Index: head/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/ChangeLog (revision 294336) @@ -1,8584 +1,8935 @@ +commit 7de4b03a6e4071d454b72927ffaf52949fa34545 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jul 1 02:32:17 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + twiddle; (this commit marks the openssh-6.9 release) + + Upstream-ID: 78500582819f61dd8adee36ec5cc9b9ac9351234 + +commit 1bf477d3cdf1a864646d59820878783d42357a1d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jul 1 02:26:31 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + better refuse ForwardX11Trusted=no connections attempted + after ForwardX11Timeout expires; reported by Jann Horn + + Upstream-ID: bf0fddadc1b46a0334e26c080038313b4b6dea21 + +commit 47aa7a0f8551b471fcae0447c1d78464f6dba869 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jul 1 01:56:13 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + put back default PermitRootLogin=no + + Upstream-ID: 7bdedd5cead99c57ed5571f3b6b7840922d5f728 + +commit 984b064fe2a23733733262f88d2e1b2a1a501662 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jul 1 01:55:13 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + openssh-6.9 + + Upstream-ID: 6cfe8e1904812531080e6ab6e752d7001b5b2d45 + +commit d921082ed670f516652eeba50705e1e9f6325346 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jul 1 01:55:00 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + reset default PermitRootLogin to 'yes' (momentarily, for + release) + + Upstream-ID: cad8513527066e65dd7a1c16363d6903e8cefa24 + +commit 66295e0e1ba860e527f191b6325d2d77dec4dbce +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Jul 1 11:49:12 2015 +1000 + + crank version numbers for release + +commit 37035c07d4f26bb1fbe000d2acf78efdb008681d +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Jul 1 10:49:37 2015 +1000 + + s/--with-ssh1/--without-ssh1/ + +commit 629df770dbadc2accfbe1c81b3f31f876d0acd84 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 30 05:25:07 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fatal() when a remote window update causes the window + value to overflow. Reported by Georg Wicherski, ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: ead397a9aceb3bf74ebfa5fcaf259d72e569f351 + +commit f715afebe735d61df3fd30ad72d9ac1c8bd3b5f2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 30 05:23:25 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix math error in remote window calculations that causes + eventual stalls for datagram channels. Reported by Georg Wicherski, ok + markus@ + + Upstream-ID: be54059d11bf64e0d85061f7257f53067842e2ab + +commit 52fb6b9b034fcfd24bf88cc7be313e9c31de9889 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue Jun 30 16:05:40 2015 +1000 + + skip IPv6-related portions on hosts without IPv6 + + with Tim Rice + +commit 512caddf590857af6aa12218461b5c0441028cf5 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jun 29 22:35:12 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add getpid to sandbox, reachable by grace_alarm_handler + + reported by Jakub Jelen; bz#2419 + + Upstream-ID: d0da1117c16d4c223954995d35b0f47c8f684cd8 + +commit 78c2a4f883ea9aba866358e2acd9793a7f42ca93 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 26 05:13:20 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix \-escaping bug that caused forward path parsing to skip + two characters and skip past the end of the string. + + Based on patch by Salvador Fandino; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 7b879dc446335677cbe4cb549495636a0535f3bd + +commit bc20205c91c9920361d12b15d253d4997dba494a +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Jun 25 09:51:39 2015 +1000 + + add missing pselect6 + + patch from Jakub Jelen + +commit 9d27fb73b4a4e5e99cb880af790d5b1ce44f720a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jun 24 23:47:23 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + correct test to sshkey_sign(); spotted by Albert S. + + Upstream-ID: 5f7347f40f0ca6abdaca2edb3bd62f4776518933 + +commit 7ed01a96a1911d8b4a9ef4f3d064e1923bfad7e3 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jun 24 01:49:19 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Revert previous commit. We still want to call setgroups + in the case where there are zero groups to remove any that we might otherwise + inherit (as pointed out by grawity at gmail.com) and since the 2nd argument + to setgroups is always a static global it's always valid to dereference in + this case. ok deraadt@ djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 895b5ac560a10befc6b82afa778641315725fd01 + +commit 882f8bf94f79528caa65b0ba71c185d705bb7195 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Jun 24 01:49:19 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Revert previous commit. We still want to call setgroups in + the case where there are zero groups to remove any that we might otherwise + inherit (as pointed out by grawity at gmail.com) and since the 2nd argument + to setgroups is always a static global it's always valid to dereference in + this case. ok deraadt@ djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 895b5ac560a10befc6b82afa778641315725fd01 + +commit 9488538a726951e82b3a4374f3c558d72c80a89b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jun 22 23:42:16 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Don't count successful partial authentication as failures + in monitor; this may have caused the monitor to refuse multiple + authentications that would otherwise have successfully completed; ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: eb74b8e506714d0f649bd5c300f762a527af04a3 + +commit 63b78d003bd8ca111a736e6cea6333da50f5f09b +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jun 22 12:29:57 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Don't call setgroups if we have zero groups; there's no + guarantee that it won't try to deref the pointer. Based on a patch from mail + at quitesimple.org, ok djm deraadt + + Upstream-ID: 2fff85e11d7a9a387ef7fddf41fbfaf566708ab1 + +commit 5c15e22c691c79a47747bcf5490126656f97cecd +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Jun 18 15:07:56 2015 +1000 + + fix syntax error + +commit 596dbca82f3f567fb3d2d69af4b4e1d3ba1e6403 +Author: jsing@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jun 15 18:44:22 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + If AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is specified, however + AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is not (or is set to "none"), authentication will + potentially fail due to key_cert_check_authority() failing to locate a + principal that matches the username, even though an authorized principal has + already been matched in the output of the subprocess. Fix this by using the + same logic to determine if pw->pw_name should be passed, as is used to + determine if a authorized principal must be matched earlier on. + + ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 43b42302ec846b0ea68aceb40677245391b9409d + +commit aff3e94c0d75d0d0fa84ea392b50ab04f8c57905 +Author: jsing@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jun 15 18:42:19 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Make the arguments to match_principals_command() similar + to match_principals_file(), by changing the last argument a struct + sshkey_cert * and dereferencing key->cert in the caller. + + No functional change. + + ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 533f99b844b21b47342b32b62e198dfffcf8651c + +commit 97e2e1596c202a4693468378b16b2353fd2d6c5e +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Jun 17 14:36:54 2015 +1000 + + trivial optimisation for seccomp-bpf + + When doing arg inspection and the syscall doesn't match, skip + past the instruction that reloads the syscall into the accumulator, + since the accumulator hasn't been modified at this point. + +commit 99f33d7304893bd9fa04d227cb6e870171cded19 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Wed Jun 17 10:50:51 2015 +1000 + + aarch64 support for seccomp-bpf sandbox + + Also resort and tidy syscall list. Based on patches by Jakub Jelen + bz#2361; ok dtucker@ + +commit 4ef702e1244633c1025ec7cfe044b9ab267097bf +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Jun 15 01:32:50 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + return failure on RSA signature error; reported by Albert S + + Upstream-ID: e61bb93dbe0349625807b0810bc213a6822121fa + +commit a170f22baf18af0b1acf2788b8b715605f41a1f9 +Author: Tim Rice +Date: Tue Jun 9 22:41:13 2015 -0700 + + Fix t12 rules for out of tree builds. + +commit ec04dc4a5515c913121bc04ed261857e68fa5c18 +Author: millert@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 5 15:13:13 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + For "ssh -L 12345:/tmp/sock" don't fail with "No forward host + name." (we have a path, not a host name). Based on a diff from Jared + Yanovich. OK djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 2846b0a8c7de037e33657f95afbd282837fc213f + +commit 732d61f417a6aea0aa5308b59cb0f563bcd6edd6 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Jun 5 03:44:14 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + typo: accidental repetition; bz#2386 + + Upstream-ID: 45e620d99f6bc301e5949d34a54027374991c88b + +commit adfb24c69d1b6f5e758db200866c711e25a2ba73 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Jun 5 14:51:40 2015 +1000 + + Add Linux powerpc64le and powerpcle entries. + + Stopgap to resolve bz#2409 because we are so close to release and will + update config.guess and friends shortly after the release. ok djm@ + +commit a1195a0fdc9eddddb04d3e9e44c4775431cb77da +Merge: 6397eed d2480bc +Author: Tim Rice +Date: Wed Jun 3 21:43:13 2015 -0700 + + Merge branch 'master' of git.mindrot.org:/var/git/openssh + +commit 6397eedf953b2b973d2d7cbb504ab501a07f8ddc +Author: Tim Rice +Date: Wed Jun 3 21:41:11 2015 -0700 + + Remove unneeded backslashes. Patch from Ángel González + +commit d2480bcac1caf31b03068de877a47d6e1027bf6d +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Jun 4 14:10:55 2015 +1000 + + Remove redundant include of stdarg.h. bz#2410 + +commit 5e67859a623826ccdf2df284cbb37e2d8e2787eb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Jun 2 09:10:40 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + mention CheckHostIP adding addresses to known_hosts; + bz#1993; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: fd44b68440fd0dc29abf9f2d3f703d74a2396cb7 + +commit d7a58bbac6583e33fd5eca8e2c2cc70c57617818 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Jun 2 20:15:26 2015 +1000 + + Replace strcpy with strlcpy. + + ok djm, sanity check by Corinna Vinschen. + +commit 51a1c2115265c6e80ede8a5c9dccada9aeed7143 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri May 29 18:27:21 2015 +1000 + + skip, rather than fatal when run without SUDO set + +commit 599f01142a376645b15cbc9349d7e8975e1cf245 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri May 29 18:03:15 2015 +1000 + + fix merge botch that left ",," in KEX algs + +commit 0c2a81dfc21822f2423edd30751e5ec53467b347 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri May 29 17:08:28 2015 +1000 + + re-enable SSH protocol 1 at compile time + +commit db438f9285d64282d3ac9e8c0944f59f037c0151 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 29 03:05:13 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + make this work without SUDO set; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-Regress-ID: bca88217b70bce2fe52b23b8e06bdeb82d98c715 + +commit 1d9a2e2849c9864fe75daabf433436341c968e14 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu May 28 07:37:31 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + wrap all moduli-related code in #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL. + based on patch from Reuben Hawkins; bz#2388 feedback and ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: d80cfc8be3e6ec65b3fac9e87c4466533b31b7cf + +commit 496aeb25bc2d6c434171292e4714771b594bd00e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu May 28 05:41:29 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Increase the allowed length of the known host file name + in the log message to be consistent with other cases. Part of bz#1993, ok + deraadt. + + Upstream-ID: a9e97567be49f25daf286721450968251ff78397 + +commit dd2cfeb586c646ff8d70eb93567b2e559ace5b14 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu May 28 05:09:45 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix typo (keywork->keyword) + + Upstream-ID: 8aacd0f4089c0a244cf43417f4f9045dfaeab534 + +commit 9cc6842493fbf23025ccc1edab064869640d3bec +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu May 28 04:50:53 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add error message on ftruncate failure; bz#2176 + + Upstream-ID: cbcc606e0b748520c74a210d8f3cc9718d3148cf + +commit d1958793a0072c22be26d136dbda5ae263e717a0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu May 28 04:40:13 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + make ssh-keygen default to ed25519 keys when compiled + without OpenSSL; bz#2388, ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 85a471fa6d3fa57a7b8e882d22cfbfc1d84cdc71 + +commit 3ecde664c9fc5fb3667aedf9e6671462600f6496 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 27 23:51:10 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Reorder client proposal to prefer + diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 over diffie-hellman-group14-sha1. ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 552c08d47347c3ee1a9a57d88441ab50abe17058 + +commit 40f64292b907afd0a674fdbf3e4c2356d17a7d68 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 27 23:39:18 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add a stronger (4k bit) fallback group that sshd can use + when the moduli file is missing or broken, sourced from RFC3526. bz#2302, ok + markus@ (earlier version), djm@ + + Upstream-ID: b635215746a25a829d117673d5e5a76d4baee7f4 + +commit 5ab7d5fa03ad55bc438fab45dfb3aeb30a3c237a +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu May 28 10:03:40 2015 +1000 + + New moduli file from OpenBSD, removing 1k groups. + + Remove 1k bit groups. ok deraadt@, markus@ + +commit a71ba58adf34e599f30cdda6e9b93ae6e3937eea +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 27 05:15:02 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + support PKCS#11 devices with external PIN entry devices + bz#2240, based on patch from Dirk-Willem van Gulik; feedback and ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 504568992b55a8fc984375242b1bd505ced61b0d + +commit b282fec1aa05246ed3482270eb70fc3ec5f39a00 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 26 23:23:40 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Cap DH-GEX group size at 4kbits for Cisco implementations. + Some of them will choke when asked for preferred sizes >4k instead of + returning the 4k group that they do have. bz#2209, ok djm@ + + Upstream-ID: 54b863a19713446b7431f9d06ad0532b4fcfef8d + +commit 3e91b4e8b0dc2b4b7e7d42cf6e8994a32e4cb55e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Sun May 24 23:39:16 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add missing 'c' option to getopt(), case statement was + already there; from Felix Bolte + + Upstream-ID: 9b19b4e2e0b54d6fefa0dfac707c51cf4bae3081 + +commit 64a89ec07660abba4d0da7c0095b7371c98bab62 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Sat May 23 14:28:37 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix a memory leak in an error path ok markus@ dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: bc1da0f205494944918533d8780fde65dff6c598 + +commit f948737449257d2cb83ffcfe7275eb79b677fd4a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 22 05:28:45 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + mention ssh-keygen -E for comparing legacy MD5 + fingerprints; bz#2332 + + Upstream-ID: 079a3669549041dbf10dbc072d9563f0dc3b2859 + +commit 0882332616e4f0272c31cc47bf2018f9cb258a4e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 22 04:45:52 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Reorder EscapeChar option parsing to avoid a single-byte + out- of-bounds read. bz#2396 from Jaak Ristioja; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 1dc6b5b63d1c8d9a88619da0b27ade461d79b060 + +commit d7c31da4d42c115843edee2074d7d501f8804420 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 22 03:50:02 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add knob to relax GSSAPI host credential check for + multihomed hosts bz#928, patch by Simon Wilkinson; ok dtucker + (kerberos/GSSAPI is not compiled by default on OpenBSD) + + Upstream-ID: 15ddf1c6f7fd9d98eea9962f480079ae3637285d + +commit aa72196a00be6e0b666215edcffbc10af234cb0e +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri May 22 17:49:46 2015 +1000 + + Include signal.h for sig_atomic_t, used by kex.h. + + bz#2402, from tomas.kuthan at oracle com. + +commit 8b02481143d75e91c49d1bfae0876ac1fbf9511a +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri May 22 12:47:24 2015 +1000 + + Import updated moduli file from OpenBSD. + +commit 4739e8d5e1c0be49624082bd9f6b077e9e758db9 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu May 21 12:01:19 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Support "ssh-keygen -lF hostname" to find search known_hosts + and print key hashes. Already advertised by ssh-keygen(1), but not delivered + by code; ok dtucker@ + + Upstream-ID: 459e0e2bf39825e41b0811c336db2d56a1c23387 + +commit e97201feca10b5196da35819ae516d0b87cf3a50 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu May 21 17:55:15 2015 +1000 + + conditionalise util.h inclusion + +commit 13640798c7dd011ece0a7d02841fe48e94cfa0e0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu May 21 06:44:25 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + regress test for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand + + Upstream-Regress-ID: c658fbf1ab6b6011dc83b73402322e396f1e1219 + +commit 84452c5d03c21f9bfb28c234e0dc1dc67dd817b1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu May 21 06:40:02 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + regress test for AuthorizedKeysCommand arguments + + Upstream-Regress-ID: bbd65c13c6b3be9a442ec115800bff9625898f12 + +commit bcc50d816187fa9a03907ac1f3a52f04a52e10d1 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu May 21 06:43:30 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand that allows getting + authorized_principals from a subprocess rather than a file, which is quite + useful in deployments with large userbases + + feedback and ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: aa1bdac7b16fc6d2fa3524ef08f04c7258d247f6 + +commit 24232a3e5ab467678a86aa67968bbb915caffed4 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu May 21 06:38:35 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + support arguments to AuthorizedKeysCommand + + bz#2081 loosely based on patch by Sami Hartikainen + feedback and ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: b080387a14aa67dddd8ece67c00f268d626541f7 + +commit d80fbe41a57c72420c87a628444da16d09d66ca7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu May 21 04:55:51 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + refactor: split base64 encoding of pubkey into its own + sshkey_to_base64() function and out of sshkey_write(); ok markus@ + + Upstream-ID: 54fc38f5832e9b91028900819bda46c3959a0c1a + +commit 7cc44ef74133a473734bbcbd3484f24d6a7328c5 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 18 15:06:05 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + getentropy() and sendsyslog() have been around long + enough. openssh-portable may want the #ifdef's but not base. discussed with + djm few weeks back + + Upstream-ID: 0506a4334de108e3fb6c66f8d6e0f9c112866926 + +commit 9173d0fbe44de7ebcad8a15618e13a8b8d78902e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 15 05:44:21 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Use a salted hash of the lock passphrase instead of plain + text and do constant-time comparisons of it. Should prevent leaking any + information about it via timing, pointed out by Ryan Castellucci. Add a 0.1s + incrementing delay for each failed unlock attempt up to 10s. ok markus@ + (earlier version), djm@ + + Upstream-ID: c599fcc325aa1cc65496b25220b622d22208c85f + +commit d028d5d3a697c71b21e4066d8672cacab3caa0a8 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue May 5 19:10:58 2015 +1000 + + upstream commit + + - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2015/01/12 03:20:04 + [bcrypt_pbkdf.c] + rename blocks to words. bcrypt "blocks" are unrelated to blowfish blocks, + nor are they the same size. + +commit f6391d4e59b058984163ab28f4e317e7a72478f1 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue May 5 19:10:23 2015 +1000 + + upstream commit + + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2015/01/08 00:30:07 + [bcrypt_pbkdf.c] + declare a local version of MIN(), call it MINIMUM() + +commit 8ac6b13cc9113eb47cd9e86c97d7b26b4b71b77f +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Tue May 5 19:09:46 2015 +1000 + + upstream commit + + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/12/30 01:41:43 + [bcrypt_pbkdf.c] + typo in comment: ouput => output + +commit 1f792489d5cf86a4f4e3003e6e9177654033f0f2 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 4 06:10:48 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Remove pattern length argument from match_pattern_list(), we + only ever use it for strlen(pattern). + + Prompted by hanno AT hboeck.de pointing an out-of-bound read + error caused by an incorrect pattern length found using AFL + and his own tools. + + ok markus@ + +commit 639d6bc57b1942393ed12fb48f00bc05d4e093e4 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 1 07:10:01 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + refactor ssh_dispatch_run_fatal() to use sshpkt_fatal() + to better report error conditions. Teach sshpkt_fatal() about ECONNRESET. + + Improves error messages on TCP connection resets. bz#2257 + + ok dtucker@ + +commit 9559d7de34c572d4d3fd990ca211f8ec99f62c4d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 1 07:08:08 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + a couple of parse targets were missing activep checks, + causing them to be misapplied in match context; bz#2272 diagnosis and + original patch from Sami Hartikainen ok dtucker@ + +commit 7e8528cad04b2775c3b7db08abf8fb42e47e6b2a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 1 04:17:51 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + make handling of AuthorizedPrincipalsFile=none more + consistent with other =none options; bz#2288 from Jakub Jelen; ok dtucker@ + +commit ca430d4d9cc0f62eca3b1fb1e2928395b7ce80f7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 1 04:03:20 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + remove failed remote forwards established by muliplexing + from the list of active forwards; bz#2363, patch mostly by Yoann Ricordel; ok + dtucker@ + +commit 8312cfb8ad88657517b3e23ac8c56c8e38eb9792 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 1 04:01:58 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + reduce stderr spam when using ssh -S /path/mux -O forward + -R 0:... ok dtucker@ + +commit 179be0f5e62f1f492462571944e45a3da660d82b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 1 03:23:51 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + prevent authorized_keys options picked up on public key + tests without a corresponding private key authentication being applied to + other authentication methods. Reported by halex@, ok markus@ + +commit a42d67be65b719a430b7fcaba2a4e4118382723a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 1 03:20:54 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Don't make parsing of authorized_keys' environment= + option conditional on PermitUserEnv - always parse it, but only use the + result if the option is enabled. This prevents the syntax of authorized_keys + changing depending on which sshd_config options were enabled. + + bz#2329; based on patch from coladict AT gmail.com, ok dtucker@ + +commit e661a86353e11592c7ed6a847e19a83609f49e77 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 4 06:10:48 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Remove pattern length argument from match_pattern_list(), we + only ever use it for strlen(pattern). + + Prompted by hanno AT hboeck.de pointing an out-of-bound read + error caused by an incorrect pattern length found using AFL + and his own tools. + + ok markus@ + +commit 0ef1de742be2ee4b10381193fe90730925b7f027 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Apr 23 05:01:19 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add a simple regression test for sshd's configuration + parser. Right now, all it does is run the output of sshd -T back through + itself and ensure the output is valid and invariant. + +commit 368f83c793275faa2c52f60eaa9bdac155c4254b +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Apr 22 01:38:36 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + use correct key for nested certificate test + +commit 8d4d1bfddbbd7d21f545dc6997081d1ea1fbc99a +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 1 07:11:47 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + mention that the user's shell from /etc/passwd is used + for commands too; bz#1459 ok dtucker@ + +commit 5ab283d0016bbc9d4d71e8e5284d011bc5a930cf +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 8 07:29:00 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + whitespace + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 6b708a3e709d5b7fd37890f874bafdff1f597519 + +commit 8377d5008ad260048192e1e56ad7d15a56d103dd +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 8 07:26:13 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + whitespace at EOL + + Upstream-Regress-ID: 9c48911643d5b05173b36a012041bed4080b8554 + +commit c28a3436fa8737709ea88e4437f8f23a6ab50359 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 8 06:45:13 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + moar whitespace at eol + + Upstream-ID: 64eaf872a3ba52ed41e494287e80d40aaba4b515 + +commit 2b64c490468fd4ca35ac8d5cc31c0520dc1508bb +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 8 06:41:56 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + whitespace at EOL + + Upstream-ID: 57bcf67d666c6fc1ad798aee448fdc3f70f7ec2c + +commit 4e636cf201ce6e7e3b9088568218f9d4e2c51712 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 8 03:56:51 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + whitespace at EOL + +commit 38b8272f823dc1dd4e29dbcee83943ed48bb12fa +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon May 4 01:47:53 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Use diff w/out -u for better portability + +commit 297060f42d5189a4065ea1b6f0afdf6371fb0507 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 8 03:25:07 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Use xcalloc for permitted_adm_opens instead of xmalloc to + ensure it's zeroed. Fixes post-auth crash with permitopen=none. bz#2355, ok + djm@ + +commit 63ebf019be863b2d90492a85e248cf55a6e87403 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri May 8 03:17:49 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + don't choke on new-format private keys encrypted with an + AEAD cipher; bz#2366, patch from Ron Frederick; ok markus@ + +commit f8484dac678ab3098ae522a5f03bb2530f822987 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 6 05:45:17 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Clarify pseudo-terminal request behaviour and use + "pseudo-terminal" consistently. bz#1716, ok jmc@ "I like it" deraadt@. + +commit ea139507bef8bad26e86ed99a42c7233ad115c38 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed May 6 04:07:18 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Blacklist DH-GEX for specific PuTTY versions known to + send non-RFC4419 DH-GEX messages rather than all versions of PuTTY. + According to Simon Tatham, 0.65 and newer versions will send RFC4419 DH-GEX + messages. ok djm@ + +commit b58234f00ee3872eb84f6e9e572a9a34e902e36e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 5 10:17:49 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + WinSCP doesn't implement RFC4419 DH-GEX so flag it so we + don't offer that KEX method. ok markus@ + +commit d5b1507a207253b39e810e91e68f9598691b7a29 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Tue May 5 02:48:17 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + use the sizeof the struct not the sizeof a pointer to the + struct in ssh_digest_start() + + This file is only used if ssh is built with OPENSSL=no + + ok markus@ + +commit a647b9b8e616c231594b2710c925d31b1b8afea3 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri May 8 11:07:27 2015 +1000 + + Put brackets around mblen() compat constant. + + This might help with the reported problem cross compiling for Android + ("error: expected identifier or '(' before numeric constant") but + shouldn't hurt in any case. + +commit d1680d36e17244d9af3843aeb5025cb8e40d6c07 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Thu Apr 30 09:18:11 2015 +1000 + + xrealloc -> xreallocarray in portable code too. + +commit 531a57a3893f9fcd4aaaba8c312b612bbbcc021e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Apr 29 03:48:56 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Allow ListenAddress, Port and AddressFamily in any + order. bz#68, ok djm@, jmc@ (for the man page bit). + +commit c1d5bcf1aaf1209af02f79e48ba1cbc76a87b56f +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Apr 28 13:47:38 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + enviroment -> environment: apologies to darren for not + spotting that first time round... + +commit 43beea053db191cac47c2cd8d3dc1930158aff1a +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Apr 28 10:25:15 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Fix typo in previous + +commit 85b96ef41374f3ddc9139581f87da09b2cd9199e +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Apr 28 10:17:58 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Document that the TERM environment variable is not + subject to SendEnv and AcceptEnv. bz#2386, based loosely on a patch from + jjelen at redhat, help and ok jmc@ + +commit 88a7c598a94ff53f76df228eeaae238d2d467565 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Apr 27 21:42:48 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Make sshd default to PermitRootLogin=no; ok deraadt@ + rpe@ + +commit 734226b4480a6c736096c729fcf6f391400599c7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Apr 27 01:52:30 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix compilation with OPENSSL=no; ok dtucker@ + +commit a4b9d2ce1eb7703eaf0809b0c8a82ded8aa4f1c6 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Apr 27 00:37:53 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Include stdio.h for FILE (used in sshkey.h) so it + compiles with OPENSSL=no. + +commit dbcc652f4ca11fe04e5930c7ef18a219318c6cda +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Apr 27 00:21:21 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + allow "sshd -f none" to skip reading the config file, + much like "ssh -F none" does. ok dtucker + +commit b7ca276fca316c952f0b90f5adb1448c8481eedc +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 24 06:26:49 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + combine -Dd onto one line and update usage(); + +commit 2ea974630d7017e4c7666d14d9dc939707613e96 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 24 05:26:44 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add ssh-agent -D to leave ssh-agent in foreground + without enabling debug mode; bz#2381 ok dtucker@ + +commit 8ac2ffd7aa06042f6b924c87139f2fea5c5682f7 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 24 01:36:24 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + 2*len -> use xreallocarray() ok djm + +commit 657a5fbc0d0aff309079ff8fb386f17e964963c2 +Author: deraadt@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 24 01:36:00 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + rename xrealloc() to xreallocarray() since it follows + that form. ok djm + +commit 1108ae242fdd2c304307b68ddf46aebe43ebffaa +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Apr 23 04:59:10 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Two small fixes for sshd -T: ListenAddress'es are added + to a list head so reverse the order when printing them to ensure the + behaviour remains the same, and print StreamLocalBindMask as octal with + leading zero. ok deraadt@ + +commit bd902b8473e1168f19378d5d0ae68d0c203525df +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Apr 23 04:53:53 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Check for and reject missing arguments for + VersionAddendum and ForceCommand. bz#2281, patch from plautrba at redhat com, + ok djm@ + +commit ca42c1758575e592239de1d5755140e054b91a0d +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Apr 22 01:24:01 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + unknown certificate extensions are non-fatal, so don't + fatal when they are encountered; bz#2387 reported by Bob Van Zant; ok + dtucker@ + +commit 39bfbf7caad231cc4bda6909fb1af0705bca04d8 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Apr 21 07:01:00 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add back a backslash removed in rev 1.42 so + KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT will include aes again. + + ok deraadt@ + +commit 6b0d576bb87eca3efd2b309fcfe4edfefc289f9c +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 17 13:32:09 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + s/recommended/required/ that private keys be og-r this + wording change was made a while ago but got accidentally reverted + +commit 44a8e7ce6f3ab4c2eb1ae49115c210b98e53c4df +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 17 13:25:52 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + don't try to cleanup NULL KEX proposals in + kex_prop_free(); found by Jukka Taimisto and Markus Hietava + +commit 3038a191872d2882052306098c1810d14835e704 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 17 13:19:22 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + use error/logit/fatal instead of fprintf(stderr, ...) + and exit(0), fix a few errors that were being printed to stdout instead of + stderr and a few non-errors that were going to stderr instead of stdout + bz#2325; ok dtucker + +commit a58be33cb6cd24441fa7e634db0e5babdd56f07f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 17 13:16:48 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + debug log missing DISPLAY environment when X11 + forwarding requested; bz#1682 ok dtucker@ + +commit 17d4d9d9fbc8fb80e322f94d95eecc604588a474 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 17 04:32:31 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + don't call record_login() in monitor when UseLogin is + enabled; bz#278 reported by drk AT sgi.com; ok dtucker + +commit 40132ff87b6cbc3dc05fb5df2e9d8e3afa06aafd +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 17 04:12:35 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Add some missing options to sshd -T and fix the output + of VersionAddendum HostCertificate. bz#2346, patch from jjelen at redhat + com, ok djm. + +commit 6cc7cfa936afde2d829e56ee6528c7ea47a42441 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Apr 16 23:25:50 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Document "none" for PidFile XAuthLocation + TrustedUserCAKeys and RevokedKeys. bz#2382, feedback from jmc@, ok djm@ + +commit 15fdfc9b1c6808b26bc54d4d61a38b54541763ed +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Apr 15 23:23:25 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Plug leak of address passed to logging. bz#2373, patch + from jjelen at redhat, ok markus@ + +commit bb2289e2a47d465eaaaeff3dee2a6b7777b4c291 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Apr 14 04:17:03 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Output remote username in debug output since with Host + and Match it's not always obvious what it will be. bz#2368, ok djm@ + +commit 70860b6d07461906730632f9758ff1b7c98c695a +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 17 10:56:13 2015 +1000 + + Format UsePAM setting when using sshd -T. + + Part of bz#2346, patch from jjelen at redhat com. + +commit ee15d9c9f0720f5a8b0b34e4b10ecf21f9824814 +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 17 10:40:23 2015 +1000 + + Wrap endian.h include inside ifdef (bz#2370). + +commit 408f4c2ad4a4c41baa7b9b2b7423d875abbfa70b +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Fri Apr 17 09:39:58 2015 +1000 + + Look for '${host}-ar' before 'ar'. + + This changes configure.ac to look for '${host}-ar' as set by + AC_CANONICAL_HOST before looking for the unprefixed 'ar'. + Useful when cross-compiling when all your binutils are prefixed. + + Patch from moben at exherbo org via astrand at lysator liu se and + bz#2352. + +commit 673a1c16ad078d41558247ce739fe812c960acc8 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Apr 16 11:40:20 2015 +1000 + + remove dependency on arpa/telnet.h + +commit 202d443eeda1829d336595a3cfc07827e49f45ed +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Wed Apr 15 15:59:49 2015 +1000 + + Remove duplicate include of pwd.h. bz#2337, patch from Mordy Ovits. + +commit 597986493412c499f2bc2209420cb195f97b3668 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Thu Apr 9 10:14:48 2015 +1000 + + platform's with openpty don't need pty_release + +commit 318be28cda1fd9108f2e6f2f86b0b7589ba2aed0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Apr 13 02:04:08 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + deprecate ancient, pre-RFC4419 and undocumented + SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD message; ok markus@ deraadt@ "seems + reasonable" dtucker@ + +commit d8f391caef62378463a0e6b36f940170dadfe605 +Author: dtucker@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 10 05:16:50 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Don't send hostkey advertisments + (hostkeys-00@openssh.com) to current versions of Tera Term as they can't + handle them. Newer versions should be OK. Patch from Bryan Drewery and + IWAMOTO Kouichi, ok djm@ + +commit 2c2cfe1a1c97eb9a08cc9817fd0678209680c636 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 10 00:08:55 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + include port number if a non-default one has been + specified; based on patch from Michael Handler + +commit 4492a4f222da4cf1e8eab12689196322e27b08c4 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Apr 7 23:00:42 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + treat Protocol=1,2|2,1 as Protocol=2 when compiled + without SSH1 support; ok dtucker@ millert@ + +commit c265e2e6e932efc6d86f6cc885dea33637a67564 +Author: miod@openbsd.org +Date: Sun Apr 5 15:43:43 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Do not use int for sig_atomic_t; spotted by + christos@netbsd; ok markus@ + +commit e7bf3a5eda6a1b02bef6096fed78527ee11e54cc +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Apr 7 10:48:04 2015 +1000 + + Use do{}while(0) for no-op functions. + + From FreeBSD. + +commit bb99844abae2b6447272f79e7fa84134802eb4df +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Apr 7 10:47:15 2015 +1000 + + Wrap blf.h include in ifdef. From FreeBSD. + +commit d9b9b43656091cf0ad55c122f08fadb07dad0abd +Author: Darren Tucker +Date: Tue Apr 7 09:10:00 2015 +1000 + + Fix misspellings of regress CONFOPTS env variables. + + Patch from Bryan Drewery. + +commit 3f4ea3c9ab1d32d43c9222c4351f58ca11144156 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Fri Apr 3 22:17:27 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + correct return value in pubkey parsing, spotted by Ben Hawkes + ok markus@ + +commit 7da2be0cb9601ed25460c83aa4d44052b967ba0f +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 31 22:59:01 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + adapt to recent hostfile.c change: when parsing + known_hosts without fully parsing the keys therein, hostkeys_foreach() will + now correctly identify KEY_RSA1 keys; ok markus@ miod@ + +commit 9e1777a0d1c706714b055811c12ab8cc21033e4a +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 24 20:19:15 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + use ${SSH} for -Q instead of installed ssh + +commit ce1b358ea414a2cc88e4430cd5a2ea7fecd9de57 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Mar 16 22:46:14 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + make CLEANFILES clean up more of the tests' droppings + +commit 398f9ef192d820b67beba01ec234d66faca65775 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 31 22:57:06 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + downgrade error() for known_hosts parse errors to debug() + to quiet warnings from ssh1 keys present when compiled !ssh1. + + also identify ssh1 keys when scanning, even when compiled !ssh1 + + ok markus@ miod@ + +commit 9a47ab80030a31f2d122b8fd95bd48c408b9fcd9 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 31 22:55:50 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fd leak for !ssh1 case; found by unittests; ok markus@ + +commit c9a0805a6280681901c270755a7cd630d7c5280e +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 31 22:55:24 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + don't fatal when a !ssh1 sshd is reexeced from a w/ssh1 + listener; reported by miod@; ok miod@ markus@ + +commit 704d8c88988cae38fb755a6243b119731d223222 +Author: tobias@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 31 11:06:49 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Comments are only supported for RSA1 keys. If a user + tried to add one and entered his passphrase, explicitly clear it before exit. + This is done in all other error paths, too. + + ok djm + +commit 78de1673c05ea2c33e0d4a4b64ecb5186b6ea2e9 +Author: jmc@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Mar 30 18:28:37 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + ssh-askpass(1) is the default, overridden by SSH_ASKPASS; + diff originally from jiri b; + +commit 26e0bcf766fadb4a44fb6199386fb1dcab65ad00 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Mar 30 00:00:29 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix uninitialised memory read when parsing a config file + consisting of a single nul byte. Found by hanno AT hboeck.de using AFL; ok + dtucker + +commit fecede00a76fbb33a349f5121c0b2f9fbc04a777 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Mar 26 19:32:19 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + sigp and lenp are not optional in ssh_agent_sign(); ok + djm@ + +commit 1b0ef3813244c78669e6d4d54c624f600945327d +Author: naddy@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Mar 26 12:32:38 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + don't try to load .ssh/identity by default if SSH1 is + disabled; ok markus@ + +commit f9b78852379b74a2d14e6fc94fe52af30b7e9c31 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Mar 26 07:00:04 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + ban all-zero curve25519 keys as recommended by latest + CFRG curves draft; ok markus + +commit b8afbe2c1aaf573565e4da775261dfafc8b1ba9c +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Thu Mar 26 06:59:28 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + relax bits needed check to allow + diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 key exchange to complete for chacha20-poly1305 was + selected as symmetric cipher; ok markus + +commit 47842f71e31da130555353c1d57a1e5a8937f1c0 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 25 19:29:58 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + ignore v1 errors on ssh-add -D; only try v2 keys on + -l/-L (unless WITH_SSH1) ok djm@ + +commit 5f57e77f91bf2230c09eca96eb5ecec39e5f2da6 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 25 19:21:48 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + unbreak ssh_agent_sign (lenp vs *lenp) + +commit 4daeb67181054f2a377677fac919ee8f9ed3490e +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 24 20:10:08 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + don't leak 'setp' on error; noted by Nicholas Lemonias; + ok djm@ + +commit 7d4f96f9de2a18af0d9fa75ea89a4990de0344f5 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 24 20:09:11 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + consistent check for NULL as noted by Nicholas + Lemonias; ok djm@ + +commit df100be51354e447d9345cf1ec22e6013c0eed50 +Author: markus@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 24 20:03:44 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + correct fmt-string for size_t as noted by Nicholas + Lemonias; ok djm@ + +commit a22b9ef21285e81775732436f7c84a27bd3f71e0 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 24 09:17:21 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + promote chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com to be the default + cipher; ok markus + +commit 2aa9da1a3b360cf7b13e96fe1521534b91501fb5 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 24 01:29:19 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + Compile-time disable SSH protocol 1. You can turn it + back on using the Makefile.inc knob if you need it to talk to ancient + devices. + +commit 53097b2022154edf96b4e8526af5666f979503f7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Tue Mar 24 01:11:12 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + fix double-negative error message "ssh1 is not + unsupported" + +commit 5c27e3b6ec2db711dfcd40e6359c0bcdd0b62ea9 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Mar 23 06:06:38 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + for ssh-keygen -A, don't try (and fail) to generate ssh + v.1 keys when compiled without SSH1 support RSA/DSA/ECDSA keys when compiled + without OpenSSL based on patch by Mike Frysinger; bz#2369 + +commit 725fd22a8c41db7de73a638539a5157b7e4424ae +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 18 01:44:21 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + KRL support doesn't need OpenSSL anymore, remove #ifdefs + from around call + +commit b07011c18e0b2e172c5fd09d21fb159a0bf5fcc7 +Author: djm@openbsd.org +Date: Mon Mar 16 11:09:52 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + #if 0 some more arrays used only for decrypting (we don't + use since we only need encrypt for AES-CTR) + +commit 1cb3016635898d287e9d58b50c430995652d5358 +Author: jsg@openbsd.org +Date: Wed Mar 11 00:48:39 2015 +0000 + + upstream commit + + add back the changes from rev 1.206, djm reverted this by + mistake in rev 1.207 + +commit 4d24b3b6a4a6383e05e7da26d183b79fa8663697 +Author: Damien Miller +Date: Fri Mar 20 09:11:59 2015 +1100 + + remove error() accidentally inserted for debugging + + pointed out by Christian Hesse + commit 9f82e5a9042f2d872e98f48a876fcab3e25dd9bb Author: Tim Rice Date: Mon Mar 16 22:49:20 2015 -0700 portability fix: Solaris systems may not have a grep that understands -q commit 8ef691f7d9ef500257a549d0906d78187490668f Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Mar 11 10:35:26 2015 +1100 fix compile with clang commit 4df590cf8dc799e8986268d62019b487a8ed63ad Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Mar 11 10:02:39 2015 +1100 make unit tests work for !OPENSSH_HAS_ECC commit 307bb40277ca2c32e97e61d70d1ed74b571fd6ba Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Mar 7 04:41:48 2015 +0000 upstream commit unbreak for w/SSH1 (default) case; ok markus@ deraadt@ commit b44ee0c998fb4c5f3c3281f2398af5ce42840b6f Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Mar 5 18:39:20 2015 -0800 unbreak hostkeys test for w/ SSH1 case commit 55e5bdeb519cb60cc18b7ba0545be581fb8598b4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Mar 6 01:40:56 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix sshkey_certify() return value for unsupported key types; ok markus@ deraadt@ commit be8f658e550a434eac04256bfbc4289457a24e99 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Mar 4 15:38:03 2015 -0800 update version numbers to match version.h commit ac5e8acefa253eb5e5ba186e34236c0e8007afdc Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 4 23:22:35 2015 +0000 upstream commit make these work with !SSH1; ok markus@ deraadt@ commit 2f04af92f036b0c87a23efb259c37da98cd81fe6 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 4 21:12:59 2015 +0000 upstream commit make ssh-add -D work with !SSH1 agent commit a05adf95d2af6abb2b7826ddaa7a0ec0cdc1726b Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Mar 4 00:55:48 2015 -0800 netcat needs poll.h portability goop commit dad2b1892b4c1b7e58df483a8c5b983c4454e099 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 3 22:35:19 2015 +0000 upstream commit make it possible to run tests w/o ssh1 support; ok djm@ commit d48a22601bdd3eec054794c535f4ae8d8ae4c6e2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Mar 4 18:53:53 2015 +0000 upstream commit crank; ok markus, deraadt commit bbffb23daa0b002dd9f296e396a9ab8a5866b339 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Mar 3 13:50:27 2015 -0800 more --without-ssh1 fixes commit 6c2039286f503e2012a58a1d109e389016e7a99b Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Mar 3 13:48:48 2015 -0800 fix merge both that broke --without-ssh1 compile commit 111dfb225478a76f89ecbcd31e96eaf1311b59d3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 3 21:21:13 2015 +0000 upstream commit add SSH1 Makefile knob to make it easier to build without SSH1 support; ok markus@ commit 3f7f5e6c5d2aa3f6710289c1a30119e534e56c5c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 3 20:42:49 2015 +0000 upstream commit expand __unused to full __attribute__ for better portability commit 2fab9b0f8720baf990c931e3f68babb0bf9949c6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Mar 4 07:41:27 2015 +1100 avoid warning commit d1bc844322461f882b4fd2277ba9a8d4966573d2 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Mar 4 06:31:45 2015 +1100 Revert "define __unused to nothing if not already defined" This reverts commit 1598419e38afbaa8aa5df8dd6b0af98301e2c908. Some system headers have objects named __unused commit 00797e86b2d98334d1bb808f65fa1fd47f328ff1 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Mar 4 05:02:45 2015 +1100 check for crypt and DES_crypt in openssl block fixes builds on systems that use DES_crypt; based on patch from Roumen Petrov commit 1598419e38afbaa8aa5df8dd6b0af98301e2c908 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Mar 4 04:59:13 2015 +1100 define __unused to nothing if not already defined fixes builds on BSD/OS commit d608a51daad4f14ad6ab43d7cf74ef4801cc3fe9 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 3 17:53:40 2015 +0000 upstream commit reorder logic for better portability; patch from Roumen Petrov commit 68d2dfc464fbcdf8d6387884260f9801f4352393 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Mar 3 06:48:58 2015 +0000 upstream commit Allow "ssh -Q protocol-version" to list supported SSH protocol versions. Useful for detecting builds without SSH v.1 support; idea and ok markus@ commit 39e2f1229562e1195169905607bc12290d21f021 Author: millert@openbsd.org Date: Sun Mar 1 15:44:40 2015 +0000 upstream commit Make sure we only call getnameinfo() for AF_INET or AF_INET6 sockets. getpeername() of a Unix domain socket may return without error on some systems without actually setting ss_family so getnameinfo() was getting called with ss_family set to AF_UNSPEC. OK djm@ commit e47536ba9692d271b8ad89078abdecf0a1c11707 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Feb 28 08:20:11 2015 -0800 portability fixes for regress/netcat.c Mostly avoiding "err(1, NULL)" commit 02973ad5f6f49d8420e50a392331432b0396c100 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Feb 28 08:05:27 2015 -0800 twiddle another test for portability from Tom G. Christensen commit f7f3116abf2a6e2f309ab096b08c58d19613e5d0 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Feb 27 15:52:49 2015 -0800 twiddle test for portability commit 1ad3a77cc9d5568f5437ff99d377aa7a41859b83 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Feb 26 20:33:22 2015 -0800 make regress/netcat.c fd passing (more) portable commit 9e1cfca7e1fe9cf8edb634fc894e43993e4da1ea Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Feb 26 20:32:58 2015 -0800 create OBJ/valgrind-out before running unittests commit bd58853102cee739f0e115e6d4b5334332ab1442 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Feb 25 16:58:22 2015 -0800 valgrind support commit f43d17269194761eded9e89f17456332f4c83824 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Feb 26 20:45:47 2015 +0000 upstream commit don't printf NULL key comments; reported by Tom Christensen commit 6e6458b476ec854db33e3e68ebf4f489d0ab3df8 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Feb 25 23:05:47 2015 +0000 upstream commit zero cmsgbuf before use; we initialise the bits we use but valgrind still spams warning on it commit a63cfa26864b93ab6afefad0b630e5358ed8edfa Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Feb 25 19:54:02 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix small memory leak when UpdateHostkeys=no commit e6b950341dd75baa8526f1862bca39e52f5b879b Author: Tim Rice Date: Wed Feb 25 09:56:48 2015 -0800 Revert "Work around finicky USL linker so netcat will build." This reverts commit d1db656021d0cd8c001a6692f772f1de29b67c8b. No longer needed with commit 678e473e2af2e4802f24dd913985864d9ead7fb3 commit 6f621603f9cff2a5d6016a404c96cb2f8ac2dec0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Feb 25 17:29:38 2015 +0000 upstream commit don't leak validity of user in "too many authentication failures" disconnect message; reported by Sebastian Reitenbach commit 6288e3a935494df12519164f52ca5c8c65fc3ca5 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Tue Feb 24 15:24:05 2015 +0000 upstream commit add -v (show ASCII art) to -l's synopsis; ok djm@ commit 678e473e2af2e4802f24dd913985864d9ead7fb3 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 26 04:12:58 2015 +1100 Remove dependency on xmalloc. Remove ssh_get_progname's dependency on xmalloc, which should reduce link order problems. ok djm@ commit 5d5ec165c5b614b03678afdad881f10e25832e46 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Feb 25 15:32:49 2015 +1100 Restrict ECDSA and ECDH tests. ifdef out some more ECDSA and ECDH tests when built against an OpenSSL that does not have eliptic curve functionality. commit 1734e276d99b17e92d4233fac7aef3a3180aaca7 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Feb 25 13:40:45 2015 +1100 Move definition of _NSIG. _NSIG is only unsed in one file, so move it there prevent redefinition warnings reported by Kevin Brott. commit a47ead7c95cfbeb72721066c4da2312e5b1b9f3d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Feb 25 13:17:40 2015 +1100 Add includes.h for compatibility stuff. commit 38806bda6d2e48ad32812b461eebe17672ada771 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 24 16:50:06 2015 -0800 include netdb.h to look for MAXHOSTNAMELEN; ok tim commit d1db656021d0cd8c001a6692f772f1de29b67c8b Author: Tim Rice Date: Tue Feb 24 10:42:08 2015 -0800 Work around finicky USL linker so netcat will build. commit cb030ce25f555737e8ba97bdd7883ac43f3ff2a3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 24 09:23:04 2015 -0800 include includes.h to avoid build failure on AIX commit 13af342458f5064144abbb07e5ac9bbd4eb42567 Author: Tim Rice Date: Tue Feb 24 07:56:47 2015 -0800 Original portability patch from djm@ for platforms missing err.h. Fix name space clash on Solaris 10. Still more to do for Solaris 10 to deal with msghdr structure differences. ok djm@ commit 910209203d0cd60c5083901cbcc0b7b44d9f48d2 Author: Tim Rice Date: Mon Feb 23 22:06:56 2015 -0800 cleaner way fix dispatch.h portion of commit a88dd1da119052870bb2654c1a32c51971eade16 (some systems have sig_atomic_t in signal.h, some in sys/signal.h) Sounds good to me djm@ commit 676c38d7cbe65b76bbfff796861bb6615cc6a596 Author: Tim Rice Date: Mon Feb 23 21:51:33 2015 -0800 portability fix: if we can't dind a better define for HOST_NAME_MAX, use 255 commit 1221b22023dce38cbc90ba77eae4c5d78c77a5e6 Author: Tim Rice Date: Mon Feb 23 21:50:34 2015 -0800 portablity fix: s/__inline__/inline/ commit 4c356308a88d309c796325bb75dce90ca16591d5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Feb 24 13:49:31 2015 +1100 Wrap stdint.h includes in HAVE_STDINT_H. commit c9c88355c6a27a908e7d1e5003a2b35ea99c1614 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Feb 24 13:43:57 2015 +1100 Add AI_NUMERICSERV to fake-rfc2553. Our getaddrinfo implementation always returns numeric values already. commit ef342ab1ce6fb9a4b30186c89c309d0ae9d0eeb4 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Feb 24 13:39:57 2015 +1100 Include OpenSSL's objects.h before bn.h. Prevents compile errors on some platforms (at least old GCCs and AIX's XLC compilers). commit dcc8997d116f615195aa7c9ec019fb36c28c6228 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Feb 24 12:30:59 2015 +1100 Convert two macros into functions. Convert packet_send_debug and packet_disconnect from macros to functions. Some older GCCs (2.7.x, 2.95.x) see to have problems with variadic macros with only one argument so we convert these two into functions. ok djm@ commit 2285c30d51b7e2052c6526445abe7e7cc7e170a1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 23 22:21:21 2015 +0000 upstream commit further silence spurious error message even when -v is specified (e.g. to get visual host keys); reported by naddy@ commit 9af21979c00652029e160295e988dea40758ece2 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 24 09:04:32 2015 +1100 don't include stdint.h unless HAVE_STDINT_H set commit 62f678dd51660d6f8aee1da33d3222c5de10a89e Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 24 09:02:54 2015 +1100 nother sys/queue.h -> sys-queue.h fix spotted by Tom Christensen commit b3c19151cba2c0ed01b27f55de0d723ad07ca98f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 23 20:32:15 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix a race condition by using a mux socket rather than an ineffectual wait statement commit a88dd1da119052870bb2654c1a32c51971eade16 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 24 06:30:29 2015 +1100 various include fixes for portable commit 5248429b5ec524d0a65507cff0cdd6e0cb99effd Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 23 16:55:51 2015 +0000 upstream commit add an XXX to remind me to improve sshkey_load_public commit e94e4b07ef2eaead38b085a60535df9981cdbcdb Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 23 16:55:31 2015 +0000 upstream commit silence a spurious error message when listing fingerprints for known_hosts; bz#2342 commit f2293a65392b54ac721f66bc0b44462e8d1d81f8 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 23 16:33:25 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix setting/clearing of TTY raw mode around UpdateHostKeys=ask confirmation question; reported by Herb Goldman commit f2004cd1adf34492eae0a44b1ef84e0e31b06088 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Feb 23 05:04:21 2015 +1100 Repair for non-ECC OpenSSL. Ifdef out the ECC parts when building with an OpenSSL that doesn't have it. commit 37f9220db8d1a52c75894c3de1e5f2ae5bd71b6f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Feb 23 03:07:24 2015 +1100 Wrap stdint.h includes in ifdefs. commit f81f1bbc5b892c8614ea740b1f92735652eb43f0 Author: Tim Rice Date: Sat Feb 21 18:12:10 2015 -0800 out of tree build fix commit 2e13a1e4d22f3b503c3bfc878562cc7386a1d1ae Author: Tim Rice Date: Sat Feb 21 18:08:51 2015 -0800 mkdir kex unit test directory so testing out of tree builds works commit 1797f49b1ba31e8700231cd6b1d512d80bb50d2c Author: halex@openbsd.org Date: Sat Feb 21 21:46:57 2015 +0000 upstream commit make "ssh-add -d" properly remove a corresponding certificate, and also not whine and fail if there is none ok djm@ commit 7faaa32da83a609059d95dbfcb0649fdb04caaf6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Feb 22 07:57:27 2015 +1100 mkdir hostkey and bitmap unit test directories commit bd49da2ef197efac5e38f5399263a8b47990c538 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 20 23:46:01 2015 +0000 upstream commit sort options useable under Match case-insensitively; prodded jmc@ commit 1a779a0dd6cd8b4a1a40ea33b5415ab8408128ac Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Feb 21 20:51:02 2015 +0000 upstream commit correct paths to configuration files being written/updated; they live in $OBJ not cwd; some by Roumen Petrov commit 28ba006c1acddff992ae946d0bc0b500b531ba6b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Feb 21 15:41:07 2015 +1100 More correct checking of HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV. commit e50e8c97a9cecae1f28febccaa6ca5ab3bc10f54 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Feb 21 15:10:33 2015 +1100 Add null declaration of AI_NUMERICINFO. Some platforms (older FreeBSD and DragonFly versions) do have getaddrinfo() but do not have AI_NUMERICINFO. so define it to zero in those cases. commit 18a208d6a460d707a45916db63a571e805f5db46 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 20 22:40:32 2015 +0000 upstream commit more options that are available under Match; bz#2353 reported by calestyo AT scientia.net commit 44732de06884238049f285f1455b2181baa7dc82 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 20 22:17:21 2015 +0000 upstream commit UpdateHostKeys fixes: I accidentally changed the format of the hostkeys@openssh.com messages last week without changing the extension name, and this has been causing connection failures for people who are running -current. First reported by sthen@ s/hostkeys@openssh.com/hostkeys-00@openssh.com/ Change the name of the proof message too, and reorder it a little. Also, UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with ControlPersist (no TTY available to read the response) so disable UpdateHostKeys if it is in ask mode and ControlPersist is active (and document this) commit 13a39414d25646f93e6d355521d832a03aaaffe2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Feb 17 00:14:05 2015 +0000 upstream commit Regression: I broke logging of public key fingerprints in 1.46. Pointed out by Pontus Lundkvist commit 773dda25e828c4c9a52f7bdce6e1e5924157beab Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jan 30 23:10:17 2015 +1100 repair --without-openssl; broken in refactor commit e89c780886b23600de1e1c8d74aabd1ff61f43f0 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 17 10:04:55 2015 +1100 hook up hostkeys unittest to portable Makefiles commit 0abf41f99aa16ff09b263bead242d6cb2dbbcf99 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 16 22:21:03 2015 +0000 upstream commit enable hostkeys unit tests commit 68a5d647ccf0fb6782b2f749433a1eee5bc9044b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 16 22:20:50 2015 +0000 upstream commit check string/memory compare arguments aren't NULL commit ef575ef20d09f20722e26b45dab80b3620469687 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 16 22:18:34 2015 +0000 upstream commit unit tests for hostfile.c code, just hostkeys_foreach so far commit 8ea3365e6aa2759ccf5c76eaea62cbc8a280b0e7 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Sat Feb 14 12:43:16 2015 +0000 upstream commit test server rekey limit commit ce63c4b063c39b2b22d4ada449c9e3fbde788cb3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 16 22:30:03 2015 +0000 upstream commit partial backout of: revision 1.441 date: 2015/01/31 20:30:05; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +17 -10; commitid : x8klYPZMJSrVlt3O; Let sshd load public host keys even when private keys are missing. Allows sshd to advertise additional keys for future key rotation. Also log fingerprint of hostkeys loaded; ok markus@ hostkey updates now require access to the private key, so we can't load public keys only. The improved log messages (fingerprints of keys loaded) are kept. commit 523463a3a2a9bfc6cfc5afa01bae9147f76a37cc Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 16 22:13:32 2015 +0000 upstream commit Revise hostkeys@openssh.com hostkey learning extension. The client will not ask the server to prove ownership of the private halves of any hitherto-unseen hostkeys it offers to the client. Allow UpdateHostKeys option to take an 'ask' argument to let the user manually review keys offered. ok markus@ commit 6c5c949782d86a6e7d58006599c7685bfcd01685 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 16 22:08:57 2015 +0000 upstream commit Refactor hostkeys_foreach() and dependent code Deal with IP addresses (i.e. CheckHostIP) Don't clobber known_hosts when nothing changed ok markus@ as part of larger commit commit 51b082ccbe633dc970df1d1f4c9c0497115fe721 Author: miod@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 16 18:26:26 2015 +0000 upstream commit Declare ge25519_base as extern, to prevent it from becoming a common. Gets us rid of ``lignment 4 of symbol `crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_ge25519_base' in mod_ge25519.o is smaller than 16 in mod_ed25519.o'' warnings at link time. commit 02db468bf7e3281a8e3c058ced571b38b6407c34 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 13 18:57:00 2015 +0000 upstream commit make rekey_limit for sshd w/privsep work; ok djm@ dtucker@ commit 8ec67d505bd23c8bf9e17b7a364b563a07a58ec8 Author: dtucker@openbsd.org Date: Thu Feb 12 20:34:19 2015 +0000 upstream commit Prevent sshd spamming syslog with "ssh_dispatch_run_fatal: disconnected". ok markus@ commit d4c0295d1afc342057ba358237acad6be8af480b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Feb 11 01:20:38 2015 +0000 upstream commit Some packet error messages show the address of the peer, but might be generated after the socket to the peer has suffered a TCP reset. In these cases, getpeername() won't work so cache the address earlier. spotted in the wild via deraadt@ and tedu@ commit 4af1709cf774475ce5d1bc3ddcc165f6c222897d Author: jsg@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 9 23:22:37 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix some leaks in error paths ok markus@ commit fd36834871d06a03e1ff8d69e41992efa1bbf85f Author: millert@openbsd.org Date: Fri Feb 6 23:21:59 2015 +0000 upstream commit SIZE_MAX is standard, we should be using it in preference to the obsolete SIZE_T_MAX. OK miod@ beck@ commit 1910a286d7771eab84c0b047f31c0a17505236fa Author: millert@openbsd.org Date: Thu Feb 5 12:59:57 2015 +0000 upstream commit Include stdint.h, not limits.h to get SIZE_MAX. OK guenther@ commit ce4f59b2405845584f45e0b3214760eb0008c06c Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Tue Feb 3 08:07:20 2015 +0000 upstream commit missing ; djm and mlarkin really having great interactions recently commit 5d34aa94938abb12b877a25be51862757f25d54b Author: halex@openbsd.org Date: Tue Feb 3 00:34:14 2015 +0000 upstream commit slightly extend the passphrase prompt if running with -c in order to give the user a chance to notice if unintentionally running without it wording tweak and ok djm@ commit cb3bde373e80902c7d5d0db429f85068d19b2918 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 2 22:48:53 2015 +0000 upstream commit handle PKCS#11 C_Login returning CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN; based on patch from Yuri Samoilenko; ok markus@ commit 15ad750e5ec3cc69765b7eba1ce90060e7083399 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 2 07:41:40 2015 +0000 upstream commit turn UpdateHostkeys off by default until I figure out mlarkin@'s warning message; requested by deraadt@ commit 3cd5103c1e1aaa59bd66f7f52f6ebbcd5deb12f9 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Mon Feb 2 01:57:44 2015 +0000 upstream commit increasing encounters with difficult DNS setups in darknets has convinced me UseDNS off by default is better ok djm commit 6049a548a8a68ff0bbe581ab1748ea6a59ecdc38 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 31 20:30:05 2015 +0000 upstream commit Let sshd load public host keys even when private keys are missing. Allows sshd to advertise additional keys for future key rotation. Also log fingerprint of hostkeys loaded; ok markus@ commit 46347ed5968f582661e8a70a45f448e0179ca0ab Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 30 11:43:14 2015 +0000 upstream commit Add a ssh_config HostbasedKeyType option to control which host public key types are tried during hostbased authentication. This may be used to prevent too many keys being sent to the server, and blowing past its MaxAuthTries limit. bz#2211 based on patch by Iain Morgan; ok markus@ commit 802660cb70453fa4d230cb0233bc1bbdf8328de1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 30 10:44:49 2015 +0000 upstream commit set a timeout to prevent hangs when talking to busted servers; ok markus@ commit 86936ec245a15c7abe71a0722610998b0a28b194 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 30 01:11:39 2015 +0000 upstream commit regression test for 'wildcard CA' serial/key ID revocations commit 4509b5d4a4fa645a022635bfa7e86d09b285001f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 30 01:13:33 2015 +0000 upstream commit avoid more fatal/exit in the packet.c paths that ssh-keyscan uses; feedback and "looks good" markus@ commit 669aee994348468af8b4b2ebd29b602cf2860b22 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 30 01:10:33 2015 +0000 upstream commit permit KRLs that revoke certificates by serial number or key ID without scoping to a particular CA; ok markus@ commit 7a2c368477e26575d0866247d3313da4256cb2b5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 30 00:59:19 2015 +0000 upstream commit missing parentheses after if in do_convert_from() broke private key conversion from other formats some time in 2010; bz#2345 reported by jjelen AT redhat.com commit 25f5f78d8bf5c22d9cea8b49de24ebeee648a355 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 30 00:22:25 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix ssh protocol 1, spotted by miod@ commit 9ce86c926dfa6e0635161b035e3944e611cbccf0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 28 22:36:00 2015 +0000 upstream commit update to new API (key_fingerprint => sshkey_fingerprint) check sshkey_fingerprint return values; ok markus commit 9125525c37bf73ad3ee4025520889d2ce9d10f29 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 28 22:05:31 2015 +0000 upstream commit avoid fatal() calls in packet code makes ssh-keyscan more reliable against server failures ok dtucker@ markus@ commit fae7bbe544cba7a9e5e4ab47ff6faa3d978646eb Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 28 21:15:47 2015 +0000 upstream commit avoid fatal() calls in packet code makes ssh-keyscan more reliable against server failures ok dtucker@ markus@ commit 1a3d14f6b44a494037c7deab485abe6496bf2c60 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 28 11:07:25 2015 +0000 upstream commit remove obsolete comment commit 80c25b7bc0a71d75c43a4575d9a1336f589eb639 Author: okan@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 27 12:54:06 2015 +0000 upstream commit Since r1.2 removed the use of PRI* macros, inttypes.h is no longer required. ok djm@ commit 69ff64f69615c2a21c97cb5878a0996c21423257 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jan 27 23:07:43 2015 +1100 compile on systems without TCP_MD5SIG (e.g. OSX) commit 358964f3082fb90b2ae15bcab07b6105cfad5a43 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jan 27 23:07:25 2015 +1100 use ssh-keygen under test rather than system's commit a2c95c1bf33ea53038324d1fdd774bc953f98236 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jan 27 23:06:59 2015 +1100 OSX lacks HOST_NAME_MAX, has _POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX commit ade31d7b6f608a19b85bee29a7a00b1e636a2919 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jan 27 23:06:23 2015 +1100 these need active_state defined to link on OSX temporary measure until active_state goes away entirely commit e56aa87502f22c5844918c10190e8b4f785f067b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 27 12:01:36 2015 +0000 upstream commit use printf instead of echo -n to reduce diff against -portable commit 9f7637f56eddfaf62ce3c0af89c25480f2cf1068 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 26 13:55:29 2015 +0000 upstream commit sort previous; commit 3076ee7d530d5b16842fac7a6229706c7e5acd26 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 26 13:36:53 2015 +0000 upstream commit properly restore umask commit d411d395556b73ba1b9e451516a0bd6697c4b03d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 26 06:12:18 2015 +0000 upstream commit regression test for host key rotation commit fe8a3a51699afbc6407a8fae59b73349d01e49f8 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 26 06:11:28 2015 +0000 upstream commit adapt to sshkey API tweaks commit 7dd355fb1f0038a3d5cdca57ebab4356c7a5b434 Author: miod@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 24 10:39:21 2015 +0000 upstream commit Move -lz late in the linker commandline for things to build on static arches. commit 0dad3b806fddb93c475b30853b9be1a25d673a33 Author: miod@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 23 21:21:23 2015 +0000 upstream commit -Wpointer-sign is supported by gcc 4 only. commit 2b3b1c1e4bd9577b6e780c255c278542ea66c098 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 20 22:58:57 2015 +0000 upstream commit use SUBDIR to recuse into unit tests; makes "make obj" actually work commit 1d1092bff8db27080155541212b420703f8b9c92 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 26 12:16:36 2015 +0000 upstream commit correct description of UpdateHostKeys in ssh_config.5 and add it to -o lists for ssh, scp and sftp; pointed out by jmc@ commit 5104db7cbd6cdd9c5971f4358e74414862fc1022 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 26 06:10:03 2015 +0000 upstream commit correctly match ECDSA subtype (== curve) for offered/recevied host keys. Fixes connection-killing host key mismatches when a server offers multiple ECDSA keys with different curve type (an extremely unlikely configuration). ok markus, "looks mechanical" deraadt@ commit 8d4f87258f31cb6def9b3b55b6a7321d84728ff2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 26 03:04:45 2015 +0000 upstream commit Host key rotation support. Add a hostkeys@openssh.com protocol extension (global request) for a server to inform a client of all its available host key after authentication has completed. The client may record the keys in known_hosts, allowing it to upgrade to better host key algorithms and a server to gracefully rotate its keys. The client side of this is controlled by a UpdateHostkeys config option (default on). ok markus@ commit 60b1825262b1f1e24fc72050b907189c92daf18e Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 26 02:59:11 2015 +0000 upstream commit small refactor and add some convenience functions; ok markus commit a5a3e3328ddce91e76f71ff479022d53e35c60c9 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 22 21:00:42 2015 +0000 upstream commit heirarchy -> hierarchy; commit dcff5810a11195c57e1b3343c0d6b6f2b9974c11 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 22 20:24:41 2015 +0000 upstream commit Provide a warning about chroot misuses (which sadly, seem to have become quite popular because shiny). sshd cannot detect/manage/do anything about these cases, best we can do is warn in the right spot in the man page. ok markus commit 087266ec33c76fc8d54ac5a19efacf2f4a4ca076 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 20 23:14:00 2015 +0000 upstream commit Reduce use of and transition to throughout. ok djm markus commit 57e783c8ba2c0797f93977e83b2a8644a03065d8 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 20 20:16:21 2015 +0000 upstream commit kex_setup errors are fatal() commit 1d6424a6ff94633c221297ae8f42d54e12a20912 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 20 08:02:33 2015 +0000 upstream commit this test would accidentally delete agent.sh if run without obj/ commit 12b5f50777203e12575f1b08568281e447249ed3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 20 07:56:44 2015 +0000 upstream commit make this compile with KERBEROS5 enabled commit e2cc6bef08941256817d44d146115b3478586ad4 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 20 07:55:33 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix hostkeys in agent; ok markus@ commit 1ca3e2155aa5d3801a7ae050f85c71f41fcb95b1 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jan 20 10:11:31 2015 +1100 fix kex test commit c78a578107c7e6dcf5d30a2f34cb6581bef14029 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 19 20:45:25 2015 +0000 upstream commit finally enable the KEX tests I wrote some years ago... commit 31821d7217e686667d04935aeec99e1fc4a46e7e Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 19 20:42:31 2015 +0000 upstream commit adapt to new error message (SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID) commit d3716ca19e510e95d956ae14d5b367e364bff7f1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 19 17:31:13 2015 +0000 upstream commit this test was broken in at least two ways, such that it wasn't checking that a KRL was not excluding valid keys commit 3f797653748e7c2b037dacb57574c01d9ef3b4d3 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 19 20:32:39 2015 +0000 upstream commit switch ssh-keyscan from setjmp to multiple ssh transport layer instances ok djm@ commit f582f0e917bb0017b00944783cd5f408bf4b0b5e Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 19 20:30:23 2015 +0000 upstream commit add experimental api for packet layer; ok djm@ commit 48b3b2ba75181f11fca7f327058a591f4426cade Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 19 20:20:20 2015 +0000 upstream commit store compat flags in struct ssh; ok djm@ commit 57d10cbe861a235dd269c74fb2fe248469ecee9d Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 19 20:16:15 2015 +0000 upstream commit adapt kex to sshbuf and struct ssh; ok djm@ commit 3fdc88a0def4f86aa88a5846ac079dc964c0546a Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 19 20:07:45 2015 +0000 upstream commit move dispatch to struct ssh; ok djm@ commit 091c302829210c41e7f57c3f094c7b9c054306f0 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 19 19:52:16 2015 +0000 upstream commit update packet.c & isolate, introduce struct ssh a) switch packet.c to buffer api and isolate per-connection info into struct ssh b) (de)serialization of the state is moved from monitor to packet.c c) the old packet.c API is implemented in opacket.[ch] d) compress.c/h is removed and integrated into packet.c with and ok djm@ commit 4e62cc68ce4ba20245d208b252e74e91d3785b74 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 19 17:35:48 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix format strings in (disabled) debugging commit d85e06245907d49a2cd0cfa0abf59150ad616f42 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 19 06:01:32 2015 +0000 upstream commit be a bit more careful in these tests to ensure that known_hosts is clean commit 7947810eab5fe0ad311f32a48f4d4eb1f71be6cf Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 22:00:18 2015 +0000 upstream commit regression test for known_host file editing using ssh-keygen (-H / -R / -F) after hostkeys_foreach() change; feedback and ok markus@ commit 3a2b09d147a565d8a47edf37491e149a02c0d3a3 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 19:54:46 2015 +0000 upstream commit more and better key tests test signatures and verification test certificate generation flesh out nested cert test removes most of the XXX todo markers commit 589e69fd82724cfc9738f128e4771da2e6405d0d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 19:53:58 2015 +0000 upstream commit make the signature fuzzing test much more rigorous: ensure that the fuzzed input cases do not match the original (using new fuzz_matches_original() function) and check that the verification fails in each case commit 80603c0daa2538c349c1c152405580b164d5475f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 19:52:44 2015 +0000 upstream commit add a fuzz_matches_original() function to the fuzzer to detect fuzz cases that are identical to the original data. Hacky implementation, but very useful when you need the fuzz to be different, e.g. when verifying signature commit 87d5495bd337e358ad69c524fcb9495208c0750b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 19:50:55 2015 +0000 upstream commit better dumps from the fuzzer (shown on errors) - include the original data as well as the fuzzed copy. commit d59ec478c453a3fff05badbbfd96aa856364f2c2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 19:47:55 2015 +0000 upstream commit enable hostkey-agent.sh test commit 26b3425170bf840e4b095e1c10bf25a0a3e3a105 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 17 18:54:30 2015 +0000 upstream commit unit test for hostkeys in ssh-agent commit 9e06a0fb23ec55d9223b26a45bb63c7649e2f2f2 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 15 23:41:29 2015 +0000 upstream commit add kex unit tests commit d2099dec6da21ae627f6289aedae6bc1d41a22ce Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 19 00:32:54 2015 +0000 upstream commit djm, your /usr/include tree is old commit 2b3c3c76c30dc5076fe09d590f5b26880f148a54 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 21:51:19 2015 +0000 upstream commit some feedback from markus@: comment hostkeys_foreach() context and avoid a member in it. commit cecb30bc2ba6d594366e657d664d5c494b6c8a7f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 21:49:42 2015 +0000 upstream commit make ssh-keygen use hostkeys_foreach(). Removes some horrendous code; ok markus@ commit ec3d065df3a9557ea96b02d061fd821a18c1a0b9 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 21:48:09 2015 +0000 upstream commit convert load_hostkeys() (hostkey ordering and known_host matching) to use the new hostkey_foreach() iterator; ok markus commit c29811cc480a260e42fd88849fc86a80c1e91038 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 21:40:23 2015 +0000 upstream commit introduce hostkeys_foreach() to allow iteration over a known_hosts file or controlled subset thereof. This will allow us to pull out some ugly and duplicated code, and will be used to implement hostkey rotation later. feedback and ok markus commit f101d8291da01bbbfd6fb8c569cfd0cc61c0d346 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 14:01:00 2015 +0000 upstream commit string truncation due to sizeof(size) ok djm markus commit 35d6022b55b7969fc10c261cb6aa78cc4a5fcc41 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 13:33:34 2015 +0000 upstream commit avoid trailing ',' in host key algorithms commit 7efb455789a0cb76bdcdee91c6060a3dc8f5c007 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Jan 18 13:22:28 2015 +0000 upstream commit infer key length correctly when user specified a fully- qualified key name instead of using the -b bits option; ok markus@ commit 83f8ffa6a55ccd0ce9d8a205e3e7439ec18fedf5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sat Jan 17 18:53:34 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix hostkeys on ssh agent; found by unit test I'm about to commit commit 369d61f17657b814124268f99c033e4dc6e436c1 Author: schwarze@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 16 16:20:23 2015 +0000 upstream commit garbage collect empty .No macros mandoc warns about commit bb8b442d32dbdb8521d610e10d8b248d938bd747 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 16 15:55:07 2015 +0000 upstream commit regression: incorrect error message on otherwise-successful ssh-keygen -A. Reported by Dmitry Orlov, via deraadt@ commit 9010902954a40b59d0bf3df3ccbc3140a653e2bc Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 16 07:19:48 2015 +0000 upstream commit when hostname canonicalisation is enabled, try to parse hostnames as addresses before looking them up for canonicalisation. fixes bz#2074 and avoids needless DNS lookups in some cases; ok markus commit 2ae4f337b2a5fb2841b6b0053b49496fef844d1c Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Fri Jan 16 06:40:12 2015 +0000 upstream commit Replace with and other less dirty headers where possible. Annotate lines with their current reasons. Switch to PATH_MAX, NGROUPS_MAX, HOST_NAME_MAX+1, LOGIN_NAME_MAX, etc. Change MIN() and MAX() to local definitions of MINIMUM() and MAXIMUM() where sensible to avoid pulling in the pollution. These are the files confirmed through binary verification. ok guenther, millert, doug (helped with the verification protocol) commit 3c4726f4c24118e8f1bb80bf75f1456c76df072c Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 15 21:38:50 2015 +0000 upstream commit remove xmalloc, switch to sshbuf commit e17ac01f8b763e4b83976b9e521e90a280acc097 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 15 21:37:14 2015 +0000 upstream commit switch to sshbuf commit ddef9995a1fa6c7a8ff3b38bfe6cf724bebf13d0 Author: naddy@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 15 18:32:54 2015 +0000 upstream commit handle UMAC128 initialization like UMAC; ok djm@ markus@ commit f14564c1f7792446bca143580aef0e7ac25dcdae Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 15 11:04:36 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix regression reported by brad@ for passworded keys without agent present commit 45c0fd70bb2a88061319dfff20cb12ef7b1bc47e Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 15 22:08:23 2015 +1100 make bitmap test compile commit d333f89abf7179021e5c3f28673f469abe032062 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 15 07:36:28 2015 +0000 upstream commit unit tests for KRL bitmap commit 7613f828f49c55ff356007ae9645038ab6682556 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 14 09:58:21 2015 +0000 upstream commit re-add comment about full path commit 6c43b48b307c41cd656b415621a644074579a578 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 14 09:54:38 2015 +0000 upstream commit don't reset to the installed sshd; connect before reconfigure, too commit 771bb47a1df8b69061f09462e78aa0b66cd594bf Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 13 14:51:51 2015 +0000 upstream commit implement a SIGINFO handler so we can discern a stuck fuzz test from a merely glacial one; prompted by and ok markus commit cfaa57962f8536f3cf0fd7daf4d6a55d6f6de45f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 13 08:23:26 2015 +0000 upstream commit use $SSH instead of installed ssh to allow override; spotted by markus@ commit 0920553d0aee117a596b03ed5b49b280d34a32c5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 13 07:49:49 2015 +0000 upstream commit regress test for PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes; ok markus@ commit 27ca1a5c0095eda151934bca39a77e391f875d17 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 12 20:13:27 2015 +0000 upstream commit unbreak parsing of pubkey comments; with gerhard; ok djm/deraadt commit 55358f0b4e0b83bc0df81c5f854c91b11e0bb4dc Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 12 11:46:32 2015 +0000 upstream commit fatal if soft-PKCS11 library is missing rather (rather than continue and fail with a more cryptic error) commit c3554cdd2a1a62434b8161017aa76fa09718a003 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 12 11:12:38 2015 +0000 upstream commit let this test all supporte key types; pointed out/ok markus@ commit 1129dcfc5a3e508635004bcc05a3574cb7687167 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 15 09:40:00 2015 +0000 upstream commit sync ssh-keysign, ssh-keygen and some dependencies to the new buffer/key API; mostly mechanical, ok markus@ commit e4ebf5586452bf512da662ac277aaf6ecf0efe7c Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 15 07:57:08 2015 +0000 upstream commit remove commented-out test code now that it has moved to a proper unit test commit e81cba066c1e9eb70aba0f6e7c0ff220611b370f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 14 20:54:29 2015 +0000 upstream commit whitespace commit 141efe49542f7156cdbc2e4cd0a041d8b1aab622 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 14 20:05:27 2015 +0000 upstream commit move authfd.c and its tentacles to the new buffer/key API; ok markus@ commit 0088c57af302cda278bd26d8c3ae81d5b6f7c289 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 14 19:33:41 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix small regression: ssh-agent would return a success message but an empty signature if asked to sign using an unknown key; ok markus@ commit b03ebe2c22b8166e4f64c37737f4278676e3488d Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 15 03:08:58 2015 +1100 more --without-openssl fix some regressions caused by upstream merges enable KRLs now that they no longer require BIGNUMs commit bc42cc6fe784f36df225c44c93b74830027cb5a2 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 15 03:08:29 2015 +1100 kludge around tun API mismatch betterer commit c332110291089b624fa0951fbf2d1ee6de525b9f Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 15 02:59:51 2015 +1100 some systems lack SO_REUSEPORT commit 83b9678a62cbdc74eb2031cf1e1e4ffd58e233ae Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 15 02:35:50 2015 +1100 fix merge botch commit 0cdc5a3eb6fb383569a4da2a30705d9b90428d6b Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 15 02:35:33 2015 +1100 unbreak across API change commit 6e2549ac2b5e7f96cbc2d83a6e0784b120444b47 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 15 02:30:18 2015 +1100 need includes.h for portable OpenSSH commit 72ef7c148c42db7d5632a29f137f8b87b579f2d9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 15 02:21:31 2015 +1100 support --without-openssl at configure time Disables and removes dependency on OpenSSL. Many features don't work and the set of crypto options is greatly restricted. This will only work on system with native arc4random or /dev/urandom. Considered highly experimental for now. commit 4f38c61c68ae7e3f9ee4b3c38bc86cd39f65ece9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 15 02:28:00 2015 +1100 add files missed in last commit commit a165bab605f7be55940bb8fae977398e8c96a46d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 14 15:02:39 2015 +0000 upstream commit avoid BIGNUM in KRL code by using a simple bitmap; feedback and ok markus commit 7d845f4a0b7ec97887be204c3760e44de8bf1f32 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 14 13:54:13 2015 +0000 upstream commit update sftp client and server to new buffer API. pretty much just mechanical changes; with & ok markus commit 139ca81866ec1b219c717d17061e5e7ad1059e2a Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 14 13:09:09 2015 +0000 upstream commit switch to sshbuf/sshkey; with & ok djm@ commit 81bfbd0bd35683de5d7f2238b985e5f8150a9180 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jan 14 21:48:18 2015 +1100 support --without-openssl at configure time Disables and removes dependency on OpenSSL. Many features don't work and the set of crypto options is greatly restricted. This will only work on system with native arc4random or /dev/urandom. Considered highly experimental for now. commit 54924b53af15ccdcbb9f89984512b5efef641a31 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 14 10:46:28 2015 +0000 upstream commit avoid an warning for the !OPENSSL case commit ae8b463217f7c9b66655bfc3945c050ffdaeb861 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 14 10:30:34 2015 +0000 upstream commit swith auth-options to new sshbuf/sshkey; ok djm@ commit 540e891191b98b89ee90aacf5b14a4a68635e763 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 14 10:29:45 2015 +0000 upstream commit make non-OpenSSL aes-ctr work on sshd w/ privsep; ok markus@ commit 60c2c4ea5e1ad0ddfe8b2877b78ed5143be79c53 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 14 10:24:42 2015 +0000 upstream commit remove unneeded includes, sync my copyright across files & whitespace; ok djm@ commit 128343bcdb0b60fc826f2733df8cf979ec1627b4 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 13 19:31:40 2015 +0000 upstream commit adapt mac.c to ssherr.h return codes (de-fatal) and simplify dependencies ok djm@ commit e7fd952f4ea01f09ceb068721a5431ac2fd416ed Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 13 19:04:35 2015 +0000 upstream commit sync changes from libopenssh; prepared by markus@ mostly debug output tweaks, a couple of error return value changes and some other minor stuff commit 76c0480a85675f03a1376167cb686abed01a3583 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jan 13 19:38:18 2015 +1100 add --without-ssh1 option to configure Allows disabling support for SSH protocol 1. commit 1f729f0614d1376c3332fa1edb6a5e5cec7e9e03 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Jan 13 07:39:19 2015 +0000 upstream commit add sshd_config HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes and PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes options to allow sshd to control what public key types will be accepted. Currently defaults to all. Feedback & ok markus@ commit 816d1538c24209a93ba0560b27c4fda57c3fff65 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 12 20:13:27 2015 +0000 upstream commit unbreak parsing of pubkey comments; with gerhard; ok djm/deraadt commit 0097565f849851812df610b7b6b3c4bd414f6c62 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 12 19:22:46 2015 +0000 upstream commit missing error assigment on sshbuf_put_string() commit a7f49dcb527dd17877fcb8d5c3a9a6f550e0bba5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 12 15:18:07 2015 +0000 upstream commit apparently memcpy(x, NULL, 0) is undefined behaviour according to C99 (cf. sections 7.21.1 and 7.1.4), so check skip memcpy calls when length==0; ok markus@ commit 905fe30fca82f38213763616d0d26eb6790bde33 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 12 14:05:19 2015 +0000 upstream commit free->sshkey_free; ok djm@ commit f067cca2bc20c86b110174c3fef04086a7f57b13 Author: markus@openbsd.org Date: Mon Jan 12 13:29:27 2015 +0000 upstream commit allow WITH_OPENSSL w/o WITH_SSH1; ok djm@ commit c4bfafcc2a9300d9cfb3c15e75572d3a7d74670d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 8 13:10:58 2015 +0000 upstream commit adjust for sshkey_load_file() API change commit e752c6d547036c602b89e9e704851463bd160e32 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 8 13:44:36 2015 +0000 upstream commit fix ssh_config FingerprintHash evaluation order; from Petr Lautrbach commit ab24ab847b0fc94c8d5e419feecff0bcb6d6d1bf Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 8 10:15:45 2015 +0000 upstream commit reorder hostbased key attempts to better match the default hostkey algorithms order in myproposal.h; ok markus@ commit 1195f4cb07ef4b0405c839293c38600b3e9bdb46 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Jan 8 10:14:08 2015 +0000 upstream commit deprecate key_load_private_pem() and sshkey_load_private_pem() interfaces. Refactor the generic key loading API to not require pathnames to be specified (they weren't really used). Fixes a few other things en passant: Makes ed25519 keys work for hostbased authentication (ssh-keysign previously used the PEM-only routines). Fixes key comment regression bz#2306: key pathnames were being lost as comment fields. ok markus@ commit febbe09e4e9aff579b0c5cc1623f756862e4757d Author: tedu@openbsd.org Date: Wed Jan 7 18:15:07 2015 +0000 upstream commit workaround for the Meyer, et al, Bleichenbacher Side Channel Attack. fake up a bignum key before RSA decryption. discussed/ok djm markus commit 5191df927db282d3123ca2f34a04d8d96153911a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Dec 23 22:42:48 2014 +0000 upstream commit KNF and add a little more debug() commit 8abd80315d3419b20e6938f74d37e2e2b547f0b7 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 22 09:26:31 2014 +0000 upstream commit add fingerprinthash to the options list; commit 296ef0560f60980da01d83b9f0e1a5257826536f Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 22 09:24:59 2014 +0000 upstream commit tweak previous; commit 462082eacbd37778a173afb6b84c6f4d898a18b5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Dec 30 08:16:11 2014 +1100 avoid uninitialised free of ldns_res If an invalid rdclass was passed to getrrsetbyname() then this would execute a free on an uninitialised pointer. OpenSSH only ever calls this with a fixed and valid rdclass. Reported by Joshua Rogers commit 01b63498801053f131a0740eb9d13faf35d636c8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Dec 29 18:10:18 2014 +1100 pull updated OpenBSD BCrypt PBKDF implementation Includes fix for 1 byte output overflow for large key length requests (not reachable in OpenSSH). Pointed out by Joshua Rogers commit c528c1b4af2f06712177b3de9b30705752f7cbcb Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Dec 23 15:26:13 2014 +1100 fix variable name for IPv6 case in construct_utmpx patch from writeonce AT midipix.org via bz#2296 commit 293cac52dcda123244b2e594d15592e5e481c55e Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Dec 22 16:30:42 2014 +1100 include and use OpenBSD netcat in regress/ commit 8f6784f0cb56dc4fd00af3e81a10050a5785228d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 22 09:05:17 2014 +0000 upstream commit mention ssh -Q feature to list supported { MAC, cipher, KEX, key } algorithms in more places and include the query string used to list the relevant information; bz#2288 commit 449e11b4d7847079bd0a2daa6e3e7ea03d8ef700 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 22 08:24:17 2014 +0000 upstream commit tweak previous; commit 4bea0ab3290c0b9dd2aa199e932de8e7e18062d6 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 22 08:06:03 2014 +0000 upstream commit regression test for multiple required pubkey authentication; ok markus@ commit f1c4d8ec52158b6f57834b8cd839605b0a33e7f2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 22 08:04:23 2014 +0000 upstream commit correct description of what will happen when a AuthorizedKeysCommand is specified but AuthorizedKeysCommandUser is not (sshd will refuse to start) commit 161cf419f412446635013ac49e8c660cadc36080 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 22 07:55:51 2014 +0000 upstream commit make internal handling of filename arguments of "none" more consistent with ssh. "none" arguments are now replaced with NULL when the configuration is finalised. Simplifies checking later on (just need to test not-NULL rather than that + strcmp) and cleans up some inconsistencies. ok markus@ commit f69b69b8625be447b8826b21d87713874dac25a6 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 22 07:51:30 2014 +0000 upstream commit remember which public keys have been used for authentication and refuse to accept previously-used keys. This allows AuthenticationMethods=publickey,publickey to require that users authenticate using two _different_ pubkeys. ok markus@ commit 46ac2ed4677968224c4ca825bc98fc68dae183f0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 22 07:24:11 2014 +0000 upstream commit fix passing of wildcard forward bind addresses when connection multiplexing is in use; patch from Sami Hartikainen via bz#2324; ok dtucker@ commit 0d1b241a262e4d0a6bbfdd595489ab1b853c43a1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 22 06:14:29 2014 +0000 upstream commit make this slightly easier to diff against portable commit 0715bcdddbf68953964058f17255bf54734b8737 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Dec 22 13:47:07 2014 +1100 add missing regress output file commit 1e30483c8ad2c2f39445d4a4b6ab20c241e40593 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 22 02:15:52 2014 +0000 upstream commit adjust for new SHA256 key fingerprints and slightly-different MD5 hex fingerprint format commit 6b40567ed722df98593ad8e6a2d2448fc2b4b151 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Dec 22 01:14:49 2014 +0000 upstream commit poll changes to netcat (usr.bin/netcat.c r1.125) broke this test; fix it by ensuring more stdio fds are sent to devnull commit a5375ccb970f49dddf7d0ef63c9b713ede9e7260 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Sun Dec 21 23:35:14 2014 +0000 upstream commit tweak previous; commit b79efde5c3badf5ce4312fe608d8307eade533c5 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Dec 21 23:12:42 2014 +0000 upstream commit document FingerprintHash here too commit d16bdd8027dd116afa01324bb071a4016cdc1a75 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Dec 22 10:18:09 2014 +1100 missing include for base64 encoding commit 56d1c83cdd1ac76f1c6bd41e01e80dad834f3994 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Sun Dec 21 22:27:55 2014 +0000 upstream commit Add FingerprintHash option to control algorithm used for key fingerprints. Default changes from MD5 to SHA256 and format from hex to base64. Feedback and ok naddy@ markus@ commit 058f839fe15c51be8b3a844a76ab9a8db550be4f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 18 23:58:04 2014 +0000 upstream commit don't count partial authentication success as a failure against MaxAuthTries; ok deraadt@ commit c7219f4f54d64d6dde66dbcf7a2699daa782d2a1 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Dec 12 00:02:17 2014 +0000 upstream commit revert chunk I didn't mean to commit yet; via jmc@ commit 7de5991aa3997e2981440f39c1ea01273a0a2c7b Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Dec 18 11:44:06 2014 +1100 upstream libc change revision 1.2 date: 2014/12/08 03:45:00; author: bcook; state: Exp; lines: +2 -2; commitid: 7zWEBgJJOCZ2hvTV; avoid left shift overflow in reallocarray. Some 64-bit platforms (e.g. Windows 64) have a 32-bit long. So, shifting 1UL 32-bits to the left causes an overflow. This replaces the constant 1UL with (size_t)1 so that we get the correct constant size for the platform. discussed with tedu@ & deraadt@ commit 2048f85a5e6da8bc6e0532efe02ecfd4e63c978c Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Dec 18 10:15:49 2014 +1100 include CFLAGS in gnome askpass targets from Fedora commit 48b68ce19ca42fa488960028048dec023f7899bb Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 11 08:20:09 2014 +0000 upstream commit explicitly include sys/param.h in files that use the howmany() macro; from portable commit d663bea30a294d440fef4398e5cd816317bd4518 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 11 05:25:06 2014 +0000 upstream commit mention AuthorizedKeysCommandUser must be set for AuthorizedKeysCommand to be run; bz#2287 commit 17bf3d81e00f2abb414a4fd271118cf4913f049f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 11 05:13:28 2014 +0000 upstream commit show in debug output which hostkeys are being tried when attempting hostbased auth; patch from Iain Morgan commit da0277e3717eadf5b15e03379fc29db133487e94 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 11 04:16:14 2014 +0000 upstream commit Make manual reflect reality: sftp-server's -d option accepts a "%d" option, not a "%h" one. bz#2316; reported by Kirk Wolf commit 4cf87f4b81fa9380bce5fcff7b0f8382ae3ad996 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Dec 10 01:24:09 2014 +0000 upstream commit better error value for invalid signature length commit 4bfad14ca56f8ae04f418997816b4ba84e2cfc3c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Dec 10 02:12:51 2014 +1100 Resync more with OpenBSD's rijndael.c, in particular "#if 0"-ing out some unused code. Should fix compile error reported by plautrba at redhat. commit 642652d280499691c8212ec6b79724b50008ce09 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Dec 10 01:32:23 2014 +1100 Add reallocarray to compat library commit 3dfd8d93dfcc69261f5af99df56f3ff598581979 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 4 22:31:50 2014 +0000 upstream commit add tests for new client RevokedHostKeys option; refactor to make it a bit more readable commit a31046cad1aed16a0b55171192faa6d02665ccec Author: krw@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 19 13:35:37 2014 +0000 upstream commit Nuke yet more obvious #include duplications. ok deraadt@ commit a7c762e5b2c1093542c0bc1df25ccec0b4cf479f Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 4 20:47:36 2014 +0000 upstream commit key_in_file() wrapper is no longer used commit 5e39a49930d885aac9c76af3129332b6e772cd75 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 4 02:24:32 2014 +0000 upstream commit add RevokedHostKeys option for the client Allow textfile or KRL-based revocation of hostkeys. commit 74de254bb92c684cf53461da97f52d5ba34ded80 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Thu Dec 4 01:49:59 2014 +0000 upstream commit convert KRL code to new buffer API ok markus@ commit db995f2eed5fc432598626fa3e30654503bf7151 Author: millert@openbsd.org Date: Wed Nov 26 18:34:51 2014 +0000 upstream commit Prefer setvbuf() to setlinebuf() for portability; ok deraadt@ commit 72bba3d179ced8b425272efe6956a309202a91f3 Author: jsg@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 24 03:39:22 2014 +0000 upstream commit Fix crashes in the handling of the sshd config file found with the afl fuzzer. ok deraadt@ djm@ commit 867f49c666adcfe92bf539d9c37c1accdea08bf6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Nov 26 13:22:41 2014 +1100 Avoid Cygwin ssh-host-config reading /etc/group Patch from Corinna Vinschen commit 8b66f36291a721b1ba7c44f24a07fdf39235593e Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Nov 26 13:20:35 2014 +1100 allow custom service name for sshd on Cygwin Permits the use of multiple sshd running with different service names. Patch by Florian Friesdorf via Corinna Vinschen commit 08c0eebf55d70a9ae1964399e609288ae3186a0c Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Sat Nov 22 19:21:03 2014 +0000 upstream commit restore word zapped in previous, and remove some useless "No" macros; commit a1418a0033fba43f061513e992e1cbcc3343e563 Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Sat Nov 22 18:15:41 2014 +0000 upstream commit /dev/random has created the same effect as /dev/arandom (and /dev/urandom) for quite some time. Mop up the last few, by using /dev/random where we actually want it, or not even mentioning arandom where it is irrelevant. commit b6de5ac9ed421362f479d1ad4fa433d2e25dad5b Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Fri Nov 21 01:00:38 2014 +0000 upstream commit fix NULL pointer dereference crash on invalid timestamp found using Michal Zalewski's afl fuzzer commit a1f8110cd5ed818d59b3a2964fab7de76e92c18e Author: mikeb@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 18 22:38:48 2014 +0000 upstream commit Sync AES code to the one shipped in OpenSSL/LibreSSL. This includes a commit made by Andy Polyakov to the OpenSSL source tree on Wed, 28 Jun 2006 with the following message: "Mitigate cache-collision timing attack on last round." OK naddy, miod, djm commit 335c83d5f35d8620e16b8aa26592d4f836e09ad2 Author: krw@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 18 20:54:28 2014 +0000 upstream commit Nuke more obvious #include duplications. ok deraadt@ millert@ tedu@ commit 51b64e44121194ae4bf153dee391228dada2abcb Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 17 00:21:40 2014 +0000 upstream commit fix KRL generation when multiple CAs are in use We would generate an invalid KRL when revoking certs by serial number for multiple CA keys due to a section being written out twice. Also extend the regress test to catch this case by having it produce a multi-CA KRL. Reported by peter AT pean.org commit d2d51003a623e21fb2b25567c4878d915e90aa2a Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Nov 18 01:02:25 2014 +0000 upstream commit fix NULL pointer dereference crash in key loading found by Michal Zalewski's AFL fuzzer commit 9f9fad0191028edc43d100d0ded39419b6895fdf Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 17 00:21:40 2014 +0000 upstream commit fix KRL generation when multiple CAs are in use We would generate an invalid KRL when revoking certs by serial number for multiple CA keys due to a section being written out twice. Also extend the regress test to catch this case by having it produce a multi-CA KRL. Reported by peter AT pean.org commit da8af83d3f7ec00099963e455010e0ed1d7d0140 Author: bentley@openbsd.org Date: Sat Nov 15 14:41:03 2014 +0000 upstream commit Reduce instances of `` '' in manuals. troff displays these as typographic quotes, but nroff implementations almost always print them literally, which rarely has the intended effect with modern fonts, even in stock xterm. These uses of `` '' can be replaced either with more semantic alternatives or with Dq, which prints typographic quotes in a UTF-8 locale (but will automatically fall back to `` '' in an ASCII locale). improvements and ok schwarze@ commit fc302561369483bb755b17f671f70fb894aec01d Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Nov 10 22:25:49 2014 +0000 upstream commit mux-related manual tweaks mention ControlPersist=0 is the same as ControlPersist=yes recommend that ControlPath sockets be placed in a og-w directory commit 0e4cff5f35ed11102fe3783779960ef07e0cd381 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Nov 5 11:01:31 2014 +1100 Prepare scripts for next Cygwin release Makes the Cygwin-specific ssh-user-config script independent of the existence of /etc/passwd. The next Cygwin release will allow to generate passwd and group entries from the Windows account DBs, so the scripts have to adapt. from Corinna Vinschen commit 7d0ba5336651731949762eb8877ce9e3b52df436 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Oct 30 10:45:41 2014 +1100 include version number in OpenSSL-too-old error commit 3bcb92e04d9207e9f78d82f7918c6d3422054ce9 Author: lteo@openbsd.org Date: Fri Oct 24 02:01:20 2014 +0000 upstream commit Remove unnecessary include: netinet/in_systm.h is not needed by these programs. NB. skipped for portable ok deraadt@ millert@ commit 6fdcaeb99532e28a69f1a1599fbd540bb15b70a0 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Oct 20 03:43:01 2014 +0000 upstream commit whitespace commit 165bc8786299e261706ed60342985f9de93a7461 Author: daniel@openbsd.org Date: Tue Oct 14 03:09:59 2014 +0000 upstream commit plug a memory leak; from Maxime Villard. ok djm@ commit b1ba15f3885947c245c2dbfaad0a04ba050abea0 Author: jmc@openbsd.org Date: Thu Oct 9 06:21:31 2014 +0000 upstream commit tweak previous; commit 259a02ebdf74ad90b41d116ecf70aa823fa4c6e7 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Oct 13 00:38:35 2014 +0000 upstream commit whitespace commit 957fbceb0f3166e41b76fdb54075ab3b9cc84cba Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 8 22:20:25 2014 +0000 upstream commit Tweak config reparsing with host canonicalisation Make the second pass through the config files always run when hostname canonicalisation is enabled. Add a "Match canonical" criteria that allows ssh_config Match blocks to trigger only in the second config pass. Add a -G option to ssh that causes it to parse its configuration and dump the result to stdout, similar to "sshd -T" Allow ssh_config Port options set in the second config parse phase to be applied (they were being ignored). bz#2267 bz#2286; ok markus commit 5c0dafd38bf66feeeb45fa0741a5baf5ad8039ba Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 8 22:15:27 2014 +0000 upstream commit another -Wpointer-sign from clang commit bb005dc815ebda9af3ae4b39ca101c4da918f835 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 8 22:15:06 2014 +0000 upstream commit fix a few -Wpointer-sign warnings from clang commit 3cc1fbb4fb0e804bfb873fd363cea91b27fc8188 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Oct 8 21:45:48 2014 +0000 upstream commit parse cert sections using nested buffers to reduce copies; ok markus commit 4a45922aebf99164e2fc83d34fe55b11ae1866ef Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Mon Oct 6 00:47:15 2014 +0000 upstream commit correct options in usage(); from mancha1 AT zoho.com commit 48dffd5bebae6fed0556dc5c36cece0370690618 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Sep 9 09:45:36 2014 +0000 upstream commit mention permissions on tun(4) devices in PermitTunnel documentation; bz#2273 commit a5883d4eccb94b16c355987f58f86a7dee17a0c2 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Wed Sep 3 18:55:07 2014 +0000 upstream commit tighten permissions on pty when the "tty" group does not exist; pointed out by Corinna Vinschen; ok markus commit 180bcb406b58bf30723c01a6b010e48ee626dda8 Author: sobrado@openbsd.org Date: Sat Aug 30 16:32:25 2014 +0000 upstream commit typo. commit f70b22bcdd52f6bf127047b3584371e6e5d45627 Author: sobrado@openbsd.org Date: Sat Aug 30 15:33:50 2014 +0000 upstream commit improve capitalization for the Ed25519 public-key signature system. ok djm@ commit 7df8818409c752cf3f0c3f8044fe9aebed8647bd Author: doug@openbsd.org Date: Thu Aug 21 01:08:52 2014 +0000 upstream commit Free resources on error in mkstemp and fdopen ok djm@ commit 40ba4c9733aaed08304714faeb61529f18da144b Author: deraadt@openbsd.org Date: Wed Aug 20 01:28:55 2014 +0000 upstream commit djm how did you make a typo like that... commit 57d378ec9278ba417a726f615daad67d157de666 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Aug 19 23:58:28 2014 +0000 upstream commit When dumping the server configuration (sshd -T), print correct KEX, MAC and cipher defaults. Spotted by Iain Morgan commit 7ff880ede5195d0b17e7f1e3b6cfbc4cb6f85240 Author: djm@openbsd.org Date: Tue Aug 19 23:57:18 2014 +0000 upstream commit ~-expand lcd paths commit 4460a7ad0c78d4cd67c467f6e9f4254d0404ed59 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Oct 12 12:35:48 2014 +1100 remove duplicated KEX_DH1 entry commit c9b8426a616138d0d762176c94f51aff3faad5ff Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Oct 9 10:34:06 2014 +1100 remove ChangeLog file Commit logs will be generated from git at release time. commit 81d18ff7c93a04affbf3903e0963859763219aed Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 7 21:24:25 2014 +1100 delete contrib/caldera directory commit 0ec9e87d3638206456968202f05bb5123670607a Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 7 19:57:27 2014 +1100 test commit commit 8fb65a44568701b779f3d77326bceae63412d28d Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 7 09:21:49 2014 +1100 - (djm) Release OpenSSH-6.7 commit e8c9f2602c46f6781df5e52e6cd8413dab4602a3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Oct 3 09:24:56 2014 +1000 - (djm) [sshd_config.5] typo; from Iain Morgan commit 703b98a26706f5083801d11059486d77491342ae Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 1 09:43:07 2014 +1000 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/Makefile.in openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c] [openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Kludge around bad glibc _FORTIFY_SOURCE check that doesn't grok heap-allocated fd_sets; ok dtucker@ commit 0fa0ed061bbfedb0daa705e220748154a84c3413 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Sep 10 08:15:34 2014 +1000 - (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Allow mremap and exit for DietLibc; patch from Felix von Leitner; ok dtucker commit ad7d23d461c3b7e1dcb15db13aee5f4b94dc1a95 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Sep 9 12:23:10 2014 +1000 20140908 - (dtucker) [INSTALL] Update info about egd. ok djm@ commit 2a8699f37cc2515e3bc60e0c677ba060f4d48191 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Sep 4 03:46:05 2014 +1000 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/arc4random.c] Zero seed after keying PRNG commit 44988defb1f5e3afe576d86000365e1f07a1b494 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Sep 3 05:35:32 2014 +1000 - (djm) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] Fix old code leading to permissions/ACLs; from Corinna Vinschen commit 23f269562b7537b2f6f5014e50a25e5dcc55a837 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Sep 3 05:33:25 2014 +1000 - (djm) [defines.h sshbuf.c] Move __predict_true|false to defines.h and conditionalise to avoid duplicate definition. commit 41c8de2c0031cf59e7cf0c06b5bcfbf4852c1fda Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Aug 30 16:23:06 2014 +1000 - (djm) [Makefile.in] Make TEST_SHELL a variable; "good idea" tim@ commit d7c81e216a7bd9eed6e239c970d9261bb1651947 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Aug 30 04:18:28 2014 +1000 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] add include guard commit 4687802dda57365b984b897fc3c8e2867ea09b22 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Aug 30 03:29:19 2014 +1000 - (djm) [misc.c] Missing newline between functions commit 51c77e29220dee87c53be2dc47092934acab26fe Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Aug 30 02:30:30 2014 +1000 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] add OPENSSL_[RD]SA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS defines for OpenSSL that lacks them commit 3d673d103bad35afaec6e7ef73e5277216ce33a3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 27 06:32:01 2014 +1000 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c] implement explicit_bzero() using memset_s() where possible; improve fallback to indirect bzero via a volatile pointer to give it more of a chance to avoid being optimised away. commit 146218ac11a1eb0dcade6f793d7acdef163b5ddc Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 27 04:11:55 2014 +1000 - (djm) [monitor.c sshd.c] SIGXFSZ needs to be ignored in postauth monitor, not preauth; bz#2263 commit 1b215c098b3b37e38aa4e4c91bb908eee41183b1 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 27 04:04:40 2014 +1000 - (djm) [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c] [regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c] [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c] [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c] [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c] Don't include openssl/ec.h on !ECC OpenSSL systems commit ad013944af0a19e3f612089d0099bb397cf6502d Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Aug 26 09:27:28 2014 +1000 - (djm) [INSTALL] Recommend libcrypto be built -fPIC, mention LibreSSL, update OpenSSL version requirement. commit ed126de8ee04c66640a0ea2697c4aaf36801f100 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Aug 26 08:37:47 2014 +1000 - (djm) [bufec.c] Skip this file on !ECC OpenSSL commit 9c1dede005746864a4fdb36a7cdf6c51296ca909 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Aug 24 03:01:06 2014 +1000 - (djm) [sftp-server.c] Some systems (e.g. Irix) have prctl() but not PR_SET_DUMPABLE, so adjust ifdef; reported by Tom Christensen commit d244a5816fd1312a33404b436e4dd83594f1119e Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Aug 23 17:06:49 2014 +1000 - (djm) [configure.ac] We now require a working vsnprintf everywhere (not just for systems that lack asprintf); check for it always and extend test to catch more brokenness. Fixes builds on Solaris <= 9 commit 4cec036362a358e398e6a2e6d19d8e5780558634 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Aug 23 03:11:09 2014 +1000 - (djm) [sshd.c] Ignore SIGXFSZ in preauth monitor child; can explode on lastlog writing on platforms with high UIDs; bz#2263 commit 394a60f2598d28b670d934b93942a3370b779b39 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Aug 22 18:06:20 2014 +1000 - (djm) [configure.ac] double braces to appease autoconf commit 4d69aeabd6e60afcdc7cca177ca751708ab79a9d Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Aug 22 17:48:27 2014 +1000 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c] Fix compilation failure (prototype/ definition mismatch) and warning for broken/missing snprintf case. commit 0c11f1ac369d2c0aeb0ab0458a7cd04c72fe5e9e Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Aug 22 17:36:56 2014 +1000 - (djm) [sshbuf-getput-crypto.c] Fix compilation when OpenSSL lacks ECC commit 6d62784b8973340b251fea6b04890f471adf28db Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Aug 22 17:36:19 2014 +1000 - (djm) [configure.ac] include leading zero characters in OpenSSL version number; fixes test for unsupported versions commit 4f1ff1ed782117f5d5204d4e91156ed5da07cbb7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Aug 21 15:54:50 2014 +1000 - (djm) [regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c] Fix for systems that don't set __progname. Diagnosed by Tom Christensen. commit 005a64da0f457410045ef0bfa93c863c2450447d Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Aug 21 10:48:41 2014 +1000 - (djm) [key.h] Fix ifdefs for no-ECC OpenSSL commit aa6598ebb3343c7380e918388e10e8ca5852b613 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Aug 21 10:47:54 2014 +1000 - (djm) [Makefile.in] fix reference to libtest_helper.a in sshkey test too. commit 54703e3cf63f0c80d4157e5ad7dbc2b363ee2c56 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 20 11:10:51 2014 +1000 - (djm) [contrib/cygwin/README] Correct build instructions; from Corinna commit f0935698f0461f24d8d1f1107b476ee5fd4db1cb Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 20 11:06:50 2014 +1000 - (djm) [sshkey.h] Fix compilation when OpenSSL lacks ECC commit c5089ecaec3b2c02f014f4e67518390702a4ba14 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 20 11:06:20 2014 +1000 - (djm) [Makefile.in] refer to libtest_helper.a by explicit path rather than -L/-l; fixes linking problems on some platforms commit 2195847e503a382f83ee969b0a8bd3dfe0e55c18 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 20 11:05:03 2014 +1000 - (djm) [configure.ac] Check OpenSSL version is supported at configure time; suggested by Kevin Brott commit a75aca1bbc989aa9f8b1b08489d37855f3d24d1a Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Aug 19 11:36:07 2014 +1000 - (djm) [INSTALL contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/cygwin/README] [contrib/redhat/openssh.spec contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Remove mentions of TCP wrappers. commit 3f022b5a9477abceeb1bbeab04b055f3cc7ca8f6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Aug 19 11:32:34 2014 +1000 - (djm) [ssh-dss.c] Include openssl/dsa.h for DSA_SIG commit 88137902632aceb923990e98cf5dc923bb3ef2f5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Aug 19 11:28:11 2014 +1000 - (djm) [sshbuf.h] Fix compilation on systems without OPENSSL_HAS_ECC. commit 2f3d1e7fb2eabd3cfbfd8d0f7bdd2f9a1888690b Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Aug 19 11:14:36 2014 +1000 - (djm) [myproposal.h] Make curve25519 KEX dependent on HAVE_EVP_SHA256 instead of OPENSSL_HAS_ECC. commit d4e7d59d01a6c7f59e8c1f94a83c086e9a33d8aa Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Aug 19 11:14:17 2014 +1000 - (djm) [serverloop.c] Fix syntax error on Cygwin; from Corinna Vinschen commit 9eaeea2cf2b6af5f166cfa9ad3c7a90711a147a9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Aug 10 11:35:05 2014 +1000 - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec] [contrib/redhat/openssh.spec contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Update versions commit f8988fbef0c9801d19fa2f8f4f041690412bec37 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Aug 1 13:31:52 2014 +1000 - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] Use -d (detach stdin) flag to disassociate nc from stdin, it's more portable commit 5b3879fd4b7a4e3d43bab8f40addda39bc1169d0 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Aug 1 12:28:31 2014 +1000 - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] Instruct nc not to quit as soon as stdin is closed; avoid regress failures when stdin is /dev/null commit a9c46746d266f8a1b092a72b2150682d1af8ebfc Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Aug 1 12:26:49 2014 +1000 - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] Skip test for non-OpenBSD netcat. We need a better solution, but this will have to do for now. commit 426117b2e965e43f47015942b5be8dd88fe74b88 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 30 12:33:20 2014 +1000 - schwarze@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/28 15:40:08 [sftp-server.8 sshd_config.5] some systems no longer need /dev/log; issue noticed by jirib; ok deraadt commit f497794b6962eaf802ab4ac2a7b22ae591cca1d5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 30 12:32:46 2014 +1000 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/25 21:22:03 [ssh-agent.c] Clear buffer used for handling messages. This prevents keys being left in memory after they have been expired or deleted in some cases (but note that ssh-agent is setgid so you would still need root to access them). Pointed out by Kevin Burns, ok deraadt commit a8a0f65c57c8ecba94d65948e9090da54014dfef Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 30 12:32:28 2014 +1000 - OpenBSD CVS Sync - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/24 22:57:10 [ssh.1] Mention UNIX-domain socket forwarding too. OK jmc@ deraadt@ commit 56b840f2b81e14a2f95c203403633a72566736f8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 25 08:11:30 2014 +1000 - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] restore incorrectly deleted line; pointed out by Christian Hesse commit dd417b60d5ca220565d1014e92b7f8f43dc081eb Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 23 10:41:21 2014 +1000 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 23:35:38 [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/*] Regenerate test keys with certs signed with ed25519 instead of ecdsa. These can be used in -portable on platforms that don't support ECDSA. commit 40e50211896369dba8f64f3b5e5fd58b76f5ac3f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 23 10:35:45 2014 +1000 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 23:57:40 [regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh] Add $OpenBSD tag to make syncs easier commit 07e644251e809b1d4c062cf85bd1146a7e3f5a8a Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 23 10:34:26 2014 +1000 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 23:23:22 [regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh] Sign test certs with ed25519 instead of ecdsa so that they'll work in -portable on platforms that don't have ECDSA in their OpenSSL. ok djm commit cea099a7c4eaecb01b001e5453bb4e5c25006c22 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 23 10:04:02 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 01:32:12 [regress/multiplex.sh] change the test for still-open Unix domain sockets to be robust against nc implementations that produce error messages. from -portable (Id sync only) commit 31eb78078d349b32ea41952ecc944b3ad6cb0d45 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 23 09:43:42 2014 +1000 - guenther@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 07:13:42 [umac.c] Convert from to the shiney new ok dtucker@, who also confirmed that -portable handles this already (ID sync only, includes.h pulls in endian.h if available.) commit 820763efef2d19d965602533036c2b4badc9d465 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 23 09:40:46 2014 +1000 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 01:18:50 [key.c] Prevent spam from key_load_private_pem during hostbased auth. ok djm@ commit c4ee219a66f3190fa96cbd45b4d11015685c6306 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jul 23 04:27:50 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_{file,fuzz,sshkey}.c] Wrap ecdsa- specific tests inside OPENSSL_HAS_ECC. commit 04f4824940ea3edd60835416ececbae16438968a Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jul 22 11:31:47 2014 +1000 - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] change the test for still-open Unix domain sockets to be robust against nc implementations that produce error messages. commit 5ea4fe00d55453aaa44007330bb4c3181bd9b796 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jul 22 09:39:19 2014 +1000 - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] ssh mux master lost -N somehow; put it back commit 948a1774a79a85f9deba6d74db95f402dee32c69 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jul 22 01:07:11 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [sshkey.c] ifdef out unused variable when compiling without OPENSSL_HAS_ECC. commit c8f610f6cc57ae129758052439d9baf13699097b Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Jul 21 10:23:27 2014 +1000 - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] Not all netcat accept the -N option. commit 0e4e95566cd95c887f69272499b8f3880b3ec0f5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Jul 21 09:52:54 2014 +1000 - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/15 15:54:15 [forwarding.sh multiplex.sh] Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding. A remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket. This is a reimplementation of the streamlocal patches by William Ahern from: http://www.25thandclement.com/~william/projects/streamlocal.html OK djm@ markus@ commit 93a87ab27ecdc709169fb24411133998f81e2761 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jul 21 06:30:25 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshkey/ {common,test_file,test_fuzz,test_sshkey}.c] Wrap stdint.h includes in ifdefs. commit 5573171352ea23df2dc6d2fe0324d023b7ba697c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jul 21 02:24:59 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [cipher.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Restore the bits needed to build AES CTR mode against OpenSSL 0.9.8f and above. ok djm commit 74e28682711d005026c7c8f15f96aea9d3c8b5a3 Author: Tim Rice Date: Fri Jul 18 20:00:11 2014 -0700 - (tim) [openbsd-compat/port-uw.c] Include misc.h for fwd_opts, used in servconf.h. commit d1a0421f8e5e933fee6fb58ee6b9a22c63c8a613 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jul 19 07:23:55 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [key.c sshkey.c] Put new ecdsa bits inside ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC. commit f0fe9ea1be62227c130b317769de3d1e736b6dc1 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jul 19 06:33:12 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Add a t-exec target to run just the executable tests. commit 450bc1180d4b061434a4b733c5c8814fa30b022b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jul 19 06:23:18 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [auth2-gss.c gss-serv-krb5.c] Include misc.h for fwd_opts, used in servconf.h. commit ab2ec586baad122ed169285c31927ccf58bc7b28 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 18 15:04:47 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/18 02:46:01 [ssh-agent.c] restore umask around listener socket creation (dropped in streamlocal patch merge) commit 357610d15946381ae90c271837dcdd0cdce7145f Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 18 15:04:10 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/17 07:22:19 [mux.c ssh.c] reflect stdio-forward ("ssh -W host:port ...") failures in exit status. previously we were always returning 0. bz#2255 reported by Brendan Germain; ok dtucker commit dad9a4a0b7c2b5d78605f8df28718f116524134e Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 18 15:03:49 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/17 00:12:03 [key.c] silence "incorrect passphrase" error spam; reported and ok dtucker@ commit f42f7684ecbeec6ce50e0310f80b3d6da2aaf533 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 18 15:03:27 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/17 00:10:18 [mux.c] preserve errno across syscall commit 1b83320628cb0733e3688b85bfe4d388a7c51909 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 18 15:03:02 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/17 00:10:56 [sandbox-systrace.c] ifdef SYS_sendsyslog so this will compile without patching on -stable commit 6d57656331bcd754d912950e4a18ad259d596e61 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 18 15:02:06 2014 +1000 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/16 14:48:57 [ssh.1] add the streamlocal* options to ssh's -o list; millert says they're irrelevant for scp/sftp; ok markus millert commit 7acefbbcbeab725420ea07397ae35992f505f702 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 18 14:11:24 2014 +1000 - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/15 15:54:14 [PROTOCOL auth-options.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth.c auth1.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c] [auth2-passwd.c auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c canohost.c channels.c channels.h] [clientloop.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c mux.c packet.c readconf.c] [readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h serverloop.c session.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] [sshd_config.5 sshlogin.c] Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding. A remote TCP port may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and vice versa or both ends may be a Unix domain socket. This is a reimplementation of the streamlocal patches by William Ahern from: http://www.25thandclement.com/~william/projects/streamlocal.html OK djm@ markus@ commit 6262d760e00714523633bd989d62e273a3dca99a Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 17 09:52:07 2014 +1000 - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/11 13:54:34 [myproposal.h] by popular demand, add back hamc-sha1 to server proposal for better compat with many clients still in use. ok deraadt commit 9d69d937b46ecba17f16d923e538ceda7b705c7a Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 17 09:49:37 2014 +1000 - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/11 08:09:54 [sandbox-systrace.c] Permit use of SYS_sendsyslog from inside the sandbox. Clock is ticking, update your kernels and sshd soon.. libc will start using sendsyslog() in about 4 days. commit f6293a0b4129826fc2e37e4062f96825df43c326 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 17 09:01:25 2014 +1000 - (djm) [digest-openssl.c] Preserve array order when disabling digests. Reported by Petr Lautrbach. commit 00f9cd230709c04399ef5ff80492d70a55230694 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jul 15 10:41:38 2014 +1000 - (djm) [configure.ac] Delay checks for arc4random* until after libcrypto has been located; fixes builds agains libressl-portable commit 1d0df3249c87019556b83306c28d4769375c2edc Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 11 09:19:04 2014 +1000 - OpenBSD CVS Sync - benno@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/09 14:15:56 [ssh-add.c] fix ssh-add crash while loading more than one key ok markus@ commit 7a57eb3d105aa4ced15fb47001092c58811e6d9d Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 9 13:22:31 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/07 08:15:26 [multiplex.sh] remove forced-fatal that I stuck in there to test the new cleanup logic and forgot to remove... commit 612f965239a30fe536b11ece1834d9f470aeb029 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 9 13:22:03 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/06 07:42:03 [multiplex.sh test-exec.sh] add a hook to the cleanup() function to kill $SSH_PID if it is set use it to kill the mux master started in multiplex.sh (it was being left around on fatal failures) commit d0bb950485ba121e43a77caf434115ed6417b46f Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 9 13:07:28 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/09 03:02:15 [key.c] downgrade more error() to debug() to better match what old authfile.c did; suppresses spurious errors with hostbased authentication enabled commit 0070776a038655c57f57e70cd05e4c38a5de9d84 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 9 13:07:06 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/09 01:45:10 [sftp.c] more useful error message when GLOB_NOSPACE occurs; bz#2254, patch from Orion Poplawski commit 079bac2a43c74ef7cf56850afbab3b1932534c50 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 9 13:06:25 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/07 08:19:12 [ssh_config.5] mention that ProxyCommand is executed using shell "exec" to avoid a lingering process; bz#1977 commit 3a48cc090096cf99b9de592deb5f90e444edebfb Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Jul 6 09:32:49 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/05 23:11:48 [channels.c] fix remote-forward cancel regression; ok markus@ commit 48bae3a38cb578713e676708164f6e7151cc64fa Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Jul 6 09:27:06 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 23:18:35 [authfile.h] remove leakmalloc droppings commit 72e6b5c9ed5e72ca3a6ccc3177941b7c487a0826 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 4 09:00:04 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 22:40:43 [servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.8 sshd_config.5] Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether ~/.ssh/rc is executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys option; bz#2160; ok markus@ commit 602943d1179a08dfa70af94f62296ea5e3d6ebb8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 4 08:59:41 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 22:33:41 [channels.c] allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses when GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family; bz#2222 ok markus@ commit 6b37fbb7921d156b31e2c8f39d9e1b6746c34983 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 4 08:59:24 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 22:23:46 [sshconnect.c] when rekeying, skip file/DNS lookup if it is the same as the key sent during initial key exchange. bz#2154 patch from Iain Morgan; ok markus@ commit d2c3cd5f2e47ee24cf7093ce8e948c2e79dfc3fd Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jul 4 08:59:01 2014 +1000 - jsing@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 12:42:16 [cipher-chachapoly.c] Call chacha_ivsetup() immediately before chacha_encrypt_bytes() - this makes it easier to verify that chacha_encrypt_bytes() is only called once per chacha_ivsetup() call. ok djm@ commit 686feb560ec43a06ba04da82b50f3c183c947309 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 21:29:38 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 11:16:55 [auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2.c] make the "Too many authentication failures" message include the user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the authentication success / failure messages; bz#2199, ok dtucker commit 0f12341402e18fd9996ec23189b9418d2722453f Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 21:28:09 2014 +1000 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 07:45:27 [ssh_config.5] escape %C since groff thinks it part of an Rs/Re block; commit 9c38643c5cd47a19db2cc28279dcc28abadc22b3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 21:27:46 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 06:39:19 [ssh.c ssh_config.5] Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that expands to a unique identifer based on a has of the tuple of (local host, remote user, hostname, port). Helps avoid exceeding sockaddr_un's miserly pathname limits for mux control paths. bz#2220, based on patch from mancha1 AT zoho.com; ok markus@ commit 49d9bfe2b2f3e90cc158a215dffa7675e57e7830 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 21:26:42 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 05:38:17 [ssh.1] document that -g will only work in the multiplexed case if applied to the mux master commit ef9f13ba4c58057b2166d1f2e790535da402fbe5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 21:26:21 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 05:32:36 [ssh_config.5] mention '%%' escape sequence in HostName directives and how it may be used to specify IPv6 link-local addresses commit e6a407789e5432dd2e53336fb73476cc69048c54 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 21:25:03 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 04:36:45 [digest.h] forward-declare struct sshbuf so consumers don't need to include sshbuf.h commit 4a1d3d50f02d0a8a4ef95ea4749293cbfb89f919 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 21:24:40 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:47:27 [ssh-keygen.c] When hashing or removing hosts using ssh-keygen, don't choke on @revoked markers and don't remove @cert-authority markers; bz#2241, reported by mlindgren AT runelind.net commit e5c0d52ceb575c3db8c313e0b1aa3845943d7ba8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 21:24:19 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:34:09 [gss-serv.c session.c ssh-keygen.c] standardise on NI_MAXHOST for gethostname() string lengths; about 1/2 the cases were using it already. Fixes bz#2239 en passant commit c174a3b7c14e0d178c61219de2aa1110e209950c Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 21:23:24 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:26:43 [digest-openssl.c] use EVP_Digest() for one-shot hash instead of creating, updating, finalising and destroying a context. bz#2231, based on patch from Timo Teras commit d7ca2cd31ecc4d63a055e2dcc4bf35c13f2db4c5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 21:23:01 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:15:01 [ssh-add.c] make stdout line-buffered; saves partial output getting lost when ssh-add fatal()s part-way through (e.g. when listing keys from an agent that supports key types that ssh-add doesn't); bz#2234, reported by Phil Pennock commit b1e967c8d7c7578dd0c172d85b3046cf54ea42ba Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 21:22:40 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:11:03 [ssh-agent.c] Only cleanup agent socket in the main agent process and not in any subprocesses it may have started (e.g. forked askpass). Fixes agent sockets being zapped when askpass processes fatal(); bz#2236 patch from Dmitry V. Levin commit 61e28e55c3438d796b02ef878bcd28620d452670 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 21:22:22 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 01:45:38 [sshkey.c] make Ed25519 keys' title fit properly in the randomart border; bz#2247 based on patch from Christian Hesse commit 9eb4cd9a32c32d40d36450b68ed93badc6a94c68 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 13:29:50 2014 +1000 - (djm) [monitor_fdpass.c] Use sys/poll.h if poll.h doesn't exist; bz#2237 commit 8da0fa24934501909408327298097b1629b89eaa Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 3 11:54:19 2014 +1000 - (djm) [digest-openssl.c configure.ac] Disable RIPEMD160 if libcrypto doesn't support it. commit 81309c857dd0dbc0a1245a16d621c490ad48cfbb Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 17:45:55 2014 +1000 - (djm) [regress/Makefile] fix execution of sshkey unit/fuzz test commit 82b2482ce68654815ee049b9bf021bb362a35ff2 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 17:43:41 2014 +1000 - (djm) [sshkey.c] Conditionalise inclusion of util.h commit dd8b1dd7933eb6f5652641b0cdced34a387f2e80 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 17:38:31 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 01:14:17 [Makefile.in regress/Makefile regress/unittests/Makefile] [regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile] [regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c] [regress/unittests/sshkey/common.h] [regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh] [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c] [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c] [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c] [regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.c] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp.bb] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.g] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.priv] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1_pw] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp.bb] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n_pw] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp.bb] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.curve] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.priv] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1_pw] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp.bb] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.curve] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.priv] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n_pw] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp.bb] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1_pw] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp.bb] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/pw] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp.bb] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.param.n] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1_pw] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp.bb] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.param.n] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp.bb] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.n] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.p] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.q] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_pw] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp.bb] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.n] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.p] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.q] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.pub] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n] [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n_pw] unit and fuzz tests for new key API commit c1dc24b71f087f385b92652b9673f52af64e0428 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 17:02:03 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 01:04:43 [regress/krl.sh] regress test for broken consecutive revoked serial number ranges commit 43d3ed2dd3feca6d0326c7dc82588d2faa115e92 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 17:01:08 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/21 07:04:21 [regress/integrity.sh] when failing because of unexpected output, show the offending output commit 5a96707ffc8d227c2e7d94fa6b0317f8a152cf4e Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 15:38:05 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/30 05:32:00 [regress/Makefile] unit tests for new buffer API; including basic fuzz testing NB. Id sync only. commit 3ff92ba756aee48e4ae3e0aeff7293517b3dd185 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 15:33:09 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/30 12:54:39 [key.c] suppress spurious error message when loading key with a passphrase; reported by kettenis@ ok markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/02 04:59:06 [cipher-3des1.c] fix ssh protocol 1 on the server that regressed with the sshkey change (sometimes fatal() after auth completed), make file return useful status codes. NB. Id sync only for these two. They were bundled into the sshkey merge above, since it was easier to sync the entire file and then apply portable-specific changed atop it. commit ec3d0e24a1e46873d80507f5cd8ee6d0d03ac5dc Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 15:30:00 2014 +1000 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/27 18:50:39 [ssh-add.c] fix loading of private keys commit 4b3ed647d5b328cf68e6a8ffbee490d8e0683e82 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 15:29:40 2014 +1000 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/27 16:41:56 [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c ssh.c] fix remote fwding with same listen port but different listen address with gerhard@, ok djm@ commit 9e01ff28664921ce9b6500681333e42fb133b4d0 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 15:29:21 2014 +1000 - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/25 14:16:09 [sshbuf.c] unblock SIGSEGV before raising it ok djm commit 1845fe6bda0729e52f4c645137f4fc3070b5438a Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 15:29:01 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 02:21:01 [scp.c] when copying local->remote fails during read, don't send uninitialised heap to the remote end. Reported by Jann Horn commit 19439e9a2a0ac0b4b3b1210e89695418beb1c883 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 15:28:40 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 02:19:48 [ssh.c] don't fatal() when hostname canonicalisation fails with a ProxyCommand in use; continue and allow the ProxyCommand to connect anyway (e.g. to a host with a name outside the DNS behind a bastion) commit 8668706d0f52654fe64c0ca41a96113aeab8d2b8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 15:28:02 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 01:13:21 [Makefile.in auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-options.c auth-rsa.c [auth2-none.c auth2-pubkey.c authfile.c authfile.h cipher-3des1.c [cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly.h cipher.c cipher.h [digest-libc.c digest-openssl.c digest.h dns.c entropy.c hmac.h [hostfile.c key.c key.h krl.c monitor.c packet.c rsa.c rsa.h [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c [ssh-keygen.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-pkcs11.c [ssh-rsa.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.h sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c [sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshkey.c sshkey.h [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] New key API: refactor key-related functions to be more library-like, existing API is offered as a set of wrappers. with and ok markus@ Thanks also to Ben Hawkes, David Tomaschik, Ivan Fratric, Matthew Dempsky and Ron Bowes for a detailed review a few months ago. NB. This commit also removes portable OpenSSH support for OpenSSL <0.9.8e. commit 2cd7929250cf9e9f658d70dcd452f529ba08c942 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 12:48:30 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 00:52:02 [krl.c] fix bug in KRL generation: multiple consecutive revoked certificate serial number ranges could be serialised to an invalid format. Readers of a broken KRL caused by this bug will fail closed, so no should-have-been-revoked key will be accepted. commit 99db840ee8dbbd2b3fbc6c45d0ee2f6a65e96898 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 12:48:04 2014 +1000 - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/18 15:42:09 [sshbuf-getput-crypto.c] The ssh_get_bignum functions must accept the same range of bignums the corresponding ssh_put_bignum functions create. This fixes the use of 16384-bit RSA keys (bug reported by Eivind Evensen). ok djm@ commit 84a89161a9629239b64171ef3e22ef6a3e462d51 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 12:47:48 2014 +1000 - matthew@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/18 02:59:13 [sandbox-systrace.c] Now that we have a dedicated getentropy(2) system call for arc4random(3), we can disallow __sysctl(2) in OpenSSH's systrace sandbox. ok djm commit 51504ceec627c0ad57b9f75585c7b3d277f326be Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jul 2 12:47:25 2014 +1000 - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/13 08:26:29 [sandbox-systrace.c] permit SYS_getentropy from matthew commit a261b8df59117f7dc52abb3a34b35a40c2c9fa88 Author: Tim Rice Date: Wed Jun 18 16:17:28 2014 -0700 - (tim) [openssh/session.c] Work around to get chroot sftp working on UnixWare commit 316fac6f18f87262a315c79bcf68b9f92c9337e4 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jun 17 23:06:07 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [entropy.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.{c,h} openbsd-compat/regress/{.cvsignore,Makefile.in,opensslvertest.c}] Move the OpenSSL header/library version test into its own function and add tests for it. Fix it to allow fix version upgrades (but not downgrades). Prompted by chl@ via OpenSMTPD (issue #462) and Debian (bug #748150). ok djm@ chl@ commit af665bb7b092a59104db1e65577851cf35b86e32 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jun 16 22:50:55 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [defines.h] Fix undef of _PATH_MAILDIR. From rak at debian via OpenSMTPD and chl@ commit f9696566fb41320820f3b257ab564fa321bb3751 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jun 13 11:06:04 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Remove tcpwrappers support, support has already been removed from sshd.c. commit 5e2b8894b0b24af4ad0a2f7aa33ebf255df7a8bc Author: Tim Rice Date: Wed Jun 11 18:31:10 2014 -0700 - (tim) [regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h] Add includes.h for u_intXX_t types. commit 985ee2cbc3e43bc65827c3c0d4df3faa99160c37 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jun 12 05:32:29 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.c regress/unittests/test_helper/*] Wrap stdlib.h include an ifdef for platforms that don't have it. commit cf5392c2db2bb1dbef9818511d34056404436109 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jun 12 05:22:49 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [defines.h] Add va_copy if we don't already have it, taken from openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c. commit 58538d795e0b662f2f4e5a7193f1204bbe992ddd Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jun 11 13:39:24 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [bufaux.c bufbn.c bufec.c buffer.c] Pull in includes.h for compat stuff, specifically whether or not OpenSSL has ECC. commit eb012ac581fd0abc16ee86ee3a68cf07c8ce4d08 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jun 11 13:10:00 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/arc4random.c] Use explicit_bzero instead of an assigment that might get optimized out. ok djm@ commit b9609fd86c623d6d440e630f5f9a63295f7aea20 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jun 11 08:04:02 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [sshbuf.h] Only declare ECC functions if building without OpenSSL or if OpenSSL has ECC. commit a54a040f66944c6e8913df8635a01a2327219be9 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jun 11 07:58:35 2014 +1000 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/10 21:46:11 [sshbuf.h] Group ECC functions together to make things a little easier in -portable. "doesn't bother me" deraadt@ commit 9f92c53bad04a89067756be8198d4ec2d8a08875 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jun 11 07:57:58 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/05 22:17:50 [sshconnect2.c] fix inverted test that caused PKCS#11 keys that were explicitly listed not to be preferred. Reported by Dirk-Willem van Gulik commit 15c254a25394f96643da2ad0f674acdc51e89856 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jun 11 07:38:49 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c] ifdef ECC variable too. commit d7af0cc5bf273eeed0897a99420bc26841d07d8f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jun 11 07:37:25 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [myprosal.h] Don't include curve25519-sha256@libssh.org in the proposal if the version of OpenSSL we're using doesn't support ECC. commit 67508ac2563c33d582be181a3e777c65f549d22f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Jun 11 06:27:16 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c] Only do NISTP256 curve tests if OpenSSL has them. commit 6482d90a65459a88c18c925368525855832272b3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue May 27 14:34:42 2014 +1000 - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c] [openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h] On Cygwin, determine privilege separation user at runtime, since it may need to be a domain account. Patch from Corinna Vinschen. commit f9eb5e0734f7a7f6e975809eb54684d2a06a7ffc Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue May 27 14:31:58 2014 +1000 - (djm) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] Updated Cygwin ssh-host-config from Corinna Vinschen, fixing a number of bugs and preparing for Cygwin 1.7.30. commit eae88744662e6b149f43ef071657727f1a157d95 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue May 27 14:27:02 2014 +1000 - (djm) [cipher.c] Fix merge botch. commit 564b5e253c1d95c26a00e8288f0089a2571661c3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 22 08:23:59 2014 +1000 - (djm) [Makefile.in] typo in path commit e84d10302aeaf7a1acb05c451f8718143656856a Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed May 21 17:13:36 2014 +1000 revert a diff I didn't mean to commit commit 795b86313f1f1aab9691666c4f2d5dae6e4acd50 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed May 21 17:12:53 2014 +1000 - (djm) [misc.c] Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC when it is available. It takes into account time spent suspended, thereby ensuring timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire correctly. bz#2228 reported by John Haxby commit 18912775cb97c0b1e75e838d3c7d4b56648137b5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed May 21 17:06:46 2014 +1000 - (djm) [commit configure.ac defines.h sshpty.c] don't attempt to use vhangup on Linux. It doens't work for non-root users, and for them it just messes up the tty settings. commit 7f1c264d3049cd95234e91970ccb5406e1d15b27 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 18:01:52 2014 +1000 - (djm) [sshbuf.c] need __predict_false commit e7429f2be8643e1100380a8a7389d85cc286c8fe Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 18:01:01 2014 +1000 - (djm) [regress/Makefile Makefile.in] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.c [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c] [regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.c] [regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c] Hook new unit tests into the build and "make tests" commit def1de086707b0e6b046fe7e115c60aca0227a99 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 15:17:15 2014 +1000 - (djm) [regress/unittests/Makefile] [regress/unittests/Makefile.inc] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c] [regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c] [regress/unittests/test_helper/Makefile] [regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.c] [regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c] [regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h] Import new unit tests from OpenBSD; not yet hooked up to build. commit 167685756fde8bc213a8df2c8e1848e312db0f46 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 15:08:40 2014 +1000 - logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/04 10:40:59 [connect-privsep.sh] Remove the Z flag from the list of malloc options as it was removed from malloc.c 10 days ago. OK from miod@ commit d0b69fe90466920d69c96069312e24b581771bd7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 15:08:19 2014 +1000 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/03 18:46:14 [proxy-connect.sh] Add tests for with and without compression, with and without privsep. commit edb1af50441d19fb2dd9ccb4d75bf14473fca584 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 15:07:53 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/21 22:15:37 [dhgex.sh integrity.sh kextype.sh rekey.sh try-ciphers.sh] repair regress tests broken by server-side default cipher/kex/mac changes by ensuring that the option under test is included in the server's algorithm list commit 54343e95c70994695f8842fb22836321350198d3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 15:07:33 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/13 20:44:49 [login-timeout.sh] this test is a sorry mess of race conditions; add another sleep to avoid a failure on slow machines (at least until I find a better way) commit e5b9f0f2ee6e133894307e44e862b66426990733 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 14:58:07 2014 +1000 - (djm) [Makefile.in configure.ac sshbuf-getput-basic.c] [sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf.c] compilation and portability fixes commit b9c566788a9ebd6a9d466f47a532124f111f0542 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 14:43:37 2014 +1000 - (djm) [configure.ac] Unconditionally define WITH_OPENSSL until we write portability glue to support building without libcrypto commit 3dc27178b42234b653a32f7a87292d7994045ee3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 14:37:59 2014 +1000 - logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/05 07:02:30 [sftp.c] Zap extra whitespace. OK from djm@ and dtucker@ commit c31a0cd5b31961f01c5b731f62a6cb9d4f767472 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 14:37:39 2014 +1000 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/03 17:20:34 [monitor.c packet.c packet.h] unbreak compression, by re-init-ing the compression code in the post-auth child. the new buffer code is more strict, and requires buffer_init() while the old code was happy after a bzero(); originally from djm@ commit 686c7d9ee6f44b2be4128d7860b6b37adaeba733 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 14:37:03 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/02 03:27:54 [chacha.h cipher-chachapoly.h digest.h hmac.h kex.h kexc25519.c] [misc.h poly1305.h ssh-pkcs11.c defines.h] revert __bounded change; it causes way more problems for portable than it solves; pointed out by dtucker@ commit 294c58a007cfb2f3bddc4fc3217e255857ffb9bf Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 14:35:03 2014 +1000 - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/30 19:07:48 [mac.c myproposal.h umac.c] UMAC can use our local fallback implementation of AES when OpenSSL isn't available. Glue code straight from Ted Krovetz's original umac.c. ok markus@ commit 05e82c3b963c33048128baf72a6f6b3a1c10b4c1 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 14:33:43 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/30 05:29:56 [bufaux.c bufbn.c bufec.c buffer.c buffer.h sshbuf-getput-basic.c] [sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c sshbuf.h ssherr.c] [ssherr.h] New buffer API; the first installment of the conversion/replacement of OpenSSH's internals to make them usable as a standalone library. This includes a set of wrappers to make it compatible with the existing buffer API so replacement can occur incrementally. With and ok markus@ Thanks also to Ben Hawkes, David Tomaschik, Ivan Fratric, Matthew Dempsky and Ron Bowes for a detailed review. commit 380948180f847a26f2d0c85b4dad3dca2ed2fd8b Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 14:25:18 2014 +1000 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 20:36:51 [sftp.c] Don't attempt to append a nul quote char to the filename. Should prevent fatal'ing with "el_insertstr failed" when there's a single quote char somewhere in the string. bz#2238, ok markus@ commit d7fd8bedd4619a2ec7fd02aae4c4e1db4431ad9f Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 14:24:59 2014 +1000 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 19:58:50 [sftp.c] Move nulling of variable next to where it's freed. ok markus@ commit 1f0311c7c7d10c94ff7f823de9c5b2ed79368b14 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 14:24:09 2014 +1000 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 18:01:49 [auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c] [kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c] [roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no); reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519; allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm commit c5893785564498cea73cb60d2cf199490483e080 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 13:48:49 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 13:10:30 [clientloop.c serverloop.c] bz#1818 - don't send channel success/failre replies on channels that have sent a close already; analysis and patch from Simon Tatham; ok markus@ commit 633de33b192d808d87537834c316dc8b75fe1880 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 13:48:26 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/28 03:09:18 [authfile.c bufaux.c buffer.h channels.c krl.c mux.c packet.c packet.h] [ssh-keygen.c] buffer_get_string_ptr's return should be const to remind callers that futzing with it will futz with the actual buffer contents commit 15271907843e4ae50dcfc83b3594014cf5e9607b Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 13:47:56 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/23 12:42:34 [readconf.c] don't record duplicate IdentityFiles commit 798a02568b13a2e46efebd81f08c8f4bb33a6dc7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 13:47:37 2014 +1000 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/22 14:16:30 [sftp.1] zap eol whitespace; commit d875ff78d2b8436807381051de112f0ebf9b9ae1 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 13:47:15 2014 +1000 - logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/22 12:42:04 [sftp.1] Document sftp upload resume. OK from djm@, with feedback from okan@. commit b15cd7bb097fd80dc99520f45290ef775da1ef19 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 13:46:52 2014 +1000 - logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/22 10:07:12 [sftp.c] Sort the sftp command list. OK from djm@ commit d8accc0aa72656ba63d50937165c5ae49db1dcd6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 13:46:25 2014 +1000 - logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/21 14:36:16 [sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp.c] Implement sftp upload resume support. OK from djm@, with input from guenther@, mlarkin@ and okan@ commit 16cd3928a87d20c77b13592a74b60b08621d3ce6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 13:45:58 2014 +1000 - logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/20 09:24:26 [dns.c dns.h ssh-keygen.c] Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519 key types. OK from djm@ commit ec0b67eb3b4e12f296ced1fafa01860c374f7eea Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu May 15 13:45:26 2014 +1000 - (djm) [rijndael.c rijndael.h] Sync with newly-ressurected versions ine OpenBSD commit f028460d0b2e5a584355321015cde69bf6fd933e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu May 1 02:24:35 2014 +1000 - (dtucker) [defines.h] Define __GNUC_PREREQ__ macro if we don't already have it. Only attempt to use __attribute__(__bounded__) for gcc. commit b628cc4c3e4a842bab5e4584d18c2bc5fa4d0edf Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:33:58 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/20 02:49:32 [compat.c] add a canonical 6.6 + curve25519 bignum fix fake version that I can recommend people use ahead of the openssh-6.7 release commit 888566913933a802f3a329ace123ebcb7154cf78 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:33:19 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/20 02:30:25 [misc.c misc.h umac.c] use get/put_u32 to load values rather than *((UINT32 *)p) that breaks on strict-alignment architectures; reported by and ok stsp@ commit 16f85cbc7e5139950e6a38317e7c8b368beafa5d Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:29:28 2014 +1000 - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/19 18:42:19 [ssh.1] delete .xr to hosts.equiv. there's still an unfortunate amount of documentation referring to rhosts equivalency in here. commit 69cb24b7356ec3f0fc5ff04a68f98f2c55c766f4 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:29:06 2014 +1000 - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/19 18:15:16 [sshd.8] remove some really old rsh references commit 84c1e7bca8c4ceaccf4d5557e39a833585a3c77e Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:27:53 2014 +1000 - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/19 14:53:48 [ssh-keysign.c sshd.c] Delete futile calls to RAND_seed. ok djm NB. Id sync only. This only applies to OpenBSD's libcrypto slashathon commit 0e6b67423b8662f9ca4c92750309e144fd637ef1 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:27:01 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/19 05:54:59 [compat.c] missing wildcard; pointed out by naddy@ commit 9395b28223334826837c15e8c1bb4dfb3b0d2ca5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:25:30 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/18 23:52:25 [compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c version.h] OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 have a bug that causes ~0.2% of connections using the curve25519-sha256@libssh.org KEX exchange method to fail when connecting with something that implements the spec properly. Disable this KEX method when speaking to one of the affected versions. reported by Aris Adamantiadis; ok markus@ commit 8c492da58f8ceb85cf5f7066f23e26fb813a963d Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:25:09 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/16 23:28:12 [ssh-agent.1] remove the identity files from this manpage - ssh-agent doesn't deal with them at all and the same information is duplicated in ssh-add.1 (which does deal with them); prodded by deraadt@ commit adbfdbbdccc70c9bd70d81ae096db115445c6e26 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:24:49 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/16 23:22:45 [bufaux.c] skip leading zero bytes in buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(); reported by jan AT mojzis.com; ok markus@ commit 75c62728dc87af6805696eeb520b9748faa136c8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:24:31 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/12 04:55:53 [sshd.c] avoid crash at exit: check that pmonitor!=NULL before dereferencing; bz#2225, patch from kavi AT juniper.net commit 2a328437fb1b0976f2f4522d8645803d5a5d0967 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:24:01 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/01 05:32:57 [packet.c] demote a debug3 to PACKET_DEBUG; ok markus@ commit 7d6a9fb660c808882d064e152d6070ffc3844c3f Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:23:43 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/01 03:34:10 [sshconnect.c] When using VerifyHostKeyDNS with a DNSSEC resolver, down-convert any certificate keys to plain keys and attempt SSHFP resolution. Prevents a server from skipping SSHFP lookup and forcing a new-hostkey dialog by offering only certificate keys. Reported by mcv21 AT cam.ac.uk commit fcd62c0b66b8415405ed0af29c236329eb88cc0f Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:23:21 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/01 02:05:27 [ssh-keysign.c] include fingerprint of key not found use arc4random_buf() instead of loop+arc4random() commit 43b156cf72f900f88065b0a1c1ebd09ab733ca46 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:23:03 2014 +1000 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/31 13:39:34 [ssh-keygen.1] the text for the -K option was inserted in the wrong place in -r1.108; fix From: Matthew Clarke commit c1621c84f2dc1279065ab9fde2aa9327af418900 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:22:46 2014 +1000 - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/28 05:17:11 [ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] sync available and default algorithms, improve algorithm list formatting help from jmc@ and schwarze@, ok deraadt@ commit f2719b7c2b8a3b14d778d8a6d8dc729b5174b054 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:22:18 2014 +1000 - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 19:58:37 [sshd.8 sshd.c] remove libwrap support. ok deraadt djm mfriedl commit 4f40209aa4060b9c066a2f0d9332ace7b8dfb391 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:21:22 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 04:55:35 [chacha.h cipher-chachapoly.h digest.h hmac.h kex.h kexc25519.c [misc.h poly1305.h ssh-pkcs11.c] use __bounded(...) attribute recently added to sys/cdefs.h instead of longform __attribute__(__bounded(...)); for brevity and a warning free compilation with llvm/clang commit 9235a030ad1b16903fb495d81544e0f7c7449523 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:17:20 2014 +1000 Three commits in one (since they touch the same heavily-diverged file repeatedly): - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03 [myproposal.h] trimm default proposals. This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers (arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration (the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available for the config files). ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26 [myproposal.h] The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code makes the previous diff highly unpallatable. We want to go in that direction for the server, but not for the client. Sigh. Brought up by naddy. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27 [myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@ commit 6e1777f592f15f4559728c78204617537b1ac076 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:02:58 2014 +1000 - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/19 14:42:44 [scp.1] there is no need for rcp anymore ok deraadt millert commit eb1b7c514d2a7b1802ccee8cd50e565a4d419887 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:02:26 2014 +1000 - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/17 19:44:10 [ssh.1] old descriptions of des and blowfish are old. maybe ok deraadt commit f0858de6e1324ec730752387074b111b8551081e Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:01:30 2014 +1000 - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/15 17:28:26 [ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] Improve usage() and documentation towards the standard form. In particular, this line saves a lot of man page reading time. usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1] [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile] ok schwarze jmc commit 94bfe0fbd6e91a56b5b0ab94ac955d2a67d101aa Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:00:51 2014 +1000 - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/12 13:06:59 [ssh-keyscan.1] scan for Ed25519 keys by default too commit 3819519288b2b3928c6882f5883b0f55148f4fc0 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:00:28 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/12 04:51:12 [authfile.c] correct test that kdf name is not "none" or "bcrypt" commit 8f9cd709c7cf0655d414306a0ed28306b33802be Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 13:00:11 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/12 04:50:32 [auth-bsdauth.c ssh-keygen.c] don't count on things that accept arguments by reference to clear things for us on error; most things do, but it's unsafe form. commit 1c7ef4be83f6dec84509a312518b9df00ab491d9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 12:59:46 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/12 04:44:58 [ssh-keyscan.c] scan for Ed25519 keys by default too commit c10bf4d051c97939b30a1616c0499310057d07da Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Apr 20 12:58:04 2014 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/03 22:22:30 [session.c] ignore enviornment variables with embedded '=' or '\0' characters; spotted by Jann Horn; ok deraadt@ Id sync only - portable already has this. commit c2e49062faccbcd7135c40d1c78c5c329c58fc2e Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Apr 1 14:42:46 2014 +1100 - (djm) Use full release (e.g. 6.5p1) in debug output rather than just version. From des@des.no commit 14928b7492abec82afa4c2b778fc03f78cd419b6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Apr 1 14:38:07 2014 +1100 - (djm) On platforms that support it, use prctl() to prevent sftp-server from accessing /proc/self/{mem,maps}; patch from jann AT thejh.net commit 48abc47e60048461fe9117e108a7e99ea1ac2bb8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Mar 17 14:45:56 2014 +1100 - (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Soft-fail stat() syscalls. Add XXX to remind myself to add sandbox violation logging via the log socket. commit 9c36698ca2f554ec221dc7ef29c7a89e97c88705 Author: Tim Rice Date: Fri Mar 14 12:45:01 2014 -0700 20140314 - (tim) [opensshd.init.in] Add support for ed25519 commit 19158b2447e35838d69b2b735fb640d1e86061ea Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Mar 13 13:14:21 2014 +1100 - (djm) Release OpenSSH 6.6 commit 8569eba5d7f7348ce3955eeeb399f66f25c52ece Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Mar 4 09:35:17 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/03 22:22:30 [session.c] ignore enviornment variables with embedded '=' or '\0' characters; spotted by Jann Horn; ok deraadt@ commit 2476c31b96e89aec7d4e73cb6fbfb9a4290de3a7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Mar 2 04:01:00 2014 +1100 - (djm) [regress/Makefile] Disable dhgex regress test; it breaks when no moduli file exists at the expected location. commit c83fdf30e9db865575b2521b1fe46315cf4c70ae Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Feb 28 10:34:03 2014 +1100 - (djm) [regress/host-expand.sh] Add RCS Id commit 834aeac3555e53f7d29a6fcf3db010dfb99681c7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Feb 28 10:25:16 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 21:21:25 [agent-ptrace.sh agent.sh] keep return values that are printed in error messages; from portable (Id sync only) commit 4f7f1a9a0de24410c30952c7e16d433240422182 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Feb 28 10:24:11 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 20:04:16 [login-timeout.sh] remove any existing LoginGraceTime from sshd_config before adding a specific one for the test back in commit d705d987c27f68080c8798eeb5262adbdd6b4ffd Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Feb 28 10:23:26 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/26 10:49:17 [scp-ssh-wrapper.sh scp.sh] make sure $SCP is tested on the remote end rather than whichever one happens to be in $PATH; from portable (Id sync only) commit 624a3ca376e3955a4b9d936c9e899e241b65d357 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Feb 28 10:22:37 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/26 10:22:10 [regress/cert-hostkey.sh] automatically generate revoked keys from listed keys rather than manually specifying each type; from portable (Id sync only) commit b84392328425e4b9a71f8bde5fe6a4a4c48d3ec4 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Feb 28 10:21:26 2014 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/25 04:35:32 [regress/Makefile regress/dhgex.sh] Add a test for DH GEX sizes commit 1e2aa3d90472293ea19008f02336d6d68aa05793 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Feb 28 10:19:51 2014 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/20 00:00:30 [sftp-chroot.sh] append to rather than truncating the log file commit f483cc16fe7314e24a37aa3a4422b03c013c3213 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Feb 28 10:19:11 2014 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/19 23:43:02 [regress/sftp-chroot.sh] Don't use -q on sftp as it suppresses logging, instead redirect the output to the regress logfile. commit 6486f16f1c0ebd6f39286f6ab5e08286d90a994a Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Feb 28 10:03:52 2014 +1100 - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec] [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Crank version numbers commit 92cf5adea194140380e6af6ec32751f9ad540794 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Feb 28 10:01:53 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 22:57:40 [version.h] openssh-6.6 commit fc5d6759aba71eb205b296b5f148010ffc828583 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Feb 28 10:01:28 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 22:47:07 [sshd_config.5] bz#2184 clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple matching Match blocks; ok dtucker@ commit 172ec7e0af1a5f1d682f6a2dca335c6c186153d5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Feb 28 10:00:57 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 08:25:09 [bufbn.c] off by one in range check commit f9a9aaba437c2787e40cf7cc928281950e161678 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Feb 28 10:00:27 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 00:41:49 [bufbn.c] fix unsigned overflow that could lead to reading a short ssh protocol 1 bignum value; found by Ben Hawkes; ok deraadt@ commit fb3423b612713d9cde67c8a75f6f51188d6a3de3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Feb 27 10:20:07 2014 +1100 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/26 21:53:37 [sshd.c] ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids needs GSSAPI commit 1348129a34f0f7728c34d86c100a32dcc8d1f922 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Feb 27 10:18:32 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/26 20:29:29 [channels.c] don't assume that the socks4 username is \0 terminated; spotted by Ben Hawkes; ok markus@ commit e6a74aeeacd01d885262ff8e50eb28faee8c8039 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Feb 27 10:17:49 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/26 20:28:44 [auth2-gss.c gss-serv.c ssh-gss.h sshd.c] bz#2107 - cache OIDs of supported GSSAPI mechanisms before privsep sandboxing, as running this code in the sandbox can cause violations; ok markus@ commit 08b57c67f3609340ff703fe2782d7058acf2529e Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Feb 27 10:17:13 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/26 20:18:37 [ssh.c] bz#2205: avoid early hostname lookups unless canonicalisation is enabled; ok dtucker@ markus@ commit 13f97b2286142fd0b8eab94e4ce84fe124eeb752 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Feb 24 15:57:55 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/23 20:11:36 [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.c ssh_config.5] reparse ssh_config and ~/.ssh/config if hostname canonicalisation changes the hostname. This allows users to write configurations that always refer to canonical hostnames, e.g. CanonicalizeHostname yes CanonicalDomains int.example.org example.org CanonicalizeFallbackLocal no Host *.int.example.org Compression off Host *.example.org User djm ok markus@ commit bee3a234f3d1ad4244952bcff1b4b7c525330dc2 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Feb 24 15:57:22 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/23 20:03:42 [ssh-ed25519.c] check for unsigned overflow; not reachable in OpenSSH but others might copy our code... commit 0628780abe61e7e50cba48cdafb1837f49ff23b2 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Feb 24 15:56:45 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/22 01:32:19 [readconf.c] when processing Match blocks, skip 'exec' clauses if previous predicates failed to match; ok markus@ commit 0890dc8191bb201eb01c3429feec0300a9d3a930 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Feb 24 15:56:07 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/15 23:05:36 [channels.c] avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" errors in ssh -W; bz#2200, debian#738692 via Colin Watson; ok dtucker@ commit d3cf67e1117c25d151d0f86396e77ee3a827045a Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Feb 24 15:55:36 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/07 06:55:54 [cipher.c mac.c] remove some logging that makes ssh debugging output very verbose; ok markus commit 03ae081aeaa118361c81ece76eb7cc1aaa2b40c5 Author: Tim Rice Date: Fri Feb 21 09:09:34 2014 -0800 20140221 - (tim) [configure.ac] Fix cut-and-paste error. Patch from Bryan Drewery. commit 4a20959d2e3c90e9d66897c0b4032c785672d815 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 13 16:38:32 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.{c,h}] Add compat code for older OpenSSL versions that don't have EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex. commit d1a7a9c0fd1ac2e3314cceb2891959fd2cd9eabb Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Feb 7 09:24:33 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/06 22:21:01 [sshconnect.c] in ssh_create_socket(), only do the getaddrinfo for BindAddress when BindAddress is actually specified. Fixes regression in 6.5 for UsePrivilegedPort=yes; patch from Corinna Vinschen commit 6ce35b6cc4ead1bf98abec34cb2e2d6ca0abb15e Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Feb 7 09:24:14 2014 +1100 - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/05 20:13:25 [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] tweak synopsis: calling ssh-keygen without any arguments is fine; ok jmc@ while here, fix ordering in usage(); requested by jmc@ commit 6434cb2cfbbf0a46375d2d22f2ff9927feb5e478 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Feb 6 11:17:50 2014 +1100 - (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Not all Linux architectures define __NR_shutdown; some go via the socketcall(2) multiplexer. commit 8d36f9ac71eff2e9f5770c0518b73d875f270647 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Feb 6 10:44:13 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c] Don't bother checking for non-NULL before freeing since free(NULL) is a no-op. ok djm. commit a0959da3680b4ce8cf911caf3293a6d90f88eeb7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Feb 5 10:33:45 2014 +1100 - (djm) [sandbox-capsicum.c] Don't fatal if Capsicum is offered by headers/libc but not supported by the kernel. Patch from Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC commit 9c449bc183b256c84d8f740727b0bc54d247b15e Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 4 11:38:28 2014 +1100 - (djm) [regress/setuid-allowed.c] Missing string.h for strerror() commit bf7e0f03be661b6f5b3bfe325135ce19391f9c4d Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 4 11:37:50 2014 +1100 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/Makefile.in] Add missing explicit_bzero.o commit eb6d870a0ea8661299bb2ea8f013d3ace04e2024 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 4 11:26:34 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/04 00:24:29 [ssh.c] delay lowercasing of hostname until right before hostname canonicalisation to unbreak case-sensitive matching of ssh_config; reported by Ike Devolder; ok markus@ commit d56b44d2dfa093883a5c4e91be3f72d99946b170 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 4 11:26:04 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/04 00:24:29 [ssh.c] delay lowercasing of hostname until right before hostname canonicalisation to unbreak case-sensitive matching of ssh_config; reported by Ike Devolder; ok markus@ commit db3c595ea74ea9ccd5aa644d7e1f8dc675710731 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 4 11:25:45 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/02 03:44:31 [digest-libc.c digest-openssl.c] convert memset of potentially-private data to explicit_bzero() commit aae07e2e2000dd318418fd7fd4597760904cae32 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 4 11:20:40 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/03 23:28:00 [ssh-ecdsa.c] fix memory leak; ECDSA_SIG_new() allocates 'r' and 's' for us, unlike DSA_SIG_new. Reported by Batz Spear; ok markus@ commit a5103f413bde6f31bff85d6e1fd29799c647d765 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 4 11:20:14 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/02 03:44:32 [auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-passwd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c cipher-3des1.c cipher.c clientloop.c gss-serv.c kex.c] [kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexecdhc.c kexgexc.c kexecdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c] [monitor.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c readpass.c rsa.c serverloop.c] [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c] [ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c] convert memset of potentially-private data to explicit_bzero() commit 1d2c4564265ee827147af246a16f3777741411ed Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 4 11:18:20 2014 +1100 - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/31 16:39:19 [auth2-chall.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufec.c canohost.c] [channels.c cipher-chachapoly.c clientloop.c configure.ac hostfile.c] [kexc25519.c krl.c monitor.c sandbox-systrace.c session.c] [sftp-client.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshlogin.c] [openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] replace most bzero with explicit_bzero, except a few that cna be memset ok djm dtucker commit 3928de067c286683a95fbdbdb5fdb3c78a0e5efd Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 4 11:13:54 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/30 22:26:14 [sandbox-systrace.c] allow shutdown(2) syscall in sandbox - it may be called by packet_close() from portable (Id sync only; change is already in portable) commit e1e480aee8a9af6cfbe7188667b7b940d6b57f9f Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 4 11:13:17 2014 +1100 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/29 14:04:51 [sshd_config.5] document kbdinteractiveauthentication; requested From: Ross L Richardson dtucker/markus helped explain its workings; commit 7cc194f70d4a5ec9a82d19422eaf18db4a6624c6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 4 11:12:56 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/29 06:18:35 [Makefile.in auth.h auth2-jpake.c auth2.c jpake.c jpake.h monitor.c] [monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h readconf.c readconf.h] [schnorr.c schnorr.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c] remove experimental, never-enabled JPAKE code; ok markus@ commit b0f26544cf6f4feeb1a4f6db09fca834f5c9867d Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 4 11:10:01 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/29 00:19:26 [sshd.c] use kill(0, ...) instead of killpg(0, ...); on most operating systems they are equivalent, but SUSv2 describes the latter as having undefined behaviour; from portable; ok dtucker (Id sync only; change is already in portable) commit f8f35bc471500348bb262039fb1fc43175d251b0 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 4 11:09:12 2014 +1100 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/28 14:13:39 [ssh-keyscan.1] kill some bad Pa; From: Jan Stary commit 0ba85d696ae9daf66002c2e4ab0d6bb111e1a787 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 4 11:08:38 2014 +1100 ignore a few more regress droppings commit ec93d15170b7a6ddf63fd654bd0f6a752acc19dd Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 4 11:07:13 2014 +1100 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/27 20:13:46 [digest.c digest-openssl.c digest-libc.c Makefile.in] rename digest.c to digest-openssl.c and add libc variant; ok djm@ commit 4a1c7aa640fb97d3472d51b215b6a0ec0fd025c7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 4 11:03:36 2014 +1100 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/27 19:18:54 [auth-rsa.c cipher.c ssh-agent.c sshconnect1.c sshd.c] replace openssl MD5 with our ssh_digest_*; ok djm@ commit 4e8d937af79ce4e253f77ec93489d098b25becc3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Feb 4 11:02:42 2014 +1100 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/27 18:58:14 [Makefile.in digest.c digest.h hostfile.c kex.h mac.c hmac.c hmac.h] replace openssl HMAC with an implementation based on our ssh_digest_* ok and feedback djm@ commit 69d0d09f76bab5aec86fbf78489169f63bd16475 Author: Tim Rice Date: Fri Jan 31 14:25:18 2014 -0800 - (tim) [Makefile.in] build regress/setuid-allow. commit 0eeafcd76b972a3d159f3118227c149a4d7817fe Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jan 31 14:18:51 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [readconf.c] Include for the hton macros. Fixes build with HP-UX's compiler. Patch from Kevin Brott. commit 7e5cec6070673e9f9785ffc749837ada22fbe99f Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jan 31 09:25:34 2014 +1100 - (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c sandbox-systrace.c] Allow shutdown(2) syscall from sandboxes; it may be called by packet_close. commit cdb6c90811caa5df2df856be9b0b16db020fe31d Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 30 12:50:17 2014 +1100 - (djm) Release openssh-6.5p1 commit 996ea80b1884b676a901439f1f2681eb6ff68501 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 30 12:49:55 2014 +1100 trim entries prior to openssh-6.0p1 commit f5bbd3b657b6340551c8a95f74a70857ff8fac79 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 30 11:26:46 2014 +1100 - (djm) [configure.ac atomicio.c] Kludge around NetBSD offering different symbols for 'read' when various compiler flags are in use, causing atomicio.c comparisons against it to break and read/write operations to hang; ok dtucker commit c2868192ddc4e1420a50389e18c05db20b0b1f32 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 30 10:21:19 2014 +1100 - (djm) [configure.ac] Only check for width-specified integer types in headers that actually exist. patch from Tom G. Christensen; ok dtucker@ commit c161fc90fc86e2035710570238a9e1ca7a68d2a5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jan 29 21:01:33 2014 +1100 - (djm) [configure.ac] Fix broken shell test '==' vs '='; patch from Tom G. Christensen commit 6f917ad376481995ab7d29fb53b08ec8d507eb9e Author: Tim Rice Date: Tue Jan 28 10:26:25 2014 -0800 - (tim) [regress/agent.sh regress/agent-ptrace.sh] Assign $? to a variable when used as an error message inside an if statement so we display the correct into. agent.sh patch from Petr Lautrbach. commit ab16ef4152914d44ce6f76e48167d26d22f66a06 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jan 28 15:08:12 2014 +1100 - (djm) [sshd.c] Use kill(0, ...) instead of killpg(0, ...); the latter being specified to have undefined behaviour in SUSv3; ok dtucker commit ab0394905884dc6e58c3721211c6b38fb8fc2ca8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jan 28 15:07:10 2014 +1100 - (djm) [configure.ac] Search for inet_ntop in libnsl and libresovl; ok dtucker commit 4ab20a82d4d4168d62318923f62382f6ef242fcd Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jan 27 17:35:04 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Remove trailing backslash which some make implementations (eg older Solaris) do not cope with. commit e7e8b3cfe9f8665faaf0e68b33df5bbb431bd129 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jan 27 17:32:50 2014 +1100 Welcome to 2014 commit 5b447c0aac0dd444251e276f6bb3bbbe1c05331c Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Jan 26 09:46:53 2014 +1100 - (djm) [configure.ac] correct AC_DEFINE for previous. commit 2035b2236d3b1f76c749c642a43e03c85eae76e6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Jan 26 09:39:53 2014 +1100 - (djm) [configure.ac sandbox-capsicum.c sandbox-rlimit.c] Disable RLIMIT_NOFILE pseudo-sandbox on FreeBSD. In some configurations, libc will attempt to open additional file descriptors for crypto offload and crash if they cannot be opened. commit a92ac7410475fbb00383c7402aa954dc0a75ae19 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Jan 26 09:38:03 2014 +1100 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/25 20:35:37 [kex.c] dh_need needs to be set to max(seclen, blocksize, ivlen, mac_len) ok dtucker@, noted by mancha commit 76eea4ab4e658670ca6e76dd1e6d17f262208b57 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Jan 26 09:37:25 2014 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/25 10:12:50 [cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h kexgexc.c] Add a special case for the DH group size for 3des-cbc, which has an effective strength much lower than the key size. This causes problems with some cryptlib implementations, which don't support group sizes larger than 4k but also don't use the largest group size it does support as specified in the RFC. Based on a patch from Petr Lautrbach at Redhat, reduced by me with input from Markus. ok djm@ markus@ commit 603b8f47f1cd9ed95a2017447db8e60ca6704594 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Jan 25 13:16:59 2014 +1100 - (djm) [configure.ac] autoconf sets finds to 'yes' not '1', so test against the correct thing. commit c96d85376d779b6ac61525b5440010d344d2f23f Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Jan 25 13:12:28 2014 +1100 - (djm) [configure.ac] Do not attempt to use capsicum sandbox unless sys/capability.h exists and cap_rights_limit is in libc. Fixes build on FreeBSD9x which provides the header but not the libc support. commit f62ecef9939cb3dbeb10602fd705d4db3976d822 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Jan 25 12:34:38 2014 +1100 - (djm) [configure.ac] Fix detection of capsicum sandbox on FreeBSD commit b0e0f760b861676a3fe5c40133b270713d5321a9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jan 24 14:27:04 2014 +1100 - (djm) [Makefile.in regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh regress/scp.sh] Make the scp regress test actually test the built scp rather than the one in $PATH. ok dtucker@ commit 42a092530159637da9cb7f9e1b5f4679e34a85e6 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Jan 23 23:14:39 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [configure.ac] NetBSD's (and FreeBSD's) strnvis is gratuitously incompatible with OpenBSD's despite post-dating it by more than a decade. Declare it as broken, and document FreeBSD's as the same. ok djm@ commit 617da33c20cb59f9ea6c99c881d92493371ef7b8 Author: Tim Rice Date: Wed Jan 22 19:16:10 2014 -0800 - (tim) [session.c] Improve error reporting on set_id(). commit 5c2ff5e31f57d303ebb414d84a934c02728fa568 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jan 22 21:30:12 2014 +1100 - (djm) [configure.ac aclocal.m4] More tests to detect fallout from platform hardening options: include some long long int arithmatic to detect missing support functions for -ftrapv in libgcc and equivalents, actually test linking when -ftrapv is supplied and set either both -pie/-fPIE or neither. feedback and ok dtucker@ commit 852472a54b8a0dc3e53786b313baaa86850a4273 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jan 22 16:31:18 2014 +1100 - (djm) [configure.ac] Unless specifically requested, only attempt to build Position Independent Executables on gcc >= 4.x; ok dtucker commit ee87838786cef0194db36ae0675b3e7c4e8ec661 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jan 22 16:30:15 2014 +1100 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c] Don't fail to compile if a platform that is expected to use the reuse-argv style setproctitle hack surprises us by providing a setproctitle in libc; ok dtucker commit 5c96a154c7940fa67b1f11c421e390dbbc159f27 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Jan 21 13:10:26 2014 +1100 - (djm) [aclocal.m4] Flesh out the code run in the OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE and OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK tests to give them a better chance of detecting toolchain-related problems; ok dtucker commit 9464ba6fb34bb42eb3501ec3c5143662e75674bf Author: Tim Rice Date: Mon Jan 20 17:59:28 2014 -0800 - (tim) [platform.c session.c] Fix bug affecting SVR5 platforms introduced with sftp chroot support. Move set_id call after chroot. commit a6d573caa14d490e6c42fb991bcb5c6860ec704b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jan 21 12:50:46 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [aclocal.m4] Differentiate between compile-time and link-time tests in the configure output. ok djm. commit 096118dc73ab14810b3c12785c0b5acb01ad6123 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jan 21 12:48:51 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Make PIE a configure-time option which defaults to on platforms where it's known to be reliably detected and off elsewhere. Works around platforms such as FreeBSD 9.1 where it does not interop with -ftrapv (it seems to work but fails when trying to link ssh). ok djm@ commit f9df7f6f477792254eab33cdef71a6d66488cb88 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Jan 20 20:07:15 2014 +1100 - (djm) [regress/cert-hostkey.sh] Fix regress failure on platforms that skip one or more key types (e.g. RHEL/CentOS 6.5); ok dtucker@ commit c74e70eb52ccc0082bd5a70b5798bb01c114d138 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Mon Jan 20 13:18:09 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [gss-serv-krb5.c] Fall back to krb5_cc_gen_new if the Kerberos implementation does not have krb5_cc_new_unique, similar to what we do in auth-krb5.c. commit 3510979e83b6a18ec8773c64c3fa04aa08b2e783 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Jan 20 12:41:53 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/20 00:08:48 [digest.c] memleak; found by Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC; ok markus@ commit 7eee358d7a6580479bee5cd7e52810ebfd03e5b2 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Jan 19 22:37:02 2014 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/19 11:21:51 [addrmatch.c] Cast the sizeof to socklen_t so it'll work even if the supplied len is negative. Suggested by and ok djm, ok deraadt. commit b7e01c09b56ab26e8fac56bbce0fd25e36d12bb0 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Jan 19 22:36:13 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/19 04:48:08 [ssh_config.5] fix inverted meaning of 'no' and 'yes' for CanonicalizeFallbackLocal commit 7b1ded04adce42efa25ada7c3a39818d3109b724 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Jan 19 15:30:02 2014 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/19 04:17:29 [canohost.c addrmatch.c] Cast socklen_t when comparing to size_t and use socklen_t to iterate over the ip options, both to prevent signed/unsigned comparison warnings. Patch from vinschen at redhat via portable openssh, begrudging ok deraadt. commit 293ee3c9f0796d99ebb033735f0e315f2e0180bf Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Jan 19 15:28:01 2014 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/18 09:36:26 [session.c] explicitly define USE_PIPES to 1 to prevent redefinition warnings in portable on platforms that use pipes for everything. From redhat @ redhat. commit 2aca159d05f9e7880d1d8f1ce49a218840057f53 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Jan 19 15:25:34 2014 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/17 06:23:24 [sftp-server.c] fix log message statvfs. ok djm commit 841f7da89ae8b367bb502d61c5c41916c6e7ae4c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jan 18 22:12:15 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [sandbox-capsicum.c] Correct some error messages and make the return value check for cap_enter() consistent with the other uses in FreeBSD. From by Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC via bz#2140. commit fdce3731660699b2429e93e822f2ccbaccd163ae Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jan 18 21:12:42 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [configure.ac] On Cygwin the getopt variables (like optargs, optind) are defined in getopt.h already. Unfortunately they are defined as "declspec(dllimport)" for historical reasons, because the GNU linker didn't allow auto-import on PE/COFF targets way back when. The problem is the dllexport attributes collide with the definitions in the various source files in OpenSSH, which obviousy define the variables without declspec(dllimport). The least intrusive way to get rid of these warnings is to disable warnings for GCC compiler attributes when building on Cygwin. Patch from vinschen at redhat.com. commit 1411c9263f46e1ee49d0d302bf7258ebe69ce827 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jan 18 21:03:59 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h] Add missing function declarations that stopped being included when we stopped including from openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h. Patch from vinschen at redhat.com. commit 89c532d843c95a085777c66365067d64d1937eb9 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jan 18 20:43:49 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [uidswap.c] Prevent unused variable warnings on Cygwin. Patch from vinschen at redhat.com commit 355f861022be7b23d3009fae8f3c9f6f7fc685f7 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jan 18 00:12:38 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [defines.h] Move our definitions of uintXX_t types down to after they're defined if we have to define them ourselves. Fixes builds on old AIX. commit a3357661ee1d5d553294f36e4940e8285c7f1332 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Jan 18 00:03:57 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [readconf.c] Wrap paths.h inside an ifdef. Allows building on Solaris. commit 9edcbff46ff01c8d5dee9c1aa843f09e9ad8a80e Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jan 17 21:54:32 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Have --without-toolchain-hardening not turn off stack-protector since that has a separate flag that's been around a while. commit 6d725687c490d4ba957a1bbc0ba0a2956c09fa69 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jan 17 19:17:34 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Also look in inttypes.h for uintXX_t types. commit 5055699c7f7c7ef21703a443ec73117da392f6ae Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jan 17 18:48:22 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h] Only start including headers if we need them to cut down on the name collisions. commit a5cf1e220def07290260e4125e74f41ac75cf88d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jan 17 18:10:58 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h] Implement enough of statvfs on top of statfs to be useful (and for the regression tests to pass) on platforms that have statfs and fstatfs. ok djm@ commit 1357d71d7b6d269969520aaa3e84d312ec971d5b Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jan 17 18:00:40 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) Fix typo in #ifndef. commit d23a91ffb289d3553a58b7a60cec39fba9f0f506 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jan 17 17:32:30 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [configure.ac digest.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Add compatibility layer for older openssl versions. ok djm@ commit 868ea1ea1c1bfdbee5dbad78f81999c5983ecf31 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jan 17 16:47:04 2014 +1100 - (djm) [Makefile.in configure.ac sandbox-capsicum.c sandbox-darwin.c] [sandbox-null.c sandbox-rlimit.c sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] [sandbox-systrace.c ssh-sandbox.h sshd.c] Support preauth sandboxing using the Capsicum API introduced in FreeBSD 10. Patch by Dag-Erling Smorgrav, updated by Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC; ok dtucker@ commit a9d186a8b50d18869a10e9203abf71c83ddb1f79 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jan 17 16:30:49 2014 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/17 05:26:41 [digest.c] remove unused includes. ok djm@ commit 5f1c57a7a7eb39c0e4fee3367712337dbcaef024 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jan 17 16:29:45 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/17 00:21:06 [sftp-client.c] signed/unsigned comparison warning fix; from portable (Id sync only) commit c548722361d89fb12c108528f96b306a26477b18 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jan 17 15:12:16 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Split AC_CHECK_FUNCS for OpenSSL functions into separate lines and alphabetize for easier diffing of changes. commit acad351a5b1c37de9130c9c1710445cc45a7f6b9 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jan 17 14:20:05 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [defines.h] Add typedefs for uintXX_t types for platforms that don't have them. commit c3ed065ce8417aaa46490836648c173a5010f226 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jan 17 14:18:45 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c] Wrap stdlib.h include inside #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H. commit f45f78ae437062c7d9506c5f475b7215f486be44 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jan 17 12:43:43 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [blocks.c fe25519.c ge25519.c hash.c sc25519.c verify.c] Include includes.h to pull in all of the compatibility stuff. commit 99df369d0340caac145d57f700d830147ff18b87 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jan 17 12:42:17 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [poly1305.c] Wrap stdlib.h include inside #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H. commit ac413b62ea1957e80c711acbe0c11b908273fc01 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jan 17 12:31:33 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [crypto_api.h] Wrap stdlib.h include inside #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H. commit 1c4a011e9c939e74815346a560843e1862c300b8 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jan 17 12:23:23 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [loginrec.c] Cast to the types specfied in the format specification to prevent warnings. commit c3d483f9a8275be1113535a1e0d0e384f605f3c4 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jan 17 11:20:26 2014 +1100 - (djm) [sftp-client.c] signed/unsigned comparison fix commit fd994379dd972417d0491767f7cd9b5bf23f4975 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Jan 17 09:53:24 2014 +1100 - (dtucker) [aclocal.m4 configure.ac] Add some additional compiler/toolchain hardening flags including -fstack-protector-strong. These default to on if the toolchain supports them, but there is a configure-time knob (--without-hardening) to disable them if necessary. ok djm@ commit 366224d21768ee8ec28cfbcc5fbade1b32582d58 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 16 18:51:44 2014 +1100 - (djm) [README] update release notes URL. commit 2ae77e64f8fa82cbf25c9755e8e847709b978b40 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 16 18:51:07 2014 +1100 - (djm) [contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec] [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Crank RPM spec version numbers. commit 0fa29e6d777c73a1b4ddd3b996b06ee20022ae8a Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 16 18:42:31 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/16 07:32:00 [version.h] openssh-6.5 commit 52c371cd6d2598cc73d4e633811b3012119c47e2 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jan 16 18:42:10 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/16 07:31:09 [sftp-client.c] needless and incorrect cast to size_t can break resumption of large download; patch from tobias@ commit 91b580e4bec55118bf96ab3cdbe5a50839e75d0a Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Jan 12 19:21:22 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/12 08:13:13 [bufaux.c buffer.h kex.c kex.h kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c kexc25519s.c] [kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c] avoid use of OpenSSL BIGNUM type and functions for KEX with Curve25519 by adding a buffer_put_bignum2_from_string() that stores a string using the bignum encoding rules. Will make it easier to build a reduced-feature OpenSSH without OpenSSL in the future; ok markus@ commit af5d4481f4c7c8c3c746e68b961bb85ef907800e Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Jan 12 19:20:47 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/10 05:59:19 [sshd_config] the /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key is loaded by default too commit 58cd63bc63038acddfb4051ed14e11179d8f4941 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jan 10 10:59:24 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/09 23:26:48 [sshconnect.c sshd.c] ban clients/servers that suffer from SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY, they are ancient, deranged and might make some attacks on KEX easier; ok markus@ commit b3051d01e505c9c2dc00faab472a0d06fa6b0e65 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jan 10 10:58:53 2014 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/09 23:20:00 [digest.c digest.h hostfile.c kex.c kex.h kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c] [kexc25519s.c kexdh.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c] [kexgexs.c key.c key.h roaming_client.c roaming_common.c schnorr.c] [schnorr.h ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect2.c] Introduce digest API and use it to perform all hashing operations rather than calling OpenSSL EVP_Digest* directly. Will make it easier to build a reduced-feature OpenSSH without OpenSSL in future; feedback, ok markus@ commit e00e413dd16eb747fb2c15a099971d91c13cf70f Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jan 10 10:40:45 2014 +1100 - guenther@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/09 03:26:00 [sftp-common.c] When formating the time for "ls -l"-style output, show dates in the future with the year, and rearrange a comparison to avoid a potentional signed arithmetic overflow that would give the wrong result. ok djm@ commit 3e49853650448883685cfa32fa382d0ba6d51d48 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Jan 10 10:37:05 2014 +1100 - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/04 17:50:55 [mac.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h xmalloc.c] use standard types and formats for size_t like variables. ok dtucker commit a9c1e500ef609795cbc662848edb1a1dca279c81 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Jan 8 16:13:12 2014 +1100 - (djm) [regress/.cvsignore] Ignore regress test droppings; ok dtucker@ commit 324541e5264e1489ca0babfaf2b39612eb80dfb3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Dec 31 12:25:40 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/30 23:52:28 [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-pubkey.c compat.c compat.h ssh-rsa.c] [sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients/servers that use the obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme. it will still be possible to connect with these clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and we'll deprecate them entirely in a future release. ok markus@ commit 9f4c8e797ea002a883307ca906f1f1f815010e78 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Dec 29 17:57:46 2013 +1100 - (djm) [regress/Makefile] Add some generated files for cleaning commit 106bf1ca3c7a5fdc34f9fd7a1fe651ca53085bc5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Dec 29 17:54:03 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 05:57:02 [sshconnect.c] when showing other hostkeys, don't forget Ed25519 keys commit 0fa47cfb32c239117632cab41e4db7d3e6de5e91 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Dec 29 17:53:39 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 05:42:16 [ssh.c] don't forget to load Ed25519 certs too commit b9a95490daa04cc307589897f95bfaff324ad2c9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Dec 29 17:50:15 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 04:35:50 [authfile.c] don't refuse to load Ed25519 certificates commit f72cdde6e6fabc51d2a62f4e75b8b926d9d7ee89 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Dec 29 17:49:55 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 04:29:25 [authfd.c] allow deletion of ed25519 keys from the agent commit 29ace1cb68cc378a464c72c0fd67aa5f9acd6b5b Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Dec 29 17:49:31 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 04:20:04 [key.c] to make sure we don't omit any key types as valid CA keys again, factor the valid key type check into a key_type_is_valid_ca() function commit 9de4fcdc5a9cff48d49a3e2f6194d3fb2d7ae34d Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Dec 29 17:49:13 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 02:49:52 [key.c] correct comment for key_drop_cert() commit 5baeacf8a80f054af40731c6f92435f9164b8e02 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Dec 29 17:48:55 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 02:37:04 [key.c] correct comment for key_to_certified() commit 83f2fe26cb19330712c952eddbd3c0b621674adc Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Dec 29 17:48:38 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 02:28:10 [key.c] allow ed25519 keys to appear as certificate authorities commit 06122e9a74bb488b0fe0a8f64e1135de870f9cc0 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Dec 29 17:48:15 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/27 22:37:18 [ssh-rsa.c] correct comment commit 3e19295c3a253c8dc8660cf45baad7f45fccb969 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Dec 29 17:47:50 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/27 22:30:17 [ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-rsa.c] make the original RSA and DSA signing/verification code look more like the ECDSA/Ed25519 ones: use key_type_plain() when checking the key type rather than tediously listing all variants, use __func__ for debug/ error messages commit 137977180be6254639e2c90245763e6965f8d815 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Dec 29 17:47:14 2013 +1100 - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/21 07:10:47 [ssh-keygen.1] small typo commit 339a48fe7ffb3186d22bbaa9efbbc3a053e602fd Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Dec 29 17:46:49 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/19 22:57:13 [poly1305.c poly1305.h] use full name for author, with his permission commit 0b36c83148976c7c8268f4f41497359e2fb26251 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Dec 29 17:45:51 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/19 01:19:41 [ssh-agent.c] bz#2186: don't crash (NULL deref) when deleting PKCS#11 keys from an agent that has a mix of normal and PKCS#11 keys; fix from jay AT slushpupie.com; ok dtucker commit 4def184e9b6c36be6d965a9705632fc4c0c2a8af Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Dec 29 17:45:26 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/19 01:04:36 [channels.c] bz#2147: fix multiple remote forwardings with dynamically assigned listen ports. In the s->c message to open the channel we were sending zero (the magic number to request a dynamic port) instead of the actual listen port. The client therefore had no way of discriminating between them. Diagnosis and fix by ronf AT timeheart.net commit bf25d114e23a803f8feca8926281b1aaedb6191b Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Dec 29 17:44:56 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/19 00:27:57 [auth-options.c] simplify freeing of source-address certificate restriction commit bb3dafe7024a5b4e851252e65ee35d45b965e4a8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Dec 29 17:44:29 2013 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/19 00:19:12 [serverloop.c] Cast client_alive_interval to u_int64_t before assinging to max_time_milliseconds to avoid potential integer overflow in the timeout. bz#2170, patch from Loganaden Velvindron, ok djm@ commit ef275ead3dcadde4db1efe7a0aa02b5e618ed40c Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Dec 29 17:44:07 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/19 00:10:30 [ssh-add.c] skip requesting smartcard PIN when removing keys from agent; bz#2187 patch from jay AT slushpupie.com; ok dtucker commit 7d97fd9a1cae778c3eacf16e09f5da3689d616c6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Dec 29 17:40:18 2013 +1100 - (djm) [loginrec.c] Check for username truncation when looking up lastlog entries commit 77244afe3b6d013b485e0952eaab89b9db83380f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Dec 21 17:02:39 2013 +1100 20131221 - (dtucker) [regress/keytype.sh] Actually test ecdsa key types. commit 53f8e784dc431a82d31c9b0e95b144507f9330e9 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Dec 19 11:31:44 2013 +1100 - (dtucker) [auth-pam.c] bz#2163: check return value from pam_get_item(). Patch from Loganaden Velvindron. commit 1fcec9d4f265e38af248c4c845986ca8c174bd68 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Dec 19 11:00:12 2013 +1100 - (dtucker) [configure.ac] bz#2178: Don't try to use BSM on Solaris versions greater than 11 either rather than just 11. Patch from Tomas Kuthan. commit 6674eb9683afd1ea4eb35670b5e66815543a759e Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Dec 18 17:50:39 2013 +1100 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/17 10:36:38 [crypto_api.h] I've assempled the header file by cut&pasting from generated headers and the source files. commit d58a5964426ee014384d67d775d16712e93057f3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Dec 18 17:50:13 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/15 21:42:35 [cipher-chachapoly.c] add some comments and constify a constant commit 059321d19af24d87420de3193f79dfab23556078 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Dec 18 17:49:48 2013 +1100 - pascal@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/15 18:17:26 [ssh-add.c] Make ssh-add also add .ssh/id_ed25519; fixes lie in manual page. ok markus@ commit 155b5a5bf158767f989215479ded2a57f331e1c6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Dec 18 17:48:32 2013 +1100 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/09 11:08:17 [crypto_api.h] remove unused defines commit 8a56dc2b6b48b05590810e7f4c3567508410000c Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Dec 18 17:48:11 2013 +1100 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/09 11:03:45 [blocks.c ed25519.c fe25519.c fe25519.h ge25519.c ge25519.h] [ge25519_base.data hash.c sc25519.c sc25519.h verify.c] Add Authors for the public domain ed25519/nacl code. see also http://nacl.cr.yp.to/features.html All of the NaCl software is in the public domain. and http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/software.html The Ed25519 software is in the public domain. commit 6575c3acf31fca117352f31f37b16ae46e664837 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Dec 18 17:47:02 2013 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/08 09:53:27 [sshd_config.5] Use a literal for the default value of KEXAlgorithms. ok deraadt jmc commit 8ba0ead6985ea14999265136b14ffd5aeec516f9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Dec 18 17:46:27 2013 +1100 - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/07 11:58:46 [ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1] [ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd_config.5] add missing mentions of ed25519; ok djm@ commit 4f752cf71cf44bf4bc777541156c2bf56daf9ce9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Dec 18 17:45:35 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/07 08:08:26 [ssh-keygen.1] document -a and -o wrt new key format commit 6d6fcd14e23a9053198342bb379815b15e504084 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Dec 8 15:53:28 2013 +1100 - (djm) [Makefile.in regress/Makefile regress/agent-ptrace.sh] [regress/setuid-allowed.c] Check that ssh-agent is not on a no-setuid filesystem before running agent-ptrace.sh; ok dtucker commit 7e6e42fb532c7dafd7078ef5e9e2d3e47fcf6752 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sun Dec 8 08:23:08 2013 +1100 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c] Missing header; from Corinna Vinschen commit da3ca351b49d52ae85db2e3998265dc3c6617068 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 7 21:43:46 2013 +1100 - (djm) [Makefile.in] PATHSUBS and keygen bits for Ed25519; from Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC in bz#2179 commit eb401585bb8336cbf81fe4fc58eb9f7cac3ab874 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 7 17:07:15 2013 +1100 - (djm) [regress/cert-hostkey.sh] Fix merge botch commit f54542af3ad07532188b10136ae302314ec69ed6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 7 16:32:44 2013 +1100 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 13:52:46 [regress/Makefile regress/agent.sh regress/cert-hostkey.sh] [regress/cert-userkey.sh regress/keytype.sh] test ed25519 support; from djm@ commit f104da263de995f66b6861b4f3368264ee483d7f Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 7 12:37:53 2013 +1100 - (djm) [ed25519.c ssh-ed25519.c openbsd-compat/Makefile.in] [openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c] Make ed25519/new key format compile on Linux commit 1ff130dac9b7aea0628f4ad30683431fe35e0020 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 7 11:51:51 2013 +1100 - [configure.ac openbsd-compat/Makefile.in openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c] [openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/blowfish.c] [openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Start at supporting bcrypt_pbkdf in portable. commit 4260828a2958ebe8c96f66d8301dac53f4cde556 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 7 11:38:03 2013 +1100 - [authfile.c] Conditionalise inclusion of util.h commit a913442bac8a26fd296a3add51293f8f6f9b3b4c Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 7 11:35:36 2013 +1100 - [Makefile.in] Add ed25519 sources commit ca570a519cb846da61d002c7f46fa92e39c83e45 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 7 11:29:09 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/07 00:19:15 [key.c] set k->cert = NULL after freeing it commit 3cccc0e155229a2f2d86b6df40bd4559b4f960ff Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 7 11:27:47 2013 +1100 - [blocks.c ed25519.c fe25519.c fe25519.h ge25519.c ge25519.h] [ge25519_base.data hash.c sc25519.c sc25519.h verify.c] Fix RCS idents commit a7827c11b3f0380b7e593664bd62013ff9c131db Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 7 11:24:30 2013 +1100 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 15:29:07 [sshd.8] missing comma; commit 5be9d9e3cbd9c66f24745d25bf2e809c1d158ee0 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 7 11:24:01 2013 +1100 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 13:39:49 [authfd.c authfile.c key.c key.h myproposal.h pathnames.h readconf.c] [servconf.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c] [ssh-keysign.c ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd.c verify.c ssh-ed25519.c] [sc25519.h sc25519.c hash.c ge25519_base.data ge25519.h ge25519.c] [fe25519.h fe25519.c ed25519.c crypto_api.h blocks.c] support ed25519 keys (hostkeys and user identities) using the public domain ed25519 reference code from SUPERCOP, see http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/software.html feedback, help & ok djm@ commit bcd00abd8451f36142ae2ee10cc657202149201e Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 7 10:41:55 2013 +1100 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 13:34:54 [authfile.c authfile.h cipher.c cipher.h key.c packet.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-keygen.c PROTOCOL.key] new private key format, bcrypt as KDF by default; details in PROTOCOL.key; feedback and lots help from djm; ok djm@ commit f0e9060d236c0e38bec2fa1c6579fb0a2ea6458d Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 7 10:40:26 2013 +1100 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 13:30:08 [authfd.c key.c key.h ssh-agent.c] move private key (de)serialization to key.c; ok djm commit 0f8536da23a6ef26e6495177c0d8a4242b710289 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 7 10:31:37 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 03:40:51 [ssh-keygen.c] remove duplicated character ('g') in getopt() string; document the (few) remaining option characters so we don't have to rummage next time. commit 393920745fd328d3fe07f739a3cf7e1e6db45b60 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Dec 7 10:31:08 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/05 22:59:45 [sftp-client.c] fix memory leak in error path in do_readdir(); pointed out by Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC in bz#2163 commit 534b2ccadea5e5e9a8b27226e6faac3ed5552e97 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Dec 5 14:07:27 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/05 01:16:41 [servconf.c servconf.h] bz#2161 - fix AuthorizedKeysCommand inside a Match block and rearrange things so the same error is harder to make next time; with and ok dtucker@ commit 8369c8e61a3408ec6bb75755fad4ffce29b5fdbe Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Dec 5 11:00:16 2013 +1100 - (dtucker) [configure.ac] bz#2173: use pkg-config --libs to include correct -L location for libedit. Patch from Serge van den Boom. commit 9275df3e0a2a3bc3897f7d664ea86a425c8a092d Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Dec 5 10:26:32 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/04 04:20:01 [sftp-client.c] bz#2171: don't leak local_fd on error; from Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC commit 960f6a2b5254e4da082d8aa3700302ed12dc769a Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Dec 5 10:26:14 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/02 03:13:14 [cipher.c] correct bzero of chacha20+poly1305 key context. bz#2177 from Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC Also make it a memset for consistency with the rest of cipher.c commit f7e8a8796d661c9d6692ab837e1effd4f5ada1c2 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Dec 5 10:25:51 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/02 03:09:22 [key.c] make key_to_blob() return a NULL blob on failure; part of bz#2175 from Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC commit f1e44ea9d9a6d4c1a95a0024132e603bd1778c9c Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Dec 5 10:23:21 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/02 02:56:17 [ssh-pkcs11-helper.c] use-after-free; bz#2175 patch from Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC commit 114e540b15d57618f9ebf624264298f80bbd8c77 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Dec 5 10:22:57 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/02 02:50:27 [PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305] typo; from Jon Cave commit e4870c090629e32f2cb649dc16d575eeb693f4a8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Dec 5 10:22:39 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/01 23:19:05 [PROTOCOL] mention curve25519-sha256@libssh.org key exchange algorithm commit 1d2f8804a6d33a4e908b876b2e1266b8260ec76b Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Dec 5 10:22:03 2013 +1100 - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/26 19:15:09 [pkcs11.h] cleanup 1 << 31 idioms. Resurrection of this issue pointed out by Eitan Adler ok markus for ssh, implies same change in kerberosV commit bdb352a54f82df94a548e3874b22f2d6ae90328d Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Dec 5 10:20:52 2013 +1100 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/26 12:14:54 [ssh.1 ssh.c] - put -Q in the right place - Ar was a poor choice for the arguments to -Q. i've chosen an admittedly equally poor Cm, at least consistent with the rest of the docs. also no need for multiple instances - zap a now redundant Nm - usage() sync commit d937dc084a087090f1cf5395822c3ac958d33759 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Dec 5 10:19:54 2013 +1100 - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/25 18:04:21 [ssh.1 ssh.c] improve -Q usage and such. One usage change is that the option is now case-sensitive ok dtucker markus djm commit dec0393f7ee8aabc7d9d0fc2c5fddb4bc649112e Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Dec 5 10:18:43 2013 +1100 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/21 08:05:09 [ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] no need for .Pp before displays; commit 8a073cf57940aabf85e49799f89f5d5e9b072c1b Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Nov 21 14:26:18 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/21 03:18:51 [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/integrity.sh regress/rekey.sh] [regress/try-ciphers.sh] use new "ssh -Q cipher-auth" query to obtain lists of authenticated encryption ciphers instead of specifying them manually; ensures that the new chacha20poly1305@openssh.com mode is tested; ok markus@ and naddy@ as part of the diff to add chacha20poly1305@openssh.com commit ea61b2179f63d48968dd2c9617621002bb658bfe Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Nov 21 14:25:15 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/21 03:16:47 [regress/modpipe.c] use unsigned long long instead of u_int64_t here to avoid warnings on some systems portable OpenSSH is built on. commit 36aba25b0409d2db6afc84d54bc47a2532d38424 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Nov 21 14:24:42 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/21 03:15:46 [regress/krl.sh] add some reminders for additional tests that I'd like to implement commit fa7a20bc289f09b334808d988746bc260a2f60c9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Nov 21 14:24:08 2013 +1100 - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/18 05:09:32 [regress/forward-control.sh] bump timeout to 10 seconds to allow slow machines (e.g. Alpha PC164) to successfully run this; ok djm@ (ID sync only; our timeouts are already longer) commit 0fde8acdad78a4d20cadae974376cc0165f645ee Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Nov 21 14:12:23 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/21 00:45:44 [Makefile.in PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 authfile.c chacha.c] [chacha.h cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly.h cipher.c cipher.h] [dh.c myproposal.h packet.c poly1305.c poly1305.h servconf.c ssh.1] [ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] Add a new protocol 2 transport cipher "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" that combines Daniel Bernstein's ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC to build an authenticated encryption mode. Inspired by and similar to Adam Langley's proposal for TLS: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03 but differs in layout used for the MAC calculation and the use of a second ChaCha20 instance to separately encrypt packet lengths. Details are in the PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 file. Feedback markus@, naddy@; manpage bits Loganden Velvindron @ AfriNIC ok markus@ naddy@ commit fdb2306acdc3eb2bc46b6dfdaaf6005c650af22a Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Nov 21 13:57:15 2013 +1100 - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/20 20:54:10 [canohost.c clientloop.c match.c readconf.c sftp.c] unsigned casts for ctype macros where neccessary ok guenther millert markus commit e00167307e4d3692695441e9bd712f25950cb894 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Nov 21 13:56:49 2013 +1100 - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/20 20:53:10 [scp.c] unsigned casts for ctype macros where neccessary ok guenther millert markus commit 23e00aa6ba9eee0e0c218f2026bf405ad4625832 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Nov 21 13:56:28 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/20 02:19:01 [sshd.c] delay closure of in/out fds until after "Bad protocol version identification..." message, as get_remote_ipaddr/get_remote_port require them open. commit 867e6934be6521f87f04a5ab86702e2d1b314245 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Nov 21 13:56:06 2013 +1100 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/13 13:48:20 [ssh-pkcs11.c] add missing braces found by pedro commit 0600c7020f4fe68a780bd7cf21ff541a8d4b568a Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Nov 21 13:55:43 2013 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/08 11:15:19 [bufaux.c bufbn.c buffer.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c] [uidswap.c] Include stdlib.h for free() as per the man page. commit b6a75b0b93b8faa6f79c3a395ab6c71f3f880b80 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Nov 10 20:25:22 2013 +1100 - (dtucker) [regress/keytype.sh] Populate ECDSA key types to be tested by querying the ones that are compiled in. commit 2c89430119367eb1bc96ea5ee55de83357e4c926 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Nov 10 12:38:42 2013 +1100 - (dtucker) [key.c] Check for the correct defines for NID_secp521r1. commit dd5264db5f641dbd03186f9e5e83e4b14b3d0003 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Nov 9 22:32:51 2013 +1100 - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Add missing "test". commit 95cb2d4eb08117be061f3ff076adef3e9a5372c3 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Nov 9 22:02:31 2013 +1100 - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Fix brackets in NID_secp521r1 test. commit 37bcef51b3d9d496caecea6394814d2f49a1357f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Nov 9 18:39:25 2013 +1100 - (dtucker) [configure.ac kex.c key.c myproposal.h] Test for the presence of NID_X9_62_prime256v1, NID_secp384r1 and NID_secp521r1 and test that the latter actually works before using it. Fedora (at least) has NID_secp521r1 that doesn't work (see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1021897). commit 6e2fe81f926d995bae4be4a6b5b3c88c1c525187 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Nov 9 16:55:03 2013 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/09 05:41:34 [regress/test-exec.sh regress/rekey.sh] Use smaller test data files to speed up tests. Grow test datafiles where necessary for a specific test. commit aff7ef1bb8b7c1eeb1f4812129091c5adbf51848 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Nov 9 00:19:22 2013 +1100 - (dtucker) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] Simplify host key generation: rather than testing and generating each key, call ssh-keygen -A. Patch from vinschen at redhat.com. commit 882abfd3fb3c98cfe70b4fc79224770468b570a5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sat Nov 9 00:17:41 2013 +1100 - (dtucker) [Makefile.in configure.ac] Set MALLOC_OPTIONS per platform and pass in TEST_ENV. Unknown options cause stderr to get polluted and the stderr-data test to fail. commit 8c333ec23bdf7da917aa20ac6803a2cdd79182c5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 8 21:12:58 2013 +1100 - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c] Add headers to prevent compile warnings. commit d94240b2f6b376b6e9de187e4a0cd4b89dfc48cb Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 8 21:10:04 2013 +1100 - (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Conditionally enable CURVE25519_SHA256. commit 1c8ce34909886288a3932dce770deec5449f7bb5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 8 19:50:32 2013 +1100 - (dtucker) [kex.c] Only enable CURVE25519_SHA256 if we actually have EVP_sha256. commit ccdb9bec46bcc88549b26a94aa0bae2b9f51031c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 8 18:54:38 2013 +1100 - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Add null implementation of arc4random_stir for platforms that have arc4random but don't have arc4random_stir (right now this is only OpenBSD -current). commit 3420a50169b52cc8d2775d51316f9f866c73398f Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 8 16:48:13 2013 +1100 - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec] [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Update version numbers following release. commit 3ac4a234df842fd8c94d9cb0ad198e1fe84b895b Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 8 12:39:49 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/08 01:38:11 [version.h] openssh-6.4 commit 6c81fee693038de7d4a5559043350391db2a2761 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 8 12:19:55 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/08 00:39:15 [auth-options.c auth2-chall.c authfd.c channels.c cipher-3des1.c] [clientloop.c gss-genr.c monitor_mm.c packet.c schnorr.c umac.c] [sftp-client.c sftp-glob.c] use calloc for all structure allocations; from markus@ commit 690d989008e18af3603a5e03f1276c9bad090370 Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Nov 8 12:16:49 2013 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/07 11:58:27 [cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h mac.c mac.h servconf.c ssh.c] Output the effective values of Ciphers, MACs and KexAlgorithms when the default has not been overridden. ok markus@ commit 08998c5fb9c7c1d248caa73b76e02ca0482e6d85 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Fri Nov 8 12:11:46 2013 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/08 01:06:14 [regress/rekey.sh] Rekey less frequently during tests to speed them up commit 4bf7e50e533aa956366df7402c132f202e841a48 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Nov 7 22:33:48 2013 +1100 - (dtucker) [Makefile.in configure.ac] Remove TEST_SSH_SHA256 environment variable. It's no longer used now that we get the supported MACs from ssh -Q. commit 6e9d6f411288374d1dee4b7debbfa90bc7e73035 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Nov 7 15:32:37 2013 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/07 04:26:56 [regress/kextype.sh] trailing space commit 74cbc22529f3e5de756e1b7677b7624efb28f62c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Nov 7 15:26:12 2013 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/07 03:55:41 [regress/kextype.sh] Use ssh -Q to get kex types instead of a static list. commit a955041c930e63405159ff7d25ef14272f36eab3 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Nov 7 15:21:19 2013 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/07 02:48:38 [regress/integrity.sh regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh] Use ssh -Q instead of hardcoding lists of ciphers or MACs. commit 06595d639577577bc15d359e037a31eb83563269 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Nov 7 15:08:02 2013 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/07 01:12:51 [regress/rekey.sh] Factor out the data transfer rekey tests commit 651dc8b2592202dac6b16ee3b82ce5b331be7da3 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Nov 7 15:04:44 2013 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/07 00:12:05 [regress/rekey.sh] Test rekeying for every Cipher, MAC and KEX, plus test every KEX with the GCM ciphers. commit 234557762ba1096a867ca6ebdec07efebddb5153 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Nov 7 15:00:51 2013 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/04 12:27:42 [regress/rekey.sh] Test rekeying with all KexAlgorithms. commit bbfb9b0f386aab0c3e19d11f136199ef1b9ad0ef Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Nov 7 14:56:43 2013 +1100 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 22:39:53 [regress/kextype.sh] add curve25519-sha256@libssh.org commit aa19548a98c0f89283ebd7354abd746ca6bc4fdf Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Nov 7 14:50:09 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/09 23:44:14 [regress/Makefile] (ID sync only) regression test for sftp request white/blacklisting and readonly mode. commit c8908aabff252f5da772d4e679479c2b7d18cac1 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Nov 7 13:38:35 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/06 23:05:59 [ssh-pkcs11.c] from portable: s/true/true_val/ to avoid name collisions on dump platforms RCSID sync only commit 49c145c5e89b9d7d48e84328d6347d5ad640b567 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Nov 7 13:35:39 2013 +1100 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/06 16:52:11 [monitor_wrap.c] fix rekeying for AES-GCM modes; ok deraadt commit 67a8800f290b39fd60e379988c700656ae3f2539 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Nov 7 13:32:51 2013 +1100 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/04 11:51:16 [monitor.c] fix rekeying for KEX_C25519_SHA256; noted by dtucker@ RCSID sync only; I thought this was a merge botch and fixed it already commit df8b030b15fcec7baf38ec7944f309f9ca8cc9a7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Nov 7 13:28:16 2013 +1100 - (djm) [configure.ac defines.h] Skip arc4random_stir() calls on platforms that lack it but have arc4random_uniform() commit a6fd1d3c38a562709374a70fa76423859160aa90 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Nov 7 12:03:26 2013 +1100 - (djm) [regress/modpipe.c regress/rekey.sh] Never intended to commit these commit c98319750b0bbdd0d1794420ec97d65dd9244613 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Nov 7 12:00:23 2013 +1100 - (djm) [Makefile.in monitor.c] Missed chunks of curve25519 KEX diff commit 61c5c2319e84a58210810d39b062c8b8e3321160 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Nov 7 11:34:14 2013 +1100 - (djm) [ssh-pkcs11.c] Bring back "non-constant initialiser" fix (rev 1.5) that got lost in recent merge. commit 094003f5454a9f5a607674b2739824a7e91835f4 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Nov 4 22:59:27 2013 +1100 - (djm) [kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c kexc25519s.c] Import missed files from KEX/curve25519 change commit ca67a7eaf8766499ba67801d0be8cdaa550b9a50 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Nov 4 09:05:17 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/03 10:37:19 [roaming_common.c] fix a couple of function definitions foo() -> foo(void) (-Wold-style-definition) commit 0bd8f1519d51af8d4229be81e8f2f4903a1d440b Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Nov 4 08:55:43 2013 +1100 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 22:39:19 [ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] the default kex is now curve25519-sha256@libssh.org commit 4c3ba0767fbe4a8a2a748df4035aaf86651f6b30 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Nov 4 08:40:13 2013 +1100 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 22:34:01 [auth-options.c] no need to include monitor_wrap.h and ssh-gss.h commit 660621b2106b987b874c2f120218bec249d0f6ba Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Nov 4 08:37:51 2013 +1100 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 22:24:24 [kexdhs.c kexecdhs.c] no need to include ssh-gss.h commit abdca986decfbbc008c895195b85e879ed460ada Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Nov 4 08:30:05 2013 +1100 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 22:10:15 [kexdhs.c kexecdhs.c] no need to include monitor_wrap.h commit 1e1242604eb0fd510fe93f81245c529237ffc513 Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Nov 4 08:26:52 2013 +1100 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 21:59:15 [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] use curve25519 for default key exchange (curve25519-sha256@libssh.org); initial patch from Aris Adamantiadis; ok djm@ commit d2252c79191d069372ed6effce7c7a2de93448cd Author: Damien Miller Date: Mon Nov 4 07:41:48 2013 +1100 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 20:03:54 [ssh-pkcs11.c] support pkcs#11 tokes that only provide x509 zerts instead of raw pubkeys; fixes bz#1908; based on patch from Laurent Barbe; ok djm commit 007e3b357e880caa974d5adf9669298ba0751c78 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Nov 3 18:43:55 2013 +1100 - (dtucker) [configure.ac defines.h] Add typedefs for intmax_t and uintmax_t for platforms that don't have them. commit 710f3747352fb93a63e5b69b12379da37f5b3fa9 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Nov 3 17:20:34 2013 +1100 - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c] Handle error case form the 2nd vsnprintf. From eric at openbsd via chl@. commit d52770452308e5c2e99f4da6edaaa77ef078b610 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Nov 3 16:30:46 2013 +1100 - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c] Include time.h for nanosleep. From OpenSMTPD where it prevents "implicit declaration" warnings (it's a no-op in OpenSSH). From chl at openbsd. commit 63857c9340d3482746a5622ffdacc756751f6448 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 30 22:31:06 2013 +1100 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/29 18:49:32 [sshd_config.5] pty(4), not pty(7); commit 5ff30c6b68adeee767dd29bf2369763c6a13c0b3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 30 22:21:50 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/29 09:48:02 [servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd_config sshd_config.5] shd_config PermitTTY to disallow TTY allocation, mirroring the longstanding no-pty authorized_keys option; bz#2070, patch from Teran McKinney; ok markus@ commit 4a3a9d4bbf8048473f5cc202cd8db7164d5e6b8d Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 30 22:19:47 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/29 09:42:11 [key.c key.h] fix potential stack exhaustion caused by nested certificates; report by Mateusz Kocielski; ok dtucker@ markus@ commit 28631ceaa7acd9bc500f924614431542893c6a21 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Oct 26 10:07:56 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/25 23:04:51 [ssh.c] fix crash when using ProxyCommand caused by previous commit - was calling freeaddrinfo(NULL); spotted by sthen@ and Tim Ruehsen, patch by sthen@ commit 26506ad29350c5681815745cc90b3952a84cf118 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Oct 26 10:05:46 2013 +1100 - (djm) [ssh-keygen.c ssh-keysign.c sshconnect1.c sshd.c] Remove unnecessary arc4random_stir() calls. The only ones left are to ensure that the PRNG gets a different state after fork() for platforms that have broken the API. commit bd43e8872325e9bbb3319c89da593614709f317c Author: Tim Rice Date: Thu Oct 24 12:22:49 2013 -0700 - (tim) [regress/sftp-perm.sh] We need a shell that understands "! somecmd" commit a90c0338083ee0e4064c4bdf61f497293a699be0 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Oct 24 21:03:17 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/24 08:19:36 [ssh.c] fix bug introduced in hostname canonicalisation commit: don't try to resolve hostnames when a ProxyCommand is set unless the user has forced canonicalisation; spotted by Iain Morgan commit cf31f3863425453ffcda540fbefa9df80088c8d1 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Oct 24 21:02:56 2013 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/24 00:51:48 [readconf.c servconf.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] Disallow empty Match statements and add "Match all" which matches everything. ok djm, man page help jmc@ commit 4bedd4032a09ce87322ae5ea80f193f109e5c607 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Oct 24 21:02:26 2013 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/24 00:49:49 [moduli.c] Periodically print progress and, if possible, expected time to completion when screening moduli for DH groups. ok deraadt djm commit 5ecb41629860687b145be63b8877fabb6bae5eda Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Oct 24 21:02:02 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/23 23:35:32 [sshd.c] include local address and port in "Connection from ..." message (only shown at loglevel>=verbose) commit 03bf2e61ad6ac59a362a1f11b105586cb755c147 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Oct 24 21:01:26 2013 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/23 05:40:58 [servconf.c] fix comment commit 8f1873191478847773906af961c8984d02a49dd6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Oct 24 10:53:02 2013 +1100 - (djm) [auth-krb5.c] bz#2032 - use local username in krb5_kuserok check rather than full client name which may be of form user@REALM; patch from Miguel Sanders; ok dtucker@ commit 5b01b0dcb417eb615df77e7ce1b59319bf04342c Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 23 16:31:31 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/23 04:16:22 [ssh-keygen.c] Make code match documentation: relative-specified certificate expiry time should be relative to current time and not the validity start time. Reported by Petr Lautrbach; ok deraadt@ commit eff5cada589f25793dbe63a76aba9da39837a148 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 23 16:31:10 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/23 03:05:19 [readconf.c ssh.c] comment commit 084bcd24e9fe874020e4df4e073e7408e1b17fb7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 23 16:30:51 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/23 03:03:07 [readconf.c] Hostname may have %h sequences that should be expanded prior to Match evaluation; spotted by Iain Morgan commit 8e5a67f46916def40b2758bb7755350dd2eee843 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 23 16:30:25 2013 +1100 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/20 18:00:13 [ssh_config.5] tweak the "exec" description, as worded by djm; commit c0049bd0bca02890cd792babc594771c563f91f2 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 23 16:29:59 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/20 09:51:26 [scp.1 sftp.1] add canonicalisation options to -o lists commit 8a04be795fc28514a09e55a54b2e67968f2e1b3a Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 23 16:29:40 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/20 06:19:28 [readconf.c ssh_config.5] rename "command" subclause of the recently-added "Match" keyword to "exec"; it's shorter, clearer in intent and we might want to add the ability to match against the command being executed at the remote end in the future. commit 5c86ebdf83b636b6741db4b03569ef4a53b89a58 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 23 16:29:12 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/20 04:39:28 [ssh_config.5] document % expansions performed by "Match command ..." commit 4502f88774edc56194707167443f94026d3c7cfa Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Oct 18 10:17:36 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/17 22:08:04 [sshd.c] include remote port in bad banner message; bz#2162 commit 1edcbf65ebd2febeaf10a836468f35e519eed7ca Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Oct 18 10:17:17 2013 +1100 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/17 07:35:48 [sftp.1 sftp.c] tweak previous; commit a176e1823013dd8533a20235b3a5131f0626f46b Author: Damien Miller Date: Fri Oct 18 09:05:41 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/09 23:44:14 [regress/Makefile regress/sftp-perm.sh] regression test for sftp request white/blacklisting and readonly mode. commit e3ea09494dcfe7ba76536e95765c8328ecfc18fb Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Oct 17 11:57:23 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/17 00:46:49 [ssh.c] rearrange check to reduce diff against -portable (Id sync only) commit f29238e67471a7f1088a99c3c3dbafce76b790cf Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Oct 17 11:48:52 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/17 00:30:13 [PROTOCOL sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp-server.c sftp.1 sftp.c] fsync@openssh.com protocol extension for sftp-server client support to allow calling fsync() faster successful transfer patch mostly by imorgan AT nas.nasa.gov; bz#1798 "fine" markus@ "grumble OK" deraadt@ "doesn't sound bad to me" millert@ commit 51682faa599550a69d8120e5e2bdbdc0625ef4be Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Oct 17 11:48:31 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/16 22:58:01 [ssh.c ssh_config.5] one I missed in previous: s/isation/ization/ commit 3850559be93f1a442ae9ed370e8c389889dd5f72 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Oct 17 11:48:13 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/16 22:49:39 [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 ssh.c ssh_config.5] s/canonicalise/canonicalize/ for consistency with existing spelling, e.g. authorized_keys; pointed out by naddy@ commit 607af3434b75acc7199a5d99d5a9c11068c01f27 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Oct 17 11:47:51 2013 +1100 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/16 06:42:25 [ssh_config.5] tweak previous; commit 0faf747e2f77f0f7083bcd59cbed30c4b5448444 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Oct 17 11:47:23 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/16 02:31:47 [readconf.c readconf.h roaming_client.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh_config.5] [sshconnect.c sshconnect.h] Implement client-side hostname canonicalisation to allow an explicit search path of domain suffixes to use to convert unqualified host names to fully-qualified ones for host key matching. This is particularly useful for host certificates, which would otherwise need to list unqualified names alongside fully-qualified ones (and this causes a number of problems). "looks fine" markus@ commit d77b81f856e078714ec6b0f86f61c20249b7ead4 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Oct 17 11:39:00 2013 +1100 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/15 14:10:25 [ssh.1 ssh_config.5] tweak previous; commit dcd39f29ce3308dc74a0ff27a9056205a932ce05 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Oct 17 11:31:40 2013 +1100 - [ssh.c] g/c unused variable. commit 5359a628ce3763408da25d83271a8eddec597a0c Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 15 12:20:37 2013 +1100 - [ssh.c] g/c unused variable. commit 386feab0c4736b054585ee8ee372865d5cde8d69 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 15 12:14:49 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/14 23:31:01 [ssh.c] whitespace at EOL; pointed out by markus@ commit e9fc72edd6c313b670558cd5219601c38a949b67 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 15 12:14:12 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/14 23:28:23 [canohost.c misc.c misc.h readconf.c sftp-server.c ssh.c] refactor client config code a little: add multistate option partsing to readconf.c, similar to servconf.c's existing code. move checking of options that accept "none" as an argument to readconf.c add a lowercase() function and use it instead of explicit tolower() in loops part of a larger diff that was ok markus@ commit 194fd904d8597a274b93e075b2047afdf5a175d4 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 15 12:13:05 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/14 22:22:05 [readconf.c readconf.h ssh-keysign.c ssh.c ssh_config.5] add a "Match" keyword to ssh_config that allows matching on hostname, user and result of arbitrary commands. "nice work" markus@ commit 71df752de2a04f423b1cd18d961a79f4fbccbcee Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 15 12:12:02 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/14 21:20:52 [session.c session.h] Add logging of session starts in a useful format; ok markus@ feedback and ok dtucker@ commit 6efab27109b82820e8d32a5d811adb7bfc354f65 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 15 12:07:05 2013 +1100 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/14 14:18:56 [sftp-server.8 sftp-server.c] tweak previous; ok djm commit 61c7de8a94156f6d7e9718ded9be8c65bb902b66 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 15 12:06:45 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/11 02:53:45 [sftp-client.h] obsolete comment commit 2f93d0556e4892208c9b072624caa8cc5ddd839d Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 15 12:06:27 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/11 02:52:23 [sftp-client.c] missed one arg reorder commit bda5c8445713ae592d969a5105ed1a65da22bc96 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 15 12:05:58 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/11 02:45:36 [sftp-client.c] rename flag arguments to be more clear and consistent. reorder some internal function arguments to make adding additional flags easier. no functional change commit 61ee4d68ca0fcc793a826fc7ec70f3b8ffd12ab6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 15 11:56:47 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/10 01:43:03 [sshd.c] bz#2139: fix re-exec fallback by ensuring that startup_pipe is correctly updated; ok dtucker@ commit 73600e51af9ee734a19767e0c084bbbc5eb5b8da Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 15 11:56:25 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/10 00:53:25 [sftp-server.c] add -Q, -P and -p to usage() before jmc@ catches me commit 6eaeebf27d92f39a38c772aa3f20c2250af2dd29 Author: Damien Miller Date: Tue Oct 15 11:55:57 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/09 23:42:17 [sftp-server.8 sftp-server.c] Add ability to whitelist and/or blacklist sftp protocol requests by name. Refactor dispatch loop and consolidate read-only mode checks. Make global variables static, since sftp-server is linked into sshd(8). ok dtucker@ commit df62d71e64d29d1054e7a53d1a801075ef70335f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Oct 10 10:32:39 2013 +1100 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/08 11:42:13 [dh.c dh.h] Increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups requested for a each symmetric key size. New values from NIST Special Publication 800-57 with the upper limit specified by RFC4419. Pointed out by Peter Backes, ok djm@. commit e6e52f8c5dc89a6767702e65bb595aaf7bc8991c Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Oct 10 10:28:07 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/19 01:26:29 [sshconnect.c] bz#1211: make BindAddress work with UsePrivilegedPort=yes; patch from swp AT swp.pp.ru; ok dtucker@ commit 71152bc9911bc34a98810b2398dac20df3fe8de3 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Oct 10 10:27:21 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/19 01:24:46 [channels.c] bz#1297 - tell the client (via packet_send_debug) when their preferred listen address has been overridden by the server's GatewayPorts; ok dtucker@ commit b59aaf3c4f3f449a4b86d8528668bd979be9aa5f Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Oct 10 10:26:21 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/19 00:49:12 [sftp-client.c] fix swapped pflag and printflag in sftp upload_dir; from Iain Morgan commit 5d80e4522d6238bdefe9d0c634f0e6d35a241e41 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Oct 10 10:25:09 2013 +1100 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/19 00:24:52 [progressmeter.c] store the initial file offset so the progress meter doesn't freak out when resuming sftp transfers. bz#2137; patch from Iain Morgan; ok dtucker@ commit ad92df7e5ed26fea85adfb3f95352d6cd8e86344 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Oct 10 10:24:11 2013 +1100 - sthen@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/16 11:35:43 [ssh_config] Remove gssapi config parts from ssh_config, as was already done for sshd_config. Req by/ok ajacoutot@ ID SYNC ONLY for portable; kerberos/gssapi is still pretty popular commit 720711960b130d36dfdd3d50eb25ef482bdd000e Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 9 10:44:47 2013 +1100 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/Makefile.in openbsd-compat/arc4random.c] [openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c] Replace old RC4-based arc4random implementation with recent OpenBSD's ChaCha-based PRNG. ok dtucker@, tested tim@ commit 9159310087a218e28940a592896808b8eb76a039 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 9 10:42:32 2013 +1100 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/arc4random.c openbsd-compat/chacha_private.h] Pull in OpenBSD implementation of arc4random, shortly to replace the existing bsd-arc4random.c commit 67f1d557a68d6fa8966a327d7b6dee3408cf0e72 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Oct 9 09:33:08 2013 +1100 correct incorrect years in datestamps; from des commit f2bf36c3eb4d969f85ec8aa342e9aecb61cc8bb1 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Sep 22 19:02:40 2013 +1000 - (dtucker) [platform.c platform.h sshd.c] bz#2156: restore Linux oom_adj setting when handling SIGHUP to maintain behaviour over retart. Patch from Matthew Ife. commit e90a06ae570fd259a2f5ced873c7f17390f535a5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Wed Sep 18 15:09:38 2013 +1000 - (dtucker) [sshd_config] Trailing whitespace; from jstjohn at purdue edu. commit 13840e0103946982cee2a05c40697be7e57dca41 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Sep 14 09:49:43 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/13 06:54:34 [channels.c] avoid unaligned access in code that reused a buffer to send a struct in_addr in a reply; simpler just use use buffer_put_int(); from portable; spotted by and ok dtucker@ commit 70182522a47d283513a010338cd028cb80dac2ab Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Sep 14 09:49:19 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/12 01:41:12 [clientloop.c] fix connection crash when sending break (~B) on ControlPersist'd session; ok dtucker@ commit ff9d6c2a4171ee32e8fe28fc3b86eb33bd5c845b Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Sep 14 09:48:55 2013 +1000 - sthen@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/07 13:53:11 [sshd_config] Remove commented-out kerberos/gssapi config options from sample config, kerberos support is currently not enabled in ssh in OpenBSD. Discussed with various people; ok deraadt@ ID SYNC ONLY for portable; kerberos/gssapi is still pretty popular commit 8bab5e7b5ff6721d926b5ebf05a3a24489889c58 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Sep 14 09:47:00 2013 +1000 - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/02 22:00:34 [ssh-keygen.c sshconnect1.c sshd.c] All the instances of arc4random_stir() are bogus, since arc4random() does this itself, inside itself, and has for a very long time.. Actually, this was probably reducing the entropy available. ok djm ID SYNC ONLY for portable; we don't trust other arc4random implementations to do this right. commit 61353b3208d548fab863e0e0ac5d2400ee5bb340 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Sep 14 09:45:32 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/31 00:13:54 [sftp.c] make ^w match ksh behaviour (delete previous word instead of entire line) commit 660854859cad31d234edb9353fb7ca2780df8128 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Sep 14 09:45:03 2013 +1000 - mikeb@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/28 12:34:27 [ssh-keygen.c] improve batch processing a bit by making use of the quite flag a bit more often and exit with a non zero code if asked to find a hostname in a known_hosts file and it wasn't there; originally from reyk@, ok djm commit 045bda5cb8acf0eb9d71c275ee1247e3154fc9e5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Sep 14 09:44:37 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/22 19:02:21 [sshd.c] Stir PRNG after post-accept fork. The child gets a different PRNG state anyway via rexec and explicit privsep reseeds, but it's good to be sure. ok markus@ commit ed4af412da60a084891b20412433a27966613fb8 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Sep 14 09:40:51 2013 +1000 add marker for 6.3p1 release at the point of the last included change commit 43968a8e66a0aa1afefb11665bf96f86b113f5d9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 28 14:00:54 2013 +1000 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c] #ifdef noytet for intmax_t bits until we have configure support. commit 04be8b9e53f8388c94b531ebc5d1bd6e10e930d1 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 28 12:49:43 2013 +1000 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c] teach our local snprintf code the 'j' (intmax_t/uintmax_t) and 'z' (size_t/ssize_t) conversions in case we start to use them in the future. commit f2f6c315a920a256937e1b6a3702757f3195a592 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 21 02:44:58 2013 +1000 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/20 06:56:07 [ssh.1 ssh_config.5] some proxyusefdpass tweaks; commit 1262b6638f7d01ab110fd373dd90d915c882fe1a Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 21 02:44:24 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/20 00:11:38 [readconf.c readconf.h ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c] Add a ssh_config ProxyUseFDPass option that supports the use of ProxyCommands that establish a connection and then pass a connected file descriptor back to ssh(1). This allows the ProxyCommand to exit rather than have to shuffle data back and forth and enables ssh to use getpeername, etc. to obtain address information just like it does with regular directly-connected sockets. ok markus@ commit b7727df37efde4dbe4f5a33b19cbf42022aabf66 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 21 02:43:49 2013 +1000 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/14 08:39:27 [scp.1 ssh.1] some Bx/Ox conversion; From: Jan Stary commit d5d9d7b1fdacf0551de4c747728bd159be40590a Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 21 02:43:27 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/13 18:33:08 [ssh-keygen.c] another of the same typo commit d234afb0b3a8de1be78cbeafed5fc86912594c3c Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 21 02:42:58 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/13 18:32:08 [ssh-keygen.c] typo in error message; from Stephan Rickauer commit e0ee727b8281a7c2ae20630ce83f6b200b404059 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 21 02:42:35 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/09 03:56:42 [sftp.c] enable ctrl-left-arrow and ctrl-right-arrow to move forward/back a word; matching ksh's relatively recent change. commit fec029f1dc2c338f3fae3fa82aabc988dc07868c Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 21 02:42:12 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/09 03:39:13 [sftp-client.c] two problems found by a to-be-committed regress test: 1) msg_id was not being initialised so was starting at a random value from the heap (harmless, but confusing). 2) some error conditions were not being propagated back to the caller commit 036d30743fc914089f9849ca52d615891d47e616 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 21 02:41:46 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/09 03:37:25 [sftp.c] do getopt parsing for all sftp commands (with an empty optstring for commands without arguments) to ensure consistent behaviour commit c7dba12bf95eb1d69711881a153cc286c1987663 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 21 02:41:15 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/08 05:04:03 [sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp.c] add a "-l" flag for the rename command to force it to use the silly standard SSH_FXP_RENAME command instead of the POSIX-rename- like posix-rename@openssh.com extension. intended for use in regress tests, so no documentation. commit 034f27a0c09e69fe3589045b41f03f6e345b63f5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 21 02:40:44 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/08 04:52:04 [sftp.c] fix two year old regression: symlinking a file would incorrectly canonicalise the target path. bz#2129 report from delphij AT freebsd.org commit c6895c5c67492144dd28589e5788f783be9152ed Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 21 02:40:21 2013 +1000 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/07 06:24:51 [sftp.1 sftp.c] sort -a; commit a6d6c1f38ac9b4a5e1bd4df889e1020a8370ed55 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 21 02:40:01 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/06 23:06:01 [servconf.c] add cast to avoid format warning; from portable commit eec840673bce3f69ad269672fba7ed8ff05f154f Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 21 02:39:39 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/06 23:05:01 [sftp.1] document top-level -a option (the -a option to 'get' was already documented) commit 02e878070d0eddad4e11f2c82644b275418eb112 Author: Damien Miller Date: Wed Aug 21 02:38:51 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/06 23:03:49 [sftp.c] fix some whitespace at EOL make list of commands an enum rather than a long list of defines add -a to usage() commit acd2060f750c16d48b87b92a10b5a833227baf9d Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Aug 8 17:02:12 2013 +1000 - (dtucker) [regress/Makefile regress/test-exec.sh] Roll back the -nt removal. The "make clean" removes modpipe which is built by the top-level directory before running the tests. Spotted by tim@ commit 9542de4547beebf707f3640082d471f1a85534c9 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Aug 8 12:50:06 2013 +1000 - (dtucker) [misc.c] Remove define added for fallback testing that was mistakenly included in the previous commit. commit 94396b7f06f512a0acb230640d7f703fb802a9ee Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Aug 8 11:52:37 2013 +1000 - (dtucker) [misc.c] Fall back to time(2) at runtime if clock_gettime( CLOCK_MONOTONIC...) fails. Some older versions of RHEL have the CLOCK_MONOTONIC define but don't actually support it. Found and tested by Kevin Brott, ok djm. commit a5a3cbfa0fb8ef011d3e7b38910a13f6ebbb8818 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Thu Aug 8 10:58:49 2013 +1000 - (dtucker) [regress/Makefile regress/test-exec.sh] Don't try to use test -nt since some platforms (eg really old FreeBSD) don't have it. Instead, run "make clean" before a complete regress run. ok djm. commit f3ab2c5f9cf4aed44971eded3ac9eeb1344b2be5 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Sun Aug 4 21:48:41 2013 +1000 - (dtucker) [auth-krb5.c configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h] Add support for building with older Heimdal versions. ok djm. commit ab3575c055adfbce70fa7405345cf0f80b07c827 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Aug 1 14:34:16 2013 +1000 - (djm) [sshlogin.h] Fix prototype merge botch from 2006; bz#2134 commit c192a4c4f6da907dc0e67a3ca61d806f9a92c931 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Aug 1 14:29:20 2013 +1000 - (djm) [channels.c channels.h] bz#2135: On Solaris, isatty() on a non- blocking connecting socket will clear any stored errno that might otherwise have been retrievable via getsockopt(). A hack to limit writes to TTYs on AIX was triggering this. Since only AIX needs the hack, wrap it in an #ifdef. Diagnosis and patch from Ivo Raisr. commit 81f7cf1ec5bc2fd202eda05abc2e5361c54633c5 Author: Tim Rice Date: Thu Jul 25 18:41:40 2013 -0700 more correct comment for last commit commit 0553ad76ffdff35fb31b9e6df935a71a1cc6daa2 Author: Tim Rice Date: Thu Jul 25 16:03:16 2013 -0700 - (tim) [regress/forwarding.sh] Fix for building outside read only source tree. commit ed899eb597a8901ff7322cba809660515ec0d601 Author: Tim Rice Date: Thu Jul 25 15:40:00 2013 -0700 - (tim) [sftp-client.c] Use of a gcc extension trips up native compilers on Solaris and UnixWare. Feedback and OK djm@ commit e9e936d33b4b1d77ffbaace9438cb2f1469c1dc7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 25 12:34:00 2013 +1000 - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec] [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Update version numbers commit d1e26cf391de31128b4edde118bff5fed98a90ea Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 25 12:11:18 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/21 02:26:26 [regress/sftp-cmds.sh regress/test-exec.sh] unbreak sftp-cmds for renamed test data (s/ls/data/) commit 78d47b7c5b182e44552913de2b4b7e0363c8e3cc Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 25 12:08:46 2013 +1000 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/10 21:56:43 [regress/forwarding.sh] Add test for forward config parsing commit fea440639e04cea9f2605375a41d654390369402 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 25 12:08:07 2013 +1000 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/30 20:12:32 [regress/test-exec.sh] use ssh and sshd as testdata since it needs to be >256k for the rekey test commit 53435b2d8773a5d7c78359e9f7bf9df2d93b9ef5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 25 11:57:15 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/25 00:57:37 [version.h] openssh-6.3 for release commit 0d032419ee6e1968fc1cb187af63bf3b77b506ea Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 25 11:56:52 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/25 00:56:52 [sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp.1 sftp.c] sftp support for resuming partial downloads; patch mostly by Loganaden Velvindron/AfriNIC with some tweaks by me; feedback and ok dtucker@ commit 98e27dcf581647b5bbe9780e8f59685d942d8ea3 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 25 11:55:52 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/25 00:29:10 [ssh.c] daemonise backgrounded (ControlPersist'ed) multiplexing master to ensure it is fully detached from its controlling terminal. based on debugging commit 94c9cd34d1590ea1d4bf76919a15b5688fa90ed1 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 25 11:55:39 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/22 12:20:02 [umac.h] oops, forgot to commit corresponding header change; spotted by jsg and jasper commit c331dbd22297ab9bf351abee659893d139c9f28a Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 25 11:55:20 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/22 05:00:17 [umac.c] make MAC key, data to be hashed and nonce for final hash const; checked with -Wcast-qual commit c8669a8cd24952b3f16a44eac63d2b6ce8a6343a Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 25 11:52:48 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/20 22:20:42 [krl.c] fix verification error in (as-yet usused) KRL signature checking path commit 63ddc899d28cf60045b560891894b9fbf6f822e9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Jul 20 13:35:45 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/20 01:55:13 [auth-krb5.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c] fix kerberos/GSSAPI deprecation warnings and linking; "looks okay" millert@ commit 1f0e86f23fcebb026371c0888402a981df2a61c4 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Jul 20 13:22:49 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/20 01:50:20 [ssh-agent.c] call cleanup_handler on SIGINT when in debug mode to ensure sockets are cleaned up on manual exit; bz#2120 commit 3009d3cbb89316b1294fb5cedb54770b5d114d04 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Jul 20 13:22:31 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/20 01:44:37 [ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] More useful error message on missing current user in /etc/passwd commit 32ecfa0f7920db31471ca8c1f4adc20ae38ed9d6 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Jul 20 13:22:13 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/20 01:43:46 [umac.c] use a union to ensure correct alignment; ok deraadt commit 85b45e09188e7a7fc8f0a900a4c6a0f04a5720a7 Author: Damien Miller Date: Sat Jul 20 13:21:52 2013 +1000 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/19 07:37:48 [auth.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexecdhs.c kexgexs.c monitor.c servconf.c] [servconf.h session.c sshd.c sshd_config.5] add ssh-agent(1) support to sshd(8); allows encrypted hostkeys, or hostkeys on smartcards; most of the work by Zev Weiss; bz #1974 ok djm@ commit d93340cbb6bc0fc0dbd4427e0cec6d994a494dd9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 18 16:14:34 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/18 01:12:26 [ssh.1] be more exact wrt perms for ~/.ssh/config; bz#2078 commit bf836e535dc3a8050c1756423539bac127ee5098 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 18 16:14:13 2013 +1000 - schwarze@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/16 00:07:52 [scp.1 sftp-server.8 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8] use .Mt for email addresses; from Jan Stary ; ok jmc@ commit 649fe025a409d0ce88c60a068f3f211193c35873 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 18 16:13:55 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/12 05:48:55 [ssh.c] set TCP nodelay for connections started with -N; bz#2124 ok dtucker@ commit 5bb8833e809d827496dffca0dc2c223052c93931 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 18 16:13:37 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/12 05:42:03 [ssh-keygen.c] do_print_resource_record() can never be called with a NULL filename, so don't attempt (and bungle) asking for one if it has not been specified bz#2127 ok dtucker@ commit 7313fc9222785d0c54a7ffcaf2067f4db02c8d72 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 18 16:13:19 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/12 00:43:50 [misc.c] in ssh_gai_strerror() don't fallback to strerror for EAI_SYSTEM when errno == 0. Avoids confusing error message in some broken resolver cases. bz#2122 patch from plautrba AT redhat.com; ok dtucker commit 746d1a6c524d2e90ebe98cc29e42573a3e1c3c1b Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 18 16:13:02 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/12 00:20:00 [sftp.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-pkcs11.c] fix pointer-signedness warnings from clang/llvm-3.3; "seems nice" deraadt@ commit ce98654674648fb7d58f73edf6aa398656a2dba4 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 18 16:12:44 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/12 00:19:59 [auth-options.c auth-rsa.c bufaux.c buffer.h channels.c hostfile.c] [hostfile.h mux.c packet.c packet.h roaming_common.c serverloop.c] fix pointer-signedness warnings from clang/llvm-3.3; "seems nice" deraadt@ commit 0d02c3e10e1ed16d6396748375a133d348127a2a Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 18 16:12:06 2013 +1000 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/02 12:31:43 [dh.c] remove extra whitespace commit fecfd118d6c90df4fcd3cec7b14e4d3ce69a41d5 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 18 16:11:50 2013 +1000 - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/27 14:05:37 [ssh-keygen.1 ssh.1 ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd_config.5] do not use Sx for sections outwith the man page - ingo informs me that stuff like html will render with broken links; issue reported by Eric S. Raymond, via djm commit bc35d92e78fd53c3f32cbdbdf89d8b1919788c50 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 18 16:11:25 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/22 06:31:57 [scp.c] improved time_t overflow check suggested by guenther@ commit 8158441d01ab84f33a7e70e27f87c02cbf67e709 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 18 16:11:07 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/21 05:43:10 [scp.c] make this -Wsign-compare clean after time_t conversion commit bbeb1dac550bad8e6aff9bd27113c6bd5ebb7413 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 18 16:10:49 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/21 05:42:32 [dh.c] sprinkle in some error() to explain moduli(5) parse failures commit 7f2b438ca0b7c3b9684a03d7bf3eaf379da16de9 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 18 16:10:29 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/21 00:37:49 [ssh_config.5] explicitly mention that IdentitiesOnly can be used with IdentityFile to control which keys are offered from an agent. commit 20bdcd72365e8b3d51261993928cc47c5f0d7c8a Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 18 16:10:09 2013 +1000 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/21 00:34:49 [auth-rsa.c auth.h auth2-hostbased.c auth2-pubkey.c monitor.c] for hostbased authentication, print the client host and user on the auth success/failure line; bz#2064, ok dtucker@ commit 3071070b39e6d1722151c754cdc2b26640eaf45e Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 18 16:09:44 2013 +1000 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/20 19:15:06 [krl.c] don't leak the rdata blob on errors; ok djm@ commit 044bd2a7ddb0b6f6b716c87e57261572e2b89028 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 18 16:09:25 2013 +1000 - guenther@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/17 04:48:42 [scp.c] Handle time_t values as long long's when formatting them and when parsing them from remote servers. Improve error checking in parsing of 'T' lines. ok dtucker@ deraadt@ commit 9a6615542108118582f64b7161ca0e12176e3712 Author: Damien Miller Date: Thu Jul 18 16:09:04 2013 +1000 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/10 19:19:44 [readconf.c] revert 1.203 while we investigate crashes reported by okan@ commit b7482cff46e7e76bfb3cda86c365a08f58d4fca0 Author: Darren Tucker Date: Tue Jul 2 20:06:46 2013 +1000 - (dtucker) [contrib/cygwin/README contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config] Modernizes and improve readability of the Cygwin README file (which hasn't been updated for ages), drop unsupported OSes from the ssh-host-config help text, and drop an unneeded option from ssh-user-config. Patch from vinschen at redhat com. - -commit b8ae92d08b91beaef34232c6ef34b9941473fdd6 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Jun 11 12:10:02 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Make the conditional algorithm support consistent - and add some comments so it's clear what goes where. - -commit 97b62f41adcb0dcbeff142d0540793a7ea17c910 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Jun 11 11:47:24 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Do not advertise AES GSM ciphers if we don't have - the required OpenSSL support. Patch from naddy at freebsd. - -commit 6d8bd57448b45b42809da32857d7804444349ee7 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Jun 11 11:26:10 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [Makefile.in configure.ac fixalgorithms] Remove unsupported - algorithms (Ciphers, MACs and HostKeyAlgorithms) from man pages. - -commit 36187093ea0b2d2240c043417b8949611687e105 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Mon Jun 10 13:07:11 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/07 15:37:52 - [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c] - Add an "ABANDONED" channel state and use for mux sessions that are - disconnected via the ~. escape sequence. Channels in this state will - be able to close if the server responds, but do not count as active channels. - This means that if you ~. all of the mux clients when using ControlPersist - on a broken network, the backgrounded mux master will exit when the - Control Persist time expires rather than hanging around indefinitely. - bz#1917, also reported and tested by tedu@. ok djm@ markus@. - -commit ae133d4b31af05bb232d797419f498f3ae7e9f2d -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jun 6 08:30:20 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac sftp.c openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Cater for - platforms that don't have multibyte character support (specifically, - mblen). - -commit 408eaf3ab716096f8faf30f091bd54a2c7a17a09 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jun 6 08:22:46 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/05 22:00:28 - [readconf.c] - plug another memleak. bz#1967, from Zhenbo Xu, detected by Melton, ok djm - -commit e52a260f16888ca75390f97de4606943e61785e8 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jun 6 08:22:05 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/05 12:52:38 - [sshconnect2.c] - Fix memory leaks found by Zhenbo Xu and the Melton tool. bz#1967, ok djm - -commit 0cca17fa1819d3a0ba06a6db41ab3eaa8d769587 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jun 6 08:21:14 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/05 02:27:50 - [sshd.c] - When running sshd -D, close stderr unless we have explicitly requesting - logging to stderr. From james.hunt at ubuntu.com via bz#1976, djm's patch - so, err, ok dtucker. - -commit 746e9067bd9b3501876e1c86f38f3c510a12f895 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jun 6 08:20:13 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/05 02:07:29 - [mux.c] - fix leaks in mux error paths, from Zhenbo Xu, found by Melton. bz#1967, - ok djm - -commit ea64721275a81c4788af36294d94bf4f74012e06 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jun 6 08:19:09 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/04 20:42:36 - [sftp.c] - Make sftp's libedit interface marginally multibyte aware by building up - the quoted string by character instead of by byte. Prevents failures - when linked against a libedit built with wide character support (bz#1990). - "looks ok" djm - -commit 194454d7a8f8cb8ac55f2b9d0199ef9445788bee -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jun 6 08:16:04 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/04 19:12:23 - [scp.c] - use MAXPATHLEN for buffer size instead of fixed value. ok markus - -commit 4ac66af091cf6db5a42c18e43738ca9c41e338e5 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jun 6 08:12:37 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/03 00:03:18 - [mac.c] - force the MAC output to be 64-bit aligned so umac won't see unaligned - accesses on strict-alignment architectures. bz#2101, patch from - tomas.kuthan at oracle.com, ok djm@ - -commit ea8342c248ad6c0a4fe1a70de133f954973bd2b2 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jun 6 08:11:40 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/02 23:36:29 - [clientloop.h clientloop.c mux.c] - No need for the mux cleanup callback to be visible so restore it to static - and call it through the detach_user function pointer. ok djm@ - -commit 5d12b8f05d79ba89d0807910a664fa80f6f3bf8c -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jun 6 08:09:10 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/02 21:01:51 - [channels.h] - typo in comment - -commit dc62edbf121c41e8b5270904091039450206d98a -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jun 6 05:12:35 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] append $CFLAGS to compiler options when building - modpipe in case there's anything in there we need. - -commit 2a22873cd869679415104bc9f6bb154811ee604c -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Jun 6 01:59:13 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [regress/forwarding.sh] For (as yet unknown) reason, the - forwarding test is extremely slow copying data on some machines so switch - back to copying the much smaller ls binary until we can figure out why - this is. - -commit b4e00949f01176cd4fae3e0cef5ffa8dea379042 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Jun 5 22:48:44 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [contrib/ssh-copy-id] bz#2117: Use portable operator in test. - Patch from cjwatson at debian. - -commit 2ea9eb77a7fcab3190564ef5a6a5377a600aa391 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Wed Jun 5 15:04:00 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) Enable sha256 kex methods based on the presence of the necessary - functions, not from the openssl version. - -commit 16cac190ebb9b5612cccea63a7c22ac33bc9a07a -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Tue Jun 4 12:55:24 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Some other platforms need sys/types.h before - sys/socket.h. - -commit 0b43ffe143a5843703c3755fa040b8684fb04134 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jun 3 09:30:44 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Some platforms need sys/types.h before sys/un.h. - -commit 3f3064c82238c486706471d300217d73dd0f125e -Author: Tim Rice -Date: Sun Jun 2 15:13:09 2013 -0700 - - - (tim) [regress/sftp-chroot.sh] skip if no sudo. ok dtucker - -commit 01ec0af301f60fefdd0079647f13ef9abadd2db5 -Author: Tim Rice -Date: Sun Jun 2 14:31:27 2013 -0700 - - - (tim) [aclocal.m4] Enhance OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE to check stderr. - feedback and ok dtucker - -commit 5ab9b63468100757479534edeb53f788a61fe08b -Author: Tim Rice -Date: Sun Jun 2 14:05:48 2013 -0700 - - - (tim) [configure.ac regress/Makefile] With rev 1.47 of test-exec.sh we - need a shell that can handle "[ file1 -nt file2 ]". Rather than keep - dealing with shell portability issues in regression tests, we let - configure find us a capable shell on those platforms with an old /bin/sh. - -commit 898ac935e56a7ac5d8b686c590fdb8b7aca27e59 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jun 3 02:03:25 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac] bz#2111: don't try to use lastlog on Android. - Patch from Nathan Osman. - -commit ef4901c3eb98c7ab1342c3cd8f2638da1f4b0678 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Jun 3 01:59:13 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac] sys/un.h needs sys/socket.h on some platforms - to prevent noise from configure. Patch from Nathan Osman. - -commit 073f795bc1c7728c320e5982c0d417376b0907f5 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jun 2 23:47:11 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/02 13:35:58 - [ssh-agent.c] - Make parent_alive_interval time_t to avoid signed/unsigned comparison - -commit 00e1abb1ebe13ab24e812f68715f46e65e7c5271 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jun 2 23:46:24 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/02 13:33:05 - [progressmeter.c] - Add misc.h for monotime prototype. (id sync only) - -commit 86211d1738695e63b2a68f0c3a4f60e1a9d9bda3 -Author: Tim Rice -Date: Sat Jun 1 18:38:23 2013 -0700 - - 20130602 - - (tim) [Makefile.in] Make Solaris, UnixWare, & OpenServer linkers happy - linking regress/modpipe. - -commit e9887d1c37940b9d6c72d55cfad7a40de4c6e28d -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jun 2 09:17:09 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Allow clock_gettimeofday. - -commit 65cf74079a2d563c4ede649116a13ca78c8cc2a4 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jun 2 09:11:19 2013 +1000 - - fix typo - -commit c9a1991b95a4c9f04f9dcef299a8110d2ec80d3e -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jun 2 08:37:05 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/01 22:34:50 - [sftp-client.c] - Update progressmeter when data is acked, not when it's sent. bz#2108, from - Debian via Colin Watson, ok djm@ - -commit a710891659202c82545e84725d4e5cd77aef567c -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jun 2 08:18:31 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac misc.c] Look for clock_gettime in librt and fall - back to time(NULL) if we can't find it anywhere. - -commit f60845fde29cead9d75e812db1c04916b4c58ffd -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jun 2 08:07:31 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [M auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c auth-pam.c cipher-aes.c cipher-ctr.c - groupaccess.c loginrec.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c session.c sshd.c - sshlogin.c uidswap.c openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c - openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c openbsd-compat/port-aix.c - openbsd-compat/port-linux.c] Replace portable-specific instances of xfree - with the equivalent calls to free. - -commit 12f6533215c0a36ab29d11ff52a853fce45573b4 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jun 2 08:01:24 2013 +1000 - - Remove stray '+' accidentally introduced in sync - -commit 3750fce6ac6b287f62584ac55a4406df95c71b92 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jun 2 07:52:21 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/01 20:59:25 - [scp.c sftp-client.c] - Replace S_IWRITE, which isn't standardized, with S_IWUSR, which is. Patch - from Nathan Osman via bz#2113. ok deraadt. - - (note: corrected bug number from 2085) - -commit b759c9c2efebe7b416ab81093ca8eb17836b6933 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jun 2 07:46:16 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/01 13:15:52 - [ssh-agent.c clientloop.c misc.h packet.c progressmeter.c misc.c - channels.c sandbox-systrace.c] - Use clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC ...) for ssh timers so that things like - keepalives and rekeying will work properly over clock steps. Suggested by - markus@, "looks good" djm@. - -commit 55119253c64808b0d3b2ab5d2bc67ee9dac3430b -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jun 2 07:43:59 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/31 12:28:10 - [ssh-agent.c] - Use time_t where appropriate. ok djm - -commit 0acca3797d53d958d240c69a5f222f2aa8444858 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jun 2 07:41:51 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/19 02:42:42 - [auth.h auth.c key.c monitor.c auth-rsa.c auth2.c auth1.c key.h] - Standardise logging of supplemental information during userauth. Keys - and ruser is now logged in the auth success/failure message alongside - the local username, remote host/port and protocol in use. Certificates - contents and CA are logged too. - Pushing all logging onto a single line simplifies log analysis as it is - no longer necessary to relate information scattered across multiple log - entries. "I like it" markus@ - -commit 74836ae0fabcc1a76b9d9eacd1629c88a054b2d0 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jun 2 07:32:00 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/19 02:38:28 - [auth2-pubkey.c] - fix failure to recognise cert-authority keys if a key of a different type - appeared in authorized_keys before it; ok markus@ - -commit a627d42e51ffa71e014d7b2d2c07118122fd3ec3 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jun 2 07:31:17 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 00:13:13 - [xmalloc.h cipher.c sftp-glob.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sftp-common.c - ssh-ecdsa.c auth2-chall.c compat.c readconf.c kexgexs.c monitor.c - gss-genr.c cipher-3des1.c kex.c monitor_wrap.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c - auth-options.c rsa.c auth2-pubkey.c sftp.c hostfile.c auth2.c - servconf.c auth.c authfile.c xmalloc.c uuencode.c sftp-client.c - auth2-gss.c sftp-server.c bufaux.c mac.c session.c jpake.c kexgexc.c - sshconnect.c auth-chall.c auth2-passwd.c sshconnect1.c buffer.c - kexecdhs.c kexdhs.c ssh-rsa.c auth1.c ssh-pkcs11.c auth2-kbdint.c - kexdhc.c sshd.c umac.c ssh-dss.c auth2-jpake.c bufbn.c clientloop.c - monitor_mm.c scp.c roaming_client.c serverloop.c key.c auth-rsa.c - ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-keygen.c match.c channels.c - sshconnect2.c addrmatch.c mux.c canohost.c kexecdhc.c schnorr.c - ssh-add.c misc.c auth2-hostbased.c ssh-agent.c bufec.c groupaccess.c - dns.c packet.c readpass.c authfd.c moduli.c] - bye, bye xfree(); ok markus@ - -commit c7aad0058c957afeb26a3f703e8cb0eddeb62365 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jun 2 07:18:47 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac defines.h] Test for fd_mask, howmany and NFDBITS - rather than trying to enumerate the plaforms that don't have them. - Based on a patch from Nathan Osman, with help from tim@. - -commit c0c3373216801797053e123b5f62d35bf41b3611 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Sun Jun 2 06:28:03 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c] bz#2112: fall back to - using openssl's DES_crpyt function on platorms that don't have a native - one, eg Android. Based on a patch from Nathan Osman. - -commit efdf5342143a887013a1daae583167dadf6752a7 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu May 30 08:29:08 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h] bz#2087: Add a null - implementation of endgrent for platforms that don't have it (eg Android). - Loosely based on a patch from Nathan Osman, ok djm - -commit 9b42d327380e5cd04efde6fb70e1535fecedf0d7 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 20:48:59 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:35:43 - [regress/scp.sh] - use a file extention that's not special on some platforms. from portable - (id sync only) - -commit 0a404b0ed79ba45ccaf7ed5528a8f5004c3698cb -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 20:47:29 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:34:30 - [regress/portnum.sh] - use a more portable negated if structure. from portable (id sync only) - -commit 62ee222e6f3f5ee288434f58b5136ae3d56f5164 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 20:46:00 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:33:09 - [regress/agent-getpeereid.sh] - don't redirect stdout from sudo. from portable (id sync only) - -commit 00478d30cb4bcc18dc1ced8144d16b03cdf790f6 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 20:45:06 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:30:07 - [regress/test-exec.sh] - wait a bit longer for startup and use case for absolute path. - from portable (id sync only) - -commit 98989eb95eef0aefed7e9fb4e65c2f625be946f6 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 20:44:09 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:28:11 - [regress/sftp.sh] - only compare copied data if sftp succeeds. from portable (id sync only) - -commit 438f60eb9a5f7cd40bb242cfec865e4fde71b07c -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 20:43:13 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:26:26 - [regress/sftp-badcmds.sh] - remove unused BATCH variable. (id sync only) - -commit 1466bd25a8d1ff7ae455a795d2d7d52dc17d2938 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 20:42:05 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:24:48 - [localcommand.sh] - use backticks for portability. (id sync only) - -commit 05b5e518c9969d63471f2ccfd85b1de6e724d30b -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 20:41:07 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:23:52 - [regress/login-timeout.sh regress/reexec.sh regress/test-exec.sh] - Use SUDO when cat'ing pid files and running the sshd log wrapper so that - it works with a restrictive umask and the pid files are not world readable. - Changes from -portable. (id sync only) - -commit dd669173f93ea8c8397e0af758eaf13ab4f1c591 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 20:39:57 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:16:26 - [regress/try-ciphers.sh] - use expr for math to keep diffs vs portable down - (id sync only) - -commit 044f32f4c6fd342f9f5949bb0ca77624c0db4494 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 20:12:57 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [regress/cfgmatch.sh] Remove unneeded sleep renderd obsolete by - rev 1.6 which calls wait. - -commit 9cc8ff7b63f175661c8807006f6d2649d56ac402 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 20:01:52 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [regress/runtests.sh] Remove obsolete test driver script. - -commit f8d5b3451726530a864b172c556c311370c244e1 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 19:53:25 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [regress/stderr-after-eof.sh regress/test-exec.sh] Move the md5 - helper function to the portable part of test-exec.sh. - -commit 6f66981ed3c6bb83b937959f329323975e356c33 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 19:28:51 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [regress/test-exec.sh] Move the portable-specific functions - together and add a couple of missing lines from openbsd. - -commit 5f1a89a3b67264f4aa83e057cd4f74fd60b9ffa4 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 19:17:58 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [regress/integrity.sh regress/krl.sh regress/test-exec.sh] - Move the jot helper function to portable-specific part of test-exec.sh. - -commit 96457a54d05dea81f34ecb4e059d2f8b98382b85 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 19:03:38 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [regress/agent-getpeereid.sh] Resync spaces with openbsd. - -commit 7f193236594e8328ad133ea05eded31f837b45b5 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 19:02:28 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [regress/cfgmatch.sh] Resync config file setup with openbsd. - -commit 8654dd2d737800d09e7730b3dfc2a54411f4cf90 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 16:03:48 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/getopt.h] Remove unneeded bits. - -commit 59d928d3b47e8298f4a8b4b3fb37fb8c8ce1b098 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 15:32:29 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 04:29:14 - [regress/sftp.sh regress/putty-ciphers.sh regress/cipher-speed.sh - regress/test-exec.sh regress/sftp-batch.sh regress/dynamic-forward.sh - regress/putty-transfer.sh regress/conch-ciphers.sh regress/sftp-cmds.sh - regress/scp.sh regress/ssh-com-sftp.sh regress/rekey.sh - regress/putty-kex.sh regress/stderr-data.sh regress/stderr-after-eof.sh - regress/sftp-badcmds.sh regress/reexec.sh regress/ssh-com-client.sh - regress/sftp-chroot.sh regress/forwarding.sh regress/transfer.sh - regress/multiplex.sh] - Move the setting of DATA and COPY into test-exec.sh - -commit 34035be27b7ddd84706fe95c39d37cba7d5c9572 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 14:47:51 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 01:32:11 - [regress/integrity.sh] - don't print output from ssh before getting it (it's available in ssh.log) - -commit b8b96b0aa634d440feba4331c80ae4de9dda2081 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 14:46:20 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 01:16:09 - [regress/agent-timeout.sh] - Pull back some portability changes from -portable: - - TIMEOUT is a read-only variable in some shells - - not all greps have -q so redirect to /dev/null instead. - (ID sync only) - -commit a40d97ff46831c9081a6a4472036689360847fb1 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 14:44:53 2013 +1000 - - sync missing ID - -commit 56347efe796a0506e846621ae65562b978e45f1d -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 13:28:36 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 00:37:40 - [regress/agent.sh regress/keytype.sh regress/cfgmatch.sh - regress/forcecommand.sh regress/proto-version.sh regress/test-exec.sh - regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/cert-hostkey.sh regress/cert-userkey.sh - regress/ssh-com.sh] - replace 'echo -n' with 'printf' since it's more portable - also remove "echon" hack. - -commit 91af05c5167fe0aa5bd41d2e4a83757d9f627c18 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 13:16:59 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [regress/integrity.sh]. Force fixed Diffie-Hellman key exchange - methods. When the openssl version doesn't support ECDH then next one on - the list is DH group exchange, but that causes a bit more traffic which can - mean that the tests flip bits in the initial exchange rather than the MACed - traffic and we get different errors to what the tests look for. - -commit 6e1e60c3c2e16c32bb7ca0876caaa6182a4e4b2c -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 11:23:41 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [regress/bsd.regress.mk] Remove unused file. We've never used it - in portable and it's long gone in openbsd. - -commit 982b0cbc4c2b5ea14725f4b339393cdf343dd0fe -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 09:45:12 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 05:48:31 - [regress/rekey.sh] - add tests for RekeyLimit parsing - -commit 14490fe7b0f45b1b19f8a3dc10eb3d214f27f5bd -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 09:44:20 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 04:26:10 - [regress/rekey.sh] - add server-side rekey test - -commit c31c8729c15f83fba14ef9da0d66bda6215ff69a -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 09:43:33 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 03:33:30 - [regress/rekey.sh] - test rekeying when there's no data being transferred - -commit a8a62fcc46c19997797846197a6256ed9a777a47 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 09:42:34 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 02:10:35 - [rekey.sh] - Add test for time-based rekeying - -commit 5e95173715d516e6014485e2b6def1fb3db84036 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 09:41:33 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/10 03:46:14 - [modpipe.c] - sync some portability changes from portable OpenSSH (id sync only) - -commit a4df65b9fc68a555a7d8781700475fb03ed6e694 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 09:37:31 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/22 07:28:53 - [multiplex.sh] - Add tests for -Oforward and -Ocancel for local and remote forwards - -commit 40aaff7e4bcb05b05e3d24938b6d34885be817da -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 09:36:20 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/22 07:23:08 - [multiplex.sh] - Write mux master logs to regress.log instead of ssh.log to keep separate - -commit f3568fc62b73b50a0a3c8447e4a00f4892cab25e -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 09:35:26 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/18 02:46:12 - [Makefile regress/sftp-chroot.sh] - test sshd ChrootDirectory+internal-sftp; feedback & ok dtucker@ - -commit dfea3bcdd7c980c2335402464b7dd8d8721e426d -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 09:31:39 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/07 02:16:03 - [regress/Makefile regress/rekey.sh regress/integrity.sh - regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh regress/forwarding.sh regress/test-exec.sh] - use -E option for ssh and sshd to write debuging logs to ssh{,d}.log and - save the output from any failing tests. If a test fails the debug output - from ssh and sshd for the failing tests (and only the failing tests) should - be available in failed-ssh{,d}.log. - -commit 75129025a2d504b630d1718fef0da002f5662f63 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 09:19:10 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/06 06:00:22 - [regress/rekey.sh regress/test-exec.sh regress/integrity.sh - regress/multiplex.sh Makefile regress/cfgmatch.sh] - Split the regress log into 3 parts: the debug output from ssh, the debug - log from sshd and the output from the client command (ssh, scp or sftp). - Somewhat functional now, will become more useful when ssh/sshd -E is added. - -commit 7c8b1e72331293b4707dc6f7f68a69e975a3fa70 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 09:10:20 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/23 11:09:43 - [test-exec.sh] - Only regenerate host keys if they don't exist or if ssh-keygen has changed - since they were. Reduces test runtime by 5-30% depending on machine - speed. - -commit 712de4d1100963b11bc618472f95ce36bf7e2ae3 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 17 09:07:12 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/07 00:20:34 - [regress/proxy-connect.sh] - repeat test with a style appended to the username - -commit 09c0f0325b2f538de9a1073e03b8ef26dece4c16 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu May 16 20:48:57 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 10:44:06 - [servconf.c] - remove another now-unused variable - -commit 9113d0c2381202412c912a20c8083ab7d6824ec9 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu May 16 20:48:14 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 10:43:34 - [servconf.c readconf.c] - remove now-unused variables - -commit e194ba4111ffd47cd1f4c8be1ddc8a4cb673d005 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu May 16 20:47:31 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac readconf.c servconf.c - openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Add compat bits for scan_scaled. - -commit b7ee8521448100e5b268111ff90feb017e657e44 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu May 16 20:33:10 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 09:12:31 - [readconf.c servconf.c] - switch RekeyLimit traffic volume parsing to scan_scaled. ok djm@ - -commit dbee308253931f8c1aeebf781d7e7730ff6a0dc1 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu May 16 20:32:29 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 09:08:41 - [log.c scp.c sshd.c serverloop.c schnorr.c sftp.c] - Fix some "unused result" warnings found via clang and -portable. - ok markus@ - -commit 64d22946d664dad8165f1fae9e78b53831ed728d -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu May 16 20:31:29 2013 +1000 - - - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 06:30:06 - [sshd_config.5] - oops! avoid Xr to self; - -commit 63e0df2b936770baadc8844617b99e5174b476d0 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu May 16 20:30:31 2013 +1000 - - - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 06:28:45 - [ssh_config.5] - put IgnoreUnknown in the right place; - -commit 0763698f71efef8b3f8460c5700758359219eb7c -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu May 16 20:30:03 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 04:27:50 - [ssh_config.5 readconf.h readconf.c] - add the ability to ignore specific unrecognised ssh_config options; - bz#866; ok markus@ - -commit 5f96f3b4bee11ae2b9b32ff9b881c3693e210f96 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu May 16 20:29:28 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 04:09:14 - [sshd_config.5 servconf.c servconf.h packet.c serverloop.c monitor.c sshd_config - sshd.c] Add RekeyLimit to sshd with the same syntax as the client allowing - rekeying based on traffic volume or time. ok djm@, help & ok jmc@ for the man - page. - -commit c53c2af173cf67fd1c26f98e7900299b1b65b6ec -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu May 16 20:28:16 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 02:00:34 - [ssh_config sshconnect2.c packet.c readconf.h readconf.c clientloop.c - ssh_config.5 packet.h] - Add an optional second argument to RekeyLimit in the client to allow - rekeying based on elapsed time in addition to amount of traffic. - with djm@ jmc@, ok djm - -commit 64c6fceecd27e1739040b42de8f3759454260b39 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu May 16 20:27:14 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/10 10:13:50 - [ssh-pkcs11-helper.c] - remove unused extern optarg. ok markus@ - -commit caf00109346e4ab6bb495b0e22bc5b1e7ee22f26 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu May 16 20:26:18 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/10 04:08:01 - [key.c] - memleak in cert_free(), wasn't actually freeing the struct; - bz#2096 from shm AT digitalsun.pl - -commit 7e831edbf7a1b0b9aeeb08328b9fceafaad1bf22 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu May 16 20:25:40 2013 +1000 - - add missing attribution - -commit 54da6be320495604ddf65d10ac4cc8cf7849c533 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu May 16 20:25:04 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/10 03:40:07 - [sshconnect2.c] - fix bzero(ptr_to_struct, sizeof(ptr_to_struct)); bz#2100 from - -commit 5d8b702d95c0dfc338726fecfbb709695afd1377 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu May 16 20:24:23 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/06 07:35:12 - [sftp-server.8] - Reference the version of the sftp draft we actually implement. ok djm@ - -commit 026d9db3fbe311b5a7e98d62472cb666aa559648 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu May 16 20:23:52 2013 +1000 - - - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/24 16:01:46 - [misc.c] - remove extra parens noticed by nicm - -commit 2ca51bf140ef2c2409fd220778529dc17c11d8fa -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu May 16 20:22:46 2013 +1000 - - - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/23 17:49:45 - [misc.c] - use xasprintf instead of a series of strlcats and strdup. ok djm - -commit 6aa3eacc5e5f39702b6dd5b27970d9fd97bc2383 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu May 16 11:10:17 2013 +1000 - - - (djm) [contrib/ssh-copy-id] Fix bug that could cause "rm *" to be - executed if mktemp failed; bz#2105 ok dtucker@ - -commit c54e3e0741a27119b3badd8ff92b1988b7e9bd50 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 10 18:53:14 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Add -Werror to the -Qunused-arguments test so - we don't get a warning on compilers that *don't* support it. Add - -Wno-unknown-warning-option. Move both to the start of the list for - maximum noise suppression. Tested with gcc 4.6.3, gcc 2.95.4 and clang 2.9. - -commit a75d247a18a5099c60226395354eb252c097ac86 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 10 18:11:55 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [kex.c] Only include sha256 and ECC key exchange methods when the - underlying libraries support them. - -commit 0abfb559e3f79d1f217773510d7626c3722aa3c1 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 10 18:08:49 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c - openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] pull in getopt.h from openbsd and plumb - in to use it when we're using our own getopt. - -commit ccfdfceacb7e23d1479ed4cc91976c5ac6e23c56 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 10 16:28:55 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/Makefile.in openbsd-compat/getopt.c - openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c regress/modpipe.c] Remove getopt.c, add - portability code to getopt_long.c and switch over Makefile and the ugly - hack in modpipe.c. Fixes bz#1448. - -commit 39332020078aa8fd4fc28e00b336438dc64b0f5a -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 10 15:38:11 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c] Import from OpenBSD. No - portability changes yet. - -commit 35b2fe99bee4f332d1c1efa49107cdb3c67da07a -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 10 15:35:26 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/getopt.c] Factor out portibility changes to - getopt.c. Preprocessed source is identical other than line numbers. - -commit abbc7a7c02e45787d023f50a30f62d7a3e14fe9e -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri May 10 13:54:23 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Enable -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess if the compiler - supports it. Mentioned by Colin Watson in bz#2100, ok djm. - -commit bc02f163f6e882d390abfb925b47b41e13ae523b -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Apr 23 19:25:49 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/22 01:17:18 - [mux.c] - typo in debug output: evitval->exitval - -commit f8b894e31dc3530c7eb6d0a378848260d54f74c4 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Apr 23 19:25:29 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 12:07:08 - [kex.c] - remove duplicated list entry pointed out by naddy@ - -commit 34bd20a1e53b63ceb01f06c1654d9112e6784b0a -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Apr 23 19:25:00 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 11:10:18 - [ssh.c] - add -Q to usage; reminded by jmc@ - -commit ea11119eee3c5e2429b1f5f8688b25b028fa991a -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Apr 23 19:24:32 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 01:06:50 - [authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c] - [key.c key.h mac.c mac.h packet.c ssh.1 ssh.c] - add the ability to query supported ciphers, MACs, key type and KEX - algorithms to ssh. Includes some refactoring of KEX and key type handling - to be table-driven; ok markus@ - -commit a56086b9903b62c1c4fdedf01b68338fe4dc90e4 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:24:18 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 01:03:01 - [session.c] - reintroduce 1.262 without the connection-killing bug: - fatal() when ChrootDirectory specified by running without root privileges; - ok markus@ - -commit 0d6771b4648889ae5bc4235f9e3fc6cd82b710bd -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:23:24 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 01:01:00 - [ssh-keygen.c] - fix some memory leaks; bz#2088 ok dtucker@ - -commit 467b00c38ba244f9966466e57a89d003f3afb159 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:23:07 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 01:00:10 - [sshd_config.5] - document the requirment that the AuthorizedKeysCommand be owned by root; - ok dtucker@ markus@ - -commit 9303e6527bb5ca7630c765f28624702c212bfd6c -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:22:40 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/18 02:16:07 - [sftp.c] - make "sftp -q" do what it says on the sticker: hush everything but errors; - -commit f1a02aea35504e8bef2ed9eef6f9ddeab12bacb3 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:22:13 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/17 09:04:09 - [session.c] - revert rev 1.262; it fails because uid is already set here. ok djm@ - -commit d5edefd27a30768cc7a4817302e964b6cb2f9be7 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:21:39 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/11 02:27:50 - [packet.c] - quiet disconnect notifications on the server from error() back to logit() - if it is a normal client closure; bz#2057 ok+feedback dtucker@ - -commit 6901032b05291fc5d2bd4067fc47904de3506fda -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:21:24 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/07 09:40:27 - [sshd.8] - clarify -e text. suggested by & ok jmc@ - -commit 03d4d7e60b16f913c75382e32e136ddfa8d6485f -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:21:06 2013 +1000 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/07 02:10:33 - [log.c log.h ssh.1 ssh.c sshd.8 sshd.c] - Add -E option to ssh and sshd to append debugging logs to a specified file - instead of stderr or syslog. ok markus@, man page help jmc@ - -commit 37f1c08473b1ef2a188ee178ce2e11e841f88563 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:20:43 2013 +1000 - - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/06 16:07:00 - [channels.c sshd.c] - handle ECONNABORTED for accept(); ok deraadt some time ago... - -commit 172859cff7df9fd8a29a1f0a4de568f644bbda50 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:19:27 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/05 00:58:51 - [mux.c] - cleanup mux-created channels that are in SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING state too - (in addition to ones already in OPEN); bz#2079, ok dtucker@ - -commit 9f12b5dcd5f7772e633fb2786c63bfcbea1f1aea -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:19:11 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/05 00:31:49 - [pathnames.h] - use the existing _PATH_SSH_USER_RC define to construct the other - pathnames; bz#2077, ok dtucker@ (no binary change) - -commit d677ad14ff7efedf21745ee1694058350e758e18 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:18:51 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/05 00:14:00 - [auth2-gss.c krl.c sshconnect2.c] - hush some {unused, printf type} warnings - -commit 508b6c3d3b95c8ec078fd4801368597ab29b2db9 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:18:28 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/08 06:32:58 - [ssh.c] - allow "ssh -f none ..." ok markus@ - -commit 91a55f28f35431f9000b95815c343b5a18fda712 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:18:10 2013 +1000 - - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/07 19:27:25 - [auth.h auth2-chall.c auth2.c monitor.c sshd_config.5] - add submethod support to AuthenticationMethods; ok and freedback djm@ - -commit 4ce189d9108c62090a0dd5dea973d175328440db -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:17:52 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/07 00:19:59 - [auth2-pubkey.c monitor.c] - reconstruct the original username that was sent by the client, which may - have included a style (e.g. "root:skey") when checking public key - signatures. Fixes public key and hostbased auth when the client specified - a style; ok markus@ - -commit 5cbec4c25954b184e43bf3d3ac09e65eb474f5f9 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:17:12 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/06 23:36:53 - [readconf.c] - g/c unused variable (-Wunused) - -commit 998cc56b65682d490c9bbf5977dceb1aa84a0233 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:16:43 2013 +1000 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/06 23:35:23 - [session.c] - fatal() when ChrootDirectory specified by running without root privileges; - ok markus@ - -commit 62e9c4f9b6027620f9091a2f43328e057bdb33f1 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Apr 23 15:15:49 2013 +1000 - - - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/05 20:16:09 - [sshconnect2.c] - reset pubkey order on partial success; ok djm@ - -commit 6332da2ae88db623d7da8070dd807efa26d9dfe8 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Tue Apr 23 14:25:52 2013 +1000 - - - (djm) [auth.c configure.ac misc.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c] Support - platforms, such as Android, that lack struct passwd.pw_gecos. Report - and initial patch from Nathan Osman bz#2086; feedback tim@ ok dtucker@ - -commit ce1c9574fcfaf753a062276867335c1e237f725c -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Thu Apr 18 21:36:19 2013 +1000 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Use -Qunused-arguments to suppress warnings from - unused argument warnings (in particular, -fno-builtin-memset) from clang. - -commit bc68f2451b836e6a3fa65df8774a8b1f10049ded -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Thu Apr 18 11:26:25 2013 +1000 - - - (djm) [config.guess config.sub] Update to last versions before they switch - to GPL3. ok dtucker@ - -commit 15fd19c4c9943cf02bc6f462d52c86ee6a8f422e -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 5 11:22:26 2013 +1100 - - - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/22 22:09:01 - [ssh.c] - Allow IdenityFile=none; ok markus deraadt (and dtucker for an earlier - version) - -commit 5d1d9541a7c83963cd887b6b36e25b46463a05d4 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 5 11:20:00 2013 +1100 - - - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/22 19:13:56 - [sshconnect.c] - support ProxyCommand=- (stdin/out already point to the proxy); ok djm@ - -commit aefa3682431f59cf1ad9a0f624114b135135aa44 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 5 11:18:35 2013 +1100 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/22 04:45:09 - [ssh.c readconf.c readconf.h] - Don't complain if IdentityFiles specified in system-wide configs are - missing. ok djm, deraadt - -commit f3c38142435622d056582e851579d8647a233c7f -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 5 11:16:52 2013 +1100 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/19 02:12:47 - [krl.c] - Remove bogus include. ok djm - (id sync only) - -commit 1910478c2d2c3d0e1edacaeff21ed388d70759e9 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Apr 5 11:13:08 2013 +1100 - - - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/17 23:16:57 - [readconf.c ssh.c readconf.h sshconnect2.c] - Keep track of which IndentityFile options were manually supplied and which - were default options, and don't warn if the latter are missing. - ok markus@ - -commit c9627cdbc65b25da943f24e6a953da899f08eefc -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Mon Apr 1 12:40:48 2013 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.{c,h}] Don't include windows.h - to avoid conflicting definitions of __int64, adding the required bits. - Patch from Corinna Vinschen. - -commit 75db01d2ce29a85f8e5a2aff2011446896cf3f8a -Author: Tim Rice -Date: Fri Mar 22 10:14:32 2013 -0700 - - - (tim) [Makefile.in] remove some duplication introduced in 20130220 commit. - -commit 221b4b2436ac78a65c3b775c25ccd396a1fed208 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Mar 22 12:51:09 2013 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [includes.h] Check if _GNU_SOURCE is already defined before - defining it again. Prevents warnings if someone, eg, sets it in CFLAGS. - -commit c8a0f27c6d761d1335d13ed84d773e9ddf1d95c8 -Author: Darren Tucker -Date: Fri Mar 22 12:49:14 2013 +1100 - - - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Add stdlib.h to zlib check for exit() prototype. - -commit eed8dc261018aea4d6b8606ca3addc9f8cf9ed1e -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Mar 22 10:25:22 2013 +1100 - - - (djm) Release 6.2p1 - -commit 83efe7c86168cc07b8e6cc6df6b54f7ace3b64a3 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Fri Mar 22 10:17:36 2013 +1100 - - - (djm) [contrib/ssh-copy-id contrib/ssh-copy-id.1] Updated to Phil - Hands' greatly revised version. - -commit 63b4bcd04e1c57b77eabb4e4d359508a4b2af685 -Author: Damien Miller -Date: Wed Mar 20 12:55:14 2013 +1100 - - - (djm) [configure.ac log.c scp.c sshconnect2.c openbsd-compat/vis.c] - [openbsd-compat/vis.h] FreeBSD's strnvis isn't compatible with OpenBSD's - so mark it as broken. Patch from des AT des.no Index: head/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL (revision 294336) @@ -1,456 +1,456 @@ This documents OpenSSH's deviations and extensions to the published SSH protocol. Note that OpenSSH's sftp and sftp-server implement revision 3 of the SSH filexfer protocol described in: http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt Newer versions of the draft will not be supported, though some features are individually implemented as extensions described below. The protocol used by OpenSSH's ssh-agent is described in the file PROTOCOL.agent 1. Transport protocol changes 1.1. transport: Protocol 2 MAC algorithm "umac-64@openssh.com" This is a new transport-layer MAC method using the UMAC algorithm (rfc4418). This method is identical to the "umac-64" method documented in: http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-umac-01.txt 1.2. transport: Protocol 2 compression algorithm "zlib@openssh.com" This transport-layer compression method uses the zlib compression algorithm (identical to the "zlib" method in rfc4253), but delays the start of compression until after authentication has completed. This avoids exposing compression code to attacks from unauthenticated users. The method is documented in: http://www.openssh.com/txt/draft-miller-secsh-compression-delayed-00.txt 1.3. transport: New public key algorithms "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com", "ssh-dsa-cert-v00@openssh.com", "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" and "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" OpenSSH introduces new public key algorithms to support certificate authentication for users and host keys. These methods are documented in the file PROTOCOL.certkeys 1.4. transport: Elliptic Curve cryptography OpenSSH supports ECC key exchange and public key authentication as specified in RFC5656. Only the ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 and ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 curves over GF(p) are supported. Elliptic curve points encoded using point compression are NOT accepted or generated. 1.5 transport: Protocol 2 Encrypt-then-MAC MAC algorithms OpenSSH supports MAC algorithms, whose names contain "-etm", that perform the calculations in a different order to that defined in RFC 4253. These variants use the so-called "encrypt then MAC" ordering, calculating the MAC over the packet ciphertext rather than the plaintext. This ordering closes a security flaw in the SSH transport protocol, where decryption of unauthenticated ciphertext provided a "decryption oracle" that could, in conjunction with cipher flaws, reveal session plaintext. Specifically, the "-etm" MAC algorithms modify the transport protocol to calculate the MAC over the packet ciphertext and to send the packet length unencrypted. This is necessary for the transport to obtain the length of the packet and location of the MAC tag so that it may be verified without decrypting unauthenticated data. As such, the MAC covers: mac = MAC(key, sequence_number || packet_length || encrypted_packet) where "packet_length" is encoded as a uint32 and "encrypted_packet" contains: byte padding_length byte[n1] payload; n1 = packet_length - padding_length - 1 byte[n2] random padding; n2 = padding_length 1.6 transport: AES-GCM OpenSSH supports the AES-GCM algorithm as specified in RFC 5647. Because of problems with the specification of the key exchange the behaviour of OpenSSH differs from the RFC as follows: AES-GCM is only negotiated as the cipher algorithms "aes128-gcm@openssh.com" or "aes256-gcm@openssh.com" and never as an MAC algorithm. Additionally, if AES-GCM is selected as the cipher the exchanged MAC algorithms are ignored and there doesn't have to be a matching MAC. 1.7 transport: chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com authenticated encryption OpenSSH supports authenticated encryption using ChaCha20 and Poly1305 as described in PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305. 1.8 transport: curve25519-sha256@libssh.org key exchange algorithm OpenSSH supports the use of ECDH in Curve25519 for key exchange as described at: http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519 2. Connection protocol changes 2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com" The SSH connection protocol (rfc4254) provides the SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF message to allow an endpoint to signal its peer that it will send no more data over a channel. Unfortunately, there is no symmetric way for an endpoint to request that its peer should cease sending data to it while still keeping the channel open for the endpoint to send data to the peer. This is desirable, since it saves the transmission of data that would otherwise need to be discarded and it allows an endpoint to signal local processes of the condition, e.g. by closing the corresponding file descriptor. OpenSSH implements a channel extension message to perform this signalling: "eow@openssh.com" (End Of Write). This message is sent by an endpoint when the local output of a session channel is closed or experiences a write error. The message is formatted as follows: byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST uint32 recipient channel string "eow@openssh.com" boolean FALSE On receiving this message, the peer SHOULD cease sending data of the channel and MAY signal the process from which the channel data originates (e.g. by closing its read file descriptor). As with the symmetric SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF message, the channel does remain open after a "eow@openssh.com" has been sent and more data may still be sent in the other direction. This message does not consume window space and may be sent even if no window space is available. NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt of this message (in contravention of RFC4254 section 5.4), this message is only sent to OpenSSH peers (identified by banner). Other SSH implementations may be whitelisted to receive this message upon request. 2.2. connection: disallow additional sessions extension "no-more-sessions@openssh.com" Most SSH connections will only ever request a single session, but a attacker may abuse a running ssh client to surreptitiously open additional sessions under their control. OpenSSH provides a global request "no-more-sessions@openssh.com" to mitigate this attack. When an OpenSSH client expects that it will never open another session (i.e. it has been started with connection multiplexing disabled), it will send the following global request: byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST string "no-more-sessions@openssh.com" char want-reply On receipt of such a message, an OpenSSH server will refuse to open future channels of type "session" and instead immediately abort the connection. Note that this is not a general defence against compromised clients (that is impossible), but it thwarts a simple attack. NB. due to certain broken SSH implementations aborting upon receipt of this message, the no-more-sessions request is only sent to OpenSSH servers (identified by banner). Other SSH implementations may be whitelisted to receive this message upon request. 2.3. connection: Tunnel forward extension "tun@openssh.com" OpenSSH supports layer 2 and layer 3 tunnelling via the "tun@openssh.com" channel type. This channel type supports forwarding of network packets -with datagram boundaries intact between endpoints equipped with +with datagram boundaries intact between endpoints equipped with interfaces like the BSD tun(4) device. Tunnel forwarding channels are requested by the client with the following packet: byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN string "tun@openssh.com" uint32 sender channel uint32 initial window size uint32 maximum packet size uint32 tunnel mode uint32 remote unit number The "tunnel mode" parameter specifies whether the tunnel should forward layer 2 frames or layer 3 packets. It may take one of the following values: SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT 1 /* layer 3 packets */ SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET 2 /* layer 2 frames */ The "tunnel unit number" specifies the remote interface number, or may be 0x7fffffff to allow the server to automatically chose an interface. A server that is not willing to open a client-specified unit should refuse the request with a SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE error. On successful open, the server should reply with SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_SUCCESS. Once established the client and server may exchange packet or frames over the tunnel channel by encapsulating them in SSH protocol strings and sending them as channel data. This ensures that packet boundaries are kept intact. Specifically, packets are transmitted using normal SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA packets: byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA uint32 recipient channel string data The contents of the "data" field for layer 3 packets is: uint32 packet length uint32 address family byte[packet length - 4] packet data The "address family" field identifies the type of packet in the message. It may be one of: SSH_TUN_AF_INET 2 /* IPv4 */ SSH_TUN_AF_INET6 24 /* IPv6 */ The "packet data" field consists of the IPv4/IPv6 datagram itself without any link layer header. The contents of the "data" field for layer 2 packets is: uint32 packet length byte[packet length] frame The "frame" field contains an IEEE 802.3 Ethernet frame, including header. 2.4. connection: Unix domain socket forwarding OpenSSH supports local and remote Unix domain socket forwarding using the "streamlocal" extension. Forwarding is initiated as per TCP sockets but with a single path instead of a host and port. Similar to direct-tcpip, direct-streamlocal is sent by the client to request that the server make a connection to a Unix domain socket. byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN string "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com" uint32 sender channel uint32 initial window size uint32 maximum packet size string socket path string reserved for future use Similar to forwarded-tcpip, forwarded-streamlocal is sent by the server when the client has previously send the server a streamlocal-forward GLOBAL_REQUEST. byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN string "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com" uint32 sender channel uint32 initial window size uint32 maximum packet size string socket path string reserved for future use The reserved field is not currently defined and is ignored on the remote end. It is intended to be used in the future to pass information about the socket file, such as ownership and mode. The client currently sends the empty string for this field. Similar to tcpip-forward, streamlocal-forward is sent by the client to request remote forwarding of a Unix domain socket. byte SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST string "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com" boolean TRUE string socket path Similar to cancel-tcpip-forward, cancel-streamlocal-forward is sent by the client cancel the forwarding of a Unix domain socket. byte SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST string "cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com" boolean FALSE string socket path 2.5. connection: hostkey update and rotation "hostkeys-00@openssh.com" and "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com" OpenSSH supports a protocol extension allowing a server to inform a client of all its protocol v.2 host keys after user-authentication has completed. byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST string "hostkeys-00@openssh.com" string[] hostkeys Upon receiving this message, a client should check which of the supplied host keys are present in known_hosts. For keys that are not present, it should send a "hostkeys-prove@openssh.com" message to request the server prove ownership of the private half of the key. byte SSH_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST string "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com" char 1 /* want-reply */ string[] hostkeys When a server receives this message, it should generate a signature using each requested key over the following: string "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com" string session identifier string hostkey These signatures should be included in the reply, in the order matching the hostkeys in the request: byte SSH_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS string[] signatures When the client receives this reply (and not a failure), it should validate the signatures and may update its known_hosts file, adding keys that it has not seen before and deleting keys for the server host that are no longer offered. These extensions let a client learn key types that it had not previously encountered, thereby allowing it to potentially upgrade from weaker key algorithms to better ones. It also supports graceful key rotation: a server may offer multiple keys of the same type for a period (to give clients an opportunity to learn them using this extension) before removing the deprecated key from those offered. 3. SFTP protocol changes 3.1. sftp: Reversal of arguments to SSH_FXP_SYMLINK When OpenSSH's sftp-server was implemented, the order of the arguments to the SSH_FXP_SYMLINK method was inadvertently reversed. Unfortunately, the reversal was not noticed until the server was widely deployed. Since fixing this to follow the specification would cause incompatibility, the current order was retained. For correct operation, clients should send SSH_FXP_SYMLINK as follows: uint32 id string targetpath string linkpath 3.2. sftp: Server extension announcement in SSH_FXP_VERSION OpenSSH's sftp-server lists the extensions it supports using the standard extension announcement mechanism in the SSH_FXP_VERSION server hello packet: uint32 3 /* protocol version */ string ext1-name string ext1-version string ext2-name string ext2-version ... string extN-name string extN-version Each extension reports its integer version number as an ASCII encoded string, e.g. "1". The version will be incremented if the extension is ever changed in an incompatible way. The server MAY advertise the same extension with multiple versions (though this is unlikely). Clients MUST check the version number before attempting to use the extension. 3.3. sftp: Extension request "posix-rename@openssh.com" This operation provides a rename operation with POSIX semantics, which are different to those provided by the standard SSH_FXP_RENAME in draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt. This request is implemented as a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the following format: uint32 id string "posix-rename@openssh.com" string oldpath string newpath On receiving this request the server will perform the POSIX operation rename(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message. This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "1". 3.4. sftp: Extension requests "statvfs@openssh.com" and "fstatvfs@openssh.com" These requests correspond to the statvfs and fstatvfs POSIX system interfaces. The "statvfs@openssh.com" request operates on an explicit pathname, and is formatted as follows: uint32 id string "statvfs@openssh.com" string path The "fstatvfs@openssh.com" operates on an open file handle: uint32 id string "fstatvfs@openssh.com" string handle These requests return a SSH_FXP_STATUS reply on failure. On success they return the following SSH_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY reply: uint32 id uint64 f_bsize /* file system block size */ uint64 f_frsize /* fundamental fs block size */ uint64 f_blocks /* number of blocks (unit f_frsize) */ uint64 f_bfree /* free blocks in file system */ uint64 f_bavail /* free blocks for non-root */ uint64 f_files /* total file inodes */ uint64 f_ffree /* free file inodes */ uint64 f_favail /* free file inodes for to non-root */ uint64 f_fsid /* file system id */ uint64 f_flag /* bit mask of f_flag values */ uint64 f_namemax /* maximum filename length */ The values of the f_flag bitmask are as follows: #define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY 0x1 /* read-only */ #define SSH_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID 0x2 /* no setuid */ Both the "statvfs@openssh.com" and "fstatvfs@openssh.com" extensions are advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "2". 10. sftp: Extension request "hardlink@openssh.com" This request is for creating a hard link to a regular file. This request is implemented as a SSH_FXP_EXTENDED request with the following format: uint32 id string "hardlink@openssh.com" string oldpath string newpath On receiving this request the server will perform the operation link(oldpath, newpath) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message. This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "1". 10. sftp: Extension request "fsync@openssh.com" This request asks the server to call fsync(2) on an open file handle. uint32 id string "fsync@openssh.com" string handle One receiving this request, a server will call fsync(handle_fd) and will respond with a SSH_FXP_STATUS message. This extension is advertised in the SSH_FXP_VERSION hello with version "1". -$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.27 2015/02/20 22:17:21 djm Exp $ +$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL,v 1.28 2015/05/08 03:56:51 djm Exp $ Index: head/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.agent =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.agent (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/PROTOCOL.agent (revision 294336) @@ -1,560 +1,560 @@ This describes the protocol used by OpenSSH's ssh-agent. OpenSSH's agent supports managing keys for the standard SSH protocol 2 as well as the legacy SSH protocol 1. Support for these key types is almost completely disjoint - in all but a few cases, operations on protocol 2 keys cannot see or affect protocol 1 keys and vice-versa. Protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys are separated because of the differing cryptographic usage: protocol 1 private RSA keys are used to decrypt challenges that were encrypted with the corresponding public key, whereas protocol 2 RSA private keys are used to sign challenges with a private key for verification with the corresponding public key. It is considered unsound practice to use the same key for signing and encryption. With a couple of exceptions, the protocol message names used in this document indicate which type of key the message relates to. SSH_* messages refer to protocol 1 keys only. SSH2_* messages refer to protocol 2 keys. Furthermore, the names also indicate whether the message is a request to the agent (*_AGENTC_*) or a reply from the agent (*_AGENT_*). Section 3 below contains the mapping of the protocol message names to their integer values. 1. Data types Because of support for legacy SSH protocol 1 keys, OpenSSH's agent protocol makes use of some data types not defined in RFC 4251. 1.1 uint16 The "uint16" data type is a simple MSB-first 16 bit unsigned integer encoded in two bytes. 1.2 mpint1 The "mpint1" type represents an arbitrary precision integer (bignum). Its format is as follows: uint16 bits byte[(bits + 7) / 8] bignum "bignum" contains an unsigned arbitrary precision integer encoded as eight bits per byte in big-endian (MSB first) format. Note the difference between the "mpint1" encoding and the "mpint" encoding defined in RFC 4251. Also note that the length of the encoded integer is specified in bits, not bytes and that the byte length of the integer must be calculated by rounding up the number of bits to the nearest eight. 2. Protocol Messages All protocol messages are prefixed with their length in bytes, encoded as a 32 bit unsigned integer. Specifically: uint32 message_length byte[message_length] message The following message descriptions refer only to the content the "message" field. 2.1 Generic server responses The following generic messages may be sent by the server in response to requests from the client. On success the agent may reply either with: byte SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS or a request-specific success message. On failure, the agent may reply with: byte SSH_AGENT_FAILURE SSH_AGENT_FAILURE messages are also sent in reply to unknown request types. 2.2 Adding keys to the agent Keys are added to the agent using the SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY and SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY requests for protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys respectively. Two variants of these requests are SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED and SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED - these add keys with optional "constraints" on their usage. OpenSSH may be built with support for keys hosted on a smartcard or other hardware security module. These keys may be added to the agent using the SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY and SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED requests. 2.2.1 Key constraints The OpenSSH agent supports some basic optional constraints on key usage. At present there are two constraints defined. The first constraint limits the validity duration of a key. It is encoded as: byte SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME uint32 seconds Where "seconds" contains the number of seconds that the key shall remain valid measured from the moment that the agent receives it. After the validity period has expired, OpenSSH's agent will erase these keys from memory. The second constraint requires the agent to seek explicit user confirmation before performing private key operations with the loaded key. This constraint is encoded as: byte SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM Zero or more constraints may be specified when adding a key with one of the *_CONSTRAINED requests. Multiple constraints are appended consecutively to the end of the request: byte constraint1_type .... constraint1_data byte constraint2_type .... constraint2_data .... byte constraintN_type .... constraintN_data Such a sequence of zero or more constraints will be referred to below as "constraint[]". Agents may determine whether there are constraints by checking whether additional data exists in the "add key" request after the key data itself. OpenSSH will refuse to add a key if it contains unknown constraints. 2.2.2 Add protocol 1 key A client may add a protocol 1 key to an agent with the following request: byte SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY or SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED uint32 ignored mpint1 rsa_n mpint1 rsa_e mpint1 rsa_d mpint1 rsa_iqmp mpint1 rsa_q mpint1 rsa_p string key_comment constraint[] key_constraints Note that there is some redundancy in the key parameters; a key could be fully specified using just rsa_q, rsa_p and rsa_e at the cost of extra computation. "key_constraints" may only be present if the request type is SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED. The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if the key has been successfully added or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred. 2.2.3 Add protocol 2 key The OpenSSH agent supports DSA, ECDSA and RSA keys for protocol 2. DSA keys may be added using the following request byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED string "ssh-dss" mpint dsa_p mpint dsa_q mpint dsa_g mpint dsa_public_key mpint dsa_private_key string key_comment constraint[] key_constraints DSA certificates may be added with: byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED string "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com" string certificate mpint dsa_private_key string key_comment constraint[] key_constraints ECDSA keys may be added using the following request byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED string "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256" | "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384" | "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521" string ecdsa_curve_name string ecdsa_public_key mpint ecdsa_private string key_comment constraint[] key_constraints ECDSA certificates may be added with: byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED string "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" | "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" | "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" string certificate mpint ecdsa_private_key string key_comment constraint[] key_constraints RSA keys may be added with this request: byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED string "ssh-rsa" mpint rsa_n mpint rsa_e mpint rsa_d mpint rsa_iqmp mpint rsa_p mpint rsa_q string key_comment constraint[] key_constraints RSA certificates may be added with this request: byte SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY or SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED string "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com" string certificate mpint rsa_d mpint rsa_iqmp mpint rsa_p mpint rsa_q string key_comment constraint[] key_constraints Note that the 'rsa_p' and 'rsa_q' parameters are sent in the reverse order to the protocol 1 add keys message. As with the corresponding protocol 1 "add key" request, the private key is overspecified to avoid redundant processing. For DSA, ECDSA and RSA key add requests, "key_constraints" may only be present if the request type is SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED. The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if the key has been successfully added or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred. 2.2.4 Loading keys from a smartcard The OpenSSH agent may have optional smartcard support built in to it. If so, it supports an operation to load keys from a smartcard. Technically, only the public components of the keys are loaded into the agent so this operation really arranges for future private key operations to be delegated to the smartcard. byte SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY or SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED string reader_id string pin constraint[] key_constraints "reader_id" is an identifier to a smartcard reader and "pin" is a PIN or passphrase used to unlock the private key(s) on the device. "key_constraints" may only be present if the request type is SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED. This operation may load all SSH keys that are unlocked using the "pin" on the specified reader. The type of key loaded (protocol 1 or protocol 2) will be specified by the smartcard itself, it is not client-specified. The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if one or more keys have been successfully loaded or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred. The agent will also return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if it does not support smartcards. 