Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/CHANGES =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/CHANGES (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/CHANGES (revision 276859) @@ -1,8869 +1,8950 @@ OpenSSL CHANGES _______________ + Changes between 0.9.8zc and 0.9.8zd [8 Jan 2015] + + *) Fix DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record. A carefully crafted DTLS + message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due to a NULL pointer + dereference. This could lead to a Denial Of Service attack. Thanks to + Markus Stenberg of Cisco Systems, Inc. for reporting this issue. + (CVE-2014-3571) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Fix issue where no-ssl3 configuration sets method to NULL. When openssl is + built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL v3 ClientHello is received the ssl + method would be set to NULL which could later result in a NULL pointer + dereference. Thanks to Frank Schmirler for reporting this issue. + (CVE-2014-3569) + [Kurt Roeckx] + + *) Abort handshake if server key exchange message is omitted for ephemeral + ECDH ciphersuites. + + Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA for + reporting this issue. + (CVE-2014-3572) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Remove non-export ephemeral RSA code on client and server. This code + violated the TLS standard by allowing the use of temporary RSA keys in + non-export ciphersuites and could be used by a server to effectively + downgrade the RSA key length used to a value smaller than the server + certificate. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at + INRIA or reporting this issue. + (CVE-2015-0204) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Fix various certificate fingerprint issues. + + By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a + certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature. + Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed + this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the + certificate fingerprint for blacklists. + + 1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits. + + If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject + the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits. + + 2. Check certificate algorithm consistency. + + Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the + certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure + errors for some broken certificates. + + Thanks to Konrad Kraszewski from Google for reporting this issue. + + 3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER. + + Reencode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received + signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch. + + This will reject various cases including garbage after signature + (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS + program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs + (negative or with leading zeroes). + + Further analysis was conducted and fixes were developed by Stephen Henson + of the OpenSSL core team. + + (CVE-2014-8275) + [Steve Henson] + + *) Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect + results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random + with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any + way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter + Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial + fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and + Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of + the OpenSSL core team. + (CVE-2014-3570) + [Andy Polyakov] + Changes between 0.9.8zb and 0.9.8zc [15 Oct 2014] *) Session Ticket Memory Leak. When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service attack. (CVE-2014-3567) [Steve Henson] *) Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete. When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be configured to send them. (CVE-2014-3568) [Akamai and the OpenSSL team] *) Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV. Client applications doing fallback retries should call SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV). (CVE-2014-3566) [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller] *) Add additional DigestInfo checks. Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded DigestInfo structures. Note: this is a precautionary measure and no attacks are currently known. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8za and 0.9.8zb [6 Aug 2014] *) OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages. Thanks to Felix Gröbert (Google) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3510) [Emilia Käsper] *) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3507) [Adam Langley] *) An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3506) [Adam Langley] *) An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3505) [Adam Langley] *) A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing output to the attacker. Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue. (CVE-2014-3508) [Emilia Käsper, and Steve Henson] *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.) for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.) [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.8y and 0.9.8za [5 Jun 2014] *) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL SSL/TLS clients and servers. Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-0224) [KIKUCHI Masashi, Steve Henson] *) Fix DTLS recursion flaw. By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing in a DoS attack. Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue. (CVE-2014-0221) [Imre Rad, Steve Henson] *) Fix DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability. A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server. Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195) [Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson] *) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites are subject to a denial of service attack. Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering this issue. (CVE-2014-3470) [Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson] *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack" by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from: http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140 Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076) [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger] Thanks to mancha for backporting the fix to the 0.9.8 branch. *) Fix handling of warning-level alerts in SSL23 client mode so they don't cause client-side termination (eg. on SNI unrecognized_name warnings). Add client and server support for six additional alerts per RFC 6066 and RFC 4279. [mancha] *) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing 10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer. [Rob Stradling, Adam Langley] Changes between 0.9.8x and 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013] *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time. This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and Emilia Käsper for the initial patch. (CVE-2013-0169) [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL. This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166) [Steve Henson] *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate() so it returns the certificate actually sent. See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836. (This is a backport) [Rob Stradling ] *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8w and 0.9.8x [10 May 2012] *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in DTLS to fix DoS attack. Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic fuzzing as a service testing platform. (CVE-2012-2333) [Steve Henson] *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages. Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8v and 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012] *) The fix for CVE-2012-2110 did not take into account that the 'len' argument to BUF_MEM_grow and BUF_MEM_grow_clean is an int in OpenSSL 0.9.8, making it still vulnerable. Fix by rejecting negative len parameter. (CVE-2012-2131) [Tomas Hoger ] Changes between 0.9.8u and 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012] *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer in CRYPTO_realloc_clean. Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this issue and to Adam Langley for fixing it. (CVE-2012-2110) [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team] Changes between 0.9.8t and 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012] *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The old behaviour can be reenabled in the CMS code by setting the CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where an MMA defence is not necessary. Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode for discovering this issue. (CVE-2012-0884) [Steve Henson] *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode for discovering this bug. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8s and 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012] *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109. Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050) [Antonio Martin] Changes between 0.9.8r and 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012] *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing differences arising during decryption processing. A research paper describing this attack can be found at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann and Michael Tuexen for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108) [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen] *) Stop policy check failure freeing same buffer twice. (CVE-2011-4109) [Ben Laurie, Kasper ] *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records. (CVE-2011-4576) [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George Kadianakis for discovering this issue and Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619) [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure. Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw and Rob Austein for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577) [Rob Austein ] *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race. [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c. [Emilia Käsper (Google)] *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different interpretations of the '..._len' fields). [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients. This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously, the last update always remained unused). [Emilia Käsper (Google)] *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular for multi-threaded use of ECDH. [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see: http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf [Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri] Changes between 0.9.8q and 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011] *) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014 [Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)] *) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is ambiguous. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8p and 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010] *) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack. Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180 [Steve Henson] *) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252 [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.8o and 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010] *) Fix extension code to avoid race conditions which can result in a buffer overrun vulnerability: resumed sessions must not be modified as they can be shared by multiple threads. CVE-2010-3864 [Steve Henson] *) Fix for double free bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c CVE-2010-2939 [Steve Henson] *) Don't reencode certificate when calculating signature: cache and use the original encoding instead. This makes signature verification of some broken encodings work correctly. [Steve Henson] *) ec2_GF2m_simple_mul bugfix: compute correct result if the output EC_POINT is also one of the inputs. [Emilia Käsper (Google)] *) Don't repeatedly append PBE algorithms to table if they already exist. Sort table on each new add. This effectively makes the table read only after all algorithms are added and subsequent calls to PKCS12_pbe_add etc are non-op. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8n and 0.9.8o [01 Jun 2010] [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.8o and later 0.9.8 patch levels were released after OpenSSL 1.0.0.] *) Correct a typo in the CMS ASN1 module which can result in invalid memory access or freeing data twice (CVE-2010-0742) [Steve Henson, Ronald Moesbergen ] *) Add SHA2 algorithms to SSL_library_init(). SHA2 is becoming far more common in certificates and some applications which only call SSL_library_init and not OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() will fail. [Steve Henson] *) VMS fixes: Reduce copying into .apps and .test in makevms.com Don't try to use blank CA certificate in CA.com Allow use of C files from original directories in maketests.com [Steven M. Schweda" ] Changes between 0.9.8m and 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010] *) When rejecting SSL/TLS records due to an incorrect version number, never update s->server with a new major version number. As of - OpenSSL 0.9.8m if 'short' is a 16-bit type, - OpenSSL 0.9.8f if 'short' is longer than 16 bits, the previous behavior could result in a read attempt at NULL when receiving specific incorrect SSL/TLS records once record payload protection is active. (CVE-2010-0740) [Bodo Moeller, Adam Langley ] *) Fix for CVE-2010-0433 where some kerberos enabled versions of OpenSSL could be crashed if the relevant tables were not present (e.g. chrooted). [Tomas Hoger ] Changes between 0.9.8l and 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010] *) Always check bn_wexpend() return values for failure. (CVE-2009-3245) [Martin Olsson, Neel Mehta] *) Fix X509_STORE locking: Every 'objs' access requires a lock (to accommodate for stack sorting, always a write lock!). [Bodo Moeller] *) On some versions of WIN32 Heap32Next is very slow. This can cause excessive delays in the RAND_poll(): over a minute. As a workaround include a time check in the inner Heap32Next loop too. [Steve Henson] *) The code that handled flushing of data in SSL/TLS originally used the BIO_CTRL_INFO ctrl to see if any data was pending first. This caused the problem outlined in PR#1949. The fix suggested there however can trigger problems with buggy BIO_CTRL_WPENDING (e.g. some versions of Apache). So instead simplify the code to flush unconditionally. This should be fine since flushing with no data to flush is a no op. [Steve Henson] *) Handle TLS versions 2.0 and later properly and correctly use the highest version of TLS/SSL supported. Although TLS >= 2.0 is some way off ancient servers have a habit of sticking around for a while... [Steve Henson] *) Modify compression code so it frees up structures without using the ex_data callbacks. This works around a problem where some applications call CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data() before application exit (e.g. when restarting) then use compression (e.g. SSL with compression) later. This results in significant per-connection memory leaks and has caused some security issues including CVE-2008-1678 and CVE-2009-4355. [Steve Henson] *) Constify crypto/cast (i.e., ): a CAST_KEY doesn't change when encrypting or decrypting. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add option SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT which will allow clients to connect and renegotiate with servers which do not support RI. Until RI is more widely deployed this option is enabled by default. [Steve Henson] *) Add "missing" ssl ctrls to clear options and mode. [Steve Henson] *) If client attempts to renegotiate and doesn't support RI respond with a no_renegotiation alert as required by RFC5746. Some renegotiating TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully when they receive the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled this alert and would hang waiting for a server hello which it will never receive. Now we treat a received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal error. This is because applications requesting a renegotiation might well expect it to succeed and would have no code in place to handle the server denying it so the only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection. [Steve Henson] *) Add ctrl macro SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() which returns 1 if peer supports secure renegotiation and 0 otherwise. Print out peer renegotiation support in s_client/s_server. [Steve Henson] *) Replace the highly broken and deprecated SPKAC certification method with the updated NID creation version. This should correctly handle UTF8. [Steve Henson] *) Implement RFC5746. Re-enable renegotiation but require the extension as needed. Unfortunately, SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION turns out to be a bad idea. It has been replaced by SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION which can be set with SSL_CTX_set_options(). This is really not recommended unless you know what you are doing. [Eric Rescorla , Ben Laurie, Steve Henson] *) Fixes to stateless session resumption handling. Use initial_ctx when issuing and attempting to decrypt tickets in case it has changed during servername handling. Use a non-zero length session ID when attempting stateless session resumption: this makes it possible to determine if a resumption has occurred immediately after receiving server hello (several places in OpenSSL subtly assume this) instead of later in the handshake. [Steve Henson] *) The functions ENGINE_ctrl(), OPENSSL_isservice(), CMS_get1_RecipientRequest() and RAND_bytes() can return <=0 on error fixes for a few places where the return code is not checked correctly. [Julia Lawall ] *) Add --strict-warnings option to Configure script to include devteam warnings in other configurations. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for --libdir option and LIBDIR variable in makefiles. This makes it possible to install openssl libraries in locations which have names other than "lib", for example "/usr/lib64" which some systems need. [Steve Henson, based on patch from Jeremy Utley] *) Don't allow the use of leading 0x80 in OIDs. This is a violation of X690 8.9.12 and can produce some misleading textual output of OIDs. [Steve Henson, reported by Dan Kaminsky] *) Delete MD2 from algorithm tables. This follows the recommendation in several standards that it is not used in new applications due to several cryptographic weaknesses. For binary compatibility reasons the MD2 API is still compiled in by default. [Steve Henson] *) Add compression id to {d2i,i2d}_SSL_SESSION so it is correctly saved and restored. [Steve Henson] *) Rename uni2asc and asc2uni functions to OPENSSL_uni2asc and OPENSSL_asc2uni conditionally on Netware platforms to avoid a name clash. [Guenter ] *) Fix the server certificate chain building code to use X509_verify_cert(), it used to have an ad-hoc builder which was unable to cope with anything other than a simple chain. [David Woodhouse , Steve Henson] *) Don't check self signed certificate signatures in X509_verify_cert() by default (a flag can override this): it just wastes time without adding any security. As a useful side effect self signed root CAs with non-FIPS digests are now usable in FIPS mode. [Steve Henson] *) In dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message() the check if the current message is already buffered was missing. For every new message was memory allocated, allowing an attacker to perform an denial of service attack with sending out of seq handshake messages until there is no memory left. Additionally every future messege was buffered, even if the sequence number made no sense and would be part of another handshake. So only messages with sequence numbers less than 10 in advance will be buffered. (CVE-2009-1378) [Robin Seggelmann, discovered by Daniel Mentz] *) Records are buffered if they arrive with a future epoch to be processed after finishing the corresponding handshake. There is currently no limitation to this buffer allowing an attacker to perform a DOS attack with sending records with future epochs until there is no memory left. This patch adds the pqueue_size() function to detemine the size of a buffer and limits the record buffer to 100 entries. (CVE-2009-1377) [Robin Seggelmann, discovered by Daniel Mentz] *) Keep a copy of frag->msg_header.frag_len so it can be used after the parent structure is freed. (CVE-2009-1379) [Daniel Mentz] *) Handle non-blocking I/O properly in SSL_shutdown() call. [Darryl Miles ] *) Add 2.5.4.* OIDs [Ilya O. ] Changes between 0.9.8k and 0.9.8l [5 Nov 2009] *) Disable renegotiation completely - this fixes a severe security problem (CVE-2009-3555) at the cost of breaking all renegotiation. Renegotiation can be re-enabled by setting SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION in s3->flags at run-time. This is really not recommended unless you know what you're doing. [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.8j and 0.9.8k [25 Mar 2009] *) Don't set val to NULL when freeing up structures, it is freed up by underlying code. If sizeof(void *) > sizeof(long) this can result in zeroing past the valid field. (CVE-2009-0789) [Paolo Ganci ] *) Fix bug where return value of CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content() was not checked correctly. This would allow some invalid signed attributes to appear to verify correctly. (CVE-2009-0591) [Ivan Nestlerode ] *) Reject UniversalString and BMPString types with invalid lengths. This prevents a crash in ASN1_STRING_print_ex() which assumes the strings have a legal length. (CVE-2009-0590) [Steve Henson] *) Set S/MIME signing as the default purpose rather than setting it unconditionally. This allows applications to override it at the store level. [Steve Henson] *) Permit restricted recursion of ASN1 strings. This is needed in practice to handle some structures. [Steve Henson] *) Improve efficiency of mem_gets: don't search whole buffer each time for a '\n' [Jeremy Shapiro ] *) New -hex option for openssl rand. [Matthieu Herrb] *) Print out UTF8String and NumericString when parsing ASN1. [Steve Henson] *) Support NumericString type for name components. [Steve Henson] *) Allow CC in the environment to override the automatically chosen compiler. Note that nothing is done to ensure flags work with the chosen compiler. [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.8i and 0.9.8j [07 Jan 2009] *) Properly check EVP_VerifyFinal() and similar return values (CVE-2008-5077). [Ben Laurie, Bodo Moeller, Google Security Team] *) Enable TLS extensions by default. [Ben Laurie] *) Allow the CHIL engine to be loaded, whether the application is multithreaded or not. (This does not release the developer from the obligation to set up the dynamic locking callbacks.) [Sander Temme ] *) Use correct exit code if there is an error in dgst command. [Steve Henson; problem pointed out by Roland Dirlewanger] *) Tweak Configure so that you need to say "experimental-jpake" to enable JPAKE, and need to use -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_JPAKE in applications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add experimental JPAKE support, including demo authentication in s_client and s_server. [Ben Laurie] *) Set the comparison function in v3_addr_canonize(). [Rob Austein ] *) Add support for XMPP STARTTLS in s_client. [Philip Paeps ] *) Change the server-side SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG behavior to ensure that even with this option, only ciphersuites in the server's preference list will be accepted. (Note that the option applies only when resuming a session, so the earlier behavior was just about the algorithm choice for symmetric cryptography.) [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.8h and 0.9.8i [15 Sep 2008] *) Fix NULL pointer dereference if a DTLS server received ChangeCipherSpec as first record (CVE-2009-1386). [PR #1679] *) Fix a state transitition in s3_srvr.c and d1_srvr.c (was using SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B, should be ..._ST_SW_SRVR_...). [Nagendra Modadugu] *) The fix in 0.9.8c that supposedly got rid of unsafe double-checked locking was incomplete for RSA blinding, addressing just one layer of what turns out to have been doubly unsafe triple-checked locking. So now fix this for real by retiring the MONT_HELPER macro in crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Marius Schilder] *) Various precautionary measures: - Avoid size_t integer overflow in HASH_UPDATE (md32_common.h). - Avoid a buffer overflow in d2i_SSL_SESSION() (ssl_asn1.c). (NB: This would require knowledge of the secret session ticket key to exploit, in which case you'd be SOL either way.) - Change bn_nist.c so that it will properly handle input BIGNUMs outside the expected range. - Enforce the 'num' check in BN_div() (bn_div.c) for non-BN_DEBUG builds. [Neel Mehta, Bodo Moeller] *) Allow engines to be "soft loaded" - i.e. optionally don't die if the load fails. Useful for distros. [Ben Laurie and the FreeBSD team] *) Add support for Local Machine Keyset attribute in PKCS#12 files. [Steve Henson] *) Fix BN_GF2m_mod_arr() top-bit cleanup code. [Huang Ying] *) Expand ENGINE to support engine supplied SSL client certificate functions. This work was sponsored by Logica. [Steve Henson] *) Add CryptoAPI ENGINE to support use of RSA and DSA keys held in Windows keystores. Support for SSL/TLS client authentication too. Not compiled unless enable-capieng specified to Configure. This work was sponsored by Logica. [Steve Henson] *) Fix bug in X509_ATTRIBUTE creation: dont set attribute using ASN1_TYPE_set1 if MBSTRING flag set. This bug would crash certain attribute creation routines such as certifcate requests and PKCS#12 files. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8g and 0.9.8h [28 May 2008] *) Fix flaw if 'Server Key exchange message' is omitted from a TLS handshake which could lead to a cilent crash as found using the Codenomicon TLS test suite (CVE-2008-1672) [Steve Henson, Mark Cox] *) Fix double free in TLS server name extensions which could lead to a remote crash found by Codenomicon TLS test suite (CVE-2008-0891) [Joe Orton] *) Clear error queue in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() Clear the error queue to ensure that error entries left from older function calls do not interfere with the correct operation. [Lutz Jaenicke, Erik de Castro Lopo] *) Remove root CA certificates of commercial CAs: The OpenSSL project does not recommend any specific CA and does not have any policy with respect to including or excluding any CA. Therefore it does not make any sense to ship an arbitrary selection of root CA certificates with the OpenSSL software. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) RSA OAEP patches to fix two separate invalid memory reads. The first one involves inputs when 'lzero' is greater than 'SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH' (it would read about SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes before the beginning of from). The second one involves inputs where the 'db' section contains nothing but zeroes (there is a one-byte invalid read after the end of 'db'). [Ivan Nestlerode ] *) Partial backport from 0.9.9-dev: Introduce bn_mul_mont (dedicated Montgomery multiplication procedure) as a candidate for BIGNUM assembler implementation. While 0.9.9-dev uses assembler for various architectures, only x86_64 is available by default here in the 0.9.8 branch, and 32-bit x86 is available through a compile-time setting. To try the 32-bit x86 assembler implementation, use Configure option "enable-montasm" (which exists only for this backport). As "enable-montasm" for 32-bit x86 disclaims code stability anyway, in this constellation we activate additional code backported from 0.9.9-dev for further performance improvements, namely BN_from_montgomery_word. (To enable this otherwise, e.g. x86_64, try "-DMONT_FROM_WORD___NON_DEFAULT_0_9_8_BUILD".) [Andy Polyakov (backport partially by Bodo Moeller)] *) Add TLS session ticket callback. This allows an application to set TLS ticket cipher and HMAC keys rather than relying on hardcoded fixed values. This is useful for key rollover for example where several key sets may exist with different names. [Steve Henson] *) Reverse ENGINE-internal logic for caching default ENGINE handles. This was broken until now in 0.9.8 releases, such that the only way a registered ENGINE could be used (assuming it initialises successfully on the host) was to explicitly set it as the default for the relevant algorithms. This is in contradiction with 0.9.7 behaviour and the documentation. With this fix, when an ENGINE is registered into a given algorithm's table of implementations, the 'uptodate' flag is reset so that auto-discovery will be used next time a new context for that algorithm attempts to select an implementation. [Ian Lister (tweaked by Geoff Thorpe)] *) Backport of CMS code to OpenSSL 0.9.8. This differs from the 0.9.9 implemention in the following ways: Lack of EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD means algorithm parameters have to be hard coded. Lack of BER streaming support means one pass streaming processing is only supported if data is detached: setting the streaming flag is ignored for embedded content. CMS support is disabled by default and must be explicitly enabled with the enable-cms configuration option. [Steve Henson] *) Update the GMP engine glue to do direct copies between BIGNUM and mpz_t when openssl and GMP use the same limb size. Otherwise the existing "conversion via a text string export" trick is still used. [Paul Sheer ] *) Zlib compression BIO. This is a filter BIO which compressed and uncompresses any data passed through it. [Steve Henson] *) Add AES_wrap_key() and AES_unwrap_key() functions to implement RFC3394 compatible AES key wrapping. [Steve Henson] *) Add utility functions to handle ASN1 structures. ASN1_STRING_set0(): sets string data without copying. X509_ALGOR_set0() and X509_ALGOR_get0(): set and retrieve X509_ALGOR (AlgorithmIdentifier) data. Attribute function X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(): retrieves data from an X509_ATTRIBUTE structure optionally checking it occurs only once. ASN1_TYPE_set1(): set and ASN1_TYPE structure copying supplied data. [Steve Henson] *) Fix BN flag handling in RSA_eay_mod_exp() and BN_MONT_CTX_set() to get the expected BN_FLG_CONSTTIME behavior. [Bodo Moeller (Google)] *) Netware support: - fixed wrong usage of ioctlsocket() when build for LIBC BSD sockets - fixed do_tests.pl to run the test suite with CLIB builds too (CLIB_OPT) - added some more tests to do_tests.pl - fixed RunningProcess usage so that it works with newer LIBC NDKs too - removed usage of BN_LLONG for CLIB builds to avoid runtime dependency - added new Configure targets netware-clib-bsdsock, netware-clib-gcc, netware-clib-bsdsock-gcc, netware-libc-bsdsock-gcc - various changes to netware.pl to enable gcc-cross builds on Win32 platform - changed crypto/bio/b_sock.c to work with macro functions (CLIB BSD) - various changes to fix missing prototype warnings - fixed x86nasm.pl to create correct asm files for NASM COFF output - added AES, WHIRLPOOL and CPUID assembler code to build files - added missing AES assembler make rules to mk1mf.pl - fixed order of includes in apps/ocsp.c so that e_os.h settings apply [Guenter Knauf ] *) Implement certificate status request TLS extension defined in RFC3546. A client can set the appropriate parameters and receive the encoded OCSP response via a callback. A server can query the supplied parameters and set the encoded OCSP response in the callback. Add simplified examples to s_client and s_server. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8f and 0.9.8g [19 Oct 2007] *) Fix various bugs: + Binary incompatibility of ssl_ctx_st structure + DTLS interoperation with non-compliant servers + Don't call get_session_cb() without proposed session + Fix ia64 assembler code [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8e and 0.9.8f [11 Oct 2007] *) DTLS Handshake overhaul. There were longstanding issues with OpenSSL DTLS implementation, which were making it impossible for RFC 4347 compliant client to communicate with OpenSSL server. Unfortunately just fixing these incompatibilities would "cut off" pre-0.9.8f clients. To allow for hassle free upgrade post-0.9.8e server keeps tolerating non RFC compliant syntax. The opposite is not true, 0.9.8f client can not communicate with earlier server. This update even addresses CVE-2007-4995. [Andy Polyakov] *) Changes to avoid need for function casts in OpenSSL: some compilers (gcc 4.2 and later) reject their use. [Kurt Roeckx , Peter Hartley , Steve Henson] *) Add RFC4507 support to OpenSSL. This includes the corrections in RFC4507bis. The encrypted ticket format is an encrypted encoded SSL_SESSION structure, that way new session features are automatically supported. If a client application caches session in an SSL_SESSION structure support is transparent because tickets are now stored in the encoded SSL_SESSION. The SSL_CTX structure automatically generates keys for ticket protection in servers so again support should be possible with no application modification. If a client or server wishes to disable RFC4507 support then the option SSL_OP_NO_TICKET can be set. Add a TLS extension debugging callback to allow the contents of any client or server extensions to be examined. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name extension so far. The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now have new members for a host name. The SSL data structure has an additional member SSL_CTX *initial_ctx so that new sessions can be stored in that context to allow for session resumption, even after the SSL has been switched to a new SSL_CTX in reaction to a client's server_name extension. New functions (subject to change): SSL_get_servername() SSL_get_servername_type() SSL_set_SSL_CTX() New CTRL codes and macros (subject to change): SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback() SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg() SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME - SSL_set_tlsext_host_name() openssl s_client has a new '-servername ...' option. openssl s_server has new options '-servername_host ...', '-cert2 ...', '-key2 ...', '-servername_fatal' (subject to change). This allows testing the HostName extension for a specific single host name ('-cert' and '-key' remain fallbacks for handshakes without HostName negotiation). If the unrecogninzed_name alert has to be sent, this by default is a warning; it becomes fatal with the '-servername_fatal' option. [Peter Sylvester, Remy Allais, Christophe Renou, Steve Henson] *) Add AES and SSE2 assembly language support to VC++ build. [Steve Henson] *) Mitigate attack on final subtraction in Montgomery reduction. [Andy Polyakov] *) Fix crypto/ec/ec_mult.c to work properly with scalars of value 0 (which previously caused an internal error). [Bodo Moeller] *) Squeeze another 10% out of IGE mode when in != out. [Ben Laurie] *) AES IGE mode speedup. [Dean Gaudet (Google)] *) Add the Korean symmetric 128-bit cipher SEED (see http://www.kisa.or.kr/kisa/seed/jsp/seed_eng.jsp) and add SEED ciphersuites from RFC 4162: TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "SEED-SHA" TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA" TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA" TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "ADH-SEED-SHA" To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8 series, SEED remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL is configured with 'enable-seed'. [KISA, Bodo Moeller] *) Mitigate branch prediction attacks, which can be practical if a single processor is shared, allowing a spy process to extract information. For detailed background information, see http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/039 (O. Aciicmez, S. Gueron, J.-P. Seifert, "New Branch Prediction Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL and Necessary Software Countermeasures"). The core of the change are new versions BN_div_no_branch() and BN_mod_inverse_no_branch() of BN_div() and BN_mod_inverse(), respectively, which are slower, but avoid the security-relevant conditional branches. These are automatically called by BN_div() and BN_mod_inverse() if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set for one of the input BIGNUMs. Also, BN_is_bit_set() has been changed to remove a conditional branch. BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is the new name for the previous BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME flag, since it now affects more than just modular exponentiation. (Since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, setting this flag in the exponent causes BN_mod_exp_mont() to use the alternative implementation in BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime().) The old name remains as a deprecated alias. Similary, RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is replaced by a more general RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME flag since the RSA implementation now uses constant-time implementations for more than just exponentiation. Here too the old name is kept as a deprecated alias. BN_BLINDING_new() will now use BN_dup() for the modulus so that the BN_BLINDING structure gets an independent copy of the modulus. This means that the previous "BIGNUM *m" argument to BN_BLINDING_new() and to BN_BLINDING_create_param() now essentially becomes "const BIGNUM *m", although we can't actually change this in the header file before 0.9.9. It allows RSA_setup_blinding() to use BN_with_flags() on the modulus to enable BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp)] *) In the SSL/TLS server implementation, be strict about session ID context matching (which matters if an application uses a single external cache for different purposes). Previously, out-of-context reuse was forbidden only if SSL_VERIFY_PEER was set. This did ensure strict client verification, but meant that, with applications using a single external cache for quite different requirements, clients could circumvent ciphersuite restrictions for a given session ID context by starting a session in a different context. [Bodo Moeller] *) Include "!eNULL" in SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST to make sure that a ciphersuite string such as "DEFAULT:RSA" cannot enable authentication-only ciphersuites. [Bodo Moeller] *) Update the SSL_get_shared_ciphers() fix CVE-2006-3738 which was not complete and could lead to a possible single byte overflow (CVE-2007-5135) [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.8d and 0.9.8e [23 Feb 2007] *) Since AES128 and AES256 (and similarly Camellia128 and Camellia256) share a single mask bit in the logic of ssl/ssl_ciph.c, the code for masking out disabled ciphers needs a kludge to work properly if AES128 is available and AES256 isn't (or if Camellia128 is available and Camellia256 isn't). [Victor Duchovni] *) Fix the BIT STRING encoding generated by crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c (within i2d_ECPrivateKey, i2d_ECPKParameters, i2d_ECParameters): When a point or a seed is encoded in a BIT STRING, we need to prevent the removal of trailing zero bits to get the proper DER encoding. (By default, crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c assumes the case of a NamedBitList, for which trailing 0 bits need to be removed.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Have SSL/TLS server implementation tolerate "mismatched" record protocol version while receiving ClientHello even if the ClientHello is fragmented. (The server can't insist on the particular protocol version it has chosen before the ServerHello message has informed the client about his choice.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add RFC 3779 support. [Rob Austein for ARIN, Ben Laurie] *) Load error codes if they are not already present instead of using a static variable. This allows them to be cleanly unloaded and reloaded. Improve header file function name parsing. [Steve Henson] *) extend SMTP and IMAP protocol emulation in s_client to use EHLO or CAPABILITY handshake as required by RFCs. [Goetz Babin-Ebell] Changes between 0.9.8c and 0.9.8d [28 Sep 2006] *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940) [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson] *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function. (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] *) Since 0.9.8b, ciphersuite strings naming explicit ciphersuites match only those. Before that, "AES256-SHA" would be interpreted as a pattern and match "AES128-SHA" too (since AES128-SHA got the same strength classification in 0.9.7h) as we currently only have a single AES bit in the ciphersuite description bitmap. That change, however, also applied to ciphersuite strings such as "RC4-MD5" that intentionally matched multiple ciphersuites -- namely, SSL 2.0 ciphersuites in addition to the more common ones from SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0. So we change the selection algorithm again: Naming an explicit ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite, and any other similar ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions. Thus, "RC4-MD5" again will properly select both the SSL 2.0 ciphersuite and the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite. Since SSL 2.0 does not have any ciphersuites for which the 128/256 bit distinction would be relevant, this works for now. The proper fix will be to use different bits for AES128 and AES256, which would have avoided the problems from the beginning; however, bits are scarce, so we can only do this in a new release (not just a patchlevel) when we can change the SSL_CIPHER definition to split the single 'unsigned long mask' bitmap into multiple values to extend the available space. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.8b and 0.9.8c [05 Sep 2006] *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team] *) Add AES IGE and biIGE modes. [Ben Laurie] *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when possible instead of select(), since the latter has some undesirable limitations. [Darryl Miles via Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller] *) Disable "ECCdraft" ciphersuites more thoroughly. Now special treatment in ssl/ssl_ciph.s makes sure that these ciphersuites cannot be implicitly activated as part of, e.g., the "AES" alias. However, please upgrade to OpenSSL 0.9.9[-dev] for non-experimental use of the ECC ciphersuites to get TLS extension support, which is required for curve and point format negotiation to avoid potential handshake problems. [Bodo Moeller] *) Disable rogue ciphersuites: - SSLv2 0x08 0x00 0x80 ("RC4-64-MD5") - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x61 ("EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5") - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x60 ("EXP1024-RC4-MD5") The latter two were purportedly from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-0[01].txt, but do not really appear there. Also deactivate the remaining ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt. These are just as unofficial, and the ID has long expired. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occured on dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add the symmetric cipher Camellia (128-bit, 192-bit, 256-bit key versions), which is now available for royalty-free use (see http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/info/chiteki.html). Also, add Camellia TLS ciphersuites from RFC 4132. To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8 series, Camellia remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL is configured with 'enable-camellia'. [NTT] *) Disable the padding bug check when compression is in use. The padding bug check assumes the first packet is of even length, this is not necessarily true if compresssion is enabled and can result in false positives causing handshake failure. The actual bug test is ancient code so it is hoped that implementations will either have fixed it by now or any which still have the bug do not support compression. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8a and 0.9.8b [04 May 2006] *) When applying a cipher rule check to see if string match is an explicit cipher suite and only match that one cipher suite if it is. [Steve Henson] *) Link in manifests for VC++ if needed. [Austin Ziegler ] *) Update support for ECC-based TLS ciphersuites according to draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt with proposed changes (but without TLS extensions, which are supported starting with the 0.9.9 branch, not in the OpenSSL 0.9.8 branch). [Douglas Stebila] *) New functions EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free() to support opaque EVP_CIPHER_CTX handling. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes and enhancements to zlib compression code. We now only use "zlib1.dll" and use the default __cdecl calling convention on Win32 to conform with the standards mentioned here: http://www.zlib.net/DLL_FAQ.txt Static zlib linking now works on Windows and the new --with-zlib-include --with-zlib-lib options to Configure can be used to supply the location of the headers and library. Gracefully handle case where zlib library can't be loaded. [Steve Henson] *) Several fixes and enhancements to the OID generation code. The old code sometimes allowed invalid OIDs (1.X for X >= 40 for example), couldn't handle numbers larger than ULONG_MAX, truncated printing and had a non standard OBJ_obj2txt() behaviour. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for building of engines under engine/ as shared libraries under VC++ build system. [Steve Henson] *) Corrected the numerous bugs in the Win32 path splitter in DSO. Hopefully, we will not see any false combination of paths any more. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.8 and 0.9.8a [11 Oct 2005] *) Remove the functionality of SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING (part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad idea. (CVE-2005-2969) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology [AIST], Japan)] *) Add two function to clear and return the verify parameter flags. [Steve Henson] *) Keep cipherlists sorted in the source instead of sorting them at runtime, thus removing the need for a lock. [Nils Larsch] *) Avoid some small subgroup attacks in Diffie-Hellman. [Nick Mathewson and Ben Laurie] *) Add functions for well-known primes. [Nick Mathewson] *) Extended Windows CE support. [Satoshi Nakamura and Andy Polyakov] *) Initialize SSL_METHOD structures at compile time instead of during runtime, thus removing the need for a lock. [Steve Henson] *) Make PKCS7_decrypt() work even if no certificate is supplied by attempting to decrypt each encrypted key in turn. Add support to smime utility. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.8 [05 Jul 2005] [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.7i and later 0.9.7 patch levels were released after OpenSSL 0.9.8.] *) Add libcrypto.pc and libssl.pc for those who feel they need them. [Richard Levitte] *) Change CA.sh and CA.pl so they don't bundle the CSR and the private key into the same file any more. [Richard Levitte] *) Add initial support for Win64, both IA64 and AMD64/x64 flavors. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add -utf8 command line and config file option to 'ca'. [Stefan and Geoff Thorpe] *) Add attribute functions to EVP_PKEY structure. Modify PKCS12_create() to recognize a CSP name attribute and use it. Make -CSP option work again in pkcs12 utility. [Steve Henson] *) Add new functionality to the bn blinding code: - automatic re-creation of the BN_BLINDING parameters after a fixed number of uses (currently 32) - add new function for parameter creation - introduce flags to control the update behaviour of the BN_BLINDING parameters - hide BN_BLINDING structure Add a second BN_BLINDING slot to the RSA structure to improve performance when a single RSA object is shared among several threads. [Nils Larsch] *) Add support for DTLS. [Nagendra Modadugu and Ben Laurie] *) Add support for DER encoded private keys (SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) to SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file() and SSL_use_PrivateKey_file() [Walter Goulet] *) Remove buggy and incompletet DH cert support from ssl/ssl_rsa.c and ssl/s3_both.c [Nils Larsch] *) Use SHA-1 instead of MD5 as the default digest algorithm for the apps/openssl applications. [Nils Larsch] *) Compile clean with "-Wall -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Werror". Currently DEBUG_SAFESTACK must also be set. [Ben Laurie] *) Change ./Configure so that certain algorithms can be disabled by default. The new counterpiece to "no-xxx" is "enable-xxx". The patented RC5 and MDC2 algorithms will now be disabled unless "enable-rc5" and "enable-mdc2", respectively, are specified. (IDEA remains enabled despite being patented. This is because IDEA is frequently required for interoperability, and there is no license fee for non-commercial use. As before, "no-idea" can be used to avoid this algorithm.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add processing of proxy certificates (see RFC 3820). This work was sponsored by KTH (The Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm) and EGEE (Enabling Grids for E-science in Europe). [Richard Levitte] *) RC4 performance overhaul on modern architectures/implementations, such as Intel P4, IA-64 and AMD64. [Andy Polyakov] *) New utility extract-section.pl. This can be used specify an alternative section number in a pod file instead of having to treat each file as a separate case in Makefile. This can be done by adding two lines to the pod file: =for comment openssl_section:XXX The blank line is mandatory. [Steve Henson] *) New arguments -certform, -keyform and -pass for s_client and s_server to allow alternative format key and certificate files and passphrase sources. [Steve Henson] *) New structure X509_VERIFY_PARAM which combines current verify parameters, update associated structures and add various utility functions. Add new policy related verify parameters, include policy checking in standard verify code. Enhance 'smime' application with extra parameters to support policy checking and print out. [Steve Henson] *) Add a new engine to support VIA PadLock ACE extensions in the VIA C3 Nehemiah processors. These extensions support AES encryption in hardware as well as RNG (though RNG support is currently disabled). [Michal Ludvig , with help from Andy Polyakov] *) Deprecate BN_[get|set]_params() functions (they were ignored internally). [Geoff Thorpe] *) New FIPS 180-2 algorithms, SHA-224/-256/-384/-512 are implemented. [Andy Polyakov and a number of other people] *) Improved PowerPC platform support. Most notably BIGNUM assembler implementation contributed by IBM. [Suresh Chari, Peter Waltenberg, Andy Polyakov] *) The new 'RSA_generate_key_ex' function now takes a BIGNUM for the public exponent rather than 'unsigned long'. There is a corresponding change to the new 'rsa_keygen' element of the RSA_METHOD structure. [Jelte Jansen, Geoff Thorpe] *) Functionality for creating the initial serial number file is now moved from CA.pl to the 'ca' utility with a new option -create_serial. (Before OpenSSL 0.9.7e, CA.pl used to initialize the serial number file to 1, which is bound to cause problems. To avoid the problems while respecting compatibility between different 0.9.7 patchlevels, 0.9.7e employed 'openssl x509 -next_serial' in CA.pl for serial number initialization. With the new release 0.9.8, we can fix the problem directly in the 'ca' utility.) [Steve Henson] *) Reduced header interdepencies by declaring more opaque objects in ossl_typ.h. As a consequence, including some headers (eg. engine.h) will give fewer recursive includes, which could break lazy source code - so this change is covered by the OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED symbol. As always, developers should define this symbol when building and using openssl to ensure they track the recommended behaviour, interfaces, [etc], but backwards-compatible behaviour prevails when this isn't defined. [Geoff Thorpe] *) New function X509_POLICY_NODE_print() which prints out policy nodes. [Steve Henson] *) Add new EVP function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key and associated functionality. This will generate a random key of the appropriate length based on the cipher context. The EVP_CIPHER can provide its own random key generation routine to support keys of a specific form. This is used in the des and 3des routines to generate a key of the correct parity. Update S/MIME code to use new functions and hence generate correct parity DES keys. Add EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY #define to return an error if the key is not valid (weak or incorrect parity). [Steve Henson] *) Add a local set of CRLs that can be used by X509_verify_cert() as well as looking them up. This is useful when the verified structure may contain CRLs, for example PKCS#7 signedData. Modify PKCS7_verify() to use any CRLs present unless the new PKCS7_NO_CRL flag is asserted. [Steve Henson] *) Extend ASN1 oid configuration module. It now additionally accepts the syntax: shortName = some long name, 1.2.3.4 [Steve Henson] *) Reimplemented the BN_CTX implementation. There is now no more static limitation on the number of variables it can handle nor the depth of the "stack" handling for BN_CTX_start()/BN_CTX_end() pairs. The stack information can now expand as required, and rather than having a single static array of bignums, BN_CTX now uses a linked-list of such arrays allowing it to expand on demand whilst maintaining the usefulness of BN_CTX's "bundling". [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add a missing BN_CTX parameter to the 'rsa_mod_exp' callback in RSA_METHOD to allow all RSA operations to function using a single BN_CTX. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Preliminary support for certificate policy evaluation and checking. This is initially intended to pass the tests outlined in "Conformance Testing of Relying Party Client Certificate Path Processing Logic" v1.07. [Steve Henson] *) bn_dup_expand() has been deprecated, it was introduced in 0.9.7 and remained unused and not that useful. A variety of other little bignum tweaks and fixes have also been made continuing on from the audit (see below). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Constify all or almost all d2i, c2i, s2i and r2i functions, along with associated ASN1, EVP and SSL functions and old ASN1 macros. [Richard Levitte] *) BN_zero() only needs to set 'top' and 'neg' to zero for correct results, and this should never fail. So the return value from the use of BN_set_word() (which can fail due to needless expansion) is now deprecated; if OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is defined, BN_zero() is a void macro. [Geoff Thorpe] *) BN_CTX_get() should return zero-valued bignums, providing the same initialised value as BN_new(). [Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf Möller] *) Support for inhibitAnyPolicy certificate extension. [Steve Henson] *) An audit of the BIGNUM code is underway, for which debugging code is enabled when BN_DEBUG is defined. This makes stricter enforcements on what is considered valid when processing BIGNUMs, and causes execution to assert() when a problem is discovered. If BN_DEBUG_RAND is defined, further steps are taken to deliberately pollute unused data in BIGNUM structures to try and expose faulty code further on. For now, openssl will (in its default mode of operation) continue to tolerate the inconsistent forms that it has tolerated in the past, but authors and packagers should consider trying openssl and their own applications when compiled with these debugging symbols defined. It will help highlight potential bugs in their own code, and will improve the test coverage for OpenSSL itself. At some point, these tighter rules will become openssl's default to improve maintainability, though the assert()s and other overheads will remain only in debugging configurations. See bn.h for more details. [Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf Möller] *) BN_CTX_init() has been deprecated, as BN_CTX is an opaque structure that can only be obtained through BN_CTX_new() (which implicitly initialises it). The presence of this function only made it possible to overwrite an existing structure (and cause memory leaks). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Because of the callback-based approach for implementing LHASH as a template type, lh_insert() adds opaque objects to hash-tables and lh_doall() or lh_doall_arg() are typically used with a destructor callback to clean up those corresponding objects before destroying the hash table (and losing the object pointers). So some over-zealous constifications in LHASH have been relaxed so that lh_insert() does not take (nor store) the objects as "const" and the lh_doall[_arg] callback wrappers are not prototyped to have "const" restrictions on the object pointers they are given (and so aren't required to cast them away any more). [Geoff Thorpe] *) The tmdiff.h API was so ugly and minimal that our own timing utility (speed) prefers to use its own implementation. The two implementations haven't been consolidated as yet (volunteers?) but the tmdiff API has had its object type properly exposed (MS_TM) instead of casting to/from "char *". This may still change yet if someone realises MS_TM and "ms_time_***" aren't necessarily the greatest nomenclatures - but this is what was used internally to the implementation so I've used that for now. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Ensure that deprecated functions do not get compiled when OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is defined. Some "openssl" subcommands and a few of the self-tests were still using deprecated key-generation functions so these have been updated also. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Reorganise PKCS#7 code to separate the digest location functionality into PKCS7_find_digest(), digest addtion into PKCS7_bio_add_digest(). New function PKCS7_set_digest() to set the digest type for PKCS#7 digestedData type. Add additional code to correctly generate the digestedData type and add support for this type in PKCS7 initialization functions. [Steve Henson] *) New function PKCS7_set0_type_other() this initializes a PKCS7 structure of type "other". [Steve Henson] *) Fix prime generation loop in crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl by making sure the loop does correctly stop and breaking ("division by zero") modulus operations are not performed. The (pre-generated) prime table crypto/bn/bn_prime.h was already correct, but it could not be re-generated on some platforms because of the "division by zero" situation in the script. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Update support for ECC-based TLS ciphersuites according to draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt: the KDF1 key derivation function with SHA-1 now is only used for "small" curves (where the representation of a field element takes up to 24 bytes); for larger curves, the field element resulting from ECDH is directly used as premaster secret. [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add code for kP+lQ timings to crypto/ec/ectest.c, and add SEC2 curve secp160r1 to the tests. [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add the possibility to load symbols globally with DSO. [Götz Babin-Ebell via Richard Levitte] *) Add the functions ERR_set_mark() and ERR_pop_to_mark() for better control of the error stack. [Richard Levitte] *) Add support for STORE in ENGINE. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the STORE type. The intention is to provide a common interface to certificate and key stores, be they simple file-based stores, or HSM-type store, or LDAP stores, or... NOTE: The code is currently UNTESTED and isn't really used anywhere. [Richard Levitte] *) Add a generic structure called OPENSSL_ITEM. This can be used to pass a list of arguments to any function as well as provide a way for a function to pass data back to the caller. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the functions BUF_strndup() and BUF_memdup(). BUF_strndup() works like BUF_strdup() but can be used to duplicate a portion of a string. The copy gets NUL-terminated. BUF_memdup() duplicates a memory area. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the function sk_find_ex() which works like sk_find(), but will return an index to an element even if an exact match couldn't be found. The index is guaranteed to point at the element where the searched-for key would be inserted to preserve sorting order. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the function OBJ_bsearch_ex() which works like OBJ_bsearch() but takes an extra flags argument for optional functionality. Currently, the following flags are defined: OBJ_BSEARCH_VALUE_ON_NOMATCH This one gets OBJ_bsearch_ex() to return a pointer to the first element where the comparing function returns a negative or zero number. OBJ_BSEARCH_FIRST_VALUE_ON_MATCH This one gets OBJ_bsearch_ex() to return a pointer to the first element where the comparing function returns zero. This is useful if there are more than one element where the comparing function returns zero. [Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to create self-signed certificates with 'openssl ca' in such a way that the self-signed certificate becomes part of the CA database and uses the same mechanisms for serial number generation as all other certificate signing. The new flag '-selfsign' enables this functionality. Adapt CA.sh and CA.pl.in. [Richard Levitte] *) Add functionality to check the public key of a certificate request against a given private. This is useful to check that a certificate request can be signed by that key (self-signing). [Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same subject in the CA index file. This is done only if the keyword 'unique_subject' is set to 'no' in the main CA section (default if 'CA_default') of the configuration file. The value is saved with the database itself in a separate index attribute file, named like the index file with '.attr' appended to the name. [Richard Levitte] *) Generate muti valued AVAs using '+' notation in config files for req and dirName. [Steve Henson] *) Support for nameConstraints certificate extension. [Steve Henson] *) Support for policyConstraints certificate extension. [Steve Henson] *) Support for policyMappings certificate extension. [Steve Henson] *) Make sure the default DSA_METHOD implementation only uses its dsa_mod_exp() and/or bn_mod_exp() handlers if they are non-NULL, and change its own handlers to be NULL so as to remove unnecessary indirection. This lets alternative implementations fallback to the default implementation more easily. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Support for directoryName in GeneralName related extensions in config files. [Steve Henson] *) Make it possible to link applications using Makefile.shared. Make that possible even when linking against static libraries! [Richard Levitte] *) Support for single pass processing for S/MIME signing. This now means that S/MIME signing can be done from a pipe, in addition cleartext signing (multipart/signed type) is effectively streaming and the signed data does not need to be all held in memory. This is done with a new flag PKCS7_STREAM. When this flag is set PKCS7_sign() only initializes the PKCS7 structure and the actual signing is done after the data is output (and digests calculated) in SMIME_write_PKCS7(). [Steve Henson] *) Add full support for -rpath/-R, both in shared libraries and applications, at least on the platforms where it's known how to do it. [Richard Levitte] *) In crypto/ec/ec_mult.c, implement fast point multiplication with precomputation, based on wNAF splitting: EC_GROUP_precompute_mult() will now compute a table of multiples of the generator that makes subsequent invocations of EC_POINTs_mul() or EC_POINT_mul() faster (notably in the case of a single point multiplication, scalar * generator). [Nils Larsch, Bodo Moeller] *) IPv6 support for certificate extensions. The various extensions which use the IP:a.b.c.d can now take IPv6 addresses using the formats of RFC1884 2.2 . IPv6 addresses are now also displayed correctly. [Steve Henson] *) Added an ENGINE that implements RSA by performing private key exponentiations with the GMP library. The conversions to and from GMP's mpz_t format aren't optimised nor are any montgomery forms cached, and on x86 it appears OpenSSL's own performance has caught up. However there are likely to be other architectures where GMP could provide a boost. This ENGINE is not built in by default, but it can be specified at Configure time and should be accompanied by the necessary linker additions, eg; ./config -DOPENSSL_USE_GMP -lgmp [Geoff Thorpe] *) "openssl engine" will not display ENGINE/DSO load failure errors when testing availability of engines with "-t" - the old behaviour is produced by increasing the feature's verbosity with "-tt". [Geoff Thorpe] *) ECDSA routines: under certain error conditions uninitialized BN objects could be freed. Solution: make sure initialization is performed early enough. (Reported and fix supplied by Nils Larsch via PR#459) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Key-generation can now be implemented in RSA_METHOD, DSA_METHOD and DH_METHOD (eg. by ENGINE implementations) to override the normal software implementations. For DSA and DH, parameter generation can also be overriden by providing the appropriate method callbacks. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Change the "progress" mechanism used in key-generation and primality testing to functions that take a new BN_GENCB pointer in place of callback/argument pairs. The new API functions have "_ex" postfixes and the older functions are reimplemented as wrappers for the new ones. The OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED symbol can be used to hide declarations of the old functions to help (graceful) attempts to migrate to the new functions. Also, the new key-generation API functions operate on a caller-supplied key-structure and return success/failure rather than returning a key or NULL - this is to help make "keygen" another member function of RSA_METHOD etc. Example for using the new callback interface: int (*my_callback)(int a, int b, BN_GENCB *cb) = ...; void *my_arg = ...; BN_GENCB my_cb; BN_GENCB_set(&my_cb, my_callback, my_arg); return BN_is_prime_ex(some_bignum, BN_prime_checks, NULL, &cb); /* For the meaning of a, b in calls to my_callback(), see the * documentation of the function that calls the callback. * cb will point to my_cb; my_arg can be retrieved as cb->arg. * my_callback should return 1 if it wants BN_is_prime_ex() * to continue, or 0 to stop. */ [Geoff Thorpe] *) Change the ZLIB compression method to be stateful, and make it available to TLS with the number defined in draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the ASN.1 structures and functions for CertificatePair, which is defined as follows (according to X.509_4thEditionDraftV6.pdf): CertificatePair ::= SEQUENCE { forward [0] Certificate OPTIONAL, reverse [1] Certificate OPTIONAL, -- at least one of the pair shall be present -- } Also implement the PEM functions to read and write certificate pairs, and defined the PEM tag as "CERTIFICATE PAIR". This needed to be defined, mostly for the sake of the LDAP attribute crossCertificatePair, but may prove useful elsewhere as well. [Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to inhibit symlinking of shared libraries in Makefile.shared, for Cygwin's sake. [Richard Levitte] *) Extend the BIGNUM API by creating a function void BN_set_negative(BIGNUM *a, int neg); and a macro that behave like int BN_is_negative(const BIGNUM *a); to avoid the need to access 'a->neg' directly in applications. [Nils Larsch] *) Implement fast modular reduction for pseudo-Mersenne primes used in NIST curves (crypto/bn/bn_nist.c, crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c). EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() will now automatically use this if applicable. [Nils Larsch ] *) Add new lock type (CRYPTO_LOCK_BN). [Bodo Moeller] *) Change the ENGINE framework to automatically load engines dynamically from specific directories unless they could be found to already be built in or loaded. Move all the current engines except for the cryptodev one to a new directory engines/. The engines in engines/ are built as shared libraries if the "shared" options was given to ./Configure or ./config. Otherwise, they are inserted in libcrypto.a. /usr/local/ssl/engines is the default directory for dynamic engines, but that can be overriden at configure time through the usual use of --prefix and/or --openssldir, and at run time with the environment variable OPENSSL_ENGINES. [Geoff Thorpe and Richard Levitte] *) Add Makefile.shared, a helper makefile to build shared libraries. Addapt Makefile.org. [Richard Levitte] *) Add version info to Win32 DLLs. [Peter 'Luna' Runestig" ] *) Add new 'medium level' PKCS#12 API. Certificates and keys can be added using this API to created arbitrary PKCS#12 files while avoiding the low level API. New options to PKCS12_create(), key or cert can be NULL and will then be omitted from the output file. The encryption algorithm NIDs can be set to -1 for no encryption, the mac iteration count can be set to 0 to omit the mac. Enhance pkcs12 utility by making the -nokeys and -nocerts options work when creating a PKCS#12 file. New option -nomac to omit the mac, NONE can be set for an encryption algorithm. New code is modified to use the enhanced PKCS12_create() instead of the low level API. [Steve Henson] *) Extend ASN1 encoder to support indefinite length constructed encoding. This can output sequences tags and octet strings in this form. Modify pk7_asn1.c to support indefinite length encoding. This is experimental and needs additional code to be useful, such as an ASN1 bio and some enhanced streaming PKCS#7 code. Extend template encode functionality so that tagging is passed down to the template encoder. [Steve Henson] *) Let 'openssl req' fail if an argument to '-newkey' is not recognized instead of using RSA as a default. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add support for ECC-based ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt. As these are not official, they are not included in "ALL"; the "ECCdraft" ciphersuite group alias can be used to select them. [Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add ECDH engine support. [Nils Gura and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add ECDH in new directory crypto/ecdh/. [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Let BN_rand_range() abort with an error after 100 iterations without success (which indicates a broken PRNG). [Bodo Moeller] *) Change BN_mod_sqrt() so that it verifies that the input value is really the square of the return value. (Previously, BN_mod_sqrt would show GIGO behaviour.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add named elliptic curves over binary fields from X9.62, SECG, and WAP/WTLS; add OIDs that were still missing. [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Extend the EC library for elliptic curves over binary fields (new files ec2_smpl.c, ec2_smpt.c, ec2_mult.c in crypto/ec/). New EC_METHOD: EC_GF2m_simple_method New API functions: EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m Point compression for binary fields is disabled by default for patent reasons (compile with OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP defined to enable it). As binary polynomials are represented as BIGNUMs, various members of the EC_GROUP and EC_POINT data structures can be shared between the implementations for prime fields and binary fields; the above ..._GF2m functions (except for EX_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m) are essentially identical to their ..._GFp counterparts. (For simplicity, the '..._GFp' prefix has been dropped from various internal method names.) An internal 'field_div' method (similar to 'field_mul' and 'field_sqr') has been added; this is used only for binary fields. [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Optionally dispatch EC_POINT_mul(), EC_POINT_precompute_mult() through methods ('mul', 'precompute_mult'). The generic implementations (now internally called 'ec_wNAF_mul' and 'ec_wNAF_precomputed_mult') remain the default if these methods are undefined. [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) New function EC_GROUP_get_degree, which is defined through EC_METHOD. For curves over prime fields, this returns the bit length of the modulus. [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) New functions EC_GROUP_dup, EC_POINT_dup. (These simply call ..._new and ..._copy). [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add binary polynomial arithmetic software in crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c. Polynomials are represented as BIGNUMs (where the sign bit is not used) in the following functions [macros]: BN_GF2m_add BN_GF2m_sub [= BN_GF2m_add] BN_GF2m_mod [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_mul [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_sqr [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_inv BN_GF2m_mod_exp [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr] BN_GF2m_cmp [= BN_ucmp] (Note that only the 'mod' functions are actually for fields GF(2^m). BN_GF2m_add() is misnomer, but this is for the sake of consistency.) For some functions, an the irreducible polynomial defining a field can be given as an 'unsigned int[]' with strictly decreasing elements giving the indices of those bits that are set; i.e., p[] represents the polynomial f(t) = t^p[0] + t^p[1] + ... + t^p[k] where p[0] > p[1] > ... > p[k] = 0. This applies to the following functions: BN_GF2m_mod_arr BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr BN_GF2m_mod_inv_arr [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_inv] BN_GF2m_mod_div_arr [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_div] BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr BN_GF2m_poly2arr BN_GF2m_arr2poly Conversion can be performed by the following functions: BN_GF2m_poly2arr BN_GF2m_arr2poly bntest.c has additional tests for binary polynomial arithmetic. Two implementations for BN_GF2m_mod_div() are available. The default algorithm simply uses BN_GF2m_mod_inv() and BN_GF2m_mod_mul(). The alternative algorithm is compiled in only if OPENSSL_SUN_GF2M_DIV is defined (patent pending; read the copyright notice in crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c before enabling it). [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add new error code 'ERR_R_DISABLED' that can be used when some functionality is disabled at compile-time. [Douglas Stebila ] *) Change default behaviour of 'openssl asn1parse' so that more information is visible when viewing, e.g., a certificate: Modify asn1_parse2 (crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c) so that in non-'dump' mode the content of non-printable OCTET STRINGs is output in a style similar to INTEGERs, but with '[HEX DUMP]' prepended to avoid the appearance of a printable string. [Nils Larsch ] *) Add 'asn1_flag' and 'asn1_form' member to EC_GROUP with access functions EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag() EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag() EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form() EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form() These control ASN1 encoding details: - Curves (i.e., groups) are encoded explicitly unless asn1_flag has been set to OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE. - Points are encoded in uncompressed form by default; options for asn1_for are as for point2oct, namely POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID Also add 'seed' and 'seed_len' members to EC_GROUP with access functions EC_GROUP_set_seed() EC_GROUP_get0_seed() EC_GROUP_get_seed_len() This is used only for ASN1 purposes (so far). [Nils Larsch ] *) Add 'field_type' member to EC_METHOD, which holds the NID of the appropriate field type OID. The new function EC_METHOD_get_field_type() returns this value. [Nils Larsch ] *) Add functions EC_POINT_point2bn() EC_POINT_bn2point() EC_POINT_point2hex() EC_POINT_hex2point() providing useful interfaces to EC_POINT_point2oct() and EC_POINT_oct2point(). [Nils Larsch ] *) Change internals of the EC library so that the functions EC_GROUP_set_generator() EC_GROUP_get_generator() EC_GROUP_get_order() EC_GROUP_get_cofactor() are implemented directly in crypto/ec/ec_lib.c and not dispatched to methods, which would lead to unnecessary code duplication when adding different types of curves. [Nils Larsch with input by Bodo Moeller] *) Implement compute_wNAF (crypto/ec/ec_mult.c) without BIGNUM arithmetic, and such that modified wNAFs are generated (which avoid length expansion in many cases). [Bodo Moeller] *) Add a function EC_GROUP_check_discriminant() (defined via EC_METHOD) that verifies that the curve discriminant is non-zero. Add a function EC_GROUP_check() that makes some sanity tests on a EC_GROUP, its generator and order. This includes EC_GROUP_check_discriminant(). [Nils Larsch ] *) Add ECDSA in new directory crypto/ecdsa/. Add applications 'openssl ecparam' and 'openssl ecdsa' (these are based on 'openssl dsaparam' and 'openssl dsa'). ECDSA support is also included in various other files across the library. Most notably, - 'openssl req' now has a '-newkey ecdsa:file' option; - EVP_PKCS82PKEY (crypto/evp/evp_pkey.c) now can handle ECDSA; - X509_PUBKEY_get (crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c) and d2i_PublicKey (crypto/asn1/d2i_pu.c) have been modified to make them suitable for ECDSA where domain parameters must be extracted before the specific public key; - ECDSA engine support has been added. [Nils Larsch ] *) Include some named elliptic curves, and add OIDs from X9.62, SECG, and WAP/WTLS. Each curve can be obtained from the new function EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(), and the list of available named curves can be obtained with EC_get_builtin_curves(). Also add a 'curve_name' member to EC_GROUP objects, which can be accessed via EC_GROUP_set_curve_name() EC_GROUP_get_curve_name() [Nils Larsch ] *) Include "!eNULL" in SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST to make sure that a ciphersuite string such as "DEFAULT:RSA" cannot enable authentication-only ciphersuites. [Bodo Moeller] *) Since AES128 and AES256 share a single mask bit in the logic of ssl/ssl_ciph.c, the code for masking out disabled ciphers needs a kludge to work properly if AES128 is available and AES256 isn't. [Victor Duchovni] *) Expand security boundary to match 1.1.1 module. [Steve Henson] *) Remove redundant features: hash file source, editing of test vectors modify fipsld to use external fips_premain.c signature. [Steve Henson] *) New perl script mkfipsscr.pl to create shell scripts or batch files to run algorithm test programs. [Steve Henson] *) Make algorithm test programs more tolerant of whitespace. [Steve Henson] *) Have SSL/TLS server implementation tolerate "mismatched" record protocol version while receiving ClientHello even if the ClientHello is fragmented. (The server can't insist on the particular protocol version it has chosen before the ServerHello message has informed the client about his choice.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Load error codes if they are not already present instead of using a static variable. This allows them to be cleanly unloaded and reloaded. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7k and 0.9.7l [28 Sep 2006] *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940) [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson] *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function. (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] *) Change ciphersuite string processing so that an explicit ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite (so that "AES256-SHA" will no longer include "AES128-SHA"), and any other similar ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions (so that "RC4-MD5" will still include both the SSL 2.0 ciphersuite and the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite). This is a backport combining changes from 0.9.8b and 0.9.8d. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.7j and 0.9.7k [05 Sep 2006] *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team] *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when possible instead of select(), since the latter has some undesirable limitations. [Darryl Miles via Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller] *) Disable rogue ciphersuites: - SSLv2 0x08 0x00 0x80 ("RC4-64-MD5") - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x61 ("EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5") - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x60 ("EXP1024-RC4-MD5") The latter two were purportedly from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-0[01].txt, but do not really appear there. Also deactive the remaining ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt. These are just as unofficial, and the ID has long expired. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occured on dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.7i and 0.9.7j [04 May 2006] *) Adapt fipsld and the build system to link against the validated FIPS module in FIPS mode. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes for VC++ 2005 build under Windows. [Steve Henson] *) Add new Windows build target VC-32-GMAKE for VC++. This uses GNU make from a Windows bash shell such as MSYS. It is autodetected from the "config" script when run from a VC++ environment. Modify standard VC++ build to use fipscanister.o from the GNU make build. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.7i [14 Oct 2005] *) Wrapped the definition of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE in a #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS. The value now differs depending on if you build for FIPS or not. BEWARE! A program linked with a shared FIPSed libcrypto can't be safely run with a non-FIPSed libcrypto, as it may crash because of the difference induced by this change. [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 0.9.7g and 0.9.7h [11 Oct 2005] *) Remove the functionality of SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING (part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad idea. (CVE-2005-2969) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology [AIST], Japan)] *) Minimal support for X9.31 signatures and PSS padding modes. This is mainly for FIPS compliance and not fully integrated at this stage. [Steve Henson] *) For DSA signing, unless DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is set, perform the exponentiation using a fixed-length exponent. (Otherwise, the information leaked through timing could expose the secret key after many signatures; cf. Bleichenbacher's attack on DSA with biased k.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Make a new fixed-window mod_exp implementation the default for RSA, DSA, and DH private-key operations so that the sequence of squares and multiplies and the memory access pattern are independent of the particular secret key. This will mitigate cache-timing and potential related attacks. BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime() is the new exponentiation implementation, and this is automatically used by BN_mod_exp_mont() if the new flag BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME is set for the exponent. RSA, DSA, and DH will use this BN flag for private exponents unless the flag RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, or DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, respectively, is set. [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp), with some changes by Bodo Moeller] *) Change the client implementation for SSLv23_method() and SSLv23_client_method() so that is uses the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 Client Hello message format if the SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 option is set. (Previously, the SSL 2.0 backwards compatible Client Hello message format would be used even with SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add support for smime-type MIME parameter in S/MIME messages which some clients need. [Steve Henson] *) New function BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked() to set montgomery parameters in a threadsafe manner. Modify rsa code to use new function and add calls to dsa and dh code (which had race conditions before). [Steve Henson] *) Include the fixed error library code in the C error file definitions instead of fixing them up at runtime. This keeps the error code structures constant. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7f and 0.9.7g [11 Apr 2005] [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.7h and later 0.9.7 patch levels were released after OpenSSL 0.9.8.] *) Fixes for newer kerberos headers. NB: the casts are needed because the 'length' field is signed on one version and unsigned on another with no (?) obvious way to tell the difference, without these VC++ complains. Also the "definition" of FAR (blank) is no longer included nor is the error ENOMEM. KRB5_PRIVATE has to be set to 1 to pick up some needed definitions. [Steve Henson] *) Undo Cygwin change. [Ulf Möller] *) Added support for proxy certificates according to RFC 3820. Because they may be a security thread to unaware applications, they must be explicitely allowed in run-time. See docs/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt for further information. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.7e and 0.9.7f [22 Mar 2005] *) Use (SSL_RANDOM_VALUE - 4) bytes of pseudo random data when generating server and client random values. Previously (SSL_RANDOM_VALUE - sizeof(time_t)) would be used which would result in less random data when sizeof(time_t) > 4 (some 64 bit platforms). This change has negligible security impact because: 1. Server and client random values still have 24 bytes of pseudo random data. 2. Server and client random values are sent in the clear in the initial handshake. 3. The master secret is derived using the premaster secret (48 bytes in size for static RSA ciphersuites) as well as client server and random values. The OpenSSL team would like to thank the UK NISCC for bringing this issue to our attention. [Stephen Henson, reported by UK NISCC] *) Use Windows randomness collection on Cygwin. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix hang in EGD/PRNGD query when communication socket is closed prematurely by EGD/PRNGD. [Darren Tucker via Lutz Jänicke, resolves #1014] *) Prompt for pass phrases when appropriate for PKCS12 input format. [Steve Henson] *) Back-port of selected performance improvements from development branch, as well as improved support for PowerPC platforms. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add lots of checks for memory allocation failure, error codes to indicate failure and freeing up memory if a failure occurs. [Nauticus Networks SSL Team , Steve Henson] *) Add new -passin argument to dgst. [Steve Henson] *) Perform some character comparisons of different types in X509_NAME_cmp: this is needed for some certificates that reencode DNs into UTF8Strings (in violation of RFC3280) and can't or wont issue name rollover certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Make an explicit check during certificate validation to see that the CA setting in each certificate on the chain is correct. As a side effect always do the following basic checks on extensions, not just when there's an associated purpose to the check: - if there is an unhandled critical extension (unless the user has chosen to ignore this fault) - if the path length has been exceeded (if one is set at all) - that certain extensions fit the associated purpose (if one has been given) [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.7d and 0.9.7e [25 Oct 2004] *) Avoid a race condition when CRLs are checked in a multi threaded environment. This would happen due to the reordering of the revoked entries during signature checking and serial number lookup. Now the encoding is cached and the serial number sort performed under a lock. Add new STACK function sk_is_sorted(). [Steve Henson] *) Add Delta CRL to the extension code. [Steve Henson] *) Various fixes to s3_pkt.c so alerts are sent properly. [David Holmes ] *) Reduce the chances of duplicate issuer name and serial numbers (in violation of RFC3280) using the OpenSSL certificate creation utilities. This is done by creating a random 64 bit value for the initial serial number when a serial number file is created or when a self signed certificate is created using 'openssl req -x509'. The initial serial number file is created using 'openssl x509 -next_serial' in CA.pl rather than being initialized to 1. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7c and 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004] *) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079) [Joe Orton, Steve Henson] *) Fix flaw in SSL/TLS handshaking when using Kerberos ciphersuites (CVE-2004-0112) [Joe Orton, Steve Henson] *) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same subject in the CA index file. This is done only if the keyword 'unique_subject' is set to 'no' in the main CA section (default if 'CA_default') of the configuration file. The value is saved with the database itself in a separate index attribute file, named like the index file with '.attr' appended to the name. [Richard Levitte] *) X509 verify fixes. Disable broken certificate workarounds when X509_V_FLAGS_X509_STRICT is set. Check CRL issuer has cRLSign set if keyUsage extension present. Don't accept CRLs with unhandled critical extensions: since verify currently doesn't process CRL extensions this rejects a CRL with *any* critical extensions. Add new verify error codes for these cases. [Steve Henson] *) When creating an OCSP nonce use an OCTET STRING inside the extnValue. A clarification of RFC2560 will require the use of OCTET STRINGs and some implementations cannot handle the current raw format. Since OpenSSL copies and compares OCSP nonces as opaque blobs without any attempt at parsing them this should not create any compatibility issues. [Steve Henson] *) New md flag EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE this allows md_data to be reused when calling EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() to avoid calling OPENSSL_malloc(). Without this HMAC (and other) operations are several times slower than OpenSSL < 0.9.7. [Steve Henson] *) Print out GeneralizedTime and UTCTime in ASN1_STRING_print_ex(). [Peter Sylvester ] *) Use the correct content when signing type "other". [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7b and 0.9.7c [30 Sep 2003] *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite: Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544). Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CVE-2003-0545). If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check certificate signature with the NULL public key. [Steve Henson] *) New -ignore_err option in ocsp application to stop the server exiting on the first error in a request. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_accept() (ssl/s3_srvr.c) only accept a client certificate if the server requested one: as stated in TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0 specifications. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_get_client_hello() (ssl/s3_srvr.c), tolerate additional extra data after the compression methods not only for TLS 1.0 but also for SSL 3.0 (as required by the specification). [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Matthias Loepfe] *) Change X509_certificate_type() to mark the key as exported/exportable when it's 512 *bits* long, not 512 bytes. [Richard Levitte] *) Change AES_cbc_encrypt() so it outputs exact multiple of blocks during encryption. [Richard Levitte] *) Various fixes to base64 BIO and non blocking I/O. On write flushes were not handled properly if the BIO retried. On read data was not being buffered properly and had various logic bugs. This also affects blocking I/O when the data being decoded is a certain size. [Steve Henson] *) Various S/MIME bugfixes and compatibility changes: output correct application/pkcs7 MIME type if PKCS7_NOOLDMIMETYPE is set. Tolerate some broken signatures. Output CR+LF for EOL if PKCS7_CRLFEOL is set (this makes opening of files as .eml work). Correctly handle very long lines in MIME parser. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7a and 0.9.7b [10 Apr 2003] *) Countermeasure against the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 padding: treat a protocol version number mismatch like a decryption error in ssl3_get_client_key_exchange (ssl/s3_srvr.c). [Bodo Moeller] *) Turn on RSA blinding by default in the default implementation to avoid a timing attack. Applications that don't want it can call RSA_blinding_off() or use the new flag RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING. They would be ill-advised to do so in most cases. [Ben Laurie, Steve Henson, Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller] *) Change RSA blinding code so that it works when the PRNG is not seeded (in this case, the secret RSA exponent is abused as an unpredictable seed -- if it is not unpredictable, there is no point in blinding anyway). Make RSA blinding thread-safe by remembering the creator's thread ID in rsa->blinding and having all other threads use local one-time blinding factors (this requires more computation than sharing rsa->blinding, but avoids excessive locking; and if an RSA object is not shared between threads, blinding will still be very fast). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fixed a typo bug that would cause ENGINE_set_default() to set an ENGINE as defaults for all supported algorithms irrespective of the 'flags' parameter. 'flags' is now honoured, so applications should make sure they are passing it correctly. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Target "mingw" now allows native Windows code to be generated in the Cygwin environment as well as with the MinGW compiler. [Ulf Moeller] Changes between 0.9.7 and 0.9.7a [19 Feb 2003] *) In ssl3_get_record (ssl/s3_pkt.c), minimize information leaked via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL), Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and Martin Vuagnoux (EPFL, Ilion)] *) Make the no-err option work as intended. The intention with no-err is not to have the whole error stack handling routines removed from libcrypto, it's only intended to remove all the function name and reason texts, thereby removing some of the footprint that may not be interesting if those errors aren't displayed anyway. NOTE: it's still possible for any application or module to have it's own set of error texts inserted. The routines are there, just not used by default when no-err is given. [Richard Levitte] *) Add support for FreeBSD on IA64. [dirk.meyer@dinoex.sub.org via Richard Levitte, resolves #454] *) Adjust DES_cbc_cksum() so it returns the same value as the MIT Kerberos function mit_des_cbc_cksum(). Before this change, the value returned by DES_cbc_cksum() was like the one from mit_des_cbc_cksum(), except the bytes were swapped. [Kevin Greaney and Richard Levitte] *) Allow an application to disable the automatic SSL chain building. Before this a rather primitive chain build was always performed in ssl3_output_cert_chain(): an application had no way to send the correct chain if the automatic operation produced an incorrect result. Now the chain builder is disabled if either: 1. Extra certificates are added via SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(). 2. The mode flag SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN is set. The reasoning behind this is that an application would not want the auto chain building to take place if extra chain certificates are present and it might also want a means of sending no additional certificates (for example the chain has two certificates and the root is omitted). [Steve Henson] *) Add the possibility to build without the ENGINE framework. [Steven Reddie via Richard Levitte] *) Under Win32 gmtime() can return NULL: check return value in OPENSSL_gmtime(). Add error code for case where gmtime() fails. [Steve Henson] *) DSA routines: under certain error conditions uninitialized BN objects could be freed. Solution: make sure initialization is performed early enough. (Reported and fix supplied by Ivan D Nestlerode , Nils Larsch via PR#459) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Another fix for SSLv2 session ID handling: the session ID was incorrectly checked on reconnect on the client side, therefore session resumption could still fail with a "ssl session id is different" error. This behaviour is masked when SSL_OP_ALL is used due to SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG being set. Behaviour observed by Crispin Flowerday as followup to PR #377. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) IA-32 assembler support enhancements: unified ELF targets, support for SCO/Caldera platforms, fix for Cygwin shared build. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add support for FreeBSD on sparc64. As a consequence, support for FreeBSD on non-x86 processors is separate from x86 processors on the config script, much like the NetBSD support. [Richard Levitte & Kris Kennaway ] Changes between 0.9.6h and 0.9.7 [31 Dec 2002] [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.6i and later 0.9.6 patch levels were released after OpenSSL 0.9.7.] *) Fix session ID handling in SSLv2 client code: the SERVER FINISHED code (06) was taken as the first octet of the session ID and the last octet was ignored consequently. As a result SSLv2 client side session caching could not have worked due to the session ID mismatch between client and server. Behaviour observed by Crispin Flowerday as PR #377. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Change the declaration of needed Kerberos libraries to use EX_LIBS instead of the special (and badly supported) LIBKRB5. LIBKRB5 is removed entirely. [Richard Levitte] *) The hw_ncipher.c engine requires dynamic locks. Unfortunately, it seems that in spite of existing for more than a year, many application author have done nothing to provide the necessary callbacks, which means that this particular engine will not work properly anywhere. This is a very unfortunate situation which forces us, in the name of usability, to give the hw_ncipher.c a static lock, which is part of libcrypto. NOTE: This is for the 0.9.7 series ONLY. This hack will never appear in 0.9.8 or later. We EXPECT application authors to have dealt properly with this when 0.9.8 is released (unless we actually make such changes in the libcrypto locking code that changes will have to be made anyway). [Richard Levitte] *) In asn1_d2i_read_bio() repeatedly call BIO_read() until all content octets have been read, EOF or an error occurs. Without this change some truncated ASN1 structures will not produce an error. [Steve Henson] *) Disable Heimdal support, since it hasn't been fully implemented. Still give the possibility to force the use of Heimdal, but with warnings and a request that patches get sent to openssl-dev. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the VC-CE target, introduce the WINCE sysname, and add INSTALL.WCE and appropriate conditionals to make it build. [Steven Reddie via Richard Levitte] *) Change the DLL names for Cygwin to cygcrypto-x.y.z.dll and cygssl-x.y.z.dll, where x, y and z are the major, minor and edit numbers of the version. [Corinna Vinschen and Richard Levitte] *) Introduce safe string copy and catenation functions (BUF_strlcpy() and BUF_strlcat()). [Ben Laurie (CHATS) and Richard Levitte] *) Avoid using fixed-size buffers for one-line DNs. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add BUF_MEM_grow_clean() to avoid information leakage when resizing buffers containing secrets, and use where appropriate. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Avoid using fixed size buffers for configuration file location. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Avoid filename truncation for various CA files. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Use sizeof in preference to magic numbers. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Avoid filename truncation in cert requests. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add assertions to check for (supposedly impossible) buffer overflows. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Don't cache truncated DNS entries in the local cache (this could potentially lead to a spoofing attack). [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Fix various buffers to be large enough for hex/decimal representations in a platform independent manner. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add CRYPTO_realloc_clean() to avoid information leakage when resizing buffers containing secrets, and use where appropriate. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add BIO_indent() to avoid much slightly worrying code to do indents. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Convert sprintf()/BIO_puts() to BIO_printf(). [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) buffer_gets() could terminate with the buffer only half full. Fixed. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add assertions to prevent user-supplied crypto functions from overflowing internal buffers by having large block sizes, etc. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) New OPENSSL_assert() macro (similar to assert(), but enabled unconditionally). [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused copy of key in RC4. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused and incorrectly sized buffers for IV in pem.h. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Fix off-by-one error in EGD path. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) If RANDFILE path is too long, ignore instead of truncating. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused and incorrectly sized X.509 structure CBCParameter. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused and dangerous function knumber(). [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused and dangerous structure, KSSL_ERR. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Protect against overlong session ID context length in an encoded session object. Since these are local, this does not appear to be exploitable. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Change from security patch (see 0.9.6e below) that did not affect the 0.9.6 release series: Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized master key in Kerberos-enabled versions. (CVE-2002-0657) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Change the SSL kerb5 codes to match RFC 2712. [Richard Levitte] *) Make -nameopt work fully for req and add -reqopt switch. [Michael Bell , Steve Henson] *) The "block size" for block ciphers in CFB and OFB mode should be 1. [Steve Henson, reported by Yngve Nysaeter Pettersen ] *) Make sure tests can be performed even if the corresponding algorithms have been removed entirely. This was also the last step to make OpenSSL compilable with DJGPP under all reasonable conditions. [Richard Levitte, Doug Kaufman ] *) Add cipher selection rules COMPLEMENTOFALL and COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT to allow version independent disabling of normally unselected ciphers, which may be activated as a side-effect of selecting a single cipher. (E.g., cipher list string "RSA" enables ciphersuites that are left out of "ALL" because they do not provide symmetric encryption. "RSA:!COMPLEMEMENTOFALL" avoids these unsafe ciphersuites.) [Lutz Jaenicke, Bodo Moeller] *) Add appropriate support for separate platform-dependent build directories. The recommended way to make a platform-dependent build directory is the following (tested on Linux), maybe with some local tweaks: # Place yourself outside of the OpenSSL source tree. In # this example, the environment variable OPENSSL_SOURCE # is assumed to contain the absolute OpenSSL source directory. mkdir -p objtree/"`uname -s`-`uname -r`-`uname -m`" cd objtree/"`uname -s`-`uname -r`-`uname -m`" (cd $OPENSSL_SOURCE; find . -type f) | while read F; do mkdir -p `dirname $F` ln -s $OPENSSL_SOURCE/$F $F done To be absolutely sure not to disturb the source tree, a "make clean" is a good thing. If it isn't successfull, don't worry about it, it probably means the source directory is very clean. [Richard Levitte] *) Make sure any ENGINE control commands make local copies of string pointers passed to them whenever necessary. Otherwise it is possible the caller may have overwritten (or deallocated) the original string data when a later ENGINE operation tries to use the stored values. [Götz Babin-Ebell ] *) Improve diagnostics in file reading and command-line digests. [Ben Laurie aided and abetted by Solar Designer ] *) Add AES modes CFB and OFB to the object database. Correct an error in AES-CFB decryption. [Richard Levitte] *) Remove most calls to EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() in evp_enc.c, this allows existing EVP_CIPHER_CTX structures to be reused after calling EVP_*Final(). This behaviour is used by encryption BIOs and some applications. This has the side effect that applications must explicitly clean up cipher contexts with EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() or they will leak memory. [Steve Henson] *) Check the values of dna and dnb in bn_mul_recursive before calling bn_mul_comba (a non zero value means the a or b arrays do not contain n2 elements) and fallback to bn_mul_normal if either is not zero. [Steve Henson] *) Fix escaping of non-ASCII characters when using the -subj option of the "openssl req" command line tool. (Robert Joop ) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Make object definitions compliant to LDAP (RFC2256): SN is the short form for "surname", serialNumber has no short form. Use "mail" as the short name for "rfc822Mailbox" according to RFC2798; therefore remove "mail" short name for "internet 7". The OID for unique identifiers in X509 certificates is x500UniqueIdentifier, not uniqueIdentifier. Some more OID additions. (Michael Bell ) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add an "init" command to the ENGINE config module and auto initialize ENGINEs. Without any "init" command the ENGINE will be initialized after all ctrl commands have been executed on it. If init=1 the ENGINE is initailized at that point (ctrls before that point are run on the uninitialized ENGINE and after on the initialized one). If init=0 then the ENGINE will not be iniatialized at all. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the 'app_verify_callback' interface so that the user-defined argument is actually passed to the callback: In the SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback() prototype, the callback declaration has been changed from int (*cb)() into int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *); in ssl_verify_cert_chain (ssl/ssl_cert.c), the call i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx) has been changed into i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg). To update applications using SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(), a dummy argument can be added to their callback functions. [D. K. Smetters ] *) Added the '4758cca' ENGINE to support IBM 4758 cards. [Maurice Gittens , touchups by Geoff Thorpe] *) Add and OPENSSL_LOAD_CONF define which will cause OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() to load the openssl.cnf config file. This allows older applications to transparently support certain OpenSSL features: such as crypto acceleration and dynamic ENGINE loading. Two new functions OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_noconf() which will never load the config file and OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_conf() which will always load it have also been added. [Steve Henson] *) Add the OFB, CFB and CTR (all with 128 bit feedback) to AES. Adjust NIDs and EVP layer. [Stephen Sprunk and Richard Levitte] *) Config modules support in openssl utility. Most commands now load modules from the config file, though in a few (such as version) this isn't done because it couldn't be used for anything. In the case of ca and req the config file used is the same as the utility itself: that is the -config command line option can be used to specify an alternative file. [Steve Henson] *) Move default behaviour from OPENSSL_config(). If appname is NULL use "openssl_conf" if filename is NULL use default openssl config file. [Steve Henson] *) Add an argument to OPENSSL_config() to allow the use of an alternative config section name. Add a new flag to tolerate a missing config file and move code to CONF_modules_load_file(). [Steve Henson] *) Support for crypto accelerator cards from Accelerated Encryption Processing, www.aep.ie. (Use engine 'aep') The support was copied from 0.9.6c [engine] and adapted/corrected to work with the new engine framework. [AEP Inc. and Richard Levitte] *) Support for SureWare crypto accelerator cards from Baltimore Technologies. (Use engine 'sureware') The support was copied from 0.9.6c [engine] and adapted to work with the new engine framework. [Richard Levitte] *) Have the CHIL engine fork-safe (as defined by nCipher) and actually make the newer ENGINE framework commands for the CHIL engine work. [Toomas Kiisk and Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to produce shared libraries on ReliantUNIX. [Robert Dahlem via Richard Levitte] *) Add the configuration target debug-linux-ppro. Make 'openssl rsa' use the general key loading routines implemented in apps.c, and make those routines able to handle the key format FORMAT_NETSCAPE and the variant FORMAT_IISSGC. [Toomas Kiisk via Richard Levitte] *) Fix a crashbug and a logic bug in hwcrhk_load_pubkey(). [Toomas Kiisk via Richard Levitte] *) Add -keyform to rsautl, and document -engine. [Richard Levitte, inspired by Toomas Kiisk ] *) Change BIO_new_file (crypto/bio/bss_file.c) to use new BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE error code rather than the generic ERR_R_SYS_LIB error code if fopen() fails with ENOENT. [Ben Laurie] *) Add new functions ERR_peek_last_error ERR_peek_last_error_line ERR_peek_last_error_line_data. These are similar to ERR_peek_error ERR_peek_error_line ERR_peek_error_line_data, but report on the latest error recorded rather than the first one still in the error queue. [Ben Laurie, Bodo Moeller] *) default_algorithms option in ENGINE config module. This allows things like: default_algorithms = ALL default_algorithms = RSA, DSA, RAND, CIPHERS, DIGESTS [Steve Henson] *) Prelminary ENGINE config module. [Steve Henson] *) New experimental application configuration code. [Steve Henson] *) Change the AES code to follow the same name structure as all other symmetric ciphers, and behave the same way. Move everything to the directory crypto/aes, thereby obsoleting crypto/rijndael. [Stephen Sprunk and Richard Levitte] *) SECURITY: remove unsafe setjmp/signal interaction from ui_openssl.c. [Ben Laurie and Theo de Raadt] *) Add option to output public keys in req command. [Massimiliano Pala madwolf@openca.org] *) Use wNAFs in EC_POINTs_mul() for improved efficiency (up to about 10% better than before for P-192 and P-224). [Bodo Moeller] *) New functions/macros SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(ctx, cb) SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(ctx, arg) SSL_set_msg_callback(ssl, cb) SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, arg) to request calling a callback function void cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg) whenever a protocol message has been completely received (write_p == 0) or sent (write_p == 1). Here 'version' is the protocol version according to which the SSL library interprets the current protocol message (SSL2_VERSION, SSL3_VERSION, or TLS1_VERSION). 'content_type' is 0 in the case of SSL 2.0, or the content type as defined in the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 protocol specification (change_cipher_spec(20), alert(21), handshake(22)). 'buf' and 'len' point to the actual message, 'ssl' to the SSL object, and 'arg' is the application-defined value set by SSL[_CTX]_set_msg_callback_arg(). 'openssl s_client' and 'openssl s_server' have new '-msg' options to enable a callback that displays all protocol messages. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change the shared library support so shared libraries are built as soon as the corresponding static library is finished, and thereby get openssl and the test programs linked against the shared library. This still only happens when the keyword "shard" has been given to the configuration scripts. NOTE: shared library support is still an experimental thing, and backward binary compatibility is still not guaranteed. ["Maciej W. Rozycki" and Richard Levitte] *) Add support for Subject Information Access extension. [Peter Sylvester ] *) Make BUF_MEM_grow() behaviour more consistent: Initialise to zero additional bytes when new memory had to be allocated, not just when reusing an existing buffer. [Bodo Moeller] *) New command line and configuration option 'utf8' for the req command. This allows field values to be specified as UTF8 strings. [Steve Henson] *) Add -multi and -mr options to "openssl speed" - giving multiple parallel runs for the former and machine-readable output for the latter. [Ben Laurie] *) Add '-noemailDN' option to 'openssl ca'. This prevents inclusion of the e-mail address in the DN (i.e., it will go into a certificate extension only). The new configuration file option 'email_in_dn = no' has the same effect. [Massimiliano Pala madwolf@openca.org] *) Change all functions with names starting with des_ to be starting with DES_ instead. Add wrappers that are compatible with libdes, but are named _ossl_old_des_*. Finally, add macros that map the des_* symbols to the corresponding _ossl_old_des_* if libdes compatibility is desired. If OpenSSL 0.9.6c compatibility is desired, the des_* symbols will be mapped to DES_*, with one exception. Since we provide two compatibility mappings, the user needs to define the macro OPENSSL_DES_LIBDES_COMPATIBILITY if libdes compatibility is desired. The default (i.e., when that macro isn't defined) is OpenSSL 0.9.6c compatibility. There are also macros that enable and disable the support of old des functions altogether. Those are OPENSSL_ENABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT and OPENSSL_DISABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT. If none or both of those are defined, the default will apply: to support the old des routines. In either case, one must include openssl/des.h to get the correct definitions. Do not try to just include openssl/des_old.h, that won't work. NOTE: This is a major break of an old API into a new one. Software authors are encouraged to switch to the DES_ style functions. Some time in the future, des_old.h and the libdes compatibility functions will be disable (i.e. OPENSSL_DISABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT will be the default), and then completely removed. [Richard Levitte] *) Test for certificates which contain unsupported critical extensions. If such a certificate is found during a verify operation it is rejected by default: this behaviour can be overridden by either handling the new error X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION or by setting the verify flag X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL. A new function X509_supported_extension() has also been added which returns 1 if a particular extension is supported. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the behaviour of EVP cipher functions in similar way to digests to retain compatibility with existing code. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the behaviour of EVP_DigestInit() and EVP_DigestFinal() to retain compatibility with existing code. In particular the 'ctx' parameter does not have to be to be initialized before the call to EVP_DigestInit() and it is tidied up after a call to EVP_DigestFinal(). New function EVP_DigestFinal_ex() which does not tidy up the ctx. Similarly function EVP_MD_CTX_copy() changed to not require the destination to be initialized valid and new function EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() added which requires the destination to be valid. Modify all the OpenSSL digest calls to use EVP_DigestInit_ex(), EVP_DigestFinal_ex() and EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(). [Steve Henson] *) Change ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) and the functions using it so that complete 'Handshake' protocol structures are kept in memory instead of overwriting 'msg_type' and 'length' with 'body' data. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add an implementation of SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack for Win32. [Massimo Santin via Richard Levitte] *) Major restructuring to the underlying ENGINE code. This includes reduction of linker bloat, separation of pure "ENGINE" manipulation (initialisation, etc) from functionality dealing with implementations of specific crypto iterfaces. This change also introduces integrated support for symmetric ciphers and digest implementations - so ENGINEs can now accelerate these by providing EVP_CIPHER and EVP_MD implementations of their own. This is detailed in crypto/engine/README as it couldn't be adequately described here. However, there are a few API changes worth noting - some RSA, DSA, DH, and RAND functions that were changed in the original introduction of ENGINE code have now reverted back - the hooking from this code to ENGINE is now a good deal more passive and at run-time, operations deal directly with RSA_METHODs, DSA_METHODs (etc) as they did before, rather than dereferencing through an ENGINE pointer any more. Also, the ENGINE functions dealing with BN_MOD_EXP[_CRT] handlers have been removed - they were not being used by the framework as there is no concept of a BIGNUM_METHOD and they could not be generalised to the new 'ENGINE_TABLE' mechanism that underlies the new code. Similarly, ENGINE_cpy() has been removed as it cannot be consistently defined in the new code. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Change ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check() to allow fractional seconds. [Steve Henson] *) Change mkdef.pl to sort symbols that get the same entry number, and make sure the automatically generated functions ERR_load_* become part of libeay.num as well. [Richard Levitte] *) New function SSL_renegotiate_pending(). This returns true once renegotiation has been requested (either SSL_renegotiate() call or HelloRequest/ClientHello receveived from the peer) and becomes false once a handshake has been completed. (For servers, SSL_renegotiate() followed by SSL_do_handshake() sends a HelloRequest, but does not ensure that a handshake takes place. SSL_renegotiate_pending() is useful for checking if the client has followed the request.) [Bodo Moeller] *) New SSL option SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION. By default, clients may request session resumption even during renegotiation (if session ID contexts permit); with this option, session resumption is possible only in the first handshake. SSL_OP_ALL is now 0x00000FFFL instead of 0x000FFFFFL. This makes more bits available for options that should not be part of SSL_OP_ALL (such as SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION). [Bodo Moeller] *) Add some demos for certificate and certificate request creation. [Steve Henson] *) Make maximum certificate chain size accepted from the peer application settable (SSL*_get/set_max_cert_list()), as proposed by "Douglas E. Engert" . [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add support for shared libraries for Unixware-7 (Boyd Lynn Gerber ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add a "destroy" handler to ENGINEs that allows structural cleanup to be done prior to destruction. Use this to unload error strings from ENGINEs that load their own error strings. NB: This adds two new API functions to "get" and "set" this destroy handler in an ENGINE. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Alter all existing ENGINE implementations (except "openssl" and "openbsd") to dynamically instantiate their own error strings. This makes them more flexible to be built both as statically-linked ENGINEs and self-contained shared-libraries loadable via the "dynamic" ENGINE. Also, add stub code to each that makes building them as self-contained shared-libraries easier (see README.ENGINE). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add a "dynamic" ENGINE that provides a mechanism for binding ENGINE implementations into applications that are completely implemented in self-contained shared-libraries. The "dynamic" ENGINE exposes control commands that can be used to configure what shared-library to load and to control aspects of the way it is handled. Also, made an update to the README.ENGINE file that brings its information up-to-date and provides some information and instructions on the "dynamic" ENGINE (ie. how to use it, how to build "dynamic"-loadable ENGINEs, etc). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Make it possible to unload ranges of ERR strings with a new "ERR_unload_strings" function. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add a copy() function to EVP_MD. [Ben Laurie] *) Make EVP_MD routines take a context pointer instead of just the md_data void pointer. [Ben Laurie] *) Add flags to EVP_MD and EVP_MD_CTX. EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT indicates that the digest can only process a single chunk of data (typically because it is provided by a piece of hardware). EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT indicates that the application is only going to provide a single chunk of data, and hence the framework needn't accumulate the data for oneshot drivers. [Ben Laurie] *) As with "ERR", make it possible to replace the underlying "ex_data" functions. This change also alters the storage and management of global ex_data state - it's now all inside ex_data.c and all "class" code (eg. RSA, BIO, SSL_CTX, etc) no longer stores its own STACKS and per-class index counters. The API functions that use this state have been changed to take a "class_index" rather than pointers to the class's local STACK and counter, and there is now an API function to dynamically create new classes. This centralisation allows us to (a) plug a lot of the thread-safety problems that existed, and (b) makes it possible to clean up all allocated state using "CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data()". W.r.t. (b) such data would previously have always leaked in application code and workarounds were in place to make the memory debugging turn a blind eye to it. Application code that doesn't use this new function will still leak as before, but their memory debugging output will announce it now rather than letting it slide. Besides the addition of CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(), another API change induced by the "ex_data" overhaul is that X509_STORE_CTX_init() now has a return value to indicate success or failure. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Make it possible to replace the underlying "ERR" functions such that the global state (2 LHASH tables and 2 locks) is only used by the "default" implementation. This change also adds two functions to "get" and "set" the implementation prior to it being automatically set the first time any other ERR function takes place. Ie. an application can call "get", pass the return value to a module it has just loaded, and that module can call its own "set" function using that value. This means the module's "ERR" operations will use (and modify) the error state in the application and not in its own statically linked copy of OpenSSL code. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Give DH, DSA, and RSA types their own "**_up_ref()" function to increment reference counts. This performs normal REF_PRINT/REF_CHECK macros on the operation, and provides a more encapsulated way for external code (crypto/evp/ and ssl/) to do this. Also changed the evp and ssl code to use these functions rather than manually incrementing the counts. Also rename "DSO_up()" function to more descriptive "DSO_up_ref()". [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add EVP test program. [Ben Laurie] *) Add symmetric cipher support to ENGINE. Expect the API to change! [Ben Laurie] *) New CRL functions: X509_CRL_set_version(), X509_CRL_set_issuer_name() X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(), X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(), X509_CRL_sort(), X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber(), and X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate(). These allow a CRL to be built without having to access X509_CRL fields directly. Modify 'ca' application to use new functions. [Steve Henson] *) Move SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG out of the SSL_OP_ALL list of recommended bug workarounds. Rollback attack detection is a security feature. The problem will only arise on OpenSSL servers when TLSv1 is not available (sslv3_server_method() or SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1). Software authors not wanting to support TLSv1 will have special reasons for their choice and can explicitly enable this option. [Bodo Moeller, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Rationalise EVP so it can be extended: don't include a union of cipher/digest structures, add init/cleanup functions for EVP_MD_CTX (similar to those existing for EVP_CIPHER_CTX). Usage example: EVP_MD_CTX md; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md); /* new function call */ EVP_DigestInit(&md, EVP_sha1()); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, in, len); EVP_DigestFinal(&md, out, NULL); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md); /* new function call */ [Ben Laurie] *) Make DES key schedule conform to the usual scheme, as well as correcting its structure. This means that calls to DES functions now have to pass a pointer to a des_key_schedule instead of a plain des_key_schedule (which was actually always a pointer anyway): E.g., des_key_schedule ks; des_set_key_checked(..., &ks); des_ncbc_encrypt(..., &ks, ...); (Note that a later change renames 'des_...' into 'DES_...'.) [Ben Laurie] *) Initial reduction of linker bloat: the use of some functions, such as PEM causes large amounts of unused functions to be linked in due to poor organisation. For example pem_all.c contains every PEM function which has a knock on effect of linking in large amounts of (unused) ASN1 code. Grouping together similar functions and splitting unrelated functions prevents this. [Steve Henson] *) Cleanup of EVP macros. [Ben Laurie] *) Change historical references to {NID,SN,LN}_des_ede and ede3 to add the correct _ecb suffix. [Ben Laurie] *) Add initial OCSP responder support to ocsp application. The revocation information is handled using the text based index use by the ca application. The responder can either handle requests generated internally, supplied in files (for example via a CGI script) or using an internal minimal server. [Steve Henson] *) Add configuration choices to get zlib compression for TLS. [Richard Levitte] *) Changes to Kerberos SSL for RFC 2712 compliance: 1. Implemented real KerberosWrapper, instead of just using KRB5 AP_REQ message. [Thanks to Simon Wilkinson ] 2. Implemented optional authenticator field of KerberosWrapper. Added openssl-style ASN.1 macros for Kerberos ticket, ap_req, and authenticator structs; see crypto/krb5/. Generalized Kerberos calls to support multiple Kerberos libraries. [Vern Staats , Jeffrey Altman via Richard Levitte] *) Cause 'openssl speed' to use fully hard-coded DSA keys as it already does with RSA. testdsa.h now has 'priv_key/pub_key' values for each of the key sizes rather than having just parameters (and 'speed' generating keys each time). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Speed up EVP routines. Before: encrypt type 8 bytes 64 bytes 256 bytes 1024 bytes 8192 bytes des-cbc 4408.85k 5560.51k 5778.46k 5862.20k 5825.16k des-cbc 4389.55k 5571.17k 5792.23k 5846.91k 5832.11k des-cbc 4394.32k 5575.92k 5807.44k 5848.37k 5841.30k decrypt des-cbc 3482.66k 5069.49k 5496.39k 5614.16k 5639.28k des-cbc 3480.74k 5068.76k 5510.34k 5609.87k 5635.52k des-cbc 3483.72k 5067.62k 5504.60k 5708.01k 5724.80k After: encrypt des-cbc 4660.16k 5650.19k 5807.19k 5827.13k 5783.32k decrypt des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k [Ben Laurie] *) Added the OS2-EMX target. ["Brian Havard" and Richard Levitte] *) Rewrite apps to use NCONF routines instead of the old CONF. New functions to support NCONF routines in extension code. New function CONF_set_nconf() to allow functions which take an NCONF to also handle the old LHASH structure: this means that the old CONF compatible routines can be retained (in particular wrt extensions) without having to duplicate the code. New function X509V3_add_ext_nconf_sk to add extensions to a stack. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance the general user interface with mechanisms for inner control and with possibilities to have yes/no kind of prompts. [Richard Levitte] *) Change all calls to low level digest routines in the library and applications to use EVP. Add missing calls to HMAC_cleanup() and don't assume HMAC_CTX can be copied using memcpy(). [Verdon Walker , Steve Henson] *) Add the possibility to control engines through control names but with arbitrary arguments instead of just a string. Change the key loaders to take a UI_METHOD instead of a callback function pointer. NOTE: this breaks binary compatibility with earlier versions of OpenSSL [engine]. Adapt the nCipher code for these new conditions and add a card insertion callback. [Richard Levitte] *) Enhance the general user interface with mechanisms to better support dialog box interfaces, application-defined prompts, the possibility to use defaults (for example default passwords from somewhere else) and interrupts/cancellations. [Richard Levitte] *) Tidy up PKCS#12 attribute handling. Add support for the CSP name attribute in PKCS#12 files, add new -CSP option to pkcs12 utility. [Steve Henson] *) Fix a memory leak in 'sk_dup()' in the case reallocation fails. (Also tidy up some unnecessarily weird code in 'sk_new()'). [Geoff, reported by Diego Tartara ] *) Change the key loading routines for ENGINEs to use the same kind callback (pem_password_cb) as all other routines that need this kind of callback. [Richard Levitte] *) Increase ENTROPY_NEEDED to 32 bytes, as Rijndael can operate with 256 bit (=32 byte) keys. Of course seeding with more entropy bytes than this minimum value is recommended. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) New random seeder for OpenVMS, using the system process statistics that are easily reachable. [Richard Levitte] *) Windows apparently can't transparently handle global variables defined in DLLs. Initialisations such as: const ASN1_ITEM *it = &ASN1_INTEGER_it; wont compile. This is used by the any applications that need to declare their own ASN1 modules. This was fixed by adding the option EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN to all Win32 platforms, although this isn't strictly needed for static libraries under Win32. [Steve Henson] *) New functions X509_PURPOSE_set() and X509_TRUST_set() to handle setting of purpose and trust fields. New X509_STORE trust and purpose functions and tidy up setting in other SSL functions. [Steve Henson] *) Add copies of X509_STORE_CTX fields and callbacks to X509_STORE structure. These are inherited by X509_STORE_CTX when it is initialised. This allows various defaults to be set in the X509_STORE structure (such as flags for CRL checking and custom purpose or trust settings) for functions which only use X509_STORE_CTX internally such as S/MIME. Modify X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit() so it only sets purposes and trust settings if they are not set in X509_STORE. This allows X509_STORE purposes and trust (in S/MIME for example) to override any set by default. Add command line options for CRL checking to smime, s_client and s_server applications. [Steve Henson] *) Initial CRL based revocation checking. If the CRL checking flag(s) are set then the CRL is looked up in the X509_STORE structure and its validity and signature checked, then if the certificate is found in the CRL the verify fails with a revoked error. Various new CRL related callbacks added to X509_STORE_CTX structure. Command line options added to 'verify' application to support this. This needs some additional work, such as being able to handle multiple CRLs with different times, extension based lookup (rather than just by subject name) and ultimately more complete V2 CRL extension handling. [Steve Henson] *) Add a general user interface API (crypto/ui/). This is designed to replace things like des_read_password and friends (backward compatibility functions using this new API are provided). The purpose is to remove prompting functions from the DES code section as well as provide for prompting through dialog boxes in a window system and the like. [Richard Levitte] *) Add "ex_data" support to ENGINE so implementations can add state at a per-structure level rather than having to store it globally. [Geoff] *) Make it possible for ENGINE structures to be copied when retrieved by ENGINE_by_id() if the ENGINE specifies a new flag: ENGINE_FLAGS_BY_ID_COPY. This causes the "original" ENGINE structure to act like a template, analogous to the RSA vs. RSA_METHOD type of separation. Because of this operational state can be localised to each ENGINE structure, despite the fact they all share the same "methods". New ENGINE structures returned in this case have no functional references and the return value is the single structural reference. This matches the single structural reference returned by ENGINE_by_id() normally, when it is incremented on the pre-existing ENGINE structure. [Geoff] *) Fix ASN1 decoder when decoding type ANY and V_ASN1_OTHER: since this needs to match any other type at all we need to manually clear the tag cache. [Steve Henson] *) Changes to the "openssl engine" utility to include; - verbosity levels ('-v', '-vv', and '-vvv') that provide information about an ENGINE's available control commands. - executing control commands from command line arguments using the '-pre' and '-post' switches. '-post' is only used if '-t' is specified and the ENGINE is successfully initialised. The syntax for the individual commands are colon-separated, for example; openssl engine chil -pre FORK_CHECK:0 -pre SO_PATH:/lib/test.so [Geoff] *) New dynamic control command support for ENGINEs. ENGINEs can now declare their own commands (numbers), names (strings), descriptions, and input types for run-time discovery by calling applications. A subset of these commands are implicitly classed as "executable" depending on their input type, and only these can be invoked through the new string-based API function ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(). (Eg. this can be based on user input, config files, etc). The distinction is that "executable" commands cannot return anything other than a boolean result and can only support numeric or string input, whereas some discoverable commands may only be for direct use through ENGINE_ctrl(), eg. supporting the exchange of binary data, function pointers, or other custom uses. The "executable" commands are to support parameterisations of ENGINE behaviour that can be unambiguously defined by ENGINEs and used consistently across any OpenSSL-based application. Commands have been added to all the existing hardware-supporting ENGINEs, noticeably "SO_PATH" to allow control over shared-library paths without source code alterations. [Geoff] *) Changed all ENGINE implementations to dynamically allocate their ENGINEs rather than declaring them statically. Apart from this being necessary with the removal of the ENGINE_FLAGS_MALLOCED distinction, this also allows the implementations to compile without using the internal engine_int.h header. [Geoff] *) Minor adjustment to "rand" code. RAND_get_rand_method() now returns a 'const' value. Any code that should be able to modify a RAND_METHOD should already have non-const pointers to it (ie. they should only modify their own ones). [Geoff] *) Made a variety of little tweaks to the ENGINE code. - "atalla" and "ubsec" string definitions were moved from header files to C code. "nuron" string definitions were placed in variables rather than hard-coded - allowing parameterisation of these values later on via ctrl() commands. - Removed unused "#if 0"'d code. - Fixed engine list iteration code so it uses ENGINE_free() to release structural references. - Constified the RAND_METHOD element of ENGINE structures. - Constified various get/set functions as appropriate and added missing functions (including a catch-all ENGINE_cpy that duplicates all ENGINE values onto a new ENGINE except reference counts/state). - Removed NULL parameter checks in get/set functions. Setting a method or function to NULL is a way of cancelling out a previously set value. Passing a NULL ENGINE parameter is just plain stupid anyway and doesn't justify the extra error symbols and code. - Deprecate the ENGINE_FLAGS_MALLOCED define and move the area for flags from engine_int.h to engine.h. - Changed prototypes for ENGINE handler functions (init(), finish(), ctrl(), key-load functions, etc) to take an (ENGINE*) parameter. [Geoff] *) Implement binary inversion algorithm for BN_mod_inverse in addition to the algorithm using long division. The binary algorithm can be used only if the modulus is odd. On 32-bit systems, it is faster only for relatively small moduli (roughly 20-30% for 128-bit moduli, roughly 5-15% for 256-bit moduli), so we use it only for moduli up to 450 bits. In 64-bit environments, the binary algorithm appears to be advantageous for much longer moduli; here we use it for moduli up to 2048 bits. [Bodo Moeller] *) Rewrite CHOICE field setting in ASN1_item_ex_d2i(). The old code could not support the combine flag in choice fields. [Steve Henson] *) Add a 'copy_extensions' option to the 'ca' utility. This copies extensions from a certificate request to the certificate. [Steve Henson] *) Allow multiple 'certopt' and 'nameopt' options to be separated by commas. Add 'namopt' and 'certopt' options to the 'ca' config file: this allows the display of the certificate about to be signed to be customised, to allow certain fields to be included or excluded and extension details. The old system didn't display multicharacter strings properly, omitted fields not in the policy and couldn't display additional details such as extensions. [Steve Henson] *) Function EC_POINTs_mul for multiple scalar multiplication of an arbitrary number of elliptic curve points \sum scalars[i]*points[i], optionally including the generator defined for the EC_GROUP: scalar*generator + \sum scalars[i]*points[i]. EC_POINT_mul is a simple wrapper function for the typical case that the point list has just one item (besides the optional generator). [Bodo Moeller] *) First EC_METHODs for curves over GF(p): EC_GFp_simple_method() uses the basic BN_mod_mul and BN_mod_sqr operations and provides various method functions that can also operate with faster implementations of modular arithmetic. EC_GFp_mont_method() reuses most functions that are part of EC_GFp_simple_method, but uses Montgomery arithmetic. [Bodo Moeller; point addition and point doubling implementation directly derived from source code provided by Lenka Fibikova ] *) Framework for elliptic curves (crypto/ec/ec.h, crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h, crypto/ec/ec_lib.c): Curves are EC_GROUP objects (with an optional group generator) based on EC_METHODs that are built into the library. Points are EC_POINT objects based on EC_GROUP objects. Most of the framework would be able to handle curves over arbitrary finite fields, but as there are no obvious types for fields other than GF(p), some functions are limited to that for now. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add the -HTTP option to s_server. It is similar to -WWW, but requires that the file contains a complete HTTP response. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the ec directory to mkdef.pl and mkfiles.pl. In mkdef.pl change the def and num file printf format specifier from "%-40sXXX" to "%-39s XXX". The latter will always guarantee a space after the field while the former will cause them to run together if the field is 40 of more characters long. [Steve Henson] *) Constify the cipher and digest 'method' functions and structures and modify related functions to take constant EVP_MD and EVP_CIPHER pointers. [Steve Henson] *) Hide BN_CTX structure details in bn_lcl.h instead of publishing them in . Also further increase BN_CTX_NUM to 32. [Bodo Moeller] *) Modify EVP_Digest*() routines so they now return values. Although the internal software routines can never fail additional hardware versions might. [Steve Henson] *) Clean up crypto/err/err.h and change some error codes to avoid conflicts: Previously ERR_R_FATAL was too small and coincided with ERR_LIB_PKCS7 (= ERR_R_PKCS7_LIB); it is now 64 instead of 32. ASN1 error codes ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR ... ERR_R_MISSING_ASN1_EOS were 4 .. 9, conflicting with ERR_LIB_RSA (= ERR_R_RSA_LIB) ... ERR_LIB_PEM (= ERR_R_PEM_LIB). They are now 58 .. 63 (i.e., just below ERR_R_FATAL). Add new error code 'ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR'. [Bodo Moeller] *) Don't overuse locks in crypto/err/err.c: For data retrieval, CRYPTO_r_lock suffices. [Bodo Moeller] *) New option '-subj arg' for 'openssl req' and 'openssl ca'. This sets the subject name for a new request or supersedes the subject name in a given request. Formats that can be parsed are 'CN=Some Name, OU=myOU, C=IT' and 'CN=Some Name/OU=myOU/C=IT'. Add options '-batch' and '-verbose' to 'openssl req'. [Massimiliano Pala ] *) Introduce the possibility to access global variables through functions on platform were that's the best way to handle exporting global variables in shared libraries. To enable this functionality, one must configure with "EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN" or defined the C macro "OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION" in crypto/opensslconf.h (the latter is normally done by Configure or something similar). To implement a global variable, use the macro OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL in the source file (foo.c) like this: OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(int,foo)=1; OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(double,bar); To declare a global variable, use the macros OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL and OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF in the header file (foo.h) like this: OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(int,foo); #define foo OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(foo) OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(double,bar); #define bar OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(bar) The #defines are very important, and therefore so is including the header file everywhere where the defined globals are used. The macro OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION also affects the definition of ASN.1 items, but that structure is a bit different. The largest change is in util/mkdef.pl which has been enhanced with better and easier to understand logic to choose which symbols should go into the Windows .def files as well as a number of fixes and code cleanup (among others, algorithm keywords are now sorted lexicographically to avoid constant rewrites). [Richard Levitte] *) In BN_div() keep a copy of the sign of 'num' before writing the result to 'rm' because if rm==num the value will be overwritten and produce the wrong result if 'num' is negative: this caused problems with BN_mod() and BN_nnmod(). [Steve Henson] *) Function OCSP_request_verify(). This checks the signature on an OCSP request and verifies the signer certificate. The signer certificate is just checked for a generic purpose and OCSP request trust settings. [Steve Henson] *) Add OCSP_check_validity() function to check the validity of OCSP responses. OCSP responses are prepared in real time and may only be a few seconds old. Simply checking that the current time lies between thisUpdate and nextUpdate max reject otherwise valid responses caused by either OCSP responder or client clock inaccuracy. Instead we allow thisUpdate and nextUpdate to fall within a certain period of the current time. The age of the response can also optionally be checked. Two new options -validity_period and -status_age added to ocsp utility. [Steve Henson] *) If signature or public key algorithm is unrecognized print out its OID rather that just UNKNOWN. [Steve Henson] *) Change OCSP_cert_to_id() to tolerate a NULL subject certificate and OCSP_cert_id_new() a NULL serialNumber. This allows a partial certificate ID to be generated from the issuer certificate alone which can then be passed to OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(). [Steve Henson] *) New compilation option ASN1_ITEM_FUNCTIONS. This causes the new ASN1 modules to export functions returning ASN1_ITEM pointers instead of the ASN1_ITEM structures themselves. This adds several new macros which allow the underlying ASN1 function/structure to be accessed transparently. As a result code should not use ASN1_ITEM references directly (such as &X509_it) but instead use the relevant macros (such as ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509)). This option is to allow use of the new ASN1 code on platforms where exporting structures is problematical (for example in shared libraries) but exporting functions returning pointers to structures is not. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for overriding the generation of SSL/TLS session IDs. These callbacks can be registered either in an SSL_CTX or per SSL. The purpose of this is to allow applications to control, if they wish, the arbitrary values chosen for use as session IDs, particularly as it can be useful for session caching in multiple-server environments. A command-line switch for testing this (and any client code that wishes to use such a feature) has been added to "s_server". [Geoff Thorpe, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Modify mkdef.pl to recognise and parse preprocessor conditionals of the form '#if defined(...) || defined(...) || ...' and '#if !defined(...) && !defined(...) && ...'. This also avoids the growing number of special cases it was previously handling. [Richard Levitte] *) Make all configuration macros available for application by making sure they are available in opensslconf.h, by giving them names starting with "OPENSSL_" to avoid conflicts with other packages and by making sure e_os2.h will cover all platform-specific cases together with opensslconf.h. Additionally, it is now possible to define configuration/platform- specific names (called "system identities"). In the C code, these are prefixed with "OPENSSL_SYSNAME_". e_os2.h will create another macro with the name beginning with "OPENSSL_SYS_", which is determined from "OPENSSL_SYSNAME_*" or compiler-specific macros depending on what is available. [Richard Levitte] *) New option -set_serial to 'req' and 'x509' this allows the serial number to use to be specified on the command line. Previously self signed certificates were hard coded with serial number 0 and the CA options of 'x509' had to use a serial number in a file which was auto incremented. [Steve Henson] *) New options to 'ca' utility to support V2 CRL entry extensions. Currently CRL reason, invalidity date and hold instruction are supported. Add new CRL extensions to V3 code and some new objects. [Steve Henson] *) New function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding() this is used to disable standard block padding (aka PKCS#5 padding) in the EVP API, which was previously mandatory. This means that the data is not padded in any way and so the total length much be a multiple of the block size, otherwise an error occurs. [Steve Henson] *) Initial (incomplete) OCSP SSL support. [Steve Henson] *) New function OCSP_parse_url(). This splits up a URL into its host, port and path components: primarily to parse OCSP URLs. New -url option to ocsp utility. [Steve Henson] *) New nonce behavior. The return value of OCSP_check_nonce() now reflects the various checks performed. Applications can decide whether to tolerate certain situations such as an absent nonce in a response when one was present in a request: the ocsp application just prints out a warning. New function OCSP_add1_basic_nonce() this is to allow responders to include a nonce in a response even if the request is nonce-less. [Steve Henson] *) Disable stdin buffering in load_cert (apps/apps.c) so that no certs are skipped when using openssl x509 multiple times on a single input file, e.g. "(openssl x509 -out cert1; openssl x509 -out cert2) ] *) New OCSP verify flag OCSP_TRUSTOTHER. When set the "other" certificates passed by the function are trusted implicitly. If any of them signed the response then it is assumed to be valid and is not verified. [Steve Henson] *) In PKCS7_set_type() initialise content_type in PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT to data. This was previously part of the PKCS7 ASN1 code. This was causing problems with OpenSSL created PKCS#12 and PKCS#7 structures. [Steve Henson, reported by Kenneth R. Robinette ] *) Add CRYPTO_push_info() and CRYPTO_pop_info() calls to new ASN1 routines: without these tracing memory leaks is very painful. Fix leaks in PKCS12 and PKCS7 routines. [Steve Henson] *) Make X509_time_adj() cope with the new behaviour of ASN1_TIME_new(). Previously it initialised the 'type' argument to V_ASN1_UTCTIME which effectively meant GeneralizedTime would never be used. Now it is initialised to -1 but X509_time_adj() now has to check the value and use ASN1_TIME_set() if the value is not V_ASN1_UTCTIME or V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, without this it always uses GeneralizedTime. [Steve Henson, reported by Kenneth R. Robinette ] *) Fixes to BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER when bn is zero. This would previously result in a zero length in the ASN1_INTEGER structure which was not consistent with the structure when d2i_ASN1_INTEGER() was used and would cause ASN1_INTEGER_cmp() to fail. Enhance s2i_ASN1_INTEGER() to cope with hex and negative integers. Fix bug in i2a_ASN1_INTEGER() where it did not print out a minus for negative ASN1_INTEGER. [Steve Henson] *) Add summary printout to ocsp utility. The various functions which convert status values to strings have been renamed to: OCSP_response_status_str(), OCSP_cert_status_str() and OCSP_crl_reason_str() and are no longer static. New options to verify nonce values and to disable verification. OCSP response printout format cleaned up. [Steve Henson] *) Add additional OCSP certificate checks. These are those specified in RFC2560. This consists of two separate checks: the CA of the certificate being checked must either be the OCSP signer certificate or the issuer of the OCSP signer certificate. In the latter case the OCSP signer certificate must contain the OCSP signing extended key usage. This check is performed by attempting to match the OCSP signer or the OCSP signer CA to the issuerNameHash and issuerKeyHash in the OCSP_CERTID structures of the response. [Steve Henson] *) Initial OCSP certificate verification added to OCSP_basic_verify() and related routines. This uses the standard OpenSSL certificate verify routines to perform initial checks (just CA validity) and to obtain the certificate chain. Then additional checks will be performed on the chain. Currently the root CA is checked to see if it is explicitly trusted for OCSP signing. This is used to set a root CA as a global signing root: that is any certificate that chains to that CA is an acceptable OCSP signing certificate. [Steve Henson] *) New '-extfile ...' option to 'openssl ca' for reading X.509v3 extensions from a separate configuration file. As when reading extensions from the main configuration file, the '-extensions ...' option may be used for specifying the section to use. [Massimiliano Pala ] *) New OCSP utility. Allows OCSP requests to be generated or read. The request can be sent to a responder and the output parsed, outputed or printed in text form. Not complete yet: still needs to check the OCSP response validity. [Steve Henson] *) New subcommands for 'openssl ca': 'openssl ca -status ' prints the status of the cert with the given serial number (according to the index file). 'openssl ca -updatedb' updates the expiry status of certificates in the index file. [Massimiliano Pala ] *) New '-newreq-nodes' command option to CA.pl. This is like '-newreq', but calls 'openssl req' with the '-nodes' option so that the resulting key is not encrypted. [Damien Miller ] *) New configuration for the GNU Hurd. [Jonathan Bartlett via Richard Levitte] *) Initial code to implement OCSP basic response verify. This is currently incomplete. Currently just finds the signer's certificate and verifies the signature on the response. [Steve Henson] *) New SSLeay_version code SSLEAY_DIR to determine the compiled-in value of OPENSSLDIR. This is available via the new '-d' option to 'openssl version', and is also included in 'openssl version -a'. [Bodo Moeller] *) Allowing defining memory allocation callbacks that will be given file name and line number information in additional arguments (a const char* and an int). The basic functionality remains, as well as the original possibility to just replace malloc(), realloc() and free() by functions that do not know about these additional arguments. To register and find out the current settings for extended allocation functions, the following functions are provided: CRYPTO_set_mem_ex_functions CRYPTO_set_locked_mem_ex_functions CRYPTO_get_mem_ex_functions CRYPTO_get_locked_mem_ex_functions These work the same way as CRYPTO_set_mem_functions and friends. CRYPTO_get_[locked_]mem_functions now writes 0 where such an extended allocation function is enabled. Similarly, CRYPTO_get_[locked_]mem_ex_functions writes 0 where a conventional allocation function is enabled. [Richard Levitte, Bodo Moeller] *) Finish off removing the remaining LHASH function pointer casts. There should no longer be any prototype-casting required when using the LHASH abstraction, and any casts that remain are "bugs". See the callback types and macros at the head of lhash.h for details (and "OBJ_cleanup" in crypto/objects/obj_dat.c as an example). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add automatic query of EGD sockets in RAND_poll() for the unix variant. If /dev/[u]random devices are not available or do not return enough entropy, EGD style sockets (served by EGD or PRNGD) will automatically be queried. The locations /var/run/egd-pool, /dev/egd-pool, /etc/egd-pool, and /etc/entropy will be queried once each in this sequence, quering stops when enough entropy was collected without querying more sockets. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Change the Unix RAND_poll() variant to be able to poll several random devices, as specified by DEVRANDOM, until a sufficient amount of data has been collected. We spend at most 10 ms on each file (select timeout) and read in non-blocking mode. DEVRANDOM now defaults to the list "/dev/urandom", "/dev/random", "/dev/srandom" (previously it was just the string "/dev/urandom"), so on typical platforms the 10 ms delay will never occur. Also separate out the Unix variant to its own file, rand_unix.c. For VMS, there's a currently-empty rand_vms.c. [Richard Levitte] *) Move OCSP client related routines to ocsp_cl.c. These provide utility functions which an application needing to issue a request to an OCSP responder and analyse the response will typically need: as opposed to those which an OCSP responder itself would need which will be added later. OCSP_request_sign() signs an OCSP request with an API similar to PKCS7_sign(). OCSP_response_status() returns status of OCSP response. OCSP_response_get1_basic() extracts basic response from response. OCSP_resp_find_status(): finds and extracts status information from an OCSP_CERTID structure (which will be created when the request structure is built). These are built from lower level functions which work on OCSP_SINGLERESP structures but wont normally be used unless the application wishes to examine extensions in the OCSP response for example. Replace nonce routines with a pair of functions. OCSP_request_add1_nonce() adds a nonce value and optionally generates a random value. OCSP_check_nonce() checks the validity of the nonce in an OCSP response. [Steve Henson] *) Change function OCSP_request_add() to OCSP_request_add0_id(). This doesn't copy the supplied OCSP_CERTID and avoids the need to free up the newly created id. Change return type to OCSP_ONEREQ to return the internal OCSP_ONEREQ structure. This can then be used to add extensions to the request. Deleted OCSP_request_new(), since most of its functionality is now in OCSP_REQUEST_new() (and the case insensitive name clash) apart from the ability to set the request name which will be added elsewhere. [Steve Henson] *) Update OCSP API. Remove obsolete extensions argument from various functions. Extensions are now handled using the new OCSP extension code. New simple OCSP HTTP function which can be used to send requests and parse the response. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the PKCS#7 (S/MIME) code to work with new ASN1. Two new ASN1_ITEM structures help with sign and verify. PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN uses the special reorder version of SET OF to sort the attributes and reorder them to match the encoded order. This resolves a long standing problem: a verify on a PKCS7 structure just after signing it used to fail because the attribute order did not match the encoded order. PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY does not reorder the attributes: it uses the received order. This is necessary to tolerate some broken software that does not order SET OF. This is handled by encoding as a SEQUENCE OF but using implicit tagging (with UNIVERSAL class) to produce the required SET OF. [Steve Henson] *) Have mk1mf.pl generate the macros OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO and OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL and use them appropriately in the header files to get correct declarations of the ASN.1 item variables. [Richard Levitte] *) Rewrite of PKCS#12 code to use new ASN1 functionality. Replace many PKCS#12 macros with real functions. Fix two unrelated ASN1 bugs: asn1_check_tlen() would sometimes attempt to use 'ctx' when it was NULL and ASN1_TYPE was not dereferenced properly in asn1_ex_c2i(). New ASN1 macro: DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM() which just declares the relevant ASN1_ITEM and no wrapper functions. [Steve Henson] *) New functions or ASN1_item_d2i_fp() and ASN1_item_d2i_bio(). These replace the old function pointer based I/O routines. Change most of the *_d2i_bio() and *_d2i_fp() functions to use these. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance mkdef.pl to be more accepting about spacing in C preprocessor lines, recognice more "algorithms" that can be deselected, and make it complain about algorithm deselection that isn't recognised. [Richard Levitte] *) New ASN1 functions to handle dup, sign, verify, digest, pack and unpack operations in terms of ASN1_ITEM. Modify existing wrappers to use new functions. Add NO_ASN1_OLD which can be set to remove some old style ASN1 functions: this can be used to determine if old code will still work when these eventually go away. [Steve Henson] *) New extension functions for OCSP structures, these follow the same conventions as certificates and CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509V3_add1_i2d(). This automatically encodes and adds an extension. Its behaviour can be customised with various flags to append, replace or delete. Various wrappers added for certifcates and CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) Fix to avoid calling the underlying ASN1 print routine when an extension cannot be parsed. Correct a typo in the OCSP_SERVICELOC extension. Tidy up print OCSP format. [Steve Henson] *) Make mkdef.pl parse some of the ASN1 macros and add apropriate entries for variables. [Steve Henson] *) Add functionality to apps/openssl.c for detecting locking problems: As the program is single-threaded, all we have to do is register a locking callback using an array for storing which locks are currently held by the program. [Bodo Moeller] *) Use a lock around the call to CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index() in SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_idx(), which is used in ssl_verify_cert_chain() and thus can be called at any time during TLS/SSL handshakes so that thread-safety is essential. Unfortunately, the ex_data design is not at all suited for multi-threaded use, so it probably should be abolished. [Bodo Moeller] *) Added Broadcom "ubsec" ENGINE to OpenSSL. [Broadcom, tweaked and integrated by Geoff Thorpe] *) Move common extension printing code to new function X509V3_print_extensions(). Reorganise OCSP print routines and implement some needed OCSP ASN1 functions. Add OCSP extensions. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509_signature_print() to remove duplication in some print routines. [Steve Henson] *) Add a special meaning when SET OF and SEQUENCE OF flags are both set (this was treated exactly the same as SET OF previously). This is used to reorder the STACK representing the structure to match the encoding. This will be used to get round a problem where a PKCS7 structure which was signed could not be verified because the STACK order did not reflect the encoded order. [Steve Henson] *) Reimplement the OCSP ASN1 module using the new code. [Steve Henson] *) Update the X509V3 code to permit the use of an ASN1_ITEM structure for its ASN1 operations. The old style function pointers still exist for now but they will eventually go away. [Steve Henson] *) Merge in replacement ASN1 code from the ASN1 branch. This almost completely replaces the old ASN1 functionality with a table driven encoder and decoder which interprets an ASN1_ITEM structure describing the ASN1 module. Compatibility with the existing ASN1 API (i2d,d2i) is largely maintained. Almost all of the old asn1_mac.h macro based ASN1 has also been converted to the new form. [Steve Henson] *) Change BN_mod_exp_recp so that negative moduli are tolerated (the sign is ignored). Similarly, ignore the sign in BN_MONT_CTX_set so that BN_mod_exp_mont and BN_mod_exp_mont_word work for negative moduli. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix BN_uadd and BN_usub: Always return non-negative results instead of not touching the result's sign bit. [Bodo Moeller] *) BN_div bugfix: If the result is 0, the sign (res->neg) must not be set. [Bodo Moeller] *) Changed the LHASH code to use prototypes for callbacks, and created macros to declare and implement thin (optionally static) functions that provide type-safety and avoid function pointer casting for the type-specific callbacks. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Added Kerberos Cipher Suites to be used with TLS, as written in RFC 2712. [Veers Staats , Jeffrey Altman , via Richard Levitte] *) Reformat the FAQ so the different questions and answers can be divided in sections depending on the subject. [Richard Levitte] *) Have the zlib compression code load ZLIB.DLL dynamically under Windows. [Richard Levitte] *) New function BN_mod_sqrt for computing square roots modulo a prime (using the probabilistic Tonelli-Shanks algorithm unless p == 3 (mod 4) or p == 5 (mod 8), which are cases that can be handled deterministically). [Lenka Fibikova , Bodo Moeller] *) Make BN_mod_inverse faster by explicitly handling small quotients in the Euclid loop. (Speed gain about 20% for small moduli [256 or 512 bits], about 30% for larger ones [1024 or 2048 bits].) [Bodo Moeller] *) New function BN_kronecker. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix BN_gcd so that it works on negative inputs; the result is positive unless both parameters are zero. Previously something reasonably close to an infinite loop was possible because numbers could be growing instead of shrinking in the implementation of Euclid's algorithm. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix BN_is_word() and BN_is_one() macros to take into account the sign of the number in question. Fix BN_is_word(a,w) to work correctly for w == 0. The old BN_is_word(a,w) macro is now called BN_abs_is_word(a,w) because its test if the absolute value of 'a' equals 'w'. Note that BN_abs_is_word does *not* handle w == 0 reliably; it exists mostly for use in the implementations of BN_is_zero(), BN_is_one(), and BN_is_word(). [Bodo Moeller] *) New function BN_swap. [Bodo Moeller] *) Use BN_nnmod instead of BN_mod in crypto/bn/bn_exp.c so that the exponentiation functions are more likely to produce reasonable results on negative inputs. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change BN_mod_mul so that the result is always non-negative. Previously, it could be negative if one of the factors was negative; I don't think anyone really wanted that behaviour. [Bodo Moeller] *) Move BN_mod_... functions into new file crypto/bn/bn_mod.c (except for exponentiation, which stays in crypto/bn/bn_exp.c, and BN_mod_mul_reciprocal, which stays in crypto/bn/bn_recp.c) and add new functions: BN_nnmod BN_mod_sqr BN_mod_add BN_mod_add_quick BN_mod_sub BN_mod_sub_quick BN_mod_lshift1 BN_mod_lshift1_quick BN_mod_lshift BN_mod_lshift_quick These functions always generate non-negative results. BN_nnmod otherwise is like BN_mod (if BN_mod computes a remainder r such that |m| < r < 0, BN_nnmod will output rem + |m| instead). BN_mod_XXX_quick(r, a, [b,] m) generates the same result as BN_mod_XXX(r, a, [b,] m, ctx), but requires that a [and b] be reduced modulo m. [Lenka Fibikova , Bodo Moeller] #if 0 The following entry accidentily appeared in the CHANGES file distributed with OpenSSL 0.9.7. The modifications described in it do *not* apply to OpenSSL 0.9.7. *) Remove a few calls to bn_wexpand() in BN_sqr() (the one in there was actually never needed) and in BN_mul(). The removal in BN_mul() required a small change in bn_mul_part_recursive() and the addition of the functions bn_cmp_part_words(), bn_sub_part_words() and bn_add_part_words(), which do the same thing as bn_cmp_words(), bn_sub_words() and bn_add_words() except they take arrays with differing sizes. [Richard Levitte] #endif *) In 'openssl passwd', verify passwords read from the terminal unless the '-salt' option is used (which usually means that verification would just waste user's time since the resulting hash is going to be compared with some given password hash) or the new '-noverify' option is used. This is an incompatible change, but it does not affect non-interactive use of 'openssl passwd' (passwords on the command line, '-stdin' option, '-in ...' option) and thus should not cause any problems. [Bodo Moeller] *) Remove all references to RSAref, since there's no more need for it. [Richard Levitte] *) Make DSO load along a path given through an environment variable (SHLIB_PATH) with shl_load(). [Richard Levitte] *) Constify the ENGINE code as a result of BIGNUM constification. Also constify the RSA code and most things related to it. In a few places, most notable in the depth of the ASN.1 code, ugly casts back to non-const were required (to be solved at a later time) [Richard Levitte] *) Make it so the openssl application has all engines loaded by default. [Richard Levitte] *) Constify the BIGNUM routines a little more. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the following functions: ENGINE_load_cswift() ENGINE_load_chil() ENGINE_load_atalla() ENGINE_load_nuron() ENGINE_load_builtin_engines() That way, an application can itself choose if external engines that are built-in in OpenSSL shall ever be used or not. The benefit is that applications won't have to be linked with libdl or other dso libraries unless it's really needed. Changed 'openssl engine' to load all engines on demand. Changed the engine header files to avoid the duplication of some declarations (they differed!). [Richard Levitte] *) 'openssl engine' can now list capabilities. [Richard Levitte] *) Better error reporting in 'openssl engine'. [Richard Levitte] *) Never call load_dh_param(NULL) in s_server. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add engine application. It can currently list engines by name and identity, and test if they are actually available. [Richard Levitte] *) Improve RPM specification file by forcing symbolic linking and making sure the installed documentation is also owned by root.root. [Damien Miller ] *) Give the OpenSSL applications more possibilities to make use of keys (public as well as private) handled by engines. [Richard Levitte] *) Add OCSP code that comes from CertCo. [Richard Levitte] *) Add VMS support for the Rijndael code. [Richard Levitte] *) Added untested support for Nuron crypto accelerator. [Ben Laurie] *) Add support for external cryptographic devices. This code was previously distributed separately as the "engine" branch. [Geoff Thorpe, Richard Levitte] *) Rework the filename-translation in the DSO code. It is now possible to have far greater control over how a "name" is turned into a filename depending on the operating environment and any oddities about the different shared library filenames on each system. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Support threads on FreeBSD-elf in Configure. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix for SHA1 assembly problem with MASM: it produces warnings about corrupt line number information when assembling with debugging information. This is caused by the overlapping of two sections. [Bernd Matthes , Steve Henson] *) NCONF changes. NCONF_get_number() has no error checking at all. As a replacement, NCONF_get_number_e() is defined (_e for "error checking") and is promoted strongly. The old NCONF_get_number is kept around for binary backward compatibility. Make it possible for methods to load from something other than a BIO, by providing a function pointer that is given a name instead of a BIO. For example, this could be used to load configuration data from an LDAP server. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix for non blocking accept BIOs. Added new I/O special reason BIO_RR_ACCEPT to cover this case. Previously use of accept BIOs with non blocking I/O was not possible because no retry code was implemented. Also added new SSL code SSL_WANT_ACCEPT to cover this case. [Steve Henson] *) Added the beginnings of Rijndael support. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix for bug in DirectoryString mask setting. Add support for X509_NAME_print_ex() in 'req' and X509_print_ex() function to allow certificate printing to more controllable, additional 'certopt' option to 'x509' to allow new printing options to be set. [Steve Henson] *) Clean old EAY MD5 hack from e_os.h. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.6l and 0.9.6m [17 Mar 2004] *) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079) [Joe Orton, Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6k and 0.9.6l [04 Nov 2003] *) Fix additional bug revealed by the NISCC test suite: Stop bug triggering large recursion when presented with certain ASN.1 tags (CVE-2003-0851) [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6j and 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003] *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite: Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544). If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check certificate signature with the NULL public key. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_accept() (ssl/s3_srvr.c) only accept a client certificate if the server requested one: as stated in TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0 specifications. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_get_client_hello() (ssl/s3_srvr.c), tolerate additional extra data after the compression methods not only for TLS 1.0 but also for SSL 3.0 (as required by the specification). [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Matthias Loepfe] *) Change X509_certificate_type() to mark the key as exported/exportable when it's 512 *bits* long, not 512 bytes. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.6i and 0.9.6j [10 Apr 2003] *) Countermeasure against the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 padding: treat a protocol version number mismatch like a decryption error in ssl3_get_client_key_exchange (ssl/s3_srvr.c). [Bodo Moeller] *) Turn on RSA blinding by default in the default implementation to avoid a timing attack. Applications that don't want it can call RSA_blinding_off() or use the new flag RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING. They would be ill-advised to do so in most cases. [Ben Laurie, Steve Henson, Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller] *) Change RSA blinding code so that it works when the PRNG is not seeded (in this case, the secret RSA exponent is abused as an unpredictable seed -- if it is not unpredictable, there is no point in blinding anyway). Make RSA blinding thread-safe by remembering the creator's thread ID in rsa->blinding and having all other threads use local one-time blinding factors (this requires more computation than sharing rsa->blinding, but avoids excessive locking; and if an RSA object is not shared between threads, blinding will still be very fast). [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6h and 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003] *) In ssl3_get_record (ssl/s3_pkt.c), minimize information leaked via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrrect block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL), Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and Martin Vuagnoux (EPFL, Ilion)] Changes between 0.9.6g and 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002] *) New function OPENSSL_cleanse(), which is used to cleanse a section of memory from it's contents. This is done with a counter that will place alternating values in each byte. This can be used to solve two issues: 1) the removal of calls to memset() by highly optimizing compilers, and 2) cleansing with other values than 0, since those can be read through on certain media, for example a swap space on disk. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Bugfix: client side session caching did not work with external caching, because the session->cipher setting was not restored when reloading from the external cache. This problem was masked, when SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) was set. (Found by Steve Haslam .) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix client_certificate (ssl/s2_clnt.c): The permissible total length of the REQUEST-CERTIFICATE message is 18 .. 34, not 17 .. 33. [Zeev Lieber ] *) Undo an undocumented change introduced in 0.9.6e which caused repeated calls to OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers() and OpenSSL_add_all_digests() to be ignored, even after calling EVP_cleanup(). [Richard Levitte] *) Change the default configuration reader to deal with last line not being properly terminated. [Richard Levitte] *) Change X509_NAME_cmp() so it applies the special rules on handling DN values that are of type PrintableString, as well as RDNs of type emailAddress where the value has the type ia5String. [stefank@valicert.com via Richard Levitte] *) Add a SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE flag to take over half the job SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP was inconsistently doing, define a new flag (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL) to be the bitwise-OR of the two for use by the majority of applications wanting this behaviour, and update the docs. The documented behaviour and actual behaviour were inconsistent and had been changing anyway, so this is more a bug-fix than a behavioural change. [Geoff Thorpe, diagnosed by Nadav Har'El] *) Don't impose a 16-byte length minimum on session IDs in ssl/s3_clnt.c (the SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 specifications allow any length up to 32 bytes). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix initialization code race conditions in SSLv23_method(), SSLv23_client_method(), SSLv23_server_method(), SSLv2_method(), SSLv2_client_method(), SSLv2_server_method(), SSLv3_method(), SSLv3_client_method(), SSLv3_server_method(), TLSv1_method(), TLSv1_client_method(), TLSv1_server_method(), ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(), ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(). [Patrick McCormick , Bodo Moeller] *) Reorder cleanup sequence in SSL_CTX_free(): only remove the ex_data after the cached sessions are flushed, as the remove_cb() might use ex_data contents. Bug found by Sam Varshavchik (see [openssl.org #212]). [Geoff Thorpe, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix typo in OBJ_txt2obj which incorrectly passed the content length, instead of the encoding length to d2i_ASN1_OBJECT. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6f and 0.9.6g [9 Aug 2002] *) [In 0.9.6g-engine release:] Fix crypto/engine/vendor_defns/cswift.h for WIN32 (use '_stdcall'). [Lynn Gazis ] Changes between 0.9.6e and 0.9.6f [8 Aug 2002] *) Fix ASN1 checks. Check for overflow by comparing with LONG_MAX and get fix the header length calculation. [Florian Weimer , Alon Kantor (and others), Steve Henson] *) Use proper error handling instead of 'assertions' in buffer overflow checks added in 0.9.6e. This prevents DoS (the assertions could call abort()). [Arne Ansper , Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002] *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear negative or the content length exceeds the length of the supplied buffer. [Steve Henson, Adi Stav , James Yonan ] *) Fix cipher selection routines: ciphers without encryption had no flags for the cipher strength set and where therefore not handled correctly by the selection routines (PR #130). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix EVP_dsa_sha macro. [Nils Larsch] *) New option SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS for disabling the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability countermeasure that was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6d. As the countermeasure turned out to be incompatible with some broken SSL implementations, the new option is part of SSL_OP_ALL. SSL_OP_ALL is usually employed when compatibility with weird SSL implementations is desired (e.g. '-bugs' option to 's_client' and 's_server'), so the new option is automatically set in many applications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Changes in security patch: Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F30602-01-2-0537. *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear negative or the content length exceeds the length of the supplied buffer. (CVE-2002-0659) [Steve Henson, Adi Stav , James Yonan ] *) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to happen in practice. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were too small for 64 bit platforms. (CVE-2002-0655) [Matthew Byng-Maddick and Ben Laurie (CHATS)> *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CVE-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized client master key. (CVE-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002] *) Fix crypto/asn1/a_sign.c so that 'parameters' is omitted (not encoded as NULL) with id-dsa-with-sha1. [Nils Larsch ; problem pointed out by Bodo Moeller] *) Check various X509_...() return values in apps/req.c. [Nils Larsch ] *) Fix BASE64 decode (EVP_DecodeUpdate) for data with CR/LF ended lines: an end-of-file condition would erronously be flagged, when the CRLF was just at the end of a processed block. The bug was discovered when processing data through a buffering memory BIO handing the data to a BASE64-decoding BIO. Bug fund and patch submitted by Pavel Tsekov and Nedelcho Stanev. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Implement a countermeasure against a vulnerability recently found in CBC ciphersuites in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0: Send an empty fragment before application data chunks to avoid the use of known IVs with data potentially chosen by the attacker. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix length checks in ssl3_get_client_hello(). [Bodo Moeller] *) TLS/SSL library bugfix: use s->s3->in_read_app_data differently to prevent ssl3_read_internal() from incorrectly assuming that ssl3_read_bytes() found application data while handshake processing was enabled when in fact s->s3->in_read_app_data was merely automatically cleared during the initial handshake. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Arne Ansper ] *) Fix object definitions for Private and Enterprise: they were not recognized in their shortname (=lowercase) representation. Extend obj_dat.pl to issue an error when using undefined keywords instead of silently ignoring the problem (Svenning Sorensen ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix DH_generate_parameters() so that it works for 'non-standard' generators, i.e. generators other than 2 and 5. (Previously, the code did not properly initialise the 'add' and 'rem' values to BN_generate_prime().) In the new general case, we do not insist that 'generator' is actually a primitive root: This requirement is rather pointless; a generator of the order-q subgroup is just as good, if not better. [Bodo Moeller] *) Map new X509 verification errors to alerts. Discovered and submitted by Tom Wu . [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix ssl3_pending() (ssl/s3_lib.c) to prevent SSL_pending() from returning non-zero before the data has been completely received when using non-blocking I/O. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by John Hughes] *) Some of the ciphers missed the strength entry (SSL_LOW etc). [Ben Laurie, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix bug in SSL_clear(): bad sessions were not removed (found by Yoram Zahavi ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add information about CygWin 1.3 and on, and preserve proper configuration for the versions before that. [Corinna Vinschen and Richard Levitte] *) Make removal from session cache (SSL_CTX_remove_session()) more robust: check whether we deal with a copy of a session and do not delete from the cache in this case. Problem reported by "Izhar Shoshani Levi" . [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Do not store session data into the internal session cache, if it is never intended to be looked up (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP flag is set). Proposed by Aslam . [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Have ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit() really clear a bit when the requested value is 0. [Richard Levitte] *) [In 0.9.6d-engine release:] Fix a crashbug and a logic bug in hwcrhk_load_pubkey(). [Toomas Kiisk via Richard Levitte] *) Add the configuration target linux-s390x. [Neale Ferguson via Richard Levitte] *) The earlier bugfix for the SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C case of ssl3_accept (ssl/s3_srvr.c) incorrectly used a local flag variable as an indication that a ClientHello message has been received. As the flag value will be lost between multiple invocations of ssl3_accept when using non-blocking I/O, the function may not be aware that a handshake has actually taken place, thus preventing a new session from being added to the session cache. To avoid this problem, we now set s->new_session to 2 instead of using a local variable. [Lutz Jaenicke, Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix: Return -1 from ssl3_get_server_done (ssl3/s3_clnt.c) if the SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH error is detected. [Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller] *) New 'shared_ldflag' column in Configure platform table. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix EVP_CIPHER_mode macro. ["Dan S. Camper" ] *) Fix ssl3_read_bytes (ssl/s3_pkt.c): To ignore messages of unknown type, we must throw them away by setting rr->length to 0. [D P Chang ] Changes between 0.9.6b and 0.9.6c [21 dec 2001] *) Fix BN_rand_range bug pointed out by Dominikus Scherkl . (The previous implementation worked incorrectly for those cases where range = 10..._2 and 3*range is two bits longer than range.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Only add signing time to PKCS7 structures if it is not already present. [Steve Henson] *) Fix crypto/objects/objects.h: "ld-ce" should be "id-ce", OBJ_ld_ce should be OBJ_id_ce. Also some ip-pda OIDs in crypto/objects/objects.txt were incorrect (cf. RFC 3039). [Matt Cooper, Frederic Giudicelli, Bodo Moeller] *) Release CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK when CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid() returns early because it has nothing to do. [Andy Schneider ] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Fix mutex callback return values in crypto/engine/hw_ncipher.c. [Andy Schneider ] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Add support for Cryptographic Appliance's keyserver technology. (Use engine 'keyclient') [Cryptographic Appliances and Geoff Thorpe] *) Add a configuration entry for OS/390 Unix. The C compiler 'c89' is called via tools/c89.sh because arguments have to be rearranged (all '-L' options must appear before the first object modules). [Richard Shapiro ] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Add support for Broadcom crypto accelerator cards, backported from 0.9.7. [Broadcom, Nalin Dahyabhai , Mark Cox] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Add support for SureWare crypto accelerator cards from Baltimore Technologies. (Use engine 'sureware') [Baltimore Technologies and Mark Cox] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Add support for crypto accelerator cards from Accelerated Encryption Processing, www.aep.ie. (Use engine 'aep') [AEP Inc. and Mark Cox] *) Add a configuration entry for gcc on UnixWare. [Gary Benson ] *) Change ssl/s2_clnt.c and ssl/s2_srvr.c so that received handshake messages are stored in a single piece (fixed-length part and variable-length part combined) and fix various bugs found on the way. [Bodo Moeller] *) Disable caching in BIO_gethostbyname(), directly use gethostbyname() instead. BIO_gethostbyname() does not know what timeouts are appropriate, so entries would stay in cache even when they have become invalid. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Rich Salz *) Change ssl23_get_client_hello (ssl/s23_srvr.c) behaviour when faced with a pathologically small ClientHello fragment that does not contain client_version: Instead of aborting with an error, simply choose the highest available protocol version (i.e., TLS 1.0 unless it is disabled). In practice, ClientHello messages are never sent like this, but this change gives us strictly correct behaviour at least for TLS. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix SSL handshake functions and SSL_clear() such that SSL_clear() never resets s->method to s->ctx->method when called from within one of the SSL handshake functions. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Niko Baric] *) In ssl3_get_client_hello (ssl/s3_srvr.c), generate a fatal alert (sent using the client's version number) if client_version is smaller than the protocol version in use. Also change ssl23_get_client_hello (ssl/s23_srvr.c) to select TLS 1.0 if the client demanded SSL 3.0 but only TLS 1.0 is enabled; then the client will at least see that alert. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) to handle message fragmentation correctly. [Bodo Moeller] *) Avoid infinite loop in ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) if a client receives HelloRequest while in a handshake. [Bodo Moeller; bug noticed by Andy Schneider ] *) Bugfix in ssl3_accept (ssl/s3_srvr.c): Case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C should end in 'break', not 'goto end' which circuments various cleanups done in state SSL_ST_OK. But session related stuff must be disabled for SSL_ST_OK in the case that we just sent a HelloRequest. Also avoid some overhead by not calling ssl_init_wbio_buffer() before just sending a HelloRequest. [Bodo Moeller, Eric Rescorla ] *) Fix ssl/s3_enc.c, ssl/t1_enc.c and ssl/s3_pkt.c so that we don't reveal whether illegal block cipher padding was found or a MAC verification error occured. (Neither SSLerr() codes nor alerts are directly visible to potential attackers, but the information may leak via logfiles.) Similar changes are not required for the SSL 2.0 implementation because the number of padding bytes is sent in clear for SSL 2.0, and the extra bytes are just ignored. However ssl/s2_pkt.c failed to verify that the purported number of padding bytes is in the legal range. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add OpenUNIX-8 support including shared libraries (Boyd Lynn Gerber ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Improve RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP() check again to avoid 'wristwatch attack' using huge encoding parameters (cf. James H. Manger's CRYPTO 2001 paper). Note that the RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING case of RSA_private_decrypt() does not use encoding parameters and hence was not vulnerable. [Bodo Moeller] *) BN_sqr() bug fix. [Ulf Möller, reported by Jim Ellis ] *) Rabin-Miller test analyses assume uniformly distributed witnesses, so use BN_pseudo_rand_range() instead of using BN_pseudo_rand() followed by modular reduction. [Bodo Moeller; pointed out by Adam Young ] *) Add BN_pseudo_rand_range() with obvious functionality: BN_rand_range() equivalent based on BN_pseudo_rand() instead of BN_rand(). [Bodo Moeller] *) s3_srvr.c: allow sending of large client certificate lists (> 16 kB). This function was broken, as the check for a new client hello message to handle SGC did not allow these large messages. (Tracked down by "Douglas E. Engert" .) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add alert descriptions for TLSv1 to SSL_alert_desc_string[_long](). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix buggy behaviour of BIO_get_num_renegotiates() and BIO_ctrl() for BIO_C_GET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE ("Stephen Hinton" ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Rework the configuration and shared library support for Tru64 Unix. The configuration part makes use of modern compiler features and still retains old compiler behavior for those that run older versions of the OS. The shared library support part includes a variant that uses the RPATH feature, and is available through the special configuration target "alpha-cc-rpath", which will never be selected automatically. [Tim Mooney via Richard Levitte] *) In ssl3_get_key_exchange (ssl/s3_clnt.c), call ssl3_get_message() with the same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request(). Otherwise, if no ServerKeyExchange message occurs, CertificateRequest messages might inadvertently be reject as too long. [Petr Lampa ] *) Enhanced support for IA-64 Unix platforms (well, Linux and HP-UX). [Andy Polyakov] *) Modified SSL library such that the verify_callback that has been set specificly for an SSL object with SSL_set_verify() is actually being used. Before the change, a verify_callback set with this function was ignored and the verify_callback() set in the SSL_CTX at the time of the call was used. New function X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb() introduced to allow the necessary settings. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Initialize static variable in crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c and crypto/dh/dh_lib.c explicitly to NULL, as at least on Solaris 8 this seems not always to be done automatically (in contradiction to the requirements of the C standard). This made problems when used from OpenSSH. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) In OpenSSL 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b, crypto/dh/dh_key.c ignored dh->length and always used BN_rand_range(priv_key, dh->p). BN_rand_range() is not necessary for Diffie-Hellman, and this specific range makes Diffie-Hellman unnecessarily inefficient if dh->length (recommended exponent length) is much smaller than the length of dh->p. We could use BN_rand_range() if the order of the subgroup was stored in the DH structure, but we only have dh->length. So switch back to BN_rand(priv_key, l, ...) where 'l' is dh->length if this is defined, or BN_num_bits(dh->p)-1 otherwise. [Bodo Moeller] *) In RSA_eay_public_encrypt RSA_eay_private_decrypt RSA_eay_private_encrypt (signing) RSA_eay_public_decrypt (signature verification) (default implementations for RSA_public_encrypt, RSA_private_decrypt, RSA_private_encrypt, RSA_public_decrypt), always reject numbers >= n. [Bodo Moeller] *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, use a new short-time lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 to synchronize access to 'locking_thread'. This is necessary on systems where access to 'locking_thread' (an 'unsigned long' variable) is not atomic. [Bodo Moeller] *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, set 'locking_thread' to current thread's ID *before* setting the 'crypto_lock_rand' flag. The previous code had a race condition if 0 is a valid thread ID. [Travis Vitek ] *) Add support for shared libraries under Irix. [Albert Chin-A-Young ] *) Add configuration option to build on Linux on both big-endian and little-endian MIPS. [Ralf Baechle ] *) Add the possibility to create shared libraries on HP-UX. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001] *) Change ssleay_rand_bytes (crypto/rand/md_rand.c) to avoid a SSLeay/OpenSSL PRNG weakness pointed out by Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen : PRNG state recovery was possible based on the output of one PRNG request appropriately sized to gain knowledge on 'md' followed by enough consecutive 1-byte PRNG requests to traverse all of 'state'. 1. When updating 'md_local' (the current thread's copy of 'md') during PRNG output generation, hash all of the previous 'md_local' value, not just the half used for PRNG output. 2. Make the number of bytes from 'state' included into the hash independent from the number of PRNG bytes requested. The first measure alone would be sufficient to avoid Markku-Juhani's attack. (Actually it had never occurred to me that the half of 'md_local' used for chaining was the half from which PRNG output bytes were taken -- I had always assumed that the secret half would be used.) The second measure makes sure that additional data from 'state' is never mixed into 'md_local' in small portions; this heuristically further strengthens the PRNG. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix crypto/bn/asm/mips3.s. [Andy Polyakov] *) When only the key is given to "enc", the IV is undefined. Print out an error message in this case. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Handle special case when X509_NAME is empty in X509 printing routines. [Steve Henson] *) In dsa_do_verify (crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c), verify that r and s are positive and less than q. [Bodo Moeller] *) Don't change *pointer in CRYPTO_add_lock() is add_lock_callback is used: it isn't thread safe and the add_lock_callback should handle that itself. [Paul Rose ] *) Verify that incoming data obeys the block size in ssl3_enc (ssl/s3_enc.c) and tls1_enc (ssl/t1_enc.c). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix OAEP check. [Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller] *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5 when fixing the server behaviour for backwards-compatible 'client hello' messages. (Note that the attack is impractical against SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 anyway because length and version checking means that the probability of guessing a valid ciphertext is around 2^-40; see section 5 in Bleichenbacher's CRYPTO '98 paper.) Before 0.9.5, the countermeasure (hide the error by generating a random 'decryption result') did not work properly because ERR_clear_error() was missing, meaning that SSL_get_error() would detect the supposedly ignored error. Both problems are now fixed. [Bodo Moeller] *) In crypto/bio/bf_buff.c, increase DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE to 4096 (previously it was 1024). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for compatibility mode trust settings: ignore trust settings unless some valid trust or reject settings are present. [Steve Henson] *) Fix for blowfish EVP: its a variable length cipher. [Steve Henson] *) Fix various bugs related to DSA S/MIME verification. Handle missing parameters in DSA public key structures and return an error in the DSA routines if parameters are absent. [Steve Henson] *) In versions up to 0.9.6, RAND_file_name() resorted to file ".rnd" in the current directory if neither $RANDFILE nor $HOME was set. RAND_file_name() in 0.9.6a returned NULL in this case. This has caused some confusion to Windows users who haven't defined $HOME. Thus RAND_file_name() is changed again: e_os.h can define a DEFAULT_HOME, which will be used if $HOME is not set. For Windows, we use "C:"; on other platforms, we still require environment variables. *) Move 'if (!initialized) RAND_poll()' into regions protected by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND. This is not strictly necessary, but avoids having multiple threads call RAND_poll() concurrently. [Bodo Moeller] *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, replace 'add_do_not_lock' flag by a combination of a flag and a thread ID variable. Otherwise while one thread is in ssleay_rand_bytes (which sets the flag), *other* threads can enter ssleay_add_bytes without obeying the CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND lock (and may even illegally release the lock that they do not hold after the first thread unsets add_do_not_lock). [Bodo Moeller] *) Change bctest again: '-x' expressions are not available in all versions of 'test'. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001] *) Fix a couple of memory leaks in PKCS7_dataDecode() [Steve Henson, reported by Heyun Zheng ] *) Change Configure and Makefiles to provide EXE_EXT, which will contain the default extension for executables, if any. Also, make the perl scripts that use symlink() to test if it really exists and use "cp" if it doesn't. All this made OpenSSL compilable and installable in CygWin. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix for asn1_GetSequence() for indefinite length constructed data. If SEQUENCE is length is indefinite just set c->slen to the total amount of data available. [Steve Henson, reported by shige@FreeBSD.org] [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.] *) Change bctest to avoid here-documents inside command substitution (workaround for FreeBSD /bin/sh bug). For compatibility with Ultrix, avoid shell functions (introduced in the bctest version that searches along $PATH). [Bodo Moeller] *) Rename 'des_encrypt' to 'des_encrypt1'. This avoids the clashes with des_encrypt() defined on some operating systems, like Solaris and UnixWare. [Richard Levitte] *) Check the result of RSA-CRT (see D. Boneh, R. DeMillo, R. Lipton: On the Importance of Eliminating Errors in Cryptographic Computations, J. Cryptology 14 (2001) 2, 101-119, http://theory.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/faults.ps.gz). [Ulf Moeller] *) MIPS assembler BIGNUM division bug fix. [Andy Polyakov] *) Disabled incorrect Alpha assembler code. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix PKCS#7 decode routines so they correctly update the length after reading an EOC for the EXPLICIT tag. [Steve Henson] [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.] *) Fix bug in PKCS#12 key generation routines. This was triggered if a 3DES key was generated with a 0 initial byte. Include PKCS12_BROKEN_KEYGEN compilation option to retain the old (but broken) behaviour. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance bctest to search for a working bc along $PATH and print it when found. [Tim Rice via Richard Levitte] *) Fix memory leaks in err.c: free err_data string if necessary; don't write to the wrong index in ERR_set_error_data. [Bodo Moeller] *) Implement ssl23_peek (analogous to ssl23_read), which previously did not exist. [Bodo Moeller] *) Replace rdtsc with _emit statements for VC++ version 5. [Jeremy Cooper ] *) Make it possible to reuse SSLv2 sessions. [Richard Levitte] *) In copy_email() check for >= 0 as a return value for X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() since 0 is a valid index. [Steve Henson reported by Massimiliano Pala ] *) Avoid coredump with unsupported or invalid public keys by checking if X509_get_pubkey() fails in PKCS7_verify(). Fix memory leak when PKCS7_verify() fails with non detached data. [Steve Henson] *) Don't use getenv in library functions when run as setuid/setgid. New function OPENSSL_issetugid(). [Ulf Moeller] *) Avoid false positives in memory leak detection code (crypto/mem_dbg.c) due to incorrect handling of multi-threading: 1. Fix timing glitch in the MemCheck_off() portion of CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(). 2. Fix logical glitch in is_MemCheck_on() aka CRYPTO_is_mem_check_on(). 3. Count how many times MemCheck_off() has been called so that nested use can be treated correctly. This also avoids inband-signalling in the previous code (which relied on the assumption that thread ID 0 is impossible). [Bodo Moeller] *) Add "-rand" option also to s_client and s_server. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix CPU detection on Irix 6.x. [Kurt Hockenbury and "Bruce W. Forsberg" ] *) Fix X509_NAME bug which produced incorrect encoding if X509_NAME was empty. [Steve Henson] [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.] *) Use the cached encoding of an X509_NAME structure rather than copying it. This is apparently the reason for the libsafe "errors" but the code is actually correct. [Steve Henson] *) Add new function BN_rand_range(), and fix DSA_sign_setup() to prevent Bleichenbacher's DSA attack. Extend BN_[pseudo_]rand: As before, top=1 forces the highest two bits to be set and top=0 forces the highest bit to be set; top=-1 is new and leaves the highest bit random. [Ulf Moeller, Bodo Moeller] *) In the NCONF_...-based implementations for CONF_... queries (crypto/conf/conf_lib.c), if the input LHASH is NULL, avoid using a temporary CONF structure with the data component set to NULL (which gives segmentation faults in lh_retrieve). Instead, use NULL for the CONF pointer in CONF_get_string and CONF_get_number (which may use environment variables) and directly return NULL from CONF_get_section. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix potential buffer overrun for EBCDIC. [Ulf Moeller] *) Tolerate nonRepudiation as being valid for S/MIME signing and certSign keyUsage if basicConstraints absent for a CA. [Steve Henson] *) Make SMIME_write_PKCS7() write mail header values with a format that is more generally accepted (no spaces before the semicolon), since some programs can't parse those values properly otherwise. Also make sure BIO's that break lines after each write do not create invalid headers. [Richard Levitte] *) Make the CRL encoding routines work with empty SEQUENCE OF. The macros previously used would not encode an empty SEQUENCE OF and break the signature. [Steve Henson] [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.] *) Zero the premaster secret after deriving the master secret in DH ciphersuites. [Steve Henson] *) Add some EVP_add_digest_alias registrations (as found in OpenSSL_add_all_digests()) to SSL_library_init() aka OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms(). This provides improved compatibility with peers using X.509 certificates with unconventional AlgorithmIdentifier OIDs. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for Irix with NO_ASM. ["Bruce W. Forsberg" ] *) ./config script fixes. [Ulf Moeller, Richard Levitte] *) Fix 'openssl passwd -1'. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change PKCS12_key_gen_asc() so it can cope with non null terminated strings whose length is passed in the passlen parameter, for example from PEM callbacks. This was done by adding an extra length parameter to asc2uni(). [Steve Henson, reported by ] *) Fix C code generated by 'openssl dsaparam -C': If a BN_bin2bn call failed, free the DSA structure. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix to uni2asc() to cope with zero length Unicode strings. These are present in some PKCS#12 files. [Steve Henson] *) Increase s2->wbuf allocation by one byte in ssl2_new (ssl/s2_lib.c). Otherwise do_ssl_write (ssl/s2_pkt.c) will write beyond buffer limits when writing a 32767 byte record. [Bodo Moeller; problem reported by Eric Day ] *) In RSA_eay_public_{en,ed}crypt and RSA_eay_mod_exp (rsa_eay.c), obtain lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA before setting rsa->_method_mod_{n,p,q}. (RSA objects have a reference count access to which is protected by CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA [see rsa_lib.c, s3_srvr.c, ssl_cert.c, ssl_rsa.c], so they are meant to be shared between threads.) [Bodo Moeller, Geoff Thorpe; original patch submitted by "Reddie, Steven" ] *) Fix a deadlock in CRYPTO_mem_leaks(). [Bodo Moeller] *) Use better test patterns in bntest. [Ulf Möller] *) rand_win.c fix for Borland C. [Ulf Möller] *) BN_rshift bugfix for n == 0. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add a 'bctest' script that checks for some known 'bc' bugs so that 'make test' does not abort just because 'bc' is broken. [Bodo Moeller] *) Store verify_result within SSL_SESSION also for client side to avoid potential security hole. (Re-used sessions on the client side always resulted in verify_result==X509_V_OK, not using the original result of the server certificate verification.) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix ssl3_pending: If the record in s->s3->rrec is not of type SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, return 0. Similarly, change ssl2_pending to return 0 if SSL_in_init(s) is true. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix SSL_peek: Both ssl2_peek and ssl3_peek, which were totally broken in earlier releases, have been re-implemented by renaming the previous implementations of ssl2_read and ssl3_read to ssl2_read_internal and ssl3_read_internal, respectively, and adding 'peek' parameters to them. The new ssl[23]_{read,peek} functions are calls to ssl[23]_read_internal with the 'peek' flag set appropriately. A 'peek' parameter has also been added to ssl3_read_bytes, which does the actual work for ssl3_read_internal. [Bodo Moeller] *) Initialise "ex_data" member of RSA/DSA/DH structures prior to calling the method-specific "init()" handler. Also clean up ex_data after calling the method-specific "finish()" handler. Previously, this was happening the other way round. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Increase BN_CTX_NUM (the number of BIGNUMs in a BN_CTX) to 16. The previous value, 12, was not always sufficient for BN_mod_exp(). [Bodo Moeller] *) Make sure that shared libraries get the internal name engine with the full version number and not just 0. This should mark the shared libraries as not backward compatible. Of course, this should be changed again when we can guarantee backward binary compatibility. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix typo in get_cert_by_subject() in by_dir.c [Jean-Marc Desperrier ] *) Rework the system to generate shared libraries: - Make note of the expected extension for the shared libraries and if there is a need for symbolic links from for example libcrypto.so.0 to libcrypto.so.0.9.7. There is extended info in Configure for that. - Make as few rebuilds of the shared libraries as possible. - Still avoid linking the OpenSSL programs with the shared libraries. - When installing, install the shared libraries separately from the static ones. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead macro to actually use its argument. Copy SSL_CTX's read_ahead flag to SSL object directly in SSL_new and not in SSL_clear because the latter is also used by the accept/connect functions; previously, the settings made by SSL_set_read_ahead would be lost during the handshake. [Bodo Moeller; problems reported by Anders Gertz ] *) Correct util/mkdef.pl to be selective about disabled algorithms. Previously, it would create entries for disableed algorithms no matter what. [Richard Levitte] *) Added several new manual pages for SSL_* function. [Lutz Jaenicke] Changes between 0.9.5a and 0.9.6 [24 Sep 2000] *) In ssl23_get_client_hello, generate an error message when faced with an initial SSL 3.0/TLS record that is too small to contain the first two bytes of the ClientHello message, i.e. client_version. (Note that this is a pathologic case that probably has never happened in real life.) The previous approach was to use the version number from the record header as a substitute; but our protocol choice should not depend on that one because it is not authenticated by the Finished messages. [Bodo Moeller] *) More robust randomness gathering functions for Windows. [Jeffrey Altman ] *) For compatibility reasons if the flag X509_V_FLAG_ISSUER_CHECK is not set then we don't setup the error code for issuer check errors to avoid possibly overwriting other errors which the callback does handle. If an application does set the flag then we assume it knows what it is doing and can handle the new informational codes appropriately. [Steve Henson] *) Fix for a nasty bug in ASN1_TYPE handling. ASN1_TYPE is used for a general "ANY" type, as such it should be able to decode anything including tagged types. However it didn't check the class so it would wrongly interpret tagged types in the same way as their universal counterpart and unknown types were just rejected. Changed so that the tagged and unknown types are handled in the same way as a SEQUENCE: that is the encoding is stored intact. There is also a new type "V_ASN1_OTHER" which is used when the class is not universal, in this case we have no idea what the actual type is so we just lump them all together. [Steve Henson] *) On VMS, stdout may very well lead to a file that is written to in a record-oriented fashion. That means that every write() will write a separate record, which will be read separately by the programs trying to read from it. This can be very confusing. The solution is to put a BIO filter in the way that will buffer text until a linefeed is reached, and then write everything a line at a time, so every record written will be an actual line, not chunks of lines and not (usually doesn't happen, but I've seen it once) several lines in one record. BIO_f_linebuffer() is the answer. Currently, it's a VMS-only method, because that's where it has been tested well enough. [Richard Levitte] *) Remove 'optimized' squaring variant in BN_mod_mul_montgomery, it can return incorrect results. (Note: The buggy variant was not enabled in OpenSSL 0.9.5a, but it was in 0.9.6-beta[12].) [Bodo Moeller] *) Disable the check for content being present when verifying detached signatures in pk7_smime.c. Some versions of Netscape (wrongly) include zero length content when signing messages. [Steve Henson] *) New BIO_shutdown_wr macro, which invokes the BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR BIO_ctrl (for BIO pairs). [Bodo Möller] *) Add DSO method for VMS. [Richard Levitte] *) Bug fix: Montgomery multiplication could produce results with the wrong sign. [Ulf Möller] *) Add RPM specification openssl.spec and modify it to build three packages. The default package contains applications, application documentation and run-time libraries. The devel package contains include files, static libraries and function documentation. The doc package contains the contents of the doc directory. The original openssl.spec was provided by Damien Miller . [Richard Levitte] *) Add a large number of documentation files for many SSL routines. [Lutz Jaenicke ] *) Add a configuration entry for Sony News 4. [NAKAJI Hiroyuki ] *) Don't set the two most significant bits to one when generating a random number < q in the DSA library. [Ulf Möller] *) New SSL API mode 'SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY'. This disables the default behaviour that SSL_read may result in SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ (even if the underlying transport is blocking) if a handshake took place. (The default behaviour is needed by applications such as s_client and s_server that use select() to determine when to use SSL_read; but for applications that know in advance when to expect data, it just makes things more complicated.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add RAND_egd_bytes(), which gives control over the number of bytes read from EGD. [Ben Laurie] *) Add a few more EBCDIC conditionals that make `req' and `x509' work better on such systems. [Martin Kraemer ] *) Add two demo programs for PKCS12_parse() and PKCS12_create(). Update PKCS12_parse() so it copies the friendlyName and the keyid to the certificates aux info. [Steve Henson] *) Fix bug in PKCS7_verify() which caused an infinite loop if there was more than one signature. [Sven Uszpelkat ] *) Major change in util/mkdef.pl to include extra information about each symbol, as well as presentig variables as well as functions. This change means that there's n more need to rebuild the .num files when some algorithms are excluded. [Richard Levitte] *) Allow the verify time to be set by an application, rather than always using the current time. [Steve Henson] *) Phase 2 verify code reorganisation. The certificate verify code now looks up an issuer certificate by a number of criteria: subject name, authority key id and key usage. It also verifies self signed certificates by the same criteria. The main comparison function is X509_check_issued() which performs these checks. Lot of changes were necessary in order to support this without completely rewriting the lookup code. Authority and subject key identifier are now cached. The LHASH 'certs' is X509_STORE has now been replaced by a STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT). This is mainly because an LHASH can't store or retrieve multiple objects with the same hash value. As a result various functions (which were all internal use only) have changed to handle the new X509_STORE structure. This will break anything that messed round with X509_STORE internally. The functions X509_STORE_add_cert() now checks for an exact match, rather than just subject name. The X509_STORE API doesn't directly support the retrieval of multiple certificates matching a given criteria, however this can be worked round by performing a lookup first (which will fill the cache with candidate certificates) and then examining the cache for matches. This is probably the best we can do without throwing out X509_LOOKUP entirely (maybe later...). The X509_VERIFY_CTX structure has been enhanced considerably. All certificate lookup operations now go via a get_issuer() callback. Although this currently uses an X509_STORE it can be replaced by custom lookups. This is a simple way to bypass the X509_STORE hackery necessary to make this work and makes it possible to use more efficient techniques in future. A very simple version which uses a simple STACK for its trusted certificate store is also provided using X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(). The verify_cb() and verify() callbacks now have equivalents in the X509_STORE_CTX structure. X509_STORE_CTX also has a 'flags' field which can be used to customise the verify behaviour. [Steve Henson] *) Add new PKCS#7 signing option PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP which excludes S/MIME capabilities. [Steve Henson] *) When a certificate request is read in keep a copy of the original encoding of the signed data and use it when outputing again. Signatures then use the original encoding rather than a decoded, encoded version which may cause problems if the request is improperly encoded. [Steve Henson] *) For consistency with other BIO_puts implementations, call buffer_write(b, ...) directly in buffer_puts instead of calling BIO_write(b, ...). In BIO_puts, increment b->num_write as in BIO_write. [Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr] *) Fix BN_mul_word for the case where the word is 0. (We have to use BN_zero, we may not return a BIGNUM with an array consisting of words set to zero.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Avoid calling abort() from within the library when problems are detected, except if preprocessor symbols have been defined (such as REF_CHECK, BN_DEBUG etc.). [Bodo Moeller] *) New openssl application 'rsautl'. This utility can be used for low level RSA operations. DER public key BIO/fp routines also added. [Steve Henson] *) New Configure entry and patches for compiling on QNX 4. [Andreas Schneider ] *) A demo state-machine implementation was sponsored by Nuron (http://www.nuron.com/) and is now available in demos/state_machine. [Ben Laurie] *) New options added to the 'dgst' utility for signature generation and verification. [Steve Henson] *) Unrecognized PKCS#7 content types are now handled via a catch all ASN1_TYPE structure. This allows unsupported types to be stored as a "blob" and an application can encode and decode it manually. [Steve Henson] *) Fix various signed/unsigned issues to make a_strex.c compile under VC++. [Oscar Jacobsson ] *) ASN1 fixes. i2d_ASN1_OBJECT was not returning the correct length if passed a buffer. ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN failed if passed a NULL BN and its argument was negative. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Sven Heiberg ] *) Modification to PKCS#7 encoding routines to output definite length encoding. Since currently the whole structures are in memory there's not real point in using indefinite length constructed encoding. However if OpenSSL is compiled with the flag PKCS7_INDEFINITE_ENCODING the old form is used. [Steve Henson] *) Added BIO_vprintf() and BIO_vsnprintf(). [Richard Levitte] *) Added more prefixes to parse for in the the strings written through a logging bio, to cover all the levels that are available through syslog. The prefixes are now: PANIC, EMERG, EMR => LOG_EMERG ALERT, ALR => LOG_ALERT CRIT, CRI => LOG_CRIT ERROR, ERR => LOG_ERR WARNING, WARN, WAR => LOG_WARNING NOTICE, NOTE, NOT => LOG_NOTICE INFO, INF => LOG_INFO DEBUG, DBG => LOG_DEBUG and as before, if none of those prefixes are present at the beginning of the string, LOG_ERR is chosen. On Win32, the LOG_* levels are mapped according to this: LOG_EMERG, LOG_ALERT, LOG_CRIT, LOG_ERR => EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE LOG_WARNING => EVENTLOG_WARNING_TYPE LOG_NOTICE, LOG_INFO, LOG_DEBUG => EVENTLOG_INFORMATION_TYPE [Richard Levitte] *) Made it possible to reconfigure with just the configuration argument "reconf" or "reconfigure". The command line arguments are stored in Makefile.ssl in the variable CONFIGURE_ARGS, and are retrieved from there when reconfiguring. [Richard Levitte] *) MD4 implemented. [Assar Westerlund , Richard Levitte] *) Add the arguments -CAfile and -CApath to the pkcs12 utility. [Richard Levitte] *) The obj_dat.pl script was messing up the sorting of object names. The reason was that it compared the quoted version of strings as a result "OCSP" > "OCSP Signing" because " > SPACE. Changed script to store unquoted versions of names and add quotes on output. It was also omitting some names from the lookup table if they were given a default value (that is if SN is missing it is given the same value as LN and vice versa), these are now added on the grounds that if an object has a name we should be able to look it up. Finally added warning output when duplicate short or long names are found. [Steve Henson] *) Changes needed for Tandem NSK. [Scott Uroff ] *) Fix SSL 2.0 rollback checking: Due to an off-by-one error in RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(), special padding was never detected and thus the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 countermeasure against protocol version rollback attacks was not effective. In s23_clnt.c, don't use special rollback-attack detection padding (RSA_SSLV23_PADDING) if SSL 2.0 is the only protocol enabled in the client; similarly, in s23_srvr.c, don't do the rollback check if SSL 2.0 is the only protocol enabled in the server. [Bodo Moeller] *) Make it possible to get hexdumps of unprintable data with 'openssl asn1parse'. By implication, the functions ASN1_parse_dump() and BIO_dump_indent() are added. [Richard Levitte] *) New functions ASN1_STRING_print_ex() and X509_NAME_print_ex() these print out strings and name structures based on various flags including RFC2253 support and proper handling of multibyte characters. Added options to the 'x509' utility to allow the various flags to be set. [Steve Henson] *) Various fixes to use ASN1_TIME instead of ASN1_UTCTIME. Also change the functions X509_cmp_current_time() and X509_gmtime_adj() work with an ASN1_TIME structure, this will enable certificates using GeneralizedTime in validity dates to be checked. [Steve Henson] *) Make the NEG_PUBKEY_BUG code (which tolerates invalid negative public key encodings) on by default, NO_NEG_PUBKEY_BUG can be set to disable it. [Steve Henson] *) New function c2i_ASN1_OBJECT() which acts on ASN1_OBJECT content octets. An i2c_ASN1_OBJECT is unnecessary because the encoding can be trivially obtained from the structure. [Steve Henson] *) crypto/err.c locking bugfix: Use write locks (CRYPTO_w_[un]lock), not read locks (CRYPTO_r_[un]lock). [Bodo Moeller] *) A first attempt at creating official support for shared libraries through configuration. I've kept it so the default is static libraries only, and the OpenSSL programs are always statically linked for now, but there are preparations for dynamic linking in place. This has been tested on Linux and Tru64. [Richard Levitte] *) Randomness polling function for Win9x, as described in: Peter Gutmann, Software Generation of Practically Strong Random Numbers. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix so PRNG is seeded in req if using an already existing DSA key. [Steve Henson] *) New options to smime application. -inform and -outform allow alternative formats for the S/MIME message including PEM and DER. The -content option allows the content to be specified separately. This should allow things like Netscape form signing output easier to verify. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the ASN1 encoding of tags using the 'long form'. [Steve Henson] *) New ASN1 functions, i2c_* and c2i_* for INTEGER and BIT STRING types. These convert content octets to and from the underlying type. The actual tag and length octets are already assumed to have been read in and checked. These are needed because all other string types have virtually identical handling apart from the tag. By having versions of the ASN1 functions that just operate on content octets IMPLICIT tagging can be handled properly. It also allows the ASN1_ENUMERATED code to be cut down because ASN1_ENUMERATED and ASN1_INTEGER are identical apart from the tag. [Steve Henson] *) Change the handling of OID objects as follows: - New object identifiers are inserted in objects.txt, following the syntax given in objects.README. - objects.pl is used to process obj_mac.num and create a new obj_mac.h. - obj_dat.pl is used to create a new obj_dat.h, using the data in obj_mac.h. This is currently kind of a hack, and the perl code in objects.pl isn't very elegant, but it works as I intended. The simplest way to check that it worked correctly is to look in obj_dat.h and check the array nid_objs and make sure the objects haven't moved around (this is important!). Additions are OK, as well as consistent name changes. [Richard Levitte] *) Add BSD-style MD5-based passwords to 'openssl passwd' (option '-1'). [Bodo Moeller] *) Addition of the command line parameter '-rand file' to 'openssl req'. The given file adds to whatever has already been seeded into the random pool through the RANDFILE configuration file option or environment variable, or the default random state file. [Richard Levitte] *) mkstack.pl now sorts each macro group into lexical order. Previously the output order depended on the order the files appeared in the directory, resulting in needless rewriting of safestack.h . [Steve Henson] *) Patches to make OpenSSL compile under Win32 again. Mostly work arounds for the VC++ problem that it treats func() as func(void). Also stripped out the parts of mkdef.pl that added extra typesafe functions: these no longer exist. [Steve Henson] *) Reorganisation of the stack code. The macros are now all collected in safestack.h . Each macro is defined in terms of a "stack macro" of the form SKM_(type, a, b). The DEBUG_SAFESTACK is now handled in terms of function casts, this has the advantage of retaining type safety without the use of additional functions. If DEBUG_SAFESTACK is not defined then the non typesafe macros are used instead. Also modified the mkstack.pl script to handle the new form. Needs testing to see if which (if any) compilers it chokes and maybe make DEBUG_SAFESTACK the default if no major problems. Similar behaviour for ASN1_SET_OF and PKCS12_STACK_OF. [Steve Henson] *) When some versions of IIS use the 'NET' form of private key the key derivation algorithm is different. Normally MD5(password) is used as a 128 bit RC4 key. In the modified case MD5(MD5(password) + "SGCKEYSALT") is used insted. Added some new functions i2d_RSA_NET(), d2i_RSA_NET() etc which are the same as the old Netscape_RSA functions except they have an additional 'sgckey' parameter which uses the modified algorithm. Also added an -sgckey command line option to the rsa utility. Thanks to Adrian Peck for posting details of the modified algorithm to openssl-dev. [Steve Henson] *) The evp_local.h macros were using 'c.##kname' which resulted in invalid expansion on some systems (SCO 5.0.5 for example). Corrected to 'c.kname'. [Phillip Porch ] *) New X509_get1_email() and X509_REQ_get1_email() functions that return a STACK of email addresses from a certificate or request, these look in the subject name and the subject alternative name extensions and omit any duplicate addresses. [Steve Henson] *) Re-implement BN_mod_exp2_mont using independent (and larger) windows. This makes DSA verification about 2 % faster. [Bodo Moeller] *) Increase maximum window size in BN_mod_exp_... to 6 bits instead of 5 (meaning that now 2^5 values will be precomputed, which is only 4 KB plus overhead for 1024 bit moduli). This makes exponentiations about 0.5 % faster for 1024 bit exponents (as measured by "openssl speed rsa2048"). [Bodo Moeller] *) Rename memory handling macros to avoid conflicts with other software: Malloc => OPENSSL_malloc Malloc_locked => OPENSSL_malloc_locked Realloc => OPENSSL_realloc Free => OPENSSL_free [Richard Levitte] *) New function BN_mod_exp_mont_word for small bases (roughly 15% faster than BN_mod_exp_mont, i.e. 7% for a full DH exchange). [Bodo Moeller] *) CygWin32 support. [John Jarvie ] *) The type-safe stack code has been rejigged. It is now only compiled in when OpenSSL is configured with the DEBUG_SAFESTACK option and by default all type-specific stack functions are "#define"d back to standard stack functions. This results in more streamlined output but retains the type-safety checking possibilities of the original approach. [Geoff Thorpe] *) The STACK code has been cleaned up, and certain type declarations that didn't make a lot of sense have been brought in line. This has also involved a cleanup of sorts in safestack.h to more correctly map type-safe stack functions onto their plain stack counterparts. This work has also resulted in a variety of "const"ifications of lots of the code, especially "_cmp" operations which should normally be prototyped with "const" parameters anyway. [Geoff Thorpe] *) When generating bytes for the first time in md_rand.c, 'stir the pool' by seeding with STATE_SIZE dummy bytes (with zero entropy count). (The PRNG state consists of two parts, the large pool 'state' and 'md', where all of 'md' is used each time the PRNG is used, but 'state' is used only indexed by a cyclic counter. As entropy may not be well distributed from the beginning, 'md' is important as a chaining variable. However, the output function chains only half of 'md', i.e. 80 bits. ssleay_rand_add, on the other hand, chains all of 'md', and seeding with STATE_SIZE dummy bytes will result in all of 'state' being rewritten, with the new values depending on virtually all of 'md'. This overcomes the 80 bit limitation.) [Bodo Moeller] *) In ssl/s2_clnt.c and ssl/s3_clnt.c, call ERR_clear_error() when the handshake is continued after ssl_verify_cert_chain(); otherwise, if SSL_VERIFY_NONE is set, remaining error codes can lead to 'unexplainable' connection aborts later. [Bodo Moeller; problem tracked down by Lutz Jaenicke] *) Major EVP API cipher revision. Add hooks for extra EVP features. This allows various cipher parameters to be set in the EVP interface. Support added for variable key length ciphers via the EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length() function and setting of RC2 and RC5 parameters. Modify EVP_OpenInit() and EVP_SealInit() to cope with variable key length ciphers. Remove lots of duplicated code from the EVP library. For example *every* cipher init() function handles the 'iv' in the same way according to the cipher mode. They also all do nothing if the 'key' parameter is NULL and for CFB and OFB modes they zero ctx->num. New functionality allows removal of S/MIME code RC2 hack. Most of the routines have the same form and so can be declared in terms of macros. By shifting this to the top level EVP_CipherInit() it can be removed from all individual ciphers. If the cipher wants to handle IVs or keys differently it can set the EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV or EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT flags. Change lots of functions like EVP_EncryptUpdate() to now return a value: although software versions of the algorithms cannot fail any installed hardware versions can. [Steve Henson] *) Implement SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG: In ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, if this option is set, tolerate broken clients that send the negotiated protocol version number instead of the requested protocol version number. [Bodo Moeller] *) Call dh_tmp_cb (set by ..._TMP_DH_CB) with correct 'is_export' flag; i.e. non-zero for export ciphersuites, zero otherwise. Previous versions had this flag inverted, inconsistent with rsa_tmp_cb (..._TMP_RSA_CB). [Bodo Moeller; problem reported by Amit Chopra] *) Add missing DSA library text string. Work around for some IIS key files with invalid SEQUENCE encoding. [Steve Henson] *) Add a document (doc/standards.txt) that list all kinds of standards and so on that are implemented in OpenSSL. [Richard Levitte] *) Enhance c_rehash script. Old version would mishandle certificates with the same subject name hash and wouldn't handle CRLs at all. Added -fingerprint option to crl utility, to support new c_rehash features. [Steve Henson] *) Eliminate non-ANSI declarations in crypto.h and stack.h. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix for SSL server purpose checking. Server checking was rejecting certificates which had extended key usage present but no ssl client purpose. [Steve Henson, reported by Rene Grosser ] *) Make PKCS#12 code work with no password. The PKCS#12 spec is a little unclear about how a blank password is handled. Since the password in encoded as a BMPString with terminating double NULL a zero length password would end up as just the double NULL. However no password at all is different and is handled differently in the PKCS#12 key generation code. NS treats a blank password as zero length. MSIE treats it as no password on export: but it will try both on import. We now do the same: PKCS12_parse() tries zero length and no password if the password is set to "" or NULL (NULL is now a valid password: it wasn't before) as does the pkcs12 application. [Steve Henson] *) Bugfixes in apps/x509.c: Avoid a memory leak; and don't use perror when PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ fails, the error message must be obtained from the error queue. [Bodo Moeller] *) Avoid 'thread_hash' memory leak in crypto/err/err.c by freeing it in ERR_remove_state if appropriate, and change ERR_get_state accordingly to avoid race conditions (this is necessary because thread_hash is no longer constant once set). [Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix for linux-elf makefile.one. [Ulf Möller] *) RSA_get_default_method() will now cause a default RSA_METHOD to be chosen if one doesn't exist already. Previously this was only set during a call to RSA_new() or RSA_new_method(NULL) meaning it was possible for RSA_get_default_method() to return NULL. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Added native name translation to the existing DSO code that will convert (if the flag to do so is set) filenames that are sufficiently small and have no path information into a canonical native form. Eg. "blah" converted to "libblah.so" or "blah.dll" etc. [Geoff Thorpe] *) New function ERR_error_string_n(e, buf, len) which is like ERR_error_string(e, buf), but writes at most 'len' bytes including the 0 terminator. For ERR_error_string_n, 'buf' may not be NULL. [Damien Miller , Bodo Moeller] *) CONF library reworked to become more general. A new CONF configuration file reader "class" is implemented as well as a new functions (NCONF_*, for "New CONF") to handle it. The now old CONF_* functions are still there, but are reimplemented to work in terms of the new functions. Also, a set of functions to handle the internal storage of the configuration data is provided to make it easier to write new configuration file reader "classes" (I can definitely see something reading a configuration file in XML format, for example), called _CONF_*, or "the configuration storage API"... The new configuration file reading functions are: NCONF_new, NCONF_free, NCONF_load, NCONF_load_fp, NCONF_load_bio, NCONF_get_section, NCONF_get_string, NCONF_get_numbre NCONF_default, NCONF_WIN32 NCONF_dump_fp, NCONF_dump_bio NCONF_default and NCONF_WIN32 are method (or "class") choosers, NCONF_new creates a new CONF object. This works in the same way as other interfaces in OpenSSL, like the BIO interface. NCONF_dump_* dump the internal storage of the configuration file, which is useful for debugging. All other functions take the same arguments as the old CONF_* functions wth the exception of the first that must be a `CONF *' instead of a `LHASH *'. To make it easer to use the new classes with the old CONF_* functions, the function CONF_set_default_method is provided. [Richard Levitte] *) Add '-tls1' option to 'openssl ciphers', which was already mentioned in the documentation but had not been implemented. (This option is not yet really useful because even the additional experimental TLS 1.0 ciphers are currently treated as SSL 3.0 ciphers.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Initial DSO code added into libcrypto for letting OpenSSL (and OpenSSL-based applications) load shared libraries and bind to them in a portable way. [Geoff Thorpe, with contributions from Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.5 and 0.9.5a [1 Apr 2000] *) Make sure _lrotl and _lrotr are only used with MSVC. *) Use lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND correctly in ssleay_rand_status (the default implementation of RAND_status). *) Rename openssl x509 option '-crlext', which was added in 0.9.5, to '-clrext' (= clear extensions), as intended and documented. [Bodo Moeller; inconsistency pointed out by Michael Attili ] *) Fix for HMAC. It wasn't zeroing the rest of the block if the key length was larger than the MD block size. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Yost William ] *) Modernise PKCS12_parse() so it uses STACK_OF(X509) for its ca argument fix a leak when the ca argument was passed as NULL. Stop X509_PUBKEY_set() using the passed key: if the passed key was a private key the result of X509_print(), for example, would be to print out all the private key components. [Steve Henson] *) des_quad_cksum() byte order bug fix. [Ulf Möller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where the solution is attributed to Derrick J Brashear ] *) Fix so V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE works again: however its use is strongly discouraged. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Brian Korver ] *) For easily testing in shell scripts whether some command 'openssl XXX' exists, the new pseudo-command 'openssl no-XXX' returns with exit code 0 iff no command of the given name is available. 'no-XXX' is printed in this case, 'XXX' otherwise. In both cases, the output goes to stdout and nothing is printed to stderr. Additional arguments are always ignored. Since for each cipher there is a command of the same name, the 'no-cipher' compilation switches can be tested this way. ('openssl no-XXX' is not able to detect pseudo-commands such as 'quit', 'list-XXX-commands', or 'no-XXX' itself.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Update test suite so that 'make test' succeeds in 'no-rsa' configuration. [Bodo Moeller] *) For SSL_[CTX_]set_tmp_dh, don't create a DH key if SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is set; it will be thrown away anyway because each handshake creates its own key. ssl_cert_dup, which is used by SSL_new, now copies DH keys in addition to parameters -- in previous versions (since OpenSSL 0.9.3) the 'default key' from SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh would always be lost, meanining you effectivly got SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE when using this macro. [Bodo Moeller] *) New s_client option -ign_eof: EOF at stdin is ignored, and 'Q' and 'R' lose their special meanings (quit/renegotiate). This is part of what -quiet does; unlike -quiet, -ign_eof does not suppress any output. [Richard Levitte] *) Add compatibility options to the purpose and trust code. The purpose X509_PURPOSE_ANY is "any purpose" which automatically accepts a certificate or CA, this was the previous behaviour, with all the associated security issues. X509_TRUST_COMPAT is the old trust behaviour: only and automatically trust self signed roots in certificate store. A new trust setting X509_TRUST_DEFAULT is used to specify that a purpose has no associated trust setting and it should instead use the value in the default purpose. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the PKCS#8 DSA private key code so it decodes keys again and fix a memory leak. [Steve Henson] *) In util/mkerr.pl (which implements 'make errors'), preserve reason strings from the previous version of the .c file, as the default to have only downcase letters (and digits) in automatically generated reasons codes is not always appropriate. [Bodo Moeller] *) In ERR_load_ERR_strings(), build an ERR_LIB_SYS error reason table using strerror. Previously, ERR_reason_error_string() returned library names as reason strings for SYSerr; but SYSerr is a special case where small numbers are errno values, not library numbers. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add '-dsaparam' option to 'openssl dhparam' application. This converts DSA parameters into DH parameters. (When creating parameters, DSA_generate_parameters is used.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Include 'length' (recommended exponent length) in C code generated by 'openssl dhparam -C'. [Bodo Moeller] *) The second argument to set_label in perlasm was already being used so couldn't be used as a "file scope" flag. Moved to third argument which was free. [Steve Henson] *) In PEM_ASN1_write_bio and some other functions, use RAND_pseudo_bytes instead of RAND_bytes for encryption IVs and salts. [Bodo Moeller] *) Include RAND_status() into RAND_METHOD instead of implementing it only for md_rand.c Otherwise replacing the PRNG by calling RAND_set_rand_method would be impossible. [Bodo Moeller] *) Don't let DSA_generate_key() enter an infinite loop if the random number generation fails. [Bodo Moeller] *) New 'rand' application for creating pseudo-random output. [Bodo Moeller] *) Added configuration support for Linux/IA64 [Rolf Haberrecker ] *) Assembler module support for Mingw32. [Ulf Möller] *) Shared library support for HPUX (in shlib/). [Lutz Jaenicke and Anonymous] *) Shared library support for Solaris gcc. [Lutz Behnke ] Changes between 0.9.4 and 0.9.5 [28 Feb 2000] *) PKCS7_encrypt() was adding text MIME headers twice because they were added manually and by SMIME_crlf_copy(). [Steve Henson] *) In bntest.c don't call BN_rand with zero bits argument. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Andrew W. Gray ] *) BN_mul bugfix: In bn_mul_part_recursion() only the a>a[n] && b>b[n] case was implemented. This caused BN_div_recp() to fail occasionally. [Ulf Möller] *) Add an optional second argument to the set_label() in the perl assembly language builder. If this argument exists and is set to 1 it signals that the assembler should use a symbol whose scope is the entire file, not just the current function. This is needed with MASM which uses the format label:: for this scope. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Peter Runestig ] *) Change the ASN1 types so they are typedefs by default. Before almost all types were #define'd to ASN1_STRING which was causing STACK_OF() problems: you couldn't declare STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) for example. [Steve Henson] *) Change names of new functions to the new get1/get0 naming convention: After 'get1', the caller owns a reference count and has to call ..._free; 'get0' returns a pointer to some data structure without incrementing reference counters. (Some of the existing 'get' functions increment a reference counter, some don't.) Similarly, 'set1' and 'add1' functions increase reference counters or duplicate objects. [Steve Henson] *) Allow for the possibility of temp RSA key generation failure: the code used to assume it always worked and crashed on failure. [Steve Henson] *) Fix potential buffer overrun problem in BIO_printf(). [Ulf Möller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem pointed out by David Sacerdote ] *) Support EGD . New functions RAND_egd() and RAND_status(). In the command line application, the EGD socket can be specified like a seed file using RANDFILE or -rand. [Ulf Möller] *) Allow the string CERTIFICATE to be tolerated in PKCS#7 structures. Some CAs (e.g. Verisign) distribute certificates in this form. [Steve Henson] *) Remove the SSL_ALLOW_ADH compile option and set the default cipher list to exclude them. This means that no special compilation option is needed to use anonymous DH: it just needs to be included in the cipher list. [Steve Henson] *) Change the EVP_MD_CTX_type macro so its meaning consistent with EVP_MD_type. The old functionality is available in a new macro called EVP_MD_md(). Change code that uses it and update docs. [Steve Henson] *) ..._ctrl functions now have corresponding ..._callback_ctrl functions where the 'void *' argument is replaced by a function pointer argument. Previously 'void *' was abused to point to functions, which works on many platforms, but is not correct. As these functions are usually called by macros defined in OpenSSL header files, most source code should work without changes. [Richard Levitte] *) (which is created by Configure) now contains sections with information on -D... compiler switches used for compiling the library so that applications can see them. To enable one of these sections, a pre-processor symbol OPENSSL_..._DEFINES must be defined. E.g., #define OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES #include defines all pertinent NO_ symbols, such as NO_IDEA, NO_RSA, etc. [Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo Möller] *) Bugfix: Tolerate fragmentation and interleaving in the SSL 3/TLS record layer. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change the 'other' type in certificate aux info to a STACK_OF X509_ALGOR. Although not an AlgorithmIdentifier as such it has the required ASN1 format: arbitrary types determined by an OID. [Steve Henson] *) Add some PEM_write_X509_REQ_NEW() functions and a command line argument to 'req'. This is not because the function is newer or better than others it just uses the work 'NEW' in the certificate request header lines. Some software needs this. [Steve Henson] *) Reorganise password command line arguments: now passwords can be obtained from various sources. Delete the PEM_cb function and make it the default behaviour: i.e. if the callback is NULL and the usrdata argument is not NULL interpret it as a null terminated pass phrase. If usrdata and the callback are NULL then the pass phrase is prompted for as usual. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for the Compaq Atalla crypto accelerator. If it is installed, the support is automatically enabled. The resulting binaries will autodetect the card and use it if present. [Ben Laurie and Compaq Inc.] *) Work around for Netscape hang bug. This sends certificate request and server done in one record. Since this is perfectly legal in the SSL/TLS protocol it isn't a "bug" option and is on by default. See the bugs/SSLv3 entry for more info. [Steve Henson] *) HP-UX tune-up: new unified configs, HP C compiler bug workaround. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add -rand argument to smime and pkcs12 applications and read/write of seed file. [Steve Henson] *) New 'passwd' tool for crypt(3) and apr1 password hashes. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add command line password options to the remaining applications. [Steve Henson] *) Bug fix for BN_div_recp() for numerators with an even number of bits. [Ulf Möller] *) More tests in bntest.c, and changed test_bn output. [Ulf Möller] *) ./config recognizes MacOS X now. [Andy Polyakov] *) Bug fix for BN_div() when the first words of num and divsor are equal (it gave wrong results if (rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2) < d0). [Ulf Möller] *) Add support for various broken PKCS#8 formats, and command line options to produce them. [Steve Henson] *) New functions BN_CTX_start(), BN_CTX_get() and BT_CTX_end() to get temporary BIGNUMs from a BN_CTX. [Ulf Möller] *) Correct return values in BN_mod_exp_mont() and BN_mod_exp2_mont() for p == 0. [Ulf Möller] *) Change the SSLeay_add_all_*() functions to OpenSSL_add_all_*() and include a #define from the old name to the new. The original intent was that statically linked binaries could for example just call SSLeay_add_all_ciphers() to just add ciphers to the table and not link with digests. This never worked becayse SSLeay_add_all_digests() and SSLeay_add_all_ciphers() were in the same source file so calling one would link with the other. They are now in separate source files. [Steve Henson] *) Add a new -notext option to 'ca' and a -pubkey option to 'spkac'. [Steve Henson] *) Use a less unusual form of the Miller-Rabin primality test (it used a binary algorithm for exponentiation integrated into the Miller-Rabin loop, our standard modexp algorithms are faster). [Bodo Moeller] *) Support for the EBCDIC character set completed. [Martin Kraemer ] *) Source code cleanups: use const where appropriate, eliminate casts, use void * instead of char * in lhash. [Ulf Möller] *) Bugfix: ssl3_send_server_key_exchange was not restartable (the state was not changed to SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B, and because of this the server could overwrite ephemeral keys that the client has already seen). [Bodo Moeller] *) Turn DSA_is_prime into a macro that calls BN_is_prime, using 50 iterations of the Rabin-Miller test. DSA_generate_parameters now uses BN_is_prime_fasttest (with 50 iterations of the Rabin-Miller test as required by the appendix to FIPS PUB 186[-1]) instead of DSA_is_prime. As BN_is_prime_fasttest includes trial division, DSA parameter generation becomes much faster. This implies a change for the callback functions in DSA_is_prime and DSA_generate_parameters: The callback function is called once for each positive witness in the Rabin-Miller test, not just occasionally in the inner loop; and the parameters to the callback function now provide an iteration count for the outer loop rather than for the current invocation of the inner loop. DSA_generate_parameters additionally can call the callback function with an 'iteration count' of -1, meaning that a candidate has passed the trial division test (when q is generated from an application-provided seed, trial division is skipped). [Bodo Moeller] *) New function BN_is_prime_fasttest that optionally does trial division before starting the Rabin-Miller test and has an additional BN_CTX * argument (whereas BN_is_prime always has to allocate at least one BN_CTX). 'callback(1, -1, cb_arg)' is called when a number has passed the trial division stage. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for bug in CRL encoding. The validity dates weren't being handled as ASN1_TIME. [Steve Henson] *) New -pkcs12 option to CA.pl script to write out a PKCS#12 file. [Steve Henson] *) New function BN_pseudo_rand(). [Ulf Möller] *) Clean up BN_mod_mul_montgomery(): replace the broken (and unreadable) bignum version of BN_from_montgomery() with the working code from SSLeay 0.9.0 (the word based version is faster anyway), and clean up the comments. [Ulf Möller] *) Avoid a race condition in s2_clnt.c (function get_server_hello) that made it impossible to use the same SSL_SESSION data structure in SSL2 clients in multiple threads. [Bodo Moeller] *) The return value of RAND_load_file() no longer counts bytes obtained by stat(). RAND_load_file(..., -1) is new and uses the complete file to seed the PRNG (previously an explicit byte count was required). [Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller] *) Clean up CRYPTO_EX_DATA functions, some of these didn't have prototypes used (char *) instead of (void *) and had casts all over the place. [Steve Henson] *) Make BN_generate_prime() return NULL on error if ret!=NULL. [Ulf Möller] *) Retain source code compatibility for BN_prime_checks macro: BN_is_prime(..., BN_prime_checks, ...) now uses BN_prime_checks_for_size to determine the appropriate number of Rabin-Miller iterations. [Ulf Möller] *) Diffie-Hellman uses "safe" primes: DH_check() return code renamed to DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME. (Check if this is true? OpenPGP calls them "strong".) [Ulf Möller] *) Merge the functionality of "dh" and "gendh" programs into a new program "dhparam". The old programs are retained for now but will handle DH keys (instead of parameters) in future. [Steve Henson] *) Make the ciphers, s_server and s_client programs check the return values when a new cipher list is set. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance the SSL/TLS cipher mechanism to correctly handle the TLS 56bit ciphers. Before when the 56bit ciphers were enabled the sorting was wrong. The syntax for the cipher sorting has been extended to support sorting by cipher-strength (using the strength_bits hard coded in the tables). The new command is "@STRENGTH" (see also doc/apps/ciphers.pod). Fix a bug in the cipher-command parser: when supplying a cipher command string with an "undefined" symbol (neither command nor alphanumeric [A-Za-z0-9], ssl_set_cipher_list used to hang in an endless loop. Now an error is flagged. Due to the strength-sorting extension, the code of the ssl_create_cipher_list() function was completely rearranged. I hope that the readability was also increased :-) [Lutz Jaenicke ] *) Minor change to 'x509' utility. The -CAcreateserial option now uses 1 for the first serial number and places 2 in the serial number file. This avoids problems when the root CA is created with serial number zero and the first user certificate has the same issuer name and serial number as the root CA. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes to X509_ATTRIBUTE utilities, change the 'req' program so it uses the new code. Add documentation for this stuff. [Steve Henson] *) Changes to X509_ATTRIBUTE utilities. These have been renamed from X509_*() to X509at_*() on the grounds that they don't handle X509 structures and behave in an analagous way to the X509v3 functions: they shouldn't be called directly but wrapper functions should be used instead. So we also now have some wrapper functions that call the X509at functions when passed certificate requests. (TO DO: similar things can be done with PKCS#7 signed and unsigned attributes, PKCS#12 attributes and a few other things. Some of these need some d2i or i2d and print functionality because they handle more complex structures.) [Steve Henson] *) Add missing #ifndefs that caused missing symbols when building libssl as a shared library without RSA. Use #ifndef NO_SSL2 instead of NO_RSA in ssl/s2*.c. [Kris Kennaway , modified by Ulf Möller] *) Precautions against using the PRNG uninitialized: RAND_bytes() now has a return value which indicates the quality of the random data (1 = ok, 0 = not seeded). Also an error is recorded on the thread's error queue. New function RAND_pseudo_bytes() generates output that is guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable. RAND_add is like RAND_seed, but takes an extra argument for an entropy estimate (RAND_seed always assumes full entropy). [Ulf Möller] *) Do more iterations of Rabin-Miller probable prime test (specifically, 3 for 1024-bit primes, 6 for 512-bit primes, 12 for 256-bit primes instead of only 2 for all lengths; see BN_prime_checks_for_size definition in crypto/bn/bn_prime.c for the complete table). This guarantees a false-positive rate of at most 2^-80 for random input. [Bodo Moeller] *) Rewrite ssl3_read_n (ssl/s3_pkt.c) avoiding a couple of bugs. [Bodo Moeller] *) New function X509_CTX_rget_chain() (renamed to X509_CTX_get1_chain in the 0.9.5 release), this returns the chain from an X509_CTX structure with a dup of the stack and all the X509 reference counts upped: so the stack will exist after X509_CTX_cleanup() has been called. Modify pkcs12.c to use this. Also make SSL_SESSION_print() print out the verify return code. [Steve Henson] *) Add manpage for the pkcs12 command. Also change the default behaviour so MAC iteration counts are used unless the new -nomaciter option is used. This improves file security and only older versions of MSIE (4.0 for example) need it. [Steve Henson] *) Honor the no-xxx Configure options when creating .DEF files. [Ulf Möller] *) Add PKCS#10 attributes to field table: challengePassword, unstructuredName and unstructuredAddress. These are taken from draft PKCS#9 v2.0 but are compatible with v1.2 provided no international characters are used. More changes to X509_ATTRIBUTE code: allow the setting of types based on strings. Remove the 'loc' parameter when adding attributes because these will be a SET OF encoding which is sorted in ASN1 order. [Steve Henson] *) Initial changes to the 'req' utility to allow request generation automation. This will allow an application to just generate a template file containing all the field values and have req construct the request. Initial support for X509_ATTRIBUTE handling. Stacks of these are used all over the place including certificate requests and PKCS#7 structures. They are currently handled manually where necessary with some primitive wrappers for PKCS#7. The new functions behave in a manner analogous to the X509 extension functions: they allow attributes to be looked up by NID and added. Later something similar to the X509V3 code would be desirable to automatically handle the encoding, decoding and printing of the more complex types. The string types like challengePassword can be handled by the string table functions. Also modified the multi byte string table handling. Now there is a 'global mask' which masks out certain types. The table itself can use the flag STABLE_NO_MASK to ignore the mask setting: this is useful when for example there is only one permissible type (as in countryName) and using the mask might result in no valid types at all. [Steve Henson] *) Clean up 'Finished' handling, and add functions SSL_get_finished and SSL_get_peer_finished to allow applications to obtain the latest Finished messages sent to the peer or expected from the peer, respectively. (SSL_get_peer_finished is usually the Finished message actually received from the peer, otherwise the protocol will be aborted.) As the Finished message are message digests of the complete handshake (with a total of 192 bits for TLS 1.0 and more for SSL 3.0), they can be used for external authentication procedures when the authentication provided by SSL/TLS is not desired or is not enough. [Bodo Moeller] *) Enhanced support for Alpha Linux is added. Now ./config checks if the host supports BWX extension and if Compaq C is present on the $PATH. Just exploiting of the BWX extension results in 20-30% performance kick for some algorithms, e.g. DES and RC4 to mention a couple. Compaq C in turn generates ~20% faster code for MD5 and SHA1. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add support for MS "fast SGC". This is arguably a violation of the SSL3/TLS protocol. Netscape SGC does two handshakes: the first with weak crypto and after checking the certificate is SGC a second one with strong crypto. MS SGC stops the first handshake after receiving the server certificate message and sends a second client hello. Since a server will typically do all the time consuming operations before expecting any further messages from the client (server key exchange is the most expensive) there is little difference between the two. To get OpenSSL to support MS SGC we have to permit a second client hello message after we have sent server done. In addition we have to reset the MAC if we do get this second client hello. [Steve Henson] *) Add a function 'd2i_AutoPrivateKey()' this will automatically decide if a DER encoded private key is RSA or DSA traditional format. Changed d2i_PrivateKey_bio() to use it. This is only needed for the "traditional" format DER encoded private key. Newer code should use PKCS#8 format which has the key type encoded in the ASN1 structure. Added DER private key support to pkcs8 application. [Steve Henson] *) SSL 3/TLS 1 servers now don't request certificates when an anonymous ciphersuites has been selected (as required by the SSL 3/TLS 1 specifications). Exception: When SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT is set, we interpret this as a request to violate the specification (the worst that can happen is a handshake failure, and 'correct' behaviour would result in a handshake failure anyway). [Bodo Moeller] *) In SSL_CTX_add_session, take into account that there might be multiple SSL_SESSION structures with the same session ID (e.g. when two threads concurrently obtain them from an external cache). The internal cache can handle only one SSL_SESSION with a given ID, so if there's a conflict, we now throw out the old one to achieve consistency. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add OIDs for idea and blowfish in CBC mode. This will allow both to be used in PKCS#5 v2.0 and S/MIME. Also add checking to some routines that use cipher OIDs: some ciphers do not have OIDs defined and so they cannot be used for S/MIME and PKCS#5 v2.0 for example. [Steve Henson] *) Simplify the trust setting structure and code. Now we just have two sequences of OIDs for trusted and rejected settings. These will typically have values the same as the extended key usage extension and any application specific purposes. The trust checking code now has a default behaviour: it will just check for an object with the same NID as the passed id. Functions can be provided to override either the default behaviour or the behaviour for a given id. SSL client, server and email already have functions in place for compatibility: they check the NID and also return "trusted" if the certificate is self signed. [Steve Henson] *) Add d2i,i2d bio/fp functions for PrivateKey: these convert the traditional format into an EVP_PKEY structure. [Steve Henson] *) Add a password callback function PEM_cb() which either prompts for a password if usr_data is NULL or otherwise assumes it is a null terminated password. Allow passwords to be passed on command line environment or config files in a few more utilities. [Steve Henson] *) Add a bunch of DER and PEM functions to handle PKCS#8 format private keys. Add some short names for PKCS#8 PBE algorithms and allow them to be specified on the command line for the pkcs8 and pkcs12 utilities. Update documentation. [Steve Henson] *) Support for ASN1 "NULL" type. This could be handled before by using ASN1_TYPE but there wasn't any function that would try to read a NULL and produce an error if it couldn't. For compatibility we also have ASN1_NULL_new() and ASN1_NULL_free() functions but these are faked and don't allocate anything because they don't need to. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for MacOS is now provided. Examine INSTALL.MacOS for details. [Andy Polyakov, Roy Woods ] *) Rebuild of the memory allocation routines used by OpenSSL code and possibly others as well. The purpose is to make an interface that provide hooks so anyone can build a separate set of allocation and deallocation routines to be used by OpenSSL, for example memory pool implementations, or something else, which was previously hard since Malloc(), Realloc() and Free() were defined as macros having the values malloc, realloc and free, respectively (except for Win32 compilations). The same is provided for memory debugging code. OpenSSL already comes with functionality to find memory leaks, but this gives people a chance to debug other memory problems. With these changes, a new set of functions and macros have appeared: CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions() [F] CRYPTO_get_mem_debug_functions() [F] CRYPTO_dbg_set_options() [F] CRYPTO_dbg_get_options() [F] CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init() [M] The memory debug functions are NULL by default, unless the library is compiled with CRYPTO_MDEBUG or friends is defined. If someone wants to debug memory anyway, CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init() (which gives the standard debugging functions that come with OpenSSL) or CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions() (tells OpenSSL to use functions provided by the library user) must be used. When the standard debugging functions are used, CRYPTO_dbg_set_options can be used to request additional information: CRYPTO_dbg_set_options(V_CYRPTO_MDEBUG_xxx) corresponds to setting the CRYPTO_MDEBUG_xxx macro when compiling the library. Also, things like CRYPTO_set_mem_functions will always give the expected result (the new set of functions is used for allocation and deallocation) at all times, regardless of platform and compiler options. To finish it up, some functions that were never use in any other way than through macros have a new API and new semantic: CRYPTO_dbg_malloc() CRYPTO_dbg_realloc() CRYPTO_dbg_free() All macros of value have retained their old syntax. [Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller] *) Some S/MIME fixes. The OID for SMIMECapabilities was wrong, the ordering of SMIMECapabilities wasn't in "strength order" and there was a missing NULL in the AlgorithmIdentifier for the SHA1 signature algorithm. [Steve Henson] *) Some ASN1 types with illegal zero length encoding (INTEGER, ENUMERATED and OBJECT IDENTIFIER) choked the ASN1 routines. [Frans Heymans , modified by Steve Henson] *) Merge in my S/MIME library for OpenSSL. This provides a simple S/MIME API on top of the PKCS#7 code, a MIME parser (with enough functionality to handle multipart/signed properly) and a utility called 'smime' to call all this stuff. This is based on code I originally wrote for Celo who have kindly allowed it to be included in OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) Add variants des_set_key_checked and des_set_key_unchecked of des_set_key (aka des_key_sched). Global variable des_check_key decides which of these is called by des_set_key; this way des_check_key behaves as it always did, but applications and the library itself, which was buggy for des_check_key == 1, have a cleaner way to pick the version they need. [Bodo Moeller] *) New function PKCS12_newpass() which changes the password of a PKCS12 structure. [Steve Henson] *) Modify X509_TRUST and X509_PURPOSE so it also uses a static and dynamic mix. In both cases the ids can be used as an index into the table. Also modified the X509_TRUST_add() and X509_PURPOSE_add() functions so they accept a list of the field values and the application doesn't need to directly manipulate the X509_TRUST structure. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the ASN1_STRING_TABLE stuff so it also uses bsearch and doesn't need initialising. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the way the V3 extension code looks up extensions. This now works in a similar way to the object code: we have some "standard" extensions in a static table which is searched with OBJ_bsearch() and the application can add dynamic ones if needed. The file crypto/x509v3/ext_dat.h now has the info: this file needs to be updated whenever a new extension is added to the core code and kept in ext_nid order. There is a simple program 'tabtest.c' which checks this. New extensions are not added too often so this file can readily be maintained manually. There are two big advantages in doing things this way. The extensions can be looked up immediately and no longer need to be "added" using X509V3_add_standard_extensions(): this function now does nothing. [Side note: I get *lots* of email saying the extension code doesn't work because people forget to call this function] Also no dynamic allocation is done unless new extensions are added: so if we don't add custom extensions there is no need to call X509V3_EXT_cleanup(). [Steve Henson] *) Modify enc utility's salting as follows: make salting the default. Add a magic header, so unsalted files fail gracefully instead of just decrypting to garbage. This is because not salting is a big security hole, so people should be discouraged from doing it. [Ben Laurie] *) Fixes and enhancements to the 'x509' utility. It allowed a message digest to be passed on the command line but it only used this parameter when signing a certificate. Modified so all relevant operations are affected by the digest parameter including the -fingerprint and -x509toreq options. Also -x509toreq choked if a DSA key was used because it didn't fix the digest. [Steve Henson] *) Initial certificate chain verify code. Currently tests the untrusted certificates for consistency with the verify purpose (which is set when the X509_STORE_CTX structure is set up) and checks the pathlength. There is a NO_CHAIN_VERIFY compilation option to keep the old behaviour: this is because it will reject chains with invalid extensions whereas every previous version of OpenSSL and SSLeay made no checks at all. Trust code: checks the root CA for the relevant trust settings. Trust settings have an initial value consistent with the verify purpose: e.g. if the verify purpose is for SSL client use it expects the CA to be trusted for SSL client use. However the default value can be changed to permit custom trust settings: one example of this would be to only trust certificates from a specific "secure" set of CAs. Also added X509_STORE_CTX_new() and X509_STORE_CTX_free() functions which should be used for version portability: especially since the verify structure is likely to change more often now. SSL integration. Add purpose and trust to SSL_CTX and SSL and functions to set them. If not set then assume SSL clients will verify SSL servers and vice versa. Two new options to the verify program: -untrusted allows a set of untrusted certificates to be passed in and -purpose which sets the intended purpose of the certificate. If a purpose is set then the new chain verify code is used to check extension consistency. [Steve Henson] *) Support for the authority information access extension. [Steve Henson] *) Modify RSA and DSA PEM read routines to transparently handle PKCS#8 format private keys. New *_PUBKEY_* functions that handle public keys in a format compatible with certificate SubjectPublicKeyInfo structures. Unfortunately there were already functions called *_PublicKey_* which used various odd formats so these are retained for compatibility: however the DSA variants were never in a public release so they have been deleted. Changed dsa/rsa utilities to handle the new format: note no releases ever handled public keys so we should be OK. The primary motivation for this change is to avoid the same fiasco that dogs private keys: there are several incompatible private key formats some of which are standard and some OpenSSL specific and require various evil hacks to allow partial transparent handling and even then it doesn't work with DER formats. Given the option anything other than PKCS#8 should be dumped: but the other formats have to stay in the name of compatibility. With public keys and the benefit of hindsight one standard format is used which works with EVP_PKEY, RSA or DSA structures: though it clearly returns an error if you try to read the wrong kind of key. Added a -pubkey option to the 'x509' utility to output the public key. Also rename the EVP_PKEY_get_*() to EVP_PKEY_rget_*() (renamed to EVP_PKEY_get1_*() in the OpenSSL 0.9.5 release) and add EVP_PKEY_rset_*() functions (renamed to EVP_PKEY_set1_*()) that do the same as the EVP_PKEY_assign_*() except they up the reference count of the added key (they don't "swallow" the supplied key). [Steve Henson] *) Fixes to crypto/x509/by_file.c the code to read in certificates and CRLs would fail if the file contained no certificates or no CRLs: added a new function to read in both types and return the number read: this means that if none are read it will be an error. The DER versions of the certificate and CRL reader would always fail because it isn't possible to mix certificates and CRLs in DER format without choking one or the other routine. Changed this to just read a certificate: this is the best we can do. Also modified the code in apps/verify.c to take notice of return codes: it was previously attempting to read in certificates from NULL pointers and ignoring any errors: this is one reason why the cert and CRL reader seemed to work. It doesn't check return codes from the default certificate routines: these may well fail if the certificates aren't installed. [Steve Henson] *) Code to support otherName option in GeneralName. [Steve Henson] *) First update to verify code. Change the verify utility so it warns if it is passed a self signed certificate: for consistency with the normal behaviour. X509_verify has been modified to it will now verify a self signed certificate if *exactly* the same certificate appears in the store: it was previously impossible to trust a single self signed certificate. This means that: openssl verify ss.pem now gives a warning about a self signed certificate but openssl verify -CAfile ss.pem ss.pem is OK. [Steve Henson] *) For servers, store verify_result in SSL_SESSION data structure (and add it to external session representation). This is needed when client certificate verifications fails, but an application-provided verification callback (set by SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback) allows accepting the session anyway (i.e. leaves x509_store_ctx->error != X509_V_OK but returns 1): When the session is reused, we have to set ssl->verify_result to the appropriate error code to avoid security holes. [Bodo Moeller, problem pointed out by Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix a bug in the new PKCS#7 code: it didn't consider the case in PKCS7_dataInit() where the signed PKCS7 structure didn't contain any existing data because it was being created. [Po-Cheng Chen , slightly modified by Steve Henson] *) Add a salt to the key derivation routines in enc.c. This forms the first 8 bytes of the encrypted file. Also add a -S option to allow a salt to be input on the command line. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509_cmp(). Oddly enough there wasn't a function to compare two certificates. We do this by working out the SHA1 hash and comparing that. X509_cmp() will be needed by the trust code. [Steve Henson] *) SSL_get1_session() is like SSL_get_session(), but increments the reference count in the SSL_SESSION returned. [Geoff Thorpe ] *) Fix for 'req': it was adding a null to request attributes. Also change the X509_LOOKUP and X509_INFO code to handle certificate auxiliary information. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for 40 and 64 bit RC2 and RC4 algorithms: document the 'enc' command. [Steve Henson] *) Add the possibility to add extra information to the memory leak detecting output, to form tracebacks, showing from where each allocation was originated: CRYPTO_push_info("constant string") adds the string plus current file name and line number to a per-thread stack, CRYPTO_pop_info() does the obvious, CRYPTO_remove_all_info() is like calling CYRPTO_pop_info() until the stack is empty. Also updated memory leak detection code to be multi-thread-safe. [Richard Levitte] *) Add options -text and -noout to pkcs7 utility and delete the encryption options which never did anything. Update docs. [Steve Henson] *) Add options to some of the utilities to allow the pass phrase to be included on either the command line (not recommended on OSes like Unix) or read from the environment. Update the manpages and fix a few bugs. [Steve Henson] *) Add a few manpages for some of the openssl commands. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the -revoke option in ca. It was freeing up memory twice, leaking and not finding already revoked certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Extensive changes to support certificate auxiliary information. This involves the use of X509_CERT_AUX structure and X509_AUX functions. An X509_AUX function such as PEM_read_X509_AUX() can still read in a certificate file in the usual way but it will also read in any additional "auxiliary information". By doing things this way a fair degree of compatibility can be retained: existing certificates can have this information added using the new 'x509' options. Current auxiliary information includes an "alias" and some trust settings. The trust settings will ultimately be used in enhanced certificate chain verification routines: currently a certificate can only be trusted if it is self signed and then it is trusted for all purposes. [Steve Henson] *) Fix assembler for Alpha (tested only on DEC OSF not Linux or *BSD). The problem was that one of the replacement routines had not been working since SSLeay releases. For now the offending routine has been replaced with non-optimised assembler. Even so, this now gives around 95% performance improvement for 1024 bit RSA signs. [Mark Cox] *) Hack to fix PKCS#7 decryption when used with some unorthodox RC2 handling. Most clients have the effective key size in bits equal to the key length in bits: so a 40 bit RC2 key uses a 40 bit (5 byte) key. A few however don't do this and instead use the size of the decrypted key to determine the RC2 key length and the AlgorithmIdentifier to determine the effective key length. In this case the effective key length can still be 40 bits but the key length can be 168 bits for example. This is fixed by manually forcing an RC2 key into the EVP_PKEY structure because the EVP code can't currently handle unusual RC2 key sizes: it always assumes the key length and effective key length are equal. [Steve Henson] *) Add a bunch of functions that should simplify the creation of X509_NAME structures. Now you should be able to do: X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, "CN", MBSTRING_ASC, "Steve", -1, -1, 0); and have it automatically work out the correct field type and fill in the structures. The more adventurous can try: X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, field, MBSTRING_UTF8, str, -1, -1, 0); and it will (hopefully) work out the correct multibyte encoding. [Steve Henson] *) Change the 'req' utility to use the new field handling and multibyte copy routines. Before the DN field creation was handled in an ad hoc way in req, ca, and x509 which was rather broken and didn't support BMPStrings or UTF8Strings. Since some software doesn't implement BMPStrings or UTF8Strings yet, they can be enabled using the config file using the dirstring_type option. See the new comment in the default openssl.cnf for more info. [Steve Henson] *) Make crypto/rand/md_rand.c more robust: - Assure unique random numbers after fork(). - Make sure that concurrent threads access the global counter and md serializably so that we never lose entropy in them or use exactly the same state in multiple threads. Access to the large state is not always serializable because the additional locking could be a performance killer, and md should be large enough anyway. [Bodo Moeller] *) New file apps/app_rand.c with commonly needed functionality for handling the random seed file. Use the random seed file in some applications that previously did not: ca, dsaparam -genkey (which also ignored its '-rand' option), s_client, s_server, x509 (when signing). Except on systems with /dev/urandom, it is crucial to have a random seed file at least for key creation, DSA signing, and for DH exchanges; for RSA signatures we could do without one. gendh and gendsa (unlike genrsa) used to read only the first byte of each file listed in the '-rand' option. The function as previously found in genrsa is now in app_rand.c and is used by all programs that support '-rand'. [Bodo Moeller] *) In RAND_write_file, use mode 0600 for creating files; don't just chmod when it may be too late. [Bodo Moeller] *) Report an error from X509_STORE_load_locations when X509_LOOKUP_load_file or X509_LOOKUP_add_dir failed. [Bill Perry] *) New function ASN1_mbstring_copy() this copies a string in either ASCII, Unicode, Universal (4 bytes per character) or UTF8 format into an ASN1_STRING type. A mask of permissible types is passed and it chooses the "minimal" type to use or an error if not type is suitable. [Steve Henson] *) Add function equivalents to the various macros in asn1.h. The old macros are retained with an M_ prefix. Code inside the library can use the M_ macros. External code (including the openssl utility) should *NOT* in order to be "shared library friendly". [Steve Henson] *) Add various functions that can check a certificate's extensions to see if it usable for various purposes such as SSL client, server or S/MIME and CAs of these types. This is currently VERY EXPERIMENTAL but will ultimately be used for certificate chain verification. Also added a -purpose flag to x509 utility to print out all the purposes. [Steve Henson] *) Add a CRYPTO_EX_DATA to X509 certificate structure and associated functions. [Steve Henson] *) New X509V3_{X509,CRL,REVOKED}_get_d2i() functions. These will search for, obtain and decode and extension and obtain its critical flag. This allows all the necessary extension code to be handled in a single function call. [Steve Henson] *) RC4 tune-up featuring 30-40% performance improvement on most RISC platforms. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details. [Andy Polyakov] *) New -noout option to asn1parse. This causes no output to be produced its main use is when combined with -strparse and -out to extract data from a file (which may not be in ASN.1 format). [Steve Henson] *) Fix for pkcs12 program. It was hashing an invalid certificate pointer when producing the local key id. [Richard Levitte ] *) New option -dhparam in s_server. This allows a DH parameter file to be stated explicitly. If it is not stated then it tries the first server certificate file. The previous behaviour hard coded the filename "server.pem". [Steve Henson] *) Add -pubin and -pubout options to the rsa and dsa commands. These allow a public key to be input or output. For example: openssl rsa -in key.pem -pubout -out pubkey.pem Also added necessary DSA public key functions to handle this. [Steve Henson] *) Fix so PKCS7_dataVerify() doesn't crash if no certificates are contained in the message. This was handled by allowing X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial() to tolerate a NULL passed to it. [Steve Henson, reported by Sampo Kellomaki ] *) Fix for bug in d2i_ASN1_bytes(): other ASN1 functions add an extra null to the end of the strings whereas this didn't. This would cause problems if strings read with d2i_ASN1_bytes() were later modified. [Steve Henson, reported by Arne Ansper ] *) Fix for base64 decode bug. When a base64 bio reads only one line of data and it contains EOF it will end up returning an error. This is caused by input 46 bytes long. The cause is due to the way base64 BIOs find the start of base64 encoded data. They do this by trying a trial decode on each line until they find one that works. When they do a flag is set and it starts again knowing it can pass all the data directly through the decoder. Unfortunately it doesn't reset the context it uses. This means that if EOF is reached an attempt is made to pass two EOFs through the context and this causes the resulting error. This can also cause other problems as well. As is usual with these problems it takes *ages* to find and the fix is trivial: move one line. [Steve Henson, reported by ian@uns.ns.ac.yu (Ivan Nejgebauer) ] *) Ugly workaround to get s_client and s_server working under Windows. The old code wouldn't work because it needed to select() on sockets and the tty (for keypresses and to see if data could be written). Win32 only supports select() on sockets so we select() with a 1s timeout on the sockets and then see if any characters are waiting to be read, if none are present then we retry, we also assume we can always write data to the tty. This isn't nice because the code then blocks until we've received a complete line of data and it is effectively polling the keyboard at 1s intervals: however it's quite a bit better than not working at all :-) A dedicated Windows application might handle this with an event loop for example. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance RSA_METHOD structure. Now there are two extra methods, rsa_sign and rsa_verify. When the RSA_FLAGS_SIGN_VER option is set these functions will be called when RSA_sign() and RSA_verify() are used. This is useful if rsa_pub_dec() and rsa_priv_enc() equivalents are not available. For this to work properly RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt() should *not* be used: RSA_sign() and RSA_verify() must be used instead. This necessitated the support of an extra signature type NID_md5_sha1 for SSL signatures and modifications to the SSL library to use it instead of calling RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt(). [Steve Henson] *) Add new -verify -CAfile and -CApath options to the crl program, these will lookup a CRL issuers certificate and verify the signature in a similar way to the verify program. Tidy up the crl program so it no longer accesses structures directly. Make the ASN1 CRL parsing a bit less strict. It will now permit CRL extensions even if it is not a V2 CRL: this will allow it to tolerate some broken CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) Initialize all non-automatic variables each time one of the openssl sub-programs is started (this is necessary as they may be started multiple times from the "OpenSSL>" prompt). [Lennart Bang, Bodo Moeller] *) Preliminary compilation option RSA_NULL which disables RSA crypto without removing all other RSA functionality (this is what NO_RSA does). This is so (for example) those in the US can disable those operations covered by the RSA patent while allowing storage and parsing of RSA keys and RSA key generation. [Steve Henson] *) Non-copying interface to BIO pairs. (still largely untested) [Bodo Moeller] *) New function ANS1_tag2str() to convert an ASN1 tag to a descriptive ASCII string. This was handled independently in various places before. [Steve Henson] *) New functions UTF8_getc() and UTF8_putc() that parse and generate UTF8 strings a character at a time. [Steve Henson] *) Use client_version from client hello to select the protocol (s23_srvr.c) and for RSA client key exchange verification (s3_srvr.c), as required by the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 specifications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add various utility functions to handle SPKACs, these were previously handled by poking round in the structure internals. Added new function NETSCAPE_SPKI_print() to print out SPKAC and a new utility 'spkac' to print, verify and generate SPKACs. Based on an original idea from Massimiliano Pala but extensively modified. [Steve Henson] *) RIPEMD160 is operational on all platforms and is back in 'make test'. [Andy Polyakov] *) Allow the config file extension section to be overwritten on the command line. Based on an original idea from Massimiliano Pala . The new option is called -extensions and can be applied to ca, req and x509. Also -reqexts to override the request extensions in req and -crlexts to override the crl extensions in ca. [Steve Henson] *) Add new feature to the SPKAC handling in ca. Now you can include the same field multiple times by preceding it by "XXXX." for example: 1.OU="Unit name 1" 2.OU="Unit name 2" this is the same syntax as used in the req config file. [Steve Henson] *) Allow certificate extensions to be added to certificate requests. These are specified in a 'req_extensions' option of the req section of the config file. They can be printed out with the -text option to req but are otherwise ignored at present. [Steve Henson] *) Fix a horrible bug in enc_read() in crypto/evp/bio_enc.c: if the first data read consists of only the final block it would not decrypted because EVP_CipherUpdate() would correctly report zero bytes had been decrypted. A misplaced 'break' also meant the decrypted final block might not be copied until the next read. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for DH_METHOD. Again based on RSA_METHOD. Also added a few extra parameters to the DH structure: these will be useful if for example we want the value of 'q' or implement X9.42 DH. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for DSA_METHOD. This is based on the RSA_METHOD and provides hooks that allow the default DSA functions or functions on a "per key" basis to be replaced. This allows hardware acceleration and hardware key storage to be handled without major modification to the library. Also added low level modexp hooks and CRYPTO_EX structure and associated functions. [Steve Henson] *) Add a new flag to memory BIOs, BIO_FLAG_MEM_RDONLY. This marks the BIO as "read only": it can't be written to and the buffer it points to will not be freed. Reading from a read only BIO is much more efficient than a normal memory BIO. This was added because there are several times when an area of memory needs to be read from a BIO. The previous method was to create a memory BIO and write the data to it, this results in two copies of the data and an O(n^2) reading algorithm. There is a new function BIO_new_mem_buf() which creates a read only memory BIO from an area of memory. Also modified the PKCS#7 routines to use read only memory BIOs. [Steve Henson] *) Bugfix: ssl23_get_client_hello did not work properly when called in state SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, i.e. when the first 7 bytes of a SSLv2-compatible client hello for SSLv3 or TLSv1 could be read, but a retry condition occured while trying to read the rest. [Bodo Moeller] *) The PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT_new() function was setting the content type as NID_pkcs7_encrypted by default: this was wrong since this should almost always be NID_pkcs7_data. Also modified the PKCS7_set_type() to handle the encrypted data type: this is a more sensible place to put it and it allows the PKCS#12 code to be tidied up that duplicated this functionality. [Steve Henson] *) Changed obj_dat.pl script so it takes its input and output files on the command line. This should avoid shell escape redirection problems under Win32. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for certificate extension requests, these are included in things like Xenroll certificate requests. Included functions to allow extensions to be obtained and added. [Steve Henson] *) -crlf option to s_client and s_server for sending newlines as CRLF (as required by many protocols). [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.3a and 0.9.4 [09 Aug 1999] *) Install libRSAglue.a when OpenSSL is built with RSAref. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) A few more ``#ifndef NO_FP_API / #endif'' pairs for consistency. [Andrija Antonijevic ] *) Fix -startdate and -enddate (which was missing) arguments to 'ca' program. [Steve Henson] *) New function DSA_dup_DH, which duplicates DSA parameters/keys as DH parameters/keys (q is lost during that conversion, but the resulting DH parameters contain its length). For 1024-bit p, DSA_generate_parameters followed by DSA_dup_DH is much faster than DH_generate_parameters (which creates parameters where p = 2*q + 1), and also the smaller q makes DH computations much more efficient (160-bit exponentiation instead of 1024-bit exponentiation); so this provides a convenient way to support DHE ciphersuites in SSL/TLS servers (see ssl/ssltest.c). It is of utter importance to use SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE); or SSL_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE); when such DH parameters are used, because otherwise small subgroup attacks may become possible! [Bodo Moeller] *) Avoid memory leak in i2d_DHparams. [Bodo Moeller] *) Allow the -k option to be used more than once in the enc program: this allows the same encrypted message to be read by multiple recipients. [Steve Henson] *) New function OBJ_obj2txt(buf, buf_len, a, no_name), this converts an ASN1_OBJECT to a text string. If the "no_name" parameter is set then it will always use the numerical form of the OID, even if it has a short or long name. [Steve Henson] *) Added an extra RSA flag: RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY. Previously the rsa_mod_exp method only got called if p,q,dmp1,dmq1,iqmp components were present, otherwise bn_mod_exp was called. In the case of hardware keys for example no private key components need be present and it might store extra data in the RSA structure, which cannot be accessed from bn_mod_exp. By setting RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY rsa_mod_exp will always be called for private key operations. [Steve Henson] *) Added support for SPARC Linux. [Andy Polyakov] *) pem_password_cb function type incompatibly changed from typedef int pem_password_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag); to ....(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *userdata); so that applications can pass data to their callbacks: The PEM[_ASN1]_{read,write}... functions and macros now take an additional void * argument, which is just handed through whenever the password callback is called. [Damien Miller ; tiny changes by Bodo Moeller] New function SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata. Compatibility note: As many C implementations push function arguments onto the stack in reverse order, the new library version is likely to interoperate with programs that have been compiled with the old pem_password_cb definition (PEM_whatever takes some data that happens to be on the stack as its last argument, and the callback just ignores this garbage); but there is no guarantee whatsoever that this will work. *) The -DPLATFORM="\"$(PLATFORM)\"" definition and the similar -DCFLAGS=... (both in crypto/Makefile.ssl for use by crypto/cversion.c) caused problems not only on Windows, but also on some Unix platforms. To avoid problematic command lines, these definitions are now in an auto-generated file crypto/buildinf.h (created by crypto/Makefile.ssl for standard "make" builds, by util/mk1mf.pl for "mk1mf" builds). [Bodo Moeller] *) MIPS III/IV assembler module is reimplemented. [Andy Polyakov] *) More DES library cleanups: remove references to srand/rand and delete an unused file. [Ulf Möller] *) Add support for the the free Netwide assembler (NASM) under Win32, since not many people have MASM (ml) and it can be hard to obtain. This is currently experimental but it seems to work OK and pass all the tests. Check out INSTALL.W32 for info. [Steve Henson] *) Fix memory leaks in s3_clnt.c: All non-anonymous SSL3/TLS1 connections without temporary keys kept an extra copy of the server key, and connections with temporary keys did not free everything in case of an error. [Bodo Moeller] *) New function RSA_check_key and new openssl rsa option -check for verifying the consistency of RSA keys. [Ulf Moeller, Bodo Moeller] *) Various changes to make Win32 compile work: 1. Casts to avoid "loss of data" warnings in p5_crpt2.c 2. Change unsigned int to int in b_dump.c to avoid "signed/unsigned comparison" warnings. 3. Add sk__sort to DEF file generator and do make update. [Steve Henson] *) Add a debugging option to PKCS#5 v2 key generation function: when you #define DEBUG_PKCS5V2 passwords, salts, iteration counts and derived keys are printed to stderr. [Steve Henson] *) Copy the flags in ASN1_STRING_dup(). [Roman E. Pavlov ] *) The x509 application mishandled signing requests containing DSA keys when the signing key was also DSA and the parameters didn't match. It was supposed to omit the parameters when they matched the signing key: the verifying software was then supposed to automatically use the CA's parameters if they were absent from the end user certificate. Omitting parameters is no longer recommended. The test was also the wrong way round! This was probably due to unusual behaviour in EVP_cmp_parameters() which returns 1 if the parameters match. This meant that parameters were omitted when they *didn't* match and the certificate was useless. Certificates signed with 'ca' didn't have this bug. [Steve Henson, reported by Doug Erickson ] *) Memory leak checking (-DCRYPTO_MDEBUG) had some problems. The interface is as follows: Applications can use CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON) aka MemCheck_start(), CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_OFF) aka MemCheck_stop(); "off" is now the default. The library internally uses CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE) aka MemCheck_off(), CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE) aka MemCheck_on() to disable memory-checking temporarily. Some inconsistent states that previously were possible (and were even the default) are now avoided. -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_TIME is new and additionally stores the current time with each memory chunk allocated; this is occasionally more helpful than just having a counter. -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_THREAD is also new and adds the thread ID. -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL enables all of the above, plus any future extensions. [Bodo Moeller] *) Introduce "mode" for SSL structures (with defaults in SSL_CTX), which largely parallels "options", but is for changing API behaviour, whereas "options" are about protocol behaviour. Initial "mode" flags are: SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE Allow SSL_write to report success when a single record has been written. SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER Don't insist that SSL_write retries use the same buffer location. (But all of the contents must be copied!) [Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix: SSL_set_options ignored its parameter, only SSL_CTX_set_options worked. *) Fix problems with no-hmac etc. [Ulf Möller, pointed out by Brian Wellington ] *) New functions RSA_get_default_method(), RSA_set_method() and RSA_get_method(). These allows replacement of RSA_METHODs without having to mess around with the internals of an RSA structure. [Steve Henson] *) Fix memory leaks in DSA_do_sign and DSA_is_prime. Also really enable memory leak checks in openssl.c and in some test programs. [Chad C. Mulligan, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix a bug in d2i_ASN1_INTEGER() and i2d_ASN1_INTEGER() which can mess up the length of negative integers. This has now been simplified to just store the length when it is first determined and use it later, rather than trying to keep track of where data is copied and updating it to point to the end. [Steve Henson, reported by Brien Wheeler ] *) Add a new function PKCS7_signatureVerify. This allows the verification of a PKCS#7 signature but with the signing certificate passed to the function itself. This contrasts with PKCS7_dataVerify which assumes the certificate is present in the PKCS#7 structure. This isn't always the case: certificates can be omitted from a PKCS#7 structure and be distributed by "out of band" means (such as a certificate database). [Steve Henson] *) Complete the PEM_* macros with DECLARE_PEM versions to replace the function prototypes in pem.h, also change util/mkdef.pl to add the necessary function names. [Steve Henson] *) mk1mf.pl (used by Windows builds) did not properly read the options set by Configure in the top level Makefile, and Configure was not even able to write more than one option correctly. Fixed, now "no-idea no-rc5 -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG" etc. works as intended. [Bodo Moeller] *) New functions CONF_load_bio() and CONF_load_fp() to allow a config file to be loaded from a BIO or FILE pointer. The BIO version will for example allow memory BIOs to contain config info. [Steve Henson] *) New function "CRYPTO_num_locks" that returns CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS. Whoever hopes to achieve shared-library compatibility across versions must use this, not the compile-time macro. (Exercise 0.9.4: Which is the minimum library version required by such programs?) Note: All this applies only to multi-threaded programs, others don't need locks. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add missing case to s3_clnt.c state machine -- one of the new SSL tests through a BIO pair triggered the default case, i.e. SSLerr(...,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE). [Bodo Moeller] *) New "BIO pair" concept (crypto/bio/bss_bio.c) so that applications can use the SSL library even if none of the specific BIOs is appropriate. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix a bug in i2d_DSAPublicKey() which meant it returned the wrong value for the encoded length. [Jeon KyoungHo ] *) Add initial documentation of the X509V3 functions. [Steve Henson] *) Add a new pair of functions PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey() and PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey() that are equivalent to PEM_write_PrivateKey() and PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey() but use the more secure PKCS#8 private key format with a high iteration count. [Steve Henson] *) Fix determination of Perl interpreter: A perl or perl5 _directory_ in $PATH was also accepted as the interpreter. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix demos/sign/sign.c: well there wasn't anything strictly speaking wrong with it but it was very old and did things like calling PEM_ASN1_read() directly and used MD5 for the hash not to mention some unusual formatting. [Steve Henson] *) Fix demos/selfsign.c: it used obsolete and deleted functions, changed to use the new extension code. [Steve Henson] *) Implement the PEM_read/PEM_write functions in crypto/pem/pem_all.c with macros. This should make it easier to change their form, add extra arguments etc. Fix a few PEM prototypes which didn't have cipher as a constant. [Steve Henson] *) Add to configuration table a new entry that can specify an alternative name for unistd.h (for pre-POSIX systems); we need this for NeXTstep, according to Mark Crispin . [Bodo Moeller] #if 0 *) DES CBC did not update the IV. Weird. [Ben Laurie] #else des_cbc_encrypt does not update the IV, but des_ncbc_encrypt does. Changing the behaviour of the former might break existing programs -- where IV updating is needed, des_ncbc_encrypt can be used. #endif *) When bntest is run from "make test" it drives bc to check its calculations, as well as internally checking them. If an internal check fails, it needs to cause bc to give a non-zero result or make test carries on without noticing the failure. Fixed. [Ben Laurie] *) DES library cleanups. [Ulf Möller] *) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PBE algorithms. This will permit PKCS#8 to be used with any cipher unlike PKCS#5 v1.5 which can at most handle 64 bit ciphers. NOTE: although the key derivation function has been verified against some published test vectors it has not been extensively tested yet. Added a -v2 "cipher" option to pkcs8 application to allow the use of v2.0. [Steve Henson] *) Instead of "mkdir -p", which is not fully portable, use new Perl script "util/mkdir-p.pl". [Bodo Moeller] *) Rewrite the way password based encryption (PBE) is handled. It used to assume that the ASN1 AlgorithmIdentifier parameter was a PBEParameter structure. This was true for the PKCS#5 v1.5 and PKCS#12 PBE algorithms but doesn't apply to PKCS#5 v2.0 where it can be something else. Now the 'parameter' field of the AlgorithmIdentifier is passed to the underlying key generation function so it must do its own ASN1 parsing. This has also changed the EVP_PBE_CipherInit() function which now has a 'parameter' argument instead of literal salt and iteration count values and the function EVP_PBE_ALGOR_CipherInit() has been deleted. [Steve Henson] *) Support for PKCS#5 v1.5 compatible password based encryption algorithms and PKCS#8 functionality. New 'pkcs8' application linked to openssl. Needed to change the PEM_STRING_EVP_PKEY value which was just "PRIVATE KEY" because this clashed with PKCS#8 unencrypted string. Since this value was just used as a "magic string" and not used directly its value doesn't matter. [Steve Henson] *) Introduce some semblance of const correctness to BN. Shame C doesn't support mutable. [Ben Laurie] *) "linux-sparc64" configuration (ultrapenguin). [Ray Miller ] "linux-sparc" configuration. [Christian Forster ] *) config now generates no-xxx options for missing ciphers. [Ulf Möller] *) Support the EBCDIC character set (work in progress). File ebcdic.c not yet included because it has a different license. [Martin Kraemer ] *) Support BS2000/OSD-POSIX. [Martin Kraemer ] *) Make callbacks for key generation use void * instead of char *. [Ben Laurie] *) Make S/MIME samples compile (not yet tested). [Ben Laurie] *) Additional typesafe stacks. [Ben Laurie] *) New configuration variants "bsdi-elf-gcc" (BSD/OS 4.x). [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.3 and 0.9.3a [29 May 1999] *) New configuration variant "sco5-gcc". *) Updated some demos. [Sean O Riordain, Wade Scholine] *) Add missing BIO_free at exit of pkcs12 application. [Wu Zhigang] *) Fix memory leak in conf.c. [Steve Henson] *) Updates for Win32 to assembler version of MD5. [Steve Henson] *) Set #! path to perl in apps/der_chop to where we found it instead of using a fixed path. [Bodo Moeller] *) SHA library changes for irix64-mips4-cc. [Andy Polyakov] *) Improvements for VMS support. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.2b and 0.9.3 [24 May 1999] *) Bignum library bug fix. IRIX 6 passes "make test" now! This also avoids the problems with SC4.2 and unpatched SC5. [Andy Polyakov ] *) New functions sk_num, sk_value and sk_set to replace the previous macros. These are required because of the typesafe stack would otherwise break existing code. If old code used a structure member which used to be STACK and is now STACK_OF (for example cert in a PKCS7_SIGNED structure) with sk_num or sk_value it would produce an error because the num, data members are not present in STACK_OF. Now it just produces a warning. sk_set replaces the old method of assigning a value to sk_value (e.g. sk_value(x, i) = y) which the library used in a few cases. Any code that does this will no longer work (and should use sk_set instead) but this could be regarded as a "questionable" behaviour anyway. [Steve Henson] *) Fix most of the other PKCS#7 bugs. The "experimental" code can now correctly handle encrypted S/MIME data. [Steve Henson] *) Change type of various DES function arguments from des_cblock (which means, in function argument declarations, pointer to char) to des_cblock * (meaning pointer to array with 8 char elements), which allows the compiler to do more typechecking; it was like that back in SSLeay, but with lots of ugly casts. Introduce new type const_des_cblock. [Bodo Moeller] *) Reorganise the PKCS#7 library and get rid of some of the more obvious problems: find RecipientInfo structure that matches recipient certificate and initialise the ASN1 structures properly based on passed cipher. [Steve Henson] *) Belatedly make the BN tests actually check the results. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix the encoding and decoding of negative ASN1 INTEGERS and conversion to and from BNs: it was completely broken. New compilation option NEG_PUBKEY_BUG to allow for some broken certificates that encode public key elements as negative integers. [Steve Henson] *) Reorganize and speed up MD5. [Andy Polyakov ] *) VMS support. [Richard Levitte ] *) New option -out to asn1parse to allow the parsed structure to be output to a file. This is most useful when combined with the -strparse option to examine the output of things like OCTET STRINGS. [Steve Henson] *) Make SSL library a little more fool-proof by not requiring any longer that SSL_set_{accept,connect}_state be called before SSL_{accept,connect} may be used (SSL_set_..._state is omitted in many applications because usually everything *appeared* to work as intended anyway -- now it really works as intended). [Bodo Moeller] *) Move openssl.cnf out of lib/. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix various things to let OpenSSL even pass ``egcc -pipe -O2 -Wall -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-align -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wnested-externs -Winline'' with EGCS 1.1.2+ [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Various fixes to the EVP and PKCS#7 code. It may now be able to handle PKCS#7 enveloped data properly. [Sebastian Akerman , modified by Steve] *) Create a duplicate of the SSL_CTX's CERT in SSL_new instead of copying pointers. The cert_st handling is changed by this in various ways (and thus what used to be known as ctx->default_cert is now called ctx->cert, since we don't resort to s->ctx->[default_]cert any longer when s->cert does not give us what we need). ssl_cert_instantiate becomes obsolete by this change. As soon as we've got the new code right (possibly it already is?), we have solved a couple of bugs of the earlier code where s->cert was used as if it could not have been shared with other SSL structures. Note that using the SSL API in certain dirty ways now will result in different behaviour than observed with earlier library versions: Changing settings for an SSL_CTX *ctx after having done s = SSL_new(ctx) does not influence s as it used to. In order to clean up things more thoroughly, inside SSL_SESSION we don't use CERT any longer, but a new structure SESS_CERT that holds per-session data (if available); currently, this is the peer's certificate chain and, for clients, the server's certificate and temporary key. CERT holds only those values that can have meaningful defaults in an SSL_CTX. [Bodo Moeller] *) New function X509V3_EXT_i2d() to create an X509_EXTENSION structure from the internal representation. Various PKCS#7 fixes: remove some evil casts and set the enc_dig_alg field properly based on the signing key type. [Steve Henson] *) Allow PKCS#12 password to be set from the command line or the environment. Let 'ca' get its config file name from the environment variables "OPENSSL_CONF" or "SSLEAY_CONF" (for consistency with 'req' and 'x509'). [Steve Henson] *) Allow certificate policies extension to use an IA5STRING for the organization field. This is contrary to the PKIX definition but VeriSign uses it and IE5 only recognises this form. Document 'x509' extension option. [Steve Henson] *) Add PEDANTIC compiler flag to allow compilation with gcc -pedantic, without disallowing inline assembler and the like for non-pedantic builds. [Ben Laurie] *) Support Borland C++ builder. [Janez Jere , modified by Ulf Möller] *) Support Mingw32. [Ulf Möller] *) SHA-1 cleanups and performance enhancements. [Andy Polyakov ] *) Sparc v8plus assembler for the bignum library. [Andy Polyakov ] *) Accept any -xxx and +xxx compiler options in Configure. [Ulf Möller] *) Update HPUX configuration. [Anonymous] *) Add missing sk__unshift() function to safestack.h [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) New function SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file that sets the "extra_cert"s in addition to the certificate. (This makes sense only for "PEM" format files, as chains as a whole are not DER-encoded.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Support verify_depth from the SSL API. x509_vfy.c had what can be considered an off-by-one-error: Its depth (which was not part of the external interface) was actually counting the number of certificates in a chain; now it really counts the depth. [Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix in crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c: The SSLerr macro was used instead of X509err, which often resulted in confusing error messages since the error codes are not globally unique (e.g. an alleged error in ssl3_accept when a certificate didn't match the private key). *) New function SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context that allows to set a default value (so that you don't need SSL_set_session_id_context for each connection using the SSL_CTX). [Bodo Moeller] *) OAEP decoding bug fix. [Ulf Möller] *) Support INSTALL_PREFIX for package builders, as proposed by David Harris. [Bodo Moeller] *) New Configure options "threads" and "no-threads". For systems where the proper compiler options are known (currently Solaris and Linux), "threads" is the default. [Bodo Moeller] *) New script util/mklink.pl as a faster substitute for util/mklink.sh. [Bodo Moeller] *) Install various scripts to $(OPENSSLDIR)/misc, not to $(INSTALLTOP)/bin -- they shouldn't clutter directories such as /usr/local/bin. [Bodo Moeller] *) "make linux-shared" to build shared libraries. [Niels Poppe ] *) New Configure option no- (rsa, idea, rc5, ...). [Ulf Möller] *) Add the PKCS#12 API documentation to openssl.txt. Preliminary support for extension adding in x509 utility. [Steve Henson] *) Remove NOPROTO sections and error code comments. [Ulf Möller] *) Partial rewrite of the DEF file generator to now parse the ANSI prototypes. [Steve Henson] *) New Configure options --prefix=DIR and --openssldir=DIR. [Ulf Möller] *) Complete rewrite of the error code script(s). It is all now handled by one script at the top level which handles error code gathering, header rewriting and C source file generation. It should be much better than the old method: it now uses a modified version of Ulf's parser to read the ANSI prototypes in all header files (thus the old K&R definitions aren't needed for error creation any more) and do a better job of translating function codes into names. The old 'ASN1 error code imbedded in a comment' is no longer necessary and it doesn't use .err files which have now been deleted. Also the error code call doesn't have to appear all on one line (which resulted in some large lines...). [Steve Henson] *) Change #include filenames from to . [Bodo Moeller] *) Change behaviour of ssl2_read when facing length-0 packets: Don't return 0 (which usually indicates a closed connection), but continue reading. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix some race conditions. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add support for CRL distribution points extension. Add Certificate Policies and CRL distribution points documentation. [Steve Henson] *) Move the autogenerated header file parts to crypto/opensslconf.h. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix new 56-bit DES export ciphersuites: they were using 7 bytes instead of 8 of keying material. Merlin has also confirmed interop with this fix between OpenSSL and Baltimore C/SSL 2.0 and J/SSL 2.0. [Merlin Hughes ] *) Fix lots of warnings. [Richard Levitte ] *) In add_cert_dir() in crypto/x509/by_dir.c, break out of the loop if the directory spec didn't end with a LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR. [Richard Levitte ] *) Fix problems with sizeof(long) == 8. [Andy Polyakov ] *) Change functions to ANSI C. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix typos in error codes. [Martin Kraemer , Ulf Möller] *) Remove defunct assembler files from Configure. [Ulf Möller] *) SPARC v8 assembler BIGNUM implementation. [Andy Polyakov ] *) Support for Certificate Policies extension: both print and set. Various additions to support the r2i method this uses. [Steve Henson] *) A lot of constification, and fix a bug in X509_NAME_oneline() that could return a const string when you are expecting an allocated buffer. [Ben Laurie] *) Add support for ASN1 types UTF8String and VISIBLESTRING, also the CHOICE types DirectoryString and DisplayText. [Steve Henson] *) Add code to allow r2i extensions to access the configuration database, add an LHASH database driver and add several ctx helper functions. [Steve Henson] *) Fix an evil bug in bn_expand2() which caused various BN functions to fail when they extended the size of a BIGNUM. [Steve Henson] *) Various utility functions to handle SXNet extension. Modify mkdef.pl to support typesafe stack. [Steve Henson] *) Fix typo in SSL_[gs]et_options(). [Nils Frostberg ] *) Delete various functions and files that belonged to the (now obsolete) old X509V3 handling code. [Steve Henson] *) New Configure option "rsaref". [Ulf Möller] *) Don't auto-generate pem.h. [Bodo Moeller] *) Introduce type-safe ASN.1 SETs. [Ben Laurie] *) Convert various additional casted stacks to type-safe STACK_OF() variants. [Ben Laurie, Ralf S. Engelschall, Steve Henson] *) Introduce type-safe STACKs. This will almost certainly break lots of code that links with OpenSSL (well at least cause lots of warnings), but fear not: the conversion is trivial, and it eliminates loads of evil casts. A few STACKed things have been converted already. Feel free to convert more. In the fullness of time, I'll do away with the STACK type altogether. [Ben Laurie] *) Add `openssl ca -revoke ' facility which revokes a certificate specified in by updating the entry in the index.txt file. This way one no longer has to edit the index.txt file manually for revoking a certificate. The -revoke option does the gory details now. [Massimiliano Pala , Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix `openssl crl -noout -text' combination where `-noout' killed the `-text' option at all and this way the `-noout -text' combination was inconsistent in `openssl crl' with the friends in `openssl x509|rsa|dsa'. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Make sure a corresponding plain text error message exists for the X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED/23 error number which can occur when a verify callback function determined that a certificate was revoked. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Bugfix: In test/testenc, don't test "openssl " for ciphers that were excluded, e.g. by -DNO_IDEA. Also, test all available cipers including rc5, which was forgotten until now. In order to let the testing shell script know which algorithms are available, a new (up to now undocumented) command "openssl list-cipher-commands" is used. [Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix: s_client occasionally would sleep in select() when it should have checked SSL_pending() first. [Bodo Moeller] *) New functions DSA_do_sign and DSA_do_verify to provide access to the raw DSA values prior to ASN.1 encoding. [Ulf Möller] *) Tweaks to Configure [Niels Poppe ] *) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 ASN1 PBES2 structures. No other support, yet... [Steve Henson] *) New variables $(RANLIB) and $(PERL) in the Makefiles. [Ulf Möller] *) New config option to avoid instructions that are illegal on the 80386. The default code is faster, but requires at least a 486. [Ulf Möller] *) Got rid of old SSL2_CLIENT_VERSION (inconsistently used) and SSL2_SERVER_VERSION (not used at all) macros, which are now the same as SSL2_VERSION anyway. [Bodo Moeller] *) New "-showcerts" option for s_client. [Bodo Moeller] *) Still more PKCS#12 integration. Add pkcs12 application to openssl application. Various cleanups and fixes. [Steve Henson] *) More PKCS#12 integration. Add new pkcs12 directory with Makefile.ssl and modify error routines to work internally. Add error codes and PBE init to library startup routines. [Steve Henson] *) Further PKCS#12 integration. Added password based encryption, PKCS#8 and packing functions to asn1 and evp. Changed function names and error codes along the way. [Steve Henson] *) PKCS12 integration: and so it begins... First of several patches to slowly integrate PKCS#12 functionality into OpenSSL. Add PKCS#12 objects to objects.h [Steve Henson] *) Add a new 'indent' option to some X509V3 extension code. Initial ASN1 and display support for Thawte strong extranet extension. [Steve Henson] *) Add LinuxPPC support. [Jeff Dubrule ] *) Get rid of redundant BN file bn_mulw.c, and rename bn_div64 to bn_div_words in alpha.s. [Hannes Reinecke and Ben Laurie] *) Make sure the RSA OAEP test is skipped under -DRSAref because OAEP isn't supported when OpenSSL is built with RSAref. [Ulf Moeller ] *) Move definitions of IS_SET/IS_SEQUENCE inside crypto/asn1/asn1.h so they no longer are missing under -DNOPROTO. [Soren S. Jorvang ] Changes between 0.9.1c and 0.9.2b [22 Mar 1999] *) Make SSL_get_peer_cert_chain() work in servers. Unfortunately, it still doesn't work when the session is reused. Coming soon! [Ben Laurie] *) Fix a security hole, that allows sessions to be reused in the wrong context thus bypassing client cert protection! All software that uses client certs and session caches in multiple contexts NEEDS PATCHING to allow session reuse! A fuller solution is in the works. [Ben Laurie, problem pointed out by Holger Reif, Bodo Moeller (and ???)] *) Some more source tree cleanups (removed obsolete files crypto/bf/asm/bf586.pl, test/test.txt and crypto/sha/asm/f.s; changed permission on "config" script to be executable) and a fix for the INSTALL document. [Ulf Moeller ] *) Remove some legacy and erroneous uses of malloc, free instead of Malloc, Free. [Lennart Bang , with minor changes by Steve] *) Make rsa_oaep_test return non-zero on error. [Ulf Moeller ] *) Add support for native Solaris shared libraries. Configure solaris-sparc-sc4-pic, make, then run shlib/solaris-sc4.sh. It'd be nice if someone would make that last step automatic. [Matthias Loepfe ] *) ctx_size was not built with the right compiler during "make links". Fixed. [Ben Laurie] *) Change the meaning of 'ALL' in the cipher list. It now means "everything except NULL ciphers". This means the default cipher list will no longer enable NULL ciphers. They need to be specifically enabled e.g. with the string "DEFAULT:eNULL". [Steve Henson] *) Fix to RSA private encryption routines: if p < q then it would occasionally produce an invalid result. This will only happen with externally generated keys because OpenSSL (and SSLeay) ensure p > q. [Steve Henson] *) Be less restrictive and allow also `perl util/perlpath.pl /path/to/bin/perl' in addition to `perl util/perlpath.pl /path/to/bin', because this way one can also use an interpreter named `perl5' (which is usually the name of Perl 5.xxx on platforms where an Perl 4.x is still installed as `perl'). [Matthias Loepfe ] *) Let util/clean-depend.pl work also with older Perl 5.00x versions. [Matthias Loepfe ] *) Fix Makefile.org so CC,CFLAG etc are passed to 'make links' add advapi32.lib to Win32 build and change the pem test comparision to fc.exe (thanks to Ulrich Kroener for the suggestion). Fix misplaced ASNI prototypes and declarations in evp.h and crypto/des/ede_cbcm_enc.c. [Steve Henson] *) DES quad checksum was broken on big-endian architectures. Fixed. [Ben Laurie] *) Comment out two functions in bio.h that aren't implemented. Fix up the Win32 test batch file so it (might) work again. The Win32 test batch file is horrible: I feel ill.... [Steve Henson] *) Move various #ifdefs around so NO_SYSLOG, NO_DIRENT etc are now selected in e_os.h. Audit of header files to check ANSI and non ANSI sections: 10 functions were absent from non ANSI section and not exported from Windows DLLs. Fixed up libeay.num for new functions. [Steve Henson] *) Make `openssl version' output lines consistent. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix Win32 symbol export lists for BIO functions: Added BIO_get_ex_new_index, BIO_get_ex_num, BIO_get_ex_data and BIO_set_ex_data to ms/libeay{16,32}.def. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Second round of fixing the OpenSSL perl/ stuff. It now at least compiled fine under Unix and passes some trivial tests I've now added. But the whole stuff is horribly incomplete, so a README.1ST with a disclaimer was added to make sure no one expects that this stuff really works in the OpenSSL 0.9.2 release. Additionally I've started to clean the XS sources up and fixed a few little bugs and inconsistencies in OpenSSL.{pm,xs} and openssl_bio.xs. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix the generation of two part addresses in perl. [Kenji Miyake , integrated by Ben Laurie] *) Add config entry for Linux on MIPS. [John Tobey ] *) Make links whenever Configure is run, unless we are on Windoze. [Ben Laurie] *) Permit extensions to be added to CRLs using crl_section in openssl.cnf. Currently only issuerAltName and AuthorityKeyIdentifier make any sense in CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) Add a useful kludge to allow package maintainers to specify compiler and other platforms details on the command line without having to patch the Configure script everytime: One now can use ``perl Configure :