2.3 Removing multiple keys A client may request that an agent delete all protocol 1 keys using the following request: byte SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES This message requests the deletion of all protocol 2 keys: byte SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES On success, the agent will delete all keys of the requested type and reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS message. If an error occurred, the agent will reply with SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. Note that, to delete all keys (both protocol 1 and 2), a client must send both a SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES and a SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES request. 2.4 Removing specific keys 2.4.1 Removing a protocol 1 key Removal of a protocol 1 key may be requested with the following message: byte SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY uint32 key_bits mpint1 rsa_e mpint1 rsa_n Note that key_bits is strictly redundant, as it may be inferred by the length of rsa_n. The agent will delete any private key matching the specified public key and return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS. If no such key was found, the agent will return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. 2.4.2 Removing a protocol 2 key Protocol 2 keys may be removed with the following request: byte SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY string key_blob Where "key_blob" is encoded as per RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key Algorithms" for any of the supported protocol 2 key types. The agent will delete any private key matching the specified public key and return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS. If no such key was found, the agent will return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. 2.4.3 Removing keys loaded from a smartcard A client may request that a server remove one or more smartcard-hosted keys using this message: byte SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY string reader_id string pin "reader_id" the an identifier to a smartcard reader and "pin" is a PIN or passphrase used to unlock the private key(s) on the device. When this message is received, and if the agent supports smartcard-hosted keys, it will delete all keys that are hosted on the specified smartcard that may be accessed with the given "pin". The agent will reply with a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS if one or more keys have been successfully removed or a SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if an error occurred. The agent will also return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE if it does not support smartcards. 2.5 Requesting a list of known keys An agent may be requested to list which keys it holds. Different requests exist for protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys. 2.5.1 Requesting a list of protocol 1 keys To request a list of protocol 1 keys that are held in the agent, a client may send the following message: byte SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES The agent will reply with the following message: byte SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER uint32 num_keys Followed by zero or more consecutive keys, encoded as: uint32 bits mpint1 rsa_e mpint1 rsa_n string key_comment 2.5.2 Requesting a list of protocol 2 keys A client may send the following message to request a list of protocol 2 keys that are stored in the agent: byte SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES The agent will reply with the following message header: byte SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER uint32 num_keys Followed by zero or more consecutive keys, encoded as: string key_blob string key_comment Where "key_blob" is encoded as per RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key Algorithms" for any of the supported protocol 2 key types. 2.6 Private key operations The purpose of the agent is to perform private key operations, such as signing and encryption without requiring a passphrase to unlock the key and without allowing the private key itself to be exposed. There are separate requests for the protocol 1 and protocol 2 private key operations. 2.6.1 Protocol 1 private key challenge The private key operation used in version 1 of the SSH protocol is decrypting a challenge that has been encrypted with a public key. It may be requested using this message: byte SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE uint32 ignored mpint1 rsa_e mpint1 rsa_n mpint1 encrypted_challenge byte[16] session_id uint32 response_type /* must be 1 */ "rsa_e" and "rsa_n" are used to identify which private key to use. "encrypted_challenge" is a challenge blob that has (presumably) -been encrypted with the public key and must be in the range +been encrypted with the public key and must be in the range 1 <= encrypted_challenge < 2^256. "session_id" is the SSH protocol 1 session ID (computed from the server host key, the server semi-ephemeral key and the session cookie). "ignored" and "response_type" exist for compatibility with legacy implementations. "response_type" must be equal to 1; other response types are not supported. On receiving this request, the server decrypts the "encrypted_challenge" using the private key matching the supplied (rsa_e, rsa_n) values. For the response derivation, the decrypted challenge is represented as an unsigned, big-endian integer encoded in a 32 byte buffer (i.e. values smaller than 2^248 will have leading 0 bytes). The response value is then calculated as: response = MD5(decrypted_challenge || session_id) and returned in the following message byte SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE byte[16] response If the agent cannot find the key specified by the supplied (rsa_e, rsa_n) then it will return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. 2.6.2 Protocol 2 private key signature request A client may use the following message to request signing of data using a protocol 2 key: byte SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST string key_blob string data uint32 flags Where "key_blob" is encoded as per RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key Algorithms" for any of the supported protocol 2 key types. "flags" is a bit-mask, but at present only one possible value is defined (see below for its meaning): SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE 1 Upon receiving this request, the agent will look up the private key that corresponds to the public key contained in key_blob. It will use this private key to sign the "data" and produce a signature blob using the key type-specific method described in RFC 4253 section 6.6 "Public Key Algorithms". An exception to this is for "ssh-dss" keys where the "flags" word contains the value SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE. In this case, a legacy signature encoding is used in lieu of the standard one. In this case, the DSA signature blob is encoded as: byte[40] signature The signature will be returned in the response message: byte SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE string signature_blob If the agent cannot find the key specified by the supplied key_blob then it will return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. 2.7 Locking or unlocking an agent The agent supports temporary locking with a passphrase to suspend processing of sensitive operations until it has been unlocked with the same passphrase. To lock an agent, a client send the following request: byte SSH_AGENTC_LOCK string passphrase Upon receipt of this message and if the agent is not already locked, it will suspend processing requests and return a SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS reply. If the agent is already locked, it will return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. While locked, the agent will refuse all requests except SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK, SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES and SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES. The "request identities" requests are treated specially by a locked agent: it will always return an empty list of keys. To unlock an agent, a client may request: byte SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK string passphrase If the passphrase matches and the agent is locked, then it will resume processing all requests and return SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS. If the agent is not locked or the passphrase does not match then it will return SSH_AGENT_FAILURE. Locking and unlocking affects both protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys. 3. Protocol message numbers 3.1 Requests from client to agent for protocol 1 key operations SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES 1 SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE 3 SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY 7 SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY 8 SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES 9 SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED 24 3.2 Requests from client to agent for protocol 2 key operations SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES 11 SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST 13 SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY 17 SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY 18 SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES 19 SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED 25 3.3 Key-type independent requests from client to agent SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY 20 SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY 21 SSH_AGENTC_LOCK 22 SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK 23 SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED 26 3.4 Generic replies from agent to client SSH_AGENT_FAILURE 5 SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS 6 3.5 Replies from agent to client for protocol 1 key operations SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 2 SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE 4 3.6 Replies from agent to client for protocol 2 key operations SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 12 SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE 14 3.7 Key constraint identifiers SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1 SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2 -$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.7 2013/01/02 00:33:49 djm Exp $ +$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.agent,v 1.8 2015/05/08 03:56:51 djm Exp $ Index: head/crypto/openssh/README =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/README (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/README (revision 294336) @@ -1,65 +1,65 @@ -See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.8 for the release notes. +See http://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.9 for the release notes. - A Japanese translation of this document and of the OpenSSH FAQ is - available at http://www.unixuser.org/~haruyama/security/openssh/index.html - Thanks to HARUYAMA Seigo This is the port of OpenBSD's excellent OpenSSH[0] to Linux and other Unices. OpenSSH is based on the last free version of Tatu Ylonen's sample implementation with all patent-encumbered algorithms removed (to external libraries), all known security bugs fixed, new features reintroduced and many other clean-ups. OpenSSH has been created by Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, and Dug Song. It has a homepage at http://www.openssh.com/ This port consists of the re-introduction of autoconf support, PAM support, EGD[1]/PRNGD[2] support and replacements for OpenBSD library functions that are (regrettably) absent from other unices. This port has been best tested on AIX, Cygwin, HP-UX, Linux, MacOS/X, NetBSD, OpenBSD, OpenServer, Solaris, Unicos, and UnixWare. This version actively tracks changes in the OpenBSD CVS repository. The PAM support is now more functional than the popular packages of commercial ssh-1.2.x. It checks "account" and "session" modules for all logins, not just when using password authentication. OpenSSH depends on Zlib[3], OpenSSL[4] and optionally PAM[5]. There is now several mailing lists for this port of OpenSSH. Please refer to http://www.openssh.com/list.html for details on how to join. Please send bug reports and patches to the mailing list openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org. The list is open to posting by unsubscribed users.Code contribution are welcomed, but please follow the OpenBSD style guidelines[6]. Please refer to the INSTALL document for information on how to install OpenSSH on your system. There are a number of differences between this port of OpenSSH and F-Secure SSH 1.x, please refer to the OpenSSH FAQ[7] for details and general tips. Damien Miller Miscellania - This version of OpenSSH is based upon code retrieved from the OpenBSD CVS repository which in turn was based on the last free sample implementation released by Tatu Ylonen. References - [0] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html [1] http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/ [2] http://www.aet.tu-cottbus.de/personen/jaenicke/postfix_tls/prngd.html [3] http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ [4] http://www.openssl.org/ [5] http://www.openpam.org http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/ (PAM also is standard on Solaris and HP-UX 11) [6] http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=style&sektion=9 [7] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html $Id: README,v 1.87 2014/08/10 01:35:06 djm Exp $ Index: head/crypto/openssh/auth-chall.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/auth-chall.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/auth-chall.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,127 +1,125 @@ /* $OpenBSD: auth-chall.c,v 1.14 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include -#include - #include "xmalloc.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" /* limited protocol v1 interface to kbd-interactive authentication */ extern KbdintDevice *devices[]; static KbdintDevice *device; extern ServerOptions options; char * get_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt) { char *challenge, *name, *info, **prompts; u_int i, numprompts; u_int *echo_on; #ifdef USE_PAM if (!options.use_pam) remove_kbdint_device("pam"); #endif device = devices[0]; /* we always use the 1st device for protocol 1 */ if (device == NULL) return NULL; if ((authctxt->kbdintctxt = device->init_ctx(authctxt)) == NULL) return NULL; if (device->query(authctxt->kbdintctxt, &name, &info, &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on)) { device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt); authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL; return NULL; } if (numprompts < 1) fatal("get_challenge: numprompts < 1"); challenge = xstrdup(prompts[0]); for (i = 0; i < numprompts; i++) free(prompts[i]); free(prompts); free(name); free(echo_on); free(info); return (challenge); } int verify_response(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *response) { char *resp[1], *name, *info, **prompts; u_int i, numprompts, *echo_on; int authenticated = 0; if (device == NULL) return 0; if (authctxt->kbdintctxt == NULL) return 0; resp[0] = (char *)response; switch (device->respond(authctxt->kbdintctxt, 1, resp)) { case 0: /* Success */ authenticated = 1; break; case 1: /* Postponed - retry with empty query for PAM */ if ((device->query(authctxt->kbdintctxt, &name, &info, &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on)) != 0) break; if (numprompts == 0 && device->respond(authctxt->kbdintctxt, 0, resp) == 0) authenticated = 1; for (i = 0; i < numprompts; i++) free(prompts[i]); free(prompts); free(name); free(echo_on); free(info); break; } device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt); authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL; return authenticated; } void abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *authctxt) { if (authctxt->kbdintctxt != NULL) { device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt); authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL; } } Index: head/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/auth-options.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,629 +1,634 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.65 2015/01/14 10:30:34 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.67 2015/05/01 03:20:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "key.h" /* XXX for typedef */ #include "buffer.h" /* XXX for typedef */ #include "xmalloc.h" #include "match.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "log.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "misc.h" #include "channels.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" /* Flags set authorized_keys flags */ int no_port_forwarding_flag = 0; int no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0; int no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0; int no_pty_flag = 0; int no_user_rc = 0; int key_is_cert_authority = 0; /* "command=" option. */ char *forced_command = NULL; /* "environment=" options. */ struct envstring *custom_environment = NULL; /* "tunnel=" option. */ int forced_tun_device = -1; /* "principals=" option. */ char *authorized_principals = NULL; extern ServerOptions options; void auth_clear_options(void) { no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0; no_port_forwarding_flag = 0; no_pty_flag = 0; no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0; no_user_rc = 0; key_is_cert_authority = 0; while (custom_environment) { struct envstring *ce = custom_environment; custom_environment = ce->next; free(ce->s); free(ce); } if (forced_command) { free(forced_command); forced_command = NULL; } if (authorized_principals) { free(authorized_principals); authorized_principals = NULL; } forced_tun_device = -1; channel_clear_permitted_opens(); } /* * return 1 if access is granted, 0 if not. * side effect: sets key option flags */ int auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum) { const char *cp; int i; /* reset options */ auth_clear_options(); if (!opts) return 1; while (*opts && *opts != ' ' && *opts != '\t') { cp = "cert-authority"; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { key_is_cert_authority = 1; opts += strlen(cp); goto next_option; } cp = "no-port-forwarding"; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { auth_debug_add("Port forwarding disabled."); no_port_forwarding_flag = 1; opts += strlen(cp); goto next_option; } cp = "no-agent-forwarding"; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { auth_debug_add("Agent forwarding disabled."); no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1; opts += strlen(cp); goto next_option; } cp = "no-X11-forwarding"; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { auth_debug_add("X11 forwarding disabled."); no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1; opts += strlen(cp); goto next_option; } cp = "no-pty"; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { auth_debug_add("Pty allocation disabled."); no_pty_flag = 1; opts += strlen(cp); goto next_option; } cp = "no-user-rc"; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { auth_debug_add("User rc file execution disabled."); no_user_rc = 1; opts += strlen(cp); goto next_option; } cp = "command=\""; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { opts += strlen(cp); if (forced_command != NULL) free(forced_command); forced_command = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1); i = 0; while (*opts) { if (*opts == '"') break; if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') { opts += 2; forced_command[i++] = '"'; continue; } forced_command[i++] = *opts++; } if (!*opts) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); free(forced_command); forced_command = NULL; goto bad_option; } forced_command[i] = '\0'; auth_debug_add("Forced command."); opts++; goto next_option; } cp = "principals=\""; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { opts += strlen(cp); if (authorized_principals != NULL) free(authorized_principals); authorized_principals = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1); i = 0; while (*opts) { if (*opts == '"') break; if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') { opts += 2; authorized_principals[i++] = '"'; continue; } authorized_principals[i++] = *opts++; } if (!*opts) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); free(authorized_principals); authorized_principals = NULL; goto bad_option; } authorized_principals[i] = '\0'; auth_debug_add("principals: %.900s", authorized_principals); opts++; goto next_option; } cp = "environment=\""; - if (options.permit_user_env && - strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { + if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { char *s; struct envstring *new_envstring; opts += strlen(cp); s = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1); i = 0; while (*opts) { if (*opts == '"') break; if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') { opts += 2; s[i++] = '"'; continue; } s[i++] = *opts++; } if (!*opts) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); free(s); goto bad_option; } s[i] = '\0'; - auth_debug_add("Adding to environment: %.900s", s); - debug("Adding to environment: %.900s", s); opts++; - new_envstring = xcalloc(1, sizeof(struct envstring)); - new_envstring->s = s; - new_envstring->next = custom_environment; - custom_environment = new_envstring; + if (options.permit_user_env) { + auth_debug_add("Adding to environment: " + "%.900s", s); + debug("Adding to environment: %.900s", s); + new_envstring = xcalloc(1, + sizeof(*new_envstring)); + new_envstring->s = s; + new_envstring->next = custom_environment; + custom_environment = new_envstring; + s = NULL; + } + free(s); goto next_option; } cp = "from=\""; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { const char *remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr(); const char *remote_host = get_canonical_hostname( options.use_dns); char *patterns = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1); opts += strlen(cp); i = 0; while (*opts) { if (*opts == '"') break; if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') { opts += 2; patterns[i++] = '"'; continue; } patterns[i++] = *opts++; } if (!*opts) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); free(patterns); goto bad_option; } patterns[i] = '\0'; opts++; switch (match_host_and_ip(remote_host, remote_ip, patterns)) { case 1: free(patterns); /* Host name matches. */ goto next_option; case -1: debug("%.100s, line %lu: invalid criteria", file, linenum); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: " "invalid criteria", file, linenum); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 0: free(patterns); logit("Authentication tried for %.100s with " "correct key but not from a permitted " "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip); auth_debug_add("Your host '%.200s' is not " "permitted to use this key for login.", remote_host); break; } /* deny access */ return 0; } cp = "permitopen=\""; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { char *host, *p; int port; char *patterns = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1); opts += strlen(cp); i = 0; while (*opts) { if (*opts == '"') break; if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') { opts += 2; patterns[i++] = '"'; continue; } patterns[i++] = *opts++; } if (!*opts) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing " "end quote", file, linenum); free(patterns); goto bad_option; } patterns[i] = '\0'; opts++; p = patterns; /* XXX - add streamlocal support */ host = hpdelim(&p); if (host == NULL || strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: Bad permitopen " "specification <%.100s>", file, linenum, patterns); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: " "Bad permitopen specification", file, linenum); free(patterns); goto bad_option; } host = cleanhostname(host); if (p == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(p)) < 0) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: Bad permitopen port " "<%.100s>", file, linenum, p ? p : ""); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: " "Bad permitopen port", file, linenum); free(patterns); goto bad_option; } if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0) channel_add_permitted_opens(host, port); free(patterns); goto next_option; } cp = "tunnel=\""; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { char *tun = NULL; opts += strlen(cp); tun = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1); i = 0; while (*opts) { if (*opts == '"') break; tun[i++] = *opts++; } if (!*opts) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); free(tun); forced_tun_device = -1; goto bad_option; } tun[i] = '\0'; forced_tun_device = a2tun(tun, NULL); free(tun); if (forced_tun_device == SSH_TUNID_ERR) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: invalid tun device", file, linenum); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: invalid tun device", file, linenum); forced_tun_device = -1; goto bad_option; } auth_debug_add("Forced tun device: %d", forced_tun_device); opts++; goto next_option; } next_option: /* * Skip the comma, and move to the next option * (or break out if there are no more). */ if (!*opts) fatal("Bugs in auth-options.c option processing."); if (*opts == ' ' || *opts == '\t') break; /* End of options. */ if (*opts != ',') goto bad_option; opts++; /* Process the next option. */ } /* grant access */ return 1; bad_option: logit("Bad options in %.100s file, line %lu: %.50s", file, linenum, opts); auth_debug_add("Bad options in %.100s file, line %lu: %.50s", file, linenum, opts); /* deny access */ return 0; } #define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1 #define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2 static int parse_option_list(struct sshbuf *oblob, struct passwd *pw, u_int which, int crit, int *cert_no_port_forwarding_flag, int *cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag, int *cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag, int *cert_no_pty_flag, int *cert_no_user_rc, char **cert_forced_command, int *cert_source_address_done) { char *command, *allowed; const char *remote_ip; char *name = NULL; struct sshbuf *c = NULL, *data = NULL; int r, ret = -1, result, found; if ((c = sshbuf_fromb(oblob)) == NULL) { error("%s: sshbuf_fromb failed", __func__); goto out; } while (sshbuf_len(c) > 0) { sshbuf_free(data); data = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(c, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(c, &data)) != 0) { error("Unable to parse certificate options: %s", ssh_err(r)); goto out; } debug3("found certificate option \"%.100s\" len %zu", name, sshbuf_len(data)); found = 0; if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0) { if (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0) { *cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0; found = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0) { *cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0; found = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0) { *cert_no_port_forwarding_flag = 0; found = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0) { *cert_no_pty_flag = 0; found = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0) { *cert_no_user_rc = 0; found = 1; } } if (!found && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0) { if (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &command, NULL)) != 0) { error("Unable to parse \"%s\" " "section: %s", name, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if (*cert_forced_command != NULL) { error("Certificate has multiple " "force-command options"); free(command); goto out; } *cert_forced_command = command; found = 1; } if (strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &allowed, NULL)) != 0) { error("Unable to parse \"%s\" " "section: %s", name, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((*cert_source_address_done)++) { error("Certificate has multiple " "source-address options"); free(allowed); goto out; } remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr(); result = addr_match_cidr_list(remote_ip, allowed); free(allowed); switch (result) { case 1: /* accepted */ break; case 0: /* no match */ logit("Authentication tried for %.100s " "with valid certificate but not " "from a permitted host " "(ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name, remote_ip); auth_debug_add("Your address '%.200s' " "is not permitted to use this " "certificate for login.", remote_ip); goto out; case -1: default: error("Certificate source-address " "contents invalid"); goto out; } found = 1; } } if (!found) { if (crit) { error("Certificate critical option \"%s\" " "is not supported", name); goto out; } else { logit("Certificate extension \"%s\" " "is not supported", name); } } else if (sshbuf_len(data) != 0) { error("Certificate option \"%s\" corrupt " "(extra data)", name); goto out; } free(name); name = NULL; } /* successfully parsed all options */ ret = 0; out: if (ret != 0 && cert_forced_command != NULL && *cert_forced_command != NULL) { free(*cert_forced_command); *cert_forced_command = NULL; } if (name != NULL) free(name); sshbuf_free(data); sshbuf_free(c); return ret; } /* * Set options from critical certificate options. These supersede user key * options so this must be called after auth_parse_options(). */ int auth_cert_options(struct sshkey *k, struct passwd *pw) { int cert_no_port_forwarding_flag = 1; int cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1; int cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1; int cert_no_pty_flag = 1; int cert_no_user_rc = 1; char *cert_forced_command = NULL; int cert_source_address_done = 0; if (sshkey_cert_is_legacy(k)) { /* All options are in the one field for v00 certs */ if (parse_option_list(k->cert->critical, pw, OPTIONS_CRITICAL|OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 1, &cert_no_port_forwarding_flag, &cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag, &cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag, &cert_no_pty_flag, &cert_no_user_rc, &cert_forced_command, &cert_source_address_done) == -1) return -1; } else { /* Separate options and extensions for v01 certs */ if (parse_option_list(k->cert->critical, pw, OPTIONS_CRITICAL, 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &cert_forced_command, &cert_source_address_done) == -1) return -1; if (parse_option_list(k->cert->extensions, pw, - OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 1, + OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 0, &cert_no_port_forwarding_flag, &cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag, &cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag, &cert_no_pty_flag, &cert_no_user_rc, NULL, NULL) == -1) return -1; } no_port_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_port_forwarding_flag; no_agent_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag; no_x11_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag; no_pty_flag |= cert_no_pty_flag; no_user_rc |= cert_no_user_rc; /* CA-specified forced command supersedes key option */ if (cert_forced_command != NULL) { if (forced_command != NULL) free(forced_command); forced_command = cert_forced_command; } return 0; } Index: head/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/auth-pam.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,1219 +1,1219 @@ /*- * Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc. * All rights reserved. * * This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and * NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc. * under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the * DARPA CHATS research program. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Damien Miller * Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Darren Tucker * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* Based on $FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam-freebsd.c,v 1.11 2003/03/31 13:48:18 des Exp $ */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef USE_PAM #if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H) #include #elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H) #include #endif /* OpenGroup RFC86.0 and XSSO specify no "const" on arguments */ #ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE # define sshpam_const /* Solaris, HP-UX, AIX */ #else # define sshpam_const const /* LinuxPAM, OpenPAM */ #endif /* Ambiguity in spec: is it an array of pointers or a pointer to an array? */ #ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE # define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((*(msg))[(n)].member) #else # define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((msg)[(n)]->member) #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-pam.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "log.h" #include "msg.h" #include "packet.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "auth-options.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" extern ServerOptions options; extern Buffer loginmsg; extern int compat20; extern u_int utmp_len; /* so we don't silently change behaviour */ #ifdef USE_POSIX_THREADS # error "USE_POSIX_THREADS replaced by UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK" #endif /* * Formerly known as USE_POSIX_THREADS, using this is completely unsupported * and generally a bad idea. Use at own risk and do not expect support if * this breaks. */ #ifdef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK #include /* * Avoid namespace clash when *not* using pthreads for systems *with* * pthreads, which unconditionally define pthread_t via sys/types.h * (e.g. Linux) */ typedef pthread_t sp_pthread_t; #else typedef pid_t sp_pthread_t; #endif struct pam_ctxt { sp_pthread_t pam_thread; int pam_psock; int pam_csock; int pam_done; }; static void sshpam_free_ctx(void *); static struct pam_ctxt *cleanup_ctxt; #ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK /* * Simulate threads with processes. */ static int sshpam_thread_status = -1; static mysig_t sshpam_oldsig; static void sshpam_sigchld_handler(int sig) { signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); if (cleanup_ctxt == NULL) return; /* handler called after PAM cleanup, shouldn't happen */ if (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, WNOHANG) <= 0) { /* PAM thread has not exitted, privsep slave must have */ kill(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, SIGTERM); if (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, 0) <= 0) return; /* could not wait */ } if (WIFSIGNALED(sshpam_thread_status) && WTERMSIG(sshpam_thread_status) == SIGTERM) return; /* terminated by pthread_cancel */ if (!WIFEXITED(sshpam_thread_status)) sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited unexpectedly"); if (WEXITSTATUS(sshpam_thread_status) != 0) sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited uncleanly"); } /* ARGSUSED */ static void pthread_exit(void *value) { _exit(0); } /* ARGSUSED */ static int pthread_create(sp_pthread_t *thread, const void *attr, void *(*thread_start)(void *), void *arg) { pid_t pid; struct pam_ctxt *ctx = arg; sshpam_thread_status = -1; switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: error("fork(): %s", strerror(errno)); return (-1); case 0: close(ctx->pam_psock); ctx->pam_psock = -1; thread_start(arg); _exit(1); default: *thread = pid; close(ctx->pam_csock); ctx->pam_csock = -1; sshpam_oldsig = signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_sigchld_handler); return (0); } } static int pthread_cancel(sp_pthread_t thread) { signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig); return (kill(thread, SIGTERM)); } /* ARGSUSED */ static int pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void **value) { int status; if (sshpam_thread_status != -1) return (sshpam_thread_status); signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig); waitpid(thread, &status, 0); return (status); } #endif static pam_handle_t *sshpam_handle = NULL; static int sshpam_err = 0; static int sshpam_authenticated = 0; static int sshpam_session_open = 0; static int sshpam_cred_established = 0; static int sshpam_account_status = -1; static char **sshpam_env = NULL; static Authctxt *sshpam_authctxt = NULL; static const char *sshpam_password = NULL; static char badpw[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT"; /* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */ #ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST static char ** pam_getenvlist(pam_handle_t *pamh) { /* * XXX - If necessary, we can still support envrionment passing * for platforms without pam_getenvlist by searching for known * env vars (e.g. KRB5CCNAME) from the PAM environment. */ return NULL; } #endif /* * Some platforms, notably Solaris, do not enforce password complexity * rules during pam_chauthtok() if the real uid of the calling process * is 0, on the assumption that it's being called by "passwd" run by root. * This wraps pam_chauthtok and sets/restore the real uid so PAM will do * the right thing. */ #ifdef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID static int sshpam_chauthtok_ruid(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags) { int result; if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL) fatal("PAM: sshpam_authctxt not initialized"); if (setreuid(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, -1) == -1) fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); result = pam_chauthtok(pamh, flags); if (setreuid(0, -1) == -1) fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return result; } # define pam_chauthtok(a,b) (sshpam_chauthtok_ruid((a), (b))) #endif void sshpam_password_change_required(int reqd) { debug3("%s %d", __func__, reqd); if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL) fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__); sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange = reqd; if (reqd) { no_port_forwarding_flag |= 2; no_agent_forwarding_flag |= 2; no_x11_forwarding_flag |= 2; } else { no_port_forwarding_flag &= ~2; no_agent_forwarding_flag &= ~2; no_x11_forwarding_flag &= ~2; } } /* Import regular and PAM environment from subprocess */ static void import_environments(Buffer *b) { char *env; u_int i, num_env; int err; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); #ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK /* Import variables set by do_pam_account */ sshpam_account_status = buffer_get_int(b); sshpam_password_change_required(buffer_get_int(b)); /* Import environment from subprocess */ num_env = buffer_get_int(b); if (num_env > 1024) fatal("%s: received %u environment variables, expected <= 1024", __func__, num_env); sshpam_env = xcalloc(num_env + 1, sizeof(*sshpam_env)); debug3("PAM: num env strings %d", num_env); for(i = 0; i < num_env; i++) sshpam_env[i] = buffer_get_string(b, NULL); sshpam_env[num_env] = NULL; /* Import PAM environment from subprocess */ num_env = buffer_get_int(b); debug("PAM: num PAM env strings %d", num_env); for(i = 0; i < num_env; i++) { env = buffer_get_string(b, NULL); #ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV /* Errors are not fatal here */ if ((err = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, env)) != PAM_SUCCESS) { error("PAM: pam_putenv: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); } #endif } #endif } /* * Conversation function for authentication thread. */ static int sshpam_thread_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { Buffer buffer; struct pam_ctxt *ctxt; struct pam_response *reply; int i; debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n); *resp = NULL; if (data == NULL) { error("PAM: conversation function passed a null context"); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } ctxt = data; if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); buffer_init(&buffer); for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) { case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), &buffer) == -1) goto fail; if (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_csock, &buffer) == -1) goto fail; if (buffer_get_char(&buffer) != PAM_AUTHTOK) goto fail; reply[i].resp = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL); break; case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), &buffer) == -1) goto fail; if (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_csock, &buffer) == -1) goto fail; if (buffer_get_char(&buffer) != PAM_AUTHTOK) goto fail; reply[i].resp = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL); break; case PAM_ERROR_MSG: buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), &buffer) == -1) goto fail; break; case PAM_TEXT_INFO: buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), &buffer) == -1) goto fail; break; default: goto fail; } buffer_clear(&buffer); } buffer_free(&buffer); *resp = reply; return (PAM_SUCCESS); fail: for(i = 0; i < n; i++) { free(reply[i].resp); } free(reply); buffer_free(&buffer); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } /* * Authentication thread. */ static void * sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp) { struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp; Buffer buffer; struct pam_conv sshpam_conv; int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ? PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0); #ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK extern char **environ; char **env_from_pam; u_int i; const char *pam_user; const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user; char *tz = getenv("TZ"); sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER, (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) goto auth_fail; environ[0] = NULL; if (tz != NULL) if (setenv("TZ", tz, 1) == -1) error("PAM: could not set TZ environment: %s", strerror(errno)); if (sshpam_authctxt != NULL) { setproctitle("%s [pam]", sshpam_authctxt->valid ? pam_user : "unknown"); } #endif sshpam_conv.conv = sshpam_thread_conv; sshpam_conv.appdata_ptr = ctxt; if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL) fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__); buffer_init(&buffer); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&sshpam_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) goto auth_fail; sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) goto auth_fail; if (compat20) { if (!do_pam_account()) { sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED; goto auth_fail; } if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) { sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) goto auth_fail; sshpam_password_change_required(0); } } buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, "OK"); #ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK /* Export variables set by do_pam_account */ buffer_put_int(&buffer, sshpam_account_status); buffer_put_int(&buffer, sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange); /* Export any environment strings set in child */ for(i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) ; /* Count */ buffer_put_int(&buffer, i); for(i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, environ[i]); /* Export any environment strings set by PAM in child */ env_from_pam = pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle); for(i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++) ; /* Count */ buffer_put_int(&buffer, i); for(i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++) buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, env_from_pam[i]); #endif /* UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK */ /* XXX - can't do much about an error here */ ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, sshpam_err, &buffer); buffer_free(&buffer); pthread_exit(NULL); auth_fail: buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); /* XXX - can't do much about an error here */ if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED) ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, &buffer); else ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_AUTH_ERR, &buffer); buffer_free(&buffer); pthread_exit(NULL); return (NULL); /* Avoid warning for non-pthread case */ } void sshpam_thread_cleanup(void) { struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = cleanup_ctxt; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); if (ctxt != NULL && ctxt->pam_thread != 0) { pthread_cancel(ctxt->pam_thread); pthread_join(ctxt->pam_thread, NULL); close(ctxt->pam_psock); close(ctxt->pam_csock); memset(ctxt, 0, sizeof(*ctxt)); cleanup_ctxt = NULL; } } static int sshpam_null_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } static struct pam_conv null_conv = { sshpam_null_conv, NULL }; static int sshpam_store_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { struct pam_response *reply; int i; size_t len; debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n); *resp = NULL; if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) { case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: len = strlen(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); buffer_append(&loginmsg, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg), len); buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\n", 1 ); reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; default: goto fail; } } *resp = reply; return (PAM_SUCCESS); fail: for(i = 0; i < n; i++) { free(reply[i].resp); } free(reply); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } static struct pam_conv store_conv = { sshpam_store_conv, NULL }; void sshpam_cleanup(void) { if (sshpam_handle == NULL || (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor())) return; debug("PAM: cleanup"); pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&null_conv); if (sshpam_session_open) { debug("PAM: closing session"); pam_close_session(sshpam_handle, PAM_SILENT); sshpam_session_open = 0; } if (sshpam_cred_established) { debug("PAM: deleting credentials"); pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED); sshpam_cred_established = 0; } sshpam_authenticated = 0; pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; } static int sshpam_init(Authctxt *authctxt) { extern char *__progname; const char *pam_rhost, *pam_user, *user = authctxt->user; const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user; if (sshpam_handle != NULL) { /* We already have a PAM context; check if the user matches */ sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER, (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user); if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && strcmp(user, pam_user) == 0) return (0); pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; } debug("PAM: initializing for \"%s\"", user); sshpam_err = pam_start(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE, user, &store_conv, &sshpam_handle); sshpam_authctxt = authctxt; if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) { pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; return (-1); } pam_rhost = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns); debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", pam_rhost); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_RHOST, pam_rhost); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) { pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; return (-1); } #ifdef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE /* * Some silly PAM modules (e.g. pam_time) require a TTY to operate. * sshd doesn't set the tty until too late in the auth process and * may not even set one (for tty-less connections) */ debug("PAM: setting PAM_TTY to \"ssh\""); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_TTY, "ssh"); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) { pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err); sshpam_handle = NULL; return (-1); } #endif return (0); } static void * sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt) { struct pam_ctxt *ctxt; int socks[2]; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); /* * Refuse to start if we don't have PAM enabled or do_pam_account * has previously failed. */ if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_account_status == 0) return NULL; /* Initialize PAM */ if (sshpam_init(authctxt) == -1) { error("PAM: initialization failed"); return (NULL); } ctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof *ctxt); /* Start the authentication thread */ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, PF_UNSPEC, socks) == -1) { error("PAM: failed create sockets: %s", strerror(errno)); free(ctxt); return (NULL); } ctxt->pam_psock = socks[0]; ctxt->pam_csock = socks[1]; if (pthread_create(&ctxt->pam_thread, NULL, sshpam_thread, ctxt) == -1) { error("PAM: failed to start authentication thread: %s", strerror(errno)); close(socks[0]); close(socks[1]); free(ctxt); return (NULL); } cleanup_ctxt = ctxt; return (ctxt); } static int sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info, u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) { Buffer buffer; struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx; size_t plen; u_char type; char *msg; size_t len, mlen; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&buffer); *name = xstrdup(""); *info = xstrdup(""); *prompts = xmalloc(sizeof(char *)); **prompts = NULL; plen = 0; *echo_on = xmalloc(sizeof(u_int)); while (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_psock, &buffer) == 0) { type = buffer_get_char(&buffer); msg = buffer_get_string(&buffer, NULL); mlen = strlen(msg); switch (type) { case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: *num = 1; len = plen + mlen + 1; - **prompts = xrealloc(**prompts, 1, len); + **prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len); strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen); plen += mlen; **echo_on = (type == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON); free(msg); return (0); case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: /* accumulate messages */ len = plen + mlen + 2; - **prompts = xrealloc(**prompts, 1, len); + **prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len); strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen); plen += mlen; strlcat(**prompts + plen, "\n", len - plen); plen++; free(msg); break; case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED: sshpam_account_status = 0; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case PAM_AUTH_ERR: debug3("PAM: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, type)); if (**prompts != NULL && strlen(**prompts) != 0) { *info = **prompts; **prompts = NULL; *num = 0; **echo_on = 0; ctxt->pam_done = -1; free(msg); return 0; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case PAM_SUCCESS: if (**prompts != NULL) { /* drain any accumulated messages */ debug("PAM: %s", **prompts); buffer_append(&loginmsg, **prompts, strlen(**prompts)); free(**prompts); **prompts = NULL; } if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) { if (!sshpam_authctxt->valid || (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)) fatal("Internal error: PAM auth " "succeeded when it should have " "failed"); import_environments(&buffer); *num = 0; **echo_on = 0; ctxt->pam_done = 1; free(msg); return (0); } error("PAM: %s for %s%.100s from %.100s", msg, sshpam_authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ", sshpam_authctxt->user, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns)); /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: *num = 0; **echo_on = 0; free(msg); ctxt->pam_done = -1; return (-1); } } return (-1); } /* XXX - see also comment in auth-chall.c:verify_response */ static int sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp) { Buffer buffer; struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx; debug2("PAM: %s entering, %u responses", __func__, num); switch (ctxt->pam_done) { case 1: sshpam_authenticated = 1; return (0); case 0: break; default: return (-1); } if (num != 1) { error("PAM: expected one response, got %u", num); return (-1); } buffer_init(&buffer); if (sshpam_authctxt->valid && (sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 || options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES)) buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, *resp); else buffer_put_cstring(&buffer, badpw); if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, &buffer) == -1) { buffer_free(&buffer); return (-1); } buffer_free(&buffer); return (1); } static void sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp) { struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp; debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__); sshpam_thread_cleanup(); free(ctxt); /* * We don't call sshpam_cleanup() here because we may need the PAM * handle at a later stage, e.g. when setting up a session. It's * still on the cleanup list, so pam_end() *will* be called before * the server process terminates. */ } KbdintDevice sshpam_device = { "pam", sshpam_init_ctx, sshpam_query, sshpam_respond, sshpam_free_ctx }; KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device = { "pam", mm_sshpam_init_ctx, mm_sshpam_query, mm_sshpam_respond, mm_sshpam_free_ctx }; /* * This replaces auth-pam.c */ void start_pam(Authctxt *authctxt) { if (!options.use_pam) fatal("PAM: initialisation requested when UsePAM=no"); if (sshpam_init(authctxt) == -1) fatal("PAM: initialisation failed"); } void finish_pam(void) { sshpam_cleanup(); } u_int do_pam_account(void) { debug("%s: called", __func__); if (sshpam_account_status != -1) return (sshpam_account_status); sshpam_err = pam_acct_mgmt(sshpam_handle, 0); debug3("PAM: %s pam_acct_mgmt = %d (%s)", __func__, sshpam_err, pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS && sshpam_err != PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) { sshpam_account_status = 0; return (sshpam_account_status); } if (sshpam_err == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) sshpam_password_change_required(1); sshpam_account_status = 1; return (sshpam_account_status); } void do_pam_set_tty(const char *tty) { if (tty != NULL) { debug("PAM: setting PAM_TTY to \"%s\"", tty); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_TTY, tty); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_TTY: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); } } void do_pam_setcred(int init) { sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&store_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); if (init) { debug("PAM: establishing credentials"); sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED); } else { debug("PAM: reinitializing credentials"); sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED); } if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS) { sshpam_cred_established = 1; return; } if (sshpam_authenticated) fatal("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); else debug("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); } static int sshpam_tty_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { char input[PAM_MAX_MSG_SIZE]; struct pam_response *reply; int i; debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n); *resp = NULL; if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG || !isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) { case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: reply[i].resp = read_passphrase(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg), RP_ALLOW_STDIN); reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON: fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); if (fgets(input, sizeof input, stdin) == NULL) input[0] = '\0'; if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(input)) == NULL) goto fail; reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; default: goto fail; } } *resp = reply; return (PAM_SUCCESS); fail: for(i = 0; i < n; i++) { free(reply[i].resp); } free(reply); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } static struct pam_conv tty_conv = { sshpam_tty_conv, NULL }; /* * XXX this should be done in the authentication phase, but ssh1 doesn't * support that */ void do_pam_chauthtok(void) { if (use_privsep) fatal("Password expired (unable to change with privsep)"); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&tty_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); debug("PAM: changing password"); sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: pam_chauthtok(): %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); } void do_pam_session(void) { debug3("PAM: opening session"); sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&store_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); sshpam_err = pam_open_session(sshpam_handle, 0); if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS) sshpam_session_open = 1; else { sshpam_session_open = 0; disable_forwarding(); error("PAM: pam_open_session(): %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); } } int is_pam_session_open(void) { return sshpam_session_open; } /* * Set a PAM environment string. We need to do this so that the session * modules can handle things like Kerberos/GSI credentials that appear * during the ssh authentication process. */ int do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value) { int ret = 1; #ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV char *compound; size_t len; len = strlen(name) + strlen(value) + 2; compound = xmalloc(len); snprintf(compound, len, "%s=%s", name, value); ret = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, compound); free(compound); #endif return (ret); } char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void) { return sshpam_env; } char ** fetch_pam_environment(void) { return (pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle)); } void free_pam_environment(char **env) { char **envp; if (env == NULL) return; for (envp = env; *envp; envp++) free(*envp); free(env); } /* * "Blind" conversation function for password authentication. Assumes that * echo-off prompts are for the password and stores messages for later * display. */ static int sshpam_passwd_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg, struct pam_response **resp, void *data) { struct pam_response *reply; int i; size_t len; debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n); *resp = NULL; if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL) return (PAM_CONV_ERR); for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) { case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: if (sshpam_password == NULL) goto fail; if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(sshpam_password)) == NULL) goto fail; reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; case PAM_ERROR_MSG: case PAM_TEXT_INFO: len = strlen(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg)); if (len > 0) { buffer_append(&loginmsg, PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg), len); buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\n", 1); } if ((reply[i].resp = strdup("")) == NULL) goto fail; reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; break; default: goto fail; } } *resp = reply; return (PAM_SUCCESS); fail: for(i = 0; i < n; i++) { free(reply[i].resp); } free(reply); return (PAM_CONV_ERR); } static struct pam_conv passwd_conv = { sshpam_passwd_conv, NULL }; /* * Attempt password authentication via PAM */ int sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) { int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ? PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0); if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_handle == NULL) fatal("PAM: %s called when PAM disabled or failed to " "initialise.", __func__); sshpam_password = password; sshpam_authctxt = authctxt; /* * If the user logging in is invalid, or is root but is not permitted * by PermitRootLogin, use an invalid password to prevent leaking * information via timing (eg if the PAM config has a delay on fail). */ if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES)) sshpam_password = badpw; sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&passwd_conv); if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) fatal("PAM: %s: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", __func__, pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags); sshpam_password = NULL; if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) { debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s", authctxt->user); return 1; } else { debug("PAM: password authentication failed for %.100s: %s", authctxt->valid ? authctxt->user : "an illegal user", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err)); return 0; } } #endif /* USE_PAM */ Index: head/crypto/openssh/auth.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/auth.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/auth.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,775 +1,774 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.110 2015/02/25 17:29:38 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.111 2015/05/01 04:17:51 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H #include #endif #ifdef USE_SHADOW #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "match.h" #include "groupaccess.h" #include "log.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "packet.h" #include "loginrec.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "authfile.h" #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "compat.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern int use_privsep; extern Buffer loginmsg; extern struct passwd *privsep_pw; /* Debugging messages */ Buffer auth_debug; int auth_debug_init; /* * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't * listed there, false will be returned. * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned. * Otherwise true is returned. */ int allowed_user(struct passwd * pw) { struct stat st; const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL; u_int i; #ifdef USE_SHADOW struct spwd *spw = NULL; #endif /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */ if (!pw || !pw->pw_name) return 0; #ifdef USE_SHADOW if (!options.use_pam) spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name); #ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw)) return 0; #endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */ #endif /* USE_SHADOW */ /* grab passwd field for locked account check */ passwd = pw->pw_passwd; #ifdef USE_SHADOW if (spw != NULL) #ifdef USE_LIBIAF passwd = get_iaf_password(pw); #else passwd = spw->sp_pwdp; #endif /* USE_LIBIAF */ #endif /* check for locked account */ if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) { int locked = 0; #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0) locked = 1; #endif #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX, strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0) locked = 1; #endif #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR)) locked = 1; #endif #ifdef USE_LIBIAF free((void *) passwd); #endif /* USE_LIBIAF */ if (locked) { logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked", pw->pw_name); return 0; } } /* * Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we * are chrooting. */ if (options.chroot_directory == NULL || strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) { char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */ if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) { logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s " "does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell); free(shell); return 0; } if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) { logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s " "is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell); free(shell); return 0; } free(shell); } if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 || options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) { hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns); ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr(); } /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */ if (options.num_deny_users > 0) { for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++) if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr, options.deny_users[i])) { logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " "because listed in DenyUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } } /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */ if (options.num_allow_users > 0) { for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++) if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr, options.allow_users[i])) break; /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */ if (i >= options.num_allow_users) { logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because " "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } } if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) { /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */ if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) { logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because " "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */ if (options.num_deny_groups > 0) if (ga_match(options.deny_groups, options.num_deny_groups)) { ga_free(); logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " "because a group is listed in DenyGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } /* * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups * isn't listed there */ if (options.num_allow_groups > 0) if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups, options.num_allow_groups)) { ga_free(); logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " "because none of user's groups are listed " "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } ga_free(); } #ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, &loginmsg)) return 0; #endif /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */ return 1; } void auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; int i; free(authctxt->info); authctxt->info = NULL; va_start(ap, fmt); i = vasprintf(&authctxt->info, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); if (i < 0 || authctxt->info == NULL) fatal("vasprintf failed"); } void auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial, const char *method, const char *submethod) { void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose; char *authmsg; if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed) return; /* Raise logging level */ if (authenticated == 1 || !authctxt->valid || authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 || strcmp(method, "password") == 0) authlog = logit; if (authctxt->postponed) authmsg = "Postponed"; else if (partial) authmsg = "Partial"; else authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed"; authlog("%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d %s%s%s", authmsg, method, submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod, authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user, get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1", authctxt->info != NULL ? ": " : "", authctxt->info != NULL ? authctxt->info : ""); free(authctxt->info); authctxt->info = NULL; #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed && (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 || strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 || strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0)) record_failed_login(authctxt->user, get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh"); # ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE if (authenticated) sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user, get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh", &loginmsg); # endif #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed) audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method)); #endif } void auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *authctxt) { error("maximum authentication attempts exceeded for " "%s%.100s from %.200s port %d %s", authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user, get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1"); packet_disconnect("Too many authentication failures"); /* NOTREACHED */ } /* * Check whether root logins are disallowed. */ int auth_root_allowed(const char *method) { switch (options.permit_root_login) { case PERMIT_YES: return 1; case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD: if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0) return 1; break; case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY: if (forced_command) { logit("Root login accepted for forced command."); return 1; } break; } logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr()); return 0; } /* * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%', * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username. * * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc. */ char * expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw) { char *file, ret[PATH_MAX]; int i; file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir, "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); /* * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward * compatible and prepend the '%h/' */ if (*file == '/') return (file); i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file); if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret)) fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long"); free(file); return (xstrdup(ret)); } char * authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw) { - if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL || - strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_file, "none") == 0) + if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL) return NULL; return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw); } /* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */ HostStatus check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host, const char *sysfile, const char *userfile) { char *user_hostfile; struct stat st; HostStatus host_status; struct hostkeys *hostkeys; const struct hostkey_entry *found; hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile); if (userfile != NULL) { user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid); if (options.strict_modes && (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) && ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) { logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: " "bad owner or modes for %.200s", pw->pw_name, user_hostfile); auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes", user_hostfile); } else { temporarily_use_uid(pw); load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile); restore_uid(); } free(user_hostfile); } host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found); if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED) error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication", found->host); else if (host_status == HOST_OK) debug("%s: key for %s found at %s:%ld", __func__, found->host, found->file, found->line); else debug("%s: key for host %s not found", __func__, host); free_hostkeys(hostkeys); return host_status; } /* * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable. * * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ? * * Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an * error buffer plus max size as arguments. * * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure */ int auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir, uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen) { char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX]; char *cp; int comparehome = 0; struct stat st; if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) { snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL) comparehome = 1; if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) { snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf); return -1; } if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) || (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) { snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s", buf); return -1; } /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */ for (;;) { if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) { snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed"); return -1; } strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf)); if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 || (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf); return -1; } /* If are past the homedir then we can stop */ if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) break; /* * dirname should always complete with a "/" path, * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too */ if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0)) break; } return 0; } /* * Version of secure_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to * avoid races. * * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure */ static int secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw, char *err, size_t errlen) { struct stat st; /* check the open file to avoid races */ if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0) { snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s", file, strerror(errno)); return -1; } return auth_secure_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen); } static FILE * auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes, int log_missing, char *file_type) { char line[1024]; struct stat st; int fd; FILE *f; if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) { if (log_missing || errno != ENOENT) debug("Could not open %s '%s': %s", file_type, file, strerror(errno)); return NULL; } if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) { close(fd); return NULL; } if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { logit("User %s %s %s is not a regular file", pw->pw_name, file_type, file); close(fd); return NULL; } unset_nonblock(fd); if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) { close(fd); return NULL; } if (strict_modes && secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) { fclose(f); logit("Authentication refused: %s", line); auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line); return NULL; } return f; } FILE * auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes) { return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys"); } FILE * auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes) { return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0, "authorized principals"); } struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char *user) { #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP extern login_cap_t *lc; #ifdef BSD_AUTH auth_session_t *as; #endif #endif struct passwd *pw; struct connection_info *ci = get_connection_info(1, options.use_dns); ci->user = user; parse_server_match_config(&options, ci); #if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB) aix_setauthdb(user); #endif pw = getpwnam(user); #if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB) aix_restoreauthdb(); #endif #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN /* * Windows usernames are case-insensitive. To avoid later problems * when trying to match the username, the user is only allowed to * login if the username is given in the same case as stored in the * user database. */ if (pw != NULL && strcmp(user, pw->pw_name) != 0) { logit("Login name %.100s does not match stored username %.100s", user, pw->pw_name); pw = NULL; } #endif if (pw == NULL) { logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s", user, get_remote_ipaddr()); #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN record_failed_login(user, get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh"); #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER); #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ return (NULL); } if (!allowed_user(pw)) return (NULL); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if ((lc = login_getpwclass(pw)) == NULL) { debug("unable to get login class: %s", user); return (NULL); } #ifdef BSD_AUTH if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 || auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) { debug("Approval failure for %s", user); pw = NULL; } if (as != NULL) auth_close(as); #endif #endif if (pw != NULL) return (pwcopy(pw)); return (NULL); } /* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */ int auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key) { char *fp = NULL; int r; if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL) return 0; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; error("%s: fingerprint key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } r = sshkey_check_revoked(key, options.revoked_keys_file); switch (r) { case 0: break; /* not revoked */ case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED: error("Authentication key %s %s revoked by file %s", sshkey_type(key), fp, options.revoked_keys_file); goto out; default: error("Error checking authentication key %s %s in " "revoked keys file %s: %s", sshkey_type(key), fp, options.revoked_keys_file, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } /* Success */ r = 0; out: free(fp); return r == 0 ? 0 : 1; } void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) { char buf[1024]; va_list args; if (!auth_debug_init) return; va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf); } void auth_debug_send(void) { char *msg; if (!auth_debug_init) return; while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) { msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL); packet_send_debug("%s", msg); free(msg); } } void auth_debug_reset(void) { if (auth_debug_init) buffer_clear(&auth_debug); else { buffer_init(&auth_debug); auth_debug_init = 1; } } struct passwd * fakepw(void) { static struct passwd fake; memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake)); fake.pw_name = "NOUSER"; fake.pw_passwd = "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK"; #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER"; #endif fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid; fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid; #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS fake.pw_class = ""; #endif fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist"; fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist"; return (&fake); } Index: head/crypto/openssh/auth.h =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/auth.h (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/auth.h (revision 294336) @@ -1,229 +1,229 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.82 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.84 2015/05/08 06:41:56 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * */ #ifndef AUTH_H #define AUTH_H #include #include #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP #include #endif #ifdef BSD_AUTH #include #endif #ifdef KRB5 #include #endif struct ssh; struct sshkey; typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt; typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod; typedef struct KbdintDevice KbdintDevice; struct Authctxt { sig_atomic_t success; int authenticated; /* authenticated and alarms cancelled */ int postponed; /* authentication needs another step */ int valid; /* user exists and is allowed to login */ int attempt; int failures; - int server_caused_failure; + int server_caused_failure; int force_pwchange; char *user; /* username sent by the client */ char *service; struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */ char *style; void *kbdintctxt; char *info; /* Extra info for next auth_log */ #ifdef BSD_AUTH auth_session_t *as; #endif char **auth_methods; /* modified from server config */ u_int num_auth_methods; #ifdef KRB5 krb5_context krb5_ctx; krb5_ccache krb5_fwd_ccache; krb5_principal krb5_user; char *krb5_ticket_file; char *krb5_ccname; #endif Buffer *loginmsg; void *methoddata; struct sshkey **prev_userkeys; u_int nprev_userkeys; }; /* * Every authentication method has to handle authentication requests for * non-existing users, or for users that are not allowed to login. In this * case 'valid' is set to 0, but 'user' points to the username requested by * the client. */ struct Authmethod { char *name; int (*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt); int *enabled; }; /* * Keyboard interactive device: * init_ctx returns: non NULL upon success * query returns: 0 - success, otherwise failure * respond returns: 0 - success, 1 - need further interaction, * otherwise - failure */ struct KbdintDevice { const char *name; void* (*init_ctx)(Authctxt*); int (*query)(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on); int (*respond)(void *ctx, u_int numresp, char **responses); void (*free_ctx)(void *ctx); }; int auth_rhosts(struct passwd *, const char *); int auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, const char *); int auth_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *, char *, Key *); int auth_password(Authctxt *, const char *); int auth_rsa(Authctxt *, BIGNUM *); int auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *); BIGNUM *auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *); int auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char[]); int auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **); int auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *); int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *); -int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *); +int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *, int); void pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *, const Key *, const char *, ...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 3, 4))); void auth2_record_userkey(Authctxt *, struct sshkey *); int auth2_userkey_already_used(Authctxt *, struct sshkey *); struct stat; int auth_secure_path(const char *, struct stat *, const char *, uid_t, char *, size_t); #ifdef KRB5 int auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *); int auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt); int auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password); void krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt); #endif /* KRB5 */ #if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE) #include int auth_shadow_acctexpired(struct spwd *); int auth_shadow_pwexpired(Authctxt *); #endif #include "auth-pam.h" #include "audit.h" void remove_kbdint_device(const char *); void disable_forwarding(void); void do_authentication(Authctxt *); void do_authentication2(Authctxt *); void auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *, ...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3))) __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2))); void auth_log(Authctxt *, int, int, const char *, const char *); void auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *) __attribute__((noreturn)); void userauth_finish(Authctxt *, int, const char *, const char *); int auth_root_allowed(const char *); void userauth_send_banner(const char *); char *auth2_read_banner(void); int auth2_methods_valid(const char *, int); int auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *); int auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *); int auth2_method_allowed(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *); void privsep_challenge_enable(void); int auth2_challenge(Authctxt *, char *); void auth2_challenge_stop(Authctxt *); int bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **); int bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **); int skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **); int skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **); int allowed_user(struct passwd *); struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char *user); char *get_challenge(Authctxt *); int verify_response(Authctxt *, const char *); void abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *); char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw); char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *); FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int); FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int); int auth_key_is_revoked(Key *); HostStatus check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, Key *, const char *, const char *, const char *); /* hostkey handling */ Key *get_hostkey_by_index(int); Key *get_hostkey_public_by_index(int, struct ssh *); Key *get_hostkey_public_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *); Key *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int, int, struct ssh *); int get_hostkey_index(Key *, int, struct ssh *); int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *); int sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, u_int); /* debug messages during authentication */ void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); void auth_debug_send(void); void auth_debug_reset(void); struct passwd *fakepw(void); int sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *); #define SKEY_PROMPT "\nS/Key Password: " #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL) #include krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *); #endif #endif Index: head/crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/auth2-hostbased.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,251 +1,250 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.24 2015/01/28 22:36:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.25 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "canohost.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "match.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern u_char *session_id2; extern u_int session_id2_len; static int userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) { Buffer b; Key *key = NULL; char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost, *service; u_char *pkblob, *sig; u_int alen, blen, slen; int pktype; int authenticated = 0; if (!authctxt->valid) { debug2("userauth_hostbased: disabled because of invalid user"); return 0; } pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen); pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); chost = packet_get_string(NULL); cuser = packet_get_string(NULL); sig = packet_get_string(&slen); debug("userauth_hostbased: cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %d", cuser, chost, pkalg, slen); #ifdef DEBUG_PK debug("signature:"); buffer_init(&b); buffer_append(&b, sig, slen); buffer_dump(&b); buffer_free(&b); #endif pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg); if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) { /* this is perfectly legal */ logit("userauth_hostbased: unsupported " "public key algorithm: %s", pkalg); goto done; } key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen); if (key == NULL) { error("userauth_hostbased: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg); goto done; } if (key->type != pktype) { error("userauth_hostbased: type mismatch for decoded key " "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype); goto done; } if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { error("Refusing RSA key because peer uses unsafe " "signature format"); goto done; } if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), - options.hostbased_key_types, - strlen(options.hostbased_key_types), 0) != 1) { + options.hostbased_key_types, 0) != 1) { logit("%s: key type %s not in HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes", __func__, sshkey_type(key)); goto done; } service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" : authctxt->service; buffer_init(&b); buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); /* reconstruct packet */ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user); buffer_put_cstring(&b, service); buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased"); buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen); buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen); buffer_put_cstring(&b, chost); buffer_put_cstring(&b, cuser); #ifdef DEBUG_PK buffer_dump(&b); #endif pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost); /* test for allowed key and correct signature */ authenticated = 0; if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) && PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b))) == 1) authenticated = 1; buffer_free(&b); done: debug2("userauth_hostbased: authenticated %d", authenticated); if (key != NULL) key_free(key); free(pkalg); free(pkblob); free(cuser); free(chost); free(sig); return authenticated; } /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */ int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost, Key *key) { const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup, *reason; HostStatus host_status; int len; char *fp; if (auth_key_is_revoked(key)) return 0; resolvedname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns); ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr(); debug2("%s: chost %s resolvedname %s ipaddr %s", __func__, chost, resolvedname, ipaddr); if (((len = strlen(chost)) > 0) && chost[len - 1] == '.') { debug2("stripping trailing dot from chost %s", chost); chost[len - 1] = '\0'; } if (options.hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only) { if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0) { debug2("%s: auth_rhosts2 refused " "user \"%.100s\" host \"%.100s\" (from packet)", __func__, cuser, chost); return 0; } lookup = chost; } else { if (strcasecmp(resolvedname, chost) != 0) logit("userauth_hostbased mismatch: " "client sends %s, but we resolve %s to %s", chost, ipaddr, resolvedname); if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr) == 0) { debug2("%s: auth_rhosts2 refused " "user \"%.100s\" host \"%.100s\" addr \"%.100s\"", __func__, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr); return 0; } lookup = resolvedname; } debug2("%s: access allowed by auth_rhosts2", __func__); if (key_is_cert(key) && key_cert_check_authority(key, 1, 0, lookup, &reason)) { error("%s", reason); auth_debug_add("%s", reason); return 0; } host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE, options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE); /* backward compat if no key has been found. */ if (host_status == HOST_NEW) { host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2, options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2); } if (host_status == HOST_OK) { if (key_is_cert(key)) { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by " "%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id, key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp, cuser, lookup); } else { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s", key_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup); } free(fp); } return (host_status == HOST_OK); } Authmethod method_hostbased = { "hostbased", userauth_hostbased, &options.hostbased_authentication }; Index: head/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/auth2-pubkey.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,739 +1,1102 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.47 2015/02/17 00:14:05 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.53 2015/06/15 18:44:22 jsing Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "canohost.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "match.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "channels.h" /* XXX for session.h */ +#include "session.h" /* XXX for child_set_env(); refactor? */ /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern u_char *session_id2; extern u_int session_id2_len; static int userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) { Buffer b; Key *key = NULL; char *pkalg, *userstyle; u_char *pkblob, *sig; u_int alen, blen, slen; int have_sig, pktype; int authenticated = 0; if (!authctxt->valid) { debug2("userauth_pubkey: disabled because of invalid user"); return 0; } have_sig = packet_get_char(); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { debug2("userauth_pubkey: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH"); /* no explicit pkalg given */ pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); buffer_init(&b); buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen); /* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */ pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen); buffer_free(&b); } else { pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen); pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); } pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg); if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) { /* this is perfectly legal */ logit("userauth_pubkey: unsupported public key algorithm: %s", pkalg); goto done; } key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen); if (key == NULL) { error("userauth_pubkey: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg); goto done; } if (key->type != pktype) { error("userauth_pubkey: type mismatch for decoded key " "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype); goto done; } if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe " "signature scheme"); goto done; } if (auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key)) { logit("refusing previously-used %s key", key_type(key)); goto done; } - if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), options.pubkey_key_types, - strlen(options.pubkey_key_types), 0) != 1) { + if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), + options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) { logit("%s: key type %s not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); goto done; } if (have_sig) { sig = packet_get_string(&slen); packet_check_eom(); buffer_init(&b); if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); } else { buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); } /* reconstruct packet */ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->style ? ":" : "", authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle); free(userstyle); buffer_put_cstring(&b, datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" : authctxt->service); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); } else { buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey"); buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg); } buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen); #ifdef DEBUG_PK buffer_dump(&b); #endif pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL); /* test for correct signature */ authenticated = 0; - if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) && + if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 1)) && PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b))) == 1) { authenticated = 1; /* Record the successful key to prevent reuse */ auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key); key = NULL; /* Don't free below */ } buffer_free(&b); free(sig); } else { debug("test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable"); packet_check_eom(); /* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */ /* * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed * to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this * message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an * issue? -markus */ - if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key))) { + if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, 0))) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK); packet_put_string(pkalg, alen); packet_put_string(pkblob, blen); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); authctxt->postponed = 1; } } if (authenticated != 1) auth_clear_options(); done: debug2("userauth_pubkey: authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg); if (key != NULL) key_free(key); free(pkalg); free(pkblob); return authenticated; } void pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...) { char *fp, *extra; va_list ap; int i; extra = NULL; if (fmt != NULL) { va_start(ap, fmt); i = vasprintf(&extra, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); if (i < 0 || extra == NULL) fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__); } if (key_is_cert(key)) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s", key_type(key), key->cert->key_id, (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra); free(fp); } else { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key), fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra); free(fp); } free(extra); } +/* + * Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic + * escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector + * and its members. + */ static int +split_argv(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp) +{ + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + int argc = 0, quote, i, j; + char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv)); + + *argvp = NULL; + *argcp = 0; + + for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) { + /* Skip leading whitespace */ + if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t') + continue; + + /* Start of a token */ + quote = 0; + if (s[i] == '\\' && + (s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\')) + i++; + else if (s[i] == '\'' || s[i] == '"') + quote = s[i++]; + + argv = xreallocarray(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv)); + arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1); + argv[argc] = NULL; + + /* Copy the token in, removing escapes */ + for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) { + if (s[i] == '\\') { + if (s[i + 1] == '\'' || + s[i + 1] == '\"' || + s[i + 1] == '\\') { + i++; /* Skip '\' */ + arg[j++] = s[i]; + } else { + /* Unrecognised escape */ + arg[j++] = s[i]; + } + } else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')) + break; /* done */ + else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote) + break; /* done */ + else + arg[j++] = s[i]; + } + if (s[i] == '\0') { + if (quote != 0) { + /* Ran out of string looking for close quote */ + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + break; + } + } + /* Success */ + *argcp = argc; + *argvp = argv; + argc = 0; + argv = NULL; + r = 0; + out: + if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) { + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) + free(argv[i]); + free(argv); + } + return r; +} + +/* + * Reassemble an argument vector into a string, quoting and escaping as + * necessary. Caller must free returned string. + */ +static char * +assemble_argv(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int i, j, ws, r; + char c, *ret; + struct sshbuf *buf, *arg; + + if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (arg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); + + for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { + ws = 0; + sshbuf_reset(arg); + for (j = 0; argv[i][j] != '\0'; j++) { + r = 0; + c = argv[i][j]; + switch (c) { + case ' ': + case '\t': + ws = 1; + r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c); + break; + case '\\': + case '\'': + case '"': + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, '\\')) != 0) + break; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + default: + r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c); + break; + } + if (r != 0) + fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8: %s", + __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((i != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ' ')) != 0) || + (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0) || + (r = sshbuf_putb(buf, arg)) != 0 || + (ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0)) + fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + } + if ((ret = malloc(sshbuf_len(buf) + 1)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: malloc failed", __func__); + memcpy(ret, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); + ret[sshbuf_len(buf)] = '\0'; + sshbuf_free(buf); + sshbuf_free(arg); + return ret; +} + +/* + * Runs command in a subprocess. Returns pid on success and a FILE* to the + * subprocess' stdout or 0 on failure. + * NB. "command" is only used for logging. + */ +static pid_t +subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command, + int ac, char **av, FILE **child) +{ + FILE *f; + struct stat st; + int devnull, p[2], i; + pid_t pid; + char *cp, errmsg[512]; + u_int envsize; + char **child_env; + + *child = NULL; + + debug3("%s: %s command \"%s\" running as %s", __func__, + tag, command, pw->pw_name); + + /* Verify the path exists and is safe-ish to execute */ + if (*av[0] != '/') { + error("%s path is not absolute", tag); + return 0; + } + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + if (stat(av[0], &st) < 0) { + error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag, + av[0], strerror(errno)); + restore_uid(); + return 0; + } + if (auth_secure_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0, + errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) { + error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg); + restore_uid(); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Run the command; stderr is left in place, stdout is the + * authorized_keys output. + */ + if (pipe(p) != 0) { + error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + restore_uid(); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and + * run cleanup_exit() code. + */ + restore_uid(); + + switch ((pid = fork())) { + case -1: /* error */ + error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + close(p[0]); + close(p[1]); + return 0; + case 0: /* child */ + /* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */ + envsize = 5; + child_env = xcalloc(sizeof(*child_env), envsize); + child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH); + child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name); + child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name); + child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir); + if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL) + child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LANG", cp); + + for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++) + signal(i, SIG_DFL); + + if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { + error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL, + strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + /* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */ + if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || + dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) { + error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); + + /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */ + if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) { + error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, + strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) { + error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, + strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */ + if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) { + error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + _exit(1); + } + + execve(av[0], av, child_env); + error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno)); + _exit(127); + default: /* parent */ + break; + } + + close(p[1]); + if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) { + error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + close(p[0]); + /* Don't leave zombie child */ + kill(pid, SIGTERM); + while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR) + ; + return 0; + } + /* Success */ + debug3("%s: %s pid %ld", __func__, tag, (long)pid); + *child = f; + return pid; +} + +/* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */ +static int +exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd) +{ + int status; + + while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { + if (errno != EINTR) { + error("%s: waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno)); + return -1; + } + } + if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { + error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status)); + return -1; + } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { + error("%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status)); + return -1; + } + return 0; +} + +static int match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert) { char *result; u_int i; /* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */ for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) { if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i], principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) { debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"", result); free(result); return 1; } } return 0; } static int -match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert) +process_principals(FILE *f, char *file, struct passwd *pw, + struct sshkey_cert *cert) { - FILE *f; char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts; u_long linenum = 0; u_int i; - temporarily_use_uid(pw); - debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file); - if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) { - restore_uid(); - return 0; - } while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { /* Skip leading whitespace. */ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; /* Skip blank and comment lines. */ if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL) *ep = '\0'; if (!*cp || *cp == '\n') continue; /* Trim trailing whitespace. */ ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1; while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t')) *ep-- = '\0'; /* * If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has * key options. */ line_opts = NULL; if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL || (ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) { for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++) ; line_opts = cp; cp = ep; } for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) { if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) { - debug3("matched principal \"%.100s\" " - "from file \"%s\" on line %lu", - cert->principals[i], file, linenum); + debug3("%s:%lu: matched principal \"%.100s\"", + file == NULL ? "(command)" : file, + linenum, cert->principals[i]); if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts, file, linenum) != 1) continue; - fclose(f); - restore_uid(); return 1; } } } + return 0; +} + +static int +match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert) +{ + FILE *f; + int success; + + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file); + if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) { + restore_uid(); + return 0; + } + success = process_principals(f, file, pw, cert); fclose(f); restore_uid(); - return 0; + return success; } /* + * Checks whether principal is allowed in output of command. + * returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise. + */ +static int +match_principals_command(struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert) +{ + FILE *f = NULL; + int ok, found_principal = 0; + struct passwd *pw; + int i, ac = 0, uid_swapped = 0; + pid_t pid; + char *tmp, *username = NULL, *command = NULL, **av = NULL; + void (*osigchld)(int); + + if (options.authorized_principals_command == NULL) + return 0; + if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL) { + error("No user for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand specified, " + "skipping"); + return 0; + } + + /* + * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to + * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly. + */ + osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); + + /* Prepare and verify the user for the command */ + username = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command_user, + "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); + pw = getpwnam(username); + if (pw == NULL) { + error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s", + username, strerror(errno)); + goto out; + } + + /* Turn the command into an argument vector */ + if (split_argv(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av) != 0) { + error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains " + "invalid quotes", command); + goto out; + } + if (ac == 0) { + error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments", + command); + goto out; + } + for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) { + tmp = percent_expand(av[i], + "u", user_pw->pw_name, + "h", user_pw->pw_dir, + (char *)NULL); + if (tmp == NULL) + fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__); + free(av[i]); + av[i] = tmp; + } + /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */ + command = assemble_argv(ac, av); + + if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", pw, command, + ac, av, &f)) == 0) + goto out; + + uid_swapped = 1; + temporarily_use_uid(pw); + + ok = process_principals(f, NULL, pw, cert); + + if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Read completed successfully */ + found_principal = ok; + out: + if (f != NULL) + fclose(f); + signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); + for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) + free(av[i]); + free(av); + if (uid_swapped) + restore_uid(); + free(command); + free(username); + return found_principal; +} +/* * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file, * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. */ static int check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw) { char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; const char *reason; int found_key = 0; u_long linenum = 0; Key *found; char *fp; found_key = 0; found = NULL; while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { char *cp, *key_options = NULL; if (found != NULL) key_free(found); found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type); auth_clear_options(); /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') continue; if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) { /* no key? check if there are options for this key */ int quoted = 0; debug2("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp); key_options = cp; for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) { if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"') cp++; /* Skip both */ else if (*cp == '"') quoted = !quoted; } /* Skip remaining whitespace. */ for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) { debug2("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp); /* still no key? advance to next line*/ continue; } } if (key_is_cert(key)) { if (!key_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key)) continue; if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum) != 1) continue; if (!key_is_cert_authority) continue; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) continue; debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s", file, linenum, key_type(found), fp); /* * If the user has specified a list of principals as * a key option, then prefer that list to matching * their username in the certificate principals list. */ if (authorized_principals != NULL && !match_principals_option(authorized_principals, key->cert)) { reason = "Certificate does not contain an " "authorized principal"; fail_reason: free(fp); error("%s", reason); auth_debug_add("%s", reason); continue; } if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0, authorized_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, &reason) != 0) goto fail_reason; if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0) { free(fp); continue; } verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" " "signed by %s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id, key_type(found), fp, file); free(fp); found_key = 1; break; } else if (key_equal(found, key)) { if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum) != 1) continue; if (key_is_cert_authority) continue; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) continue; debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s", file, linenum, key_type(found), fp); free(fp); found_key = 1; break; } } if (found != NULL) key_free(found); if (!found_key) debug2("key not found"); return found_key; } /* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */ static int user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) { char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL; const char *reason; - int ret = 0; + int ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals; if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL) return 0; if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) return 0; if (sshkey_in_file(key->cert->signature_key, options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1, 0) != 0) { debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__, key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, options.trusted_user_ca_keys); goto out; } /* * If AuthorizedPrincipals is in use, then compare the certificate * principals against the names in that file rather than matching * against the username. */ if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) { - if (!match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert)) { - reason = "Certificate does not contain an " - "authorized principal"; + if (match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert)) + found_principal = 1; + } + /* Try querying command if specified */ + if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(pw, key->cert)) + found_principal = 1; + /* If principals file or command is specified, then require a match */ + use_authorized_principals = principals_file != NULL || + options.authorized_principals_command != NULL; + if (!found_principal && use_authorized_principals) { + reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal"; fail_reason: - error("%s", reason); - auth_debug_add("%s", reason); - goto out; - } + error("%s", reason); + auth_debug_add("%s", reason); + goto out; } if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1, - principals_file == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, &reason) != 0) + use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0) goto fail_reason; if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0) goto out; verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by %s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id, key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, options.trusted_user_ca_keys); ret = 1; out: free(principals_file); free(ca_fp); return ret; } /* * Checks whether key is allowed in file. * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. */ static int user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file) { FILE *f; int found_key = 0; /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */ temporarily_use_uid(pw); debug("trying public key file %s", file); if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) { found_key = check_authkeys_file(f, file, key, pw); fclose(f); } restore_uid(); return found_key; } /* * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command. * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. */ static int user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key) { - FILE *f; - int ok, found_key = 0; + FILE *f = NULL; + int r, ok, found_key = 0; struct passwd *pw; - struct stat st; - int status, devnull, p[2], i; + int i, uid_swapped = 0, ac = 0; pid_t pid; - char *username, errmsg[512]; + char *username = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL; + char *tmp, *command = NULL, **av = NULL; + void (*osigchld)(int); - if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL || - options.authorized_keys_command[0] != '/') + if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL) return 0; - if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) { error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping"); return 0; } + /* + * NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to + * ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly. + */ + osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); + + /* Prepare and verify the user for the command */ username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user, "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); pw = getpwnam(username); if (pw == NULL) { error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s", username, strerror(errno)); - free(username); - return 0; + goto out; } - free(username); - temporarily_use_uid(pw); - - if (stat(options.authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) { - error("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s", - options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno)); + /* Prepare AuthorizedKeysCommand */ + if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, + SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { + error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); goto out; } - if (auth_secure_path(options.authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0, - errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) { - error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg); + if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) { + error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } - if (pipe(p) != 0) { - error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + /* Turn the command into an argument vector */ + if (split_argv(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av) != 0) { + error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes", + command); goto out; } + if (ac == 0) { + error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments", + command); + goto out; + } + for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) { + tmp = percent_expand(av[i], + "u", user_pw->pw_name, + "h", user_pw->pw_dir, + "t", sshkey_ssh_name(key), + "f", key_fp, + "k", keytext, + (char *)NULL); + if (tmp == NULL) + fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__); + free(av[i]); + av[i] = tmp; + } + /* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */ + command = assemble_argv(ac, av); - debug3("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s %s\" as \"%s\"", - options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, pw->pw_name); - /* - * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and - * run cleanup_exit() code. + * If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments + * then fall back to the old behaviour of passing the + * target username as a single argument. */ - restore_uid(); - - switch ((pid = fork())) { - case -1: /* error */ - error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); - close(p[0]); - close(p[1]); - return 0; - case 0: /* child */ - for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++) - signal(i, SIG_DFL); - - if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { - error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL, - strerror(errno)); - _exit(1); - } - /* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */ - if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || - dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) { - error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); - _exit(1); - } - closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); - - /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */ - if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) { - error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, - strerror(errno)); - _exit(1); - } - if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) { - error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, - strerror(errno)); - _exit(1); - } - /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */ - if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) { - error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); - _exit(1); - } - - execl(options.authorized_keys_command, - options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, NULL); - - error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s", - options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno)); - _exit(127); - default: /* parent */ - break; + if (ac == 1) { + av = xreallocarray(av, ac + 2, sizeof(*av)); + av[1] = xstrdup(user_pw->pw_name); + av[2] = NULL; + /* Fix up command too, since it is used in log messages */ + free(command); + xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]); } + if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", pw, command, + ac, av, &f)) == 0) + goto out; + + uid_swapped = 1; temporarily_use_uid(pw); - close(p[1]); - if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) { - error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); - close(p[0]); - /* Don't leave zombie child */ - kill(pid, SIGTERM); - while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR) - ; - goto out; - } ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw); - fclose(f); - while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { - if (errno != EINTR) { - error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); - goto out; - } - } - if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { - error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d", - options.authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status)); + if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command) != 0) goto out; - } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { - error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d", - options.authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status)); - goto out; - } + + /* Read completed successfully */ found_key = ok; out: - restore_uid(); + if (f != NULL) + fclose(f); + signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); + for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) + free(av[i]); + free(av); + if (uid_swapped) + restore_uid(); + free(command); + free(username); + free(key_fp); + free(keytext); return found_key; } /* * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user. */ int -user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) +user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, int auth_attempt) { u_int success, i; char *file; if (auth_key_is_revoked(key)) return 0; if (key_is_cert(key) && auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key)) return 0; success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key); if (success) return success; success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key); if (success > 0) return success; for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) { if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0) continue; file = expand_authorized_keys( options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw); success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file); free(file); } return success; } /* Records a public key in the list of previously-successful keys */ void auth2_record_userkey(Authctxt *authctxt, struct sshkey *key) { struct sshkey **tmp; if (authctxt->nprev_userkeys >= INT_MAX || (tmp = reallocarray(authctxt->prev_userkeys, authctxt->nprev_userkeys + 1, sizeof(*tmp))) == NULL) fatal("%s: reallocarray failed", __func__); authctxt->prev_userkeys = tmp; authctxt->prev_userkeys[authctxt->nprev_userkeys] = key; authctxt->nprev_userkeys++; } /* Checks whether a key has already been used successfully for authentication */ int auth2_userkey_already_used(Authctxt *authctxt, struct sshkey *key) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < authctxt->nprev_userkeys; i++) { if (sshkey_equal_public(key, authctxt->prev_userkeys[i])) { return 1; } } return 0; } Authmethod method_pubkey = { "publickey", userauth_pubkey, &options.pubkey_authentication }; Index: head/crypto/openssh/authfd.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/authfd.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/authfd.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,711 +1,709 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.94 2015/01/14 20:05:27 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.97 2015/03/26 19:32:19 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions for connecting the local authentication agent. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 implementation, * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "compat.h" #include "log.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "misc.h" #include "ssherr.h" #define MAX_AGENT_IDENTITIES 2048 /* Max keys in agent reply */ #define MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN (256 * 1024) /* Max bytes in agent reply */ /* macro to check for "agent failure" message */ #define agent_failed(x) \ ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || \ (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \ (x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE)) /* Convert success/failure response from agent to a err.h status */ static int decode_reply(u_char type) { if (agent_failed(type)) return SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE; else if (type == SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS) return 0; else return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } /* Returns the number of the authentication fd, or -1 if there is none. */ int ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp) { const char *authsocket; int sock, oerrno; struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; if (fdp != NULL) *fdp = -1; authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); if (!authsocket) return SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT; memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr)); sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)); if ((sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; /* close on exec */ if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1 || connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) { oerrno = errno; close(sock); errno = oerrno; return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; } if (fdp != NULL) *fdp = sock; else close(sock); return 0; } /* Communicate with agent: send request and read reply */ static int ssh_request_reply(int sock, struct sshbuf *request, struct sshbuf *reply) { int r; size_t l, len; char buf[1024]; /* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */ len = sshbuf_len(request); put_u32(buf, len); /* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */ if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, 4) != 4 || atomicio(vwrite, sock, (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(request), sshbuf_len(request)) != sshbuf_len(request)) return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION; /* * Wait for response from the agent. First read the length of the * response packet. */ if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, 4) != 4) return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION; /* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */ len = get_u32(buf); if (len > MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* Read the rest of the response in to the buffer. */ sshbuf_reset(reply); while (len > 0) { l = len; if (l > sizeof(buf)) l = sizeof(buf); if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, l) != l) return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION; if ((r = sshbuf_put(reply, buf, l)) != 0) return r; len -= l; } return 0; } /* * Closes the agent socket if it should be closed (depends on how it was * obtained). The argument must have been returned by * ssh_get_authentication_socket(). */ void ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock) { if (getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME)) close(sock); } /* Lock/unlock agent */ int ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password) { int r; u_char type = lock ? SSH_AGENTC_LOCK : SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK; struct sshbuf *msg; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, password)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; r = decode_reply(type); out: sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } #ifdef WITH_SSH1 static int deserialise_identity1(struct sshbuf *ids, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { struct sshkey *key; int r, keybits; u_int32_t bits; char *comment = NULL; if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(ids, &bits)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(ids, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(ids, key->rsa->n)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(ids, &comment, NULL)) != 0) goto out; keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n); /* XXX previously we just warned here. I think we should be strict */ if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH; goto out; } if (keyp != NULL) { *keyp = key; key = NULL; } if (commentp != NULL) { *commentp = comment; comment = NULL; } r = 0; out: sshkey_free(key); free(comment); return r; } #endif static int deserialise_identity2(struct sshbuf *ids, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { int r; char *comment = NULL; const u_char *blob; size_t blen; if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(ids, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(ids, &comment, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, keyp)) != 0) goto out; if (commentp != NULL) { *commentp = comment; comment = NULL; } r = 0; out: free(comment); return r; } /* * Fetch list of identities held by the agent. */ int ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, int version, struct ssh_identitylist **idlp) { u_char type, code1 = 0, code2 = 0; u_int32_t num, i; struct sshbuf *msg; struct ssh_identitylist *idl = NULL; int r; /* Determine request and expected response types */ switch (version) { case 1: code1 = SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES; code2 = SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER; break; case 2: code1 = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES; code2 = SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER; break; default: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } /* * Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the * identities it can represent. */ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code1)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) goto out; /* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; if (agent_failed(type)) { r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE; goto out; } else if (type != code2) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &num)) != 0) goto out; if (num > MAX_AGENT_IDENTITIES) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (num == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES; goto out; } /* Deserialise the response into a list of keys/comments */ if ((idl = calloc(1, sizeof(*idl))) == NULL || (idl->keys = calloc(num, sizeof(*idl->keys))) == NULL || (idl->comments = calloc(num, sizeof(*idl->comments))) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } for (i = 0; i < num;) { switch (version) { case 1: #ifdef WITH_SSH1 if ((r = deserialise_identity1(msg, &(idl->keys[i]), &(idl->comments[i]))) != 0) goto out; #endif break; case 2: if ((r = deserialise_identity2(msg, &(idl->keys[i]), &(idl->comments[i]))) != 0) { if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN) { /* Gracefully skip unknown key types */ num--; continue; } else goto out; } break; } i++; } idl->nkeys = num; *idlp = idl; idl = NULL; r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(msg); if (idl != NULL) ssh_free_identitylist(idl); return r; } void ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl) { size_t i; if (idl == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < idl->nkeys; i++) { if (idl->keys != NULL) sshkey_free(idl->keys[i]); if (idl->comments != NULL) free(idl->comments[i]); } free(idl); } /* * Sends a challenge (typically from a server via ssh(1)) to the agent, * and waits for a response from the agent. * Returns true (non-zero) if the agent gave the correct answer, zero * otherwise. */ #ifdef WITH_SSH1 int ssh_decrypt_challenge(int sock, struct sshkey* key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char session_id[16], u_char response[16]) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; u_char type; if (key->type != KEY_RSA1) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->n)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, challenge)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(msg, session_id, 16)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 1)) != 0) /* Response type for proto 1.1 */ goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; if (agent_failed(type)) { r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE; goto out; } else if (type != SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get(msg, response, 16)) != 0) goto out; r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } #endif /* ask agent to sign data, returns err.h code on error, 0 on success */ int ssh_agent_sign(int sock, struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_char *blob = NULL, type; size_t blen = 0, len = 0; u_int flags = 0; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if (sigp != NULL) - *sigp = NULL; - if (lenp != NULL) - *lenp = 0; + *sigp = NULL; + *lenp = 0; if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (compat & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) flags |= SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, datalen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, flags)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg) != 0)) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; if (agent_failed(type)) { r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE; goto out; } else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, sigp, &len)) != 0) goto out; *lenp = len; r = 0; out: if (blob != NULL) { explicit_bzero(blob, blen); free(blob); } sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } /* Encode key for a message to the agent. */ #ifdef WITH_SSH1 static int ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(struct sshbuf *b, RSA *key, const char *comment) { int r; /* To keep within the protocol: p < q for ssh. in SSL p > q */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, BN_num_bits(key->n))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->n)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->d)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->iqmp)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->q)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(b, key->p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comment)) != 0) return r; return 0; } #endif static int ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key, const char *comment) { int r; if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, b)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comment)) != 0) return r; return 0; } static int encode_constraints(struct sshbuf *m, u_int life, u_int confirm) { int r; if (life != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, life)) != 0) goto out; } if (confirm != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM)) != 0) goto out; } r = 0; out: return r; } /* * Adds an identity to the authentication server. * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications. */ int ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, struct sshkey *key, const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r, constrained = (life || confirm); u_char type; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; switch (key->type) { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 case KEY_RSA1: type = constrained ? SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED : SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 || (r = ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(msg, key->rsa, comment)) != 0) goto out; break; #endif #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: #endif case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: type = constrained ? SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED : SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 || (r = ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(msg, key, comment)) != 0) goto out; break; default: r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if (constrained && (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; r = decode_reply(type); out: sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } /* * Removes an identity from the authentication server. * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications. */ int ssh_remove_identity(int sock, struct sshkey *key) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; u_char type, *blob = NULL; size_t blen; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; #ifdef WITH_SSH1 if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, key->rsa->n)) != 0) goto out; } else #endif if (key->type != KEY_UNSPEC) { if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0) goto out; } else { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; r = decode_reply(type); out: if (blob != NULL) { explicit_bzero(blob, blen); free(blob); } sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } /* * Add/remove an token-based identity from the authentication server. * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications. */ int ssh_update_card(int sock, int add, const char *reader_id, const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r, constrained = (life || confirm); u_char type; if (add) { type = constrained ? SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED : SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY; } else type = SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, reader_id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, pin)) != 0) goto out; if (constrained && (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; r = decode_reply(type); out: sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } /* * Removes all identities from the agent. * This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications. */ int ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_char type = (version == 1) ? SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES : SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto out; r = decode_reply(type); out: sshbuf_free(msg); return r; } Index: head/crypto/openssh/authfile.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/authfile.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/authfile.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,578 +1,580 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.111 2015/02/23 16:55:51 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.114 2015/04/17 13:32:09 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "cipher.h" #include "key.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "log.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "misc.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "krl.h" #define MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE (1024 * 1024) /* Save a key blob to a file */ static int sshkey_save_private_blob(struct sshbuf *keybuf, const char *filename) { int fd, oerrno; if ((fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600)) < 0) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(keybuf), sshbuf_len(keybuf)) != sshbuf_len(keybuf)) { oerrno = errno; close(fd); unlink(filename); errno = oerrno; return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; } close(fd); return 0; } int sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, const char *comment, int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds) { struct sshbuf *keyblob = NULL; int r; if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshkey_private_to_fileblob(key, keyblob, passphrase, comment, force_new_format, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshkey_save_private_blob(keyblob, filename)) != 0) goto out; r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(keyblob); return r; } /* Load a key from a fd into a buffer */ int sshkey_load_file(int fd, struct sshbuf *blob) { u_char buf[1024]; size_t len; struct stat st; int r; if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 && st.st_size > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; for (;;) { if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0) { if (errno == EPIPE) break; r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, buf, len)) != 0) goto out; if (sshbuf_len(blob) > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 && st.st_size != (off_t)sshbuf_len(blob)) { r = SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED; goto out; } r = 0; out: explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); if (r != 0) sshbuf_reset(blob); return r; } #ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* * Loads the public part of the ssh v1 key file. Returns NULL if an error was * encountered (the file does not exist or is not readable), and the key * otherwise. */ static int sshkey_load_public_rsa1(int fd, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL; int r; *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, b)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(b, keyp, commentp)) != 0) goto out; r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(b); return r; } #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ /* XXX remove error() calls from here? */ int sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename) { struct stat st; if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; /* * if a key owned by the user is accessed, then we check the * permissions of the file. if the key owned by a different user, * then we don't care. */ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN if (check_ntsec(filename)) #endif if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) { error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("@ WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE! @"); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("Permissions 0%3.3o for '%s' are too open.", (u_int)st.st_mode & 0777, filename); - error("It is recommended that your private key files are NOT accessible by others."); + error("It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others."); error("This private key will be ignored."); return SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS; } return 0; } /* XXX kill perm_ok now that we have SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS? */ int sshkey_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp, int *perm_ok) { int fd, r; *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { if (perm_ok != NULL) *perm_ok = 0; return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; } if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) { if (perm_ok != NULL) *perm_ok = 0; r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS; goto out; } if (perm_ok != NULL) *perm_ok = 1; r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(fd, type, passphrase, keyp, commentp); out: close(fd); return r; } int sshkey_load_private_type_fd(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL; int r; if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, buffer)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, type, passphrase, keyp, commentp)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; out: if (buffer != NULL) sshbuf_free(buffer); return r; } /* XXX this is almost identical to sshkey_load_private_type() */ int sshkey_load_private(const char *filename, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL; int r, fd; *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS; goto out; } if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, buffer)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buffer, passphrase, filename, keyp, commentp)) != 0) goto out; r = 0; out: close(fd); if (buffer != NULL) sshbuf_free(buffer); return r; } static int sshkey_try_load_public(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename, char **commentp) { FILE *f; char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; char *cp; u_long linenum = 0; int r; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; while (read_keyfile_line(f, filename, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { cp = line; switch (*cp) { case '#': case '\n': case '\0': continue; } /* Abort loading if this looks like a private key */ if (strncmp(cp, "-----BEGIN", 10) == 0 || strcmp(cp, "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE") == 0) break; /* Skip leading whitespace. */ for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++) ; if (*cp) { if ((r = sshkey_read(k, &cp)) == 0) { cp[strcspn(cp, "\r\n")] = '\0'; if (commentp) { *commentp = strdup(*cp ? cp : filename); if (*commentp == NULL) r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } fclose(f); return r; } } } fclose(f); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } /* load public key from ssh v1 private or any pubkey file */ int sshkey_load_public(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { struct sshkey *pub = NULL; char file[PATH_MAX]; int r, fd; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; /* XXX should load file once and attempt to parse each format */ if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) goto skip; #ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* try rsa1 private key */ r = sshkey_load_public_rsa1(fd, keyp, commentp); close(fd); switch (r) { case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR: case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL: case SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: case 0: return r; } +#else /* WITH_SSH1 */ + close(fd); #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ /* try ssh2 public key */ if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp)) == 0) { if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = pub; return 0; } sshkey_free(pub); #ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* try rsa1 public key */ if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp)) == 0) { if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = pub; return 0; } sshkey_free(pub); #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ skip: /* try .pub suffix */ if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* in case strlcpy or strlcat fail */ if ((strlcpy(file, filename, sizeof file) < sizeof(file)) && (strlcat(file, ".pub", sizeof file) < sizeof(file)) && (r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, file, commentp)) == 0) { if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = pub; return 0; } sshkey_free(pub); return r; } /* Load the certificate associated with the named private key */ int sshkey_load_cert(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp) { struct sshkey *pub = NULL; char *file = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; *keyp = NULL; if (asprintf(&file, "%s-cert.pub", filename) == -1) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, file, NULL)) != 0) goto out; *keyp = pub; pub = NULL; r = 0; out: if (file != NULL) free(file); if (pub != NULL) sshkey_free(pub); return r; } /* Load private key and certificate */ int sshkey_load_private_cert(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, int *perm_ok) { struct sshkey *key = NULL, *cert = NULL; int r; *keyp = NULL; switch (type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ED25519: #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_UNSPEC: break; default: return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; } if ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(type, filename, passphrase, &key, NULL, perm_ok)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_load_cert(filename, &cert)) != 0) goto out; /* Make sure the private key matches the certificate */ if (sshkey_equal_public(key, cert) == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(key, sshkey_cert_is_legacy(cert))) != 0 || (r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, key)) != 0) goto out; r = 0; *keyp = key; key = NULL; out: if (key != NULL) sshkey_free(key); if (cert != NULL) sshkey_free(cert); return r; } /* * Returns success if the specified "key" is listed in the file "filename", * SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND: if the key is not listed or another error. * If "strict_type" is set then the key type must match exactly, * otherwise a comparison that ignores certficiate data is performed. * If "check_ca" is set and "key" is a certificate, then its CA key is * also checked and sshkey_in_file() will return success if either is found. */ int sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, int strict_type, int check_ca) { FILE *f; char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; char *cp; u_long linenum = 0; int r = 0; struct sshkey *pub = NULL; int (*sshkey_compare)(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *) = strict_type ? sshkey_equal : sshkey_equal_public; if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; while (read_keyfile_line(f, filename, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { cp = line; /* Skip leading whitespace. */ for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++) ; /* Skip comments and empty lines */ switch (*cp) { case '#': case '\n': case '\0': continue; } if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_read(pub, &cp)) != 0) goto out; if (sshkey_compare(key, pub) || (check_ca && sshkey_is_cert(key) && sshkey_compare(key->cert->signature_key, pub))) { r = 0; goto out; } sshkey_free(pub); pub = NULL; } r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; out: if (pub != NULL) sshkey_free(pub); fclose(f); return r; } /* * Checks whether the specified key is revoked, returning 0 if not, * SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED if it is or another error code if something * unexpected happened. * This will check both the key and, if it is a certificate, its CA key too. * "revoked_keys_file" may be a KRL or a one-per-line list of public keys. */ int sshkey_check_revoked(struct sshkey *key, const char *revoked_keys_file) { int r; r = ssh_krl_file_contains_key(revoked_keys_file, key); /* If this was not a KRL to begin with then continue below */ if (r != SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC) return r; /* * If the file is not a KRL or we can't handle KRLs then attempt to * parse the file as a flat list of keys. */ switch ((r = sshkey_in_file(key, revoked_keys_file, 0, 1))) { case 0: /* Key found => revoked */ return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; case SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND: /* Key not found => not revoked */ return 0; default: /* Some other error occurred */ return r; } } Index: head/crypto/openssh/channels.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/channels.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/channels.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,4263 +1,4286 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.341 2015/02/06 23:21:59 millert Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.347 2015/07/01 02:26:31 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * This file contains functions for generic socket connection forwarding. * There is also code for initiating connection forwarding for X11 connections, * arbitrary tcp/ip connections, and the authentication agent connection. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include /* MIN MAX */ #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "channels.h" #include "compat.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "key.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "pathnames.h" /* -- channel core */ /* * Pointer to an array containing all allocated channels. The array is * dynamically extended as needed. */ static Channel **channels = NULL; /* * Size of the channel array. All slots of the array must always be * initialized (at least the type field); unused slots set to NULL */ static u_int channels_alloc = 0; /* * Maximum file descriptor value used in any of the channels. This is * updated in channel_new. */ static int channel_max_fd = 0; /* -- tcp forwarding */ /* * Data structure for storing which hosts are permitted for forward requests. * The local sides of any remote forwards are stored in this array to prevent * a corrupt remote server from accessing arbitrary TCP/IP ports on our local * network (which might be behind a firewall). */ /* XXX: streamlocal wants a path instead of host:port */ /* Overload host_to_connect; we could just make this match Forward */ /* XXX - can we use listen_host instead of listen_path? */ typedef struct { char *host_to_connect; /* Connect to 'host'. */ int port_to_connect; /* Connect to 'port'. */ char *listen_host; /* Remote side should listen address. */ char *listen_path; /* Remote side should listen path. */ int listen_port; /* Remote side should listen port. */ } ForwardPermission; /* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect by the user. */ static ForwardPermission *permitted_opens = NULL; /* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect by the admin. */ static ForwardPermission *permitted_adm_opens = NULL; /* Number of permitted host/port pairs in the array permitted by the user. */ static int num_permitted_opens = 0; /* Number of permitted host/port pair in the array permitted by the admin. */ static int num_adm_permitted_opens = 0; /* special-case port number meaning allow any port */ #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT 0 /* * If this is true, all opens are permitted. This is the case on the server * on which we have to trust the client anyway, and the user could do * anything after logging in anyway. */ static int all_opens_permitted = 0; /* -- X11 forwarding */ /* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */ #define MAX_DISPLAYS 1000 /* Saved X11 local (client) display. */ static char *x11_saved_display = NULL; /* Saved X11 authentication protocol name. */ static char *x11_saved_proto = NULL; /* Saved X11 authentication data. This is the real data. */ static char *x11_saved_data = NULL; static u_int x11_saved_data_len = 0; +/* Deadline after which all X11 connections are refused */ +static u_int x11_refuse_time; + /* * Fake X11 authentication data. This is what the server will be sending us; * we should replace any occurrences of this by the real data. */ static u_char *x11_fake_data = NULL; static u_int x11_fake_data_len; /* -- agent forwarding */ #define NUM_SOCKS 10 /* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */ static int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; /* helper */ static void port_open_helper(Channel *c, char *rtype); /* non-blocking connect helpers */ static int connect_next(struct channel_connect *); static void channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *); /* -- channel core */ Channel * channel_by_id(int id) { Channel *c; if (id < 0 || (u_int)id >= channels_alloc) { logit("channel_by_id: %d: bad id", id); return NULL; } c = channels[id]; if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_by_id: %d: bad id: channel free", id); return NULL; } return c; } /* * Returns the channel if it is allowed to receive protocol messages. * Private channels, like listening sockets, may not receive messages. */ Channel * channel_lookup(int id) { Channel *c; if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL) return (NULL); switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: return (c); } logit("Non-public channel %d, type %d.", id, c->type); return (NULL); } /* * Register filedescriptors for a channel, used when allocating a channel or * when the channel consumer/producer is ready, e.g. shell exec'd */ static void channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty) { /* Update the maximum file descriptor value. */ channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, rfd); channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, wfd); channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, efd); if (rfd != -1) fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd) fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd) fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); c->rfd = rfd; c->wfd = wfd; c->sock = (rfd == wfd) ? rfd : -1; c->efd = efd; c->extended_usage = extusage; if ((c->isatty = is_tty) != 0) debug2("channel %d: rfd %d isatty", c->self, c->rfd); #ifdef _AIX /* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */ c->wfd_isatty = is_tty || isatty(c->wfd); #endif /* enable nonblocking mode */ if (nonblock) { if (rfd != -1) set_nonblock(rfd); if (wfd != -1) set_nonblock(wfd); if (efd != -1) set_nonblock(efd); } } /* * Allocate a new channel object and set its type and socket. This will cause * remote_name to be freed. */ Channel * channel_new(char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, u_int window, u_int maxpack, int extusage, char *remote_name, int nonblock) { int found; u_int i; Channel *c; /* Do initial allocation if this is the first call. */ if (channels_alloc == 0) { channels_alloc = 10; channels = xcalloc(channels_alloc, sizeof(Channel *)); for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) channels[i] = NULL; } /* Try to find a free slot where to put the new channel. */ for (found = -1, i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) if (channels[i] == NULL) { /* Found a free slot. */ found = (int)i; break; } if (found < 0) { /* There are no free slots. Take last+1 slot and expand the array. */ found = channels_alloc; if (channels_alloc > 10000) fatal("channel_new: internal error: channels_alloc %d " "too big.", channels_alloc); - channels = xrealloc(channels, channels_alloc + 10, + channels = xreallocarray(channels, channels_alloc + 10, sizeof(Channel *)); channels_alloc += 10; debug2("channel: expanding %d", channels_alloc); for (i = found; i < channels_alloc; i++) channels[i] = NULL; } /* Initialize and return new channel. */ c = channels[found] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Channel)); buffer_init(&c->input); buffer_init(&c->output); buffer_init(&c->extended); c->path = NULL; c->listening_addr = NULL; c->listening_port = 0; c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN; c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_OPEN; c->flags = 0; channel_register_fds(c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, 0); c->notbefore = 0; c->self = found; c->type = type; c->ctype = ctype; c->local_window = window; c->local_window_max = window; c->local_consumed = 0; c->local_maxpacket = maxpack; c->remote_id = -1; c->remote_name = xstrdup(remote_name); c->remote_window = 0; c->remote_maxpacket = 0; c->force_drain = 0; c->single_connection = 0; c->detach_user = NULL; c->detach_close = 0; c->open_confirm = NULL; c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL; c->input_filter = NULL; c->output_filter = NULL; c->filter_ctx = NULL; c->filter_cleanup = NULL; c->ctl_chan = -1; c->mux_rcb = NULL; c->mux_ctx = NULL; c->mux_pause = 0; c->delayed = 1; /* prevent call to channel_post handler */ TAILQ_INIT(&c->status_confirms); debug("channel %d: new [%s]", found, remote_name); return c; } static int channel_find_maxfd(void) { u_int i; int max = 0; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { c = channels[i]; if (c != NULL) { max = MAX(max, c->rfd); max = MAX(max, c->wfd); max = MAX(max, c->efd); } } return max; } int channel_close_fd(int *fdp) { int ret = 0, fd = *fdp; if (fd != -1) { ret = close(fd); *fdp = -1; if (fd == channel_max_fd) channel_max_fd = channel_find_maxfd(); } return ret; } /* Close all channel fd/socket. */ static void channel_close_fds(Channel *c) { channel_close_fd(&c->sock); channel_close_fd(&c->rfd); channel_close_fd(&c->wfd); channel_close_fd(&c->efd); } /* Free the channel and close its fd/socket. */ void channel_free(Channel *c) { char *s; u_int i, n; struct channel_confirm *cc; for (n = 0, i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) if (channels[i]) n++; debug("channel %d: free: %s, nchannels %u", c->self, c->remote_name ? c->remote_name : "???", n); s = channel_open_message(); debug3("channel %d: status: %s", c->self, s); free(s); if (c->sock != -1) shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_RDWR); channel_close_fds(c); buffer_free(&c->input); buffer_free(&c->output); buffer_free(&c->extended); free(c->remote_name); c->remote_name = NULL; free(c->path); c->path = NULL; free(c->listening_addr); c->listening_addr = NULL; while ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) != NULL) { if (cc->abandon_cb != NULL) cc->abandon_cb(c, cc->ctx); TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry); explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc)); free(cc); } if (c->filter_cleanup != NULL && c->filter_ctx != NULL) c->filter_cleanup(c->self, c->filter_ctx); channels[c->self] = NULL; free(c); } void channel_free_all(void) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) if (channels[i] != NULL) channel_free(channels[i]); } /* * Closes the sockets/fds of all channels. This is used to close extra file * descriptors after a fork. */ void channel_close_all(void) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) if (channels[i] != NULL) channel_close_fds(channels[i]); } /* * Stop listening to channels. */ void channel_stop_listening(void) { u_int i; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { c = channels[i]; if (c != NULL) { switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: channel_close_fd(&c->sock); channel_free(c); break; } } } } /* * Returns true if no channel has too much buffered data, and false if one or * more channel is overfull. */ int channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(void) { u_int i; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { c = channels[i]; if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { #if 0 if (!compat20 && buffer_len(&c->input) > packet_get_maxsize()) { debug2("channel %d: big input buffer %d", c->self, buffer_len(&c->input)); return 0; } #endif if (buffer_len(&c->output) > packet_get_maxsize()) { debug2("channel %d: big output buffer %u > %u", c->self, buffer_len(&c->output), packet_get_maxsize()); return 0; } } } return 1; } /* Returns true if any channel is still open. */ int channel_still_open(void) { u_int i; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: if (!compat20) fatal("cannot happen: SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL"); continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT: return 1; case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING: if (!compat13) fatal("cannot happen: OUT_DRAIN"); return 1; default: fatal("channel_still_open: bad channel type %d", c->type); /* NOTREACHED */ } } return 0; } /* Returns the id of an open channel suitable for keepaliving */ int channel_find_open(void) { u_int i; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->remote_id < 0) continue; switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: return i; case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING: if (!compat13) fatal("cannot happen: OUT_DRAIN"); return i; default: fatal("channel_find_open: bad channel type %d", c->type); /* NOTREACHED */ } } return -1; } /* * Returns a message describing the currently open forwarded connections, * suitable for sending to the client. The message contains crlf pairs for * newlines. */ char * channel_open_message(void) { Buffer buffer; Channel *c; char buf[1024], *cp; u_int i; buffer_init(&buffer); snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "The following connections are open:\r\n"); buffer_append(&buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING: snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, " #%d %.300s (t%d r%d i%d/%d o%d/%d fd %d/%d cc %d)\r\n", c->self, c->remote_name, c->type, c->remote_id, c->istate, buffer_len(&c->input), c->ostate, buffer_len(&c->output), c->rfd, c->wfd, c->ctl_chan); buffer_append(&buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); continue; default: fatal("channel_open_message: bad channel type %d", c->type); /* NOTREACHED */ } } buffer_append(&buffer, "\0", 1); cp = xstrdup((char *)buffer_ptr(&buffer)); buffer_free(&buffer); return cp; } void channel_send_open(int id) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_send_open: %d: bad id", id); return; } debug2("channel %d: send open", id); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN); packet_put_cstring(c->ctype); packet_put_int(c->self); packet_put_int(c->local_window); packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); packet_send(); } void channel_request_start(int id, char *service, int wantconfirm) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_request_start: %d: unknown channel id", id); return; } debug2("channel %d: request %s confirm %d", id, service, wantconfirm); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_cstring(service); packet_put_char(wantconfirm); } void channel_register_status_confirm(int id, channel_confirm_cb *cb, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb, void *ctx) { struct channel_confirm *cc; Channel *c; if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) fatal("channel_register_expect: %d: bad id", id); cc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cc)); cc->cb = cb; cc->abandon_cb = abandon_cb; cc->ctx = ctx; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry); } void channel_register_open_confirm(int id, channel_open_fn *fn, void *ctx) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_register_open_confirm: %d: bad id", id); return; } c->open_confirm = fn; c->open_confirm_ctx = ctx; } void channel_register_cleanup(int id, channel_callback_fn *fn, int do_close) { Channel *c = channel_by_id(id); if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_register_cleanup: %d: bad id", id); return; } c->detach_user = fn; c->detach_close = do_close; } void channel_cancel_cleanup(int id) { Channel *c = channel_by_id(id); if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_cancel_cleanup: %d: bad id", id); return; } c->detach_user = NULL; c->detach_close = 0; } void channel_register_filter(int id, channel_infilter_fn *ifn, channel_outfilter_fn *ofn, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *cfn, void *ctx) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_register_filter: %d: bad id", id); return; } c->input_filter = ifn; c->output_filter = ofn; c->filter_ctx = ctx; c->filter_cleanup = cfn; } void channel_set_fds(int id, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty, u_int window_max) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) fatal("channel_activate for non-larval channel %d.", id); channel_register_fds(c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, is_tty); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; c->local_window = c->local_window_max = window_max; packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_int(c->local_window); packet_send(); } /* * 'channel_pre*' are called just before select() to add any bits relevant to * channels in the select bitmasks. */ /* * 'channel_post*': perform any appropriate operations for channels which * have events pending. */ typedef void chan_fn(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset); chan_fn *channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE]; chan_fn *channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE]; /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_pre_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { FD_SET(c->sock, readset); } /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_pre_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { debug3("channel %d: waiting for connection", c->self); FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); } static void channel_pre_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { if (buffer_len(&c->input) < packet_get_maxsize()) FD_SET(c->sock, readset); if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); } static void channel_pre_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { u_int limit = compat20 ? c->remote_window : packet_get_maxsize(); if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && limit > 0 && buffer_len(&c->input) < limit && buffer_check_alloc(&c->input, CHAN_RBUF)) FD_SET(c->rfd, readset); if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN || c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) { FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset); } else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { if (CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c)) debug2("channel %d: obuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%d)", c->self, c->efd, buffer_len(&c->extended)); else chan_obuf_empty(c); } } /** XXX check close conditions, too */ if (compat20 && c->efd != -1 && !(c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED && c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)) { if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0) FD_SET(c->efd, writeset); else if (c->efd != -1 && !(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) && (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ || c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) && buffer_len(&c->extended) < c->remote_window) FD_SET(c->efd, readset); } /* XXX: What about efd? races? */ } /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_pre_input_draining(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { if (buffer_len(&c->input) == 0) { packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_send(); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED; debug2("channel %d: closing after input drain.", c->self); } } /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_pre_output_draining(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { if (buffer_len(&c->output) == 0) chan_mark_dead(c); else FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); } /* * This is a special state for X11 authentication spoofing. An opened X11 * connection (when authentication spoofing is being done) remains in this * state until the first packet has been completely read. The authentication * data in that packet is then substituted by the real data if it matches the * fake data, and the channel is put into normal mode. * XXX All this happens at the client side. * Returns: 0 = need more data, -1 = wrong cookie, 1 = ok */ static int x11_open_helper(Buffer *b) { u_char *ucp; u_int proto_len, data_len; + /* Is this being called after the refusal deadline? */ + if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) { + verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout " + "expired"); + return -1; + } + /* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ if (buffer_len(b) < 12) return 0; /* Parse the lengths of variable-length fields. */ ucp = buffer_ptr(b); if (ucp[0] == 0x42) { /* Byte order MSB first. */ proto_len = 256 * ucp[6] + ucp[7]; data_len = 256 * ucp[8] + ucp[9]; } else if (ucp[0] == 0x6c) { /* Byte order LSB first. */ proto_len = ucp[6] + 256 * ucp[7]; data_len = ucp[8] + 256 * ucp[9]; } else { debug2("Initial X11 packet contains bad byte order byte: 0x%x", ucp[0]); return -1; } /* Check if the whole packet is in buffer. */ if (buffer_len(b) < 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3) + ((data_len + 3) & ~3)) return 0; /* Check if authentication protocol matches. */ if (proto_len != strlen(x11_saved_proto) || memcmp(ucp + 12, x11_saved_proto, proto_len) != 0) { debug2("X11 connection uses different authentication protocol."); return -1; } /* Check if authentication data matches our fake data. */ if (data_len != x11_fake_data_len || timingsafe_bcmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3), x11_fake_data, x11_fake_data_len) != 0) { debug2("X11 auth data does not match fake data."); return -1; } /* Check fake data length */ if (x11_fake_data_len != x11_saved_data_len) { error("X11 fake_data_len %d != saved_data_len %d", x11_fake_data_len, x11_saved_data_len); return -1; } /* * Received authentication protocol and data match * our fake data. Substitute the fake data with real * data. */ memcpy(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3), x11_saved_data, x11_saved_data_len); return 1; } static void channel_pre_x11_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { int ret = x11_open_helper(&c->output); if (ret == 1) { /* Start normal processing for the channel. */ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; channel_pre_open_13(c, readset, writeset); } else if (ret == -1) { /* * We have received an X11 connection that has bad * authentication information. */ logit("X11 connection rejected because of wrong authentication."); buffer_clear(&c->input); buffer_clear(&c->output); channel_close_fd(&c->sock); c->sock = -1; c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED; packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_send(); } } static void channel_pre_x11_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { int ret = x11_open_helper(&c->output); /* c->force_drain = 1; */ if (ret == 1) { c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; channel_pre_open(c, readset, writeset); } else if (ret == -1) { logit("X11 connection rejected because of wrong authentication."); debug2("X11 rejected %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate); chan_read_failed(c); buffer_clear(&c->input); chan_ibuf_empty(c); buffer_clear(&c->output); /* for proto v1, the peer will send an IEOF */ if (compat20) chan_write_failed(c); else c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; debug2("X11 closed %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate); } } static void channel_pre_mux_client(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && !c->mux_pause && buffer_check_alloc(&c->input, CHAN_RBUF)) FD_SET(c->rfd, readset); if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { /* clear buffer immediately (discard any partial packet) */ buffer_clear(&c->input); chan_ibuf_empty(c); /* Start output drain. XXX just kill chan? */ chan_rcvd_oclose(c); } if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN || c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset); else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) chan_obuf_empty(c); } } /* try to decode a socks4 header */ /* ARGSUSED */ static int channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { char *p, *host; u_int len, have, i, found, need; char username[256]; struct { u_int8_t version; u_int8_t command; u_int16_t dest_port; struct in_addr dest_addr; } s4_req, s4_rsp; debug2("channel %d: decode socks4", c->self); have = buffer_len(&c->input); len = sizeof(s4_req); if (have < len) return 0; p = (char *)buffer_ptr(&c->input); need = 1; /* SOCKS4A uses an invalid IP address 0.0.0.x */ if (p[4] == 0 && p[5] == 0 && p[6] == 0 && p[7] != 0) { debug2("channel %d: socks4a request", c->self); /* ... and needs an extra string (the hostname) */ need = 2; } /* Check for terminating NUL on the string(s) */ for (found = 0, i = len; i < have; i++) { if (p[i] == '\0') { found++; if (found == need) break; } if (i > 1024) { /* the peer is probably sending garbage */ debug("channel %d: decode socks4: too long", c->self); return -1; } } if (found < need) return 0; buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.version, 1); buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.command, 1); buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.dest_port, 2); buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.dest_addr, 4); have = buffer_len(&c->input); p = (char *)buffer_ptr(&c->input); if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL) fatal("channel %d: decode socks4: user not nul terminated", c->self); len = strlen(p); debug2("channel %d: decode socks4: user %s/%d", c->self, p, len); len++; /* trailing '\0' */ if (len > have) fatal("channel %d: decode socks4: len %d > have %d", c->self, len, have); strlcpy(username, p, sizeof(username)); buffer_consume(&c->input, len); free(c->path); c->path = NULL; if (need == 1) { /* SOCKS4: one string */ host = inet_ntoa(s4_req.dest_addr); c->path = xstrdup(host); } else { /* SOCKS4A: two strings */ have = buffer_len(&c->input); p = (char *)buffer_ptr(&c->input); len = strlen(p); debug2("channel %d: decode socks4a: host %s/%d", c->self, p, len); len++; /* trailing '\0' */ if (len > have) fatal("channel %d: decode socks4a: len %d > have %d", c->self, len, have); if (len > NI_MAXHOST) { error("channel %d: hostname \"%.100s\" too long", c->self, p); return -1; } c->path = xstrdup(p); buffer_consume(&c->input, len); } c->host_port = ntohs(s4_req.dest_port); debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks4 host %s port %u command %u", c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s4_req.command); if (s4_req.command != 1) { debug("channel %d: cannot handle: %s cn %d", c->self, need == 1 ? "SOCKS4" : "SOCKS4A", s4_req.command); return -1; } s4_rsp.version = 0; /* vn: 0 for reply */ s4_rsp.command = 90; /* cd: req granted */ s4_rsp.dest_port = 0; /* ignored */ s4_rsp.dest_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; /* ignored */ buffer_append(&c->output, &s4_rsp, sizeof(s4_rsp)); return 1; } /* try to decode a socks5 header */ #define SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE 0x1000 #define SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH 0x00 #define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4 0x01 #define SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN 0x03 #define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6 0x04 #define SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT 0x01 #define SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS 0x00 /* ARGSUSED */ static int channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { struct { u_int8_t version; u_int8_t command; u_int8_t reserved; u_int8_t atyp; } s5_req, s5_rsp; u_int16_t dest_port; char dest_addr[255+1], ntop[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN]; u_char *p; u_int have, need, i, found, nmethods, addrlen, af; debug2("channel %d: decode socks5", c->self); p = buffer_ptr(&c->input); if (p[0] != 0x05) return -1; have = buffer_len(&c->input); if (!(c->flags & SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE)) { /* format: ver | nmethods | methods */ if (have < 2) return 0; nmethods = p[1]; if (have < nmethods + 2) return 0; /* look for method: "NO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED" */ for (found = 0, i = 2; i < nmethods + 2; i++) { if (p[i] == SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH) { found = 1; break; } } if (!found) { debug("channel %d: method SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH not found", c->self); return -1; } buffer_consume(&c->input, nmethods + 2); buffer_put_char(&c->output, 0x05); /* version */ buffer_put_char(&c->output, SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH); /* method */ FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); c->flags |= SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE; debug2("channel %d: socks5 auth done", c->self); return 0; /* need more */ } debug2("channel %d: socks5 post auth", c->self); if (have < sizeof(s5_req)+1) return 0; /* need more */ memcpy(&s5_req, p, sizeof(s5_req)); if (s5_req.version != 0x05 || s5_req.command != SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT || s5_req.reserved != 0x00) { debug2("channel %d: only socks5 connect supported", c->self); return -1; } switch (s5_req.atyp){ case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4: addrlen = 4; af = AF_INET; break; case SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN: addrlen = p[sizeof(s5_req)]; af = -1; break; case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6: addrlen = 16; af = AF_INET6; break; default: debug2("channel %d: bad socks5 atyp %d", c->self, s5_req.atyp); return -1; } need = sizeof(s5_req) + addrlen + 2; if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) need++; if (have < need) return 0; buffer_consume(&c->input, sizeof(s5_req)); if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) buffer_consume(&c->input, 1); /* host string length */ buffer_get(&c->input, &dest_addr, addrlen); buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&dest_port, 2); dest_addr[addrlen] = '\0'; free(c->path); c->path = NULL; if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) { if (addrlen >= NI_MAXHOST) { error("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 hostname " "\"%.100s\" too long", c->self, dest_addr); return -1; } c->path = xstrdup(dest_addr); } else { if (inet_ntop(af, dest_addr, ntop, sizeof(ntop)) == NULL) return -1; c->path = xstrdup(ntop); } c->host_port = ntohs(dest_port); debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 host %s port %u command %u", c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s5_req.command); s5_rsp.version = 0x05; s5_rsp.command = SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS; s5_rsp.reserved = 0; /* ignored */ s5_rsp.atyp = SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4; dest_port = 0; /* ignored */ buffer_append(&c->output, &s5_rsp, sizeof(s5_rsp)); buffer_put_int(&c->output, ntohl(INADDR_ANY)); /* bind address */ buffer_append(&c->output, &dest_port, sizeof(dest_port)); return 1; } Channel * channel_connect_stdio_fwd(const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int in, int out) { Channel *c; debug("channel_connect_stdio_fwd %s:%d", host_to_connect, port_to_connect); c = channel_new("stdio-forward", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "stdio-forward", /*nonblock*/0); c->path = xstrdup(host_to_connect); c->host_port = port_to_connect; c->listening_port = 0; c->force_drain = 1; channel_register_fds(c, in, out, -1, 0, 1, 0); port_open_helper(c, "direct-tcpip"); return c; } /* dynamic port forwarding */ static void channel_pre_dynamic(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { u_char *p; u_int have; int ret; have = buffer_len(&c->input); debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: have %d", c->self, have); /* buffer_dump(&c->input); */ /* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ if (have < 3) { /* need more */ FD_SET(c->sock, readset); return; } /* try to guess the protocol */ p = buffer_ptr(&c->input); switch (p[0]) { case 0x04: ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, readset, writeset); break; case 0x05: ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, readset, writeset); break; default: ret = -1; break; } if (ret < 0) { chan_mark_dead(c); } else if (ret == 0) { debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: need more", c->self); /* need more */ FD_SET(c->sock, readset); } else { /* switch to the next state */ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; port_open_helper(c, "direct-tcpip"); } } /* This is our fake X11 server socket. */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_post_x11_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { Channel *nc; struct sockaddr_storage addr; int newsock, oerrno; socklen_t addrlen; char buf[16384], *remote_ipaddr; int remote_port; if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) { debug("X11 connection requested."); addrlen = sizeof(addr); newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); if (c->single_connection) { oerrno = errno; debug2("single_connection: closing X11 listener."); channel_close_fd(&c->sock); chan_mark_dead(c); errno = oerrno; } if (newsock < 0) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && errno != ECONNABORTED) error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; return; } set_nodelay(newsock); remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(newsock); remote_port = get_peer_port(newsock); snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "X11 connection from %.200s port %d", remote_ipaddr, remote_port); nc = channel_new("accepted x11 socket", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, buf, 1); if (compat20) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN); packet_put_cstring("x11"); packet_put_int(nc->self); packet_put_int(nc->local_window_max); packet_put_int(nc->local_maxpacket); /* originator ipaddr and port */ packet_put_cstring(remote_ipaddr); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_X11FWD) { debug2("ssh2 x11 bug compat mode"); } else { packet_put_int(remote_port); } packet_send(); } else { packet_start(SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN); packet_put_int(nc->self); if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) packet_put_cstring(buf); packet_send(); } free(remote_ipaddr); } } static void port_open_helper(Channel *c, char *rtype) { char buf[1024]; char *local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(c->sock); int local_port = c->sock == -1 ? 65536 : get_sock_port(c->sock, 1); char *remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(c->sock); int remote_port = get_peer_port(c->sock); if (remote_port == -1) { /* Fake addr/port to appease peers that validate it (Tectia) */ free(remote_ipaddr); remote_ipaddr = xstrdup("127.0.0.1"); remote_port = 65535; } snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s: listening port %d for %.100s port %d, " "connect from %.200s port %d to %.100s port %d", rtype, c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port, remote_ipaddr, remote_port, local_ipaddr, local_port); free(c->remote_name); c->remote_name = xstrdup(buf); if (compat20) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN); packet_put_cstring(rtype); packet_put_int(c->self); packet_put_int(c->local_window_max); packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) { /* target host, port */ packet_put_cstring(c->path); packet_put_int(c->host_port); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { /* target path */ packet_put_cstring(c->path); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { /* listen path */ packet_put_cstring(c->path); } else { /* listen address, port */ packet_put_cstring(c->path); packet_put_int(local_port); } if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { /* reserved for future owner/mode info */ packet_put_cstring(""); } else { /* originator host and port */ packet_put_cstring(remote_ipaddr); packet_put_int((u_int)remote_port); } packet_send(); } else { packet_start(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN); packet_put_int(c->self); packet_put_cstring(c->path); packet_put_int(c->host_port); if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) packet_put_cstring(c->remote_name); packet_send(); } free(remote_ipaddr); free(local_ipaddr); } static void channel_set_reuseaddr(int fd) { int on = 1; /* * Set socket options. * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT. */ if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR fd %d: %s", fd, strerror(errno)); } +void +channel_set_x11_refuse_time(u_int refuse_time) +{ + x11_refuse_time = refuse_time; +} + /* * This socket is listening for connections to a forwarded TCP/IP port. */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_post_port_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { Channel *nc; struct sockaddr_storage addr; int newsock, nextstate; socklen_t addrlen; char *rtype; if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) { debug("Connection to port %d forwarding " "to %.100s port %d requested.", c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port); if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; rtype = "forwarded-tcpip"; } else if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER) { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; rtype = "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com"; } else if (c->host_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; rtype = "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com"; } else if (c->host_port == 0) { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC; rtype = "dynamic-tcpip"; } else { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; rtype = "direct-tcpip"; } addrlen = sizeof(addr); newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); if (newsock < 0) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && errno != ECONNABORTED) error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; return; } if (c->host_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL) set_nodelay(newsock); nc = channel_new(rtype, nextstate, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, rtype, 1); nc->listening_port = c->listening_port; nc->host_port = c->host_port; if (c->path != NULL) nc->path = xstrdup(c->path); if (nextstate != SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC) port_open_helper(nc, rtype); } } /* * This is the authentication agent socket listening for connections from * clients. */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_post_auth_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { Channel *nc; int newsock; struct sockaddr_storage addr; socklen_t addrlen; if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) { addrlen = sizeof(addr); newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); if (newsock < 0) { error("accept from auth socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; return; } nc = channel_new("accepted auth socket", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, "accepted auth socket", 1); if (compat20) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN); packet_put_cstring("auth-agent@openssh.com"); packet_put_int(nc->self); packet_put_int(c->local_window_max); packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); } else { packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN); packet_put_int(nc->self); } packet_send(); } } /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_post_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { int err = 0, sock; socklen_t sz = sizeof(err); if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset)) { if (getsockopt(c->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &err, &sz) < 0) { err = errno; error("getsockopt SO_ERROR failed"); } if (err == 0) { debug("channel %d: connected to %s port %d", c->self, c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port); channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; if (compat20) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_int(c->self); packet_put_int(c->local_window); packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); } else { packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_int(c->self); } } else { debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s", c->self, strerror(err)); /* Try next address, if any */ if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) { close(c->sock); c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock; channel_max_fd = channel_find_maxfd(); return; } /* Exhausted all addresses */ error("connect_to %.100s port %d: failed.", c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port); channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx); if (compat20) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED); if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) { packet_put_cstring(strerror(err)); packet_put_cstring(""); } } else { packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); } chan_mark_dead(c); } packet_send(); } } /* ARGSUSED */ static int channel_handle_rfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { char buf[CHAN_RBUF]; int len, force; force = c->isatty && c->detach_close && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED; if (c->rfd != -1 && (force || FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset))) { errno = 0; len = read(c->rfd, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !force))) return 1; #ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD if (len <= 0) { #else if ((!c->isatty && len <= 0) || (c->isatty && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) { #endif debug2("channel %d: read<=0 rfd %d len %d", c->self, c->rfd, len); if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self); chan_mark_dead(c); return -1; } else if (compat13) { buffer_clear(&c->output); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING; debug2("channel %d: input draining.", c->self); } else { chan_read_failed(c); } return -1; } if (c->input_filter != NULL) { if (c->input_filter(c, buf, len) == -1) { debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self); chan_read_failed(c); } } else if (c->datagram) { buffer_put_string(&c->input, buf, len); } else { buffer_append(&c->input, buf, len); } } return 1; } /* ARGSUSED */ static int channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { struct termios tio; u_char *data = NULL, *buf; u_int dlen, olen = 0; int len; /* Send buffered output data to the socket. */ if (c->wfd != -1 && FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) && buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) { olen = buffer_len(&c->output); if (c->output_filter != NULL) { if ((buf = c->output_filter(c, &data, &dlen)) == NULL) { debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self); if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) chan_mark_dead(c); else chan_write_failed(c); return -1; } } else if (c->datagram) { buf = data = buffer_get_string(&c->output, &dlen); } else { buf = data = buffer_ptr(&c->output); dlen = buffer_len(&c->output); } if (c->datagram) { /* ignore truncated writes, datagrams might get lost */ len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen); free(data); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) return 1; if (len <= 0) { if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) chan_mark_dead(c); else chan_write_failed(c); return -1; } goto out; } #ifdef _AIX /* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */ if (compat20 && c->wfd_isatty) dlen = MIN(dlen, 8*1024); #endif len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) return 1; if (len <= 0) { if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self); chan_mark_dead(c); return -1; } else if (compat13) { buffer_clear(&c->output); debug2("channel %d: input draining.", c->self); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING; } else { chan_write_failed(c); } return -1; } #ifndef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON if (compat20 && c->isatty && dlen >= 1 && buf[0] != '\r') { if (tcgetattr(c->wfd, &tio) == 0 && !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) { /* * Simulate echo to reduce the impact of * traffic analysis. We need to match the * size of a SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA message * (4 byte channel id + buf) */ packet_send_ignore(4 + len); packet_send(); } } #endif buffer_consume(&c->output, len); } out: if (compat20 && olen > 0) c->local_consumed += olen - buffer_len(&c->output); return 1; } static int channel_handle_efd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { char buf[CHAN_RBUF]; int len; /** XXX handle drain efd, too */ if (c->efd != -1) { if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && FD_ISSET(c->efd, writeset) && buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0) { len = write(c->efd, buffer_ptr(&c->extended), buffer_len(&c->extended)); debug2("channel %d: written %d to efd %d", c->self, len, c->efd); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) return 1; if (len <= 0) { debug2("channel %d: closing write-efd %d", c->self, c->efd); channel_close_fd(&c->efd); } else { buffer_consume(&c->extended, len); c->local_consumed += len; } } else if (c->efd != -1 && (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ || c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) && (c->detach_close || FD_ISSET(c->efd, readset))) { len = read(c->efd, buf, sizeof(buf)); debug2("channel %d: read %d from efd %d", c->self, len, c->efd); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !c->detach_close))) return 1; if (len <= 0) { debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d", c->self, c->efd); channel_close_fd(&c->efd); } else { if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) { debug3("channel %d: discard efd", c->self); } else buffer_append(&c->extended, buf, len); } } } return 1; } static int channel_check_window(Channel *c) { if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && !(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) && ((c->local_window_max - c->local_window > c->local_maxpacket*3) || c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) && c->local_consumed > 0) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_int(c->local_consumed); packet_send(); debug2("channel %d: window %d sent adjust %d", c->self, c->local_window, c->local_consumed); c->local_window += c->local_consumed; c->local_consumed = 0; } return 1; } static void channel_post_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { channel_handle_rfd(c, readset, writeset); channel_handle_wfd(c, readset, writeset); if (!compat20) return; channel_handle_efd(c, readset, writeset); channel_check_window(c); } static u_int read_mux(Channel *c, u_int need) { char buf[CHAN_RBUF]; int len; u_int rlen; if (buffer_len(&c->input) < need) { rlen = need - buffer_len(&c->input); len = read(c->rfd, buf, MIN(rlen, CHAN_RBUF)); if (len <= 0) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN) { debug2("channel %d: ctl read<=0 rfd %d len %d", c->self, c->rfd, len); chan_read_failed(c); return 0; } } else buffer_append(&c->input, buf, len); } return buffer_len(&c->input); } static void channel_post_mux_client(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { u_int need; ssize_t len; if (!compat20) fatal("%s: entered with !compat20", __func__); if (c->rfd != -1 && !c->mux_pause && FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset) && (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN || c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN)) { /* * Don't not read past the precise end of packets to * avoid disrupting fd passing. */ if (read_mux(c, 4) < 4) /* read header */ return; need = get_u32(buffer_ptr(&c->input)); #define CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET (256 * 1024) if (need > CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET) { debug2("channel %d: packet too big %u > %u", c->self, CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET, need); chan_rcvd_oclose(c); return; } if (read_mux(c, need + 4) < need + 4) /* read body */ return; if (c->mux_rcb(c) != 0) { debug("channel %d: mux_rcb failed", c->self); chan_mark_dead(c); return; } } if (c->wfd != -1 && FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) && buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) { len = write(c->wfd, buffer_ptr(&c->output), buffer_len(&c->output)); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) return; if (len <= 0) { chan_mark_dead(c); return; } buffer_consume(&c->output, len); } } static void channel_post_mux_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { Channel *nc; struct sockaddr_storage addr; socklen_t addrlen; int newsock; uid_t euid; gid_t egid; if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) return; debug("multiplexing control connection"); /* * Accept connection on control socket */ memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addrlen = sizeof(addr); if ((newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, &addrlen)) == -1) { error("%s accept: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; return; } if (getpeereid(newsock, &euid, &egid) < 0) { error("%s getpeereid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(newsock); return; } if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) { error("multiplex uid mismatch: peer euid %u != uid %u", (u_int)euid, (u_int)getuid()); close(newsock); return; } nc = channel_new("multiplex client", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, "mux-control", 1); nc->mux_rcb = c->mux_rcb; debug3("%s: new mux channel %d fd %d", __func__, nc->self, nc->sock); /* establish state */ nc->mux_rcb(nc); /* mux state transitions must not elicit protocol messages */ nc->flags |= CHAN_LOCAL; } /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_post_output_drain_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { int len; /* Send buffered output data to the socket. */ if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset) && buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) { len = write(c->sock, buffer_ptr(&c->output), buffer_len(&c->output)); if (len <= 0) buffer_clear(&c->output); else buffer_consume(&c->output, len); } } static void channel_handler_init_20(void) { channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_pre_mux_client; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_mux_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_post_mux_client; } static void channel_handler_init_13(void) { channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open_13; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open_13; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING] = &channel_pre_input_draining; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING] = &channel_pre_output_draining; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING] = &channel_post_output_drain_13; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open; } static void channel_handler_init_15(void) { channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open; } static void channel_handler_init(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE; i++) { channel_pre[i] = NULL; channel_post[i] = NULL; } if (compat20) channel_handler_init_20(); else if (compat13) channel_handler_init_13(); else channel_handler_init_15(); } /* gc dead channels */ static void channel_garbage_collect(Channel *c) { if (c == NULL) return; if (c->detach_user != NULL) { if (!chan_is_dead(c, c->detach_close)) return; debug2("channel %d: gc: notify user", c->self); c->detach_user(c->self, NULL); /* if we still have a callback */ if (c->detach_user != NULL) return; debug2("channel %d: gc: user detached", c->self); } if (!chan_is_dead(c, 1)) return; debug2("channel %d: garbage collecting", c->self); channel_free(c); } static void channel_handler(chan_fn *ftab[], fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset, time_t *unpause_secs) { static int did_init = 0; u_int i, oalloc; Channel *c; time_t now; if (!did_init) { channel_handler_init(); did_init = 1; } now = monotime(); if (unpause_secs != NULL) *unpause_secs = 0; for (i = 0, oalloc = channels_alloc; i < oalloc; i++) { c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; if (c->delayed) { if (ftab == channel_pre) c->delayed = 0; else continue; } if (ftab[c->type] != NULL) { /* * Run handlers that are not paused. */ if (c->notbefore <= now) (*ftab[c->type])(c, readset, writeset); else if (unpause_secs != NULL) { /* * Collect the time that the earliest * channel comes off pause. */ debug3("%s: chan %d: skip for %d more seconds", __func__, c->self, (int)(c->notbefore - now)); if (*unpause_secs == 0 || (c->notbefore - now) < *unpause_secs) *unpause_secs = c->notbefore - now; } } channel_garbage_collect(c); } if (unpause_secs != NULL && *unpause_secs != 0) debug3("%s: first channel unpauses in %d seconds", __func__, (int)*unpause_secs); } /* * Allocate/update select bitmasks and add any bits relevant to channels in * select bitmasks. */ void channel_prepare_select(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, time_t *minwait_secs, int rekeying) { u_int n, sz, nfdset; n = MAX(*maxfdp, channel_max_fd); nfdset = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS); /* Explicitly test here, because xrealloc isn't always called */ if (nfdset && SIZE_MAX / nfdset < sizeof(fd_mask)) fatal("channel_prepare_select: max_fd (%d) is too large", n); sz = nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask); /* perhaps check sz < nalloc/2 and shrink? */ if (*readsetp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) { - *readsetp = xrealloc(*readsetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); - *writesetp = xrealloc(*writesetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); + *readsetp = xreallocarray(*readsetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); + *writesetp = xreallocarray(*writesetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); *nallocp = sz; } *maxfdp = n; memset(*readsetp, 0, sz); memset(*writesetp, 0, sz); if (!rekeying) channel_handler(channel_pre, *readsetp, *writesetp, minwait_secs); } /* * After select, perform any appropriate operations for channels which have * events pending. */ void channel_after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { channel_handler(channel_post, readset, writeset, NULL); } /* If there is data to send to the connection, enqueue some of it now. */ void channel_output_poll(void) { Channel *c; u_int i, len; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; /* * We are only interested in channels that can have buffered * incoming data. */ if (compat13) { if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING) continue; } else { if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) continue; } if (compat20 && (c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD))) { /* XXX is this true? */ debug3("channel %d: will not send data after close", c->self); continue; } /* Get the amount of buffered data for this channel. */ if ((c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN || c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) && (len = buffer_len(&c->input)) > 0) { if (c->datagram) { if (len > 0) { u_char *data; u_int dlen; data = buffer_get_string(&c->input, &dlen); if (dlen > c->remote_window || dlen > c->remote_maxpacket) { debug("channel %d: datagram " "too big for channel", c->self); free(data); continue; } packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_string(data, dlen); packet_send(); - c->remote_window -= dlen + 4; + c->remote_window -= dlen; free(data); } continue; } /* * Send some data for the other side over the secure * connection. */ if (compat20) { if (len > c->remote_window) len = c->remote_window; if (len > c->remote_maxpacket) len = c->remote_maxpacket; } else { if (packet_is_interactive()) { if (len > 1024) len = 512; } else { /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */ if (len > packet_get_maxsize()/2) len = packet_get_maxsize()/2; } } if (len > 0) { packet_start(compat20 ? SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA : SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&c->input), len); packet_send(); buffer_consume(&c->input, len); c->remote_window -= len; } } else if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { if (compat13) fatal("cannot happen: istate == INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN for proto 1.3"); /* * input-buffer is empty and read-socket shutdown: * tell peer, that we will not send more data: send IEOF. * hack for extended data: delay EOF if EFD still in use. */ if (CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c)) debug2("channel %d: ibuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%d)", c->self, c->efd, buffer_len(&c->extended)); else chan_ibuf_empty(c); } /* Send extended data, i.e. stderr */ if (compat20 && !(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) && c->remote_window > 0 && (len = buffer_len(&c->extended)) > 0 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ) { debug2("channel %d: rwin %u elen %u euse %d", c->self, c->remote_window, buffer_len(&c->extended), c->extended_usage); if (len > c->remote_window) len = c->remote_window; if (len > c->remote_maxpacket) len = c->remote_maxpacket; packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_int(SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR); packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&c->extended), len); packet_send(); buffer_consume(&c->extended, len); c->remote_window -= len; debug2("channel %d: sent ext data %d", c->self, len); } } } /* -- protocol input */ /* ARGSUSED */ int channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int id; const u_char *data; u_int data_len, win_len; Channel *c; /* Get the channel number and verify it. */ id = packet_get_int(); c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) packet_disconnect("Received data for nonexistent channel %d.", id); /* Ignore any data for non-open channels (might happen on close) */ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN) return 0; /* Get the data. */ data = packet_get_string_ptr(&data_len); win_len = data_len; if (c->datagram) win_len += 4; /* string length header */ /* * Ignore data for protocol > 1.3 if output end is no longer open. * For protocol 2 the sending side is reducing its window as it sends * data, so we must 'fake' consumption of the data in order to ensure * that window updates are sent back. Otherwise the connection might * deadlock. */ if (!compat13 && c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) { if (compat20) { c->local_window -= win_len; c->local_consumed += win_len; } return 0; } if (compat20) { if (win_len > c->local_maxpacket) { logit("channel %d: rcvd big packet %d, maxpack %d", c->self, win_len, c->local_maxpacket); } if (win_len > c->local_window) { logit("channel %d: rcvd too much data %d, win %d", c->self, win_len, c->local_window); return 0; } c->local_window -= win_len; } if (c->datagram) buffer_put_string(&c->output, data, data_len); else buffer_append(&c->output, data, data_len); packet_check_eom(); return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int id; char *data; u_int data_len, tcode; Channel *c; /* Get the channel number and verify it. */ id = packet_get_int(); c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) packet_disconnect("Received extended_data for bad channel %d.", id); if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { logit("channel %d: ext data for non open", id); return 0; } if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) { if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF) debug("channel %d: accepting ext data after eof", id); else packet_disconnect("Received extended_data after EOF " "on channel %d.", id); } tcode = packet_get_int(); if (c->efd == -1 || c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE || tcode != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR) { logit("channel %d: bad ext data", c->self); return 0; } data = packet_get_string(&data_len); packet_check_eom(); if (data_len > c->local_window) { logit("channel %d: rcvd too much extended_data %d, win %d", c->self, data_len, c->local_window); free(data); return 0; } debug2("channel %d: rcvd ext data %d", c->self, data_len); c->local_window -= data_len; buffer_append(&c->extended, data, data_len); free(data); return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int channel_input_ieof(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int id; Channel *c; id = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) packet_disconnect("Received ieof for nonexistent channel %d.", id); chan_rcvd_ieof(c); /* XXX force input close */ if (c->force_drain && c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) { debug("channel %d: FORCE input drain", c->self); c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN; if (buffer_len(&c->input) == 0) chan_ibuf_empty(c); } return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int channel_input_close(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int id; Channel *c; id = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) packet_disconnect("Received close for nonexistent channel %d.", id); /* * Send a confirmation that we have closed the channel and no more * data is coming for it. */ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_send(); /* * If the channel is in closed state, we have sent a close request, * and the other side will eventually respond with a confirmation. * Thus, we cannot free the channel here, because then there would be * no-one to receive the confirmation. The channel gets freed when * the confirmation arrives. */ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED) { /* * Not a closed channel - mark it as draining, which will * cause it to be freed later. */ buffer_clear(&c->input); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING; } return 0; } /* proto version 1.5 overloads CLOSE_CONFIRMATION with OCLOSE */ /* ARGSUSED */ int channel_input_oclose(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int id = packet_get_int(); Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); packet_check_eom(); if (c == NULL) packet_disconnect("Received oclose for nonexistent channel %d.", id); chan_rcvd_oclose(c); return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int channel_input_close_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int id = packet_get_int(); Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); packet_check_eom(); if (c == NULL) packet_disconnect("Received close confirmation for " "out-of-range channel %d.", id); if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED) packet_disconnect("Received close confirmation for " "non-closed channel %d (type %d).", id, c->type); channel_free(c); return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int channel_input_open_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int id, remote_id; Channel *c; id = packet_get_int(); c = channel_lookup(id); if (c==NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) packet_disconnect("Received open confirmation for " "non-opening channel %d.", id); remote_id = packet_get_int(); /* Record the remote channel number and mark that the channel is now open. */ c->remote_id = remote_id; c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; if (compat20) { c->remote_window = packet_get_int(); c->remote_maxpacket = packet_get_int(); if (c->open_confirm) { debug2("callback start"); c->open_confirm(c->self, 1, c->open_confirm_ctx); debug2("callback done"); } debug2("channel %d: open confirm rwindow %u rmax %u", c->self, c->remote_window, c->remote_maxpacket); } packet_check_eom(); return 0; } static char * reason2txt(int reason) { switch (reason) { case SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED: return "administratively prohibited"; case SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED: return "connect failed"; case SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE: return "unknown channel type"; case SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE: return "resource shortage"; } return "unknown reason"; } /* ARGSUSED */ int channel_input_open_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int id, reason; char *msg = NULL, *lang = NULL; Channel *c; id = packet_get_int(); c = channel_lookup(id); if (c==NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) packet_disconnect("Received open failure for " "non-opening channel %d.", id); if (compat20) { reason = packet_get_int(); if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) { msg = packet_get_string(NULL); lang = packet_get_string(NULL); } logit("channel %d: open failed: %s%s%s", id, reason2txt(reason), msg ? ": ": "", msg ? msg : ""); free(msg); free(lang); if (c->open_confirm) { debug2("callback start"); c->open_confirm(c->self, 0, c->open_confirm_ctx); debug2("callback done"); } } packet_check_eom(); /* Schedule the channel for cleanup/deletion. */ chan_mark_dead(c); return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c; int id; - u_int adjust; + u_int adjust, tmp; if (!compat20) return 0; /* Get the channel number and verify it. */ id = packet_get_int(); c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) { logit("Received window adjust for non-open channel %d.", id); return 0; } adjust = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %u", id, adjust); - c->remote_window += adjust; + if ((tmp = c->remote_window + adjust) < c->remote_window) + fatal("channel %d: adjust %u overflows remote window %u", + id, adjust, c->remote_window); + c->remote_window = tmp; return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int channel_input_port_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c = NULL; u_short host_port; char *host, *originator_string; int remote_id; remote_id = packet_get_int(); host = packet_get_string(NULL); host_port = packet_get_int(); if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) { originator_string = packet_get_string(NULL); } else { originator_string = xstrdup("unknown (remote did not supply name)"); } packet_check_eom(); c = channel_connect_to_port(host, host_port, "connected socket", originator_string); free(originator_string); free(host); if (c == NULL) { packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); packet_put_int(remote_id); packet_send(); } else c->remote_id = remote_id; return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int channel_input_status_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c; struct channel_confirm *cc; int id; /* Reset keepalive timeout */ packet_set_alive_timeouts(0); id = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); debug2("channel_input_status_confirm: type %d id %d", type, id); if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) { logit("channel_input_status_confirm: %d: unknown", id); return 0; } if ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) == NULL) return 0; cc->cb(type, c, cc->ctx); TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry); explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc)); free(cc); return 0; } /* -- tcp forwarding */ void channel_set_af(int af) { IPv4or6 = af; } /* * Determine whether or not a port forward listens to loopback, the * specified address or wildcard. On the client, a specified bind * address will always override gateway_ports. On the server, a * gateway_ports of 1 (``yes'') will override the client's specification * and force a wildcard bind, whereas a value of 2 (``clientspecified'') * will bind to whatever address the client asked for. * * Special-case listen_addrs are: * * "0.0.0.0" -> wildcard v4/v6 if SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR * "" (empty string), "*" -> wildcard v4/v6 * "localhost" -> loopback v4/v6 * "127.0.0.1" / "::1" -> accepted even if gateway_ports isn't set */ static const char * channel_fwd_bind_addr(const char *listen_addr, int *wildcardp, int is_client, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { const char *addr = NULL; int wildcard = 0; if (listen_addr == NULL) { /* No address specified: default to gateway_ports setting */ if (fwd_opts->gateway_ports) wildcard = 1; } else if (fwd_opts->gateway_ports || is_client) { if (((datafellows & SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR) && strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") == 0 && is_client == 0) || *listen_addr == '\0' || strcmp(listen_addr, "*") == 0 || (!is_client && fwd_opts->gateway_ports == 1)) { wildcard = 1; /* * Notify client if they requested a specific listen * address and it was overridden. */ if (*listen_addr != '\0' && strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") != 0 && strcmp(listen_addr, "*") != 0) { packet_send_debug("Forwarding listen address " "\"%s\" overridden by server " "GatewayPorts", listen_addr); } } else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "localhost") != 0 || strcmp(listen_addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 || strcmp(listen_addr, "::1") == 0) { /* Accept localhost address when GatewayPorts=yes */ addr = listen_addr; } } else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 || strcmp(listen_addr, "::1") == 0) { /* * If a specific IPv4/IPv6 localhost address has been * requested then accept it even if gateway_ports is in * effect. This allows the client to prefer IPv4 or IPv6. */ addr = listen_addr; } if (wildcardp != NULL) *wildcardp = wildcard; return addr; } static int channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(int type, struct Forward *fwd, int *allocated_listen_port, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { Channel *c; int sock, r, success = 0, wildcard = 0, is_client; struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; const char *host, *addr; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; in_port_t *lport_p; - host = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) ? - fwd->listen_host : fwd->connect_host; is_client = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER); - if (host == NULL) { - error("No forward host name."); - return 0; + if (is_client && fwd->connect_path != NULL) { + host = fwd->connect_path; + } else { + host = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) ? + fwd->listen_host : fwd->connect_host; + if (host == NULL) { + error("No forward host name."); + return 0; + } + if (strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) { + error("Forward host name too long."); + return 0; + } } - if (strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) { - error("Forward host name too long."); - return 0; - } /* Determine the bind address, cf. channel_fwd_bind_addr() comment */ addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(fwd->listen_host, &wildcard, is_client, fwd_opts); debug3("%s: type %d wildcard %d addr %s", __func__, type, wildcard, (addr == NULL) ? "NULL" : addr); /* * getaddrinfo returns a loopback address if the hostname is * set to NULL and hints.ai_flags is not AI_PASSIVE */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; hints.ai_flags = wildcard ? AI_PASSIVE : 0; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", fwd->listen_port); if ((r = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { if (addr == NULL) { /* This really shouldn't happen */ packet_disconnect("getaddrinfo: fatal error: %s", ssh_gai_strerror(r)); } else { error("%s: getaddrinfo(%.64s): %s", __func__, addr, ssh_gai_strerror(r)); } return 0; } if (allocated_listen_port != NULL) *allocated_listen_port = 0; for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { switch (ai->ai_family) { case AF_INET: lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in *)ai->ai_addr)-> sin_port; break; case AF_INET6: lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)ai->ai_addr)-> sin6_port; break; default: continue; } /* * If allocating a port for -R forwards, then use the * same port for all address families. */ if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL && *allocated_listen_port > 0) *lport_p = htons(*allocated_listen_port); if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { error("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__); continue; } /* Create a port to listen for the host. */ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock < 0) { /* this is no error since kernel may not support ipv6 */ verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } channel_set_reuseaddr(sock); if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) sock_set_v6only(sock); debug("Local forwarding listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport); /* Bind the socket to the address. */ if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { /* address can be in use ipv6 address is already bound */ if (!ai->ai_next) error("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno)); else verbose("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(sock); continue; } /* Start listening for connections on the socket. */ if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) { error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(sock); continue; } /* * fwd->listen_port == 0 requests a dynamically allocated port - * record what we got. */ if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL && *allocated_listen_port == 0) { *allocated_listen_port = get_sock_port(sock, 1); debug("Allocated listen port %d", *allocated_listen_port); } /* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */ c = channel_new("port listener", type, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "port listener", 1); c->path = xstrdup(host); c->host_port = fwd->connect_port; c->listening_addr = addr == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(addr); if (fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL && !(datafellows & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT)) c->listening_port = *allocated_listen_port; else c->listening_port = fwd->listen_port; success = 1; } if (success == 0) error("%s: cannot listen to port: %d", __func__, fwd->listen_port); freeaddrinfo(aitop); return success; } static int channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(int type, struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; const char *path; Channel *c; int port, sock; mode_t omask; switch (type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) { if (strlen(fwd->connect_path) > sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) { error("Local connecting path too long: %s", fwd->connect_path); return 0; } path = fwd->connect_path; port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { if (fwd->connect_host == NULL) { error("No forward host name."); return 0; } if (strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) { error("Forward host name too long."); return 0; } path = fwd->connect_host; port = fwd->connect_port; } break; case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: path = fwd->listen_path; port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; break; default: error("%s: unexpected channel type %d", __func__, type); return 0; } if (fwd->listen_path == NULL) { error("No forward path name."); return 0; } if (strlen(fwd->listen_path) > sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) { error("Local listening path too long: %s", fwd->listen_path); return 0; } debug3("%s: type %d path %s", __func__, type, fwd->listen_path); /* Start a Unix domain listener. */ omask = umask(fwd_opts->streamlocal_bind_mask); sock = unix_listener(fwd->listen_path, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, fwd_opts->streamlocal_bind_unlink); umask(omask); if (sock < 0) return 0; debug("Local forwarding listening on path %s.", fwd->listen_path); /* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */ c = channel_new("unix listener", type, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "unix listener", 1); c->path = xstrdup(path); c->host_port = port; c->listening_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; c->listening_addr = xstrdup(fwd->listen_path); return 1; } static int channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(const char *host, u_short port) { u_int i; int found = 0; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { Channel *c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) continue; if (strcmp(c->path, host) == 0 && c->listening_port == port) { debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i); channel_free(c); found = 1; } } return (found); } static int channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(const char *path) { u_int i; int found = 0; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { Channel *c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER) continue; if (c->path == NULL) continue; if (strcmp(c->path, path) == 0) { debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i); channel_free(c); found = 1; } } return (found); } int channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct Forward *fwd) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) return channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(fwd->listen_path); else return channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port); } static int channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(const char *lhost, u_short lport, int cport, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { u_int i; int found = 0; const char *addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(lhost, NULL, 1, fwd_opts); for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { Channel *c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER) continue; if (c->listening_port != lport) continue; if (cport == CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC) { /* skip dynamic forwardings */ if (c->host_port == 0) continue; } else { if (c->host_port != cport) continue; } if ((c->listening_addr == NULL && addr != NULL) || (c->listening_addr != NULL && addr == NULL)) continue; if (addr == NULL || strcmp(c->listening_addr, addr) == 0) { debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i); channel_free(c); found = 1; } } return (found); } static int channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(const char *path) { u_int i; int found = 0; if (path == NULL) { error("%s: no path specified.", __func__); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { Channel *c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER) continue; if (c->listening_addr == NULL) continue; if (strcmp(c->listening_addr, path) == 0) { debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i); channel_free(c); found = 1; } } return (found); } int channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct Forward *fwd, int cport, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) return channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(fwd->listen_path); else return channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, cport, fwd_opts); } /* protocol local port fwd, used by ssh (and sshd in v1) */ int channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal( SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts); } else { return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER, fwd, NULL, fwd_opts); } } /* protocol v2 remote port fwd, used by sshd */ int channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct Forward *fwd, int *allocated_listen_port, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal( SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts); } else { return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip( SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER, fwd, allocated_listen_port, fwd_opts); } } /* * Translate the requested rfwd listen host to something usable for * this server. */ static const char * channel_rfwd_bind_host(const char *listen_host) { if (listen_host == NULL) { if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR) return "127.0.0.1"; else return "localhost"; } else if (*listen_host == '\0' || strcmp(listen_host, "*") == 0) { if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR) return "0.0.0.0"; else return ""; } else return listen_host; } /* * Initiate forwarding of connections to port "port" on remote host through * the secure channel to host:port from local side. * Returns handle (index) for updating the dynamic listen port with * channel_update_permitted_opens(). */ int channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct Forward *fwd) { int type, success = 0, idx = -1; /* Send the forward request to the remote side. */ if (compat20) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { packet_put_cstring("streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"); packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */ packet_put_cstring(fwd->listen_path); } else { packet_put_cstring("tcpip-forward"); packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */ packet_put_cstring(channel_rfwd_bind_host(fwd->listen_host)); packet_put_int(fwd->listen_port); } packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Assume that server accepts the request */ success = 1; } else if (fwd->listen_path == NULL) { packet_start(SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST); packet_put_int(fwd->listen_port); packet_put_cstring(fwd->connect_host); packet_put_int(fwd->connect_port); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Wait for response from the remote side. */ type = packet_read(); switch (type) { case SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS: success = 1; break; case SSH_SMSG_FAILURE: break; default: /* Unknown packet */ packet_disconnect("Protocol error for port forward request:" "received packet type %d.", type); } } else { logit("Warning: Server does not support remote stream local forwarding."); } if (success) { /* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */ - permitted_opens = xrealloc(permitted_opens, + permitted_opens = xreallocarray(permitted_opens, num_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_opens)); idx = num_permitted_opens++; if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) { permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_path); permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_host); permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect = fwd->connect_port; } if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { permitted_opens[idx].listen_host = NULL; permitted_opens[idx].listen_path = xstrdup(fwd->listen_path); permitted_opens[idx].listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { permitted_opens[idx].listen_host = fwd->listen_host ? xstrdup(fwd->listen_host) : NULL; permitted_opens[idx].listen_path = NULL; permitted_opens[idx].listen_port = fwd->listen_port; } } return (idx); } static int open_match(ForwardPermission *allowed_open, const char *requestedhost, int requestedport) { if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL) return 0; if (allowed_open->port_to_connect != FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT && allowed_open->port_to_connect != requestedport) return 0; if (strcmp(allowed_open->host_to_connect, requestedhost) != 0) return 0; return 1; } /* * Note that in the listen host/port case * we don't support FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT and * need to translate between the configured-host (listen_host) * and what we've sent to the remote server (channel_rfwd_bind_host) */ static int open_listen_match_tcpip(ForwardPermission *allowed_open, const char *requestedhost, u_short requestedport, int translate) { const char *allowed_host; if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL) return 0; if (allowed_open->listen_port != requestedport) return 0; if (!translate && allowed_open->listen_host == NULL && requestedhost == NULL) return 1; allowed_host = translate ? channel_rfwd_bind_host(allowed_open->listen_host) : allowed_open->listen_host; if (allowed_host == NULL || strcmp(allowed_host, requestedhost) != 0) return 0; return 1; } static int open_listen_match_streamlocal(ForwardPermission *allowed_open, const char *requestedpath) { if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL) return 0; if (allowed_open->listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL) return 0; if (allowed_open->listen_path == NULL || strcmp(allowed_open->listen_path, requestedpath) != 0) return 0; return 1; } /* * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of connection host:port from * local side. */ static int channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(const char *host, u_short port) { int i; if (!compat20) return -1; for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) { if (open_listen_match_tcpip(&permitted_opens[i], host, port, 0)) break; } if (i >= num_permitted_opens) { debug("%s: requested forward not found", __func__); return -1; } packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring("cancel-tcpip-forward"); packet_put_char(0); packet_put_cstring(channel_rfwd_bind_host(host)); packet_put_int(port); packet_send(); permitted_opens[i].listen_port = 0; permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect = 0; free(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect); permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect = NULL; free(permitted_opens[i].listen_host); permitted_opens[i].listen_host = NULL; permitted_opens[i].listen_path = NULL; return 0; } /* * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of Unix domain socket * path from local side. */ static int channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(const char *path) { int i; if (!compat20) return -1; for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) { if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(&permitted_opens[i], path)) break; } if (i >= num_permitted_opens) { debug("%s: requested forward not found", __func__); return -1; } packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring("cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"); packet_put_char(0); packet_put_cstring(path); packet_send(); permitted_opens[i].listen_port = 0; permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect = 0; free(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect); permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect = NULL; permitted_opens[i].listen_host = NULL; free(permitted_opens[i].listen_path); permitted_opens[i].listen_path = NULL; return 0; } /* * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of a connection from local side. */ int channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct Forward *fwd) { if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { return (channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal( fwd->listen_path)); } else { return (channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port ? fwd->listen_port : fwd->allocated_port)); } } /* * This is called after receiving CHANNEL_FORWARDING_REQUEST. This initates * listening for the port, and sends back a success reply (or disconnect * message if there was an error). */ int channel_input_port_forward_request(int is_root, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { int success = 0; struct Forward fwd; /* Get arguments from the packet. */ memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); fwd.listen_port = packet_get_int(); fwd.connect_host = packet_get_string(NULL); fwd.connect_port = packet_get_int(); #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN /* * Check that an unprivileged user is not trying to forward a * privileged port. */ if (fwd.listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED && !is_root) packet_disconnect( "Requested forwarding of port %d but user is not root.", fwd.listen_port); if (fwd.connect_port == 0) packet_disconnect("Dynamic forwarding denied."); #endif /* Initiate forwarding */ success = channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(&fwd, fwd_opts); /* Free the argument string. */ free(fwd.connect_host); return (success ? 0 : -1); } /* * Permits opening to any host/port if permitted_opens[] is empty. This is * usually called by the server, because the user could connect to any port * anyway, and the server has no way to know but to trust the client anyway. */ void channel_permit_all_opens(void) { if (num_permitted_opens == 0) all_opens_permitted = 1; } void channel_add_permitted_opens(char *host, int port) { debug("allow port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port); - permitted_opens = xrealloc(permitted_opens, + permitted_opens = xreallocarray(permitted_opens, num_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_opens)); permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = xstrdup(host); permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port; permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].listen_host = NULL; permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].listen_path = NULL; permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].listen_port = 0; num_permitted_opens++; all_opens_permitted = 0; } /* * Update the listen port for a dynamic remote forward, after * the actual 'newport' has been allocated. If 'newport' < 0 is * passed then they entry will be invalidated. */ void channel_update_permitted_opens(int idx, int newport) { if (idx < 0 || idx >= num_permitted_opens) { debug("channel_update_permitted_opens: index out of range:" " %d num_permitted_opens %d", idx, num_permitted_opens); return; } debug("%s allowed port %d for forwarding to host %s port %d", newport > 0 ? "Updating" : "Removing", newport, permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect, permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect); if (newport >= 0) { permitted_opens[idx].listen_port = (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT) ? 0 : newport; } else { permitted_opens[idx].listen_port = 0; permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect = 0; free(permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect); permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect = NULL; free(permitted_opens[idx].listen_host); permitted_opens[idx].listen_host = NULL; free(permitted_opens[idx].listen_path); permitted_opens[idx].listen_path = NULL; } } int channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(char *host, int port) { debug("config allows port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port); - permitted_adm_opens = xrealloc(permitted_adm_opens, + permitted_adm_opens = xreallocarray(permitted_adm_opens, num_adm_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_adm_opens)); permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = xstrdup(host); permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port; permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].listen_host = NULL; permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].listen_path = NULL; permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].listen_port = 0; return ++num_adm_permitted_opens; } void channel_disable_adm_local_opens(void) { channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(); - permitted_adm_opens = xmalloc(sizeof(*permitted_adm_opens)); + permitted_adm_opens = xcalloc(sizeof(*permitted_adm_opens), 1); permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = NULL; num_adm_permitted_opens = 1; } void channel_clear_permitted_opens(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) { free(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect); free(permitted_opens[i].listen_host); free(permitted_opens[i].listen_path); } free(permitted_opens); permitted_opens = NULL; num_permitted_opens = 0; } void channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++) { free(permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect); free(permitted_adm_opens[i].listen_host); free(permitted_adm_opens[i].listen_path); } free(permitted_adm_opens); permitted_adm_opens = NULL; num_adm_permitted_opens = 0; } void channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(void) { int i; printf("permitopen"); if (num_adm_permitted_opens == 0) { printf(" any\n"); return; } for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++) if (permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect == NULL) printf(" none"); else printf(" %s:%d", permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect, permitted_adm_opens[i].port_to_connect); printf("\n"); } /* returns port number, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT or -1 on error */ int permitopen_port(const char *p) { int port; if (strcmp(p, "*") == 0) return FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT; if ((port = a2port(p)) > 0) return port; return -1; } /* Try to start non-blocking connect to next host in cctx list */ static int connect_next(struct channel_connect *cctx) { int sock, saved_errno; struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[MAX(NI_MAXSERV,sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path))]; for (; cctx->ai; cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next) { switch (cctx->ai->ai_family) { case AF_UNIX: /* unix:pathname instead of host:port */ sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)cctx->ai->ai_addr; strlcpy(ntop, "unix", sizeof(ntop)); strlcpy(strport, sunaddr->sun_path, sizeof(strport)); break; case AF_INET: case AF_INET6: if (getnameinfo(cctx->ai->ai_addr, cctx->ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { error("connect_next: getnameinfo failed"); continue; } break; default: continue; } if ((sock = socket(cctx->ai->ai_family, cctx->ai->ai_socktype, cctx->ai->ai_protocol)) == -1) { if (cctx->ai->ai_next == NULL) error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); else verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } if (set_nonblock(sock) == -1) fatal("%s: set_nonblock(%d)", __func__, sock); if (connect(sock, cctx->ai->ai_addr, cctx->ai->ai_addrlen) == -1 && errno != EINPROGRESS) { debug("connect_next: host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s): " "%.100s", cctx->host, ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); saved_errno = errno; close(sock); errno = saved_errno; continue; /* fail -- try next */ } if (cctx->ai->ai_family != AF_UNIX) set_nodelay(sock); debug("connect_next: host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s) " "in progress, fd=%d", cctx->host, ntop, strport, sock); cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next; return sock; } return -1; } static void channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *cctx) { free(cctx->host); if (cctx->aitop) { if (cctx->aitop->ai_family == AF_UNIX) free(cctx->aitop); else freeaddrinfo(cctx->aitop); } memset(cctx, 0, sizeof(*cctx)); } /* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path */ static Channel * connect_to(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname) { struct addrinfo hints; int gaierr; int sock = -1; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; struct channel_connect cctx; Channel *c; memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx)); if (port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) { struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr; struct addrinfo *ai; if (strlen(name) > sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)) { error("%.100s: %.100s", name, strerror(ENAMETOOLONG)); return (NULL); } /* * Fake up a struct addrinfo for AF_UNIX connections. * channel_connect_ctx_free() must check ai_family * and use free() not freeaddirinfo() for AF_UNIX. */ ai = xmalloc(sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(*sunaddr)); memset(ai, 0, sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(*sunaddr)); ai->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)(ai + 1); ai->ai_addrlen = sizeof(*sunaddr); ai->ai_family = AF_UNIX; ai->ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; ai->ai_protocol = PF_UNSPEC; sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)ai->ai_addr; sunaddr->sun_family = AF_UNIX; strlcpy(sunaddr->sun_path, name, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)); cctx.aitop = ai; } else { memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &cctx.aitop)) != 0) { error("connect_to %.100s: unknown host (%s)", name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return NULL; } } cctx.host = xstrdup(name); cctx.port = port; cctx.ai = cctx.aitop; if ((sock = connect_next(&cctx)) == -1) { error("connect to %.100s port %d failed: %s", name, port, strerror(errno)); channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx); return NULL; } c = channel_new(ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1); c->connect_ctx = cctx; return c; } Channel * channel_connect_by_listen_address(const char *listen_host, u_short listen_port, char *ctype, char *rname) { int i; for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) { if (open_listen_match_tcpip(&permitted_opens[i], listen_host, listen_port, 1)) { return connect_to( permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect, permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect, ctype, rname); } } error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown listen_port %d", listen_port); return NULL; } Channel * channel_connect_by_listen_path(const char *path, char *ctype, char *rname) { int i; for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) { if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(&permitted_opens[i], path)) { return connect_to( permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect, permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect, ctype, rname); } } error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown path %.100s", path); return NULL; } /* Check if connecting to that port is permitted and connect. */ Channel * channel_connect_to_port(const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype, char *rname) { int i, permit, permit_adm = 1; permit = all_opens_permitted; if (!permit) { for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) if (open_match(&permitted_opens[i], host, port)) { permit = 1; break; } } if (num_adm_permitted_opens > 0) { permit_adm = 0; for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++) if (open_match(&permitted_adm_opens[i], host, port)) { permit_adm = 1; break; } } if (!permit || !permit_adm) { logit("Received request to connect to host %.100s port %d, " "but the request was denied.", host, port); return NULL; } return connect_to(host, port, ctype, rname); } /* Check if connecting to that path is permitted and connect. */ Channel * channel_connect_to_path(const char *path, char *ctype, char *rname) { int i, permit, permit_adm = 1; permit = all_opens_permitted; if (!permit) { for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) if (open_match(&permitted_opens[i], path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) { permit = 1; break; } } if (num_adm_permitted_opens > 0) { permit_adm = 0; for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++) if (open_match(&permitted_adm_opens[i], path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) { permit_adm = 1; break; } } if (!permit || !permit_adm) { logit("Received request to connect to path %.100s, " "but the request was denied.", path); return NULL; } return connect_to(path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL, ctype, rname); } void channel_send_window_changes(void) { u_int i; struct winsize ws; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { if (channels[i] == NULL || !channels[i]->client_tty || channels[i]->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) continue; if (ioctl(channels[i]->rfd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0) continue; channel_request_start(i, "window-change", 0); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel); packet_send(); } } /* -- X11 forwarding */ /* * Creates an internet domain socket for listening for X11 connections. * Returns 0 and a suitable display number for the DISPLAY variable * stored in display_numberp , or -1 if an error occurs. */ int x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_offset, int x11_use_localhost, int single_connection, u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids) { Channel *nc = NULL; int display_number, sock; u_short port; struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int gaierr, n, num_socks = 0, socks[NUM_SOCKS]; if (chanids == NULL) return -1; for (display_number = x11_display_offset; display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS; display_number++) { port = 6000 + display_number; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { error("getaddrinfo: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return -1; } for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock < 0) { if ((errno != EINVAL) && (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) #ifdef EPFNOSUPPORT && (errno != EPFNOSUPPORT) #endif ) { error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); freeaddrinfo(aitop); return -1; } else { debug("x11_create_display_inet: Socket family %d not supported", ai->ai_family); continue; } } if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) sock_set_v6only(sock); if (x11_use_localhost) channel_set_reuseaddr(sock); if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { debug2("bind port %d: %.100s", port, strerror(errno)); close(sock); for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) { close(socks[n]); } num_socks = 0; break; } socks[num_socks++] = sock; if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS) break; } freeaddrinfo(aitop); if (num_socks > 0) break; } if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) { error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket."); return -1; } /* Start listening for connections on the socket. */ for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) { sock = socks[n]; if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) { error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(sock); return -1; } } /* Allocate a channel for each socket. */ *chanids = xcalloc(num_socks + 1, sizeof(**chanids)); for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) { sock = socks[n]; nc = channel_new("x11 listener", SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "X11 inet listener", 1); nc->single_connection = single_connection; (*chanids)[n] = nc->self; } (*chanids)[n] = -1; /* Return the display number for the DISPLAY environment variable. */ *display_numberp = display_number; return (0); } static int connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname) { int sock; struct sockaddr_un addr; sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (sock < 0) error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path); if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0) return sock; close(sock); error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno)); return -1; } static int connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr) { char buf[1024]; snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr); return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf); } int x11_connect_display(void) { u_int display_number; const char *display; char buf[1024], *cp; struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int gaierr, sock = 0; /* Try to open a socket for the local X server. */ display = getenv("DISPLAY"); if (!display) { error("DISPLAY not set."); return -1; } /* * Now we decode the value of the DISPLAY variable and make a * connection to the real X server. */ /* Check if the display is from launchd. */ #ifdef __APPLE__ if (strncmp(display, "/tmp/launch", 11) == 0) { sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(display); if (sock < 0) return -1; /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */ return sock; } #endif /* * Check if it is a unix domain socket. Unix domain displays are in * one of the following formats: unix:d[.s], :d[.s], ::d[.s] */ if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0 || display[0] == ':') { /* Connect to the unix domain socket. */ if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) { error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s", display); return -1; } /* Create a socket. */ sock = connect_local_xsocket(display_number); if (sock < 0) return -1; /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */ return sock; } /* * Connect to an inet socket. The DISPLAY value is supposedly * hostname:d[.s], where hostname may also be numeric IP address. */ strlcpy(buf, display, sizeof(buf)); cp = strchr(buf, ':'); if (!cp) { error("Could not find ':' in DISPLAY: %.100s", display); return -1; } *cp = 0; /* buf now contains the host name. But first we parse the display number. */ if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) { error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s", display); return -1; } /* Look up the host address */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return -1; } for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { /* Create a socket. */ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock < 0) { debug2("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } /* Connect it to the display. */ if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno)); close(sock); continue; } /* Success */ break; } freeaddrinfo(aitop); if (!ai) { error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno)); return -1; } set_nodelay(sock); return sock; } /* * This is called when SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN is received. The packet contains * the remote channel number. We should do whatever we want, and respond * with either SSH_MSG_OPEN_CONFIRMATION or SSH_MSG_OPEN_FAILURE. */ /* ARGSUSED */ int x11_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c = NULL; int remote_id, sock = 0; char *remote_host; debug("Received X11 open request."); remote_id = packet_get_int(); if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) { remote_host = packet_get_string(NULL); } else { remote_host = xstrdup("unknown (remote did not supply name)"); } packet_check_eom(); /* Obtain a connection to the real X display. */ sock = x11_connect_display(); if (sock != -1) { /* Allocate a channel for this connection. */ c = channel_new("connected x11 socket", SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, 0, 0, 0, remote_host, 1); c->remote_id = remote_id; c->force_drain = 1; } free(remote_host); if (c == NULL) { /* Send refusal to the remote host. */ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); packet_put_int(remote_id); } else { /* Send a confirmation to the remote host. */ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); packet_put_int(remote_id); packet_put_int(c->self); } packet_send(); return 0; } /* dummy protocol handler that denies SSH-1 requests (agent/x11) */ /* ARGSUSED */ int deny_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int rchan = packet_get_int(); switch (type) { case SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN: error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding."); break; case SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN: error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding."); break; default: error("deny_input_open: type %d", type); break; } error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a malicious server."); packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); packet_put_int(rchan); packet_send(); return 0; } /* * Requests forwarding of X11 connections, generates fake authentication * data, and enables authentication spoofing. * This should be called in the client only. */ void x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int client_session_id, const char *disp, const char *proto, const char *data, int want_reply) { u_int data_len = (u_int) strlen(data) / 2; u_int i, value; char *new_data; int screen_number; const char *cp; u_int32_t rnd = 0; if (x11_saved_display == NULL) x11_saved_display = xstrdup(disp); else if (strcmp(disp, x11_saved_display) != 0) { error("x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing: different " "$DISPLAY already forwarded"); return; } cp = strchr(disp, ':'); if (cp) cp = strchr(cp, '.'); if (cp) screen_number = (u_int)strtonum(cp + 1, 0, 400, NULL); else screen_number = 0; if (x11_saved_proto == NULL) { /* Save protocol name. */ x11_saved_proto = xstrdup(proto); /* * Extract real authentication data and generate fake data * of the same length. */ x11_saved_data = xmalloc(data_len); x11_fake_data = xmalloc(data_len); for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) { if (sscanf(data + 2 * i, "%2x", &value) != 1) fatal("x11_request_forwarding: bad " "authentication data: %.100s", data); if (i % 4 == 0) rnd = arc4random(); x11_saved_data[i] = value; x11_fake_data[i] = rnd & 0xff; rnd >>= 8; } x11_saved_data_len = data_len; x11_fake_data_len = data_len; } /* Convert the fake data into hex. */ new_data = tohex(x11_fake_data, data_len); /* Send the request packet. */ if (compat20) { channel_request_start(client_session_id, "x11-req", want_reply); packet_put_char(0); /* XXX bool single connection */ } else { packet_start(SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING); } packet_put_cstring(proto); packet_put_cstring(new_data); packet_put_int(screen_number); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); free(new_data); } /* -- agent forwarding */ /* Sends a message to the server to request authentication fd forwarding. */ void auth_request_forwarding(void) { packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } Index: head/crypto/openssh/channels.h =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/channels.h (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/channels.h (revision 294336) @@ -1,315 +1,316 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.116 2015/01/19 20:07:45 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.118 2015/07/01 02:26:31 djm Exp $ */ /* $FreeBSD$ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef CHANNEL_H #define CHANNEL_H /* Definitions for channel types. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER 1 /* Listening for inet X11 conn. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER 2 /* Listening on a port. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING 3 /* waiting for confirmation */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN 4 /* normal open two-way channel */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED 5 /* waiting for close confirmation */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET 6 /* authentication socket */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN 7 /* reading first X11 packet */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING 8 /* sending remaining data to conn */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING 9 /* sending remaining data to app */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL 10 /* larval session */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER 11 /* Listening to a R-style port */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING 12 #define SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC 13 #define SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE 14 /* Almost dead. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER 15 /* Listener for mux conn. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT 16 /* Conn. to mux slave */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED 17 /* Abandoned session, eg mux */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER 18 /* Listening on a domain socket. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER 19 /* Listening to a R-style domain socket. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE 20 #define CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC -1 struct Channel; typedef struct Channel Channel; typedef void channel_open_fn(int, int, void *); typedef void channel_callback_fn(int, void *); typedef int channel_infilter_fn(struct Channel *, char *, int); typedef void channel_filter_cleanup_fn(int, void *); typedef u_char *channel_outfilter_fn(struct Channel *, u_char **, u_int *); /* Channel success/failure callbacks */ typedef void channel_confirm_cb(int, struct Channel *, void *); typedef void channel_confirm_abandon_cb(struct Channel *, void *); struct channel_confirm { TAILQ_ENTRY(channel_confirm) entry; channel_confirm_cb *cb; channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb; void *ctx; }; TAILQ_HEAD(channel_confirms, channel_confirm); /* Context for non-blocking connects */ struct channel_connect { char *host; int port; struct addrinfo *ai, *aitop; }; /* Callbacks for mux channels back into client-specific code */ typedef int mux_callback_fn(struct Channel *); struct Channel { int type; /* channel type/state */ int self; /* my own channel identifier */ int remote_id; /* channel identifier for remote peer */ u_int istate; /* input from channel (state of receive half) */ u_int ostate; /* output to channel (state of transmit half) */ int flags; /* close sent/rcvd */ int rfd; /* read fd */ int wfd; /* write fd */ int efd; /* extended fd */ int sock; /* sock fd */ int ctl_chan; /* control channel (multiplexed connections) */ int isatty; /* rfd is a tty */ #ifdef _AIX int wfd_isatty; /* wfd is a tty */ #endif int client_tty; /* (client) TTY has been requested */ int force_drain; /* force close on iEOF */ time_t notbefore; /* Pause IO until deadline (time_t) */ int delayed; /* post-select handlers for newly created * channels are delayed until the first call - * to a matching pre-select handler. + * to a matching pre-select handler. * this way post-select handlers are not * accidentally called if a FD gets reused */ Buffer input; /* data read from socket, to be sent over * encrypted connection */ Buffer output; /* data received over encrypted connection for * send on socket */ Buffer extended; char *path; /* path for unix domain sockets, or host name for forwards */ int listening_port; /* port being listened for forwards */ char *listening_addr; /* addr being listened for forwards */ int host_port; /* remote port to connect for forwards */ char *remote_name; /* remote hostname */ u_int remote_window; u_int remote_maxpacket; u_int local_window; u_int local_window_max; u_int local_consumed; u_int local_maxpacket; int extended_usage; int single_connection; char *ctype; /* type */ /* callback */ channel_open_fn *open_confirm; void *open_confirm_ctx; channel_callback_fn *detach_user; int detach_close; struct channel_confirms status_confirms; /* filter */ channel_infilter_fn *input_filter; channel_outfilter_fn *output_filter; void *filter_ctx; channel_filter_cleanup_fn *filter_cleanup; /* keep boundaries */ int datagram; /* non-blocking connect */ struct channel_connect connect_ctx; /* multiplexing protocol hook, called for each packet received */ mux_callback_fn *mux_rcb; void *mux_ctx; int mux_pause; }; #define CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE 0 #define CHAN_EXTENDED_READ 1 #define CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE 2 /* default window/packet sizes for tcp/x11-fwd-channel */ #define CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT (32*1024) #define CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT (64*CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT) #define CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT (32*1024) #define CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT (64*CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT) #define CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT (16*1024) #define CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT (4*CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT) /* possible input states */ #define CHAN_INPUT_OPEN 0 #define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN 1 #define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_OCLOSE 2 #define CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED 3 /* possible output states */ #define CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN 0 #define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN 1 #define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_IEOF 2 #define CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED 3 #define CHAN_CLOSE_SENT 0x01 #define CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD 0x02 #define CHAN_EOF_SENT 0x04 #define CHAN_EOF_RCVD 0x08 #define CHAN_LOCAL 0x10 #define CHAN_RBUF 16*1024 /* check whether 'efd' is still in use */ #define CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c) \ (compat20 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ && \ (c->efd != -1 || \ buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0)) #define CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c) \ (compat20 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && \ c->efd != -1 && (!(c->flags & (CHAN_EOF_RCVD|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) || \ buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0)) /* channel management */ Channel *channel_by_id(int); Channel *channel_lookup(int); Channel *channel_new(char *, int, int, int, int, u_int, u_int, int, char *, int); void channel_set_fds(int, int, int, int, int, int, int, u_int); void channel_free(Channel *); void channel_free_all(void); void channel_stop_listening(void); void channel_send_open(int); void channel_request_start(int, char *, int); void channel_register_cleanup(int, channel_callback_fn *, int); void channel_register_open_confirm(int, channel_open_fn *, void *); void channel_register_filter(int, channel_infilter_fn *, channel_outfilter_fn *, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *, void *); void channel_register_status_confirm(int, channel_confirm_cb *, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *, void *); void channel_cancel_cleanup(int); int channel_close_fd(int *); void channel_send_window_changes(void); /* protocol handler */ int channel_input_close(int, u_int32_t, void *); int channel_input_close_confirmation(int, u_int32_t, void *); int channel_input_data(int, u_int32_t, void *); int channel_input_extended_data(int, u_int32_t, void *); int channel_input_ieof(int, u_int32_t, void *); int channel_input_oclose(int, u_int32_t, void *); int channel_input_open_confirmation(int, u_int32_t, void *); int channel_input_open_failure(int, u_int32_t, void *); int channel_input_port_open(int, u_int32_t, void *); int channel_input_window_adjust(int, u_int32_t, void *); int channel_input_status_confirm(int, u_int32_t, void *); /* file descriptor handling (read/write) */ void channel_prepare_select(fd_set **, fd_set **, int *, u_int*, time_t*, int); void channel_after_select(fd_set *, fd_set *); void channel_output_poll(void); int channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(void); void channel_close_all(void); int channel_still_open(void); char *channel_open_message(void); int channel_find_open(void); /* tcp forwarding */ struct Forward; struct ForwardOptions; void channel_set_af(int af); void channel_permit_all_opens(void); void channel_add_permitted_opens(char *, int); int channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(char *, int); void channel_disable_adm_local_opens(void); void channel_update_permitted_opens(int, int); void channel_clear_permitted_opens(void); void channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(void); void channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(void); int channel_input_port_forward_request(int, struct ForwardOptions *); Channel *channel_connect_to_port(const char *, u_short, char *, char *); Channel *channel_connect_to_path(const char *, char *, char *); Channel *channel_connect_stdio_fwd(const char*, u_short, int, int); Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_address(const char *, u_short, char *, char *); Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_path(const char *, char *, char *); int channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct Forward *); int channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct Forward *, struct ForwardOptions *); int channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct Forward *); int channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct Forward *, int *, struct ForwardOptions *); int channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct Forward *); int channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct Forward *, int, struct ForwardOptions *); int permitopen_port(const char *); /* x11 forwarding */ +void channel_set_x11_refuse_time(u_int); int x11_connect_display(void); int x11_create_display_inet(int, int, int, u_int *, int **); int x11_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *); void x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int, const char *, const char *, const char *, int); int deny_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *); /* agent forwarding */ void auth_request_forwarding(void); /* channel close */ int chan_is_dead(Channel *, int); void chan_mark_dead(Channel *); /* channel events */ void chan_rcvd_oclose(Channel *); void chan_rcvd_eow(Channel *); /* SSH2-only */ void chan_read_failed(Channel *); void chan_ibuf_empty(Channel *); void chan_rcvd_ieof(Channel *); void chan_write_failed(Channel *); void chan_obuf_empty(Channel *); #endif Index: head/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/clientloop.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,2677 +1,2689 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.272 2015/02/25 19:54:02 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.274 2015/07/01 02:26:31 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * The main loop for the interactive session (client side). * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * * * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include /* MIN MAX */ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "compat.h" #include "channels.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "key.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "clientloop.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "match.h" #include "msg.h" #include "roaming.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "hostfile.h" /* import options */ extern Options options; /* Flag indicating that stdin should be redirected from /dev/null. */ extern int stdin_null_flag; /* Flag indicating that no shell has been requested */ extern int no_shell_flag; /* Control socket */ extern int muxserver_sock; /* XXX use mux_client_cleanup() instead */ /* * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the * command line, or the HostName specified for the user-supplied name in a * configuration file. */ extern char *host; /* * Flag to indicate that we have received a window change signal which has * not yet been processed. This will cause a message indicating the new * window size to be sent to the server a little later. This is volatile * because this is updated in a signal handler. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_window_change_signal = 0; static volatile sig_atomic_t received_signal = 0; /* Flag indicating whether the user's terminal is in non-blocking mode. */ static int in_non_blocking_mode = 0; /* Time when backgrounded control master using ControlPersist should exit */ static time_t control_persist_exit_time = 0; /* Common data for the client loop code. */ volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; /* Set non-zero to quit the loop. */ static int escape_char1; /* Escape character. (proto1 only) */ static int escape_pending1; /* Last character was an escape (proto1 only) */ static int last_was_cr; /* Last character was a newline. */ static int exit_status; /* Used to store the command exit status. */ static int stdin_eof; /* EOF has been encountered on stderr. */ static Buffer stdin_buffer; /* Buffer for stdin data. */ static Buffer stdout_buffer; /* Buffer for stdout data. */ static Buffer stderr_buffer; /* Buffer for stderr data. */ static u_int buffer_high; /* Soft max buffer size. */ static int connection_in; /* Connection to server (input). */ static int connection_out; /* Connection to server (output). */ static int need_rekeying; /* Set to non-zero if rekeying is requested. */ static int session_closed; /* In SSH2: login session closed. */ -static int x11_refuse_time; /* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */ +static u_int x11_refuse_time; /* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */ static void client_init_dispatch(void); int session_ident = -1; int session_resumed = 0; /* Track escape per proto2 channel */ struct escape_filter_ctx { int escape_pending; int escape_char; }; /* Context for channel confirmation replies */ struct channel_reply_ctx { const char *request_type; int id; enum confirm_action action; }; /* Global request success/failure callbacks */ struct global_confirm { TAILQ_ENTRY(global_confirm) entry; global_confirm_cb *cb; void *ctx; int ref_count; }; TAILQ_HEAD(global_confirms, global_confirm); static struct global_confirms global_confirms = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(global_confirms); void ssh_process_session2_setup(int, int, int, Buffer *); /* Restores stdin to blocking mode. */ static void leave_non_blocking(void) { if (in_non_blocking_mode) { unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin)); in_non_blocking_mode = 0; } } /* Puts stdin terminal in non-blocking mode. */ static void enter_non_blocking(void) { in_non_blocking_mode = 1; set_nonblock(fileno(stdin)); } /* * Signal handler for the window change signal (SIGWINCH). This just sets a * flag indicating that the window has changed. */ /*ARGSUSED */ static void window_change_handler(int sig) { received_window_change_signal = 1; signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler); } /* * Signal handler for signals that cause the program to terminate. These * signals must be trapped to restore terminal modes. */ /*ARGSUSED */ static void signal_handler(int sig) { received_signal = sig; quit_pending = 1; } /* * Returns current time in seconds from Jan 1, 1970 with the maximum * available resolution. */ static double get_current_time(void) { struct timeval tv; gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); return (double) tv.tv_sec + (double) tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0; } /* * Sets control_persist_exit_time to the absolute time when the * backgrounded control master should exit due to expiry of the * ControlPersist timeout. Sets it to 0 if we are not a backgrounded * control master process, or if there is no ControlPersist timeout. */ static void set_control_persist_exit_time(void) { if (muxserver_sock == -1 || !options.control_persist || options.control_persist_timeout == 0) { /* not using a ControlPersist timeout */ control_persist_exit_time = 0; } else if (channel_still_open()) { /* some client connections are still open */ if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) debug2("%s: cancel scheduled exit", __func__); control_persist_exit_time = 0; } else if (control_persist_exit_time <= 0) { /* a client connection has recently closed */ control_persist_exit_time = monotime() + (time_t)options.control_persist_timeout; debug2("%s: schedule exit in %d seconds", __func__, options.control_persist_timeout); } /* else we are already counting down to the timeout */ } #define SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS ":/.-_" static int client_x11_display_valid(const char *display) { size_t i, dlen; dlen = strlen(display); for (i = 0; i < dlen; i++) { if (!isalnum((u_char)display[i]) && strchr(SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS, display[i]) == NULL) { debug("Invalid character '%c' in DISPLAY", display[i]); return 0; } } return 1; } -#define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1" +#define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1" +#define X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK 60 void client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path, u_int trusted, u_int timeout, char **_proto, char **_data) { char cmd[1024]; char line[512]; char xdisplay[512]; static char proto[512], data[512]; FILE *f; int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i; char *xauthdir, *xauthfile; struct stat st; - u_int now; + u_int now, x11_timeout_real; xauthdir = xauthfile = NULL; *_proto = proto; *_data = data; proto[0] = data[0] = '\0'; if (xauth_path == NULL ||(stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1)) { debug("No xauth program."); } else if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) { logit("DISPLAY '%s' invalid, falling back to fake xauth data", display); } else { if (display == NULL) { debug("x11_get_proto: DISPLAY not set"); return; } /* * Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does * not match an authorization entry. For this we * just try "xauth list unix:displaynum.screennum". * XXX: "localhost" match to determine FamilyLocal * is not perfect. */ if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) { snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s", display + 10); display = xdisplay; } if (trusted == 0) { xauthdir = xmalloc(PATH_MAX); xauthfile = xmalloc(PATH_MAX); mktemp_proto(xauthdir, PATH_MAX); + /* + * The authentication cookie should briefly outlive + * ssh's willingness to forward X11 connections to + * avoid nasty fail-open behaviour in the X server. + */ + if (timeout >= UINT_MAX - X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK) + x11_timeout_real = UINT_MAX; + else + x11_timeout_real = timeout + X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK; if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) != NULL) { do_unlink = 1; snprintf(xauthfile, PATH_MAX, "%s/xauthfile", xauthdir); snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO " untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL, - xauth_path, xauthfile, display, timeout); + xauth_path, xauthfile, display, + x11_timeout_real); debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd); - if (system(cmd) == 0) - generated = 1; if (x11_refuse_time == 0) { now = monotime() + 1; if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now) x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX; else x11_refuse_time = now + timeout; + channel_set_x11_refuse_time( + x11_refuse_time); } + if (system(cmd) == 0) + generated = 1; } } /* * When in untrusted mode, we read the cookie only if it was * successfully generated as an untrusted one in the step * above. */ if (trusted || generated) { snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "%s %s%s list %s 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL, xauth_path, generated ? "-f " : "" , generated ? xauthfile : "", display); debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd); f = popen(cmd, "r"); if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) && sscanf(line, "%*s %511s %511s", proto, data) == 2) got_data = 1; if (f) pclose(f); } else error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: " "xauth key data not generated"); } if (do_unlink) { unlink(xauthfile); rmdir(xauthdir); } free(xauthdir); free(xauthfile); /* * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some * data. The forwarding code will check the validity of the * response anyway, and substitute this data. The X11 * server, however, will ignore this fake data and use * whatever authentication mechanisms it was using otherwise * for the local connection. */ if (!got_data) { u_int32_t rnd = 0; logit("Warning: No xauth data; " "using fake authentication data for X11 forwarding."); strlcpy(proto, SSH_X11_PROTO, sizeof proto); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { if (i % 4 == 0) rnd = arc4random(); snprintf(data + 2 * i, sizeof data - 2 * i, "%02x", rnd & 0xff); rnd >>= 8; } } } /* * This is called when the interactive is entered. This checks if there is * an EOF coming on stdin. We must check this explicitly, as select() does * not appear to wake up when redirecting from /dev/null. */ static void client_check_initial_eof_on_stdin(void) { int len; char buf[1]; /* * If standard input is to be "redirected from /dev/null", we simply * mark that we have seen an EOF and send an EOF message to the * server. Otherwise, we try to read a single character; it appears * that for some files, such /dev/null, select() never wakes up for * read for this descriptor, which means that we never get EOF. This * way we will get the EOF if stdin comes from /dev/null or similar. */ if (stdin_null_flag) { /* Fake EOF on stdin. */ debug("Sending eof."); stdin_eof = 1; packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); packet_send(); } else { enter_non_blocking(); /* Check for immediate EOF on stdin. */ len = read(fileno(stdin), buf, 1); if (len == 0) { /* * EOF. Record that we have seen it and send * EOF to server. */ debug("Sending eof."); stdin_eof = 1; packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); packet_send(); } else if (len > 0) { /* * Got data. We must store the data in the buffer, * and also process it as an escape character if * appropriate. */ if ((u_char) buf[0] == escape_char1) escape_pending1 = 1; else buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, buf, 1); } leave_non_blocking(); } } /* * Make packets from buffered stdin data, and buffer them for sending to the * connection. */ static void client_make_packets_from_stdin_data(void) { u_int len; /* Send buffered stdin data to the server. */ while (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0 && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) { len = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer); /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */ if (len > packet_get_maxsize()) len = packet_get_maxsize(); packet_start(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA); packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer), len); packet_send(); buffer_consume(&stdin_buffer, len); /* If we have a pending EOF, send it now. */ if (stdin_eof && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) { packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); packet_send(); } } } /* * Checks if the client window has changed, and sends a packet about it to * the server if so. The actual change is detected elsewhere (by a software * interrupt on Unix); this just checks the flag and sends a message if * appropriate. */ static void client_check_window_change(void) { struct winsize ws; if (! received_window_change_signal) return; /** XXX race */ received_window_change_signal = 0; debug2("client_check_window_change: changed"); if (compat20) { channel_send_window_changes(); } else { if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0) return; packet_start(SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel); packet_send(); } } static int client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct global_confirm *gc; if ((gc = TAILQ_FIRST(&global_confirms)) == NULL) return 0; if (gc->cb != NULL) gc->cb(type, seq, gc->ctx); if (--gc->ref_count <= 0) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&global_confirms, gc, entry); explicit_bzero(gc, sizeof(*gc)); free(gc); } packet_set_alive_timeouts(0); return 0; } static void server_alive_check(void) { if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.server_alive_count_max) { logit("Timeout, server %s not responding.", host); cleanup_exit(255); } packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring("keepalive@openssh.com"); packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */ packet_send(); /* Insert an empty placeholder to maintain ordering */ client_register_global_confirm(NULL, NULL); } /* * Waits until the client can do something (some data becomes available on * one of the file descriptors). */ static void client_wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, int rekeying) { struct timeval tv, *tvp; int timeout_secs; time_t minwait_secs = 0, server_alive_time = 0, now = monotime(); int ret; /* Add any selections by the channel mechanism. */ channel_prepare_select(readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, nallocp, &minwait_secs, rekeying); if (!compat20) { /* Read from the connection, unless our buffers are full. */ if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) < buffer_high && buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) < buffer_high && channel_not_very_much_buffered_data()) FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp); /* * Read from stdin, unless we have seen EOF or have very much * buffered data to send to the server. */ if (!stdin_eof && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) FD_SET(fileno(stdin), *readsetp); /* Select stdout/stderr if have data in buffer. */ if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0) FD_SET(fileno(stdout), *writesetp); if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0) FD_SET(fileno(stderr), *writesetp); } else { /* channel_prepare_select could have closed the last channel */ if (session_closed && !channel_still_open() && !packet_have_data_to_write()) { /* clear mask since we did not call select() */ memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp); memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp); return; } else { FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp); } } /* Select server connection if have data to write to the server. */ if (packet_have_data_to_write()) FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp); /* * Wait for something to happen. This will suspend the process until * some selected descriptor can be read, written, or has some other * event pending, or a timeout expires. */ timeout_secs = INT_MAX; /* we use INT_MAX to mean no timeout */ if (options.server_alive_interval > 0 && compat20) { timeout_secs = options.server_alive_interval; server_alive_time = now + options.server_alive_interval; } if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && compat20 && !rekeying) timeout_secs = MIN(timeout_secs, packet_get_rekey_timeout()); set_control_persist_exit_time(); if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) { timeout_secs = MIN(timeout_secs, control_persist_exit_time - now); if (timeout_secs < 0) timeout_secs = 0; } if (minwait_secs != 0) timeout_secs = MIN(timeout_secs, (int)minwait_secs); if (timeout_secs == INT_MAX) tvp = NULL; else { tv.tv_sec = timeout_secs; tv.tv_usec = 0; tvp = &tv; } ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp); if (ret < 0) { char buf[100]; /* * We have to clear the select masks, because we return. * We have to return, because the mainloop checks for the flags * set by the signal handlers. */ memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp); memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp); if (errno == EINTR) return; /* Note: we might still have data in the buffers. */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "select: %s\r\n", strerror(errno)); buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); quit_pending = 1; } else if (ret == 0) { /* * Timeout. Could have been either keepalive or rekeying. * Keepalive we check here, rekeying is checked in clientloop. */ if (server_alive_time != 0 && server_alive_time <= monotime()) server_alive_check(); } } static void client_suspend_self(Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr) { /* Flush stdout and stderr buffers. */ if (buffer_len(bout) > 0) atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(bout), buffer_len(bout)); if (buffer_len(berr) > 0) atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(berr), buffer_len(berr)); leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); /* * Free (and clear) the buffer to reduce the amount of data that gets * written to swap. */ buffer_free(bin); buffer_free(bout); buffer_free(berr); /* Send the suspend signal to the program itself. */ kill(getpid(), SIGTSTP); /* Reset window sizes in case they have changed */ received_window_change_signal = 1; /* OK, we have been continued by the user. Reinitialize buffers. */ buffer_init(bin); buffer_init(bout); buffer_init(berr); enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); } static void client_process_net_input(fd_set *readset) { int len, cont = 0; char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ]; /* * Read input from the server, and add any such data to the buffer of * the packet subsystem. */ if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) { /* Read as much as possible. */ len = roaming_read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf), &cont); if (len == 0 && cont == 0) { /* * Received EOF. The remote host has closed the * connection. */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "Connection to %.300s closed by remote host.\r\n", host); buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); quit_pending = 1; return; } /* * There is a kernel bug on Solaris that causes select to * sometimes wake up even though there is no data available. */ if (len < 0 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) len = 0; if (len < 0) { /* * An error has encountered. Perhaps there is a * network problem. */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "Read from remote host %.300s: %.100s\r\n", host, strerror(errno)); buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); quit_pending = 1; return; } packet_process_incoming(buf, len); } } static void client_status_confirm(int type, Channel *c, void *ctx) { struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = (struct channel_reply_ctx *)ctx; char errmsg[256]; int tochan; /* * If a TTY was explicitly requested, then a failure to allocate * one is fatal. */ if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY && (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE || options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES)) cr->action = CONFIRM_CLOSE; /* XXX supress on mux _client_ quietmode */ tochan = options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR && c->ctl_chan != -1 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE; if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) { debug2("%s request accepted on channel %d", cr->request_type, c->self); } else if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) { if (tochan) { snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), "%s request failed\r\n", cr->request_type); } else { snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), "%s request failed on channel %d", cr->request_type, c->self); } /* If error occurred on primary session channel, then exit */ if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE && c->self == session_ident) fatal("%s", errmsg); /* * If error occurred on mux client, append to * their stderr. */ if (tochan) { buffer_append(&c->extended, errmsg, strlen(errmsg)); } else error("%s", errmsg); if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY) { /* * If a TTY allocation error occurred, then arrange * for the correct TTY to leave raw mode. */ if (c->self == session_ident) leave_raw_mode(0); else mux_tty_alloc_failed(c); } else if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE) { chan_read_failed(c); chan_write_failed(c); } } free(cr); } static void client_abandon_status_confirm(Channel *c, void *ctx) { free(ctx); } void client_expect_confirm(int id, const char *request, enum confirm_action action) { struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cr)); cr->request_type = request; cr->action = action; channel_register_status_confirm(id, client_status_confirm, client_abandon_status_confirm, cr); } void client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *cb, void *ctx) { struct global_confirm *gc, *last_gc; /* Coalesce identical callbacks */ last_gc = TAILQ_LAST(&global_confirms, global_confirms); if (last_gc && last_gc->cb == cb && last_gc->ctx == ctx) { if (++last_gc->ref_count >= INT_MAX) fatal("%s: last_gc->ref_count = %d", __func__, last_gc->ref_count); return; } gc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*gc)); gc->cb = cb; gc->ctx = ctx; gc->ref_count = 1; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&global_confirms, gc, entry); } static void process_cmdline(void) { void (*handler)(int); char *s, *cmd; int ok, delete = 0, local = 0, remote = 0, dynamic = 0; struct Forward fwd; memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); handler = signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); cmd = s = read_passphrase("\r\nssh> ", RP_ECHO); if (s == NULL) goto out; while (isspace((u_char)*s)) s++; if (*s == '-') s++; /* Skip cmdline '-', if any */ if (*s == '\0') goto out; if (*s == 'h' || *s == 'H' || *s == '?') { logit("Commands:"); logit(" -L[bind_address:]port:host:hostport " "Request local forward"); logit(" -R[bind_address:]port:host:hostport " "Request remote forward"); logit(" -D[bind_address:]port " "Request dynamic forward"); logit(" -KL[bind_address:]port " "Cancel local forward"); logit(" -KR[bind_address:]port " "Cancel remote forward"); logit(" -KD[bind_address:]port " "Cancel dynamic forward"); if (!options.permit_local_command) goto out; logit(" !args " "Execute local command"); goto out; } if (*s == '!' && options.permit_local_command) { s++; ssh_local_cmd(s); goto out; } if (*s == 'K') { delete = 1; s++; } if (*s == 'L') local = 1; else if (*s == 'R') remote = 1; else if (*s == 'D') dynamic = 1; else { logit("Invalid command."); goto out; } if (delete && !compat20) { logit("Not supported for SSH protocol version 1."); goto out; } while (isspace((u_char)*++s)) ; /* XXX update list of forwards in options */ if (delete) { /* We pass 1 for dynamicfwd to restrict to 1 or 2 fields. */ if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, 1, 0)) { logit("Bad forwarding close specification."); goto out; } if (remote) ok = channel_request_rforward_cancel(&fwd) == 0; else if (dynamic) ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(&fwd, 0, &options.fwd_opts) > 0; else ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(&fwd, CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC, &options.fwd_opts) > 0; if (!ok) { logit("Unkown port forwarding."); goto out; } logit("Canceled forwarding."); } else { if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, dynamic, remote)) { logit("Bad forwarding specification."); goto out; } if (local || dynamic) { if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(&fwd, &options.fwd_opts)) { logit("Port forwarding failed."); goto out; } } else { if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(&fwd) < 0) { logit("Port forwarding failed."); goto out; } } logit("Forwarding port."); } out: signal(SIGINT, handler); enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); free(cmd); free(fwd.listen_host); free(fwd.listen_path); free(fwd.connect_host); free(fwd.connect_path); } /* reasons to suppress output of an escape command in help output */ #define SUPPRESS_NEVER 0 /* never suppress, always show */ #define SUPPRESS_PROTO1 1 /* don't show in protocol 1 sessions */ #define SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT 2 /* don't show in mux client sessions */ #define SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER 4 /* don't show in mux master sessions */ #define SUPPRESS_SYSLOG 8 /* don't show when logging to syslog */ struct escape_help_text { const char *cmd; const char *text; unsigned int flags; }; static struct escape_help_text esc_txt[] = { {".", "terminate session", SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER}, {".", "terminate connection (and any multiplexed sessions)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"B", "send a BREAK to the remote system", SUPPRESS_PROTO1}, {"C", "open a command line", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"R", "request rekey", SUPPRESS_PROTO1}, {"V/v", "decrease/increase verbosity (LogLevel)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"^Z", "suspend ssh", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"#", "list forwarded connections", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, {"&", "background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"?", "this message", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, }; static void print_escape_help(Buffer *b, int escape_char, int protocol2, int mux_client, int using_stderr) { unsigned int i, suppress_flags; char string[1024]; snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c?\r\n" "Supported escape sequences:\r\n", escape_char); buffer_append(b, string, strlen(string)); suppress_flags = (protocol2 ? 0 : SUPPRESS_PROTO1) | (mux_client ? SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT : 0) | (mux_client ? 0 : SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER) | (using_stderr ? 0 : SUPPRESS_SYSLOG); for (i = 0; i < sizeof(esc_txt)/sizeof(esc_txt[0]); i++) { if (esc_txt[i].flags & suppress_flags) continue; snprintf(string, sizeof string, " %c%-3s - %s\r\n", escape_char, esc_txt[i].cmd, esc_txt[i].text); buffer_append(b, string, strlen(string)); } snprintf(string, sizeof string, " %c%c - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n" "(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after " "newline.)\r\n", escape_char, escape_char); buffer_append(b, string, strlen(string)); } /* * Process the characters one by one, call with c==NULL for proto1 case. */ static int process_escapes(Channel *c, Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr, char *buf, int len) { char string[1024]; pid_t pid; int bytes = 0; u_int i; u_char ch; char *s; int *escape_pendingp, escape_char; struct escape_filter_ctx *efc; if (c == NULL) { escape_pendingp = &escape_pending1; escape_char = escape_char1; } else { if (c->filter_ctx == NULL) return 0; efc = (struct escape_filter_ctx *)c->filter_ctx; escape_pendingp = &efc->escape_pending; escape_char = efc->escape_char; } if (len <= 0) return (0); for (i = 0; i < (u_int)len; i++) { /* Get one character at a time. */ ch = buf[i]; if (*escape_pendingp) { /* We have previously seen an escape character. */ /* Clear the flag now. */ *escape_pendingp = 0; /* Process the escaped character. */ switch (ch) { case '.': /* Terminate the connection. */ snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c.\r\n", escape_char); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) { chan_read_failed(c); chan_write_failed(c); if (c->detach_user) c->detach_user(c->self, NULL); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED; buffer_clear(&c->input); chan_ibuf_empty(c); return 0; } else quit_pending = 1; return -1; case 'Z' - 64: /* XXX support this for mux clients */ if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) { char b[16]; noescape: if (ch == 'Z' - 64) snprintf(b, sizeof b, "^Z"); else snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%c", ch); snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c%s escape not available to " "multiplexed sessions\r\n", escape_char, b); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); continue; } /* Suspend the program. Inform the user */ snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c^Z [suspend ssh]\r\n", escape_char); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); /* Restore terminal modes and suspend. */ client_suspend_self(bin, bout, berr); /* We have been continued. */ continue; case 'B': if (compat20) { snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%cB\r\n", escape_char); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); channel_request_start(c->self, "break", 0); packet_put_int(1000); packet_send(); } continue; case 'R': if (compat20) { if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY) logit("Server does not " "support re-keying"); else need_rekeying = 1; } continue; case 'V': /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 'v': if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) goto noescape; if (!log_is_on_stderr()) { snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c%c [Logging to syslog]\r\n", escape_char, ch); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); continue; } if (ch == 'V' && options.log_level > SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) log_change_level(--options.log_level); if (ch == 'v' && options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) log_change_level(++options.log_level); snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c%c [LogLevel %s]\r\n", escape_char, ch, log_level_name(options.log_level)); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); continue; case '&': if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) goto noescape; /* * Detach the program (continue to serve * connections, but put in background and no * more new connections). */ /* Restore tty modes. */ leave_raw_mode( options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); /* Stop listening for new connections. */ channel_stop_listening(); snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c& [backgrounded]\n", escape_char); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); /* Fork into background. */ pid = fork(); if (pid < 0) { error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } if (pid != 0) { /* This is the parent. */ /* The parent just exits. */ exit(0); } /* The child continues serving connections. */ if (compat20) { buffer_append(bin, "\004", 1); /* fake EOF on stdin */ return -1; } else if (!stdin_eof) { /* * Sending SSH_CMSG_EOF alone does not * always appear to be enough. So we * try to send an EOF character first. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA); packet_put_string("\004", 1); packet_send(); /* Close stdin. */ stdin_eof = 1; if (buffer_len(bin) == 0) { packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); packet_send(); } } continue; case '?': print_escape_help(berr, escape_char, compat20, (c && c->ctl_chan != -1), log_is_on_stderr()); continue; case '#': snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c#\r\n", escape_char); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); s = channel_open_message(); buffer_append(berr, s, strlen(s)); free(s); continue; case 'C': if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) goto noescape; process_cmdline(); continue; default: if (ch != escape_char) { buffer_put_char(bin, escape_char); bytes++; } /* Escaped characters fall through here */ break; } } else { /* * The previous character was not an escape char. * Check if this is an escape. */ if (last_was_cr && ch == escape_char) { /* * It is. Set the flag and continue to * next character. */ *escape_pendingp = 1; continue; } } /* * Normal character. Record whether it was a newline, * and append it to the buffer. */ last_was_cr = (ch == '\r' || ch == '\n'); buffer_put_char(bin, ch); bytes++; } return bytes; } static void client_process_input(fd_set *readset) { int len; char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ]; /* Read input from stdin. */ if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdin), readset)) { /* Read as much as possible. */ len = read(fileno(stdin), buf, sizeof(buf)); if (len < 0 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) return; /* we'll try again later */ if (len <= 0) { /* * Received EOF or error. They are treated * similarly, except that an error message is printed * if it was an error condition. */ if (len < 0) { snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "read: %.100s\r\n", strerror(errno)); buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); } /* Mark that we have seen EOF. */ stdin_eof = 1; /* * Send an EOF message to the server unless there is * data in the buffer. If there is data in the * buffer, no message will be sent now. Code * elsewhere will send the EOF when the buffer * becomes empty if stdin_eof is set. */ if (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) { packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); packet_send(); } } else if (escape_char1 == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) { /* * Normal successful read, and no escape character. * Just append the data to buffer. */ buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, buf, len); } else { /* * Normal, successful read. But we have an escape * character and have to process the characters one * by one. */ if (process_escapes(NULL, &stdin_buffer, &stdout_buffer, &stderr_buffer, buf, len) == -1) return; } } } static void client_process_output(fd_set *writeset) { int len; char buf[100]; /* Write buffered output to stdout. */ if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdout), writeset)) { /* Write as much data as possible. */ len = write(fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), buffer_len(&stdout_buffer)); if (len <= 0) { if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) len = 0; else { /* * An error or EOF was encountered. Put an * error message to stderr buffer. */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "write stdout: %.50s\r\n", strerror(errno)); buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); quit_pending = 1; return; } } /* Consume printed data from the buffer. */ buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len); } /* Write buffered output to stderr. */ if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stderr), writeset)) { /* Write as much data as possible. */ len = write(fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer), buffer_len(&stderr_buffer)); if (len <= 0) { if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) len = 0; else { /* * EOF or error, but can't even print * error message. */ quit_pending = 1; return; } } /* Consume printed characters from the buffer. */ buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len); } } /* * Get packets from the connection input buffer, and process them as long as * there are packets available. * * Any unknown packets received during the actual * session cause the session to terminate. This is * intended to make debugging easier since no * confirmations are sent. Any compatible protocol * extensions must be negotiated during the * preparatory phase. */ static void client_process_buffered_input_packets(void) { dispatch_run(DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, &quit_pending, active_state); } /* scan buf[] for '~' before sending data to the peer */ /* Helper: allocate a new escape_filter_ctx and fill in its escape char */ void * client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int escape_char) { struct escape_filter_ctx *ret; ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret)); ret->escape_pending = 0; ret->escape_char = escape_char; return (void *)ret; } /* Free the escape filter context on channel free */ void client_filter_cleanup(int cid, void *ctx) { free(ctx); } int client_simple_escape_filter(Channel *c, char *buf, int len) { if (c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE) return 0; return process_escapes(c, &c->input, &c->output, &c->extended, buf, len); } static void client_channel_closed(int id, void *arg) { channel_cancel_cleanup(id); session_closed = 1; leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); } /* * Implements the interactive session with the server. This is called after * the user has been authenticated, and a command has been started on the * remote host. If escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, it is the character * used as an escape character for terminating or suspending the session. */ int client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id) { fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL; double start_time, total_time; int r, max_fd = 0, max_fd2 = 0, len, rekeying = 0; u_int64_t ibytes, obytes; u_int nalloc = 0; char buf[100]; debug("Entering interactive session."); start_time = get_current_time(); /* Initialize variables. */ escape_pending1 = 0; last_was_cr = 1; exit_status = -1; stdin_eof = 0; buffer_high = 64 * 1024; connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out); if (!compat20) { /* enable nonblocking unless tty */ if (!isatty(fileno(stdin))) set_nonblock(fileno(stdin)); if (!isatty(fileno(stdout))) set_nonblock(fileno(stdout)); if (!isatty(fileno(stderr))) set_nonblock(fileno(stderr)); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fileno(stdin)); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fileno(stdout)); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fileno(stderr)); } quit_pending = 0; escape_char1 = escape_char_arg; /* Initialize buffers. */ buffer_init(&stdin_buffer); buffer_init(&stdout_buffer); buffer_init(&stderr_buffer); client_init_dispatch(); /* * Set signal handlers, (e.g. to restore non-blocking mode) * but don't overwrite SIG_IGN, matches behaviour from rsh(1) */ if (signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) signal(SIGHUP, signal_handler); if (signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) signal(SIGINT, signal_handler); if (signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) signal(SIGQUIT, signal_handler); if (signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) signal(SIGTERM, signal_handler); signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler); if (have_pty) enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); if (compat20) { session_ident = ssh2_chan_id; if (session_ident != -1) { if (escape_char_arg != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) { channel_register_filter(session_ident, client_simple_escape_filter, NULL, client_filter_cleanup, client_new_escape_filter_ctx( escape_char_arg)); } channel_register_cleanup(session_ident, client_channel_closed, 0); } } else { /* Check if we should immediately send eof on stdin. */ client_check_initial_eof_on_stdin(); } /* Main loop of the client for the interactive session mode. */ while (!quit_pending) { /* Process buffered packets sent by the server. */ client_process_buffered_input_packets(); if (compat20 && session_closed && !channel_still_open()) break; rekeying = (active_state->kex != NULL && !active_state->kex->done); if (rekeying) { debug("rekeying in progress"); } else { /* * Make packets of buffered stdin data, and buffer * them for sending to the server. */ if (!compat20) client_make_packets_from_stdin_data(); /* * Make packets from buffered channel data, and * enqueue them for sending to the server. */ if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) channel_output_poll(); /* * Check if the window size has changed, and buffer a * message about it to the server if so. */ client_check_window_change(); if (quit_pending) break; } /* * Wait until we have something to do (something becomes * available on one of the descriptors). */ max_fd2 = max_fd; client_wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset, &max_fd2, &nalloc, rekeying); if (quit_pending) break; /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */ if (!rekeying) { channel_after_select(readset, writeset); if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) { debug("need rekeying"); active_state->kex->done = 0; if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(active_state)) != 0) fatal("%s: kex_send_kexinit: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); need_rekeying = 0; } } /* Buffer input from the connection. */ client_process_net_input(readset); if (quit_pending) break; if (!compat20) { /* Buffer data from stdin */ client_process_input(readset); /* * Process output to stdout and stderr. Output to * the connection is processed elsewhere (above). */ client_process_output(writeset); } if (session_resumed) { connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, connection_out); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, connection_in); session_resumed = 0; } /* * Send as much buffered packet data as possible to the * sender. */ if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset)) packet_write_poll(); /* * If we are a backgrounded control master, and the * timeout has expired without any active client * connections, then quit. */ if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) { if (monotime() >= control_persist_exit_time) { debug("ControlPersist timeout expired"); break; } } } free(readset); free(writeset); /* Terminate the session. */ /* Stop watching for window change. */ signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL); if (compat20) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT); packet_put_int(SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION); packet_put_cstring("disconnected by user"); packet_put_cstring(""); /* language tag */ packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } channel_free_all(); if (have_pty) leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); /* restore blocking io */ if (!isatty(fileno(stdin))) unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin)); if (!isatty(fileno(stdout))) unset_nonblock(fileno(stdout)); if (!isatty(fileno(stderr))) unset_nonblock(fileno(stderr)); /* * If there was no shell or command requested, there will be no remote * exit status to be returned. In that case, clear error code if the * connection was deliberately terminated at this end. */ if (no_shell_flag && received_signal == SIGTERM) { received_signal = 0; exit_status = 0; } if (received_signal) fatal("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal); /* * In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating * that the connection has been closed. */ if (have_pty && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) { snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "Connection to %.64s closed.\r\n", host); buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); } /* Output any buffered data for stdout. */ if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0) { len = atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), buffer_len(&stdout_buffer)); if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != buffer_len(&stdout_buffer)) error("Write failed flushing stdout buffer."); else buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len); } /* Output any buffered data for stderr. */ if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0) { len = atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer), buffer_len(&stderr_buffer)); if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != buffer_len(&stderr_buffer)) error("Write failed flushing stderr buffer."); else buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len); } /* Clear and free any buffers. */ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); buffer_free(&stdin_buffer); buffer_free(&stdout_buffer); buffer_free(&stderr_buffer); /* Report bytes transferred, and transfer rates. */ total_time = get_current_time() - start_time; packet_get_bytes(&ibytes, &obytes); verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes, in %.1f seconds", (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes, total_time); if (total_time > 0) verbose("Bytes per second: sent %.1f, received %.1f", obytes / total_time, ibytes / total_time); /* Return the exit status of the program. */ debug("Exit status %d", exit_status); return exit_status; } /*********/ static int client_input_stdout_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { u_int data_len; char *data = packet_get_string(&data_len); packet_check_eom(); buffer_append(&stdout_buffer, data, data_len); explicit_bzero(data, data_len); free(data); return 0; } static int client_input_stderr_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { u_int data_len; char *data = packet_get_string(&data_len); packet_check_eom(); buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, data, data_len); explicit_bzero(data, data_len); free(data); return 0; } static int client_input_exit_status(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { exit_status = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); /* Acknowledge the exit. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION); packet_send(); /* * Must wait for packet to be sent since we are * exiting the loop. */ packet_write_wait(); /* Flag that we want to exit. */ quit_pending = 1; return 0; } static int client_input_agent_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c = NULL; int r, remote_id, sock; /* Read the remote channel number from the message. */ remote_id = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); /* * Get a connection to the local authentication agent (this may again * get forwarded). */ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&sock)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT) debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* * If we could not connect the agent, send an error message back to * the server. This should never happen unless the agent dies, * because authentication forwarding is only enabled if we have an * agent. */ if (sock >= 0) { c = channel_new("", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, 0, 0, 0, "authentication agent connection", 1); c->remote_id = remote_id; c->force_drain = 1; } if (c == NULL) { packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); packet_put_int(remote_id); } else { /* Send a confirmation to the remote host. */ debug("Forwarding authentication connection."); packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); packet_put_int(remote_id); packet_put_int(c->self); } packet_send(); return 0; } static Channel * client_request_forwarded_tcpip(const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; char *listen_address, *originator_address; u_short listen_port, originator_port; /* Get rest of the packet */ listen_address = packet_get_string(NULL); listen_port = packet_get_int(); originator_address = packet_get_string(NULL); originator_port = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); debug("%s: listen %s port %d, originator %s port %d", __func__, listen_address, listen_port, originator_address, originator_port); c = channel_connect_by_listen_address(listen_address, listen_port, "forwarded-tcpip", originator_address); free(originator_address); free(listen_address); return c; } static Channel * client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; char *listen_path; /* Get the remote path. */ listen_path = packet_get_string(NULL); /* XXX: Skip reserved field for now. */ if (packet_get_string_ptr(NULL) == NULL) fatal("%s: packet_get_string_ptr failed", __func__); packet_check_eom(); debug("%s: %s", __func__, listen_path); c = channel_connect_by_listen_path(listen_path, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com", "forwarded-streamlocal"); free(listen_path); return c; } static Channel * client_request_x11(const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; char *originator; u_short originator_port; int sock; if (!options.forward_x11) { error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding."); error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a " "malicious server."); return NULL; } - if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) { + if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) { verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout " "expired"); return NULL; } originator = packet_get_string(NULL); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_X11FWD) { debug2("buggy server: x11 request w/o originator_port"); originator_port = 0; } else { originator_port = packet_get_int(); } packet_check_eom(); /* XXX check permission */ debug("client_request_x11: request from %s %d", originator, originator_port); free(originator); sock = x11_connect_display(); if (sock < 0) return NULL; c = channel_new("x11", SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1); c->force_drain = 1; return c; } static Channel * client_request_agent(const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; int r, sock; if (!options.forward_agent) { error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding."); error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a " "malicious server."); return NULL; } if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&sock)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT) debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return NULL; } c = channel_new("authentication agent connection", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "authentication agent connection", 1); c->force_drain = 1; return c; } int client_request_tun_fwd(int tun_mode, int local_tun, int remote_tun) { Channel *c; int fd; if (tun_mode == SSH_TUNMODE_NO) return 0; if (!compat20) { error("Tunnel forwarding is not supported for protocol 1"); return -1; } debug("Requesting tun unit %d in mode %d", local_tun, tun_mode); /* Open local tunnel device */ if ((fd = tun_open(local_tun, tun_mode)) == -1) { error("Tunnel device open failed."); return -1; } c = channel_new("tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1); c->datagram = 1; #if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER) if (options.tun_open == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT) channel_register_filter(c->self, sys_tun_infilter, sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL); #endif packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN); packet_put_cstring("tun@openssh.com"); packet_put_int(c->self); packet_put_int(c->local_window_max); packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); packet_put_int(tun_mode); packet_put_int(remote_tun); packet_send(); return 0; } /* XXXX move to generic input handler */ static int client_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c = NULL; char *ctype; int rchan; u_int rmaxpack, rwindow, len; ctype = packet_get_string(&len); rchan = packet_get_int(); rwindow = packet_get_int(); rmaxpack = packet_get_int(); debug("client_input_channel_open: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d", ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack); if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-tcpip") == 0) { c = client_request_forwarded_tcpip(ctype, rchan); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { c = client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(ctype, rchan); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "x11") == 0) { c = client_request_x11(ctype, rchan); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "auth-agent@openssh.com") == 0) { c = client_request_agent(ctype, rchan); } /* XXX duplicate : */ if (c != NULL) { debug("confirm %s", ctype); c->remote_id = rchan; c->remote_window = rwindow; c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack; if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_int(c->self); packet_put_int(c->local_window); packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); packet_send(); } } else { debug("failure %s", ctype); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); packet_put_int(rchan); packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED); if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) { packet_put_cstring("open failed"); packet_put_cstring(""); } packet_send(); } free(ctype); return 0; } static int client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c = NULL; int exitval, id, reply, success = 0; char *rtype; id = packet_get_int(); rtype = packet_get_string(NULL); reply = packet_get_char(); debug("client_input_channel_req: channel %d rtype %s reply %d", id, rtype, reply); if (id == -1) { error("client_input_channel_req: request for channel -1"); } else if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) { error("client_input_channel_req: channel %d: " "unknown channel", id); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com") == 0) { packet_check_eom(); chan_rcvd_eow(c); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exit-status") == 0) { exitval = packet_get_int(); if (c->ctl_chan != -1) { mux_exit_message(c, exitval); success = 1; } else if (id == session_ident) { /* Record exit value of local session */ success = 1; exit_status = exitval; } else { /* Probably for a mux channel that has already closed */ debug("%s: no sink for exit-status on channel %d", __func__, id); } packet_check_eom(); } if (reply && c != NULL && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) { packet_start(success ? SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_send(); } free(rtype); return 0; } struct hostkeys_update_ctx { /* The hostname and (optionally) IP address string for the server */ char *host_str, *ip_str; /* * Keys received from the server and a flag for each indicating * whether they already exist in known_hosts. * keys_seen is filled in by hostkeys_find() and later (for new * keys) by client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm(). */ struct sshkey **keys; int *keys_seen; size_t nkeys; size_t nnew; /* * Keys that are in known_hosts, but were not present in the update * from the server (i.e. scheduled to be deleted). * Filled in by hostkeys_find(). */ struct sshkey **old_keys; size_t nold; }; static void hostkeys_update_ctx_free(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx) { size_t i; if (ctx == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) sshkey_free(ctx->keys[i]); free(ctx->keys); free(ctx->keys_seen); for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) sshkey_free(ctx->old_keys[i]); free(ctx->old_keys); free(ctx->host_str); free(ctx->ip_str); free(ctx); } static int hostkeys_find(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx; size_t i; struct sshkey **tmp; if (l->status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED || l->key == NULL || l->key->type == KEY_RSA1) return 0; /* Mark off keys we've already seen for this host */ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (sshkey_equal(l->key, ctx->keys[i])) { debug3("%s: found %s key at %s:%ld", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(ctx->keys[i]), l->path, l->linenum); ctx->keys_seen[i] = 1; return 0; } } /* This line contained a key that not offered by the server */ debug3("%s: deprecated %s key at %s:%ld", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(l->key), l->path, l->linenum); if ((tmp = reallocarray(ctx->old_keys, ctx->nold + 1, sizeof(*ctx->old_keys))) == NULL) fatal("%s: reallocarray failed nold = %zu", __func__, ctx->nold); ctx->old_keys = tmp; ctx->old_keys[ctx->nold++] = l->key; l->key = NULL; return 0; } static void update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx) { int r, was_raw = 0; int loglevel = options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; char *fp, *response; size_t i; for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (ctx->keys_seen[i] != 2) continue; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); do_log2(loglevel, "Learned new hostkey: %s %s", sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), fp); free(fp); } for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->old_keys[i], options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); do_log2(loglevel, "Deprecating obsolete hostkey: %s %s", sshkey_type(ctx->old_keys[i]), fp); free(fp); } if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) { if (get_saved_tio() != NULL) { leave_raw_mode(1); was_raw = 1; } response = NULL; for (i = 0; !quit_pending && i < 3; i++) { free(response); response = read_passphrase("Accept updated hostkeys? " "(yes/no): ", RP_ECHO); if (strcasecmp(response, "yes") == 0) break; else if (quit_pending || response == NULL || strcasecmp(response, "no") == 0) { options.update_hostkeys = 0; break; } else { do_log2(loglevel, "Please enter " "\"yes\" or \"no\""); } } if (quit_pending || i >= 3 || response == NULL) options.update_hostkeys = 0; free(response); if (was_raw) enter_raw_mode(1); } /* * Now that all the keys are verified, we can go ahead and replace * them in known_hosts (assuming SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK didn't * cancel the operation). */ if (options.update_hostkeys != 0 && (r = hostfile_replace_entries(options.user_hostfiles[0], ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str, ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys, options.hash_known_hosts, 0, options.fingerprint_hash)) != 0) error("%s: hostfile_replace_entries failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } static void client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *_ctx) { struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx; size_t i, ndone; struct sshbuf *signdata; int r; const u_char *sig; size_t siglen; if (ctx->nnew == 0) fatal("%s: ctx->nnew == 0", __func__); /* sanity */ if (type != SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) { error("Server failed to confirm ownership of " "private host keys"); hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx); return; } if ((signdata = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* Don't want to accidentally accept an unbound signature */ if (ssh->kex->session_id_len == 0) fatal("%s: ssh->kex->session_id_len == 0", __func__); /* * Expect a signature for each of the ctx->nnew private keys we * haven't seen before. They will be in the same order as the * ctx->keys where the corresponding ctx->keys_seen[i] == 0. */ for (ndone = i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (ctx->keys_seen[i]) continue; /* Prepare data to be signed: session ID, unique string, key */ sshbuf_reset(signdata); if ( (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(signdata, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(signdata, ssh->kex->session_id, ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_puts(ctx->keys[i], signdata)) != 0) fatal("%s: failed to prepare signature: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* Extract and verify signature */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &sig, &siglen)) != 0) { error("%s: couldn't parse message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_verify(ctx->keys[i], sig, siglen, sshbuf_ptr(signdata), sshbuf_len(signdata), 0)) != 0) { error("%s: server gave bad signature for %s key %zu", __func__, sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i); goto out; } /* Key is good. Mark it as 'seen' */ ctx->keys_seen[i] = 2; ndone++; } if (ndone != ctx->nnew) fatal("%s: ndone != ctx->nnew (%zu / %zu)", __func__, ndone, ctx->nnew); /* Shouldn't happen */ ssh_packet_check_eom(ssh); /* Make the edits to known_hosts */ update_known_hosts(ctx); out: hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx); } /* * Handle hostkeys-00@openssh.com global request to inform the client of all * the server's hostkeys. The keys are checked against the user's * HostkeyAlgorithms preference before they are accepted. */ static int client_input_hostkeys(void) { struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ const u_char *blob = NULL; size_t i, len = 0; struct sshbuf *buf = NULL; struct sshkey *key = NULL, **tmp; int r; char *fp; static int hostkeys_seen = 0; /* XXX use struct ssh */ extern struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; /* XXX from ssh.c */ struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = NULL; if (hostkeys_seen) fatal("%s: server already sent hostkeys", __func__); if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK && options.batch_mode) return 1; /* won't ask in batchmode, so don't even try */ if (!options.update_hostkeys || options.num_user_hostfiles <= 0) return 1; ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ctx)); while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) { sshkey_free(key); key = NULL; if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &len)) != 0) { error("%s: couldn't parse message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, len, &key)) != 0) { error("%s: parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); debug3("%s: received %s key %s", __func__, sshkey_type(key), fp); free(fp); /* Check that the key is accepted in HostkeyAlgorithms */ if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL && match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), - options.hostkeyalgorithms, - strlen(options.hostkeyalgorithms), 0) != 1) { + options.hostkeyalgorithms, 0) != 1) { debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); continue; } /* Skip certs */ if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { debug3("%s: %s key is a certificate; skipping", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); continue; } /* Ensure keys are unique */ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (sshkey_equal(key, ctx->keys[i])) { error("%s: received duplicated %s host key", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key)); goto out; } } /* Key is good, record it */ if ((tmp = reallocarray(ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys + 1, sizeof(*ctx->keys))) == NULL) fatal("%s: reallocarray failed nkeys = %zu", __func__, ctx->nkeys); ctx->keys = tmp; ctx->keys[ctx->nkeys++] = key; key = NULL; } if (ctx->nkeys == 0) { debug("%s: server sent no hostkeys", __func__); goto out; } if ((ctx->keys_seen = calloc(ctx->nkeys, sizeof(*ctx->keys_seen))) == NULL) fatal("%s: calloc failed", __func__); get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host, options.check_host_ip ? (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr : NULL, options.port, &ctx->host_str, options.check_host_ip ? &ctx->ip_str : NULL); /* Find which keys we already know about. */ if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(options.user_hostfiles[0], hostkeys_find, ctx, ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str, HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY|HKF_WANT_MATCH)) != 0) { error("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } /* Figure out if we have any new keys to add */ ctx->nnew = 0; for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (!ctx->keys_seen[i]) ctx->nnew++; } debug3("%s: %zu keys from server: %zu new, %zu retained. %zu to remove", __func__, ctx->nkeys, ctx->nnew, ctx->nkeys - ctx->nnew, ctx->nold); if (ctx->nnew == 0 && ctx->nold != 0) { /* We have some keys to remove. Just do it. */ update_known_hosts(ctx); } else if (ctx->nnew != 0) { /* * We have received hitherto-unseen keys from the server. * Ask the server to confirm ownership of the private halves. */ debug3("%s: asking server to prove ownership for %zu keys", __func__, ctx->nnew); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* bool: want reply */ fatal("%s: cannot prepare packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (ctx->keys_seen[i]) continue; sshbuf_reset(buf); if ((r = sshkey_putb(ctx->keys[i], buf)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshkey_putb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshpkt_put_string: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshpkt_send: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); client_register_global_confirm( client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm, ctx); ctx = NULL; /* will be freed in callback */ } /* Success */ out: hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx); sshkey_free(key); sshbuf_free(buf); /* * NB. Return success for all cases. The server doesn't need to know * what the client does with its hosts file. */ return 1; } static int client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { char *rtype; int want_reply; int success = 0; rtype = packet_get_cstring(NULL); want_reply = packet_get_char(); debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d", rtype, want_reply); if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-00@openssh.com") == 0) success = client_input_hostkeys(); if (want_reply) { packet_start(success ? SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } free(rtype); return 0; } void client_session2_setup(int id, int want_tty, int want_subsystem, const char *term, struct termios *tiop, int in_fd, Buffer *cmd, char **env) { int len; Channel *c = NULL; debug2("%s: id %d", __func__, id); if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) fatal("client_session2_setup: channel %d: unknown channel", id); packet_set_interactive(want_tty, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); if (want_tty) { struct winsize ws; /* Store window size in the packet. */ if (ioctl(in_fd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0) memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws)); channel_request_start(id, "pty-req", 1); client_expect_confirm(id, "PTY allocation", CONFIRM_TTY); packet_put_cstring(term != NULL ? term : ""); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel); if (tiop == NULL) tiop = get_saved_tio(); tty_make_modes(-1, tiop); packet_send(); /* XXX wait for reply */ c->client_tty = 1; } /* Transfer any environment variables from client to server */ if (options.num_send_env != 0 && env != NULL) { int i, j, matched; char *name, *val; debug("Sending environment."); for (i = 0; env[i] != NULL; i++) { /* Split */ name = xstrdup(env[i]); if ((val = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) { free(name); continue; } *val++ = '\0'; matched = 0; for (j = 0; j < options.num_send_env; j++) { if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[j])) { matched = 1; break; } } if (!matched) { debug3("Ignored env %s", name); free(name); continue; } debug("Sending env %s = %s", name, val); channel_request_start(id, "env", 0); packet_put_cstring(name); packet_put_cstring(val); packet_send(); free(name); } } len = buffer_len(cmd); if (len > 0) { if (len > 900) len = 900; if (want_subsystem) { debug("Sending subsystem: %.*s", len, (u_char*)buffer_ptr(cmd)); channel_request_start(id, "subsystem", 1); client_expect_confirm(id, "subsystem", CONFIRM_CLOSE); } else { debug("Sending command: %.*s", len, (u_char*)buffer_ptr(cmd)); channel_request_start(id, "exec", 1); client_expect_confirm(id, "exec", CONFIRM_CLOSE); } packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(cmd), buffer_len(cmd)); packet_send(); } else { channel_request_start(id, "shell", 1); client_expect_confirm(id, "shell", CONFIRM_CLOSE); packet_send(); } } static void client_init_dispatch_20(void) { dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &client_input_channel_open); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &client_input_channel_req); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &channel_input_status_confirm); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &channel_input_status_confirm); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &client_input_global_request); /* rekeying */ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); /* global request reply messages */ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &client_global_request_reply); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &client_global_request_reply); } static void client_init_dispatch_13(void) { dispatch_init(NULL); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_close); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_close_confirmation); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN, &channel_input_port_open); dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS, &client_input_exit_status); dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA, &client_input_stderr_data); dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA, &client_input_stdout_data); dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN, options.forward_agent ? &client_input_agent_open : &deny_input_open); dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN, options.forward_x11 ? &x11_input_open : &deny_input_open); } static void client_init_dispatch_15(void) { client_init_dispatch_13(); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_ieof); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, & channel_input_oclose); } static void client_init_dispatch(void) { if (compat20) client_init_dispatch_20(); else if (compat13) client_init_dispatch_13(); else client_init_dispatch_15(); } void client_stop_mux(void) { if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1) unlink(options.control_path); /* * If we are in persist mode, or don't have a shell, signal that we * should close when all active channels are closed. */ if (options.control_persist || no_shell_flag) { session_closed = 1; setproctitle("[stopped mux]"); } } /* client specific fatal cleanup */ void cleanup_exit(int i) { leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); leave_non_blocking(); if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1) unlink(options.control_path); ssh_kill_proxy_command(); _exit(i); } Index: head/crypto/openssh/compat.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/compat.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/compat.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,286 +1,313 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.87 2015/01/19 20:20:20 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.94 2015/05/26 23:23:40 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "packet.h" #include "compat.h" #include "log.h" #include "match.h" int compat13 = 0; int compat20 = 0; int datafellows = 0; void enable_compat20(void) { if (compat20) return; debug("Enabling compatibility mode for protocol 2.0"); compat20 = 1; } void enable_compat13(void) { debug("Enabling compatibility mode for protocol 1.3"); compat13 = 1; } /* datafellows bug compatibility */ u_int compat_datafellows(const char *version) { int i; static struct { char *pat; int bugs; } check[] = { { "OpenSSH-2.0*," "OpenSSH-2.1*," "OpenSSH_2.1*," "OpenSSH_2.2*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_BANNER| SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY| SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR}, { "OpenSSH_2.3.0*", SSH_BUG_BANNER|SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES| SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY| SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR}, { "OpenSSH_2.3.*", SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES|SSH_OLD_DHGEX| SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF| SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR}, { "OpenSSH_2.5.0p1*," "OpenSSH_2.5.1p1*", SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES|SSH_OLD_DHGEX| SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF| SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR}, { "OpenSSH_2.5.0*," "OpenSSH_2.5.1*," "OpenSSH_2.5.2*", SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY| SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR}, { "OpenSSH_2.5.3*", SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF| SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR}, { "OpenSSH_2.*," "OpenSSH_3.0*," "OpenSSH_3.1*", SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR}, { "OpenSSH_3.*", SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR }, { "Sun_SSH_1.0*", SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF}, { "OpenSSH_4*", 0 }, { "OpenSSH_5*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT}, { "OpenSSH_6.6.1*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH}, { "OpenSSH_6.5*," "OpenSSH_6.6*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD}, { "OpenSSH*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH }, { "*MindTerm*", 0 }, { "2.1.0*", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC| SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG| SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE| SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX }, { "2.1 *", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC| SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG| SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE| SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX }, { "2.0.13*," "2.0.14*," "2.0.15*," "2.0.16*," "2.0.17*," "2.0.18*," "2.0.19*", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC| SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG| SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE|SSH_BUG_X11FWD| SSH_BUG_PKOK|SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5| SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE|SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE| SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN|SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX }, { "2.0.11*," "2.0.12*", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC| SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG| SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE|SSH_BUG_X11FWD| SSH_BUG_PKAUTH|SSH_BUG_PKOK| SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE| SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN|SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX }, { "2.0.*", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC| SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG| SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE|SSH_BUG_X11FWD| SSH_BUG_PKAUTH|SSH_BUG_PKOK| SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE| SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY|SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN| SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX }, { "2.2.0*," "2.3.0*", SSH_BUG_HMAC|SSH_BUG_DEBUG| SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX }, { "2.3.*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG|SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5| SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX }, { "2.4", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID }, /* Van Dyke */ { "2.*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG|SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX| SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR }, { "3.0.*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG }, { "3.0 SecureCRT*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID }, { "1.7 SecureFX*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID }, { "1.2.18*," "1.2.19*," "1.2.20*," "1.2.21*," "1.2.22*", SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG }, { "1.3.2*", /* F-Secure */ SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG }, + { "Cisco-1.*", SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE }, { "*SSH Compatible Server*", /* Netscreen */ SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD }, { "*OSU_0*," "OSU_1.0*," "OSU_1.1*," "OSU_1.2*," "OSU_1.3*," "OSU_1.4*," "OSU_1.5alpha1*," "OSU_1.5alpha2*," "OSU_1.5alpha3*", SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD }, { "*SSH_Version_Mapper*", SSH_BUG_SCANNER }, + { "PuTTY-Release-0.5*," /* 0.50-0.57, DH-GEX in >=0.52 */ + "PuTTY_Release_0.5*," /* 0.58-0.59 */ + "PuTTY_Release_0.60*," + "PuTTY_Release_0.61*," + "PuTTY_Release_0.62*," + "PuTTY_Release_0.63*," + "PuTTY_Release_0.64*", + SSH_OLD_DHGEX }, { "Probe-*", SSH_BUG_PROBE }, + { "TeraTerm SSH*," + "TTSSH/1.5.