'', i.e. platform ids are allowed to have details appended to them (seperated by colons). This is treated as there would be a static pre-configured entry in Configure's %table under key with value
and ``perl Configure '' is called. So, when you want to perform a quick test-compile under FreeBSD 3.1 with pgcc and without assembler stuff you can use ``perl Configure "FreeBSD-elf:pgcc:-O6:::"'' now, which overrides the FreeBSD-elf entry on-the-fly. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Disable new TLS1 ciphersuites by default: they aren't official yet. [Ben Laurie] *) Allow DSO flags like -fpic, -fPIC, -KPIC etc. to be specified on the `perl Configure ...' command line. This way one can compile OpenSSL libraries with Position Independent Code (PIC) which is needed for linking it into DSOs. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Remarkably, export ciphers were totally broken and no-one had noticed! Fixed. [Ben Laurie] *) Cleaned up the LICENSE document: The official contact for any license questions now is the OpenSSL core team under openssl-core@openssl.org. And add a paragraph about the dual-license situation to make sure people recognize that _BOTH_ the OpenSSL license _AND_ the SSLeay license apply to the OpenSSL toolkit. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) General source tree makefile cleanups: Made `making xxx in yyy...' display consistent in the source tree and replaced `/bin/rm' by `rm'. Additonally cleaned up the `make links' target: Remove unnecessary semicolons, subsequent redundant removes, inline point.sh into mklink.sh to speed processing and no longer clutter the display with confusing stuff. Instead only the actually done links are displayed. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Permit null encryption ciphersuites, used for authentication only. It used to be necessary to set the preprocessor define SSL_ALLOW_ENULL to do this. It is now necessary to set SSL_FORBID_ENULL to prevent the use of null encryption. [Ben Laurie] *) Add a bunch of fixes to the PKCS#7 stuff. It used to sometimes reorder signed attributes when verifying signatures (this would break them), the detached data encoding was wrong and public keys obtained using X509_get_pubkey() weren't freed. [Steve Henson] *) Add text documentation for the BUFFER functions. Also added a work around to a Win95 console bug. This was triggered by the password read stuff: the last character typed gets carried over to the next fread(). If you were generating a new cert request using 'req' for example then the last character of the passphrase would be CR which would then enter the first field as blank. [Steve Henson] *) Added the new `Includes OpenSSL Cryptography Software' button as doc/openssl_button.{gif,html} which is similar in style to the old SSLeay button and can be used by applications based on OpenSSL to show the relationship to the OpenSSL project. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Remove confusing variables in function signatures in files ssl/ssl_lib.c and ssl/ssl.h. [Lennart Bong ] *) Don't install bss_file.c under PREFIX/include/ [Lennart Bong ] *) Get the Win32 compile working again. Modify mkdef.pl so it can handle functions that return function pointers and has support for NT specific stuff. Fix mk1mf.pl and VC-32.pl to support NT differences also. Various #ifdef WIN32 and WINNTs sprinkled about the place and some changes from unsigned to signed types: this was killing the Win32 compile. [Steve Henson] *) Add new certificate file to stack functions, SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() and SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(). These largely supplant SSL_load_client_CA_file(), and can be used to add multiple certs easily to a stack (usually this is then handed to SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list()). This means that Apache-SSL and similar packages don't have to mess around to add as many CAs as they want to the preferred list. [Ben Laurie] *) Experiment with doxygen documentation. Currently only partially applied to ssl/ssl_lib.c. See http://www.stack.nl/~dimitri/doxygen/index.html, and run doxygen with openssl.doxy as the configuration file. [Ben Laurie] *) Get rid of remaining C++-style comments which strict C compilers hate. [Ralf S. Engelschall, pointed out by Carlos Amengual] *) Changed BN_RECURSION in bn_mont.c to BN_RECURSION_MONT so it is not compiled in by default: it has problems with large keys. [Steve Henson] *) Add a bunch of SSL_xxx() functions for configuring the temporary RSA and DH private keys and/or callback functions which directly correspond to their SSL_CTX_xxx() counterparts but work on a per-connection basis. This is needed for applications which have to configure certificates on a per-connection basis (e.g. Apache+mod_ssl) instead of a per-context basis (e.g. s_server). For the RSA certificate situation is makes no difference, but for the DSA certificate situation this fixes the "no shared cipher" problem where the OpenSSL cipher selection procedure failed because the temporary keys were not overtaken from the context and the API provided no way to reconfigure them. The new functions now let applications reconfigure the stuff and they are in detail: SSL_need_tmp_RSA, SSL_set_tmp_rsa, SSL_set_tmp_dh, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback and SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback. Additionally a new non-public-API function ssl_cert_instantiate() is used as a helper function and also to reduce code redundancy inside ssl_rsa.c. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Move s_server -dcert and -dkey options out of the undocumented feature area because they are useful for the DSA situation and should be recognized by the users. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix the cipher decision scheme for export ciphers: the export bits are *not* within SSL_MKEY_MASK or SSL_AUTH_MASK, they are within SSL_EXP_MASK. So, the original variable has to be used instead of the already masked variable. [Richard Levitte ] *) Fix 'port' variable from `int' to `unsigned int' in crypto/bio/b_sock.c [Richard Levitte ] *) Change type of another md_len variable in pk7_doit.c:PKCS7_dataFinal() from `int' to `unsigned int' because it's a length and initialized by EVP_DigestFinal() which expects an `unsigned int *'. [Richard Levitte ] *) Don't hard-code path to Perl interpreter on shebang line of Configure script. Instead use the usual Shell->Perl transition trick. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Make `openssl x509 -noout -modulus' functional also for DSA certificates (in addition to RSA certificates) to match the behaviour of `openssl dsa -noout -modulus' as it's already the case for `openssl rsa -noout -modulus'. For RSA the -modulus is the real "modulus" while for DSA currently the public key is printed (a decision which was already done by `openssl dsa -modulus' in the past) which serves a similar purpose. Additionally the NO_RSA no longer completely removes the whole -modulus option; it now only avoids using the RSA stuff. Same applies to NO_DSA now, too. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Add Arne Ansper's reliable BIO - this is an encrypted, block-digested BIO. See the source (crypto/evp/bio_ok.c) for more info. [Arne Ansper ] *) Dump the old yucky req code that tried (and failed) to allow raw OIDs to be added. Now both 'req' and 'ca' can use new objects defined in the config file. [Steve Henson] *) Add cool BIO that does syslog (or event log on NT). [Arne Ansper , integrated by Ben Laurie] *) Add support for new TLS ciphersuites, TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_RC4_56_MD5, TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5 and TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, as specified in "56-bit Export Cipher Suites For TLS", draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-00.txt. [Ben Laurie] *) Add preliminary config info for new extension code. [Steve Henson] *) Make RSA_NO_PADDING really use no padding. [Ulf Moeller ] *) Generate errors when private/public key check is done. [Ben Laurie] *) Overhaul for 'crl' utility. New function X509_CRL_print. Partial support for some CRL extensions and new objects added. [Steve Henson] *) Really fix the ASN1 IMPLICIT bug this time... Partial support for private key usage extension and fuller support for authority key id. [Steve Henson] *) Add OAEP encryption for the OpenSSL crypto library. OAEP is the improved padding method for RSA, which is recommended for new applications in PKCS #1 v2.0 (RFC 2437, October 1998). OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding) has better theoretical foundations than the ad-hoc padding used in PKCS #1 v1.5. It is secure against Bleichbacher's attack on RSA. [Ulf Moeller , reformatted, corrected and integrated by Ben Laurie] *) Updates to the new SSL compression code [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)] *) Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3 (because the server will not accept higher), that the version number is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00 [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)] *) Run extensive memory leak checks on SSL apps. Fixed *lots* of memory leaks in ssl/ relating to new X509_get_pubkey() behaviour. Also fixes in apps/ and an unrelated leak in crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c [Steve Henson] *) Support for RAW extensions where an arbitrary extension can be created by including its DER encoding. See apps/openssl.cnf for an example. [Steve Henson] *) Make sure latest Perl versions don't interpret some generated C array code as Perl array code in the crypto/err/err_genc.pl script. [Lars Weber <3weber@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>] *) Modify ms/do_ms.bat to not generate assembly language makefiles since not many people have the assembler. Various Win32 compilation fixes and update to the INSTALL.W32 file with (hopefully) more accurate Win32 build instructions. [Steve Henson] *) Modify configure script 'Configure' to automatically create crypto/date.h file under Win32 and also build pem.h from pem.org. New script util/mkfiles.pl to create the MINFO file on environments that can't do a 'make files': perl util/mkfiles.pl >MINFO should work. [Steve Henson] *) Major rework of DES function declarations, in the pursuit of correctness and purity. As a result, many evil casts evaporated, and some weirdness, too. You may find this causes warnings in your code. Zapping your evil casts will probably fix them. Mostly. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix for a typo in asn1.h. Bug fix to object creation script obj_dat.pl. It considered a zero in an object definition to mean "end of object": none of the objects in objects.h have any zeros so it wasn't spotted. [Steve Henson, reported by Erwann ABALEA ] *) Add support for Triple DES Cipher Block Chaining with Output Feedback Masking (CBCM). In the absence of test vectors, the best I have been able to do is check that the decrypt undoes the encrypt, so far. Send me test vectors if you have them. [Ben Laurie] *) Correct calculation of key length for export ciphers (too much space was allocated for null ciphers). This has not been tested! [Ben Laurie] *) Modifications to the mkdef.pl for Win32 DEF file creation. The usage message is now correct (it understands "crypto" and "ssl" on its command line). There is also now an "update" option. This will update the util/ssleay.num and util/libeay.num files with any new functions. If you do a: perl util/mkdef.pl crypto ssl update it will update them. [Steve Henson] *) Overhauled the Perl interface (perl/*): - ported BN stuff to OpenSSL's different BN library - made the perl/ source tree CVS-aware - renamed the package from SSLeay to OpenSSL (the files still contain their history because I've copied them in the repository) - removed obsolete files (the test scripts will be replaced by better Test::Harness variants in the future) [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) First cut for a very conservative source tree cleanup: 1. merge various obsolete readme texts into doc/ssleay.txt where we collect the old documents and readme texts. 2. remove the first part of files where I'm already sure that we no longer need them because of three reasons: either they are just temporary files which were left by Eric or they are preserved original files where I've verified that the diff is also available in the CVS via "cvs diff -rSSLeay_0_8_1b" or they were renamed (as it was definitely the case for the crypto/md/ stuff). [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) More extension code. Incomplete support for subject and issuer alt name, issuer and authority key id. Change the i2v function parameters and add an extra 'crl' parameter in the X509V3_CTX structure: guess what that's for :-) Fix to ASN1 macro which messed up IMPLICIT tag and add f_enum.c which adds a2i, i2a for ENUMERATED. [Steve Henson] *) Preliminary support for ENUMERATED type. This is largely copied from the INTEGER code. [Steve Henson] *) Add new function, EVP_MD_CTX_copy() to replace frequent use of memcpy. [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)] *) Make sure `make rehash' target really finds the `openssl' program. [Ralf S. Engelschall, Matthias Loepfe ] *) Squeeze another 7% of speed out of MD5 assembler, at least on a P2. I'd like to hear about it if this slows down other processors. [Ben Laurie] *) Add CygWin32 platform information to Configure script. [Alan Batie ] *) Fixed ms/32all.bat script: `no_asm' -> `no-asm' [Rainer W. Gerling ] *) New program nseq to manipulate netscape certificate sequences [Steve Henson] *) Modify crl2pkcs7 so it supports multiple -certfile arguments. Fix a few typos. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes to BN code. Previously the default was to define BN_RECURSION but the BN code had some problems that would cause failures when doing certificate verification and some other functions. [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)] *) Add ASN1 and PEM code to support netscape certificate sequences. [Steve Henson] *) Add ASN1 and PEM code to support netscape certificate sequences. [Steve Henson] *) Add several PKIX and private extended key usage OIDs. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the 'ca' program to handle the new extension code. Modify openssl.cnf for new extension format, add comments. [Steve Henson] *) More X509 V3 changes. Fix typo in v3_bitstr.c. Add support to 'req' and add a sample to openssl.cnf so req -x509 now adds appropriate CA extensions. [Steve Henson] *) Continued X509 V3 changes. Add to other makefiles, integrate with the error code, add initial support to X509_print() and x509 application. [Steve Henson] *) Takes a deep breath and start addding X509 V3 extension support code. Add files in crypto/x509v3. Move original stuff to crypto/x509v3/old. All this stuff is currently isolated and isn't even compiled yet. [Steve Henson] *) Continuing patches for GeneralizedTime. Fix up certificate and CRL ASN1 to use ASN1_TIME and modify print routines to use ASN1_TIME_print. Removed the versions check from X509 routines when loading extensions: this allows certain broken certificates that don't set the version properly to be processed. [Steve Henson] *) Deal with irritating shit to do with dependencies, in YAAHW (Yet Another Ad Hoc Way) - Makefile.ssls now all contain local dependencies, which can still be regenerated with "make depend". [Ben Laurie] *) Spelling mistake in C version of CAST-128. [Ben Laurie, reported by Jeremy Hylton ] *) Changes to the error generation code. The perl script err-code.pl now reads in the old error codes and retains the old numbers, only adding new ones if necessary. It also only changes the .err files if new codes are added. The makefiles have been modified to only insert errors when needed (to avoid needlessly modifying header files). This is done by only inserting errors if the .err file is newer than the auto generated C file. To rebuild all the error codes from scratch (the old behaviour) either modify crypto/Makefile.ssl to pass the -regen flag to err_code.pl or delete all the .err files. [Steve Henson] *) CAST-128 was incorrectly implemented for short keys. The C version has been fixed, but is untested. The assembler versions are also fixed, but new assembler HAS NOT BEEN GENERATED FOR WIN32 - the Makefile needs fixing to regenerate it if needed. [Ben Laurie, reported (with fix for C version) by Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino ] *) File was opened incorrectly in randfile.c. [Ulf Möller ] *) Beginning of support for GeneralizedTime. d2i, i2d, check and print functions. Also ASN1_TIME suite which is a CHOICE of UTCTime or GeneralizedTime. ASN1_TIME is the proper type used in certificates et al: it's just almost always a UTCTime. Note this patch adds new error codes so do a "make errors" if there are problems. [Steve Henson] *) Correct Linux 1 recognition in config. [Ulf Möller ] *) Remove pointless MD5 hash when using DSA keys in ca. [Anonymous ] *) Generate an error if given an empty string as a cert directory. Also generate an error if handed NULL (previously returned 0 to indicate an error, but didn't set one). [Ben Laurie, reported by Anonymous ] *) Add prototypes to SSL methods. Make SSL_write's buffer const, at last. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix the dummy function BN_ref_mod_exp() in rsaref.c to have the correct parameters. This was causing a warning which killed off the Win32 compile. [Steve Henson] *) Remove C++ style comments from crypto/bn/bn_local.h. [Neil Costigan ] *) The function OBJ_txt2nid was broken. It was supposed to return a nid based on a text string, looking up short and long names and finally "dot" format. The "dot" format stuff didn't work. Added new function OBJ_txt2obj to do the same but return an ASN1_OBJECT and rewrote OBJ_txt2nid to use it. OBJ_txt2obj can also return objects even if the OID is not part of the table. [Steve Henson] *) Add prototypes to X509 lookup/verify methods, fixing a bug in X509_LOOKUP_by_alias(). [Ben Laurie] *) Sort openssl functions by name. [Ben Laurie] *) Get the gendsa program working (hopefully) and add it to app list. Remove encryption from sample DSA keys (in case anyone is interested the password was "1234"). [Steve Henson] *) Make _all_ *_free functions accept a NULL pointer. [Frans Heymans ] *) If a DH key is generated in s3_srvr.c, don't blow it by trying to use NULL pointers. [Anonymous ] *) s_server should send the CAfile as acceptable CAs, not its own cert. [Bodo Moeller <3moeller@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>] *) Don't blow it for numeric -newkey arguments to apps/req. [Bodo Moeller <3moeller@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>] *) Temp key "for export" tests were wrong in s3_srvr.c. [Anonymous ] *) Add prototype for temp key callback functions SSL_CTX_set_tmp_{rsa,dh}_callback(). [Ben Laurie] *) Make DH_free() tolerate being passed a NULL pointer (like RSA_free() and DSA_free()). Make X509_PUBKEY_set() check for errors in d2i_PublicKey(). [Steve Henson] *) X509_name_add_entry() freed the wrong thing after an error. [Arne Ansper ] *) rsa_eay.c would attempt to free a NULL context. [Arne Ansper ] *) BIO_s_socket() had a broken should_retry() on Windoze. [Arne Ansper ] *) BIO_f_buffer() didn't pass on BIO_CTRL_FLUSH. [Arne Ansper ] *) Make sure the already existing X509_STORE->depth variable is initialized in X509_STORE_new(), but document the fact that this variable is still unused in the certificate verification process. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix the various library and apps files to free up pkeys obtained from X509_PUBKEY_get() et al. Also allow x509.c to handle netscape extensions. [Steve Henson] *) Fix reference counting in X509_PUBKEY_get(). This makes demos/maurice/example2.c work, amongst others, probably. [Steve Henson and Ben Laurie] *) First cut of a cleanup for apps/. First the `ssleay' program is now named `openssl' and second, the shortcut symlinks for the `openssl ' are no longer created. This way we have a single and consistent command line interface `openssl ', similar to `cvs '. [Ralf S. Engelschall, Paul Sutton and Ben Laurie] *) ca.c: move test for DSA keys inside #ifndef NO_DSA. Make pubkey BIT STRING wrapper always have zero unused bits. [Steve Henson] *) Add CA.pl, perl version of CA.sh, add extended key usage OID. [Steve Henson] *) Make the top-level INSTALL documentation easier to understand. [Paul Sutton] *) Makefiles updated to exit if an error occurs in a sub-directory make (including if user presses ^C) [Paul Sutton] *) Make Montgomery context stuff explicit in RSA data structure. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix build order of pem and err to allow for generated pem.h. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix renumbering bug in X509_NAME_delete_entry(). [Ben Laurie] *) Enhanced the err-ins.pl script so it makes the error library number global and can add a library name. This is needed for external ASN1 and other error libraries. [Steve Henson] *) Fixed sk_insert which never worked properly. [Steve Henson] *) Fix ASN1 macros so they can handle indefinite length construted EXPLICIT tags. Some non standard certificates use these: they can now be read in. [Steve Henson] *) Merged the various old/obsolete SSLeay documentation files (doc/xxx.doc) into a single doc/ssleay.txt bundle. This way the information is still preserved but no longer messes up this directory. Now it's new room for the new set of documenation files. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) SETs were incorrectly DER encoded. This was a major pain, because they shared code with SEQUENCEs, which aren't coded the same. This means that almost everything to do with SETs or SEQUENCEs has either changed name or number of arguments. [Ben Laurie, based on a partial fix by GP Jayan ] *) Fix test data to work with the above. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix the RSA header declarations that hid a bug I fixed in 0.9.0b but was already fixed by Eric for 0.9.1 it seems. [Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf Möller ] *) Autodetect FreeBSD3. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix various bugs in Configure. This affects the following platforms: nextstep ncr-scde unixware-2.0 unixware-2.0-pentium sco5-cc. [Ben Laurie] *) Eliminate generated files from CVS. Reorder tests to regenerate files before they are needed. [Ben Laurie] *) Generate Makefile.ssl from Makefile.org (to keep CVS happy). [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.1b and 0.9.1c [23-Dec-1998] *) Added OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to crypto/crypto.h and changed SSLeay to OpenSSL in version strings. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Some fixups to the top-level documents. [Paul Sutton] *) Fixed the nasty bug where rsaref.h was not found under compile-time because the symlink to include/ was missing. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Incorporated the popular no-RSA/DSA-only patches which allow to compile a RSA-free SSLeay. [Andrew Cooke / Interrader Ldt., Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fixed nasty rehash problem under `make -f Makefile.ssl links' when "ssleay" is still not found. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Added more platforms to Configure: Cray T3E, HPUX 11, [Ralf S. Engelschall, Beckmann ] *) Updated the README file. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Added various .cvsignore files in the CVS repository subdirs to make a "cvs update" really silent. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Recompiled the error-definition header files and added missing symbols to the Win32 linker tables. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Cleaned up the top-level documents; o new files: CHANGES and LICENSE o merged VERSION, HISTORY* and README* files a CHANGES.SSLeay o merged COPYRIGHT into LICENSE o removed obsolete TODO file o renamed MICROSOFT to INSTALL.W32 [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Removed dummy files from the 0.9.1b source tree: crypto/asn1/x crypto/bio/cd crypto/bio/fg crypto/bio/grep crypto/bio/vi crypto/bn/asm/......add.c crypto/bn/asm/a.out crypto/dsa/f crypto/md5/f crypto/pem/gmon.out crypto/perlasm/f crypto/pkcs7/build crypto/rsa/f crypto/sha/asm/f crypto/threads/f ms/zzz ssl/f ssl/f.mak test/f util/f.mak util/pl/f util/pl/f.mak crypto/bf/bf_locl.old apps/f [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Added various platform portability fixes. [Mark J. Cox] *) The Genesis of the OpenSSL rpject: We start with the latest (unreleased) SSLeay version 0.9.1b which Eric A. Young and Tim J. Hudson created while they were working for C2Net until summer 1998. [The OpenSSL Project] Changes between 0.9.0b and 0.9.1b [not released] *) Updated a few CA certificates under certs/ [Eric A. Young] *) Changed some BIGNUM api stuff. [Eric A. Young] *) Various platform ports: OpenBSD, Ultrix, IRIX 64bit, NetBSD, DGUX x86, Linux Alpha, etc. [Eric A. Young] *) New COMP library [crypto/comp/] for SSL Record Layer Compression: RLE (dummy implemented) and ZLIB (really implemented when ZLIB is available). [Eric A. Young] *) Add -strparse option to asn1pars program which parses nested binary structures [Dr Stephen Henson ] *) Added "oid_file" to ssleay.cnf for "ca" and "req" programs. [Eric A. Young] *) DSA fix for "ca" program. [Eric A. Young] *) Added "-genkey" option to "dsaparam" program. [Eric A. Young] *) Added RIPE MD160 (rmd160) message digest. [Eric A. Young] *) Added -a (all) option to "ssleay version" command. [Eric A. Young] *) Added PLATFORM define which is the id given to Configure. [Eric A. Young] *) Added MemCheck_XXXX functions to crypto/mem.c for memory checking. [Eric A. Young] *) Extended the ASN.1 parser routines. [Eric A. Young] *) Extended BIO routines to support REUSEADDR, seek, tell, etc. [Eric A. Young] *) Added a BN_CTX to the BN library. [Eric A. Young] *) Fixed the weak key values in DES library [Eric A. Young] *) Changed API in EVP library for cipher aliases. [Eric A. Young] *) Added support for RC2/64bit cipher. [Eric A. Young] *) Converted the lhash library to the crypto/mem.c functions. [Eric A. Young] *) Added more recognized ASN.1 object ids. [Eric A. Young] *) Added more RSA padding checks for SSL/TLS. [Eric A. Young] *) Added BIO proxy/filter functionality. [Eric A. Young] *) Added extra_certs to SSL_CTX which can be used send extra CA certificates to the client in the CA cert chain sending process. It can be configured with SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(). [Eric A. Young] *) Now Fortezza is denied in the authentication phase because this is key exchange mechanism is not supported by SSLeay at all. [Eric A. Young] *) Additional PKCS1 checks. [Eric A. Young] *) Support the string "TLSv1" for all TLS v1 ciphers. [Eric A. Young] *) Added function SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() which gives the ex_data index of the SSL context in the X509_STORE_CTX ex_data. [Eric A. Young] *) Fixed a few memory leaks. [Eric A. Young] *) Fixed various code and comment typos. [Eric A. Young] *) A minor bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c where there would always be 4 0 bytes sent in the client random. [Edward Bishop ] Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/FREEBSD-upgrade =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/FREEBSD-upgrade (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/FREEBSD-upgrade (revision 276859) @@ -1,83 +1,83 @@ This contains various notes used to import a new OpenSSL version into the FreeBSD base system. It is not expected to be complete but just to contain some hints for imports. Note that this doesn't actually deal with getting OpenSSL to compile... XXX This file currently partly contain CVS and SVN instructions. First, read http://wiki.freebsd.org/SubversionPrimer/VendorImports # Xlist setenv XLIST /FreeBSD/work/openssl/svn-FREEBSD-files/FREEBSD-Xlist setenv FSVN "svn+ssh://svn.freebsd.org/base" -setenv OSSLVER 0.9.8zc -# OSSLTAG format: v0_9_8zc +setenv OSSLVER 0.9.8zd +# OSSLTAG format: v0_9_8zd ###setenv OSSLTAG v`echo ${OSSLVER} | tr . _` cd /FreeBSD/work/openssl/merge fetch http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${OSSLVER}.tar.gz \ http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${OSSLVER}.tar.gz.asc gpg --verify openssl-${OSSLVER}.tar.gz.asc openssl-${OSSLVER}.tar.gz svn co $FSVN/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8 dist-0.9.8 tar -x -X $XLIST -f openssl-${OSSLVER}.tar.gz cd dist-0.9.8 svn list -R | egrep -v -e '/$' -e '^FREEBSD-(Xlist|upgrade)$' | sort >../old cd ../openssl-${OSSLVER} find . -type f -or -type l | cut -c 3- | sort >../new cd .. # See that files to remove makes sense comm -23 old new # See that files to add makes sense comm -13 old new tar -cf - -C openssl-${OSSLVER} . | tar -xf - -C dist-0.9.8 cd dist-0.9.8 comm -23 ../old ../new | xargs svn rm # Make sure to remove empty directories comm -13 ../old ../new | xargs svn --parents add svn stat svn ci svn cp ^/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8 ^/vendor-crypto/openssl/$OSSLVER # Merge to head mkdir ../head cd ../head svn co $FSVN/head/crypto/openssl crypto/openssl svn merge ^/vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8 crypto/openssl # Resolve conflicts manually svn co $FSVN/head/secure/lib/libcrypto secure/lib/libcrypto svn co $FSVN/head/secure/lib/libssl secure/lib/libssl svn co $FSVN/head/secure/usr.bin/openssl secure/usr.bin/openssl cd secure/lib/libcrypto # Update version number and release date in Makefile.inc # Update all opensslconf-${MACHINE_CPUARCH}.h # Regen assembly files if necessary make -f Makefile.asm all mv *.[Ss] ${MACHINE_CPUARCH} make -f Makefile.asm clean # Regen manual pages make man-makefile-update && make man-update cd ../libssl make man-makefile-update && make man-update cd ../../usr.bin/openssl make man-makefile-update && make man-update cd ../../.. # Commit! svn ci crypto/openssl secure/lib/libcrypto secure/lib/libssl secure/usr.bin/openssl -- simon@, jkim@ $FreeBSD$ Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/Makefile =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/Makefile (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/Makefile (revision 276859) @@ -1,732 +1,732 @@ ### Generated automatically from Makefile.org by Configure. ## ## Makefile for OpenSSL ## -VERSION=0.9.8zc +VERSION=0.9.8zd MAJOR=0 MINOR=9.8 SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER=0.9.8 SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY= SHLIB_MAJOR=0 SHLIB_MINOR=9.8 SHLIB_EXT= PLATFORM=dist OPTIONS= no-camellia no-capieng no-cms no-gmp no-jpake no-krb5 no-mdc2 no-montasm no-rc5 no-rfc3779 no-seed no-shared no-zlib no-zlib-dynamic CONFIGURE_ARGS=dist SHLIB_TARGET= # HERE indicates where this Makefile lives. This can be used to indicate # where sub-Makefiles are expected to be. Currently has very limited usage, # and should probably not be bothered with at all. HERE=. # INSTALL_PREFIX is for package builders so that they can configure # for, say, /usr/ and yet have everything installed to /tmp/somedir/usr/. # Normally it is left empty. INSTALL_PREFIX= INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl # Do not edit this manually. Use Configure --openssldir=DIR do change this! OPENSSLDIR=/usr/local/ssl # NO_IDEA - Define to build without the IDEA algorithm # NO_RC4 - Define to build without the RC4 algorithm # NO_RC2 - Define to build without the RC2 algorithm # THREADS - Define when building with threads, you will probably also need any # system defines as well, i.e. _REENTERANT for Solaris 2.[34] # TERMIO - Define the termio terminal subsystem, needed if sgtty is missing. # TERMIOS - Define the termios terminal subsystem, Silicon Graphics. # LONGCRYPT - Define to use HPUX 10.x's long password modification to crypt(3). # DEVRANDOM - Give this the value of the 'random device' if your OS supports # one. 32 bytes will be read from this when the random # number generator is initalised. # SSL_FORBID_ENULL - define if you want the server to be not able to use the # NULL encryption ciphers. # # LOCK_DEBUG - turns on lots of lock debug output :-) # REF_CHECK - turn on some xyz_free() assertions. # REF_PRINT - prints some stuff on structure free. # CRYPTO_MDEBUG - turns on my 'memory leak' detecting stuff # MFUNC - Make all Malloc/Free/Realloc calls call # CRYPTO_malloc/CRYPTO_free/CRYPTO_realloc which can be setup to # call application defined callbacks via CRYPTO_set_mem_functions() # MD5_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for MD5 # SHA1_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for SHA1 # RMD160_ASM needs to be defined to use the x86 assembler for RIPEMD160 # Do not define B_ENDIAN or L_ENDIAN if 'unsigned long' == 8. It must # equal 4. # PKCS1_CHECK - pkcs1 tests. CC= cc CFLAG= -O DEPFLAG= -DOPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA -DOPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG -DOPENSSL_NO_CMS -DOPENSSL_NO_GMP -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE -DOPENSSL_NO_MDC2 -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5 -DOPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 -DOPENSSL_NO_SEED PEX_LIBS= EX_LIBS= EXE_EXT= ARFLAGS= AR= ar $(ARFLAGS) r ARD=ar $(ARFLAGS) d RANLIB= /usr/bin/ranlib PERL= /usr/bin/perl TAR= tar TARFLAGS= --no-recursion --record-size=10240 MAKEDEPPROG=makedepend LIBDIR=lib # We let the C compiler driver to take care of .s files. This is done in # order to be excused from maintaining a separate set of architecture # dependent assembler flags. E.g. if you throw -mcpu=ultrasparc at SPARC # gcc, then the driver will automatically translate it to -xarch=v8plus # and pass it down to assembler. AS=$(CC) -c ASFLAG=$(CFLAG) # For x86 assembler: Set PROCESSOR to 386 if you want to support # the 80386. PROCESSOR= # CPUID module collects small commonly used assembler snippets CPUID_OBJ= BN_ASM= bn_asm.o DES_ENC= des_enc.o fcrypt_b.o AES_ASM_OBJ= aes_core.o aes_cbc.o BF_ENC= bf_enc.o CAST_ENC= c_enc.o RC4_ENC= rc4_enc.o rc4_skey.o RC5_ENC= rc5_enc.o MD5_ASM_OBJ= SHA1_ASM_OBJ= RMD160_ASM_OBJ= # KRB5 stuff KRB5_INCLUDES= LIBKRB5= # Zlib stuff ZLIB_INCLUDE= LIBZLIB= # This is the location of fipscanister.o and friends. # The FIPS module build will place it $(INSTALLTOP)/lib # but since $(INSTALLTOP) can only take the default value # when the module is built it will be in /usr/local/ssl/lib # $(INSTALLTOP) for this build make be different so hard # code the path. FIPSLIBDIR=/usr/local/ssl/fips-1.0/lib/ # This is set to "y" if fipscanister.o is compiled internally as # opposed to coming from an external validated location. FIPSCANISTERINTERNAL=n # The location of the library which contains fipscanister.o # normally it will be libcrypto unless fipsdso is set in which # case it will be libfips. If not compiling in FIPS mode at all # this is empty making it a useful test for a FIPS compile. FIPSCANLIB= # Shared library base address. Currently only used on Windows. # BASEADDR=0xFB00000 DIRS= crypto ssl engines apps test tools SHLIBDIRS= crypto ssl # dirs in crypto to build SDIRS= \ objects \ md2 md4 md5 sha hmac ripemd \ des aes rc2 rc4 idea bf cast \ bn ec rsa dsa ecdsa dh ecdh dso engine \ buffer bio stack lhash rand err \ evp asn1 pem x509 x509v3 conf txt_db pkcs7 pkcs12 comp ocsp ui krb5 \ store pqueue # keep in mind that the above list is adjusted by ./Configure # according to no-xxx arguments... # tests to perform. "alltests" is a special word indicating that all tests # should be performed. TESTS = alltests MAKEFILE= Makefile MANDIR=$(OPENSSLDIR)/man MAN1=1 MAN3=3 MANSUFFIX= SHELL=/bin/sh TOP= . ONEDIRS=out tmp EDIRS= times doc bugs util include certs ms shlib mt demos perl sf dep VMS WDIRS= windows LIBS= libcrypto.a libssl.a SHARED_CRYPTO=libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT) SHARED_SSL=libssl$(SHLIB_EXT) SHARED_FIPS= SHARED_LIBS= SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS= SHARED_LDFLAGS= GENERAL= Makefile BASENAME= openssl NAME= $(BASENAME)-$(VERSION) TARFILE= $(NAME).tar WTARFILE= $(NAME)-win.tar EXHEADER= e_os2.h HEADER= e_os.h all: Makefile build_all openssl.pc libssl.pc libcrypto.pc # as we stick to -e, CLEARENV ensures that local variables in lower # Makefiles remain local and variable. $${VAR+VAR} is tribute to Korn # shell, which [annoyingly enough] terminates unset with error if VAR # is not present:-( TOP= && unset TOP is tribute to HP-UX /bin/sh, # which terminates unset with error if no variable was present:-( CLEARENV= TOP= && unset TOP $${LIB+LIB} $${LIBS+LIBS} \ $${INCLUDE+INCLUDE} $${INCLUDES+INCLUDES} \ $${DIR+DIR} $${DIRS+DIRS} $${SRC+SRC} \ $${LIBSRC+LIBSRC} $${LIBOBJ+LIBOBJ} $${ALL+ALL} \ $${EXHEADER+EXHEADER} $${HEADER+HEADER} \ $${GENERAL+GENERAL} $${CFLAGS+CFLAGS} \ $${ASFLAGS+ASFLAGS} $${AFLAGS+AFLAGS} \ $${LDCMD+LDCMD} $${LDFLAGS+LDFLAGS} \ $${SHAREDCMD+SHAREDCMD} $${SHAREDFLAGS+SHAREDFLAGS} \ $${SHARED_LIB+SHARED_LIB} $${LIBEXTRAS+LIBEXTRAS} BUILDENV= PLATFORM='${PLATFORM}' PROCESSOR='${PROCESSOR}' \ CC='${CC}' CFLAG='${CFLAG}' \ AS='${CC}' ASFLAG='${CFLAG} -c' \ AR='${AR}' PERL='${PERL}' RANLIB='${RANLIB}' \ SDIRS='${SDIRS}' LIBRPATH='${INSTALLTOP}/$(LIBDIR)' \ INSTALL_PREFIX='${INSTALL_PREFIX}' \ INSTALLTOP='${INSTALLTOP}' OPENSSLDIR='${OPENSSLDIR}' \ LIBDIR='${LIBDIR}' \ MAKEDEPEND='$$$${TOP}/util/domd $$$${TOP} -MD ${MAKEDEPPROG}' \ DEPFLAG='-DOPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED ${DEPFLAG}' \ MAKEDEPPROG='${MAKEDEPPROG}' \ SHARED_LDFLAGS='${SHARED_LDFLAGS}' \ KRB5_INCLUDES='${KRB5_INCLUDES}' LIBKRB5='${LIBKRB5}' \ EXE_EXT='${EXE_EXT}' SHARED_LIBS='${SHARED_LIBS}' \ SHLIB_EXT='${SHLIB_EXT}' SHLIB_TARGET='${SHLIB_TARGET}' \ PEX_LIBS='${PEX_LIBS}' EX_LIBS='${EX_LIBS}' \ CPUID_OBJ='${CPUID_OBJ}' \ BN_ASM='${BN_ASM}' DES_ENC='${DES_ENC}' \ AES_ASM_OBJ='${AES_ASM_OBJ}' \ BF_ENC='${BF_ENC}' CAST_ENC='${CAST_ENC}' \ RC4_ENC='${RC4_ENC}' RC5_ENC='${RC5_ENC}' \ SHA1_ASM_OBJ='${SHA1_ASM_OBJ}' \ MD5_ASM_OBJ='${MD5_ASM_OBJ}' \ RMD160_ASM_OBJ='${RMD160_ASM_OBJ}' \ FIPSLIBDIR='${FIPSLIBDIR}' \ FIPSCANLIB="$${FIPSCANLIB:-$(FIPSCANLIB)}" \ FIPSCANISTERINTERNAL='${FIPSCANISTERINTERNAL}' \ FIPS_EX_OBJ='${FIPS_EX_OBJ}' \ THIS=$${THIS:-$@} MAKEFILE=Makefile MAKEOVERRIDES= # MAKEOVERRIDES= effectively "equalizes" GNU-ish and SysV-ish make flavors, # which in turn eliminates ambiguities in variable treatment with -e. # BUILD_CMD is a generic macro to build a given target in a given # subdirectory. The target must be given through the shell variable # `target' and the subdirectory to build in must be given through `dir'. # This macro shouldn't be used directly, use RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD or # BUILD_ONE_CMD instead. # # BUILD_ONE_CMD is a macro to build a given target in a given # subdirectory if that subdirectory is part of $(DIRS). It requires # exactly the same shell variables as BUILD_CMD. # # RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD is a macro to build a given target in all # subdirectories defined in $(DIRS). It requires that the target # is given through the shell variable `target'. BUILD_CMD= if [ -d "$$dir" ]; then \ ( [ $$target != all -a -z "$(FIPSCANLIB)" ] && FIPSCANLIB=/dev/null; \ cd $$dir && echo "making $$target in $$dir..." && \ $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) TOP=.. DIR=$$dir $$target \ ) || exit 1; \ fi RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD=for dir in $(DIRS); do $(BUILD_CMD); done BUILD_ONE_CMD=\ if echo " $(DIRS) " | grep " $$dir " >/dev/null 2>/dev/null; then \ $(BUILD_CMD); \ fi reflect: @[ -n "$(THIS)" ] && $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) $(THIS) -e $(BUILDENV) FIPS_EX_OBJ= ../crypto/aes/aes_cfb.o \ ../crypto/aes/aes_ecb.o \ ../crypto/aes/aes_ofb.o \ ../crypto/bn/bn_add.o \ ../crypto/bn/bn_blind.o \ ../crypto/bn/bn_ctx.o \ ../crypto/bn/bn_div.o \ ../crypto/bn/bn_exp2.o \ ../crypto/bn/bn_exp.o \ ../crypto/bn/bn_gcd.o \ ../crypto/bn/bn_lib.o \ ../crypto/bn/bn_mod.o \ ../crypto/bn/bn_mont.o \ ../crypto/bn/bn_mul.o \ ../crypto/bn/bn_prime.o \ ../crypto/bn/bn_rand.o \ ../crypto/bn/bn_recp.o \ ../crypto/bn/bn_shift.o \ ../crypto/bn/bn_sqr.o \ ../crypto/bn/bn_word.o \ ../crypto/bn/bn_x931p.o \ ../crypto/buffer/buf_str.o \ ../crypto/cryptlib.o \ ../crypto/des/cfb64ede.o \ ../crypto/des/cfb64enc.o \ ../crypto/des/cfb_enc.o \ ../crypto/des/ecb3_enc.o \ ../crypto/des/ecb_enc.o \ ../crypto/des/ofb64ede.o \ ../crypto/des/ofb64enc.o \ ../crypto/des/fcrypt.o \ ../crypto/des/set_key.o \ ../crypto/dsa/dsa_utl.o \ ../crypto/dsa/dsa_sign.o \ ../crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.o \ ../crypto/err/err.o \ ../crypto/evp/digest.o \ ../crypto/evp/enc_min.o \ ../crypto/evp/e_aes.o \ ../crypto/evp/e_des3.o \ ../crypto/evp/p_sign.o \ ../crypto/evp/p_verify.o \ ../crypto/mem_clr.o \ ../crypto/mem.o \ ../crypto/rand/md_rand.o \ ../crypto/rand/rand_egd.o \ ../crypto/rand/randfile.o \ ../crypto/rand/rand_lib.o \ ../crypto/rand/rand_os2.o \ ../crypto/rand/rand_unix.o \ ../crypto/rand/rand_win.o \ ../crypto/rsa/rsa_lib.o \ ../crypto/rsa/rsa_none.o \ ../crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.o \ ../crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.o \ ../crypto/rsa/rsa_pss.o \ ../crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.o \ ../crypto/rsa/rsa_x931.o \ ../crypto/sha/sha1dgst.o \ ../crypto/sha/sha256.o \ ../crypto/sha/sha512.o \ ../crypto/uid.o sub_all: build_all build_all: build_libs build_apps build_tests build_tools build_libs: build_crypto build_fips build_ssl build_shared build_engines build_crypto: if [ -n "$(FIPSCANLIB)" ]; then \ EXCL_OBJ='$(AES_ASM_OBJ) $(BN_ASM) $(DES_ENC) $(CPUID_OBJ) $(SHA1_ASM_OBJ) $(FIPS_EX_OBJ)' ; export EXCL_OBJ ; \ ARX='$(PERL) $${TOP}/util/arx.pl $(AR)' ; \ else \ ARX='${AR}' ; \ fi ; export ARX ; \ dir=crypto; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD) build_fips: @dir=fips; target=all; [ -z "$(FIPSCANLIB)" ] || $(BUILD_ONE_CMD) build_ssl: build_crypto @dir=ssl; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD) build_engines: build_crypto @dir=engines; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD) build_apps: build_libs @dir=apps; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD) build_tests: build_libs @dir=test; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD) build_tools: build_libs @dir=tools; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD) all_testapps: build_libs build_testapps build_testapps: @dir=crypto; target=testapps; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD) build_shared: $(SHARED_LIBS) libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto.a $(SHARED_FIPS) @if [ "$(SHLIB_TARGET)" != "" ]; then \ if [ "$(FIPSCANLIB)" = "libfips" ]; then \ $(ARD) libcrypto.a fipscanister.o ; \ $(MAKE) SHLIBDIRS='crypto' SHLIBDEPS='-lfips' build-shared; \ $(AR) libcrypto.a fips/fipscanister.o ; \ else \ if [ "$(FIPSCANLIB)" = "libcrypto" ]; then \ FIPSLD_CC="$(CC)"; CC=fips/fipsld; \ export CC FIPSLD_CC; \ fi; \ $(MAKE) -e SHLIBDIRS='crypto' build-shared; \ fi \ else \ echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \ exit 1; \ fi libssl$(SHLIB_EXT): libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT) libssl.a @if [ "$(SHLIB_TARGET)" != "" ]; then \ shlibdeps=-lcrypto; \ [ "$(FIPSCANLIB)" = "libfips" ] && shlibdeps="$$shlibdeps -lfips"; \ $(MAKE) SHLIBDIRS=ssl SHLIBDEPS="$$shlibdeps" build-shared; \ else \ echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2 ; \ exit 1; \ fi fips/fipscanister.o: build_fips libfips$(SHLIB_EXT): fips/fipscanister.o @if [ "$(SHLIB_TARGET)" != "" ]; then \ FIPSLD_CC="$(CC)"; CC=fips/fipsld; export CC FIPSLD_CC; \ $(MAKE) -f Makefile.shared -e $(BUILDENV) \ CC=$${CC} LIBNAME=fips THIS=$@ \ LIBEXTRAS=fips/fipscanister.o \ LIBDEPS="$(EX_LIBS)" \ LIBVERSION=${SHLIB_MAJOR}.${SHLIB_MINOR} \ link_o.$(SHLIB_TARGET) || { rm -f $@; exit 1; } \ else \ echo "There's no support for shared libraries on this platform" >&2; \ exit 1; \ fi libfips.a: dir=fips; target=all; $(BUILD_ONE_CMD) clean-shared: @set -e; for i in $(SHLIBDIRS); do \ if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS)" ]; then \ tmp="$(SHARED_LIBS_LINK_EXTS)"; \ for j in $${tmp:-x}; do \ ( set -x; rm -f lib$$i$$j ); \ done; \ fi; \ ( set -x; rm -f lib$$i$(SHLIB_EXT) ); \ if [ "$(PLATFORM)" = "Cygwin" ]; then \ ( set -x; rm -f cyg$$i$(SHLIB_EXT) lib$$i$(SHLIB_EXT).a ); \ fi; \ done link-shared: @ set -e; for i in ${SHLIBDIRS}; do \ $(MAKE) -f $(HERE)/Makefile.shared -e $(BUILDENV) \ LIBNAME=$$i LIBVERSION=${SHLIB_MAJOR}.${SHLIB_MINOR} \ LIBCOMPATVERSIONS=";${SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY}" \ symlink.$(SHLIB_TARGET); \ libs="$$libs -l$$i"; \ done build-shared: do_$(SHLIB_TARGET) link-shared do_$(SHLIB_TARGET): @ set -e; libs='-L. ${SHLIBDEPS}'; for i in ${SHLIBDIRS}; do \ if [ "${SHLIBDIRS}" = "ssl" -a -n "$(LIBKRB5)" ]; then \ libs="$(LIBKRB5) $$libs"; \ fi; \ $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -f Makefile.shared -e $(BUILDENV) \ LIBNAME=$$i LIBVERSION=${SHLIB_MAJOR}.${SHLIB_MINOR} \ LIBCOMPATVERSIONS=";${SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY}" \ LIBDEPS="$$libs $(EX_LIBS)" \ link_a.$(SHLIB_TARGET); \ libs="-l$$i $$libs"; \ done libcrypto.pc: Makefile @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \ echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \ echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \ echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \ echo ''; \ echo 'Name: OpenSSL-libcrypto'; \ echo 'Description: OpenSSL cryptography library'; \ echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \ echo 'Requires: '; \ echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lcrypto $(EX_LIBS)'; \ echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > libcrypto.pc libssl.pc: Makefile @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \ echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \ echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \ echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \ echo ''; \ echo 'Name: OpenSSL'; \ echo 'Description: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries'; \ echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \ echo 'Requires: '; \ echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl -lcrypto $(EX_LIBS)'; \ echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > libssl.pc openssl.pc: Makefile @ ( echo 'prefix=$(INSTALLTOP)'; \ echo 'exec_prefix=$${prefix}'; \ echo 'libdir=$${exec_prefix}/$(LIBDIR)'; \ echo 'includedir=$${prefix}/include'; \ echo ''; \ echo 'Name: OpenSSL'; \ echo 'Description: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools'; \ echo 'Version: '$(VERSION); \ echo 'Requires: '; \ echo 'Libs: -L$${libdir} -lssl -lcrypto $(EX_LIBS)'; \ echo 'Cflags: -I$${includedir} $(KRB5_INCLUDES)' ) > openssl.pc Makefile: Makefile.org Configure config @echo "Makefile is older than Makefile.org, Configure or config." @echo "Reconfigure the source tree (via './config' or 'perl Configure'), please." @false libclean: rm -f *.map *.so *.so.* *.dll engines/*.so engines/*.dll *.a engines/*.a */lib */*/lib clean: libclean rm -f shlib/*.o *.o core a.out fluff rehash.time testlog make.log cctest cctest.c @set -e; target=clean; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD) rm -f $(LIBS) rm -f openssl.pc libssl.pc libcrypto.pc rm -f speed.* .pure rm -f $(TARFILE) @set -e; for i in $(ONEDIRS) ;\ do \ rm -fr $$i/*; \ done makefile.one: files $(PERL) util/mk1mf.pl >makefile.one; \ sh util/do_ms.sh files: $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile > $(TOP)/MINFO @set -e; target=files; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD) links: @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl include/openssl @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl include/openssl $(EXHEADER) @set -e; target=links; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD) @if [ -z "$(FIPSCANLIB)" ]; then \ set -e; target=links; dir=fips ; $(BUILD_CMD) ; \ fi gentests: @(cd test && echo "generating dummy tests (if needed)..." && \ $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) TESTS='${TESTS}' OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on generate ); dclean: rm -f *.bak @set -e; target=dclean; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD) rehash: rehash.time rehash.time: certs apps @if [ -z "$(CROSS_COMPILE)" ]; then \ (OPENSSL="`pwd`/util/opensslwrap.sh"; \ OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on; \ export OPENSSL OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY; \ $(PERL) tools/c_rehash certs) && \ touch rehash.time; \ fi test: tests tests: rehash @(cd test && echo "testing..." && \ $(CLEARENV) && $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) TOP=.. TESTS='${TESTS}' OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY=on tests ); util/opensslwrap.sh version -a report: @$(PERL) util/selftest.pl depend: @set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD) lint: @set -e; target=lint; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD) tags: rm -f TAGS find . -name '[^.]*.[ch]' | xargs etags -a errors: $(PERL) util/mkerr.pl -recurse -write (cd engines; $(MAKE) PERL=$(PERL) errors) $(PERL) util/ck_errf.pl */*.c */*/*.c stacks: $(PERL) util/mkstack.pl -write util/libeay.num:: $(PERL) util/mkdef.pl crypto update util/ssleay.num:: $(PERL) util/mkdef.pl ssl update crypto/objects/obj_dat.h: crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl crypto/objects/obj_mac.h $(PERL) crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl crypto/objects/obj_mac.h crypto/objects/obj_dat.h crypto/objects/obj_mac.h: crypto/objects/objects.pl crypto/objects/objects.txt crypto/objects/obj_mac.num $(PERL) crypto/objects/objects.pl crypto/objects/objects.txt crypto/objects/obj_mac.num crypto/objects/obj_mac.h apps/openssl-vms.cnf: apps/openssl.cnf $(PERL) VMS/VMSify-conf.pl < apps/openssl.cnf > apps/openssl-vms.cnf crypto/bn/bn_prime.h: crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl $(PERL) crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl >crypto/bn/bn_prime.h TABLE: Configure (echo 'Output of `Configure TABLE'"':"; \ $(PERL) Configure TABLE) > TABLE update: errors stacks util/libeay.num util/ssleay.num crypto/objects/obj_dat.h apps/openssl-vms.cnf crypto/bn/bn_prime.h TABLE depend # Build distribution tar-file. As the list of files returned by "find" is # pretty long, on several platforms a "too many arguments" error or similar # would occur. Therefore the list of files is temporarily stored into a file # and read directly, requiring GNU-Tar. Call "make TAR=gtar dist" if the normal # tar does not support the --files-from option. tar: find . -type d -print | xargs chmod 755 find . -type f -print | xargs chmod a+r find . -type f -perm -0100 -print | xargs chmod a+x find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE | sort > ../$(TARFILE).list; \ $(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) --files-from ../$(TARFILE).list -cvf - | \ tardy --user_number=0 --user_name=openssl \ --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \ --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - |\ gzip --best >../$(TARFILE).gz; \ rm -f ../$(TARFILE).list; \ ls -l ../$(TARFILE).gz tar-snap: @$(TAR) $(TARFLAGS) -cvf - \ `find * \! -path CVS/\* \! -path \*/CVS/\* \! -name CVS \! -name .cvsignore \! -name STATUS \! -name TABLE \! -name '*.o' \! -name '*.a' \! -name '*.so' \! -name '*.so.*' \! -name 'openssl' \! -name '*test' \! -name '.#*' \! -name '*~' | sort` |\ tardy --user_number=0 --user_name=openssl \ --group_number=0 --group_name=openssl \ --prefix=openssl-$(VERSION) - > ../$(TARFILE);\ ls -l ../$(TARFILE) dist: $(PERL) Configure dist @$(MAKE) dist_pem_h @$(MAKE) SDIRS='${SDIRS}' clean @$(MAKE) TAR='${TAR}' TARFLAGS='${TARFLAGS}' tar dist_pem_h: (cd crypto/pem; $(MAKE) -e $(BUILDENV) pem.h; $(MAKE) clean) install: all install_docs install_sw install_sw: @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR) \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/engines \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/misc \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/certs \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(OPENSSLDIR)/private @set -e; headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist;\ do \ (cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \ done; @set -e; target=install; $(RECURSIVE_BUILD_CMD) @set -e; for i in $(LIBS) ;\ do \ if [ -f "$$i" ]; then \ ( echo installing $$i; \ cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \ $(RANLIB) $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i ); \ fi; \ done; @set -e; if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS)" ]; then \ tmp="$(SHARED_LIBS)"; \ for i in $${tmp:-x}; \ do \ if [ -f "$$i" -o -f "$$i.a" ]; then \ ( echo installing $$i; \ if [ "$(PLATFORM)" != "Cygwin" ]; then \ cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \ chmod 555 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i; \ else \ c=`echo $$i | sed 's/^lib\(.*\)\.dll\.a/cyg\1-$(SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER).dll/'`; \ cp $$c $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c.new; \ chmod 755 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c.new; \ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/bin/$$c; \ cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new; \ mv -f $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i.new $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/$$i; \ fi ); \ fi; \ done; \ ( here="`pwd`"; \ cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR); \ $(MAKE) -f $$here/Makefile HERE="$$here" link-shared ); \ if [ "$(INSTALLTOP)" != "/usr" ]; then \ echo 'OpenSSL shared libraries have been installed in:'; \ echo ' $(INSTALLTOP)'; \ echo ''; \ sed -e '1,/^$$/d' doc/openssl-shared.txt; \ fi; \ fi cp libcrypto.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libcrypto.pc cp libssl.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/libssl.pc cp openssl.pc $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/$(LIBDIR)/pkgconfig/openssl.pc install_docs: @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mkdir-p.pl \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man1 \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man3 \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man5 \ $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man7 @pod2man="`cd ./util; ./pod2mantest $(PERL)`"; \ here="`pwd`"; \ filecase=; \ if [ "$(PLATFORM)" = "DJGPP" -o "$(PLATFORM)" = "Cygwin" -o "$(PLATFORM)" = "mingw" ]; then \ filecase=-i; \ fi; \ set -e; for i in doc/apps/*.pod; do \ fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \ sec=`$(PERL) util/extract-section.pl 1 < $$i`; \ echo "installing man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX)"; \ (cd `$(PERL) util/dirname.pl $$i`; \ sh -c "$$pod2man \ --section=$$sec --center=OpenSSL \ --release=$(VERSION) `basename $$i`") \ > $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \ $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \ (grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$"; true) | \ (grep -v "[ ]"; true) | \ (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/; \ while read n; do \ $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX) "$$n".$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \ done); \ done; \ set -e; for i in doc/crypto/*.pod doc/ssl/*.pod; do \ fn=`basename $$i .pod`; \ sec=`$(PERL) util/extract-section.pl 3 < $$i`; \ echo "installing man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX)"; \ (cd `$(PERL) util/dirname.pl $$i`; \ sh -c "$$pod2man \ --section=$$sec --center=OpenSSL \ --release=$(VERSION) `basename $$i`") \ > $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/$$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \ $(PERL) util/extract-names.pl < $$i | \ (grep -v $$filecase "^$$fn\$$"; true) | \ (grep -v "[ ]"; true) | \ (cd $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(MANDIR)/man$$sec/; \ while read n; do \ $$here/util/point.sh $$fn.$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX) "$$n".$${sec}$(MANSUFFIX); \ done); \ done # DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it. Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/NEWS =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/NEWS (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/NEWS (revision 276859) @@ -1,610 +1,619 @@ NEWS ==== This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL release. For more details please read the CHANGES file. + Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8zc and OpenSSL 0.9.8zd [8 Jan 2015] + + o Fix for CVE-2014-3571 + o Fix for CVE-2014-3569 + o Fix for CVE-2014-3572 + o Fix for CVE-2015-0204 + o Fix for CVE-2014-8275 + o Fix for CVE-2014-3570 + Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8zb and OpenSSL 0.9.8zc [15 Oct 2014]: o Fix for CVE-2014-3513 o Fix for CVE-2014-3567 o Mitigation for CVE-2014-3566 (SSL protocol vulnerability) o Fix for CVE-2014-3568 Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8za and OpenSSL 0.9.8zb [6 Aug 2014]: o Fix for CVE-2014-3510 o Fix for CVE-2014-3507 o Fix for CVE-2014-3506 o Fix for CVE-2014-3505 o Fix for CVE-2014-3508 Known issues in OpenSSL 0.9.8za: o Compilation failure of s3_pkt.c on some platforms due to missing include. Fixed in 0.9.8zb-dev. o FIPS capable link failure with missing symbol BN_consttime_swap. Fixed in 0.9.8zb-dev. Workaround is to compile with no-ec: the EC algorithms are not FIPS approved in OpenSSL 0.9.8 anyway. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8y and OpenSSL 0.9.8za [5 Jun 2014]: o Fix for CVE-2014-0224 o Fix for CVE-2014-0221 o Fix for CVE-2014-0195 o Fix for CVE-2014-3470 o Fix for CVE-2014-0076 o Fix for CVE-2010-5298 o Fix to TLS alert handling. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8x and OpenSSL 0.9.8y [5 Feb 2013]: o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169 o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166 Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8w and OpenSSL 0.9.8x [10 May 2012]: o Fix DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333 Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8v and OpenSSL 0.9.8w [23 Apr 2012]: o Fix for CVE-2012-2131 (corrected fix for 0.9.8 and CVE-2012-2110) Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8u and OpenSSL 0.9.8v [19 Apr 2012]: o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110 Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8t and OpenSSL 0.9.8u [12 Mar 2012]: o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884 o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619 o Various DTLS fixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8s and OpenSSL 0.9.8t [18 Jan 2012]: o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050 Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8r and OpenSSL 0.9.8s [4 Jan 2012]: o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108 o Fix policy check double free error CVE-2011-4109 o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576 o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619 o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577 Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8q and OpenSSL 0.9.8r [8 Feb 2011]: o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014 Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8p and OpenSSL 0.9.8q [2 Dec 2010]: o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180 o Fix for CVE-2010-4252 Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8o and OpenSSL 0.9.8p [16 Nov 2010]: o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 0.9.8o [1 Jun 2010]: o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-0742. o Various DTLS fixes. o Recognise SHA2 certificates if only SSL algorithms added. o Fix for no-rc4 compilation. o Chil ENGINE unload workaround. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]: o CFB cipher definition fixes. o Fix security issues CVE-2010-0740 and CVE-2010-0433. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8l and OpenSSL 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010]: o Cipher definition fixes. o Workaround for slow RAND_poll() on some WIN32 versions. o Remove MD2 from algorithm tables. o SPKAC handling fixes. o Support for RFC5746 TLS renegotiation extension. o Compression memory leak fixed. o Compression session resumption fixed. o Ticket and SNI coexistence fixes. o Many fixes to DTLS handling. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8k and OpenSSL 0.9.8l [5 Nov 2009]: o Temporary work around for CVE-2009-3555: disable renegotiation. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8j and OpenSSL 0.9.8k [25 Mar 2009]: o Fix various build issues. o Fix security issues (CVE-2009-0590, CVE-2009-0591, CVE-2009-0789) Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8i and OpenSSL 0.9.8j [7 Jan 2009]: o Fix security issue (CVE-2008-5077) o Merge FIPS 140-2 branch code. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8g and OpenSSL 0.9.8h [28 May 2008]: o CryptoAPI ENGINE support. o Various precautionary measures. o Fix for bugs affecting certificate request creation. o Support for local machine keyset attribute in PKCS#12 files. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8f and OpenSSL 0.9.8g [19 Oct 2007]: o Backport of CMS functionality to 0.9.8. o Fixes for bugs introduced with 0.9.8f. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8e and OpenSSL 0.9.8f [11 Oct 2007]: o Add gcc 4.2 support. o Add support for AES and SSE2 assembly lanugauge optimization for VC++ build. o Support for RFC4507bis and server name extensions if explicitly selected at compile time. o DTLS improvements. o RFC4507bis support. o TLS Extensions support. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8d and OpenSSL 0.9.8e [23 Feb 2007]: o Various ciphersuite selection fixes. o RFC3779 support. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8c and OpenSSL 0.9.8d [28 Sep 2006]: o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS (CVE-2006-2940) o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343) o Changes to ciphersuite selection algorithm Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8b and OpenSSL 0.9.8c [5 Sep 2006]: o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339 o New cipher Camellia Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8a and OpenSSL 0.9.8b [4 May 2006]: o Cipher string fixes. o Fixes for VC++ 2005. o Updated ECC cipher suite support. o New functions EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(). o Zlib compression usage fixes. o Built in dynamic engine compilation support on Win32. o Fixes auto dynamic engine loading in Win32. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8 and OpenSSL 0.9.8a [11 Oct 2005]: o Fix potential SSL 2.0 rollback, CVE-2005-2969 o Extended Windows CE support Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.8 [5 Jul 2005]: o Major work on the BIGNUM library for higher efficiency and to make operations more streamlined and less contradictory. This is the result of a major audit of the BIGNUM library. o Addition of BIGNUM functions for fields GF(2^m) and NIST curves, to support the Elliptic Crypto functions. o Major work on Elliptic Crypto; ECDH and ECDSA added, including the use through EVP, X509 and ENGINE. o New ASN.1 mini-compiler that's usable through the OpenSSL configuration file. o Added support for ASN.1 indefinite length constructed encoding. o New PKCS#12 'medium level' API to manipulate PKCS#12 files. o Complete rework of shared library construction and linking programs with shared or static libraries, through a separate Makefile.shared. o Rework of the passing of parameters from one Makefile to another. o Changed ENGINE framework to load dynamic engine modules automatically from specifically given directories. o New structure and ASN.1 functions for CertificatePair. o Changed the ZLIB compression method to be stateful. o Changed the key-generation and primality testing "progress" mechanism to take a structure that contains the ticker function and an argument. o New engine module: GMP (performs private key exponentiation). o New engine module: VIA PadLOck ACE extension in VIA C3 Nehemiah processors. o Added support for IPv6 addresses in certificate extensions. See RFC 1884, section 2.2. o Added support for certificate policy mappings, policy constraints and name constraints. o Added support for multi-valued AVAs in the OpenSSL configuration file. o Added support for multiple certificates with the same subject in the 'openssl ca' index file. o Make it possible to create self-signed certificates using 'openssl ca -selfsign'. o Make it possible to generate a serial number file with 'openssl ca -create_serial'. o New binary search functions with extended functionality. o New BUF functions. o New STORE structure and library to provide an interface to all sorts of data repositories. Supports storage of public and private keys, certificates, CRLs, numbers and arbitrary blobs. This library is unfortunately unfinished and unused withing OpenSSL. o New control functions for the error stack. o Changed the PKCS#7 library to support one-pass S/MIME processing. o Added the possibility to compile without old deprecated functionality with the OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED macro or the 'no-deprecated' argument to the config and Configure scripts. o Constification of all ASN.1 conversion functions, and other affected functions. o Improved platform support for PowerPC. o New FIPS 180-2 algorithms (SHA-224, -256, -384 and -512). o New X509_VERIFY_PARAM structure to support parametrisation of X.509 path validation. o Major overhaul of RC4 performance on Intel P4, IA-64 and AMD64. o Changed the Configure script to have some algorithms disabled by default. Those can be explicitely enabled with the new argument form 'enable-xxx'. o Change the default digest in 'openssl' commands from MD5 to SHA-1. o Added support for DTLS. o New BIGNUM blinding. o Added support for the RSA-PSS encryption scheme o Added support for the RSA X.931 padding. o Added support for BSD sockets on NetWare. o Added support for files larger than 2GB. o Added initial support for Win64. o Added alternate pkg-config files. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7l and OpenSSL 0.9.7m [23 Feb 2007]: o FIPS 1.1.1 module linking. o Various ciphersuite selection fixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l [28 Sep 2006]: o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS (CVE-2006-2940) o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343) Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k [5 Sep 2006]: o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339 Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j [4 May 2006]: o Visual C++ 2005 fixes. o Update Windows build system for FIPS. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7h and OpenSSL 0.9.7i [14 Oct 2005]: o Give EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE it's old value, except for a FIPS build. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.7h [11 Oct 2005]: o Fix SSL 2.0 Rollback, CVE-2005-2969 o Allow use of fixed-length exponent on DSA signing o Default fixed-window RSA, DSA, DH private-key operations Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7f and OpenSSL 0.9.7g [11 Apr 2005]: o More compilation issues fixed. o Adaptation to more modern Kerberos API. o Enhanced or corrected configuration for Solaris64, Mingw and Cygwin. o Enhanced x86_64 assembler BIGNUM module. o More constification. o Added processing of proxy certificates (RFC 3820). Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7e and OpenSSL 0.9.7f [22 Mar 2005]: o Several compilation issues fixed. o Many memory allocation failure checks added. o Improved comparison of X509 Name type. o Mandatory basic checks on certificates. o Performance improvements. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7d and OpenSSL 0.9.7e [25 Oct 2004]: o Fix race condition in CRL checking code. o Fixes to PKCS#7 (S/MIME) code. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7c and OpenSSL 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004]: o Security: Fix Kerberos ciphersuite SSL/TLS handshaking bug o Security: Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() o Allow multiple active certificates with same subject in CA index o Multiple X509 verification fixes o Speed up HMAC and other operations Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7b and OpenSSL 0.9.7c [30 Sep 2003]: o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs. o New -ignore_err option to OCSP utility. o Various interop and bug fixes in S/MIME code. o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7a and OpenSSL 0.9.7b [10 Apr 2003]: o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichbacher's attack o Security: make RSA blinding default. o Configuration: Irix fixes, AIX fixes, better mingw support. o Support for new platforms: linux-ia64-ecc. o Build: shared library support fixes. o ASN.1: treat domainComponent correctly. o Documentation: fixes and additions. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7 and OpenSSL 0.9.7a [19 Feb 2003]: o Security: Important security related bugfixes. o Enhanced compatibility with MIT Kerberos. o Can be built without the ENGINE framework. o IA32 assembler enhancements. o Support for new platforms: FreeBSD/IA64 and FreeBSD/Sparc64. o Configuration: the no-err option now works properly. o SSL/TLS: now handles manual certificate chain building. o SSL/TLS: certain session ID malfunctions corrected. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.7 [30 Dec 2002]: o New library section OCSP. o Complete rewrite of ASN1 code. o CRL checking in verify code and openssl utility. o Extension copying in 'ca' utility. o Flexible display options in 'ca' utility. o Provisional support for international characters with UTF8. o Support for external crypto devices ('engine') is no longer a separate distribution. o New elliptic curve library section. o New AES (Rijndael) library section. o Support for new platforms: Windows CE, Tandem OSS, A/UX, AIX 64-bit, Linux x86_64, Linux 64-bit on Sparc v9 o Extended support for some platforms: VxWorks o Enhanced support for shared libraries. o Now only builds PIC code when shared library support is requested. o Support for pkg-config. o Lots of new manuals. o Makes symbolic links to or copies of manuals to cover all described functions. o Change DES API to clean up the namespace (some applications link also against libdes providing similar functions having the same name). Provide macros for backward compatibility (will be removed in the future). o Unify handling of cryptographic algorithms (software and engine) to be available via EVP routines for asymmetric and symmetric ciphers. o NCONF: new configuration handling routines. o Change API to use more 'const' modifiers to improve error checking and help optimizers. o Finally remove references to RSAref. o Reworked parts of the BIGNUM code. o Support for new engines: Broadcom ubsec, Accelerated Encryption Processing, IBM 4758. o A few new engines added in the demos area. o Extended and corrected OID (object identifier) table. o PRNG: query at more locations for a random device, automatic query for EGD style random sources at several locations. o SSL/TLS: allow optional cipher choice according to server's preference. o SSL/TLS: allow server to explicitly set new session ids. o SSL/TLS: support Kerberos cipher suites (RFC2712). Only supports MIT Kerberos for now. o SSL/TLS: allow more precise control of renegotiations and sessions. o SSL/TLS: add callback to retrieve SSL/TLS messages. o SSL/TLS: support AES cipher suites (RFC3268). Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6j and OpenSSL 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003]: o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs. o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6i and OpenSSL 0.9.6j [10 Apr 2003]: o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichbacher's attack o Security: make RSA blinding default. o Build: shared library support fixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6h and OpenSSL 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003]: o Important security related bugfixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6g and OpenSSL 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002]: o New configuration targets for Tandem OSS and A/UX. o New OIDs for Microsoft attributes. o Better handling of SSL session caching. o Better comparison of distinguished names. o Better handling of shared libraries in a mixed GNU/non-GNU environment. o Support assembler code with Borland C. o Fixes for length problems. o Fixes for uninitialised variables. o Fixes for memory leaks, some unusual crashes and some race conditions. o Fixes for smaller building problems. o Updates of manuals, FAQ and other instructive documents. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6f and OpenSSL 0.9.6g [9 Aug 2002]: o Important building fixes on Unix. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6e and OpenSSL 0.9.6f [8 Aug 2002]: o Various important bugfixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6d and OpenSSL 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002]: o Important security related bugfixes. o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6c and OpenSSL 0.9.6d [9 May 2002]: o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes. o Fix DH parameter generation for 'non-standard' generators. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6b and OpenSSL 0.9.6c [21 Dec 2001]: o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes. o BIGNUM library fixes. o RSA OAEP and random number generation fixes. o Object identifiers corrected and added. o Add assembler BN routines for IA64. o Add support for OS/390 Unix, UnixWare with gcc, OpenUNIX 8, MIPS Linux; shared library support for Irix, HP-UX. o Add crypto accelerator support for AEP, Baltimore SureWare, Broadcom and Cryptographic Appliance's keyserver [in 0.9.6c-engine release]. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6a and OpenSSL 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001]: o Security fix: PRNG improvements. o Security fix: RSA OAEP check. o Security fix: Reinsert and fix countermeasure to Bleichbacher's attack. o MIPS bug fix in BIGNUM. o Bug fix in "openssl enc". o Bug fix in X.509 printing routine. o Bug fix in DSA verification routine and DSA S/MIME verification. o Bug fix to make PRNG thread-safe. o Bug fix in RAND_file_name(). o Bug fix in compatibility mode trust settings. o Bug fix in blowfish EVP. o Increase default size for BIO buffering filter. o Compatibility fixes in some scripts. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001]: o Security fix: change behavior of OpenSSL to avoid using environment variables when running as root. o Security fix: check the result of RSA-CRT to reduce the possibility of deducing the private key from an incorrectly calculated signature. o Security fix: prevent Bleichenbacher's DSA attack. o Security fix: Zero the premaster secret after deriving the master secret in DH ciphersuites. o Reimplement SSL_peek(), which had various problems. o Compatibility fix: the function des_encrypt() renamed to des_encrypt1() to avoid clashes with some Unixen libc. o Bug fixes for Win32, HP/UX and Irix. o Bug fixes in BIGNUM, SSL, PKCS#7, PKCS#12, X.509, CONF and memory checking routines. o Bug fixes for RSA operations in threaded environments. o Bug fixes in misc. openssl applications. o Remove a few potential memory leaks. o Add tighter checks of BIGNUM routines. o Shared library support has been reworked for generality. o More documentation. o New function BN_rand_range(). o Add "-rand" option to openssl s_client and s_server. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5a and OpenSSL 0.9.6 [10 Oct 2000]: o Some documentation for BIO and SSL libraries. o Enhanced chain verification using key identifiers. o New sign and verify options to 'dgst' application. o Support for DER and PEM encoded messages in 'smime' application. o New 'rsautl' application, low level RSA utility. o MD4 now included. o Bugfix for SSL rollback padding check. o Support for external crypto devices [1]. o Enhanced EVP interface. [1] The support for external crypto devices is currently a separate distribution. See the file README.ENGINE. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5 and OpenSSL 0.9.5a [1 Apr 2000]: o Bug fixes for Win32, SuSE Linux, NeXTSTEP and FreeBSD 2.2.8 o Shared library support for HPUX and Solaris-gcc o Support of Linux/IA64 o Assembler support for Mingw32 o New 'rand' application o New way to check for existence of algorithms from scripts Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.4 and OpenSSL 0.9.5 [25 May 2000]: o S/MIME support in new 'smime' command o Documentation for the OpenSSL command line application o Automation of 'req' application o Fixes to make s_client, s_server work under Windows o Support for multiple fieldnames in SPKACs o New SPKAC command line utilty and associated library functions o Options to allow passwords to be obtained from various sources o New public key PEM format and options to handle it o Many other fixes and enhancements to command line utilities o Usable certificate chain verification o Certificate purpose checking o Certificate trust settings o Support of authority information access extension o Extensions in certificate requests o Simplified X509 name and attribute routines o Initial (incomplete) support for international character sets o New DH_METHOD, DSA_METHOD and enhanced RSA_METHOD o Read only memory BIOs and simplified creation function o TLS/SSL protocol bugfixes: Accept TLS 'client hello' in SSL 3.0 record; allow fragmentation and interleaving of handshake and other data o TLS/SSL code now "tolerates" MS SGC o Work around for Netscape client certificate hang bug o RSA_NULL option that removes RSA patent code but keeps other RSA functionality o Memory leak detection now allows applications to add extra information via a per-thread stack o PRNG robustness improved o EGD support o BIGNUM library bug fixes o Faster DSA parameter generation o Enhanced support for Alpha Linux o Experimental MacOS support Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.3 and OpenSSL 0.9.4 [9 Aug 1999]: o Transparent support for PKCS#8 format private keys: these are used by several software packages and are more secure than the standard form o PKCS#5 v2.0 implementation o Password callbacks have a new void * argument for application data o Avoid various memory leaks o New pipe-like BIO that allows using the SSL library when actual I/O must be handled by the application (BIO pair) Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.2b and OpenSSL 0.9.3 [24 May 1999]: o Lots of enhancements and cleanups to the Configuration mechanism o RSA OEAP related fixes o Added `openssl ca -revoke' option for revoking a certificate o Source cleanups: const correctness, type-safe stacks and ASN.1 SETs o Source tree cleanups: removed lots of obsolete files o Thawte SXNet, certificate policies and CRL distribution points extension support o Preliminary (experimental) S/MIME support o Support for ASN.1 UTF8String and VisibleString o Full integration of PKCS#12 code o Sparc assembler bignum implementation, optimized hash functions o Option to disable selected ciphers Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.1c and OpenSSL 0.9.2b [22 Mar 1999]: o Fixed a security hole related to session resumption o Fixed RSA encryption routines for the p < q case o "ALL" in cipher lists now means "everything except NULL ciphers" o Support for Triple-DES CBCM cipher o Support of Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) for RSA o First support for new TLSv1 ciphers o Added a few new BIOs (syslog BIO, reliable BIO) o Extended support for DSA certificate/keys. o Extended support for Certificate Signing Requests (CSR) o Initial support for X.509v3 extensions o Extended support for compression inside the SSL record layer o Overhauled Win32 builds o Cleanups and fixes to the Big Number (BN) library o Support for ASN.1 GeneralizedTime o Splitted ASN.1 SETs from SEQUENCEs o ASN1 and PEM support for Netscape Certificate Sequences o Overhauled Perl interface o Lots of source tree cleanups. o Lots of memory leak fixes. o Lots of bug fixes. Major changes between SSLeay 0.9.0b and OpenSSL 0.9.1c [23 Dec 1998]: o Integration of the popular NO_RSA/NO_DSA patches o Initial support for compression inside the SSL record layer o Added BIO proxy and filtering functionality o Extended Big Number (BN) library o Added RIPE MD160 message digest o Addeed support for RC2/64bit cipher o Extended ASN.1 parser routines o Adjustations of the source tree for CVS o Support for various new platforms Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/README =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/README (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/README (revision 276859) @@ -1,218 +1,218 @@ - OpenSSL 0.9.8zc 15 Oct 2014 + OpenSSL 0.9.8zd 8 Jan 2015 Copyright (c) 1998-2011 The OpenSSL Project Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson All rights reserved. DESCRIPTION ----------- The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, fully featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library. The project is managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the Internet to communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL toolkit and its related documentation. OpenSSL is based on the excellent SSLeay library developed from Eric A. Young and Tim J. Hudson. The OpenSSL toolkit is licensed under a dual-license (the OpenSSL license plus the SSLeay license) situation, which basically means that you are free to get and use it for commercial and non-commercial purposes as long as you fulfill the conditions of both licenses. OVERVIEW -------- The OpenSSL toolkit includes: libssl.a: Implementation of SSLv2, SSLv3, TLSv1 and the required code to support both SSLv2, SSLv3 and TLSv1 in the one server and client. libcrypto.a: General encryption and X.509 v1/v3 stuff needed by SSL/TLS but not actually logically part of it. It includes routines for the following: Ciphers libdes - EAY's libdes DES encryption package which was floating around the net for a few years, and was then relicensed by him as part of SSLeay. It includes 15 'modes/variations' of DES (1, 2 and 3 key versions of ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb; pcbc and a more general form of cfb and ofb) including desx in cbc mode, a fast crypt(3), and routines to read passwords from the keyboard. RC4 encryption, RC2 encryption - 4 different modes, ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb. Blowfish encryption - 4 different modes, ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb. IDEA encryption - 4 different modes, ecb, cbc, cfb and ofb. Digests MD5 and MD2 message digest algorithms, fast implementations, SHA (SHA-0) and SHA-1 message digest algorithms, MDC2 message digest. A DES based hash that is popular on smart cards. Public Key RSA encryption/decryption/generation. There is no limit on the number of bits. DSA encryption/decryption/generation. There is no limit on the number of bits. Diffie-Hellman key-exchange/key generation. There is no limit on the number of bits. X.509v3 certificates X509 encoding/decoding into/from binary ASN1 and a PEM based ASCII-binary encoding which supports encryption with a private key. Program to generate RSA and DSA certificate requests and to generate RSA and DSA certificates. Systems The normal digital envelope routines and base64 encoding. Higher level access to ciphers and digests by name. New ciphers can be loaded at run time. The BIO io system which is a simple non-blocking IO abstraction. Current methods supported are file descriptors, sockets, socket accept, socket connect, memory buffer, buffering, SSL client/server, file pointer, encryption, digest, non-blocking testing and null. Data structures A dynamically growing hashing system A simple stack. A Configuration loader that uses a format similar to MS .ini files. openssl: A command line tool that can be used for: Creation of RSA, DH and DSA key parameters Creation of X.509 certificates, CSRs and CRLs Calculation of Message Digests Encryption and Decryption with Ciphers SSL/TLS Client and Server Tests Handling of S/MIME signed or encrypted mail PATENTS ------- Various companies hold various patents for various algorithms in various locations around the world. _YOU_ are responsible for ensuring that your use of any algorithms is legal by checking if there are any patents in your country. The file contains some of the patents that we know about or are rumored to exist. This is not a definitive list. RSA Security holds software patents on the RC5 algorithm. If you intend to use this cipher, you must contact RSA Security for licensing conditions. Their web page is http://www.rsasecurity.com/. RC4 is a trademark of RSA Security, so use of this label should perhaps only be used with RSA Security's permission. The IDEA algorithm is patented by Ascom in Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and the USA. They should be contacted if that algorithm is to be used; their web page is http://www.ascom.ch/. NTT and Mitsubishi have patents and pending patents on the Camellia algorithm, but allow use at no charge without requiring an explicit licensing agreement: http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/info/chiteki.html INSTALLATION ------------ To install this package under a Unix derivative, read the INSTALL file. For a Win32 platform, read the INSTALL.W32 file. For OpenVMS systems, read INSTALL.VMS. Read the documentation in the doc/ directory. It is quite rough, but it lists the functions; you will probably have to look at the code to work out how to use them. Look at the example programs. PROBLEMS -------- For some platforms, there are some known problems that may affect the user or application author. We try to collect those in doc/PROBLEMS, with current thoughts on how they should be solved in a future of OpenSSL. SUPPORT ------- See the OpenSSL website www.openssl.org for details of how to obtain commercial technical support. If you have any problems with OpenSSL then please take the following steps first: - Download the current snapshot from ftp://ftp.openssl.org/snapshot/ to see if the problem has already been addressed - Remove ASM versions of libraries - Remove compiler optimisation flags If you wish to report a bug then please include the following information in any bug report: - On Unix systems: Self-test report generated by 'make report' - On other systems: OpenSSL version: output of 'openssl version -a' OS Name, Version, Hardware platform Compiler Details (name, version) - Application Details (name, version) - Problem Description (steps that will reproduce the problem, if known) - Stack Traceback (if the application dumps core) Report the bug to the OpenSSL project via the Request Tracker (http://www.openssl.org/support/rt.html) by mail to: openssl-bugs@openssl.org Note that the request tracker should NOT be used for general assistance or support queries. Just because something doesn't work the way you expect does not mean it is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL. Note that mail to openssl-bugs@openssl.org is recorded in the publicly readable request tracker database and is forwarded to a public mailing list. Confidential mail may be sent to openssl-security@openssl.org (PGP key available from the key servers). HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL ---------------------------- Development is coordinated on the openssl-dev mailing list (see http://www.openssl.org for information on subscribing). If you would like to submit a patch, send it to openssl-bugs@openssl.org with the string "[PATCH]" in the subject. Please be sure to include a textual explanation of what your patch does. If you are unsure as to whether a feature will be useful for the general OpenSSL community please discuss it on the openssl-dev mailing list first. Someone may be already working on the same thing or there may be a good reason as to why that feature isn't implemented. Patches should be as up to date as possible, preferably relative to the current Git or the last snapshot. They should follow the coding style of OpenSSL and compile without warnings. Some of the core team developer targets can be used for testing purposes, (debug-steve64, debug-geoff etc). OpenSSL compiles on many varied platforms: try to ensure you only use portable features. Note: For legal reasons, contributions from the US can be accepted only if a TSU notification and a copy of the patch are sent to crypt@bis.doc.gov (formerly BXA) with a copy to the ENC Encryption Request Coordinator; please take some time to look at http://www.bis.doc.gov/Encryption/PubAvailEncSourceCodeNofify.html [sic] and http://w3.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/740.pdf (EAR Section 740.13(e)) for the details. If "your encryption source code is too large to serve as an email attachment", they are glad to receive it by fax instead; hope you have a cheap long-distance plan. Our preferred format for changes is "diff -u" output. You might generate it like this: # cd openssl-work # [your changes] # ./Configure dist; make clean # cd .. # diff -ur openssl-orig openssl-work > mydiffs.patch Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/Makefile =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/Makefile (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/Makefile (revision 276859) @@ -1,225 +1,226 @@ # # OpenSSL/crypto/Makefile # DIR= crypto TOP= .. CC= cc INCLUDE= -I. -I$(TOP) -I../include # INCLUDES targets sudbirs! INCLUDES= -I.. -I../.. -I../../include CFLAG= -g MAKEDEPPROG= makedepend MAKEDEPEND= $(TOP)/util/domd $(TOP) -MD $(MAKEDEPPROG) MAKEFILE= Makefile RM= rm -f AR= ar r RECURSIVE_MAKE= [ -n "$(SDIRS)" ] && for i in $(SDIRS) ; do \ (cd $$i && echo "making $$target in $(DIR)/$$i..." && \ $(MAKE) -e TOP=../.. DIR=$$i INCLUDES='${INCLUDES}' $$target ) || exit 1; \ done; PEX_LIBS= EX_LIBS= CFLAGS= $(INCLUDE) $(CFLAG) ASFLAGS= $(INCLUDE) $(ASFLAG) AFLAGS=$(ASFLAGS) LIBS= GENERAL=Makefile README crypto-lib.com install.com TEST=constant_time_test.c LIB= $(TOP)/libcrypto.a SHARED_LIB= libcrypto$(SHLIB_EXT) LIBSRC= cryptlib.c dyn_lck.c mem.c mem_clr.c mem_dbg.c cversion.c ex_data.c tmdiff.c cpt_err.c ebcdic.c uid.c o_time.c o_str.c o_dir.c o_init.c fips_err.c LIBOBJ= cryptlib.o dyn_lck.o mem.o mem_clr.o mem_dbg.o cversion.o ex_data.o tmdiff.o cpt_err.o ebcdic.o uid.o o_time.o o_str.o o_dir.o o_init.o fips_err.o $(CPUID_OBJ) SRC= $(LIBSRC) EXHEADER= crypto.h tmdiff.h opensslv.h opensslconf.h ebcdic.h symhacks.h \ ossl_typ.h -HEADER= cryptlib.h buildinf.h md32_common.h o_time.h o_str.h o_dir.h $(EXHEADER) +HEADER= cryptlib.h buildinf.h md32_common.h o_time.h o_str.h o_dir.h \ + constant_time_locl.h $(EXHEADER) ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER) top: @(cd ..; $(MAKE) DIRS=$(DIR) all) all: lib buildinf.h: ../Makefile ( echo "#ifndef MK1MF_BUILD"; \ echo ' /* auto-generated by crypto/Makefile for crypto/cversion.c */'; \ echo ' #define CFLAGS "$(CC) $(CFLAG)"'; \ echo ' #define PLATFORM "$(PLATFORM)"'; \ echo " #define DATE \"`LC_ALL=C LC_TIME=C date`\""; \ echo '#endif' ) >buildinf.h x86cpuid-elf.s: x86cpuid.pl perlasm/x86asm.pl $(PERL) x86cpuid.pl elf $(CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) > $@ x86cpuid-cof.s: x86cpuid.pl perlasm/x86asm.pl $(PERL) x86cpuid.pl coff $(CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) > $@ x86cpuid-out.s: x86cpuid.pl perlasm/x86asm.pl $(PERL) x86cpuid.pl a.out $(CFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR) > $@ uplink.o: ../ms/uplink.c $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -c -o $@ ../ms/uplink.c uplink-cof.s: ../ms/uplink.pl $(PERL) ../ms/uplink.pl coff > $@ x86_64cpuid.s: x86_64cpuid.pl $(PERL) x86_64cpuid.pl $@ ia64cpuid.s: ia64cpuid.S $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -E ia64cpuid.S > $@ testapps: [ -z "$(THIS)" ] || ( if echo ${SDIRS} | fgrep ' des '; \ then cd des && $(MAKE) -e des; fi ) [ -z "$(THIS)" ] || ( cd pkcs7 && $(MAKE) -e testapps ); @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi subdirs: @target=all; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) files: $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO @target=files; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) links: @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../include/openssl $(EXHEADER) @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../test $(TEST) @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../apps $(APPS) @target=links; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) # lib: and $(LIB): are splitted to avoid end-less loop lib: buildinf.h $(LIB) subdirs @touch lib $(LIB): $(LIBOBJ) $(ARX) $(LIB) $(LIBOBJ) $(RANLIB) $(LIB) || echo Never mind. shared: buildinf.h lib subdirs if [ -n "$(SHARED_LIBS)" ]; then \ (cd ..; $(MAKE) $(SHARED_LIB)); \ fi libs: @target=lib; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) install: @[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] # should be set by top Makefile... @headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist ;\ do \ (cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \ done; @target=install; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) lint: @target=lint; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) depend: @[ -z "$(THIS)" -o -f buildinf.h ] || touch buildinf.h # fake buildinf.h if it does not exist @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDE) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) @[ -z "$(THIS)" -o -s buildinf.h ] || rm buildinf.h @[ -z "$(THIS)" ] || (set -e; target=depend; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) ) @if [ -z "$(THIS)" ]; then $(MAKE) -f $(TOP)/Makefile reflect THIS=$@; fi clean: rm -f buildinf.h *.s *.o */*.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff @target=clean; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) dclean: $(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE) @target=dclean; $(RECURSIVE_MAKE) # DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it. cpt_err.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h cpt_err.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/err.h cpt_err.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h cpt_err.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h cpt_err.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/stack.h cpt_err.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h cpt_err.c cryptlib.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h cryptlib.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h cryptlib.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h cryptlib.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h cryptlib.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h cryptlib.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h cryptlib.c cryptlib.o: cryptlib.h cversion.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h cversion.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h cversion.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h cversion.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h cversion.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h cversion.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h buildinf.h cversion.o: cryptlib.h cversion.c dyn_lck.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h dyn_lck.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h dyn_lck.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h dyn_lck.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h dyn_lck.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h dyn_lck.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h cryptlib.h dyn_lck.o: dyn_lck.c ebcdic.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ebcdic.c ex_data.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h ex_data.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ex_data.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h ex_data.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ex_data.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h ex_data.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h cryptlib.h ex_data.o: ex_data.c fips_err.o: ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h fips_err.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/err.h fips_err.o: ../include/openssl/fips.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h fips_err.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h fips_err.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h fips_err.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h fips_err.c fips_err.o: fips_err.h mem.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h mem.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h mem.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h mem.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h mem.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h mem.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h cryptlib.h mem.o: mem.c mem_clr.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h mem_clr.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h mem_clr.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h mem_clr.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h mem_clr.c mem_dbg.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h mem_dbg.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h mem_dbg.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h mem_dbg.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h mem_dbg.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h mem_dbg.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h cryptlib.h mem_dbg.o: mem_dbg.c o_dir.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h o_dir.o: LPdir_unix.c o_dir.c o_dir.h o_init.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/crypto.h o_init.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/err.h o_init.o: ../include/openssl/lhash.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h o_init.o: ../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h o_init.o: ../include/openssl/safestack.h ../include/openssl/stack.h o_init.o: ../include/openssl/symhacks.h o_init.c o_str.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h o_str.o: o_str.c o_str.h o_time.o: ../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h o_time.c o_time.o: o_time.h tmdiff.o: ../e_os.h ../include/openssl/bio.h ../include/openssl/buffer.h tmdiff.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h tmdiff.o: ../include/openssl/err.h ../include/openssl/lhash.h tmdiff.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h tmdiff.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h tmdiff.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h tmdiff.o: ../include/openssl/tmdiff.h cryptlib.h tmdiff.c uid.o: ../include/openssl/crypto.h ../include/openssl/e_os2.h uid.o: ../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../include/openssl/opensslv.h uid.o: ../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../include/openssl/safestack.h uid.o: ../include/openssl/stack.h ../include/openssl/symhacks.h uid.c Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c (revision 276859) @@ -1,225 +1,230 @@ /* crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(ASN1_BIT_STRING *x, unsigned char *d, int len) { return M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(x, d, len); } int i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, unsigned char **pp) { int ret,j,bits,len; unsigned char *p,*d; if (a == NULL) return(0); len=a->length; if (len > 0) { if (a->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT) { bits=(int)a->flags&0x07; } else { for ( ; len > 0; len--) { if (a->data[len-1]) break; } j=a->data[len-1]; if (j & 0x01) bits=0; else if (j & 0x02) bits=1; else if (j & 0x04) bits=2; else if (j & 0x08) bits=3; else if (j & 0x10) bits=4; else if (j & 0x20) bits=5; else if (j & 0x40) bits=6; else if (j & 0x80) bits=7; else bits=0; /* should not happen */ } } else bits=0; ret=1+len; if (pp == NULL) return(ret); p= *pp; *(p++)=(unsigned char)bits; d=a->data; memcpy(p,d,len); p+=len; if (len > 0) p[-1]&=(0xff< 7) + { + i=ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT; + goto err; + } /* We do this to preserve the settings. If we modify * the settings, via the _set_bit function, we will recalculate * on output */ ret->flags&= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT|0x07); /* clear */ - ret->flags|=(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT|(i&0x07)); /* set */ + ret->flags|=(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT|i); /* set */ if (len-- > 1) /* using one because of the bits left byte */ { s=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc((int)len); if (s == NULL) { i=ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; } memcpy(s,p,(int)len); s[len-1]&=(0xff<length=(int)len; if (ret->data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ret->data); ret->data=s; ret->type=V_ASN1_BIT_STRING; if (a != NULL) (*a)=ret; *pp=p; return(ret); err: ASN1err(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING,i); if ((ret != NULL) && ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret))) M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(ret); return(NULL); } /* These next 2 functions from Goetz Babin-Ebell */ int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n, int value) { int w,v,iv; unsigned char *c; w=n/8; v=1<<(7-(n&0x07)); iv= ~v; if (!value) v=0; if (a == NULL) return 0; a->flags&= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT|0x07); /* clear, set on write */ if ((a->length < (w+1)) || (a->data == NULL)) { if (!value) return(1); /* Don't need to set */ if (a->data == NULL) c=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(w+1); else c=(unsigned char *)OPENSSL_realloc_clean(a->data, a->length, w+1); if (c == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_BIT_STRING_SET_BIT,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (w+1-a->length > 0) memset(c+a->length, 0, w+1-a->length); a->data=c; a->length=w+1; } a->data[w]=((a->data[w])&iv)|v; while ((a->length > 0) && (a->data[a->length-1] == 0)) a->length--; return(1); } int ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n) { int w,v; w=n/8; v=1<<(7-(n&0x07)); if ((a == NULL) || (a->length < (w+1)) || (a->data == NULL)) return(0); return((a->data[w]&v) != 0); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/asn1/a_type.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/asn1/a_type.c (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/asn1/a_type.c (revision 276859) @@ -1,110 +1,156 @@ /* crypto/asn1/a_type.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include int ASN1_TYPE_get(ASN1_TYPE *a) { if ((a->value.ptr != NULL) || (a->type == V_ASN1_NULL)) return(a->type); else return(0); } void ASN1_TYPE_set(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, void *value) { if (a->value.ptr != NULL) { ASN1_TYPE **tmp_a = &a; ASN1_primitive_free((ASN1_VALUE **)tmp_a, NULL); } a->type=type; a->value.ptr=value; } int ASN1_TYPE_set1(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, const void *value) { if (!value || (type == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN)) { void *p = (void *)value; ASN1_TYPE_set(a, type, p); } else if (type == V_ASN1_OBJECT) { ASN1_OBJECT *odup; odup = OBJ_dup(value); if (!odup) return 0; ASN1_TYPE_set(a, type, odup); } else { ASN1_STRING *sdup; sdup = ASN1_STRING_dup((ASN1_STRING *)value); if (!sdup) return 0; ASN1_TYPE_set(a, type, sdup); } return 1; } IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(ASN1_TYPE) + +/* Returns 0 if they are equal, != 0 otherwise. */ +int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b) + { + int result = -1; + + if (!a || !b || a->type != b->type) return -1; + + switch (a->type) + { + case V_ASN1_OBJECT: + result = OBJ_cmp(a->value.object, b->value.object); + break; + case V_ASN1_NULL: + result = 0; /* They do not have content. */ + break; + case V_ASN1_INTEGER: + case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER: + case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED: + case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED: + case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING: + case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING: + case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE: + case V_ASN1_SET: + case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING: + case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING: + case V_ASN1_T61STRING: + case V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING: + case V_ASN1_IA5STRING: + case V_ASN1_UTCTIME: + case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME: + case V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING: + case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING: + case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING: + case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING: + case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING: + case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING: + case V_ASN1_OTHER: + default: + result = ASN1_STRING_cmp((ASN1_STRING *) a->value.ptr, + (ASN1_STRING *) b->value.ptr); + break; + } + + return result; + } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/asn1/a_verify.c (revision 276859) @@ -1,192 +1,204 @@ /* crypto/asn1/a_verify.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include #include "cryptlib.h" #ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef NO_ASN1_OLD int ASN1_verify(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, char *data, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { EVP_MD_CTX ctx; const EVP_MD *type; unsigned char *p,*buf_in=NULL; int ret= -1,i,inl; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); i=OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm); type=EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(i)); if (type == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM); goto err; } + + if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7) + { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT); + goto err; + } inl=i2d(data,NULL); buf_in=OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)inl); if (buf_in == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } p=buf_in; i2d(data,&p); if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,type, NULL)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB); ret=0; goto err; } EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)buf_in,inl); OPENSSL_cleanse(buf_in,(unsigned int)inl); OPENSSL_free(buf_in); if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx,(unsigned char *)signature->data, (unsigned int)signature->length,pkey) <= 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB); ret=0; goto err; } /* we don't need to zero the 'ctx' because we just checked * public information */ /* memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx)); */ ret=1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return(ret); } #endif int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *a, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *asn, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { EVP_MD_CTX ctx; const EVP_MD *type; unsigned char *buf_in=NULL; int ret= -1,i,inl; if (!pkey) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); + return -1; + } + + if (signature->type == V_ASN1_BIT_STRING && signature->flags & 0x7) + { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY, ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT); return -1; } EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); i=OBJ_obj2nid(a->algorithm); type=EVP_get_digestbyname(OBJ_nid2sn(i)); if (type == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM); goto err; } if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx,type, NULL)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB); ret=0; goto err; } inl = ASN1_item_i2d(asn, &buf_in, it); if (buf_in == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx,(unsigned char *)buf_in,inl); OPENSSL_cleanse(buf_in,(unsigned int)inl); OPENSSL_free(buf_in); if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx,(unsigned char *)signature->data, (unsigned int)signature->length,pkey) <= 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY,ERR_R_EVP_LIB); ret=0; goto err; } /* we don't need to zero the 'ctx' because we just checked * public information */ /* memset(&ctx,0,sizeof(ctx)); */ ret=1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); return(ret); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/asn1/asn1.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/asn1/asn1.h (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/asn1/asn1.h (revision 276859) @@ -1,1332 +1,1335 @@ /* crypto/asn1/asn1.h */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #ifndef HEADER_ASN1_H #define HEADER_ASN1_H #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO #include #endif #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED #include #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO # undef OPENSSL_EXTERN # define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_EXPORT #endif #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #define V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL 0x00 #define V_ASN1_APPLICATION 0x40 #define V_ASN1_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC 0x80 #define V_ASN1_PRIVATE 0xc0 #define V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED 0x20 #define V_ASN1_PRIMITIVE_TAG 0x1f #define V_ASN1_PRIMATIVE_TAG 0x1f #define V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE -2 /* let the recipient choose */ #define V_ASN1_OTHER -3 /* used in ASN1_TYPE */ #define V_ASN1_ANY -4 /* used in ASN1 template code */ #define V_ASN1_NEG 0x100 /* negative flag */ #define V_ASN1_UNDEF -1 #define V_ASN1_EOC 0 #define V_ASN1_BOOLEAN 1 /**/ #define V_ASN1_INTEGER 2 #define V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER (2 | V_ASN1_NEG) #define V_ASN1_BIT_STRING 3 #define V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 4 #define V_ASN1_NULL 5 #define V_ASN1_OBJECT 6 #define V_ASN1_OBJECT_DESCRIPTOR 7 #define V_ASN1_EXTERNAL 8 #define V_ASN1_REAL 9 #define V_ASN1_ENUMERATED 10 #define V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED (10 | V_ASN1_NEG) #define V_ASN1_UTF8STRING 12 #define V_ASN1_SEQUENCE 16 #define V_ASN1_SET 17 #define V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING 18 /**/ #define V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING 19 #define V_ASN1_T61STRING 20 #define V_ASN1_TELETEXSTRING 20 /* alias */ #define V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING 21 /**/ #define V_ASN1_IA5STRING 22 #define V_ASN1_UTCTIME 23 #define V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME 24 /**/ #define V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING 25 /**/ #define V_ASN1_ISO64STRING 26 /**/ #define V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING 26 /* alias */ #define V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING 27 /**/ #define V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING 28 /**/ #define V_ASN1_BMPSTRING 30 /* For use with d2i_ASN1_type_bytes() */ #define B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING 0x0001 #define B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING 0x0002 #define B_ASN1_T61STRING 0x0004 #define B_ASN1_TELETEXSTRING 0x0004 #define B_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING 0x0008 #define B_ASN1_IA5STRING 0x0010 #define B_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING 0x0020 #define B_ASN1_ISO64STRING 0x0040 #define B_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING 0x0040 #define B_ASN1_GENERALSTRING 0x0080 #define B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING 0x0100 #define B_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 0x0200 #define B_ASN1_BIT_STRING 0x0400 #define B_ASN1_BMPSTRING 0x0800 #define B_ASN1_UNKNOWN 0x1000 #define B_ASN1_UTF8STRING 0x2000 #define B_ASN1_UTCTIME 0x4000 #define B_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME 0x8000 #define B_ASN1_SEQUENCE 0x10000 /* For use with ASN1_mbstring_copy() */ #define MBSTRING_FLAG 0x1000 #define MBSTRING_UTF8 (MBSTRING_FLAG) #define MBSTRING_ASC (MBSTRING_FLAG|1) #define MBSTRING_BMP (MBSTRING_FLAG|2) #define MBSTRING_UNIV (MBSTRING_FLAG|4) #define SMIME_OLDMIME 0x400 #define SMIME_CRLFEOL 0x800 #define SMIME_STREAM 0x1000 struct X509_algor_st; DECLARE_STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) #define DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(type) /* filled in by mkstack.pl */ #define IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(type) /* nothing, no longer needed */ /* We MUST make sure that, except for constness, asn1_ctx_st and asn1_const_ctx are exactly the same. Fortunately, as soon as the old ASN1 parsing macros are gone, we can throw this away as well... */ typedef struct asn1_ctx_st { unsigned char *p;/* work char pointer */ int eos; /* end of sequence read for indefinite encoding */ int error; /* error code to use when returning an error */ int inf; /* constructed if 0x20, indefinite is 0x21 */ int tag; /* tag from last 'get object' */ int xclass; /* class from last 'get object' */ long slen; /* length of last 'get object' */ unsigned char *max; /* largest value of p allowed */ unsigned char *q;/* temporary variable */ unsigned char **pp;/* variable */ int line; /* used in error processing */ } ASN1_CTX; typedef struct asn1_const_ctx_st { const unsigned char *p;/* work char pointer */ int eos; /* end of sequence read for indefinite encoding */ int error; /* error code to use when returning an error */ int inf; /* constructed if 0x20, indefinite is 0x21 */ int tag; /* tag from last 'get object' */ int xclass; /* class from last 'get object' */ long slen; /* length of last 'get object' */ const unsigned char *max; /* largest value of p allowed */ const unsigned char *q;/* temporary variable */ const unsigned char **pp;/* variable */ int line; /* used in error processing */ } ASN1_const_CTX; /* These are used internally in the ASN1_OBJECT to keep track of * whether the names and data need to be free()ed */ #define ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC 0x01 /* internal use */ #define ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_CRITICAL 0x02 /* critical x509v3 object id */ #define ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS 0x04 /* internal use */ #define ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA 0x08 /* internal use */ typedef struct asn1_object_st { const char *sn,*ln; int nid; int length; unsigned char *data; int flags; /* Should we free this one */ } ASN1_OBJECT; #define ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT 0x08 /* Set if 0x07 has bits left value */ /* This indicates that the ASN1_STRING is not a real value but just a place * holder for the location where indefinite length constructed data should * be inserted in the memory buffer */ #define ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF 0x010 /* This flag is used by the CMS code to indicate that a string is not * complete and is a place holder for content when it had all been * accessed. The flag will be reset when content has been written to it. */ #define ASN1_STRING_FLAG_CONT 0x020 /* This is the base type that holds just about everything :-) */ typedef struct asn1_string_st { int length; int type; unsigned char *data; /* The value of the following field depends on the type being * held. It is mostly being used for BIT_STRING so if the * input data has a non-zero 'unused bits' value, it will be * handled correctly */ long flags; } ASN1_STRING; /* ASN1_ENCODING structure: this is used to save the received * encoding of an ASN1 type. This is useful to get round * problems with invalid encodings which can break signatures. */ typedef struct ASN1_ENCODING_st { unsigned char *enc; /* DER encoding */ long len; /* Length of encoding */ int modified; /* set to 1 if 'enc' is invalid */ } ASN1_ENCODING; /* Used with ASN1 LONG type: if a long is set to this it is omitted */ #define ASN1_LONG_UNDEF 0x7fffffffL #define STABLE_FLAGS_MALLOC 0x01 #define STABLE_NO_MASK 0x02 #define DIRSTRING_TYPE \ (B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING|B_ASN1_T61STRING|B_ASN1_BMPSTRING|B_ASN1_UTF8STRING) #define PKCS9STRING_TYPE (DIRSTRING_TYPE|B_ASN1_IA5STRING) typedef struct asn1_string_table_st { int nid; long minsize; long maxsize; unsigned long mask; unsigned long flags; } ASN1_STRING_TABLE; DECLARE_STACK_OF(ASN1_STRING_TABLE) /* size limits: this stuff is taken straight from RFC2459 */ #define ub_name 32768 #define ub_common_name 64 #define ub_locality_name 128 #define ub_state_name 128 #define ub_organization_name 64 #define ub_organization_unit_name 64 #define ub_title 64 #define ub_email_address 128 /* Declarations for template structures: for full definitions * see asn1t.h */ typedef struct ASN1_TEMPLATE_st ASN1_TEMPLATE; typedef struct ASN1_ITEM_st ASN1_ITEM; typedef struct ASN1_TLC_st ASN1_TLC; /* This is just an opaque pointer */ typedef struct ASN1_VALUE_st ASN1_VALUE; /* Declare ASN1 functions: the implement macro in in asn1t.h */ #define DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(type) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(type, type) #define DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(type) \ DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_name(type, type) #define DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(type, name) \ DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_name(type, name) \ DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(type, name, name) #define DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_fname(type, itname, name) \ DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_name(type, name) \ DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(type, itname, name) #define DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(type, itname, name) \ type *d2i_##name(type **a, const unsigned char **in, long len); \ int i2d_##name(type *a, unsigned char **out); \ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(itname) #define DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(type, name) \ type *d2i_##name(type **a, const unsigned char **in, long len); \ int i2d_##name(const type *a, unsigned char **out); \ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(name) #define DECLARE_ASN1_NDEF_FUNCTION(name) \ int i2d_##name##_NDEF(name *a, unsigned char **out); #define DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(name) \ DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(name) \ DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(name, name) #define DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS_name(type, name) \ type *name##_new(void); \ void name##_free(type *a); #define D2I_OF(type) type *(*)(type **,const unsigned char **,long) #define I2D_OF(type) int (*)(type *,unsigned char **) #define I2D_OF_const(type) int (*)(const type *,unsigned char **) #define CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i) \ ((d2i_of_void*) (1 ? d2i : ((D2I_OF(type))0))) #define CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d) \ ((i2d_of_void*) (1 ? i2d : ((I2D_OF(type))0))) #define CHECKED_NEW_OF(type, xnew) \ ((void *(*)(void)) (1 ? xnew : ((type *(*)(void))0))) #define CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, p) \ ((void*) (1 ? p : (type*)0)) #define CHECKED_PPTR_OF(type, p) \ ((void**) (1 ? p : (type**)0)) #define CHECKED_PTR_OF_TO_CHAR(type, p) \ ((char*) (1 ? p : (type*)0)) #define TYPEDEF_D2I_OF(type) typedef type *d2i_of_##type(type **,const unsigned char **,long) #define TYPEDEF_I2D_OF(type) typedef int i2d_of_##type(type *,unsigned char **) #define TYPEDEF_D2I2D_OF(type) TYPEDEF_D2I_OF(type); TYPEDEF_I2D_OF(type) TYPEDEF_D2I2D_OF(void); /* The following macros and typedefs allow an ASN1_ITEM * to be embedded in a structure and referenced. Since * the ASN1_ITEM pointers need to be globally accessible * (possibly from shared libraries) they may exist in * different forms. On platforms that support it the * ASN1_ITEM structure itself will be globally exported. * Other platforms will export a function that returns * an ASN1_ITEM pointer. * * To handle both cases transparently the macros below * should be used instead of hard coding an ASN1_ITEM * pointer in a structure. * * The structure will look like this: * * typedef struct SOMETHING_st { * ... * ASN1_ITEM_EXP *iptr; * ... * } SOMETHING; * * It would be initialised as e.g.: * * SOMETHING somevar = {...,ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509),...}; * * and the actual pointer extracted with: * * const ASN1_ITEM *it = ASN1_ITEM_ptr(somevar.iptr); * * Finally an ASN1_ITEM pointer can be extracted from an * appropriate reference with: ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509). This * would be used when a function takes an ASN1_ITEM * argument. * */ #ifndef OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION /* ASN1_ITEM pointer exported type */ typedef const ASN1_ITEM ASN1_ITEM_EXP; /* Macro to obtain ASN1_ITEM pointer from exported type */ #define ASN1_ITEM_ptr(iptr) (iptr) /* Macro to include ASN1_ITEM pointer from base type */ #define ASN1_ITEM_ref(iptr) (&(iptr##_it)) #define ASN1_ITEM_rptr(ref) (&(ref##_it)) #define DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(name) \ OPENSSL_EXTERN const ASN1_ITEM name##_it; #else /* Platforms that can't easily handle shared global variables are declared * as functions returning ASN1_ITEM pointers. */ /* ASN1_ITEM pointer exported type */ typedef const ASN1_ITEM * ASN1_ITEM_EXP(void); /* Macro to obtain ASN1_ITEM pointer from exported type */ #define ASN1_ITEM_ptr(iptr) (iptr()) /* Macro to include ASN1_ITEM pointer from base type */ #define ASN1_ITEM_ref(iptr) (iptr##_it) #define ASN1_ITEM_rptr(ref) (ref##_it()) #define DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(name) \ const ASN1_ITEM * name##_it(void); #endif /* Parameters used by ASN1_STRING_print_ex() */ /* These determine which characters to escape: * RFC2253 special characters, control characters and * MSB set characters */ #define ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 1 #define ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL 2 #define ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB 4 /* This flag determines how we do escaping: normally * RC2253 backslash only, set this to use backslash and * quote. */ #define ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE 8 /* These three flags are internal use only. */ /* Character is a valid PrintableString character */ #define CHARTYPE_PRINTABLESTRING 0x10 /* Character needs escaping if it is the first character */ #define CHARTYPE_FIRST_ESC_2253 0x20 /* Character needs escaping if it is the last character */ #define CHARTYPE_LAST_ESC_2253 0x40 /* NB the internal flags are safely reused below by flags * handled at the top level. */ /* If this is set we convert all character strings * to UTF8 first */ #define ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT 0x10 /* If this is set we don't attempt to interpret content: * just assume all strings are 1 byte per character. This * will produce some pretty odd looking output! */ #define ASN1_STRFLGS_IGNORE_TYPE 0x20 /* If this is set we include the string type in the output */ #define ASN1_STRFLGS_SHOW_TYPE 0x40 /* This determines which strings to display and which to * 'dump' (hex dump of content octets or DER encoding). We can * only dump non character strings or everything. If we * don't dump 'unknown' they are interpreted as character * strings with 1 octet per character and are subject to * the usual escaping options. */ #define ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_ALL 0x80 #define ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_UNKNOWN 0x100 /* These determine what 'dumping' does, we can dump the * content octets or the DER encoding: both use the * RFC2253 #XXXXX notation. */ #define ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER 0x200 /* All the string flags consistent with RFC2253, * escaping control characters isn't essential in * RFC2253 but it is advisable anyway. */ #define ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253 | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_UNKNOWN | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER) DECLARE_STACK_OF(ASN1_INTEGER) DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(ASN1_INTEGER) DECLARE_STACK_OF(ASN1_GENERALSTRING) typedef struct asn1_type_st { int type; union { char *ptr; ASN1_BOOLEAN boolean; ASN1_STRING * asn1_string; ASN1_OBJECT * object; ASN1_INTEGER * integer; ASN1_ENUMERATED * enumerated; ASN1_BIT_STRING * bit_string; ASN1_OCTET_STRING * octet_string; ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING * printablestring; ASN1_T61STRING * t61string; ASN1_IA5STRING * ia5string; ASN1_GENERALSTRING * generalstring; ASN1_BMPSTRING * bmpstring; ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING * universalstring; ASN1_UTCTIME * utctime; ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME * generalizedtime; ASN1_VISIBLESTRING * visiblestring; ASN1_UTF8STRING * utf8string; /* set and sequence are left complete and still * contain the set or sequence bytes */ ASN1_STRING * set; ASN1_STRING * sequence; ASN1_VALUE * asn1_value; } value; } ASN1_TYPE; DECLARE_STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(ASN1_TYPE) typedef struct asn1_method_st { i2d_of_void *i2d; d2i_of_void *d2i; void *(*create)(void); void (*destroy)(void *); } ASN1_METHOD; /* This is used when parsing some Netscape objects */ typedef struct asn1_header_st { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *header; void *data; ASN1_METHOD *meth; } ASN1_HEADER; /* This is used to contain a list of bit names */ typedef struct BIT_STRING_BITNAME_st { int bitnum; const char *lname; const char *sname; } BIT_STRING_BITNAME; #define M_ASN1_STRING_length(x) ((x)->length) #define M_ASN1_STRING_length_set(x, n) ((x)->length = (n)) #define M_ASN1_STRING_type(x) ((x)->type) #define M_ASN1_STRING_data(x) ((x)->data) /* Macros for string operations */ #define M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_new() (ASN1_BIT_STRING *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_BIT_STRING) #define M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_dup(a) (ASN1_BIT_STRING *)\ ASN1_STRING_dup((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_cmp(a,b) ASN1_STRING_cmp(\ (ASN1_STRING *)a,(ASN1_STRING *)b) #define M_ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(a,b,c) ASN1_STRING_set((ASN1_STRING *)a,b,c) #define M_ASN1_INTEGER_new() (ASN1_INTEGER *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_INTEGER) #define M_ASN1_INTEGER_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_ASN1_INTEGER_dup(a) (ASN1_INTEGER *)ASN1_STRING_dup((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(a,b) ASN1_STRING_cmp(\ (ASN1_STRING *)a,(ASN1_STRING *)b) #define M_ASN1_ENUMERATED_new() (ASN1_ENUMERATED *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_ENUMERATED) #define M_ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_ASN1_ENUMERATED_dup(a) (ASN1_ENUMERATED *)ASN1_STRING_dup((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_ASN1_ENUMERATED_cmp(a,b) ASN1_STRING_cmp(\ (ASN1_STRING *)a,(ASN1_STRING *)b) #define M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new() (ASN1_OCTET_STRING *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) #define M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(a) (ASN1_OCTET_STRING *)\ ASN1_STRING_dup((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(a,b) ASN1_STRING_cmp(\ (ASN1_STRING *)a,(ASN1_STRING *)b) #define M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(a,b,c) ASN1_STRING_set((ASN1_STRING *)a,b,c) #define M_ASN1_OCTET_STRING_print(a,b) ASN1_STRING_print(a,(ASN1_STRING *)b) #define M_i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(a,pp) \ i2d_ASN1_bytes((ASN1_STRING *)a,pp,V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,\ V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) #define B_ASN1_TIME \ B_ASN1_UTCTIME | \ B_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME #define B_ASN1_PRINTABLE \ B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING| \ B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING| \ B_ASN1_T61STRING| \ B_ASN1_IA5STRING| \ B_ASN1_BIT_STRING| \ B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING|\ B_ASN1_BMPSTRING|\ B_ASN1_UTF8STRING|\ B_ASN1_SEQUENCE|\ B_ASN1_UNKNOWN #define B_ASN1_DIRECTORYSTRING \ B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING| \ B_ASN1_TELETEXSTRING|\ B_ASN1_BMPSTRING|\ B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING|\ B_ASN1_UTF8STRING #define B_ASN1_DISPLAYTEXT \ B_ASN1_IA5STRING| \ B_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING| \ B_ASN1_BMPSTRING|\ B_ASN1_UTF8STRING #define M_ASN1_PRINTABLE_new() ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_T61STRING) #define M_ASN1_PRINTABLE_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_i2d_ASN1_PRINTABLE(a,pp) i2d_ASN1_bytes((ASN1_STRING *)a,\ pp,a->type,V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) #define M_d2i_ASN1_PRINTABLE(a,pp,l) \ d2i_ASN1_type_bytes((ASN1_STRING **)a,pp,l, \ B_ASN1_PRINTABLE) #define M_DIRECTORYSTRING_new() ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) #define M_DIRECTORYSTRING_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_i2d_DIRECTORYSTRING(a,pp) i2d_ASN1_bytes((ASN1_STRING *)a,\ pp,a->type,V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) #define M_d2i_DIRECTORYSTRING(a,pp,l) \ d2i_ASN1_type_bytes((ASN1_STRING **)a,pp,l, \ B_ASN1_DIRECTORYSTRING) #define M_DISPLAYTEXT_new() ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING) #define M_DISPLAYTEXT_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_i2d_DISPLAYTEXT(a,pp) i2d_ASN1_bytes((ASN1_STRING *)a,\ pp,a->type,V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) #define M_d2i_DISPLAYTEXT(a,pp,l) \ d2i_ASN1_type_bytes((ASN1_STRING **)a,pp,l, \ B_ASN1_DISPLAYTEXT) #define M_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING_new() (ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) #define M_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_i2d_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING(a,pp) \ i2d_ASN1_bytes((ASN1_STRING *)a,pp,V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING,\ V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) #define M_d2i_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING(a,pp,l) \ (ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING *)d2i_ASN1_type_bytes\ ((ASN1_STRING **)a,pp,l,B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) #define M_ASN1_T61STRING_new() (ASN1_T61STRING *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_T61STRING) #define M_ASN1_T61STRING_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_i2d_ASN1_T61STRING(a,pp) \ i2d_ASN1_bytes((ASN1_STRING *)a,pp,V_ASN1_T61STRING,\ V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) #define M_d2i_ASN1_T61STRING(a,pp,l) \ (ASN1_T61STRING *)d2i_ASN1_type_bytes\ ((ASN1_STRING **)a,pp,l,B_ASN1_T61STRING) #define M_ASN1_IA5STRING_new() (ASN1_IA5STRING *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_IA5STRING) #define M_ASN1_IA5STRING_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_ASN1_IA5STRING_dup(a) \ (ASN1_IA5STRING *)ASN1_STRING_dup((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_i2d_ASN1_IA5STRING(a,pp) \ i2d_ASN1_bytes((ASN1_STRING *)a,pp,V_ASN1_IA5STRING,\ V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) #define M_d2i_ASN1_IA5STRING(a,pp,l) \ (ASN1_IA5STRING *)d2i_ASN1_type_bytes((ASN1_STRING **)a,pp,l,\ B_ASN1_IA5STRING) #define M_ASN1_UTCTIME_new() (ASN1_UTCTIME *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_UTCTIME) #define M_ASN1_UTCTIME_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_ASN1_UTCTIME_dup(a) (ASN1_UTCTIME *)ASN1_STRING_dup((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new() (ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) #define M_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_dup(a) (ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *)ASN1_STRING_dup(\ (ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_ASN1_TIME_new() (ASN1_TIME *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_UTCTIME) #define M_ASN1_TIME_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_ASN1_TIME_dup(a) (ASN1_TIME *)ASN1_STRING_dup((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_ASN1_GENERALSTRING_new() (ASN1_GENERALSTRING *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING) #define M_ASN1_GENERALSTRING_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_i2d_ASN1_GENERALSTRING(a,pp) \ i2d_ASN1_bytes((ASN1_STRING *)a,pp,V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING,\ V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) #define M_d2i_ASN1_GENERALSTRING(a,pp,l) \ (ASN1_GENERALSTRING *)d2i_ASN1_type_bytes\ ((ASN1_STRING **)a,pp,l,B_ASN1_GENERALSTRING) #define M_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_new() (ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING) #define M_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_i2d_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING(a,pp) \ i2d_ASN1_bytes((ASN1_STRING *)a,pp,V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING,\ V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) #define M_d2i_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING(a,pp,l) \ (ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING *)d2i_ASN1_type_bytes\ ((ASN1_STRING **)a,pp,l,B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING) #define M_ASN1_BMPSTRING_new() (ASN1_BMPSTRING *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_BMPSTRING) #define M_ASN1_BMPSTRING_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_i2d_ASN1_BMPSTRING(a,pp) \ i2d_ASN1_bytes((ASN1_STRING *)a,pp,V_ASN1_BMPSTRING,\ V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) #define M_d2i_ASN1_BMPSTRING(a,pp,l) \ (ASN1_BMPSTRING *)d2i_ASN1_type_bytes\ ((ASN1_STRING **)a,pp,l,B_ASN1_BMPSTRING) #define M_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_new() (ASN1_VISIBLESTRING *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING) #define M_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_i2d_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING(a,pp) \ i2d_ASN1_bytes((ASN1_STRING *)a,pp,V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING,\ V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) #define M_d2i_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING(a,pp,l) \ (ASN1_VISIBLESTRING *)d2i_ASN1_type_bytes\ ((ASN1_STRING **)a,pp,l,B_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING) #define M_ASN1_UTF8STRING_new() (ASN1_UTF8STRING *)\ ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_UTF8STRING) #define M_ASN1_UTF8STRING_free(a) ASN1_STRING_free((ASN1_STRING *)a) #define M_i2d_ASN1_UTF8STRING(a,pp) \ i2d_ASN1_bytes((ASN1_STRING *)a,pp,V_ASN1_UTF8STRING,\ V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) #define M_d2i_ASN1_UTF8STRING(a,pp,l) \ (ASN1_UTF8STRING *)d2i_ASN1_type_bytes\ ((ASN1_STRING **)a,pp,l,B_ASN1_UTF8STRING) /* for the is_set parameter to i2d_ASN1_SET */ #define IS_SEQUENCE 0 #define IS_SET 1 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_fname(ASN1_TYPE, ASN1_ANY, ASN1_TYPE) int ASN1_TYPE_get(ASN1_TYPE *a); void ASN1_TYPE_set(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, void *value); int ASN1_TYPE_set1(ASN1_TYPE *a, int type, const void *value); +int ASN1_TYPE_cmp(const ASN1_TYPE *a, const ASN1_TYPE *b); ASN1_OBJECT * ASN1_OBJECT_new(void ); void ASN1_OBJECT_free(ASN1_OBJECT *a); int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT *a,unsigned char **pp); ASN1_OBJECT * c2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a,const unsigned char **pp, long length); ASN1_OBJECT * d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(ASN1_OBJECT **a,const unsigned char **pp, long length); DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ASN1_OBJECT) DECLARE_STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) ASN1_STRING * ASN1_STRING_new(void); void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *a); ASN1_STRING * ASN1_STRING_dup(ASN1_STRING *a); ASN1_STRING * ASN1_STRING_type_new(int type ); int ASN1_STRING_cmp(ASN1_STRING *a, ASN1_STRING *b); /* Since this is used to store all sorts of things, via macros, for now, make its data void * */ int ASN1_STRING_set(ASN1_STRING *str, const void *data, int len); void ASN1_STRING_set0(ASN1_STRING *str, void *data, int len); int ASN1_STRING_length(ASN1_STRING *x); void ASN1_STRING_length_set(ASN1_STRING *x, int n); int ASN1_STRING_type(ASN1_STRING *x); unsigned char * ASN1_STRING_data(ASN1_STRING *x); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_BIT_STRING) int i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a,unsigned char **pp); ASN1_BIT_STRING *c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING(ASN1_BIT_STRING **a,const unsigned char **pp, long length); int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, unsigned char *d, int length ); int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n, int value); int ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(ASN1_BIT_STRING *a, int n); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO int ASN1_BIT_STRING_name_print(BIO *out, ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs, BIT_STRING_BITNAME *tbl, int indent); #endif int ASN1_BIT_STRING_num_asc(char *name, BIT_STRING_BITNAME *tbl); int ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_asc(ASN1_BIT_STRING *bs, char *name, int value, BIT_STRING_BITNAME *tbl); int i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN(int a,unsigned char **pp); int d2i_ASN1_BOOLEAN(int *a,const unsigned char **pp,long length); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_INTEGER) int i2c_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER *a,unsigned char **pp); ASN1_INTEGER *c2i_ASN1_INTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER **a,const unsigned char **pp, long length); ASN1_INTEGER *d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER(ASN1_INTEGER **a,const unsigned char **pp, long length); ASN1_INTEGER * ASN1_INTEGER_dup(ASN1_INTEGER *x); int ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ASN1_INTEGER *x, ASN1_INTEGER *y); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_ENUMERATED) int ASN1_UTCTIME_check(ASN1_UTCTIME *a); ASN1_UTCTIME *ASN1_UTCTIME_set(ASN1_UTCTIME *s,time_t t); int ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string(ASN1_UTCTIME *s, const char *str); int ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t(const ASN1_UTCTIME *s, time_t t); #if 0 time_t ASN1_UTCTIME_get(const ASN1_UTCTIME *s); #endif int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *a); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *s,time_t t); int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *s, const char *str); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_OCTET_STRING) ASN1_OCTET_STRING * ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a); int ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *b); int ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *str, const unsigned char *data, int len); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_VISIBLESTRING) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_UTF8STRING) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_NULL) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_BMPSTRING) int UTF8_getc(const unsigned char *str, int len, unsigned long *val); int UTF8_putc(unsigned char *str, int len, unsigned long value); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(ASN1_STRING, ASN1_PRINTABLE) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(ASN1_STRING, DIRECTORYSTRING) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(ASN1_STRING, DISPLAYTEXT) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_T61STRING) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_IA5STRING) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_GENERALSTRING) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_UTCTIME) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_TIME) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF) ASN1_TIME *ASN1_TIME_set(ASN1_TIME *s,time_t t); int ASN1_TIME_check(ASN1_TIME *t); ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime(ASN1_TIME *t, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **out); int i2d_ASN1_SET(STACK *a, unsigned char **pp, i2d_of_void *i2d, int ex_tag, int ex_class, int is_set); STACK * d2i_ASN1_SET(STACK **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length, d2i_of_void *d2i, void (*free_func)(void *), int ex_tag, int ex_class); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO int i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(BIO *bp, ASN1_INTEGER *a); int a2i_ASN1_INTEGER(BIO *bp,ASN1_INTEGER *bs,char *buf,int size); int i2a_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIO *bp, ASN1_ENUMERATED *a); int a2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIO *bp,ASN1_ENUMERATED *bs,char *buf,int size); int i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(BIO *bp,ASN1_OBJECT *a); int a2i_ASN1_STRING(BIO *bp,ASN1_STRING *bs,char *buf,int size); int i2a_ASN1_STRING(BIO *bp, ASN1_STRING *a, int type); #endif int i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(char *buf,int buf_len,ASN1_OBJECT *a); int a2d_ASN1_OBJECT(unsigned char *out,int olen, const char *buf, int num); ASN1_OBJECT *ASN1_OBJECT_create(int nid, unsigned char *data,int len, const char *sn, const char *ln); int ASN1_INTEGER_set(ASN1_INTEGER *a, long v); long ASN1_INTEGER_get(ASN1_INTEGER *a); ASN1_INTEGER *BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_INTEGER *ai); BIGNUM *ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(ASN1_INTEGER *ai,BIGNUM *bn); int ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a, long v); long ASN1_ENUMERATED_get(ASN1_ENUMERATED *a); ASN1_ENUMERATED *BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED(BIGNUM *bn, ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai); BIGNUM *ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN(ASN1_ENUMERATED *ai,BIGNUM *bn); /* General */ /* given a string, return the correct type, max is the maximum length */ int ASN1_PRINTABLE_type(const unsigned char *s, int max); int i2d_ASN1_bytes(ASN1_STRING *a, unsigned char **pp, int tag, int xclass); ASN1_STRING *d2i_ASN1_bytes(ASN1_STRING **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length, int Ptag, int Pclass); unsigned long ASN1_tag2bit(int tag); /* type is one or more of the B_ASN1_ values. */ ASN1_STRING *d2i_ASN1_type_bytes(ASN1_STRING **a,const unsigned char **pp, long length,int type); /* PARSING */ int asn1_Finish(ASN1_CTX *c); int asn1_const_Finish(ASN1_const_CTX *c); /* SPECIALS */ int ASN1_get_object(const unsigned char **pp, long *plength, int *ptag, int *pclass, long omax); int ASN1_check_infinite_end(unsigned char **p,long len); int ASN1_const_check_infinite_end(const unsigned char **p,long len); void ASN1_put_object(unsigned char **pp, int constructed, int length, int tag, int xclass); int ASN1_put_eoc(unsigned char **pp); int ASN1_object_size(int constructed, int length, int tag); /* Used to implement other functions */ void *ASN1_dup(i2d_of_void *i2d, d2i_of_void *d2i, char *x); #define ASN1_dup_of(type,i2d,d2i,x) \ ((type*)ASN1_dup(CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d), \ CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i), \ CHECKED_PTR_OF_TO_CHAR(type, x))) #define ASN1_dup_of_const(type,i2d,d2i,x) \ ((type*)ASN1_dup(CHECKED_I2D_OF(const type, i2d), \ CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i), \ CHECKED_PTR_OF_TO_CHAR(const type, x))) void *ASN1_item_dup(const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *x); /* ASN1 alloc/free macros for when a type is only used internally */ #define M_ASN1_new_of(type) (type *)ASN1_item_new(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(type)) #define M_ASN1_free_of(x, type) \ ASN1_item_free(CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, x), ASN1_ITEM_rptr(type)) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API void *ASN1_d2i_fp(void *(*xnew)(void), d2i_of_void *d2i, FILE *in, void **x); #define ASN1_d2i_fp_of(type,xnew,d2i,in,x) \ ((type*)ASN1_d2i_fp(CHECKED_NEW_OF(type, xnew), \ CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i), \ in, \ CHECKED_PPTR_OF(type, x))) void *ASN1_item_d2i_fp(const ASN1_ITEM *it, FILE *in, void *x); int ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_of_void *i2d,FILE *out,void *x); #define ASN1_i2d_fp_of(type,i2d,out,x) \ (ASN1_i2d_fp(CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d), \ out, \ CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, x))) #define ASN1_i2d_fp_of_const(type,i2d,out,x) \ (ASN1_i2d_fp(CHECKED_I2D_OF(const type, i2d), \ out, \ CHECKED_PTR_OF(const type, x))) int ASN1_item_i2d_fp(const ASN1_ITEM *it, FILE *out, void *x); int ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags); #endif int ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(unsigned char **out, ASN1_STRING *in); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO void *ASN1_d2i_bio(void *(*xnew)(void), d2i_of_void *d2i, BIO *in, void **x); #define ASN1_d2i_bio_of(type,xnew,d2i,in,x) \ ((type*)ASN1_d2i_bio( CHECKED_NEW_OF(type, xnew), \ CHECKED_D2I_OF(type, d2i), \ in, \ CHECKED_PPTR_OF(type, x))) void *ASN1_item_d2i_bio(const ASN1_ITEM *it, BIO *in, void *x); int ASN1_i2d_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d,BIO *out, unsigned char *x); #define ASN1_i2d_bio_of(type,i2d,out,x) \ (ASN1_i2d_bio(CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d), \ out, \ CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, x))) #define ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(type,i2d,out,x) \ (ASN1_i2d_bio(CHECKED_I2D_OF(const type, i2d), \ out, \ CHECKED_PTR_OF(const type, x))) int ASN1_item_i2d_bio(const ASN1_ITEM *it, BIO *out, void *x); int ASN1_UTCTIME_print(BIO *fp,ASN1_UTCTIME *a); int ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print(BIO *fp,ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *a); int ASN1_TIME_print(BIO *fp,ASN1_TIME *a); int ASN1_STRING_print(BIO *bp,ASN1_STRING *v); int ASN1_STRING_print_ex(BIO *out, ASN1_STRING *str, unsigned long flags); int ASN1_parse(BIO *bp,const unsigned char *pp,long len,int indent); int ASN1_parse_dump(BIO *bp,const unsigned char *pp,long len,int indent,int dump); #endif const char *ASN1_tag2str(int tag); /* Used to load and write netscape format cert/key */ int i2d_ASN1_HEADER(ASN1_HEADER *a,unsigned char **pp); ASN1_HEADER *d2i_ASN1_HEADER(ASN1_HEADER **a,const unsigned char **pp, long length); ASN1_HEADER *ASN1_HEADER_new(void ); void ASN1_HEADER_free(ASN1_HEADER *a); int ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_to_string(ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING *s); /* Not used that much at this point, except for the first two */ ASN1_METHOD *X509_asn1_meth(void); ASN1_METHOD *RSAPrivateKey_asn1_meth(void); ASN1_METHOD *ASN1_IA5STRING_asn1_meth(void); ASN1_METHOD *ASN1_BIT_STRING_asn1_meth(void); int ASN1_TYPE_set_octetstring(ASN1_TYPE *a, unsigned char *data, int len); int ASN1_TYPE_get_octetstring(ASN1_TYPE *a, unsigned char *data, int max_len); int ASN1_TYPE_set_int_octetstring(ASN1_TYPE *a, long num, unsigned char *data, int len); int ASN1_TYPE_get_int_octetstring(ASN1_TYPE *a,long *num, unsigned char *data, int max_len); STACK *ASN1_seq_unpack(const unsigned char *buf, int len, d2i_of_void *d2i, void (*free_func)(void *)); unsigned char *ASN1_seq_pack(STACK *safes, i2d_of_void *i2d, unsigned char **buf, int *len ); void *ASN1_unpack_string(ASN1_STRING *oct, d2i_of_void *d2i); void *ASN1_item_unpack(ASN1_STRING *oct, const ASN1_ITEM *it); ASN1_STRING *ASN1_pack_string(void *obj, i2d_of_void *i2d, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **oct); #define ASN1_pack_string_of(type,obj,i2d,oct) \ (ASN1_pack_string(CHECKED_PTR_OF(type, obj), \ CHECKED_I2D_OF(type, i2d), \ oct)) ASN1_STRING *ASN1_item_pack(void *obj, const ASN1_ITEM *it, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **oct); void ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask(unsigned long mask); int ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc(const char *p); unsigned long ASN1_STRING_get_default_mask(void); int ASN1_mbstring_copy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int len, int inform, unsigned long mask); int ASN1_mbstring_ncopy(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int len, int inform, unsigned long mask, long minsize, long maxsize); ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID(ASN1_STRING **out, const unsigned char *in, int inlen, int inform, int nid); ASN1_STRING_TABLE *ASN1_STRING_TABLE_get(int nid); int ASN1_STRING_TABLE_add(int, long, long, unsigned long, unsigned long); void ASN1_STRING_TABLE_cleanup(void); /* ASN1 template functions */ /* Old API compatible functions */ ASN1_VALUE *ASN1_item_new(const ASN1_ITEM *it); void ASN1_item_free(ASN1_VALUE *val, const ASN1_ITEM *it); ASN1_VALUE * ASN1_item_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it); int ASN1_item_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it); int ASN1_item_ndef_i2d(ASN1_VALUE *val, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it); void ASN1_add_oid_module(void); ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_nconf(char *str, CONF *nconf); ASN1_TYPE *ASN1_generate_v3(char *str, X509V3_CTX *cnf); typedef int asn1_output_data_fn(BIO *out, BIO *data, ASN1_VALUE *val, int flags, const ASN1_ITEM *it); int int_smime_write_ASN1(BIO *bio, ASN1_VALUE *val, BIO *data, int flags, int ctype_nid, int econt_nid, STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *mdalgs, asn1_output_data_fn *data_fn, const ASN1_ITEM *it); ASN1_VALUE *SMIME_read_ASN1(BIO *bio, BIO **bcont, const ASN1_ITEM *it); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void); /* Error codes for the ASN1 functions. */ /* Function codes. */ #define ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT 100 #define ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_ENUMERATED 101 #define ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_INTEGER 102 #define ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_STRING 103 #define ASN1_F_APPEND_EXP 176 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_BIT_STRING_SET_BIT 183 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_CB 177 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_CHECK_TLEN 104 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLATE_PRIMITIVE 105 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT 106 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE 108 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_FP 109 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO 107 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_DIGEST 184 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_DO_ADB 110 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_DUP 111 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_ENUMERATED_SET 112 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_ENUMERATED_TO_BN 113 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I 204 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_FIND_END 190 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_SET 185 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERATE_V3 178 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_OBJECT 114 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_HEADER_NEW 115 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_I2D_BIO 116 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_I2D_FP 117 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_INTEGER_SET 118 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_INTEGER_TO_BN 119 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_D2I_FP 206 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_DUP 191 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_COMBINE_NEW 121 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I 120 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_BIO 192 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_FP 193 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_PACK 198 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN 195 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_UNPACK 199 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY 197 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY 122 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_OBJECT_NEW 123 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_OUTPUT_DATA 207 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_PACK_STRING 124 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_PCTX_NEW 205 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_PKCS5_PBE_SET 125 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_SEQ_PACK 126 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_SEQ_UNPACK 127 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_SIGN 128 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE 179 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_SET 186 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TABLE_ADD 129 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TYPE_NEW 130 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I 132 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NEW 133 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I 131 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_TIME_SET 175 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_TYPE_GET_INT_OCTETSTRING 134 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_TYPE_GET_OCTETSTRING 135 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_UNPACK_STRING 136 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_UTCTIME_SET 187 #define ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY 137 #define ASN1_F_B64_READ_ASN1 208 #define ASN1_F_B64_WRITE_ASN1 209 #define ASN1_F_BITSTR_CB 180 #define ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_ENUMERATED 138 #define ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER 139 #define ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING 189 #define ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_INTEGER 194 #define ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT 196 #define ASN1_F_COLLECT_DATA 140 #define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING 141 #define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_BOOLEAN 142 #define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_BYTES 143 #define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME 144 #define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_HEADER 145 #define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_INTEGER 146 #define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_OBJECT 147 #define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_SET 148 #define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_TYPE_BYTES 149 #define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_UINTEGER 150 #define ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_UTCTIME 151 #define ASN1_F_D2I_NETSCAPE_RSA 152 #define ASN1_F_D2I_NETSCAPE_RSA_2 153 #define ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY 154 #define ASN1_F_D2I_PUBLICKEY 155 #define ASN1_F_D2I_RSA_NET 200 #define ASN1_F_D2I_RSA_NET_2 201 #define ASN1_F_D2I_X509 156 #define ASN1_F_D2I_X509_CINF 157 #define ASN1_F_D2I_X509_PKEY 159 #define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_SET 188 #define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_TIME 160 #define ASN1_F_I2D_DSA_PUBKEY 161 #define ASN1_F_I2D_EC_PUBKEY 181 #define ASN1_F_I2D_PRIVATEKEY 163 #define ASN1_F_I2D_PUBLICKEY 164 #define ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_NET 162 #define ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_PUBKEY 165 #define ASN1_F_LONG_C2I 166 #define ASN1_F_OID_MODULE_INIT 174 #define ASN1_F_PARSE_TAGGING 182 #define ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET 167 #define ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE_SET 202 #define ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1 210 #define ASN1_F_SMIME_TEXT 211 #define ASN1_F_X509_CINF_NEW 168 #define ASN1_F_X509_CRL_ADD0_REVOKED 169 #define ASN1_F_X509_INFO_NEW 170 #define ASN1_F_X509_NAME_ENCODE 203 #define ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_D2I 158 #define ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_NEW 171 #define ASN1_F_X509_NEW 172 #define ASN1_F_X509_PKEY_NEW 173 /* Reason codes. */ #define ASN1_R_ADDING_OBJECT 171 #define ASN1_R_ASN1_PARSE_ERROR 198 #define ASN1_R_ASN1_SIG_PARSE_ERROR 199 #define ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR 100 #define ASN1_R_BAD_CLASS 101 #define ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER 102 #define ASN1_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ 103 #define ASN1_R_BAD_TAG 104 #define ASN1_R_BMPSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH 210 #define ASN1_R_BN_LIB 105 #define ASN1_R_BOOLEAN_IS_WRONG_LENGTH 106 #define ASN1_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL 107 #define ASN1_R_CIPHER_HAS_NO_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER 108 #define ASN1_R_DATA_IS_WRONG 109 #define ASN1_R_DECODE_ERROR 110 #define ASN1_R_DECODING_ERROR 111 #define ASN1_R_DEPTH_EXCEEDED 174 #define ASN1_R_ENCODE_ERROR 112 #define ASN1_R_ERROR_GETTING_TIME 173 #define ASN1_R_ERROR_LOADING_SECTION 172 #define ASN1_R_ERROR_PARSING_SET_ELEMENT 113 #define ASN1_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER_PARAMS 114 #define ASN1_R_EXPECTING_AN_INTEGER 115 #define ASN1_R_EXPECTING_AN_OBJECT 116 #define ASN1_R_EXPECTING_A_BOOLEAN 117 #define ASN1_R_EXPECTING_A_TIME 118 #define ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_LENGTH_MISMATCH 119 #define ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_TAG_NOT_CONSTRUCTED 120 #define ASN1_R_FIELD_MISSING 121 #define ASN1_R_FIRST_NUM_TOO_LARGE 122 #define ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG 123 #define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_BITSTRING_FORMAT 175 #define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_BOOLEAN 176 #define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_CHARACTERS 124 #define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_FORMAT 177 #define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_HEX 178 #define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_IMPLICIT_TAG 179 #define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_INTEGER 180 #define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NESTED_TAGGING 181 #define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NULL 125 #define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NULL_VALUE 182 #define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OBJECT 183 #define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONAL_ANY 126 #define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONS_ON_ITEM_TEMPLATE 170 #define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TAGGED_ANY 127 #define ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TIME_VALUE 184 #define ASN1_R_INTEGER_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT 185 #define ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG 128 +#define ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT 220 #define ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING_LENGTH 129 #define ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT 130 #define ASN1_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE 200 #define ASN1_R_INVALID_MODIFIER 186 #define ASN1_R_INVALID_NUMBER 187 #define ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING 212 #define ASN1_R_INVALID_SEPARATOR 131 #define ASN1_R_INVALID_TIME_FORMAT 132 #define ASN1_R_INVALID_UNIVERSALSTRING_LENGTH 133 #define ASN1_R_INVALID_UTF8STRING 134 #define ASN1_R_IV_TOO_LARGE 135 #define ASN1_R_LENGTH_ERROR 136 #define ASN1_R_LIST_ERROR 188 #define ASN1_R_MIME_NO_CONTENT_TYPE 201 #define ASN1_R_MIME_PARSE_ERROR 202 #define ASN1_R_MIME_SIG_PARSE_ERROR 203 #define ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC 137 #define ASN1_R_MISSING_SECOND_NUMBER 138 #define ASN1_R_MISSING_VALUE 189 #define ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL 139 #define ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG 140 #define ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_STRING 197 #define ASN1_R_NON_HEX_CHARACTERS 141 #define ASN1_R_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT 190 #define ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA 142 #define ASN1_R_NO_CONTENT_TYPE 204 #define ASN1_R_NO_MATCHING_CHOICE_TYPE 143 #define ASN1_R_NO_MULTIPART_BODY_FAILURE 205 #define ASN1_R_NO_MULTIPART_BOUNDARY 206 #define ASN1_R_NO_SIG_CONTENT_TYPE 207 #define ASN1_R_NULL_IS_WRONG_LENGTH 144 #define ASN1_R_OBJECT_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT 191 #define ASN1_R_ODD_NUMBER_OF_CHARS 145 #define ASN1_R_PRIVATE_KEY_HEADER_MISSING 146 #define ASN1_R_SECOND_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE 147 #define ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_LENGTH_MISMATCH 148 #define ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED 149 #define ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_OR_SET_NEEDS_CONFIG 192 #define ASN1_R_SHORT_LINE 150 #define ASN1_R_SIG_INVALID_MIME_TYPE 208 #define ASN1_R_STREAMING_NOT_SUPPORTED 209 #define ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_LONG 151 #define ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_SHORT 152 #define ASN1_R_TAG_VALUE_TOO_HIGH 153 #define ASN1_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD 154 #define ASN1_R_TIME_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT 193 #define ASN1_R_TOO_LONG 155 #define ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED 156 +#define ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE 218 #define ASN1_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_RSA_KEY 157 #define ASN1_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_RSA_PRIVATE_KEY 158 #define ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC 159 #define ASN1_R_UNIVERSALSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH 211 #define ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_FORMAT 160 #define ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM 161 #define ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_OBJECT_TYPE 162 #define ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE 163 #define ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_TAG 194 #define ASN1_R_UNKOWN_FORMAT 195 #define ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ANY_DEFINED_BY_TYPE 164 #define ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER 165 #define ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM 166 #define ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE 167 #define ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE 196 #define ASN1_R_WRONG_TAG 168 #define ASN1_R_WRONG_TYPE 169 #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c (revision 276859) @@ -1,318 +1,320 @@ /* crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999-2008 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999-2014 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes * made to it will be overwritten when the script next updates this file, * only reason strings will be preserved. */ #include #include #include /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR #define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1,func,0) #define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1,0,reason) static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_functs[]= { {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_A2D_ASN1_OBJECT), "a2d_ASN1_OBJECT"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_ENUMERATED), "a2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_INTEGER), "a2i_ASN1_INTEGER"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_A2I_ASN1_STRING), "a2i_ASN1_STRING"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_APPEND_EXP), "APPEND_EXP"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_BIT_STRING_SET_BIT), "ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_CB), "ASN1_CB"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_CHECK_TLEN), "ASN1_CHECK_TLEN"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLATE_PRIMITIVE), "ASN1_COLLATE_PRIMITIVE"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT), "ASN1_COLLECT"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE), "ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_FP), "ASN1_d2i_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO), "ASN1_D2I_READ_BIO"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_DIGEST), "ASN1_digest"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_DO_ADB), "ASN1_DO_ADB"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_DUP), "ASN1_dup"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ENUMERATED_SET), "ASN1_ENUMERATED_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ENUMERATED_TO_BN), "ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I), "ASN1_EX_C2I"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_FIND_END), "ASN1_FIND_END"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_SET), "ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_GENERATE_V3), "ASN1_generate_v3"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_OBJECT), "ASN1_get_object"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_HEADER_NEW), "ASN1_HEADER_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_I2D_BIO), "ASN1_i2d_bio"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_I2D_FP), "ASN1_i2d_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_INTEGER_SET), "ASN1_INTEGER_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_INTEGER_TO_BN), "ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_D2I_FP), "ASN1_item_d2i_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_DUP), "ASN1_item_dup"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_COMBINE_NEW), "ASN1_ITEM_EX_COMBINE_NEW"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I), "ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_BIO), "ASN1_item_i2d_bio"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_I2D_FP), "ASN1_item_i2d_fp"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_PACK), "ASN1_item_pack"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_SIGN), "ASN1_item_sign"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_UNPACK), "ASN1_item_unpack"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_VERIFY), "ASN1_item_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_MBSTRING_NCOPY), "ASN1_mbstring_ncopy"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_OBJECT_NEW), "ASN1_OBJECT_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_OUTPUT_DATA), "ASN1_OUTPUT_DATA"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_PACK_STRING), "ASN1_pack_string"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_PCTX_NEW), "ASN1_PCTX_NEW"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_PKCS5_PBE_SET), "ASN1_PKCS5_PBE_SET"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_SEQ_PACK), "ASN1_seq_pack"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_SEQ_UNPACK), "ASN1_seq_unpack"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_SIGN), "ASN1_sign"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_STR2TYPE), "ASN1_STR2TYPE"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_SET), "ASN1_STRING_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TABLE_ADD), "ASN1_STRING_TABLE_add"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TYPE_NEW), "ASN1_STRING_type_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I), "ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NEW), "ASN1_TEMPLATE_NEW"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I), "ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TIME_SET), "ASN1_TIME_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TYPE_GET_INT_OCTETSTRING), "ASN1_TYPE_get_int_octetstring"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_TYPE_GET_OCTETSTRING), "ASN1_TYPE_get_octetstring"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_UNPACK_STRING), "ASN1_unpack_string"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_UTCTIME_SET), "ASN1_UTCTIME_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_ASN1_VERIFY), "ASN1_verify"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_B64_READ_ASN1), "B64_READ_ASN1"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_B64_WRITE_ASN1), "B64_WRITE_ASN1"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_BITSTR_CB), "BITSTR_CB"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_ENUMERATED), "BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER), "BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING), "c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_INTEGER), "c2i_ASN1_INTEGER"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_C2I_ASN1_OBJECT), "c2i_ASN1_OBJECT"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_COLLECT_DATA), "COLLECT_DATA"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING), "D2I_ASN1_BIT_STRING"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_BOOLEAN), "d2i_ASN1_BOOLEAN"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_BYTES), "d2i_ASN1_bytes"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME), "D2I_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_HEADER), "d2i_ASN1_HEADER"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_INTEGER), "D2I_ASN1_INTEGER"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_OBJECT), "d2i_ASN1_OBJECT"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_SET), "d2i_ASN1_SET"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_TYPE_BYTES), "d2i_ASN1_type_bytes"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_UINTEGER), "d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_ASN1_UTCTIME), "D2I_ASN1_UTCTIME"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_NETSCAPE_RSA), "d2i_Netscape_RSA"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_NETSCAPE_RSA_2), "D2I_NETSCAPE_RSA_2"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_PRIVATEKEY), "d2i_PrivateKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_PUBLICKEY), "d2i_PublicKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_RSA_NET), "d2i_RSA_NET"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_RSA_NET_2), "D2I_RSA_NET_2"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_X509), "D2I_X509"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_X509_CINF), "D2I_X509_CINF"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_D2I_X509_PKEY), "d2i_X509_PKEY"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_SET), "i2d_ASN1_SET"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_TIME), "I2D_ASN1_TIME"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_DSA_PUBKEY), "i2d_DSA_PUBKEY"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_EC_PUBKEY), "i2d_EC_PUBKEY"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_PRIVATEKEY), "i2d_PrivateKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_PUBLICKEY), "i2d_PublicKey"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_NET), "i2d_RSA_NET"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_I2D_RSA_PUBKEY), "i2d_RSA_PUBKEY"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_LONG_C2I), "LONG_C2I"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_OID_MODULE_INIT), "OID_MODULE_INIT"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_PARSE_TAGGING), "PARSE_TAGGING"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE2_SET), "PKCS5_pbe2_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_PKCS5_PBE_SET), "PKCS5_pbe_set"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_SMIME_READ_ASN1), "SMIME_read_ASN1"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_SMIME_TEXT), "SMIME_text"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_CINF_NEW), "X509_CINF_NEW"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_CRL_ADD0_REVOKED), "X509_CRL_add0_revoked"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_INFO_NEW), "X509_INFO_new"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_ENCODE), "X509_NAME_ENCODE"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_D2I), "X509_NAME_EX_D2I"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_NEW), "X509_NAME_EX_NEW"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_NEW), "X509_NEW"}, {ERR_FUNC(ASN1_F_X509_PKEY_NEW), "X509_PKEY_new"}, {0,NULL} }; static ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_reasons[]= { {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ADDING_OBJECT) ,"adding object"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ASN1_PARSE_ERROR) ,"asn1 parse error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ASN1_SIG_PARSE_ERROR) ,"asn1 sig parse error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR) ,"aux error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BAD_CLASS) ,"bad class"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER) ,"bad object header"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ) ,"bad password read"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BAD_TAG) ,"bad tag"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BMPSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH),"bmpstring is wrong length"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BN_LIB) ,"bn lib"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BOOLEAN_IS_WRONG_LENGTH),"boolean is wrong length"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) ,"buffer too small"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_CIPHER_HAS_NO_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER),"cipher has no object identifier"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_DATA_IS_WRONG) ,"data is wrong"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_DECODE_ERROR) ,"decode error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_DECODING_ERROR) ,"decoding error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_DEPTH_EXCEEDED) ,"depth exceeded"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ENCODE_ERROR) ,"encode error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ERROR_GETTING_TIME) ,"error getting time"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ERROR_LOADING_SECTION),"error loading section"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ERROR_PARSING_SET_ELEMENT),"error parsing set element"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ERROR_SETTING_CIPHER_PARAMS),"error setting cipher params"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_EXPECTING_AN_INTEGER) ,"expecting an integer"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_EXPECTING_AN_OBJECT) ,"expecting an object"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_EXPECTING_A_BOOLEAN) ,"expecting a boolean"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_EXPECTING_A_TIME) ,"expecting a time"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_LENGTH_MISMATCH),"explicit length mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_TAG_NOT_CONSTRUCTED),"explicit tag not constructed"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_FIELD_MISSING) ,"field missing"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_FIRST_NUM_TOO_LARGE) ,"first num too large"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG) ,"header too long"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_BITSTRING_FORMAT),"illegal bitstring format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_BOOLEAN) ,"illegal boolean"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_CHARACTERS) ,"illegal characters"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_FORMAT) ,"illegal format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_HEX) ,"illegal hex"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_IMPLICIT_TAG) ,"illegal implicit tag"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_INTEGER) ,"illegal integer"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NESTED_TAGGING),"illegal nested tagging"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NULL) ,"illegal null"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NULL_VALUE) ,"illegal null value"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OBJECT) ,"illegal object"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONAL_ANY) ,"illegal optional any"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONS_ON_ITEM_TEMPLATE),"illegal options on item template"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TAGGED_ANY) ,"illegal tagged any"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TIME_VALUE) ,"illegal time value"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INTEGER_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT),"integer not ascii format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INTEGER_TOO_LARGE_FOR_LONG),"integer too large for long"}, +{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_BIT_STRING_BITS_LEFT),"invalid bit string bits left"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_BMPSTRING_LENGTH),"invalid bmpstring length"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_DIGIT) ,"invalid digit"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_MIME_TYPE) ,"invalid mime type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_MODIFIER) ,"invalid modifier"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_NUMBER) ,"invalid number"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_OBJECT_ENCODING),"invalid object encoding"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_SEPARATOR) ,"invalid separator"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_TIME_FORMAT) ,"invalid time format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_UNIVERSALSTRING_LENGTH),"invalid universalstring length"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_INVALID_UTF8STRING) ,"invalid utf8string"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_IV_TOO_LARGE) ,"iv too large"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_LENGTH_ERROR) ,"length error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_LIST_ERROR) ,"list error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MIME_NO_CONTENT_TYPE) ,"mime no content type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MIME_PARSE_ERROR) ,"mime parse error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MIME_SIG_PARSE_ERROR) ,"mime sig parse error"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC) ,"missing eoc"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MISSING_SECOND_NUMBER),"missing second number"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MISSING_VALUE) ,"missing value"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL),"mstring not universal"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG) ,"mstring wrong tag"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_STRING) ,"nested asn1 string"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NON_HEX_CHARACTERS) ,"non hex characters"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT) ,"not ascii format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NOT_ENOUGH_DATA) ,"not enough data"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NO_CONTENT_TYPE) ,"no content type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NO_MATCHING_CHOICE_TYPE),"no matching choice type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NO_MULTIPART_BODY_FAILURE),"no multipart body failure"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NO_MULTIPART_BOUNDARY),"no multipart boundary"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NO_SIG_CONTENT_TYPE) ,"no sig content type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_NULL_IS_WRONG_LENGTH) ,"null is wrong length"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_OBJECT_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT),"object not ascii format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_ODD_NUMBER_OF_CHARS) ,"odd number of chars"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_PRIVATE_KEY_HEADER_MISSING),"private key header missing"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_SECOND_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE),"second number too large"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_LENGTH_MISMATCH),"sequence length mismatch"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED),"sequence not constructed"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_OR_SET_NEEDS_CONFIG),"sequence or set needs config"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_SHORT_LINE) ,"short line"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_SIG_INVALID_MIME_TYPE),"sig invalid mime type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_STREAMING_NOT_SUPPORTED),"streaming not supported"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_LONG) ,"string too long"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_STRING_TOO_SHORT) ,"string too short"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TAG_VALUE_TOO_HIGH) ,"tag value too high"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD),"the asn1 object identifier is not known for this md"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TIME_NOT_ASCII_FORMAT),"time not ascii format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TOO_LONG) ,"too long"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED) ,"type not constructed"}, +{ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE) ,"type not primitive"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_RSA_KEY),"unable to decode rsa key"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_RSA_PRIVATE_KEY),"unable to decode rsa private key"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC) ,"unexpected eoc"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNIVERSALSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH),"universalstring is wrong length"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_FORMAT) ,"unknown format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM),"unknown message digest algorithm"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_OBJECT_TYPE) ,"unknown object type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE),"unknown public key type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKNOWN_TAG) ,"unknown tag"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNKOWN_FORMAT) ,"unkown format"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ANY_DEFINED_BY_TYPE),"unsupported any defined by type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER) ,"unsupported cipher"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM),"unsupported encryption algorithm"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_PUBLIC_KEY_TYPE),"unsupported public key type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_UNSUPPORTED_TYPE) ,"unsupported type"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_WRONG_TAG) ,"wrong tag"}, {ERR_REASON(ASN1_R_WRONG_TYPE) ,"wrong type"}, {0,NULL} }; #endif void ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (ERR_func_error_string(ASN1_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) { ERR_load_strings(0,ASN1_str_functs); ERR_load_strings(0,ASN1_str_reasons); } #endif } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/asn1/tasn_dec.c (revision 276859) @@ -1,1343 +1,1351 @@ /* tasn_dec.c */ /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL * project 2000. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 2000-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include static int asn1_check_eoc(const unsigned char **in, long len); static int asn1_find_end(const unsigned char **in, long len, char inf); static int asn1_collect(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **in, long len, char inf, int tag, int aclass, int depth); static int collect_data(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **p, long plen); static int asn1_check_tlen(long *olen, int *otag, unsigned char *oclass, char *inf, char *cst, const unsigned char **in, long len, int exptag, int expclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx); static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx); static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx); static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx); /* Table to convert tags to bit values, used for MSTRING type */ static const unsigned long tag2bit[32] = { 0, 0, 0, B_ASN1_BIT_STRING, /* tags 0 - 3 */ B_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0, 0, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,/* tags 4- 7 */ B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,/* tags 8-11 */ B_ASN1_UTF8STRING,B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,/* tags 12-15 */ B_ASN1_SEQUENCE,0,B_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING,B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING, /* tags 16-19 */ B_ASN1_T61STRING,B_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING,B_ASN1_IA5STRING, /* tags 20-22 */ B_ASN1_UTCTIME, B_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, /* tags 23-24 */ B_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING,B_ASN1_ISO64STRING,B_ASN1_GENERALSTRING, /* tags 25-27 */ B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING,B_ASN1_UNKNOWN,B_ASN1_BMPSTRING,B_ASN1_UNKNOWN, /* tags 28-31 */ }; unsigned long ASN1_tag2bit(int tag) { if ((tag < 0) || (tag > 30)) return 0; return tag2bit[tag]; } /* Macro to initialize and invalidate the cache */ #define asn1_tlc_clear(c) if (c) (c)->valid = 0 /* Decode an ASN1 item, this currently behaves just * like a standard 'd2i' function. 'in' points to * a buffer to read the data from, in future we will * have more advanced versions that can input data * a piece at a time and this will simply be a special * case. */ ASN1_VALUE *ASN1_item_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { ASN1_TLC c; ASN1_VALUE *ptmpval = NULL; if (!pval) pval = &ptmpval; c.valid = 0; if (ASN1_item_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, -1, 0, 0, &c) > 0) return *pval; return NULL; } int ASN1_template_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt) { ASN1_TLC c; c.valid = 0; return asn1_template_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, tt, 0, &c); } /* Decode an item, taking care of IMPLICIT tagging, if any. * If 'opt' set and tag mismatch return -1 to handle OPTIONAL */ int ASN1_item_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, *errtt = NULL; const ASN1_COMPAT_FUNCS *cf; const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS *ef; const ASN1_AUX *aux = it->funcs; ASN1_aux_cb *asn1_cb; const unsigned char *p = NULL, *q; unsigned char *wp=NULL; /* BIG FAT WARNING! BREAKS CONST WHERE USED */ unsigned char imphack = 0, oclass; char seq_eoc, seq_nolen, cst, isopt; long tmplen; int i; int otag; int ret = 0; ASN1_VALUE **pchptr, *ptmpval; if (!pval) return 0; if (aux && aux->asn1_cb) asn1_cb = aux->asn1_cb; else asn1_cb = 0; switch(it->itype) { case ASN1_ITYPE_PRIMITIVE: if (it->templates) { /* tagging or OPTIONAL is currently illegal on an item * template because the flags can't get passed down. * In practice this isn't a problem: we include the * relevant flags from the item template in the * template itself. */ if ((tag != -1) || opt) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONS_ON_ITEM_TEMPLATE); goto err; } return asn1_template_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it->templates, opt, ctx); } return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx); break; case ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING: p = *in; /* Just read in tag and class */ ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, &otag, &oclass, NULL, NULL, &p, len, -1, 0, 1, ctx); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } /* Must be UNIVERSAL class */ if (oclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { /* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */ if (opt) return -1; ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_NOT_UNIVERSAL); goto err; } /* Check tag matches bit map */ if (!(ASN1_tag2bit(otag) & it->utype)) { /* If OPTIONAL, assume this is OK */ if (opt) return -1; ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MSTRING_WRONG_TAG); goto err; } return asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(pval, in, len, it, otag, 0, 0, ctx); case ASN1_ITYPE_EXTERN: /* Use new style d2i */ ef = it->funcs; return ef->asn1_ex_d2i(pval, in, len, it, tag, aclass, opt, ctx); case ASN1_ITYPE_COMPAT: /* we must resort to old style evil hackery */ cf = it->funcs; /* If OPTIONAL see if it is there */ if (opt) { int exptag; p = *in; if (tag == -1) exptag = it->utype; else exptag = tag; /* Don't care about anything other than presence * of expected tag */ ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &p, len, exptag, aclass, 1, ctx); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } if (ret == -1) return -1; } /* This is the old style evil hack IMPLICIT handling: * since the underlying code is expecting a tag and * class other than the one present we change the * buffer temporarily then change it back afterwards. * This doesn't and never did work for tags > 30. * * Yes this is *horrible* but it is only needed for * old style d2i which will hopefully not be around * for much longer. * FIXME: should copy the buffer then modify it so * the input buffer can be const: we should *always* * copy because the old style d2i might modify the * buffer. */ if (tag != -1) { wp = *(unsigned char **)in; imphack = *wp; if (p == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } *wp = (unsigned char)((*p & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) | it->utype); } ptmpval = cf->asn1_d2i(pval, in, len); if (tag != -1) *wp = imphack; if (ptmpval) return 1; ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; case ASN1_ITYPE_CHOICE: if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it)) goto auxerr; /* Allocate structure */ if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } /* CHOICE type, try each possibility in turn */ p = *in; for (i = 0, tt=it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) { pchptr = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, tt); /* We mark field as OPTIONAL so its absence * can be recognised. */ ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pchptr, &p, len, tt, 1, ctx); /* If field not present, try the next one */ if (ret == -1) continue; /* If positive return, read OK, break loop */ if (ret > 0) break; /* Otherwise must be an ASN1 parsing error */ errtt = tt; ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } /* Did we fall off the end without reading anything? */ if (i == it->tcount) { /* If OPTIONAL, this is OK */ if (opt) { /* Free and zero it */ ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it); return -1; } ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_NO_MATCHING_CHOICE_TYPE); goto err; } asn1_set_choice_selector(pval, i, it); *in = p; if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it)) goto auxerr; return 1; case ASN1_ITYPE_NDEF_SEQUENCE: case ASN1_ITYPE_SEQUENCE: p = *in; tmplen = len; /* If no IMPLICIT tagging set to SEQUENCE, UNIVERSAL */ if (tag == -1) { tag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE; aclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL; } /* Get SEQUENCE length and update len, p */ ret = asn1_check_tlen(&len, NULL, NULL, &seq_eoc, &cst, &p, len, tag, aclass, opt, ctx); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } else if (ret == -1) return -1; if (aux && (aux->flags & ASN1_AFLG_BROKEN)) { len = tmplen - (p - *in); seq_nolen = 1; } /* If indefinite we don't do a length check */ else seq_nolen = seq_eoc; if (!cst) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED); goto err; } if (!*pval && !ASN1_item_ex_new(pval, it)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_PRE, pval, it)) goto auxerr; /* Get each field entry */ for (i = 0, tt = it->templates; i < it->tcount; i++, tt++) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt; ASN1_VALUE **pseqval; seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1); if (!seqtt) goto err; pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt); /* Have we ran out of data? */ if (!len) break; q = p; if (asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) { if (!seq_eoc) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC); goto err; } len -= p - q; seq_eoc = 0; q = p; break; } /* This determines the OPTIONAL flag value. The field * cannot be omitted if it is the last of a SEQUENCE * and there is still data to be read. This isn't * strictly necessary but it increases efficiency in * some cases. */ if (i == (it->tcount - 1)) isopt = 0; else isopt = (char)(seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL); /* attempt to read in field, allowing each to be * OPTIONAL */ ret = asn1_template_ex_d2i(pseqval, &p, len, seqtt, isopt, ctx); if (!ret) { errtt = seqtt; goto err; } else if (ret == -1) { /* OPTIONAL component absent. * Free and zero the field. */ ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt); continue; } /* Update length */ len -= p - q; } /* Check for EOC if expecting one */ if (seq_eoc && !asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC); goto err; } /* Check all data read */ if (!seq_nolen && len) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_SEQUENCE_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } /* If we get here we've got no more data in the SEQUENCE, * however we may not have read all fields so check all * remaining are OPTIONAL and clear any that are. */ for (; i < it->tcount; tt++, i++) { const ASN1_TEMPLATE *seqtt; seqtt = asn1_do_adb(pval, tt, 1); if (!seqtt) goto err; if (seqtt->flags & ASN1_TFLG_OPTIONAL) { ASN1_VALUE **pseqval; pseqval = asn1_get_field_ptr(pval, seqtt); ASN1_template_free(pseqval, seqtt); } else { errtt = seqtt; ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_FIELD_MISSING); goto err; } } /* Save encoding */ if (!asn1_enc_save(pval, *in, p - *in, it)) goto auxerr; *in = p; if (asn1_cb && !asn1_cb(ASN1_OP_D2I_POST, pval, it)) goto auxerr; return 1; default: return 0; } auxerr: ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_ITEM_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_AUX_ERROR); err: ASN1_item_ex_free(pval, it); if (errtt) ERR_add_error_data(4, "Field=", errtt->field_name, ", Type=", it->sname); else ERR_add_error_data(2, "Type=", it->sname); return 0; } /* Templates are handled with two separate functions. * One handles any EXPLICIT tag and the other handles the rest. */ static int asn1_template_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val, const unsigned char **in, long inlen, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx) { int flags, aclass; int ret; long len; const unsigned char *p, *q; char exp_eoc; if (!val) return 0; flags = tt->flags; aclass = flags & ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS; p = *in; /* Check if EXPLICIT tag expected */ if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG) { char cst; /* Need to work out amount of data available to the inner * content and where it starts: so read in EXPLICIT header to * get the info. */ ret = asn1_check_tlen(&len, NULL, NULL, &exp_eoc, &cst, &p, inlen, tt->tag, aclass, opt, ctx); q = p; if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); return 0; } else if (ret == -1) return -1; if (!cst) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_TAG_NOT_CONSTRUCTED); return 0; } /* We've found the field so it can't be OPTIONAL now */ ret = asn1_template_noexp_d2i(val, &p, len, tt, 0, ctx); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); return 0; } /* We read the field in OK so update length */ len -= p - q; if (exp_eoc) { /* If NDEF we must have an EOC here */ if (!asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC); goto err; } } else { /* Otherwise we must hit the EXPLICIT tag end or its * an error */ if (len) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_EX_D2I, ASN1_R_EXPLICIT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } } } else return asn1_template_noexp_d2i(val, in, inlen, tt, opt, ctx); *in = p; return 1; err: ASN1_template_free(val, tt); return 0; } static int asn1_template_noexp_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_TEMPLATE *tt, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx) { int flags, aclass; int ret; const unsigned char *p, *q; if (!val) return 0; flags = tt->flags; aclass = flags & ASN1_TFLG_TAG_CLASS; p = *in; q = p; if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SK_MASK) { /* SET OF, SEQUENCE OF */ int sktag, skaclass; char sk_eoc; /* First work out expected inner tag value */ if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_IMPTAG) { sktag = tt->tag; skaclass = aclass; } else { skaclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL; if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF) sktag = V_ASN1_SET; else sktag = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE; } /* Get the tag */ ret = asn1_check_tlen(&len, NULL, NULL, &sk_eoc, NULL, &p, len, sktag, skaclass, opt, ctx); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); return 0; } else if (ret == -1) return -1; if (!*val) *val = (ASN1_VALUE *)sk_new_null(); else { /* We've got a valid STACK: free up any items present */ STACK *sktmp = (STACK *)*val; ASN1_VALUE *vtmp; while(sk_num(sktmp) > 0) { vtmp = (ASN1_VALUE *)sk_pop(sktmp); ASN1_item_ex_free(&vtmp, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item)); } } if (!*val) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Read as many items as we can */ while(len > 0) { ASN1_VALUE *skfield; q = p; /* See if EOC found */ if (asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) { if (!sk_eoc) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC); goto err; } len -= p - q; sk_eoc = 0; break; } skfield = NULL; if (!ASN1_item_ex_d2i(&skfield, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, 0, 0, ctx)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } len -= p - q; if (!sk_push((STACK *)*val, (char *)skfield)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (sk_eoc) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC); goto err; } } else if (flags & ASN1_TFLG_IMPTAG) { /* IMPLICIT tagging */ ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), tt->tag, aclass, opt, ctx); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } else if (ret == -1) return -1; } else { /* Nothing special */ ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(val, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_ptr(tt->item), -1, 0, opt, ctx); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_TEMPLATE_NOEXP_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } else if (ret == -1) return -1; } *in = p; return 1; err: ASN1_template_free(val, tt); return 0; } static int asn1_d2i_ex_primitive(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char **in, long inlen, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx) { int ret = 0, utype; long plen; char cst, inf, free_cont = 0; const unsigned char *p; BUF_MEM buf; const unsigned char *cont = NULL; long len; if (!pval) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_NULL); return 0; /* Should never happen */ } if (it->itype == ASN1_ITYPE_MSTRING) { utype = tag; tag = -1; } else utype = it->utype; if (utype == V_ASN1_ANY) { /* If type is ANY need to figure out type from tag */ unsigned char oclass; if (tag >= 0) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_TAGGED_ANY); return 0; } if (opt) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ASN1_R_ILLEGAL_OPTIONAL_ANY); return 0; } p = *in; ret = asn1_check_tlen(NULL, &utype, &oclass, NULL, NULL, &p, inlen, -1, 0, 0, ctx); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); return 0; } if (oclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) utype = V_ASN1_OTHER; } if (tag == -1) { tag = utype; aclass = V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL; } p = *in; /* Check header */ ret = asn1_check_tlen(&plen, NULL, NULL, &inf, &cst, &p, inlen, tag, aclass, opt, ctx); if (!ret) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); return 0; } else if (ret == -1) return -1; ret = 0; /* SEQUENCE, SET and "OTHER" are left in encoded form */ if ((utype == V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) || (utype == V_ASN1_SET) || (utype == V_ASN1_OTHER)) { /* Clear context cache for type OTHER because the auto clear * when we have a exact match wont work */ if (utype == V_ASN1_OTHER) { asn1_tlc_clear(ctx); } /* SEQUENCE and SET must be constructed */ else if (!cst) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_CONSTRUCTED); return 0; } cont = *in; /* If indefinite length constructed find the real end */ if (inf) { if (!asn1_find_end(&p, plen, inf)) goto err; len = p - cont; } else { len = p - cont + plen; p += plen; buf.data = NULL; } } else if (cst) { + if (utype == V_ASN1_NULL || utype == V_ASN1_BOOLEAN + || utype == V_ASN1_OBJECT || utype == V_ASN1_INTEGER + || utype == V_ASN1_ENUMERATED) + { + ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, + ASN1_R_TYPE_NOT_PRIMITIVE); + return 0; + } buf.length = 0; buf.max = 0; buf.data = NULL; /* Should really check the internal tags are correct but * some things may get this wrong. The relevant specs * say that constructed string types should be OCTET STRINGs * internally irrespective of the type. So instead just check * for UNIVERSAL class and ignore the tag. */ if (!asn1_collect(&buf, &p, plen, inf, -1, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL, 0)) { free_cont = 1; goto err; } len = buf.length; /* Append a final null to string */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(&buf, len + 1)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_D2I_EX_PRIMITIVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } buf.data[len] = 0; cont = (const unsigned char *)buf.data; free_cont = 1; } else { cont = p; len = plen; p += plen; } /* We now have content length and type: translate into a structure */ if (!asn1_ex_c2i(pval, cont, len, utype, &free_cont, it)) goto err; *in = p; ret = 1; err: if (free_cont && buf.data) OPENSSL_free(buf.data); return ret; } /* Translate ASN1 content octets into a structure */ int asn1_ex_c2i(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const unsigned char *cont, int len, int utype, char *free_cont, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { ASN1_VALUE **opval = NULL; ASN1_STRING *stmp; ASN1_TYPE *typ = NULL; int ret = 0; const ASN1_PRIMITIVE_FUNCS *pf; ASN1_INTEGER **tint; pf = it->funcs; if (pf && pf->prim_c2i) return pf->prim_c2i(pval, cont, len, utype, free_cont, it); /* If ANY type clear type and set pointer to internal value */ if (it->utype == V_ASN1_ANY) { if (!*pval) { typ = ASN1_TYPE_new(); if (typ == NULL) goto err; *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)typ; } else typ = (ASN1_TYPE *)*pval; if (utype != typ->type) ASN1_TYPE_set(typ, utype, NULL); opval = pval; pval = &typ->value.asn1_value; } switch(utype) { case V_ASN1_OBJECT: if (!c2i_ASN1_OBJECT((ASN1_OBJECT **)pval, &cont, len)) goto err; break; case V_ASN1_NULL: if (len) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ASN1_R_NULL_IS_WRONG_LENGTH); goto err; } *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)1; break; case V_ASN1_BOOLEAN: if (len != 1) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ASN1_R_BOOLEAN_IS_WRONG_LENGTH); goto err; } else { ASN1_BOOLEAN *tbool; tbool = (ASN1_BOOLEAN *)pval; *tbool = *cont; } break; case V_ASN1_BIT_STRING: if (!c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING((ASN1_BIT_STRING **)pval, &cont, len)) goto err; break; case V_ASN1_INTEGER: case V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER: case V_ASN1_ENUMERATED: case V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED: tint = (ASN1_INTEGER **)pval; if (!c2i_ASN1_INTEGER(tint, &cont, len)) goto err; /* Fixup type to match the expected form */ (*tint)->type = utype | ((*tint)->type & V_ASN1_NEG); break; case V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING: case V_ASN1_NUMERICSTRING: case V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING: case V_ASN1_T61STRING: case V_ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING: case V_ASN1_IA5STRING: case V_ASN1_UTCTIME: case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME: case V_ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING: case V_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING: case V_ASN1_GENERALSTRING: case V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING: case V_ASN1_BMPSTRING: case V_ASN1_UTF8STRING: case V_ASN1_OTHER: case V_ASN1_SET: case V_ASN1_SEQUENCE: default: if (utype == V_ASN1_BMPSTRING && (len & 1)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ASN1_R_BMPSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH); goto err; } if (utype == V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING && (len & 3)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ASN1_R_UNIVERSALSTRING_IS_WRONG_LENGTH); goto err; } /* All based on ASN1_STRING and handled the same */ if (!*pval) { stmp = ASN1_STRING_type_new(utype); if (!stmp) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)stmp; } else { stmp = (ASN1_STRING *)*pval; stmp->type = utype; } /* If we've already allocated a buffer use it */ if (*free_cont) { if (stmp->data) OPENSSL_free(stmp->data); stmp->data = (unsigned char *)cont; /* UGLY CAST! RL */ stmp->length = len; *free_cont = 0; } else { if (!ASN1_STRING_set(stmp, cont, len)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_EX_C2I, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ASN1_STRING_free(stmp); *pval = NULL; goto err; } } break; } /* If ASN1_ANY and NULL type fix up value */ if (typ && (utype == V_ASN1_NULL)) typ->value.ptr = NULL; ret = 1; err: if (!ret) { ASN1_TYPE_free(typ); if (opval) *opval = NULL; } return ret; } /* This function finds the end of an ASN1 structure when passed its maximum * length, whether it is indefinite length and a pointer to the content. * This is more efficient than calling asn1_collect because it does not * recurse on each indefinite length header. */ static int asn1_find_end(const unsigned char **in, long len, char inf) { int expected_eoc; long plen; const unsigned char *p = *in, *q; /* If not indefinite length constructed just add length */ if (inf == 0) { *in += len; return 1; } expected_eoc = 1; /* Indefinite length constructed form. Find the end when enough EOCs * are found. If more indefinite length constructed headers * are encountered increment the expected eoc count otherwise just * skip to the end of the data. */ while (len > 0) { if(asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) { expected_eoc--; if (expected_eoc == 0) break; len -= 2; continue; } q = p; /* Just read in a header: only care about the length */ if(!asn1_check_tlen(&plen, NULL, NULL, &inf, NULL, &p, len, -1, 0, 0, NULL)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_FIND_END, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); return 0; } if (inf) expected_eoc++; else p += plen; len -= p - q; } if (expected_eoc) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_FIND_END, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC); return 0; } *in = p; return 1; } /* This function collects the asn1 data from a constructred string * type into a buffer. The values of 'in' and 'len' should refer * to the contents of the constructed type and 'inf' should be set * if it is indefinite length. */ #ifndef ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST /* This determines how many levels of recursion are permitted in ASN1 * string types. If it is not limited stack overflows can occur. If set * to zero no recursion is allowed at all. Although zero should be adequate * examples exist that require a value of 1. So 5 should be more than enough. */ #define ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST 5 #endif static int asn1_collect(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **in, long len, char inf, int tag, int aclass, int depth) { const unsigned char *p, *q; long plen; char cst, ininf; p = *in; inf &= 1; /* If no buffer and not indefinite length constructed just pass over * the encoded data */ if (!buf && !inf) { *in += len; return 1; } while(len > 0) { q = p; /* Check for EOC */ if (asn1_check_eoc(&p, len)) { /* EOC is illegal outside indefinite length * constructed form */ if (!inf) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT, ASN1_R_UNEXPECTED_EOC); return 0; } inf = 0; break; } if (!asn1_check_tlen(&plen, NULL, NULL, &ininf, &cst, &p, len, tag, aclass, 0, NULL)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); return 0; } /* If indefinite length constructed update max length */ if (cst) { if (depth >= ASN1_MAX_STRING_NEST) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT, ASN1_R_NESTED_ASN1_STRING); return 0; } if (!asn1_collect(buf, &p, plen, ininf, tag, aclass, depth + 1)) return 0; } else if (plen && !collect_data(buf, &p, plen)) return 0; len -= p - q; } if (inf) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_COLLECT, ASN1_R_MISSING_EOC); return 0; } *in = p; return 1; } static int collect_data(BUF_MEM *buf, const unsigned char **p, long plen) { int len; if (buf) { len = buf->length; if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, len + plen)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_COLLECT_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } memcpy(buf->data + len, *p, plen); } *p += plen; return 1; } /* Check for ASN1 EOC and swallow it if found */ static int asn1_check_eoc(const unsigned char **in, long len) { const unsigned char *p; if (len < 2) return 0; p = *in; if (!p[0] && !p[1]) { *in += 2; return 1; } return 0; } /* Check an ASN1 tag and length: a bit like ASN1_get_object * but it sets the length for indefinite length constructed * form, we don't know the exact length but we can set an * upper bound to the amount of data available minus the * header length just read. */ static int asn1_check_tlen(long *olen, int *otag, unsigned char *oclass, char *inf, char *cst, const unsigned char **in, long len, int exptag, int expclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx) { int i; int ptag, pclass; long plen; const unsigned char *p, *q; p = *in; q = p; if (ctx && ctx->valid) { i = ctx->ret; plen = ctx->plen; pclass = ctx->pclass; ptag = ctx->ptag; p += ctx->hdrlen; } else { i = ASN1_get_object(&p, &plen, &ptag, &pclass, len); if (ctx) { ctx->ret = i; ctx->plen = plen; ctx->pclass = pclass; ctx->ptag = ptag; ctx->hdrlen = p - q; ctx->valid = 1; /* If definite length, and no error, length + * header can't exceed total amount of data available. */ if (!(i & 0x81) && ((plen + ctx->hdrlen) > len)) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CHECK_TLEN, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG); asn1_tlc_clear(ctx); return 0; } } } if (i & 0x80) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CHECK_TLEN, ASN1_R_BAD_OBJECT_HEADER); asn1_tlc_clear(ctx); return 0; } if (exptag >= 0) { if ((exptag != ptag) || (expclass != pclass)) { /* If type is OPTIONAL, not an error: * indicate missing type. */ if (opt) return -1; asn1_tlc_clear(ctx); ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_CHECK_TLEN, ASN1_R_WRONG_TAG); return 0; } /* We have a tag and class match: * assume we are going to do something with it */ asn1_tlc_clear(ctx); } if (i & 1) plen = len - (p - q); if (inf) *inf = i & 1; if (cst) *cst = i & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED; if (olen) *olen = plen; if (oclass) *oclass = pclass; if (otag) *otag = ptag; *in = p; return 1; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/asn1/x_algor.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/asn1/x_algor.c (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/asn1/x_algor.c (revision 276859) @@ -1,130 +1,140 @@ /* x_algor.c */ /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL * project 2000. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include #include #include ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_ALGOR) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_ALGOR, algorithm, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_OPT(X509_ALGOR, parameter, ASN1_ANY) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_ALGOR) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(X509_ALGORS) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, algorithms, X509_ALGOR) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(X509_ALGORS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_ALGOR) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_fname(X509_ALGORS, X509_ALGORS, X509_ALGORS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_ALGOR) IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ALGOR) int X509_ALGOR_set0(X509_ALGOR *alg, ASN1_OBJECT *aobj, int ptype, void *pval) { if (!alg) return 0; if (ptype != V_ASN1_UNDEF) { if (alg->parameter == NULL) alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new(); if (alg->parameter == NULL) return 0; } if (alg) { if (alg->algorithm) ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg->algorithm); alg->algorithm = aobj; } if (ptype == 0) return 1; if (ptype == V_ASN1_UNDEF) { if (alg->parameter) { ASN1_TYPE_free(alg->parameter); alg->parameter = NULL; } } else ASN1_TYPE_set(alg->parameter, ptype, pval); return 1; } void X509_ALGOR_get0(ASN1_OBJECT **paobj, int *pptype, void **ppval, X509_ALGOR *algor) { if (paobj) *paobj = algor->algorithm; if (pptype) { if (algor->parameter == NULL) { *pptype = V_ASN1_UNDEF; return; } else *pptype = algor->parameter->type; if (ppval) *ppval = algor->parameter->value.ptr; } } +int X509_ALGOR_cmp(const X509_ALGOR *a, const X509_ALGOR *b) + { + int rv; + rv = OBJ_cmp(a->algorithm, b->algorithm); + if (rv) + return rv; + if (!a->parameter && !b->parameter) + return 0; + return ASN1_TYPE_cmp(a->parameter, b->parameter); + } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/bn/asm/mips3.s =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/bn/asm/mips3.s (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/bn/asm/mips3.s (revision 276859) @@ -1,2201 +1,2201 @@ .rdata .asciiz "mips3.s, Version 1.1" .asciiz "MIPS III/IV ISA artwork by Andy Polyakov " /* * ==================================================================== * Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL * project. * * Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary forms are * granted according to the OpenSSL license. Warranty of any kind is * disclaimed. * ==================================================================== */ /* * This is my modest contributon to the OpenSSL project (see * http://www.openssl.org/ for more information about it) and is * a drop-in MIPS III/IV ISA replacement for crypto/bn/bn_asm.c * module. For updates see http://fy.chalmers.se/~appro/hpe/. * * The module is designed to work with either of the "new" MIPS ABI(5), * namely N32 or N64, offered by IRIX 6.x. It's not ment to work under * IRIX 5.x not only because it doesn't support new ABIs but also * because 5.x kernels put R4x00 CPU into 32-bit mode and all those * 64-bit instructions (daddu, dmultu, etc.) found below gonna only * cause illegal instruction exception:-( * * In addition the code depends on preprocessor flags set up by MIPSpro * compiler driver (either as or cc) and therefore (probably?) can't be * compiled by the GNU assembler. GNU C driver manages fine though... * I mean as long as -mmips-as is specified or is the default option, * because then it simply invokes /usr/bin/as which in turn takes * perfect care of the preprocessor definitions. Another neat feature * offered by the MIPSpro assembler is an optimization pass. This gave * me the opportunity to have the code looking more regular as all those * architecture dependent instruction rescheduling details were left to * the assembler. Cool, huh? * * Performance improvement is astonishing! 'apps/openssl speed rsa dsa' * goes way over 3 times faster! * * */ #include #include #if _MIPS_ISA>=4 #define MOVNZ(cond,dst,src) \ movn dst,src,cond #else #define MOVNZ(cond,dst,src) \ .set noreorder; \ bnezl cond,.+8; \ move dst,src; \ .set reorder #endif .text .set noat .set reorder #define MINUS4 v1 .align 5 LEAF(bn_mul_add_words) .set noreorder bgtzl a2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_proceed ld t0,0(a1) jr ra move v0,zero .set reorder .L_bn_mul_add_words_proceed: li MINUS4,-4 and ta0,a2,MINUS4 move v0,zero beqz ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_tail .L_bn_mul_add_words_loop: dmultu t0,a3 ld t1,0(a0) ld t2,8(a1) ld t3,8(a0) ld ta0,16(a1) ld ta1,16(a0) daddu t1,v0 sltu v0,t1,v0 /* All manuals say it "compares 32-bit * values", but it seems to work fine * even on 64-bit registers. */ mflo AT mfhi t0 daddu t1,AT daddu v0,t0 sltu AT,t1,AT sd t1,0(a0) daddu v0,AT dmultu t2,a3 ld ta2,24(a1) ld ta3,24(a0) daddu t3,v0 sltu v0,t3,v0 mflo AT mfhi t2 daddu t3,AT daddu v0,t2 sltu AT,t3,AT sd t3,8(a0) daddu v0,AT dmultu ta0,a3 subu a2,4 PTR_ADD a0,32 PTR_ADD a1,32 daddu ta1,v0 sltu v0,ta1,v0 mflo AT mfhi ta0 daddu ta1,AT daddu v0,ta0 sltu AT,ta1,AT sd ta1,-16(a0) daddu v0,AT dmultu ta2,a3 and ta0,a2,MINUS4 daddu ta3,v0 sltu v0,ta3,v0 mflo AT mfhi ta2 daddu ta3,AT daddu v0,ta2 sltu AT,ta3,AT sd ta3,-8(a0) daddu v0,AT .set noreorder bgtzl ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop ld t0,0(a1) bnezl a2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_tail ld t0,0(a1) .set reorder .L_bn_mul_add_words_return: jr ra .L_bn_mul_add_words_tail: dmultu t0,a3 ld t1,0(a0) subu a2,1 daddu t1,v0 sltu v0,t1,v0 mflo AT mfhi t0 daddu t1,AT daddu v0,t0 sltu AT,t1,AT sd t1,0(a0) daddu v0,AT beqz a2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_return ld t0,8(a1) dmultu t0,a3 ld t1,8(a0) subu a2,1 daddu t1,v0 sltu v0,t1,v0 mflo AT mfhi t0 daddu t1,AT daddu v0,t0 sltu AT,t1,AT sd t1,8(a0) daddu v0,AT beqz a2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_return ld t0,16(a1) dmultu t0,a3 ld t1,16(a0) daddu t1,v0 sltu v0,t1,v0 mflo AT mfhi t0 daddu t1,AT daddu v0,t0 sltu AT,t1,AT sd t1,16(a0) daddu v0,AT jr ra END(bn_mul_add_words) .align 5 LEAF(bn_mul_words) .set noreorder bgtzl a2,.L_bn_mul_words_proceed ld t0,0(a1) jr ra move v0,zero .set reorder .L_bn_mul_words_proceed: li MINUS4,-4 and ta0,a2,MINUS4 move v0,zero beqz ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_tail .L_bn_mul_words_loop: dmultu t0,a3 ld t2,8(a1) ld ta0,16(a1) ld ta2,24(a1) mflo AT mfhi t0 daddu v0,AT sltu t1,v0,AT sd v0,0(a0) daddu v0,t1,t0 dmultu t2,a3 subu a2,4 PTR_ADD a0,32 PTR_ADD a1,32 mflo AT mfhi t2 daddu v0,AT sltu t3,v0,AT sd v0,-24(a0) daddu v0,t3,t2 dmultu ta0,a3 mflo AT mfhi ta0 daddu v0,AT sltu ta1,v0,AT sd v0,-16(a0) daddu v0,ta1,ta0 dmultu ta2,a3 and ta0,a2,MINUS4 mflo AT mfhi ta2 daddu v0,AT sltu ta3,v0,AT sd v0,-8(a0) daddu v0,ta3,ta2 .set noreorder bgtzl ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_loop ld t0,0(a1) bnezl a2,.L_bn_mul_words_tail ld t0,0(a1) .set reorder .L_bn_mul_words_return: jr ra .L_bn_mul_words_tail: dmultu t0,a3 subu a2,1 mflo AT mfhi t0 daddu v0,AT sltu t1,v0,AT sd v0,0(a0) daddu v0,t1,t0 beqz a2,.L_bn_mul_words_return ld t0,8(a1) dmultu t0,a3 subu a2,1 mflo AT mfhi t0 daddu v0,AT sltu t1,v0,AT sd v0,8(a0) daddu v0,t1,t0 beqz a2,.L_bn_mul_words_return ld t0,16(a1) dmultu t0,a3 mflo AT mfhi t0 daddu v0,AT sltu t1,v0,AT sd v0,16(a0) daddu v0,t1,t0 jr ra END(bn_mul_words) .align 5 LEAF(bn_sqr_words) .set noreorder bgtzl a2,.L_bn_sqr_words_proceed ld t0,0(a1) jr ra move v0,zero .set reorder .L_bn_sqr_words_proceed: li MINUS4,-4 and ta0,a2,MINUS4 move v0,zero beqz ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_tail .L_bn_sqr_words_loop: dmultu t0,t0 ld t2,8(a1) ld ta0,16(a1) ld ta2,24(a1) mflo t1 mfhi t0 sd t1,0(a0) sd t0,8(a0) dmultu t2,t2 subu a2,4 PTR_ADD a0,64 PTR_ADD a1,32 mflo t3 mfhi t2 sd t3,-48(a0) sd t2,-40(a0) dmultu ta0,ta0 mflo ta1 mfhi ta0 sd ta1,-32(a0) sd ta0,-24(a0) dmultu ta2,ta2 and ta0,a2,MINUS4 mflo ta3 mfhi ta2 sd ta3,-16(a0) sd ta2,-8(a0) .set noreorder bgtzl ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_loop ld t0,0(a1) bnezl a2,.L_bn_sqr_words_tail ld t0,0(a1) .set reorder .L_bn_sqr_words_return: move v0,zero jr ra .L_bn_sqr_words_tail: dmultu t0,t0 subu a2,1 mflo t1 mfhi t0 sd t1,0(a0) sd t0,8(a0) beqz a2,.L_bn_sqr_words_return ld t0,8(a1) dmultu t0,t0 subu a2,1 mflo t1 mfhi t0 sd t1,16(a0) sd t0,24(a0) beqz a2,.L_bn_sqr_words_return ld t0,16(a1) dmultu t0,t0 mflo t1 mfhi t0 sd t1,32(a0) sd t0,40(a0) jr ra END(bn_sqr_words) .align 5 LEAF(bn_add_words) .set noreorder bgtzl a3,.L_bn_add_words_proceed ld t0,0(a1) jr ra move v0,zero .set reorder .L_bn_add_words_proceed: li MINUS4,-4 and AT,a3,MINUS4 move v0,zero beqz AT,.L_bn_add_words_tail .L_bn_add_words_loop: ld ta0,0(a2) subu a3,4 ld t1,8(a1) and AT,a3,MINUS4 ld t2,16(a1) PTR_ADD a2,32 ld t3,24(a1) PTR_ADD a0,32 ld ta1,-24(a2) PTR_ADD a1,32 ld ta2,-16(a2) ld ta3,-8(a2) daddu ta0,t0 sltu t8,ta0,t0 daddu t0,ta0,v0 sltu v0,t0,ta0 sd t0,-32(a0) daddu v0,t8 daddu ta1,t1 sltu t9,ta1,t1 daddu t1,ta1,v0 sltu v0,t1,ta1 sd t1,-24(a0) daddu v0,t9 daddu ta2,t2 sltu t8,ta2,t2 daddu t2,ta2,v0 sltu v0,t2,ta2 sd t2,-16(a0) daddu v0,t8 daddu ta3,t3 sltu t9,ta3,t3 daddu t3,ta3,v0 sltu v0,t3,ta3 sd t3,-8(a0) daddu v0,t9 .set noreorder bgtzl AT,.L_bn_add_words_loop ld t0,0(a1) bnezl a3,.L_bn_add_words_tail ld t0,0(a1) .set reorder .L_bn_add_words_return: jr ra .L_bn_add_words_tail: ld ta0,0(a2) daddu ta0,t0 subu a3,1 sltu t8,ta0,t0 daddu t0,ta0,v0 sltu v0,t0,ta0 sd t0,0(a0) daddu v0,t8 beqz a3,.L_bn_add_words_return ld t1,8(a1) ld ta1,8(a2) daddu ta1,t1 subu a3,1 sltu t9,ta1,t1 daddu t1,ta1,v0 sltu v0,t1,ta1 sd t1,8(a0) daddu v0,t9 beqz a3,.L_bn_add_words_return ld t2,16(a1) ld ta2,16(a2) daddu ta2,t2 sltu t8,ta2,t2 daddu t2,ta2,v0 sltu v0,t2,ta2 sd t2,16(a0) daddu v0,t8 jr ra END(bn_add_words) .align 5 LEAF(bn_sub_words) .set noreorder bgtzl a3,.L_bn_sub_words_proceed ld t0,0(a1) jr ra move v0,zero .set reorder .L_bn_sub_words_proceed: li MINUS4,-4 and AT,a3,MINUS4 move v0,zero beqz AT,.L_bn_sub_words_tail .L_bn_sub_words_loop: ld ta0,0(a2) subu a3,4 ld t1,8(a1) and AT,a3,MINUS4 ld t2,16(a1) PTR_ADD a2,32 ld t3,24(a1) PTR_ADD a0,32 ld ta1,-24(a2) PTR_ADD a1,32 ld ta2,-16(a2) ld ta3,-8(a2) sltu t8,t0,ta0 dsubu t0,ta0 dsubu ta0,t0,v0 sd ta0,-32(a0) MOVNZ (t0,v0,t8) sltu t9,t1,ta1 dsubu t1,ta1 dsubu ta1,t1,v0 sd ta1,-24(a0) MOVNZ (t1,v0,t9) sltu t8,t2,ta2 dsubu t2,ta2 dsubu ta2,t2,v0 sd ta2,-16(a0) MOVNZ (t2,v0,t8) sltu t9,t3,ta3 dsubu t3,ta3 dsubu ta3,t3,v0 sd ta3,-8(a0) MOVNZ (t3,v0,t9) .set noreorder bgtzl AT,.L_bn_sub_words_loop ld t0,0(a1) bnezl a3,.L_bn_sub_words_tail ld t0,0(a1) .set reorder .L_bn_sub_words_return: jr ra .L_bn_sub_words_tail: ld ta0,0(a2) subu a3,1 sltu t8,t0,ta0 dsubu t0,ta0 dsubu ta0,t0,v0 MOVNZ (t0,v0,t8) sd ta0,0(a0) beqz a3,.L_bn_sub_words_return ld t1,8(a1) subu a3,1 ld ta1,8(a2) sltu t9,t1,ta1 dsubu t1,ta1 dsubu ta1,t1,v0 MOVNZ (t1,v0,t9) sd ta1,8(a0) beqz a3,.L_bn_sub_words_return ld t2,16(a1) ld ta2,16(a2) sltu t8,t2,ta2 dsubu t2,ta2 dsubu ta2,t2,v0 MOVNZ (t2,v0,t8) sd ta2,16(a0) jr ra END(bn_sub_words) #undef MINUS4 .align 5 LEAF(bn_div_3_words) .set reorder move a3,a0 /* we know that bn_div_words doesn't * touch a3, ta2, ta3 and preserves a2 * so that we can save two arguments * and return address in registers * instead of stack:-) */ ld a0,(a3) move ta2,a1 ld a1,-8(a3) bne a0,a2,.L_bn_div_3_words_proceed li v0,-1 jr ra .L_bn_div_3_words_proceed: move ta3,ra bal bn_div_words move ra,ta3 dmultu ta2,v0 ld t2,-16(a3) move ta0,zero mfhi t1 mflo t0 sltu t8,t1,v1 .L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop: bnez t8,.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop_done sgeu AT,t2,t0 seq t9,t1,v1 and AT,t9 sltu t3,t0,ta2 daddu v1,a2 dsubu t1,t3 dsubu t0,ta2 sltu t8,t1,v1 sltu ta0,v1,a2 or t8,ta0 .set noreorder beqzl AT,.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop dsubu v0,1 .set reorder .L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop_done: jr ra END(bn_div_3_words) .align 5 LEAF(bn_div_words) .set noreorder bnezl a2,.L_bn_div_words_proceed move v1,zero jr ra li v0,-1 /* I'd rather signal div-by-zero * which can be done with 'break 7' */ .L_bn_div_words_proceed: bltz a2,.L_bn_div_words_body move t9,v1 dsll a2,1 bgtz a2,.-4 addu t9,1 .set reorder negu t1,t9 li t2,-1 dsll t2,t1 and t2,a0 dsrl AT,a1,t1 .set noreorder bnezl t2,.+8 break 6 /* signal overflow */ .set reorder dsll a0,t9 dsll a1,t9 or a0,AT #define QT ta0 #define HH ta1 #define DH v1 .L_bn_div_words_body: dsrl DH,a2,32 sgeu AT,a0,a2 .set noreorder bnezl AT,.+8 dsubu a0,a2 .set reorder li QT,-1 dsrl HH,a0,32 dsrl QT,32 /* q=0xffffffff */ beq DH,HH,.L_bn_div_words_skip_div1 ddivu zero,a0,DH mflo QT .L_bn_div_words_skip_div1: dmultu a2,QT dsll t3,a0,32 dsrl AT,a1,32 or t3,AT mflo t0 mfhi t1 .L_bn_div_words_inner_loop1: sltu t2,t3,t0 seq t8,HH,t1 sltu AT,HH,t1 and t2,t8 sltu v0,t0,a2 or AT,t2 .set noreorder beqz AT,.L_bn_div_words_inner_loop1_done dsubu t1,v0 dsubu t0,a2 b .L_bn_div_words_inner_loop1 dsubu QT,1 .set reorder .L_bn_div_words_inner_loop1_done: dsll a1,32 dsubu a0,t3,t0 dsll v0,QT,32 li QT,-1 dsrl HH,a0,32 dsrl QT,32 /* q=0xffffffff */ beq DH,HH,.L_bn_div_words_skip_div2 ddivu zero,a0,DH mflo QT .L_bn_div_words_skip_div2: #undef DH dmultu a2,QT dsll t3,a0,32 dsrl AT,a1,32 or t3,AT mflo t0 mfhi t1 .L_bn_div_words_inner_loop2: sltu t2,t3,t0 seq t8,HH,t1 sltu AT,HH,t1 and t2,t8 sltu v1,t0,a2 or AT,t2 .set noreorder beqz AT,.L_bn_div_words_inner_loop2_done dsubu t1,v1 dsubu t0,a2 b .L_bn_div_words_inner_loop2 dsubu QT,1 .set reorder .L_bn_div_words_inner_loop2_done: #undef HH dsubu a0,t3,t0 or v0,QT dsrl v1,a0,t9 /* v1 contains remainder if anybody wants it */ dsrl a2,t9 /* restore a2 */ jr ra #undef QT END(bn_div_words) #define a_0 t0 #define a_1 t1 #define a_2 t2 #define a_3 t3 #define b_0 ta0 #define b_1 ta1 #define b_2 ta2 #define b_3 ta3 #define a_4 s0 #define a_5 s2 #define a_6 s4 #define a_7 a1 /* once we load a[7] we don't need a anymore */ #define b_4 s1 #define b_5 s3 #define b_6 s5 #define b_7 a2 /* once we load b[7] we don't need b anymore */ #define t_1 t8 #define t_2 t9 #define c_1 v0 #define c_2 v1 #define c_3 a3 #define FRAME_SIZE 48 .align 5 LEAF(bn_mul_comba8) .set noreorder PTR_SUB sp,FRAME_SIZE .frame sp,64,ra .set reorder ld a_0,0(a1) /* If compiled with -mips3 option on * R5000 box assembler barks on this * line with "shouldn't have mult/div * as last instruction in bb (R10K * bug)" warning. If anybody out there * has a clue about how to circumvent * this do send me a note. * */ ld b_0,0(a2) ld a_1,8(a1) ld a_2,16(a1) ld a_3,24(a1) ld b_1,8(a2) ld b_2,16(a2) ld b_3,24(a2) dmultu a_0,b_0 /* mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); */ sd s0,0(sp) sd s1,8(sp) sd s2,16(sp) sd s3,24(sp) sd s4,32(sp) sd s5,40(sp) mflo c_1 mfhi c_2 dmultu a_0,b_1 /* mul_add_c(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1); */ ld a_4,32(a1) ld a_5,40(a1) ld a_6,48(a1) ld a_7,56(a1) ld b_4,32(a2) ld b_5,40(a2) mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu c_3,t_2,AT dmultu a_1,b_0 /* mul_add_c(a[1],b[0],c2,c3,c1); */ ld b_6,48(a2) ld b_7,56(a2) sd c_1,0(a0) /* r[0]=c1; */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu c_1,c_3,t_2 sd c_2,8(a0) /* r[1]=c2; */ dmultu a_2,b_0 /* mul_add_c(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 dmultu a_1,b_1 /* mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu c_2,c_1,t_2 dmultu a_0,b_2 /* mul_add_c(a[0],b[2],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT sd c_3,16(a0) /* r[2]=c3; */ dmultu a_0,b_3 /* mul_add_c(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu c_3,c_2,t_2 dmultu a_1,b_2 /* mul_add_c(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT dmultu a_2,b_1 /* mul_add_c(a[2],b[1],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT dmultu a_3,b_0 /* mul_add_c(a[3],b[0],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT sd c_1,24(a0) /* r[3]=c1; */ dmultu a_4,b_0 /* mul_add_c(a[4],b[0],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu c_1,c_3,t_2 dmultu a_3,b_1 /* mul_add_c(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT dmultu a_2,b_2 /* mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT dmultu a_1,b_3 /* mul_add_c(a[1],b[3],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT dmultu a_0,b_4 /* mul_add_c(a[0],b[4],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT sd c_2,32(a0) /* r[4]=c2; */ dmultu a_0,b_5 /* mul_add_c(a[0],b[5],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu c_2,c_1,t_2 dmultu a_1,b_4 /* mul_add_c(a[1],b[4],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT dmultu a_2,b_3 /* mul_add_c(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT dmultu a_3,b_2 /* mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT dmultu a_4,b_1 /* mul_add_c(a[4],b[1],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT dmultu a_5,b_0 /* mul_add_c(a[5],b[0],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT sd c_3,40(a0) /* r[5]=c3; */ dmultu a_6,b_0 /* mul_add_c(a[6],b[0],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu c_3,c_2,t_2 dmultu a_5,b_1 /* mul_add_c(a[5],b[1],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT dmultu a_4,b_2 /* mul_add_c(a[4],b[2],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT dmultu a_3,b_3 /* mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT dmultu a_2,b_4 /* mul_add_c(a[2],b[4],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT dmultu a_1,b_5 /* mul_add_c(a[1],b[5],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT dmultu a_0,b_6 /* mul_add_c(a[0],b[6],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT sd c_1,48(a0) /* r[6]=c1; */ dmultu a_0,b_7 /* mul_add_c(a[0],b[7],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu c_1,c_3,t_2 dmultu a_1,b_6 /* mul_add_c(a[1],b[6],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT dmultu a_2,b_5 /* mul_add_c(a[2],b[5],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT dmultu a_3,b_4 /* mul_add_c(a[3],b[4],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT dmultu a_4,b_3 /* mul_add_c(a[4],b[3],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT dmultu a_5,b_2 /* mul_add_c(a[5],b[2],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT dmultu a_6,b_1 /* mul_add_c(a[6],b[1],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT dmultu a_7,b_0 /* mul_add_c(a[7],b[0],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT sd c_2,56(a0) /* r[7]=c2; */ dmultu a_7,b_1 /* mul_add_c(a[7],b[1],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu c_2,c_1,t_2 dmultu a_6,b_2 /* mul_add_c(a[6],b[2],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT dmultu a_5,b_3 /* mul_add_c(a[5],b[3],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT dmultu a_4,b_4 /* mul_add_c(a[4],b[4],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT dmultu a_3,b_5 /* mul_add_c(a[3],b[5],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT dmultu a_2,b_6 /* mul_add_c(a[2],b[6],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT dmultu a_1,b_7 /* mul_add_c(a[1],b[7],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT sd c_3,64(a0) /* r[8]=c3; */ dmultu a_2,b_7 /* mul_add_c(a[2],b[7],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu c_3,c_2,t_2 dmultu a_3,b_6 /* mul_add_c(a[3],b[6],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT dmultu a_4,b_5 /* mul_add_c(a[4],b[5],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT dmultu a_5,b_4 /* mul_add_c(a[5],b[4],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT dmultu a_6,b_3 /* mul_add_c(a[6],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT dmultu a_7,b_2 /* mul_add_c(a[7],b[2],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT sd c_1,72(a0) /* r[9]=c1; */ dmultu a_7,b_3 /* mul_add_c(a[7],b[3],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu c_1,c_3,t_2 dmultu a_6,b_4 /* mul_add_c(a[6],b[4],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT dmultu a_5,b_5 /* mul_add_c(a[5],b[5],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT dmultu a_4,b_6 /* mul_add_c(a[4],b[6],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT dmultu a_3,b_7 /* mul_add_c(a[3],b[7],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT sd c_2,80(a0) /* r[10]=c2; */ dmultu a_4,b_7 /* mul_add_c(a[4],b[7],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu c_2,c_1,t_2 dmultu a_5,b_6 /* mul_add_c(a[5],b[6],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT dmultu a_6,b_5 /* mul_add_c(a[6],b[5],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT dmultu a_7,b_4 /* mul_add_c(a[7],b[4],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT sd c_3,88(a0) /* r[11]=c3; */ dmultu a_7,b_5 /* mul_add_c(a[7],b[5],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu c_3,c_2,t_2 dmultu a_6,b_6 /* mul_add_c(a[6],b[6],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT dmultu a_5,b_7 /* mul_add_c(a[5],b[7],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT sd c_1,96(a0) /* r[12]=c1; */ dmultu a_6,b_7 /* mul_add_c(a[6],b[7],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu c_1,c_3,t_2 dmultu a_7,b_6 /* mul_add_c(a[7],b[6],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT sd c_2,104(a0) /* r[13]=c2; */ dmultu a_7,b_7 /* mul_add_c(a[7],b[7],c3,c1,c2); */ ld s0,0(sp) ld s1,8(sp) ld s2,16(sp) ld s3,24(sp) ld s4,32(sp) ld s5,40(sp) mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sd c_3,112(a0) /* r[14]=c3; */ sd c_1,120(a0) /* r[15]=c1; */ PTR_ADD sp,FRAME_SIZE jr ra END(bn_mul_comba8) .align 5 LEAF(bn_mul_comba4) .set reorder ld a_0,0(a1) ld b_0,0(a2) ld a_1,8(a1) ld a_2,16(a1) dmultu a_0,b_0 /* mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); */ ld a_3,24(a1) ld b_1,8(a2) ld b_2,16(a2) ld b_3,24(a2) mflo c_1 mfhi c_2 sd c_1,0(a0) dmultu a_0,b_1 /* mul_add_c(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu c_3,t_2,AT dmultu a_1,b_0 /* mul_add_c(a[1],b[0],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu c_1,c_3,t_2 sd c_2,8(a0) dmultu a_2,b_0 /* mul_add_c(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 dmultu a_1,b_1 /* mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu c_2,c_1,t_2 dmultu a_0,b_2 /* mul_add_c(a[0],b[2],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT sd c_3,16(a0) dmultu a_0,b_3 /* mul_add_c(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu c_3,c_2,t_2 dmultu a_1,b_2 /* mul_add_c(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT dmultu a_2,b_1 /* mul_add_c(a[2],b[1],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT dmultu a_3,b_0 /* mul_add_c(a[3],b[0],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT sd c_1,24(a0) dmultu a_3,b_1 /* mul_add_c(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu c_1,c_3,t_2 dmultu a_2,b_2 /* mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT dmultu a_1,b_3 /* mul_add_c(a[1],b[3],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT sd c_2,32(a0) dmultu a_2,b_3 /* mul_add_c(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu c_2,c_1,t_2 dmultu a_3,b_2 /* mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT sd c_3,40(a0) dmultu a_3,b_3 /* mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sd c_1,48(a0) sd c_2,56(a0) jr ra END(bn_mul_comba4) #undef a_4 #undef a_5 #undef a_6 #undef a_7 #define a_4 b_0 #define a_5 b_1 #define a_6 b_2 #define a_7 b_3 .align 5 LEAF(bn_sqr_comba8) .set reorder ld a_0,0(a1) ld a_1,8(a1) ld a_2,16(a1) ld a_3,24(a1) dmultu a_0,a_0 /* mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); */ ld a_4,32(a1) ld a_5,40(a1) ld a_6,48(a1) ld a_7,56(a1) mflo c_1 mfhi c_2 sd c_1,0(a0) dmultu a_0,a_1 /* mul_add_c2(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 slt c_1,t_2,zero dsll t_2,1 slt a2,t_1,zero daddu t_2,a2 dsll t_1,1 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu c_3,t_2,AT sd c_2,8(a0) dmultu a_2,a_0 /* mul_add_c2(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt c_2,t_2,zero - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_3,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_3,t_1 + daddu c_1,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu c_2,c_1,AT daddu c_1,t_2 - sltu AT,c_1,t_2 - daddu c_2,AT + sltu t_2,c_1,t_2 + daddu c_2,t_2 dmultu a_1,a_1 /* mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT sd c_3,16(a0) dmultu a_0,a_3 /* mul_add_c2(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt c_3,t_2,zero - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_1,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_1,t_1 + daddu c_2,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu c_3,c_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 - sltu AT,c_2,t_2 - daddu c_3,AT + sltu t_2,c_2,t_2 + daddu c_3,t_2 dmultu a_1,a_2 /* mul_add_c2(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt AT,t_2,zero - daddu c_3,AT - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_1,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_1,t_1 + daddu c_2,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu AT,c_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 - sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT + sltu t_2,c_2,t_2 + daddu c_3,t_2 sd c_1,24(a0) dmultu a_4,a_0 /* mul_add_c2(a[4],b[0],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt c_1,t_2,zero - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_2,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_2,t_1 + daddu c_3,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu c_1,c_3,AT daddu c_3,t_2 - sltu AT,c_3,t_2 - daddu c_1,AT + sltu t_2,c_3,t_2 + daddu c_1,t_2 dmultu a_3,a_1 /* mul_add_c2(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt AT,t_2,zero - daddu c_1,AT - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_2,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_2,t_1 + daddu c_3,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu AT,c_3,AT daddu c_3,t_2 - sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT + sltu t_2,c_3,t_2 + daddu c_1,t_2 dmultu a_2,a_2 /* mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT sd c_2,32(a0) dmultu a_0,a_5 /* mul_add_c2(a[0],b[5],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt c_2,t_2,zero - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_3,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_3,t_1 + daddu c_1,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu c_2,c_1,AT daddu c_1,t_2 - sltu AT,c_1,t_2 - daddu c_2,AT + sltu t_2,c_1,t_2 + daddu c_2,t_2 dmultu a_1,a_4 /* mul_add_c2(a[1],b[4],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt AT,t_2,zero - daddu c_2,AT - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_3,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_3,t_1 + daddu c_1,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu AT,c_1,AT daddu c_1,t_2 - sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT + sltu t_2,c_1,t_2 + daddu c_2,t_2 dmultu a_2,a_3 /* mul_add_c2(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt AT,t_2,zero - daddu c_2,AT - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_3,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_3,t_1 + daddu c_1,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu AT,c_1,AT daddu c_1,t_2 - sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT + sltu t_2,c_1,t_2 + daddu c_2,t_2 sd c_3,40(a0) dmultu a_6,a_0 /* mul_add_c2(a[6],b[0],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt c_3,t_2,zero - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_1,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_1,t_1 + daddu c_2,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu c_3,c_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 - sltu AT,c_2,t_2 - daddu c_3,AT + sltu t_2,c_2,t_2 + daddu c_3,t_2 dmultu a_5,a_1 /* mul_add_c2(a[5],b[1],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt AT,t_2,zero - daddu c_3,AT - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_1,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_1,t_1 + daddu c_2,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu AT,c_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 - sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT + sltu t_2,c_2,t_2 + daddu c_3,t_2 dmultu a_4,a_2 /* mul_add_c2(a[4],b[2],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt AT,t_2,zero - daddu c_3,AT - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_1,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_1,t_1 + daddu c_2,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu AT,c_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 - sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT + sltu t_2,c_2,t_2 + daddu c_3,t_2 dmultu a_3,a_3 /* mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT sd c_1,48(a0) dmultu a_0,a_7 /* mul_add_c2(a[0],b[7],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt c_1,t_2,zero - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_2,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_2,t_1 + daddu c_3,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu c_1,c_3,AT daddu c_3,t_2 - sltu AT,c_3,t_2 - daddu c_1,AT + sltu t_2,c_3,t_2 + daddu c_1,t_2 dmultu a_1,a_6 /* mul_add_c2(a[1],b[6],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt AT,t_2,zero - daddu c_1,AT - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_2,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_2,t_1 + daddu c_3,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu AT,c_3,AT daddu c_3,t_2 - sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT + sltu t_2,c_3,t_2 + daddu c_1,t_2 dmultu a_2,a_5 /* mul_add_c2(a[2],b[5],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt AT,t_2,zero - daddu c_1,AT - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_2,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_2,t_1 + daddu c_3,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu AT,c_3,AT daddu c_3,t_2 - sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT + sltu t_2,c_3,t_2 + daddu c_1,t_2 dmultu a_3,a_4 /* mul_add_c2(a[3],b[4],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt AT,t_2,zero - daddu c_1,AT - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_2,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_2,t_1 + daddu c_3,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu AT,c_3,AT daddu c_3,t_2 - sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT + sltu t_2,c_3,t_2 + daddu c_1,t_2 sd c_2,56(a0) dmultu a_7,a_1 /* mul_add_c2(a[7],b[1],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt c_2,t_2,zero - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_3,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_3,t_1 + daddu c_1,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu c_2,c_1,AT daddu c_1,t_2 - sltu AT,c_1,t_2 - daddu c_2,AT + sltu t_2,c_1,t_2 + daddu c_2,t_2 dmultu a_6,a_2 /* mul_add_c2(a[6],b[2],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt AT,t_2,zero - daddu c_2,AT - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_3,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_3,t_1 + daddu c_1,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu AT,c_1,AT daddu c_1,t_2 - sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT + sltu t_2,c_1,t_2 + daddu c_2,t_2 dmultu a_5,a_3 /* mul_add_c2(a[5],b[3],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt AT,t_2,zero - daddu c_2,AT - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_3,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_3,t_1 + daddu c_1,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu AT,c_1,AT daddu c_1,t_2 - sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT + sltu t_2,c_1,t_2 + daddu c_2,t_2 dmultu a_4,a_4 /* mul_add_c(a[4],b[4],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT sd c_3,64(a0) dmultu a_2,a_7 /* mul_add_c2(a[2],b[7],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt c_3,t_2,zero - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_1,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_1,t_1 + daddu c_2,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu c_3,c_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 - sltu AT,c_2,t_2 - daddu c_3,AT + sltu t_2,c_2,t_2 + daddu c_3,t_2 dmultu a_3,a_6 /* mul_add_c2(a[3],b[6],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt AT,t_2,zero - daddu c_3,AT - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_1,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_1,t_1 + daddu c_2,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu AT,c_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 - sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT + sltu t_2,c_2,t_2 + daddu c_3,t_2 dmultu a_4,a_5 /* mul_add_c2(a[4],b[5],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt AT,t_2,zero - daddu c_3,AT - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_1,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_1,t_1 + daddu c_2,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu AT,c_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 - sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT + sltu t_2,c_2,t_2 + daddu c_3,t_2 sd c_1,72(a0) dmultu a_7,a_3 /* mul_add_c2(a[7],b[3],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt c_1,t_2,zero - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_2,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_2,t_1 + daddu c_3,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu c_1,c_3,AT daddu c_3,t_2 - sltu AT,c_3,t_2 - daddu c_1,AT + sltu t_2,c_3,t_2 + daddu c_1,t_2 dmultu a_6,a_4 /* mul_add_c2(a[6],b[4],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt AT,t_2,zero - daddu c_1,AT - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_2,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_2,t_1 + daddu c_3,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu AT,c_3,AT daddu c_3,t_2 - sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT + sltu t_2,c_3,t_2 + daddu c_1,t_2 dmultu a_5,a_5 /* mul_add_c(a[5],b[5],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT sd c_2,80(a0) dmultu a_4,a_7 /* mul_add_c2(a[4],b[7],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt c_2,t_2,zero - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_3,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_3,t_1 + daddu c_1,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu c_2,c_1,AT daddu c_1,t_2 - sltu AT,c_1,t_2 - daddu c_2,AT + sltu t_2,c_1,t_2 + daddu c_2,t_2 dmultu a_5,a_6 /* mul_add_c2(a[5],b[6],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt AT,t_2,zero - daddu c_2,AT - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_3,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_3,t_1 + daddu c_1,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu AT,c_1,AT daddu c_1,t_2 - sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT + sltu t_2,c_1,t_2 + daddu c_2,t_2 sd c_3,88(a0) dmultu a_7,a_5 /* mul_add_c2(a[7],b[5],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt c_3,t_2,zero - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_1,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_1,t_1 + daddu c_2,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu c_3,c_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 - sltu AT,c_2,t_2 - daddu c_3,AT + sltu t_2,c_2,t_2 + daddu c_3,t_2 dmultu a_6,a_6 /* mul_add_c(a[6],b[6],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT sd c_1,96(a0) dmultu a_6,a_7 /* mul_add_c2(a[6],b[7],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt c_1,t_2,zero - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_2,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_2,t_1 + daddu c_3,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu c_1,c_3,AT daddu c_3,t_2 - sltu AT,c_3,t_2 - daddu c_1,AT + sltu t_2,c_3,t_2 + daddu c_1,t_2 sd c_2,104(a0) dmultu a_7,a_7 /* mul_add_c(a[7],b[7],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sd c_3,112(a0) sd c_1,120(a0) jr ra END(bn_sqr_comba8) .align 5 LEAF(bn_sqr_comba4) .set reorder ld a_0,0(a1) ld a_1,8(a1) + dmultu a_0,a_0 /* mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); */ ld a_2,16(a1) ld a_3,24(a1) - dmultu a_0,a_0 /* mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo c_1 mfhi c_2 sd c_1,0(a0) dmultu a_0,a_1 /* mul_add_c2(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 slt c_1,t_2,zero dsll t_2,1 slt a2,t_1,zero daddu t_2,a2 dsll t_1,1 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu c_3,t_2,AT sd c_2,8(a0) dmultu a_2,a_0 /* mul_add_c2(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt c_2,t_2,zero - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_3,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_3,t_1 + daddu c_1,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu c_2,c_1,AT daddu c_1,t_2 - sltu AT,c_1,t_2 - daddu c_2,AT + sltu t_2,c_1,t_2 + daddu c_2,t_2 dmultu a_1,a_1 /* mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_1,t_2 sltu AT,c_1,t_2 daddu c_2,AT sd c_3,16(a0) dmultu a_0,a_3 /* mul_add_c2(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt c_3,t_2,zero - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_1,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_1,t_1 + daddu c_2,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu c_3,c_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 - sltu AT,c_2,t_2 - daddu c_3,AT + sltu t_2,c_2,t_2 + daddu c_3,t_2 dmultu a_1,a_2 /* mul_add_c(a2[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt AT,t_2,zero - daddu c_3,AT - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_1,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_1,t_1 + daddu c_2,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu AT,c_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 - sltu AT,c_2,t_2 daddu c_3,AT + sltu t_2,c_2,t_2 + daddu c_3,t_2 sd c_1,24(a0) dmultu a_3,a_1 /* mul_add_c2(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt c_1,t_2,zero - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_2,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_2,t_1 + daddu c_3,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu c_1,c_3,AT daddu c_3,t_2 - sltu AT,c_3,t_2 - daddu c_1,AT + sltu t_2,c_3,t_2 + daddu c_1,t_2 dmultu a_2,a_2 /* mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_2,t_1 sltu AT,c_2,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_3,t_2 sltu AT,c_3,t_2 daddu c_1,AT sd c_2,32(a0) dmultu a_2,a_3 /* mul_add_c2(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 - slt c_2,t_2,zero - dsll t_2,1 - slt a2,t_1,zero - daddu t_2,a2 - dsll t_1,1 daddu c_3,t_1 sltu AT,c_3,t_1 - daddu t_2,AT + daddu c_3,t_1 + daddu AT,t_2 + sltu t_1,c_3,t_1 + daddu c_1,AT + daddu t_2,t_1 + sltu c_2,c_1,AT daddu c_1,t_2 - sltu AT,c_1,t_2 - daddu c_2,AT + sltu t_2,c_1,t_2 + daddu c_2,t_2 sd c_3,40(a0) dmultu a_3,a_3 /* mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3); */ mflo t_1 mfhi t_2 daddu c_1,t_1 sltu AT,c_1,t_1 daddu t_2,AT daddu c_2,t_2 sd c_1,48(a0) sd c_2,56(a0) jr ra END(bn_sqr_comba4) Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c (revision 276859) @@ -1,602 +1,598 @@ #include "../bn_lcl.h" #ifdef __SUNPRO_C # include "../bn_asm.c" /* kind of dirty hack for Sun Studio */ #else /* * x86_64 BIGNUM accelerator version 0.1, December 2002. * * Implemented by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL * project. * * Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary forms are * granted according to the OpenSSL license. Warranty of any kind is * disclaimed. * * Q. Version 0.1? It doesn't sound like Andy, he used to assign real * versions, like 1.0... * A. Well, that's because this code is basically a quick-n-dirty * proof-of-concept hack. As you can see it's implemented with * inline assembler, which means that you're bound to GCC and that * there might be enough room for further improvement. * * Q. Why inline assembler? * A. x86_64 features own ABI which I'm not familiar with. This is * why I decided to let the compiler take care of subroutine * prologue/epilogue as well as register allocation. For reference. * Win64 implements different ABI for AMD64, different from Linux. * * Q. How much faster does it get? * A. 'apps/openssl speed rsa dsa' output with no-asm: * * sign verify sign/s verify/s * rsa 512 bits 0.0006s 0.0001s 1683.8 18456.2 * rsa 1024 bits 0.0028s 0.0002s 356.0 6407.0 * rsa 2048 bits 0.0172s 0.0005s 58.0 1957.8 * rsa 4096 bits 0.1155s 0.0018s 8.7 555.6 * sign verify sign/s verify/s * dsa 512 bits 0.0005s 0.0006s 2100.8 1768.3 * dsa 1024 bits 0.0014s 0.0018s 692.3 559.2 * dsa 2048 bits 0.0049s 0.0061s 204.7 165.0 * * 'apps/openssl speed rsa dsa' output with this module: * * sign verify sign/s verify/s * rsa 512 bits 0.0004s 0.0000s 2767.1 33297.9 * rsa 1024 bits 0.0012s 0.0001s 867.4 14674.7 * rsa 2048 bits 0.0061s 0.0002s 164.0 5270.0 * rsa 4096 bits 0.0384s 0.0006s 26.1 1650.8 * sign verify sign/s verify/s * dsa 512 bits 0.0002s 0.0003s 4442.2 3786.3 * dsa 1024 bits 0.0005s 0.0007s 1835.1 1497.4 * dsa 2048 bits 0.0016s 0.0020s 620.4 504.6 * * For the reference. IA-32 assembler implementation performs * very much like 64-bit code compiled with no-asm on the same * machine. */ #define BN_ULONG unsigned long #undef mul #undef mul_add #undef sqr /* * "m"(a), "+m"(r) is the way to favor DirectPath µ-code; * "g"(0) let the compiler to decide where does it * want to keep the value of zero; */ #define mul_add(r,a,word,carry) do { \ register BN_ULONG high,low; \ asm ("mulq %3" \ : "=a"(low),"=d"(high) \ : "a"(word),"m"(a) \ : "cc"); \ asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \ : "+r"(carry),"+d"(high)\ : "a"(low),"g"(0) \ : "cc"); \ asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \ : "+m"(r),"+d"(high) \ : "r"(carry),"g"(0) \ : "cc"); \ carry=high; \ } while (0) #define mul(r,a,word,carry) do { \ register BN_ULONG high,low; \ asm ("mulq %3" \ : "=a"(low),"=d"(high) \ : "a"(word),"g"(a) \ : "cc"); \ asm ("addq %2,%0; adcq %3,%1" \ : "+r"(carry),"+d"(high)\ : "a"(low),"g"(0) \ : "cc"); \ (r)=carry, carry=high; \ } while (0) #define sqr(r0,r1,a) \ asm ("mulq %2" \ : "=a"(r0),"=d"(r1) \ : "a"(a) \ : "cc"); BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w) { BN_ULONG c1=0; if (num <= 0) return(c1); while (num&~3) { mul_add(rp[0],ap[0],w,c1); mul_add(rp[1],ap[1],w,c1); mul_add(rp[2],ap[2],w,c1); mul_add(rp[3],ap[3],w,c1); ap+=4; rp+=4; num-=4; } if (num) { mul_add(rp[0],ap[0],w,c1); if (--num==0) return c1; mul_add(rp[1],ap[1],w,c1); if (--num==0) return c1; mul_add(rp[2],ap[2],w,c1); return c1; } return(c1); } BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w) { BN_ULONG c1=0; if (num <= 0) return(c1); while (num&~3) { mul(rp[0],ap[0],w,c1); mul(rp[1],ap[1],w,c1); mul(rp[2],ap[2],w,c1); mul(rp[3],ap[3],w,c1); ap+=4; rp+=4; num-=4; } if (num) { mul(rp[0],ap[0],w,c1); if (--num == 0) return c1; mul(rp[1],ap[1],w,c1); if (--num == 0) return c1; mul(rp[2],ap[2],w,c1); } return(c1); } void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n) { if (n <= 0) return; while (n&~3) { sqr(r[0],r[1],a[0]); sqr(r[2],r[3],a[1]); sqr(r[4],r[5],a[2]); sqr(r[6],r[7],a[3]); a+=4; r+=8; n-=4; } if (n) { sqr(r[0],r[1],a[0]); if (--n == 0) return; sqr(r[2],r[3],a[1]); if (--n == 0) return; sqr(r[4],r[5],a[2]); } } BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d) { BN_ULONG ret,waste; asm ("divq %4" : "=a"(ret),"=d"(waste) : "a"(l),"d"(h),"g"(d) : "cc"); return ret; } BN_ULONG bn_add_words (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,int n) { BN_ULONG ret=0,i=0; if (n <= 0) return 0; asm volatile ( " subq %2,%2 \n" ".align 16 \n" "1: movq (%4,%2,8),%0 \n" " adcq (%5,%2,8),%0 \n" " movq %0,(%3,%2,8) \n" " leaq 1(%2),%2 \n" " loop 1b \n" " sbbq %0,%0 \n" : "=&a"(ret),"+c"(n),"=&r"(i) : "r"(rp),"r"(ap),"r"(bp) : "cc", "memory" ); return ret&1; } #ifndef SIMICS BN_ULONG bn_sub_words (BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, const BN_ULONG *bp,int n) { BN_ULONG ret=0,i=0; if (n <= 0) return 0; asm volatile ( " subq %2,%2 \n" ".align 16 \n" "1: movq (%4,%2,8),%0 \n" " sbbq (%5,%2,8),%0 \n" " movq %0,(%3,%2,8) \n" " leaq 1(%2),%2 \n" " loop 1b \n" " sbbq %0,%0 \n" : "=&a"(ret),"+c"(n),"=&r"(i) : "r"(rp),"r"(ap),"r"(bp) : "cc", "memory" ); return ret&1; } #else /* Simics 1.4<7 has buggy sbbq:-( */ #define BN_MASK2 0xffffffffffffffffL BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, BN_ULONG *a, BN_ULONG *b, int n) { BN_ULONG t1,t2; int c=0; if (n <= 0) return((BN_ULONG)0); for (;;) { t1=a[0]; t2=b[0]; r[0]=(t1-t2-c)&BN_MASK2; if (t1 != t2) c=(t1 < t2); if (--n <= 0) break; t1=a[1]; t2=b[1]; r[1]=(t1-t2-c)&BN_MASK2; if (t1 != t2) c=(t1 < t2); if (--n <= 0) break; t1=a[2]; t2=b[2]; r[2]=(t1-t2-c)&BN_MASK2; if (t1 != t2) c=(t1 < t2); if (--n <= 0) break; t1=a[3]; t2=b[3]; r[3]=(t1-t2-c)&BN_MASK2; if (t1 != t2) c=(t1 < t2); if (--n <= 0) break; a+=4; b+=4; r+=4; } return(c); } #endif /* mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=a*b for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */ /* mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a*b for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */ /* sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=a[i]^2 for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */ /* sqr_add_c2(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a[i]*a[j] for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */ +/* + * Keep in mind that carrying into high part of multiplication result + * can not overflow, because it cannot be all-ones. + */ #if 0 /* original macros are kept for reference purposes */ #define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) { \ BN_ULONG ta=(a),tb=(b); \ t1 = ta * tb; \ t2 = BN_UMULT_HIGH(ta,tb); \ c0 += t1; t2 += (c0 #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include "bn_lcl.h" #if defined(BN_LLONG) || defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH) BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w) { BN_ULONG c1=0; assert(num >= 0); if (num <= 0) return(c1); while (num&~3) { mul_add(rp[0],ap[0],w,c1); mul_add(rp[1],ap[1],w,c1); mul_add(rp[2],ap[2],w,c1); mul_add(rp[3],ap[3],w,c1); ap+=4; rp+=4; num-=4; } if (num) { mul_add(rp[0],ap[0],w,c1); if (--num==0) return c1; mul_add(rp[1],ap[1],w,c1); if (--num==0) return c1; mul_add(rp[2],ap[2],w,c1); return c1; } return(c1); } BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w) { BN_ULONG c1=0; assert(num >= 0); if (num <= 0) return(c1); while (num&~3) { mul(rp[0],ap[0],w,c1); mul(rp[1],ap[1],w,c1); mul(rp[2],ap[2],w,c1); mul(rp[3],ap[3],w,c1); ap+=4; rp+=4; num-=4; } if (num) { mul(rp[0],ap[0],w,c1); if (--num == 0) return c1; mul(rp[1],ap[1],w,c1); if (--num == 0) return c1; mul(rp[2],ap[2],w,c1); } return(c1); } void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n) { assert(n >= 0); if (n <= 0) return; while (n&~3) { sqr(r[0],r[1],a[0]); sqr(r[2],r[3],a[1]); sqr(r[4],r[5],a[2]); sqr(r[6],r[7],a[3]); a+=4; r+=8; n-=4; } if (n) { sqr(r[0],r[1],a[0]); if (--n == 0) return; sqr(r[2],r[3],a[1]); if (--n == 0) return; sqr(r[4],r[5],a[2]); } } #else /* !(defined(BN_LLONG) || defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH)) */ BN_ULONG bn_mul_add_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w) { BN_ULONG c=0; BN_ULONG bl,bh; assert(num >= 0); if (num <= 0) return((BN_ULONG)0); bl=LBITS(w); bh=HBITS(w); for (;;) { mul_add(rp[0],ap[0],bl,bh,c); if (--num == 0) break; mul_add(rp[1],ap[1],bl,bh,c); if (--num == 0) break; mul_add(rp[2],ap[2],bl,bh,c); if (--num == 0) break; mul_add(rp[3],ap[3],bl,bh,c); if (--num == 0) break; ap+=4; rp+=4; } return(c); } BN_ULONG bn_mul_words(BN_ULONG *rp, const BN_ULONG *ap, int num, BN_ULONG w) { BN_ULONG carry=0; BN_ULONG bl,bh; assert(num >= 0); if (num <= 0) return((BN_ULONG)0); bl=LBITS(w); bh=HBITS(w); for (;;) { mul(rp[0],ap[0],bl,bh,carry); if (--num == 0) break; mul(rp[1],ap[1],bl,bh,carry); if (--num == 0) break; mul(rp[2],ap[2],bl,bh,carry); if (--num == 0) break; mul(rp[3],ap[3],bl,bh,carry); if (--num == 0) break; ap+=4; rp+=4; } return(carry); } void bn_sqr_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, int n) { assert(n >= 0); if (n <= 0) return; for (;;) { sqr64(r[0],r[1],a[0]); if (--n == 0) break; sqr64(r[2],r[3],a[1]); if (--n == 0) break; sqr64(r[4],r[5],a[2]); if (--n == 0) break; sqr64(r[6],r[7],a[3]); if (--n == 0) break; a+=4; r+=8; } } #endif /* !(defined(BN_LLONG) || defined(BN_UMULT_HIGH)) */ #if defined(BN_LLONG) && defined(BN_DIV2W) BN_ULONG bn_div_words(BN_ULONG h, BN_ULONG l, BN_ULONG d) { return((BN_ULONG)(((((BN_ULLONG)h)<= d) h-=d; if (i) { d<<=i; h=(h<>(BN_BITS2-i)); l<<=i; } dh=(d&BN_MASK2h)>>BN_BITS4; dl=(d&BN_MASK2l); for (;;) { if ((h>>BN_BITS4) == dh) q=BN_MASK2l; else q=h/dh; th=q*dh; tl=dl*q; for (;;) { t=h-th; if ((t&BN_MASK2h) || ((tl) <= ( (t<>BN_BITS4)))) break; q--; th-=dh; tl-=dl; } t=(tl>>BN_BITS4); tl=(tl<>BN_BITS4))&BN_MASK2; l=(l&BN_MASK2l)<= 0); if (n <= 0) return((BN_ULONG)0); for (;;) { ll+=(BN_ULLONG)a[0]+b[0]; r[0]=(BN_ULONG)ll&BN_MASK2; ll>>=BN_BITS2; if (--n <= 0) break; ll+=(BN_ULLONG)a[1]+b[1]; r[1]=(BN_ULONG)ll&BN_MASK2; ll>>=BN_BITS2; if (--n <= 0) break; ll+=(BN_ULLONG)a[2]+b[2]; r[2]=(BN_ULONG)ll&BN_MASK2; ll>>=BN_BITS2; if (--n <= 0) break; ll+=(BN_ULLONG)a[3]+b[3]; r[3]=(BN_ULONG)ll&BN_MASK2; ll>>=BN_BITS2; if (--n <= 0) break; a+=4; b+=4; r+=4; } return((BN_ULONG)ll); } #else /* !BN_LLONG */ BN_ULONG bn_add_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n) { BN_ULONG c,l,t; assert(n >= 0); if (n <= 0) return((BN_ULONG)0); c=0; for (;;) { t=a[0]; t=(t+c)&BN_MASK2; c=(t < c); l=(t+b[0])&BN_MASK2; c+=(l < t); r[0]=l; if (--n <= 0) break; t=a[1]; t=(t+c)&BN_MASK2; c=(t < c); l=(t+b[1])&BN_MASK2; c+=(l < t); r[1]=l; if (--n <= 0) break; t=a[2]; t=(t+c)&BN_MASK2; c=(t < c); l=(t+b[2])&BN_MASK2; c+=(l < t); r[2]=l; if (--n <= 0) break; t=a[3]; t=(t+c)&BN_MASK2; c=(t < c); l=(t+b[3])&BN_MASK2; c+=(l < t); r[3]=l; if (--n <= 0) break; a+=4; b+=4; r+=4; } return((BN_ULONG)c); } #endif /* !BN_LLONG */ BN_ULONG bn_sub_words(BN_ULONG *r, const BN_ULONG *a, const BN_ULONG *b, int n) { BN_ULONG t1,t2; int c=0; assert(n >= 0); if (n <= 0) return((BN_ULONG)0); for (;;) { t1=a[0]; t2=b[0]; r[0]=(t1-t2-c)&BN_MASK2; if (t1 != t2) c=(t1 < t2); if (--n <= 0) break; t1=a[1]; t2=b[1]; r[1]=(t1-t2-c)&BN_MASK2; if (t1 != t2) c=(t1 < t2); if (--n <= 0) break; t1=a[2]; t2=b[2]; r[2]=(t1-t2-c)&BN_MASK2; if (t1 != t2) c=(t1 < t2); if (--n <= 0) break; t1=a[3]; t2=b[3]; r[3]=(t1-t2-c)&BN_MASK2; if (t1 != t2) c=(t1 < t2); if (--n <= 0) break; a+=4; b+=4; r+=4; } return(c); } #ifdef BN_MUL_COMBA #undef bn_mul_comba8 #undef bn_mul_comba4 #undef bn_sqr_comba8 #undef bn_sqr_comba4 /* mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=a*b for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */ /* mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a*b for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */ /* sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=a[i]^2 for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */ /* sqr_add_c2(a,i,c0,c1,c2) -- c+=2*a[i]*a[j] for three word number c=(c2,c1,c0) */ +/* + * Keep in mind that carrying into high part of multiplication result + * can not overflow, because it cannot be all-ones. + */ #ifdef BN_LLONG #define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) \ t=(BN_ULLONG)a*b; \ t1=(BN_ULONG)Lw(t); \ t2=(BN_ULONG)Hw(t); \ c0=(c0+t1)&BN_MASK2; if ((c0) < t1) t2++; \ c1=(c1+t2)&BN_MASK2; if ((c1) < t2) c2++; #define mul_add_c2(a,b,c0,c1,c2) \ t=(BN_ULLONG)a*b; \ tt=(t+t)&BN_MASK; \ if (tt < t) c2++; \ t1=(BN_ULONG)Lw(tt); \ t2=(BN_ULONG)Hw(tt); \ c0=(c0+t1)&BN_MASK2; \ if ((c0 < t1) && (((++t2)&BN_MASK2) == 0)) c2++; \ c1=(c1+t2)&BN_MASK2; if ((c1) < t2) c2++; #define sqr_add_c(a,i,c0,c1,c2) \ t=(BN_ULLONG)a[i]*a[i]; \ t1=(BN_ULONG)Lw(t); \ t2=(BN_ULONG)Hw(t); \ c0=(c0+t1)&BN_MASK2; if ((c0) < t1) t2++; \ c1=(c1+t2)&BN_MASK2; if ((c1) < t2) c2++; #define sqr_add_c2(a,i,j,c0,c1,c2) \ mul_add_c2((a)[i],(a)[j],c0,c1,c2) #elif defined(BN_UMULT_LOHI) #define mul_add_c(a,b,c0,c1,c2) { \ BN_ULONG ta=(a),tb=(b); \ BN_UMULT_LOHI(t1,t2,ta,tb); \ c0 += t1; t2 += (c0 #include #include #include "e_os.h" #include #include #include #include #include const int num0 = 100; /* number of tests */ const int num1 = 50; /* additional tests for some functions */ const int num2 = 5; /* number of tests for slow functions */ int test_add(BIO *bp); int test_sub(BIO *bp); int test_lshift1(BIO *bp); int test_lshift(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx,BIGNUM *a_); int test_rshift1(BIO *bp); int test_rshift(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx); int test_div(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx); int test_div_word(BIO *bp); int test_div_recp(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx); int test_mul(BIO *bp); int test_sqr(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx); int test_mont(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx); int test_mod(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx); int test_mod_mul(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx); int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx); int test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx); int test_exp(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx); int test_gf2m_add(BIO *bp); int test_gf2m_mod(BIO *bp); int test_gf2m_mod_mul(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx); int test_gf2m_mod_sqr(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx); int test_gf2m_mod_inv(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx); int test_gf2m_mod_div(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx); int test_gf2m_mod_exp(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx); int test_gf2m_mod_sqrt(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx); int test_gf2m_mod_solve_quad(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx); int test_kron(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx); int test_sqrt(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx); int rand_neg(void); static int results=0; static unsigned char lst[]="\xC6\x4F\x43\x04\x2A\xEA\xCA\x6E\x58\x36\x80\x5B\xE8\xC9" "\x9B\x04\x5D\x48\x36\xC2\xFD\x16\xC9\x64\xF0"; static const char rnd_seed[] = "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy"; static void message(BIO *out, char *m) { fprintf(stderr, "test %s\n", m); BIO_puts(out, "print \"test "); BIO_puts(out, m); BIO_puts(out, "\\n\"\n"); } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { BN_CTX *ctx; BIO *out; char *outfile=NULL; results = 0; RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed); /* or BN_generate_prime may fail */ argc--; argv++; while (argc >= 1) { if (strcmp(*argv,"-results") == 0) results=1; else if (strcmp(*argv,"-out") == 0) { if (--argc < 1) break; outfile= *(++argv); } argc--; argv++; } ctx=BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) EXIT(1); out=BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (out == NULL) EXIT(1); if (outfile == NULL) { BIO_set_fp(out,stdout,BIO_NOCLOSE); } else { if (!BIO_write_filename(out,outfile)) { perror(outfile); EXIT(1); } } if (!results) BIO_puts(out,"obase=16\nibase=16\n"); message(out,"BN_add"); if (!test_add(out)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_sub"); if (!test_sub(out)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_lshift1"); if (!test_lshift1(out)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_lshift (fixed)"); if (!test_lshift(out,ctx,BN_bin2bn(lst,sizeof(lst)-1,NULL))) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_lshift"); if (!test_lshift(out,ctx,NULL)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_rshift1"); if (!test_rshift1(out)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_rshift"); if (!test_rshift(out,ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_sqr"); if (!test_sqr(out,ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_mul"); if (!test_mul(out)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_div"); if (!test_div(out,ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_div_word"); if (!test_div_word(out)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_div_recp"); if (!test_div_recp(out,ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_mod"); if (!test_mod(out,ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_mod_mul"); if (!test_mod_mul(out,ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_mont"); if (!test_mont(out,ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_mod_exp"); if (!test_mod_exp(out,ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime"); if (!test_mod_exp_mont_consttime(out,ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_exp"); if (!test_exp(out,ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_kronecker"); if (!test_kron(out,ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_mod_sqrt"); if (!test_sqrt(out,ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_GF2m_add"); if (!test_gf2m_add(out)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_GF2m_mod"); if (!test_gf2m_mod(out)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_GF2m_mod_mul"); if (!test_gf2m_mod_mul(out,ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_GF2m_mod_sqr"); if (!test_gf2m_mod_sqr(out,ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_GF2m_mod_inv"); if (!test_gf2m_mod_inv(out,ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_GF2m_mod_div"); if (!test_gf2m_mod_div(out,ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_GF2m_mod_exp"); if (!test_gf2m_mod_exp(out,ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt"); if (!test_gf2m_mod_sqrt(out,ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); message(out,"BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad"); if (!test_gf2m_mod_solve_quad(out,ctx)) goto err; (void)BIO_flush(out); BN_CTX_free(ctx); BIO_free(out); /**/ EXIT(0); err: BIO_puts(out,"1\n"); /* make sure the Perl script fed by bc notices * the failure, see test_bn in test/Makefile.ssl*/ (void)BIO_flush(out); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); EXIT(1); return(1); } int test_add(BIO *bp) { BIGNUM a,b,c; int i; BN_init(&a); BN_init(&b); BN_init(&c); BN_bntest_rand(&a,512,0,0); for (i=0; i sizeof(unsigned long)) { unsigned long h=(unsigned long)(w>>32), l=(unsigned long)(w); if (h) BIO_printf(bp,"%lX%08lX",h,l); else BIO_printf(bp,"%lX",l); return; } #endif BIO_printf(bp,"%lX",w); } int test_div_word(BIO *bp) { BIGNUM a,b; BN_ULONG r,s; int i; BN_init(&a); BN_init(&b); for (i=0; ineg=rand_neg(); + BN_sqr(c,a,ctx); if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { - BN_print(bp,&a); + BN_print(bp,a); BIO_puts(bp," * "); - BN_print(bp,&a); + BN_print(bp,a); BIO_puts(bp," - "); } - BN_print(bp,&c); + BN_print(bp,c); BIO_puts(bp,"\n"); } - BN_div(&d,&e,&c,&a,ctx); - BN_sub(&d,&d,&a); - if(!BN_is_zero(&d) || !BN_is_zero(&e)) - { - fprintf(stderr,"Square test failed!\n"); - return 0; - } + BN_div(d,e,c,a,ctx); + BN_sub(d,d,a); + if(!BN_is_zero(d) || !BN_is_zero(e)) + { + fprintf(stderr,"Square test failed!\n"); + goto err; + } } - BN_free(&a); - BN_free(&c); - BN_free(&d); - BN_free(&e); - return(1); + + /* Regression test for a BN_sqr overflow bug. */ + BN_hex2bn(&a, + "80000000000000008000000000000001FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE0000000000000000"); + BN_sqr(c, a, ctx); + if (bp != NULL) + { + if (!results) + { + BN_print(bp,a); + BIO_puts(bp," * "); + BN_print(bp,a); + BIO_puts(bp," - "); + } + BN_print(bp,c); + BIO_puts(bp,"\n"); + } + BN_mul(d, a, a, ctx); + if (BN_cmp(c, d)) + { + fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed: BN_sqr and BN_mul produce " + "different results!\n"); + goto err; + } + + /* Regression test for a BN_sqr overflow bug. */ + BN_hex2bn(&a, + "80000000000000000000000080000001FFFFFFFE000000000000000000000000"); + BN_sqr(c, a, ctx); + if (bp != NULL) + { + if (!results) + { + BN_print(bp,a); + BIO_puts(bp," * "); + BN_print(bp,a); + BIO_puts(bp," - "); + } + BN_print(bp,c); + BIO_puts(bp,"\n"); + } + BN_mul(d, a, a, ctx); + if (BN_cmp(c, d)) + { + fprintf(stderr, "Square test failed: BN_sqr and BN_mul produce " + "different results!\n"); + goto err; + } + ret = 1; +err: + if (a != NULL) BN_free(a); + if (c != NULL) BN_free(c); + if (d != NULL) BN_free(d); + if (e != NULL) BN_free(e); + return ret; } int test_mont(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM a,b,c,d,A,B; BIGNUM n; int i; BN_MONT_CTX *mont; BN_init(&a); BN_init(&b); BN_init(&c); BN_init(&d); BN_init(&A); BN_init(&B); BN_init(&n); mont=BN_MONT_CTX_new(); BN_bntest_rand(&a,100,0,0); /**/ BN_bntest_rand(&b,100,0,0); /**/ for (i=0; iN)); #endif BN_print(bp,&a); BIO_puts(bp," * "); BN_print(bp,&b); BIO_puts(bp," % "); BN_print(bp,&(mont->N)); BIO_puts(bp," - "); } BN_print(bp,&A); BIO_puts(bp,"\n"); } BN_mod_mul(&d,&a,&b,&n,ctx); BN_sub(&d,&d,&A); if(!BN_is_zero(&d)) { fprintf(stderr,"Montgomery multiplication test failed!\n"); return 0; } } BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); BN_free(&a); BN_free(&b); BN_free(&c); BN_free(&d); BN_free(&A); BN_free(&B); BN_free(&n); return(1); } int test_mod(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a,*b,*c,*d,*e; int i; a=BN_new(); b=BN_new(); c=BN_new(); d=BN_new(); e=BN_new(); BN_bntest_rand(a,1024,0,0); /**/ for (i=0; ineg=rand_neg(); b->neg=rand_neg(); BN_mod(c,a,b,ctx);/**/ if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BN_print(bp,a); BIO_puts(bp," % "); BN_print(bp,b); BIO_puts(bp," - "); } BN_print(bp,c); BIO_puts(bp,"\n"); } BN_div(d,e,a,b,ctx); BN_sub(e,e,c); if(!BN_is_zero(e)) { fprintf(stderr,"Modulo test failed!\n"); return 0; } } BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); BN_free(d); BN_free(e); return(1); } int test_mod_mul(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a,*b,*c,*d,*e; int i,j; a=BN_new(); b=BN_new(); c=BN_new(); d=BN_new(); e=BN_new(); for (j=0; j<3; j++) { BN_bntest_rand(c,1024,0,0); /**/ for (i=0; ineg=rand_neg(); b->neg=rand_neg(); if (!BN_mod_mul(e,a,b,c,ctx)) { unsigned long l; while ((l=ERR_get_error())) fprintf(stderr,"ERROR:%s\n", ERR_error_string(l,NULL)); EXIT(1); } if (bp != NULL) { if (!results) { BN_print(bp,a); BIO_puts(bp," * "); BN_print(bp,b); BIO_puts(bp," % "); BN_print(bp,c); if ((a->neg ^ b->neg) && !BN_is_zero(e)) { /* If (a*b) % c is negative, c must be added * in order to obtain the normalized remainder * (new with OpenSSL 0.9.7, previous versions of * BN_mod_mul could generate negative results) */ BIO_puts(bp," + "); BN_print(bp,c); } BIO_puts(bp," - "); } BN_print(bp,e); BIO_puts(bp,"\n"); } BN_mul(d,a,b,ctx); BN_sub(d,d,e); BN_div(a,b,d,c,ctx); if(!BN_is_zero(b)) { fprintf(stderr,"Modulo multiply test failed!\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); return 0; } } } BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(c); BN_free(d); BN_free(e); return(1); } int test_mod_exp(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BIGNUM *a,*b,*c,*d,*e; int i; a=BN_new(); b=BN_new(); c=BN_new(); d=BN_new(); e=BN_new(); BN_bntest_rand(c,30,0,1); /* must be odd for montgomery */ for (i=0; ineg = rand_neg(); putc('\n', stderr); for (i = 0; i < num0; i++) { if (!BN_bntest_rand(a, 512, 0, 0)) goto err; a->neg = rand_neg(); /* t := (|b|-1)/2 (note that b is odd) */ if (!BN_copy(t, b)) goto err; t->neg = 0; if (!BN_sub_word(t, 1)) goto err; if (!BN_rshift1(t, t)) goto err; /* r := a^t mod b */ b->neg=0; if (!BN_mod_exp_recp(r, a, t, b, ctx)) goto err; b->neg=1; if (BN_is_word(r, 1)) legendre = 1; else if (BN_is_zero(r)) legendre = 0; else { if (!BN_add_word(r, 1)) goto err; if (0 != BN_ucmp(r, b)) { fprintf(stderr, "Legendre symbol computation failed\n"); goto err; } legendre = -1; } kronecker = BN_kronecker(a, b, ctx); if (kronecker < -1) goto err; /* we actually need BN_kronecker(a, |b|) */ if (a->neg && b->neg) kronecker = -kronecker; if (legendre != kronecker) { fprintf(stderr, "legendre != kronecker; a = "); BN_print_fp(stderr, a); fprintf(stderr, ", b = "); BN_print_fp(stderr, b); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); goto err; } putc('.', stderr); fflush(stderr); } putc('\n', stderr); fflush(stderr); ret = 1; err: if (a != NULL) BN_free(a); if (b != NULL) BN_free(b); if (r != NULL) BN_free(r); if (t != NULL) BN_free(t); return ret; } int test_sqrt(BIO *bp, BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_GENCB cb; BIGNUM *a,*p,*r; int i, j; int ret = 0; a = BN_new(); p = BN_new(); r = BN_new(); if (a == NULL || p == NULL || r == NULL) goto err; BN_GENCB_set(&cb, genprime_cb, NULL); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { if (i < 8) { unsigned primes[8] = { 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19 }; if (!BN_set_word(p, primes[i])) goto err; } else { if (!BN_set_word(a, 32)) goto err; if (!BN_set_word(r, 2*i + 1)) goto err; if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(p, 256, 0, a, r, &cb)) goto err; putc('\n', stderr); } p->neg = rand_neg(); for (j = 0; j < num2; j++) { /* construct 'a' such that it is a square modulo p, * but in general not a proper square and not reduced modulo p */ if (!BN_bntest_rand(r, 256, 0, 3)) goto err; if (!BN_nnmod(r, r, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_sqr(r, r, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_bntest_rand(a, 256, 0, 3)) goto err; if (!BN_nnmod(a, a, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_sqr(a, a, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mul(a, a, r, ctx)) goto err; if (rand_neg()) if (!BN_sub(a, a, p)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_sqrt(r, a, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_mod_sqr(r, r, p, ctx)) goto err; if (!BN_nnmod(a, a, p, ctx)) goto err; if (BN_cmp(a, r) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "BN_mod_sqrt failed: a = "); BN_print_fp(stderr, a); fprintf(stderr, ", r = "); BN_print_fp(stderr, r); fprintf(stderr, ", p = "); BN_print_fp(stderr, p); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); goto err; } putc('.', stderr); fflush(stderr); } putc('\n', stderr); fflush(stderr); } ret = 1; err: if (a != NULL) BN_free(a); if (p != NULL) BN_free(p); if (r != NULL) BN_free(r); return ret; } int test_lshift(BIO *bp,BN_CTX *ctx,BIGNUM *a_) { BIGNUM *a,*b,*c,*d; int i; b=BN_new(); c=BN_new(); d=BN_new(); BN_one(c); if(a_) a=a_; else { a=BN_new(); BN_bntest_rand(a,200,0,0); /**/ a->neg=rand_neg(); } for (i=0; ineg=rand_neg(); for (i=0; ineg=rand_neg(); for (i=0; ineg=rand_neg(); for (i=0; i #include #include #include "../e_os.h" #include #include #include #include #define NUM_BITS (BN_BITS*2) static const char rnd_seed[] = "string to make the random number generator think it has entropy"; +/* + * Disabled for FIPS capable builds because they use the FIPS BIGNUM library + * which will fail this test. + */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS /* test_exp_mod_zero tests that x**0 mod 1 == 0. It returns zero on success. */ static int test_exp_mod_zero() { BIGNUM a, p, m; BIGNUM r; BN_CTX *ctx = BN_CTX_new(); int ret = 1; BN_init(&m); BN_one(&m); BN_init(&a); BN_one(&a); BN_init(&p); BN_zero(&p); BN_init(&r); BN_mod_exp(&r, &a, &p, &m, ctx); BN_CTX_free(ctx); if (BN_is_zero(&r)) ret = 0; else { printf("1**0 mod 1 = "); BN_print_fp(stdout, &r); printf(", should be 0\n"); } BN_free(&r); BN_free(&a); BN_free(&p); BN_free(&m); return ret; } - +#endif int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { BN_CTX *ctx; BIO *out=NULL; int i,ret; unsigned char c; BIGNUM *r_mont,*r_mont_const,*r_recp,*r_simple,*a,*b,*m; RAND_seed(rnd_seed, sizeof rnd_seed); /* or BN_rand may fail, and we don't * even check its return value * (which we should) */ ERR_load_BN_strings(); ctx=BN_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) EXIT(1); r_mont=BN_new(); r_mont_const=BN_new(); r_recp=BN_new(); r_simple=BN_new(); a=BN_new(); b=BN_new(); m=BN_new(); if ( (r_mont == NULL) || (r_recp == NULL) || (a == NULL) || (b == NULL)) goto err; out=BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (out == NULL) EXIT(1); BIO_set_fp(out,stdout,BIO_NOCLOSE); for (i=0; i<200; i++) { RAND_bytes(&c,1); c=(c%BN_BITS)-BN_BITS2; BN_rand(a,NUM_BITS+c,0,0); RAND_bytes(&c,1); c=(c%BN_BITS)-BN_BITS2; BN_rand(b,NUM_BITS+c,0,0); RAND_bytes(&c,1); c=(c%BN_BITS)-BN_BITS2; BN_rand(m,NUM_BITS+c,0,1); BN_mod(a,a,m,ctx); BN_mod(b,b,m,ctx); ret=BN_mod_exp_mont(r_mont,a,b,m,ctx,NULL); if (ret <= 0) { printf("BN_mod_exp_mont() problems\n"); ERR_print_errors(out); EXIT(1); } ret=BN_mod_exp_recp(r_recp,a,b,m,ctx); if (ret <= 0) { printf("BN_mod_exp_recp() problems\n"); ERR_print_errors(out); EXIT(1); } ret=BN_mod_exp_simple(r_simple,a,b,m,ctx); if (ret <= 0) { printf("BN_mod_exp_simple() problems\n"); ERR_print_errors(out); EXIT(1); } ret=BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime(r_mont_const,a,b,m,ctx,NULL); if (ret <= 0) { printf("BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime() problems\n"); ERR_print_errors(out); EXIT(1); } if (BN_cmp(r_simple, r_mont) == 0 && BN_cmp(r_simple,r_recp) == 0 && BN_cmp(r_simple,r_mont_const) == 0) { printf("."); fflush(stdout); } else { if (BN_cmp(r_simple,r_mont) != 0) printf("\nsimple and mont results differ\n"); if (BN_cmp(r_simple,r_mont) != 0) printf("\nsimple and mont const time results differ\n"); if (BN_cmp(r_simple,r_recp) != 0) printf("\nsimple and recp results differ\n"); printf("a (%3d) = ",BN_num_bits(a)); BN_print(out,a); printf("\nb (%3d) = ",BN_num_bits(b)); BN_print(out,b); printf("\nm (%3d) = ",BN_num_bits(m)); BN_print(out,m); printf("\nsimple ="); BN_print(out,r_simple); printf("\nrecp ="); BN_print(out,r_recp); printf("\nmont ="); BN_print(out,r_mont); printf("\nmont_ct ="); BN_print(out,r_mont_const); printf("\n"); EXIT(1); } } BN_free(r_mont); BN_free(r_mont_const); BN_free(r_recp); BN_free(r_simple); BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(m); BN_CTX_free(ctx); ERR_remove_state(0); CRYPTO_mem_leaks(out); BIO_free(out); printf("\n"); - +#ifndef OPENSSL_FIPS if (test_exp_mod_zero() != 0) goto err; - +#endif printf("done\n"); EXIT(0); err: ERR_load_crypto_strings(); ERR_print_errors(out); #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE printf("ERROR\n"); #endif EXIT(1); return(1); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/constant_time_locl.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/constant_time_locl.h (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/constant_time_locl.h (revision 276859) @@ -1,216 +1,206 @@ /* crypto/constant_time_locl.h */ /* * Utilities for constant-time cryptography. * * Author: Emilia Kasper (emilia@openssl.org) * Based on previous work by Bodo Moeller, Emilia Kasper, Adam Langley * (Google). * ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 2014 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #ifndef HEADER_CONSTANT_TIME_LOCL_H #define HEADER_CONSTANT_TIME_LOCL_H #include "e_os.h" /* For 'inline' */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* * The boolean methods return a bitmask of all ones (0xff...f) for true * and 0 for false. This is useful for choosing a value based on the result * of a conditional in constant time. For example, * * if (a < b) { * c = a; * } else { * c = b; * } * * can be written as * * unsigned int lt = constant_time_lt(a, b); * c = constant_time_select(lt, a, b); */ /* * Returns the given value with the MSB copied to all the other * bits. Uses the fact that arithmetic shift shifts-in the sign bit. * However, this is not ensured by the C standard so you may need to * replace this with something else on odd CPUs. */ static inline unsigned int constant_time_msb(unsigned int a); /* * Returns 0xff..f if a < b and 0 otherwise. */ static inline unsigned int constant_time_lt(unsigned int a, unsigned int b); /* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */ static inline unsigned char constant_time_lt_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b); /* * Returns 0xff..f if a >= b and 0 otherwise. */ static inline unsigned int constant_time_ge(unsigned int a, unsigned int b); /* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */ static inline unsigned char constant_time_ge_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b); /* * Returns 0xff..f if a == 0 and 0 otherwise. */ static inline unsigned int constant_time_is_zero(unsigned int a); /* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */ static inline unsigned char constant_time_is_zero_8(unsigned int a); /* * Returns 0xff..f if a == b and 0 otherwise. */ static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq(unsigned int a, unsigned int b); /* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */ static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b); /* Signed integers. */ static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq_int(int a, int b); /* Convenience method for getting an 8-bit mask. */ static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_int_8(int a, int b); /* * Returns (mask & a) | (~mask & b). * * When |mask| is all 1s or all 0s (as returned by the methods above), * the select methods return either |a| (if |mask| is nonzero) or |b| * (if |mask| is zero). */ static inline unsigned int constant_time_select(unsigned int mask, unsigned int a, unsigned int b); /* Convenience method for unsigned chars. */ static inline unsigned char constant_time_select_8(unsigned char mask, unsigned char a, unsigned char b); /* Convenience method for signed integers. */ static inline int constant_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int a, int b); static inline unsigned int constant_time_msb(unsigned int a) { - return (unsigned int)((int)(a) >> (sizeof(int) * 8 - 1)); + return 0-(a >> (sizeof(a) * 8 - 1)); } static inline unsigned int constant_time_lt(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) { - unsigned int lt; - /* Case 1: msb(a) == msb(b). a < b iff the MSB of a - b is set.*/ - lt = ~(a ^ b) & (a - b); - /* Case 2: msb(a) != msb(b). a < b iff the MSB of b is set. */ - lt |= ~a & b; - return constant_time_msb(lt); + return constant_time_msb(a^((a^b)|((a-b)^b))); } static inline unsigned char constant_time_lt_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) { return (unsigned char)(constant_time_lt(a, b)); } static inline unsigned int constant_time_ge(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) { - unsigned int ge; - /* Case 1: msb(a) == msb(b). a >= b iff the MSB of a - b is not set.*/ - ge = ~((a ^ b) | (a - b)); - /* Case 2: msb(a) != msb(b). a >= b iff the MSB of a is set. */ - ge |= a & ~b; - return constant_time_msb(ge); + return ~constant_time_lt(a, b); } static inline unsigned char constant_time_ge_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) { return (unsigned char)(constant_time_ge(a, b)); } static inline unsigned int constant_time_is_zero(unsigned int a) { return constant_time_msb(~a & (a - 1)); } static inline unsigned char constant_time_is_zero_8(unsigned int a) { return (unsigned char)(constant_time_is_zero(a)); } static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) { return constant_time_is_zero(a ^ b); } static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_8(unsigned int a, unsigned int b) { return (unsigned char)(constant_time_eq(a, b)); } static inline unsigned int constant_time_eq_int(int a, int b) { return constant_time_eq((unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b)); } static inline unsigned char constant_time_eq_int_8(int a, int b) { return constant_time_eq_8((unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b)); } static inline unsigned int constant_time_select(unsigned int mask, unsigned int a, unsigned int b) { return (mask & a) | (~mask & b); } static inline unsigned char constant_time_select_8(unsigned char mask, unsigned char a, unsigned char b) { return (unsigned char)(constant_time_select(mask, a, b)); } -inline int constant_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int a, int b) +static inline int constant_time_select_int(unsigned int mask, int a, int b) { return (int)(constant_time_select(mask, (unsigned)(a), (unsigned)(b))); } #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* HEADER_CONSTANT_TIME_LOCL_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/dsa/dsa_asn1.c (revision 276859) @@ -1,220 +1,232 @@ /* dsa_asn1.c */ /* Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL * project 2000. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS #include #endif /* Override the default new methods */ static int sig_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { if(operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE) { DSA_SIG *sig; sig = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DSA_SIG)); sig->r = NULL; sig->s = NULL; *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)sig; if(sig) return 2; DSAerr(DSA_F_SIG_CB, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } return 1; } ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(DSA_SIG, sig_cb) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA_SIG, r, CBIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA_SIG, s, CBIGNUM) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(DSA_SIG, DSA_SIG) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(DSA_SIG,DSA_SIG,DSA_SIG) /* Override the default free and new methods */ static int dsa_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { if(operation == ASN1_OP_NEW_PRE) { *pval = (ASN1_VALUE *)DSA_new(); if(*pval) return 2; return 0; } else if(operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) { DSA_free((DSA *)*pval); *pval = NULL; return 2; } return 1; } ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(DSAPrivateKey, dsa_cb) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, version, LONG), ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, p, BIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, q, BIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, g, BIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, pub_key, BIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, priv_key, BIGNUM) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(DSA, DSAPrivateKey) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(DSA, DSAPrivateKey, DSAPrivateKey) ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(DSAparams, dsa_cb) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, p, BIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, q, BIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, g, BIGNUM), } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(DSA, DSAparams) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(DSA, DSAparams, DSAparams) /* DSA public key is a bit trickier... its effectively a CHOICE type * decided by a field called write_params which can either write out * just the public key as an INTEGER or the parameters and public key * in a SEQUENCE */ ASN1_SEQUENCE(dsa_pub_internal) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, pub_key, BIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, p, BIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, q, BIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, g, BIGNUM) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_name(DSA, dsa_pub_internal) ASN1_CHOICE_cb(DSAPublicKey, dsa_cb) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(DSA, pub_key, BIGNUM), ASN1_EX_COMBINE(0, 0, dsa_pub_internal) } ASN1_CHOICE_END_cb(DSA, DSAPublicKey, write_params) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(DSA, DSAPublicKey, DSAPublicKey) int DSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, DSA *dsa) { DSA_SIG *s; #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if(FIPS_mode() && !(dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN, DSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE); return 0; } #endif RAND_seed(dgst, dlen); s=DSA_do_sign(dgst,dlen,dsa); if (s == NULL) { *siglen=0; return(0); } *siglen=i2d_DSA_SIG(s,&sig); DSA_SIG_free(s); return(1); } int DSA_size(const DSA *r) { int ret,i; ASN1_INTEGER bs; unsigned char buf[4]; /* 4 bytes looks really small. However, i2d_ASN1_INTEGER() will not look beyond the first byte, as long as the second parameter is NULL. */ i=BN_num_bits(r->q); bs.length=(i+7)/8; bs.data=buf; bs.type=V_ASN1_INTEGER; /* If the top bit is set the asn1 encoding is 1 larger. */ buf[0]=0xff; i=i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(&bs,NULL); i+=i; /* r and s */ ret=ASN1_object_size(1,i,V_ASN1_SEQUENCE); return(ret); } /* data has already been hashed (probably with SHA or SHA-1). */ /* returns * 1: correct signature * 0: incorrect signature * -1: error */ int DSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, int siglen, DSA *dsa) { DSA_SIG *s; + const unsigned char *p = sigbuf; + unsigned char *der = NULL; + int derlen = -1; int ret=-1; + #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if(FIPS_mode() && !(dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) { DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_VERIFY, DSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE); return 0; } #endif s = DSA_SIG_new(); if (s == NULL) return(ret); - if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s,&sigbuf,siglen) == NULL) goto err; + if (d2i_DSA_SIG(&s,&p,siglen) == NULL) goto err; + /* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */ + derlen = i2d_DSA_SIG(s, &der); + if (derlen != siglen || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen)) + goto err; ret=DSA_do_verify(dgst,dgst_len,s,dsa); err: + if (derlen > 0) + { + OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen); + OPENSSL_free(der); + } DSA_SIG_free(s); return(ret); } - Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/ecdsa/Makefile =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/ecdsa/Makefile (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/ecdsa/Makefile (revision 276859) @@ -1,143 +1,144 @@ # # crypto/ecdsa/Makefile # DIR= ecdsa TOP= ../.. CC= cc INCLUDES= -I.. -I$(TOP) -I../../include CFLAG=-g -Wall MAKEFILE= Makefile AR= ar r CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG) GENERAL=Makefile TEST=ecdsatest.c APPS= LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a LIBSRC= ecs_lib.c ecs_asn1.c ecs_ossl.c ecs_sign.c ecs_vrf.c ecs_err.c LIBOBJ= ecs_lib.o ecs_asn1.o ecs_ossl.o ecs_sign.o ecs_vrf.o ecs_err.o SRC= $(LIBSRC) EXHEADER= ecdsa.h HEADER= ecs_locl.h $(EXHEADER) ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER) top: (cd ../..; $(MAKE) DIRS=crypto SDIRS=$(DIR) sub_all) all: lib lib: $(LIBOBJ) $(ARX) $(LIB) $(LIBOBJ) $(RANLIB) $(LIB) || echo Never mind. @touch lib files: $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO links: @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../include/openssl $(EXHEADER) @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../test $(TEST) @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../apps $(APPS) install: @[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] # should be set by top Makefile... @headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist; \ do \ (cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \ done; tags: ctags $(SRC) tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(PROGS) $(LIBSRC) dclean: $(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE) clean: rm -f *.o */*.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff # DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it. ecs_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/asn1t.h ecs_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ecs_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h ecs_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h ecs_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ecs_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ecs_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h ecs_asn1.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ecs_asn1.c ecs_locl.h ecs_err.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ecs_err.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ecs_err.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ecs_err.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ecs_err.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ecs_err.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ecs_err.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ecs_err.o: ecs_err.c ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ecs_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ecs_lib.o: ecs_lib.c ecs_locl.h ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h ecs_ossl.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ecs_locl.h ecs_ossl.c ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ecs_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ecs_sign.o: ecs_locl.h ecs_sign.c -ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h -ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h -ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h -ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h -ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h +ecs_vrf.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h +ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h +ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h +ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h +ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h +ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ecs_vrf.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h -ecs_vrf.o: ecs_locl.h ecs_vrf.c +ecs_vrf.o: ../cryptlib.h ecs_locl.h ecs_vrf.c Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/ecdsa/ecs_vrf.c (revision 276859) @@ -1,96 +1,109 @@ /* crypto/ecdsa/ecdsa_vrf.c */ /* * Written by Nils Larsch for the OpenSSL project */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include "ecs_locl.h" +#include "cryptlib.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE #include #endif /* returns * 1: correct signature * 0: incorrect signature * -1: error */ int ECDSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey) { ECDSA_DATA *ecdsa = ecdsa_check(eckey); if (ecdsa == NULL) return 0; return ecdsa->meth->ecdsa_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, sig, eckey); } /* returns * 1: correct signature * 0: incorrect signature * -1: error */ int ECDSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey) { ECDSA_SIG *s; + const unsigned char *p = sigbuf; + unsigned char *der = NULL; + int derlen = -1; int ret=-1; s = ECDSA_SIG_new(); if (s == NULL) return(ret); - if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &sigbuf, sig_len) == NULL) goto err; + if (d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&s, &p, sig_len) == NULL) goto err; + /* Ensure signature uses DER and doesn't have trailing garbage */ + derlen = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(s, &der); + if (derlen != sig_len || memcmp(sigbuf, der, derlen)) + goto err; ret=ECDSA_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, s, eckey); err: + if (derlen > 0) + { + OPENSSL_cleanse(der, derlen); + OPENSSL_free(der); + } ECDSA_SIG_free(s); return(ret); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/evp/Makefile =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/evp/Makefile (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/evp/Makefile (revision 276859) @@ -1,728 +1,727 @@ # # OpenSSL/crypto/evp/Makefile # DIR= evp TOP= ../.. CC= cc INCLUDES= -I.. -I$(TOP) -I../../include CFLAG=-g MAKEFILE= Makefile AR= ar r CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG) GENERAL=Makefile TEST=evp_test.c TESTDATA=evptests.txt APPS= LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a LIBSRC= encode.c digest.c dig_eng.c evp_enc.c evp_key.c evp_acnf.c evp_cnf.c \ e_des.c e_bf.c e_idea.c e_des3.c e_camellia.c\ e_rc4.c e_aes.c names.c e_seed.c \ e_xcbc_d.c e_rc2.c e_cast.c e_rc5.c enc_min.c \ m_null.c m_md2.c m_md4.c m_md5.c m_sha.c m_sha1.c \ m_dss.c m_dss1.c m_mdc2.c m_ripemd.c m_ecdsa.c\ p_open.c p_seal.c p_sign.c p_verify.c p_lib.c p_enc.c p_dec.c \ bio_md.c bio_b64.c bio_enc.c evp_err.c e_null.c \ c_all.c c_allc.c c_alld.c evp_lib.c bio_ok.c \ evp_pkey.c evp_pbe.c p5_crpt.c p5_crpt2.c \ e_old.c LIBOBJ= encode.o digest.o dig_eng.o evp_enc.o evp_key.o evp_acnf.o evp_cnf.o \ e_des.o e_bf.o e_idea.o e_des3.o e_camellia.o\ e_rc4.o e_aes.o names.o e_seed.o \ e_xcbc_d.o e_rc2.o e_cast.o e_rc5.o enc_min.o \ m_null.o m_md2.o m_md4.o m_md5.o m_sha.o m_sha1.o \ m_dss.o m_dss1.o m_mdc2.o m_ripemd.o m_ecdsa.o\ p_open.o p_seal.o p_sign.o p_verify.o p_lib.o p_enc.o p_dec.o \ bio_md.o bio_b64.o bio_enc.o evp_err.o e_null.o \ c_all.o c_allc.o c_alld.o evp_lib.o bio_ok.o \ evp_pkey.o evp_pbe.o p5_crpt.o p5_crpt2.o \ e_old.o SRC= $(LIBSRC) EXHEADER= evp.h HEADER= $(EXHEADER) ALL= $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER) top: (cd ../..; $(MAKE) DIRS=crypto SDIRS=$(DIR) sub_all) all: lib lib: $(LIBOBJ) $(ARX) $(LIB) $(LIBOBJ) $(RANLIB) $(LIB) || echo Never mind. @touch lib files: $(PERL) $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile >> $(TOP)/MINFO links: @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../include/openssl $(EXHEADER) @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../test $(TEST) cp $(TESTDATA) ../../test @$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../apps $(APPS) install: @[ -n "$(INSTALLTOP)" ] # should be set by top Makefile... @headerlist="$(EXHEADER)"; for i in $$headerlist ; \ do \ (cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \ chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \ done; tags: ctags $(SRC) tests: lint: lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff depend: @[ -n "$(MAKEDEPEND)" ] # should be set by upper Makefile... $(MAKEDEPEND) -- $(CFLAG) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) -- $(LIBSRC) dclean: $(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE) clean: rm -f *.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff # DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it. bio_b64.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h bio_b64.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h bio_b64.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h bio_b64.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h bio_b64.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h bio_b64.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h bio_b64.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h bio_b64.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h bio_b64.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h bio_b64.o: ../cryptlib.h bio_b64.c bio_enc.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h bio_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h bio_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h bio_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h bio_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h bio_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h bio_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h bio_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h bio_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h bio_enc.o: ../cryptlib.h bio_enc.c bio_md.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h bio_md.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bio_md.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bio_md.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h bio_md.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h bio_md.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bio_md.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bio_md.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h bio_md.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h bio_md.c bio_ok.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h bio_ok.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h bio_ok.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h bio_ok.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h bio_ok.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h bio_ok.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h bio_ok.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h bio_ok.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h bio_ok.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h bio_ok.o: ../cryptlib.h bio_ok.c c_all.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h c_all.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h c_all.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h c_all.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h c_all.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/err.h c_all.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h c_all.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h c_all.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h c_all.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h c_all.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h c_all.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h c_all.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h c_all.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h c_all.c c_allc.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h c_allc.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h c_allc.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h c_allc.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h c_allc.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h c_allc.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h c_allc.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h c_allc.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h c_allc.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs12.h c_allc.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h c_allc.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h c_allc.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h c_allc.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h c_allc.c c_alld.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h c_alld.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h c_alld.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h c_alld.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h c_alld.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h c_alld.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h c_alld.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h c_alld.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h c_alld.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs12.h c_alld.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h c_alld.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h c_alld.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h c_alld.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h c_alld.c dig_eng.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h dig_eng.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h dig_eng.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h dig_eng.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h dig_eng.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h dig_eng.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h dig_eng.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h dig_eng.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h dig_eng.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h dig_eng.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h dig_eng.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h dig_eng.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h dig_eng.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h dig_eng.o: ../cryptlib.h dig_eng.c evp_locl.h digest.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h digest.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h digest.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h digest.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h digest.o: ../../include/openssl/engine.h ../../include/openssl/err.h digest.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h digest.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h digest.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h digest.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h digest.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h digest.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h digest.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h digest.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h digest.c evp_locl.h e_aes.o: ../../include/openssl/aes.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h e_aes.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h e_aes.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h e_aes.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h e_aes.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h e_aes.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h e_aes.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h e_aes.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h e_aes.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h e_aes.c evp_locl.h e_bf.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h e_bf.o: ../../include/openssl/blowfish.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h e_bf.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h e_bf.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h e_bf.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h e_bf.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h e_bf.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h e_bf.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h e_bf.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h e_bf.o: ../cryptlib.h e_bf.c evp_locl.h e_camellia.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h e_camellia.c e_cast.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h e_cast.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/cast.h e_cast.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h e_cast.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h e_cast.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h e_cast.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h e_cast.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h e_cast.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h e_cast.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h e_cast.o: ../cryptlib.h e_cast.c evp_locl.h e_des.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h e_des.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h e_des.o: ../../include/openssl/des.h ../../include/openssl/des_old.h e_des.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h e_des.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h e_des.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h e_des.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h e_des.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h e_des.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h e_des.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h e_des.o: ../../include/openssl/ui.h ../../include/openssl/ui_compat.h e_des.o: ../cryptlib.h e_des.c evp_locl.h e_des3.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h e_des3.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h e_des3.o: ../../include/openssl/des.h ../../include/openssl/des_old.h e_des3.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h e_des3.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h e_des3.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h e_des3.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h e_des3.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h e_des3.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h e_des3.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h e_des3.o: ../../include/openssl/ui.h ../../include/openssl/ui_compat.h e_des3.o: ../cryptlib.h e_des3.c evp_locl.h e_idea.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h e_idea.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h e_idea.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h e_idea.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h e_idea.o: ../../include/openssl/idea.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h e_idea.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h e_idea.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h e_idea.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h e_idea.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h e_idea.o: ../cryptlib.h e_idea.c evp_locl.h e_null.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h e_null.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h e_null.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h e_null.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h e_null.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h e_null.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h e_null.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h e_null.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h e_null.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h e_null.c e_old.o: e_old.c e_rc2.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h e_rc2.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h e_rc2.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h e_rc2.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h e_rc2.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h e_rc2.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h e_rc2.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h e_rc2.o: ../../include/openssl/rc2.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h e_rc2.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h e_rc2.o: ../cryptlib.h e_rc2.c evp_locl.h e_rc4.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h e_rc4.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h e_rc4.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h e_rc4.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h e_rc4.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h e_rc4.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h e_rc4.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h e_rc4.o: ../../include/openssl/rc4.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h e_rc4.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h e_rc4.o: ../cryptlib.h e_rc4.c evp_locl.h e_rc5.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h e_rc5.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h e_rc5.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h e_rc5.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h e_rc5.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h e_rc5.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h e_rc5.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h e_rc5.c e_seed.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h e_seed.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h e_seed.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h e_seed.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h e_seed.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h e_seed.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h e_seed.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h e_seed.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h e_seed.o: e_seed.c e_xcbc_d.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h e_xcbc_d.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h e_xcbc_d.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/des.h e_xcbc_d.o: ../../include/openssl/des_old.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h e_xcbc_d.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h e_xcbc_d.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h e_xcbc_d.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h e_xcbc_d.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h e_xcbc_d.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h e_xcbc_d.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h e_xcbc_d.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/ui.h e_xcbc_d.o: ../../include/openssl/ui_compat.h ../cryptlib.h e_xcbc_d.c enc_min.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h enc_min.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h enc_min.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h enc_min.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h enc_min.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h enc_min.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h enc_min.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h enc_min.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h enc_min.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h enc_min.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h enc_min.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h enc_min.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h enc_min.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h enc_min.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h enc_min.c evp_locl.h encode.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h encode.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h encode.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h encode.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h encode.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h encode.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h encode.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h encode.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h encode.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h encode.c evp_acnf.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h evp_acnf.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h evp_acnf.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h evp_acnf.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h evp_acnf.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h evp_acnf.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h evp_acnf.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h evp_acnf.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h evp_acnf.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h evp_acnf.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h evp_acnf.c evp_cnf.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/conf.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/dso.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h evp_cnf.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../../include/openssl/x509v3.h evp_cnf.o: ../cryptlib.h evp_cnf.c evp_enc.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/engine.h evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h -evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../constant_time_locl.h -evp_enc.o: ../cryptlib.h evp_enc.c evp_locl.h +evp_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h evp_enc.c evp_locl.h evp_err.