*," + "TTSSH/2.1*," + "TTSSH/2.2*," + "TTSSH/2.3*," + "TTSSH/2.4*," + "TTSSH/2.5*," + "TTSSH/2.6*," + "TTSSH/2.70*," + "TTSSH/2.71*," + "TTSSH/2.72*", SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS }, + { "WinSCP*", SSH_OLD_DHGEX }, { NULL, 0 } }; /* process table, return first match */ for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) { - if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, - strlen(check[i].pat), 0) == 1) { + if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, 0) == 1) { debug("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x", version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs); datafellows = check[i].bugs; /* XXX for now */ return check[i].bugs; } } debug("no match: %s", version); return 0; } #define SEP "," int proto_spec(const char *spec) { char *s, *p, *q; int ret = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN; if (spec == NULL) return ret; q = s = strdup(spec); if (s == NULL) return ret; for ((p = strsep(&q, SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&q, SEP))) { switch (atoi(p)) { case 1: +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 if (ret == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) ret |= SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED; ret |= SSH_PROTO_1; +#endif break; case 2: ret |= SSH_PROTO_2; break; default: logit("ignoring bad proto spec: '%s'.", p); break; } } free(s); return ret; } /* * Filters a proposal string, excluding any algorithm matching the 'filter' * pattern list. */ static char * filter_proposal(char *proposal, const char *filter) { Buffer b; char *orig_prop, *fix_prop; char *cp, *tmp; buffer_init(&b); tmp = orig_prop = xstrdup(proposal); while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) { - if (match_pattern_list(cp, filter, strlen(cp), 0) != 1) { + if (match_pattern_list(cp, filter, 0) != 1) { if (buffer_len(&b) > 0) buffer_append(&b, ",", 1); buffer_append(&b, cp, strlen(cp)); } else debug2("Compat: skipping algorithm \"%s\"", cp); } buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1); fix_prop = xstrdup((char *)buffer_ptr(&b)); buffer_free(&b); free(orig_prop); return fix_prop; } char * compat_cipher_proposal(char *cipher_prop) { if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES)) return cipher_prop; debug2("%s: original cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop); cipher_prop = filter_proposal(cipher_prop, "aes*"); debug2("%s: compat cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop); if (*cipher_prop == '\0') fatal("No supported ciphers found"); return cipher_prop; } char * compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop) { if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5)) return pkalg_prop; debug2("%s: original public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop); pkalg_prop = filter_proposal(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa"); debug2("%s: compat public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop); if (*pkalg_prop == '\0') fatal("No supported PK algorithms found"); return pkalg_prop; } char * -compat_kex_proposal(char *kex_prop) +compat_kex_proposal(char *p) { - if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD)) - return kex_prop; - debug2("%s: original KEX proposal: %s", __func__, kex_prop); - kex_prop = filter_proposal(kex_prop, "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"); - debug2("%s: compat KEX proposal: %s", __func__, kex_prop); - if (*kex_prop == '\0') + if ((datafellows & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0) + return p; + debug2("%s: original KEX proposal: %s", __func__, p); + if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0) + p = filter_proposal(p, "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"); + if ((datafellows & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) { + p = filter_proposal(p, "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256"); + p = filter_proposal(p, "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1"); + } + debug2("%s: compat KEX proposal: %s", __func__, p); + if (*p == '\0') fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found"); - return kex_prop; + return p; } Index: head/crypto/openssh/compat.h =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/compat.h (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/compat.h (revision 294336) @@ -1,76 +1,78 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.46 2015/01/19 20:20:20 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.48 2015/05/26 23:23:40 dtucker Exp $ */ /* $FreeBSD$ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef COMPAT_H #define COMPAT_H #define SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN 0x00 #define SSH_PROTO_1 0x01 #define SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED 0x02 #define SSH_PROTO_2 0x04 #define SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB 0x00000001 #define SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE 0x00000002 #define SSH_BUG_HMAC 0x00000004 #define SSH_BUG_X11FWD 0x00000008 #define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID 0x00000010 #define SSH_BUG_PKAUTH 0x00000020 #define SSH_BUG_DEBUG 0x00000040 #define SSH_BUG_BANNER 0x00000080 #define SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG 0x00000100 #define SSH_BUG_PKOK 0x00000200 #define SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD 0x00000400 #define SSH_BUG_SCANNER 0x00000800 #define SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES 0x00001000 #define SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 0x00002000 #define SSH_OLD_DHGEX 0x00004000 #define SSH_BUG_NOREKEY 0x00008000 #define SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE 0x00010000 #define SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE 0x00020000 #define SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY 0x00040000 #define SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN 0x00100000 #define SSH_BUG_EXTEOF 0x00200000 #define SSH_BUG_PROBE 0x00400000 #define SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX 0x00800000 #define SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR 0x01000000 #define SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR 0x02000000 #define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH 0x04000000 #define SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT 0x08000000 #define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD 0x10000000 +#define SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS 0x20000000 +#define SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE 0x40000000 void enable_compat13(void); void enable_compat20(void); u_int compat_datafellows(const char *); int proto_spec(const char *); char *compat_cipher_proposal(char *); char *compat_pkalg_proposal(char *); char *compat_kex_proposal(char *); extern int compat13; extern int compat20; extern int datafellows; #endif Index: head/crypto/openssh/config.guess =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/config.guess (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/config.guess (revision 294336) @@ -1,1537 +1,1543 @@ #! /bin/sh # Attempt to guess a canonical system name. # Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, # 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, # 2011, 2012, 2013 Free Software Foundation, Inc. timestamp='2012-12-23' # This file is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it # under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by # the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or # (at your option) any later version. # # This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but # WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of # MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU # General Public License for more details. # # You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License # along with this program; if not, see . # # As a special exception to the GNU General Public License, if you # distribute this file as part of a program that contains a # configuration script generated by Autoconf, you may include it under # the same distribution terms that you use for the rest of that program. # Originally written by Per Bothner. Please send patches (context # diff format) to and include a ChangeLog # entry. # # This script attempts to guess a canonical system name similar to # config.sub. If it succeeds, it prints the system name on stdout, and # exits with 0. Otherwise, it exits with 1. # # You can get the latest version of this script from: # http://git.savannah.gnu.org/gitweb/?p=config.git;a=blob_plain;f=config.guess;hb=HEAD me=`echo "$0" | sed -e 's,.*/,,'` usage="\ Usage: $0 [OPTION] Output the configuration name of the system \`$me' is run on. Operation modes: -h, --help print this help, then exit -t, --time-stamp print date of last modification, then exit -v, --version print version number, then exit Report bugs and patches to ." version="\ GNU config.guess ($timestamp) Originally written by Per Bothner. Copyright (C) 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 Free Software Foundation, Inc. This is free software; see the source for copying conditions. There is NO warranty; not even for MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE." help=" Try \`$me --help' for more information." # Parse command line while test $# -gt 0 ; do case $1 in --time-stamp | --time* | -t ) echo "$timestamp" ; exit ;; --version | -v ) echo "$version" ; exit ;; --help | --h* | -h ) echo "$usage"; exit ;; -- ) # Stop option processing shift; break ;; - ) # Use stdin as input. break ;; -* ) echo "$me: invalid option $1$help" >&2 exit 1 ;; * ) break ;; esac done if test $# != 0; then echo "$me: too many arguments$help" >&2 exit 1 fi trap 'exit 1' 1 2 15 # CC_FOR_BUILD -- compiler used by this script. Note that the use of a # compiler to aid in system detection is discouraged as it requires # temporary files to be created and, as you can see below, it is a # headache to deal with in a portable fashion. # Historically, `CC_FOR_BUILD' used to be named `HOST_CC'. We still # use `HOST_CC' if defined, but it is deprecated. # Portable tmp directory creation inspired by the Autoconf team. set_cc_for_build=' trap "exitcode=\$?; (rm -f \$tmpfiles 2>/dev/null; rmdir \$tmp 2>/dev/null) && exit \$exitcode" 0 ; trap "rm -f \$tmpfiles 2>/dev/null; rmdir \$tmp 2>/dev/null; exit 1" 1 2 13 15 ; : ${TMPDIR=/tmp} ; { tmp=`(umask 077 && mktemp -d "$TMPDIR/cgXXXXXX") 2>/dev/null` && test -n "$tmp" && test -d "$tmp" ; } || { test -n "$RANDOM" && tmp=$TMPDIR/cg$$-$RANDOM && (umask 077 && mkdir $tmp) ; } || { tmp=$TMPDIR/cg-$$ && (umask 077 && mkdir $tmp) && echo "Warning: creating insecure temp directory" >&2 ; } || { echo "$me: cannot create a temporary directory in $TMPDIR" >&2 ; exit 1 ; } ; dummy=$tmp/dummy ; tmpfiles="$dummy.c $dummy.o $dummy.rel $dummy" ; case $CC_FOR_BUILD,$HOST_CC,$CC in ,,) echo "int x;" > $dummy.c ; for c in cc gcc c89 c99 ; do if ($c -c -o $dummy.o $dummy.c) >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then CC_FOR_BUILD="$c"; break ; fi ; done ; if test x"$CC_FOR_BUILD" = x ; then CC_FOR_BUILD=no_compiler_found ; fi ;; ,,*) CC_FOR_BUILD=$CC ;; ,*,*) CC_FOR_BUILD=$HOST_CC ;; esac ; set_cc_for_build= ;' # This is needed to find uname on a Pyramid OSx when run in the BSD universe. # (ghazi@noc.rutgers.edu 1994-08-24) if (test -f /.attbin/uname) >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then PATH=$PATH:/.attbin ; export PATH fi UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -m) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_MACHINE=unknown UNAME_RELEASE=`(uname -r) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_RELEASE=unknown UNAME_SYSTEM=`(uname -s) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_SYSTEM=unknown UNAME_VERSION=`(uname -v) 2>/dev/null` || UNAME_VERSION=unknown # Note: order is significant - the case branches are not exclusive. case "${UNAME_MACHINE}:${UNAME_SYSTEM}:${UNAME_RELEASE}:${UNAME_VERSION}" in *:NetBSD:*:*) # NetBSD (nbsd) targets should (where applicable) match one or # more of the tuples: *-*-netbsdelf*, *-*-netbsdaout*, # *-*-netbsdecoff* and *-*-netbsd*. For targets that recently # switched to ELF, *-*-netbsd* would select the old # object file format. This provides both forward # compatibility and a consistent mechanism for selecting the # object file format. # # Note: NetBSD doesn't particularly care about the vendor # portion of the name. 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However, they do not need # kernel version information, so it can be replaced with a # suitable tag, in the style of linux-gnu. case "${UNAME_VERSION}" in Debian*) release='-gnu' ;; *) release=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-_].*/\./'` ;; esac # Since CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-KERNEL-OPERATING_SYSTEM: # contains redundant information, the shorter form: # CPU_TYPE-MANUFACTURER-OPERATING_SYSTEM is used. echo "${machine}-${os}${release}" exit ;; *:Bitrig:*:*) UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`arch | sed 's/Bitrig.//'` echo ${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}-unknown-bitrig${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; *:OpenBSD:*:*) UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH=`arch | sed 's/OpenBSD.//'` echo ${UNAME_MACHINE_ARCH}-unknown-openbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; *:ekkoBSD:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-ekkobsd${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; *:SolidBSD:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-solidbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; macppc:MirBSD:*:*) echo powerpc-unknown-mirbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; *:MirBSD:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-mirbsd${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; alpha:OSF1:*:*) case $UNAME_RELEASE in *4.0) UNAME_RELEASE=`/usr/sbin/sizer -v | awk '{print $3}'` ;; *5.*) UNAME_RELEASE=`/usr/sbin/sizer -v | awk '{print $4}'` ;; esac # According to Compaq, /usr/sbin/psrinfo has been available on # OSF/1 and Tru64 systems produced since 1995. I hope that # covers most systems running today. This code pipes the CPU # types through head -n 1, so we only detect the type of CPU 0. ALPHA_CPU_TYPE=`/usr/sbin/psrinfo -v | sed -n -e 's/^ The alpha \(.*\) processor.*$/\1/p' | head -n 1` case "$ALPHA_CPU_TYPE" in "EV4 (21064)") UNAME_MACHINE="alpha" ;; "EV4.5 (21064)") UNAME_MACHINE="alpha" ;; "LCA4 (21066/21068)") UNAME_MACHINE="alpha" ;; "EV5 (21164)") UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev5" ;; "EV5.6 (21164A)") UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev56" ;; "EV5.6 (21164PC)") UNAME_MACHINE="alphapca56" ;; "EV5.7 (21164PC)") UNAME_MACHINE="alphapca57" ;; "EV6 (21264)") UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev6" ;; "EV6.7 (21264A)") UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev67" ;; "EV6.8CB (21264C)") UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev68" ;; "EV6.8AL (21264B)") UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev68" ;; "EV6.8CX (21264D)") UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev68" ;; "EV6.9A (21264/EV69A)") UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev69" ;; "EV7 (21364)") UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev7" ;; "EV7.9 (21364A)") UNAME_MACHINE="alphaev79" ;; esac # A Pn.n version is a patched version. # A Vn.n version is a released version. # A Tn.n version is a released field test version. # A Xn.n version is an unreleased experimental baselevel. # 1.2 uses "1.2" for uname -r. echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-dec-osf`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/^[PVTX]//' | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'` # Reset EXIT trap before exiting to avoid spurious non-zero exit code. exitcode=$? trap '' 0 exit $exitcode ;; Alpha\ *:Windows_NT*:*) # How do we know it's Interix rather than the generic POSIX subsystem? # Should we change UNAME_MACHINE based on the output of uname instead # of the specific Alpha model? echo alpha-pc-interix exit ;; 21064:Windows_NT:50:3) echo alpha-dec-winnt3.5 exit ;; Amiga*:UNIX_System_V:4.0:*) echo m68k-unknown-sysv4 exit ;; *:[Aa]miga[Oo][Ss]:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-amigaos exit ;; *:[Mm]orph[Oo][Ss]:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-morphos exit ;; *:OS/390:*:*) echo i370-ibm-openedition exit ;; *:z/VM:*:*) echo s390-ibm-zvmoe exit ;; *:OS400:*:*) echo powerpc-ibm-os400 exit ;; arm:RISC*:1.[012]*:*|arm:riscix:1.[012]*:*) echo arm-acorn-riscix${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; arm*:riscos:*:*|arm*:RISCOS:*:*) echo arm-unknown-riscos exit ;; SR2?01:HI-UX/MPP:*:* | SR8000:HI-UX/MPP:*:*) echo hppa1.1-hitachi-hiuxmpp exit ;; Pyramid*:OSx*:*:* | MIS*:OSx*:*:* | MIS*:SMP_DC-OSx*:*:*) # akee@wpdis03.wpafb.af.mil (Earle F. Ake) contributed MIS and NILE. if test "`(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null`" = att ; then echo pyramid-pyramid-sysv3 else echo pyramid-pyramid-bsd fi exit ;; NILE*:*:*:dcosx) echo pyramid-pyramid-svr4 exit ;; DRS?6000:unix:4.0:6*) echo sparc-icl-nx6 exit ;; DRS?6000:UNIX_SV:4.2*:7* | DRS?6000:isis:4.2*:7*) case `/usr/bin/uname -p` in sparc) echo sparc-icl-nx7; exit ;; esac ;; s390x:SunOS:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` exit ;; sun4H:SunOS:5.*:*) echo sparc-hal-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` exit ;; sun4*:SunOS:5.*:* | tadpole*:SunOS:5.*:*) echo sparc-sun-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` exit ;; i86pc:AuroraUX:5.*:* | i86xen:AuroraUX:5.*:*) echo i386-pc-auroraux${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; i86pc:SunOS:5.*:* | i86xen:SunOS:5.*:*) eval $set_cc_for_build SUN_ARCH="i386" # If there is a compiler, see if it is configured for 64-bit objects. # Note that the Sun cc does not turn __LP64__ into 1 like gcc does. # This test works for both compilers. if [ "$CC_FOR_BUILD" != 'no_compiler_found' ]; then if (echo '#ifdef __amd64'; echo IS_64BIT_ARCH; echo '#endif') | \ (CCOPTS= $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) | \ grep IS_64BIT_ARCH >/dev/null then SUN_ARCH="x86_64" fi fi echo ${SUN_ARCH}-pc-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` exit ;; sun4*:SunOS:6*:*) # According to config.sub, this is the proper way to canonicalize # SunOS6. Hard to guess exactly what SunOS6 will be like, but # it's likely to be more like Solaris than SunOS4. echo sparc-sun-solaris3`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` exit ;; sun4*:SunOS:*:*) case "`/usr/bin/arch -k`" in Series*|S4*) UNAME_RELEASE=`uname -v` ;; esac # Japanese Language versions have a version number like `4.1.3-JL'. echo sparc-sun-sunos`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/-/_/'` exit ;; sun3*:SunOS:*:*) echo m68k-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; sun*:*:4.2BSD:*) UNAME_RELEASE=`(sed 1q /etc/motd | awk '{print substr($5,1,3)}') 2>/dev/null` test "x${UNAME_RELEASE}" = "x" && UNAME_RELEASE=3 case "`/bin/arch`" in sun3) echo m68k-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} ;; sun4) echo sparc-sun-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} ;; esac exit ;; aushp:SunOS:*:*) echo sparc-auspex-sunos${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; # The situation for MiNT is a little confusing. The machine name # can be virtually everything (everything which is not # "atarist" or "atariste" at least should have a processor # > m68000). The system name ranges from "MiNT" over "FreeMiNT" # to the lowercase version "mint" (or "freemint"). Finally # the system name "TOS" denotes a system which is actually not # MiNT. But MiNT is downward compatible to TOS, so this should # be no problem. atarist[e]:*MiNT:*:* | atarist[e]:*mint:*:* | atarist[e]:*TOS:*:*) echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; atari*:*MiNT:*:* | atari*:*mint:*:* | atarist[e]:*TOS:*:*) echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; *falcon*:*MiNT:*:* | *falcon*:*mint:*:* | *falcon*:*TOS:*:*) echo m68k-atari-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; milan*:*MiNT:*:* | milan*:*mint:*:* | *milan*:*TOS:*:*) echo m68k-milan-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; hades*:*MiNT:*:* | hades*:*mint:*:* | *hades*:*TOS:*:*) echo m68k-hades-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; *:*MiNT:*:* | *:*mint:*:* | *:*TOS:*:*) echo m68k-unknown-mint${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; m68k:machten:*:*) echo m68k-apple-machten${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; powerpc:machten:*:*) echo powerpc-apple-machten${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; RISC*:Mach:*:*) echo mips-dec-mach_bsd4.3 exit ;; RISC*:ULTRIX:*:*) echo mips-dec-ultrix${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; VAX*:ULTRIX*:*:*) echo vax-dec-ultrix${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; 2020:CLIX:*:* | 2430:CLIX:*:*) echo clipper-intergraph-clix${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; mips:*:*:UMIPS | mips:*:*:RISCos) eval $set_cc_for_build sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c #ifdef __cplusplus #include /* for printf() prototype */ int main (int argc, char *argv[]) { #else int main (argc, argv) int argc; char *argv[]; { #endif #if defined (host_mips) && defined (MIPSEB) #if defined (SYSTYPE_SYSV) printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssysv\n", argv[1]); exit (0); #endif #if defined (SYSTYPE_SVR4) printf ("mips-mips-riscos%ssvr4\n", argv[1]); exit (0); #endif #if defined (SYSTYPE_BSD43) || defined(SYSTYPE_BSD) printf ("mips-mips-riscos%sbsd\n", argv[1]); exit (0); #endif #endif exit (-1); } EOF $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c && dummyarg=`echo "${UNAME_RELEASE}" | sed -n 's/\([0-9]*\).*/\1/p'` && SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy $dummyarg` && { echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"; exit; } echo mips-mips-riscos${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; Motorola:PowerMAX_OS:*:*) echo powerpc-motorola-powermax exit ;; Motorola:*:4.3:PL8-*) echo powerpc-harris-powermax exit ;; Night_Hawk:*:*:PowerMAX_OS | Synergy:PowerMAX_OS:*:*) echo powerpc-harris-powermax exit ;; Night_Hawk:Power_UNIX:*:*) echo powerpc-harris-powerunix exit ;; m88k:CX/UX:7*:*) echo m88k-harris-cxux7 exit ;; m88k:*:4*:R4*) echo m88k-motorola-sysv4 exit ;; m88k:*:3*:R3*) echo m88k-motorola-sysv3 exit ;; AViiON:dgux:*:*) # DG/UX returns AViiON for all architectures UNAME_PROCESSOR=`/usr/bin/uname -p` if [ $UNAME_PROCESSOR = mc88100 ] || [ $UNAME_PROCESSOR = mc88110 ] then if [ ${TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE}x = m88kdguxelfx ] || \ [ ${TARGET_BINARY_INTERFACE}x = x ] then echo m88k-dg-dgux${UNAME_RELEASE} else echo m88k-dg-dguxbcs${UNAME_RELEASE} fi else echo i586-dg-dgux${UNAME_RELEASE} fi exit ;; M88*:DolphinOS:*:*) # DolphinOS (SVR3) echo m88k-dolphin-sysv3 exit ;; M88*:*:R3*:*) # Delta 88k system running SVR3 echo m88k-motorola-sysv3 exit ;; XD88*:*:*:*) # Tektronix XD88 system running UTekV (SVR3) echo m88k-tektronix-sysv3 exit ;; Tek43[0-9][0-9]:UTek:*:*) # Tektronix 4300 system running UTek (BSD) echo m68k-tektronix-bsd exit ;; *:IRIX*:*:*) echo mips-sgi-irix`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/-/_/g'` exit ;; ????????:AIX?:[12].1:2) # AIX 2.2.1 or AIX 2.1.1 is RT/PC AIX. echo romp-ibm-aix # uname -m gives an 8 hex-code CPU id exit ;; # Note that: echo "'`uname -s`'" gives 'AIX ' i*86:AIX:*:*) echo i386-ibm-aix exit ;; ia64:AIX:*:*) if [ -x /usr/bin/oslevel ] ; then IBM_REV=`/usr/bin/oslevel` else IBM_REV=${UNAME_VERSION}.${UNAME_RELEASE} fi echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-ibm-aix${IBM_REV} exit ;; *:AIX:2:3) if grep bos325 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then eval $set_cc_for_build sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c #include main() { if (!__power_pc()) exit(1); puts("powerpc-ibm-aix3.2.5"); exit(0); } EOF if $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c && SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy` then echo "$SYSTEM_NAME" else echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.5 fi elif grep bos324 /usr/include/stdio.h >/dev/null 2>&1; then echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2.4 else echo rs6000-ibm-aix3.2 fi exit ;; *:AIX:*:[4567]) IBM_CPU_ID=`/usr/sbin/lsdev -C -c processor -S available | sed 1q | awk '{ print $1 }'` if /usr/sbin/lsattr -El ${IBM_CPU_ID} | grep ' POWER' >/dev/null 2>&1; then IBM_ARCH=rs6000 else IBM_ARCH=powerpc fi if [ -x /usr/bin/oslevel ] ; then IBM_REV=`/usr/bin/oslevel` else IBM_REV=${UNAME_VERSION}.${UNAME_RELEASE} fi echo ${IBM_ARCH}-ibm-aix${IBM_REV} exit ;; *:AIX:*:*) echo rs6000-ibm-aix exit ;; ibmrt:4.4BSD:*|romp-ibm:BSD:*) echo romp-ibm-bsd4.4 exit ;; ibmrt:*BSD:*|romp-ibm:BSD:*) # covers RT/PC BSD and echo romp-ibm-bsd${UNAME_RELEASE} # 4.3 with uname added to exit ;; # report: romp-ibm BSD 4.3 *:BOSX:*:*) echo rs6000-bull-bosx exit ;; DPX/2?00:B.O.S.:*:*) echo m68k-bull-sysv3 exit ;; 9000/[34]??:4.3bsd:1.*:*) echo m68k-hp-bsd exit ;; hp300:4.4BSD:*:* | 9000/[34]??:4.3bsd:2.*:*) echo m68k-hp-bsd4.4 exit ;; 9000/[34678]??:HP-UX:*:*) HPUX_REV=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'` case "${UNAME_MACHINE}" in 9000/31? ) HP_ARCH=m68000 ;; 9000/[34]?? ) HP_ARCH=m68k ;; 9000/[678][0-9][0-9]) if [ -x /usr/bin/getconf ]; then sc_cpu_version=`/usr/bin/getconf SC_CPU_VERSION 2>/dev/null` sc_kernel_bits=`/usr/bin/getconf SC_KERNEL_BITS 2>/dev/null` case "${sc_cpu_version}" in 523) HP_ARCH="hppa1.0" ;; # CPU_PA_RISC1_0 528) HP_ARCH="hppa1.1" ;; # CPU_PA_RISC1_1 532) # CPU_PA_RISC2_0 case "${sc_kernel_bits}" in 32) HP_ARCH="hppa2.0n" ;; 64) HP_ARCH="hppa2.0w" ;; '') HP_ARCH="hppa2.0" ;; # HP-UX 10.20 esac ;; esac fi if [ "${HP_ARCH}" = "" ]; then eval $set_cc_for_build sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c #define _HPUX_SOURCE #include #include int main () { #if defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS) long bits = sysconf(_SC_KERNEL_BITS); #endif long cpu = sysconf (_SC_CPU_VERSION); switch (cpu) { case CPU_PA_RISC1_0: puts ("hppa1.0"); break; case CPU_PA_RISC1_1: puts ("hppa1.1"); break; case CPU_PA_RISC2_0: #if defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS) switch (bits) { case 64: puts ("hppa2.0w"); break; case 32: puts ("hppa2.0n"); break; default: puts ("hppa2.0"); break; } break; #else /* !defined(_SC_KERNEL_BITS) */ puts ("hppa2.0"); break; #endif default: puts ("hppa1.0"); break; } exit (0); } EOF (CCOPTS= $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c 2>/dev/null) && HP_ARCH=`$dummy` test -z "$HP_ARCH" && HP_ARCH=hppa fi ;; esac if [ ${HP_ARCH} = "hppa2.0w" ] then eval $set_cc_for_build # hppa2.0w-hp-hpux* has a 64-bit kernel and a compiler generating # 32-bit code. hppa64-hp-hpux* has the same kernel and a compiler # generating 64-bit code. GNU and HP use different nomenclature: # # $ CC_FOR_BUILD=cc ./config.guess # => hppa2.0w-hp-hpux11.23 # $ CC_FOR_BUILD="cc +DA2.0w" ./config.guess # => hppa64-hp-hpux11.23 if echo __LP64__ | (CCOPTS= $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) | grep -q __LP64__ then HP_ARCH="hppa2.0w" else HP_ARCH="hppa64" fi fi echo ${HP_ARCH}-hp-hpux${HPUX_REV} exit ;; ia64:HP-UX:*:*) HPUX_REV=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'` echo ia64-hp-hpux${HPUX_REV} exit ;; 3050*:HI-UX:*:*) eval $set_cc_for_build sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c #include int main () { long cpu = sysconf (_SC_CPU_VERSION); /* The order matters, because CPU_IS_HP_MC68K erroneously returns true for CPU_PA_RISC1_0. CPU_IS_PA_RISC returns correct results, however. */ if (CPU_IS_PA_RISC (cpu)) { switch (cpu) { case CPU_PA_RISC1_0: puts ("hppa1.0-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break; case CPU_PA_RISC1_1: puts ("hppa1.1-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break; case CPU_PA_RISC2_0: puts ("hppa2.0-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break; default: puts ("hppa-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); break; } } else if (CPU_IS_HP_MC68K (cpu)) puts ("m68k-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); else puts ("unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2"); exit (0); } EOF $CC_FOR_BUILD -o $dummy $dummy.c && SYSTEM_NAME=`$dummy` && { echo "$SYSTEM_NAME"; exit; } echo unknown-hitachi-hiuxwe2 exit ;; 9000/7??:4.3bsd:*:* | 9000/8?[79]:4.3bsd:*:* ) echo hppa1.1-hp-bsd exit ;; 9000/8??:4.3bsd:*:*) echo hppa1.0-hp-bsd exit ;; *9??*:MPE/iX:*:* | *3000*:MPE/iX:*:*) echo hppa1.0-hp-mpeix exit ;; hp7??:OSF1:*:* | hp8?[79]:OSF1:*:* ) echo hppa1.1-hp-osf exit ;; hp8??:OSF1:*:*) echo hppa1.0-hp-osf exit ;; i*86:OSF1:*:*) if [ -x /usr/sbin/sysversion ] ; then echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-osf1mk else echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-osf1 fi exit ;; parisc*:Lites*:*:*) echo hppa1.1-hp-lites exit ;; C1*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C1*:*) echo c1-convex-bsd exit ;; C2*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C2*:*) if getsysinfo -f scalar_acc then echo c32-convex-bsd else echo c2-convex-bsd fi exit ;; C34*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C34*:*) echo c34-convex-bsd exit ;; C38*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C38*:*) echo c38-convex-bsd exit ;; C4*:ConvexOS:*:* | convex:ConvexOS:C4*:*) echo c4-convex-bsd exit ;; CRAY*Y-MP:*:*:*) echo ymp-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' exit ;; CRAY*[A-Z]90:*:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} \ | sed -e 's/CRAY.*\([A-Z]90\)/\1/' \ -e y/ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ/abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz/ \ -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' exit ;; CRAY*TS:*:*:*) echo t90-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' exit ;; CRAY*T3E:*:*:*) echo alphaev5-cray-unicosmk${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' exit ;; CRAY*SV1:*:*:*) echo sv1-cray-unicos${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' exit ;; *:UNICOS/mp:*:*) echo craynv-cray-unicosmp${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/\.[^.]*$/.X/' exit ;; F30[01]:UNIX_System_V:*:* | F700:UNIX_System_V:*:*) FUJITSU_PROC=`uname -m | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'` FUJITSU_SYS=`uname -p | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' | sed -e 's/\///'` FUJITSU_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed -e 's/ /_/'` echo "${FUJITSU_PROC}-fujitsu-${FUJITSU_SYS}${FUJITSU_REL}" exit ;; 5000:UNIX_System_V:4.*:*) FUJITSU_SYS=`uname -p | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' | sed -e 's/\///'` FUJITSU_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | tr 'ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ' 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz' | sed -e 's/ /_/'` echo "sparc-fujitsu-${FUJITSU_SYS}${FUJITSU_REL}" exit ;; i*86:BSD/386:*:* | i*86:BSD/OS:*:* | *:Ascend\ Embedded/OS:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; sparc*:BSD/OS:*:*) echo sparc-unknown-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; *:BSD/OS:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-bsdi${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; *:FreeBSD:*:*) UNAME_PROCESSOR=`/usr/bin/uname -p` case ${UNAME_PROCESSOR} in amd64) echo x86_64-unknown-freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` ;; *) echo ${UNAME_PROCESSOR}-unknown-freebsd`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` ;; esac exit ;; i*:CYGWIN*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-cygwin exit ;; *:MINGW64*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mingw64 exit ;; *:MINGW*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mingw32 exit ;; i*:MSYS*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-msys exit ;; i*:windows32*:*) # uname -m includes "-pc" on this system. echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-mingw32 exit ;; i*:PW*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-pw32 exit ;; *:Interix*:*) case ${UNAME_MACHINE} in x86) echo i586-pc-interix${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; authenticamd | genuineintel | EM64T) echo x86_64-unknown-interix${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; IA64) echo ia64-unknown-interix${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; esac ;; [345]86:Windows_95:* | [345]86:Windows_98:* | [345]86:Windows_NT:*) echo i${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-mks exit ;; 8664:Windows_NT:*) echo x86_64-pc-mks exit ;; i*:Windows_NT*:* | Pentium*:Windows_NT*:*) # How do we know it's Interix rather than the generic POSIX subsystem? # It also conflicts with pre-2.0 versions of AT&T UWIN. Should we # UNAME_MACHINE based on the output of uname instead of i386? echo i586-pc-interix exit ;; i*:UWIN*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-uwin exit ;; amd64:CYGWIN*:*:* | x86_64:CYGWIN*:*:*) echo x86_64-unknown-cygwin exit ;; p*:CYGWIN*:*) echo powerpcle-unknown-cygwin exit ;; prep*:SunOS:5.*:*) echo powerpcle-unknown-solaris2`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*//'` exit ;; *:GNU:*:*) # the GNU system echo `echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}|sed -e 's,[-/].*$,,'`-unknown-gnu`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's,/.*$,,'` exit ;; *:GNU/*:*:*) # other systems with GNU libc and userland echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-`echo ${UNAME_SYSTEM} | sed 's,^[^/]*/,,' | tr '[A-Z]' '[a-z]'``echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'`-gnu exit ;; i*86:Minix:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-minix exit ;; aarch64:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu exit ;; aarch64_be:Linux:*:*) UNAME_MACHINE=aarch64_be echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu exit ;; alpha:Linux:*:*) case `sed -n '/^cpu model/s/^.*: \(.*\)/\1/p' < /proc/cpuinfo` in EV5) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev5 ;; EV56) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev56 ;; PCA56) UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca56 ;; PCA57) UNAME_MACHINE=alphapca56 ;; EV6) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev6 ;; EV67) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev67 ;; EV68*) UNAME_MACHINE=alphaev68 ;; esac objdump --private-headers /bin/sh | grep -q ld.so.1 if test "$?" = 0 ; then LIBC="libc1" ; else LIBC="" ; fi echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu${LIBC} exit ;; arm*:Linux:*:*) eval $set_cc_for_build if echo __ARM_EABI__ | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \ | grep -q __ARM_EABI__ then echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu else if echo __ARM_PCS_VFP | $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null \ | grep -q __ARM_PCS_VFP then echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnueabi else echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnueabihf fi fi exit ;; avr32*:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu exit ;; cris:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-axis-linux-gnu exit ;; crisv32:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-axis-linux-gnu exit ;; frv:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu exit ;; hexagon:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu exit ;; i*86:Linux:*:*) LIBC=gnu eval $set_cc_for_build sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c #ifdef __dietlibc__ LIBC=dietlibc #endif EOF eval `$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | grep '^LIBC'` echo "${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-linux-${LIBC}" exit ;; ia64:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu exit ;; m32r*:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu exit ;; m68*:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu exit ;; mips:Linux:*:* | mips64:Linux:*:*) eval $set_cc_for_build sed 's/^ //' << EOF >$dummy.c #undef CPU #undef ${UNAME_MACHINE} #undef ${UNAME_MACHINE}el #if defined(__MIPSEL__) || defined(__MIPSEL) || defined(_MIPSEL) || defined(MIPSEL) CPU=${UNAME_MACHINE}el #else #if defined(__MIPSEB__) || defined(__MIPSEB) || defined(_MIPSEB) || defined(MIPSEB) CPU=${UNAME_MACHINE} #else CPU= #endif #endif EOF eval `$CC_FOR_BUILD -E $dummy.c 2>/dev/null | grep '^CPU'` test x"${CPU}" != x && { echo "${CPU}-unknown-linux-gnu"; exit; } ;; or32:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu exit ;; 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x86_64:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu exit ;; xtensa*:Linux:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-linux-gnu exit ;; i*86:DYNIX/ptx:4*:*) # ptx 4.0 does uname -s correctly, with DYNIX/ptx in there. # earlier versions are messed up and put the nodename in both # sysname and nodename. echo i386-sequent-sysv4 exit ;; i*86:UNIX_SV:4.2MP:2.*) # Unixware is an offshoot of SVR4, but it has its own version # number series starting with 2... # I am not positive that other SVR4 systems won't match this, # I just have to hope. -- rms. # Use sysv4.2uw... so that sysv4* matches it. echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv4.2uw${UNAME_VERSION} exit ;; i*86:OS/2:*:*) # If we were able to find `uname', then EMX Unix compatibility # is probably installed. echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-os2-emx exit ;; i*86:XTS-300:*:STOP) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-stop exit ;; i*86:atheos:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-atheos exit ;; i*86:syllable:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-syllable exit ;; i*86:LynxOS:2.*:* | i*86:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | i*86:LynxOS:4.[02]*:*) echo i386-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; i*86:*DOS:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-msdosdjgpp exit ;; i*86:*:4.*:* | i*86:SYSTEM_V:4.*:*) UNAME_REL=`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE} | sed 's/\/MP$//'` if grep Novell /usr/include/link.h >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-univel-sysv${UNAME_REL} else echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv${UNAME_REL} fi exit ;; i*86:*:5:[678]*) # UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX and OpenServer 6. case `/bin/uname -X | grep "^Machine"` in *486*) UNAME_MACHINE=i486 ;; *Pentium) UNAME_MACHINE=i586 ;; *Pent*|*Celeron) UNAME_MACHINE=i686 ;; esac echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE}${UNAME_SYSTEM}${UNAME_VERSION} exit ;; i*86:*:3.2:*) if test -f /usr/options/cb.name; then UNAME_REL=`sed -n 's/.*Version //p' /dev/null >/dev/null ; then UNAME_REL=`(/bin/uname -X|grep Release|sed -e 's/.*= //')` (/bin/uname -X|grep i80486 >/dev/null) && UNAME_MACHINE=i486 (/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pentium' >/dev/null) \ && UNAME_MACHINE=i586 (/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pent *II' >/dev/null) \ && UNAME_MACHINE=i686 (/bin/uname -X|grep '^Machine.*Pentium Pro' >/dev/null) \ && UNAME_MACHINE=i686 echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sco$UNAME_REL else echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-sysv32 fi exit ;; pc:*:*:*) # Left here for compatibility: # uname -m prints for DJGPP always 'pc', but it prints nothing about # the processor, so we play safe by assuming i586. # Note: whatever this is, it MUST be the same as what config.sub # prints for the "djgpp" host, or else GDB configury will decide that # this is a cross-build. echo i586-pc-msdosdjgpp exit ;; Intel:Mach:3*:*) echo i386-pc-mach3 exit ;; paragon:*:*:*) echo i860-intel-osf1 exit ;; i860:*:4.*:*) # i860-SVR4 if grep Stardent /usr/include/sys/uadmin.h >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then echo i860-stardent-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} # Stardent Vistra i860-SVR4 else # Add other i860-SVR4 vendors below as they are discovered. echo i860-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} # Unknown i860-SVR4 fi exit ;; mini*:CTIX:SYS*5:*) # "miniframe" echo m68010-convergent-sysv exit ;; mc68k:UNIX:SYSTEM5:3.51m) echo m68k-convergent-sysv exit ;; M680?0:D-NIX:5.3:*) echo m68k-diab-dnix exit ;; M68*:*:R3V[5678]*:*) test -r /sysV68 && { echo 'm68k-motorola-sysv'; exit; } ;; 3[345]??:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??A:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:3.0 | 3[34]??/*:*:4.0:3.0 | 4400:*:4.0:3.0 | 4850:*:4.0:3.0 | SKA40:*:4.0:3.0 | SDS2:*:4.0:3.0 | SHG2:*:4.0:3.0 | S7501*:*:4.0:3.0) OS_REL='' test -r /etc/.relid \ && OS_REL=.`sed -n 's/[^ ]* [^ ]* \([0-9][0-9]\).*/\1/p' < /etc/.relid` /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \ && { echo i486-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; } /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep entium >/dev/null \ && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; } ;; 3[34]??:*:4.0:* | 3[34]??,*:*:4.0:*) /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \ && { echo i486-ncr-sysv4; exit; } ;; NCR*:*:4.2:* | MPRAS*:*:4.2:*) OS_REL='.3' test -r /etc/.relid \ && OS_REL=.`sed -n 's/[^ ]* [^ ]* \([0-9][0-9]\).*/\1/p' < /etc/.relid` /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | grep 86 >/dev/null \ && { echo i486-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; } /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep entium >/dev/null \ && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; } /bin/uname -p 2>/dev/null | /bin/grep pteron >/dev/null \ && { echo i586-ncr-sysv4.3${OS_REL}; exit; } ;; m68*:LynxOS:2.*:* | m68*:LynxOS:3.0*:*) echo m68k-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; mc68030:UNIX_System_V:4.*:*) echo m68k-atari-sysv4 exit ;; TSUNAMI:LynxOS:2.*:*) echo sparc-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; rs6000:LynxOS:2.*:*) echo rs6000-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; PowerPC:LynxOS:2.*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:3.[01]*:* | PowerPC:LynxOS:4.[02]*:*) echo powerpc-unknown-lynxos${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; SM[BE]S:UNIX_SV:*:*) echo mips-dde-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; RM*:ReliantUNIX-*:*:*) echo mips-sni-sysv4 exit ;; RM*:SINIX-*:*:*) echo mips-sni-sysv4 exit ;; *:SINIX-*:*:*) if uname -p 2>/dev/null >/dev/null ; then UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -p) 2>/dev/null` echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-sni-sysv4 else echo ns32k-sni-sysv fi exit ;; PENTIUM:*:4.0*:*) # Unisys `ClearPath HMP IX 4000' SVR4/MP effort # says echo i586-unisys-sysv4 exit ;; *:UNIX_System_V:4*:FTX*) # From Gerald Hewes . # How about differentiating between stratus architectures? -djm echo hppa1.1-stratus-sysv4 exit ;; *:*:*:FTX*) # From seanf@swdc.stratus.com. echo i860-stratus-sysv4 exit ;; i*86:VOS:*:*) # From Paul.Green@stratus.com. echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-stratus-vos exit ;; *:VOS:*:*) # From Paul.Green@stratus.com. echo hppa1.1-stratus-vos exit ;; mc68*:A/UX:*:*) echo m68k-apple-aux${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; news*:NEWS-OS:6*:*) echo mips-sony-newsos6 exit ;; R[34]000:*System_V*:*:* | R4000:UNIX_SYSV:*:* | R*000:UNIX_SV:*:*) if [ -d /usr/nec ]; then echo mips-nec-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} else echo mips-unknown-sysv${UNAME_RELEASE} fi exit ;; BeBox:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on hardware made by Be, PPC only. echo powerpc-be-beos exit ;; BeMac:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on Mac or Mac clone, PPC only. echo powerpc-apple-beos exit ;; BePC:BeOS:*:*) # BeOS running on Intel PC compatible. echo i586-pc-beos exit ;; BePC:Haiku:*:*) # Haiku running on Intel PC compatible. echo i586-pc-haiku exit ;; x86_64:Haiku:*:*) echo x86_64-unknown-haiku exit ;; SX-4:SUPER-UX:*:*) echo sx4-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; SX-5:SUPER-UX:*:*) echo sx5-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; SX-6:SUPER-UX:*:*) echo sx6-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; SX-7:SUPER-UX:*:*) echo sx7-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; SX-8:SUPER-UX:*:*) echo sx8-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; SX-8R:SUPER-UX:*:*) echo sx8r-nec-superux${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; Power*:Rhapsody:*:*) echo powerpc-apple-rhapsody${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; *:Rhapsody:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-apple-rhapsody${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; *:Darwin:*:*) UNAME_PROCESSOR=`uname -p` || UNAME_PROCESSOR=unknown case $UNAME_PROCESSOR in i386) eval $set_cc_for_build if [ "$CC_FOR_BUILD" != 'no_compiler_found' ]; then if (echo '#ifdef __LP64__'; echo IS_64BIT_ARCH; echo '#endif') | \ (CCOPTS= $CC_FOR_BUILD -E - 2>/dev/null) | \ grep IS_64BIT_ARCH >/dev/null then UNAME_PROCESSOR="x86_64" fi fi ;; unknown) UNAME_PROCESSOR=powerpc ;; esac echo ${UNAME_PROCESSOR}-apple-darwin${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; *:procnto*:*:* | *:QNX:[0123456789]*:*) UNAME_PROCESSOR=`uname -p` if test "$UNAME_PROCESSOR" = "x86"; then UNAME_PROCESSOR=i386 UNAME_MACHINE=pc fi echo ${UNAME_PROCESSOR}-${UNAME_MACHINE}-nto-qnx${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; *:QNX:*:4*) echo i386-pc-qnx exit ;; NEO-?:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*) echo neo-tandem-nsk${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; NSE-*:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*) echo nse-tandem-nsk${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; NSR-?:NONSTOP_KERNEL:*:*) echo nsr-tandem-nsk${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; *:NonStop-UX:*:*) echo mips-compaq-nonstopux exit ;; BS2000:POSIX*:*:*) echo bs2000-siemens-sysv exit ;; DS/*:UNIX_System_V:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-${UNAME_SYSTEM}-${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; *:Plan9:*:*) # "uname -m" is not consistent, so use $cputype instead. 386 # is converted to i386 for consistency with other x86 # operating systems. if test "$cputype" = "386"; then UNAME_MACHINE=i386 else UNAME_MACHINE="$cputype" fi echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-plan9 exit ;; *:TOPS-10:*:*) echo pdp10-unknown-tops10 exit ;; *:TENEX:*:*) echo pdp10-unknown-tenex exit ;; KS10:TOPS-20:*:* | KL10:TOPS-20:*:* | TYPE4:TOPS-20:*:*) echo pdp10-dec-tops20 exit ;; XKL-1:TOPS-20:*:* | TYPE5:TOPS-20:*:*) echo pdp10-xkl-tops20 exit ;; *:TOPS-20:*:*) echo pdp10-unknown-tops20 exit ;; *:ITS:*:*) echo pdp10-unknown-its exit ;; SEI:*:*:SEIUX) echo mips-sei-seiux${UNAME_RELEASE} exit ;; *:DragonFly:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-dragonfly`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` exit ;; *:*VMS:*:*) UNAME_MACHINE=`(uname -p) 2>/dev/null` case "${UNAME_MACHINE}" in A*) echo alpha-dec-vms ; exit ;; I*) echo ia64-dec-vms ; exit ;; V*) echo vax-dec-vms ; exit ;; esac ;; *:XENIX:*:SysV) echo i386-pc-xenix exit ;; i*86:skyos:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-skyos`echo ${UNAME_RELEASE}` | sed -e 's/ .*$//' exit ;; i*86:rdos:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-rdos exit ;; i*86:AROS:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-pc-aros exit ;; x86_64:VMkernel:*:*) echo ${UNAME_MACHINE}-unknown-esx exit ;; esac eval $set_cc_for_build cat >$dummy.c < # include #endif main () { #if defined (sony) #if defined (MIPSEB) /* BFD wants "bsd" instead of "newsos". 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Now check whether nonexistent headers # can be detected and how. cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then : # Broken: success on invalid input. continue else # Passes both tests. ac_preproc_ok=: break fi rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext done # Because of `break', _AC_PREPROC_IFELSE's cleaning code was skipped. rm -f conftest.i conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext if $ac_preproc_ok; then : break fi done ac_cv_prog_CPP=$CPP fi CPP=$ac_cv_prog_CPP else ac_cv_prog_CPP=$CPP fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CPP" >&5 $as_echo "$CPP" >&6; } ac_preproc_ok=false for ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in '' yes do # Use a header file that comes with gcc, so configuring glibc # with a fresh cross-compiler works. # Prefer to if __STDC__ is defined, since # exists even on freestanding compilers. # On the NeXT, cc -E runs the code through the compiler's parser, # not just through cpp. "Syntax error" is here to catch this case. cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #ifdef __STDC__ # include #else # include #endif Syntax error _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then : else # Broken: fails on valid input. continue fi rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext # OK, works on sane cases. Now check whether nonexistent headers # can be detected and how. cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then : # Broken: success on invalid input. continue else # Passes both tests. ac_preproc_ok=: break fi rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext done # Because of `break', _AC_PREPROC_IFELSE's cleaning code was skipped. rm -f conftest.i conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext if $ac_preproc_ok; then : else { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5 $as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;} as_fn_error $? "C preprocessor \"$CPP\" fails sanity check See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; } fi ac_ext=c ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS' ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5' ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5' ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}ranlib", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}ranlib; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_prog_RANLIB+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else if test -n "$RANLIB"; then ac_cv_prog_RANLIB="$RANLIB" # Let the user override the test. else as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_prog_RANLIB="${ac_tool_prefix}ranlib" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS fi fi RANLIB=$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB if test -n "$RANLIB"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $RANLIB" >&5 $as_echo "$RANLIB" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi fi if test -z "$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB"; then ac_ct_RANLIB=$RANLIB # Extract the first word of "ranlib", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy ranlib; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else if test -n "$ac_ct_RANLIB"; then ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB="$ac_ct_RANLIB" # Let the user override the test. else as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB="ranlib" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS fi fi ac_ct_RANLIB=$ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB if test -n "$ac_ct_RANLIB"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_ct_RANLIB" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_ct_RANLIB" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi if test "x$ac_ct_RANLIB" = x; then RANLIB=":" else case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in yes:) { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5 $as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;} ac_tool_warned=yes ;; esac RANLIB=$ac_ct_RANLIB fi else RANLIB="$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB" fi # Find a good install program. We prefer a C program (faster), # so one script is as good as another. But avoid the broken or # incompatible versions: # SysV /etc/install, /usr/sbin/install # SunOS /usr/etc/install # IRIX /sbin/install # AIX /bin/install # AmigaOS /C/install, which installs bootblocks on floppy discs # AIX 4 /usr/bin/installbsd, which doesn't work without a -g flag # AFS /usr/afsws/bin/install, which mishandles nonexistent args # SVR4 /usr/ucb/install, which tries to use the nonexistent group "staff" # OS/2's system install, which has a completely different semantic # ./install, which can be erroneously created by make from ./install.sh. # Reject install programs that cannot install multiple files. { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for a BSD-compatible install" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for a BSD-compatible install... " >&6; } if test -z "$INSTALL"; then if ${ac_cv_path_install+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. # Account for people who put trailing slashes in PATH elements. case $as_dir/ in #(( ./ | .// | /[cC]/* | \ /etc/* | /usr/sbin/* | /usr/etc/* | /sbin/* | /usr/afsws/bin/* | \ ?:[\\/]os2[\\/]install[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]OS2[\\/]INSTALL[\\/]* | \ /usr/ucb/* ) ;; *) # OSF1 and SCO ODT 3.0 have their own names for install. # Don't use installbsd from OSF since it installs stuff as root # by default. for ac_prog in ginstall scoinst install; do for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext"; then if test $ac_prog = install && grep dspmsg "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" >/dev/null 2>&1; then # AIX install. It has an incompatible calling convention. : elif test $ac_prog = install && grep pwplus "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" >/dev/null 2>&1; then # program-specific install script used by HP pwplus--don't use. : else rm -rf conftest.one conftest.two conftest.dir echo one > conftest.one echo two > conftest.two mkdir conftest.dir if "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" -c conftest.one conftest.two "`pwd`/conftest.dir" && test -s conftest.one && test -s conftest.two && test -s conftest.dir/conftest.one && test -s conftest.dir/conftest.two then ac_cv_path_install="$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext -c" break 3 fi fi fi done done ;; esac done IFS=$as_save_IFS rm -rf conftest.one conftest.two conftest.dir fi if test "${ac_cv_path_install+set}" = set; then INSTALL=$ac_cv_path_install else # As a last resort, use the slow shell script. Don't cache a # value for INSTALL within a source directory, because that will # break other packages using the cache if that directory is # removed, or if the value is a relative name. INSTALL=$ac_install_sh fi fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $INSTALL" >&5 $as_echo "$INSTALL" >&6; } # Use test -z because SunOS4 sh mishandles braces in ${var-val}. # It thinks the first close brace ends the variable substitution. test -z "$INSTALL_PROGRAM" && INSTALL_PROGRAM='${INSTALL}' test -z "$INSTALL_SCRIPT" && INSTALL_SCRIPT='${INSTALL}' test -z "$INSTALL_DATA" && INSTALL_DATA='${INSTALL} -m 644' { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for egrep" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for egrep... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_EGREP+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else if echo a | $GREP -E '(a|b)' >/dev/null 2>&1 then ac_cv_path_EGREP="$GREP -E" else if test -z "$EGREP"; then ac_path_EGREP_found=false # Loop through the user's path and test for each of PROGNAME-LIST as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_prog in egrep; do for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do ac_path_EGREP="$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" as_fn_executable_p "$ac_path_EGREP" || continue # Check for GNU ac_path_EGREP and select it if it is found. # Check for GNU $ac_path_EGREP case `"$ac_path_EGREP" --version 2>&1` in *GNU*) ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP" ac_path_EGREP_found=:;; *) ac_count=0 $as_echo_n 0123456789 >"conftest.in" while : do cat "conftest.in" "conftest.in" >"conftest.tmp" mv "conftest.tmp" "conftest.in" cp "conftest.in" "conftest.nl" $as_echo 'EGREP' >> "conftest.nl" "$ac_path_EGREP" 'EGREP$' < "conftest.nl" >"conftest.out" 2>/dev/null || break diff "conftest.out" "conftest.nl" >/dev/null 2>&1 || break as_fn_arith $ac_count + 1 && ac_count=$as_val if test $ac_count -gt ${ac_path_EGREP_max-0}; then # Best one so far, save it but keep looking for a better one ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP" ac_path_EGREP_max=$ac_count fi # 10*(2^10) chars as input seems more than enough test $ac_count -gt 10 && break done rm -f conftest.in conftest.tmp conftest.nl conftest.out;; esac $ac_path_EGREP_found && break 3 done done done IFS=$as_save_IFS if test -z "$ac_cv_path_EGREP"; then as_fn_error $? "no acceptable egrep could be found in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin" "$LINENO" 5 fi else ac_cv_path_EGREP=$EGREP fi fi fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&6; } EGREP="$ac_cv_path_EGREP" -# Extract the first word of "ar", so it can be a program name with args. -set dummy ar; ac_word=$2 +if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then + for ac_prog in ar + do + # Extract the first word of "$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy $ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } -if ${ac_cv_path_AR+:} false; then : +if ${ac_cv_prog_AR+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else - case $AR in - [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) - ac_cv_path_AR="$AR" # Let the user override the test with a path. - ;; - *) - as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR + if test -n "$AR"; then + ac_cv_prog_AR="$AR" # Let the user override the test. +else +as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then - ac_cv_path_AR="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" + ac_cv_prog_AR="$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS - ;; -esac fi -AR=$ac_cv_path_AR +fi +AR=$ac_cv_prog_AR if test -n "$AR"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $AR" >&5 $as_echo "$AR" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi + test -n "$AR" && break + done +fi +if test -z "$AR"; then + ac_ct_AR=$AR + for ac_prog in ar +do + # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args. +set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2 +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 +$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } +if ${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR+:} false; then : + $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 +else + if test -n "$ac_ct_AR"; then + ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR="$ac_ct_AR" # Let the user override the test. +else +as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR +for as_dir in $PATH +do + IFS=$as_save_IFS + test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. + for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do + if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then + ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR="$ac_prog" + $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 + break 2 + fi +done + done +IFS=$as_save_IFS + +fi +fi +ac_ct_AR=$ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR +if test -n "$ac_ct_AR"; then + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_ct_AR" >&5 +$as_echo "$ac_ct_AR" >&6; } +else + { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 +$as_echo "no" >&6; } +fi + + + test -n "$ac_ct_AR" && break +done + + if test "x$ac_ct_AR" = x; then + AR="" + else + case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in +yes:) +{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5 +$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;} +ac_tool_warned=yes ;; +esac + AR=$ac_ct_AR + fi +fi + # Extract the first word of "cat", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy cat; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_CAT+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $CAT in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_CAT="$CAT" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_CAT="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi CAT=$ac_cv_path_CAT if test -n "$CAT"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CAT" >&5 $as_echo "$CAT" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "kill", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy kill; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_KILL+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $KILL in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_KILL="$KILL" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_KILL="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi KILL=$ac_cv_path_KILL if test -n "$KILL"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $KILL" >&5 $as_echo "$KILL" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi for ac_prog in perl5 perl do # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_PERL+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $PERL in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_PERL="$PERL" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_PERL="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi PERL=$ac_cv_path_PERL if test -n "$PERL"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PERL" >&5 $as_echo "$PERL" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi test -n "$PERL" && break done # Extract the first word of "sed", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy sed; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_SED+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $SED in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_SED="$SED" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_SED="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi SED=$ac_cv_path_SED if test -n "$SED"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $SED" >&5 $as_echo "$SED" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "ent", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy ent; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_ENT+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $ENT in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_ENT="$ENT" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_ENT="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi ENT=$ac_cv_path_ENT if test -n "$ENT"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ENT" >&5 $as_echo "$ENT" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "bash", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy bash; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5 $as_echo "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "ksh", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy ksh; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5 $as_echo "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "sh", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy sh; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5 $as_echo "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "sh", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy sh; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_SH+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $SH in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_SH="$SH" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi SH=$ac_cv_path_SH if test -n "$SH"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $SH" >&5 $as_echo "$SH" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "groff", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy groff; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_GROFF+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $GROFF in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_GROFF="$GROFF" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_GROFF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi GROFF=$ac_cv_path_GROFF if test -n "$GROFF"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $GROFF" >&5 $as_echo "$GROFF" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "nroff", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy nroff; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_NROFF+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $NROFF in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_NROFF="$NROFF" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_NROFF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi NROFF=$ac_cv_path_NROFF if test -n "$NROFF"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NROFF" >&5 $as_echo "$NROFF" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "mandoc", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy mandoc; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_MANDOC+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $MANDOC in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_MANDOC="$MANDOC" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_MANDOC="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi MANDOC=$ac_cv_path_MANDOC if test -n "$MANDOC"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $MANDOC" >&5 $as_echo "$MANDOC" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi TEST_SHELL=sh if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then MANFMT="$MANDOC" elif test "x$NROFF" != "x" ; then MANFMT="$NROFF -mandoc" elif test "x$GROFF" != "x" ; then MANFMT="$GROFF -mandoc -Tascii" else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: no manpage formatted found" >&5 $as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: no manpage formatted found" >&2;} MANFMT="false" fi # Extract the first word of "groupadd", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy groupadd; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $PATH_GROUPADD_PROG in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in /usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" && ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="groupadd" ;; esac fi PATH_GROUPADD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG if test -n "$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" >&5 $as_echo "$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "useradd", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy useradd; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $PATH_USERADD_PROG in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="$PATH_USERADD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in /usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG" && ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="useradd" ;; esac fi PATH_USERADD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG if test -n "$PATH_USERADD_PROG"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PATH_USERADD_PROG" >&5 $as_echo "$PATH_USERADD_PROG" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "pkgmk", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy pkgmk; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else if test -n "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED"; then ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" # Let the user override the test. else as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="yes" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" && ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="no" fi fi MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED=$ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED if test -n "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" >&5 $as_echo "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi if test -x /sbin/sh; then STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL=/sbin/sh else STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL=/bin/sh fi # System features # Check whether --enable-largefile was given. if test "${enable_largefile+set}" = set; then : enableval=$enable_largefile; fi if test "$enable_largefile" != no; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for special C compiler options needed for large files" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for special C compiler options needed for large files... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC=no if test "$GCC" != yes; then ac_save_CC=$CC while :; do # IRIX 6.2 and later do not support large files by default, # so use the C compiler's -n32 option if that helps. cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly. We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807, since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */ #define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62)) int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721 && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1) ? 1 : -1]; int main () { ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : break fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext CC="$CC -n32" if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC=' -n32'; break fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext break done CC=$ac_save_CC rm -f conftest.$ac_ext fi fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" >&6; } if test "$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" != no; then CC=$CC$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for _FILE_OFFSET_BITS value needed for large files" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for _FILE_OFFSET_BITS value needed for large files... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else while :; do cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly. We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807, since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */ #define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62)) int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721 && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1) ? 1 : -1]; int main () { ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=no; break fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS 64 #include /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly. We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807, since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */ #define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62)) int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721 && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1) ? 1 : -1]; int main () { ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=64; break fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=unknown break done fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits" >&6; } case $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits in #( no | unknown) ;; *) cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits _ACEOF ;; esac rm -rf conftest* if test $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits = unknown; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for _LARGE_FILES value needed for large files" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for _LARGE_FILES value needed for large files... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_sys_large_files+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else while :; do cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly. We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807, since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */ #define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62)) int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721 && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1) ? 1 : -1]; int main () { ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_sys_large_files=no; break fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #define _LARGE_FILES 1 #include /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly. We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807, since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */ #define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62)) int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721 && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1) ? 1 : -1]; int main () { ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_sys_large_files=1; break fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext ac_cv_sys_large_files=unknown break done fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sys_large_files" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_sys_large_files" >&6; } case $ac_cv_sys_large_files in #( no | unknown) ;; *) cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define _LARGE_FILES $ac_cv_sys_large_files _ACEOF ;; esac rm -rf conftest* fi fi if test -z "$AR" ; then as_fn_error $? "*** 'ar' missing, please install or fix your \$PATH ***" "$LINENO" 5 fi # Use LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment if possible if test ! -z "$LOGIN_PROGRAM" ; then cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK "$LOGIN_PROGRAM" _ACEOF else # Search for login # Extract the first word of "login", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy login; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... 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then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF fi done # sys/capsicum.h requires sys/types.h for ac_header in sys/capsicum.h do : ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/capsicum.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" " #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif " if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_SYS_CAPSICUM_H 1 _ACEOF fi done # lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris for ac_header in lastlog.h do : ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "lastlog.h" "ac_cv_header_lastlog_h" " #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif " if test "x$ac_cv_header_lastlog_h" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_LASTLOG_H 1 _ACEOF fi done # sys/ptms.h requires sys/stream.h to be included first on Solaris for ac_header in sys/ptms.h do : ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/ptms.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_ptms_h" " #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H # include #endif " if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_ptms_h" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H 1 _ACEOF fi done # login_cap.h requires sys/types.h on NetBSD for ac_header in login_cap.h do : ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "login_cap.h" "ac_cv_header_login_cap_h" " #include " if test "x$ac_cv_header_login_cap_h" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H 1 _ACEOF fi done # older BSDs need sys/param.h before sys/mount.h for ac_header in sys/mount.h do : ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/mount.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_mount_h" " #include " if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_mount_h" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H 1 _ACEOF fi done # Android requires sys/socket.h to be included before sys/un.h for ac_header in sys/un.h do : ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/un.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_un_h" " #include #include " if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_un_h" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_SYS_UN_H 1 _ACEOF fi done # Messages for features tested for in target-specific section SIA_MSG="no" SPC_MSG="no" SP_MSG="no" # Check for some target-specific stuff case "$host" in *-*-aix*) # Some versions of VAC won't allow macro redefinitions at # -qlanglevel=ansi, and autoconf 2.60 sometimes insists on using that # particularly with older versions of vac or xlc. # It also throws errors about null macro argments, but these are # not fatal. { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if compiler allows macro redefinitions" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if compiler allows macro redefinitions... 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" >&6; } if ${ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS LIBS="-lxnet $LIBS" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char t_error (); int main () { return t_error (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error=yes else ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error=no fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_LIBXNET 1 _ACEOF LIBS="-lxnet $LIBS" else as_fn_error $? "*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5 fi # next, we define all of the options specific to major releases case "$host" in *-*-hpux10*) if test -z "$GCC"; then CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae" fi ;; *-*-hpux11*) $as_echo "#define PAM_SUN_CODEBASE 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define USE_BTMP 1" >>confdefs.h check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo=1 check_for_conflicting_getspnam=1 ;; esac # lastly, we define options specific to minor releases case "$host" in *-*-hpux10.26) $as_echo "#define HAVE_SECUREWARE 1" >>confdefs.h disable_ptmx_check=yes LIBS="$LIBS -lsecpw" ;; esac ;; *-*-irix5*) PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc" $as_echo "#define BROKEN_INET_NTOA 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h ;; *-*-irix6*) PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc" $as_echo "#define WITH_IRIX_ARRAY 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define WITH_IRIX_PROJECT 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define WITH_IRIX_AUDIT 1" >>confdefs.h ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "jlimit_startjob" "ac_cv_func_jlimit_startjob" if test "x$ac_cv_func_jlimit_startjob" = xyes; then : $as_echo "#define WITH_IRIX_JOBS 1" >>confdefs.h fi $as_echo "#define BROKEN_INET_NTOA 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define BROKEN_UPDWTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h ;; *-*-k*bsd*-gnu | *-*-kopensolaris*-gnu) check_for_libcrypt_later=1 $as_echo "#define PAM_TTY_KLUDGE 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX \"!\"" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define _PATH_BTMP \"/var/log/btmp\"" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define USE_BTMP 1" >>confdefs.h ;; *-*-linux*) no_dev_ptmx=1 use_pie=auto check_for_libcrypt_later=1 check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1 $as_echo "#define PAM_TTY_KLUDGE 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX \"!\"" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO EPERM" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define _PATH_BTMP \"/var/log/btmp\"" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define USE_BTMP 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define LINUX_OOM_ADJUST 1" >>confdefs.h inet6_default_4in6=yes case `uname -r` in 1.*|2.0.*) $as_echo "#define BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE 1" >>confdefs.h ;; esac # tun(4) forwarding compat code for ac_header in linux/if_tun.h do : ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "linux/if_tun.h" "ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" "$ac_includes_default" if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H 1 _ACEOF fi done if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = "xyes" ; then $as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_LINUX 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF 1" >>confdefs.h fi for ac_header in linux/seccomp.h linux/filter.h linux/audit.h do : as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "#include " if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF fi done for ac_func in prctl do : ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "prctl" "ac_cv_func_prctl" if test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_PRCTL 1 _ACEOF fi done { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for seccomp architecture" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for seccomp architecture... 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" >&6; } if ${ac_cv_lib_project_setproject+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS LIBS="-lproject $LIBS" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. 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" >&6; } if ${ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS LIBS="-lresolv $LIBS" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. 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" >&6; } if ${ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS LIBS="-lc89 $LIBS" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char utimes (); int main () { return utimes (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes=yes else ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes=no fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes" = xyes; then : $as_echo "#define HAVE_UTIMES 1" >>confdefs.h LIBS="$LIBS -lc89" fi fi done for ac_header in bsd/libutil.h libutil.h do : as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default" if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF fi done { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing fmt_scaled" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for library containing fmt_scaled... 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Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char fmt_scaled (); int main () { return fmt_scaled (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do if test -z "$ac_lib"; then ac_res="none required" else ac_res=-l$ac_lib LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" fi if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled=$ac_res fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext if ${ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled+:} false; then : break fi done if ${ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled+:} false; then : else ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled=no fi rm conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled" >&6; } ac_res=$ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled if test "$ac_res" != no; then : test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing scan_scaled" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for library containing scan_scaled... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_search_scan_scaled+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char scan_scaled (); int main () { return scan_scaled (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do if test -z "$ac_lib"; then ac_res="none required" else ac_res=-l$ac_lib LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" fi if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_search_scan_scaled=$ac_res fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext if ${ac_cv_search_scan_scaled+:} false; then : break fi done if ${ac_cv_search_scan_scaled+:} false; then : else ac_cv_search_scan_scaled=no fi rm conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_scan_scaled" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_search_scan_scaled" >&6; } ac_res=$ac_cv_search_scan_scaled if test "$ac_res" != no; then : test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing login" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for library containing login... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_search_login+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char login (); int main () { return login (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do if test -z "$ac_lib"; then ac_res="none required" else ac_res=-l$ac_lib LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" fi if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_search_login=$ac_res fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext if ${ac_cv_search_login+:} false; then : break fi done if ${ac_cv_search_login+:} false; then : else ac_cv_search_login=no fi rm conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_login" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_search_login" >&6; } ac_res=$ac_cv_search_login if test "$ac_res" != no; then : test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing logout" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for library containing logout... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_search_logout+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char logout (); int main () { return logout (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do if test -z "$ac_lib"; then ac_res="none required" else ac_res=-l$ac_lib LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" fi if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_search_logout=$ac_res fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext if ${ac_cv_search_logout+:} false; then : break fi done if ${ac_cv_search_logout+:} false; then : else ac_cv_search_logout=no fi rm conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_logout" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_search_logout" >&6; } ac_res=$ac_cv_search_logout if test "$ac_res" != no; then : test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing logwtmp" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for library containing logwtmp... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_search_logwtmp+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char logwtmp (); int main () { return logwtmp (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do if test -z "$ac_lib"; then ac_res="none required" else ac_res=-l$ac_lib LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" fi if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_search_logwtmp=$ac_res fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext if ${ac_cv_search_logwtmp+:} false; then : break fi done if ${ac_cv_search_logwtmp+:} false; then : else ac_cv_search_logwtmp=no fi rm conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_logwtmp" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_search_logwtmp" >&6; } ac_res=$ac_cv_search_logwtmp if test "$ac_res" != no; then : test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing openpty" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for library containing openpty... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_search_openpty+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char openpty (); int main () { return openpty (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do if test -z "$ac_lib"; then ac_res="none required" else ac_res=-l$ac_lib LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" fi if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_search_openpty=$ac_res fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext if ${ac_cv_search_openpty+:} false; then : break fi done if ${ac_cv_search_openpty+:} false; then : else ac_cv_search_openpty=no fi rm conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_openpty" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_search_openpty" >&6; } ac_res=$ac_cv_search_openpty if test "$ac_res" != no; then : test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing updwtmp" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for library containing updwtmp... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_search_updwtmp+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char updwtmp (); int main () { return updwtmp (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do if test -z "$ac_lib"; then ac_res="none required" else ac_res=-l$ac_lib LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" fi if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_search_updwtmp=$ac_res fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext if ${ac_cv_search_updwtmp+:} false; then : break fi done if ${ac_cv_search_updwtmp+:} false; then : else ac_cv_search_updwtmp=no fi rm conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_updwtmp" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_search_updwtmp" >&6; } ac_res=$ac_cv_search_updwtmp if test "$ac_res" != no; then : test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" fi for ac_func in fmt_scaled scan_scaled login logout openpty updwtmp logwtmp do : as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF fi done # On some platforms, inet_ntop may be found in libresolv or libnsl. { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing inet_ntop" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for library containing inet_ntop... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_search_inet_ntop+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char inet_ntop (); int main () { return inet_ntop (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF for ac_lib in '' resolv nsl; do if test -z "$ac_lib"; then ac_res="none required" else ac_res=-l$ac_lib LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" fi if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_search_inet_ntop=$ac_res fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext if ${ac_cv_search_inet_ntop+:} false; then : break fi done if ${ac_cv_search_inet_ntop+:} false; then : else ac_cv_search_inet_ntop=no fi rm conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_inet_ntop" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_search_inet_ntop" >&6; } ac_res=$ac_cv_search_inet_ntop if test "$ac_res" != no; then : test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" fi for ac_func in strftime do : ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strftime" "ac_cv_func_strftime" if test "x$ac_cv_func_strftime" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_STRFTIME 1 _ACEOF else # strftime is in -lintl on SCO UNIX. { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for strftime in -lintl" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for strftime in -lintl... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS LIBS="-lintl $LIBS" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char strftime (); int main () { return strftime (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime=yes else ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime=no fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime" = xyes; then : $as_echo "#define HAVE_STRFTIME 1" >>confdefs.h LIBS="-lintl $LIBS" fi fi done # Check for ALTDIRFUNC glob() extension { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support... 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"BSM enabled and required function not found" "$LINENO" 5 fi done # These are optional for ac_func in getaudit_addr aug_get_machine do : as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF fi done $as_echo "#define USE_BSM_AUDIT 1" >>confdefs.h if test "$sol2ver" -ge 11; then SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lscf" $as_echo "#define BROKEN_BSM_API 1" >>confdefs.h fi ;; linux) { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: linux" >&5 $as_echo "linux" >&6; } AUDIT_MODULE=linux for ac_header in libaudit.h do : ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "libaudit.h" "ac_cv_header_libaudit_h" "$ac_includes_default" if test "x$ac_cv_header_libaudit_h" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_LIBAUDIT_H 1 _ACEOF fi done SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -laudit" $as_echo "#define USE_LINUX_AUDIT 1" >>confdefs.h ;; debug) AUDIT_MODULE=debug { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: debug" >&5 $as_echo "debug" >&6; } $as_echo "#define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS 1" >>confdefs.h ;; no) { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } ;; *) as_fn_error $? "Unknown audit module $withval" "$LINENO" 5 ;; esac fi # Check whether --with-pie was given. if test "${with_pie+set}" = set; then : withval=$with_pie; if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then use_pie=no fi if test "x$withval" = "xyes"; then use_pie=yes fi fi if test "x$use_pie" = "x"; then use_pie=no fi if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" != "x1" && test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then # Turn off automatic PIE when toolchain hardening is off. use_pie=no fi if test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then # Automatic PIE requires gcc >= 4.x { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gcc >= 4.x" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for gcc >= 4.x... 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" >&6; } cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main () { exit(EVP_aes_128_gcm() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_gcm() == NULL || EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED == 0 || EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN == 0 || EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG == 0 || EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG == 0 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(NULL, 0, 0, NULL) == 0); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } $as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM 1" >>confdefs.h else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_cipers \ aes128-gcm@openssh.com aes256-gcm@openssh.com" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for library containing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl... 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Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl (); int main () { return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF for ac_lib in '' crypto; do if test -z "$ac_lib"; then ac_res="none required" else ac_res=-l$ac_lib LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" fi if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl=$ac_res fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl+:} false; then : break fi done if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl+:} false; then : else ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl=no fi rm conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl" >&6; } ac_res=$ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl if test "$ac_res" != no; then : test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" $as_echo "#define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL 1" >>confdefs.h fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int... " >&6; } cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main () { if(EVP_DigestUpdate(NULL, NULL,0)) exit(0); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } $as_echo "#define OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID 1" >>confdefs.h fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext # Some systems want crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the version in OpenSSL, # because the system crypt() is more featureful. if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_before" = "x1"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for crypt in -lcrypt" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for crypt in -lcrypt... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char crypt (); int main () { return crypt (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=yes else ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=no fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_LIBCRYPT 1 _ACEOF LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS" fi fi # Some Linux systems (Slackware) need crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the # version in OpenSSL. if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_later" = "x1"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for crypt in -lcrypt" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for crypt in -lcrypt... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char crypt (); int main () { return crypt (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=yes else ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=no fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" = xyes; then : LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt" fi fi for ac_func in crypt DES_crypt do : as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF fi done # Search for SHA256 support in libc and/or OpenSSL for ac_func in SHA256_Update EVP_sha256 do : as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512 \ diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 \ hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com" fi done # Search for RIPE-MD support in OpenSSL for ac_func in EVP_ripemd160 do : ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EVP_ripemd160" "ac_cv_func_EVP_ripemd160" if test "x$ac_cv_func_EVP_ripemd160" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160 1 _ACEOF else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ hmac-ripemd160 hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com" fi done # Check complete ECC support in OpenSSL { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1... " >&6; } cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */ # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code" #endif int main () { EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha256(); /* We need this too */ ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } enable_nistp256=1 else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1... " >&6; } cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */ # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code" #endif int main () { EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha384(); /* We need this too */ ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } enable_nistp384=1 else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1... " >&6; } cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */ # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code" #endif int main () { EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */ ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional... " >&6; } if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross-compiling: assuming yes" >&5 $as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross-compiling: assuming yes" >&2;} enable_nistp521=1 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include int main () { EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */ exit(e == NULL || m == NULL); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } enable_nistp521=1 else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext COMMENT_OUT_ECC="#no ecc#" TEST_SSH_ECC=no if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1 || test x$enable_nistp384 = x1 || \ test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then $as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_ECC 1" >>confdefs.h fi if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1; then $as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 1" >>confdefs.h TEST_SSH_ECC=yes COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 \ ecdh-sha2-nistp256 ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" fi if test x$enable_nistp384 = x1; then $as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384 1" >>confdefs.h TEST_SSH_ECC=yes COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \ ecdh-sha2-nistp384 ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" fi if test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then $as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 1" >>confdefs.h TEST_SSH_ECC=yes COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms ecdh-sha2-nistp521 \ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for crypt in -lcrypt" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for crypt in -lcrypt... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char crypt (); int main () { return crypt (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=yes else ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=no fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" = xyes; then : LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt" fi for ac_func in crypt do : ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "crypt" "ac_cv_func_crypt" if test "x$ac_cv_func_crypt" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_CRYPT 1 _ACEOF fi done fi for ac_func in \ arc4random \ arc4random_buf \ arc4random_stir \ arc4random_uniform \ do : as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF fi done saved_LIBS="$LIBS" { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ia_openinfo in -liaf" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for ia_openinfo in -liaf... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS LIBS="-liaf $LIBS" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char ia_openinfo (); int main () { return ia_openinfo (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo=yes else ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo=no fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo" = xyes; then : LIBS="$LIBS -liaf" for ac_func in set_id do : ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "set_id" "ac_cv_func_set_id" if test "x$ac_cv_func_set_id" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_SET_ID 1 _ACEOF SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -liaf" $as_echo "#define HAVE_LIBIAF 1" >>confdefs.h fi done fi LIBS="$saved_LIBS" ### Configure cryptographic random number support # Check wheter OpenSSL seeds itself if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded... " >&6; } if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5 $as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;} # This is safe, since we will fatal() at runtime if # OpenSSL is not seeded correctly. OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main () { exit(RAND_status() == 1 ? 0 : 1); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext fi fi # PRNGD TCP socket # Check whether --with-prngd-port was given. if test "${with_prngd_port+set}" = set; then : withval=$with_prngd_port; case "$withval" in no) withval="" ;; [0-9]*) ;; *) as_fn_error $? "You must specify a numeric port number for --with-prngd-port" "$LINENO" 5 ;; esac if test ! -z "$withval" ; then PRNGD_PORT="$withval" cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define PRNGD_PORT $PRNGD_PORT _ACEOF fi fi # PRNGD Unix domain socket # Check whether --with-prngd-socket was given. if test "${with_prngd_socket+set}" = set; then : withval=$with_prngd_socket; case "$withval" in yes) withval="/var/run/egd-pool" ;; no) withval="" ;; /*) ;; *) as_fn_error $? "You must specify an absolute path to the entropy socket" "$LINENO" 5 ;; esac if test ! -z "$withval" ; then if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then as_fn_error $? "You may not specify both a PRNGD/EGD port and socket" "$LINENO" 5 fi if test ! -r "$withval" ; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Entropy socket is not readable" >&5 $as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Entropy socket is not readable" >&2;} fi PRNGD_SOCKET="$withval" cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define PRNGD_SOCKET "$PRNGD_SOCKET" _ACEOF fi else # Check for existing socket only if we don't have a random device already if test "x$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" != "xyes" ; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PRNGD/EGD socket" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for PRNGD/EGD socket... " >&6; } # Insert other locations here for sock in /var/run/egd-pool /dev/egd-pool /etc/entropy; do if test -r $sock && $TEST_MINUS_S_SH -c "test -S $sock -o -p $sock" ; then PRNGD_SOCKET="$sock" cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define PRNGD_SOCKET "$PRNGD_SOCKET" _ACEOF break; fi done if test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PRNGD_SOCKET" >&5 $as_echo "$PRNGD_SOCKET" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5 $as_echo "not found" >&6; } fi fi fi # Which randomness source do we use? if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then RAND_MSG="PRNGd port $PRNGD_PORT" elif test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then RAND_MSG="PRNGd socket $PRNGD_SOCKET" elif test ! -z "$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" ; then $as_echo "#define OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY 1" >>confdefs.h RAND_MSG="OpenSSL internal ONLY" elif test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: OpenSSH will use /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers. It will fail if this device is not supported or accessible" >&5 $as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: OpenSSH will use /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers. It will fail if this device is not supported or accessible" >&2;} else as_fn_error $? "OpenSSH has no source of random numbers. Please configure OpenSSL with an entropy source or re-run configure using one of the --with-prngd-port or --with-prngd-socket options" "$LINENO" 5 fi # Check for PAM libs PAM_MSG="no" # Check whether --with-pam was given. if test "${with_pam+set}" = set; then : withval=$with_pam; if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then as_fn_error $? "PAM headers not found" "$LINENO" 5 fi saved_LIBS="$LIBS" { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for dlopen in -ldl" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for dlopen in -ldl... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS LIBS="-ldl $LIBS" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. 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"systrace sandbox requires systrace headers and SYSTR_POLICY_KILL support" "$LINENO" 5 SANDBOX_STYLE="systrace" $as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SYSTRACE 1" >>confdefs.h elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xdarwin" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" = "xyes") ; then test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" != "xyes" -o \ "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" != "xyes" && \ as_fn_error $? "Darwin seatbelt sandbox requires sandbox.h and sandbox_init function" "$LINENO" 5 SANDBOX_STYLE="darwin" $as_echo "#define SANDBOX_DARWIN 1" >>confdefs.h elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xseccomp_filter" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \ test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_elf_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_audit_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_filter_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" && \ test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" && \ test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" = "xyes" ) ; then test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" = "x" && \ as_fn_error $? "seccomp_filter sandbox not supported on $host" "$LINENO" 5 test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" != "x1" && \ as_fn_error $? "seccomp_filter sandbox requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" "$LINENO" 5 test "x$have_seccomp_filter" != "x1" && \ as_fn_error $? "seccomp_filter sandbox requires seccomp headers" "$LINENO" 5 test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" != "xyes" && \ as_fn_error $? "seccomp_filter sandbox requires prctl function" "$LINENO" 5 SANDBOX_STYLE="seccomp_filter" $as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER 1" >>confdefs.h elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" != "xyes" && \ as_fn_error $? "capsicum sandbox requires sys/capsicum.h header" "$LINENO" 5 test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \ as_fn_error $? "capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function" "$LINENO" 5 SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum" $as_echo "#define SANDBOX_CAPSICUM 1" >>confdefs.h elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" && \ test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" = "xyes" && \ test "x$rlimit_nofile_zero_works" = "xyes" ) ; then test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \ as_fn_error $? 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((a) * -1) : (a)) /* * printf in libc on some platforms (eg old Tru64) does not understand %lld so * we do this the hard way. */ static int fprint_ll(FILE *f, long long n) { unsigned int i; int l[sizeof(long long) * 8]; if (n < 0) if (fprintf(f, "-") < 0) return -1; for (i = 0; n != 0; i++) { l[i] = my_abs(n % 10); n /= 10; } do { if (fprintf(f, "%d", l[--i]) < 0) return -1; } while (i != 0); if (fprintf(f, " ") < 0) return -1; return 0; } int main () { FILE *f; long long i, llmin, llmax = 0; if((f = fopen(DATA,"w")) == NULL) exit(1); #if defined(LLONG_MIN) && defined(LLONG_MAX) fprintf(stderr, "Using system header for LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n"); llmin = LLONG_MIN; llmax = LLONG_MAX; #else fprintf(stderr, "Calculating LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n"); /* This will work on one's complement and two's complement */ for (i = 1; i > llmax; i <<= 1, i++) llmax = i; llmin = llmax + 1LL; /* wrap */ #endif /* Sanity check */ if (llmin + 1 < llmin || llmin - 1 < llmin || llmax + 1 > llmax || llmax - 1 > llmax || llmin == llmax || llmin == 0 || llmax == 0 || llmax < LONG_MAX || llmin > LONG_MIN) { fprintf(f, "unknown unknown\n"); exit(2); } if (fprint_ll(f, llmin) < 0) exit(3); if (fprint_ll(f, llmax) < 0) exit(4); if (fclose(f) < 0) exit(5); exit(0); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : llong_min=`$AWK '{print $1}' conftest.llminmax` llong_max=`$AWK '{print $2}' conftest.llminmax` { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $llong_max" >&5 $as_echo "$llong_max" >&6; } cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define LLONG_MAX ${llong_max}LL _ACEOF { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for min value of long long" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for min value of long long... 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"Cannot find a type to use in place of socklen_t" "$LINENO" 5 fi fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" >&5 $as_echo "$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" >&6; } cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define socklen_t $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv _ACEOF fi ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "sig_atomic_t" "ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t" "#include " if test "x$ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T 1 _ACEOF fi ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "fsblkcnt_t" "ac_cv_type_fsblkcnt_t" " #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif " if test "x$ac_cv_type_fsblkcnt_t" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T 1 _ACEOF fi ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "fsfilcnt_t" "ac_cv_type_fsfilcnt_t" " #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif " if test "x$ac_cv_type_fsfilcnt_t" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_FSFILCNT_T 1 _ACEOF fi ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "in_addr_t" "ac_cv_type_in_addr_t" "#include #include " if test "x$ac_cv_type_in_addr_t" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_IN_ADDR_T 1 _ACEOF fi ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "in_port_t" "ac_cv_type_in_port_t" "#include #include " if test "x$ac_cv_type_in_port_t" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_IN_PORT_T 1 _ACEOF fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for size_t" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for size_t... 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" >&6; } if ${ac_cv_have_sa_family_t+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main () { sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include #include int main () { sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" else ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="no" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" = "xyes" ; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T 1" >>confdefs.h fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pid_t" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for pid_t... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_have_pid_t+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include int main () { pid_t foo; foo = 1235; ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_have_pid_t="yes" else ac_cv_have_pid_t="no" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_pid_t" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_have_pid_t" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_have_pid_t" = "xyes" ; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_PID_T 1" >>confdefs.h fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for mode_t" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for mode_t... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_have_mode_t+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include int main () { mode_t foo; foo = 1235; ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_have_mode_t="yes" else ac_cv_have_mode_t="no" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_mode_t" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_have_mode_t" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_have_mode_t" = "xyes" ; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_MODE_T 1" >>confdefs.h fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct sockaddr_storage" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for struct sockaddr_storage... 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" >&6; } if ${ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main () { struct in6_addr s; s.s6_addr[0] = 0; ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="yes" else ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="no" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" = "xyes" ; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR 1" >>confdefs.h ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct sockaddr_in6" "sin6_scope_id" "ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id" " #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H #include #endif #include " if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID 1 _ACEOF fi fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct addrinfo" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for struct addrinfo... 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Contact your vendor or install" echo "an alternative compiler (I.E., GCC) before continuing." echo "" exit 1; else if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&5 $as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&2;} else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF main() { char buf[50]; char expected_out[50]; int mazsize = 50 ; #if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8) long int num = 0x7fffffffffffffff; #else long long num = 0x7fffffffffffffffll; #endif strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807"); snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num); if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0) exit(1); exit(0); } #else main() { exit(0); } #endif _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : true else $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h fi rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext fi fi # look for field 'ut_host' in header 'utmp.h' ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_host { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_host field in utmp.h" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for ut_host field in utmp.h... 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" >&6; } if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include _ACEOF if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | $EGREP "ut_type" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : eval "$ossh_varname=yes" else eval "$ossh_varname=no" fi rm -f conftest* fi ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 $as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # look for field 'ut_type' in header 'utmpx.h' ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_type { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_type field in utmpx.h" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for ut_type field in utmpx.h... " >&6; } if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include _ACEOF if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | $EGREP "ut_type" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : eval "$ossh_varname=yes" else eval "$ossh_varname=no" fi rm -f conftest* fi ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 $as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # look for field 'ut_tv' in header 'utmp.h' ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_tv { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_tv field in utmp.h" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for ut_tv field in utmp.h... 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" >&6; } if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include _ACEOF if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | $EGREP "ut_id" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : eval "$ossh_varname=yes" else eval "$ossh_varname=no" fi rm -f conftest* fi ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 $as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # look for field 'ut_id' in header 'utmpx.h' ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_id { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_id field in utmpx.h" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for ut_id field in utmpx.h... 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" >&6; } if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include _ACEOF if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | $EGREP "ut_addr" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : eval "$ossh_varname=yes" else eval "$ossh_varname=no" fi rm -f conftest* fi ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 $as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # look for field 'ut_addr' in header 'utmpx.h' ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr field in utmpx.h" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for ut_addr field in utmpx.h... 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If" echo " used, ensure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work.)" fi fi if test ! -z "$superuser_path" ; then echo " sshd superuser user PATH: $J" fi echo " Manpage format: $MANTYPE" echo " PAM support: $PAM_MSG" echo " OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG" echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG" echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG" echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG" echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG" echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG" echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG" echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG" echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG" echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG" echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG" echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG" echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG" echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG" echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE" echo "" echo " Host: ${host}" echo " Compiler: ${CC}" echo " Compiler flags: ${CFLAGS}" echo "Preprocessor flags: ${CPPFLAGS}" echo " Linker flags: ${LDFLAGS}" echo " Libraries: ${LIBS}" if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then echo " +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}" fi if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then echo " +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}" fi echo "" if test "x$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" = "xyes" ; then echo "SVR4 style packages are supported with \"make package\"" echo "" fi if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then echo "PAM is enabled. You may need to install a PAM control file " echo "for sshd, otherwise password authentication may fail. " echo "Example PAM control files can be found in the contrib/ " echo "subdirectory" echo "" fi if test ! -z "$NO_PEERCHECK" ; then echo "WARNING: the operating system that you are using does not" echo "appear to support getpeereid(), getpeerucred() or the" echo "SO_PEERCRED getsockopt() option. These facilities are used to" echo "enforce security checks to prevent unauthorised connections to" echo "ssh-agent. Their absence increases the risk that a malicious" echo "user can connect to your agent." echo "" fi if test "$AUDIT_MODULE" = "bsm" ; then echo "WARNING: BSM audit support is currently considered EXPERIMENTAL." echo "See the Solaris section in README.platform for details." fi Index: head/crypto/openssh/configure.ac =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/configure.ac (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/configure.ac (revision 294336) @@ -1,5015 +1,5023 @@ # $Id: configure.ac,v 1.583 2014/08/26 20:32:01 djm Exp $ # # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller # # Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any # purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above # copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. # # THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES # WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF # MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR # ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES # WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN # ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org]) AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.583 $) AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c]) AC_LANG([C]) AC_CONFIG_HEADER([config.h]) AC_PROG_CC AC_CANONICAL_HOST AC_C_BIGENDIAN # Checks for programs. AC_PROG_AWK AC_PROG_CPP AC_PROG_RANLIB AC_PROG_INSTALL AC_PROG_EGREP -AC_PATH_PROG([AR], [ar]) +AC_CHECK_TOOLS([AR], [ar]) AC_PATH_PROG([CAT], [cat]) AC_PATH_PROG([KILL], [kill]) AC_PATH_PROGS([PERL], [perl5 perl]) AC_PATH_PROG([SED], [sed]) AC_SUBST([PERL]) AC_PATH_PROG([ENT], [ent]) AC_SUBST([ENT]) AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [bash]) AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [ksh]) AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [sh]) AC_PATH_PROG([SH], [sh]) AC_PATH_PROG([GROFF], [groff]) AC_PATH_PROG([NROFF], [nroff]) AC_PATH_PROG([MANDOC], [mandoc]) AC_SUBST([TEST_SHELL], [sh]) dnl select manpage formatter if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then MANFMT="$MANDOC" elif test "x$NROFF" != "x" ; then MANFMT="$NROFF -mandoc" elif test "x$GROFF" != "x" ; then MANFMT="$GROFF -mandoc -Tascii" else AC_MSG_WARN([no manpage formatted found]) MANFMT="false" fi AC_SUBST([MANFMT]) dnl for buildpkg.sh AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_GROUPADD_PROG], [groupadd], [groupadd], [/usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc]) AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_USERADD_PROG], [useradd], [useradd], [/usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc]) AC_CHECK_PROG([MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED], [pkgmk], [yes], [no]) if test -x /sbin/sh; then AC_SUBST([STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL], [/sbin/sh]) else AC_SUBST([STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL], [/bin/sh]) fi # System features AC_SYS_LARGEFILE if test -z "$AR" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([*** 'ar' missing, please install or fix your \$PATH ***]) fi # Use LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment if possible if test ! -z "$LOGIN_PROGRAM" ; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK], ["$LOGIN_PROGRAM"], [If your header files don't define LOGIN_PROGRAM, then use this (detected) from environment and PATH]) else # Search for login AC_PATH_PROG([LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK], [login]) if test ! -z "$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK" ; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK], ["$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK"]) fi fi AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_PASSWD_PROG], [passwd]) if test ! -z "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" ; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([_PATH_PASSWD_PROG], ["$PATH_PASSWD_PROG"], [Full path of your "passwd" program]) fi if test -z "$LD" ; then LD=$CC fi AC_SUBST([LD]) AC_C_INLINE AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX], [have_llong_max=1], , [#include ]) AC_CHECK_DECL([SYSTR_POLICY_KILL], [have_systr_policy_kill=1], , [ #include #include #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECL([RLIMIT_NPROC], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC], [], [sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC])], , [ #include #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECL([PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS], [have_linux_no_new_privs=1], , [ #include #include ]) openssl=yes ssh1=yes AC_ARG_WITH([openssl], [ --without-openssl Disable use of OpenSSL; use only limited internal crypto **EXPERIMENTAL** ], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then openssl=no ssh1=no fi ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL will be used for cryptography]) if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([WITH_OPENSSL], [1], [use libcrypto for cryptography]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi AC_ARG_WITH([ssh1], - [ --without-ssh1 Disable support for SSH protocol 1], + [ --without-ssh1 Enable support for SSH protocol 1], [ - if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then + if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then + if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then + AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot enable SSH protocol 1 with OpenSSL disabled]) + fi + ssh1=yes + elif test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then ssh1=no - elif test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then - AC_MSG_ERROR([Cannot enable SSH protocol 1 with OpenSSL disabled]) + else + AC_MSG_ERROR([unknown --with-ssh1 argument]) fi ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether SSH protocol 1 support is enabled]) if test "x$ssh1" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([WITH_SSH1], [1], [include SSH protocol version 1 support]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi use_stack_protector=1 use_toolchain_hardening=1 AC_ARG_WITH([stackprotect], [ --without-stackprotect Don't use compiler's stack protection], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then use_stack_protector=0 fi ]) AC_ARG_WITH([hardening], [ --without-hardening Don't use toolchain hardening flags], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then use_toolchain_hardening=0 fi ]) # We use -Werror for the tests only so that we catch warnings like "this is # on by default" for things like -fPIE. AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports -Werror]) saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror" AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[int main(void) { return 0; }]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) WERROR="-Werror"], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) WERROR="" ] ) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Qunused-arguments]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunknown-warning-option]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wall]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-arith]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wuninitialized]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wsign-compare]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wformat-security]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-sign], [-Wno-pointer-sign]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunused-result], [-Wno-unused-result]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fno-strict-aliasing]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2]) if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" = "x1"; then OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,relro]) OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,now]) OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,noexecstack]) # NB. -ftrapv expects certain support functions to be present in # the compiler library (libgcc or similar) to detect integer operations # that can overflow. We must check that the result of enabling it # actually links. The test program compiled/linked includes a number # of integer operations that should exercise this. OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK([-ftrapv]) fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([gcc version]) GCC_VER=`$CC -v 2>&1 | $AWK '/gcc version /{print $3}'` case $GCC_VER in 1.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;; 2.8* | 2.9*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;; 2.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;; *) ;; esac AC_MSG_RESULT([$GCC_VER]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC accepts -fno-builtin-memset]) saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fno-builtin-memset" AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char b[10]; memset(b, 0, sizeof(b)); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ] ) # -fstack-protector-all doesn't always work for some GCC versions # and/or platforms, so we test if we can. If it's not supported # on a given platform gcc will emit a warning so we use -Werror. if test "x$use_stack_protector" = "x1"; then for t in -fstack-protector-strong -fstack-protector-all \ -fstack-protector; do AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports $t]) saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $t -Werror" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $t -Werror" AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char x[256]; snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX"); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $t" LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $t" AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $t works]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char x[256]; snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX"); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) break ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: cannot test]) break ] ) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" done fi if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then # retry LLONG_MAX with -std=gnu99, needed on some Linuxes unset ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -std=gnu99" AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX], [have_llong_max=1], [CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"], [#include ] ) fi fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include __attribute__((__unused__)) static void foo(void){return;}]], [[ exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE(NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE, 1, [compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types]) ] ) if test "x$no_attrib_nonnull" != "x1" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__], [1], [Have attribute nonnull]) fi AC_ARG_WITH([rpath], [ --without-rpath Disable auto-added -R linker paths], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then need_dash_r="" fi if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then need_dash_r=1 fi ] ) # Allow user to specify flags AC_ARG_WITH([cflags], [ --with-cflags Specify additional flags to pass to compiler], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $withval" fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([cppflags], [ --with-cppflags Specify additional flags to pass to preprocessor] , [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $withval" fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([ldflags], [ --with-ldflags Specify additional flags to pass to linker], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $withval" fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([libs], [ --with-libs Specify additional libraries to link with], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then LIBS="$LIBS $withval" fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([Werror], [ --with-Werror Build main code with -Werror], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno"; then werror_flags="-Werror" if test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then werror_flags="$withval" fi fi ] ) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \ blf.h \ bstring.h \ crypt.h \ crypto/sha2.h \ dirent.h \ endian.h \ elf.h \ features.h \ fcntl.h \ floatingpoint.h \ getopt.h \ glob.h \ ia.h \ iaf.h \ inttypes.h \ limits.h \ locale.h \ login.h \ maillock.h \ ndir.h \ net/if_tun.h \ netdb.h \ netgroup.h \ pam/pam_appl.h \ paths.h \ poll.h \ pty.h \ readpassphrase.h \ rpc/types.h \ security/pam_appl.h \ sha2.h \ shadow.h \ stddef.h \ stdint.h \ string.h \ strings.h \ sys/audit.h \ sys/bitypes.h \ sys/bsdtty.h \ sys/cdefs.h \ sys/dir.h \ sys/mman.h \ sys/ndir.h \ sys/poll.h \ sys/prctl.h \ sys/pstat.h \ sys/select.h \ sys/stat.h \ sys/stream.h \ sys/stropts.h \ sys/strtio.h \ sys/statvfs.h \ sys/sysmacros.h \ sys/time.h \ sys/timers.h \ time.h \ tmpdir.h \ ttyent.h \ ucred.h \ unistd.h \ usersec.h \ util.h \ utime.h \ utmp.h \ utmpx.h \ vis.h \ ]) # sys/capsicum.h requires sys/types.h AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/capsicum.h], [], [], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif ]) # lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris AC_CHECK_HEADERS([lastlog.h], [], [], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif ]) # sys/ptms.h requires sys/stream.h to be included first on Solaris AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/ptms.h], [], [], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H # include #endif ]) # login_cap.h requires sys/types.h on NetBSD AC_CHECK_HEADERS([login_cap.h], [], [], [ #include ]) # older BSDs need sys/param.h before sys/mount.h AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/mount.h], [], [], [ #include ]) # Android requires sys/socket.h to be included before sys/un.h AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/un.h], [], [], [ #include #include ]) # Messages for features tested for in target-specific section SIA_MSG="no" SPC_MSG="no" SP_MSG="no" # Check for some target-specific stuff case "$host" in *-*-aix*) # Some versions of VAC won't allow macro redefinitions at # -qlanglevel=ansi, and autoconf 2.60 sometimes insists on using that # particularly with older versions of vac or xlc. # It also throws errors about null macro argments, but these are # not fatal. AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows macro redefinitions]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #define testmacro foo #define testmacro bar]], [[ exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) CC="`echo $CC | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`" LD="`echo $LD | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`" CFLAGS="`echo $CFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`" CPPFLAGS="`echo $CPPFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`" ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)]) if (test -z "$blibpath"); then blibpath="/usr/lib:/lib" fi saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" if test "$GCC" = "yes"; then flags="-Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath, -blibpath:" else flags="-blibpath: -Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath," fi for tryflags in $flags ;do if (test -z "$blibflags"); then LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $tryflags$blibpath" AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[]])], [blibflags=$tryflags], []) fi done if (test -z "$blibflags"); then AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) AC_MSG_ERROR([*** must be able to specify blibpath on AIX - check config.log]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([$blibflags]) fi LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" dnl Check for authenticate. Might be in libs.a on older AIXes AC_CHECK_FUNC([authenticate], [AC_DEFINE([WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE], [1], [Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function])], [AC_CHECK_LIB([s], [authenticate], [ AC_DEFINE([WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE]) LIBS="$LIBS -ls" ]) ]) dnl Check for various auth function declarations in headers. AC_CHECK_DECLS([authenticate, loginrestrictions, loginsuccess, passwdexpired, setauthdb], , , [#include ]) dnl Check if loginfailed is declared and takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2) AC_CHECK_DECLS([loginfailed], [AC_MSG_CHECKING([if loginfailed takes 4 arguments]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ (void)loginfailed("user","host","tty",0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG], [1], [Define if your AIX loginfailed() function takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2)])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ])], [], [#include ] ) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getgrset setauthdb]) AC_CHECK_DECL([F_CLOSEM], AC_DEFINE([HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM], [1], [Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom]), [], [ #include #include ] ) check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo=1 AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_REALPATH], [1], [Define if you have a broken realpath.]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID], [1], [Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID], [1], [Define if your setreuid() is broken]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID], [1], [Define if your setregid() is broken]) dnl AIX handles lastlog as part of its login message AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG], [1], [Define if you don't want to use lastlog]) AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX], [1], [Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work]) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV], [Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is supported by bsd-setproctitle.c]) AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1], [AIX 5.2 and 5.3 (and presumably newer) require this]) AC_DEFINE([PTY_ZEROREAD], [1], [read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd]) AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)]) ;; *-*-android*) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use utmp]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use wtmp]) ;; *-*-cygwin*) check_for_libcrypt_later=1 LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textreadmode.o" AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CYGWIN], [1], [Define if you are on Cygwin]) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES], [1], [Use PIPES instead of a socketpair()]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW], [1], [Define if you want to disable shadow passwords]) AC_DEFINE([NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS], [1], [Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system]) AC_DEFINE([NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT], [1], [Define if the concept of ports only accessible to superusers isn't known]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING], [1], [Define if your platform needs to skip post auth file descriptor passing]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_IOBUFSZ], [65535], [Windows is sensitive to read buffer size]) AC_DEFINE([FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH], [1], [File names may not contain backslash characters]) # Cygwin defines optargs, optargs as declspec(dllimport) for historical # reasons which cause compile warnings, so we disable those warnings. OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wno-attributes]) ;; *-*-dgux*) AC_DEFINE([IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN], [1], [Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) ;; *-*-darwin*) use_pie=auto AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have working getaddrinfo]) AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16)) exit(0); else exit(1); } ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([working])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([buggy]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO], [1], [getaddrinfo is broken (if present)]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([assume it is working])]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [OS X glob does not do what we expect]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([BIND_8_COMPAT], [1], [Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1], [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv]) AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [], AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records]) [#include ] AC_DEFINE([LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE], [1], [Define if pututxline updates lastlog too]) ) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV], [Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is supported by bsd-setproctitle.c]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([sandbox_init]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sandbox.h]) ;; *-*-dragonfly*) SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcrypt" TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX" ;; *-*-haiku*) LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd " AC_CHECK_LIB([network], [socket]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T]) MANTYPE=man ;; *-*-hpux*) # first we define all of the options common to all HP-UX releases CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1" IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT], [1], [Define if your login program cannot handle end of options ("--")]) AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*"], [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account]) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_PSTAT]) AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)]) maildir="/var/mail" LIBS="$LIBS -lsec" AC_CHECK_LIB([xnet], [t_error], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***])]) # next, we define all of the options specific to major releases case "$host" in *-*-hpux10*) if test -z "$GCC"; then CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae" fi ;; *-*-hpux11*) AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE], [1], [Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which passes pam_messages to the conversation function with an extra level of indirection]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use utmp]) AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins]) check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo=1 check_for_conflicting_getspnam=1 ;; esac # lastly, we define options specific to minor releases case "$host" in *-*-hpux10.26) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE], [1], [Define if you have SecureWare-based protected password database]) disable_ptmx_check=yes LIBS="$LIBS -lsecpw" ;; esac ;; *-*-irix5*) PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc" AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA], [1], [Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted (e.g. Irix gcc issue)]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY], [1], [Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your ttyname in [uw]tmp]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) ;; *-*-irix6*) PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc" AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_ARRAY], [1], [Define if you have/want arrays (cluster-wide session managment, not C arrays)]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_PROJECT], [1], [Define if you want IRIX project management]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_AUDIT], [1], [Define if you want IRIX audit trails]) AC_CHECK_FUNC([jlimit_startjob], [AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_JOBS], [1], [Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs])]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX], [1], [updwtmpx is broken (if present)]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) ;; *-*-k*bsd*-gnu | *-*-kopensolaris*-gnu) check_for_libcrypt_later=1 AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"]) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV]) AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts]) AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins]) ;; *-*-linux*) no_dev_ptmx=1 use_pie=auto check_for_libcrypt_later=1 check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1 AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE], [1], [Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"], [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account]) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV]) AC_DEFINE([LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO], [EPERM], [Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported" if it doesn't return EOPNOTSUPP.]) AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts]) AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP]) AC_DEFINE([LINUX_OOM_ADJUST], [1], [Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer]) inet6_default_4in6=yes case `uname -r` in 1.*|2.0.*) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE], [1], [Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly]) ;; esac # tun(4) forwarding compat code AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/if_tun.h]) if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_LINUX], [1], [Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1], [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) fi AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/seccomp.h linux/filter.h linux/audit.h], [], [], [#include ]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([prctl]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for seccomp architecture]) seccomp_audit_arch= case "$host" in x86_64-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 ;; i*86-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386 ;; - arm*-*) + arm*-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM - ;; + ;; + aarch64*-*) + seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64 + ;; esac if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT(["$seccomp_audit_arch"]) - AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH], [$seccomp_audit_arch], - [Specify the system call convention in use]) + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH], [$seccomp_audit_arch], + [Specify the system call convention in use]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([architecture not supported]) fi ;; mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4) AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP], [1], [Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty]) SONY=1 ;; *-*-netbsd*) check_for_libcrypt_before=1 if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then need_dash_r=1 fi AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way]) AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], , AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support])) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX" AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1], [NetBSD strnvis argument order is swapped compared to OpenBSD]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON], [1], [NetBSD read function is sometimes redirected, breaking atomicio comparisons against it]) ;; *-*-freebsd*) check_for_libcrypt_later=1 AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["*LOCKED*"], [Account locked with pw(1)]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way]) AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], , AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support])) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [FreeBSD glob does not do what we need]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1], [FreeBSD strnvis argument order is swapped compared to OpenBSD]) TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX" # Preauth crypto occasionally uses file descriptors for crypto offload # and will crash if they cannot be opened. AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE], [1], [define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things]) ;; *-*-bsdi*) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) ;; *-next-*) conf_lastlog_location="/usr/adm/lastlog" conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp conf_wtmp_location=/usr/adm/wtmp maildir=/usr/spool/mail AC_DEFINE([HAVE_NEXT], [1], [Define if you are on NeXT]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_REALPATH]) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS], [1], [Needed for NeXT]) ;; *-*-openbsd*) use_pie=auto AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__], [1], [OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__], [1], [OpenBSD's gcc has bounded]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_OPENBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way]) AC_DEFINE([SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND], [1], [syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler]) TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX" ;; *-*-solaris*) if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then need_dash_r=1 fi AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE]) AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX]) AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM], [1], [Some versions of /bin/login need the TERM supplied on the commandline]) AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE]) AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1], [Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set to the unpriv'ed user]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) # Pushing STREAMS modules will cause sshd to acquire a controlling tty. AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY], [1], [Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY after setsid()]) AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME], [1], [must supply username to passwd in case the name is longer than 8 chars]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON], [1], [tcgetattr with ICANON may hang]) external_path_file=/etc/default/login # hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions) conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x]) sol2ver=`echo "$host"| sed -e 's/.*[[0-9]]\.//'` if test "$sol2ver" -ge 8; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use wtmp]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-contracts], [ --with-solaris-contracts Enable Solaris process contracts (experimental)], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([contract], [ct_tmpl_activate], [ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS], [1], [Define if you have Solaris process contracts]) SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcontract" SPC_MSG="yes" ], ) ], ) AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-projects], [ --with-solaris-projects Enable Solaris projects (experimental)], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([project], [setproject], [ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS], [1], [Define if you have Solaris projects]) SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lproject" SP_MSG="yes" ], ) ], ) TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell ;; *-*-sunos4*) CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DSUNOS4" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getpwanam]) AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE]) conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp conf_wtmp_location=/var/adm/wtmp conf_lastlog_location=/var/adm/lastlog AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) ;; *-ncr-sysv*) LIBS="$LIBS -lc89" AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) ;; *-sni-sysv*) # /usr/ucblib MUST NOT be searched on ReliantUNIX AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlsym], ,) # -lresolv needs to be at the end of LIBS or DNS lookups break AC_CHECK_LIB([resolv], [res_query], [ LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv" ]) IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY]) external_path_file=/etc/default/login # /usr/ucblib/libucb.a no longer needed on ReliantUNIX # Attention: always take care to bind libsocket and libnsl before libc, # otherwise you will find lots of "SIOCGPGRP errno 22" on syslog ;; # UnixWare 1.x, UnixWare 2.x, and others based on code from Univel. *-*-sysv4.2*) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME], [1], [must supply username to passwd]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell ;; # UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX 8 *-*-sysv5*) CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -Dvsnprintf=_xvsnprintf -Dsnprintf=_xsnprintf" AC_DEFINE([UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS], [1], [Support passwords > 8 chars]) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME]) TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell case "$host" in *-*-sysv5SCO_SV*) # SCO OpenServer 6.x maildir=/var/spool/mail AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_LIBIAF], [1], [ia_uinfo routines not supported by OS yet]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX]) AC_CHECK_LIB([prot], [getluid], [ LIBS="$LIBS -lprot" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid], , , [-lprot]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW]) ], , ) ;; *) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) check_for_libcrypt_later=1 ;; esac ;; *-*-sysv*) ;; # SCO UNIX and OEM versions of SCO UNIX *-*-sco3.2v4*) AC_MSG_ERROR("This Platform is no longer supported.") ;; # SCO OpenServer 5.x *-*-sco3.2v5*) if test -z "$GCC"; then CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -belf" fi LIBS="$LIBS -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm" no_dev_ptmx=1 AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX]) AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid]) MANTYPE=man TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE=yes ;; *-*-unicosmk*) AC_DEFINE([NO_SSH_LASTLOG], [1], [Define if you don't want to use lastlog in session.c]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lrsc -lshare -luex -lacm" MANTYPE=cat ;; *-*-unicosmp*) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY]) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lacid -ldb" MANTYPE=cat ;; *-*-unicos*) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) AC_DEFINE([NO_SSH_LASTLOG]) LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -Wl,-Dmsglevel=334:fatal" LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lrsc -lshare -luex -lacm" MANTYPE=cat ;; *-dec-osf*) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Digital Unix SIA]) no_osfsia="" AC_ARG_WITH([osfsia], [ --with-osfsia Enable Digital Unix SIA], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([disabled]) no_osfsia=1 fi ], ) if test -z "$no_osfsia" ; then if test -f /etc/sia/matrix.conf; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OSF_SIA], [1], [Define if you have Digital Unix Security Integration Architecture]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LOGIN], [1], [Define if you don't want to use your system's login() call]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) LIBS="$LIBS -lsecurity -ldb -lm -laud" SIA_MSG="yes" else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR], ["Nologin"], [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account]) fi fi AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON], [1], [Can't do comparisons on readv]) ;; *-*-nto-qnx*) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG]) AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE], [1], [QNX shadow support is broken]) enable_etc_default_login=no # has incompatible /etc/default/login case "$host" in *-*-nto-qnx6*) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) ;; esac ;; *-*-ultrix*) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETGROUPS], [1], [getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_MMAP], [1], [Ultrix mmap can't map files]) AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H], [1], [Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix]) ;; *-*-lynxos) CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D__NO_INCLUDE_WARN__" AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETVBUF], [1], [LynxOS has broken setvbuf() implementation]) ;; esac AC_MSG_CHECKING([compiler and flags for sanity]) AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_MSG_ERROR([*** compiler cannot create working executables, check config.log ***]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity]) ] ) dnl Checks for header files. # Checks for libraries. AC_CHECK_FUNC([yp_match], , [AC_CHECK_LIB([nsl], [yp_match])]) AC_CHECK_FUNC([setsockopt], , [AC_CHECK_LIB([socket], [setsockopt])]) dnl IRIX and Solaris 2.5.1 have dirname() in libgen AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dirname], [AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libgen.h])] , [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gen], [dirname], [ AC_CACHE_CHECK([for broken dirname], ac_cv_have_broken_dirname, [ save_LIBS="$LIBS" LIBS="$LIBS -lgen" AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { char *s, buf[32]; strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32); s = dirname(buf); if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) { exit(1); } else { exit(0); } } ]])], [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ], [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ], ) LIBS="$save_LIBS" ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" = "xno" ; then LIBS="$LIBS -lgen" AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DIRNAME]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libgen.h]) fi ]) ]) AC_CHECK_FUNC([getspnam], , [AC_CHECK_LIB([gen], [getspnam], [LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"])]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([basename], [gen], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_BASENAME], [1], [Define if you have the basename function.])]) dnl zlib is required AC_ARG_WITH([zlib], [ --with-zlib=PATH Use zlib in PATH], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib is required ***]) elif test "x$withval" != "xyes"; then if test -d "$withval/lib"; then if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" fi else if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" fi fi if test -d "$withval/include"; then CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}" else CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}" fi fi ] ) AC_CHECK_HEADER([zlib.h], ,[AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib.h missing - please install first or check config.log ***])]) AC_CHECK_LIB([z], [deflate], , [ saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" save_LIBS="$LIBS" dnl Check default zlib install dir if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib -R/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}" fi CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}" LIBS="$LIBS -lz" AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([deflate], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBZ])], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib missing - please install first or check config.log ***]) ] ) ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([zlib-version-check], [ --without-zlib-version-check Disable zlib version check], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then zlib_check_nonfatal=1 fi ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for possibly buggy zlib]) AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ int a=0, b=0, c=0, d=0, n, v; n = sscanf(ZLIB_VERSION, "%d.%d.%d.%d", &a, &b, &c, &d); if (n != 3 && n != 4) exit(1); v = a*1000000 + b*10000 + c*100 + d; fprintf(stderr, "found zlib version %s (%d)\n", ZLIB_VERSION, v); /* 1.1.4 is OK */ if (a == 1 && b == 1 && c >= 4) exit(0); /* 1.2.3 and up are OK */ if (v >= 1020300) exit(0); exit(2); ]])], AC_MSG_RESULT([no]), [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) if test -z "$zlib_check_nonfatal" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib too old - check config.log *** Your reported zlib version has known security problems. It's possible your vendor has fixed these problems without changing the version number. If you are sure this is the case, you can disable the check by running "./configure --without-zlib-version-check". If you are in doubt, upgrade zlib to version 1.2.3 or greater. See http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ for details.]) else AC_MSG_WARN([zlib version may have security problems]) fi ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking zlib version]) ] ) dnl UnixWare 2.x AC_CHECK_FUNC([strcasecmp], [], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([resolv], [strcasecmp], [LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"]) ] ) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utimes], [], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([c89], [utimes], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UTIMES]) LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"]) ] ) dnl Checks for libutil functions AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsd/libutil.h libutil.h]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([fmt_scaled], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([scan_scaled], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([login], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logout], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logwtmp], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([openpty], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([updwtmp], [util bsd]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([fmt_scaled scan_scaled login logout openpty updwtmp logwtmp]) # On some platforms, inet_ntop may be found in libresolv or libnsl. AC_SEARCH_LIBS([inet_ntop], [resolv nsl]) AC_FUNC_STRFTIME # Check for ALTDIRFUNC glob() extension AC_MSG_CHECKING([for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support]) AC_EGREP_CPP([FOUNDIT], [ #include #ifdef GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC FOUNDIT #endif ], [ AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC], [1], [Define if your system glob() function has the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) # Check for g.gl_matchc glob() extension AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gl_matchc field in glob_t]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ glob_t g; g.gl_matchc = 1; ]])], [ AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC], [1], [Define if your system glob() function has gl_matchc options in glob_t]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) # Check for g.gl_statv glob() extension AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gl_statv and GLOB_KEEPSTAT extensions for glob]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ #ifndef GLOB_KEEPSTAT #error "glob does not support GLOB_KEEPSTAT extension" #endif glob_t g; g.gl_statv = NULL; ]])], [ AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV], [1], [Define if your system glob() function has gl_statv options in glob_t]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([GLOB_NOMATCH], , , [#include ]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct dirent d; exit(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char)); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME], [1], [Define if your struct dirent expects you to allocate extra space for d_name]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME]) ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for /proc/pid/fd directory]) if test -d "/proc/$$/fd" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PROC_PID], [1], [Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi # Check whether user wants S/Key support SKEY_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([skey], [ --with-skey[[=PATH]] Enable S/Key support (optionally in PATH)], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib" fi AC_DEFINE([SKEY], [1], [Define if you want S/Key support]) LIBS="-lskey $LIBS" SKEY_MSG="yes" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for s/key support]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ char *ff = skey_keyinfo(""); ff=""; exit(0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing s/key libraries.]) ]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if skeychallenge takes 4 arguments]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ (void)skeychallenge(NULL,"name","",0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([SKEYCHALLENGE_4ARG], [1], [Define if your skeychallenge() function takes 4 arguments (NetBSD)])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi ] ) # Check whether user wants TCP wrappers support TCPW_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([tcp-wrappers], [ --with-tcp-wrappers[[=PATH]] Enable tcpwrappers support (optionally in PATH)], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then saved_LIBS="$LIBS" saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" if test -n "${withval}" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then if test -d "${withval}/lib"; then if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" fi else if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" fi fi if test -d "${withval}/include"; then CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}" else CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}" fi fi LIBS="-lwrap $LIBS" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libwrap]) AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0; ]], [[ hosts_access(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([LIBWRAP], [1], [Define if you want TCP Wrappers support]) SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lwrap" TCPW_MSG="yes" ], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libwrap missing]) ]) LIBS="$saved_LIBS" fi ] ) # Check whether user wants to use ldns LDNS_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH(ldns, [ --with-ldns[[=PATH]] Use ldns for DNSSEC support (optionally in PATH)], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib" fi AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LDNS, 1, [Define if you want ldns support]) LIBS="-lldns $LIBS" LDNS_MSG="yes" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for ldns support]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include #include #include #include int main() { ldns_status status = ldns_verify_trusted(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); status=LDNS_STATUS_OK; exit(0); } ]]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing ldns libraries.]) ]) fi ] ) # Check whether user wants libedit support LIBEDIT_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([libedit], [ --with-libedit[[=PATH]] Enable libedit support for sftp], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no]) if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $PKGCONFIG knows about libedit]) if "$PKGCONFIG" libedit; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) use_pkgconfig_for_libedit=yes else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi fi else CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" fi fi if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libedit" = "xyes"; then LIBEDIT=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libedit` CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libedit`" else LIBEDIT="-ledit -lcurses" fi OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBEDIT | sed 's/-ledit//'` AC_CHECK_LIB([edit], [el_init], [ AC_DEFINE([USE_LIBEDIT], [1], [Use libedit for sftp]) LIBEDIT_MSG="yes" AC_SUBST([LIBEDIT]) ], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([libedit not found]) ], [ $OTHERLIBS ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if libedit version is compatible]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ int i = H_SETSIZE; el_init("", NULL, NULL, NULL); exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_MSG_ERROR([libedit version is not compatible]) ] ) fi ] ) AUDIT_MODULE=none AC_ARG_WITH([audit], [ --with-audit=module Enable audit support (modules=debug,bsm,linux)], [ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for supported audit module]) case "$withval" in bsm) AC_MSG_RESULT([bsm]) AUDIT_MODULE=bsm dnl Checks for headers, libs and functions AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsm/audit.h], [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and bsm/audit.h not found])], [ #ifdef HAVE_TIME_H # include #endif ] ) AC_CHECK_LIB([bsm], [getaudit], [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and required library not found])]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getaudit], [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and required function not found])]) # These are optional AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getaudit_addr aug_get_machine]) AC_DEFINE([USE_BSM_AUDIT], [1], [Use BSM audit module]) if test "$sol2ver" -ge 11; then SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lscf" AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_BSM_API], [1], [The system has incomplete BSM API]) fi ;; linux) AC_MSG_RESULT([linux]) AUDIT_MODULE=linux dnl Checks for headers, libs and functions AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libaudit.h]) SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -laudit" AC_DEFINE([USE_LINUX_AUDIT], [1], [Use Linux audit module]) ;; debug) AUDIT_MODULE=debug AC_MSG_RESULT([debug]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS], [1], [Use audit debugging module]) ;; no) AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ;; *) AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown audit module $withval]) ;; esac ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([pie], [ --with-pie Build Position Independent Executables if possible], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then use_pie=no fi if test "x$withval" = "xyes"; then use_pie=yes fi ] ) if test "x$use_pie" = "x"; then use_pie=no fi if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" != "x1" && test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then # Turn off automatic PIE when toolchain hardening is off. use_pie=no fi if test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then # Automatic PIE requires gcc >= 4.x AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gcc >= 4.x]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #if !defined(__GNUC__) || __GNUC__ < 4 #error gcc is too old #endif ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) use_pie=no ] ) fi if test "x$use_pie" != "xno"; then SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" SAVED_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fPIE]) OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-pie]) # We use both -fPIE and -pie or neither. AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether both -fPIE and -pie are supported]) if echo "x $CFLAGS" | grep ' -fPIE' >/dev/null 2>&1 && \ echo "x $LDFLAGS" | grep ' -pie' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS" LDFLAGS="$SAVED_LDFLAGS" fi fi dnl Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ Blowfish_initstate \ Blowfish_expandstate \ Blowfish_expand0state \ Blowfish_stream2word \ asprintf \ b64_ntop \ __b64_ntop \ b64_pton \ __b64_pton \ bcopy \ bcrypt_pbkdf \ bindresvport_sa \ blf_enc \ cap_rights_limit \ clock \ closefrom \ dirfd \ endgrent \ explicit_bzero \ fchmod \ fchown \ freeaddrinfo \ fstatfs \ fstatvfs \ futimes \ getaddrinfo \ getcwd \ getgrouplist \ getnameinfo \ getopt \ getpeereid \ getpeerucred \ getpgid \ getpgrp \ _getpty \ getrlimit \ getttyent \ glob \ group_from_gid \ inet_aton \ inet_ntoa \ inet_ntop \ innetgr \ login_getcapbool \ mblen \ md5_crypt \ memmove \ memset_s \ mkdtemp \ mmap \ ngetaddrinfo \ nsleep \ ogetaddrinfo \ openlog_r \ poll \ prctl \ pstat \ readpassphrase \ reallocarray \ realpath \ recvmsg \ rresvport_af \ sendmsg \ setdtablesize \ setegid \ setenv \ seteuid \ setgroupent \ setgroups \ setlinebuf \ setlogin \ setpassent\ setpcred \ setproctitle \ setregid \ setreuid \ setrlimit \ setsid \ setvbuf \ sigaction \ sigvec \ snprintf \ socketpair \ statfs \ statvfs \ strdup \ strerror \ strlcat \ strlcpy \ strmode \ strnlen \ strnvis \ strptime \ strtonum \ strtoll \ strtoul \ strtoull \ swap32 \ sysconf \ tcgetpgrp \ timingsafe_bcmp \ truncate \ unsetenv \ updwtmpx \ user_from_uid \ usleep \ vasprintf \ vsnprintf \ waitpid \ ]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM( [[ #include ]], [[ return (isblank('a')); ]])], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ISBLANK], [1], [Define if you have isblank(3C).]) ]) # PKCS11 depends on OpenSSL. if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then # PKCS#11 support requires dlopen() and co AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlopen], [dl], [AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_PKCS11], [], [Enable for PKCS#11 support])] ) fi # IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror() AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gai_strerror], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GAI_STRERROR]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include const char *gai_strerror(int); ]], [[ char *str; str = gai_strerror(0); ]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO], [1], [Define if gai_strerror() returns const char *])], [])]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([nanosleep], [rt posix4], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_NANOSLEEP], [1], [Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc])]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([clock_gettime], [rt], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME], [1], [Have clock_gettime])]) dnl Make sure prototypes are defined for these before using them. AC_CHECK_DECL([getrusage], [AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getrusage])]) AC_CHECK_DECL([strsep], [AC_CHECK_FUNCS([strsep])], [], [ #ifdef HAVE_STRING_H # include #endif ]) dnl tcsendbreak might be a macro AC_CHECK_DECL([tcsendbreak], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_TCSENDBREAK])], [AC_CHECK_FUNCS([tcsendbreak])], [#include ] ) AC_CHECK_DECLS([h_errno], , ,[#include ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([SHUT_RD], , , [ #include #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([O_NONBLOCK], , , [ #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H # include #endif ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([writev], , , [ #include #include #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([MAXSYMLINKS], , , [ #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([offsetof], , , [ #include ]) # extra bits for select(2) AC_CHECK_DECLS([howmany, NFDBITS], [], [], [[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H #include #endif ]]) AC_CHECK_TYPES([fd_mask], [], [], [[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H #include #endif ]]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setresuid], [ dnl Some platorms have setresuid that isn't implemented, test for this AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setresuid seems to work]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ errno=0; setresuid(0,0,0); if (errno==ENOSYS) exit(1); else exit(0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETRESUID], [1], [Define if your setresuid() is broken]) AC_MSG_RESULT([not implemented])], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking setresuid])] ) ]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setresgid], [ dnl Some platorms have setresgid that isn't implemented, test for this AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setresgid seems to work]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ errno=0; setresgid(0,0,0); if (errno==ENOSYS) exit(1); else exit(0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETRESGID], [1], [Define if your setresgid() is broken]) AC_MSG_RESULT([not implemented])], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking setresuid])] ) ]) dnl Checks for time functions AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gettimeofday time]) dnl Checks for utmp functions AC_CHECK_FUNCS([endutent getutent getutid getutline pututline setutent]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utmpname]) dnl Checks for utmpx functions AC_CHECK_FUNCS([endutxent getutxent getutxid getutxline getutxuser pututxline]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setutxdb setutxent utmpxname]) dnl Checks for lastlog functions AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getlastlogxbyname]) AC_CHECK_FUNC([daemon], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DAEMON], [1], [Define if your libraries define daemon()])], [AC_CHECK_LIB([bsd], [daemon], [LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd"; AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DAEMON])])] ) AC_CHECK_FUNC([getpagesize], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETPAGESIZE], [1], [Define if your libraries define getpagesize()])], [AC_CHECK_LIB([ucb], [getpagesize], [LIBS="$LIBS -lucb"; AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETPAGESIZE])])] ) # Check for broken snprintf if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char b[5]; snprintf(b,5,"123456789"); exit(b[4]!='\0'); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1], [Define if your snprintf is busted]) AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) ] ) fi # We depend on vsnprintf returning the right thing on overflow: the # number of characters it tried to create (as per SUSv3) if test "x$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include int x_snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...) { size_t ret; va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); return ret; } ]], [[ char x[1]; if (x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11) return 1; if (x_snprintf(NULL, 0, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11) return 1; return 0; ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1], [Define if your snprintf is busted]) AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your vsnprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working vsnprintf()]) ] ) fi # On systems where [v]snprintf is broken, but is declared in stdio, # check that the fmt argument is const char * or just char *. # This is only useful for when BROKEN_SNPRINTF AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf can declare const char *fmt]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include int snprintf(char *a, size_t b, const char *c, ...) { return 0; } ]], [[ snprintf(0, 0, 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([SNPRINTF_CONST], [const], [Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([SNPRINTF_CONST], [/* not const */])]) # Check for missing getpeereid (or equiv) support NO_PEERCHECK="" if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpeereid" != "xyes" -a "x$ac_cv_func_getpeerucred" != "xyes"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[int i = SO_PEERCRED;]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SO_PEERCRED], [1], [Have PEERCRED socket option]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) NO_PEERCHECK=1 ]) fi dnl see whether mkstemp() requires XXXXXX if test "x$ac_cv_func_mkdtemp" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for (overly) strict mkstemp]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char template[]="conftest.mkstemp-test"; if (mkstemp(template) == -1) exit(1); unlink(template); exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP], [1], [Silly mkstemp()]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP]) ] ) fi dnl make sure that openpty does not reacquire controlling terminal if test ! -z "$check_for_openpty_ctty_bug"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if openpty correctly handles controlling tty]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include ]], [[ pid_t pid; int fd, ptyfd, ttyfd, status; pid = fork(); if (pid < 0) { /* failed */ exit(1); } else if (pid > 0) { /* parent */ waitpid(pid, &status, 0); if (WIFEXITED(status)) exit(WEXITSTATUS(status)); else exit(2); } else { /* child */ close(0); close(1); close(2); setsid(); openpty(&ptyfd, &ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL); fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); if (fd >= 0) exit(3); /* Acquired ctty: broken */ else exit(0); /* Did not acquire ctty: OK */ } ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes]) ] ) fi if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \ test "x$check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #define TEST_PORT "2222" ]], [[ int err, sock; struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai); if (err != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err)); exit(1); } for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV); if (err != 0) { if (err == EAI_SYSTEM) perror("getnameinfo EAI_SYSTEM"); else fprintf(stderr, "getnameinfo failed: %s\n", gai_strerror(err)); exit(2); } sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock < 0) perror("socket"); if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { if (errno == EBADF) exit(3); } } exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes]) ] ) fi if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \ test "x$check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #define TEST_PORT "2222" ]], [[ int err, sock; struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai); if (err != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err)); exit(1); } for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV); if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET && err != 0) { perror("getnameinfo"); exit(2); } } exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK], [1], [Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails for the all-zeros IPv6 address]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming no]) ] ) fi if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes"; then AC_CHECK_DECLS(AI_NUMERICSERV, , , [#include #include #include ]) fi if test "x$check_for_conflicting_getspnam" = "x1"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS], [1], [Conflicting defs for getspnam]) ] ) fi AC_FUNC_GETPGRP # Search for OpenSSL saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" AC_ARG_WITH([ssl-dir], [ --with-ssl-dir=PATH Specify path to OpenSSL installation ], [ if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot use --with-ssl-dir when OpenSSL disabled]) fi if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then case "$withval" in # Relative paths ./*|../*) withval="`pwd`/$withval" esac if test -d "$withval/lib"; then if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" fi elif test -d "$withval/lib64"; then if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 -R${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}" fi else if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" fi fi if test -d "$withval/include"; then CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}" else CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}" fi fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([openssl-header-check], [ --without-openssl-header-check Disable OpenSSL version consistency check], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then openssl_check_nonfatal=1 fi ] ) openssl_engine=no AC_ARG_WITH([ssl-engine], [ --with-ssl-engine Enable OpenSSL (hardware) ENGINE support ], [ if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot use --with-ssl-engine when OpenSSL disabled]) fi if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then openssl_engine=yes fi ] ) if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then LIBS="-lcrypto $LIBS" AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([RAND_add], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OPENSSL], [1], [Define if your ssl headers are included with #include ])], [ dnl Check default openssl install dir if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/ssl/lib -R/usr/local/ssl/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/ssl/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}" fi CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/ssl/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}" AC_CHECK_HEADER([openssl/opensslv.h], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** OpenSSL headers missing - please install first or check config.log ***])]) AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([RAND_add], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OPENSSL])], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** Can't find recent OpenSSL libcrypto (see config.log for details) ***]) ] ) ] ) # Determine OpenSSL header version AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL header version]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #define DATA "conftest.sslincver" ]], [[ FILE *fd; int rc; fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); if(fd == NULL) exit(1); if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%08x (%s)\n", OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) <0) exit(1); exit(0); ]])], [ ssl_header_ver=`cat conftest.sslincver` AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_header_ver]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL version header not found.]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking]) ] ) # Determine OpenSSL library version AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL library version]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #define DATA "conftest.ssllibver" ]], [[ FILE *fd; int rc; fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); if(fd == NULL) exit(1); if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%08x (%s)\n", SSLeay(), SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION))) <0) exit(1); exit(0); ]])], [ ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver` # Check version is supported. case "$ssl_library_ver" in 0090[[0-7]]*|009080[[0-5]]*) AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL >= 0.9.8f required (have "$ssl_library_ver")]) ;; *) ;; esac AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_library_ver]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL library not found.]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking]) ] ) # Sanity check OpenSSL headers AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's headers match the library]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ exit(SSLeay() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) if test "x$openssl_check_nonfatal" = "x"; then AC_MSG_ERROR([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your library. Check config.log for details. If you are sure your installation is consistent, you can disable the check by running "./configure --without-openssl-header-check". Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches. ]) else AC_MSG_WARN([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your library. Check config.log for details. Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.]) fi ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking]) ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL functions will link]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) saved_LIBS="$LIBS" LIBS="$LIBS -ldl" AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) LIBS="$saved_LIBS" ] ) ] ) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ BN_is_prime_ex \ DSA_generate_parameters_ex \ EVP_DigestInit_ex \ EVP_DigestFinal_ex \ EVP_MD_CTX_init \ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup \ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex \ HMAC_CTX_init \ RSA_generate_key_ex \ RSA_get_default_method \ ]) if test "x$openssl_engine" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for OpenSSL ENGINE support]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); ENGINE_register_all_complete(); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE], [1], [Enable OpenSSL engine support]) ], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL ENGINE support not found]) ]) fi # Check for OpenSSL without EVP_aes_{192,256}_cbc AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ exit(EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES], [1], [libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions]) ] ) # Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*ctr AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ exit(EVP_aes_128_ctr() == NULL || EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR], [1], [libcrypto has EVP AES CTR]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) # Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*gcm AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ exit(EVP_aes_128_gcm() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_gcm() == NULL || EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED == 0 || EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN == 0 || EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG == 0 || EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG == 0 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(NULL, 0, 0, NULL) == 0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM], [1], [libcrypto has EVP AES GCM]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_cipers \ aes128-gcm@openssh.com aes256-gcm@openssh.com" ] ) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl], [crypto], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL], [1], [Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl])]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ if(EVP_DigestUpdate(NULL, NULL,0)) exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID], [1], [Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void]) ] ) # Some systems want crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the version in OpenSSL, # because the system crypt() is more featureful. if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_before" = "x1"; then AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt]) fi # Some Linux systems (Slackware) need crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the # version in OpenSSL. if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_later" = "x1"; then AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt], [LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"]) fi AC_CHECK_FUNCS([crypt DES_crypt]) # Search for SHA256 support in libc and/or OpenSSL AC_CHECK_FUNCS([SHA256_Update EVP_sha256], , [unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512 \ diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 \ hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com" ] ) # Search for RIPE-MD support in OpenSSL AC_CHECK_FUNCS([EVP_ripemd160], , [unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ hmac-ripemd160 hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com" ] ) # Check complete ECC support in OpenSSL AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */ # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code" #endif ]], [[ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha256(); /* We need this too */ ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) enable_nistp256=1 ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */ # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code" #endif ]], [[ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha384(); /* We need this too */ ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) enable_nistp384=1 ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */ # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code" #endif ]], [[ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */ ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include ]],[[ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */ exit(e == NULL || m == NULL); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) enable_nistp521=1 ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross-compiling: assuming yes]) enable_nistp521=1 ] )], AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ) COMMENT_OUT_ECC="#no ecc#" TEST_SSH_ECC=no if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1 || test x$enable_nistp384 = x1 || \ test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC, [1], [OpenSSL has ECC]) fi if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1; then AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256], [1], [libcrypto has NID_X9_62_prime256v1]) TEST_SSH_ECC=yes COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 \ ecdh-sha2-nistp256 ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" fi if test x$enable_nistp384 = x1; then AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384], [1], [libcrypto has NID_secp384r1]) TEST_SSH_ECC=yes COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \ ecdh-sha2-nistp384 ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" fi if test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521], [1], [libcrypto has NID_secp521r1]) TEST_SSH_ECC=yes COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms ecdh-sha2-nistp521 \ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" fi AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_ECC]) AC_SUBST([COMMENT_OUT_ECC]) else AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt], [LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([crypt]) fi AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ arc4random \ arc4random_buf \ arc4random_stir \ arc4random_uniform \ ]) saved_LIBS="$LIBS" AC_CHECK_LIB([iaf], [ia_openinfo], [ LIBS="$LIBS -liaf" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([set_id], [SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -liaf" AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBIAF], [1], [Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id]) ]) ]) LIBS="$saved_LIBS" ### Configure cryptographic random number support # Check wheter OpenSSL seeds itself if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ exit(RAND_status() == 1 ? 0 : 1); ]])], [ OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes]) # This is safe, since we will fatal() at runtime if # OpenSSL is not seeded correctly. OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes ] ) fi # PRNGD TCP socket AC_ARG_WITH([prngd-port], [ --with-prngd-port=PORT read entropy from PRNGD/EGD TCP localhost:PORT], [ case "$withval" in no) withval="" ;; [[0-9]]*) ;; *) AC_MSG_ERROR([You must specify a numeric port number for --with-prngd-port]) ;; esac if test ! -z "$withval" ; then PRNGD_PORT="$withval" AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_PORT], [$PRNGD_PORT], [Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket]) fi ] ) # PRNGD Unix domain socket AC_ARG_WITH([prngd-socket], [ --with-prngd-socket=FILE read entropy from PRNGD/EGD socket FILE (default=/var/run/egd-pool)], [ case "$withval" in yes) withval="/var/run/egd-pool" ;; no) withval="" ;; /*) ;; *) AC_MSG_ERROR([You must specify an absolute path to the entropy socket]) ;; esac if test ! -z "$withval" ; then if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([You may not specify both a PRNGD/EGD port and socket]) fi if test ! -r "$withval" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([Entropy socket is not readable]) fi PRNGD_SOCKET="$withval" AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_SOCKET], ["$PRNGD_SOCKET"], [Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket]) fi ], [ # Check for existing socket only if we don't have a random device already if test "x$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" != "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for PRNGD/EGD socket]) # Insert other locations here for sock in /var/run/egd-pool /dev/egd-pool /etc/entropy; do if test -r $sock && $TEST_MINUS_S_SH -c "test -S $sock -o -p $sock" ; then PRNGD_SOCKET="$sock" AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_SOCKET], ["$PRNGD_SOCKET"]) break; fi done if test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([$PRNGD_SOCKET]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) fi fi ] ) # Which randomness source do we use? if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then RAND_MSG="PRNGd port $PRNGD_PORT" elif test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then RAND_MSG="PRNGd socket $PRNGD_SOCKET" elif test ! -z "$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" ; then AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY], [1], [Define if you want the OpenSSL internally seeded PRNG only]) RAND_MSG="OpenSSL internal ONLY" elif test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([OpenSSH will use /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers. It will fail if this device is not supported or accessible]) else AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSH has no source of random numbers. Please configure OpenSSL with an entropy source or re-run configure using one of the --with-prngd-port or --with-prngd-socket options]) fi # Check for PAM libs PAM_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([pam], [ --with-pam Enable PAM support ], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([PAM headers not found]) fi saved_LIBS="$LIBS" AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlopen], , ) AC_CHECK_LIB([pam], [pam_set_item], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libpam missing])]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pam_getenvlist]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pam_putenv]) LIBS="$saved_LIBS" PAM_MSG="yes" SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam" AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1], [Define if you want to enable PAM support]) if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen = yes; then case "$LIBS" in *-ldl*) # libdl already in LIBS ;; *) SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl" ;; esac fi fi ] ) # Check for older PAM if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then # Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether pam_strerror takes only one argument]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H) #include #elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H) #include #endif ]], [[ (void)pam_strerror((pam_handle_t *)NULL, -1); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OLD_PAM], [1], [Define if you have an old version of PAM which takes only one argument to pam_strerror]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) PAM_MSG="yes (old library)" ]) fi case "$host" in *-*-cygwin*) SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER ;; *) SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd ;; esac AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-user], [ --with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=$withval fi ] ) if test "x$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" = "xCYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], [CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], [Cygwin function to fetch non-privileged user for privilege separation]) else AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], ["$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER"], [non-privileged user for privilege separation]) fi AC_SUBST([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER]) if test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" ; then AC_CHECK_DECL([SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER], [have_seccomp_filter=1], , [ #include #include ]) fi if test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([kernel for seccomp_filter support]) AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include ]], [[ int i = $seccomp_audit_arch; errno = 0; prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, 0, 0); exit(errno == EFAULT ? 0 : 1); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) # Disable seccomp filter as a target have_seccomp_filter=0 ] ) fi # Decide which sandbox style to use sandbox_arg="" AC_ARG_WITH([sandbox], [ --with-sandbox=style Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, darwin, rlimit, systrace, seccomp_filter, capsicum)], [ if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then sandbox_arg="" else sandbox_arg="$withval" fi ] ) # Some platforms (seems to be the ones that have a kernel poll(2)-type # function with which they implement select(2)) use an extra file descriptor # when calling select(2), which means we can't use the rlimit sandbox. AC_MSG_CHECKING([if select works with descriptor rlimit]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H # include #endif #include #include #include ]],[[ struct rlimit rl_zero; int fd, r; fd_set fds; struct timeval tv; fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY); FD_ZERO(&fds); FD_SET(fd, &fds); rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero); setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero); tv.tv_sec = 1; tv.tv_usec = 0; r = select(fd+1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv); exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) select_works_with_rlimit=yes], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) select_works_with_rlimit=no], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include ]],[[ struct rlimit rl_zero; int fd, r; fd_set fds; rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; r = setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero); exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) rlimit_nofile_zero_works=no], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]],[[ struct rlimit rl_zero; rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; exit(setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) != 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE(SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE, 1, [setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works])], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])] ) if test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsystrace" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" = "x1" ) ; then test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" != "x1" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([systrace sandbox requires systrace headers and SYSTR_POLICY_KILL support]) SANDBOX_STYLE="systrace" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SYSTRACE], [1], [Sandbox using systrace(4)]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xdarwin" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" = "xyes") ; then test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" != "xyes" -o \ "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([Darwin seatbelt sandbox requires sandbox.h and sandbox_init function]) SANDBOX_STYLE="darwin" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_DARWIN], [1], [Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3)]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xseccomp_filter" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \ test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_elf_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_audit_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_filter_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" && \ test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" && \ test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" = "xyes" ) ; then test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" = "x" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox not supported on $host]) test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" != "x1" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS]) test "x$have_seccomp_filter" != "x1" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires seccomp headers]) test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires prctl function]) SANDBOX_STYLE="seccomp_filter" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER], [1], [Sandbox using seccomp filter]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires sys/capsicum.h header]) test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function]) SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_CAPSICUM], [1], [Sandbox using capsicum]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" && \ test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" = "xyes" && \ test "x$rlimit_nofile_zero_works" = "xyes" ) ; then test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires setrlimit function]) test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires select to work with rlimit]) SANDBOX_STYLE="rlimit" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_RLIMIT], [1], [Sandbox using setrlimit(2)]) elif test -z "$sandbox_arg" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xno" || \ test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnone" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnull" ; then SANDBOX_STYLE="none" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_NULL], [1], [no privsep sandboxing]) else AC_MSG_ERROR([unsupported --with-sandbox]) fi # Cheap hack to ensure NEWS-OS libraries are arranged right. if test ! -z "$SONY" ; then LIBS="$LIBS -liberty"; fi # Check for long long datatypes AC_CHECK_TYPES([long long, unsigned long long, long double]) # Check datatype sizes AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([short int], [2]) AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([int], [4]) AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long int], [4]) AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long long int], [8]) # Sanity check long long for some platforms (AIX) if test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x4" ; then ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0 fi # compute LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX if we don't know them. if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for max value of long long]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include /* Why is this so damn hard? */ #ifdef __GNUC__ # undef __GNUC__ #endif #define __USE_ISOC99 #include #define DATA "conftest.llminmax" #define my_abs(a) ((a) < 0 ? ((a) * -1) : (a)) /* * printf in libc on some platforms (eg old Tru64) does not understand %lld so * we do this the hard way. */ static int fprint_ll(FILE *f, long long n) { unsigned int i; int l[sizeof(long long) * 8]; if (n < 0) if (fprintf(f, "-") < 0) return -1; for (i = 0; n != 0; i++) { l[i] = my_abs(n % 10); n /= 10; } do { if (fprintf(f, "%d", l[--i]) < 0) return -1; } while (i != 0); if (fprintf(f, " ") < 0) return -1; return 0; } ]], [[ FILE *f; long long i, llmin, llmax = 0; if((f = fopen(DATA,"w")) == NULL) exit(1); #if defined(LLONG_MIN) && defined(LLONG_MAX) fprintf(stderr, "Using system header for LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n"); llmin = LLONG_MIN; llmax = LLONG_MAX; #else fprintf(stderr, "Calculating LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n"); /* This will work on one's complement and two's complement */ for (i = 1; i > llmax; i <<= 1, i++) llmax = i; llmin = llmax + 1LL; /* wrap */ #endif /* Sanity check */ if (llmin + 1 < llmin || llmin - 1 < llmin || llmax + 1 > llmax || llmax - 1 > llmax || llmin == llmax || llmin == 0 || llmax == 0 || llmax < LONG_MAX || llmin > LONG_MIN) { fprintf(f, "unknown unknown\n"); exit(2); } if (fprint_ll(f, llmin) < 0) exit(3); if (fprint_ll(f, llmax) < 0) exit(4); if (fclose(f) < 0) exit(5); exit(0); ]])], [ llong_min=`$AWK '{print $1}' conftest.llminmax` llong_max=`$AWK '{print $2}' conftest.llminmax` AC_MSG_RESULT([$llong_max]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LLONG_MAX], [${llong_max}LL], [max value of long long calculated by configure]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for min value of long long]) AC_MSG_RESULT([$llong_min]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LLONG_MIN], [${llong_min}LL], [min value of long long calculated by configure]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking]) ] ) fi # More checks for data types AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int type], ac_cv_have_u_int, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int a; a = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_u_int="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_int="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT], [1], [define if you have u_int data type]) have_u_int=1 fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_intxx_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T], [1], [define if you have intxx_t data type]) have_intxx_t=1 fi if (test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t types in stdint.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for int64_t type], ac_cv_have_int64_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H # include #endif ]], [[ int64_t a; a = 1; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INT64_T], [1], [define if you have int64_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T], [1], [define if you have u_intxx_t data type]) have_u_intxx_t=1 fi if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int64_t types], ac_cv_have_u_int64_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int64_t a; a = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T], [1], [define if you have u_int64_t data type]) have_u_int64_t=1 fi if (test -z "$have_u_int64_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int64_t a; a = 1]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then AC_CACHE_CHECK([for uintXX_t types], ac_cv_have_uintxx_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T], [1], [define if you have uintxx_t data type]) fi fi if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in stdint.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_inttypes_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in inttypes.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi if (test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" || test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; u_int8_t e; u_int16_t f; u_int32_t g; a = b = c = e = f = g = 1; ]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_char], ac_cv_have_u_char, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_char foo; foo = 125; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_u_char="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_char="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_char" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_CHAR], [1], [define if you have u_char data type]) fi AC_CHECK_TYPES([intmax_t, uintmax_t], , , [ #include #include ]) TYPE_SOCKLEN_T AC_CHECK_TYPES([sig_atomic_t], , , [#include ]) AC_CHECK_TYPES([fsblkcnt_t, fsfilcnt_t], , , [ #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif ]) AC_CHECK_TYPES([in_addr_t, in_port_t], , , [#include #include ]) AC_CACHE_CHECK([for size_t], ac_cv_have_size_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ size_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_size_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_size_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_size_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SIZE_T], [1], [define if you have size_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ssize_t], ac_cv_have_ssize_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ ssize_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SSIZE_T], [1], [define if you have ssize_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for clock_t], ac_cv_have_clock_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ clock_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_clock_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_clock_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_clock_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CLOCK_T], [1], [define if you have clock_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for sa_family_t], ac_cv_have_sa_family_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ], [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="no" ] ) ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T], [1], [define if you have sa_family_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for pid_t], ac_cv_have_pid_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ pid_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_pid_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_pid_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_pid_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PID_T], [1], [define if you have pid_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for mode_t], ac_cv_have_mode_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ mode_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_mode_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_mode_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_mode_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MODE_T], [1], [define if you have mode_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_storage], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE], [1], [define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_in6], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct sockaddr_in6 s; s.sin6_family = 0; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6], [1], [define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct in6_addr], ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct in6_addr s; s.s6_addr[0] = 0; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR], [1], [define if you have struct in6_addr data type]) dnl Now check for sin6_scope_id AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct sockaddr_in6.sin6_scope_id], , , [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H #include #endif #include ]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct addrinfo], ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ struct addrinfo s; s.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO], [1], [define if you have struct addrinfo data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct timeval], ac_cv_have_struct_timeval, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ struct timeval tv; tv.tv_sec = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL], [1], [define if you have struct timeval]) have_struct_timeval=1 fi AC_CHECK_TYPES([struct timespec]) # We need int64_t or else certian parts of the compile will fail. if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xno" && \ test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" != "x8" && \ test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x0" ; then echo "OpenSSH requires int64_t support. Contact your vendor or install" echo "an alternative compiler (I.E., GCC) before continuing." echo "" exit 1; else dnl test snprintf (broken on SCO w/gcc) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF main() { char buf[50]; char expected_out[50]; int mazsize = 50 ; #if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8) long int num = 0x7fffffffffffffff; #else long long num = 0x7fffffffffffffffll; #endif strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807"); snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num); if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0) exit(1); exit(0); } #else main() { exit(0); } #endif ]])], [ true ], [ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF]) ], AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) ) fi dnl Checks for structure members OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_host], [utmp.h], [HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_host], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([syslen], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_pid], [utmp.h], [HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_type], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_type], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_id], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_id], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr_v6], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr_v6], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_exit], [utmp.h], [HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX]) AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_blksize]) AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct passwd.pw_gecos, struct passwd.pw_class, struct passwd.pw_change, struct passwd.pw_expire], [], [], [[ #include #include ]]) AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct __res_state.retrans], [], [AC_DEFINE([__res_state], [state], [Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h])], [[ #include #if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif #include #include #include ]]) AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage], ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.ss_family = 1; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS], [1], [Fields in struct sockaddr_storage]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage], ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.__ss_family = 1; ]])], [ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS], [1], [Fields in struct sockaddr_storage]) fi dnl make sure we're using the real structure members and not defines AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr], ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ #ifdef msg_accrights #error "msg_accrights is a macro" exit(1); #endif struct msghdr m; m.msg_accrights = 0; exit(0); ]])], [ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="no" ] ) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR], [1], [Define if your system uses access rights style file descriptor passing]) fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif ]], [[ struct statvfs s; s.f_fsid = 0; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if fsid_t has member val]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ fsid_t t; t.val[0] = 0; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([FSID_HAS_VAL], [1], [fsid_t has member val]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if f_fsid has member __val]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ fsid_t t; t.__val[0] = 0; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([FSID_HAS___VAL], [1], [fsid_t has member __val]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) ]) AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_control field in struct msghdr], ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ #ifdef msg_control #error "msg_control is a macro" exit(1); #endif struct msghdr m; m.msg_control = 0; exit(0); ]])], [ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="no" ] ) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR], [1], [Define if your system uses ancillary data style file descriptor passing]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines __progname], ac_cv_libc_defines___progname, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[ extern char *__progname; printf("%s", __progname); ]])], [ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="yes" ], [ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___PROGNAME], [1], [Define if libc defines __progname]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether $CC implements __FUNCTION__], ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ printf("%s", __FUNCTION__); ]])], [ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="yes" ], [ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___FUNCTION__], [1], [Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether $CC implements __func__], ac_cv_cc_implements___func__, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ printf("%s", __func__); ]])], [ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="yes" ], [ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___func__], [1], [Define if compiler implements __func__]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether va_copy exists], ac_cv_have_va_copy, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include va_list x,y; ]], [[ va_copy(x,y); ]])], [ ac_cv_have_va_copy="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_va_copy="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_va_copy" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_VA_COPY], [1], [Define if va_copy exists]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether __va_copy exists], ac_cv_have___va_copy, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include va_list x,y; ]], [[ __va_copy(x,y); ]])], [ ac_cv_have___va_copy="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have___va_copy="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have___va_copy" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___VA_COPY], [1], [Define if __va_copy exists]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether getopt has optreset support], ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ extern int optreset; optreset = 0; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET], [1], [Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_errlist], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[ extern const char *const sys_errlist[]; printf("%s", sys_errlist[0]);]])], [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="yes" ], [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST], [1], [Define if your system defines sys_errlist[]]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_nerr], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[ extern int sys_nerr; printf("%i", sys_nerr);]])], [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="yes" ], [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_NERR], [1], [Define if your system defines sys_nerr]) fi # Check libraries needed by DNS fingerprint support AC_SEARCH_LIBS([getrrsetbyname], [resolv], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME], [1], [Define if getrrsetbyname() exists])], [ # Needed by our getrrsetbyname() AC_SEARCH_LIBS([res_query], [resolv]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if res_query will link]) AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include ]], [[ res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0); ]])], AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]), [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) saved_LIBS="$LIBS" LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for res_query in -lresolv]) AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include ]], [[ res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [LIBS="$saved_LIBS" AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]) ]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([_getshort _getlong]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([_getshort, _getlong], , , [#include #include ]) AC_CHECK_MEMBER([HEADER.ad], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_HEADER_AD], [1], [Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h])], , [#include ]) ]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if struct __res_state _res is an extern]) AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif #include #include #include extern struct __res_state _res; ]], [[ ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE__RES_EXTERN], [1], [Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) # Check whether user wants SELinux support SELINUX_MSG="no" LIBSELINUX="" AC_ARG_WITH([selinux], [ --with-selinux Enable SELinux support], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then save_LIBS="$LIBS" AC_DEFINE([WITH_SELINUX], [1], [Define if you want SELinux support.]) SELINUX_MSG="yes" AC_CHECK_HEADER([selinux/selinux.h], , AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires selinux.h header])) AC_CHECK_LIB([selinux], [setexeccon], [ LIBSELINUX="-lselinux" LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux" ], AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires libselinux library])) SSHLIBS="$SSHLIBS $LIBSELINUX" SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level]) LIBS="$save_LIBS" fi ] ) AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS]) AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS]) # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support KRB5_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5], [ --with-kerberos5=PATH Enable Kerberos 5 support], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then KRB5ROOT="/usr/local" else KRB5ROOT=${withval} fi AC_DEFINE([KRB5], [1], [Define if you want Kerberos 5 support]) KRB5_MSG="yes" AC_PATH_PROG([KRB5CONF], [krb5-config], [$KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config], [$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH]) if test -x $KRB5CONF ; then K5CFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags`" K5LIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs`" CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $K5CFLAGS" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gssapi support]) if $KRB5CONF | grep gssapi >/dev/null ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI], [1], [Define this if you want GSSAPI support in the version 2 protocol]) GSSCFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags gssapi`" GSSLIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs gssapi`" CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $GSSCFLAGS" else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL], [1], [Define this if you are using the Heimdal version of Kerberos V5]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) else CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${KRB5ROOT}/lib" AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL]) K5LIBS="-lkrb5" K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lcom_err -lasn1" AC_CHECK_LIB([roken], [net_write], [K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lroken"]) AC_CHECK_LIB([des], [des_cbc_encrypt], [K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -ldes"]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) K5LIBS="-lkrb5 -lk5crypto -lcom_err" ]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv]) AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi_krb5], [gss_init_sec_context], [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI]) GSSLIBS="-lgssapi_krb5" ], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi], [gss_init_sec_context], [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI]) GSSLIBS="-lgssapi" ], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gss], [gss_init_sec_context], [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI]) GSSLIBS="-lgss" ], AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail])) ]) ]) AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi.h], , [ unset ac_cv_header_gssapi_h CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi" AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h], , AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail]) ) ] ) oldCPP="$CPPFLAGS" CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi" AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi_krb5.h], , [ CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP" ]) fi if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -R${KRB5ROOT}/lib" fi if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then blibpath="$blibpath:${KRB5ROOT}/lib" fi AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1], [Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE], [], [], [[ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H # include #elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H) # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H # include #elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H) # include #endif ]]) saved_LIBS="$LIBS" LIBS="$LIBS $K5LIBS" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([krb5_cc_new_unique krb5_get_error_message krb5_free_error_message]) LIBS="$saved_LIBS" fi ] ) AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS]) AC_SUBST([K5LIBS]) # Looking for programs, paths and files PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-path], [ --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot (default=/var/empty)], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then PRIVSEP_PATH=$withval fi ] ) AC_SUBST([PRIVSEP_PATH]) AC_ARG_WITH([xauth], [ --with-xauth=PATH Specify path to xauth program ], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then xauth_path=$withval fi ], [ TestPath="$PATH" TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X/bin" TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/bin/X11" TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X11R6/bin" TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/openwin/bin" AC_PATH_PROG([xauth_path], [xauth], , [$TestPath]) if (test ! -z "$xauth_path" && test -x "/usr/openwin/bin/xauth") ; then xauth_path="/usr/openwin/bin/xauth" fi ] ) STRIP_OPT=-s AC_ARG_ENABLE([strip], [ --disable-strip Disable calling strip(1) on install], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then STRIP_OPT= fi ] ) AC_SUBST([STRIP_OPT]) if test -z "$xauth_path" ; then XAUTH_PATH="undefined" AC_SUBST([XAUTH_PATH]) else AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([XAUTH_PATH], ["$xauth_path"], [Define if xauth is found in your path]) XAUTH_PATH=$xauth_path AC_SUBST([XAUTH_PATH]) fi dnl # --with-maildir=/path/to/mail gets top priority. dnl # if maildir is set in the platform case statement above we use that. dnl # Otherwise we run a program to get the dir from system headers. dnl # We first look for _PATH_MAILDIR then MAILDIR then _PATH_MAIL dnl # If we find _PATH_MAILDIR we do nothing because that is what dnl # session.c expects anyway. Otherwise we set to the value found dnl # stripping any trailing slash. If for some strage reason our program dnl # does not find what it needs, we default to /var/spool/mail. # Check for mail directory AC_ARG_WITH([maildir], [ --with-maildir=/path/to/mail Specify your system mail directory], [ if test "X$withval" != X && test "x$withval" != xno && \ test "x${withval}" != xyes; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$withval"], [Set this to your mail directory if you do not have _PATH_MAILDIR]) fi ],[ if test "X$maildir" != "X"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$maildir"]) else AC_MSG_CHECKING([Discovering system mail directory]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H #include #endif #define DATA "conftest.maildir" ]], [[ FILE *fd; int rc; fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); if(fd == NULL) exit(1); #if defined (_PATH_MAILDIR) if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAILDIR:%s\n", _PATH_MAILDIR)) <0) exit(1); #elif defined (MAILDIR) if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"MAILDIR:%s\n", MAILDIR)) <0) exit(1); #elif defined (_PATH_MAIL) if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAIL:%s\n", _PATH_MAIL)) <0) exit(1); #else exit (2); #endif exit(0); ]])], [ maildir_what=`awk -F: '{print $1}' conftest.maildir` maildir=`awk -F: '{print $2}' conftest.maildir \ | sed 's|/$||'` AC_MSG_RESULT([Using: $maildir from $maildir_what]) if test "x$maildir_what" != "x_PATH_MAILDIR"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$maildir"]) fi ], [ if test "X$ac_status" = "X2";then # our test program didn't find it. Default to /var/spool/mail AC_MSG_RESULT([Using: default value of /var/spool/mail]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["/var/spool/mail"]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([*** not found ***]) fi ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: use --with-maildir=/path/to/mail]) ] ) fi ] ) # maildir if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test]) disable_ptmx_check=yes fi if test -z "$no_dev_ptmx" ; then if test "x$disable_ptmx_check" != "xyes" ; then AC_CHECK_FILE(["/dev/ptmx"], [ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_DEV_PTMX], [1], [Define if you have /dev/ptmx]) have_dev_ptmx=1 ] ) fi fi if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" != "xyes"; then AC_CHECK_FILE(["/dev/ptc"], [ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC], [1], [Define if you have /dev/ptc]) have_dev_ptc=1 ] ) else AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptc test]) fi # Options from here on. Some of these are preset by platform above AC_ARG_WITH([mantype], [ --with-mantype=man|cat|doc Set man page type], [ case "$withval" in man|cat|doc) MANTYPE=$withval ;; *) AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid man type: $withval]) ;; esac ] ) if test -z "$MANTYPE"; then TestPath="/usr/bin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/ucb" AC_PATH_PROGS([NROFF], [nroff awf], [/bin/false], [$TestPath]) if ${NROFF} -mdoc ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then MANTYPE=doc elif ${NROFF} -man ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then MANTYPE=man else MANTYPE=cat fi fi AC_SUBST([MANTYPE]) if test "$MANTYPE" = "doc"; then mansubdir=man; else mansubdir=$MANTYPE; fi AC_SUBST([mansubdir]) # Check whether to enable MD5 passwords MD5_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([md5-passwords], [ --with-md5-passwords Enable use of MD5 passwords], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS], [1], [Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords]) MD5_MSG="yes" fi ] ) # Whether to disable shadow password support AC_ARG_WITH([shadow], [ --without-shadow Disable shadow password support], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW]) disable_shadow=yes fi ] ) if test -z "$disable_shadow" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if the systems has expire shadow information]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include struct spwd sp; ]], [[ sp.sp_expire = sp.sp_lstchg = sp.sp_inact = 0; ]])], [ sp_expire_available=yes ], [ ]) if test "x$sp_expire_available" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE], [1], [Define if you want to use shadow password expire field]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi fi # Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY if test ! -z "$IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY" ; then DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes" AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY], [1], [Define if you need to use IP address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY]) else DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([ipaddr-display], - [ --with-ipaddr-display Use ip address instead of hostname in \$DISPLAY], + [ --with-ipaddr-display Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY]) DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes" fi ] ) fi # check for /etc/default/login and use it if present. AC_ARG_ENABLE([etc-default-login], [ --disable-etc-default-login Disable using PATH from /etc/default/login [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno"; then AC_MSG_NOTICE([/etc/default/login handling disabled]) etc_default_login=no else etc_default_login=yes fi ], [ if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking /etc/default/login]) etc_default_login=no else etc_default_login=yes fi ] ) if test "x$etc_default_login" != "xno"; then AC_CHECK_FILE(["/etc/default/login"], [ external_path_file=/etc/default/login ]) if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/default/login"; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN], [1], [Define if your system has /etc/default/login]) fi fi dnl BSD systems use /etc/login.conf so --with-default-path= has no effect if test $ac_cv_func_login_getcapbool = "yes" && \ test $ac_cv_header_login_cap_h = "yes" ; then external_path_file=/etc/login.conf fi # Whether to mess with the default path SERVER_PATH_MSG="(default)" AC_ARG_WITH([default-path], - [ --with-default-path= Specify default \$PATH environment for server], + [ --with-default-path= Specify default $PATH environment for server], [ if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([ --with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system. Edit /etc/login.conf instead.]) elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([ --with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in $external_path_file .]) fi user_path="$withval" SERVER_PATH_MSG="$withval" fi ], [ if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf]) else if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([ If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included, otherwise scp will not work.]) fi AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ /* find out what STDPATH is */ #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #ifndef _PATH_STDPATH # ifdef _PATH_USERPATH /* Irix */ # define _PATH_STDPATH _PATH_USERPATH # else # define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" # endif #endif #include #include #include #define DATA "conftest.stdpath" ]], [[ FILE *fd; int rc; fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); if(fd == NULL) exit(1); if ((rc = fprintf(fd,"%s", _PATH_STDPATH)) < 0) exit(1); exit(0); ]])], [ user_path=`cat conftest.stdpath` ], [ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ], [ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ] ) # make sure $bindir is in USER_PATH so scp will work t_bindir="${bindir}" while echo "${t_bindir}" | egrep '\$\{|NONE/' >/dev/null 2>&1; do t_bindir=`eval echo ${t_bindir}` case $t_bindir in NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$prefix~"` ;; esac case $t_bindir in NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;; esac done echo $user_path | grep ":$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1 if test $? -ne 0 ; then echo $user_path | grep "^$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1 if test $? -ne 0 ; then user_path=$user_path:$t_bindir AC_MSG_RESULT([Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work]) fi fi fi ] ) if test "x$external_path_file" != "x/etc/login.conf" ; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([USER_PATH], ["$user_path"], [Specify default $PATH]) AC_SUBST([user_path]) fi # Set superuser path separately to user path AC_ARG_WITH([superuser-path], [ --with-superuser-path= Specify different path for super-user], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SUPERUSER_PATH], ["$withval"], [Define if you want a different $PATH for the superuser]) superuser_path=$withval fi ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses]) IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH(4in6, [ --with-4in6 Check for and convert IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([IPV4_IN_IPV6], [1], [Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and treat as IPv4]) IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes" else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi ], [ if test "x$inet6_default_4in6" = "xyes"; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes (default)]) AC_DEFINE([IPV4_IN_IPV6]) IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes" else AC_MSG_RESULT([no (default)]) fi ] ) # Whether to enable BSD auth support BSD_AUTH_MSG=no AC_ARG_WITH([bsd-auth], [ --with-bsd-auth Enable BSD auth support], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([BSD_AUTH], [1], [Define if you have BSD auth support]) BSD_AUTH_MSG=yes fi ] ) # Where to place sshd.pid piddir=/var/run # make sure the directory exists if test ! -d $piddir ; then piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` case $piddir in NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;; esac fi AC_ARG_WITH([pid-dir], [ --with-pid-dir=PATH Specify location of ssh.pid file], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then piddir=$withval if test ! -d $piddir ; then AC_MSG_WARN([** no $piddir directory on this system **]) fi fi ] ) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR], ["$piddir"], [Specify location of ssh.pid]) AC_SUBST([piddir]) dnl allow user to disable some login recording features AC_ARG_ENABLE([lastlog], [ --disable-lastlog disable use of lastlog even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([utmp], [ --disable-utmp disable use of utmp even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([utmpx], [ --disable-utmpx disable use of utmpx even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], [Define if you don't want to use utmpx]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([wtmp], [ --disable-wtmp disable use of wtmp even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([wtmpx], [ --disable-wtmpx disable use of wtmpx even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMPX], [1], [Define if you don't want to use wtmpx]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([libutil], [ --disable-libutil disable use of libutil (login() etc.) [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LOGIN]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([pututline], [ --disable-pututline disable use of pututline() etc. ([uw]tmp) [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PUTUTLINE], [1], [Define if you don't want to use pututline() etc. to write [uw]tmp]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([pututxline], [ --disable-pututxline disable use of pututxline() etc. ([uw]tmpx) [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE], [1], [Define if you don't want to use pututxline() etc. to write [uw]tmpx]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([lastlog], [ --with-lastlog=FILE|DIR specify lastlog location [common locations]], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG]) elif test -n "$withval" && test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then conf_lastlog_location=$withval fi ] ) dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection dnl NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the dnl need for command-line parameters dnl lastlog and [uw]tmp are subject to a file search if all else fails dnl lastlog detection dnl NOTE: the code itself will detect if lastlog is a directory AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *lastlog = LASTLOG_FILE; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *lastlog = _PATH_LASTLOG; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) system_lastlog_path=no ]) ]) if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then if test x"$system_lastlog_path" = x"no" ; then for f in /var/log/lastlog /usr/adm/lastlog /var/adm/lastlog /etc/security/lastlog ; do if (test -d "$f" || test -f "$f") ; then conf_lastlog_location=$f fi done if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then AC_MSG_WARN([** Cannot find lastlog **]) dnl Don't define DISABLE_LASTLOG - that means we don't try wtmp/wtmpx fi fi fi if test -n "$conf_lastlog_location"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_LASTLOG_FILE], ["$conf_lastlog_location"], [Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file]) fi dnl utmp detection AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines UTMP_FILE]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *utmp = UTMP_FILE; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) system_utmp_path=no ]) if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then if test x"$system_utmp_path" = x"no" ; then for f in /etc/utmp /usr/adm/utmp /var/run/utmp; do if test -f $f ; then conf_utmp_location=$f fi done if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP]) fi fi fi if test -n "$conf_utmp_location"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_UTMP_FILE], ["$conf_utmp_location"], [Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file]) fi dnl wtmp detection AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMP_FILE]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *wtmp = WTMP_FILE; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) system_wtmp_path=no ]) if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then if test x"$system_wtmp_path" = x"no" ; then for f in /usr/adm/wtmp /var/log/wtmp; do if test -f $f ; then conf_wtmp_location=$f fi done if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP]) fi fi fi if test -n "$conf_wtmp_location"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMP_FILE], ["$conf_wtmp_location"], [Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file]) fi dnl wtmpx detection AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMPX_FILE]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *wtmpx = WTMPX_FILE; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) system_wtmpx_path=no ]) if test -z "$conf_wtmpx_location"; then if test x"$system_wtmpx_path" = x"no" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMPX]) fi else AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMPX_FILE], ["$conf_wtmpx_location"], [Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file]) fi if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $blibflags$blibpath" AC_MSG_WARN([Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile]) fi AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct lastlog.ll_line], [], [ if test x$SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE != "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG]) fi ], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H #include #endif ]) AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct utmp.ut_line], [], [ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP]) ], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H #include #endif ]) dnl Adding -Werror to CFLAGS early prevents configure tests from running. dnl Add now. CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags" if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" != "xyes" ; then TEST_SSH_IPV6=no else TEST_SSH_IPV6=yes fi AC_CHECK_DECL([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO], [TEST_SSH_IPV6=no]) AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_IPV6], [$TEST_SSH_IPV6]) AC_SUBST([TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS], [$TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS]) AC_SUBST([UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS], [$unsupported_algorithms]) AC_EXEEXT AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml \ openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile \ survey.sh]) AC_OUTPUT # Print summary of options # Someone please show me a better way :) A=`eval echo ${prefix}` ; A=`eval echo ${A}` B=`eval echo ${bindir}` ; B=`eval echo ${B}` C=`eval echo ${sbindir}` ; C=`eval echo ${C}` D=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` ; D=`eval echo ${D}` E=`eval echo ${libexecdir}/ssh-askpass` ; E=`eval echo ${E}` F=`eval echo ${mandir}/${mansubdir}X` ; F=`eval echo ${F}` G=`eval echo ${piddir}` ; G=`eval echo ${G}` H=`eval echo ${PRIVSEP_PATH}` ; H=`eval echo ${H}` I=`eval echo ${user_path}` ; I=`eval echo ${I}` J=`eval echo ${superuser_path}` ; J=`eval echo ${J}` echo "" echo "OpenSSH has been configured with the following options:" echo " User binaries: $B" echo " System binaries: $C" echo " Configuration files: $D" echo " Askpass program: $E" echo " Manual pages: $F" echo " PID file: $G" echo " Privilege separation chroot path: $H" if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then echo " At runtime, sshd will use the path defined in $external_path_file" echo " Make sure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work" else echo " sshd default user PATH: $I" if test ! -z "$external_path_file"; then echo " (If PATH is set in $external_path_file it will be used instead. If" echo " used, ensure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work.)" fi fi if test ! -z "$superuser_path" ; then echo " sshd superuser user PATH: $J" fi echo " Manpage format: $MANTYPE" echo " PAM support: $PAM_MSG" echo " OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG" echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG" echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG" echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG" echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG" echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG" echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG" echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG" echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG" echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG" echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG" echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG" echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG" echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG" echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE" echo "" echo " Host: ${host}" echo " Compiler: ${CC}" echo " Compiler flags: ${CFLAGS}" echo "Preprocessor flags: ${CPPFLAGS}" echo " Linker flags: ${LDFLAGS}" echo " Libraries: ${LIBS}" if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then echo " +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}" fi if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then echo " +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}" fi echo "" if test "x$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" = "xyes" ; then echo "SVR4 style packages are supported with \"make package\"" echo "" fi if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then echo "PAM is enabled. You may need to install a PAM control file " echo "for sshd, otherwise password authentication may fail. " echo "Example PAM control files can be found in the contrib/ " echo "subdirectory" echo "" fi if test ! -z "$NO_PEERCHECK" ; then echo "WARNING: the operating system that you are using does not" echo "appear to support getpeereid(), getpeerucred() or the" echo "SO_PEERCRED getsockopt() option. These facilities are used to" echo "enforce security checks to prevent unauthorised connections to" echo "ssh-agent. Their absence increases the risk that a malicious" echo "user can connect to your agent." echo "" fi if test "$AUDIT_MODULE" = "bsm" ; then echo "WARNING: BSM audit support is currently considered EXPERIMENTAL." echo "See the Solaris section in README.platform for details." fi Index: head/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec (revision 294336) @@ -1,811 +1,811 @@ -%define ver 6.8p1 +%define ver 6.9p1 %define rel 1 # OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID %define sshd_uid 74 %define sshd_gid 74 # Version of ssh-askpass %define aversion 1.2.4.1 # Do we want to disable building of x11-askpass? (1=yes 0=no) %define no_x11_askpass 0 # Do we want to disable building of gnome-askpass? (1=yes 0=no) %define no_gnome_askpass 0 # Do we want to link against a static libcrypto? (1=yes 0=no) %define static_libcrypto 0 # Do we want smartcard support (1=yes 0=no) %define scard 0 # Use GTK2 instead of GNOME in gnome-ssh-askpass %define gtk2 1 # Is this build for RHL 6.x? %define build6x 0 # Do we want kerberos5 support (1=yes 0=no) %define kerberos5 1 # Reserve options to override askpass settings with: # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'skip_xxx 1' %{?skip_x11_askpass:%define no_x11_askpass 1} %{?skip_gnome_askpass:%define no_gnome_askpass 1} # Add option to build without GTK2 for older platforms with only GTK+. # RedHat <= 7.2 and Red Hat Advanced Server 2.1 are examples. # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'no_gtk2 1' %{?no_gtk2:%define gtk2 0} # Is this a build for RHL 6.x or earlier? %{?build_6x:%define build6x 1} # If this is RHL 6.x, the default configuration has sysconfdir in /usr/etc. %if %{build6x} %define _sysconfdir /etc %endif # Options for static OpenSSL link: # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "static_openssl 1" %{?static_openssl:%define static_libcrypto 1} # Options for Smartcard support: (needs libsectok and openssl-engine) # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "smartcard 1" %{?smartcard:%define scard 1} # Is this a build for the rescue CD (without PAM, with MD5)? (1=yes 0=no) %define rescue 0 %{?build_rescue:%define rescue 1} # Turn off some stuff for resuce builds %if %{rescue} %define kerberos5 0 %endif Summary: The OpenSSH implementation of SSH protocol versions 1 and 2. Name: openssh Version: %{ver} %if %{rescue} Release: %{rel}rescue %else Release: %{rel} %endif URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} Source1: http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}.tar.gz %endif License: BSD Group: Applications/Internet BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-buildroot Obsoletes: ssh %if %{build6x} PreReq: initscripts >= 5.00 %else Requires: initscripts >= 5.20 %endif BuildRequires: perl, openssl-devel BuildRequires: /bin/login %if ! %{build6x} BuildPreReq: glibc-devel, pam %else BuildRequires: /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h %endif %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} BuildRequires: /usr/include/X11/Xlib.h %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} BuildRequires: pkgconfig %endif %if %{kerberos5} BuildRequires: krb5-devel BuildRequires: krb5-libs %endif %package clients Summary: OpenSSH clients. Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} Group: Applications/Internet Obsoletes: ssh-clients %package server Summary: The OpenSSH server daemon. Group: System Environment/Daemons Obsoletes: ssh-server Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}, chkconfig >= 0.9 %if ! %{build6x} Requires: /etc/pam.d/system-auth %endif %package askpass Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and X. Group: Applications/Internet Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} Obsoletes: ssh-extras %package askpass-gnome Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH, X, and GNOME. Group: Applications/Internet Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} Obsoletes: ssh-extras %description SSH (Secure SHell) is a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. SSH is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and to provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. OpenSSH is OpenBSD's version of the last free version of SSH, bringing it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all patented algorithms to separate libraries. This package includes the core files necessary for both the OpenSSH client and server. To make this package useful, you should also install openssh-clients, openssh-server, or both. %description clients OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package includes the clients necessary to make encrypted connections to SSH servers. You'll also need to install the openssh package on OpenSSH clients. %description server OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains the secure shell daemon (sshd). The sshd daemon allows SSH clients to securely connect to your SSH server. You also need to have the openssh package installed. %description askpass OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH. %description askpass-gnome OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the GNOME GUI desktop environment. %prep %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} %setup -q -a 1 %else %setup -q %endif %build %if %{rescue} CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -Os"; export CFLAGS %endif %if %{kerberos5} K5DIR=`rpm -ql krb5-devel | grep include/krb5.h | sed 's,\/include\/krb5.h,,'` echo K5DIR=$K5DIR %endif %configure \ --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \ --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh \ --datadir=%{_datadir}/openssh \ --with-rsh=%{_bindir}/rsh \ --with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/bin:/usr/bin \ --with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \ --with-privsep-path=%{_var}/empty/sshd \ --with-md5-passwords \ %if %{scard} --with-smartcard \ %endif %if %{rescue} --without-pam \ %else --with-pam \ %endif %if %{kerberos5} --with-kerberos5=$K5DIR \ %endif %if %{static_libcrypto} perl -pi -e "s|-lcrypto|%{_libdir}/libcrypto.a|g" Makefile %endif make %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} pushd x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion} %configure --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh xmkmf -a make popd %endif # Define a variable to toggle gnome1/gtk2 building. This is necessary # because RPM doesn't handle nested %if statements. %if %{gtk2} gtk2=yes %else gtk2=no %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} pushd contrib if [ $gtk2 = yes ] ; then make gnome-ssh-askpass2 mv gnome-ssh-askpass2 gnome-ssh-askpass else make gnome-ssh-askpass1 mv gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass fi popd %endif %install rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_var}/empty/sshd make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh %if %{build6x} install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam.old $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd %else install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd %endif install -m755 contrib/redhat/sshd.init $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} install -s x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass ln -s x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} install -s contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass %endif %if ! %{scard} rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/openssh/Ssh.bin %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} install -m 755 -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ %endif perl -pi -e "s|$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||g" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/* %clean rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT %triggerun server -- ssh-server if [ "$1" != 0 -a -r /var/run/sshd.pid ] ; then touch /var/run/sshd.restart fi %triggerun server -- openssh-server < 2.5.0p1 # Count the number of HostKey and HostDsaKey statements we have. gawk 'BEGIN {IGNORECASE=1} /^hostkey/ || /^hostdsakey/ {sawhostkey = sawhostkey + 1} END {exit sawhostkey}' /etc/ssh/sshd_config # And if we only found one, we know the client was relying on the old default # behavior, which loaded the the SSH2 DSA host key when HostDsaKey wasn't # specified. Now that HostKey is used for both SSH1 and SSH2 keys, specifying # one nullifies the default, which would have loaded both. if [ $? -eq 1 ] ; then echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config fi %triggerpostun server -- ssh-server if [ "$1" != 0 ] ; then /sbin/chkconfig --add sshd if test -f /var/run/sshd.restart ; then rm -f /var/run/sshd.restart /sbin/service sshd start > /dev/null 2>&1 || : fi fi %pre server %{_sbindir}/groupadd -r -g %{sshd_gid} sshd 2>/dev/null || : %{_sbindir}/useradd -d /var/empty/sshd -s /bin/false -u %{sshd_uid} \ -g sshd -M -r sshd 2>/dev/null || : %post server /sbin/chkconfig --add sshd %postun server /sbin/service sshd condrestart > /dev/null 2>&1 || : %preun server if [ "$1" = 0 ] then /sbin/service sshd stop > /dev/null 2>&1 || : /sbin/chkconfig --del sshd fi %files %defattr(-,root,root) %doc CREDITS ChangeLog INSTALL LICENCE OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL* TODO %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1* %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli %if ! %{rescue} %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1* %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh %attr(4711,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8* %endif %if %{scard} %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_datadir}/openssh %attr(0644,root,root) %{_datadir}/openssh/Ssh.bin %endif %files clients %defattr(-,root,root) %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config %attr(-,root,root) %{_bindir}/slogin %attr(-,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/slogin.1* %if ! %{rescue} %attr(2755,root,nobody) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1* %endif %if ! %{rescue} %files server %defattr(-,root,root) %dir %attr(0111,root,root) %{_var}/empty/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8* %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd %endif %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} %files askpass %defattr(-,root,root) %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/README %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/ChangeLog %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/SshAskpass*.ad %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} %files askpass-gnome %defattr(-,root,root) %attr(0755,root,root) %config %{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.* %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass %endif %changelog * Wed Jul 14 2010 Tim Rice - test for skip_x11_askpass (line 77) should have been for no_x11_askpass * Mon Jun 2 2003 Damien Miller - Remove noip6 option. This may be controlled at run-time in client config file using new AddressFamily directive * Mon May 12 2003 Damien Miller - Don't install profile.d scripts when not building with GNOME/GTK askpass (patch from bet@rahul.net) * Wed Oct 01 2002 Damien Miller - Install ssh-agent setgid nobody to prevent ptrace() key theft attacks * Mon Sep 30 2002 Damien Miller - Use contrib/ Makefile for building askpass programs * Fri Jun 21 2002 Damien Miller - Merge in spec changes from seba@iq.pl (Sebastian Pachuta) - Add new {ssh,sshd}_config.5 manpages - Add new ssh-keysign program and remove setuid from ssh client * Fri May 10 2002 Damien Miller - Merge in spec changes from RedHat, reorgansie a little - Add Privsep user, group and directory * Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-2 - bump and grind (through the build system) * Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-1 - require sharutils for building (mindrot #137) - require db1-devel only when building for 6.x (#55105), which probably won't work anyway (3.1 requires OpenSSL 0.9.6 to build), but what the heck - require pam-devel by file (not by package name) again - add Markus's patch to compile with OpenSSL 0.9.5a (from http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=141) and apply it if we're building for 6.x * Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-0 - update to 3.1p1 * Tue Mar 5 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai SNAP-20020305 - update to SNAP-20020305 - drop debug patch, fixed upstream * Wed Feb 20 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai SNAP-20020220 - update to SNAP-20020220 for testing purposes (you've been warned, if there's anything to be warned about, gss patches won't apply, I don't mind) * Wed Feb 13 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-3 - add patches from Simon Wilkinson and Nicolas Williams for GSSAPI key exchange, authentication, and named key support * Wed Jan 23 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-2 - remove dependency on db1-devel, which has just been swallowed up whole by gnome-libs-devel * Sun Dec 29 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - adjust build dependencies so that build6x actually works right (fix from Hugo van der Kooij) * Tue Dec 4 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-1 - update to 3.0.2p1 * Fri Nov 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.1p1-1 - update to 3.0.1p1 * Tue Nov 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to current CVS (not for use in distribution) * Thu Nov 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0p1-1 - merge some of Damien Miller changes from the upstream 3.0p1 spec file and init script * Wed Nov 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 3.0p1 - update to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.4.1 - change build dependency on a file from pam-devel to the pam-devel package - replace primes with moduli * Thu Sep 27 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-9 - incorporate fix from Markus Friedl's advisory for IP-based authorization bugs * Thu Sep 13 2001 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer 2.9p2-8 - Merge changes to rescue build from current sysadmin survival cd * Thu Sep 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-7 - fix scp's server's reporting of file sizes, and build with the proper preprocessor define to get large-file capable open(), stat(), etc. (sftp has been doing this correctly all along) (#51827) - configure without --with-ipv4-default on RHL 7.x and newer (#45987,#52247) - pull cvs patch to fix support for /etc/nologin for non-PAM logins (#47298) - mark profile.d scriptlets as config files (#42337) - refer to Jason Stone's mail for zsh workaround for exit-hanging quasi-bug - change a couple of log() statements to debug() statements (#50751) - pull cvs patch to add -t flag to sshd (#28611) - clear fd_sets correctly (one bit per FD, not one byte per FD) (#43221) * Mon Aug 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-6 - add db1-devel as a BuildPrerequisite (noted by Hans Ecke) * Thu Aug 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - pull cvs patch to fix remote port forwarding with protocol 2 * Thu Aug 9 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - pull cvs patch to add session initialization to no-pty sessions - pull cvs patch to not cut off challengeresponse auth needlessly - refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed (#49263) * Wed Aug 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - don't apply patches to code we don't intend to build (spotted by Matt Galgoci) * Mon Aug 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - pass OPTIONS correctly to initlog (#50151) * Wed Jul 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - switch to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.2 * Wed Jul 11 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - rebuild in new environment * Mon Jun 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - disable the gssapi patch * Mon Jun 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 2.9p2 - refresh to a new version of the gssapi patch * Thu Jun 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - change Copyright: BSD to License: BSD - add Markus Friedl's unverified patch for the cookie file deletion problem so that we can verify it - drop patch to check if xauth is present (was folded into cookie patch) - don't apply gssapi patches for the errata candidate - clear supplemental groups list at startup * Fri May 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - fix an error parsing the new default sshd_config - add a fix from Markus Friedl (via openssh-unix-dev) for ssh-keygen not dealing with comments right * Thu May 24 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - add in Simon Wilkinson's GSSAPI patch to give it some testing in-house, to be removed before the next beta cycle because it's a big departure from the upstream version * Thu May 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - finish marking strings in the init script for translation - modify init script to source /etc/sysconfig/sshd and pass $OPTIONS to sshd at startup (change merged from openssh.com init script, originally by Pekka Savola) - refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed * Wed May 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 2.9 - drop various patches that came from or went upstream or to or from CVS * Wed Apr 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - only require initscripts 5.00 on 6.2 (reported by Peter Bieringer) * Sun Apr 8 2001 Preston Brown - remove explicit openssl requirement, fixes builddistro issue - make initscript stop() function wait until sshd really dead to avoid races in condrestart * Mon Apr 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - mention that challengereponse supports PAM, so disabling password doesn't limit users to pubkey and rsa auth (#34378) - bypass the daemon() function in the init script and call initlog directly, because daemon() won't start a daemon it detects is already running (like open connections) - require the version of openssl we had when we were built * Fri Mar 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - make do_pam_setcred() smart enough to know when to establish creds and when to reinitialize them - add in a couple of other fixes from Damien for inclusion in the errata * Thu Mar 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 2.5.2p2 - call setcred() again after initgroups, because the "creds" could actually be group memberships * Tue Mar 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 2.5.2p1 (includes endianness fixes in the rijndael implementation) - don't enable challenge-response by default until we find a way to not have too many userauth requests (we may make up to six pubkey and up to three password attempts as it is) - remove build dependency on rsh to match openssh.com's packages more closely * Sat Mar 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - remove dependency on openssl -- would need to be too precise * Fri Mar 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - rebuild in new environment * Mon Feb 26 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Revert the patch to move pam_open_session. - Init script and spec file changes from Pekka Savola. (#28750) - Patch sftp to recognize '-o protocol' arguments. (#29540) * Thu Feb 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Chuck the closing patch. - Add a trigger to add host keys for protocol 2 to the config file, now that configuration file syntax requires us to specify it with HostKey if we specify any other HostKey values, which we do. * Tue Feb 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Redo patch to move pam_open_session after the server setuid()s to the user. - Rework the nopam patch to use be picked up by autoconf. * Mon Feb 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update for 2.5.1p1. - Add init script mods from Pekka Savola. - Tweak the init script to match the CVS contrib script more closely. - Redo patch to ssh-add to try to adding both identity and id_dsa to also try adding id_rsa. * Fri Feb 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update for 2.5.0p1. - Use $RPM_OPT_FLAGS instead of -O when building gnome-ssh-askpass - Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS, including update of x11 askpass to 1.2.0. - Only require openssl (don't prereq) because we generate keys in the init script now. * Tue Feb 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Don't open a PAM session until we've forked and become the user (#25690). - Apply Andrew Bartlett's patch for letting pam_authenticate() know which host the user is attempting a login from. - Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS. - Don't expose KbdInt responses in debug messages (from CVS). - Detect and handle errors in rsa_{public,private}_decrypt (from CVS). * Wed Feb 7 2001 Trond Eivind Glomsrxd - i18n-tweak to initscript. * Tue Jan 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - More gettextizing. - Close all files after going into daemon mode (needs more testing). - Extract patch from CVS to handle auth banners (in the client). - Extract patch from CVS to handle compat weirdness. * Fri Jan 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Finish with the gettextizing. * Thu Jan 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Fix a bug in auth2-pam.c (#23877) - Gettextize the init script. * Wed Dec 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Incorporate a switch for using PAM configs for 6.x, just in case. * Tue Dec 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Incorporate Bero's changes for a build specifically for rescue CDs. * Wed Nov 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Don't treat pam_setcred() failure as fatal unless pam_authenticate() has succeeded, to allow public-key authentication after a failure with "none" authentication. (#21268) * Tue Nov 28 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to x11-askpass 1.1.1. (#21301) - Don't second-guess fixpaths, which causes paths to get fixed twice. (#21290) * Mon Nov 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Merge multiple PAM text messages into subsequent prompts when possible when doing keyboard-interactive authentication. * Sun Nov 26 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Disable the built-in MD5 password support. We're using PAM. - Take a crack at doing keyboard-interactive authentication with PAM, and enable use of it in the default client configuration so that the client will try it when the server disallows password authentication. - Build with debugging flags. Build root policies strip all binaries anyway. * Tue Nov 21 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Use DESTDIR instead of %%makeinstall. - Remove /usr/X11R6/bin from the path-fixing patch. * Mon Nov 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Add the primes file from the latest snapshot to the main package (#20884). - Add the dev package to the prereq list (#19984). - Remove the default path and mimic login's behavior in the server itself. * Fri Nov 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Resync with conditional options in Damien Miller's .spec file for an errata. - Change libexecdir from %%{_libexecdir}/ssh to %%{_libexecdir}/openssh. * Tue Nov 7 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to OpenSSH 2.3.0p1. - Update to x11-askpass 1.1.0. - Enable keyboard-interactive authentication. * Mon Oct 30 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to ssh-askpass-x11 1.0.3. - Change authentication related messages to be private (#19966). * Tue Oct 10 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Patch ssh-keygen to be able to list signatures for DSA public key files it generates. * Thu Oct 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Add BuildRequires on /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h to be sure we always build PAM authentication in. - Try setting SSH_ASKPASS if gnome-ssh-askpass is installed. - Clean out no-longer-used patches. - Patch ssh-add to try to add both identity and id_dsa, and to error only when neither exists. * Mon Oct 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update x11-askpass to 1.0.2. (#17835) - Add BuildRequiress for /bin/login and /usr/bin/rsh so that configure will always find them in the right place. (#17909) - Set the default path to be the same as the one supplied by /bin/login, but add /usr/X11R6/bin. (#17909) - Try to handle obsoletion of ssh-server more cleanly. Package names are different, but init script name isn't. (#17865) * Wed Sep 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.2.0p1. (#17835) - Tweak the init script to allow proper restarting. (#18023) * Wed Aug 23 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 20000823 snapshot. - Change subpackage requirements from %%{version} to %%{version}-%%{release} - Back out the pipe patch. * Mon Jul 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.1.1p4, which includes fixes for config file parsing problems. - Move the init script back. - Add Damien's quick fix for wackiness. * Wed Jul 12 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.1.1p3, which includes fixes for X11 forwarding and strtok(). * Thu Jul 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Move condrestart to server postun. - Move key generation to init script. - Actually use the right patch for moving the key generation to the init script. - Clean up the init script a bit. * Wed Jul 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Fix X11 forwarding, from mail post by Chan Shih-Ping Richard. * Sun Jul 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.1.1p2. - Use of strtok() considered harmful. * Sat Jul 1 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Get the build root out of the man pages. * Thu Jun 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Add and use condrestart support in the init script. - Add newer initscripts as a prereq. * Tue Jun 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Build in new environment (release 2) - Move -clients subpackage to Applications/Internet group * Fri Jun 9 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.2.1p1 * Sat Jun 3 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Patch to build with neither RSA nor RSAref. - Miscellaneous FHS-compliance tweaks. - Fix for possibly-compressed man pages. * Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller - Updated for new location - Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build * Sun Dec 26 1999 Damien Miller - Added Jim Knoble's askpass * Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller - Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble * Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller - Added 'Obsoletes' directives * Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller - Use make install - Subpackages * Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller - Added links for slogin - Fixed perms on manpages * Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller - Renamed init script * Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller - Back to old binary names * Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller - Use autoconf - New binary names * Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller - Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's spec. Index: head/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/contrib/suse/openssh.spec (revision 294336) @@ -1,243 +1,243 @@ # Default values for additional components %define build_x11_askpass 1 # Define the UID/GID to use for privilege separation %define sshd_gid 65 %define sshd_uid 71 # The version of x11-ssh-askpass to use %define xversion 1.2.4.1 # Allow the ability to override defaults with -D skip_xxx=1 %{?skip_x11_askpass:%define build_x11_askpass 0} Summary: OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation Name: openssh -Version: 6.8p1 +Version: 6.9p1 URL: http://www.openssh.com/ Release: 1 Source0: openssh-%{version}.tar.gz Source1: x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}.tar.gz License: BSD Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/openssh-%{version}-buildroot PreReq: openssl Obsoletes: ssh Provides: ssh # # (Build[ing] Prereq[uisites] only work for RPM 2.95 and newer.) # building prerequisites -- stuff for # OpenSSL (openssl-devel), # and Gnome (glibdev, gtkdev, and gnlibsd) # BuildPrereq: openssl BuildPrereq: zlib-devel #BuildPrereq: glibdev #BuildPrereq: gtkdev #BuildPrereq: gnlibsd %package askpass Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the X window System. Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH Requires: openssh = %{version} Obsoletes: ssh-extras Provides: openssh:${_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass %if %{build_x11_askpass} BuildPrereq: XFree86-devel %endif %description Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all patented algorithms to seperate libraries (OpenSSL). This package includes all files necessary for both the OpenSSH client and server. %description askpass Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all patented algorithms to seperate libraries (OpenSSL). This package contains an X Window System passphrase dialog for OpenSSH. %changelog * Wed Oct 26 2005 Iain Morgan - Removed accidental inclusion of --without-zlib-version-check * Tue Oct 25 2005 Iain Morgan - Overhaul to deal with newer versions of SuSE and OpenSSH * Mon Jun 12 2000 Damien Miller - Glob manpages to catch compressed files * Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller - Updated for new location - Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build * Sun Dec 26 1999 Chris Saia - Made symlink to gnome-ssh-askpass called ssh-askpass * Wed Nov 24 1999 Chris Saia - Removed patches that included /etc/pam.d/sshd, /sbin/init.d/rc.sshd, and /var/adm/fillup-templates/rc.config.sshd, since Damien merged these into his released tarfile - Changed permissions on ssh_config in the install procedure to 644 from 600 even though it was correct in the %files section and thus right in the RPMs - Postinstall script for the server now only prints "Generating SSH host key..." if we need to actually do this, in order to eliminate a confusing message if an SSH host key is already in place - Marked all manual pages as %doc(umentation) * Mon Nov 22 1999 Chris Saia - Added flag to configure daemon with TCP Wrappers support - Added building prerequisites (works in RPM 3.0 and newer) * Thu Nov 18 1999 Chris Saia - Made this package correct for SuSE. - Changed instances of pam_pwdb.so to pam_unix.so, since it works more properly with SuSE, and lib_pwdb.so isn't installed by default. * Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller - Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble * Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller - Added 'Obsoletes' directives * Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller - Use make install - Subpackages * Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller - Added links for slogin - Fixed perms on manpages * Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller - Renamed init script * Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller - Back to old binary names * Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller - Use autoconf - New binary names * Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller - Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's spec. %prep %if %{build_x11_askpass} %setup -q -a 1 %else %setup -q %endif %build CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" \ %configure --prefix=/usr \ --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \ --mandir=%{_mandir} \ --with-privsep-path=/var/lib/empty \ --with-pam \ --libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh make %if %{build_x11_askpass} cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion} %configure --mandir=/usr/X11R6/man \ --libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh xmkmf -a make cd .. %endif %install rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates install -m644 contrib/sshd.pam.generic $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd install -m744 contrib/suse/rc.sshd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/sshd install -m744 contrib/suse/sysconfig.ssh \ $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates %if %{build_x11_askpass} cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion} make install install.man BINDIR=%{_libdir}/ssh DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/Ssh.bin %endif %clean rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT %pre /usr/sbin/groupadd -g %{sshd_gid} -o -r sshd 2> /dev/null || : /usr/sbin/useradd -r -o -g sshd -u %{sshd_uid} -s /bin/false -c "SSH Privilege Separation User" -d /var/lib/sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || : %post /usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A %{fillup_and_insserv -n -y ssh sshd} %run_permissions %verifyscript %verify_permissions -e /etc/ssh/sshd_config -e /etc/ssh/ssh_config -e /usr/bin/ssh %preun %stop_on_removal sshd %postun %restart_on_update sshd %{insserv_cleanup} %files %defattr(-,root,root) %doc ChangeLog OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL* %doc TODO CREDITS LICENCE %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/init.d/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh %attr(-,root,root) %{_bindir}/slogin %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libdir}/ssh %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/sftp-server %attr(4711,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-keysign %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1* %attr(-,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/slogin.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8* %attr(0644,root,root) /var/adm/fillup-templates/sysconfig.ssh %if %{build_x11_askpass} %files askpass %defattr(-,root,root) %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/README %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/ChangeLog %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/SshAskpass*.ad %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/x11-ssh-askpass %attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/ssh-askpass.1x* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/x11-ssh-askpass.1x* %attr(0644,root,root) %config /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/app-defaults/SshAskpass %endif Index: head/crypto/openssh/dh.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/dh.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/dh.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,359 +1,398 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.55 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dh.c,v 1.57 2015/05/27 23:39:18 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include /* MIN */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "dh.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "ssherr.h" static int parse_prime(int linenum, char *line, struct dhgroup *dhg) { char *cp, *arg; char *strsize, *gen, *prime; const char *errstr = NULL; long long n; dhg->p = dhg->g = NULL; cp = line; if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL) return 0; /* Ignore leading whitespace */ if (*arg == '\0') arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || !*arg || *arg == '#') return 0; /* time */ if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0') goto truncated; arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* type */ if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0') goto truncated; /* Ensure this is a safe prime */ n = strtonum(arg, 0, 5, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL || n != MODULI_TYPE_SAFE) { error("moduli:%d: type is not %d", linenum, MODULI_TYPE_SAFE); goto fail; } arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* tests */ if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0') goto truncated; /* Ensure prime has been tested and is not composite */ n = strtonum(arg, 0, 0x1f, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL || (n & MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE) || !(n & ~MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE)) { error("moduli:%d: invalid moduli tests flag", linenum); goto fail; } arg = strsep(&cp, " "); /* tries */ if (cp == NULL || *arg == '\0') goto truncated; n = strtonum(arg, 0, 1<<30, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL || n == 0) { error("moduli:%d: invalid primality trial count", linenum); goto fail; } strsize = strsep(&cp, " "); /* size */ if (cp == NULL || *strsize == '\0' || (dhg->size = (int)strtonum(strsize, 0, 64*1024, &errstr)) == 0 || errstr) { error("moduli:%d: invalid prime length", linenum); goto fail; } /* The whole group is one bit larger */ dhg->size++; gen = strsep(&cp, " "); /* gen */ if (cp == NULL || *gen == '\0') goto truncated; prime = strsep(&cp, " "); /* prime */ if (cp != NULL || *prime == '\0') { truncated: error("moduli:%d: truncated", linenum); goto fail; } if ((dhg->g = BN_new()) == NULL || (dhg->p = BN_new()) == NULL) { error("parse_prime: BN_new failed"); goto fail; } if (BN_hex2bn(&dhg->g, gen) == 0) { error("moduli:%d: could not parse generator value", linenum); goto fail; } if (BN_hex2bn(&dhg->p, prime) == 0) { error("moduli:%d: could not parse prime value", linenum); goto fail; } if (BN_num_bits(dhg->p) != dhg->size) { error("moduli:%d: prime has wrong size: actual %d listed %d", linenum, BN_num_bits(dhg->p), dhg->size - 1); goto fail; } if (BN_cmp(dhg->g, BN_value_one()) <= 0) { error("moduli:%d: generator is invalid", linenum); goto fail; } return 1; fail: if (dhg->g != NULL) BN_clear_free(dhg->g); if (dhg->p != NULL) BN_clear_free(dhg->p); dhg->g = dhg->p = NULL; return 0; } DH * choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max) { FILE *f; char line[4096]; int best, bestcount, which; int linenum; struct dhgroup dhg; if ((f = fopen(_PATH_DH_MODULI, "r")) == NULL && (f = fopen(_PATH_DH_PRIMES, "r")) == NULL) { logit("WARNING: %s does not exist, using fixed modulus", _PATH_DH_MODULI); - return (dh_new_group14()); + return (dh_new_group_fallback(max)); } linenum = 0; best = bestcount = 0; while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { linenum++; if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg)) continue; BN_clear_free(dhg.g); BN_clear_free(dhg.p); if (dhg.size > max || dhg.size < min) continue; if ((dhg.size > wantbits && dhg.size < best) || (dhg.size > best && best < wantbits)) { best = dhg.size; bestcount = 0; } if (dhg.size == best) bestcount++; } rewind(f); if (bestcount == 0) { fclose(f); logit("WARNING: no suitable primes in %s", _PATH_DH_PRIMES); - return (dh_new_group14()); + return (dh_new_group_fallback(max)); } linenum = 0; which = arc4random_uniform(bestcount); while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { if (!parse_prime(linenum, line, &dhg)) continue; if ((dhg.size > max || dhg.size < min) || dhg.size != best || linenum++ != which) { BN_clear_free(dhg.g); BN_clear_free(dhg.p); continue; } break; } fclose(f); if (linenum != which+1) { logit("WARNING: line %d disappeared in %s, giving up", which, _PATH_DH_PRIMES); - return (dh_new_group14()); + return (dh_new_group_fallback(max)); } return (dh_new_group(dhg.g, dhg.p)); } /* diffie-hellman-groupN-sha1 */ int dh_pub_is_valid(DH *dh, BIGNUM *dh_pub) { int i; int n = BN_num_bits(dh_pub); int bits_set = 0; BIGNUM *tmp; if (dh_pub->neg) { logit("invalid public DH value: negative"); return 0; } if (BN_cmp(dh_pub, BN_value_one()) != 1) { /* pub_exp <= 1 */ logit("invalid public DH value: <= 1"); return 0; } if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) { error("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); return 0; } if (!BN_sub(tmp, dh->p, BN_value_one()) || BN_cmp(dh_pub, tmp) != -1) { /* pub_exp > p-2 */ BN_clear_free(tmp); logit("invalid public DH value: >= p-1"); return 0; } BN_clear_free(tmp); for (i = 0; i <= n; i++) if (BN_is_bit_set(dh_pub, i)) bits_set++; debug2("bits set: %d/%d", bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->p)); /* if g==2 and bits_set==1 then computing log_g(dh_pub) is trivial */ if (bits_set > 1) return 1; logit("invalid public DH value (%d/%d)", bits_set, BN_num_bits(dh->p)); return 0; } int dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need) { int pbits; if (need < 0 || dh->p == NULL || (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh->p)) <= 0 || - need > INT_MAX / 2 || 2 * need >= pbits) + need > INT_MAX / 2 || 2 * need > pbits) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; dh->length = MIN(need * 2, pbits - 1); if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0 || !dh_pub_is_valid(dh, dh->pub_key)) { BN_clear_free(dh->priv_key); return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; } return 0; } DH * dh_new_group_asc(const char *gen, const char *modulus) { DH *dh; if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) return NULL; if (BN_hex2bn(&dh->p, modulus) == 0 || BN_hex2bn(&dh->g, gen) == 0) { DH_free(dh); return NULL; } return (dh); } /* * This just returns the group, we still need to generate the exchange * value. */ DH * dh_new_group(BIGNUM *gen, BIGNUM *modulus) { DH *dh; if ((dh = DH_new()) == NULL) return NULL; dh->p = modulus; dh->g = gen; return (dh); } DH * dh_new_group1(void) { static char *gen = "2", *group1 = "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1" "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD" "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245" "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED" "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE65381" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF"; return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group1)); } DH * dh_new_group14(void) { static char *gen = "2", *group14 = "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1" "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD" "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245" "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED" "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE45B3D" "C2007CB8" "A163BF05" "98DA4836" "1C55D39A" "69163FA8" "FD24CF5F" "83655D23" "DCA3AD96" "1C62F356" "208552BB" "9ED52907" "7096966D" "670C354E" "4ABC9804" "F1746C08" "CA18217C" "32905E46" "2E36CE3B" "E39E772C" "180E8603" "9B2783A2" "EC07A28F" "B5C55DF0" "6F4C52C9" "DE2BCBF6" "95581718" "3995497C" "EA956AE5" "15D22618" "98FA0510" "15728E5A" "8AACAA68" "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF"; return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group14)); +} + +/* + * 4k bit fallback group used by DH-GEX if moduli file cannot be read. + * Source: MODP group 16 from RFC3526. + */ +DH * +dh_new_group_fallback(int max) +{ + static char *gen = "2", *group16 = + "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF" "C90FDAA2" "2168C234" "C4C6628B" "80DC1CD1" + "29024E08" "8A67CC74" "020BBEA6" "3B139B22" "514A0879" "8E3404DD" + "EF9519B3" "CD3A431B" "302B0A6D" "F25F1437" "4FE1356D" "6D51C245" + "E485B576" "625E7EC6" "F44C42E9" "A637ED6B" "0BFF5CB6" "F406B7ED" + "EE386BFB" "5A899FA5" "AE9F2411" "7C4B1FE6" "49286651" "ECE45B3D" + "C2007CB8" "A163BF05" "98DA4836" "1C55D39A" "69163FA8" "FD24CF5F" + "83655D23" "DCA3AD96" "1C62F356" "208552BB" "9ED52907" "7096966D" + "670C354E" "4ABC9804" "F1746C08" "CA18217C" "32905E46" "2E36CE3B" + "E39E772C" "180E8603" "9B2783A2" "EC07A28F" "B5C55DF0" "6F4C52C9" + "DE2BCBF6" "95581718" "3995497C" "EA956AE5" "15D22618" "98FA0510" + "15728E5A" "8AAAC42D" "AD33170D" "04507A33" "A85521AB" "DF1CBA64" + "ECFB8504" "58DBEF0A" "8AEA7157" "5D060C7D" "B3970F85" "A6E1E4C7" + "ABF5AE8C" "DB0933D7" "1E8C94E0" "4A25619D" "CEE3D226" "1AD2EE6B" + "F12FFA06" "D98A0864" "D8760273" "3EC86A64" "521F2B18" "177B200C" + "BBE11757" "7A615D6C" "770988C0" "BAD946E2" "08E24FA0" "74E5AB31" + "43DB5BFC" "E0FD108E" "4B82D120" "A9210801" "1A723C12" "A787E6D7" + "88719A10" "BDBA5B26" "99C32718" "6AF4E23C" "1A946834" "B6150BDA" + "2583E9CA" "2AD44CE8" "DBBBC2DB" "04DE8EF9" "2E8EFC14" "1FBECAA6" + "287C5947" "4E6BC05D" "99B2964F" "A090C3A2" "233BA186" "515BE7ED" + "1F612970" "CEE2D7AF" "B81BDD76" "2170481C" "D0069127" "D5B05AA9" + "93B4EA98" "8D8FDDC1" "86FFB7DC" "90A6C08F" "4DF435C9" "34063199" + "FFFFFFFF" "FFFFFFFF"; + + if (max < 4096) { + debug3("requested max size %d, using 2k bit group 14", max); + return dh_new_group14(); + } + debug3("using 4k bit group 16"); + return (dh_new_group_asc(gen, group16)); } /* * Estimates the group order for a Diffie-Hellman group that has an * attack complexity approximately the same as O(2**bits). * Values from NIST Special Publication 800-57: Recommendation for Key * Management Part 1 (rev 3) limited by the recommended maximum value * from RFC4419 section 3. */ u_int dh_estimate(int bits) { if (bits <= 112) return 2048; if (bits <= 128) return 3072; if (bits <= 192) return 7680; return 8192; } Index: head/crypto/openssh/dh.h =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/dh.h (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/dh.h (revision 294336) @@ -1,74 +1,75 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.12 2015/01/19 20:16:15 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dh.h,v 1.13 2015/05/27 23:39:18 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef DH_H #define DH_H struct dhgroup { int size; BIGNUM *g; BIGNUM *p; }; DH *choose_dh(int, int, int); DH *dh_new_group_asc(const char *, const char *); DH *dh_new_group(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *); DH *dh_new_group1(void); DH *dh_new_group14(void); +DH *dh_new_group_fallback(int); int dh_gen_key(DH *, int); int dh_pub_is_valid(DH *, BIGNUM *); u_int dh_estimate(int); /* Min and max values from RFC4419. */ #define DH_GRP_MIN 1024 #define DH_GRP_MAX 8192 /* * Values for "type" field of moduli(5) * Specifies the internal structure of the prime modulus. */ #define MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN (0) #define MODULI_TYPE_UNSTRUCTURED (1) #define MODULI_TYPE_SAFE (2) #define MODULI_TYPE_SCHNORR (3) #define MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN (4) #define MODULI_TYPE_STRONG (5) /* * Values for "tests" field of moduli(5) * Specifies the methods used in checking for primality. * Usually, more than one test is used. */ #define MODULI_TESTS_UNTESTED (0x00) #define MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE (0x01) #define MODULI_TESTS_SIEVE (0x02) #define MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN (0x04) #define MODULI_TESTS_JACOBI (0x08) #define MODULI_TESTS_ELLIPTIC (0x10) #endif Index: head/crypto/openssh/digest-libc.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/digest-libc.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/digest-libc.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,264 +1,264 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: digest-libc.c,v 1.4 2014/12/21 22:27:56 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: digest-libc.c,v 1.5 2015/05/05 02:48:17 jsg Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #if 0 #include #include #include #include #endif #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" typedef void md_init_fn(void *mdctx); typedef void md_update_fn(void *mdctx, const u_int8_t *m, size_t mlen); typedef void md_final_fn(u_int8_t[], void *mdctx); struct ssh_digest_ctx { int alg; void *mdctx; }; struct ssh_digest { int id; const char *name; size_t block_len; size_t digest_len; size_t ctx_len; md_init_fn *md_init; md_update_fn *md_update; md_final_fn *md_final; }; /* NB. Indexed directly by algorithm number */ const struct ssh_digest digests[SSH_DIGEST_MAX] = { { SSH_DIGEST_MD5, "MD5", MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(MD5_CTX), (md_init_fn *) MD5Init, (md_update_fn *) MD5Update, (md_final_fn *) MD5Final }, { SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160, "RIPEMD160", RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH, RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(RMD160_CTX), (md_init_fn *) RMD160Init, (md_update_fn *) RMD160Update, (md_final_fn *) RMD160Final }, { SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, "SHA1", SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH, SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA1_CTX), (md_init_fn *) SHA1Init, (md_update_fn *) SHA1Update, (md_final_fn *) SHA1Final }, { SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, "SHA256", SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA256_CTX), (md_init_fn *) SHA256_Init, (md_update_fn *) SHA256_Update, (md_final_fn *) SHA256_Final }, { SSH_DIGEST_SHA384, "SHA384", SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA384_CTX), (md_init_fn *) SHA384_Init, (md_update_fn *) SHA384_Update, (md_final_fn *) SHA384_Final }, { SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, "SHA512", SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA512_CTX), (md_init_fn *) SHA512_Init, (md_update_fn *) SHA512_Update, (md_final_fn *) SHA512_Final } }; static const struct ssh_digest * ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg) { if (alg < 0 || alg >= SSH_DIGEST_MAX) return NULL; if (digests[alg].id != alg) /* sanity */ return NULL; return &(digests[alg]); } int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name) { int alg; for (alg = 0; alg < SSH_DIGEST_MAX; alg++) { if (strcasecmp(name, digests[alg].name) == 0) return digests[alg].id; } return -1; } const char * ssh_digest_alg_name(int alg) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg); return digest == NULL ? NULL : digest->name; } size_t ssh_digest_bytes(int alg) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg); return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->digest_len; } size_t ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg); return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->block_len; } struct ssh_digest_ctx * ssh_digest_start(int alg) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg); struct ssh_digest_ctx *ret; if (digest == NULL || (ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) return NULL; if ((ret->mdctx = calloc(1, digest->ctx_len)) == NULL) { free(ret); return NULL; } ret->alg = alg; digest->md_init(ret->mdctx); return ret; } int ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(from->alg); if (digest == NULL || from->alg != to->alg) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; memcpy(to->mdctx, from->mdctx, digest->ctx_len); return 0; } int ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg); if (digest == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; digest->md_update(ctx->mdctx, m, mlen); return 0; } int ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b) { return ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)); } int ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg); if (digest == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (dlen > UINT_MAX) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; digest->md_final(d, ctx->mdctx); return 0; } void ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx) { const struct ssh_digest *digest; if (ctx != NULL) { digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg); if (digest) { explicit_bzero(ctx->mdctx, digest->ctx_len); free(ctx->mdctx); explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); free(ctx); } } } int ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen) { struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx = ssh_digest_start(alg); if (ctx == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, m, mlen) != 0 || ssh_digest_final(ctx, d, dlen) != 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ssh_digest_free(ctx); return 0; } int ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const struct sshbuf *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen) { return ssh_digest_memory(alg, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), d, dlen); } #endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */ Index: head/crypto/openssh/dispatch.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/dispatch.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/dispatch.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,158 +1,142 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.26 2015/02/12 20:34:19 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dispatch.c,v 1.27 2015/05/01 07:10:01 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "log.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "packet.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssherr.h" int dispatch_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctx) { struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ int r; logit("dispatch_protocol_error: type %d seq %u", type, seq); if (!compat20) fatal("protocol error"); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r); return 0; } int dispatch_protocol_ignore(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ssh) { logit("dispatch_protocol_ignore: type %d seq %u", type, seq); return 0; } void ssh_dispatch_init(struct ssh *ssh, dispatch_fn *dflt) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < DISPATCH_MAX; i++) ssh->dispatch[i] = dflt; } void ssh_dispatch_range(struct ssh *ssh, u_int from, u_int to, dispatch_fn *fn) { u_int i; for (i = from; i <= to; i++) { if (i >= DISPATCH_MAX) break; ssh->dispatch[i] = fn; } } void ssh_dispatch_set(struct ssh *ssh, int type, dispatch_fn *fn) { ssh->dispatch[type] = fn; } int ssh_dispatch_run(struct ssh *ssh, int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done, void *ctxt) { int r; u_char type; u_int32_t seqnr; for (;;) { if (mode == DISPATCH_BLOCK) { r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, &seqnr); if (r != 0) return r; } else { r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, &type, &seqnr); if (r != 0) return r; if (type == SSH_MSG_NONE) return 0; } if (type > 0 && type < DISPATCH_MAX && ssh->dispatch[type] != NULL) { if (ssh->dispatch_skip_packets) { debug2("skipped packet (type %u)", type); ssh->dispatch_skip_packets--; continue; } /* XXX 'ssh' will replace 'ctxt' later */ r = (*ssh->dispatch[type])(type, seqnr, ctxt); if (r != 0) return r; } else { r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "protocol error: rcvd type %d", type); if (r != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED; } if (done != NULL && *done) return 0; } } void ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, int mode, volatile sig_atomic_t *done, void *ctxt) { int r; - if ((r = ssh_dispatch_run(ssh, mode, done, ctxt)) != 0) { - switch (r) { - case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED: - logit("Connection closed by %.200s", - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh)); - cleanup_exit(255); - case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT: - logit("Connection to %.200s timed out while " - "waiting to read", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh)); - cleanup_exit(255); - case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED: - logit("Disconnected from %.200s", - ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh)); - cleanup_exit(255); - default: - fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - } - } + if ((r = ssh_dispatch_run(ssh, mode, done, ctxt)) != 0) + sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r); } Index: head/crypto/openssh/dns.h =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/dns.h (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/dns.h (revision 294336) @@ -1,57 +1,57 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.14 2015/01/15 09:40:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.15 2015/05/08 06:45:13 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2003 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef DNS_H #define DNS_H enum sshfp_types { SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED = 0, SSHFP_KEY_RSA = 1, SSHFP_KEY_DSA = 2, SSHFP_KEY_ECDSA = 3, - SSHFP_KEY_ED25519 = 4 + SSHFP_KEY_ED25519 = 4 }; enum sshfp_hashes { SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED = 0, SSHFP_HASH_SHA1 = 1, SSHFP_HASH_SHA256 = 2, SSHFP_HASH_MAX = 3 }; #define DNS_RDATACLASS_IN 1 #define DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP 44 #define DNS_VERIFY_FOUND 0x00000001 #define DNS_VERIFY_MATCH 0x00000002 #define DNS_VERIFY_SECURE 0x00000004 int verify_host_key_dns(const char *, struct sockaddr *, struct sshkey *, int *); int export_dns_rr(const char *, struct sshkey *, FILE *, int); #endif /* DNS_H */ Index: head/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/groupaccess.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,130 +1,128 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.c,v 1.15 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: groupaccess.c,v 1.16 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Kevin Steves. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "groupaccess.h" #include "match.h" #include "log.h" static int ngroups; static char **groups_byname; /* * Initialize group access list for user with primary (base) and * supplementary groups. Return the number of groups in the list. */ int ga_init(const char *user, gid_t base) { gid_t *groups_bygid; int i, j; struct group *gr; if (ngroups > 0) ga_free(); ngroups = NGROUPS_MAX; #if defined(HAVE_SYSCONF) && defined(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX) ngroups = MAX(NGROUPS_MAX, sysconf(_SC_NGROUPS_MAX)); #endif groups_bygid = xcalloc(ngroups, sizeof(*groups_bygid)); groups_byname = xcalloc(ngroups, sizeof(*groups_byname)); if (getgrouplist(user, base, groups_bygid, &ngroups) == -1) logit("getgrouplist: groups list too small"); for (i = 0, j = 0; i < ngroups; i++) if ((gr = getgrgid(groups_bygid[i])) != NULL) groups_byname[j++] = xstrdup(gr->gr_name); free(groups_bygid); return (ngroups = j); } /* * Return 1 if one of user's groups is contained in groups. * Return 0 otherwise. Use match_pattern() for string comparison. */ int ga_match(char * const *groups, int n) { int i, j; for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) for (j = 0; j < n; j++) if (match_pattern(groups_byname[i], groups[j])) return 1; return 0; } /* * Return 1 if one of user's groups matches group_pattern list. * Return 0 on negated or no match. */ int ga_match_pattern_list(const char *group_pattern) { int i, found = 0; - size_t len = strlen(group_pattern); for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) { - switch (match_pattern_list(groups_byname[i], - group_pattern, len, 0)) { + switch (match_pattern_list(groups_byname[i], group_pattern, 0)) { case -1: return 0; /* Negated match wins */ case 0: continue; case 1: found = 1; } } return found; } /* * Free memory allocated for group access list. */ void ga_free(void) { int i; if (ngroups > 0) { for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) free(groups_byname[i]); ngroups = 0; free(groups_byname); } } Index: head/crypto/openssh/gss-genr.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/gss-genr.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/gss-genr.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,282 +1,283 @@ /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.23 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "log.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "ssh-gss.h" extern u_char *session_id2; extern u_int session_id2_len; /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */ int ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len) { return (ctx != NULL && ctx->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID && ctx->oid->length == len && memcmp(ctx->oid->elements, data, len) == 0); } /* Set the contexts OID from a data stream */ void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len) { if (ctx->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID) { free(ctx->oid->elements); free(ctx->oid); } ctx->oid = xcalloc(1, sizeof(gss_OID_desc)); ctx->oid->length = len; ctx->oid->elements = xmalloc(len); memcpy(ctx->oid->elements, data, len); } /* Set the contexts OID */ void ssh_gssapi_set_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_OID oid) { ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(ctx, oid->elements, oid->length); } /* All this effort to report an error ... */ void ssh_gssapi_error(Gssctxt *ctxt) { char *s; s = ssh_gssapi_last_error(ctxt, NULL, NULL); debug("%s", s); free(s); } char * ssh_gssapi_last_error(Gssctxt *ctxt, OM_uint32 *major_status, OM_uint32 *minor_status) { OM_uint32 lmin; gss_buffer_desc msg = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; OM_uint32 ctx; Buffer b; char *ret; buffer_init(&b); if (major_status != NULL) *major_status = ctxt->major; if (minor_status != NULL) *minor_status = ctxt->minor; ctx = 0; /* The GSSAPI error */ do { gss_display_status(&lmin, ctxt->major, GSS_C_GSS_CODE, ctxt->oid, &ctx, &msg); buffer_append(&b, msg.value, msg.length); buffer_put_char(&b, '\n'); gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &msg); } while (ctx != 0); /* The mechanism specific error */ do { gss_display_status(&lmin, ctxt->minor, GSS_C_MECH_CODE, ctxt->oid, &ctx, &msg); buffer_append(&b, msg.value, msg.length); buffer_put_char(&b, '\n'); gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &msg); } while (ctx != 0); buffer_put_char(&b, '\0'); ret = xmalloc(buffer_len(&b)); buffer_get(&b, ret, buffer_len(&b)); buffer_free(&b); return (ret); } /* * Initialise our GSSAPI context. We use this opaque structure to contain all * of the data which both the client and server need to persist across * {accept,init}_sec_context calls, so that when we do it from the userauth * stuff life is a little easier */ void ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx) { *ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof (Gssctxt)); (*ctx)->context = GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT; (*ctx)->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; (*ctx)->oid = GSS_C_NO_OID; (*ctx)->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; (*ctx)->client = GSS_C_NO_NAME; (*ctx)->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; } /* Delete our context, providing it has been built correctly */ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx) { OM_uint32 ms; if ((*ctx) == NULL) return; if ((*ctx)->context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) gss_delete_sec_context(&ms, &(*ctx)->context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); if ((*ctx)->name != GSS_C_NO_NAME) gss_release_name(&ms, &(*ctx)->name); if ((*ctx)->oid != GSS_C_NO_OID) { free((*ctx)->oid->elements); free((*ctx)->oid); (*ctx)->oid = GSS_C_NO_OID; } if ((*ctx)->creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) gss_release_cred(&ms, &(*ctx)->creds); if ((*ctx)->client != GSS_C_NO_NAME) gss_release_name(&ms, &(*ctx)->client); if ((*ctx)->client_creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL) gss_release_cred(&ms, &(*ctx)->client_creds); free(*ctx); *ctx = NULL; } /* * Wrapper to init_sec_context * Requires that the context contains: * oid * server name (from ssh_gssapi_import_name) */ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok, gss_buffer_desc* send_tok, OM_uint32 *flags) { int deleg_flag = 0; if (deleg_creds) { deleg_flag = GSS_C_DELEG_FLAG; debug("Delegating credentials"); } ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, &ctx->context, ctx->name, ctx->oid, GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag, 0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL); if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); return (ctx->major); } /* Create a service name for the given host */ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host) { gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; char *val; xasprintf(&val, "host@%s", host); gssbuf.value = val; gssbuf.length = strlen(gssbuf.value); if ((ctx->major = gss_import_name(&ctx->minor, &gssbuf, GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE, &ctx->name))) ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); free(gssbuf.value); return (ctx->major); } OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash) { if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash))) ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); return (ctx->major); } void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(Buffer *b, const char *user, const char *service, const char *context) { buffer_init(b); buffer_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len); buffer_put_char(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); buffer_put_cstring(b, user); buffer_put_cstring(b, service); buffer_put_cstring(b, context); } int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host) { gss_buffer_desc token = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; OM_uint32 major, minor; gss_OID_desc spnego_oid = {6, (void *)"\x2B\x06\x01\x05\x05\x02"}; /* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */ if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && (memcmp(oid->elements, spnego_oid.elements, oid->length) == 0)) return 0; /* false */ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx); ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid); major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host); if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) { major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, NULL); gss_release_buffer(&minor, &token); if ((*ctx)->context != GSS_C_NO_CONTEXT) gss_delete_sec_context(&minor, &(*ctx)->context, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER); } if (GSS_ERROR(major)) ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx); return (!GSS_ERROR(major)); } #endif /* GSSAPI */ Index: head/crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/gss-serv.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,386 +1,396 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.28 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.29 2015/05/22 03:50:02 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "log.h" #include "channels.h" #include "session.h" #include "misc.h" +#include "servconf.h" #include "ssh-gss.h" +extern ServerOptions options; + static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client = { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}}; ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech = { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; #ifdef KRB5 extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech; #endif ssh_gssapi_mech* supported_mechs[]= { #ifdef KRB5 &gssapi_kerberos_mech, #endif &gssapi_null_mech, }; /* * ssh_gssapi_supported_oids() can cause sandbox violations, so prepare the * list of supported mechanisms before privsep is set up. */ static gss_OID_set supported_oids; void ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(void) { ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported_oids); } OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *ms, gss_OID member, int *present) { if (supported_oids == NULL) ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(); return gss_test_oid_set_member(ms, member, supported_oids, present); } /* * Acquire credentials for a server running on the current host. * Requires that the context structure contains a valid OID */ /* Returns a GSSAPI error code */ /* Privileged (called from ssh_gssapi_server_ctx) */ static OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx) { OM_uint32 status; char lname[NI_MAXHOST]; gss_OID_set oidset; - gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); - gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); + if (options.gss_strict_acceptor) { + gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); + gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); - if (gethostname(lname, sizeof(lname))) { - gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); - return (-1); - } + if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) { + gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); + return (-1); + } - if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { + if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { + gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); + return (ctx->major); + } + + if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, + ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, + NULL, NULL))) + ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); + gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); return (ctx->major); + } else { + ctx->name = GSS_C_NO_NAME; + ctx->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; } - - if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, - ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL))) - ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); - - gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); - return (ctx->major); + return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } /* Privileged */ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid) { if (*ctx) ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx); ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx); ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid); return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx)); } /* Unprivileged */ void ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset) { int i = 0; OM_uint32 min_status; int present; gss_OID_set supported; gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset); gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported); while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) { if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status, &supported_mechs[i]->oid, supported, &present))) present = 0; if (present) gss_add_oid_set_member(&min_status, &supported_mechs[i]->oid, oidset); i++; } gss_release_oid_set(&min_status, &supported); } /* Wrapper around accept_sec_context * Requires that the context contains: * oid * credentials (from ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred) */ /* Privileged */ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok, gss_buffer_desc *send_tok, OM_uint32 *flags) { OM_uint32 status; gss_OID mech; ctx->major = gss_accept_sec_context(&ctx->minor, &ctx->context, ctx->creds, recv_tok, GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, &ctx->client, &mech, send_tok, flags, NULL, &ctx->client_creds); if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); if (ctx->client_creds) debug("Received some client credentials"); else debug("Got no client credentials"); status = ctx->major; /* Now, if we're complete and we have the right flags, then * we flag the user as also having been authenticated */ if (((flags == NULL) || ((*flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) && (*flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) && (ctx->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)) { if (ssh_gssapi_getclient(ctx, &gssapi_client)) fatal("Couldn't convert client name"); } return (status); } /* * This parses an exported name, extracting the mechanism specific portion * to use for ACL checking. It verifies that the name belongs the mechanism * originally selected. */ static OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name) { u_char *tok; OM_uint32 offset; OM_uint32 oidl; tok = ename->value; /* * Check that ename is long enough for all of the fixed length * header, and that the initial ID bytes are correct */ if (ename->length < 6 || memcmp(tok, "\x04\x01", 2) != 0) return GSS_S_FAILURE; /* * Extract the OID, and check it. Here GSSAPI breaks with tradition * and does use the OID type and length bytes. To confuse things * there are two lengths - the first including these, and the * second without. */ oidl = get_u16(tok+2); /* length including next two bytes */ oidl = oidl-2; /* turn it into the _real_ length of the variable OID */ /* * Check the BER encoding for correct type and length, that the * string is long enough and that the OID matches that in our context */ if (tok[4] != 0x06 || tok[5] != oidl || ename->length < oidl+6 || !ssh_gssapi_check_oid(ctx, tok+6, oidl)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; offset = oidl+6; if (ename->length < offset+4) return GSS_S_FAILURE; name->length = get_u32(tok+offset); offset += 4; if (UINT_MAX - offset < name->length) return GSS_S_FAILURE; if (ename->length < offset+name->length) return GSS_S_FAILURE; name->value = xmalloc(name->length+1); memcpy(name->value, tok+offset, name->length); ((char *)name->value)[name->length] = 0; return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } /* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably * be called once for a context */ /* Privileged (called from accept_secure_ctx) */ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) { int i = 0; gss_buffer_desc ename; client->mech = NULL; while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) { if (supported_mechs[i]->oid.length == ctx->oid->length && (memcmp(supported_mechs[i]->oid.elements, ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) == 0)) client->mech = supported_mechs[i]; i++; } if (client->mech == NULL) return GSS_S_FAILURE; if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client, &client->displayname, NULL))) { ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); return (ctx->major); } if ((ctx->major = gss_export_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client, &ename))) { ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); return (ctx->major); } if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(ctx,&ename, &client->exportedname))) { return (ctx->major); } /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */ client->creds = ctx->client_creds; ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; return (ctx->major); } /* As user - called on fatal/exit */ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void) { if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) { /* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */ debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"", gssapi_client.store.filename); unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename); } } /* As user */ void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void) { if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) { (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client); } else debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism"); } /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the childs environment based * on the passed authentication process and credentials. */ /* As user */ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep) { if (gssapi_client.store.envvar != NULL && gssapi_client.store.envval != NULL) { debug("Setting %s to %s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, gssapi_client.store.envval); child_set_env(envp, envsizep, gssapi_client.store.envvar, gssapi_client.store.envval); } } /* Privileged */ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) { OM_uint32 lmin; if (gssapi_client.exportedname.length == 0 || gssapi_client.exportedname.value == NULL) { debug("No suitable client data"); return 0; } if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok) if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) return 1; else { /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */ gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname); gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname); gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds); explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client, sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client)); return 0; } else debug("ssh_gssapi_userok: Unknown GSSAPI mechanism"); return (0); } /* Privileged */ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) { ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); return (ctx->major); } #endif Index: head/crypto/openssh/hmac.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/hmac.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/hmac.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,197 +1,197 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: hmac.c,v 1.11 2015/01/15 21:37:14 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: hmac.c,v 1.12 2015/03/24 20:03:44 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" #include "hmac.h" struct ssh_hmac_ctx { int alg; struct ssh_digest_ctx *ictx; struct ssh_digest_ctx *octx; struct ssh_digest_ctx *digest; u_char *buf; size_t buf_len; }; size_t ssh_hmac_bytes(int alg) { return ssh_digest_bytes(alg); } struct ssh_hmac_ctx * ssh_hmac_start(int alg) { struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ret; if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) return NULL; ret->alg = alg; if ((ret->ictx = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL || (ret->octx = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL || (ret->digest = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL) goto fail; ret->buf_len = ssh_digest_blocksize(ret->ictx); if ((ret->buf = calloc(1, ret->buf_len)) == NULL) goto fail; return ret; fail: ssh_hmac_free(ret); return NULL; } int ssh_hmac_init(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *key, size_t klen) { size_t i; /* reset ictx and octx if no is key given */ if (key != NULL) { /* truncate long keys */ if (klen <= ctx->buf_len) memcpy(ctx->buf, key, klen); else if (ssh_digest_memory(ctx->alg, key, klen, ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len) < 0) return -1; for (i = 0; i < ctx->buf_len; i++) ctx->buf[i] ^= 0x36; if (ssh_digest_update(ctx->ictx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len) < 0) return -1; for (i = 0; i < ctx->buf_len; i++) ctx->buf[i] ^= 0x36 ^ 0x5c; if (ssh_digest_update(ctx->octx, ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len) < 0) return -1; explicit_bzero(ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len); } /* start with ictx */ if (ssh_digest_copy_state(ctx->ictx, ctx->digest) < 0) return -1; return 0; } int ssh_hmac_update(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen) { return ssh_digest_update(ctx->digest, m, mlen); } int ssh_hmac_update_buffer(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b) { return ssh_digest_update_buffer(ctx->digest, b); } int ssh_hmac_final(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen) { size_t len; len = ssh_digest_bytes(ctx->alg); if (dlen < len || ssh_digest_final(ctx->digest, ctx->buf, len)) return -1; /* switch to octx */ if (ssh_digest_copy_state(ctx->octx, ctx->digest) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(ctx->digest, ctx->buf, len) < 0 || ssh_digest_final(ctx->digest, d, dlen) < 0) return -1; return 0; } void ssh_hmac_free(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx) { if (ctx != NULL) { ssh_digest_free(ctx->ictx); ssh_digest_free(ctx->octx); ssh_digest_free(ctx->digest); if (ctx->buf) { explicit_bzero(ctx->buf, ctx->buf_len); free(ctx->buf); } explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); free(ctx); } } #ifdef TEST /* cc -DTEST hmac.c digest.c buffer.c cleanup.c fatal.c log.c xmalloc.c -lcrypto */ static void hmac_test(void *key, size_t klen, void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *e, size_t elen) { struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx; size_t i; u_char digest[16]; if ((ctx = ssh_hmac_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL) printf("ssh_hmac_start failed"); if (ssh_hmac_init(ctx, key, klen) < 0 || ssh_hmac_update(ctx, m, mlen) < 0 || ssh_hmac_final(ctx, digest, sizeof(digest)) < 0) printf("ssh_hmac_xxx failed"); ssh_hmac_free(ctx); if (memcmp(e, digest, elen)) { for (i = 0; i < elen; i++) - printf("[%zd] %2.2x %2.2x\n", i, e[i], digest[i]); + printf("[%zu] %2.2x %2.2x\n", i, e[i], digest[i]); printf("mismatch\n"); } else printf("ok\n"); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { /* try test vectors from RFC 2104 */ u_char key1[16] = { 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb, 0xb }; u_char *data1 = "Hi There"; u_char dig1[16] = { 0x92, 0x94, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x36, 0x38, 0xbb, 0x1c, 0x13, 0xf4, 0x8e, 0xf8, 0x15, 0x8b, 0xfc, 0x9d }; u_char *key2 = "Jefe"; u_char *data2 = "what do ya want for nothing?"; u_char dig2[16] = { 0x75, 0x0c, 0x78, 0x3e, 0x6a, 0xb0, 0xb5, 0x03, 0xea, 0xa8, 0x6e, 0x31, 0x0a, 0x5d, 0xb7, 0x38 }; u_char key3[16]; u_char data3[50]; u_char dig3[16] = { 0x56, 0xbe, 0x34, 0x52, 0x1d, 0x14, 0x4c, 0x88, 0xdb, 0xb8, 0xc7, 0x33, 0xf0, 0xe8, 0xb3, 0xf6 }; memset(key3, 0xaa, sizeof(key3)); memset(data3, 0xdd, sizeof(data3)); hmac_test(key1, sizeof(key1), data1, strlen(data1), dig1, sizeof(dig1)); hmac_test(key2, strlen(key2), data2, strlen(data2), dig2, sizeof(dig2)); hmac_test(key3, sizeof(key3), data3, sizeof(data3), dig3, sizeof(dig3)); return 0; } #endif Index: head/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/hostfile.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,851 +1,852 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.64 2015/02/16 22:08:57 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.66 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions for manipulating the known hosts files. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "match.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "digest.h" #include "hmac.h" struct hostkeys { struct hostkey_entry *entries; u_int num_entries; }; /* XXX hmac is too easy to dictionary attack; use bcrypt? */ static int extract_salt(const char *s, u_int l, u_char *salt, size_t salt_len) { char *p, *b64salt; u_int b64len; int ret; if (l < sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) { debug2("extract_salt: string too short"); return (-1); } if (strncmp(s, HASH_MAGIC, sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) { debug2("extract_salt: invalid magic identifier"); return (-1); } s += sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1; l -= sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1; if ((p = memchr(s, HASH_DELIM, l)) == NULL) { debug2("extract_salt: missing salt termination character"); return (-1); } b64len = p - s; /* Sanity check */ if (b64len == 0 || b64len > 1024) { debug2("extract_salt: bad encoded salt length %u", b64len); return (-1); } b64salt = xmalloc(1 + b64len); memcpy(b64salt, s, b64len); b64salt[b64len] = '\0'; ret = __b64_pton(b64salt, salt, salt_len); free(b64salt); if (ret == -1) { debug2("extract_salt: salt decode error"); return (-1); } if (ret != (int)ssh_hmac_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) { debug2("extract_salt: expected salt len %zd, got %d", ssh_hmac_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1), ret); return (-1); } return (0); } char * host_hash(const char *host, const char *name_from_hostfile, u_int src_len) { struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx; u_char salt[256], result[256]; char uu_salt[512], uu_result[512]; static char encoded[1024]; u_int i, len; len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); if (name_from_hostfile == NULL) { /* Create new salt */ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) salt[i] = arc4random(); } else { /* Extract salt from known host entry */ if (extract_salt(name_from_hostfile, src_len, salt, sizeof(salt)) == -1) return (NULL); } if ((ctx = ssh_hmac_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL || ssh_hmac_init(ctx, salt, len) < 0 || ssh_hmac_update(ctx, host, strlen(host)) < 0 || ssh_hmac_final(ctx, result, sizeof(result))) fatal("%s: ssh_hmac failed", __func__); ssh_hmac_free(ctx); if (__b64_ntop(salt, len, uu_salt, sizeof(uu_salt)) == -1 || __b64_ntop(result, len, uu_result, sizeof(uu_result)) == -1) fatal("%s: __b64_ntop failed", __func__); snprintf(encoded, sizeof(encoded), "%s%s%c%s", HASH_MAGIC, uu_salt, HASH_DELIM, uu_result); return (encoded); } /* * Parses an RSA (number of bits, e, n) or DSA key from a string. Moves the * pointer over the key. Skips any whitespace at the beginning and at end. */ int hostfile_read_key(char **cpp, u_int *bitsp, struct sshkey *ret) { char *cp; int r; /* Skip leading whitespace. */ for (cp = *cpp; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if ((r = sshkey_read(ret, &cp)) != 0) return 0; /* Skip trailing whitespace. */ for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; /* Return results. */ *cpp = cp; if (bitsp != NULL) *bitsp = sshkey_size(ret); return 1; } static HostkeyMarker check_markers(char **cpp) { char marker[32], *sp, *cp = *cpp; int ret = MRK_NONE; while (*cp == '@') { /* Only one marker is allowed */ if (ret != MRK_NONE) return MRK_ERROR; /* Markers are terminated by whitespace */ if ((sp = strchr(cp, ' ')) == NULL && (sp = strchr(cp, '\t')) == NULL) return MRK_ERROR; /* Extract marker for comparison */ if (sp <= cp + 1 || sp >= cp + sizeof(marker)) return MRK_ERROR; memcpy(marker, cp, sp - cp); marker[sp - cp] = '\0'; if (strcmp(marker, CA_MARKER) == 0) ret = MRK_CA; else if (strcmp(marker, REVOKE_MARKER) == 0) ret = MRK_REVOKE; else return MRK_ERROR; /* Skip past marker and any whitespace that follows it */ cp = sp; for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; } *cpp = cp; return ret; } struct hostkeys * init_hostkeys(void) { struct hostkeys *ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret)); ret->entries = NULL; return ret; } struct load_callback_ctx { const char *host; u_long num_loaded; struct hostkeys *hostkeys; }; static int record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct load_callback_ctx *ctx = (struct load_callback_ctx *)_ctx; struct hostkeys *hostkeys = ctx->hostkeys; struct hostkey_entry *tmp; if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) { - error("%s:%ld: parse error in hostkeys file", + /* XXX make this verbose() in the future */ + debug("%s:%ld: parse error in hostkeys file", l->path, l->linenum); return 0; } debug3("%s: found %skey type %s in file %s:%lu", __func__, l->marker == MRK_NONE ? "" : (l->marker == MRK_CA ? "ca " : "revoked "), sshkey_type(l->key), l->path, l->linenum); if ((tmp = reallocarray(hostkeys->entries, hostkeys->num_entries + 1, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; hostkeys->entries = tmp; hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].host = xstrdup(ctx->host); hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].file = xstrdup(l->path); hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].line = l->linenum; hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].key = l->key; l->key = NULL; /* steal it */ hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].marker = l->marker; hostkeys->num_entries++; ctx->num_loaded++; return 0; } void load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *host, const char *path) { int r; struct load_callback_ctx ctx; ctx.host = host; ctx.num_loaded = 0; ctx.hostkeys = hostkeys; if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(path, record_hostkey, &ctx, host, NULL, HKF_WANT_MATCH|HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno != ENOENT) debug("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed for %s: %s", __func__, path, ssh_err(r)); } if (ctx.num_loaded != 0) debug3("%s: loaded %lu keys from %s", __func__, ctx.num_loaded, host); } void free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) { free(hostkeys->entries[i].host); free(hostkeys->entries[i].file); sshkey_free(hostkeys->entries[i].key); explicit_bzero(hostkeys->entries + i, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries)); } free(hostkeys->entries); explicit_bzero(hostkeys, sizeof(*hostkeys)); free(hostkeys); } static int check_key_not_revoked(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *k) { int is_cert = sshkey_is_cert(k); u_int i; for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) { if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != MRK_REVOKE) continue; if (sshkey_equal_public(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) return -1; if (is_cert && sshkey_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) return -1; } return 0; } /* * Match keys against a specified key, or look one up by key type. * * If looking for a keytype (key == NULL) and one is found then return * HOST_FOUND, otherwise HOST_NEW. * * If looking for a key (key != NULL): * 1. If the key is a cert and a matching CA is found, return HOST_OK * 2. If the key is not a cert and a matching key is found, return HOST_OK * 3. If no key matches but a key with a different type is found, then * return HOST_CHANGED * 4. If no matching keys are found, then return HOST_NEW. * * Finally, check any found key is not revoked. */ static HostStatus check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *k, int keytype, const struct hostkey_entry **found) { u_int i; HostStatus end_return = HOST_NEW; int want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(k); HostkeyMarker want_marker = want_cert ? MRK_CA : MRK_NONE; int proto = (k ? k->type : keytype) == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2; if (found != NULL) *found = NULL; for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) { if (proto == 1 && hostkeys->entries[i].key->type != KEY_RSA1) continue; if (proto == 2 && hostkeys->entries[i].key->type == KEY_RSA1) continue; if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != want_marker) continue; if (k == NULL) { if (hostkeys->entries[i].key->type != keytype) continue; end_return = HOST_FOUND; if (found != NULL) *found = hostkeys->entries + i; k = hostkeys->entries[i].key; break; } if (want_cert) { if (sshkey_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) { /* A matching CA exists */ end_return = HOST_OK; if (found != NULL) *found = hostkeys->entries + i; break; } } else { if (sshkey_equal(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) { end_return = HOST_OK; if (found != NULL) *found = hostkeys->entries + i; break; } /* A non-maching key exists */ end_return = HOST_CHANGED; if (found != NULL) *found = hostkeys->entries + i; } } if (check_key_not_revoked(hostkeys, k) != 0) { end_return = HOST_REVOKED; if (found != NULL) *found = NULL; } return end_return; } HostStatus check_key_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *key, const struct hostkey_entry **found) { if (key == NULL) fatal("no key to look up"); return check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, key, 0, found); } int lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, int keytype, const struct hostkey_entry **found) { return (check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, NULL, keytype, found) == HOST_FOUND); } static int write_host_entry(FILE *f, const char *host, const char *ip, const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash) { int r, success = 0; char *hashed_host = NULL; if (store_hash) { if ((hashed_host = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL) { error("%s: host_hash failed", __func__); return 0; } fprintf(f, "%s ", hashed_host); } else if (ip != NULL) fprintf(f, "%s,%s ", host, ip); else fprintf(f, "%s ", host); if ((r = sshkey_write(key, f)) == 0) success = 1; else error("%s: sshkey_write failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); fputc('\n', f); return success; } /* * Appends an entry to the host file. Returns false if the entry could not * be appended. */ int add_host_to_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host, const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash) { FILE *f; int success; if (key == NULL) return 1; /* XXX ? */ f = fopen(filename, "a"); if (!f) return 0; success = write_host_entry(f, host, NULL, key, store_hash); fclose(f); return success; } struct host_delete_ctx { FILE *out; int quiet; const char *host; int *skip_keys; /* XXX split for host/ip? might want to ensure both */ struct sshkey * const *keys; size_t nkeys; int modified; }; static int host_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct host_delete_ctx *ctx = (struct host_delete_ctx *)_ctx; int loglevel = ctx->quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; size_t i; if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) { if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) { /* Don't remove CA and revocation lines */ fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); return 0; } /* XXX might need a knob for this later */ /* Don't remove RSA1 keys */ if (l->key->type == KEY_RSA1) { fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); return 0; } /* * If this line contains one of the keys that we will be * adding later, then don't change it and mark the key for * skipping. */ for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) { if (sshkey_equal(ctx->keys[i], l->key)) { ctx->skip_keys[i] = 1; fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); debug3("%s: %s key already at %s:%ld", __func__, sshkey_type(l->key), l->path, l->linenum); return 0; } } /* * Hostname matches and has no CA/revoke marker, delete it * by *not* writing the line to ctx->out. */ do_log2(loglevel, "%s%s%s:%ld: Removed %s key for host %s", ctx->quiet ? __func__ : "", ctx->quiet ? ": " : "", l->path, l->linenum, sshkey_type(l->key), ctx->host); ctx->modified = 1; return 0; } /* Retain non-matching hosts and invalid lines when deleting */ if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) { do_log2(loglevel, "%s%s%s:%ld: invalid known_hosts entry", ctx->quiet ? __func__ : "", ctx->quiet ? ": " : "", l->path, l->linenum); } fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); return 0; } int hostfile_replace_entries(const char *filename, const char *host, const char *ip, struct sshkey **keys, size_t nkeys, int store_hash, int quiet, int hash_alg) { int r, fd, oerrno = 0; int loglevel = quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE; struct host_delete_ctx ctx; char *fp, *temp = NULL, *back = NULL; mode_t omask; size_t i; omask = umask(077); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.host = host; ctx.quiet = quiet; if ((ctx.skip_keys = calloc(nkeys, sizeof(*ctx.skip_keys))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ctx.keys = keys; ctx.nkeys = nkeys; ctx.modified = 0; /* * Prepare temporary file for in-place deletion. */ if ((r = asprintf(&temp, "%s.XXXXXXXXXXX", filename)) < 0 || (r = asprintf(&back, "%s.old", filename)) < 0) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } if ((fd = mkstemp(temp)) == -1) { oerrno = errno; error("%s: mkstemp: %s", __func__, strerror(oerrno)); r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto fail; } if ((ctx.out = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) { oerrno = errno; close(fd); error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(oerrno)); r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto fail; } /* Remove all entries for the specified host from the file */ if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(filename, host_delete, &ctx, host, ip, HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY)) != 0) { error("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto fail; } /* Add the requested keys */ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (ctx.skip_keys[i]) continue; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], hash_alg, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } do_log2(loglevel, "%s%sAdding new key for %s to %s: %s %s", quiet ? __func__ : "", quiet ? ": " : "", host, filename, sshkey_ssh_name(keys[i]), fp); free(fp); if (!write_host_entry(ctx.out, host, ip, keys[i], store_hash)) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto fail; } ctx.modified = 1; } fclose(ctx.out); ctx.out = NULL; if (ctx.modified) { /* Backup the original file and replace it with the temporary */ if (unlink(back) == -1 && errno != ENOENT) { oerrno = errno; error("%s: unlink %.100s: %s", __func__, back, strerror(errno)); r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto fail; } if (link(filename, back) == -1) { oerrno = errno; error("%s: link %.100s to %.100s: %s", __func__, filename, back, strerror(errno)); r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto fail; } if (rename(temp, filename) == -1) { oerrno = errno; error("%s: rename \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", __func__, temp, filename, strerror(errno)); r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto fail; } } else { /* No changes made; just delete the temporary file */ if (unlink(temp) != 0) error("%s: unlink \"%s\": %s", __func__, temp, strerror(errno)); } /* success */ r = 0; fail: if (temp != NULL && r != 0) unlink(temp); free(temp); free(back); if (ctx.out != NULL) fclose(ctx.out); free(ctx.skip_keys); umask(omask); if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR) errno = oerrno; return r; } static int match_maybe_hashed(const char *host, const char *names, int *was_hashed) { int hashed = *names == HASH_DELIM; const char *hashed_host; size_t nlen = strlen(names); if (was_hashed != NULL) *was_hashed = hashed; if (hashed) { if ((hashed_host = host_hash(host, names, nlen)) == NULL) return -1; return nlen == strlen(hashed_host) && strncmp(hashed_host, names, nlen) == 0; } - return match_hostname(host, names, nlen) == 1; + return match_hostname(host, names) == 1; } int hostkeys_foreach(const char *path, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx, const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options) { FILE *f; char line[8192], oline[8192], ktype[128]; u_long linenum = 0; char *cp, *cp2; u_int kbits; int hashed; int s, r = 0; struct hostkey_foreach_line lineinfo; size_t l; memset(&lineinfo, 0, sizeof(lineinfo)); if (host == NULL && (options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; debug3("%s: reading file \"%s\"", __func__, path); while (read_keyfile_line(f, path, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) == 0) { line[strcspn(line, "\n")] = '\0'; strlcpy(oline, line, sizeof(oline)); sshkey_free(lineinfo.key); memset(&lineinfo, 0, sizeof(lineinfo)); lineinfo.path = path; lineinfo.linenum = linenum; lineinfo.line = oline; lineinfo.marker = MRK_NONE; lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_OK; lineinfo.keytype = KEY_UNSPEC; /* Skip any leading whitespace, comments and empty lines. */ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n') { if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) == 0) { lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_COMMENT; if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0) break; } continue; } if ((lineinfo.marker = check_markers(&cp)) == MRK_ERROR) { verbose("%s: invalid marker at %s:%lu", __func__, path, linenum); if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) == 0) goto bad; continue; } /* Find the end of the host name portion. */ for (cp2 = cp; *cp2 && *cp2 != ' ' && *cp2 != '\t'; cp2++) ; lineinfo.hosts = cp; *cp2++ = '\0'; /* Check if the host name matches. */ if (host != NULL) { if ((s = match_maybe_hashed(host, lineinfo.hosts, &hashed)) == -1) { debug2("%s: %s:%ld: bad host hash \"%.32s\"", __func__, path, linenum, lineinfo.hosts); goto bad; } if (s == 1) { lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED; lineinfo.match |= HKF_MATCH_HOST | (hashed ? HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED : 0); } /* Try matching IP address if supplied */ if (ip != NULL) { if ((s = match_maybe_hashed(ip, lineinfo.hosts, &hashed)) == -1) { debug2("%s: %s:%ld: bad ip hash " "\"%.32s\"", __func__, path, linenum, lineinfo.hosts); goto bad; } if (s == 1) { lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED; lineinfo.match |= HKF_MATCH_IP | (hashed ? HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED : 0); } } /* * Skip this line if host matching requested and * neither host nor address matched. */ if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0 && lineinfo.status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) continue; } /* Got a match. Skip host name and any following whitespace */ for (; *cp2 == ' ' || *cp2 == '\t'; cp2++) ; if (*cp2 == '\0' || *cp2 == '#') { debug2("%s:%ld: truncated before key type", path, linenum); goto bad; } lineinfo.rawkey = cp = cp2; if ((options & HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY) != 0) { /* * Extract the key from the line. This will skip * any leading whitespace. Ignore badly formatted * lines. */ if ((lineinfo.key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; break; } if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, lineinfo.key)) { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 sshkey_free(lineinfo.key); lineinfo.key = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1); if (lineinfo.key == NULL) { error("%s: sshkey_new fail", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; break; } if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, lineinfo.key)) goto bad; #else goto bad; #endif } lineinfo.keytype = lineinfo.key->type; lineinfo.comment = cp; } else { /* Extract and parse key type */ l = strcspn(lineinfo.rawkey, " \t"); if (l <= 1 || l >= sizeof(ktype) || lineinfo.rawkey[l] == '\0') goto bad; memcpy(ktype, lineinfo.rawkey, l); ktype[l] = '\0'; lineinfo.keytype = sshkey_type_from_name(ktype); -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 + /* * Assume RSA1 if the first component is a short * decimal number. */ if (lineinfo.keytype == KEY_UNSPEC && l < 8 && strspn(ktype, "0123456789") == l) lineinfo.keytype = KEY_RSA1; -#endif + /* * Check that something other than whitespace follows * the key type. This won't catch all corruption, but * it does catch trivial truncation. */ cp2 += l; /* Skip past key type */ for (; *cp2 == ' ' || *cp2 == '\t'; cp2++) ; if (*cp2 == '\0' || *cp2 == '#') { debug2("%s:%ld: truncated after key type", path, linenum); lineinfo.keytype = KEY_UNSPEC; } if (lineinfo.keytype == KEY_UNSPEC) { bad: sshkey_free(lineinfo.key); lineinfo.key = NULL; lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_INVALID; if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0) break; continue; } } if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0) break; } sshkey_free(lineinfo.key); fclose(f); return r; } Index: head/crypto/openssh/kex.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/kex.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/kex.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,834 +1,836 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.105 2015/01/30 00:22:25 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.106 2015/04/17 13:25:52 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include /* MAX roundup */ #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #endif #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" #include "log.h" #include "mac.h" #include "match.h" #include "misc.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "monitor.h" #include "roaming.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256 # else extern const EVP_MD *evp_ssh_sha256(void); # endif #endif /* prototype */ static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *); static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, void *); struct kexalg { char *name; u_int type; int ec_nid; int hash_alg; }; static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL { KEX_DH1, KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, { KEX_DH14, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, { KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 { KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 }, # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) || !