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h evp_err.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h evp_err.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h evp_err.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h evp_err.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h evp_err.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h evp_err.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h evp_err.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h evp_err.o: evp_err.c evp_key.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h evp_key.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h evp_key.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h evp_key.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h evp_key.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h evp_key.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h evp_key.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h evp_key.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h evp_key.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h evp_key.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h evp_key.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h evp_key.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/ui.h evp_key.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h evp_key.o: ../cryptlib.h evp_key.c evp_lib.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h evp_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h evp_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h evp_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h evp_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h evp_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h evp_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h evp_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h evp_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h evp_lib.o: ../cryptlib.h evp_lib.c evp_pbe.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h evp_pbe.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h evp_pbe.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h evp_pbe.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h evp_pbe.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h evp_pbe.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h evp_pbe.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h evp_pbe.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h evp_pbe.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h evp_pbe.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h evp_pbe.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h evp_pbe.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h evp_pbe.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h evp_pbe.c evp_pkey.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h evp_pkey.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h evp_pkey.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h evp_pkey.o: ../../include/openssl/dsa.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h evp_pkey.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h evp_pkey.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h evp_pkey.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h evp_pkey.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h evp_pkey.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h evp_pkey.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h evp_pkey.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rand.h evp_pkey.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h evp_pkey.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h evp_pkey.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h evp_pkey.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h evp_pkey.c m_dss.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/dsa.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h m_dss.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h m_dss.c m_dss1.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/dsa.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h m_dss1.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h m_dss1.c m_ecdsa.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h m_ecdsa.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h m_ecdsa.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h m_ecdsa.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h m_ecdsa.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h m_ecdsa.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h m_ecdsa.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h m_ecdsa.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h m_ecdsa.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h m_ecdsa.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h m_ecdsa.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h m_ecdsa.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h m_ecdsa.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h m_ecdsa.c m_md2.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h m_md2.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h m_md2.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h m_md2.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h m_md2.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h m_md2.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h m_md2.o: ../../include/openssl/md2.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h m_md2.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h m_md2.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h m_md2.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h m_md2.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h m_md2.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h m_md2.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h m_md2.o: ../cryptlib.h evp_locl.h m_md2.c m_md4.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h m_md4.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h m_md4.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h m_md4.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h m_md4.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h m_md4.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h m_md4.o: ../../include/openssl/md4.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h m_md4.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h m_md4.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h m_md4.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h m_md4.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h m_md4.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h m_md4.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h m_md4.o: ../cryptlib.h evp_locl.h m_md4.c m_md5.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h m_md5.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h m_md5.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h m_md5.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h m_md5.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h m_md5.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h m_md5.o: ../../include/openssl/md5.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h m_md5.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h m_md5.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h m_md5.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h m_md5.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h m_md5.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h m_md5.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h m_md5.o: ../cryptlib.h evp_locl.h m_md5.c m_mdc2.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h m_mdc2.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h m_mdc2.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/err.h m_mdc2.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h m_mdc2.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h m_mdc2.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h m_mdc2.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../cryptlib.h evp_locl.h m_mdc2.c m_null.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h m_null.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h m_null.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h m_null.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h m_null.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h m_null.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h m_null.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h m_null.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h m_null.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h m_null.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h m_null.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h m_null.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h m_null.o: ../cryptlib.h m_null.c m_ripemd.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h m_ripemd.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h m_ripemd.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h m_ripemd.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h m_ripemd.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h m_ripemd.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h m_ripemd.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h m_ripemd.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h m_ripemd.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h m_ripemd.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/ripemd.h m_ripemd.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h m_ripemd.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h m_ripemd.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h m_ripemd.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h m_ripemd.c m_sha.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h m_sha.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h m_sha.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h m_sha.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h m_sha.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h m_sha.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h m_sha.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h m_sha.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h m_sha.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h m_sha.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h m_sha.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h m_sha.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h m_sha.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h evp_locl.h m_sha.c m_sha1.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h m_sha1.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h m_sha1.c names.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h names.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h names.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h names.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h names.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h names.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h names.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h names.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h names.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h names.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h names.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h names.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h names.o: ../cryptlib.h names.c p5_crpt.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h p5_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h p5_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h p5_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h p5_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h p5_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h p5_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h p5_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h p5_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h p5_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h p5_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h p5_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h p5_crpt.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h p5_crpt.c p5_crpt2.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h p5_crpt2.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h p5_crpt2.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h p5_crpt2.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h p5_crpt2.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h p5_crpt2.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h p5_crpt2.o: ../../include/openssl/hmac.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h p5_crpt2.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h p5_crpt2.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h p5_crpt2.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h p5_crpt2.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h p5_crpt2.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h p5_crpt2.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h p5_crpt2.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h p5_crpt2.c p_dec.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h p_dec.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h p_dec.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h p_dec.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h p_dec.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h p_dec.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h p_dec.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h p_dec.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h p_dec.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h p_dec.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h p_dec.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h p_dec.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h p_dec.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h p_dec.o: ../cryptlib.h p_dec.c p_enc.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h p_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h p_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h p_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h p_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h p_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h p_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h p_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h p_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h p_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h p_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h p_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h p_enc.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h p_enc.o: ../cryptlib.h p_enc.c p_lib.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h p_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1_mac.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h p_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/bn.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h p_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/dh.h p_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/dsa.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h p_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h p_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h p_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h p_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h p_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h p_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h p_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h p_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h p_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h p_lib.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h p_lib.o: ../cryptlib.h p_lib.c p_open.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h p_open.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h p_open.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h p_open.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h p_open.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h p_open.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h p_open.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h p_open.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h p_open.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h p_open.o: ../../include/openssl/rsa.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h p_open.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h p_open.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h p_open.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h p_open.c p_seal.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h p_seal.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h p_seal.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h p_seal.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h p_seal.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h p_seal.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h p_seal.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h p_seal.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h p_seal.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h p_seal.o: ../../include/openssl/rand.h ../../include/openssl/rsa.h p_seal.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h p_seal.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h p_seal.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h p_seal.o: ../cryptlib.h p_seal.c p_sign.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/bio.h p_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/buffer.h ../../include/openssl/crypto.h p_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h ../../include/openssl/ec.h p_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h p_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/err.h ../../include/openssl/evp.h p_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/fips.h ../../include/openssl/lhash.h p_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h ../../include/openssl/objects.h p_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h p_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h p_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/safestack.h ../../include/openssl/sha.h p_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h p_sign.o: ../../include/openssl/x509.h ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h p_sign.o: ../cryptlib.h p_sign.c p_verify.o: ../../e_os.h ../../include/openssl/asn1.h p_verify.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/buffer.h p_verify.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h p_verify.o: ../../include/openssl/ec.h ../../include/openssl/ecdh.h p_verify.o: ../../include/openssl/ecdsa.h ../../include/openssl/err.h p_verify.o: ../../include/openssl/evp.h ../../include/openssl/fips.h p_verify.o: ../../include/openssl/lhash.h ../../include/openssl/obj_mac.h p_verify.o: ../../include/openssl/objects.h ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h p_verify.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/ossl_typ.h p_verify.o: ../../include/openssl/pkcs7.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h p_verify.o: ../../include/openssl/sha.h ../../include/openssl/stack.h p_verify.o: ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h ../../include/openssl/x509.h p_verify.o: ../../include/openssl/x509_vfy.h ../cryptlib.h p_verify.c Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c (revision 276859) @@ -1,447 +1,440 @@ /* crypto/evp/evp_enc.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE #include #endif -#include "../constant_time_locl.h" #include "evp_locl.h" #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS #define M_do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl) \ EVP_Cipher(ctx,out,in,inl) #else #define M_do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl) \ ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx,out,in,inl) #endif const char EVP_version[]="EVP" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(void) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx=OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof *ctx); if (ctx) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx); return ctx; } int EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { if (cipher) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(ctx); return EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx,cipher,NULL,key,iv,enc); } int EVP_CipherUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl) { if (ctx->encrypt) return EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx,out,outl,in,inl); else return EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx,out,outl,in,inl); } int EVP_CipherFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl) { if (ctx->encrypt) return EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx,out,outl); else return EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx,out,outl); } int EVP_CipherFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl) { if (ctx->encrypt) return EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx,out,outl); else return EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx,out,outl); } int EVP_EncryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv) { return EVP_CipherInit(ctx, cipher, key, iv, 1); } int EVP_EncryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *impl, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv) { return EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, impl, key, iv, 1); } int EVP_DecryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv) { return EVP_CipherInit(ctx, cipher, key, iv, 0); } int EVP_DecryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *impl, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv) { return EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, impl, key, iv, 0); } int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl) { int i,j,bl; if (inl <= 0) { *outl = 0; return inl == 0; } if(ctx->buf_len == 0 && (inl&(ctx->block_mask)) == 0) { if(M_do_cipher(ctx,out,in,inl)) { *outl=inl; return 1; } else { *outl=0; return 0; } } i=ctx->buf_len; bl=ctx->cipher->block_size; OPENSSL_assert(bl <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf)); if (i != 0) { if (i+inl < bl) { memcpy(&(ctx->buf[i]),in,inl); ctx->buf_len+=inl; *outl=0; return 1; } else { j=bl-i; memcpy(&(ctx->buf[i]),in,j); if(!M_do_cipher(ctx,out,ctx->buf,bl)) return 0; inl-=j; in+=j; out+=bl; *outl=bl; } } else *outl = 0; i=inl&(bl-1); inl-=i; if (inl > 0) { if(!M_do_cipher(ctx,out,in,inl)) return 0; *outl+=inl; } if (i != 0) memcpy(ctx->buf,&(in[inl]),i); ctx->buf_len=i; return 1; } int EVP_EncryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl) { int ret; ret = EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, out, outl); return ret; } int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl) { int n,ret; unsigned int i, b, bl; b=ctx->cipher->block_size; OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof ctx->buf); if (b == 1) { *outl=0; return 1; } bl=ctx->buf_len; if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING) { if(bl) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX,EVP_R_DATA_NOT_MULTIPLE_OF_BLOCK_LENGTH); return 0; } *outl = 0; return 1; } n=b-bl; for (i=bl; ibuf[i]=n; ret=M_do_cipher(ctx,out,ctx->buf,b); if(ret) *outl=b; return ret; } int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl) { int fix_len; unsigned int b; if (inl <= 0) { *outl = 0; return inl == 0; } if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING) return EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl); b=ctx->cipher->block_size; OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof ctx->final); if(ctx->final_used) { memcpy(out,ctx->final,b); out+=b; fix_len = 1; } else fix_len = 0; if(!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx,out,outl,in,inl)) return 0; /* if we have 'decrypted' a multiple of block size, make sure * we have a copy of this last block */ if (b > 1 && !ctx->buf_len) { *outl-=b; ctx->final_used=1; memcpy(ctx->final,&out[*outl],b); } else ctx->final_used = 0; if (fix_len) *outl += b; return 1; } int EVP_DecryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl) { int ret; ret = EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, out, outl); return ret; } int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl) { - unsigned int i, b; - unsigned char pad, padding_good; + int i,n; + unsigned int b; *outl=0; - b=(unsigned int)(ctx->cipher->block_size); + b=ctx->cipher->block_size; if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING) { if(ctx->buf_len) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX,EVP_R_DATA_NOT_MULTIPLE_OF_BLOCK_LENGTH); return 0; } *outl = 0; return 1; } if (b > 1) { if (ctx->buf_len || !ctx->final_used) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX,EVP_R_WRONG_FINAL_BLOCK_LENGTH); return(0); } OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof ctx->final); - pad=ctx->final[b-1]; - - padding_good = (unsigned char)(~constant_time_is_zero_8(pad)); - padding_good &= constant_time_ge_8(b, pad); - - for (i = 1; i < b; ++i) + n=ctx->final[b-1]; + if (n == 0 || n > (int)b) { - unsigned char is_pad_index = constant_time_lt_8(i, pad); - unsigned char pad_byte_good = constant_time_eq_8(ctx->final[b-i-1], pad); - padding_good &= constant_time_select_8(is_pad_index, pad_byte_good, 0xff); + EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX,EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT); + return(0); } - - /* - * At least 1 byte is always padding, so we always write b - 1 - * bytes to avoid a timing leak. The caller is required to have |b| - * bytes space in |out| by the API contract. - */ - for (i = 0; i < b - 1; ++i) - out[i] = ctx->final[i] & padding_good; - /* Safe cast: for a good padding, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH >= b >= pad */ - *outl = padding_good & ((unsigned char)(b - pad)); - return padding_good & 1; + for (i=0; ifinal[--b] != n) + { + EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX,EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT); + return(0); + } + } + n=ctx->cipher->block_size-n; + for (i=0; ifinal[i]; + *outl=n; } else - { - *outl = 0; - return 1; - } + *outl=0; + return(1); } void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } } int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int keylen) { if(c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_KEY_LENGTH) return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c, EVP_CTRL_SET_KEY_LENGTH, keylen, NULL); if(c->key_len == keylen) return 1; if((keylen > 0) && (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH)) { c->key_len = keylen; return 1; } EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH,EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); return 0; } int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int pad) { if (pad) ctx->flags &= ~EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING; else ctx->flags |= EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING; return 1; } int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key) { if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY) return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_RAND_KEY, 0, key); if (RAND_bytes(key, ctx->key_len) <= 0) return 0; return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS static int do_evp_enc_engine_full(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER **pcipher, ENGINE *impl) { if(impl) { if (!ENGINE_init(impl)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_DO_EVP_ENC_ENGINE_FULL, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); return 0; } } else /* Ask if an ENGINE is reserved for this job */ impl = ENGINE_get_cipher_engine((*pcipher)->nid); if(impl) { /* There's an ENGINE for this job ... (apparently) */ const EVP_CIPHER *c = ENGINE_get_cipher(impl, (*pcipher)->nid); if(!c) { /* One positive side-effect of US's export * control history, is that we should at least * be able to avoid using US mispellings of * "initialisation"? */ EVPerr(EVP_F_DO_EVP_ENC_ENGINE_FULL, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); return 0; } /* We'll use the ENGINE's private cipher definition */ *pcipher = c; /* Store the ENGINE functional reference so we know * 'cipher' came from an ENGINE and we need to release * it when done. */ ctx->engine = impl; } else ctx->engine = NULL; return 1; } void int_EVP_CIPHER_init_engine_callbacks(void) { int_EVP_CIPHER_set_engine_callbacks( ENGINE_finish, do_evp_enc_engine_full); } #endif #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/md32_common.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/md32_common.h (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/md32_common.h (revision 276859) @@ -1,408 +1,406 @@ /* crypto/md32_common.h */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * licensing@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * */ /* * This is a generic 32 bit "collector" for message digest algorithms. * Whenever needed it collects input character stream into chunks of * 32 bit values and invokes a block function that performs actual hash * calculations. * * Porting guide. * * Obligatory macros: * * DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN or DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN * this macro defines byte order of input stream. * HASH_CBLOCK * size of a unit chunk HASH_BLOCK operates on. * HASH_LONG * has to be at lest 32 bit wide, if it's wider, then * HASH_LONG_LOG2 *has to* be defined along * HASH_CTX * context structure that at least contains following * members: * typedef struct { * ... * HASH_LONG Nl,Nh; * either { * HASH_LONG data[HASH_LBLOCK]; * unsigned char data[HASH_CBLOCK]; * }; * unsigned int num; * ... * } HASH_CTX; * data[] vector is expected to be zeroed upon first call to * HASH_UPDATE. * HASH_UPDATE * name of "Update" function, implemented here. * HASH_TRANSFORM * name of "Transform" function, implemented here. * HASH_FINAL * name of "Final" function, implemented here. * HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER * name of "block" function capable of treating *unaligned* input * message in original (data) byte order, implemented externally. * HASH_MAKE_STRING * macro convering context variables to an ASCII hash string. * * MD5 example: * * #define DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN * * #define HASH_LONG MD5_LONG * #define HASH_LONG_LOG2 MD5_LONG_LOG2 * #define HASH_CTX MD5_CTX * #define HASH_CBLOCK MD5_CBLOCK * #define HASH_UPDATE MD5_Update * #define HASH_TRANSFORM MD5_Transform * #define HASH_FINAL MD5_Final * #define HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER md5_block_data_order * * */ #if !defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) && !defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN) #error "DATA_ORDER must be defined!" #endif #ifndef HASH_CBLOCK #error "HASH_CBLOCK must be defined!" #endif #ifndef HASH_LONG #error "HASH_LONG must be defined!" #endif #ifndef HASH_CTX #error "HASH_CTX must be defined!" #endif #ifndef HASH_UPDATE #error "HASH_UPDATE must be defined!" #endif #ifndef HASH_TRANSFORM #error "HASH_TRANSFORM must be defined!" #endif #ifndef HASH_FINAL #error "HASH_FINAL must be defined!" #endif #ifndef HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER #error "HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER must be defined!" #endif /* * Engage compiler specific rotate intrinsic function if available. */ #undef ROTATE #ifndef PEDANTIC # if defined(_MSC_VER) || defined(__ICC) # define ROTATE(a,n) _lrotl(a,n) # elif defined(__MWERKS__) # if defined(__POWERPC__) # define ROTATE(a,n) __rlwinm(a,n,0,31) # elif defined(__MC68K__) /* Motorola specific tweak. */ # define ROTATE(a,n) ( n<24 ? __rol(a,n) : __ror(a,32-n) ) # else # define ROTATE(a,n) __rol(a,n) # endif # elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM) /* * Some GNU C inline assembler templates. Note that these are * rotates by *constant* number of bits! But that's exactly * what we need here... * */ # if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) # define ROTATE(a,n) ({ register unsigned int ret; \ asm ( \ "roll %1,%0" \ : "=r"(ret) \ : "I"(n), "0"(a) \ : "cc"); \ ret; \ }) # elif defined(_ARCH_PPC) || defined(_ARCH_PPC64) || \ defined(__powerpc) || defined(__ppc__) || defined(__powerpc64__) # define ROTATE(a,n) ({ register unsigned int ret; \ asm ( \ "rlwinm %0,%1,%2,0,31" \ : "=r"(ret) \ : "r"(a), "I"(n)); \ ret; \ }) # elif defined(__s390x__) # define ROTATE(a,n) ({ register unsigned int ret; \ asm ("rll %0,%1,%2" \ : "=r"(ret) \ : "r"(a), "I"(n)); \ ret; \ }) # endif # endif #endif /* PEDANTIC */ #ifndef ROTATE #define ROTATE(a,n) (((a)<<(n))|(((a)&0xffffffff)>>(32-(n)))) #endif #if defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) #ifndef PEDANTIC # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM) # if ((defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__)) && !defined(I386_ONLY)) || \ (defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__)) # if !defined(B_ENDIAN) /* * This gives ~30-40% performance improvement in SHA-256 compiled * with gcc [on P4]. Well, first macro to be frank. We can pull * this trick on x86* platforms only, because these CPUs can fetch * unaligned data without raising an exception. */ # define HOST_c2l(c,l) ({ unsigned int r=*((const unsigned int *)(c)); \ asm ("bswapl %0":"=r"(r):"0"(r)); \ (c)+=4; (l)=r; }) # define HOST_l2c(l,c) ({ unsigned int r=(l); \ asm ("bswapl %0":"=r"(r):"0"(r)); \ *((unsigned int *)(c))=r; (c)+=4; r; }) # endif # endif # endif #endif #if defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__) # define HOST_c2l(c,l) ((l)=*((const unsigned int *)(c)), (c)+=4, (l)) # define HOST_l2c(l,c) (*((unsigned int *)(c))=(l), (c)+=4, (l)) #endif #ifndef HOST_c2l #define HOST_c2l(c,l) (l =(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24), \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16), \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8), \ - l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++))) ), \ - l) + l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++))) ) ) #endif #ifndef HOST_l2c #define HOST_l2c(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff), \ l) #endif #elif defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN) #ifndef PEDANTIC # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM) # if defined(__s390x__) # define HOST_c2l(c,l) ({ asm ("lrv %0,%1" \ :"=d"(l) :"m"(*(const unsigned int *)(c)));\ (c)+=4; (l); }) # define HOST_l2c(l,c) ({ asm ("strv %1,%0" \ :"=m"(*(unsigned int *)(c)) :"d"(l));\ (c)+=4; (l); }) # endif # endif #endif #if defined(__i386) || defined(__i386__) || defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) # ifndef B_ENDIAN /* See comment in DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN section. */ # define HOST_c2l(c,l) ((l)=*((const unsigned int *)(c)), (c)+=4, l) # define HOST_l2c(l,c) (*((unsigned int *)(c))=(l), (c)+=4, l) # endif #endif #ifndef HOST_c2l #define HOST_c2l(c,l) (l =(((unsigned long)(*((c)++))) ), \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8), \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16), \ - l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24), \ - l) + l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24) ) #endif #ifndef HOST_l2c #define HOST_l2c(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \ l) #endif #endif /* * Time for some action:-) */ int HASH_UPDATE (HASH_CTX *c, const void *data_, size_t len) { const unsigned char *data=data_; unsigned char *p; HASH_LONG l; size_t n; if (len==0) return 1; l=(c->Nl+(((HASH_LONG)len)<<3))&0xffffffffUL; /* 95-05-24 eay Fixed a bug with the overflow handling, thanks to * Wei Dai for pointing it out. */ if (l < c->Nl) /* overflow */ c->Nh++; c->Nh+=(len>>29); /* might cause compiler warning on 16-bit */ c->Nl=l; n = c->num; if (n != 0) { p=(unsigned char *)c->data; if (len >= HASH_CBLOCK || len+n >= HASH_CBLOCK) { memcpy (p+n,data,HASH_CBLOCK-n); HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER (c,p,1); n = HASH_CBLOCK-n; data += n; len -= n; c->num = 0; memset (p,0,HASH_CBLOCK); /* keep it zeroed */ } else { memcpy (p+n,data,len); c->num += (unsigned int)len; return 1; } } n = len/HASH_CBLOCK; if (n > 0) { HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER (c,data,n); n *= HASH_CBLOCK; data += n; len -= n; } if (len != 0) { p = (unsigned char *)c->data; c->num = len; memcpy (p,data,len); } return 1; } void HASH_TRANSFORM (HASH_CTX *c, const unsigned char *data) { HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER (c,data,1); } int HASH_FINAL (unsigned char *md, HASH_CTX *c) { unsigned char *p = (unsigned char *)c->data; size_t n = c->num; p[n] = 0x80; /* there is always room for one */ n++; if (n > (HASH_CBLOCK-8)) { memset (p+n,0,HASH_CBLOCK-n); n=0; HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER (c,p,1); } memset (p+n,0,HASH_CBLOCK-8-n); p += HASH_CBLOCK-8; #if defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_BIG_ENDIAN) (void)HOST_l2c(c->Nh,p); (void)HOST_l2c(c->Nl,p); #elif defined(DATA_ORDER_IS_LITTLE_ENDIAN) (void)HOST_l2c(c->Nl,p); (void)HOST_l2c(c->Nh,p); #endif p -= HASH_CBLOCK; HASH_BLOCK_DATA_ORDER (c,p,1); c->num=0; memset (p,0,HASH_CBLOCK); #ifndef HASH_MAKE_STRING #error "HASH_MAKE_STRING must be defined!" #else HASH_MAKE_STRING(c,md); #endif return 1; } #ifndef MD32_REG_T #define MD32_REG_T long /* * This comment was originaly written for MD5, which is why it * discusses A-D. But it basically applies to all 32-bit digests, * which is why it was moved to common header file. * * In case you wonder why A-D are declared as long and not * as MD5_LONG. Doing so results in slight performance * boost on LP64 architectures. The catch is we don't * really care if 32 MSBs of a 64-bit register get polluted * with eventual overflows as we *save* only 32 LSBs in * *either* case. Now declaring 'em long excuses the compiler * from keeping 32 MSBs zeroed resulting in 13% performance * improvement under SPARC Solaris7/64 and 5% under AlphaLinux. * Well, to be honest it should say that this *prevents* * performance degradation. * * Apparently there're LP64 compilers that generate better * code if A-D are declared int. Most notably GCC-x86_64 * generates better code. * */ #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/opensslv.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/opensslv.h (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/opensslv.h (revision 276859) @@ -1,89 +1,89 @@ #ifndef HEADER_OPENSSLV_H #define HEADER_OPENSSLV_H /* Numeric release version identifier: * MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status * The status nibble has one of the values 0 for development, 1 to e for betas * 1 to 14, and f for release. The patch level is exactly that. * For example: * 0.9.3-dev 0x00903000 * 0.9.3-beta1 0x00903001 * 0.9.3-beta2-dev 0x00903002 * 0.9.3-beta2 0x00903002 (same as ...beta2-dev) * 0.9.3 0x0090300f * 0.9.3a 0x0090301f * 0.9.4 0x0090400f * 1.2.3z 0x102031af * * For continuity reasons (because 0.9.5 is already out, and is coded * 0x00905100), between 0.9.5 and 0.9.6 the coding of the patch level * part is slightly different, by setting the highest bit. This means * that 0.9.5a looks like this: 0x0090581f. At 0.9.6, we can start * with 0x0090600S... * * (Prior to 0.9.3-dev a different scheme was used: 0.9.2b is 0x0922.) * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for * major minor fix final patch/beta) */ -#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x009081cfL +#define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x009081dfL #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS -#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 0.9.8zc-fips 15 Oct 2014" +#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 0.9.8zd-fips 8 Jan 2015" #else -#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 0.9.8zc 15 Oct 2014" +#define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 0.9.8zd 8 Jan 2015" #endif #define OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT " part of " OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT /* The macros below are to be used for shared library (.so, .dll, ...) * versioning. That kind of versioning works a bit differently between * operating systems. The most usual scheme is to set a major and a minor * number, and have the runtime loader check that the major number is equal * to what it was at application link time, while the minor number has to * be greater or equal to what it was at application link time. With this * scheme, the version number is usually part of the file name, like this: * * libcrypto.so.0.9 * * Some unixen also make a softlink with the major verson number only: * * libcrypto.so.0 * * On Tru64 and IRIX 6.x it works a little bit differently. There, the * shared library version is stored in the file, and is actually a series * of versions, separated by colons. The rightmost version present in the * library when linking an application is stored in the application to be * matched at run time. When the application is run, a check is done to * see if the library version stored in the application matches any of the * versions in the version string of the library itself. * This version string can be constructed in any way, depending on what * kind of matching is desired. However, to implement the same scheme as * the one used in the other unixen, all compatible versions, from lowest * to highest, should be part of the string. Consecutive builds would * give the following versions strings: * * 3.0 * 3.0:3.1 * 3.0:3.1:3.2 * 4.0 * 4.0:4.1 * * Notice how version 4 is completely incompatible with version, and * therefore give the breach you can see. * * There may be other schemes as well that I haven't yet discovered. * * So, here's the way it works here: first of all, the library version * number doesn't need at all to match the overall OpenSSL version. * However, it's nice and more understandable if it actually does. * The current library version is stored in the macro SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER, * which is just a piece of text in the format "M.m.e" (Major, minor, edit). * For the sake of Tru64, IRIX, and any other OS that behaves in similar ways, * we need to keep a history of version numbers, which is done in the * macro SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY. The numbers are separated by colons and * should only keep the versions that are binary compatible with the current. */ #define SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY "" #define SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "0.9.8" #endif /* HEADER_OPENSSLV_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c (revision 276859) @@ -1,246 +1,246 @@ /* crypto/rsa/rsa_oaep.c */ /* Written by Ulf Moeller. This software is distributed on an "AS IS" basis, WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. */ /* EME-OAEP as defined in RFC 2437 (PKCS #1 v2.0) */ /* See Victor Shoup, "OAEP reconsidered," Nov. 2000, * * for problems with the security proof for the * original OAEP scheme, which EME-OAEP is based on. * * A new proof can be found in E. Fujisaki, T. Okamoto, * D. Pointcheval, J. Stern, "RSA-OEAP is Still Alive!", * Dec. 2000, . * The new proof has stronger requirements for the * underlying permutation: "partial-one-wayness" instead * of one-wayness. For the RSA function, this is * an equivalent notion. */ -#include "../constant_time_locl.h" +#include "constant_time_locl.h" #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1) #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen); int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen, const unsigned char *param, int plen) { int i, emlen = tlen - 1; unsigned char *db, *seed; unsigned char *dbmask, seedmask[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; if (flen > emlen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); return 0; } if (emlen < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); return 0; } to[0] = 0; seed = to + 1; db = to + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 1; EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, db, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL); memset(db + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0, emlen - flen - 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1); db[emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1] = 0x01; memcpy(db + emlen - flen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, from, (unsigned int) flen); if (RAND_bytes(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0) return 0; #ifdef PKCS_TESTVECT memcpy(seed, "\xaa\xfd\x12\xf6\x59\xca\xe6\x34\x89\xb4\x79\xe5\x07\x6d\xde\xc2\xf0\x6c\xb5\x8f", 20); #endif dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); if (dbmask == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } MGF1(dbmask, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); for (i = 0; i < emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) db[i] ^= dbmask[i]; MGF1(seedmask, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, db, emlen - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) seed[i] ^= seedmask[i]; OPENSSL_free(dbmask); return 1; } int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num, const unsigned char *param, int plen) { int i, dblen, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index; unsigned int good, found_one_byte; const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb; /* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes: * em = Y || maskedSeed || maskedDB */ unsigned char *db = NULL, *em = NULL, seed[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], phash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0) return -1; /* * |num| is the length of the modulus; |flen| is the length of the * encoded message. Therefore, for any |from| that was obtained by * decrypting a ciphertext, we must have |flen| <= |num|. Similarly, * num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 2 must hold for the modulus * irrespective of the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2. * This does not leak any side-channel information. */ if (num < flen || num < 2 * SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + 2) goto decoding_err; dblen = num - SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH - 1; db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen); em = OPENSSL_malloc(num); if (db == NULL || em == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto cleanup; } /* * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|. * * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL. */ memset(em, 0, num); memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen); /* * The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is * true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA * Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [...]", CRYPTO 2001). */ good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]); maskedseed = em + 1; maskeddb = em + 1 + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; MGF1(seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, maskeddb, dblen); for (i = 0; i < SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i++) seed[i] ^= maskedseed[i]; MGF1(db, dblen, seed, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH); for (i = 0; i < dblen; i++) db[i] ^= maskeddb[i]; EVP_Digest((void *)param, plen, phash, NULL, EVP_sha1(), NULL); good &= constant_time_is_zero(CRYPTO_memcmp(db, phash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH)); found_one_byte = 0; for (i = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; i < dblen; i++) { /* Padding consists of a number of 0-bytes, followed by a 1. */ unsigned int equals1 = constant_time_eq(db[i], 1); unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(db[i]); one_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_one_byte & equals1, i, one_index); found_one_byte |= equals1; good &= (found_one_byte | equals0); } good &= found_one_byte; /* * At this point |good| is zero unless the plaintext was valid, * so plaintext-awareness ensures timing side-channels are no longer a * concern. */ if (!good) goto decoding_err; msg_index = one_index + 1; mlen = dblen - msg_index; if (tlen < mlen) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE); mlen = -1; } else { memcpy(to, db + msg_index, mlen); goto cleanup; } decoding_err: /* To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not reveal * which kind of decoding error happened. */ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR); cleanup: if (db != NULL) OPENSSL_free(db); if (em != NULL) OPENSSL_free(em); return mlen; } int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen, const EVP_MD *dgst) { long i, outlen = 0; unsigned char cnt[4]; EVP_MD_CTX c; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; int mdlen; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&c); mdlen = M_EVP_MD_size(dgst); for (i = 0; outlen < len; i++) { cnt[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 255); cnt[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 255); cnt[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8)) & 255; cnt[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 255); EVP_DigestInit_ex(&c,dgst, NULL); EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, seed, seedlen); EVP_DigestUpdate(&c, cnt, 4); if (outlen + mdlen <= len) { EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, mask + outlen, NULL); outlen += mdlen; } else { EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&c, md, NULL); memcpy(mask + outlen, md, len - outlen); outlen = len; } } EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&c); return 0; } int MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len, const unsigned char *seed, long seedlen) { return PKCS1_MGF1(mask, len, seed, seedlen, EVP_sha1()); } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c (revision 276859) @@ -1,269 +1,269 @@ /* crypto/rsa/rsa_pk1.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ -#include "../constant_time_locl.h" +#include "constant_time_locl.h" #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen) { int j; unsigned char *p; if (flen > (tlen-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); return(0); } p=(unsigned char *)to; *(p++)=0; *(p++)=1; /* Private Key BT (Block Type) */ /* pad out with 0xff data */ j=tlen-3-flen; memset(p,0xff,j); p+=j; *(p++)='\0'; memcpy(p,from,(unsigned int)flen); return(1); } int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num) { int i,j; const unsigned char *p; p=from; if ((num != (flen+1)) || (*(p++) != 01)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01); return(-1); } /* scan over padding data */ j=flen-1; /* one for type. */ for (i=0; i tlen) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE); return(-1); } memcpy(to,p,(unsigned int)j); return(j); } int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen, const unsigned char *from, int flen) { int i,j; unsigned char *p; if (flen > (tlen-11)) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2,RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); return(0); } p=(unsigned char *)to; *(p++)=0; *(p++)=2; /* Public Key BT (Block Type) */ /* pad out with non-zero random data */ j=tlen-3-flen; if (RAND_bytes(p,j) <= 0) return(0); for (i=0; i num) goto err; if (num < 11) goto err; em = OPENSSL_malloc(num); if (em == NULL) { RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } memset(em, 0, num); /* * Always do this zero-padding copy (even when num == flen) to avoid * leaking that information. The copy still leaks some side-channel * information, but it's impossible to have a fixed memory access * pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of |from|. * * TODO(emilia): Consider porting BN_bn2bin_padded from BoringSSL. */ memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen); good = constant_time_is_zero(em[0]); good &= constant_time_eq(em[1], 2); found_zero_byte = 0; for (i = 2; i < num; i++) { unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(em[i]); zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i, zero_index); found_zero_byte |= equals0; } /* * PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |em|. * If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check * also fails. */ good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(zero_index), 2 + 8); /* Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte * but in this case we also do not copy the message out. */ msg_index = zero_index + 1; mlen = num - msg_index; /* For good measure, do this check in constant time as well; it could * leak something if |tlen| was assuming valid padding. */ good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(tlen), (unsigned int)(mlen)); /* * We can't continue in constant-time because we need to copy the result * and we cannot fake its length. This unavoidably leaks timing * information at the API boundary. * TODO(emilia): this could be addressed at the call site, * see BoringSSL commit 0aa0767340baf925bda4804882aab0cb974b2d26. */ if (!good) { mlen = -1; goto err; } memcpy(to, em + msg_index, mlen); err: if (em != NULL) OPENSSL_free(em); if (mlen == -1) RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR); return mlen; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/x509/x509.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/x509/x509.h (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/x509/x509.h (revision 276859) @@ -1,1357 +1,1358 @@ /* crypto/x509/x509.h */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECDH support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #ifndef HEADER_X509_H #define HEADER_X509_H #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUFFER #include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EVP #include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO #include #endif #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC #include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA #include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH #include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA #include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA #include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH #include #endif #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA #include #endif #include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 /* Under Win32 these are defined in wincrypt.h */ #undef X509_NAME #undef X509_CERT_PAIR #undef X509_EXTENSIONS #endif #define X509_FILETYPE_PEM 1 #define X509_FILETYPE_ASN1 2 #define X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT 3 #define X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE 0x0080 #define X509v3_KU_NON_REPUDIATION 0x0040 #define X509v3_KU_KEY_ENCIPHERMENT 0x0020 #define X509v3_KU_DATA_ENCIPHERMENT 0x0010 #define X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT 0x0008 #define X509v3_KU_KEY_CERT_SIGN 0x0004 #define X509v3_KU_CRL_SIGN 0x0002 #define X509v3_KU_ENCIPHER_ONLY 0x0001 #define X509v3_KU_DECIPHER_ONLY 0x8000 #define X509v3_KU_UNDEF 0xffff typedef struct X509_objects_st { int nid; int (*a2i)(void); int (*i2a)(void); } X509_OBJECTS; struct X509_algor_st { ASN1_OBJECT *algorithm; ASN1_TYPE *parameter; } /* X509_ALGOR */; DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ALGOR) typedef STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) X509_ALGORS; typedef struct X509_val_st { ASN1_TIME *notBefore; ASN1_TIME *notAfter; } X509_VAL; typedef struct X509_pubkey_st { X509_ALGOR *algor; ASN1_BIT_STRING *public_key; EVP_PKEY *pkey; } X509_PUBKEY; typedef struct X509_sig_st { X509_ALGOR *algor; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *digest; } X509_SIG; typedef struct X509_name_entry_st { ASN1_OBJECT *object; ASN1_STRING *value; int set; int size; /* temp variable */ } X509_NAME_ENTRY; DECLARE_STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) /* we always keep X509_NAMEs in 2 forms. */ struct X509_name_st { STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *entries; int modified; /* true if 'bytes' needs to be built */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BUFFER BUF_MEM *bytes; #else char *bytes; #endif unsigned long hash; /* Keep the hash around for lookups */ } /* X509_NAME */; DECLARE_STACK_OF(X509_NAME) #define X509_EX_V_NETSCAPE_HACK 0x8000 #define X509_EX_V_INIT 0x0001 typedef struct X509_extension_st { ASN1_OBJECT *object; ASN1_BOOLEAN critical; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *value; } X509_EXTENSION; typedef STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) X509_EXTENSIONS; DECLARE_STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_EXTENSION) /* a sequence of these are used */ typedef struct x509_attributes_st { ASN1_OBJECT *object; int single; /* 0 for a set, 1 for a single item (which is wrong) */ union { char *ptr; /* 0 */ STACK_OF(ASN1_TYPE) *set; /* 1 */ ASN1_TYPE *single; } value; } X509_ATTRIBUTE; DECLARE_STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) typedef struct X509_req_info_st { ASN1_ENCODING enc; ASN1_INTEGER *version; X509_NAME *subject; X509_PUBKEY *pubkey; /* d=2 hl=2 l= 0 cons: cont: 00 */ STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attributes; /* [ 0 ] */ } X509_REQ_INFO; typedef struct X509_req_st { X509_REQ_INFO *req_info; X509_ALGOR *sig_alg; ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature; int references; } X509_REQ; typedef struct x509_cinf_st { ASN1_INTEGER *version; /* [ 0 ] default of v1 */ ASN1_INTEGER *serialNumber; X509_ALGOR *signature; X509_NAME *issuer; X509_VAL *validity; X509_NAME *subject; X509_PUBKEY *key; ASN1_BIT_STRING *issuerUID; /* [ 1 ] optional in v2 */ ASN1_BIT_STRING *subjectUID; /* [ 2 ] optional in v2 */ STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *extensions; /* [ 3 ] optional in v3 */ ASN1_ENCODING enc; } X509_CINF; /* This stuff is certificate "auxiliary info" * it contains details which are useful in certificate * stores and databases. When used this is tagged onto * the end of the certificate itself */ typedef struct x509_cert_aux_st { STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *trust; /* trusted uses */ STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *reject; /* rejected uses */ ASN1_UTF8STRING *alias; /* "friendly name" */ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *keyid; /* key id of private key */ STACK_OF(X509_ALGOR) *other; /* other unspecified info */ } X509_CERT_AUX; struct x509_st { X509_CINF *cert_info; X509_ALGOR *sig_alg; ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature; int valid; int references; char *name; CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* These contain copies of various extension values */ long ex_pathlen; long ex_pcpathlen; unsigned long ex_flags; unsigned long ex_kusage; unsigned long ex_xkusage; unsigned long ex_nscert; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid; struct AUTHORITY_KEYID_st *akid; X509_POLICY_CACHE *policy_cache; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 STACK_OF(IPAddressFamily) *rfc3779_addr; struct ASIdentifiers_st *rfc3779_asid; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA unsigned char sha1_hash[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; #endif X509_CERT_AUX *aux; } /* X509 */; DECLARE_STACK_OF(X509) DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(X509) /* This is used for a table of trust checking functions */ typedef struct x509_trust_st { int trust; int flags; int (*check_trust)(struct x509_trust_st *, X509 *, int); char *name; int arg1; void *arg2; } X509_TRUST; DECLARE_STACK_OF(X509_TRUST) typedef struct x509_cert_pair_st { X509 *forward; X509 *reverse; } X509_CERT_PAIR; /* standard trust ids */ #define X509_TRUST_DEFAULT -1 /* Only valid in purpose settings */ #define X509_TRUST_COMPAT 1 #define X509_TRUST_SSL_CLIENT 2 #define X509_TRUST_SSL_SERVER 3 #define X509_TRUST_EMAIL 4 #define X509_TRUST_OBJECT_SIGN 5 #define X509_TRUST_OCSP_SIGN 6 #define X509_TRUST_OCSP_REQUEST 7 /* Keep these up to date! */ #define X509_TRUST_MIN 1 #define X509_TRUST_MAX 7 /* trust_flags values */ #define X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC 1 #define X509_TRUST_DYNAMIC_NAME 2 /* check_trust return codes */ #define X509_TRUST_TRUSTED 1 #define X509_TRUST_REJECTED 2 #define X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED 3 /* Flags for X509_print_ex() */ #define X509_FLAG_COMPAT 0 #define X509_FLAG_NO_HEADER 1L #define X509_FLAG_NO_VERSION (1L << 1) #define X509_FLAG_NO_SERIAL (1L << 2) #define X509_FLAG_NO_SIGNAME (1L << 3) #define X509_FLAG_NO_ISSUER (1L << 4) #define X509_FLAG_NO_VALIDITY (1L << 5) #define X509_FLAG_NO_SUBJECT (1L << 6) #define X509_FLAG_NO_PUBKEY (1L << 7) #define X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS (1L << 8) #define X509_FLAG_NO_SIGDUMP (1L << 9) #define X509_FLAG_NO_AUX (1L << 10) #define X509_FLAG_NO_ATTRIBUTES (1L << 11) /* Flags specific to X509_NAME_print_ex() */ /* The field separator information */ #define XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK (0xf << 16) #define XN_FLAG_COMPAT 0 /* Traditional SSLeay: use old X509_NAME_print */ #define XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS (1 << 16) /* RFC2253 ,+ */ #define XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC (2 << 16) /* ,+ spaced: more readable */ #define XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC (3 << 16) /* ;+ spaced */ #define XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE (4 << 16) /* One line per field */ #define XN_FLAG_DN_REV (1 << 20) /* Reverse DN order */ /* How the field name is shown */ #define XN_FLAG_FN_MASK (0x3 << 21) #define XN_FLAG_FN_SN 0 /* Object short name */ #define XN_FLAG_FN_LN (1 << 21) /* Object long name */ #define XN_FLAG_FN_OID (2 << 21) /* Always use OIDs */ #define XN_FLAG_FN_NONE (3 << 21) /* No field names */ #define XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ (1 << 23) /* Put spaces round '=' */ /* This determines if we dump fields we don't recognise: * RFC2253 requires this. */ #define XN_FLAG_DUMP_UNKNOWN_FIELDS (1 << 24) #define XN_FLAG_FN_ALIGN (1 << 25) /* Align field names to 20 characters */ /* Complete set of RFC2253 flags */ #define XN_FLAG_RFC2253 (ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 | \ XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS | \ XN_FLAG_DN_REV | \ XN_FLAG_FN_SN | \ XN_FLAG_DUMP_UNKNOWN_FIELDS) /* readable oneline form */ #define XN_FLAG_ONELINE (ASN1_STRFLGS_RFC2253 | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE | \ XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC | \ XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ | \ XN_FLAG_FN_SN) /* readable multiline form */ #define XN_FLAG_MULTILINE (ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL | \ ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB | \ XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE | \ XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ | \ XN_FLAG_FN_LN | \ XN_FLAG_FN_ALIGN) typedef struct X509_revoked_st { ASN1_INTEGER *serialNumber; ASN1_TIME *revocationDate; STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) /* optional */ *extensions; int sequence; /* load sequence */ } X509_REVOKED; DECLARE_STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_REVOKED) typedef struct X509_crl_info_st { ASN1_INTEGER *version; X509_ALGOR *sig_alg; X509_NAME *issuer; ASN1_TIME *lastUpdate; ASN1_TIME *nextUpdate; STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revoked; STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) /* [0] */ *extensions; ASN1_ENCODING enc; } X509_CRL_INFO; struct X509_crl_st { /* actual signature */ X509_CRL_INFO *crl; X509_ALGOR *sig_alg; ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature; int references; } /* X509_CRL */; DECLARE_STACK_OF(X509_CRL) DECLARE_ASN1_SET_OF(X509_CRL) typedef struct private_key_st { int version; /* The PKCS#8 data types */ X509_ALGOR *enc_algor; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *enc_pkey; /* encrypted pub key */ /* When decrypted, the following will not be NULL */ EVP_PKEY *dec_pkey; /* used to encrypt and decrypt */ int key_length; char *key_data; int key_free; /* true if we should auto free key_data */ /* expanded version of 'enc_algor' */ EVP_CIPHER_INFO cipher; int references; } X509_PKEY; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EVP typedef struct X509_info_st { X509 *x509; X509_CRL *crl; X509_PKEY *x_pkey; EVP_CIPHER_INFO enc_cipher; int enc_len; char *enc_data; int references; } X509_INFO; DECLARE_STACK_OF(X509_INFO) #endif /* The next 2 structures and their 8 routines were sent to me by * Pat Richard and are used to manipulate * Netscapes spki structures - useful if you are writing a CA web page */ typedef struct Netscape_spkac_st { X509_PUBKEY *pubkey; ASN1_IA5STRING *challenge; /* challenge sent in atlas >= PR2 */ } NETSCAPE_SPKAC; typedef struct Netscape_spki_st { NETSCAPE_SPKAC *spkac; /* signed public key and challenge */ X509_ALGOR *sig_algor; ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature; } NETSCAPE_SPKI; /* Netscape certificate sequence structure */ typedef struct Netscape_certificate_sequence { ASN1_OBJECT *type; STACK_OF(X509) *certs; } NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE; /* Unused (and iv length is wrong) typedef struct CBCParameter_st { unsigned char iv[8]; } CBC_PARAM; */ /* Password based encryption structure */ typedef struct PBEPARAM_st { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *salt; ASN1_INTEGER *iter; } PBEPARAM; /* Password based encryption V2 structures */ typedef struct PBE2PARAM_st { X509_ALGOR *keyfunc; X509_ALGOR *encryption; } PBE2PARAM; typedef struct PBKDF2PARAM_st { ASN1_TYPE *salt; /* Usually OCTET STRING but could be anything */ ASN1_INTEGER *iter; ASN1_INTEGER *keylength; X509_ALGOR *prf; } PBKDF2PARAM; /* PKCS#8 private key info structure */ typedef struct pkcs8_priv_key_info_st { int broken; /* Flag for various broken formats */ #define PKCS8_OK 0 #define PKCS8_NO_OCTET 1 #define PKCS8_EMBEDDED_PARAM 2 #define PKCS8_NS_DB 3 ASN1_INTEGER *version; X509_ALGOR *pkeyalg; ASN1_TYPE *pkey; /* Should be OCTET STRING but some are broken */ STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attributes; } PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO; #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #include #include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #ifdef SSLEAY_MACROS #define X509_verify(a,r) ASN1_verify((int (*)())i2d_X509_CINF,a->sig_alg,\ a->signature,(char *)a->cert_info,r) #define X509_REQ_verify(a,r) ASN1_verify((int (*)())i2d_X509_REQ_INFO, \ a->sig_alg,a->signature,(char *)a->req_info,r) #define X509_CRL_verify(a,r) ASN1_verify((int (*)())i2d_X509_CRL_INFO, \ a->sig_alg, a->signature,(char *)a->crl,r) #define X509_sign(x,pkey,md) \ ASN1_sign((int (*)())i2d_X509_CINF, x->cert_info->signature, \ x->sig_alg, x->signature, (char *)x->cert_info,pkey,md) #define X509_REQ_sign(x,pkey,md) \ ASN1_sign((int (*)())i2d_X509_REQ_INFO,x->sig_alg, NULL, \ x->signature, (char *)x->req_info,pkey,md) #define X509_CRL_sign(x,pkey,md) \ ASN1_sign((int (*)())i2d_X509_CRL_INFO,x->crl->sig_alg,x->sig_alg, \ x->signature, (char *)x->crl,pkey,md) #define NETSCAPE_SPKI_sign(x,pkey,md) \ ASN1_sign((int (*)())i2d_NETSCAPE_SPKAC, x->sig_algor,NULL, \ x->signature, (char *)x->spkac,pkey,md) #define X509_dup(x509) (X509 *)ASN1_dup((int (*)())i2d_X509, \ (char *(*)())d2i_X509,(char *)x509) #define X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup(xa) (X509_ATTRIBUTE *)ASN1_dup(\ (int (*)())i2d_X509_ATTRIBUTE, \ (char *(*)())d2i_X509_ATTRIBUTE,(char *)xa) #define X509_EXTENSION_dup(ex) (X509_EXTENSION *)ASN1_dup( \ (int (*)())i2d_X509_EXTENSION, \ (char *(*)())d2i_X509_EXTENSION,(char *)ex) #define d2i_X509_fp(fp,x509) (X509 *)ASN1_d2i_fp((char *(*)())X509_new, \ (char *(*)())d2i_X509, (fp),(unsigned char **)(x509)) #define i2d_X509_fp(fp,x509) ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_X509,fp,(unsigned char *)x509) #define d2i_X509_bio(bp,x509) (X509 *)ASN1_d2i_bio((char *(*)())X509_new, \ (char *(*)())d2i_X509, (bp),(unsigned char **)(x509)) #define i2d_X509_bio(bp,x509) ASN1_i2d_bio(i2d_X509,bp,(unsigned char *)x509) #define X509_CRL_dup(crl) (X509_CRL *)ASN1_dup((int (*)())i2d_X509_CRL, \ (char *(*)())d2i_X509_CRL,(char *)crl) #define d2i_X509_CRL_fp(fp,crl) (X509_CRL *)ASN1_d2i_fp((char *(*)()) \ X509_CRL_new,(char *(*)())d2i_X509_CRL, (fp),\ (unsigned char **)(crl)) #define i2d_X509_CRL_fp(fp,crl) ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_X509_CRL,fp,\ (unsigned char *)crl) #define d2i_X509_CRL_bio(bp,crl) (X509_CRL *)ASN1_d2i_bio((char *(*)()) \ X509_CRL_new,(char *(*)())d2i_X509_CRL, (bp),\ (unsigned char **)(crl)) #define i2d_X509_CRL_bio(bp,crl) ASN1_i2d_bio(i2d_X509_CRL,bp,\ (unsigned char *)crl) #define PKCS7_dup(p7) (PKCS7 *)ASN1_dup((int (*)())i2d_PKCS7, \ (char *(*)())d2i_PKCS7,(char *)p7) #define d2i_PKCS7_fp(fp,p7) (PKCS7 *)ASN1_d2i_fp((char *(*)()) \ PKCS7_new,(char *(*)())d2i_PKCS7, (fp),\ (unsigned char **)(p7)) #define i2d_PKCS7_fp(fp,p7) ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_PKCS7,fp,\ (unsigned char *)p7) #define d2i_PKCS7_bio(bp,p7) (PKCS7 *)ASN1_d2i_bio((char *(*)()) \ PKCS7_new,(char *(*)())d2i_PKCS7, (bp),\ (unsigned char **)(p7)) #define i2d_PKCS7_bio(bp,p7) ASN1_i2d_bio(i2d_PKCS7,bp,\ (unsigned char *)p7) #define X509_REQ_dup(req) (X509_REQ *)ASN1_dup((int (*)())i2d_X509_REQ, \ (char *(*)())d2i_X509_REQ,(char *)req) #define d2i_X509_REQ_fp(fp,req) (X509_REQ *)ASN1_d2i_fp((char *(*)())\ X509_REQ_new, (char *(*)())d2i_X509_REQ, (fp),\ (unsigned char **)(req)) #define i2d_X509_REQ_fp(fp,req) ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_X509_REQ,fp,\ (unsigned char *)req) #define d2i_X509_REQ_bio(bp,req) (X509_REQ *)ASN1_d2i_bio((char *(*)())\ X509_REQ_new, (char *(*)())d2i_X509_REQ, (bp),\ (unsigned char **)(req)) #define i2d_X509_REQ_bio(bp,req) ASN1_i2d_bio(i2d_X509_REQ,bp,\ (unsigned char *)req) #define RSAPublicKey_dup(rsa) (RSA *)ASN1_dup((int (*)())i2d_RSAPublicKey, \ (char *(*)())d2i_RSAPublicKey,(char *)rsa) #define RSAPrivateKey_dup(rsa) (RSA *)ASN1_dup((int (*)())i2d_RSAPrivateKey, \ (char *(*)())d2i_RSAPrivateKey,(char *)rsa) #define d2i_RSAPrivateKey_fp(fp,rsa) (RSA *)ASN1_d2i_fp((char *(*)())\ RSA_new,(char *(*)())d2i_RSAPrivateKey, (fp), \ (unsigned char **)(rsa)) #define i2d_RSAPrivateKey_fp(fp,rsa) ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_RSAPrivateKey,fp, \ (unsigned char *)rsa) #define d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio(bp,rsa) (RSA *)ASN1_d2i_bio((char *(*)())\ RSA_new,(char *(*)())d2i_RSAPrivateKey, (bp), \ (unsigned char **)(rsa)) #define i2d_RSAPrivateKey_bio(bp,rsa) ASN1_i2d_bio(i2d_RSAPrivateKey,bp, \ (unsigned char *)rsa) #define d2i_RSAPublicKey_fp(fp,rsa) (RSA *)ASN1_d2i_fp((char *(*)())\ RSA_new,(char *(*)())d2i_RSAPublicKey, (fp), \ (unsigned char **)(rsa)) #define i2d_RSAPublicKey_fp(fp,rsa) ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_RSAPublicKey,fp, \ (unsigned char *)rsa) #define d2i_RSAPublicKey_bio(bp,rsa) (RSA *)ASN1_d2i_bio((char *(*)())\ RSA_new,(char *(*)())d2i_RSAPublicKey, (bp), \ (unsigned char **)(rsa)) #define i2d_RSAPublicKey_bio(bp,rsa) ASN1_i2d_bio(i2d_RSAPublicKey,bp, \ (unsigned char *)rsa) #define d2i_DSAPrivateKey_fp(fp,dsa) (DSA *)ASN1_d2i_fp((char *(*)())\ DSA_new,(char *(*)())d2i_DSAPrivateKey, (fp), \ (unsigned char **)(dsa)) #define i2d_DSAPrivateKey_fp(fp,dsa) ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_DSAPrivateKey,fp, \ (unsigned char *)dsa) #define d2i_DSAPrivateKey_bio(bp,dsa) (DSA *)ASN1_d2i_bio((char *(*)())\ DSA_new,(char *(*)())d2i_DSAPrivateKey, (bp), \ (unsigned char **)(dsa)) #define i2d_DSAPrivateKey_bio(bp,dsa) ASN1_i2d_bio(i2d_DSAPrivateKey,bp, \ (unsigned char *)dsa) #define d2i_ECPrivateKey_fp(fp,ecdsa) (EC_KEY *)ASN1_d2i_fp((char *(*)())\ EC_KEY_new,(char *(*)())d2i_ECPrivateKey, (fp), \ (unsigned char **)(ecdsa)) #define i2d_ECPrivateKey_fp(fp,ecdsa) ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_ECPrivateKey,fp, \ (unsigned char *)ecdsa) #define d2i_ECPrivateKey_bio(bp,ecdsa) (EC_KEY *)ASN1_d2i_bio((char *(*)())\ EC_KEY_new,(char *(*)())d2i_ECPrivateKey, (bp), \ (unsigned char **)(ecdsa)) #define i2d_ECPrivateKey_bio(bp,ecdsa) ASN1_i2d_bio(i2d_ECPrivateKey,bp, \ (unsigned char *)ecdsa) #define X509_ALGOR_dup(xn) (X509_ALGOR *)ASN1_dup((int (*)())i2d_X509_ALGOR,\ (char *(*)())d2i_X509_ALGOR,(char *)xn) #define X509_NAME_dup(xn) (X509_NAME *)ASN1_dup((int (*)())i2d_X509_NAME, \ (char *(*)())d2i_X509_NAME,(char *)xn) #define X509_NAME_ENTRY_dup(ne) (X509_NAME_ENTRY *)ASN1_dup( \ (int (*)())i2d_X509_NAME_ENTRY, \ (char *(*)())d2i_X509_NAME_ENTRY,\ (char *)ne) #define X509_digest(data,type,md,len) \ ASN1_digest((int (*)())i2d_X509,type,(char *)data,md,len) #define X509_NAME_digest(data,type,md,len) \ ASN1_digest((int (*)())i2d_X509_NAME,type,(char *)data,md,len) #ifndef PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_digest #define PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_digest(data,type,md,len) \ ASN1_digest((int (*)())i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL,type,\ (char *)data,md,len) #endif #endif #define X509_EXT_PACK_UNKNOWN 1 #define X509_EXT_PACK_STRING 2 #define X509_get_version(x) ASN1_INTEGER_get((x)->cert_info->version) /* #define X509_get_serialNumber(x) ((x)->cert_info->serialNumber) */ #define X509_get_notBefore(x) ((x)->cert_info->validity->notBefore) #define X509_get_notAfter(x) ((x)->cert_info->validity->notAfter) #define X509_extract_key(x) X509_get_pubkey(x) /*****/ #define X509_REQ_get_version(x) ASN1_INTEGER_get((x)->req_info->version) #define X509_REQ_get_subject_name(x) ((x)->req_info->subject) #define X509_REQ_extract_key(a) X509_REQ_get_pubkey(a) #define X509_name_cmp(a,b) X509_NAME_cmp((a),(b)) #define X509_get_signature_type(x) EVP_PKEY_type(OBJ_obj2nid((x)->sig_alg->algorithm)) #define X509_CRL_get_version(x) ASN1_INTEGER_get((x)->crl->version) #define X509_CRL_get_lastUpdate(x) ((x)->crl->lastUpdate) #define X509_CRL_get_nextUpdate(x) ((x)->crl->nextUpdate) #define X509_CRL_get_issuer(x) ((x)->crl->issuer) #define X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(x) ((x)->crl->revoked) /* This one is only used so that a binary form can output, as in * i2d_X509_NAME(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(x),&buf) */ #define X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(x) ((x)->cert_info->key) const char *X509_verify_cert_error_string(long n); #ifndef SSLEAY_MACROS #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EVP int X509_verify(X509 *a, EVP_PKEY *r); int X509_REQ_verify(X509_REQ *a, EVP_PKEY *r); int X509_CRL_verify(X509_CRL *a, EVP_PKEY *r); int NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify(NETSCAPE_SPKI *a, EVP_PKEY *r); NETSCAPE_SPKI * NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode(const char *str, int len); char * NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_encode(NETSCAPE_SPKI *x); EVP_PKEY *NETSCAPE_SPKI_get_pubkey(NETSCAPE_SPKI *x); int NETSCAPE_SPKI_set_pubkey(NETSCAPE_SPKI *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int NETSCAPE_SPKI_print(BIO *out, NETSCAPE_SPKI *spki); int X509_signature_print(BIO *bp,X509_ALGOR *alg, ASN1_STRING *sig); int X509_sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md); int X509_REQ_sign(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md); int X509_CRL_sign(X509_CRL *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md); int NETSCAPE_SPKI_sign(NETSCAPE_SPKI *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md); int X509_pubkey_digest(const X509 *data,const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len); int X509_digest(const X509 *data,const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len); int X509_CRL_digest(const X509_CRL *data,const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len); int X509_REQ_digest(const X509_REQ *data,const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len); int X509_NAME_digest(const X509_NAME *data,const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API X509 *d2i_X509_fp(FILE *fp, X509 **x509); int i2d_X509_fp(FILE *fp,X509 *x509); X509_CRL *d2i_X509_CRL_fp(FILE *fp,X509_CRL **crl); int i2d_X509_CRL_fp(FILE *fp,X509_CRL *crl); X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ_fp(FILE *fp,X509_REQ **req); int i2d_X509_REQ_fp(FILE *fp,X509_REQ *req); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *d2i_RSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp,RSA **rsa); int i2d_RSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp,RSA *rsa); RSA *d2i_RSAPublicKey_fp(FILE *fp,RSA **rsa); int i2d_RSAPublicKey_fp(FILE *fp,RSA *rsa); RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp,RSA **rsa); int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp,RSA *rsa); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, DSA **dsa); int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, DSA *dsa); DSA *d2i_DSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, DSA **dsa); int i2d_DSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, DSA *dsa); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY **eckey); int i2d_EC_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY *eckey); EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY **eckey); int i2d_ECPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY *eckey); #endif X509_SIG *d2i_PKCS8_fp(FILE *fp,X509_SIG **p8); int i2d_PKCS8_fp(FILE *fp,X509_SIG *p8); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO **p8inf); int i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp(FILE *fp,PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf); int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKeyInfo_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *key); int i2d_PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *pkey); EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **a); int i2d_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *pkey); EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **a); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO X509 *d2i_X509_bio(BIO *bp,X509 **x509); int i2d_X509_bio(BIO *bp,X509 *x509); X509_CRL *d2i_X509_CRL_bio(BIO *bp,X509_CRL **crl); int i2d_X509_CRL_bio(BIO *bp,X509_CRL *crl); X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ_bio(BIO *bp,X509_REQ **req); int i2d_X509_REQ_bio(BIO *bp,X509_REQ *req); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp,RSA **rsa); int i2d_RSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp,RSA *rsa); RSA *d2i_RSAPublicKey_bio(BIO *bp,RSA **rsa); int i2d_RSAPublicKey_bio(BIO *bp,RSA *rsa); RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp,RSA **rsa); int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp,RSA *rsa); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, DSA **dsa); int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, DSA *dsa); DSA *d2i_DSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, DSA **dsa); int i2d_DSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, DSA *dsa); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY **eckey); int i2d_EC_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY *eckey); EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY **eckey); int i2d_ECPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY *eckey); #endif X509_SIG *d2i_PKCS8_bio(BIO *bp,X509_SIG **p8); int i2d_PKCS8_bio(BIO *bp,X509_SIG *p8); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO **p8inf); int i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(BIO *bp,PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf); int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKeyInfo_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *key); int i2d_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *pkey); EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **a); int i2d_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *pkey); EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **a); #endif X509 *X509_dup(X509 *x509); X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup(X509_ATTRIBUTE *xa); X509_EXTENSION *X509_EXTENSION_dup(X509_EXTENSION *ex); X509_CRL *X509_CRL_dup(X509_CRL *crl); X509_REQ *X509_REQ_dup(X509_REQ *req); X509_ALGOR *X509_ALGOR_dup(X509_ALGOR *xn); int X509_ALGOR_set0(X509_ALGOR *alg, ASN1_OBJECT *aobj, int ptype, void *pval); void X509_ALGOR_get0(ASN1_OBJECT **paobj, int *pptype, void **ppval, X509_ALGOR *algor); +int X509_ALGOR_cmp(const X509_ALGOR *a, const X509_ALGOR *b); X509_NAME *X509_NAME_dup(X509_NAME *xn); X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_dup(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne); #endif /* !SSLEAY_MACROS */ int X509_cmp_time(ASN1_TIME *s, time_t *t); int X509_cmp_current_time(ASN1_TIME *s); ASN1_TIME * X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj, time_t *t); ASN1_TIME * X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj); const char * X509_get_default_cert_area(void ); const char * X509_get_default_cert_dir(void ); const char * X509_get_default_cert_file(void ); const char * X509_get_default_cert_dir_env(void ); const char * X509_get_default_cert_file_env(void ); const char * X509_get_default_private_dir(void ); X509_REQ * X509_to_X509_REQ(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md); X509 * X509_REQ_to_X509(X509_REQ *r, int days,EVP_PKEY *pkey); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_ALGOR) DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(X509_ALGORS, X509_ALGORS, X509_ALGORS) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_VAL) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_PUBKEY) int X509_PUBKEY_set(X509_PUBKEY **x, EVP_PKEY *pkey); EVP_PKEY * X509_PUBKEY_get(X509_PUBKEY *key); int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain); int i2d_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY *a,unsigned char **pp); EVP_PKEY * d2i_PUBKEY(EVP_PKEY **a,const unsigned char **pp, long length); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY(RSA *a,unsigned char **pp); RSA * d2i_RSA_PUBKEY(RSA **a,const unsigned char **pp, long length); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA *a,unsigned char **pp); DSA * d2i_DSA_PUBKEY(DSA **a,const unsigned char **pp, long length); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int i2d_EC_PUBKEY(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **pp); EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length); #endif DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_SIG) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REQ_INFO) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REQ) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_ATTRIBUTE) X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create(int nid, int atrtype, void *value); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_EXTENSION) DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(X509_EXTENSIONS, X509_EXTENSIONS, X509_EXTENSIONS) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_NAME_ENTRY) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_NAME) int X509_NAME_set(X509_NAME **xn, X509_NAME *name); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CINF) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CERT_AUX) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CERT_PAIR) int X509_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); int X509_set_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx, void *arg); void *X509_get_ex_data(X509 *r, int idx); int i2d_X509_AUX(X509 *a,unsigned char **pp); X509 * d2i_X509_AUX(X509 **a,const unsigned char **pp,long length); int X509_alias_set1(X509 *x, unsigned char *name, int len); int X509_keyid_set1(X509 *x, unsigned char *id, int len); unsigned char * X509_alias_get0(X509 *x, int *len); unsigned char * X509_keyid_get0(X509 *x, int *len); int (*X509_TRUST_set_default(int (*trust)(int , X509 *, int)))(int, X509 *, int); int X509_TRUST_set(int *t, int trust); int X509_add1_trust_object(X509 *x, ASN1_OBJECT *obj); int X509_add1_reject_object(X509 *x, ASN1_OBJECT *obj); void X509_trust_clear(X509 *x); void X509_reject_clear(X509 *x); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_REVOKED) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL_INFO) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_CRL) int X509_CRL_add0_revoked(X509_CRL *crl, X509_REVOKED *rev); X509_PKEY * X509_PKEY_new(void ); void X509_PKEY_free(X509_PKEY *a); int i2d_X509_PKEY(X509_PKEY *a,unsigned char **pp); X509_PKEY * d2i_X509_PKEY(X509_PKEY **a,const unsigned char **pp,long length); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(NETSCAPE_SPKI) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(NETSCAPE_SPKAC) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EVP X509_INFO * X509_INFO_new(void); void X509_INFO_free(X509_INFO *a); char * X509_NAME_oneline(X509_NAME *a,char *buf,int size); int ASN1_verify(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *algor1, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,char *data,EVP_PKEY *pkey); int ASN1_digest(i2d_of_void *i2d,const EVP_MD *type,char *data, unsigned char *md,unsigned int *len); int ASN1_sign(i2d_of_void *i2d, X509_ALGOR *algor1, X509_ALGOR *algor2, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, char *data,EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *type); int ASN1_item_digest(const ASN1_ITEM *it,const EVP_MD *type,void *data, unsigned char *md,unsigned int *len); int ASN1_item_verify(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *algor1, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature,void *data,EVP_PKEY *pkey); int ASN1_item_sign(const ASN1_ITEM *it, X509_ALGOR *algor1, X509_ALGOR *algor2, ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature, void *data, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *type); #endif int X509_set_version(X509 *x,long version); int X509_set_serialNumber(X509 *x, ASN1_INTEGER *serial); ASN1_INTEGER * X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *x); int X509_set_issuer_name(X509 *x, X509_NAME *name); X509_NAME * X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a); int X509_set_subject_name(X509 *x, X509_NAME *name); X509_NAME * X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a); int X509_set_notBefore(X509 *x, ASN1_TIME *tm); int X509_set_notAfter(X509 *x, ASN1_TIME *tm); int X509_set_pubkey(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey); EVP_PKEY * X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x); ASN1_BIT_STRING * X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x); int X509_certificate_type(X509 *x,EVP_PKEY *pubkey /* optional */); int X509_REQ_set_version(X509_REQ *x,long version); int X509_REQ_set_subject_name(X509_REQ *req,X509_NAME *name); int X509_REQ_set_pubkey(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey); EVP_PKEY * X509_REQ_get_pubkey(X509_REQ *req); int X509_REQ_extension_nid(int nid); int * X509_REQ_get_extension_nids(void); void X509_REQ_set_extension_nids(int *nids); STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509_REQ_get_extensions(X509_REQ *req); int X509_REQ_add_extensions_nid(X509_REQ *req, STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts, int nid); int X509_REQ_add_extensions(X509_REQ *req, STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts); int X509_REQ_get_attr_count(const X509_REQ *req); int X509_REQ_get_attr_by_NID(const X509_REQ *req, int nid, int lastpos); int X509_REQ_get_attr_by_OBJ(const X509_REQ *req, ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_REQ_get_attr(const X509_REQ *req, int loc); X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_REQ_delete_attr(X509_REQ *req, int loc); int X509_REQ_add1_attr(X509_REQ *req, X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr); int X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_OBJ(X509_REQ *req, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); int X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_NID(X509_REQ *req, int nid, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); int X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_txt(X509_REQ *req, const char *attrname, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); int X509_CRL_set_version(X509_CRL *x, long version); int X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(X509_CRL *x, X509_NAME *name); int X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(X509_CRL *x, ASN1_TIME *tm); int X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(X509_CRL *x, ASN1_TIME *tm); int X509_CRL_sort(X509_CRL *crl); int X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber(X509_REVOKED *x, ASN1_INTEGER *serial); int X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate(X509_REVOKED *r, ASN1_TIME *tm); int X509_REQ_check_private_key(X509_REQ *x509,EVP_PKEY *pkey); int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x509,EVP_PKEY *pkey); int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b); unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a); int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b); unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *a); int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b); unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x); int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b); int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b); unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x); int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API int X509_print_ex_fp(FILE *bp,X509 *x, unsigned long nmflag, unsigned long cflag); int X509_print_fp(FILE *bp,X509 *x); int X509_CRL_print_fp(FILE *bp,X509_CRL *x); int X509_REQ_print_fp(FILE *bp,X509_REQ *req); int X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(FILE *fp, X509_NAME *nm, int indent, unsigned long flags); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO int X509_NAME_print(BIO *bp, X509_NAME *name, int obase); int X509_NAME_print_ex(BIO *out, X509_NAME *nm, int indent, unsigned long flags); int X509_print_ex(BIO *bp,X509 *x, unsigned long nmflag, unsigned long cflag); int X509_print(BIO *bp,X509 *x); int X509_ocspid_print(BIO *bp,X509 *x); int X509_CERT_AUX_print(BIO *bp,X509_CERT_AUX *x, int indent); int X509_CRL_print(BIO *bp,X509_CRL *x); int X509_REQ_print_ex(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *x, unsigned long nmflag, unsigned long cflag); int X509_REQ_print(BIO *bp,X509_REQ *req); #endif int X509_NAME_entry_count(X509_NAME *name); int X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, char *buf,int len); int X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, ASN1_OBJECT *obj, char *buf,int len); /* NOTE: you should be passsing -1, not 0 as lastpos. The functions that use * lastpos, search after that position on. */ int X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(X509_NAME *name,int nid,int lastpos); int X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name,ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_get_entry(X509_NAME *name, int loc); X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_delete_entry(X509_NAME *name, int loc); int X509_NAME_add_entry(X509_NAME *name,X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, int loc, int set); int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ(X509_NAME *name, ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc, int set); int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(X509_NAME *name, int nid, int type, unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc, int set); X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, const char *field, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, int nid, int type,unsigned char *bytes, int len); int X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(X509_NAME *name, const char *field, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len, int loc, int set); X509_NAME_ENTRY *X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ(X509_NAME_ENTRY **ne, ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type,const unsigned char *bytes, int len); int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, ASN1_OBJECT *obj); int X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); ASN1_OBJECT * X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne); ASN1_STRING * X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne); int X509v3_get_ext_count(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x); int X509v3_get_ext_by_NID(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int nid, int lastpos); int X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, ASN1_OBJECT *obj,int lastpos); int X509v3_get_ext_by_critical(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int crit, int lastpos); X509_EXTENSION *X509v3_get_ext(const STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int loc); X509_EXTENSION *X509v3_delete_ext(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *x, int loc); STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *X509v3_add_ext(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc); int X509_get_ext_count(X509 *x); int X509_get_ext_by_NID(X509 *x, int nid, int lastpos); int X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(X509 *x,ASN1_OBJECT *obj,int lastpos); int X509_get_ext_by_critical(X509 *x, int crit, int lastpos); X509_EXTENSION *X509_get_ext(X509 *x, int loc); X509_EXTENSION *X509_delete_ext(X509 *x, int loc); int X509_add_ext(X509 *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc); void * X509_get_ext_d2i(X509 *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx); int X509_add1_ext_i2d(X509 *x, int nid, void *value, int crit, unsigned long flags); int X509_CRL_get_ext_count(X509_CRL *x); int X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(X509_CRL *x, int nid, int lastpos); int X509_CRL_get_ext_by_OBJ(X509_CRL *x,ASN1_OBJECT *obj,int lastpos); int X509_CRL_get_ext_by_critical(X509_CRL *x, int crit, int lastpos); X509_EXTENSION *X509_CRL_get_ext(X509_CRL *x, int loc); X509_EXTENSION *X509_CRL_delete_ext(X509_CRL *x, int loc); int X509_CRL_add_ext(X509_CRL *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc); void * X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(X509_CRL *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx); int X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(X509_CRL *x, int nid, void *value, int crit, unsigned long flags); int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_count(X509_REVOKED *x); int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_NID(X509_REVOKED *x, int nid, int lastpos); int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_OBJ(X509_REVOKED *x,ASN1_OBJECT *obj,int lastpos); int X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_critical(X509_REVOKED *x, int crit, int lastpos); X509_EXTENSION *X509_REVOKED_get_ext(X509_REVOKED *x, int loc); X509_EXTENSION *X509_REVOKED_delete_ext(X509_REVOKED *x, int loc); int X509_REVOKED_add_ext(X509_REVOKED *x, X509_EXTENSION *ex, int loc); void * X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i(X509_REVOKED *x, int nid, int *crit, int *idx); int X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d(X509_REVOKED *x, int nid, void *value, int crit, unsigned long flags); X509_EXTENSION *X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID(X509_EXTENSION **ex, int nid, int crit, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data); X509_EXTENSION *X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ(X509_EXTENSION **ex, ASN1_OBJECT *obj,int crit,ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data); int X509_EXTENSION_set_object(X509_EXTENSION *ex,ASN1_OBJECT *obj); int X509_EXTENSION_set_critical(X509_EXTENSION *ex, int crit); int X509_EXTENSION_set_data(X509_EXTENSION *ex, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *data); ASN1_OBJECT * X509_EXTENSION_get_object(X509_EXTENSION *ex); ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_EXTENSION *ne); int X509_EXTENSION_get_critical(X509_EXTENSION *ex); int X509at_get_attr_count(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x); int X509at_get_attr_by_NID(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, int nid, int lastpos); int X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *sk, ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509at_get_attr(const STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, int loc); X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509at_delete_attr(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, int loc); STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) **x, X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr); STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr_by_OBJ(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) **x, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr_by_NID(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) **x, int nid, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *X509at_add1_attr_by_txt(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) **x, const char *attrname, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); void *X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *x, ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos, int type); X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_NID(X509_ATTRIBUTE **attr, int nid, int atrtype, const void *data, int len); X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_OBJ(X509_ATTRIBUTE **attr, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int atrtype, const void *data, int len); X509_ATTRIBUTE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_txt(X509_ATTRIBUTE **attr, const char *atrname, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); int X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_object(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj); int X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, int attrtype, const void *data, int len); void *X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_data(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, int idx, int atrtype, void *data); int X509_ATTRIBUTE_count(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr); ASN1_OBJECT *X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_object(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr); ASN1_TYPE *X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type(X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr, int idx); int EVP_PKEY_get_attr_count(const EVP_PKEY *key); int EVP_PKEY_get_attr_by_NID(const EVP_PKEY *key, int nid, int lastpos); int EVP_PKEY_get_attr_by_OBJ(const EVP_PKEY *key, ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int lastpos); X509_ATTRIBUTE *EVP_PKEY_get_attr(const EVP_PKEY *key, int loc); X509_ATTRIBUTE *EVP_PKEY_delete_attr(EVP_PKEY *key, int loc); int EVP_PKEY_add1_attr(EVP_PKEY *key, X509_ATTRIBUTE *attr); int EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_OBJ(EVP_PKEY *key, const ASN1_OBJECT *obj, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); int EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_NID(EVP_PKEY *key, int nid, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); int EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_txt(EVP_PKEY *key, const char *attrname, int type, const unsigned char *bytes, int len); int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* lookup a cert from a X509 STACK */ X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk,X509_NAME *name, ASN1_INTEGER *serial); X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk,X509_NAME *name); DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PBEPARAM) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PBE2PARAM) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PBKDF2PARAM) X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe_set(int alg, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen); X509_ALGOR *PKCS5_pbe2_set(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, int iter, unsigned char *salt, int saltlen); /* PKCS#8 utilities */ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO) EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKCS82PKEY(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(EVP_PKEY *pkey); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *EVP_PKEY2PKCS8_broken(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int broken); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *PKCS8_set_broken(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, int broken); int X509_check_trust(X509 *x, int id, int flags); int X509_TRUST_get_count(void); X509_TRUST * X509_TRUST_get0(int idx); int X509_TRUST_get_by_id(int id); int X509_TRUST_add(int id, int flags, int (*ck)(X509_TRUST *, X509 *, int), char *name, int arg1, void *arg2); void X509_TRUST_cleanup(void); int X509_TRUST_get_flags(X509_TRUST *xp); char *X509_TRUST_get0_name(X509_TRUST *xp); int X509_TRUST_get_trust(X509_TRUST *xp); /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ void ERR_load_X509_strings(void); /* Error codes for the X509 functions. */ /* Function codes. */ #define X509_F_ADD_CERT_DIR 100 #define X509_F_BY_FILE_CTRL 101 #define X509_F_CHECK_POLICY 145 #define X509_F_DIR_CTRL 102 #define X509_F_GET_CERT_BY_SUBJECT 103 #define X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_DECODE 129 #define X509_F_NETSCAPE_SPKI_B64_ENCODE 130 #define X509_F_X509AT_ADD1_ATTR 135 #define X509_F_X509V3_ADD_EXT 104 #define X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_NID 136 #define X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_OBJ 137 #define X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_CREATE_BY_TXT 140 #define X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_GET0_DATA 139 #define X509_F_X509_ATTRIBUTE_SET1_DATA 138 #define X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY 128 #define X509_F_X509_CRL_PRINT_FP 147 #define X509_F_X509_EXTENSION_CREATE_BY_NID 108 #define X509_F_X509_EXTENSION_CREATE_BY_OBJ 109 #define X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS 110 #define X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_CRL_FILE 132 #define X509_F_X509_LOAD_CERT_FILE 111 #define X509_F_X509_LOAD_CRL_FILE 112 #define X509_F_X509_NAME_ADD_ENTRY 113 #define X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_CREATE_BY_NID 114 #define X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_CREATE_BY_TXT 131 #define X509_F_X509_NAME_ENTRY_SET_OBJECT 115 #define X509_F_X509_NAME_ONELINE 116 #define X509_F_X509_NAME_PRINT 117 #define X509_F_X509_PRINT_EX_FP 118 #define X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_GET 119 #define X509_F_X509_PUBKEY_SET 120 #define X509_F_X509_REQ_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY 144 #define X509_F_X509_REQ_PRINT_EX 121 #define X509_F_X509_REQ_PRINT_FP 122 #define X509_F_X509_REQ_TO_X509 123 #define X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CERT 124 #define X509_F_X509_STORE_ADD_CRL 125 #define X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_GET1_ISSUER 146 #define X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT 143 #define X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW 142 #define X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT 134 #define X509_F_X509_TO_X509_REQ 126 #define X509_F_X509_TRUST_ADD 133 #define X509_F_X509_TRUST_SET 141 #define X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT 127 /* Reason codes. */ #define X509_R_BAD_X509_FILETYPE 100 #define X509_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR 118 #define X509_R_CANT_CHECK_DH_KEY 114 #define X509_R_CERT_ALREADY_IN_HASH_TABLE 101 #define X509_R_ERR_ASN1_LIB 102 #define X509_R_INVALID_DIRECTORY 113 #define X509_R_INVALID_FIELD_NAME 119 #define X509_R_INVALID_TRUST 123 #define X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH 115 #define X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH 116 #define X509_R_LOADING_CERT_DIR 103 #define X509_R_LOADING_DEFAULTS 104 #define X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY 105 #define X509_R_SHOULD_RETRY 106 #define X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN 107 #define X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY 108 #define X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE 117 #define X509_R_UNKNOWN_NID 109 #define X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID 121 #define X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID 120 #define X509_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM 111 #define X509_R_WRONG_LOOKUP_TYPE 112 #define X509_R_WRONG_TYPE 122 #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/x509/x_all.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/x509/x_all.c (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/crypto/x509/x_all.c (revision 276859) @@ -1,523 +1,525 @@ /* crypto/x509/x_all.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #undef SSLEAY_MACROS #include #include "cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA #include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA #include #endif int X509_verify(X509 *a, EVP_PKEY *r) { + if (X509_ALGOR_cmp(a->sig_alg, a->cert_info->signature)) + return 0; return(ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF),a->sig_alg, a->signature,a->cert_info,r)); } int X509_REQ_verify(X509_REQ *a, EVP_PKEY *r) { return( ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ_INFO), a->sig_alg,a->signature,a->req_info,r)); } int X509_CRL_verify(X509_CRL *a, EVP_PKEY *r) { return(ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL_INFO), a->sig_alg, a->signature,a->crl,r)); } int NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify(NETSCAPE_SPKI *a, EVP_PKEY *r) { return(ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(NETSCAPE_SPKAC), a->sig_algor,a->signature,a->spkac,r)); } int X509_sign(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md) { x->cert_info->enc.modified = 1; return(ASN1_item_sign(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CINF), x->cert_info->signature, x->sig_alg, x->signature, x->cert_info,pkey,md)); } int X509_REQ_sign(X509_REQ *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md) { return(ASN1_item_sign(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ_INFO),x->sig_alg, NULL, x->signature, x->req_info,pkey,md)); } int X509_CRL_sign(X509_CRL *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md) { x->crl->enc.modified = 1; return(ASN1_item_sign(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL_INFO),x->crl->sig_alg, x->sig_alg, x->signature, x->crl,pkey,md)); } int NETSCAPE_SPKI_sign(NETSCAPE_SPKI *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, const EVP_MD *md) { return(ASN1_item_sign(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(NETSCAPE_SPKAC), x->sig_algor,NULL, x->signature, x->spkac,pkey,md)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API X509 *d2i_X509_fp(FILE *fp, X509 **x509) { return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509), fp, x509); } int i2d_X509_fp(FILE *fp, X509 *x509) { return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509), fp, x509); } #endif X509 *d2i_X509_bio(BIO *bp, X509 **x509) { return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509), bp, x509); } int i2d_X509_bio(BIO *bp, X509 *x509) { return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509), bp, x509); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API X509_CRL *d2i_X509_CRL_fp(FILE *fp, X509_CRL **crl) { return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL), fp, crl); } int i2d_X509_CRL_fp(FILE *fp, X509_CRL *crl) { return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL), fp, crl); } #endif X509_CRL *d2i_X509_CRL_bio(BIO *bp, X509_CRL **crl) { return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL), bp, crl); } int i2d_X509_CRL_bio(BIO *bp, X509_CRL *crl) { return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL), bp, crl); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API PKCS7 *d2i_PKCS7_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS7 **p7) { return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7), fp, p7); } int i2d_PKCS7_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS7 *p7) { return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7), fp, p7); } #endif PKCS7 *d2i_PKCS7_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS7 **p7) { return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7), bp, p7); } int i2d_PKCS7_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS7 *p7) { return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7), bp, p7); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ_fp(FILE *fp, X509_REQ **req) { return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ), fp, req); } int i2d_X509_REQ_fp(FILE *fp, X509_REQ *req) { return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ), fp, req); } #endif X509_REQ *d2i_X509_REQ_bio(BIO *bp, X509_REQ **req) { return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ), bp, req); } int i2d_X509_REQ_bio(BIO *bp, X509_REQ *req) { return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ), bp, req); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API RSA *d2i_RSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA **rsa) { return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPrivateKey), fp, rsa); } int i2d_RSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *rsa) { return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPrivateKey), fp, rsa); } RSA *d2i_RSAPublicKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA **rsa) { return ASN1_item_d2i_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), fp, rsa); } RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, RSA **rsa) { return ASN1_d2i_fp((void *(*)(void)) RSA_new,(D2I_OF(void))d2i_RSA_PUBKEY, fp, (void **)rsa); } int i2d_RSAPublicKey_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *rsa) { return ASN1_item_i2d_fp(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), fp, rsa); } int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, RSA *rsa) { return ASN1_i2d_fp((I2D_OF(void))i2d_RSA_PUBKEY,fp,rsa); } #endif RSA *d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA **rsa) { return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPrivateKey), bp, rsa); } int i2d_RSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA *rsa) { return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPrivateKey), bp, rsa); } RSA *d2i_RSAPublicKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA **rsa) { return ASN1_item_d2i_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), bp, rsa); } RSA *d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, RSA **rsa) { return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(RSA,RSA_new,d2i_RSA_PUBKEY,bp,rsa); } int i2d_RSAPublicKey_bio(BIO *bp, RSA *rsa) { return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSAPublicKey), bp, rsa); } int i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, RSA *rsa) { return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(RSA,i2d_RSA_PUBKEY,bp,rsa); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API DSA *d2i_DSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, DSA **dsa) { return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(DSA,DSA_new,d2i_DSAPrivateKey,fp,dsa); } int i2d_DSAPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, DSA *dsa) { return ASN1_i2d_fp_of_const(DSA,i2d_DSAPrivateKey,fp,dsa); } DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, DSA **dsa) { return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(DSA,DSA_new,d2i_DSA_PUBKEY,fp,dsa); } int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, DSA *dsa) { return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(DSA,i2d_DSA_PUBKEY,fp,dsa); } #endif DSA *d2i_DSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, DSA **dsa) { return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(DSA,DSA_new,d2i_DSAPrivateKey,bp,dsa ); } int i2d_DSAPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, DSA *dsa) { return ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(DSA,i2d_DSAPrivateKey,bp,dsa); } DSA *d2i_DSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, DSA **dsa) { return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(DSA,DSA_new,d2i_DSA_PUBKEY,bp,dsa); } int i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, DSA *dsa) { return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(DSA,i2d_DSA_PUBKEY,bp,dsa); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY **eckey) { return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(EC_KEY,EC_KEY_new,d2i_EC_PUBKEY,fp,eckey); } int i2d_EC_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY *eckey) { return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(EC_KEY,i2d_EC_PUBKEY,fp,eckey); } EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY **eckey) { return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(EC_KEY,EC_KEY_new,d2i_ECPrivateKey,fp,eckey); } int i2d_ECPrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EC_KEY *eckey) { return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(EC_KEY,i2d_ECPrivateKey,fp,eckey); } #endif EC_KEY *d2i_EC_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY **eckey) { return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(EC_KEY,EC_KEY_new,d2i_EC_PUBKEY,bp,eckey); } int i2d_EC_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY *ecdsa) { return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(EC_KEY,i2d_EC_PUBKEY,bp,ecdsa); } EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY **eckey) { return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(EC_KEY,EC_KEY_new,d2i_ECPrivateKey,bp,eckey); } int i2d_ECPrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EC_KEY *eckey) { return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(EC_KEY,i2d_ECPrivateKey,bp,eckey); } #endif int X509_pubkey_digest(const X509 *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len) { ASN1_BIT_STRING *key; key = X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(data); if(!key) return 0; return EVP_Digest(key->data, key->length, md, len, type, NULL); } int X509_digest(const X509 *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len) { return(ASN1_item_digest(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509),type,(char *)data,md,len)); } int X509_CRL_digest(const X509_CRL *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len) { return(ASN1_item_digest(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_CRL),type,(char *)data,md,len)); } int X509_REQ_digest(const X509_REQ *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len) { return(ASN1_item_digest(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_REQ),type,(char *)data,md,len)); } int X509_NAME_digest(const X509_NAME *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len) { return(ASN1_item_digest(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_NAME),type,(char *)data,md,len)); } int PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_digest(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL *data, const EVP_MD *type, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *len) { return(ASN1_item_digest(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL),type, (char *)data,md,len)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API X509_SIG *d2i_PKCS8_fp(FILE *fp, X509_SIG **p8) { return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(X509_SIG,X509_SIG_new,d2i_X509_SIG,fp,p8); } int i2d_PKCS8_fp(FILE *fp, X509_SIG *p8) { return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(X509_SIG,i2d_X509_SIG,fp,p8); } #endif X509_SIG *d2i_PKCS8_bio(BIO *bp, X509_SIG **p8) { return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(X509_SIG,X509_SIG_new,d2i_X509_SIG,bp,p8); } int i2d_PKCS8_bio(BIO *bp, X509_SIG *p8) { return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(X509_SIG,i2d_X509_SIG,bp,p8); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO **p8inf) { return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO,PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_new, d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO,fp,p8inf); } int i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp(FILE *fp, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf) { return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO,i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO,fp, p8inf); } int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKeyInfo_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *key) { PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf; int ret; p8inf = EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(key); if(!p8inf) return 0; ret = i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp(fp, p8inf); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf); return ret; } int i2d_PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(EVP_PKEY,i2d_PrivateKey,fp,pkey); } EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **a) { return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(EVP_PKEY,EVP_PKEY_new,d2i_AutoPrivateKey,fp,a); } int i2d_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return ASN1_i2d_fp_of(EVP_PKEY,i2d_PUBKEY,fp,pkey); } EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY_fp(FILE *fp, EVP_PKEY **a) { return ASN1_d2i_fp_of(EVP_PKEY,EVP_PKEY_new,d2i_PUBKEY,fp,a); } #endif PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO **p8inf) { return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO,PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_new, d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO,bp,p8inf); } int i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(BIO *bp, PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf) { return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO,i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO,bp, p8inf); } int i2d_PKCS8PrivateKeyInfo_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *key) { PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf; int ret; p8inf = EVP_PKEY2PKCS8(key); if(!p8inf) return 0; ret = i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio(bp, p8inf); PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free(p8inf); return ret; } int i2d_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(EVP_PKEY,i2d_PrivateKey,bp,pkey); } EVP_PKEY *d2i_PrivateKey_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **a) { return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(EVP_PKEY,EVP_PKEY_new,d2i_AutoPrivateKey,bp,a); } int i2d_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return ASN1_i2d_bio_of(EVP_PKEY,i2d_PUBKEY,bp,pkey); } EVP_PKEY *d2i_PUBKEY_bio(BIO *bp, EVP_PKEY **a) { return ASN1_d2i_bio_of(EVP_PKEY,EVP_PKEY_new,d2i_PUBKEY,bp,a); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_mode.pod (revision 276859) @@ -1,87 +1,91 @@ =pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_mode, SSL_set_mode, SSL_CTX_get_mode, SSL_get_mode - manipulate SSL engine mode =head1 SYNOPSIS #include long SSL_CTX_set_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx, long mode); long SSL_set_mode(SSL *ssl, long mode); long SSL_CTX_get_mode(SSL_CTX *ctx); long SSL_get_mode(SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_mode() adds the mode set via bitmask in B to B. Options already set before are not cleared. SSL_set_mode() adds the mode set via bitmask in B to B. Options already set before are not cleared. SSL_CTX_get_mode() returns the mode set for B. SSL_get_mode() returns the mode set for B. =head1 NOTES The following mode changes are available: =over 4 =item SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE Allow SSL_write(..., n) to return r with 0 < r < n (i.e. report success when just a single record has been written). When not set (the default), SSL_write() will only report success once the complete chunk was written. Once SSL_write() returns with r, r bytes have been successfully written and the next call to SSL_write() must only send the n-r bytes left, imitating the behaviour of write(). =item SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER Make it possible to retry SSL_write() with changed buffer location (the buffer contents must stay the same). This is not the default to avoid the misconception that non-blocking SSL_write() behaves like non-blocking write(). =item SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY Never bother the application with retries if the transport is blocking. If a renegotiation take place during normal operation, a L or L would return with -1 and indicate the need to retry with SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ. In a non-blocking environment applications must be prepared to handle incomplete read/write operations. In a blocking environment, applications are not always prepared to deal with read/write operations returning without success report. The flag SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY will cause read/write operations to only return after the handshake and successful completion. -=item SSL_MODE_FALLBACK_SCSV +=item SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello. -To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol +To be set only by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. + +DO NOT ENABLE THIS if your application attempts a normal handshake. +Only use this in explicit fallback retries, following the guidance +in draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00. =back =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CTX_set_mode() and SSL_set_mode() return the new mode bitmask after adding B. SSL_CTX_get_mode() and SSL_get_mode() return the current bitmask. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L =head1 HISTORY SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY as been added in OpenSSL 0.9.6. =cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_options.pod (revision 276859) @@ -1,348 +1,340 @@ =pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_options, SSL_set_options, SSL_CTX_clear_options, SSL_clear_options, SSL_CTX_get_options, SSL_get_options, SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support - manipulate SSL options =head1 SYNOPSIS #include long SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, long options); long SSL_set_options(SSL *ssl, long options); long SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, long options); long SSL_clear_options(SSL *ssl, long options); long SSL_CTX_get_options(SSL_CTX *ctx); long SSL_get_options(SSL *ssl); long SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION Note: all these functions are implemented using macros. SSL_CTX_set_options() adds the options set via bitmask in B to B. Options already set before are not cleared! SSL_set_options() adds the options set via bitmask in B to B. Options already set before are not cleared! SSL_CTX_clear_options() clears the options set via bitmask in B to B. SSL_clear_options() clears the options set via bitmask in B to B. SSL_CTX_get_options() returns the options set for B. SSL_get_options() returns the options set for B. SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() indicates whether the peer supports secure renegotiation. =head1 NOTES The behaviour of the SSL library can be changed by setting several options. The options are coded as bitmasks and can be combined by a logical B operation (|). SSL_CTX_set_options() and SSL_set_options() affect the (external) protocol behaviour of the SSL library. The (internal) behaviour of the API can be changed by using the similar L and SSL_set_mode() functions. During a handshake, the option settings of the SSL object are used. When a new SSL object is created from a context using SSL_new(), the current option setting is copied. Changes to B do not affect already created SSL objects. SSL_clear() does not affect the settings. The following B options are available: =over 4 =item SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG www.microsoft.com - when talking SSLv2, if session-id reuse is performed, the session-id passed back in the server-finished message is different from the one decided upon. =item SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG Netscape-Commerce/1.12, when talking SSLv2, accepts a 32 byte challenge but then appears to only use 16 bytes when generating the encryption keys. Using 16 bytes is ok but it should be ok to use 32. According to the SSLv3 spec, one should use 32 bytes for the challenge when operating in SSLv2/v3 compatibility mode, but as mentioned above, this breaks this server so 16 bytes is the way to go. =item SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG As of OpenSSL 0.9.8q and 1.0.0c, this option has no effect. =item SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG ... =item SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER ... =item SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG Don't prefer ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be Safari on OS X. OS X 10.8..10.8.3 has broken support for ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers. =item SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG ... =item SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG ... =item SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG ... =item SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS Disables a countermeasure against a SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 protocol vulnerability affecting CBC ciphers, which cannot be handled by some broken SSL implementations. This option has no effect for connections using other ciphers. =item SSL_OP_ALL All of the above bug workarounds. =back It is usually safe to use B to enable the bug workaround options if compatibility with somewhat broken implementations is desired. The following B options are available: =over 4 =item SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG Disable version rollback attack detection. During the client key exchange, the client must send the same information about acceptable SSL/TLS protocol levels as during the first hello. Some clients violate this rule by adapting to the server's answer. (Example: the client sends a SSLv2 hello and accepts up to SSLv3.1=TLSv1, the server only understands up to SSLv3. In this case the client must still use the same SSLv3.1=TLSv1 announcement. Some clients step down to SSLv3 with respect to the server's answer and violate the version rollback protection.) =item SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE Always create a new key when using temporary/ephemeral DH parameters (see L). This option must be used to prevent small subgroup attacks, when the DH parameters were not generated using "strong" primes (e.g. when using DSA-parameters, see L). If "strong" primes were used, it is not strictly necessary to generate a new DH key during each handshake but it is also recommended. B should therefore be enabled whenever temporary/ephemeral DH parameters are used. =item SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA -Always use ephemeral (temporary) RSA key when doing RSA operations -(see L). -According to the specifications this is only done, when a RSA key -can only be used for signature operations (namely under export ciphers -with restricted RSA keylength). By setting this option, ephemeral -RSA keys are always used. This option breaks compatibility with the -SSL/TLS specifications and may lead to interoperability problems with -clients and should therefore never be used. Ciphers with EDH (ephemeral -Diffie-Hellman) key exchange should be used instead. +This option is no longer implemented and is treated as no op. =item SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE When choosing a cipher, use the server's preferences instead of the client preferences. When not set, the SSL server will always follow the clients preferences. When set, the SSLv3/TLSv1 server will choose following its own preferences. Because of the different protocol, for SSLv2 the server will send its list of preferences to the client and the client chooses. =item SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1 ... =item SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2 ... =item SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG If we accept a netscape connection, demand a client cert, have a non-self-signed CA which does not have its CA in netscape, and the browser has a cert, it will crash/hang. Works for 3.x and 4.xbeta =item SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG ... =item SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 Do not use the SSLv2 protocol. =item SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 Do not use the SSLv3 protocol. =item SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 Do not use the TLSv1 protocol. =item SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION When performing renegotiation as a server, always start a new session (i.e., session resumption requests are only accepted in the initial handshake). This option is not needed for clients. =item SSL_OP_NO_TICKET Normally clients and servers will, where possible, transparently make use of RFC4507bis tickets for stateless session resumption if extension support is explicitly set when OpenSSL is compiled. If this option is set this functionality is disabled and tickets will not be used by clients or servers. =item SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION Allow legacy insecure renegotiation between OpenSSL and unpatched clients or servers. See the B section for more details. =item SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT Allow legacy insecure renegotiation between OpenSSL and unpatched servers B: this option is currently set by default. See the B section for more details. =back =head1 SECURE RENEGOTIATION OpenSSL 0.9.8m and later always attempts to use secure renegotiation as described in RFC5746. This counters the prefix attack described in CVE-2009-3555 and elsewhere. The deprecated and highly broken SSLv2 protocol does not support renegotiation at all: its use is B discouraged. This attack has far reaching consequences which application writers should be aware of. In the description below an implementation supporting secure renegotiation is referred to as I. A server not supporting secure renegotiation is referred to as I. The following sections describe the operations permitted by OpenSSL's secure renegotiation implementation. =head2 Patched client and server Connections and renegotiation are always permitted by OpenSSL implementations. =head2 Unpatched client and patched OpenSSL server The initial connection succeeds but client renegotiation is denied by the server with a B warning alert if TLS v1.0 is used or a fatal B alert in SSL v3.0. If the patched OpenSSL server attempts to renegotiate a fatal B alert is sent. This is because the server code may be unaware of the unpatched nature of the client. If the option B is set then renegotiation B succeeds. B a bug in OpenSSL clients earlier than 0.9.8m (all of which are unpatched) will result in the connection hanging if it receives a B alert. OpenSSL versions 0.9.8m and later will regard a B alert as fatal and respond with a fatal B alert. This is because the OpenSSL API currently has no provision to indicate to an application that a renegotiation attempt was refused. =head2 Patched OpenSSL client and unpatched server. If the option B or B is set then initial connections and renegotiation between patched OpenSSL clients and unpatched servers succeeds. If neither option is set then initial connections to unpatched servers will fail. The option B is currently set by default even though it has security implications: otherwise it would be impossible to connect to unpatched servers (i.e. all of them initially) and this is clearly not acceptable. Renegotiation is permitted because this does not add any additional security issues: during an attack clients do not see any renegotiations anyway. As more servers become patched the option B will B be set by default in a future version of OpenSSL. OpenSSL client applications wishing to ensure they can connect to unpatched servers should always B B OpenSSL client applications that want to ensure they can B connect to unpatched servers (and thus avoid any security issues) should always B B using SSL_CTX_clear_options() or SSL_clear_options(). The difference between the B and B options is that B enables initial connections and secure renegotiation between OpenSSL clients and unpatched servers B, while B allows initial connections and renegotiation between OpenSSL and unpatched clients or servers. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CTX_set_options() and SSL_set_options() return the new options bitmask after adding B. SSL_CTX_clear_options() and SSL_clear_options() return the new options bitmask after clearing B. SSL_CTX_get_options() and SSL_get_options() return the current bitmask. SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() returns 1 is the peer supports secure renegotiation and 0 if it does not. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY B and B have been added in OpenSSL 0.9.7. B has been added in OpenSSL 0.9.6 and was automatically enabled with B. As of 0.9.7, it is no longer included in B and must be explicitly set. B has been added in OpenSSL 0.9.6e. Versions up to OpenSSL 0.9.6c do not include the countermeasure that can be disabled with this option (in OpenSSL 0.9.6d, it was always enabled). SSL_CTX_clear_options() and SSL_clear_options() were first added in OpenSSL 0.9.8m. B, B and the function SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() were first added in OpenSSL 0.9.8m. =cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback.pod =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback.pod (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/doc/ssl/SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback.pod (revision 276859) @@ -1,166 +1,159 @@ =pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa, SSL_CTX_need_tmp_rsa, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa, SSL_need_tmp_rsa - handle RSA keys for ephemeral key exchange =head1 SYNOPSIS #include void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *(*tmp_rsa_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); long SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa); long SSL_CTX_need_tmp_rsa(SSL_CTX *ctx); void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *(*tmp_rsa_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)); long SSL_set_tmp_rsa(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa) long SSL_need_tmp_rsa(SSL *ssl) RSA *(*tmp_rsa_callback)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback() sets the callback function for B to be used when a temporary/ephemeral RSA key is required to B. The callback is inherited by all SSL objects newly created from B with . Already created SSL objects are not affected. SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa() sets the temporary/ephemeral RSA key to be used to be B. The key is inherited by all SSL objects newly created from B with . Already created SSL objects are not affected. SSL_CTX_need_tmp_rsa() returns 1, if a temporary/ephemeral RSA key is needed for RSA-based strength-limited 'exportable' ciphersuites because a RSA key with a keysize larger than 512 bits is installed. SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback() sets the callback only for B. SSL_set_tmp_rsa() sets the key only for B. SSL_need_tmp_rsa() returns 1, if a temporary/ephemeral RSA key is needed, for RSA-based strength-limited 'exportable' ciphersuites because a RSA key with a keysize larger than 512 bits is installed. These functions apply to SSL/TLS servers only. =head1 NOTES When using a cipher with RSA authentication, an ephemeral RSA key exchange can take place. In this case the session data are negotiated using the ephemeral/temporary RSA key and the RSA key supplied and certified by the certificate chain is only used for signing. Under previous export restrictions, ciphers with RSA keys shorter (512 bits) than the usual key length of 1024 bits were created. To use these ciphers with RSA keys of usual length, an ephemeral key exchange must be performed, as the normal (certified) key cannot be directly used. Using ephemeral RSA key exchange yields forward secrecy, as the connection can only be decrypted, when the RSA key is known. By generating a temporary RSA key inside the server application that is lost when the application is left, it becomes impossible for an attacker to decrypt past sessions, even if he gets hold of the normal (certified) RSA key, as this key was used for signing only. The downside is that creating a RSA key is computationally expensive. Additionally, the use of ephemeral RSA key exchange is only allowed in the TLS standard, when the RSA key can be used for signing only, that is for export ciphers. Using ephemeral RSA key exchange for other purposes violates the standard and can break interoperability with clients. It is therefore strongly recommended to not use ephemeral RSA key exchange and use EDH (Ephemeral Diffie-Hellman) key exchange instead in order to achieve forward secrecy (see L). -On OpenSSL servers ephemeral RSA key exchange is therefore disabled by default -and must be explicitly enabled using the SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA option of -L, violating the TLS/SSL -standard. When ephemeral RSA key exchange is required for export ciphers, -it will automatically be used without this option! - -An application may either directly specify the key or can supply the key via -a callback function. The callback approach has the advantage, that the -callback may generate the key only in case it is actually needed. As the -generation of a RSA key is however costly, it will lead to a significant -delay in the handshake procedure. Another advantage of the callback function -is that it can supply keys of different size (e.g. for SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA -usage) while the explicit setting of the key is only useful for key size of -512 bits to satisfy the export restricted ciphers and does give away key length -if a longer key would be allowed. +An application may either directly specify the key or can supply the key via a +callback function. The callback approach has the advantage, that the callback +may generate the key only in case it is actually needed. As the generation of a +RSA key is however costly, it will lead to a significant delay in the handshake +procedure. Another advantage of the callback function is that it can supply +keys of different size while the explicit setting of the key is only useful for +key size of 512 bits to satisfy the export restricted ciphers and does give +away key length if a longer key would be allowed. The B is called with the B needed and the B information. The B flag is set, when the ephemeral RSA key exchange is performed with an export cipher. =head1 EXAMPLES Generate temporary RSA keys to prepare ephemeral RSA key exchange. As the generation of a RSA key costs a lot of computer time, they saved for later reuse. For demonstration purposes, two keys for 512 bits and 1024 bits respectively are generated. ... /* Set up ephemeral RSA stuff */ RSA *rsa_512 = NULL; RSA *rsa_1024 = NULL; rsa_512 = RSA_generate_key(512,RSA_F4,NULL,NULL); if (rsa_512 == NULL) evaluate_error_queue(); rsa_1024 = RSA_generate_key(1024,RSA_F4,NULL,NULL); if (rsa_1024 == NULL) evaluate_error_queue(); ... RSA *tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *s, int is_export, int keylength) { RSA *rsa_tmp=NULL; switch (keylength) { case 512: if (rsa_512) rsa_tmp = rsa_512; else { /* generate on the fly, should not happen in this example */ rsa_tmp = RSA_generate_key(keylength,RSA_F4,NULL,NULL); rsa_512 = rsa_tmp; /* Remember for later reuse */ } break; case 1024: if (rsa_1024) rsa_tmp=rsa_1024; else should_not_happen_in_this_example(); break; default: /* Generating a key on the fly is very costly, so use what is there */ if (rsa_1024) rsa_tmp=rsa_1024; else rsa_tmp=rsa_512; /* Use at least a shorter key */ } return(rsa_tmp); } =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback() and SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback() do not return diagnostic output. SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa() and SSL_set_tmp_rsa() do return 1 on success and 0 on failure. Check the error queue to find out the reason of failure. SSL_CTX_need_tmp_rsa() and SSL_need_tmp_rsa() return 1 if a temporary RSA key is needed and 0 otherwise. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L =cut Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/e_os.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/e_os.h (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/e_os.h (revision 276859) @@ -1,718 +1,726 @@ /* e_os.h */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #ifndef HEADER_E_OS_H #define HEADER_E_OS_H #include #include /* contains what we can justify to make visible * to the outside; this file e_os.h is not part of the exported * interface. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* Used to checking reference counts, most while doing perl5 stuff :-) */ #ifdef REF_PRINT #undef REF_PRINT #define REF_PRINT(a,b) fprintf(stderr,"%08X:%4d:%s\n",(int)b,b->references,a) #endif #ifndef DEVRANDOM /* set this to a comma-separated list of 'random' device files to try out. * My default, we will try to read at least one of these files */ #define DEVRANDOM "/dev/urandom","/dev/random","/dev/srandom" #endif #ifndef DEVRANDOM_EGD /* set this to a comma-seperated list of 'egd' sockets to try out. These * sockets will be tried in the order listed in case accessing the device files * listed in DEVRANDOM did not return enough entropy. */ #define DEVRANDOM_EGD "/var/run/egd-pool","/dev/egd-pool","/etc/egd-pool","/etc/entropy" #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) # define NO_SYS_PARAM_H # define NO_CHMOD # define NO_SYSLOG #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC) # if macintosh==1 # ifndef MAC_OS_GUSI_SOURCE # define MAC_OS_pre_X # define NO_SYS_TYPES_H typedef long ssize_t; # endif # define NO_SYS_PARAM_H # define NO_CHMOD # define NO_SYSLOG # undef DEVRANDOM # define GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS # endif #endif /******************************************************************** The Microsoft section ********************************************************************/ /* The following is used becaue of the small stack in some * Microsoft operating systems */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_WIN32) # define MS_STATIC static #else # define MS_STATIC #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) && !defined(WIN32) # define WIN32 #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) && !defined(WIN16) # define WIN16 #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(WINDOWS) # define WINDOWS #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(MSDOS) # define MSDOS #endif #if defined(MSDOS) && !defined(GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS) # define GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS #endif #ifdef WIN32 #define get_last_sys_error() GetLastError() #define clear_sys_error() SetLastError(0) #if !defined(WINNT) #define WIN_CONSOLE_BUG #endif #else #define get_last_sys_error() errno #define clear_sys_error() errno=0 #endif #if defined(WINDOWS) #define get_last_socket_error() WSAGetLastError() #define clear_socket_error() WSASetLastError(0) #define readsocket(s,b,n) recv((s),(b),(n),0) #define writesocket(s,b,n) send((s),(b),(n),0) #elif defined(__DJGPP__) #define WATT32 #define get_last_socket_error() errno #define clear_socket_error() errno=0 #define closesocket(s) close_s(s) #define readsocket(s,b,n) read_s(s,b,n) #define writesocket(s,b,n) send(s,b,n,0) #elif defined(MAC_OS_pre_X) #define get_last_socket_error() errno #define clear_socket_error() errno=0 #define closesocket(s) MacSocket_close(s) #define readsocket(s,b,n) MacSocket_recv((s),(b),(n),true) #define writesocket(s,b,n) MacSocket_send((s),(b),(n)) #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) #define get_last_socket_error() errno #define clear_socket_error() errno=0 #define ioctlsocket(a,b,c) ioctl(a,b,c) #define closesocket(s) close(s) #define readsocket(s,b,n) recv((s),(b),(n),0) #define writesocket(s,b,n) send((s),(b),(n),0) #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) #define get_last_socket_error() errno #define clear_socket_error() errno=0 #define ioctlsocket(a,b,c) ioctl((a),(b),(int)(c)) #define closesocket(s) close(s) #define readsocket(s,b,n) read((s),(b),(n)) #define writesocket(s,b,n) write((s),(char *)(b),(n)) #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) #if defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK) #define get_last_socket_error() errno #define clear_socket_error() errno=0 #define closesocket(s) close(s) #define ioctlsocket(a,b,c) ioctl(a,b,c) #if defined(NETWARE_LIBC) #define readsocket(s,b,n) recv((s),(b),(n),0) #define writesocket(s,b,n) send((s),(b),(n),0) #else #define readsocket(s,b,n) recv((s),(char*)(b),(n),0) #define writesocket(s,b,n) send((s),(char*)(b),(n),0) #endif #else #define get_last_socket_error() WSAGetLastError() #define clear_socket_error() WSASetLastError(0) #define readsocket(s,b,n) recv((s),(b),(n),0) #define writesocket(s,b,n) send((s),(b),(n),0) #endif #else #define get_last_socket_error() errno #define clear_socket_error() errno=0 #define ioctlsocket(a,b,c) ioctl(a,b,c) #define closesocket(s) close(s) #define readsocket(s,b,n) read((s),(b),(n)) #define writesocket(s,b,n) write((s),(b),(n)) #endif #ifdef WIN16 # define MS_CALLBACK _far _loadds # define MS_FAR _far #else # define MS_CALLBACK # define MS_FAR #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO # undef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API # define OPENSSL_NO_FP_API #endif #if (defined(WINDOWS) || defined(MSDOS)) # ifdef __DJGPP__ # include # include # include # include # include # define _setmode setmode # define _O_TEXT O_TEXT # define _O_BINARY O_BINARY # undef DEVRANDOM # define DEVRANDOM "/dev/urandom\x24" # endif /* __DJGPP__ */ # ifndef S_IFDIR # define S_IFDIR _S_IFDIR # endif # ifndef S_IFMT # define S_IFMT _S_IFMT # endif # if !defined(WINNT) && !defined(__DJGPP__) # define NO_SYSLOG # endif # define NO_DIRENT # ifdef WINDOWS # if !defined(_WIN32_WCE) && !defined(_WIN32_WINNT) /* * Defining _WIN32_WINNT here in e_os.h implies certain "discipline." * Most notably we ought to check for availability of each specific * routine with GetProcAddress() and/or quard NT-specific calls with * GetVersion() < 0x80000000. One can argue that in latter "or" case * we ought to /DELAYLOAD some .DLLs in order to protect ourselves * against run-time link errors. This doesn't seem to be necessary, * because it turned out that already Windows 95, first non-NT Win32 * implementation, is equipped with at least NT 3.51 stubs, dummy * routines with same name, but which do nothing. Meaning that it's * apparently appropriate to guard generic NT calls with GetVersion * alone, while NT 4.0 and above calls ought to be additionally * checked upon with GetProcAddress. */ # define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0400 # endif # include # include # include # include # include # ifdef _WIN64 # define strlen(s) _strlen31(s) /* cut strings to 2GB */ -static unsigned int _strlen31(const char *str) +static __inline unsigned int _strlen31(const char *str) { unsigned int len=0; while (*str && len<0x80000000U) str++, len++; return len&0x7FFFFFFF; } # endif # include # if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER<=1200 && defined(_MT) && defined(isspace) /* compensate for bug in VC6 ctype.h */ # undef isspace # undef isdigit # undef isalnum # undef isupper # undef isxdigit # endif # if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(_DLL) && defined(stdin) # if _MSC_VER>=1300 # undef stdin # undef stdout # undef stderr FILE *__iob_func(); # define stdin (&__iob_func()[0]) # define stdout (&__iob_func()[1]) # define stderr (&__iob_func()[2]) # elif defined(I_CAN_LIVE_WITH_LNK4049) # undef stdin # undef stdout # undef stderr /* pre-1300 has __p__iob(), but it's available only in msvcrt.lib, * or in other words with /MD. Declaring implicit import, i.e. * with _imp_ prefix, works correctly with all compiler options, * but without /MD results in LINK warning LNK4049: * 'locally defined symbol "__iob" imported'. */ extern FILE *_imp___iob; # define stdin (&_imp___iob[0]) # define stdout (&_imp___iob[1]) # define stderr (&_imp___iob[2]) # endif # endif # endif # include # include # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE # include # endif # define ssize_t long # if defined (__BORLANDC__) # define _setmode setmode # define _O_TEXT O_TEXT # define _O_BINARY O_BINARY # define _int64 __int64 # define _kbhit kbhit # endif # if defined(WIN16) && defined(SSLEAY) && defined(_WINEXITNOPERSIST) # define EXIT(n) _wsetexit(_WINEXITNOPERSIST) # define OPENSSL_EXIT(n) do { if (n == 0) EXIT(n); return(n); } while(0) # else # define EXIT(n) exit(n) # endif # define LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR ';' # ifndef X_OK # define X_OK 0 # endif # ifndef W_OK # define W_OK 2 # endif # ifndef R_OK # define R_OK 4 # endif # define OPENSSL_CONF "openssl.cnf" # define SSLEAY_CONF OPENSSL_CONF # define NUL_DEV "nul" # define RFILE ".rnd" # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE # define DEFAULT_HOME "" # else # define DEFAULT_HOME "C:" # endif -/* - * Visual Studio: inline is available in C++ only, however - * __inline is available for C, see - * http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/z8y1yy88.aspx - */ -#if defined(_MSC_VER) && !defined(__cplusplus) && !defined(inline) -# define inline __inline -#endif - #else /* The non-microsoft world */ # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS # define VMS 1 /* some programs don't include stdlib, so exit() and others give implicit function warnings */ # include # if defined(__DECC) # include # else # include # endif # define OPENSSL_CONF "openssl.cnf" # define SSLEAY_CONF OPENSSL_CONF # define RFILE ".rnd" # define LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR ',' # define NUL_DEV "NLA0:" /* We don't have any well-defined random devices on VMS, yet... */ # undef DEVRANDOM /* We need to do this since VMS has the following coding on status codes: Bits 0-2: status type: 0 = warning, 1 = success, 2 = error, 3 = info ... The important thing to know is that odd numbers are considered good, while even ones are considered errors. Bits 3-15: actual status number Bits 16-27: facility number. 0 is considered "unknown" Bits 28-31: control bits. If bit 28 is set, the shell won't try to output the message (which, for random codes, just looks ugly) So, what we do here is to change 0 to 1 to get the default success status, and everything else is shifted up to fit into the status number field, and the status is tagged as an error, which I believe is what is wanted here. -- Richard Levitte */ # define EXIT(n) do { int __VMS_EXIT = n; \ if (__VMS_EXIT == 0) \ __VMS_EXIT = 1; \ else \ __VMS_EXIT = (n << 3) | 2; \ __VMS_EXIT |= 0x10000000; \ exit(__VMS_EXIT); } while(0) # define NO_SYS_PARAM_H # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) # include # include # define NO_SYS_TYPES_H # undef DEVRANDOM # ifdef NETWARE_CLIB # define getpid GetThreadID extern int GetThreadID(void); /* # include */ extern int kbhit(void); extern void delay(unsigned milliseconds); # else # include # endif # define NO_SYSLOG # define _setmode setmode # define _kbhit kbhit # define _O_TEXT O_TEXT # define _O_BINARY O_BINARY # define OPENSSL_CONF "openssl.cnf" # define SSLEAY_CONF OPENSSL_CONF # define RFILE ".rnd" # define LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR ';' # define EXIT(n) { if (n) printf("ERROR: %d\n", (int)n); exit(n); } # else /* !defined VMS */ # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_MPE # define NO_SYS_PARAM_H # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_UNISTD # include OPENSSL_UNISTD # else # include # endif # ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H # include # endif # if defined(NeXT) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NEWS4) # define pid_t int /* pid_t is missing on NEXTSTEP/OPENSTEP * (unless when compiling with -D_POSIX_SOURCE, * which doesn't work for us) */ # endif # if defined(NeXT) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NEWS4) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_SUNOS) # define ssize_t int /* ditto */ # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_NEWS4 /* setvbuf is missing on mips-sony-bsd */ # define setvbuf(a, b, c, d) setbuffer((a), (b), (d)) typedef unsigned long clock_t; # endif # define OPENSSL_CONF "openssl.cnf" # define SSLEAY_CONF OPENSSL_CONF # define RFILE ".rnd" # define LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR ':' # define NUL_DEV "/dev/null" # define EXIT(n) exit(n) # endif # define SSLeay_getpid() getpid() #endif /*************/ #ifdef USE_SOCKETS # if defined(WINDOWS) || defined(MSDOS) /* windows world */ # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK # define SSLeay_Write(a,b,c) (-1) # define SSLeay_Read(a,b,c) (-1) # define SHUTDOWN(fd) close(fd) # define SHUTDOWN2(fd) close(fd) # elif !defined(__DJGPP__) # include extern HINSTANCE _hInstance; # ifdef _WIN64 /* * Even though sizeof(SOCKET) is 8, it's safe to cast it to int, because * the value constitutes an index in per-process table of limited size * and not a real pointer. */ # define socket(d,t,p) ((int)socket(d,t,p)) # define accept(s,f,l) ((int)accept(s,f,l)) # endif # define SSLeay_Write(a,b,c) send((a),(b),(c),0) # define SSLeay_Read(a,b,c) recv((a),(b),(c),0) # define SHUTDOWN(fd) { shutdown((fd),0); closesocket(fd); } # define SHUTDOWN2(fd) { shutdown((fd),2); closesocket(fd); } # else # define SSLeay_Write(a,b,c) write_s(a,b,c,0) # define SSLeay_Read(a,b,c) read_s(a,b,c) # define SHUTDOWN(fd) close_s(fd) # define SHUTDOWN2(fd) close_s(fd) # endif # elif defined(MAC_OS_pre_X) # include "MacSocket.h" # define SSLeay_Write(a,b,c) MacSocket_send((a),(b),(c)) # define SSLeay_Read(a,b,c) MacSocket_recv((a),(b),(c),true) # define SHUTDOWN(fd) MacSocket_close(fd) # define SHUTDOWN2(fd) MacSocket_close(fd) # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) /* NetWare uses the WinSock2 interfaces by default, but can be configured for BSD */ # if defined(NETWARE_BSDSOCK) # include # include # include # if defined(NETWARE_CLIB) # include # else # include # endif # define INVALID_SOCKET (int)(~0) # else # include # endif # define SSLeay_Write(a,b,c) send((a),(b),(c),0) # define SSLeay_Read(a,b,c) recv((a),(b),(c),0) # define SHUTDOWN(fd) { shutdown((fd),0); closesocket(fd); } # define SHUTDOWN2(fd) { shutdown((fd),2); closesocket(fd); } # else # ifndef NO_SYS_PARAM_H # include # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS # include # elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MPE) # include /* Needed under linux for FD_XXX */ # endif # include # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_NODECC) # include # include # include # else # include # ifdef FILIO_H # include /* Added for FIONBIO under unixware */ # endif # include # include # endif # if defined(NeXT) || defined(_NEXT_SOURCE) # include # include # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_AIX # include # endif # ifdef __QNX__ # include # endif # if defined(sun) # include # else # ifndef VMS # include # else /* ioctl is only in VMS > 7.0 and when socketshr is not used */ # if !defined(TCPIP_TYPE_SOCKETSHR) && defined(__VMS_VER) && (__VMS_VER > 70000000) # include # endif # endif # endif # ifdef VMS # include # if defined(TCPIP_TYPE_SOCKETSHR) # include # endif # endif # define SSLeay_Read(a,b,c) read((a),(b),(c)) # define SSLeay_Write(a,b,c) write((a),(b),(c)) # define SHUTDOWN(fd) { shutdown((fd),0); closesocket((fd)); } # define SHUTDOWN2(fd) { shutdown((fd),2); closesocket((fd)); } # ifndef INVALID_SOCKET # define INVALID_SOCKET (-1) # endif /* INVALID_SOCKET */ # endif #endif #if defined(__ultrix) # ifndef ssize_t # define ssize_t int # endif #endif #if defined(sun) && !defined(__svr4__) && !defined(__SVR4) /* include headers first, so our defines don't break it */ #include #include /* bcopy can handle overlapping moves according to SunOS 4.1.4 manpage */ # define memmove(s1,s2,n) bcopy((s2),(s1),(n)) # define strtoul(s,e,b) ((unsigned long int)strtol((s),(e),(b))) extern char *sys_errlist[]; extern int sys_nerr; # define strerror(errnum) \ (((errnum)<0 || (errnum)>=sys_nerr) ? NULL : sys_errlist[errnum]) /* Being signed SunOS 4.x memcpy breaks ASN1_OBJECT table lookup */ #include "crypto/o_str.h" # define memcmp OPENSSL_memcmp #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_EXIT # if defined(MONOLITH) && !defined(OPENSSL_C) # define OPENSSL_EXIT(n) return(n) # else # define OPENSSL_EXIT(n) do { EXIT(n); return(n); } while(0) # endif #endif /***********************************************/ /* do we need to do this for getenv. * Just define getenv for use under windows */ #ifdef WIN16 /* How to do this needs to be thought out a bit more.... */ /*char *GETENV(char *); #define Getenv GETENV*/ #define Getenv getenv #else #define Getenv getenv #endif #define DG_GCC_BUG /* gcc < 2.6.3 on DGUX */ #ifdef sgi #define IRIX_CC_BUG /* all version of IRIX I've tested (4.* 5.*) */ #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_SNI #define IRIX_CC_BUG /* CDS++ up to V2.0Bsomething suffered from the same bug.