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */ { NULL, -1, -1, -1}, }; char * kex_alg_list(char sep) { char *ret = NULL, *tmp; size_t nlen, rlen = 0; const struct kexalg *k; for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { if (ret != NULL) ret[rlen++] = sep; nlen = strlen(k->name); if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) { free(ret); return NULL; } ret = tmp; memcpy(ret + rlen, k->name, nlen + 1); rlen += nlen; } return ret; } static const struct kexalg * kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) { const struct kexalg *k; for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0) return k; } return NULL; } /* Validate KEX method name list */ int kex_names_valid(const char *names) { char *s, *cp, *p; if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0) return 0; if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL) return 0; for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) { error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p); free(s); return 0; } } debug3("kex names ok: [%s]", names); free(s); return 1; } /* put algorithm proposal into buffer */ int kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]) { u_int i; int r; sshbuf_reset(b); /* * add a dummy cookie, the cookie will be overwritten by * kex_send_kexinit(), each time a kexinit is set */ for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0) return r; } for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, proposal[i])) != 0) return r; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 || /* first_kex_packet_follows */ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, 0)) != 0) /* uint32 reserved */ return r; return 0; } /* parse buffer and return algorithm proposal */ int kex_buf2prop(struct sshbuf *raw, int *first_kex_follows, char ***propp) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL; u_char v; u_int i; char **proposal = NULL; int r; *propp = NULL; if ((proposal = calloc(PROPOSAL_MAX, sizeof(char *))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(raw)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, KEX_COOKIE_LEN)) != 0) /* skip cookie */ goto out; /* extract kex init proposal strings */ for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &(proposal[i]), NULL)) != 0) goto out; debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: %s", proposal[i]); } /* first kex follows / reserved */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &v)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i)) != 0) goto out; if (first_kex_follows != NULL) *first_kex_follows = i; debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: first_kex_follows %d ", v); debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: reserved %u ", i); r = 0; *propp = proposal; out: if (r != 0 && proposal != NULL) kex_prop_free(proposal); sshbuf_free(b); return r; } void kex_prop_free(char **proposal) { u_int i; + if (proposal == NULL) + return; for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) free(proposal[i]); free(proposal); } /* ARGSUSED */ static int kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { error("Hm, kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq); return 0; } static void kex_reset_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN, SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX, &kex_protocol_error); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); } int kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh) { int r; kex_reset_dispatch(ssh); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) return r; debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS sent"); debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_input_newkeys); return 0; } static int kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; int r; debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_protocol_error); if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) return r; kex->done = 1; sshbuf_reset(kex->peer); /* sshbuf_reset(kex->my); */ kex->flags &= ~KEX_INIT_SENT; free(kex->name); kex->name = NULL; return 0; } int kex_send_kexinit(struct ssh *ssh) { u_char *cookie; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; int r; if (kex == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT) return 0; kex->done = 0; /* generate a random cookie */ if (sshbuf_len(kex->my) < KEX_COOKIE_LEN) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; if ((cookie = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(kex->my)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; arc4random_buf(cookie, KEX_COOKIE_LEN); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, kex->my)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) return r; debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT sent"); kex->flags |= KEX_INIT_SENT; return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; const u_char *ptr; u_int i; size_t dlen; int r; debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received"); if (kex == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen); if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0) return r; /* discard packet */ for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0) return r; for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) return r; /* * XXX RFC4253 sec 7: "each side MAY guess" - currently no supported * KEX method has the server move first, but a server might be using * a custom method or one that we otherwise don't support. We should * be prepared to remember first_kex_follows here so we can eat a * packet later. * XXX2 - RFC4253 is kind of ambiguous on what first_kex_follows means * for cases where the server *doesn't* go first. I guess we should * ignore it when it is set for these cases, which is what we do now. */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */ (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */ (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) return r; if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT)) if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) return r; if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0) return r; if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL) return (kex->kex[kex->kex_type])(ssh); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } int kex_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX], struct kex **kexp) { struct kex *kex; int r; *kexp = NULL; if ((kex = calloc(1, sizeof(*kex))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((kex->peer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (kex->my = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = kex_prop2buf(kex->my, proposal)) != 0) goto out; kex->done = 0; kex_reset_dispatch(ssh); r = 0; *kexp = kex; out: if (r != 0) kex_free(kex); return r; } void kex_free_newkeys(struct newkeys *newkeys) { if (newkeys == NULL) return; if (newkeys->enc.key) { explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.key, newkeys->enc.key_len); free(newkeys->enc.key); newkeys->enc.key = NULL; } if (newkeys->enc.iv) { explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.iv, newkeys->enc.block_size); free(newkeys->enc.iv); newkeys->enc.iv = NULL; } free(newkeys->enc.name); explicit_bzero(&newkeys->enc, sizeof(newkeys->enc)); free(newkeys->comp.name); explicit_bzero(&newkeys->comp, sizeof(newkeys->comp)); mac_clear(&newkeys->mac); if (newkeys->mac.key) { explicit_bzero(newkeys->mac.key, newkeys->mac.key_len); free(newkeys->mac.key); newkeys->mac.key = NULL; } free(newkeys->mac.name); explicit_bzero(&newkeys->mac, sizeof(newkeys->mac)); explicit_bzero(newkeys, sizeof(*newkeys)); free(newkeys); } void kex_free(struct kex *kex) { u_int mode; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL if (kex->dh) DH_free(kex->dh); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC if (kex->ec_client_key) EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key); #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { kex_free_newkeys(kex->newkeys[mode]); kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL; } sshbuf_free(kex->peer); sshbuf_free(kex->my); free(kex->session_id); free(kex->client_version_string); free(kex->server_version_string); free(kex); } int kex_setup(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]) { int r; if ((r = kex_new(ssh, proposal, &ssh->kex)) != 0) return r; if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) { /* we start */ kex_free(ssh->kex); ssh->kex = NULL; return r; } return 0; } static int choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server) { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); if (name == NULL) return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH; if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; enc->name = name; enc->enabled = 0; enc->iv = NULL; enc->iv_len = cipher_ivlen(enc->cipher); enc->key = NULL; enc->key_len = cipher_keylen(enc->cipher); enc->block_size = cipher_blocksize(enc->cipher); return 0; } static int choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server) { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); if (name == NULL) return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH; if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* truncate the key */ if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_HMAC) mac->key_len = 16; mac->name = name; mac->key = NULL; mac->enabled = 0; return 0; } static int choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server) { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); if (name == NULL) return SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH; if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) { comp->type = COMP_DELAYED; } else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) { comp->type = COMP_ZLIB; } else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) { comp->type = COMP_NONE; } else { return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } comp->name = name; return 0; } static int choose_kex(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server) { const struct kexalg *kexalg; k->name = match_list(client, server, NULL); if (k->name == NULL) return SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH; if ((kexalg = kex_alg_by_name(k->name)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; k->kex_type = kexalg->type; k->hash_alg = kexalg->hash_alg; k->ec_nid = kexalg->ec_nid; return 0; } static int choose_hostkeyalg(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server) { char *hostkeyalg = match_list(client, server, NULL); if (hostkeyalg == NULL) return SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH; k->hostkey_type = sshkey_type_from_name(hostkeyalg); if (k->hostkey_type == KEY_UNSPEC) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; k->hostkey_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(hostkeyalg); free(hostkeyalg); return 0; } static int proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX]) { static int check[] = { PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS, PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS, -1 }; int *idx; char *p; for (idx = &check[0]; *idx != -1; idx++) { if ((p = strchr(my[*idx], ',')) != NULL) *p = '\0'; if ((p = strchr(peer[*idx], ',')) != NULL) *p = '\0'; if (strcmp(my[*idx], peer[*idx]) != 0) { debug2("proposal mismatch: my %s peer %s", my[*idx], peer[*idx]); return (0); } } debug2("proposals match"); return (1); } static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; struct newkeys *newkeys; char **my = NULL, **peer = NULL; char **cprop, **sprop; int nenc, nmac, ncomp; u_int mode, ctos, need, dh_need, authlen; int r, first_kex_follows; if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->my, NULL, &my)) != 0 || (r = kex_buf2prop(kex->peer, &first_kex_follows, &peer)) != 0) goto out; if (kex->server) { cprop=peer; sprop=my; } else { cprop=my; sprop=peer; } /* Check whether server offers roaming */ if (!kex->server) { char *roaming = match_list(KEX_RESUME, peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL); if (roaming) { kex->roaming = 1; free(roaming); } } /* Algorithm Negotiation */ for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { if ((newkeys = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkeys))) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } kex->newkeys[mode] = newkeys; ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) || (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN); nenc = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC; nmac = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC; ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC; if ((r = choose_enc(&newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc], sprop[nenc])) != 0) goto out; authlen = cipher_authlen(newkeys->enc.cipher); /* ignore mac for authenticated encryption */ if (authlen == 0 && (r = choose_mac(ssh, &newkeys->mac, cprop[nmac], sprop[nmac])) != 0) goto out; if ((r = choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp], sprop[ncomp])) != 0) goto out; debug("kex: %s %s %s %s", ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client", newkeys->enc.name, authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "", newkeys->comp.name); } if ((r = choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS])) != 0 || (r = choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) != 0) goto out; need = dh_need = 0; for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode]; need = MAX(need, newkeys->enc.key_len); need = MAX(need, newkeys->enc.block_size); need = MAX(need, newkeys->enc.iv_len); need = MAX(need, newkeys->mac.key_len); dh_need = MAX(dh_need, cipher_seclen(newkeys->enc.cipher)); dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size); dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len); dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len); } /* XXX need runden? */ kex->we_need = need; kex->dh_need = dh_need; /* ignore the next message if the proposals do not match */ if (first_kex_follows && !proposals_match(my, peer) && !(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX)) ssh->dispatch_skip_packets = 1; r = 0; out: kex_prop_free(my); kex_prop_free(peer); return r; } static int derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; struct ssh_digest_ctx *hashctx = NULL; char c = id; u_int have; size_t mdsz; u_char *digest; int r; if ((mdsz = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((digest = calloc(1, roundup(need, mdsz))) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* K1 = HASH(K || H || "A" || session_id) */ if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL || ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, shared_secret) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, &c, 1) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len) != 0 || ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest, mdsz) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } ssh_digest_free(hashctx); hashctx = NULL; /* * expand key: * Kn = HASH(K || H || K1 || K2 || ... || Kn-1) * Key = K1 || K2 || ... || Kn */ for (have = mdsz; need > have; have += mdsz) { if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL || ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, shared_secret) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, digest, have) != 0 || ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest + have, mdsz) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } ssh_digest_free(hashctx); hashctx = NULL; } #ifdef DEBUG_KEX fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", c); dump_digest("key", digest, need); #endif *keyp = digest; digest = NULL; r = 0; out: if (digest) free(digest); ssh_digest_free(hashctx); return r; } #define NKEYS 6 int kex_derive_keys(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, const struct sshbuf *shared_secret) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; u_char *keys[NKEYS]; u_int i, j, mode, ctos; int r; for (i = 0; i < NKEYS; i++) { if ((r = derive_key(ssh, 'A'+i, kex->we_need, hash, hashlen, shared_secret, &keys[i])) != 0) { for (j = 0; j < i; j++) free(keys[j]); return r; } } for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) || (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN); kex->newkeys[mode]->enc.iv = keys[ctos ? 0 : 1]; kex->newkeys[mode]->enc.key = keys[ctos ? 2 : 3]; kex->newkeys[mode]->mac.key = keys[ctos ? 4 : 5]; } return 0; } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL int kex_derive_keys_bn(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, const BIGNUM *secret) { struct sshbuf *shared_secret; int r; if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(shared_secret, secret)) == 0) r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret); sshbuf_free(shared_secret); return r; } #endif #ifdef WITH_SSH1 int derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *host_modulus, BIGNUM *server_modulus, u_int8_t cookie[8], u_int8_t id[16]) { u_int8_t hbuf[2048], sbuf[2048], obuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; struct ssh_digest_ctx *hashctx = NULL; size_t hlen, slen; int r; hlen = BN_num_bytes(host_modulus); slen = BN_num_bytes(server_modulus); if (hlen < (512 / 8) || (u_int)hlen > sizeof(hbuf) || slen < (512 / 8) || (u_int)slen > sizeof(sbuf)) return SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH; if (BN_bn2bin(host_modulus, hbuf) <= 0 || BN_bn2bin(server_modulus, sbuf) <= 0) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hbuf, hlen) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, sbuf, slen) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, cookie, 8) != 0 || ssh_digest_final(hashctx, obuf, sizeof(obuf)) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } memcpy(id, obuf, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)); r = 0; out: ssh_digest_free(hashctx); explicit_bzero(hbuf, sizeof(hbuf)); explicit_bzero(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf)); explicit_bzero(obuf, sizeof(obuf)); return r; } #endif #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) void dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, int len) { fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg); sshbuf_dump_data(digest, len, stderr); } #endif Index: head/crypto/openssh/kexc25519.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/kexc25519.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/kexc25519.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,128 +1,133 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519.c,v 1.8 2015/01/19 20:16:15 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519.c,v 1.9 2015/03/26 07:00:04 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2013 Aris Adamantiadis. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "log.h" #include "digest.h" #include "ssherr.h" extern int crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(u_char a[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char b[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char c[CURVE25519_SIZE]) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 3, CURVE25519_SIZE))); void kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE]) { static const u_char basepoint[CURVE25519_SIZE] = {9}; arc4random_buf(key, CURVE25519_SIZE); crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(pub, key, basepoint); } int kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out) { u_char shared_key[CURVE25519_SIZE]; int r; + + /* Check for all-zero public key */ + explicit_bzero(shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE); + if (timingsafe_bcmp(pub, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE) == 0) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE; crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(shared_key, key, pub); #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH dump_digest("shared secret", shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE); #endif sshbuf_reset(out); r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(out, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE); explicit_bzero(shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE); return r; } int kex_c25519_hash( int hash_alg, const char *client_version_string, const char *server_version_string, const char *ckexinit, size_t ckexinitlen, const char *skexinit, size_t skexinitlen, const u_char *serverhostkeyblob, size_t sbloblen, const u_char client_dh_pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char server_dh_pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char *shared_secret, size_t secretlen, u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen) { struct sshbuf *b; int r; if (*hashlen < ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, client_version_string)) < 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, server_version_string)) < 0 || /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, ckexinitlen+1)) < 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) < 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen)) < 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, skexinitlen+1)) < 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) < 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(b, skexinit, skexinitlen)) < 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen)) < 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, client_dh_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE)) < 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, server_dh_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE)) < 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(b, shared_secret, secretlen)) < 0) { sshbuf_free(b); return r; } #ifdef DEBUG_KEX sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); #endif if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, b, hash, *hashlen) != 0) { sshbuf_free(b); return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; } sshbuf_free(b); *hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg); #ifdef DEBUG_KEX dump_digest("hash", hash, *hashlen); #endif return 0; } Index: head/crypto/openssh/kexc25519s.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/kexc25519s.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/kexc25519s.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,158 +1,159 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519s.c,v 1.8 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519s.c,v 1.9 2015/04/27 00:37:53 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2013 Aris Adamantiadis. All rights reserved. * * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include +#include #include #include #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "digest.h" #include "kex.h" #include "log.h" #include "packet.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" static int input_kex_c25519_init(int, u_int32_t, void *); int kexc25519_server(struct ssh *ssh) { debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT, &input_kex_c25519_init); return 0; } static int input_kex_c25519_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; struct sshkey *server_host_private, *server_host_public; struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL; u_char *server_host_key_blob = NULL, *signature = NULL; u_char server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE]; u_char *client_pubkey = NULL; u_char server_pubkey[CURVE25519_SIZE]; u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; size_t slen, pklen, sbloblen, hashlen; int r; /* generate private key */ kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pubkey); #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH dump_digest("server private key:", server_key, sizeof(server_key)); #endif if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL || kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type, kex->hostkey_nid, ssh); server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type, kex->hostkey_nid, ssh); if (server_host_public == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED; goto out; } if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &client_pubkey, &pklen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; if (pklen != CURVE25519_SIZE) { r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH dump_digest("client public key:", client_pubkey, CURVE25519_SIZE); #endif if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key(server_key, client_pubkey, shared_secret)) < 0) goto out; /* calc H */ if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen)) != 0) goto out; hashlen = sizeof(hash); if ((r = kex_c25519_hash( kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer), sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my), server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, client_pubkey, server_pubkey, sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret), hash, &hashlen)) < 0) goto out; /* save session id := H */ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { kex->session_id_len = hashlen; kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len); if (kex->session_id == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); } /* sign H */ if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature, &slen, hash, hashlen, ssh->compat)) < 0) goto out; /* send server hostkey, ECDH pubkey 'Q_S' and signed H */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_pubkey, sizeof(server_pubkey))) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); out: explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); explicit_bzero(server_key, sizeof(server_key)); free(server_host_key_blob); free(signature); free(client_pubkey); sshbuf_free(shared_secret); return r; } Index: head/crypto/openssh/kexgexc.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/kexgexc.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/kexgexc.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,279 +1,272 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.20 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.22 2015/05/26 23:23:40 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "digest.h" #include "kex.h" #include "log.h" #include "packet.h" #include "dh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "compat.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" static int input_kex_dh_gex_group(int, u_int32_t, void *); static int input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int, u_int32_t, void *); int kexgex_client(struct ssh *ssh) { struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; int r; u_int nbits; nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8); kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN; kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX; kex->nbits = nbits; - if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) { - /* Old GEX request */ - if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD)) - != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) - goto out; - debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD(%u) sent", kex->nbits); - } else { - /* New GEX request */ - if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->max)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) - goto out; - debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(%u<%u<%u) sent", - kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max); - } + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE) + kex->nbits = MIN(kex->nbits, 4096); + /* New GEX request */ + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->max)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) + goto out; + debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(%u<%u<%u) sent", + kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max); #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH fprintf(stderr, "\nmin = %d, nbits = %d, max = %d\n", kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max); #endif ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, &input_kex_dh_gex_group); r = 0; out: return r; } static int input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL; int r, bits; debug("got SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP"); if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL || (g = BN_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, p)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, g)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; if ((bits = BN_num_bits(p)) < 0 || (u_int)bits < kex->min || (u_int)bits > kex->max) { r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE; goto out; } if ((kex->dh = dh_new_group(g, p)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */ /* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) goto out; debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT sent"); #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh); fprintf(stderr, "pub= "); BN_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh->pub_key); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); #endif ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, NULL); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, &input_kex_dh_gex_reply); r = 0; out: if (p) BN_clear_free(p); if (g) BN_clear_free(g); return r; } static int input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL, *shared_secret = NULL; struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL; u_char *kbuf = NULL, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL; u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; size_t klen = 0, slen, sbloblen, hashlen; int kout, r; debug("got SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY"); if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } /* key, cert */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_from_blob(server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, &server_host_key)) != 0) goto out; if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; goto out; } if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type || (kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA && server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid)) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; goto out; } if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1) { r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto out; } /* DH parameter f, server public DH key */ if ((dh_server_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* signed H */ if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, dh_server_pub)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH fprintf(stderr, "dh_server_pub= "); BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_server_pub); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_server_pub)); #endif if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_server_pub)) { sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "bad server public DH value"); r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; goto out; } klen = DH_size(kex->dh); if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL || (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_server_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 || BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout); #endif if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) kex->min = kex->max = -1; /* calc and verify H */ hashlen = sizeof(hash); if ((r = kexgex_hash( kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my), sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer), server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, kex->dh->p, kex->dh->g, kex->dh->pub_key, dh_server_pub, shared_secret, hash, &hashlen)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen, ssh->compat)) != 0) goto out; /* save session id */ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { kex->session_id_len = hashlen; kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len); if (kex->session_id == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); } if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); out: explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash)); DH_free(kex->dh); kex->dh = NULL; if (dh_server_pub) BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub); if (kbuf) { explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen); free(kbuf); } if (shared_secret) BN_clear_free(shared_secret); sshkey_free(server_host_key); free(server_host_key_blob); free(signature); return r; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ Index: head/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/kexgexs.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,277 +1,254 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.24 2015/01/26 06:10:03 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kexgexs.c,v 1.25 2015/04/13 02:04:08 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include /* MIN MAX */ #include #include #include #include #include #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "digest.h" #include "kex.h" #include "log.h" #include "packet.h" #include "dh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "compat.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" static int input_kex_dh_gex_request(int, u_int32_t, void *); static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int, u_int32_t, void *); int kexgex_server(struct ssh *ssh) { - ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD, - &input_kex_dh_gex_request); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST, &input_kex_dh_gex_request); debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST"); return 0; } static int input_kex_dh_gex_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; int r; u_int min = 0, max = 0, nbits = 0; - switch (type) { - case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST: - debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST received"); - if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &max)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) - goto out; - kex->nbits = nbits; - kex->min = min; - kex->max = max; - min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min); - max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max); - nbits = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits); - nbits = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits); - break; - case SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD: - debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD received"); - if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 || - (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) - goto out; - kex->nbits = nbits; - /* unused for old GEX */ - kex->min = min = DH_GRP_MIN; - kex->max = max = DH_GRP_MAX; - break; - default: - r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST received"); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &max)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; - } + kex->nbits = nbits; + kex->min = min; + kex->max = max; + min = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, min); + max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, max); + nbits = MAX(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits); + nbits = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits); if (kex->max < kex->min || kex->nbits < kex->min || kex->max < kex->nbits) { r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE; goto out; } /* Contact privileged parent */ kex->dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max)); if (kex->dh == NULL) { sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "no matching DH grp found"); r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP sent"); if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->p)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->g)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) goto out; /* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */ if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) goto out; - - /* old KEX does not use min/max in kexgex_hash() */ - if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST_OLD) - kex->min = kex->max = -1; debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT"); ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT, &input_kex_dh_gex_init); r = 0; out: return r; } static int input_kex_dh_gex_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct ssh *ssh = ctxt; struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL, *dh_client_pub = NULL; struct sshkey *server_host_public, *server_host_private; u_char *kbuf = NULL, *signature = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL; u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; size_t sbloblen, slen; size_t klen = 0, hashlen; int kout, r; if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL || kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } server_host_public = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type, kex->hostkey_nid, ssh); server_host_private = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type, kex->hostkey_nid, ssh); if (server_host_public == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED; goto out; } /* key, cert */ if ((dh_client_pub = BN_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, dh_client_pub)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH fprintf(stderr, "dh_client_pub= "); BN_print_fp(stderr, dh_client_pub); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); debug("bits %d", BN_num_bits(dh_client_pub)); #endif #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh); fprintf(stderr, "pub= "); BN_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh->pub_key); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); #endif if (!dh_pub_is_valid(kex->dh, dh_client_pub)) { sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "bad client public DH value"); r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; goto out; } klen = DH_size(kex->dh); if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL || (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_client_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 || BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout); #endif if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(server_host_public, &server_host_key_blob, &sbloblen)) != 0) goto out; /* calc H */ hashlen = sizeof(hash); if ((r = kexgex_hash( kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version_string, kex->server_version_string, sshbuf_ptr(kex->peer), sshbuf_len(kex->peer), sshbuf_ptr(kex->my), sshbuf_len(kex->my), server_host_key_blob, sbloblen, kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, kex->dh->p, kex->dh->g, dh_client_pub, kex->dh->pub_key, shared_secret, hash, &hashlen)) != 0) goto out; /* save session id := H */ if (kex->session_id == NULL) { kex->session_id_len = hashlen; kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len); if (kex->session_id == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len); } /* sign H */ if ((r = kex->sign(server_host_private, server_host_public, &signature, &slen, hash, hashlen, ssh->compat)) < 0) goto out; /* destroy_sensitive_data(); */ /* send server hostkey, DH pubkey 'f' and singed H */ if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, server_host_key_blob, sbloblen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, kex->dh->pub_key)) != 0 || /* f */ (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = kex_derive_keys_bn(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0) r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh); out: DH_free(kex->dh); kex->dh = NULL; if (dh_client_pub) BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub); if (kbuf) { explicit_bzero(kbuf, klen); free(kbuf); } if (shared_secret) BN_clear_free(shared_secret); free(server_host_key_blob); free(signature); return r; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ Index: head/crypto/openssh/krl.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/krl.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/krl.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,1303 +1,1303 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ -/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.31 2015/01/30 01:10:33 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.32 2015/06/24 23:47:23 djm Exp $ */ #include "includes.h" #include /* MIN */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "misc.h" #include "log.h" #include "digest.h" #include "bitmap.h" #include "krl.h" /* #define DEBUG_KRL */ #ifdef DEBUG_KRL # define KRL_DBG(x) debug3 x #else # define KRL_DBG(x) #endif /* * Trees of revoked serial numbers, key IDs and keys. This allows * quick searching, querying and producing lists in canonical order. */ /* Tree of serial numbers. XXX make smarter: really need a real sparse bitmap */ struct revoked_serial { u_int64_t lo, hi; RB_ENTRY(revoked_serial) tree_entry; }; static int serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b); RB_HEAD(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial); RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial, tree_entry, serial_cmp); /* Tree of key IDs */ struct revoked_key_id { char *key_id; RB_ENTRY(revoked_key_id) tree_entry; }; static int key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b); RB_HEAD(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id); RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id, tree_entry, key_id_cmp); /* Tree of blobs (used for keys and fingerprints) */ struct revoked_blob { u_char *blob; size_t len; RB_ENTRY(revoked_blob) tree_entry; }; static int blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b); RB_HEAD(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob); RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob, tree_entry, blob_cmp); /* Tracks revoked certs for a single CA */ struct revoked_certs { struct sshkey *ca_key; struct revoked_serial_tree revoked_serials; struct revoked_key_id_tree revoked_key_ids; TAILQ_ENTRY(revoked_certs) entry; }; TAILQ_HEAD(revoked_certs_list, revoked_certs); struct ssh_krl { u_int64_t krl_version; u_int64_t generated_date; u_int64_t flags; char *comment; struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_keys; struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha1s; struct revoked_certs_list revoked_certs; }; /* Return equal if a and b overlap */ static int serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b) { if (a->hi >= b->lo && a->lo <= b->hi) return 0; return a->lo < b->lo ? -1 : 1; } static int key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b) { return strcmp(a->key_id, b->key_id); } static int blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b) { int r; if (a->len != b->len) { if ((r = memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, MIN(a->len, b->len))) != 0) return r; return a->len > b->len ? 1 : -1; } else return memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, a->len); } struct ssh_krl * ssh_krl_init(void) { struct ssh_krl *krl; if ((krl = calloc(1, sizeof(*krl))) == NULL) return NULL; RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_keys); RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha1s); TAILQ_INIT(&krl->revoked_certs); return krl; } static void revoked_certs_free(struct revoked_certs *rc) { struct revoked_serial *rs, *trs; struct revoked_key_id *rki, *trki; RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rs, revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, trs) { RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs); free(rs); } RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, trki) { RB_REMOVE(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki); free(rki->key_id); free(rki); } sshkey_free(rc->ca_key); } void ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl) { struct revoked_blob *rb, *trb; struct revoked_certs *rc, *trc; if (krl == NULL) return; free(krl->comment); RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, trb) { RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, rb); free(rb->blob); free(rb); } RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, trb) { RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, rb); free(rb->blob); free(rb); } TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry, trc) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry); revoked_certs_free(rc); } } void ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version) { krl->krl_version = version; } int ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment) { free(krl->comment); if ((krl->comment = strdup(comment)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; return 0; } /* * Find the revoked_certs struct for a CA key. If allow_create is set then * create a new one in the tree if one did not exist already. */ static int revoked_certs_for_ca_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, struct revoked_certs **rcp, int allow_create) { struct revoked_certs *rc; int r; *rcp = NULL; TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) { if ((ca_key == NULL && rc->ca_key == NULL) || sshkey_equal(rc->ca_key, ca_key)) { *rcp = rc; return 0; } } if (!allow_create) return 0; /* If this CA doesn't exist in the list then add it now */ if ((rc = calloc(1, sizeof(*rc))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (ca_key == NULL) rc->ca_key = NULL; else if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca_key, &rc->ca_key)) != 0) { free(rc); return r; } RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_serials); RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_key_ids); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry); KRL_DBG(("%s: new CA %s", __func__, ca_key == NULL ? "*" : sshkey_type(ca_key))); *rcp = rc; return 0; } static int insert_serial_range(struct revoked_serial_tree *rt, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi) { struct revoked_serial rs, *ers, *crs, *irs; KRL_DBG(("%s: insert %llu:%llu", __func__, lo, hi)); memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs)); rs.lo = lo; rs.hi = hi; ers = RB_NFIND(revoked_serial_tree, rt, &rs); if (ers == NULL || serial_cmp(ers, &rs) != 0) { /* No entry matches. Just insert */ if ((irs = malloc(sizeof(rs))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; memcpy(irs, &rs, sizeof(*irs)); ers = RB_INSERT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, irs); if (ers != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: bad: ers != NULL", __func__)); /* Shouldn't happen */ free(irs); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } ers = irs; } else { KRL_DBG(("%s: overlap found %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi)); /* * The inserted entry overlaps an existing one. Grow the * existing entry. */ if (ers->lo > lo) ers->lo = lo; if (ers->hi < hi) ers->hi = hi; } /* * The inserted or revised range might overlap or abut adjacent ones; * coalesce as necessary. */ /* Check predecessors */ while ((crs = RB_PREV(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: pred %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi)); if (ers->lo != 0 && crs->hi < ers->lo - 1) break; /* This entry overlaps. */ if (crs->lo < ers->lo) { ers->lo = crs->lo; KRL_DBG(("%s: pred extend %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi)); } RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs); free(crs); } /* Check successors */ while ((crs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: succ %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi)); if (ers->hi != (u_int64_t)-1 && crs->lo > ers->hi + 1) break; /* This entry overlaps. */ if (crs->hi > ers->hi) { ers->hi = crs->hi; KRL_DBG(("%s: succ extend %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi)); } RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs); free(crs); } KRL_DBG(("%s: done, final %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi)); return 0; } int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t serial) { return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key, serial, serial); } int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi) { struct revoked_certs *rc; int r; if (lo > hi || lo == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0) return r; return insert_serial_range(&rc->revoked_serials, lo, hi); } int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key, const char *key_id) { struct revoked_key_id *rki, *erki; struct revoked_certs *rc; int r; if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0) return r; KRL_DBG(("%s: revoke %s", __func__, key_id)); if ((rki = calloc(1, sizeof(*rki))) == NULL || (rki->key_id = strdup(key_id)) == NULL) { free(rki); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } erki = RB_INSERT(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki); if (erki != NULL) { free(rki->key_id); free(rki); } return 0; } /* Convert "key" to a public key blob without any certificate information */ static int plain_key_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blob, size_t *blen) { struct sshkey *kcopy; int r; if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &kcopy)) != 0) return r; if (sshkey_is_cert(kcopy)) { if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(kcopy)) != 0) { sshkey_free(kcopy); return r; } } r = sshkey_to_blob(kcopy, blob, blen); sshkey_free(kcopy); return r; } /* Revoke a key blob. Ownership of blob is transferred to the tree */ static int revoke_blob(struct revoked_blob_tree *rbt, u_char *blob, size_t len) { struct revoked_blob *rb, *erb; if ((rb = calloc(1, sizeof(*rb))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; rb->blob = blob; rb->len = len; erb = RB_INSERT(revoked_blob_tree, rbt, rb); if (erb != NULL) { free(rb->blob); free(rb); } return 0; } int ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) { u_char *blob; size_t len; int r; debug3("%s: revoke type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(key)); if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &blob, &len)) != 0) return r; return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_keys, blob, len); } int ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) { u_char *blob; size_t len; int r; debug3("%s: revoke type %s by sha1", __func__, sshkey_type(key)); if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &blob, &len)) != 0) return r; return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_sha1s, blob, len); } int ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) { if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) return ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, key); if (sshkey_cert_is_legacy(key) || key->cert->serial == 0) { return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, key->cert->signature_key, key->cert->key_id); } else { return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, key->cert->signature_key, key->cert->serial); } } /* * Select the most compact section type to emit next in a KRL based on * the current section type, the run length of contiguous revoked serial * numbers and the gaps from the last and to the next revoked serial. * Applies a mostly-accurate bit cost model to select the section type * that will minimise the size of the resultant KRL. */ static int choose_next_state(int current_state, u_int64_t contig, int final, u_int64_t last_gap, u_int64_t next_gap, int *force_new_section) { int new_state; u_int64_t cost, cost_list, cost_range, cost_bitmap, cost_bitmap_restart; /* * Avoid unsigned overflows. * The limits are high enough to avoid confusing the calculations. */ contig = MIN(contig, 1ULL<<31); last_gap = MIN(last_gap, 1ULL<<31); next_gap = MIN(next_gap, 1ULL<<31); /* * Calculate the cost to switch from the current state to candidates. * NB. range sections only ever contain a single range, so their * switching cost is independent of the current_state. */ cost_list = cost_bitmap = cost_bitmap_restart = 0; cost_range = 8; switch (current_state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64; break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: cost_list = 8; cost_bitmap_restart = 8 + 64; break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: case 0: cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64; cost_list = 8; } /* Estimate base cost in bits of each section type */ cost_list += 64 * contig + (final ? 0 : 8+64); cost_range += (2 * 64) + (final ? 0 : 8+64); cost_bitmap += last_gap + contig + (final ? 0 : MIN(next_gap, 8+64)); cost_bitmap_restart += contig + (final ? 0 : MIN(next_gap, 8+64)); /* Convert to byte costs for actual comparison */ cost_list = (cost_list + 7) / 8; cost_bitmap = (cost_bitmap + 7) / 8; cost_bitmap_restart = (cost_bitmap_restart + 7) / 8; cost_range = (cost_range + 7) / 8; /* Now pick the best choice */ *force_new_section = 0; new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP; cost = cost_bitmap; if (cost_range < cost) { new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE; cost = cost_range; } if (cost_list < cost) { new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST; cost = cost_list; } if (cost_bitmap_restart < cost) { new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP; *force_new_section = 1; cost = cost_bitmap_restart; } KRL_DBG(("%s: contig %llu last_gap %llu next_gap %llu final %d, costs:" "list %llu range %llu bitmap %llu new bitmap %llu, " "selected 0x%02x%s", __func__, (long long unsigned)contig, (long long unsigned)last_gap, (long long unsigned)next_gap, final, (long long unsigned)cost_list, (long long unsigned)cost_range, (long long unsigned)cost_bitmap, (long long unsigned)cost_bitmap_restart, new_state, *force_new_section ? " restart" : "")); return new_state; } static int put_bitmap(struct sshbuf *buf, struct bitmap *bitmap) { size_t len; u_char *blob; int r; len = bitmap_nbytes(bitmap); if ((blob = malloc(len)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (bitmap_to_string(bitmap, blob, len) != 0) { free(blob); return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(buf, blob, len); free(blob); return r; } /* Generate a KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES KRL section */ static int revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf) { int final, force_new_sect, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; u_int64_t i, contig, gap, last = 0, bitmap_start = 0; struct revoked_serial *rs, *nrs; struct revoked_key_id *rki; int next_state, state = 0; struct sshbuf *sect; struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL; if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* Store the header: optional CA scope key, reserved */ if (rc->ca_key == NULL) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0) goto out; } else { if ((r = sshkey_puts(rc->ca_key, buf)) != 0) goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0) goto out; /* Store the revoked serials. */ for (rs = RB_MIN(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials); rs != NULL; rs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs)) { KRL_DBG(("%s: serial %llu:%llu state 0x%02x", __func__, (long long unsigned)rs->lo, (long long unsigned)rs->hi, state)); /* Check contiguous length and gap to next section (if any) */ nrs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs); final = nrs == NULL; gap = nrs == NULL ? 0 : nrs->lo - rs->hi; contig = 1 + (rs->hi - rs->lo); /* Choose next state based on these */ next_state = choose_next_state(state, contig, final, state == 0 ? 0 : rs->lo - last, gap, &force_new_sect); /* * If the current section is a range section or has a different * type to the next section, then finish it off now. */ if (state != 0 && (force_new_sect || next_state != state || state == KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE)) { KRL_DBG(("%s: finish state 0x%02x", __func__, state)); switch (state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0) goto out; bitmap_free(bitmap); bitmap = NULL; break; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; sshbuf_reset(sect); } /* If we are starting a new section then prepare it now */ if (next_state != state || force_new_sect) { KRL_DBG(("%s: start state 0x%02x", __func__, next_state)); state = next_state; sshbuf_reset(sect); switch (state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } bitmap_start = rs->lo; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, bitmap_start)) != 0) goto out; break; } } /* Perform section-specific processing */ switch (state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo + i)) != 0) goto out; } break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->hi)) != 0) goto out; break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: if (rs->lo - bitmap_start > INT_MAX) { error("%s: insane bitmap gap", __func__); goto out; } for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) { if (bitmap_set_bit(bitmap, rs->lo + i - bitmap_start) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } } break; } last = rs->hi; } /* Flush the remaining section, if any */ if (state != 0) { KRL_DBG(("%s: serial final flush for state 0x%02x", __func__, state)); switch (state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0) goto out; bitmap_free(bitmap); bitmap = NULL; break; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; } KRL_DBG(("%s: serial done ", __func__)); /* Now output a section for any revocations by key ID */ sshbuf_reset(sect); RB_FOREACH(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids) { KRL_DBG(("%s: key ID %s", __func__, rki->key_id)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sect, rki->key_id)) != 0) goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; } r = 0; out: bitmap_free(bitmap); sshbuf_free(sect); return r; } int ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshkey **sign_keys, u_int nsign_keys) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct revoked_certs *rc; struct revoked_blob *rb; struct sshbuf *sect; u_char *sblob = NULL; size_t slen, i; if (krl->generated_date == 0) krl->generated_date = time(NULL); if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* Store the header */ if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, KRL_FORMAT_VERSION)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->krl_version)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->generated_date) != 0) || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buf, krl->comment)) != 0) goto out; /* Store sections for revoked certificates */ TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) { sshbuf_reset(sect); if ((r = revoked_certs_generate(rc, sect)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; } /* Finally, output sections for revocations by public key/hash */ sshbuf_reset(sect); RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys) { KRL_DBG(("%s: key len %zu ", __func__, rb->len)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0) goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; } sshbuf_reset(sect); RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s) { KRL_DBG(("%s: hash len %zu ", __func__, rb->len)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0) goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0) goto out; } for (i = 0; i < nsign_keys; i++) { KRL_DBG(("%s: signature key %s", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(sign_keys[i]))); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_puts(sign_keys[i], buf)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_keys[i], &sblob, &slen, - sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), 0)) == -1) + sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), 0)) != 0) goto out; KRL_DBG(("%s: signature sig len %zu", __func__, slen)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, sblob, slen)) != 0) goto out; } r = 0; out: free(sblob); sshbuf_free(sect); return r; } static void format_timestamp(u_int64_t timestamp, char *ts, size_t nts) { time_t t; struct tm *tm; t = timestamp; tm = localtime(&t); if (tm == NULL) strlcpy(ts, "", nts); else { *ts = '\0'; strftime(ts, nts, "%Y%m%dT%H%M%S", tm); } } static int parse_revoked_certs(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl *krl) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; u_char type; const u_char *blob; size_t blen, nbits; struct sshbuf *subsect = NULL; u_int64_t serial, serial_lo, serial_hi; struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL; char *key_id = NULL; struct sshkey *ca_key = NULL; if ((subsect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* Header: key, reserved */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_skip_string(buf)) != 0) goto out; if (blen != 0 && (r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &ca_key)) != 0) goto out; while (sshbuf_len(buf) > 0) { if (subsect != NULL) { sshbuf_free(subsect); subsect = NULL; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(buf, &subsect)) != 0) goto out; KRL_DBG(("%s: subsection type 0x%02x", __func__, type)); /* sshbuf_dump(subsect, stderr); */ switch (type) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, ca_key, serial)) != 0) goto out; } break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_hi)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key, serial_lo, serial_hi)) != 0) goto out; break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(subsect, &blob, &blen)) != 0) goto out; if (bitmap_from_string(bitmap, blob, blen) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } nbits = bitmap_nbits(bitmap); for (serial = 0; serial < (u_int64_t)nbits; serial++) { if (serial > 0 && serial_lo + serial == 0) { error("%s: bitmap wraps u64", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (!bitmap_test_bit(bitmap, serial)) continue; if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, ca_key, serial_lo + serial)) != 0) goto out; } bitmap_free(bitmap); bitmap = NULL; break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID: while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(subsect, &key_id, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca_key, key_id)) != 0) goto out; free(key_id); key_id = NULL; } break; default: error("Unsupported KRL certificate section %u", type); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) { error("KRL certificate section contains unparsed data"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } r = 0; out: if (bitmap != NULL) bitmap_free(bitmap); free(key_id); sshkey_free(ca_key); sshbuf_free(subsect); return r; } /* Attempt to parse a KRL, checking its signature (if any) with sign_ca_keys. */ int ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp, const struct sshkey **sign_ca_keys, size_t nsign_ca_keys) { struct sshbuf *copy = NULL, *sect = NULL; struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL; char timestamp[64]; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, sig_seen; struct sshkey *key = NULL, **ca_used = NULL, **tmp_ca_used; u_char type, *rdata = NULL; const u_char *blob; size_t i, j, sig_off, sects_off, rlen, blen, nca_used; u_int format_version; nca_used = 0; *krlp = NULL; if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1 || memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(buf), KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) { debug3("%s: not a KRL", __func__); return SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC; } /* Take a copy of the KRL buffer so we can verify its signature later */ if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0) goto out; if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) { error("%s: alloc failed", __func__); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, &format_version)) != 0) goto out; if (format_version != KRL_FORMAT_VERSION) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->krl_version)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->generated_date)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(copy, &krl->comment, NULL)) != 0) goto out; format_timestamp(krl->generated_date, timestamp, sizeof(timestamp)); debug("KRL version %llu generated at %s%s%s", (long long unsigned)krl->krl_version, timestamp, *krl->comment ? ": " : "", krl->comment); /* * 1st pass: verify signatures, if any. This is done to avoid * detailed parsing of data whose provenance is unverified. */ sig_seen = 0; if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) { /* Shouldn't happen */ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } sects_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy); while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0) goto out; KRL_DBG(("%s: first pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type)); if (type != KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE) { if (sig_seen) { error("KRL contains non-signature section " "after signature"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* Not interested for now. */ continue; } sig_seen = 1; /* First string component is the signing key */ if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) { /* Shouldn't happen */ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } sig_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy); /* Second string component is the signature itself */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* Check signature over entire KRL up to this point */ if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, blob, blen, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf) - sig_off, 0)) != 0) goto out; /* Check if this key has already signed this KRL */ for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) { if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[i], key)) { error("KRL signed more than once with " "the same key"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } /* Record keys used to sign the KRL */ tmp_ca_used = reallocarray(ca_used, nca_used + 1, sizeof(*ca_used)); if (tmp_ca_used == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } ca_used = tmp_ca_used; ca_used[nca_used++] = key; key = NULL; break; } if (sshbuf_len(copy) != 0) { /* Shouldn't happen */ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } /* * 2nd pass: parse and load the KRL, skipping the header to the point * where the section start. */ sshbuf_free(copy); if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sects_off)) != 0) goto out; while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) { if (sect != NULL) { sshbuf_free(sect); sect = NULL; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(copy, §)) != 0) goto out; KRL_DBG(("%s: second pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type)); switch (type) { case KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES: if ((r = parse_revoked_certs(sect, krl)) != 0) goto out; break; case KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY: case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1: while (sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(sect, &rdata, &rlen)) != 0) goto out; if (type == KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 && rlen != 20) { error("%s: bad SHA1 length", __func__); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((r = revoke_blob( type == KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY ? &krl->revoked_keys : &krl->revoked_sha1s, rdata, rlen)) != 0) goto out; rdata = NULL; /* revoke_blob frees rdata */ } break; case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE: /* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */ sshbuf_reset(sect); sect = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0) goto out; break; default: error("Unsupported KRL section %u", type); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) { error("KRL section contains unparsed data"); r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } /* Check that the key(s) used to sign the KRL weren't revoked */ sig_seen = 0; for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) { if (ssh_krl_check_key(krl, ca_used[i]) == 0) sig_seen = 1; else { sshkey_free(ca_used[i]); ca_used[i] = NULL; } } if (nca_used && !sig_seen) { error("All keys used to sign KRL were revoked"); r = SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; goto out; } /* If we have CA keys, then verify that one was used to sign the KRL */ if (sig_seen && nsign_ca_keys != 0) { sig_seen = 0; for (i = 0; !sig_seen && i < nsign_ca_keys; i++) { for (j = 0; j < nca_used; j++) { if (ca_used[j] == NULL) continue; if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[j], sign_ca_keys[i])) { sig_seen = 1; break; } } } if (!sig_seen) { r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; error("KRL not signed with any trusted key"); goto out; } } *krlp = krl; r = 0; out: if (r != 0) ssh_krl_free(krl); for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) sshkey_free(ca_used[i]); free(ca_used); free(rdata); sshkey_free(key); sshbuf_free(copy); sshbuf_free(sect); return r; } /* Checks certificate serial number and key ID revocation */ static int is_cert_revoked(const struct sshkey *key, struct revoked_certs *rc) { struct revoked_serial rs, *ers; struct revoked_key_id rki, *erki; /* Check revocation by cert key ID */ memset(&rki, 0, sizeof(rki)); rki.key_id = key->cert->key_id; erki = RB_FIND(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, &rki); if (erki != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key ID", __func__)); return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; } /* * Legacy cert formats lack serial numbers. Zero serials numbers * are ignored (it's the default when the CA doesn't specify one). */ if (sshkey_cert_is_legacy(key) || key->cert->serial == 0) return 0; memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs)); rs.lo = rs.hi = key->cert->serial; ers = RB_FIND(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, &rs); if (ers != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked serial %llu matched %llu:%llu", __func__, key->cert->serial, ers->lo, ers->hi)); return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; } return 0; } /* Checks whether a given key/cert is revoked. Does not check its CA */ static int is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) { struct revoked_blob rb, *erb; struct revoked_certs *rc; int r; /* Check explicitly revoked hashes first */ memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb)); if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0) return r; erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb); free(rb.blob); if (erb != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key SHA1", __func__)); return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; } /* Next, explicit keys */ memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb)); if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0) return r; erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb); free(rb.blob); if (erb != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by explicit key", __func__)); return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED; } if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) return 0; /* Check cert revocation for the specified CA */ if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, key->cert->signature_key, &rc, 0)) != 0) return r; if (rc != NULL) { if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0) return r; } /* Check cert revocation for the wildcard CA */ if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, NULL, &rc, 0)) != 0) return r; if (rc != NULL) { if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0) return r; } KRL_DBG(("%s: %llu no match", __func__, key->cert->serial)); return 0; } int ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key) { int r; KRL_DBG(("%s: checking key", __func__)); if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key)) != 0) return r; if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { debug2("%s: checking CA key", __func__); if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key->cert->signature_key)) != 0) return r; } KRL_DBG(("%s: key okay", __func__)); return 0; } int ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key) { struct sshbuf *krlbuf = NULL; struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL; int oerrno = 0, r, fd; if (path == NULL) return 0; if ((krlbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1) { r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; oerrno = errno; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, krlbuf)) != 0) { oerrno = errno; goto out; } if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, &krl, NULL, 0)) != 0) goto out; debug2("%s: checking KRL %s", __func__, path); r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key); out: close(fd); sshbuf_free(krlbuf); ssh_krl_free(krl); if (r != 0) errno = oerrno; return r; } Index: head/crypto/openssh/match.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/match.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/match.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,279 +1,277 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.29 2013/11/20 20:54:10 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.30 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Simple pattern matching, with '*' and '?' as wildcards. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "match.h" /* * Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ? * and * as wildcards), and zero if it does not match. */ int match_pattern(const char *s, const char *pattern) { for (;;) { /* If at end of pattern, accept if also at end of string. */ if (!*pattern) return !*s; if (*pattern == '*') { /* Skip the asterisk. */ pattern++; /* If at end of pattern, accept immediately. */ if (!*pattern) return 1; /* If next character in pattern is known, optimize. */ if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != '*') { /* * Look instances of the next character in * pattern, and try to match starting from * those. */ for (; *s; s++) if (*s == *pattern && match_pattern(s + 1, pattern + 1)) return 1; /* Failed. */ return 0; } /* * Move ahead one character at a time and try to * match at each position. */ for (; *s; s++) if (match_pattern(s, pattern)) return 1; /* Failed. */ return 0; } /* * There must be at least one more character in the string. * If we are at the end, fail. */ if (!*s) return 0; /* Check if the next character of the string is acceptable. */ if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != *s) return 0; /* Move to the next character, both in string and in pattern. */ s++; pattern++; } /* NOTREACHED */ } /* * Tries to match the string against the * comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to * indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is * a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all. */ - int -match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, u_int len, - int dolower) +match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, int dolower) { char sub[1024]; int negated; int got_positive; - u_int i, subi; + u_int i, subi, len = strlen(pattern); got_positive = 0; for (i = 0; i < len;) { /* Check if the subpattern is negated. */ if (pattern[i] == '!') { negated = 1; i++; } else negated = 0; /* * Extract the subpattern up to a comma or end. Convert the * subpattern to lowercase. */ for (subi = 0; i < len && subi < sizeof(sub) - 1 && pattern[i] != ','; subi++, i++) sub[subi] = dolower && isupper((u_char)pattern[i]) ? tolower((u_char)pattern[i]) : pattern[i]; /* If subpattern too long, return failure (no match). */ if (subi >= sizeof(sub) - 1) return 0; /* If the subpattern was terminated by a comma, skip the comma. */ if (i < len && pattern[i] == ',') i++; /* Null-terminate the subpattern. */ sub[subi] = '\0'; /* Try to match the subpattern against the string. */ if (match_pattern(string, sub)) { if (negated) return -1; /* Negative */ else got_positive = 1; /* Positive */ } } /* * Return success if got a positive match. If there was a negative * match, we have already returned -1 and never get here. */ return got_positive; } /* * Tries to match the host name (which must be in all lowercase) against the * comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to * indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is * a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all. */ int -match_hostname(const char *host, const char *pattern, u_int len) +match_hostname(const char *host, const char *pattern) { - return match_pattern_list(host, pattern, len, 1); + return match_pattern_list(host, pattern, 1); } /* * returns 0 if we get a negative match for the hostname or the ip * or if we get no match at all. returns -1 on error, or 1 on * successful match. */ int match_host_and_ip(const char *host, const char *ipaddr, const char *patterns) { int mhost, mip; /* error in ipaddr match */ if ((mip = addr_match_list(ipaddr, patterns)) == -2) return -1; else if (mip == -1) /* negative ip address match */ return 0; /* negative hostname match */ - if ((mhost = match_hostname(host, patterns, strlen(patterns))) == -1) + if ((mhost = match_hostname(host, patterns)) == -1) return 0; /* no match at all */ if (mhost == 0 && mip == 0) return 0; return 1; } /* * match user, user@host_or_ip, user@host_or_ip_list against pattern */ int match_user(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ipaddr, const char *pattern) { char *p, *pat; int ret; if ((p = strchr(pattern,'@')) == NULL) return match_pattern(user, pattern); pat = xstrdup(pattern); p = strchr(pat, '@'); *p++ = '\0'; if ((ret = match_pattern(user, pat)) == 1) ret = match_host_and_ip(host, ipaddr, p); free(pat); return ret; } /* * Returns first item from client-list that is also supported by server-list, * caller must free the returned string. */ #define MAX_PROP 40 #define SEP "," char * match_list(const char *client, const char *server, u_int *next) { char *sproposals[MAX_PROP]; char *c, *s, *p, *ret, *cp, *sp; int i, j, nproposals; c = cp = xstrdup(client); s = sp = xstrdup(server); for ((p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i++) { if (i < MAX_PROP) sproposals[i] = p; else break; } nproposals = i; for ((p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i++) { for (j = 0; j < nproposals; j++) { if (strcmp(p, sproposals[j]) == 0) { ret = xstrdup(p); if (next != NULL) *next = (cp == NULL) ? strlen(c) : (u_int)(cp - c); free(c); free(s); return ret; } } } if (next != NULL) *next = strlen(c); free(c); free(s); return NULL; } Index: head/crypto/openssh/match.h =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/match.h (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/match.h (revision 294336) @@ -1,27 +1,27 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.15 2010/02/26 20:29:54 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: match.h,v 1.16 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #ifndef MATCH_H #define MATCH_H int match_pattern(const char *, const char *); -int match_pattern_list(const char *, const char *, u_int, int); -int match_hostname(const char *, const char *, u_int); +int match_pattern_list(const char *, const char *, int); +int match_hostname(const char *, const char *); int match_host_and_ip(const char *, const char *, const char *); int match_user(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *); char *match_list(const char *, const char *, u_int *); /* addrmatch.c */ int addr_match_list(const char *, const char *); int addr_match_cidr_list(const char *, const char *); #endif Index: head/crypto/openssh/misc.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/misc.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/misc.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,1118 +1,1118 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.96 2015/01/16 06:40:12 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.97 2015/04/24 01:36:00 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #include #endif #ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD #include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "misc.h" #include "log.h" #include "ssh.h" /* remove newline at end of string */ char * chop(char *s) { char *t = s; while (*t) { if (*t == '\n' || *t == '\r') { *t = '\0'; return s; } t++; } return s; } /* set/unset filedescriptor to non-blocking */ int set_nonblock(int fd) { int val; val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0); if (val < 0) { error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL, 0): %s", fd, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } if (val & O_NONBLOCK) { debug3("fd %d is O_NONBLOCK", fd); return (0); } debug2("fd %d setting O_NONBLOCK", fd); val |= O_NONBLOCK; if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) { debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK): %s", fd, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } return (0); } int unset_nonblock(int fd) { int val; val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0); if (val < 0) { error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL, 0): %s", fd, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } if (!(val & O_NONBLOCK)) { debug3("fd %d is not O_NONBLOCK", fd); return (0); } debug("fd %d clearing O_NONBLOCK", fd); val &= ~O_NONBLOCK; if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) { debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, ~O_NONBLOCK): %s", fd, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } return (0); } const char * ssh_gai_strerror(int gaierr) { if (gaierr == EAI_SYSTEM && errno != 0) return strerror(errno); return gai_strerror(gaierr); } /* disable nagle on socket */ void set_nodelay(int fd) { int opt; socklen_t optlen; optlen = sizeof opt; if (getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, &optlen) == -1) { debug("getsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno)); return; } if (opt == 1) { debug2("fd %d is TCP_NODELAY", fd); return; } opt = 1; debug2("fd %d setting TCP_NODELAY", fd); if (setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, sizeof opt) == -1) error("setsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno)); } /* Characters considered whitespace in strsep calls. */ #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" #define QUOTE "\"" /* return next token in configuration line */ char * strdelim(char **s) { char *old; int wspace = 0; if (*s == NULL) return NULL; old = *s; *s = strpbrk(*s, WHITESPACE QUOTE "="); if (*s == NULL) return (old); if (*s[0] == '\"') { memmove(*s, *s + 1, strlen(*s)); /* move nul too */ /* Find matching quote */ if ((*s = strpbrk(*s, QUOTE)) == NULL) { return (NULL); /* no matching quote */ } else { *s[0] = '\0'; *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; return (old); } } /* Allow only one '=' to be skipped */ if (*s[0] == '=') wspace = 1; *s[0] = '\0'; /* Skip any extra whitespace after first token */ *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; if (*s[0] == '=' && !wspace) *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; return (old); } struct passwd * pwcopy(struct passwd *pw) { struct passwd *copy = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*copy)); copy->pw_name = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); copy->pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd); #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS copy->pw_gecos = xstrdup(pw->pw_gecos); #endif copy->pw_uid = pw->pw_uid; copy->pw_gid = pw->pw_gid; #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE copy->pw_expire = pw->pw_expire; #endif #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE copy->pw_change = pw->pw_change; #endif #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS copy->pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class); #endif copy->pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir); copy->pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell); return copy; } /* * Convert ASCII string to TCP/IP port number. * Port must be >=0 and <=65535. * Return -1 if invalid. */ int a2port(const char *s) { long long port; const char *errstr; port = strtonum(s, 0, 65535, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) return -1; return (int)port; } int a2tun(const char *s, int *remote) { const char *errstr = NULL; char *sp, *ep; int tun; if (remote != NULL) { *remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY; sp = xstrdup(s); if ((ep = strchr(sp, ':')) == NULL) { free(sp); return (a2tun(s, NULL)); } ep[0] = '\0'; ep++; *remote = a2tun(ep, NULL); tun = a2tun(sp, NULL); free(sp); return (*remote == SSH_TUNID_ERR ? *remote : tun); } if (strcasecmp(s, "any") == 0) return (SSH_TUNID_ANY); tun = strtonum(s, 0, SSH_TUNID_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) return (SSH_TUNID_ERR); return (tun); } #define SECONDS 1 #define MINUTES (SECONDS * 60) #define HOURS (MINUTES * 60) #define DAYS (HOURS * 24) #define WEEKS (DAYS * 7) /* * Convert a time string into seconds; format is * a sequence of: * time[qualifier] * * Valid time qualifiers are: * seconds * s|S seconds * m|M minutes * h|H hours * d|D days * w|W weeks * * Examples: * 90m 90 minutes * 1h30m 90 minutes * 2d 2 days * 1w 1 week * * Return -1 if time string is invalid. */ long convtime(const char *s) { long total, secs; const char *p; char *endp; errno = 0; total = 0; p = s; if (p == NULL || *p == '\0') return -1; while (*p) { secs = strtol(p, &endp, 10); if (p == endp || (errno == ERANGE && (secs == LONG_MIN || secs == LONG_MAX)) || secs < 0) return -1; switch (*endp++) { case '\0': endp--; break; case 's': case 'S': break; case 'm': case 'M': secs *= MINUTES; break; case 'h': case 'H': secs *= HOURS; break; case 'd': case 'D': secs *= DAYS; break; case 'w': case 'W': secs *= WEEKS; break; default: return -1; } total += secs; if (total < 0) return -1; p = endp; } return total; } /* * Returns a standardized host+port identifier string. * Caller must free returned string. */ char * put_host_port(const char *host, u_short port) { char *hoststr; if (port == 0 || port == SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) return(xstrdup(host)); if (asprintf(&hoststr, "[%s]:%d", host, (int)port) < 0) fatal("put_host_port: asprintf: %s", strerror(errno)); debug3("put_host_port: %s", hoststr); return hoststr; } /* * Search for next delimiter between hostnames/addresses and ports. * Argument may be modified (for termination). * Returns *cp if parsing succeeds. * *cp is set to the start of the next delimiter, if one was found. * If this is the last field, *cp is set to NULL. */ char * hpdelim(char **cp) { char *s, *old; if (cp == NULL || *cp == NULL) return NULL; old = s = *cp; if (*s == '[') { if ((s = strchr(s, ']')) == NULL) return NULL; else s++; } else if ((s = strpbrk(s, ":/")) == NULL) s = *cp + strlen(*cp); /* skip to end (see first case below) */ switch (*s) { case '\0': *cp = NULL; /* no more fields*/ break; case ':': case '/': *s = '\0'; /* terminate */ *cp = s + 1; break; default: return NULL; } return old; } char * cleanhostname(char *host) { if (*host == '[' && host[strlen(host) - 1] == ']') { host[strlen(host) - 1] = '\0'; return (host + 1); } else return host; } char * colon(char *cp) { int flag = 0; if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */ return NULL; if (*cp == '[') flag = 1; for (; *cp; ++cp) { if (*cp == '@' && *(cp+1) == '[') flag = 1; if (*cp == ']' && *(cp+1) == ':' && flag) return (cp+1); if (*cp == ':' && !flag) return (cp); if (*cp == '/') return NULL; } return NULL; } /* function to assist building execv() arguments */ void addargs(arglist *args, char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; char *cp; u_int nalloc; int r; va_start(ap, fmt); r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); if (r == -1) fatal("addargs: argument too long"); nalloc = args->nalloc; if (args->list == NULL) { nalloc = 32; args->num = 0; } else if (args->num+2 >= nalloc) nalloc *= 2; - args->list = xrealloc(args->list, nalloc, sizeof(char *)); + args->list = xreallocarray(args->list, nalloc, sizeof(char *)); args->nalloc = nalloc; args->list[args->num++] = cp; args->list[args->num] = NULL; } void replacearg(arglist *args, u_int which, char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; char *cp; int r; va_start(ap, fmt); r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); if (r == -1) fatal("replacearg: argument too long"); if (which >= args->num) fatal("replacearg: tried to replace invalid arg %d >= %d", which, args->num); free(args->list[which]); args->list[which] = cp; } void freeargs(arglist *args) { u_int i; if (args->list != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < args->num; i++) free(args->list[i]); free(args->list); args->nalloc = args->num = 0; args->list = NULL; } } /* * Expands tildes in the file name. Returns data allocated by xmalloc. * Warning: this calls getpw*. */ char * tilde_expand_filename(const char *filename, uid_t uid) { const char *path, *sep; char user[128], *ret; struct passwd *pw; u_int len, slash; if (*filename != '~') return (xstrdup(filename)); filename++; path = strchr(filename, '/'); if (path != NULL && path > filename) { /* ~user/path */ slash = path - filename; if (slash > sizeof(user) - 1) fatal("tilde_expand_filename: ~username too long"); memcpy(user, filename, slash); user[slash] = '\0'; if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such user %s", user); } else if ((pw = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) /* ~/path */ fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such uid %ld", (long)uid); /* Make sure directory has a trailing '/' */ len = strlen(pw->pw_dir); if (len == 0 || pw->pw_dir[len - 1] != '/') sep = "/"; else sep = ""; /* Skip leading '/' from specified path */ if (path != NULL) filename = path + 1; if (xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir, sep, filename) >= PATH_MAX) fatal("tilde_expand_filename: Path too long"); return (ret); } /* * Expand a string with a set of %[char] escapes. A number of escapes may be * specified as (char *escape_chars, char *replacement) pairs. The list must * be terminated by a NULL escape_char. Returns replaced string in memory * allocated by xmalloc. */ char * percent_expand(const char *string, ...) { #define EXPAND_MAX_KEYS 16 u_int num_keys, i, j; struct { const char *key; const char *repl; } keys[EXPAND_MAX_KEYS]; char buf[4096]; va_list ap; /* Gather keys */ va_start(ap, string); for (num_keys = 0; num_keys < EXPAND_MAX_KEYS; num_keys++) { keys[num_keys].key = va_arg(ap, char *); if (keys[num_keys].key == NULL) break; keys[num_keys].repl = va_arg(ap, char *); if (keys[num_keys].repl == NULL) fatal("%s: NULL replacement", __func__); } if (num_keys == EXPAND_MAX_KEYS && va_arg(ap, char *) != NULL) fatal("%s: too many keys", __func__); va_end(ap); /* Expand string */ *buf = '\0'; for (i = 0; *string != '\0'; string++) { if (*string != '%') { append: buf[i++] = *string; if (i >= sizeof(buf)) fatal("%s: string too long", __func__); buf[i] = '\0'; continue; } string++; /* %% case */ if (*string == '%') goto append; for (j = 0; j < num_keys; j++) { if (strchr(keys[j].key, *string) != NULL) { i = strlcat(buf, keys[j].repl, sizeof(buf)); if (i >= sizeof(buf)) fatal("%s: string too long", __func__); break; } } if (j >= num_keys) fatal("%s: unknown key %%%c", __func__, *string); } return (xstrdup(buf)); #undef EXPAND_MAX_KEYS } /* * Read an entire line from a public key file into a static buffer, discarding * lines that exceed the buffer size. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. */ int read_keyfile_line(FILE *f, const char *filename, char *buf, size_t bufsz, u_long *lineno) { while (fgets(buf, bufsz, f) != NULL) { if (buf[0] == '\0') continue; (*lineno)++; if (buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == '\n' || feof(f)) { return 0; } else { debug("%s: %s line %lu exceeds size limit", __func__, filename, *lineno); /* discard remainder of line */ while (fgetc(f) != '\n' && !feof(f)) ; /* nothing */ } } return -1; } int tun_open(int tun, int mode) { #if defined(CUSTOM_SYS_TUN_OPEN) return (sys_tun_open(tun, mode)); #elif defined(SSH_TUN_OPENBSD) struct ifreq ifr; char name[100]; int fd = -1, sock; /* Open the tunnel device */ if (tun <= SSH_TUNID_MAX) { snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/tun%d", tun); fd = open(name, O_RDWR); } else if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) { for (tun = 100; tun >= 0; tun--) { snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/tun%d", tun); if ((fd = open(name, O_RDWR)) >= 0) break; } } else { debug("%s: invalid tunnel %u", __func__, tun); return (-1); } if (fd < 0) { debug("%s: %s open failed: %s", __func__, name, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, name, mode, fd); /* Set the tunnel device operation mode */ snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "tun%d", tun); if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) goto failed; if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) goto failed; /* Set interface mode */ ifr.ifr_flags &= ~IFF_UP; if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_LINK0; else ifr.ifr_flags &= ~IFF_LINK0; if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) goto failed; /* Bring interface up */ ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP; if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) goto failed; close(sock); return (fd); failed: if (fd >= 0) close(fd); if (sock >= 0) close(sock); debug("%s: failed to set %s mode %d: %s", __func__, name, mode, strerror(errno)); return (-1); #else error("Tunnel interfaces are not supported on this platform"); return (-1); #endif } void sanitise_stdfd(void) { int nullfd, dupfd; if ((nullfd = dupfd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open /dev/null: %s\n", strerror(errno)); exit(1); } while (++dupfd <= 2) { /* Only clobber closed fds */ if (fcntl(dupfd, F_GETFL, 0) >= 0) continue; if (dup2(nullfd, dupfd) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno)); exit(1); } } if (nullfd > 2) close(nullfd); } char * tohex(const void *vp, size_t l) { const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; char b[3], *r; size_t i, hl; if (l > 65536) return xstrdup("tohex: length > 65536"); hl = l * 2 + 1; r = xcalloc(1, hl); for (i = 0; i < l; i++) { snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%02x", p[i]); strlcat(r, b, hl); } return (r); } u_int64_t get_u64(const void *vp) { const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; u_int64_t v; v = (u_int64_t)p[0] << 56; v |= (u_int64_t)p[1] << 48; v |= (u_int64_t)p[2] << 40; v |= (u_int64_t)p[3] << 32; v |= (u_int64_t)p[4] << 24; v |= (u_int64_t)p[5] << 16; v |= (u_int64_t)p[6] << 8; v |= (u_int64_t)p[7]; return (v); } u_int32_t get_u32(const void *vp) { const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; u_int32_t v; v = (u_int32_t)p[0] << 24; v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 16; v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 8; v |= (u_int32_t)p[3]; return (v); } u_int32_t get_u32_le(const void *vp) { const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; u_int32_t v; v = (u_int32_t)p[0]; v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 8; v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 16; v |= (u_int32_t)p[3] << 24; return (v); } u_int16_t get_u16(const void *vp) { const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; u_int16_t v; v = (u_int16_t)p[0] << 8; v |= (u_int16_t)p[1]; return (v); } void put_u64(void *vp, u_int64_t v) { u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 56) & 0xff; p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 48) & 0xff; p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 40) & 0xff; p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 32) & 0xff; p[4] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff; p[5] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff; p[6] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; p[7] = (u_char)v & 0xff; } void put_u32(void *vp, u_int32_t v) { u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff; p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff; p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; p[3] = (u_char)v & 0xff; } void put_u32_le(void *vp, u_int32_t v) { u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; p[0] = (u_char)v & 0xff; p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff; p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff; } void put_u16(void *vp, u_int16_t v) { u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; p[1] = (u_char)v & 0xff; } void ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *start, int *ms) { struct timeval diff, finish; gettimeofday(&finish, NULL); timersub(&finish, start, &diff); *ms -= (diff.tv_sec * 1000) + (diff.tv_usec / 1000); } void ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *tv, int ms) { if (ms < 0) ms = 0; tv->tv_sec = ms / 1000; tv->tv_usec = (ms % 1000) * 1000; } time_t monotime(void) { #if defined(HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME) && \ (defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) || defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME)) struct timespec ts; static int gettime_failed = 0; if (!gettime_failed) { #if defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME) if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &ts) == 0) return (ts.tv_sec); #endif #if defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts) == 0) return (ts.tv_sec); #endif debug3("clock_gettime: %s", strerror(errno)); gettime_failed = 1; } #endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME && (CLOCK_MONOTONIC || CLOCK_BOOTTIME */ return time(NULL); } void bandwidth_limit_init(struct bwlimit *bw, u_int64_t kbps, size_t buflen) { bw->buflen = buflen; bw->rate = kbps; bw->thresh = bw->rate; bw->lamt = 0; timerclear(&bw->bwstart); timerclear(&bw->bwend); } /* Callback from read/write loop to insert bandwidth-limiting delays */ void bandwidth_limit(struct bwlimit *bw, size_t read_len) { u_int64_t waitlen; struct timespec ts, rm; if (!timerisset(&bw->bwstart)) { gettimeofday(&bw->bwstart, NULL); return; } bw->lamt += read_len; if (bw->lamt < bw->thresh) return; gettimeofday(&bw->bwend, NULL); timersub(&bw->bwend, &bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend); if (!timerisset(&bw->bwend)) return; bw->lamt *= 8; waitlen = (double)1000000L * bw->lamt / bw->rate; bw->bwstart.tv_sec = waitlen / 1000000L; bw->bwstart.tv_usec = waitlen % 1000000L; if (timercmp(&bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend, >)) { timersub(&bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend, &bw->bwend); /* Adjust the wait time */ if (bw->bwend.tv_sec) { bw->thresh /= 2; if (bw->thresh < bw->buflen / 4) bw->thresh = bw->buflen / 4; } else if (bw->bwend.tv_usec < 10000) { bw->thresh *= 2; if (bw->thresh > bw->buflen * 8) bw->thresh = bw->buflen * 8; } TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&bw->bwend, &ts); while (nanosleep(&ts, &rm) == -1) { if (errno != EINTR) break; ts = rm; } } bw->lamt = 0; gettimeofday(&bw->bwstart, NULL); } /* Make a template filename for mk[sd]temp() */ void mktemp_proto(char *s, size_t len) { const char *tmpdir; int r; if ((tmpdir = getenv("TMPDIR")) != NULL) { r = snprintf(s, len, "%s/ssh-XXXXXXXXXXXX", tmpdir); if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < len) return; } r = snprintf(s, len, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXXXX"); if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= len) fatal("%s: template string too short", __func__); } static const struct { const char *name; int value; } ipqos[] = { { "af11", IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 }, { "af12", IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 }, { "af13", IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 }, { "af21", IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 }, { "af22", IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 }, { "af23", IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 }, { "af31", IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 }, { "af32", IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 }, { "af33", IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 }, { "af41", IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 }, { "af42", IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 }, { "af43", IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 }, { "cs0", IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 }, { "cs1", IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 }, { "cs2", IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 }, { "cs3", IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 }, { "cs4", IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 }, { "cs5", IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 }, { "cs6", IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 }, { "cs7", IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 }, { "ef", IPTOS_DSCP_EF }, { "lowdelay", IPTOS_LOWDELAY }, { "throughput", IPTOS_THROUGHPUT }, { "reliability", IPTOS_RELIABILITY }, { NULL, -1 } }; int parse_ipqos(const char *cp) { u_int i; char *ep; long val; if (cp == NULL) return -1; for (i = 0; ipqos[i].name != NULL; i++) { if (strcasecmp(cp, ipqos[i].name) == 0) return ipqos[i].value; } /* Try parsing as an integer */ val = strtol(cp, &ep, 0); if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0' || val < 0 || val > 255) return -1; return val; } const char * iptos2str(int iptos) { int i; static char iptos_str[sizeof "0xff"]; for (i = 0; ipqos[i].name != NULL; i++) { if (ipqos[i].value == iptos) return ipqos[i].name; } snprintf(iptos_str, sizeof iptos_str, "0x%02x", iptos); return iptos_str; } void lowercase(char *s) { for (; *s; s++) *s = tolower((u_char)*s); } int unix_listener(const char *path, int backlog, int unlink_first) { struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; int saved_errno, sock; memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr)); sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; if (strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, path, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) { error("%s: \"%s\" too long for Unix domain socket", __func__, path); errno = ENAMETOOLONG; return -1; } sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (sock < 0) { saved_errno = errno; error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); errno = saved_errno; return -1; } if (unlink_first == 1) { if (unlink(path) != 0 && errno != ENOENT) error("unlink(%s): %.100s", path, strerror(errno)); } if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) { saved_errno = errno; error("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(sock); error("%s: cannot bind to path: %s", __func__, path); errno = saved_errno; return -1; } if (listen(sock, backlog) < 0) { saved_errno = errno; error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(sock); unlink(path); error("%s: cannot listen on path: %s", __func__, path); errno = saved_errno; return -1; } return sock; } void sock_set_v6only(int s) { #ifdef IPV6_V6ONLY int on = 1; debug3("%s: set socket %d IPV6_V6ONLY", __func__, s); if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) error("setsockopt IPV6_V6ONLY: %s", strerror(errno)); #endif } Index: head/crypto/openssh/moduli =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/moduli (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/moduli (revision 294336) @@ -1,276 +1,247 @@ -# $OpenBSD: moduli,v 1.12 2015/05/22 02:45:42 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: moduli,v 1.13 2015/05/28 00:03:06 dtucker Exp $ # Time Type Tests Tries Size Generator Modulus -20150520233853 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2AC62AF -20150520233854 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2BCC50F -20150520233854 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2C241F3 -20150520233855 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2DDF347 -20150520233856 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA2E3FDBB -20150520233857 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3006603 -20150520233858 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA31D9C37 -20150520233859 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA333355B -20150520233900 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3428B23 -20150520233902 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA37C9A43 -20150520233903 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA384B367 -20150520233903 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3903453 -20150520233904 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3946C77 -20150520233904 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA39F6A9B -20150520233904 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3A0E88B -20150520233905 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3A37763 -20150520233906 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3BBDD57 -20150520233906 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3BDCDD7 -20150520233906 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3BF5D73 -20150520233907 2 6 100 1023 2 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3C9BB83 -20150520233908 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3E5ADCF -20150520233909 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA3F82077 -20150520233910 2 6 100 1023 5 DB662973FB21C0B7BF21AB46AFD3E2002AE70C92DE6B9AEAFECF7B0A96D7ACB024B7C29DB18E70CB945FA54C7773519BC7161648AFE4939058AC40ECDBBD3636F5BF45863117E955007C9D0F9333BB4EF62F7C9F6298AB79A309C734F3CF201C61EBC3926ADD4E80968A65D9F60535164ACE7A7BFEDC1022002BB2BBA406944F -20150520233910 2 6 100 1023 5 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Index: head/crypto/openssh/monitor.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/monitor.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/monitor.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,2057 +1,2061 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.145 2015/02/20 22:17:21 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.150 2015/06/22 23:42:16 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #else # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H # include # endif #endif #ifdef SKEY #include #endif #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "key.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "dh.h" #ifdef TARGET_OS_MAC /* XXX Broken krb5 headers on Mac */ #undef TARGET_OS_MAC #include "zlib.h" #define TARGET_OS_MAC 1 #else #include "zlib.h" #endif #include "packet.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "channels.h" #include "session.h" #include "sshlogin.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "monitor.h" #include "monitor_mm.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "monitor_fdpass.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "roaming.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "match.h" #include "ssherr.h" #ifdef GSSAPI static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL; #endif /* Imports */ extern ServerOptions options; extern u_int utmp_len; extern u_char session_id[]; extern Buffer auth_debug; extern int auth_debug_init; extern Buffer loginmsg; /* State exported from the child */ static struct sshbuf *child_state; /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */ int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *); #ifdef USE_PAM int mm_answer_pam_start(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pam_account(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pam_query(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pam_respond(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int, Buffer *); #endif #ifdef GSSAPI int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *); #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *); #endif static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *); static Authctxt *authctxt; #ifdef WITH_SSH1 static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */ #endif /* local state for key verify */ static u_char *key_blob = NULL; static u_int key_bloblen = 0; static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY; static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL; static char *hostbased_chost = NULL; static char *auth_method = "unknown"; static char *auth_submethod = NULL; static u_int session_id2_len = 0; static u_char *session_id2 = NULL; static pid_t monitor_child_pid; struct mon_table { enum monitor_reqtype type; int flags; int (*f)(int, Buffer *); }; #define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */ #define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */ #define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */ #define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */ #define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE) #define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli}, #endif {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign}, {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword}, #ifdef USE_PAM {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx}, #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, #endif #ifdef BSD_AUTH {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery}, {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond}, #endif #ifdef SKEY {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery}, {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond}, #endif {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed}, {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify}, #ifdef GSSAPI {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic}, #endif {0, 0, NULL} }; struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli}, #endif {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign}, {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty}, {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup}, {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term}, #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command}, #endif {0, 0, NULL} }; struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow}, {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey}, {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword}, {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed}, {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed}, {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge}, {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response}, #ifdef BSD_AUTH {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery}, {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond}, #endif #ifdef SKEY {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery}, {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond}, #endif #ifdef USE_PAM {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx}, #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, #endif #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ {0, 0, NULL} }; struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty}, {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup}, {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term}, #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command}, #endif #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ {0, 0, NULL} }; struct mon_table *mon_dispatch; /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */ static void monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit) { while (ent->f != NULL) { if (ent->type == type) { ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT; ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0; return; } ent++; } } static void monitor_permit_authentications(int permit) { struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch; while (ent->f != NULL) { if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) { ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT; ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0; } ent++; } } void monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor) { struct mon_table *ent; int authenticated = 0, partial = 0; debug3("preauth child monitor started"); close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd); pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1; authctxt = _authctxt; memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt)); authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg; if (compat20) { mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20; /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); } else { mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15; monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1); } /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */ while (!authenticated) { partial = 0; auth_method = "unknown"; auth_submethod = NULL; authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1); /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */ if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) { if (!compat20) fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported" "with SSH protocol 1"); if (authenticated && !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt, auth_method, auth_submethod)) { debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__, auth_method); authenticated = 0; partial = 1; } } if (authenticated) { if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE)) fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d", __func__, ent->type); if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && !auth_root_allowed(auth_method)) authenticated = 0; #ifdef USE_PAM /* PAM needs to perform account checks after auth */ if (options.use_pam && authenticated) { Buffer m; buffer_init(&m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m); authenticated = mm_answer_pam_account(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m); buffer_free(&m); } #endif } if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) { auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial, auth_method, auth_submethod); - if (!authenticated) + if (!partial && !authenticated) authctxt->failures++; } } if (!authctxt->valid) fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__); if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0) fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__); debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process", __func__, authctxt->user); mm_get_keystate(pmonitor); /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) ; close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd); pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1; } static void monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid) { monitor_child_pid = pid; } static void monitor_child_handler(int sig) { kill(monitor_child_pid, sig); } void monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor) { close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1; monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid); signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler); signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler); signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler); #ifdef SIGXFSZ signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN); #endif if (compat20) { mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20; /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); } else { mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15; monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); } if (!no_pty_flag) { monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1); } for (;;) monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL); } void monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor) { if (options.compression) { /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */ mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback); } } /* Allocation functions for zlib */ static void * mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size) { size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount; void *address; if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_MAX / size) fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size); address = mm_malloc(mm, len); return (address); } static void mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address) { mm_free(mm, address); } static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor) { Buffer logmsg; u_int len, level; char *msg; buffer_init(&logmsg); /* Read length */ buffer_append_space(&logmsg, 4); if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) { if (errno == EPIPE) { buffer_free(&logmsg); debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__); close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd); pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1; return -1; } fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } len = buffer_get_int(&logmsg); if (len <= 4 || len > 8192) fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len); /* Read severity, message */ buffer_clear(&logmsg); buffer_append_space(&logmsg, len); if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); /* Log it */ level = buffer_get_int(&logmsg); msg = buffer_get_string(&logmsg, NULL); if (log_level_name(level) == NULL) fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", __func__, level); do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg); buffer_free(&logmsg); free(msg); return 0; } int monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent, struct mon_table **pent) { Buffer m; int ret; u_char type; struct pollfd pfd[2]; for (;;) { memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd)); pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd; pfd[0].events = POLLIN; pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd; pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN; if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) { if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN) continue; fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } if (pfd[1].revents) { /* * Drain all log messages before processing next * monitor request. */ monitor_read_log(pmonitor); continue; } if (pfd[0].revents) break; /* Continues below */ } buffer_init(&m); mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m); type = buffer_get_char(&m); debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type); while (ent->f != NULL) { if (ent->type == type) break; ent++; } if (ent->f != NULL) { if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT)) fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__, type); ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m); buffer_free(&m); /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */ if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) { debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__, type); ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT; } if (pent != NULL) *pent = ent; return ret; } fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type); /* NOTREACHED */ return (-1); } /* allowed key state */ static int monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen) { /* make sure key is allowed */ if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen || timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen)) return (0); return (1); } static void monitor_reset_key_state(void) { /* reset state */ free(key_blob); free(hostbased_cuser); free(hostbased_chost); key_blob = NULL; key_bloblen = 0; key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY; hostbased_cuser = NULL; hostbased_chost = NULL; } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL int mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m) { DH *dh; int min, want, max; min = buffer_get_int(m); want = buffer_get_int(m); max = buffer_get_int(m); debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d", __func__, min, want, max); /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */ if (max < min || want < min || max < want) fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d", __func__, min, want, max); buffer_clear(m); dh = choose_dh(min, want, max); if (dh == NULL) { buffer_put_char(m, 0); return (0); } else { /* Send first bignum */ buffer_put_char(m, 1); buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p); buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g); DH_free(dh); } mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m); return (0); } #endif int mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m) { struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */ struct sshkey *key; struct sshbuf *sigbuf; u_char *p; u_char *signature; size_t datlen, siglen; int r, keyid, is_proof = 0; const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com"; debug3("%s", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes), * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes). * * Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey * proof. * * XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too? * it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather * than the full kex structure... */ if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) { /* * Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what * the client sent us. */ if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */ fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu", __func__, datlen); if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL) fatal("%s: no hostkey for index %d", __func__, keyid); if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0) || (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0) fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key " "proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) || memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0) fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu", __func__, datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf)); sshbuf_free(sigbuf); is_proof = 1; } /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */ if (session_id2_len == 0) { session_id2_len = datlen; session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len); memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len); } if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) { if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, datafellows)) != 0) fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL && auth_sock > 0) { if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, datafellows)) != 0) { fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } else fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid); debug3("%s: %s signature %p(%zu)", __func__, is_proof ? "KEX" : "hostkey proof", signature, siglen); sshbuf_reset(m); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(p); free(signature); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m); /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1); return (0); } /* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */ int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m) { char *username; struct passwd *pwent; int allowed = 0; u_int i; debug3("%s", __func__); if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0) fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__); username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); pwent = getpwnamallow(username); authctxt->user = xstrdup(username); setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown"); free(username); buffer_clear(m); if (pwent == NULL) { buffer_put_char(m, 0); authctxt->pw = fakepw(); goto out; } allowed = 1; authctxt->pw = pwent; authctxt->valid = 1; buffer_put_char(m, 1); buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd)); buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name); buffer_put_cstring(m, "*"); #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos); #endif #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class); #endif buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir); buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell); out: buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options)); #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \ if (options.x != NULL) \ buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x); \ } while (0) #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \ for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) \ buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x[i]); \ } while (0) /* See comment in servconf.h */ COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS(); #undef M_CP_STROPT #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT /* Create valid auth method lists */ if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) { /* * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any * authentication to succeed. */ debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__); } debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m); /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */ if (!compat20) monitor_permit_authentications(1); else { /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1); } #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1); #endif return (0); } int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m) { char *banner; buffer_clear(m); banner = auth2_read_banner(); buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : ""); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m); free(banner); return (0); } int mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m) { monitor_permit_authentications(1); authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s", __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style); if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) { free(authctxt->style); authctxt->style = NULL; } return (0); } int mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m) { static int call_count; char *passwd; int authenticated; u_int plen; passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen); /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */ authenticated = options.password_authentication && auth_password(authctxt, passwd); explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd)); free(passwd); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, authenticated); debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m); call_count++; if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1) auth_method = "none"; else auth_method = "password"; /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */ return (authenticated); } #ifdef BSD_AUTH int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m) { char *name, *infotxt; u_int numprompts; u_int *echo_on; char **prompts; u_int success; success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1; buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, success); if (success) buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]); debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m); if (success) { free(name); free(infotxt); free(prompts); free(echo_on); } return (0); } int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m) { char *response; int authok; if (authctxt->as == 0) fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__); response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); authok = options.challenge_response_authentication && auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0); authctxt->as = NULL; debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok); free(response); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, authok); debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m); if (compat20) { auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; auth_submethod = "bsdauth"; } else auth_method = "bsdauth"; return (authok != 0); } #endif #ifdef SKEY int mm_answer_skeyquery(int sock, Buffer *m) { struct skey skey; char challenge[1024]; u_int success; success = _compat_skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge, sizeof(challenge)) < 0 ? 0 : 1; buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, success); if (success) buffer_put_cstring(m, challenge); debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY, m); return (0); } int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int sock, Buffer *m) { char *response; int authok; response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); authok = (options.challenge_response_authentication && authctxt->valid && skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 && skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, response) != -1); free(response); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, authok); debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, m); auth_method = "skey"; return (authok != 0); } #endif #ifdef USE_PAM int mm_answer_pam_start(int sock, Buffer *m) { if (!options.use_pam) fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__); start_pam(authctxt); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 1); return (0); } int mm_answer_pam_account(int sock, Buffer *m) { u_int ret; if (!options.use_pam) fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__); ret = do_pam_account(); buffer_put_int(m, ret); buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg)); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m); return (ret); } static void *sshpam_ctxt, *sshpam_authok; extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device; int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m) { debug3("%s", __func__); sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt); sshpam_authok = NULL; buffer_clear(m); if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) { monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1); buffer_put_int(m, 1); } else { buffer_put_int(m, 0); } mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m); return (0); } int mm_answer_pam_query(int sock, Buffer *m) { char *name = NULL, *info = NULL, **prompts = NULL; u_int i, num = 0, *echo_on = 0; int ret; debug3("%s", __func__); sshpam_authok = NULL; ret = (sshpam_device.query)(sshpam_ctxt, &name, &info, &num, &prompts, &echo_on); if (ret == 0 && num == 0) sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt; if (num > 1 || name == NULL || info == NULL) ret = -1; buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, ret); buffer_put_cstring(m, name); free(name); buffer_put_cstring(m, info); free(info); buffer_put_int(m, num); for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[i]); free(prompts[i]); buffer_put_int(m, echo_on[i]); } free(prompts); free(echo_on); auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; auth_submethod = "pam"; mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m); return (0); } int mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m) { char **resp; u_int i, num; int ret; debug3("%s", __func__); sshpam_authok = NULL; num = buffer_get_int(m); if (num > 0) { resp = xcalloc(num, sizeof(char *)); for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) resp[i] = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp); for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) free(resp[i]); free(resp); } else { ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, NULL); } buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, ret); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m); auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; auth_submethod = "pam"; if (ret == 0) sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt; return (0); } int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m) { int r = sshpam_authok != NULL && sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt; debug3("%s", __func__); (sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt); sshpam_ctxt = sshpam_authok = NULL; buffer_clear(m); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m); auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; auth_submethod = "pam"; return r; } #endif int mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m) { Key *key; char *cuser, *chost; u_char *blob; - u_int bloblen; + u_int bloblen, pubkey_auth_attempt; enum mm_keytype type = 0; int allowed = 0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); type = buffer_get_int(m); cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen); + pubkey_auth_attempt = buffer_get_int(m); key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen); if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) || (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)) fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__); debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key); if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) { /* These should not make it past the privsep child */ if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) fatal("%s: passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key", __func__); switch (type) { case MM_USERKEY: allowed = options.pubkey_authentication && !auth2_userkey_already_used(authctxt, key) && match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), - options.pubkey_key_types, - strlen(options.pubkey_key_types), 0) == 1 && - user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key); + options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1 && + user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key, + pubkey_auth_attempt); pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL); auth_method = "publickey"; - if (options.pubkey_authentication && allowed != 1) + if (options.pubkey_authentication && + (!pubkey_auth_attempt || allowed != 1)) auth_clear_options(); break; case MM_HOSTKEY: allowed = options.hostbased_authentication && match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key), - options.hostbased_key_types, - strlen(options.hostbased_key_types), 0) == 1 && + options.hostbased_key_types, 0) == 1 && hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key); pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost); auth_method = "hostbased"; break; #ifdef WITH_SSH1 case MM_RSAHOSTKEY: key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */ allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key); if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1) auth_clear_options(); auth_method = "rsa"; break; #endif default: fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type); break; } } if (key != NULL) key_free(key); /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */ monitor_reset_key_state(); if (allowed) { /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */ key_blob = blob; key_bloblen = bloblen; key_blobtype = type; hostbased_cuser = cuser; hostbased_chost = chost; } else { /* Log failed attempt */ auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL); free(blob); free(cuser); free(chost); } debug3("%s: key %p is %s", __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed"); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, allowed); buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m); if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed); return (0); } static int monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen) { Buffer b; char *p, *userstyle; u_int len; int fail = 0; buffer_init(&b); buffer_append(&b, data, datalen); if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { p = buffer_ptr(&b); len = buffer_len(&b); if ((session_id2 == NULL) || (len < session_id2_len) || (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)) fail++; buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len); } else { p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len); if ((session_id2 == NULL) || (len != session_id2_len) || (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)) fail++; free(p); } if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) fail++; p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL); xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->style ? ":" : "", authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) { logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, p); fail++; } free(userstyle); free(p); buffer_skip_string(&b); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { if (!buffer_get_char(&b)) fail++; } else { p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL); if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0) fail++; free(p); if (!buffer_get_char(&b)) fail++; buffer_skip_string(&b); } buffer_skip_string(&b); if (buffer_len(&b) != 0) fail++; buffer_free(&b); return (fail == 0); } static int monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser, char *chost) { Buffer b; char *p, *userstyle; u_int len; int fail = 0; buffer_init(&b); buffer_append(&b, data, datalen); p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len); if ((session_id2 == NULL) || (len != session_id2_len) || (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)) fail++; free(p); if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) fail++; p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL); xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->style ? ":" : "", authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) { logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, p); fail++; } free(userstyle); free(p); buffer_skip_string(&b); /* service */ p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL); if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0) fail++; free(p); buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkalg */ buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkblob */ /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */ p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.') p[len - 1] = '\0'; if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0) fail++; free(p); /* verify client user */ p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0) fail++; free(p); if (buffer_len(&b) != 0) fail++; buffer_free(&b); return (fail == 0); } int mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) { Key *key; u_char *signature, *data, *blob; u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen; int verified = 0; int valid_data = 0; blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen); signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen); data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen); if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL || !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen)) fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__); key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen); if (key == NULL) fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__); switch (key_blobtype) { case MM_USERKEY: valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen); break; case MM_HOSTKEY: valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen, hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost); break; default: valid_data = 0; break; } if (!valid_data) fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__); verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); debug3("%s: key %p signature %s", __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified"); /* If auth was successful then record key to ensure it isn't reused */ if (verified == 1) auth2_record_userkey(authctxt, key); else key_free(key); free(blob); free(signature); free(data); auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased"; monitor_reset_key_state(); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, verified); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m); return (verified == 1); } static void mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw) { socklen_t fromlen; struct sockaddr_storage from; + + if (options.use_login) + return; /* * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let * the address be 0.0.0.0. */ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); fromlen = sizeof(from); if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(255); } } /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */ record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen); } static void mm_session_close(Session *s) { debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid); if (s->ttyfd != -1) { debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd); session_pty_cleanup2(s); } session_unused(s->self); } int mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m) { extern struct monitor *pmonitor; Session *s; int res, fd0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_clear(m); s = session_new(); if (s == NULL) goto error; s->authctxt = authctxt; s->pw = authctxt->pw; s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid; res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty)); if (res == 0) goto error; pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty); buffer_put_int(m, 1); buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty); /* We need to trick ttyslot */ if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1) fatal("%s: dup2", __func__); mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw); /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */ close(0); /* send messages generated by record_login */ buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg)); buffer_clear(&loginmsg); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m); if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 || mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1) fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__); /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */ if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0) fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (fd0 != 0) error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0); /* slave is not needed */ close(s->ttyfd); s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd; /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */ s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd; debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd); return (0); error: if (s != NULL) mm_session_close(s); buffer_put_int(m, 0); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m); return (0); } int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m) { Session *s; char *tty; debug3("%s entering", __func__); tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL) mm_session_close(s); buffer_clear(m); free(tty); return (0); } #ifdef WITH_SSH1 int mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m) { BIGNUM *p; int rsafail; /* Turn off permissions */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0); if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__); buffer_get_bignum2(m, p); rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, rsafail); buffer_put_bignum2(m, p); BN_clear_free(p); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m); /* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1); return (0); } int mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m) { int i; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (buffer_len(m) != 16) fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m); /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1); return (0); } int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m) { BIGNUM *client_n; Key *key = NULL; u_char *blob = NULL; u_int blen = 0; int allowed = 0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); auth_method = "rsa"; if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) { if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__); buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n); allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key); BN_clear_free(client_n); } buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, allowed); buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL); /* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */ monitor_reset_key_state(); if (allowed && key != NULL) { key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */ if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0) fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__); buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen); /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */ key_blob = blob; key_bloblen = blen; key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY; } if (key != NULL) key_free(key); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0); return (0); } int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m) { Key *key = NULL; u_char *blob; u_int blen; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (!authctxt->valid) fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__); blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen); if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen)) fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__); if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY) fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__); if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL) fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__); if (key->type != KEY_RSA) fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type); key->type = KEY_RSA1; if (ssh1_challenge) BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge); ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge); debug3("%s sending reply", __func__); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1); free(blob); key_free(key); return (0); } int mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m) { Key *key = NULL; u_char *blob, *response; u_int blen, len; int success; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (!authctxt->valid) fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__); if (ssh1_challenge == NULL) fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__); blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen); if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen)) fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__); if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY) fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype); if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL) fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__); response = buffer_get_string(m, &len); if (len != 16) fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__); success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response); free(blob); key_free(key); free(response); auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa"; /* reset state */ BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge); ssh1_challenge = NULL; monitor_reset_key_state(); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, success); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m); return (success); } #endif int mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req) { extern struct monitor *pmonitor; int res, status; debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__); /* The child is terminating */ session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close); #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) sshpam_cleanup(); #endif while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) exit(1); res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1; /* Terminate process */ exit(res); } #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS /* Report that an audit event occurred */ int mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer *m) { ssh_audit_event_t event; debug3("%s entering", __func__); event = buffer_get_int(m); switch(event) { case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI: case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED: case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: case SSH_INVALID_USER: audit_event(event); break; default: fatal("Audit event type %d not permitted", event); } return (0); } int mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m) { u_int len; char *cmd; debug3("%s entering", __func__); cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len); /* sanity check command, if so how? */ audit_run_command(cmd); free(cmd); return (0); } #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ void monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) { struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ struct kex *kex; int r; debug3("%s: packet_set_state", __func__); if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0) fatal("%s: packet_set_state: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(child_state); child_state = NULL; if ((kex = ssh->kex) != 0) { /* XXX set callbacks */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; # endif #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server; kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type; kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type; kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index; kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign; } /* Update with new address */ if (options.compression) { ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, pmonitor->m_zlib, (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc, (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree); } } /* This function requries careful sanity checking */ void mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) { debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__); if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, child_state); debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__); } /* XXX */ #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \ if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \ fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \ } while (0) static void monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds) { int pair[2]; if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]); FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]); mon->m_recvfd = pair[0]; mon->m_sendfd = pair[1]; if (do_logfds) { if (pipe(pair) == -1) fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]); FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]); mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0]; mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1]; } else mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1; } #define MM_MEMSIZE 65536 struct monitor * monitor_init(void) { struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ struct monitor *mon; mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon)); monitor_openfds(mon, 1); /* Used to share zlib space across processes */ if (options.compression) { mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE); mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE); /* Compression needs to share state across borders */ ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(ssh, mon->m_zlib, (ssh_packet_comp_alloc_func *)mm_zalloc, (ssh_packet_comp_free_func *)mm_zfree); } return mon; } void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon) { monitor_openfds(mon, 0); } #ifdef GSSAPI int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m) { gss_OID_desc goid; OM_uint32 major; u_int len; goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len); goid.length = len; major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid); free(goid.elements); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, major); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m); /* Now we have a context, enable the step */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1); return (0); } int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m) { gss_buffer_desc in; gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; OM_uint32 major, minor; OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */ u_int len; in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); in.length = len; major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags); free(in.value); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, major); buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length); buffer_put_int(m, flags); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m); gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out); if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1); } return (0); } int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m) { gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic; OM_uint32 ret; u_int len; gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); gssbuf.length = len; mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); mic.length = len; ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic); free(gssbuf.value); free(mic.value); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, ret); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m); if (!GSS_ERROR(ret)) monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); return (0); } int mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m) { int authenticated; authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, authenticated); debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m); auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic"; /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */ return (authenticated); } #endif /* GSSAPI */ Index: head/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,1088 +1,1089 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.84 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.85 2015/05/01 03:23:51 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include "dh.h" #endif #include "buffer.h" #include "key.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "packet.h" #include "mac.h" #include "log.h" #ifdef TARGET_OS_MAC /* XXX Broken krb5 headers on Mac */ #undef TARGET_OS_MAC #include "zlib.h" #define TARGET_OS_MAC 1 #else #include "zlib.h" #endif #include "monitor.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "monitor_fdpass.h" #include "misc.h" #include "uuencode.h" #include "channels.h" #include "session.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "roaming.h" #include "ssherr.h" /* Imports */ extern int compat20; extern z_stream incoming_stream; extern z_stream outgoing_stream; extern struct monitor *pmonitor; extern Buffer loginmsg; extern ServerOptions options; void mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, const char *msg, void *ctx) { Buffer log_msg; struct monitor *mon = (struct monitor *)ctx; if (mon->m_log_sendfd == -1) fatal("%s: no log channel", __func__); buffer_init(&log_msg); /* * Placeholder for packet length. Will be filled in with the actual * packet length once the packet has been constucted. This saves * fragile math. */ buffer_put_int(&log_msg, 0); buffer_put_int(&log_msg, level); buffer_put_cstring(&log_msg, msg); put_u32(buffer_ptr(&log_msg), buffer_len(&log_msg) - 4); if (atomicio(vwrite, mon->m_log_sendfd, buffer_ptr(&log_msg), buffer_len(&log_msg)) != buffer_len(&log_msg)) fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_free(&log_msg); } int mm_is_monitor(void) { /* * m_pid is only set in the privileged part, and * points to the unprivileged child. */ return (pmonitor && pmonitor->m_pid > 0); } void mm_request_send(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m) { u_int mlen = buffer_len(m); u_char buf[5]; debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type); put_u32(buf, mlen + 1); buf[4] = (u_char) type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */ if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buffer_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen) fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } void mm_request_receive(int sock, Buffer *m) { u_char buf[4]; u_int msg_len; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) { - if (errno == EPIPE) { - error("%s: socket closed", __func__); + if (errno == EPIPE) cleanup_exit(255); - } fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } msg_len = get_u32(buf); if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len); buffer_clear(m); buffer_append_space(m, msg_len); if (atomicio(read, sock, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } void mm_request_receive_expect(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m) { u_char rtype; debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type); mm_request_receive(sock, m); rtype = buffer_get_char(m); if (rtype != type) fatal("%s: read: rtype %d != type %d", __func__, rtype, type); } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL DH * mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max) { BIGNUM *p, *g; int success = 0; Buffer m; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, min); buffer_put_int(&m, nbits); buffer_put_int(&m, max); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_MODULI", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, &m); success = buffer_get_char(&m); if (success == 0) fatal("%s: MONITOR_ANS_MODULI failed", __func__); if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); buffer_get_bignum2(&m, p); buffer_get_bignum2(&m, g); debug3("%s: remaining %d", __func__, buffer_len(&m)); buffer_free(&m); return (dh_new_group(g, p)); } #endif int mm_key_sign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, const u_char *data, u_int datalen) { struct kex *kex = *pmonitor->m_pkex; Buffer m; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, kex->host_key_index(key, 0, active_state)); buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_SIGN", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, &m); *sigp = buffer_get_string(&m, lenp); buffer_free(&m); return (0); } struct passwd * mm_getpwnamallow(const char *username) { Buffer m; struct passwd *pw; u_int len, i; ServerOptions *newopts; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, username); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, &m); if (buffer_get_char(&m) == 0) { pw = NULL; goto out; } pw = buffer_get_string(&m, &len); if (len != sizeof(struct passwd)) fatal("%s: struct passwd size mismatch", __func__); pw->pw_name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); pw->pw_passwd = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS pw->pw_gecos = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); #endif #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS pw->pw_class = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); #endif pw->pw_dir = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); pw->pw_shell = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); out: /* copy options block as a Match directive may have changed some */ newopts = buffer_get_string(&m, &len); if (len != sizeof(*newopts)) fatal("%s: option block size mismatch", __func__); #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \ if (newopts->x != NULL) \ newopts->x = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); \ } while (0) #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \ for (i = 0; i < newopts->nx; i++) \ newopts->x[i] = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); \ } while (0) /* See comment in servconf.h */ COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS(); #undef M_CP_STROPT #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT copy_set_server_options(&options, newopts, 1); free(newopts); buffer_free(&m); return (pw); } char * mm_auth2_read_banner(void) { Buffer m; char *banner; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, &m); buffer_clear(&m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, &m); banner = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); /* treat empty banner as missing banner */ if (strlen(banner) == 0) { free(banner); banner = NULL; } return (banner); } /* Inform the privileged process about service and style */ void mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style) { Buffer m; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, service); buffer_put_cstring(&m, style ? style : ""); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, &m); buffer_free(&m); } /* Do the password authentication */ int mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password) { Buffer m; int authenticated = 0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, password); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, &m); authenticated = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated", __func__, authenticated ? "" : "not "); return (authenticated); } int -mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) +mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt) { - return (mm_key_allowed(MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, key)); + return (mm_key_allowed(MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, key, + pubkey_auth_attempt)); } int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *user, char *host, Key *key) { - return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key)); + return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key, 0)); } int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *user, char *host, Key *key) { int ret; key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX hack for key_to_blob */ - ret = mm_key_allowed(MM_RSAHOSTKEY, user, host, key); + ret = mm_key_allowed(MM_RSAHOSTKEY, user, host, key, 0); key->type = KEY_RSA1; return (ret); } int -mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, char *user, char *host, Key *key) +mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, char *user, char *host, Key *key, + int pubkey_auth_attempt) { Buffer m; u_char *blob; u_int len; int allowed = 0, have_forced = 0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); /* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */ if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len)) return (0); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, type); buffer_put_cstring(&m, user ? user : ""); buffer_put_cstring(&m, host ? host : ""); buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len); + buffer_put_int(&m, pubkey_auth_attempt); free(blob); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, &m); allowed = buffer_get_int(&m); /* fake forced command */ auth_clear_options(); have_forced = buffer_get_int(&m); forced_command = have_forced ? xstrdup("true") : NULL; buffer_free(&m); return (allowed); } /* * This key verify needs to send the key type along, because the * privileged parent makes the decision if the key is allowed * for authentication. */ int mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) { Buffer m; u_char *blob; u_int len; int verified = 0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); /* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */ if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len)) return (0); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len); buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen); buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen); free(blob); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, &m); verified = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); return (verified); } void mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor) { struct ssh *ssh = active_state; /* XXX */ struct sshbuf *m; int r; if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = ssh_packet_get_state(ssh, m)) != 0) fatal("%s: get_state failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, m); debug3("%s: Finished sending state", __func__); sshbuf_free(m); } int mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen) { Buffer m; char *p, *msg; int success = 0, tmp1 = -1, tmp2 = -1; /* Kludge: ensure there are fds free to receive the pty/tty */ if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 || (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) { error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__); if (tmp1 > 0) close(tmp1); if (tmp2 > 0) close(tmp2); return 0; } close(tmp1); close(tmp2); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PTY", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, &m); success = buffer_get_int(&m); if (success == 0) { debug3("%s: pty alloc failed", __func__); buffer_free(&m); return (0); } p = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); msg = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); strlcpy(namebuf, p, namebuflen); /* Possible truncation */ free(p); buffer_append(&loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg)); free(msg); if ((*ptyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 || (*ttyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) fatal("%s: receive fds failed", __func__); /* Success */ return (1); } void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s) { Buffer m; if (s->ttyfd == -1) return; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, s->tty); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, &m); buffer_free(&m); /* closed dup'ed master */ if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) < 0) error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s", s->ptymaster, strerror(errno)); /* unlink pty from session */ s->ttyfd = -1; } #ifdef USE_PAM void mm_start_pam(Authctxt *authctxt) { Buffer m; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (!options.use_pam) fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, &m); buffer_free(&m); } u_int mm_do_pam_account(void) { Buffer m; u_int ret; char *msg; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (!options.use_pam) fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m); ret = buffer_get_int(&m); msg = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_append(&loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg)); free(msg); buffer_free(&m); debug3("%s returning %d", __func__, ret); return (ret); } void * mm_sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt) { Buffer m; int success; debug3("%s", __func__); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m); success = buffer_get_int(&m); if (success == 0) { debug3("%s: pam_init_ctx failed", __func__); buffer_free(&m); return (NULL); } buffer_free(&m); return (authctxt); } int mm_sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info, u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) { Buffer m; u_int i; int ret; debug3("%s", __func__); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, &m); ret = buffer_get_int(&m); debug3("%s: pam_query returned %d", __func__, ret); *name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); *info = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); *num = buffer_get_int(&m); if (*num > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) fatal("%s: recieved %u PAM messages, expected <= %u", __func__, *num, PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG); *prompts = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(char *)); *echo_on = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(u_int)); for (i = 0; i < *num; ++i) { (*prompts)[i] = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); (*echo_on)[i] = buffer_get_int(&m); } buffer_free(&m); return (ret); } int mm_sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp) { Buffer m; u_int i; int ret; debug3("%s", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, num); for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) buffer_put_cstring(&m, resp[i]); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, &m); ret = buffer_get_int(&m); debug3("%s: pam_respond returned %d", __func__, ret); buffer_free(&m); return (ret); } void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp) { Buffer m; debug3("%s", __func__); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, &m); buffer_free(&m); } #endif /* USE_PAM */ /* Request process termination */ void mm_terminate(void) { Buffer m; buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, &m); buffer_free(&m); } #ifdef WITH_SSH1 int mm_ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *num) { int rsafail; Buffer m; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_bignum2(&m, num); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, &m); rsafail = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_get_bignum2(&m, num); buffer_free(&m); return (rsafail); } #endif static void mm_chall_setup(char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) { *name = xstrdup(""); *infotxt = xstrdup(""); *numprompts = 1; *prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *)); *echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int)); (*echo_on)[0] = 0; } int mm_bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) { Buffer m; u_int success; char *challenge; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, &m); success = buffer_get_int(&m); if (success == 0) { debug3("%s: no challenge", __func__); buffer_free(&m); return (-1); } /* Get the challenge, and format the response */ challenge = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on); (*prompts)[0] = challenge; debug3("%s: received challenge: %s", __func__, challenge); return (0); } int mm_bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses) { Buffer m; int authok; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); if (numresponses != 1) return (-1); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, responses[0]); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, &m); authok = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); return ((authok == 0) ? -1 : 0); } #ifdef SKEY int mm_skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) { Buffer m; u_int success; char *challenge; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY, &m); success = buffer_get_int(&m); if (success == 0) { debug3("%s: no challenge", __func__); buffer_free(&m); return (-1); } /* Get the challenge, and format the response */ challenge = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); debug3("%s: received challenge: %s", __func__, challenge); mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on); xasprintf(*prompts, "%s%s", challenge, SKEY_PROMPT); free(challenge); return (0); } int mm_skey_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses) { Buffer m; int authok; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); if (numresponses != 1) return (-1); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, responses[0]); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, &m); authok = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); return ((authok == 0) ? -1 : 0); } #endif /* SKEY */ void mm_ssh1_session_id(u_char session_id[16]) { Buffer m; int i; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) buffer_put_char(&m, session_id[i]); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, &m); buffer_free(&m); } #ifdef WITH_SSH1 int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey) { Buffer m; Key *key; u_char *blob; u_int blen; int allowed = 0, have_forced = 0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_bignum2(&m, client_n); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, &m); allowed = buffer_get_int(&m); /* fake forced command */ auth_clear_options(); have_forced = buffer_get_int(&m); forced_command = have_forced ? xstrdup("true") : NULL; if (allowed && rkey != NULL) { blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &blen); if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL) fatal("%s: key_from_blob failed", __func__); *rkey = key; free(blob); } buffer_free(&m); return (allowed); } BIGNUM * mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key) { Buffer m; BIGNUM *challenge; u_char *blob; u_int blen; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX cheat for key_to_blob */ if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0) fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__); key->type = KEY_RSA1; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_string(&m, blob, blen); free(blob); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, &m); buffer_get_bignum2(&m, challenge); buffer_free(&m); return (challenge); } int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *p, u_char response[16]) { Buffer m; u_char *blob; u_int blen; int success = 0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX cheat for key_to_blob */ if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0) fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__); key->type = KEY_RSA1; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_string(&m, blob, blen); buffer_put_string(&m, response, 16); free(blob); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, &m); success = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); return (success); } #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) { Buffer m; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, event); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, &m); buffer_free(&m); } void mm_audit_run_command(const char *command) { Buffer m; debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, command); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m); buffer_free(&m); } #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ #ifdef GSSAPI OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID goid) { Buffer m; OM_uint32 major; /* Client doesn't get to see the context */ *ctx = NULL; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_string(&m, goid->elements, goid->length); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, &m); major = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); return (major); } OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *in, gss_buffer_desc *out, OM_uint32 *flags) { Buffer m; OM_uint32 major; u_int len; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_string(&m, in->value, in->length); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, &m); major = buffer_get_int(&m); out->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len); out->length = len; if (flags) *flags = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); return (major); } OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) { Buffer m; OM_uint32 major; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_string(&m, gssbuf->value, gssbuf->length); buffer_put_string(&m, gssmic->value, gssmic->length); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, &m); major = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); return(major); } int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) { Buffer m; int authenticated = 0; buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, &m); authenticated = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not "); return (authenticated); } #endif /* GSSAPI */ Index: head/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/monitor_wrap.h (revision 294336) @@ -1,108 +1,108 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.26 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.27 2015/05/01 03:23:51 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _MM_WRAP_H_ #define _MM_WRAP_H_ extern int use_privsep; #define PRIVSEP(x) (use_privsep ? mm_##x : x) enum mm_keytype {MM_NOKEY, MM_HOSTKEY, MM_USERKEY, MM_RSAHOSTKEY, MM_RSAUSERKEY}; struct monitor; struct mm_master; struct Authctxt; void mm_log_handler(LogLevel, const char *, void *); int mm_is_monitor(void); DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int); int mm_key_sign(Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int); void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *); struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(const char *); char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void); int mm_auth_password(struct Authctxt *, char *); -int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char *, char *, Key *); -int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *); +int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, char *, char *, Key *, int); +int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *, int); int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *); int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *); int mm_key_verify(Key *, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int); int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **); int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char *); BIGNUM *mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *); #ifdef GSSAPI OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID); OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *); int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user); OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t); #endif #ifdef USE_PAM void mm_start_pam(struct Authctxt *); u_int mm_do_pam_account(void); void *mm_sshpam_init_ctx(struct Authctxt *); int mm_sshpam_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **); int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, char **); void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *); #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS #include "audit.h" void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t); void mm_audit_run_command(const char *); #endif struct Session; void mm_terminate(void); int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t); void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *); /* SSHv1 interfaces */ void mm_ssh1_session_id(u_char *); int mm_ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *); /* Key export functions */ struct newkeys *mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *, int); int mm_newkeys_to_blob(int, u_char **, u_int *); void monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *); void mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *); void mm_send_keystate(struct monitor*); /* bsdauth */ int mm_bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **); int mm_bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **); /* skey */ int mm_skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **); int mm_skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **); /* zlib allocation hooks */ void mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *); #endif /* _MM_WRAP_H_ */ Index: head/crypto/openssh/mux.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/mux.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/mux.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,2188 +1,2201 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.50 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.53 2015/05/01 04:03:20 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* ssh session multiplexing support */ /* * TODO: * - Better signalling from master to slave, especially passing of * error messages * - Better fall-back from mux slave error to new connection. * - ExitOnForwardingFailure * - Maybe extension mechanisms for multi-X11/multi-agent forwarding * - Support ~^Z in mux slaves. * - Inspect or control sessions in master. * - If we ever support the "signal" channel request, send signals on * sessions in master. */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #else # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H # include # endif #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H # include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "misc.h" #include "match.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "channels.h" #include "msg.h" #include "packet.h" #include "monitor_fdpass.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "key.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "clientloop.h" /* from ssh.c */ extern int tty_flag; extern Options options; extern int stdin_null_flag; extern char *host; extern int subsystem_flag; extern Buffer command; extern volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; extern char *stdio_forward_host; extern int stdio_forward_port; /* Context for session open confirmation callback */ struct mux_session_confirm_ctx { u_int want_tty; u_int want_subsys; u_int want_x_fwd; u_int want_agent_fwd; Buffer cmd; char *term; struct termios tio; char **env; u_int rid; }; /* Context for stdio fwd open confirmation callback */ struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx { u_int rid; }; /* Context for global channel callback */ struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx { u_int cid; /* channel id */ u_int rid; /* request id */ int fid; /* forward id */ }; /* fd to control socket */ int muxserver_sock = -1; /* client request id */ u_int muxclient_request_id = 0; /* Multiplexing control command */ u_int muxclient_command = 0; /* Set when signalled. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t muxclient_terminate = 0; /* PID of multiplex server */ static u_int muxserver_pid = 0; static Channel *mux_listener_channel = NULL; struct mux_master_state { int hello_rcvd; }; /* mux protocol messages */ #define MUX_MSG_HELLO 0x00000001 #define MUX_C_NEW_SESSION 0x10000002 #define MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK 0x10000004 #define MUX_C_TERMINATE 0x10000005 #define MUX_C_OPEN_FWD 0x10000006 #define MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD 0x10000007 #define MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD 0x10000008 #define MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING 0x10000009 #define MUX_S_OK 0x80000001 #define MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED 0x80000002 #define MUX_S_FAILURE 0x80000003 #define MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE 0x80000004 #define MUX_S_ALIVE 0x80000005 #define MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED 0x80000006 #define MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT 0x80000007 #define MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL 0x80000008 /* type codes for MUX_C_OPEN_FWD and MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD */ #define MUX_FWD_LOCAL 1 #define MUX_FWD_REMOTE 2 #define MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC 3 static void mux_session_confirm(int, int, void *); static void mux_stdio_confirm(int, int, void *); static int process_mux_master_hello(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); static int process_mux_new_session(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); static int process_mux_alive_check(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); static int process_mux_terminate(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); static int process_mux_open_fwd(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); static int process_mux_close_fwd(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); static int process_mux_stdio_fwd(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); static int process_mux_stop_listening(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); static const struct { u_int type; int (*handler)(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); } mux_master_handlers[] = { { MUX_MSG_HELLO, process_mux_master_hello }, { MUX_C_NEW_SESSION, process_mux_new_session }, { MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK, process_mux_alive_check }, { MUX_C_TERMINATE, process_mux_terminate }, { MUX_C_OPEN_FWD, process_mux_open_fwd }, { MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD, process_mux_close_fwd }, { MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD, process_mux_stdio_fwd }, { MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING, process_mux_stop_listening }, { 0, NULL } }; /* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux slave _session_ channel */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void mux_master_session_cleanup_cb(int cid, void *unused) { Channel *cc, *c = channel_by_id(cid); debug3("%s: entering for channel %d", __func__, cid); if (c == NULL) fatal("%s: channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", __func__, cid); if (c->ctl_chan != -1) { if ((cc = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d missing control channel %d", __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan); c->ctl_chan = -1; cc->remote_id = -1; chan_rcvd_oclose(cc); } channel_cancel_cleanup(c->self); } /* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux slave _control_ channel */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void mux_master_control_cleanup_cb(int cid, void *unused) { Channel *sc, *c = channel_by_id(cid); debug3("%s: entering for channel %d", __func__, cid); if (c == NULL) fatal("%s: channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", __func__, cid); if (c->remote_id != -1) { if ((sc = channel_by_id(c->remote_id)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d missing session channel %d", __func__, c->self, c->remote_id); c->remote_id = -1; sc->ctl_chan = -1; if (sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) { debug2("%s: channel %d: not open", __func__, sc->self); chan_mark_dead(sc); } else { if (sc->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) chan_read_failed(sc); if (sc->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) chan_write_failed(sc); } } channel_cancel_cleanup(c->self); } /* Check mux client environment variables before passing them to mux master. */ static int env_permitted(char *env) { int i, ret; char name[1024], *cp; if ((cp = strchr(env, '=')) == NULL || cp == env) return 0; ret = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%.*s", (int)(cp - env), env); if (ret <= 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(name)) { error("env_permitted: name '%.100s...' too long", env); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_send_env; i++) if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[i])) return 1; return 0; } /* Mux master protocol message handlers */ static int process_mux_master_hello(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { u_int ver; struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx; if (state == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d: c->mux_ctx == NULL", __func__, c->self); if (state->hello_rcvd) { error("%s: HELLO received twice", __func__); return -1; } if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ver, m) != 0) { malf: error("%s: malformed message", __func__); return -1; } if (ver != SSHMUX_VER) { error("Unsupported multiplexing protocol version %d " "(expected %d)", ver, SSHMUX_VER); return -1; } debug2("%s: channel %d slave version %u", __func__, c->self, ver); /* No extensions are presently defined */ while (buffer_len(m) > 0) { char *name = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL); char *value = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL); if (name == NULL || value == NULL) { free(name); free(value); goto malf; } debug2("Unrecognised slave extension \"%s\"", name); free(name); free(value); } state->hello_rcvd = 1; return 0; } static int process_mux_new_session(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { Channel *nc; struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx; char *reserved, *cmd, *cp; u_int i, j, len, env_len, escape_char, window, packetmax; int new_fd[3]; /* Reply for SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN */ cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx)); cctx->term = NULL; cctx->rid = rid; cmd = reserved = NULL; cctx->env = NULL; env_len = 0; if ((reserved = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || buffer_get_int_ret(&cctx->want_tty, m) != 0 || buffer_get_int_ret(&cctx->want_x_fwd, m) != 0 || buffer_get_int_ret(&cctx->want_agent_fwd, m) != 0 || buffer_get_int_ret(&cctx->want_subsys, m) != 0 || buffer_get_int_ret(&escape_char, m) != 0 || (cctx->term = buffer_get_string_ret(m, &len)) == NULL || (cmd = buffer_get_string_ret(m, &len)) == NULL) { malf: free(cmd); free(reserved); for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++) free(cctx->env[j]); free(cctx->env); free(cctx->term); free(cctx); error("%s: malformed message", __func__); return -1; } free(reserved); reserved = NULL; while (buffer_len(m) > 0) { #define MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS 4096 if ((cp = buffer_get_string_ret(m, &len)) == NULL) goto malf; if (!env_permitted(cp)) { free(cp); continue; } - cctx->env = xrealloc(cctx->env, env_len + 2, + cctx->env = xreallocarray(cctx->env, env_len + 2, sizeof(*cctx->env)); cctx->env[env_len++] = cp; cctx->env[env_len] = NULL; if (env_len > MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS) { error(">%d environment variables received, ignoring " "additional", MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS); break; } } debug2("%s: channel %d: request tty %d, X %d, agent %d, subsys %d, " "term \"%s\", cmd \"%s\", env %u", __func__, c->self, cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_x_fwd, cctx->want_agent_fwd, cctx->want_subsys, cctx->term, cmd, env_len); buffer_init(&cctx->cmd); buffer_append(&cctx->cmd, cmd, strlen(cmd)); free(cmd); cmd = NULL; /* Gather fds from client */ for(i = 0; i < 3; i++) { if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(c->sock)) == -1) { error("%s: failed to receive fd %d from slave", __func__, i); for (j = 0; j < i; j++) close(new_fd[j]); for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++) free(cctx->env[j]); free(cctx->env); free(cctx->term); buffer_free(&cctx->cmd); free(cctx); /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "did not receive file descriptors"); return -1; } } debug3("%s: got fds stdin %d, stdout %d, stderr %d", __func__, new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2]); /* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */ if (c->remote_id != -1) { debug2("%s: session already open", __func__); /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Multiple sessions not supported"); cleanup: close(new_fd[0]); close(new_fd[1]); close(new_fd[2]); free(cctx->term); if (env_len != 0) { for (i = 0; i < env_len; i++) free(cctx->env[i]); free(cctx->env); } buffer_free(&cctx->cmd); free(cctx); return 0; } if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Allow shared connection to %s? ", host)) { debug2("%s: session refused by user", __func__); /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied"); goto cleanup; } } /* Try to pick up ttymodes from client before it goes raw */ if (cctx->want_tty && tcgetattr(new_fd[0], &cctx->tio) == -1) error("%s: tcgetattr: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); /* enable nonblocking unless tty */ if (!isatty(new_fd[0])) set_nonblock(new_fd[0]); if (!isatty(new_fd[1])) set_nonblock(new_fd[1]); if (!isatty(new_fd[2])) set_nonblock(new_fd[2]); window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT; packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT; if (cctx->want_tty) { window >>= 1; packetmax >>= 1; } nc = channel_new("session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2], window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", /*nonblock*/0); nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */ c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */ if (cctx->want_tty && escape_char != 0xffffffff) { channel_register_filter(nc->self, client_simple_escape_filter, NULL, client_filter_cleanup, client_new_escape_filter_ctx((int)escape_char)); } debug2("%s: channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d", __func__, nc->self, nc->ctl_chan); channel_send_open(nc->self); channel_register_open_confirm(nc->self, mux_session_confirm, cctx); c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */ channel_register_cleanup(nc->self, mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1); /* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */ return 0; } static int process_mux_alive_check(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { debug2("%s: channel %d: alive check", __func__, c->self); /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_ALIVE); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_int(r, (u_int)getpid()); return 0; } static int process_mux_terminate(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { debug2("%s: channel %d: terminate request", __func__, c->self); if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Terminate shared connection to %s? ", host)) { debug2("%s: termination refused by user", __func__); buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied"); return 0; } } quit_pending = 1; buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK); buffer_put_int(r, rid); /* XXX exit happens too soon - message never makes it to client */ return 0; } static char * format_forward(u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd) { char *ret; switch (ftype) { case MUX_FWD_LOCAL: xasprintf(&ret, "local forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d", (fwd->listen_path != NULL) ? fwd->listen_path : (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ? (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") : fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, (fwd->connect_path != NULL) ? fwd->connect_path : fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port); break; case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC: xasprintf(&ret, "dynamic forward %.200s:%d -> *", (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ? (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") : fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port); break; case MUX_FWD_REMOTE: xasprintf(&ret, "remote forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d", (fwd->listen_path != NULL) ? fwd->listen_path : (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ? "LOCALHOST" : fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, (fwd->connect_path != NULL) ? fwd->connect_path : fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port); break; default: fatal("%s: unknown forward type %u", __func__, ftype); } return ret; } static int compare_host(const char *a, const char *b) { if (a == NULL && b == NULL) return 1; if (a == NULL || b == NULL) return 0; return strcmp(a, b) == 0; } static int compare_forward(struct Forward *a, struct Forward *b) { if (!compare_host(a->listen_host, b->listen_host)) return 0; if (!compare_host(a->listen_path, b->listen_path)) return 0; if (a->listen_port != b->listen_port) return 0; if (!compare_host(a->connect_host, b->connect_host)) return 0; if (!compare_host(a->connect_path, b->connect_path)) return 0; if (a->connect_port != b->connect_port) return 0; return 1; } static void mux_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx = ctxt; char *failmsg = NULL; struct Forward *rfwd; Channel *c; Buffer out; if ((c = channel_by_id(fctx->cid)) == NULL) { /* no channel for reply */ error("%s: unknown channel", __func__); return; } buffer_init(&out); - if (fctx->fid >= options.num_remote_forwards) { + if (fctx->fid >= options.num_remote_forwards || + (options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid].connect_path == NULL && + options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid].connect_host == NULL)) { xasprintf(&failmsg, "unknown forwarding id %d", fctx->fid); goto fail; } rfwd = &options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid]; debug("%s: %s for: listen %d, connect %s:%d", __func__, type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure", rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path : rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) { if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) { rfwd->allocated_port = packet_get_int(); - logit("Allocated port %u for mux remote forward" + debug("Allocated port %u for mux remote forward" " to %s:%d", rfwd->allocated_port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT); buffer_put_int(&out, fctx->rid); buffer_put_int(&out, rfwd->allocated_port); channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle, rfwd->allocated_port); } else { buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_OK); buffer_put_int(&out, fctx->rid); } goto out; } else { if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle, -1); if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL) xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for " "listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path); else xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for " "listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); + + debug2("%s: clearing registered forwarding for listen %d, " + "connect %s:%d", __func__, rfwd->listen_port, + rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path : + rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); + + free(rfwd->listen_host); + free(rfwd->listen_path); + free(rfwd->connect_host); + free(rfwd->connect_path); + memset(rfwd, 0, sizeof(*rfwd)); } fail: error("%s: %s", __func__, failmsg); buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(&out, fctx->rid); buffer_put_cstring(&out, failmsg); free(failmsg); out: buffer_put_string(&c->output, buffer_ptr(&out), buffer_len(&out)); buffer_free(&out); if (c->mux_pause <= 0) fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, c->mux_pause); c->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */ } static int process_mux_open_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { struct Forward fwd; char *fwd_desc = NULL; char *listen_addr, *connect_addr; u_int ftype; u_int lport, cport; int i, ret = 0, freefwd = 1; /* XXX - lport/cport check redundant */ if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ftype, m) != 0 || (listen_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || buffer_get_int_ret(&lport, m) != 0 || (connect_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || buffer_get_int_ret(&cport, m) != 0 || (lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) || (cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) { error("%s: malformed message", __func__); ret = -1; goto out; } if (*listen_addr == '\0') { free(listen_addr); listen_addr = NULL; } if (*connect_addr == '\0') { free(connect_addr); connect_addr = NULL; } memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); fwd.listen_port = lport; if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) fwd.listen_path = listen_addr; else fwd.listen_host = listen_addr; fwd.connect_port = cport; if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) fwd.connect_path = connect_addr; else fwd.connect_host = connect_addr; debug2("%s: channel %d: request %s", __func__, c->self, (fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd))); if (ftype != MUX_FWD_LOCAL && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE && ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) { logit("%s: invalid forwarding type %u", __func__, ftype); invalid: free(listen_addr); free(connect_addr); buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Invalid forwarding request"); return 0; } if (ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.listen_path) { logit("%s: streamlocal and dynamic forwards " "are mutually exclusive", __func__); goto invalid; } if (fwd.listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && fwd.listen_port >= 65536) { logit("%s: invalid listen port %u", __func__, fwd.listen_port); goto invalid; } if ((fwd.connect_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && fwd.connect_port >= 65536) || (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE && fwd.connect_port == 0)) { logit("%s: invalid connect port %u", __func__, fwd.connect_port); goto invalid; } if (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.connect_host == NULL && fwd.connect_path == NULL) { logit("%s: missing connect host", __func__); goto invalid; } /* Skip forwards that have already been requested */ switch (ftype) { case MUX_FWD_LOCAL: case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC: for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { if (compare_forward(&fwd, options.local_forwards + i)) { exists: debug2("%s: found existing forwarding", __func__); buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK); buffer_put_int(r, rid); goto out; } } break; case MUX_FWD_REMOTE: for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { if (compare_forward(&fwd, options.remote_forwards + i)) { if (fwd.listen_port != 0) goto exists; debug2("%s: found allocated port", __func__); buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_int(r, options.remote_forwards[i].allocated_port); goto out; } } break; } if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Open %s on %s?", fwd_desc, host)) { debug2("%s: forwarding refused by user", __func__); buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied"); goto out; } } if (ftype == MUX_FWD_LOCAL || ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) { if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(&fwd, &options.fwd_opts)) { fail: logit("slave-requested %s failed", fwd_desc); buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Port forwarding failed"); goto out; } add_local_forward(&options, &fwd); freefwd = 0; } else { struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx; fwd.handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding(&fwd); if (fwd.handle < 0) goto fail; add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd); fctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*fctx)); fctx->cid = c->self; fctx->rid = rid; fctx->fid = options.num_remote_forwards - 1; client_register_global_confirm(mux_confirm_remote_forward, fctx); freefwd = 0; c->mux_pause = 1; /* wait for mux_confirm_remote_forward */ /* delayed reply in mux_confirm_remote_forward */ goto out; } buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK); buffer_put_int(r, rid); out: free(fwd_desc); if (freefwd) { free(fwd.listen_host); free(fwd.listen_path); free(fwd.connect_host); free(fwd.connect_path); } return ret; } static int process_mux_close_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { struct Forward fwd, *found_fwd; char *fwd_desc = NULL; const char *error_reason = NULL; char *listen_addr = NULL, *connect_addr = NULL; u_int ftype; int i, ret = 0; u_int lport, cport; if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ftype, m) != 0 || (listen_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || buffer_get_int_ret(&lport, m) != 0 || (connect_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || buffer_get_int_ret(&cport, m) != 0 || (lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) || (cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) { error("%s: malformed message", __func__); ret = -1; goto out; } if (*listen_addr == '\0') { free(listen_addr); listen_addr = NULL; } if (*connect_addr == '\0') { free(connect_addr); connect_addr = NULL; } memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); fwd.listen_port = lport; if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) fwd.listen_path = listen_addr; else fwd.listen_host = listen_addr; fwd.connect_port = cport; if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) fwd.connect_path = connect_addr; else fwd.connect_host = connect_addr; debug2("%s: channel %d: request cancel %s", __func__, c->self, (fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd))); /* make sure this has been requested */ found_fwd = NULL; switch (ftype) { case MUX_FWD_LOCAL: case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC: for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { if (compare_forward(&fwd, options.local_forwards + i)) { found_fwd = options.local_forwards + i; break; } } break; case MUX_FWD_REMOTE: for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { if (compare_forward(&fwd, options.remote_forwards + i)) { found_fwd = options.remote_forwards + i; break; } } break; } if (found_fwd == NULL) error_reason = "port not forwarded"; else if (ftype == MUX_FWD_REMOTE) { /* * This shouldn't fail unless we confused the host/port * between options.remote_forwards and permitted_opens. * However, for dynamic allocated listen ports we need * to use the actual listen port. */ if (channel_request_rforward_cancel(found_fwd) == -1) error_reason = "port not in permitted opens"; } else { /* local and dynamic forwards */ /* Ditto */ if (channel_cancel_lport_listener(&fwd, fwd.connect_port, &options.fwd_opts) == -1) error_reason = "port not found"; } if (error_reason == NULL) { buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK); buffer_put_int(r, rid); free(found_fwd->listen_host); free(found_fwd->listen_path); free(found_fwd->connect_host); free(found_fwd->connect_path); found_fwd->listen_host = found_fwd->connect_host = NULL; found_fwd->listen_path = found_fwd->connect_path = NULL; found_fwd->listen_port = found_fwd->connect_port = 0; } else { buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, error_reason); } out: free(fwd_desc); free(listen_addr); free(connect_addr); return ret; } static int process_mux_stdio_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { Channel *nc; char *reserved, *chost; u_int cport, i, j; int new_fd[2]; struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx; chost = reserved = NULL; if ((reserved = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || (chost = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || buffer_get_int_ret(&cport, m) != 0) { free(reserved); free(chost); error("%s: malformed message", __func__); return -1; } free(reserved); debug2("%s: channel %d: request stdio fwd to %s:%u", __func__, c->self, chost, cport); /* Gather fds from client */ for(i = 0; i < 2; i++) { if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(c->sock)) == -1) { error("%s: failed to receive fd %d from slave", __func__, i); for (j = 0; j < i; j++) close(new_fd[j]); free(chost); /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "did not receive file descriptors"); return -1; } } debug3("%s: got fds stdin %d, stdout %d", __func__, new_fd[0], new_fd[1]); /* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */ if (c->remote_id != -1) { debug2("%s: session already open", __func__); /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Multiple sessions not supported"); cleanup: close(new_fd[0]); close(new_fd[1]); free(chost); return 0; } if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Allow forward to %s:%u? ", chost, cport)) { debug2("%s: stdio fwd refused by user", __func__); /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied"); goto cleanup; } } /* enable nonblocking unless tty */ if (!isatty(new_fd[0])) set_nonblock(new_fd[0]); if (!isatty(new_fd[1])) set_nonblock(new_fd[1]); nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1]); nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */ c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */ debug2("%s: channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d", __func__, nc->self, nc->ctl_chan); channel_register_cleanup(nc->self, mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1); cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx)); cctx->rid = rid; channel_register_open_confirm(nc->self, mux_stdio_confirm, cctx); c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */ /* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */ return 0; } /* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux stdio fwd session. */ static void mux_stdio_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg) { struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg; Channel *c, *cc; Buffer reply; if (cctx == NULL) fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__); if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL) fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id); if ((cc = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__, id, c->ctl_chan); if (!success) { debug3("%s: sending failure reply", __func__); /* prepare reply */ buffer_init(&reply); buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid); buffer_put_cstring(&reply, "Session open refused by peer"); goto done; } debug3("%s: sending success reply", __func__); /* prepare reply */ buffer_init(&reply); buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED); buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid); buffer_put_int(&reply, c->self); done: /* Send reply */ buffer_put_string(&cc->output, buffer_ptr(&reply), buffer_len(&reply)); buffer_free(&reply); if (cc->mux_pause <= 0) fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, cc->mux_pause); cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */ c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL; free(cctx); } static int process_mux_stop_listening(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { debug("%s: channel %d: stop listening", __func__, c->self); if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Disable further multiplexing on shared " "connection to %s? ", host)) { debug2("%s: stop listen refused by user", __func__); buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied"); return 0; } } if (mux_listener_channel != NULL) { channel_free(mux_listener_channel); client_stop_mux(); free(options.control_path); options.control_path = NULL; mux_listener_channel = NULL; muxserver_sock = -1; } /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK); buffer_put_int(r, rid); return 0; } /* Channel callbacks fired on read/write from mux slave fd */ static int mux_master_read_cb(Channel *c) { struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx; Buffer in, out; const u_char *ptr; u_int type, rid, have, i; int ret = -1; /* Setup ctx and */ if (c->mux_ctx == NULL) { state = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*state)); c->mux_ctx = state; channel_register_cleanup(c->self, mux_master_control_cleanup_cb, 0); /* Send hello */ buffer_init(&out); buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_MSG_HELLO); buffer_put_int(&out, SSHMUX_VER); /* no extensions */ buffer_put_string(&c->output, buffer_ptr(&out), buffer_len(&out)); buffer_free(&out); debug3("%s: channel %d: hello sent", __func__, c->self); return 0; } buffer_init(&in); buffer_init(&out); /* Channel code ensures that we receive whole packets */ if ((ptr = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&c->input, &have)) == NULL) { malf: error("%s: malformed message", __func__); goto out; } buffer_append(&in, ptr, have); if (buffer_get_int_ret(&type, &in) != 0) goto malf; debug3("%s: channel %d packet type 0x%08x len %u", __func__, c->self, type, buffer_len(&in)); if (type == MUX_MSG_HELLO) rid = 0; else { if (!state->hello_rcvd) { error("%s: expected MUX_MSG_HELLO(0x%08x), " "received 0x%08x", __func__, MUX_MSG_HELLO, type); goto out; } if (buffer_get_int_ret(&rid, &in) != 0) goto malf; } for (i = 0; mux_master_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) { if (type == mux_master_handlers[i].type) { ret = mux_master_handlers[i].handler(rid, c, &in, &out); break; } } if (mux_master_handlers[i].handler == NULL) { error("%s: unsupported mux message 0x%08x", __func__, type); buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(&out, rid); buffer_put_cstring(&out, "unsupported request"); ret = 0; } /* Enqueue reply packet */ if (buffer_len(&out) != 0) { buffer_put_string(&c->output, buffer_ptr(&out), buffer_len(&out)); } out: buffer_free(&in); buffer_free(&out); return ret; } void mux_exit_message(Channel *c, int exitval) { Buffer m; Channel *mux_chan; debug3("%s: channel %d: exit message, exitval %d", __func__, c->self, exitval); if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d missing mux channel %d", __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan); /* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */ buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE); buffer_put_int(&m, c->self); buffer_put_int(&m, exitval); buffer_put_string(&mux_chan->output, buffer_ptr(&m), buffer_len(&m)); buffer_free(&m); } void mux_tty_alloc_failed(Channel *c) { Buffer m; Channel *mux_chan; debug3("%s: channel %d: TTY alloc failed", __func__, c->self); if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d missing mux channel %d", __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan); /* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */ buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL); buffer_put_int(&m, c->self); buffer_put_string(&mux_chan->output, buffer_ptr(&m), buffer_len(&m)); buffer_free(&m); } /* Prepare a mux master to listen on a Unix domain socket. */ void muxserver_listen(void) { mode_t old_umask; char *orig_control_path = options.control_path; char rbuf[16+1]; u_int i, r; int oerrno; if (options.control_path == NULL || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO) return; debug("setting up multiplex master socket"); /* * Use a temporary path before listen so we can pseudo-atomically * establish the listening socket in its final location to avoid * other processes racing in between bind() and listen() and hitting * an unready socket. */ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rbuf) - 1; i++) { r = arc4random_uniform(26+26+10); rbuf[i] = (r < 26) ? 'a' + r : (r < 26*2) ? 'A' + r - 26 : '0' + r - 26 - 26; } rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] = '\0'; options.control_path = NULL; xasprintf(&options.control_path, "%s.%s", orig_control_path, rbuf); debug3("%s: temporary control path %s", __func__, options.control_path); old_umask = umask(0177); muxserver_sock = unix_listener(options.control_path, 64, 0); oerrno = errno; umask(old_umask); if (muxserver_sock < 0) { if (oerrno == EINVAL || oerrno == EADDRINUSE) { error("ControlSocket %s already exists, " "disabling multiplexing", options.control_path); disable_mux_master: if (muxserver_sock != -1) { close(muxserver_sock); muxserver_sock = -1; } free(orig_control_path); free(options.control_path); options.control_path = NULL; options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO; return; } else { /* unix_listener() logs the error */ cleanup_exit(255); } } /* Now atomically "move" the mux socket into position */ if (link(options.control_path, orig_control_path) != 0) { if (errno != EEXIST) { fatal("%s: link mux listener %s => %s: %s", __func__, options.control_path, orig_control_path, strerror(errno)); } error("ControlSocket %s already exists, disabling multiplexing", orig_control_path); unlink(options.control_path); goto disable_mux_master; } unlink(options.control_path); free(options.control_path); options.control_path = orig_control_path; set_nonblock(muxserver_sock); mux_listener_channel = channel_new("mux listener", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER, muxserver_sock, muxserver_sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, options.control_path, 1); mux_listener_channel->mux_rcb = mux_master_read_cb; debug3("%s: mux listener channel %d fd %d", __func__, mux_listener_channel->self, mux_listener_channel->sock); } /* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux client session. */ static void mux_session_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg) { struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg; const char *display; Channel *c, *cc; int i; Buffer reply; if (cctx == NULL) fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__); if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL) fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id); if ((cc = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__, id, c->ctl_chan); if (!success) { debug3("%s: sending failure reply", __func__); /* prepare reply */ buffer_init(&reply); buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid); buffer_put_cstring(&reply, "Session open refused by peer"); goto done; } display = getenv("DISPLAY"); if (cctx->want_x_fwd && options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) { char *proto, *data; /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */ client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data); /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " "spoofing."); x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto, data, 1); client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN); /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */ } if (cctx->want_agent_fwd && options.forward_agent) { debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding."); channel_request_start(id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0); packet_send(); } client_session2_setup(id, cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_subsys, cctx->term, &cctx->tio, c->rfd, &cctx->cmd, cctx->env); debug3("%s: sending success reply", __func__); /* prepare reply */ buffer_init(&reply); buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED); buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid); buffer_put_int(&reply, c->self); done: /* Send reply */ buffer_put_string(&cc->output, buffer_ptr(&reply), buffer_len(&reply)); buffer_free(&reply); if (cc->mux_pause <= 0) fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, cc->mux_pause); cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */ c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL; buffer_free(&cctx->cmd); free(cctx->term); if (cctx->env != NULL) { for (i = 0; cctx->env[i] != NULL; i++) free(cctx->env[i]); free(cctx->env); } free(cctx); } /* ** Multiplexing client support */ /* Exit signal handler */ static void control_client_sighandler(int signo) { muxclient_terminate = signo; } /* * Relay signal handler - used to pass some signals from mux client to * mux master. */ static void control_client_sigrelay(int signo) { int save_errno = errno; if (muxserver_pid > 1) kill(muxserver_pid, signo); errno = save_errno; } static int mux_client_read(int fd, Buffer *b, u_int need) { u_int have; ssize_t len; u_char *p; struct pollfd pfd; pfd.fd = fd; pfd.events = POLLIN; p = buffer_append_space(b, need); for (have = 0; have < need; ) { if (muxclient_terminate) { errno = EINTR; return -1; } len = read(fd, p + have, need - have); if (len < 0) { switch (errno) { #if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN) case EWOULDBLOCK: #endif case EAGAIN: (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case EINTR: continue; default: return -1; } } if (len == 0) { errno = EPIPE; return -1; } have += (u_int)len; } return 0; } static int mux_client_write_packet(int fd, Buffer *m) { Buffer queue; u_int have, need; int oerrno, len; u_char *ptr; struct pollfd pfd; pfd.fd = fd; pfd.events = POLLOUT; buffer_init(&queue); buffer_put_string(&queue, buffer_ptr(m), buffer_len(m)); need = buffer_len(&queue); ptr = buffer_ptr(&queue); for (have = 0; have < need; ) { if (muxclient_terminate) { buffer_free(&queue); errno = EINTR; return -1; } len = write(fd, ptr + have, need - have); if (len < 0) { switch (errno) { #if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN) case EWOULDBLOCK: #endif case EAGAIN: (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case EINTR: continue; default: oerrno = errno; buffer_free(&queue); errno = oerrno; return -1; } } if (len == 0) { buffer_free(&queue); errno = EPIPE; return -1; } have += (u_int)len; } buffer_free(&queue); return 0; } static int mux_client_read_packet(int fd, Buffer *m) { Buffer queue; u_int need, have; const u_char *ptr; int oerrno; buffer_init(&queue); if (mux_client_read(fd, &queue, 4) != 0) { if ((oerrno = errno) == EPIPE) debug3("%s: read header failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_free(&queue); errno = oerrno; return -1; } need = get_u32(buffer_ptr(&queue)); if (mux_client_read(fd, &queue, need) != 0) { oerrno = errno; debug3("%s: read body failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_free(&queue); errno = oerrno; return -1; } ptr = buffer_get_string_ptr(&queue, &have); buffer_append(m, ptr, have); buffer_free(&queue); return 0; } static int mux_client_hello_exchange(int fd) { Buffer m; u_int type, ver; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_MSG_HELLO); buffer_put_int(&m, SSHMUX_VER); /* no extensions */ if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_clear(&m); /* Read their HELLO */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) { buffer_free(&m); return -1; } type = buffer_get_int(&m); if (type != MUX_MSG_HELLO) fatal("%s: expected HELLO (%u) received %u", __func__, MUX_MSG_HELLO, type); ver = buffer_get_int(&m); if (ver != SSHMUX_VER) fatal("Unsupported multiplexing protocol version %d " "(expected %d)", ver, SSHMUX_VER); debug2("%s: master version %u", __func__, ver); /* No extensions are presently defined */ while (buffer_len(&m) > 0) { char *name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); char *value = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); debug2("Unrecognised master extension \"%s\"", name); free(name); free(value); } buffer_free(&m); return 0; } static u_int mux_client_request_alive(int fd) { Buffer m; char *e; u_int pid, type, rid; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK); buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_clear(&m); /* Read their reply */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) { buffer_free(&m); return 0; } type = buffer_get_int(&m); if (type != MUX_S_ALIVE) { e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e); } if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); pid = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); debug3("%s: done pid = %u", __func__, pid); muxclient_request_id++; return pid; } static void mux_client_request_terminate(int fd) { Buffer m; char *e; u_int type, rid; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_TERMINATE); buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_clear(&m); /* Read their reply */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) { /* Remote end exited already */ if (errno == EPIPE) { buffer_free(&m); return; } fatal("%s: read from master failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } type = buffer_get_int(&m); if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_OK: break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); fatal("Master refused termination request: %s", e); case MUX_S_FAILURE: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); fatal("%s: termination request failed: %s", __func__, e); default: fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", __func__, type); } buffer_free(&m); muxclient_request_id++; } static int mux_client_forward(int fd, int cancel_flag, u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd) { Buffer m; char *e, *fwd_desc; u_int type, rid; fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, fwd); debug("Requesting %s %s", cancel_flag ? "cancellation of" : "forwarding of", fwd_desc); free(fwd_desc); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, cancel_flag ? MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD : MUX_C_OPEN_FWD); buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id); buffer_put_int(&m, ftype); if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { buffer_put_cstring(&m, fwd->listen_path); } else { buffer_put_cstring(&m, fwd->listen_host == NULL ? "" : (*fwd->listen_host == '\0' ? "*" : fwd->listen_host)); } buffer_put_int(&m, fwd->listen_port); if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) { buffer_put_cstring(&m, fwd->connect_path); } else { buffer_put_cstring(&m, fwd->connect_host == NULL ? "" : fwd->connect_host); } buffer_put_int(&m, fwd->connect_port); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_clear(&m); /* Read their reply */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) { buffer_free(&m); return -1; } type = buffer_get_int(&m); if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_OK: break; case MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT: if (cancel_flag) fatal("%s: got MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT for cancel", __func__); fwd->allocated_port = buffer_get_int(&m); - logit("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d", + verbose("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d", fwd->allocated_port, fwd->connect_host ? fwd->connect_host : "", fwd->connect_port); if (muxclient_command == SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD) fprintf(stdout, "%u\n", fwd->allocated_port); break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); error("Master refused forwarding request: %s", e); return -1; case MUX_S_FAILURE: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); error("%s: forwarding request failed: %s", __func__, e); return -1; default: fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", __func__, type); } buffer_free(&m); muxclient_request_id++; return 0; } static int mux_client_forwards(int fd, int cancel_flag) { int i, ret = 0; debug3("%s: %s forwardings: %d local, %d remote", __func__, cancel_flag ? "cancel" : "request", options.num_local_forwards, options.num_remote_forwards); /* XXX ExitOnForwardingFailure */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { if (mux_client_forward(fd, cancel_flag, options.local_forwards[i].connect_port == 0 ? MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC : MUX_FWD_LOCAL, options.local_forwards + i) != 0) ret = -1; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { if (mux_client_forward(fd, cancel_flag, MUX_FWD_REMOTE, options.remote_forwards + i) != 0) ret = -1; } return ret; } static int mux_client_request_session(int fd) { Buffer m; char *e, *term; u_int i, rid, sid, esid, exitval, type, exitval_seen; extern char **environ; int devnull, rawmode; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) { error("%s: master alive request failed", __func__); return -1; } signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); if (stdin_null_flag) { if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1) fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno)); if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) close(devnull); } term = getenv("TERM"); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_NEW_SESSION); buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id); buffer_put_cstring(&m, ""); /* reserved */ buffer_put_int(&m, tty_flag); buffer_put_int(&m, options.forward_x11); buffer_put_int(&m, options.forward_agent); buffer_put_int(&m, subsystem_flag); buffer_put_int(&m, options.escape_char == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE ? 0xffffffff : (u_int)options.escape_char); buffer_put_cstring(&m, term == NULL ? "" : term); buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(&command), buffer_len(&command)); if (options.num_send_env > 0 && environ != NULL) { /* Pass environment */ for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) { if (env_permitted(environ[i])) { buffer_put_cstring(&m, environ[i]); } } } if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); /* Send the stdio file descriptors */ if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 || mm_send_fd(fd, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__); debug3("%s: session request sent", __func__); /* Read their reply */ buffer_clear(&m); if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) { error("%s: read from master failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_free(&m); return -1; } type = buffer_get_int(&m); if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED: sid = buffer_get_int(&m); debug("%s: master session id: %u", __func__, sid); break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); error("Master refused session request: %s", e); return -1; case MUX_S_FAILURE: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); error("%s: session request failed: %s", __func__, e); return -1; default: buffer_free(&m); error("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", __func__, type); return -1; } muxclient_request_id++; signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler); signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler); signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler); signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay); rawmode = tty_flag; if (tty_flag) enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); /* * Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd. * Before it does, it is expected to write an exit message. * This process must read the value and wait for the closure of * the client_fd; if this one closes early, the multiplex master will * terminate early too (possibly losing data). */ for (exitval = 255, exitval_seen = 0;;) { buffer_clear(&m); if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) break; type = buffer_get_int(&m); switch (type) { case MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL: if ((esid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != sid) fatal("%s: tty alloc fail on unknown session: " "my id %u theirs %u", __func__, sid, esid); leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); rawmode = 0; continue; case MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE: if ((esid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != sid) fatal("%s: exit on unknown session: " "my id %u theirs %u", __func__, sid, esid); if (exitval_seen) fatal("%s: exitval sent twice", __func__); exitval = buffer_get_int(&m); exitval_seen = 1; continue; default: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e); } } close(fd); if (rawmode) leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); if (muxclient_terminate) { debug2("Exiting on signal %ld", (long)muxclient_terminate); exitval = 255; } else if (!exitval_seen) { debug2("Control master terminated unexpectedly"); exitval = 255; } else debug2("Received exit status from master %d", exitval); if (tty_flag && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) fprintf(stderr, "Shared connection to %s closed.\r\n", host); exit(exitval); } static int mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(int fd) { Buffer m; char *e; u_int type, rid, sid; int devnull; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) { error("%s: master alive request failed", __func__); return -1; } signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); if (stdin_null_flag) { if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1) fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno)); if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) close(devnull); } buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD); buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id); buffer_put_cstring(&m, ""); /* reserved */ buffer_put_cstring(&m, stdio_forward_host); buffer_put_int(&m, stdio_forward_port); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); /* Send the stdio file descriptors */ if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__); debug3("%s: stdio forward request sent", __func__); /* Read their reply */ buffer_clear(&m); if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) { error("%s: read from master failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_free(&m); return -1; } type = buffer_get_int(&m); if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED: sid = buffer_get_int(&m); debug("%s: master session id: %u", __func__, sid); break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); fatal("Master refused stdio forwarding request: %s", e); case MUX_S_FAILURE: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); fatal("Stdio forwarding request failed: %s", e); default: buffer_free(&m); error("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", __func__, type); return -1; } muxclient_request_id++; signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler); signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler); signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler); signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay); /* * Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd. */ buffer_clear(&m); if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) { if (errno == EPIPE || (errno == EINTR && muxclient_terminate != 0)) return 0; fatal("%s: mux_client_read_packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } fatal("%s: master returned unexpected message %u", __func__, type); } static void mux_client_request_stop_listening(int fd) { Buffer m; char *e; u_int type, rid; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING); buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_clear(&m); /* Read their reply */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) fatal("%s: read from master failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); type = buffer_get_int(&m); if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_OK: break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); fatal("Master refused stop listening request: %s", e); case MUX_S_FAILURE: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); fatal("%s: stop listening request failed: %s", __func__, e); default: fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", __func__, type); } buffer_free(&m); muxclient_request_id++; } /* Multiplex client main loop. */ void muxclient(const char *path) { struct sockaddr_un addr; socklen_t sun_len; int sock; u_int pid; if (muxclient_command == 0) { if (stdio_forward_host != NULL) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD; else muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN; } switch (options.control_master) { case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO: case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK: debug("auto-mux: Trying existing master"); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case SSHCTL_MASTER_NO: break; default: return; } memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr)); addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; sun_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(path) + 1; if (strlcpy(addr.sun_path, path, sizeof(addr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path)) fatal("ControlPath too long"); if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sun_len) == -1) { switch (muxclient_command) { case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN: case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD: break; default: fatal("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path, strerror(errno)); } if (errno == ECONNREFUSED && options.control_master != SSHCTL_MASTER_NO) { debug("Stale control socket %.100s, unlinking", path); unlink(path); } else if (errno == ENOENT) { debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path); } else { error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path, strerror(errno)); } close(sock); return; } set_nonblock(sock); if (mux_client_hello_exchange(sock) != 0) { error("%s: master hello exchange failed", __func__); close(sock); return; } switch (muxclient_command) { case SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK: if ((pid = mux_client_request_alive(sock)) == 0) fatal("%s: master alive check failed", __func__); fprintf(stderr, "Master running (pid=%d)\r\n", pid); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE: mux_client_request_terminate(sock); fprintf(stderr, "Exit request sent.\r\n"); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD: if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 0) != 0) fatal("%s: master forward request failed", __func__); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN: if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 0) != 0) { error("%s: master forward request failed", __func__); return; } mux_client_request_session(sock); return; case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD: mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(sock); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP: mux_client_request_stop_listening(sock); fprintf(stderr, "Stop listening request sent.\r\n"); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD: if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 1) != 0) error("%s: master cancel forward request failed", __func__); exit(0); default: fatal("unrecognised muxclient_command %d", muxclient_command); } } Index: head/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/myproposal.h (revision 294336) @@ -1,197 +1,200 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.41 2014/07/11 13:54:34 tedu Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.44 2015/05/27 23:51:10 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include /* conditional algorithm support */ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 # define KEX_ECDH_METHODS \ "ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \ "ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \ "ecdh-sha2-nistp521," # define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," # define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," #else # define KEX_ECDH_METHODS \ "ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \ "ecdh-sha2-nistp384," # define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," # define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," #endif #else # define KEX_ECDH_METHODS # define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS # define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM # define AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES \ - "aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com," + ",aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com" #else # define AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES #endif #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 # define KEX_SHA256_METHODS \ "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," #define SHA2_HMAC_MODES \ "hmac-sha2-256," \ "hmac-sha2-512," #else # define KEX_SHA256_METHODS # define SHA2_HMAC_MODES #endif #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL # ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 # define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org," # else # define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS "" # endif -#define KEX_SERVER_KEX \ +#define KEX_COMMON_KEX \ KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS \ KEX_ECDH_METHODS \ - KEX_SHA256_METHODS \ - "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" + KEX_SHA256_METHODS -#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_SERVER_KEX "," \ +#define KEX_SERVER_KEX KEX_COMMON_KEX \ + "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" \ + +#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_COMMON_KEX \ "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \ + "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1," \ "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" #define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \ HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \ "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com," \ "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com," \ HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \ "ssh-ed25519," \ "ssh-rsa," \ "ssh-dss" /* the actual algorithms */ #define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \ - "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \ - AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES \ - "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" + "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \ + "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr" \ + AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES #define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT "," \ "arcfour256,arcfour128," \ "aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc," \ "aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,arcfour,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se" #define KEX_SERVER_MAC \ "umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \ "umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \ "umac-64@openssh.com," \ "umac-128@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha2-256," \ "hmac-sha2-512," \ "hmac-sha1" #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC "," \ "hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-md5," \ "hmac-ripemd160," \ "hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha1-96," \ "hmac-md5-96" #else #define KEX_SERVER_KEX \ "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org" #define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \ "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ssh-ed25519" #define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \ - "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \ - "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" + "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \ + "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr" #define KEX_SERVER_MAC \ "umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \ "umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \ "umac-64@openssh.com," \ "umac-128@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha2-256," \ "hmac-sha2-512," \ "hmac-sha1" #define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_SERVER_KEX #define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #define KEX_DEFAULT_COMP "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib" #define KEX_DEFAULT_LANG "" #define KEX_CLIENT \ KEX_CLIENT_KEX, \ KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \ KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, \ KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, \ KEX_CLIENT_MAC, \ KEX_CLIENT_MAC, \ KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \ KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \ KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, \ KEX_DEFAULT_LANG #define KEX_SERVER \ KEX_SERVER_KEX, \ KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \ KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, \ KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, \ KEX_SERVER_MAC, \ KEX_SERVER_MAC, \ KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \ KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \ KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, \ KEX_DEFAULT_LANG Index: head/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,177 +1,179 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: bcrypt_pbkdf.c,v 1.9 2014/07/13 21:21:25 tedu Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: bcrypt_pbkdf.c,v 1.13 2015/01/12 03:20:04 tedu Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2013 Ted Unangst * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H # include #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_BLF_H # include #endif #include "crypto_api.h" #ifdef SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH # undef SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH #endif #define SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES +#define MINIMUM(a,b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b)) + /* * pkcs #5 pbkdf2 implementation using the "bcrypt" hash * * The bcrypt hash function is derived from the bcrypt password hashing * function with the following modifications: * 1. The input password and salt are preprocessed with SHA512. * 2. The output length is expanded to 256 bits. * 3. Subsequently the magic string to be encrypted is lengthened and modifed * to "OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite" * 4. The hash function is defined to perform 64 rounds of initial state * expansion. (More rounds are performed by iterating the hash.) * * Note that this implementation pulls the SHA512 operations into the caller * as a performance optimization. * * One modification from official pbkdf2. Instead of outputting key material * linearly, we mix it. pbkdf2 has a known weakness where if one uses it to * generate (e.g.) 512 bits of key material for use as two 256 bit keys, an * attacker can merely run once through the outer loop, but the user * always runs it twice. Shuffling output bytes requires computing the * entirety of the key material to assemble any subkey. This is something a * wise caller could do; we just do it for you. */ -#define BCRYPT_BLOCKS 8 -#define BCRYPT_HASHSIZE (BCRYPT_BLOCKS * 4) +#define BCRYPT_WORDS 8 +#define BCRYPT_HASHSIZE (BCRYPT_WORDS * 4) static void bcrypt_hash(u_int8_t *sha2pass, u_int8_t *sha2salt, u_int8_t *out) { blf_ctx state; u_int8_t ciphertext[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE] = "OxychromaticBlowfishSwatDynamite"; - uint32_t cdata[BCRYPT_BLOCKS]; + uint32_t cdata[BCRYPT_WORDS]; int i; uint16_t j; size_t shalen = SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH; /* key expansion */ Blowfish_initstate(&state); Blowfish_expandstate(&state, sha2salt, shalen, sha2pass, shalen); for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) { Blowfish_expand0state(&state, sha2salt, shalen); Blowfish_expand0state(&state, sha2pass, shalen); } /* encryption */ j = 0; - for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_BLOCKS; i++) + for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_WORDS; i++) cdata[i] = Blowfish_stream2word(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext), &j); for (i = 0; i < 64; i++) blf_enc(&state, cdata, sizeof(cdata) / sizeof(uint64_t)); /* copy out */ - for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_BLOCKS; i++) { + for (i = 0; i < BCRYPT_WORDS; i++) { out[4 * i + 3] = (cdata[i] >> 24) & 0xff; out[4 * i + 2] = (cdata[i] >> 16) & 0xff; out[4 * i + 1] = (cdata[i] >> 8) & 0xff; out[4 * i + 0] = cdata[i] & 0xff; } /* zap */ explicit_bzero(ciphertext, sizeof(ciphertext)); explicit_bzero(cdata, sizeof(cdata)); explicit_bzero(&state, sizeof(state)); } int bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *pass, size_t passlen, const u_int8_t *salt, size_t saltlen, u_int8_t *key, size_t keylen, unsigned int rounds) { u_int8_t sha2pass[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; u_int8_t sha2salt[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; u_int8_t out[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE]; u_int8_t tmpout[BCRYPT_HASHSIZE]; u_int8_t *countsalt; size_t i, j, amt, stride; uint32_t count; size_t origkeylen = keylen; /* nothing crazy */ if (rounds < 1) return -1; if (passlen == 0 || saltlen == 0 || keylen == 0 || keylen > sizeof(out) * sizeof(out) || saltlen > 1<<20) return -1; if ((countsalt = calloc(1, saltlen + 4)) == NULL) return -1; stride = (keylen + sizeof(out) - 1) / sizeof(out); amt = (keylen + stride - 1) / stride; memcpy(countsalt, salt, saltlen); /* collapse password */ crypto_hash_sha512(sha2pass, pass, passlen); /* generate key, sizeof(out) at a time */ for (count = 1; keylen > 0; count++) { countsalt[saltlen + 0] = (count >> 24) & 0xff; countsalt[saltlen + 1] = (count >> 16) & 0xff; countsalt[saltlen + 2] = (count >> 8) & 0xff; countsalt[saltlen + 3] = count & 0xff; /* first round, salt is salt */ crypto_hash_sha512(sha2salt, countsalt, saltlen + 4); bcrypt_hash(sha2pass, sha2salt, tmpout); memcpy(out, tmpout, sizeof(out)); for (i = 1; i < rounds; i++) { /* subsequent rounds, salt is previous output */ crypto_hash_sha512(sha2salt, tmpout, sizeof(tmpout)); bcrypt_hash(sha2pass, sha2salt, tmpout); for (j = 0; j < sizeof(out); j++) out[j] ^= tmpout[j]; } /* - * pbkdf2 deviation: ouput the key material non-linearly. + * pbkdf2 deviation: output the key material non-linearly. */ - amt = MIN(amt, keylen); + amt = MINIMUM(amt, keylen); for (i = 0; i < amt; i++) { size_t dest = i * stride + (count - 1); if (dest >= origkeylen) break; key[dest] = out[i]; } keylen -= i; } /* zap */ explicit_bzero(out, sizeof(out)); free(countsalt); return 0; } #endif /* HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF */ Index: head/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,119 +1,119 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2011, 2013 Corinna Vinschen * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * * Created: Sat Sep 02 12:17:00 2000 cv * * This file contains functions for forcing opened file descriptors to * binary mode on Windows systems. */ #define NO_BINARY_OPEN /* Avoid redefining open to binary_open for this file */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" int binary_open(const char *filename, int flags, ...) { va_list ap; mode_t mode; va_start(ap, flags); mode = va_arg(ap, mode_t); va_end(ap); return (open(filename, flags | O_BINARY, mode)); } int check_ntsec(const char *filename) { return (pathconf(filename, _PC_POSIX_PERMISSIONS)); } const char * cygwin_ssh_privsep_user() { static char cyg_privsep_user[DNLEN + UNLEN + 2]; if (!cyg_privsep_user[0]) { #ifdef CW_CYGNAME_FROM_WINNAME if (cygwin_internal (CW_CYGNAME_FROM_WINNAME, "sshd", cyg_privsep_user, sizeof cyg_privsep_user) != 0) #endif - strcpy (cyg_privsep_user, "sshd"); + strlcpy(cyg_privsep_user, "sshd", sizeof(cyg_privsep_user)); } return cyg_privsep_user; } #define NL(x) x, (sizeof (x) - 1) #define WENV_SIZ (sizeof (wenv_arr) / sizeof (wenv_arr[0])) static struct wenv { const char *name; size_t namelen; } wenv_arr[] = { { NL("ALLUSERSPROFILE=") }, { NL("COMPUTERNAME=") }, { NL("COMSPEC=") }, { NL("CYGWIN=") }, { NL("OS=") }, { NL("PATH=") }, { NL("PATHEXT=") }, { NL("PROGRAMFILES=") }, { NL("SYSTEMDRIVE=") }, { NL("SYSTEMROOT=") }, { NL("WINDIR=") } }; char ** fetch_windows_environment(void) { char **e, **p; unsigned int i, idx = 0; p = xcalloc(WENV_SIZ + 1, sizeof(char *)); for (e = environ; *e != NULL; ++e) { for (i = 0; i < WENV_SIZ; ++i) { if (!strncmp(*e, wenv_arr[i].name, wenv_arr[i].namelen)) p[idx++] = *e; } } p[idx] = NULL; return p; } void free_windows_environment(char **p) { free(p); } #endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ Index: head/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h (revision 294336) @@ -1,125 +1,125 @@ /* $Id: bsd-misc.h,v 1.25 2013/08/04 11:48:41 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef _BSD_MISC_H #define _BSD_MISC_H #include "includes.h" char *ssh_get_progname(char *); #ifndef HAVE_SETSID #define setsid() setpgrp(0, getpid()) #endif /* !HAVE_SETSID */ #ifndef HAVE_SETENV int setenv(const char *, const char *, int); #endif /* !HAVE_SETENV */ #ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN int setlogin(const char *); #endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */ #ifndef HAVE_INNETGR int innetgr(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *); #endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */ #if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) int seteuid(uid_t); #endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */ #if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) int setegid(uid_t); #endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */ #if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR) const char *strerror(int); #endif #if !defined(HAVE_SETLINEBUF) #define setlinebuf(a) (setvbuf((a), NULL, _IOLBF, 0)) #endif #ifndef HAVE_UTIMES #ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL struct timeval { long tv_sec; long tv_usec; } #endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL */ int utimes(char *, struct timeval *); #endif /* HAVE_UTIMES */ #ifndef HAVE_TRUNCATE int truncate (const char *, off_t); #endif /* HAVE_TRUNCATE */ #if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && !defined(HAVE_NSLEEP) #ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC struct timespec { time_t tv_sec; long tv_nsec; }; #endif int nanosleep(const struct timespec *, struct timespec *); #endif #ifndef HAVE_USLEEP int usleep(unsigned int useconds); #endif #ifndef HAVE_TCGETPGRP pid_t tcgetpgrp(int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK int tcsendbreak(int, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_UNSETENV int unsetenv(const char *); #endif /* wrapper for signal interface */ typedef void (*mysig_t)(int); mysig_t mysignal(int sig, mysig_t act); #define signal(a,b) mysignal(a,b) #ifndef HAVE_ISBLANK int isblank(int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_GETPGID pid_t getpgid(pid_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_ENDGRENT -# define endgrent() do { } while (0) +# define endgrent() do { } while(0) #endif #ifndef HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE # define krb5_get_error_message krb5_get_err_text #endif #ifndef HAVE_KRB5_FREE_ERROR_MESSAGE # define krb5_free_error_message(a,b) do { } while(0) #endif #endif /* _BSD_MISC_H */ Index: head/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h (revision 294336) @@ -1,294 +1,294 @@ /* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.62 2014/09/30 23:43:08 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2003 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002 Tim Rice. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H #define _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H #include "includes.h" #include #include #include /* OpenBSD function replacements */ #include "base64.h" #include "sigact.h" #include "glob.h" #include "readpassphrase.h" #include "vis.h" #include "getrrsetbyname.h" #include "sha1.h" #include "sha2.h" #include "rmd160.h" #include "md5.h" #include "blf.h" #ifndef HAVE_BASENAME char *basename(const char *path); #endif #ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA int bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa); #endif #ifndef HAVE_CLOSEFROM void closefrom(int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_GETCWD char *getcwd(char *pt, size_t size); #endif #ifndef HAVE_REALLOCARRAY void *reallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t); #endif #if !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH) char *realpath(const char *path, char *resolved); #endif #ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF int rresvport_af(int *alport, sa_family_t af); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY /* #include XXX Still needed? */ size_t strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT /* #include XXX Still needed? */ size_t strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz); #endif #ifndef HAVE_SETENV int setenv(register const char *name, register const char *value, int rewrite); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRMODE void strmode(int mode, char *p); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRPTIME #include char *strptime(const char *buf, const char *fmt, struct tm *tm); #endif #if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP) int mkstemps(char *path, int slen); int mkstemp(char *path); char *mkdtemp(char *path); #endif #ifndef HAVE_DAEMON int daemon(int nochdir, int noclose); #endif #ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME char *dirname(const char *path); #endif #ifndef HAVE_FMT_SCALED #define FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE 7 int fmt_scaled(long long number, char *result); #endif #ifndef HAVE_SCAN_SCALED int scan_scaled(char *, long long *); #endif #if defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA) char *inet_ntoa(struct in_addr in); #endif #ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP const char *inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, socklen_t size); #endif #ifndef HAVE_INET_ATON int inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRSEP char *strsep(char **stringp, const char *delim); #endif #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE void setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...); void compat_init_setproctitle(int argc, char *argv[]); #endif #ifndef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST /* #include XXXX Still needed ? */ int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *); #endif #if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET) int BSDgetopt(int argc, char * const *argv, const char *opts); #include "openbsd-compat/getopt.h" #endif #if defined(HAVE_DECL_WRITEV) && HAVE_DECL_WRITEV == 0 # include # include int writev(int, struct iovec *, int); #endif /* Home grown routines */ #include "bsd-misc.h" #include "bsd-setres_id.h" #include "bsd-statvfs.h" #include "bsd-waitpid.h" #include "bsd-poll.h" #ifndef HAVE_GETPEEREID int getpeereid(int , uid_t *, gid_t *); #endif #ifdef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM # ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR # define arc4random_stir() # endif #else unsigned int arc4random(void); void arc4random_stir(void); #endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */ #ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF void arc4random_buf(void *, size_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM u_int32_t arc4random_uniform(u_int32_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF int asprintf(char **, const char *, ...); #endif #ifndef HAVE_OPENPTY # include /* for struct winsize */ int openpty(int *, int *, char *, struct termios *, struct winsize *); #endif /* HAVE_OPENPTY */ /* #include XXX needed? For size_t */ #ifndef HAVE_SNPRINTF int snprintf(char *, size_t, SNPRINTF_CONST char *, ...); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRTOLL long long strtoll(const char *, char **, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRTOUL unsigned long strtoul(const char *, char **, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRTOULL unsigned long long strtoull(const char *, char **, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRTONUM long long strtonum(const char *, long long, long long, const char **); #endif /* multibyte character support */ #ifndef HAVE_MBLEN -# define mblen(x, y) 1 +# define mblen(x, y) (1) #endif #if !defined(HAVE_VASPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) # include #endif #ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF int vasprintf(char **, const char *, va_list); #endif #ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF int vsnprintf(char *, size_t, const char *, va_list); #endif #ifndef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID char *user_from_uid(uid_t, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID char *group_from_gid(gid_t, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP int timingsafe_bcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF int bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *, size_t, const u_int8_t *, size_t, u_int8_t *, size_t, unsigned int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO void explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n); #endif void *xmmap(size_t size); char *xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt); char *shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw); /* rfc2553 socket API replacements */ #include "fake-rfc2553.h" /* Routines for a single OS platform */ #include "bsd-cray.h" #include "bsd-cygwin_util.h" #include "port-aix.h" #include "port-irix.h" #include "port-linux.h" #include "port-solaris.h" #include "port-tun.h" #include "port-uw.h" /* _FORTIFY_SOURCE breaks FD_ISSET(n)/FD_SET(n) for n > FD_SETSIZE. Avoid. */ #if defined(HAVE_FEATURES_H) && defined(_FORTIFY_SOURCE) # include # if defined(__GNU_LIBRARY__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ) # if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) # include /* Ensure include guard is defined */ # undef FD_SET # undef FD_ISSET # define FD_SET(n, set) kludge_FD_SET(n, set) # define FD_ISSET(n, set) kludge_FD_ISSET(n, set) void kludge_FD_SET(int, fd_set *); int kludge_FD_ISSET(int, fd_set *); # endif /* __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) */ # endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ && __GLIBC_PREREQ */ #endif /* HAVE_FEATURES_H && _FORTIFY_SOURCE */ #endif /* _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H */ Index: head/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,376 +1,378 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Preneel, Bosselaers, Dobbertin, "The Cryptographic Hash Function RIPEMD-160", * RSA Laboratories, CryptoBytes, Volume 3, Number 2, Autumn 1997, * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/cryptobytes/crypto3n2.pdf */ #include "includes.h" #ifndef WITH_OPENSSL #include +#ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H #include +#endif #include #include #define PUT_64BIT_LE(cp, value) do { \ (cp)[7] = (value) >> 56; \ (cp)[6] = (value) >> 48; \ (cp)[5] = (value) >> 40; \ (cp)[4] = (value) >> 32; \ (cp)[3] = (value) >> 24; \ (cp)[2] = (value) >> 16; \ (cp)[1] = (value) >> 8; \ (cp)[0] = (value); } while (0) #define PUT_32BIT_LE(cp, value) do { \ (cp)[3] = (value) >> 24; \ (cp)[2] = (value) >> 16; \ (cp)[1] = (value) >> 8; \ (cp)[0] = (value); } while (0) #define H0 0x67452301U #define H1 0xEFCDAB89U #define H2 0x98BADCFEU #define H3 0x10325476U #define H4 0xC3D2E1F0U #define K0 0x00000000U #define K1 0x5A827999U #define K2 0x6ED9EBA1U #define K3 0x8F1BBCDCU #define K4 0xA953FD4EU #define KK0 0x50A28BE6U #define KK1 0x5C4DD124U #define KK2 0x6D703EF3U #define KK3 0x7A6D76E9U #define KK4 0x00000000U /* rotate x left n bits. */ #define ROL(n, x) (((x) << (n)) | ((x) >> (32-(n)))) #define F0(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z)) #define F1(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) | ((~x) & (z))) #define F2(x, y, z) (((x) | (~y)) ^ (z)) #define F3(x, y, z) (((x) & (z)) | ((y) & (~z))) #define F4(x, y, z) ((x) ^ ((y) | (~z))) #define R(a, b, c, d, e, Fj, Kj, sj, rj) \ do { \ a = ROL(sj, a + Fj(b,c,d) + X(rj) + Kj) + e; \ c = ROL(10, c); \ } while(0) #define X(i) x[i] static u_int8_t PADDING[RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH] = { 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; void RMD160Init(RMD160_CTX *ctx) { ctx->count = 0; ctx->state[0] = H0; ctx->state[1] = H1; ctx->state[2] = H2; ctx->state[3] = H3; ctx->state[4] = H4; } void RMD160Update(RMD160_CTX *ctx, const u_int8_t *input, size_t len) { size_t have, off, need; have = (ctx->count / 8) % RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH; need = RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH - have; ctx->count += 8 * len; off = 0; if (len >= need) { if (have) { memcpy(ctx->buffer + have, input, need); RMD160Transform(ctx->state, ctx->buffer); off = need; have = 0; } /* now the buffer is empty */ while (off + RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH <= len) { RMD160Transform(ctx->state, input+off); off += RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH; } } if (off < len) memcpy(ctx->buffer + have, input+off, len-off); } void RMD160Pad(RMD160_CTX *ctx) { u_int8_t size[8]; size_t padlen; PUT_64BIT_LE(size, ctx->count); /* * pad to RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH byte blocks, at least one byte from * PADDING plus 8 bytes for the size */ padlen = RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH - ((ctx->count / 8) % RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH); if (padlen < 1 + 8) padlen += RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH; RMD160Update(ctx, PADDING, padlen - 8); /* padlen - 8 <= 64 */ RMD160Update(ctx, size, 8); } void RMD160Final(u_int8_t digest[RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH], RMD160_CTX *ctx) { int i; RMD160Pad(ctx); for (i = 0; i < 5; i++) PUT_32BIT_LE(digest + i*4, ctx->state[i]); memset(ctx, 0, sizeof (*ctx)); } void RMD160Transform(u_int32_t state[5], const u_int8_t block[RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH]) { u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e, aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, t, x[16]; #if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN memcpy(x, block, RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH); #else int i; for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) x[i] = (u_int32_t)( (u_int32_t)(block[i*4 + 0]) | (u_int32_t)(block[i*4 + 1]) << 8 | (u_int32_t)(block[i*4 + 2]) << 16 | (u_int32_t)(block[i*4 + 3]) << 24); #endif a = state[0]; b = state[1]; c = state[2]; d = state[3]; e = state[4]; /* Round 1 */ R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 11, 0); R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, K0, 14, 1); R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, K0, 15, 2); R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, K0, 12, 3); R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, K0, 5, 4); R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 8, 5); R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, K0, 7, 6); R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, K0, 9, 7); R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, K0, 11, 8); R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, K0, 13, 9); R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 14, 10); R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, K0, 15, 11); R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, K0, 6, 12); R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, K0, 7, 13); R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, K0, 9, 14); R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 8, 15); /* #15 */ /* Round 2 */ R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 7, 7); R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, K1, 6, 4); R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, K1, 8, 13); R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, K1, 13, 1); R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, K1, 11, 10); R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 9, 6); R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, K1, 7, 15); R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, K1, 15, 3); R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, K1, 7, 12); R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, K1, 12, 0); R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 15, 9); R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, K1, 9, 5); R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, K1, 11, 2); R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, K1, 7, 14); R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, K1, 13, 11); R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 12, 8); /* #31 */ /* Round 3 */ R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 11, 3); R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, K2, 13, 10); R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, K2, 6, 14); R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, K2, 7, 4); R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, K2, 14, 9); R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 9, 15); R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, K2, 13, 8); R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, K2, 15, 1); R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, K2, 14, 2); R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, K2, 8, 7); R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 13, 0); R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, K2, 6, 6); R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, K2, 5, 13); R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, K2, 12, 11); R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, K2, 7, 5); R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 5, 12); /* #47 */ /* Round 4 */ R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 11, 1); R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, K3, 12, 9); R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, K3, 14, 11); R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, K3, 15, 10); R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, K3, 14, 0); R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 15, 8); R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, K3, 9, 12); R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, K3, 8, 4); R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, K3, 9, 13); R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, K3, 14, 3); R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 5, 7); R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, K3, 6, 15); R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, K3, 8, 14); R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, K3, 6, 5); R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, K3, 5, 6); R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 12, 2); /* #63 */ /* Round 5 */ R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 9, 4); R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, K4, 15, 0); R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, K4, 5, 5); R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, K4, 11, 9); R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, K4, 6, 7); R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 8, 12); R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, K4, 13, 2); R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, K4, 12, 10); R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, K4, 5, 14); R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, K4, 12, 1); R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 13, 3); R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, K4, 14, 8); R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, K4, 11, 11); R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, K4, 8, 6); R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, K4, 5, 15); R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 6, 13); /* #79 */ aa = a ; bb = b; cc = c; dd = d; ee = e; a = state[0]; b = state[1]; c = state[2]; d = state[3]; e = state[4]; /* Parallel round 1 */ R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 8, 5); R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, KK0, 9, 14); R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, KK0, 9, 7); R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, KK0, 11, 0); R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, KK0, 13, 9); R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 15, 2); R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, KK0, 15, 11); R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, KK0, 5, 4); R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, KK0, 7, 13); R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, KK0, 7, 6); R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 8, 15); R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, KK0, 11, 8); R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, KK0, 14, 1); R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, KK0, 14, 10); R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, KK0, 12, 3); R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 6, 12); /* #15 */ /* Parallel round 2 */ R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 9, 6); R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, KK1, 13, 11); R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, KK1, 15, 3); R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, KK1, 7, 7); R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, KK1, 12, 0); R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 8, 13); R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, KK1, 9, 5); R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, KK1, 11, 10); R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, KK1, 7, 14); R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, KK1, 7, 15); R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 12, 8); R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, KK1, 7, 12); R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, KK1, 6, 4); R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, KK1, 15, 9); R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, KK1, 13, 1); R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 11, 2); /* #31 */ /* Parallel round 3 */ R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2, 9, 15); R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, KK2, 7, 5); R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, KK2, 15, 1); R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, KK2, 11, 3); R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, KK2, 8, 7); R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2, 6, 14); R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, KK2, 6, 6); R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, KK2, 14, 9); R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, KK2, 12, 11); R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, KK2, 13, 8); R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2, 5, 12); R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, KK2, 14, 2); R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, KK2, 13, 10); R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, KK2, 13, 0); R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, KK2, 7, 4); R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2, 5, 13); /* #47 */ /* Parallel round 4 */ R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 15, 8); R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, KK3, 5, 6); R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, KK3, 8, 4); R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, KK3, 11, 1); R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, KK3, 14, 3); R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 14, 11); R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, KK3, 6, 15); R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, KK3, 14, 0); R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, KK3, 6, 5); R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, KK3, 9, 12); R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 12, 2); R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, KK3, 9, 13); R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, KK3, 12, 9); R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, KK3, 5, 7); R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, KK3, 15, 10); R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 8, 14); /* #63 */ /* Parallel round 5 */ R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 8, 12); R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, KK4, 5, 15); R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, KK4, 12, 10); R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, KK4, 9, 4); R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, KK4, 12, 1); R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 5, 5); R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, KK4, 14, 8); R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, KK4, 6, 7); R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, KK4, 8, 6); R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, KK4, 13, 2); R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 6, 13); R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, KK4, 5, 14); R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, KK4, 15, 0); R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, KK4, 13, 3); R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, KK4, 11, 9); R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 11, 11); /* #79 */ t = state[1] + cc + d; state[1] = state[2] + dd + e; state[2] = state[3] + ee + a; state[3] = state[4] + aa + b; state[4] = state[0] + bb + c; state[0] = t; } #endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */ Index: head/crypto/openssh/packet.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/packet.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/packet.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,2899 +1,2917 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.208 2015/02/13 18:57:00 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.212 2015/05/01 07:10:01 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * This file contains code implementing the packet protocol and communication * with the other side. This same code is used both on client and server side. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * * SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include /* MIN roundup */ #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "buffer.h" /* typedefs XXX */ #include "key.h" /* typedefs XXX */ #include "xmalloc.h" #include "crc32.h" #include "deattack.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "kex.h" #include "digest.h" #include "mac.h" #include "log.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "misc.h" #include "channels.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "packet.h" #include "roaming.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG #define DBG(x) x #else #define DBG(x) #endif #define PACKET_MAX_SIZE (256 * 1024) struct packet_state { u_int32_t seqnr; u_int32_t packets; u_int64_t blocks; u_int64_t bytes; }; struct packet { TAILQ_ENTRY(packet) next; u_char type; struct sshbuf *payload; }; struct session_state { /* * This variable contains the file descriptors used for * communicating with the other side. connection_in is used for * reading; connection_out for writing. These can be the same * descriptor, in which case it is assumed to be a socket. */ int connection_in; int connection_out; /* Protocol flags for the remote side. */ u_int remote_protocol_flags; /* Encryption context for receiving data. Only used for decryption. */ struct sshcipher_ctx receive_context; /* Encryption context for sending data. Only used for encryption. */ struct sshcipher_ctx send_context; /* Buffer for raw input data from the socket. */ struct sshbuf *input; /* Buffer for raw output data going to the socket. */ struct sshbuf *output; /* Buffer for the partial outgoing packet being constructed. */ struct sshbuf *outgoing_packet; /* Buffer for the incoming packet currently being processed. */ struct sshbuf *incoming_packet; /* Scratch buffer for packet compression/decompression. */ struct sshbuf *compression_buffer; /* Incoming/outgoing compression dictionaries */ z_stream compression_in_stream; z_stream compression_out_stream; int compression_in_started; int compression_out_started; int compression_in_failures; int compression_out_failures; /* * Flag indicating whether packet compression/decompression is * enabled. */ int packet_compression; /* default maximum packet size */ u_int max_packet_size; /* Flag indicating whether this module has been initialized. */ int initialized; /* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */ int interactive_mode; /* Set to true if we are the server side. */ int server_side; /* Set to true if we are authenticated. */ int after_authentication; int keep_alive_timeouts; /* The maximum time that we will wait to send or receive a packet */ int packet_timeout_ms; /* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */ struct newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX]; struct packet_state p_read, p_send; /* Volume-based rekeying */ u_int64_t max_blocks_in, max_blocks_out; u_int32_t rekey_limit; /* Time-based rekeying */ u_int32_t rekey_interval; /* how often in seconds */ time_t rekey_time; /* time of last rekeying */ /* Session key for protocol v1 */ u_char ssh1_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; u_int ssh1_keylen; /* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */ u_char extra_pad; /* XXX discard incoming data after MAC error */ u_int packet_discard; struct sshmac *packet_discard_mac; /* Used in packet_read_poll2() */ u_int packlen; /* Used in packet_send2 */ int rekeying; /* Used in packet_set_interactive */ int set_interactive_called; /* Used in packet_set_maxsize */ int set_maxsize_called; /* One-off warning about weak ciphers */ int cipher_warning_done; /* SSH1 CRC compensation attack detector */ struct deattack_ctx deattack; TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing; }; struct ssh * ssh_alloc_session_state(void) { struct ssh *ssh = NULL; struct session_state *state = NULL; if ((ssh = calloc(1, sizeof(*ssh))) == NULL || (state = calloc(1, sizeof(*state))) == NULL || (state->input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (state->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (state->incoming_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) goto fail; TAILQ_INIT(&state->outgoing); TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->private_keys); TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->public_keys); state->connection_in = -1; state->connection_out = -1; state->max_packet_size = 32768; state->packet_timeout_ms = -1; state->p_send.packets = state->p_read.packets = 0; state->initialized = 1; /* * ssh_packet_send2() needs to queue packets until * we've done the initial key exchange. */ state->rekeying = 1; ssh->state = state; return ssh; fail: if (state) { sshbuf_free(state->input); sshbuf_free(state->output); sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet); sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet); free(state); } free(ssh); return NULL; } /* * Sets the descriptors used for communication. Disables encryption until * packet_set_encryption_key is called. */ struct ssh * ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out) { struct session_state *state; const struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none"); int r; if (none == NULL) { error("%s: cannot load cipher 'none'", __func__); return NULL; } if (ssh == NULL) ssh = ssh_alloc_session_state(); if (ssh == NULL) { error("%s: cound not allocate state", __func__); return NULL; } state = ssh->state; state->connection_in = fd_in; state->connection_out = fd_out; if ((r = cipher_init(&state->send_context, none, (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 || (r = cipher_init(&state->receive_context, none, (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0) { error("%s: cipher_init failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + free(ssh); return NULL; } state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL; deattack_init(&state->deattack); /* * Cache the IP address of the remote connection for use in error * messages that might be generated after the connection has closed. */ (void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); return ssh; } void ssh_packet_set_timeout(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout, int count) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; if (timeout <= 0 || count <= 0) { state->packet_timeout_ms = -1; return; } if ((INT_MAX / 1000) / count < timeout) state->packet_timeout_ms = INT_MAX; else state->packet_timeout_ms = timeout * count * 1000; } int ssh_packet_stop_discard(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; int r; if (state->packet_discard_mac) { char buf[1024]; memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf)); while (sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet) < PACKET_MAX_SIZE) if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->incoming_packet, buf, sizeof(buf))) != 0) return r; (void) mac_compute(state->packet_discard_mac, state->p_read.seqnr, sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet), PACKET_MAX_SIZE, NULL, 0); } logit("Finished discarding for %.200s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh)); return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID; } static int ssh_packet_start_discard(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshenc *enc, struct sshmac *mac, u_int packet_length, u_int discard) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; int r; if (enc == NULL || !cipher_is_cbc(enc->cipher) || (mac && mac->etm)) { if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID; } if (packet_length != PACKET_MAX_SIZE && mac && mac->enabled) state->packet_discard_mac = mac; if (sshbuf_len(state->input) >= discard && (r = ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh)) != 0) return r; state->packet_discard = discard - sshbuf_len(state->input); return 0; } /* Returns 1 if remote host is connected via socket, 0 if not. */ int ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; struct sockaddr_storage from, to; socklen_t fromlen, tolen; /* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */ if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) return 1; fromlen = sizeof(from); memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); if (getpeername(state->connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) return 0; tolen = sizeof(to); memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to)); if (getpeername(state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to, &tolen) < 0) return 0; if (fromlen != tolen || memcmp(&from, &to, fromlen) != 0) return 0; if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6) return 0; return 1; } void ssh_packet_get_bytes(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *ibytes, u_int64_t *obytes) { if (ibytes) *ibytes = ssh->state->p_read.bytes; if (obytes) *obytes = ssh->state->p_send.bytes; } int ssh_packet_connection_af(struct ssh *ssh) { struct sockaddr_storage to; socklen_t tolen = sizeof(to); memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to)); if (getsockname(ssh->state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to, &tolen) < 0) return 0; #ifdef IPV4_IN_IPV6 if (to.ss_family == AF_INET6 && IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&to)->sin6_addr)) return AF_INET; #endif return to.ss_family; } /* Sets the connection into non-blocking mode. */ void ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(struct ssh *ssh) { /* Set the socket into non-blocking mode. */ set_nonblock(ssh->state->connection_in); if (ssh->state->connection_out != ssh->state->connection_in) set_nonblock(ssh->state->connection_out); } /* Returns the socket used for reading. */ int ssh_packet_get_connection_in(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->connection_in; } /* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */ int ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->connection_out; } /* * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned * string must not be freed. */ const char * ssh_remote_ipaddr(struct ssh *ssh) { /* Check whether we have cached the ipaddr. */ if (ssh->remote_ipaddr == NULL) ssh->remote_ipaddr = ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) ? get_peer_ipaddr(ssh->state->connection_in) : strdup("UNKNOWN"); if (ssh->remote_ipaddr == NULL) return "UNKNOWN"; return ssh->remote_ipaddr; } /* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */ void ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; int r; u_int mode; if (!state->initialized) return; state->initialized = 0; if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) { shutdown(state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR); close(state->connection_out); } else { close(state->connection_in); close(state->connection_out); } sshbuf_free(state->input); sshbuf_free(state->output); sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet); sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet); for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]); if (state->compression_buffer) { sshbuf_free(state->compression_buffer); if (state->compression_out_started) { z_streamp stream = &state->compression_out_stream; debug("compress outgoing: " "raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f", (unsigned long long)stream->total_in, (unsigned long long)stream->total_out, stream->total_in == 0 ? 0.0 : (double) stream->total_out / stream->total_in); if (state->compression_out_failures == 0) deflateEnd(stream); } if (state->compression_in_started) { z_streamp stream = &state->compression_out_stream; debug("compress incoming: " "raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f", (unsigned long long)stream->total_out, (unsigned long long)stream->total_in, stream->total_out == 0 ? 0.0 : (double) stream->total_in / stream->total_out); if (state->compression_in_failures == 0) inflateEnd(stream); } } if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context)) != 0) error("%s: cipher_cleanup failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context)) != 0) error("%s: cipher_cleanup failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (ssh->remote_ipaddr) { free(ssh->remote_ipaddr); ssh->remote_ipaddr = NULL; } free(ssh->state); ssh->state = NULL; } /* Sets remote side protocol flags. */ void ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh, u_int protocol_flags) { ssh->state->remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags; } /* Returns the remote protocol flags set earlier by the above function. */ u_int ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->remote_protocol_flags; } /* * Starts packet compression from the next packet on in both directions. * Level is compression level 1 (fastest) - 9 (slow, best) as in gzip. */ static int ssh_packet_init_compression(struct ssh *ssh) { if (!ssh->state->compression_buffer && ((ssh->state->compression_buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; return 0; } static int start_compression_out(struct ssh *ssh, int level) { if (level < 1 || level > 9) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; debug("Enabling compression at level %d.", level); if (ssh->state->compression_out_started == 1) deflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream); switch (deflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream, level)) { case Z_OK: ssh->state->compression_out_started = 1; break; case Z_MEM_ERROR: return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; default: return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } return 0; } static int start_compression_in(struct ssh *ssh) { if (ssh->state->compression_in_started == 1) inflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream); switch (inflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream)) { case Z_OK: ssh->state->compression_in_started = 1; break; case Z_MEM_ERROR: return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; default: return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } return 0; } int ssh_packet_start_compression(struct ssh *ssh, int level) { int r; if (ssh->state->packet_compression && !compat20) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ssh->state->packet_compression = 1; if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0 || (r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0 || (r = start_compression_out(ssh, level)) != 0) return r; return 0; } /* XXX remove need for separate compression buffer */ static int compress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out) { u_char buf[4096]; int r, status; if (ssh->state->compression_out_started != 1) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* This case is not handled below. */ if (sshbuf_len(in) == 0) return 0; /* Input is the contents of the input buffer. */ if ((ssh->state->compression_out_stream.next_in = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(in)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_in = sshbuf_len(in); /* Loop compressing until deflate() returns with avail_out != 0. */ do { /* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */ ssh->state->compression_out_stream.next_out = buf; ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf); /* Compress as much data into the buffer as possible. */ status = deflate(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH); switch (status) { case Z_MEM_ERROR: return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; case Z_OK: /* Append compressed data to output_buffer. */ if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) - ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out)) != 0) return r; break; case Z_STREAM_ERROR: default: ssh->state->compression_out_failures++; return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } } while (ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out == 0); return 0; } static int uncompress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out) { u_char buf[4096]; int r, status; if (ssh->state->compression_in_started != 1) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((ssh->state->compression_in_stream.next_in = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(in)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_in = sshbuf_len(in); for (;;) { /* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */ ssh->state->compression_in_stream.next_out = buf; ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf); status = inflate(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream, Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH); switch (status) { case Z_OK: if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) - ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out)) != 0) return r; break; case Z_BUF_ERROR: /* * Comments in zlib.h say that we should keep calling * inflate() until we get an error. This appears to * be the error that we get. */ return 0; case Z_DATA_ERROR: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; case Z_MEM_ERROR: return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; case Z_STREAM_ERROR: default: ssh->state->compression_in_failures++; return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; } } /* NOTREACHED */ } /* Serialise compression state into a blob for privsep */ static int ssh_packet_get_compress_state(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; struct sshbuf *b; int r; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (state->compression_in_started) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, &state->compression_in_stream, sizeof(state->compression_in_stream))) != 0) goto out; } else if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0)) != 0) goto out; if (state->compression_out_started) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, &state->compression_out_stream, sizeof(state->compression_out_stream))) != 0) goto out; } else if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0)) != 0) goto out; r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b); out: sshbuf_free(b); return r; } /* Deserialise compression state from a blob for privsep */ static int ssh_packet_set_compress_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; int r; const u_char *inblob, *outblob; size_t inl, outl; if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &inblob, &inl)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &outblob, &outl)) != 0) goto out; if (inl == 0) state->compression_in_started = 0; else if (inl != sizeof(state->compression_in_stream)) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } else { state->compression_in_started = 1; memcpy(&state->compression_in_stream, inblob, inl); } if (outl == 0) state->compression_out_started = 0; else if (outl != sizeof(state->compression_out_stream)) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } else { state->compression_out_started = 1; memcpy(&state->compression_out_stream, outblob, outl); } r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(b); return r; } void ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks(struct ssh *ssh, void *ctx, void *(*allocfunc)(void *, u_int, u_int), void (*freefunc)(void *, void *)) { ssh->state->compression_out_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)allocfunc; ssh->state->compression_out_stream.zfree = (free_func)freefunc; ssh->state->compression_out_stream.opaque = ctx; ssh->state->compression_in_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)allocfunc; ssh->state->compression_in_stream.zfree = (free_func)freefunc; ssh->state->compression_in_stream.opaque = ctx; } /* * Causes any further packets to be encrypted using the given key. The same * key is used for both sending and reception. However, both directions are * encrypted independently of each other. */ void ssh_packet_set_encryption_key(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *key, u_int keylen, int number) { -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 +#ifndef WITH_SSH1 + fatal("no SSH protocol 1 support"); +#else /* WITH_SSH1 */ struct session_state *state = ssh->state; const struct sshcipher *cipher = cipher_by_number(number); int r; const char *wmsg; if (cipher == NULL) fatal("%s: unknown cipher number %d", __func__, number); if (keylen < 20) fatal("%s: keylen too small: %d", __func__, keylen); if (keylen > SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH) fatal("%s: keylen too big: %d", __func__, keylen); memcpy(state->ssh1_key, key, keylen); state->ssh1_keylen = keylen; if ((r = cipher_init(&state->send_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 || (r = cipher_init(&state->receive_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT) != 0)) fatal("%s: cipher_init failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (!state->cipher_warning_done && ((wmsg = cipher_warning_message(&state->send_context)) != NULL || (wmsg = cipher_warning_message(&state->send_context)) != NULL)) { error("Warning: %s", wmsg); state->cipher_warning_done = 1; } #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ } /* * Finalizes and sends the packet. If the encryption key has been set, * encrypts the packet before sending. */ int ssh_packet_send1(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_char buf[8], *cp; int r, padding, len; u_int checksum; /* * If using packet compression, compress the payload of the outgoing * packet. */ if (state->packet_compression) { sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer); /* Skip padding. */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->outgoing_packet, 8)) != 0) goto out; /* padding */ if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->compression_buffer, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = compress_buffer(ssh, state->outgoing_packet, state->compression_buffer)) != 0) goto out; sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet); if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->outgoing_packet, state->compression_buffer)) != 0) goto out; } /* Compute packet length without padding (add checksum, remove padding). */ len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) + 4 - 8; /* Insert padding. Initialized to zero in packet_start1() */ padding = 8 - len % 8; if (!state->send_context.plaintext) { cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet); if (cp == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } arc4random_buf(cp + 8 - padding, padding); } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->outgoing_packet, 8 - padding)) != 0) goto out; /* Add check bytes. */ checksum = ssh_crc32(sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet), sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet)); POKE_U32(buf, checksum); if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->outgoing_packet, buf, 4)) != 0) goto out; #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "packet_send plain: "); sshbuf_dump(state->outgoing_packet, stderr); #endif /* Append to output. */ POKE_U32(buf, len); if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->output, buf, 4)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->output, sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet), &cp)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(&state->send_context, 0, cp, sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet), sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet), 0, 0)) != 0) goto out; #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: "); sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr); #endif state->p_send.packets++; state->p_send.bytes += len + sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet); sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet); /* * Note that the packet is now only buffered in output. It won't be * actually sent until ssh_packet_write_wait or ssh_packet_write_poll * is called. */ r = 0; out: return r; } int ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; struct sshenc *enc; struct sshmac *mac; struct sshcomp *comp; struct sshcipher_ctx *cc; u_int64_t *max_blocks; const char *wmsg; int r, crypt_type; debug2("set_newkeys: mode %d", mode); if (mode == MODE_OUT) { cc = &state->send_context; crypt_type = CIPHER_ENCRYPT; state->p_send.packets = state->p_send.blocks = 0; max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_out; } else { cc = &state->receive_context; crypt_type = CIPHER_DECRYPT; state->p_read.packets = state->p_read.blocks = 0; max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_in; } if (state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) { debug("set_newkeys: rekeying"); if ((r = cipher_cleanup(cc)) != 0) return r; enc = &state->newkeys[mode]->enc; mac = &state->newkeys[mode]->mac; comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp; mac_clear(mac); explicit_bzero(enc->iv, enc->iv_len); explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len); explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len); free(enc->name); free(enc->iv); free(enc->key); free(mac->name); free(mac->key); free(comp->name); free(state->newkeys[mode]); } /* move newkeys from kex to state */ if ((state->newkeys[mode] = ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL; enc = &state->newkeys[mode]->enc; mac = &state->newkeys[mode]->mac; comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp; if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) { if ((r = mac_init(mac)) != 0) return r; } mac->enabled = 1; DBG(debug("cipher_init_context: %d", mode)); if ((r = cipher_init(cc, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len, enc->iv, enc->iv_len, crypt_type)) != 0) return r; if (!state->cipher_warning_done && (wmsg = cipher_warning_message(cc)) != NULL) { error("Warning: %s", wmsg); state->cipher_warning_done = 1; } /* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */ /* explicit_bzero(enc->iv, enc->block_size); explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len); explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len); */ if ((comp->type == COMP_ZLIB || (comp->type == COMP_DELAYED && state->after_authentication)) && comp->enabled == 0) { if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) < 0) return r; if (mode == MODE_OUT) { if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0) return r; } else { if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0) return r; } comp->enabled = 1; } /* * The 2^(blocksize*2) limit is too expensive for 3DES, * blowfish, etc, so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes. */ if (enc->block_size >= 16) *max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2); else *max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size; if (state->rekey_limit) *max_blocks = MIN(*max_blocks, state->rekey_limit / enc->block_size); return 0; } /* * Delayed compression for SSH2 is enabled after authentication: * This happens on the server side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is sent, * and on the client side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is received. */ static int ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; struct sshcomp *comp = NULL; int r, mode; /* * Remember that we are past the authentication step, so rekeying * with COMP_DELAYED will turn on compression immediately. */ state->after_authentication = 1; for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { /* protocol error: USERAUTH_SUCCESS received before NEWKEYS */ if (state->newkeys[mode] == NULL) continue; comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp; if (comp && !comp->enabled && comp->type == COMP_DELAYED) { if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0) return r; if (mode == MODE_OUT) { if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0) return r; } else { if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0) return r; } comp->enabled = 1; } } return 0; } /* * Finalize packet in SSH2 format (compress, mac, encrypt, enqueue) */ int ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_char type, *cp, macbuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; u_char padlen, pad = 0; u_int authlen = 0, aadlen = 0; u_int len; struct sshenc *enc = NULL; struct sshmac *mac = NULL; struct sshcomp *comp = NULL; int r, block_size; if (state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL) { enc = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc; mac = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->mac; comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp; /* disable mac for authenticated encryption */ if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0) mac = NULL; } block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8; aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0; type = (sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet))[5]; #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "plain: "); sshbuf_dump(state->outgoing_packet, stderr); #endif if (comp && comp->enabled) { len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet); /* skip header, compress only payload */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->outgoing_packet, 5)) != 0) goto out; sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer); if ((r = compress_buffer(ssh, state->outgoing_packet, state->compression_buffer)) != 0) goto out; sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet); if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->outgoing_packet, "\0\0\0\0\0", 5)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_putb(state->outgoing_packet, state->compression_buffer)) != 0) goto out; DBG(debug("compression: raw %d compressed %zd", len, sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet))); } /* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload) */ len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet); /* * calc size of padding, alloc space, get random data, * minimum padding is 4 bytes */ len -= aadlen; /* packet length is not encrypted for EtM modes */ padlen = block_size - (len % block_size); if (padlen < 4) padlen += block_size; if (state->extra_pad) { /* will wrap if extra_pad+padlen > 255 */ state->extra_pad = roundup(state->extra_pad, block_size); pad = state->extra_pad - ((len + padlen) % state->extra_pad); DBG(debug3("%s: adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)", __func__, pad, len, padlen, state->extra_pad)); padlen += pad; state->extra_pad = 0; } if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->outgoing_packet, padlen, &cp)) != 0) goto out; if (enc && !state->send_context.plaintext) { /* random padding */ arc4random_buf(cp, padlen); } else { /* clear padding */ explicit_bzero(cp, padlen); } /* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload + padding) */ len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet); cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet); if (cp == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } /* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */ POKE_U32(cp, len - 4); cp[4] = padlen; DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d, aadlen %d)", len, padlen, aadlen)); /* compute MAC over seqnr and packet(length fields, payload, padding) */ if (mac && mac->enabled && !mac->etm) { if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_send.seqnr, sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet), len, macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0) goto out; DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", state->p_send.seqnr)); } /* encrypt packet and append to output buffer. */ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->output, sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) + authlen, &cp)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(&state->send_context, state->p_send.seqnr, cp, sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet), len - aadlen, aadlen, authlen)) != 0) goto out; /* append unencrypted MAC */ if (mac && mac->enabled) { if (mac->etm) { /* EtM: compute mac over aadlen + cipher text */ if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_send.seqnr, cp, len, macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0) goto out; DBG(debug("done calc MAC(EtM) out #%d", state->p_send.seqnr)); } if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->output, macbuf, mac->mac_len)) != 0) goto out; } #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: "); sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr); #endif /* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */ if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0) logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around"); if (++state->p_send.packets == 0) if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)) return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY; state->p_send.blocks += len / block_size; state->p_send.bytes += len; sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet); if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT); else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side) r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh); else r = 0; out: return r; } int ssh_packet_send2(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; struct packet *p; u_char type; int r; type = sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet)[5]; /* during rekeying we can only send key exchange messages */ if (state->rekeying) { if ((type < SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN) || (type > SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX) || (type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST) || (type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)) { debug("enqueue packet: %u", type); p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p)); if (p == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; p->type = type; p->payload = state->outgoing_packet; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&state->outgoing, p, next); state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new(); if (state->outgoing_packet == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; return 0; } } /* rekeying starts with sending KEXINIT */ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) state->rekeying = 1; if ((r = ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(ssh)) != 0) return r; /* after a NEWKEYS message we can send the complete queue */ if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) { state->rekeying = 0; state->rekey_time = monotime(); while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&state->outgoing))) { type = p->type; debug("dequeue packet: %u", type); sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet); state->outgoing_packet = p->payload; TAILQ_REMOVE(&state->outgoing, p, next); free(p); if ((r = ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(ssh)) != 0) return r; } } return 0; } /* * Waits until a packet has been received, and returns its type. Note that * no other data is processed until this returns, so this function should not * be used during the interactive session. */ int ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; int len, r, ms_remain, cont; fd_set *setp; char buf[8192]; struct timeval timeout, start, *timeoutp = NULL; DBG(debug("packet_read()")); setp = (fd_set *)calloc(howmany(state->connection_in + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask)); if (setp == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* * Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have * been sent. */ if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) - return r; + goto out; /* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */ for (;;) { /* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */ r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p); if (r != 0) break; if (!compat20 && ( *typep == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS || *typep == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE || *typep == SSH_CMSG_EOF || *typep == SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION)) if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) break; /* If we got a packet, return it. */ if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE) break; /* * Otherwise, wait for some data to arrive, add it to the * buffer, and try again. */ memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_in + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask)); FD_SET(state->connection_in, setp); if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) { ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms; timeoutp = &timeout; } /* Wait for some data to arrive. */ for (;;) { if (state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) { ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain); gettimeofday(&start, NULL); } if ((r = select(state->connection_in + 1, setp, NULL, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0) break; if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) break; if (state->packet_timeout_ms == -1) continue; ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain); if (ms_remain <= 0) { r = 0; break; } } if (r == 0) return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT; /* Read data from the socket. */ do { cont = 0; len = roaming_read(state->connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf), &cont); } while (len == 0 && cont); - if (len == 0) - return SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; - if (len < 0) - return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + if (len == 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; + goto out; + } + if (len < 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + goto out; + } /* Append it to the buffer. */ if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len)) != 0) - return r; + goto out; } + out: free(setp); return r; } int ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *ssh) { u_char type; int r; if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return type; } /* * Waits until a packet has been received, verifies that its type matches * that given, and gives a fatal error and exits if there is a mismatch. */ int ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *ssh, u_int expected_type) { int r; u_char type; if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0) return r; if (type != expected_type) { if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: expected packet type %d, got %d", expected_type, type)) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR; } return 0; } /* Checks if a full packet is available in the data received so far via * packet_process_incoming. If so, reads the packet; otherwise returns * SSH_MSG_NONE. This does not wait for data from the connection. * * SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT is handled specially here. Also, * SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages are skipped by this function and are never returned * to higher levels. */ int ssh_packet_read_poll1(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_int len, padded_len; const char *emsg; const u_char *cp; u_char *p; u_int checksum, stored_checksum; int r; *typep = SSH_MSG_NONE; /* Check if input size is less than minimum packet size. */ if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < 4 + 8) return 0; /* Get length of incoming packet. */ len = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(state->input)); if (len < 1 + 2 + 2 || len > 256 * 1024) { if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Bad packet length %u", len)) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT; } padded_len = (len + 8) & ~7; /* Check if the packet has been entirely received. */ if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < 4 + padded_len) return 0; /* The entire packet is in buffer. */ /* Consume packet length. */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, 4)) != 0) goto out; /* * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh * (C)1998 CORE-SDI, Buenos Aires Argentina * Ariel Futoransky(futo@core-sdi.com) */ if (!state->receive_context.plaintext) { emsg = NULL; switch (detect_attack(&state->deattack, sshbuf_ptr(state->input), padded_len)) { case DEATTACK_OK: break; case DEATTACK_DETECTED: emsg = "crc32 compensation attack detected"; break; case DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED: emsg = "deattack denial of service detected"; break; default: emsg = "deattack error"; break; } if (emsg != NULL) { error("%s", emsg); if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "%s", emsg)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT; } } /* Decrypt data to incoming_packet. */ sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet); if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, padded_len, &p)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(&state->receive_context, 0, p, sshbuf_ptr(state->input), padded_len, 0, 0)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, padded_len)) != 0) goto out; #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "read_poll plain: "); sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr); #endif /* Compute packet checksum. */ checksum = ssh_crc32(sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet), sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet) - 4); /* Skip padding. */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->incoming_packet, 8 - len % 8)) != 0) goto out; /* Test check bytes. */ if (len != sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)) { error("%s: len %d != sshbuf_len %zd", __func__, len, sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)); if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid packet length")) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT; } cp = sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet) + len - 4; stored_checksum = PEEK_U32(cp); if (checksum != stored_checksum) { error("Corrupted check bytes on input"); if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "connection corrupted")) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(state->incoming_packet, 4)) < 0) goto out; if (state->packet_compression) { sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer); if ((r = uncompress_buffer(ssh, state->incoming_packet, state->compression_buffer)) != 0) goto out; sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet); if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->incoming_packet, state->compression_buffer)) != 0) goto out; } state->p_read.packets++; state->p_read.bytes += padded_len + 4; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0) goto out; if (*typep < SSH_MSG_MIN || *typep > SSH_MSG_MAX) { error("Invalid ssh1 packet type: %d", *typep); if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "invalid packet type")) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR; } r = 0; out: return r; } int ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_int padlen, need; u_char *cp, macbuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; u_int maclen, aadlen = 0, authlen = 0, block_size; struct sshenc *enc = NULL; struct sshmac *mac = NULL; struct sshcomp *comp = NULL; int r; *typep = SSH_MSG_NONE; if (state->packet_discard) return 0; if (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) { enc = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc; mac = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac; comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp; /* disable mac for authenticated encryption */ if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0) mac = NULL; } maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0; block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8; aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0; if (aadlen && state->packlen == 0) { if (cipher_get_length(&state->receive_context, &state->packlen, state->p_read.seqnr, sshbuf_ptr(state->input), sshbuf_len(state->input)) != 0) return 0; if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 || state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) { #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr); #endif logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen); if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0) return r; } sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet); } else if (state->packlen == 0) { /* * check if input size is less than the cipher block size, * decrypt first block and extract length of incoming packet */ if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < block_size) return 0; sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet); if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, block_size, &cp)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(&state->receive_context, state->p_send.seqnr, cp, sshbuf_ptr(state->input), block_size, 0, 0)) != 0) goto out; state->packlen = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet)); if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 || state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) { #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "input: \n"); sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr); fprintf(stderr, "incoming_packet: \n"); sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr); #endif logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen); return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, state->packlen, PACKET_MAX_SIZE); } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, block_size)) != 0) goto out; } DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", state->packlen+4)); if (aadlen) { /* only the payload is encrypted */ need = state->packlen; } else { /* * the payload size and the payload are encrypted, but we * have a partial packet of block_size bytes */ need = 4 + state->packlen - block_size; } DBG(debug("partial packet: block %d, need %d, maclen %d, authlen %d," " aadlen %d", block_size, need, maclen, authlen, aadlen)); if (need % block_size != 0) { logit("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d", need, block_size, need % block_size); return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, state->packlen, PACKET_MAX_SIZE - block_size); } /* * check if the entire packet has been received and * decrypt into incoming_packet: * 'aadlen' bytes are unencrypted, but authenticated. * 'need' bytes are encrypted, followed by either * 'authlen' bytes of authentication tag or * 'maclen' bytes of message authentication code. */ if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < aadlen + need + authlen + maclen) return 0; #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "read_poll enc/full: "); sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr); #endif /* EtM: compute mac over encrypted input */ if (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) { if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_read.seqnr, sshbuf_ptr(state->input), aadlen + need, macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0) goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, aadlen + need, &cp)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(&state->receive_context, state->p_read.seqnr, cp, sshbuf_ptr(state->input), need, aadlen, authlen)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, aadlen + need + authlen)) != 0) goto out; /* * compute MAC over seqnr and packet, * increment sequence number for incoming packet */ if (mac && mac->enabled) { if (!mac->etm) if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_read.seqnr, sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet), sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet), macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0) goto out; if (timingsafe_bcmp(macbuf, sshbuf_ptr(state->input), mac->mac_len) != 0) { logit("Corrupted MAC on input."); if (need > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, state->packlen, PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need); } DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", state->p_read.seqnr)); if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0) goto out; } if (seqnr_p != NULL) *seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr; if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) logit("incoming seqnr wraps around"); if (++state->p_read.packets == 0) if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)) return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY; state->p_read.blocks += (state->packlen + 4) / block_size; state->p_read.bytes += state->packlen + 4; /* get padlen */ padlen = sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet)[4]; DBG(debug("input: padlen %d", padlen)); if (padlen < 4) { if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Corrupted padlen %d on input.", padlen)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT; } /* skip packet size + padlen, discard padding */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->incoming_packet, 4 + 1)) != 0 || ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(state->incoming_packet, padlen)) != 0)) goto out; DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %zd", sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet))); if (comp && comp->enabled) { sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer); if ((r = uncompress_buffer(ssh, state->incoming_packet, state->compression_buffer)) != 0) goto out; sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet); if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->incoming_packet, state->compression_buffer)) != 0) goto out; DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %zd", sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet))); } /* * get packet type, implies consume. * return length of payload (without type field) */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0) goto out; if (*typep < SSH2_MSG_MIN || *typep >= SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN) { if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid ssh2 packet type: %d", *typep)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) return r; return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR; } if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN); else if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && !state->server_side) r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh); else r = 0; #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "read/plain[%d]:\r\n", *typep); sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr); #endif /* reset for next packet */ state->packlen = 0; out: return r; } int ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_int reason, seqnr; int r; u_char *msg; for (;;) { msg = NULL; if (compat20) { r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p); if (r != 0) return r; if (*typep) { state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep)); } switch (*typep) { case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE: debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE"); break; case SSH2_MSG_DEBUG: if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { if (msg) free(msg); return r; } debug("Remote: %.900s", msg); free(msg); break; case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0) return r; /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */ do_log2(ssh->state->server_side && reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Received disconnect from %s: %u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), reason, msg); free(msg); return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED; case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED: if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0) return r; debug("Received SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for %u", seqnr); break; default: return 0; } } else { r = ssh_packet_read_poll1(ssh, typep); switch (*typep) { case SSH_MSG_NONE: return SSH_MSG_NONE; case SSH_MSG_IGNORE: break; case SSH_MSG_DEBUG: if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0) return r; debug("Remote: %.900s", msg); free(msg); break; case SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT: if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0) return r; logit("Received disconnect from %s: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), msg); free(msg); return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED; default: DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep)); return 0; } } } } /* * Buffers the given amount of input characters. This is intended to be used * together with packet_read_poll. */ int ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *ssh, const char *buf, u_int len) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; int r; if (state->packet_discard) { state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; /* ?? */ if (len >= state->packet_discard) { if ((r = ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh)) != 0) return r; } state->packet_discard -= len; return 0; } if ((r = sshbuf_put(ssh->state->input, buf, len)) != 0) return r; return 0; } int ssh_packet_remaining(struct ssh *ssh) { return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet); } /* * Sends a diagnostic message from the server to the client. This message * can be sent at any time (but not while constructing another message). The * message is printed immediately, but only if the client is being executed * in verbose mode. These messages are primarily intended to ease debugging * authentication problems. The length of the formatted message must not * exceed 1024 bytes. This will automatically call ssh_packet_write_wait. */ void ssh_packet_send_debug(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...) { char buf[1024]; va_list args; int r; if (compat20 && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DEBUG)) return; va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); if (compat20) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DEBUG)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* always display */ (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH_MSG_DEBUG)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } /* * Pretty-print connection-terminating errors and exit. */ void sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *tag, int r) { switch (r) { case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED: logit("Connection closed by %.200s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh)); cleanup_exit(255); case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT: - logit("Connection to %.200s timed out while " - "waiting to write", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh)); + logit("Connection to %.200s timed out", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh)); cleanup_exit(255); + case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED: + logit("Disconnected from %.200s", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh)); + cleanup_exit(255); + case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: + if (errno == ECONNRESET) { + logit("Connection reset by %.200s", + ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh)); + cleanup_exit(255); + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: fatal("%s%sConnection to %.200s: %s", tag != NULL ? tag : "", tag != NULL ? ": " : "", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_err(r)); } } /* * Logs the error plus constructs and sends a disconnect packet, closes the * connection, and exits. This function never returns. The error message * should not contain a newline. The length of the formatted message must * not exceed 1024 bytes. */ void ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...) { char buf[1024]; va_list args; static int disconnecting = 0; int r; if (disconnecting) /* Guard against recursive invocations. */ fatal("packet_disconnect called recursively."); disconnecting = 1; /* * Format the message. Note that the caller must make sure the * message is of limited size. */ va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); /* Display the error locally */ logit("Disconnecting: %.100s", buf); /* * Send the disconnect message to the other side, and wait * for it to get sent. */ if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "%s", buf)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r); if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0) sshpkt_fatal(ssh, __func__, r); /* Close the connection. */ ssh_packet_close(ssh); cleanup_exit(255); } /* * Checks if there is any buffered output, and tries to write some of * the output. */ int ssh_packet_write_poll(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; int len = sshbuf_len(state->output); int cont, r; if (len > 0) { cont = 0; len = roaming_write(state->connection_out, sshbuf_ptr(state->output), len, &cont); if (len == -1) { if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) return 0; return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; } if (len == 0 && !cont) return SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->output, len)) != 0) return r; } return 0; } /* * Calls packet_write_poll repeatedly until all pending output data has been * written. */ int ssh_packet_write_wait(struct ssh *ssh) { fd_set *setp; int ret, r, ms_remain = 0; struct timeval start, timeout, *timeoutp = NULL; struct session_state *state = ssh->state; setp = (fd_set *)calloc(howmany(state->connection_out + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask)); if (setp == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh); while (ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) { memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_out + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask)); FD_SET(state->connection_out, setp); if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) { ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms; timeoutp = &timeout; } for (;;) { if (state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) { ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain); gettimeofday(&start, NULL); } if ((ret = select(state->connection_out + 1, NULL, setp, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0) break; if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) break; if (state->packet_timeout_ms == -1) continue; ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain); if (ms_remain <= 0) { ret = 0; break; } } if (ret == 0) { free(setp); return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT; } if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) { free(setp); return r; } } free(setp); return 0; } /* Returns true if there is buffered data to write to the connection. */ int ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(struct ssh *ssh) { return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) != 0; } /* Returns true if there is not too much data to write to the connection. */ int ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(struct ssh *ssh) { if (ssh->state->interactive_mode) return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) < 16384; else return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) < 128 * 1024; } void ssh_packet_set_tos(struct ssh *ssh, int tos) { #ifndef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) return; switch (ssh_packet_connection_af(ssh)) { # ifdef IP_TOS case AF_INET: debug3("%s: set IP_TOS 0x%02x", __func__, tos); if (setsockopt(ssh->state->connection_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) < 0) error("setsockopt IP_TOS %d: %.100s:", tos, strerror(errno)); break; # endif /* IP_TOS */ # ifdef IPV6_TCLASS case AF_INET6: debug3("%s: set IPV6_TCLASS 0x%02x", __func__, tos); if (setsockopt(ssh->state->connection_in, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_TCLASS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) < 0) error("setsockopt IPV6_TCLASS %d: %.100s:", tos, strerror(errno)); break; # endif /* IPV6_TCLASS */ } #endif /* IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN */ } /* Informs that the current session is interactive. Sets IP flags for that. */ void ssh_packet_set_interactive(struct ssh *ssh, int interactive, int qos_interactive, int qos_bulk) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; if (state->set_interactive_called) return; state->set_interactive_called = 1; /* Record that we are in interactive mode. */ state->interactive_mode = interactive; /* Only set socket options if using a socket. */ if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) return; set_nodelay(state->connection_in); ssh_packet_set_tos(ssh, interactive ? qos_interactive : qos_bulk); } /* Returns true if the current connection is interactive. */ int ssh_packet_is_interactive(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->interactive_mode; } int ssh_packet_set_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh, u_int s) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; if (state->set_maxsize_called) { logit("packet_set_maxsize: called twice: old %d new %d", state->max_packet_size, s); return -1; } if (s < 4 * 1024 || s > 1024 * 1024) { logit("packet_set_maxsize: bad size %d", s); return -1; } state->set_maxsize_called = 1; debug("packet_set_maxsize: setting to %d", s); state->max_packet_size = s; return s; } int ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh) { return ++ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts; } void ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh, int ka) { ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts = ka; } u_int ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh) { return ssh->state->max_packet_size; } /* * 9.2. Ignored Data Message * * byte SSH_MSG_IGNORE * string data * * All implementations MUST understand (and ignore) this message at any * time (after receiving the protocol version). No implementation is * required to send them. This message can be used as an additional * protection measure against advanced traffic analysis techniques. */ void ssh_packet_send_ignore(struct ssh *ssh, int nbytes) { u_int32_t rnd = 0; int r, i; if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, compat20 ? SSH2_MSG_IGNORE : SSH_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, nbytes)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) { if (i % 4 == 0) rnd = arc4random(); if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, (u_char)rnd & 0xff)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); rnd >>= 8; } } #define MAX_PACKETS (1U<<31) int ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY) return 0; return (state->p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS) || (state->p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS) || (state->max_blocks_out && (state->p_send.blocks > state->max_blocks_out)) || (state->max_blocks_in && (state->p_read.blocks > state->max_blocks_in)) || (state->rekey_interval != 0 && state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime()); } void ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t bytes, time_t seconds) { debug3("rekey after %lld bytes, %d seconds", (long long)bytes, (int)seconds); ssh->state->rekey_limit = bytes; ssh->state->rekey_interval = seconds; } time_t ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(struct ssh *ssh) { time_t seconds; seconds = ssh->state->rekey_time + ssh->state->rekey_interval - monotime(); return (seconds <= 0 ? 1 : seconds); } void ssh_packet_set_server(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh->state->server_side = 1; } void ssh_packet_set_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh) { ssh->state->after_authentication = 1; } void * ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *ssh) { return (void *)ssh->state->input; } void * ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh) { return (void *)ssh->state->output; } /* XXX TODO update roaming to new API (does not work anyway) */ /* * Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when * resuming a suspended connection. */ void ssh_packet_backup_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct ssh *backup_state) { struct ssh *tmp; close(ssh->state->connection_in); ssh->state->connection_in = -1; close(ssh->state->connection_out); ssh->state->connection_out = -1; if (backup_state) tmp = backup_state; else tmp = ssh_alloc_session_state(); backup_state = ssh; ssh = tmp; } /* XXX FIXME FIXME FIXME */ /* * Swap in the old state when resuming a connecion. */ void ssh_packet_restore_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct ssh *backup_state) { struct ssh *tmp; u_int len; int r; tmp = backup_state; backup_state = ssh; ssh = tmp; ssh->state->connection_in = backup_state->state->connection_in; backup_state->state->connection_in = -1; ssh->state->connection_out = backup_state->state->connection_out; backup_state->state->connection_out = -1; len = sshbuf_len(backup_state->state->input); if (len > 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_putb(ssh->state->input, backup_state->state->input)) != 0) fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_reset(backup_state->state->input); add_recv_bytes(len); } } /* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */ static int ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh) { struct sshcomp *comp; int r, mode; debug("%s: called", __func__); /* This was set in net child, but is not visible in user child */ ssh->state->after_authentication = 1; ssh->state->rekeying = 0; for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { if (ssh->state->newkeys[mode] == NULL) continue; comp = &ssh->state->newkeys[mode]->comp; if (comp && comp->enabled && (r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0) return r; } return 0; } /* Packet state (de-)serialization for privsep */ /* turn kex into a blob for packet state serialization */ static int kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex) { int r; if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->we_need)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, kex->client_version_string)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, kex->server_version_string)) != 0) return r; return 0; } /* turn key exchange results into a blob for packet state serialization */ static int newkeys_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode) { struct sshbuf *b; struct sshcipher_ctx *cc; struct sshcomp *comp; struct sshenc *enc; struct sshmac *mac; struct newkeys *newkey; int r; if ((newkey = ssh->state->newkeys[mode]) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; enc = &newkey->enc; mac = &newkey->mac; comp = &newkey->comp; cc = (mode == MODE_OUT) ? &ssh->state->send_context : &ssh->state->receive_context; if ((r = cipher_get_keyiv(cc, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0) return r; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* The cipher struct is constant and shared, you export pointer */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, enc->name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->enabled)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->block_size)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->key, enc->key_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0) goto out; if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, mac->name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, mac->enabled)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, mac->key, mac->key_len)) != 0) goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, comp->type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, comp->enabled)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comp->name)) != 0) goto out; r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b); out: if (b != NULL) sshbuf_free(b); return r; } /* serialize packet state into a blob */ int ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; u_char *p; size_t slen, rlen; int r, ssh1cipher; if (!compat20) { ssh1cipher = cipher_get_number(state->receive_context.cipher); slen = cipher_get_keyiv_len(&state->send_context); rlen = cipher_get_keyiv_len(&state->receive_context); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->remote_protocol_flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ssh1cipher)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(m, state->ssh1_key, state->ssh1_keylen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, slen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_reserve(m, slen, &p)) != 0 || (r = cipher_get_keyiv(&state->send_context, p, slen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, rlen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_reserve(m, rlen, &p)) != 0 || (r = cipher_get_keyiv(&state->receive_context, p, rlen)) != 0) return r; } else { if ((r = kex_to_blob(m, ssh->kex)) != 0 || (r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 || (r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->rekey_limit)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->rekey_interval)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.packets)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.packets)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.bytes)) != 0) return r; } slen = cipher_get_keycontext(&state->send_context, NULL); rlen = cipher_get_keycontext(&state->receive_context, NULL); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, slen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_reserve(m, slen, &p)) != 0) return r; if (cipher_get_keycontext(&state->send_context, p) != (int)slen) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, rlen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_reserve(m, rlen, &p)) != 0) return r; if (cipher_get_keycontext(&state->receive_context, p) != (int)rlen) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((r = ssh_packet_get_compress_state(m, ssh)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->input)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->output)) != 0) return r; if (compat20) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, get_sent_bytes())) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, get_recv_bytes())) != 0) return r; } return 0; } /* restore key exchange results from blob for packet state de-serialization */ static int newkeys_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode) { struct sshbuf *b = NULL; struct sshcomp *comp; struct sshenc *enc; struct sshmac *mac; struct newkeys *newkey = NULL; size_t keylen, ivlen, maclen; int r; if ((newkey = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkey))) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0) goto out; #ifdef DEBUG_PK sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); #endif enc = &newkey->enc; mac = &newkey->mac; comp = &newkey->comp; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &enc->name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get(b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&enc->enabled)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &enc->block_size)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->key, &keylen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->iv, &ivlen)) != 0) goto out; if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &mac->name, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = mac_setup(mac, mac->name)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&mac->enabled)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &mac->key, &maclen)) != 0) goto out; if (maclen > mac->key_len) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } mac->key_len = maclen; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &comp->type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&comp->enabled)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &comp->name, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if (enc->name == NULL || cipher_by_name(enc->name) != enc->cipher) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } enc->key_len = keylen; enc->iv_len = ivlen; ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = newkey; newkey = NULL; r = 0; out: if (newkey != NULL) free(newkey); if (b != NULL) sshbuf_free(b); return r; } /* restore kex from blob for packet state de-serialization */ static int kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp) { struct kex *kex; int r; if ((kex = calloc(1, sizeof(struct kex))) == NULL || (kex->my = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (kex->peer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &kex->session_id, &kex->session_id_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->we_need)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &kex->client_version_string, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &kex->server_version_string, NULL)) != 0) goto out; kex->server = 1; kex->done = 1; r = 0; out: if (r != 0 || kexp == NULL) { if (kex != NULL) { if (kex->my != NULL) sshbuf_free(kex->my); if (kex->peer != NULL) sshbuf_free(kex->peer); free(kex); } if (kexp != NULL) *kexp = NULL; } else { *kexp = kex; } return r; } /* * Restore packet state from content of blob 'm' (de-serialization). * Note that 'm' will be partially consumed on parsing or any other errors. */ int ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m) { struct session_state *state = ssh->state; const u_char *ssh1key, *ivin, *ivout, *keyin, *keyout, *input, *output; size_t ssh1keylen, rlen, slen, ilen, olen; int r; u_int ssh1cipher = 0; u_int64_t sent_bytes = 0, recv_bytes = 0; if (!compat20) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->remote_protocol_flags)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ssh1cipher)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ssh1key, &ssh1keylen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ivout, &slen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &ivin, &rlen)) != 0) return r; if (ssh1cipher > INT_MAX) return SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER; ssh_packet_set_encryption_key(ssh, ssh1key, ssh1keylen, (int)ssh1cipher); if (cipher_get_keyiv_len(&state->send_context) != (int)slen || cipher_get_keyiv_len(&state->receive_context) != (int)rlen) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; if ((r = cipher_set_keyiv(&state->send_context, ivout)) != 0 || (r = cipher_set_keyiv(&state->receive_context, ivin)) != 0) return r; } else { if ((r = kex_from_blob(m, &ssh->kex)) != 0 || (r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 || (r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->rekey_limit)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->rekey_interval)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.packets)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.packets)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.bytes)) != 0) return r; /* * We set the time here so that in post-auth privsep slave we * count from the completion of the authentication. */ state->rekey_time = monotime(); /* XXX ssh_set_newkeys overrides p_read.packets? XXX */ if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 || (r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0) return r; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &keyout, &slen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &keyin, &rlen)) != 0) return r; if (cipher_get_keycontext(&state->send_context, NULL) != (int)slen || cipher_get_keycontext(&state->receive_context, NULL) != (int)rlen) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; cipher_set_keycontext(&state->send_context, keyout); cipher_set_keycontext(&state->receive_context, keyin); if ((r = ssh_packet_set_compress_state(ssh, m)) != 0 || (r = ssh_packet_set_postauth(ssh)) != 0) return r; sshbuf_reset(state->input); sshbuf_reset(state->output); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &input, &ilen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &output, &olen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(state->input, input, ilen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(state->output, output, olen)) != 0) return r; if (compat20) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &sent_bytes)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &recv_bytes)) != 0) return r; roam_set_bytes(sent_bytes, recv_bytes); } if (sshbuf_len(m)) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; debug3("%s: done", __func__); return 0; } /* NEW API */ /* put data to the outgoing packet */ int sshpkt_put(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len) { return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, len); } int sshpkt_putb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *b) { return sshbuf_putb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, b); } int sshpkt_put_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char val) { return sshbuf_put_u8(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val); } int sshpkt_put_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t val) { return sshbuf_put_u32(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val); } int sshpkt_put_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t val) { return sshbuf_put_u64(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val); } int sshpkt_put_string(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len) { return sshbuf_put_string(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, len); } int sshpkt_put_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v) { return sshbuf_put_cstring(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v); } int sshpkt_put_stringb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *v) { return sshbuf_put_stringb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v); } -#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC int sshpkt_put_ec(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g) { return sshbuf_put_ec(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, g); } -#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #ifdef WITH_SSH1 int sshpkt_put_bignum1(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v) { return sshbuf_put_bignum1(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v); } #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ -#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL int sshpkt_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v) { return sshbuf_put_bignum2(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v); } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ /* fetch data from the incoming packet */ int sshpkt_get(struct ssh *ssh, void *valp, size_t len) { return sshbuf_get(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, len); } int sshpkt_get_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *valp) { return sshbuf_get_u8(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp); } int sshpkt_get_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t *valp) { return sshbuf_get_u32(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp); } int sshpkt_get_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *valp) { return sshbuf_get_u64(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp); } int sshpkt_get_string(struct ssh *ssh, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) { return sshbuf_get_string(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp); } int sshpkt_get_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) { return sshbuf_get_string_direct(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp); } int sshpkt_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, char **valp, size_t *lenp) { return sshbuf_get_cstring(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp); } -#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC int sshpkt_get_ec(struct ssh *ssh, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g) { return sshbuf_get_ec(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v, g); } -#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #ifdef WITH_SSH1 int sshpkt_get_bignum1(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v) { return sshbuf_get_bignum1(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v); } #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ -#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL int sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM *v) { return sshbuf_get_bignum2(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v); } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ int sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh) { if (sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet) > 0) return SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; return 0; } const u_char * sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp) { if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet); return sshbuf_ptr(ssh->state->incoming_packet); } /* start a new packet */ int sshpkt_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type) { u_char buf[9]; int len; DBG(debug("packet_start[%d]", type)); len = compat20 ? 6 : 9; memset(buf, 0, len - 1); buf[len - 1] = type; sshbuf_reset(ssh->state->outgoing_packet); return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, buf, len); } /* send it */ int sshpkt_send(struct ssh *ssh) { if (compat20) return ssh_packet_send2(ssh); else return ssh_packet_send1(ssh); } int sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...) { char buf[1024]; va_list args; int r; va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); if (compat20) { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) return r; } else { if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) return r; } return 0; } /* roundup current message to pad bytes */ int sshpkt_add_padding(struct ssh *ssh, u_char pad) { ssh->state->extra_pad = pad; return 0; } Index: head/crypto/openssh/readconf.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/readconf.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/readconf.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,2432 +1,2433 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.232 2015/02/16 22:13:32 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.237 2015/06/26 05:13:20 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions for reading the configuration files. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H #include #endif #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) # include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "match.h" #include "kex.h" #include "mac.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "digest.h" #include "version.h" /* Format of the configuration file: # Configuration data is parsed as follows: # 1. command line options # 2. user-specific file # 3. system-wide file # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set. # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the # configuration file, and defaults at the end. # Host-specific declarations. These may override anything above. A single # host may match multiple declarations; these are processed in the order # that they are given in. Host *.ngs.fi ngs.fi User foo Host fake.com HostName another.host.name.real.org User blaah Port 34289 ForwardX11 no ForwardAgent no Host books.com RemoteForward 9999 shadows.cs.hut.fi:9999 Cipher 3des Host fascist.blob.com Port 23123 User tylonen PasswordAuthentication no Host puukko.hut.fi User t35124p ProxyCommand ssh-proxy %h %p Host *.fr PublicKeyAuthentication no Host *.su Cipher none PasswordAuthentication no Host vpn.fake.com Tunnel yes TunnelDevice 3 # Defaults for various options Host * ForwardAgent no ForwardX11 no PasswordAuthentication yes RSAAuthentication yes RhostsRSAAuthentication yes StrictHostKeyChecking yes TcpKeepAlive no IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity Port 22 EscapeChar ~ */ /* Keyword tokens. */ typedef enum { oBadOption, oHost, oMatch, oForwardAgent, oForwardX11, oForwardX11Trusted, oForwardX11Timeout, oGatewayPorts, oExitOnForwardFailure, oPasswordAuthentication, oRSAAuthentication, oChallengeResponseAuthentication, oXAuthLocation, oIdentityFile, oHostName, oPort, oCipher, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward, oUser, oEscapeChar, oRhostsRSAAuthentication, oProxyCommand, oGlobalKnownHostsFile, oUserKnownHostsFile, oConnectionAttempts, oBatchMode, oCheckHostIP, oStrictHostKeyChecking, oCompression, oCompressionLevel, oTCPKeepAlive, oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, oUsePrivilegedPort, oLogLevel, oCiphers, oProtocol, oMacs, oPubkeyAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias, oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication, oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oPKCS11Provider, oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, oHashKnownHosts, oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oVisualHostKey, oUseRoaming, oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass, oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots, oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs, oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys, oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes, oVersionAddendum, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported } OpCodes; /* Textual representations of the tokens. */ static struct { const char *name; OpCodes opcode; } keywords[] = { { "forwardagent", oForwardAgent }, { "forwardx11", oForwardX11 }, { "forwardx11trusted", oForwardX11Trusted }, { "forwardx11timeout", oForwardX11Timeout }, { "exitonforwardfailure", oExitOnForwardFailure }, { "xauthlocation", oXAuthLocation }, { "gatewayports", oGatewayPorts }, { "useprivilegedport", oUsePrivilegedPort }, { "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated }, { "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication }, { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication }, { "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices }, { "rsaauthentication", oRSAAuthentication }, { "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, { "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, /* alias */ { "rhostsrsaauthentication", oRhostsRSAAuthentication }, { "hostbasedauthentication", oHostbasedAuthentication }, { "challengeresponseauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, { "skeyauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */ { "tisauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */ { "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported }, { "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported }, { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported }, #if defined(GSSAPI) { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, #else { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, #endif { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated }, { "usersh", oDeprecated }, { "identityfile", oIdentityFile }, { "identityfile2", oIdentityFile }, /* obsolete */ { "identitiesonly", oIdentitiesOnly }, { "hostname", oHostName }, { "hostkeyalias", oHostKeyAlias }, { "proxycommand", oProxyCommand }, { "port", oPort }, { "cipher", oCipher }, { "ciphers", oCiphers }, { "macs", oMacs }, { "protocol", oProtocol }, { "remoteforward", oRemoteForward }, { "localforward", oLocalForward }, { "user", oUser }, { "host", oHost }, { "match", oMatch }, { "escapechar", oEscapeChar }, { "globalknownhostsfile", oGlobalKnownHostsFile }, { "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated }, { "userknownhostsfile", oUserKnownHostsFile }, { "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated }, { "connectionattempts", oConnectionAttempts }, { "batchmode", oBatchMode }, { "checkhostip", oCheckHostIP }, { "stricthostkeychecking", oStrictHostKeyChecking }, { "compression", oCompression }, { "compressionlevel", oCompressionLevel }, { "tcpkeepalive", oTCPKeepAlive }, { "keepalive", oTCPKeepAlive }, /* obsolete */ { "numberofpasswordprompts", oNumberOfPasswordPrompts }, { "loglevel", oLogLevel }, { "dynamicforward", oDynamicForward }, { "preferredauthentications", oPreferredAuthentications }, { "hostkeyalgorithms", oHostKeyAlgorithms }, { "bindaddress", oBindAddress }, #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 { "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider }, { "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider }, #else { "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported }, { "pkcs11provider", oUnsupported }, #endif { "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings }, { "enablesshkeysign", oEnableSSHKeysign }, { "verifyhostkeydns", oVerifyHostKeyDNS }, { "nohostauthenticationforlocalhost", oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost }, { "rekeylimit", oRekeyLimit }, { "connecttimeout", oConnectTimeout }, { "addressfamily", oAddressFamily }, { "serveraliveinterval", oServerAliveInterval }, { "serveralivecountmax", oServerAliveCountMax }, { "sendenv", oSendEnv }, { "controlpath", oControlPath }, { "controlmaster", oControlMaster }, { "controlpersist", oControlPersist }, { "hashknownhosts", oHashKnownHosts }, { "tunnel", oTunnel }, { "tunneldevice", oTunnelDevice }, { "localcommand", oLocalCommand }, { "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand }, { "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey }, { "useroaming", oUseRoaming }, { "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms }, { "ipqos", oIPQoS }, { "requesttty", oRequestTTY }, { "proxyusefdpass", oProxyUseFdpass }, { "canonicaldomains", oCanonicalDomains }, { "canonicalizefallbacklocal", oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal }, { "canonicalizehostname", oCanonicalizeHostname }, { "canonicalizemaxdots", oCanonicalizeMaxDots }, { "canonicalizepermittedcnames", oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs }, { "streamlocalbindmask", oStreamLocalBindMask }, { "streamlocalbindunlink", oStreamLocalBindUnlink }, { "revokedhostkeys", oRevokedHostKeys }, { "fingerprinthash", oFingerprintHash }, { "updatehostkeys", oUpdateHostkeys }, { "hostbasedkeytypes", oHostbasedKeyTypes }, { "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown }, { "hpndisabled", oDeprecated }, { "hpnbuffersize", oDeprecated }, { "tcprcvbufpoll", oDeprecated }, { "tcprcvbuf", oDeprecated }, { "versionaddendum", oVersionAddendum }, { NULL, oBadOption } }; /* * Adds a local TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is an * error. */ void add_local_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd) { struct Forward *fwd; #ifndef NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT extern uid_t original_real_uid; int ipport_reserved; #ifdef __FreeBSD__ size_t len_ipport_reserved = sizeof(ipport_reserved); if (sysctlbyname("net.inet.ip.portrange.reservedhigh", &ipport_reserved, &len_ipport_reserved, NULL, 0) != 0) ipport_reserved = IPPORT_RESERVED; else ipport_reserved++; #else ipport_reserved = IPPORT_RESERVED; #endif if (newfwd->listen_port < ipport_reserved && original_real_uid != 0) if (newfwd->listen_port < ipport_reserved && original_real_uid != 0 && newfwd->listen_path == NULL) fatal("Privileged ports can only be forwarded by root."); #endif - options->local_forwards = xrealloc(options->local_forwards, + options->local_forwards = xreallocarray(options->local_forwards, options->num_local_forwards + 1, sizeof(*options->local_forwards)); fwd = &options->local_forwards[options->num_local_forwards++]; fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host; fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port; fwd->listen_path = newfwd->listen_path; fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host; fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port; fwd->connect_path = newfwd->connect_path; } /* * Adds a remote TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is * an error. */ void add_remote_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd) { struct Forward *fwd; - options->remote_forwards = xrealloc(options->remote_forwards, + options->remote_forwards = xreallocarray(options->remote_forwards, options->num_remote_forwards + 1, sizeof(*options->remote_forwards)); fwd = &options->remote_forwards[options->num_remote_forwards++]; fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host; fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port; fwd->listen_path = newfwd->listen_path; fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host; fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port; fwd->connect_path = newfwd->connect_path; fwd->handle = newfwd->handle; fwd->allocated_port = 0; } static void clear_forwardings(Options *options) { int i; for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) { free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_host); free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_path); free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_host); free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_path); } if (options->num_local_forwards > 0) { free(options->local_forwards); options->local_forwards = NULL; } options->num_local_forwards = 0; for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) { free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_host); free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_path); free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_host); free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_path); } if (options->num_remote_forwards > 0) { free(options->remote_forwards); options->remote_forwards = NULL; } options->num_remote_forwards = 0; options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; } void add_identity_file(Options *options, const char *dir, const char *filename, int userprovided) { char *path; int i; if (options->num_identity_files >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) fatal("Too many identity files specified (max %d)", SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES); if (dir == NULL) /* no dir, filename is absolute */ path = xstrdup(filename); else (void)xasprintf(&path, "%.100s%.100s", dir, filename); /* Avoid registering duplicates */ for (i = 0; i < options->num_identity_files; i++) { if (options->identity_file_userprovided[i] == userprovided && strcmp(options->identity_files[i], path) == 0) { debug2("%s: ignoring duplicate key %s", __func__, path); free(path); return; } } options->identity_file_userprovided[options->num_identity_files] = userprovided; options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files++] = path; } int default_ssh_port(void) { static int port; struct servent *sp; if (port == 0) { sp = getservbyname(SSH_SERVICE_NAME, "tcp"); port = sp ? ntohs(sp->s_port) : SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; } return port; } /* * Execute a command in a shell. * Return its exit status or -1 on abnormal exit. */ static int execute_in_shell(const char *cmd) { char *shell, *command_string; pid_t pid; int devnull, status; extern uid_t original_real_uid; if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL) shell = _PATH_BSHELL; /* * Use "exec" to avoid "sh -c" processes on some platforms * (e.g. Solaris) */ xasprintf(&command_string, "exec %s", cmd); /* Need this to redirect subprocess stdin/out */ if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno)); debug("Executing command: '%.500s'", cmd); /* Fork and execute the command. */ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { char *argv[4]; /* Child. Permanently give up superuser privileges. */ permanently_drop_suid(original_real_uid); /* Redirect child stdin and stdout. Leave stderr */ if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); if (dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) close(devnull); closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); argv[0] = shell; argv[1] = "-c"; argv[2] = command_string; argv[3] = NULL; execv(argv[0], argv); error("Unable to execute '%.100s': %s", cmd, strerror(errno)); /* Die with signal to make this error apparent to parent. */ signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); kill(getpid(), SIGTERM); _exit(1); } /* Parent. */ if (pid < 0) fatal("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(devnull); free(command_string); while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN) fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } if (!WIFEXITED(status)) { error("command '%.100s' exited abnormally", cmd); return -1; } debug3("command returned status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status)); return WEXITSTATUS(status); } /* * Parse and execute a Match directive. */ static int match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **condition, struct passwd *pw, const char *host_arg, const char *original_host, int post_canon, const char *filename, int linenum) { char *arg, *oattrib, *attrib, *cmd, *cp = *condition, *host, *criteria; const char *ruser; int r, port, this_result, result = 1, attributes = 0, negate; - size_t len; char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; /* * Configuration is likely to be incomplete at this point so we * must be prepared to use default values. */ port = options->port <= 0 ? default_ssh_port() : options->port; ruser = options->user == NULL ? pw->pw_name : options->user; if (options->hostname != NULL) { /* NB. Please keep in sync with ssh.c:main() */ host = percent_expand(options->hostname, "h", host_arg, (char *)NULL); } else host = xstrdup(host_arg); debug2("checking match for '%s' host %s originally %s", cp, host, original_host); while ((oattrib = attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') { criteria = NULL; this_result = 1; if ((negate = attrib[0] == '!')) attrib++; /* criteria "all" and "canonical" have no argument */ if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) { if (attributes > 1 || ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')) { error("%.200s line %d: '%s' cannot be combined " "with other Match attributes", filename, linenum, oattrib); result = -1; goto out; } if (result) result = negate ? 0 : 1; goto out; } attributes++; if (strcasecmp(attrib, "canonical") == 0) { r = !!post_canon; /* force bitmask member to boolean */ if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; debug3("%.200s line %d: %smatched '%s'", filename, linenum, this_result ? "" : "not ", oattrib); continue; } /* All other criteria require an argument */ if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') { error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib); result = -1; goto out; } - len = strlen(arg); if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) { criteria = xstrdup(host); - r = match_hostname(host, arg, len) == 1; + r = match_hostname(host, arg) == 1; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "originalhost") == 0) { criteria = xstrdup(original_host); - r = match_hostname(original_host, arg, len) == 1; + r = match_hostname(original_host, arg) == 1; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) { criteria = xstrdup(ruser); - r = match_pattern_list(ruser, arg, len, 0) == 1; + r = match_pattern_list(ruser, arg, 0) == 1; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localuser") == 0) { criteria = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); - r = match_pattern_list(pw->pw_name, arg, len, 0) == 1; + r = match_pattern_list(pw->pw_name, arg, 0) == 1; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "exec") == 0) { if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1) fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); strlcpy(shorthost, thishost, sizeof(shorthost)); shorthost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0'; snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", port); cmd = percent_expand(arg, "L", shorthost, "d", pw->pw_dir, "h", host, "l", thishost, "n", original_host, "p", portstr, "r", ruser, "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); if (result != 1) { /* skip execution if prior predicate failed */ debug3("%.200s line %d: skipped exec " "\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, cmd); free(cmd); continue; } r = execute_in_shell(cmd); if (r == -1) { fatal("%.200s line %d: match exec " "'%.100s' error", filename, linenum, cmd); } criteria = xstrdup(cmd); free(cmd); /* Force exit status to boolean */ r = r == 0; if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0)) this_result = result = 0; } else { error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib); result = -1; goto out; } debug3("%.200s line %d: %smatched '%s \"%.100s\"' ", filename, linenum, this_result ? "": "not ", oattrib, criteria); free(criteria); } if (attributes == 0) { error("One or more attributes required for Match"); result = -1; goto out; } out: if (result != -1) debug2("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not "); *condition = cp; free(host); return result; } /* Check and prepare a domain name: removes trailing '.' and lowercases */ static void valid_domain(char *name, const char *filename, int linenum) { size_t i, l = strlen(name); u_char c, last = '\0'; if (l == 0) fatal("%s line %d: empty hostname suffix", filename, linenum); if (!isalpha((u_char)name[0]) && !isdigit((u_char)name[0])) fatal("%s line %d: hostname suffix \"%.100s\" " "starts with invalid character", filename, linenum, name); for (i = 0; i < l; i++) { c = tolower((u_char)name[i]); name[i] = (char)c; if (last == '.' && c == '.') fatal("%s line %d: hostname suffix \"%.100s\" contains " "consecutive separators", filename, linenum, name); if (c != '.' && c != '-' && !isalnum(c) && c != '_') /* technically invalid, but common */ fatal("%s line %d: hostname suffix \"%.100s\" contains " "invalid characters", filename, linenum, name); last = c; } if (name[l - 1] == '.') name[l - 1] = '\0'; } /* * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or oBadOption. */ static OpCodes parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum, const char *ignored_unknown) { int i; for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) if (strcmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) return keywords[i].opcode; - if (ignored_unknown != NULL && match_pattern_list(cp, ignored_unknown, - strlen(ignored_unknown), 1) == 1) + if (ignored_unknown != NULL && + match_pattern_list(cp, ignored_unknown, 1) == 1) return oIgnoredUnknownOption; error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s", filename, linenum, cp); return oBadOption; } /* Multistate option parsing */ struct multistate { char *key; int value; }; static const struct multistate multistate_flag[] = { { "true", 1 }, { "false", 0 }, { "yes", 1 }, { "no", 0 }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoask[] = { { "true", 1 }, { "false", 0 }, { "yes", 1 }, { "no", 0 }, { "ask", 2 }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = { { "inet", AF_INET }, { "inet6", AF_INET6 }, { "any", AF_UNSPEC }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_controlmaster[] = { { "true", SSHCTL_MASTER_YES }, { "yes", SSHCTL_MASTER_YES }, { "false", SSHCTL_MASTER_NO }, { "no", SSHCTL_MASTER_NO }, { "auto", SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO }, { "ask", SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK }, { "autoask", SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_tunnel[] = { { "ethernet", SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET }, { "point-to-point", SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT }, { "true", SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT }, { "yes", SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT }, { "false", SSH_TUNMODE_NO }, { "no", SSH_TUNMODE_NO }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_requesttty[] = { { "true", REQUEST_TTY_YES }, { "yes", REQUEST_TTY_YES }, { "false", REQUEST_TTY_NO }, { "no", REQUEST_TTY_NO }, { "force", REQUEST_TTY_FORCE }, { "auto", REQUEST_TTY_AUTO }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_canonicalizehostname[] = { { "true", SSH_CANONICALISE_YES }, { "false", SSH_CANONICALISE_NO }, { "yes", SSH_CANONICALISE_YES }, { "no", SSH_CANONICALISE_NO }, { "always", SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS }, { NULL, -1 } }; /* * Processes a single option line as used in the configuration files. This * only sets those values that have not already been set. */ #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" int process_config_line(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, const char *original_host, char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, int flags) { char *s, **charptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg, *arg2; char **cpptr, fwdarg[256]; u_int i, *uintptr, max_entries = 0; int negated, opcode, *intptr, value, value2, cmdline = 0; LogLevel *log_level_ptr; long long val64; size_t len; struct Forward fwd; const struct multistate *multistate_ptr; struct allowed_cname *cname; if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */ cmdline = 1; activep = &cmdline; } /* Strip trailing whitespace */ - for (len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) { + if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0) + return 0; + for (len--; len > 0; len--) { if (strchr(WHITESPACE, line[len]) == NULL) break; line[len] = '\0'; } s = line; /* Get the keyword. (Each line is supposed to begin with a keyword). */ if ((keyword = strdelim(&s)) == NULL) return 0; /* Ignore leading whitespace. */ if (*keyword == '\0') keyword = strdelim(&s); if (keyword == NULL || !*keyword || *keyword == '\n' || *keyword == '#') return 0; /* Match lowercase keyword */ lowercase(keyword); opcode = parse_token(keyword, filename, linenum, options->ignored_unknown); switch (opcode) { case oBadOption: /* don't panic, but count bad options */ return -1; /* NOTREACHED */ case oIgnoredUnknownOption: debug("%s line %d: Ignored unknown option \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword); return 0; case oConnectTimeout: intptr = &options->connection_timeout; parse_time: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.", filename, linenum); if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) value = -1; else if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oForwardAgent: intptr = &options->forward_agent; parse_flag: multistate_ptr = multistate_flag; parse_multistate: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = -1; for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) { value = multistate_ptr[i].value; break; } } if (value == -1) fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oForwardX11: intptr = &options->forward_x11; goto parse_flag; case oForwardX11Trusted: intptr = &options->forward_x11_trusted; goto parse_flag; case oForwardX11Timeout: intptr = &options->forward_x11_timeout; goto parse_time; case oGatewayPorts: intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports; goto parse_flag; case oExitOnForwardFailure: intptr = &options->exit_on_forward_failure; goto parse_flag; case oUsePrivilegedPort: intptr = &options->use_privileged_port; goto parse_flag; case oPasswordAuthentication: intptr = &options->password_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oKbdInteractiveAuthentication: intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oKbdInteractiveDevices: charptr = &options->kbd_interactive_devices; goto parse_string; case oPubkeyAuthentication: intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oRSAAuthentication: intptr = &options->rsa_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oRhostsRSAAuthentication: intptr = &options->rhosts_rsa_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oHostbasedAuthentication: intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oChallengeResponseAuthentication: intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oGssAuthentication: intptr = &options->gss_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oGssDelegateCreds: intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; goto parse_flag; case oBatchMode: intptr = &options->batch_mode; goto parse_flag; case oCheckHostIP: intptr = &options->check_host_ip; goto parse_flag; case oVerifyHostKeyDNS: intptr = &options->verify_host_key_dns; multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask; goto parse_multistate; case oStrictHostKeyChecking: intptr = &options->strict_host_key_checking; multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask; goto parse_multistate; case oCompression: intptr = &options->compression; goto parse_flag; case oTCPKeepAlive: intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive; goto parse_flag; case oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost: intptr = &options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost; goto parse_flag; case oNumberOfPasswordPrompts: intptr = &options->number_of_password_prompts; goto parse_int; case oCompressionLevel: intptr = &options->compression_level; goto parse_int; case oRekeyLimit: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) { val64 = 0; } else { if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s", filename, linenum, arg, strerror(errno)); /* check for too-large or too-small limits */ if (val64 > UINT_MAX) fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too large", filename, linenum); if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16) fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small", filename, linenum); } if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1) options->rekey_limit = (u_int32_t)val64; if (s != NULL) { /* optional rekey interval present */ if (strcmp(s, "none") == 0) { (void)strdelim(&s); /* discard */ break; } intptr = &options->rekey_interval; goto parse_time; } break; case oIdentityFile: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (*activep) { intptr = &options->num_identity_files; if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) fatal("%.200s line %d: Too many identity files specified (max %d).", filename, linenum, SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES); add_identity_file(options, NULL, arg, flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF); } break; case oXAuthLocation: charptr=&options->xauth_location; goto parse_string; case oUser: charptr = &options->user; parse_string: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case oGlobalKnownHostsFile: cpptr = (char **)&options->system_hostfiles; uintptr = &options->num_system_hostfiles; max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES; parse_char_array: if (*activep && *uintptr == 0) { while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { if ((*uintptr) >= max_entries) fatal("%s line %d: " "too many authorized keys files.", filename, linenum); cpptr[(*uintptr)++] = xstrdup(arg); } } return 0; case oUserKnownHostsFile: cpptr = (char **)&options->user_hostfiles; uintptr = &options->num_user_hostfiles; max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES; goto parse_char_array; case oHostName: charptr = &options->hostname; goto parse_string; case oHostKeyAlias: charptr = &options->host_key_alias; goto parse_string; case oPreferredAuthentications: charptr = &options->preferred_authentications; goto parse_string; case oBindAddress: charptr = &options->bind_address; goto parse_string; case oPKCS11Provider: charptr = &options->pkcs11_provider; goto parse_string; case oProxyCommand: charptr = &options->proxy_command; parse_command: if (s == NULL) fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); len = strspn(s, WHITESPACE "="); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(s + len); return 0; case oPort: intptr = &options->port; parse_int: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (arg[0] < '0' || arg[0] > '9') fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum); /* Octal, decimal, or hex format? */ value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 0); if (arg == endofnumber) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oConnectionAttempts: intptr = &options->connection_attempts; goto parse_int; case oCipher: intptr = &options->cipher; arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = cipher_number(arg); if (value == -1) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad cipher '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oCiphers: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (!ciphers_valid(arg)) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && options->ciphers == NULL) options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg); break; case oMacs: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (!mac_valid(arg)) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 Mac spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && options->macs == NULL) options->macs = xstrdup(arg); break; case oKexAlgorithms: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (!kex_names_valid(arg)) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL) options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); break; case oHostKeyAlgorithms: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (!sshkey_names_valid2(arg, 1)) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad protocol 2 host key algorithms '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && options->hostkeyalgorithms == NULL) options->hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup(arg); break; case oProtocol: intptr = &options->protocol; arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = proto_spec(arg); if (value == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad protocol spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *intptr == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) *intptr = value; break; case oLogLevel: log_level_ptr = &options->log_level; arg = strdelim(&s); value = log_level_number(arg); if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *log_level_ptr == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) *log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value; break; case oLocalForward: case oRemoteForward: case oDynamicForward: arg = strdelim(&s); if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing port argument.", filename, linenum); if (opcode == oLocalForward || opcode == oRemoteForward) { arg2 = strdelim(&s); if (arg2 == NULL || *arg2 == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing target argument.", filename, linenum); /* construct a string for parse_forward */ snprintf(fwdarg, sizeof(fwdarg), "%s:%s", arg, arg2); } else if (opcode == oDynamicForward) { strlcpy(fwdarg, arg, sizeof(fwdarg)); } if (parse_forward(&fwd, fwdarg, opcode == oDynamicForward ? 1 : 0, opcode == oRemoteForward ? 1 : 0) == 0) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding specification.", filename, linenum); if (*activep) { if (opcode == oLocalForward || opcode == oDynamicForward) add_local_forward(options, &fwd); else if (opcode == oRemoteForward) add_remote_forward(options, &fwd); } break; case oClearAllForwardings: intptr = &options->clear_forwardings; goto parse_flag; case oHost: if (cmdline) fatal("Host directive not supported as a command-line " "option"); *activep = 0; arg2 = NULL; while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { negated = *arg == '!'; if (negated) arg++; if (match_pattern(host, arg)) { if (negated) { debug("%.200s line %d: Skipping Host " "block because of negated match " "for %.100s", filename, linenum, arg); *activep = 0; break; } if (!*activep) arg2 = arg; /* logged below */ *activep = 1; } } if (*activep) debug("%.200s line %d: Applying options for %.100s", filename, linenum, arg2); /* Avoid garbage check below, as strdelim is done. */ return 0; case oMatch: if (cmdline) fatal("Host directive not supported as a command-line " "option"); value = match_cfg_line(options, &s, pw, host, original_host, flags & SSHCONF_POSTCANON, filename, linenum); if (value < 0) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename, linenum); *activep = value; break; case oEscapeChar: intptr = &options->escape_char; arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); - if (arg[0] == '^' && arg[2] == 0 && + if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) + value = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE; + else if (arg[1] == '\0') + value = (u_char) arg[0]; + else if (arg[0] == '^' && arg[2] == 0 && (u_char) arg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) arg[1] < 128) value = (u_char) arg[1] & 31; - else if (strlen(arg) == 1) - value = (u_char) arg[0]; - else if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) - value = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE; else { fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad escape character.", filename, linenum); /* NOTREACHED */ value = 0; /* Avoid compiler warning. */ } if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oAddressFamily: intptr = &options->address_family; multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily; goto parse_multistate; case oEnableSSHKeysign: intptr = &options->enable_ssh_keysign; goto parse_flag; case oIdentitiesOnly: intptr = &options->identities_only; goto parse_flag; case oServerAliveInterval: intptr = &options->server_alive_interval; goto parse_time; case oServerAliveCountMax: intptr = &options->server_alive_count_max; goto parse_int; case oSendEnv: while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { if (strchr(arg, '=') != NULL) fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) continue; if (options->num_send_env >= MAX_SEND_ENV) fatal("%s line %d: too many send env.", filename, linenum); options->send_env[options->num_send_env++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case oControlPath: charptr = &options->control_path; goto parse_string; case oControlMaster: intptr = &options->control_master; multistate_ptr = multistate_controlmaster; goto parse_multistate; case oControlPersist: /* no/false/yes/true, or a time spec */ intptr = &options->control_persist; arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing ControlPersist" " argument.", filename, linenum); value = 0; value2 = 0; /* timeout */ if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "false") == 0) value = 0; else if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "true") == 0) value = 1; else if ((value2 = convtime(arg)) >= 0) value = 1; else fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad ControlPersist argument.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) { *intptr = value; options->control_persist_timeout = value2; } break; case oHashKnownHosts: intptr = &options->hash_known_hosts; goto parse_flag; case oTunnel: intptr = &options->tun_open; multistate_ptr = multistate_tunnel; goto parse_multistate; case oTunnelDevice: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = a2tun(arg, &value2); if (value == SSH_TUNID_ERR) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad tun device.", filename, linenum); if (*activep) { options->tun_local = value; options->tun_remote = value2; } break; case oLocalCommand: charptr = &options->local_command; goto parse_command; case oPermitLocalCommand: intptr = &options->permit_local_command; goto parse_flag; case oVisualHostKey: intptr = &options->visual_host_key; goto parse_flag; case oIPQoS: arg = strdelim(&s); if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s", filename, linenum, arg); arg = strdelim(&s); if (arg == NULL) value2 = value; else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep) { options->ip_qos_interactive = value; options->ip_qos_bulk = value2; } break; case oUseRoaming: intptr = &options->use_roaming; goto parse_flag; case oRequestTTY: intptr = &options->request_tty; multistate_ptr = multistate_requesttty; goto parse_multistate; case oVersionAddendum: if (s == NULL) fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); len = strspn(s, WHITESPACE); if (*activep && options->version_addendum == NULL) { if (strcasecmp(s + len, "none") == 0) options->version_addendum = xstrdup(""); else if (strchr(s + len, '\r') != NULL) fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid argument", filename, linenum); else options->version_addendum = xstrdup(s + len); } return 0; case oIgnoreUnknown: charptr = &options->ignored_unknown; goto parse_string; case oProxyUseFdpass: intptr = &options->proxy_use_fdpass; goto parse_flag; case oCanonicalDomains: value = options->num_canonical_domains != 0; while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { valid_domain(arg, filename, linenum); if (!*activep || value) continue; if (options->num_canonical_domains >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS) fatal("%s line %d: too many hostname suffixes.", filename, linenum); options->canonical_domains[ options->num_canonical_domains++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs: value = options->num_permitted_cnames != 0; while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { /* Either '*' for everything or 'list:list' */ if (strcmp(arg, "*") == 0) arg2 = arg; else { lowercase(arg); if ((arg2 = strchr(arg, ':')) == NULL || arg2[1] == '\0') { fatal("%s line %d: " "Invalid permitted CNAME \"%s\"", filename, linenum, arg); } *arg2 = '\0'; arg2++; } if (!*activep || value) continue; if (options->num_permitted_cnames >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS) fatal("%s line %d: too many permitted CNAMEs.", filename, linenum); cname = options->permitted_cnames + options->num_permitted_cnames++; cname->source_list = xstrdup(arg); cname->target_list = xstrdup(arg2); } break; case oCanonicalizeHostname: intptr = &options->canonicalize_hostname; multistate_ptr = multistate_canonicalizehostname; goto parse_multistate; case oCanonicalizeMaxDots: intptr = &options->canonicalize_max_dots; goto parse_int; case oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal: intptr = &options->canonicalize_fallback_local; goto parse_flag; case oStreamLocalBindMask: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing StreamLocalBindMask argument.", filename, linenum); /* Parse mode in octal format */ value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 8); if (arg == endofnumber || value < 0 || value > 0777) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum); options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value; break; case oStreamLocalBindUnlink: intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink; goto parse_flag; case oRevokedHostKeys: charptr = &options->revoked_host_keys; goto parse_string; case oFingerprintHash: intptr = &options->fingerprint_hash; arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1) fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\".", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oUpdateHostkeys: intptr = &options->update_hostkeys; multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask; goto parse_multistate; case oHostbasedKeyTypes: charptr = &options->hostbased_key_types; arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (!sshkey_names_valid2(arg, 1)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case oDeprecated: debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword); return 0; case oUnsupported: error("%s line %d: Unsupported option \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword); return 0; default: fatal("%s: Unimplemented opcode %d", __func__, opcode); } /* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */ if ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { fatal("%.200s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".", filename, linenum, arg); } return 0; } /* * Reads the config file and modifies the options accordingly. Options * should already be initialized before this call. This never returns if * there is an error. If the file does not exist, this returns 0. */ int read_config_file(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, const char *original_host, Options *options, int flags) { FILE *f; char line[1024]; int active, linenum; int bad_options = 0; if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) return 0; if (flags & SSHCONF_CHECKPERM) { struct stat sb; if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1) fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) || (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0)) fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename); } debug("Reading configuration data %.200s", filename); /* * Mark that we are now processing the options. This flag is turned * on/off by Host specifications. */ active = 1; linenum = 0; while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { /* Update line number counter. */ linenum++; if (process_config_line(options, pw, host, original_host, line, filename, linenum, &active, flags) != 0) bad_options++; } fclose(f); if (bad_options > 0) fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options", filename, bad_options); return 1; } /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */ int option_clear_or_none(const char *o) { return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0; } /* * Initializes options to special values that indicate that they have not yet * been set. Read_config_file will only set options with this value. Options * are processed in the following order: command line, user config file, * system config file. Last, fill_default_options is called. */ void initialize_options(Options * options) { memset(options, 'X', sizeof(*options)); options->forward_agent = -1; options->forward_x11 = -1; options->forward_x11_trusted = -1; options->forward_x11_timeout = -1; options->exit_on_forward_failure = -1; options->xauth_location = NULL; options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1; options->use_privileged_port = -1; options->rsa_authentication = -1; options->pubkey_authentication = -1; options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; options->gss_authentication = -1; options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; options->password_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = -1; options->hostbased_authentication = -1; options->batch_mode = -1; options->check_host_ip = -1; options->strict_host_key_checking = -1; options->compression = -1; options->tcp_keep_alive = -1; options->compression_level = -1; options->port = -1; options->address_family = -1; options->connection_attempts = -1; options->connection_timeout = -1; options->number_of_password_prompts = -1; options->cipher = -1; options->ciphers = NULL; options->macs = NULL; options->kex_algorithms = NULL; options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL; options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN; options->num_identity_files = 0; options->hostname = NULL; options->host_key_alias = NULL; options->proxy_command = NULL; options->user = NULL; options->escape_char = -1; options->num_system_hostfiles = 0; options->num_user_hostfiles = 0; options->local_forwards = NULL; options->num_local_forwards = 0; options->remote_forwards = NULL; options->num_remote_forwards = 0; options->clear_forwardings = -1; options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET; options->preferred_authentications = NULL; options->bind_address = NULL; options->pkcs11_provider = NULL; options->enable_ssh_keysign = - 1; options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = - 1; options->identities_only = - 1; options->rekey_limit = - 1; options->rekey_interval = -1; options->verify_host_key_dns = -1; options->server_alive_interval = -1; options->server_alive_count_max = -1; options->num_send_env = 0; options->control_path = NULL; options->control_master = -1; options->control_persist = -1; options->control_persist_timeout = 0; options->hash_known_hosts = -1; options->tun_open = -1; options->tun_local = -1; options->tun_remote = -1; options->local_command = NULL; options->permit_local_command = -1; options->use_roaming = 0; options->visual_host_key = -1; options->ip_qos_interactive = -1; options->ip_qos_bulk = -1; options->request_tty = -1; options->proxy_use_fdpass = -1; options->ignored_unknown = NULL; options->num_canonical_domains = 0; options->num_permitted_cnames = 0; options->canonicalize_max_dots = -1; options->canonicalize_fallback_local = -1; options->canonicalize_hostname = -1; options->revoked_host_keys = NULL; options->fingerprint_hash = -1; options->update_hostkeys = -1; options->hostbased_key_types = NULL; options->version_addendum = NULL; } /* * A petite version of fill_default_options() that just fills the options * needed for hostname canonicalization to proceed. */ void fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *options) { if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1) options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1; if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1) options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1; if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1) options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO; } /* * Called after processing other sources of option data, this fills those * options for which no value has been specified with their default values. */ void fill_default_options(Options * options) { if (options->forward_agent == -1) options->forward_agent = 0; if (options->forward_x11 == -1) options->forward_x11 = 0; if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1) options->forward_x11_trusted = 0; if (options->forward_x11_timeout == -1) options->forward_x11_timeout = 1200; if (options->exit_on_forward_failure == -1) options->exit_on_forward_failure = 0; if (options->xauth_location == NULL) options->xauth_location = _PATH_XAUTH; if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1) options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0; if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177; if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0; if (options->use_privileged_port == -1) options->use_privileged_port = 0; if (options->rsa_authentication == -1) options->rsa_authentication = 1; if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1) options->pubkey_authentication = 1; if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1) options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; if (options->gss_authentication == -1) options->gss_authentication = 0; if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; if (options->password_authentication == -1) options->password_authentication = 1; if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1) options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0; if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1) options->hostbased_authentication = 0; if (options->batch_mode == -1) options->batch_mode = 0; if (options->check_host_ip == -1) options->check_host_ip = 0; if (options->strict_host_key_checking == -1) options->strict_host_key_checking = 2; /* 2 is default */ if (options->compression == -1) options->compression = 0; if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1) options->tcp_keep_alive = 1; if (options->compression_level == -1) options->compression_level = 6; if (options->port == -1) options->port = 0; /* Filled in ssh_connect. */ if (options->address_family == -1) options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; if (options->connection_attempts == -1) options->connection_attempts = 1; if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1) options->number_of_password_prompts = 3; /* Selected in ssh_login(). */ if (options->cipher == -1) options->cipher = SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET; /* options->ciphers, default set in myproposals.h */ /* options->macs, default set in myproposals.h */ /* options->kex_algorithms, default set in myproposals.h */ /* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */ if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2; if (options->num_identity_files == 0) { if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) { add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY, 0); } if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA, 0); add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA, 0); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA, 0); #endif add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519, 0); } } if (options->escape_char == -1) options->escape_char = '~'; if (options->num_system_hostfiles == 0) { options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE); options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2); } if (options->num_user_hostfiles == 0) { options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE); options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2); } if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; if (options->clear_forwardings == 1) clear_forwardings(options); if (options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost == - 1) options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = 0; if (options->identities_only == -1) options->identities_only = 0; if (options->enable_ssh_keysign == -1) options->enable_ssh_keysign = 0; if (options->rekey_limit == -1) options->rekey_limit = 0; if (options->rekey_interval == -1) options->rekey_interval = 0; #if HAVE_LDNS if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1) /* automatically trust a verified SSHFP record */ options->verify_host_key_dns = 1; #else if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1) options->verify_host_key_dns = 0; #endif if (options->server_alive_interval == -1) options->server_alive_interval = 0; if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1) options->server_alive_count_max = 3; if (options->control_master == -1) options->control_master = 0; if (options->control_persist == -1) { options->control_persist = 0; options->control_persist_timeout = 0; } if (options->hash_known_hosts == -1) options->hash_known_hosts = 0; if (options->tun_open == -1) options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; if (options->tun_local == -1) options->tun_local = SSH_TUNID_ANY; if (options->tun_remote == -1) options->tun_remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY; if (options->permit_local_command == -1) options->permit_local_command = 0; options->use_roaming = 0; if (options->visual_host_key == -1) options->visual_host_key = 0; if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_LOWDELAY; if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1) options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT; if (options->request_tty == -1) options->request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_AUTO; if (options->proxy_use_fdpass == -1) options->proxy_use_fdpass = 0; if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1) options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1; if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1) options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1; if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1) options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO; if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1) options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; if (options->update_hostkeys == -1) options->update_hostkeys = 0; if (options->hostbased_key_types == NULL) options->hostbased_key_types = xstrdup("*"); #define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \ do { \ if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \ free(v); \ v = NULL; \ } \ } while(0) CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->local_command); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->proxy_command); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->control_path); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_host_keys); /* options->user will be set in the main program if appropriate */ /* options->hostname will be set in the main program if appropriate */ /* options->host_key_alias should not be set by default */ /* options->preferred_authentications will be set in ssh */ if (options->version_addendum == NULL) options->version_addendum = xstrdup(SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD); } struct fwdarg { char *arg; int ispath; }; /* * parse_fwd_field * parses the next field in a port forwarding specification. * sets fwd to the parsed field and advances p past the colon * or sets it to NULL at end of string. * returns 0 on success, else non-zero. */ static int parse_fwd_field(char **p, struct fwdarg *fwd) { char *ep, *cp = *p; int ispath = 0; if (*cp == '\0') { *p = NULL; return -1; /* end of string */ } /* * A field escaped with square brackets is used literally. * XXX - allow ']' to be escaped via backslash? */ if (*cp == '[') { /* find matching ']' */ for (ep = cp + 1; *ep != ']' && *ep != '\0'; ep++) { if (*ep == '/') ispath = 1; } /* no matching ']' or not at end of field. */ if (ep[0] != ']' || (ep[1] != ':' && ep[1] != '\0')) return -1; /* NUL terminate the field and advance p past the colon */ *ep++ = '\0'; if (*ep != '\0') *ep++ = '\0'; fwd->arg = cp + 1; fwd->ispath = ispath; *p = ep; return 0; } for (cp = *p; *cp != '\0'; cp++) { switch (*cp) { case '\\': memmove(cp, cp + 1, strlen(cp + 1) + 1); - cp++; + if (*cp == '\0') + return -1; break; case '/': ispath = 1; break; case ':': *cp++ = '\0'; goto done; } } done: fwd->arg = *p; fwd->ispath = ispath; *p = cp; return 0; } /* * parse_forward * parses a string containing a port forwarding specification of the form: * dynamicfwd == 0 * [listenhost:]listenport|listenpath:connecthost:connectport|connectpath * listenpath:connectpath * dynamicfwd == 1 * [listenhost:]listenport * returns number of arguments parsed or zero on error */ int parse_forward(struct Forward *fwd, const char *fwdspec, int dynamicfwd, int remotefwd) { struct fwdarg fwdargs[4]; char *p, *cp; int i; memset(fwd, 0, sizeof(*fwd)); memset(fwdargs, 0, sizeof(fwdargs)); cp = p = xstrdup(fwdspec); /* skip leading spaces */ while (isspace((u_char)*cp)) cp++; for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) { if (parse_fwd_field(&cp, &fwdargs[i]) != 0) break; } /* Check for trailing garbage */ if (cp != NULL && *cp != '\0') { i = 0; /* failure */ } switch (i) { case 1: if (fwdargs[0].ispath) { fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { fwd->listen_host = NULL; fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg); } fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks"); break; case 2: if (fwdargs[0].ispath && fwdargs[1].ispath) { fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else if (fwdargs[1].ispath) { fwd->listen_host = NULL; fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks"); } break; case 3: if (fwdargs[0].ispath) { fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[2].arg); } else if (fwdargs[2].ispath) { fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[2].arg); fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; } else { fwd->listen_host = NULL; fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[2].arg); } break; case 4: fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg); fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[2].arg); fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[3].arg); break; default: i = 0; /* failure */ } free(p); if (dynamicfwd) { if (!(i == 1 || i == 2)) goto fail_free; } else { if (!(i == 3 || i == 4)) { if (fwd->connect_path == NULL && fwd->listen_path == NULL) goto fail_free; } if (fwd->connect_port <= 0 && fwd->connect_path == NULL) goto fail_free; } if ((fwd->listen_port < 0 && fwd->listen_path == NULL) || (!remotefwd && fwd->listen_port == 0)) goto fail_free; if (fwd->connect_host != NULL && strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) goto fail_free; /* XXX - if connecting to a remote socket, max sun len may not match this host */ if (fwd->connect_path != NULL && strlen(fwd->connect_path) >= PATH_MAX_SUN) goto fail_free; if (fwd->listen_host != NULL && strlen(fwd->listen_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) goto fail_free; if (fwd->listen_path != NULL && strlen(fwd->listen_path) >= PATH_MAX_SUN) goto fail_free; return (i); fail_free: free(fwd->connect_host); fwd->connect_host = NULL; free(fwd->connect_path); fwd->connect_path = NULL; free(fwd->listen_host); fwd->listen_host = NULL; free(fwd->listen_path); fwd->listen_path = NULL; return (0); } /* XXX the following is a near-vebatim copy from servconf.c; refactor */ static const char * fmt_multistate_int(int val, const struct multistate *m) { u_int i; for (i = 0; m[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (m[i].value == val) return m[i].key; } return "UNKNOWN"; } static const char * fmt_intarg(OpCodes code, int val) { if (val == -1) return "unset"; switch (code) { case oAddressFamily: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily); case oVerifyHostKeyDNS: case oStrictHostKeyChecking: case oUpdateHostkeys: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_yesnoask); case oControlMaster: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_controlmaster); case oTunnel: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tunnel); case oRequestTTY: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_requesttty); case oCanonicalizeHostname: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_canonicalizehostname); case oFingerprintHash: return ssh_digest_alg_name(val); case oProtocol: switch (val) { case SSH_PROTO_1: return "1"; case SSH_PROTO_2: return "2"; case (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2): return "2,1"; default: return "UNKNOWN"; } default: switch (val) { case 0: return "no"; case 1: return "yes"; default: return "UNKNOWN"; } } } static const char * lookup_opcode_name(OpCodes code) { u_int i; for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++) if (keywords[i].opcode == code) return(keywords[i].name); return "UNKNOWN"; } static void dump_cfg_int(OpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); } static void dump_cfg_fmtint(OpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val)); } static void dump_cfg_string(OpCodes code, const char *val) { if (val == NULL) return; printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); } static void dump_cfg_strarray(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < count; i++) printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]); } static void dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) { u_int i; printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code)); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) printf(" %s", vals[i]); printf("\n"); } static void dump_cfg_forwards(OpCodes code, u_int count, const struct Forward *fwds) { const struct Forward *fwd; u_int i; /* oDynamicForward */ for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { fwd = &fwds[i]; if (code == oDynamicForward && strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") != 0) continue; if (code == oLocalForward && strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") == 0) continue; printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code)); if (fwd->listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) printf(" %s", fwd->listen_path); else if (fwd->listen_host == NULL) printf(" %d", fwd->listen_port); else { printf(" [%s]:%d", fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port); } if (code != oDynamicForward) { if (fwd->connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) printf(" %s", fwd->connect_path); else if (fwd->connect_host == NULL) printf(" %d", fwd->connect_port); else { printf(" [%s]:%d", fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port); } } printf("\n"); } } void dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host) { int i; char vbuf[5]; /* Most interesting options first: user, host, port */ dump_cfg_string(oUser, o->user); dump_cfg_string(oHostName, host); dump_cfg_int(oPort, o->port); /* Flag options */ dump_cfg_fmtint(oAddressFamily, o->address_family); dump_cfg_fmtint(oBatchMode, o->batch_mode); dump_cfg_fmtint(oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, o->canonicalize_fallback_local); dump_cfg_fmtint(oCanonicalizeHostname, o->canonicalize_hostname); dump_cfg_fmtint(oChallengeResponseAuthentication, o->challenge_response_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oCheckHostIP, o->check_host_ip); dump_cfg_fmtint(oCompression, o->compression); dump_cfg_fmtint(oControlMaster, o->control_master); dump_cfg_fmtint(oEnableSSHKeysign, o->enable_ssh_keysign); dump_cfg_fmtint(oExitOnForwardFailure, o->exit_on_forward_failure); dump_cfg_fmtint(oFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash); dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardAgent, o->forward_agent); dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11, o->forward_x11); dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11Trusted, o->forward_x11_trusted); dump_cfg_fmtint(oGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports); #ifdef GSSAPI dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssDelegateCreds, o->gss_deleg_creds); #endif /* GSSAPI */ dump_cfg_fmtint(oHashKnownHosts, o->hash_known_hosts); dump_cfg_fmtint(oHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oIdentitiesOnly, o->identities_only); dump_cfg_fmtint(oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, o->kbd_interactive_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, o->no_host_authentication_for_localhost); dump_cfg_fmtint(oPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oPermitLocalCommand, o->permit_local_command); dump_cfg_fmtint(oProtocol, o->protocol); dump_cfg_fmtint(oProxyUseFdpass, o->proxy_use_fdpass); dump_cfg_fmtint(oPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oRequestTTY, o->request_tty); dump_cfg_fmtint(oRhostsRSAAuthentication, o->rhosts_rsa_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oRSAAuthentication, o->rsa_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(oStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink); dump_cfg_fmtint(oStrictHostKeyChecking, o->strict_host_key_checking); dump_cfg_fmtint(oTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive); dump_cfg_fmtint(oTunnel, o->tun_open); dump_cfg_fmtint(oUsePrivilegedPort, o->use_privileged_port); dump_cfg_fmtint(oVerifyHostKeyDNS, o->verify_host_key_dns); dump_cfg_fmtint(oVisualHostKey, o->visual_host_key); dump_cfg_fmtint(oUpdateHostkeys, o->update_hostkeys); /* Integer options */ dump_cfg_int(oCanonicalizeMaxDots, o->canonicalize_max_dots); dump_cfg_int(oCompressionLevel, o->compression_level); dump_cfg_int(oConnectionAttempts, o->connection_attempts); dump_cfg_int(oForwardX11Timeout, o->forward_x11_timeout); dump_cfg_int(oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, o->number_of_password_prompts); dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveCountMax, o->server_alive_count_max); dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveInterval, o->server_alive_interval); /* String options */ dump_cfg_string(oBindAddress, o->bind_address); dump_cfg_string(oCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT); dump_cfg_string(oControlPath, o->control_path); dump_cfg_string(oHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms ? o->hostkeyalgorithms : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG); dump_cfg_string(oHostKeyAlias, o->host_key_alias); dump_cfg_string(oHostbasedKeyTypes, o->hostbased_key_types); dump_cfg_string(oKbdInteractiveDevices, o->kbd_interactive_devices); dump_cfg_string(oKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms ? o->kex_algorithms : KEX_CLIENT_KEX); dump_cfg_string(oLocalCommand, o->local_command); dump_cfg_string(oLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level)); dump_cfg_string(oMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_CLIENT_MAC); dump_cfg_string(oPKCS11Provider, o->pkcs11_provider); dump_cfg_string(oPreferredAuthentications, o->preferred_authentications); dump_cfg_string(oProxyCommand, o->proxy_command); dump_cfg_string(oRevokedHostKeys, o->revoked_host_keys); dump_cfg_string(oXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location); /* Forwards */ dump_cfg_forwards(oDynamicForward, o->num_local_forwards, o->local_forwards); dump_cfg_forwards(oLocalForward, o->num_local_forwards, o->local_forwards); dump_cfg_forwards(oRemoteForward, o->num_remote_forwards, o->remote_forwards); /* String array options */ dump_cfg_strarray(oIdentityFile, o->num_identity_files, o->identity_files); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oCanonicalDomains, o->num_canonical_domains, o->canonical_domains); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oGlobalKnownHostsFile, o->num_system_hostfiles, o->system_hostfiles); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oUserKnownHostsFile, o->num_user_hostfiles, o->user_hostfiles); dump_cfg_strarray(oSendEnv, o->num_send_env, o->send_env); /* Special cases */ /* oConnectTimeout */ if (o->connection_timeout == -1) printf("connecttimeout none\n"); else dump_cfg_int(oConnectTimeout, o->connection_timeout); /* oTunnelDevice */ printf("tunneldevice"); if (o->tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ANY) printf(" any"); else printf(" %d", o->tun_local); if (o->tun_remote == SSH_TUNID_ANY) printf(":any"); else printf(":%d", o->tun_remote); printf("\n"); /* oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs */ if ( o->num_permitted_cnames > 0) { printf("canonicalizePermittedcnames"); for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_cnames; i++) { printf(" %s:%s", o->permitted_cnames[i].source_list, o->permitted_cnames[i].target_list); } printf("\n"); } /* oCipher */ if (o->cipher != SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET) printf("Cipher %s\n", cipher_name(o->cipher)); /* oControlPersist */ if (o->control_persist == 0 || o->control_persist_timeout == 0) dump_cfg_fmtint(oControlPersist, o->control_persist); else dump_cfg_int(oControlPersist, o->control_persist_timeout); /* oEscapeChar */ if (o->escape_char == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) printf("escapechar none\n"); else { vis(vbuf, o->escape_char, VIS_WHITE, 0); printf("escapechar %s\n", vbuf); } /* oIPQoS */ printf("ipqos %s ", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_interactive)); printf("%s\n", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_bulk)); /* oRekeyLimit */ printf("rekeylimit %lld %d\n", (long long)o->rekey_limit, o->rekey_interval); /* oStreamLocalBindMask */ printf("streamlocalbindmask 0%o\n", o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask); } Index: head/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/regress/Makefile (revision 294336) @@ -1,219 +1,221 @@ -# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.78 2015/01/26 06:12:18 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.81 2015/05/21 06:44:25 djm Exp $ REGRESS_TARGETS= unit t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12 t-exec tests: prep $(REGRESS_TARGETS) # Interop tests are not run by default interop interop-tests: t-exec-interop prep: test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || mkdir -p $(OBJ)/valgrind-out clean: for F in $(CLEANFILES); do rm -f $(OBJ)$$F; done test -z "${SUDO}" || ${SUDO} rm -f ${SUDO_CLEAN} rm -rf $(OBJ).putty distclean: clean LTESTS= connect \ proxy-connect \ connect-privsep \ proto-version \ proto-mismatch \ exit-status \ envpass \ transfer \ banner \ rekey \ stderr-data \ stderr-after-eof \ broken-pipe \ try-ciphers \ yes-head \ login-timeout \ agent \ agent-getpeereid \ agent-timeout \ agent-ptrace \ keyscan \ keygen-change \ keygen-convert \ key-options \ scp \ sftp \ sftp-chroot \ sftp-cmds \ sftp-badcmds \ sftp-batch \ sftp-glob \ sftp-perm \ reconfigure \ dynamic-forward \ forwarding \ multiplex \ reexec \ brokenkeys \ + cfgparse \ cfgmatch \ addrmatch \ localcommand \ forcecommand \ portnum \ keytype \ kextype \ cert-hostkey \ cert-userkey \ host-expand \ keys-command \ forward-control \ integrity \ krl \ multipubkey \ limit-keytype \ hostkey-agent \ keygen-knownhosts \ - hostkey-rotate + hostkey-rotate \ + principals-command # dhgex \ INTEROP_TESTS= putty-transfer putty-ciphers putty-kex conch-ciphers #INTEROP_TESTS+=ssh-com ssh-com-client ssh-com-keygen ssh-com-sftp #LTESTS= cipher-speed USER!= id -un CLEANFILES= t2.out t3.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub copy.1 copy.2 \ t8.out t8.out.pub t9.out t9.out.pub t10.out t10.out.pub \ t12.out t12.out.pub \ authorized_keys_${USER} known_hosts pidfile testdata \ ssh_config sshd_config.orig ssh_proxy sshd_config sshd_proxy \ rsa.pub rsa rsa1.pub rsa1 host.rsa host.rsa1 \ rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa1-agent rsa1-agent.pub \ ls.copy banner.in banner.out empty.in \ scp-ssh-wrapper.scp ssh_proxy_envpass remote_pid \ sshd_proxy_bak rsa_ssh2_cr.prv rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv \ known_hosts-cert host_ca_key* cert_host_key* cert_user_key* \ putty.rsa2 sshd_proxy_orig ssh_proxy_bak \ key.rsa-* key.dsa-* key.ecdsa-* \ authorized_principals_${USER} expect actual ready \ sshd_proxy.* authorized_keys_${USER}.* modpipe revoked-* krl-* \ ssh.log failed-ssh.log sshd.log failed-sshd.log \ regress.log failed-regress.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh \ sftp-server.sh sftp-server.log sftp.log setuid-allowed \ data ed25519-agent ed25519-agent.pub key.ed25519-512 \ key.ed25519-512.pub netcat host_krl_* host_revoked_* \ kh.* user_*key* agent-key.* known_hosts.* hkr.* SUDO_CLEAN+= /var/run/testdata_${USER} /var/run/keycommand_${USER} # Enable all malloc(3) randomisations and checks TEST_ENV= "MALLOC_OPTIONS=AFGJPRX" TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN?=ssh-keygen CPPFLAGS=-I.. t1: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv tr '\n' '\r' <${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv awk '{print $$0 "\r"}' ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv t2: cat ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv > $(OBJ)/t2.out chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t2.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t2.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub t3: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -ef ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub >$(OBJ)/t3.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if $(OBJ)/t3.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub t4: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E md5 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\ awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t4.ok t5: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\ awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t5.ok t6: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.prv > $(OBJ)/t6.out1 ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.pub > $(OBJ)/t6.out2 chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t6.out1 ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t6.out1 | diff - $(OBJ)/t6.out2 $(OBJ)/t7.out: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t rsa -N '' -f $@ t7: $(OBJ)/t7.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null $(OBJ)/t8.out: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t dsa -N '' -f $@ t8: $(OBJ)/t8.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null $(OBJ)/t9.out: test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ecdsa -N '' -f $@ t9: $(OBJ)/t9.out test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null $(OBJ)/t10.out: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -f $@ t10: $(OBJ)/t10.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null t11: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E sha256 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\ awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t11.ok -t12.out: - ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -C 'test-comment-1234' -f $(OBJ)/$@ +$(OBJ)/t12.out: + ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -C 'test-comment-1234' -f $@ -t12: t12.out +t12: $(OBJ)/t12.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t12.out.pub | grep test-comment-1234 >/dev/null t-exec: ${LTESTS:=.sh} @if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \ for TEST in ""$?; do \ echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \ (env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \ done t-exec-interop: ${INTEROP_TESTS:=.sh} @if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \ for TEST in ""$?; do \ echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \ (env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \ done # Not run by default interop: ${INTEROP_TARGETS} # Unit tests, built by top-level Makefile unit: set -e ; if test -z "${SKIP_UNIT}" ; then \ V="" ; \ test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || \ V=${.CURDIR}/valgrind-unit.sh ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \ -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshkey/testdata ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/kex/test_kex ; \ $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys \ -d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/testdata ; \ fi Index: head/crypto/openssh/regress/README.regress =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/regress/README.regress (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/regress/README.regress (revision 294336) @@ -1,104 +1,104 @@ Overview. $ ./configure && make tests You'll see some progress info. A failure will cause either the make to abort or the driver script to report a "FATAL" failure. The test consists of 2 parts. The first is the file-based tests which is driven by the Makefile, and the second is a set of network or proxycommand based tests, which are driven by a driver script (test-exec.sh) which is called multiple times by the Makefile. Failures in the first part will cause the Makefile to return an error. Failures in the second part will print a "FATAL" message for the failed test and continue. OpenBSD has a system-wide regression test suite. OpenSSH Portable's test suite is based on OpenBSD's with modifications. Environment variables. SUDO: path to sudo command, if desired. Note that some systems (notably systems using PAM) require sudo to execute some tests. TEST_SSH_TRACE: set to "yes" for verbose output from tests TEST_SSH_QUIET: set to "yes" to suppress non-fatal output. TEST_SSH_x: path to "ssh" command under test, where x=SSH,SSHD,SSHAGENT,SSHADD SSHKEYGEN,SSHKEYSCAN,SFTP,SFTPSERVER OBJ: used by test scripts to access build dir. TEST_SHELL: shell used for running the test scripts. TEST_SSH_PORT: TCP port to be used for the listening tests. TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS: Configuration directives to be added to ssh_config before running each test. -TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOTPS: Configuration directives to be added to sshd_config +TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS: Configuration directives to be added to sshd_config before running each test. Individual tests. You can run an individual test from the top-level Makefile, eg: $ make tests LTESTS=agent-timeout If you need to manipulate the environment more you can invoke test-exec.sh directly if you set up the path to find the binaries under test and the test scripts themselves, for example: $ cd regress $ PATH=`pwd`/..:$PATH:. TEST_SHELL=/bin/sh sh test-exec.sh `pwd` \ agent-timeout.sh ok agent timeout test Files. test-exec.sh: the main test driver. Sets environment, creates config files and keys and runs the specified test. At the time of writing, the individual tests are: agent-timeout.sh: agent timeout test agent.sh: simple agent test broken-pipe.sh: broken pipe test connect-privsep.sh: proxy connect with privsep connect.sh: simple connect exit-status.sh: remote exit status forwarding.sh: local and remote forwarding keygen-change.sh: change passphrase for key keyscan.sh: keyscan proto-mismatch.sh: protocol version mismatch proto-version.sh: sshd version with different protocol combinations proxy-connect.sh: proxy connect sftp.sh: basic sftp put/get ssh-com-client.sh: connect with ssh.com client ssh-com-keygen.sh: ssh.com key import ssh-com-sftp.sh: basic sftp put/get with ssh.com server ssh-com.sh: connect to ssh.com server stderr-after-eof.sh: stderr data after eof stderr-data.sh: stderr data transfer transfer.sh: transfer data try-ciphers.sh: try ciphers yes-head.sh: yes pipe head Problems? Run the failing test with shell tracing (-x) turned on: $ PATH=`pwd`/..:$PATH:. sh -x test-exec.sh `pwd` agent-timeout.sh Failed tests can be difficult to diagnose. Suggestions: - run the individual test via ./test-exec.sh `pwd` [testname] - set LogLevel to VERBOSE in test-exec.sh and enable syslogging of auth.debug (eg to /var/log/authlog). Known Issues. - Similarly, if you do not have "scp" in your system's $PATH then the multiplex scp tests will fail (since the system's shell startup scripts will determine where the shell started by sshd will look for scp). - Recent GNU coreutils deprecate "head -[n]": this will cause the yes-head test to fail. The old behaviour can be restored by setting (and exporting) _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 before running the tests. $Id: README.regress,v 1.12 2011/05/05 03:48:42 djm Exp $ Index: head/crypto/openssh/regress/cfgparse.sh =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/regress/cfgparse.sh (nonexistent) +++ head/crypto/openssh/regress/cfgparse.sh (revision 294336) @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +# $OpenBSD: cfgparse.sh,v 1.5 2015/05/29 03:05:13 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="config parse" + +# This is a reasonable proxy for IPv6 support. +if ! config_defined HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR ; then + SKIP_IPV6=yes +fi + +# We need to use the keys generated for the regression test because sshd -T +# will fail if we're not running with SUDO (no permissions for real keys) or +# if we are # running tests on a system that has never had sshd installed +# (keys won't exist). + +grep "HostKey " $OBJ/sshd_config > $OBJ/sshd_config_minimal +SSHD_KEYS="`cat $OBJ/sshd_config_minimal`" + +verbose "reparse minimal config" +($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config_minimal >$OBJ/sshd_config.1 && + $SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 && + diff $OBJ/sshd_config.1 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || fail "reparse minimal config" + +verbose "reparse regress config" +($SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config >$OBJ/sshd_config.1 && + $SUDO ${SSHD} -T -f $OBJ/sshd_config.1 >$OBJ/sshd_config.2 && + diff $OBJ/sshd_config.1 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || fail "reparse regress config" + +verbose "listenaddress order" +# expected output +cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.0 <> $OBJ/sshd_config.0 < $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <> $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <$OBJ/sshd_config.2 && + diff $OBJ/sshd_config.0 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || \ + fail "listenaddress order 1" +# test 2: listenaddress first +cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <> $OBJ/sshd_config.1 <$OBJ/sshd_config.2 && + diff $OBJ/sshd_config.0 $OBJ/sshd_config.2) || \ + fail "listenaddress order 2" + +# cleanup +rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.[012] Property changes on: head/crypto/openssh/regress/cfgparse.sh ___________________________________________________________________ Added: svn:eol-style ## -0,0 +1 ## +native \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:executable ## -0,0 +1 ## +* \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:keywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +FreeBSD=%H \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: head/crypto/openssh/regress/cipher-speed.sh =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/regress/cipher-speed.sh (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/regress/cipher-speed.sh (revision 294336) @@ -1,51 +1,51 @@ -# $OpenBSD: cipher-speed.sh,v 1.12 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: cipher-speed.sh,v 1.13 2015/03/24 20:22:17 markus Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="cipher speed" getbytes () { sed -n -e '/transferred/s/.*secs (\(.* bytes.sec\).*/\1/p' \ -e '/copied/s/.*s, \(.* MB.s\).*/\1/p' } tries="1 2" for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do n=0; for m in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do trace "proto 2 cipher $c mac $m" for x in $tries; do printf "%-60s" "$c/$m:" ( ${SSH} -o 'compression no' \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -2 -m $m -c $c somehost \ exec sh -c \'"dd of=/dev/null obs=32k"\' \ < ${DATA} ) 2>&1 | getbytes if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh -2 failed with mac $m cipher $c" fi done # No point trying all MACs for AEAD ciphers since they are ignored. - if ssh -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then break fi n=`expr $n + 1` done; done if ssh_version 1; then ciphers="3des blowfish" else ciphers="" fi for c in $ciphers; do trace "proto 1 cipher $c" for x in $tries; do printf "%-60s" "$c:" ( ${SSH} -o 'compression no' \ -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -1 -c $c somehost \ exec sh -c \'"dd of=/dev/null obs=32k"\' \ < ${DATA} ) 2>&1 | getbytes if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh -1 failed with cipher $c" fi done done Index: head/crypto/openssh/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh (revision 294336) @@ -1,128 +1,128 @@ -# $OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.2 2015/03/03 17:53:40 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/24 20:22:17 markus Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="hostkey rotate" # Need full names here since they are used in HostKeyAlgorithms HOSTKEY_TYPES="ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 ssh-ed25519 ssh-rsa ssh-dss" rm -f $OBJ/hkr.* $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig grep -vi 'hostkey' $OBJ/sshd_proxy > $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig echo "UpdateHostkeys=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy rm $OBJ/known_hosts trace "prepare hostkeys" nkeys=0 all_algs="" -for k in `ssh -Q key-plain` ; do +for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/hkr.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k" echo "Hostkey $OBJ/hkr.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig nkeys=`expr $nkeys + 1` test "x$all_algs" = "x" || all_algs="${all_algs}," all_algs="${all_algs}$k" done dossh() { # All ssh should succeed in this test ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy "$@" x true || fail "ssh $@ failed" } expect_nkeys() { _expected=$1 _message=$2 _n=`wc -l $OBJ/known_hosts | awk '{ print $1 }'` || fatal "wc failed" [ "x$_n" = "x$_expected" ] || fail "$_message (got $_n wanted $_expected)" } check_key_present() { _type=$1 _kfile=$2 test "x$_kfile" = "x" && _kfile="$OBJ/hkr.${_type}.pub" _kpub=`awk "/$_type /"' { print $2 }' < $_kfile` || \ fatal "awk failed" fgrep "$_kpub" $OBJ/known_hosts > /dev/null } cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy # Connect to sshd with StrictHostkeyChecking=no verbose "learn hostkey with StrictHostKeyChecking=no" >$OBJ/known_hosts dossh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-ed25519 -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no # Verify no additional keys learned expect_nkeys 1 "unstrict connect keys" check_key_present ssh-ed25519 || fail "unstrict didn't learn key" # Connect to sshd as usual verbose "learn additional hostkeys" dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes # Check that other keys learned expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys" check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn keys" # Check each key type -for k in `ssh -Q key-plain` ; do +for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do verbose "learn additional hostkeys, type=$k" dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k,$all_algs expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys $k" check_key_present $k || fail "didn't learn $k" done # Change one hostkey (non primary) and relearn verbose "learn changed non-primary hostkey" mv $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub.old rm -f $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ssh-rsa -f $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k" dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes # Check that the key was replaced expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys" check_key_present ssh-rsa $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub.old && fail "old key present" check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn changed key" # Add new hostkey (primary type) to sshd and connect verbose "learn new primary hostkey" ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ssh-rsa -f $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k" ( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig ; echo HostKey $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new ) \ > $OBJ/sshd_proxy # Check new hostkey added dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa,$all_algs expect_nkeys `expr $nkeys + 1` "learn hostkeys" check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "current key missing" check_key_present ssh-rsa $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new.pub || fail "new key missing" # Remove old hostkey (primary type) from sshd verbose "rotate primary hostkey" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy mv $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub.old mv $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new.pub $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub mv $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa-new $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa # Check old hostkey removed dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa,$all_algs expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys" check_key_present ssh-rsa $OBJ/hkr.ssh-rsa.pub.old && fail "old key present" check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn changed key" # Connect again, forcing rotated key verbose "check rotate primary hostkey" dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=ssh-rsa expect_nkeys 1 "learn hostkeys" check_key_present ssh-rsa || fail "didn't learn changed key" -# $OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.2 2015/03/03 17:53:40 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.3 2015/03/24 20:22:17 markus Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="hostkey rotate" # Prepare hostkeys file with one key # Connect to sshd # Check that other keys learned # Change one hostkey (non primary) # Connect to sshd # Check that the key was replaced Index: head/crypto/openssh/regress/integrity.sh =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/regress/integrity.sh (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/regress/integrity.sh (revision 294336) @@ -1,75 +1,75 @@ -# $OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.15 2015/01/19 20:42:31 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.16 2015/03/24 20:22:17 markus Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="integrity" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak # start at byte 2900 (i.e. after kex) and corrupt at different offsets # XXX the test hangs if we modify the low bytes of the packet length # XXX and ssh tries to read... tries=10 startoffset=2900 macs=`${SSH} -Q mac` # The following are not MACs, but ciphers with integrated integrity. They are # handled specially below. macs="$macs `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`" # avoid DH group exchange as the extra traffic makes it harder to get the # offset into the stream right. echo "KexAlgorithms diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" \ >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy # sshd-command for proxy (see test-exec.sh) cmd="$SUDO sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy" for m in $macs; do trace "test $tid: mac $m" elen=0 epad=0 emac=0 ecnt=0 skip=0 for off in `jot $tries $startoffset`; do skip=`expr $skip - 1` if [ $skip -gt 0 ]; then # avoid modifying the high bytes of the length continue fi cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy # modify output from sshd at offset $off pxy="proxycommand=$cmd | $OBJ/modpipe -wm xor:$off:1" - if ssh -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${m}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${m}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then echo "Ciphers=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy macopt="-c $m" else echo "Ciphers=aes128-ctr" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "MACs=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy macopt="-m $m -c aes128-ctr" fi verbose "test $tid: $m @$off" ${SSH} $macopt -2F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o "$pxy" \ -oServerAliveInterval=1 -oServerAliveCountMax=30 \ 999.999.999.999 'printf "%4096s" " "' >/dev/null if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh -m $m succeeds with bit-flip at $off" fi ecnt=`expr $ecnt + 1` out=$(tail -2 $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE | egrep -v "^debug" | \ tr -s '\r\n' '.') case "$out" in Bad?packet*) elen=`expr $elen + 1`; skip=3;; Corrupted?MAC* | *message?authentication?code?incorrect*) emac=`expr $emac + 1`; skip=0;; padding*) epad=`expr $epad + 1`; skip=0;; *) fail "unexpected error mac $m at $off: $out";; esac done verbose "test $tid: $ecnt errors: mac $emac padding $epad length $elen" if [ $emac -eq 0 ]; then fail "$m: no mac errors" fi expect=`expr $ecnt - $epad - $elen` if [ $emac -ne $expect ]; then fail "$m: expected $expect mac errors, got $emac" fi done Index: head/crypto/openssh/regress/kextype.sh =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/regress/kextype.sh (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/regress/kextype.sh (revision 294336) @@ -1,25 +1,25 @@ -# $OpenBSD: kextype.sh,v 1.5 2014/04/21 22:15:37 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: kextype.sh,v 1.6 2015/03/24 20:19:15 markus Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="login with different key exchange algorithms" TIME=/usr/bin/time cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak # Make server accept all key exchanges. -ALLKEX=`ssh -Q kex` +ALLKEX=`${SSH} -Q kex` KEXOPT=`echo $ALLKEX | tr ' ' ,` echo "KexAlgorithms=$KEXOPT" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy tries="1 2 3 4" for k in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do verbose "kex $k" for i in $tries; do ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o KexAlgorithms=$k x true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh kex $k" fi done done Index: head/crypto/openssh/regress/keys-command.sh =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/regress/keys-command.sh (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/regress/keys-command.sh (revision 294336) @@ -1,39 +1,76 @@ -# $OpenBSD: keys-command.sh,v 1.2 2012/12/06 06:06:54 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: keys-command.sh,v 1.3 2015/05/21 06:40:02 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="authorized keys from command" if test -z "$SUDO" ; then echo "skipped (SUDO not set)" echo "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without" exit 0 fi +rm -f $OBJ/keys-command-args + +touch $OBJ/keys-command-args +chmod a+rw $OBJ/keys-command-args + +expected_key_text=`awk '{ print $2 }' < $OBJ/rsa.pub` +expected_key_fp=`$SSHKEYGEN -lf $OBJ/rsa.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'` + # Establish a AuthorizedKeysCommand in /var/run where it will have # acceptable directory permissions. KEY_COMMAND="/var/run/keycommand_${LOGNAME}" -cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "cat > '$KEY_COMMAND'" +cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "rm -f '$KEY_COMMAND' ; cat > '$KEY_COMMAND'" #!/bin/sh +echo args: "\$@" >> $OBJ/keys-command-args +echo "$PATH" | grep -q mekmitasdigoat && exit 7 test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1 +if test $# -eq 6 ; then + test "x\$2" != "xblah" && exit 2 + test "x\$3" != "x${expected_key_text}" && exit 3 + test "x\$4" != "xssh-rsa" && exit 4 + test "x\$5" != "x${expected_key_fp}" && exit 5 + test "x\$6" != "xblah" && exit 6 +fi exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_keys_${LOGNAME}" _EOF $SUDO chmod 0755 "$KEY_COMMAND" -cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak -( - grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak - echo AuthorizedKeysFile none - echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND - echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME} -) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy - if [ -x $KEY_COMMAND ]; then - ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true + cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak + + verbose "AuthorizedKeysCommand with arguments" + ( + grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak + echo AuthorizedKeysFile none + echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND %u blah %k %t %f blah + echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME} + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + + # Ensure that $PATH is sanitised in sshd + env PATH=$PATH:/sbin/mekmitasdigoat \ + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "connect failed" + fi + + verbose "AuthorizedKeysCommand without arguments" + # Check legacy behavior of no-args resulting in username being passed. + ( + grep -vi AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/sshd_proxy.bak + echo AuthorizedKeysFile none + echo AuthorizedKeysCommand $KEY_COMMAND + echo AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ${LOGNAME} + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + + # Ensure that $PATH is sanitised in sshd + env PATH=$PATH:/sbin/mekmitasdigoat \ + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "connect failed" fi else echo "SKIPPED: $KEY_COMMAND not executable (/var/run mounted noexec?)" fi $SUDO rm -f $KEY_COMMAND Index: head/crypto/openssh/regress/netcat.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/regress/netcat.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/regress/netcat.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,1690 +1,1696 @@ /* $OpenBSD: netcat.c,v 1.126 2014/10/30 16:08:31 tedu Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Eric Jackson * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products * derived from this software without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Re-written nc(1) for OpenBSD. Original implementation by * *Hobbit* . */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "atomicio.h" #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #else # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H # include # endif #endif + +/* Telnet options from arpa/telnet.h */ +#define IAC 255 +#define DONT 254 +#define DO 253 +#define WONT 252 +#define WILL 251 #ifndef SUN_LEN #define SUN_LEN(su) \ (sizeof(*(su)) - sizeof((su)->sun_path) + strlen((su)->sun_path)) #endif #define PORT_MAX 65535 #define PORT_MAX_LEN 6 #define UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE 19 #define POLL_STDIN 0 #define POLL_NETOUT 1 #define POLL_NETIN 2 #define POLL_STDOUT 3 #define BUFSIZE 16384 /* Command Line Options */ int dflag; /* detached, no stdin */ int Fflag; /* fdpass sock to stdout */ unsigned int iflag; /* Interval Flag */ int kflag; /* More than one connect */ int lflag; /* Bind to local port */ int Nflag; /* shutdown() network socket */ int nflag; /* Don't do name look up */ char *Pflag; /* Proxy username */ char *pflag; /* Localport flag */ int rflag; /* Random ports flag */ char *sflag; /* Source Address */ int tflag; /* Telnet Emulation */ int uflag; /* UDP - Default to TCP */ int vflag; /* Verbosity */ int xflag; /* Socks proxy */ int zflag; /* Port Scan Flag */ int Dflag; /* sodebug */ int Iflag; /* TCP receive buffer size */ int Oflag; /* TCP send buffer size */ int Sflag; /* TCP MD5 signature option */ int Tflag = -1; /* IP Type of Service */ int rtableid = -1; int timeout = -1; int family = AF_UNSPEC; char *portlist[PORT_MAX+1]; char *unix_dg_tmp_socket; void atelnet(int, unsigned char *, unsigned int); void build_ports(char *); void help(void); int local_listen(char *, char *, struct addrinfo); void readwrite(int); void fdpass(int nfd) __attribute__((noreturn)); int remote_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo); int timeout_connect(int, const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t); int socks_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo, const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo, int, const char *); int udptest(int); int unix_bind(char *); int unix_connect(char *); int unix_listen(char *); void set_common_sockopts(int); int map_tos(char *, int *); void report_connect(const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t); void usage(int); ssize_t drainbuf(int, unsigned char *, size_t *); ssize_t fillbuf(int, unsigned char *, size_t *); static void err(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); static void errx(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); static void warn(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); static void err(int r, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", strerror(errno)); vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args); fputc('\n', stderr); va_end(args); exit(r); } static void errx(int r, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args); fputc('\n', stderr); va_end(args); exit(r); } static void warn(const char *fmt, ...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", strerror(errno)); vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args); fputc('\n', stderr); va_end(args); } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { int ch, s, ret, socksv; char *host, *uport; struct addrinfo hints; struct servent *sv; socklen_t len; struct sockaddr_storage cliaddr; char *proxy = NULL; const char *errstr, *proxyhost = "", *proxyport = NULL; struct addrinfo proxyhints; char unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf[UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE]; ret = 1; s = 0; socksv = 5; host = NULL; uport = NULL; sv = NULL; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "46DdFhI:i:klNnO:P:p:rSs:tT:UuV:vw:X:x:z")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case '4': family = AF_INET; break; case '6': family = AF_INET6; break; case 'U': family = AF_UNIX; break; case 'X': if (strcasecmp(optarg, "connect") == 0) socksv = -1; /* HTTP proxy CONNECT */ else if (strcmp(optarg, "4") == 0) socksv = 4; /* SOCKS v.4 */ else if (strcmp(optarg, "5") == 0) socksv = 5; /* SOCKS v.5 */ else errx(1, "unsupported proxy protocol"); break; case 'd': dflag = 1; break; case 'F': Fflag = 1; break; case 'h': help(); break; case 'i': iflag = strtonum(optarg, 0, UINT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) errx(1, "interval %s: %s", errstr, optarg); break; case 'k': kflag = 1; break; case 'l': lflag = 1; break; case 'N': Nflag = 1; break; case 'n': nflag = 1; break; case 'P': Pflag = optarg; break; case 'p': pflag = optarg; break; case 'r': rflag = 1; break; case 's': sflag = optarg; break; case 't': tflag = 1; break; case 'u': uflag = 1; break; #ifdef SO_RTABLE case 'V': rtableid = (int)strtonum(optarg, 0, RT_TABLEID_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) errx(1, "rtable %s: %s", errstr, optarg); break; #endif case 'v': vflag = 1; break; case 'w': timeout = strtonum(optarg, 0, INT_MAX / 1000, &errstr); if (errstr) errx(1, "timeout %s: %s", errstr, optarg); timeout *= 1000; break; case 'x': xflag = 1; if ((proxy = strdup(optarg)) == NULL) errx(1, "strdup"); break; case 'z': zflag = 1; break; case 'D': Dflag = 1; break; case 'I': Iflag = strtonum(optarg, 1, 65536 << 14, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) errx(1, "TCP receive window %s: %s", errstr, optarg); break; case 'O': Oflag = strtonum(optarg, 1, 65536 << 14, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) errx(1, "TCP send window %s: %s", errstr, optarg); break; case 'S': Sflag = 1; break; case 'T': errstr = NULL; errno = 0; if (map_tos(optarg, &Tflag)) break; if (strlen(optarg) > 1 && optarg[0] == '0' && optarg[1] == 'x') Tflag = (int)strtol(optarg, NULL, 16); else Tflag = (int)strtonum(optarg, 0, 255, &errstr); if (Tflag < 0 || Tflag > 255 || errstr || errno) errx(1, "illegal tos value %s", optarg); break; default: usage(1); } } argc -= optind; argv += optind; /* Cruft to make sure options are clean, and used properly. */ if (argv[0] && !argv[1] && family == AF_UNIX) { host = argv[0]; uport = NULL; } else if (argv[0] && !argv[1]) { if (!lflag) usage(1); uport = argv[0]; host = NULL; } else if (argv[0] && argv[1]) { host = argv[0]; uport = argv[1]; } else usage(1); if (lflag && sflag) errx(1, "cannot use -s and -l"); if (lflag && pflag) errx(1, "cannot use -p and -l"); if (lflag && zflag) errx(1, "cannot use -z and -l"); if (!lflag && kflag) errx(1, "must use -l with -k"); /* Get name of temporary socket for unix datagram client */ if ((family == AF_UNIX) && uflag && !lflag) { if (sflag) { unix_dg_tmp_socket = sflag; } else { strlcpy(unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf, "/tmp/nc.XXXXXXXXXX", UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE); if (mktemp(unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf) == NULL) err(1, "mktemp"); unix_dg_tmp_socket = unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf; } } /* Initialize addrinfo structure. */ if (family != AF_UNIX) { memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo)); hints.ai_family = family; hints.ai_socktype = uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_protocol = uflag ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP; if (nflag) hints.ai_flags |= AI_NUMERICHOST; } if (xflag) { if (uflag) errx(1, "no proxy support for UDP mode"); if (lflag) errx(1, "no proxy support for listen"); if (family == AF_UNIX) errx(1, "no proxy support for unix sockets"); /* XXX IPv6 transport to proxy would probably work */ if (family == AF_INET6) errx(1, "no proxy support for IPv6"); if (sflag) errx(1, "no proxy support for local source address"); proxyhost = strsep(&proxy, ":"); proxyport = proxy; memset(&proxyhints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo)); proxyhints.ai_family = family; proxyhints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; proxyhints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; if (nflag) proxyhints.ai_flags |= AI_NUMERICHOST; } if (lflag) { int connfd; ret = 0; if (family == AF_UNIX) { if (uflag) s = unix_bind(host); else s = unix_listen(host); } /* Allow only one connection at a time, but stay alive. */ for (;;) { if (family != AF_UNIX) s = local_listen(host, uport, hints); if (s < 0) err(1, "local_listen"); /* * For UDP and -k, don't connect the socket, let it * receive datagrams from multiple socket pairs. */ if (uflag && kflag) readwrite(s); /* * For UDP and not -k, we will use recvfrom() initially * to wait for a caller, then use the regular functions * to talk to the caller. */ else if (uflag && !kflag) { int rv, plen; char buf[16384]; struct sockaddr_storage z; len = sizeof(z); plen = 2048; rv = recvfrom(s, buf, plen, MSG_PEEK, (struct sockaddr *)&z, &len); if (rv < 0) err(1, "recvfrom"); rv = connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&z, len); if (rv < 0) err(1, "connect"); if (vflag) report_connect((struct sockaddr *)&z, len); readwrite(s); } else { len = sizeof(cliaddr); connfd = accept(s, (struct sockaddr *)&cliaddr, &len); if (connfd == -1) { /* For now, all errnos are fatal */ err(1, "accept"); } if (vflag) report_connect((struct sockaddr *)&cliaddr, len); readwrite(connfd); close(connfd); } if (family != AF_UNIX) close(s); else if (uflag) { if (connect(s, NULL, 0) < 0) err(1, "connect"); } if (!kflag) break; } } else if (family == AF_UNIX) { ret = 0; if ((s = unix_connect(host)) > 0 && !zflag) { readwrite(s); close(s); } else ret = 1; if (uflag) unlink(unix_dg_tmp_socket); exit(ret); } else { int i = 0; /* Construct the portlist[] array. */ build_ports(uport); /* Cycle through portlist, connecting to each port. */ for (i = 0; portlist[i] != NULL; i++) { if (s) close(s); if (xflag) s = socks_connect(host, portlist[i], hints, proxyhost, proxyport, proxyhints, socksv, Pflag); else s = remote_connect(host, portlist[i], hints); if (s < 0) continue; ret = 0; if (vflag || zflag) { /* For UDP, make sure we are connected. */ if (uflag) { if (udptest(s) == -1) { ret = 1; continue; } } /* Don't look up port if -n. */ if (nflag) sv = NULL; else { sv = getservbyport( ntohs(atoi(portlist[i])), uflag ? "udp" : "tcp"); } fprintf(stderr, "Connection to %s %s port [%s/%s] " "succeeded!\n", host, portlist[i], uflag ? "udp" : "tcp", sv ? sv->s_name : "*"); } if (Fflag) fdpass(s); else if (!zflag) readwrite(s); } } if (s) close(s); exit(ret); } /* * unix_bind() * Returns a unix socket bound to the given path */ int unix_bind(char *path) { struct sockaddr_un sun_sa; int s; /* Create unix domain socket. */ if ((s = socket(AF_UNIX, uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) return (-1); memset(&sun_sa, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_un)); sun_sa.sun_family = AF_UNIX; if (strlcpy(sun_sa.sun_path, path, sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) >= sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) { close(s); errno = ENAMETOOLONG; return (-1); } if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sun_sa, SUN_LEN(&sun_sa)) < 0) { close(s); return (-1); } return (s); } /* * unix_connect() * Returns a socket connected to a local unix socket. Returns -1 on failure. */ int unix_connect(char *path) { struct sockaddr_un sun_sa; int s; if (uflag) { if ((s = unix_bind(unix_dg_tmp_socket)) < 0) return (-1); } else { if ((s = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) return (-1); } (void)fcntl(s, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); memset(&sun_sa, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_un)); sun_sa.sun_family = AF_UNIX; if (strlcpy(sun_sa.sun_path, path, sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) >= sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) { close(s); errno = ENAMETOOLONG; return (-1); } if (connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sun_sa, SUN_LEN(&sun_sa)) < 0) { close(s); return (-1); } return (s); } /* * unix_listen() * Create a unix domain socket, and listen on it. */ int unix_listen(char *path) { int s; if ((s = unix_bind(path)) < 0) return (-1); if (listen(s, 5) < 0) { close(s); return (-1); } return (s); } /* * remote_connect() * Returns a socket connected to a remote host. Properly binds to a local * port or source address if needed. Returns -1 on failure. */ int remote_connect(const char *host, const char *port, struct addrinfo hints) { struct addrinfo *res, *res0; int s, error; #if defined(SO_RTABLE) || defined(SO_BINDANY) int on = 1; #endif if ((error = getaddrinfo(host, port, &hints, &res))) errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error)); res0 = res; do { if ((s = socket(res0->ai_family, res0->ai_socktype, res0->ai_protocol)) < 0) continue; #ifdef SO_RTABLE if (rtableid >= 0 && (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE, &rtableid, sizeof(rtableid)) == -1)) err(1, "setsockopt SO_RTABLE"); #endif /* Bind to a local port or source address if specified. */ if (sflag || pflag) { struct addrinfo ahints, *ares; #ifdef SO_BINDANY /* try SO_BINDANY, but don't insist */ setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDANY, &on, sizeof(on)); #endif memset(&ahints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo)); ahints.ai_family = res0->ai_family; ahints.ai_socktype = uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM; ahints.ai_protocol = uflag ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP; ahints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; if ((error = getaddrinfo(sflag, pflag, &ahints, &ares))) errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error)); if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)ares->ai_addr, ares->ai_addrlen) < 0) err(1, "bind failed"); freeaddrinfo(ares); } set_common_sockopts(s); if (timeout_connect(s, res0->ai_addr, res0->ai_addrlen) == 0) break; else if (vflag) warn("connect to %s port %s (%s) failed", host, port, uflag ? "udp" : "tcp"); close(s); s = -1; } while ((res0 = res0->ai_next) != NULL); freeaddrinfo(res); return (s); } int timeout_connect(int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen) { struct pollfd pfd; socklen_t optlen; int flags = 0, optval; int ret; if (timeout != -1) { flags = fcntl(s, F_GETFL, 0); if (fcntl(s, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK) == -1) err(1, "set non-blocking mode"); } if ((ret = connect(s, name, namelen)) != 0 && errno == EINPROGRESS) { pfd.fd = s; pfd.events = POLLOUT; if ((ret = poll(&pfd, 1, timeout)) == 1) { optlen = sizeof(optval); if ((ret = getsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, &optlen)) == 0) { errno = optval; ret = optval == 0 ? 0 : -1; } } else if (ret == 0) { errno = ETIMEDOUT; ret = -1; } else err(1, "poll failed"); } if (timeout != -1 && fcntl(s, F_SETFL, flags) == -1) err(1, "restoring flags"); return (ret); } /* * local_listen() * Returns a socket listening on a local port, binds to specified source * address. Returns -1 on failure. */ int local_listen(char *host, char *port, struct addrinfo hints) { struct addrinfo *res, *res0; int s, ret, x = 1; int error; /* Allow nodename to be null. */ hints.ai_flags |= AI_PASSIVE; /* * In the case of binding to a wildcard address * default to binding to an ipv4 address. */ if (host == NULL && hints.ai_family == AF_UNSPEC) hints.ai_family = AF_INET; if ((error = getaddrinfo(host, port, &hints, &res))) errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error)); res0 = res; do { if ((s = socket(res0->ai_family, res0->ai_socktype, res0->ai_protocol)) < 0) continue; #ifdef SO_RTABLE if (rtableid >= 0 && (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE, &rtableid, sizeof(rtableid)) == -1)) err(1, "setsockopt SO_RTABLE"); #endif #ifdef SO_REUSEPORT ret = setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEPORT, &x, sizeof(x)); if (ret == -1) err(1, "setsockopt"); #endif set_common_sockopts(s); if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)res0->ai_addr, res0->ai_addrlen) == 0) break; close(s); s = -1; } while ((res0 = res0->ai_next) != NULL); if (!uflag && s != -1) { if (listen(s, 1) < 0) err(1, "listen"); } freeaddrinfo(res); return (s); } /* * readwrite() * Loop that polls on the network file descriptor and stdin. */ void readwrite(int net_fd) { struct pollfd pfd[4]; int stdin_fd = STDIN_FILENO; int stdout_fd = STDOUT_FILENO; unsigned char netinbuf[BUFSIZE]; size_t netinbufpos = 0; unsigned char stdinbuf[BUFSIZE]; size_t stdinbufpos = 0; int n, num_fds; ssize_t ret; /* don't read from stdin if requested */ if (dflag) stdin_fd = -1; /* stdin */ pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = stdin_fd; pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = POLLIN; /* network out */ pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = net_fd; pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = 0; /* network in */ pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = net_fd; pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = POLLIN; /* stdout */ pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = stdout_fd; pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = 0; while (1) { /* both inputs are gone, buffers are empty, we are done */ if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd == -1 && pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1 && stdinbufpos == 0 && netinbufpos == 0) { close(net_fd); return; } /* both outputs are gone, we can't continue */ if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd == -1 && pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd == -1) { close(net_fd); return; } /* listen and net in gone, queues empty, done */ if (lflag && pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1 && stdinbufpos == 0 && netinbufpos == 0) { close(net_fd); return; } /* help says -i is for "wait between lines sent". We read and * write arbitrary amounts of data, and we don't want to start * scanning for newlines, so this is as good as it gets */ if (iflag) sleep(iflag); /* poll */ num_fds = poll(pfd, 4, timeout); /* treat poll errors */ if (num_fds == -1) { close(net_fd); err(1, "polling error"); } /* timeout happened */ if (num_fds == 0) return; /* treat socket error conditions */ for (n = 0; n < 4; n++) { if (pfd[n].revents & (POLLERR|POLLNVAL)) { pfd[n].fd = -1; } } /* reading is possible after HUP */ if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].events & POLLIN && pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLHUP && ! (pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLIN)) pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1; if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].events & POLLIN && pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLHUP && ! (pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLIN)) pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1; if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].revents & POLLHUP) { if (Nflag) shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, SHUT_WR); pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1; } /* if HUP, stop watching stdout */ if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].revents & POLLHUP) pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1; /* if no net out, stop watching stdin */ if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd == -1) pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1; /* if no stdout, stop watching net in */ if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd == -1) { if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd != -1) shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, SHUT_RD); pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1; } /* try to read from stdin */ if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLIN && stdinbufpos < BUFSIZE) { ret = fillbuf(pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd, stdinbuf, &stdinbufpos); /* error or eof on stdin - remove from pfd */ if (ret == 0 || ret == -1) pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1; /* read something - poll net out */ if (stdinbufpos > 0) pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = POLLOUT; /* filled buffer - remove self from polling */ if (stdinbufpos == BUFSIZE) pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = 0; } /* try to write to network */ if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].revents & POLLOUT && stdinbufpos > 0) { ret = drainbuf(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, stdinbuf, &stdinbufpos); if (ret == -1) pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1; /* buffer empty - remove self from polling */ if (stdinbufpos == 0) pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = 0; /* buffer no longer full - poll stdin again */ if (stdinbufpos < BUFSIZE) pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = POLLIN; } /* try to read from network */ if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLIN && netinbufpos < BUFSIZE) { ret = fillbuf(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, netinbuf, &netinbufpos); if (ret == -1) pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1; /* eof on net in - remove from pfd */ if (ret == 0) { shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, SHUT_RD); pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1; } /* read something - poll stdout */ if (netinbufpos > 0) pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = POLLOUT; /* filled buffer - remove self from polling */ if (netinbufpos == BUFSIZE) pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = 0; /* handle telnet */ if (tflag) atelnet(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, netinbuf, netinbufpos); } /* try to write to stdout */ if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].revents & POLLOUT && netinbufpos > 0) { ret = drainbuf(pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd, netinbuf, &netinbufpos); if (ret == -1) pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1; /* buffer empty - remove self from polling */ if (netinbufpos == 0) pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = 0; /* buffer no longer full - poll net in again */ if (netinbufpos < BUFSIZE) pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = POLLIN; } /* stdin gone and queue empty? */ if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd == -1 && stdinbufpos == 0) { if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd != -1 && Nflag) shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, SHUT_WR); pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1; } /* net in gone and queue empty? */ if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1 && netinbufpos == 0) { pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1; } } } ssize_t drainbuf(int fd, unsigned char *buf, size_t *bufpos) { ssize_t n; ssize_t adjust; n = write(fd, buf, *bufpos); /* don't treat EAGAIN, EINTR as error */ if (n == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) n = -2; if (n <= 0) return n; /* adjust buffer */ adjust = *bufpos - n; if (adjust > 0) memmove(buf, buf + n, adjust); *bufpos -= n; return n; } ssize_t fillbuf(int fd, unsigned char *buf, size_t *bufpos) { size_t num = BUFSIZE - *bufpos; ssize_t n; n = read(fd, buf + *bufpos, num); /* don't treat EAGAIN, EINTR as error */ if (n == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) n = -2; if (n <= 0) return n; *bufpos += n; return n; } /* * fdpass() * Pass the connected file descriptor to stdout and exit. */ void fdpass(int nfd) { #if defined(HAVE_SENDMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR)) struct msghdr msg; #ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR union { struct cmsghdr hdr; char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))]; } cmsgbuf; struct cmsghdr *cmsg; #endif struct iovec vec; char ch = '\0'; struct pollfd pfd; ssize_t r; memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); #ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&nfd; msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(nfd); #else memset(&cmsgbuf, 0, sizeof(cmsgbuf)); msg.msg_control = (caddr_t)&cmsgbuf.buf; msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf); cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int)); cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET; cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS; *(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg) = nfd; #endif vec.iov_base = &ch; vec.iov_len = 1; msg.msg_iov = &vec; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; bzero(&pfd, sizeof(pfd)); pfd.fd = STDOUT_FILENO; for (;;) { r = sendmsg(STDOUT_FILENO, &msg, 0); if (r == -1) { if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR) { pfd.events = POLLOUT; if (poll(&pfd, 1, -1) == -1) err(1, "poll"); continue; } err(1, "sendmsg"); } else if (r == -1) errx(1, "sendmsg: unexpected return value %zd", r); else break; } exit(0); #else errx(1, "%s: file descriptor passing not supported", __func__); #endif } /* Deal with RFC 854 WILL/WONT DO/DONT negotiation. */ void atelnet(int nfd, unsigned char *buf, unsigned int size) { unsigned char *p, *end; unsigned char obuf[4]; if (size < 3) return; end = buf + size - 2; for (p = buf; p < end; p++) { if (*p != IAC) continue; obuf[0] = IAC; p++; if ((*p == WILL) || (*p == WONT)) obuf[1] = DONT; else if ((*p == DO) || (*p == DONT)) obuf[1] = WONT; else continue; p++; obuf[2] = *p; if (atomicio(vwrite, nfd, obuf, 3) != 3) warn("Write Error!"); } } /* * build_ports() * Build an array of ports in portlist[], listing each port * that we should try to connect to. */ void build_ports(char *p) { const char *errstr; char *n; int hi, lo, cp; int x = 0; if ((n = strchr(p, '-')) != NULL) { *n = '\0'; n++; /* Make sure the ports are in order: lowest->highest. */ hi = strtonum(n, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, n); lo = strtonum(p, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, p); if (lo > hi) { cp = hi; hi = lo; lo = cp; } /* Load ports sequentially. */ for (cp = lo; cp <= hi; cp++) { portlist[x] = calloc(1, PORT_MAX_LEN); if (portlist[x] == NULL) errx(1, "calloc"); snprintf(portlist[x], PORT_MAX_LEN, "%d", cp); x++; } /* Randomly swap ports. */ if (rflag) { int y; char *c; for (x = 0; x <= (hi - lo); x++) { y = (arc4random() & 0xFFFF) % (hi - lo); c = portlist[x]; portlist[x] = portlist[y]; portlist[y] = c; } } } else { hi = strtonum(p, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, p); portlist[0] = strdup(p); if (portlist[0] == NULL) errx(1, "strdup"); } } /* * udptest() * Do a few writes to see if the UDP port is there. * Fails once PF state table is full. */ int udptest(int s) { int i, ret; for (i = 0; i <= 3; i++) { if (write(s, "X", 1) == 1) ret = 1; else ret = -1; } return (ret); } void set_common_sockopts(int s) { int x = 1; #ifdef TCP_MD5SIG if (Sflag) { if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_MD5SIG, &x, sizeof(x)) == -1) err(1, "setsockopt"); } #endif if (Dflag) { if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_DEBUG, &x, sizeof(x)) == -1) err(1, "setsockopt"); } if (Tflag != -1) { if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &Tflag, sizeof(Tflag)) == -1) err(1, "set IP ToS"); } if (Iflag) { if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &Iflag, sizeof(Iflag)) == -1) err(1, "set TCP receive buffer size"); } if (Oflag) { if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF, &Oflag, sizeof(Oflag)) == -1) err(1, "set TCP send buffer size"); } } int map_tos(char *s, int *val) { /* DiffServ Codepoints and other TOS mappings */ const struct toskeywords { const char *keyword; int val; } *t, toskeywords[] = { { "af11", IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 }, { "af12", IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 }, { "af13", IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 }, { "af21", IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 }, { "af22", IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 }, { "af23", IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 }, { "af31", IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 }, { "af32", IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 }, { "af33", IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 }, { "af41", IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 }, { "af42", IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 }, { "af43", IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 }, { "critical", IPTOS_PREC_CRITIC_ECP }, { "cs0", IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 }, { "cs1", IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 }, { "cs2", IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 }, { "cs3", IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 }, { "cs4", IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 }, { "cs5", IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 }, { "cs6", IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 }, { "cs7", IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 }, { "ef", IPTOS_DSCP_EF }, { "inetcontrol", IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL }, { "lowdelay", IPTOS_LOWDELAY }, { "netcontrol", IPTOS_PREC_NETCONTROL }, { "reliability", IPTOS_RELIABILITY }, { "throughput", IPTOS_THROUGHPUT }, { NULL, -1 }, }; for (t = toskeywords; t->keyword != NULL; t++) { if (strcmp(s, t->keyword) == 0) { *val = t->val; return (1); } } return (0); } void report_connect(const struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t salen) { char remote_host[NI_MAXHOST]; char remote_port[NI_MAXSERV]; int herr; int flags = NI_NUMERICSERV; if (nflag) flags |= NI_NUMERICHOST; if ((herr = getnameinfo(sa, salen, remote_host, sizeof(remote_host), remote_port, sizeof(remote_port), flags)) != 0) { if (herr == EAI_SYSTEM) err(1, "getnameinfo"); else errx(1, "getnameinfo: %s", gai_strerror(herr)); } fprintf(stderr, "Connection from %s %s " "received!\n", remote_host, remote_port); } void help(void) { usage(0); fprintf(stderr, "\tCommand Summary:\n\ \t-4 Use IPv4\n\ \t-6 Use IPv6\n\ \t-D Enable the debug socket option\n\ \t-d Detach from stdin\n\ \t-F Pass socket fd\n\ \t-h This help text\n\ \t-I length TCP receive buffer length\n\ \t-i secs\t Delay interval for lines sent, ports scanned\n\ \t-k Keep inbound sockets open for multiple connects\n\ \t-l Listen mode, for inbound connects\n\ \t-N Shutdown the network socket after EOF on stdin\n\ \t-n Suppress name/port resolutions\n\ \t-O length TCP send buffer length\n\ \t-P proxyuser\tUsername for proxy authentication\n\ \t-p port\t Specify local port for remote connects\n\ \t-r Randomize remote ports\n\ \t-S Enable the TCP MD5 signature option\n\ \t-s addr\t Local source address\n\ \t-T toskeyword\tSet IP Type of Service\n\ \t-t Answer TELNET negotiation\n\ \t-U Use UNIX domain socket\n\ \t-u UDP mode\n\ \t-V rtable Specify alternate routing table\n\ \t-v Verbose\n\ \t-w secs\t Timeout for connects and final net reads\n\ \t-X proto Proxy protocol: \"4\", \"5\" (SOCKS) or \"connect\"\n\ \t-x addr[:port]\tSpecify proxy address and port\n\ \t-z Zero-I/O mode [used for scanning]\n\ Port numbers can be individual or ranges: lo-hi [inclusive]\n"); exit(1); } void usage(int ret) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: nc [-46DdFhklNnrStUuvz] [-I length] [-i interval] [-O length]\n" "\t [-P proxy_username] [-p source_port] [-s source] [-T ToS]\n" "\t [-V rtable] [-w timeout] [-X proxy_protocol]\n" "\t [-x proxy_address[:port]] [destination] [port]\n"); if (ret) exit(1); } /* *** src/usr.bin/nc/socks.c *** */ /* $OpenBSD: socks.c,v 1.20 2012/03/08 09:56:28 espie Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #define SOCKS_PORT "1080" #define HTTP_PROXY_PORT "3128" #define HTTP_MAXHDRS 64 #define SOCKS_V5 5 #define SOCKS_V4 4 #define SOCKS_NOAUTH 0 #define SOCKS_NOMETHOD 0xff #define SOCKS_CONNECT 1 #define SOCKS_IPV4 1 #define SOCKS_DOMAIN 3 #define SOCKS_IPV6 4 int remote_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo); int socks_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo, const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo, int, const char *); static int decode_addrport(const char *h, const char *p, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen, int v4only, int numeric) { int r; struct addrinfo hints, *res; bzero(&hints, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = v4only ? PF_INET : PF_UNSPEC; hints.ai_flags = numeric ? AI_NUMERICHOST : 0; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; r = getaddrinfo(h, p, &hints, &res); /* Don't fatal when attempting to convert a numeric address */ if (r != 0) { if (!numeric) { errx(1, "getaddrinfo(\"%.64s\", \"%.64s\"): %s", h, p, gai_strerror(r)); } return (-1); } if (addrlen < res->ai_addrlen) { freeaddrinfo(res); errx(1, "internal error: addrlen < res->ai_addrlen"); } memcpy(addr, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen); freeaddrinfo(res); return (0); } static int proxy_read_line(int fd, char *buf, size_t bufsz) { size_t off; for(off = 0;;) { if (off >= bufsz) errx(1, "proxy read too long"); if (atomicio(read, fd, buf + off, 1) != 1) err(1, "proxy read"); /* Skip CR */ if (buf[off] == '\r') continue; if (buf[off] == '\n') { buf[off] = '\0'; break; } off++; } return (off); } static const char * getproxypass(const char *proxyuser, const char *proxyhost) { char prompt[512]; static char pw[256]; snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Proxy password for %s@%s: ", proxyuser, proxyhost); if (readpassphrase(prompt, pw, sizeof(pw), RPP_REQUIRE_TTY) == NULL) errx(1, "Unable to read proxy passphrase"); return (pw); } int socks_connect(const char *host, const char *port, struct addrinfo hints __attribute__ ((__unused__)), const char *proxyhost, const char *proxyport, struct addrinfo proxyhints, int socksv, const char *proxyuser) { int proxyfd, r, authretry = 0; size_t hlen, wlen = 0; unsigned char buf[1024]; size_t cnt; struct sockaddr_storage addr; struct sockaddr_in *in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr; struct sockaddr_in6 *in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&addr; in_port_t serverport; const char *proxypass = NULL; if (proxyport == NULL) proxyport = (socksv == -1) ? HTTP_PROXY_PORT : SOCKS_PORT; /* Abuse API to lookup port */ if (decode_addrport("0.0.0.0", port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr), 1, 1) == -1) errx(1, "unknown port \"%.64s\"", port); serverport = in4->sin_port; again: if (authretry++ > 3) errx(1, "Too many authentication failures"); proxyfd = remote_connect(proxyhost, proxyport, proxyhints); if (proxyfd < 0) return (-1); if (socksv == 5) { if (decode_addrport(host, port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr), 0, 1) == -1) addr.ss_family = 0; /* used in switch below */ /* Version 5, one method: no authentication */ buf[0] = SOCKS_V5; buf[1] = 1; buf[2] = SOCKS_NOAUTH; cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, 3); if (cnt != 3) err(1, "write failed (%zu/3)", cnt); cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 2); if (cnt != 2) err(1, "read failed (%zu/3)", cnt); if (buf[1] == SOCKS_NOMETHOD) errx(1, "authentication method negotiation failed"); switch (addr.ss_family) { case 0: /* Version 5, connect: domain name */ /* Max domain name length is 255 bytes */ hlen = strlen(host); if (hlen > 255) errx(1, "host name too long for SOCKS5"); buf[0] = SOCKS_V5; buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT; buf[2] = 0; buf[3] = SOCKS_DOMAIN; buf[4] = hlen; memcpy(buf + 5, host, hlen); memcpy(buf + 5 + hlen, &serverport, sizeof serverport); wlen = 7 + hlen; break; case AF_INET: /* Version 5, connect: IPv4 address */ buf[0] = SOCKS_V5; buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT; buf[2] = 0; buf[3] = SOCKS_IPV4; memcpy(buf + 4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof in4->sin_addr); memcpy(buf + 8, &in4->sin_port, sizeof in4->sin_port); wlen = 10; break; case AF_INET6: /* Version 5, connect: IPv6 address */ buf[0] = SOCKS_V5; buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT; buf[2] = 0; buf[3] = SOCKS_IPV6; memcpy(buf + 4, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof in6->sin6_addr); memcpy(buf + 20, &in6->sin6_port, sizeof in6->sin6_port); wlen = 22; break; default: errx(1, "internal error: silly AF"); } cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, wlen); if (cnt != wlen) err(1, "write failed (%zu/%zu)", cnt, wlen); cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 4); if (cnt != 4) err(1, "read failed (%zu/4)", cnt); if (buf[1] != 0) errx(1, "connection failed, SOCKS error %d", buf[1]); switch (buf[3]) { case SOCKS_IPV4: cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf + 4, 6); if (cnt != 6) err(1, "read failed (%zu/6)", cnt); break; case SOCKS_IPV6: cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf + 4, 18); if (cnt != 18) err(1, "read failed (%zu/18)", cnt); break; default: errx(1, "connection failed, unsupported address type"); } } else if (socksv == 4) { /* This will exit on lookup failure */ decode_addrport(host, port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr), 1, 0); /* Version 4 */ buf[0] = SOCKS_V4; buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT; /* connect */ memcpy(buf + 2, &in4->sin_port, sizeof in4->sin_port); memcpy(buf + 4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof in4->sin_addr); buf[8] = 0; /* empty username */ wlen = 9; cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, wlen); if (cnt != wlen) err(1, "write failed (%zu/%zu)", cnt, wlen); cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 8); if (cnt != 8) err(1, "read failed (%zu/8)", cnt); if (buf[1] != 90) errx(1, "connection failed, SOCKS error %d", buf[1]); } else if (socksv == -1) { /* HTTP proxy CONNECT */ /* Disallow bad chars in hostname */ if (strcspn(host, "\r\n\t []:") != strlen(host)) errx(1, "Invalid hostname"); /* Try to be sane about numeric IPv6 addresses */ if (strchr(host, ':') != NULL) { r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "CONNECT [%s]:%d HTTP/1.0\r\n", host, ntohs(serverport)); } else { r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.0\r\n", host, ntohs(serverport)); } if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf)) errx(1, "hostname too long"); r = strlen(buf); cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, r); if (cnt != (size_t)r) err(1, "write failed (%zu/%d)", cnt, r); if (authretry > 1) { char resp[1024]; proxypass = getproxypass(proxyuser, proxyhost); r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s:%s", proxyuser, proxypass); if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf) || b64_ntop(buf, strlen(buf), resp, sizeof(resp)) == -1) errx(1, "Proxy username/password too long"); r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Proxy-Authorization: " "Basic %s\r\n", resp); if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf)) errx(1, "Proxy auth response too long"); r = strlen(buf); if ((cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, r)) != (size_t)r) err(1, "write failed (%zu/%d)", cnt, r); } /* Terminate headers */ if ((r = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, "\r\n", 2)) != 2) err(1, "write failed (2/%d)", r); /* Read status reply */ proxy_read_line(proxyfd, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (proxyuser != NULL && strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.0 407 ", 12) == 0) { if (authretry > 1) { fprintf(stderr, "Proxy authentication " "failed\n"); } close(proxyfd); goto again; } else if (strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.0 200 ", 12) != 0 && strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.1 200 ", 12) != 0) errx(1, "Proxy error: \"%s\"", buf); /* Headers continue until we hit an empty line */ for (r = 0; r < HTTP_MAXHDRS; r++) { proxy_read_line(proxyfd, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (*buf == '\0') break; } if (*buf != '\0') errx(1, "Too many proxy headers received"); } else errx(1, "Unknown proxy protocol %d", socksv); return (proxyfd); } Index: head/crypto/openssh/regress/principals-command.sh =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/regress/principals-command.sh (nonexistent) +++ head/crypto/openssh/regress/principals-command.sh (revision 294336) @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +# $OpenBSD: principals-command.sh,v 1.1 2015/05/21 06:44:25 djm Exp $ +# Placed in the Public Domain. + +tid="authorized principals command" + +rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key* +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + +if test -z "$SUDO" ; then + echo "skipped (SUDO not set)" + echo "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without" + exit 0 +fi + +# Establish a AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand in /var/run where it will have +# acceptable directory permissions. +PRINCIPALS_COMMAND="/var/run/principals_command_${LOGNAME}" +cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "cat > '$PRINCIPALS_COMMAND'" +#!/bin/sh +test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1 +test -f "$OBJ/authorized_principals_${LOGNAME}" && + exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_principals_${LOGNAME}" +_EOF +test $? -eq 0 || fatal "couldn't prepare principals command" +$SUDO chmod 0755 "$PRINCIPALS_COMMAND" + +# Create a CA key and a user certificate. +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key || \ + fatal "ssh-keygen of user_ca_key failed" +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/cert_user_key || \ + fatal "ssh-keygen of cert_user_key failed" +${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \ + -z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/cert_user_key || \ + fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key" + +# Test explicitly-specified principals +for privsep in yes no ; do + _prefix="privsep $privsep" + + # Setup for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand + rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + ( + cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep" + echo "AuthorizedKeysFile none" + echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND %u" + echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser ${LOGNAME}" + echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + + # XXX test missing command + # XXX test failing command + + # Empty authorized_principals + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty authorized_principals" + echo > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + + # Wrong authorized_principals + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong authorized_principals" + echo gregorsamsa > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + + # Correct authorized_principals + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct authorized_principals" + echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect failed" + fi + + # authorized_principals with bad key option + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals bad key opt" + echo 'blah mekmitasdigoat' > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + + # authorized_principals with command=false + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=false" + echo 'command="false" mekmitasdigoat' > \ + $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + + + # authorized_principals with command=true + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=true" + echo 'command="true" mekmitasdigoat' > \ + $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect failed" + fi + + # Setup for principals= key option + rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER + ( + cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep" + ) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy + + # Wrong principals list + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong principals key option" + ( + printf 'cert-authority,principals="gregorsamsa" ' + cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub + ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly" + fi + + # Correct principals list + verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct principals key option" + ( + printf 'cert-authority,principals="mekmitasdigoat" ' + cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub + ) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER + ${SSH} -2i $OBJ/cert_user_key \ + -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1 + if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then + fail "ssh cert connect failed" + fi +done Property changes on: head/crypto/openssh/regress/principals-command.sh ___________________________________________________________________ Added: svn:eol-style ## -0,0 +1 ## +native \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:executable ## -0,0 +1 ## +* \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:keywords ## -0,0 +1 ## +FreeBSD=%H \ No newline at end of property Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +text/plain \ No newline at end of property Index: head/crypto/openssh/regress/ssh-com.sh =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/regress/ssh-com.sh (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/regress/ssh-com.sh (revision 294336) @@ -1,119 +1,119 @@ -# $OpenBSD: ssh-com.sh,v 1.8 2013/05/17 00:37:40 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: ssh-com.sh,v 1.9 2015/05/08 07:29:00 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="connect to ssh.com server" #TEST_COMBASE=/path/to/ssh/com/binaries if [ "X${TEST_COMBASE}" = "X" ]; then fatal '$TEST_COMBASE is not set' fi VERSIONS=" 2.0.12 2.0.13 2.1.0 2.2.0 2.3.0 2.4.0 3.0.0 3.1.0 3.2.0 3.2.2 3.2.3 3.2.5 3.2.9 3.2.9.1 3.3.0" # 2.0.10 does not support UserConfigDirectory # 2.3.1 requires a config in $HOME/.ssh2 SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}` # ssh.com cat << EOF > $OBJ/sshd2_config #*: # Port and ListenAddress are not used. QuietMode yes Port 4343 ListenAddress 127.0.0.1 UserConfigDirectory ${OBJ}/%U Ciphers AnyCipher PubKeyAuthentication yes #AllowedAuthentications publickey AuthorizationFile authorization HostKeyFile ${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.prv PublicHostKeyFile ${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.pub RandomSeedFile ${OBJ}/random_seed - MaxConnections 0 + MaxConnections 0 PermitRootLogin yes VerboseMode no CheckMail no Ssh1Compatibility no EOF -# create client config +# create client config sed "s/HostKeyAlias.*/HostKeyAlias ssh2-localhost-with-alias/" \ < $OBJ/ssh_config > $OBJ/ssh_config_com # we need a DSA key for rm -f ${OBJ}/dsa ${OBJ}/dsa.pub ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t dsa -f ${OBJ}/dsa # setup userdir, try rsa first mkdir -p ${OBJ}/${USER} cp /dev/null ${OBJ}/${USER}/authorization for t in rsa dsa; do ${SSHKEYGEN} -e -f ${OBJ}/$t.pub > ${OBJ}/${USER}/$t.com echo Key $t.com >> ${OBJ}/${USER}/authorization echo IdentityFile ${OBJ}/$t >> ${OBJ}/ssh_config_com done # convert and append DSA hostkey ( printf 'ssh2-localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' ${SSHKEYGEN} -if ${SRC}/dsa_ssh2.pub ) >> $OBJ/known_hosts # go for it for v in ${VERSIONS}; do sshd2=${TEST_COMBASE}/${v}/sshd2 if [ ! -x ${sshd2} ]; then continue fi trace "sshd2 ${v}" PROXY="proxycommand ${sshd2} -qif ${OBJ}/sshd2_config 2> /dev/null" ${SSH} -qF ${OBJ}/ssh_config_com -o "${PROXY}" dummy exit 0 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh connect to sshd2 ${v} failed" fi ciphers="3des-cbc blowfish-cbc arcfour" macs="hmac-md5" case $v in 2.4.*) ciphers="$ciphers cast128-cbc" macs="$macs hmac-sha1 hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96" ;; 3.*) ciphers="$ciphers aes128-cbc cast128-cbc" macs="$macs hmac-sha1 hmac-sha1-96 hmac-md5-96" ;; esac #ciphers="3des-cbc" for m in $macs; do for c in $ciphers; do trace "sshd2 ${v} cipher $c mac $m" verbose "test ${tid}: sshd2 ${v} cipher $c mac $m" ${SSH} -c $c -m $m -qF ${OBJ}/ssh_config_com -o "${PROXY}" dummy exit 0 if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh connect to sshd2 ${v} with $c/$m failed" fi done done done rm -rf ${OBJ}/${USER} for i in sshd_config_proxy ssh_config_proxy random_seed \ sshd2_config dsa.pub dsa ssh_config_com; do rm -f ${OBJ}/$i done Index: head/crypto/openssh/regress/ssh2putty.sh =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/regress/ssh2putty.sh (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/regress/ssh2putty.sh (revision 294336) @@ -1,34 +1,34 @@ #!/bin/sh -# $OpenBSD: ssh2putty.sh,v 1.2 2009/10/06 23:51:49 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: ssh2putty.sh,v 1.3 2015/05/08 07:26:13 djm Exp $ if test "x$1" = "x" -o "x$2" = "x" -o "x$3" = "x" ; then echo "Usage: ssh2putty hostname port ssh-private-key" exit 1 fi HOST=$1 PORT=$2 KEYFILE=$3 # XXX - support DSA keys too if grep "BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY" $KEYFILE >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then : else echo "Unsupported private key format" exit 1 fi public_exponent=` - openssl rsa -noout -text -in $KEYFILE | grep ^publicExponent | + openssl rsa -noout -text -in $KEYFILE | grep ^publicExponent | sed 's/.*(//;s/).*//' ` test $? -ne 0 && exit 1 modulus=` - openssl rsa -noout -modulus -in $KEYFILE | grep ^Modulus= | + openssl rsa -noout -modulus -in $KEYFILE | grep ^Modulus= | sed 's/^Modulus=/0x/' | tr A-Z a-z ` test $? -ne 0 && exit 1 echo "rsa2@$PORT:$HOST $public_exponent,$modulus" Index: head/crypto/openssh/regress/test-exec.sh =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/regress/test-exec.sh (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/regress/test-exec.sh (revision 294336) @@ -1,564 +1,564 @@ # $OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.51 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. #SUDO=sudo # Unbreak GNU head(1) _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 export _POSIX2_VERSION case `uname -s 2>/dev/null` in OSF1*) BIN_SH=xpg4 export BIN_SH ;; CYGWIN_NT-5.0) os=cygwin TEST_SSH_IPV6=no ;; CYGWIN*) os=cygwin ;; esac if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_PORT" ]; then PORT="$TEST_SSH_PORT" else PORT=4242 fi if [ -x /usr/ucb/whoami ]; then USER=`/usr/ucb/whoami` elif whoami >/dev/null 2>&1; then USER=`whoami` elif logname >/dev/null 2>&1; then USER=`logname` else USER=`id -un` fi OBJ=$1 if [ "x$OBJ" = "x" ]; then echo '$OBJ not defined' exit 2 fi if [ ! -d $OBJ ]; then echo "not a directory: $OBJ" exit 2 fi SCRIPT=$2 if [ "x$SCRIPT" = "x" ]; then echo '$SCRIPT not defined' exit 2 fi if [ ! -f $SCRIPT ]; then echo "not a file: $SCRIPT" exit 2 fi if $TEST_SHELL -n $SCRIPT; then true else echo "syntax error in $SCRIPT" exit 2 fi unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}` # defaults SSH=ssh SSHD=sshd SSHAGENT=ssh-agent SSHADD=ssh-add SSHKEYGEN=ssh-keygen SSHKEYSCAN=ssh-keyscan SFTP=sftp SFTPSERVER=/usr/libexec/openssh/sftp-server SCP=scp # Interop testing PLINK=plink PUTTYGEN=puttygen CONCH=conch if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSH" != "x" ]; then SSH="${TEST_SSH_SSH}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHD" != "x" ]; then SSHD="${TEST_SSH_SSHD}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT" != "x" ]; then SSHAGENT="${TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHADD" != "x" ]; then SSHADD="${TEST_SSH_SSHADD}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN" != "x" ]; then SSHKEYGEN="${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN" != "x" ]; then SSHKEYSCAN="${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SFTP" != "x" ]; then SFTP="${TEST_SSH_SFTP}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER" != "x" ]; then SFTPSERVER="${TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SCP" != "x" ]; then SCP="${TEST_SSH_SCP}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PLINK" != "x" ]; then # Find real binary, if it exists case "${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" in /*) PLINK="${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" ;; *) PLINK=`which ${TEST_SSH_PLINK} 2>/dev/null` ;; esac fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN" != "x" ]; then # Find real binary, if it exists case "${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" in /*) PUTTYGEN="${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" ;; *) PUTTYGEN=`which ${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN} 2>/dev/null` ;; esac fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_CONCH" != "x" ]; then # Find real binary, if it exists case "${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" in /*) CONCH="${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" ;; *) CONCH=`which ${TEST_SSH_CONCH} 2>/dev/null` ;; esac fi SSH_PROTOCOLS=`$SSH -Q protocol-version` if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PROTOCOLS" != "x" ]; then SSH_PROTOCOLS="${TEST_SSH_PROTOCOLS}" fi # Path to sshd must be absolute for rexec case "$SSHD" in /*) ;; *) SSHD=`which $SSHD` ;; esac case "$SSHAGENT" in /*) ;; *) SSHAGENT=`which $SSHAGENT` ;; esac # Record the actual binaries used. SSH_BIN=${SSH} SSHD_BIN=${SSHD} SSHAGENT_BIN=${SSHAGENT} SSHADD_BIN=${SSHADD} SSHKEYGEN_BIN=${SSHKEYGEN} SSHKEYSCAN_BIN=${SSHKEYSCAN} SFTP_BIN=${SFTP} SFTPSERVER_BIN=${SFTPSERVER} SCP_BIN=${SCP} if [ "x$USE_VALGRIND" != "x" ]; then mkdir -p $OBJ/valgrind-out VG_TEST=`basename $SCRIPT .sh` # Some tests are difficult to fix. case "$VG_TEST" in connect-privsep|reexec) VG_SKIP=1 ;; esac if [ x"$VG_SKIP" = "x" ]; then VG_IGNORE="/bin/*,/sbin/*,/usr/*,/var/*" VG_LOG="$OBJ/valgrind-out/${VG_TEST}." VG_OPTS="--track-origins=yes --leak-check=full" VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children=yes" VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children-skip=${VG_IGNORE}" VG_PATH="valgrind" if [ "x$VALGRIND_PATH" != "x" ]; then VG_PATH="$VALGRIND_PATH" fi VG="$VG_PATH $VG_OPTS" SSH="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh.%p $SSH" SSHD="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sshd.%p $SSHD" SSHAGENT="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-agent.%p $SSHAGENT" SSHADD="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-add.%p $SSHADD" SSHKEYGEN="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-keygen.%p $SSHKEYGEN" SSHKEYSCAN="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-keyscan.%p $SSHKEYSCAN" SFTP="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sftp.%p ${SFTP}" SCP="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}scp.%p $SCP" cat > $OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh << EOF #!/bin/sh exec $VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sftp-server.%p $SFTPSERVER "\$@" EOF chmod a+rx $OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh SFTPSERVER="$OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh" fi fi # Logfiles. # SSH_LOGFILE should be the debug output of ssh(1) only # SSHD_LOGFILE should be the debug output of sshd(8) only # REGRESS_LOGFILE is the output of the test itself stdout and stderr if [ "x$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then TEST_SSH_LOGFILE=$OBJ/ssh.log fi if [ "x$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE=$OBJ/sshd.log fi if [ "x$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE=$OBJ/regress.log fi # truncate logfiles >$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE >$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE >$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE # Create wrapper ssh with logging. We can't just specify "SSH=ssh -E..." # because sftp and scp don't handle spaces in arguments. SSHLOGWRAP=$OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh echo "#!/bin/sh" > $SSHLOGWRAP echo "exec ${SSH} -E${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} "'"$@"' >>$SSHLOGWRAP chmod a+rx $OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh SSH="$SSHLOGWRAP" # Some test data. We make a copy because some tests will overwrite it. # The tests may assume that $DATA exists and is writable and $COPY does # not exist. Tests requiring larger data files can call increase_datafile_size # [kbytes] to ensure the file is at least that large. DATANAME=data DATA=$OBJ/${DATANAME} cat ${SSHAGENT_BIN} >${DATA} chmod u+w ${DATA} COPY=$OBJ/copy rm -f ${COPY} increase_datafile_size() { while [ `du -k ${DATA} | cut -f1` -lt $1 ]; do cat ${SSHAGENT_BIN} >>${DATA} done } # these should be used in tests export SSH SSHD SSHAGENT SSHADD SSHKEYGEN SSHKEYSCAN SFTP SFTPSERVER SCP #echo $SSH $SSHD $SSHAGENT $SSHADD $SSHKEYGEN $SSHKEYSCAN $SFTP $SFTPSERVER $SCP # Portable specific functions have_prog() { saved_IFS="$IFS" IFS=":" for i in $PATH do if [ -x $i/$1 ]; then IFS="$saved_IFS" return 0 fi done IFS="$saved_IFS" return 1 } jot() { awk "BEGIN { for (i = $2; i < $2 + $1; i++) { printf \"%d\n\", i } exit }" } # Check whether preprocessor symbols are defined in config.h. config_defined () { str=$1 while test "x$2" != "x" ; do str="$str|$2" shift done egrep "^#define.*($str)" ${BUILDDIR}/config.h >/dev/null 2>&1 } md5 () { if have_prog md5sum; then md5sum elif have_prog openssl; then openssl md5 elif have_prog cksum; then cksum elif have_prog sum; then sum else wc -c fi } # End of portable specific functions # helper cleanup () { if [ "x$SSH_PID" != "x" ]; then if [ $SSH_PID -lt 2 ]; then echo bad pid for ssh: $SSH_PID else kill $SSH_PID fi fi if [ -f $PIDFILE ]; then pid=`$SUDO cat $PIDFILE` if [ "X$pid" = "X" ]; then echo no sshd running else if [ $pid -lt 2 ]; then echo bad pid for sshd: $pid else $SUDO kill $pid trace "wait for sshd to exit" i=0; while [ -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 5 ]; do i=`expr $i + 1` sleep $i done test -f $PIDFILE && \ fatal "sshd didn't exit port $PORT pid $pid" fi fi fi } start_debug_log () { echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE } save_debug_log () { echo $@ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE echo $@ >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE echo $@ >>$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE (cat $TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-regress.log (cat $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-ssh.log (cat $TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-sshd.log } trace () { start_debug_log $@ if [ "X$TEST_SSH_TRACE" = "Xyes" ]; then echo "$@" fi } verbose () { start_debug_log $@ if [ "X$TEST_SSH_QUIET" != "Xyes" ]; then echo "$@" fi } warn () { echo "WARNING: $@" >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE echo "WARNING: $@" } fail () { save_debug_log "FAIL: $@" RESULT=1 echo "$@" } fatal () { save_debug_log "FATAL: $@" printf "FATAL: " fail "$@" cleanup exit $RESULT } ssh_version () { echo ${SSH_PROTOCOLS} | grep "$1" >/dev/null } RESULT=0 PIDFILE=$OBJ/pidfile trap fatal 3 2 if ssh_version 1; then PROTO="2,1" else PROTO="2" fi # create server config cat << EOF > $OBJ/sshd_config StrictModes no Port $PORT Protocol $PROTO AddressFamily inet ListenAddress 127.0.0.1 #ListenAddress ::1 PidFile $PIDFILE AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/authorized_keys_%u LogLevel DEBUG3 AcceptEnv _XXX_TEST_* AcceptEnv _XXX_TEST Subsystem sftp $SFTPSERVER EOF if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" ]; then trace "adding sshd_config option $TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" echo "$TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/sshd_config fi # server config for proxy connects cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_proxy # allow group-writable directories in proxy-mode echo 'StrictModes no' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy # create client config cat << EOF > $OBJ/ssh_config Host * Protocol $PROTO Hostname 127.0.0.1 HostKeyAlias localhost-with-alias Port $PORT User $USER GlobalKnownHostsFile $OBJ/known_hosts UserKnownHostsFile $OBJ/known_hosts RSAAuthentication yes PubkeyAuthentication yes ChallengeResponseAuthentication no HostbasedAuthentication no PasswordAuthentication no RhostsRSAAuthentication no BatchMode yes StrictHostKeyChecking yes LogLevel DEBUG3 EOF if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" ]; then - trace "adding ssh_config option $TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" + trace "adding ssh_config option $TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" echo "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/ssh_config fi rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER if ssh_version 1; then SSH_KEYTYPES="rsa rsa1" else SSH_KEYTYPES="rsa ed25519" fi trace "generate keys" for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do # generate user key if [ ! -f $OBJ/$t ] || [ ${SSHKEYGEN_BIN} -nt $OBJ/$t ]; then rm -f $OBJ/$t ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t -f $OBJ/$t ||\ fail "ssh-keygen for $t failed" fi # known hosts file for client ( printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' cat $OBJ/$t.pub ) >> $OBJ/known_hosts # setup authorized keys cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER echo IdentityFile $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/ssh_config # use key as host key, too $SUDO cp $OBJ/$t $OBJ/host.$t echo HostKey $OBJ/host.$t >> $OBJ/sshd_config # don't use SUDO for proxy connect echo HostKey $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy done chmod 644 $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER # Activate Twisted Conch tests if the binary is present REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=no if test -x "$CONCH" ; then REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=yes fi # If PuTTY is present and we are running a PuTTY test, prepare keys and # configuration REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=no if test -x "$PUTTYGEN" -a -x "$PLINK" ; then REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=yes fi case "$SCRIPT" in *putty*) ;; *) REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=no ;; esac if test "$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" = "yes" ; then mkdir -p ${OBJ}/.putty # Add a PuTTY key to authorized_keys rm -f ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 puttygen -t rsa -o ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 < /dev/null > /dev/null puttygen -O public-openssh ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \ >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER # Convert rsa2 host key to PuTTY format ${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 $PORT $OBJ/rsa > \ ${OBJ}/.putty/sshhostkeys ${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 22 $OBJ/rsa >> \ ${OBJ}/.putty/sshhostkeys # Setup proxied session mkdir -p ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions rm -f ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "Hostname=127.0.0.1" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "PortNumber=$PORT" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "ProxyMethod=5" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "ProxyTelnetCommand=sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=yes fi # create a proxy version of the client config ( cat $OBJ/ssh_config echo proxycommand ${SUDO} sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy ) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy # check proxy config ${SSHD} -t -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy || fatal "sshd_proxy broken" start_sshd () { # start sshd $SUDO ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -t || fatal "sshd_config broken" $SUDO ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -E$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE trace "wait for sshd" i=0; while [ ! -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 10 ]; do i=`expr $i + 1` sleep $i done test -f $PIDFILE || fatal "no sshd running on port $PORT" } # source test body . $SCRIPT # kill sshd cleanup if [ $RESULT -eq 0 ]; then verbose ok $tid else echo failed $tid fi exit $RESULT Index: head/crypto/openssh/regress/try-ciphers.sh =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/regress/try-ciphers.sh (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/regress/try-ciphers.sh (revision 294336) @@ -1,42 +1,42 @@ -# $OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.24 2015/03/03 22:35:19 markus Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.25 2015/03/24 20:22:17 markus Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="try ciphers" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do n=0 for m in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do trace "proto 2 cipher $c mac $m" verbose "test $tid: proto 2 cipher $c mac $m" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "Ciphers=$c" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo "MACs=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -2 -m $m -c $c somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh -2 failed with mac $m cipher $c" fi # No point trying all MACs for AEAD ciphers since they # are ignored. - if ssh -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then break fi n=`expr $n + 1` done done if ssh_version 1; then ciphers="3des blowfish" else ciphers="" fi for c in $ciphers; do trace "proto 1 cipher $c" verbose "test $tid: proto 1 cipher $c" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -1 -c $c somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh -1 failed with cipher $c" fi done Index: head/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,1171 +1,1171 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: test_iterate.c,v 1.3 2015/03/07 04:41:48 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: test_iterate.c,v 1.4 2015/03/31 22:59:01 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for hostfile.h hostkeys_foreach() * * Placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "hostfile.h" struct expected { const char *key_file; /* Path for key, NULL for none */ int no_parse_status; /* Expected status w/o key parsing */ int no_parse_keytype; /* Expected keytype w/o key parsing */ int match_host_p; /* Match 'prometheus.example.com' */ int match_host_s; /* Match 'sisyphus.example.com' */ int match_ipv4; /* Match '192.0.2.1' */ int match_ipv6; /* Match '2001:db8::1' */ int match_flags; /* Expected flags from match */ struct hostkey_foreach_line l; /* Expected line contents */ }; struct cbctx { const struct expected *expected; size_t nexpected; size_t i; int flags; int match_host_p; int match_host_s; int match_ipv4; int match_ipv6; }; /* * hostkeys_foreach() iterator callback that verifies the line passed * against an array of expected entries. */ static int check(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct cbctx *ctx = (struct cbctx *)_ctx; const struct expected *expected; int parse_key = (ctx->flags & HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY) != 0; const int matching = (ctx->flags & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0; u_int expected_status, expected_match; int expected_keytype; test_subtest_info("entry %zu/%zu, file line %ld", ctx->i + 1, ctx->nexpected, l->linenum); for (;;) { ASSERT_SIZE_T_LT(ctx->i, ctx->nexpected); expected = ctx->expected + ctx->i++; /* If we are matching host/IP then skip entries that don't */ if (!matching) break; if (ctx->match_host_p && expected->match_host_p) break; if (ctx->match_host_s && expected->match_host_s) break; if (ctx->match_ipv4 && expected->match_ipv4) break; if (ctx->match_ipv6 && expected->match_ipv6) break; } expected_status = (parse_key || expected->no_parse_status < 0) ? expected->l.status : (u_int)expected->no_parse_status; expected_match = expected->l.match; #define UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(x) do { \ if (ctx->x && expected->x) { \ expected_match |= expected->x; \ if (expected_status == HKF_STATUS_OK) \ expected_status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED; \ } \ } while (0) expected_keytype = (parse_key || expected->no_parse_keytype < 0) ? expected->l.keytype : expected->no_parse_keytype; #ifndef WITH_SSH1 - if (expected->l.keytype == KEY_RSA1 || - expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_RSA1) { + if (parse_key && (expected->l.keytype == KEY_RSA1 || + expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_RSA1)) { expected_status = HKF_STATUS_INVALID; expected_keytype = KEY_UNSPEC; parse_key = 0; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC if (expected->l.keytype == KEY_ECDSA || expected->no_parse_keytype == KEY_ECDSA) { expected_status = HKF_STATUS_INVALID; expected_keytype = KEY_UNSPEC; parse_key = 0; } #endif UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(match_host_p); UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(match_host_s); UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(match_ipv4); UPDATE_MATCH_STATUS(match_ipv6); ASSERT_PTR_NE(l->path, NULL); /* Don't care about path */ ASSERT_LONG_LONG_EQ(l->linenum, expected->l.linenum); ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(l->status, expected_status); ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(l->match, expected_match); /* Not all test entries contain fulltext */ if (expected->l.line != NULL) ASSERT_STRING_EQ(l->line, expected->l.line); ASSERT_INT_EQ(l->marker, expected->l.marker); /* XXX we skip hashed hostnames for now; implement checking */ if (expected->l.hosts != NULL) ASSERT_STRING_EQ(l->hosts, expected->l.hosts); /* Not all test entries contain raw keys */ if (expected->l.rawkey != NULL) ASSERT_STRING_EQ(l->rawkey, expected->l.rawkey); /* XXX synthesise raw key for cases lacking and compare */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(l->keytype, expected_keytype); if (parse_key) { if (expected->l.key == NULL) ASSERT_PTR_EQ(l->key, NULL); if (expected->l.key != NULL) { ASSERT_PTR_NE(l->key, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(l->key, expected->l.key), 1); } } if (parse_key && !(l->comment == NULL && expected->l.comment == NULL)) ASSERT_STRING_EQ(l->comment, expected->l.comment); return 0; } /* Loads public keys for a set of expected results */ static void prepare_expected(struct expected *expected, size_t n) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { if (expected[i].key_file == NULL) continue; #ifndef WITH_SSH1 if (expected[i].l.keytype == KEY_RSA1) continue; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC if (expected[i].l.keytype == KEY_ECDSA) continue; #endif ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public( test_data_file(expected[i].key_file), &expected[i].l.key, NULL), 0); } } struct expected expected_full[] = { { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, /* path, don't care */ 1, /* line number */ HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, /* status */ 0, /* match flags */ "# Plain host keys, plain host names", /* full line, optional */ MRK_NONE, /* marker (CA / revoked) */ NULL, /* hosts text */ NULL, /* raw key, optional */ KEY_UNSPEC, /* key type */ NULL, /* deserialised key */ NULL, /* comment */ } }, { "dsa_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 2, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, KEY_DSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "DSA #1", } }, { "ecdsa_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 3, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, KEY_ECDSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ECDSA #1", } }, { "ed25519_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 4, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, KEY_ED25519, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ED25519 #1", } }, { "rsa1_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 5, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, KEY_RSA1, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "RSA1 #1", } }, { "rsa_1.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 6, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, KEY_RSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "RSA #1", } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 7, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "", MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 8, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "# Plain host keys, hostnames + addresses", MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { "dsa_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, 9, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1", NULL, KEY_DSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "DSA #2", } }, { "ecdsa_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, 10, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1", NULL, KEY_ECDSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ECDSA #2", } }, { "ed25519_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, 11, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1", NULL, KEY_ED25519, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ED25519 #2", } }, { "rsa1_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, 12, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1", NULL, KEY_RSA1, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "RSA1 #2", } }, { "rsa_2.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, 13, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "prometheus.example.com,192.0.2.1,2001:db8::1", NULL, KEY_RSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "RSA #2", } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 14, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "", MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 15, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "# Some hosts with wildcard names / IPs", MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { "dsa_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, 16, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*", NULL, KEY_DSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "DSA #3", } }, { "ecdsa_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, 17, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*", NULL, KEY_ECDSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ECDSA #3", } }, { "ed25519_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, 18, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*", NULL, KEY_ED25519, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ED25519 #3", } }, { "rsa1_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, 19, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*", NULL, KEY_RSA1, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "RSA1 #3", } }, { "rsa_3.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_IP, HKF_MATCH_IP, -1, { NULL, 20, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "*.example.com,192.0.2.*,2001:*", NULL, KEY_RSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "RSA #3", } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 21, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "", MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 22, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "# Hashed hostname and address entries", MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { "dsa_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 23, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_DSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "DSA #5", } }, { "ecdsa_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 24, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_ECDSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ECDSA #5", } }, { "ed25519_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 25, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_ED25519, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ED25519 #5", } }, { "rsa1_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 26, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_RSA1, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "RSA1 #5", } }, { "rsa_5.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 27, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_RSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "RSA #5", } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 28, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "", MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, /* * The next series have each key listed multiple times, as the * hostname and addresses in the pre-hashed known_hosts are split * to separate lines. */ { "dsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 29, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_DSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "DSA #6", } }, { "dsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, { NULL, 30, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_DSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "DSA #6", } }, { "dsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, { NULL, 31, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_DSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "DSA #6", } }, { "ecdsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 32, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_ECDSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ECDSA #6", } }, { "ecdsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, { NULL, 33, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_ECDSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ECDSA #6", } }, { "ecdsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, { NULL, 34, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_ECDSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ECDSA #6", } }, { "ed25519_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 35, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_ED25519, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ED25519 #6", } }, { "ed25519_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, { NULL, 36, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_ED25519, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ED25519 #6", } }, { "ed25519_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, { NULL, 37, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_ED25519, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ED25519 #6", } }, { "rsa1_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 38, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_RSA1, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "RSA1 #6", } }, { "rsa1_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, { NULL, 39, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_RSA1, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "RSA1 #6", } }, { "rsa1_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, { NULL, 40, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_RSA1, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "RSA1 #6", } }, { "rsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST|HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 41, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_RSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "RSA #6", } }, { "rsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, 0, -1, { NULL, 42, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_RSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "RSA #6", } }, { "rsa_6.pub" , -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, HKF_MATCH_IP|HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED, -1, { NULL, 43, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_RSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "RSA #6", } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 44, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "", MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 45, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "", MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 46, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "# Revoked and CA keys", MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { "rsa1_4.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 47, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_REVOKE, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, KEY_RSA1, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "RSA1 #4", } }, { "ed25519_4.pub" , -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 48, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_REVOKE, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, KEY_ED25519, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ED25519 #4", } }, { "ecdsa_4.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 49, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_CA, "prometheus.example.com", NULL, KEY_ECDSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "ECDSA #4", } }, { "dsa_4.pub" , -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 50, HKF_STATUS_OK, 0, NULL, MRK_CA, "*.example.com", NULL, KEY_DSA, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ "DSA #4", } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 51, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "", MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 52, HKF_STATUS_COMMENT, 0, "# Some invalid lines", MRK_NONE, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 53, HKF_STATUS_INVALID, 0, NULL, MRK_ERROR, NULL, NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 54, HKF_STATUS_INVALID, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { NULL, -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 55, HKF_STATUS_INVALID, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "prometheus.example.com", NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 56, HKF_STATUS_INVALID, /* Would be ok if key not parsed */ 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { NULL, -1, -1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 57, HKF_STATUS_INVALID, /* Would be ok if key not parsed */ 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "prometheus.example.com", NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { NULL, HKF_STATUS_OK, KEY_RSA1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 58, HKF_STATUS_INVALID, /* Would be ok if key not parsed */ 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL, } }, { NULL, HKF_STATUS_OK, KEY_RSA1, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 59, HKF_STATUS_INVALID, /* Would be ok if key not parsed */ 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "prometheus.example.com", NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ NULL, } }, { NULL, -1, -1, 0, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 60, HKF_STATUS_INVALID, 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ NULL, } }, { NULL, HKF_STATUS_OK, KEY_RSA, HKF_MATCH_HOST, 0, 0, 0, -1, { NULL, 61, HKF_STATUS_INVALID, /* Would be ok if key not parsed */ 0, NULL, MRK_NONE, "prometheus.example.com", NULL, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, /* filled at runtime */ NULL, } }, }; void test_iterate(void); void test_iterate(void) { struct cbctx ctx; TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate all with key parse"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, NULL, NULL, ctx.flags), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate all without key parse"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = 0; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, NULL, NULL, ctx.flags), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host 1"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = 0; ctx.match_host_p = 1; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host 2"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = 0; ctx.match_host_s = 1; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host 1"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH; ctx.match_host_p = 1; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host 2"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH; ctx.match_host_s = 1; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", NULL, ctx.flags), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host missing"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = 0; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "actaeon.example.org", NULL, ctx.flags), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host missing"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "actaeon.example.org", NULL, ctx.flags), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify IPv4"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = 0; ctx.match_ipv4 = 1; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify IPv6"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = 0; ctx.match_ipv6 = 1; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "2001:db8::1", ctx.flags), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match IPv4"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH; ctx.match_ipv4 = 1; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match IPv6"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH; ctx.match_ipv6 = 1; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "2001:db8::1", ctx.flags), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify addr missing"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = 0; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "192.168.0.1", ctx.flags), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match addr missing"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "tiresias.example.org", "::1", ctx.flags), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host 2 and IPv4"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = 0; ctx.match_host_s = 1; ctx.match_ipv4 = 1; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host 1 and IPv6"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH; ctx.match_host_p = 1; ctx.match_ipv6 = 1; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com", "2001:db8::1", ctx.flags), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate specify host 2 and IPv4 w/ key parse"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY; ctx.match_host_s = 1; ctx.match_ipv4 = 1; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "sisyphus.example.com", "192.0.2.1", ctx.flags), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("hostkeys_iterate match host 1 and IPv6 w/ key parse"); memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.expected = expected_full; ctx.nexpected = sizeof(expected_full)/sizeof(*expected_full); ctx.flags = HKF_WANT_MATCH|HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY; ctx.match_host_p = 1; ctx.match_ipv6 = 1; prepare_expected(expected_full, ctx.nexpected); ASSERT_INT_EQ(hostkeys_foreach(test_data_file("known_hosts"), check, &ctx, "prometheus.example.com", "2001:db8::1", ctx.flags), 0); TEST_DONE(); } Index: head/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,519 +1,519 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: test_sshkey.c,v 1.3 2015/01/26 06:11:28 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: test_sshkey.c,v 1.4 2015/04/22 01:38:36 djm Exp $ */ /* * Regress test for sshkey.h key management API * * Placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256) # include #endif #include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #define SSHBUF_INTERNAL 1 /* access internals for testing */ #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "common.h" #include "ssh2.h" void sshkey_tests(void); static void put_opt(struct sshbuf *b, const char *name, const char *value) { struct sshbuf *sect; sect = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(sect, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, name), 0); if (value != NULL) ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(sect, value), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, sect), 0); sshbuf_free(sect); } static void build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, const struct sshkey *k, const char *type, const struct sshkey *sign_key, const struct sshkey *ca_key) { struct sshbuf *ca_buf, *pk, *principals, *critopts, *exts; u_char *sigblob; size_t siglen; ca_buf = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(ca_buf, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(ca_key, ca_buf), 0); /* * Get the public key serialisation by rendering the key and skipping * the type string. This is a bit of a hack :/ */ pk = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(pk, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb_plain(k, pk), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_skip_string(pk), 0); principals = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(principals, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, "gsamsa"), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, "gregor"), 0); critopts = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(critopts, NULL); put_opt(critopts, "force-command", "/usr/local/bin/nethack"); put_opt(critopts, "source-address", "192.168.0.0/24,127.0.0.1,::1"); exts = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(exts, NULL); put_opt(critopts, "permit-X11-forwarding", NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, type), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "noncenoncenonce!"), 0); /* nonce */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_putb(b, pk), 0); /* public key serialisation */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 1234), 0); /* serial */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(b, SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER), 0); /* type */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "gregor"), 0); /* key ID */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, principals), 0); /* principals */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 0), 0); /* start */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 0xffffffffffffffffULL), 0); /* end */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, critopts), 0); /* options */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, exts), 0); /* extensions */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0), 0); /* reserved */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ca_buf), 0); /* signature key */ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(sign_key, &sigblob, &siglen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), 0), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */ free(sigblob); sshbuf_free(ca_buf); sshbuf_free(exts); sshbuf_free(critopts); sshbuf_free(principals); sshbuf_free(pk); } static void signature_test(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const u_char *d, size_t l) { size_t len; u_char *sig; ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, 0), 0); ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8); ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, 0), 0); ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, 0), 0); /* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */ sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10; ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, 0), 0); free(sig); } static void banana(u_char *s, size_t l) { size_t o; const u_char the_banana[] = { 'b', 'a', 'n', 'a', 'n', 'a' }; for (o = 0; o < l; o += sizeof(the_banana)) { if (l - o < sizeof(the_banana)) { memcpy(s + o, "nanananana", l - o); break; } memcpy(s + o, banana, sizeof(the_banana)); } } static void signature_tests(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad) { u_char i, buf[2049]; size_t lens[] = { 1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17, 31, 32, 33, 127, 128, 129, 255, 256, 257, 1023, 1024, 1025, 2047, 2048, 2049 }; for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(lens)/sizeof(lens[0])); i++) { test_subtest_info("%s key, banana length %zu", sshkey_type(k), lens[i]); banana(buf, lens[i]); signature_test(k, bad, buf, lens[i]); } } static struct sshkey * get_private(const char *n) { struct sshbuf *b; struct sshkey *ret; b = load_file(n); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(b, "", n, &ret, NULL), 0); sshbuf_free(b); return ret; } void sshkey_tests(void) { struct sshkey *k1, *k2, *k3, *k4, *kr, *kd, *kf; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC struct sshkey *ke; #endif struct sshbuf *b; TEST_START("new invalid"); k1 = sshkey_new(-42); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("new/free KEY_UNSPEC"); k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("new/free KEY_RSA1"); k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->rsa->p, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("new/free KEY_RSA"); k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->rsa->p, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("new/free KEY_DSA"); k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_DSA); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->g, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->dsa->priv_key, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC TEST_START("new/free KEY_ECDSA"); k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_ECDSA); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ecdsa, NULL); /* Can't allocate without NID */ sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #endif TEST_START("new/free KEY_ED25519"); k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_ED25519); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); /* These should be blank until key loaded or generated */ ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_sk, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_pk, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("new_private KEY_RSA"); k1 = sshkey_new_private(KEY_RSA); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->p, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_add_private(k1), 0); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("new_private KEY_DSA"); k1 = sshkey_new_private(KEY_DSA); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->g, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->priv_key, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_add_private(k1), 0); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA too small modulus"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 128, &k1), SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA too large modulus"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1 << 20, &k1), SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA wrong bits"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 2048, &k1), SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC TEST_START("generate KEY_ECDSA wrong bits"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 42, &k1), SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #endif TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 768, &kr), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa->n, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa->e, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa->p, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_num_bits(kr->rsa->n), 768); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 1024, &kd), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa->g, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa->priv_key, NULL); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC TEST_START("generate KEY_ECDSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 256, &ke), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke->ecdsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL); TEST_DONE(); #endif TEST_START("generate KEY_ED25519"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ED25519, 256, &kf), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(kf->type, KEY_ED25519); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf->ed25519_pk, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf->ed25519_sk, NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("demote KEY_RSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_demote(kr, &k1), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, k1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_RSA); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->rsa->p, NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("equal KEY_RSA/demoted KEY_RSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, k1), 1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("demote KEY_DSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_demote(kd, &k1), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, k1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_DSA); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->g, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->dsa->priv_key, NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("equal KEY_DSA/demoted KEY_DSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, k1), 1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC TEST_START("demote KEY_ECDSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_demote(ke, &k1), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke, k1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ECDSA); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->ecdsa, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->ecdsa_nid, ke->ecdsa_nid); ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k1->ecdsa), NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("equal KEY_ECDSA/demoted KEY_ECDSA"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, k1), 1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); #endif TEST_START("demote KEY_ED25519"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_demote(kf, &k1), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf, k1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ED25519); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->ed25519_pk, NULL); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_sk, NULL); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("equal KEY_ED25519/demoted KEY_ED25519"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kf, k1), 1); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("equal mismatched key types"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, kr), 0); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, ke), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, ke), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, kf), 0); #endif ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, kf), 0); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("equal different keys"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 768, &k1), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, k1), 0); sshkey_free(k1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 1024, &k1), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, k1), 0); sshkey_free(k1); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 256, &k1), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, k1), 0); sshkey_free(k1); #endif ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ED25519, 256, &k1), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kf, k1), 0); sshkey_free(k1); TEST_DONE(); sshkey_free(kr); sshkey_free(kd); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC sshkey_free(ke); #endif sshkey_free(kf); TEST_START("certify key"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_1.pub"), &k1, NULL), 0); k2 = get_private("ed25519_2"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_to_certified(k1, 0), 0); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert, NULL); k1->cert->type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER; k1->cert->serial = 1234; k1->cert->key_id = strdup("estragon"); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->key_id, NULL); k1->cert->principals = calloc(4, sizeof(*k1->cert->principals)); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals, NULL); k1->cert->principals[0] = strdup("estragon"); k1->cert->principals[1] = strdup("vladimir"); k1->cert->principals[2] = strdup("pozzo"); k1->cert->principals[3] = strdup("lucky"); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[0], NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[1], NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[2], NULL); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[3], NULL); k1->cert->valid_after = 0; k1->cert->valid_before = (u_int64_t)-1; k1->cert->critical = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->critical, NULL); k1->cert->extensions = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->extensions, NULL); put_opt(k1->cert->critical, "force-command", "/usr/bin/true"); put_opt(k1->cert->critical, "source-address", "127.0.0.1"); put_opt(k1->cert->extensions, "permit-X11-forwarding", NULL); put_opt(k1->cert->extensions, "permit-agent-forwarding", NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(k2, &k1->cert->signature_key), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_certify(k1, k2), 0); b = sshbuf_new(); ASSERT_PTR_NE(b, NULL); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(k1, b), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k3), 0); sshkey_free(k1); sshkey_free(k2); sshkey_free(k3); sshbuf_reset(b); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sign and verify RSA"); k1 = get_private("rsa_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_2.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); signature_tests(k1, k2); sshkey_free(k1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("sign and verify DSA"); k1 = get_private("dsa_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("dsa_2.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); signature_tests(k1, k2); sshkey_free(k1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC TEST_START("sign and verify ECDSA"); k1 = get_private("ecdsa_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ecdsa_2.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); signature_tests(k1, k2); sshkey_free(k1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); #endif TEST_START("sign and verify ED25519"); k1 = get_private("ed25519_1"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_2.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); signature_tests(k1, k2); sshkey_free(k1); sshkey_free(k2); TEST_DONE(); TEST_START("nested certificate"); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k1), 0); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2, NULL), 0); - k3 = get_private("ed25519_2"); + k3 = get_private("rsa_1"); build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1); ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4), SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY); ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL); sshkey_free(k1); sshkey_free(k2); sshkey_free(k3); sshbuf_free(b); TEST_DONE(); } Index: head/crypto/openssh/rijndael.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/rijndael.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/rijndael.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,1129 +1,1129 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: rijndael.c,v 1.19 2014/11/18 22:38:48 mikeb Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: rijndael.c,v 1.20 2015/03/16 11:09:52 djm Exp $ */ /** * rijndael-alg-fst.c * * @version 3.0 (December 2000) * * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES) * * @author Vincent Rijmen * @author Antoon Bosselaers * @author Paulo Barreto * * This code is hereby placed in the public domain. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include "rijndael.h" #undef FULL_UNROLL /* Te0[x] = S [x].[02, 01, 01, 03]; Te1[x] = S [x].[03, 02, 01, 01]; Te2[x] = S [x].[01, 03, 02, 01]; Te3[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 03, 02]; Td0[x] = Si[x].[0e, 09, 0d, 0b]; Td1[x] = Si[x].[0b, 0e, 09, 0d]; Td2[x] = Si[x].[0d, 0b, 0e, 09]; Td3[x] = Si[x].[09, 0d, 0b, 0e]; Td4[x] = Si[x].[01]; */ static const u32 Te0[256] = { 0xc66363a5U, 0xf87c7c84U, 0xee777799U, 0xf67b7b8dU, 0xfff2f20dU, 0xd66b6bbdU, 0xde6f6fb1U, 0x91c5c554U, 0x60303050U, 0x02010103U, 0xce6767a9U, 0x562b2b7dU, 0xe7fefe19U, 0xb5d7d762U, 0x4dababe6U, 0xec76769aU, 0x8fcaca45U, 0x1f82829dU, 0x89c9c940U, 0xfa7d7d87U, 0xeffafa15U, 0xb25959ebU, 0x8e4747c9U, 0xfbf0f00bU, 0x41adadecU, 0xb3d4d467U, 0x5fa2a2fdU, 0x45afafeaU, 0x239c9cbfU, 0x53a4a4f7U, 0xe4727296U, 0x9bc0c05bU, 0x75b7b7c2U, 0xe1fdfd1cU, 0x3d9393aeU, 0x4c26266aU, 0x6c36365aU, 0x7e3f3f41U, 0xf5f7f702U, 0x83cccc4fU, 0x6834345cU, 0x51a5a5f4U, 0xd1e5e534U, 0xf9f1f108U, 0xe2717193U, 0xabd8d873U, 0x62313153U, 0x2a15153fU, 0x0804040cU, 0x95c7c752U, 0x46232365U, 0x9dc3c35eU, 0x30181828U, 0x379696a1U, 0x0a05050fU, 0x2f9a9ab5U, 0x0e070709U, 0x24121236U, 0x1b80809bU, 0xdfe2e23dU, 0xcdebeb26U, 0x4e272769U, 0x7fb2b2cdU, 0xea75759fU, 0x1209091bU, 0x1d83839eU, 0x582c2c74U, 0x341a1a2eU, 0x361b1b2dU, 0xdc6e6eb2U, 0xb45a5aeeU, 0x5ba0a0fbU, 0xa45252f6U, 0x763b3b4dU, 0xb7d6d661U, 0x7db3b3ceU, 0x5229297bU, 0xdde3e33eU, 0x5e2f2f71U, 0x13848497U, 0xa65353f5U, 0xb9d1d168U, 0x00000000U, 0xc1eded2cU, 0x40202060U, 0xe3fcfc1fU, 0x79b1b1c8U, 0xb65b5bedU, 0xd46a6abeU, 0x8dcbcb46U, 0x67bebed9U, 0x7239394bU, 0x944a4adeU, 0x984c4cd4U, 0xb05858e8U, 0x85cfcf4aU, 0xbbd0d06bU, 0xc5efef2aU, 0x4faaaae5U, 0xedfbfb16U, 0x864343c5U, 0x9a4d4dd7U, 0x66333355U, 0x11858594U, 0x8a4545cfU, 0xe9f9f910U, 0x04020206U, 0xfe7f7f81U, 0xa05050f0U, 0x783c3c44U, 0x259f9fbaU, 0x4ba8a8e3U, 0xa25151f3U, 0x5da3a3feU, 0x804040c0U, 0x058f8f8aU, 0x3f9292adU, 0x219d9dbcU, 0x70383848U, 0xf1f5f504U, 0x63bcbcdfU, 0x77b6b6c1U, 0xafdada75U, 0x42212163U, 0x20101030U, 0xe5ffff1aU, 0xfdf3f30eU, 0xbfd2d26dU, 0x81cdcd4cU, 0x180c0c14U, 0x26131335U, 0xc3ecec2fU, 0xbe5f5fe1U, 0x359797a2U, 0x884444ccU, 0x2e171739U, 0x93c4c457U, 0x55a7a7f2U, 0xfc7e7e82U, 0x7a3d3d47U, 0xc86464acU, 0xba5d5de7U, 0x3219192bU, 0xe6737395U, 0xc06060a0U, 0x19818198U, 0x9e4f4fd1U, 0xa3dcdc7fU, 0x44222266U, 0x542a2a7eU, 0x3b9090abU, 0x0b888883U, 0x8c4646caU, 0xc7eeee29U, 0x6bb8b8d3U, 0x2814143cU, 0xa7dede79U, 0xbc5e5ee2U, 0x160b0b1dU, 0xaddbdb76U, 0xdbe0e03bU, 0x64323256U, 0x743a3a4eU, 0x140a0a1eU, 0x924949dbU, 0x0c06060aU, 0x4824246cU, 0xb85c5ce4U, 0x9fc2c25dU, 0xbdd3d36eU, 0x43acacefU, 0xc46262a6U, 0x399191a8U, 0x319595a4U, 0xd3e4e437U, 0xf279798bU, 0xd5e7e732U, 0x8bc8c843U, 0x6e373759U, 0xda6d6db7U, 0x018d8d8cU, 0xb1d5d564U, 0x9c4e4ed2U, 0x49a9a9e0U, 0xd86c6cb4U, 0xac5656faU, 0xf3f4f407U, 0xcfeaea25U, 0xca6565afU, 0xf47a7a8eU, 0x47aeaee9U, 0x10080818U, 0x6fbabad5U, 0xf0787888U, 0x4a25256fU, 0x5c2e2e72U, 0x381c1c24U, 0x57a6a6f1U, 0x73b4b4c7U, 0x97c6c651U, 0xcbe8e823U, 0xa1dddd7cU, 0xe874749cU, 0x3e1f1f21U, 0x964b4bddU, 0x61bdbddcU, 0x0d8b8b86U, 0x0f8a8a85U, 0xe0707090U, 0x7c3e3e42U, 0x71b5b5c4U, 0xcc6666aaU, 0x904848d8U, 0x06030305U, 0xf7f6f601U, 0x1c0e0e12U, 0xc26161a3U, 0x6a35355fU, 0xae5757f9U, 0x69b9b9d0U, 0x17868691U, 0x99c1c158U, 0x3a1d1d27U, 0x279e9eb9U, 0xd9e1e138U, 0xebf8f813U, 0x2b9898b3U, 0x22111133U, 0xd26969bbU, 0xa9d9d970U, 0x078e8e89U, 0x339494a7U, 0x2d9b9bb6U, 0x3c1e1e22U, 0x15878792U, 0xc9e9e920U, 0x87cece49U, 0xaa5555ffU, 0x50282878U, 0xa5dfdf7aU, 0x038c8c8fU, 0x59a1a1f8U, 0x09898980U, 0x1a0d0d17U, 0x65bfbfdaU, 0xd7e6e631U, 0x844242c6U, 0xd06868b8U, 0x824141c3U, 0x299999b0U, 0x5a2d2d77U, 0x1e0f0f11U, 0x7bb0b0cbU, 0xa85454fcU, 0x6dbbbbd6U, 0x2c16163aU, }; static const u32 Te1[256] = { 0xa5c66363U, 0x84f87c7cU, 0x99ee7777U, 0x8df67b7bU, 0x0dfff2f2U, 0xbdd66b6bU, 0xb1de6f6fU, 0x5491c5c5U, 0x50603030U, 0x03020101U, 0xa9ce6767U, 0x7d562b2bU, 0x19e7fefeU, 0x62b5d7d7U, 0xe64dababU, 0x9aec7676U, 0x458fcacaU, 0x9d1f8282U, 0x4089c9c9U, 0x87fa7d7dU, 0x15effafaU, 0xebb25959U, 0xc98e4747U, 0x0bfbf0f0U, 0xec41adadU, 0x67b3d4d4U, 0xfd5fa2a2U, 0xea45afafU, 0xbf239c9cU, 0xf753a4a4U, 0x96e47272U, 0x5b9bc0c0U, 0xc275b7b7U, 0x1ce1fdfdU, 0xae3d9393U, 0x6a4c2626U, 0x5a6c3636U, 0x417e3f3fU, 0x02f5f7f7U, 0x4f83ccccU, 0x5c683434U, 0xf451a5a5U, 0x34d1e5e5U, 0x08f9f1f1U, 0x93e27171U, 0x73abd8d8U, 0x53623131U, 0x3f2a1515U, 0x0c080404U, 0x5295c7c7U, 0x65462323U, 0x5e9dc3c3U, 0x28301818U, 0xa1379696U, 0x0f0a0505U, 0xb52f9a9aU, 0x090e0707U, 0x36241212U, 0x9b1b8080U, 0x3ddfe2e2U, 0x26cdebebU, 0x694e2727U, 0xcd7fb2b2U, 0x9fea7575U, 0x1b120909U, 0x9e1d8383U, 0x74582c2cU, 0x2e341a1aU, 0x2d361b1bU, 0xb2dc6e6eU, 0xeeb45a5aU, 0xfb5ba0a0U, 0xf6a45252U, 0x4d763b3bU, 0x61b7d6d6U, 0xce7db3b3U, 0x7b522929U, 0x3edde3e3U, 0x715e2f2fU, 0x97138484U, 0xf5a65353U, 0x68b9d1d1U, 0x00000000U, 0x2cc1ededU, 0x60402020U, 0x1fe3fcfcU, 0xc879b1b1U, 0xedb65b5bU, 0xbed46a6aU, 0x468dcbcbU, 0xd967bebeU, 0x4b723939U, 0xde944a4aU, 0xd4984c4cU, 0xe8b05858U, 0x4a85cfcfU, 0x6bbbd0d0U, 0x2ac5efefU, 0xe54faaaaU, 0x16edfbfbU, 0xc5864343U, 0xd79a4d4dU, 0x55663333U, 0x94118585U, 0xcf8a4545U, 0x10e9f9f9U, 0x06040202U, 0x81fe7f7fU, 0xf0a05050U, 0x44783c3cU, 0xba259f9fU, 0xe34ba8a8U, 0xf3a25151U, 0xfe5da3a3U, 0xc0804040U, 0x8a058f8fU, 0xad3f9292U, 0xbc219d9dU, 0x48703838U, 0x04f1f5f5U, 0xdf63bcbcU, 0xc177b6b6U, 0x75afdadaU, 0x63422121U, 0x30201010U, 0x1ae5ffffU, 0x0efdf3f3U, 0x6dbfd2d2U, 0x4c81cdcdU, 0x14180c0cU, 0x35261313U, 0x2fc3ececU, 0xe1be5f5fU, 0xa2359797U, 0xcc884444U, 0x392e1717U, 0x5793c4c4U, 0xf255a7a7U, 0x82fc7e7eU, 0x477a3d3dU, 0xacc86464U, 0xe7ba5d5dU, 0x2b321919U, 0x95e67373U, 0xa0c06060U, 0x98198181U, 0xd19e4f4fU, 0x7fa3dcdcU, 0x66442222U, 0x7e542a2aU, 0xab3b9090U, 0x830b8888U, 0xca8c4646U, 0x29c7eeeeU, 0xd36bb8b8U, 0x3c281414U, 0x79a7dedeU, 0xe2bc5e5eU, 0x1d160b0bU, 0x76addbdbU, 0x3bdbe0e0U, 0x56643232U, 0x4e743a3aU, 0x1e140a0aU, 0xdb924949U, 0x0a0c0606U, 0x6c482424U, 0xe4b85c5cU, 0x5d9fc2c2U, 0x6ebdd3d3U, 0xef43acacU, 0xa6c46262U, 0xa8399191U, 0xa4319595U, 0x37d3e4e4U, 0x8bf27979U, 0x32d5e7e7U, 0x438bc8c8U, 0x596e3737U, 0xb7da6d6dU, 0x8c018d8dU, 0x64b1d5d5U, 0xd29c4e4eU, 0xe049a9a9U, 0xb4d86c6cU, 0xfaac5656U, 0x07f3f4f4U, 0x25cfeaeaU, 0xafca6565U, 0x8ef47a7aU, 0xe947aeaeU, 0x18100808U, 0xd56fbabaU, 0x88f07878U, 0x6f4a2525U, 0x725c2e2eU, 0x24381c1cU, 0xf157a6a6U, 0xc773b4b4U, 0x5197c6c6U, 0x23cbe8e8U, 0x7ca1ddddU, 0x9ce87474U, 0x213e1f1fU, 0xdd964b4bU, 0xdc61bdbdU, 0x860d8b8bU, 0x850f8a8aU, 0x90e07070U, 0x427c3e3eU, 0xc471b5b5U, 0xaacc6666U, 0xd8904848U, 0x05060303U, 0x01f7f6f6U, 0x121c0e0eU, 0xa3c26161U, 0x5f6a3535U, 0xf9ae5757U, 0xd069b9b9U, 0x91178686U, 0x5899c1c1U, 0x273a1d1dU, 0xb9279e9eU, 0x38d9e1e1U, 0x13ebf8f8U, 0xb32b9898U, 0x33221111U, 0xbbd26969U, 0x70a9d9d9U, 0x89078e8eU, 0xa7339494U, 0xb62d9b9bU, 0x223c1e1eU, 0x92158787U, 0x20c9e9e9U, 0x4987ceceU, 0xffaa5555U, 0x78502828U, 0x7aa5dfdfU, 0x8f038c8cU, 0xf859a1a1U, 0x80098989U, 0x171a0d0dU, 0xda65bfbfU, 0x31d7e6e6U, 0xc6844242U, 0xb8d06868U, 0xc3824141U, 0xb0299999U, 0x775a2d2dU, 0x111e0f0fU, 0xcb7bb0b0U, 0xfca85454U, 0xd66dbbbbU, 0x3a2c1616U, }; static const u32 Te2[256] = { 0x63a5c663U, 0x7c84f87cU, 0x7799ee77U, 0x7b8df67bU, 0xf20dfff2U, 0x6bbdd66bU, 0x6fb1de6fU, 0xc55491c5U, 0x30506030U, 0x01030201U, 0x67a9ce67U, 0x2b7d562bU, 0xfe19e7feU, 0xd762b5d7U, 0xabe64dabU, 0x769aec76U, 0xca458fcaU, 0x829d1f82U, 0xc94089c9U, 0x7d87fa7dU, 0xfa15effaU, 0x59ebb259U, 0x47c98e47U, 0xf00bfbf0U, 0xadec41adU, 0xd467b3d4U, 0xa2fd5fa2U, 0xafea45afU, 0x9cbf239cU, 0xa4f753a4U, 0x7296e472U, 0xc05b9bc0U, 0xb7c275b7U, 0xfd1ce1fdU, 0x93ae3d93U, 0x266a4c26U, 0x365a6c36U, 0x3f417e3fU, 0xf702f5f7U, 0xcc4f83ccU, 0x345c6834U, 0xa5f451a5U, 0xe534d1e5U, 0xf108f9f1U, 0x7193e271U, 0xd873abd8U, 0x31536231U, 0x153f2a15U, 0x040c0804U, 0xc75295c7U, 0x23654623U, 0xc35e9dc3U, 0x18283018U, 0x96a13796U, 0x050f0a05U, 0x9ab52f9aU, 0x07090e07U, 0x12362412U, 0x809b1b80U, 0xe23ddfe2U, 0xeb26cdebU, 0x27694e27U, 0xb2cd7fb2U, 0x759fea75U, 0x091b1209U, 0x839e1d83U, 0x2c74582cU, 0x1a2e341aU, 0x1b2d361bU, 0x6eb2dc6eU, 0x5aeeb45aU, 0xa0fb5ba0U, 0x52f6a452U, 0x3b4d763bU, 0xd661b7d6U, 0xb3ce7db3U, 0x297b5229U, 0xe33edde3U, 0x2f715e2fU, 0x84971384U, 0x53f5a653U, 0xd168b9d1U, 0x00000000U, 0xed2cc1edU, 0x20604020U, 0xfc1fe3fcU, 0xb1c879b1U, 0x5bedb65bU, 0x6abed46aU, 0xcb468dcbU, 0xbed967beU, 0x394b7239U, 0x4ade944aU, 0x4cd4984cU, 0x58e8b058U, 0xcf4a85cfU, 0xd06bbbd0U, 0xef2ac5efU, 0xaae54faaU, 0xfb16edfbU, 0x43c58643U, 0x4dd79a4dU, 0x33556633U, 0x85941185U, 0x45cf8a45U, 0xf910e9f9U, 0x02060402U, 0x7f81fe7fU, 0x50f0a050U, 0x3c44783cU, 0x9fba259fU, 0xa8e34ba8U, 0x51f3a251U, 0xa3fe5da3U, 0x40c08040U, 0x8f8a058fU, 0x92ad3f92U, 0x9dbc219dU, 0x38487038U, 0xf504f1f5U, 0xbcdf63bcU, 0xb6c177b6U, 0xda75afdaU, 0x21634221U, 0x10302010U, 0xff1ae5ffU, 0xf30efdf3U, 0xd26dbfd2U, 0xcd4c81cdU, 0x0c14180cU, 0x13352613U, 0xec2fc3ecU, 0x5fe1be5fU, 0x97a23597U, 0x44cc8844U, 0x17392e17U, 0xc45793c4U, 0xa7f255a7U, 0x7e82fc7eU, 0x3d477a3dU, 0x64acc864U, 0x5de7ba5dU, 0x192b3219U, 0x7395e673U, 0x60a0c060U, 0x81981981U, 0x4fd19e4fU, 0xdc7fa3dcU, 0x22664422U, 0x2a7e542aU, 0x90ab3b90U, 0x88830b88U, 0x46ca8c46U, 0xee29c7eeU, 0xb8d36bb8U, 0x143c2814U, 0xde79a7deU, 0x5ee2bc5eU, 0x0b1d160bU, 0xdb76addbU, 0xe03bdbe0U, 0x32566432U, 0x3a4e743aU, 0x0a1e140aU, 0x49db9249U, 0x060a0c06U, 0x246c4824U, 0x5ce4b85cU, 0xc25d9fc2U, 0xd36ebdd3U, 0xacef43acU, 0x62a6c462U, 0x91a83991U, 0x95a43195U, 0xe437d3e4U, 0x798bf279U, 0xe732d5e7U, 0xc8438bc8U, 0x37596e37U, 0x6db7da6dU, 0x8d8c018dU, 0xd564b1d5U, 0x4ed29c4eU, 0xa9e049a9U, 0x6cb4d86cU, 0x56faac56U, 0xf407f3f4U, 0xea25cfeaU, 0x65afca65U, 0x7a8ef47aU, 0xaee947aeU, 0x08181008U, 0xbad56fbaU, 0x7888f078U, 0x256f4a25U, 0x2e725c2eU, 0x1c24381cU, 0xa6f157a6U, 0xb4c773b4U, 0xc65197c6U, 0xe823cbe8U, 0xdd7ca1ddU, 0x749ce874U, 0x1f213e1fU, 0x4bdd964bU, 0xbddc61bdU, 0x8b860d8bU, 0x8a850f8aU, 0x7090e070U, 0x3e427c3eU, 0xb5c471b5U, 0x66aacc66U, 0x48d89048U, 0x03050603U, 0xf601f7f6U, 0x0e121c0eU, 0x61a3c261U, 0x355f6a35U, 0x57f9ae57U, 0xb9d069b9U, 0x86911786U, 0xc15899c1U, 0x1d273a1dU, 0x9eb9279eU, 0xe138d9e1U, 0xf813ebf8U, 0x98b32b98U, 0x11332211U, 0x69bbd269U, 0xd970a9d9U, 0x8e89078eU, 0x94a73394U, 0x9bb62d9bU, 0x1e223c1eU, 0x87921587U, 0xe920c9e9U, 0xce4987ceU, 0x55ffaa55U, 0x28785028U, 0xdf7aa5dfU, 0x8c8f038cU, 0xa1f859a1U, 0x89800989U, 0x0d171a0dU, 0xbfda65bfU, 0xe631d7e6U, 0x42c68442U, 0x68b8d068U, 0x41c38241U, 0x99b02999U, 0x2d775a2dU, 0x0f111e0fU, 0xb0cb7bb0U, 0x54fca854U, 0xbbd66dbbU, 0x163a2c16U, }; static const u32 Te3[256] = { 0x6363a5c6U, 0x7c7c84f8U, 0x777799eeU, 0x7b7b8df6U, 0xf2f20dffU, 0x6b6bbdd6U, 0x6f6fb1deU, 0xc5c55491U, 0x30305060U, 0x01010302U, 0x6767a9ceU, 0x2b2b7d56U, 0xfefe19e7U, 0xd7d762b5U, 0xababe64dU, 0x76769aecU, 0xcaca458fU, 0x82829d1fU, 0xc9c94089U, 0x7d7d87faU, 0xfafa15efU, 0x5959ebb2U, 0x4747c98eU, 0xf0f00bfbU, 0xadadec41U, 0xd4d467b3U, 0xa2a2fd5fU, 0xafafea45U, 0x9c9cbf23U, 0xa4a4f753U, 0x727296e4U, 0xc0c05b9bU, 0xb7b7c275U, 0xfdfd1ce1U, 0x9393ae3dU, 0x26266a4cU, 0x36365a6cU, 0x3f3f417eU, 0xf7f702f5U, 0xcccc4f83U, 0x34345c68U, 0xa5a5f451U, 0xe5e534d1U, 0xf1f108f9U, 0x717193e2U, 0xd8d873abU, 0x31315362U, 0x15153f2aU, 0x04040c08U, 0xc7c75295U, 0x23236546U, 0xc3c35e9dU, 0x18182830U, 0x9696a137U, 0x05050f0aU, 0x9a9ab52fU, 0x0707090eU, 0x12123624U, 0x80809b1bU, 0xe2e23ddfU, 0xebeb26cdU, 0x2727694eU, 0xb2b2cd7fU, 0x75759feaU, 0x09091b12U, 0x83839e1dU, 0x2c2c7458U, 0x1a1a2e34U, 0x1b1b2d36U, 0x6e6eb2dcU, 0x5a5aeeb4U, 0xa0a0fb5bU, 0x5252f6a4U, 0x3b3b4d76U, 0xd6d661b7U, 0xb3b3ce7dU, 0x29297b52U, 0xe3e33eddU, 0x2f2f715eU, 0x84849713U, 0x5353f5a6U, 0xd1d168b9U, 0x00000000U, 0xeded2cc1U, 0x20206040U, 0xfcfc1fe3U, 0xb1b1c879U, 0x5b5bedb6U, 0x6a6abed4U, 0xcbcb468dU, 0xbebed967U, 0x39394b72U, 0x4a4ade94U, 0x4c4cd498U, 0x5858e8b0U, 0xcfcf4a85U, 0xd0d06bbbU, 0xefef2ac5U, 0xaaaae54fU, 0xfbfb16edU, 0x4343c586U, 0x4d4dd79aU, 0x33335566U, 0x85859411U, 0x4545cf8aU, 0xf9f910e9U, 0x02020604U, 0x7f7f81feU, 0x5050f0a0U, 0x3c3c4478U, 0x9f9fba25U, 0xa8a8e34bU, 0x5151f3a2U, 0xa3a3fe5dU, 0x4040c080U, 0x8f8f8a05U, 0x9292ad3fU, 0x9d9dbc21U, 0x38384870U, 0xf5f504f1U, 0xbcbcdf63U, 0xb6b6c177U, 0xdada75afU, 0x21216342U, 0x10103020U, 0xffff1ae5U, 0xf3f30efdU, 0xd2d26dbfU, 0xcdcd4c81U, 0x0c0c1418U, 0x13133526U, 0xecec2fc3U, 0x5f5fe1beU, 0x9797a235U, 0x4444cc88U, 0x1717392eU, 0xc4c45793U, 0xa7a7f255U, 0x7e7e82fcU, 0x3d3d477aU, 0x6464acc8U, 0x5d5de7baU, 0x19192b32U, 0x737395e6U, 0x6060a0c0U, 0x81819819U, 0x4f4fd19eU, 0xdcdc7fa3U, 0x22226644U, 0x2a2a7e54U, 0x9090ab3bU, 0x8888830bU, 0x4646ca8cU, 0xeeee29c7U, 0xb8b8d36bU, 0x14143c28U, 0xdede79a7U, 0x5e5ee2bcU, 0x0b0b1d16U, 0xdbdb76adU, 0xe0e03bdbU, 0x32325664U, 0x3a3a4e74U, 0x0a0a1e14U, 0x4949db92U, 0x06060a0cU, 0x24246c48U, 0x5c5ce4b8U, 0xc2c25d9fU, 0xd3d36ebdU, 0xacacef43U, 0x6262a6c4U, 0x9191a839U, 0x9595a431U, 0xe4e437d3U, 0x79798bf2U, 0xe7e732d5U, 0xc8c8438bU, 0x3737596eU, 0x6d6db7daU, 0x8d8d8c01U, 0xd5d564b1U, 0x4e4ed29cU, 0xa9a9e049U, 0x6c6cb4d8U, 0x5656faacU, 0xf4f407f3U, 0xeaea25cfU, 0x6565afcaU, 0x7a7a8ef4U, 0xaeaee947U, 0x08081810U, 0xbabad56fU, 0x787888f0U, 0x25256f4aU, 0x2e2e725cU, 0x1c1c2438U, 0xa6a6f157U, 0xb4b4c773U, 0xc6c65197U, 0xe8e823cbU, 0xdddd7ca1U, 0x74749ce8U, 0x1f1f213eU, 0x4b4bdd96U, 0xbdbddc61U, 0x8b8b860dU, 0x8a8a850fU, 0x707090e0U, 0x3e3e427cU, 0xb5b5c471U, 0x6666aaccU, 0x4848d890U, 0x03030506U, 0xf6f601f7U, 0x0e0e121cU, 0x6161a3c2U, 0x35355f6aU, 0x5757f9aeU, 0xb9b9d069U, 0x86869117U, 0xc1c15899U, 0x1d1d273aU, 0x9e9eb927U, 0xe1e138d9U, 0xf8f813ebU, 0x9898b32bU, 0x11113322U, 0x6969bbd2U, 0xd9d970a9U, 0x8e8e8907U, 0x9494a733U, 0x9b9bb62dU, 0x1e1e223cU, 0x87879215U, 0xe9e920c9U, 0xcece4987U, 0x5555ffaaU, 0x28287850U, 0xdfdf7aa5U, 0x8c8c8f03U, 0xa1a1f859U, 0x89898009U, 0x0d0d171aU, 0xbfbfda65U, 0xe6e631d7U, 0x4242c684U, 0x6868b8d0U, 0x4141c382U, 0x9999b029U, 0x2d2d775aU, 0x0f0f111eU, 0xb0b0cb7bU, 0x5454fca8U, 0xbbbbd66dU, 0x16163a2cU, }; #if 0 static const u32 Td0[256] = { 0x51f4a750U, 0x7e416553U, 0x1a17a4c3U, 0x3a275e96U, 0x3bab6bcbU, 0x1f9d45f1U, 0xacfa58abU, 0x4be30393U, 0x2030fa55U, 0xad766df6U, 0x88cc7691U, 0xf5024c25U, 0x4fe5d7fcU, 0xc52acbd7U, 0x26354480U, 0xb562a38fU, 0xdeb15a49U, 0x25ba1b67U, 0x45ea0e98U, 0x5dfec0e1U, 0xc32f7502U, 0x814cf012U, 0x8d4697a3U, 0x6bd3f9c6U, 0x038f5fe7U, 0x15929c95U, 0xbf6d7aebU, 0x955259daU, 0xd4be832dU, 0x587421d3U, 0x49e06929U, 0x8ec9c844U, 0x75c2896aU, 0xf48e7978U, 0x99583e6bU, 0x27b971ddU, 0xbee14fb6U, 0xf088ad17U, 0xc920ac66U, 0x7dce3ab4U, 0x63df4a18U, 0xe51a3182U, 0x97513360U, 0x62537f45U, 0xb16477e0U, 0xbb6bae84U, 0xfe81a01cU, 0xf9082b94U, 0x70486858U, 0x8f45fd19U, 0x94de6c87U, 0x527bf8b7U, 0xab73d323U, 0x724b02e2U, 0xe31f8f57U, 0x6655ab2aU, 0xb2eb2807U, 0x2fb5c203U, 0x86c57b9aU, 0xd33708a5U, 0x302887f2U, 0x23bfa5b2U, 0x02036abaU, 0xed16825cU, 0x8acf1c2bU, 0xa779b492U, 0xf307f2f0U, 0x4e69e2a1U, 0x65daf4cdU, 0x0605bed5U, 0xd134621fU, 0xc4a6fe8aU, 0x342e539dU, 0xa2f355a0U, 0x058ae132U, 0xa4f6eb75U, 0x0b83ec39U, 0x4060efaaU, 0x5e719f06U, 0xbd6e1051U, 0x3e218af9U, 0x96dd063dU, 0xdd3e05aeU, 0x4de6bd46U, 0x91548db5U, 0x71c45d05U, 0x0406d46fU, 0x605015ffU, 0x1998fb24U, 0xd6bde997U, 0x894043ccU, 0x67d99e77U, 0xb0e842bdU, 0x07898b88U, 0xe7195b38U, 0x79c8eedbU, 0xa17c0a47U, 0x7c420fe9U, 0xf8841ec9U, 0x00000000U, 0x09808683U, 0x322bed48U, 0x1e1170acU, 0x6c5a724eU, 0xfd0efffbU, 0x0f853856U, 0x3daed51eU, 0x362d3927U, 0x0a0fd964U, 0x685ca621U, 0x9b5b54d1U, 0x24362e3aU, 0x0c0a67b1U, 0x9357e70fU, 0xb4ee96d2U, 0x1b9b919eU, 0x80c0c54fU, 0x61dc20a2U, 0x5a774b69U, 0x1c121a16U, 0xe293ba0aU, 0xc0a02ae5U, 0x3c22e043U, 0x121b171dU, 0x0e090d0bU, 0xf28bc7adU, 0x2db6a8b9U, 0x141ea9c8U, 0x57f11985U, 0xaf75074cU, 0xee99ddbbU, 0xa37f60fdU, 0xf701269fU, 0x5c72f5bcU, 0x44663bc5U, 0x5bfb7e34U, 0x8b432976U, 0xcb23c6dcU, 0xb6edfc68U, 0xb8e4f163U, 0xd731dccaU, 0x42638510U, 0x13972240U, 0x84c61120U, 0x854a247dU, 0xd2bb3df8U, 0xaef93211U, 0xc729a16dU, 0x1d9e2f4bU, 0xdcb230f3U, 0x0d8652ecU, 0x77c1e3d0U, 0x2bb3166cU, 0xa970b999U, 0x119448faU, 0x47e96422U, 0xa8fc8cc4U, 0xa0f03f1aU, 0x567d2cd8U, 0x223390efU, 0x87494ec7U, 0xd938d1c1U, 0x8ccaa2feU, 0x98d40b36U, 0xa6f581cfU, 0xa57ade28U, 0xdab78e26U, 0x3fadbfa4U, 0x2c3a9de4U, 0x5078920dU, 0x6a5fcc9bU, 0x547e4662U, 0xf68d13c2U, 0x90d8b8e8U, 0x2e39f75eU, 0x82c3aff5U, 0x9f5d80beU, 0x69d0937cU, 0x6fd52da9U, 0xcf2512b3U, 0xc8ac993bU, 0x10187da7U, 0xe89c636eU, 0xdb3bbb7bU, 0xcd267809U, 0x6e5918f4U, 0xec9ab701U, 0x834f9aa8U, 0xe6956e65U, 0xaaffe67eU, 0x21bccf08U, 0xef15e8e6U, 0xbae79bd9U, 0x4a6f36ceU, 0xea9f09d4U, 0x29b07cd6U, 0x31a4b2afU, 0x2a3f2331U, 0xc6a59430U, 0x35a266c0U, 0x744ebc37U, 0xfc82caa6U, 0xe090d0b0U, 0x33a7d815U, 0xf104984aU, 0x41ecdaf7U, 0x7fcd500eU, 0x1791f62fU, 0x764dd68dU, 0x43efb04dU, 0xccaa4d54U, 0xe49604dfU, 0x9ed1b5e3U, 0x4c6a881bU, 0xc12c1fb8U, 0x4665517fU, 0x9d5eea04U, 0x018c355dU, 0xfa877473U, 0xfb0b412eU, 0xb3671d5aU, 0x92dbd252U, 0xe9105633U, 0x6dd64713U, 0x9ad7618cU, 0x37a10c7aU, 0x59f8148eU, 0xeb133c89U, 0xcea927eeU, 0xb761c935U, 0xe11ce5edU, 0x7a47b13cU, 0x9cd2df59U, 0x55f2733fU, 0x1814ce79U, 0x73c737bfU, 0x53f7cdeaU, 0x5ffdaa5bU, 0xdf3d6f14U, 0x7844db86U, 0xcaaff381U, 0xb968c43eU, 0x3824342cU, 0xc2a3405fU, 0x161dc372U, 0xbce2250cU, 0x283c498bU, 0xff0d9541U, 0x39a80171U, 0x080cb3deU, 0xd8b4e49cU, 0x6456c190U, 0x7bcb8461U, 0xd532b670U, 0x486c5c74U, 0xd0b85742U, }; static const u32 Td1[256] = { 0x5051f4a7U, 0x537e4165U, 0xc31a17a4U, 0x963a275eU, 0xcb3bab6bU, 0xf11f9d45U, 0xabacfa58U, 0x934be303U, 0x552030faU, 0xf6ad766dU, 0x9188cc76U, 0x25f5024cU, 0xfc4fe5d7U, 0xd7c52acbU, 0x80263544U, 0x8fb562a3U, 0x49deb15aU, 0x6725ba1bU, 0x9845ea0eU, 0xe15dfec0U, 0x02c32f75U, 0x12814cf0U, 0xa38d4697U, 0xc66bd3f9U, 0xe7038f5fU, 0x9515929cU, 0xebbf6d7aU, 0xda955259U, 0x2dd4be83U, 0xd3587421U, 0x2949e069U, 0x448ec9c8U, 0x6a75c289U, 0x78f48e79U, 0x6b99583eU, 0xdd27b971U, 0xb6bee14fU, 0x17f088adU, 0x66c920acU, 0xb47dce3aU, 0x1863df4aU, 0x82e51a31U, 0x60975133U, 0x4562537fU, 0xe0b16477U, 0x84bb6baeU, 0x1cfe81a0U, 0x94f9082bU, 0x58704868U, 0x198f45fdU, 0x8794de6cU, 0xb7527bf8U, 0x23ab73d3U, 0xe2724b02U, 0x57e31f8fU, 0x2a6655abU, 0x07b2eb28U, 0x032fb5c2U, 0x9a86c57bU, 0xa5d33708U, 0xf2302887U, 0xb223bfa5U, 0xba02036aU, 0x5ced1682U, 0x2b8acf1cU, 0x92a779b4U, 0xf0f307f2U, 0xa14e69e2U, 0xcd65daf4U, 0xd50605beU, 0x1fd13462U, 0x8ac4a6feU, 0x9d342e53U, 0xa0a2f355U, 0x32058ae1U, 0x75a4f6ebU, 0x390b83ecU, 0xaa4060efU, 0x065e719fU, 0x51bd6e10U, 0xf93e218aU, 0x3d96dd06U, 0xaedd3e05U, 0x464de6bdU, 0xb591548dU, 0x0571c45dU, 0x6f0406d4U, 0xff605015U, 0x241998fbU, 0x97d6bde9U, 0xcc894043U, 0x7767d99eU, 0xbdb0e842U, 0x8807898bU, 0x38e7195bU, 0xdb79c8eeU, 0x47a17c0aU, 0xe97c420fU, 0xc9f8841eU, 0x00000000U, 0x83098086U, 0x48322bedU, 0xac1e1170U, 0x4e6c5a72U, 0xfbfd0effU, 0x560f8538U, 0x1e3daed5U, 0x27362d39U, 0x640a0fd9U, 0x21685ca6U, 0xd19b5b54U, 0x3a24362eU, 0xb10c0a67U, 0x0f9357e7U, 0xd2b4ee96U, 0x9e1b9b91U, 0x4f80c0c5U, 0xa261dc20U, 0x695a774bU, 0x161c121aU, 0x0ae293baU, 0xe5c0a02aU, 0x433c22e0U, 0x1d121b17U, 0x0b0e090dU, 0xadf28bc7U, 0xb92db6a8U, 0xc8141ea9U, 0x8557f119U, 0x4caf7507U, 0xbbee99ddU, 0xfda37f60U, 0x9ff70126U, 0xbc5c72f5U, 0xc544663bU, 0x345bfb7eU, 0x768b4329U, 0xdccb23c6U, 0x68b6edfcU, 0x63b8e4f1U, 0xcad731dcU, 0x10426385U, 0x40139722U, 0x2084c611U, 0x7d854a24U, 0xf8d2bb3dU, 0x11aef932U, 0x6dc729a1U, 0x4b1d9e2fU, 0xf3dcb230U, 0xec0d8652U, 0xd077c1e3U, 0x6c2bb316U, 0x99a970b9U, 0xfa119448U, 0x2247e964U, 0xc4a8fc8cU, 0x1aa0f03fU, 0xd8567d2cU, 0xef223390U, 0xc787494eU, 0xc1d938d1U, 0xfe8ccaa2U, 0x3698d40bU, 0xcfa6f581U, 0x28a57adeU, 0x26dab78eU, 0xa43fadbfU, 0xe42c3a9dU, 0x0d507892U, 0x9b6a5fccU, 0x62547e46U, 0xc2f68d13U, 0xe890d8b8U, 0x5e2e39f7U, 0xf582c3afU, 0xbe9f5d80U, 0x7c69d093U, 0xa96fd52dU, 0xb3cf2512U, 0x3bc8ac99U, 0xa710187dU, 0x6ee89c63U, 0x7bdb3bbbU, 0x09cd2678U, 0xf46e5918U, 0x01ec9ab7U, 0xa8834f9aU, 0x65e6956eU, 0x7eaaffe6U, 0x0821bccfU, 0xe6ef15e8U, 0xd9bae79bU, 0xce4a6f36U, 0xd4ea9f09U, 0xd629b07cU, 0xaf31a4b2U, 0x312a3f23U, 0x30c6a594U, 0xc035a266U, 0x37744ebcU, 0xa6fc82caU, 0xb0e090d0U, 0x1533a7d8U, 0x4af10498U, 0xf741ecdaU, 0x0e7fcd50U, 0x2f1791f6U, 0x8d764dd6U, 0x4d43efb0U, 0x54ccaa4dU, 0xdfe49604U, 0xe39ed1b5U, 0x1b4c6a88U, 0xb8c12c1fU, 0x7f466551U, 0x049d5eeaU, 0x5d018c35U, 0x73fa8774U, 0x2efb0b41U, 0x5ab3671dU, 0x5292dbd2U, 0x33e91056U, 0x136dd647U, 0x8c9ad761U, 0x7a37a10cU, 0x8e59f814U, 0x89eb133cU, 0xeecea927U, 0x35b761c9U, 0xede11ce5U, 0x3c7a47b1U, 0x599cd2dfU, 0x3f55f273U, 0x791814ceU, 0xbf73c737U, 0xea53f7cdU, 0x5b5ffdaaU, 0x14df3d6fU, 0x867844dbU, 0x81caaff3U, 0x3eb968c4U, 0x2c382434U, 0x5fc2a340U, 0x72161dc3U, 0x0cbce225U, 0x8b283c49U, 0x41ff0d95U, 0x7139a801U, 0xde080cb3U, 0x9cd8b4e4U, 0x906456c1U, 0x617bcb84U, 0x70d532b6U, 0x74486c5cU, 0x42d0b857U, }; static const u32 Td2[256] = { 0xa75051f4U, 0x65537e41U, 0xa4c31a17U, 0x5e963a27U, 0x6bcb3babU, 0x45f11f9dU, 0x58abacfaU, 0x03934be3U, 0xfa552030U, 0x6df6ad76U, 0x769188ccU, 0x4c25f502U, 0xd7fc4fe5U, 0xcbd7c52aU, 0x44802635U, 0xa38fb562U, 0x5a49deb1U, 0x1b6725baU, 0x0e9845eaU, 0xc0e15dfeU, 0x7502c32fU, 0xf012814cU, 0x97a38d46U, 0xf9c66bd3U, 0x5fe7038fU, 0x9c951592U, 0x7aebbf6dU, 0x59da9552U, 0x832dd4beU, 0x21d35874U, 0x692949e0U, 0xc8448ec9U, 0x896a75c2U, 0x7978f48eU, 0x3e6b9958U, 0x71dd27b9U, 0x4fb6bee1U, 0xad17f088U, 0xac66c920U, 0x3ab47dceU, 0x4a1863dfU, 0x3182e51aU, 0x33609751U, 0x7f456253U, 0x77e0b164U, 0xae84bb6bU, 0xa01cfe81U, 0x2b94f908U, 0x68587048U, 0xfd198f45U, 0x6c8794deU, 0xf8b7527bU, 0xd323ab73U, 0x02e2724bU, 0x8f57e31fU, 0xab2a6655U, 0x2807b2ebU, 0xc2032fb5U, 0x7b9a86c5U, 0x08a5d337U, 0x87f23028U, 0xa5b223bfU, 0x6aba0203U, 0x825ced16U, 0x1c2b8acfU, 0xb492a779U, 0xf2f0f307U, 0xe2a14e69U, 0xf4cd65daU, 0xbed50605U, 0x621fd134U, 0xfe8ac4a6U, 0x539d342eU, 0x55a0a2f3U, 0xe132058aU, 0xeb75a4f6U, 0xec390b83U, 0xefaa4060U, 0x9f065e71U, 0x1051bd6eU, 0x8af93e21U, 0x063d96ddU, 0x05aedd3eU, 0xbd464de6U, 0x8db59154U, 0x5d0571c4U, 0xd46f0406U, 0x15ff6050U, 0xfb241998U, 0xe997d6bdU, 0x43cc8940U, 0x9e7767d9U, 0x42bdb0e8U, 0x8b880789U, 0x5b38e719U, 0xeedb79c8U, 0x0a47a17cU, 0x0fe97c42U, 0x1ec9f884U, 0x00000000U, 0x86830980U, 0xed48322bU, 0x70ac1e11U, 0x724e6c5aU, 0xfffbfd0eU, 0x38560f85U, 0xd51e3daeU, 0x3927362dU, 0xd9640a0fU, 0xa621685cU, 0x54d19b5bU, 0x2e3a2436U, 0x67b10c0aU, 0xe70f9357U, 0x96d2b4eeU, 0x919e1b9bU, 0xc54f80c0U, 0x20a261dcU, 0x4b695a77U, 0x1a161c12U, 0xba0ae293U, 0x2ae5c0a0U, 0xe0433c22U, 0x171d121bU, 0x0d0b0e09U, 0xc7adf28bU, 0xa8b92db6U, 0xa9c8141eU, 0x198557f1U, 0x074caf75U, 0xddbbee99U, 0x60fda37fU, 0x269ff701U, 0xf5bc5c72U, 0x3bc54466U, 0x7e345bfbU, 0x29768b43U, 0xc6dccb23U, 0xfc68b6edU, 0xf163b8e4U, 0xdccad731U, 0x85104263U, 0x22401397U, 0x112084c6U, 0x247d854aU, 0x3df8d2bbU, 0x3211aef9U, 0xa16dc729U, 0x2f4b1d9eU, 0x30f3dcb2U, 0x52ec0d86U, 0xe3d077c1U, 0x166c2bb3U, 0xb999a970U, 0x48fa1194U, 0x642247e9U, 0x8cc4a8fcU, 0x3f1aa0f0U, 0x2cd8567dU, 0x90ef2233U, 0x4ec78749U, 0xd1c1d938U, 0xa2fe8ccaU, 0x0b3698d4U, 0x81cfa6f5U, 0xde28a57aU, 0x8e26dab7U, 0xbfa43fadU, 0x9de42c3aU, 0x920d5078U, 0xcc9b6a5fU, 0x4662547eU, 0x13c2f68dU, 0xb8e890d8U, 0xf75e2e39U, 0xaff582c3U, 0x80be9f5dU, 0x937c69d0U, 0x2da96fd5U, 0x12b3cf25U, 0x993bc8acU, 0x7da71018U, 0x636ee89cU, 0xbb7bdb3bU, 0x7809cd26U, 0x18f46e59U, 0xb701ec9aU, 0x9aa8834fU, 0x6e65e695U, 0xe67eaaffU, 0xcf0821bcU, 0xe8e6ef15U, 0x9bd9bae7U, 0x36ce4a6fU, 0x09d4ea9fU, 0x7cd629b0U, 0xb2af31a4U, 0x23312a3fU, 0x9430c6a5U, 0x66c035a2U, 0xbc37744eU, 0xcaa6fc82U, 0xd0b0e090U, 0xd81533a7U, 0x984af104U, 0xdaf741ecU, 0x500e7fcdU, 0xf62f1791U, 0xd68d764dU, 0xb04d43efU, 0x4d54ccaaU, 0x04dfe496U, 0xb5e39ed1U, 0x881b4c6aU, 0x1fb8c12cU, 0x517f4665U, 0xea049d5eU, 0x355d018cU, 0x7473fa87U, 0x412efb0bU, 0x1d5ab367U, 0xd25292dbU, 0x5633e910U, 0x47136dd6U, 0x618c9ad7U, 0x0c7a37a1U, 0x148e59f8U, 0x3c89eb13U, 0x27eecea9U, 0xc935b761U, 0xe5ede11cU, 0xb13c7a47U, 0xdf599cd2U, 0x733f55f2U, 0xce791814U, 0x37bf73c7U, 0xcdea53f7U, 0xaa5b5ffdU, 0x6f14df3dU, 0xdb867844U, 0xf381caafU, 0xc43eb968U, 0x342c3824U, 0x405fc2a3U, 0xc372161dU, 0x250cbce2U, 0x498b283cU, 0x9541ff0dU, 0x017139a8U, 0xb3de080cU, 0xe49cd8b4U, 0xc1906456U, 0x84617bcbU, 0xb670d532U, 0x5c74486cU, 0x5742d0b8U, }; static const u32 Td3[256] = { 0xf4a75051U, 0x4165537eU, 0x17a4c31aU, 0x275e963aU, 0xab6bcb3bU, 0x9d45f11fU, 0xfa58abacU, 0xe303934bU, 0x30fa5520U, 0x766df6adU, 0xcc769188U, 0x024c25f5U, 0xe5d7fc4fU, 0x2acbd7c5U, 0x35448026U, 0x62a38fb5U, 0xb15a49deU, 0xba1b6725U, 0xea0e9845U, 0xfec0e15dU, 0x2f7502c3U, 0x4cf01281U, 0x4697a38dU, 0xd3f9c66bU, 0x8f5fe703U, 0x929c9515U, 0x6d7aebbfU, 0x5259da95U, 0xbe832dd4U, 0x7421d358U, 0xe0692949U, 0xc9c8448eU, 0xc2896a75U, 0x8e7978f4U, 0x583e6b99U, 0xb971dd27U, 0xe14fb6beU, 0x88ad17f0U, 0x20ac66c9U, 0xce3ab47dU, 0xdf4a1863U, 0x1a3182e5U, 0x51336097U, 0x537f4562U, 0x6477e0b1U, 0x6bae84bbU, 0x81a01cfeU, 0x082b94f9U, 0x48685870U, 0x45fd198fU, 0xde6c8794U, 0x7bf8b752U, 0x73d323abU, 0x4b02e272U, 0x1f8f57e3U, 0x55ab2a66U, 0xeb2807b2U, 0xb5c2032fU, 0xc57b9a86U, 0x3708a5d3U, 0x2887f230U, 0xbfa5b223U, 0x036aba02U, 0x16825cedU, 0xcf1c2b8aU, 0x79b492a7U, 0x07f2f0f3U, 0x69e2a14eU, 0xdaf4cd65U, 0x05bed506U, 0x34621fd1U, 0xa6fe8ac4U, 0x2e539d34U, 0xf355a0a2U, 0x8ae13205U, 0xf6eb75a4U, 0x83ec390bU, 0x60efaa40U, 0x719f065eU, 0x6e1051bdU, 0x218af93eU, 0xdd063d96U, 0x3e05aeddU, 0xe6bd464dU, 0x548db591U, 0xc45d0571U, 0x06d46f04U, 0x5015ff60U, 0x98fb2419U, 0xbde997d6U, 0x4043cc89U, 0xd99e7767U, 0xe842bdb0U, 0x898b8807U, 0x195b38e7U, 0xc8eedb79U, 0x7c0a47a1U, 0x420fe97cU, 0x841ec9f8U, 0x00000000U, 0x80868309U, 0x2bed4832U, 0x1170ac1eU, 0x5a724e6cU, 0x0efffbfdU, 0x8538560fU, 0xaed51e3dU, 0x2d392736U, 0x0fd9640aU, 0x5ca62168U, 0x5b54d19bU, 0x362e3a24U, 0x0a67b10cU, 0x57e70f93U, 0xee96d2b4U, 0x9b919e1bU, 0xc0c54f80U, 0xdc20a261U, 0x774b695aU, 0x121a161cU, 0x93ba0ae2U, 0xa02ae5c0U, 0x22e0433cU, 0x1b171d12U, 0x090d0b0eU, 0x8bc7adf2U, 0xb6a8b92dU, 0x1ea9c814U, 0xf1198557U, 0x75074cafU, 0x99ddbbeeU, 0x7f60fda3U, 0x01269ff7U, 0x72f5bc5cU, 0x663bc544U, 0xfb7e345bU, 0x4329768bU, 0x23c6dccbU, 0xedfc68b6U, 0xe4f163b8U, 0x31dccad7U, 0x63851042U, 0x97224013U, 0xc6112084U, 0x4a247d85U, 0xbb3df8d2U, 0xf93211aeU, 0x29a16dc7U, 0x9e2f4b1dU, 0xb230f3dcU, 0x8652ec0dU, 0xc1e3d077U, 0xb3166c2bU, 0x70b999a9U, 0x9448fa11U, 0xe9642247U, 0xfc8cc4a8U, 0xf03f1aa0U, 0x7d2cd856U, 0x3390ef22U, 0x494ec787U, 0x38d1c1d9U, 0xcaa2fe8cU, 0xd40b3698U, 0xf581cfa6U, 0x7ade28a5U, 0xb78e26daU, 0xadbfa43fU, 0x3a9de42cU, 0x78920d50U, 0x5fcc9b6aU, 0x7e466254U, 0x8d13c2f6U, 0xd8b8e890U, 0x39f75e2eU, 0xc3aff582U, 0x5d80be9fU, 0xd0937c69U, 0xd52da96fU, 0x2512b3cfU, 0xac993bc8U, 0x187da710U, 0x9c636ee8U, 0x3bbb7bdbU, 0x267809cdU, 0x5918f46eU, 0x9ab701ecU, 0x4f9aa883U, 0x956e65e6U, 0xffe67eaaU, 0xbccf0821U, 0x15e8e6efU, 0xe79bd9baU, 0x6f36ce4aU, 0x9f09d4eaU, 0xb07cd629U, 0xa4b2af31U, 0x3f23312aU, 0xa59430c6U, 0xa266c035U, 0x4ebc3774U, 0x82caa6fcU, 0x90d0b0e0U, 0xa7d81533U, 0x04984af1U, 0xecdaf741U, 0xcd500e7fU, 0x91f62f17U, 0x4dd68d76U, 0xefb04d43U, 0xaa4d54ccU, 0x9604dfe4U, 0xd1b5e39eU, 0x6a881b4cU, 0x2c1fb8c1U, 0x65517f46U, 0x5eea049dU, 0x8c355d01U, 0x877473faU, 0x0b412efbU, 0x671d5ab3U, 0xdbd25292U, 0x105633e9U, 0xd647136dU, 0xd7618c9aU, 0xa10c7a37U, 0xf8148e59U, 0x133c89ebU, 0xa927eeceU, 0x61c935b7U, 0x1ce5ede1U, 0x47b13c7aU, 0xd2df599cU, 0xf2733f55U, 0x14ce7918U, 0xc737bf73U, 0xf7cdea53U, 0xfdaa5b5fU, 0x3d6f14dfU, 0x44db8678U, 0xaff381caU, 0x68c43eb9U, 0x24342c38U, 0xa3405fc2U, 0x1dc37216U, 0xe2250cbcU, 0x3c498b28U, 0x0d9541ffU, 0xa8017139U, 0x0cb3de08U, 0xb4e49cd8U, 0x56c19064U, 0xcb84617bU, 0x32b670d5U, 0x6c5c7448U, 0xb85742d0U, }; static const u8 Td4[256] = { 0x52U, 0x09U, 0x6aU, 0xd5U, 0x30U, 0x36U, 0xa5U, 0x38U, 0xbfU, 0x40U, 0xa3U, 0x9eU, 0x81U, 0xf3U, 0xd7U, 0xfbU, 0x7cU, 0xe3U, 0x39U, 0x82U, 0x9bU, 0x2fU, 0xffU, 0x87U, 0x34U, 0x8eU, 0x43U, 0x44U, 0xc4U, 0xdeU, 0xe9U, 0xcbU, 0x54U, 0x7bU, 0x94U, 0x32U, 0xa6U, 0xc2U, 0x23U, 0x3dU, 0xeeU, 0x4cU, 0x95U, 0x0bU, 0x42U, 0xfaU, 0xc3U, 0x4eU, 0x08U, 0x2eU, 0xa1U, 0x66U, 0x28U, 0xd9U, 0x24U, 0xb2U, 0x76U, 0x5bU, 0xa2U, 0x49U, 0x6dU, 0x8bU, 0xd1U, 0x25U, 0x72U, 0xf8U, 0xf6U, 0x64U, 0x86U, 0x68U, 0x98U, 0x16U, 0xd4U, 0xa4U, 0x5cU, 0xccU, 0x5dU, 0x65U, 0xb6U, 0x92U, 0x6cU, 0x70U, 0x48U, 0x50U, 0xfdU, 0xedU, 0xb9U, 0xdaU, 0x5eU, 0x15U, 0x46U, 0x57U, 0xa7U, 0x8dU, 0x9dU, 0x84U, 0x90U, 0xd8U, 0xabU, 0x00U, 0x8cU, 0xbcU, 0xd3U, 0x0aU, 0xf7U, 0xe4U, 0x58U, 0x05U, 0xb8U, 0xb3U, 0x45U, 0x06U, 0xd0U, 0x2cU, 0x1eU, 0x8fU, 0xcaU, 0x3fU, 0x0fU, 0x02U, 0xc1U, 0xafU, 0xbdU, 0x03U, 0x01U, 0x13U, 0x8aU, 0x6bU, 0x3aU, 0x91U, 0x11U, 0x41U, 0x4fU, 0x67U, 0xdcU, 0xeaU, 0x97U, 0xf2U, 0xcfU, 0xceU, 0xf0U, 0xb4U, 0xe6U, 0x73U, 0x96U, 0xacU, 0x74U, 0x22U, 0xe7U, 0xadU, 0x35U, 0x85U, 0xe2U, 0xf9U, 0x37U, 0xe8U, 0x1cU, 0x75U, 0xdfU, 0x6eU, 0x47U, 0xf1U, 0x1aU, 0x71U, 0x1dU, 0x29U, 0xc5U, 0x89U, 0x6fU, 0xb7U, 0x62U, 0x0eU, 0xaaU, 0x18U, 0xbeU, 0x1bU, 0xfcU, 0x56U, 0x3eU, 0x4bU, 0xc6U, 0xd2U, 0x79U, 0x20U, 0x9aU, 0xdbU, 0xc0U, 0xfeU, 0x78U, 0xcdU, 0x5aU, 0xf4U, 0x1fU, 0xddU, 0xa8U, 0x33U, 0x88U, 0x07U, 0xc7U, 0x31U, 0xb1U, 0x12U, 0x10U, 0x59U, 0x27U, 0x80U, 0xecU, 0x5fU, 0x60U, 0x51U, 0x7fU, 0xa9U, 0x19U, 0xb5U, 0x4aU, 0x0dU, 0x2dU, 0xe5U, 0x7aU, 0x9fU, 0x93U, 0xc9U, 0x9cU, 0xefU, 0xa0U, 0xe0U, 0x3bU, 0x4dU, 0xaeU, 0x2aU, 0xf5U, 0xb0U, 0xc8U, 0xebU, 0xbbU, 0x3cU, 0x83U, 0x53U, 0x99U, 0x61U, 0x17U, 0x2bU, 0x04U, 0x7eU, 0xbaU, 0x77U, 0xd6U, 0x26U, 0xe1U, 0x69U, 0x14U, 0x63U, 0x55U, 0x21U, 0x0cU, 0x7dU, }; #endif static const u32 rcon[] = { 0x01000000, 0x02000000, 0x04000000, 0x08000000, 0x10000000, 0x20000000, 0x40000000, 0x80000000, 0x1B000000, 0x36000000, /* for 128-bit blocks, Rijndael never uses more than 10 rcon values */ }; #define GETU32(pt) (((u32)(pt)[0] << 24) ^ ((u32)(pt)[1] << 16) ^ ((u32)(pt)[2] << 8) ^ ((u32)(pt)[3])) #define PUTU32(ct, st) { (ct)[0] = (u8)((st) >> 24); (ct)[1] = (u8)((st) >> 16); (ct)[2] = (u8)((st) >> 8); (ct)[3] = (u8)(st); } /** * Expand the cipher key into the encryption key schedule. * * @return the number of rounds for the given cipher key size. */ int rijndaelKeySetupEnc(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits) { int i = 0; u32 temp; rk[0] = GETU32(cipherKey ); rk[1] = GETU32(cipherKey + 4); rk[2] = GETU32(cipherKey + 8); rk[3] = GETU32(cipherKey + 12); if (keyBits == 128) { for (;;) { temp = rk[3]; rk[4] = rk[0] ^ (Te2[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te3[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te0[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te1[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^ rcon[i]; rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4]; rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5]; rk[7] = rk[3] ^ rk[6]; if (++i == 10) { return 10; } rk += 4; } } rk[4] = GETU32(cipherKey + 16); rk[5] = GETU32(cipherKey + 20); if (keyBits == 192) { for (;;) { temp = rk[ 5]; rk[ 6] = rk[ 0] ^ (Te2[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te3[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te0[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te1[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^ rcon[i]; rk[ 7] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 6]; rk[ 8] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 7]; rk[ 9] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[ 8]; if (++i == 8) { return 12; } rk[10] = rk[ 4] ^ rk[ 9]; rk[11] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[10]; rk += 6; } } rk[6] = GETU32(cipherKey + 24); rk[7] = GETU32(cipherKey + 28); if (keyBits == 256) { for (;;) { temp = rk[ 7]; rk[ 8] = rk[ 0] ^ (Te2[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te3[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te0[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te1[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^ rcon[i]; rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8]; rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9]; rk[11] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[10]; if (++i == 7) { return 14; } temp = rk[11]; rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^ (Te2[(temp >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te3[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te0[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te1[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff); rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12]; rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13]; rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14]; rk += 8; } } return 0; } #if 0 /** * Expand the cipher key into the decryption key schedule. * * @return the number of rounds for the given cipher key size. */ int rijndaelKeySetupDec(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits) { int Nr, i, j; u32 temp; /* expand the cipher key: */ Nr = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(rk, cipherKey, keyBits); /* invert the order of the round keys: */ for (i = 0, j = 4*Nr; i < j; i += 4, j -= 4) { temp = rk[i ]; rk[i ] = rk[j ]; rk[j ] = temp; temp = rk[i + 1]; rk[i + 1] = rk[j + 1]; rk[j + 1] = temp; temp = rk[i + 2]; rk[i + 2] = rk[j + 2]; rk[j + 2] = temp; temp = rk[i + 3]; rk[i + 3] = rk[j + 3]; rk[j + 3] = temp; } /* apply the inverse MixColumn transform to all round keys but the first and the last: */ for (i = 1; i < Nr; i++) { rk += 4; rk[0] = Td0[Te1[(rk[0] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ Td1[Te1[(rk[0] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td2[Te1[(rk[0] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td3[Te1[(rk[0] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; rk[1] = Td0[Te1[(rk[1] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ Td1[Te1[(rk[1] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td2[Te1[(rk[1] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td3[Te1[(rk[1] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; rk[2] = Td0[Te1[(rk[2] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ Td1[Te1[(rk[2] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td2[Te1[(rk[2] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td3[Te1[(rk[2] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; rk[3] = Td0[Te1[(rk[3] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ Td1[Te1[(rk[3] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td2[Te1[(rk[3] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td3[Te1[(rk[3] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; } return Nr; } #endif void rijndaelEncrypt(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 pt[16], u8 ct[16]) { u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3; #ifndef FULL_UNROLL int r; #endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ /* * map byte array block to cipher state * and add initial round key: */ s0 = GETU32(pt ) ^ rk[0]; s1 = GETU32(pt + 4) ^ rk[1]; s2 = GETU32(pt + 8) ^ rk[2]; s3 = GETU32(pt + 12) ^ rk[3]; #ifdef FULL_UNROLL /* round 1: */ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4]; t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5]; t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6]; t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7]; /* round 2: */ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8]; s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9]; s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[10]; s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[11]; /* round 3: */ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[12]; t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[13]; t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[14]; t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[15]; /* round 4: */ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[16]; s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[17]; s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[18]; s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[19]; /* round 5: */ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[20]; t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[21]; t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[22]; t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[23]; /* round 6: */ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[24]; s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[25]; s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[26]; s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[27]; /* round 7: */ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[28]; t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[29]; t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[30]; t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[31]; /* round 8: */ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[32]; s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[33]; s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[34]; s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[35]; /* round 9: */ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[36]; t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[37]; t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[38]; t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[39]; if (Nr > 10) { /* round 10: */ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[40]; s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[41]; s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[42]; s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[43]; /* round 11: */ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[44]; t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[45]; t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[46]; t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[47]; if (Nr > 12) { /* round 12: */ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[48]; s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[49]; s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[50]; s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[51]; /* round 13: */ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[52]; t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[53]; t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[54]; t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[55]; } } rk += Nr << 2; #else /* !FULL_UNROLL */ /* * Nr - 1 full rounds: */ r = Nr >> 1; for (;;) { t0 = Te0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[4]; t1 = Te0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[5]; t2 = Te0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[6]; t3 = Te0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[7]; rk += 8; if (--r == 0) { break; } s0 = Te0[(t0 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(t3 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[0]; s1 = Te0[(t1 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(t0 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[1]; s2 = Te0[(t2 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(t1 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[2]; s3 = Te0[(t3 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(t2 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[3]; } #endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ /* * apply last round and * map cipher state to byte array block: */ s0 = (Te2[(t0 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te3[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te0[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te1[(t3 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ rk[0]; PUTU32(ct , s0); s1 = (Te2[(t1 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te3[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te0[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te1[(t0 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ rk[1]; PUTU32(ct + 4, s1); s2 = (Te2[(t2 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te3[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te0[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te1[(t1 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ rk[2]; PUTU32(ct + 8, s2); s3 = (Te2[(t3 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te3[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te0[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te1[(t2 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ rk[3]; PUTU32(ct + 12, s3); } #if 0 static void rijndaelDecrypt(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 ct[16], u8 pt[16]) { u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3; #ifndef FULL_UNROLL int r; #endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ /* * map byte array block to cipher state * and add initial round key: */ s0 = GETU32(ct ) ^ rk[0]; s1 = GETU32(ct + 4) ^ rk[1]; s2 = GETU32(ct + 8) ^ rk[2]; s3 = GETU32(ct + 12) ^ rk[3]; #ifdef FULL_UNROLL /* round 1: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7]; /* round 2: */ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8]; s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9]; s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[10]; s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[11]; /* round 3: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[12]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[13]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[14]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[15]; /* round 4: */ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[16]; s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[17]; s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[18]; s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[19]; /* round 5: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[20]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[21]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[22]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[23]; /* round 6: */ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[24]; s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[25]; s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[26]; s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[27]; /* round 7: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[28]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[29]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[30]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[31]; /* round 8: */ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[32]; s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[33]; s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[34]; s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[35]; /* round 9: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[36]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[37]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[38]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[39]; if (Nr > 10) { /* round 10: */ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[40]; s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[41]; s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[42]; s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[43]; /* round 11: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[44]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[45]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[46]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[47]; if (Nr > 12) { /* round 12: */ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[48]; s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[49]; s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[50]; s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[51]; /* round 13: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[52]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[53]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[54]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[55]; } } rk += Nr << 2; #else /* !FULL_UNROLL */ /* * Nr - 1 full rounds: */ r = Nr >> 1; for (;;) { t0 = Td0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[4]; t1 = Td0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[5]; t2 = Td0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[6]; t3 = Td0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[7]; rk += 8; if (--r == 0) { break; } s0 = Td0[(t0 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(t1 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[0]; s1 = Td0[(t1 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(t2 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[1]; s2 = Td0[(t2 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(t3 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[2]; s3 = Td0[(t3 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(t0 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[3]; } #endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ /* * apply last round and * map cipher state to byte array block: */ s0 = (Td4[(t0 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ (Td4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ (Td4[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ (Td4[(t1 ) & 0xff]) ^ rk[0]; PUTU32(pt , s0); s1 = (Td4[(t1 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ (Td4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ (Td4[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ (Td4[(t2 ) & 0xff]) ^ rk[1]; PUTU32(pt + 4, s1); s2 = (Td4[(t2 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ (Td4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ (Td4[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ (Td4[(t3 ) & 0xff]) ^ rk[2]; PUTU32(pt + 8, s2); s3 = (Td4[(t3 >> 24) ] << 24) ^ (Td4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] << 16) ^ (Td4[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] << 8) ^ (Td4[(t0 ) & 0xff]) ^ rk[3]; PUTU32(pt + 12, s3); } #endif Index: head/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,247 +1,318 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 2012 Will Drewry * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* * Uncomment the SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG macro below to help diagnose * filter breakage during development. *Do not* use this in production, * as it relies on making library calls that are unsafe in signal context. * * Instead, live systems the auditctl(8) may be used to monitor failures. * E.g. * auditctl -a task,always -F uid= */ /* #define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG 1 */ /* XXX it should be possible to do logging via the log socket safely */ #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG /* Use the kernel headers in case of an older toolchain. */ # include # define __have_siginfo_t 1 # define __have_sigval_t 1 # define __have_sigevent_t 1 #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* for offsetof */ #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "xmalloc.h" /* Linux seccomp_filter sandbox */ #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_KILL /* Use a signal handler to emit violations when debugging */ #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG # undef SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL # define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ /* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */ #define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno)) #define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW) +#define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \ + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 4), \ + /* load first syscall argument */ \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)])), \ + BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_arg_val), 0, 1), \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \ + /* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \ + BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \ + offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)) /* Syscall filtering set for preauth. */ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { /* Ensure the syscall arch convention is as expected. */ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch)), BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH, 1, 0), BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL), /* Load the syscall number for checking. */ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)), + + /* Syscalls to non-fatally deny */ +#ifdef __NR_fstat + SC_DENY(fstat, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_fstat64 + SC_DENY(fstat64, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_open SC_DENY(open, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_openat + SC_DENY(openat, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_newfstatat + SC_DENY(newfstatat, EACCES), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_stat SC_DENY(stat, EACCES), - SC_ALLOW(getpid), - SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_stat64 + SC_DENY(stat64, EACCES), +#endif + + /* Syscalls to permit */ +#ifdef __NR_brk + SC_ALLOW(brk), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime), -#ifdef __NR_time /* not defined on EABI ARM */ - SC_ALLOW(time), #endif - SC_ALLOW(read), - SC_ALLOW(write), +#ifdef __NR_close SC_ALLOW(close), -#ifdef __NR_shutdown /* not defined on archs that go via socketcall(2) */ - SC_ALLOW(shutdown), #endif - SC_ALLOW(brk), - SC_ALLOW(poll), -#ifdef __NR__newselect - SC_ALLOW(_newselect), -#else - SC_ALLOW(select), +#ifdef __NR_exit + SC_ALLOW(exit), #endif +#ifdef __NR_exit_group + SC_ALLOW(exit_group), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_getpgid + SC_ALLOW(getpgid), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_getpid + SC_ALLOW(getpid), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_gettimeofday + SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_madvise SC_ALLOW(madvise), -#ifdef __NR_mmap2 /* EABI ARM only has mmap2() */ - SC_ALLOW(mmap2), #endif #ifdef __NR_mmap SC_ALLOW(mmap), #endif -#ifdef __dietlibc__ +#ifdef __NR_mmap2 + SC_ALLOW(mmap2), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_mremap SC_ALLOW(mremap), - SC_ALLOW(exit), #endif +#ifdef __NR_munmap SC_ALLOW(munmap), - SC_ALLOW(exit_group), +#endif +#ifdef __NR__newselect + SC_ALLOW(_newselect), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_poll + SC_ALLOW(poll), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_pselect6 + SC_ALLOW(pselect6), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_read + SC_ALLOW(read), +#endif #ifdef __NR_rt_sigprocmask SC_ALLOW(rt_sigprocmask), -#else +#endif +#ifdef __NR_select + SC_ALLOW(select), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_shutdown + SC_ALLOW(shutdown), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_sigprocmask SC_ALLOW(sigprocmask), #endif +#ifdef __NR_time + SC_ALLOW(time), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_write + SC_ALLOW(write), +#endif +#ifdef __NR_socketcall + SC_ALLOW_ARG(socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN), +#endif + + /* Default deny */ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL), }; static const struct sock_fprog preauth_program = { .len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(preauth_insns)/sizeof(preauth_insns[0])), .filter = (struct sock_filter *)preauth_insns, }; struct ssh_sandbox { pid_t child_pid; }; struct ssh_sandbox * ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) { struct ssh_sandbox *box; /* * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API. */ debug3("%s: preparing seccomp filter sandbox", __func__); box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); box->child_pid = 0; return box; } #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG extern struct monitor *pmonitor; void mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, const char *msg, void *ctx); static void ssh_sandbox_violation(int signum, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context) { char msg[256]; snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "%s: unexpected system call (arch:0x%x,syscall:%d @ %p)", __func__, info->si_arch, info->si_syscall, info->si_call_addr); mm_log_handler(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, msg, pmonitor); _exit(1); } static void ssh_sandbox_child_debugging(void) { struct sigaction act; sigset_t mask; debug3("%s: installing SIGSYS handler", __func__); memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act)); sigemptyset(&mask); sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS); act.sa_sigaction = &ssh_sandbox_violation; act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO; if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL) == -1) fatal("%s: sigaction(SIGSYS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL) == -1) fatal("%s: sigprocmask(SIGSYS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ void ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { struct rlimit rl_zero; int nnp_failed = 0; /* Set rlimits for completeness if possible. */ rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1) fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1) fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1) fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG ssh_sandbox_child_debugging(); #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ debug3("%s: setting PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS", __func__); if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1) { debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); nnp_failed = 1; } debug3("%s: attaching seccomp filter program", __func__); if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &preauth_program) == -1) debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); else if (nnp_failed) fatal("%s: SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER activated but " "PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS failed", __func__); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { free(box); debug3("%s: finished", __func__); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) { box->child_pid = child_pid; } #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER */ Index: head/crypto/openssh/sandbox-systrace.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/sandbox-systrace.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/sandbox-systrace.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,210 +1,209 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-systrace.c,v 1.14 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-systrace.c,v 1.16 2015/06/29 22:35:12 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef SANDBOX_SYSTRACE #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "atomicio.h" #include "log.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "xmalloc.h" struct sandbox_policy { int syscall; int action; }; /* Permitted syscalls in preauth. Unlisted syscalls get SYSTR_POLICY_KILL */ static const struct sandbox_policy preauth_policy[] = { - { SYS_open, SYSTR_POLICY_NEVER }, - + { SYS_clock_gettime, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_close, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_exit, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, #ifdef SYS_getentropy /* OpenBSD 5.6 and newer use getentropy(2) to seed arc4random(3). */ { SYS_getentropy, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, #else /* Previous releases used sysctl(3)'s kern.arnd variable. */ { SYS___sysctl, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, #endif - -#ifdef SYS_sendsyslog - { SYS_sendsyslog, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, -#endif - { SYS_close, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, - { SYS_exit, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_getpid, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_getpgid, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_gettimeofday, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, - { SYS_clock_gettime, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_madvise, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_mmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_mprotect, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_mquery, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, - { SYS_poll, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_munmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, + { SYS_open, SYSTR_POLICY_NEVER }, + { SYS_poll, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_read, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_select, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, +#ifdef SYS_sendsyslog + { SYS_sendsyslog, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, +#endif { SYS_shutdown, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_sigprocmask, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_write, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { -1, -1 } }; struct ssh_sandbox { int systrace_fd; pid_t child_pid; void (*osigchld)(int); }; struct ssh_sandbox * ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) { struct ssh_sandbox *box; debug3("%s: preparing systrace sandbox", __func__); box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); box->systrace_fd = -1; box->child_pid = 0; box->osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN); return box; } void ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { debug3("%s: ready", __func__); signal(SIGCHLD, box->osigchld); if (kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP) != 0) fatal("%s: kill(%d, SIGSTOP)", __func__, getpid()); debug3("%s: started", __func__); } static void ssh_sandbox_parent(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid, const struct sandbox_policy *allowed_syscalls) { int dev_systrace, i, j, found, status; pid_t pid; struct systrace_policy policy; /* Wait for the child to send itself a SIGSTOP */ debug3("%s: wait for child %ld", __func__, (long)child_pid); do { pid = waitpid(child_pid, &status, WUNTRACED); } while (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR); signal(SIGCHLD, box->osigchld); if (!WIFSTOPPED(status)) { if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) fatal("%s: child terminated with signal %d", __func__, WTERMSIG(status)); if (WIFEXITED(status)) fatal("%s: child exited with status %d", __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status)); fatal("%s: child not stopped", __func__); } debug3("%s: child %ld stopped", __func__, (long)child_pid); box->child_pid = child_pid; /* Set up systracing of child */ if ((dev_systrace = open("/dev/systrace", O_RDONLY)) == -1) fatal("%s: open(\"/dev/systrace\"): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (ioctl(dev_systrace, STRIOCCLONE, &box->systrace_fd) == -1) fatal("%s: ioctl(STRIOCCLONE, %d): %s", __func__, dev_systrace, strerror(errno)); close(dev_systrace); debug3("%s: systrace attach, fd=%d", __func__, box->systrace_fd); if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCATTACH, &child_pid) == -1) fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCATTACH, %d): %s", __func__, box->systrace_fd, child_pid, strerror(errno)); /* Allocate and assign policy */ memset(&policy, 0, sizeof(policy)); policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_NEW; policy.strp_maxents = SYS_MAXSYSCALL; if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1) fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (new)): %s", __func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno)); policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_ASSIGN; policy.strp_pid = box->child_pid; if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1) fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (assign)): %s", __func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno)); /* Set per-syscall policy */ for (i = 0; i < SYS_MAXSYSCALL; i++) { found = 0; for (j = 0; allowed_syscalls[j].syscall != -1; j++) { if (allowed_syscalls[j].syscall == i) { found = 1; break; } } policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_MODIFY; policy.strp_code = i; policy.strp_policy = found ? allowed_syscalls[j].action : SYSTR_POLICY_KILL; if (found) debug3("%s: policy: enable syscall %d", __func__, i); if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1) fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (modify)): %s", __func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno)); } /* Signal the child to start running */ debug3("%s: start child %ld", __func__, (long)child_pid); if (kill(box->child_pid, SIGCONT) != 0) fatal("%s: kill(%d, SIGCONT)", __func__, box->child_pid); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { /* Closing this before the child exits will terminate it */ close(box->systrace_fd); free(box); debug3("%s: finished", __func__); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) { ssh_sandbox_parent(box, child_pid, preauth_policy); } #endif /* SANDBOX_SYSTRACE */ Index: head/crypto/openssh/scp.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/scp.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/scp.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,1351 +1,1351 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.181 2015/01/16 06:40:12 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.182 2015/04/24 01:36:00 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd). * * NOTE: This version should NOT be suid root. (This uses ssh to * do the transfer and ssh has the necessary privileges.) * * 1995 Timo Rinne , Tatu Ylonen * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Parts from: * * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #else # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H # include # endif #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) #include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "progressmeter.h" extern char *__progname; #define COPY_BUFLEN 16384 int do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout); int do_cmd2(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int fdin, int fdout); /* Struct for addargs */ arglist args; arglist remote_remote_args; /* Bandwidth limit */ long long limit_kbps = 0; struct bwlimit bwlimit; /* Name of current file being transferred. */ char *curfile; /* This is set to non-zero to enable verbose mode. */ int verbose_mode = 0; /* This is set to zero if the progressmeter is not desired. */ int showprogress = 1; /* * This is set to non-zero if remote-remote copy should be piped * through this process. */ int throughlocal = 0; /* This is the program to execute for the secured connection. ("ssh" or -S) */ char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM; /* This is used to store the pid of ssh_program */ pid_t do_cmd_pid = -1; static void killchild(int signo) { if (do_cmd_pid > 1) { kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM); waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0); } if (signo) _exit(1); exit(1); } static void suspchild(int signo) { int status; if (do_cmd_pid > 1) { kill(do_cmd_pid, signo); while (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, WUNTRACED) == -1 && errno == EINTR) ; kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP); } } static int do_local_cmd(arglist *a) { u_int i; int status; pid_t pid; if (a->num == 0) fatal("do_local_cmd: no arguments"); if (verbose_mode) { fprintf(stderr, "Executing:"); for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++) fprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } if ((pid = fork()) == -1) fatal("do_local_cmd: fork: %s", strerror(errno)); if (pid == 0) { execvp(a->list[0], a->list); perror(a->list[0]); exit(1); } do_cmd_pid = pid; signal(SIGTERM, killchild); signal(SIGINT, killchild); signal(SIGHUP, killchild); while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("do_local_cmd: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno)); do_cmd_pid = -1; if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) return (-1); return (0); } /* * This function executes the given command as the specified user on the * given host. This returns < 0 if execution fails, and >= 0 otherwise. This * assigns the input and output file descriptors on success. */ int do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout) { int pin[2], pout[2], reserved[2]; if (verbose_mode) fprintf(stderr, "Executing: program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n", ssh_program, host, remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd); /* * Reserve two descriptors so that the real pipes won't get * descriptors 0 and 1 because that will screw up dup2 below. */ if (pipe(reserved) < 0) fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Create a socket pair for communicating with ssh. */ if (pipe(pin) < 0) fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); if (pipe(pout) < 0) fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Free the reserved descriptors. */ close(reserved[0]); close(reserved[1]); signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild); signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild); signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild); /* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */ do_cmd_pid = fork(); if (do_cmd_pid == 0) { /* Child. */ close(pin[1]); close(pout[0]); dup2(pin[0], 0); dup2(pout[1], 1); close(pin[0]); close(pout[1]); replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program); if (remuser != NULL) { addargs(&args, "-l"); addargs(&args, "%s", remuser); } addargs(&args, "--"); addargs(&args, "%s", host); addargs(&args, "%s", cmd); execvp(ssh_program, args.list); perror(ssh_program); exit(1); } else if (do_cmd_pid == -1) { fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); } /* Parent. Close the other side, and return the local side. */ close(pin[0]); *fdout = pin[1]; close(pout[1]); *fdin = pout[0]; signal(SIGTERM, killchild); signal(SIGINT, killchild); signal(SIGHUP, killchild); return 0; } /* * This functions executes a command simlar to do_cmd(), but expects the * input and output descriptors to be setup by a previous call to do_cmd(). * This way the input and output of two commands can be connected. */ int do_cmd2(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int fdin, int fdout) { pid_t pid; int status; if (verbose_mode) fprintf(stderr, "Executing: 2nd program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n", ssh_program, host, remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd); /* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */ pid = fork(); if (pid == 0) { dup2(fdin, 0); dup2(fdout, 1); replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program); if (remuser != NULL) { addargs(&args, "-l"); addargs(&args, "%s", remuser); } addargs(&args, "--"); addargs(&args, "%s", host); addargs(&args, "%s", cmd); execvp(ssh_program, args.list); perror(ssh_program); exit(1); } else if (pid == -1) { fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); } while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("do_cmd2: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno)); return 0; } typedef struct { size_t cnt; char *buf; } BUF; BUF *allocbuf(BUF *, int, int); void lostconn(int); int okname(char *); void run_err(const char *,...); void verifydir(char *); struct passwd *pwd; uid_t userid; int errs, remin, remout; int pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory; #define CMDNEEDS 64 char cmd[CMDNEEDS]; /* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */ int response(void); void rsource(char *, struct stat *); void sink(int, char *[]); void source(int, char *[]); void tolocal(int, char *[]); void toremote(char *, int, char *[]); void usage(void); int main(int argc, char **argv) { int ch, fflag, tflag, status, n; char *targ, **newargv; const char *errstr; extern char *optarg; extern int optind; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); /* Copy argv, because we modify it */ newargv = xcalloc(MAX(argc + 1, 1), sizeof(*newargv)); for (n = 0; n < argc; n++) newargv[n] = xstrdup(argv[n]); argv = newargv; __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args)); memset(&remote_remote_args, '\0', sizeof(remote_remote_args)); args.list = remote_remote_args.list = NULL; addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program); addargs(&args, "-x"); addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent=no"); addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand=no"); addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes"); fflag = tflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfl:prtvBCc:i:P:q12346S:o:F:")) != -1) switch (ch) { /* User-visible flags. */ case '1': case '2': case '4': case '6': case 'C': addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch); break; case '3': throughlocal = 1; break; case 'o': case 'c': case 'i': case 'F': addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "%s", optarg); addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); addargs(&args, "%s", optarg); break; case 'P': addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-p"); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "%s", optarg); addargs(&args, "-p"); addargs(&args, "%s", optarg); break; case 'B': addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-oBatchmode=yes"); addargs(&args, "-oBatchmode=yes"); break; case 'l': limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) usage(); limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */ bandwidth_limit_init(&bwlimit, limit_kbps, COPY_BUFLEN); break; case 'p': pflag = 1; break; case 'r': iamrecursive = 1; break; case 'S': ssh_program = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'v': addargs(&args, "-v"); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-v"); verbose_mode = 1; break; case 'q': addargs(&args, "-q"); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-q"); showprogress = 0; break; /* Server options. */ case 'd': targetshouldbedirectory = 1; break; case 'f': /* "from" */ iamremote = 1; fflag = 1; break; case 't': /* "to" */ iamremote = 1; tflag = 1; #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN setmode(0, O_BINARY); #endif break; default: usage(); } argc -= optind; argv += optind; if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL) fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid); if (!isatty(STDOUT_FILENO)) showprogress = 0; remin = STDIN_FILENO; remout = STDOUT_FILENO; if (fflag) { /* Follow "protocol", send data. */ (void) response(); source(argc, argv); exit(errs != 0); } if (tflag) { /* Receive data. */ sink(argc, argv); exit(errs != 0); } if (argc < 2) usage(); if (argc > 2) targetshouldbedirectory = 1; remin = remout = -1; do_cmd_pid = -1; /* Command to be executed on remote system using "ssh". */ (void) snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "scp%s%s%s%s", verbose_mode ? " -v" : "", iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "", targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : ""); (void) signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn); if ((targ = colon(argv[argc - 1]))) /* Dest is remote host. */ toremote(targ, argc, argv); else { if (targetshouldbedirectory) verifydir(argv[argc - 1]); tolocal(argc, argv); /* Dest is local host. */ } /* * Finally check the exit status of the ssh process, if one was forked * and no error has occurred yet */ if (do_cmd_pid != -1 && errs == 0) { if (remin != -1) (void) close(remin); if (remout != -1) (void) close(remout); if (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, 0) == -1) errs = 1; else { if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) errs = 1; } } exit(errs != 0); } /* Callback from atomicio6 to update progress meter and limit bandwidth */ static int scpio(void *_cnt, size_t s) { off_t *cnt = (off_t *)_cnt; *cnt += s; if (limit_kbps > 0) bandwidth_limit(&bwlimit, s); return 0; } static int do_times(int fd, int verb, const struct stat *sb) { /* strlen(2^64) == 20; strlen(10^6) == 7 */ char buf[(20 + 7 + 2) * 2 + 2]; (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "T%llu 0 %llu 0\n", (unsigned long long) (sb->st_mtime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_mtime), (unsigned long long) (sb->st_atime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_atime)); if (verb) { fprintf(stderr, "File mtime %lld atime %lld\n", (long long)sb->st_mtime, (long long)sb->st_atime); fprintf(stderr, "Sending file timestamps: %s", buf); } (void) atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, strlen(buf)); return (response()); } void toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv) { char *bp, *host, *src, *suser, *thost, *tuser, *arg; arglist alist; int i; u_int j; memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist)); alist.list = NULL; *targ++ = 0; if (*targ == 0) targ = "."; arg = xstrdup(argv[argc - 1]); if ((thost = strrchr(arg, '@'))) { /* user@host */ *thost++ = 0; tuser = arg; if (*tuser == '\0') tuser = NULL; } else { thost = arg; tuser = NULL; } if (tuser != NULL && !okname(tuser)) { free(arg); return; } for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) { src = colon(argv[i]); if (src && throughlocal) { /* extended remote to remote */ *src++ = 0; if (*src == 0) src = "."; host = strrchr(argv[i], '@'); if (host) { *host++ = 0; host = cleanhostname(host); suser = argv[i]; if (*suser == '\0') suser = pwd->pw_name; else if (!okname(suser)) continue; } else { host = cleanhostname(argv[i]); suser = NULL; } xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s", cmd, *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src); if (do_cmd(host, suser, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) exit(1); free(bp); host = cleanhostname(thost); xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd, *targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ); if (do_cmd2(host, tuser, bp, remin, remout) < 0) exit(1); free(bp); (void) close(remin); (void) close(remout); remin = remout = -1; } else if (src) { /* standard remote to remote */ freeargs(&alist); addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program); addargs(&alist, "-x"); addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes"); addargs(&alist, "-n"); for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) { addargs(&alist, "%s", remote_remote_args.list[j]); } *src++ = 0; if (*src == 0) src = "."; host = strrchr(argv[i], '@'); if (host) { *host++ = 0; host = cleanhostname(host); suser = argv[i]; if (*suser == '\0') suser = pwd->pw_name; else if (!okname(suser)) continue; addargs(&alist, "-l"); addargs(&alist, "%s", suser); } else { host = cleanhostname(argv[i]); } addargs(&alist, "--"); addargs(&alist, "%s", host); addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd); addargs(&alist, "%s", src); addargs(&alist, "%s%s%s:%s", tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "", thost, targ); if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0) errs = 1; } else { /* local to remote */ if (remin == -1) { xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd, *targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ); host = cleanhostname(thost); if (do_cmd(host, tuser, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) exit(1); if (response() < 0) exit(1); free(bp); } source(1, argv + i); } } free(arg); } void tolocal(int argc, char **argv) { char *bp, *host, *src, *suser; arglist alist; int i; memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist)); alist.list = NULL; for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) { if (!(src = colon(argv[i]))) { /* Local to local. */ freeargs(&alist); addargs(&alist, "%s", _PATH_CP); if (iamrecursive) addargs(&alist, "-r"); if (pflag) addargs(&alist, "-p"); addargs(&alist, "--"); addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[i]); addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[argc-1]); if (do_local_cmd(&alist)) ++errs; continue; } *src++ = 0; if (*src == 0) src = "."; if ((host = strrchr(argv[i], '@')) == NULL) { host = argv[i]; suser = NULL; } else { *host++ = 0; suser = argv[i]; if (*suser == '\0') suser = pwd->pw_name; } host = cleanhostname(host); xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s", cmd, *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src); if (do_cmd(host, suser, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) { free(bp); ++errs; continue; } free(bp); sink(1, argv + argc - 1); (void) close(remin); remin = remout = -1; } } void source(int argc, char **argv) { struct stat stb; static BUF buffer; BUF *bp; off_t i, statbytes; size_t amt, nr; int fd = -1, haderr, indx; char *last, *name, buf[2048], encname[PATH_MAX]; int len; for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) { name = argv[indx]; statbytes = 0; len = strlen(name); while (len > 1 && name[len-1] == '/') name[--len] = '\0'; if ((fd = open(name, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK, 0)) < 0) goto syserr; if (strchr(name, '\n') != NULL) { strnvis(encname, name, sizeof(encname), VIS_NL); name = encname; } if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) { syserr: run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno)); goto next; } if (stb.st_size < 0) { run_err("%s: %s", name, "Negative file size"); goto next; } unset_nonblock(fd); switch (stb.st_mode & S_IFMT) { case S_IFREG: break; case S_IFDIR: if (iamrecursive) { rsource(name, &stb); goto next; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: run_err("%s: not a regular file", name); goto next; } if ((last = strrchr(name, '/')) == NULL) last = name; else ++last; curfile = last; if (pflag) { if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, &stb) < 0) goto next; } #define FILEMODEMASK (S_ISUID|S_ISGID|S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO) snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lld %s\n", (u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), (long long)stb.st_size, last); if (verbose_mode) { fprintf(stderr, "Sending file modes: %s", buf); } (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, buf, strlen(buf)); if (response() < 0) goto next; if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, fd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) { next: if (fd != -1) { (void) close(fd); fd = -1; } continue; } if (showprogress) start_progress_meter(curfile, stb.st_size, &statbytes); set_nonblock(remout); for (haderr = i = 0; i < stb.st_size; i += bp->cnt) { amt = bp->cnt; if (i + (off_t)amt > stb.st_size) amt = stb.st_size - i; if (!haderr) { if ((nr = atomicio(read, fd, bp->buf, amt)) != amt) { haderr = errno; memset(bp->buf + nr, 0, amt - nr); } } /* Keep writing after error to retain sync */ if (haderr) { (void)atomicio(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt); memset(bp->buf, 0, amt); continue; } if (atomicio6(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt, scpio, &statbytes) != amt) haderr = errno; } unset_nonblock(remout); if (showprogress) stop_progress_meter(); if (fd != -1) { if (close(fd) < 0 && !haderr) haderr = errno; fd = -1; } if (!haderr) (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); else run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(haderr)); (void) response(); } } void rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp) { DIR *dirp; struct dirent *dp; char *last, *vect[1], path[PATH_MAX]; if (!(dirp = opendir(name))) { run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno)); return; } last = strrchr(name, '/'); if (last == 0) last = name; else last++; if (pflag) { if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, statp) < 0) { closedir(dirp); return; } } (void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "D%04o %d %.1024s\n", (u_int) (statp->st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), 0, last); if (verbose_mode) fprintf(stderr, "Entering directory: %s", path); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, path, strlen(path)); if (response() < 0) { closedir(dirp); return; } while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) { if (dp->d_ino == 0) continue; if (!strcmp(dp->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(dp->d_name, "..")) continue; if (strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(dp->d_name) >= sizeof(path) - 1) { run_err("%s/%s: name too long", name, dp->d_name); continue; } (void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/%s", name, dp->d_name); vect[0] = path; source(1, vect); } (void) closedir(dirp); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "E\n", 2); (void) response(); } void sink(int argc, char **argv) { static BUF buffer; struct stat stb; enum { YES, NO, DISPLAYED } wrerr; BUF *bp; off_t i; size_t j, count; int amt, exists, first, ofd; mode_t mode, omode, mask; off_t size, statbytes; unsigned long long ull; int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0; char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048]; struct timeval tv[2]; #define atime tv[0] #define mtime tv[1] #define SCREWUP(str) { why = str; goto screwup; } setimes = targisdir = 0; mask = umask(0); if (!pflag) (void) umask(mask); if (argc != 1) { run_err("ambiguous target"); exit(1); } targ = *argv; if (targetshouldbedirectory) verifydir(targ); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) targisdir = 1; for (first = 1;; first = 0) { cp = buf; if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1) return; if (*cp++ == '\n') SCREWUP("unexpected "); do { if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch)) SCREWUP("lost connection"); *cp++ = ch; } while (cp < &buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] && ch != '\n'); *cp = 0; if (verbose_mode) fprintf(stderr, "Sink: %s", buf); if (buf[0] == '\01' || buf[0] == '\02') { if (iamremote == 0) (void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, buf + 1, strlen(buf + 1)); if (buf[0] == '\02') exit(1); ++errs; continue; } if (buf[0] == 'E') { (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); return; } if (ch == '\n') *--cp = 0; cp = buf; if (*cp == 'T') { setimes++; cp++; if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp)) SCREWUP("mtime.sec not present"); ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("mtime.sec not delimited"); if ((time_t)ull < 0 || (unsigned long long)(time_t)ull != ull) setimes = 0; /* out of range */ mtime.tv_sec = ull; mtime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ' || mtime.tv_usec < 0 || mtime.tv_usec > 999999) SCREWUP("mtime.usec not delimited"); if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp)) SCREWUP("atime.sec not present"); ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("atime.sec not delimited"); if ((time_t)ull < 0 || (unsigned long long)(time_t)ull != ull) setimes = 0; /* out of range */ atime.tv_sec = ull; atime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != '\0' || atime.tv_usec < 0 || atime.tv_usec > 999999) SCREWUP("atime.usec not delimited"); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); continue; } if (*cp != 'C' && *cp != 'D') { /* * Check for the case "rcp remote:foo\* local:bar". * In this case, the line "No match." can be returned * by the shell before the rcp command on the remote is * executed so the ^Aerror_message convention isn't * followed. */ if (first) { run_err("%s", cp); exit(1); } SCREWUP("expected control record"); } mode = 0; for (++cp; cp < buf + 5; cp++) { if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '7') SCREWUP("bad mode"); mode = (mode << 3) | (*cp - '0'); } if (*cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("mode not delimited"); for (size = 0; isdigit((unsigned char)*cp);) size = size * 10 + (*cp++ - '0'); if (*cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("size not delimited"); if ((strchr(cp, '/') != NULL) || (strcmp(cp, "..") == 0)) { run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp); exit(1); } if (targisdir) { static char *namebuf; static size_t cursize; size_t need; need = strlen(targ) + strlen(cp) + 250; if (need > cursize) { free(namebuf); namebuf = xmalloc(need); cursize = need; } (void) snprintf(namebuf, need, "%s%s%s", targ, strcmp(targ, "/") ? "/" : "", cp); np = namebuf; } else np = targ; curfile = cp; exists = stat(np, &stb) == 0; if (buf[0] == 'D') { int mod_flag = pflag; if (!iamrecursive) SCREWUP("received directory without -r"); if (exists) { if (!S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) { errno = ENOTDIR; goto bad; } if (pflag) (void) chmod(np, mode); } else { /* Handle copying from a read-only directory */ mod_flag = 1; if (mkdir(np, mode | S_IRWXU) < 0) goto bad; } vect[0] = xstrdup(np); sink(1, vect); if (setimes) { setimes = 0; if (utimes(vect[0], tv) < 0) run_err("%s: set times: %s", vect[0], strerror(errno)); } if (mod_flag) (void) chmod(vect[0], mode); free(vect[0]); continue; } omode = mode; mode |= S_IWUSR; if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) < 0) { bad: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno)); continue; } (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, ofd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) { (void) close(ofd); continue; } cp = bp->buf; wrerr = NO; statbytes = 0; if (showprogress) start_progress_meter(curfile, size, &statbytes); set_nonblock(remin); for (count = i = 0; i < size; i += bp->cnt) { amt = bp->cnt; if (i + amt > size) amt = size - i; count += amt; do { j = atomicio6(read, remin, cp, amt, scpio, &statbytes); if (j == 0) { run_err("%s", j != EPIPE ? strerror(errno) : "dropped connection"); exit(1); } amt -= j; cp += j; } while (amt > 0); if (count == bp->cnt) { /* Keep reading so we stay sync'd up. */ if (wrerr == NO) { if (atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count) != count) { wrerr = YES; wrerrno = errno; } } count = 0; cp = bp->buf; } } unset_nonblock(remin); if (showprogress) stop_progress_meter(); if (count != 0 && wrerr == NO && atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count) != count) { wrerr = YES; wrerrno = errno; } if (wrerr == NO && (!exists || S_ISREG(stb.st_mode)) && ftruncate(ofd, size) != 0) { run_err("%s: truncate: %s", np, strerror(errno)); wrerr = DISPLAYED; } if (pflag) { if (exists || omode != mode) #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD if (fchmod(ofd, omode)) { #else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ if (chmod(np, omode)) { #endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ run_err("%s: set mode: %s", np, strerror(errno)); wrerr = DISPLAYED; } } else { if (!exists && omode != mode) #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD if (fchmod(ofd, omode & ~mask)) { #else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ if (chmod(np, omode & ~mask)) { #endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ run_err("%s: set mode: %s", np, strerror(errno)); wrerr = DISPLAYED; } } if (close(ofd) == -1) { wrerr = YES; wrerrno = errno; } (void) response(); if (setimes && wrerr == NO) { setimes = 0; if (utimes(np, tv) < 0) { run_err("%s: set times: %s", np, strerror(errno)); wrerr = DISPLAYED; } } switch (wrerr) { case YES: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(wrerrno)); break; case NO: (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); break; case DISPLAYED: break; } } screwup: run_err("protocol error: %s", why); exit(1); } int response(void) { char ch, *cp, resp, rbuf[2048]; if (atomicio(read, remin, &resp, sizeof(resp)) != sizeof(resp)) lostconn(0); cp = rbuf; switch (resp) { case 0: /* ok */ return (0); default: *cp++ = resp; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 1: /* error, followed by error msg */ case 2: /* fatal error, "" */ do { if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch)) lostconn(0); *cp++ = ch; } while (cp < &rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] && ch != '\n'); if (!iamremote) (void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, rbuf, cp - rbuf); ++errs; if (resp == 1) return (-1); exit(1); } /* NOTREACHED */ } void usage(void) { (void) fprintf(stderr, "usage: scp [-12346BCpqrv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]\n" " [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program]\n" " [[user@]host1:]file1 ... [[user@]host2:]file2\n"); exit(1); } void run_err(const char *fmt,...) { static FILE *fp; va_list ap; ++errs; if (fp != NULL || (remout != -1 && (fp = fdopen(remout, "w")))) { (void) fprintf(fp, "%c", 0x01); (void) fprintf(fp, "scp: "); va_start(ap, fmt); (void) vfprintf(fp, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); (void) fprintf(fp, "\n"); (void) fflush(fp); } if (!iamremote) { va_start(ap, fmt); vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } } void verifydir(char *cp) { struct stat stb; if (!stat(cp, &stb)) { if (S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) return; errno = ENOTDIR; } run_err("%s: %s", cp, strerror(errno)); killchild(0); } int okname(char *cp0) { int c; char *cp; cp = cp0; do { c = (int)*cp; if (c & 0200) goto bad; if (!isalpha(c) && !isdigit((unsigned char)c)) { switch (c) { case '\'': case '"': case '`': case ' ': case '#': goto bad; default: break; } } } while (*++cp); return (1); bad: fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid user name\n", cp0); return (0); } BUF * allocbuf(BUF *bp, int fd, int blksize) { size_t size; #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE struct stat stb; if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) { run_err("fstat: %s", strerror(errno)); return (0); } size = roundup(stb.st_blksize, blksize); if (size == 0) size = blksize; #else /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */ size = blksize; #endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */ if (bp->cnt >= size) return (bp); if (bp->buf == NULL) bp->buf = xmalloc(size); else - bp->buf = xrealloc(bp->buf, 1, size); + bp->buf = xreallocarray(bp->buf, 1, size); memset(bp->buf, 0, size); bp->cnt = size; return (bp); } void lostconn(int signo) { if (!iamremote) (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "lost connection\n", 16); if (signo) _exit(1); else exit(1); } Index: head/crypto/openssh/servconf.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/servconf.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/servconf.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,2223 +1,2331 @@ - -/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.260 2015/02/02 01:57:44 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.274 2015/07/01 02:32:17 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "log.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "key.h" #include "kex.h" #include "mac.h" #include "match.h" #include "channels.h" #include "groupaccess.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "packet.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "digest.h" #include "version.h" static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int); static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int); /* Use of privilege separation or not */ extern int use_privsep; extern Buffer cfg; /* Initializes the server options to their default values. */ void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) { memset(options, 0, sizeof(*options)); /* Portable-specific options */ options->use_pam = -1; /* Standard Options */ options->num_ports = 0; options->ports_from_cmdline = 0; + options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL; + options->num_queued_listens = 0; options->listen_addrs = NULL; options->address_family = -1; options->num_host_key_files = 0; options->num_host_cert_files = 0; options->host_key_agent = NULL; options->pid_file = NULL; options->server_key_bits = -1; options->login_grace_time = -1; options->key_regeneration_time = -1; options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NOT_SET; options->ignore_rhosts = -1; options->ignore_user_known_hosts = -1; options->print_motd = -1; options->print_lastlog = -1; options->x11_forwarding = -1; options->x11_display_offset = -1; options->x11_use_localhost = -1; options->permit_tty = -1; options->permit_user_rc = -1; options->xauth_location = NULL; options->strict_modes = -1; options->tcp_keep_alive = -1; options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET; options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET; options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = -1; options->hostbased_authentication = -1; options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = -1; options->hostbased_key_types = NULL; options->rsa_authentication = -1; options->pubkey_authentication = -1; options->pubkey_key_types = NULL; options->kerberos_authentication = -1; options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1; options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1; options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; options->gss_authentication=-1; options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; + options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1; options->password_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; options->permit_empty_passwd = -1; options->permit_user_env = -1; options->use_login = -1; options->compression = -1; options->rekey_limit = -1; options->rekey_interval = -1; options->allow_tcp_forwarding = -1; options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = -1; options->allow_agent_forwarding = -1; options->num_allow_users = 0; options->num_deny_users = 0; options->num_allow_groups = 0; options->num_deny_groups = 0; options->ciphers = NULL; options->macs = NULL; options->kex_algorithms = NULL; options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN; options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1; options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1; options->num_subsystems = 0; options->max_startups_begin = -1; options->max_startups_rate = -1; options->max_startups = -1; options->max_authtries = -1; options->max_sessions = -1; options->banner = NULL; options->use_dns = -1; options->client_alive_interval = -1; options->client_alive_count_max = -1; options->num_authkeys_files = 0; options->num_accept_env = 0; options->permit_tun = -1; options->num_permitted_opens = -1; options->adm_forced_command = NULL; options->chroot_directory = NULL; options->authorized_keys_command = NULL; options->authorized_keys_command_user = NULL; options->revoked_keys_file = NULL; options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL; options->authorized_principals_file = NULL; + options->authorized_principals_command = NULL; + options->authorized_principals_command_user = NULL; options->ip_qos_interactive = -1; options->ip_qos_bulk = -1; options->version_addendum = NULL; options->fingerprint_hash = -1; } /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */ static int option_clear_or_none(const char *o) { return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0; } void fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) { int i; /* Portable-specific options */ if (options->use_pam == -1) options->use_pam = 1; /* Standard Options */ if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2; if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) { /* fill default hostkeys for protocols */ if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] = _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE; if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] = _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE; options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] = _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] = _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE; #endif options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] = _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE; } } /* No certificates by default */ if (options->num_ports == 0) options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; + if (options->address_family == -1) + options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; if (options->listen_addrs == NULL) add_listen_addr(options, NULL, 0); if (options->pid_file == NULL) options->pid_file = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE); if (options->server_key_bits == -1) options->server_key_bits = 1024; if (options->login_grace_time == -1) options->login_grace_time = 120; if (options->key_regeneration_time == -1) options->key_regeneration_time = 3600; if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET) options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO; if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1) options->ignore_rhosts = 1; if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1) options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0; if (options->print_motd == -1) options->print_motd = 1; if (options->print_lastlog == -1) options->print_lastlog = 1; if (options->x11_forwarding == -1) options->x11_forwarding = 1; if (options->x11_display_offset == -1) options->x11_display_offset = 10; if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1) options->x11_use_localhost = 1; if (options->xauth_location == NULL) options->xauth_location = xstrdup(_PATH_XAUTH); if (options->permit_tty == -1) options->permit_tty = 1; if (options->permit_user_rc == -1) options->permit_user_rc = 1; if (options->strict_modes == -1) options->strict_modes = 1; if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1) options->tcp_keep_alive = 1; if (options->log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH; if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1) options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0; if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1) options->hostbased_authentication = 0; if (options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only == -1) options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = 0; if (options->hostbased_key_types == NULL) options->hostbased_key_types = xstrdup("*"); if (options->rsa_authentication == -1) options->rsa_authentication = 1; if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1) options->pubkey_authentication = 1; if (options->pubkey_key_types == NULL) options->pubkey_key_types = xstrdup("*"); if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1) options->kerberos_authentication = 0; if (options->kerberos_or_local_passwd == -1) options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = 1; if (options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup == -1) options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1; if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1) options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0; if (options->gss_authentication == -1) options->gss_authentication = 0; if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1) options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1; + if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1) + options->gss_strict_acceptor = 0; if (options->password_authentication == -1) options->password_authentication = 0; if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 0; if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1) options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1) options->permit_empty_passwd = 0; if (options->permit_user_env == -1) options->permit_user_env = 0; if (options->use_login == -1) options->use_login = 0; if (options->compression == -1) options->compression = COMP_DELAYED; if (options->rekey_limit == -1) options->rekey_limit = 0; if (options->rekey_interval == -1) options->rekey_interval = 0; if (options->allow_tcp_forwarding == -1) options->allow_tcp_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW; if (options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding == -1) options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW; if (options->allow_agent_forwarding == -1) options->allow_agent_forwarding = 1; if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1) options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0; if (options->max_startups == -1) options->max_startups = 100; if (options->max_startups_rate == -1) options->max_startups_rate = 30; /* 30% */ if (options->max_startups_begin == -1) options->max_startups_begin = 10; if (options->max_authtries == -1) options->max_authtries = DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX; if (options->max_sessions == -1) options->max_sessions = DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX; if (options->use_dns == -1) options->use_dns = 0; if (options->client_alive_interval == -1) options->client_alive_interval = 0; if (options->client_alive_count_max == -1) options->client_alive_count_max = 3; if (options->num_authkeys_files == 0) { options->authorized_keys_files[options->num_authkeys_files++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS); options->authorized_keys_files[options->num_authkeys_files++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2); } if (options->permit_tun == -1) options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_LOWDELAY; if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1) options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT; if (options->version_addendum == NULL) options->version_addendum = xstrdup(SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD); if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177; if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1) options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0; if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1) options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; /* Turn privilege separation on by default */ if (use_privsep == -1) use_privsep = PRIVSEP_ON; #define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \ do { \ if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \ free(v); \ v = NULL; \ } \ } while(0) CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->pid_file); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->xauth_location); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->banner); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->trusted_user_ca_keys); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_keys_file); + CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->authorized_principals_file); for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_key_files; i++) CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_files[i]); for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_cert_files; i++) CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_cert_files[i]); #undef CLEAR_ON_NONE #ifndef HAVE_MMAP if (use_privsep && options->compression == 1) { error("This platform does not support both privilege " "separation and compression"); error("Compression disabled"); options->compression = 0; } #endif } /* Keyword tokens. */ typedef enum { sBadOption, /* == unknown option */ /* Portable-specific options */ sUsePAM, /* Standard Options */ sPort, sHostKeyFile, sServerKeyBits, sLoginGraceTime, sKeyRegenerationTime, sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication, sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup, sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication, sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily, sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts, sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost, sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive, sPermitUserEnvironment, sUseLogin, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression, sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups, sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sProtocol, sPidFile, sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem, sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions, sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication, sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, - sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, + sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor, + sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, sHostCertificate, sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, + sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum, sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC, sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink, sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDeprecated, sUnsupported } ServerOpCodes; #define SSHCFG_GLOBAL 0x01 /* allowed in main section of sshd_config */ #define SSHCFG_MATCH 0x02 /* allowed inside a Match section */ #define SSHCFG_ALL (SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH) /* Textual representation of the tokens. */ static struct { const char *name; ServerOpCodes opcode; u_int flags; } keywords[] = { /* Portable-specific options */ #ifdef USE_PAM { "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* Standard Options */ { "port", sPort, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "hostkey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */ { "hostkeyagent", sHostKeyAgent, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "serverkeybits", sServerKeyBits, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "logingracetime", sLoginGraceTime, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "keyregenerationinterval", sKeyRegenerationTime, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "permitrootlogin", sPermitRootLogin, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "syslogfacility", sLogFacility, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "loglevel", sLogLevel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "rhostsauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "rhostsrsaauthentication", sRhostsRSAAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostbasedauthentication", sHostbasedAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostbasedacceptedkeytypes", sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "rsaauthentication", sRSAAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */ #ifdef KRB5 { "kerberosauthentication", sKerberosAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "kerberosticketcleanup", sKerberosTicketCleanup, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #ifdef USE_AFS { "kerberosgetafstoken", sKerberosGetAFSToken, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif #else { "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #ifdef GSSAPI { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, + { "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "skeyauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */ { "checkmail", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "listenaddress", sListenAddress, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "addressfamily", sAddressFamily, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "printmotd", sPrintMotd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "printlastlog", sPrintLastLog, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "ignorerhosts", sIgnoreRhosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "uselogin", sUseLogin, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "compression", sCompression, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "rekeylimit", sRekeyLimit, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "tcpkeepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "keepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* obsolete alias */ { "allowtcpforwarding", sAllowTcpForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "allowagentforwarding", sAllowAgentForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "allowusers", sAllowUsers, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "denyusers", sDenyUsers, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "allowgroups", sAllowGroups, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "denygroups", sDenyGroups, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "ciphers", sCiphers, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "macs", sMacs, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "protocol", sProtocol, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gatewayports", sGatewayPorts, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "subsystem", sSubsystem, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "maxstartups", sMaxStartups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "clientaliveinterval", sClientAliveInterval, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeysfile2", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "useprivilegeseparation", sUsePrivilegeSeparation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL}, { "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permittty", sPermitTTY, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permituserrc", sPermitUserRC, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "match", sMatch, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostcertificate", sHostCertificate, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "authorizedprincipalscommand", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "authorizedprincipalscommanduser", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "streamlocalbindmask", sStreamLocalBindMask, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "streamlocalbindunlink", sStreamLocalBindUnlink, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "allowstreamlocalforwarding", sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "hpndisabled", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hpnbuffersize", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "tcprcvbufpoll", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { NULL, sBadOption, 0 } }; static struct { int val; char *text; } tunmode_desc[] = { { SSH_TUNMODE_NO, "no" }, { SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT, "point-to-point" }, { SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET, "ethernet" }, { SSH_TUNMODE_YES, "yes" }, { -1, NULL } }; /* * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or sBadOption. */ static ServerOpCodes parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum, u_int *flags) { u_int i; for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) { *flags = keywords[i].flags; return keywords[i].opcode; } error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s", filename, linenum, cp); return sBadOption; } char * derelativise_path(const char *path) { char *expanded, *ret, cwd[PATH_MAX]; if (strcasecmp(path, "none") == 0) return xstrdup("none"); expanded = tilde_expand_filename(path, getuid()); if (*expanded == '/') return expanded; if (getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)) == NULL) fatal("%s: getcwd: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); xasprintf(&ret, "%s/%s", cwd, expanded); free(expanded); return ret; } static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, int port) { u_int i; - if (options->num_ports == 0) - options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; - if (options->address_family == -1) - options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; if (port == 0) for (i = 0; i < options->num_ports; i++) add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, options->ports[i]); else add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, port); } static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, int port) { struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int gaierr; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = options->address_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = (addr == NULL) ? AI_PASSIVE : 0; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) fatal("bad addr or host: %s (%s)", addr ? addr : "", ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); for (ai = aitop; ai->ai_next; ai = ai->ai_next) ; ai->ai_next = options->listen_addrs; options->listen_addrs = aitop; } +/* + * Queue a ListenAddress to be processed once we have all of the Ports + * and AddressFamily options. + */ +static void +queue_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, int port) +{ + options->queued_listen_addrs = xreallocarray( + options->queued_listen_addrs, options->num_queued_listens + 1, + sizeof(addr)); + options->queued_listen_ports = xreallocarray( + options->queued_listen_ports, options->num_queued_listens + 1, + sizeof(port)); + options->queued_listen_addrs[options->num_queued_listens] = + xstrdup(addr); + options->queued_listen_ports[options->num_queued_listens] = port; + options->num_queued_listens++; +} + +/* + * Process queued (text) ListenAddress entries. + */ +static void +process_queued_listen_addrs(ServerOptions *options) +{ + u_int i; + + if (options->num_ports == 0) + options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; + if (options->address_family == -1) + options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; + + for (i = 0; i < options->num_queued_listens; i++) { + add_listen_addr(options, options->queued_listen_addrs[i], + options->queued_listen_ports[i]); + free(options->queued_listen_addrs[i]); + options->queued_listen_addrs[i] = NULL; + } + free(options->queued_listen_addrs); + options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL; + free(options->queued_listen_ports); + options->queued_listen_ports = NULL; + options->num_queued_listens = 0; +} + struct connection_info * get_connection_info(int populate, int use_dns) { static struct connection_info ci; if (!populate) return &ci; ci.host = get_canonical_hostname(use_dns); ci.address = get_remote_ipaddr(); ci.laddress = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in()); ci.lport = get_local_port(); return &ci; } /* * The strategy for the Match blocks is that the config file is parsed twice. * * The first time is at startup. activep is initialized to 1 and the * directives in the global context are processed and acted on. Hitting a * Match directive unsets activep and the directives inside the block are * checked for syntax only. * * The second time is after a connection has been established but before * authentication. activep is initialized to 2 and global config directives * are ignored since they have already been processed. If the criteria in a * Match block is met, activep is set and the subsequent directives * processed and actioned until EOF or another Match block unsets it. Any * options set are copied into the main server config. * * Potential additions/improvements: * - Add Match support for pre-kex directives, eg Protocol, Ciphers. * * - Add a Tag directive (idea from David Leonard) ala pf, eg: * Match Address 192.168.0.* * Tag trusted * Match Group wheel * Tag trusted * Match Tag trusted * AllowTcpForwarding yes * GatewayPorts clientspecified * [...] * * - Add a PermittedChannelRequests directive * Match Group shell * PermittedChannelRequests session,forwarded-tcpip */ static int match_cfg_line_group(const char *grps, int line, const char *user) { int result = 0; struct passwd *pw; if (user == NULL) goto out; if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) { debug("Can't match group at line %d because user %.100s does " "not exist", line, user); } else if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) { debug("Can't Match group because user %.100s not in any group " "at line %d", user, line); } else if (ga_match_pattern_list(grps) != 1) { debug("user %.100s does not match group list %.100s at line %d", user, grps, line); } else { debug("user %.100s matched group list %.100s at line %d", user, grps, line); result = 1; } out: ga_free(); return result; } /* * All of the attributes on a single Match line are ANDed together, so we need * to check every attribute and set the result to zero if any attribute does * not match. */ static int match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci) { int result = 1, attributes = 0, port; char *arg, *attrib, *cp = *condition; - size_t len; if (ci == NULL) debug3("checking syntax for 'Match %s'", cp); else debug3("checking match for '%s' user %s host %s addr %s " "laddr %s lport %d", cp, ci->user ? ci->user : "(null)", ci->host ? ci->host : "(null)", ci->address ? ci->address : "(null)", ci->laddress ? ci->laddress : "(null)", ci->lport); while ((attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') { attributes++; if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) { if (attributes != 1 || ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')) { error("'all' cannot be combined with other " "Match attributes"); return -1; } *condition = cp; return 1; } if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') { error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib); return -1; } - len = strlen(arg); if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || ci->user == NULL) { result = 0; continue; } - if (match_pattern_list(ci->user, arg, len, 0) != 1) + if (match_pattern_list(ci->user, arg, 0) != 1) result = 0; else debug("user %.100s matched 'User %.100s' at " "line %d", ci->user, arg, line); } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "group") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || ci->user == NULL) { result = 0; continue; } switch (match_cfg_line_group(arg, line, ci->user)) { case -1: return -1; case 0: result = 0; } } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || ci->host == NULL) { result = 0; continue; } - if (match_hostname(ci->host, arg, len) != 1) + if (match_hostname(ci->host, arg) != 1) result = 0; else debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Host " "%.100s' at line %d", ci->host, arg, line); } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "address") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || ci->address == NULL) { result = 0; continue; } switch (addr_match_list(ci->address, arg)) { case 1: debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Address " "%.100s' at line %d", ci->address, arg, line); break; case 0: case -1: result = 0; break; case -2: return -1; } } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localaddress") == 0){ if (ci == NULL || ci->laddress == NULL) { result = 0; continue; } switch (addr_match_list(ci->laddress, arg)) { case 1: debug("connection from %.100s matched " "'LocalAddress %.100s' at line %d", ci->laddress, arg, line); break; case 0: case -1: result = 0; break; case -2: return -1; } } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localport") == 0) { if ((port = a2port(arg)) == -1) { error("Invalid LocalPort '%s' on Match line", arg); return -1; } if (ci == NULL || ci->lport == 0) { result = 0; continue; } /* TODO support port lists */ if (port == ci->lport) debug("connection from %.100s matched " "'LocalPort %d' at line %d", ci->laddress, port, line); else result = 0; } else { error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib); return -1; } } if (attributes == 0) { error("One or more attributes required for Match"); return -1; } if (ci != NULL) debug3("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not "); *condition = cp; return result; } #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" /* Multistate option parsing */ struct multistate { char *key; int value; }; static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = { { "inet", AF_INET }, { "inet6", AF_INET6 }, { "any", AF_UNSPEC }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_permitrootlogin[] = { { "without-password", PERMIT_NO_PASSWD }, { "forced-commands-only", PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY }, { "yes", PERMIT_YES }, { "no", PERMIT_NO }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_compression[] = { { "delayed", COMP_DELAYED }, { "yes", COMP_ZLIB }, { "no", COMP_NONE }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_gatewayports[] = { { "clientspecified", 2 }, { "yes", 1 }, { "no", 0 }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_privsep[] = { { "yes", PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX }, { "sandbox", PRIVSEP_ON }, { "nosandbox", PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX }, { "no", PRIVSEP_OFF }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_tcpfwd[] = { { "yes", FORWARD_ALLOW }, { "all", FORWARD_ALLOW }, { "no", FORWARD_DENY }, { "remote", FORWARD_REMOTE }, { "local", FORWARD_LOCAL }, { NULL, -1 } }; int process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, struct connection_info *connectinfo) { char *cp, **charptr, *arg, *p; int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port; SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr; LogLevel *log_level_ptr; ServerOpCodes opcode; u_int i, flags = 0; size_t len; long long val64; const struct multistate *multistate_ptr; cp = line; if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL) return 0; /* Ignore leading whitespace */ if (*arg == '\0') arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || !*arg || *arg == '#') return 0; intptr = NULL; charptr = NULL; opcode = parse_token(arg, filename, linenum, &flags); if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */ cmdline = 1; activep = &cmdline; } if (*activep && opcode != sMatch) debug3("%s:%d setting %s %s", filename, linenum, arg, cp); if (*activep == 0 && !(flags & SSHCFG_MATCH)) { if (connectinfo == NULL) { fatal("%s line %d: Directive '%s' is not allowed " "within a Match block", filename, linenum, arg); } else { /* this is a directive we have already processed */ while (arg) arg = strdelim(&cp); return 0; } } switch (opcode) { /* Portable-specific options */ case sUsePAM: intptr = &options->use_pam; goto parse_flag; /* Standard Options */ case sBadOption: return -1; case sPort: /* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */ if (options->ports_from_cmdline) return 0; - if (options->listen_addrs != NULL) - fatal("%s line %d: ports must be specified before " - "ListenAddress.", filename, linenum); if (options->num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) fatal("%s line %d: too many ports.", filename, linenum); arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing port number.", filename, linenum); options->ports[options->num_ports++] = a2port(arg); if (options->ports[options->num_ports-1] <= 0) fatal("%s line %d: Badly formatted port number.", filename, linenum); break; case sServerKeyBits: intptr = &options->server_key_bits; parse_int: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing integer value.", filename, linenum); value = atoi(arg); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sLoginGraceTime: intptr = &options->login_grace_time; parse_time: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.", filename, linenum); if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.", filename, linenum); - if (*intptr == -1) + if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sKeyRegenerationTime: intptr = &options->key_regeneration_time; goto parse_time; case sListenAddress: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing address", filename, linenum); /* check for bare IPv6 address: no "[]" and 2 or more ":" */ if (strchr(arg, '[') == NULL && (p = strchr(arg, ':')) != NULL && strchr(p+1, ':') != NULL) { - add_listen_addr(options, arg, 0); + queue_listen_addr(options, arg, 0); break; } p = hpdelim(&arg); if (p == NULL) fatal("%s line %d: bad address:port usage", filename, linenum); p = cleanhostname(p); if (arg == NULL) port = 0; else if ((port = a2port(arg)) <= 0) fatal("%s line %d: bad port number", filename, linenum); - add_listen_addr(options, p, port); + queue_listen_addr(options, p, port); break; case sAddressFamily: intptr = &options->address_family; multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily; - if (options->listen_addrs != NULL) - fatal("%s line %d: address family must be specified " - "before ListenAddress.", filename, linenum); parse_multistate: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = -1; for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) { value = multistate_ptr[i].value; break; } } if (value == -1) fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sHostKeyFile: intptr = &options->num_host_key_files; if (*intptr >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) fatal("%s line %d: too many host keys specified (max %d).", filename, linenum, MAX_HOSTKEYS); charptr = &options->host_key_files[*intptr]; parse_filename: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) { *charptr = derelativise_path(arg); /* increase optional counter */ if (intptr != NULL) *intptr = *intptr + 1; } break; case sHostKeyAgent: charptr = &options->host_key_agent; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing socket name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = !strcmp(arg, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) ? xstrdup(arg) : derelativise_path(arg); break; case sHostCertificate: intptr = &options->num_host_cert_files; if (*intptr >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) fatal("%s line %d: too many host certificates " "specified (max %d).", filename, linenum, MAX_HOSTCERTS); charptr = &options->host_cert_files[*intptr]; goto parse_filename; break; case sPidFile: charptr = &options->pid_file; goto parse_filename; case sPermitRootLogin: intptr = &options->permit_root_login; multistate_ptr = multistate_permitrootlogin; goto parse_multistate; case sIgnoreRhosts: intptr = &options->ignore_rhosts; parse_flag: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing yes/no argument.", filename, linenum); value = 0; /* silence compiler */ if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0) value = 1; else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0) value = 0; else fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/no argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sIgnoreUserKnownHosts: intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts; goto parse_flag; case sRhostsRSAAuthentication: intptr = &options->rhosts_rsa_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sHostbasedAuthentication: intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly: intptr = &options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; goto parse_flag; case sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes: charptr = &options->hostbased_key_types; parse_keytypes: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (!sshkey_names_valid2(arg, 1)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case sRSAAuthentication: intptr = &options->rsa_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sPubkeyAuthentication: intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes: charptr = &options->pubkey_key_types; goto parse_keytypes; case sKerberosAuthentication: intptr = &options->kerberos_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sKerberosOrLocalPasswd: intptr = &options->kerberos_or_local_passwd; goto parse_flag; case sKerberosTicketCleanup: intptr = &options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup; goto parse_flag; case sKerberosGetAFSToken: intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token; goto parse_flag; case sGssAuthentication: intptr = &options->gss_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sGssCleanupCreds: intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds; goto parse_flag; + case sGssStrictAcceptor: + intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor; + goto parse_flag; + case sPasswordAuthentication: intptr = &options->password_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sKbdInteractiveAuthentication: intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sChallengeResponseAuthentication: intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sPrintMotd: intptr = &options->print_motd; goto parse_flag; case sPrintLastLog: intptr = &options->print_lastlog; goto parse_flag; case sX11Forwarding: intptr = &options->x11_forwarding; goto parse_flag; case sX11DisplayOffset: intptr = &options->x11_display_offset; goto parse_int; case sX11UseLocalhost: intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost; goto parse_flag; case sXAuthLocation: charptr = &options->xauth_location; goto parse_filename; case sPermitTTY: intptr = &options->permit_tty; goto parse_flag; case sPermitUserRC: intptr = &options->permit_user_rc; goto parse_flag; case sStrictModes: intptr = &options->strict_modes; goto parse_flag; case sTCPKeepAlive: intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive; goto parse_flag; case sEmptyPasswd: intptr = &options->permit_empty_passwd; goto parse_flag; case sPermitUserEnvironment: intptr = &options->permit_user_env; goto parse_flag; case sUseLogin: intptr = &options->use_login; goto parse_flag; case sCompression: intptr = &options->compression; multistate_ptr = multistate_compression; goto parse_multistate; case sRekeyLimit: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) { val64 = 0; } else { if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s", filename, linenum, arg, strerror(errno)); /* check for too-large or too-small limits */ if (val64 > UINT_MAX) fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too large", filename, linenum); if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16) fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small", filename, linenum); } if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1) options->rekey_limit = (u_int32_t)val64; if (cp != NULL) { /* optional rekey interval present */ if (strcmp(cp, "none") == 0) { (void)strdelim(&cp); /* discard */ break; } intptr = &options->rekey_interval; goto parse_time; } break; case sGatewayPorts: intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports; multistate_ptr = multistate_gatewayports; goto parse_multistate; case sUseDNS: intptr = &options->use_dns; goto parse_flag; case sLogFacility: log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility; arg = strdelim(&cp); value = log_facility_number(arg); if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*log_facility_ptr == -1) *log_facility_ptr = (SyslogFacility) value; break; case sLogLevel: log_level_ptr = &options->log_level; arg = strdelim(&cp); value = log_level_number(arg); if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*log_level_ptr == -1) *log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value; break; case sAllowTcpForwarding: intptr = &options->allow_tcp_forwarding; multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd; goto parse_multistate; case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding: intptr = &options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding; multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd; goto parse_multistate; case sAllowAgentForwarding: intptr = &options->allow_agent_forwarding; goto parse_flag; case sUsePrivilegeSeparation: intptr = &use_privsep; multistate_ptr = multistate_privsep; goto parse_multistate; case sAllowUsers: while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS) fatal("%s line %d: too many allow users.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) continue; options->allow_users[options->num_allow_users++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case sDenyUsers: while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (options->num_deny_users >= MAX_DENY_USERS) fatal("%s line %d: too many deny users.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) continue; options->deny_users[options->num_deny_users++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case sAllowGroups: while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (options->num_allow_groups >= MAX_ALLOW_GROUPS) fatal("%s line %d: too many allow groups.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) continue; options->allow_groups[options->num_allow_groups++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case sDenyGroups: while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (options->num_deny_groups >= MAX_DENY_GROUPS) fatal("%s line %d: too many deny groups.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) continue; options->deny_groups[options->num_deny_groups++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case sCiphers: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (!ciphers_valid(arg)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (options->ciphers == NULL) options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg); break; case sMacs: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (!mac_valid(arg)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (options->macs == NULL) options->macs = xstrdup(arg); break; case sKexAlgorithms: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (!kex_names_valid(arg)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL) options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); break; case sProtocol: intptr = &options->protocol; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = proto_spec(arg); if (value == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) fatal("%s line %d: Bad protocol spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*intptr == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) *intptr = value; break; case sSubsystem: if (options->num_subsystems >= MAX_SUBSYSTEMS) { fatal("%s line %d: too many subsystems defined.", filename, linenum); } arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) { arg = strdelim(&cp); break; } for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++) if (strcmp(arg, options->subsystem_name[i]) == 0) fatal("%s line %d: Subsystem '%s' already defined.", filename, linenum, arg); options->subsystem_name[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg); arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem command.", filename, linenum); options->subsystem_command[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg); /* Collect arguments (separate to executable) */ p = xstrdup(arg); len = strlen(p) + 1; while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { len += 1 + strlen(arg); - p = xrealloc(p, 1, len); + p = xreallocarray(p, 1, len); strlcat(p, " ", len); strlcat(p, arg, len); } options->subsystem_args[options->num_subsystems] = p; options->num_subsystems++; break; case sMaxStartups: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing MaxStartups spec.", filename, linenum); if ((n = sscanf(arg, "%d:%d:%d", &options->max_startups_begin, &options->max_startups_rate, &options->max_startups)) == 3) { if (options->max_startups_begin > options->max_startups || options->max_startups_rate > 100 || options->max_startups_rate < 1) fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.", filename, linenum); } else if (n != 1) fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.", filename, linenum); else options->max_startups = options->max_startups_begin; break; case sMaxAuthTries: intptr = &options->max_authtries; goto parse_int; case sMaxSessions: intptr = &options->max_sessions; goto parse_int; case sBanner: charptr = &options->banner; goto parse_filename; /* * These options can contain %X options expanded at * connect time, so that you can specify paths like: * * AuthorizedKeysFile /etc/ssh_keys/%u */ case sAuthorizedKeysFile: if (*activep && options->num_authkeys_files == 0) { while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (options->num_authkeys_files >= MAX_AUTHKEYS_FILES) fatal("%s line %d: " "too many authorized keys files.", filename, linenum); options->authorized_keys_files[ options->num_authkeys_files++] = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid()); } } return 0; case sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile: charptr = &options->authorized_principals_file; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) { *charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid()); /* increase optional counter */ if (intptr != NULL) *intptr = *intptr + 1; } break; case sClientAliveInterval: intptr = &options->client_alive_interval; goto parse_time; case sClientAliveCountMax: intptr = &options->client_alive_count_max; goto parse_int; case sAcceptEnv: while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (strchr(arg, '=') != NULL) fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.", filename, linenum); if (options->num_accept_env >= MAX_ACCEPT_ENV) fatal("%s line %d: too many allow env.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) continue; options->accept_env[options->num_accept_env++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case sPermitTunnel: intptr = &options->permit_tun; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing yes/point-to-point/" "ethernet/no argument.", filename, linenum); value = -1; for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++) if (strcmp(tunmode_desc[i].text, arg) == 0) { value = tunmode_desc[i].val; break; } if (value == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/point-to-point/ethernet/" "no argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg); - if (*intptr == -1) + if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sMatch: if (cmdline) fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line " "option"); value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum, connectinfo); if (value < 0) fatal("%s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename, linenum); *activep = value; break; case sPermitOpen: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing PermitOpen specification", filename, linenum); n = options->num_permitted_opens; /* modified later */ if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) { if (*activep && n == -1) { channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(); options->num_permitted_opens = 0; } break; } if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) { if (*activep && n == -1) { options->num_permitted_opens = 1; channel_disable_adm_local_opens(); } break; } if (*activep && n == -1) channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(); for (; arg != NULL && *arg != '\0'; arg = strdelim(&cp)) { p = hpdelim(&arg); if (p == NULL) fatal("%s line %d: missing host in PermitOpen", filename, linenum); p = cleanhostname(p); if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0)) fatal("%s line %d: bad port number in " "PermitOpen", filename, linenum); if (*activep && n == -1) options->num_permitted_opens = channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(p, port); } break; case sForceCommand: - if (cp == NULL) + if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); if (*activep && options->adm_forced_command == NULL) options->adm_forced_command = xstrdup(cp + len); return 0; case sChrootDirectory: charptr = &options->chroot_directory; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case sTrustedUserCAKeys: charptr = &options->trusted_user_ca_keys; goto parse_filename; case sRevokedKeys: charptr = &options->revoked_keys_file; goto parse_filename; case sIPQoS: arg = strdelim(&cp); if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s", filename, linenum, arg); arg = strdelim(&cp); if (arg == NULL) value2 = value; else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep) { options->ip_qos_interactive = value; options->ip_qos_bulk = value2; } break; case sVersionAddendum: - if (cp == NULL) + if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); if (*activep && options->version_addendum == NULL) { if (strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") == 0) options->version_addendum = xstrdup(""); else if (strchr(cp + len, '\r') != NULL) fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid argument", filename, linenum); else options->version_addendum = xstrdup(cp + len); } return 0; case sAuthorizedKeysCommand: if (cp == NULL) fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); if (*activep && options->authorized_keys_command == NULL) { if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0) fatal("%.200s line %d: AuthorizedKeysCommand " "must be an absolute path", filename, linenum); options->authorized_keys_command = xstrdup(cp + len); } return 0; case sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser: charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command_user; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing AuthorizedKeysCommandUser " "argument.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; + case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand: + if (cp == NULL) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, + linenum); + len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); + if (*activep && + options->authorized_principals_command == NULL) { + if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0) + fatal("%.200s line %d: " + "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand must be " + "an absolute path", filename, linenum); + options->authorized_principals_command = + xstrdup(cp + len); + } + return 0; + + case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser: + charptr = &options->authorized_principals_command_user; + + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing " + "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser argument.", + filename, linenum); + if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) + *charptr = xstrdup(arg); + break; + case sAuthenticationMethods: - if (*activep && options->num_auth_methods == 0) { + if (options->num_auth_methods == 0) { while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (options->num_auth_methods >= MAX_AUTH_METHODS) fatal("%s line %d: " "too many authentication methods.", filename, linenum); if (auth2_methods_valid(arg, 0) != 0) fatal("%s line %d: invalid " "authentication method list.", filename, linenum); + if (!*activep) + continue; options->auth_methods[ options->num_auth_methods++] = xstrdup(arg); } } return 0; case sStreamLocalBindMask: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') - fatal("%s line %d: missing StreamLocalBindMask argument.", - filename, linenum); + fatal("%s line %d: missing StreamLocalBindMask " + "argument.", filename, linenum); /* Parse mode in octal format */ value = strtol(arg, &p, 8); if (arg == p || value < 0 || value > 0777) fatal("%s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum); - options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value; + if (*activep) + options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value; break; case sStreamLocalBindUnlink: intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink; goto parse_flag; case sFingerprintHash: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1) fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\".", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep) options->fingerprint_hash = value; break; case sDeprecated: logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s", filename, linenum, arg); while (arg) arg = strdelim(&cp); break; case sUnsupported: logit("%s line %d: Unsupported option %s", filename, linenum, arg); while (arg) arg = strdelim(&cp); break; default: fatal("%s line %d: Missing handler for opcode %s (%d)", filename, linenum, arg, opcode); } if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') fatal("%s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".", filename, linenum, arg); return 0; } /* Reads the server configuration file. */ void load_server_config(const char *filename, Buffer *conf) { char line[4096], *cp; FILE *f; int lineno = 0; debug2("%s: filename %s", __func__, filename); if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) { perror(filename); exit(1); } buffer_clear(conf); while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { lineno++; if (strlen(line) == sizeof(line) - 1) fatal("%s line %d too long", filename, lineno); /* * Trim out comments and strip whitespace * NB - preserve newlines, they are needed to reproduce * line numbers later for error messages */ if ((cp = strchr(line, '#')) != NULL) memcpy(cp, "\n", 2); cp = line + strspn(line, " \t\r"); buffer_append(conf, cp, strlen(cp)); } buffer_append(conf, "\0", 1); fclose(f); debug2("%s: done config len = %d", __func__, buffer_len(conf)); } void parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *options, struct connection_info *connectinfo) { ServerOptions mo; initialize_server_options(&mo); parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", &cfg, connectinfo); copy_set_server_options(options, &mo, 0); } int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *ci, char *spec) { char *p; while ((p = strsep(&spec, ",")) && *p != '\0') { if (strncmp(p, "addr=", 5) == 0) { ci->address = xstrdup(p + 5); } else if (strncmp(p, "host=", 5) == 0) { ci->host = xstrdup(p + 5); } else if (strncmp(p, "user=", 5) == 0) { ci->user = xstrdup(p + 5); } else if (strncmp(p, "laddr=", 6) == 0) { ci->laddress = xstrdup(p + 6); } else if (strncmp(p, "lport=", 6) == 0) { ci->lport = a2port(p + 6); if (ci->lport == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid port '%s' in test mode" " specification %s\n", p+6, p); return -1; } } else { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid test mode specification %s\n", p); return -1; } } return 0; } /* * returns 1 for a complete spec, 0 for partial spec and -1 for an * empty spec. */ int server_match_spec_complete(struct connection_info *ci) { if (ci->user && ci->host && ci->address) return 1; /* complete */ if (!ci->user && !ci->host && !ci->address) return -1; /* empty */ return 0; /* partial */ } /* * Copy any supported values that are set. * * If the preauth flag is set, we do not bother copying the string or * array values that are not used pre-authentication, because any that we * do use must be explictly sent in mm_getpwnamallow(). */ void copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth) { #define M_CP_INTOPT(n) do {\ if (src->n != -1) \ dst->n = src->n; \ } while (0) M_CP_INTOPT(password_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(rsa_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(kerberos_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only); M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_root_login); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_empty_passwd); M_CP_INTOPT(allow_tcp_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(allow_streamlocal_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(allow_agent_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tun); M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.gateway_ports); M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset); M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc); M_CP_INTOPT(max_sessions); M_CP_INTOPT(max_authtries); M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive); M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk); M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit); M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval); /* M_CP_STROPT and M_CP_STRARRAYOPT should not appear before here */ #define M_CP_STROPT(n) do {\ if (src->n != NULL && dst->n != src->n) { \ free(dst->n); \ dst->n = src->n; \ } \ } while(0) #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(n, num_n) do {\ if (src->num_n != 0) { \ for (dst->num_n = 0; dst->num_n < src->num_n; dst->num_n++) \ dst->n[dst->num_n] = xstrdup(src->n[dst->num_n]); \ } \ } while(0) /* See comment in servconf.h */ COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS(); /* * The only things that should be below this point are string options * which are only used after authentication. */ if (preauth) return; M_CP_STROPT(adm_forced_command); M_CP_STROPT(chroot_directory); } #undef M_CP_INTOPT #undef M_CP_STROPT #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT void parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename, Buffer *conf, struct connection_info *connectinfo) { int active, linenum, bad_options = 0; char *cp, *obuf, *cbuf; debug2("%s: config %s len %d", __func__, filename, buffer_len(conf)); obuf = cbuf = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(conf)); active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1; linenum = 1; while ((cp = strsep(&cbuf, "\n")) != NULL) { if (process_server_config_line(options, cp, filename, linenum++, &active, connectinfo) != 0) bad_options++; } free(obuf); if (bad_options > 0) fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options", filename, bad_options); + process_queued_listen_addrs(options); } static const char * fmt_multistate_int(int val, const struct multistate *m) { u_int i; for (i = 0; m[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (m[i].value == val) return m[i].key; } return "UNKNOWN"; } static const char * fmt_intarg(ServerOpCodes code, int val) { if (val == -1) return "unset"; switch (code) { case sAddressFamily: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily); case sPermitRootLogin: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_permitrootlogin); case sGatewayPorts: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_gatewayports); case sCompression: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_compression); case sUsePrivilegeSeparation: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_privsep); case sAllowTcpForwarding: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd); case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd); case sFingerprintHash: return ssh_digest_alg_name(val); case sProtocol: switch (val) { case SSH_PROTO_1: return "1"; case SSH_PROTO_2: return "2"; case (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2): return "2,1"; default: return "UNKNOWN"; } default: switch (val) { case 0: return "no"; case 1: return "yes"; default: return "UNKNOWN"; } } } static const char * lookup_opcode_name(ServerOpCodes code) { u_int i; for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++) if (keywords[i].opcode == code) return(keywords[i].name); return "UNKNOWN"; } static void dump_cfg_int(ServerOpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); } static void +dump_cfg_oct(ServerOpCodes code, int val) +{ + printf("%s 0%o\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); +} + +static void dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val)); } static void dump_cfg_string(ServerOpCodes code, const char *val) { if (val == NULL) return; printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val == NULL ? "none" : val); } static void dump_cfg_strarray(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < count; i++) printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]); } static void dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) { u_int i; + if (count <= 0) + return; printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code)); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) printf(" %s", vals[i]); printf("\n"); } void dump_config(ServerOptions *o) { u_int i; int ret; struct addrinfo *ai; char addr[NI_MAXHOST], port[NI_MAXSERV], *s = NULL; + char *laddr1 = xstrdup(""), *laddr2 = NULL; /* these are usually at the top of the config */ for (i = 0; i < o->num_ports; i++) printf("port %d\n", o->ports[i]); dump_cfg_fmtint(sProtocol, o->protocol); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAddressFamily, o->address_family); - /* ListenAddress must be after Port */ + /* + * ListenAddress must be after Port. add_one_listen_addr pushes + * addresses onto a stack, so to maintain ordering we need to + * print these in reverse order. + */ for (ai = o->listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, addr, sizeof(addr), port, sizeof(port), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) { error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s", (ret != EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(ret) : strerror(errno)); } else { + laddr2 = laddr1; if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) - printf("listenaddress [%s]:%s\n", addr, port); + xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress [%s]:%s\n%s", + addr, port, laddr2); else - printf("listenaddress %s:%s\n", addr, port); + xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress %s:%s\n%s", + addr, port, laddr2); + free(laddr2); } } + printf("%s", laddr1); + free(laddr1); /* integer arguments */ #ifdef USE_PAM - dump_cfg_int(sUsePAM, o->use_pam); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePAM, o->use_pam); #endif dump_cfg_int(sServerKeyBits, o->server_key_bits); dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time); dump_cfg_int(sKeyRegenerationTime, o->key_regeneration_time); dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset); dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries); dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions); dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval); dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max); + dump_cfg_oct(sStreamLocalBindMask, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask); /* formatted integer arguments */ dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitRootLogin, o->permit_root_login); dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreRhosts, o->ignore_rhosts); dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, o->ignore_user_known_hosts); dump_cfg_fmtint(sRhostsRSAAuthentication, o->rhosts_rsa_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, o->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only); dump_cfg_fmtint(sRSAAuthentication, o->rsa_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication); #ifdef KRB5 dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosAuthentication, o->kerberos_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, o->kerberos_or_local_passwd); dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosTicketCleanup, o->kerberos_ticket_cleanup); # ifdef USE_AFS dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token); # endif #endif #ifdef GSSAPI dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds); #endif dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, o->kbd_interactive_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sChallengeResponseAuthentication, o->challenge_response_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintMotd, o->print_motd); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintLastLog, o->print_lastlog); dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11Forwarding, o->x11_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11UseLocalhost, o->x11_use_localhost); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitTTY, o->permit_tty); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserRC, o->permit_user_rc); dump_cfg_fmtint(sStrictModes, o->strict_modes); dump_cfg_fmtint(sTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive); dump_cfg_fmtint(sEmptyPasswd, o->permit_empty_passwd); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserEnvironment, o->permit_user_env); dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseLogin, o->use_login); dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression); dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports); dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowAgentForwarding, o->allow_agent_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, o->allow_streamlocal_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep); dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash); /* string arguments */ dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file); dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location); dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT); dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_SERVER_MAC); dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner); dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command); dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory); dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys); dump_cfg_string(sRevokedKeys, o->revoked_keys_file); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, o->authorized_principals_file); - dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, o->version_addendum); + dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, *o->version_addendum == '\0' + ? "none" : o->version_addendum); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, o->authorized_keys_command_user); + dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, o->authorized_principals_command); + dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, o->authorized_principals_command_user); dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAgent, o->host_key_agent); dump_cfg_string(sKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms ? o->kex_algorithms : KEX_SERVER_KEX); dump_cfg_string(sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, o->hostbased_key_types ? o->hostbased_key_types : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG); dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types ? o->pubkey_key_types : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG); /* string arguments requiring a lookup */ dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level)); dump_cfg_string(sLogFacility, log_facility_name(o->log_facility)); /* string array arguments */ dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthorizedKeysFile, o->num_authkeys_files, o->authorized_keys_files); dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_key_files, o->host_key_files); - dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_cert_files, + dump_cfg_strarray(sHostCertificate, o->num_host_cert_files, o->host_cert_files); dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowUsers, o->num_allow_users, o->allow_users); dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyUsers, o->num_deny_users, o->deny_users); dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowGroups, o->num_allow_groups, o->allow_groups); dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyGroups, o->num_deny_groups, o->deny_groups); dump_cfg_strarray(sAcceptEnv, o->num_accept_env, o->accept_env); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthenticationMethods, o->num_auth_methods, o->auth_methods); /* other arguments */ for (i = 0; i < o->num_subsystems; i++) printf("subsystem %s %s\n", o->subsystem_name[i], o->subsystem_args[i]); printf("maxstartups %d:%d:%d\n", o->max_startups_begin, o->max_startups_rate, o->max_startups); for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++) if (tunmode_desc[i].val == o->permit_tun) { s = tunmode_desc[i].text; break; } dump_cfg_string(sPermitTunnel, s); printf("ipqos %s ", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_interactive)); printf("%s\n", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_bulk)); printf("rekeylimit %lld %d\n", (long long)o->rekey_limit, o->rekey_interval); channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(); } Index: head/crypto/openssh/servconf.h =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/servconf.h (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/servconf.h (revision 294336) @@ -1,246 +1,253 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.116 2015/01/13 07:39:19 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.119 2015/05/22 03:50:02 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Definitions for server configuration data and for the functions reading it. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #ifndef SERVCONF_H #define SERVCONF_H #define MAX_PORTS 256 /* Max # ports. */ #define MAX_ALLOW_USERS 256 /* Max # users on allow list. */ #define MAX_DENY_USERS 256 /* Max # users on deny list. */ #define MAX_ALLOW_GROUPS 256 /* Max # groups on allow list. */ #define MAX_DENY_GROUPS 256 /* Max # groups on deny list. */ #define MAX_SUBSYSTEMS 256 /* Max # subsystems. */ #define MAX_HOSTKEYS 256 /* Max # hostkeys. */ #define MAX_HOSTCERTS 256 /* Max # host certificates. */ #define MAX_ACCEPT_ENV 256 /* Max # of env vars. */ #define MAX_MATCH_GROUPS 256 /* Max # of groups for Match. */ #define MAX_AUTHKEYS_FILES 256 /* Max # of authorized_keys files. */ #define MAX_AUTH_METHODS 256 /* Max # of AuthenticationMethods. */ /* permit_root_login */ #define PERMIT_NOT_SET -1 #define PERMIT_NO 0 #define PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY 1 #define PERMIT_NO_PASSWD 2 #define PERMIT_YES 3 /* use_privsep */ #define PRIVSEP_OFF 0 #define PRIVSEP_ON 1 #define PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX 2 /* AllowTCPForwarding */ #define FORWARD_DENY 0 #define FORWARD_REMOTE (1) #define FORWARD_LOCAL (1<<1) #define FORWARD_ALLOW (FORWARD_REMOTE|FORWARD_LOCAL) #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX 6 /* Default for MaxAuthTries */ #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX 10 /* Default for MaxSessions */ /* Magic name for internal sftp-server */ #define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME "internal-sftp" typedef struct { u_int num_ports; u_int ports_from_cmdline; int ports[MAX_PORTS]; /* Port number to listen on. */ - char *listen_addr; /* Address on which the server listens. */ + u_int num_queued_listens; + char **queued_listen_addrs; + int *queued_listen_ports; struct addrinfo *listen_addrs; /* Addresses on which the server listens. */ int address_family; /* Address family used by the server. */ char *host_key_files[MAX_HOSTKEYS]; /* Files containing host keys. */ int num_host_key_files; /* Number of files for host keys. */ char *host_cert_files[MAX_HOSTCERTS]; /* Files containing host certs. */ int num_host_cert_files; /* Number of files for host certs. */ char *host_key_agent; /* ssh-agent socket for host keys. */ char *pid_file; /* Where to put our pid */ int server_key_bits;/* Size of the server key. */ int login_grace_time; /* Disconnect if no auth in this time * (sec). */ int key_regeneration_time; /* Server key lifetime (seconds). */ int permit_root_login; /* PERMIT_*, see above */ int ignore_rhosts; /* Ignore .rhosts and .shosts. */ int ignore_user_known_hosts; /* Ignore ~/.ssh/known_hosts * for RhostsRsaAuth */ int print_motd; /* If true, print /etc/motd. */ int print_lastlog; /* If true, print lastlog */ int x11_forwarding; /* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */ int x11_display_offset; /* What DISPLAY number to start * searching at */ int x11_use_localhost; /* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */ char *xauth_location; /* Location of xauth program */ int permit_tty; /* If false, deny pty allocation */ int permit_user_rc; /* If false, deny ~/.ssh/rc execution */ int strict_modes; /* If true, require string home dir modes. */ int tcp_keep_alive; /* If true, set SO_KEEPALIVE. */ int ip_qos_interactive; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */ int ip_qos_bulk; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */ char *ciphers; /* Supported SSH2 ciphers. */ char *macs; /* Supported SSH2 macs. */ char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */ int protocol; /* Supported protocol versions. */ struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts; /* forwarding options */ SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */ LogLevel log_level; /* Level for system logging. */ int rhosts_rsa_authentication; /* If true, permit rhosts RSA * authentication. */ int hostbased_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 hostbased auth */ int hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; /* experimental */ char *hostbased_key_types; /* Key types allowed for hostbased */ int rsa_authentication; /* If true, permit RSA authentication. */ int pubkey_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 pubkey authentication. */ char *pubkey_key_types; /* Key types allowed for public key */ int kerberos_authentication; /* If true, permit Kerberos * authentication. */ int kerberos_or_local_passwd; /* If true, permit kerberos * and any other password * authentication mechanism, * such as SecurID or * /etc/passwd */ int kerberos_ticket_cleanup; /* If true, destroy ticket * file on logout. */ int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if * authenticated with Kerberos. */ int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ + int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */ int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password * authentication. */ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */ int challenge_response_authentication; int permit_empty_passwd; /* If false, do not permit empty * passwords. */ int permit_user_env; /* If true, read ~/.ssh/environment */ int use_login; /* If true, login(1) is used */ int compression; /* If true, compression is allowed */ int allow_tcp_forwarding; /* One of FORWARD_* */ int allow_streamlocal_forwarding; /* One of FORWARD_* */ int allow_agent_forwarding; u_int num_allow_users; char *allow_users[MAX_ALLOW_USERS]; u_int num_deny_users; char *deny_users[MAX_DENY_USERS]; u_int num_allow_groups; char *allow_groups[MAX_ALLOW_GROUPS]; u_int num_deny_groups; char *deny_groups[MAX_DENY_GROUPS]; u_int num_subsystems; char *subsystem_name[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS]; char *subsystem_command[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS]; char *subsystem_args[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS]; u_int num_accept_env; char *accept_env[MAX_ACCEPT_ENV]; int max_startups_begin; int max_startups_rate; int max_startups; int max_authtries; int max_sessions; char *banner; /* SSH-2 banner message */ int use_dns; int client_alive_interval; /* * poke the client this often to * see if it's still there */ int client_alive_count_max; /* * If the client is unresponsive * for this many intervals above, * disconnect the session */ u_int num_authkeys_files; /* Files containing public keys */ char *authorized_keys_files[MAX_AUTHKEYS_FILES]; char *adm_forced_command; int use_pam; /* Enable auth via PAM */ int permit_tun; int num_permitted_opens; char *chroot_directory; char *revoked_keys_file; char *trusted_user_ca_keys; - char *authorized_principals_file; char *authorized_keys_command; char *authorized_keys_command_user; + char *authorized_principals_file; + char *authorized_principals_command; + char *authorized_principals_command_user; int64_t rekey_limit; int rekey_interval; char *version_addendum; /* Appended to SSH banner */ u_int num_auth_methods; char *auth_methods[MAX_AUTH_METHODS]; int fingerprint_hash; } ServerOptions; /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */ struct connection_info { const char *user; const char *host; /* possibly resolved hostname */ const char *address; /* remote address */ const char *laddress; /* local address */ int lport; /* local port */ }; /* * These are string config options that must be copied between the * Match sub-config and the main config, and must be sent from the * privsep slave to the privsep master. We use a macro to ensure all * the options are copied and the copies are done in the correct order. * * NB. an option must appear in servconf.c:copy_set_server_options() or * COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS here but never both. */ #define COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS() do { \ M_CP_STROPT(banner); \ M_CP_STROPT(trusted_user_ca_keys); \ M_CP_STROPT(revoked_keys_file); \ - M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_file); \ M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command); \ M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command_user); \ + M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_file); \ + M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command); \ + M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command_user); \ M_CP_STROPT(hostbased_key_types); \ M_CP_STROPT(pubkey_key_types); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_users, num_allow_users); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_users, num_deny_users); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_groups, num_allow_groups); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_groups, num_deny_groups); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(accept_env, num_accept_env); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(auth_methods, num_auth_methods); \ } while (0) struct connection_info *get_connection_info(int, int); void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *); void fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *); int process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *, char *, const char *, int, int *, struct connection_info *); void load_server_config(const char *, Buffer *); void parse_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, Buffer *, struct connection_info *); void parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *, struct connection_info *); int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *, char *); int server_match_spec_complete(struct connection_info *); void copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *, ServerOptions *, int); void dump_config(ServerOptions *); char *derelativise_path(const char *); #endif /* SERVCONF_H */ Index: head/crypto/openssh/session.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/session.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/session.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,2784 +1,2784 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.277 2015/01/16 06:40:12 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.278 2015/04/24 01:36:00 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "packet.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "match.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "compat.h" #include "channels.h" #include "key.h" #include "cipher.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "sshlogin.h" #include "serverloop.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "session.h" #include "kex.h" #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "sftp.h" #if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS) #include #endif #ifdef WITH_SELINUX #include #endif #define IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(c) \ (!strncmp(c, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1) && \ (c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\0' || \ c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == ' ' || \ c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\t')) /* func */ Session *session_new(void); void session_set_fds(Session *, int, int, int, int, int); void session_pty_cleanup(Session *); void session_proctitle(Session *); int session_setup_x11fwd(Session *); int do_exec_pty(Session *, const char *); int do_exec_no_pty(Session *, const char *); int do_exec(Session *, const char *); void do_login(Session *, const char *); #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX static void do_pre_login(Session *s); #endif void do_child(Session *, const char *); void do_motd(void); int check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *); static void do_authenticated1(Authctxt *); static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *); static int session_pty_req(Session *); /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern char *__progname; extern int log_stderr; extern int debug_flag; extern u_int utmp_len; extern int startup_pipe; extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void); extern Buffer loginmsg; /* original command from peer. */ const char *original_command = NULL; /* data */ static int sessions_first_unused = -1; static int sessions_nalloc = 0; static Session *sessions = NULL; #define SUBSYSTEM_NONE 0 #define SUBSYSTEM_EXT 1 #define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP 2 #define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR 3 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP login_cap_t *lc; #endif static int is_child = 0; /* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */ static char *auth_sock_name = NULL; static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL; /* removes the agent forwarding socket */ static void auth_sock_cleanup_proc(struct passwd *pw) { if (auth_sock_name != NULL) { temporarily_use_uid(pw); unlink(auth_sock_name); rmdir(auth_sock_dir); auth_sock_name = NULL; restore_uid(); } } static int auth_input_request_forwarding(struct passwd * pw) { Channel *nc; int sock = -1; if (auth_sock_name != NULL) { error("authentication forwarding requested twice."); return 0; } /* Temporarily drop privileged uid for mkdir/bind. */ temporarily_use_uid(pw); /* Allocate a buffer for the socket name, and format the name. */ auth_sock_dir = xstrdup("/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX"); /* Create private directory for socket */ if (mkdtemp(auth_sock_dir) == NULL) { packet_send_debug("Agent forwarding disabled: " "mkdtemp() failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); restore_uid(); free(auth_sock_dir); auth_sock_dir = NULL; goto authsock_err; } xasprintf(&auth_sock_name, "%s/agent.%ld", auth_sock_dir, (long) getpid()); /* Start a Unix listener on auth_sock_name. */ sock = unix_listener(auth_sock_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0); /* Restore the privileged uid. */ restore_uid(); /* Check for socket/bind/listen failure. */ if (sock < 0) goto authsock_err; /* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */ nc = channel_new("auth socket", SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "auth socket", 1); nc->path = xstrdup(auth_sock_name); return 1; authsock_err: free(auth_sock_name); if (auth_sock_dir != NULL) { rmdir(auth_sock_dir); free(auth_sock_dir); } if (sock != -1) close(sock); auth_sock_name = NULL; auth_sock_dir = NULL; return 0; } static void display_loginmsg(void) { if (buffer_len(&loginmsg) > 0) { buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1); printf("%s", (char *)buffer_ptr(&loginmsg)); buffer_clear(&loginmsg); } } void do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt) { setproctitle("%s", authctxt->pw->pw_name); /* setup the channel layer */ /* XXX - streamlocal? */ if (no_port_forwarding_flag || (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) == 0) channel_disable_adm_local_opens(); else channel_permit_all_opens(); auth_debug_send(); if (compat20) do_authenticated2(authctxt); else do_authenticated1(authctxt); do_cleanup(authctxt); } /* * Prepares for an interactive session. This is called after the user has * been successfully authenticated. During this message exchange, pseudo * terminals are allocated, X11, TCP/IP, and authentication agent forwardings * are requested, etc. */ static void do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt) { Session *s; char *command; int success, type, screen_flag; int enable_compression_after_reply = 0; u_int proto_len, data_len, dlen, compression_level = 0; s = session_new(); if (s == NULL) { error("no more sessions"); return; } s->authctxt = authctxt; s->pw = authctxt->pw; /* * We stay in this loop until the client requests to execute a shell * or a command. */ for (;;) { success = 0; /* Get a packet from the client. */ type = packet_read(); /* Process the packet. */ switch (type) { case SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION: compression_level = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); if (compression_level < 1 || compression_level > 9) { packet_send_debug("Received invalid compression level %d.", compression_level); break; } if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) { debug2("compression disabled"); break; } /* Enable compression after we have responded with SUCCESS. */ enable_compression_after_reply = 1; success = 1; break; case SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY: success = session_pty_req(s); break; case SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING: s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(&proto_len); s->auth_data = packet_get_string(&data_len); screen_flag = packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER; debug2("SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER: %d", screen_flag); if (packet_remaining() == 4) { if (!screen_flag) debug2("Buggy client: " "X11 screen flag missing"); s->screen = packet_get_int(); } else { s->screen = 0; } packet_check_eom(); success = session_setup_x11fwd(s); if (!success) { free(s->auth_proto); free(s->auth_data); s->auth_proto = NULL; s->auth_data = NULL; } break; case SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING: if (!options.allow_agent_forwarding || no_agent_forwarding_flag || compat13) { debug("Authentication agent forwarding not permitted for this authentication."); break; } debug("Received authentication agent forwarding request."); success = auth_input_request_forwarding(s->pw); break; case SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST: if (no_port_forwarding_flag) { debug("Port forwarding not permitted for this authentication."); break; } if (!(options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE)) { debug("Port forwarding not permitted."); break; } debug("Received TCP/IP port forwarding request."); if (channel_input_port_forward_request(s->pw->pw_uid == 0, &options.fwd_opts) < 0) { debug("Port forwarding failed."); break; } success = 1; break; case SSH_CMSG_MAX_PACKET_SIZE: if (packet_set_maxsize(packet_get_int()) > 0) success = 1; break; case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL: case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD: if (type == SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD) { command = packet_get_string(&dlen); debug("Exec command '%.500s'", command); if (do_exec(s, command) != 0) packet_disconnect( "command execution failed"); free(command); } else { if (do_exec(s, NULL) != 0) packet_disconnect( "shell execution failed"); } packet_check_eom(); session_close(s); return; default: /* * Any unknown messages in this phase are ignored, * and a failure message is returned. */ logit("Unknown packet type received after authentication: %d", type); } packet_start(success ? SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS : SSH_SMSG_FAILURE); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Enable compression now that we have replied if appropriate. */ if (enable_compression_after_reply) { enable_compression_after_reply = 0; packet_start_compression(compression_level); } } } #define USE_PIPES 1 /* * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty. This * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after * setting up file descriptors and such. */ int do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command) { pid_t pid; #ifdef USE_PIPES int pin[2], pout[2], perr[2]; if (s == NULL) fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session"); /* Allocate pipes for communicating with the program. */ if (pipe(pin) < 0) { error("%s: pipe in: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (pipe(pout) < 0) { error("%s: pipe out: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(pin[0]); close(pin[1]); return -1; } if (pipe(perr) < 0) { error("%s: pipe err: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(pin[0]); close(pin[1]); close(pout[0]); close(pout[1]); return -1; } #else int inout[2], err[2]; if (s == NULL) fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session"); /* Uses socket pairs to communicate with the program. */ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) < 0) { error("%s: socketpair #1: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, err) < 0) { error("%s: socketpair #2: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(inout[0]); close(inout[1]); return -1; } #endif session_proctitle(s); /* Fork the child. */ switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: error("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); #ifdef USE_PIPES close(pin[0]); close(pin[1]); close(pout[0]); close(pout[1]); close(perr[0]); close(perr[1]); #else close(inout[0]); close(inout[1]); close(err[0]); close(err[1]); #endif return -1; case 0: is_child = 1; /* Child. Reinitialize the log since the pid has changed. */ log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); /* * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD * setlogin() affects the entire process group. */ if (setsid() < 0) error("setsid failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); #ifdef USE_PIPES /* * Redirect stdin. We close the parent side of the socket * pair, and make the child side the standard input. */ close(pin[1]); if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0) perror("dup2 stdin"); close(pin[0]); /* Redirect stdout. */ close(pout[0]); if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0) perror("dup2 stdout"); close(pout[1]); /* Redirect stderr. */ close(perr[0]); if (dup2(perr[1], 2) < 0) perror("dup2 stderr"); close(perr[1]); #else /* * Redirect stdin, stdout, and stderr. Stdin and stdout will * use the same socket, as some programs (particularly rdist) * seem to depend on it. */ close(inout[1]); close(err[1]); if (dup2(inout[0], 0) < 0) /* stdin */ perror("dup2 stdin"); if (dup2(inout[0], 1) < 0) /* stdout (same as stdin) */ perror("dup2 stdout"); close(inout[0]); if (dup2(err[0], 2) < 0) /* stderr */ perror("dup2 stderr"); close(err[0]); #endif #ifdef _UNICOS cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */ #endif /* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */ do_child(s, command); /* NOTREACHED */ default: break; } #ifdef _UNICOS signal(WJSIGNAL, cray_job_termination_handler); #endif /* _UNICOS */ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); #endif s->pid = pid; /* Set interactive/non-interactive mode. */ packet_set_interactive(s->display != NULL, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); /* * Clear loginmsg, since it's the child's responsibility to display * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate * multiple copies of the login messages. */ buffer_clear(&loginmsg); #ifdef USE_PIPES /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the pipes. */ close(pin[0]); close(pout[1]); close(perr[1]); if (compat20) { session_set_fds(s, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0], s->is_subsystem, 0); } else { /* Enter the interactive session. */ server_loop(pid, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0]); /* server_loop has closed pin[1], pout[0], and perr[0]. */ } #else /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the socket pairs. */ close(inout[0]); close(err[0]); /* * Enter the interactive session. Note: server_loop must be able to * handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same. */ if (compat20) { session_set_fds(s, inout[1], inout[1], err[1], s->is_subsystem, 0); } else { server_loop(pid, inout[1], inout[1], err[1]); /* server_loop has closed inout[1] and err[1]. */ } #endif return 0; } /* * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have a tty. This * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after * setting up file descriptors, controlling tty, updating wtmp, utmp, * lastlog, and other such operations. */ int do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command) { int fdout, ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster; pid_t pid; if (s == NULL) fatal("do_exec_pty: no session"); ptyfd = s->ptyfd; ttyfd = s->ttyfd; /* * Create another descriptor of the pty master side for use as the * standard input. We could use the original descriptor, but this * simplifies code in server_loop. The descriptor is bidirectional. * Do this before forking (and cleanup in the child) so as to * detect and gracefully fail out-of-fd conditions. */ if ((fdout = dup(ptyfd)) < 0) { error("%s: dup #1: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(ttyfd); close(ptyfd); return -1; } /* we keep a reference to the pty master */ if ((ptymaster = dup(ptyfd)) < 0) { error("%s: dup #2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(ttyfd); close(ptyfd); close(fdout); return -1; } /* Fork the child. */ switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: error("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(fdout); close(ptymaster); close(ttyfd); close(ptyfd); return -1; case 0: is_child = 1; close(fdout); close(ptymaster); /* Child. Reinitialize the log because the pid has changed. */ log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); /* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */ close(ptyfd); /* Make the pseudo tty our controlling tty. */ pty_make_controlling_tty(&ttyfd, s->tty); /* Redirect stdin/stdout/stderr from the pseudo tty. */ if (dup2(ttyfd, 0) < 0) error("dup2 stdin: %s", strerror(errno)); if (dup2(ttyfd, 1) < 0) error("dup2 stdout: %s", strerror(errno)); if (dup2(ttyfd, 2) < 0) error("dup2 stderr: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */ close(ttyfd); /* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */ #ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL)) { #ifdef _UNICOS cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */ #endif /* _UNICOS */ do_login(s, command); } # ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX else do_pre_login(s); # endif #endif /* * Do common processing for the child, such as execing * the command. */ do_child(s, command); /* NOTREACHED */ default: break; } #ifdef _UNICOS signal(WJSIGNAL, cray_job_termination_handler); #endif /* _UNICOS */ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); #endif s->pid = pid; /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */ close(ttyfd); /* Enter interactive session. */ s->ptymaster = ptymaster; packet_set_interactive(1, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); if (compat20) { session_set_fds(s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1); } else { server_loop(pid, ptyfd, fdout, -1); /* server_loop _has_ closed ptyfd and fdout. */ } return 0; } #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX static void do_pre_login(Session *s) { socklen_t fromlen; struct sockaddr_storage from; pid_t pid = getpid(); /* * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let * the address be 0.0.0.0. */ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); fromlen = sizeof(from); if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(255); } } record_utmp_only(pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen); } #endif /* * This is called to fork and execute a command. If another command is * to be forced, execute that instead. */ int do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) { int ret; const char *forced = NULL; char session_type[1024], *tty = NULL; if (options.adm_forced_command) { original_command = command; command = options.adm_forced_command; forced = "(config)"; } else if (forced_command) { original_command = command; command = forced_command; forced = "(key-option)"; } if (forced != NULL) { if (IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(command)) { s->is_subsystem = s->is_subsystem ? SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP : SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR; } else if (s->is_subsystem) s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT; snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "forced-command %s '%.900s'", forced, command); } else if (s->is_subsystem) { snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "subsystem '%.900s'", s->subsys); } else if (command == NULL) { snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "shell"); } else { /* NB. we don't log unforced commands to preserve privacy */ snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "command"); } if (s->ttyfd != -1) { tty = s->tty; if (strncmp(tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0) tty += 5; } verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d", session_type, tty == NULL ? "" : " on ", tty == NULL ? "" : tty, s->pw->pw_name, get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port()); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS if (command != NULL) PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command)); else if (s->ttyfd == -1) { char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell; if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */ shell =_PATH_BSHELL; PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell)); } #endif if (s->ttyfd != -1) ret = do_exec_pty(s, command); else ret = do_exec_no_pty(s, command); original_command = NULL; /* * Clear loginmsg: it's the child's responsibility to display * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate * multiple copies of the login messages. */ buffer_clear(&loginmsg); return ret; } /* administrative, login(1)-like work */ void do_login(Session *s, const char *command) { socklen_t fromlen; struct sockaddr_storage from; struct passwd * pw = s->pw; pid_t pid = getpid(); /* * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let * the address be 0.0.0.0. */ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); fromlen = sizeof(from); if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(255); } } /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */ if (!use_privsep) record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen); #ifdef USE_PAM /* * If password change is needed, do it now. * This needs to occur before the ~/.hushlogin check. */ if (options.use_pam && !use_privsep && s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { display_loginmsg(); do_pam_chauthtok(); s->authctxt->force_pwchange = 0; /* XXX - signal [net] parent to enable forwardings */ } #endif if (check_quietlogin(s, command)) return; display_loginmsg(); do_motd(); } /* * Display the message of the day. */ void do_motd(void) { FILE *f; char buf[256]; if (options.print_motd) { #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "welcome", "/etc/motd", "/etc/motd"), "r"); #else f = fopen("/etc/motd", "r"); #endif if (f) { while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) fputs(buf, stdout); fclose(f); } } } /* * Check for quiet login, either .hushlogin or command given. */ int check_quietlogin(Session *s, const char *command) { char buf[256]; struct passwd *pw = s->pw; struct stat st; /* Return 1 if .hushlogin exists or a command given. */ if (command != NULL) return 1; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.200s/.hushlogin", pw->pw_dir); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (login_getcapbool(lc, "hushlogin", 0) || stat(buf, &st) >= 0) return 1; #else if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0) return 1; #endif return 0; } /* * Sets the value of the given variable in the environment. If the variable * already exists, its value is overridden. */ void child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name, const char *value) { char **env; u_int envsize; u_int i, namelen; if (strchr(name, '=') != NULL) { error("Invalid environment variable \"%.100s\"", name); return; } /* * If we're passed an uninitialized list, allocate a single null * entry before continuing. */ if (*envp == NULL && *envsizep == 0) { *envp = xmalloc(sizeof(char *)); *envp[0] = NULL; *envsizep = 1; } /* * Find the slot where the value should be stored. If the variable * already exists, we reuse the slot; otherwise we append a new slot * at the end of the array, expanding if necessary. */ env = *envp; namelen = strlen(name); for (i = 0; env[i]; i++) if (strncmp(env[i], name, namelen) == 0 && env[i][namelen] == '=') break; if (env[i]) { /* Reuse the slot. */ free(env[i]); } else { /* New variable. Expand if necessary. */ envsize = *envsizep; if (i >= envsize - 1) { if (envsize >= 1000) fatal("child_set_env: too many env vars"); envsize += 50; - env = (*envp) = xrealloc(env, envsize, sizeof(char *)); + env = (*envp) = xreallocarray(env, envsize, sizeof(char *)); *envsizep = envsize; } /* Need to set the NULL pointer at end of array beyond the new slot. */ env[i + 1] = NULL; } /* Allocate space and format the variable in the appropriate slot. */ env[i] = xmalloc(strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1); snprintf(env[i], strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1, "%s=%s", name, value); } /* * Reads environment variables from the given file and adds/overrides them * into the environment. If the file does not exist, this does nothing. * Otherwise, it must consist of empty lines, comments (line starts with '#') * and assignments of the form name=value. No other forms are allowed. */ static void read_environment_file(char ***env, u_int *envsize, const char *filename) { FILE *f; char buf[4096]; char *cp, *value; u_int lineno = 0; f = fopen(filename, "r"); if (!f) return; while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) { if (++lineno > 1000) fatal("Too many lines in environment file %s", filename); for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n') continue; cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0'; value = strchr(cp, '='); if (value == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad line %u in %.100s\n", lineno, filename); continue; } /* * Replace the equals sign by nul, and advance value to * the value string. */ *value = '\0'; value++; child_set_env(env, envsize, cp, value); } fclose(f); } #ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN /* * Return named variable from specified environment, or NULL if not present. */ static char * child_get_env(char **env, const char *name) { int i; size_t len; len = strlen(name); for (i=0; env[i] != NULL; i++) if (strncmp(name, env[i], len) == 0 && env[i][len] == '=') return(env[i] + len + 1); return NULL; } /* * Read /etc/default/login. * We pick up the PATH (or SUPATH for root) and UMASK. */ static void read_etc_default_login(char ***env, u_int *envsize, uid_t uid) { char **tmpenv = NULL, *var; u_int i, tmpenvsize = 0; u_long mask; /* * We don't want to copy the whole file to the child's environment, * so we use a temporary environment and copy the variables we're * interested in. */ read_environment_file(&tmpenv, &tmpenvsize, "/etc/default/login"); if (tmpenv == NULL) return; if (uid == 0) var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "SUPATH"); else var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "PATH"); if (var != NULL) child_set_env(env, envsize, "PATH", var); if ((var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "UMASK")) != NULL) if (sscanf(var, "%5lo", &mask) == 1) umask((mode_t)mask); for (i = 0; tmpenv[i] != NULL; i++) free(tmpenv[i]); free(tmpenv); } #endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */ void copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize) { char *var_name, *var_val; int i; if (source == NULL) return; for(i = 0; source[i] != NULL; i++) { var_name = xstrdup(source[i]); if ((var_val = strstr(var_name, "=")) == NULL) { free(var_name); continue; } *var_val++ = '\0'; debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val); child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val); free(var_name); } } static char ** do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell) { char buf[256]; u_int i, envsize; char **env, *laddr; struct passwd *pw = s->pw; #if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN) char *path = NULL; #else extern char **environ; char **senv, **var; #endif /* Initialize the environment. */ envsize = 100; env = xcalloc(envsize, sizeof(char *)); env[0] = NULL; #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN /* * The Windows environment contains some setting which are * important for a running system. They must not be dropped. */ { char **p; p = fetch_windows_environment(); copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize); free_windows_environment(p); } #endif if (getenv("TZ")) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ")); #ifdef GSSAPI /* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter * the childs environment as they see fit */ ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize); #endif if (!options.use_login) { /* Set basic environment. */ for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, s->env[i].name, s->env[i].val); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name); #ifdef _AIX child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGIN", pw->pw_name); #endif child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir); snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s", _PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", "su"); senv = environ; environ = xmalloc(sizeof(char *)); *environ = NULL; (void) setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETENV|LOGIN_SETPATH); copy_environment(environ, &env, &envsize); for (var = environ; *var != NULL; ++var) free(*var); free(environ); environ = senv; #else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ # ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN /* * There's no standard path on Windows. The path contains * important components pointing to the system directories, * needed for loading shared libraries. So the path better * remains intact here. */ # ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN read_etc_default_login(&env, &envsize, pw->pw_uid); path = child_get_env(env, "PATH"); # endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */ if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') { child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", s->pw->pw_uid == 0 ? SUPERUSER_PATH : _PATH_STDPATH); } # endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ /* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell); } /* Set custom environment options from RSA authentication. */ if (!options.use_login) { while (custom_environment) { struct envstring *ce = custom_environment; char *str = ce->s; for (i = 0; str[i] != '=' && str[i]; i++) ; if (str[i] == '=') { str[i] = 0; child_set_env(&env, &envsize, str, str + i + 1); } custom_environment = ce->next; free(ce->s); free(ce); } } /* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %d", get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), get_local_port()); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf); laddr = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in()); snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %.50s %d", get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), laddr, get_local_port()); free(laddr); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf); if (s->ttyfd != -1) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TTY", s->tty); if (s->term) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", s->term); if (s->display) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "DISPLAY", s->display); if (original_command) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND", original_command); #ifdef _UNICOS if (cray_tmpdir[0] != '\0') child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TMPDIR", cray_tmpdir); #endif /* _UNICOS */ /* * Since we clear KRB5CCNAME at startup, if it's set now then it * must have been set by a native authentication method (eg AIX or * SIA), so copy it to the child. */ { char *cp; if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp); } #ifdef _AIX { char *cp; if ((cp = getenv("AUTHSTATE")) != NULL) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "AUTHSTATE", cp); read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment"); } #endif #ifdef KRB5 if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", s->authctxt->krb5_ccname); #endif #ifdef USE_PAM /* * Pull in any environment variables that may have * been set by PAM. */ if (options.use_pam) { char **p; p = fetch_pam_child_environment(); copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize); free_pam_environment(p); p = fetch_pam_environment(); copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize); free_pam_environment(p); } #endif /* USE_PAM */ if (auth_sock_name != NULL) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, auth_sock_name); /* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */ if (options.permit_user_env && !options.use_login) { snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/.ssh/environment", strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? pw->pw_dir : ""); read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf); } if (debug_flag) { /* dump the environment */ fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n"); for (i = 0; env[i]; i++) fprintf(stderr, " %.200s\n", env[i]); } return env; } /* * Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/ssh/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found * first in this order). */ static void do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell) { FILE *f = NULL; char cmd[1024]; int do_xauth; struct stat st; do_xauth = s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL; /* ignore _PATH_SSH_USER_RC for subsystems and admin forced commands */ if (!s->is_subsystem && options.adm_forced_command == NULL && !no_user_rc && options.permit_user_rc && stat(_PATH_SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0) { snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'", shell, _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC); if (debug_flag) fprintf(stderr, "Running %s\n", cmd); f = popen(cmd, "w"); if (f) { if (do_xauth) fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); pclose(f); } else fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", _PATH_SSH_USER_RC); } else if (stat(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, &st) >= 0) { if (debug_flag) fprintf(stderr, "Running %s %s\n", _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC); f = popen(_PATH_BSHELL " " _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, "w"); if (f) { if (do_xauth) fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); pclose(f); } else fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC); } else if (do_xauth && options.xauth_location != NULL) { /* Add authority data to .Xauthority if appropriate. */ if (debug_flag) { fprintf(stderr, "Running %.500s remove %.100s\n", options.xauth_location, s->auth_display); fprintf(stderr, "%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n", options.xauth_location, s->auth_display, s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); } snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -q -", options.xauth_location); f = popen(cmd, "w"); if (f) { fprintf(f, "remove %s\n", s->auth_display); fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n", s->auth_display, s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); pclose(f); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", cmd); } } } static void do_nologin(struct passwd *pw) { FILE *f = NULL; char buf[1024], *nl, *def_nl = _PATH_NOLOGIN; struct stat sb; #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (login_getcapbool(lc, "ignorenologin", 0) || pw->pw_uid == 0) return; nl = login_getcapstr(lc, "nologin", def_nl, def_nl); #else if (pw->pw_uid == 0) return; nl = def_nl; #endif if (stat(nl, &sb) == -1) { if (nl != def_nl) free(nl); return; } /* /etc/nologin exists. Print its contents if we can and exit. */ logit("User %.100s not allowed because %s exists", pw->pw_name, nl); if ((f = fopen(nl, "r")) != NULL) { while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) fputs(buf, stderr); fclose(f); } exit(254); } /* * Chroot into a directory after checking it for safety: all path components * must be root-owned directories with strict permissions. */ static void safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid) { const char *cp; char component[PATH_MAX]; struct stat st; if (*path != '/') fatal("chroot path does not begin at root"); if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component)) fatal("chroot path too long"); /* * Descend the path, checking that each component is a * root-owned directory with strict permissions. */ for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) { if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL) strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component)); else { cp++; memcpy(component, path, cp - path); component[cp - path] = '\0'; } debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component); if (stat(component, &st) != 0) fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__, component, strerror(errno)); if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot " "directory %s\"%s\"", cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component); if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory", cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component); } if (chdir(path) == -1) fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": " "%s", path, strerror(errno)); if (chroot(path) == -1) fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", path, strerror(errno)); if (chdir("/") == -1) fatal("%s: chdir(/) after chroot: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); verbose("Changed root directory to \"%s\"", path); } /* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */ void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) { char *chroot_path, *tmp; #ifdef USE_LIBIAF int doing_chroot = 0; #endif platform_setusercontext(pw); if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) { #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETENV|LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) { perror("unable to set user context"); exit(1); } #else if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0) error("setlogin failed: %s", strerror(errno)); if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) { perror("setgid"); exit(1); } /* Initialize the group list. */ if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) { perror("initgroups"); exit(1); } endgrent(); #endif platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw); if (options.chroot_directory != NULL && strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) { tmp = tilde_expand_filename(options.chroot_directory, pw->pw_uid); chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir, "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid); free(tmp); free(chroot_path); /* Make sure we don't attempt to chroot again */ free(options.chroot_directory); options.chroot_directory = NULL; #ifdef USE_LIBIAF doing_chroot = 1; #endif } #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUSER) < 0) { perror("unable to set user context (setuser)"); exit(1); } /* * FreeBSD's setusercontext() will not apply the user's * own umask setting unless running with the user's UID. */ (void) setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUMASK); #else # ifdef USE_LIBIAF /* In a chroot environment, the set_id() will always fail; typically * because of the lack of necessary authentication services and runtime * such as ./usr/lib/libiaf.so, ./usr/lib/libpam.so.1, and ./etc/passwd * We skip it in the internal sftp chroot case. * We'll lose auditing and ACLs but permanently_set_uid will * take care of the rest. */ if ((doing_chroot == 0) && set_id(pw->pw_name) != 0) { fatal("set_id(%s) Failed", pw->pw_name); } # endif /* USE_LIBIAF */ /* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */ permanently_set_uid(pw); #endif } else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL && strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) { fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory"); } if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid) fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid); } static void do_pwchange(Session *s) { fflush(NULL); fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Your password has expired.\n"); if (s->ttyfd != -1) { fprintf(stderr, "You must change your password now and login again!\n"); #ifdef WITH_SELINUX setexeccon(NULL); #endif #ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); #else execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", (char *)NULL); #endif perror("passwd"); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Password change required but no TTY available.\n"); } exit(1); } static void launch_login(struct passwd *pw, const char *hostname) { /* Launch login(1). */ execl(LOGIN_PROGRAM, "login", "-h", hostname, #ifdef xxxLOGIN_NEEDS_TERM (s->term ? s->term : "unknown"), #endif /* LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM */ #ifdef LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT "-p", "-f", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); #else "-p", "-f", "--", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); #endif /* Login couldn't be executed, die. */ perror("login"); exit(1); } static void child_close_fds(void) { extern int auth_sock; if (auth_sock != -1) { close(auth_sock); auth_sock = -1; } if (packet_get_connection_in() == packet_get_connection_out()) close(packet_get_connection_in()); else { close(packet_get_connection_in()); close(packet_get_connection_out()); } /* * Close all descriptors related to channels. They will still remain * open in the parent. */ /* XXX better use close-on-exec? -markus */ channel_close_all(); /* * Close any extra file descriptors. Note that there may still be * descriptors left by system functions. They will be closed later. */ endpwent(); /* * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file * descriptors open. */ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); } /* * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group * ids, and executing the command or shell. */ #define ARGV_MAX 10 void do_child(Session *s, const char *command) { extern char **environ; char **env; char *argv[ARGV_MAX]; const char *shell, *shell0, *hostname = NULL; struct passwd *pw = s->pw; int r = 0; /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ destroy_sensitive_data(); /* Force a password change */ if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { do_setusercontext(pw); child_close_fds(); do_pwchange(s); exit(1); } /* login(1) is only called if we execute the login shell */ if (options.use_login && command != NULL) options.use_login = 0; #ifdef _UNICOS cray_setup(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_name, command); #endif /* _UNICOS */ /* * Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h" * switch, so we let login(1) to this for us. */ if (!options.use_login) { #ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA session_setup_sia(pw, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty); if (!check_quietlogin(s, command)) do_motd(); #else /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ /* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */ if (!options.use_pam) do_nologin(pw); do_setusercontext(pw); /* * PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have * generated messages, so if this in an interactive * login then display them too. */ if (!check_quietlogin(s, command)) display_loginmsg(); #endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ } #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam && !options.use_login && !is_pam_session_open()) { debug3("PAM session not opened, exiting"); display_loginmsg(); exit(254); } #endif /* * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is * legal, and means /bin/sh. */ shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell; /* * Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file, * even if shell is overridden from login.conf */ env = do_setup_env(s, shell); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell); #endif /* we have to stash the hostname before we close our socket. */ if (options.use_login) hostname = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns); /* * Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and * the server will still have the socket open, and it is important * that we do not shutdown it. Note that the descriptors cannot be * closed before building the environment, as we call * get_remote_ipaddr there. */ child_close_fds(); /* * Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc, * /etc/ssh/sshrc and xauth are run in the proper environment. */ environ = env; #if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS) /* * At this point, we check to see if AFS is active and if we have * a valid Kerberos 5 TGT. If so, it seems like a good idea to see * if we can (and need to) extend the ticket into an AFS token. If * we don't do this, we run into potential problems if the user's * home directory is in AFS and it's not world-readable. */ if (options.kerberos_get_afs_token && k_hasafs() && (s->authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL)) { char cell[64]; debug("Getting AFS token"); k_setpag(); if (k_afs_cell_of_file(pw->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0) krb5_afslog(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx, s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, cell, NULL); krb5_afslog_home(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx, s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, NULL, NULL, pw->pw_dir); } #endif /* Change current directory to the user's home directory. */ if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) < 0) { /* Suppress missing homedir warning for chroot case */ #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP r = login_getcapbool(lc, "requirehome", 0); #endif if (r || options.chroot_directory == NULL || strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) fprintf(stderr, "Could not chdir to home " "directory %s: %s\n", pw->pw_dir, strerror(errno)); if (r) exit(1); } closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); if (!options.use_login) do_rc_files(s, shell); /* restore SIGPIPE for child */ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR) { printf("This service allows sftp connections only.\n"); fflush(NULL); exit(1); } else if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) { extern int optind, optreset; int i; char *p, *args; setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME); args = xstrdup(command ? command : "sftp-server"); for (i = 0, (p = strtok(args, " ")); p; (p = strtok(NULL, " "))) if (i < ARGV_MAX - 1) argv[i++] = p; argv[i] = NULL; optind = optreset = 1; __progname = argv[0]; #ifdef WITH_SELINUX ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t"); #endif exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw)); } fflush(NULL); if (options.use_login) { launch_login(pw, hostname); /* NEVERREACHED */ } /* Get the last component of the shell name. */ if ((shell0 = strrchr(shell, '/')) != NULL) shell0++; else shell0 = shell; /* * If we have no command, execute the shell. In this case, the shell * name to be passed in argv[0] is preceded by '-' to indicate that * this is a login shell. */ if (!command) { char argv0[256]; /* Start the shell. Set initial character to '-'. */ argv0[0] = '-'; if (strlcpy(argv0 + 1, shell0, sizeof(argv0) - 1) >= sizeof(argv0) - 1) { errno = EINVAL; perror(shell); exit(1); } /* Execute the shell. */ argv[0] = argv0; argv[1] = NULL; execve(shell, argv, env); /* Executing the shell failed. */ perror(shell); exit(1); } /* * Execute the command using the user's shell. This uses the -c * option to execute the command. */ argv[0] = (char *) shell0; argv[1] = "-c"; argv[2] = (char *) command; argv[3] = NULL; execve(shell, argv, env); perror(shell); exit(1); } void session_unused(int id) { debug3("%s: session id %d unused", __func__, id); if (id >= options.max_sessions || id >= sessions_nalloc) { fatal("%s: insane session id %d (max %d nalloc %d)", __func__, id, options.max_sessions, sessions_nalloc); } memset(&sessions[id], 0, sizeof(*sessions)); sessions[id].self = id; sessions[id].used = 0; sessions[id].chanid = -1; sessions[id].ptyfd = -1; sessions[id].ttyfd = -1; sessions[id].ptymaster = -1; sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL; sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused; sessions_first_unused = id; } Session * session_new(void) { Session *s, *tmp; if (sessions_first_unused == -1) { if (sessions_nalloc >= options.max_sessions) return NULL; debug2("%s: allocate (allocated %d max %d)", __func__, sessions_nalloc, options.max_sessions); - tmp = xrealloc(sessions, sessions_nalloc + 1, + tmp = xreallocarray(sessions, sessions_nalloc + 1, sizeof(*sessions)); if (tmp == NULL) { error("%s: cannot allocate %d sessions", __func__, sessions_nalloc + 1); return NULL; } sessions = tmp; session_unused(sessions_nalloc++); } if (sessions_first_unused >= sessions_nalloc || sessions_first_unused < 0) { fatal("%s: insane first_unused %d max %d nalloc %d", __func__, sessions_first_unused, options.max_sessions, sessions_nalloc); } s = &sessions[sessions_first_unused]; if (s->used) { fatal("%s: session %d already used", __func__, sessions_first_unused); } sessions_first_unused = s->next_unused; s->used = 1; s->next_unused = -1; debug("session_new: session %d", s->self); return s; } static void session_dump(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; debug("dump: used %d next_unused %d session %d %p " "channel %d pid %ld", s->used, s->next_unused, s->self, s, s->chanid, (long)s->pid); } } int session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid) { Session *s = session_new(); debug("session_open: channel %d", chanid); if (s == NULL) { error("no more sessions"); return 0; } s->authctxt = authctxt; s->pw = authctxt->pw; if (s->pw == NULL || !authctxt->valid) fatal("no user for session %d", s->self); debug("session_open: session %d: link with channel %d", s->self, chanid); s->chanid = chanid; return 1; } Session * session_by_tty(char *tty) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1 && strcmp(s->tty, tty) == 0) { debug("session_by_tty: session %d tty %s", i, tty); return s; } } debug("session_by_tty: unknown tty %.100s", tty); session_dump(); return NULL; } static Session * session_by_channel(int id) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used && s->chanid == id) { debug("session_by_channel: session %d channel %d", i, id); return s; } } debug("session_by_channel: unknown channel %d", id); session_dump(); return NULL; } static Session * session_by_x11_channel(int id) { int i, j; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->x11_chanids == NULL || !s->used) continue; for (j = 0; s->x11_chanids[j] != -1; j++) { if (s->x11_chanids[j] == id) { debug("session_by_x11_channel: session %d " "channel %d", s->self, id); return s; } } } debug("session_by_x11_channel: unknown channel %d", id); session_dump(); return NULL; } static Session * session_by_pid(pid_t pid) { int i; debug("session_by_pid: pid %ld", (long)pid); for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used && s->pid == pid) return s; } error("session_by_pid: unknown pid %ld", (long)pid); session_dump(); return NULL; } static int session_window_change_req(Session *s) { s->col = packet_get_int(); s->row = packet_get_int(); s->xpixel = packet_get_int(); s->ypixel = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel); return 1; } static int session_pty_req(Session *s) { u_int len; int n_bytes; if (no_pty_flag || !options.permit_tty) { debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this authentication."); return 0; } if (s->ttyfd != -1) { packet_disconnect("Protocol error: you already have a pty."); return 0; } s->term = packet_get_string(&len); if (compat20) { s->col = packet_get_int(); s->row = packet_get_int(); } else { s->row = packet_get_int(); s->col = packet_get_int(); } s->xpixel = packet_get_int(); s->ypixel = packet_get_int(); if (strcmp(s->term, "") == 0) { free(s->term); s->term = NULL; } /* Allocate a pty and open it. */ debug("Allocating pty."); if (!PRIVSEP(pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty)))) { free(s->term); s->term = NULL; s->ptyfd = -1; s->ttyfd = -1; error("session_pty_req: session %d alloc failed", s->self); return 0; } debug("session_pty_req: session %d alloc %s", s->self, s->tty); /* for SSH1 the tty modes length is not given */ if (!compat20) n_bytes = packet_remaining(); tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes); if (!use_privsep) pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty); /* Set window size from the packet. */ pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel); packet_check_eom(); session_proctitle(s); return 1; } static int session_subsystem_req(Session *s) { struct stat st; u_int len; int success = 0; char *prog, *cmd; u_int i; s->subsys = packet_get_string(&len); packet_check_eom(); debug2("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s", s->subsys, s->pw->pw_name); for (i = 0; i < options.num_subsystems; i++) { if (strcmp(s->subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) { prog = options.subsystem_command[i]; cmd = options.subsystem_args[i]; if (strcmp(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, prog) == 0) { s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP; debug("subsystem: %s", prog); } else { if (stat(prog, &st) < 0) debug("subsystem: cannot stat %s: %s", prog, strerror(errno)); s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT; debug("subsystem: exec() %s", cmd); } success = do_exec(s, cmd) == 0; break; } } if (!success) logit("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s failed, " "subsystem not found", s->subsys, s->pw->pw_name); return success; } static int session_x11_req(Session *s) { int success; if (s->auth_proto != NULL || s->auth_data != NULL) { error("session_x11_req: session %d: " "x11 forwarding already active", s->self); return 0; } s->single_connection = packet_get_char(); s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(NULL); s->auth_data = packet_get_string(NULL); s->screen = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); success = session_setup_x11fwd(s); if (!success) { free(s->auth_proto); free(s->auth_data); s->auth_proto = NULL; s->auth_data = NULL; } return success; } static int session_shell_req(Session *s) { packet_check_eom(); return do_exec(s, NULL) == 0; } static int session_exec_req(Session *s) { u_int len, success; char *command = packet_get_string(&len); packet_check_eom(); success = do_exec(s, command) == 0; free(command); return success; } static int session_break_req(Session *s) { packet_get_int(); /* ignored */ packet_check_eom(); if (s->ptymaster == -1 || tcsendbreak(s->ptymaster, 0) < 0) return 0; return 1; } static int session_env_req(Session *s) { char *name, *val; u_int name_len, val_len, i; name = packet_get_cstring(&name_len); val = packet_get_cstring(&val_len); packet_check_eom(); /* Don't set too many environment variables */ if (s->num_env > 128) { debug2("Ignoring env request %s: too many env vars", name); goto fail; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_accept_env; i++) { if (match_pattern(name, options.accept_env[i])) { debug2("Setting env %d: %s=%s", s->num_env, name, val); - s->env = xrealloc(s->env, s->num_env + 1, + s->env = xreallocarray(s->env, s->num_env + 1, sizeof(*s->env)); s->env[s->num_env].name = name; s->env[s->num_env].val = val; s->num_env++; return (1); } } debug2("Ignoring env request %s: disallowed name", name); fail: free(name); free(val); return (0); } static int session_auth_agent_req(Session *s) { static int called = 0; packet_check_eom(); if (no_agent_forwarding_flag || !options.allow_agent_forwarding) { debug("session_auth_agent_req: no_agent_forwarding_flag"); return 0; } if (called) { return 0; } else { called = 1; return auth_input_request_forwarding(s->pw); } } int session_input_channel_req(Channel *c, const char *rtype) { int success = 0; Session *s; if ((s = session_by_channel(c->self)) == NULL) { logit("session_input_channel_req: no session %d req %.100s", c->self, rtype); return 0; } debug("session_input_channel_req: session %d req %s", s->self, rtype); /* * a session is in LARVAL state until a shell, a command * or a subsystem is executed */ if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) { if (strcmp(rtype, "shell") == 0) { success = session_shell_req(s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exec") == 0) { success = session_exec_req(s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "pty-req") == 0) { success = session_pty_req(s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "x11-req") == 0) { success = session_x11_req(s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com") == 0) { success = session_auth_agent_req(s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "subsystem") == 0) { success = session_subsystem_req(s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "env") == 0) { success = session_env_req(s); } } if (strcmp(rtype, "window-change") == 0) { success = session_window_change_req(s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "break") == 0) { success = session_break_req(s); } return success; } void session_set_fds(Session *s, int fdin, int fdout, int fderr, int ignore_fderr, int is_tty) { if (!compat20) fatal("session_set_fds: called for proto != 2.0"); /* * now that have a child and a pipe to the child, * we can activate our channel and register the fd's */ if (s->chanid == -1) fatal("no channel for session %d", s->self); channel_set_fds(s->chanid, fdout, fdin, fderr, ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ, 1, is_tty, CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT); } /* * Function to perform pty cleanup. Also called if we get aborted abnormally * (e.g., due to a dropped connection). */ void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s) { if (s == NULL) { error("session_pty_cleanup: no session"); return; } if (s->ttyfd == -1) return; debug("session_pty_cleanup: session %d release %s", s->self, s->tty); /* Record that the user has logged out. */ if (s->pid != 0) record_logout(s->pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name); /* Release the pseudo-tty. */ if (getuid() == 0) pty_release(s->tty); /* * Close the server side of the socket pairs. We must do this after * the pty cleanup, so that another process doesn't get this pty * while we're still cleaning up. */ if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) < 0) error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s", s->ptymaster, strerror(errno)); /* unlink pty from session */ s->ttyfd = -1; } void session_pty_cleanup(Session *s) { PRIVSEP(session_pty_cleanup2(s)); } static char * sig2name(int sig) { #define SSH_SIG(x) if (sig == SIG ## x) return #x SSH_SIG(ABRT); SSH_SIG(ALRM); SSH_SIG(FPE); SSH_SIG(HUP); SSH_SIG(ILL); SSH_SIG(INT); SSH_SIG(KILL); SSH_SIG(PIPE); SSH_SIG(QUIT); SSH_SIG(SEGV); SSH_SIG(TERM); SSH_SIG(USR1); SSH_SIG(USR2); #undef SSH_SIG return "SIG@openssh.com"; } static void session_close_x11(int id) { Channel *c; if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL) { debug("session_close_x11: x11 channel %d missing", id); } else { /* Detach X11 listener */ debug("session_close_x11: detach x11 channel %d", id); channel_cancel_cleanup(id); if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) chan_mark_dead(c); } } static void session_close_single_x11(int id, void *arg) { Session *s; u_int i; debug3("session_close_single_x11: channel %d", id); channel_cancel_cleanup(id); if ((s = session_by_x11_channel(id)) == NULL) fatal("session_close_single_x11: no x11 channel %d", id); for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) { debug("session_close_single_x11: session %d: " "closing channel %d", s->self, s->x11_chanids[i]); /* * The channel "id" is already closing, but make sure we * close all of its siblings. */ if (s->x11_chanids[i] != id) session_close_x11(s->x11_chanids[i]); } free(s->x11_chanids); s->x11_chanids = NULL; free(s->display); s->display = NULL; free(s->auth_proto); s->auth_proto = NULL; free(s->auth_data); s->auth_data = NULL; free(s->auth_display); s->auth_display = NULL; } static void session_exit_message(Session *s, int status) { Channel *c; if ((c = channel_lookup(s->chanid)) == NULL) fatal("session_exit_message: session %d: no channel %d", s->self, s->chanid); debug("session_exit_message: session %d channel %d pid %ld", s->self, s->chanid, (long)s->pid); if (WIFEXITED(status)) { channel_request_start(s->chanid, "exit-status", 0); packet_put_int(WEXITSTATUS(status)); packet_send(); } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { channel_request_start(s->chanid, "exit-signal", 0); packet_put_cstring(sig2name(WTERMSIG(status))); #ifdef WCOREDUMP packet_put_char(WCOREDUMP(status)? 1 : 0); #else /* WCOREDUMP */ packet_put_char(0); #endif /* WCOREDUMP */ packet_put_cstring(""); packet_put_cstring(""); packet_send(); } else { /* Some weird exit cause. Just exit. */ packet_disconnect("wait returned status %04x.", status); } /* disconnect channel */ debug("session_exit_message: release channel %d", s->chanid); /* * Adjust cleanup callback attachment to send close messages when * the channel gets EOF. The session will be then be closed * by session_close_by_channel when the childs close their fds. */ channel_register_cleanup(c->self, session_close_by_channel, 1); /* * emulate a write failure with 'chan_write_failed', nobody will be * interested in data we write. * Note that we must not call 'chan_read_failed', since there could * be some more data waiting in the pipe. */ if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) chan_write_failed(c); } void session_close(Session *s) { u_int i; debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid); if (s->ttyfd != -1) session_pty_cleanup(s); free(s->term); free(s->display); free(s->x11_chanids); free(s->auth_display); free(s->auth_data); free(s->auth_proto); free(s->subsys); if (s->env != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) { free(s->env[i].name); free(s->env[i].val); } free(s->env); } session_proctitle(s); session_unused(s->self); } void session_close_by_pid(pid_t pid, int status) { Session *s = session_by_pid(pid); if (s == NULL) { debug("session_close_by_pid: no session for pid %ld", (long)pid); return; } if (s->chanid != -1) session_exit_message(s, status); if (s->ttyfd != -1) session_pty_cleanup(s); s->pid = 0; } /* * this is called when a channel dies before * the session 'child' itself dies */ void session_close_by_channel(int id, void *arg) { Session *s = session_by_channel(id); u_int i; if (s == NULL) { debug("session_close_by_channel: no session for id %d", id); return; } debug("session_close_by_channel: channel %d child %ld", id, (long)s->pid); if (s->pid != 0) { debug("session_close_by_channel: channel %d: has child", id); /* * delay detach of session, but release pty, since * the fd's to the child are already closed */ if (s->ttyfd != -1) session_pty_cleanup(s); return; } /* detach by removing callback */ channel_cancel_cleanup(s->chanid); /* Close any X11 listeners associated with this session */ if (s->x11_chanids != NULL) { for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) { session_close_x11(s->x11_chanids[i]); s->x11_chanids[i] = -1; } } s->chanid = -1; session_close(s); } void session_destroy_all(void (*closefunc)(Session *)) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used) { if (closefunc != NULL) closefunc(s); else session_close(s); } } } static char * session_tty_list(void) { static char buf[1024]; int i; char *cp; buf[0] = '\0'; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1) { if (strncmp(s->tty, "/dev/", 5) != 0) { cp = strrchr(s->tty, '/'); cp = (cp == NULL) ? s->tty : cp + 1; } else cp = s->tty + 5; if (buf[0] != '\0') strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof buf); strlcat(buf, cp, sizeof buf); } } if (buf[0] == '\0') strlcpy(buf, "notty", sizeof buf); return buf; } void session_proctitle(Session *s) { if (s->pw == NULL) error("no user for session %d", s->self); else setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, session_tty_list()); } int session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s) { struct stat st; char display[512], auth_display[512]; char hostname[NI_MAXHOST]; u_int i; if (no_x11_forwarding_flag) { packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled in user configuration file."); return 0; } if (!options.x11_forwarding) { debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file."); return 0; } if (options.xauth_location == NULL || (stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) { packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward with spoofing."); return 0; } if (options.use_login) { packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled; " "not compatible with UseLogin=yes."); return 0; } if (s->display != NULL) { debug("X11 display already set."); return 0; } if (x11_create_display_inet(options.x11_display_offset, options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection, &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) { debug("x11_create_display_inet failed."); return 0; } for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) { channel_register_cleanup(s->x11_chanids[i], session_close_single_x11, 0); } /* Set up a suitable value for the DISPLAY variable. */ if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0) fatal("gethostname: %.100s", strerror(errno)); /* * auth_display must be used as the displayname when the * authorization entry is added with xauth(1). This will be * different than the DISPLAY string for localhost displays. */ if (options.x11_use_localhost) { snprintf(display, sizeof display, "localhost:%u.%u", s->display_number, s->screen); snprintf(auth_display, sizeof auth_display, "unix:%u.%u", s->display_number, s->screen); s->display = xstrdup(display); s->auth_display = xstrdup(auth_display); } else { #ifdef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY struct hostent *he; struct in_addr my_addr; he = gethostbyname(hostname); if (he == NULL) { error("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY."); packet_send_debug("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY."); return 0; } memcpy(&my_addr, he->h_addr_list[0], sizeof(struct in_addr)); snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.50s:%u.%u", inet_ntoa(my_addr), s->display_number, s->screen); #else snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.400s:%u.%u", hostname, s->display_number, s->screen); #endif s->display = xstrdup(display); s->auth_display = xstrdup(display); } return 1; } static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt) { server_loop2(authctxt); } void do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt) { static int called = 0; debug("do_cleanup"); /* no cleanup if we're in the child for login shell */ if (is_child) return; /* avoid double cleanup */ if (called) return; called = 1; if (authctxt == NULL) return; #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) { sshpam_cleanup(); sshpam_thread_cleanup(); } #endif if (!authctxt->authenticated) return; #ifdef KRB5 if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup && authctxt->krb5_ctx) krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt); #endif #ifdef GSSAPI if (compat20 && options.gss_cleanup_creds) ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(); #endif /* remove agent socket */ auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw); /* * Cleanup ptys/utmp only if privsep is disabled, * or if running in monitor. */ if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2); } Index: head/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,1895 +1,1898 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.117 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.120 2015/05/28 04:50:53 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* XXX: memleaks */ /* XXX: signed vs unsigned */ /* XXX: remove all logging, only return status codes */ /* XXX: copy between two remote sites */ #include "includes.h" #include /* MIN MAX */ #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "log.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "progressmeter.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sftp.h" #include "sftp-common.h" #include "sftp-client.h" extern volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted; extern int showprogress; /* Minimum amount of data to read at a time */ #define MIN_READ_SIZE 512 /* Maximum depth to descend in directory trees */ #define MAX_DIR_DEPTH 64 struct sftp_conn { int fd_in; int fd_out; u_int transfer_buflen; u_int num_requests; u_int version; u_int msg_id; #define SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME 0x00000001 #define SFTP_EXT_STATVFS 0x00000002 #define SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS 0x00000004 #define SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK 0x00000008 #define SFTP_EXT_FSYNC 0x00000010 u_int exts; u_int64_t limit_kbps; struct bwlimit bwlimit_in, bwlimit_out; }; static u_char * get_handle(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, size_t *len, const char *errfmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 4, 5))); /* ARGSUSED */ static int sftpio(void *_bwlimit, size_t amount) { struct bwlimit *bwlimit = (struct bwlimit *)_bwlimit; bandwidth_limit(bwlimit, amount); return 0; } static void send_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m) { u_char mlen[4]; struct iovec iov[2]; if (sshbuf_len(m) > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) fatal("Outbound message too long %zu", sshbuf_len(m)); /* Send length first */ put_u32(mlen, sshbuf_len(m)); iov[0].iov_base = mlen; iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(mlen); iov[1].iov_base = (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(m); iov[1].iov_len = sshbuf_len(m); if (atomiciov6(writev, conn->fd_out, iov, 2, conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_out) != sshbuf_len(m) + sizeof(mlen)) fatal("Couldn't send packet: %s", strerror(errno)); sshbuf_reset(m); } static void get_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sshbuf *m) { u_int msg_len; u_char *p; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, 4, &p)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, 4, conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_in) != 4) { if (errno == EPIPE) fatal("Connection closed"); else fatal("Couldn't read packet: %s", strerror(errno)); } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &msg_len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) fatal("Received message too long %u", msg_len); if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, p, msg_len, conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_in) != msg_len) { if (errno == EPIPE) fatal("Connection closed"); else fatal("Read packet: %s", strerror(errno)); } } static void send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, const char *s, u_int len) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, s, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", conn->fd_out, code, id); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void send_string_attrs_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, const void *s, u_int len, Attrib *a) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, code)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, s, len)) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", conn->fd_out, code, id); sshbuf_free(msg); } static u_int get_status(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_char type; u_int id, status; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(msg); debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status); return status; } static u_char * get_handle(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, size_t *len, const char *errfmt, ...) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int id, status; u_char type; u_char *handle; char errmsg[256]; va_list args; int r; va_start(args, errfmt); if (errfmt != NULL) vsnprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), errfmt, args); va_end(args); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (id != expected_id) fatal("%s: ID mismatch (%u != %u)", errfmt == NULL ? __func__ : errmsg, id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (errfmt != NULL) error("%s: %s", errmsg, fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return(NULL); } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_HANDLE) fatal("%s: Expected SSH2_FXP_HANDLE(%u) packet, got %u", errfmt == NULL ? __func__ : errmsg, SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &handle, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(msg); return handle; } static Attrib * get_decode_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, int quiet) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int id; u_char type; int r; static Attrib a; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("Received stat reply T:%u I:%u", type, id); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (quiet) debug("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status)); else error("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return(NULL); } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_ATTRS) { fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_ATTRS(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_ATTRS, type); } if ((r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) { error("%s: couldn't decode attrib: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(msg); return NULL; } sshbuf_free(msg); return &a; } static int get_decode_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sftp_statvfs *st, u_int expected_id, int quiet) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_char type; u_int id; u_int64_t flag; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("Received statvfs reply T:%u I:%u", type, id); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (quiet) debug("Couldn't statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status)); else error("Couldn't statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return -1; } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY) { fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY, type); } memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st)); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bsize)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_frsize)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bfree)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_bavail)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_files)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_ffree)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_favail)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_fsid)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &flag)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(msg, &st->f_namemax)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); st->f_flag = (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY) ? ST_RDONLY : 0; st->f_flag |= (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID) ? ST_NOSUID : 0; sshbuf_free(msg); return 0; } struct sftp_conn * do_init(int fd_in, int fd_out, u_int transfer_buflen, u_int num_requests, u_int64_t limit_kbps) { u_char type; struct sshbuf *msg; struct sftp_conn *ret; int r; ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret)); ret->msg_id = 1; ret->fd_in = fd_in; ret->fd_out = fd_out; ret->transfer_buflen = transfer_buflen; ret->num_requests = num_requests; ret->exts = 0; ret->limit_kbps = 0; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_INIT)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(ret, msg); sshbuf_reset(msg); get_msg(ret, msg); /* Expecting a VERSION reply */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (type != SSH2_FXP_VERSION) { error("Invalid packet back from SSH2_FXP_INIT (type %u)", type); sshbuf_free(msg); + free(ret); return(NULL); } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &ret->version)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug2("Remote version: %u", ret->version); /* Check for extensions */ while (sshbuf_len(msg) > 0) { char *name; u_char *value; size_t vlen; int known = 0; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &value, &vlen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (strcmp(name, "posix-rename@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "statvfs@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "2") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_STATVFS; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "fstatvfs@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "2") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "hardlink@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "fsync@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp((char *)value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSYNC; known = 1; } if (known) { debug2("Server supports extension \"%s\" revision %s", name, value); } else { debug2("Unrecognised server extension \"%s\"", name); } free(name); free(value); } sshbuf_free(msg); /* Some filexfer v.0 servers don't support large packets */ if (ret->version == 0) ret->transfer_buflen = MIN(ret->transfer_buflen, 20480); ret->limit_kbps = limit_kbps; if (ret->limit_kbps > 0) { bandwidth_limit_init(&ret->bwlimit_in, ret->limit_kbps, ret->transfer_buflen); bandwidth_limit_init(&ret->bwlimit_out, ret->limit_kbps, ret->transfer_buflen); } return ret; } u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *conn) { return conn->version; } int do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len) { u_int id, status; struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_CLOSE I:%u", id); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't close file: %s", fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } static int do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int print_flag, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int count, id, i, expected_id, ents = 0; size_t handle_len; u_char type; char *handle; int status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; int r; if (dir) *dir = NULL; id = conn->msg_id++; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len, "remote readdir(\"%s\")", path); if (handle == NULL) { sshbuf_free(msg); return -1; } if (dir) { ents = 0; *dir = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**dir)); (*dir)[0] = NULL; } for (; !interrupted;) { id = expected_id = conn->msg_id++; debug3("Sending SSH2_FXP_READDIR I:%u", id); sshbuf_reset(msg); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_READDIR)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_reset(msg); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u", type, id); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int rstatus; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &rstatus)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("Received SSH2_FXP_STATUS %d", rstatus); if (rstatus == SSH2_FX_EOF) break; error("Couldn't read directory: %s", fx2txt(rstatus)); goto out; } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (count == 0) break; debug3("Received %d SSH2_FXP_NAME responses", count); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { char *filename, *longname; Attrib a; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) { error("%s: couldn't decode attrib: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(filename); free(longname); sshbuf_free(msg); return -1; } if (print_flag) printf("%s\n", longname); /* * Directory entries should never contain '/' * These can be used to attack recursive ops * (e.g. send '../../../../etc/passwd') */ if (strchr(filename, '/') != NULL) { error("Server sent suspect path \"%s\" " "during readdir of \"%s\"", filename, path); } else if (dir) { - *dir = xrealloc(*dir, ents + 2, sizeof(**dir)); + *dir = xreallocarray(*dir, ents + 2, sizeof(**dir)); (*dir)[ents] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(***dir)); (*dir)[ents]->filename = xstrdup(filename); (*dir)[ents]->longname = xstrdup(longname); memcpy(&(*dir)[ents]->a, &a, sizeof(a)); (*dir)[++ents] = NULL; } free(filename); free(longname); } } status = 0; out: sshbuf_free(msg); do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); free(handle); if (status != 0 && dir != NULL) { /* Don't return results on error */ free_sftp_dirents(*dir); *dir = NULL; } else if (interrupted && dir != NULL && *dir != NULL) { /* Don't return partial matches on interrupt */ free_sftp_dirents(*dir); *dir = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**dir)); **dir = NULL; } return status; } int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) { return(do_lsreaddir(conn, path, 0, dir)); } void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **s) { int i; if (s == NULL) return; for (i = 0; s[i]; i++) { free(s[i]->filename); free(s[i]->longname); free(s[i]); } free(s); } int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { u_int status, id; debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REMOVE \"%s\"", path); id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, path, strlen(path)); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't delete file: %s", fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a, int print_flag) { u_int status, id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, path, strlen(path), a); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK && print_flag) error("Couldn't create directory: %s", fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { u_int status, id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, path, strlen(path)); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't remove directory: %s", fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } Attrib * do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet) { u_int id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, conn->version == 0 ? SSH2_FXP_STAT_VERSION_0 : SSH2_FXP_STAT, path, strlen(path)); return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet)); } Attrib * do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int quiet) { u_int id; if (conn->version == 0) { if (quiet) debug("Server version does not support lstat operation"); else logit("Server version does not support lstat operation"); return(do_stat(conn, path, quiet)); } id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, path, strlen(path)); return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet)); } #ifdef notyet Attrib * do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len, int quiet) { u_int id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, handle, handle_len); return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet)); } #endif int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a) { u_int status, id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, path, strlen(path), a); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't setstat on \"%s\": %s", path, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len, Attrib *a) { u_int status, id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, handle, handle_len, a); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't fsetstat: %s", fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } char * do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int expected_id, count, id; char *filename, *longname; Attrib a; u_char type; int r; expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, path, strlen(path)); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); error("Couldn't canonicalize: %s", fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return NULL; } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (count != 1) fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_REALPATH", count); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0 || (r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("SSH_FXP_REALPATH %s -> %s size %lu", path, filename, (unsigned long)a.size); free(longname); sshbuf_free(msg); return(filename); } int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath, int force_legacy) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int status, id; int r, use_ext = (conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME) && !force_legacy; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* Send rename request */ id = conn->msg_id++; if (use_ext) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "posix-rename@openssh.com")) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_RENAME)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message %s \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", use_ext ? "posix-rename@openssh.com" : "SSH2_FXP_RENAME", oldpath, newpath); sshbuf_free(msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't rename file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, newpath, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int status, id; int r; if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK) == 0) { error("Server does not support hardlink@openssh.com extension"); return -1; } if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* Send link request */ id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "hardlink@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message hardlink@openssh.com \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); sshbuf_free(msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't link file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, newpath, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *oldpath, const char *newpath) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int status, id; int r; if (conn->version < 3) { error("This server does not support the symlink operation"); return(SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED); } if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* Send symlink request */ id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, oldpath)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, newpath)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); sshbuf_free(msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't symlink file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, newpath, fx2txt(status)); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_char *handle, u_int handle_len) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int status, id; int r; /* Silently return if the extension is not supported */ if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSYNC) == 0) return -1; /* Send fsync request */ if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fsync@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message fsync@openssh.com I:%u", id); sshbuf_free(msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't sync file: %s", fx2txt(status)); return status; } #ifdef notyet char * do_readlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int expected_id, count, id; char *filename, *longname; Attrib a; u_char type; int r; expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, path, strlen(path)); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); error("Couldn't readlink: %s", fx2txt(status)); sshbuf_free(msg); return(NULL); } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &count)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (count != 1) fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_READLINK", count); if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &filename, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &longname, NULL)) != 0 || (r = decode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("SSH_FXP_READLINK %s -> %s", path, filename); free(longname); sshbuf_free(msg); return filename; } #endif int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, struct sftp_statvfs *st, int quiet) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int id; int r; if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_STATVFS) == 0) { error("Server does not support statvfs@openssh.com extension"); return -1; } id = conn->msg_id++; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); sshbuf_reset(msg); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "statvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, path)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_free(msg); return get_decode_statvfs(conn, st, id, quiet); } #ifdef notyet int do_fstatvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len, struct sftp_statvfs *st, int quiet) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int id; if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS) == 0) { error("Server does not support fstatvfs@openssh.com extension"); return -1; } id = conn->msg_id++; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); sshbuf_reset(msg); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fstatvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_free(msg); return get_decode_statvfs(conn, st, id, quiet); } #endif static void send_read_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int64_t offset, u_int len, const u_char *handle, u_int handle_len) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); sshbuf_reset(msg); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_READ)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, offset)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } int do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path, const char *local_path, Attrib *a, int preserve_flag, int resume_flag, int fsync_flag) { Attrib junk; struct sshbuf *msg; u_char *handle; int local_fd = -1, write_error; int read_error, write_errno, reordered = 0, r; u_int64_t offset = 0, size, highwater; u_int mode, id, buflen, num_req, max_req, status = SSH2_FX_OK; off_t progress_counter; size_t handle_len; struct stat st; struct request { u_int id; size_t len; u_int64_t offset; TAILQ_ENTRY(request) tq; }; TAILQ_HEAD(reqhead, request) requests; struct request *req; u_char type; TAILQ_INIT(&requests); if (a == NULL && (a = do_stat(conn, remote_path, 0)) == NULL) return -1; /* Do not preserve set[ug]id here, as we do not preserve ownership */ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) mode = a->perm & 0777; else mode = 0666; if ((a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) && (!S_ISREG(a->perm))) { error("Cannot download non-regular file: %s", remote_path); return(-1); } if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) size = a->size; else size = 0; buflen = conn->transfer_buflen; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); attrib_clear(&junk); /* Send empty attributes */ /* Send open request */ id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, remote_path)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FXF_READ)) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, &junk)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, remote_path); handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len, "remote open(\"%s\")", remote_path); if (handle == NULL) { sshbuf_free(msg); return(-1); } local_fd = open(local_path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | (resume_flag ? 0 : O_TRUNC), mode | S_IWUSR); if (local_fd == -1) { error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for writing: %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } offset = highwater = 0; if (resume_flag) { if (fstat(local_fd, &st) == -1) { error("Unable to stat local file \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } if (st.st_size < 0) { error("\"%s\" has negative size", local_path); goto fail; } if ((u_int64_t)st.st_size > size) { error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": " "local file is larger than remote", local_path); fail: do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); sshbuf_free(msg); free(handle); if (local_fd != -1) close(local_fd); return -1; } offset = highwater = st.st_size; } /* Read from remote and write to local */ write_error = read_error = write_errno = num_req = 0; max_req = 1; progress_counter = offset; if (showprogress && size != 0) start_progress_meter(remote_path, size, &progress_counter); while (num_req > 0 || max_req > 0) { u_char *data; size_t len; /* * Simulate EOF on interrupt: stop sending new requests and * allow outstanding requests to drain gracefully */ if (interrupted) { if (num_req == 0) /* If we haven't started yet... */ break; max_req = 0; } /* Send some more requests */ while (num_req < max_req) { debug3("Request range %llu -> %llu (%d/%d)", (unsigned long long)offset, (unsigned long long)offset + buflen - 1, num_req, max_req); req = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*req)); req->id = conn->msg_id++; req->len = buflen; req->offset = offset; offset += buflen; num_req++; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&requests, req, tq); send_read_request(conn, req->id, req->offset, req->len, handle, handle_len); } sshbuf_reset(msg); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u R:%d", type, id, max_req); /* Find the request in our queue */ for (req = TAILQ_FIRST(&requests); req != NULL && req->id != id; req = TAILQ_NEXT(req, tq)) ; if (req == NULL) fatal("Unexpected reply %u", id); switch (type) { case SSH2_FXP_STATUS: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (status != SSH2_FX_EOF) read_error = 1; max_req = 0; TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq); free(req); num_req--; break; case SSH2_FXP_DATA: if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &data, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("Received data %llu -> %llu", (unsigned long long)req->offset, (unsigned long long)req->offset + len - 1); if (len > req->len) fatal("Received more data than asked for " "%zu > %zu", len, req->len); if ((lseek(local_fd, req->offset, SEEK_SET) == -1 || atomicio(vwrite, local_fd, data, len) != len) && !write_error) { write_errno = errno; write_error = 1; max_req = 0; } else if (!reordered && req->offset <= highwater) highwater = req->offset + len; else if (!reordered && req->offset > highwater) reordered = 1; progress_counter += len; free(data); if (len == req->len) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq); free(req); num_req--; } else { /* Resend the request for the missing data */ debug3("Short data block, re-requesting " "%llu -> %llu (%2d)", (unsigned long long)req->offset + len, (unsigned long long)req->offset + req->len - 1, num_req); req->id = conn->msg_id++; req->len -= len; req->offset += len; send_read_request(conn, req->id, req->offset, req->len, handle, handle_len); /* Reduce the request size */ if (len < buflen) buflen = MAX(MIN_READ_SIZE, len); } if (max_req > 0) { /* max_req = 0 iff EOF received */ if (size > 0 && offset > size) { /* Only one request at a time * after the expected EOF */ debug3("Finish at %llu (%2d)", (unsigned long long)offset, num_req); max_req = 1; } else if (max_req <= conn->num_requests) { ++max_req; } } break; default: fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_DATA(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_DATA, type); } } if (showprogress && size) stop_progress_meter(); /* Sanity check */ if (TAILQ_FIRST(&requests) != NULL) fatal("Transfer complete, but requests still in queue"); /* Truncate at highest contiguous point to avoid holes on interrupt */ if (read_error || write_error || interrupted) { if (reordered && resume_flag) { error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": " "server reordered requests", local_path); } debug("truncating at %llu", (unsigned long long)highwater); - ftruncate(local_fd, highwater); + if (ftruncate(local_fd, highwater) == -1) + error("ftruncate \"%s\": %s", local_path, + strerror(errno)); } if (read_error) { error("Couldn't read from remote file \"%s\" : %s", remote_path, fx2txt(status)); status = -1; do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); } else if (write_error) { error("Couldn't write to \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(write_errno)); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); } else { if (do_close(conn, handle, handle_len) != 0 || interrupted) status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; else status = SSH2_FX_OK; /* Override umask and utimes if asked */ #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD if (preserve_flag && fchmod(local_fd, mode) == -1) #else if (preserve_flag && chmod(local_path, mode) == -1) #endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ error("Couldn't set mode on \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); if (preserve_flag && (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME)) { struct timeval tv[2]; tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime; tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime; tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0; if (utimes(local_path, tv) == -1) error("Can't set times on \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); } if (fsync_flag) { debug("syncing \"%s\"", local_path); if (fsync(local_fd) == -1) error("Couldn't sync file \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); } } close(local_fd); sshbuf_free(msg); free(handle); return(status); } static int download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int depth, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag, int fsync_flag) { int i, ret = 0; SFTP_DIRENT **dir_entries; char *filename, *new_src, *new_dst; mode_t mode = 0777; if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) { error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth); return -1; } if (dirattrib == NULL && (dirattrib = do_stat(conn, src, 1)) == NULL) { error("Unable to stat remote directory \"%s\"", src); return -1; } if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) { error("\"%s\" is not a directory", src); return -1; } if (print_flag) printf("Retrieving %s\n", src); if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) mode = dirattrib->perm & 01777; else { debug("Server did not send permissions for " "directory \"%s\"", dst); } if (mkdir(dst, mode) == -1 && errno != EEXIST) { error("mkdir %s: %s", dst, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (do_readdir(conn, src, &dir_entries) == -1) { error("%s: Failed to get directory contents", src); return -1; } for (i = 0; dir_entries[i] != NULL && !interrupted; i++) { filename = dir_entries[i]->filename; new_dst = path_append(dst, filename); new_src = path_append(src, filename); if (S_ISDIR(dir_entries[i]->a.perm)) { if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 || strcmp(filename, "..") == 0) continue; if (download_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst, depth + 1, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag, print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1) ret = -1; } else if (S_ISREG(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ) { if (do_download(conn, new_src, new_dst, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1) { error("Download of file %s to %s failed", new_src, new_dst); ret = -1; } } else logit("%s: not a regular file\n", new_src); free(new_dst); free(new_src); } if (preserve_flag) { if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { struct timeval tv[2]; tv[0].tv_sec = dirattrib->atime; tv[1].tv_sec = dirattrib->mtime; tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0; if (utimes(dst, tv) == -1) error("Can't set times on \"%s\": %s", dst, strerror(errno)); } else debug("Server did not send times for directory " "\"%s\"", dst); } free_sftp_dirents(dir_entries); return ret; } int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag, int fsync_flag) { char *src_canon; int ret; if ((src_canon = do_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) { error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", src); return -1; } ret = download_dir_internal(conn, src_canon, dst, 0, dirattrib, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag); free(src_canon); return ret; } int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *local_path, const char *remote_path, int preserve_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag) { int r, local_fd; u_int status = SSH2_FX_OK; u_int id; u_char type; off_t offset, progress_counter; u_char *handle, *data; struct sshbuf *msg; struct stat sb; Attrib a, *c = NULL; u_int32_t startid; u_int32_t ackid; struct outstanding_ack { u_int id; u_int len; off_t offset; TAILQ_ENTRY(outstanding_ack) tq; }; TAILQ_HEAD(ackhead, outstanding_ack) acks; struct outstanding_ack *ack = NULL; size_t handle_len; TAILQ_INIT(&acks); if ((local_fd = open(local_path, O_RDONLY, 0)) == -1) { error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for reading: %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); return(-1); } if (fstat(local_fd, &sb) == -1) { error("Couldn't fstat local file \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); close(local_fd); return(-1); } if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { error("%s is not a regular file", local_path); close(local_fd); return(-1); } stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a); a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE; a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; a.perm &= 0777; if (!preserve_flag) a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME; if (resume) { /* Get remote file size if it exists */ if ((c = do_stat(conn, remote_path, 0)) == NULL) { close(local_fd); return -1; } if ((off_t)c->size >= sb.st_size) { error("destination file bigger or same size as " "source file"); close(local_fd); return -1; } if (lseek(local_fd, (off_t)c->size, SEEK_SET) == -1) { close(local_fd); return -1; } } if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* Send open request */ id = conn->msg_id++; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, remote_path)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT| (resume ? SSH2_FXF_APPEND : SSH2_FXF_TRUNC))) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, &a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, remote_path); sshbuf_reset(msg); handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len, "remote open(\"%s\")", remote_path); if (handle == NULL) { close(local_fd); sshbuf_free(msg); return -1; } startid = ackid = id + 1; data = xmalloc(conn->transfer_buflen); /* Read from local and write to remote */ offset = progress_counter = (resume ? c->size : 0); if (showprogress) start_progress_meter(local_path, sb.st_size, &progress_counter); for (;;) { int len; /* * Can't use atomicio here because it returns 0 on EOF, * thus losing the last block of the file. * Simulate an EOF on interrupt, allowing ACKs from the * server to drain. */ if (interrupted || status != SSH2_FX_OK) len = 0; else do len = read(local_fd, data, conn->transfer_buflen); while ((len == -1) && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)); if (len == -1) fatal("Couldn't read from \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); if (len != 0) { ack = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ack)); ack->id = ++id; ack->offset = offset; ack->len = len; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&acks, ack, tq); sshbuf_reset(msg); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_WRITE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, ack->id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, handle, handle_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, offset)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(conn, msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_WRITE I:%u O:%llu S:%u", id, (unsigned long long)offset, len); } else if (TAILQ_FIRST(&acks) == NULL) break; if (ack == NULL) fatal("Unexpected ACK %u", id); if (id == startid || len == 0 || id - ackid >= conn->num_requests) { u_int rid; sshbuf_reset(msg); get_msg(conn, msg); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &rid)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%d) packet, " "got %d", SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status); /* Find the request in our queue */ for (ack = TAILQ_FIRST(&acks); ack != NULL && ack->id != rid; ack = TAILQ_NEXT(ack, tq)) ; if (ack == NULL) fatal("Can't find request for ID %u", rid); TAILQ_REMOVE(&acks, ack, tq); debug3("In write loop, ack for %u %u bytes at %lld", ack->id, ack->len, (long long)ack->offset); ++ackid; progress_counter += ack->len; free(ack); } offset += len; if (offset < 0) fatal("%s: offset < 0", __func__); } sshbuf_free(msg); if (showprogress) stop_progress_meter(); free(data); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) { error("Couldn't write to remote file \"%s\": %s", remote_path, fx2txt(status)); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; } if (close(local_fd) == -1) { error("Couldn't close local file \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; } /* Override umask and utimes if asked */ if (preserve_flag) do_fsetstat(conn, handle, handle_len, &a); if (fsync_flag) (void)do_fsync(conn, handle, handle_len); if (do_close(conn, handle, handle_len) != SSH2_FX_OK) status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; free(handle); return status == SSH2_FX_OK ? 0 : -1; } static int upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int depth, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag) { int ret = 0; u_int status; DIR *dirp; struct dirent *dp; char *filename, *new_src, *new_dst; struct stat sb; Attrib a; if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) { error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth); return -1; } if (stat(src, &sb) == -1) { error("Couldn't stat directory \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (!S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) { error("\"%s\" is not a directory", src); return -1; } if (print_flag) printf("Entering %s\n", src); attrib_clear(&a); stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a); a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE; a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; a.perm &= 01777; if (!preserve_flag) a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME; status = do_mkdir(conn, dst, &a, 0); /* * we lack a portable status for errno EEXIST, * so if we get a SSH2_FX_FAILURE back we must check * if it was created successfully. */ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) { if (status != SSH2_FX_FAILURE) return -1; if (do_stat(conn, dst, 0) == NULL) return -1; } if ((dirp = opendir(src)) == NULL) { error("Failed to open dir \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno)); return -1; } while (((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) && !interrupted) { if (dp->d_ino == 0) continue; filename = dp->d_name; new_dst = path_append(dst, filename); new_src = path_append(src, filename); if (lstat(new_src, &sb) == -1) { logit("%s: lstat failed: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); ret = -1; } else if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) { if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 || strcmp(filename, "..") == 0) continue; if (upload_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst, depth + 1, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume, fsync_flag) == -1) ret = -1; } else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { if (do_upload(conn, new_src, new_dst, preserve_flag, resume, fsync_flag) == -1) { error("Uploading of file %s to %s failed!", new_src, new_dst); ret = -1; } } else logit("%s: not a regular file\n", filename); free(new_dst); free(new_src); } do_setstat(conn, dst, &a); (void) closedir(dirp); return ret; } int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag) { char *dst_canon; int ret; if ((dst_canon = do_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) { error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", dst); return -1; } ret = upload_dir_internal(conn, src, dst_canon, 0, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume, fsync_flag); free(dst_canon); return ret; } char * path_append(const char *p1, const char *p2) { char *ret; size_t len = strlen(p1) + strlen(p2) + 2; ret = xmalloc(len); strlcpy(ret, p1, len); if (p1[0] != '\0' && p1[strlen(p1) - 1] != '/') strlcat(ret, "/", len); strlcat(ret, p2, len); return(ret); } Index: head/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/sftp-client.h (revision 294336) @@ -1,136 +1,136 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.26 2015/01/14 13:54:13 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.27 2015/05/08 06:45:13 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* Client side of SSH2 filexfer protocol */ #ifndef _SFTP_CLIENT_H #define _SFTP_CLIENT_H typedef struct SFTP_DIRENT SFTP_DIRENT; struct SFTP_DIRENT { char *filename; char *longname; Attrib a; }; /* * Used for statvfs responses on the wire from the server, because the * server's native format may be larger than the client's. */ struct sftp_statvfs { u_int64_t f_bsize; u_int64_t f_frsize; u_int64_t f_blocks; u_int64_t f_bfree; u_int64_t f_bavail; u_int64_t f_files; u_int64_t f_ffree; u_int64_t f_favail; u_int64_t f_fsid; u_int64_t f_flag; u_int64_t f_namemax; }; /* * Initialise a SSH filexfer connection. Returns NULL on error or * a pointer to a initialized sftp_conn struct on success. */ struct sftp_conn *do_init(int, int, u_int, u_int, u_int64_t); u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *); /* Close file referred to by 'handle' */ int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, const u_char *, u_int); /* Read contents of 'path' to NULL-terminated array 'dir' */ int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***); /* Frees a NULL-terminated array of SFTP_DIRENTs (eg. from do_readdir) */ void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **); /* Delete file 'path' */ int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, const char *); /* Create directory 'path' */ int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *, int); /* Remove directory 'path' */ int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *); /* Get file attributes of 'path' (follows symlinks) */ Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int); /* Get file attributes of 'path' (does not follow symlinks) */ Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int); /* Set file attributes of 'path' */ int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, Attrib *); /* Set file attributes of open file 'handle' */ int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, const u_char *, u_int, Attrib *); /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */ char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *); /* Get statistics for filesystem hosting file at "path" */ int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, struct sftp_statvfs *, int); /* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int force_legacy); /* Link 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *); /* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *); /* Call fsync() on open file 'handle' */ int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_char *, u_int); /* * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times * if 'pflag' is set */ int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int, int, int); /* - * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve + * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve * times if 'pflag' is set */ int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *, int, int, int, int); /* * Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times * if 'pflag' is set */ int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int); /* - * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve + * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve * times if 'pflag' is set */ int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int, int); /* Concatenate paths, taking care of slashes. Caller must free result. */ char *path_append(const char *, const char *); #endif Index: head/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/sftp-server.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,1712 +1,1711 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.105 2015/01/20 23:14:00 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.106 2015/04/24 01:36:01 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include /* MIN */ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include -#include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "match.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "sftp.h" #include "sftp-common.h" /* Our verbosity */ static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; /* Our client */ static struct passwd *pw = NULL; static char *client_addr = NULL; /* input and output queue */ struct sshbuf *iqueue; struct sshbuf *oqueue; /* Version of client */ static u_int version; /* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */ static int init_done; /* Disable writes */ static int readonly; /* Requests that are allowed/denied */ static char *request_whitelist, *request_blacklist; /* portable attributes, etc. */ typedef struct Stat Stat; struct Stat { char *name; char *long_name; Attrib attrib; }; /* Packet handlers */ static void process_open(u_int32_t id); static void process_close(u_int32_t id); static void process_read(u_int32_t id); static void process_write(u_int32_t id); static void process_stat(u_int32_t id); static void process_lstat(u_int32_t id); static void process_fstat(u_int32_t id); static void process_setstat(u_int32_t id); static void process_fsetstat(u_int32_t id); static void process_opendir(u_int32_t id); static void process_readdir(u_int32_t id); static void process_remove(u_int32_t id); static void process_mkdir(u_int32_t id); static void process_rmdir(u_int32_t id); static void process_realpath(u_int32_t id); static void process_rename(u_int32_t id); static void process_readlink(u_int32_t id); static void process_symlink(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_posix_rename(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_statvfs(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_fstatvfs(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_hardlink(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_fsync(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended(u_int32_t id); struct sftp_handler { const char *name; /* user-visible name for fine-grained perms */ const char *ext_name; /* extended request name */ u_int type; /* packet type, for non extended packets */ void (*handler)(u_int32_t); int does_write; /* if nonzero, banned for readonly mode */ }; struct sftp_handler handlers[] = { /* NB. SSH2_FXP_OPEN does the readonly check in the handler itself */ { "open", NULL, SSH2_FXP_OPEN, process_open, 0 }, { "close", NULL, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE, process_close, 0 }, { "read", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READ, process_read, 0 }, { "write", NULL, SSH2_FXP_WRITE, process_write, 1 }, { "lstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, process_lstat, 0 }, { "fstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, process_fstat, 0 }, { "setstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, process_setstat, 1 }, { "fsetstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, process_fsetstat, 1 }, { "opendir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR, process_opendir, 0 }, { "readdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READDIR, process_readdir, 0 }, { "remove", NULL, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, process_remove, 1 }, { "mkdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, process_mkdir, 1 }, { "rmdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, process_rmdir, 1 }, { "realpath", NULL, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, process_realpath, 0 }, { "stat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_STAT, process_stat, 0 }, { "rename", NULL, SSH2_FXP_RENAME, process_rename, 1 }, { "readlink", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, process_readlink, 0 }, { "symlink", NULL, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK, process_symlink, 1 }, { NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 } }; /* SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED submessages */ struct sftp_handler extended_handlers[] = { { "posix-rename", "posix-rename@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_posix_rename, 1 }, { "statvfs", "statvfs@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_statvfs, 0 }, { "fstatvfs", "fstatvfs@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_fstatvfs, 0 }, { "hardlink", "hardlink@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_hardlink, 1 }, { "fsync", "fsync@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_fsync, 1 }, { NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 } }; static int request_permitted(struct sftp_handler *h) { char *result; if (readonly && h->does_write) { verbose("Refusing %s request in read-only mode", h->name); return 0; } if (request_blacklist != NULL && ((result = match_list(h->name, request_blacklist, NULL))) != NULL) { free(result); verbose("Refusing blacklisted %s request", h->name); return 0; } if (request_whitelist != NULL && ((result = match_list(h->name, request_whitelist, NULL))) != NULL) { free(result); debug2("Permitting whitelisted %s request", h->name); return 1; } if (request_whitelist != NULL) { verbose("Refusing non-whitelisted %s request", h->name); return 0; } return 1; } static int errno_to_portable(int unixerrno) { int ret = 0; switch (unixerrno) { case 0: ret = SSH2_FX_OK; break; case ENOENT: case ENOTDIR: case EBADF: case ELOOP: ret = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE; break; case EPERM: case EACCES: case EFAULT: ret = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED; break; case ENAMETOOLONG: case EINVAL: ret = SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE; break; case ENOSYS: ret = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED; break; default: ret = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; break; } return ret; } static int flags_from_portable(int pflags) { int flags = 0; if ((pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) && (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE)) { flags = O_RDWR; } else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) { flags = O_RDONLY; } else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE) { flags = O_WRONLY; } if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_APPEND) flags |= O_APPEND; if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT) flags |= O_CREAT; if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC) flags |= O_TRUNC; if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL) flags |= O_EXCL; return flags; } static const char * string_from_portable(int pflags) { static char ret[128]; *ret = '\0'; #define PAPPEND(str) { \ if (*ret != '\0') \ strlcat(ret, ",", sizeof(ret)); \ strlcat(ret, str, sizeof(ret)); \ } if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) PAPPEND("READ") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE) PAPPEND("WRITE") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_APPEND) PAPPEND("APPEND") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT) PAPPEND("CREATE") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC) PAPPEND("TRUNCATE") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL) PAPPEND("EXCL") return ret; } /* handle handles */ typedef struct Handle Handle; struct Handle { int use; DIR *dirp; int fd; int flags; char *name; u_int64_t bytes_read, bytes_write; int next_unused; }; enum { HANDLE_UNUSED, HANDLE_DIR, HANDLE_FILE }; Handle *handles = NULL; u_int num_handles = 0; int first_unused_handle = -1; static void handle_unused(int i) { handles[i].use = HANDLE_UNUSED; handles[i].next_unused = first_unused_handle; first_unused_handle = i; } static int handle_new(int use, const char *name, int fd, int flags, DIR *dirp) { int i; if (first_unused_handle == -1) { if (num_handles + 1 <= num_handles) return -1; num_handles++; - handles = xrealloc(handles, num_handles, sizeof(Handle)); + handles = xreallocarray(handles, num_handles, sizeof(Handle)); handle_unused(num_handles - 1); } i = first_unused_handle; first_unused_handle = handles[i].next_unused; handles[i].use = use; handles[i].dirp = dirp; handles[i].fd = fd; handles[i].flags = flags; handles[i].name = xstrdup(name); handles[i].bytes_read = handles[i].bytes_write = 0; return i; } static int handle_is_ok(int i, int type) { return i >= 0 && (u_int)i < num_handles && handles[i].use == type; } static int handle_to_string(int handle, u_char **stringp, int *hlenp) { if (stringp == NULL || hlenp == NULL) return -1; *stringp = xmalloc(sizeof(int32_t)); put_u32(*stringp, handle); *hlenp = sizeof(int32_t); return 0; } static int handle_from_string(const u_char *handle, u_int hlen) { int val; if (hlen != sizeof(int32_t)) return -1; val = get_u32(handle); if (handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_FILE) || handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_DIR)) return val; return -1; } static char * handle_to_name(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)|| handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return handles[handle].name; return NULL; } static DIR * handle_to_dir(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)) return handles[handle].dirp; return NULL; } static int handle_to_fd(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return handles[handle].fd; return -1; } static int handle_to_flags(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return handles[handle].flags; return 0; } static void handle_update_read(int handle, ssize_t bytes) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0) handles[handle].bytes_read += bytes; } static void handle_update_write(int handle, ssize_t bytes) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0) handles[handle].bytes_write += bytes; } static u_int64_t handle_bytes_read(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return (handles[handle].bytes_read); return 0; } static u_int64_t handle_bytes_write(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return (handles[handle].bytes_write); return 0; } static int handle_close(int handle) { int ret = -1; if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) { ret = close(handles[handle].fd); free(handles[handle].name); handle_unused(handle); } else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)) { ret = closedir(handles[handle].dirp); free(handles[handle].name); handle_unused(handle); } else { errno = ENOENT; } return ret; } static void handle_log_close(int handle, char *emsg) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) { logit("%s%sclose \"%s\" bytes read %llu written %llu", emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ", handle_to_name(handle), (unsigned long long)handle_bytes_read(handle), (unsigned long long)handle_bytes_write(handle)); } else { logit("%s%sclosedir \"%s\"", emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ", handle_to_name(handle)); } } static void handle_log_exit(void) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < num_handles; i++) if (handles[i].use != HANDLE_UNUSED) handle_log_close(i, "forced"); } static int get_handle(struct sshbuf *queue, int *hp) { u_char *handle; int r; size_t hlen; *hp = -1; if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(queue, &handle, &hlen)) != 0) return r; if (hlen < 256) *hp = handle_from_string(handle, hlen); free(handle); return 0; } /* send replies */ static void send_msg(struct sshbuf *m) { int r; if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(oqueue, m)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_reset(m); } static const char * status_to_message(u_int32_t status) { const char *status_messages[] = { "Success", /* SSH_FX_OK */ "End of file", /* SSH_FX_EOF */ "No such file", /* SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE */ "Permission denied", /* SSH_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED */ "Failure", /* SSH_FX_FAILURE */ "Bad message", /* SSH_FX_BAD_MESSAGE */ "No connection", /* SSH_FX_NO_CONNECTION */ "Connection lost", /* SSH_FX_CONNECTION_LOST */ "Operation unsupported", /* SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED */ "Unknown error" /* Others */ }; return (status_messages[MIN(status,SSH2_FX_MAX)]); } static void send_status(u_int32_t id, u_int32_t status) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; debug3("request %u: sent status %u", id, status); if (log_level > SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE || (status != SSH2_FX_OK && status != SSH2_FX_EOF)) logit("sent status %s", status_to_message(status)); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_STATUS)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, status)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (version >= 3) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, status_to_message(status))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "")) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void send_data_or_handle(char type, u_int32_t id, const u_char *data, int dlen) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, dlen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void send_data(u_int32_t id, const u_char *data, int dlen) { debug("request %u: sent data len %d", id, dlen); send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_DATA, id, data, dlen); } static void send_handle(u_int32_t id, int handle) { u_char *string; int hlen; handle_to_string(handle, &string, &hlen); debug("request %u: sent handle handle %d", id, handle); send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, id, string, hlen); free(string); } static void send_names(u_int32_t id, int count, const Stat *stats) { struct sshbuf *msg; int i, r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_NAME)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, count)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: sent names count %d", id, count); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, stats[i].name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, stats[i].long_name)) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, &stats[i].attrib)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void send_attrib(u_int32_t id, const Attrib *a) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; debug("request %u: sent attrib have 0x%x", id, a->flags); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_ATTRS)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = encode_attrib(msg, a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void send_statvfs(u_int32_t id, struct statvfs *st) { struct sshbuf *msg; u_int64_t flag; int r; flag = (st->f_flag & ST_RDONLY) ? SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY : 0; flag |= (st->f_flag & ST_NOSUID) ? SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID : 0; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, id)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bsize)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_frsize)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_blocks)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bfree)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_bavail)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_files)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_ffree)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_favail)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, FSID_TO_ULONG(st->f_fsid))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, flag)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u64(msg, st->f_namemax)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } /* parse incoming */ static void process_init(void) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &version)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); verbose("received client version %u", version); if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_FXP_VERSION)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION)) != 0 || /* POSIX rename extension */ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "posix-rename@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "1")) != 0 || /* version */ /* statvfs extension */ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "statvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "2")) != 0 || /* version */ /* fstatvfs extension */ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fstatvfs@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "2")) != 0 || /* version */ /* hardlink extension */ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "hardlink@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "1")) != 0 || /* version */ /* fsync extension */ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "fsync@openssh.com")) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "1")) != 0) /* version */ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send_msg(msg); sshbuf_free(msg); } static void process_open(u_int32_t id) { u_int32_t pflags; Attrib a; char *name; int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */ (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags); flags = flags_from_portable(pflags); mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666; logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o", name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode); if (readonly && ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY || (flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDWR)) { verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode"); status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED; } else { fd = open(name, flags, mode); if (fd < 0) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else { handle = handle_new(HANDLE_FILE, name, fd, flags, NULL); if (handle < 0) { close(fd); } else { send_handle(id, handle); status = SSH2_FX_OK; } } } if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_close(u_int32_t id) { int r, handle, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: close handle %u", id, handle); handle_log_close(handle, NULL); ret = handle_close(handle); status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); } static void process_read(u_int32_t id) { u_char buf[64*1024]; u_int32_t len; int r, handle, fd, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; u_int64_t off; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(iqueue, &off)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: read \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %d", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len); if (len > sizeof buf) { len = sizeof buf; debug2("read change len %d", len); } fd = handle_to_fd(handle); if (fd >= 0) { if (lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) < 0) { error("process_read: seek failed"); status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else { ret = read(fd, buf, len); if (ret < 0) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else if (ret == 0) { status = SSH2_FX_EOF; } else { send_data(id, buf, ret); status = SSH2_FX_OK; handle_update_read(handle, ret); } } } if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); } static void process_write(u_int32_t id) { u_int64_t off; size_t len; int r, handle, fd, ret, status; u_char *data; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u64(iqueue, &off)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(iqueue, &data, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: write \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %zu", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len); fd = handle_to_fd(handle); if (fd < 0) status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; else { if (!(handle_to_flags(handle) & O_APPEND) && lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) < 0) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); error("process_write: seek failed"); } else { /* XXX ATOMICIO ? */ ret = write(fd, data, len); if (ret < 0) { error("process_write: write failed"); status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else if ((size_t)ret == len) { status = SSH2_FX_OK; handle_update_write(handle, ret); } else { debug2("nothing at all written"); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; } } } send_status(id, status); free(data); } static void process_do_stat(u_int32_t id, int do_lstat) { Attrib a; struct stat st; char *name; int r, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: %sstat", id, do_lstat ? "l" : ""); verbose("%sstat name \"%s\"", do_lstat ? "l" : "", name); r = do_lstat ? lstat(name, &st) : stat(name, &st); if (r < 0) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else { stat_to_attrib(&st, &a); send_attrib(id, &a); status = SSH2_FX_OK; } if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_stat(u_int32_t id) { process_do_stat(id, 0); } static void process_lstat(u_int32_t id) { process_do_stat(id, 1); } static void process_fstat(u_int32_t id) { Attrib a; struct stat st; int fd, r, handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: fstat \"%s\" (handle %u)", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle); fd = handle_to_fd(handle); if (fd >= 0) { r = fstat(fd, &st); if (r < 0) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else { stat_to_attrib(&st, &a); send_attrib(id, &a); status = SSH2_FX_OK; } } if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); } static struct timeval * attrib_to_tv(const Attrib *a) { static struct timeval tv[2]; tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime; tv[0].tv_usec = 0; tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime; tv[1].tv_usec = 0; return tv; } static void process_setstat(u_int32_t id) { Attrib a; char *name; int r, status = SSH2_FX_OK; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: setstat name \"%s\"", id, name); if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) { logit("set \"%s\" size %llu", name, (unsigned long long)a.size); r = truncate(name, a.size); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) { logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a.perm); r = chmod(name, a.perm & 07777); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { char buf[64]; time_t t = a.mtime; strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S", localtime(&t)); logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf); r = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(&a)); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name, (u_long)a.uid, (u_long)a.gid); r = chown(name, a.uid, a.gid); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_fsetstat(u_int32_t id) { Attrib a; int handle, fd, r; int status = SSH2_FX_OK; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0 || (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: fsetstat handle %d", id, handle); fd = handle_to_fd(handle); if (fd < 0) status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; else { char *name = handle_to_name(handle); if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) { logit("set \"%s\" size %llu", name, (unsigned long long)a.size); r = ftruncate(fd, a.size); if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) { logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a.perm); #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD r = fchmod(fd, a.perm & 07777); #else r = chmod(name, a.perm & 07777); #endif if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { char buf[64]; time_t t = a.mtime; strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S", localtime(&t)); logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf); #ifdef HAVE_FUTIMES r = futimes(fd, attrib_to_tv(&a)); #else r = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(&a)); #endif if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name, (u_long)a.uid, (u_long)a.gid); #ifdef HAVE_FCHOWN r = fchown(fd, a.uid, a.gid); #else r = chown(name, a.uid, a.gid); #endif if (r == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } } send_status(id, status); } static void process_opendir(u_int32_t id) { DIR *dirp = NULL; char *path; int r, handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: opendir", id); logit("opendir \"%s\"", path); dirp = opendir(path); if (dirp == NULL) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else { handle = handle_new(HANDLE_DIR, path, 0, 0, dirp); if (handle < 0) { closedir(dirp); } else { send_handle(id, handle); status = SSH2_FX_OK; } } if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); free(path); } static void process_readdir(u_int32_t id) { DIR *dirp; struct dirent *dp; char *path; int r, handle; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: readdir \"%s\" (handle %d)", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle); dirp = handle_to_dir(handle); path = handle_to_name(handle); if (dirp == NULL || path == NULL) { send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE); } else { struct stat st; char pathname[PATH_MAX]; Stat *stats; int nstats = 10, count = 0, i; stats = xcalloc(nstats, sizeof(Stat)); while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) { if (count >= nstats) { nstats *= 2; - stats = xrealloc(stats, nstats, sizeof(Stat)); + stats = xreallocarray(stats, nstats, sizeof(Stat)); } /* XXX OVERFLOW ? */ snprintf(pathname, sizeof pathname, "%s%s%s", path, strcmp(path, "/") ? "/" : "", dp->d_name); if (lstat(pathname, &st) < 0) continue; stat_to_attrib(&st, &(stats[count].attrib)); stats[count].name = xstrdup(dp->d_name); stats[count].long_name = ls_file(dp->d_name, &st, 0, 0); count++; /* send up to 100 entries in one message */ /* XXX check packet size instead */ if (count == 100) break; } if (count > 0) { send_names(id, count, stats); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { free(stats[i].name); free(stats[i].long_name); } } else { send_status(id, SSH2_FX_EOF); } free(stats); } } static void process_remove(u_int32_t id) { char *name; int r, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: remove", id); logit("remove name \"%s\"", name); r = unlink(name); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_mkdir(u_int32_t id) { Attrib a; char *name; int r, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = decode_attrib(iqueue, &a)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm & 07777 : 0777; debug3("request %u: mkdir", id); logit("mkdir name \"%s\" mode 0%o", name, mode); r = mkdir(name, mode); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_rmdir(u_int32_t id) { char *name; int r, status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: rmdir", id); logit("rmdir name \"%s\"", name); r = rmdir(name); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_realpath(u_int32_t id) { char resolvedname[PATH_MAX]; char *path; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (path[0] == '\0') { free(path); path = xstrdup("."); } debug3("request %u: realpath", id); verbose("realpath \"%s\"", path); if (realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) { send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); } else { Stat s; attrib_clear(&s.attrib); s.name = s.long_name = resolvedname; send_names(id, 1, &s); } free(path); } static void process_rename(u_int32_t id) { char *oldpath, *newpath; int r, status; struct stat sb; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: rename", id); logit("rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if (lstat(oldpath, &sb) == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { /* Race-free rename of regular files */ if (link(oldpath, newpath) == -1) { if (errno == EOPNOTSUPP || errno == ENOSYS #ifdef EXDEV || errno == EXDEV #endif #ifdef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO || errno == LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO #endif ) { struct stat st; /* * fs doesn't support links, so fall back to * stat+rename. This is racy. */ if (stat(newpath, &st) == -1) { if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); else status = SSH2_FX_OK; } } else { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } } else if (unlink(oldpath) == -1) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); /* clean spare link */ unlink(newpath); } else status = SSH2_FX_OK; } else if (stat(newpath, &sb) == -1) { if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); else status = SSH2_FX_OK; } send_status(id, status); free(oldpath); free(newpath); } static void process_readlink(u_int32_t id) { int r, len; char buf[PATH_MAX]; char *path; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: readlink", id); verbose("readlink \"%s\"", path); if ((len = readlink(path, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1)) == -1) send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); else { Stat s; buf[len] = '\0'; attrib_clear(&s.attrib); s.name = s.long_name = buf; send_names(id, 1, &s); } free(path); } static void process_symlink(u_int32_t id) { char *oldpath, *newpath; int r, status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: symlink", id); logit("symlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); /* this will fail if 'newpath' exists */ r = symlink(oldpath, newpath); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(oldpath); free(newpath); } static void process_extended_posix_rename(u_int32_t id) { char *oldpath, *newpath; int r, status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: posix-rename", id); logit("posix-rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); r = rename(oldpath, newpath); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(oldpath); free(newpath); } static void process_extended_statvfs(u_int32_t id) { char *path; struct statvfs st; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &path, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: statvfs", id); logit("statvfs \"%s\"", path); if (statvfs(path, &st) != 0) send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); else send_statvfs(id, &st); free(path); } static void process_extended_fstatvfs(u_int32_t id) { int r, handle, fd; struct statvfs st; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("request %u: fstatvfs \"%s\" (handle %u)", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle); if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) < 0) { send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE); return; } if (fstatvfs(fd, &st) != 0) send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); else send_statvfs(id, &st); } static void process_extended_hardlink(u_int32_t id) { char *oldpath, *newpath; int r, status; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &oldpath, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &newpath, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: hardlink", id); logit("hardlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); r = link(oldpath, newpath); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(oldpath); free(newpath); } static void process_extended_fsync(u_int32_t id) { int handle, fd, r, status = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED; if ((r = get_handle(iqueue, &handle)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug3("request %u: fsync (handle %u)", id, handle); verbose("fsync \"%s\"", handle_to_name(handle)); if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) < 0) status = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE; else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) { r = fsync(fd); status = (r == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; } send_status(id, status); } static void process_extended(u_int32_t id) { char *request; int i, r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &request, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) { if (strcmp(request, extended_handlers[i].ext_name) == 0) { if (!request_permitted(&extended_handlers[i])) send_status(id, SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED); else extended_handlers[i].handler(id); break; } } if (extended_handlers[i].handler == NULL) { error("Unknown extended request \"%.100s\"", request); send_status(id, SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED); /* MUST */ } free(request); } /* stolen from ssh-agent */ static void process(void) { u_int msg_len; u_int buf_len; u_int consumed; u_char type; const u_char *cp; int i, r; u_int32_t id; buf_len = sshbuf_len(iqueue); if (buf_len < 5) return; /* Incomplete message. */ cp = sshbuf_ptr(iqueue); msg_len = get_u32(cp); if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) { error("bad message from %s local user %s", client_addr, pw->pw_name); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(11); } if (buf_len < msg_len + 4) return; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, 4)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); buf_len -= 4; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(iqueue, &type)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); switch (type) { case SSH2_FXP_INIT: process_init(); init_done = 1; break; case SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED: if (!init_done) fatal("Received extended request before init"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); process_extended(id); break; default: if (!init_done) fatal("Received %u request before init", type); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &id)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) { if (type == handlers[i].type) { if (!request_permitted(&handlers[i])) { send_status(id, SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED); } else { handlers[i].handler(id); } break; } } if (handlers[i].handler == NULL) error("Unknown message %u", type); } /* discard the remaining bytes from the current packet */ if (buf_len < sshbuf_len(iqueue)) { error("iqueue grew unexpectedly"); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255); } consumed = buf_len - sshbuf_len(iqueue); if (msg_len < consumed) { error("msg_len %u < consumed %u", msg_len, consumed); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255); } if (msg_len > consumed && (r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, msg_len - consumed)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } /* Cleanup handler that logs active handles upon normal exit */ void sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int i) { if (pw != NULL && client_addr != NULL) { handle_log_exit(); logit("session closed for local user %s from [%s]", pw->pw_name, client_addr); } _exit(i); } static void sftp_server_usage(void) { extern char *__progname; fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] " "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] " "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n" " %s -Q protocol_feature\n", __progname, __progname); exit(1); } int sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw) { fd_set *rset, *wset; int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0; ssize_t len, olen, set_size; SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH; char *cp, *homedir = NULL, buf[4*4096]; long mask; extern char *optarg; extern char *__progname; __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); pw = pwcopy(user_pw); while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv, "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'Q': if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid query type\n"); exit(1); } for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) printf("%s\n", handlers[i].name); for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) printf("%s\n", extended_handlers[i].name); exit(0); break; case 'R': readonly = 1; break; case 'c': /* * Ignore all arguments if we are invoked as a * shell using "sftp-server -c command" */ skipargs = 1; break; case 'e': log_stderr = 1; break; case 'l': log_level = log_level_number(optarg); if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) error("Invalid log level \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'f': log_facility = log_facility_number(optarg); if (log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) error("Invalid log facility \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'd': cp = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, user_pw->pw_uid); homedir = percent_expand(cp, "d", user_pw->pw_dir, "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); free(cp); break; case 'p': if (request_whitelist != NULL) fatal("Permitted requests already set"); request_whitelist = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'P': if (request_blacklist != NULL) fatal("Refused requests already set"); request_blacklist = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'u': errno = 0; mask = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8); if (mask < 0 || mask > 0777 || *cp != '\0' || cp == optarg || (mask == 0 && errno != 0)) fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg); (void)umask((mode_t)mask); break; case 'h': default: sftp_server_usage(); } } log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); #if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE) /* * On Linux, we should try to avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps} * available to the user so that sftp access doesn't automatically * imply arbitrary code execution access that will break * restricted configurations. */ if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) != 0) fatal("unable to make the process undumpable"); #endif /* defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE) */ if ((cp = getenv("SSH_CONNECTION")) != NULL) { client_addr = xstrdup(cp); if ((cp = strchr(client_addr, ' ')) == NULL) { error("Malformed SSH_CONNECTION variable: \"%s\"", getenv("SSH_CONNECTION")); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255); } *cp = '\0'; } else client_addr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); logit("session opened for local user %s from [%s]", pw->pw_name, client_addr); in = STDIN_FILENO; out = STDOUT_FILENO; #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN setmode(in, O_BINARY); setmode(out, O_BINARY); #endif max = 0; if (in > max) max = in; if (out > max) max = out; if ((iqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((oqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); set_size = howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); rset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(set_size); wset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(set_size); if (homedir != NULL) { if (chdir(homedir) != 0) { error("chdir to \"%s\" failed: %s", homedir, strerror(errno)); } } for (;;) { memset(rset, 0, set_size); memset(wset, 0, set_size); /* * Ensure that we can read a full buffer and handle * the worst-case length packet it can generate, * otherwise apply backpressure by stopping reads. */ if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(iqueue, sizeof(buf))) == 0 && (r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) == 0) FD_SET(in, rset); else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE) fatal("%s: sshbuf_check_reserve failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); olen = sshbuf_len(oqueue); if (olen > 0) FD_SET(out, wset); if (select(max+1, rset, wset, NULL, NULL) < 0) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; error("select: %s", strerror(errno)); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(2); } /* copy stdin to iqueue */ if (FD_ISSET(in, rset)) { len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf); if (len == 0) { debug("read eof"); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(0); } else if (len < 0) { error("read: %s", strerror(errno)); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1); } else if ((r = sshbuf_put(iqueue, buf, len)) != 0) { fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } /* send oqueue to stdout */ if (FD_ISSET(out, wset)) { len = write(out, sshbuf_ptr(oqueue), olen); if (len < 0) { error("write: %s", strerror(errno)); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1); } else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(oqueue, len)) != 0) { fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } /* * Process requests from client if we can fit the results * into the output buffer, otherwise stop processing input * and let the output queue drain. */ r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH); if (r == 0) process(); else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE) fatal("%s: sshbuf_check_reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } } Index: head/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.0 =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.0 (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.0 (revision 294336) @@ -1,128 +1,129 @@ SSH-ADD(1) General Commands Manual SSH-ADD(1) NAME ssh-add M-bM-^@M-^S adds private key identities to the authentication agent SYNOPSIS ssh-add [-cDdkLlXx] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-t life] [file ...] ssh-add -s pkcs11 ssh-add -e pkcs11 DESCRIPTION ssh-add adds private key identities to the authentication agent, ssh-agent(1). When run without arguments, it adds the files ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and ~/.ssh/identity. After loading a private key, ssh-add will try to load corresponding certificate information from the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to the name of the private key file. Alternative file names can be given on the command line. If any file requires a passphrase, ssh-add asks for the passphrase from the user. The passphrase is read from the user's tty. ssh-add retries the last passphrase if multiple identity files are given. The authentication agent must be running and the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable must contain the name of its socket for ssh-add to work. The options are as follows: -c Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation before being used for authentication. Confirmation is performed - by the SSH_ASKPASS program mentioned below. Successful - confirmation is signaled by a zero exit status from the - SSH_ASKPASS program, rather than text entered into the requester. + by ssh-askpass(1). Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero + exit status from ssh-askpass(1), rather than text entered into + the requester. -D Deletes all identities from the agent. -d Instead of adding identities, removes identities from the agent. If ssh-add has been run without arguments, the keys for the default identities and their corresponding certificates will be removed. Otherwise, the argument list will be interpreted as a list of paths to public key files to specify keys and certificates to be removed from the agent. If no public key is found at a given path, ssh-add will append .pub and retry. -E fingerprint_hash Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. -e pkcs11 Remove keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11. -k When loading keys into or deleting keys from the agent, process plain private keys only and skip certificates. -L Lists public key parameters of all identities currently represented by the agent. -l Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the agent. -s pkcs11 Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11. -t life Set a maximum lifetime when adding identities to an agent. The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format specified in sshd_config(5). -X Unlock the agent. -x Lock the agent with a password. ENVIRONMENT DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS If ssh-add needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current terminal if it was run from a terminal. If ssh-add does not have a terminal associated with it but DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute the program specified by - SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the passphrase. This - is particularly useful when calling ssh-add from a .xsession or - related script. (Note that on some machines it may be necessary - to redirect the input from /dev/null to make this work.) + SSH_ASKPASS (by default M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-askpassM-bM-^@M-^]) and open an X11 window to + read the passphrase. This is particularly useful when calling + ssh-add from a .xsession or related script. (Note that on some + machines it may be necessary to redirect the input from /dev/null + to make this work.) SSH_AUTH_SOCK Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with the agent. FILES ~/.ssh/identity Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user. ~/.ssh/id_dsa Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user. ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa Contains the protocol version 2 ECDSA authentication identity of the user. ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 Contains the protocol version 2 Ed25519 authentication identity of the user. ~/.ssh/id_rsa Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user. Identity files should not be readable by anyone but the user. Note that ssh-add ignores identity files if they are accessible by others. EXIT STATUS Exit status is 0 on success, 1 if the specified command fails, and 2 if ssh-add is unable to contact the authentication agent. SEE ALSO - ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8) + ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-askpass(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8) AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. -OpenBSD 5.7 December 21, 2014 OpenBSD 5.7 +OpenBSD 5.7 March 30, 2015 OpenBSD 5.7 Index: head/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.1 =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.1 (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.1 (revision 294336) @@ -1,210 +1,212 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.61 2014/12/21 22:27:56 djm Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.62 2015/03/30 18:28:37 jmc Exp $ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: December 21 2014 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: March 30 2015 $ .Dt SSH-ADD 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh-add .Nd adds private key identities to the authentication agent .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ssh-add .Op Fl cDdkLlXx .Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash .Op Fl t Ar life .Op Ar .Nm ssh-add .Fl s Ar pkcs11 .Nm ssh-add .Fl e Ar pkcs11 .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm adds private key identities to the authentication agent, .Xr ssh-agent 1 . When run without arguments, it adds the files .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and .Pa ~/.ssh/identity . After loading a private key, .Nm will try to load corresponding certificate information from the filename obtained by appending .Pa -cert.pub to the name of the private key file. Alternative file names can be given on the command line. .Pp If any file requires a passphrase, .Nm asks for the passphrase from the user. The passphrase is read from the user's tty. .Nm retries the last passphrase if multiple identity files are given. .Pp The authentication agent must be running and the .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable must contain the name of its socket for .Nm to work. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl c Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation before being used for authentication. -Confirmation is performed by the -.Ev SSH_ASKPASS -program mentioned below. -Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero exit status from the -.Ev SSH_ASKPASS -program, rather than text entered into the requester. +Confirmation is performed by +.Xr ssh-askpass 1 . +Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero exit status from +.Xr ssh-askpass 1 , +rather than text entered into the requester. .It Fl D Deletes all identities from the agent. .It Fl d Instead of adding identities, removes identities from the agent. If .Nm has been run without arguments, the keys for the default identities and their corresponding certificates will be removed. Otherwise, the argument list will be interpreted as a list of paths to public key files to specify keys and certificates to be removed from the agent. If no public key is found at a given path, .Nm will append .Pa .pub and retry. .It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. Valid options are: .Dq md5 and .Dq sha256 . The default is .Dq sha256 . .It Fl e Ar pkcs11 Remove keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library .Ar pkcs11 . .It Fl k When loading keys into or deleting keys from the agent, process plain private keys only and skip certificates. .It Fl L Lists public key parameters of all identities currently represented by the agent. .It Fl l Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the agent. .It Fl s Ar pkcs11 Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library .Ar pkcs11 . .It Fl t Ar life Set a maximum lifetime when adding identities to an agent. The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format specified in .Xr sshd_config 5 . .It Fl X Unlock the agent. .It Fl x Lock the agent with a password. .El .Sh ENVIRONMENT .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Ev "DISPLAY" and "SSH_ASKPASS" If .Nm needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current terminal if it was run from a terminal. If .Nm does not have a terminal associated with it but .Ev DISPLAY and .Ev SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute the program specified by .Ev SSH_ASKPASS +(by default +.Dq ssh-askpass ) and open an X11 window to read the passphrase. This is particularly useful when calling .Nm from a .Pa .xsession or related script. (Note that on some machines it may be necessary to redirect the input from .Pa /dev/null to make this work.) .It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK Identifies the path of a .Ux Ns -domain socket used to communicate with the agent. .El .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Pa ~/.ssh/identity Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user. .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user. .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa Contains the protocol version 2 ECDSA authentication identity of the user. .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 Contains the protocol version 2 Ed25519 authentication identity of the user. .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user. .El .Pp Identity files should not be readable by anyone but the user. Note that .Nm ignores identity files if they are accessible by others. .Sh EXIT STATUS Exit status is 0 on success, 1 if the specified command fails, and 2 if .Nm is unable to contact the authentication agent. .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 , +.Xr ssh-askpass 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Index: head/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/ssh-add.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,620 +1,626 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.120 2015/02/21 21:46:57 halex Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.122 2015/03/26 12:32:38 naddy Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Adds an identity to the authentication server, or removes an identity. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 implementation, * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "misc.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "digest.h" /* argv0 */ extern char *__progname; /* Default files to add */ static char *default_files[] = { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA, _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA, #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA, #endif #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519, +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY, +#endif NULL }; static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; /* Default lifetime (0 == forever) */ static int lifetime = 0; /* User has to confirm key use */ static int confirm = 0; /* we keep a cache of one passphrases */ static char *pass = NULL; static void clear_pass(void) { if (pass) { explicit_bzero(pass, strlen(pass)); free(pass); pass = NULL; } } static int delete_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only) { struct sshkey *public, *cert = NULL; char *certpath = NULL, *comment = NULL; int r, ret = -1; if ((r = sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, &comment)) != 0) { printf("Bad key file %s: %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); return -1; } if ((r = ssh_remove_identity(agent_fd, public)) == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment); ret = 0; } else fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity \"%s\": %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); if (key_only) goto out; /* Now try to delete the corresponding certificate too */ free(comment); comment = NULL; xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(certpath, &cert, &comment)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || errno != ENOENT) error("Failed to load certificate \"%s\": %s", certpath, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if (!sshkey_equal_public(cert, public)) fatal("Certificate %s does not match private key %s", certpath, filename); if ((r = ssh_remove_identity(agent_fd, cert)) == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", certpath, comment); ret = 0; } else fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity \"%s\": %s\n", certpath, ssh_err(r)); out: if (cert != NULL) sshkey_free(cert); if (public != NULL) sshkey_free(public); free(certpath); free(comment); return ret; } /* Send a request to remove all identities. */ static int delete_all(int agent_fd) { int ret = -1; - if (ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 1) == 0) + if (ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 2) == 0) ret = 0; - /* ignore error-code for ssh2 */ - /* XXX revisit */ - ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 2); + /* ignore error-code for ssh1 */ + ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 1); if (ret == 0) fprintf(stderr, "All identities removed.\n"); else fprintf(stderr, "Failed to remove all identities.\n"); return ret; } static int add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only) { struct sshkey *private, *cert; char *comment = NULL; char msg[1024], *certpath = NULL; int r, fd, ret = -1; struct sshbuf *keyblob; if (strcmp(filename, "-") == 0) { fd = STDIN_FILENO; filename = "(stdin)"; } else if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { perror(filename); return -1; } /* * Since we'll try to load a keyfile multiple times, permission errors * will occur multiple times, so check perms first and bail if wrong. */ if (fd != STDIN_FILENO) { if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) { close(fd); return -1; } } if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, keyblob)) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(keyblob); close(fd); return -1; } close(fd); /* At first, try empty passphrase */ if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, "", filename, &private, &comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); goto fail_load; } /* try last */ if (private == NULL && pass != NULL) { if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass, filename, &private, &comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); goto fail_load; } } if (comment == NULL) comment = xstrdup(filename); if (private == NULL) { /* clear passphrase since it did not work */ clear_pass(); snprintf(msg, sizeof msg, "Enter passphrase for %.200s%s: ", comment, confirm ? " (will confirm each use)" : ""); for (;;) { pass = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (strcmp(pass, "") == 0) goto fail_load; if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass, filename, &private, NULL)) == 0) break; else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); fail_load: clear_pass(); free(comment); sshbuf_free(keyblob); return -1; } clear_pass(); snprintf(msg, sizeof msg, "Bad passphrase, try again for %.200s%s: ", comment, confirm ? " (will confirm each use)" : ""); } } sshbuf_free(keyblob); if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, private, comment, lifetime, confirm)) == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment); ret = 0; if (lifetime != 0) fprintf(stderr, "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime); if (confirm != 0) fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm each use of the key\n"); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity \"%s\": %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r)); } /* Skip trying to load the cert if requested */ if (key_only) goto out; /* Now try to add the certificate flavour too */ xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(certpath, &cert, NULL)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || errno != ENOENT) error("Failed to load certificate \"%s\": %s", certpath, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if (!sshkey_equal_public(cert, private)) { error("Certificate %s does not match private key %s", certpath, filename); sshkey_free(cert); goto out; } /* Graft with private bits */ if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(private, sshkey_cert_is_legacy(cert))) != 0) { error("%s: sshkey_to_certified: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(cert); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, private)) != 0) { error("%s: key_cert_copy: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(cert); goto out; } sshkey_free(cert); if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, private, comment, lifetime, confirm)) != 0) { error("Certificate %s (%s) add failed: %s", certpath, private->cert->key_id, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } fprintf(stderr, "Certificate added: %s (%s)\n", certpath, private->cert->key_id); if (lifetime != 0) fprintf(stderr, "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime); if (confirm != 0) fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm each use of the key\n"); out: free(certpath); free(comment); sshkey_free(private); return ret; } static int update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id) { char *pin = NULL; int r, ret = -1; if (add) { if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for PKCS#11: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL) return -1; } if ((r = ssh_update_card(agent_fd, add, id, pin == NULL ? "" : pin, lifetime, confirm)) == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Card %s: %s\n", add ? "added" : "removed", id); ret = 0; } else { fprintf(stderr, "Could not %s card \"%s\": %s\n", add ? "add" : "remove", id, ssh_err(r)); ret = -1; } free(pin); return ret; } static int list_identities(int agent_fd, int do_fp) { char *fp; - int version, r, had_identities = 0; + int r, had_identities = 0; struct ssh_identitylist *idlist; size_t i; +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 + int version = 1; +#else + int version = 2; +#endif - for (version = 1; version <= 2; version++) { + for (; version <= 2; version++) { if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, version, &idlist)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES) fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities for " "protocol %d: %s\n", version, ssh_err(r)); continue; } for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) { had_identities = 1; if (do_fp) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(idlist->keys[i], fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(idlist->keys[i]), fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, idlist->comments[i], sshkey_type(idlist->keys[i])); free(fp); } else { if ((r = sshkey_write(idlist->keys[i], stdout)) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "sshkey_write: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); continue; } fprintf(stdout, " %s\n", idlist->comments[i]); } } ssh_free_identitylist(idlist); } if (!had_identities) { printf("The agent has no identities.\n"); return -1; } return 0; } static int lock_agent(int agent_fd, int lock) { char prompt[100], *p1, *p2; int r, passok = 1, ret = -1; strlcpy(prompt, "Enter lock password: ", sizeof(prompt)); p1 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (lock) { strlcpy(prompt, "Again: ", sizeof prompt); p2 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (strcmp(p1, p2) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Passwords do not match.\n"); passok = 0; } explicit_bzero(p2, strlen(p2)); free(p2); } if (passok) { if ((r = ssh_lock_agent(agent_fd, lock, p1)) == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Agent %slocked.\n", lock ? "" : "un"); ret = 0; } else { fprintf(stderr, "Failed to %slock agent: %s\n", lock ? "" : "un", ssh_err(r)); } } explicit_bzero(p1, strlen(p1)); free(p1); return (ret); } static int do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int key_only, char *file) { if (deleting) { if (delete_file(agent_fd, file, key_only) == -1) return -1; } else { if (add_file(agent_fd, file, key_only) == -1) return -1; } return 0; } static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [options] [file ...]\n", __progname); fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -l List fingerprints of all identities.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -E hash Specify hash algorithm used for fingerprints.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -L List public key parameters of all identities.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -k Load only keys and not certificates.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -c Require confirmation to sign using identities\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -t life Set lifetime (in seconds) when adding identities.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -d Delete identity.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -D Delete all identities.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -x Lock agent.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -X Unlock agent.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -s pkcs11 Add keys from PKCS#11 provider.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -e pkcs11 Remove keys provided by PKCS#11 provider.\n"); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { extern char *optarg; extern int optind; int agent_fd; char *pkcs11provider = NULL; int r, i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0, key_only = 0; int xflag = 0, lflag = 0, Dflag = 0; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); seed_rng(); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); #endif setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0); /* First, get a connection to the authentication agent. */ switch (r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) { case 0: break; case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT: fprintf(stderr, "Could not open a connection to your " "authentication agent.\n"); exit(2); default: fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to agent: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); exit(2); } while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "klLcdDxXE:e:s:t:")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'E': fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg); if (fingerprint_hash == -1) fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'k': key_only = 1; break; case 'l': case 'L': if (lflag != 0) fatal("-%c flag already specified", lflag); lflag = ch; break; case 'x': case 'X': if (xflag != 0) fatal("-%c flag already specified", xflag); xflag = ch; break; case 'c': confirm = 1; break; case 'd': deleting = 1; break; case 'D': Dflag = 1; break; case 's': pkcs11provider = optarg; break; case 'e': deleting = 1; pkcs11provider = optarg; break; case 't': if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n"); ret = 1; goto done; } break; default: usage(); ret = 1; goto done; } } if ((xflag != 0) + (lflag != 0) + (Dflag != 0) > 1) fatal("Invalid combination of actions"); else if (xflag) { if (lock_agent(agent_fd, xflag == 'x' ? 1 : 0) == -1) ret = 1; goto done; } else if (lflag) { if (list_identities(agent_fd, lflag == 'l' ? 1 : 0) == -1) ret = 1; goto done; } else if (Dflag) { if (delete_all(agent_fd) == -1) ret = 1; goto done; } argc -= optind; argv += optind; if (pkcs11provider != NULL) { if (update_card(agent_fd, !deleting, pkcs11provider) == -1) ret = 1; goto done; } if (argc == 0) { char buf[PATH_MAX]; struct passwd *pw; struct stat st; int count = 0; if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "No user found with uid %u\n", (u_int)getuid()); ret = 1; goto done; } for (i = 0; default_files[i]; i++) { snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, default_files[i]); if (stat(buf, &st) < 0) continue; if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only, buf) == -1) ret = 1; else count++; } if (count == 0) ret = 1; } else { for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only, argv[i]) == -1) ret = 1; } } clear_pass(); done: ssh_close_authentication_socket(agent_fd); return ret; } Index: head/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.0 =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.0 (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.0 (revision 294336) @@ -1,109 +1,112 @@ SSH-AGENT(1) General Commands Manual SSH-AGENT(1) NAME ssh-agent M-bM-^@M-^S authentication agent SYNOPSIS - ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-d] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash] + ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-t life] [command [arg ...]] ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k DESCRIPTION ssh-agent is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication (RSA, DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519). ssh-agent is usually started in the beginning of an X-session or a login session, and all other windows or programs are started as clients to the ssh-agent program. Through use of environment variables the agent can be located and automatically used for authentication when logging in to other machines using ssh(1). The agent initially does not have any private keys. Keys are added using ssh-add(1). Multiple identities may be stored in ssh-agent concurrently and ssh(1) will automatically use them if present. ssh-add(1) is also used to remove keys from ssh-agent and to query the keys that are held in one. The options are as follows: -a bind_address Bind the agent to the UNIX-domain socket bind_address. The default is $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.. -c Generate C-shell commands on stdout. This is the default if SHELL looks like it's a csh style of shell. + -D Foreground mode. When this option is specified ssh-agent will + not fork. + -d Debug mode. When this option is specified ssh-agent will not - fork. + fork and will write debug information to standard error. -E fingerprint_hash Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. -k Kill the current agent (given by the SSH_AGENT_PID environment variable). -s Generate Bourne shell commands on stdout. This is the default if SHELL does not look like it's a csh style of shell. -t life Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added to the agent. The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format specified in sshd_config(5). A lifetime specified for an identity with ssh-add(1) overrides this value. Without this option the default maximum lifetime is forever. If a commandline is given, this is executed as a subprocess of the agent. When the command dies, so does the agent. The idea is that the agent is run in the user's local PC, laptop, or terminal. Authentication data need not be stored on any other machine, and authentication passphrases never go over the network. However, the connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH remote logins, and the user can thus use the privileges given by the identities anywhere in the network in a secure way. There are two main ways to get an agent set up: The first is that the agent starts a new subcommand into which some environment variables are exported, eg ssh-agent xterm &. The second is that the agent prints the needed shell commands (either sh(1) or csh(1) syntax can be generated) which can be evaluated in the calling shell, eg eval `ssh-agent -s` for Bourne-type shells such as sh(1) or ksh(1) and eval `ssh-agent -c` for csh(1) and derivatives. Later ssh(1) looks at these variables and uses them to establish a connection to the agent. The agent will never send a private key over its request channel. Instead, operations that require a private key will be performed by the agent, and the result will be returned to the requester. This way, private keys are not exposed to clients using the agent. A UNIX-domain socket is created and the name of this socket is stored in the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. The socket is made accessible only to the current user. This method is easily abused by root or another instance of the same user. The SSH_AGENT_PID environment variable holds the agent's process ID. The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command line terminates. FILES $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent. UNIX-domain sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent. These sockets should only be readable by the owner. The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits. SEE ALSO ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8) AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. -OpenBSD 5.7 December 21, 2014 OpenBSD 5.7 +OpenBSD 5.7 April 24, 2015 OpenBSD 5.7 Index: head/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1 =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1 (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.1 (revision 294336) @@ -1,208 +1,213 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.57 2014/12/21 22:27:56 djm Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.59 2015/04/24 06:26:49 jmc Exp $ .\" $FreeBSD$ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: December 21 2014 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: April 24 2015 $ .Dt SSH-AGENT 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh-agent .Nd authentication agent .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ssh-agent .Op Fl c | s -.Op Fl dx +.Op Fl Ddx .Op Fl a Ar bind_address .Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash .Op Fl t Ar life .Op Ar command Op Ar arg ... .Nm ssh-agent .Op Fl c | s .Fl k .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication (RSA, DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519). .Nm is usually started in the beginning of an X-session or a login session, and all other windows or programs are started as clients to the ssh-agent program. Through use of environment variables the agent can be located and automatically used for authentication when logging in to other machines using .Xr ssh 1 . .Pp The agent initially does not have any private keys. Keys are added using .Xr ssh-add 1 . Multiple identities may be stored in .Nm concurrently and .Xr ssh 1 will automatically use them if present. .Xr ssh-add 1 is also used to remove keys from .Nm and to query the keys that are held in one. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl a Ar bind_address Bind the agent to the .Ux Ns -domain socket .Ar bind_address . The default is .Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt . .It Fl c Generate C-shell commands on .Dv stdout . This is the default if .Ev SHELL looks like it's a csh style of shell. +.It Fl D +Foreground mode. +When this option is specified +.Nm +will not fork. .It Fl d Debug mode. When this option is specified .Nm -will not fork. +will not fork and will write debug information to standard error. .It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. Valid options are: .Dq md5 and .Dq sha256 . The default is .Dq sha256 . .It Fl k Kill the current agent (given by the .Ev SSH_AGENT_PID environment variable). .It Fl s Generate Bourne shell commands on .Dv stdout . This is the default if .Ev SHELL does not look like it's a csh style of shell. .It Fl t Ar life Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added to the agent. The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format specified in .Xr sshd_config 5 . A lifetime specified for an identity with .Xr ssh-add 1 overrides this value. Without this option the default maximum lifetime is forever. .It Fl x Exit after the last client has disconnected. .El .Pp If a commandline is given, this is executed as a subprocess of the agent. When the command dies, so does the agent. .Pp The idea is that the agent is run in the user's local PC, laptop, or terminal. Authentication data need not be stored on any other machine, and authentication passphrases never go over the network. However, the connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH remote logins, and the user can thus use the privileges given by the identities anywhere in the network in a secure way. .Pp There are two main ways to get an agent set up: The first is that the agent starts a new subcommand into which some environment variables are exported, eg .Cm ssh-agent xterm & . The second is that the agent prints the needed shell commands (either .Xr sh 1 or .Xr csh 1 syntax can be generated) which can be evaluated in the calling shell, eg .Cm eval `ssh-agent -s` for Bourne-type shells such as .Xr sh 1 or .Xr ksh 1 and .Cm eval `ssh-agent -c` for .Xr csh 1 and derivatives. .Pp Later .Xr ssh 1 looks at these variables and uses them to establish a connection to the agent. .Pp The agent will never send a private key over its request channel. Instead, operations that require a private key will be performed by the agent, and the result will be returned to the requester. This way, private keys are not exposed to clients using the agent. .Pp A .Ux Ns -domain socket is created and the name of this socket is stored in the .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. The socket is made accessible only to the current user. This method is easily abused by root or another instance of the same user. .Pp The .Ev SSH_AGENT_PID environment variable holds the agent's process ID. .Pp The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command line terminates. .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt .Ux Ns -domain sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent. These sockets should only be readable by the owner. The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Index: head/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/ssh-agent.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,1416 +1,1452 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.199 2015/03/04 21:12:59 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.203 2015/05/15 05:44:21 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * The authentication agent program. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include /* MIN MAX */ #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H # include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include +#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H +# include +#endif #include "key.h" /* XXX for typedef */ #include "buffer.h" /* XXX for typedef */ #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "compat.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "digest.h" #include "ssherr.h" #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #endif #if defined(HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H) #include /* For prctl() and PR_SET_DUMPABLE */ #endif typedef enum { AUTH_UNUSED, AUTH_SOCKET, AUTH_CONNECTION } sock_type; typedef struct { int fd; sock_type type; struct sshbuf *input; struct sshbuf *output; struct sshbuf *request; } SocketEntry; u_int sockets_alloc = 0; SocketEntry *sockets = NULL; typedef struct identity { TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next; struct sshkey *key; char *comment; char *provider; time_t death; u_int confirm; } Identity; typedef struct { int nentries; TAILQ_HEAD(idqueue, identity) idlist; } Idtab; /* private key table, one per protocol version */ Idtab idtable[3]; int max_fd = 0; /* pid of shell == parent of agent */ pid_t parent_pid = -1; time_t parent_alive_interval = 0; /* pid of process for which cleanup_socket is applicable */ pid_t cleanup_pid = 0; /* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */ char socket_name[PATH_MAX]; char socket_dir[PATH_MAX]; /* locking */ +#define LOCK_SIZE 32 +#define LOCK_SALT_SIZE 16 +#define LOCK_ROUNDS 1 int locked = 0; -char *lock_passwd = NULL; +char lock_passwd[LOCK_SIZE]; +char lock_salt[LOCK_SALT_SIZE]; extern char *__progname; /* Default lifetime in seconds (0 == forever) */ static long lifetime = 0; static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; /* * Client connection count; incremented in new_socket() and decremented in * close_socket(). When it reaches 0, ssh-agent will exit. Since it is * normally initialized to 1, it will never reach 0. However, if the -x * option is specified, it is initialized to 0 in main(); in that case, * ssh-agent will exit as soon as it has had at least one client but no * longer has any. */ static int xcount = 1; static void close_socket(SocketEntry *e) { int last = 0; if (e->type == AUTH_CONNECTION) { debug("xcount %d -> %d", xcount, xcount - 1); if (--xcount == 0) last = 1; } close(e->fd); e->fd = -1; e->type = AUTH_UNUSED; sshbuf_free(e->input); sshbuf_free(e->output); sshbuf_free(e->request); if (last) cleanup_exit(0); } static void idtab_init(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i <=2; i++) { TAILQ_INIT(&idtable[i].idlist); idtable[i].nentries = 0; } } /* return private key table for requested protocol version */ static Idtab * idtab_lookup(int version) { if (version < 1 || version > 2) fatal("internal error, bad protocol version %d", version); return &idtable[version]; } static void free_identity(Identity *id) { sshkey_free(id->key); free(id->provider); free(id->comment); free(id); } /* return matching private key for given public key */ static Identity * lookup_identity(struct sshkey *key, int version) { Identity *id; Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &tab->idlist, next) { if (sshkey_equal(key, id->key)) return (id); } return (NULL); } /* Check confirmation of keysign request */ static int confirm_key(Identity *id) { char *p; int ret = -1; p = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); if (p != NULL && ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.", id->comment, p)) ret = 0; free(p); return (ret); } static void send_status(SocketEntry *e, int success) { int r; if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(e->output, 1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(e->output, success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } /* send list of supported public keys to 'client' */ static void process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version) { Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); Identity *id; struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, (version == 1) ? SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER : SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, tab->nentries)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &tab->idlist, next) { if (id->key->type == KEY_RSA1) { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, BN_num_bits(id->key->rsa->n))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, id->key->rsa->e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(msg, id->key->rsa->n)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); #endif } else { u_char *blob; size_t blen; if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) { error("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); continue; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(blob); } if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, id->comment)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(msg); } #ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* ssh1 only */ static void process_authentication_challenge1(SocketEntry *e) { u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16], session_id[16]; u_int response_type; BIGNUM *challenge; Identity *id; int r, len; struct sshbuf *msg; struct ssh_digest_ctx *md; struct sshkey *key; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__); if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, NULL)) != 0 || /* ignored */ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->n)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, challenge))) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* Only protocol 1.1 is supported */ if (sshbuf_len(e->request) == 0) goto failure; if ((r = sshbuf_get(e->request, session_id, sizeof(session_id))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &response_type)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (response_type != 1) goto failure; id = lookup_identity(key, 1); if (id != NULL && (!id->confirm || confirm_key(id) == 0)) { struct sshkey *private = id->key; /* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */ if ((r = rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, private->rsa) != 0)) { fatal("%s: rsa_public_encrypt: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto failure; /* XXX ? */ } /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id */ len = BN_num_bytes(challenge); if (len <= 0 || len > 32) { logit("%s: bad challenge length %d", __func__, len); goto failure; } memset(buf, 0, 32); BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len); if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL || ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 32) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, 16) < 0 || ssh_digest_final(md, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf)) < 0) fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__); ssh_digest_free(md); /* Send the response. */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put(msg, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf))) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto send; } failure: /* Unknown identity or protocol error. Send failure. */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); send: if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(key); BN_clear_free(challenge); sshbuf_free(msg); } #endif /* ssh2 only */ static void process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e) { u_char *blob, *data, *signature = NULL; size_t blen, dlen, slen = 0; u_int compat = 0, flags; int r, ok = -1; struct sshbuf *msg; struct sshkey *key; struct identity *id; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(e->request, &blob, &blen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(e->request, &data, &dlen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &flags)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (flags & SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE) compat = SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB; if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) { error("%s: cannot parse key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ok)); goto send; } if ((id = lookup_identity(key, 2)) == NULL) { verbose("%s: %s key not found", __func__, sshkey_type(key)); goto send; } if (id->confirm && confirm_key(id) != 0) { verbose("%s: user refused key", __func__); goto send; } if ((r = sshkey_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen, data, dlen, compat)) != 0) { error("%s: sshkey_sign: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ok)); goto send; } /* Success */ ok = 0; send: sshkey_free(key); if (ok == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, signature, slen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(msg); free(data); free(blob); free(signature); } /* shared */ static void process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version) { size_t blen; int r, success = 0; struct sshkey *key = NULL; u_char *blob; #ifdef WITH_SSH1 u_int bits; #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ switch (version) { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 case 1: if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) { error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__); return; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &bits)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(e->request, key->rsa->n)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (bits != sshkey_size(key)) logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: " "actual %u, announced %u", sshkey_size(key), bits); break; #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ case 2: if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(e->request, &blob, &blen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) error("%s: sshkey_from_blob failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(blob); break; } if (key != NULL) { Identity *id = lookup_identity(key, version); if (id != NULL) { /* * We have this key. Free the old key. Since we * don't want to leave empty slots in the middle of * the array, we actually free the key there and move * all the entries between the empty slot and the end * of the array. */ Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); if (tab->nentries < 1) fatal("process_remove_identity: " "internal error: tab->nentries %d", tab->nentries); TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next); free_identity(id); tab->nentries--; success = 1; } sshkey_free(key); } send_status(e, success); } static void process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version) { Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); Identity *id; /* Loop over all identities and clear the keys. */ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next); free_identity(id); } /* Mark that there are no identities. */ tab->nentries = 0; /* Send success. */ send_status(e, 1); } /* removes expired keys and returns number of seconds until the next expiry */ static time_t reaper(void) { time_t deadline = 0, now = monotime(); Identity *id, *nxt; int version; Idtab *tab; for (version = 1; version < 3; version++) { tab = idtab_lookup(version); for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = nxt) { nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next); if (id->death == 0) continue; if (now >= id->death) { debug("expiring key '%s'", id->comment); TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next); free_identity(id); tab->nentries--; } else deadline = (deadline == 0) ? id->death : MIN(deadline, id->death); } } if (deadline == 0 || deadline <= now) return 0; else return (deadline - now); } /* * XXX this and the corresponding serialisation function probably belongs * in key.c */ #ifdef WITH_SSH1 static int agent_decode_rsa1(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshkey **kp) { struct sshkey *k = NULL; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; *kp = NULL; if ((k = sshkey_new_private(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, NULL)) != 0 || /* ignored */ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->n)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->d)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || /* SSH1 and SSL have p and q swapped */ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->q)) != 0 || /* p */ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(m, k->rsa->p)) != 0) /* q */ goto out; /* Generate additional parameters */ if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa)) != 0) goto out; /* enable blinding */ if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } r = 0; /* success */ out: if (r == 0) *kp = k; else sshkey_free(k); return r; } #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ static void process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version) { Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); Identity *id; int success = 0, confirm = 0; u_int seconds; char *comment = NULL; time_t death = 0; struct sshkey *k = NULL; u_char ctype; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; switch (version) { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 case 1: r = agent_decode_rsa1(e->request, &k); break; #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ case 2: r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k); break; } if (r != 0 || k == NULL || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &comment, NULL)) != 0) { error("%s: decode private key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto err; } while (sshbuf_len(e->request)) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &ctype)) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto err; } switch (ctype) { case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &seconds)) != 0) { error("%s: bad lifetime constraint: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto err; } death = monotime() + seconds; break; case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM: confirm = 1; break; default: error("%s: Unknown constraint %d", __func__, ctype); err: sshbuf_reset(e->request); free(comment); sshkey_free(k); goto send; } } success = 1; if (lifetime && !death) death = monotime() + lifetime; if ((id = lookup_identity(k, version)) == NULL) { id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity)); id->key = k; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next); /* Increment the number of identities. */ tab->nentries++; } else { sshkey_free(k); free(id->comment); } id->comment = comment; id->death = death; id->confirm = confirm; send: send_status(e, success); } /* XXX todo: encrypt sensitive data with passphrase */ static void process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock) { - int r, success = 0; - char *passwd; + int r, success = 0, delay; + char *passwd, passwdhash[LOCK_SIZE]; + static u_int fail_count = 0; + size_t pwlen; - if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &passwd, NULL)) != 0) + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &passwd, &pwlen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); - if (locked && !lock && strcmp(passwd, lock_passwd) == 0) { - locked = 0; - explicit_bzero(lock_passwd, strlen(lock_passwd)); - free(lock_passwd); - lock_passwd = NULL; - success = 1; + if (pwlen == 0) { + debug("empty password not supported"); + } else if (locked && !lock) { + if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt), + passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0) + fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf"); + if (timingsafe_bcmp(passwdhash, lock_passwd, LOCK_SIZE) == 0) { + debug("agent unlocked"); + locked = 0; + fail_count = 0; + explicit_bzero(lock_passwd, sizeof(lock_passwd)); + success = 1; + } else { + /* delay in 0.1s increments up to 10s */ + if (fail_count < 100) + fail_count++; + delay = 100000 * fail_count; + debug("unlock failed, delaying %0.1lf seconds", + (double)delay/1000000); + usleep(delay); + } + explicit_bzero(passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash)); } else if (!locked && lock) { + debug("agent locked"); locked = 1; - lock_passwd = xstrdup(passwd); + arc4random_buf(lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt)); + if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt), + lock_passwd, sizeof(lock_passwd), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0) + fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf"); success = 1; } - explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd)); + explicit_bzero(passwd, pwlen); free(passwd); send_status(e, success); } static void no_identities(SocketEntry *e, u_int type) { struct sshbuf *msg; int r; if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, (type == SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES) ? SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER : SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(msg); } #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 static void process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) { char *provider = NULL, *pin; int r, i, version, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0; u_int seconds; time_t death = 0; u_char type; struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k; Identity *id; Idtab *tab; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); while (sshbuf_len(e->request)) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); switch (type) { case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &seconds)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); death = monotime() + seconds; break; case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM: confirm = 1; break; default: error("process_add_smartcard_key: " "Unknown constraint type %d", type); goto send; } } if (lifetime && !death) death = monotime() + lifetime; count = pkcs11_add_provider(provider, pin, &keys); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { k = keys[i]; version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2; tab = idtab_lookup(version); if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) { id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity)); id->key = k; id->provider = xstrdup(provider); id->comment = xstrdup(provider); /* XXX */ id->death = death; id->confirm = confirm; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next); tab->nentries++; success = 1; } else { sshkey_free(k); } keys[i] = NULL; } send: free(pin); free(provider); free(keys); send_status(e, success); } static void process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) { char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL; int r, version, success = 0; Identity *id, *nxt; Idtab *tab; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); free(pin); for (version = 1; version < 3; version++) { tab = idtab_lookup(version); for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = nxt) { nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next); /* Skip file--based keys */ if (id->provider == NULL) continue; if (!strcmp(provider, id->provider)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next); free_identity(id); tab->nentries--; } } } if (pkcs11_del_provider(provider) == 0) success = 1; else error("process_remove_smartcard_key:" " pkcs11_del_provider failed"); free(provider); send_status(e, success); } #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ /* dispatch incoming messages */ static void process_message(SocketEntry *e) { u_int msg_len; u_char type; const u_char *cp; int r; if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < 5) return; /* Incomplete message. */ cp = sshbuf_ptr(e->input); msg_len = PEEK_U32(cp); if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) { close_socket(e); return; } if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < msg_len + 4) return; /* move the current input to e->request */ sshbuf_reset(e->request); if ((r = sshbuf_get_stringb(e->input, e->request)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* check wheter agent is locked */ if (locked && type != SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK) { sshbuf_reset(e->request); switch (type) { case SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES: case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES: /* send empty lists */ no_identities(e, type); break; default: /* send a fail message for all other request types */ send_status(e, 0); } return; } debug("type %d", type); switch (type) { case SSH_AGENTC_LOCK: case SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK: process_lock_agent(e, type == SSH_AGENTC_LOCK); break; #ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* ssh1 */ case SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE: process_authentication_challenge1(e); break; case SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES: process_request_identities(e, 1); break; case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY: case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED: process_add_identity(e, 1); break; case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY: process_remove_identity(e, 1); break; #endif case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES: process_remove_all_identities(e, 1); /* safe for !WITH_SSH1 */ break; /* ssh2 */ case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST: process_sign_request2(e); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES: process_request_identities(e, 2); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY: case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED: process_add_identity(e, 2); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY: process_remove_identity(e, 2); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES: process_remove_all_identities(e, 2); break; #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY: case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED: process_add_smartcard_key(e); break; case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY: process_remove_smartcard_key(e); break; #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ default: /* Unknown message. Respond with failure. */ error("Unknown message %d", type); sshbuf_reset(e->request); send_status(e, 0); break; } } static void new_socket(sock_type type, int fd) { u_int i, old_alloc, new_alloc; if (type == AUTH_CONNECTION) { debug("xcount %d -> %d", xcount, xcount + 1); ++xcount; } set_nonblock(fd); if (fd > max_fd) max_fd = fd; for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) if (sockets[i].type == AUTH_UNUSED) { sockets[i].fd = fd; if ((sockets[i].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((sockets[i].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((sockets[i].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); sockets[i].type = type; return; } old_alloc = sockets_alloc; new_alloc = sockets_alloc + 10; - sockets = xrealloc(sockets, new_alloc, sizeof(sockets[0])); + sockets = xreallocarray(sockets, new_alloc, sizeof(sockets[0])); for (i = old_alloc; i < new_alloc; i++) sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED; sockets_alloc = new_alloc; sockets[old_alloc].fd = fd; if ((sockets[old_alloc].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((sockets[old_alloc].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((sockets[old_alloc].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); sockets[old_alloc].type = type; } static int prepare_select(fd_set **fdrp, fd_set **fdwp, int *fdl, u_int *nallocp, struct timeval **tvpp) { u_int i, sz; int n = 0; static struct timeval tv; time_t deadline; for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) { switch (sockets[i].type) { case AUTH_SOCKET: case AUTH_CONNECTION: n = MAX(n, sockets[i].fd); break; case AUTH_UNUSED: break; default: fatal("Unknown socket type %d", sockets[i].type); break; } } sz = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); if (*fdrp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) { free(*fdrp); free(*fdwp); *fdrp = xmalloc(sz); *fdwp = xmalloc(sz); *nallocp = sz; } if (n < *fdl) debug("XXX shrink: %d < %d", n, *fdl); *fdl = n; memset(*fdrp, 0, sz); memset(*fdwp, 0, sz); for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) { switch (sockets[i].type) { case AUTH_SOCKET: case AUTH_CONNECTION: FD_SET(sockets[i].fd, *fdrp); if (sshbuf_len(sockets[i].output) > 0) FD_SET(sockets[i].fd, *fdwp); break; default: break; } } deadline = reaper(); if (parent_alive_interval != 0) deadline = (deadline == 0) ? parent_alive_interval : MIN(deadline, parent_alive_interval); if (deadline == 0) { *tvpp = NULL; } else { tv.tv_sec = deadline; tv.tv_usec = 0; *tvpp = &tv; } return (1); } static void after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; socklen_t slen; char buf[1024]; int len, sock, r; u_int i, orig_alloc; uid_t euid; gid_t egid; for (i = 0, orig_alloc = sockets_alloc; i < orig_alloc; i++) switch (sockets[i].type) { case AUTH_UNUSED: break; case AUTH_SOCKET: if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, readset)) { slen = sizeof(sunaddr); sock = accept(sockets[i].fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, &slen); if (sock < 0) { error("accept from AUTH_SOCKET: %s", strerror(errno)); break; } if (getpeereid(sock, &euid, &egid) < 0) { error("getpeereid %d failed: %s", sock, strerror(errno)); close(sock); break; } if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) { error("uid mismatch: " "peer euid %u != uid %u", (u_int) euid, (u_int) getuid()); close(sock); break; } new_socket(AUTH_CONNECTION, sock); } break; case AUTH_CONNECTION: if (sshbuf_len(sockets[i].output) > 0 && FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, writeset)) { len = write(sockets[i].fd, sshbuf_ptr(sockets[i].output), sshbuf_len(sockets[i].output)); if (len == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR)) continue; if (len <= 0) { close_socket(&sockets[i]); break; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(sockets[i].output, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, readset)) { len = read(sockets[i].fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (len == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR)) continue; if (len <= 0) { close_socket(&sockets[i]); break; } if ((r = sshbuf_put(sockets[i].input, buf, len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); process_message(&sockets[i]); } break; default: fatal("Unknown type %d", sockets[i].type); } } static void cleanup_socket(void) { if (cleanup_pid != 0 && getpid() != cleanup_pid) return; debug("%s: cleanup", __func__); if (socket_name[0]) unlink(socket_name); if (socket_dir[0]) rmdir(socket_dir); } void cleanup_exit(int i) { cleanup_socket(); _exit(i); } /*ARGSUSED*/ static void cleanup_handler(int sig) { cleanup_socket(); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 pkcs11_terminate(); #endif _exit(2); } static void check_parent_exists(void) { /* * If our parent has exited then getppid() will return (pid_t)1, * so testing for that should be safe. */ if (parent_pid != -1 && getppid() != parent_pid) { /* printf("Parent has died - Authentication agent exiting.\n"); */ cleanup_socket(); _exit(2); } } static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, - "usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-d] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n" + "usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n" " [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n" " ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -x Exit when the last client disconnects.\n"); exit(1); } int main(int ac, char **av) { - int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0; + int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, D_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0; int sock, fd, ch, result, saved_errno; u_int nalloc; char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL; fd_set *readsetp = NULL, *writesetp = NULL; #ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT struct rlimit rlim; #endif extern int optind; extern char *optarg; pid_t pid; char pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid]; struct timeval *tvp = NULL; size_t len; mode_t prev_mask; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); /* drop */ setegid(getgid()); setgid(getgid()); setuid(geteuid()); #if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE) /* Disable ptrace on Linux without sgid bit */ prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0); #endif #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); #endif __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); seed_rng(); - while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cdksE:a:t:x")) != -1) { + while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:t:x")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'E': fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg); if (fingerprint_hash == -1) fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'c': if (s_flag) usage(); c_flag++; break; case 'k': k_flag++; break; case 's': if (c_flag) usage(); s_flag++; break; case 'd': - if (d_flag) + if (d_flag || D_flag) usage(); d_flag++; break; + case 'D': + if (d_flag || D_flag) + usage(); + D_flag++; + break; case 'a': agentsocket = optarg; break; case 't': if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n"); usage(); } break; case 'x': xcount = 0; break; default: usage(); } } ac -= optind; av += optind; - if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag)) + if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag || D_flag)) usage(); if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) { shell = getenv("SHELL"); if (shell != NULL && (len = strlen(shell)) > 2 && strncmp(shell + len - 3, "csh", 3) == 0) c_flag = 1; } if (k_flag) { const char *errstr = NULL; pidstr = getenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); if (pidstr == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "%s not set, cannot kill agent\n", SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); exit(1); } pid = (int)strtonum(pidstr, 2, INT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) { fprintf(stderr, "%s=\"%s\", which is not a good PID: %s\n", SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstr, errstr); exit(1); } if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) == -1) { perror("kill"); exit(1); } format = c_flag ? "unsetenv %s;\n" : "unset %s;\n"; printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); printf("echo Agent pid %ld killed;\n", (long)pid); exit(0); } parent_pid = getpid(); if (agentsocket == NULL) { /* Create private directory for agent socket */ mktemp_proto(socket_dir, sizeof(socket_dir)); if (mkdtemp(socket_dir) == NULL) { perror("mkdtemp: private socket dir"); exit(1); } snprintf(socket_name, sizeof socket_name, "%s/agent.%ld", socket_dir, (long)parent_pid); } else { /* Try to use specified agent socket */ socket_dir[0] = '\0'; strlcpy(socket_name, agentsocket, sizeof socket_name); } /* * Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from * the parent. */ prev_mask = umask(0177); sock = unix_listener(socket_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0); if (sock < 0) { /* XXX - unix_listener() calls error() not perror() */ *socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */ cleanup_exit(1); } umask(prev_mask); /* * Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present * the socket data. The child continues as the authentication agent. */ - if (d_flag) { - log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1); + if (D_flag || d_flag) { + log_init(__progname, + d_flag ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, + SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1); format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n"; printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)parent_pid); goto skip; } pid = fork(); if (pid == -1) { perror("fork"); cleanup_exit(1); } if (pid != 0) { /* Parent - execute the given command. */ close(sock); snprintf(pidstrbuf, sizeof pidstrbuf, "%ld", (long)pid); if (ac == 0) { format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n"; printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)pid); exit(0); } if (setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, 1) == -1 || setenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, 1) == -1) { perror("setenv"); exit(1); } execvp(av[0], av); perror(av[0]); exit(1); } /* child */ log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0); if (setsid() == -1) { error("setsid: %s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(1); } (void)chdir("/"); if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) { /* XXX might close listen socket */ (void)dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO); (void)dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO); (void)dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO); if (fd > 2) close(fd); } #ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT /* deny core dumps, since memory contains unencrypted private keys */ rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0; if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) < 0) { error("setrlimit RLIMIT_CORE: %s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(1); } #endif skip: cleanup_pid = getpid(); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 pkcs11_init(0); #endif new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock); if (ac > 0) parent_alive_interval = 10; idtab_init(); signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); - signal(SIGINT, d_flag ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN); + signal(SIGINT, (d_flag | D_flag) ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN); signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler); signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler); nalloc = 0; while (1) { prepare_select(&readsetp, &writesetp, &max_fd, &nalloc, &tvp); result = select(max_fd + 1, readsetp, writesetp, NULL, tvp); saved_errno = errno; if (parent_alive_interval != 0) check_parent_exists(); (void) reaper(); /* remove expired keys */ if (result < 0) { if (saved_errno == EINTR) continue; fatal("select: %s", strerror(saved_errno)); } else if (result > 0) after_select(readsetp, writesetp); } /* NOTREACHED */ } Index: head/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/ssh-keygen.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,2751 +1,2720 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.266 2015/02/26 20:45:47 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.274 2015/05/28 07:37:31 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Identity and host key generation and maintenance. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "uuencode.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "match.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "dns.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "krl.h" #include "digest.h" +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +# define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa" +#else +# define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519" +#endif + /* Number of bits in the RSA/DSA key. This value can be set on the command line. */ #define DEFAULT_BITS 2048 #define DEFAULT_BITS_DSA 1024 #define DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA 256 u_int32_t bits = 0; /* * Flag indicating that we just want to change the passphrase. This can be * set on the command line. */ int change_passphrase = 0; /* * Flag indicating that we just want to change the comment. This can be set * on the command line. */ int change_comment = 0; int quiet = 0; int log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; /* Flag indicating that we want to hash a known_hosts file */ int hash_hosts = 0; /* Flag indicating that we want lookup a host in known_hosts file */ int find_host = 0; /* Flag indicating that we want to delete a host from a known_hosts file */ int delete_host = 0; /* Flag indicating that we want to show the contents of a certificate */ int show_cert = 0; /* Flag indicating that we just want to see the key fingerprint */ int print_fingerprint = 0; int print_bubblebabble = 0; /* Hash algorithm to use for fingerprints. */ int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT; /* The identity file name, given on the command line or entered by the user. */ char identity_file[1024]; int have_identity = 0; /* This is set to the passphrase if given on the command line. */ char *identity_passphrase = NULL; /* This is set to the new passphrase if given on the command line. */ char *identity_new_passphrase = NULL; /* This is set to the new comment if given on the command line. */ char *identity_comment = NULL; /* Path to CA key when certifying keys. */ char *ca_key_path = NULL; /* Certificate serial number */ unsigned long long cert_serial = 0; /* Key type when certifying */ u_int cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER; /* "key ID" of signed key */ char *cert_key_id = NULL; /* Comma-separated list of principal names for certifying keys */ char *cert_principals = NULL; /* Validity period for certificates */ u_int64_t cert_valid_from = 0; u_int64_t cert_valid_to = ~0ULL; /* Certificate options */ #define CERTOPT_X_FWD (1) #define CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD (1<<1) #define CERTOPT_PORT_FWD (1<<2) #define CERTOPT_PTY (1<<3) #define CERTOPT_USER_RC (1<<4) #define CERTOPT_DEFAULT (CERTOPT_X_FWD|CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD| \ CERTOPT_PORT_FWD|CERTOPT_PTY|CERTOPT_USER_RC) u_int32_t certflags_flags = CERTOPT_DEFAULT; char *certflags_command = NULL; char *certflags_src_addr = NULL; /* Conversion to/from various formats */ int convert_to = 0; int convert_from = 0; enum { FMT_RFC4716, FMT_PKCS8, FMT_PEM } convert_format = FMT_RFC4716; int print_public = 0; int print_generic = 0; char *key_type_name = NULL; /* Load key from this PKCS#11 provider */ char *pkcs11provider = NULL; /* Use new OpenSSH private key format when writing SSH2 keys instead of PEM */ int use_new_format = 0; /* Cipher for new-format private keys */ char *new_format_cipher = NULL; /* * Number of KDF rounds to derive new format keys / * number of primality trials when screening moduli. */ int rounds = 0; /* argv0 */ extern char *__progname; char hostname[NI_MAXHOST]; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* moduli.c */ int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *); int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long, unsigned long); +#endif static void type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - u_int maxbits; - int nid; + u_int maxbits, nid; #endif - if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) { - fprintf(stderr, "unknown key type %s\n", key_type_name); - exit(1); - } + if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) + fatal("unknown key type %s", key_type_name); if (*bitsp == 0) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL if (type == KEY_DSA) *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_DSA; else if (type == KEY_ECDSA) { if (name != NULL && (nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(name)) > 0) *bitsp = sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(nid); if (*bitsp == 0) *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA; } else #endif *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS; } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL maxbits = (type == KEY_DSA) ? OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS : OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS; - if (*bitsp > maxbits) { - fprintf(stderr, "key bits exceeds maximum %d\n", maxbits); - exit(1); - } + if (*bitsp > maxbits) + fatal("key bits exceeds maximum %d", maxbits); if (type == KEY_DSA && *bitsp != 1024) fatal("DSA keys must be 1024 bits"); else if (type != KEY_ECDSA && type != KEY_ED25519 && *bitsp < 768) fatal("Key must at least be 768 bits"); else if (type == KEY_ECDSA && sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(*bitsp) == -1) fatal("Invalid ECDSA key length - valid lengths are " "256, 384 or 521 bits"); #endif } static void ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt) { char buf[1024]; char *name = NULL; if (key_type_name == NULL) name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA; else { switch (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name)) { case KEY_RSA1: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY; break; case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA; break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA; break; #endif case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_RSA: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA; break; case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519; break; default: - fprintf(stderr, "bad key type\n"); - exit(1); - break; + fatal("bad key type"); } } - snprintf(identity_file, sizeof(identity_file), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, name); - fprintf(stderr, "%s (%s): ", prompt, identity_file); + snprintf(identity_file, sizeof(identity_file), + "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, name); + printf("%s (%s): ", prompt, identity_file); + fflush(stdout); if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) exit(1); buf[strcspn(buf, "\n")] = '\0'; if (strcmp(buf, "") != 0) strlcpy(identity_file, buf, sizeof(identity_file)); have_identity = 1; } static struct sshkey * load_identity(char *filename) { char *pass; struct sshkey *prv; int r; if ((r = sshkey_load_private(filename, "", &prv, NULL)) == 0) return prv; if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) fatal("Load key \"%s\": %s", filename, ssh_err(r)); if (identity_passphrase) pass = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); else pass = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); r = sshkey_load_private(filename, pass, &prv, NULL); explicit_bzero(pass, strlen(pass)); free(pass); if (r != 0) fatal("Load key \"%s\": %s", filename, ssh_err(r)); return prv; } #define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----" #define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END "---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----" #define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----" #define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC 0x3f6ff9eb #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL static void do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *k) { size_t len; u_char *blob; char comment[61]; int r; - if (k->type == KEY_RSA1) { - fprintf(stderr, "version 1 keys are not supported\n"); - exit(1); - } - if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(k, &blob, &len)) != 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "key_to_blob failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); - exit(1); - } + if (k->type == KEY_RSA1) + fatal("version 1 keys are not supported"); + if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(k, &blob, &len)) != 0) + fatal("key_to_blob failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); /* Comment + surrounds must fit into 72 chars (RFC 4716 sec 3.3) */ snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment), "%u-bit %s, converted by %s@%s from OpenSSH", sshkey_size(k), sshkey_type(k), pw->pw_name, hostname); fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN); fprintf(stdout, "Comment: \"%s\"\n", comment); dump_base64(stdout, blob, len); fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END); sshkey_free(k); free(blob); exit(0); } static void do_convert_to_pkcs8(struct sshkey *k) { switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) { case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: if (!PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->rsa)) fatal("PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY failed"); break; case KEY_DSA: if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa)) fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed"); break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa)) fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed"); break; #endif default: fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k)); } exit(0); } static void do_convert_to_pem(struct sshkey *k) { switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) { case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: if (!PEM_write_RSAPublicKey(stdout, k->rsa)) fatal("PEM_write_RSAPublicKey failed"); break; #if notyet /* OpenSSH 0.9.8 lacks this function */ case KEY_DSA: if (!PEM_write_DSAPublicKey(stdout, k->dsa)) fatal("PEM_write_DSAPublicKey failed"); break; #endif /* XXX ECDSA? */ default: fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k)); } exit(0); } static void do_convert_to(struct passwd *pw) { struct sshkey *k; struct stat st; int r; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(identity_file, &k, NULL)) != 0) k = load_identity(identity_file); switch (convert_format) { case FMT_RFC4716: do_convert_to_ssh2(pw, k); break; case FMT_PKCS8: do_convert_to_pkcs8(k); break; case FMT_PEM: do_convert_to_pem(k); break; default: fatal("%s: unknown key format %d", __func__, convert_format); } exit(0); } /* * This is almost exactly the bignum1 encoding, but with 32 bit for length * instead of 16. */ static void buffer_get_bignum_bits(struct sshbuf *b, BIGNUM *value) { u_int bytes, bignum_bits; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &bignum_bits)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); bytes = (bignum_bits + 7) / 8; if (sshbuf_len(b) < bytes) fatal("%s: input buffer too small: need %d have %zu", __func__, bytes, sshbuf_len(b)); if (BN_bin2bn(sshbuf_ptr(b), bytes, value) == NULL) fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, bytes)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } static struct sshkey * do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(u_char *blob, u_int blen) { struct sshbuf *b; struct sshkey *key = NULL; char *type, *cipher; u_char e1, e2, e3, *sig = NULL, data[] = "abcde12345"; int r, rlen, ktype; u_int magic, i1, i2, i3, i4; size_t slen; u_long e; if ((b = sshbuf_from(blob, blen)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_from failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &magic)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (magic != SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC) { error("bad magic 0x%x != 0x%x", magic, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC); sshbuf_free(b); return NULL; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &type, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cipher, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i2)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i3)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i4)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug("ignore (%d %d %d %d)", i1, i2, i3, i4); if (strcmp(cipher, "none") != 0) { error("unsupported cipher %s", cipher); free(cipher); sshbuf_free(b); free(type); return NULL; } free(cipher); if (strstr(type, "dsa")) { ktype = KEY_DSA; } else if (strstr(type, "rsa")) { ktype = KEY_RSA; } else { sshbuf_free(b); free(type); return NULL; } if ((key = sshkey_new_private(ktype)) == NULL) fatal("key_new_private failed"); free(type); switch (key->type) { case KEY_DSA: buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->p); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->g); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->q); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->pub_key); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->dsa->priv_key); break; case KEY_RSA: if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e1)) != 0 || (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e2)) != 0) || (e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e3)) != 0)) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); e = e1; debug("e %lx", e); if (e < 30) { e <<= 8; e += e2; debug("e %lx", e); e <<= 8; e += e3; debug("e %lx", e); } if (!BN_set_word(key->rsa->e, e)) { sshbuf_free(b); sshkey_free(key); return NULL; } buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->d); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->n); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->iqmp); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->q); buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, key->rsa->p); if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(key->rsa)) != 0) fatal("generate RSA parameters failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); break; } rlen = sshbuf_len(b); if (rlen != 0) error("do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob: " "remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen); sshbuf_free(b); /* try the key */ if (sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data), 0) != 0 || sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data), 0) != 0) { sshkey_free(key); free(sig); return NULL; } free(sig); return key; } static int get_line(FILE *fp, char *line, size_t len) { int c; size_t pos = 0; line[0] = '\0'; while ((c = fgetc(fp)) != EOF) { - if (pos >= len - 1) { - fprintf(stderr, "input line too long.\n"); - exit(1); - } + if (pos >= len - 1) + fatal("input line too long."); switch (c) { case '\r': c = fgetc(fp); - if (c != EOF && c != '\n' && ungetc(c, fp) == EOF) { - fprintf(stderr, "unget: %s\n", strerror(errno)); - exit(1); - } + if (c != EOF && c != '\n' && ungetc(c, fp) == EOF) + fatal("unget: %s", strerror(errno)); return pos; case '\n': return pos; } line[pos++] = c; line[pos] = '\0'; } /* We reached EOF */ return -1; } static void do_convert_from_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey **k, int *private) { int r, blen, escaped = 0; u_int len; char line[1024]; u_char blob[8096]; char encoded[8096]; FILE *fp; if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); encoded[0] = '\0'; while ((blen = get_line(fp, line, sizeof(line))) != -1) { if (blen > 0 && line[blen - 1] == '\\') escaped++; if (strncmp(line, "----", 4) == 0 || strstr(line, ": ") != NULL) { if (strstr(line, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN) != NULL) *private = 1; if (strstr(line, " END ") != NULL) { break; } /* fprintf(stderr, "ignore: %s", line); */ continue; } if (escaped) { escaped--; /* fprintf(stderr, "escaped: %s", line); */ continue; } strlcat(encoded, line, sizeof(encoded)); } len = strlen(encoded); if (((len % 4) == 3) && (encoded[len-1] == '=') && (encoded[len-2] == '=') && (encoded[len-3] == '=')) encoded[len-3] = '\0'; blen = uudecode(encoded, blob, sizeof(blob)); - if (blen < 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "uudecode failed.\n"); - exit(1); - } + if (blen < 0) + fatal("uudecode failed."); if (*private) *k = do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(blob, blen); - else if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, k)) != 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "decode blob failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); - exit(1); - } + else if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, k)) != 0) + fatal("decode blob failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); fclose(fp); } static void do_convert_from_pkcs8(struct sshkey **k, int *private) { EVP_PKEY *pubkey; FILE *fp; if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((pubkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) { fatal("%s: %s is not a recognised public key format", __func__, identity_file); } fclose(fp); switch (EVP_PKEY_type(pubkey->type)) { case EVP_PKEY_RSA: if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); (*k)->type = KEY_RSA; (*k)->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pubkey); break; case EVP_PKEY_DSA: if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); (*k)->type = KEY_DSA; (*k)->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pubkey); break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case EVP_PKEY_EC: if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); (*k)->type = KEY_ECDSA; (*k)->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pubkey); (*k)->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid((*k)->ecdsa); break; #endif default: fatal("%s: unsupported pubkey type %d", __func__, EVP_PKEY_type(pubkey->type)); } EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey); return; } static void do_convert_from_pem(struct sshkey **k, int *private) { FILE *fp; RSA *rsa; #ifdef notyet DSA *dsa; #endif if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((rsa = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) { if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); (*k)->type = KEY_RSA; (*k)->rsa = rsa; fclose(fp); return; } #if notyet /* OpenSSH 0.9.8 lacks this function */ rewind(fp); if ((dsa = PEM_read_DSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) { if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); (*k)->type = KEY_DSA; (*k)->dsa = dsa; fclose(fp); return; } /* XXX ECDSA */ #endif fatal("%s: unrecognised raw private key format", __func__); } static void do_convert_from(struct passwd *pw) { struct sshkey *k = NULL; int r, private = 0, ok = 0; struct stat st; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); switch (convert_format) { case FMT_RFC4716: do_convert_from_ssh2(pw, &k, &private); break; case FMT_PKCS8: do_convert_from_pkcs8(&k, &private); break; case FMT_PEM: do_convert_from_pem(&k, &private); break; default: fatal("%s: unknown key format %d", __func__, convert_format); } if (!private) { if ((r = sshkey_write(k, stdout)) == 0) ok = 1; if (ok) fprintf(stdout, "\n"); } else { switch (k->type) { case KEY_DSA: ok = PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->dsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: ok = PEM_write_ECPrivateKey(stdout, k->ecdsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); break; #endif case KEY_RSA: ok = PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->rsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); break; default: fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k)); } } - if (!ok) { - fprintf(stderr, "key write failed\n"); - exit(1); - } + if (!ok) + fatal("key write failed"); sshkey_free(k); exit(0); } #endif static void do_print_public(struct passwd *pw) { struct sshkey *prv; struct stat st; int r; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); - if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) { - perror(identity_file); - exit(1); - } + if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) + fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); prv = load_identity(identity_file); if ((r = sshkey_write(prv, stdout)) != 0) - fprintf(stderr, "key_write failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); + error("key_write failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(prv); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); exit(0); } static void do_download(struct passwd *pw) { #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 struct sshkey **keys = NULL; int i, nkeys; enum sshkey_fp_rep rep; int fptype; char *fp, *ra; fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash; rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT; pkcs11_init(0); nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, NULL, &keys); if (nkeys <= 0) fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11"); for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (print_fingerprint) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", sshkey_size(keys[i]), fp, sshkey_type(keys[i])); if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) printf("%s\n", ra); free(ra); free(fp); } else { (void) sshkey_write(keys[i], stdout); /* XXX check */ fprintf(stdout, "\n"); } sshkey_free(keys[i]); } free(keys); pkcs11_terminate(); exit(0); #else fatal("no pkcs11 support"); #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ } static void do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) { FILE *f; struct sshkey *public; char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra; int r, i, skip = 0, num = 0, invalid = 1; enum sshkey_fp_rep rep; int fptype; struct stat st; fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash; rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); - if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) { - perror(identity_file); - exit(1); - } + if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) + fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(identity_file, &public, &comment)) != 0) debug2("Error loading public key \"%s\": %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); else { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(public), fp, comment, sshkey_type(public)); if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) printf("%s\n", ra); sshkey_free(public); free(comment); free(ra); free(fp); exit(0); } if (comment) { free(comment); comment = NULL; } if ((f = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { if ((cp = strchr(line, '\n')) == NULL) { error("line %d too long: %.40s...", num + 1, line); skip = 1; continue; } num++; if (skip) { skip = 0; continue; } *cp = '\0'; /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') continue; i = strtol(cp, &ep, 10); if (i == 0 || ep == NULL || (*ep != ' ' && *ep != '\t')) { int quoted = 0; comment = cp; for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) { if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"') cp++; /* Skip both */ else if (*cp == '"') quoted = !quoted; } if (!*cp) continue; *cp++ = '\0'; } ep = cp; if ((public = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); if ((r = sshkey_read(public, &cp)) != 0) { cp = ep; sshkey_free(public); if ((public = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_new failed"); if ((r = sshkey_read(public, &cp)) != 0) { sshkey_free(public); continue; } } comment = *cp ? cp : comment; fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(public), fp, comment ? comment : "no comment", sshkey_type(public)); if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) printf("%s\n", ra); free(ra); free(fp); sshkey_free(public); invalid = 0; } fclose(f); - if (invalid) { - printf("%s is not a public key file.\n", identity_file); - exit(1); - } + if (invalid) + fatal("%s is not a public key file.", identity_file); exit(0); } static void do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw) { struct { char *key_type; char *key_type_display; char *path; } key_types[] = { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 { "rsa1", "RSA1", _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE }, +#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ { "rsa", "RSA" ,_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE }, { "dsa", "DSA", _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE }, #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC { "ecdsa", "ECDSA",_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE }, -#endif +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ { "ed25519", "ED25519",_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE }, { NULL, NULL, NULL } }; int first = 0; struct stat st; struct sshkey *private, *public; char comment[1024]; int i, type, fd, r; FILE *f; for (i = 0; key_types[i].key_type; i++) { if (stat(key_types[i].path, &st) == 0) continue; if (errno != ENOENT) { - printf("Could not stat %s: %s", key_types[i].path, + error("Could not stat %s: %s", key_types[i].path, strerror(errno)); first = 0; continue; } if (first == 0) { first = 1; printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname); } printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display); fflush(stdout); type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type); strlcpy(identity_file, key_types[i].path, sizeof(identity_file)); bits = 0; type_bits_valid(type, NULL, &bits); if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "key_generate failed: %s\n", - ssh_err(r)); + error("key_generate failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); first = 0; continue; } if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) fatal("sshkey_from_private failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname); if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, "", comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { - printf("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s\n", identity_file, - ssh_err(r)); + error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s", + identity_file, ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(private); sshkey_free(public); first = 0; continue; } sshkey_free(private); strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644); if (fd == -1) { - printf("Could not save your public key in %s\n", + error("Could not save your public key in %s", identity_file); sshkey_free(public); first = 0; continue; } f = fdopen(fd, "w"); if (f == NULL) { - printf("fdopen %s failed\n", identity_file); + error("fdopen %s failed", identity_file); close(fd); sshkey_free(public); first = 0; continue; } if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "write key failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); + error("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); fclose(f); sshkey_free(public); first = 0; continue; } fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment); fclose(f); sshkey_free(public); } if (first != 0) printf("\n"); } struct known_hosts_ctx { const char *host; /* Hostname searched for in find/delete case */ FILE *out; /* Output file, stdout for find_hosts case */ int has_unhashed; /* When hashing, original had unhashed hosts */ int found_key; /* For find/delete, host was found */ int invalid; /* File contained invalid items; don't delete */ }; static int known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx; char *hashed, *cp, *hosts, *ohosts; int has_wild = l->hosts && strcspn(l->hosts, "*?!") != strlen(l->hosts); switch (l->status) { case HKF_STATUS_OK: case HKF_STATUS_MATCHED: /* * Don't hash hosts already already hashed, with wildcard * characters or a CA/revocation marker. */ if ((l->match & HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED) != 0 || has_wild || l->marker != MRK_NONE) { fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); if (has_wild && !find_host) { - fprintf(stderr, "%s:%ld: ignoring host name " - "with wildcard: %.64s\n", l->path, + logit("%s:%ld: ignoring host name " + "with wildcard: %.64s", l->path, l->linenum, l->hosts); } return 0; } /* * Split any comma-separated hostnames from the host list, * hash and store separately. */ ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(l->hosts); while ((cp = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') { if ((hashed = host_hash(cp, NULL, 0)) == NULL) fatal("hash_host failed"); fprintf(ctx->out, "%s %s\n", hashed, l->rawkey); ctx->has_unhashed = 1; } free(ohosts); return 0; case HKF_STATUS_INVALID: /* Retain invalid lines, but mark file as invalid. */ ctx->invalid = 1; - fprintf(stderr, "%s:%ld: invalid line\n", l->path, l->linenum); + logit("%s:%ld: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum); /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); return 0; } /* NOTREACHED */ return -1; } static int known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx) { struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx; + enum sshkey_fp_rep rep; + int fptype; + char *fp; + fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash; + rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT; + if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) { if (delete_host) { if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) { /* Don't remove CA and revocation lines */ fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); } else { /* * Hostname matches and has no CA/revoke * marker, delete it by *not* writing the * line to ctx->out. */ ctx->found_key = 1; if (!quiet) printf("# Host %s found: line %ld\n", ctx->host, l->linenum); } return 0; } else if (find_host) { ctx->found_key = 1; if (!quiet) { printf("# Host %s found: line %ld %s\n", ctx->host, l->linenum, l->marker == MRK_CA ? "CA" : (l->marker == MRK_REVOKE ? "REVOKED" : "")); } if (hash_hosts) known_hosts_hash(l, ctx); - else + else if (print_fingerprint) { + fp = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key, fptype, rep); + printf("%s %s %s %s\n", ctx->host, + sshkey_type(l->key), fp, l->comment); + free(fp); + } else fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); return 0; } } else if (delete_host) { /* Retain non-matching hosts when deleting */ if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) { ctx->invalid = 1; - fprintf(stderr, "%s:%ld: invalid line\n", - l->path, l->linenum); + logit("%s:%ld: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum); } fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line); } return 0; } static void do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name) { char *cp, tmp[PATH_MAX], old[PATH_MAX]; int r, fd, oerrno, inplace = 0; struct known_hosts_ctx ctx; + u_int foreach_options; if (!have_identity) { cp = tilde_expand_filename(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, pw->pw_uid); if (strlcpy(identity_file, cp, sizeof(identity_file)) >= sizeof(identity_file)) fatal("Specified known hosts path too long"); free(cp); have_identity = 1; } memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx)); ctx.out = stdout; ctx.host = name; /* * Find hosts goes to stdout, hash and deletions happen in-place * A corner case is ssh-keygen -HF foo, which should go to stdout */ if (!find_host && (hash_hosts || delete_host)) { if (strlcpy(tmp, identity_file, sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) || strlcat(tmp, ".XXXXXXXXXX", sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) || strlcpy(old, identity_file, sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old) || strlcat(old, ".old", sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old)) fatal("known_hosts path too long"); umask(077); if ((fd = mkstemp(tmp)) == -1) fatal("mkstemp: %s", strerror(errno)); if ((ctx.out = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) { oerrno = errno; unlink(tmp); fatal("fdopen: %s", strerror(oerrno)); } inplace = 1; } /* XXX support identity_file == "-" for stdin */ + foreach_options = find_host ? HKF_WANT_MATCH : 0; + foreach_options |= print_fingerprint ? HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY : 0; if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(identity_file, hash_hosts ? known_hosts_hash : known_hosts_find_delete, &ctx, - name, NULL, find_host ? HKF_WANT_MATCH : 0)) != 0) + name, NULL, foreach_options)) != 0) fatal("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (inplace) fclose(ctx.out); if (ctx.invalid) { - fprintf(stderr, "%s is not a valid known_hosts file.\n", - identity_file); + error("%s is not a valid known_hosts file.", identity_file); if (inplace) { - fprintf(stderr, "Not replacing existing known_hosts " - "file because of errors\n"); + error("Not replacing existing known_hosts " + "file because of errors"); unlink(tmp); } exit(1); } else if (delete_host && !ctx.found_key) { - fprintf(stderr, "Host %s not found in %s\n", - name, identity_file); + logit("Host %s not found in %s", name, identity_file); unlink(tmp); } else if (inplace) { /* Backup existing file */ if (unlink(old) == -1 && errno != ENOENT) fatal("unlink %.100s: %s", old, strerror(errno)); if (link(identity_file, old) == -1) fatal("link %.100s to %.100s: %s", identity_file, old, strerror(errno)); /* Move new one into place */ if (rename(tmp, identity_file) == -1) { error("rename\"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", tmp, identity_file, strerror(errno)); unlink(tmp); unlink(old); exit(1); } - fprintf(stderr, "%s updated.\n", identity_file); - fprintf(stderr, "Original contents retained as %s\n", old); + printf("%s updated.\n", identity_file); + printf("Original contents retained as %s\n", old); if (ctx.has_unhashed) { - fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: %s contains unhashed " - "entries\n", old); - fprintf(stderr, "Delete this file to ensure privacy " - "of hostnames\n"); + logit("WARNING: %s contains unhashed entries", old); + logit("Delete this file to ensure privacy " + "of hostnames"); } } exit (find_host && !ctx.found_key); } /* * Perform changing a passphrase. The argument is the passwd structure * for the current user. */ static void do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw) { char *comment; char *old_passphrase, *passphrase1, *passphrase2; struct stat st; struct sshkey *private; int r; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); - if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) { - perror(identity_file); - exit(1); - } + if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) + fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); /* Try to load the file with empty passphrase. */ r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "", &private, &comment); if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { if (identity_passphrase) old_passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); else old_passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter old passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, old_passphrase, &private, &comment); explicit_bzero(old_passphrase, strlen(old_passphrase)); free(old_passphrase); if (r != 0) goto badkey; } else if (r != 0) { badkey: - fprintf(stderr, "Failed to load key \"%s\": %s\n", - identity_file, ssh_err(r)); - exit(1); + fatal("Failed to load key %s: %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); } if (comment) printf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment); /* Ask the new passphrase (twice). */ if (identity_new_passphrase) { passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); passphrase2 = NULL; } else { passphrase1 = read_passphrase("Enter new passphrase (empty for no " "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); /* Verify that they are the same. */ if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) { explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); free(passphrase1); free(passphrase2); printf("Pass phrases do not match. Try again.\n"); exit(1); } /* Destroy the other copy. */ explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); free(passphrase2); } /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1, comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { - printf("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s.\n", + error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s.", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); free(passphrase1); sshkey_free(private); free(comment); exit(1); } /* Destroy the passphrase and the copy of the key in memory. */ explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); free(passphrase1); sshkey_free(private); /* Destroys contents */ free(comment); printf("Your identification has been saved with the new passphrase.\n"); exit(0); } /* * Print the SSHFP RR. */ static int do_print_resource_record(struct passwd *pw, char *fname, char *hname) { struct sshkey *public; char *comment = NULL; struct stat st; int r; if (fname == NULL) fatal("%s: no filename", __func__); if (stat(fname, &st) < 0) { if (errno == ENOENT) return 0; - perror(fname); - exit(1); + fatal("%s: %s", fname, strerror(errno)); } - if ((r = sshkey_load_public(fname, &public, &comment)) != 0) { - printf("Failed to read v2 public key from \"%s\": %s.\n", + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(fname, &public, &comment)) != 0) + fatal("Failed to read v2 public key from \"%s\": %s.", fname, ssh_err(r)); - exit(1); - } export_dns_rr(hname, public, stdout, print_generic); sshkey_free(public); free(comment); return 1; } /* * Change the comment of a private key file. */ static void do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw) { char new_comment[1024], *comment, *passphrase; struct sshkey *private; struct sshkey *public; struct stat st; FILE *f; int r, fd; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); - if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) { - perror(identity_file); - exit(1); - } + if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) + fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "", &private, &comment)) == 0) passphrase = xstrdup(""); - else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) { - printf("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.\n", + else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) + fatal("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); - exit(1); - } else { + else { if (identity_passphrase) passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); else if (identity_new_passphrase) passphrase = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); else passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); /* Try to load using the passphrase. */ if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, passphrase, &private, &comment)) != 0) { explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); free(passphrase); - printf("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.\n", + fatal("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); - exit(1); } } + /* XXX what about new-format keys? */ if (private->type != KEY_RSA1) { - fprintf(stderr, "Comments are only supported for RSA1 keys.\n"); + error("Comments are only supported for RSA1 keys."); + explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); sshkey_free(private); exit(1); } printf("Key now has comment '%s'\n", comment); if (identity_comment) { strlcpy(new_comment, identity_comment, sizeof(new_comment)); } else { printf("Enter new comment: "); fflush(stdout); if (!fgets(new_comment, sizeof(new_comment), stdin)) { explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); sshkey_free(private); exit(1); } new_comment[strcspn(new_comment, "\n")] = '\0'; } /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase, new_comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { - printf("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s\n", + error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); free(passphrase); sshkey_free(private); free(comment); exit(1); } explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); free(passphrase); if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) fatal("key_from_private failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(private); strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644); - if (fd == -1) { - printf("Could not save your public key in %s\n", identity_file); - exit(1); - } + if (fd == -1) + fatal("Could not save your public key in %s", identity_file); f = fdopen(fd, "w"); - if (f == NULL) { - printf("fdopen %s failed\n", identity_file); - exit(1); - } + if (f == NULL) + fatal("fdopen %s failed: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0) - fprintf(stderr, "write key failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); + fatal("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(public); fprintf(f, " %s\n", new_comment); fclose(f); free(comment); printf("The comment in your key file has been changed.\n"); exit(0); } static const char * fmt_validity(u_int64_t valid_from, u_int64_t valid_to) { char from[32], to[32]; static char ret[64]; time_t tt; struct tm *tm; *from = *to = '\0'; if (valid_from == 0 && valid_to == 0xffffffffffffffffULL) return "forever"; if (valid_from != 0) { /* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */ tt = valid_from > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : valid_from; tm = localtime(&tt); strftime(from, sizeof(from), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm); } if (valid_to != 0xffffffffffffffffULL) { /* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */ tt = valid_to > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : valid_to; tm = localtime(&tt); strftime(to, sizeof(to), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm); } if (valid_from == 0) { snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "before %s", to); return ret; } if (valid_to == 0xffffffffffffffffULL) { snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "after %s", from); return ret; } snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "from %s to %s", from, to); return ret; } static void add_flag_option(struct sshbuf *c, const char *name) { int r; debug3("%s: %s", __func__, name); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(c, NULL, 0)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } static void add_string_option(struct sshbuf *c, const char *name, const char *value) { struct sshbuf *b; int r; debug3("%s: %s=%s", __func__, name, value); if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, value)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c, b)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(b); } #define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1 #define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2 static void prepare_options_buf(struct sshbuf *c, int which) { sshbuf_reset(c); if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 && certflags_command != NULL) add_string_option(c, "force-command", certflags_command); if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_X_FWD) != 0) add_flag_option(c, "permit-X11-forwarding"); if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD) != 0) add_flag_option(c, "permit-agent-forwarding"); if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PORT_FWD) != 0) add_flag_option(c, "permit-port-forwarding"); if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PTY) != 0) add_flag_option(c, "permit-pty"); if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_USER_RC) != 0) add_flag_option(c, "permit-user-rc"); if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 && certflags_src_addr != NULL) add_string_option(c, "source-address", certflags_src_addr); } static struct sshkey * load_pkcs11_key(char *path) { #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *public, *private = NULL; int r, i, nkeys; if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &public, NULL)) != 0) fatal("Couldn't load CA public key \"%s\": %s", path, ssh_err(r)); nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, identity_passphrase, &keys); debug3("%s: %d keys", __func__, nkeys); if (nkeys <= 0) fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11"); for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (sshkey_equal_public(public, keys[i])) { private = keys[i]; continue; } sshkey_free(keys[i]); } free(keys); sshkey_free(public); return private; #else fatal("no pkcs11 support"); #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ } static void do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv) { int r, i, fd; u_int n; struct sshkey *ca, *public; char *otmp, *tmp, *cp, *out, *comment, **plist = NULL; FILE *f; int v00 = 0; /* legacy keys */ if (key_type_name != NULL) { switch (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name)) { case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: v00 = 1; break; case KEY_UNSPEC: if (strcasecmp(key_type_name, "v00") == 0) { v00 = 1; break; } else if (strcasecmp(key_type_name, "v01") == 0) break; /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: - fprintf(stderr, "unknown key type %s\n", key_type_name); - exit(1); + fatal("unknown key type %s", key_type_name); } } #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 pkcs11_init(1); #endif tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid); if (pkcs11provider != NULL) { if ((ca = load_pkcs11_key(tmp)) == NULL) fatal("No PKCS#11 key matching %s found", ca_key_path); } else ca = load_identity(tmp); free(tmp); for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { /* Split list of principals */ n = 0; if (cert_principals != NULL) { otmp = tmp = xstrdup(cert_principals); plist = NULL; for (; (cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL; n++) { - plist = xrealloc(plist, n + 1, sizeof(*plist)); + plist = xreallocarray(plist, n + 1, sizeof(*plist)); if (*(plist[n] = xstrdup(cp)) == '\0') fatal("Empty principal name"); } free(otmp); } tmp = tilde_expand_filename(argv[i], pw->pw_uid); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &public, &comment)) != 0) fatal("%s: unable to open \"%s\": %s", __func__, tmp, ssh_err(r)); if (public->type != KEY_RSA && public->type != KEY_DSA && public->type != KEY_ECDSA && public->type != KEY_ED25519) fatal("%s: key \"%s\" type %s cannot be certified", __func__, tmp, sshkey_type(public)); /* Prepare certificate to sign */ if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(public, v00)) != 0) fatal("Could not upgrade key %s to certificate: %s", tmp, ssh_err(r)); public->cert->type = cert_key_type; public->cert->serial = (u_int64_t)cert_serial; public->cert->key_id = xstrdup(cert_key_id); public->cert->nprincipals = n; public->cert->principals = plist; public->cert->valid_after = cert_valid_from; public->cert->valid_before = cert_valid_to; if (v00) { prepare_options_buf(public->cert->critical, OPTIONS_CRITICAL|OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS); } else { prepare_options_buf(public->cert->critical, OPTIONS_CRITICAL); prepare_options_buf(public->cert->extensions, OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS); } if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca, &public->cert->signature_key)) != 0) fatal("key_from_private (ca key): %s", ssh_err(r)); if (sshkey_certify(public, ca) != 0) fatal("Couldn't not certify key %s", tmp); if ((cp = strrchr(tmp, '.')) != NULL && strcmp(cp, ".pub") == 0) *cp = '\0'; xasprintf(&out, "%s-cert.pub", tmp); free(tmp); if ((fd = open(out, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1) fatal("Could not open \"%s\" for writing: %s", out, strerror(errno)); if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) fatal("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0) fatal("Could not write certified key to %s: %s", out, ssh_err(r)); fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment); fclose(f); if (!quiet) { logit("Signed %s key %s: id \"%s\" serial %llu%s%s " "valid %s", sshkey_cert_type(public), out, public->cert->key_id, (unsigned long long)public->cert->serial, cert_principals != NULL ? " for " : "", cert_principals != NULL ? cert_principals : "", fmt_validity(cert_valid_from, cert_valid_to)); } sshkey_free(public); free(out); } #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 pkcs11_terminate(); #endif exit(0); } static u_int64_t parse_relative_time(const char *s, time_t now) { int64_t mul, secs; mul = *s == '-' ? -1 : 1; if ((secs = convtime(s + 1)) == -1) fatal("Invalid relative certificate time %s", s); if (mul == -1 && secs > now) fatal("Certificate time %s cannot be represented", s); return now + (u_int64_t)(secs * mul); } static u_int64_t parse_absolute_time(const char *s) { struct tm tm; time_t tt; char buf[32], *fmt; /* * POSIX strptime says "The application shall ensure that there * is white-space or other non-alphanumeric characters between * any two conversion specifications" so arrange things this way. */ switch (strlen(s)) { case 8: fmt = "%Y-%m-%d"; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6); break; case 14: fmt = "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2sT%.2s:%.2s:%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6, s + 8, s + 10, s + 12); break; default: fatal("Invalid certificate time format %s", s); } memset(&tm, 0, sizeof(tm)); if (strptime(buf, fmt, &tm) == NULL) fatal("Invalid certificate time %s", s); if ((tt = mktime(&tm)) < 0) fatal("Certificate time %s cannot be represented", s); return (u_int64_t)tt; } static void parse_cert_times(char *timespec) { char *from, *to; time_t now = time(NULL); int64_t secs; /* +timespec relative to now */ if (*timespec == '+' && strchr(timespec, ':') == NULL) { if ((secs = convtime(timespec + 1)) == -1) fatal("Invalid relative certificate life %s", timespec); cert_valid_to = now + secs; /* * Backdate certificate one minute to avoid problems on hosts * with poorly-synchronised clocks. */ cert_valid_from = ((now - 59)/ 60) * 60; return; } /* * from:to, where * from := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS * to := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS */ from = xstrdup(timespec); to = strchr(from, ':'); if (to == NULL || from == to || *(to + 1) == '\0') fatal("Invalid certificate life specification %s", timespec); *to++ = '\0'; if (*from == '-' || *from == '+') cert_valid_from = parse_relative_time(from, now); else cert_valid_from = parse_absolute_time(from); if (*to == '-' || *to == '+') cert_valid_to = parse_relative_time(to, now); else cert_valid_to = parse_absolute_time(to); if (cert_valid_to <= cert_valid_from) fatal("Empty certificate validity interval"); free(from); } static void add_cert_option(char *opt) { char *val; if (strcasecmp(opt, "clear") == 0) certflags_flags = 0; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-x11-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_X_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-x11-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_X_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-agent-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-port-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PORT_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PORT_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-pty") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PTY; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-pty") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PTY; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-user-rc") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_USER_RC; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-user-rc") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_USER_RC; else if (strncasecmp(opt, "force-command=", 14) == 0) { val = opt + 14; if (*val == '\0') fatal("Empty force-command option"); if (certflags_command != NULL) fatal("force-command already specified"); certflags_command = xstrdup(val); } else if (strncasecmp(opt, "source-address=", 15) == 0) { val = opt + 15; if (*val == '\0') fatal("Empty source-address option"); if (certflags_src_addr != NULL) fatal("source-address already specified"); if (addr_match_cidr_list(NULL, val) != 0) fatal("Invalid source-address list"); certflags_src_addr = xstrdup(val); } else fatal("Unsupported certificate option \"%s\"", opt); } static void show_options(struct sshbuf *optbuf, int v00, int in_critical) { char *name, *arg; struct sshbuf *options, *option = NULL; int r; if ((options = sshbuf_fromb(optbuf)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_fromb failed", __func__); while (sshbuf_len(options) != 0) { sshbuf_free(option); option = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(options, &name, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(options, &option)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); printf(" %s", name); if ((v00 || !in_critical) && (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0 || strcmp(name, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0 || strcmp(name, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0 || strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0 || strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0)) printf("\n"); else if ((v00 || in_critical) && (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0 || strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0)) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(option, &arg, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); printf(" %s\n", arg); free(arg); } else { printf(" UNKNOWN OPTION (len %zu)\n", sshbuf_len(option)); sshbuf_reset(option); } free(name); if (sshbuf_len(option) != 0) fatal("Option corrupt: extra data at end"); } sshbuf_free(option); sshbuf_free(options); } static void do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw) { struct sshkey *key; struct stat st; char *key_fp, *ca_fp; u_int i, v00; int r; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(identity_file, &key, NULL)) != 0) fatal("Cannot load public key \"%s\": %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) fatal("%s is not a certificate", identity_file); v00 = key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00 || key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00; key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); if (key_fp == NULL || ca_fp == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); printf("%s:\n", identity_file); printf(" Type: %s %s certificate\n", sshkey_ssh_name(key), sshkey_cert_type(key)); printf(" Public key: %s %s\n", sshkey_type(key), key_fp); printf(" Signing CA: %s %s\n", sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp); printf(" Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id); if (!v00) { printf(" Serial: %llu\n", (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial); } printf(" Valid: %s\n", fmt_validity(key->cert->valid_after, key->cert->valid_before)); printf(" Principals: "); if (key->cert->nprincipals == 0) printf("(none)\n"); else { for (i = 0; i < key->cert->nprincipals; i++) printf("\n %s", key->cert->principals[i]); printf("\n"); } printf(" Critical Options: "); if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->critical) == 0) printf("(none)\n"); else { printf("\n"); show_options(key->cert->critical, v00, 1); } if (!v00) { printf(" Extensions: "); if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->extensions) == 0) printf("(none)\n"); else { printf("\n"); show_options(key->cert->extensions, v00, 0); } } exit(0); } static void load_krl(const char *path, struct ssh_krl **krlp) { struct sshbuf *krlbuf; int r, fd; if ((krlbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("sshbuf_new failed"); if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1) fatal("open %s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, krlbuf)) != 0) fatal("Unable to load KRL: %s", ssh_err(r)); close(fd); /* XXX check sigs */ if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, krlp, NULL, 0)) != 0 || *krlp == NULL) fatal("Invalid KRL file: %s", ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_free(krlbuf); } static void update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw, const char *file, int wild_ca, const struct sshkey *ca, struct ssh_krl *krl) { struct sshkey *key = NULL; u_long lnum = 0; char *path, *cp, *ep, line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; unsigned long long serial, serial2; int i, was_explicit_key, was_sha1, r; FILE *krl_spec; path = tilde_expand_filename(file, pw->pw_uid); if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) { krl_spec = stdin; free(path); path = xstrdup("(standard input)"); } else if ((krl_spec = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) fatal("fopen %s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); if (!quiet) printf("Revoking from %s\n", path); while (read_keyfile_line(krl_spec, path, line, sizeof(line), &lnum) == 0) { was_explicit_key = was_sha1 = 0; cp = line + strspn(line, " \t"); /* Trim trailing space, comments and strip \n */ for (i = 0, r = -1; cp[i] != '\0'; i++) { if (cp[i] == '#' || cp[i] == '\n') { cp[i] = '\0'; break; } if (cp[i] == ' ' || cp[i] == '\t') { /* Remember the start of a span of whitespace */ if (r == -1) r = i; } else r = -1; } if (r != -1) cp[r] = '\0'; if (*cp == '\0') continue; if (strncasecmp(cp, "serial:", 7) == 0) { if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) { fatal("revoking certificates by serial number " "requires specification of a CA key"); } cp += 7; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); errno = 0; serial = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0); if (*cp == '\0' || (*ep != '\0' && *ep != '-')) fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"", path, lnum, cp); if (errno == ERANGE && serial == ULLONG_MAX) fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range", path, lnum); serial2 = serial; if (*ep == '-') { cp = ep + 1; errno = 0; serial2 = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0); if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0') fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"", path, lnum, cp); if (errno == ERANGE && serial2 == ULLONG_MAX) fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range", path, lnum); if (serial2 <= serial) fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial range " "%llu:%llu", path, lnum, (unsigned long long)serial, (unsigned long long)serial2); } if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca, serial, serial2) != 0) { fatal("%s: revoke serial failed", __func__); } } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "id:", 3) == 0) { if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) { fatal("revoking certificates by key ID " "requires specification of a CA key"); } cp += 3; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca, cp) != 0) fatal("%s: revoke key ID failed", __func__); } else { if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) { cp += 4; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); was_explicit_key = 1; } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha1:", 5) == 0) { cp += 5; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); was_sha1 = 1; } else { /* * Just try to process the line as a key. * Parsing will fail if it isn't. */ } if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("key_new"); if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) fatal("%s:%lu: invalid key: %s", path, lnum, ssh_err(r)); if (was_explicit_key) r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key); else if (was_sha1) r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, key); else r = ssh_krl_revoke_key(krl, key); if (r != 0) fatal("%s: revoke key failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshkey_free(key); } } if (strcmp(path, "-") != 0) fclose(krl_spec); free(path); } static void do_gen_krl(struct passwd *pw, int updating, int argc, char **argv) { struct ssh_krl *krl; struct stat sb; struct sshkey *ca = NULL; int fd, i, r, wild_ca = 0; char *tmp; struct sshbuf *kbuf; if (*identity_file == '\0') fatal("KRL generation requires an output file"); if (stat(identity_file, &sb) == -1) { if (errno != ENOENT) fatal("Cannot access KRL \"%s\": %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if (updating) fatal("KRL \"%s\" does not exist", identity_file); } if (ca_key_path != NULL) { if (strcasecmp(ca_key_path, "none") == 0) wild_ca = 1; else { tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid); if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &ca, NULL)) != 0) fatal("Cannot load CA public key %s: %s", tmp, ssh_err(r)); free(tmp); } } if (updating) load_krl(identity_file, &krl); else if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) fatal("couldn't create KRL"); if (cert_serial != 0) ssh_krl_set_version(krl, cert_serial); if (identity_comment != NULL) ssh_krl_set_comment(krl, identity_comment); for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) update_krl_from_file(pw, argv[i], wild_ca, ca, krl); if ((kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("sshbuf_new failed"); if (ssh_krl_to_blob(krl, kbuf, NULL, 0) != 0) fatal("Couldn't generate KRL"); if ((fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1) fatal("open %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, (void *)sshbuf_ptr(kbuf), sshbuf_len(kbuf)) != sshbuf_len(kbuf)) fatal("write %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); close(fd); sshbuf_free(kbuf); ssh_krl_free(krl); if (ca != NULL) sshkey_free(ca); } static void do_check_krl(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv) { int i, r, ret = 0; char *comment; struct ssh_krl *krl; struct sshkey *k; if (*identity_file == '\0') fatal("KRL checking requires an input file"); load_krl(identity_file, &krl); for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { if ((r = sshkey_load_public(argv[i], &k, &comment)) != 0) fatal("Cannot load public key %s: %s", argv[i], ssh_err(r)); r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, k); printf("%s%s%s%s: %s\n", argv[i], *comment ? " (" : "", comment, *comment ? ")" : "", r == 0 ? "ok" : "REVOKED"); if (r != 0) ret = 1; sshkey_free(k); free(comment); } ssh_krl_free(krl); exit(ret); } static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1]\n" " [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -p [-P old_passphrase] [-N new_passphrase] [-f keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -i [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -e [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -c [-P passphrase] [-C comment] [-f keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]\n"); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 fprintf(stderr, " ssh-keygen -D pkcs11\n"); #endif fprintf(stderr, " ssh-keygen -F hostname [-f known_hosts_file] [-l]\n" " ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file]\n" " ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file]\n" " ssh-keygen -r hostname [-f input_keyfile] [-g]\n" +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL " ssh-keygen -G output_file [-v] [-b bits] [-M memory] [-S start_point]\n" " ssh-keygen -T output_file -f input_file [-v] [-a rounds] [-J num_lines]\n" " [-j start_line] [-K checkpt] [-W generator]\n" +#endif " ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I certificate_identity [-h] [-n principals]\n" " [-O option] [-V validity_interval] [-z serial_number] file ...\n" " ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]\n" " ssh-keygen -A\n" " ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number]\n" " file ...\n" " ssh-keygen -Q -f krl_file file ...\n"); exit(1); } /* * Main program for key management. */ int main(int argc, char **argv) { char dotsshdir[PATH_MAX], comment[1024], *passphrase1, *passphrase2; - char *checkpoint = NULL; - char out_file[PATH_MAX], *rr_hostname = NULL, *ep, *fp, *ra; + char *rr_hostname = NULL, *ep, *fp, *ra; struct sshkey *private, *public; struct passwd *pw; struct stat st; int r, opt, type, fd; + int gen_all_hostkeys = 0, gen_krl = 0, update_krl = 0, check_krl = 0; + FILE *f; + const char *errstr; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + /* Moduli generation/screening */ + char out_file[PATH_MAX], *checkpoint = NULL; u_int32_t memory = 0, generator_wanted = 0; int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0; - int gen_all_hostkeys = 0, gen_krl = 0, update_krl = 0, check_krl = 0; unsigned long start_lineno = 0, lines_to_process = 0; BIGNUM *start = NULL; - FILE *f; - const char *errstr; +#endif extern int optind; extern char *optarg; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); #endif log_init(argv[0], SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); seed_rng(); /* we need this for the home * directory. */ pw = getpwuid(getuid()); - if (!pw) { - printf("No user exists for uid %lu\n", (u_long)getuid()); - exit(1); - } - if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0) { - perror("gethostname"); - exit(1); - } + if (!pw) + fatal("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid()); + if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0) + fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Remaining characters: UYdw */ while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ABHLQXceghiklopquvxy" "C:D:E:F:G:I:J:K:M:N:O:P:R:S:T:V:W:Z:" "a:b:f:g:j:m:n:r:s:t:z:")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case 'A': gen_all_hostkeys = 1; break; case 'b': bits = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 256, 32768, &errstr); if (errstr) fatal("Bits has bad value %s (%s)", optarg, errstr); break; case 'E': fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg); if (fingerprint_hash == -1) fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'F': find_host = 1; rr_hostname = optarg; break; case 'H': hash_hosts = 1; break; case 'I': cert_key_id = optarg; break; - case 'J': - lines_to_process = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10); - break; - case 'j': - start_lineno = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10); - break; case 'R': delete_host = 1; rr_hostname = optarg; break; case 'L': show_cert = 1; break; case 'l': print_fingerprint = 1; break; case 'B': print_bubblebabble = 1; break; case 'm': if (strcasecmp(optarg, "RFC4716") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "ssh2") == 0) { convert_format = FMT_RFC4716; break; } if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PKCS8") == 0) { convert_format = FMT_PKCS8; break; } if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PEM") == 0) { convert_format = FMT_PEM; break; } fatal("Unsupported conversion format \"%s\"", optarg); case 'n': cert_principals = optarg; break; case 'o': use_new_format = 1; break; case 'p': change_passphrase = 1; break; case 'c': change_comment = 1; break; case 'f': - if (strlcpy(identity_file, optarg, sizeof(identity_file)) >= - sizeof(identity_file)) + if (strlcpy(identity_file, optarg, + sizeof(identity_file)) >= sizeof(identity_file)) fatal("Identity filename too long"); have_identity = 1; break; case 'g': print_generic = 1; break; case 'P': identity_passphrase = optarg; break; case 'N': identity_new_passphrase = optarg; break; case 'Q': check_krl = 1; break; case 'O': add_cert_option(optarg); break; case 'Z': new_format_cipher = optarg; break; case 'C': identity_comment = optarg; break; case 'q': quiet = 1; break; case 'e': case 'x': /* export key */ convert_to = 1; break; case 'h': cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST; certflags_flags = 0; break; case 'k': gen_krl = 1; break; case 'i': case 'X': /* import key */ convert_from = 1; break; case 'y': print_public = 1; break; case 's': ca_key_path = optarg; break; case 't': key_type_name = optarg; break; case 'D': pkcs11provider = optarg; break; case 'u': update_krl = 1; break; case 'v': if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; else { if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 && log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) log_level++; } break; case 'r': rr_hostname = optarg; break; - case 'W': - generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, - UINT_MAX, &errstr); - if (errstr) - fatal("Desired generator has bad value: %s (%s)", - optarg, errstr); - break; case 'a': rounds = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)", optarg, errstr); break; + case 'V': + parse_cert_times(optarg); + break; + case 'z': + errno = 0; + cert_serial = strtoull(optarg, &ep, 10); + if (*optarg < '0' || *optarg > '9' || *ep != '\0' || + (errno == ERANGE && cert_serial == ULLONG_MAX)) + fatal("Invalid serial number \"%s\"", optarg); + break; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + /* Moduli generation/screening */ + case 'W': + generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, + UINT_MAX, &errstr); + if (errstr) + fatal("Desired generator has bad value: %s (%s)", + optarg, errstr); + break; case 'M': memory = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) fatal("Memory limit is %s: %s", errstr, optarg); break; case 'G': do_gen_candidates = 1; if (strlcpy(out_file, optarg, sizeof(out_file)) >= sizeof(out_file)) fatal("Output filename too long"); break; case 'T': do_screen_candidates = 1; if (strlcpy(out_file, optarg, sizeof(out_file)) >= sizeof(out_file)) fatal("Output filename too long"); break; case 'K': if (strlen(optarg) >= PATH_MAX) fatal("Checkpoint filename too long"); checkpoint = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'S': /* XXX - also compare length against bits */ if (BN_hex2bn(&start, optarg) == 0) fatal("Invalid start point."); break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ - case 'V': - parse_cert_times(optarg); - break; - case 'z': - errno = 0; - cert_serial = strtoull(optarg, &ep, 10); - if (*optarg < '0' || *optarg > '9' || *ep != '\0' || - (errno == ERANGE && cert_serial == ULLONG_MAX)) - fatal("Invalid serial number \"%s\"", optarg); - break; case '?': default: usage(); } } /* reinit */ log_init(argv[0], log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); argv += optind; argc -= optind; if (ca_key_path != NULL) { if (argc < 1 && !gen_krl) { - printf("Too few arguments.\n"); + error("Too few arguments."); usage(); } } else if (argc > 0 && !gen_krl && !check_krl) { - printf("Too many arguments.\n"); + error("Too many arguments."); usage(); } if (change_passphrase && change_comment) { - printf("Can only have one of -p and -c.\n"); + error("Can only have one of -p and -c."); usage(); } if (print_fingerprint && (delete_host || hash_hosts)) { - printf("Cannot use -l with -H or -R.\n"); + error("Cannot use -l with -H or -R."); usage(); } if (gen_krl) { do_gen_krl(pw, update_krl, argc, argv); return (0); } if (check_krl) { do_check_krl(pw, argc, argv); return (0); } if (ca_key_path != NULL) { if (cert_key_id == NULL) fatal("Must specify key id (-I) when certifying"); do_ca_sign(pw, argc, argv); } if (show_cert) do_show_cert(pw); if (delete_host || hash_hosts || find_host) do_known_hosts(pw, rr_hostname); if (pkcs11provider != NULL) do_download(pw); if (print_fingerprint || print_bubblebabble) do_fingerprint(pw); if (change_passphrase) do_change_passphrase(pw); if (change_comment) do_change_comment(pw); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL if (convert_to) do_convert_to(pw); if (convert_from) do_convert_from(pw); #endif if (print_public) do_print_public(pw); if (rr_hostname != NULL) { unsigned int n = 0; if (have_identity) { n = do_print_resource_record(pw, identity_file, rr_hostname); - if (n == 0) { - perror(identity_file); - exit(1); - } + if (n == 0) + fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); exit(0); } else { n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname); n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname); n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname); n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname); if (n == 0) fatal("no keys found."); exit(0); } } +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL if (do_gen_candidates) { FILE *out = fopen(out_file, "w"); if (out == NULL) { error("Couldn't open modulus candidate file \"%s\": %s", out_file, strerror(errno)); return (1); } if (bits == 0) bits = DEFAULT_BITS; if (gen_candidates(out, memory, bits, start) != 0) fatal("modulus candidate generation failed"); return (0); } if (do_screen_candidates) { FILE *in; FILE *out = fopen(out_file, "a"); if (have_identity && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0) { if ((in = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) { fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate " "file \"%s\": %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); } } else in = stdin; if (out == NULL) { fatal("Couldn't open moduli file \"%s\": %s", out_file, strerror(errno)); } if (prime_test(in, out, rounds == 0 ? 100 : rounds, generator_wanted, checkpoint, start_lineno, lines_to_process) != 0) fatal("modulus screening failed"); return (0); } +#endif if (gen_all_hostkeys) { do_gen_all_hostkeys(pw); return (0); } if (key_type_name == NULL) - key_type_name = "rsa"; + key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME; type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name); type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits); if (!quiet) printf("Generating public/private %s key pair.\n", key_type_name); - if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "key_generate failed\n"); - exit(1); - } - if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) { - fprintf(stderr, "key_from_private failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); - exit(1); - } + if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) + fatal("key_generate failed"); + if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0) + fatal("key_from_private failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which to save the key"); /* Create ~/.ssh directory if it doesn't already exist. */ snprintf(dotsshdir, sizeof dotsshdir, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR); if (strstr(identity_file, dotsshdir) != NULL) { if (stat(dotsshdir, &st) < 0) { if (errno != ENOENT) { error("Could not stat %s: %s", dotsshdir, strerror(errno)); } else if (mkdir(dotsshdir, 0700) < 0) { error("Could not create directory '%s': %s", dotsshdir, strerror(errno)); } else if (!quiet) printf("Created directory '%s'.\n", dotsshdir); } } /* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */ if (stat(identity_file, &st) >= 0) { char yesno[3]; printf("%s already exists.\n", identity_file); printf("Overwrite (y/n)? "); fflush(stdout); if (fgets(yesno, sizeof(yesno), stdin) == NULL) exit(1); if (yesno[0] != 'y' && yesno[0] != 'Y') exit(1); } /* Ask for a passphrase (twice). */ if (identity_passphrase) passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); else if (identity_new_passphrase) passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); else { passphrase_again: passphrase1 = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase (empty for no " "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) { /* * The passphrases do not match. Clear them and * retry. */ explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); free(passphrase1); free(passphrase2); printf("Passphrases do not match. Try again.\n"); goto passphrase_again; } /* Clear the other copy of the passphrase. */ explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); free(passphrase2); } if (identity_comment) { strlcpy(comment, identity_comment, sizeof(comment)); } else { /* Create default comment field for the passphrase. */ snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname); } /* Save the key with the given passphrase and comment. */ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1, comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) { - printf("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s\n", + error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r)); explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); free(passphrase1); exit(1); } /* Clear the passphrase. */ explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); free(passphrase1); /* Clear the private key and the random number generator. */ sshkey_free(private); if (!quiet) printf("Your identification has been saved in %s.\n", identity_file); strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); - fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644); - if (fd == -1) { - printf("Could not save your public key in %s\n", identity_file); - exit(1); - } - f = fdopen(fd, "w"); - if (f == NULL) { - printf("fdopen %s failed\n", identity_file); - exit(1); - } + if ((fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1) + fatal("Unable to save public key to %s: %s", + identity_file, strerror(errno)); + if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) + fatal("fdopen %s failed: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0) - fprintf(stderr, "write key failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); + error("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment); fclose(f); if (!quiet) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n", identity_file); printf("The key fingerprint is:\n"); printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment); printf("The key's randomart image is:\n"); printf("%s\n", ra); free(ra); free(fp); } sshkey_free(public); exit(0); } Index: head/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/ssh-keyscan.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,801 +1,804 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.99 2015/01/30 10:44:49 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.101 2015/04/10 00:08:55 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres . * * Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is * permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the * OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "compat.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "packet.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "log.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "misc.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "ssh_api.h" /* Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line. Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. */ int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; int ssh_port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; #define KT_RSA1 1 #define KT_DSA 2 #define KT_RSA 4 #define KT_ECDSA 8 #define KT_ED25519 16 int get_keytypes = KT_RSA|KT_ECDSA|KT_ED25519; int hash_hosts = 0; /* Hash hostname on output */ #define MAXMAXFD 256 /* The number of seconds after which to give up on a TCP connection */ int timeout = 5; int maxfd; #define MAXCON (maxfd - 10) extern char *__progname; fd_set *read_wait; size_t read_wait_nfdset; int ncon; struct ssh *active_state = NULL; /* XXX needed for linking */ /* * Keep a connection structure for each file descriptor. The state * associated with file descriptor n is held in fdcon[n]. */ typedef struct Connection { u_char c_status; /* State of connection on this file desc. */ #define CS_UNUSED 0 /* File descriptor unused */ #define CS_CON 1 /* Waiting to connect/read greeting */ #define CS_SIZE 2 /* Waiting to read initial packet size */ #define CS_KEYS 3 /* Waiting to read public key packet */ int c_fd; /* Quick lookup: c->c_fd == c - fdcon */ int c_plen; /* Packet length field for ssh packet */ int c_len; /* Total bytes which must be read. */ int c_off; /* Length of data read so far. */ int c_keytype; /* Only one of KT_RSA1, KT_DSA, or KT_RSA */ - int c_done; /* SSH2 done */ + sig_atomic_t c_done; /* SSH2 done */ char *c_namebase; /* Address to free for c_name and c_namelist */ char *c_name; /* Hostname of connection for errors */ char *c_namelist; /* Pointer to other possible addresses */ char *c_output_name; /* Hostname of connection for output */ char *c_data; /* Data read from this fd */ struct ssh *c_ssh; /* SSH-connection */ struct timeval c_tv; /* Time at which connection gets aborted */ TAILQ_ENTRY(Connection) c_link; /* List of connections in timeout order. */ } con; TAILQ_HEAD(conlist, Connection) tq; /* Timeout Queue */ con *fdcon; static void keyprint(con *c, struct sshkey *key); static int fdlim_get(int hard) { #if defined(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) struct rlimit rlfd; if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0) return (-1); if ((hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur) == RLIM_INFINITY) return SSH_SYSFDMAX; else return hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur; #else return SSH_SYSFDMAX; #endif } static int fdlim_set(int lim) { #if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) struct rlimit rlfd; #endif if (lim <= 0) return (-1); #if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0) return (-1); rlfd.rlim_cur = lim; if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0) return (-1); #elif defined (HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE) setdtablesize(lim); #endif return (0); } /* * This is an strsep function that returns a null field for adjacent * separators. This is the same as the 4.4BSD strsep, but different from the * one in the GNU libc. */ static char * xstrsep(char **str, const char *delim) { char *s, *e; if (!**str) return (NULL); s = *str; e = s + strcspn(s, delim); if (*e != '\0') *e++ = '\0'; *str = e; return (s); } /* * Get the next non-null token (like GNU strsep). Strsep() will return a * null token for two adjacent separators, so we may have to loop. */ static char * strnnsep(char **stringp, char *delim) { char *tok; do { tok = xstrsep(stringp, delim); } while (tok && *tok == '\0'); return (tok); } #ifdef WITH_SSH1 static struct sshkey * keygrab_ssh1(con *c) { static struct sshkey *rsa; static struct sshbuf *msg; int r; u_char type; if (rsa == NULL) { if ((rsa = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) { error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__); return NULL; } if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); } if ((r = sshbuf_put(msg, c->c_data, c->c_plen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_consume(msg, 8 - (c->c_plen & 7))) != 0 || /* padding */ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0) goto buf_err; if (type != (int) SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY) { error("%s: invalid packet type", c->c_name); sshbuf_reset(msg); return NULL; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(msg, 8)) != 0 || /* cookie */ /* server key */ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, NULL)) != 0 || /* host key */ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, rsa->rsa->e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(msg, rsa->rsa->n)) != 0) { buf_err: error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); sshbuf_reset(msg); return NULL; } sshbuf_reset(msg); return (rsa); } #endif static int key_print_wrapper(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) { con *c; if ((c = ssh_get_app_data(ssh)) != NULL) keyprint(c, hostkey); /* always abort key exchange */ return -1; } static int ssh2_capable(int remote_major, int remote_minor) { switch (remote_major) { case 1: if (remote_minor == 99) return 1; break; case 2: return 1; default: break; } return 0; } static void keygrab_ssh2(con *c) { char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT }; int r; enable_compat20(); myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = c->c_keytype == KT_DSA ? "ssh-dss" : (c->c_keytype == KT_RSA ? "ssh-rsa" : (c->c_keytype == KT_ED25519 ? "ssh-ed25519" : "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521")); if ((r = kex_setup(c->c_ssh, myproposal)) != 0) { free(c->c_ssh); fprintf(stderr, "kex_setup: %s\n", ssh_err(r)); exit(1); } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client; c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client; c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client; # endif #endif c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client; ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(c->c_ssh, key_print_wrapper); /* * do the key-exchange until an error occurs or until * the key_print_wrapper() callback sets c_done. */ ssh_dispatch_run(c->c_ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &c->c_done, c->c_ssh); } static void keyprint(con *c, struct sshkey *key) { char *host = c->c_output_name ? c->c_output_name : c->c_name; + char *hostport = NULL; if (!key) return; if (hash_hosts && (host = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL) fatal("host_hash failed"); - fprintf(stdout, "%s ", host); + hostport = put_host_port(host, ssh_port); + fprintf(stdout, "%s ", hostport); sshkey_write(key, stdout); fputs("\n", stdout); + free(hostport); } static int tcpconnect(char *host) { struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int gaierr, s = -1; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", ssh_port); memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { error("getaddrinfo %s: %s", host, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return -1; } for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { s = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (s < 0) { error("socket: %s", strerror(errno)); continue; } if (set_nonblock(s) == -1) fatal("%s: set_nonblock(%d)", __func__, s); if (connect(s, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0 && errno != EINPROGRESS) error("connect (`%s'): %s", host, strerror(errno)); else break; close(s); s = -1; } freeaddrinfo(aitop); return s; } static int conalloc(char *iname, char *oname, int keytype) { char *namebase, *name, *namelist; int s; namebase = namelist = xstrdup(iname); do { name = xstrsep(&namelist, ","); if (!name) { free(namebase); return (-1); } } while ((s = tcpconnect(name)) < 0); if (s >= maxfd) fatal("conalloc: fdno %d too high", s); if (fdcon[s].c_status) fatal("conalloc: attempt to reuse fdno %d", s); fdcon[s].c_fd = s; fdcon[s].c_status = CS_CON; fdcon[s].c_namebase = namebase; fdcon[s].c_name = name; fdcon[s].c_namelist = namelist; fdcon[s].c_output_name = xstrdup(oname); fdcon[s].c_data = (char *) &fdcon[s].c_plen; fdcon[s].c_len = 4; fdcon[s].c_off = 0; fdcon[s].c_keytype = keytype; gettimeofday(&fdcon[s].c_tv, NULL); fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); FD_SET(s, read_wait); ncon++; return (s); } static void confree(int s) { if (s >= maxfd || fdcon[s].c_status == CS_UNUSED) fatal("confree: attempt to free bad fdno %d", s); close(s); free(fdcon[s].c_namebase); free(fdcon[s].c_output_name); if (fdcon[s].c_status == CS_KEYS) free(fdcon[s].c_data); fdcon[s].c_status = CS_UNUSED; fdcon[s].c_keytype = 0; if (fdcon[s].c_ssh) { ssh_packet_close(fdcon[s].c_ssh); free(fdcon[s].c_ssh); fdcon[s].c_ssh = NULL; } TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); FD_CLR(s, read_wait); ncon--; } static void contouch(int s) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); gettimeofday(&fdcon[s].c_tv, NULL); fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); } static int conrecycle(int s) { con *c = &fdcon[s]; int ret; ret = conalloc(c->c_namelist, c->c_output_name, c->c_keytype); confree(s); return (ret); } static void congreet(int s) { int n = 0, remote_major = 0, remote_minor = 0; char buf[256], *cp; char remote_version[sizeof buf]; size_t bufsiz; con *c = &fdcon[s]; for (;;) { memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf)); bufsiz = sizeof(buf); cp = buf; while (bufsiz-- && (n = atomicio(read, s, cp, 1)) == 1 && *cp != '\n') { if (*cp == '\r') *cp = '\n'; cp++; } if (n != 1 || strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0) break; } if (n == 0) { switch (errno) { case EPIPE: error("%s: Connection closed by remote host", c->c_name); break; case ECONNREFUSED: break; default: error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno)); break; } conrecycle(s); return; } if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') { error("%s: bad greeting", c->c_name); confree(s); return; } *cp = '\0'; if ((c->c_ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, s, s)) == NULL) fatal("ssh_packet_set_connection failed"); ssh_packet_set_timeout(c->c_ssh, timeout, 1); ssh_set_app_data(c->c_ssh, c); /* back link */ if (sscanf(buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) == 3) c->c_ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version); else c->c_ssh->compat = 0; if (c->c_keytype != KT_RSA1) { if (!ssh2_capable(remote_major, remote_minor)) { debug("%s doesn't support ssh2", c->c_name); confree(s); return; } } else if (remote_major != 1) { debug("%s doesn't support ssh1", c->c_name); confree(s); return; } - fprintf(stderr, "# %s %s\n", c->c_name, chop(buf)); + fprintf(stderr, "# %s:%d %s\n", c->c_name, ssh_port, chop(buf)); n = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-OpenSSH-keyscan\r\n", c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MINOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MINOR_2); if (n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sizeof(buf)) { error("snprintf: buffer too small"); confree(s); return; } if (atomicio(vwrite, s, buf, n) != (size_t)n) { error("write (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno)); confree(s); return; } if (c->c_keytype != KT_RSA1) { keygrab_ssh2(c); confree(s); return; } c->c_status = CS_SIZE; contouch(s); } static void conread(int s) { con *c = &fdcon[s]; size_t n; if (c->c_status == CS_CON) { congreet(s); return; } n = atomicio(read, s, c->c_data + c->c_off, c->c_len - c->c_off); if (n == 0) { error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno)); confree(s); return; } c->c_off += n; if (c->c_off == c->c_len) switch (c->c_status) { case CS_SIZE: c->c_plen = htonl(c->c_plen); c->c_len = c->c_plen + 8 - (c->c_plen & 7); c->c_off = 0; c->c_data = xmalloc(c->c_len); c->c_status = CS_KEYS; break; #ifdef WITH_SSH1 case CS_KEYS: keyprint(c, keygrab_ssh1(c)); confree(s); return; #endif default: fatal("conread: invalid status %d", c->c_status); break; } contouch(s); } static void conloop(void) { struct timeval seltime, now; fd_set *r, *e; con *c; int i; gettimeofday(&now, NULL); c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq); if (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec > now.tv_sec || (c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec > now.tv_usec))) { seltime = c->c_tv; seltime.tv_sec -= now.tv_sec; seltime.tv_usec -= now.tv_usec; if (seltime.tv_usec < 0) { seltime.tv_usec += 1000000; seltime.tv_sec--; } } else timerclear(&seltime); r = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); e = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); memcpy(r, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask)); memcpy(e, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask)); while (select(maxfd, r, NULL, e, &seltime) == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) ; for (i = 0; i < maxfd; i++) { if (FD_ISSET(i, e)) { error("%s: exception!", fdcon[i].c_name); confree(i); } else if (FD_ISSET(i, r)) conread(i); } free(r); free(e); c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq); while (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec < now.tv_sec || (c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec < now.tv_usec))) { int s = c->c_fd; c = TAILQ_NEXT(c, c_link); conrecycle(s); } } static void do_host(char *host) { char *name = strnnsep(&host, " \t\n"); int j; if (name == NULL) return; for (j = KT_RSA1; j <= KT_ED25519; j *= 2) { if (get_keytypes & j) { while (ncon >= MAXCON) conloop(); conalloc(name, *host ? host : name, j); } } } void fatal(const char *fmt,...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args); va_end(args); exit(255); } static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-46Hv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type]\n" "\t\t [host | addrlist namelist] ...\n", __progname); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int debug_flag = 0, log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; int opt, fopt_count = 0, j; char *tname, *cp, line[NI_MAXHOST]; FILE *fp; u_long linenum; extern int optind; extern char *optarg; __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); seed_rng(); TAILQ_INIT(&tq); /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); if (argc <= 1) usage(); while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "Hv46p:T:t:f:")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case 'H': hash_hosts = 1; break; case 'p': ssh_port = a2port(optarg); if (ssh_port <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg); exit(1); } break; case 'T': timeout = convtime(optarg); if (timeout == -1 || timeout == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad timeout '%s'\n", optarg); usage(); } break; case 'v': if (!debug_flag) { debug_flag = 1; log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; } else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) log_level++; else fatal("Too high debugging level."); break; case 'f': if (strcmp(optarg, "-") == 0) optarg = NULL; argv[fopt_count++] = optarg; break; case 't': get_keytypes = 0; tname = strtok(optarg, ","); while (tname) { int type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname); switch (type) { case KEY_RSA1: get_keytypes |= KT_RSA1; break; case KEY_DSA: get_keytypes |= KT_DSA; break; case KEY_ECDSA: get_keytypes |= KT_ECDSA; break; case KEY_RSA: get_keytypes |= KT_RSA; break; case KEY_ED25519: get_keytypes |= KT_ED25519; break; case KEY_UNSPEC: fatal("unknown key type %s", tname); } tname = strtok(NULL, ","); } break; case '4': IPv4or6 = AF_INET; break; case '6': IPv4or6 = AF_INET6; break; case '?': default: usage(); } } if (optind == argc && !fopt_count) usage(); log_init("ssh-keyscan", log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); maxfd = fdlim_get(1); if (maxfd < 0) fatal("%s: fdlim_get: bad value", __progname); if (maxfd > MAXMAXFD) maxfd = MAXMAXFD; if (MAXCON <= 0) fatal("%s: not enough file descriptors", __progname); if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0)) fdlim_set(maxfd); fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con)); read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS); read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); for (j = 0; j < fopt_count; j++) { if (argv[j] == NULL) fp = stdin; else if ((fp = fopen(argv[j], "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j], strerror(errno)); linenum = 0; while (read_keyfile_line(fp, argv[j] == NULL ? "(stdin)" : argv[j], line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { /* Chomp off trailing whitespace and comments */ if ((cp = strchr(line, '#')) == NULL) cp = line + strlen(line) - 1; while (cp >= line) { if (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t' || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') *cp-- = '\0'; else break; } /* Skip empty lines */ if (*line == '\0') continue; do_host(line); } if (ferror(fp)) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j], strerror(errno)); fclose(fp); } while (optind < argc) do_host(argv[optind++]); while (ncon > 0) conloop(); return (0); } Index: head/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/ssh-keysign.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,296 +1,296 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.47 2015/01/28 22:36:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.48 2015/03/24 20:09:11 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "msg.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "ssherr.h" struct ssh *active_state = NULL; /* XXX needed for linking */ /* XXX readconf.c needs these */ uid_t original_real_uid; extern char *__progname; static int valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, struct sshkey **ret, u_char *data, size_t datalen) { struct sshbuf *b; struct sshkey *key = NULL; u_char type, *pkblob; char *p; size_t blen, len; char *pkalg, *luser; int r, pktype, fail; if (ret != NULL) *ret = NULL; fail = 0; if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_from failed", __func__); /* session id, currently limited to SHA1 (20 bytes) or SHA256 (32) */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, NULL, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (len != 20 && len != 32) fail++; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) fail++; /* server user */ if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* service */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (strcmp("ssh-connection", p) != 0) fail++; free(p); /* method */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (strcmp("hostbased", p) != 0) fail++; free(p); /* pubkey */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg); if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) fail++; else if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) { error("%s: bad key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); fail++; } else if (key->type != pktype) fail++; free(pkalg); free(pkblob); /* client host name, handle trailing dot */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, &len)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); debug2("%s: check expect chost %s got %s", __func__, host, p); if (strlen(host) != len - 1) fail++; else if (p[len - 1] != '.') fail++; else if (strncasecmp(host, p, len - 1) != 0) fail++; free(p); /* local user */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &luser, NULL)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, luser) != 0) fail++; free(luser); /* end of message */ if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) fail++; sshbuf_free(b); debug3("%s: fail %d", __func__, fail); if (fail && key != NULL) sshkey_free(key); - else + else if (ret != NULL) *ret = key; return (fail ? -1 : 0); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { struct sshbuf *b; Options options; #define NUM_KEYTYPES 4 struct sshkey *keys[NUM_KEYTYPES], *key = NULL; struct passwd *pw; int r, key_fd[NUM_KEYTYPES], i, found, version = 2, fd; u_char *signature, *data, rver; char *host, *fp; size_t slen, dlen; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL u_int32_t rnd[256]; #endif /* Ensure that stdin and stdout are connected */ if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) < 2) exit(1); /* Leave /dev/null fd iff it is attached to stderr */ if (fd > 2) close(fd); i = 0; key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); original_real_uid = getuid(); /* XXX readconf.c needs this */ if ((pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid)) == NULL) fatal("getpwuid failed"); pw = pwcopy(pw); permanently_set_uid(pw); seed_rng(); #ifdef DEBUG_SSH_KEYSIGN log_init("ssh-keysign", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0); #endif /* verify that ssh-keysign is enabled by the admin */ initialize_options(&options); (void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw, "", "", &options, 0); fill_default_options(&options); if (options.enable_ssh_keysign != 1) fatal("ssh-keysign not enabled in %s", _PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE); for (i = found = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) { if (key_fd[i] != -1) found = 1; } if (found == 0) fatal("could not open any host key"); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); #endif found = 0; for (i = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) { keys[i] = NULL; if (key_fd[i] == -1) continue; r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(key_fd[i], KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, &key, NULL); close(key_fd[i]); if (r != 0) debug("parse key %d: %s", i, ssh_err(r)); else if (key != NULL) { keys[i] = key; found = 1; } } if (!found) fatal("no hostkey found"); if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); if (ssh_msg_recv(STDIN_FILENO, b) < 0) fatal("ssh_msg_recv failed"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &rver)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (rver != version) fatal("bad version: received %d, expected %d", rver, version); if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&fd)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (fd < 0 || fd == STDIN_FILENO || fd == STDOUT_FILENO) fatal("bad fd"); if ((host = get_local_name(fd)) == NULL) fatal("cannot get local name for fd"); if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &data, &dlen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (valid_request(pw, host, &key, data, dlen) < 0) fatal("not a valid request"); free(host); found = 0; for (i = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) { if (keys[i] != NULL && sshkey_equal_public(key, keys[i])) { found = 1; break; } } if (!found) { if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); fatal("no matching hostkey found for key %s %s", sshkey_type(key), fp ? fp : ""); } if ((r = sshkey_sign(keys[i], &signature, &slen, data, dlen, 0)) != 0) fatal("sshkey_sign failed: %s", ssh_err(r)); free(data); /* send reply */ sshbuf_reset(b); if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, signature, slen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (ssh_msg_send(STDOUT_FILENO, version, b) == -1) fatal("ssh_msg_send failed"); return (0); } Index: head/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/ssh-pkcs11.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,672 +1,680 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.17 2015/02/03 08:07:20 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.19 2015/05/27 05:15:02 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include #define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT #include "pkcs11.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sshkey.h" #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #include "xmalloc.h" struct pkcs11_slotinfo { CK_TOKEN_INFO token; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; int logged_in; }; struct pkcs11_provider { char *name; void *handle; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *function_list; CK_INFO info; CK_ULONG nslots; CK_SLOT_ID *slotlist; struct pkcs11_slotinfo *slotinfo; int valid; int refcount; TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_provider) next; }; TAILQ_HEAD(, pkcs11_provider) pkcs11_providers; struct pkcs11_key { struct pkcs11_provider *provider; CK_ULONG slotidx; int (*orig_finish)(RSA *rsa); RSA_METHOD rsa_method; char *keyid; int keyid_len; }; int pkcs11_interactive = 0; int pkcs11_init(int interactive) { pkcs11_interactive = interactive; TAILQ_INIT(&pkcs11_providers); return (0); } /* * finalize a provider shared libarary, it's no longer usable. * however, there might still be keys referencing this provider, * so the actuall freeing of memory is handled by pkcs11_provider_unref(). * this is called when a provider gets unregistered. */ static void pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p) { CK_RV rv; CK_ULONG i; debug("pkcs11_provider_finalize: %p refcount %d valid %d", p, p->refcount, p->valid); if (!p->valid) return; for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) { if (p->slotinfo[i].session && (rv = p->function_list->C_CloseSession( p->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK) error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv); } if ((rv = p->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv); p->valid = 0; p->function_list = NULL; dlclose(p->handle); } /* * remove a reference to the provider. * called when a key gets destroyed or when the provider is unregistered. */ static void pkcs11_provider_unref(struct pkcs11_provider *p) { debug("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p refcount %d", p, p->refcount); if (--p->refcount <= 0) { if (p->valid) error("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p still valid", p); free(p->slotlist); free(p->slotinfo); free(p); } } /* unregister all providers, keys might still point to the providers */ void pkcs11_terminate(void) { struct pkcs11_provider *p; while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&pkcs11_providers)) != NULL) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); pkcs11_provider_finalize(p); pkcs11_provider_unref(p); } } /* lookup provider by name */ static struct pkcs11_provider * pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id) { struct pkcs11_provider *p; TAILQ_FOREACH(p, &pkcs11_providers, next) { debug("check %p %s", p, p->name); if (!strcmp(provider_id, p->name)) return (p); } return (NULL); } /* unregister provider by name */ int pkcs11_del_provider(char *provider_id) { struct pkcs11_provider *p; if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); pkcs11_provider_finalize(p); pkcs11_provider_unref(p); return (0); } return (-1); } /* openssl callback for freeing an RSA key */ static int pkcs11_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa) { struct pkcs11_key *k11; int rv = -1; if ((k11 = RSA_get_app_data(rsa)) != NULL) { if (k11->orig_finish) rv = k11->orig_finish(rsa); if (k11->provider) pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider); free(k11->keyid); free(k11); } return (rv); } /* find a single 'obj' for given attributes */ static int pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj) { CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_ULONG nfound = 0; CK_RV rv; int ret = -1; f = p->function_list; session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, nattr)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_FindObjectsInit failed (nattr %lu): %lu", nattr, rv); return (-1); } if ((rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, obj, 1, &nfound)) != CKR_OK || nfound != 1) { debug("C_FindObjects failed (nfound %lu nattr %lu): %lu", nfound, nattr, rv); } else ret = 0; if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session)) != CKR_OK) error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv); return (ret); } /* openssl callback doing the actual signing operation */ static int pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { struct pkcs11_key *k11; struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj; CK_ULONG tlen = 0; CK_RV rv; CK_OBJECT_CLASS private_key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; CK_BBOOL true_val = CK_TRUE; CK_MECHANISM mech = { CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL_PTR, 0 }; CK_ATTRIBUTE key_filter[] = { {CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(private_key_class) }, {CKA_ID, NULL, 0}, {CKA_SIGN, NULL, sizeof(true_val) } }; - char *pin, prompt[1024]; + char *pin = NULL, prompt[1024]; int rval = -1; key_filter[0].pValue = &private_key_class; key_filter[2].pValue = &true_val; if ((k11 = RSA_get_app_data(rsa)) == NULL) { error("RSA_get_app_data failed for rsa %p", rsa); return (-1); } if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) { error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider for rsa %p", rsa); return (-1); } f = k11->provider->function_list; si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) { if (!pkcs11_interactive) { - error("need pin"); + error("need pin entry%s", (si->token.flags & + CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) ? + " on reader keypad" : ""); return (-1); } - snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%s': ", - si->token.label); - pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF); - if (pin == NULL) - return (-1); /* bail out */ - rv = f->C_Login(si->session, CKU_USER, - (u_char *)pin, strlen(pin)); - if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN) { + if (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) + verbose("Deferring PIN entry to reader keypad."); + else { + snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), + "Enter PIN for '%s': ", si->token.label); + pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF); + if (pin == NULL) + return (-1); /* bail out */ + } + rv = f->C_Login(si->session, CKU_USER, (u_char *)pin, + (pin != NULL) ? strlen(pin) : 0); + if (pin != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(pin, strlen(pin)); free(pin); + } + if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN) { error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv); return (-1); } - free(pin); si->logged_in = 1; } key_filter[1].pValue = k11->keyid; key_filter[1].ulValueLen = k11->keyid_len; /* try to find object w/CKA_SIGN first, retry w/o */ if (pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 3, &obj) < 0 && pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 2, &obj) < 0) { error("cannot find private key"); } else if ((rv = f->C_SignInit(si->session, &mech, obj)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_SignInit failed: %lu", rv); } else { /* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */ tlen = RSA_size(rsa); rv = f->C_Sign(si->session, (CK_BYTE *)from, flen, to, &tlen); if (rv == CKR_OK) rval = tlen; else error("C_Sign failed: %lu", rv); } return (rval); } static int pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { return (-1); } /* redirect private key operations for rsa key to pkcs11 token */ static int pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, RSA *rsa) { struct pkcs11_key *k11; const RSA_METHOD *def = RSA_get_default_method(); k11 = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k11)); k11->provider = provider; provider->refcount++; /* provider referenced by RSA key */ k11->slotidx = slotidx; /* identify key object on smartcard */ k11->keyid_len = keyid_attrib->ulValueLen; k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len); memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len); k11->orig_finish = def->finish; memcpy(&k11->rsa_method, def, sizeof(k11->rsa_method)); k11->rsa_method.name = "pkcs11"; k11->rsa_method.rsa_priv_enc = pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt; k11->rsa_method.rsa_priv_dec = pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt; k11->rsa_method.finish = pkcs11_rsa_finish; RSA_set_method(rsa, &k11->rsa_method); RSA_set_app_data(rsa, k11); return (0); } /* remove trailing spaces */ static void rmspace(u_char *buf, size_t len) { size_t i; if (!len) return; for (i = len - 1; i > 0; i--) if (i == len - 1 || buf[i] == ' ') buf[i] = '\0'; else break; } /* * open a pkcs11 session and login if required. * if pin == NULL we delay login until key use */ static int pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *pin) { CK_RV rv; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; int login_required; f = p->function_list; login_required = p->slotinfo[slotidx].token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED; if (pin && login_required && !strlen(pin)) { error("pin required"); return (-1); } if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION| CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &session)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_OpenSession failed: %lu", rv); return (-1); } if (login_required && pin) { rv = f->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, (u_char *)pin, strlen(pin)); if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN) { error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv); if ((rv = f->C_CloseSession(session)) != CKR_OK) error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv); return (-1); } p->slotinfo[slotidx].logged_in = 1; } p->slotinfo[slotidx].session = session; return (0); } /* * lookup public keys for token in slot identified by slotidx, * add 'wrapped' public keys to the 'keysp' array and increment nkeys. * keysp points to an (possibly empty) array with *nkeys keys. */ static int pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *, CK_ULONG, CK_ATTRIBUTE [], CK_ATTRIBUTE [3], struct sshkey ***, int *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,4, 3 * sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)))); static int pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys) { CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubkey_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; CK_OBJECT_CLASS cert_class = CKO_CERTIFICATE; CK_ATTRIBUTE pubkey_filter[] = { { CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(pubkey_class) } }; CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_filter[] = { { CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(cert_class) } }; CK_ATTRIBUTE pubkey_attribs[] = { { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 }, { CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0 }, { CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL, 0 } }; CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_attribs[] = { { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 }, { CKA_SUBJECT, NULL, 0 }, { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 } }; pubkey_filter[0].pValue = &pubkey_class; cert_filter[0].pValue = &cert_class; if (pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(p, slotidx, pubkey_filter, pubkey_attribs, keysp, nkeys) < 0 || pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(p, slotidx, cert_filter, cert_attribs, keysp, nkeys) < 0) return (-1); return (0); } static int pkcs11_key_included(struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys, struct sshkey *key) { int i; for (i = 0; i < *nkeys; i++) if (sshkey_equal(key, (*keysp)[i])) return (1); return (0); } static int pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE filter[], CK_ATTRIBUTE attribs[3], struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys) { struct sshkey *key; RSA *rsa; X509 *x509; EVP_PKEY *evp; int i; const u_char *cp; CK_RV rv; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj; CK_ULONG nfound; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; f = p->function_list; session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; /* setup a filter the looks for public keys */ if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, filter, 1)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv); return (-1); } while (1) { /* XXX 3 attributes in attribs[] */ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { attribs[i].pValue = NULL; attribs[i].ulValueLen = 0; } if ((rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &nfound)) != CKR_OK || nfound == 0) break; /* found a key, so figure out size of the attributes */ if ((rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attribs, 3)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); continue; } /* check that none of the attributes are zero length */ if (attribs[0].ulValueLen == 0 || attribs[1].ulValueLen == 0 || attribs[2].ulValueLen == 0) { continue; } /* allocate buffers for attributes */ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) attribs[i].pValue = xmalloc(attribs[i].ulValueLen); /* * retrieve ID, modulus and public exponent of RSA key, * or ID, subject and value for certificates. */ rsa = NULL; if ((rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attribs, 3)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); } else if (attribs[1].type == CKA_MODULUS ) { if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) { error("RSA_new failed"); } else { rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(attribs[1].pValue, attribs[1].ulValueLen, NULL); rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(attribs[2].pValue, attribs[2].ulValueLen, NULL); } } else { cp = attribs[2].pValue; if ((x509 = X509_new()) == NULL) { error("X509_new failed"); } else if (d2i_X509(&x509, &cp, attribs[2].ulValueLen) == NULL) { error("d2i_X509 failed"); } else if ((evp = X509_get_pubkey(x509)) == NULL || evp->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA || evp->pkey.rsa == NULL) { debug("X509_get_pubkey failed or no rsa"); } else if ((rsa = RSAPublicKey_dup(evp->pkey.rsa)) == NULL) { error("RSAPublicKey_dup"); } if (x509) X509_free(x509); } if (rsa && rsa->n && rsa->e && pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &attribs[0], rsa) == 0) { key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); key->rsa = rsa; key->type = KEY_RSA; key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; if (pkcs11_key_included(keysp, nkeys, key)) { sshkey_free(key); } else { /* expand key array and add key */ - *keysp = xrealloc(*keysp, *nkeys + 1, + *keysp = xreallocarray(*keysp, *nkeys + 1, sizeof(struct sshkey *)); (*keysp)[*nkeys] = key; *nkeys = *nkeys + 1; debug("have %d keys", *nkeys); } } else if (rsa) { RSA_free(rsa); } for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) free(attribs[i].pValue); } if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session)) != CKR_OK) error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv); return (0); } /* register a new provider, fails if provider already exists */ int pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp) { int nkeys, need_finalize = 0; struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL; void *handle = NULL; CK_RV (*getfunctionlist)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST **); CK_RV rv; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; CK_TOKEN_INFO *token; CK_ULONG i; *keyp = NULL; if (pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id) != NULL) { error("provider already registered: %s", provider_id); goto fail; } /* open shared pkcs11-libarary */ if ((handle = dlopen(provider_id, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) { error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_id, dlerror()); goto fail; } if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) { error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror()); goto fail; } p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p)); p->name = xstrdup(provider_id); p->handle = handle; /* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */ if ((rv = (*getfunctionlist)(&f)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetFunctionList failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } p->function_list = f; if ((rv = f->C_Initialize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_Initialize failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } need_finalize = 1; if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&p->info)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetInfo failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } rmspace(p->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(p->info.manufacturerID)); rmspace(p->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(p->info.libraryDescription)); debug("manufacturerID <%s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d" " libraryDescription <%s> libraryVersion %d.%d", p->info.manufacturerID, p->info.cryptokiVersion.major, p->info.cryptokiVersion.minor, p->info.libraryDescription, p->info.libraryVersion.major, p->info.libraryVersion.minor); if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } if (p->nslots == 0) { error("no slots"); goto fail; } p->slotlist = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID)); if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, p->slotlist, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } p->slotinfo = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo)); p->valid = 1; nkeys = 0; for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) { token = &p->slotinfo[i].token; if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(p->slotlist[i], token)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetTokenInfo failed: %lu", rv); continue; } rmspace(token->label, sizeof(token->label)); rmspace(token->manufacturerID, sizeof(token->manufacturerID)); rmspace(token->model, sizeof(token->model)); rmspace(token->serialNumber, sizeof(token->serialNumber)); debug("label <%s> manufacturerID <%s> model <%s> serial <%s>" " flags 0x%lx", token->label, token->manufacturerID, token->model, token->serialNumber, token->flags); /* open session, login with pin and retrieve public keys */ if (pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin) == 0) pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, &nkeys); } if (nkeys > 0) { TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); p->refcount++; /* add to provider list */ return (nkeys); } error("no keys"); /* don't add the provider, since it does not have any keys */ fail: if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv); if (p) { free(p->slotlist); free(p->slotinfo); free(p); } if (handle) dlclose(handle); return (-1); } #else int pkcs11_init(int interactive) { return (0); } void pkcs11_terminate(void) { return; } #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ Index: head/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/ssh-rsa.