*/ #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) # define strcasecmp _stricmp # define strncasecmp _strnicmp #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) /* VMS below version 7.0 doesn't have strcasecmp() */ # include "o_str.h" # define strcasecmp OPENSSL_strcasecmp # define strncasecmp OPENSSL_strncasecmp # define OPENSSL_IMPLEMENTS_strncasecmp #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) && defined(__EMX__) # define strcasecmp stricmp # define strncasecmp strnicmp #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) # include # if defined(NETWARE_CLIB) # define strcasecmp stricmp # define strncasecmp strnicmp # endif /* NETWARE_CLIB */ #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) && defined(__EMX__) # include # include # define NO_SYSLOG #endif /* vxworks */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) #include #include #include #define TTY_STRUCT int #define sleep(a) taskDelay((a) * sysClkRateGet()) #include #include #include #define getpid taskIdSelf /* NOTE: these are implemented by helpers in database app! * if the database is not linked, we need to implement them * elswhere */ struct hostent *gethostbyname(const char *name); struct hostent *gethostbyaddr(const char *addr, int length, int type); struct servent *getservbyname(const char *name, const char *proto); #endif /* end vxworks */ + +#if !defined(inline) && !defined(__cplusplus) +# if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__>=199901L + /* do nothing, inline works */ +# elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 +# define inline __inline__ +# elif defined(_MSC_VER) + /* + * Visual Studio: inline is available in C++ only, however + * __inline is available for C, see + * http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/z8y1yy88.aspx + */ +# define inline __inline +# else +# define inline +# endif +#endif #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/openssl.spec =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/openssl.spec (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/openssl.spec (revision 276859) @@ -1,209 +1,209 @@ %define _unpackaged_files_terminate_build 0 Release: 1 %define openssldir /var/ssl Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography libraries and tools Name: openssl -Version: 0.9.8zc +Version: 0.9.8zd Source0: ftp://ftp.openssl.org/source/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz License: OpenSSL Group: System Environment/Libraries Provides: SSL URL: http://www.openssl.org/ Packager: Damien Miller BuildRoot: /var/tmp/%{name}-%{version}-root %description The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, fully featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library. The project is managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the Internet to communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL tookit and its related documentation. OpenSSL is based on the excellent SSLeay library developed from Eric A. Young and Tim J. Hudson. The OpenSSL toolkit is licensed under an Apache-style licence, which basically means that you are free to get and use it for commercial and non-commercial purposes. This package contains the base OpenSSL cryptography and SSL/TLS libraries and tools. %package devel Summary: Secure Sockets Layer and cryptography static libraries and headers Group: Development/Libraries Requires: openssl %description devel The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, fully featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library. The project is managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the Internet to communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL tookit and its related documentation. OpenSSL is based on the excellent SSLeay library developed from Eric A. Young and Tim J. Hudson. The OpenSSL toolkit is licensed under an Apache-style licence, which basically means that you are free to get and use it for commercial and non-commercial purposes. This package contains the the OpenSSL cryptography and SSL/TLS static libraries and header files required when developing applications. %package doc Summary: OpenSSL miscellaneous files Group: Documentation Requires: openssl %description doc The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, fully featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library. The project is managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the Internet to communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL tookit and its related documentation. OpenSSL is based on the excellent SSLeay library developed from Eric A. Young and Tim J. Hudson. The OpenSSL toolkit is licensed under an Apache-style licence, which basically means that you are free to get and use it for commercial and non-commercial purposes. This package contains the the OpenSSL cryptography and SSL/TLS extra documentation and POD files from which the man pages were produced. %prep %setup -q %build %define CONFIG_FLAGS -DSSL_ALLOW_ADH --prefix=/usr --openssldir=%{openssldir} perl util/perlpath.pl /usr/bin/perl %ifarch i386 i486 i586 i686 ./Configure %{CONFIG_FLAGS} linux-elf shared %endif %ifarch ppc ./Configure %{CONFIG_FLAGS} linux-ppc shared %endif %ifarch alpha ./Configure %{CONFIG_FLAGS} linux-alpha shared %endif %ifarch x86_64 ./Configure %{CONFIG_FLAGS} linux-x86_64 shared %endif LD_LIBRARY_PATH=`pwd` make LD_LIBRARY_PATH=`pwd` make rehash LD_LIBRARY_PATH=`pwd` make test %install rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT make MANDIR=/usr/man MANSUFFIX=ssl INSTALL_PREFIX="$RPM_BUILD_ROOT" install # Make backwards-compatibility symlink to ssleay ln -sf /usr/bin/openssl $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/bin/ssleay %clean rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT %files %defattr(0644,root,root,0755) %doc CHANGES CHANGES.SSLeay LICENSE NEWS README %attr(0755,root,root) /usr/bin/* %attr(0755,root,root) /usr/lib/*.so* %attr(0755,root,root) %{openssldir}/misc/* %attr(0644,root,root) /usr/man/man[157]/* %config %attr(0644,root,root) %{openssldir}/openssl.cnf %dir %attr(0755,root,root) %{openssldir}/certs %dir %attr(0755,root,root) %{openssldir}/misc %dir %attr(0750,root,root) %{openssldir}/private %files devel %defattr(0644,root,root,0755) %doc CHANGES CHANGES.SSLeay LICENSE NEWS README %attr(0644,root,root) /usr/lib/*.a %attr(0644,root,root) /usr/lib/pkgconfig/openssl.pc %attr(0644,root,root) /usr/include/openssl/* %attr(0644,root,root) /usr/man/man[3]/* %files doc %defattr(0644,root,root,0755) %doc CHANGES CHANGES.SSLeay LICENSE NEWS README %doc doc %post ldconfig %postun ldconfig %changelog * Sun Jun 6 2005 Richard Levitte - Remove the incorrect installation of '%{openssldir}/lib'. * Wed May 7 2003 Richard Levitte - Add /usr/lib/pkgconfig/openssl.pc to the development section. * Thu Mar 22 2001 Richard Levitte - Removed redundant subsection that re-installed libcrypto.a and libssl.a as well. Also remove RSAref stuff completely, since it's not needed any more. * Thu Mar 15 2001 Jeremiah Johnson - Removed redundant subsection that re-installed libcrypto.so.0.9.6 and libssl.so.0.9.6. As well as the subsection that created symlinks for these. make install handles all this. * Sat Oct 21 2000 Horms - Make sure symlinks are created by using -f flag to ln. Otherwise some .so libraries are copied rather than linked in the resulting binary RPM. This causes the package to be larger than neccessary and makes ldconfig complain. * Fri Oct 13 2000 Horms - Make defattr is set for files in all packages so packages built as non-root will still be installed with files owned by root. * Thu Sep 14 2000 Richard Levitte - Changed to adapt to the new (supported) way of making shared libraries - Installs all static libraries, not just libRSAglue.a - Extra documents now end up in a separate document package * Sun Feb 27 2000 Damien Miller - Merged patches to spec - Updated to 0.9.5beta2 (now with manpages) * Sat Feb 5 2000 Michal Jaegermann - added 'linux-alpha' to configuration - fixed nasty absolute links * Tue Jan 25 2000 Bennett Todd - Added -DSSL_ALLOW_ADH, bumped Release to 4 * Thu Oct 14 1999 Damien Miller - Set default permissions - Removed documentation from devel sub-package * Thu Sep 30 1999 Damien Miller - Added "make test" stage - GPG signed * Tue Sep 10 1999 Damien Miller - Updated to version 0.9.4 * Tue May 25 1999 Damien Miller - Updated to version 0.9.3 - Added attributes for all files - Paramatised openssl directory * Sat Mar 20 1999 Carlo M. Arenas Belon - Added "official" bnrec patch and taking other out - making a link from ssleay to openssl binary - putting all changelog together on SPEC file * Fri Mar 5 1999 Henri Gomez - Added bnrec patch * Tue Dec 29 1998 Jonathan Ruano - minimum spec and patches changes for openssl - modified for openssl sources * Sat Aug 8 1998 Khimenko Victor - shared library creating process honours $RPM_OPT_FLAGS - shared libarry supports threads (as well as static library) * Wed Jul 22 1998 Khimenko Victor - building of shared library completely reworked * Tue Jul 21 1998 Khimenko Victor - RPM is BuildRoot'ed * Tue Feb 10 1998 Khimenko Victor - all stuff is moved out of /usr/local Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/ssl/d1_pkt.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/ssl/d1_pkt.c (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/ssl/d1_pkt.c (revision 276859) @@ -1,1843 +1,1842 @@ /* ssl/d1_pkt.c */ /* * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include #define USE_SOCKETS #include "ssl_locl.h" #include #include #include #include static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek); static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap, PQ_64BIT *seq_num); static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap); static DTLS1_BITMAP *dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch); #if 0 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset); #endif static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *q, PQ_64BIT *priority); static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s); #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER static PQ_64BIT bytes_to_long_long(unsigned char *bytes, PQ_64BIT *num); #endif /* copy buffered record into SSL structure */ static int dtls1_copy_record(SSL *s, pitem *item) { DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf); s->packet = rdata->packet; s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length; memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); /* Set proper sequence number for mac calculation */ memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), &(rdata->packet[5]), 6); return(1); } static int dtls1_buffer_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue, PQ_64BIT *priority) { DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; pitem *item; /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */ if (pqueue_size(queue->q) >= 100) return 0; rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(DTLS1_RECORD_DATA)); item = pitem_new(*priority, rdata); if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) { if (rdata != NULL) OPENSSL_free(rdata); if (item != NULL) pitem_free(item); SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return(0); } rdata->packet = s->packet; rdata->packet_length = s->packet_length; memcpy(&(rdata->rbuf), &(s->s3->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); memcpy(&(rdata->rrec), &(s->s3->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); item->data = rdata; /* insert should not fail, since duplicates are dropped */ if (pqueue_insert(queue->q, item) == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(rdata); pitem_free(item); return(0); } s->packet = NULL; s->packet_length = 0; memset(&(s->s3->rbuf), 0, sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); memset(&(s->s3->rrec), 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); OPENSSL_free(rdata); pitem_free(item); return(0); } return(1); } static int dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record(SSL *s, record_pqueue *queue) { pitem *item; item = pqueue_pop(queue->q); if (item) { dtls1_copy_record(s, item); OPENSSL_free(item->data); pitem_free(item); return(1); } return(0); } /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the new epoch, i.e., not processed * yet */ #define dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s) \ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ &((s)->d1->unprocessed_rcds)) /* retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, ie, processed */ #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ &((s)->d1->processed_rcds)) static int dtls1_process_buffered_records(SSL *s) { pitem *item; item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q); if (item) { /* Check if epoch is current. */ if (s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) return(1); /* Nothing to do. */ /* Process all the records. */ while (pqueue_peek(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.q)) { dtls1_get_unprocessed_record(s); if ( ! dtls1_process_record(s)) return(0); dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->processed_rcds), &s->s3->rrec.seq_num); } } /* sync epoch numbers once all the unprocessed records * have been processed */ s->d1->processed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch; s->d1->unprocessed_rcds.epoch = s->d1->r_epoch + 1; return(1); } #if 0 static int dtls1_get_buffered_record(SSL *s) { pitem *item; PQ_64BIT priority = (((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->handshake_read_seq) << 32) | ((PQ_64BIT)s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off); if ( ! SSL_in_init(s)) /* if we're not (re)negotiating, nothing buffered */ return 0; item = pqueue_peek(s->d1->rcvd_records); if (item && item->priority == priority) { /* Check if we've received the record of interest. It must be * a handshake record, since data records as passed up without * buffering */ DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *rdata; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->rcvd_records); rdata = (DTLS1_RECORD_DATA *)item->data; if (s->s3->rbuf.buf != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->s3->rbuf.buf); s->packet = rdata->packet; s->packet_length = rdata->packet_length; memcpy(&(s->s3->rbuf), &(rdata->rbuf), sizeof(SSL3_BUFFER)); memcpy(&(s->s3->rrec), &(rdata->rrec), sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); OPENSSL_free(item->data); pitem_free(item); /* s->d1->next_expected_seq_num++; */ return(1); } return 0; } #endif static int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s) { int i,al; int enc_err; SSL_SESSION *sess; SSL3_RECORD *rr; unsigned int mac_size, orig_len; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; rr= &(s->s3->rrec); sess = s->session; /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, * and we have that many bytes in s->packet */ rr->input= &(s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which * need to be copied into rr->data by either * the decryption or by the decompression * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer, * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ /* check is not needed I believe */ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ rr->data=rr->input; enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0); /* enc_err is: * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. * 1: if the padding is valid * -1: if the padding is invalid */ if (enc_err == 0) { /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */ rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; goto err; } #ifdef TLS_DEBUG printf("dec %d\n",rr->length); { unsigned int z; for (z=0; zlength; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } printf("\n"); #endif /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (s->read_hash != NULL)) { /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ unsigned char *mac = NULL; unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash); OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */ orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8); /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, * therefore we can safely process the record in a different * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. */ if (orig_len < mac_size || /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && orig_len < mac_size+1)) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract * the MAC in constant time from within the record, * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes. * */ mac = mac_tmp; ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); rr->length -= mac_size; } else { /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */ rr->length -= mac_size; mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; } i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */); if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) enc_err = -1; if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+mac_size) enc_err = -1; } if (enc_err < 0) { /* decryption failed, silently discard message */ rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; goto err; } /* r->length is now just compressed */ if (s->expand != NULL) { if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) { al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); goto f_err; } } if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } rr->off=0; /* So at this point the following is true * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment * after use :-). */ /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ s->packet_length=0; dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, &(s->d1->bitmap));/* Mark receipt of record. */ return(1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); err: return(0); } /* Call this to get a new input record. * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error * or non-blocking IO. * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes */ /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) { int ssl_major,ssl_minor; int i,n; SSL3_RECORD *rr; unsigned char *p = NULL; unsigned short version; DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap; unsigned int is_next_epoch; rr= &(s->s3->rrec); /* The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the * pending records. This is a non-blocking operation. */ dtls1_process_buffered_records(s); /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */ if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s)) return 1; /* get something from the wire */ again: /* check if we have the header */ if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || (s->packet_length < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { n=ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */ if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */ /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ if (s->packet_length != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { s->packet_length = 0; goto again; } s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY; p=s->packet; /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */ rr->type= *(p++); ssl_major= *(p++); ssl_minor= *(p++); version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor; /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */ n2s(p,rr->epoch); memcpy(&(s->s3->read_sequence[2]), p, 6); p+=6; n2s(p,rr->length); /* Lets check version */ if (!s->first_packet) { if (version != s->version && version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { /* unexpected version, silently discard */ rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; goto again; } } if ((version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00) && (version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_BAD_VER & 0xff00)) { /* wrong version, silently discard record */ rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; goto again; } if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { /* record too long, silently discard it */ rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; goto again; } s->client_version = version; /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ } /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ if (rr->length > s->packet_length-DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { /* now s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ i=rr->length; n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1); - if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */ - /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ if ( n != i) { rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; goto again; } /* now n == rr->length, * and s->packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */ } s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */ bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); if ( bitmap == NULL) { rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; /* dump this record */ goto again; /* get another record */ } /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. * Don't check if we're listening and this message is * a ClientHello. They can look as if they're replayed, * since they arrive from different connections and * would be dropped unnecessarily. */ if (!(s->d1->listen && rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && - *p == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && + s->packet_length > DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH && + s->packet[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && ! dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap, &(rr->seq_num))) { rr->length = 0; s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */ goto again; /* get another record */ } /* just read a 0 length packet */ if (rr->length == 0) goto again; /* If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), * and a handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it * cannot be processed at this time. However, do not buffer * anything while listening. */ if (is_next_epoch) { if ((SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) && !s->d1->listen) { dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->unprocessed_rcds), &rr->seq_num); } rr->length = 0; s->packet_length = 0; goto again; } if (!dtls1_process_record(s)) { rr->length = 0; s->packet_length=0; /* dump this record */ goto again; /* get another record */ } return(1); } /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. * 'type' is one of the following: * * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) * * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). * * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): * Change cipher spec protocol * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored * Alert protocol * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) * Handshake protocol * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages * here, anything else is handled by higher layers * Application data protocol * none of our business */ int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) { int al,i,j,ret; unsigned int n; SSL3_RECORD *rr; void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL; if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) return(-1); /* XXX: check what the second '&& type' is about */ if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && type) || (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } /* check whether there's a handshake message (client hello?) waiting */ if ( (ret = have_handshake_fragment(s, type, buf, len, peek))) return ret; /* Now s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) { /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ i=s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return(i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return(-1); } } start: s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record * s->s3->rrec.data, - data * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */ rr = &(s->s3->rrec); /* We are not handshaking and have no data yet, * so process data buffered during the last handshake * in advance, if any. */ if (s->state == SSL_ST_OK && rr->length == 0) { pitem *item; item = pqueue_pop(s->d1->buffered_app_data.q); if (item) { dtls1_copy_record(s, item); OPENSSL_free(item->data); pitem_free(item); } } /* Check for timeout */ if (dtls1_handle_timeout(s) > 0) goto start; /* get new packet if necessary */ if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) { ret=dtls1_get_record(s); if (ret <= 0) { ret = dtls1_read_failed(s, ret); /* anything other than a timeout is an error */ if (ret <= 0) return(ret); else goto start; } } if (s->d1->listen && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { rr->length = 0; goto start; } /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { /* We now have application data between CCS and Finished. * Most likely the packets were reordered on their way, so * buffer the application data for later processing rather * than dropping the connection. */ dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->d1->buffered_app_data), &rr->seq_num); rr->length = 0; goto start; } /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away * (even in 'peek' mode) */ if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { rr->length=0; s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; return(0); } if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ { /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we * are doing a handshake for the first time */ if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); goto f_err; } if (len <= 0) return(len); if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) n = rr->length; else n = (unsigned int)len; memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n); if (!peek) { rr->length-=n; rr->off+=n; if (rr->length == 0) { s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; rr->off=0; } } return(n); } /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */ /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. */ { unsigned int k, dest_maxlen = 0; unsigned char *dest = NULL; unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { dest_maxlen = sizeof s->d1->handshake_fragment; dest = s->d1->handshake_fragment; dest_len = &s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->d1->alert_fragment); dest = s->d1->alert_fragment; dest_len = &s->d1->alert_fragment_len; } /* else it's a CCS message, or application data or wrong */ else if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* Application data while renegotiating * is allowed. Try again reading. */ if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { BIO *bio; s->s3->in_read_app_data=2; bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); s->rwstate=SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); return(-1); } /* Not certain if this is the right error handling */ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; } if (dest_maxlen > 0) { /* XDTLS: In a pathalogical case, the Client Hello * may be fragmented--don't always expect dest_maxlen bytes */ if ( rr->length < dest_maxlen) { #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE /* * for normal alerts rr->length is 2, while * dest_maxlen is 7 if we were to handle this * non-existing alert... */ FIX ME #endif s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; rr->length = 0; goto start; } /* now move 'n' bytes: */ for ( k = 0; k < dest_maxlen; k++) { dest[k] = rr->data[rr->off++]; rr->length--; } *dest_len = dest_maxlen; } } /* s->d1->handshake_fragment_len == 12 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; * s->d1->alert_fragment_len == 7 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ if ((!s->server) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { s->d1->handshake_fragment_len = 0; if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || (s->d1->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || (s->d1->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); goto err; } /* no need to check sequence number on HELLO REQUEST messages */ if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->d1->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && !s->s3->renegotiate) { s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; ssl3_renegotiate(s); if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) { i=s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return(i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return(-1); } if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ { BIO *bio; /* In the case where we try to read application data, * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ s->rwstate=SSL_READING; bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); return(-1); } } } } /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */ goto start; } if (s->d1->alert_fragment_len >= DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH) { int alert_level = s->d1->alert_fragment[0]; int alert_descr = s->d1->alert_fragment[1]; s->d1->alert_fragment_len = 0; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->d1->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb=s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb=s->ctx->info_callback; if (cb != NULL) { j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); } if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */ { s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; return(0); } #if 0 /* XXX: this is a possible improvement in the future */ /* now check if it's a missing record */ if (alert_descr == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) { unsigned short seq; unsigned int frag_off; unsigned char *p = &(s->d1->alert_fragment[2]); n2s(p, seq); n2l3(p, frag_off); dtls1_retransmit_message(s, dtls1_get_queue_priority(frag->msg_header.seq, 0), frag_off, &found); if ( ! found && SSL_in_init(s)) { /* fprintf( stderr,"in init = %d\n", SSL_in_init(s)); */ /* requested a message not yet sent, send an alert ourselves */ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); } } #endif } else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */ { char tmp[16]; s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr); ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp); s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); return(0); } else { al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); goto f_err; } goto start; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */ { s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; rr->length=0; return(0); } if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr; unsigned int ccs_hdr_len = DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH; dtls1_get_ccs_header(rr->data, &ccs_hdr); /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know * exactly what the record payload has to look like */ /* XDTLS: check that epoch is consistent */ if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) ccs_hdr_len = 3; if ((rr->length != ccs_hdr_len) || (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) { i=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); goto err; } rr->length=0; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake * messages are still missing, so just drop it. */ if (!s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok) { goto start; } s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0; s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1; if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) goto err; /* do this whenever CCS is processed */ dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; goto start; } /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ if ((s->d1->handshake_fragment_len >= DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) && !s->in_handshake) { struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; /* this may just be a stale retransmit */ dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr); if( rr->epoch != s->d1->r_epoch) { rr->length = 0; goto start; } /* If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the * client here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED. */ if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(s) < 0) return -1; dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(s); rr->length = 0; goto start; } if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting * protocol violations): */ s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server) ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT :SSL_ST_CONNECT; #else s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; #endif s->new_session=1; } i=s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return(i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return(-1); } if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ { BIO *bio; /* In the case where we try to read application data, * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ s->rwstate=SSL_READING; bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); return(-1); } } goto start; } switch (rr->type) { default: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */ if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) { rr->length = 0; goto start; } #endif al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: case SSL3_RT_ALERT: case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that * should not happen when type != rr->type */ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, * but have application data. If the library was * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data * is set) and it makes sense to read application data * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started), * we will indulge it. */ if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && (( (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) ) || ( (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) ) )) { s->s3->in_read_app_data=2; return(-1); } else { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; } } /* not reached */ f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); err: return(-1); } int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) { int i; if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) { i=s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return(i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return -1; } } if (len > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES,SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG); return -1; } i = dtls1_write_bytes(s, type, buf_, len); return i; } /* this only happens when a client hello is received and a handshake * is started. */ static int have_handshake_fragment(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) { if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ { unsigned char *src = s->d1->handshake_fragment; unsigned char *dst = buf; unsigned int k,n; /* peek == 0 */ n = 0; while ((len > 0) && (s->d1->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { *dst++ = *src++; len--; s->d1->handshake_fragment_len--; n++; } /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ for (k = 0; k < s->d1->handshake_fragment_len; k++) s->d1->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; return n; } return 0; } /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. */ int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf, int len) { int i; OPENSSL_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH); s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; i=do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, 0); return i; } int do_dtls1_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) { unsigned char *p,*pseq; int i,mac_size,clear=0; int prefix_len = 0; SSL3_RECORD *wr; SSL3_BUFFER *wb; SSL_SESSION *sess; int bs; /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */ if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0) { OPENSSL_assert(0); /* XDTLS: want to see if we ever get here */ return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len)); } /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); if (i <= 0) return(i); /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ } if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) return 0; wr= &(s->s3->wrec); wb= &(s->s3->wbuf); sess=s->session; if ( (sess == NULL) || (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (s->write_hash == NULL)) clear=1; if (clear) mac_size=0; else mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash); /* DTLS implements explicit IV, so no need for empty fragments */ #if 0 /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */ if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_VERSION && SSL_version(s) != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later * together with the actual payload) */ prefix_len = s->method->do_ssl_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); if (prefix_len <= 0) goto err; if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE) { /* insufficient space */ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; } #endif p = wb->buf + prefix_len; /* write the header */ *(p++)=type&0xff; wr->type=type; if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) *(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER>>8, *(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER&0xff; else *(p++)=(s->version>>8), *(p++)=s->version&0xff; /* field where we are to write out packet epoch, seq num and len */ pseq=p; p+=10; /* lets setup the record stuff. */ /* Make space for the explicit IV in case of CBC. * (this is a bit of a boundary violation, but what the heck). */ if ( s->enc_write_ctx && (EVP_CIPHER_mode( s->enc_write_ctx->cipher ) & EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)) bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(s->enc_write_ctx->cipher); else bs = 0; wr->data=p + bs; /* make room for IV in case of CBC */ wr->length=(int)len; wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf; /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into * wr->data */ /* first we compress */ if (s->compress != NULL) { if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); goto err; } } else { memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length); wr->input=wr->data; } /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length. * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */ if (mac_size != 0) { s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length + bs]),1); wr->length+=mac_size; } /* this is true regardless of mac size */ wr->input=p; wr->data=p; /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */ if (bs) /* bs != 0 in case of CBC */ { RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,bs); /* master IV and last CBC residue stand for * the rest of randomness */ wr->length += bs; } s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1); /* record length after mac and block padding */ /* if (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || (type == SSL3_RT_ALERT && ! SSL_in_init(s))) */ /* there's only one epoch between handshake and app data */ s2n(s->d1->w_epoch, pseq); /* XDTLS: ?? */ /* else s2n(s->d1->handshake_epoch, pseq); */ memcpy(pseq, &(s->s3->write_sequence[2]), 6); pseq+=6; s2n(wr->length,pseq); /* we should now have * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is * wr->length long */ wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ wr->length+=DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; #if 0 /* this is now done at the message layer */ /* buffer the record, making it easy to handle retransmits */ if ( type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) dtls1_buffer_record(s, wr->data, wr->length, *((PQ_64BIT *)&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]))); #endif ssl3_record_sequence_update(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0])); if (create_empty_fragment) { /* we are in a recursive call; * just return the length, don't write out anything here */ return wr->length; } /* now let's set up wb */ wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; wb->offset = 0; /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */ s->s3->wpend_tot=len; s->s3->wpend_buf=buf; s->s3->wpend_type=type; s->s3->wpend_ret=len; /* we now just need to write the buffer */ return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len); err: return -1; } static int dtls1_record_replay_check(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap, PQ_64BIT *seq_num) { #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER PQ_64BIT mask = 0x0000000000000001L; #endif PQ_64BIT rcd_num, tmp; pq_64bit_init(&rcd_num); pq_64bit_init(&tmp); /* this is the sequence number for the record just read */ pq_64bit_bin2num(&rcd_num, s->s3->read_sequence, 8); if (pq_64bit_gt(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)) || pq_64bit_eq(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num))) { pq_64bit_assign(seq_num, &rcd_num); pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num); pq_64bit_free(&tmp); return 1; /* this record is new */ } pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num); if ( pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp) > bitmap->length) { pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num); pq_64bit_free(&tmp); return 0; /* stale, outside the window */ } #if PQ_64BIT_IS_BIGNUM { int offset; pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num); pq_64bit_sub_word(&tmp, 1); offset = pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp); if ( pq_64bit_is_bit_set(&(bitmap->map), offset)) { pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num); pq_64bit_free(&tmp); return 0; } } #else mask <<= (bitmap->max_seq_num - rcd_num - 1); if (bitmap->map & mask) return 0; /* record previously received */ #endif pq_64bit_assign(seq_num, &rcd_num); pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num); pq_64bit_free(&tmp); return 1; } static void dtls1_record_bitmap_update(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) { unsigned int shift; PQ_64BIT rcd_num; PQ_64BIT tmp; PQ_64BIT_CTX *ctx; pq_64bit_init(&rcd_num); pq_64bit_init(&tmp); pq_64bit_bin2num(&rcd_num, s->s3->read_sequence, 8); /* unfortunate code complexity due to 64-bit manipulation support * on 32-bit machines */ if ( pq_64bit_gt(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)) || pq_64bit_eq(&rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num))) { pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &rcd_num, &(bitmap->max_seq_num)); pq_64bit_add_word(&tmp, 1); shift = (unsigned int)pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp); pq_64bit_lshift(&(tmp), &(bitmap->map), shift); pq_64bit_assign(&(bitmap->map), &tmp); pq_64bit_set_bit(&(bitmap->map), 0); pq_64bit_add_word(&rcd_num, 1); pq_64bit_assign(&(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num); pq_64bit_assign_word(&tmp, 1); pq_64bit_lshift(&tmp, &tmp, bitmap->length); ctx = pq_64bit_ctx_new(&ctx); pq_64bit_mod(&(bitmap->map), &(bitmap->map), &tmp, ctx); pq_64bit_ctx_free(ctx); } else { pq_64bit_sub(&tmp, &(bitmap->max_seq_num), &rcd_num); pq_64bit_sub_word(&tmp, 1); shift = (unsigned int)pq_64bit_get_word(&tmp); pq_64bit_set_bit(&(bitmap->map), shift); } pq_64bit_free(&rcd_num); pq_64bit_free(&tmp); } int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) { int i,j; void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; unsigned char buf[DTLS1_AL_HEADER_LENGTH]; unsigned char *ptr = &buf[0]; s->s3->alert_dispatch=0; memset(buf, 0x00, sizeof(buf)); *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[0]; *ptr++ = s->s3->send_alert[1]; #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE if (s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE) { s2n(s->d1->handshake_read_seq, ptr); #if 0 if ( s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off == 0) /* waiting for a new msg */ else s2n(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq, ptr); /* partial msg read */ #endif #if 0 fprintf(stderr, "s->d1->handshake_read_seq = %d, s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq = %d\n",s->d1->handshake_read_seq,s->d1->r_msg_hdr.seq); #endif l2n3(s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off, ptr); } #endif i = do_dtls1_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &buf[0], sizeof(buf), 0); if (i <= 0) { s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; /* fprintf( stderr, "not done with alert\n" ); */ } else { if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL #ifdef DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE || s->s3->send_alert[1] == DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE #endif ) (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb=s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb=s->ctx->info_callback; if (cb != NULL) { j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1]; cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j); } } return(i); } static DTLS1_BITMAP * dtls1_get_bitmap(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned int *is_next_epoch) { *is_next_epoch = 0; /* In current epoch, accept HM, CCS, DATA, & ALERT */ if (rr->epoch == s->d1->r_epoch) return &s->d1->bitmap; /* Only HM and ALERT messages can be from the next epoch */ else if (rr->epoch == (unsigned long)(s->d1->r_epoch + 1) && (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { *is_next_epoch = 1; return &s->d1->next_bitmap; } return NULL; } #if 0 static int dtls1_record_needs_buffering(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rr, unsigned short *priority, unsigned long *offset) { /* alerts are passed up immediately */ if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA || rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) return 0; /* Only need to buffer if a handshake is underway. * (this implies that Hello Request and Client Hello are passed up * immediately) */ if ( SSL_in_init(s)) { unsigned char *data = rr->data; /* need to extract the HM/CCS sequence number here */ if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { unsigned short seq_num; struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; struct ccs_header_st ccs_hdr; if ( rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { dtls1_get_message_header(data, &msg_hdr); seq_num = msg_hdr.seq; *offset = msg_hdr.frag_off; } else { dtls1_get_ccs_header(data, &ccs_hdr); seq_num = ccs_hdr.seq; *offset = 0; } /* this is either a record we're waiting for, or a * retransmit of something we happened to previously * receive (higher layers will drop the repeat silently */ if ( seq_num < s->d1->handshake_read_seq) return 0; if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq && msg_hdr.frag_off < s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off) return 0; else if ( seq_num == s->d1->handshake_read_seq && (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC || msg_hdr.frag_off == s->d1->r_msg_hdr.frag_off)) return 0; else { *priority = seq_num; return 1; } } else /* unknown record type */ return 0; } return 0; } #endif void dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(SSL *s, int rw) { unsigned char *seq; unsigned int seq_bytes = sizeof(s->s3->read_sequence); if ( rw & SSL3_CC_READ) { seq = s->s3->read_sequence; s->d1->r_epoch++; pq_64bit_assign(&(s->d1->bitmap.map), &(s->d1->next_bitmap.map)); s->d1->bitmap.length = s->d1->next_bitmap.length; pq_64bit_assign(&(s->d1->bitmap.max_seq_num), &(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num)); pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.map)); pq_64bit_free(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num)); memset(&(s->d1->next_bitmap), 0x00, sizeof(DTLS1_BITMAP)); pq_64bit_init(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.map)); pq_64bit_init(&(s->d1->next_bitmap.max_seq_num)); } else { seq = s->s3->write_sequence; memcpy(s->d1->last_write_sequence, seq, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); s->d1->w_epoch++; } memset(seq, 0x00, seq_bytes); } #if PQ_64BIT_IS_INTEGER static PQ_64BIT bytes_to_long_long(unsigned char *bytes, PQ_64BIT *num) { PQ_64BIT _num; _num = (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[0]) << 56) | (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[1]) << 48) | (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[2]) << 40) | (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[3]) << 32) | (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[4]) << 24) | (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[5]) << 16) | (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[6]) << 8) | (((PQ_64BIT)bytes[7]) ); *num = _num ; return _num; } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/ssl/d1_srvr.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/ssl/d1_srvr.c (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/ssl/d1_srvr.c (revision 276859) @@ -1,1343 +1,1331 @@ /* ssl/d1_srvr.c */ /* * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1999-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH #include #endif static SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver); static int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s); static SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver) { if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION) return(DTLSv1_server_method()); else return(NULL); } IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLSv1_server_method, dtls1_accept, ssl_undefined_function, dtls1_get_server_method) int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) { BUF_MEM *buf; unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; int ret= -1; int new_state,state,skip=0; int listen; RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); ERR_clear_error(); clear_sys_error(); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb=s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb=s->ctx->info_callback; listen = s->d1->listen; /* init things to blank */ s->in_handshake++; if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); s->d1->listen = listen; if (s->cert == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); return(-1); } for (;;) { state=s->state; switch (s->state) { case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: s->new_session=1; /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ case SSL_ST_BEFORE: case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: s->server=1; if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; if (s->init_buf == NULL) { if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { ret= -1; goto end; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { ret= -1; goto end; } s->init_buf=buf; } if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; } s->init_num=0; if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) */ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; } ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; } else { /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, * we will just send a HelloRequest */ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; } break; case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: s->shutdown=0; dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s); dtls1_start_timer(s); ret=dtls1_send_hello_request(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->init_num=0; ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); break; case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: s->state=SSL_ST_OK; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: s->shutdown=0; ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; dtls1_stop_timer(s); if (ret == 1 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A; else s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; s->init_num=0; /* Reflect ClientHello sequence to remain stateless while listening */ if (listen) { memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->s3->read_sequence, sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); } /* If we're just listening, stop here */ if (listen && s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { ret = 2; s->d1->listen = 0; /* Set expected sequence numbers * to continue the handshake. */ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 2; s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1; s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1; goto end; } break; case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: ret = dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(s); if ( ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; /* HelloVerifyRequests resets Finished MAC */ if (s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); break; case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: s->new_session = 2; dtls1_start_timer(s); ret=dtls1_send_server_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->hit) { if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; } #else if (s->hit) s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; #endif else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: /* Check if it is anon DH */ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)) { dtls1_start_timer(s); ret=dtls1_send_server_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->tlsext_status_expected) s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; } else { skip = 1; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; } #else } else skip=1; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; #endif s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; /* clear this, it may get reset by * send_server_key_exchange */ - if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA) -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - && !(l & SSL_KRB5) -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ - ) - /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key - * even when forbidden by protocol specs - * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to - * be able to handle this) */ - s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; - else - s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0; + s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0; /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or * RSA but we have a sign only certificate */ - if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp - || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA)) + if ((l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA)) || ((l & SSL_kRSA) && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ) ) ) ) { dtls1_start_timer(s); ret=dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; } else skip=1; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */ ((s->session->peer != NULL) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts * and in RFC 2246): */ ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) && /* ... except when the application insists on verification * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5)) { /* no cert request */ skip=1; s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; } else { s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1; dtls1_start_timer(s); ret=dtls1_send_certificate_request(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; #else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; #endif s->init_num=0; } break; case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: dtls1_start_timer(s); ret=dtls1_send_server_done(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; } s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (ret == 2) { dtls1_stop_timer(s); s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; } else { if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; } s->init_num=0; s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; } break; case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; s->init_num=0; /* We need to get hashes here so if there is * a client cert, it can be verified */ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, &(s->s3->finish_dgst1), &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0])); s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, &(s->s3->finish_dgst2), &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH])); break; case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1; /* we should decide if we expected this one */ ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1; ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; dtls1_stop_timer(s); if (s->hit) s->state=SSL_ST_OK; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; #endif else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; s->init_num=0; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: ret=dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; s->init_num=0; break; #endif case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; } ret=dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; s->init_num=0; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { ret= -1; goto end; } dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); break; case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: ret=dtls1_send_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; if (s->hit) s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; else s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL_ST_OK: /* clean a few things up */ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); #if 0 BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); s->init_buf=NULL; #endif /* remove buffering on output */ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); s->init_num=0; if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ { /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */ s->new_session=0; ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; /* s->server=1; */ s->handshake_func=dtls1_accept; if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); } ret = 1; /* done handshaking, next message is client hello */ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; /* next message is server hello */ s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; goto end; /* break; */ default: SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); ret= -1; goto end; /* break; */ } if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { if (s->debug) { if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) goto end; } if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { new_state=s->state; s->state=state; cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1); s->state=new_state; } } skip=0; } end: /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ s->in_handshake--; if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret); return(ret); } int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0); s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_off=0; /* no need to buffer this message, since there are no retransmit * requests for it */ } /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s) { unsigned int msg_len; unsigned char *msg, *buf, *p; if (s->state == DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A) { buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; msg = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) *(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER>>8, *(p++) = DTLS1_BAD_VER&0xff; else *(p++) = s->version >> 8, *(p++) = s->version & 0xFF; if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } *(p++) = (unsigned char) s->d1->cookie_len; memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); p += s->d1->cookie_len; msg_len = p - msg; dtls1_set_message_header(s, buf, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, msg_len); s->state=DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num=p-buf; s->init_off=0; } /* s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B */ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s) { unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p,*d; int i; unsigned int sl; unsigned long l,Time; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; p=s->s3->server_random; Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ l2n(Time,p); RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4); /* Do the message type and length last */ d=p= &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); if (s->client_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) *(p++)=DTLS1_BAD_VER>>8, *(p++)=DTLS1_BAD_VER&0xff; else *(p++)=s->version>>8, *(p++)=s->version&0xff; /* Random stuff */ memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length * session-id if we want it to be single use. * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff. */ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)) s->session->session_id_length=0; sl=s->session->session_id_length; if (sl > sizeof s->session->session_id) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } *(p++)=sl; memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl); p+=sl; /* put the cipher */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) return -1; i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p); p+=i; /* put the compression method */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP *(p++)=0; #else if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) *(p++)=0; else *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } #endif /* do the header */ l=(p-d); d=buf; d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l, 0, l); s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num=p-buf; s->init_off=0; /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); } /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } int dtls1_send_server_done(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; /* do the header */ p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0, 0, 0); s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num=DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_off=0; /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); } /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA unsigned char *q; int j,num; RSA *rsa; unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned int u; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *dh=NULL,*dhp; #endif EVP_PKEY *pkey; unsigned char *p,*d; int al,i; unsigned long type; int n; CERT *cert; BIGNUM *r[4]; int nr[4],kn; BUF_MEM *buf; EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK; cert=s->cert; buf=s->init_buf; r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL; n=0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (type & SSL_kRSA) { rsa=cert->rsa_tmp; if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) { rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); if(rsa == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); goto f_err; } RSA_up_ref(rsa); cert->rsa_tmp=rsa; } if (rsa == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); goto f_err; } r[0]=rsa->n; r[1]=rsa->e; s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (type & SSL_kEDH) { dhp=cert->dh_tmp; if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); if (dhp == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { DH_free(dh); SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.dh=dh; if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || dhp->priv_key == NULL || (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) { if(!DH_generate_key(dh)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } } else { dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } } r[0]=dh->p; r[1]=dh->g; r[2]=dh->pub_key; } else #endif { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++) { nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]); n+=2+nr[i]; } if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)) { if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); } else { pkey=NULL; kn=0; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+kn)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF); goto err; } d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; p= &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++) { s2n(nr[i],p); BN_bn2bin(r[i],p); p+=nr[i]; } /* not anonymous */ if (pkey != NULL) { /* n is the length of the params, they start at * &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) and p points to the space * at the end. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { q=md_buf; j=0; for (num=2; num > 0; num--) { EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n); EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q, (unsigned int *)&i); q+=i; j+=i; } if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA); goto err; } s2n(u,p); n+=u+2; } else #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { /* lets do DSS */ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]),n); if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA); goto err; } s2n(i,p); n+=i+2; } else #endif { /* Is this error check actually needed? */ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); goto f_err; } } d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n); /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send * it off */ s->init_num=n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_off=0; /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); } s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); err: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return(-1); } int dtls1_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p,*d; int i,j,nl,off,n; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL; X509_NAME *name; BUF_MEM *buf; unsigned int msg_len; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { buf=s->init_buf; d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ p++; n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p); d[0]=n; p+=n; n++; off=n; p+=2; n+=2; sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); nl=0; if (sk != NULL) { for (i=0; idata[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+n]); if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) { s2n(j,p); i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); n+=2+j; nl+=2+j; } else { d=p; i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2; n+=j; nl+=j; } } } /* else no CA names */ p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH+off]); s2n(nl,p); d=(unsigned char *)buf->data; *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; l2n3(n,d); s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq,d); s->d1->handshake_write_seq++; /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send * it off */ s->init_num=n+DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_off=0; #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG /* XXX: what to do about this? */ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; /* do the header */ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; *(p++)=0; *(p++)=0; *(p++)=0; s->init_num += 4; #endif /* XDTLS: set message header ? */ msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, msg_len); /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); err: return(-1); } int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) { unsigned long l; X509 *x; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); if (x == NULL && /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK)) != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return(0); } l=dtls1_output_cert_chain(s,x); s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; s->init_num=(int)l; s->init_off=0; /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); } /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) { if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; int len, slen; unsigned int hlen, msg_len; EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; HMAC_CTX hctx; SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char key_name[16]; /* get session encoding length */ slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is * too long */ if (slen > 0xFF00) return -1; /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as * follows 12 (DTLS handshake message header) + * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) return -1; senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen); if (!senc) return -1; p = senc; i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); p=(unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present * it does all the work otherwise use generated values * from parent ctx. */ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx, 1) < 0) { OPENSSL_free(senc); return -1; } } else { RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); } l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p); /* Skip ticket length for now */ p += 2; /* Output key name */ macstart = p; memcpy(p, key_name, 16); p += 16; /* output IV */ memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); /* Encrypt session data */ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); p += len; EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); p += len; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); p += hlen; /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ /* Total length */ len = p - (unsigned char *)(s->init_buf->data); /* Ticket length */ p=(unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) + 4; s2n(len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 6, p); /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num= len; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; s->init_off=0; OPENSSL_free(senc); /* XDTLS: set message header ? */ msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, msg_len, 0, msg_len); /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); } /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ return(dtls1_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/ssl/s23_srvr.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/ssl/s23_srvr.c (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/ssl/s23_srvr.c (revision 276859) @@ -1,610 +1,612 @@ /* ssl/s23_srvr.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include #include #include #include static SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver); int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s); static SSL_METHOD *ssl23_get_server_method(int ver) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 if (ver == SSL2_VERSION) return(SSLv2_server_method()); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) return(SSLv3_server_method()); #endif if (ver == TLS1_VERSION) return(TLSv1_server_method()); else return(NULL); } IMPLEMENT_ssl23_meth_func(SSLv23_server_method, ssl23_accept, ssl_undefined_function, ssl23_get_server_method) int ssl23_accept(SSL *s) { BUF_MEM *buf; unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; int ret= -1; int new_state,state; RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); ERR_clear_error(); clear_sys_error(); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb=s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb=s->ctx->info_callback; s->in_handshake++; if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); for (;;) { state=s->state; switch(s->state) { case SSL_ST_BEFORE: case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: s->server=1; if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */ s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; if (s->init_buf == NULL) { if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { ret= -1; goto end; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { ret= -1; goto end; } s->init_buf=buf; } ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: case SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: s->shutdown=0; ret=ssl23_get_client_hello(s); if (ret >= 0) cb=NULL; goto end; /* break; */ default: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); ret= -1; goto end; /* break; */ } if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { new_state=s->state; s->state=state; cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1); s->state=new_state; } } end: s->in_handshake--; if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret); return(ret); } int ssl23_get_client_hello(SSL *s) { char buf_space[11]; /* Request this many bytes in initial read. * We can detect SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 Client Hellos * ('type == 3') correctly only when the following * is in a single record, which is not guaranteed by * the protocol specification: * Byte Content * 0 type \ * 1/2 version > record header * 3/4 length / * 5 msg_type \ * 6-8 length > Client Hello message * 9/10 client_version / */ char *buf= &(buf_space[0]); unsigned char *p,*d,*d_len,*dd; unsigned int i; unsigned int csl,sil,cl; int n=0,j; int type=0; int v[2]; if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) { /* read the initial header */ v[0]=v[1]=0; if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) goto err; n=ssl23_read_bytes(s, sizeof buf_space); if (n != sizeof buf_space) return(n); /* n == -1 || n == 0 */ p=s->packet; memcpy(buf,p,n); if ((p[0] & 0x80) && (p[2] == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) { /* * SSLv2 header */ if ((p[3] == 0x00) && (p[4] == 0x02)) { v[0]=p[3]; v[1]=p[4]; /* SSLv2 */ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2)) type=1; } else if (p[3] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { v[0]=p[3]; v[1]=p[4]; /* SSLv3/TLSv1 */ if (p[4] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) { if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) { s->version=TLS1_VERSION; /* type=2; */ /* done later to survive restarts */ s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; } else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) { s->version=SSL3_VERSION; /* type=2; */ s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; } else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2)) { type=1; } } else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) { s->version=SSL3_VERSION; /* type=2; */ s->state=SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; } else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2)) type=1; } } else if ((p[0] == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (p[1] == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) && (p[5] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && ((p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 5 /* silly record length? */) || (p[9] >= p[1]))) { /* * SSLv3 or tls1 header */ v[0]=p[1]; /* major version (= SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) */ /* We must look at client_version inside the Client Hello message * to get the correct minor version. * However if we have only a pathologically small fragment of the * Client Hello message, this would be difficult, and we'd have * to read more records to find out. * No known SSL 3.0 client fragments ClientHello like this, * so we simply reject such connections to avoid * protocol version downgrade attacks. */ if (p[3] == 0 && p[4] < 6) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); goto err; } /* if major version number > 3 set minor to a value * which will use the highest version 3 we support. * If TLS 2.0 ever appears we will need to revise * this.... */ if (p[9] > SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) v[1]=0xff; else v[1]=p[10]; /* minor version according to client_version */ if (v[1] >= TLS1_VERSION_MINOR) { if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) { s->version=TLS1_VERSION; type=3; } else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) { s->version=SSL3_VERSION; type=3; } } else { /* client requests SSL 3.0 */ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3)) { s->version=SSL3_VERSION; type=3; } else if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1)) { /* we won't be able to use TLS of course, * but this will send an appropriate alert */ s->version=TLS1_VERSION; type=3; } } } else if ((strncmp("GET ", (char *)p,4) == 0) || (strncmp("POST ",(char *)p,5) == 0) || (strncmp("HEAD ",(char *)p,5) == 0) || (strncmp("PUT ", (char *)p,4) == 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST); goto err; } else if (strncmp("CONNECT",(char *)p,7) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST); goto err; } } #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (FIPS_mode() && (s->version < TLS1_VERSION)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE); goto err; } #endif /* ensure that TLS_MAX_VERSION is up-to-date */ OPENSSL_assert(s->version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION); if (s->state == SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B) { /* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 in an SSLv2 header * (other cases skip this state) */ type=2; p=s->packet; v[0] = p[3]; /* == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR */ v[1] = p[4]; /* An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS * record. It's format is: * Byte Content * 0-1 msg_length * 2 msg_type * 3-4 version * 5-6 cipher_spec_length * 7-8 session_id_length * 9-10 challenge_length * ... ... */ n=((p[0]&0x7f)<<8)|p[1]; if (n > (1024*4)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE); goto err; } if (n < 9) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } j=ssl23_read_bytes(s,n+2); /* We previously read 11 bytes, so if j > 0, we must have * j == n+2 == s->packet_length. We have at least 11 valid * packet bytes. */ if (j <= 0) return(j); ssl3_finish_mac(s, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2); if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->packet+2, s->packet_length-2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* CLIENT-HELLO */ p=s->packet; p+=5; n2s(p,csl); n2s(p,sil); n2s(p,cl); d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; if ((csl+sil+cl+11) != s->packet_length) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } /* record header: msg_type ... */ *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO; /* ... and length (actual value will be written later) */ d_len = d; d += 3; /* client_version */ *(d++) = SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR; /* == v[0] */ *(d++) = v[1]; /* lets populate the random area */ /* get the challenge_length */ i=(cl > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE)?SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE:cl; memset(d,0,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); memcpy(&(d[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-i]),&(p[csl+sil]),i); d+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; /* no session-id reuse */ *(d++)=0; /* ciphers */ j=0; dd=d; d+=2; for (i=0; iinit_buf->data) - 4; l2n3((long)i, d_len); /* get the data reused from the init_buf */ s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; s->s3->tmp.message_type=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO; s->s3->tmp.message_size=i; } /* imaginary new state (for program structure): */ /* s->state = SSL23_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C */ if (type == 1) { #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); goto err; #else /* we are talking sslv2 */ /* we need to clean up the SSLv3/TLSv1 setup and put in the * sslv2 stuff. */ if (s->s2 == NULL) { if (!ssl2_new(s)) goto err; } else ssl2_clear(s); if (s->s3 != NULL) ssl3_free(s); if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(s->init_buf, SSL2_MAX_RECORD_LENGTH_3_BYTE_HEADER)) { goto err; } s->state=SSL2_ST_GET_CLIENT_HELLO_A; if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 && s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3) s->s2->ssl2_rollback=0; else /* reject SSL 2.0 session if client supports SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0 * (SSL 3.0 draft/RFC 2246, App. E.2) */ s->s2->ssl2_rollback=1; /* setup the n bytes we have read so we get them from * the sslv2 buffer */ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; s->packet_length=n; s->packet= &(s->s2->rbuf[0]); memcpy(s->packet,buf,n); s->s2->rbuf_left=n; s->s2->rbuf_offs=0; s->method=SSLv2_server_method(); s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept; #endif } if ((type == 2) || (type == 3)) { /* we have SSLv3/TLSv1 (type 2: SSL2 style, type 3: SSL3/TLS style) */ - s->method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version); - if (s->method == NULL) + SSL_METHOD *new_method; + new_method = ssl23_get_server_method(s->version); + if (new_method == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); goto err; } + s->method = new_method; if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) goto err; /* we are in this state */ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; if (type == 3) { /* put the 'n' bytes we have read into the input buffer * for SSLv3 */ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; s->packet_length=n; s->packet= &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[0]); memcpy(s->packet,buf,n); s->s3->rbuf.left=n; s->s3->rbuf.offset=0; } else { s->packet_length=0; s->s3->rbuf.left=0; s->s3->rbuf.offset=0; } #if 0 /* ssl3_get_client_hello does this */ s->client_version=(v[0]<<8)|v[1]; #endif s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept; } if ((type < 1) || (type > 3)) { /* bad, very bad */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); goto err; } s->init_num=0; if (buf != buf_space) OPENSSL_free(buf); return(SSL_accept(s)); err: if (buf != buf_space) OPENSSL_free(buf); return(-1); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/ssl/s3_clnt.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/ssl/s3_clnt.c (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/ssl/s3_clnt.c (revision 276859) @@ -1,2850 +1,2868 @@ /* ssl/s3_clnt.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2003 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include "kssl_lcl.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS #include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH #include #endif #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE #include #endif static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver); static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a,const X509_NAME * const *b); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH static int curve_id2nid(int curve_id); int check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL_CIPHER *cs); #endif static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_client_method(int ver) { if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) return(SSLv3_client_method()); else return(NULL); } IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_client_method, ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_connect, ssl3_get_client_method) int ssl3_connect(SSL *s) { BUF_MEM *buf=NULL; unsigned long Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; int ret= -1; int new_state,state,skip=0; RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); ERR_clear_error(); clear_sys_error(); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb=s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb=s->ctx->info_callback; s->in_handshake++; if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); for (;;) { state=s->state; switch(s->state) { case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: s->new_session=1; s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT; s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate++; /* break */ case SSL_ST_BEFORE: case SSL_ST_CONNECT: case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_CONNECT: case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_CONNECT: s->server=0; if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); if ((s->version & 0xff00 ) != 0x0300) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ret = -1; goto end; } /* s->version=SSL3_VERSION; */ s->type=SSL_ST_CONNECT; if (s->init_buf == NULL) { if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { ret= -1; goto end; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { ret= -1; goto end; } s->init_buf=buf; buf=NULL; } if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; } /* setup buffing BIO */ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,0)) { ret= -1; goto end; } /* don't push the buffering BIO quite yet */ ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A; s->ctx->stats.sess_connect++; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B: s->shutdown=0; ret=ssl3_client_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A; s->init_num=0; /* turn on buffering for the next lot of output */ if (s->bbio != s->wbio) s->wbio=BIO_push(s->bbio,s->wbio); break; case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B: ret=ssl3_get_server_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (s->hit) { s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { /* receive renewed session ticket */ s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; } #endif } else s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT ret=ssl3_check_finished(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (ret == 2) { s->hit = 1; if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; else s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; s->init_num=0; break; } #endif /* Check if it is anon DH/ECDH */ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)) { ret=ssl3_get_server_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->tlsext_status_expected) s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A; else s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; } else { skip = 1; s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; } #else } else skip=1; s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; #endif s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B: ret=ssl3_get_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A; s->init_num=0; /* at this point we check that we have the * required stuff from the server */ if (!ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; } break; case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B: ret=ssl3_get_certificate_request(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B: ret=ssl3_get_server_done(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req) s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A; else s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B: case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C: case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D: ret=ssl3_send_client_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B: ret=ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; /* EAY EAY EAY need to check for DH fix cert * sent back */ /* For TLS, cert_req is set to 2, so a cert chain * of nothing is sent, but no verify packet is sent */ /* XXX: For now, we do not support client * authentication in ECDH cipher suites with * ECDH (rather than ECDSA) certificates. * We need to skip the certificate verify * message when client's ECDH public key is sent * inside the client certificate. */ if (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) { s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A; } else { s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0; } s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B: ret=ssl3_send_client_verify(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; s->init_num=0; s->s3->change_cipher_spec=0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B: ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A; s->init_num=0; s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP s->session->compress_meth=0; #else if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) s->session->compress_meth=0; else s->session->compress_meth= s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; #endif if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; } if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE)) { ret= -1; goto end; } break; case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B: ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_CW_FINISHED_B, s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label, s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH; /* clear flags */ s->s3->flags&= ~SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER; if (s->hit) { s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED) { s->state=SSL_ST_OK; s->s3->flags|=SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER; s->s3->delay_buf_pop_ret=0; } } else { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* Allow NewSessionTicket if ticket expected */ if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A; else #endif s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; } s->init_num=0; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B: ret=ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B: ret=ssl3_get_cert_status(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A; s->init_num=0; break; #endif case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B: s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_CR_FINISHED_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (s->hit) s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CHANGE_A; else s->state=SSL_ST_OK; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_CW_FLUSH: s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; } s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; break; case SSL_ST_OK: /* clean a few things up */ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); if (s->init_buf != NULL) { BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); s->init_buf=NULL; } /* If we are not 'joining' the last two packets, * remove the buffering now */ if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER)) ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); /* else do it later in ssl3_write */ s->init_num=0; s->new_session=0; ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); if (s->hit) s->ctx->stats.sess_hit++; ret=1; /* s->server=0; */ s->handshake_func=ssl3_connect; s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good++; if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); goto end; /* break; */ default: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); ret= -1; goto end; /* break; */ } /* did we do anything */ if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { if (s->debug) { if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) goto end; } if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { new_state=s->state; s->state=state; cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP,1); s->state=new_state; } } skip=0; } end: s->in_handshake--; if (buf != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(buf); if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT,ret); return(ret); } int ssl3_client_hello(SSL *s) { unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p,*d; int i; unsigned long Time,l; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP int j; SSL_COMP *comp; #endif buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) { SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; if ((sess == NULL) || (sess->ssl_version != s->version) || #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT !sess->session_id_length || #else (!sess->session_id_length && !sess->tlsext_tick) || #endif (sess->not_resumable)) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0)) goto err; } /* else use the pre-loaded session */ p=s->s3->client_random; Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ l2n(Time,p); if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0) goto err; /* Do the message type and length last */ d=p= &(buf[4]); *(p++)=s->version>>8; *(p++)=s->version&0xff; s->client_version=s->version; /* Random stuff */ memcpy(p,s->s3->client_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; /* Session ID */ if (s->new_session) i=0; else i=s->session->session_id_length; *(p++)=i; if (i != 0) { if (i > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,i); p+=i; } /* Ciphers supported */ i=ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(s,SSL_get_ciphers(s),&(p[2]),0); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); goto err; } s2n(i,p); p+=i; /* COMPRESSION */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP *(p++)=1; #else if (s->ctx->comp_methods == NULL) j=0; else j=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); *(p++)=1+j; for (i=0; ictx->comp_methods,i); *(p++)=comp->id; } #endif *(p++)=0; /* Add the NULL method */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if ((p = ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } #endif l=(p-d); d=buf; *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO; l2n3(l,d); s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num=p-buf; s->init_off=0; } /* SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); err: return(-1); } int ssl3_get_server_hello(SSL *s) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; SSL_CIPHER *c; unsigned char *p,*d; int i,al,ok; unsigned int j; long n; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP SSL_COMP *comp; #endif n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_B, -1, 20000, /* ?? */ &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); if ( SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type == DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST) { if ( s->d1->send_cookie == 0) { s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; return 1; } else /* already sent a cookie */ { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } } } if ( s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; if ((p[0] != (s->version>>8)) || (p[1] != (s->version&0xff))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); s->version=(s->version&0xff00)|p[1]; al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } p+=2; /* load the server hello data */ /* load the server random */ memcpy(s->s3->server_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; /* get the session-id */ j= *(p++); if ((j > sizeof s->session->session_id) || (j > SSL3_SESSION_ID_SIZE)) { al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } if (j != 0 && j == s->session->session_id_length && memcmp(p,s->session->session_id,j) == 0) { if(s->sid_ctx_length != s->session->sid_ctx_length || memcmp(s->session->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx,s->sid_ctx_length)) { /* actually a client application bug */ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT); goto f_err; } s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; s->hit=1; } else /* a miss or crap from the other end */ { /* If we were trying for session-id reuse, make a new * SSL_SESSION so we don't stuff up other people */ s->hit=0; if (s->session->session_id_length > 0) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,0)) { al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } } s->session->session_id_length=j; memcpy(s->session->session_id,p,j); /* j could be 0 */ } p+=j; c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p); if (c == NULL) { /* unknown cipher */ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto f_err; } p+=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL); sk=ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(s); i=sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(sk,c); if (i < 0) { /* we did not say we would use this cipher */ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED); goto f_err; } /* Depending on the session caching (internal/external), the cipher and/or cipher_id values may not be set. Make sure that cipher_id is set and use it for comparison. */ if (s->session->cipher) s->session->cipher_id = s->session->cipher->id; if (s->hit && (s->session->cipher_id != c->id)) { /* Workaround is now obsolete */ #if 0 if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG)) #endif { al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED); goto f_err; } } s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; /* lets get the compression algorithm */ /* COMPRESSION */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (*(p++) != 0) { al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); goto f_err; } #else j= *(p++); if (j == 0) comp=NULL; else comp=ssl3_comp_find(s->ctx->comp_methods,j); if ((j != 0) && (comp == NULL)) { al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); goto f_err; } else { s->s3->tmp.new_compression=comp; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* TLS extensions*/ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) { /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); goto f_err; } if (ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); goto err; } } #endif if (p != (d+n)) { /* wrong packet length */ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO,SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH); goto f_err; } return(1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT err: #endif return(-1); } int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s) { int al,i,ok,ret= -1; unsigned long n,nc,llen,l; X509 *x=NULL; const unsigned char *q,*p; unsigned char *d; STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; SESS_CERT *sc; EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; int need_cert = 1; /* VRS: 0=> will allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) || ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5) && (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE))) { s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; return(1); } if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } n2l3(p,llen); if (llen+3 != n) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } for (nc=0; nc llen) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } q=p; x=d2i_X509(NULL,&q,l); if (x == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto f_err; } if (q != (p+l)) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } x=NULL; nc+=l+3; p=q; } i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); if ((s->verify_mode != SSL_VERIFY_NONE) && (i <= 0) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 && (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK)) != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5) #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ ) { al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); goto f_err; } ERR_clear_error(); /* but we keep s->verify_result */ sc=ssl_sess_cert_new(); if (sc == NULL) goto err; if (s->session->sess_cert) ssl_sess_cert_free(s->session->sess_cert); s->session->sess_cert=sc; sc->cert_chain=sk; /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does include the peer's * certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */ x=sk_X509_value(sk,0); sk=NULL; /* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/ pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x); /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ need_cert = ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK)) == (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))? 0: 1; #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG printf("pkey,x = %p, %p\n", (void *)pkey,(void *)x); printf("ssl_cert_type(x,pkey) = %d\n", ssl_cert_type(x,pkey)); printf("cipher, alg, nc = %s, %lx, %d\n", s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->name, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms, need_cert); #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey))) { x=NULL; al=SSL3_AL_FATAL; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); goto f_err; } i=ssl_cert_type(x,pkey); if (need_cert && i < 0) { x=NULL; al=SSL3_AL_FATAL; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); goto f_err; } if (need_cert) { sc->peer_cert_type=i; CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); /* Why would the following ever happen? * We just created sc a couple of lines ago. */ if (sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509 != NULL) X509_free(sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509); sc->peer_pkeys[i].x509=x; sc->peer_key= &(sc->peer_pkeys[i]); if (s->session->peer != NULL) X509_free(s->session->peer); CRYPTO_add(&x->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); s->session->peer=x; } else { sc->peer_cert_type=i; sc->peer_key= NULL; if (s->session->peer != NULL) X509_free(s->session->peer); s->session->peer=NULL; } s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; x=NULL; ret=1; if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); } err: EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); X509_free(x); sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); return(ret); } int ssl3_get_key_exchange(SSL *s) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA unsigned char *q,md_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE*2]; #endif EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; unsigned char *param,*p; int al,j,ok; long i,param_len,n,alg; EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *rsa=NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *dh=NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL; BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; int curve_nid = 0; int encoded_pt_len = 0; #endif /* use same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request() * as ServerKeyExchange message may be skipped */ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_A, SSL3_ST_CR_KEY_EXCH_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); + alg=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; + EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); + if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE) { + /* + * Can't skip server key exchange if this is an ephemeral + * ciphersuite. + */ + if (alg & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kECDHE)) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + al = SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + goto f_err; + } s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; return(1); } param=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; if (s->session->sess_cert != NULL) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) { RSA_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp); s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=NULL; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp) { DH_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp); s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=NULL; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp) { EC_KEY_free(s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp); s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=NULL; } #endif } else { s->session->sess_cert=ssl_sess_cert_new(); } /* Total length of the parameters including the length prefix */ param_len=0; - alg=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; - EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (alg & SSL_kRSA) { + /* Temporary RSA keys only allowed in export ciphersuites */ + if (!SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) + { + al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + goto f_err; + } if ((rsa=RSA_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } param_len = 2; if (param_len > n) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } n2s(p,i); if (i > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH); goto f_err; } param_len += i; if (!(rsa->n=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->n))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p+=i; if (2 > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } param_len += 2; n2s(p,i); if (i > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH); goto f_err; } param_len += i; if (!(rsa->e=BN_bin2bn(p,i,rsa->e))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p+=i; n-=param_len; /* this should be because we are using an export cipher */ if (alg & SSL_aRSA) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp=rsa; rsa=NULL; } #else /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ if (0) ; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH else if (alg & SSL_kEDH) { if ((dh=DH_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } param_len = 2; if (param_len > n) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } n2s(p,i); if (i > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH); goto f_err; } param_len += i; if (!(dh->p=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p+=i; if (2 > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } param_len += 2; n2s(p,i); if (i > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH); goto f_err; } param_len += i; if (!(dh->g=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p+=i; if (2 > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } param_len += 2; n2s(p,i); if (i > n - param_len) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH); goto f_err; } param_len += i; if (!(dh->pub_key=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } p+=i; n-=param_len; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (alg & SSL_aRSA) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); #else if (0) ; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA else if (alg & SSL_aDSS) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].x509); #endif /* else anonymous DH, so no certificate or pkey. */ s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp=dh; dh=NULL; } else if ((alg & SSL_kDHr) || (alg & SSL_kDHd)) { al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER); goto f_err; } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH else if (alg & SSL_kECDHE) { EC_GROUP *ngroup; const EC_GROUP *group; if ((ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Extract elliptic curve parameters and the * server's ephemeral ECDH public key. * Keep accumulating lengths of various components in * param_len and make sure it never exceeds n. */ /* XXX: For now we only support named (not generic) curves * and the ECParameters in this case is just three bytes. We * also need one byte for the length of the encoded point */ param_len=4; if (param_len > n) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } if ((*p != NAMED_CURVE_TYPE) || ((curve_nid = curve_id2nid(*(p + 2))) == 0)) { al=SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS); goto f_err; } ngroup = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_nid); if (ngroup == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (EC_KEY_set_group(ecdh, ngroup) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } EC_GROUP_free(ngroup); group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh); if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { al=SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); goto f_err; } p+=3; /* Next, get the encoded ECPoint */ if (((srvr_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) || ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } encoded_pt_len = *p; /* length of encoded point */ p+=1; if ((encoded_pt_len > n - param_len) || (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, srvr_ecpoint, p, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx) == 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); goto f_err; } param_len += encoded_pt_len; n-=param_len; p+=encoded_pt_len; /* The ECC/TLS specification does not mention * the use of DSA to sign ECParameters in the server * key exchange message. We do support RSA and ECDSA. */ if (0) ; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA else if (alg & SSL_aRSA) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA else if (alg & SSL_aECDSA) pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509); #endif /* else anonymous ECDH, so no certificate or pkey. */ EC_KEY_set_public_key(ecdh, srvr_ecpoint); s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp=ecdh; ecdh=NULL; BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx = NULL; EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); srvr_ecpoint = NULL; } else if (alg & SSL_kECDH) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ if (alg & SSL_aFZA) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER); goto f_err; } /* p points to the next byte, there are 'n' bytes left */ /* if it was signed, check the signature */ if (pkey != NULL) { n2s(p,i); n-=2; j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); /* Check signature length. If n is 0 then signature is empty */ if ((i != n) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { /* wrong packet length */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH); goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { int num; unsigned int size; j=0; q=md_buf; for (num=2; num > 0; num--) { EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len); EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q,&size); q+=size; j+=size; } i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, p, n, pkey->pkey.rsa); if (i < 0) { al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); goto f_err; } if (i == 0) { /* bad signature */ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { /* lets do DSS */ EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL); EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len); if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0) { /* bad signature */ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { /* let's do ECDSA */ EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL); EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_VerifyUpdate(&md_ctx,param,param_len); if (EVP_VerifyFinal(&md_ctx,p,(int)n,pkey) <= 0) { /* bad signature */ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #endif { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } else { /* still data left over */ if (!(alg & SSL_aNULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (n != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } } EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return(1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); err: EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (rsa != NULL) RSA_free(rsa); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (dh != NULL) DH_free(dh); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); EC_POINT_free(srvr_ecpoint); if (ecdh != NULL) EC_KEY_free(ecdh); #endif EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return(-1); } int ssl3_get_certificate_request(SSL *s) { int ok,ret=0; unsigned long n,nc,l; unsigned int llen,ctype_num,i; X509_NAME *xn=NULL; const unsigned char *p,*q; unsigned char *d; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk=NULL; n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_REQ_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0; if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE) { s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; return(1); } if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto err; } /* TLS does not like anon-DH with client cert */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) { l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; if (l & SSL_aNULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER); goto err; } } p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; if ((ca_sk=sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* get the certificate types */ ctype_num= *(p++); if (ctype_num > SSL3_CT_NUMBER) ctype_num=SSL3_CT_NUMBER; for (i=0; is3->tmp.ctype[i]= p[i]; p+=ctype_num; /* get the CA RDNs */ n2s(p,llen); #if 0 { FILE *out; out=fopen("/tmp/vsign.der","w"); fwrite(p,1,llen,out); fclose(out); } #endif if ((llen+ctype_num+2+1) != n) { ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } for (nc=0; nc llen) { if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) goto cont; /* netscape bugs */ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG); goto err; } q=p; if ((xn=d2i_X509_NAME(NULL,&q,l)) == NULL) { /* If netscape tolerance is on, ignore errors */ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG) goto cont; else { ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } } if (q != (p+l)) { ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk,xn)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } p+=l; nc+=l+2; } if (0) { cont: ERR_clear_error(); } /* we should setup a certificate to return.... */ s->s3->tmp.cert_req=1; s->s3->tmp.ctype_num=ctype_num; if (s->s3->tmp.ca_names != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.ca_names,X509_NAME_free); s->s3->tmp.ca_names=ca_sk; ca_sk=NULL; ret=1; err: if (ca_sk != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk,X509_NAME_free); return(ret); } static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME * const *a, const X509_NAME * const *b) { return(X509_NAME_cmp(*a,*b)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT int ssl3_get_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) { int ok,al,ret=0, ticklen; long n; const unsigned char *p; unsigned char *d; n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_A, SSL3_ST_CR_SESSION_TICKET_B, -1, 16384, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; return(1); } if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } if (n < 6) { /* need at least ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket length */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; n2l(p, s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint); n2s(p, ticklen); /* ticket_lifetime_hint + ticket_length + ticket */ if (ticklen + 6 != n) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (s->session->tlsext_tick) { OPENSSL_free(s->session->tlsext_tick); s->session->tlsext_ticklen = 0; } s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, p, ticklen); s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; /* There are two ways to detect a resumed ticket sesion. * One is to set an appropriate session ID and then the server * must return a match in ServerHello. This allows the normal * client session ID matching to work and we know much * earlier that the ticket has been accepted. * * The other way is to set zero length session ID when the * ticket is presented and rely on the handshake to determine * session resumption. * * We choose the former approach because this fits in with * assumptions elsewhere in OpenSSL. The session ID is set * to the SHA256 (or SHA1 is SHA256 is disabled) hash of the * ticket. */ EVP_Digest(p, ticklen, s->session->session_id, &s->session->session_id_length, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 EVP_sha256(), NULL); #else EVP_sha1(), NULL); #endif ret=1; return(ret); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); err: return(-1); } int ssl3_get_cert_status(SSL *s) { int ok, al; unsigned long resplen; long n; const unsigned char *p; n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_STATUS_B, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS, 16384, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); if (n < 4) { /* need at least status type + length */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } p = (unsigned char *)s->init_msg; if (*p++ != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE); goto f_err; } n2l3(p, resplen); if (resplen + 4 != (unsigned long)n) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = BUF_memdup(p, resplen); if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = resplen; if (s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { int ret; ret = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); if (ret == 0) { al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE); goto f_err; } if (ret < 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } } return 1; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); return(-1); } #endif int ssl3_get_server_done(SSL *s) { int ok,ret=0; long n; n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_A, SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_DONE_B, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 30, /* should be very small, like 0 :-) */ &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); if (n > 0) { /* should contain no data */ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return -1; } ret=1; return(ret); } int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p,*d; int n; unsigned long l; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA unsigned char *q; EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *clnt_ecdh = NULL; const EC_POINT *srvr_ecpoint = NULL; EVP_PKEY *srvr_pub_pkey = NULL; unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; int encoded_pt_len = 0; BN_CTX * bn_ctx = NULL; #endif if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_A) { d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; p= &(d[4]); l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; /* Fool emacs indentation */ if (0) {} #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA else if (l & SSL_kRSA) { RSA *rsa; unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { /* We should always have a server certificate with SSL_kRSA. */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp != NULL) rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp; else { pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509); if ((pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); } tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8; tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff; if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0) goto err; s->session->master_key_length=sizeof tmp_buf; q=p; /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) p+=2; n=RSA_public_encrypt(sizeof tmp_buf, tmp_buf,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); #ifdef PKCS1_CHECK if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1) p[1]++; if (s->options & SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2) tmp_buf[0]=0x70; #endif if (n <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT); goto err; } /* Fix buf for TLS and beyond */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) { s2n(n,q); n+=2; } s->session->master_key_length= s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf); OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf,sizeof tmp_buf); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 else if (l & SSL_kKRB5) { krb5_error_code krb5rc; KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; /* krb5_data krb5_ap_req; */ krb5_data *enc_ticket; krb5_data authenticator, *authp = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; unsigned char epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; int padl, outl = sizeof(epms); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n", l, SSL_kKRB5); #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ authp = NULL; #ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH if (KRB5SENDAUTH) authp = &authenticator; #endif /* KRB5SENDAUTH */ krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp, &kssl_err); enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); if (enc == NULL) goto err; #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG { printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc); if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text) printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text); } #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ if (krb5rc) { ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); goto err; } /* 20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ ** in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in: ** ** Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length) ** n = krb5_ap_req.length; ** memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length); ** if (krb5_ap_req.data) ** kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req); ** ** Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper ** (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson ) ** Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced ** with a 2-byte length followed by the value. ** Example: ** KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms ** Where "xx xx" = length bytes. Shown here with ** optional authenticator omitted. */ /* KerberosWrapper.Ticket */ s2n(enc_ticket->length,p); memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length); p+= enc_ticket->length; n = enc_ticket->length + 2; /* KerberosWrapper.Authenticator */ if (authp && authp->length) { s2n(authp->length,p); memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length); p+= authp->length; n+= authp->length + 2; free(authp->data); authp->data = NULL; authp->length = 0; } else { s2n(0,p);/* null authenticator length */ n+=2; } tmp_buf[0]=s->client_version>>8; tmp_buf[1]=s->client_version&0xff; if (RAND_bytes(&(tmp_buf[2]),sizeof tmp_buf-2) <= 0) goto err; /* 20010420 VRS. Tried it this way; failed. ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL); ** EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx, ** kssl_ctx->length); ** EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv); */ memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL, kssl_ctx->key,iv); EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx,epms,&outl,tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(epms[outl]),&padl); outl += padl; if (outl > sizeof epms) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); /* KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret */ s2n(outl,p); memcpy(p, epms, outl); p+=outl; n+=outl + 2; s->session->master_key_length= s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, sizeof tmp_buf); OPENSSL_cleanse(epms, outl); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH else if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) { DH *dh_srvr,*dh_clnt; if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto err; } if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp != NULL) dh_srvr=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp; else { /* we get them from the cert */ ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS); goto err; } /* generate a new random key */ if ((dh_clnt=DHparams_dup(dh_srvr)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } if (!DH_generate_key(dh_clnt)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } /* use the 'p' output buffer for the DH key, but * make sure to clear it out afterwards */ n=DH_compute_key(p,dh_srvr->pub_key,dh_clnt); if (n <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } /* generate master key from the result */ s->session->master_key_length= s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key,p,n); /* clean up */ memset(p,0,n); /* send off the data */ n=BN_num_bytes(dh_clnt->pub_key); s2n(n,p); BN_bn2bin(dh_clnt->pub_key,p); n+=2; DH_free(dh_clnt); /* perhaps clean things up a bit EAY EAY EAY EAY*/ } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH else if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE)) { const EC_GROUP *srvr_group = NULL; EC_KEY *tkey; int ecdh_clnt_cert = 0; int field_size = 0; if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); goto err; } /* Did we send out the client's * ECDH share for use in premaster * computation as part of client certificate? * If so, set ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. */ if ((l & SSL_kECDH) && (s->cert != NULL)) { /* XXX: For now, we do not support client * authentication using ECDH certificates. * To add such support, one needs to add * code that checks for appropriate * conditions and sets ecdh_clnt_cert to 1. * For example, the cert have an ECC * key on the same curve as the server's * and the key should be authorized for * key agreement. * * One also needs to add code in ssl3_connect * to skip sending the certificate verify * message. * * if ((s->cert->key->privatekey != NULL) && * (s->cert->key->privatekey->type == * EVP_PKEY_EC) && ...) * ecdh_clnt_cert = 1; */ } if (s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp != NULL) { tkey = s->session->sess_cert->peer_ecdh_tmp; } else { /* Get the Server Public Key from Cert */ srvr_pub_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(s->session-> \ sess_cert->peer_pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509); if ((srvr_pub_pkey == NULL) || (srvr_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) || (srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } tkey = srvr_pub_pkey->pkey.ec; } srvr_group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); srvr_ecpoint = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(tkey); if ((srvr_group == NULL) || (srvr_ecpoint == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if ((clnt_ecdh=EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EC_KEY_set_group(clnt_ecdh, srvr_group)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (ecdh_clnt_cert) { /* Reuse key info from our certificate * We only need our private key to perform * the ECDH computation. */ const BIGNUM *priv_key; tkey = s->cert->key->privatekey->pkey.ec; priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); if (priv_key == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!EC_KEY_set_private_key(clnt_ecdh, priv_key)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } else { /* Generate a new ECDH key pair */ if (!(EC_KEY_generate_key(clnt_ecdh))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } } /* use the 'p' output buffer for the ECDH key, but * make sure to clear it out afterwards */ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(srvr_group); if (field_size <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } n=ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, srvr_ecpoint, clnt_ecdh, NULL); if (n <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } /* generate master key from the result */ s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc \ -> generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, n); memset(p, 0, n); /* clean up */ if (ecdh_clnt_cert) { /* Send empty client key exch message */ n = 0; } else { /* First check the size of encoding and * allocate memory accordingly. */ encoded_pt_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(encoded_pt_len * sizeof(unsigned char)); bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Encode the public key */ n = EC_POINT_point2oct(srvr_group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_ecdh), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, encodedPoint, encoded_pt_len, bn_ctx); *p = n; /* length of encoded point */ /* Encoded point will be copied here */ p += 1; /* copy the point */ memcpy((unsigned char *)p, encodedPoint, n); /* increment n to account for length field */ n += 1; } /* Free allocated memory */ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ else { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE; l2n3(n,d); s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num=n+4; s->init_off=0; } /* SSL3_ST_CW_KEY_EXCH_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); err: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); if (clnt_ecdh != NULL) EC_KEY_free(clnt_ecdh); EVP_PKEY_free(srvr_pub_pkey); #endif return(-1); } int ssl3_send_client_verify(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p,*d; unsigned char data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; EVP_PKEY *pkey; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA unsigned u=0; #endif unsigned long n; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA) int j; #endif if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_A) { d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; p= &(d[4]); pkey=s->cert->key->privatekey; s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s,&(s->s3->finish_dgst2), &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH])); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, &(s->s3->finish_dgst1),&(data[0])); if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, data, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0 ) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_RSA_LIB); goto err; } s2n(u,p); n=u+2; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { if (!DSA_sign(pkey->save_type, &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]), (unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.dsa)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_DSA_LIB); goto err; } s2n(j,p); n=j+2; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { if (!ECDSA_sign(pkey->save_type, &(data[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,&(p[2]), (unsigned int *)&j,pkey->pkey.ec)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY, ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB); goto err; } s2n(j,p); n=j+2; } else #endif { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY; l2n3(n,d); s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_VRFY_B; s->init_num=(int)n+4; s->init_off=0; } return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); err: return(-1); } int ssl3_send_client_certificate(SSL *s) { X509 *x509=NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; int i; unsigned long l; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_A) { if ((s->cert == NULL) || (s->cert->key->x509 == NULL) || (s->cert->key->privatekey == NULL)) s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; else s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; } /* We need to get a client cert */ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B) { /* If we get an error, we need to * ssl->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1); * We then get retied later */ i=0; i = ssl_do_client_cert_cb(s, &x509, &pkey); if (i < 0) { s->rwstate=SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return(-1); } s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; if ((i == 1) && (pkey != NULL) && (x509 != NULL)) { s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_B; if ( !SSL_use_certificate(s,x509) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(s,pkey)) i=0; } else if (i == 1) { i=0; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK); } if (x509 != NULL) X509_free(x509); if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (i == 0) { if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { s->s3->tmp.cert_req=0; ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING,SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE); return(1); } else { s->s3->tmp.cert_req=2; } } /* Ok, we have a cert */ s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C; } if (s->state == SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_C) { s->state=SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D; l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, (s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 2)?NULL:s->cert->key->x509); s->init_num=(int)l; s->init_off=0; } /* SSL3_ST_CW_CERT_D */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } #define has_bits(i,m) (((i)&(m)) == (m)) int ssl3_check_cert_and_algorithm(SSL *s) { int i,idx; long algs; EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; SESS_CERT *sc; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *rsa; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *dh; #endif sc=s->session->sess_cert; algs=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; /* we don't have a certificate */ if (algs & (SSL_aDH|SSL_aNULL|SSL_aKRB5)) return(1); if (sc == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA rsa=s->session->sess_cert->peer_rsa_tmp; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH dh=s->session->sess_cert->peer_dh_tmp; #endif /* This is the passed certificate */ idx=sc->peer_cert_type; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (idx == SSL_PKEY_ECC) { if (check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) == 0) { /* check failed */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT); goto f_err; } else { return 1; } } #endif pkey=X509_get_pubkey(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509); i=X509_certificate_type(sc->peer_pkeys[idx].x509,pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); /* Check that we have a certificate if we require one */ if ((algs & SSL_aRSA) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT); goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA else if ((algs & SSL_aDSS) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DSA|EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT); goto f_err; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if ((algs & SSL_kRSA) && !(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_RSA|EVP_PKT_ENC) || (rsa != NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT); goto f_err; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if ((algs & SSL_kEDH) && !(has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKT_EXCH) || (dh != NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } else if ((algs & SSL_kDHr) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_RSA)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT); goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA else if ((algs & SSL_kDHd) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PK_DH|EVP_PKS_DSA)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT); goto f_err; } #endif #endif if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && !has_bits(i,EVP_PKT_EXP)) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (algs & SSL_kRSA) { if (rsa == NULL || RSA_size(rsa)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY); goto f_err; } } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (algs & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) { if (dh == NULL || DH_size(dh)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } } else #endif { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } } return(1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); err: return(0); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH /* This is the complement of nid2curve_id in s3_srvr.c. */ static int curve_id2nid(int curve_id) { /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001) * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */ static int nid_list[26] = { 0, NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */ }; if ((curve_id < 1) || (curve_id > 25)) return 0; return nid_list[curve_id]; } #endif /* Check to see if handshake is full or resumed. Usually this is just a * case of checking to see if a cache hit has occurred. In the case of * session tickets we have to check the next message to be sure. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT int ssl3_check_finished(SSL *s) { int ok; long n; /* If we have no ticket or session ID is non-zero length (a match of * a non-zero session length would never reach here) it cannot be a * resumed session. */ if (!s->session->tlsext_tick || s->session->session_id_length) return 1; /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate * message, so permit appropriate message length */ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_CR_CERT_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; if ((s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) || (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET)) return 2; return 1; } #endif int ssl_do_client_cert_cb(SSL *s, X509 **px509, EVP_PKEY **ppkey) { int i = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (s->ctx->client_cert_engine) { i = ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(s->ctx->client_cert_engine, s, SSL_get_client_CA_list(s), px509, ppkey, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (i != 0) return i; } #endif if (s->ctx->client_cert_cb) i = s->ctx->client_cert_cb(s,px509,ppkey); return i; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/ssl/s3_pkt.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/ssl/s3_pkt.c (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/ssl/s3_pkt.c (revision 276859) @@ -1,1418 +1,1420 @@ /* ssl/s3_pkt.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2002 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ #include #include #include #define USE_SOCKETS #include "ssl_locl.h" #include #include static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment); static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s); int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, int n, int max, int extend) { /* If extend == 0, obtain new n-byte packet; if extend == 1, increase * packet by another n bytes. * The packet will be in the sub-array of s->s3->rbuf.buf specified * by s->packet and s->packet_length. * (If s->read_ahead is set, 'max' bytes may be stored in rbuf * [plus s->packet_length bytes if extend == 1].) */ int i,off,newb; if (!extend) { /* start with empty packet ... */ if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) s->s3->rbuf.offset = 0; s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf + s->s3->rbuf.offset; s->packet_length = 0; /* ... now we can act as if 'extend' was set */ } /* For DTLS/UDP reads should not span multiple packets * because the read operation returns the whole packet * at once (as long as it fits into the buffer). */ if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION) { + if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0 && extend) + return 0; if ( s->s3->rbuf.left > 0 && n > s->s3->rbuf.left) n = s->s3->rbuf.left; } /* if there is enough in the buffer from a previous read, take some */ if (s->s3->rbuf.left >= (int)n) { s->packet_length+=n; s->s3->rbuf.left-=n; s->s3->rbuf.offset+=n; return(n); } /* else we need to read more data */ if (!s->read_ahead) max=n; { /* avoid buffer overflow */ int max_max = s->s3->rbuf.len - s->packet_length; if (max > max_max) max = max_max; } if (n > max) /* does not happen */ { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } off = s->packet_length; newb = s->s3->rbuf.left; /* Move any available bytes to front of buffer: * 'off' bytes already pointed to by 'packet', * 'newb' extra ones at the end */ if (s->packet != s->s3->rbuf.buf) { /* off > 0 */ memmove(s->s3->rbuf.buf, s->packet, off+newb); s->packet = s->s3->rbuf.buf; } while (newb < n) { /* Now we have off+newb bytes at the front of s->s3->rbuf.buf and need * to read in more until we have off+n (up to off+max if possible) */ clear_sys_error(); if (s->rbio != NULL) { s->rwstate=SSL_READING; i=BIO_read(s->rbio, &(s->s3->rbuf.buf[off+newb]), max-newb); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N,SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET); i = -1; } if (i <= 0) { s->s3->rbuf.left = newb; return(i); } newb+=i; /* reads should *never* span multiple packets for DTLS because * the underlying transport protocol is message oriented as opposed * to byte oriented as in the TLS case. */ if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION) { if (n > newb) n = newb; /* makes the while condition false */ } } /* done reading, now the book-keeping */ s->s3->rbuf.offset = off + n; s->s3->rbuf.left = newb - n; s->packet_length += n; s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; return(n); } /* MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that will * be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an attacker * could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and cause * ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */ #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32 /* Call this to get a new input record. * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error * or non-blocking IO. * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes */ /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ static int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) { int ssl_major,ssl_minor,al; int enc_err,n,i,ret= -1; SSL3_RECORD *rr; SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned char *p; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; short version; unsigned mac_size, orig_len; size_t extra; unsigned empty_record_count = 0; rr= &(s->s3->rrec); sess=s->session; if (s->options & SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER) extra=SSL3_RT_MAX_EXTRA; else extra=0; if (extra != s->s3->rbuf.len - SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE) { /* actually likely an application error: SLS_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER * set after ssl3_setup_buffers() was done */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } again: /* check if we have the header */ if ( (s->rstate != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || (s->packet_length < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { n=ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s->s3->rbuf.len, 0); if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking */ s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_BODY; p=s->packet; /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ rr->type= *(p++); ssl_major= *(p++); ssl_minor= *(p++); version=(ssl_major<<8)|ssl_minor; n2s(p,rr->length); /* Lets check version */ if (!s->first_packet) { if (version != s->version) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00)) /* Send back error using their minor version number :-) */ s->version = (unsigned short)version; al=SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } } if ((version>>8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); goto err; } if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra) { al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } /* now s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ } /* s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ if (rr->length > s->packet_length-SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { /* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ i=rr->length; n=ssl3_read_n(s,i,i,1); if (n <= 0) return(n); /* error or non-blocking io */ /* now n == rr->length, * and s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */ } s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; /* set state for later operations */ /* At this point, s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, * and we have that many bytes in s->packet */ rr->input= &(s->packet[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); /* ok, we can now read from 's->packet' data into 'rr' * rr->input points at rr->length bytes, which * need to be copied into rr->data by either * the decryption or by the decompression * When the data is 'copied' into the rr->data buffer, * rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ /* We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] * rr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ /* check is not needed I believe */ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH+extra) { al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ rr->data=rr->input; enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,0); /* enc_err is: * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid. * 1: if the padding is valid * -1: if the padding is invalid */ if (enc_err == 0) { al=SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); goto f_err; } #ifdef TLS_DEBUG printf("dec %d\n",rr->length); { unsigned int z; for (z=0; zlength; z++) printf("%02X%c",rr->data[z],((z+1)%16)?' ':'\n'); } printf("\n"); #endif /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (s->read_hash != NULL)) { /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ unsigned char *mac = NULL; unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->read_hash); OPENSSL_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); /* kludge: *_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rr->type */ orig_len = rr->length+((unsigned int)rr->type>>8); /* orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, * therefore we can safely process the record in a different * amount of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. */ if (orig_len < mac_size || /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && orig_len < mac_size+1)) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { /* We update the length so that the TLS header bytes * can be constructed correctly but we need to extract * the MAC in constant time from within the record, * without leaking the contents of the padding bytes. * */ mac = mac_tmp; ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size, orig_len); rr->length -= mac_size; } else { /* In this case there's no padding, so |orig_len| * equals |rec->length| and we checked that there's * enough bytes for |mac_size| above. */ rr->length -= mac_size; mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; } i=s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,md,0 /* not send */); if (i < 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) enc_err = -1; if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra+mac_size) enc_err = -1; } if (enc_err < 0) { /* A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, * we should not reveal which kind of error occured -- this * might become visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */ al=SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); goto f_err; } /* r->length is now just compressed */ if (s->expand != NULL) { if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH+extra) { al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s)) { al=SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); goto f_err; } } if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH+extra) { al=SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } rr->off=0; /* So at this point the following is true * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment * after use :-). */ /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ s->packet_length=0; /* just read a 0 length packet */ if (rr->length == 0) { empty_record_count++; if (empty_record_count > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); goto f_err; } goto again; } return(1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); err: return(ret); } int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP int i; SSL3_RECORD *rr; rr= &(ssl->s3->rrec); i=COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand,rr->comp, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH,rr->data,(int)rr->length); if (i < 0) return(0); else rr->length=i; rr->data=rr->comp; #endif return(1); } int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP int i; SSL3_RECORD *wr; wr= &(ssl->s3->wrec); i=COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress,wr->data, SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH, wr->input,(int)wr->length); if (i < 0) return(0); else wr->length=i; wr->input=wr->data; #endif return(1); } /* Call this to write data in records of type 'type' * It will return <= 0 if not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. */ int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len) { const unsigned char *buf=buf_; unsigned int n,nw; int i,tot; s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; OPENSSL_assert(s->s3->wnum <= INT_MAX); tot=s->s3->wnum; s->s3->wnum=0; if (SSL_in_init(s) && !s->in_handshake) { i=s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return(i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return -1; } } /* ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write * out than the the original len from a write which didn't complete * for non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding * the check for this in ssl3_write_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as * it must never be possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large * number that will then promptly send beyond the end of the users * buffer ... so we trap and report the error in a way the user * will notice */ if (len < tot) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); return(-1); } n=(len-tot); for (;;) { if (n > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) nw=SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; else nw=n; i=do_ssl3_write(s, type, &(buf[tot]), nw, 0); if (i <= 0) { s->s3->wnum=tot; return i; } if ((i == (int)n) || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE))) { /* next chunk of data should get another prepended empty fragment * in ciphersuites with known-IV weakness: */ s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 0; return tot+i; } n-=i; tot+=i; } } static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len, int create_empty_fragment) { unsigned char *p,*plen; int i,mac_size,clear=0; int prefix_len = 0; SSL3_RECORD *wr; SSL3_BUFFER *wb; SSL_SESSION *sess; /* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written * out. This will happen with non blocking IO */ if (s->s3->wbuf.left != 0) return(ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len)); /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { i=s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); if (i <= 0) return(i); /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ } if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment) return 0; wr= &(s->s3->wrec); wb= &(s->s3->wbuf); sess=s->session; if ( (sess == NULL) || (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) || (s->write_hash == NULL)) clear=1; if (clear) mac_size=0; else mac_size=EVP_MD_size(s->write_hash); /* 'create_empty_fragment' is true only when this function calls itself */ if (!clear && !create_empty_fragment && !s->s3->empty_fragment_done) { /* countermeasure against known-IV weakness in CBC ciphersuites * (see http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) */ if (s->s3->need_empty_fragments && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { /* recursive function call with 'create_empty_fragment' set; * this prepares and buffers the data for an empty fragment * (these 'prefix_len' bytes are sent out later * together with the actual payload) */ prefix_len = do_ssl3_write(s, type, buf, 0, 1); if (prefix_len <= 0) goto err; if (s->s3->wbuf.len < (size_t)prefix_len + SSL3_RT_MAX_PACKET_SIZE) { /* insufficient space */ SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } s->s3->empty_fragment_done = 1; } p = wb->buf + prefix_len; /* write the header */ *(p++)=type&0xff; wr->type=type; *(p++)=(s->version>>8); *(p++)=s->version&0xff; /* field where we are to write out packet length */ plen=p; p+=2; /* lets setup the record stuff. */ wr->data=p; wr->length=(int)len; wr->input=(unsigned char *)buf; /* we now 'read' from wr->input, wr->length bytes into * wr->data */ /* first we compress */ if (s->compress != NULL) { if (!ssl3_do_compress(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE,SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE); goto err; } } else { memcpy(wr->data,wr->input,wr->length); wr->input=wr->data; } /* we should still have the output to wr->data and the input * from wr->input. Length should be wr->length. * wr->data still points in the wb->buf */ if (mac_size != 0) { s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s,&(p[wr->length]),1); wr->length+=mac_size; wr->input=p; wr->data=p; } /* ssl3_enc can only have an error on read */ s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s,1); /* record length after mac and block padding */ s2n(wr->length,plen); /* we should now have * wr->data pointing to the encrypted data, which is * wr->length long */ wr->type=type; /* not needed but helps for debugging */ wr->length+=SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; if (create_empty_fragment) { /* we are in a recursive call; * just return the length, don't write out anything here */ return wr->length; } /* now let's set up wb */ wb->left = prefix_len + wr->length; wb->offset = 0; /* memorize arguments so that ssl3_write_pending can detect bad write retries later */ s->s3->wpend_tot=len; s->s3->wpend_buf=buf; s->s3->wpend_type=type; s->s3->wpend_ret=len; /* we now just need to write the buffer */ return ssl3_write_pending(s,type,buf,len); err: return -1; } /* if s->s3->wbuf.left != 0, we need to call this */ int ssl3_write_pending(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf, unsigned int len) { int i; /* XXXX */ if ((s->s3->wpend_tot > (int)len) || ((s->s3->wpend_buf != buf) && !(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER)) || (s->s3->wpend_type != type)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); return(-1); } for (;;) { clear_sys_error(); if (s->wbio != NULL) { s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; i=BIO_write(s->wbio, (char *)&(s->s3->wbuf.buf[s->s3->wbuf.offset]), (unsigned int)s->s3->wbuf.left); } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING,SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET); i= -1; } if (i == s->s3->wbuf.left) { s->s3->wbuf.left=0; s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; return(s->s3->wpend_ret); } else if (i <= 0) { if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { /* For DTLS, just drop it. That's kind of the whole point in using a datagram service */ s->s3->wbuf.left = 0; } return(i); } s->s3->wbuf.offset+=i; s->s3->wbuf.left-=i; } } /* Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. * 'type' is one of the following: * * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when ssl3_get_message calls us) * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) * * If we don't have stored data to work from, read a SSL/TLS record first * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). * * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as * Alert records (e.g. close_notify), ChangeCipherSpec records (not really * a surprise, but handled as if it were), or renegotiation requests. * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): * Change cipher spec protocol * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored * Alert protocol * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) * Handshake protocol * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages * here, anything else is handled by higher layers * Application data protocol * none of our business */ int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek) { int al,i,j,ret; unsigned int n; SSL3_RECORD *rr; void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type2,int val)=NULL; if (s->s3->rbuf.buf == NULL) /* Not initialized yet */ if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) return(-1); if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ { unsigned char *src = s->s3->handshake_fragment; unsigned char *dst = buf; unsigned int k; /* peek == 0 */ n = 0; while ((len > 0) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { *dst++ = *src++; len--; s->s3->handshake_fragment_len--; n++; } /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ for (k = 0; k < s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; k++) s->s3->handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; return n; } /* Now s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. */ if (!s->in_handshake && SSL_in_init(s)) { /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ i=s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return(i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return(-1); } } start: s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; /* s->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record * s->s3->rrec.data, - data * s->s3->rrec.off, - offset into 'data' for next read * s->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes. */ rr = &(s->s3->rrec); /* get new packet if necessary */ if ((rr->length == 0) || (s->rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY)) { ret=ssl3_get_record(s); if (ret <= 0) return(ret); } /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); goto f_err; } /* If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away * (even in 'peek' mode) */ if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { rr->length=0; s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; return(0); } if (type == rr->type) /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE */ { /* make sure that we are not getting application data when we * are doing a handshake for the first time */ if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL)) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); goto f_err; } if (len <= 0) return(len); if ((unsigned int)len > rr->length) n = rr->length; else n = (unsigned int)len; memcpy(buf,&(rr->data[rr->off]),n); if (!peek) { rr->length-=n; rr->off+=n; if (rr->length == 0) { s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; rr->off=0; } } return(n); } /* If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake * message, then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). */ /* In case of record types for which we have 'fragment' storage, * fill that so that we can process the data at a fixed place. */ { unsigned int dest_maxlen = 0; unsigned char *dest = NULL; unsigned int *dest_len = NULL; if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->handshake_fragment; dest = s->s3->handshake_fragment; dest_len = &s->s3->handshake_fragment_len; } else if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { dest_maxlen = sizeof s->s3->alert_fragment; dest = s->s3->alert_fragment; dest_len = &s->s3->alert_fragment_len; } if (dest_maxlen > 0) { n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ if (rr->length < n) n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ /* now move 'n' bytes: */ while (n-- > 0) { dest[(*dest_len)++] = rr->data[rr->off++]; rr->length--; } if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) goto start; /* fragment was too small */ } } /* s->s3->handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; * s->s3->alert_fragment_len == 2 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT. * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) */ /* If we are a client, check for an incoming 'Hello Request': */ if ((!s->server) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) && (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) { s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0; if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment[1] != 0) || (s->s3->handshake_fragment[2] != 0) || (s->s3->handshake_fragment[3] != 0)) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST); goto f_err; } if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->s3->handshake_fragment, 4, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (SSL_is_init_finished(s) && !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS) && !s->s3->renegotiate) { ssl3_renegotiate(s); if (ssl3_renegotiate_check(s)) { i=s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return(i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return(-1); } if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ { BIO *bio; /* In the case where we try to read application data, * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ s->rwstate=SSL_READING; bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); return(-1); } } } } /* we either finished a handshake or ignored the request, * now try again to obtain the (application) data we were asked for */ goto start; } /* If we are a server and get a client hello when renegotiation isn't * allowed send back a no renegotiation alert and carry on. * WARNING: experimental code, needs reviewing (steve) */ if (s->server && SSL_is_init_finished(s) && !s->s3->send_connection_binding && (s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && (s->s3->handshake_fragment[0] == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) && (s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL) && !(s->ctx->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { /*s->s3->handshake_fragment_len = 0;*/ rr->length = 0; ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); goto start; } if (s->s3->alert_fragment_len >= 2) { int alert_level = s->s3->alert_fragment[0]; int alert_descr = s->s3->alert_fragment[1]; s->s3->alert_fragment_len = 0; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->alert_fragment, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb=s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb=s->ctx->info_callback; if (cb != NULL) { j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); } if (alert_level == 1) /* warning */ { s->s3->warn_alert = alert_descr; if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; return(0); } /* This is a warning but we receive it if we requested * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with * a fatal alert because if application tried to * renegotiatie it presumably had a good reason and * expects it to succeed. * * In future we might have a renegotiation where we * don't care if the peer refused it where we carry on. */ else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); goto f_err; } } else if (alert_level == 2) /* fatal */ { char tmp[16]; s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; s->s3->fatal_alert = alert_descr; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES, SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr); BIO_snprintf(tmp,sizeof tmp,"%d",alert_descr); ERR_add_error_data(2,"SSL alert number ",tmp); s->shutdown|=SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); return(0); } else { al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); goto f_err; } goto start; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) /* but we have not received a shutdown */ { s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; rr->length=0; return(0); } if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, so we know * exactly what the record payload has to look like */ if ( (rr->length != 1) || (rr->off != 0) || (rr->data[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS)) { al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); goto f_err; } /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); goto f_err; } if (!(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK)) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); goto f_err; } s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; rr->length=0; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, rr->data, 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); s->s3->change_cipher_spec=1; if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) goto err; else goto start; } /* Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) */ if ((s->s3->handshake_fragment_len >= 4) && !s->in_handshake) { if (((s->state&SSL_ST_MASK) == SSL_ST_OK) && !(s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS)) { #if 0 /* worked only because C operator preferences are not as expected (and * because this is not really needed for clients except for detecting * protocol violations): */ s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|(s->server) ?SSL_ST_ACCEPT :SSL_ST_CONNECT; #else s->state = s->server ? SSL_ST_ACCEPT : SSL_ST_CONNECT; #endif s->new_session=1; } i=s->handshake_func(s); if (i < 0) return(i); if (i == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); return(-1); } if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { if (s->s3->rbuf.left == 0) /* no read-ahead left? */ { BIO *bio; /* In the case where we try to read application data, * but we trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with * the retry option set. Otherwise renegotiation may * cause nasty problems in the blocking world */ s->rwstate=SSL_READING; bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); BIO_set_retry_read(bio); return(-1); } } goto start; } switch (rr->type) { default: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS /* TLS just ignores unknown message types */ if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) { rr->length = 0; goto start; } #endif al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: case SSL3_RT_ALERT: case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: /* we already handled all of these, with the possible exception * of SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when s->in_handshake is set, but that * should not happen when type != rr->type */ al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: /* At this point, we were expecting handshake data, * but have application data. If the library was * running inside ssl3_read() (i.e. in_read_app_data * is set) and it makes sense to read application data * at this point (session renegotiation not yet started), * we will indulge it. */ if (s->s3->in_read_app_data && (s->s3->total_renegotiations != 0) && (( (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) && (s->state >= SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) && (s->state <= SSL3_ST_CR_SRVR_HELLO_A) ) || ( (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) && (s->state <= SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) && (s->state >= SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) ) )) { s->s3->in_read_app_data=2; return(-1); } else { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES,SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); goto f_err; } } /* not reached */ f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); err: return(-1); } int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s) { int i; const char *sender; int slen; if (s->state & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ; else i=SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ; if (s->s3->tmp.key_block == NULL) { if (s->session == NULL || s->session->master_key_length == 0) { /* might happen if dtls1_read_bytes() calls this */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); return (0); } s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) return(0); } if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s,i)) return(0); /* we have to record the message digest at * this point so we can get it before we read * the finished message */ if (s->state & SSL_ST_CONNECT) { sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; } else { sender=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; slen=s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; } s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, &(s->s3->finish_dgst1), &(s->s3->finish_dgst2), sender,slen,s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); return(1); } int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc) { /* Map tls/ssl alert value to correct one */ desc=s->method->ssl3_enc->alert_value(desc); if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && desc == SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION) desc = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; /* SSL 3.0 does not have protocol_version alerts */ if (desc < 0) return -1; /* If a fatal one, remove from cache */ if ((level == 2) && (s->session != NULL)) SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->ctx,s->session); s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; s->s3->send_alert[0]=level; s->s3->send_alert[1]=desc; if (s->s3->wbuf.left == 0) /* data still being written out? */ return s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); /* else data is still being written out, we will get written * some time in the future */ return -1; } int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s) { int i,j; void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; s->s3->alert_dispatch=0; i = do_ssl3_write(s, SSL3_RT_ALERT, &s->s3->send_alert[0], 2, 0); if (i <= 0) { s->s3->alert_dispatch=1; } else { /* Alert sent to BIO. If it is important, flush it now. * If the message does not get sent due to non-blocking IO, * we will not worry too much. */ if (s->s3->send_alert[0] == SSL3_AL_FATAL) (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, s->s3->send_alert, 2, s, s->msg_callback_arg); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb=s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb=s->ctx->info_callback; if (cb != NULL) { j=(s->s3->send_alert[0]<<8)|s->s3->send_alert[1]; cb(s,SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT,j); } } return(i); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/ssl/s3_srvr.