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,268 +1,268 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.52 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.53 2015/06/15 01:32:50 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include #include #include "sshbuf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssherr.h" #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL #include "sshkey.h" #include "digest.h" static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *); /* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v2.0 signature) with SHA1 */ int ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { int hash_alg; u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL; size_t slen; u_int dlen, len; int nid, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if (sigp != NULL) *sigp = NULL; if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; slen = RSA_size(key->rsa); if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* hash the data */ hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; nid = NID_sha1; if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) goto out; if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (len < slen) { size_t diff = slen - len; memmove(sig + diff, sig, len); explicit_bzero(sig, diff); } else if (len > slen) { ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } /* encode signature */ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-rsa")) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, sig, slen)) != 0) goto out; len = sshbuf_len(b); if (sigp != NULL) { if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); } if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; ret = 0; out: explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); if (sig != NULL) { explicit_bzero(sig, slen); free(sig); } if (b != NULL) sshbuf_free(b); - return 0; + return ret; } int ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { char *ktype = NULL; int hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; size_t len, diff, modlen, dlen; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL; if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA || BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (strcmp("ssh-rsa", ktype) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; goto out; } if (sshbuf_get_string(b, &sigblob, &len) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; goto out; } /* RSA_verify expects a signature of RSA_size */ modlen = RSA_size(key->rsa); if (len > modlen) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH; goto out; } else if (len < modlen) { diff = modlen - len; osigblob = sigblob; if ((sigblob = realloc(sigblob, modlen)) == NULL) { sigblob = osigblob; /* put it back for clear/free */ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memmove(sigblob + diff, sigblob, len); explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff); len = modlen; } hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) goto out; ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, dlen, sigblob, len, key->rsa); out: if (sigblob != NULL) { explicit_bzero(sigblob, len); free(sigblob); } if (ktype != NULL) free(ktype); if (b != NULL) sshbuf_free(b); explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); return ret; } /* * See: * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/ * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn */ /* * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) * oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 } */ static const u_char id_sha1[] = { 0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */ 0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */ 0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */ 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */ 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */ 0x04, 0x14 /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */ }; static int openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, size_t hashlen, u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa) { size_t ret, rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0; int len, oidmatch, hashmatch; const u_char *oid = NULL; u_char *decrypted = NULL; ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; switch (hash_alg) { case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1: oid = id_sha1; oidlen = sizeof(id_sha1); hlen = 20; break; default: goto done; } if (hashlen != hlen) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto done; } rsasize = RSA_size(rsa); if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM || siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto done; } if ((decrypted = malloc(rsasize)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto done; } if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto done; } if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != hlen + oidlen) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto done; } oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0; hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0; if (!oidmatch || !hashmatch) { ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto done; } ret = 0; done: if (decrypted) { explicit_bzero(decrypted, rsasize); free(decrypted); } return ret; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ Index: head/crypto/openssh/ssh.0 =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/ssh.0 (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/ssh.0 (revision 294336) @@ -1,951 +1,960 @@ SSH(1) General Commands Manual SSH(1) NAME ssh M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program) SYNOPSIS ssh [-1246AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec] [-D [bind_address:]port] [-E log_file] [-e escape_char] [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11] [-i identity_file] [-L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport] [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port] [-Q cipher | cipher-auth | mac | kex | key | protocol-version] [-R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport] [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port] [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] [user@]hostname [command] DESCRIPTION ssh (SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for executing commands on a remote machine. It is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections, arbitrary TCP ports and UNIX-domain sockets can also be forwarded over the secure channel. ssh connects and logs into the specified hostname (with optional user name). The user must prove his/her identity to the remote machine using one of several methods depending on the protocol version used (see below). If command is specified, it is executed on the remote host instead of a login shell. The options are as follows: -1 Forces ssh to try protocol version 1 only. -2 Forces ssh to try protocol version 2 only. -4 Forces ssh to use IPv4 addresses only. -6 Forces ssh to use IPv6 addresses only. -A Enables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file. Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's UNIX-domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent. -a Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. -b bind_address Use bind_address on the local machine as the source address of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one address. -C Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, stderr, and data for forwarded X11, TCP and UNIX-domain connections). The compression algorithm is the same used by gzip(1), and the M-bM-^@M-^\levelM-bM-^@M-^] can be controlled by the CompressionLevel option for protocol version 1. Compression is desirable on modem lines and other slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks. The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the configuration files; see the Compression option. -c cipher_spec Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session. Protocol version 1 allows specification of a single cipher. The supported values are M-bM-^@M-^\3desM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\blowfishM-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\desM-bM-^@M-^]. For protocol version 2, cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of ciphers listed in order of preference. See the Ciphers keyword in ssh_config(5) for more information. -D [bind_address:]port Specifies a local M-bM-^@M-^\dynamicM-bM-^@M-^] application-level port forwarding. This works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the local side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address. Whenever a connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the remote machine. Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and ssh will act as a SOCKS server. Only root can forward privileged ports. Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The bind_address of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. -E log_file Append debug logs to log_file instead of standard error. -e escape_char Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default: M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y). The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a line. The escape character followed by a dot (M-bM-^@M-^X.M-bM-^@M-^Y) closes the connection; followed by control-Z suspends the connection; and followed by itself sends the escape character once. Setting the character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] disables any escapes and makes the session fully transparent. -F configfile Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file. If a configuration file is given on the command line, the system-wide configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config) will be ignored. The default for the per-user configuration file is ~/.ssh/config. -f Requests ssh to go to background just before command execution. This is useful if ssh is going to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user wants it in the background. This implies -n. The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is with something like ssh -f host xterm. If the ExitOnForwardFailure configuration option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], then a client started with -f will wait for all remote port forwards to be successfully established before placing itself in the background. -G Causes ssh to print its configuration after evaluating Host and Match blocks and exit. -g Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports. If used on a multiplexed connection, then this option must be specified on the master process. -I pkcs11 Specify the PKCS#11 shared library ssh should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's private RSA key. -i identity_file Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for public key authentication is read. The default is ~/.ssh/identity for protocol version 1, and ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and ~/.ssh/id_rsa for protocol version 2. Identity files may also be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. It is possible to have multiple -i options (and multiple identities specified in configuration files). ssh will also try to load certificate information from the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to identity filenames. -K Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server. -k Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server. -L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport Specifies that the given port on the local (client) host is to be forwarded to the given host and port on the remote side. This works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the local side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address. Whenever a connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is made to host port hostport from the remote machine. Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The bind_address of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. -l login_name Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine. This also may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. -M Places the ssh client into M-bM-^@M-^\masterM-bM-^@M-^] mode for connection sharing. Multiple -M options places ssh into M-bM-^@M-^\masterM-bM-^@M-^] mode with confirmation required before slave connections are accepted. Refer to the description of ControlMaster in ssh_config(5) for details. -m mac_spec Additionally, for protocol version 2 a comma-separated list of MAC (message authentication code) algorithms can be specified in order of preference. See the MACs keyword for more information. -N Do not execute a remote command. This is useful for just forwarding ports (protocol version 2 only). -n Redirects stdin from /dev/null (actually, prevents reading from stdin). This must be used when ssh is run in the background. A common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote machine. For example, ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & will start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel. The ssh program will be put in the background. (This does not work if ssh needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the -f option.) -O ctl_cmd Control an active connection multiplexing master process. When the -O option is specified, the ctl_cmd argument is interpreted and passed to the master process. Valid commands are: M-bM-^@M-^\checkM-bM-^@M-^] (check that the master process is running), M-bM-^@M-^\forwardM-bM-^@M-^] (request forwardings without command execution), M-bM-^@M-^\cancelM-bM-^@M-^] (cancel forwardings), M-bM-^@M-^\exitM-bM-^@M-^] (request the master to exit), and M-bM-^@M-^\stopM-bM-^@M-^] (request the master to stop accepting further multiplexing requests). -o option Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see ssh_config(5). AddressFamily BatchMode BindAddress CanonicalDomains CanonicalizeFallbackLocal CanonicalizeHostname CanonicalizeMaxDots CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs ChallengeResponseAuthentication CheckHostIP Cipher Ciphers ClearAllForwardings Compression CompressionLevel ConnectionAttempts ConnectTimeout ControlMaster ControlPath ControlPersist DynamicForward EscapeChar ExitOnForwardFailure FingerprintHash ForwardAgent ForwardX11 ForwardX11Timeout ForwardX11Trusted GatewayPorts GlobalKnownHostsFile GSSAPIAuthentication GSSAPIDelegateCredentials HashKnownHosts Host HostbasedAuthentication HostbasedKeyTypes HostKeyAlgorithms HostKeyAlias HostName IdentityFile IdentitiesOnly IPQoS KbdInteractiveAuthentication KbdInteractiveDevices KexAlgorithms LocalCommand LocalForward LogLevel MACs Match NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost NumberOfPasswordPrompts PasswordAuthentication PermitLocalCommand PKCS11Provider Port PreferredAuthentications Protocol ProxyCommand ProxyUseFdpass PubkeyAuthentication RekeyLimit RemoteForward RequestTTY RhostsRSAAuthentication RSAAuthentication SendEnv ServerAliveInterval ServerAliveCountMax StreamLocalBindMask StreamLocalBindUnlink StrictHostKeyChecking TCPKeepAlive Tunnel TunnelDevice UpdateHostKeys UsePrivilegedPort User UserKnownHostsFile VerifyHostKeyDNS VisualHostKey XAuthLocation -p port Port to connect to on the remote host. This can be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. -Q cipher | cipher-auth | mac | kex | key | protocol-version Queries ssh for the algorithms supported for the specified version 2. The available features are: cipher (supported symmetric ciphers), cipher-auth (supported symmetric ciphers that support authenticated encryption), mac (supported message integrity codes), kex (key exchange algorithms), key (key types) and protocol-version (supported SSH protocol versions). -q Quiet mode. Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be suppressed. -R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport Specifies that the given port on the remote (server) host is to be forwarded to the given host and port on the local side. This works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the remote side, and whenever a connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is made to host port hostport from the local machine. Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on the remote machine. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. By default, the listening socket on the server will be bound to the loopback interface only. This may be overridden by specifying a bind_address. An empty bind_address, or the address M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y, indicates that the remote socket should listen on all interfaces. Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see sshd_config(5)). If the port argument is M-bM-^@M-^X0M-bM-^@M-^Y, the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time. When used together with -O forward the allocated port will be printed to the standard output. -S ctl_path Specifies the location of a control socket for connection sharing, or the string M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to disable connection sharing. Refer to the description of ControlPath and ControlMaster in ssh_config(5) for details. -s May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote system. Subsystems are a feature of the SSH2 protocol which facilitate the use of SSH as a secure transport for other applications (eg. sftp(1)). The subsystem is specified as the remote command. - -T Disable pseudo-tty allocation. + -T Disable pseudo-terminal allocation. - -t Force pseudo-tty allocation. This can be used to execute + -t Force pseudo-terminal allocation. This can be used to execute arbitrary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be very useful, e.g. when implementing menu services. Multiple -t options force tty allocation, even if ssh has no local tty. -V Display the version number and exit. -v Verbose mode. Causes ssh to print debugging messages about its progress. This is helpful in debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems. Multiple -v options increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3. -W host:port Requests that standard input and output on the client be forwarded to host on port over the secure channel. Implies -N, -T, ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings. Works with Protocol version 2 only. -w local_tun[:remote_tun] Requests tunnel device forwarding with the specified tun(4) devices between the client (local_tun) and the server (remote_tun). The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^], which uses the next available tunnel device. If remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^]. See also the Tunnel and TunnelDevice directives in ssh_config(5). If the Tunnel directive is unset, it is set to the default tunnel mode, which is M-bM-^@M-^\point-to-pointM-bM-^@M-^]. -X Enables X11 forwarding. This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file. X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the user's X authorization database) can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring. For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY extension restrictions by default. Please refer to the ssh -Y option and the ForwardX11Trusted directive in ssh_config(5) for more information. -x Disables X11 forwarding. -Y Enables trusted X11 forwarding. Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls. -y Send log information using the syslog(3) system module. By default this information is sent to stderr. ssh may additionally obtain configuration data from a per-user configuration file and a system-wide configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in ssh_config(5). AUTHENTICATION The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocols 1 and 2. The default is to use protocol 2 only, though this can be changed via the Protocol option in ssh_config(5) or the -1 and -2 options (see above). Both protocols support similar authentication methods, but protocol 2 is the default since it provides additional mechanisms for confidentiality (the traffic is encrypted using AES, 3DES, Blowfish, CAST128, or Arcfour) and integrity (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512, umac-64, umac-128, hmac-ripemd160). Protocol 1 lacks a strong mechanism for ensuring the integrity of the connection. The methods available for authentication are: GSSAPI-based authentication, host-based authentication, public key authentication, challenge-response authentication, and password authentication. Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above, though protocol 2 has a configuration option to change the default order: PreferredAuthentications. Host-based authentication works as follows: If the machine the user logs in from is listed in /etc/hosts.equiv or /etc/shosts.equiv on the remote machine, and the user names are the same on both sides, or if the files ~/.rhosts or ~/.shosts exist in the user's home directory on the remote machine and contain a line containing the name of the client machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is considered for login. Additionally, the server must be able to verify the client's host key (see the description of /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and ~/.ssh/known_hosts, below) for login to be permitted. This authentication method closes security holes due to IP spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing. [Note to the administrator: /etc/hosts.equiv, ~/.rhosts, and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be disabled if security is desired.] Public key authentication works as follows: The scheme is based on public-key cryptography, using cryptosystems where encryption and decryption are done using separate keys, and it is unfeasible to derive the decryption key from the encryption key. The idea is that each user creates a public/private key pair for authentication purposes. The server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key. ssh implements public key authentication protocol automatically, using one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms. Protocol 1 is restricted to using only RSA keys, but protocol 2 may use any. The HISTORY section of ssl(8) contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms. The file ~/.ssh/authorized_keys lists the public keys that are permitted for logging in. When the user logs in, the ssh program tells the server which key pair it would like to use for authentication. The client proves that it has access to the private key and the server checks that the corresponding public key is authorized to accept the account. The user creates his/her key pair by running ssh-keygen(1). This stores the private key in ~/.ssh/identity (protocol 1), ~/.ssh/id_dsa (protocol 2 DSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa (protocol 2 ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 (protocol 2 Ed25519), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa (protocol 2 RSA) and stores the public key in ~/.ssh/identity.pub (protocol 1), ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub (protocol 2 DSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub (protocol 2 ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub (protocol 2 Ed25519), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub (protocol 2 RSA) in the user's home directory. The user should then copy the public key to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys in his/her home directory on the remote machine. The authorized_keys file corresponds to the conventional ~/.rhosts file, and has one key per line, though the lines can be very long. After this, the user can log in without giving the password. A variation on public key authentication is available in the form of certificate authentication: instead of a set of public/private keys, signed certificates are used. This has the advantage that a single trusted certification authority can be used in place of many public/private keys. See the CERTIFICATES section of ssh-keygen(1) for more information. The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication may be with an authentication agent. See ssh-agent(1) for more information. Challenge-response authentication works as follows: The server sends an arbitrary "challenge" text, and prompts for a response. Protocol 2 allows multiple challenges and responses; protocol 1 is restricted to just one challenge/response. Examples of challenge-response authentication include BSD Authentication (see login.conf(5)) and PAM (some non-OpenBSD systems). Finally, if other authentication methods fail, ssh prompts the user for a password. The password is sent to the remote host for checking; however, since all communications are encrypted, the password cannot be seen by someone listening on the network. ssh automatically maintains and checks a database containing identification for all hosts it has ever been used with. Host keys are stored in ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the user's home directory. Additionally, the file /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts is automatically checked for known hosts. Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file. If a host's identification ever changes, ssh warns about this and disables password authentication to prevent server spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks, which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption. The StrictHostKeyChecking option can be used to control logins to machines whose host key is not known or has changed. When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server - either executes the given command, or logs into the machine and gives the - user a normal shell on the remote machine. All communication with the + either executes the given command in a non-interactive session or, if no + command has been specified, logs into the machine and gives the user a + normal shell as an interactive session. All communication with the remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted. - If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated (normal login session), the user - may use the escape characters noted below. + If an interactive session is requested ssh by default will only request a + pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive sessions when the client has one. + The flags -T and -t can be used to override this behaviour. - If no pseudo-tty has been allocated, the session is transparent and can - be used to reliably transfer binary data. On most systems, setting the - escape character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] will also make the session transparent even if - a tty is used. + If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated the user may use the escape + characters noted below. + If no pseudo-terminal has been allocated, the session is transparent and + can be used to reliably transfer binary data. On most systems, setting + the escape character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] will also make the session transparent + even if a tty is used. + The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote machine exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed. ESCAPE CHARACTERS When a pseudo-terminal has been requested, ssh supports a number of functions through the use of an escape character. A single tilde character can be sent as ~~ or by following the tilde by a character other than those described below. The escape character must always follow a newline to be interpreted as special. The escape character can be changed in configuration files using the EscapeChar configuration directive or on the command line by the -e option. The supported escapes (assuming the default M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y) are: ~. Disconnect. ~^Z Background ssh. ~# List forwarded connections. ~& Background ssh at logout when waiting for forwarded connection / X11 sessions to terminate. ~? Display a list of escape characters. ~B Send a BREAK to the remote system (only useful for SSH protocol version 2 and if the peer supports it). ~C Open command line. Currently this allows the addition of port forwardings using the -L, -R and -D options (see above). It also allows the cancellation of existing port-forwardings with -KL[bind_address:]port for local, -KR[bind_address:]port for remote and -KD[bind_address:]port for dynamic port-forwardings. !command allows the user to execute a local command if the PermitLocalCommand option is enabled in ssh_config(5). Basic help is available, using the -h option. ~R Request rekeying of the connection (only useful for SSH protocol version 2 and if the peer supports it). ~V Decrease the verbosity (LogLevel) when errors are being written to stderr. ~v Increase the verbosity (LogLevel) when errors are being written to stderr. TCP FORWARDING Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over the secure channel can be specified either on the command line or in a configuration file. One possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a mail server; another is going through firewalls. In the example below, we look at encrypting communication between an IRC client and server, even though the IRC server does not directly support encrypted communications. This works as follows: the user connects to the remote host using ssh, specifying a port to be used to forward connections to the remote server. After that it is possible to start the service which is to be encrypted on the client machine, connecting to the same local port, and ssh will encrypt and forward the connection. The following example tunnels an IRC session from client machine M-bM-^@M-^\127.0.0.1M-bM-^@M-^] (localhost) to remote server M-bM-^@M-^\server.example.comM-bM-^@M-^]: $ ssh -f -L 1234:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10 $ irc -c '#users' -p 1234 pinky 127.0.0.1 This tunnels a connection to IRC server M-bM-^@M-^\server.example.comM-bM-^@M-^], joining channel M-bM-^@M-^\#usersM-bM-^@M-^], nickname M-bM-^@M-^\pinkyM-bM-^@M-^], using port 1234. It doesn't matter which port is used, as long as it's greater than 1023 (remember, only root can open sockets on privileged ports) and doesn't conflict with any ports already in use. The connection is forwarded to port 6667 on the remote server, since that's the standard port for IRC services. The -f option backgrounds ssh and the remote command M-bM-^@M-^\sleep 10M-bM-^@M-^] is specified to allow an amount of time (10 seconds, in the example) to start the service which is to be tunnelled. If no connections are made within the time specified, ssh will exit. X11 FORWARDING If the ForwardX11 variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (or see the description of the -X, -x, and -Y options above) and the user is using X11 (the DISPLAY environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11 programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made from the local machine. The user should not manually set DISPLAY. Forwarding of X11 connections can be configured on the command line or in configuration files. The DISPLAY value set by ssh will point to the server machine, but with a display number greater than zero. This is normal, and happens because ssh creates a M-bM-^@M-^\proxyM-bM-^@M-^] X server on the server machine for forwarding the connections over the encrypted channel. ssh will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine. For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie, store it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded connections carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when the connection is opened. The real authentication cookie is never sent to the server machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain). If the ForwardAgent variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (or see the description of the -A and -a options above) and the user is using an authentication agent, the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the remote side. VERIFYING HOST KEYS When connecting to a server for the first time, a fingerprint of the server's public key is presented to the user (unless the option StrictHostKeyChecking has been disabled). Fingerprints can be determined using ssh-keygen(1): $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched and the key can be - accepted or rejected. Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys - just by looking at fingerprint strings, there is also support to compare - host keys visually, using random art. By setting the VisualHostKey - option to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], a small ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a - server, no matter if the session itself is interactive or not. By - learning the pattern a known server produces, a user can easily find out - that the host key has changed when a completely different pattern is - displayed. Because these patterns are not unambiguous however, a pattern - that looks similar to the pattern remembered only gives a good - probability that the host key is the same, not guaranteed proof. + accepted or rejected. If only legacy (MD5) fingerprints for the server + are available, the ssh-keygen(1) -E option may be used to downgrade the + fingerprint algorithm to match. + Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys just by looking at + fingerprint strings, there is also support to compare host keys visually, + using random art. By setting the VisualHostKey option to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], a small + ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter if the + session itself is interactive or not. By learning the pattern a known + server produces, a user can easily find out that the host key has changed + when a completely different pattern is displayed. Because these patterns + are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks similar to the pattern + remembered only gives a good probability that the host key is the same, + not guaranteed proof. + To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for all known hosts, the following command line can be used: $ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts If the fingerprint is unknown, an alternative method of verification is available: SSH fingerprints verified by DNS. An additional resource record (RR), SSHFP, is added to a zonefile and the connecting client is able to match the fingerprint with that of the key presented. In this example, we are connecting a client to a server, M-bM-^@M-^\host.example.comM-bM-^@M-^]. The SSHFP resource records should first be added to the zonefile for host.example.com: $ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com. The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile. To check that the zone is answering fingerprint queries: $ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com Finally the client connects: $ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com [...] Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? See the VerifyHostKeyDNS option in ssh_config(5) for more information. SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS ssh contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling using the tun(4) network pseudo-device, allowing two networks to be joined securely. The sshd_config(5) configuration option PermitTunnel controls whether the server supports this, and at what level (layer 2 or 3 traffic). The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24 with remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection from 10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2, provided that the SSH server running on the gateway to the remote network, at 192.168.1.15, allows it. On the client: # ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true # ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252 # route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2 On the server: # ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252 # route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1 Client access may be more finely tuned via the /root/.ssh/authorized_keys file (see below) and the PermitRootLogin server option. The following entry would permit connections on tun(4) device 1 from user M-bM-^@M-^\janeM-bM-^@M-^] and on tun device 2 from user M-bM-^@M-^\johnM-bM-^@M-^], if PermitRootLogin is set to M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^]: tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead, it may be more suited to temporary setups, such as for wireless VPNs. More permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as ipsecctl(8) and isakmpd(8). ENVIRONMENT ssh will normally set the following environment variables: DISPLAY The DISPLAY variable indicates the location of the X11 server. It is automatically set by ssh to point to a value of the form M-bM-^@M-^\hostname:nM-bM-^@M-^], where M-bM-^@M-^\hostnameM-bM-^@M-^] indicates the host where the shell runs, and M-bM-^@M-^XnM-bM-^@M-^Y is an integer M-bM-^IM-% 1. ssh uses this special value to forward X11 connections over the secure channel. The user should normally not set DISPLAY explicitly, as that will render the X11 connection insecure (and will require the user to manually copy any required authorization cookies). HOME Set to the path of the user's home directory. LOGNAME Synonym for USER; set for compatibility with systems that use this variable. MAIL Set to the path of the user's mailbox. PATH Set to the default PATH, as specified when compiling ssh. SSH_ASKPASS If ssh needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current terminal if it was run from a terminal. If ssh does not have a terminal associated with it but DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute the program specified by SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the passphrase. This is particularly useful when calling ssh from a .xsession or related script. (Note that on some machines it may be necessary to redirect the input from /dev/null to make this work.) SSH_AUTH_SOCK Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with the agent. SSH_CONNECTION Identifies the client and server ends of the connection. The variable contains four space- separated values: client IP address, client port number, server IP address, and server port number. SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND This variable contains the original command line if a forced command is executed. It can be used to extract the original arguments. SSH_TTY This is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associated with the current shell or command. If the current session has no tty, this variable is not set. TZ This variable is set to indicate the present time zone if it was set when the daemon was started (i.e. the daemon passes the value on to new connections). USER Set to the name of the user logging in. Additionally, ssh reads ~/.ssh/environment, and adds lines of the format M-bM-^@M-^\VARNAME=valueM-bM-^@M-^] to the environment if the file exists and users are allowed to change their environment. For more information, see the PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5). FILES ~/.rhosts This file is used for host-based authentication (see above). On some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because sshd(8) reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. ~/.shosts This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. ~/.ssh/ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration and authentication information. There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user, and not accessible by others. ~/.ssh/authorized_keys Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used for logging in as this user. The format of this file is described in the sshd(8) manual page. This file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. ~/.ssh/config This is the per-user configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in ssh_config(5). Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions: read/write for the user, and not writable by others. ~/.ssh/environment Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see ENVIRONMENT, above. ~/.ssh/identity ~/.ssh/id_dsa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 ~/.ssh/id_rsa Contains the private key for authentication. These files contain sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not accessible by others (read/write/execute). ssh will simply ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key which will be used to encrypt the sensitive part of this file using 3DES. ~/.ssh/identity.pub ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub Contains the public key for authentication. These files are not sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone. ~/.ssh/known_hosts Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys. See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this file. ~/.ssh/rc Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the sshd(8) manual page for more information. /etc/hosts.equiv This file is for host-based authentication (see above). It should only be writable by root. /etc/shosts.equiv This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. /etc/ssh/ssh_config Systemwide configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in ssh_config(5). /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key These files contain the private parts of the host keys and are used for host-based authentication. If protocol version 1 is used, ssh must be setuid root, since the host key is readable only by root. For protocol version 2, ssh uses ssh-keysign(8) to access the host keys, eliminating the requirement that ssh be setuid root when host-based authentication is used. By default ssh is not setuid root. /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the organization. It should be world-readable. See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this file. /etc/ssh/sshrc Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the sshd(8) manual page for more information. EXIT STATUS ssh exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 if an error occurred. SEE ALSO scp(1), sftp(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh-keyscan(1), tun(4), ssh_config(5), ssh-keysign(8), sshd(8) STANDARDS S. Lehtinen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned Numbers, RFC 4250, January 2006. T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture, RFC 4251, January 2006. T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol, RFC 4252, January 2006. T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4253, January 2006. T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol, RFC 4254, January 2006. J. Schlyter and W. Griffin, Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints, RFC 4255, January 2006. F. Cusack and M. Forssen, Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH), RFC 4256, January 2006. J. Galbraith and P. Remaker, The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break Extension, RFC 4335, January 2006. M. Bellare, T. Kohno, and C. Namprempre, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes, RFC 4344, January 2006. B. Harris, Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4345, January 2006. M. Friedl, N. Provos, and W. Simpson, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, March 2006. J. Galbraith and R. Thayer, The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format, RFC 4716, November 2006. D. Stebila and J. Green, Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer, RFC 5656, December 2009. A. Perrig and D. Song, Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security, 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99). AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. -OpenBSD 5.7 March 3, 2015 OpenBSD 5.7 +OpenBSD 5.7 May 22, 2015 OpenBSD 5.7 Index: head/crypto/openssh/ssh.1 =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/ssh.1 (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/ssh.1 (revision 294336) @@ -1,1597 +1,1613 @@ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.356 2015/03/03 06:48:58 djm Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.358 2015/05/22 05:28:45 djm Exp $ .\" $FreeBSD$ -.Dd $Mdocdate: March 3 2015 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: May 22 2015 $ .Dt SSH 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh .Nd OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program) .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ssh .Bk -words .Op Fl 1246AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy .Op Fl b Ar bind_address .Op Fl c Ar cipher_spec .Op Fl D Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ns Ar port .Op Fl E Ar log_file .Op Fl e Ar escape_char .Op Fl F Ar configfile .Op Fl I Ar pkcs11 .Op Fl i Ar identity_file .Op Fl L Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ns Ar port : Ns Ar host : Ns Ar hostport .Op Fl l Ar login_name .Op Fl m Ar mac_spec .Op Fl O Ar ctl_cmd .Op Fl o Ar option .Op Fl p Ar port .Op Fl Q Cm cipher | cipher-auth | mac | kex | key | protocol-version .Op Fl R Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ns Ar port : Ns Ar host : Ns Ar hostport .Op Fl S Ar ctl_path .Op Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port .Op Fl w Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun .Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns Ar hostname .Op Ar command .Ek .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm (SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for executing commands on a remote machine. It is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections, arbitrary TCP ports and .Ux Ns -domain sockets can also be forwarded over the secure channel. .Pp .Nm connects and logs into the specified .Ar hostname (with optional .Ar user name). The user must prove his/her identity to the remote machine using one of several methods depending on the protocol version used (see below). .Pp If .Ar command is specified, it is executed on the remote host instead of a login shell. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl 1 Forces .Nm to try protocol version 1 only. .It Fl 2 Forces .Nm to try protocol version 2 only. .It Fl 4 Forces .Nm to use IPv4 addresses only. .It Fl 6 Forces .Nm to use IPv6 addresses only. .It Fl A Enables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file. .Pp Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's .Ux Ns -domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent. .It Fl a Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. .It Fl b Ar bind_address Use .Ar bind_address on the local machine as the source address of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one address. .It Fl C Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, stderr, and data for forwarded X11, TCP and .Ux Ns -domain connections). The compression algorithm is the same used by .Xr gzip 1 , and the .Dq level can be controlled by the .Cm CompressionLevel option for protocol version 1. Compression is desirable on modem lines and other slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks. The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the configuration files; see the .Cm Compression option. .It Fl c Ar cipher_spec Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session. .Pp Protocol version 1 allows specification of a single cipher. The supported values are .Dq 3des , .Dq blowfish , and .Dq des . For protocol version 2, .Ar cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of ciphers listed in order of preference. See the .Cm Ciphers keyword in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information. .It Fl D Xo .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc .Ar port .Sm on .Xc Specifies a local .Dq dynamic application-level port forwarding. This works by allocating a socket to listen to .Ar port on the local side, optionally bound to the specified .Ar bind_address . Whenever a connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the remote machine. Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and .Nm will act as a SOCKS server. Only root can forward privileged ports. Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. .Pp IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the .Cm GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit .Ar bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The .Ar bind_address of .Dq localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or .Sq * indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. .It Fl E Ar log_file Append debug logs to .Ar log_file instead of standard error. .It Fl e Ar escape_char Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default: .Ql ~ ) . The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a line. The escape character followed by a dot .Pq Ql \&. closes the connection; followed by control-Z suspends the connection; and followed by itself sends the escape character once. Setting the character to .Dq none disables any escapes and makes the session fully transparent. .It Fl F Ar configfile Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file. If a configuration file is given on the command line, the system-wide configuration file .Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config will be ignored. The default for the per-user configuration file is .Pa ~/.ssh/config . .It Fl f Requests .Nm to go to background just before command execution. This is useful if .Nm is going to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user wants it in the background. This implies .Fl n . The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is with something like .Ic ssh -f host xterm . .Pp If the .Cm ExitOnForwardFailure configuration option is set to .Dq yes , then a client started with .Fl f will wait for all remote port forwards to be successfully established before placing itself in the background. .It Fl G Causes .Nm to print its configuration after evaluating .Cm Host and .Cm Match blocks and exit. .It Fl g Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports. If used on a multiplexed connection, then this option must be specified on the master process. .It Fl I Ar pkcs11 Specify the PKCS#11 shared library .Nm should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's private RSA key. .It Fl i Ar identity_file Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for public key authentication is read. The default is .Pa ~/.ssh/identity for protocol version 1, and .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa for protocol version 2. Identity files may also be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. It is possible to have multiple .Fl i options (and multiple identities specified in configuration files). .Nm will also try to load certificate information from the filename obtained by appending .Pa -cert.pub to identity filenames. .It Fl K Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server. .It Fl k Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server. .It Fl L Xo .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc .Ar port : host : hostport .Sm on .Xc Specifies that the given port on the local (client) host is to be forwarded to the given host and port on the remote side. This works by allocating a socket to listen to .Ar port on the local side, optionally bound to the specified .Ar bind_address . Whenever a connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is made to .Ar host port .Ar hostport from the remote machine. Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the .Cm GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit .Ar bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The .Ar bind_address of .Dq localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or .Sq * indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. .It Fl l Ar login_name Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine. This also may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. .It Fl M Places the .Nm client into .Dq master mode for connection sharing. Multiple .Fl M options places .Nm into .Dq master mode with confirmation required before slave connections are accepted. Refer to the description of .Cm ControlMaster in .Xr ssh_config 5 for details. .It Fl m Ar mac_spec Additionally, for protocol version 2 a comma-separated list of MAC (message authentication code) algorithms can be specified in order of preference. See the .Cm MACs keyword for more information. .It Fl N Do not execute a remote command. This is useful for just forwarding ports (protocol version 2 only). .It Fl n Redirects stdin from .Pa /dev/null (actually, prevents reading from stdin). This must be used when .Nm is run in the background. A common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote machine. For example, .Ic ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & will start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel. The .Nm program will be put in the background. (This does not work if .Nm needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the .Fl f option.) .It Fl O Ar ctl_cmd Control an active connection multiplexing master process. When the .Fl O option is specified, the .Ar ctl_cmd argument is interpreted and passed to the master process. Valid commands are: .Dq check (check that the master process is running), .Dq forward (request forwardings without command execution), .Dq cancel (cancel forwardings), .Dq exit (request the master to exit), and .Dq stop (request the master to stop accepting further multiplexing requests). .It Fl o Ar option Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact .It AddressFamily .It BatchMode .It BindAddress .It CanonicalDomains .It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal .It CanonicalizeHostname .It CanonicalizeMaxDots .It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs .It ChallengeResponseAuthentication .It CheckHostIP .It Cipher .It Ciphers .It ClearAllForwardings .It Compression .It CompressionLevel .It ConnectionAttempts .It ConnectTimeout .It ControlMaster .It ControlPath .It ControlPersist .It DynamicForward .It EscapeChar .It ExitOnForwardFailure .It FingerprintHash .It ForwardAgent .It ForwardX11 .It ForwardX11Timeout .It ForwardX11Trusted .It GatewayPorts .It GlobalKnownHostsFile .It GSSAPIAuthentication .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials .It HashKnownHosts .It Host .It HostbasedAuthentication .It HostbasedKeyTypes .It HostKeyAlgorithms .It HostKeyAlias .It HostName .It IdentityFile .It IdentitiesOnly .It IPQoS .It KbdInteractiveAuthentication .It KbdInteractiveDevices .It KexAlgorithms .It LocalCommand .It LocalForward .It LogLevel .It MACs .It Match .It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost .It NumberOfPasswordPrompts .It PasswordAuthentication .It PermitLocalCommand .It PKCS11Provider .It Port .It PreferredAuthentications .It Protocol .It ProxyCommand .It ProxyUseFdpass .It PubkeyAuthentication .It RekeyLimit .It RemoteForward .It RequestTTY .It RhostsRSAAuthentication .It RSAAuthentication .It SendEnv .It ServerAliveInterval .It ServerAliveCountMax .It StreamLocalBindMask .It StreamLocalBindUnlink .It StrictHostKeyChecking .It TCPKeepAlive .It Tunnel .It TunnelDevice .It UpdateHostKeys .It UsePrivilegedPort .It User .It UserKnownHostsFile .It VerifyHostKeyDNS .It VersionAddendum .It VisualHostKey .It XAuthLocation .El .It Fl p Ar port Port to connect to on the remote host. This can be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. .It Fl Q Cm cipher | cipher-auth | mac | kex | key | protocol-version Queries .Nm for the algorithms supported for the specified version 2. The available features are: .Ar cipher (supported symmetric ciphers), .Ar cipher-auth (supported symmetric ciphers that support authenticated encryption), .Ar mac (supported message integrity codes), .Ar kex (key exchange algorithms), .Ar key (key types) and .Ar protocol-version (supported SSH protocol versions). .It Fl q Quiet mode. Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be suppressed. .It Fl R Xo .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc .Ar port : host : hostport .Sm on .Xc Specifies that the given port on the remote (server) host is to be forwarded to the given host and port on the local side. This works by allocating a socket to listen to .Ar port on the remote side, and whenever a connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is made to .Ar host port .Ar hostport from the local machine. .Pp Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on the remote machine. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. .Pp By default, the listening socket on the server will be bound to the loopback interface only. This may be overridden by specifying a .Ar bind_address . An empty .Ar bind_address , or the address .Ql * , indicates that the remote socket should listen on all interfaces. Specifying a remote .Ar bind_address will only succeed if the server's .Cm GatewayPorts option is enabled (see .Xr sshd_config 5 ) . .Pp If the .Ar port argument is .Ql 0 , the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time. When used together with .Ic -O forward the allocated port will be printed to the standard output. .It Fl S Ar ctl_path Specifies the location of a control socket for connection sharing, or the string .Dq none to disable connection sharing. Refer to the description of .Cm ControlPath and .Cm ControlMaster in .Xr ssh_config 5 for details. .It Fl s May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote system. Subsystems are a feature of the SSH2 protocol which facilitate the use of SSH as a secure transport for other applications (eg.\& .Xr sftp 1 ) . The subsystem is specified as the remote command. .It Fl T -Disable pseudo-tty allocation. +Disable pseudo-terminal allocation. .It Fl t -Force pseudo-tty allocation. +Force pseudo-terminal allocation. This can be used to execute arbitrary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be very useful, e.g. when implementing menu services. Multiple .Fl t options force tty allocation, even if .Nm has no local tty. .It Fl V Display the version number and exit. .It Fl v Verbose mode. Causes .Nm to print debugging messages about its progress. This is helpful in debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems. Multiple .Fl v options increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3. .It Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port Requests that standard input and output on the client be forwarded to .Ar host on .Ar port over the secure channel. Implies .Fl N , .Fl T , .Cm ExitOnForwardFailure and .Cm ClearAllForwardings . Works with Protocol version 2 only. .It Fl w Xo .Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun .Xc Requests tunnel device forwarding with the specified .Xr tun 4 devices between the client .Pq Ar local_tun and the server .Pq Ar remote_tun . .Pp The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword .Dq any , which uses the next available tunnel device. If .Ar remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to .Dq any . See also the .Cm Tunnel and .Cm TunnelDevice directives in .Xr ssh_config 5 . If the .Cm Tunnel directive is unset, it is set to the default tunnel mode, which is .Dq point-to-point . .It Fl X Enables X11 forwarding. This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file. .Pp X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the user's X authorization database) can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring. .Pp For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY extension restrictions by default. Please refer to the .Nm .Fl Y option and the .Cm ForwardX11Trusted directive in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information. .It Fl x Disables X11 forwarding. .It Fl Y Enables trusted X11 forwarding. Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls. .It Fl y Send log information using the .Xr syslog 3 system module. By default this information is sent to stderr. .El .Pp .Nm may additionally obtain configuration data from a per-user configuration file and a system-wide configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Sh AUTHENTICATION The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocols 1 and 2. The default is to use protocol 2 only, though this can be changed via the .Cm Protocol option in .Xr ssh_config 5 or the .Fl 1 and .Fl 2 options (see above). Both protocols support similar authentication methods, but protocol 2 is the default since it provides additional mechanisms for confidentiality (the traffic is encrypted using AES, 3DES, Blowfish, CAST128, or Arcfour) and integrity (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512, umac-64, umac-128, hmac-ripemd160). Protocol 1 lacks a strong mechanism for ensuring the integrity of the connection. .Pp The methods available for authentication are: GSSAPI-based authentication, host-based authentication, public key authentication, challenge-response authentication, and password authentication. Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above, though protocol 2 has a configuration option to change the default order: .Cm PreferredAuthentications . .Pp Host-based authentication works as follows: If the machine the user logs in from is listed in .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv or .Pa /etc/shosts.equiv on the remote machine, and the user names are the same on both sides, or if the files .Pa ~/.rhosts or .Pa ~/.shosts exist in the user's home directory on the remote machine and contain a line containing the name of the client machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is considered for login. Additionally, the server .Em must be able to verify the client's host key (see the description of .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts , below) for login to be permitted. This authentication method closes security holes due to IP spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing. [Note to the administrator: .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv , .Pa ~/.rhosts , and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be disabled if security is desired.] .Pp Public key authentication works as follows: The scheme is based on public-key cryptography, using cryptosystems where encryption and decryption are done using separate keys, and it is unfeasible to derive the decryption key from the encryption key. The idea is that each user creates a public/private key pair for authentication purposes. The server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key. .Nm implements public key authentication protocol automatically, using one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms. Protocol 1 is restricted to using only RSA keys, but protocol 2 may use any. The HISTORY section of .Xr ssl 8 contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms. .Pp The file .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys lists the public keys that are permitted for logging in. When the user logs in, the .Nm program tells the server which key pair it would like to use for authentication. The client proves that it has access to the private key and the server checks that the corresponding public key is authorized to accept the account. .Pp The user creates his/her key pair by running .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . This stores the private key in .Pa ~/.ssh/identity (protocol 1), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa (protocol 2 DSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa (protocol 2 ECDSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 (protocol 2 Ed25519), or .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa (protocol 2 RSA) and stores the public key in .Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub (protocol 1), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub (protocol 2 DSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub (protocol 2 ECDSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub (protocol 2 Ed25519), or .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub (protocol 2 RSA) in the user's home directory. The user should then copy the public key to .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys in his/her home directory on the remote machine. The .Pa authorized_keys file corresponds to the conventional .Pa ~/.rhosts file, and has one key per line, though the lines can be very long. After this, the user can log in without giving the password. .Pp A variation on public key authentication is available in the form of certificate authentication: instead of a set of public/private keys, signed certificates are used. This has the advantage that a single trusted certification authority can be used in place of many public/private keys. See the CERTIFICATES section of .Xr ssh-keygen 1 for more information. .Pp The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication may be with an authentication agent. See .Xr ssh-agent 1 for more information. .Pp Challenge-response authentication works as follows: The server sends an arbitrary .Qq challenge text, and prompts for a response. Protocol 2 allows multiple challenges and responses; protocol 1 is restricted to just one challenge/response. Examples of challenge-response authentication include .Bx Authentication (see .Xr login.conf 5 ) and PAM (some .Pf non- Ox systems). .Pp Finally, if other authentication methods fail, .Nm prompts the user for a password. The password is sent to the remote host for checking; however, since all communications are encrypted, the password cannot be seen by someone listening on the network. .Pp .Nm automatically maintains and checks a database containing identification for all hosts it has ever been used with. Host keys are stored in .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the user's home directory. Additionally, the file .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts is automatically checked for known hosts. Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file. If a host's identification ever changes, .Nm warns about this and disables password authentication to prevent server spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks, which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption. The .Cm StrictHostKeyChecking option can be used to control logins to machines whose host key is not known or has changed. .Pp When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server -either executes the given command, or logs into the machine and gives -the user a normal shell on the remote machine. +either executes the given command in a non-interactive session or, +if no command has been specified, logs into the machine and gives +the user a normal shell as an interactive session. All communication with the remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted. .Pp -If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated (normal login session), the +If an interactive session is requested +.Nm +by default will only request a pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive +sessions when the client has one. +The flags +.Fl T +and +.Fl t +can be used to override this behaviour. +.Pp +If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated the user may use the escape characters noted below. .Pp -If no pseudo-tty has been allocated, +If no pseudo-terminal has been allocated, the session is transparent and can be used to reliably transfer binary data. On most systems, setting the escape character to .Dq none will also make the session transparent even if a tty is used. .Pp The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote machine exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed. .Sh ESCAPE CHARACTERS When a pseudo-terminal has been requested, .Nm supports a number of functions through the use of an escape character. .Pp A single tilde character can be sent as .Ic ~~ or by following the tilde by a character other than those described below. The escape character must always follow a newline to be interpreted as special. The escape character can be changed in configuration files using the .Cm EscapeChar configuration directive or on the command line by the .Fl e option. .Pp The supported escapes (assuming the default .Ql ~ ) are: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm ~. Disconnect. .It Cm ~^Z Background .Nm . .It Cm ~# List forwarded connections. .It Cm ~& Background .Nm at logout when waiting for forwarded connection / X11 sessions to terminate. .It Cm ~? Display a list of escape characters. .It Cm ~B Send a BREAK to the remote system (only useful for SSH protocol version 2 and if the peer supports it). .It Cm ~C Open command line. Currently this allows the addition of port forwardings using the .Fl L , .Fl R and .Fl D options (see above). It also allows the cancellation of existing port-forwardings with .Sm off .Fl KL Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on for local, .Sm off .Fl KR Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on for remote and .Sm off .Fl KD Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on for dynamic port-forwardings. .Ic !\& Ns Ar command allows the user to execute a local command if the .Ic PermitLocalCommand option is enabled in .Xr ssh_config 5 . Basic help is available, using the .Fl h option. .It Cm ~R Request rekeying of the connection (only useful for SSH protocol version 2 and if the peer supports it). .It Cm ~V Decrease the verbosity .Pq Ic LogLevel when errors are being written to stderr. .It Cm ~v Increase the verbosity .Pq Ic LogLevel when errors are being written to stderr. .El .Sh TCP FORWARDING Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over the secure channel can be specified either on the command line or in a configuration file. One possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a mail server; another is going through firewalls. .Pp In the example below, we look at encrypting communication between an IRC client and server, even though the IRC server does not directly support encrypted communications. This works as follows: the user connects to the remote host using .Nm , specifying a port to be used to forward connections to the remote server. After that it is possible to start the service which is to be encrypted on the client machine, connecting to the same local port, and .Nm will encrypt and forward the connection. .Pp The following example tunnels an IRC session from client machine .Dq 127.0.0.1 (localhost) to remote server .Dq server.example.com : .Bd -literal -offset 4n $ ssh -f -L 1234:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10 $ irc -c '#users' -p 1234 pinky 127.0.0.1 .Ed .Pp This tunnels a connection to IRC server .Dq server.example.com , joining channel .Dq #users , nickname .Dq pinky , using port 1234. It doesn't matter which port is used, as long as it's greater than 1023 (remember, only root can open sockets on privileged ports) and doesn't conflict with any ports already in use. The connection is forwarded to port 6667 on the remote server, since that's the standard port for IRC services. .Pp The .Fl f option backgrounds .Nm and the remote command .Dq sleep 10 is specified to allow an amount of time (10 seconds, in the example) to start the service which is to be tunnelled. If no connections are made within the time specified, .Nm will exit. .Sh X11 FORWARDING If the .Cm ForwardX11 variable is set to .Dq yes (or see the description of the .Fl X , .Fl x , and .Fl Y options above) and the user is using X11 (the .Ev DISPLAY environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11 programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made from the local machine. The user should not manually set .Ev DISPLAY . Forwarding of X11 connections can be configured on the command line or in configuration files. .Pp The .Ev DISPLAY value set by .Nm will point to the server machine, but with a display number greater than zero. This is normal, and happens because .Nm creates a .Dq proxy X server on the server machine for forwarding the connections over the encrypted channel. .Pp .Nm will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine. For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie, store it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded connections carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when the connection is opened. The real authentication cookie is never sent to the server machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain). .Pp If the .Cm ForwardAgent variable is set to .Dq yes (or see the description of the .Fl A and .Fl a options above) and the user is using an authentication agent, the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the remote side. .Sh VERIFYING HOST KEYS When connecting to a server for the first time, a fingerprint of the server's public key is presented to the user (unless the option .Cm StrictHostKeyChecking has been disabled). Fingerprints can be determined using .Xr ssh-keygen 1 : .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key .Pp If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched and the key can be accepted or rejected. +If only legacy (MD5) fingerprints for the server are available, the +.Xr ssh-keygen 1 +.Fl E +option may be used to downgrade the fingerprint algorithm to match. +.Pp Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys just by looking at fingerprint strings, there is also support to compare host keys visually, using .Em random art . By setting the .Cm VisualHostKey option to .Dq yes , a small ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter if the session itself is interactive or not. By learning the pattern a known server produces, a user can easily find out that the host key has changed when a completely different pattern is displayed. Because these patterns are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks similar to the pattern remembered only gives a good probability that the host key is the same, not guaranteed proof. .Pp To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for all known hosts, the following command line can be used: .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts .Pp If the fingerprint is unknown, an alternative method of verification is available: SSH fingerprints verified by DNS. An additional resource record (RR), SSHFP, is added to a zonefile and the connecting client is able to match the fingerprint with that of the key presented. .Pp In this example, we are connecting a client to a server, .Dq host.example.com . The SSHFP resource records should first be added to the zonefile for host.example.com: .Bd -literal -offset indent $ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com. .Ed .Pp The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile. To check that the zone is answering fingerprint queries: .Pp .Dl $ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com .Pp Finally the client connects: .Bd -literal -offset indent $ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com [...] Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? .Ed .Pp See the .Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS option in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information. .Sh SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS .Nm contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling using the .Xr tun 4 network pseudo-device, allowing two networks to be joined securely. The .Xr sshd_config 5 configuration option .Cm PermitTunnel controls whether the server supports this, and at what level (layer 2 or 3 traffic). .Pp The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24 with remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection from 10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2, provided that the SSH server running on the gateway to the remote network, at 192.168.1.15, allows it. .Pp On the client: .Bd -literal -offset indent # ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true # ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252 # route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2 .Ed .Pp On the server: .Bd -literal -offset indent # ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252 # route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1 .Ed .Pp Client access may be more finely tuned via the .Pa /root/.ssh/authorized_keys file (see below) and the .Cm PermitRootLogin server option. The following entry would permit connections on .Xr tun 4 device 1 from user .Dq jane and on tun device 2 from user .Dq john , if .Cm PermitRootLogin is set to .Dq forced-commands-only : .Bd -literal -offset 2n tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john .Ed .Pp Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead, it may be more suited to temporary setups, such as for wireless VPNs. More permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as .Xr ipsecctl 8 and .Xr isakmpd 8 . .Sh ENVIRONMENT .Nm will normally set the following environment variables: .Bl -tag -width "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND" .It Ev DISPLAY The .Ev DISPLAY variable indicates the location of the X11 server. It is automatically set by .Nm to point to a value of the form .Dq hostname:n , where .Dq hostname indicates the host where the shell runs, and .Sq n is an integer \*(Ge 1. .Nm uses this special value to forward X11 connections over the secure channel. The user should normally not set .Ev DISPLAY explicitly, as that will render the X11 connection insecure (and will require the user to manually copy any required authorization cookies). .It Ev HOME Set to the path of the user's home directory. .It Ev LOGNAME Synonym for .Ev USER ; set for compatibility with systems that use this variable. .It Ev MAIL Set to the path of the user's mailbox. .It Ev PATH Set to the default .Ev PATH , as specified when compiling .Nm . .It Ev SSH_ASKPASS If .Nm needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current terminal if it was run from a terminal. If .Nm does not have a terminal associated with it but .Ev DISPLAY and .Ev SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute the program specified by .Ev SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the passphrase. This is particularly useful when calling .Nm from a .Pa .xsession or related script. (Note that on some machines it may be necessary to redirect the input from .Pa /dev/null to make this work.) .It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK Identifies the path of a .Ux Ns -domain socket used to communicate with the agent. .It Ev SSH_CONNECTION Identifies the client and server ends of the connection. The variable contains four space-separated values: client IP address, client port number, server IP address, and server port number. .It Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND This variable contains the original command line if a forced command is executed. It can be used to extract the original arguments. .It Ev SSH_TTY This is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associated with the current shell or command. If the current session has no tty, this variable is not set. .It Ev TZ This variable is set to indicate the present time zone if it was set when the daemon was started (i.e. the daemon passes the value on to new connections). .It Ev USER Set to the name of the user logging in. .El .Pp Additionally, .Nm reads .Pa ~/.ssh/environment , and adds lines of the format .Dq VARNAME=value to the environment if the file exists and users are allowed to change their environment. For more information, see the .Cm PermitUserEnvironment option in .Xr sshd_config 5 . .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Pa ~/.rhosts This file is used for host-based authentication (see above). On some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because .Xr sshd 8 reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.shosts This file is used in exactly the same way as .Pa .rhosts , but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration and authentication information. There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used for logging in as this user. The format of this file is described in the .Xr sshd 8 manual page. This file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/config This is the per-user configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in .Xr ssh_config 5 . Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions: read/write for the user, and not writable by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/environment Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see .Sx ENVIRONMENT , above. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/identity .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa Contains the private key for authentication. These files contain sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not accessible by others (read/write/execute). .Nm will simply ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key which will be used to encrypt the sensitive part of this file using 3DES. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub Contains the public key for authentication. These files are not sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys. See .Xr sshd 8 for further details of the format of this file. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/rc Commands in this file are executed by .Nm when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the .Xr sshd 8 manual page for more information. .Pp .It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv This file is for host-based authentication (see above). It should only be writable by root. .Pp .It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv This file is used in exactly the same way as .Pa hosts.equiv , but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config Systemwide configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key These files contain the private parts of the host keys and are used for host-based authentication. If protocol version 1 is used, .Nm must be setuid root, since the host key is readable only by root. For protocol version 2, .Nm uses .Xr ssh-keysign 8 to access the host keys, eliminating the requirement that .Nm be setuid root when host-based authentication is used. By default .Nm is not setuid root. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the organization. It should be world-readable. See .Xr sshd 8 for further details of the format of this file. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc Commands in this file are executed by .Nm when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the .Xr sshd 8 manual page for more information. .El .Sh EXIT STATUS .Nm exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 if an error occurred. .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr scp 1 , .Xr sftp 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 , .Xr tun 4 , .Xr ssh_config 5 , .Xr ssh-keysign 8 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh STANDARDS .Rs .%A S. Lehtinen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4250 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned Numbers .Re .Pp .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4251 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture .Re .Pp .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4252 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4253 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4254 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A J. Schlyter .%A W. Griffin .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4255 .%T Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints .Re .Pp .Rs .%A F. Cusack .%A M. Forssen .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4256 .%T Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) .Re .Pp .Rs .%A J. Galbraith .%A P. Remaker .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4335 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break Extension .Re .Pp .Rs .%A M. Bellare .%A T. Kohno .%A C. Namprempre .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4344 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes .Re .Pp .Rs .%A B. Harris .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4345 .%T Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A M. Friedl .%A N. Provos .%A W. Simpson .%D March 2006 .%R RFC 4419 .%T Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A J. Galbraith .%A R. Thayer .%D November 2006 .%R RFC 4716 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format .Re .Pp .Rs .%A D. Stebila .%A J. Green .%D December 2009 .%R RFC 5656 .%T Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer .Re .Pp .Rs .%A A. Perrig .%A D. Song .%D 1999 .%O International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99) .%T Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security .Re .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Index: head/crypto/openssh/ssh.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/ssh.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/ssh.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,2060 +1,2062 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.416 2015/03/03 06:48:58 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.418 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Ssh client program. This program can be used to log into a remote machine. * The software supports strong authentication, encryption, and forwarding * of X11, TCP/IP, and authentication connections. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Modified to work with SSL by Niels Provos * in Canada (German citizen). * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "digest.h" #include "packet.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "channels.h" #include "key.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "clientloop.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "kex.h" #include "mac.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "match.h" #include "msg.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "roaming.h" #include "version.h" #include "ssherr.h" #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #endif extern char *__progname; /* Saves a copy of argv for setproctitle emulation */ #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE static char **saved_av; #endif /* Flag indicating whether debug mode is on. May be set on the command line. */ int debug_flag = 0; /* Flag indicating whether a tty should be requested */ int tty_flag = 0; /* don't exec a shell */ int no_shell_flag = 0; /* * Flag indicating that nothing should be read from stdin. This can be set * on the command line. */ int stdin_null_flag = 0; /* * Flag indicating that the current process should be backgrounded and * a new slave launched in the foreground for ControlPersist. */ int need_controlpersist_detach = 0; /* Copies of flags for ControlPersist foreground slave */ int ostdin_null_flag, ono_shell_flag, otty_flag, orequest_tty; /* * Flag indicating that ssh should fork after authentication. This is useful * so that the passphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the * background. */ int fork_after_authentication_flag = 0; /* forward stdio to remote host and port */ char *stdio_forward_host = NULL; int stdio_forward_port = 0; /* * General data structure for command line options and options configurable * in configuration files. See readconf.h. */ Options options; /* optional user configfile */ char *config = NULL; /* * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the * command line, or the HostName specified for the user-supplied name in a * configuration file. */ char *host; /* socket address the host resolves to */ struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; /* Private host keys. */ Sensitive sensitive_data; /* Original real UID. */ uid_t original_real_uid; uid_t original_effective_uid; /* command to be executed */ Buffer command; /* Should we execute a command or invoke a subsystem? */ int subsystem_flag = 0; /* # of replies received for global requests */ static int remote_forward_confirms_received = 0; /* mux.c */ extern int muxserver_sock; extern u_int muxclient_command; /* Prints a help message to the user. This function never returns. */ static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: ssh [-1246AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]\n" " [-D [bind_address:]port] [-E log_file] [-e escape_char]\n" " [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11] [-i identity_file]\n" " [-L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport] [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec]\n" " [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]\n" " [-Q cipher | cipher-auth | mac | kex | key]\n" " [-R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport] [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port]\n" " [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] [user@]hostname [command]\n" ); exit(255); } static int ssh_session(void); static int ssh_session2(void); static void load_public_identity_files(void); static void main_sigchld_handler(int); /* from muxclient.c */ void muxclient(const char *); void muxserver_listen(void); /* ~/ expand a list of paths. NB. assumes path[n] is heap-allocated. */ static void tilde_expand_paths(char **paths, u_int num_paths) { u_int i; char *cp; for (i = 0; i < num_paths; i++) { cp = tilde_expand_filename(paths[i], original_real_uid); free(paths[i]); paths[i] = cp; } } /* * Attempt to resolve a host name / port to a set of addresses and * optionally return any CNAMEs encountered along the way. * Returns NULL on failure. * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. */ static struct addrinfo * resolve_host(const char *name, int port, int logerr, char *cname, size_t clen) { char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; struct addrinfo hints, *res; int gaierr, loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; if (port <= 0) port = default_ssh_port(); snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port); memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ? AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; if (cname != NULL) hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) { if (logerr || (gaierr != EAI_NONAME && gaierr != EAI_NODATA)) loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; do_log2(loglevel, "%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s", __progname, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return NULL; } if (cname != NULL && res->ai_canonname != NULL) { if (strlcpy(cname, res->ai_canonname, clen) >= clen) { error("%s: host \"%s\" cname \"%s\" too long (max %lu)", __func__, name, res->ai_canonname, (u_long)clen); if (clen > 0) *cname = '\0'; } } return res; } /* * Attempt to resolve a numeric host address / port to a single address. * Returns a canonical address string. * Returns NULL on failure. * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. */ static struct addrinfo * resolve_addr(const char *name, int port, char *caddr, size_t clen) { char addr[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; struct addrinfo hints, *res; int gaierr; if (port <= 0) port = default_ssh_port(); snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port); memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ? AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST|AI_NUMERICSERV; if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) { debug2("%s: could not resolve name %.100s as address: %s", __func__, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return NULL; } if (res == NULL) { debug("%s: getaddrinfo %.100s returned no addresses", __func__, name); return NULL; } if (res->ai_next != NULL) { debug("%s: getaddrinfo %.100s returned multiple addresses", __func__, name); goto fail; } if ((gaierr = getnameinfo(res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen, addr, sizeof(addr), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != 0) { debug("%s: Could not format address for name %.100s: %s", __func__, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); goto fail; } if (strlcpy(caddr, addr, clen) >= clen) { error("%s: host \"%s\" addr \"%s\" too long (max %lu)", __func__, name, addr, (u_long)clen); if (clen > 0) *caddr = '\0'; fail: freeaddrinfo(res); return NULL; } return res; } /* * Check whether the cname is a permitted replacement for the hostname * and perform the replacement if it is. * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. */ static int check_follow_cname(char **namep, const char *cname) { int i; struct allowed_cname *rule; if (*cname == '\0' || options.num_permitted_cnames == 0 || strcmp(*namep, cname) == 0) return 0; if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO) return 0; /* * Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by * a proxy unless the user specifically requests so. */ if (!option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) && options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS) return 0; debug3("%s: check \"%s\" CNAME \"%s\"", __func__, *namep, cname); for (i = 0; i < options.num_permitted_cnames; i++) { rule = options.permitted_cnames + i; - if (match_pattern_list(*namep, rule->source_list, - strlen(rule->source_list), 1) != 1 || - match_pattern_list(cname, rule->target_list, - strlen(rule->target_list), 1) != 1) + if (match_pattern_list(*namep, rule->source_list, 1) != 1 || + match_pattern_list(cname, rule->target_list, 1) != 1) continue; verbose("Canonicalized DNS aliased hostname " "\"%s\" => \"%s\"", *namep, cname); free(*namep); *namep = xstrdup(cname); return 1; } return 0; } /* * Attempt to resolve the supplied hostname after applying the user's * canonicalization rules. Returns the address list for the host or NULL * if no name was found after canonicalization. * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. */ static struct addrinfo * resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, int port) { int i, ndots; char *cp, *fullhost, newname[NI_MAXHOST]; struct addrinfo *addrs; if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO) return NULL; /* * Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by * a proxy unless the user specifically requests so. */ if (!option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) && options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS) return NULL; /* Try numeric hostnames first */ if ((addrs = resolve_addr(*hostp, port, newname, sizeof(newname))) != NULL) { debug2("%s: hostname %.100s is address", __func__, *hostp); if (strcasecmp(*hostp, newname) != 0) { debug2("%s: canonicalised address \"%s\" => \"%s\"", __func__, *hostp, newname); free(*hostp); *hostp = xstrdup(newname); } return addrs; } /* Don't apply canonicalization to sufficiently-qualified hostnames */ ndots = 0; for (cp = *hostp; *cp != '\0'; cp++) { if (*cp == '.') ndots++; } if (ndots > options.canonicalize_max_dots) { debug3("%s: not canonicalizing hostname \"%s\" (max dots %d)", __func__, *hostp, options.canonicalize_max_dots); return NULL; } /* Attempt each supplied suffix */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_canonical_domains; i++) { *newname = '\0'; xasprintf(&fullhost, "%s.%s.", *hostp, options.canonical_domains[i]); debug3("%s: attempting \"%s\" => \"%s\"", __func__, *hostp, fullhost); if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0, newname, sizeof(newname))) == NULL) { free(fullhost); continue; } /* Remove trailing '.' */ fullhost[strlen(fullhost) - 1] = '\0'; /* Follow CNAME if requested */ if (!check_follow_cname(&fullhost, newname)) { debug("Canonicalized hostname \"%s\" => \"%s\"", *hostp, fullhost); } free(*hostp); *hostp = fullhost; return addrs; } if (!options.canonicalize_fallback_local) fatal("%s: Could not resolve host \"%s\"", __progname, *hostp); debug2("%s: host %s not found in any suffix", __func__, *hostp); return NULL; } /* * Read per-user configuration file. Ignore the system wide config * file if the user specifies a config file on the command line. */ static void process_config_files(const char *host_arg, struct passwd *pw, int post_canon) { char buf[PATH_MAX]; int r; if (config != NULL) { if (strcasecmp(config, "none") != 0 && !read_config_file(config, pw, host, host_arg, &options, SSHCONF_USERCONF | (post_canon ? SSHCONF_POSTCANON : 0))) fatal("Can't open user config file %.100s: " "%.100s", config, strerror(errno)); } else { r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE); if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf)) (void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_arg, &options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | SSHCONF_USERCONF | (post_canon ? SSHCONF_POSTCANON : 0)); /* Read systemwide configuration file after user config. */ (void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw, host, host_arg, &options, post_canon ? SSHCONF_POSTCANON : 0); } } /* Rewrite the port number in an addrinfo list of addresses */ static void set_addrinfo_port(struct addrinfo *addrs, int port) { struct addrinfo *addr; for (addr = addrs; addr != NULL; addr = addr->ai_next) { switch (addr->ai_family) { case AF_INET: ((struct sockaddr_in *)addr->ai_addr)-> sin_port = htons(port); break; case AF_INET6: ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr->ai_addr)-> sin6_port = htons(port); break; } } } /* * Main program for the ssh client. */ int main(int ac, char **av) { int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog, config_test = 0; char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, buf[PATH_MAX], *host_arg, *logfile; char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; char cname[NI_MAXHOST]; struct stat st; struct passwd *pw; int timeout_ms; extern int optind, optreset; extern char *optarg; struct Forward fwd; struct addrinfo *addrs = NULL; struct ssh_digest_ctx *md; u_char conn_hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; char *conn_hash_hex; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */ /* Save argv so it isn't clobbered by setproctitle() emulation */ saved_av = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_av)); for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) saved_av[i] = xstrdup(av[i]); saved_av[i] = NULL; compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av); av = saved_av; #endif /* * Discard other fds that are hanging around. These can cause problem * with backgrounded ssh processes started by ControlPersist. */ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); /* * Save the original real uid. It will be needed later (uid-swapping * may clobber the real uid). */ original_real_uid = getuid(); original_effective_uid = geteuid(); /* * Use uid-swapping to give up root privileges for the duration of * option processing. We will re-instantiate the rights when we are * ready to create the privileged port, and will permanently drop * them when the port has been created (actually, when the connection * has been made, as we may need to create the port several times). */ PRIV_END; #ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT /* If we are installed setuid root be careful to not drop core. */ if (original_real_uid != original_effective_uid) { struct rlimit rlim; rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0; if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) < 0) fatal("setrlimit failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); } #endif /* Get user data. */ pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid); if (!pw) { logit("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)original_real_uid); exit(255); } /* Take a copy of the returned structure. */ pw = pwcopy(pw); /* * Set our umask to something reasonable, as some files are created * with the default umask. This will make them world-readable but * writable only by the owner, which is ok for all files for which we * don't set the modes explicitly. */ umask(022); /* * Initialize option structure to indicate that no values have been * set. */ initialize_options(&options); /* Parse command-line arguments. */ host = NULL; use_syslog = 0; logfile = NULL; argv0 = av[0]; again: while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvx" "ACD:E:F:GI:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case '1': options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1; break; case '2': options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_2; break; case '4': options.address_family = AF_INET; break; case '6': options.address_family = AF_INET6; break; case 'n': stdin_null_flag = 1; break; case 'f': fork_after_authentication_flag = 1; stdin_null_flag = 1; break; case 'x': options.forward_x11 = 0; break; case 'X': options.forward_x11 = 1; break; case 'y': use_syslog = 1; break; case 'E': logfile = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'G': config_test = 1; break; case 'Y': options.forward_x11 = 1; options.forward_x11_trusted = 1; break; case 'g': options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 1; break; case 'O': if (stdio_forward_host != NULL) fatal("Cannot specify multiplexing " "command with -W"); else if (muxclient_command != 0) fatal("Multiplexing command already specified"); if (strcmp(optarg, "check") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK; else if (strcmp(optarg, "forward") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD; else if (strcmp(optarg, "exit") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE; else if (strcmp(optarg, "stop") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP; else if (strcmp(optarg, "cancel") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD; else fatal("Invalid multiplex command."); break; case 'P': /* deprecated */ options.use_privileged_port = 0; break; case 'Q': cp = NULL; if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher") == 0) cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 0); else if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher-auth") == 0) cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 1); else if (strcmp(optarg, "mac") == 0) cp = mac_alg_list('\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0) cp = kex_alg_list('\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0) cp = key_alg_list(0, 0); else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0) cp = key_alg_list(1, 0); else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-plain") == 0) cp = key_alg_list(0, 1); else if (strcmp(optarg, "protocol-version") == 0) { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 cp = xstrdup("1\n2"); #else cp = xstrdup("2"); #endif } if (cp == NULL) fatal("Unsupported query \"%s\"", optarg); printf("%s\n", cp); free(cp); exit(0); break; case 'a': options.forward_agent = 0; break; case 'A': options.forward_agent = 1; break; case 'k': options.gss_deleg_creds = 0; break; case 'K': options.gss_authentication = 1; options.gss_deleg_creds = 1; break; case 'i': if (stat(optarg, &st) < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s " "not accessible: %s.\n", optarg, strerror(errno)); break; } add_identity_file(&options, NULL, optarg, 1); break; case 'I': #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 options.pkcs11_provider = xstrdup(optarg); #else fprintf(stderr, "no support for PKCS#11.\n"); #endif break; case 't': if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES) options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_FORCE; else options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_YES; break; case 'v': if (debug_flag == 0) { debug_flag = 1; options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; } else { if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) options.log_level++; } break; case 'V': if (options.version_addendum && *options.version_addendum != '\0') fprintf(stderr, "%s %s, %s\n", SSH_RELEASE, options.version_addendum, OPENSSL_VERSION); else fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", SSH_RELEASE, OPENSSL_VERSION); if (opt == 'V') exit(0); break; case 'w': if (options.tun_open == -1) options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT; options.tun_local = a2tun(optarg, &options.tun_remote); if (options.tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ERR) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad tun device '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'W': if (stdio_forward_host != NULL) fatal("stdio forward already specified"); if (muxclient_command != 0) fatal("Cannot specify stdio forward with -O"); if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) { stdio_forward_host = fwd.listen_host; stdio_forward_port = fwd.listen_port; free(fwd.connect_host); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad stdio forwarding specification '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO; no_shell_flag = 1; options.clear_forwardings = 1; options.exit_on_forward_failure = 1; break; case 'q': options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; break; case 'e': if (optarg[0] == '^' && optarg[2] == 0 && (u_char) optarg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) optarg[1] < 128) options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[1] & 31; else if (strlen(optarg) == 1) options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[0]; else if (strcmp(optarg, "none") == 0) options.escape_char = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE; else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad escape character '%s'.\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'c': if (ciphers_valid(optarg)) { /* SSH2 only */ options.ciphers = xstrdup(optarg); options.cipher = SSH_CIPHER_INVALID; } else { /* SSH1 only */ options.cipher = cipher_number(optarg); if (options.cipher == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher type '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_3DES) options.ciphers = "3des-cbc"; else if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH) options.ciphers = "blowfish-cbc"; else options.ciphers = (char *)-1; } break; case 'm': if (mac_valid(optarg)) options.macs = xstrdup(optarg); else { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown mac type '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'M': if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_YES) options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK; else options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_YES; break; case 'p': options.port = a2port(optarg); if (options.port <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'l': options.user = optarg; break; case 'L': if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 0)) add_local_forward(&options, &fwd); else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad local forwarding specification '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'R': if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 1)) { add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad remote forwarding specification " "'%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'D': if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) { add_local_forward(&options, &fwd); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad dynamic forwarding specification " "'%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'C': options.compression = 1; break; case 'N': no_shell_flag = 1; options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO; break; case 'T': options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO; break; case 'o': line = xstrdup(optarg); if (process_config_line(&options, pw, host ? host : "", host ? host : "", line, "command-line", 0, NULL, SSHCONF_USERCONF) != 0) exit(255); free(line); break; case 's': subsystem_flag = 1; break; case 'S': if (options.control_path != NULL) free(options.control_path); options.control_path = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'b': options.bind_address = optarg; break; case 'F': config = optarg; break; default: usage(); } } ac -= optind; av += optind; if (ac > 0 && !host) { if (strrchr(*av, '@')) { p = xstrdup(*av); cp = strrchr(p, '@'); if (cp == NULL || cp == p) usage(); options.user = p; *cp = '\0'; host = xstrdup(++cp); } else host = xstrdup(*av); if (ac > 1) { optind = optreset = 1; goto again; } ac--, av++; } /* Check that we got a host name. */ if (!host) usage(); host_arg = xstrdup(host); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); #endif /* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */ buffer_init(&command); /* * Save the command to execute on the remote host in a buffer. There * is no limit on the length of the command, except by the maximum * packet size. Also sets the tty flag if there is no command. */ if (!ac) { /* No command specified - execute shell on a tty. */ if (subsystem_flag) { fprintf(stderr, "You must specify a subsystem to invoke.\n"); usage(); } } else { /* A command has been specified. Store it into the buffer. */ for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) { if (i) buffer_append(&command, " ", 1); buffer_append(&command, av[i], strlen(av[i])); } } /* Cannot fork to background if no command. */ if (fork_after_authentication_flag && buffer_len(&command) == 0 && !no_shell_flag) fatal("Cannot fork into background without a command " "to execute."); /* * Initialize "log" output. Since we are the client all output * goes to stderr unless otherwise specified by -y or -E. */ if (use_syslog && logfile != NULL) fatal("Can't specify both -y and -E"); if (logfile != NULL) { log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile); free(logfile); } log_init(argv0, options.log_level == -1 ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, !use_syslog); if (debug_flag) logit("%s, %s", SSH_RELEASE, OPENSSL_VERSION); /* Parse the configuration files */ process_config_files(host_arg, pw, 0); /* Hostname canonicalisation needs a few options filled. */ fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(&options); /* If the user has replaced the hostname then take it into use now */ if (options.hostname != NULL) { /* NB. Please keep in sync with readconf.c:match_cfg_line() */ cp = percent_expand(options.hostname, "h", host, (char *)NULL); free(host); host = cp; free(options.hostname); options.hostname = xstrdup(host); } /* If canonicalization requested then try to apply it */ lowercase(host); if (options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_NO) addrs = resolve_canonicalize(&host, options.port); /* * If CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs have been specified but * other canonicalization did not happen (by not being requested * or by failing with fallback) then the hostname may still be changed * as a result of CNAME following. * * Try to resolve the bare hostname name using the system resolver's * usual search rules and then apply the CNAME follow rules. * * Skip the lookup if a ProxyCommand is being used unless the user * has specifically requested canonicalisation for this case via * CanonicalizeHostname=always */ if (addrs == NULL && options.num_permitted_cnames != 0 && (option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) || options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)) { if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command), cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL) { /* Don't fatal proxied host names not in the DNS */ if (option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command)) cleanup_exit(255); /* logged in resolve_host */ } else check_follow_cname(&host, cname); } /* * If canonicalisation is enabled then re-parse the configuration * files as new stanzas may match. */ if (options.canonicalize_hostname != 0) { debug("Re-reading configuration after hostname " "canonicalisation"); free(options.hostname); options.hostname = xstrdup(host); process_config_files(host_arg, pw, 1); /* * Address resolution happens early with canonicalisation * enabled and the port number may have changed since, so * reset it in address list */ if (addrs != NULL && options.port > 0) set_addrinfo_port(addrs, options.port); } /* Fill configuration defaults. */ fill_default_options(&options); if (options.port == 0) options.port = default_ssh_port(); channel_set_af(options.address_family); /* Tidy and check options */ if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) lowercase(options.host_key_alias); if (options.proxy_command != NULL && strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0 && options.proxy_use_fdpass) fatal("ProxyCommand=- and ProxyUseFDPass are incompatible"); if (options.control_persist && options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) { debug("UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with ControlPersist; " "disabling"); options.update_hostkeys = 0; } #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN if (original_effective_uid != 0) options.use_privileged_port = 0; #endif /* reinit */ log_init(argv0, options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, !use_syslog); if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES || options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) tty_flag = 1; /* Allocate a tty by default if no command specified. */ if (buffer_len(&command) == 0) tty_flag = options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_NO; /* Force no tty */ if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_NO || muxclient_command != 0) tty_flag = 0; /* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */ if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || stdin_null_flag) && options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) { if (tty_flag) logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because " "stdin is not a terminal."); tty_flag = 0; } seed_rng(); if (options.user == NULL) options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1) fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); strlcpy(shorthost, thishost, sizeof(shorthost)); shorthost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0'; snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", options.port); /* Find canonic host name. */ if (strchr(host, '.') == 0) { struct addrinfo hints; struct addrinfo *ai = NULL; int errgai; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = options.address_family; hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; errgai = getaddrinfo(host, NULL, &hints, &ai); if (errgai == 0) { if (ai->ai_canonname != NULL) host = xstrdup(ai->ai_canonname); freeaddrinfo(ai); } } if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL || ssh_digest_update(md, thishost, strlen(thishost)) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(md, host, strlen(host)) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(md, portstr, strlen(portstr)) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(md, options.user, strlen(options.user)) < 0 || ssh_digest_final(md, conn_hash, sizeof(conn_hash)) < 0) fatal("%s: mux digest failed", __func__); ssh_digest_free(md); conn_hash_hex = tohex(conn_hash, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)); if (options.local_command != NULL) { debug3("expanding LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command); cp = options.local_command; options.local_command = percent_expand(cp, "C", conn_hash_hex, "L", shorthost, "d", pw->pw_dir, "h", host, "l", thishost, "n", host_arg, "p", portstr, "r", options.user, "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); debug3("expanded LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command); free(cp); } if (options.control_path != NULL) { cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.control_path, original_real_uid); free(options.control_path); options.control_path = percent_expand(cp, "C", conn_hash_hex, "L", shorthost, "h", host, "l", thishost, "n", host_arg, "p", portstr, "r", options.user, "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); free(cp); } free(conn_hash_hex); if (config_test) { dump_client_config(&options, host); exit(0); } if (muxclient_command != 0 && options.control_path == NULL) fatal("No ControlPath specified for \"-O\" command"); if (options.control_path != NULL) muxclient(options.control_path); /* * If hostname canonicalisation was not enabled, then we may not * have yet resolved the hostname. Do so now. */ if (addrs == NULL && options.proxy_command == NULL) { if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, 1, cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL) cleanup_exit(255); /* resolve_host logs the error */ } timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000; /* Open a connection to the remote host. */ if (ssh_connect(host, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port, options.address_family, options.connection_attempts, &timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive, options.use_privileged_port) != 0) exit(255); if (addrs != NULL) freeaddrinfo(addrs); packet_set_timeout(options.server_alive_interval, options.server_alive_count_max); if (timeout_ms > 0) debug3("timeout: %d ms remain after connect", timeout_ms); /* * If we successfully made the connection, load the host private key * in case we will need it later for combined rsa-rhosts * authentication. This must be done before releasing extra * privileges, because the file is only readable by root. * If we cannot access the private keys, load the public keys * instead and try to execute the ssh-keysign helper instead. */ sensitive_data.nkeys = 0; sensitive_data.keys = NULL; sensitive_data.external_keysign = 0; if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication || options.hostbased_authentication) { sensitive_data.nkeys = 9; sensitive_data.keys = xcalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys, sizeof(Key)); for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++) sensitive_data.keys[i] = NULL; PRIV_START; sensitive_data.keys[0] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1, _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_ECDSA, _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL); #endif sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_ED25519, _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, "", NULL); sensitive_data.keys[3] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_RSA, _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL); sensitive_data.keys[4] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_DSA, _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC sensitive_data.keys[5] = key_load_private_type(KEY_ECDSA, _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL); #endif sensitive_data.keys[6] = key_load_private_type(KEY_ED25519, _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL); sensitive_data.keys[7] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA, _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL); sensitive_data.keys[8] = key_load_private_type(KEY_DSA, _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL); PRIV_END; if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1 && sensitive_data.keys[0] == NULL && sensitive_data.keys[5] == NULL && sensitive_data.keys[6] == NULL && sensitive_data.keys[7] == NULL && sensitive_data.keys[8] == NULL) { #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_cert( _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE); #endif sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_cert( _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE); sensitive_data.keys[3] = key_load_cert( _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE); sensitive_data.keys[4] = key_load_cert( _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC sensitive_data.keys[5] = key_load_public( _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, NULL); #endif sensitive_data.keys[6] = key_load_public( _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, NULL); sensitive_data.keys[7] = key_load_public( _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, NULL); sensitive_data.keys[8] = key_load_public( _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, NULL); sensitive_data.external_keysign = 1; } } /* * Get rid of any extra privileges that we may have. We will no * longer need them. Also, extra privileges could make it very hard * to read identity files and other non-world-readable files from the * user's home directory if it happens to be on a NFS volume where * root is mapped to nobody. */ if (original_effective_uid == 0) { PRIV_START; permanently_set_uid(pw); } /* * Now that we are back to our own permissions, create ~/.ssh * directory if it doesn't already exist. */ if (config == NULL) { r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir, strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? "/" : "", _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR); if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf) && stat(buf, &st) < 0) { #ifdef WITH_SELINUX ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(buf); #endif if (mkdir(buf, 0700) < 0) error("Could not create directory '%.200s'.", buf); #ifdef WITH_SELINUX ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(NULL); #endif } } /* load options.identity_files */ load_public_identity_files(); /* Expand ~ in known host file names. */ tilde_expand_paths(options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles); tilde_expand_paths(options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles); signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */ signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); /* Log into the remote system. Never returns if the login fails. */ ssh_login(&sensitive_data, host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr, options.port, pw, timeout_ms); if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { verbose("Authenticated to %s ([%s]:%d).", host, get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port()); } else { verbose("Authenticated to %s (via proxy).", host); } /* We no longer need the private host keys. Clear them now. */ if (sensitive_data.nkeys != 0) { for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++) { if (sensitive_data.keys[i] != NULL) { /* Destroys contents safely */ debug3("clear hostkey %d", i); key_free(sensitive_data.keys[i]); sensitive_data.keys[i] = NULL; } } free(sensitive_data.keys); } for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { free(options.identity_files[i]); options.identity_files[i] = NULL; if (options.identity_keys[i]) { key_free(options.identity_keys[i]); options.identity_keys[i] = NULL; } } exit_status = compat20 ? ssh_session2() : ssh_session(); packet_close(); if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1) unlink(options.control_path); /* Kill ProxyCommand if it is running. */ ssh_kill_proxy_command(); return exit_status; } static void control_persist_detach(void) { pid_t pid; int devnull; debug("%s: backgrounding master process", __func__); /* * master (current process) into the background, and make the * foreground process a client of the backgrounded master. */ switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: fatal("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); case 0: /* Child: master process continues mainloop */ break; default: /* Parent: set up mux slave to connect to backgrounded master */ debug2("%s: background process is %ld", __func__, (long)pid); stdin_null_flag = ostdin_null_flag; options.request_tty = orequest_tty; tty_flag = otty_flag; close(muxserver_sock); muxserver_sock = -1; options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO; muxclient(options.control_path); /* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */ fatal("Failed to connect to new control master"); } if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { error("%s: open(\"/dev/null\"): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } else { if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) close(devnull); } daemon(1, 1); setproctitle("%s [mux]", options.control_path); } /* Do fork() after authentication. Used by "ssh -f" */ static void fork_postauth(void) { if (need_controlpersist_detach) control_persist_detach(); debug("forking to background"); fork_after_authentication_flag = 0; if (daemon(1, 1) < 0) fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); } /* Callback for remote forward global requests */ static void ssh_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct Forward *rfwd = (struct Forward *)ctxt; /* XXX verbose() on failure? */ debug("remote forward %s for: listen %s%s%d, connect %s:%d", type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure", rfwd->listen_path ? rfwd->listen_path : rfwd->listen_host ? rfwd->listen_host : "", (rfwd->listen_path || rfwd->listen_host) ? ":" : "", rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path : rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); if (rfwd->listen_path == NULL && rfwd->listen_port == 0) { if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) { rfwd->allocated_port = packet_get_int(); logit("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d", rfwd->allocated_port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle, rfwd->allocated_port); } else { channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle, -1); } } if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE) { if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) { if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL) fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed " "for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path); else fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed " "for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); } else { if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL) logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed " "for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path); else logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed " "for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); } } if (++remote_forward_confirms_received == options.num_remote_forwards) { debug("All remote forwarding requests processed"); if (fork_after_authentication_flag) fork_postauth(); } } static void client_cleanup_stdio_fwd(int id, void *arg) { debug("stdio forwarding: done"); cleanup_exit(0); } static void ssh_stdio_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg) { if (!success) fatal("stdio forwarding failed"); } static void ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(void) { Channel *c; int in, out; if (stdio_forward_host == NULL) return; if (!compat20) fatal("stdio forwarding require Protocol 2"); debug3("%s: %s:%d", __func__, stdio_forward_host, stdio_forward_port); if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) < 0 || (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) < 0) fatal("channel_connect_stdio_fwd: dup() in/out failed"); if ((c = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(stdio_forward_host, stdio_forward_port, in, out)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel_connect_stdio_fwd failed", __func__); channel_register_cleanup(c->self, client_cleanup_stdio_fwd, 0); channel_register_open_confirm(c->self, ssh_stdio_confirm, NULL); } static void ssh_init_forwarding(void) { int success = 0; int i; /* Initiate local TCP/IP port forwardings. */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { debug("Local connections to %.200s:%d forwarded to remote " "address %.200s:%d", (options.local_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ? options.local_forwards[i].listen_path : (options.local_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ? (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") : options.local_forwards[i].listen_host, options.local_forwards[i].listen_port, (options.local_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ? options.local_forwards[i].connect_path : options.local_forwards[i].connect_host, options.local_forwards[i].connect_port); success += channel_setup_local_fwd_listener( &options.local_forwards[i], &options.fwd_opts); } if (i > 0 && success != i && options.exit_on_forward_failure) fatal("Could not request local forwarding."); if (i > 0 && success == 0) error("Could not request local forwarding."); /* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { debug("Remote connections from %.200s:%d forwarded to " "local address %.200s:%d", (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ? options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path : (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ? "LOCALHOST" : options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host, options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port, (options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ? options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path : options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host, options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port); options.remote_forwards[i].handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding( &options.remote_forwards[i]); if (options.remote_forwards[i].handle < 0) { if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) fatal("Could not request remote forwarding."); else logit("Warning: Could not request remote " "forwarding."); } else { client_register_global_confirm(ssh_confirm_remote_forward, &options.remote_forwards[i]); } } /* Initiate tunnel forwarding. */ if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) { if (client_request_tun_fwd(options.tun_open, options.tun_local, options.tun_remote) == -1) { if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) fatal("Could not request tunnel forwarding."); else error("Could not request tunnel forwarding."); } } } static void check_agent_present(void) { int r; if (options.forward_agent) { /* Clear agent forwarding if we don't have an agent. */ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) != 0) { options.forward_agent = 0; if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT) debug("ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s", ssh_err(r)); } } } static int ssh_session(void) { int type; int interactive = 0; int have_tty = 0; struct winsize ws; char *cp; const char *display; /* Enable compression if requested. */ if (options.compression) { debug("Requesting compression at level %d.", options.compression_level); if (options.compression_level < 1 || options.compression_level > 9) fatal("Compression level must be from 1 (fast) to " "9 (slow, best)."); /* Send the request. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION); packet_put_int(options.compression_level); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); type = packet_read(); if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) packet_start_compression(options.compression_level); else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) logit("Warning: Remote host refused compression."); else packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for " "compression response."); } /* Allocate a pseudo tty if appropriate. */ if (tty_flag) { debug("Requesting pty."); /* Start the packet. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY); /* Store TERM in the packet. There is no limit on the length of the string. */ cp = getenv("TERM"); if (!cp) cp = ""; packet_put_cstring(cp); /* Store window size in the packet. */ if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0) memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws)); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel); /* Store tty modes in the packet. */ tty_make_modes(fileno(stdin), NULL); /* Send the packet, and wait for it to leave. */ packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Read response from the server. */ type = packet_read(); if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { interactive = 1; have_tty = 1; } else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) logit("Warning: Remote host failed or refused to " "allocate a pseudo tty."); else packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for pty " "request response."); } /* Request X11 forwarding if enabled and DISPLAY is set. */ display = getenv("DISPLAY"); + if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11) + debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set"); if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) { char *proto, *data; /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */ client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data); /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " "spoofing."); x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(0, display, proto, data, 0); /* Read response from the server. */ type = packet_read(); if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { interactive = 1; } else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) { logit("Warning: Remote host denied X11 forwarding."); } else { packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for X11 " "forwarding"); } } /* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */ packet_set_interactive(interactive, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); /* Request authentication agent forwarding if appropriate. */ check_agent_present(); if (options.forward_agent) { debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding."); auth_request_forwarding(); /* Read response from the server. */ type = packet_read(); packet_check_eom(); if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) logit("Warning: Remote host denied authentication agent forwarding."); } /* Initiate port forwardings. */ ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(); ssh_init_forwarding(); /* Execute a local command */ if (options.local_command != NULL && options.permit_local_command) ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command); /* * If requested and we are not interested in replies to remote * forwarding requests, then let ssh continue in the background. */ if (fork_after_authentication_flag) { if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && options.num_remote_forwards > 0) { debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward " "confirmation received"); } else fork_postauth(); } /* * If a command was specified on the command line, execute the * command now. Otherwise request the server to start a shell. */ if (buffer_len(&command) > 0) { int len = buffer_len(&command); if (len > 900) len = 900; debug("Sending command: %.*s", len, (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&command)); packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD); packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&command), buffer_len(&command)); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } else { debug("Requesting shell."); packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } /* Enter the interactive session. */ return client_loop(have_tty, tty_flag ? options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, 0); } /* request pty/x11/agent/tcpfwd/shell for channel */ static void ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success, void *arg) { extern char **environ; const char *display; int interactive = tty_flag; if (!success) return; /* No need for error message, channels code sens one */ display = getenv("DISPLAY"); + if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11) + debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set"); if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) { char *proto, *data; /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */ client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data); /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " "spoofing."); x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto, data, 1); client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN); /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */ interactive = 1; } check_agent_present(); if (options.forward_agent) { debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding."); channel_request_start(id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0); packet_send(); } /* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */ packet_set_interactive(interactive, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); client_session2_setup(id, tty_flag, subsystem_flag, getenv("TERM"), NULL, fileno(stdin), &command, environ); } /* open new channel for a session */ static int ssh_session2_open(void) { Channel *c; int window, packetmax, in, out, err; if (stdin_null_flag) { in = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY); } else { in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); } out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO); err = dup(STDERR_FILENO); if (in < 0 || out < 0 || err < 0) fatal("dup() in/out/err failed"); /* enable nonblocking unless tty */ if (!isatty(in)) set_nonblock(in); if (!isatty(out)) set_nonblock(out); if (!isatty(err)) set_nonblock(err); window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT; packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT; if (tty_flag) { window >>= 1; packetmax >>= 1; } c = channel_new( "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err, window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", /*nonblock*/0); debug3("ssh_session2_open: channel_new: %d", c->self); channel_send_open(c->self); if (!no_shell_flag) channel_register_open_confirm(c->self, ssh_session2_setup, NULL); return c->self; } static int ssh_session2(void) { int id = -1; /* XXX should be pre-session */ if (!options.control_persist) ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(); ssh_init_forwarding(); /* Start listening for multiplex clients */ muxserver_listen(); /* * If we are in control persist mode and have a working mux listen * socket, then prepare to background ourselves and have a foreground * client attach as a control slave. * NB. we must save copies of the flags that we override for * the backgrounding, since we defer attachment of the slave until * after the connection is fully established (in particular, * async rfwd replies have been received for ExitOnForwardFailure). */ if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock != -1) { ostdin_null_flag = stdin_null_flag; ono_shell_flag = no_shell_flag; orequest_tty = options.request_tty; otty_flag = tty_flag; stdin_null_flag = 1; no_shell_flag = 1; tty_flag = 0; if (!fork_after_authentication_flag) need_controlpersist_detach = 1; fork_after_authentication_flag = 1; } /* * ControlPersist mux listen socket setup failed, attempt the * stdio forward setup that we skipped earlier. */ if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock == -1) ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(); if (!no_shell_flag || (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN)) id = ssh_session2_open(); else { packet_set_interactive( options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); } /* If we don't expect to open a new session, then disallow it */ if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO && (datafellows & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH)) { debug("Requesting no-more-sessions@openssh.com"); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring("no-more-sessions@openssh.com"); packet_put_char(0); packet_send(); } /* Execute a local command */ if (options.local_command != NULL && options.permit_local_command) ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command); /* * If requested and we are not interested in replies to remote * forwarding requests, then let ssh continue in the background. */ if (fork_after_authentication_flag) { if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && options.num_remote_forwards > 0) { debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward " "confirmation received"); } else fork_postauth(); } return client_loop(tty_flag, tty_flag ? options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id); } static void load_public_identity_files(void) { char *filename, *cp, thishost[NI_MAXHOST]; char *pwdir = NULL, *pwname = NULL; int i = 0; Key *public; struct passwd *pw; u_int n_ids; char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; Key *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 Key **keys; int nkeys; #endif /* PKCS11 */ n_ids = 0; memset(identity_files, 0, sizeof(identity_files)); memset(identity_keys, 0, sizeof(identity_keys)); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL && options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES && (pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode) == 0) && (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(options.pkcs11_provider, NULL, &keys)) > 0) { for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) { key_free(keys[i]); continue; } identity_keys[n_ids] = keys[i]; identity_files[n_ids] = xstrdup(options.pkcs11_provider); /* XXX */ n_ids++; } free(keys); } #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ if ((pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid)) == NULL) fatal("load_public_identity_files: getpwuid failed"); pwname = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); pwdir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir); if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1) fatal("load_public_identity_files: gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES || strcasecmp(options.identity_files[i], "none") == 0) { free(options.identity_files[i]); continue; } cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i], original_real_uid); filename = percent_expand(cp, "d", pwdir, "u", pwname, "l", thishost, "h", host, "r", options.user, (char *)NULL); free(cp); public = key_load_public(filename, NULL); debug("identity file %s type %d", filename, public ? public->type : -1); free(options.identity_files[i]); identity_files[n_ids] = filename; identity_keys[n_ids] = public; if (++n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) continue; /* Try to add the certificate variant too */ xasprintf(&cp, "%s-cert", filename); public = key_load_public(cp, NULL); debug("identity file %s type %d", cp, public ? public->type : -1); if (public == NULL) { free(cp); continue; } if (!key_is_cert(public)) { debug("%s: key %s type %s is not a certificate", __func__, cp, key_type(public)); key_free(public); free(cp); continue; } identity_keys[n_ids] = public; /* point to the original path, most likely the private key */ identity_files[n_ids] = xstrdup(filename); n_ids++; } options.num_identity_files = n_ids; memcpy(options.identity_files, identity_files, sizeof(identity_files)); memcpy(options.identity_keys, identity_keys, sizeof(identity_keys)); explicit_bzero(pwname, strlen(pwname)); free(pwname); explicit_bzero(pwdir, strlen(pwdir)); free(pwdir); } static void main_sigchld_handler(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; pid_t pid; int status; while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 || (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR)) ; signal(sig, main_sigchld_handler); errno = save_errno; } Index: head/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.0 =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.0 (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.0 (revision 294336) @@ -1,981 +1,985 @@ SSH_CONFIG(5) File Formats Manual SSH_CONFIG(5) NAME ssh_config M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SSH client configuration files SYNOPSIS ~/.ssh/config /etc/ssh/ssh_config DESCRIPTION ssh(1) obtains configuration data from the following sources in the following order: 1. command-line options 2. user's configuration file (~/.ssh/config) 3. system-wide configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config) For each parameter, the first obtained value will be used. The configuration files contain sections separated by M-bM-^@M-^\HostM-bM-^@M-^] specifications, and that section is only applied for hosts that match one of the patterns given in the specification. The matched host name is usually the one given on the command line (see the CanonicalizeHostname option for exceptions.) Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more host- specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the file, and general defaults at the end. The configuration file has the following format: Empty lines and lines starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are comments. Otherwise a line is of the format M-bM-^@M-^\keyword argumentsM-bM-^@M-^]. Configuration options may be separated by whitespace or optional whitespace and exactly one M-bM-^@M-^X=M-bM-^@M-^Y; the latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace when specifying configuration options using the ssh, scp, and sftp -o option. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes (") in order to represent arguments containing spaces. The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): Host Restricts the following declarations (up to the next Host or Match keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns given after the keyword. If more than one pattern is provided, they should be separated by whitespace. A single M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y as a pattern can be used to provide global defaults for all hosts. The host is usually the hostname argument given on the command line (see the CanonicalizeHostname option for exceptions.) A pattern entry may be negated by prefixing it with an exclamation mark (M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y). If a negated entry is matched, then the Host entry is ignored, regardless of whether any other patterns on the line match. Negated matches are therefore useful to provide exceptions for wildcard matches. See PATTERNS for more information on patterns. Match Restricts the following declarations (up to the next Host or Match keyword) to be used only when the conditions following the Match keyword are satisfied. Match conditions are specified using one or more critera or the single token all which always matches. The available criteria keywords are: canonical, exec, host, originalhost, user, and localuser. The all criteria must appear alone or immediately after canonical. Other criteria may be combined arbitrarily. All criteria but all and canonical require an argument. Criteria may be negated by prepending an exclamation mark (M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y). - The canonical keywork matches only when the configuration file is + The canonical keyword matches only when the configuration file is being re-parsed after hostname canonicalization (see the CanonicalizeHostname option.) This may be useful to specify conditions that work with canonical host names only. The exec keyword executes the specified command under the user's shell. If the command returns a zero exit status then the condition is considered true. Commands containing whitespace characters must be quoted. The following character sequences in the command will be expanded prior to execution: M-bM-^@M-^X%LM-bM-^@M-^Y will be substituted by the first component of the local host name, M-bM-^@M-^X%lM-bM-^@M-^Y will be substituted by the local host name (including any domain name), M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y will be substituted by the target host name, M-bM-^@M-^X%nM-bM-^@M-^Y will be substituted by the original target host name specified on the command-line, M-bM-^@M-^X%pM-bM-^@M-^Y the destination port, M-bM-^@M-^X%rM-bM-^@M-^Y by the remote login username, and M-bM-^@M-^X%uM-bM-^@M-^Y by the username of the user running ssh(1). The other keywords' criteria must be single entries or comma- separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the PATTERNS section. The criteria for the host keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any substitution by the Hostname or CanonicalizeHostname options. The originalhost keyword matches against the hostname as it was specified on the command-line. The user keyword matches against the target username on the remote host. The localuser keyword matches against the name of the local user running ssh(1) (this keyword may be useful in system-wide ssh_config files). AddressFamily Specifies which address family to use when connecting. Valid arguments are M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\inetM-bM-^@M-^] (use IPv4 only), or M-bM-^@M-^\inet6M-bM-^@M-^] (use IPv6 only). BatchMode If set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], passphrase/password querying will be disabled. This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user is present to supply the password. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. BindAddress Use the specified address on the local machine as the source address of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one address. Note that this option does not work if UsePrivilegedPort is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. CanonicalDomains When CanonicalizeHostname is enabled, this option specifies the list of domain suffixes in which to search for the specified destination host. CanonicalizeFallbackLocal Specifies whether to fail with an error when hostname canonicalization fails. The default, M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], will attempt to look up the unqualified hostname using the system resolver's search rules. A value of M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] will cause ssh(1) to fail instantly if CanonicalizeHostname is enabled and the target hostname cannot be found in any of the domains specified by CanonicalDomains. CanonicalizeHostname Controls whether explicit hostname canonicalization is performed. The default, M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], is not to perform any name rewriting and let the system resolver handle all hostname lookups. If set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] then, for connections that do not use a ProxyCommand, ssh(1) will attempt to canonicalize the hostname specified on the command line using the CanonicalDomains suffixes and CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs rules. If CanonicalizeHostname is set to M-bM-^@M-^\alwaysM-bM-^@M-^], then canonicalization is applied to proxied connections too. If this option is enabled, then the configuration files are processed again using the new target name to pick up any new configuration in matching Host and Match stanzas. CanonicalizeMaxDots Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname before canonicalization is disabled. The default, M-bM-^@M-^\1M-bM-^@M-^], allows a single dot (i.e. hostname.subdomain). CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs Specifies rules to determine whether CNAMEs should be followed when canonicalizing hostnames. The rules consist of one or more arguments of source_domain_list:target_domain_list, where source_domain_list is a pattern-list of domains that may follow CNAMEs in canonicalization, and target_domain_list is a pattern- list of domains that they may resolve to. For example, M-bM-^@M-^\*.a.example.com:*.b.example.com,*.c.example.comM-bM-^@M-^] will allow hostnames matching M-bM-^@M-^\*.a.example.comM-bM-^@M-^] to be canonicalized to names in the M-bM-^@M-^\*.b.example.comM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\*.c.example.comM-bM-^@M-^] domains. ChallengeResponseAuthentication Specifies whether to use challenge-response authentication. The argument to this keyword must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. CheckHostIP If this flag is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], ssh(1) will additionally check the host IP address in the known_hosts file. This allows ssh to - detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing. If the option - is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], the check will not be executed. The default is - M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. + detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing and will add + addresses of destination hosts to ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the + process, regardless of the setting of StrictHostKeyChecking. If + the option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], the check will not be executed. The + default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. Cipher Specifies the cipher to use for encrypting the session in protocol version 1. Currently, M-bM-^@M-^\blowfishM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\3desM-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\desM-bM-^@M-^] are supported. des is only supported in the ssh(1) client for interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations that do not support the 3des cipher. Its use is strongly discouraged due to cryptographic weaknesses. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\3desM-bM-^@M-^]. Ciphers Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2 in order of preference. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. The supported ciphers are: 3des-cbc aes128-cbc aes192-cbc aes256-cbc aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr aes128-gcm@openssh.com aes256-gcm@openssh.com arcfour arcfour128 arcfour256 blowfish-cbc cast128-cbc chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com The default is: aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com, chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, arcfour256,arcfour128, aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc, aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,arcfour The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using the -Q option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\cipherM-bM-^@M-^]. ClearAllForwardings Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings specified in the configuration files or on the command line be cleared. This option is primarily useful when used from the ssh(1) command line to clear port forwardings set in configuration files, and is automatically set by scp(1) and sftp(1). The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. Compression Specifies whether to use compression. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. CompressionLevel Specifies the compression level to use if compression is enabled. The argument must be an integer from 1 (fast) to 9 (slow, best). The default level is 6, which is good for most applications. The meaning of the values is the same as in gzip(1). Note that this option applies to protocol version 1 only. ConnectionAttempts Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before exiting. The argument must be an integer. This may be useful in scripts if the connection sometimes fails. The default is 1. ConnectTimeout Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout. This value is used only when the target is down or really unreachable, not when it refuses the connection. ControlMaster Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network connection. When set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], ssh(1) will listen for connections on a control socket specified using the ControlPath argument. Additional sessions can connect to this socket using the same ControlPath with ControlMaster set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] (the default). These sessions will try to reuse the master instance's network connection rather than initiating new ones, but will fall back to connecting normally if the control socket does not exist, or is not listening. Setting this to M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^] will cause ssh to listen for control - connections, but require confirmation using the SSH_ASKPASS - program before they are accepted (see ssh-add(1) for details). - If the ControlPath cannot be opened, ssh will continue without + connections, but require confirmation using ssh-askpass(1). If + the ControlPath cannot be opened, ssh will continue without connecting to a master instance. X11 and ssh-agent(1) forwarding is supported over these multiplexed connections, however the display and agent forwarded will be the one belonging to the master connection i.e. it is not possible to forward multiple displays or agents. Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try to use a master connection but fall back to creating a new one if one does not already exist. These options are: M-bM-^@M-^\autoM-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\autoaskM-bM-^@M-^]. The latter requires confirmation like the M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^] option. ControlPath Specify the path to the control socket used for connection sharing as described in the ControlMaster section above or the string M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to disable connection sharing. In the path, M-bM-^@M-^X%LM-bM-^@M-^Y will be substituted by the first component of the local host name, M-bM-^@M-^X%lM-bM-^@M-^Y will be substituted by the local host name (including any domain name), M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y will be substituted by the target host name, M-bM-^@M-^X%nM-bM-^@M-^Y will be substituted by the original target host name specified on the command line, M-bM-^@M-^X%pM-bM-^@M-^Y the destination port, M-bM-^@M-^X%rM-bM-^@M-^Y by the remote login username, M-bM-^@M-^X%uM-bM-^@M-^Y by the username of the user running ssh(1), and M-bM-^@M-^X%CM-bM-^@M-^Y by a hash of the concatenation: %l%h%p%r. It is recommended that any ControlPath used for opportunistic connection sharing include at least %h, %p, and %r (or alternatively %C) and be placed in a directory that is not writable by other users. This ensures that shared connections are uniquely identified. ControlPersist When used in conjunction with ControlMaster, specifies that the master connection should remain open in the background (waiting for future client connections) after the initial client connection has been closed. If set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], then the master connection will not be placed into the background, and will close as soon as the initial client connection is closed. If set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\0M-bM-^@M-^], then the master connection will remain in the background indefinitely (until killed or closed via a mechanism such as the ssh(1) M-bM-^@M-^\-O exitM-bM-^@M-^] option). If set to a time in seconds, or a time in any of the formats documented in sshd_config(5), then the backgrounded master connection will automatically terminate after it has remained idle (with no client connections) for the specified time. DynamicForward Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the remote machine. The argument must be [bind_address:]port. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The bind_address of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and ssh(1) will act as a SOCKS server. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. EnableSSHKeysign Setting this option to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] in the global client configuration file /etc/ssh/ssh_config enables the use of the helper program ssh-keysign(8) during HostbasedAuthentication. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section. See ssh-keysign(8) for more information. EscapeChar Sets the escape character (default: M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y). The escape character can also be set on the command line. The argument should be a single character, M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y followed by a letter, or M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to disable the escape character entirely (making the connection transparent for binary data). ExitOnForwardFailure Specifies whether ssh(1) should terminate the connection if it cannot set up all requested dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote port forwardings. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. FingerprintHash Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. ForwardAgent Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any) will be forwarded to the remote machine. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent. ForwardX11 Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically redirected over the secure channel and DISPLAY set. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the user's X11 authorization database) can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring if the ForwardX11Trusted option is also enabled. ForwardX11Timeout Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding using the format described in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5). X11 connections received by ssh(1) after this time will be refused. The default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty minutes has elapsed. ForwardX11Trusted If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display. If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11 clients. Furthermore, the xauth(1) token used for the session will be set to expire after 20 minutes. Remote clients will be refused access after this time. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients. GatewayPorts Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local forwarded ports. By default, ssh(1) binds local port forwardings to the loopback address. This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. GatewayPorts can be used to specify that ssh should bind local port forwardings to the wildcard address, thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. GlobalKnownHostsFile Specifies one or more files to use for the global host key database, separated by whitespace. The default is /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts, /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2. GSSAPIAuthentication Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. GSSAPIDelegateCredentials Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. HashKnownHosts Indicates that ssh(1) should hash host names and addresses when they are added to ~/.ssh/known_hosts. These hashed names may be used normally by ssh(1) and sshd(8), but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files will not be converted automatically, but may be manually hashed using ssh-keygen(1). HostbasedAuthentication Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key authentication. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. This option applies to protocol version 2 only and is similar to RhostsRSAAuthentication. HostbasedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be used for hostbased authentication as a comma-separated pattern list. The default M-bM-^@M-^\*M-bM-^@M-^] will allow all key types. The -Q option of ssh(1) may be used to list supported key types. HostKeyAlgorithms Specifies the protocol version 2 host key algorithms that the client wants to use in order of preference. The default for this option is: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default is modified to prefer their algorithms. The list of available key types may also be obtained using the -Q option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\keyM-bM-^@M-^]. HostKeyAlias Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the real host name when looking up or saving the host key in the host key database files. This option is useful for tunneling SSH connections or for multiple servers running on a single host. HostName Specifies the real host name to log into. This can be used to specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts. If the hostname contains the character sequence M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y, then this will be replaced with the host name specified on the command line (this is useful for manipulating unqualified names). The character sequence M-bM-^@M-^X%%M-bM-^@M-^Y will be replaced by a single M-bM-^@M-^X%M-bM-^@M-^Y character, which may be used when specifying IPv6 link-local addresses. The default is the name given on the command line. Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in HostName specifications). IdentitiesOnly Specifies that ssh(1) should only use the authentication identity files configured in the ssh_config files, even if ssh-agent(1) or a PKCS11Provider offers more identities. The argument to this keyword must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. This option is intended for situations where ssh-agent offers many different identities. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. IdentityFile Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity is read. The default is ~/.ssh/identity for protocol version 1, and ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and ~/.ssh/id_rsa for protocol version 2. Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent will be used for authentication unless IdentitiesOnly is set. ssh(1) will try to load certificate information from the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to the path of a specified IdentityFile. The file name may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory or one of the following escape characters: M-bM-^@M-^X%dM-bM-^@M-^Y (local user's home directory), M-bM-^@M-^X%uM-bM-^@M-^Y (local user name), M-bM-^@M-^X%lM-bM-^@M-^Y (local host name), M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote host name) or M-bM-^@M-^X%rM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote user name). It is possible to have multiple identity files specified in configuration files; all these identities will be tried in sequence. Multiple IdentityFile directives will add to the list of identities tried (this behaviour differs from that of other configuration directives). IdentityFile may be used in conjunction with IdentitiesOnly to select which identities in an agent are offered during authentication. IgnoreUnknown Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are encountered in configuration parsing. This may be used to suppress errors if ssh_config contains options that are unrecognised by ssh(1). It is recommended that IgnoreUnknown be listed early in the configuration file as it will not be applied to unknown options that appear before it. IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for connections. Accepted values are M-bM-^@M-^\af11M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af12M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af13M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af21M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af22M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af23M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af31M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af32M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af33M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af41M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af42M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af43M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs0M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs1M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs2M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs3M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs4M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs5M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs6M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs7M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\efM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\lowdelayM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\throughputM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\reliabilityM-bM-^@M-^], or a numeric value. This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\lowdelayM-bM-^@M-^] for interactive sessions and M-bM-^@M-^\throughputM-bM-^@M-^] for non-interactive sessions. KbdInteractiveAuthentication Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication. The argument to this keyword must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. KbdInteractiveDevices Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive authentication. Multiple method names must be comma-separated. The default is to use the server specified list. The methods available vary depending on what the server supports. For an OpenSSH server, it may be zero or more of: M-bM-^@M-^\bsdauthM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\pamM-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\skeyM-bM-^@M-^]. KexAlgorithms Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. The default is: curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, - diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1, + diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using the -Q option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\kexM-bM-^@M-^]. LocalCommand Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully connecting to the server. The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's shell. The following escape character substitutions will be performed: M-bM-^@M-^X%dM-bM-^@M-^Y (local user's home directory), M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote host name), M-bM-^@M-^X%lM-bM-^@M-^Y (local host name), M-bM-^@M-^X%nM-bM-^@M-^Y (host name as provided on the command line), M-bM-^@M-^X%pM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote port), M-bM-^@M-^X%rM-bM-^@M-^Y (remote user name) or M-bM-^@M-^X%uM-bM-^@M-^Y (local user name) or M-bM-^@M-^X%CM-bM-^@M-^Y by a hash of the concatenation: %l%h%p%r. The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the session of the ssh(1) that spawned it. It should not be used for interactive commands. This directive is ignored unless PermitLocalCommand has been enabled. LocalForward Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote machine. The first argument must be [bind_address:]port and the second argument must be host:hostport. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The bind_address of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. LogLevel Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from ssh(1). The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO. DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output. MACs Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms in order of preference. The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2 for data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. The algorithms that contain M-bM-^@M-^\-etmM-bM-^@M-^] calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and their use recommended. The default is: umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512, hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com,hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com, hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,hmac-ripemd160, hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96 The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using the -Q option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\macM-bM-^@M-^]. NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost This option can be used if the home directory is shared across machines. In this case localhost will refer to a different machine on each of the machines and the user will get many warnings about changed host keys. However, this option disables host authentication for localhost. The argument to this keyword must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is to check the host key for localhost. NumberOfPasswordPrompts Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up. The argument to this keyword must be an integer. The default is 3. PasswordAuthentication Specifies whether to use password authentication. The argument to this keyword must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. PermitLocalCommand Allow local command execution via the LocalCommand option or using the !command escape sequence in ssh(1). The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. PKCS11Provider Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use. The argument to this keyword is the PKCS#11 shared library ssh(1) should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's private RSA key. Port Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host. The default is 22. PreferredAuthentications Specifies the order in which the client should try protocol 2 authentication methods. This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g. keyboard-interactive) over another method (e.g. password). The default is: gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey, keyboard-interactive,password Protocol Specifies the protocol versions ssh(1) should support in order of preference. The possible values are M-bM-^@M-^X1M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X2M-bM-^@M-^Y. Multiple versions must be comma-separated. When this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\2,1M-bM-^@M-^] ssh will try version 2 and fall back to version 1 if version 2 is not available. The default is M-bM-^@M-^X2M-bM-^@M-^Y. ProxyCommand Specifies the command to use to connect to the server. The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed using the user's shell M-bM-^@M-^XexecM-bM-^@M-^Y directive to avoid a lingering shell process. In the command string, any occurrence of M-bM-^@M-^X%hM-bM-^@M-^Y will be substituted by the host name to connect, M-bM-^@M-^X%pM-bM-^@M-^Y by the port, and M-bM-^@M-^X%rM-bM-^@M-^Y by the remote user name. The command can be basically anything, and should read from its standard input and write to its standard output. It should eventually connect an sshd(8) server running on some machine, or execute sshd -i somewhere. Host key management will be done using the HostName of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by the user). Setting the command to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] disables this option entirely. Note that CheckHostIP is not available for connects with a proxy command. This directive is useful in conjunction with nc(1) and its proxy support. For example, the following directive would connect via an HTTP proxy at 192.0.2.0: ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p ProxyUseFdpass Specifies that ProxyCommand will pass a connected file descriptor back to ssh(1) instead of continuing to execute and pass data. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. PubkeyAuthentication Specifies whether to try public key authentication. The argument to this keyword must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. RekeyLimit Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of M-bM-^@M-^XKM-bM-^@M-^Y, M-bM-^@M-^XMM-bM-^@M-^Y, or M-bM-^@M-^XGM-bM-^@M-^Y to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between M-bM-^@M-^X1GM-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X4GM-bM-^@M-^Y, depending on the cipher. The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units documented in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5). The default value for RekeyLimit is M-bM-^@M-^\default noneM-bM-^@M-^], which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. RemoteForward Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over the secure channel to the specified host and port from the local machine. The first argument must be [bind_address:]port and the second argument must be host:hostport. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on the remote machine. If the port argument is M-bM-^@M-^X0M-bM-^@M-^Y, the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time. If the bind_address is not specified, the default is to only bind to loopback addresses. If the bind_address is M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y or an empty string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all interfaces. Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see sshd_config(5)). RequestTTY Specifies whether to request a pseudo-tty for the session. The argument may be one of: M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] (never request a TTY), M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (always request a TTY when standard input is a TTY), M-bM-^@M-^\forceM-bM-^@M-^] (always request a TTY) or M-bM-^@M-^\autoM-bM-^@M-^] (request a TTY when opening a login session). This option mirrors the -t and -T flags for ssh(1). RevokedHostKeys Specifies revoked host public keys. Keys listed in this file will be refused for host authentication. Note that if this file does not exist or is not readable, then host authentication will be refused for all hosts. Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by ssh-keygen(1). For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in ssh-keygen(1). RhostsRSAAuthentication Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with RSA host authentication. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. This option applies to protocol version 1 only and requires ssh(1) to be setuid root. RSAAuthentication Specifies whether to try RSA authentication. The argument to this keyword must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. RSA authentication will only be attempted if the identity file exists, or an authentication agent is running. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. Note that this option applies to protocol version 1 only. SendEnv Specifies what variables from the local environ(7) should be sent to the server. Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2. The server must also support it, and the server - must be configured to accept these environment variables. Refer - to AcceptEnv in sshd_config(5) for how to configure the server. - Variables are specified by name, which may contain wildcard - characters. Multiple environment variables may be separated by - whitespace or spread across multiple SendEnv directives. The - default is not to send any environment variables. + must be configured to accept these environment variables. Note + that the TERM environment variable is always sent whenever a + pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol. + Refer to AcceptEnv in sshd_config(5) for how to configure the + server. Variables are specified by name, which may contain + wildcard characters. Multiple environment variables may be + separated by whitespace or spread across multiple SendEnv + directives. The default is not to send any environment + variables. See PATTERNS for more information on patterns. ServerAliveCountMax Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be sent without ssh(1) receiving any messages back from the server. If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are being sent, ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the session. It is important to note that the use of server alive messages is very different from TCPKeepAlive (below). The server alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option enabled by TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The server alive mechanism is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive. The default value is 3. If, for example, ServerAliveInterval (see below) is set to 15 and ServerAliveCountMax is left at the default, if the server becomes unresponsive, ssh will disconnect after approximately 45 seconds. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. ServerAliveInterval Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received from the server, ssh(1) will send a message through the encrypted channel to request a response from the server. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. StreamLocalBindMask Sets the octal file creation mode mask (umask) used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is readable and writable only by the owner. Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain socket files. StreamLocalBindUnlink Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one. If the socket file already exists and StreamLocalBindUnlink is not enabled, ssh will be unable to forward the port to the Unix- domain socket file. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. StrictHostKeyChecking If this flag is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], ssh(1) will never automatically add host keys to the ~/.ssh/known_hosts file, and refuses to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. This provides maximum protection against trojan horse attacks, though it can be annoying when the /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts file is poorly maintained or when connections to new hosts are frequently made. This option forces the user to manually add all new hosts. If this flag is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user known hosts files. If this flag is set to M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^], new host keys will be added to the user known host files only after the user has confirmed that is what they really want to do, and ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. The host keys of known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^]. TCPKeepAlive Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However, this means that connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people find it annoying. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the client will notice if the network goes down or the remote host dies. This is important in scripts, and many users want it too. To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. Tunnel Request tun(4) device forwarding between the client and the server. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\point-to-pointM-bM-^@M-^] (layer 3), M-bM-^@M-^\ethernetM-bM-^@M-^] (layer 2), or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. Specifying M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] requests the default tunnel mode, which is M-bM-^@M-^\point-to-pointM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. TunnelDevice Specifies the tun(4) devices to open on the client (local_tun) and the server (remote_tun). The argument must be local_tun[:remote_tun]. The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^], which uses the next available tunnel device. If remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\any:anyM-bM-^@M-^]. UpdateHostKeys Specifies whether ssh(1) should accept notifications of additional hostkeys from the server sent after authentication has completed and add them to UserKnownHostsFile. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] (the default) or M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^]. Enabling this option allows learning alternate hostkeys for a server and supports graceful key rotation by allowing a server to send replacement public keys before old ones are removed. Additional hostkeys are only accepted if the key used to authenticate the host was already trusted or explicity accepted by the user. If UpdateHostKeys is set to M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^], then the user is asked to confirm the modifications to the known_hosts file. Confirmation is currently incompatible with ControlPersist, and will be disabled if it is enabled. Presently, only sshd(8) from OpenSSH 6.8 and greater support the M-bM-^@M-^\hostkeys@openssh.comM-bM-^@M-^] protocol extension used to inform the client of all the server's hostkeys. UsePrivilegedPort Specifies whether to use a privileged port for outgoing connections. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. If set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], ssh(1) must be setuid root. Note that this option must be set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] for RhostsRSAAuthentication with older servers. User Specifies the user to log in as. This can be useful when a different user name is used on different machines. This saves the trouble of having to remember to give the user name on the command line. UserKnownHostsFile Specifies one or more files to use for the user host key database, separated by whitespace. The default is ~/.ssh/known_hosts, ~/.ssh/known_hosts2. VerifyHostKeyDNS Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP resource records. If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], the client will implicitly trust keys that match a secure fingerprint from DNS. Insecure fingerprints will be handled as if this option was set to M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^]. If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^], information on fingerprint match will be displayed, but the user will still need to confirm new host keys according to the StrictHostKeyChecking option. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\askM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. See also VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1). VisualHostKey If this flag is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], an ASCII art representation of the remote host key fingerprint is printed in addition to the fingerprint string at login and for unknown host keys. If this flag is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], no fingerprint strings are printed at login and only the fingerprint string will be printed for unknown host keys. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. XAuthLocation Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program. The default is /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth. PATTERNS A pattern consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters, M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y (a wildcard that matches zero or more characters), or M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y (a wildcard that matches exactly one character). For example, to specify a set of declarations for any host in the M-bM-^@M-^\.co.ukM-bM-^@M-^] set of domains, the following pattern could be used: Host *.co.uk The following pattern would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network range: Host 192.168.0.? A pattern-list is a comma-separated list of patterns. Patterns within pattern-lists may be negated by preceding them with an exclamation mark (M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y). For example, to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an organization except from the M-bM-^@M-^\dialupM-bM-^@M-^] pool, the following entry (in authorized_keys) could be used: from="!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com" FILES ~/.ssh/config This is the per-user configuration file. The format of this file is described above. This file is used by the SSH client. Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions: read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. /etc/ssh/ssh_config Systemwide configuration file. This file provides defaults for those values that are not specified in the user's configuration file, and for those users who do not have a configuration file. This file must be world-readable. SEE ALSO ssh(1) AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. -OpenBSD 5.7 February 20, 2015 OpenBSD 5.7 +OpenBSD 5.7 June 2, 2015 OpenBSD 5.7 Index: head/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/ssh_config.5 (revision 294336) @@ -1,1681 +1,1686 @@ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.205 2015/02/20 22:17:21 djm Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.211 2015/06/02 09:10:40 djm Exp $ .\" $FreeBSD$ -.Dd $Mdocdate: February 20 2015 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: June 2 2015 $ .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh_config .Nd OpenSSH SSH client configuration files .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ~/.ssh/config .Nm /etc/ssh/ssh_config .Sh DESCRIPTION .Xr ssh 1 obtains configuration data from the following sources in the following order: .Pp .Bl -enum -offset indent -compact .It command-line options .It user's configuration file .Pq Pa ~/.ssh/config .It system-wide configuration file .Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config .El .Pp For each parameter, the first obtained value will be used. The configuration files contain sections separated by .Dq Host specifications, and that section is only applied for hosts that match one of the patterns given in the specification. The matched host name is usually the one given on the command line (see the .Cm CanonicalizeHostname option for exceptions.) .Pp Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the file, and general defaults at the end. .Pp The configuration file has the following format: .Pp Empty lines and lines starting with .Ql # are comments. Otherwise a line is of the format .Dq keyword arguments . Configuration options may be separated by whitespace or optional whitespace and exactly one .Ql = ; the latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace when specifying configuration options using the .Nm ssh , .Nm scp , and .Nm sftp .Fl o option. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes .Pq \&" in order to represent arguments containing spaces. .Pp The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm Host Restricts the following declarations (up to the next .Cm Host or .Cm Match keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns given after the keyword. If more than one pattern is provided, they should be separated by whitespace. A single .Ql * as a pattern can be used to provide global defaults for all hosts. The host is usually the .Ar hostname argument given on the command line (see the .Cm CanonicalizeHostname option for exceptions.) .Pp A pattern entry may be negated by prefixing it with an exclamation mark .Pq Sq !\& . If a negated entry is matched, then the .Cm Host entry is ignored, regardless of whether any other patterns on the line match. Negated matches are therefore useful to provide exceptions for wildcard matches. .Pp See .Sx PATTERNS for more information on patterns. .It Cm Match Restricts the following declarations (up to the next .Cm Host or .Cm Match keyword) to be used only when the conditions following the .Cm Match keyword are satisfied. Match conditions are specified using one or more critera or the single token .Cm all which always matches. The available criteria keywords are: .Cm canonical , .Cm exec , .Cm host , .Cm originalhost , .Cm user , and .Cm localuser . The .Cm all criteria must appear alone or immediately after .Cm canonical . Other criteria may be combined arbitrarily. All criteria but .Cm all and .Cm canonical require an argument. Criteria may be negated by prepending an exclamation mark .Pq Sq !\& . .Pp The .Cm canonical -keywork matches only when the configuration file is being re-parsed +keyword matches only when the configuration file is being re-parsed after hostname canonicalization (see the .Cm CanonicalizeHostname option.) This may be useful to specify conditions that work with canonical host names only. The .Cm exec keyword executes the specified command under the user's shell. If the command returns a zero exit status then the condition is considered true. Commands containing whitespace characters must be quoted. The following character sequences in the command will be expanded prior to execution: .Ql %L will be substituted by the first component of the local host name, .Ql %l will be substituted by the local host name (including any domain name), .Ql %h will be substituted by the target host name, .Ql %n will be substituted by the original target host name specified on the command-line, .Ql %p the destination port, .Ql %r by the remote login username, and .Ql %u by the username of the user running .Xr ssh 1 . .Pp The other keywords' criteria must be single entries or comma-separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the .Sx PATTERNS section. The criteria for the .Cm host keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any substitution by the .Cm Hostname or .Cm CanonicalizeHostname options. The .Cm originalhost keyword matches against the hostname as it was specified on the command-line. The .Cm user keyword matches against the target username on the remote host. The .Cm localuser keyword matches against the name of the local user running .Xr ssh 1 (this keyword may be useful in system-wide .Nm files). .It Cm AddressFamily Specifies which address family to use when connecting. Valid arguments are .Dq any , .Dq inet (use IPv4 only), or .Dq inet6 (use IPv6 only). .It Cm BatchMode If set to .Dq yes , passphrase/password querying will be disabled. This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user is present to supply the password. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm BindAddress Use the specified address on the local machine as the source address of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one address. Note that this option does not work if .Cm UsePrivilegedPort is set to .Dq yes . .It Cm CanonicalDomains When .Cm CanonicalizeHostname is enabled, this option specifies the list of domain suffixes in which to search for the specified destination host. .It Cm CanonicalizeFallbackLocal Specifies whether to fail with an error when hostname canonicalization fails. The default, .Dq yes , will attempt to look up the unqualified hostname using the system resolver's search rules. A value of .Dq no will cause .Xr ssh 1 to fail instantly if .Cm CanonicalizeHostname is enabled and the target hostname cannot be found in any of the domains specified by .Cm CanonicalDomains . .It Cm CanonicalizeHostname Controls whether explicit hostname canonicalization is performed. The default, .Dq no , is not to perform any name rewriting and let the system resolver handle all hostname lookups. If set to .Dq yes then, for connections that do not use a .Cm ProxyCommand , .Xr ssh 1 will attempt to canonicalize the hostname specified on the command line using the .Cm CanonicalDomains suffixes and .Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs rules. If .Cm CanonicalizeHostname is set to .Dq always , then canonicalization is applied to proxied connections too. .Pp If this option is enabled, then the configuration files are processed again using the new target name to pick up any new configuration in matching .Cm Host and .Cm Match stanzas. .It Cm CanonicalizeMaxDots Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname before canonicalization is disabled. The default, .Dq 1 , allows a single dot (i.e. hostname.subdomain). .It Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs Specifies rules to determine whether CNAMEs should be followed when canonicalizing hostnames. The rules consist of one or more arguments of .Ar source_domain_list : Ns Ar target_domain_list , where .Ar source_domain_list is a pattern-list of domains that may follow CNAMEs in canonicalization, and .Ar target_domain_list is a pattern-list of domains that they may resolve to. .Pp For example, .Dq *.a.example.com:*.b.example.com,*.c.example.com will allow hostnames matching .Dq *.a.example.com to be canonicalized to names in the .Dq *.b.example.com or .Dq *.c.example.com domains. .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication Specifies whether to use challenge-response authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm CheckHostIP If this flag is set to .Dq yes , .Xr ssh 1 will additionally check the host IP address in the .Pa known_hosts file. -This allows ssh to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing. +This allows ssh to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing +and will add addresses of destination hosts to +.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts +in the process, regardless of the setting of +.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking . If the option is set to .Dq no , the check will not be executed. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm Cipher Specifies the cipher to use for encrypting the session in protocol version 1. Currently, .Dq blowfish , .Dq 3des , and .Dq des are supported. .Ar des is only supported in the .Xr ssh 1 client for interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations that do not support the .Ar 3des cipher. Its use is strongly discouraged due to cryptographic weaknesses. The default is .Dq 3des . .It Cm Ciphers Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2 in order of preference. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. The supported ciphers are: .Pp .Bl -item -compact -offset indent .It 3des-cbc .It aes128-cbc .It aes192-cbc .It aes256-cbc .It aes128-ctr .It aes192-ctr .It aes256-ctr .It aes128-gcm@openssh.com .It aes256-gcm@openssh.com .It arcfour .It arcfour128 .It arcfour256 .It blowfish-cbc .It cast128-cbc .It chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com .El .Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com, chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, arcfour256,arcfour128, aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc, aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,arcfour .Ed .Pp The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using the .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 with an argument of .Dq cipher . .It Cm ClearAllForwardings Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings specified in the configuration files or on the command line be cleared. This option is primarily useful when used from the .Xr ssh 1 command line to clear port forwardings set in configuration files, and is automatically set by .Xr scp 1 and .Xr sftp 1 . The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm Compression Specifies whether to use compression. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm CompressionLevel Specifies the compression level to use if compression is enabled. The argument must be an integer from 1 (fast) to 9 (slow, best). The default level is 6, which is good for most applications. The meaning of the values is the same as in .Xr gzip 1 . Note that this option applies to protocol version 1 only. .It Cm ConnectionAttempts Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before exiting. The argument must be an integer. This may be useful in scripts if the connection sometimes fails. The default is 1. .It Cm ConnectTimeout Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout. This value is used only when the target is down or really unreachable, not when it refuses the connection. .It Cm ControlMaster Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network connection. When set to .Dq yes , .Xr ssh 1 will listen for connections on a control socket specified using the .Cm ControlPath argument. Additional sessions can connect to this socket using the same .Cm ControlPath with .Cm ControlMaster set to .Dq no (the default). These sessions will try to reuse the master instance's network connection rather than initiating new ones, but will fall back to connecting normally if the control socket does not exist, or is not listening. .Pp Setting this to .Dq ask will cause ssh -to listen for control connections, but require confirmation using the -.Ev SSH_ASKPASS -program before they are accepted (see -.Xr ssh-add 1 -for details). +to listen for control connections, but require confirmation using +.Xr ssh-askpass 1 . If the .Cm ControlPath cannot be opened, ssh will continue without connecting to a master instance. .Pp X11 and .Xr ssh-agent 1 forwarding is supported over these multiplexed connections, however the display and agent forwarded will be the one belonging to the master connection i.e. it is not possible to forward multiple displays or agents. .Pp Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try to use a master connection but fall back to creating a new one if one does not already exist. These options are: .Dq auto and .Dq autoask . The latter requires confirmation like the .Dq ask option. .It Cm ControlPath Specify the path to the control socket used for connection sharing as described in the .Cm ControlMaster section above or the string .Dq none to disable connection sharing. In the path, .Ql %L will be substituted by the first component of the local host name, .Ql %l will be substituted by the local host name (including any domain name), .Ql %h will be substituted by the target host name, .Ql %n will be substituted by the original target host name specified on the command line, .Ql %p the destination port, .Ql %r by the remote login username, .Ql %u by the username of the user running .Xr ssh 1 , and .Ql \&%C by a hash of the concatenation: %l%h%p%r. It is recommended that any .Cm ControlPath used for opportunistic connection sharing include at least %h, %p, and %r (or alternatively %C) and be placed in a directory that is not writable by other users. This ensures that shared connections are uniquely identified. .It Cm ControlPersist When used in conjunction with .Cm ControlMaster , specifies that the master connection should remain open in the background (waiting for future client connections) after the initial client connection has been closed. If set to .Dq no , then the master connection will not be placed into the background, and will close as soon as the initial client connection is closed. If set to .Dq yes or .Dq 0 , then the master connection will remain in the background indefinitely (until killed or closed via a mechanism such as the .Xr ssh 1 .Dq Fl O No exit option). If set to a time in seconds, or a time in any of the formats documented in .Xr sshd_config 5 , then the backgrounded master connection will automatically terminate after it has remained idle (with no client connections) for the specified time. .It Cm DynamicForward Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the remote machine. .Pp The argument must be .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port . .Sm on IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the .Cm GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit .Ar bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The .Ar bind_address of .Dq localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or .Sq * indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. .Pp Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and .Xr ssh 1 will act as a SOCKS server. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. .It Cm EnableSSHKeysign Setting this option to .Dq yes in the global client configuration file .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config enables the use of the helper program .Xr ssh-keysign 8 during .Cm HostbasedAuthentication . The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section. See .Xr ssh-keysign 8 for more information. .It Cm EscapeChar Sets the escape character (default: .Ql ~ ) . The escape character can also be set on the command line. The argument should be a single character, .Ql ^ followed by a letter, or .Dq none to disable the escape character entirely (making the connection transparent for binary data). .It Cm ExitOnForwardFailure Specifies whether .Xr ssh 1 should terminate the connection if it cannot set up all requested dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote port forwardings. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm FingerprintHash Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints. Valid options are: .Dq md5 and .Dq sha256 . The default is .Dq sha256 . .It Cm ForwardAgent Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any) will be forwarded to the remote machine. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .Pp Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent. .It Cm ForwardX11 Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically redirected over the secure channel and .Ev DISPLAY set. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .Pp X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the user's X11 authorization database) can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring if the .Cm ForwardX11Trusted option is also enabled. .It Cm ForwardX11Timeout Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding using the format described in the TIME FORMATS section of .Xr sshd_config 5 . X11 connections received by .Xr ssh 1 after this time will be refused. The default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty minutes has elapsed. .It Cm ForwardX11Trusted If this option is set to .Dq yes , remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display. .Pp If this option is set to .Dq no , remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11 clients. Furthermore, the .Xr xauth 1 token used for the session will be set to expire after 20 minutes. Remote clients will be refused access after this time. .Pp The default is .Dq no . .Pp See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients. .It Cm GatewayPorts Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local forwarded ports. By default, .Xr ssh 1 binds local port forwardings to the loopback address. This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. .Cm GatewayPorts can be used to specify that ssh should bind local port forwardings to the wildcard address, thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm GlobalKnownHostsFile Specifies one or more files to use for the global host key database, separated by whitespace. The default is .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts , .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2 . .It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. The default is .Dq no . Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. The default is .Dq no . Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm HashKnownHosts Indicates that .Xr ssh 1 should hash host names and addresses when they are added to .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts . These hashed names may be used normally by .Xr ssh 1 and .Xr sshd 8 , but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed. The default is .Dq no . Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files will not be converted automatically, but may be manually hashed using .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key authentication. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . This option applies to protocol version 2 only and is similar to .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication . .It Cm HostbasedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be used for hostbased authentication as a comma-separated pattern list. The default .Dq * will allow all key types. The .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 may be used to list supported key types. .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms Specifies the protocol version 2 host key algorithms that the client wants to use in order of preference. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss .Ed .Pp If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default is modified to prefer their algorithms. .Pp The list of available key types may also be obtained using the .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 with an argument of .Dq key . .It Cm HostKeyAlias Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the real host name when looking up or saving the host key in the host key database files. This option is useful for tunneling SSH connections or for multiple servers running on a single host. .It Cm HostName Specifies the real host name to log into. This can be used to specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts. If the hostname contains the character sequence .Ql %h , then this will be replaced with the host name specified on the command line (this is useful for manipulating unqualified names). The character sequence .Ql %% will be replaced by a single .Ql % character, which may be used when specifying IPv6 link-local addresses. .Pp The default is the name given on the command line. Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in .Cm HostName specifications). .It Cm IdentitiesOnly Specifies that .Xr ssh 1 should only use the authentication identity files configured in the .Nm files, even if .Xr ssh-agent 1 or a .Cm PKCS11Provider offers more identities. The argument to this keyword must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . This option is intended for situations where ssh-agent offers many different identities. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm IdentityFile Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity is read. The default is .Pa ~/.ssh/identity for protocol version 1, and .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa for protocol version 2. Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent will be used for authentication unless .Cm IdentitiesOnly is set. .Xr ssh 1 will try to load certificate information from the filename obtained by appending .Pa -cert.pub to the path of a specified .Cm IdentityFile . .Pp The file name may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory or one of the following escape characters: .Ql %d (local user's home directory), .Ql %u (local user name), .Ql %l (local host name), .Ql %h (remote host name) or .Ql %r (remote user name). .Pp It is possible to have multiple identity files specified in configuration files; all these identities will be tried in sequence. Multiple .Cm IdentityFile directives will add to the list of identities tried (this behaviour differs from that of other configuration directives). .Pp .Cm IdentityFile may be used in conjunction with .Cm IdentitiesOnly to select which identities in an agent are offered during authentication. .It Cm IgnoreUnknown Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are encountered in configuration parsing. This may be used to suppress errors if .Nm contains options that are unrecognised by .Xr ssh 1 . It is recommended that .Cm IgnoreUnknown be listed early in the configuration file as it will not be applied to unknown options that appear before it. .It Cm IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for connections. Accepted values are .Dq af11 , .Dq af12 , .Dq af13 , .Dq af21 , .Dq af22 , .Dq af23 , .Dq af31 , .Dq af32 , .Dq af33 , .Dq af41 , .Dq af42 , .Dq af43 , .Dq cs0 , .Dq cs1 , .Dq cs2 , .Dq cs3 , .Dq cs4 , .Dq cs5 , .Dq cs6 , .Dq cs7 , .Dq ef , .Dq lowdelay , .Dq throughput , .Dq reliability , or a numeric value. This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. The default is .Dq lowdelay for interactive sessions and .Dq throughput for non-interactive sessions. .It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm KbdInteractiveDevices Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive authentication. Multiple method names must be comma-separated. The default is to use the server specified list. The methods available vary depending on what the server supports. For an OpenSSH server, it may be zero or more of: .Dq bsdauth , .Dq pam , and .Dq skey . .It Cm KexAlgorithms Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, -diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1, +diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 .Ed .Pp The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using the .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 with an argument of .Dq kex . .It Cm LocalCommand Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully connecting to the server. The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's shell. The following escape character substitutions will be performed: .Ql %d (local user's home directory), .Ql %h (remote host name), .Ql %l (local host name), .Ql %n (host name as provided on the command line), .Ql %p (remote port), .Ql %r (remote user name) or .Ql %u (local user name) or .Ql \&%C by a hash of the concatenation: %l%h%p%r. .Pp The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the session of the .Xr ssh 1 that spawned it. It should not be used for interactive commands. .Pp This directive is ignored unless .Cm PermitLocalCommand has been enabled. .It Cm LocalForward Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote machine. The first argument must be .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on and the second argument must be .Ar host : Ns Ar hostport . IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the .Cm GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit .Ar bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The .Ar bind_address of .Dq localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or .Sq * indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. .It Cm LogLevel Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from .Xr ssh 1 . The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO. DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output. .It Cm MACs Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms in order of preference. The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2 for data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. The algorithms that contain .Dq -etm calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and their use recommended. The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512, hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com,hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com, hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,hmac-ripemd160, hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96 .Ed .Pp The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using the .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 with an argument of .Dq mac . .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost This option can be used if the home directory is shared across machines. In this case localhost will refer to a different machine on each of the machines and the user will get many warnings about changed host keys. However, this option disables host authentication for localhost. The argument to this keyword must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is to check the host key for localhost. .It Cm NumberOfPasswordPrompts Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up. The argument to this keyword must be an integer. The default is 3. .It Cm PasswordAuthentication Specifies whether to use password authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm PermitLocalCommand Allow local command execution via the .Ic LocalCommand option or using the .Ic !\& Ns Ar command escape sequence in .Xr ssh 1 . The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm PKCS11Provider Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use. The argument to this keyword is the PKCS#11 shared library .Xr ssh 1 should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's private RSA key. .It Cm Port Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host. The default is 22. .It Cm PreferredAuthentications Specifies the order in which the client should try protocol 2 authentication methods. This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.\& .Cm keyboard-interactive ) over another method (e.g.\& .Cm password ) . The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey, keyboard-interactive,password .Ed .It Cm Protocol Specifies the protocol versions .Xr ssh 1 should support in order of preference. The possible values are .Sq 1 and .Sq 2 . Multiple versions must be comma-separated. When this option is set to .Dq 2,1 .Nm ssh will try version 2 and fall back to version 1 if version 2 is not available. The default is .Sq 2 . .It Cm ProxyCommand Specifies the command to use to connect to the server. The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed using the user's shell .Ql exec directive to avoid a lingering shell process. .Pp In the command string, any occurrence of .Ql %h will be substituted by the host name to connect, .Ql %p by the port, and .Ql %r by the remote user name. The command can be basically anything, and should read from its standard input and write to its standard output. It should eventually connect an .Xr sshd 8 server running on some machine, or execute .Ic sshd -i somewhere. Host key management will be done using the HostName of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by the user). Setting the command to .Dq none disables this option entirely. Note that .Cm CheckHostIP is not available for connects with a proxy command. .Pp This directive is useful in conjunction with .Xr nc 1 and its proxy support. For example, the following directive would connect via an HTTP proxy at 192.0.2.0: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p .Ed .It Cm ProxyUseFdpass Specifies that .Cm ProxyCommand will pass a connected file descriptor back to .Xr ssh 1 instead of continuing to execute and pass data. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication Specifies whether to try public key authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq yes . This option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm RekeyLimit Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of .Sq K , .Sq M , or .Sq G to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between .Sq 1G and .Sq 4G , depending on the cipher. The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units documented in the TIME FORMATS section of .Xr sshd_config 5 . The default value for .Cm RekeyLimit is .Dq default none , which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm RemoteForward Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over the secure channel to the specified host and port from the local machine. The first argument must be .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on and the second argument must be .Ar host : Ns Ar hostport . IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on the remote machine. .Pp If the .Ar port argument is .Ql 0 , the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time. .Pp If the .Ar bind_address is not specified, the default is to only bind to loopback addresses. If the .Ar bind_address is .Ql * or an empty string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all interfaces. Specifying a remote .Ar bind_address will only succeed if the server's .Cm GatewayPorts option is enabled (see .Xr sshd_config 5 ) . .It Cm RequestTTY Specifies whether to request a pseudo-tty for the session. The argument may be one of: .Dq no (never request a TTY), .Dq yes (always request a TTY when standard input is a TTY), .Dq force (always request a TTY) or .Dq auto (request a TTY when opening a login session). This option mirrors the .Fl t and .Fl T flags for .Xr ssh 1 . .It Cm RevokedHostKeys Specifies revoked host public keys. Keys listed in this file will be refused for host authentication. Note that if this file does not exist or is not readable, then host authentication will be refused for all hosts. Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with RSA host authentication. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . This option applies to protocol version 1 only and requires .Xr ssh 1 to be setuid root. .It Cm RSAAuthentication Specifies whether to try RSA authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . RSA authentication will only be attempted if the identity file exists, or an authentication agent is running. The default is .Dq yes . Note that this option applies to protocol version 1 only. .It Cm SendEnv Specifies what variables from the local .Xr environ 7 should be sent to the server. Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2. The server must also support it, and the server must be configured to accept these environment variables. +Note that the +.Ev TERM +environment variable is always sent whenever a +pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol. Refer to .Cm AcceptEnv in .Xr sshd_config 5 for how to configure the server. Variables are specified by name, which may contain wildcard characters. Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread across multiple .Cm SendEnv directives. The default is not to send any environment variables. .Pp See .Sx PATTERNS for more information on patterns. .It Cm ServerAliveCountMax Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be sent without .Xr ssh 1 receiving any messages back from the server. If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are being sent, ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the session. It is important to note that the use of server alive messages is very different from .Cm TCPKeepAlive (below). The server alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option enabled by .Cm TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The server alive mechanism is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive. .Pp The default value is 3. If, for example, .Cm ServerAliveInterval (see below) is set to 15 and .Cm ServerAliveCountMax is left at the default, if the server becomes unresponsive, ssh will disconnect after approximately 45 seconds. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm ServerAliveInterval Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received from the server, .Xr ssh 1 will send a message through the encrypted channel to request a response from the server. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm StreamLocalBindMask Sets the octal file creation mode mask .Pq umask used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. .Pp The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is readable and writable only by the owner. Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain socket files. .It Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one. If the socket file already exists and .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink is not enabled, .Nm ssh will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-domain socket file. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. .Pp The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm StrictHostKeyChecking If this flag is set to .Dq yes , .Xr ssh 1 will never automatically add host keys to the .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts file, and refuses to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. This provides maximum protection against trojan horse attacks, though it can be annoying when the .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts file is poorly maintained or when connections to new hosts are frequently made. This option forces the user to manually add all new hosts. If this flag is set to .Dq no , ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user known hosts files. If this flag is set to .Dq ask , new host keys will be added to the user known host files only after the user has confirmed that is what they really want to do, and ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. The host keys of known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases. The argument must be .Dq yes , .Dq no , or .Dq ask . The default is .Dq ask . .It Cm TCPKeepAlive Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However, this means that connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people find it annoying. .Pp The default is .Dq yes (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the client will notice if the network goes down or the remote host dies. This is important in scripts, and many users want it too. .Pp To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to .Dq no . .It Cm Tunnel Request .Xr tun 4 device forwarding between the client and the server. The argument must be .Dq yes , .Dq point-to-point (layer 3), .Dq ethernet (layer 2), or .Dq no . Specifying .Dq yes requests the default tunnel mode, which is .Dq point-to-point . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm TunnelDevice Specifies the .Xr tun 4 devices to open on the client .Pq Ar local_tun and the server .Pq Ar remote_tun . .Pp The argument must be .Sm off .Ar local_tun Op : Ar remote_tun . .Sm on The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword .Dq any , which uses the next available tunnel device. If .Ar remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to .Dq any . The default is .Dq any:any . .It Cm UpdateHostKeys Specifies whether .Xr ssh 1 should accept notifications of additional hostkeys from the server sent after authentication has completed and add them to .Cm UserKnownHostsFile . The argument must be .Dq yes , .Dq no (the default) or .Dq ask . Enabling this option allows learning alternate hostkeys for a server and supports graceful key rotation by allowing a server to send replacement public keys before old ones are removed. Additional hostkeys are only accepted if the key used to authenticate the host was already trusted or explicity accepted by the user. If .Cm UpdateHostKeys is set to .Dq ask , then the user is asked to confirm the modifications to the known_hosts file. Confirmation is currently incompatible with .Cm ControlPersist , and will be disabled if it is enabled. .Pp Presently, only .Xr sshd 8 from OpenSSH 6.8 and greater support the .Dq hostkeys@openssh.com protocol extension used to inform the client of all the server's hostkeys. .It Cm UsePrivilegedPort Specifies whether to use a privileged port for outgoing connections. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . If set to .Dq yes , .Xr ssh 1 must be setuid root. Note that this option must be set to .Dq yes for .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication with older servers. .It Cm User Specifies the user to log in as. This can be useful when a different user name is used on different machines. This saves the trouble of having to remember to give the user name on the command line. .It Cm UserKnownHostsFile Specifies one or more files to use for the user host key database, separated by whitespace. The default is .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts , .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts2 . .It Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP resource records. If this option is set to .Dq yes , the client will implicitly trust keys that match a secure fingerprint from DNS. Insecure fingerprints will be handled as if this option was set to .Dq ask . If this option is set to .Dq ask , information on fingerprint match will be displayed, but the user will still need to confirm new host keys according to the .Cm StrictHostKeyChecking option. The argument must be .Dq yes , .Dq no , or .Dq ask . The default is .Dq yes if compiled with LDNS and .Dq no otherwise. Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. .Pp See also VERIFYING HOST KEYS in .Xr ssh 1 . .It Cm VersionAddendum Specifies a string to append to the regular version string to identify OS- or site-specific modifications. The default is .Dq FreeBSD-20160119 . The value .Dq none may be used to disable this. .It Cm VisualHostKey If this flag is set to .Dq yes , an ASCII art representation of the remote host key fingerprint is printed in addition to the fingerprint string at login and for unknown host keys. If this flag is set to .Dq no , no fingerprint strings are printed at login and only the fingerprint string will be printed for unknown host keys. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm XAuthLocation Specifies the full pathname of the .Xr xauth 1 program. The default is .Pa /usr/local/bin/xauth . .El .Sh PATTERNS A .Em pattern consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters, .Sq * (a wildcard that matches zero or more characters), or .Sq ?\& (a wildcard that matches exactly one character). For example, to specify a set of declarations for any host in the .Dq .co.uk set of domains, the following pattern could be used: .Pp .Dl Host *.co.uk .Pp The following pattern would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network range: .Pp .Dl Host 192.168.0.? .Pp A .Em pattern-list is a comma-separated list of patterns. Patterns within pattern-lists may be negated by preceding them with an exclamation mark .Pq Sq !\& . For example, to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an organization except from the .Dq dialup pool, the following entry (in authorized_keys) could be used: .Pp .Dl from=\&"!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com\&" .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Pa ~/.ssh/config This is the per-user configuration file. The format of this file is described above. This file is used by the SSH client. Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions: read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config Systemwide configuration file. This file provides defaults for those values that are not specified in the user's configuration file, and for those users who do not have a configuration file. This file must be world-readable. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Index: head/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/ssh_namespace.h (revision 294336) @@ -1,931 +1,935 @@ /* * Namespace munging inspired by an equivalent hack in NetBSD's tree: add - * the "ssh_" prefix to every symbol in libssh which doesn't already have + * the "Fssh_" prefix to every symbol in libssh which doesn't already have * it. This prevents collisions between symbols in libssh and symbols in * other libraries or applications which link with libssh, either directly * or indirectly (e.g. through PAM loading pam_ssh). * * A list of symbols which need munging is obtained as follows: * # nm libprivatessh.a | LC_ALL=C awk ' /^[0-9a-z]+ [Tt] [A-Za-z_][0-9A-Za-z_]*$/ && $3 !~ /^Fssh_/ { printf("#define %-39s Fssh_%s\n", $3, $3) }' | unexpand -a | LC_ALL=C sort -u * * $FreeBSD$ */ #define Blowfish_decipher Fssh_Blowfish_decipher #define Blowfish_encipher Fssh_Blowfish_encipher #define Blowfish_expand0state Fssh_Blowfish_expand0state #define Blowfish_expandstate Fssh_Blowfish_expandstate #define Blowfish_initstate Fssh_Blowfish_initstate #define Blowfish_stream2word Fssh_Blowfish_stream2word #define _ssh_exchange_banner Fssh__ssh_exchange_banner #define _ssh_host_key_sign Fssh__ssh_host_key_sign #define _ssh_host_private_key Fssh__ssh_host_private_key #define _ssh_host_public_key Fssh__ssh_host_public_key #define _ssh_order_hostkeyalgs Fssh__ssh_order_hostkeyalgs #define _ssh_read_banner Fssh__ssh_read_banner #define _ssh_send_banner Fssh__ssh_send_banner #define _ssh_verify_host_key Fssh__ssh_verify_host_key #define a2port Fssh_a2port #define a2tun Fssh_a2tun #define add_host_to_hostfile Fssh_add_host_to_hostfile #define add_p1p1 Fssh_add_p1p1 #define addargs Fssh_addargs #define addr_match_cidr_list Fssh_addr_match_cidr_list #define addr_match_list Fssh_addr_match_list #define addr_netmatch Fssh_addr_netmatch #define addr_pton Fssh_addr_pton #define addr_pton_cidr Fssh_addr_pton_cidr #define ask_permission Fssh_ask_permission #define atomicio Fssh_atomicio #define atomicio6 Fssh_atomicio6 #define atomiciov Fssh_atomiciov #define atomiciov6 Fssh_atomiciov6 #define auth_request_forwarding Fssh_auth_request_forwarding #define bandwidth_limit Fssh_bandwidth_limit #define bandwidth_limit_init Fssh_bandwidth_limit_init #define barrett_reduce Fssh_barrett_reduce #define bcrypt_hash Fssh_bcrypt_hash #define bcrypt_pbkdf Fssh_bcrypt_pbkdf #define bf_ssh1_cipher Fssh_bf_ssh1_cipher #define bitmap_clear_bit Fssh_bitmap_clear_bit #define bitmap_free Fssh_bitmap_free #define bitmap_from_string Fssh_bitmap_from_string #define bitmap_nbits Fssh_bitmap_nbits #define bitmap_nbytes Fssh_bitmap_nbytes #define bitmap_new Fssh_bitmap_new #define bitmap_set_bit Fssh_bitmap_set_bit #define bitmap_test_bit Fssh_bitmap_test_bit #define bitmap_to_string Fssh_bitmap_to_string #define bitmap_zero Fssh_bitmap_zero #define blf_cbc_decrypt Fssh_blf_cbc_decrypt #define blf_cbc_encrypt Fssh_blf_cbc_encrypt #define blf_dec Fssh_blf_dec #define blf_ecb_decrypt Fssh_blf_ecb_decrypt #define blf_ecb_encrypt Fssh_blf_ecb_encrypt #define blf_enc Fssh_blf_enc #define blf_key Fssh_blf_key #define buffer_append Fssh_buffer_append #define buffer_append_space Fssh_buffer_append_space #define buffer_check_alloc Fssh_buffer_check_alloc #define buffer_consume Fssh_buffer_consume #define buffer_consume_end Fssh_buffer_consume_end #define buffer_consume_end_ret Fssh_buffer_consume_end_ret #define buffer_consume_ret Fssh_buffer_consume_ret #define buffer_get Fssh_buffer_get #define buffer_get_bignum Fssh_buffer_get_bignum #define buffer_get_bignum2 Fssh_buffer_get_bignum2 #define buffer_get_bignum2_ret Fssh_buffer_get_bignum2_ret #define buffer_get_bignum_ret Fssh_buffer_get_bignum_ret #define buffer_get_char Fssh_buffer_get_char #define buffer_get_char_ret Fssh_buffer_get_char_ret #define buffer_get_cstring Fssh_buffer_get_cstring #define buffer_get_cstring_ret Fssh_buffer_get_cstring_ret #define buffer_get_ecpoint Fssh_buffer_get_ecpoint #define buffer_get_ecpoint_ret Fssh_buffer_get_ecpoint_ret #define buffer_get_int Fssh_buffer_get_int #define buffer_get_int64 Fssh_buffer_get_int64 #define buffer_get_int64_ret Fssh_buffer_get_int64_ret #define buffer_get_int_ret Fssh_buffer_get_int_ret #define buffer_get_ret Fssh_buffer_get_ret #define buffer_get_short Fssh_buffer_get_short #define buffer_get_short_ret Fssh_buffer_get_short_ret #define buffer_get_string Fssh_buffer_get_string #define buffer_get_string_ptr Fssh_buffer_get_string_ptr #define buffer_get_string_ptr_ret Fssh_buffer_get_string_ptr_ret #define buffer_get_string_ret Fssh_buffer_get_string_ret #define buffer_put_bignum Fssh_buffer_put_bignum #define buffer_put_bignum2 Fssh_buffer_put_bignum2 #define buffer_put_bignum2_from_string Fssh_buffer_put_bignum2_from_string #define buffer_put_bignum2_ret Fssh_buffer_put_bignum2_ret #define buffer_put_bignum_ret Fssh_buffer_put_bignum_ret #define buffer_put_char Fssh_buffer_put_char #define buffer_put_cstring Fssh_buffer_put_cstring #define buffer_put_ecpoint Fssh_buffer_put_ecpoint #define buffer_put_ecpoint_ret Fssh_buffer_put_ecpoint_ret #define buffer_put_int Fssh_buffer_put_int #define buffer_put_int64 Fssh_buffer_put_int64 #define buffer_put_short Fssh_buffer_put_short #define buffer_put_string Fssh_buffer_put_string #define cert_free Fssh_cert_free #define cert_new Fssh_cert_new #define chacha_encrypt_bytes Fssh_chacha_encrypt_bytes #define chacha_ivsetup Fssh_chacha_ivsetup #define chacha_keysetup Fssh_chacha_keysetup #define chachapoly_crypt Fssh_chachapoly_crypt #define chachapoly_get_length Fssh_chachapoly_get_length #define chachapoly_init Fssh_chachapoly_init #define chan_ibuf_empty Fssh_chan_ibuf_empty #define chan_is_dead Fssh_chan_is_dead #define chan_mark_dead Fssh_chan_mark_dead #define chan_obuf_empty Fssh_chan_obuf_empty #define chan_rcvd_eow Fssh_chan_rcvd_eow #define chan_rcvd_ieof Fssh_chan_rcvd_ieof #define chan_rcvd_oclose Fssh_chan_rcvd_oclose #define chan_read_failed Fssh_chan_read_failed #define chan_send_eof2 Fssh_chan_send_eof2 #define chan_send_ieof1 Fssh_chan_send_ieof1 #define chan_send_oclose1 Fssh_chan_send_oclose1 #define chan_shutdown_read Fssh_chan_shutdown_read #define chan_shutdown_write Fssh_chan_shutdown_write #define chan_write_failed Fssh_chan_write_failed #define channel_add_adm_permitted_opens Fssh_channel_add_adm_permitted_opens #define channel_add_permitted_opens Fssh_channel_add_permitted_opens #define channel_after_select Fssh_channel_after_select #define channel_by_id Fssh_channel_by_id #define channel_cancel_cleanup Fssh_channel_cancel_cleanup #define channel_cancel_lport_listener Fssh_channel_cancel_lport_listener #define channel_cancel_rport_listener Fssh_channel_cancel_rport_listener #define channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens Fssh_channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens #define channel_clear_permitted_opens Fssh_channel_clear_permitted_opens #define channel_close_all Fssh_channel_close_all #define channel_close_fd Fssh_channel_close_fd #define channel_close_fds Fssh_channel_close_fds #define channel_connect_by_listen_address Fssh_channel_connect_by_listen_address #define channel_connect_by_listen_path Fssh_channel_connect_by_listen_path #define channel_connect_stdio_fwd Fssh_channel_connect_stdio_fwd #define channel_connect_to_path Fssh_channel_connect_to_path #define channel_connect_to_port Fssh_channel_connect_to_port #define channel_disable_adm_local_opens Fssh_channel_disable_adm_local_opens #define channel_find_open Fssh_channel_find_open #define channel_free Fssh_channel_free #define channel_free_all Fssh_channel_free_all #define channel_fwd_bind_addr Fssh_channel_fwd_bind_addr #define channel_handler Fssh_channel_handler #define channel_input_close Fssh_channel_input_close #define channel_input_close_confirmation Fssh_channel_input_close_confirmation #define channel_input_data Fssh_channel_input_data #define channel_input_extended_data Fssh_channel_input_extended_data #define channel_input_ieof Fssh_channel_input_ieof #define channel_input_oclose Fssh_channel_input_oclose #define channel_input_open_confirmation Fssh_channel_input_open_confirmation #define channel_input_open_failure Fssh_channel_input_open_failure #define channel_input_port_forward_request Fssh_channel_input_port_forward_request #define channel_input_port_open Fssh_channel_input_port_open #define channel_input_status_confirm Fssh_channel_input_status_confirm #define channel_input_window_adjust Fssh_channel_input_window_adjust #define channel_lookup Fssh_channel_lookup #define channel_new Fssh_channel_new #define channel_not_very_much_buffered_data Fssh_channel_not_very_much_buffered_data #define channel_open_message Fssh_channel_open_message #define channel_output_poll Fssh_channel_output_poll #define channel_permit_all_opens Fssh_channel_permit_all_opens #define channel_post_auth_listener Fssh_channel_post_auth_listener #define channel_post_connecting Fssh_channel_post_connecting #define channel_post_mux_client Fssh_channel_post_mux_client #define channel_post_mux_listener Fssh_channel_post_mux_listener #define channel_post_open Fssh_channel_post_open #define channel_post_output_drain_13 Fssh_channel_post_output_drain_13 #define channel_post_port_listener Fssh_channel_post_port_listener #define channel_post_x11_listener Fssh_channel_post_x11_listener #define channel_pre_connecting Fssh_channel_pre_connecting #define channel_pre_dynamic Fssh_channel_pre_dynamic #define channel_pre_input_draining Fssh_channel_pre_input_draining #define channel_pre_listener Fssh_channel_pre_listener #define channel_pre_mux_client Fssh_channel_pre_mux_client #define channel_pre_open Fssh_channel_pre_open #define channel_pre_open_13 Fssh_channel_pre_open_13 #define channel_pre_output_draining Fssh_channel_pre_output_draining #define channel_pre_x11_open Fssh_channel_pre_x11_open #define channel_pre_x11_open_13 Fssh_channel_pre_x11_open_13 #define channel_prepare_select Fssh_channel_prepare_select #define channel_print_adm_permitted_opens Fssh_channel_print_adm_permitted_opens #define channel_register_cleanup Fssh_channel_register_cleanup #define channel_register_fds Fssh_channel_register_fds #define channel_register_filter Fssh_channel_register_filter #define channel_register_open_confirm Fssh_channel_register_open_confirm #define channel_register_status_confirm Fssh_channel_register_status_confirm #define channel_request_remote_forwarding Fssh_channel_request_remote_forwarding #define channel_request_rforward_cancel Fssh_channel_request_rforward_cancel #define channel_request_start Fssh_channel_request_start #define channel_send_open Fssh_channel_send_open #define channel_send_window_changes Fssh_channel_send_window_changes #define channel_set_af Fssh_channel_set_af #define channel_set_fds Fssh_channel_set_fds +#define channel_set_x11_refuse_time Fssh_channel_set_x11_refuse_time #define channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal Fssh_channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal #define channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip Fssh_channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip #define channel_setup_local_fwd_listener Fssh_channel_setup_local_fwd_listener #define channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener Fssh_channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener #define channel_still_open Fssh_channel_still_open #define channel_stop_listening Fssh_channel_stop_listening #define channel_update_permitted_opens Fssh_channel_update_permitted_opens #define check_crc Fssh_check_crc #define check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type Fssh_check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type #define check_key_in_hostkeys Fssh_check_key_in_hostkeys #define choose_dh Fssh_choose_dh #define choose_t Fssh_choose_t #define chop Fssh_chop #define cipher_alg_list Fssh_cipher_alg_list #define cipher_authlen Fssh_cipher_authlen #define cipher_blocksize Fssh_cipher_blocksize #define cipher_by_name Fssh_cipher_by_name #define cipher_by_number Fssh_cipher_by_number #define cipher_cleanup Fssh_cipher_cleanup #define cipher_crypt Fssh_cipher_crypt #define cipher_get_keycontext Fssh_cipher_get_keycontext #define cipher_get_keyiv Fssh_cipher_get_keyiv #define cipher_get_keyiv_len Fssh_cipher_get_keyiv_len #define cipher_get_length Fssh_cipher_get_length #define cipher_get_number Fssh_cipher_get_number #define cipher_init Fssh_cipher_init #define cipher_is_cbc Fssh_cipher_is_cbc #define cipher_ivlen Fssh_cipher_ivlen #define cipher_keylen Fssh_cipher_keylen #define cipher_mask_ssh1 Fssh_cipher_mask_ssh1 #define cipher_name Fssh_cipher_name #define cipher_number Fssh_cipher_number #define cipher_seclen Fssh_cipher_seclen #define cipher_set_key_string Fssh_cipher_set_key_string #define cipher_set_keycontext Fssh_cipher_set_keycontext #define cipher_set_keyiv Fssh_cipher_set_keyiv #define cipher_warning_message Fssh_cipher_warning_message #define ciphers_valid Fssh_ciphers_valid #define cleanhostname Fssh_cleanhostname #define cleanup_exit Fssh_cleanup_exit #define clear_cached_addr Fssh_clear_cached_addr #define colon Fssh_colon #define compare Fssh_compare #define compare_gps Fssh_compare_gps #define compat_cipher_proposal Fssh_compat_cipher_proposal #define compat_datafellows Fssh_compat_datafellows #define compat_kex_proposal Fssh_compat_kex_proposal #define compat_pkalg_proposal Fssh_compat_pkalg_proposal #define compress_buffer Fssh_compress_buffer #define connect_next Fssh_connect_next #define connect_to Fssh_connect_to #define convtime Fssh_convtime #define crypto_hash_sha512 Fssh_crypto_hash_sha512 #define crypto_hashblocks_sha512 Fssh_crypto_hashblocks_sha512 #define crypto_scalarmult_curve25519 Fssh_crypto_scalarmult_curve25519 #define crypto_sign_ed25519 Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519 #define crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair #define crypto_sign_ed25519_open Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_open #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_double_scalarmult_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_double_scalarmult_vartime #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_add Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_add #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_cmov Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_cmov #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_freeze Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_freeze #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_getparity Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_getparity #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_invert Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_invert #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_iseq_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_iseq_vartime #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_iszero Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_iszero #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_mul Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_mul #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_neg Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_neg #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_pack Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_pack #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_pow2523 Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_pow2523 #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_setone Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_setone #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_setzero Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_setzero #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_square Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_square #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_sub Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_sub #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_unpack Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_fe25519_unpack #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_isneutral_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_isneutral_vartime #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_pack Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_pack #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_2interleave2 Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_2interleave2 #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_add Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_add #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from32bytes Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from32bytes #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from64bytes Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from64bytes #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from_shortsc Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_from_shortsc #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_isshort_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_isshort_vartime #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_iszero_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_iszero_vartime #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_lt_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_lt_vartime #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_mul Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_mul #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_mul_shortsc Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_mul_shortsc #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_sub_nored Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_sub_nored #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_to32bytes Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_to32bytes #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_window3 Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_window3 #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_window5 Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_sc25519_window5 #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_scalarmult_base Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_scalarmult_base #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_shortsc25519_from16bytes Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_shortsc25519_from16bytes #define crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_unpackneg_vartime Fssh_crypto_sign_ed25519_ref_unpackneg_vartime #define crypto_verify_32 Fssh_crypto_verify_32 #define dbl_p1p1 Fssh_dbl_p1p1 #define deattack_init Fssh_deattack_init #define debug Fssh_debug #define debug2 Fssh_debug2 #define debug3 Fssh_debug3 #define deny_input_open Fssh_deny_input_open #define derive_ssh1_session_id Fssh_derive_ssh1_session_id #define detect_attack Fssh_detect_attack #define dh_estimate Fssh_dh_estimate #define dh_gen_key Fssh_dh_gen_key #define dh_new_group Fssh_dh_new_group #define dh_new_group1 Fssh_dh_new_group1 #define dh_new_group14 Fssh_dh_new_group14 #define dh_new_group_asc Fssh_dh_new_group_asc +#define dh_new_group_fallback Fssh_dh_new_group_fallback #define dh_pub_is_valid Fssh_dh_pub_is_valid #define dispatch_protocol_error Fssh_dispatch_protocol_error #define dispatch_protocol_ignore Fssh_dispatch_protocol_ignore #define dns_read_key Fssh_dns_read_key #define do_log Fssh_do_log #define do_log2 Fssh_do_log2 #define dump_base64 Fssh_dump_base64 #define enable_compat13 Fssh_enable_compat13 #define enable_compat20 Fssh_enable_compat20 #define error Fssh_error #define evp_ssh1_3des Fssh_evp_ssh1_3des #define evp_ssh1_bf Fssh_evp_ssh1_bf #define export_dns_rr Fssh_export_dns_rr #define fatal Fssh_fatal #define filter_proposal Fssh_filter_proposal #define fingerprint_b64 Fssh_fingerprint_b64 #define fingerprint_hex Fssh_fingerprint_hex #define fmt_scaled Fssh_fmt_scaled #define free_hostkeys Fssh_free_hostkeys #define freeargs Fssh_freeargs #define freerrset Fssh_freerrset #define gen_candidates Fssh_gen_candidates #define get_canonical_hostname Fssh_get_canonical_hostname #define get_local_ipaddr Fssh_get_local_ipaddr #define get_local_name Fssh_get_local_name #define get_local_port Fssh_get_local_port #define get_peer_ipaddr Fssh_get_peer_ipaddr #define get_peer_port Fssh_get_peer_port #define get_remote_ipaddr Fssh_get_remote_ipaddr #define get_remote_name_or_ip Fssh_get_remote_name_or_ip #define get_remote_port Fssh_get_remote_port #define get_sock_port Fssh_get_sock_port #define get_socket_address Fssh_get_socket_address #define get_u16 Fssh_get_u16 #define get_u32 Fssh_get_u32 #define get_u32_le Fssh_get_u32_le #define get_u64 Fssh_get_u64 #define getrrsetbyname Fssh_getrrsetbyname #define glob Fssh_glob #define glob0 Fssh_glob0 #define glob2 Fssh_glob2 #define globexp1 Fssh_globexp1 #define globextend Fssh_globextend #define globfree Fssh_globfree #define host_delete Fssh_host_delete #define host_hash Fssh_host_hash #define hostfile_read_key Fssh_hostfile_read_key #define hostfile_replace_entries Fssh_hostfile_replace_entries #define hostkeys_foreach Fssh_hostkeys_foreach #define hpdelim Fssh_hpdelim #define init_hostkeys Fssh_init_hostkeys #define input_kex_c25519_init Fssh_input_kex_c25519_init #define input_kex_c25519_reply Fssh_input_kex_c25519_reply #define input_kex_dh Fssh_input_kex_dh #define input_kex_dh_gex_group Fssh_input_kex_dh_gex_group #define input_kex_dh_gex_init Fssh_input_kex_dh_gex_init #define input_kex_dh_gex_reply Fssh_input_kex_dh_gex_reply #define input_kex_dh_gex_request Fssh_input_kex_dh_gex_request #define input_kex_dh_init Fssh_input_kex_dh_init #define input_kex_ecdh_init Fssh_input_kex_ecdh_init #define input_kex_ecdh_reply Fssh_input_kex_ecdh_reply #define iptos2str Fssh_iptos2str #define ipv64_normalise_mapped Fssh_ipv64_normalise_mapped #define is_cert_revoked Fssh_is_cert_revoked #define is_key_revoked Fssh_is_key_revoked #define kex_alg_by_name Fssh_kex_alg_by_name #define kex_alg_list Fssh_kex_alg_list #define kex_buf2prop Fssh_kex_buf2prop #define kex_c25519_hash Fssh_kex_c25519_hash #define kex_derive_keys Fssh_kex_derive_keys #define kex_derive_keys_bn Fssh_kex_derive_keys_bn #define kex_dh_hash Fssh_kex_dh_hash #define kex_ecdh_hash Fssh_kex_ecdh_hash #define kex_free Fssh_kex_free #define kex_free_newkeys Fssh_kex_free_newkeys #define kex_input_kexinit Fssh_kex_input_kexinit #define kex_input_newkeys Fssh_kex_input_newkeys #define kex_names_valid Fssh_kex_names_valid #define kex_new Fssh_kex_new #define kex_prop2buf Fssh_kex_prop2buf #define kex_prop_free Fssh_kex_prop_free #define kex_protocol_error Fssh_kex_protocol_error #define kex_send_kexinit Fssh_kex_send_kexinit #define kex_send_newkeys Fssh_kex_send_newkeys #define kex_setup Fssh_kex_setup #define kexc25519_client Fssh_kexc25519_client #define kexc25519_keygen Fssh_kexc25519_keygen #define kexc25519_server Fssh_kexc25519_server #define kexc25519_shared_key Fssh_kexc25519_shared_key #define kexdh_client Fssh_kexdh_client #define kexdh_server Fssh_kexdh_server #define kexecdh_client Fssh_kexecdh_client #define kexecdh_server Fssh_kexecdh_server #define kexgex_client Fssh_kexgex_client #define kexgex_hash Fssh_kexgex_hash #define kexgex_server Fssh_kexgex_server #define key_add_private Fssh_key_add_private #define key_alg_list Fssh_key_alg_list #define key_cert_check_authority Fssh_key_cert_check_authority #define key_cert_copy Fssh_key_cert_copy #define key_certify Fssh_key_certify #define key_demote Fssh_key_demote #define key_drop_cert Fssh_key_drop_cert #define key_ec_validate_private Fssh_key_ec_validate_private #define key_ec_validate_public Fssh_key_ec_validate_public #define key_from_blob Fssh_key_from_blob #define key_from_private Fssh_key_from_private #define key_generate Fssh_key_generate #define key_load_cert Fssh_key_load_cert #define key_load_file Fssh_key_load_file #define key_load_private Fssh_key_load_private #define key_load_private_cert Fssh_key_load_private_cert #define key_load_private_type Fssh_key_load_private_type #define key_load_public Fssh_key_load_public #define key_new_private Fssh_key_new_private #define key_perm_ok Fssh_key_perm_ok #define key_private_deserialize Fssh_key_private_deserialize #define key_private_serialize Fssh_key_private_serialize #define key_read Fssh_key_read #define key_save_private Fssh_key_save_private #define key_sign Fssh_key_sign #define key_to_blob Fssh_key_to_blob #define key_to_certified Fssh_key_to_certified #define key_verify Fssh_key_verify #define key_write Fssh_key_write #define load_hostkeys Fssh_load_hostkeys #define log_change_level Fssh_log_change_level #define log_facility_name Fssh_log_facility_name #define log_facility_number Fssh_log_facility_number #define log_init Fssh_log_init #define log_is_on_stderr Fssh_log_is_on_stderr #define log_level_name Fssh_log_level_name #define log_level_number Fssh_log_level_number #define log_redirect_stderr_to Fssh_log_redirect_stderr_to #define logit Fssh_logit #define lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type Fssh_lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type #define lowercase Fssh_lowercase #define mac_alg_list Fssh_mac_alg_list #define mac_clear Fssh_mac_clear #define mac_compute Fssh_mac_compute #define mac_init Fssh_mac_init #define mac_setup Fssh_mac_setup #define mac_valid Fssh_mac_valid #define match Fssh_match #define match_host_and_ip Fssh_match_host_and_ip #define match_hostname Fssh_match_hostname #define match_list Fssh_match_list #define match_maybe_hashed Fssh_match_maybe_hashed #define match_pattern Fssh_match_pattern #define match_pattern_list Fssh_match_pattern_list #define match_user Fssh_match_user #define mktemp_proto Fssh_mktemp_proto #define mm_choose_dh Fssh_mm_choose_dh #define mm_receive_fd Fssh_mm_receive_fd #define mm_send_fd Fssh_mm_send_fd #define mm_sshkey_sign Fssh_mm_sshkey_sign #define monotime Fssh_monotime #define ms_subtract_diff Fssh_ms_subtract_diff #define ms_to_timeval Fssh_ms_to_timeval #define mult Fssh_mult #define mysignal Fssh_mysignal #define newkeys_from_blob Fssh_newkeys_from_blob #define newkeys_to_blob Fssh_newkeys_to_blob #define nh_aux Fssh_nh_aux #define nh_final Fssh_nh_final #define packet_backup_state Fssh_packet_backup_state #define packet_close Fssh_packet_close #define packet_disconnect Fssh_packet_disconnect #define packet_get_char Fssh_packet_get_char #define packet_get_int Fssh_packet_get_int #define packet_process_incoming Fssh_packet_process_incoming #define packet_read_expect Fssh_packet_read_expect #define packet_read_poll_seqnr Fssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr #define packet_read_seqnr Fssh_packet_read_seqnr #define packet_restore_state Fssh_packet_restore_state #define packet_send_debug Fssh_packet_send_debug #define packet_set_connection Fssh_packet_set_connection #define packet_write_poll Fssh_packet_write_poll #define packet_write_wait Fssh_packet_write_wait #define parse_ipqos Fssh_parse_ipqos #define parse_prime Fssh_parse_prime #define percent_expand Fssh_percent_expand #define permanently_drop_suid Fssh_permanently_drop_suid #define permanently_set_uid Fssh_permanently_set_uid #define permitopen_port Fssh_permitopen_port #define pkcs11_add_provider Fssh_pkcs11_add_provider #define pkcs11_del_provider Fssh_pkcs11_del_provider #define pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter Fssh_pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter #define pkcs11_find Fssh_pkcs11_find #define pkcs11_init Fssh_pkcs11_init #define pkcs11_provider_finalize Fssh_pkcs11_provider_finalize #define pkcs11_provider_unref Fssh_pkcs11_provider_unref #define pkcs11_rsa_finish Fssh_pkcs11_rsa_finish #define pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt Fssh_pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt #define pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt Fssh_pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt #define pkcs11_terminate Fssh_pkcs11_terminate #define plain_key_blob Fssh_plain_key_blob #define poly1305_auth Fssh_poly1305_auth #define poly64 Fssh_poly64 #define poly_hash Fssh_poly_hash #define port_open_helper Fssh_port_open_helper #define prime_test Fssh_prime_test #define proto_spec Fssh_proto_spec #define put_bitmap Fssh_put_bitmap #define put_host_port Fssh_put_host_port #define put_u16 Fssh_put_u16 #define put_u32 Fssh_put_u32 #define put_u32_le Fssh_put_u32_le #define put_u64 Fssh_put_u64 #define pwcopy Fssh_pwcopy #define qfileout Fssh_qfileout #define read_keyfile_line Fssh_read_keyfile_line #define read_mux Fssh_read_mux #define read_passphrase Fssh_read_passphrase #define record_hostkey Fssh_record_hostkey #define reduce_add_sub Fssh_reduce_add_sub #define refresh_progress_meter Fssh_refresh_progress_meter #define replacearg Fssh_replacearg #define restore_uid Fssh_restore_uid #define revoke_blob Fssh_revoke_blob #define revoked_blob_tree_RB_REMOVE Fssh_revoked_blob_tree_RB_REMOVE #define revoked_certs_for_ca_key Fssh_revoked_certs_for_ca_key #define revoked_serial_tree_RB_REMOVE Fssh_revoked_serial_tree_RB_REMOVE #define rijndaelEncrypt Fssh_rijndaelEncrypt #define rijndaelKeySetupEnc Fssh_rijndaelKeySetupEnc #define rsa_generate_additional_parameters Fssh_rsa_generate_additional_parameters #define rsa_private_decrypt Fssh_rsa_private_decrypt #define rsa_public_encrypt Fssh_rsa_public_encrypt #define sanitise_stdfd Fssh_sanitise_stdfd #define scan_scaled Fssh_scan_scaled #define seed_rng Fssh_seed_rng #define set_log_handler Fssh_set_log_handler #define set_nodelay Fssh_set_nodelay #define set_nonblock Fssh_set_nonblock #define shadow_pw Fssh_shadow_pw #define sieve_large Fssh_sieve_large #define sig_winch Fssh_sig_winch #define sigdie Fssh_sigdie #define sock_set_v6only Fssh_sock_set_v6only #define square Fssh_square #define ssh1_3des_cbc Fssh_ssh1_3des_cbc #define ssh1_3des_cleanup Fssh_ssh1_3des_cleanup #define ssh1_3des_init Fssh_ssh1_3des_init #define ssh1_3des_iv Fssh_ssh1_3des_iv #define ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms Fssh_ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms #define ssh_add_hostkey Fssh_ssh_add_hostkey #define ssh_add_identity_constrained Fssh_ssh_add_identity_constrained #define ssh_agent_sign Fssh_ssh_agent_sign #define ssh_alloc_session_state Fssh_ssh_alloc_session_state #define ssh_close_authentication_socket Fssh_ssh_close_authentication_socket #define ssh_compatible_openssl Fssh_ssh_compatible_openssl #define ssh_crc32 Fssh_ssh_crc32 #define ssh_decrypt_challenge Fssh_ssh_decrypt_challenge #define ssh_digest_alg_by_name Fssh_ssh_digest_alg_by_name #define ssh_digest_alg_name Fssh_ssh_digest_alg_name #define ssh_digest_blocksize Fssh_ssh_digest_blocksize #define ssh_digest_buffer Fssh_ssh_digest_buffer #define ssh_digest_bytes Fssh_ssh_digest_bytes #define ssh_digest_copy_state Fssh_ssh_digest_copy_state #define ssh_digest_final Fssh_ssh_digest_final #define ssh_digest_free Fssh_ssh_digest_free #define ssh_digest_memory Fssh_ssh_digest_memory #define ssh_digest_start Fssh_ssh_digest_start #define ssh_digest_update Fssh_ssh_digest_update #define ssh_digest_update_buffer Fssh_ssh_digest_update_buffer #define ssh_dispatch_init Fssh_ssh_dispatch_init #define ssh_dispatch_range Fssh_ssh_dispatch_range #define ssh_dispatch_run Fssh_ssh_dispatch_run #define ssh_dispatch_run_fatal Fssh_ssh_dispatch_run_fatal #define ssh_dispatch_set Fssh_ssh_dispatch_set #define ssh_dss_sign Fssh_ssh_dss_sign #define ssh_dss_verify Fssh_ssh_dss_verify #define ssh_ecdsa_sign Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_sign #define ssh_ecdsa_verify Fssh_ssh_ecdsa_verify #define ssh_ed25519_sign Fssh_ssh_ed25519_sign #define ssh_ed25519_verify Fssh_ssh_ed25519_verify #define ssh_err Fssh_ssh_err #define ssh_fetch_identitylist Fssh_ssh_fetch_identitylist #define ssh_free Fssh_ssh_free #define ssh_free_identitylist Fssh_ssh_free_identitylist #define ssh_gai_strerror Fssh_ssh_gai_strerror #define ssh_get_app_data Fssh_ssh_get_app_data #define ssh_get_authentication_socket Fssh_ssh_get_authentication_socket #define ssh_get_progname Fssh_ssh_get_progname #define ssh_gssapi_build_ctx Fssh_ssh_gssapi_build_ctx #define ssh_gssapi_buildmic Fssh_ssh_gssapi_buildmic #define ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism Fssh_ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism #define ssh_gssapi_check_oid Fssh_ssh_gssapi_check_oid #define ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx Fssh_ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx #define ssh_gssapi_error Fssh_ssh_gssapi_error #define ssh_gssapi_import_name Fssh_ssh_gssapi_import_name #define ssh_gssapi_init_ctx Fssh_ssh_gssapi_init_ctx #define ssh_gssapi_last_error Fssh_ssh_gssapi_last_error #define ssh_gssapi_set_oid Fssh_ssh_gssapi_set_oid #define ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data Fssh_ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data #define ssh_gssapi_sign Fssh_ssh_gssapi_sign #define ssh_hmac_bytes Fssh_ssh_hmac_bytes #define ssh_hmac_final Fssh_ssh_hmac_final #define ssh_hmac_free Fssh_ssh_hmac_free #define ssh_hmac_init Fssh_ssh_hmac_init #define ssh_hmac_start Fssh_ssh_hmac_start #define ssh_hmac_update Fssh_ssh_hmac_update #define ssh_hmac_update_buffer Fssh_ssh_hmac_update_buffer #define ssh_init Fssh_ssh_init #define ssh_input_append Fssh_ssh_input_append #define ssh_input_space Fssh_ssh_input_space #define ssh_krl_check_key Fssh_ssh_krl_check_key #define ssh_krl_file_contains_key Fssh_ssh_krl_file_contains_key #define ssh_krl_free Fssh_ssh_krl_free #define ssh_krl_from_blob Fssh_ssh_krl_from_blob #define ssh_krl_init Fssh_ssh_krl_init #define ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id #define ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial #define ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range #define ssh_krl_revoke_key Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_key #define ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit #define ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1 Fssh_ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1 #define ssh_krl_set_comment Fssh_ssh_krl_set_comment #define ssh_krl_set_version Fssh_ssh_krl_set_version #define ssh_krl_to_blob Fssh_ssh_krl_to_blob #define ssh_lock_agent Fssh_ssh_lock_agent #define ssh_msg_recv Fssh_ssh_msg_recv #define ssh_msg_send Fssh_ssh_msg_send #define ssh_output_consume Fssh_ssh_output_consume #define ssh_output_ptr Fssh_ssh_output_ptr #define ssh_output_space Fssh_ssh_output_space #define ssh_packet_backup_state Fssh_ssh_packet_backup_state #define ssh_packet_close Fssh_ssh_packet_close #define ssh_packet_connection_af Fssh_ssh_packet_connection_af #define ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket Fssh_ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket #define ssh_packet_disconnect Fssh_ssh_packet_disconnect #define ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress Fssh_ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress #define ssh_packet_get_bignum Fssh_ssh_packet_get_bignum #define ssh_packet_get_bignum2 Fssh_ssh_packet_get_bignum2 #define ssh_packet_get_bytes Fssh_ssh_packet_get_bytes #define ssh_packet_get_char Fssh_ssh_packet_get_char #define ssh_packet_get_connection_in Fssh_ssh_packet_get_connection_in #define ssh_packet_get_connection_out Fssh_ssh_packet_get_connection_out #define ssh_packet_get_cstring Fssh_ssh_packet_get_cstring #define ssh_packet_get_ecpoint Fssh_ssh_packet_get_ecpoint #define ssh_packet_get_input Fssh_ssh_packet_get_input #define ssh_packet_get_int Fssh_ssh_packet_get_int #define ssh_packet_get_int64 Fssh_ssh_packet_get_int64 #define ssh_packet_get_maxsize Fssh_ssh_packet_get_maxsize #define ssh_packet_get_output Fssh_ssh_packet_get_output #define ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags Fssh_ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags #define ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout Fssh_ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout #define ssh_packet_get_state Fssh_ssh_packet_get_state #define ssh_packet_get_string Fssh_ssh_packet_get_string #define ssh_packet_get_string_ptr Fssh_ssh_packet_get_string_ptr #define ssh_packet_have_data_to_write Fssh_ssh_packet_have_data_to_write #define ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts Fssh_ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts #define ssh_packet_is_interactive Fssh_ssh_packet_is_interactive #define ssh_packet_need_rekeying Fssh_ssh_packet_need_rekeying #define ssh_packet_next Fssh_ssh_packet_next #define ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write Fssh_ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write #define ssh_packet_payload Fssh_ssh_packet_payload #define ssh_packet_process_incoming Fssh_ssh_packet_process_incoming #define ssh_packet_put Fssh_ssh_packet_put #define ssh_packet_put_bignum Fssh_ssh_packet_put_bignum #define ssh_packet_put_bignum2 Fssh_ssh_packet_put_bignum2 #define ssh_packet_put_char Fssh_ssh_packet_put_char #define ssh_packet_put_cstring Fssh_ssh_packet_put_cstring #define ssh_packet_put_ecpoint Fssh_ssh_packet_put_ecpoint #define ssh_packet_put_int Fssh_ssh_packet_put_int #define ssh_packet_put_int64 Fssh_ssh_packet_put_int64 #define ssh_packet_put_raw Fssh_ssh_packet_put_raw #define ssh_packet_put_string Fssh_ssh_packet_put_string #define ssh_packet_read Fssh_ssh_packet_read #define ssh_packet_read_expect Fssh_ssh_packet_read_expect #define ssh_packet_read_poll1 Fssh_ssh_packet_read_poll1 #define ssh_packet_read_poll2 Fssh_ssh_packet_read_poll2 #define ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr Fssh_ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr #define ssh_packet_read_seqnr Fssh_ssh_packet_read_seqnr #define ssh_packet_remaining Fssh_ssh_packet_remaining #define ssh_packet_restore_state Fssh_ssh_packet_restore_state #define ssh_packet_send Fssh_ssh_packet_send #define ssh_packet_send1 Fssh_ssh_packet_send1 #define ssh_packet_send2 Fssh_ssh_packet_send2 #define ssh_packet_send2_wrapped Fssh_ssh_packet_send2_wrapped #define ssh_packet_send_debug Fssh_ssh_packet_send_debug #define ssh_packet_send_ignore Fssh_ssh_packet_send_ignore #define ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts Fssh_ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts #define ssh_packet_set_authenticated Fssh_ssh_packet_set_authenticated #define ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks Fssh_ssh_packet_set_compress_hooks #define ssh_packet_set_connection Fssh_ssh_packet_set_connection #define ssh_packet_set_encryption_key Fssh_ssh_packet_set_encryption_key #define ssh_packet_set_interactive Fssh_ssh_packet_set_interactive #define ssh_packet_set_maxsize Fssh_ssh_packet_set_maxsize #define ssh_packet_set_nonblocking Fssh_ssh_packet_set_nonblocking #define ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags Fssh_ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags #define ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits Fssh_ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits #define ssh_packet_set_server Fssh_ssh_packet_set_server #define ssh_packet_set_state Fssh_ssh_packet_set_state #define ssh_packet_set_timeout Fssh_ssh_packet_set_timeout #define ssh_packet_set_tos Fssh_ssh_packet_set_tos #define ssh_packet_start Fssh_ssh_packet_start #define ssh_packet_start_compression Fssh_ssh_packet_start_compression #define ssh_packet_start_discard Fssh_ssh_packet_start_discard #define ssh_packet_stop_discard Fssh_ssh_packet_stop_discard #define ssh_packet_write_poll Fssh_ssh_packet_write_poll #define ssh_packet_write_wait Fssh_ssh_packet_write_wait #define ssh_remote_ipaddr Fssh_ssh_remote_ipaddr #define ssh_remove_all_identities Fssh_ssh_remove_all_identities #define ssh_remove_identity Fssh_ssh_remove_identity #define ssh_request_reply Fssh_ssh_request_reply #define ssh_rsa_sign Fssh_ssh_rsa_sign #define ssh_rsa_verify Fssh_ssh_rsa_verify #define ssh_set_app_data Fssh_ssh_set_app_data #define ssh_set_newkeys Fssh_ssh_set_newkeys #define ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback Fssh_ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback #define ssh_update_card Fssh_ssh_update_card #define sshbuf_alloc Fssh_sshbuf_alloc #define sshbuf_avail Fssh_sshbuf_avail #define sshbuf_b64tod Fssh_sshbuf_b64tod #define sshbuf_check_reserve Fssh_sshbuf_check_reserve #define sshbuf_consume Fssh_sshbuf_consume #define sshbuf_consume_end Fssh_sshbuf_consume_end #define sshbuf_dtob16 Fssh_sshbuf_dtob16 #define sshbuf_dtob64 Fssh_sshbuf_dtob64 #define sshbuf_dump Fssh_sshbuf_dump #define sshbuf_dump_data Fssh_sshbuf_dump_data #define sshbuf_free Fssh_sshbuf_free #define sshbuf_from Fssh_sshbuf_from #define sshbuf_fromb Fssh_sshbuf_fromb #define sshbuf_froms Fssh_sshbuf_froms #define sshbuf_get Fssh_sshbuf_get #define sshbuf_get_bignum1 Fssh_sshbuf_get_bignum1 #define sshbuf_get_bignum2 Fssh_sshbuf_get_bignum2 #define sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct Fssh_sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct #define sshbuf_get_cstring Fssh_sshbuf_get_cstring #define sshbuf_get_ec Fssh_sshbuf_get_ec #define sshbuf_get_eckey Fssh_sshbuf_get_eckey #define sshbuf_get_string Fssh_sshbuf_get_string #define sshbuf_get_string_direct Fssh_sshbuf_get_string_direct #define sshbuf_get_stringb Fssh_sshbuf_get_stringb #define sshbuf_get_u16 Fssh_sshbuf_get_u16 #define sshbuf_get_u32 Fssh_sshbuf_get_u32 #define sshbuf_get_u64 Fssh_sshbuf_get_u64 #define sshbuf_get_u8 Fssh_sshbuf_get_u8 #define sshbuf_init Fssh_sshbuf_init #define sshbuf_len Fssh_sshbuf_len #define sshbuf_max_size Fssh_sshbuf_max_size #define sshbuf_mutable_ptr Fssh_sshbuf_mutable_ptr #define sshbuf_new Fssh_sshbuf_new #define sshbuf_parent Fssh_sshbuf_parent #define sshbuf_peek_string_direct Fssh_sshbuf_peek_string_direct #define sshbuf_ptr Fssh_sshbuf_ptr #define sshbuf_put Fssh_sshbuf_put #define sshbuf_put_bignum1 Fssh_sshbuf_put_bignum1 #define sshbuf_put_bignum2 Fssh_sshbuf_put_bignum2 #define sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes Fssh_sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes #define sshbuf_put_cstring Fssh_sshbuf_put_cstring #define sshbuf_put_ec Fssh_sshbuf_put_ec #define sshbuf_put_eckey Fssh_sshbuf_put_eckey #define sshbuf_put_string Fssh_sshbuf_put_string #define sshbuf_put_stringb Fssh_sshbuf_put_stringb #define sshbuf_put_u16 Fssh_sshbuf_put_u16 #define sshbuf_put_u32 Fssh_sshbuf_put_u32 #define sshbuf_put_u64 Fssh_sshbuf_put_u64 #define sshbuf_put_u8 Fssh_sshbuf_put_u8 #define sshbuf_putb Fssh_sshbuf_putb #define sshbuf_putf Fssh_sshbuf_putf #define sshbuf_putfv Fssh_sshbuf_putfv #define sshbuf_refcount Fssh_sshbuf_refcount #define sshbuf_reserve Fssh_sshbuf_reserve #define sshbuf_reset Fssh_sshbuf_reset #define sshbuf_set_max_size Fssh_sshbuf_set_max_size #define sshbuf_set_parent Fssh_sshbuf_set_parent #define sshkey_add_private Fssh_sshkey_add_private #define sshkey_cert_check_authority Fssh_sshkey_cert_check_authority #define sshkey_cert_copy Fssh_sshkey_cert_copy #define sshkey_cert_is_legacy Fssh_sshkey_cert_is_legacy #define sshkey_cert_type Fssh_sshkey_cert_type #define sshkey_certify Fssh_sshkey_certify #define sshkey_check_revoked Fssh_sshkey_check_revoked #define sshkey_curve_name_to_nid Fssh_sshkey_curve_name_to_nid #define sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits Fssh_sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits #define sshkey_curve_nid_to_name Fssh_sshkey_curve_nid_to_name #define sshkey_demote Fssh_sshkey_demote #define sshkey_drop_cert Fssh_sshkey_drop_cert #define sshkey_dump_ec_key Fssh_sshkey_dump_ec_key #define sshkey_dump_ec_point Fssh_sshkey_dump_ec_point #define sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg Fssh_sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg #define sshkey_ec_validate_private Fssh_sshkey_ec_validate_private #define sshkey_ec_validate_public Fssh_sshkey_ec_validate_public #define sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid Fssh_sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid #define sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid Fssh_sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid #define sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name Fssh_sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name #define sshkey_equal Fssh_sshkey_equal #define sshkey_equal_public Fssh_sshkey_equal_public #define sshkey_fingerprint Fssh_sshkey_fingerprint #define sshkey_fingerprint_raw Fssh_sshkey_fingerprint_raw #define sshkey_free Fssh_sshkey_free #define sshkey_from_blob Fssh_sshkey_from_blob #define sshkey_from_blob_internal Fssh_sshkey_from_blob_internal #define sshkey_from_private Fssh_sshkey_from_private #define sshkey_fromb Fssh_sshkey_fromb #define sshkey_froms Fssh_sshkey_froms #define sshkey_generate Fssh_sshkey_generate #define sshkey_in_file Fssh_sshkey_in_file #define sshkey_is_cert Fssh_sshkey_is_cert #define sshkey_load_cert Fssh_sshkey_load_cert #define sshkey_load_file Fssh_sshkey_load_file #define sshkey_load_private Fssh_sshkey_load_private #define sshkey_load_private_cert Fssh_sshkey_load_private_cert #define sshkey_load_private_type Fssh_sshkey_load_private_type #define sshkey_load_private_type_fd Fssh_sshkey_load_private_type_fd #define sshkey_load_public Fssh_sshkey_load_public #define sshkey_names_valid2 Fssh_sshkey_names_valid2 #define sshkey_new Fssh_sshkey_new #define sshkey_new_private Fssh_sshkey_new_private #define sshkey_parse_private2 Fssh_sshkey_parse_private2 #define sshkey_parse_private_fileblob Fssh_sshkey_parse_private_fileblob #define sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type Fssh_sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type #define sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob Fssh_sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob #define sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob Fssh_sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob #define sshkey_perm_ok Fssh_sshkey_perm_ok #define sshkey_plain_to_blob Fssh_sshkey_plain_to_blob #define sshkey_private_deserialize Fssh_sshkey_private_deserialize #define sshkey_private_serialize Fssh_sshkey_private_serialize #define sshkey_private_to_blob2 Fssh_sshkey_private_to_blob2 #define sshkey_private_to_fileblob Fssh_sshkey_private_to_fileblob #define sshkey_putb Fssh_sshkey_putb #define sshkey_putb_plain Fssh_sshkey_putb_plain #define sshkey_puts Fssh_sshkey_puts #define sshkey_read Fssh_sshkey_read #define sshkey_save_private Fssh_sshkey_save_private #define sshkey_sign Fssh_sshkey_sign #define sshkey_size Fssh_sshkey_size #define sshkey_ssh_name Fssh_sshkey_ssh_name #define sshkey_ssh_name_plain Fssh_sshkey_ssh_name_plain +#define sshkey_to_base64 Fssh_sshkey_to_base64 #define sshkey_to_blob Fssh_sshkey_to_blob #define sshkey_to_certified Fssh_sshkey_to_certified #define sshkey_try_load_public Fssh_sshkey_try_load_public #define sshkey_type Fssh_sshkey_type #define sshkey_type_from_name Fssh_sshkey_type_from_name #define sshkey_type_is_cert Fssh_sshkey_type_is_cert #define sshkey_type_plain Fssh_sshkey_type_plain #define sshkey_verify Fssh_sshkey_verify #define sshkey_write Fssh_sshkey_write #define sshpkt_add_padding Fssh_sshpkt_add_padding #define sshpkt_disconnect Fssh_sshpkt_disconnect #define sshpkt_fatal Fssh_sshpkt_fatal #define sshpkt_get Fssh_sshpkt_get #define sshpkt_get_bignum1 Fssh_sshpkt_get_bignum1 #define sshpkt_get_bignum2 Fssh_sshpkt_get_bignum2 #define sshpkt_get_cstring Fssh_sshpkt_get_cstring #define sshpkt_get_ec Fssh_sshpkt_get_ec #define sshpkt_get_end Fssh_sshpkt_get_end #define sshpkt_get_string Fssh_sshpkt_get_string #define sshpkt_get_string_direct Fssh_sshpkt_get_string_direct #define sshpkt_get_u32 Fssh_sshpkt_get_u32 #define sshpkt_get_u64 Fssh_sshpkt_get_u64 #define sshpkt_get_u8 Fssh_sshpkt_get_u8 #define sshpkt_ptr Fssh_sshpkt_ptr #define sshpkt_put Fssh_sshpkt_put #define sshpkt_put_bignum1 Fssh_sshpkt_put_bignum1 #define sshpkt_put_bignum2 Fssh_sshpkt_put_bignum2 #define sshpkt_put_cstring Fssh_sshpkt_put_cstring #define sshpkt_put_ec Fssh_sshpkt_put_ec #define sshpkt_put_string Fssh_sshpkt_put_string #define sshpkt_put_stringb Fssh_sshpkt_put_stringb #define sshpkt_put_u32 Fssh_sshpkt_put_u32 #define sshpkt_put_u64 Fssh_sshpkt_put_u64 #define sshpkt_put_u8 Fssh_sshpkt_put_u8 #define sshpkt_putb Fssh_sshpkt_putb #define sshpkt_send Fssh_sshpkt_send #define sshpkt_start Fssh_sshpkt_start #define start_progress_meter Fssh_start_progress_meter #define stop_progress_meter Fssh_stop_progress_meter #define strdelim Fssh_strdelim #define strnvis Fssh_strnvis #define strvis Fssh_strvis #define strvisx Fssh_strvisx #define sys_tun_open Fssh_sys_tun_open #define temporarily_use_uid Fssh_temporarily_use_uid #define tilde_expand_filename Fssh_tilde_expand_filename #define timingsafe_bcmp Fssh_timingsafe_bcmp #define to_blob Fssh_to_blob #define to_blob_buf Fssh_to_blob_buf #define tohex Fssh_tohex #define tty_make_modes Fssh_tty_make_modes #define tty_parse_modes Fssh_tty_parse_modes #define tun_open Fssh_tun_open #define umac128_delete Fssh_umac128_delete #define umac128_final Fssh_umac128_final #define umac128_new Fssh_umac128_new #define umac128_update Fssh_umac128_update #define umac_delete Fssh_umac_delete #define umac_final Fssh_umac_final #define umac_new Fssh_umac_new #define umac_update Fssh_umac_update #define uncompress_buffer Fssh_uncompress_buffer #define unix_listener Fssh_unix_listener #define unset_nonblock Fssh_unset_nonblock #define update_progress_meter Fssh_update_progress_meter #define uudecode Fssh_uudecode #define uuencode Fssh_uuencode #define verbose Fssh_verbose #define verify_host_key_dns Fssh_verify_host_key_dns #define vis Fssh_vis #define write_host_entry Fssh_write_host_entry #define x11_connect_display Fssh_x11_connect_display #define x11_create_display_inet Fssh_x11_create_display_inet #define x11_input_open Fssh_x11_input_open #define x11_open_helper Fssh_x11_open_helper #define x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing Fssh_x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing #define xasprintf Fssh_xasprintf #define xcalloc Fssh_xcalloc #define xcrypt Fssh_xcrypt #define xmalloc Fssh_xmalloc #define xmmap Fssh_xmmap #define xrealloc Fssh_xrealloc +#define xreallocarray Fssh_xreallocarray #define xstrdup Fssh_xstrdup Index: head/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-misc.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-misc.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/sshbuf-misc.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,138 +1,138 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-misc.c,v 1.3 2015/02/05 12:59:57 millert Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-misc.c,v 1.4 2015/03/24 20:03:44 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include "ssherr.h" #define SSHBUF_INTERNAL #include "sshbuf.h" void sshbuf_dump_data(const void *s, size_t len, FILE *f) { size_t i, j; const u_char *p = (const u_char *)s; for (i = 0; i < len; i += 16) { - fprintf(f, "%.4zd: ", i); + fprintf(f, "%.4zu: ", i); for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) { if (j < len) fprintf(f, "%02x ", p[j]); else fprintf(f, " "); } fprintf(f, " "); for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) { if (j < len) { if (isascii(p[j]) && isprint(p[j])) fprintf(f, "%c", p[j]); else fprintf(f, "."); } } fprintf(f, "\n"); } } void sshbuf_dump(struct sshbuf *buf, FILE *f) { fprintf(f, "buffer %p len = %zu\n", buf, sshbuf_len(buf)); sshbuf_dump_data(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), f); } char * sshbuf_dtob16(struct sshbuf *buf) { size_t i, j, len = sshbuf_len(buf); const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); char *ret; const char hex[] = "0123456789abcdef"; if (len == 0) return strdup(""); if (SIZE_MAX / 2 <= len || (ret = malloc(len * 2 + 1)) == NULL) return NULL; for (i = j = 0; i < len; i++) { ret[j++] = hex[(p[i] >> 4) & 0xf]; ret[j++] = hex[p[i] & 0xf]; } ret[j] = '\0'; return ret; } char * sshbuf_dtob64(struct sshbuf *buf) { size_t len = sshbuf_len(buf), plen; const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); char *ret; int r; if (len == 0) return strdup(""); plen = ((len + 2) / 3) * 4 + 1; if (SIZE_MAX / 2 <= len || (ret = malloc(plen)) == NULL) return NULL; if ((r = b64_ntop(p, len, ret, plen)) == -1) { bzero(ret, plen); free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } int sshbuf_b64tod(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *b64) { size_t plen = strlen(b64); int nlen, r; u_char *p; if (plen == 0) return 0; if ((p = malloc(plen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((nlen = b64_pton(b64, p, plen)) < 0) { bzero(p, plen); free(p); return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, p, nlen)) < 0) { bzero(p, plen); free(p); return r; } bzero(p, plen); free(p); return 0; } Index: head/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/sshconnect.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,1489 +1,1490 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.259 2015/01/28 22:36:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.262 2015/05/28 05:41:29 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the * login (authentication) dialog. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include /* roundup */ #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "packet.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "compat.h" #include "key.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "dns.h" #include "roaming.h" #include "monitor_fdpass.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "version.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "ssherr.h" char *client_version_string = NULL; char *server_version_string = NULL; Key *previous_host_key = NULL; static int matching_host_key_dns = 0; static pid_t proxy_command_pid = 0; /* import */ extern Options options; extern char *__progname; extern uid_t original_real_uid; extern uid_t original_effective_uid; static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *, Key *); static void warn_changed_key(Key *); /* Expand a proxy command */ static char * expand_proxy_command(const char *proxy_command, const char *user, const char *host, int port) { char *tmp, *ret, strport[NI_MAXSERV]; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); xasprintf(&tmp, "exec %s", proxy_command); ret = percent_expand(tmp, "h", host, "p", strport, "r", options.user, (char *)NULL); free(tmp); return ret; } /* * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command that passes a * a connected fd back to us. */ static int ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command) { char *command_string; int sp[2], sock; pid_t pid; char *shell; if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL) shell = _PATH_BSHELL; if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sp) < 0) fatal("Could not create socketpair to communicate with " "proxy dialer: %.100s", strerror(errno)); command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user, host, port); debug("Executing proxy dialer command: %.500s", command_string); /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { char *argv[10]; /* Child. Permanently give up superuser privileges. */ permanently_drop_suid(original_real_uid); close(sp[1]); /* Redirect stdin and stdout. */ if (sp[0] != 0) { if (dup2(sp[0], 0) < 0) perror("dup2 stdin"); } if (sp[0] != 1) { if (dup2(sp[0], 1) < 0) perror("dup2 stdout"); } if (sp[0] >= 2) close(sp[0]); /* * Stderr is left as it is so that error messages get * printed on the user's terminal. */ argv[0] = shell; argv[1] = "-c"; argv[2] = command_string; argv[3] = NULL; /* * Execute the proxy command. * Note that we gave up any extra privileges above. */ execv(argv[0], argv); perror(argv[0]); exit(1); } /* Parent. */ if (pid < 0) fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(sp[0]); free(command_string); if ((sock = mm_receive_fd(sp[1])) == -1) fatal("proxy dialer did not pass back a connection"); while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Set the connection file descriptors. */ packet_set_connection(sock, sock); return 0; } /* * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command. */ static int ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command) { char *command_string; int pin[2], pout[2]; pid_t pid; char *shell; if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0') shell = _PATH_BSHELL; /* Create pipes for communicating with the proxy. */ if (pipe(pin) < 0 || pipe(pout) < 0) fatal("Could not create pipes to communicate with the proxy: %.100s", strerror(errno)); command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user, host, port); debug("Executing proxy command: %.500s", command_string); /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { char *argv[10]; /* Child. Permanently give up superuser privileges. */ permanently_drop_suid(original_real_uid); /* Redirect stdin and stdout. */ close(pin[1]); if (pin[0] != 0) { if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0) perror("dup2 stdin"); close(pin[0]); } close(pout[0]); if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0) perror("dup2 stdout"); /* Cannot be 1 because pin allocated two descriptors. */ close(pout[1]); /* Stderr is left as it is so that error messages get printed on the user's terminal. */ argv[0] = shell; argv[1] = "-c"; argv[2] = command_string; argv[3] = NULL; /* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any extra privileges above. */ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); execv(argv[0], argv); perror(argv[0]); exit(1); } /* Parent. */ if (pid < 0) fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); else proxy_command_pid = pid; /* save pid to clean up later */ /* Close child side of the descriptors. */ close(pin[0]); close(pout[1]); /* Free the command name. */ free(command_string); /* Set the connection file descriptors. */ packet_set_connection(pout[0], pin[1]); /* Indicate OK return */ return 0; } void ssh_kill_proxy_command(void) { /* * Send SIGHUP to proxy command if used. We don't wait() in * case it hangs and instead rely on init to reap the child */ if (proxy_command_pid > 1) kill(proxy_command_pid, SIGHUP); } /* * Creates a (possibly privileged) socket for use as the ssh connection. */ static int ssh_create_socket(int privileged, struct addrinfo *ai) { int sock, r, gaierr; struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL; sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock < 0) { error("socket: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); /* Bind the socket to an alternative local IP address */ if (options.bind_address == NULL && !privileged) return sock; if (options.bind_address) { memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = ai->ai_family; hints.ai_socktype = ai->ai_socktype; hints.ai_protocol = ai->ai_protocol; hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; gaierr = getaddrinfo(options.bind_address, NULL, &hints, &res); if (gaierr) { error("getaddrinfo: %s: %s", options.bind_address, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); close(sock); return -1; } } /* * If we are running as root and want to connect to a privileged * port, bind our own socket to a privileged port. */ if (privileged) { PRIV_START; r = bindresvport_sa(sock, res ? res->ai_addr : NULL); PRIV_END; if (r < 0) { error("bindresvport_sa: af=%d %s", ai->ai_family, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } } else { if (bind(sock, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0) { error("bind: %s: %s", options.bind_address, strerror(errno)); fail: close(sock); freeaddrinfo(res); return -1; } } if (res != NULL) freeaddrinfo(res); return sock; } static int timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr, socklen_t addrlen, int *timeoutp) { fd_set *fdset; struct timeval tv, t_start; socklen_t optlen; int optval, rc, result = -1; gettimeofday(&t_start, NULL); if (*timeoutp <= 0) { result = connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen); goto done; } set_nonblock(sockfd); rc = connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen); if (rc == 0) { unset_nonblock(sockfd); result = 0; goto done; } if (errno != EINPROGRESS) { result = -1; goto done; } fdset = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(sockfd + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask)); FD_SET(sockfd, fdset); ms_to_timeval(&tv, *timeoutp); for (;;) { rc = select(sockfd + 1, NULL, fdset, NULL, &tv); if (rc != -1 || errno != EINTR) break; } switch (rc) { case 0: /* Timed out */ errno = ETIMEDOUT; break; case -1: /* Select error */ debug("select: %s", strerror(errno)); break; case 1: /* Completed or failed */ optval = 0; optlen = sizeof(optval); if (getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, &optlen) == -1) { debug("getsockopt: %s", strerror(errno)); break; } if (optval != 0) { errno = optval; break; } result = 0; unset_nonblock(sockfd); break; default: /* Should not occur */ fatal("Bogus return (%d) from select()", rc); } free(fdset); done: if (result == 0 && *timeoutp > 0) { ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, timeoutp); if (*timeoutp <= 0) { errno = ETIMEDOUT; result = -1; } } return (result); } /* * Opens a TCP/IP connection to the remote server on the given host. * The address of the remote host will be returned in hostaddr. * If port is 0, the default port will be used. If needpriv is true, * a privileged port will be allocated to make the connection. * This requires super-user privileges if needpriv is true. * Connection_attempts specifies the maximum number of tries (one per * second). If proxy_command is non-NULL, it specifies the command (with %h * and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact * the daemon. */ static int ssh_connect_direct(const char *host, struct addrinfo *aitop, struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family, int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive, int needpriv) { int on = 1; int sock = -1, attempt; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; struct addrinfo *ai; debug2("ssh_connect: needpriv %d", needpriv); for (attempt = 0; attempt < connection_attempts; attempt++) { if (attempt > 0) { /* Sleep a moment before retrying. */ sleep(1); debug("Trying again..."); } /* * Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in * sequence until the connection succeeds. */ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { error("ssh_connect: getnameinfo failed"); continue; } debug("Connecting to %.200s [%.100s] port %s.", host, ntop, strport); /* Create a socket for connecting. */ sock = ssh_create_socket(needpriv, ai); if (sock < 0) /* Any error is already output */ continue; if (timeout_connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, timeout_ms) >= 0) { /* Successful connection. */ memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen); break; } else { debug("connect to address %s port %s: %s", ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); close(sock); sock = -1; } } if (sock != -1) break; /* Successful connection. */ } /* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */ if (sock == -1) { error("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s", host, strport, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } debug("Connection established."); /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */ if (want_keepalive && setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)) < 0) error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); /* Set the connection. */ packet_set_connection(sock, sock); return 0; } int ssh_connect(const char *host, struct addrinfo *addrs, struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family, int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive, int needpriv) { if (options.proxy_command == NULL) { return ssh_connect_direct(host, addrs, hostaddr, port, family, connection_attempts, timeout_ms, want_keepalive, needpriv); } else if (strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0) { packet_set_connection(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO); return 0; /* Always succeeds */ } else if (options.proxy_use_fdpass) { return ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(host, port, options.proxy_command); } return ssh_proxy_connect(host, port, options.proxy_command); } static void send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1) { /* Send our own protocol version identification. */ xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s", compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, compat20 ? PROTOCOL_MINOR_2 : minor1, SSH_VERSION, *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ", options.version_addendum, compat20 ? "\r\n" : "\n"); if (roaming_atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, client_version_string, strlen(client_version_string)) != strlen(client_version_string)) fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno)); chop(client_version_string); debug("Local version string %.100s", client_version_string); } /* * Waits for the server identification string, and sends our own * identification string. */ void ssh_exchange_identification(int timeout_ms) { char buf[256], remote_version[256]; /* must be same size! */ int remote_major, remote_minor, mismatch; int connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); int connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); int minor1 = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1, client_banner_sent = 0; u_int i, n; size_t len; int fdsetsz, remaining, rc; struct timeval t_start, t_remaining; fd_set *fdset; fdsetsz = howmany(connection_in + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); fdset = xcalloc(1, fdsetsz); /* * If we are SSH2-only then we can send the banner immediately and * save a round-trip. */ if (options.protocol == SSH_PROTO_2) { enable_compat20(); send_client_banner(connection_out, 0); client_banner_sent = 1; } /* Read other side's version identification. */ remaining = timeout_ms; for (n = 0;;) { for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) { if (timeout_ms > 0) { gettimeofday(&t_start, NULL); ms_to_timeval(&t_remaining, remaining); FD_SET(connection_in, fdset); rc = select(connection_in + 1, fdset, NULL, fdset, &t_remaining); ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, &remaining); if (rc == 0 || remaining <= 0) fatal("Connection timed out during " "banner exchange"); if (rc == -1) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: " "select: %s", strerror(errno)); } } len = roaming_atomicio(read, connection_in, &buf[i], 1); if (len != 1 && errno == EPIPE) fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: " "Connection closed by remote host"); else if (len != 1) fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: " "read: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (buf[i] == '\r') { buf[i] = '\n'; buf[i + 1] = 0; continue; /**XXX wait for \n */ } if (buf[i] == '\n') { buf[i + 1] = 0; break; } if (++n > 65536) fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: " "No banner received"); } buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; if (strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0) break; debug("ssh_exchange_identification: %s", buf); } server_version_string = xstrdup(buf); free(fdset); /* * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. */ if (sscanf(server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) fatal("Bad remote protocol version identification: '%.100s'", buf); debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s", remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); active_state->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version); mismatch = 0; switch (remote_major) { case 1: if (remote_minor == 99 && (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED)) { enable_compat20(); break; } if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) { mismatch = 1; break; } if (remote_minor < 3) { fatal("Remote machine has too old SSH software version."); } else if (remote_minor == 3 || remote_minor == 4) { /* We speak 1.3, too. */ enable_compat13(); minor1 = 3; if (options.forward_agent) { logit("Agent forwarding disabled for protocol 1.3"); options.forward_agent = 0; } } break; case 2: if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { enable_compat20(); break; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: mismatch = 1; break; } if (mismatch) fatal("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d", (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, remote_major); if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY) != 0) fatal("Server version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe key agreement; " "refusing connection", remote_version); if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) logit("Server version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature " "scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version); if (!client_banner_sent) send_client_banner(connection_out, minor1); chop(server_version_string); } /* defaults to 'no' */ static int confirm(const char *prompt) { const char *msg, *again = "Please type 'yes' or 'no': "; char *p; int ret = -1; if (options.batch_mode) return 0; for (msg = prompt;;msg = again) { p = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ECHO); if (p == NULL || (p[0] == '\0') || (p[0] == '\n') || strncasecmp(p, "no", 2) == 0) ret = 0; if (p && strncasecmp(p, "yes", 3) == 0) ret = 1; free(p); if (ret != -1) return ret; } } static int check_host_cert(const char *host, const Key *host_key) { const char *reason; if (key_cert_check_authority(host_key, 1, 0, host, &reason) != 0) { error("%s", reason); return 0; } if (buffer_len(host_key->cert->critical) != 0) { error("Certificate for %s contains unsupported " "critical options(s)", host); return 0; } return 1; } static int sockaddr_is_local(struct sockaddr *hostaddr) { switch (hostaddr->sa_family) { case AF_INET: return (ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)hostaddr)-> sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET; case AF_INET6: return IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK( &(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)hostaddr)->sin6_addr)); default: return 0; } } /* * Prepare the hostname and ip address strings that are used to lookup * host keys in known_hosts files. These may have a port number appended. */ void get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, char **hostfile_hostname, char **hostfile_ipaddr) { char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; socklen_t addrlen; switch (hostaddr == NULL ? -1 : hostaddr->sa_family) { case -1: addrlen = 0; break; case AF_INET: addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); break; case AF_INET6: addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); break; default: addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr); break; } /* * We don't have the remote ip-address for connections * using a proxy command */ if (hostfile_ipaddr != NULL) { if (options.proxy_command == NULL) { if (getnameinfo(hostaddr, addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0) fatal("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__); *hostfile_ipaddr = put_host_port(ntop, port); } else { *hostfile_ipaddr = xstrdup(""); } } /* * Allow the user to record the key under a different name or * differentiate a non-standard port. This is useful for ssh * tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run multiple * sshd's on different ports on the same machine. */ if (hostfile_hostname != NULL) { if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) { *hostfile_hostname = xstrdup(options.host_key_alias); debug("using hostkeyalias: %s", *hostfile_hostname); } else { *hostfile_hostname = put_host_port(hostname, port); } } } /* * check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key * is not valid. user_hostfile[0] will not be updated if 'readonly' is true. */ #define RDRW 0 #define RDONLY 1 #define ROQUIET 2 static int check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, Key *host_key, int readonly, char **user_hostfiles, u_int num_user_hostfiles, char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles) { HostStatus host_status; HostStatus ip_status; Key *raw_key = NULL; char *ip = NULL, *host = NULL; char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp, *ra; char msg[1024]; const char *type; const struct hostkey_entry *host_found, *ip_found; int len, cancelled_forwarding = 0; int local = sockaddr_is_local(hostaddr); int r, want_cert = key_is_cert(host_key), host_ip_differ = 0; int hostkey_trusted = 0; /* Known or explicitly accepted by user */ struct hostkeys *host_hostkeys, *ip_hostkeys; u_int i; /* * Force accepting of the host key for loopback/localhost. The * problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to multiple * machines, localhost will refer to a different machine in each of * them, and the user will get bogus HOST_CHANGED warnings. This * essentially disables host authentication for localhost; however, * this is probably not a real problem. */ if (options.no_host_authentication_for_localhost == 1 && local && options.host_key_alias == NULL) { debug("Forcing accepting of host key for " "loopback/localhost."); return 0; } /* * Prepare the hostname and address strings used for hostkey lookup. * In some cases, these will have a port number appended. */ get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(hostname, hostaddr, port, &host, &ip); /* * Turn off check_host_ip if the connection is to localhost, via proxy * command or if we don't have a hostname to compare with */ if (options.check_host_ip && (local || strcmp(hostname, ip) == 0 || options.proxy_command != NULL)) options.check_host_ip = 0; host_hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, user_hostfiles[i]); for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, system_hostfiles[i]); ip_hostkeys = NULL; if (!want_cert && options.check_host_ip) { ip_hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, user_hostfiles[i]); for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, system_hostfiles[i]); } retry: /* Reload these as they may have changed on cert->key downgrade */ want_cert = key_is_cert(host_key); type = key_type(host_key); /* * Check if the host key is present in the user's list of known * hosts or in the systemwide list. */ host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host_key, &host_found); /* * Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are * localhost, looking for a certificate, or the hostname was an ip * address to begin with. */ if (!want_cert && ip_hostkeys != NULL) { ip_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, host_key, &ip_found); if (host_status == HOST_CHANGED && (ip_status != HOST_CHANGED || (ip_found != NULL && !key_equal(ip_found->key, host_found->key)))) host_ip_differ = 1; } else ip_status = host_status; switch (host_status) { case HOST_OK: /* The host is known and the key matches. */ debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the %s host %s.", host, type, want_cert ? "certificate" : "key"); debug("Found %s in %s:%lu", want_cert ? "CA key" : "key", host_found->file, host_found->line); if (want_cert && !check_host_cert(hostname, host_key)) goto fail; if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) { if (readonly || want_cert) logit("%s host key for IP address " "'%.128s' not in list of known hosts.", type, ip); else if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts)) logit("Failed to add the %s host key for IP " "address '%.128s' to the list of known " - "hosts (%.30s).", type, ip, + "hosts (%.500s).", type, ip, user_hostfiles[0]); else logit("Warning: Permanently added the %s host " "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list " "of known hosts.", type, ip); } else if (options.visual_host_key) { fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s\n", fp, ra); free(ra); free(fp); } hostkey_trusted = 1; break; case HOST_NEW: if (options.host_key_alias == NULL && port != 0 && port != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) { debug("checking without port identifier"); if (check_host_key(hostname, hostaddr, 0, host_key, ROQUIET, user_hostfiles, num_user_hostfiles, system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles) == 0) { debug("found matching key w/out port"); break; } } if (readonly || want_cert) goto fail; /* The host is new. */ if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) { /* * User has requested strict host key checking. We * will not add the host key automatically. The only * alternative left is to abort. */ error("No %s host key is known for %.200s and you " "have requested strict checking.", type, host); goto fail; } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) { char msg1[1024], msg2[1024]; if (show_other_keys(host_hostkeys, host_key)) snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), "\nbut keys of different type are already" " known for this host."); else snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), "."); /* The default */ fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); msg2[0] = '\0'; if (options.verify_host_key_dns) { if (matching_host_key_dns) snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2), "Matching host key fingerprint" " found in DNS.\n"); else snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2), "No matching host key fingerprint" " found in DNS.\n"); } snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be " "established%s\n" "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s" "Are you sure you want to continue connecting " "(yes/no)? ", host, ip, msg1, type, fp, options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "", options.visual_host_key ? ra : "", msg2); free(ra); free(fp); if (!confirm(msg)) goto fail; hostkey_trusted = 1; /* user explicitly confirmed */ } /* * If not in strict mode, add the key automatically to the * local known_hosts file. */ if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) { snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s", host, ip); hostp = hostline; if (options.hash_known_hosts) { /* Add hash of host and IP separately */ r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], host, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts) && add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts); } else { /* Add unhashed "host,ip" */ r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], hostline, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts); } } else { r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], host, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts); hostp = host; } if (!r) logit("Failed to add the host to the list of known " "hosts (%.500s).", user_hostfiles[0]); else logit("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' (%s) to the " "list of known hosts.", hostp, type); break; case HOST_REVOKED: error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("@ WARNING: REVOKED HOST KEY DETECTED! @"); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("The %s host key for %s is marked as revoked.", type, host); error("This could mean that a stolen key is being used to"); error("impersonate this host."); /* * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have * to edit the key manually and we can only abort. */ if (options.strict_host_key_checking) { error("%s host key for %.200s was revoked and you have " "requested strict checking.", type, host); goto fail; } goto continue_unsafe; case HOST_CHANGED: if (want_cert) { /* * This is only a debug() since it is valid to have * CAs with wildcard DNS matches that don't match * all hosts that one might visit. */ debug("Host certificate authority does not " "match %s in %s:%lu", CA_MARKER, host_found->file, host_found->line); goto fail; } if (readonly == ROQUIET) goto fail; if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) { char *key_msg; if (ip_status == HOST_NEW) key_msg = "is unknown"; else if (ip_status == HOST_OK) key_msg = "is unchanged"; else key_msg = "has a different value"; error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("@ WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED! @"); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("The %s host key for %s has changed,", type, host); error("and the key for the corresponding IP address %s", ip); error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg); error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host"); error("and its host key have changed at the same time."); if (ip_status != HOST_NEW) error("Offending key for IP in %s:%lu", ip_found->file, ip_found->line); } /* The host key has changed. */ warn_changed_key(host_key); error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.", user_hostfiles[0]); error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", key_type(host_found->key), host_found->file, host_found->line); /* * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have * to edit the key manually and we can only abort. */ if (options.strict_host_key_checking) { error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have " "requested strict checking.", type, host); goto fail; } continue_unsafe: /* * If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow * the connection but without MITM-able authentication or * forwarding. */ if (options.password_authentication) { error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.password_authentication = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication) { error("Keyboard-interactive authentication is disabled" " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0; options.challenge_response_authentication = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.challenge_response_authentication) { error("Challenge/response authentication is disabled" " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.challenge_response_authentication = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.forward_agent) { error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.forward_agent = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.forward_x11) { error("X11 forwarding is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.forward_x11 = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.num_local_forwards > 0 || options.num_remote_forwards > 0) { error("Port forwarding is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.num_local_forwards = options.num_remote_forwards = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) { error("Tunnel forwarding is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && cancelled_forwarding) fatal("Error: forwarding disabled due to host key " "check failure"); /* * XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id. * This could be done by converting the host key to an * identifying sentence, tell that the host identifies itself * by that sentence, and ask the user if he/she wishes to * accept the authentication. */ break; case HOST_FOUND: fatal("internal error"); break; } if (options.check_host_ip && host_status != HOST_CHANGED && ip_status == HOST_CHANGED) { snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "Warning: the %s host key for '%.200s' " "differs from the key for the IP address '%.128s'" "\nOffending key for IP in %s:%lu", type, host, ip, ip_found->file, ip_found->line); if (host_status == HOST_OK) { len = strlen(msg); snprintf(msg + len, sizeof(msg) - len, "\nMatching host key in %s:%lu", host_found->file, host_found->line); } if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) { logit("%s", msg); error("Exiting, you have requested strict checking."); goto fail; } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) { strlcat(msg, "\nAre you sure you want " "to continue connecting (yes/no)? ", sizeof(msg)); if (!confirm(msg)) goto fail; } else { logit("%s", msg); } } if (!hostkey_trusted && options.update_hostkeys) { debug("%s: hostkey not known or explicitly trusted: " "disabling UpdateHostkeys", __func__); options.update_hostkeys = 0; } free(ip); free(host); if (host_hostkeys != NULL) free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys); if (ip_hostkeys != NULL) free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys); return 0; fail: if (want_cert && host_status != HOST_REVOKED) { /* * No matching certificate. Downgrade cert to raw key and * search normally. */ debug("No matching CA found. Retry with plain key"); raw_key = key_from_private(host_key); if (key_drop_cert(raw_key) != 0) fatal("Couldn't drop certificate"); host_key = raw_key; goto retry; } if (raw_key != NULL) key_free(raw_key); free(ip); free(host); if (host_hostkeys != NULL) free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys); if (ip_hostkeys != NULL) free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys); return -1; } /* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */ int verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key) { int r = -1, flags = 0; char *fp = NULL; struct sshkey *plain = NULL; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { error("%s: fingerprint host key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); r = -1; goto out; } debug("Server host key: %s %s", compat20 ? sshkey_ssh_name(host_key) : sshkey_type(host_key), fp); if (sshkey_equal(previous_host_key, host_key)) { debug2("%s: server host key %s %s matches cached key", __func__, sshkey_type(host_key), fp); r = 0; goto out; } /* Check in RevokedHostKeys file if specified */ if (options.revoked_host_keys != NULL) { r = sshkey_check_revoked(host_key, options.revoked_host_keys); switch (r) { case 0: break; /* not revoked */ case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED: error("Host key %s %s revoked by file %s", sshkey_type(host_key), fp, options.revoked_host_keys); r = -1; goto out; default: error("Error checking host key %s %s in " "revoked keys file %s: %s", sshkey_type(host_key), fp, options.revoked_host_keys, ssh_err(r)); r = -1; goto out; } } if (options.verify_host_key_dns) { /* * XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS, so downgrade * them and try the plain key. */ if ((r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &plain)) != 0) goto out; if (sshkey_is_cert(plain)) sshkey_drop_cert(plain); if (verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, plain, &flags) == 0) { if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) { if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 && flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH && flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) { r = 0; goto out; } if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) { matching_host_key_dns = 1; } else { warn_changed_key(plain); error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS " "with the new host key to get rid " "of this message."); } } } } r = check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key, RDRW, options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles, options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles); out: sshkey_free(plain); free(fp); if (r == 0 && host_key != NULL) { key_free(previous_host_key); previous_host_key = key_from_private(host_key); } return r; } /* * Starts a dialog with the server, and authenticates the current user on the * server. This does not need any extra privileges. The basic connection * to the server must already have been established before this is called. * If login fails, this function prints an error and never returns. * This function does not require super-user privileges. */ void ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, struct passwd *pw, int timeout_ms) { char *host; char *server_user, *local_user; local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user; /* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */ host = xstrdup(orighost); lowercase(host); /* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */ ssh_exchange_identification(timeout_ms); /* Put the connection into non-blocking mode. */ packet_set_nonblocking(); /* key exchange */ /* authenticate user */ + debug("Authenticating to %s:%d as '%s'", host, port, server_user); if (compat20) { ssh_kex2(host, hostaddr, port); ssh_userauth2(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive); } else { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 ssh_kex(host, hostaddr); ssh_userauth1(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive); #else - fatal("ssh1 is not unsupported"); + fatal("ssh1 is not supported"); #endif } free(local_user); } void ssh_put_password(char *password) { int size; char *padded; if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD) { packet_put_cstring(password); return; } size = roundup(strlen(password) + 1, 32); padded = xcalloc(1, size); strlcpy(padded, password, size); packet_put_string(padded, size); explicit_bzero(padded, size); free(padded); } /* print all known host keys for a given host, but skip keys of given type */ static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, Key *key) { int type[] = { KEY_RSA1, KEY_RSA, KEY_DSA, KEY_ECDSA, KEY_ED25519, -1 }; int i, ret = 0; char *fp, *ra; const struct hostkey_entry *found; for (i = 0; type[i] != -1; i++) { if (type[i] == key->type) continue; if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found)) continue; fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); ra = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n" "in %s:%lu\n" "%s key fingerprint %s.", key_type(found->key), found->host, found->file, found->line, key_type(found->key), fp); if (options.visual_host_key) logit("%s", ra); free(ra); free(fp); ret = 1; } return ret; } static void warn_changed_key(Key *host_key) { char *fp; fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); if (fp == NULL) fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @"); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!"); error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!"); error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed."); error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.", key_type(host_key), fp); error("Please contact your system administrator."); free(fp); } /* * Execute a local command */ int ssh_local_cmd(const char *args) { char *shell; pid_t pid; int status; void (*osighand)(int); if (!options.permit_local_command || args == NULL || !*args) return (1); if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0') shell = _PATH_BSHELL; osighand = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); pid = fork(); if (pid == 0) { signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args); execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL); error("Couldn't execute %s -c \"%s\": %s", shell, args, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } else if (pid == -1) fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno)); signal(SIGCHLD, osighand); if (!WIFEXITED(status)) return (1); return (WEXITSTATUS(status)); } Index: head/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/sshconnect2.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,1824 +1,1823 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.223 2015/01/30 11:43:14 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.224 2015/05/04 06:10:48 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "packet.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "key.h" #include "kex.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "dh.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "match.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "msg.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "ssherr.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif /* import */ extern char *client_version_string; extern char *server_version_string; extern Options options; /* * SSH2 key exchange */ u_char *session_id2 = NULL; u_int session_id2_len = 0; char *xxx_host; struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr; static int verify_host_key_callback(Key *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh) { if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey) == -1) fatal("Host key verification failed."); return 0; } static char * order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) { char *oavail, *avail, *first, *last, *alg, *hostname, *ret; size_t maxlen; struct hostkeys *hostkeys; int ktype; u_int i; /* Find all hostkeys for this hostname */ get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host, hostaddr, port, &hostname, NULL); hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.user_hostfiles[i]); for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i]); oavail = avail = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG); maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1; first = xmalloc(maxlen); last = xmalloc(maxlen); *first = *last = '\0'; #define ALG_APPEND(to, from) \ do { \ if (*to != '\0') \ strlcat(to, ",", maxlen); \ strlcat(to, from, maxlen); \ } while (0) while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') { if ((ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) fatal("%s: unknown alg %s", __func__, alg); if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, sshkey_type_plain(ktype), NULL)) ALG_APPEND(first, alg); else ALG_APPEND(last, alg); } #undef ALG_APPEND xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", first, (*first == '\0' || *last == '\0') ? "" : ",", last); if (*first != '\0') debug3("%s: prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", __func__, first); free(first); free(last); free(hostname); free(oavail); free_hostkeys(hostkeys); return ret; } void ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) { char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT }; struct kex *kex; int r; xxx_host = host; xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) { logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults."); options.ciphers = NULL; } if (options.ciphers != NULL) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; } myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]); if (options.compression) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "zlib@openssh.com,zlib,none"; } else { myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib"; } if (options.macs != NULL) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; } if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL) myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms); else { /* Prefer algorithms that we already have keys for */ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal( order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port)); } if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL) myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms; myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal( myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]); if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit, (time_t)options.rekey_interval); /* start key exchange */ if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0) fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r)); kex = active_state->kex; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client; # endif #endif kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client; kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state); if (options.use_roaming && !kex->roaming) { debug("Roaming not allowed by server"); options.use_roaming = 0; } session_id2 = kex->session_id; session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE); packet_put_cstring("markus"); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); #endif } /* * Authenticate user */ typedef struct cauthctxt Authctxt; typedef struct cauthmethod Authmethod; typedef struct identity Identity; typedef struct idlist Idlist; struct identity { TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next; int agent_fd; /* >=0 if agent supports key */ struct sshkey *key; /* public/private key */ char *filename; /* comment for agent-only keys */ int tried; int isprivate; /* key points to the private key */ int userprovided; }; TAILQ_HEAD(idlist, identity); struct cauthctxt { const char *server_user; const char *local_user; const char *host; const char *service; struct cauthmethod *method; sig_atomic_t success; char *authlist; int attempt; /* pubkey */ struct idlist keys; int agent_fd; /* hostbased */ Sensitive *sensitive; char *oktypes, *ktypes; const char *active_ktype; /* kbd-interactive */ int info_req_seen; /* generic */ void *methoddata; }; struct cauthmethod { char *name; /* string to compare against server's list */ int (*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt); void (*cleanup)(Authctxt *authctxt); int *enabled; /* flag in option struct that enables method */ int *batch_flag; /* flag in option struct that disables method */ }; int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, void *); int input_userauth_success_unexpected(int, u_int32_t, void *); int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, void *); int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, void *); int input_userauth_error(int, u_int32_t, void *); int input_userauth_info_req(int, u_int32_t, void *); int input_userauth_pk_ok(int, u_int32_t, void *); int input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int, u_int32_t, void *); int userauth_none(Authctxt *); int userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *); int userauth_passwd(Authctxt *); int userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *); int userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *); #ifdef GSSAPI int userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt); int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, void *); int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, void *); int input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *); int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *); int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); #endif void userauth(Authctxt *, char *); static int sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *, Identity *); static void pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *); static void pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *); static Key *load_identity_file(char *, int); static Authmethod *authmethod_get(char *authlist); static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *name); static char *authmethods_get(void); Authmethod authmethods[] = { #ifdef GSSAPI {"gssapi-with-mic", userauth_gssapi, NULL, &options.gss_authentication, NULL}, #endif {"hostbased", userauth_hostbased, NULL, &options.hostbased_authentication, NULL}, {"publickey", userauth_pubkey, NULL, &options.pubkey_authentication, NULL}, {"keyboard-interactive", userauth_kbdint, NULL, &options.kbd_interactive_authentication, &options.batch_mode}, {"password", userauth_passwd, NULL, &options.password_authentication, &options.batch_mode}, {"none", userauth_none, NULL, NULL, NULL}, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL} }; void ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host, Sensitive *sensitive) { Authctxt authctxt; int type; if (options.challenge_response_authentication) options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; packet_start(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring("ssh-userauth"); packet_send(); debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST sent"); packet_write_wait(); type = packet_read(); if (type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) fatal("Server denied authentication request: %d", type); if (packet_remaining() > 0) { char *reply = packet_get_string(NULL); debug2("service_accept: %s", reply); free(reply); } else { debug2("buggy server: service_accept w/o service"); } packet_check_eom(); debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT received"); if (options.preferred_authentications == NULL) options.preferred_authentications = authmethods_get(); /* setup authentication context */ memset(&authctxt, 0, sizeof(authctxt)); pubkey_prepare(&authctxt); authctxt.server_user = server_user; authctxt.local_user = local_user; authctxt.host = host; authctxt.service = "ssh-connection"; /* service name */ authctxt.success = 0; authctxt.method = authmethod_lookup("none"); authctxt.authlist = NULL; authctxt.methoddata = NULL; authctxt.sensitive = sensitive; authctxt.active_ktype = authctxt.oktypes = authctxt.ktypes = NULL; authctxt.info_req_seen = 0; authctxt.agent_fd = -1; if (authctxt.method == NULL) fatal("ssh_userauth2: internal error: cannot send userauth none request"); /* initial userauth request */ userauth_none(&authctxt); dispatch_init(&input_userauth_error); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, &input_userauth_success); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE, &input_userauth_failure); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER, &input_userauth_banner); dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success, &authctxt); /* loop until success */ pubkey_cleanup(&authctxt); dispatch_range(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX, NULL); debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name); } void userauth(Authctxt *authctxt, char *authlist) { if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL) authctxt->method->cleanup(authctxt); free(authctxt->methoddata); authctxt->methoddata = NULL; if (authlist == NULL) { authlist = authctxt->authlist; } else { free(authctxt->authlist); authctxt->authlist = authlist; } for (;;) { Authmethod *method = authmethod_get(authlist); if (method == NULL) fatal("Permission denied (%s).", authlist); authctxt->method = method; /* reset the per method handler */ dispatch_range(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MAX, NULL); /* and try new method */ if (method->userauth(authctxt) != 0) { debug2("we sent a %s packet, wait for reply", method->name); break; } else { debug2("we did not send a packet, disable method"); method->enabled = NULL; } } } /* ARGSUSED */ int input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { fatal("input_userauth_error: bad message during authentication: " "type %d", type); return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { char *msg, *raw, *lang; u_int len; debug3("input_userauth_banner"); raw = packet_get_string(&len); lang = packet_get_string(NULL); if (len > 0 && options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) { if (len > 65536) len = 65536; msg = xmalloc(len * 4 + 1); /* max expansion from strnvis() */ strnvis(msg, raw, len * 4 + 1, VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL|VIS_NOSLASH); fprintf(stderr, "%s", msg); free(msg); } free(raw); free(lang); return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_success: no authentication context"); free(authctxt->authlist); authctxt->authlist = NULL; if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL) authctxt->method->cleanup(authctxt); free(authctxt->methoddata); authctxt->methoddata = NULL; authctxt->success = 1; /* break out */ return 0; } int input_userauth_success_unexpected(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("%s: no authentication context", __func__); fatal("Unexpected authentication success during %s.", authctxt->method->name); return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int input_userauth_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; char *authlist = NULL; int partial; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_failure: no authentication context"); authlist = packet_get_string(NULL); partial = packet_get_char(); packet_check_eom(); if (partial != 0) { logit("Authenticated with partial success."); /* reset state */ pubkey_cleanup(authctxt); pubkey_prepare(authctxt); } debug("Authentications that can continue: %s", authlist); userauth(authctxt, authlist); return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; Key *key = NULL; Identity *id = NULL; Buffer b; int pktype, sent = 0; u_int alen, blen; char *pkalg, *fp; u_char *pkblob; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_pk_ok: no authentication context"); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKOK) { /* this is similar to SSH_BUG_PKAUTH */ debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: SSH_BUG_PKOK"); pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); buffer_init(&b); buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen); pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen); buffer_free(&b); } else { pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen); pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); } packet_check_eom(); debug("Server accepts key: pkalg %s blen %u", pkalg, blen); if ((pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) { debug("unknown pkalg %s", pkalg); goto done; } if ((key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen)) == NULL) { debug("no key from blob. pkalg %s", pkalg); goto done; } if (key->type != pktype) { error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch " "for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype); goto done; } if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) goto done; debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp); free(fp); /* * search keys in the reverse order, because last candidate has been * moved to the end of the queue. this also avoids confusion by * duplicate keys */ TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(id, &authctxt->keys, idlist, next) { if (key_equal(key, id->key)) { sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(authctxt, id); break; } } done: if (key != NULL) key_free(key); free(pkalg); free(pkblob); /* try another method if we did not send a packet */ if (sent == 0) userauth(authctxt, NULL); return 0; } #ifdef GSSAPI int userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) { Gssctxt *gssctxt = NULL; static gss_OID_set gss_supported = NULL; static u_int mech = 0; OM_uint32 min; int ok = 0; /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at * once. */ if (gss_supported == NULL) gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported); /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */ while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) { /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) { ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ } else { mech++; } } if (!ok) return 0; authctxt->methoddata=(void *)gssctxt; packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); packet_put_int(1); packet_put_int((gss_supported->elements[mech].length) + 2); packet_put_char(SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE); packet_put_char(gss_supported->elements[mech].length); packet_put_raw(gss_supported->elements[mech].elements, gss_supported->elements[mech].length); packet_send(); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE, &input_gssapi_response); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR, &input_gssapi_error); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok); mech++; /* Move along to next candidate */ return 1; } static OM_uint32 process_gssapi_token(void *ctxt, gss_buffer_t recv_tok) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; OM_uint32 status, ms, flags; Buffer b; status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds, recv_tok, &send_tok, &flags); if (send_tok.length > 0) { if (GSS_ERROR(status)) packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK); else packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN); packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); packet_send(); gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok); } if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { /* send either complete or MIC, depending on mechanism */ if (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE); packet_send(); } else { ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service, "gssapi-with-mic"); gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); status = ssh_gssapi_sign(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic); if (!GSS_ERROR(status)) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC); packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length); packet_send(); } buffer_free(&b); gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic); } } return status; } /* ARGSUSED */ int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; int oidlen; char *oidv; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; /* Setup our OID */ oidv = packet_get_string(&oidlen); if (oidlen <= 2 || oidv[0] != SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE || oidv[1] != oidlen - 2) { free(oidv); debug("Badly encoded mechanism OID received"); userauth(authctxt, NULL); return 0; } if (!ssh_gssapi_check_oid(gssctxt, oidv + 2, oidlen - 2)) fatal("Server returned different OID than expected"); packet_check_eom(); free(oidv); if (GSS_ERROR(process_gssapi_token(ctxt, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER))) { /* Start again with next method on list */ debug("Trying to start again"); userauth(authctxt, NULL); return 0; } return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; OM_uint32 status; u_int slen; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); recv_tok.length = slen; /* safe typecast */ packet_check_eom(); status = process_gssapi_token(ctxt, &recv_tok); free(recv_tok.value); if (GSS_ERROR(status)) { /* Start again with the next method in the list */ userauth(authctxt, NULL); return 0; } return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; OM_uint32 ms; u_int len; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&len); recv_tok.length = len; packet_check_eom(); /* Stick it into GSSAPI and see what it says */ (void)ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds, &recv_tok, &send_tok, NULL); free(recv_tok.value); gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok); /* Server will be returning a failed packet after this one */ return 0; } /* ARGSUSED */ int input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) { char *msg; char *lang; /* maj */(void)packet_get_int(); /* min */(void)packet_get_int(); msg=packet_get_string(NULL); lang=packet_get_string(NULL); packet_check_eom(); debug("Server GSSAPI Error:\n%s", msg); free(msg); free(lang); return 0; } #endif /* GSSAPI */ int userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt) { /* initial userauth request */ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); packet_send(); return 1; } int userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt) { static int attempt = 0; char prompt[150]; char *password; const char *host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host; if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts) return 0; if (attempt != 1) error("Permission denied, please try again."); snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.128s's password: ", authctxt->server_user, host); password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); packet_put_char(0); packet_put_cstring(password); explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password)); free(password); packet_add_padding(64); packet_send(); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, &input_userauth_passwd_changereq); return 1; } /* * parse PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, prompt user and send SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST */ /* ARGSUSED */ int input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; char *info, *lang, *password = NULL, *retype = NULL; char prompt[150]; const char *host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host; debug2("input_userauth_passwd_changereq"); if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_passwd_changereq: " "no authentication context"); info = packet_get_string(NULL); lang = packet_get_string(NULL); if (strlen(info) > 0) logit("%s", info); free(info); free(lang); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); packet_put_char(1); /* additional info */ snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter %.30s@%.128s's old password: ", authctxt->server_user, host); password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); packet_put_cstring(password); explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password)); free(password); password = NULL; while (password == NULL) { snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter %.30s@%.128s's new password: ", authctxt->server_user, host); password = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF); if (password == NULL) { /* bail out */ return 0; } snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Retype %.30s@%.128s's new password: ", authctxt->server_user, host); retype = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); if (strcmp(password, retype) != 0) { explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password)); free(password); logit("Mismatch; try again, EOF to quit."); password = NULL; } explicit_bzero(retype, strlen(retype)); free(retype); } packet_put_cstring(password); explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password)); free(password); packet_add_padding(64); packet_send(); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, &input_userauth_passwd_changereq); return 0; } static int identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { Key *prv; int ret; /* the agent supports this key */ if (id->agent_fd) return ssh_agent_sign(id->agent_fd, id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat); /* * we have already loaded the private key or * the private key is stored in external hardware */ if (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT)) return (sshkey_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat)); /* load the private key from the file */ if ((prv = load_identity_file(id->filename, id->userprovided)) == NULL) return (-1); /* XXX return decent error code */ ret = sshkey_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat); sshkey_free(prv); return (ret); } static int sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id) { Buffer b; u_char *blob, *signature; u_int bloblen; size_t slen; u_int skip = 0; int ret = -1; int have_sig = 1; char *fp; if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) return 0; debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s", key_type(id->key), fp); free(fp); if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) { /* we cannot handle this key */ debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: cannot handle key"); return 0; } /* data to be signed */ buffer_init(&b); if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); skip = session_id2_len; } else { buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); skip = buffer_len(&b); } buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->server_user); buffer_put_cstring(&b, datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" : authctxt->service); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); } else { buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name); buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(id->key)); } buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen); /* generate signature */ ret = identity_sign(id, &signature, &slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), datafellows); if (ret != 0) { free(blob); buffer_free(&b); return 0; } #ifdef DEBUG_PK buffer_dump(&b); #endif if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE) { buffer_clear(&b); buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); skip = session_id2_len; buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->server_user); buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->service); buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name); buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH)) buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(id->key)); buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen); } free(blob); /* append signature */ buffer_put_string(&b, signature, slen); free(signature); /* skip session id and packet type */ if (buffer_len(&b) < skip + 1) fatal("userauth_pubkey: internal error"); buffer_consume(&b, skip + 1); /* put remaining data from buffer into packet */ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)); buffer_free(&b); packet_send(); return 1; } static int send_pubkey_test(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id) { u_char *blob; u_int bloblen, have_sig = 0; debug3("send_pubkey_test"); if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) { /* we cannot handle this key */ debug3("send_pubkey_test: cannot handle key"); return 0; } /* register callback for USERAUTH_PK_OK message */ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, &input_userauth_pk_ok); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); packet_put_char(have_sig); if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH)) packet_put_cstring(key_ssh_name(id->key)); packet_put_string(blob, bloblen); free(blob); packet_send(); return 1; } static Key * load_identity_file(char *filename, int userprovided) { Key *private; char prompt[300], *passphrase; int r, perm_ok = 0, quit = 0, i; struct stat st; if (stat(filename, &st) < 0) { (userprovided ? logit : debug3)("no such identity: %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); return NULL; } snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt, "Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ", filename); for (i = 0; i <= options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) { if (i == 0) passphrase = ""; else { passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); if (*passphrase == '\0') { debug2("no passphrase given, try next key"); free(passphrase); break; } } switch ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename, passphrase, &private, NULL, &perm_ok))) { case 0: break; case SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE: if (options.batch_mode) { quit = 1; break; } if (i != 0) debug2("bad passphrase given, try again..."); break; case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: if (errno == ENOENT) { debug2("Load key \"%s\": %s", filename, ssh_err(r)); quit = 1; break; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: error("Load key \"%s\": %s", filename, ssh_err(r)); quit = 1; break; } if (i > 0) { explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); free(passphrase); } if (private != NULL || quit) break; } return private; } /* * try keys in the following order: * 1. agent keys that are found in the config file * 2. other agent keys * 3. keys that are only listed in the config file */ static void pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt) { struct identity *id, *id2, *tmp; struct idlist agent, files, *preferred; struct sshkey *key; int agent_fd, i, r, found; size_t j; struct ssh_identitylist *idlist; TAILQ_INIT(&agent); /* keys from the agent */ TAILQ_INIT(&files); /* keys from the config file */ preferred = &authctxt->keys; TAILQ_INIT(preferred); /* preferred order of keys */ /* list of keys stored in the filesystem and PKCS#11 */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { key = options.identity_keys[i]; if (key && key->type == KEY_RSA1) continue; if (key && key->cert && key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) continue; options.identity_keys[i] = NULL; id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id)); id->key = key; id->filename = xstrdup(options.identity_files[i]); id->userprovided = options.identity_file_userprovided[i]; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&files, id, next); } /* Prefer PKCS11 keys that are explicitly listed */ TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, &files, next, tmp) { if (id->key == NULL || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) continue; found = 0; TAILQ_FOREACH(id2, &files, next) { if (id2->key == NULL || (id2->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) continue; if (sshkey_equal(id->key, id2->key)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); found = 1; break; } } /* If IdentitiesOnly set and key not found then don't use it */ if (!found && options.identities_only) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); explicit_bzero(id, sizeof(*id)); free(id); } } /* list of keys supported by the agent */ if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT) debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, 2, &idlist)) != 0) { if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES) debug("%s: ssh_fetch_identitylist: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } else { for (j = 0; j < idlist->nkeys; j++) { found = 0; TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &files, next) { /* * agent keys from the config file are * preferred */ if (sshkey_equal(idlist->keys[j], id->key)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); id->agent_fd = agent_fd; found = 1; break; } } if (!found && !options.identities_only) { id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id)); /* XXX "steals" key/comment from idlist */ id->key = idlist->keys[j]; id->filename = idlist->comments[j]; idlist->keys[j] = NULL; idlist->comments[j] = NULL; id->agent_fd = agent_fd; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&agent, id, next); } } ssh_free_identitylist(idlist); /* append remaining agent keys */ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&agent, id, next); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); } authctxt->agent_fd = agent_fd; } /* append remaining keys from the config file */ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); } TAILQ_FOREACH(id, preferred, next) { debug2("key: %s (%p),%s", id->filename, id->key, id->userprovided ? " explicit" : ""); } } static void pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt) { Identity *id; if (authctxt->agent_fd != -1) ssh_close_authentication_socket(authctxt->agent_fd); for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next); if (id->key) sshkey_free(id->key); free(id->filename); free(id); } } int userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) { Identity *id; int sent = 0; while ((id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys))) { if (id->tried++) return (0); /* move key to the end of the queue */ TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&authctxt->keys, id, next); /* * send a test message if we have the public key. for * encrypted keys we cannot do this and have to load the * private key instead */ if (id->key != NULL) { if (key_type_plain(id->key->type) == KEY_RSA && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { debug("Skipped %s key %s for RSA/MD5 server", key_type(id->key), id->filename); } else if (id->key->type != KEY_RSA1) { debug("Offering %s public key: %s", key_type(id->key), id->filename); sent = send_pubkey_test(authctxt, id); } } else { debug("Trying private key: %s", id->filename); id->key = load_identity_file(id->filename, id->userprovided); if (id->key != NULL) { id->isprivate = 1; if (key_type_plain(id->key->type) == KEY_RSA && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { debug("Skipped %s key %s for RSA/MD5 " "server", key_type(id->key), id->filename); } else { sent = sign_and_send_pubkey( authctxt, id); } key_free(id->key); id->key = NULL; } } if (sent) return (sent); } return (0); } /* * Send userauth request message specifying keyboard-interactive method. */ int userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt) { static int attempt = 0; if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts) return 0; /* disable if no SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST has been seen */ if (attempt > 1 && !authctxt->info_req_seen) { debug3("userauth_kbdint: disable: no info_req_seen"); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, NULL); return 0; } debug2("userauth_kbdint"); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); packet_put_cstring(""); /* lang */ packet_put_cstring(options.kbd_interactive_devices ? options.kbd_interactive_devices : ""); packet_send(); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, &input_userauth_info_req); return 1; } /* * parse INFO_REQUEST, prompt user and send INFO_RESPONSE */ int input_userauth_info_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; char *name, *inst, *lang, *prompt, *response; u_int num_prompts, i; int echo = 0; debug2("input_userauth_info_req"); if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_info_req: no authentication context"); authctxt->info_req_seen = 1; name = packet_get_string(NULL); inst = packet_get_string(NULL); lang = packet_get_string(NULL); if (strlen(name) > 0) logit("%s", name); if (strlen(inst) > 0) logit("%s", inst); free(name); free(inst); free(lang); num_prompts = packet_get_int(); /* * Begin to build info response packet based on prompts requested. * We commit to providing the correct number of responses, so if * further on we run into a problem that prevents this, we have to * be sure and clean this up and send a correct error response. */ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE); packet_put_int(num_prompts); debug2("input_userauth_info_req: num_prompts %d", num_prompts); for (i = 0; i < num_prompts; i++) { prompt = packet_get_string(NULL); echo = packet_get_char(); response = read_passphrase(prompt, echo ? RP_ECHO : 0); packet_put_cstring(response); explicit_bzero(response, strlen(response)); free(response); free(prompt); } packet_check_eom(); /* done with parsing incoming message. */ packet_add_padding(64); packet_send(); return 0; } static int ssh_keysign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen) { struct sshbuf *b; struct stat st; pid_t pid; int i, r, to[2], from[2], status, sock = packet_get_connection_in(); u_char rversion = 0, version = 2; void (*osigchld)(int); *sigp = NULL; *lenp = 0; if (stat(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, &st) < 0) { error("%s: not installed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (fflush(stdout) != 0) { error("%s: fflush: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (pipe(to) < 0) { error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (pipe(from) < 0) { error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if ((pid = fork()) < 0) { error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); if (pid == 0) { /* keep the socket on exec */ fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 0); permanently_drop_suid(getuid()); close(from[0]); if (dup2(from[1], STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(to[1]); if (dup2(to[0], STDIN_FILENO) < 0) fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(from[1]); close(to[0]); /* Close everything but stdio and the socket */ for (i = STDERR_FILENO + 1; i < sock; i++) close(i); closefrom(sock + 1); debug3("%s: [child] pid=%ld, exec %s", __func__, (long)getpid(), _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN); execl(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, (char *) 0); fatal("%s: exec(%s): %s", __func__, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, strerror(errno)); } close(from[1]); close(to[0]); if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); /* send # of sock, data to be signed */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sock) != 0) || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, data, datalen)) != 0) fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (ssh_msg_send(to[1], version, b) == -1) fatal("%s: couldn't send request", __func__); sshbuf_reset(b); r = ssh_msg_recv(from[0], b); close(from[0]); close(to[1]); if (r < 0) { error("%s: no reply", __func__); goto fail; } errno = 0; while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) { if (errno != EINTR) { error("%s: waitpid %ld: %s", __func__, (long)pid, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } } if (!WIFEXITED(status)) { error("%s: exited abnormally", __func__); goto fail; } if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { error("%s: exited with status %d", __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status)); goto fail; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &rversion)) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto fail; } if (rversion != version) { error("%s: bad version", __func__); goto fail; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, sigp, lenp)) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); fail: signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); sshbuf_free(b); return -1; } signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld); sshbuf_free(b); return 0; } int userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) { struct ssh *ssh = active_state; struct sshkey *private = NULL; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; const char *service; u_char *sig = NULL, *keyblob = NULL; char *fp = NULL, *chost = NULL, *lname = NULL; size_t siglen = 0, keylen = 0; int i, r, success = 0; if (authctxt->ktypes == NULL) { authctxt->oktypes = xstrdup(options.hostbased_key_types); authctxt->ktypes = authctxt->oktypes; } /* * Work through each listed type pattern in HostbasedKeyTypes, * trying each hostkey that matches the type in turn. */ for (;;) { if (authctxt->active_ktype == NULL) authctxt->active_ktype = strsep(&authctxt->ktypes, ","); if (authctxt->active_ktype == NULL || *authctxt->active_ktype == '\0') break; debug3("%s: trying key type %s", __func__, authctxt->active_ktype); /* check for a useful key */ private = NULL; for (i = 0; i < authctxt->sensitive->nkeys; i++) { if (authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] == NULL || authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 || authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_UNSPEC) continue; if (match_pattern_list( sshkey_ssh_name(authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]), - authctxt->active_ktype, - strlen(authctxt->active_ktype), 0) != 1) + authctxt->active_ktype, 0) != 1) continue; /* we take and free the key */ private = authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]; authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] = NULL; break; } /* Found one */ if (private != NULL) break; /* No more keys of this type; advance */ authctxt->active_ktype = NULL; } if (private == NULL) { free(authctxt->oktypes); authctxt->oktypes = authctxt->ktypes = NULL; authctxt->active_ktype = NULL; debug("No more client hostkeys for hostbased authentication."); goto out; } if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(private, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) { error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__); goto out; } debug("%s: trying hostkey %s %s", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp); /* figure out a name for the client host */ if ((lname = get_local_name(packet_get_connection_in())) == NULL) { error("%s: cannot get local ipaddr/name", __func__); goto out; } /* XXX sshbuf_put_stringf? */ xasprintf(&chost, "%s.", lname); debug2("%s: chost %s", __func__, chost); service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" : authctxt->service; /* construct data */ if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { error("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__); goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(private, &keyblob, &keylen)) != 0) { error("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, service)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key_ssh_name(private))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, keyblob, keylen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, chost)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->local_user)) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_PK sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); #endif if (authctxt->sensitive->external_keysign) r = ssh_keysign(private, &sig, &siglen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)); else if ((r = sshkey_sign(private, &sig, &siglen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), datafellows)) != 0) debug("%s: sshkey_sign: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); if (r != 0) { error("sign using hostkey %s %s failed", sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp); goto out; } if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, key_ssh_name(private))) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, keyblob, keylen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, chost)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->local_user)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sig, siglen)) != 0 || (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) { error("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); goto out; } success = 1; out: if (sig != NULL) { explicit_bzero(sig, siglen); free(sig); } free(keyblob); free(lname); free(fp); free(chost); sshkey_free(private); sshbuf_free(b); return success; } /* find auth method */ /* * given auth method name, if configurable options permit this method fill * in auth_ident field and return true, otherwise return false. */ static int authmethod_is_enabled(Authmethod *method) { if (method == NULL) return 0; /* return false if options indicate this method is disabled */ if (method->enabled == NULL || *method->enabled == 0) return 0; /* return false if batch mode is enabled but method needs interactive mode */ if (method->batch_flag != NULL && *method->batch_flag != 0) return 0; return 1; } static Authmethod * authmethod_lookup(const char *name) { Authmethod *method = NULL; if (name != NULL) for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) if (strcmp(name, method->name) == 0) return method; debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name ? name : "NULL"); return NULL; } /* XXX internal state */ static Authmethod *current = NULL; static char *supported = NULL; static char *preferred = NULL; /* * Given the authentication method list sent by the server, return the * next method we should try. If the server initially sends a nil list, * use a built-in default list. */ static Authmethod * authmethod_get(char *authlist) { char *name = NULL; u_int next; /* Use a suitable default if we're passed a nil list. */ if (authlist == NULL || strlen(authlist) == 0) authlist = options.preferred_authentications; if (supported == NULL || strcmp(authlist, supported) != 0) { debug3("start over, passed a different list %s", authlist); free(supported); supported = xstrdup(authlist); preferred = options.preferred_authentications; debug3("preferred %s", preferred); current = NULL; } else if (current != NULL && authmethod_is_enabled(current)) return current; for (;;) { if ((name = match_list(preferred, supported, &next)) == NULL) { debug("No more authentication methods to try."); current = NULL; return NULL; } preferred += next; debug3("authmethod_lookup %s", name); debug3("remaining preferred: %s", preferred); if ((current = authmethod_lookup(name)) != NULL && authmethod_is_enabled(current)) { debug3("authmethod_is_enabled %s", name); debug("Next authentication method: %s", name); free(name); return current; } free(name); } } static char * authmethods_get(void) { Authmethod *method = NULL; Buffer b; char *list; buffer_init(&b); for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) { if (authmethod_is_enabled(method)) { if (buffer_len(&b) > 0) buffer_append(&b, ",", 1); buffer_append(&b, method->name, strlen(method->name)); } } buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1); list = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b)); buffer_free(&b); return list; } Index: head/crypto/openssh/sshd.0 =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/sshd.0 (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/sshd.0 (revision 294336) @@ -1,639 +1,641 @@ SSHD(8) System Manager's Manual SSHD(8) NAME sshd M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SSH daemon SYNOPSIS sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-b bits] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_certificate_file] [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time] [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len] DESCRIPTION sshd (OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for ssh(1). Together these programs replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. sshd listens for connections from clients. It is normally started at boot from /etc/rc. It forks a new daemon for each incoming connection. The forked daemons handle key exchange, encryption, authentication, command execution, and data exchange. sshd can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file (by default sshd_config(5)); command-line options override values specified in the configuration file. sshd rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal, SIGHUP, by executing itself with the name and options it was started with, e.g. /usr/sbin/sshd. The options are as follows: -4 Forces sshd to use IPv4 addresses only. -6 Forces sshd to use IPv6 addresses only. -b bits Specifies the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key (default 1024). -C connection_spec Specify the connection parameters to use for the -T extended test mode. If provided, any Match directives in the configuration file that would apply to the specified user, host, and address will be set before the configuration is written to standard output. The connection parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs. The keywords are M-bM-^@M-^\userM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\hostM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\laddrM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\lportM-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\addrM-bM-^@M-^]. All are required and may be supplied in any order, either with multiple -C options or as a comma-separated list. -c host_certificate_file Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify sshd during key exchange. The certificate file must match a host key file specified using the -h option or the HostKey configuration directive. -D When this option is specified, sshd will not detach and does not become a daemon. This allows easy monitoring of sshd. -d Debug mode. The server sends verbose debug output to standard error, and does not put itself in the background. The server also will not fork and will only process one connection. This option is only intended for debugging for the server. Multiple -d options increase the debugging level. Maximum is 3. -E log_file Append debug logs to log_file instead of the system log. -e Write debug logs to standard error instead of the system log. -f config_file Specifies the name of the configuration file. The default is /etc/ssh/sshd_config. sshd refuses to start if there is no configuration file. -g login_grace_time Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (default 120 seconds). If the client fails to authenticate the user within this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits. A value of zero indicates no limit. -h host_key_file Specifies a file from which a host key is read. This option must be given if sshd is not run as root (as the normal host key files are normally not readable by anyone but root). The default is /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key for protocol version 1, and /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key. /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key for protocol version 2. It is possible to have multiple host key files for the different protocol versions and host key algorithms. -i Specifies that sshd is being run from inetd(8). sshd is normally not run from inetd because it needs to generate the server key before it can respond to the client, and this may take tens of seconds. Clients would have to wait too long if the key was regenerated every time. However, with small key sizes (e.g. 512) using sshd from inetd may be feasible. -k key_gen_time Specifies how often the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key is regenerated (default 3600 seconds, or one hour). The motivation for regenerating the key fairly often is that the key is not stored anywhere, and after about an hour it becomes impossible to recover the key for decrypting intercepted communications even if the machine is cracked into or physically seized. A value of zero indicates that the key will never be regenerated. -o option Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details of the options, and their values, see sshd_config(5). -p port Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections (default 22). Multiple port options are permitted. Ports specified in the configuration file with the Port option are ignored when a command-line port is specified. Ports specified using the ListenAddress option override command-line ports. -q Quiet mode. Nothing is sent to the system log. Normally the beginning, authentication, and termination of each connection is logged. -T Extended test mode. Check the validity of the configuration file, output the effective configuration to stdout and then exit. Optionally, Match rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more -C options. -t Test mode. Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys. This is useful for updating sshd reliably as configuration options may change. -u len This option is used to specify the size of the field in the utmp structure that holds the remote host name. If the resolved host name is longer than len, the dotted decimal value will be used instead. This allows hosts with very long host names that overflow this field to still be uniquely identified. Specifying -u0 indicates that only dotted decimal addresses should be put into the utmp file. -u0 may also be used to prevent sshd from making DNS requests unless the authentication mechanism or configuration requires it. Authentication mechanisms that may require DNS include RhostsRSAAuthentication, HostbasedAuthentication, and using a from="pattern-list" option in a key file. Configuration options that require DNS include using a USER@HOST pattern in AllowUsers or DenyUsers. AUTHENTICATION The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocols 1 and 2. The default is to use protocol 2 only, though this can be changed via the Protocol option in sshd_config(5). Protocol 2 supports DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 and RSA keys; protocol 1 only supports RSA keys. For both protocols, each host has a host-specific key, normally 2048 bits, used to identify the host. Forward security for protocol 1 is provided through an additional server key, normally 768 bits, generated when the server starts. This key is normally regenerated every hour if it has been used, and is never stored on disk. Whenever a client connects, the daemon responds with its public host and server keys. The client compares the RSA host key against its own database to verify that it has not changed. The client then generates a 256-bit random number. It encrypts this random number using both the host key and the server key, and sends the encrypted number to the server. Both sides then use this random number as a session key which is used to encrypt all further communications in the session. The rest of the session is encrypted using a conventional cipher, currently Blowfish or 3DES, with 3DES being used by default. The client selects the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the server. For protocol 2, forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement. This key agreement results in a shared session key. The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher, currently 128-bit AES, Blowfish, 3DES, CAST128, Arcfour, 192-bit AES, or 256-bit AES. The client selects the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the server. Additionally, session integrity is provided through a cryptographic message authentication code (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64, umac-128, hmac-ripemd160, hmac-sha2-256 or hmac-sha2-512). Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog. The client tries to authenticate itself using host-based authentication, public key authentication, challenge-response authentication, or password authentication. Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to ensure that it is accessible. An account is not accessible if it is locked, listed in DenyUsers or its group is listed in DenyGroups . The definition of a locked account is system dependant. Some platforms have their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field ( M-bM-^@M-^X*LK*M-bM-^@M-^Y on Solaris and UnixWare, M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y on HP-UX, containing M-bM-^@M-^XNologinM-bM-^@M-^Y on Tru64, a leading M-bM-^@M-^X*LOCKED*M-bM-^@M-^Y on FreeBSD and a leading M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y on most Linuxes). If there is a requirement to disable password authentication for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field should be set to something other than these values (eg M-bM-^@M-^XNPM-bM-^@M-^Y or M-bM-^@M-^X*NP*M-bM-^@M-^Y ). If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for preparing the session is entered. At this time the client may request things like allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections, forwarding TCP connections, or forwarding the authentication agent connection over the secure channel. After this, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command. The sides then enter session mode. In this mode, either side may send data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or command on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side. When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to the client, and both sides exit. LOGIN PROCESS When a user successfully logs in, sshd does the following: 1. If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified, prints last login time and /etc/motd (unless prevented in the configuration file or by ~/.hushlogin; see the FILES section). 2. If the login is on a tty, records login time. 3. Checks /etc/nologin; if it exists, prints contents and quits (unless root). 4. Changes to run with normal user privileges. 5. Sets up basic environment. 6. Reads the file ~/.ssh/environment, if it exists, and users are allowed to change their environment. See the PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5). 7. Changes to user's home directory. 8. If ~/.ssh/rc exists and the sshd_config(5) PermitUserRC option is set, runs it; else if /etc/ssh/sshrc exists, runs it; otherwise runs xauth. The M-bM-^@M-^\rcM-bM-^@M-^] files are given the X11 authentication protocol and cookie in standard input. See SSHRC, below. - 9. Runs user's shell or command. + 9. Runs user's shell or command. All commands are run under the + user's login shell as specified in the system password + database. SSHRC If the file ~/.ssh/rc exists, sh(1) runs it after reading the environment files but before starting the user's shell or command. It must not produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used instead. If X11 forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in its standard input (and DISPLAY in its environment). The script must call xauth(1) because sshd will not run xauth automatically to add X11 cookies. The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environment. This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by something similar to: if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then # X11UseLocalhost=yes echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY | cut -c11-` $proto $cookie else # X11UseLocalhost=no echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie fi | xauth -q - fi If this file does not exist, /etc/ssh/sshrc is run, and if that does not exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie. AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT AuthorizedKeysFile specifies the files containing public keys for public key authentication; if none is specified, the default is ~/.ssh/authorized_keys and ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2. Each line of the file contains one key (empty lines and lines starting with a M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are ignored as comments). Protocol 1 public keys consist of the following space-separated fields: options, bits, exponent, modulus, comment. Protocol 2 public key consist of: options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment. The options field is optional; its presence is determined by whether the line starts with a number or not (the options field never starts with a number). The bits, exponent, modulus, and comment fields give the RSA key for protocol version 1; the comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the user to identify the key). For protocol version 2 the keytype is M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-sha2-nistp256M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-sha2-nistp384M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-sha2-nistp521M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-dssM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-rsaM-bM-^@M-^]. Note that lines in this file are usually several hundred bytes long (because of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of 8 kilobytes, which permits DSA keys up to 8 kilobits and RSA keys up to 16 kilobits. You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the identity.pub, id_dsa.pub, id_ecdsa.pub, id_ed25519.pub, or the id_rsa.pub file and edit it. sshd enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size for protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys of 768 bits. The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option specifications. No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes. The following option specifications are supported (note that option keywords are case-insensitive): cert-authority Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA) that is trusted to validate signed certificates for user authentication. Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key options. If both certificate restrictions and key options are present, the most restrictive union of the two is applied. command="command" Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for authentication. The command supplied by the user (if any) is ignored. The command is run on a pty if the client requests a pty; otherwise it is run without a tty. If an 8-bit clean channel is required, one must not request a pty or should specify no-pty. A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash. This option might be useful to restrict certain public keys to perform just a specific operation. An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else. Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11 forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited. The command originally supplied by the client is available in the SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution. Also note that this command may be superseded by either a sshd_config(5) ForceCommand directive or a command embedded in a certificate. environment="NAME=value" Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when logging in using this key. Environment variables set this way override other default environment values. Multiple options of this type are permitted. Environment processing is disabled by default and is controlled via the PermitUserEnvironment option. This option is automatically disabled if UseLogin is enabled. from="pattern-list" Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either the canonical name of the remote host or its IP address must be present in the comma-separated list of patterns. See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns. In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to hostnames or addresses, a from stanza may match IP addresses using CIDR address/masklen notation. The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security: public key authentication by itself does not trust the network or name servers or anything (but the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world. This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to just the key). no-agent-forwarding Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for authentication. no-port-forwarding Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication. Any port forward requests by the client will return an error. This might be used, e.g. in connection with the command option. no-pty Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail). no-user-rc Disables execution of ~/.ssh/rc. no-X11-forwarding Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication. Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error. permitopen="host:port" Limit local port forwarding with ssh(1) -L such that it may only connect to the specified host and port. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Multiple permitopen options may be applied separated by commas. No pattern matching is performed on the specified hostnames, they must be literal domains or addresses. A port specification of * matches any port. principals="principals" On a cert-authority line, specifies allowed principals for certificate authentication as a comma-separated list. At least one name from the list must appear in the certificate's list of principals for the certificate to be accepted. This option is ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate signers using the cert-authority option. tunnel="n" Force a tun(4) device on the server. Without this option, the next available device will be used if the client requests a tunnel. An example authorized_keys file: # Comments allowed at start of line ssh-rsa AAAAB3Nza...LiPk== user@example.net from="*.sales.example.net,!pc.sales.example.net" ssh-rsa AAAAB2...19Q== john@example.net command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding ssh-dss AAAAC3...51R== example.net permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-dss AAAAB5...21S== tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa AAAA...== jane@example.net SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT The /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and ~/.ssh/known_hosts files contain host public keys for all known hosts. The global file should be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is maintained automatically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host, its key is added to the per-user file. Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers (optional), hostnames, bits, exponent, modulus, comment. The fields are separated by spaces. The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of M-bM-^@M-^\@cert-authorityM-bM-^@M-^], to indicate that the line contains a certification authority (CA) key, or M-bM-^@M-^\@revokedM-bM-^@M-^], to indicate that the key contained on the line is revoked and must not ever be accepted. Only one marker should be used on a key line. Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns (M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y act as wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the canonical host name (when authenticating a client) or against the user-supplied name (when authenticating a server). A pattern may also be preceded by M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it matched another pattern on the line. A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within M-bM-^@M-^X[M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X]M-bM-^@M-^Y brackets then followed by M-bM-^@M-^X:M-bM-^@M-^Y and a non-standard port number. Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host names and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed. Hashed hostnames start with a M-bM-^@M-^X|M-bM-^@M-^Y character. Only one hashed hostname may appear on a single line and none of the above negation or wildcard operators may be applied. Bits, exponent, and modulus are taken directly from the RSA host key; they can be obtained, for example, from /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub. The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used. Lines starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y and empty lines are ignored as comments. When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or, if the server has presented a certificate for authentication, the key of the certification authority that signed the certificate. For a key to be trusted as a certification authority, it must use the M-bM-^@M-^\@cert-authorityM-bM-^@M-^] marker described above. The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked, for example when it is known that the associated private key has been stolen. Revoked keys are specified by including the M-bM-^@M-^\@revokedM-bM-^@M-^] marker at the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for authentication or as certification authorities, but instead will produce a warning from ssh(1) when they are encountered. It is permissible (but not recommended) to have several lines or different host keys for the same names. This will inevitably happen when short forms of host names from different domains are put in the file. It is possible that the files contain conflicting information; authentication is accepted if valid information can be found from either file. Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand. Rather, generate them by a script, ssh-keyscan(1) or by taking /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub and adding the host names at the front. ssh-keygen(1) also offers some basic automated editing for ~/.ssh/known_hosts including removing hosts matching a host name and converting all host names to their hashed representations. An example ssh_known_hosts file: # Comments allowed at start of line closenet,...,192.0.2.53 1024 37 159...93 closenet.example.net cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....= # A hashed hostname |1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....= # A revoked key @revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... # A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org @cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... FILES ~/.hushlogin This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and /etc/motd, if PrintLastLog and PrintMotd, respectively, are enabled. It does not suppress printing of the banner specified by Banner. ~/.rhosts This file is used for host-based authentication (see ssh(1) for more information). On some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because sshd reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. ~/.shosts This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. ~/.ssh/ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration and authentication information. There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user, and not accessible by others. ~/.ssh/authorized_keys Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used for logging in as this user. The format of this file is described above. The content of the file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. If this file, the ~/.ssh directory, or the user's home directory are writable by other users, then the file could be modified or replaced by unauthorized users. In this case, sshd will not allow it to be used unless the StrictModes option has been set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. ~/.ssh/environment This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists). It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y), and assignment lines of the form name=value. The file should be writable only by the user; it need not be readable by anyone else. Environment processing is disabled by default and is controlled via the PermitUserEnvironment option. ~/.ssh/known_hosts Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys. The format of this file is described above. This file should be writable only by root/the owner and can, but need not be, world-readable. ~/.ssh/rc Contains initialization routines to be run before the user's home directory becomes accessible. This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be readable by anyone else. /etc/hosts.allow /etc/hosts.deny Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here. Further details are described in hosts_access(5). /etc/hosts.equiv This file is for host-based authentication (see ssh(1)). It should only be writable by root. /etc/moduli Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange". The file format is described in moduli(5). /etc/motd See motd(5). /etc/nologin If this file exists, sshd refuses to let anyone except root log in. The contents of the file are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are refused. The file should be world-readable. /etc/shosts.equiv This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key These files contain the private parts of the host keys. These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not accessible to others. Note that sshd does not start if these files are group/world-accessible. /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub These files contain the public parts of the host keys. These files should be world-readable but writable only by root. Their contents should match the respective private parts. These files are not really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files. These files are created using ssh-keygen(1). /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the organization. The format of this file is described above. This file should be writable only by root/the owner and should be world-readable. /etc/ssh/sshd_config Contains configuration data for sshd. The file format and configuration options are described in sshd_config(5). /etc/ssh/sshrc Similar to ~/.ssh/rc, it can be used to specify machine-specific login-time initializations globally. This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable. /var/empty chroot(2) directory used by sshd during privilege separation in the pre-authentication phase. The directory should not contain any files and must be owned by root and not group or world- writable. /var/run/sshd.pid Contains the process ID of the sshd listening for connections (if there are several daemons running concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one started last). The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world- readable. SEE ALSO scp(1), sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh-keyscan(1), chroot(2), hosts_access(5), login.conf(5), moduli(5), sshd_config(5), inetd(8), sftp-server(8) AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support for privilege separation. -OpenBSD 5.7 November 15, 2014 OpenBSD 5.7 +OpenBSD 5.7 May 1, 2015 OpenBSD 5.7 Index: head/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/sshd.8 (revision 294336) @@ -1,982 +1,984 @@ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.278 2014/11/15 14:41:03 bentley Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.279 2015/05/01 07:11:47 djm Exp $ .\" $FreeBSD$ -.Dd $Mdocdate: November 15 2014 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: May 1 2015 $ .Dt SSHD 8 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm sshd .Nd OpenSSH SSH daemon .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm sshd .Bk -words .Op Fl 46DdeiqTt .Op Fl b Ar bits .Op Fl C Ar connection_spec .Op Fl c Ar host_certificate_file .Op Fl E Ar log_file .Op Fl f Ar config_file .Op Fl g Ar login_grace_time .Op Fl h Ar host_key_file .Op Fl k Ar key_gen_time .Op Fl o Ar option .Op Fl p Ar port .Op Fl u Ar len .Ek .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm (OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for .Xr ssh 1 . Together these programs replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. .Pp .Nm listens for connections from clients. It is normally started at boot from .Pa /etc/rc.d/sshd . It forks a new daemon for each incoming connection. The forked daemons handle key exchange, encryption, authentication, command execution, and data exchange. .Pp .Nm can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file (by default .Xr sshd_config 5 ) ; command-line options override values specified in the configuration file. .Nm rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal, .Dv SIGHUP , by executing itself with the name and options it was started with, e.g.\& .Pa /usr/sbin/sshd . .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl 4 Forces .Nm to use IPv4 addresses only. .It Fl 6 Forces .Nm to use IPv6 addresses only. .It Fl b Ar bits Specifies the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key (default 1024). .It Fl C Ar connection_spec Specify the connection parameters to use for the .Fl T extended test mode. If provided, any .Cm Match directives in the configuration file that would apply to the specified user, host, and address will be set before the configuration is written to standard output. The connection parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs. The keywords are .Dq user , .Dq host , .Dq laddr , .Dq lport , and .Dq addr . All are required and may be supplied in any order, either with multiple .Fl C options or as a comma-separated list. .It Fl c Ar host_certificate_file Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify .Nm during key exchange. The certificate file must match a host key file specified using the .Fl h option or the .Cm HostKey configuration directive. .It Fl D When this option is specified, .Nm will not detach and does not become a daemon. This allows easy monitoring of .Nm sshd . .It Fl d Debug mode. The server sends verbose debug output to standard error, and does not put itself in the background. The server also will not fork and will only process one connection. This option is only intended for debugging for the server. Multiple .Fl d options increase the debugging level. Maximum is 3. .It Fl E Ar log_file Append debug logs to .Ar log_file instead of the system log. .It Fl e Write debug logs to standard error instead of the system log. .It Fl f Ar config_file Specifies the name of the configuration file. The default is .Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config . .Nm refuses to start if there is no configuration file. .It Fl g Ar login_grace_time Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (default 120 seconds). If the client fails to authenticate the user within this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits. A value of zero indicates no limit. .It Fl h Ar host_key_file Specifies a file from which a host key is read. This option must be given if .Nm is not run as root (as the normal host key files are normally not readable by anyone but root). The default is .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key for protocol version 1, and .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key , .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key . .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key for protocol version 2. It is possible to have multiple host key files for the different protocol versions and host key algorithms. .It Fl i Specifies that .Nm is being run from .Xr inetd 8 . .Nm is normally not run from inetd because it needs to generate the server key before it can respond to the client, and this may take tens of seconds. Clients would have to wait too long if the key was regenerated every time. However, with small key sizes (e.g. 512) using .Nm from inetd may be feasible. .It Fl k Ar key_gen_time Specifies how often the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key is regenerated (default 3600 seconds, or one hour). The motivation for regenerating the key fairly often is that the key is not stored anywhere, and after about an hour it becomes impossible to recover the key for decrypting intercepted communications even if the machine is cracked into or physically seized. A value of zero indicates that the key will never be regenerated. .It Fl o Ar option Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details of the options, and their values, see .Xr sshd_config 5 . .It Fl p Ar port Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections (default 22). Multiple port options are permitted. Ports specified in the configuration file with the .Cm Port option are ignored when a command-line port is specified. Ports specified using the .Cm ListenAddress option override command-line ports. .It Fl q Quiet mode. Nothing is sent to the system log. Normally the beginning, authentication, and termination of each connection is logged. .It Fl T Extended test mode. Check the validity of the configuration file, output the effective configuration to stdout and then exit. Optionally, .Cm Match rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more .Fl C options. .It Fl t Test mode. Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys. This is useful for updating .Nm reliably as configuration options may change. .It Fl u Ar len This option is used to specify the size of the field in the .Li utmp structure that holds the remote host name. If the resolved host name is longer than .Ar len , the dotted decimal value will be used instead. This allows hosts with very long host names that overflow this field to still be uniquely identified. Specifying .Fl u0 indicates that only dotted decimal addresses should be put into the .Pa utmp file. .Fl u0 may also be used to prevent .Nm from making DNS requests unless the authentication mechanism or configuration requires it. Authentication mechanisms that may require DNS include .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication , .Cm HostbasedAuthentication , and using a .Cm from="pattern-list" option in a key file. Configuration options that require DNS include using a USER@HOST pattern in .Cm AllowUsers or .Cm DenyUsers . .El .Sh AUTHENTICATION The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocols 1 and 2. The default is to use protocol 2 only, though this can be changed via the .Cm Protocol option in .Xr sshd_config 5 . Protocol 2 supports DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 and RSA keys; protocol 1 only supports RSA keys. For both protocols, each host has a host-specific key, normally 2048 bits, used to identify the host. .Pp Forward security for protocol 1 is provided through an additional server key, normally 768 bits, generated when the server starts. This key is normally regenerated every hour if it has been used, and is never stored on disk. Whenever a client connects, the daemon responds with its public host and server keys. The client compares the RSA host key against its own database to verify that it has not changed. The client then generates a 256-bit random number. It encrypts this random number using both the host key and the server key, and sends the encrypted number to the server. Both sides then use this random number as a session key which is used to encrypt all further communications in the session. The rest of the session is encrypted using a conventional cipher, currently Blowfish or 3DES, with 3DES being used by default. The client selects the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the server. .Pp For protocol 2, forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement. This key agreement results in a shared session key. The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher, currently 128-bit AES, Blowfish, 3DES, CAST128, Arcfour, 192-bit AES, or 256-bit AES. The client selects the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the server. Additionally, session integrity is provided through a cryptographic message authentication code (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64, umac-128, hmac-ripemd160, hmac-sha2-256 or hmac-sha2-512). .Pp Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog. The client tries to authenticate itself using host-based authentication, public key authentication, challenge-response authentication, or password authentication. .Pp Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to ensure that it is accessible. An account is not accessible if it is locked, listed in .Cm DenyUsers or its group is listed in .Cm DenyGroups \&. The definition of a locked account is system dependant. Some platforms have their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field ( .Ql \&*LK\&* on Solaris and UnixWare, .Ql \&* on HP-UX, containing .Ql Nologin on Tru64, a leading .Ql \&*LOCKED\&* on FreeBSD and a leading .Ql \&! on most Linuxes). If there is a requirement to disable password authentication for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field should be set to something other than these values (eg .Ql NP or .Ql \&*NP\&* ). .Pp If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for preparing the session is entered. At this time the client may request things like allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections, forwarding TCP connections, or forwarding the authentication agent connection over the secure channel. .Pp After this, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command. The sides then enter session mode. In this mode, either side may send data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or command on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side. .Pp When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to the client, and both sides exit. .Sh LOGIN PROCESS When a user successfully logs in, .Nm does the following: .Bl -enum -offset indent .It If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified, prints last login time and .Pa /etc/motd (unless prevented in the configuration file or by .Pa ~/.hushlogin ; see the .Sx FILES section). .It If the login is on a tty, records login time. .It Checks .Pa /etc/nologin and .Pa /var/run/nologin ; if one exists, it prints the contents and quits (unless root). .It Changes to run with normal user privileges. .It Sets up basic environment. .It Reads the file .Pa ~/.ssh/environment , if it exists, and users are allowed to change their environment. See the .Cm PermitUserEnvironment option in .Xr sshd_config 5 . .It Changes to user's home directory. .It If .Pa ~/.ssh/rc exists and the .Xr sshd_config 5 .Cm PermitUserRC option is set, runs it; else if .Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc exists, runs it; otherwise runs .Xr xauth 1 . The .Dq rc files are given the X11 authentication protocol and cookie in standard input. See .Sx SSHRC , below. .It Runs user's shell or command. +All commands are run under the user's login shell as specified in the +system password database. .El .Sh SSHRC If the file .Pa ~/.ssh/rc exists, .Xr sh 1 runs it after reading the environment files but before starting the user's shell or command. It must not produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used instead. If X11 forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in its standard input (and .Ev DISPLAY in its environment). The script must call .Xr xauth 1 because .Nm will not run xauth automatically to add X11 cookies. .Pp The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environment. .Pp This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by something similar to: .Bd -literal -offset 3n if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then # X11UseLocalhost=yes echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY | cut -c11-` $proto $cookie else # X11UseLocalhost=no echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie fi | xauth -q - fi .Ed .Pp If this file does not exist, .Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc is run, and if that does not exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie. .Sh AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile specifies the files containing public keys for public key authentication; if none is specified, the default is .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys and .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2 . Each line of the file contains one key (empty lines and lines starting with a .Ql # are ignored as comments). Protocol 1 public keys consist of the following space-separated fields: options, bits, exponent, modulus, comment. Protocol 2 public key consist of: options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment. The options field is optional; its presence is determined by whether the line starts with a number or not (the options field never starts with a number). The bits, exponent, modulus, and comment fields give the RSA key for protocol version 1; the comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the user to identify the key). For protocol version 2 the keytype is .Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 , .Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 , .Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 , .Dq ssh-ed25519 , .Dq ssh-dss or .Dq ssh-rsa . .Pp Note that lines in this file are usually several hundred bytes long (because of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of 8 kilobytes, which permits DSA keys up to 8 kilobits and RSA keys up to 16 kilobits. You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the .Pa identity.pub , .Pa id_dsa.pub , .Pa id_ecdsa.pub , .Pa id_ed25519.pub , or the .Pa id_rsa.pub file and edit it. .Pp .Nm enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size for protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys of 768 bits. .Pp The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option specifications. No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes. The following option specifications are supported (note that option keywords are case-insensitive): .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm cert-authority Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA) that is trusted to validate signed certificates for user authentication. .Pp Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key options. If both certificate restrictions and key options are present, the most restrictive union of the two is applied. .It Cm command="command" Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for authentication. The command supplied by the user (if any) is ignored. The command is run on a pty if the client requests a pty; otherwise it is run without a tty. If an 8-bit clean channel is required, one must not request a pty or should specify .Cm no-pty . A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash. This option might be useful to restrict certain public keys to perform just a specific operation. An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else. Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11 forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited. The command originally supplied by the client is available in the .Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution. Also note that this command may be superseded by either a .Xr sshd_config 5 .Cm ForceCommand directive or a command embedded in a certificate. .It Cm environment="NAME=value" Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when logging in using this key. Environment variables set this way override other default environment values. Multiple options of this type are permitted. Environment processing is disabled by default and is controlled via the .Cm PermitUserEnvironment option. This option is automatically disabled if .Cm UseLogin is enabled. .It Cm from="pattern-list" Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either the canonical name of the remote host or its IP address must be present in the comma-separated list of patterns. See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .Pp In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to hostnames or addresses, a .Cm from stanza may match IP addresses using CIDR address/masklen notation. .Pp The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security: public key authentication by itself does not trust the network or name servers or anything (but the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world. This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to just the key). .It Cm no-agent-forwarding Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for authentication. .It Cm no-port-forwarding Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication. Any port forward requests by the client will return an error. This might be used, e.g. in connection with the .Cm command option. .It Cm no-pty Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail). .It Cm no-user-rc Disables execution of .Pa ~/.ssh/rc . .It Cm no-X11-forwarding Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication. Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error. .It Cm permitopen="host:port" Limit local port forwarding with .Xr ssh 1 .Fl L such that it may only connect to the specified host and port. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Multiple .Cm permitopen options may be applied separated by commas. No pattern matching is performed on the specified hostnames, they must be literal domains or addresses. A port specification of .Cm * matches any port. .It Cm principals="principals" On a .Cm cert-authority line, specifies allowed principals for certificate authentication as a comma-separated list. At least one name from the list must appear in the certificate's list of principals for the certificate to be accepted. This option is ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate signers using the .Cm cert-authority option. .It Cm tunnel="n" Force a .Xr tun 4 device on the server. Without this option, the next available device will be used if the client requests a tunnel. .El .Pp An example authorized_keys file: .Bd -literal -offset 3n # Comments allowed at start of line ssh-rsa AAAAB3Nza...LiPk== user@example.net from="*.sales.example.net,!pc.sales.example.net" ssh-rsa AAAAB2...19Q== john@example.net command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding ssh-dss AAAAC3...51R== example.net permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-dss AAAAB5...21S== tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa AAAA...== jane@example.net .Ed .Sh SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT The .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts files contain host public keys for all known hosts. The global file should be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is maintained automatically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host, its key is added to the per-user file. .Pp Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers (optional), hostnames, bits, exponent, modulus, comment. The fields are separated by spaces. .Pp The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of .Dq @cert-authority , to indicate that the line contains a certification authority (CA) key, or .Dq @revoked , to indicate that the key contained on the line is revoked and must not ever be accepted. Only one marker should be used on a key line. .Pp Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns .Pf ( Ql * and .Ql \&? act as wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the canonical host name (when authenticating a client) or against the user-supplied name (when authenticating a server). A pattern may also be preceded by .Ql \&! to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it matched another pattern on the line. A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within .Ql \&[ and .Ql \&] brackets then followed by .Ql \&: and a non-standard port number. .Pp Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host names and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed. Hashed hostnames start with a .Ql | character. Only one hashed hostname may appear on a single line and none of the above negation or wildcard operators may be applied. .Pp Bits, exponent, and modulus are taken directly from the RSA host key; they can be obtained, for example, from .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub . The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used. .Pp Lines starting with .Ql # and empty lines are ignored as comments. .Pp When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or, if the server has presented a certificate for authentication, the key of the certification authority that signed the certificate. For a key to be trusted as a certification authority, it must use the .Dq @cert-authority marker described above. .Pp The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked, for example when it is known that the associated private key has been stolen. Revoked keys are specified by including the .Dq @revoked marker at the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for authentication or as certification authorities, but instead will produce a warning from .Xr ssh 1 when they are encountered. .Pp It is permissible (but not recommended) to have several lines or different host keys for the same names. This will inevitably happen when short forms of host names from different domains are put in the file. It is possible that the files contain conflicting information; authentication is accepted if valid information can be found from either file. .Pp Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand. Rather, generate them by a script, .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 or by taking .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub and adding the host names at the front. .Xr ssh-keygen 1 also offers some basic automated editing for .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts including removing hosts matching a host name and converting all host names to their hashed representations. .Pp An example ssh_known_hosts file: .Bd -literal -offset 3n # Comments allowed at start of line closenet,...,192.0.2.53 1024 37 159...93 closenet.example.net cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....= # A hashed hostname |1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....= # A revoked key @revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... # A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org @cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... .Ed .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Pa ~/.hushlogin This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and .Pa /etc/motd , if .Cm PrintLastLog and .Cm PrintMotd , respectively, are enabled. It does not suppress printing of the banner specified by .Cm Banner . .Pp .It Pa ~/.rhosts This file is used for host-based authentication (see .Xr ssh 1 for more information). On some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because .Nm reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.shosts This file is used in exactly the same way as .Pa .rhosts , but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration and authentication information. There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used for logging in as this user. The format of this file is described above. The content of the file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp If this file, the .Pa ~/.ssh directory, or the user's home directory are writable by other users, then the file could be modified or replaced by unauthorized users. In this case, .Nm will not allow it to be used unless the .Cm StrictModes option has been set to .Dq no . .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/environment This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists). It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with .Ql # ) , and assignment lines of the form name=value. The file should be writable only by the user; it need not be readable by anyone else. Environment processing is disabled by default and is controlled via the .Cm PermitUserEnvironment option. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys. The format of this file is described above. This file should be writable only by root/the owner and can, but need not be, world-readable. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/rc Contains initialization routines to be run before the user's home directory becomes accessible. This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be readable by anyone else. .Pp .It Pa /etc/hosts.allow .It Pa /etc/hosts.deny Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here. Further details are described in .Xr hosts_access 5 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv This file is for host-based authentication (see .Xr ssh 1 ) . It should only be writable by root. .Pp .It Pa /etc/moduli Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange". The file format is described in .Xr moduli 5 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/motd See .Xr motd 5 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/nologin If this file exists, .Nm refuses to let anyone except root log in. The contents of the file are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are refused. The file should be world-readable. .Pp .It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv This file is used in exactly the same way as .Pa hosts.equiv , but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key These files contain the private parts of the host keys. These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not accessible to others. Note that .Nm does not start if these files are group/world-accessible. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub These files contain the public parts of the host keys. These files should be world-readable but writable only by root. Their contents should match the respective private parts. These files are not really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files. These files are created using .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the organization. The format of this file is described above. This file should be writable only by root/the owner and should be world-readable. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config Contains configuration data for .Nm sshd . The file format and configuration options are described in .Xr sshd_config 5 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc Similar to .Pa ~/.ssh/rc , it can be used to specify machine-specific login-time initializations globally. This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable. .Pp .It Pa /var/empty .Xr chroot 2 directory used by .Nm during privilege separation in the pre-authentication phase. The directory should not contain any files and must be owned by root and not group or world-writable. .Pp .It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid Contains the process ID of the .Nm listening for connections (if there are several daemons running concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one started last). The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr scp 1 , .Xr sftp 1 , .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 , .Xr chroot 2 , .Xr hosts_access 5 , .Xr login.conf 5 , .Xr moduli 5 , .Xr sshd_config 5 , .Xr inetd 8 , .Xr sftp-server 8 .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support for privilege separation. Index: head/crypto/openssh/sshd.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/sshd.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/sshd.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,2690 +1,2699 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.444 2015/02/20 22:17:21 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.450 2015/05/24 23:39:16 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients, * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and * authentication agent connections. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 implementation: * Privilege Separation: * * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" __RCSID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h" #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #endif #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE #include #include #endif #ifdef __FreeBSD__ #include #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H) #include #elif defined(GSSAPI) && defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_H) #include #endif #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "digest.h" #include "key.h" #include "kex.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "msg.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "channels.h" #include "session.h" #include "monitor_mm.h" #include "monitor.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "roaming.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "version.h" #include "ssherr.h" #ifdef LIBWRAP #include #include int allow_severity; int deny_severity; #endif /* LIBWRAP */ #ifndef O_NOCTTY #define O_NOCTTY 0 #endif /* Re-exec fds */ #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1) #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2) #define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3) #define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4) extern char *__progname; /* Server configuration options. */ ServerOptions options; /* Name of the server configuration file. */ char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE; /* * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing * the first connection. */ int debug_flag = 0; /* Flag indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. */ int test_flag = 0; /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */ int inetd_flag = 0; /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */ int no_daemon_flag = 0; /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */ int log_stderr = 0; /* Saved arguments to main(). */ char **saved_argv; int saved_argc; /* re-exec */ int rexeced_flag = 0; int rexec_flag = 1; int rexec_argc = 0; char **rexec_argv; /* * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP * signal handler. */ #define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16 int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS]; int num_listen_socks = 0; /* * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL, * sshd will skip the version-number exchange */ char *client_version_string = NULL; char *server_version_string = NULL; /* Daemon's agent connection */ int auth_sock = -1; int have_agent = 0; /* * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle) * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented. */ struct { Key *server_key; /* ephemeral server key */ Key *ssh1_host_key; /* ssh1 host key */ Key **host_keys; /* all private host keys */ Key **host_pubkeys; /* all public host keys */ Key **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */ int have_ssh1_key; int have_ssh2_key; u_char ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; } sensitive_data; /* * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated. * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0; /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0; static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0; /* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */ u_char session_id[16]; /* same for ssh2 */ u_char *session_id2 = NULL; u_int session_id2_len = 0; /* record remote hostname or ip */ u_int utmp_len = HOST_NAME_MAX+1; /* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */ int *startup_pipes = NULL; int startup_pipe; /* in child */ /* variables used for privilege separation */ int use_privsep = -1; struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL; int privsep_is_preauth = 1; /* global authentication context */ Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL; /* sshd_config buffer */ Buffer cfg; /* message to be displayed after login */ Buffer loginmsg; /* Unprivileged user */ struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL; /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ void destroy_sensitive_data(void); void demote_sensitive_data(void); #ifdef WITH_SSH1 static void do_ssh1_kex(void); #endif static void do_ssh2_kex(void); /* * Close all listening sockets */ static void close_listen_socks(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) close(listen_socks[i]); num_listen_socks = -1; } static void close_startup_pipes(void) { int i; if (startup_pipes) for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) close(startup_pipes[i]); } /* * Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP; * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate * the server key). */ /*ARGSUSED*/ static void sighup_handler(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; received_sighup = 1; signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler); errno = save_errno; } /* * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP. * Restarts the server. */ static void sighup_restart(void) { logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting."); platform_pre_restart(); close_listen_socks(); close_startup_pipes(); alarm(0); /* alarm timer persists across exec */ signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* will be restored after exec */ execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv); logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0], strerror(errno)); exit(1); } /* * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon. */ /*ARGSUSED*/ static void sigterm_handler(int sig) { received_sigterm = sig; } /* * SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then * reap any zombies left by exited children. */ /*ARGSUSED*/ static void main_sigchld_handler(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; pid_t pid; int status; while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 || (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR)) ; signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); errno = save_errno; } /* * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired. */ /*ARGSUSED*/ static void grace_alarm_handler(int sig) { if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0) kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM); /* * Try to kill any processes that we have spawned, E.g. authorized * keys command helpers. */ if (getpgid(0) == getpid()) { signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN); kill(0, SIGTERM); } /* Log error and exit. */ sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s", get_remote_ipaddr()); } /* * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm. Note that this * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not * do anything with the private key or random state before forking. * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution * problems. */ static void generate_ephemeral_server_key(void) { verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.", sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits); if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL) key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1, options.server_key_bits); verbose("RSA key generation complete."); arc4random_buf(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); } /*ARGSUSED*/ static void key_regeneration_alarm(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); errno = save_errno; key_do_regen = 1; } static void sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out) { u_int i; int mismatch; int remote_major, remote_minor; int major, minor; char *s, *newline = "\n"; char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */ char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)) { major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1; minor = 99; } else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2; minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2; newline = "\r\n"; } else { major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1; minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1; } xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s", major, minor, SSH_VERSION, *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ", options.version_addendum, newline); /* Send our protocol version identification. */ if (roaming_atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string, strlen(server_version_string)) != strlen(server_version_string)) { logit("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr()); cleanup_exit(255); } /* Read other sides version identification. */ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) { if (roaming_atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) { logit("Did not receive identification string from %s", get_remote_ipaddr()); cleanup_exit(255); } if (buf[i] == '\r') { buf[i] = 0; /* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */ if (i == 12 && strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0) break; continue; } if (buf[i] == '\n') { buf[i] = 0; break; } } buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; client_version_string = xstrdup(buf); /* * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. */ if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) { s = "Protocol mismatch.\n"; (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); logit("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' " "from %s port %d", client_version_string, get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port()); close(sock_in); close(sock_out); cleanup_exit(255); } debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s", remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); active_state->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version); if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_PROBE) != 0) { logit("probed from %s with %s. Don't panic.", get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string); cleanup_exit(255); } if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) != 0) { logit("scanned from %s with %s. Don't panic.", get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string); cleanup_exit(255); } if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { logit("Client version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature " "scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version); } if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY) != 0) { fatal("Client version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe key agreement; " "refusing connection", remote_version); } mismatch = 0; switch (remote_major) { case 1: if (remote_minor == 99) { if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) enable_compat20(); else mismatch = 1; break; } if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) { mismatch = 1; break; } if (remote_minor < 3) { packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and " "is no longer supported. Please install a newer version."); } else if (remote_minor == 3) { /* note that this disables agent-forwarding */ enable_compat13(); } break; case 2: if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { enable_compat20(); break; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: mismatch = 1; break; } chop(server_version_string); debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string); if (mismatch) { s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n"; (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); close(sock_in); close(sock_out); logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr(), server_version_string, client_version_string); cleanup_exit(255); } } /* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */ void destroy_sensitive_data(void) { int i; if (sensitive_data.server_key) { key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; } if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { key_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]); sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; } } sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL; explicit_bzero(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); } /* Demote private to public keys for network child */ void demote_sensitive_data(void) { Key *tmp; int i; if (sensitive_data.server_key) { tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key); key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); sensitive_data.server_key = tmp; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp; if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1) sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp; } /* Certs do not need demotion */ } /* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie. XXX - Okay Niels? */ } static void privsep_preauth_child(void) { u_int32_t rnd[256]; gid_t gidset[1]; /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */ privsep_challenge_enable(); #ifdef GSSAPI /* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */ if (options.gss_authentication) ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(); #endif arc4random_stir(); arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); #endif explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ demote_sensitive_data(); /* Change our root directory */ if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1) fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, strerror(errno)); if (chdir("/") == -1) fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno)); /* Drop our privileges */ debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_uid, (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_gid); #if 0 /* XXX not ready, too heavy after chroot */ do_setusercontext(privsep_pw); #else gidset[0] = privsep_pw->pw_gid; if (setgroups(1, gidset) < 0) fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); permanently_set_uid(privsep_pw); #endif } static int privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) { int status, r; pid_t pid; struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL; /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */ pmonitor = monitor_init(); /* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */ pmonitor->m_pkex = &active_state->kex; if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON) box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor); pid = fork(); if (pid == -1) { fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); } else if (pid != 0) { debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid); pmonitor->m_pid = pid; if (have_agent) { r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock); if (r != 0) { error("Could not get agent socket: %s", ssh_err(r)); have_agent = 0; } } if (box != NULL) ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(box, pid); monitor_child_preauth(authctxt, pmonitor); /* Sync memory */ monitor_sync(pmonitor); /* Wait for the child's exit status */ while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; pmonitor->m_pid = -1; fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } privsep_is_preauth = 0; pmonitor->m_pid = -1; if (WIFEXITED(status)) { if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) fatal("%s: preauth child exited with status %d", __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status)); } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) fatal("%s: preauth child terminated by signal %d", __func__, WTERMSIG(status)); if (box != NULL) ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(box); return 1; } else { /* child */ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd); /* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */ set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor); /* Demote the child */ if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) privsep_preauth_child(); setproctitle("%s", "[net]"); if (box != NULL) ssh_sandbox_child(box); return 0; } } static void privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) { u_int32_t rnd[256]; #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING if (1) { #else if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) { #endif /* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */ use_privsep = 0; goto skip; } /* New socket pair */ monitor_reinit(pmonitor); pmonitor->m_pid = fork(); if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1) fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); buffer_clear(&loginmsg); monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor); /* NEVERREACHED */ exit(0); } /* child */ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1; /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ demote_sensitive_data(); arc4random_stir(); arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); #endif explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); /* Drop privileges */ do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw); skip: /* It is safe now to apply the key state */ monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor); /* * Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since * this information is not part of the key state. */ packet_set_authenticated(); } static char * list_hostkey_types(void) { Buffer b; const char *p; char *ret; int i; Key *key; buffer_init(&b); for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; if (key == NULL) key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i]; if (key == NULL) continue; switch (key->type) { case KEY_RSA: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ED25519: if (buffer_len(&b) > 0) buffer_append(&b, ",", 1); p = key_ssh_name(key); buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p)); break; } /* If the private key has a cert peer, then list that too */ key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]; if (key == NULL) continue; switch (key->type) { case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: if (buffer_len(&b) > 0) buffer_append(&b, ",", 1); p = key_ssh_name(key); buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p)); break; } } buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1); ret = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b)); buffer_free(&b); debug("list_hostkey_types: %s", ret); return ret; } static Key * get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int nid, int need_private, struct ssh *ssh) { int i; Key *key; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { switch (type) { case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]; break; default: key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; if (key == NULL && !need_private) key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i]; break; } if (key != NULL && key->type == type && (key->type != KEY_ECDSA || key->ecdsa_nid == nid)) return need_private ? sensitive_data.host_keys[i] : key; } return NULL; } Key * get_hostkey_public_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh) { return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 0, ssh); } Key * get_hostkey_private_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh) { return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 1, ssh); } Key * get_hostkey_by_index(int ind) { if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files) return (NULL); return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]); } Key * get_hostkey_public_by_index(int ind, struct ssh *ssh) { if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files) return (NULL); return (sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[ind]); } int get_hostkey_index(Key *key, int compare, struct ssh *ssh) { int i; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (key_is_cert(key)) { if (key == sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] || (compare && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] && sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]))) return (i); } else { if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i] || (compare && sensitive_data.host_keys[i] && sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_keys[i]))) return (i); if (key == sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] || (compare && sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] && sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i]))) return (i); } } return (-1); } /* Inform the client of all hostkeys */ static void notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh) { struct sshbuf *buf; struct sshkey *key; int i, nkeys, r; char *fp; + /* Some clients cannot cope with the hostkeys message, skip those. */ + if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS) + return; + if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__); for (i = nkeys = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(i, ssh); if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC || key->type == KEY_RSA1 || sshkey_is_cert(key)) continue; fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT); debug3("%s: key %d: %s %s", __func__, i, sshkey_ssh_name(key), fp); free(fp); if (nkeys == 0) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring("hostkeys-00@openssh.com"); packet_put_char(0); /* want-reply */ } sshbuf_reset(buf); if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, buf)) != 0) fatal("%s: couldn't put hostkey %d: %s", __func__, i, ssh_err(r)); packet_put_string(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); nkeys++; } debug3("%s: sent %d hostkeys", __func__, nkeys); if (nkeys == 0) fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__); packet_send(); sshbuf_free(buf); } /* * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise. * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups */ static int drop_connection(int startups) { int p, r; if (startups < options.max_startups_begin) return 0; if (startups >= options.max_startups) return 1; if (options.max_startups_rate == 100) return 1; p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate; p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin; p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin; p += options.max_startups_rate; r = arc4random_uniform(100); debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r); return (r < p) ? 1 : 0; } static void usage(void) { if (options.version_addendum && *options.version_addendum != '\0') fprintf(stderr, "%s %s, %s\n", SSH_RELEASE, options.version_addendum, OPENSSL_VERSION); else fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", SSH_RELEASE, OPENSSL_VERSION); fprintf(stderr, "usage: sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-b bits] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_cert_file]\n" " [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n" " [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time] [-o option] [-p port]\n" " [-u len]\n" ); exit(1); } static void send_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf) { Buffer m; debug3("%s: entering fd = %d config len %d", __func__, fd, buffer_len(conf)); /* * Protocol from reexec master to child: * string configuration * u_int ephemeral_key_follows * bignum e (only if ephemeral_key_follows == 1) * bignum n " * bignum d " * bignum iqmp " * bignum p " * bignum q " * string rngseed (only if OpenSSL is not self-seeded) */ buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, buffer_ptr(conf)); #ifdef WITH_SSH1 if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL && sensitive_data.server_key->type == KEY_RSA1) { buffer_put_int(&m, 1); buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e); buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n); buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d); buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp); buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p); buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q); } else #endif buffer_put_int(&m, 0); #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY) rexec_send_rng_seed(&m); #endif if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, &m) == -1) fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__); buffer_free(&m); debug3("%s: done", __func__); } static void recv_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf) { Buffer m; char *cp; u_int len; debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__, fd); buffer_init(&m); if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, &m) == -1) fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__); if (buffer_get_char(&m) != 0) fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__); cp = buffer_get_string(&m, &len); if (conf != NULL) buffer_append(conf, cp, len + 1); free(cp); if (buffer_get_int(&m)) { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL) key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); sensitive_data.server_key = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1); buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e); buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n); buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d); buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp); buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p); buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q); if (rsa_generate_additional_parameters( sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0) fatal("%s: rsa_generate_additional_parameters " "error", __func__); -#else - fatal("ssh1 not supported"); #endif } #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY) rexec_recv_rng_seed(&m); #endif buffer_free(&m); debug3("%s: done", __func__); } /* Accept a connection from inetd */ static void server_accept_inetd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out) { int fd; startup_pipe = -1; if (rexeced_flag) { close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD); *sock_in = *sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO); if (!debug_flag) { startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); } } else { *sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); *sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO); } /* * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2 * as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if * ttyfd happens to be one of those. */ if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) { dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO); dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO); if (!log_stderr) dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO); if (fd > (log_stderr ? STDERR_FILENO : STDOUT_FILENO)) close(fd); } debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", *sock_in, *sock_out); } /* * Listen for TCP connections */ static void server_listen(void) { int ret, listen_sock, on = 1; struct addrinfo *ai; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int socksize; socklen_t len; for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS) fatal("Too many listen sockets. " "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS"); if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) { error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(ret)); continue; } /* Create socket for listening. */ listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (listen_sock < 0) { /* kernel may not support ipv6 */ verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) { close(listen_sock); continue; } /* * Set socket options. * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT. */ if (setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Only communicate in IPv6 over AF_INET6 sockets. */ if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) sock_set_v6only(listen_sock); debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop); len = sizeof(socksize); getsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &socksize, &len); debug("Server TCP RWIN socket size: %d", socksize); /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */ if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.", strport, ntop, strerror(errno)); close(listen_sock); continue; } listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock; num_listen_socks++; /* Start listening on the port. */ if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) fatal("listen on [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); logit("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport); } freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs); if (!num_listen_socks) fatal("Cannot bind any address."); } /* * The main TCP accept loop. Note that, for the non-debug case, returns * from this function are in a forked subprocess. */ static void server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) { fd_set *fdset; int i, j, ret, maxfd; int key_used = 0, startups = 0; int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 }; struct sockaddr_storage from; socklen_t fromlen; pid_t pid; u_char rnd[256]; /* setup fd set for accept */ fdset = NULL; maxfd = 0; for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd) maxfd = listen_socks[i]; /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */ startup_pipes = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int)); for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) startup_pipes[i] = -1; /* * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or * the daemon is killed with a signal. */ for (;;) { if (received_sighup) sighup_restart(); if (fdset != NULL) free(fdset); fdset = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(maxfd + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask)); for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset); for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset); /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */ ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR) error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (received_sigterm) { logit("Received signal %d; terminating.", (int) received_sigterm); close_listen_socks(); if (options.pid_file != NULL) unlink(options.pid_file); exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255); } if (key_used && key_do_regen) { generate_ephemeral_server_key(); key_used = 0; key_do_regen = 0; } if (ret < 0) continue; for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 && FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) { /* * the read end of the pipe is ready * if the child has closed the pipe * after successful authentication * or if the child has died */ close(startup_pipes[i]); startup_pipes[i] = -1; startups--; } for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) { if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset)) continue; fromlen = sizeof(from); *newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen); if (*newsock < 0) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && errno != ECONNABORTED && errno != EAGAIN) error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) usleep(100 * 1000); continue; } if (unset_nonblock(*newsock) == -1) { close(*newsock); continue; } if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) { debug("drop connection #%d", startups); close(*newsock); continue; } if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) { close(*newsock); continue; } if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1) { error("reexec socketpair: %s", strerror(errno)); close(*newsock); close(startup_p[0]); close(startup_p[1]); continue; } for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++) if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) { startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0]; if (maxfd < startup_p[0]) maxfd = startup_p[0]; startups++; break; } /* * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless * we are in debugging mode. */ if (debug_flag) { /* * In debugging mode. Close the listening * socket, and start processing the * connection without forking. */ debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode."); close_listen_socks(); *sock_in = *newsock; *sock_out = *newsock; close(startup_p[0]); close(startup_p[1]); startup_pipe = -1; pid = getpid(); if (rexec_flag) { send_rexec_state(config_s[0], &cfg); close(config_s[0]); } break; } /* * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have * the child process the connection. The * parent continues listening. */ platform_pre_fork(); if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { /* * Child. Close the listening and * max_startup sockets. Start using * the accepted socket. Reinitialize * logging (since our pid has changed). * We break out of the loop to handle * the connection. */ platform_post_fork_child(); startup_pipe = startup_p[1]; close_startup_pipes(); close_listen_socks(); *sock_in = *newsock; *sock_out = *newsock; log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); if (rexec_flag) close(config_s[0]); break; } /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */ platform_post_fork_parent(pid); if (pid < 0) error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); else debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid); close(startup_p[1]); if (rexec_flag) { send_rexec_state(config_s[0], &cfg); close(config_s[0]); close(config_s[1]); } /* * Mark that the key has been used (it * was "given" to the child). */ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && key_used == 0) { /* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */ signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm); alarm(options.key_regeneration_time); key_used = 1; } close(*newsock); /* * Ensure that our random state differs * from that of the child */ arc4random_stir(); arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); #endif explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); } /* child process check (or debug mode) */ if (num_listen_socks < 0) break; } } /* * Main program for the daemon. */ int main(int ac, char **av) { extern char *optarg; extern int optind; int r, opt, i, j, on = 1; int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1; const char *remote_ip; int remote_port; - char *fp, *line, *logfile = NULL; + char *fp, *line, *laddr, *logfile = NULL; int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 }; u_int n; u_int64_t ibytes, obytes; mode_t new_umask; Key *key; Key *pubkey; int keytype; Authctxt *authctxt; struct connection_info *connection_info = get_connection_info(0, 0); #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE (void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av); #endif __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */ saved_argc = ac; rexec_argc = ac; saved_argv = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_argv)); for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]); saved_argv[i] = NULL; #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */ compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av); av = saved_argv; #endif if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1) debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno)); /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */ initialize_server_options(&options); /* Parse command-line arguments. */ - while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:u:o:C:dDeE:iqrtQRT46")) != -1) { + while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, + "C:E:b:c:f:g:h:k:o:p:u:46DQRTdeiqrt")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case '4': options.address_family = AF_INET; break; case '6': options.address_family = AF_INET6; break; case 'f': config_file_name = optarg; break; case 'c': if (options.num_host_cert_files >= MAX_HOSTCERTS) { fprintf(stderr, "too many host certificates.\n"); exit(1); } options.host_cert_files[options.num_host_cert_files++] = derelativise_path(optarg); break; case 'd': if (debug_flag == 0) { debug_flag = 1; options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) options.log_level++; break; case 'D': no_daemon_flag = 1; break; case 'E': logfile = xstrdup(optarg); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 'e': log_stderr = 1; break; case 'i': inetd_flag = 1; break; case 'r': rexec_flag = 0; break; case 'R': rexeced_flag = 1; inetd_flag = 1; break; case 'Q': /* ignored */ break; case 'q': options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; break; case 'b': options.server_key_bits = (int)strtonum(optarg, 256, 32768, NULL); break; case 'p': options.ports_from_cmdline = 1; if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) { fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n"); exit(1); } options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg); if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n"); exit(1); } break; case 'g': if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n"); exit(1); } break; case 'k': if ((options.key_regeneration_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid key regeneration interval.\n"); exit(1); } break; case 'h': if (options.num_host_key_files >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) { fprintf(stderr, "too many host keys.\n"); exit(1); } options.host_key_files[options.num_host_key_files++] = derelativise_path(optarg); break; case 't': test_flag = 1; break; case 'T': test_flag = 2; break; case 'C': if (parse_server_match_testspec(connection_info, optarg) == -1) exit(1); break; case 'u': utmp_len = (u_int)strtonum(optarg, 0, HOST_NAME_MAX+1+1, NULL); if (utmp_len > HOST_NAME_MAX+1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n"); exit(1); } break; case 'o': line = xstrdup(optarg); if (process_server_config_line(&options, line, "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL) != 0) exit(1); free(line); break; case '?': default: usage(); break; } } if (rexeced_flag || inetd_flag) rexec_flag = 0; if (!test_flag && (rexec_flag && (av[0] == NULL || *av[0] != '/'))) fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path"); if (rexeced_flag) closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD); else closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); #endif /* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */ if (logfile != NULL) { log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile); free(logfile); } /* * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host * key (unless started from inetd) */ log_init(__progname, options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level, options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ? SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility, log_stderr || !inetd_flag); /* * Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from * root's environment */ if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL) (void) unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME"); #ifdef _UNICOS /* Cray can define user privs drop all privs now! * Not needed on PRIV_SU systems! */ drop_cray_privs(); #endif sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL; sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0; sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0; /* * If we're doing an extended config test, make sure we have all of * the parameters we need. If we're not doing an extended test, * do not silently ignore connection test params. */ if (test_flag >= 2 && server_match_spec_complete(connection_info) == 0) fatal("user, host and addr are all required when testing " "Match configs"); if (test_flag < 2 && server_match_spec_complete(connection_info) >= 0) fatal("Config test connection parameter (-C) provided without " "test mode (-T)"); /* Fetch our configuration */ buffer_init(&cfg); if (rexeced_flag) recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, &cfg); - else + else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0) load_server_config(config_file_name, &cfg); parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name, &cfg, NULL); seed_rng(); /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */ fill_default_server_options(&options); /* challenge-response is implemented via keyboard interactive */ if (options.challenge_response_authentication) options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; /* Check that options are sensible */ if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL && (options.authorized_keys_command != NULL && strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_command, "none") != 0)) fatal("AuthorizedKeysCommand set without " "AuthorizedKeysCommandUser"); + if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL && + (options.authorized_principals_command != NULL && + strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_command, "none") != 0)) + fatal("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand set without " + "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser"); /* * Check whether there is any path through configured auth methods. * Unfortunately it is not possible to verify this generally before * daemonisation in the presence of Match block, but this catches * and warns for trivial misconfigurations that could break login. */ if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) { if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported with " "SSH protocol 1"); for (n = 0; n < options.num_auth_methods; n++) { if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[n], 1) == 0) break; } if (n >= options.num_auth_methods) fatal("AuthenticationMethods cannot be satisfied by " "enabled authentication methods"); } /* set default channel AF */ channel_set_af(options.address_family); /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */ if (optind < ac) { fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]); exit(1); } debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION, #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION) #else "without OpenSSL" #endif ); /* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */ if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) { if (use_privsep || options.kerberos_authentication) fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist", SSH_PRIVSEP_USER); } else { explicit_bzero(privsep_pw->pw_passwd, strlen(privsep_pw->pw_passwd)); privsep_pw = pwcopy(privsep_pw); free(privsep_pw->pw_passwd); privsep_pw->pw_passwd = xstrdup("*"); } endpwent(); /* load host keys */ sensitive_data.host_keys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, sizeof(Key *)); sensitive_data.host_pubkeys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, sizeof(Key *)); if (options.host_key_agent) { if (strcmp(options.host_key_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME)) setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, options.host_key_agent, 1); if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) == 0) have_agent = 1; else error("Could not connect to agent \"%s\": %s", options.host_key_agent, ssh_err(r)); } for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (options.host_key_files[i] == NULL) continue; key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL); pubkey = key_load_public(options.host_key_files[i], NULL); if (pubkey == NULL && key != NULL) pubkey = key_demote(key); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key; sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = pubkey; if (key == NULL && pubkey != NULL && pubkey->type != KEY_RSA1 && have_agent) { debug("will rely on agent for hostkey %s", options.host_key_files[i]); keytype = pubkey->type; } else if (key != NULL) { keytype = key->type; } else { error("Could not load host key: %s", options.host_key_files[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = NULL; continue; } switch (keytype) { case KEY_RSA1: sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key; sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1; break; case KEY_RSA: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ED25519: if (have_agent || key != NULL) sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1; break; } if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(pubkey, options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed"); debug("%s host key #%d: %s %s", key ? "private" : "agent", i, keytype == KEY_RSA1 ? sshkey_type(pubkey) : sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp); free(fp); } if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) { logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key"); options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; } if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key"); options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2; } if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) { logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); exit(1); } /* * Load certificates. They are stored in an array at identical * indices to the public keys that they relate to. */ sensitive_data.host_certificates = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, sizeof(Key *)); for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_cert_files; i++) { if (options.host_cert_files[i] == NULL) continue; key = key_load_public(options.host_cert_files[i], NULL); if (key == NULL) { error("Could not load host certificate: %s", options.host_cert_files[i]); continue; } if (!key_is_cert(key)) { error("Certificate file is not a certificate: %s", options.host_cert_files[i]); key_free(key); continue; } /* Find matching private key */ for (j = 0; j < options.num_host_key_files; j++) { if (key_equal_public(key, sensitive_data.host_keys[j])) { sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key; break; } } if (j >= options.num_host_key_files) { error("No matching private key for certificate: %s", options.host_cert_files[i]); key_free(key); continue; } sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key; debug("host certificate: #%d type %d %s", j, key->type, key_type(key)); } #ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* Check certain values for sanity. */ if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) { if (options.server_key_bits < 512 || options.server_key_bits > 32768) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad server key size.\n"); exit(1); } /* * Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently. This * is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. Oh, I * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels */ if (options.server_key_bits > BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) - SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && options.server_key_bits < BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { options.server_key_bits = BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED; debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.", options.server_key_bits); } } #endif if (use_privsep) { struct stat st; if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) || (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0)) fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR); #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) && (st.st_uid != getuid () || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)) #else if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0) #endif fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or " "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR); } if (test_flag > 1) { if (server_match_spec_complete(connection_info) == 1) parse_server_match_config(&options, connection_info); dump_config(&options); } /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */ if (test_flag) exit(0); /* * Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This * prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the * portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every * module which might be used). */ if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0) debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); if (rexec_flag) { rexec_argv = xcalloc(rexec_argc + 2, sizeof(char *)); for (i = 0; i < rexec_argc; i++) { debug("rexec_argv[%d]='%s'", i, saved_argv[i]); rexec_argv[i] = saved_argv[i]; } rexec_argv[rexec_argc] = "-R"; rexec_argv[rexec_argc + 1] = NULL; } /* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */ new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022; (void) umask(new_umask); /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */ if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag)) log_stderr = 1; log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); /* * If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd, disconnect * from the controlling terminal, and fork. The original process * exits. */ if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag)) { #ifdef TIOCNOTTY int fd; #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ if (daemon(0, 0) < 0) fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); /* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */ #ifdef TIOCNOTTY fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); if (fd >= 0) { (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL); close(fd); } #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ } /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */ log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); /* Avoid killing the process in high-pressure swapping environments. */ if (!inetd_flag && madvise(NULL, 0, MADV_PROTECT) != 0) debug("madvise(): %.200s", strerror(errno)); /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be unmounted if desired. */ if (chdir("/") == -1) error("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno)); /* ignore SIGPIPE */ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* Get a connection, either from inetd or a listening TCP socket */ if (inetd_flag) { server_accept_inetd(&sock_in, &sock_out); } else { platform_pre_listen(); server_listen(); if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) generate_ephemeral_server_key(); signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler); signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler); signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler); /* * Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler * is setup and the listen sockets are bound */ if (options.pid_file != NULL && !debug_flag) { FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w"); if (f == NULL) { error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s", options.pid_file, strerror(errno)); } else { fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid()); fclose(f); } } /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */ server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out, &newsock, config_s); } /* This is the child processing a new connection. */ setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]"); /* * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't * want the child to be able to affect the parent. */ #if !defined(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY) /* * If setsid is called, on some platforms sshd will later acquire a * controlling terminal which will result in "could not set * controlling tty" errors. */ if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0) error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno)); #endif if (rexec_flag) { int fd; debug("rexec start in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d", sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]); dup2(newsock, STDIN_FILENO); dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO); if (startup_pipe == -1) close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); else if (startup_pipe != REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD) { dup2(startup_pipe, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); close(startup_pipe); startup_pipe = REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD; } dup2(config_s[1], REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD); close(config_s[1]); execv(rexec_argv[0], rexec_argv); /* Reexec has failed, fall back and continue */ error("rexec of %s failed: %s", rexec_argv[0], strerror(errno)); recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, NULL); log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); /* Clean up fds */ close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD); newsock = sock_out = sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) { dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO); dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO); if (fd > STDERR_FILENO) close(fd); } debug("rexec cleanup in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d", sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]); } /* Executed child processes don't need these. */ fcntl(sock_out, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); fcntl(sock_in, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); /* * Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense. */ alarm(0); signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL); signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); #ifdef __FreeBSD__ /* * Initialize the resolver. This may not happen automatically * before privsep chroot(). */ if ((_res.options & RES_INIT) == 0) { debug("res_init()"); res_init(); } #ifdef GSSAPI /* * Force GSS-API to parse its configuration and load any * mechanism plugins. */ { gss_OID_set mechs; OM_uint32 minor_status; gss_indicate_mechs(&minor_status, &mechs); gss_release_oid_set(&minor_status, &mechs); } #endif #endif /* * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do * not have a key. */ packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out); packet_set_server(); /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */ if (options.tcp_keep_alive && packet_connection_is_on_socket() && setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0) error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if ((remote_port = get_remote_port()) < 0) { debug("get_remote_port failed"); cleanup_exit(255); } /* * We use get_canonical_hostname with usedns = 0 instead of * get_remote_ipaddr here so IP options will be checked. */ (void) get_canonical_hostname(0); /* * The rest of the code depends on the fact that * get_remote_ipaddr() caches the remote ip, even if * the socket goes away. */ remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr(); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port); #endif #ifdef LIBWRAP allow_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_INFO; deny_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_WARNING; /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { struct request_info req; request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0); fromhost(&req); if (!hosts_access(&req)) { debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper"); refuse(&req); /* NOTREACHED */ fatal("libwrap refuse returns"); } } #endif /* LIBWRAP */ /* Log the connection. */ + laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in); verbose("Connection from %s port %d on %s port %d", - remote_ip, remote_port, - get_local_ipaddr(sock_in), get_local_port()); + remote_ip, remote_port, laddr, get_local_port()); + free(laddr); /* * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero * indicates no limit. Note that we don't set the alarm in debugging * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you * are about to discover the bug. */ signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler); if (!debug_flag) alarm(options.login_grace_time); sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out); /* In inetd mode, generate ephemeral key only for proto 1 connections */ if (!compat20 && inetd_flag && sensitive_data.server_key == NULL) generate_ephemeral_server_key(); packet_set_nonblocking(); /* allocate authentication context */ authctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*authctxt)); authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg; /* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */ the_authctxt = authctxt; /* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */ buffer_init(&loginmsg); auth_debug_reset(); if (use_privsep) { if (privsep_preauth(authctxt) == 1) goto authenticated; } else if (compat20 && have_agent) { if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) { error("Unable to get agent socket: %s", ssh_err(r)); have_agent = 0; } } /* perform the key exchange */ /* authenticate user and start session */ if (compat20) { do_ssh2_kex(); do_authentication2(authctxt); } else { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 do_ssh1_kex(); do_authentication(authctxt); #else fatal("ssh1 not supported"); #endif } /* * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers * the current keystate and exits */ if (use_privsep) { mm_send_keystate(pmonitor); exit(0); } authenticated: /* * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for * authentication. */ alarm(0); signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); authctxt->authenticated = 1; if (startup_pipe != -1) { close(startup_pipe); startup_pipe = -1; } #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS); #endif #ifdef GSSAPI if (options.gss_authentication) { temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); ssh_gssapi_storecreds(); restore_uid(); } #endif #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) { do_pam_setcred(1); do_pam_session(); } #endif /* * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare * file descriptor passing. */ if (use_privsep) { privsep_postauth(authctxt); /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */ if (!compat20) destroy_sensitive_data(); } packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval, options.client_alive_count_max); /* Try to send all our hostkeys to the client */ if (compat20) notify_hostkeys(active_state); /* Start session. */ do_authenticated(authctxt); /* The connection has been terminated. */ packet_get_bytes(&ibytes, &obytes); verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes", (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes); verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port); #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) finish_pam(); #endif /* USE_PAM */ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE)); #endif packet_close(); if (use_privsep) mm_terminate(); exit(0); } #ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* * Decrypt session_key_int using our private server key and private host key * (key with larger modulus first). */ int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int) { int rsafail = 0; if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) { /* Server key has bigger modulus. */ if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) < BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { fatal("do_connection: %s: " "server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", get_remote_ipaddr(), BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n), SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); } if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0) rsafail++; if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) != 0) rsafail++; } else { /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */ if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) < BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { fatal("do_connection: %s: " "host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", get_remote_ipaddr(), BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); } if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) != 0) rsafail++; if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0) rsafail++; } return (rsafail); } /* * SSH1 key exchange */ static void do_ssh1_kex(void) { int i, len; int rsafail = 0; BIGNUM *session_key_int, *fake_key_int, *real_key_int; u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; u_char fake_key_bytes[4096 / 8]; size_t fake_key_len; u_char cookie[8]; u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags; /* * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip * spoofing attacks. Note that this only works against somebody * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure. */ arc4random_buf(cookie, sizeof(cookie)); /* * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP * spoofing. */ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) packet_put_char(cookie[i]); /* Store our public server RSA key. */ packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n)); packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e); packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n); /* Store our public host RSA key. */ packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n)); packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e); packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n); /* Put protocol flags. */ packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN); /* Declare which ciphers we support. */ packet_put_int(cipher_mask_ssh1(0)); /* Declare supported authentication types. */ auth_mask = 0; if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA; if (options.rsa_authentication) auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA; if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1) auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS; if (options.password_authentication) auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD; packet_put_int(auth_mask); /* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */ packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.", BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n)); /* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */ packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY); /* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */ cipher_type = packet_get_char(); if (!(cipher_mask_ssh1(0) & (1 << cipher_type))) packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher."); /* Get check bytes from the packet. These must match those we sent earlier with the public key packet. */ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char()) packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match."); debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type)); /* Get the encrypted integer. */ if ((real_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed"); packet_get_bignum(real_key_int); protocol_flags = packet_get_int(); packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags); packet_check_eom(); /* Setup a fake key in case RSA decryption fails */ if ((fake_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed"); fake_key_len = BN_num_bytes(real_key_int); if (fake_key_len > sizeof(fake_key_bytes)) fake_key_len = sizeof(fake_key_bytes); arc4random_buf(fake_key_bytes, fake_key_len); if (BN_bin2bn(fake_key_bytes, fake_key_len, fake_key_int) == NULL) fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_bin2bn failed"); /* Decrypt real_key_int using host/server keys */ rsafail = PRIVSEP(ssh1_session_key(real_key_int)); /* If decryption failed, use the fake key. Else, the real key. */ if (rsafail) session_key_int = fake_key_int; else session_key_int = real_key_int; /* * Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the * key is in the highest bits. */ (void) BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8); len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int); if (len < 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(session_key)) { error("do_ssh1_kex: bad session key len from %s: " "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu", get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key)); rsafail++; } else { explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key)); BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len); derive_ssh1_session_id( sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, cookie, session_id); /* * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the * session id. */ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) session_key[i] ^= session_id[i]; } /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */ destroy_sensitive_data(); if (use_privsep) mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id); /* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */ BN_clear_free(real_key_int); BN_clear_free(fake_key_int); /* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be encrypted. */ packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type); /* Destroy our copy of the session key. It is no longer needed. */ explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key)); debug("Received session key; encryption turned on."); /* Send an acknowledgment packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } #endif int sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *privkey, Key *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slen, const u_char *data, size_t dlen, u_int flag) { int r; u_int xxx_slen, xxx_dlen = dlen; if (privkey) { if (PRIVSEP(key_sign(privkey, signature, &xxx_slen, data, xxx_dlen) < 0)) fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__); if (slen) *slen = xxx_slen; } else if (use_privsep) { if (mm_key_sign(pubkey, signature, &xxx_slen, data, xxx_dlen) < 0) fatal("%s: pubkey_sign failed", __func__); if (slen) *slen = xxx_slen; } else { if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, pubkey, signature, slen, data, dlen, datafellows)) != 0) fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } return 0; } /* * SSH2 key exchange: diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 */ static void do_ssh2_kex(void) { char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER }; struct kex *kex; int r; if (options.ciphers != NULL) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; } myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]); if (options.macs != NULL) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; } if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none"; } else if (options.compression == COMP_DELAYED) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com"; } if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL) myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms; myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal( myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]); if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit, (time_t)options.rekey_interval); myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal( list_hostkey_types()); /* start key exchange */ if ((r = kex_setup(active_state, myproposal)) != 0) fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r)); kex = active_state->kex; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; # endif #endif kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server; kex->server = 1; kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type; kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type; kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index; kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign; dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, active_state); session_id2 = kex->session_id; session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE); packet_put_cstring("markus"); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); #endif debug("KEX done"); } /* server specific fatal cleanup */ void cleanup_exit(int i) { if (the_authctxt) { do_cleanup(the_authctxt); if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) { debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid); if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 && errno != ESRCH) error("%s: kill(%d): %s", __func__, pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno)); } } #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */ if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON); #endif _exit(i); } Index: head/crypto/openssh/sshd_config =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/sshd_config (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/sshd_config (revision 294336) @@ -1,136 +1,136 @@ -# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.94 2015/02/02 01:57:44 deraadt Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: sshd_config,v 1.95 2015/04/27 21:42:48 djm Exp $ # $FreeBSD$ # This is the sshd server system-wide configuration file. See # sshd_config(5) for more information. # This sshd was compiled with PATH=/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin # The strategy used for options in the default sshd_config shipped with # OpenSSH is to specify options with their default value where # possible, but leave them commented. Uncommented options override the # default value. # Note that some of FreeBSD's defaults differ from OpenBSD's, and # FreeBSD has a few additional options. #Port 22 #AddressFamily any #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 #ListenAddress :: # The default requires explicit activation of protocol 1 #Protocol 2 # HostKey for protocol version 1 #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key # HostKeys for protocol version 2 #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key #HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key # Lifetime and size of ephemeral version 1 server key #KeyRegenerationInterval 1h #ServerKeyBits 1024 # Ciphers and keying #RekeyLimit default none # Logging # obsoletes QuietMode and FascistLogging #SyslogFacility AUTH #LogLevel INFO # Authentication: #LoginGraceTime 2m #PermitRootLogin no #StrictModes yes #MaxAuthTries 6 #MaxSessions 10 #RSAAuthentication yes #PubkeyAuthentication yes # The default is to check both .ssh/authorized_keys and .ssh/authorized_keys2 #AuthorizedKeysFile .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2 #AuthorizedPrincipalsFile none #AuthorizedKeysCommand none #AuthorizedKeysCommandUser nobody # For this to work you will also need host keys in /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts #RhostsRSAAuthentication no # similar for protocol version 2 #HostbasedAuthentication no # Change to yes if you don't trust ~/.ssh/known_hosts for # RhostsRSAAuthentication and HostbasedAuthentication #IgnoreUserKnownHosts no # Don't read the user's ~/.rhosts and ~/.shosts files #IgnoreRhosts yes # Change to yes to enable built-in password authentication. #PasswordAuthentication no #PermitEmptyPasswords no # Change to no to disable PAM authentication #ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes # Kerberos options #KerberosAuthentication no #KerberosOrLocalPasswd yes #KerberosTicketCleanup yes #KerberosGetAFSToken no # GSSAPI options #GSSAPIAuthentication no #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes # Set this to 'no' to disable PAM authentication, account processing, # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will # be allowed through the ChallengeResponseAuthentication and # PasswordAuthentication. Depending on your PAM configuration, # PAM authentication via ChallengeResponseAuthentication may bypass # the setting of "PermitRootLogin without-password". # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'. #UsePAM yes #AllowAgentForwarding yes #AllowTcpForwarding yes #GatewayPorts no #X11Forwarding yes #X11DisplayOffset 10 #X11UseLocalhost yes #PermitTTY yes #PrintMotd yes #PrintLastLog yes #TCPKeepAlive yes #UseLogin no #UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox #PermitUserEnvironment no #Compression delayed #ClientAliveInterval 0 #ClientAliveCountMax 3 #UseDNS no #PidFile /var/run/sshd.pid #MaxStartups 10:30:100 #PermitTunnel no #ChrootDirectory none #VersionAddendum FreeBSD-20160119 # no default banner path #Banner none # override default of no subsystems Subsystem sftp /usr/libexec/sftp-server # Example of overriding settings on a per-user basis #Match User anoncvs # X11Forwarding no # AllowTcpForwarding no # PermitTTY no # ForceCommand cvs server Index: head/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.0 =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.0 (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.0 (revision 294336) @@ -1,946 +1,995 @@ SSHD_CONFIG(5) File Formats Manual SSHD_CONFIG(5) NAME sshd_config M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SSH daemon configuration file SYNOPSIS /etc/ssh/sshd_config DESCRIPTION sshd(8) reads configuration data from /etc/ssh/sshd_config (or the file specified with -f on the command line). The file contains keyword- argument pairs, one per line. Lines starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y and empty lines are interpreted as comments. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes (") in order to represent arguments containing spaces. The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): AcceptEnv Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be copied into the session's environ(7). See SendEnv in ssh_config(5) for how to configure the client. Note that - environment passing is only supported for protocol 2. Variables - are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters - M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y. Multiple environment variables may be separated by - whitespace or spread across multiple AcceptEnv directives. Be - warned that some environment variables could be used to bypass - restricted user environments. For this reason, care should be - taken in the use of this directive. The default is not to accept - any environment variables. + environment passing is only supported for protocol 2, and that + the TERM environment variable is always sent whenever the client + requests a pseudo-terminal as it is required by the protocol. + Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard + characters M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y. Multiple environment variables may be + separated by whitespace or spread across multiple AcceptEnv + directives. Be warned that some environment variables could be + used to bypass restricted user environments. For this reason, + care should be taken in the use of this directive. The default + is not to accept any environment variables. AddressFamily Specifies which address family should be used by sshd(8). Valid arguments are M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\inetM-bM-^@M-^] (use IPv4 only), or M-bM-^@M-^\inet6M-bM-^@M-^] (use IPv6 only). The default is M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^]. AllowAgentForwarding Specifies whether ssh-agent(1) forwarding is permitted. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. Note that disabling agent forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. AllowGroups This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns. Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally AllowGroups. See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns. AllowTcpForwarding Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted. The available options are M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\allM-bM-^@M-^] to allow TCP forwarding, M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] to prevent all TCP forwarding, M-bM-^@M-^\localM-bM-^@M-^] to allow local (from the perspective of ssh(1)) forwarding only or M-bM-^@M-^\remoteM-bM-^@M-^] to allow remote forwarding only. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. AllowStreamLocalForwarding Specifies whether StreamLocal (Unix-domain socket) forwarding is permitted. The available options are M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\allM-bM-^@M-^] to allow StreamLocal forwarding, M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] to prevent all StreamLocal forwarding, M-bM-^@M-^\localM-bM-^@M-^] to allow local (from the perspective of ssh(1)) forwarding only or M-bM-^@M-^\remoteM-bM-^@M-^] to allow remote forwarding only. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. Note that disabling StreamLocal forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. AllowUsers This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for user names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to particular users from particular hosts. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally AllowGroups. See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns. AuthenticationMethods Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully completed for a user to be granted access. This option must be followed by one or more comma-separated lists of authentication method names. Successful authentication requires completion of every method in at least one of these lists. For example, an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactiveM-bM-^@M-^] would require the user to complete public key authentication, followed by either password or keyboard interactive authentication. Only methods that are next in one or more lists are offered at each stage, so for this example, it would not be possible to attempt password or keyboard-interactive authentication before public key. For keyboard interactive authentication it is also possible to restrict authentication to a specific device by appending a colon followed by the device identifier M-bM-^@M-^\bsdauthM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\pamM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\skeyM-bM-^@M-^], depending on the server configuration. For example, M-bM-^@M-^\keyboard-interactive:bsdauthM-bM-^@M-^] would restrict keyboard interactive authentication to the M-bM-^@M-^\bsdauthM-bM-^@M-^] device. If the M-bM-^@M-^\publickeyM-bM-^@M-^] method is listed more than once, sshd(8) verifies that keys that have been used successfully are not reused for subsequent authentications. For example, an AuthenticationMethods of M-bM-^@M-^\publickey,publickeyM-bM-^@M-^] will require successful authentication using two different public keys. This option is only available for SSH protocol 2 and will yield a fatal error if enabled if protocol 1 is also enabled. Note that each authentication method listed should also be explicitly enabled in the configuration. The default is not to require multiple authentication; successful completion of a single authentication method is sufficient. AuthorizedKeysCommand Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys. - The program must be owned by root and not writable by group or - others. It will be invoked with a single argument of the - username being authenticated, and should produce on standard - output zero or more lines of authorized_keys output (see - AUTHORIZED_KEYS in sshd(8)). If a key supplied by - AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully authenticate and - authorize the user then public key authentication continues using - the usual AuthorizedKeysFile files. By default, no - AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. + The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or + others and specified by an absolute path. + Arguments to AuthorizedKeysCommand may be provided using the + following tokens, which will be expanded at runtime: %% is + replaced by a literal '%', %u is replaced by the username being + authenticated, %h is replaced by the home directory of the user + being authenticated, %t is replaced with the key type offered for + authentication, %f is replaced with the fingerprint of the key, + and %k is replaced with the key being offered for authentication. + If no arguments are specified then the username of the target + user will be supplied. + + The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines + of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in sshd(8)). If a + key supplied by AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully + authenticate and authorize the user then public key + authentication continues using the usual AuthorizedKeysFile + files. By default, no AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. + AuthorizedKeysCommandUser Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host than running authorized keys commands. If AuthorizedKeysCommand is specified but AuthorizedKeysCommandUser is not, then sshd(8) will refuse to start. AuthorizedKeysFile Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used for user authentication. The format is described in the AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT section of sshd(8). AuthorizedKeysFile may contain tokens of the form %T which are substituted during connection setup. The following tokens are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is replaced by the username of that user. After expansion, AuthorizedKeysFile is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home directory. Multiple files may be listed, separated by whitespace. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\.ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2M-bM-^@M-^]. + AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand + Specifies a program to be used to generate the list of allowed + certificate principals as per AuthorizedPrincipalsFile. The + program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others + and specified by an absolute path. + + Arguments to AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand may be provided using + the following tokens, which will be expanded at runtime: %% is + replaced by a literal '%', %u is replaced by the username being + authenticated and %h is replaced by the home directory of the + user being authenticated. + + The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines + of AuthorizedPrincipalsFile output. If either + AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand or AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is + specified, then certificates offered by the client for + authentication must contain a principal that is listed. By + default, no AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run. + + AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser + Specifies the user under whose account the + AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run. It is recommended to use a + dedicated user that has no other role on the host than running + authorized principals commands. If AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand + is specified but AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser is not, then + sshd(8) will refuse to start. + AuthorizedPrincipalsFile Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for certificate authentication. When using certificates signed by a key listed in TrustedUserCAKeys, this file lists names, one of which must appear in the certificate for it to be accepted for authentication. Names are listed one per line preceded by key options (as described in AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT in sshd(8)). Empty lines and comments starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are ignored. AuthorizedPrincipalsFile may contain tokens of the form %T which are substituted during connection setup. The following tokens are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is replaced by the username of that user. After expansion, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home directory. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^], i.e. not to use a principals file M-bM-^@M-^S in this case, the username of the user must appear in a certificate's principals list for it to be accepted. Note that AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is only used when authentication proceeds using a CA listed in TrustedUserCAKeys and is not consulted for certification authorities trusted via ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, though the principals= key option offers a similar facility (see sshd(8) for details). Banner The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before authentication is allowed. If the argument is M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] then no banner is displayed. This option is only available for protocol version 2. By default, no banner is displayed. ChallengeResponseAuthentication Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via PAM or through authentication styles supported in login.conf(5)) The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. ChrootDirectory Specifies the pathname of a directory to chroot(2) to after authentication. At session startup sshd(8) checks that all components of the pathname are root-owned directories which are not writable by any other user or group. After the chroot, sshd(8) changes the working directory to the user's home directory. The pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at runtime once the connecting user has been authenticated: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is replaced by the username of that user. The ChrootDirectory must contain the necessary files and directories to support the user's session. For an interactive session this requires at least a shell, typically sh(1), and basic /dev nodes such as null(4), zero(4), stdin(4), stdout(4), stderr(4), and tty(4) devices. For file transfer sessions using M-bM-^@M-^\sftpM-bM-^@M-^], no additional configuration of the environment is necessary if the in-process sftp server is used, though sessions which use logging may require /dev/log inside the chroot directory on some operating systems (see sftp-server(8) for details). For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be prevented from modification by other processes on the system (especially those outside the jail). Misconfiguration can lead to unsafe environments which sshd(8) cannot detect. The default is not to chroot(2). Ciphers Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. The supported ciphers are: 3des-cbc aes128-cbc aes192-cbc aes256-cbc aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr aes128-gcm@openssh.com aes256-gcm@openssh.com arcfour arcfour128 arcfour256 blowfish-cbc cast128-cbc chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com The default is: aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com, chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using the -Q option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\cipherM-bM-^@M-^]. ClientAliveCountMax Sets the number of client alive messages (see below) which may be sent without sshd(8) receiving any messages back from the client. If this threshold is reached while client alive messages are being sent, sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the session. It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is very different from TCPKeepAlive (below). The client alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option enabled by TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The client alive mechanism is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive. The default value is 3. If ClientAliveInterval (see below) is set to 15, and ClientAliveCountMax is left at the default, unresponsive SSH clients will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. ClientAliveInterval Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received from the client, sshd(8) will send a message through the encrypted channel to request a response from the client. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the client. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. Compression Specifies whether compression is allowed, or delayed until the user has authenticated successfully. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\delayedM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\delayedM-bM-^@M-^]. DenyGroups This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns. Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally AllowGroups. See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns. DenyUsers This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for user names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to particular users from particular hosts. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally AllowGroups. See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns. FingerprintHash Specifies the hash algorithm used when logging key fingerprints. Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. ForceCommand Forces the execution of the command specified by ForceCommand, ignoring any command supplied by the client and ~/.ssh/rc if present. The command is invoked by using the user's login shell with the -c option. This applies to shell, command, or subsystem execution. It is most useful inside a Match block. The command originally supplied by the client is available in the SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Specifying a command of M-bM-^@M-^\internal-sftpM-bM-^@M-^] will force the use of an in-process sftp server that requires no support files when used with ChrootDirectory. GatewayPorts Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports forwarded for the client. By default, sshd(8) binds remote port forwardings to the loopback address. This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. GatewayPorts can be used to specify that sshd should allow remote port forwardings to bind to non-loopback addresses, thus allowing other hosts to connect. The argument may be M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] to force remote port forwardings to be available to the local host only, M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] to force remote port forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or M-bM-^@M-^\clientspecifiedM-bM-^@M-^] to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding is bound. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. GSSAPIAuthentication Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. GSSAPICleanupCredentials Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache on logout. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. + GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck + Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI + acceptor a client authenticates against. If set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] then + the client must authenticate against the host service on the + current hostname. If set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] then the client may + authenticate against any service key stored in the machine's + default store. This facility is provided to assist with + operation on multi homed machines. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. + HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication as a comma-separated pattern list. The default M-bM-^@M-^\*M-bM-^@M-^] will allow all key types. The -Q option of ssh(1) may be used to list supported key types. HostbasedAuthentication Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together with successful public key client host authentication is allowed (host-based authentication). This option is similar to RhostsRSAAuthentication and applies to protocol version 2 only. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a reverse name lookup when matching the name in the ~/.shosts, ~/.rhosts, and /etc/hosts.equiv files during HostbasedAuthentication. A setting of M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] means that sshd(8) uses the name supplied by the client rather than attempting to resolve the name from the TCP connection itself. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. HostCertificate Specifies a file containing a public host certificate. The certificate's public key must match a private host key already specified by HostKey. The default behaviour of sshd(8) is not to load any certificates. HostKey Specifies a file containing a private host key used by SSH. The default is /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key for protocol version 1, and /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key for protocol version 2. Note that sshd(8) will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-accessible. It is possible to have multiple host key files. M-bM-^@M-^\rsa1M-bM-^@M-^] keys are used for version 1 and M-bM-^@M-^\dsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^] are used for version 2 of the SSH protocol. It is also possible to specify public host key files instead. In this case operations on the private key will be delegated to an ssh-agent(1). HostKeyAgent Identifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with an agent that has access to the private host keys. If M-bM-^@M-^\SSH_AUTH_SOCKM-bM-^@M-^] is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. IgnoreRhosts Specifies that .rhosts and .shosts files will not be used in RhostsRSAAuthentication or HostbasedAuthentication. /etc/hosts.equiv and /etc/shosts.equiv are still used. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. IgnoreUserKnownHosts Specifies whether sshd(8) should ignore the user's ~/.ssh/known_hosts during RhostsRSAAuthentication or HostbasedAuthentication. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the connection. Accepted values are M-bM-^@M-^\af11M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af12M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af13M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af21M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af22M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af23M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af31M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af32M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af33M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af41M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af42M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\af43M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs0M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs1M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs2M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs3M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs4M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs5M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs6M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\cs7M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\efM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\lowdelayM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\throughputM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\reliabilityM-bM-^@M-^], or a numeric value. This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\lowdelayM-bM-^@M-^] for interactive sessions and M-bM-^@M-^\throughputM-bM-^@M-^] for non-interactive sessions. KbdInteractiveAuthentication Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication. The argument to this keyword must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is to use whatever value ChallengeResponseAuthentication is set to (by default M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]). KerberosAuthentication Specifies whether the password provided by the user for PasswordAuthentication will be validated through the Kerberos KDC. To use this option, the server needs a Kerberos servtab which allows the verification of the KDC's identity. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. KerberosGetAFSToken If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to acquire an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. KerberosOrLocalPasswd If password authentication through Kerberos fails then the password will be validated via any additional local mechanism such as /etc/passwd. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. KerberosTicketCleanup Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache file on logout. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. KexAlgorithms Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. The supported algorithms are: curve25519-sha256@libssh.org diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 ecdh-sha2-nistp256 ecdh-sha2-nistp384 ecdh-sha2-nistp521 The default is: curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using the -Q option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\kexM-bM-^@M-^]. KeyRegenerationInterval In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically regenerated after this many seconds (if it has been used). The purpose of regeneration is to prevent decrypting captured sessions by later breaking into the machine and stealing the keys. The key is never stored anywhere. If the value is 0, the key is never regenerated. The default is 3600 (seconds). ListenAddress Specifies the local addresses sshd(8) should listen on. The following forms may be used: ListenAddress host|IPv4_addr|IPv6_addr ListenAddress host|IPv4_addr:port ListenAddress [host|IPv6_addr]:port If port is not specified, sshd will listen on the address and all - prior Port options specified. The default is to listen on all - local addresses. Multiple ListenAddress options are permitted. - Additionally, any Port options must precede this option for non- - port qualified addresses. + Port options specified. The default is to listen on all local + addresses. Multiple ListenAddress options are permitted. LoginGraceTime The server disconnects after this time if the user has not successfully logged in. If the value is 0, there is no time limit. The default is 120 seconds. LogLevel Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from sshd(8). The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO. DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output. Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended. MACs Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms. The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2 for data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma- separated. The algorithms that contain M-bM-^@M-^\-etmM-bM-^@M-^] calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and their use recommended. The supported MACs are: hmac-md5 hmac-md5-96 hmac-ripemd160 hmac-sha1 hmac-sha1-96 hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512 umac-64@openssh.com umac-128@openssh.com hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com umac-64-etm@openssh.com umac-128-etm@openssh.com The default is: umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512 The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using the -Q option of ssh(1) with an argument of M-bM-^@M-^\macM-bM-^@M-^]. Match Introduces a conditional block. If all of the criteria on the Match line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines override those set in the global section of the config file, until either another Match line or the end of the file. If a keyword appears in multiple Match blocks that are satisfied, only the first instance of the keyword is applied. The arguments to Match are one or more criteria-pattern pairs or the single token All which matches all criteria. The available criteria are User, Group, Host, LocalAddress, LocalPort, and Address. The match patterns may consist of single entries or comma-separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the PATTERNS section of ssh_config(5). The patterns in an Address criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format, e.g. M-bM-^@M-^\192.0.2.0/24M-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\3ffe:ffff::/32M-bM-^@M-^]. Note that the mask length provided must be consistent with the address - it is an error to specify a mask length that is too long for the address or one with bits set in this host portion of the address. For example, M-bM-^@M-^\192.0.2.0/33M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\192.0.2.0/8M-bM-^@M-^] respectively. Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a Match keyword. Available keywords are AcceptEnv, AllowAgentForwarding, AllowGroups, AllowStreamLocalForwarding, AllowTcpForwarding, AllowUsers, AuthenticationMethods, AuthorizedKeysCommand, AuthorizedKeysCommandUser, AuthorizedKeysFile, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile, Banner, ChrootDirectory, DenyGroups, DenyUsers, ForceCommand, GatewayPorts, GSSAPIAuthentication, HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, HostbasedAuthentication, HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, IPQoS, KbdInteractiveAuthentication, KerberosAuthentication, MaxAuthTries, MaxSessions, PasswordAuthentication, PermitEmptyPasswords, PermitOpen, PermitRootLogin, PermitTTY, PermitTunnel, PermitUserRC, PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, PubkeyAuthentication, RekeyLimit, RevokedKeys, RhostsRSAAuthentication, RSAAuthentication, StreamLocalBindMask, StreamLocalBindUnlink, TrustedUserCAKeys, X11DisplayOffset, X11Forwarding and X11UseLocalHost. MaxAuthTries Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted per connection. Once the number of failures reaches half this value, additional failures are logged. The default is 6. MaxSessions Specifies the maximum number of open sessions permitted per network connection. The default is 10. MaxStartups Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated connections to the SSH daemon. Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the LoginGraceTime expires for a connection. The default is 10:30:100. Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying the three colon separated values M-bM-^@M-^\start:rate:fullM-bM-^@M-^] (e.g. "10:30:60"). sshd(8) will refuse connection attempts with a probability of M-bM-^@M-^\rate/100M-bM-^@M-^] (30%) if there are currently M-bM-^@M-^\startM-bM-^@M-^] (10) unauthenticated connections. The probability increases linearly and all connection attempts are refused if the number of unauthenticated connections reaches M-bM-^@M-^\fullM-bM-^@M-^] (60). PasswordAuthentication Specifies whether password authentication is allowed. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. PermitEmptyPasswords When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the server allows login to accounts with empty password strings. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. PermitOpen Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is permitted. The forwarding specification must be one of the following forms: PermitOpen host:port PermitOpen IPv4_addr:port PermitOpen [IPv6_addr]:port Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with whitespace. An argument of M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^] can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any forwarding requests. An argument of M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests. By default all port forwarding requests are permitted. PermitRootLogin Specifies whether root can log in using ssh(1). The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\without-passwordM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^], or - M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. + M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\without-passwordM-bM-^@M-^], password authentication is disabled for root. If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^], root login with public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the command option has been specified (which may be useful for taking remote backups even if root login is normally not allowed). All other authentication methods are disabled for root. If this option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^], root is not allowed to log in. PermitTunnel Specifies whether tun(4) device forwarding is allowed. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\point-to-pointM-bM-^@M-^] (layer 3), M-bM-^@M-^\ethernetM-bM-^@M-^] (layer 2), or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. Specifying M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] permits both M-bM-^@M-^\point-to-pointM-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\ethernetM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. Independent of this setting, the permissions of the selected tun(4) device must allow access to the user. PermitTTY Specifies whether pty(4) allocation is permitted. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. PermitUserEnvironment Specifies whether ~/.ssh/environment and environment= options in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys are processed by sshd(8). The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. Enabling environment processing may enable users to bypass access restrictions in some configurations using mechanisms such as LD_PRELOAD. PermitUserRC Specifies whether any ~/.ssh/rc file is executed. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. PidFile Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the SSH - daemon. The default is /var/run/sshd.pid. + daemon, or M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to not write one. The default is + /var/run/sshd.pid. Port Specifies the port number that sshd(8) listens on. The default is 22. Multiple options of this type are permitted. See also ListenAddress. PrintLastLog Specifies whether sshd(8) should print the date and time of the last user login when a user logs in interactively. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. PrintMotd Specifies whether sshd(8) should print /etc/motd when a user logs in interactively. (On some systems it is also printed by the shell, /etc/profile, or equivalent.) The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. Protocol Specifies the protocol versions sshd(8) supports. The possible values are M-bM-^@M-^X1M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X2M-bM-^@M-^Y. Multiple versions must be comma- separated. The default is M-bM-^@M-^X2M-bM-^@M-^Y. Note that the order of the protocol list does not indicate preference, because the client selects among multiple protocol versions offered by the server. Specifying M-bM-^@M-^\2,1M-bM-^@M-^] is identical to M-bM-^@M-^\1,2M-bM-^@M-^]. PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key authentication as a comma-separated pattern list. The default M-bM-^@M-^\*M-bM-^@M-^] will allow all key types. The -Q option of ssh(1) may be used to list supported key types. PubkeyAuthentication Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. RekeyLimit Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of M-bM-^@M-^XKM-bM-^@M-^Y, M-bM-^@M-^XMM-bM-^@M-^Y, or M-bM-^@M-^XGM-bM-^@M-^Y to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between M-bM-^@M-^X1GM-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X4GM-bM-^@M-^Y, depending on the cipher. The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units documented in the TIME FORMATS section. The default value for RekeyLimit is M-bM-^@M-^\default noneM-bM-^@M-^], which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. RevokedKeys - Specifies revoked public keys. Keys listed in this file will be - refused for public key authentication. Note that if this file is - not readable, then public key authentication will be refused for - all users. Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one - public key per line, or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) - as generated by ssh-keygen(1). For more information on KRLs, see - the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in ssh-keygen(1). + Specifies revoked public keys file, or M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to not use one. + Keys listed in this file will be refused for public key + authentication. Note that if this file is not readable, then + public key authentication will be refused for all users. Keys + may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, + or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by + ssh-keygen(1). For more information on KRLs, see the KEY + REVOCATION LISTS section in ssh-keygen(1). RhostsRSAAuthentication Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together with successful RSA host authentication is allowed. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. This option applies to protocol version 1 only. RSAAuthentication Specifies whether pure RSA authentication is allowed. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. This option applies to protocol version 1 only. ServerKeyBits Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key. The minimum value is 512, and the default is 1024. StreamLocalBindMask Sets the octal file creation mode mask (umask) used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is readable and writable only by the owner. Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain socket files. StreamLocalBindUnlink Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one. If the socket file already exists and StreamLocalBindUnlink is not enabled, sshd will be unable to forward the port to the Unix- domain socket file. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. StrictModes Specifies whether sshd(8) should check file modes and ownership of the user's files and home directory before accepting login. This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally leave their directory or files world-writable. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. Note that this does not apply to ChrootDirectory, whose permissions and ownership are checked unconditionally. Subsystem Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon). Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional arguments) to execute upon subsystem request. The command sftp-server(8) implements the M-bM-^@M-^\sftpM-bM-^@M-^] file transfer subsystem. Alternately the name M-bM-^@M-^\internal-sftpM-bM-^@M-^] implements an in-process M-bM-^@M-^\sftpM-bM-^@M-^] server. This may simplify configurations using ChrootDirectory to force a different filesystem root on clients. By default no subsystems are defined. Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. SyslogFacility Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The default is AUTH. TCPKeepAlive Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However, this means that connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people find it annoying. On the other hand, if TCP keepalives are not sent, sessions may hang indefinitely on the server, leaving M-bM-^@M-^\ghostM-bM-^@M-^] users and consuming server resources. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the server will notice if the network goes down or the client host crashes. This avoids infinitely hanging sessions. To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. TrustedUserCAKeys Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are trusted to sign user certificates for - authentication. Keys are listed one per line; empty lines and - comments starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are allowed. If a certificate is - presented for authentication and has its signing CA key listed in - this file, then it may be used for authentication for any user - listed in the certificate's principals list. Note that - certificates that lack a list of principals will not be permitted - for authentication using TrustedUserCAKeys. For more details on - certificates, see the CERTIFICATES section in ssh-keygen(1). + authentication, or M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to not use one. Keys are listed one + per line; empty lines and comments starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are allowed. + If a certificate is presented for authentication and has its + signing CA key listed in this file, then it may be used for + authentication for any user listed in the certificate's + principals list. Note that certificates that lack a list of + principals will not be permitted for authentication using + TrustedUserCAKeys. For more details on certificates, see the + CERTIFICATES section in ssh-keygen(1). UseDNS Specifies whether sshd(8) should look up the remote host name and check that the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the very same IP address. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. UseLogin Specifies whether login(1) is used for interactive login sessions. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. Note that login(1) is never used for remote command execution. Note also, that if this is enabled, X11Forwarding will be disabled because login(1) does not know how to handle xauth(1) cookies. If UsePrivilegeSeparation is specified, it will be disabled after authentication. UsePAM Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface. If set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] this will enable PAM authentication using ChallengeResponseAuthentication and PasswordAuthentication in addition to PAM account and session module processing for all authentication types. Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable either PasswordAuthentication or ChallengeResponseAuthentication. If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a non-root user. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. UsePrivilegeSeparation Specifies whether sshd(8) separates privileges by creating an unprivileged child process to deal with incoming network traffic. After successful authentication, another process will be created that has the privilege of the authenticated user. The goal of privilege separation is to prevent privilege escalation by containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. If UsePrivilegeSeparation is set to M-bM-^@M-^\sandboxM-bM-^@M-^] then the pre-authentication unprivileged process is subject to additional restrictions. VersionAddendum Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner sent by the server upon connection. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^]. X11DisplayOffset Specifies the first display number available for sshd(8)'s X11 forwarding. This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers. The default is 10. X11Forwarding Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure to the server and to client displays if the sshd(8) proxy display is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see X11UseLocalhost below), though this is not the default. Additionally, the authentication spoofing and authentication data verification and substitution occur on the client side. The security risk of using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11 display server may be exposed to attack when the SSH client requests forwarding (see the warnings for ForwardX11 in ssh_config(5)). A system administrator may have a stance in which they want to protect clients that may expose themselves to attack by unwittingly requesting X11 forwarding, which can warrant a M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] setting. Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own forwarders. X11 forwarding is automatically disabled if UseLogin is enabled. X11UseLocalhost Specifies whether sshd(8) should bind the X11 forwarding server to the loopback address or to the wildcard address. By default, sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets the hostname part of the DISPLAY environment variable to M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^]. This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display. However, some older X11 clients may not function with this configuration. X11UseLocalhost may be set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] to specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the wildcard address. The argument must be M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^]. The default is M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^]. XAuthLocation - Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program. The default - is /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth. + Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program, or M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to + not use one. The default is /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth. TIME FORMATS sshd(8) command-line arguments and configuration file options that specify time may be expressed using a sequence of the form: time[qualifier], where time is a positive integer value and qualifier is one of the following: M-bM-^_M-(noneM-bM-^_M-) seconds s | S seconds m | M minutes h | H hours d | D days w | W weeks Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate the total time value. Time format examples: 600 600 seconds (10 minutes) 10m 10 minutes 1h30m 1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes) FILES /etc/ssh/sshd_config Contains configuration data for sshd(8). This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended (though not necessary) that it be world-readable. SEE ALSO sshd(8) AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support for privilege separation. -OpenBSD 5.7 February 20, 2015 OpenBSD 5.7 +OpenBSD 5.7 June 5, 2015 OpenBSD 5.7 Index: head/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/sshd_config.5 (revision 294336) @@ -1,1602 +1,1674 @@ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.194 2015/02/20 23:46:01 djm Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.204 2015/06/05 03:44:14 djm Exp $ .\" $FreeBSD$ -.Dd $Mdocdate: February 20 2015 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: June 5 2015 $ .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm sshd_config .Nd OpenSSH SSH daemon configuration file .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm /etc/ssh/sshd_config .Sh DESCRIPTION .Xr sshd 8 reads configuration data from .Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config (or the file specified with .Fl f on the command line). The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line. Lines starting with .Ql # and empty lines are interpreted as comments. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes .Pq \&" in order to represent arguments containing spaces. .Pp The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm AcceptEnv Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be copied into the session's .Xr environ 7 . See .Cm SendEnv in .Xr ssh_config 5 for how to configure the client. -Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2. +Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2, and +that the +.Ev TERM +environment variable is always sent whenever the client +requests a pseudo-terminal as it is required by the protocol. Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters .Ql * and .Ql \&? . Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread across multiple .Cm AcceptEnv directives. Be warned that some environment variables could be used to bypass restricted user environments. For this reason, care should be taken in the use of this directive. The default is not to accept any environment variables. .It Cm AddressFamily Specifies which address family should be used by .Xr sshd 8 . Valid arguments are .Dq any , .Dq inet (use IPv4 only), or .Dq inet6 (use IPv6 only). The default is .Dq any . .It Cm AllowAgentForwarding Specifies whether .Xr ssh-agent 1 forwarding is permitted. The default is .Dq yes . Note that disabling agent forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. .It Cm AllowGroups This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns. Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: .Cm DenyUsers , .Cm AllowUsers , .Cm DenyGroups , and finally .Cm AllowGroups . .Pp See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .It Cm AllowTcpForwarding Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted. The available options are .Dq yes or .Dq all to allow TCP forwarding, .Dq no to prevent all TCP forwarding, .Dq local to allow local (from the perspective of .Xr ssh 1 ) forwarding only or .Dq remote to allow remote forwarding only. The default is .Dq yes . Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. .It Cm AllowStreamLocalForwarding Specifies whether StreamLocal (Unix-domain socket) forwarding is permitted. The available options are .Dq yes or .Dq all to allow StreamLocal forwarding, .Dq no to prevent all StreamLocal forwarding, .Dq local to allow local (from the perspective of .Xr ssh 1 ) forwarding only or .Dq remote to allow remote forwarding only. The default is .Dq yes . Note that disabling StreamLocal forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. .It Cm AllowUsers This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for user names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to particular users from particular hosts. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: .Cm DenyUsers , .Cm AllowUsers , .Cm DenyGroups , and finally .Cm AllowGroups . .Pp See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .It Cm AuthenticationMethods Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully completed for a user to be granted access. This option must be followed by one or more comma-separated lists of authentication method names. Successful authentication requires completion of every method in at least one of these lists. .Pp For example, an argument of .Dq publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactive would require the user to complete public key authentication, followed by either password or keyboard interactive authentication. Only methods that are next in one or more lists are offered at each stage, so for this example, it would not be possible to attempt password or keyboard-interactive authentication before public key. .Pp For keyboard interactive authentication it is also possible to restrict authentication to a specific device by appending a colon followed by the device identifier .Dq bsdauth , .Dq pam , or .Dq skey , depending on the server configuration. For example, .Dq keyboard-interactive:bsdauth would restrict keyboard interactive authentication to the .Dq bsdauth device. .Pp If the .Dq publickey method is listed more than once, .Xr sshd 8 verifies that keys that have been used successfully are not reused for subsequent authentications. For example, an .Cm AuthenticationMethods of .Dq publickey,publickey will require successful authentication using two different public keys. .Pp This option is only available for SSH protocol 2 and will yield a fatal error if enabled if protocol 1 is also enabled. Note that each authentication method listed should also be explicitly enabled in the configuration. The default is not to require multiple authentication; successful completion of a single authentication method is sufficient. .It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys. -The program must be owned by root and not writable by group or others. -It will be invoked with a single argument of the username -being authenticated, and should produce on standard output zero or +The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and +specified by an absolute path. +.Pp +Arguments to +.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand +may be provided using the following tokens, which will be expanded +at runtime: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %u is replaced by the +username being authenticated, %h is replaced by the home directory +of the user being authenticated, %t is replaced with the key type +offered for authentication, %f is replaced with the fingerprint of +the key, and %k is replaced with the key being offered for authentication. +If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user +will be supplied. +.Pp +The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in .Xr sshd 8 ) . If a key supplied by AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully authenticate and authorize the user then public key authentication continues using the usual .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile files. By default, no AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. .It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host than running authorized keys commands. If .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand is specified but .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser is not, then .Xr sshd 8 will refuse to start. .It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used for user authentication. The format is described in the AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT section of .Xr sshd 8 . .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile may contain tokens of the form %T which are substituted during connection setup. The following tokens are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is replaced by the username of that user. After expansion, .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home directory. Multiple files may be listed, separated by whitespace. The default is .Dq .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2 . +.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand +Specifies a program to be used to generate the list of allowed +certificate principals as per +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile . +The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and +specified by an absolute path. +.Pp +Arguments to +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand +may be provided using the following tokens, which will be expanded +at runtime: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %u is replaced by the +username being authenticated and %h is replaced by the home directory +of the user being authenticated. +.Pp +The program should produce on standard output zero or +more lines of +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile +output. +If either +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand +or +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile +is specified, then certificates offered by the client for authentication +must contain a principal that is listed. +By default, no AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run. +.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser +Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run. +It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host +than running authorized principals commands. +If +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand +is specified but +.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser +is not, then +.Xr sshd 8 +will refuse to start. .It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for certificate authentication. When using certificates signed by a key listed in .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys , this file lists names, one of which must appear in the certificate for it to be accepted for authentication. Names are listed one per line preceded by key options (as described in AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT in .Xr sshd 8 ) . Empty lines and comments starting with .Ql # are ignored. .Pp .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile may contain tokens of the form %T which are substituted during connection setup. The following tokens are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is replaced by the username of that user. After expansion, .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home directory. .Pp The default is .Dq none , i.e. not to use a principals file \(en in this case, the username of the user must appear in a certificate's principals list for it to be accepted. Note that .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is only used when authentication proceeds using a CA listed in .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys and is not consulted for certification authorities trusted via .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys , though the .Cm principals= key option offers a similar facility (see .Xr sshd 8 for details). .It Cm Banner The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before authentication is allowed. If the argument is .Dq none then no banner is displayed. This option is only available for protocol version 2. By default, no banner is displayed. .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via PAM or through authentication styles supported in .Xr login.conf 5 ) The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm ChrootDirectory Specifies the pathname of a directory to .Xr chroot 2 to after authentication. At session startup .Xr sshd 8 checks that all components of the pathname are root-owned directories which are not writable by any other user or group. After the chroot, .Xr sshd 8 changes the working directory to the user's home directory. .Pp The pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at runtime once the connecting user has been authenticated: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is replaced by the username of that user. .Pp The .Cm ChrootDirectory must contain the necessary files and directories to support the user's session. For an interactive session this requires at least a shell, typically .Xr sh 1 , and basic .Pa /dev nodes such as .Xr null 4 , .Xr zero 4 , .Xr stdin 4 , .Xr stdout 4 , .Xr stderr 4 , and .Xr tty 4 devices. For file transfer sessions using .Dq sftp , no additional configuration of the environment is necessary if the in-process sftp server is used, though sessions which use logging may require .Pa /dev/log inside the chroot directory on some operating systems (see .Xr sftp-server 8 for details). .Pp For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be prevented from modification by other processes on the system (especially those outside the jail). Misconfiguration can lead to unsafe environments which .Xr sshd 8 cannot detect. .Pp The default is not to .Xr chroot 2 . .It Cm Ciphers Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. The supported ciphers are: .Pp .Bl -item -compact -offset indent .It 3des-cbc .It aes128-cbc .It aes192-cbc .It aes256-cbc .It aes128-ctr .It aes192-ctr .It aes256-ctr .It aes128-gcm@openssh.com .It aes256-gcm@openssh.com .It arcfour .It arcfour128 .It arcfour256 .It blowfish-cbc .It cast128-cbc .It chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com .El .Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com, chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com .Ed .Pp The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using the .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 with an argument of .Dq cipher . .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax Sets the number of client alive messages (see below) which may be sent without .Xr sshd 8 receiving any messages back from the client. If this threshold is reached while client alive messages are being sent, sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the session. It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is very different from .Cm TCPKeepAlive (below). The client alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option enabled by .Cm TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The client alive mechanism is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive. .Pp The default value is 3. If .Cm ClientAliveInterval (see below) is set to 15, and .Cm ClientAliveCountMax is left at the default, unresponsive SSH clients will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm ClientAliveInterval Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received from the client, .Xr sshd 8 will send a message through the encrypted channel to request a response from the client. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the client. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm Compression Specifies whether compression is allowed, or delayed until the user has authenticated successfully. The argument must be .Dq yes , .Dq delayed , or .Dq no . The default is .Dq delayed . .It Cm DenyGroups This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns. Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: .Cm DenyUsers , .Cm AllowUsers , .Cm DenyGroups , and finally .Cm AllowGroups . .Pp See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .It Cm DenyUsers This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for user names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to particular users from particular hosts. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: .Cm DenyUsers , .Cm AllowUsers , .Cm DenyGroups , and finally .Cm AllowGroups . .Pp See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .It Cm FingerprintHash Specifies the hash algorithm used when logging key fingerprints. Valid options are: .Dq md5 and .Dq sha256 . The default is .Dq sha256 . .It Cm ForceCommand Forces the execution of the command specified by .Cm ForceCommand , ignoring any command supplied by the client and .Pa ~/.ssh/rc if present. The command is invoked by using the user's login shell with the -c option. This applies to shell, command, or subsystem execution. It is most useful inside a .Cm Match block. The command originally supplied by the client is available in the .Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Specifying a command of .Dq internal-sftp will force the use of an in-process sftp server that requires no support files when used with .Cm ChrootDirectory . .It Cm GatewayPorts Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports forwarded for the client. By default, .Xr sshd 8 binds remote port forwardings to the loopback address. This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. .Cm GatewayPorts can be used to specify that sshd should allow remote port forwardings to bind to non-loopback addresses, thus allowing other hosts to connect. The argument may be .Dq no to force remote port forwardings to be available to the local host only, .Dq yes to force remote port forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or .Dq clientspecified to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding is bound. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. The default is .Dq no . Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache on logout. The default is .Dq yes . Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. +.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck +Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor +a client authenticates against. +If set to +.Dq yes +then the client must authenticate against the +.Pa host +service on the current hostname. +If set to +.Dq no +then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the +machine's default store. +This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines. +The default is +.Dq yes . .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication as a comma-separated pattern list. The default .Dq * will allow all key types. The .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 may be used to list supported key types. .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together with successful public key client host authentication is allowed (host-based authentication). This option is similar to .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication and applies to protocol version 2 only. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a reverse name lookup when matching the name in the .Pa ~/.shosts , .Pa ~/.rhosts , and .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv files during .Cm HostbasedAuthentication . A setting of .Dq yes means that .Xr sshd 8 uses the name supplied by the client rather than attempting to resolve the name from the TCP connection itself. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm HostCertificate Specifies a file containing a public host certificate. The certificate's public key must match a private host key already specified by .Cm HostKey . The default behaviour of .Xr sshd 8 is not to load any certificates. .It Cm HostKey Specifies a file containing a private host key used by SSH. The default is .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key for protocol version 1, and .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key , .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key , .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key for protocol version 2. Note that .Xr sshd 8 will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-accessible. It is possible to have multiple host key files. .Dq rsa1 keys are used for version 1 and .Dq dsa , .Dq ecdsa , .Dq ed25519 or .Dq rsa are used for version 2 of the SSH protocol. It is also possible to specify public host key files instead. In this case operations on the private key will be delegated to an .Xr ssh-agent 1 . .It Cm HostKeyAgent Identifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with an agent that has access to the private host keys. If .Dq SSH_AUTH_SOCK is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. .It Cm IgnoreRhosts Specifies that .Pa .rhosts and .Pa .shosts files will not be used in .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication or .Cm HostbasedAuthentication . .Pp .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv and .Pa /etc/ssh/shosts.equiv are still used. The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm IgnoreUserKnownHosts Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should ignore the user's .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts during .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication or .Cm HostbasedAuthentication . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the connection. Accepted values are .Dq af11 , .Dq af12 , .Dq af13 , .Dq af21 , .Dq af22 , .Dq af23 , .Dq af31 , .Dq af32 , .Dq af33 , .Dq af41 , .Dq af42 , .Dq af43 , .Dq cs0 , .Dq cs1 , .Dq cs2 , .Dq cs3 , .Dq cs4 , .Dq cs5 , .Dq cs6 , .Dq cs7 , .Dq ef , .Dq lowdelay , .Dq throughput , .Dq reliability , or a numeric value. This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. The default is .Dq lowdelay for interactive sessions and .Dq throughput for non-interactive sessions. .It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is to use whatever value .Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication is set to (by default .Dq yes ) . .It Cm KerberosAuthentication Specifies whether the password provided by the user for .Cm PasswordAuthentication will be validated through the Kerberos KDC. To use this option, the server needs a Kerberos servtab which allows the verification of the KDC's identity. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm KerberosGetAFSToken If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to acquire an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm KerberosOrLocalPasswd If password authentication through Kerberos fails then the password will be validated via any additional local mechanism such as .Pa /etc/passwd . The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm KerberosTicketCleanup Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache file on logout. The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm KexAlgorithms Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. The supported algorithms are: .Pp .Bl -item -compact -offset indent .It curve25519-sha256@libssh.org .It diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 .It diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 .It diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 .It diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 .It ecdh-sha2-nistp256 .It ecdh-sha2-nistp384 .It ecdh-sha2-nistp521 .El .Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 .Ed .Pp The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using the .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 with an argument of .Dq kex . .It Cm KeyRegenerationInterval In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically regenerated after this many seconds (if it has been used). The purpose of regeneration is to prevent decrypting captured sessions by later breaking into the machine and stealing the keys. The key is never stored anywhere. If the value is 0, the key is never regenerated. The default is 3600 (seconds). .It Cm ListenAddress Specifies the local addresses .Xr sshd 8 should listen on. The following forms may be used: .Pp .Bl -item -offset indent -compact .It .Cm ListenAddress .Sm off .Ar host | Ar IPv4_addr | Ar IPv6_addr .Sm on .It .Cm ListenAddress .Sm off .Ar host | Ar IPv4_addr : Ar port .Sm on .It .Cm ListenAddress .Sm off .Oo .Ar host | Ar IPv6_addr Oc : Ar port .Sm on .El .Pp If .Ar port is not specified, -sshd will listen on the address and all prior +sshd will listen on the address and all .Cm Port options specified. The default is to listen on all local addresses. Multiple .Cm ListenAddress options are permitted. -Additionally, any -.Cm Port -options must precede this option for non-port qualified addresses. .It Cm LoginGraceTime The server disconnects after this time if the user has not successfully logged in. If the value is 0, there is no time limit. The default is 120 seconds. .It Cm LogLevel Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from .Xr sshd 8 . The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO. DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output. Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended. .It Cm MACs Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms. The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2 for data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. The algorithms that contain .Dq -etm calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and their use recommended. The supported MACs are: .Pp .Bl -item -compact -offset indent .It hmac-md5 .It hmac-md5-96 .It hmac-ripemd160 .It hmac-sha1 .It hmac-sha1-96 .It hmac-sha2-256 .It hmac-sha2-512 .It umac-64@openssh.com .It umac-128@openssh.com .It hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com .It hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com .It umac-64-etm@openssh.com .It umac-128-etm@openssh.com .El .Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512 .Ed .Pp The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using the .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 with an argument of .Dq mac . .It Cm Match Introduces a conditional block. If all of the criteria on the .Cm Match line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines override those set in the global section of the config file, until either another .Cm Match line or the end of the file. If a keyword appears in multiple .Cm Match blocks that are satisfied, only the first instance of the keyword is applied. .Pp The arguments to .Cm Match are one or more criteria-pattern pairs or the single token .Cm All which matches all criteria. The available criteria are .Cm User , .Cm Group , .Cm Host , .Cm LocalAddress , .Cm LocalPort , and .Cm Address . The match patterns may consist of single entries or comma-separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the PATTERNS section of .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp The patterns in an .Cm Address criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format, e.g.\& .Dq 192.0.2.0/24 or .Dq 3ffe:ffff::/32 . Note that the mask length provided must be consistent with the address - it is an error to specify a mask length that is too long for the address or one with bits set in this host portion of the address. For example, .Dq 192.0.2.0/33 and .Dq 192.0.2.0/8 respectively. .Pp Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a .Cm Match keyword. Available keywords are .Cm AcceptEnv , .Cm AllowAgentForwarding , .Cm AllowGroups , .Cm AllowStreamLocalForwarding , .Cm AllowTcpForwarding , .Cm AllowUsers , .Cm AuthenticationMethods , .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand , .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser , .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile , .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile , .Cm Banner , .Cm ChrootDirectory , .Cm DenyGroups , .Cm DenyUsers , .Cm ForceCommand , .Cm GatewayPorts , .Cm GSSAPIAuthentication , .Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes , .Cm HostbasedAuthentication , .Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly , .Cm IPQoS , .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication , .Cm KerberosAuthentication , .Cm MaxAuthTries , .Cm MaxSessions , .Cm PasswordAuthentication , .Cm PermitEmptyPasswords , .Cm PermitOpen , .Cm PermitRootLogin , .Cm PermitTTY , .Cm PermitTunnel , .Cm PermitUserRC , .Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes , .Cm PubkeyAuthentication , .Cm RekeyLimit , .Cm RevokedKeys , .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication , .Cm RSAAuthentication , .Cm StreamLocalBindMask , .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink , .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys , .Cm X11DisplayOffset , .Cm X11Forwarding and .Cm X11UseLocalHost . .It Cm MaxAuthTries Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted per connection. Once the number of failures reaches half this value, additional failures are logged. The default is 6. .It Cm MaxSessions Specifies the maximum number of open sessions permitted per network connection. The default is 10. .It Cm MaxStartups Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated connections to the SSH daemon. Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the .Cm LoginGraceTime expires for a connection. The default is 10:30:100. .Pp Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying the three colon separated values .Dq start:rate:full (e.g. "10:30:60"). .Xr sshd 8 will refuse connection attempts with a probability of .Dq rate/100 (30%) if there are currently .Dq start (10) unauthenticated connections. The probability increases linearly and all connection attempts are refused if the number of unauthenticated connections reaches .Dq full (60). .It Cm PasswordAuthentication Specifies whether password authentication is allowed. See also .Cm UsePAM . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm PermitEmptyPasswords When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the server allows login to accounts with empty password strings. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm PermitOpen Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is permitted. The forwarding specification must be one of the following forms: .Pp .Bl -item -offset indent -compact .It .Cm PermitOpen .Sm off .Ar host : port .Sm on .It .Cm PermitOpen .Sm off .Ar IPv4_addr : port .Sm on .It .Cm PermitOpen .Sm off .Ar \&[ IPv6_addr \&] : port .Sm on .El .Pp Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with whitespace. An argument of .Dq any can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any forwarding requests. An argument of .Dq none can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests. By default all port forwarding requests are permitted. .It Cm PermitRootLogin Specifies whether root can log in using .Xr ssh 1 . The argument must be .Dq yes , .Dq without-password , .Dq forced-commands-only , or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . Note that if .Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication is .Dq yes , the root user may be allowed in with its password even if .Cm PermitRootLogin is set to .Dq without-password . .Pp If this option is set to .Dq without-password , password authentication is disabled for root. .Pp If this option is set to .Dq forced-commands-only , root login with public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the .Ar command option has been specified (which may be useful for taking remote backups even if root login is normally not allowed). All other authentication methods are disabled for root. .Pp If this option is set to .Dq no , root is not allowed to log in. .It Cm PermitTunnel Specifies whether .Xr tun 4 device forwarding is allowed. The argument must be .Dq yes , .Dq point-to-point (layer 3), .Dq ethernet (layer 2), or .Dq no . Specifying .Dq yes permits both .Dq point-to-point and .Dq ethernet . The default is .Dq no . .Pp Independent of this setting, the permissions of the selected .Xr tun 4 device must allow access to the user. .It Cm PermitTTY Specifies whether .Xr pty 4 allocation is permitted. The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm PermitUserEnvironment Specifies whether .Pa ~/.ssh/environment and .Cm environment= options in .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys are processed by .Xr sshd 8 . The default is .Dq no . Enabling environment processing may enable users to bypass access restrictions in some configurations using mechanisms such as .Ev LD_PRELOAD . .It Cm PermitUserRC Specifies whether any .Pa ~/.ssh/rc file is executed. The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm PidFile Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the -SSH daemon. +SSH daemon, or +.Dq none +to not write one. The default is .Pa /var/run/sshd.pid . .It Cm Port Specifies the port number that .Xr sshd 8 listens on. The default is 22. Multiple options of this type are permitted. See also .Cm ListenAddress . .It Cm PrintLastLog Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should print the date and time of the last user login when a user logs in interactively. The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm PrintMotd Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should print .Pa /etc/motd when a user logs in interactively. (On some systems it is also printed by the shell, .Pa /etc/profile , or equivalent.) The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm Protocol Specifies the protocol versions .Xr sshd 8 supports. The possible values are .Sq 1 and .Sq 2 . Multiple versions must be comma-separated. The default is .Sq 2 . Note that the order of the protocol list does not indicate preference, because the client selects among multiple protocol versions offered by the server. Specifying .Dq 2,1 is identical to .Dq 1,2 . .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key authentication as a comma-separated pattern list. The default .Dq * will allow all key types. The .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 may be used to list supported key types. .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed. The default is .Dq yes . Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm RekeyLimit Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of .Sq K , .Sq M , or .Sq G to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between .Sq 1G and .Sq 4G , depending on the cipher. The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units documented in the .Sx TIME FORMATS section. The default value for .Cm RekeyLimit is .Dq default none , which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm RevokedKeys -Specifies revoked public keys. +Specifies revoked public keys file, or +.Dq none +to not use one. Keys listed in this file will be refused for public key authentication. Note that if this file is not readable, then public key authentication will be refused for all users. Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication Specifies whether rhosts or .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together with successful RSA host authentication is allowed. The default is .Dq no . This option applies to protocol version 1 only. .It Cm RSAAuthentication Specifies whether pure RSA authentication is allowed. The default is .Dq yes . This option applies to protocol version 1 only. .It Cm ServerKeyBits Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key. The minimum value is 512, and the default is 1024. .It Cm StreamLocalBindMask Sets the octal file creation mode mask .Pq umask used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. .Pp The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is readable and writable only by the owner. Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain socket files. .It Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one. If the socket file already exists and .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink is not enabled, .Nm sshd will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-domain socket file. This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. .Pp The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm StrictModes Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should check file modes and ownership of the user's files and home directory before accepting login. This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally leave their directory or files world-writable. The default is .Dq yes . Note that this does not apply to .Cm ChrootDirectory , whose permissions and ownership are checked unconditionally. .It Cm Subsystem Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon). Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional arguments) to execute upon subsystem request. .Pp The command .Xr sftp-server 8 implements the .Dq sftp file transfer subsystem. .Pp Alternately the name .Dq internal-sftp implements an in-process .Dq sftp server. This may simplify configurations using .Cm ChrootDirectory to force a different filesystem root on clients. .Pp By default no subsystems are defined. Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm SyslogFacility Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from .Xr sshd 8 . The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The default is AUTH. .It Cm TCPKeepAlive Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However, this means that connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people find it annoying. On the other hand, if TCP keepalives are not sent, sessions may hang indefinitely on the server, leaving .Dq ghost users and consuming server resources. .Pp The default is .Dq yes (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the server will notice if the network goes down or the client host crashes. This avoids infinitely hanging sessions. .Pp To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to .Dq no . .It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are -trusted to sign user certificates for authentication. +trusted to sign user certificates for authentication, or +.Dq none +to not use one. Keys are listed one per line; empty lines and comments starting with .Ql # are allowed. If a certificate is presented for authentication and has its signing CA key listed in this file, then it may be used for authentication for any user listed in the certificate's principals list. Note that certificates that lack a list of principals will not be permitted for authentication using .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys . For more details on certificates, see the CERTIFICATES section in .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Cm UseDNS Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should look up the remote host name and check that the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the very same IP address. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm UseLogin Specifies whether .Xr login 1 is used for interactive login sessions. The default is .Dq no . Note that .Xr login 1 is never used for remote command execution. Note also, that if this is enabled, .Cm X11Forwarding will be disabled because .Xr login 1 does not know how to handle .Xr xauth 1 cookies. If .Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation is specified, it will be disabled after authentication. .It Cm UsePAM Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface. If set to .Dq yes this will enable PAM authentication using .Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication and .Cm PasswordAuthentication in addition to PAM account and session module processing for all authentication types. .Pp Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable either .Cm PasswordAuthentication or .Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication. .Pp If .Cm UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run .Xr sshd 8 as a non-root user. The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 separates privileges by creating an unprivileged child process to deal with incoming network traffic. After successful authentication, another process will be created that has the privilege of the authenticated user. The goal of privilege separation is to prevent privilege escalation by containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes. The default is .Dq sandbox . If .Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation is set to .Dq sandbox then the pre-authentication unprivileged process is subject to additional restrictions. .It Cm VersionAddendum Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner sent by the server upon connection. The default is .Dq FreeBSD-20160119 . The value .Dq none may be used to disable this. .It Cm X11DisplayOffset Specifies the first display number available for .Xr sshd 8 Ns 's X11 forwarding. This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers. The default is 10. .It Cm X11Forwarding Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq yes . .Pp When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure to the server and to client displays if the .Xr sshd 8 proxy display is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see .Cm X11UseLocalhost below), though this is not the default. Additionally, the authentication spoofing and authentication data verification and substitution occur on the client side. The security risk of using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11 display server may be exposed to attack when the SSH client requests forwarding (see the warnings for .Cm ForwardX11 in .Xr ssh_config 5 ) . A system administrator may have a stance in which they want to protect clients that may expose themselves to attack by unwittingly requesting X11 forwarding, which can warrant a .Dq no setting. .Pp Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own forwarders. X11 forwarding is automatically disabled if .Cm UseLogin is enabled. .It Cm X11UseLocalhost Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should bind the X11 forwarding server to the loopback address or to the wildcard address. By default, sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets the hostname part of the .Ev DISPLAY environment variable to .Dq localhost . This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display. However, some older X11 clients may not function with this configuration. .Cm X11UseLocalhost may be set to .Dq no to specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the wildcard address. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm XAuthLocation Specifies the full pathname of the .Xr xauth 1 -program. +program, or +.Dq none +to not use one. The default is .Pa /usr/local/bin/xauth . .El .Sh TIME FORMATS .Xr sshd 8 command-line arguments and configuration file options that specify time may be expressed using a sequence of the form: .Sm off .Ar time Op Ar qualifier , .Sm on where .Ar time is a positive integer value and .Ar qualifier is one of the following: .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent .It Aq Cm none seconds .It Cm s | Cm S seconds .It Cm m | Cm M minutes .It Cm h | Cm H hours .It Cm d | Cm D days .It Cm w | Cm W weeks .El .Pp Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate the total time value. .Pp Time format examples: .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent .It 600 600 seconds (10 minutes) .It 10m 10 minutes .It 1h30m 1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes) .El .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config Contains configuration data for .Xr sshd 8 . This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended (though not necessary) that it be world-readable. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr sshd 8 .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support for privilege separation. Index: head/crypto/openssh/sshkey.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/sshkey.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/sshkey.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,3941 +1,3972 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.15 2015/03/06 01:40:56 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.19 2015/05/21 04:55:51 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2008 Alexander von Gernler. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2010,2011 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include /* MIN MAX */ #include #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #endif #include "crypto_api.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H #include #endif /* HAVE_UTIL_H */ #include "ssh2.h" #include "ssherr.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sshbuf.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "digest.h" #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL #include "sshkey.h" #include "match.h" /* openssh private key file format */ #define MARK_BEGIN "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n" #define MARK_END "-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n" #define MARK_BEGIN_LEN (sizeof(MARK_BEGIN) - 1) #define MARK_END_LEN (sizeof(MARK_END) - 1) #define KDFNAME "bcrypt" #define AUTH_MAGIC "openssh-key-v1" #define SALT_LEN 16 #define DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME "aes256-cbc" #define DEFAULT_ROUNDS 16 /* Version identification string for SSH v1 identity files. */ #define LEGACY_BEGIN "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE FORMAT 1.1\n" static int sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **keyp, int allow_cert); /* Supported key types */ struct keytype { const char *name; const char *shortname; int type; int nid; int cert; }; static const struct keytype keytypes[] = { { "ssh-ed25519", "ED25519", KEY_ED25519, 0, 0 }, { "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ED25519-CERT", KEY_ED25519_CERT, 0, 1 }, #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL { NULL, "RSA1", KEY_RSA1, 0, 0 }, { "ssh-rsa", "RSA", KEY_RSA, 0, 0 }, { "ssh-dss", "DSA", KEY_DSA, 0, 0 }, # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256", "ECDSA", KEY_ECDSA, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 0 }, { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384", "ECDSA", KEY_ECDSA, NID_secp384r1, 0 }, # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521", "ECDSA", KEY_ECDSA, NID_secp521r1, 0 }, # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ { "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT", KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, 1 }, { "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com", "DSA-CERT", KEY_DSA_CERT, 0, 1 }, # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1 }, { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp384r1, 1 }, # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp521r1, 1 }, # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ { "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT-V00", KEY_RSA_CERT_V00, 0, 1 }, { "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com", "DSA-CERT-V00", KEY_DSA_CERT_V00, 0, 1 }, #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ { NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0 } }; const char * sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *k) { const struct keytype *kt; for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { if (kt->type == k->type) return kt->shortname; } return "unknown"; } static const char * sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(int type, int nid) { const struct keytype *kt; for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { if (kt->type == type && (kt->nid == 0 || kt->nid == nid)) return kt->name; } return "ssh-unknown"; } int sshkey_type_is_cert(int type) { const struct keytype *kt; for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { if (kt->type == type) return kt->cert; } return 0; } const char * sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *k) { return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(k->type, k->ecdsa_nid); } const char * sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *k) { return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(sshkey_type_plain(k->type), k->ecdsa_nid); } int sshkey_type_from_name(const char *name) { const struct keytype *kt; for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { /* Only allow shortname matches for plain key types */ if ((kt->name != NULL && strcmp(name, kt->name) == 0) || (!kt->cert && strcasecmp(kt->shortname, name) == 0)) return kt->type; } return KEY_UNSPEC; } int sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *name) { const struct keytype *kt; for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { if (kt->type != KEY_ECDSA && kt->type != KEY_ECDSA_CERT) continue; if (kt->name != NULL && strcmp(name, kt->name) == 0) return kt->nid; } return -1; } char * key_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only) { char *tmp, *ret = NULL; size_t nlen, rlen = 0; const struct keytype *kt; for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { if (kt->name == NULL) continue; if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert)) continue; if (ret != NULL) ret[rlen++] = '\n'; nlen = strlen(kt->name); if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) { free(ret); return NULL; } ret = tmp; memcpy(ret + rlen, kt->name, nlen + 1); rlen += nlen; } return ret; } int sshkey_names_valid2(const char *names, int allow_wildcard) { char *s, *cp, *p; const struct keytype *kt; int type; if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0) return 0; if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL) return 0; for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { type = sshkey_type_from_name(p); if (type == KEY_RSA1) { free(s); return 0; } if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) { if (allow_wildcard) { /* * Try matching key types against the string. * If any has a positive or negative match then * the component is accepted. */ for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { if (kt->type == KEY_RSA1) continue; if (match_pattern_list(kt->name, - p, strlen(p), 0) != 0) + p, 0) != 0) break; } if (kt->type != -1) continue; } free(s); return 0; } } free(s); return 1; } u_int sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *k) { switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_RSA_CERT: return BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n); case KEY_DSA: case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA_CERT: return BN_num_bits(k->dsa->p); case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: return sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(k->ecdsa_nid); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: return 256; /* XXX */ } return 0; } int sshkey_cert_is_legacy(const struct sshkey *k) { switch (k->type) { case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: return 1; default: return 0; } } static int sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type) { switch (type) { case KEY_RSA: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ED25519: return 1; default: return 0; } } int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k) { if (k == NULL) return 0; return sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type); } /* Return the cert-less equivalent to a certified key type */ int sshkey_type_plain(int type) { switch (type) { case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_RSA_CERT: return KEY_RSA; case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA_CERT: return KEY_DSA; case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: return KEY_ECDSA; case KEY_ED25519_CERT: return KEY_ED25519; default: return type; } } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */ int sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name) { if (strcmp(name, "nistp256") == 0) return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; else if (strcmp(name, "nistp384") == 0) return NID_secp384r1; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 else if (strcmp(name, "nistp521") == 0) return NID_secp521r1; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ else return -1; } u_int sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(int nid) { switch (nid) { case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: return 256; case NID_secp384r1: return 384; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 case NID_secp521r1: return 521; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ default: return 0; } } int sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int bits) { switch (bits) { case 256: return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; case 384: return NID_secp384r1; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 case 521: return NID_secp521r1; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ default: return -1; } } const char * sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(int nid) { switch (nid) { case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: return "nistp256"; case NID_secp384r1: return "nistp384"; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 case NID_secp521r1: return "nistp521"; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ default: return NULL; } } int sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid) { int kbits = sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(nid); if (kbits <= 0) return -1; /* RFC5656 section 6.2.1 */ if (kbits <= 256) return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256; else if (kbits <= 384) return SSH_DIGEST_SHA384; else return SSH_DIGEST_SHA512; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ static void cert_free(struct sshkey_cert *cert) { u_int i; if (cert == NULL) return; if (cert->certblob != NULL) sshbuf_free(cert->certblob); if (cert->critical != NULL) sshbuf_free(cert->critical); if (cert->extensions != NULL) sshbuf_free(cert->extensions); if (cert->key_id != NULL) free(cert->key_id); for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) free(cert->principals[i]); if (cert->principals != NULL) free(cert->principals); if (cert->signature_key != NULL) sshkey_free(cert->signature_key); explicit_bzero(cert, sizeof(*cert)); free(cert); } static struct sshkey_cert * cert_new(void) { struct sshkey_cert *cert; if ((cert = calloc(1, sizeof(*cert))) == NULL) return NULL; if ((cert->certblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (cert->critical = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (cert->extensions = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { cert_free(cert); return NULL; } cert->key_id = NULL; cert->principals = NULL; cert->signature_key = NULL; return cert; } struct sshkey * sshkey_new(int type) { struct sshkey *k; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL RSA *rsa; DSA *dsa; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ if ((k = calloc(1, sizeof(*k))) == NULL) return NULL; k->type = type; k->ecdsa = NULL; k->ecdsa_nid = -1; k->dsa = NULL; k->rsa = NULL; k->cert = NULL; k->ed25519_sk = NULL; k->ed25519_pk = NULL; switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_RSA_CERT: if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL || (rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL || (rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL) { if (rsa != NULL) RSA_free(rsa); free(k); return NULL; } k->rsa = rsa; break; case KEY_DSA: case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA_CERT: if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL || (dsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL || (dsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL || (dsa->g = BN_new()) == NULL || (dsa->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) { if (dsa != NULL) DSA_free(dsa); free(k); return NULL; } k->dsa = dsa; break; case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: /* Cannot do anything until we know the group */ break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: /* no need to prealloc */ break; case KEY_UNSPEC: break; default: free(k); return NULL; break; } if (sshkey_is_cert(k)) { if ((k->cert = cert_new()) == NULL) { sshkey_free(k); return NULL; } } return k; } int sshkey_add_private(struct sshkey *k) { switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_RSA_CERT: #define bn_maybe_alloc_failed(p) (p == NULL && (p = BN_new()) == NULL) if (bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->d) || bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->iqmp) || bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->q) || bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->p) || bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->dmq1) || bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->dmp1)) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; break; case KEY_DSA: case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA_CERT: if (bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->dsa->priv_key)) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; break; #undef bn_maybe_alloc_failed case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: /* Cannot do anything until we know the group */ break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: /* no need to prealloc */ break; case KEY_UNSPEC: break; default: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } return 0; } struct sshkey * sshkey_new_private(int type) { struct sshkey *k = sshkey_new(type); if (k == NULL) return NULL; if (sshkey_add_private(k) != 0) { sshkey_free(k); return NULL; } return k; } void sshkey_free(struct sshkey *k) { if (k == NULL) return; switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_RSA_CERT: if (k->rsa != NULL) RSA_free(k->rsa); k->rsa = NULL; break; case KEY_DSA: case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA_CERT: if (k->dsa != NULL) DSA_free(k->dsa); k->dsa = NULL; break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: if (k->ecdsa != NULL) EC_KEY_free(k->ecdsa); k->ecdsa = NULL; break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: if (k->ed25519_pk) { explicit_bzero(k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ); free(k->ed25519_pk); k->ed25519_pk = NULL; } if (k->ed25519_sk) { explicit_bzero(k->ed25519_sk, ED25519_SK_SZ); free(k->ed25519_sk); k->ed25519_sk = NULL; } break; case KEY_UNSPEC: break; default: break; } if (sshkey_is_cert(k)) cert_free(k->cert); explicit_bzero(k, sizeof(*k)); free(k); } static int cert_compare(struct sshkey_cert *a, struct sshkey_cert *b) { if (a == NULL && b == NULL) return 1; if (a == NULL || b == NULL) return 0; if (sshbuf_len(a->certblob) != sshbuf_len(b->certblob)) return 0; if (timingsafe_bcmp(sshbuf_ptr(a->certblob), sshbuf_ptr(b->certblob), sshbuf_len(a->certblob)) != 0) return 0; return 1; } /* * Compare public portions of key only, allowing comparisons between * certificates and plain keys too. */ int sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b) { #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) BN_CTX *bnctx; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ if (a == NULL || b == NULL || sshkey_type_plain(a->type) != sshkey_type_plain(b->type)) return 0; switch (a->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA: return a->rsa != NULL && b->rsa != NULL && BN_cmp(a->rsa->e, b->rsa->e) == 0 && BN_cmp(a->rsa->n, b->rsa->n) == 0; case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA: return a->dsa != NULL && b->dsa != NULL && BN_cmp(a->dsa->p, b->dsa->p) == 0 && BN_cmp(a->dsa->q, b->dsa->q) == 0 && BN_cmp(a->dsa->g, b->dsa->g) == 0 && BN_cmp(a->dsa->pub_key, b->dsa->pub_key) == 0; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA: if (a->ecdsa == NULL || b->ecdsa == NULL || EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa) == NULL || EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa) == NULL) return 0; if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return 0; if (EC_GROUP_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_group(b->ecdsa), bnctx) != 0 || EC_POINT_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa), bnctx) != 0) { BN_CTX_free(bnctx); return 0; } BN_CTX_free(bnctx); return 1; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: return a->ed25519_pk != NULL && b->ed25519_pk != NULL && memcmp(a->ed25519_pk, b->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ) == 0; default: return 0; } /* NOTREACHED */ } int sshkey_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b) { if (a == NULL || b == NULL || a->type != b->type) return 0; if (sshkey_is_cert(a)) { if (!cert_compare(a->cert, b->cert)) return 0; } return sshkey_equal_public(a, b); } static int to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, int force_plain) { int type, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; const char *typename; if (key == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { + if (key->cert == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT; + if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB; + } type = force_plain ? sshkey_type_plain(key->type) : key->type; typename = sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid); switch (type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA_CERT: #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519_CERT: /* Use the existing blob */ /* XXX modified flag? */ if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0) return ret; break; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA: if (key->dsa == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key)) != 0) return ret; break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: if (key->ecdsa == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0) return ret; break; # endif case KEY_RSA: if (key->rsa == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n)) != 0) return ret; break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: if (key->ed25519_pk == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0) return ret; break; default: return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; } return 0; } int sshkey_putb(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) { return to_blob_buf(key, b, 0); } int sshkey_puts(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) { struct sshbuf *tmp; int r; if ((tmp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; r = to_blob_buf(key, tmp, 0); if (r == 0) r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, tmp); sshbuf_free(tmp); return r; } int sshkey_putb_plain(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) { return to_blob_buf(key, b, 1); } static int to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp, int force_plain) { int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; size_t len; struct sshbuf *b = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if (blobp != NULL) *blobp = NULL; if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((ret = to_blob_buf(key, b, force_plain)) != 0) goto out; len = sshbuf_len(b); if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; if (blobp != NULL) { if ((*blobp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } memcpy(*blobp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); } ret = 0; out: sshbuf_free(b); return ret; } int sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp) { return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 0); } int sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp) { return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 1); } int sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg, u_char **retp, size_t *lenp) { u_char *blob = NULL, *ret = NULL; size_t blob_len = 0; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (retp != NULL) *retp = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if (ssh_digest_bytes(dgst_alg) == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if (k->type == KEY_RSA1) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL int nlen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->n); int elen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->e); blob_len = nlen + elen; if (nlen >= INT_MAX - elen || (blob = malloc(blob_len)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->n, blob); BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->e, blob + nlen); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ } else if ((r = to_blob(k, &blob, &blob_len, 1)) != 0) goto out; if ((ret = calloc(1, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(dgst_alg, blob, blob_len, ret, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ if (retp != NULL) { *retp = ret; ret = NULL; } if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = ssh_digest_bytes(dgst_alg); r = 0; out: free(ret); if (blob != NULL) { explicit_bzero(blob, blob_len); free(blob); } return r; } static char * fingerprint_b64(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len) { char *ret; size_t plen = strlen(alg) + 1; size_t rlen = ((dgst_raw_len + 2) / 3) * 4 + plen + 1; int r; if (dgst_raw_len > 65536 || (ret = calloc(1, rlen)) == NULL) return NULL; strlcpy(ret, alg, rlen); strlcat(ret, ":", rlen); if (dgst_raw_len == 0) return ret; if ((r = b64_ntop(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, ret + plen, rlen - plen)) == -1) { explicit_bzero(ret, rlen); free(ret); return NULL; } /* Trim padding characters from end */ ret[strcspn(ret, "=")] = '\0'; return ret; } static char * fingerprint_hex(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len) { char *retval, hex[5]; size_t i, rlen = dgst_raw_len * 3 + strlen(alg) + 2; if (dgst_raw_len > 65536 || (retval = calloc(1, rlen)) == NULL) return NULL; strlcpy(retval, alg, rlen); strlcat(retval, ":", rlen); for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) { snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%s%02x", i > 0 ? ":" : "", dgst_raw[i]); strlcat(retval, hex, rlen); } return retval; } static char * fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len) { char vowels[] = { 'a', 'e', 'i', 'o', 'u', 'y' }; char consonants[] = { 'b', 'c', 'd', 'f', 'g', 'h', 'k', 'l', 'm', 'n', 'p', 'r', 's', 't', 'v', 'z', 'x' }; u_int i, j = 0, rounds, seed = 1; char *retval; rounds = (dgst_raw_len / 2) + 1; if ((retval = calloc(rounds, 6)) == NULL) return NULL; retval[j++] = 'x'; for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) { u_int idx0, idx1, idx2, idx3, idx4; if ((i + 1 < rounds) || (dgst_raw_len % 2 != 0)) { idx0 = (((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 6) & 3) + seed) % 6; idx1 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 2) & 15; idx2 = ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) & 3) + (seed / 6)) % 6; retval[j++] = vowels[idx0]; retval[j++] = consonants[idx1]; retval[j++] = vowels[idx2]; if ((i + 1) < rounds) { idx3 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])) >> 4) & 15; idx4 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1]))) & 15; retval[j++] = consonants[idx3]; retval[j++] = '-'; retval[j++] = consonants[idx4]; seed = ((seed * 5) + ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) * 7) + ((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])))) % 36; } } else { idx0 = seed % 6; idx1 = 16; idx2 = seed / 6; retval[j++] = vowels[idx0]; retval[j++] = consonants[idx1]; retval[j++] = vowels[idx2]; } } retval[j++] = 'x'; retval[j++] = '\0'; return retval; } /* * Draw an ASCII-Art representing the fingerprint so human brain can * profit from its built-in pattern recognition ability. * This technique is called "random art" and can be found in some * scientific publications like this original paper: * * "Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security", * Perrig A. and Song D., 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic * Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99) * sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/projects/validation/validation.pdf * * The subject came up in a talk by Dan Kaminsky, too. * * If you see the picture is different, the key is different. * If the picture looks the same, you still know nothing. * * The algorithm used here is a worm crawling over a discrete plane, * leaving a trace (augmenting the field) everywhere it goes. * Movement is taken from dgst_raw 2bit-wise. Bumping into walls * makes the respective movement vector be ignored for this turn. * Graphs are not unambiguous, because circles in graphs can be * walked in either direction. */ /* * Field sizes for the random art. Have to be odd, so the starting point * can be in the exact middle of the picture, and FLDBASE should be >=8 . * Else pictures would be too dense, and drawing the frame would * fail, too, because the key type would not fit in anymore. */ #define FLDBASE 8 #define FLDSIZE_Y (FLDBASE + 1) #define FLDSIZE_X (FLDBASE * 2 + 1) static char * fingerprint_randomart(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len, const struct sshkey *k) { /* * Chars to be used after each other every time the worm * intersects with itself. Matter of taste. */ char *augmentation_string = " .o+=*BOX@%&#/^SE"; char *retval, *p, title[FLDSIZE_X], hash[FLDSIZE_X]; u_char field[FLDSIZE_X][FLDSIZE_Y]; size_t i, tlen, hlen; u_int b; int x, y, r; size_t len = strlen(augmentation_string) - 1; if ((retval = calloc((FLDSIZE_X + 3), (FLDSIZE_Y + 2))) == NULL) return NULL; /* initialize field */ memset(field, 0, FLDSIZE_X * FLDSIZE_Y * sizeof(char)); x = FLDSIZE_X / 2; y = FLDSIZE_Y / 2; /* process raw key */ for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) { int input; /* each byte conveys four 2-bit move commands */ input = dgst_raw[i]; for (b = 0; b < 4; b++) { /* evaluate 2 bit, rest is shifted later */ x += (input & 0x1) ? 1 : -1; y += (input & 0x2) ? 1 : -1; /* assure we are still in bounds */ x = MAX(x, 0); y = MAX(y, 0); x = MIN(x, FLDSIZE_X - 1); y = MIN(y, FLDSIZE_Y - 1); /* augment the field */ if (field[x][y] < len - 2) field[x][y]++; input = input >> 2; } } /* mark starting point and end point*/ field[FLDSIZE_X / 2][FLDSIZE_Y / 2] = len - 1; field[x][y] = len; /* assemble title */ r = snprintf(title, sizeof(title), "[%s %u]", sshkey_type(k), sshkey_size(k)); /* If [type size] won't fit, then try [type]; fits "[ED25519-CERT]" */ if (r < 0 || r > (int)sizeof(title)) r = snprintf(title, sizeof(title), "[%s]", sshkey_type(k)); tlen = (r <= 0) ? 0 : strlen(title); /* assemble hash ID. */ r = snprintf(hash, sizeof(hash), "[%s]", alg); hlen = (r <= 0) ? 0 : strlen(hash); /* output upper border */ p = retval; *p++ = '+'; for (i = 0; i < (FLDSIZE_X - tlen) / 2; i++) *p++ = '-'; memcpy(p, title, tlen); p += tlen; for (i += tlen; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++) *p++ = '-'; *p++ = '+'; *p++ = '\n'; /* output content */ for (y = 0; y < FLDSIZE_Y; y++) { *p++ = '|'; for (x = 0; x < FLDSIZE_X; x++) *p++ = augmentation_string[MIN(field[x][y], len)]; *p++ = '|'; *p++ = '\n'; } /* output lower border */ *p++ = '+'; for (i = 0; i < (FLDSIZE_X - hlen) / 2; i++) *p++ = '-'; memcpy(p, hash, hlen); p += hlen; for (i += hlen; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++) *p++ = '-'; *p++ = '+'; return retval; } char * sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg, enum sshkey_fp_rep dgst_rep) { char *retval = NULL; u_char *dgst_raw; size_t dgst_raw_len; if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(k, dgst_alg, &dgst_raw, &dgst_raw_len) != 0) return NULL; switch (dgst_rep) { case SSH_FP_DEFAULT: if (dgst_alg == SSH_DIGEST_MD5) { retval = fingerprint_hex(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg), dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); } else { retval = fingerprint_b64(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg), dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); } break; case SSH_FP_HEX: retval = fingerprint_hex(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg), dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); break; case SSH_FP_BASE64: retval = fingerprint_b64(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg), dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); break; case SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE: retval = fingerprint_bubblebabble(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); break; case SSH_FP_RANDOMART: retval = fingerprint_randomart(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg), dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, k); break; default: explicit_bzero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); free(dgst_raw); return NULL; } explicit_bzero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); free(dgst_raw); return retval; } #ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances * the pointer. The integer must already be initialized. This function is * permitted to modify the buffer. This leaves *cpp to point just beyond the * last processed character. */ static int read_decimal_bignum(char **cpp, BIGNUM *v) { char *cp; size_t e; int skip = 1; /* skip white space */ cp = *cpp; while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t') cp++; e = strspn(cp, "0123456789"); if (e == 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; if (e > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 3) return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE; if (cp[e] == '\0') skip = 0; else if (index(" \t\r\n", cp[e]) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; cp[e] = '\0'; if (BN_dec2bn(&v, cp) <= 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; *cpp = cp + e + skip; return 0; } #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ /* returns 0 ok, and < 0 error */ int sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp) { struct sshkey *k; int retval = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; char *cp, *space; int r, type, curve_nid = -1; struct sshbuf *blob; #ifdef WITH_SSH1 char *ep; u_long bits; #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ cp = *cpp; switch (ret->type) { case KEY_RSA1: #ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* Get number of bits. */ bits = strtoul(cp, &ep, 10); if (*cp == '\0' || index(" \t\r\n", *ep) == NULL || bits == 0 || bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* Bad bit count... */ /* Get public exponent, public modulus. */ if ((r = read_decimal_bignum(&ep, ret->rsa->e)) < 0) return r; if ((r = read_decimal_bignum(&ep, ret->rsa->n)) < 0) return r; *cpp = ep; /* validate the claimed number of bits */ if (BN_num_bits(ret->rsa->n) != (int)bits) return SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH; retval = 0; #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ break; case KEY_UNSPEC: case KEY_RSA: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: space = strchr(cp, ' '); if (space == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; *space = '\0'; type = sshkey_type_from_name(cp); if (sshkey_type_plain(type) == KEY_ECDSA && (curve_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(cp)) == -1) return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID; *space = ' '; if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; cp = space+1; if (*cp == '\0') return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; if (ret->type != KEY_UNSPEC && ret->type != type) return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; if ((blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* trim comment */ space = strchr(cp, ' '); if (space) { /* advance 'space': skip whitespace */ *space++ = '\0'; while (*space == ' ' || *space == '\t') space++; *cpp = space; } else *cpp = cp + strlen(cp); if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(blob, cp)) != 0) { sshbuf_free(blob); return r; } if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(blob), sshbuf_len(blob), &k)) != 0) { sshbuf_free(blob); return r; } sshbuf_free(blob); if (k->type != type) { sshkey_free(k); return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; } if (sshkey_type_plain(type) == KEY_ECDSA && curve_nid != k->ecdsa_nid) { sshkey_free(k); return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH; } ret->type = type; if (sshkey_is_cert(ret)) { if (!sshkey_is_cert(k)) { sshkey_free(k); return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT; } if (ret->cert != NULL) cert_free(ret->cert); ret->cert = k->cert; k->cert = NULL; } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL if (sshkey_type_plain(ret->type) == KEY_RSA) { if (ret->rsa != NULL) RSA_free(ret->rsa); ret->rsa = k->rsa; k->rsa = NULL; #ifdef DEBUG_PK RSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->rsa, 8); #endif } if (sshkey_type_plain(ret->type) == KEY_DSA) { if (ret->dsa != NULL) DSA_free(ret->dsa); ret->dsa = k->dsa; k->dsa = NULL; #ifdef DEBUG_PK DSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->dsa, 8); #endif } # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC if (sshkey_type_plain(ret->type) == KEY_ECDSA) { if (ret->ecdsa != NULL) EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdsa); ret->ecdsa = k->ecdsa; ret->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid; k->ecdsa = NULL; k->ecdsa_nid = -1; #ifdef DEBUG_PK sshkey_dump_ec_key(ret->ecdsa); #endif } # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ if (sshkey_type_plain(ret->type) == KEY_ED25519) { free(ret->ed25519_pk); ret->ed25519_pk = k->ed25519_pk; k->ed25519_pk = NULL; #ifdef DEBUG_PK /* XXX */ #endif } retval = 0; /*XXXX*/ sshkey_free(k); if (retval != 0) break; break; default: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } return retval; } int -sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f) +sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *key, char **b64p) { - int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; char *uu = NULL; + + if (b64p != NULL) + *b64p = NULL; + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, b)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((uu = sshbuf_dtob64(b)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + /* Success */ + if (b64p != NULL) { + *b64p = uu; + uu = NULL; + } + r = 0; + out: + sshbuf_free(b); + free(uu); + return r; +} + +static int +sshkey_format_rsa1(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) +{ + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; #ifdef WITH_SSH1 u_int bits = 0; char *dec_e = NULL, *dec_n = NULL; -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ - if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { - if (key->cert == NULL) - return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT; - if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) - return SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB; + if (key->rsa == NULL || key->rsa->e == NULL || + key->rsa->n == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; } - if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) - return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - switch (key->type) { -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - case KEY_RSA1: - if (key->rsa == NULL || key->rsa->e == NULL || - key->rsa->n == NULL) { - ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - goto out; - } - if ((dec_e = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->e)) == NULL || - (dec_n = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->n)) == NULL) { - ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; - goto out; - } - /* size of modulus 'n' */ - if ((bits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) <= 0) { - ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - goto out; - } - if ((ret = sshbuf_putf(b, "%u %s %s", bits, dec_e, dec_n)) != 0) - goto out; + if ((dec_e = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->e)) == NULL || + (dec_n = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->n)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + /* size of modulus 'n' */ + if ((bits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) <= 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%u %s %s", bits, dec_e, dec_n)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Success */ + r = 0; + out: + if (dec_e != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(dec_e); + if (dec_n != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(dec_n); #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ - break; -#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL - case KEY_DSA: - case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_DSA_CERT: - case KEY_ECDSA: - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: - case KEY_RSA: - case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_RSA_CERT: -#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ - case KEY_ED25519: - case KEY_ED25519_CERT: - if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { - ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + + return r; +} + +static int +sshkey_format_text(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) +{ + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + char *uu = NULL; + + if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) { + if ((r = sshkey_format_rsa1(key, b)) != 0) goto out; - } - if ((ret = sshkey_putb(key, bb)) != 0) + } else { + /* Unsupported key types handled in sshkey_to_base64() */ + if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &uu)) != 0) goto out; - if ((uu = sshbuf_dtob64(bb)) == NULL) { - ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s %s", + sshkey_ssh_name(key), uu)) != 0) goto out; - } - if ((ret = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s ", sshkey_ssh_name(key))) != 0) - goto out; - if ((ret = sshbuf_put(b, uu, strlen(uu))) != 0) - goto out; - break; - default: - ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; - goto out; } + r = 0; + out: + free(uu); + return r; +} + +int +sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f) +{ + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshkey_format_text(key, b)) != 0) + goto out; if (fwrite(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), 1, f) != 1) { if (feof(f)) errno = EPIPE; - ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; goto out; } - ret = 0; + /* Success */ + r = 0; out: - if (b != NULL) - sshbuf_free(b); - if (bb != NULL) - sshbuf_free(bb); - if (uu != NULL) - free(uu); -#ifdef WITH_SSH1 - if (dec_e != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(dec_e); - if (dec_n != NULL) - OPENSSL_free(dec_n); -#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ - return ret; + sshbuf_free(b); + return r; } const char * sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *k) { switch (k->cert->type) { case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER: return "user"; case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST: return "host"; default: return "unknown"; } } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL static int rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA **rsap) { RSA *private = NULL; BIGNUM *f4 = NULL; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (rsap == NULL || bits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE || bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; *rsap = NULL; if ((private = RSA_new()) == NULL || (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) || !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } *rsap = private; private = NULL; ret = 0; out: if (private != NULL) RSA_free(private); if (f4 != NULL) BN_free(f4); return ret; } static int dsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, DSA **dsap) { DSA *private; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (dsap == NULL || bits != 1024) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((private = DSA_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } *dsap = NULL; if (!DSA_generate_parameters_ex(private, bits, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL) || !DSA_generate_key(private)) { DSA_free(private); ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } *dsap = private; private = NULL; ret = 0; out: if (private != NULL) DSA_free(private); return ret; } # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC int sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *k) { EC_GROUP *eg; int nids[] = { NID_X9_62_prime256v1, NID_secp384r1, # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 NID_secp521r1, # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ -1 }; int nid; u_int i; BN_CTX *bnctx; const EC_GROUP *g = EC_KEY_get0_group(k); /* * The group may be stored in a ASN.1 encoded private key in one of two * ways: as a "named group", which is reconstituted by ASN.1 object ID * or explicit group parameters encoded into the key blob. Only the * "named group" case sets the group NID for us, but we can figure * it out for the other case by comparing against all the groups that * are supported. */ if ((nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(g)) > 0) return nid; if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return -1; for (i = 0; nids[i] != -1; i++) { if ((eg = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nids[i])) == NULL) { BN_CTX_free(bnctx); return -1; } if (EC_GROUP_cmp(g, eg, bnctx) == 0) break; EC_GROUP_free(eg); } BN_CTX_free(bnctx); if (nids[i] != -1) { /* Use the group with the NID attached */ EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(eg, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE); if (EC_KEY_set_group(k, eg) != 1) { EC_GROUP_free(eg); return -1; } } return nids[i]; } static int ecdsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, int *nid, EC_KEY **ecdsap) { EC_KEY *private; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (nid == NULL || ecdsap == NULL || (*nid = sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits)) == -1) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; *ecdsap = NULL; if ((private = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(*nid)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (EC_KEY_generate_key(private) != 1) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(private, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE); *ecdsap = private; private = NULL; ret = 0; out: if (private != NULL) EC_KEY_free(private); return ret; } # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ int sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp) { struct sshkey *k; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (keyp == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; *keyp = NULL; if ((k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; switch (type) { case KEY_ED25519: if ((k->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL || (k->ed25519_sk = malloc(ED25519_SK_SZ)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; break; } crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(k->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_sk); ret = 0; break; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA: ret = dsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->dsa); break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: ret = ecdsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->ecdsa_nid, &k->ecdsa); break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA1: ret = rsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->rsa); break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ default: ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } if (ret == 0) { k->type = type; *keyp = k; } else sshkey_free(k); return ret; } int sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *from_key, struct sshkey *to_key) { u_int i; const struct sshkey_cert *from; struct sshkey_cert *to; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (to_key->cert != NULL) { cert_free(to_key->cert); to_key->cert = NULL; } if ((from = from_key->cert) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((to = to_key->cert = cert_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(to->certblob, from->certblob)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_putb(to->critical, from->critical)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_putb(to->extensions, from->extensions) != 0)) return ret; to->serial = from->serial; to->type = from->type; if (from->key_id == NULL) to->key_id = NULL; else if ((to->key_id = strdup(from->key_id)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; to->valid_after = from->valid_after; to->valid_before = from->valid_before; if (from->signature_key == NULL) to->signature_key = NULL; else if ((ret = sshkey_from_private(from->signature_key, &to->signature_key)) != 0) return ret; if (from->nprincipals > SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (from->nprincipals > 0) { if ((to->principals = calloc(from->nprincipals, sizeof(*to->principals))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; for (i = 0; i < from->nprincipals; i++) { to->principals[i] = strdup(from->principals[i]); if (to->principals[i] == NULL) { to->nprincipals = i; return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } } } to->nprincipals = from->nprincipals; return 0; } int sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey **pkp) { struct sshkey *n = NULL; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (pkp != NULL) *pkp = NULL; switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA: case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA_CERT: if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((BN_copy(n->dsa->p, k->dsa->p) == NULL) || (BN_copy(n->dsa->q, k->dsa->q) == NULL) || (BN_copy(n->dsa->g, k->dsa->g) == NULL) || (BN_copy(n->dsa->pub_key, k->dsa->pub_key) == NULL)) { sshkey_free(n); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; n->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid; n->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid); if (n->ecdsa == NULL) { sshkey_free(n); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(n->ecdsa, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 1) { sshkey_free(n); return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; } break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_RSA_CERT: if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n) == NULL) || (BN_copy(n->rsa->e, k->rsa->e) == NULL)) { sshkey_free(n); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (k->ed25519_pk != NULL) { if ((n->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL) { sshkey_free(n); return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } memcpy(n->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ); } break; default: return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; } if (sshkey_is_cert(k)) { if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, n)) != 0) { sshkey_free(n); return ret; } } *pkp = n; return 0; } static int cert_parse(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *certbuf) { struct sshbuf *principals = NULL, *crit = NULL; struct sshbuf *exts = NULL, *ca = NULL; u_char *sig = NULL; size_t signed_len = 0, slen = 0, kidlen = 0; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; int v00 = sshkey_cert_is_legacy(key); /* Copy the entire key blob for verification and later serialisation */ if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->certblob, certbuf)) != 0) return ret; if ((!v00 && (ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->serial)) != 0) || (ret = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &key->cert->type)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &key->cert->key_id, &kidlen)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &principals)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->valid_after)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->valid_before)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &crit)) != 0 || (!v00 && (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &exts)) != 0) || (v00 && (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0) || (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &ca)) != 0) { /* XXX debug print error for ret */ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* Signature is left in the buffer so we can calculate this length */ signed_len = sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) - sshbuf_len(b); if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &sig, &slen)) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER && key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE; goto out; } /* Parse principals section */ while (sshbuf_len(principals) > 0) { char *principal = NULL; char **oprincipals = NULL; if (key->cert->nprincipals >= SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(principals, &principal, NULL)) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } oprincipals = key->cert->principals; key->cert->principals = realloc(key->cert->principals, (key->cert->nprincipals + 1) * sizeof(*key->cert->principals)); if (key->cert->principals == NULL) { free(principal); key->cert->principals = oprincipals; ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } key->cert->principals[key->cert->nprincipals++] = principal; } /* * Stash a copies of the critical options and extensions sections * for later use. */ if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->critical, crit)) != 0 || (exts != NULL && (ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->extensions, exts)) != 0)) goto out; /* * Validate critical options and extensions sections format. * NB. extensions are not present in v00 certs. */ while (sshbuf_len(crit) != 0) { if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(crit, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(crit, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { sshbuf_reset(key->cert->critical); ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } while (exts != NULL && sshbuf_len(exts) != 0) { if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(exts, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(exts, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { sshbuf_reset(key->cert->extensions); ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } /* Parse CA key and check signature */ if (sshkey_from_blob_internal(ca, &key->cert->signature_key, 0) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; goto out; } if (!sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(key->cert->signature_key->type)) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; goto out; } if ((ret = sshkey_verify(key->cert->signature_key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(key->cert->certblob), signed_len, 0)) != 0) goto out; /* Success */ ret = 0; out: sshbuf_free(ca); sshbuf_free(crit); sshbuf_free(exts); sshbuf_free(principals); free(sig); return ret; } static int sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp, int allow_cert) { int type, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; char *ktype = NULL, *curve = NULL; struct sshkey *key = NULL; size_t len; u_char *pk = NULL; struct sshbuf *copy; #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) EC_POINT *q = NULL; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #ifdef DEBUG_PK /* XXX */ sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); #endif *keyp = NULL; if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(b)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } type = sshkey_type_from_name(ktype); if (!allow_cert && sshkey_type_is_cert(type)) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; goto out; } switch (type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA_CERT: /* Skip nonce */ if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } - if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e) == -1 || - sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n) == -1) { + if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e) != 0 || + sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_PK RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8); #endif break; case KEY_DSA_CERT: /* Skip nonce */ if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_DSA: case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } - if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p) == -1 || - sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q) == -1 || - sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g) == -1 || - sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key) == -1) { + if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p) != 0 || + sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q) != 0 || + sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g) != 0 || + sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_PK DSA_print_fp(stderr, key->dsa, 8); #endif break; case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: /* Skip nonce */ if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } key->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(ktype); if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &curve, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (key->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) { ret = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH; goto out; } if (key->ecdsa != NULL) EC_KEY_free(key->ecdsa); if ((key->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(key->ecdsa_nid)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID; goto out; } if ((q = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa))) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (sshbuf_get_ec(b, q, EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa)) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), q) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE; goto out; } if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(key->ecdsa, q) != 1) { /* XXX assume it is a allocation error */ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } #ifdef DEBUG_PK sshkey_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), q); #endif break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519_CERT: /* Skip nonce */ if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_ED25519: if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pk, &len)) != 0) goto out; if (len != ED25519_PK_SZ) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } key->ed25519_pk = pk; pk = NULL; break; case KEY_UNSPEC: if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } break; default: ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; goto out; } /* Parse certificate potion */ if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && (ret = cert_parse(b, key, copy)) != 0) goto out; if (key != NULL && sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } ret = 0; *keyp = key; key = NULL; out: sshbuf_free(copy); sshkey_free(key); free(ktype); free(curve); free(pk); #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) if (q != NULL) EC_POINT_free(q); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ return ret; } int sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *blob, size_t blen, struct sshkey **keyp) { struct sshbuf *b; int r; if ((b = sshbuf_from(blob, blen)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; r = sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1); sshbuf_free(b); return r; } int sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp) { return sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1); } int sshkey_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **keyp) { struct sshbuf *b; int r; if ((r = sshbuf_froms(buf, &b)) != 0) return r; r = sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1); sshbuf_free(b); return r; } int sshkey_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { if (sigp != NULL) *sigp = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; switch (key->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA: return ssh_dss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat); # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA: return ssh_ecdsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat); # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA: return ssh_rsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: return ssh_ed25519_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat); default: return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; } } /* * ssh_key_verify returns 0 for a correct signature and < 0 on error. */ int sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t dlen, u_int compat) { if (siglen == 0 || dlen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; switch (key->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA: return ssh_dss_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat); # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA: return ssh_ecdsa_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat); # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA: return ssh_rsa_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: return ssh_ed25519_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat); default: return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; } } /* Converts a private to a public key */ int sshkey_demote(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey **dkp) { struct sshkey *pk; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (dkp != NULL) *dkp = NULL; if ((pk = calloc(1, sizeof(*pk))) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; pk->type = k->type; pk->flags = k->flags; pk->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid; pk->dsa = NULL; pk->ecdsa = NULL; pk->rsa = NULL; pk->ed25519_pk = NULL; pk->ed25519_sk = NULL; switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_RSA_CERT: if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, pk)) != 0) goto fail; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: if ((pk->rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL || (pk->rsa->e = BN_dup(k->rsa->e)) == NULL || (pk->rsa->n = BN_dup(k->rsa->n)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } break; case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA_CERT: if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, pk)) != 0) goto fail; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_DSA: if ((pk->dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL || (pk->dsa->p = BN_dup(k->dsa->p)) == NULL || (pk->dsa->q = BN_dup(k->dsa->q)) == NULL || (pk->dsa->g = BN_dup(k->dsa->g)) == NULL || (pk->dsa->pub_key = BN_dup(k->dsa->pub_key)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } break; case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, pk)) != 0) goto fail; /* FALLTHROUGH */ # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: pk->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(pk->ecdsa_nid); if (pk->ecdsa == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(pk->ecdsa, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 1) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto fail; } break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519_CERT: if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, pk)) != 0) goto fail; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case KEY_ED25519: if (k->ed25519_pk != NULL) { if ((pk->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto fail; } memcpy(pk->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ); } break; default: ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; fail: sshkey_free(pk); return ret; } *dkp = pk; return 0; } /* Convert a plain key to their _CERT equivalent */ int sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *k, int legacy) { int newtype; switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA: newtype = legacy ? KEY_RSA_CERT_V00 : KEY_RSA_CERT; break; case KEY_DSA: newtype = legacy ? KEY_DSA_CERT_V00 : KEY_DSA_CERT; break; case KEY_ECDSA: if (legacy) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; newtype = KEY_ECDSA_CERT; break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: if (legacy) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; newtype = KEY_ED25519_CERT; break; default: return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } if ((k->cert = cert_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; k->type = newtype; return 0; } /* Convert a certificate to its raw key equivalent */ int sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *k) { if (!sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type)) return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; cert_free(k->cert); k->cert = NULL; k->type = sshkey_type_plain(k->type); return 0; } /* Sign a certified key, (re-)generating the signed certblob. */ int sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca) { struct sshbuf *principals = NULL; u_char *ca_blob = NULL, *sig_blob = NULL, nonce[32]; size_t i, ca_len, sig_len; int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshbuf *cert; if (k == NULL || k->cert == NULL || k->cert->certblob == NULL || ca == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (!sshkey_is_cert(k)) return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; if (!sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(ca->type)) return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; if ((ret = sshkey_to_blob(ca, &ca_blob, &ca_len)) != 0) return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; cert = k->cert->certblob; /* for readability */ sshbuf_reset(cert); if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, sshkey_ssh_name(k))) != 0) goto out; /* -v01 certs put nonce first */ arc4random_buf(&nonce, sizeof(nonce)); if (!sshkey_cert_is_legacy(k)) { if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, nonce, sizeof(nonce))) != 0) goto out; } /* XXX this substantially duplicates to_blob(); refactor */ switch (k->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA_CERT: if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->p)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->q)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->g)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->pub_key)) != 0) goto out; break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(k->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_ec(cert, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa))) != 0) goto out; break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_RSA_CERT: if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->rsa->e)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->rsa->n)) != 0) goto out; break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519_CERT: if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0) goto out; break; default: ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } /* -v01 certs have a serial number next */ if (!sshkey_cert_is_legacy(k)) { if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->serial)) != 0) goto out; } if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u32(cert, k->cert->type)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, k->cert->key_id)) != 0) goto out; if ((principals = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) { if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, k->cert->principals[i])) != 0) goto out; } if ((ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, principals)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->valid_after)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->valid_before)) != 0 || (ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, k->cert->critical)) != 0) goto out; /* -v01 certs have non-critical options here */ if (!sshkey_cert_is_legacy(k)) { if ((ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, k->cert->extensions)) != 0) goto out; } /* -v00 certs put the nonce at the end */ if (sshkey_cert_is_legacy(k)) { if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, nonce, sizeof(nonce))) != 0) goto out; } if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* Reserved */ (ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, ca_blob, ca_len)) != 0) goto out; /* Sign the whole mess */ if ((ret = sshkey_sign(ca, &sig_blob, &sig_len, sshbuf_ptr(cert), sshbuf_len(cert), 0)) != 0) goto out; /* Append signature and we are done */ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, sig_blob, sig_len)) != 0) goto out; ret = 0; out: if (ret != 0) sshbuf_reset(cert); if (sig_blob != NULL) free(sig_blob); if (ca_blob != NULL) free(ca_blob); if (principals != NULL) sshbuf_free(principals); return ret; } int sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *k, int want_host, int require_principal, const char *name, const char **reason) { u_int i, principal_matches; time_t now = time(NULL); if (reason != NULL) *reason = NULL; if (want_host) { if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) { *reason = "Certificate invalid: not a host certificate"; return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; } } else { if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) { *reason = "Certificate invalid: not a user certificate"; return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; } } if (now < 0) { /* yikes - system clock before epoch! */ *reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid"; return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; } if ((u_int64_t)now < k->cert->valid_after) { *reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid"; return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; } if ((u_int64_t)now >= k->cert->valid_before) { *reason = "Certificate invalid: expired"; return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; } if (k->cert->nprincipals == 0) { if (require_principal) { *reason = "Certificate lacks principal list"; return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; } } else if (name != NULL) { principal_matches = 0; for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) { if (strcmp(name, k->cert->principals[i]) == 0) { principal_matches = 1; break; } } if (!principal_matches) { *reason = "Certificate invalid: name is not a listed " "principal"; return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; } } return 0; } int sshkey_private_serialize(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) { int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key))) != 0) goto out; switch (key->type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA: if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_RSA_CERT: if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_DSA: if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA_CERT: if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key)) != 0) goto out; break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa))) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa))) != 0) goto out; break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_sk, ED25519_SK_SZ)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_ED25519_CERT: if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_sk, ED25519_SK_SZ)) != 0) goto out; break; default: r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } /* success */ r = 0; out: return r; } int sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **kp) { char *tname = NULL, *curve = NULL; struct sshkey *k = NULL; size_t pklen = 0, sklen = 0; int type, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; u_char *ed25519_pk = NULL, *ed25519_sk = NULL; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL BIGNUM *exponent = NULL; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ if (kp != NULL) *kp = NULL; if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &tname, NULL)) != 0) goto out; type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname); switch (type) { #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA: if ((k = sshkey_new_private(type)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->q)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->g)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->pub_key)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->priv_key)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA_CERT: if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->priv_key)) != 0) goto out; break; # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: if ((k = sshkey_new_private(type)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((k->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(tname)) == -1) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &curve, NULL)) != 0) goto out; if (k->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) { r = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH; goto out; } k->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid); if (k->ecdsa == NULL || (exponent = BN_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_eckey(buf, k->ecdsa)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, exponent))) goto out; if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, exponent) != 1) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 0) || (r = sshkey_ec_validate_private(k->ecdsa)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: if ((exponent = BN_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, exponent)) != 0) goto out; if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, exponent) != 1) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 0) || (r = sshkey_ec_validate_private(k->ecdsa)) != 0) goto out; break; # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ case KEY_RSA: if ((k = sshkey_new_private(type)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->n)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->d)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->p)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->q)) != 0 || (r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa)) != 0) goto out; break; case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_RSA_CERT: if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->d) != 0) || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->iqmp) != 0) || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->p) != 0) || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->q) != 0) || (r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa)) != 0) goto out; break; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: if ((k = sshkey_new_private(type)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_pk, &pklen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_sk, &sklen)) != 0) goto out; if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ || sklen != ED25519_SK_SZ) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } k->ed25519_pk = ed25519_pk; k->ed25519_sk = ed25519_sk; ed25519_pk = ed25519_sk = NULL; break; case KEY_ED25519_CERT: if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 || (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_pk, &pklen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_sk, &sklen)) != 0) goto out; if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ || sklen != ED25519_SK_SZ) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } k->ed25519_pk = ed25519_pk; k->ed25519_sk = ed25519_sk; ed25519_pk = ed25519_sk = NULL; break; default: r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; goto out; } #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* enable blinding */ switch (k->type) { case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA1: if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } break; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ /* success */ r = 0; if (kp != NULL) { *kp = k; k = NULL; } out: free(tname); free(curve); #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL if (exponent != NULL) BN_clear_free(exponent); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ sshkey_free(k); if (ed25519_pk != NULL) { explicit_bzero(ed25519_pk, pklen); free(ed25519_pk); } if (ed25519_sk != NULL) { explicit_bzero(ed25519_sk, sklen); free(ed25519_sk); } return r; } #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) int sshkey_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *public) { BN_CTX *bnctx; EC_POINT *nq = NULL; BIGNUM *order, *x, *y, *tmp; int ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE; if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; BN_CTX_start(bnctx); /* * We shouldn't ever hit this case because bignum_get_ecpoint() * refuses to load GF2m points. */ if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) != NID_X9_62_prime_field) goto out; /* Q != infinity */ if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, public)) goto out; if ((x = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || (y = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || (order = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || (tmp = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* log2(x) > log2(order)/2, log2(y) > log2(order)/2 */ if (EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, bnctx) != 1 || EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, public, x, y, bnctx) != 1) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (BN_num_bits(x) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2 || BN_num_bits(y) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2) goto out; /* nQ == infinity (n == order of subgroup) */ if ((nq = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (EC_POINT_mul(group, nq, NULL, public, order, bnctx) != 1) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, nq) != 1) goto out; /* x < order - 1, y < order - 1 */ if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one())) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (BN_cmp(x, tmp) >= 0 || BN_cmp(y, tmp) >= 0) goto out; ret = 0; out: BN_CTX_free(bnctx); if (nq != NULL) EC_POINT_free(nq); return ret; } int sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *key) { BN_CTX *bnctx; BIGNUM *order, *tmp; int ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE; if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; BN_CTX_start(bnctx); if ((order = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || (tmp = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL) { ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* log2(private) > log2(order)/2 */ if (EC_GROUP_get_order(EC_KEY_get0_group(key), order, bnctx) != 1) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (BN_num_bits(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2) goto out; /* private < order - 1 */ if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one())) { ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if (BN_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key), tmp) >= 0) goto out; ret = 0; out: BN_CTX_free(bnctx); return ret; } void sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point) { BIGNUM *x, *y; BN_CTX *bnctx; if (point == NULL) { fputs("point=(NULL)\n", stderr); return; } if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: BN_CTX_new failed\n", __func__); return; } BN_CTX_start(bnctx); if ((x = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || (y = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: BN_CTX_get failed\n", __func__); return; } if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) != NID_X9_62_prime_field) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: group is not a prime field\n", __func__); return; } if (EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, bnctx) != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "%s: EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp\n", __func__); return; } fputs("x=", stderr); BN_print_fp(stderr, x); fputs("\ny=", stderr); BN_print_fp(stderr, y); fputs("\n", stderr); BN_CTX_free(bnctx); } void sshkey_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *key) { const BIGNUM *exponent; sshkey_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key)); fputs("exponent=", stderr); if ((exponent = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) == NULL) fputs("(NULL)", stderr); else BN_print_fp(stderr, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)); fputs("\n", stderr); } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ static int sshkey_private_to_blob2(const struct sshkey *prv, struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase, const char *comment, const char *ciphername, int rounds) { u_char *cp, *key = NULL, *pubkeyblob = NULL; u_char salt[SALT_LEN]; char *b64 = NULL; size_t i, pubkeylen, keylen, ivlen, blocksize, authlen; u_int check; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext; const struct sshcipher *cipher; const char *kdfname = KDFNAME; struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *encrypted = NULL, *kdf = NULL; memset(&ciphercontext, 0, sizeof(ciphercontext)); if (rounds <= 0) rounds = DEFAULT_ROUNDS; if (passphrase == NULL || !strlen(passphrase)) { ciphername = "none"; kdfname = "none"; } else if (ciphername == NULL) ciphername = DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME; else if (cipher_number(ciphername) != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } if ((kdf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (encrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher); keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher); ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher); authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher); if ((key = calloc(1, keylen + ivlen)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") == 0) { arc4random_buf(salt, SALT_LEN); if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), salt, SALT_LEN, key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(kdf, salt, SALT_LEN)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(kdf, rounds)) != 0) goto out; } else if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0) { /* Unsupported KDF type */ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER; goto out; } if ((r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen, key + keylen, ivlen, 1)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_put(encoded, AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encoded, ciphername)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encoded, kdfname)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(encoded, kdf)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, 1)) != 0 || /* number of keys */ (r = sshkey_to_blob(prv, &pubkeyblob, &pubkeylen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_string(encoded, pubkeyblob, pubkeylen)) != 0) goto out; /* set up the buffer that will be encrypted */ /* Random check bytes */ check = arc4random(); if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, check)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, check)) != 0) goto out; /* append private key and comment*/ if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(prv, encrypted)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encrypted, comment)) != 0) goto out; /* padding */ i = 0; while (sshbuf_len(encrypted) % blocksize) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encrypted, ++i & 0xff)) != 0) goto out; } /* length in destination buffer */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, sshbuf_len(encrypted))) != 0) goto out; /* encrypt */ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encoded, sshbuf_len(encrypted) + authlen, &cp)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, cp, sshbuf_ptr(encrypted), sshbuf_len(encrypted), 0, authlen)) != 0) goto out; /* uuencode */ if ((b64 = sshbuf_dtob64(encoded)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } sshbuf_reset(blob); if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, MARK_BEGIN, MARK_BEGIN_LEN)) != 0) goto out; for (i = 0; i < strlen(b64); i++) { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(blob, b64[i])) != 0) goto out; /* insert line breaks */ if (i % 70 == 69 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(blob, '\n')) != 0) goto out; } if (i % 70 != 69 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(blob, '\n')) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, MARK_END, MARK_END_LEN)) != 0) goto out; /* success */ r = 0; out: sshbuf_free(kdf); sshbuf_free(encoded); sshbuf_free(encrypted); cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext); explicit_bzero(salt, sizeof(salt)); if (key != NULL) { explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen); free(key); } if (pubkeyblob != NULL) { explicit_bzero(pubkeyblob, pubkeylen); free(pubkeyblob); } if (b64 != NULL) { explicit_bzero(b64, strlen(b64)); free(b64); } return r; } static int sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { char *comment = NULL, *ciphername = NULL, *kdfname = NULL; const struct sshcipher *cipher = NULL; const u_char *cp; int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; size_t encoded_len; - size_t i, keylen = 0, ivlen = 0, slen = 0; + size_t i, keylen = 0, ivlen = 0, authlen = 0, slen = 0; struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *decoded = NULL; struct sshbuf *kdf = NULL, *decrypted = NULL; struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext; struct sshkey *k = NULL; u_char *key = NULL, *salt = NULL, *dp, pad, last; u_int blocksize, rounds, nkeys, encrypted_len, check1, check2; memset(&ciphercontext, 0, sizeof(ciphercontext)); if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; if ((encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (decoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (decrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* check preamble */ cp = sshbuf_ptr(blob); encoded_len = sshbuf_len(blob); if (encoded_len < (MARK_BEGIN_LEN + MARK_END_LEN) || memcmp(cp, MARK_BEGIN, MARK_BEGIN_LEN) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } cp += MARK_BEGIN_LEN; encoded_len -= MARK_BEGIN_LEN; /* Look for end marker, removing whitespace as we go */ while (encoded_len > 0) { if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') { if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, *cp)) != 0) goto out; } last = *cp; encoded_len--; cp++; if (last == '\n') { if (encoded_len >= MARK_END_LEN && memcmp(cp, MARK_END, MARK_END_LEN) == 0) { /* \0 terminate */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, 0)) != 0) goto out; break; } } } if (encoded_len == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* decode base64 */ if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(decoded, (char *)sshbuf_ptr(encoded))) != 0) goto out; /* check magic */ if (sshbuf_len(decoded) < sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC) || memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(decoded), AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* parse public portion of key */ if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decoded, &ciphername, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decoded, &kdfname, NULL)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_froms(decoded, &kdf)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &nkeys)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_skip_string(decoded)) != 0 || /* pubkey */ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &encrypted_len)) != 0) goto out; if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER; goto out; } if ((passphrase == NULL || strlen(passphrase) == 0) && strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0) { /* passphrase required */ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; goto out; } if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0 && strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER; goto out; } if (!strcmp(kdfname, "none") && strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } if (nkeys != 1) { /* XXX only one key supported */ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* check size of encrypted key blob */ blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher); if (encrypted_len < blocksize || (encrypted_len % blocksize) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* setup key */ keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher); ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher); + authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher); if ((key = calloc(1, keylen + ivlen)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if (strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") == 0) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(kdf, &salt, &slen)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(kdf, &rounds)) != 0) goto out; if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), salt, slen, key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } + /* check that an appropriate amount of auth data is present */ + if (sshbuf_len(decoded) < encrypted_len + authlen) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + /* decrypt private portion of key */ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, encrypted_len, &dp)) != 0 || (r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen, key + keylen, ivlen, 0)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(decoded), - sshbuf_len(decoded), 0, cipher_authlen(cipher))) != 0) { + encrypted_len, 0, authlen)) != 0) { /* an integrity error here indicates an incorrect passphrase */ if (r == SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID) r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; goto out; } - if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, encrypted_len)) != 0) + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, encrypted_len + authlen)) != 0) goto out; /* there should be no trailing data */ if (sshbuf_len(decoded) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } /* check check bytes */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(decrypted, &check1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decrypted, &check2)) != 0) goto out; if (check1 != check2) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; goto out; } /* Load the private key and comment */ if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(decrypted, &k)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decrypted, &comment, NULL)) != 0) goto out; /* Check deterministic padding */ i = 0; while (sshbuf_len(decrypted)) { if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(decrypted, &pad)) != 0) goto out; if (pad != (++i & 0xff)) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } } /* XXX decode pubkey and check against private */ /* success */ r = 0; if (keyp != NULL) { *keyp = k; k = NULL; } if (commentp != NULL) { *commentp = comment; comment = NULL; } out: pad = 0; cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext); free(ciphername); free(kdfname); free(comment); if (salt != NULL) { explicit_bzero(salt, slen); free(salt); } if (key != NULL) { explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen); free(key); } sshbuf_free(encoded); sshbuf_free(decoded); sshbuf_free(kdf); sshbuf_free(decrypted); sshkey_free(k); return r; } #if WITH_SSH1 /* * Serialises the authentication (private) key to a blob, encrypting it with * passphrase. The identification of the blob (lowest 64 bits of n) will * precede the key to provide identification of the key without needing a * passphrase. */ static int sshkey_private_rsa1_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase, const char *comment) { struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL, *encrypted = NULL; u_char buf[8]; int r, cipher_num; struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext; const struct sshcipher *cipher; u_char *cp; /* * If the passphrase is empty, use SSH_CIPHER_NONE to ease converting * to another cipher; otherwise use SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER. */ cipher_num = (strcmp(passphrase, "") == 0) ? SSH_CIPHER_NONE : SSH_CIPHER_3DES; if ((cipher = cipher_by_number(cipher_num)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* This buffer is used to build the secret part of the private key. */ if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* Put checkbytes for checking passphrase validity. */ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buffer, 4, &cp)) != 0) goto out; arc4random_buf(cp, 2); memcpy(cp + 2, cp, 2); /* * Store the private key (n and e will not be stored because they * will be stored in plain text, and storing them also in encrypted * format would just give known plaintext). * Note: q and p are stored in reverse order to SSL. */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->d)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->q)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->p)) != 0) goto out; /* Pad the part to be encrypted to a size that is a multiple of 8. */ explicit_bzero(buf, 8); if ((r = sshbuf_put(buffer, buf, 8 - (sshbuf_len(buffer) % 8))) != 0) goto out; /* This buffer will be used to contain the data in the file. */ if ((encrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } /* First store keyfile id string. */ if ((r = sshbuf_put(encrypted, LEGACY_BEGIN, sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN))) != 0) goto out; /* Store cipher type and "reserved" field. */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encrypted, cipher_num)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, 0)) != 0) goto out; /* Store public key. This will be in plain text. */ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(encrypted, key->rsa->n) != 0) || (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(encrypted, key->rsa->e) != 0) || (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encrypted, comment) != 0)) goto out; /* Allocate space for the private part of the key in the buffer. */ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encrypted, sshbuf_len(buffer), &cp)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, cp, sshbuf_ptr(buffer), sshbuf_len(buffer), 0, 0)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext)) != 0) goto out; r = sshbuf_putb(blob, encrypted); out: explicit_bzero(&ciphercontext, sizeof(ciphercontext)); explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); if (buffer != NULL) sshbuf_free(buffer); if (encrypted != NULL) sshbuf_free(encrypted); return r; } #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL /* convert SSH v2 key in OpenSSL PEM format */ static int sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob, const char *_passphrase, const char *comment) { int success, r; int blen, len = strlen(_passphrase); u_char *passphrase = (len > 0) ? (u_char *)_passphrase : NULL; #if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L) const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_des_ede3_cbc() : NULL; #else const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_aes_128_cbc() : NULL; #endif const u_char *bptr; BIO *bio = NULL; if (len > 0 && len <= 4) return SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT; if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; switch (key->type) { case KEY_DSA: success = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bio, key->dsa, cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL); break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: success = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key->ecdsa, cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL); break; #endif case KEY_RSA: success = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio, key->rsa, cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL); break; default: success = 0; break; } if (success == 0) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } if ((blen = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &bptr)) <= 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, bptr, blen)) != 0) goto out; r = 0; out: BIO_free(bio); return r; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ /* Serialise "key" to buffer "blob" */ int sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase, const char *comment, int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds) { switch (key->type) { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 case KEY_RSA1: return sshkey_private_rsa1_to_blob(key, blob, passphrase, comment); #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_RSA: if (force_new_format) { return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase, comment, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds); } return sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(key, blob, passphrase, comment); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase, comment, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds); default: return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; } } #ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* * Parse the public, unencrypted portion of a RSA1 key. */ int sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { int r; struct sshkey *pub = NULL; struct sshbuf *copy = NULL; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; /* Check that it is at least big enough to contain the ID string. */ if (sshbuf_len(blob) < sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN)) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* * Make sure it begins with the id string. Consume the id string * from the buffer. */ if (memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(blob), LEGACY_BEGIN, sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN)) != 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* Make a working copy of the keyblob and skip past the magic */ if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(blob)) == NULL) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN))) != 0) goto out; /* Skip cipher type, reserved data and key bits. */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, NULL)) != 0 || /* cipher type */ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, NULL)) != 0) /* key bits */ goto out; /* Read the public key from the buffer. */ if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, pub->rsa->n)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, pub->rsa->e)) != 0) goto out; /* Finally, the comment */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(copy, (u_char**)commentp, NULL)) != 0) goto out; /* The encrypted private part is not parsed by this function. */ r = 0; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = pub; else sshkey_free(pub); pub = NULL; out: if (copy != NULL) sshbuf_free(copy); if (pub != NULL) sshkey_free(pub); return r; } static int sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { int r; u_int16_t check1, check2; u_int8_t cipher_type; struct sshbuf *decrypted = NULL, *copy = NULL; u_char *cp; char *comment = NULL; struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext; const struct sshcipher *cipher; struct sshkey *prv = NULL; *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; /* Check that it is at least big enough to contain the ID string. */ if (sshbuf_len(blob) < sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN)) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* * Make sure it begins with the id string. Consume the id string * from the buffer. */ if (memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(blob), LEGACY_BEGIN, sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN)) != 0) return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; if ((prv = sshkey_new_private(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(blob)) == NULL || (decrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN))) != 0) goto out; /* Read cipher type. */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &cipher_type)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, NULL)) != 0) /* reserved */ goto out; /* Read the public key and comment from the buffer. */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, NULL)) != 0 || /* key bits */ (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, prv->rsa->n)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, prv->rsa->e)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(copy, &comment, NULL)) != 0) goto out; /* Check that it is a supported cipher. */ cipher = cipher_by_number(cipher_type); if (cipher == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER; goto out; } /* Initialize space for decrypted data. */ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, sshbuf_len(copy), &cp)) != 0) goto out; /* Rest of the buffer is encrypted. Decrypt it using the passphrase. */ if ((r = cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, cp, sshbuf_ptr(copy), sshbuf_len(copy), 0, 0)) != 0) { cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext); goto out; } if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext)) != 0) goto out; if ((r = sshbuf_get_u16(decrypted, &check1)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_u16(decrypted, &check2)) != 0) goto out; if (check1 != check2) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; goto out; } /* Read the rest of the private key. */ if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->d)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->q)) != 0 || (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->p)) != 0) goto out; /* calculate p-1 and q-1 */ if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(prv->rsa)) != 0) goto out; /* enable blinding */ if (RSA_blinding_on(prv->rsa, NULL) != 1) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } r = 0; *keyp = prv; prv = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) { *commentp = comment; comment = NULL; } out: explicit_bzero(&ciphercontext, sizeof(ciphercontext)); if (comment != NULL) free(comment); if (prv != NULL) sshkey_free(prv); if (copy != NULL) sshbuf_free(copy); if (decrypted != NULL) sshbuf_free(decrypted); return r; } #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL static int sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp) { EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; struct sshkey *prv = NULL; BIO *bio = NULL; int r; *keyp = NULL; if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL || sshbuf_len(blob) > INT_MAX) return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if (BIO_write(bio, sshbuf_ptr(blob), sshbuf_len(blob)) != (int)sshbuf_len(blob)) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } if ((pk = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, NULL, (char *)passphrase)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; goto out; } if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_RSA)) { if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } prv->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pk); prv->type = KEY_RSA; #ifdef DEBUG_PK RSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->rsa, 8); #endif if (RSA_blinding_on(prv->rsa, NULL) != 1) { r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto out; } } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA && (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_DSA)) { if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } prv->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pk); prv->type = KEY_DSA; #ifdef DEBUG_PK DSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->dsa, 8); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_EC && (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_ECDSA)) { if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; goto out; } prv->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pk); prv->type = KEY_ECDSA; prv->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(prv->ecdsa); if (prv->ecdsa_nid == -1 || sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(prv->ecdsa_nid) == NULL || sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(prv->ecdsa), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(prv->ecdsa)) != 0 || sshkey_ec_validate_private(prv->ecdsa) != 0) { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } # ifdef DEBUG_PK if (prv != NULL && prv->ecdsa != NULL) sshkey_dump_ec_key(prv->ecdsa); # endif #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ } else { r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto out; } r = 0; *keyp = prv; prv = NULL; out: BIO_free(bio); if (pk != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pk); if (prv != NULL) sshkey_free(prv); return r; } #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { int r; *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; switch (type) { #ifdef WITH_SSH1 case KEY_RSA1: return sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(blob, passphrase, keyp, commentp); #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_RSA: return sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(blob, type, passphrase, keyp); #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ case KEY_ED25519: return sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, keyp, commentp); case KEY_UNSPEC: if ((r = sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, keyp, commentp)) == 0) return 0; #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL return sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(blob, type, passphrase, keyp); #else return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ default: return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; } } int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer, const char *passphrase, const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { int r; if (keyp != NULL) *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) *commentp = NULL; #ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* it's a SSH v1 key if the public key part is readable */ if ((r = sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(buffer, NULL, NULL)) == 0) { return sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_RSA1, passphrase, keyp, commentp); } #endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_UNSPEC, passphrase, keyp, commentp)) == 0) return 0; return r; } Index: head/crypto/openssh/sshkey.h =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/sshkey.h (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/sshkey.h (revision 294336) @@ -1,231 +1,232 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.5 2015/01/26 02:59:11 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.6 2015/05/21 04:55:51 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef SSHKEY_H #define SSHKEY_H #include #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC # include # else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ # define EC_KEY void # define EC_GROUP void # define EC_POINT void # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ # define RSA void # define DSA void # define EC_KEY void # define EC_GROUP void # define EC_POINT void #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #define SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE 768 #define SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE (1 << 20) struct sshbuf; /* Key types */ enum sshkey_types { KEY_RSA1, KEY_RSA, KEY_DSA, KEY_ECDSA, KEY_ED25519, KEY_RSA_CERT, KEY_DSA_CERT, KEY_ECDSA_CERT, KEY_ED25519_CERT, KEY_RSA_CERT_V00, KEY_DSA_CERT_V00, KEY_UNSPEC }; /* Default fingerprint hash */ #define SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 /* Fingerprint representation formats */ enum sshkey_fp_rep { SSH_FP_DEFAULT = 0, SSH_FP_HEX, SSH_FP_BASE64, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE, SSH_FP_RANDOMART }; /* key is stored in external hardware */ #define SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT 0x0001 #define SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS 256 /* XXX opaquify? */ struct sshkey_cert { struct sshbuf *certblob; /* Kept around for use on wire */ u_int type; /* SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER or SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST */ u_int64_t serial; char *key_id; u_int nprincipals; char **principals; u_int64_t valid_after, valid_before; struct sshbuf *critical; struct sshbuf *extensions; struct sshkey *signature_key; }; /* XXX opaquify? */ struct sshkey { int type; int flags; RSA *rsa; DSA *dsa; int ecdsa_nid; /* NID of curve */ EC_KEY *ecdsa; u_char *ed25519_sk; u_char *ed25519_pk; struct sshkey_cert *cert; }; #define ED25519_SK_SZ crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES #define ED25519_PK_SZ crypto_sign_ed25519_PUBLICKEYBYTES struct sshkey *sshkey_new(int); int sshkey_add_private(struct sshkey *); struct sshkey *sshkey_new_private(int); void sshkey_free(struct sshkey *); int sshkey_demote(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey **); int sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_equal(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *); char *sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *, int, enum sshkey_fp_rep); int sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k, int, u_char **retp, size_t *lenp); const char *sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *); const char *sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *, FILE *); int sshkey_read(struct sshkey *, char **); u_int sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp); int sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey **); int sshkey_type_from_name(const char *); int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_type_is_cert(int); int sshkey_type_plain(int); int sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *, int); int sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *); int sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *); int sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *); int sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *, int, int, const char *, const char **); int sshkey_cert_is_legacy(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *); int sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *); const char * sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(int); u_int sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(int); int sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int); int sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *); int sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid); int sshkey_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); int sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *); const char *sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *); const char *sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *); int sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int); char *key_alg_list(int, int); int sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **); int sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **); int sshkey_froms(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **); int sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *); +int sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *, char **); int sshkey_putb(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); int sshkey_puts(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); int sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *); int sshkey_putb_plain(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); int sshkey_sign(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, u_int); int sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, const u_char *, size_t, u_int); /* for debug */ void sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); void sshkey_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *); /* private key parsing and serialisation */ int sshkey_private_serialize(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf); int sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **keyp); /* private key file format parsing and serialisation */ int sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase, const char *comment, int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds); int sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp); int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer, const char *passphrase, const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp); int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp); #ifdef SSHKEY_INTERNAL int ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); int ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); int ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); int ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); int ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); int ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); int ssh_ed25519_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); int ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); #endif #if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) # undef RSA # undef DSA # undef EC_KEY # undef EC_GROUP # undef EC_POINT #elif !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) # undef EC_KEY # undef EC_GROUP # undef EC_POINT #endif #endif /* SSHKEY_H */ Index: head/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/sshpty.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,240 +1,240 @@ /* $OpenBSD: sshpty.c,v 1.29 2014/09/03 18:55:07 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Allocating a pseudo-terminal, and making it the controlling tty. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H # include #endif #include #include "sshpty.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #ifdef HAVE_PTY_H # include #endif #ifndef O_NOCTTY #define O_NOCTTY 0 #endif #ifdef __APPLE__ # include # if (MAC_OS_X_VERSION_MAX_ALLOWED >= MAC_OS_X_VERSION_10_5) # define __APPLE_PRIVPTY__ # endif #endif /* * Allocates and opens a pty. Returns 0 if no pty could be allocated, or * nonzero if a pty was successfully allocated. On success, open file * descriptors for the pty and tty sides and the name of the tty side are * returned (the buffer must be able to hold at least 64 characters). */ int pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen) { /* openpty(3) exists in OSF/1 and some other os'es */ char *name; int i; i = openpty(ptyfd, ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (i < 0) { error("openpty: %.100s", strerror(errno)); return 0; } name = ttyname(*ttyfd); if (!name) fatal("openpty returns device for which ttyname fails."); strlcpy(namebuf, name, namebuflen); /* possible truncation */ return 1; } /* Releases the tty. Its ownership is returned to root, and permissions to 0666. */ void pty_release(const char *tty) { -#ifndef __APPLE_PRIVPTY__ +#if !defined(__APPLE_PRIVPTY__) && !defined(HAVE_OPENPTY) if (chown(tty, (uid_t) 0, (gid_t) 0) < 0) error("chown %.100s 0 0 failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno)); if (chmod(tty, (mode_t) 0666) < 0) error("chmod %.100s 0666 failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno)); -#endif /* __APPLE_PRIVPTY__ */ +#endif /* !__APPLE_PRIVPTY__ && !HAVE_OPENPTY */ } /* Makes the tty the process's controlling tty and sets it to sane modes. */ void pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *tty) { int fd; #ifdef _UNICOS if (setsid() < 0) error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno)); fd = open(tty, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY); if (fd != -1) { signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); ioctl(fd, TCVHUP, (char *)NULL); signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); setpgid(0, 0); close(fd); } else { error("Failed to disconnect from controlling tty."); } debug("Setting controlling tty using TCSETCTTY."); ioctl(*ttyfd, TCSETCTTY, NULL); fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR); if (fd < 0) error("%.100s: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno)); close(*ttyfd); *ttyfd = fd; #else /* _UNICOS */ /* First disconnect from the old controlling tty. */ #ifdef TIOCNOTTY fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); if (fd >= 0) { (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL); close(fd); } #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ if (setsid() < 0) error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno)); /* * Verify that we are successfully disconnected from the controlling * tty. */ fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); if (fd >= 0) { error("Failed to disconnect from controlling tty."); close(fd); } /* Make it our controlling tty. */ #ifdef TIOCSCTTY debug("Setting controlling tty using TIOCSCTTY."); if (ioctl(*ttyfd, TIOCSCTTY, NULL) < 0) error("ioctl(TIOCSCTTY): %.100s", strerror(errno)); #endif /* TIOCSCTTY */ #ifdef NEED_SETPGRP if (setpgrp(0,0) < 0) error("SETPGRP %s",strerror(errno)); #endif /* NEED_SETPGRP */ fd = open(tty, O_RDWR); if (fd < 0) { error("%.100s: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno)); } else { close(fd); } /* Verify that we now have a controlling tty. */ fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_WRONLY); if (fd < 0) error("open /dev/tty failed - could not set controlling tty: %.100s", strerror(errno)); else close(fd); #endif /* _UNICOS */ } /* Changes the window size associated with the pty. */ void pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, u_int row, u_int col, u_int xpixel, u_int ypixel) { struct winsize w; /* may truncate u_int -> u_short */ w.ws_row = row; w.ws_col = col; w.ws_xpixel = xpixel; w.ws_ypixel = ypixel; (void) ioctl(ptyfd, TIOCSWINSZ, &w); } void pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty) { struct group *grp; gid_t gid; mode_t mode; struct stat st; /* Determine the group to make the owner of the tty. */ grp = getgrnam("tty"); gid = (grp != NULL) ? grp->gr_gid : pw->pw_gid; mode = (grp != NULL) ? 0622 : 0600; /* * Change owner and mode of the tty as required. * Warn but continue if filesystem is read-only and the uids match/ * tty is owned by root. */ if (stat(tty, &st)) fatal("stat(%.100s) failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno)); #ifdef WITH_SELINUX ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty); #endif if (st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid || st.st_gid != gid) { if (chown(tty, pw->pw_uid, gid) < 0) { if (errno == EROFS && (st.st_uid == pw->pw_uid || st.st_uid == 0)) debug("chown(%.100s, %u, %u) failed: %.100s", tty, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)gid, strerror(errno)); else fatal("chown(%.100s, %u, %u) failed: %.100s", tty, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)gid, strerror(errno)); } } if ((st.st_mode & (S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)) != mode) { if (chmod(tty, mode) < 0) { if (errno == EROFS && (st.st_mode & (S_IRGRP | S_IROTH)) == 0) debug("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s", tty, (u_int)mode, strerror(errno)); else fatal("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s", tty, (u_int)mode, strerror(errno)); } } } Index: head/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/uidswap.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,257 +1,257 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: uidswap.c,v 1.37 2015/01/16 06:40:12 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: uidswap.c,v 1.39 2015/06/24 01:49:19 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Code for uid-swapping. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "xmalloc.h" /* * Note: all these functions must work in all of the following cases: * 1. euid=0, ruid=0 * 2. euid=0, ruid!=0 * 3. euid!=0, ruid!=0 * Additionally, they must work regardless of whether the system has * POSIX saved uids or not. */ #if defined(_POSIX_SAVED_IDS) && !defined(BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS) /* Lets assume that posix saved ids also work with seteuid, even though that is not part of the posix specification. */ #define SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID /* Saved effective uid. */ static uid_t saved_euid = 0; static gid_t saved_egid = 0; #endif /* Saved effective uid. */ static int privileged = 0; static int temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0; static gid_t *saved_egroups = NULL, *user_groups = NULL; static int saved_egroupslen = -1, user_groupslen = -1; /* * Temporarily changes to the given uid. If the effective user * id is not root, this does nothing. This call cannot be nested. */ void temporarily_use_uid(struct passwd *pw) { /* Save the current euid, and egroups. */ #ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID saved_euid = geteuid(); saved_egid = getegid(); debug("temporarily_use_uid: %u/%u (e=%u/%u)", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, (u_int)saved_euid, (u_int)saved_egid); #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN if (saved_euid != 0) { privileged = 0; return; } #endif #else if (geteuid() != 0) { privileged = 0; return; } #endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ privileged = 1; temporarily_use_uid_effective = 1; saved_egroupslen = getgroups(0, NULL); if (saved_egroupslen < 0) fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (saved_egroupslen > 0) { - saved_egroups = xrealloc(saved_egroups, + saved_egroups = xreallocarray(saved_egroups, saved_egroupslen, sizeof(gid_t)); if (getgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) < 0) fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); } else { /* saved_egroupslen == 0 */ free(saved_egroups); } /* set and save the user's groups */ if (user_groupslen == -1) { if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) fatal("initgroups: %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name, strerror(errno)); user_groupslen = getgroups(0, NULL); if (user_groupslen < 0) fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (user_groupslen > 0) { - user_groups = xrealloc(user_groups, + user_groups = xreallocarray(user_groups, user_groupslen, sizeof(gid_t)); if (getgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) < 0) fatal("getgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); } else { /* user_groupslen == 0 */ free(user_groups); } } /* Set the effective uid to the given (unprivileged) uid. */ if (setgroups(user_groupslen, user_groups) < 0) fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); #ifndef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID /* Propagate the privileged gid to all of our gids. */ if (setgid(getegid()) < 0) debug("setgid %u: %.100s", (u_int) getegid(), strerror(errno)); /* Propagate the privileged uid to all of our uids. */ if (setuid(geteuid()) < 0) debug("setuid %u: %.100s", (u_int) geteuid(), strerror(errno)); #endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ if (setegid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)); if (seteuid(pw->pw_uid) == -1) fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno)); } void permanently_drop_suid(uid_t uid) { #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN uid_t old_uid = getuid(); #endif debug("permanently_drop_suid: %u", (u_int)uid); if (setresuid(uid, uid, uid) < 0) fatal("setresuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)uid, strerror(errno)); #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN /* Try restoration of UID if changed (test clearing of saved uid) */ if (old_uid != uid && (setuid(old_uid) != -1 || seteuid(old_uid) != -1)) fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]uid", __func__); #endif /* Verify UID drop was successful */ if (getuid() != uid || geteuid() != uid) { fatal("%s: euid incorrect uid:%u euid:%u (should be %u)", __func__, (u_int)getuid(), (u_int)geteuid(), (u_int)uid); } } /* * Restores to the original (privileged) uid. */ void restore_uid(void) { /* it's a no-op unless privileged */ if (!privileged) { debug("restore_uid: (unprivileged)"); return; } if (!temporarily_use_uid_effective) fatal("restore_uid: temporarily_use_uid not effective"); #ifdef SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID debug("restore_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)saved_euid, (u_int)saved_egid); /* Set the effective uid back to the saved privileged uid. */ if (seteuid(saved_euid) < 0) fatal("seteuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_euid, strerror(errno)); if (setegid(saved_egid) < 0) fatal("setegid %u: %.100s", (u_int)saved_egid, strerror(errno)); #else /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ /* * We are unable to restore the real uid to its unprivileged value. * Propagate the real uid (usually more privileged) to effective uid * as well. */ setuid(getuid()); setgid(getgid()); #endif /* SAVED_IDS_WORK_WITH_SETEUID */ if (setgroups(saved_egroupslen, saved_egroups) < 0) fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); temporarily_use_uid_effective = 0; } /* * Permanently sets all uids to the given uid. This cannot be * called while temporarily_use_uid is effective. */ void permanently_set_uid(struct passwd *pw) { #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN uid_t old_uid = getuid(); gid_t old_gid = getgid(); #endif if (pw == NULL) fatal("permanently_set_uid: no user given"); if (temporarily_use_uid_effective) fatal("permanently_set_uid: temporarily_use_uid effective"); debug("permanently_set_uid: %u/%u", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)pw->pw_gid); if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) < 0) fatal("setresgid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)); #ifdef __APPLE__ /* * OS X requires initgroups after setgid to opt back into * memberd support for >16 supplemental groups. */ if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) fatal("initgroups %.100s %u: %.100s", pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)); #endif if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) < 0) fatal("setresuid %u: %.100s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno)); #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN /* Try restoration of GID if changed (test clearing of saved gid) */ if (old_gid != pw->pw_gid && pw->pw_uid != 0 && (setgid(old_gid) != -1 || setegid(old_gid) != -1)) fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]gid", __func__); #endif /* Verify GID drop was successful */ if (getgid() != pw->pw_gid || getegid() != pw->pw_gid) { fatal("%s: egid incorrect gid:%u egid:%u (should be %u)", __func__, (u_int)getgid(), (u_int)getegid(), (u_int)pw->pw_gid); } #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN /* Try restoration of UID if changed (test clearing of saved uid) */ if (old_uid != pw->pw_uid && (setuid(old_uid) != -1 || seteuid(old_uid) != -1)) fatal("%s: was able to restore old [e]uid", __func__); #endif /* Verify UID drop was successful */ if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid) { fatal("%s: euid incorrect uid:%u euid:%u (should be %u)", __func__, (u_int)getuid(), (u_int)geteuid(), (u_int)pw->pw_uid); } } Index: head/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/uuencode.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,95 +1,95 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: uuencode.c,v 1.27 2013/05/17 00:13:14 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: uuencode.c,v 1.28 2015/04/24 01:36:24 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "uuencode.h" /* * Encode binary 'src' of length 'srclength', writing base64-encoded text * to 'target' of size 'targsize'. Will always nul-terminate 'target'. * Returns the number of bytes stored in 'target' or -1 on error (inc. * 'targsize' too small). */ int uuencode(const u_char *src, u_int srclength, char *target, size_t targsize) { return __b64_ntop(src, srclength, target, targsize); } /* * Decode base64-encoded 'src' into buffer 'target' of 'targsize' bytes. * Will skip leading and trailing whitespace. Returns the number of bytes * stored in 'target' or -1 on error (inc. targsize too small). */ int uudecode(const char *src, u_char *target, size_t targsize) { int len; char *encoded, *p; /* copy the 'readonly' source */ encoded = xstrdup(src); /* skip whitespace and data */ for (p = encoded; *p == ' ' || *p == '\t'; p++) ; for (; *p != '\0' && *p != ' ' && *p != '\t'; p++) ; /* and remove trailing whitespace because __b64_pton needs this */ *p = '\0'; len = __b64_pton(encoded, target, targsize); free(encoded); return len; } void dump_base64(FILE *fp, const u_char *data, u_int len) { char *buf; int i, n; if (len > 65536) { fprintf(fp, "dump_base64: len > 65536\n"); return; } - buf = xmalloc(2*len); + buf = xreallocarray(NULL, 2, len); n = uuencode(data, len, buf, 2*len); for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { fprintf(fp, "%c", buf[i]); if (i % 70 == 69) fprintf(fp, "\n"); } if (i % 70 != 69) fprintf(fp, "\n"); free(buf); } Index: head/crypto/openssh/version.h =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/version.h (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/version.h (revision 294336) @@ -1,15 +1,15 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.72 2015/03/04 18:53:53 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.73 2015/07/01 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */ /* $FreeBSD$ */ -#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_6.8" +#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_6.9" #define SSH_PORTABLE "p1" #define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE #define SSH_VERSION_FREEBSD "FreeBSD-20160119" #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #define OPENSSL_VERSION SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION) #else #define OPENSSL_VERSION "without OpenSSL" #endif Index: head/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.c =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.c (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.c (revision 294336) @@ -1,104 +1,96 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.c,v 1.31 2015/02/06 23:21:59 millert Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.c,v 1.32 2015/04/24 01:36:01 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Versions of malloc and friends that check their results, and never return * failure (they call fatal if they encounter an error). * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" void * xmalloc(size_t size) { void *ptr; if (size == 0) fatal("xmalloc: zero size"); ptr = malloc(size); if (ptr == NULL) fatal("xmalloc: out of memory (allocating %zu bytes)", size); return ptr; } void * xcalloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size) { void *ptr; if (size == 0 || nmemb == 0) fatal("xcalloc: zero size"); if (SIZE_MAX / nmemb < size) fatal("xcalloc: nmemb * size > SIZE_MAX"); ptr = calloc(nmemb, size); if (ptr == NULL) fatal("xcalloc: out of memory (allocating %zu bytes)", size * nmemb); return ptr; } void * -xrealloc(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size) +xreallocarray(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size) { void *new_ptr; - size_t new_size = nmemb * size; - if (new_size == 0) - fatal("xrealloc: zero size"); - if (SIZE_MAX / nmemb < size) - fatal("xrealloc: nmemb * size > SIZE_MAX"); - if (ptr == NULL) - new_ptr = malloc(new_size); - else - new_ptr = realloc(ptr, new_size); + new_ptr = reallocarray(ptr, nmemb, size); if (new_ptr == NULL) - fatal("xrealloc: out of memory (new_size %zu bytes)", - new_size); + fatal("xreallocarray: out of memory (%zu elements of %zu bytes)", + nmemb, size); return new_ptr; } char * xstrdup(const char *str) { size_t len; char *cp; len = strlen(str) + 1; cp = xmalloc(len); strlcpy(cp, str, len); return cp; } int xasprintf(char **ret, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; int i; va_start(ap, fmt); i = vasprintf(ret, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); if (i < 0 || *ret == NULL) fatal("xasprintf: could not allocate memory"); return (i); } Index: head/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.h =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.h (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh/xmalloc.h (revision 294336) @@ -1,25 +1,25 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.h,v 1.14 2013/05/17 00:13:14 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.h,v 1.15 2015/04/24 01:36:01 deraadt Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Created: Mon Mar 20 22:09:17 1995 ylo * * Versions of malloc and friends that check their results, and never return * failure (they call fatal if they encounter an error). * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ void *xmalloc(size_t); void *xcalloc(size_t, size_t); -void *xrealloc(void *, size_t, size_t); +void *xreallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t); char *xstrdup(const char *); int xasprintf(char **, const char *, ...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3))) __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2))); Index: head/crypto/openssh =================================================================== --- head/crypto/openssh (revision 294335) +++ head/crypto/openssh (revision 294336) Property changes on: head/crypto/openssh ___________________________________________________________________ Modified: svn:mergeinfo ## -0,0 +0,1 ## Merged /vendor-crypto/openssh/dist:r285033