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/ssl/s3_srvr.c (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/ssl/s3_srvr.c (revision 276859) @@ -1,2926 +1,2914 @@ /* ssl/s3_srvr.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2005 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ #define REUSE_CIPHER_BUG #define NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include "kssl_lcl.h" #include "../crypto/constant_time_locl.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH #include #endif #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 #include #endif #include static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH static int nid2curve_id(int nid); #endif static SSL_METHOD *ssl3_get_server_method(int ver) { if (ver == SSL3_VERSION) return(SSLv3_server_method()); else return(NULL); } IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(SSLv3_server_method, ssl3_accept, ssl_undefined_function, ssl3_get_server_method) int ssl3_accept(SSL *s) { BUF_MEM *buf; unsigned long l,Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)=NULL; int ret= -1; int new_state,state,skip=0; RAND_add(&Time,sizeof(Time),0); ERR_clear_error(); clear_sys_error(); if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb=s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb=s->ctx->info_callback; /* init things to blank */ s->in_handshake++; if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) SSL_clear(s); if (s->cert == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); return(-1); } for (;;) { state=s->state; switch (s->state) { case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: s->new_session=1; /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ case SSL_ST_BEFORE: case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: case SSL_ST_BEFORE|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: case SSL_ST_OK|SSL_ST_ACCEPT: s->server=1; if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START,1); if ((s->version>>8) != 3) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } s->type=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; if (s->init_buf == NULL) { if ((buf=BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { ret= -1; goto end; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf,SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { ret= -1; goto end; } s->init_buf=buf; } if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; } s->init_num=0; s->s3->flags &= ~SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { /* Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that * the output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) */ if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s,1)) { ret= -1; goto end; } ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { /* Server attempting to renegotiate with * client that doesn't support secure * renegotiation. */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); ret = -1; goto end; } else { /* s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, * we will just send a HelloRequest */ s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; } break; case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: s->shutdown=0; ret=ssl3_send_hello_request(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->init_num=0; ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); break; case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: s->state=SSL_ST_OK; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: s->shutdown=0; ret=ssl3_get_client_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->new_session = 2; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: ret=ssl3_send_server_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->hit) { if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; } #else if (s->hit) s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; #endif else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH or KRB5 */ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5)) { ret=ssl3_send_server_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->tlsext_status_expected) s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; } else { skip = 1; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; } #else } else skip=1; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; #endif s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; /* clear this, it may get reset by * send_server_key_exchange */ - if ((s->options & SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA) -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 - && !(l & SSL_KRB5) -#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ - ) - /* option SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA sends temporary RSA key - * even when forbidden by protocol specs - * (handshake may fail as clients are not required to - * be able to handle this) */ - s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; - else - s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0; + s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=0; /* only send if a DH key exchange, fortezza or * RSA but we have a sign only certificate * * For ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange * message only if the cipher suite is either * ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, the * server certificate contains the server's * public key for key exchange. */ - if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp - || (l & SSL_kECDHE) + if ((l & SSL_kECDHE) || (l & (SSL_DH|SSL_kFZA)) || ((l & SSL_kRSA) && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey)*8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ) ) ) ) { ret=ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; } else skip=1; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: if (/* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || /* if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, * don't request cert during re-negotiation: */ ((s->session->peer != NULL) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || /* never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites * (see section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts * and in RFC 2246): */ ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL) && /* ... except when the application insists on verification * (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts this for SSL 3) */ !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || /* never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites */ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aKRB5)) { /* no cert request */ skip=1; s->s3->tmp.cert_request=0; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; } else { s->s3->tmp.cert_request=1; ret=ssl3_send_certificate_request(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; #else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; #endif s->init_num=0; } break; case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: ret=ssl3_send_server_done(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: /* This code originally checked to see if * any data was pending using BIO_CTRL_INFO * and then flushed. This caused problems * as documented in PR#1939. The proposed * fix doesn't completely resolve this issue * as buggy implementations of BIO_CTRL_PENDING * still exist. So instead we just flush * unconditionally. */ s->rwstate=SSL_WRITING; if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { ret= -1; goto end; } s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; s->state=s->s3->tmp.next_state; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (ret == 2) s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; else { if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { ret=ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; } s->init_num=0; s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; } break; case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: ret=ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (ret == 2) { /* For the ECDH ciphersuites when * the client sends its ECDH pub key in * a certificate, the CertificateVerify * message is not sent. */ s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; s->init_num = 0; } else { s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; s->init_num=0; /* We need to get hashes here so if there is * a client cert, it can be verified */ s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, &(s->s3->finish_dgst1), &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[0])); s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, &(s->s3->finish_dgst2), &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH])); } break; case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; /* we should decide if we expected this one */ ret=ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_CCS_OK; ret=ssl3_get_finished(s,SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; if (s->hit) s->state=SSL_ST_OK; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; #endif else s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; s->init_num=0; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: ret=ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: ret=ssl3_send_cert_status(s); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; s->init_num=0; break; #endif case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: s->session->cipher=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { ret= -1; goto end; } ret=ssl3_send_change_cipher_spec(s, SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A,SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; s->init_num=0; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { ret= -1; goto end; } break; case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: ret=ssl3_send_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A,SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); if (ret <= 0) goto end; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; if (s->hit) s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; else s->s3->tmp.next_state=SSL_ST_OK; s->init_num=0; break; case SSL_ST_OK: /* clean a few things up */ ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); s->init_buf=NULL; /* remove buffering on output */ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); s->init_num=0; if (s->new_session == 2) /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ { /* actually not necessarily a 'new' session unless * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */ s->new_session=0; ssl_update_cache(s,SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; /* s->server=1; */ s->handshake_func=ssl3_accept; if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE,1); } ret = 1; goto end; /* break; */ default: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); ret= -1; goto end; /* break; */ } if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { if (s->debug) { if ((ret=BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) goto end; } if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { new_state=s->state; s->state=state; cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP,1); s->state=new_state; } } skip=0; } end: /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ s->in_handshake--; if (cb != NULL) cb(s,SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT,ret); return(ret); } int ssl3_send_hello_request(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; *(p++)=SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST; *(p++)=0; *(p++)=0; *(p++)=0; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num=4; s->init_off=0; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } int ssl3_check_client_hello(SSL *s) { int ok; long n; /* this function is called when we really expect a Certificate message, * so permit appropriate message length */ n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); s->s3->tmp.reuse_message = 1; if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { /* We only allow the client to restart the handshake once per * negotiation. */ if (s->s3->flags & SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS); return -1; } /* Throw away what we have done so far in the current handshake, * which will now be aborted. (A full SSL_clear would be too much.) */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); s->s3->tmp.dh = NULL; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); s->s3->tmp.ecdh = NULL; } #endif s->s3->flags |= SSL3_FLAGS_SGC_RESTART_DONE; return 2; } return 1; } int ssl3_get_client_hello(SSL *s) { int i,j,ok,al,ret= -1; unsigned int cookie_len; long n; unsigned long id; unsigned char *p,*d,*q; SSL_CIPHER *c; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP SSL_COMP *comp=NULL; #endif STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers=NULL; /* We do this so that we will respond with our native type. * If we are TLSv1 and we get SSLv3, we will respond with TLSv1, * This down switching should be handled by a different method. * If we are SSLv3, we will respond with SSLv3, even if prompted with * TLSv1. */ if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A) { s->state=SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B; } s->first_packet=1; n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); s->first_packet=0; d=p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; /* use version from inside client hello, not from record header * (may differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ s->client_version=(((int)p[0])<<8)|(int)p[1]; p+=2; if ((s->version == DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version > s->version) || (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION && s->client_version < s->version)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); if ((s->client_version>>8) == SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { /* similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version number */ s->version = s->client_version; } al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } /* If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't * contain one, just return since we do not want to * allocate any memory yet. So check cookie length... */ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { unsigned int session_length, cookie_length; session_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); cookie_length = *(p + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + session_length + 1); if (cookie_length == 0) return 1; } /* load the client random */ memcpy(s->s3->client_random,p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; /* get the session-id */ j= *(p++); s->hit=0; /* Versions before 0.9.7 always allow session reuse during renegotiation * (i.e. when s->new_session is true), option * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is new with 0.9.7. * Maybe this optional behaviour should always have been the default, * but we cannot safely change the default behaviour (or new applications * might be written that become totally unsecure when compiled with * an earlier library version) */ if ((s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) goto err; } else { i=ssl_get_prev_session(s, p, j, d + n); if (i == 1) { /* previous session */ s->hit=1; } else if (i == -1) goto err; else /* i == 0 */ { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s,1)) goto err; } } p+=j; if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { /* cookie stuff */ cookie_len = *(p++); /* * The ClientHello may contain a cookie even if the * HelloVerify message has not been sent--make sure that it * does not cause an overflow. */ if ( cookie_len > sizeof(s->d1->rcvd_cookie)) { /* too much data */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } /* verify the cookie if appropriate option is set. */ if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) && cookie_len > 0) { memcpy(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, p, cookie_len); if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { if ( s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->rcvd_cookie, cookie_len) == 0) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } /* else cookie verification succeeded */ } else if ( memcmp(s->d1->rcvd_cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len) != 0) /* default verification */ { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } ret = 2; } p += cookie_len; } n2s(p,i); if ((i == 0) && (j != 0)) { /* we need a cipher if we are not resuming a session */ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); goto f_err; } if ((p+i) >= (d+n)) { /* not enough data */ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if ((i > 0) && (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s,p,i,&(ciphers)) == NULL)) { goto err; } p+=i; /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ if ((s->hit) && (i > 0)) { j=0; id=s->session->cipher->id; #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG printf("client sent %d ciphers\n",sk_num(ciphers)); #endif for (i=0; iid == id) { j=1; break; } } /* Disabled because it can be used in a ciphersuite downgrade * attack: CVE-2010-4180. */ #if 0 if (j == 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) && (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers) == 1)) { /* Special case as client bug workaround: the previously used cipher may * not be in the current list, the client instead might be trying to * continue using a cipher that before wasn't chosen due to server * preferences. We'll have to reject the connection if the cipher is not * enabled, though. */ c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, 0); if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_get_ciphers(s), c) >= 0) { s->session->cipher = c; j = 1; } } #endif if (j == 0) { /* we need to have the cipher in the cipher * list if we are asked to reuse it */ al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); goto f_err; } } /* compression */ i= *(p++); if ((p+i) > (d+n)) { /* not enough data */ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } q=p; for (j=0; j= i) { /* no compress */ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* TLS extensions*/ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s,&p,d,n, &al)) { /* 'al' set by ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); goto f_err; } } if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); goto err; } #endif /* Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other * options, we will now look for them. We have i-1 compression * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ s->s3->tmp.new_compression=NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (s->ctx->comp_methods != NULL) { /* See if we have a match */ int m,nn,o,v,done=0; nn=sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); for (m=0; mctx->comp_methods,m); v=comp->id; for (o=0; os3->tmp.new_compression=comp; else comp=NULL; } #endif /* TLS does not mind if there is extra stuff */ #if 0 /* SSL 3.0 does not mind either, so we should disable this test * (was enabled in 0.9.6d through 0.9.6j and 0.9.7 through 0.9.7b, * in earlier SSLeay/OpenSSL releases this test existed but was buggy) */ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { if (p < (d+n)) { /* wrong number of bytes, * there could be more to follow */ al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } } #endif /* Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must * pick a cipher */ if (!s->hit) { #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP s->session->compress_meth=0; #else s->session->compress_meth=(comp == NULL)?0:comp->id; #endif if (s->session->ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); s->session->ciphers=ciphers; if (ciphers == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED); goto f_err; } ciphers=NULL; c=ssl3_choose_cipher(s,s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); if (c == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); goto f_err; } s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=c; } else { /* Session-id reuse */ #ifdef REUSE_CIPHER_BUG STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; SSL_CIPHER *nc=NULL; SSL_CIPHER *ec=NULL; if (s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG) { sk=s->session->ciphers; for (i=0; ialgorithms & SSL_eNULL) nc=c; if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(c)) ec=c; } if (nc != NULL) s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=nc; else if (ec != NULL) s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=ec; else s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; } else #endif s->s3->tmp.new_cipher=s->session->cipher; } /* we now have the following setup. * client_random * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers * compression - basically ignored right now * ssl version is set - sslv3 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. * s->hit - session reuse flag * s->tmp.new_cipher - the new cipher to use. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO,SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); goto err; } } #endif if (ret < 0) ret=1; if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); } err: if (ciphers != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); return(ret); } int ssl3_send_server_hello(SSL *s) { unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p,*d; int i,sl; unsigned long l,Time; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { buf=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; p=s->s3->server_random; Time=(unsigned long)time(NULL); /* Time */ l2n(Time,p); if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE-4) <= 0) return -1; /* Do the message type and length last */ d=p= &(buf[4]); *(p++)=s->version>>8; *(p++)=s->version&0xff; /* Random stuff */ memcpy(p,s->s3->server_random,SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p+=SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; /* now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the * session id. If it is a re-use, we send back the * old session-id, if it is a new session, we send * back the new session-id or we send back a 0 length * session-id if we want it to be single use. * Currently I will not implement the '0' length session-id * 12-Jan-98 - I'll now support the '0' length stuff. * * We also have an additional case where stateless session * resumption is successful: we always send back the old * session id. In this case s->hit is non zero: this can * only happen if stateless session resumption is succesful * if session caching is disabled so existing functionality * is unaffected. */ if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) && !s->hit) s->session->session_id_length=0; sl=s->session->session_id_length; if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } *(p++)=sl; memcpy(p,s->session->session_id,sl); p+=sl; /* put the cipher */ i=ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher,p); p+=i; /* put the compression method */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP *(p++)=0; #else if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) *(p++)=0; else *(p++)=s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf+SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } #endif /* do the header */ l=(p-d); d=buf; *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO; l2n3(l,d); s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num=p-buf; s->init_off=0; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } int ssl3_send_server_done(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; /* do the header */ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; *(p++)=0; *(p++)=0; *(p++)=0; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num=4; s->init_off=0; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } int ssl3_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA unsigned char *q; int j,num; RSA *rsa; unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned int u; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH DH *dh=NULL,*dhp; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *ecdh=NULL, *ecdhp; unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; int encodedlen = 0; int curve_id = 0; BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; #endif EVP_PKEY *pkey; unsigned char *p,*d; int al,i; unsigned long type; int n; CERT *cert; BIGNUM *r[4]; int nr[4],kn; BUF_MEM *buf; EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { type=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_MKEY_MASK; cert=s->cert; buf=s->init_buf; r[0]=r[1]=r[2]=r[3]=NULL; n=0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (type & SSL_kRSA) { rsa=cert->rsa_tmp; if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) { rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); if(rsa == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); goto f_err; } RSA_up_ref(rsa); cert->rsa_tmp=rsa; } if (rsa == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); goto f_err; } r[0]=rsa->n; r[1]=rsa->e; s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp=1; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (type & SSL_kEDH) { dhp=cert->dh_tmp; if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) dhp=s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); if (dhp == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if ((dh=DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.dh=dh; if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || dhp->priv_key == NULL || (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) { if(!DH_generate_key(dh)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } } else { dh->pub_key=BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); dh->priv_key=BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); goto err; } } r[0]=dh->p; r[1]=dh->g; r[2]=dh->pub_key; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (type & SSL_kECDHE) { const EC_GROUP *group; ecdhp=cert->ecdh_tmp; if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { ecdhp=s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher), SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)); } if (ecdhp == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); goto f_err; } if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ if (ecdhp == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.ecdh=ecdh; if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) { if(!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } } if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); goto err; } /* XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH * keys over named (not generic) curves. For * supported named curves, curve_id is non-zero. */ if ((curve_id = nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); goto err; } /* Encode the public key. * First check the size of encoding and * allocate memory accordingly. */ encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL); encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen*sizeof(unsigned char)); bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); if (encodedlen == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); bn_ctx=NULL; /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not * generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. * In this situation, we need four additional bytes * to encode the entire ServerECDHParams * structure. */ n = 4 + encodedlen; /* We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message * explicitly so we can set these to NULLs */ r[0]=NULL; r[1]=NULL; r[2]=NULL; r[3]=NULL; } else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++) { nr[i]=BN_num_bytes(r[i]); n+=2+nr[i]; } if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & SSL_aNULL)) { if ((pkey=ssl_get_sign_pkey(s,s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } kn=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); } else { pkey=NULL; kn=0; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf,n+4+kn)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_BUF); goto err; } d=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; p= &(d[4]); for (i=0; r[i] != NULL; i++) { s2n(nr[i],p); BN_bn2bin(r[i],p); p+=nr[i]; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (type & SSL_kECDHE) { /* XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. * In this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: * [1 byte CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] * [1 byte length of encoded point], followed by * the actual encoded point itself */ *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; p += 1; *p = 0; p += 1; *p = curve_id; p += 1; *p = encodedlen; p += 1; memcpy((unsigned char*)p, (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen); OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); encodedPoint = NULL; p += encodedlen; } #endif /* not anonymous */ if (pkey != NULL) { /* n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) * and p points to the space at the end. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { q=md_buf; j=0; for (num=2; num > 0; num--) { EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx,(num == 2) ?s->ctx->md5:s->ctx->sha1, NULL); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx,q, (unsigned int *)&i); q+=i; j+=i; } if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_RSA); goto err; } s2n(u,p); n+=u+2; } else #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { /* lets do DSS */ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_dss1(), NULL); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_DSA); goto err; } s2n(i,p); n+=i+2; } else #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA) if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { /* let's do ECDSA */ EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx,EVP_ecdsa(), NULL); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->client_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(s->s3->server_random[0]),SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx,&(d[4]),n); if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx,&(p[2]), (unsigned int *)&i,pkey)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_LIB_ECDSA); goto err; } s2n(i,p); n+=i+2; } else #endif { /* Is this error check actually needed? */ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); goto f_err; } } *(d++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE; l2n3(n,d); /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send * it off */ s->init_num=n+4; s->init_off=0; } s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); err: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (encodedPoint != NULL) OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); #endif EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); return(-1); } int ssl3_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p,*d; int i,j,nl,off,n; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk=NULL; X509_NAME *name; BUF_MEM *buf; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { buf=s->init_buf; d=p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4]); /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ p++; n=ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s,p); d[0]=n; p+=n; n++; off=n; p+=2; n+=2; sk=SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); nl=0; if (sk != NULL) { for (i=0; idata[4+n]); if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) { s2n(j,p); i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); n+=2+j; nl+=2+j; } else { d=p; i2d_X509_NAME(name,&p); j-=2; s2n(j,d); j+=2; n+=j; nl+=j; } } } /* else no CA names */ p=(unsigned char *)&(buf->data[4+off]); s2n(nl,p); d=(unsigned char *)buf->data; *(d++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; l2n3(n,d); /* we should now have things packed up, so lets send * it off */ s->init_num=n+4; s->init_off=0; #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, s->init_num + 4)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; /* do the header */ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; *(p++)=0; *(p++)=0; *(p++)=0; s->init_num += 4; #endif s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); err: return(-1); } int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s) { int i,al,ok; long n; unsigned long l; unsigned char *p; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *rsa=NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH BIGNUM *pub=NULL; DH *dh_srvr; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 KSSL_ERR kssl_err; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EC_KEY *srvr_ecdh = NULL; EVP_PKEY *clnt_pub_pkey = NULL; EC_POINT *clnt_ecpoint = NULL; BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; #endif n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A, SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B, SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, 2048, /* ??? */ &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; l=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (l & SSL_kRSA) { unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; int decrypt_len; unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ if (s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp) { if ((s->cert != NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp != NULL)) rsa=s->cert->rsa_tmp; /* Don't do a callback because rsa_tmp should * be sent already */ if (rsa == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY); goto f_err; } } else { pkey=s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey; if ( (pkey == NULL) || (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA) || (pkey->pkey.rsa == NULL)) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); goto f_err; } rsa=pkey->pkey.rsa; } /* TLS and [incidentally] DTLS, including pre-0.9.8f */ if (s->version > SSL3_VERSION && s->client_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { n2s(p,i); if (n != i+2) { if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); goto err; } else p-=2; } else n=i; } /* We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because * of Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see * RFC 2246, section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of * the TLS RFC and generates a random premaster secret for the * case that the decrypt fails. See * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */ /* should be RAND_bytes, but we cannot work around a failure. */ if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) goto err; decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt((int)n,p,p,rsa,RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); ERR_clear_error(); /* decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. * decrypt_good will be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */ decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); /* If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct * then version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. * The Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version * number check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks * are done in constant time and are treated like any other * decryption error. */ version_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version>>8)); version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version&0xff)); /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as * the ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks * (strangely, the protocol does not offer such protection for * DH ciphersuites). However, buggy clients exist that send the * negotiated protocol version instead if the server does not * support the requested protocol version. If * SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. */ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { unsigned char workaround_good; workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(p[0], (unsigned)(s->version>>8)); workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(p[1], (unsigned)(s->version&0xff)); version_good |= workaround_good; } /* Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good * to remain non-zero (0xff). */ decrypt_good &= version_good; /* Now copy rand_premaster_secret over p using * decrypt_good_mask. */ for (i = 0; i < (int) sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); i++) { p[i] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, p[i], rand_premaster_secret[i]); } s->session->master_key_length= s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p,i); OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (l & (SSL_kEDH|SSL_kDHr|SSL_kDHd)) { n2s(p,i); if (n != i+2) { if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); goto err; } else { p-=2; i=(int)n; } } if (n == 0L) /* the parameters are in the cert */ { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS); goto f_err; } else { if (s->s3->tmp.dh == NULL) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } else dh_srvr=s->s3->tmp.dh; } pub=BN_bin2bn(p,i,NULL); if (pub == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } i=DH_compute_key(p,pub,dh_srvr); if (i <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,ERR_R_DH_LIB); BN_clear_free(pub); goto err; } DH_free(s->s3->tmp.dh); s->s3->tmp.dh=NULL; BN_clear_free(pub); pub=NULL; s->session->master_key_length= s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key,p,i); OPENSSL_cleanse(p,i); } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 if (l & SSL_kKRB5) { krb5_error_code krb5rc; krb5_data enc_ticket; krb5_data authenticator; krb5_data enc_pms; KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx; EVP_CIPHER_CTX ciph_ctx; EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH]; int padl, outl; krb5_timestamp authtime = 0; krb5_ticket_times ttimes; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ciph_ctx); if (!kssl_ctx) kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); n2s(p,i); enc_ticket.length = i; if (n < (int)enc_ticket.length + 6) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } enc_ticket.data = (char *)p; p+=enc_ticket.length; n2s(p,i); authenticator.length = i; if (n < (int)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length) + 6) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } authenticator.data = (char *)p; p+=authenticator.length; n2s(p,i); enc_pms.length = i; enc_pms.data = (char *)p; p+=enc_pms.length; /* Note that the length is checked again below, ** after decryption */ if(enc_pms.length > sizeof pms) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (n != (long)(enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length + enc_pms.length + 6)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes, &kssl_err)) != 0) { #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n", krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); if (kssl_err.text) printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); goto err; } /* Note: no authenticator is not considered an error, ** but will return authtime == 0. */ if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator, &authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0) { #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n", krb5rc, kssl_err.reason); if (kssl_err.text) printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text); #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason); goto err; } if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc); goto err; } #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx); #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype); if (enc == NULL) goto err; memset(iv, 0, sizeof iv); /* per RFC 1510 */ if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ciph_ctx,enc,NULL,kssl_ctx->key,iv)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto err; } if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl, (unsigned char *)enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto err; } if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (!EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto err; } outl += padl; if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } if (!((pms[0] == (s->client_version>>8)) && (pms[1] == (s->client_version & 0xff)))) { /* The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). * However, buggy clients exist that send random bytes instead of * the protocol version. * If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such clients. * (Perhaps we should have a separate BUG value for the Kerberos cipher) */ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } } EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx); s->session->master_key_length= s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, pms, outl); if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) { size_t len = strlen(kssl_ctx->client_princ); if ( len < SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH ) { s->session->krb5_client_princ_len = len; memcpy(s->session->krb5_client_princ,kssl_ctx->client_princ,len); } } /* Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, ** but it caused problems for apache. ** kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx); ** if (s->kssl_ctx) s->kssl_ctx = NULL; */ } else #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if ((l & SSL_kECDH) || (l & SSL_kECDHE)) { int ret = 1; int field_size = 0; const EC_KEY *tkey; const EC_GROUP *group; const BIGNUM *priv_key; /* initialize structures for server's ECDH key pair */ if ((srvr_ecdh = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Let's get server private key and group information */ if (l & SSL_kECDH) { /* use the certificate */ tkey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey->pkey.ec; } else { /* use the ephermeral values we saved when * generating the ServerKeyExchange msg. */ tkey = s->s3->tmp.ecdh; } group = EC_KEY_get0_group(tkey); priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(tkey); if (!EC_KEY_set_group(srvr_ecdh, group) || !EC_KEY_set_private_key(srvr_ecdh, priv_key)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* Let's get client's public key */ if ((clnt_ecpoint = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (n == 0L) { /* Client Publickey was in Client Certificate */ if (l & SSL_kECDHE) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); goto f_err; } if (((clnt_pub_pkey=X509_get_pubkey(s->session->peer)) == NULL) || (clnt_pub_pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC)) { /* XXX: For now, we do not support client * authentication using ECDH certificates * so this branch (n == 0L) of the code is * never executed. When that support is * added, we ought to ensure the key * received in the certificate is * authorized for key agreement. * ECDH_compute_key implicitly checks that * the two ECDH shares are for the same * group. */ al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS); goto f_err; } if (EC_POINT_copy(clnt_ecpoint, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(clnt_pub_pkey->pkey.ec)) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } ret = 2; /* Skip certificate verify processing */ } else { /* Get client's public key from encoded point * in the ClientKeyExchange message. */ if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Get encoded point length */ i = *p; p += 1; if (n != 1 + i) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (EC_POINT_oct2point(group, clnt_ecpoint, p, i, bn_ctx) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* p is pointing to somewhere in the buffer * currently, so set it to the start */ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; } /* Compute the shared pre-master secret */ field_size = EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); if (field_size <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } i = ECDH_compute_key(p, (field_size+7)/8, clnt_ecpoint, srvr_ecdh, NULL); if (i <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); goto err; } EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); /* Compute the master secret */ s->session->master_key_length = s->method->ssl3_enc-> \ generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, p, i); OPENSSL_cleanse(p, i); return (ret); } else #endif { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); goto f_err; } return(1); f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDH) err: #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH EVP_PKEY_free(clnt_pub_pkey); EC_POINT_free(clnt_ecpoint); if (srvr_ecdh != NULL) EC_KEY_free(srvr_ecdh); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); #endif return(-1); } int ssl3_get_cert_verify(SSL *s) { EVP_PKEY *pkey=NULL; unsigned char *p; int al,ok,ret=0; long n; int type=0,i,j; X509 *peer; n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B, -1, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); if (s->session->peer != NULL) { peer=s->session->peer; pkey=X509_get_pubkey(peer); type=X509_certificate_type(peer,pkey); } else { peer=NULL; pkey=NULL; } if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; - if ((peer != NULL) && (type | EVP_PKT_SIGN)) + if (peer != NULL) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE); goto f_err; } ret=1; goto end; } if (peer == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED); al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; goto f_err; } if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; goto f_err; } if (s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; goto f_err; } /* we now have a signature that we need to verify */ p=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; n2s(p,i); n-=2; if (i > n) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } j=EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); if ((i > j) || (n > j) || (n <= 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { i=RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH+SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, p, i, pkey->pkey.rsa); if (i < 0) { al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT); goto f_err; } if (i == 0) { al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { j=DSA_verify(pkey->save_type, &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.dsa); if (j <= 0) { /* bad signature */ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { j=ECDSA_verify(pkey->save_type, &(s->s3->tmp.cert_verify_md[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]), SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH,p,i,pkey->pkey.ec); if (j <= 0) { /* bad signature */ al=SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } } else #endif { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); al=SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; goto f_err; } ret=1; if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); } end: EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return(ret); } int ssl3_get_client_certificate(SSL *s) { int i,ok,al,ret= -1; X509 *x=NULL; unsigned long l,nc,llen,n; const unsigned char *p,*q; unsigned char *d; STACK_OF(X509) *sk=NULL; n=s->method->ssl_get_message(s, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A, SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B, -1, s->max_cert_list, &ok); if (!ok) return((int)n); if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { if ( (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto f_err; } /* If tls asked for a client cert, the client must return a 0 list */ if ((s->version > SSL3_VERSION) && s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST); al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; goto f_err; } s->s3->tmp.reuse_message=1; return(1); } if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { al=SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } p=d=(unsigned char *)s->init_msg; if ((sk=sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } n2l3(p,llen); if (llen+3 != n) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } for (nc=0; nc llen) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } q=p; x=d2i_X509(NULL,&p,l); if (x == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } if (p != (q+l)) { al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (!sk_X509_push(sk,x)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } x=NULL; nc+=l+3; } if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); goto f_err; } /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto f_err; } } else { i=ssl_verify_cert_chain(s,sk); if (i <= 0) { al=ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED); goto f_err; } } if (s->session->peer != NULL) /* This should not be needed */ X509_free(s->session->peer); s->session->peer=sk_X509_shift(sk); s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; /* With the current implementation, sess_cert will always be NULL * when we arrive here. */ if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { s->session->sess_cert = ssl_sess_cert_new(); if (s->session->sess_cert == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain, X509_free); s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain=sk; /* Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the * peer's own certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */ sk=NULL; ret=1; if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,al); } err: if (x != NULL) X509_free(x); if (sk != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(sk,X509_free); return(ret); } int ssl3_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) { unsigned long l; X509 *x; if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { x=ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); if (x == NULL && /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK)) != (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return(0); } l=ssl3_output_cert_chain(s,x); s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; s->init_num=(int)l; s->init_off=0; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH /* This is the complement of curve_id2nid in s3_clnt.c. */ static int nid2curve_id(int nid) { /* ECC curves from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt (Mar 15, 2001) * (no changes in draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt [June 2003]) */ switch (nid) { case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ return 1; case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ return 2; case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ return 3; case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ return 4; case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ return 5; case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ return 6; case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ return 7; case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ return 8; case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ return 9; case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ return 10; case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ return 11; case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ return 12; case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ return 13; case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ return 14; case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ return 15; case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ return 16; case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ return 17; case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ return 18; case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ return 19; case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ return 20; case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ return 21; case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ return 22; case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ return 23; case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ return 24; case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ return 25; default: return 0; } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT int ssl3_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) { if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; int len, slen; unsigned int hlen; EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; HMAC_CTX hctx; SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char key_name[16]; /* get session encoding length */ slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); /* Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is * too long */ if (slen > 0xFF00) return -1; /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as * follows 1 (size of message name) + 3 (message length * bytes) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 26 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) return -1; senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen); if (!senc) return -1; p = senc; i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; /* do the header */ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET; /* Skip message length for now */ p += 3; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); /* Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present * it does all the work otherwise use generated values * from parent ctx. */ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, &hctx, 1) < 0) { OPENSSL_free(senc); return -1; } } else { RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); } l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p); /* Skip ticket length for now */ p += 2; /* Output key name */ macstart = p; memcpy(p, key_name, 16); p += 16; /* output IV */ memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); /* Encrypt session data */ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); p += len; EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); p += len; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); p += hlen; /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ /* Total length */ len = p - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + 1; l2n3(len - 4, p); /* Message length */ p += 4; s2n(len - 10, p); /* Ticket length */ /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num= len; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; s->init_off=0; OPENSSL_free(senc); } /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } int ssl3_send_cert_status(SSL *s) { if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A) { unsigned char *p; /* Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) * + (ocsp response) */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) return -1; p=(unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; /* do the header */ *(p++)=SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; /* message length */ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); /* status type */ *(p++)= s->tlsext_status_type; /* length of OCSP response */ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); /* actual response */ memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; s->state=SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B; s->init_off = 0; } /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B */ return(ssl3_do_write(s,SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/ssl/ssl.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/ssl/ssl.h (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/ssl/ssl.h (revision 276859) @@ -1,2145 +1,2149 @@ /* ssl/ssl.h */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #ifndef HEADER_SSL_H #define HEADER_SSL_H #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP #include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO #include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_X509 #include #endif #include #include #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* SSLeay version number for ASN.1 encoding of the session information */ /* Version 0 - initial version * Version 1 - added the optional peer certificate */ #define SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION 0x0001 /* text strings for the ciphers */ #define SSL_TXT_NULL_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_NULL_WITH_MD5 #define SSL_TXT_RC4_128_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_WITH_MD5 #define SSL_TXT_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC4_128_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 #define SSL_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 #define SSL_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_RC2_128_CBC_EXPORT40_WITH_MD5 #define SSL_TXT_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_IDEA_128_CBC_WITH_MD5 #define SSL_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_MD5 #define SSL_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_SHA SSL2_TXT_DES_64_CBC_WITH_SHA #define SSL_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 SSL2_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_MD5 #define SSL_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_SHA SSL2_TXT_DES_192_EDE3_CBC_WITH_SHA /* VRS Additional Kerberos5 entries */ #define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA #define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA #define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_SHA #define SSL_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_SHA #define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 #define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 #define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_128_MD5 #define SSL_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_IDEA_128_CBC_MD5 #define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA #define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_SHA #define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_SHA #define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 #define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC2_40_CBC_MD5 #define SSL_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_RC4_40_MD5 #define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_SHA #define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_40_CBC_MD5 #define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_SHA #define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_64_CBC_MD5 #define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_SHA #define SSL_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 SSL3_TXT_KRB5_DES_192_CBC3_MD5 #define SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH 256 #define SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 32 #define SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH 32 #define SSL_MIN_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH_IN_BYTES (512/8) #define SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH 8 #define SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 48 /* These are used to specify which ciphers to use and not to use */ #define SSL_TXT_LOW "LOW" #define SSL_TXT_MEDIUM "MEDIUM" #define SSL_TXT_HIGH "HIGH" #define SSL_TXT_FIPS "FIPS" #define SSL_TXT_kFZA "kFZA" #define SSL_TXT_aFZA "aFZA" #define SSL_TXT_eFZA "eFZA" #define SSL_TXT_FZA "FZA" #define SSL_TXT_aNULL "aNULL" #define SSL_TXT_eNULL "eNULL" #define SSL_TXT_NULL "NULL" #define SSL_TXT_kKRB5 "kKRB5" #define SSL_TXT_aKRB5 "aKRB5" #define SSL_TXT_KRB5 "KRB5" #define SSL_TXT_kRSA "kRSA" #define SSL_TXT_kDHr "kDHr" #define SSL_TXT_kDHd "kDHd" #define SSL_TXT_kEDH "kEDH" #define SSL_TXT_aRSA "aRSA" #define SSL_TXT_aDSS "aDSS" #define SSL_TXT_aDH "aDH" #define SSL_TXT_DSS "DSS" #define SSL_TXT_DH "DH" #define SSL_TXT_EDH "EDH" #define SSL_TXT_ADH "ADH" #define SSL_TXT_RSA "RSA" #define SSL_TXT_DES "DES" #define SSL_TXT_3DES "3DES" #define SSL_TXT_RC4 "RC4" #define SSL_TXT_RC2 "RC2" #define SSL_TXT_IDEA "IDEA" #define SSL_TXT_SEED "SEED" #define SSL_TXT_AES "AES" #define SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA "CAMELLIA" #define SSL_TXT_MD5 "MD5" #define SSL_TXT_SHA1 "SHA1" #define SSL_TXT_SHA "SHA" #define SSL_TXT_EXP "EXP" #define SSL_TXT_EXPORT "EXPORT" #define SSL_TXT_EXP40 "EXPORT40" #define SSL_TXT_EXP56 "EXPORT56" #define SSL_TXT_SSLV2 "SSLv2" #define SSL_TXT_SSLV3 "SSLv3" #define SSL_TXT_TLSV1 "TLSv1" #define SSL_TXT_ALL "ALL" #define SSL_TXT_ECC "ECCdraft" /* ECC ciphersuites are not yet official */ /* * COMPLEMENTOF* definitions. These identifiers are used to (de-select) * ciphers normally not being used. * Example: "RC4" will activate all ciphers using RC4 including ciphers * without authentication, which would normally disabled by DEFAULT (due * the "!ADH" being part of default). Therefore "RC4:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" * will make sure that it is also disabled in the specific selection. * COMPLEMENTOF* identifiers are portable between version, as adjustments * to the default cipher setup will also be included here. * * COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT does not experience the same special treatment that * DEFAULT gets, as only selection is being done and no sorting as needed * for DEFAULT. */ #define SSL_TXT_CMPALL "COMPLEMENTOFALL" #define SSL_TXT_CMPDEF "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" /* The following cipher list is used by default. * It also is substituted when an application-defined cipher list string * starts with 'DEFAULT'. */ #define SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST "AES:ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL:+RC4:@STRENGTH" /* low priority for RC4 */ /* Used in SSL_set_shutdown()/SSL_get_shutdown(); */ #define SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN 1 #define SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN 2 #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif #if (defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5)) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SSL2) #define OPENSSL_NO_SSL2 #endif #define SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1 X509_FILETYPE_ASN1 #define SSL_FILETYPE_PEM X509_FILETYPE_PEM /* This is needed to stop compilers complaining about the * 'struct ssl_st *' function parameters used to prototype callbacks * in SSL_CTX. */ typedef struct ssl_st *ssl_crock_st; /* used to hold info on the particular ciphers used */ typedef struct ssl_cipher_st { int valid; const char *name; /* text name */ unsigned long id; /* id, 4 bytes, first is version */ unsigned long algorithms; /* what ciphers are used */ unsigned long algo_strength; /* strength and export flags */ unsigned long algorithm2; /* Extra flags */ int strength_bits; /* Number of bits really used */ int alg_bits; /* Number of bits for algorithm */ unsigned long mask; /* used for matching */ unsigned long mask_strength; /* also used for matching */ } SSL_CIPHER; DECLARE_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) /* Used to hold functions for SSLv2 or SSLv3/TLSv1 functions */ typedef struct ssl_method_st { int version; int (*ssl_new)(SSL *s); void (*ssl_clear)(SSL *s); void (*ssl_free)(SSL *s); int (*ssl_accept)(SSL *s); int (*ssl_connect)(SSL *s); int (*ssl_read)(SSL *s,void *buf,int len); int (*ssl_peek)(SSL *s,void *buf,int len); int (*ssl_write)(SSL *s,const void *buf,int len); int (*ssl_shutdown)(SSL *s); int (*ssl_renegotiate)(SSL *s); int (*ssl_renegotiate_check)(SSL *s); long (*ssl_get_message)(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, int mt, long max, int *ok); int (*ssl_read_bytes)(SSL *s, int type, unsigned char *buf, int len, int peek); int (*ssl_write_bytes)(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, int len); int (*ssl_dispatch_alert)(SSL *s); long (*ssl_ctrl)(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg); long (*ssl_ctx_ctrl)(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,void *parg); SSL_CIPHER *(*get_cipher_by_char)(const unsigned char *ptr); int (*put_cipher_by_char)(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher,unsigned char *ptr); int (*ssl_pending)(const SSL *s); int (*num_ciphers)(void); SSL_CIPHER *(*get_cipher)(unsigned ncipher); struct ssl_method_st *(*get_ssl_method)(int version); long (*get_timeout)(void); struct ssl3_enc_method *ssl3_enc; /* Extra SSLv3/TLS stuff */ int (*ssl_version)(void); long (*ssl_callback_ctrl)(SSL *s, int cb_id, void (*fp)(void)); long (*ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl)(SSL_CTX *s, int cb_id, void (*fp)(void)); } SSL_METHOD; /* Lets make this into an ASN.1 type structure as follows * SSL_SESSION_ID ::= SEQUENCE { * version INTEGER, -- structure version number * SSLversion INTEGER, -- SSL version number * Cipher OCTET_STRING, -- the 3 byte cipher ID * Session_ID OCTET_STRING, -- the Session ID * Master_key OCTET_STRING, -- the master key * KRB5_principal OCTET_STRING -- optional Kerberos principal * Key_Arg [ 0 ] IMPLICIT OCTET_STRING, -- the optional Key argument * Time [ 1 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- optional Start Time * Timeout [ 2 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- optional Timeout ins seconds * Peer [ 3 ] EXPLICIT X509, -- optional Peer Certificate * Session_ID_context [ 4 ] EXPLICIT OCTET_STRING, -- the Session ID context * Verify_result [ 5 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER -- X509_V_... code for `Peer' * Compression [6] IMPLICIT ASN1_OBJECT -- compression OID XXXXX * } * Look in ssl/ssl_asn1.c for more details * I'm using EXPLICIT tags so I can read the damn things using asn1parse :-). */ typedef struct ssl_session_st { int ssl_version; /* what ssl version session info is * being kept in here? */ /* only really used in SSLv2 */ unsigned int key_arg_length; unsigned char key_arg[SSL_MAX_KEY_ARG_LENGTH]; int master_key_length; unsigned char master_key[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; /* session_id - valid? */ unsigned int session_id_length; unsigned char session_id[SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH]; /* this is used to determine whether the session is being reused in * the appropriate context. It is up to the application to set this, * via SSL_new */ unsigned int sid_ctx_length; unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH]; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 unsigned int krb5_client_princ_len; unsigned char krb5_client_princ[SSL_MAX_KRB5_PRINCIPAL_LENGTH]; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ int not_resumable; /* The cert is the certificate used to establish this connection */ struct sess_cert_st /* SESS_CERT */ *sess_cert; /* This is the cert for the other end. * On clients, it will be the same as sess_cert->peer_key->x509 * (the latter is not enough as sess_cert is not retained * in the external representation of sessions, see ssl_asn1.c). */ X509 *peer; /* when app_verify_callback accepts a session where the peer's certificate * is not ok, we must remember the error for session reuse: */ long verify_result; /* only for servers */ int references; long timeout; long time; int compress_meth; /* Need to lookup the method */ SSL_CIPHER *cipher; unsigned long cipher_id; /* when ASN.1 loaded, this * needs to be used to load * the 'cipher' structure */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers; /* shared ciphers? */ CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* application specific data */ /* These are used to make removal of session-ids more * efficient and to implement a maximum cache size. */ struct ssl_session_st *prev,*next; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT char *tlsext_hostname; /* RFC4507 info */ unsigned char *tlsext_tick; /* Session ticket */ size_t tlsext_ticklen; /* Session ticket length */ long tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; /* Session lifetime hint in seconds */ #endif } SSL_SESSION; #define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG 0x00000001L #define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CHALLENGE_BUG 0x00000002L /* Allow initial connection to servers that don't support RI */ #define SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT 0x00000004L #define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0x00000008L #define SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG 0x00000010L #define SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER 0x00000020L #define SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG 0x00000040L #define SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG 0x00000080L #define SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG 0x00000100L #define SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG 0x00000200L /* Hasn't done anything since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, retained for compatibility */ #define SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING 0x0 /* Disable SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability workaround that was added * in OpenSSL 0.9.6d. Usually (depending on the application protocol) * the workaround is not needed. Unfortunately some broken SSL/TLS * implementations cannot handle it at all, which is why we include * it in SSL_OP_ALL. */ #define SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS 0x00000800L /* added in 0.9.6e */ /* SSL_OP_ALL: various bug workarounds that should be rather harmless. * This used to be 0x000FFFFFL before 0.9.7. */ #define SSL_OP_ALL 0x00000FFFL /* DTLS options */ #define SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU 0x00001000L /* Turn on Cookie Exchange (on relevant for servers) */ #define SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE 0x00002000L /* Don't use RFC4507 ticket extension */ #define SSL_OP_NO_TICKET 0x00004000L /* Use Cisco's "speshul" version of DTLS_BAD_VER (as client) */ #define SSL_OP_CISCO_ANYCONNECT 0x00008000L /* As server, disallow session resumption on renegotiation */ #define SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION 0x00010000L /* Permit unsafe legacy renegotiation */ #define SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION 0x00040000L /* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_ecdh parameters */ #define SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE 0x00080000L /* If set, always create a new key when using tmp_dh parameters */ #define SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE 0x00100000L -/* Set to always use the tmp_rsa key when doing RSA operations, - * even when this violates protocol specs */ -#define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA 0x00200000L +/* Does nothing: retained for compatibiity */ +#define SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA 0x0 /* Set on servers to choose the cipher according to the server's * preferences */ #define SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE 0x00400000L /* If set, a server will allow a client to issue a SSLv3.0 version number * as latest version supported in the premaster secret, even when TLSv1.0 * (version 3.1) was announced in the client hello. Normally this is * forbidden to prevent version rollback attacks. */ #define SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG 0x00800000L #define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 0x01000000L #define SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3 0x02000000L #define SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1 0x04000000L /* The next flag deliberately changes the ciphertest, this is a check * for the PKCS#1 attack */ #define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1 0x08000000L #define SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2 0x10000000L #define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG 0x20000000L #define SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG 0x40000000L /* Allow SSL_write(..., n) to return r with 0 < r < n (i.e. report success * when just a single record has been written): */ #define SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE 0x00000001L /* Make it possible to retry SSL_write() with changed buffer location * (buffer contents must stay the same!); this is not the default to avoid * the misconception that non-blocking SSL_write() behaves like * non-blocking write(): */ #define SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER 0x00000002L /* Never bother the application with retries if the transport * is blocking: */ #define SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY 0x00000004L /* Don't attempt to automatically build certificate chain */ #define SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN 0x00000008L /* Send TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV in the ClientHello. - * To be set by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol - * version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. */ + * To be set only by applications that reconnect with a downgraded protocol + * version; see draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00 for details. + * + * DO NOT ENABLE THIS if your application attempts a normal handshake. + * Only use this in explicit fallback retries, following the guidance + * in draft-ietf-tls-downgrade-scsv-00. + */ #define SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV 0x00000080L /* Note: SSL[_CTX]_set_{options,mode} use |= op on the previous value, * they cannot be used to clear bits. */ #define SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx,op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,(op),NULL) #define SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx,op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS,(op),NULL) #define SSL_CTX_get_options(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,0,NULL) #define SSL_set_options(ssl,op) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,(op),NULL) #define SSL_clear_options(ssl,op) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS,(op),NULL) #define SSL_get_options(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS,0,NULL) #define SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx,op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL) #define SSL_CTX_clear_mode(ctx,op) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE,(op),NULL) #define SSL_CTX_get_mode(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL) #define SSL_clear_mode(ssl,op) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE,(op),NULL) #define SSL_set_mode(ssl,op) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,(op),NULL) #define SSL_get_mode(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_MODE,0,NULL) #define SSL_set_mtu(ssl, mtu) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU,(mtu),NULL) #define SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT, 0, NULL) void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)); #define SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(ctx, arg) SSL_CTX_ctrl((ctx), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg)) #define SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, arg) SSL_ctrl((ssl), SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG, 0, (arg)) #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) #define SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT 1024*30 /* 30k max cert list :-) */ #else #define SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT 1024*100 /* 100k max cert list :-) */ #endif #define SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT (1024*20) /* This callback type is used inside SSL_CTX, SSL, and in the functions that set * them. It is used to override the generation of SSL/TLS session IDs in a * server. Return value should be zero on an error, non-zero to proceed. Also, * callbacks should themselves check if the id they generate is unique otherwise * the SSL handshake will fail with an error - callbacks can do this using the * 'ssl' value they're passed by; * SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) * The length value passed in is set at the maximum size the session ID can be. * In SSLv2 this is 16 bytes, whereas SSLv3/TLSv1 it is 32 bytes. The callback * can alter this length to be less if desired, but under SSLv2 session IDs are * supposed to be fixed at 16 bytes so the id will be padded after the callback * returns in this case. It is also an error for the callback to set the size to * zero. */ typedef int (*GEN_SESSION_CB)(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, unsigned int *id_len); typedef struct ssl_comp_st { int id; const char *name; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP COMP_METHOD *method; #else char *method; #endif } SSL_COMP; DECLARE_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) struct ssl_ctx_st { SSL_METHOD *method; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list; /* same as above but sorted for lookup */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id; struct x509_store_st /* X509_STORE */ *cert_store; struct lhash_st /* LHASH */ *sessions; /* a set of SSL_SESSIONs */ /* Most session-ids that will be cached, default is * SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT. 0 is unlimited. */ unsigned long session_cache_size; struct ssl_session_st *session_cache_head; struct ssl_session_st *session_cache_tail; /* This can have one of 2 values, ored together, * SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT, * SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER, * Default is SSL_SESSION_CACHE_SERVER, which means only * SSL_accept which cache SSL_SESSIONS. */ int session_cache_mode; /* If timeout is not 0, it is the default timeout value set * when SSL_new() is called. This has been put in to make * life easier to set things up */ long session_timeout; /* If this callback is not null, it will be called each * time a session id is added to the cache. If this function * returns 1, it means that the callback will do a * SSL_SESSION_free() when it has finished using it. Otherwise, * on 0, it means the callback has finished with it. * If remove_session_cb is not null, it will be called when * a session-id is removed from the cache. After the call, * OpenSSL will SSL_SESSION_free() it. */ int (*new_session_cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl,SSL_SESSION *sess); void (*remove_session_cb)(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx,SSL_SESSION *sess); SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl, unsigned char *data,int len,int *copy); struct { int sess_connect; /* SSL new conn - started */ int sess_connect_renegotiate;/* SSL reneg - requested */ int sess_connect_good; /* SSL new conne/reneg - finished */ int sess_accept; /* SSL new accept - started */ int sess_accept_renegotiate;/* SSL reneg - requested */ int sess_accept_good; /* SSL accept/reneg - finished */ int sess_miss; /* session lookup misses */ int sess_timeout; /* reuse attempt on timeouted session */ int sess_cache_full; /* session removed due to full cache */ int sess_hit; /* session reuse actually done */ int sess_cb_hit; /* session-id that was not * in the cache was * passed back via the callback. This * indicates that the application is * supplying session-id's from other * processes - spooky :-) */ } stats; int references; /* if defined, these override the X509_verify_cert() calls */ int (*app_verify_callback)(X509_STORE_CTX *, void *); void *app_verify_arg; /* before OpenSSL 0.9.7, 'app_verify_arg' was ignored * ('app_verify_callback' was called with just one argument) */ /* Default password callback. */ pem_password_cb *default_passwd_callback; /* Default password callback user data. */ void *default_passwd_callback_userdata; /* get client cert callback */ int (*client_cert_cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey); /* cookie generate callback */ int (*app_gen_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len); /* verify cookie callback */ int (*app_verify_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len); CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; const EVP_MD *rsa_md5;/* For SSLv2 - name is 'ssl2-md5' */ const EVP_MD *md5; /* For SSLv3/TLSv1 'ssl3-md5' */ const EVP_MD *sha1; /* For SSLv3/TLSv1 'ssl3->sha1' */ STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *comp_methods; /* stack of SSL_COMP, SSLv3/TLSv1 */ /* Default values used when no per-SSL value is defined follow */ void (*info_callback)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val); /* used if SSL's info_callback is NULL */ /* what we put in client cert requests */ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_CA; /* Default values to use in SSL structures follow (these are copied by SSL_new) */ unsigned long options; unsigned long mode; long max_cert_list; struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert; int read_ahead; /* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */ void (*msg_callback)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg); void *msg_callback_arg; int verify_mode; unsigned int sid_ctx_length; unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH]; int (*default_verify_callback)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* called 'verify_callback' in the SSL */ /* Default generate session ID callback. */ GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; #if 0 int purpose; /* Purpose setting */ int trust; /* Trust setting */ #endif int quiet_shutdown; #ifndef OPENSSL_ENGINE /* Engine to pass requests for client certs to */ ENGINE *client_cert_engine; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* TLS extensions servername callback */ int (*tlsext_servername_callback)(SSL*, int *, void *); void *tlsext_servername_arg; /* RFC 4507 session ticket keys */ unsigned char tlsext_tick_key_name[16]; unsigned char tlsext_tick_hmac_key[16]; unsigned char tlsext_tick_aes_key[16]; /* Callback to support customisation of ticket key setting */ int (*tlsext_ticket_key_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *name, unsigned char *iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ectx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc); /* certificate status request info */ /* Callback for status request */ int (*tlsext_status_cb)(SSL *ssl, void *arg); void *tlsext_status_arg; #endif }; #define SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF 0x0000 #define SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT 0x0001 #define SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER 0x0002 #define SSL_SESS_CACHE_BOTH (SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT|SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) #define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR 0x0080 /* enough comments already ... see SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(3) */ #define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP 0x0100 #define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE 0x0200 #define SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL \ (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP|SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) struct lhash_st *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx); #define SSL_CTX_sess_number(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER,0,NULL) #define SSL_CTX_sess_connect(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT,0,NULL) #define SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD,0,NULL) #define SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE,0,NULL) #define SSL_CTX_sess_accept(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT,0,NULL) #define SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE,0,NULL) #define SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD,0,NULL) #define SSL_CTX_sess_hits(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT,0,NULL) #define SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT,0,NULL) #define SSL_CTX_sess_misses(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES,0,NULL) #define SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS,0,NULL) #define SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL,0,NULL) void SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*new_session_cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl,SSL_SESSION *sess)); int (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_new_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess); void SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*remove_session_cb)(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx,SSL_SESSION *sess)); void (*SSL_CTX_sess_get_remove_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess); void SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb)(struct ssl_st *ssl, unsigned char *data,int len,int *copy)); SSL_SESSION *(*SSL_CTX_sess_get_get_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(struct ssl_st *ssl, unsigned char *Data, int len, int *copy); void SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)); void (*SSL_CTX_get_info_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx))(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val); void SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*client_cert_cb)(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey)); int (*SSL_CTX_get_client_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx))(SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE int SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENGINE *e); #endif void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_gen_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len)); void SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*app_verify_cookie_cb)(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len)); #define SSL_NOTHING 1 #define SSL_WRITING 2 #define SSL_READING 3 #define SSL_X509_LOOKUP 4 /* These will only be used when doing non-blocking IO */ #define SSL_want_nothing(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_NOTHING) #define SSL_want_read(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_READING) #define SSL_want_write(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_WRITING) #define SSL_want_x509_lookup(s) (SSL_want(s) == SSL_X509_LOOKUP) struct ssl_st { /* protocol version * (one of SSL2_VERSION, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_VERSION, DTLS1_VERSION) */ int version; int type; /* SSL_ST_CONNECT or SSL_ST_ACCEPT */ SSL_METHOD *method; /* SSLv3 */ /* There are 2 BIO's even though they are normally both the * same. This is so data can be read and written to different * handlers */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO BIO *rbio; /* used by SSL_read */ BIO *wbio; /* used by SSL_write */ BIO *bbio; /* used during session-id reuse to concatenate * messages */ #else char *rbio; /* used by SSL_read */ char *wbio; /* used by SSL_write */ char *bbio; #endif /* This holds a variable that indicates what we were doing * when a 0 or -1 is returned. This is needed for * non-blocking IO so we know what request needs re-doing when * in SSL_accept or SSL_connect */ int rwstate; /* true when we are actually in SSL_accept() or SSL_connect() */ int in_handshake; int (*handshake_func)(SSL *); /* Imagine that here's a boolean member "init" that is * switched as soon as SSL_set_{accept/connect}_state * is called for the first time, so that "state" and * "handshake_func" are properly initialized. But as * handshake_func is == 0 until then, we use this * test instead of an "init" member. */ int server; /* are we the server side? - mostly used by SSL_clear*/ int new_session;/* 1 if we are to use a new session. * 2 if we are a server and are inside a handshake * (i.e. not just sending a HelloRequest) * NB: For servers, the 'new' session may actually be a previously * cached session or even the previous session unless * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */ int quiet_shutdown;/* don't send shutdown packets */ int shutdown; /* we have shut things down, 0x01 sent, 0x02 * for received */ int state; /* where we are */ int rstate; /* where we are when reading */ BUF_MEM *init_buf; /* buffer used during init */ void *init_msg; /* pointer to handshake message body, set by ssl3_get_message() */ int init_num; /* amount read/written */ int init_off; /* amount read/written */ /* used internally to point at a raw packet */ unsigned char *packet; unsigned int packet_length; struct ssl2_state_st *s2; /* SSLv2 variables */ struct ssl3_state_st *s3; /* SSLv3 variables */ struct dtls1_state_st *d1; /* DTLSv1 variables */ int read_ahead; /* Read as many input bytes as possible * (for non-blocking reads) */ /* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */ void (*msg_callback)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg); void *msg_callback_arg; int hit; /* reusing a previous session */ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; #if 0 int purpose; /* Purpose setting */ int trust; /* Trust setting */ #endif /* crypto */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id; /* These are the ones being used, the ones in SSL_SESSION are * the ones to be 'copied' into these ones */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_read_ctx; /* cryptographic state */ const EVP_MD *read_hash; /* used for mac generation */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP COMP_CTX *expand; /* uncompress */ #else char *expand; #endif EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_write_ctx; /* cryptographic state */ const EVP_MD *write_hash; /* used for mac generation */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP COMP_CTX *compress; /* compression */ #else char *compress; #endif /* session info */ /* client cert? */ /* This is used to hold the server certificate used */ struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert; /* the session_id_context is used to ensure sessions are only reused * in the appropriate context */ unsigned int sid_ctx_length; unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH]; /* This can also be in the session once a session is established */ SSL_SESSION *session; /* Default generate session ID callback. */ GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id; /* Used in SSL2 and SSL3 */ int verify_mode; /* 0 don't care about verify failure. * 1 fail if verify fails */ int (*verify_callback)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* fail if callback returns 0 */ void (*info_callback)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val); /* optional informational callback */ int error; /* error bytes to be written */ int error_code; /* actual code */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx; /* Kerberos 5 context */ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ SSL_CTX *ctx; /* set this flag to 1 and a sleep(1) is put into all SSL_read() * and SSL_write() calls, good for nbio debuging :-) */ int debug; /* extra application data */ long verify_result; CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* for server side, keep the list of CA_dn we can use */ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_CA; int references; unsigned long options; /* protocol behaviour */ unsigned long mode; /* API behaviour */ long max_cert_list; int first_packet; int client_version; /* what was passed, used for * SSLv3/TLS rollback check */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /* TLS extension debug callback */ void (*tlsext_debug_cb)(SSL *s, int client_server, int type, unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg); void *tlsext_debug_arg; char *tlsext_hostname; int servername_done; /* no further mod of servername 0 : call the servername extension callback. 1 : prepare 2, allow last ack just after in server callback. 2 : don't call servername callback, no ack in server hello */ /* certificate status request info */ /* Status type or -1 if no status type */ int tlsext_status_type; /* Expect OCSP CertificateStatus message */ int tlsext_status_expected; /* OCSP status request only */ STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *tlsext_ocsp_ids; X509_EXTENSIONS *tlsext_ocsp_exts; /* OCSP response received or to be sent */ unsigned char *tlsext_ocsp_resp; int tlsext_ocsp_resplen; /* RFC4507 session ticket expected to be received or sent */ int tlsext_ticket_expected; SSL_CTX * initial_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */ #define session_ctx initial_ctx #else #define session_ctx ctx #endif }; #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #include #include #include /* This is mostly sslv3 with a few tweaks */ #include /* Datagram TLS */ #include #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /* compatibility */ #define SSL_set_app_data(s,arg) (SSL_set_ex_data(s,0,(char *)arg)) #define SSL_get_app_data(s) (SSL_get_ex_data(s,0)) #define SSL_SESSION_set_app_data(s,a) (SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(s,0,(char *)a)) #define SSL_SESSION_get_app_data(s) (SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(s,0)) #define SSL_CTX_get_app_data(ctx) (SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(ctx,0)) #define SSL_CTX_set_app_data(ctx,arg) (SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx,0,(char *)arg)) /* The following are the possible values for ssl->state are are * used to indicate where we are up to in the SSL connection establishment. * The macros that follow are about the only things you should need to use * and even then, only when using non-blocking IO. * It can also be useful to work out where you were when the connection * failed */ #define SSL_ST_CONNECT 0x1000 #define SSL_ST_ACCEPT 0x2000 #define SSL_ST_MASK 0x0FFF #define SSL_ST_INIT (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_ACCEPT) #define SSL_ST_BEFORE 0x4000 #define SSL_ST_OK 0x03 #define SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE (0x04|SSL_ST_INIT) #define SSL_CB_LOOP 0x01 #define SSL_CB_EXIT 0x02 #define SSL_CB_READ 0x04 #define SSL_CB_WRITE 0x08 #define SSL_CB_ALERT 0x4000 /* used in callback */ #define SSL_CB_READ_ALERT (SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_READ) #define SSL_CB_WRITE_ALERT (SSL_CB_ALERT|SSL_CB_WRITE) #define SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP (SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_LOOP) #define SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT (SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_CB_EXIT) #define SSL_CB_CONNECT_LOOP (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_LOOP) #define SSL_CB_CONNECT_EXIT (SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_CB_EXIT) #define SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START 0x10 #define SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE 0x20 /* Is the SSL_connection established? */ #define SSL_get_state(a) SSL_state(a) #define SSL_is_init_finished(a) (SSL_state(a) == SSL_ST_OK) #define SSL_in_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_INIT) #define SSL_in_before(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_BEFORE) #define SSL_in_connect_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_CONNECT) #define SSL_in_accept_init(a) (SSL_state(a)&SSL_ST_ACCEPT) /* The following 2 states are kept in ssl->rstate when reads fail, * you should not need these */ #define SSL_ST_READ_HEADER 0xF0 #define SSL_ST_READ_BODY 0xF1 #define SSL_ST_READ_DONE 0xF2 /* Obtain latest Finished message * -- that we sent (SSL_get_finished) * -- that we expected from peer (SSL_get_peer_finished). * Returns length (0 == no Finished so far), copies up to 'count' bytes. */ size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count); size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count); /* use either SSL_VERIFY_NONE or SSL_VERIFY_PEER, the last 2 options * are 'ored' with SSL_VERIFY_PEER if they are desired */ #define SSL_VERIFY_NONE 0x00 #define SSL_VERIFY_PEER 0x01 #define SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT 0x02 #define SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE 0x04 #define OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms() SSL_library_init() #define SSLeay_add_ssl_algorithms() SSL_library_init() /* this is for backward compatibility */ #if 0 /* NEW_SSLEAY */ #define SSL_CTX_set_default_verify(a,b,c) SSL_CTX_set_verify(a,b,c) #define SSL_set_pref_cipher(c,n) SSL_set_cipher_list(c,n) #define SSL_add_session(a,b) SSL_CTX_add_session((a),(b)) #define SSL_remove_session(a,b) SSL_CTX_remove_session((a),(b)) #define SSL_flush_sessions(a,b) SSL_CTX_flush_sessions((a),(b)) #endif /* More backward compatibility */ #define SSL_get_cipher(s) \ SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(s)) #define SSL_get_cipher_bits(s,np) \ SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(SSL_get_current_cipher(s),np) #define SSL_get_cipher_version(s) \ SSL_CIPHER_get_version(SSL_get_current_cipher(s)) #define SSL_get_cipher_name(s) \ SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(s)) #define SSL_get_time(a) SSL_SESSION_get_time(a) #define SSL_set_time(a,b) SSL_SESSION_set_time((a),(b)) #define SSL_get_timeout(a) SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(a) #define SSL_set_timeout(a,b) SSL_SESSION_set_timeout((a),(b)) #if 1 /*SSLEAY_MACROS*/ #define d2i_SSL_SESSION_bio(bp,s_id) ASN1_d2i_bio_of(SSL_SESSION,SSL_SESSION_new,d2i_SSL_SESSION,bp,s_id) #define i2d_SSL_SESSION_bio(bp,s_id) ASN1_i2d_bio_of(SSL_SESSION,i2d_SSL_SESSION,bp,s_id) #define PEM_read_SSL_SESSION(fp,x,cb,u) (SSL_SESSION *)PEM_ASN1_read( \ (char *(*)())d2i_SSL_SESSION,PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION,fp,(char **)x,cb,u) #define PEM_read_bio_SSL_SESSION(bp,x,cb,u) PEM_ASN1_read_bio_of(SSL_SESSION,d2i_SSL_SESSION,PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION,bp,x,cb,u) #define PEM_write_SSL_SESSION(fp,x) \ PEM_ASN1_write((int (*)())i2d_SSL_SESSION, \ PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION,fp, (char *)x, NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL) #define PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION(bp,x) \ PEM_ASN1_write_bio_of(SSL_SESSION,i2d_SSL_SESSION,PEM_STRING_SSL_SESSION,bp,x,NULL,NULL,0,NULL,NULL) #endif #define SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET 1000 /* These alert types are for SSLv3 and TLSv1 */ #define SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY #define SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE /* fatal */ #define SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC /* fatal */ #define SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED #define SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW #define SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE/* fatal */ #define SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE/* fatal */ #define SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE /* Not for TLS */ #define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE #define SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE #define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED #define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED #define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN #define SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER /* fatal */ #define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA /* fatal */ #define SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED /* fatal */ #define SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR /* fatal */ #define SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR #define SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION/* fatal */ #define SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION /* fatal */ #define SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY/* fatal */ #define SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR /* fatal */ #define SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED #define SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION #define SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION #define SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE #define SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME #define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE #define SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE #define SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY /* fatal */ #define SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK /* fatal */ #define SSL_ERROR_NONE 0 #define SSL_ERROR_SSL 1 #define SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ 2 #define SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE 3 #define SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP 4 #define SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL 5 /* look at error stack/return value/errno */ #define SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN 6 #define SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT 7 #define SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT 8 #define SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA 1 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA 2 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH 3 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH 4 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB 5 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB 6 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB 7 #define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED 8 #define SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_REQUEST 9 #define SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS 10 #define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS 11 #define SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS 12 #define SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS 13 #define SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT 14 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK 15 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG 16 /* only applies to datagram connections */ #define SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU 17 /* Stats */ #define SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER 20 #define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT 21 #define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD 22 #define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE 23 #define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT 24 #define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD 25 #define SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE 26 #define SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT 27 #define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT 28 #define SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES 29 #define SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS 30 #define SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL 31 #define SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS 32 #define SSL_CTRL_MODE 33 #define SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD 40 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD 41 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE 42 #define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE 43 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE 44 #define SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE 45 #define SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST 50 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST 51 /* see tls1.h for macros based on these */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT #define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB 53 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG 54 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME 55 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB 56 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG 57 #define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS 58 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS 59 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB 63 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG 64 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE 65 #define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS 66 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS 67 #define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS 68 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS 69 #define SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP 70 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP 71 #define SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB 72 #endif #define DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT 73 #define DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT 74 #define DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN 75 #define SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT 76 #define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS 77 #define SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE 78 #define SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION 119 #define DTLSv1_get_timeout(ssl, arg) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_GET_TIMEOUT,0, (void *)arg) #define DTLSv1_handle_timeout(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_HANDLE_TIMEOUT,0, NULL) #define DTLSv1_listen(ssl, peer) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,DTLS_CTRL_LISTEN,0, (void *)peer) #define SSL_session_reused(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_SESSION_REUSED,0,NULL) #define SSL_num_renegotiations(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL) #define SSL_clear_num_renegotiations(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL) #define SSL_total_renegotiations(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl((ssl),SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS,0,NULL) #define SSL_CTX_need_tmp_RSA(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA,0,NULL) #define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa(ctx,rsa) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA,0,(char *)rsa) #define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx,dh) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH,0,(char *)dh) #define SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh(ctx,ecdh) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH,0,(char *)ecdh) #define SSL_need_tmp_RSA(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_NEED_TMP_RSA,0,NULL) #define SSL_set_tmp_rsa(ssl,rsa) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA,0,(char *)rsa) #define SSL_set_tmp_dh(ssl,dh) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH,0,(char *)dh) #define SSL_set_tmp_ecdh(ssl,ecdh) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH,0,(char *)ecdh) #define SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(ctx,x509) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT,0,(char *)x509) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void); BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int client); BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx); BIO *BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx); int BIO_ssl_copy_session_id(BIO *to,BIO *from); void BIO_ssl_shutdown(BIO *ssl_bio); #endif int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *,const char *str); SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth); void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *); long SSL_CTX_set_timeout(SSL_CTX *ctx,long t); long SSL_CTX_get_timeout(const SSL_CTX *ctx); X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *); void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *,X509_STORE *); int SSL_want(const SSL *s); int SSL_clear(SSL *s); void SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx,long tm); SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s); int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c,int *alg_bits); char * SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c); const char * SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c); int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s); int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s); int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s); const char * SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s,int n); char * SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int len); int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL * s); int SSL_pending(const SSL *s); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd); int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd); int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio,BIO *wbio); BIO * SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s); BIO * SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s); #endif int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str); void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes); int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s); int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s); int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *); void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode, int (*callback)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)); void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL *ssl, RSA *rsa); #endif int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *d, long len); int SSL_use_PrivateKey(SSL *ssl, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int SSL_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk,SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, long len); int SSL_use_certificate(SSL *ssl, X509 *x); int SSL_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *d, int len); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int SSL_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); int SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); int SSL_use_certificate_file(SSL *ssl, const char *file, int type); int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file, int type); int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *file); /* PEM type */ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file); int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stackCAs, const char *file); #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_MACINTOSH_CLASSIC /* XXXXX: Better scheme needed! [was: #ifndef MAC_OS_pre_X] */ int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stackCAs, const char *dir); #endif #endif #endif void SSL_load_error_strings(void ); const char *SSL_state_string(const SSL *s); const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s); const char *SSL_state_string_long(const SSL *s); const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s); long SSL_SESSION_get_time(const SSL_SESSION *s); long SSL_SESSION_set_time(SSL_SESSION *s, long t); long SSL_SESSION_get_timeout(const SSL_SESSION *s); long SSL_SESSION_set_timeout(SSL_SESSION *s, long t); void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *to,const SSL *from); SSL_SESSION *SSL_SESSION_new(void); unsigned long SSL_SESSION_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a); int SSL_SESSION_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a,const SSL_SESSION *b); const unsigned char *SSL_SESSION_get_id(const SSL_SESSION *s, unsigned int *len); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_FP_API int SSL_SESSION_print_fp(FILE *fp,const SSL_SESSION *ses); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BIO int SSL_SESSION_print(BIO *fp,const SSL_SESSION *ses); #endif void SSL_SESSION_free(SSL_SESSION *ses); int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in,unsigned char **pp); int SSL_set_session(SSL *to, SSL_SESSION *session); int SSL_CTX_add_session(SSL_CTX *s, SSL_SESSION *c); int SSL_CTX_remove_session(SSL_CTX *,SSL_SESSION *c); int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *, GEN_SESSION_CB); int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *, GEN_SESSION_CB); int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, unsigned int id_len); SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a,const unsigned char **pp, long length); #ifdef HEADER_X509_H X509 * SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s); #endif STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s); int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx); int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *); void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode, int (*callback)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)); void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth); void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *), void *arg); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *rsa); #endif int SSL_CTX_use_RSAPrivateKey_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *d, long len); int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(SSL_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey); int SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_ASN1(int pk,SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *d, long len); int SSL_CTX_use_certificate(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); int SSL_CTX_use_certificate_ASN1(SSL_CTX *ctx, int len, const unsigned char *d); void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb); void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u); int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ctx); int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx,const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len); SSL * SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl,const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len); int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose); int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose); int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust); int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust); void SSL_free(SSL *ssl); int SSL_accept(SSL *ssl); int SSL_connect(SSL *ssl); int SSL_read(SSL *ssl,void *buf,int num); int SSL_peek(SSL *ssl,void *buf,int num); int SSL_write(SSL *ssl,const void *buf,int num); long SSL_ctrl(SSL *ssl,int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *, int, void (*)(void)); long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *, int, void (*)(void)); int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s,int ret_code); const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s); /* This sets the 'default' SSL version that SSL_new() will create */ int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_METHOD *meth); SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_method(void); /* SSLv2 */ SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_server_method(void); /* SSLv2 */ SSL_METHOD *SSLv2_client_method(void); /* SSLv2 */ SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_method(void); /* SSLv3 */ SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_server_method(void); /* SSLv3 */ SSL_METHOD *SSLv3_client_method(void); /* SSLv3 */ SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_method(void); /* SSLv3 but can rollback to v2 */ SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_server_method(void); /* SSLv3 but can rollback to v2 */ SSL_METHOD *SSLv23_client_method(void); /* SSLv3 but can rollback to v2 */ SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_method(void); /* TLSv1.0 */ SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_server_method(void); /* TLSv1.0 */ SSL_METHOD *TLSv1_client_method(void); /* TLSv1.0 */ SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_method(void); /* DTLSv1.0 */ SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_server_method(void); /* DTLSv1.0 */ SSL_METHOD *DTLSv1_client_method(void); /* DTLSv1.0 */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s); int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s); int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s); int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s); int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s); SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s); int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s,SSL_METHOD *method); const char *SSL_alert_type_string_long(int value); const char *SSL_alert_type_string(int value); const char *SSL_alert_desc_string_long(int value); const char *SSL_alert_desc_string(int value); void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list); void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list); STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s); STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *s); int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl,X509 *x); int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509 *x); void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s); void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s); long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s); int SSL_library_init(void ); char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *,char *buf,int size); STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk); SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *ssl); X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *ssl); /* EVP_PKEY */ struct evp_pkey_st *SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *ssl); void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode); int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx); void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *ssl,int mode); int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *ssl); void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *ssl,int mode); int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *ssl); int SSL_version(const SSL *ssl); int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx); int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, const char *CApath); #define SSL_get0_session SSL_get_session /* just peek at pointer */ SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl); SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl); /* obtain a reference count */ SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl); SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx); void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)); void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val); int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl); void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl,long v); long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl); int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *ssl,int idx,void *data); void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *ssl,int idx); int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); int SSL_SESSION_set_ex_data(SSL_SESSION *ss,int idx,void *data); void *SSL_SESSION_get_ex_data(const SSL_SESSION *ss,int idx); int SSL_SESSION_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ssl,int idx,void *data); void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ssl,int idx); int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl, void *argp, CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func, CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func); int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void ); #define SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx,t) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE,t,NULL) #define SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE,0,NULL) #define SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx,m) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE,m,NULL) #define SSL_CTX_get_session_cache_mode(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE,0,NULL) #define SSL_CTX_get_default_read_ahead(ctx) SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(ctx) #define SSL_CTX_set_default_read_ahead(ctx,m) SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx,m) #define SSL_CTX_get_read_ahead(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD,0,NULL) #define SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(ctx,m) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD,m,NULL) #define SSL_CTX_get_max_cert_list(ctx) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST,0,NULL) #define SSL_CTX_set_max_cert_list(ctx,m) \ SSL_CTX_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST,m,NULL) #define SSL_get_max_cert_list(ssl) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST,0,NULL) #define SSL_set_max_cert_list(ssl,m) \ SSL_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST,m,NULL) /* NB: the keylength is only applicable when is_export is true */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, int keylength)); void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl, RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, int keylength)); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, int keylength)); void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, int keylength)); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, int keylength)); void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl, EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, int keylength)); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s); const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s); const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp); STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void); int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id,COMP_METHOD *cm); #else const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s); const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s); const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const void *comp); void *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void); int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id,void *cm); #endif /* BEGIN ERROR CODES */ /* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run. */ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void); /* Error codes for the SSL functions. */ /* Function codes. */ #define SSL_F_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 100 #define SSL_F_CLIENT_FINISHED 167 #define SSL_F_CLIENT_HELLO 101 #define SSL_F_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 102 #define SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION 103 #define SSL_F_DO_DTLS1_WRITE 245 #define SSL_F_DO_SSL3_WRITE 104 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT 246 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF 280 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_BUFFER_RECORD 247 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_CHECK_TIMEOUT_NUM 293 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_CLIENT_HELLO 248 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_CONNECT 249 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_ENC 250 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_HELLO_VERIFY 251 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE 252 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_MESSAGE_FRAGMENT 253 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_GET_RECORD 254 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_HANDLE_TIMEOUT 282 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN 255 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_PREPROCESS_FRAGMENT 277 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_OUT_OF_SEQ_MESSAGE 256 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD 257 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_BYTES 258 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_READ_FAILED 259 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 260 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 261 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 262 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY 263 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST 264 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 265 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO 266 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 267 #define SSL_F_DTLS1_WRITE_APP_DATA_BYTES 268 #define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_FINISHED 105 #define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_HELLO 106 #define SSL_F_GET_CLIENT_MASTER_KEY 107 #define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_FINISHED 108 #define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_HELLO 109 #define SSL_F_GET_SERVER_VERIFY 110 #define SSL_F_I2D_SSL_SESSION 111 #define SSL_F_READ_N 112 #define SSL_F_REQUEST_CERTIFICATE 113 #define SSL_F_SERVER_FINISH 239 #define SSL_F_SERVER_HELLO 114 #define SSL_F_SERVER_VERIFY 240 #define SSL_F_SSL23_ACCEPT 115 #define SSL_F_SSL23_CLIENT_HELLO 116 #define SSL_F_SSL23_CONNECT 117 #define SSL_F_SSL23_GET_CLIENT_HELLO 118 #define SSL_F_SSL23_GET_SERVER_HELLO 119 #define SSL_F_SSL23_PEEK 237 #define SSL_F_SSL23_READ 120 #define SSL_F_SSL23_WRITE 121 #define SSL_F_SSL2_ACCEPT 122 #define SSL_F_SSL2_CONNECT 123 #define SSL_F_SSL2_ENC_INIT 124 #define SSL_F_SSL2_GENERATE_KEY_MATERIAL 241 #define SSL_F_SSL2_PEEK 234 #define SSL_F_SSL2_READ 125 #define SSL_F_SSL2_READ_INTERNAL 236 #define SSL_F_SSL2_SET_CERTIFICATE 126 #define SSL_F_SSL2_WRITE 127 #define SSL_F_SSL3_ACCEPT 128 #define SSL_F_SSL3_ADD_CERT_TO_BUF 281 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CALLBACK_CTRL 233 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE 129 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CERT_AND_ALGORITHM 130 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CHECK_CLIENT_HELLO 292 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CLIENT_HELLO 131 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CONNECT 132 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL 213 #define SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL 133 #define SSL_F_SSL3_DO_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 279 #define SSL_F_SSL3_ENC 134 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GENERATE_KEY_BLOCK 238 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 135 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_STATUS 288 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CERT_VERIFY 136 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 137 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_HELLO 138 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 139 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_FINISHED 140 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_KEY_EXCHANGE 141 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_MESSAGE 142 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 283 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD 143 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 144 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_DONE 145 #define SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_HELLO 146 #define SSL_F_SSL3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET 284 #define SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN 147 #define SSL_F_SSL3_PEEK 235 #define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_BYTES 148 #define SSL_F_SSL3_READ_N 149 #define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST 150 #define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE 151 #define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE 152 #define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_VERIFY 153 #define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE 154 #define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_HELLO 242 #define SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE 155 #define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_BUFFERS 156 #define SSL_F_SSL3_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK 157 #define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_BYTES 158 #define SSL_F_SSL3_WRITE_PENDING 159 #define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 285 #define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 272 #define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK 215 #define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK 216 #define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 286 #define SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 273 #define SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD 160 #define SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST 161 #define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP 221 #define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INST 222 #define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_INSTANTIATE 214 #define SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW 162 #define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY 163 #define SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 274 #define SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR 230 #define SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT 231 #define SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR 164 #define SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD 165 #define SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST 166 #define SSL_F_SSL_CTRL 232 #define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY 168 #define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW 169 #define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST 269 #define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CLIENT_CERT_ENGINE 278 #define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_PURPOSE 226 #define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT 219 #define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION 170 #define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_TRUST 229 #define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE 171 #define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1 172 #define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_CHAIN_FILE 220 #define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE 173 #define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY 174 #define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1 175 #define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE 176 #define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY 177 #define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1 178 #define SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE 179 #define SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE 180 #define SSL_F_SSL_GET_NEW_SESSION 181 #define SSL_F_SSL_GET_PREV_SESSION 217 #define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_CERT 182 #define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY 317 #define SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY 183 #define SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER 184 #define SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE 185 #define SSL_F_SSL_NEW 186 #define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 287 #define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 290 #define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_RENEGOTIATE_EXT 289 #define SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 291 #define SSL_F_SSL_PEEK 270 #define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 275 #define SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 276 #define SSL_F_SSL_READ 223 #define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PRIVATE_DECRYPT 187 #define SSL_F_SSL_RSA_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT 188 #define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_NEW 189 #define SSL_F_SSL_SESSION_PRINT_FP 190 #define SSL_F_SSL_SESS_CERT_NEW 225 #define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CERT 191 #define SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST 271 #define SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD 192 #define SSL_F_SSL_SET_PKEY 193 #define SSL_F_SSL_SET_PURPOSE 227 #define SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD 194 #define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION 195 #define SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT 218 #define SSL_F_SSL_SET_TRUST 228 #define SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD 196 #define SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN 224 #define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION 243 #define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION 197 #define SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION 244 #define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE 198 #define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_ASN1 199 #define SSL_F_SSL_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE 200 #define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY 201 #define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_ASN1 202 #define SSL_F_SSL_USE_PRIVATEKEY_FILE 203 #define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY 204 #define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_ASN1 205 #define SSL_F_SSL_USE_RSAPRIVATEKEY_FILE 206 #define SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN 207 #define SSL_F_SSL_WRITE 208 #define SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE 209 #define SSL_F_TLS1_ENC 210 #define SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK 211 #define SSL_F_WRITE_PENDING 212 /* Reason codes. */ #define SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE 100 #define SSL_R_ATTEMPT_TO_REUSE_SESSION_IN_DIFFERENT_CONTEXT 272 #define SSL_R_BAD_ALERT_RECORD 101 #define SSL_R_BAD_AUTHENTICATION_TYPE 102 #define SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC 103 #define SSL_R_BAD_CHECKSUM 104 #define SSL_R_BAD_DATA_RETURNED_BY_CALLBACK 106 #define SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION 107 #define SSL_R_BAD_DH_G_LENGTH 108 #define SSL_R_BAD_DH_PUB_KEY_LENGTH 109 #define SSL_R_BAD_DH_P_LENGTH 110 #define SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH 111 #define SSL_R_BAD_DSA_SIGNATURE 112 #define SSL_R_BAD_ECC_CERT 304 #define SSL_R_BAD_ECDSA_SIGNATURE 305 #define SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT 306 #define SSL_R_BAD_HELLO_REQUEST 105 #define SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH 271 #define SSL_R_BAD_MAC_DECODE 113 #define SSL_R_BAD_MESSAGE_TYPE 114 #define SSL_R_BAD_PACKET_LENGTH 115 #define SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER 116 #define SSL_R_BAD_RESPONSE_ARGUMENT 117 #define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_DECRYPT 118 #define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_ENCRYPT 119 #define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_E_LENGTH 120 #define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_MODULUS_LENGTH 121 #define SSL_R_BAD_RSA_SIGNATURE 122 #define SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE 123 #define SSL_R_BAD_SSL_FILETYPE 124 #define SSL_R_BAD_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH 125 #define SSL_R_BAD_STATE 126 #define SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY 127 #define SSL_R_BIO_NOT_SET 128 #define SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG 129 #define SSL_R_BN_LIB 130 #define SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH 131 #define SSL_R_CA_DN_TOO_LONG 132 #define SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY 133 #define SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED 134 #define SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH 135 #define SSL_R_CHALLENGE_IS_DIFFERENT 136 #define SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH 137 #define SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE 138 #define SSL_R_CIPHER_TABLE_SRC_ERROR 139 #define SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT 157 #define SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 140 #define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_FAILURE 141 #define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE 307 #define SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR 142 #define SSL_R_CONNECTION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT 143 #define SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET 144 #define SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH 308 #define SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED 145 #define SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 146 #define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED 147 #define SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC 281 #define SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 148 #define SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED 149 #define SSL_R_DTLS_MESSAGE_TOO_BIG 318 #define SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID 309 #define SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER 310 #define SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 150 #define SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY 282 #define SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST 151 #define SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE 152 #define SSL_R_EXTRA_DATA_IN_MESSAGE 153 #define SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS 154 #define SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST 155 #define SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST 156 #define SSL_R_ILLEGAL_PADDING 283 #define SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 373 #define SSL_R_INVALID_CHALLENGE_LENGTH 158 #define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND 280 #define SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE 278 #define SSL_R_INVALID_STATUS_RESPONSE 316 #define SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH 275 #define SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST 279 #define SSL_R_KEY_ARG_TOO_LONG 284 #define SSL_R_KRB5 285 #define SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC 286 #define SSL_R_KRB5_C_GET_CRED 287 #define SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT 288 #define SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ 289 #define SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET 290 #define SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT 291 #define SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ 292 #define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED 293 #define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV 294 #define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW 295 #define SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH 159 #define SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT 160 #define SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG 274 #define SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS 161 #define SSL_R_MESSAGE_TOO_LONG 296 #define SSL_R_MISSING_DH_DSA_CERT 162 #define SSL_R_MISSING_DH_KEY 163 #define SSL_R_MISSING_DH_RSA_CERT 164 #define SSL_R_MISSING_DSA_SIGNING_CERT 165 #define SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_DH_KEY 166 #define SSL_R_MISSING_EXPORT_TMP_RSA_KEY 167 #define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE 168 #define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_ENCRYPTING_CERT 169 #define SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_SIGNING_CERT 170 #define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY 171 #define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY 311 #define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY 172 #define SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_PKEY 173 #define SSL_R_MISSING_VERIFY_MESSAGE 174 #define SSL_R_MULTIPLE_SGC_RESTARTS 325 #define SSL_R_NON_SSLV2_INITIAL_PACKET 175 #define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED 176 #define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED 177 #define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_RETURNED 178 #define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET 179 #define SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SPECIFIED 180 #define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE 181 #define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_PASSED 182 #define SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED 183 #define SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_LIST 184 #define SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH 185 #define SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_METHOD 317 #define SSL_R_NO_CLIENT_CERT_RECEIVED 186 #define SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED 187 #define SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED 188 #define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATEKEY 189 #define SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED 190 #define SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE 191 #define SSL_R_NO_PUBLICKEY 192 #define SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION 319 #define SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER 193 #define SSL_R_NO_VERIFY_CALLBACK 194 #define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX 195 #define SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED 196 #define SSL_R_OLD_SESSION_CIPHER_NOT_RETURNED 197 #define SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE 297 #define SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 198 #define SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT 223 #define SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG 270 #define SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE 199 #define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR 200 #define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_CERTIFICATE 201 #define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CERTIFICATE 202 #define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_NO_CIPHER 203 #define SSL_R_PEER_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 204 #define SSL_R_PRE_MAC_LENGTH_TOO_LONG 205 #define SSL_R_PROBLEMS_MAPPING_CIPHER_FUNCTIONS 206 #define SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN 207 #define SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_ENCRYPT_ERROR 208 #define SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_IS_NOT_RSA 209 #define SSL_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA 210 #define SSL_R_READ_BIO_NOT_SET 211 #define SSL_R_READ_TIMEOUT_EXPIRED 312 #define SSL_R_READ_WRONG_PACKET_TYPE 212 #define SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH 213 #define SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_LARGE 214 #define SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL 298 #define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATE_EXT_TOO_LONG 320 #define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR 321 #define SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH 322 #define SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING 215 #define SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_LENGTH_NOT_ZERO 216 #define SSL_R_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_NOT_ZERO 217 #define SSL_R_REUSE_CIPHER_LIST_NOT_ZERO 218 #define SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING 324 #define SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT 224 #define SSL_R_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_UNINITIALIZED 277 #define SSL_R_SHORT_READ 219 #define SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE 220 #define SSL_R_SSL23_DOING_SESSION_ID_REUSE 221 #define SSL_R_SSL2_CONNECTION_ID_TOO_LONG 299 #define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME 225 #define SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE 226 #define SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_LONG 300 #define SSL_R_SSL3_SESSION_ID_TOO_SHORT 222 #define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_CERTIFICATE 1042 #define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_BAD_RECORD_MAC 1020 #define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED 1045 #define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED 1044 #define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN 1046 #define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE 1030 #define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 1040 #define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER 1047 #define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_NO_CERTIFICATE 1041 #define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 1010 #define SSL_R_SSLV3_ALERT_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE 1043 #define SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION 228 #define SSL_R_SSL_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE 229 #define SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS 230 #define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CALLBACK_FAILED 301 #define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONFLICT 302 #define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG 273 #define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_HAS_BAD_LENGTH 303 #define SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_IS_DIFFERENT 231 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_ACCESS_DENIED 1049 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECODE_ERROR 1050 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPTION_FAILED 1021 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_DECRYPT_ERROR 1051 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_EXPORT_RESTRICTION 1060 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK 1086 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY 1071 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_INTERNAL_ERROR 1080 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_NO_RENEGOTIATION 1100 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_PROTOCOL_VERSION 1070 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_RECORD_OVERFLOW 1022 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_UNKNOWN_CA 1048 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_ALERT_USER_CANCELLED 1090 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE 1114 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE 1113 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE 1111 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME 1112 #define SSL_R_TLSV1_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION 1110 #define SSL_R_TLS_CLIENT_CERT_REQ_WITH_ANON_CIPHER 232 #define SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST 227 #define SSL_R_TLS_PEER_DID_NOT_RESPOND_WITH_CERTIFICATE_LIST 233 #define SSL_R_TLS_RSA_ENCRYPTED_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG 234 #define SSL_R_TRIED_TO_USE_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER 235 #define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_DH_CERTS 236 #define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ECDH_CERTS 313 #define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_EXTRACT_PUBLIC_KEY 237 #define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_DH_PARAMETERS 238 #define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_ECDH_PARAMETERS 314 #define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS 239 #define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_SSL_METHOD 240 #define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES 241 #define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES 242 #define SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES 243 #define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE 244 #define SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD 245 #define SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED 276 #define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE 246 #define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE 247 #define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_RETURNED 248 #define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE 249 #define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE 250 #define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE 251 #define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL 252 #define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_REMOTE_ERROR_TYPE 253 #define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION 254 #define SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE 255 #define SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED 323 #define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER 256 #define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM 257 #define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE 315 #define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL 258 #define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION 259 #define SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_STATUS_TYPE 329 #define SSL_R_WRITE_BIO_NOT_SET 260 #define SSL_R_WRONG_CIPHER_RETURNED 261 #define SSL_R_WRONG_MESSAGE_TYPE 262 #define SSL_R_WRONG_NUMBER_OF_KEY_BITS 263 #define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH 264 #define SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE 265 #define SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION 266 #define SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER 267 #define SSL_R_X509_LIB 268 #define SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS 269 #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/ssl/ssl_lib.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/ssl/ssl_lib.c (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/ssl/ssl_lib.c (revision 276859) @@ -1,2811 +1,2812 @@ /*! \file ssl/ssl_lib.c * \brief Version independent SSL functions. */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and contributed to the OpenSSL project. */ #ifdef REF_CHECK # include #endif #include #include "ssl_locl.h" #include "kssl_lcl.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH #include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE #include #endif const char *SSL_version_str=OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT; SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method={ /* evil casts, but these functions are only called if there's a library bug */ (int (*)(SSL *,int))ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function, ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, int))ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL*, int))ssl_undefined_function, (int (*)(SSL *, EVP_MD_CTX *, EVP_MD_CTX *, const char*, int, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function, 0, /* finish_mac_length */ (int (*)(SSL *, EVP_MD_CTX *, unsigned char *))ssl_undefined_function, NULL, /* client_finished_label */ 0, /* client_finished_label_len */ NULL, /* server_finished_label */ 0, /* server_finished_label_len */ (int (*)(int))ssl_undefined_function }; int SSL_clear(SSL *s) { if (s->method == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED); return(0); } if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) { SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); s->session=NULL; } s->error=0; s->hit=0; s->shutdown=0; #if 0 /* Disabled since version 1.10 of this file (early return not * needed because SSL_clear is not called when doing renegotiation) */ /* This is set if we are doing dynamic renegotiation so keep * the old cipher. It is sort of a SSL_clear_lite :-) */ if (s->new_session) return(1); #else if (s->new_session) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } #endif s->type=0; s->state=SSL_ST_BEFORE|((s->server)?SSL_ST_ACCEPT:SSL_ST_CONNECT); s->version=s->method->version; s->client_version=s->version; s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; s->rstate=SSL_ST_READ_HEADER; #if 0 s->read_ahead=s->ctx->read_ahead; #endif if (s->init_buf != NULL) { BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); s->init_buf=NULL; } ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); s->first_packet=0; #if 1 /* Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if * so, revert back if we are not doing session-id reuse. */ if (!s->in_handshake && (s->session == NULL) && (s->method != s->ctx->method)) { s->method->ssl_free(s); s->method=s->ctx->method; if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) return(0); } else #endif s->method->ssl_clear(s); return(1); } /** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */ int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx,SSL_METHOD *meth) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; ctx->method=meth; sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&(ctx->cipher_list), &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id),SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST); if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION,SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); return(0); } return(1); } SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) { SSL *s; if (ctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX); return(NULL); } if (ctx->method == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION); return(NULL); } s=(SSL *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL)); if (s == NULL) goto err; memset(s,0,sizeof(SSL)); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 s->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new(); #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ s->options=ctx->options; s->mode=ctx->mode; s->max_cert_list=ctx->max_cert_list; if (ctx->cert != NULL) { /* Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to * the CERT, not its contents; only when setting new * parameters for the per-SSL copy, ssl_cert_new would be * called (and the direct reference to the per-SSL_CTX * settings would be lost, but those still were indirectly * accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert). * Now we don't look at the SSL_CTX's CERT after having * duplicated it once. */ s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); if (s->cert == NULL) goto err; } else s->cert=NULL; /* Cannot really happen (see SSL_CTX_new) */ s->read_ahead=ctx->read_ahead; s->msg_callback=ctx->msg_callback; s->msg_callback_arg=ctx->msg_callback_arg; s->verify_mode=ctx->verify_mode; #if 0 s->verify_depth=ctx->verify_depth; #endif s->sid_ctx_length=ctx->sid_ctx_length; OPENSSL_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof s->sid_ctx); memcpy(&s->sid_ctx,&ctx->sid_ctx,sizeof(s->sid_ctx)); s->verify_callback=ctx->default_verify_callback; s->generate_session_id=ctx->generate_session_id; s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); if (!s->param) goto err; X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param); #if 0 s->purpose = ctx->purpose; s->trust = ctx->trust; #endif s->quiet_shutdown=ctx->quiet_shutdown; CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); s->ctx=ctx; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT s->tlsext_debug_cb = 0; s->tlsext_debug_arg = NULL; s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; s->tlsext_status_type = -1; s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = NULL; s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = NULL; s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); s->initial_ctx=ctx; #endif s->verify_result=X509_V_OK; s->method=ctx->method; if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) goto err; s->references=1; s->server=(ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function)?0:1; SSL_clear(s); CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); return(s); err: if (s != NULL) { if (s->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(s->cert); if (s->ctx != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ OPENSSL_free(s); } SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return(NULL); } int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx,const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { if(sid_ctx_len > sizeof ctx->sid_ctx) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); return 0; } ctx->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len; memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len); return 1; } int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl,const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { if(sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT,SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); return 0; } ssl->sid_ctx_length=sid_ctx_len; memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx,sid_ctx,sid_ctx_len); return 1; } int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) { CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); ctx->generate_session_id = cb; CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); return 1; } int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) { CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); ssl->generate_session_id = cb; CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); return 1; } int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, unsigned int id_len) { /* A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - ie. to * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in * use by this SSL. */ SSL_SESSION r, *p; if(id_len > sizeof r.session_id) return 0; r.ssl_version = ssl->version; r.session_id_length = id_len; memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len); /* NB: SSLv2 always uses a fixed 16-byte session ID, so even if a * callback is calling us to check the uniqueness of a shorter ID, it * must be compared as a padded-out ID because that is what it will be * converted to when the callback has finished choosing it. */ if((r.ssl_version == SSL2_VERSION) && (id_len < SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) { memset(r.session_id + id_len, 0, SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH - id_len); r.session_id_length = SSL2_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH; } CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); p = (SSL_SESSION *)lh_retrieve(ssl->ctx->sessions, &r); CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); return (p != NULL); } int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); } int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); } int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); } int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); } void SSL_free(SSL *s) { int i; if(s == NULL) return; i=CRYPTO_add(&s->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL); #ifdef REF_PRINT REF_PRINT("SSL",s); #endif if (i > 0) return; #ifdef REF_CHECK if (i < 0) { fprintf(stderr,"SSL_free, bad reference count\n"); abort(); /* ok */ } #endif if (s->param) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); if (s->bbio != NULL) { /* If the buffering BIO is in place, pop it off */ if (s->bbio == s->wbio) { s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio); } BIO_free(s->bbio); s->bbio=NULL; } if (s->rbio != NULL) BIO_free_all(s->rbio); if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != s->rbio)) BIO_free_all(s->wbio); if (s->init_buf != NULL) BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); /* add extra stuff */ if (s->cipher_list != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); /* Make the next call work :-) */ if (s->session != NULL) { ssl_clear_bad_session(s); SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); } ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); if (s->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(s->cert); /* Free up if allocated */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (s->tlsext_hostname) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_hostname); if (s->initial_ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->initial_ctx); if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); if (s->tlsext_ocsp_ids) sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) OPENSSL_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); #endif if (s->client_CA != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_CA,X509_NAME_free); if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s); if (s->ctx) SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 if (s->kssl_ctx != NULL) kssl_ctx_free(s->kssl_ctx); #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ OPENSSL_free(s); } void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s,BIO *rbio,BIO *wbio) { /* If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it */ if (s->bbio != NULL) { if (s->wbio == s->bbio) { s->wbio=s->wbio->next_bio; s->bbio->next_bio=NULL; } } if ((s->rbio != NULL) && (s->rbio != rbio)) BIO_free_all(s->rbio); if ((s->wbio != NULL) && (s->wbio != wbio) && (s->rbio != s->wbio)) BIO_free_all(s->wbio); s->rbio=rbio; s->wbio=wbio; } BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s) { return(s->rbio); } BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s) { return(s->wbio); } int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s) { return(SSL_get_rfd(s)); } int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s) { int ret= -1; BIO *b,*r; b=SSL_get_rbio(s); r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); if (r != NULL) BIO_get_fd(r,&ret); return(ret); } int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s) { int ret= -1; BIO *b,*r; b=SSL_get_wbio(s); r=BIO_find_type(b,BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); if (r != NULL) BIO_get_fd(r,&ret); return(ret); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s,int fd) { int ret=0; BIO *bio=NULL; bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); if (bio == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_bio(s,bio,bio); ret=1; err: return(ret); } int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s,int fd) { int ret=0; BIO *bio=NULL; if ((s->rbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET) || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->rbio,NULL) != fd)) { bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); if (bio == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),bio); } else SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_rbio(s),SSL_get_rbio(s)); ret=1; err: return(ret); } int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s,int fd) { int ret=0; BIO *bio=NULL; if ((s->wbio == NULL) || (BIO_method_type(s->wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET) || ((int)BIO_get_fd(s->wbio,NULL) != fd)) { bio=BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); if (bio == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } BIO_set_fd(bio,fd,BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_bio(s,bio,SSL_get_wbio(s)); } else SSL_set_bio(s,SSL_get_wbio(s),SSL_get_wbio(s)); ret=1; err: return(ret); } #endif /* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */ size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) { size_t ret = 0; if (s->s3 != NULL) { ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len; if (count > ret) count = ret; memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count); } return ret; } /* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */ size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) { size_t ret = 0; if (s->s3 != NULL) { ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; if (count > ret) count = ret; memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count); } return ret; } int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s) { return(s->verify_mode); } int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param); } int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *) { return(s->verify_callback); } int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return(ctx->verify_mode); } int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param); } int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx))(int,X509_STORE_CTX *) { return(ctx->default_verify_callback); } void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s,int mode, int (*callback)(int ok,X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)) { s->verify_mode=mode; if (callback != NULL) s->verify_callback=callback; } void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s,int depth) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth); } void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s,int yes) { s->read_ahead=yes; } int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s) { return(s->read_ahead); } int SSL_pending(const SSL *s) { /* SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), * and it is impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report * errors that may be observed while scanning the new data. * (Note that SSL_pending() is often used as a boolean value, * so we'd better not return -1.) */ return(s->method->ssl_pending(s)); } X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s) { X509 *r; if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL)) r=NULL; else r=s->session->peer; if (r == NULL) return(r); CRYPTO_add(&r->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_X509); return(r); } STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s) { STACK_OF(X509) *r; if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL) || (s->session->sess_cert == NULL)) r=NULL; else r=s->session->sess_cert->cert_chain; /* If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own * certificate; if we are a server, it does not. */ return(r); } /* Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to * modify. We need to be able to read f without being hassled */ void SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t,const SSL *f) { CERT *tmp; /* Do we need to to SSL locking? */ SSL_set_session(t,SSL_get_session(f)); /* what if we are setup as SSLv2 but want to talk SSLv3 or * vice-versa */ if (t->method != f->method) { t->method->ssl_free(t); /* cleanup current */ t->method=f->method; /* change method */ t->method->ssl_new(t); /* setup new */ } tmp=t->cert; if (f->cert != NULL) { CRYPTO_add(&f->cert->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CERT); t->cert=f->cert; } else t->cert=NULL; if (tmp != NULL) ssl_cert_free(tmp); SSL_set_session_id_context(t,f->sid_ctx,f->sid_ctx_length); } /* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */ int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { if ( (ctx == NULL) || (ctx->cert == NULL) || (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return(0); } if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); return(0); } return(X509_check_private_key(ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey)); } /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl) { if (ssl == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return(0); } if (ssl->cert == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return 0; } if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return(0); } if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY,SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); return(0); } return(X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509, ssl->cert->key->privatekey)); } int SSL_accept(SSL *s) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) /* Not properly initialized yet */ SSL_set_accept_state(s); return(s->method->ssl_accept(s)); } int SSL_connect(SSL *s) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) /* Not properly initialized yet */ SSL_set_connect_state(s); return(s->method->ssl_connect(s)); } long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s) { return(s->method->get_timeout()); } int SSL_read(SSL *s,void *buf,int num) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; return(0); } return(s->method->ssl_read(s,buf,num)); } int SSL_peek(SSL *s,void *buf,int num) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { return(0); } return(s->method->ssl_peek(s,buf,num)); } int SSL_write(SSL *s,const void *buf,int num) { if (s->handshake_func == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { s->rwstate=SSL_NOTHING; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE,SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); return(-1); } return(s->method->ssl_write(s,buf,num)); } int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s) { /* Note that this function behaves differently from what one might * expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet), * 1 for success; but calling it once is usually not enough, * even if blocking I/O is used (see ssl3_shutdown). */ if (s->handshake_func == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if ((s != NULL) && !SSL_in_init(s)) return(s->method->ssl_shutdown(s)); else return(1); } int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s) { if (s->new_session == 0) { s->new_session=1; } return(s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s)); } int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s) { /* becomes true when negotiation is requested; * false again once a handshake has finished */ return (s->new_session != 0); } long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s,int cmd,long larg,void *parg) { long l; switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: return(s->read_ahead); case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: l=s->read_ahead; s->read_ahead=larg; return(l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: s->msg_callback_arg = parg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: return(s->options|=larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS: return(s->options&=~larg); case SSL_CTRL_MODE: return(s->mode|=larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: return(s->mode &=~larg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: return(s->max_cert_list); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: l=s->max_cert_list; s->max_cert_list=larg; return(l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MTU: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 if (larg < (long)dtls1_min_mtu()) return 0; #endif if (SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_VERSION || SSL_version(s) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { s->d1->mtu = larg; return larg; } return 0; case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT: if (s->s3) return s->s3->send_connection_binding; else return 0; default: return(s->method->ssl_ctrl(s,cmd,larg,parg)); } } long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp)(void)) { switch(cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: s->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); return 1; default: return(s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s,cmd,fp)); } } struct lhash_st *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->sessions; } long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx,int cmd,long larg,void *parg) { long l; switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: return(ctx->read_ahead); case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: l=ctx->read_ahead; ctx->read_ahead=larg; return(l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: return(ctx->max_cert_list); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: l=ctx->max_cert_list; ctx->max_cert_list=larg; return(l); case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: l=ctx->session_cache_size; ctx->session_cache_size=larg; return(l); case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: return(ctx->session_cache_size); case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: l=ctx->session_cache_mode; ctx->session_cache_mode=larg; return(l); case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: return(ctx->session_cache_mode); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER: return(ctx->sessions->num_items); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT: return(ctx->stats.sess_connect); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD: return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE: return(ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT: return(ctx->stats.sess_accept); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD: return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE: return(ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT: return(ctx->stats.sess_hit); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT: return(ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES: return(ctx->stats.sess_miss); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS: return(ctx->stats.sess_timeout); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL: return(ctx->stats.sess_cache_full); case SSL_CTRL_OPTIONS: return(ctx->options|=larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_OPTIONS: return(ctx->options&=~larg); case SSL_CTRL_MODE: return(ctx->mode|=larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: return(ctx->mode&=~larg); default: return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx,cmd,larg,parg)); } } long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp)(void)) { switch(cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: ctx->msg_callback = (void (*)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); return 1; default: return(ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx,cmd,fp)); } } int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b) { long l; l=a->id-b->id; if (l == 0L) return(0); else return((l > 0)?1:-1); } int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER * const *ap, const SSL_CIPHER * const *bp) { long l; l=(*ap)->id-(*bp)->id; if (l == 0L) return(0); else return((l > 0)?1:-1); } /** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of * preference */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s) { if (s != NULL) { if (s->cipher_list != NULL) { return(s->cipher_list); } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) { return(s->ctx->cipher_list); } } return(NULL); } /** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of * algorithm id */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s) { if (s != NULL) { if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) { return(s->cipher_list_by_id); } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) { return(s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id); } } return(NULL); } /** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */ const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s,int n) { SSL_CIPHER *c; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; if (s == NULL) return(NULL); sk=SSL_get_ciphers(s); if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n)) return(NULL); c=sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk,n); if (c == NULL) return(NULL); return(c->name); } /** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */ int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,&ctx->cipher_list, &ctx->cipher_list_by_id,str); /* ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it * was unable to find a cipher matching the given rule string * (for example if the rule string specifies a cipher which * has been disabled). This is not an error as far as * ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been * updated. */ if (sk == NULL) return 0; else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); return 0; } return 1; } /** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */ int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s,const char *str) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; sk=ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method,&s->cipher_list, &s->cipher_list_by_id,str); /* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */ if (sk == NULL) return 0; else if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); return 0; } return 1; } /* works well for SSLv2, not so good for SSLv3 */ char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s,char *buf,int len) { char *p; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; SSL_CIPHER *c; int i; if ((s->session == NULL) || (s->session->ciphers == NULL) || (len < 2)) return(NULL); p=buf; sk=s->session->ciphers; if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) == 0) return NULL; for (i=0; iname); if (n+1 > len) { if (p != buf) --p; *p='\0'; return buf; } strcpy(p,c->name); p+=n; *(p++)=':'; len-=n+1; } p[-1]='\0'; return(buf); } int ssl_cipher_list_to_bytes(SSL *s,STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk,unsigned char *p, int (*put_cb)(const SSL_CIPHER *, unsigned char *)) { int i,j=0; SSL_CIPHER *c; unsigned char *q; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 int nokrb5 = !kssl_tgt_is_available(s->kssl_ctx); #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ if (sk == NULL) return(0); q=p; if (put_cb == NULL) put_cb = s->method->put_cipher_by_char; for (i=0; ialgorithms & SSL_KRB5) && nokrb5) continue; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */ j = put_cb(c,p); p+=j; } /* If p == q, no ciphers; caller indicates an error. * Otherwise, add applicable SCSVs. */ if (p != q) { if (!s->new_session) { static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, }; j = put_cb(&scsv,p); p+=j; #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV sent by client\n"); #endif } if (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) { static SSL_CIPHER scsv = { 0, NULL, SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, }; j = put_cb(&scsv,p); p+=j; } } return(p-q); } STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s,unsigned char *p,int num, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp) { SSL_CIPHER *c; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; int i,n; if (s->s3) s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; n=ssl_put_cipher_by_char(s,NULL,NULL); if (n == 0 || (num%n) != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); return(NULL); } if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) sk=sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */ else { sk= *skp; sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk); } for (i=0; is3 && (n != 3 || !p[0]) && (p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && (p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) { /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */ if (s->new_session) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); goto err; } s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; p += n; #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n"); #endif continue; } /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */ if ((n != 3 || !p[0]) && (p[n-2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && (p[n-1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) { /* The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher version. * Fail if the current version is an unexpected downgrade. */ if (!SSL_ctrl(s, SSL_CTRL_CHECK_PROTO_VERSION, 0, NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); if (s->s3) ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); goto err; } + p += n; continue; } c=ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s,p); p+=n; if (c != NULL) { if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk,c)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } } if (skp != NULL) *skp=sk; return(sk); err: if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); return(NULL); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT /** return a servername extension value if provided in Client Hello, or NULL. * So far, only host_name types are defined (RFC 3546). */ const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type) { if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) return NULL; return s->session && !s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname; } int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s) { if (s->session && (!s->tlsext_hostname ? s->session->tlsext_hostname : s->tlsext_hostname)) return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; return -1; } #endif unsigned long SSL_SESSION_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a) { unsigned long l; l=(unsigned long) ((unsigned int) a->session_id[0] )| ((unsigned int) a->session_id[1]<< 8L)| ((unsigned long)a->session_id[2]<<16L)| ((unsigned long)a->session_id[3]<<24L); return(l); } /* NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on being * able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing session * with a matching session ID. */ int SSL_SESSION_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a,const SSL_SESSION *b) { if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) return(1); if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length) return(1); return(memcmp(a->session_id,b->session_id,a->session_id_length)); } /* These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed via * ssl.h. */ static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(SSL_SESSION_hash, SSL_SESSION *) static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(SSL_SESSION_cmp, SSL_SESSION *) SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(SSL_METHOD *meth) { SSL_CTX *ret=NULL; if (meth == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED); return(NULL); } #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS if (FIPS_mode() && (meth->version < TLS1_VERSION)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_ONLY_TLS_ALLOWED_IN_FIPS_MODE); return NULL; } #endif if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS); goto err; } ret=(SSL_CTX *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SSL_CTX)); if (ret == NULL) goto err; memset(ret,0,sizeof(SSL_CTX)); ret->method=meth; ret->cert_store=NULL; ret->session_cache_mode=SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER; ret->session_cache_size=SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT; ret->session_cache_head=NULL; ret->session_cache_tail=NULL; /* We take the system default */ ret->session_timeout=meth->get_timeout(); ret->new_session_cb=0; ret->remove_session_cb=0; ret->get_session_cb=0; ret->generate_session_id=0; memset((char *)&ret->stats,0,sizeof(ret->stats)); ret->references=1; ret->quiet_shutdown=0; /* ret->cipher=NULL;*/ /* ret->s2->challenge=NULL; ret->master_key=NULL; ret->key_arg=NULL; ret->s2->conn_id=NULL; */ ret->info_callback=NULL; ret->app_verify_callback=0; ret->app_verify_arg=NULL; ret->max_cert_list=SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT; ret->read_ahead=0; ret->msg_callback=0; ret->msg_callback_arg=NULL; ret->verify_mode=SSL_VERIFY_NONE; #if 0 ret->verify_depth=-1; /* Don't impose a limit (but x509_lu.c does) */ #endif ret->sid_ctx_length=0; ret->default_verify_callback=NULL; if ((ret->cert=ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) goto err; ret->default_passwd_callback=0; ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata=NULL; ret->client_cert_cb=0; ret->app_gen_cookie_cb=0; ret->app_verify_cookie_cb=0; ret->sessions=lh_new(LHASH_HASH_FN(SSL_SESSION_hash), LHASH_COMP_FN(SSL_SESSION_cmp)); if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err; ret->cert_store=X509_STORE_new(); if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err; ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method, &ret->cipher_list,&ret->cipher_list_by_id, SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST); if (ret->cipher_list == NULL || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); goto err2; } ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); if (!ret->param) goto err; if ((ret->rsa_md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl2-md5")) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL2_MD5_ROUTINES); goto err2; } if ((ret->md5=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES); goto err2; } if ((ret->sha1=EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES); goto err2; } if ((ret->client_CA=sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data); ret->extra_certs=NULL; /* No compression for DTLS */ if (meth->version != DTLS1_VERSION) ret->comp_methods=SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT ret->tlsext_servername_callback = 0; ret->tlsext_servername_arg = NULL; /* Setup RFC4507 ticket keys */ if ((RAND_pseudo_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16) <= 0) || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16) <= 0) || (RAND_bytes(ret->tlsext_tick_aes_key, 16) <= 0)) ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; ret->tlsext_status_cb = 0; ret->tlsext_status_arg = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ret->client_cert_engine = NULL; #ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO #define eng_strx(x) #x #define eng_str(x) eng_strx(x) /* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */ { ENGINE *eng; eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO)); if (!eng) { ERR_clear_error(); ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO)); } if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng)) ERR_clear_error(); } #endif #endif /* Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely * deployed might change this. */ ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT; return(ret); err: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW,ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err2: if (ret != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ret); return(NULL); } #if 0 static void SSL_COMP_free(SSL_COMP *comp) { OPENSSL_free(comp); } #endif void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) { int i; if (a == NULL) return; i=CRYPTO_add(&a->references,-1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); #ifdef REF_PRINT REF_PRINT("SSL_CTX",a); #endif if (i > 0) return; #ifdef REF_CHECK if (i < 0) { fprintf(stderr,"SSL_CTX_free, bad reference count\n"); abort(); /* ok */ } #endif if (a->param) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param); /* * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed * after the sessions were flushed. * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache, * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then * free ex_data, then finally free the cache. * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].) */ if (a->sessions != NULL) SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a,0); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data); if (a->sessions != NULL) lh_free(a->sessions); if (a->cert_store != NULL) X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store); if (a->cipher_list != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list); if (a->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id); if (a->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(a->cert); if (a->client_CA != NULL) sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_CA,X509_NAME_free); if (a->extra_certs != NULL) sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs,X509_free); #if 0 /* This should never be done, since it removes a global database */ if (a->comp_methods != NULL) sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(a->comp_methods,SSL_COMP_free); #else a->comp_methods = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (a->client_cert_engine) ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine); #endif OPENSSL_free(a); } void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb) { ctx->default_passwd_callback=cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx,void *u) { ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata=u; } void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *), void *arg) { ctx->app_verify_callback=cb; ctx->app_verify_arg=arg; } void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode,int (*cb)(int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) { ctx->verify_mode=mode; ctx->default_verify_callback=cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx,int depth) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); } void ssl_set_cert_masks(CERT *c, SSL_CIPHER *cipher) { CERT_PKEY *cpk; int rsa_enc,rsa_tmp,rsa_sign,dh_tmp,dh_rsa,dh_dsa,dsa_sign; int rsa_enc_export,dh_rsa_export,dh_dsa_export; int rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp_export,kl; unsigned long mask,emask; int have_ecc_cert, ecdh_ok, ecdsa_ok, ecc_pkey_size; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH int have_ecdh_tmp; #endif X509 *x = NULL; EVP_PKEY *ecc_pkey = NULL; int signature_nid = 0; if (c == NULL) return; kl=SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(cipher); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA rsa_tmp=(c->rsa_tmp != NULL || c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL); rsa_tmp_export=(c->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL || (rsa_tmp && RSA_size(c->rsa_tmp)*8 <= kl)); #else rsa_tmp=rsa_tmp_export=0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH dh_tmp=(c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL); dh_tmp_export=(c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL || (dh_tmp && DH_size(c->dh_tmp)*8 <= kl)); #else dh_tmp=dh_tmp_export=0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH have_ecdh_tmp=(c->ecdh_tmp != NULL || c->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL); #endif cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC]); rsa_enc= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); rsa_enc_export=(rsa_enc && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl); cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN]); rsa_sign=(cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN]); dsa_sign=(cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA]); dh_rsa= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); dh_rsa_export=(dh_rsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl); cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA]); /* FIX THIS EAY EAY EAY */ dh_dsa= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); dh_dsa_export=(dh_dsa && EVP_PKEY_size(cpk->privatekey)*8 <= kl); cpk= &(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]); have_ecc_cert= (cpk->x509 != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL); mask=0; emask=0; #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG printf("rt=%d rte=%d dht=%d re=%d ree=%d rs=%d ds=%d dhr=%d dhd=%d\n", rsa_tmp,rsa_tmp_export,dh_tmp, rsa_enc,rsa_enc_export,rsa_sign,dsa_sign,dh_rsa,dh_dsa); #endif if (rsa_enc || (rsa_tmp && rsa_sign)) mask|=SSL_kRSA; if (rsa_enc_export || (rsa_tmp_export && (rsa_sign || rsa_enc))) emask|=SSL_kRSA; #if 0 /* The match needs to be both kEDH and aRSA or aDSA, so don't worry */ if ( (dh_tmp || dh_rsa || dh_dsa) && (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign)) mask|=SSL_kEDH; if ((dh_tmp_export || dh_rsa_export || dh_dsa_export) && (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || dsa_sign)) emask|=SSL_kEDH; #endif if (dh_tmp_export) emask|=SSL_kEDH; if (dh_tmp) mask|=SSL_kEDH; if (dh_rsa) mask|=SSL_kDHr; if (dh_rsa_export) emask|=SSL_kDHr; if (dh_dsa) mask|=SSL_kDHd; if (dh_dsa_export) emask|=SSL_kDHd; if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign) { mask|=SSL_aRSA; emask|=SSL_aRSA; } if (dsa_sign) { mask|=SSL_aDSS; emask|=SSL_aDSS; } mask|=SSL_aNULL; emask|=SSL_aNULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 mask|=SSL_kKRB5|SSL_aKRB5; emask|=SSL_kKRB5|SSL_aKRB5; #endif /* An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or * ECDSA cipher suites depending on the key usage extension. */ if (have_ecc_cert) { /* This call populates extension flags (ex_flags) */ x = (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]).x509; X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); ecdh_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ? (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT) : 1; ecdsa_ok = (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) ? (x->ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE) : 1; ecc_pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); ecc_pkey_size = (ecc_pkey != NULL) ? EVP_PKEY_bits(ecc_pkey) : 0; EVP_PKEY_free(ecc_pkey); if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (ecdh_ok) { if ((signature_nid == NID_md5WithRSAEncryption) || (signature_nid == NID_md4WithRSAEncryption) || (signature_nid == NID_md2WithRSAEncryption)) { mask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aRSA; if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) emask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aRSA; } if (signature_nid == NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1) { mask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aECDSA; if (ecc_pkey_size <= 163) emask|=SSL_kECDH|SSL_aECDSA; } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA if (ecdsa_ok) { mask|=SSL_aECDSA; emask|=SSL_aECDSA; } #endif } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH if (have_ecdh_tmp) { mask|=SSL_kECDHE; emask|=SSL_kECDHE; } #endif c->mask=mask; c->export_mask=emask; c->valid=1; } /* This handy macro borrowed from crypto/x509v3/v3_purp.c */ #define ku_reject(x, usage) \ (((x)->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !((x)->ex_kusage & (usage))) int check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL_CIPHER *cs) { unsigned long alg = cs->algorithms; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; int keysize = 0; int signature_nid = 0; if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(cs)) { /* ECDH key length in export ciphers must be <= 163 bits */ pkey = X509_get_pubkey(x); if (pkey == NULL) return 0; keysize = EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); if (keysize > 163) return 0; } /* This call populates the ex_flags field correctly */ X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0); if ((x->sig_alg) && (x->sig_alg->algorithm)) signature_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(x->sig_alg->algorithm); if (alg & SSL_kECDH) { /* key usage, if present, must allow key agreement */ if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_KEY_AGREEMENT)) { return 0; } if (alg & SSL_aECDSA) { /* signature alg must be ECDSA */ if (signature_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1) { return 0; } } if (alg & SSL_aRSA) { /* signature alg must be RSA */ if ((signature_nid != NID_md5WithRSAEncryption) && (signature_nid != NID_md4WithRSAEncryption) && (signature_nid != NID_md2WithRSAEncryption)) { return 0; } } } else if (alg & SSL_aECDSA) { /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */ if (ku_reject(x, X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { return 0; } } return 1; /* all checks are ok */ } /* THIS NEEDS CLEANING UP */ CERT_PKEY *ssl_get_server_send_pkey(const SSL *s) { unsigned long alg,kalg; CERT *c; int i; c=s->cert; ssl_set_cert_masks(c, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); alg=s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms; kalg=alg&(SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK); if (kalg & SSL_kECDH) { /* we don't need to look at SSL_kECDHE * since no certificate is needed for * anon ECDH and for authenticated * ECDHE, the check for the auth * algorithm will set i correctly * NOTE: For ECDH-RSA, we need an ECC * not an RSA cert but for ECDHE-RSA * we need an RSA cert. Placing the * checks for SSL_kECDH before RSA * checks ensures the correct cert is chosen. */ i=SSL_PKEY_ECC; } else if (kalg & SSL_aECDSA) { i=SSL_PKEY_ECC; } else if (kalg & SSL_kDHr) i=SSL_PKEY_DH_RSA; else if (kalg & SSL_kDHd) i=SSL_PKEY_DH_DSA; else if (kalg & SSL_aDSS) i=SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; else if (kalg & SSL_aRSA) { if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].x509 == NULL) i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; else i=SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC; } else if (kalg & SSL_aKRB5) { /* VRS something else here? */ return(NULL); } else /* if (kalg & SSL_aNULL) */ { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SERVER_SEND_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return(NULL); } return c->pkeys + i; } X509 *ssl_get_server_send_cert(const SSL *s) { CERT_PKEY *cpk; cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); if (!cpk) return NULL; return cpk->x509; } EVP_PKEY *ssl_get_sign_pkey(SSL *s,SSL_CIPHER *cipher) { unsigned long alg; CERT *c; alg=cipher->algorithms; c=s->cert; if ((alg & SSL_aDSS) && (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL)) return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].privatekey); else if (alg & SSL_aRSA) { if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey != NULL) return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].privatekey); else if (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey != NULL) return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey); else return(NULL); } else if ((alg & SSL_aECDSA) && (c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey != NULL)) return(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey); else /* if (alg & SSL_aNULL) */ { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_GET_SIGN_PKEY,ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return(NULL); } } void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s,int mode) { int i; /* If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, * and it would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */ if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return; i=s->ctx->session_cache_mode; if ((i & mode) && (!s->hit) && ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) || SSL_CTX_add_session(s->ctx,s->session)) && (s->ctx->new_session_cb != NULL)) { CRYPTO_add(&s->session->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_SESSION); if (!s->ctx->new_session_cb(s,s->session)) SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); } /* auto flush every 255 connections */ if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) && ((i & mode) == mode)) { if ( (((mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) ?s->ctx->stats.sess_connect_good :s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good) & 0xff) == 0xff) { SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->ctx,(unsigned long)time(NULL)); } } } SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s) { return(s->method); } int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s,SSL_METHOD *meth) { int conn= -1; int ret=1; if (s->method != meth) { if (s->handshake_func != NULL) conn=(s->handshake_func == s->method->ssl_connect); if (s->method->version == meth->version) s->method=meth; else { s->method->ssl_free(s); s->method=meth; ret=s->method->ssl_new(s); } if (conn == 1) s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_connect; else if (conn == 0) s->handshake_func=meth->ssl_accept; } return(ret); } int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s,int i) { int reason; unsigned long l; BIO *bio; if (i > 0) return(SSL_ERROR_NONE); /* Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake * etc, where we do encode the error */ if ((l=ERR_peek_error()) != 0) { if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS) return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); else return(SSL_ERROR_SSL); } if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_read(s)) { bio=SSL_get_rbio(s); if (BIO_should_read(bio)) return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); else if (BIO_should_write(bio)) /* This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try * to write to the rbio, and an application program where * rbio and wbio are separate couldn't even know what it * should wait for. * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly * (so that we have SSL_want_read(s) instead of * SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and wbio *are* the same, * this test works around that bug; so it might be safer * to keep it. */ return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); else return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); /* unknown */ } } if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_write(s)) { bio=SSL_get_wbio(s); if (BIO_should_write(bio)) return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE); else if (BIO_should_read(bio)) /* See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) */ return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ); else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { reason=BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT); else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT); else return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); } } if ((i < 0) && SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) { return(SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP); } if (i == 0) { if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) { /* assume it is the socket being closed */ return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN); } else { if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) && (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)) return(SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN); } } return(SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL); } int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s) { int ret=1; if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE,SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET); return(-1); } s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s); if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) { ret=s->handshake_func(s); } return(ret); } /* For the next 2 functions, SSL_clear() sets shutdown and so * one of these calls will reset it */ void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s) { s->server=1; s->shutdown=0; s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT|SSL_ST_BEFORE; s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_accept; /* clear the current cipher */ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); } void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s) { s->server=0; s->shutdown=0; s->state=SSL_ST_CONNECT|SSL_ST_BEFORE; s->handshake_func=s->method->ssl_connect; /* clear the current cipher */ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); } int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return(0); } int ssl_undefined_void_function(void) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return(0); } int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_CONST_FUNCTION,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return(0); } SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD,ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return(NULL); } const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s) { if (s->version == TLS1_VERSION) return("TLSv1"); else if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) return("SSLv3"); else if (s->version == SSL2_VERSION) return("SSLv2"); else return("unknown"); } SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) { STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk; X509_NAME *xn; SSL *ret; int i; if ((ret=SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL) return(NULL); ret->version = s->version; ret->type = s->type; ret->method = s->method; if (s->session != NULL) { /* This copies session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */ SSL_copy_session_id(ret,s); } else { /* No session has been established yet, so we have to expect * that s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later -- * they should not both point to the same object, * and thus we can't use SSL_copy_session_id. */ ret->method->ssl_free(ret); ret->method = s->method; ret->method->ssl_new(ret); if (s->cert != NULL) { if (ret->cert != NULL) { ssl_cert_free(ret->cert); } ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert); if (ret->cert == NULL) goto err; } SSL_set_session_id_context(ret, s->sid_ctx, s->sid_ctx_length); } ret->options=s->options; ret->mode=s->mode; SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret,SSL_get_max_cert_list(s)); SSL_set_read_ahead(ret,SSL_get_read_ahead(s)); ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback; ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg; SSL_set_verify(ret,SSL_get_verify_mode(s), SSL_get_verify_callback(s)); SSL_set_verify_depth(ret,SSL_get_verify_depth(s)); ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id; SSL_set_info_callback(ret,SSL_get_info_callback(s)); ret->debug=s->debug; /* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */ if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data)) goto err; /* setup rbio, and wbio */ if (s->rbio != NULL) { if (!BIO_dup_state(s->rbio,(char *)&ret->rbio)) goto err; } if (s->wbio != NULL) { if (s->wbio != s->rbio) { if (!BIO_dup_state(s->wbio,(char *)&ret->wbio)) goto err; } else ret->wbio=ret->rbio; } ret->rwstate = s->rwstate; ret->in_handshake = s->in_handshake; ret->handshake_func = s->handshake_func; ret->server = s->server; ret->new_session = s->new_session; ret->quiet_shutdown = s->quiet_shutdown; ret->shutdown=s->shutdown; ret->state=s->state; /* SSL_dup does not really work at any state, though */ ret->rstate=s->rstate; ret->init_num = 0; /* would have to copy ret->init_buf, ret->init_msg, ret->init_num, ret->init_off */ ret->hit=s->hit; X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param); /* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */ if (s->cipher_list != NULL) { if ((ret->cipher_list=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL) goto err; } if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id=sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id)) == NULL) goto err; /* Dup the client_CA list */ if (s->client_CA != NULL) { if ((sk=sk_X509_NAME_dup(s->client_CA)) == NULL) goto err; ret->client_CA=sk; for (i=0; ienc_read_ctx != NULL) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_read_ctx); OPENSSL_free(s->enc_read_ctx); s->enc_read_ctx=NULL; } if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(s->enc_write_ctx); OPENSSL_free(s->enc_write_ctx); s->enc_write_ctx=NULL; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (s->expand != NULL) { COMP_CTX_free(s->expand); s->expand=NULL; } if (s->compress != NULL) { COMP_CTX_free(s->compress); s->compress=NULL; } #endif } /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s) { if (s->cert != NULL) return(s->cert->key->x509); else return(NULL); } /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(SSL *s) { if (s->cert != NULL) return(s->cert->key->privatekey); else return(NULL); } SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s) { if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) return(s->session->cipher); return(NULL); } #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP const void *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s) { return NULL; } const void *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s) { return NULL; } #else const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(SSL *s) { if (s->compress != NULL) return(s->compress->meth); return(NULL); } const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(SSL *s) { if (s->expand != NULL) return(s->expand->meth); return(NULL); } #endif int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s,int push) { BIO *bbio; if (s->bbio == NULL) { bbio=BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); if (bbio == NULL) return(0); s->bbio=bbio; } else { bbio=s->bbio; if (s->bbio == s->wbio) s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio); } (void)BIO_reset(bbio); /* if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(bbio,16*1024)) */ if (!BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio,1)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER,ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return(0); } if (push) { if (s->wbio != bbio) s->wbio=BIO_push(bbio,s->wbio); } else { if (s->wbio == bbio) s->wbio=BIO_pop(bbio); } return(1); } void ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s) { if (s->bbio == NULL) return; if (s->bbio == s->wbio) { /* remove buffering */ s->wbio=BIO_pop(s->wbio); #ifdef REF_CHECK /* not the usual REF_CHECK, but this avoids adding one more preprocessor symbol */ assert(s->wbio != NULL); #endif } BIO_free(s->bbio); s->bbio=NULL; } void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx,int mode) { ctx->quiet_shutdown=mode; } int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return(ctx->quiet_shutdown); } void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode) { s->quiet_shutdown=mode; } int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s) { return(s->quiet_shutdown); } void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s,int mode) { s->shutdown=mode; } int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s) { return(s->shutdown); } int SSL_version(const SSL *s) { return(s->version); } SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl) { return(ssl->ctx); } SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX* ctx) { if (ssl->ctx == ctx) return ssl->ctx; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT if (ctx == NULL) ctx = ssl->initial_ctx; #endif if (ssl->cert != NULL) ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert); ssl->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); CRYPTO_add(&ctx->references,1,CRYPTO_LOCK_SSL_CTX); if (ssl->ctx != NULL) SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ ssl->ctx = ctx; return(ssl->ctx); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return(X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store)); } int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, const char *CApath) { return(X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store,CAfile,CApath)); } #endif void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(const SSL *ssl,int type,int val)) { ssl->info_callback=cb; } /* One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned function pointer. */ void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl))(const SSL * /*ssl*/,int /*type*/,int /*val*/) { return ssl->info_callback; } int SSL_state(const SSL *ssl) { return(ssl->state); } void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl,long arg) { ssl->verify_result=arg; } long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl) { return(ssl->verify_result); } int SSL_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, argl, argp, new_func, dup_func, free_func); } int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s,int idx,void *arg) { return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg)); } void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s,int idx) { return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx)); } int SSL_CTX_get_ex_new_index(long argl,void *argp,CRYPTO_EX_new *new_func, CRYPTO_EX_dup *dup_func,CRYPTO_EX_free *free_func) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, argl, argp, new_func, dup_func, free_func); } int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s,int idx,void *arg) { return(CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx,arg)); } void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s,int idx) { return(CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data,idx)); } int ssl_ok(SSL *s) { return(1); } X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return(ctx->cert_store); } void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx,X509_STORE *store) { if (ctx->cert_store != NULL) X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store); ctx->cert_store=store; } int SSL_want(const SSL *s) { return(s->rwstate); } /*! * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary RSA keys. * \param ctx the SSL context. * \param cb the callback */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb); } void SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback(SSL *ssl,RSA *(*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_RSA_CB,(void (*)(void))cb); } #endif #ifdef DOXYGEN /*! * \brief The RSA temporary key callback function. * \param ssl the SSL session. * \param is_export \c TRUE if the temp RSA key is for an export ciphersuite. * \param keylength if \c is_export is \c TRUE, then \c keylength is the size * of the required key in bits. * \return the temporary RSA key. * \sa SSL_CTX_set_tmp_rsa_callback, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback */ RSA *cb(SSL *ssl,int is_export,int keylength) {} #endif /*! * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys. * \param ctx the SSL context. * \param dh the callback */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh); } void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl,DH *(*dh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB,(void (*)(void))dh); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh); } void SSL_set_tmp_ecdh_callback(SSL *ssl,EC_KEY *(*ecdh)(SSL *ssl,int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl,SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH_CB,(void (*)(void))ecdh); } #endif void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); } void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb)(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); } #if defined(_WINDLL) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN16) #include "../crypto/bio/bss_file.c" #endif IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) IMPLEMENT_STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/util/libeay.num =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/util/libeay.num (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/util/libeay.num (revision 276859) @@ -1,3732 +1,3734 @@ SSLeay 1 EXIST::FUNCTION: SSLeay_version 2 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_BIT_STRING_asn1_meth 3 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_HEADER_free 4 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_HEADER_new 5 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_IA5STRING_asn1_meth 6 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_INTEGER_get 7 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_INTEGER_set 8 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN 9 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_OBJECT_create 10 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_OBJECT_free 11 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_OBJECT_new 12 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_PRINTABLE_type 13 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_STRING_cmp 14 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_STRING_dup 15 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_STRING_free 16 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_STRING_new 17 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_STRING_print 18 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO ASN1_STRING_set 19 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_STRING_type_new 20 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_TYPE_free 21 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_TYPE_new 22 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_to_string 23 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_UTCTIME_check 24 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_UTCTIME_print 25 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO ASN1_UTCTIME_set 26 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_check_infinite_end 27 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_d2i_bio 28 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO ASN1_d2i_fp 29 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API ASN1_digest 30 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP ASN1_dup 31 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_get_object 32 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_i2d_bio 33 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO ASN1_i2d_fp 34 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API ASN1_object_size 35 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_parse 36 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO ASN1_put_object 37 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_sign 38 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP ASN1_verify 39 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP BF_cbc_encrypt 40 EXIST::FUNCTION:BF BF_cfb64_encrypt 41 EXIST::FUNCTION:BF BF_ecb_encrypt 42 EXIST::FUNCTION:BF BF_encrypt 43 EXIST::FUNCTION:BF BF_ofb64_encrypt 44 EXIST::FUNCTION:BF BF_options 45 EXIST::FUNCTION:BF BF_set_key 46 EXIST::FUNCTION:BF BIO_CONNECT_free 47 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_CONNECT_new 48 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_accept 51 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_ctrl 52 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_int_ctrl 53 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_debug_callback 54 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_dump 55 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_dup_chain 56 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_f_base64 57 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO BIO_f_buffer 58 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_f_cipher 59 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO BIO_f_md 60 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO BIO_f_null 61 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_f_proxy_server 62 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_fd_non_fatal_error 63 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_fd_should_retry 64 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_find_type 65 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_free 66 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_free_all 67 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_get_accept_socket 69 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_get_filter_bio 70 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_get_host_ip 71 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_get_port 72 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_get_retry_BIO 73 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_get_retry_reason 74 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_gethostbyname 75 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_gets 76 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_new 78 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_new_accept 79 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_new_connect 80 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_new_fd 81 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_new_file 82 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:FP_API BIO_new_fp 83 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:FP_API BIO_new_socket 84 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_pop 85 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_printf 86 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_push 87 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_puts 88 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_read 89 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_s_accept 90 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_s_connect 91 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_s_fd 92 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_s_file 93 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:FP_API BIO_s_mem 95 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_s_null 96 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_s_proxy_client 97 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_s_socket 98 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_set 100 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_set_cipher 101 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO BIO_set_tcp_ndelay 102 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_sock_cleanup 103 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_sock_error 104 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_sock_init 105 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_sock_non_fatal_error 106 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_sock_should_retry 107 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_socket_ioctl 108 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_write 109 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_CTX_free 110 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_CTX_new 111 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_MONT_CTX_free 112 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_MONT_CTX_new 113 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_MONT_CTX_set 114 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_add 115 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_add_word 116 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_hex2bn 117 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_bin2bn 118 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_bn2hex 119 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_bn2bin 120 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_clear 121 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_clear_bit 122 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_clear_free 123 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_cmp 124 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_copy 125 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_div 126 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_div_word 127 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_dup 128 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_free 129 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_from_montgomery 130 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_gcd 131 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_generate_prime 132 EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATED BN_get_word 133 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_is_bit_set 134 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_is_prime 135 EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATED BN_lshift 136 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_lshift1 137 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_mask_bits 138 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_mod 139 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: BN_mod_exp 140 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_mod_exp_mont 141 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_mod_exp_simple 143 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_mod_inverse 144 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_mod_mul 145 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_mod_mul_montgomery 146 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_mod_word 148 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_mul 149 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_new 150 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_num_bits 151 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_num_bits_word 152 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_options 153 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_print 154 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_print_fp 155 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API BN_rand 156 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_reciprocal 157 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_rshift 158 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_rshift1 159 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_set_bit 160 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_set_word 161 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_sqr 162 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_sub 163 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER 164 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_ucmp 165 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_value_one 166 EXIST::FUNCTION: BUF_MEM_free 167 EXIST::FUNCTION: BUF_MEM_grow 168 EXIST::FUNCTION: BUF_MEM_new 169 EXIST::FUNCTION: BUF_strdup 170 EXIST::FUNCTION: CONF_free 171 EXIST::FUNCTION: CONF_get_number 172 EXIST::FUNCTION: CONF_get_section 173 EXIST::FUNCTION: CONF_get_string 174 EXIST::FUNCTION: CONF_load 175 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_add_lock 176 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_dbg_free 177 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_dbg_malloc 178 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_dbg_realloc 179 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_dbg_remalloc 180 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_free 181 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_get_add_lock_callback 182 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_get_id_callback 183 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_get_lock_name 184 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_get_locking_callback 185 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_get_mem_functions 186 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_lock 187 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_malloc 188 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_mem_ctrl 189 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_mem_leaks 190 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_mem_leaks_cb 191 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_mem_leaks_fp 192 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API CRYPTO_realloc 193 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_remalloc 194 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_set_add_lock_callback 195 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_set_id_callback 196 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_set_locking_callback 197 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_set_mem_functions 198 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_thread_id 199 EXIST::FUNCTION: DH_check 200 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH DH_compute_key 201 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH DH_free 202 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH DH_generate_key 203 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH DH_generate_parameters 204 EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATED,DH DH_new 205 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH DH_size 206 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH DHparams_print 207 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO,DH DHparams_print_fp 208 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH,FP_API DSA_free 209 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA DSA_generate_key 210 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA DSA_generate_parameters 211 EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATED,DSA DSA_is_prime 212 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: DSA_new 213 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA DSA_print 214 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO,DSA DSA_print_fp 215 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA,FP_API DSA_sign 216 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA DSA_sign_setup 217 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA DSA_size 218 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA DSA_verify 219 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA DSAparams_print 220 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO,DSA DSAparams_print_fp 221 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA,FP_API ERR_clear_error 222 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_error_string 223 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_free_strings 224 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_func_error_string 225 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_get_err_state_table 226 EXIST::FUNCTION:LHASH ERR_get_error 227 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_get_error_line 228 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_get_state 229 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_get_string_table 230 EXIST::FUNCTION:LHASH ERR_lib_error_string 231 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_load_ASN1_strings 232 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_load_BIO_strings 233 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_load_BN_strings 234 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_load_BUF_strings 235 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_load_CONF_strings 236 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_load_DH_strings 237 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH ERR_load_DSA_strings 238 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA ERR_load_ERR_strings 239 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_load_EVP_strings 240 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_load_OBJ_strings 241 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_load_PEM_strings 242 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_load_PROXY_strings 243 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_load_RSA_strings 244 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA ERR_load_X509_strings 245 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_load_crypto_strings 246 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_load_strings 247 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_peek_error 248 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_peek_error_line 249 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_print_errors 250 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO ERR_print_errors_fp 251 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API ERR_put_error 252 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_reason_error_string 253 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_remove_state 254 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_BytesToKey 255 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup 256 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_CipherFinal 257 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_CipherInit 258 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_CipherUpdate 259 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_DecodeBlock 260 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_DecodeFinal 261 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_DecodeInit 262 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_DecodeUpdate 263 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_DecryptFinal 264 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_DecryptInit 265 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_DecryptUpdate 266 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_DigestFinal 267 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_DigestInit 268 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_DigestUpdate 269 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_EncodeBlock 270 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_EncodeFinal 271 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_EncodeInit 272 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_EncodeUpdate 273 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_EncryptFinal 274 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_EncryptInit 275 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_EncryptUpdate 276 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_OpenFinal 277 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA EVP_OpenInit 278 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA EVP_PKEY_assign 279 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters 280 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_free 281 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters 282 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_new 283 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_save_parameters 284 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_size 285 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_type 286 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_SealFinal 287 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA EVP_SealInit 288 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA EVP_SignFinal 289 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_VerifyFinal 290 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_add_alias 291 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_add_cipher 292 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_add_digest 293 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_bf_cbc 294 EXIST::FUNCTION:BF EVP_bf_cfb64 295 EXIST::FUNCTION:BF EVP_bf_ecb 296 EXIST::FUNCTION:BF EVP_bf_ofb 297 EXIST::FUNCTION:BF EVP_cleanup 298 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_des_cbc 299 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES EVP_des_cfb64 300 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES EVP_des_ecb 301 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES EVP_des_ede 302 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES EVP_des_ede3 303 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES EVP_des_ede3_cbc 304 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES EVP_des_ede3_cfb64 305 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES EVP_des_ede3_ofb 306 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES EVP_des_ede_cbc 307 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES EVP_des_ede_cfb64 308 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES EVP_des_ede_ofb 309 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES EVP_des_ofb 310 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES EVP_desx_cbc 311 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES EVP_dss 312 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA,SHA EVP_dss1 313 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA,SHA EVP_enc_null 314 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_get_cipherbyname 315 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_get_digestbyname 316 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_get_pw_prompt 317 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_idea_cbc 318 EXIST::FUNCTION:IDEA EVP_idea_cfb64 319 EXIST::FUNCTION:IDEA EVP_idea_ecb 320 EXIST::FUNCTION:IDEA EVP_idea_ofb 321 EXIST::FUNCTION:IDEA EVP_md2 322 EXIST::FUNCTION:MD2 EVP_md5 323 EXIST::FUNCTION:MD5 EVP_md_null 324 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_rc2_cbc 325 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2 EVP_rc2_cfb64 326 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2 EVP_rc2_ecb 327 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2 EVP_rc2_ofb 328 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2 EVP_rc4 329 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC4 EVP_read_pw_string 330 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_set_pw_prompt 331 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_sha 332 EXIST::FUNCTION:SHA EVP_sha1 333 EXIST::FUNCTION:SHA MD2 334 EXIST::FUNCTION:MD2 MD2_Final 335 EXIST::FUNCTION:MD2 MD2_Init 336 EXIST::FUNCTION:MD2 MD2_Update 337 EXIST::FUNCTION:MD2 MD2_options 338 EXIST::FUNCTION:MD2 MD5 339 EXIST::FUNCTION:MD5 MD5_Final 340 EXIST::FUNCTION:MD5 MD5_Init 341 EXIST::FUNCTION:MD5 MD5_Update 342 EXIST::FUNCTION:MD5 MDC2 343 EXIST::FUNCTION:MDC2 MDC2_Final 344 EXIST::FUNCTION:MDC2 MDC2_Init 345 EXIST::FUNCTION:MDC2 MDC2_Update 346 EXIST::FUNCTION:MDC2 NETSCAPE_SPKAC_free 347 EXIST::FUNCTION: NETSCAPE_SPKAC_new 348 EXIST::FUNCTION: NETSCAPE_SPKI_free 349 EXIST::FUNCTION: NETSCAPE_SPKI_new 350 EXIST::FUNCTION: NETSCAPE_SPKI_sign 351 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP NETSCAPE_SPKI_verify 352 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP OBJ_add_object 353 EXIST::FUNCTION: OBJ_bsearch 354 EXIST::FUNCTION: OBJ_cleanup 355 EXIST::FUNCTION: OBJ_cmp 356 EXIST::FUNCTION: OBJ_create 357 EXIST::FUNCTION: OBJ_dup 358 EXIST::FUNCTION: OBJ_ln2nid 359 EXIST::FUNCTION: OBJ_new_nid 360 EXIST::FUNCTION: OBJ_nid2ln 361 EXIST::FUNCTION: OBJ_nid2obj 362 EXIST::FUNCTION: OBJ_nid2sn 363 EXIST::FUNCTION: OBJ_obj2nid 364 EXIST::FUNCTION: OBJ_sn2nid 365 EXIST::FUNCTION: OBJ_txt2nid 366 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_ASN1_read 367 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION: PEM_ASN1_read_bio 368 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO PEM_ASN1_write 369 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION: PEM_ASN1_write_bio 370 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO PEM_SealFinal 371 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA PEM_SealInit 372 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA PEM_SealUpdate 373 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA PEM_SignFinal 374 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_SignInit 375 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_SignUpdate 376 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_X509_INFO_read 377 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION: PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio 378 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO PEM_X509_INFO_write_bio 379 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO PEM_dek_info 380 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_do_header 381 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO 382 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_proc_type 383 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_read 384 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION: PEM_read_DHparams 385 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:DH PEM_read_DSAPrivateKey 386 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:DSA PEM_read_DSAparams 387 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:DSA PEM_read_PKCS7 388 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION: PEM_read_PrivateKey 389 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION: PEM_read_RSAPrivateKey 390 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:RSA PEM_read_X509 391 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION: PEM_read_X509_CRL 392 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION: PEM_read_X509_REQ 393 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION: PEM_read_bio 394 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO PEM_read_bio_DHparams 395 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH PEM_read_bio_DSAPrivateKey 396 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA PEM_read_bio_DSAparams 397 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA PEM_read_bio_PKCS7 398 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey 399 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_read_bio_RSAPrivateKey 400 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA PEM_read_bio_X509 401 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL 402 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ 403 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_write 404 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION: PEM_write_DHparams 405 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:DH PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey 406 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:DSA PEM_write_DSAparams 407 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:DSA PEM_write_PKCS7 408 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION: PEM_write_PrivateKey 409 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION: PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey 410 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:RSA PEM_write_X509 411 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION: PEM_write_X509_CRL 412 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION: PEM_write_X509_REQ 413 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION: PEM_write_bio 414 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO PEM_write_bio_DHparams 415 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey 416 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA PEM_write_bio_DSAparams 417 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA PEM_write_bio_PKCS7 418 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey 419 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey 420 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA PEM_write_bio_X509 421 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_write_bio_X509_CRL 422 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ 423 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_DIGEST_free 424 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_DIGEST_new 425 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_ENCRYPT_free 426 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_ENCRYPT_new 427 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT_free 428 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT_new 429 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_ENVELOPE_free 430 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_ENVELOPE_new 431 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_digest 432 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_free 433 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_new 434 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_free 435 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_new 436 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_SIGNED_free 437 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_SIGNED_new 438 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_free 439 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_new 440 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE_free 441 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE_new 442 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_dup 443 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_free 444 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_new 445 EXIST::FUNCTION: PROXY_ENTRY_add_noproxy 446 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PROXY_ENTRY_clear_noproxy 447 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PROXY_ENTRY_free 448 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PROXY_ENTRY_get_noproxy 449 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PROXY_ENTRY_new 450 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PROXY_ENTRY_set_server 451 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PROXY_add_noproxy 452 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PROXY_add_server 453 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PROXY_check_by_host 454 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PROXY_check_url 455 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PROXY_clear_noproxy 456 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PROXY_free 457 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PROXY_get_noproxy 458 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PROXY_get_proxies 459 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PROXY_get_proxy_entry 460 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PROXY_load_conf 461 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PROXY_new 462 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PROXY_print 463 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: RAND_bytes 464 EXIST::FUNCTION: RAND_cleanup 465 EXIST::FUNCTION: RAND_file_name 466 EXIST::FUNCTION: RAND_load_file 467 EXIST::FUNCTION: RAND_screen 468 EXIST:WIN32:FUNCTION: RAND_seed 469 EXIST::FUNCTION: RAND_write_file 470 EXIST::FUNCTION: RC2_cbc_encrypt 471 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2 RC2_cfb64_encrypt 472 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2 RC2_ecb_encrypt 473 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2 RC2_encrypt 474 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2 RC2_ofb64_encrypt 475 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2 RC2_set_key 476 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2 RC4 477 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC4 RC4_options 478 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC4 RC4_set_key 479 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC4 RSAPrivateKey_asn1_meth 480 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSAPrivateKey_dup 481 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSAPublicKey_dup 482 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay 483 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_free 484 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_generate_key 485 EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATED,RSA RSA_new 486 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_new_method 487 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_print 488 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO,RSA RSA_print_fp 489 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API,RSA RSA_private_decrypt 490 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_private_encrypt 491 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_public_decrypt 492 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_public_encrypt 493 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_set_default_method 494 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_sign 495 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 496 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_size 497 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_verify 498 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 499 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA SHA 500 EXIST::FUNCTION:SHA,SHA0 SHA1 501 EXIST::FUNCTION:SHA,SHA1 SHA1_Final 502 EXIST::FUNCTION:SHA,SHA1 SHA1_Init 503 EXIST::FUNCTION:SHA,SHA1 SHA1_Update 504 EXIST::FUNCTION:SHA,SHA1 SHA_Final 505 EXIST::FUNCTION:SHA,SHA0 SHA_Init 506 EXIST::FUNCTION:SHA,SHA0 SHA_Update 507 EXIST::FUNCTION:SHA,SHA0 OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms 508 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers 509 EXIST::FUNCTION: OpenSSL_add_all_digests 510 EXIST::FUNCTION: TXT_DB_create_index 511 EXIST::FUNCTION: TXT_DB_free 512 EXIST::FUNCTION: TXT_DB_get_by_index 513 EXIST::FUNCTION: TXT_DB_insert 514 EXIST::FUNCTION: TXT_DB_read 515 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO TXT_DB_write 516 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO X509_ALGOR_free 517 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_ALGOR_new 518 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_ATTRIBUTE_free 519 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_ATTRIBUTE_new 520 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CINF_free 521 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CINF_new 522 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CRL_INFO_free 523 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CRL_INFO_new 524 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CRL_add_ext 525 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CRL_cmp 526 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CRL_delete_ext 527 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CRL_dup 528 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CRL_free 529 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CRL_get_ext 530 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID 531 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CRL_get_ext_by_OBJ 532 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CRL_get_ext_by_critical 533 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CRL_get_ext_count 534 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CRL_new 535 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CRL_sign 536 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP X509_CRL_verify 537 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP X509_EXTENSION_create_by_NID 538 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_EXTENSION_create_by_OBJ 539 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_EXTENSION_dup 540 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_EXTENSION_free 541 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_EXTENSION_get_critical 542 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_EXTENSION_get_data 543 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_EXTENSION_get_object 544 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_EXTENSION_new 545 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_EXTENSION_set_critical 546 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_EXTENSION_set_data 547 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_EXTENSION_set_object 548 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_INFO_free 549 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP X509_INFO_new 550 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP X509_LOOKUP_by_alias 551 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_LOOKUP_by_fingerprint 552 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_LOOKUP_by_issuer_serial 553 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_LOOKUP_by_subject 554 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_LOOKUP_ctrl 555 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_LOOKUP_file 556 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_LOOKUP_free 557 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir 558 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_LOOKUP_init 559 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_LOOKUP_new 560 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_LOOKUP_shutdown 561 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_NID 562 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_OBJ 563 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_ENTRY_dup 564 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_ENTRY_free 565 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data 566 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object 567 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_ENTRY_new 568 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_data 569 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_ENTRY_set_object 570 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_add_entry 571 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_cmp 572 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_delete_entry 573 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_digest 574 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP X509_NAME_dup 575 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_entry_count 576 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_free 577 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_get_entry 578 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID 579 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_get_index_by_OBJ 580 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID 581 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_get_text_by_OBJ 582 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_hash 583 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_new 584 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_oneline 585 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP X509_NAME_print 586 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO X509_NAME_set 587 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_OBJECT_free_contents 588 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_OBJECT_retrieve_by_subject 589 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count 590 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_PKEY_free 591 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_PKEY_new 592 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_PUBKEY_free 593 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_PUBKEY_get 594 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_PUBKEY_new 595 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_PUBKEY_set 596 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_INFO_free 597 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_INFO_new 598 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_dup 599 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_free 600 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_get_pubkey 601 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_new 602 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_print 603 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO X509_REQ_print_fp 604 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API X509_REQ_set_pubkey 605 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_set_subject_name 606 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_set_version 607 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_sign 608 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP X509_REQ_to_X509 609 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_verify 610 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP X509_REVOKED_add_ext 611 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REVOKED_delete_ext 612 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REVOKED_free 613 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REVOKED_get_ext 614 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_NID 615 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_OBJ 616 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_critical 617 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: X509_REVOKED_get_ext_by_critic 617 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: X509_REVOKED_get_ext_count 618 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REVOKED_new 619 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_SIG_free 620 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_SIG_new 621 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup 622 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_init 623 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_add_cert 624 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_add_lookup 625 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_free 626 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_get_by_subject 627 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_load_locations 628 EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO X509_STORE_new 629 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_set_default_paths 630 EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO X509_VAL_free 631 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_VAL_new 632 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_add_ext 633 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_asn1_meth 634 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_certificate_type 635 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_check_private_key 636 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_cmp_current_time 637 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_delete_ext 638 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_digest 639 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP X509_dup 640 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_free 641 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_get_default_cert_area 642 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_get_default_cert_dir 643 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_get_default_cert_dir_env 644 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_get_default_cert_file 645 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_get_default_cert_file_env 646 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_get_default_private_dir 647 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_get_ext 648 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_get_ext_by_NID 649 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_get_ext_by_OBJ 650 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_get_ext_by_critical 651 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_get_ext_count 652 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_get_issuer_name 653 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_get_pubkey 654 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_get_pubkey_parameters 655 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_get_serialNumber 656 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_get_subject_name 657 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_gmtime_adj 658 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp 659 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_issuer_and_serial_hash 660 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_issuer_name_cmp 661 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_issuer_name_hash 662 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_load_cert_file 663 EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO X509_new 664 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_print 665 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO X509_print_fp 666 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API X509_set_issuer_name 667 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_set_notAfter 668 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_set_notBefore 669 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_set_pubkey 670 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_set_serialNumber 671 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_set_subject_name 672 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_set_version 673 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_sign 674 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP X509_subject_name_cmp 675 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_subject_name_hash 676 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_to_X509_REQ 677 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_verify 678 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP X509_verify_cert 679 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_verify_cert_error_string 680 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509v3_add_ext 681 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509v3_add_extension 682 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: X509v3_add_netscape_extensions 683 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: X509v3_add_standard_extensions 684 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: X509v3_cleanup_extensions 685 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: X509v3_data_type_by_NID 686 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: X509v3_data_type_by_OBJ 687 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: X509v3_delete_ext 688 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509v3_get_ext 689 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509v3_get_ext_by_NID 690 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509v3_get_ext_by_OBJ 691 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509v3_get_ext_by_critical 692 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509v3_get_ext_count 693 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509v3_pack_string 694 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: X509v3_pack_type_by_NID 695 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: X509v3_pack_type_by_OBJ 696 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: X509v3_unpack_string 697 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: _des_crypt 698 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: a2d_ASN1_OBJECT 699 EXIST::FUNCTION: a2i_ASN1_INTEGER 700 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO a2i_ASN1_STRING 701 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO asn1_Finish 702 EXIST::FUNCTION: asn1_GetSequence 703 EXIST::FUNCTION: bn_div_words 704 EXIST::FUNCTION: bn_expand2 705 EXIST::FUNCTION: bn_mul_add_words 706 EXIST::FUNCTION: bn_mul_words 707 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_uadd 708 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_usub 709 EXIST::FUNCTION: bn_sqr_words 710 EXIST::FUNCTION: _ossl_old_crypt 711 EXIST:!NeXT,!PERL5:FUNCTION:DES d2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING 712 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_BOOLEAN 713 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_HEADER 714 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_IA5STRING 715 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_INTEGER 716 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_OBJECT 717 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 718 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_PRINTABLE 719 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING 720 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_SET 721 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_T61STRING 722 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_TYPE 723 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_UTCTIME 724 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_bytes 725 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_type_bytes 726 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_DHparams 727 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH d2i_DSAPrivateKey 728 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA d2i_DSAPrivateKey_bio 729 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO,DSA d2i_DSAPrivateKey_fp 730 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA,FP_API d2i_DSAPublicKey 731 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA d2i_DSAparams 732 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA d2i_NETSCAPE_SPKAC 733 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_NETSCAPE_SPKI 734 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_Netscape_RSA 735 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC4,RSA d2i_PKCS7 736 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PKCS7_DIGEST 737 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PKCS7_ENCRYPT 738 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT 739 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PKCS7_ENVELOPE 740 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL 741 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO 742 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PKCS7_SIGNED 743 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO 744 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE 745 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PKCS7_bio 746 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PKCS7_fp 747 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API d2i_PrivateKey 748 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PublicKey 749 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_RSAPrivateKey 750 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio 751 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO,RSA d2i_RSAPrivateKey_fp 752 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API,RSA d2i_RSAPublicKey 753 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA d2i_X509 754 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_X509_ALGOR 755 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_X509_ATTRIBUTE 756 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_X509_CINF 757 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_X509_CRL 758 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_X509_CRL_INFO 759 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_X509_CRL_bio 760 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO d2i_X509_CRL_fp 761 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API d2i_X509_EXTENSION 762 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_X509_NAME 763 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_X509_NAME_ENTRY 764 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_X509_PKEY 765 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_X509_PUBKEY 766 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_X509_REQ 767 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_X509_REQ_INFO 768 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_X509_REQ_bio 769 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO d2i_X509_REQ_fp 770 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API d2i_X509_REVOKED 771 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_X509_SIG 772 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_X509_VAL 773 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_X509_bio 774 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO d2i_X509_fp 775 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API DES_cbc_cksum 777 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_cbc_encrypt 778 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_cblock_print_file 779 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: DES_cfb64_encrypt 780 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_cfb_encrypt 781 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_decrypt3 782 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_ecb3_encrypt 783 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_ecb_encrypt 784 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt 785 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_ede3_cfb64_encrypt 786 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_ede3_ofb64_encrypt 787 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_enc_read 788 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_enc_write 789 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_encrypt1 790 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_encrypt2 791 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_encrypt3 792 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_fcrypt 793 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_is_weak_key 794 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_key_sched 795 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_ncbc_encrypt 796 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_ofb64_encrypt 797 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_ofb_encrypt 798 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_options 799 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_pcbc_encrypt 800 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_quad_cksum 801 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_random_key 802 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES _ossl_old_des_random_seed 803 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES _ossl_old_des_read_2passwords 804 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES _ossl_old_des_read_password 805 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES _ossl_old_des_read_pw 806 EXIST::FUNCTION: _ossl_old_des_read_pw_string 807 EXIST::FUNCTION: DES_set_key 808 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_set_odd_parity 809 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_string_to_2keys 810 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_string_to_key 811 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_xcbc_encrypt 812 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_xwhite_in2out 813 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: fcrypt_body 814 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: i2a_ASN1_INTEGER 815 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO i2a_ASN1_OBJECT 816 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO i2a_ASN1_STRING 817 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO i2d_ASN1_BIT_STRING 818 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_BOOLEAN 819 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_HEADER 820 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_IA5STRING 821 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_INTEGER 822 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_OBJECT 823 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 824 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_PRINTABLE 825 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_SET 826 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_TYPE 827 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_UTCTIME 828 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_bytes 829 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_DHparams 830 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH i2d_DSAPrivateKey 831 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA i2d_DSAPrivateKey_bio 832 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO,DSA i2d_DSAPrivateKey_fp 833 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA,FP_API i2d_DSAPublicKey 834 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA i2d_DSAparams 835 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA i2d_NETSCAPE_SPKAC 836 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_NETSCAPE_SPKI 837 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_Netscape_RSA 838 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC4,RSA i2d_PKCS7 839 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS7_DIGEST 840 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS7_ENCRYPT 841 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT 842 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS7_ENVELOPE 843 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL 844 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO 845 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS7_SIGNED 846 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO 847 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE 848 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS7_bio 849 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS7_fp 850 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API i2d_PrivateKey 851 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PublicKey 852 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_RSAPrivateKey 853 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA i2d_RSAPrivateKey_bio 854 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO,RSA i2d_RSAPrivateKey_fp 855 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API,RSA i2d_RSAPublicKey 856 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA i2d_X509 857 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_X509_ALGOR 858 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_X509_ATTRIBUTE 859 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_X509_CINF 860 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_X509_CRL 861 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_X509_CRL_INFO 862 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_X509_CRL_bio 863 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO i2d_X509_CRL_fp 864 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API i2d_X509_EXTENSION 865 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_X509_NAME 866 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_X509_NAME_ENTRY 867 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_X509_PKEY 868 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_X509_PUBKEY 869 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_X509_REQ 870 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_X509_REQ_INFO 871 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_X509_REQ_bio 872 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO i2d_X509_REQ_fp 873 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API i2d_X509_REVOKED 874 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_X509_SIG 875 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_X509_VAL 876 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_X509_bio 877 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO i2d_X509_fp 878 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API idea_cbc_encrypt 879 EXIST::FUNCTION:IDEA idea_cfb64_encrypt 880 EXIST::FUNCTION:IDEA idea_ecb_encrypt 881 EXIST::FUNCTION:IDEA idea_encrypt 882 EXIST::FUNCTION:IDEA idea_ofb64_encrypt 883 EXIST::FUNCTION:IDEA idea_options 884 EXIST::FUNCTION:IDEA idea_set_decrypt_key 885 EXIST::FUNCTION:IDEA idea_set_encrypt_key 886 EXIST::FUNCTION:IDEA lh_delete 887 EXIST::FUNCTION: lh_doall 888 EXIST::FUNCTION: lh_doall_arg 889 EXIST::FUNCTION: lh_free 890 EXIST::FUNCTION: lh_insert 891 EXIST::FUNCTION: lh_new 892 EXIST::FUNCTION: lh_node_stats 893 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API lh_node_stats_bio 894 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO lh_node_usage_stats 895 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API lh_node_usage_stats_bio 896 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO lh_retrieve 897 EXIST::FUNCTION: lh_stats 898 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API lh_stats_bio 899 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO lh_strhash 900 EXIST::FUNCTION: sk_delete 901 EXIST::FUNCTION: sk_delete_ptr 902 EXIST::FUNCTION: sk_dup 903 EXIST::FUNCTION: sk_find 904 EXIST::FUNCTION: sk_free 905 EXIST::FUNCTION: sk_insert 906 EXIST::FUNCTION: sk_new 907 EXIST::FUNCTION: sk_pop 908 EXIST::FUNCTION: sk_pop_free 909 EXIST::FUNCTION: sk_push 910 EXIST::FUNCTION: sk_set_cmp_func 911 EXIST::FUNCTION: sk_shift 912 EXIST::FUNCTION: sk_unshift 913 EXIST::FUNCTION: sk_zero 914 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_f_nbio_test 915 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_TYPE_get 916 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_TYPE_set 917 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_content_free 918 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_load_PKCS7_strings 919 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial 920 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_find_by_subject 921 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_ctrl 927 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_set_type 928 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_set_content 929 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_set 930 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_add_signer 931 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_add_certificate 932 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_add_crl 933 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_content_new 934 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_dataSign 935 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_dataVerify 936 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_dataInit 937 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_add_signature 938 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_cert_from_signer_info 939 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_get_signer_info 940 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_delete_alias 941 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_mdc2 942 EXIST::FUNCTION:MDC2 PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey 943 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA PEM_write_bio_RSAPublicKey 944 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA d2i_RSAPublicKey_bio 945 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO,RSA i2d_RSAPublicKey_bio 946 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO,RSA PEM_read_RSAPublicKey 947 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:RSA PEM_write_RSAPublicKey 949 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:RSA d2i_RSAPublicKey_fp 952 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API,RSA i2d_RSAPublicKey_fp 954 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API,RSA BIO_copy_next_retry 955 EXIST::FUNCTION: RSA_flags 956 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA X509_STORE_add_crl 957 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_load_crl_file 958 EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO EVP_rc2_40_cbc 959 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2 EVP_rc4_40 960 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC4 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init 961 EXIST::FUNCTION: HMAC 962 EXIST::FUNCTION:HMAC HMAC_Init 963 EXIST::FUNCTION:HMAC HMAC_Update 964 EXIST::FUNCTION:HMAC HMAC_Final 965 EXIST::FUNCTION:HMAC ERR_get_next_error_library 966 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters 967 EXIST::FUNCTION: HMAC_cleanup 968 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_ptr_ctrl 969 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_new_file_internal 970 EXIST:WIN16:FUNCTION:FP_API BIO_new_fp_internal 971 EXIST:WIN16:FUNCTION:FP_API BIO_s_file_internal 972 EXIST:WIN16:FUNCTION:FP_API BN_BLINDING_convert 973 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_BLINDING_invert 974 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_BLINDING_update 975 EXIST::FUNCTION: RSA_blinding_on 977 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_blinding_off 978 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA i2t_ASN1_OBJECT 979 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_BLINDING_new 980 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_BLINDING_free 981 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_cast5_cbc 983 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAST EVP_cast5_cfb64 984 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAST EVP_cast5_ecb 985 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAST EVP_cast5_ofb 986 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAST BF_decrypt 987 EXIST::FUNCTION:BF CAST_set_key 988 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAST CAST_encrypt 989 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAST CAST_decrypt 990 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAST CAST_ecb_encrypt 991 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAST CAST_cbc_encrypt 992 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAST CAST_cfb64_encrypt 993 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAST CAST_ofb64_encrypt 994 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAST RC2_decrypt 995 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2 OBJ_create_objects 997 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_exp 998 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_mul_word 999 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_sub_word 1000 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_dec2bn 1001 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_bn2dec 1002 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_ghbn_ctrl 1003 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_free_ex_data 1004 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_get_ex_data 1005 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_set_ex_data 1007 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings 1009 EXIST:!OS2,!VMS,!WIN16:FUNCTION: ERR_load_CRYPTOlib_strings 1009 EXIST:OS2,VMS,WIN16:FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_bits 1010 EXIST::FUNCTION: MD5_Transform 1011 EXIST::FUNCTION:MD5 SHA1_Transform 1012 EXIST::FUNCTION:SHA,SHA1 SHA_Transform 1013 EXIST::FUNCTION:SHA,SHA0 X509_STORE_CTX_get_chain 1014 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert 1015 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_get_error 1016 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth 1017 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data 1018 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert 1020 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_set_chain 1021 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_set_error 1022 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data 1023 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_dup_ex_data 1025 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_get_new_lockid 1026 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_new_ex_data 1027 EXIST::FUNCTION: RSA_set_ex_data 1028 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_get_ex_data 1029 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_get_ex_new_index 1030 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1 1031 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2 1032 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_padding_add_SSLv23 1033 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_padding_add_none 1034 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1 1035 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2 1036 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_padding_check_SSLv23 1037 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_padding_check_none 1038 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA bn_add_words 1039 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_Netscape_RSA_2 1040 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index 1041 EXIST::FUNCTION: RIPEMD160_Init 1042 EXIST::FUNCTION:RIPEMD RIPEMD160_Update 1043 EXIST::FUNCTION:RIPEMD RIPEMD160_Final 1044 EXIST::FUNCTION:RIPEMD RIPEMD160 1045 EXIST::FUNCTION:RIPEMD RIPEMD160_Transform 1046 EXIST::FUNCTION:RIPEMD RC5_32_set_key 1047 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC5 RC5_32_ecb_encrypt 1048 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC5 RC5_32_encrypt 1049 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC5 RC5_32_decrypt 1050 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC5 RC5_32_cbc_encrypt 1051 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC5 RC5_32_cfb64_encrypt 1052 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC5 RC5_32_ofb64_encrypt 1053 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC5 BN_bn2mpi 1058 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_mpi2bn 1059 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit 1060 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit 1061 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_get_ex_data 1062 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_get_ex_new_index 1063 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_set_ex_data 1064 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509v3_get_key_usage 1066 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: X509v3_set_key_usage 1067 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: a2i_X509v3_key_usage 1068 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: i2a_X509v3_key_usage 1069 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_decrypt 1070 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_encrypt 1071 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_set 1072 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_add_recipient 1073 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_add_recipient_info 1074 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_set_cipher 1075 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_TYPE_get_int_octetstring 1076 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_TYPE_get_octetstring 1077 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_TYPE_set_int_octetstring 1078 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_TYPE_set_octetstring 1079 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_UTCTIME_set_string 1080 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_add_error_data 1081 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO ERR_set_error_data 1082 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param 1083 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1 1084 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv 1085 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv 1086 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cbc 1087 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC5 EVP_rc5_32_12_16_cfb64 1088 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC5 EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ecb 1089 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC5 EVP_rc5_32_12_16_ofb 1090 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC5 asn1_add_error 1091 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_BMPSTRING 1092 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_BMPSTRING 1093 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_f_ber 1094 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: BN_init 1095 EXIST::FUNCTION: COMP_CTX_new 1096 EXIST::FUNCTION: COMP_CTX_free 1097 EXIST::FUNCTION: COMP_CTX_compress_block 1098 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: COMP_CTX_expand_block 1099 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index 1100 EXIST::FUNCTION: OBJ_NAME_add 1101 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_socket_nbio 1102 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_rc2_64_cbc 1103 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC2 OBJ_NAME_cleanup 1104 EXIST::FUNCTION: OBJ_NAME_get 1105 EXIST::FUNCTION: OBJ_NAME_init 1106 EXIST::FUNCTION: OBJ_NAME_new_index 1107 EXIST::FUNCTION: OBJ_NAME_remove 1108 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_MONT_CTX_copy 1109 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_new_socks4a_connect 1110 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_s_socks4a_connect 1111 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PROXY_set_connect_mode 1112 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: RAND_SSLeay 1113 EXIST::FUNCTION: RAND_set_rand_method 1114 EXIST::FUNCTION: RSA_memory_lock 1115 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA bn_sub_words 1116 EXIST::FUNCTION: bn_mul_normal 1117 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: bn_mul_comba8 1118 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: bn_mul_comba4 1119 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: bn_sqr_normal 1120 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: bn_sqr_comba8 1121 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: bn_sqr_comba4 1122 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: bn_cmp_words 1123 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: bn_mul_recursive 1124 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: bn_mul_part_recursive 1125 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: bn_sqr_recursive 1126 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: bn_mul_low_normal 1127 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: BN_RECP_CTX_init 1128 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_RECP_CTX_new 1129 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_RECP_CTX_free 1130 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_RECP_CTX_set 1131 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_mod_mul_reciprocal 1132 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_mod_exp_recp 1133 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_div_recp 1134 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_CTX_init 1135 EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATED BN_MONT_CTX_init 1136 EXIST::FUNCTION: RAND_get_rand_method 1137 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_add_attribute 1138 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_add_signed_attribute 1139 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_digest_from_attributes 1140 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_get_attribute 1141 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_get_issuer_and_serial 1142 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_get_signed_attribute 1143 EXIST::FUNCTION: COMP_compress_block 1144 EXIST::FUNCTION: COMP_expand_block 1145 EXIST::FUNCTION: COMP_rle 1146 EXIST::FUNCTION: COMP_zlib 1147 EXIST::FUNCTION: ms_time_diff 1148 EXIST::FUNCTION: ms_time_new 1149 EXIST::FUNCTION: ms_time_free 1150 EXIST::FUNCTION: ms_time_cmp 1151 EXIST::FUNCTION: ms_time_get 1152 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_set_attributes 1153 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_set_signed_attributes 1154 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_ATTRIBUTE_create 1155 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_ATTRIBUTE_dup 1156 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check 1157 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_print 1158 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set 1159 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set_string 1160 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_TIME_print 1161 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_free 1162 EXIST::FUNCTION: BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_new 1163 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_load_X509V3_strings 1164 EXIST::FUNCTION: NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE_free 1165 EXIST::FUNCTION: NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE_new 1166 EXIST::FUNCTION: OBJ_txt2obj 1167 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_read_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE 1168 EXIST:!VMS,!WIN16:FUNCTION: PEM_read_NS_CERT_SEQ 1168 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: PEM_read_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE 1169 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: PEM_read_bio_NS_CERT_SEQ 1169 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: PEM_write_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE 1170 EXIST:!VMS,!WIN16:FUNCTION: PEM_write_NS_CERT_SEQ 1170 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: PEM_write_bio_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE 1171 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: PEM_write_bio_NS_CERT_SEQ 1171 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: X509V3_EXT_add 1172 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_EXT_add_alias 1173 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_EXT_add_conf 1174 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_EXT_cleanup 1175 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_EXT_conf 1176 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_EXT_conf_nid 1177 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_EXT_get 1178 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_EXT_get_nid 1179 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_EXT_print 1180 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_EXT_print_fp 1181 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_add_standard_extensions 1182 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_add_value 1183 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_add_value_bool 1184 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_add_value_int 1185 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_conf_free 1186 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_get_value_bool 1187 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_get_value_int 1188 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_parse_list 1189 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME 1190 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_TIME 1191 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS 1192 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE 1193 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ext_ku 1194 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: ext_ku_free 1195 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: ext_ku_new 1196 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME 1197 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_TIME 1198 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS 1199 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE 1200 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ext_ku 1201 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_MD_CTX_copy 1202 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_ENUMERATED 1203 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED 1204 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_ENUMERATED_set 1205 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_ENUMERATED_get 1206 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_to_ASN1_ENUMERATED 1207 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN 1208 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2a_ASN1_ENUMERATED 1209 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO a2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED 1210 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO i2d_GENERAL_NAME 1211 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_GENERAL_NAME 1212 EXIST::FUNCTION: GENERAL_NAME_new 1213 EXIST::FUNCTION: GENERAL_NAME_free 1214 EXIST::FUNCTION: GENERAL_NAMES_new 1215 EXIST::FUNCTION: GENERAL_NAMES_free 1216 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_GENERAL_NAMES 1217 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_GENERAL_NAMES 1218 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2v_GENERAL_NAMES 1219 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2s_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 1220 EXIST::FUNCTION: s2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING 1221 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_EXT_check_conf 1222 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: hex_to_string 1223 EXIST::FUNCTION: string_to_hex 1224 EXIST::FUNCTION: DES_ede3_cbcm_encrypt 1225 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP 1226 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP 1227 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA X509_CRL_print_fp 1228 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API X509_CRL_print 1229 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO i2v_GENERAL_NAME 1230 EXIST::FUNCTION: v2i_GENERAL_NAME 1231 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD 1232 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD 1233 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD_new 1234 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD_free 1235 EXIST::FUNCTION: v2i_GENERAL_NAMES 1236 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2s_ASN1_INTEGER 1237 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_EXT_d2i 1238 EXIST::FUNCTION: name_cmp 1239 EXIST::FUNCTION: str_dup 1240 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED 1241 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED_TABLE 1242 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_s_log 1243 EXIST:!OS2,!WIN16,!WIN32,!macintosh:FUNCTION: BIO_f_reliable 1244 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO PKCS7_dataFinal 1245 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_dataDecode 1246 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_EXT_CRL_add_conf 1247 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_set_params 1248 EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATED BN_get_params 1249 EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATED BIO_get_ex_num 1250 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_set_ex_free_func 1251 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_ripemd160 1252 EXIST::FUNCTION:RIPEMD ASN1_TIME_set 1253 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_AUTHORITY_KEYID 1254 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_AUTHORITY_KEYID 1255 EXIST::FUNCTION: AUTHORITY_KEYID_new 1256 EXIST::FUNCTION: AUTHORITY_KEYID_free 1257 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_seq_unpack 1258 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_seq_pack 1259 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_unpack_string 1260 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_pack_string 1261 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_pack_safebag 1262 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_MAKE_KEYBAG 1263 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS8_encrypt 1264 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_MAKE_SHKEYBAG 1265 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_pack_p7data 1266 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_pack_p7encdata 1267 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_add_localkeyid 1268 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_add_friendlyname_asc 1269 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_add_friendlyname_uni 1270 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_get_friendlyname 1271 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_pbe_crypt 1272 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_decrypt_d2i 1273 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_i2d_encrypt 1274 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_init 1275 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_key_gen_asc 1276 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_key_gen_uni 1277 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_gen_mac 1278 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_verify_mac 1279 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_set_mac 1280 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_setup_mac 1281 EXIST::FUNCTION: asc2uni 1282 EXIST:!NETWARE:FUNCTION: uni2asc 1283 EXIST:!NETWARE:FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS12_BAGS 1284 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_BAGS_new 1285 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PKCS12_BAGS 1286 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_BAGS_free 1287 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS12 1288 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PKCS12 1289 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_new 1290 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_free 1291 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS12_MAC_DATA 1292 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_MAC_DATA_new 1293 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PKCS12_MAC_DATA 1294 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_MAC_DATA_free 1295 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS12_SAFEBAG 1296 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_SAFEBAG_new 1297 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PKCS12_SAFEBAG 1298 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_SAFEBAG_free 1299 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_load_PKCS12_strings 1300 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_PBE_add 1301 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS8_add_keyusage 1302 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_get_attr_gen 1303 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_parse 1304 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_create 1305 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS12_bio 1306 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS12_fp 1307 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PKCS12_bio 1308 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PKCS12_fp 1309 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PBEPARAM 1310 EXIST::FUNCTION: PBEPARAM_new 1311 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PBEPARAM 1312 EXIST::FUNCTION: PBEPARAM_free 1313 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO 1314 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_new 1315 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO 1316 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_free 1317 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKCS82PKEY 1318 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY2PKCS8 1319 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS8_set_broken 1320 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PBE_ALGOR_CipherInit 1321 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PBE_alg_add 1322 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS5_pbe_set 1323 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PBE_cleanup 1324 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_SXNET 1325 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_SXNET 1326 EXIST::FUNCTION: SXNET_new 1327 EXIST::FUNCTION: SXNET_free 1328 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_SXNETID 1329 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_SXNETID 1330 EXIST::FUNCTION: SXNETID_new 1331 EXIST::FUNCTION: SXNETID_free 1332 EXIST::FUNCTION: DSA_SIG_new 1333 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA DSA_SIG_free 1334 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA DSA_do_sign 1335 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA DSA_do_verify 1336 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA d2i_DSA_SIG 1337 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA i2d_DSA_SIG 1338 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA i2d_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING 1339 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING 1340 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_UTF8STRING 1341 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_UTF8STRING 1342 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_DIRECTORYSTRING 1343 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_DIRECTORYSTRING 1344 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_DISPLAYTEXT 1345 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_DISPLAYTEXT 1346 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_X509 1379 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_SET_OF_X509 1380 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PBKDF2PARAM 1397 EXIST::FUNCTION: PBKDF2PARAM_new 1398 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PBKDF2PARAM 1399 EXIST::FUNCTION: PBKDF2PARAM_free 1400 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PBE2PARAM 1401 EXIST::FUNCTION: PBE2PARAM_new 1402 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PBE2PARAM 1403 EXIST::FUNCTION: PBE2PARAM_free 1404 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_GENERAL_NAME 1421 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_SET_OF_GENERAL_NAME 1422 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_SXNETID 1439 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_SET_OF_SXNETID 1440 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_POLICYQUALINFO 1457 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_SET_OF_POLICYQUALINFO 1458 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_POLICYINFO 1475 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_SET_OF_POLICYINFO 1476 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: SXNET_add_id_asc 1477 EXIST::FUNCTION: SXNET_add_id_ulong 1478 EXIST::FUNCTION: SXNET_add_id_INTEGER 1479 EXIST::FUNCTION: SXNET_get_id_asc 1480 EXIST::FUNCTION: SXNET_get_id_ulong 1481 EXIST::FUNCTION: SXNET_get_id_INTEGER 1482 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_set_conf_lhash 1483 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_CERTIFICATEPOLICIES 1484 EXIST::FUNCTION: CERTIFICATEPOLICIES_new 1485 EXIST::FUNCTION: CERTIFICATEPOLICIES_free 1486 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_CERTIFICATEPOLICIES 1487 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_POLICYINFO 1488 EXIST::FUNCTION: POLICYINFO_new 1489 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_POLICYINFO 1490 EXIST::FUNCTION: POLICYINFO_free 1491 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_POLICYQUALINFO 1492 EXIST::FUNCTION: POLICYQUALINFO_new 1493 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_POLICYQUALINFO 1494 EXIST::FUNCTION: POLICYQUALINFO_free 1495 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_USERNOTICE 1496 EXIST::FUNCTION: USERNOTICE_new 1497 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_USERNOTICE 1498 EXIST::FUNCTION: USERNOTICE_free 1499 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_NOTICEREF 1500 EXIST::FUNCTION: NOTICEREF_new 1501 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_NOTICEREF 1502 EXIST::FUNCTION: NOTICEREF_free 1503 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_get_string 1504 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_get_section 1505 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_string_free 1506 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_section_free 1507 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_set_ctx 1508 EXIST::FUNCTION: s2i_ASN1_INTEGER 1509 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_set_locked_mem_functions 1510 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_get_locked_mem_functions 1511 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_malloc_locked 1512 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_free_locked 1513 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_mod_exp2_mont 1514 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_get_error_line_data 1515 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_peek_error_line_data 1516 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_PBE_keyivgen 1517 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_ALGOR_dup 1518 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_DIST_POINT 1535 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_SET_OF_DIST_POINT 1536 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_CRL_DIST_POINTS 1537 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRL_DIST_POINTS_new 1538 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRL_DIST_POINTS_free 1539 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_CRL_DIST_POINTS 1540 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_DIST_POINT 1541 EXIST::FUNCTION: DIST_POINT_new 1542 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_DIST_POINT 1543 EXIST::FUNCTION: DIST_POINT_free 1544 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_DIST_POINT_NAME 1545 EXIST::FUNCTION: DIST_POINT_NAME_new 1546 EXIST::FUNCTION: DIST_POINT_NAME_free 1547 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_DIST_POINT_NAME 1548 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_add_value_uchar 1549 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_X509_ATTRIBUTE 1555 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_SET_OF_ASN1_TYPE 1560 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_X509_EXTENSION 1567 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY 1574 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_ASN1_TYPE 1589 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_SET_OF_X509_ATTRIBUTE 1615 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_SET_OF_X509_EXTENSION 1624 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_SET_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY 1633 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_EXT_i2d 1646 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_EXT_val_prn 1647 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_EXT_add_list 1648 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_CIPHER_type 1649 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PBE_CipherInit 1650 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_add_value_bool_nf 1651 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER 1652 EXIST::FUNCTION: sk_value 1653 EXIST::FUNCTION: sk_num 1654 EXIST::FUNCTION: sk_set 1655 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_SET_OF_X509_REVOKED 1661 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: sk_sort 1671 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_X509_REVOKED 1674 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_SET_OF_X509_ALGOR 1682 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_SET_OF_X509_CRL 1685 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_X509_ALGOR 1696 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_X509_CRL 1702 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_SET_OF_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO 1723 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_SET_OF_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO 1738 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO 1748 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO 1753 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS5_PBE_add 1775 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_write_bio_PKCS8 1776 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS8_fp 1777 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API PEM_read_bio_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO 1778 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: PEM_read_bio_P8_PRIV_KEY_INFO 1778 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: d2i_PKCS8_bio 1779 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp 1780 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API PEM_write_bio_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO 1781 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: PEM_write_bio_P8_PRIV_KEY_INFO 1781 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: PEM_read_PKCS8 1782 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION: d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio 1783 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO d2i_PKCS8_fp 1784 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API PEM_write_PKCS8 1785 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION: PEM_read_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO 1786 EXIST:!VMS,!WIN16:FUNCTION: PEM_read_P8_PRIV_KEY_INFO 1786 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: PEM_read_bio_PKCS8 1787 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_write_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO 1788 EXIST:!VMS,!WIN16:FUNCTION: PEM_write_P8_PRIV_KEY_INFO 1788 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: PKCS5_PBE_keyivgen 1789 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS8_bio 1790 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp 1791 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio 1792 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO BIO_s_bio 1793 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS5_pbe2_set 1794 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1 1795 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen 1796 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey 1797 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey 1798 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_ctrl_get_read_request 1799 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_ctrl_pending 1800 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_ctrl_wpending 1801 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_new_bio_pair 1802 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_ctrl_get_write_guarantee 1803 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_num_locks 1804 EXIST::FUNCTION: CONF_load_bio 1805 EXIST::FUNCTION: CONF_load_fp 1806 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API i2d_ASN1_SET_OF_ASN1_OBJECT 1837 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_ASN1_OBJECT 1844 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_signatureVerify 1845 EXIST::FUNCTION: RSA_set_method 1846 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_get_method 1847 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_get_default_method 1848 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_check_key 1869 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA OBJ_obj2txt 1870 EXIST::FUNCTION: DSA_dup_DH 1871 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH,DSA X509_REQ_get_extensions 1872 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_set_extension_nids 1873 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_nwrite 1874 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_extension_nid 1875 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_nread 1876 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_get_extension_nids 1877 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_nwrite0 1878 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_add_extensions_nid 1879 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_nread0 1880 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_add_extensions 1881 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_new_mem_buf 1882 EXIST::FUNCTION: DH_set_ex_data 1883 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH DH_set_method 1884 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH DSA_OpenSSL 1885 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA DH_get_ex_data 1886 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH DH_get_ex_new_index 1887 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH DSA_new_method 1888 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA DH_new_method 1889 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH DH_OpenSSL 1890 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH DSA_get_ex_new_index 1891 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA DH_get_default_method 1892 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH DSA_set_ex_data 1893 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA DH_set_default_method 1894 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH DSA_get_ex_data 1895 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA X509V3_EXT_REQ_add_conf 1896 EXIST::FUNCTION: NETSCAPE_SPKI_print 1897 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP NETSCAPE_SPKI_set_pubkey 1898 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_encode 1899 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP NETSCAPE_SPKI_get_pubkey 1900 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP NETSCAPE_SPKI_b64_decode 1901 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP UTF8_putc 1902 EXIST::FUNCTION: UTF8_getc 1903 EXIST::FUNCTION: RSA_null_method 1904 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA ASN1_tag2str 1905 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_ctrl_reset_read_request 1906 EXIST::FUNCTION: DISPLAYTEXT_new 1907 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free 1908 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REVOKED_get_ext_d2i 1909 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_set_ex_data 1910 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_reject_set_bit_asc 1911 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt 1912 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID 1914 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_PURPOSE_get0 1915 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_read_X509_AUX 1917 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION: d2i_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS 1918 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_write_PUBKEY 1921 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION: ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_new 1925 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CERT_AUX_free 1926 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION 1927 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_trust_clear 1928 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_TRUST_add 1931 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_new 1932 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_alias_set1 1933 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING_free 1934 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA 1935 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA ASN1_BMPSTRING_new 1936 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_mbstring_copy 1937 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_UTF8STRING_new 1938 EXIST::FUNCTION: DSA_get_default_method 1941 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA i2d_ASN1_SET_OF_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION 1945 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_T61STRING_free 1946 EXIST::FUNCTION: DSA_set_method 1949 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA X509_get_ex_data 1950 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_STRING_type 1951 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_PURPOSE_get_by_sname 1952 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_TIME_free 1954 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp 1955 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_BIT_STRING_new 1957 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_get_ext_d2i 1958 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX 1959 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask_asc 1960 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: ASN1_STRING_set_def_mask_asc 1960 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: PEM_write_bio_RSA_PUBKEY 1961 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA ASN1_INTEGER_cmp 1963 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_fp 1964 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API,RSA X509_trust_set_bit_asc 1967 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_write_bio_DSA_PUBKEY 1968 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA X509_STORE_CTX_free 1969 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA 1970 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_fp 1971 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA,FP_API X509_load_cert_crl_file 1972 EXIST::FUNCTION:STDIO ASN1_TIME_new 1973 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_RSA_PUBKEY 1974 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit 1976 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_read_RSA_PUBKEY 1977 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:RSA d2i_X509_AUX 1980 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_DSA_PUBKEY 1981 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA X509_CERT_AUX_print 1982 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO PEM_read_DSA_PUBKEY 1984 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:DSA i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_bio 1985 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO,RSA ASN1_BIT_STRING_num_asc 1986 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PUBKEY 1987 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_UTCTIME_free 1988 EXIST::FUNCTION: DSA_set_default_method 1989 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id 1990 EXIST::FUNCTION: ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_free 1994 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY 1995 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_STRING_set_by_NID 1996 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_PURPOSE_get_id 1997 EXIST::FUNCTION: DISPLAYTEXT_free 1998 EXIST::FUNCTION: OTHERNAME_new 1999 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CERT_AUX_new 2001 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_TRUST_cleanup 2007 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_add_entry_by_OBJ 2008 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i 2009 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_PURPOSE_get0_name 2011 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_read_PUBKEY 2012 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION: i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_bio 2014 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO,DSA i2d_OTHERNAME 2015 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free 2016 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_asc 2017 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_get_ex_new_index 2019 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_STRING_TABLE_cleanup 2020 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_TRUST_get_by_id 2021 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_PURPOSE_get_trust 2022 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_STRING_length 2023 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION 2024 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING_new 2025 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_get_d2i 2026 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_ENUMERATED_free 2027 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_X509_CERT_AUX 2028 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust 2030 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_STRING_set_default_mask 2032 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_new 2033 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA 2034 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA DIRECTORYSTRING_free 2038 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_write_X509_AUX 2039 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION: ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set 2040 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_DSA_PUBKEY_fp 2041 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA,FP_API d2i_RSA_PUBKEY 2044 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA X509_TRUST_get0_name 2046 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_TRUST_get0 2047 EXIST::FUNCTION: AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS_free 2048 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_IA5STRING_new 2049 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_DSA_PUBKEY 2050 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA X509_check_purpose 2051 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_ENUMERATED_new 2052 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_bio 2053 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO,RSA d2i_PUBKEY 2054 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_TRUST_get_trust 2055 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_TRUST_get_flags 2056 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_BMPSTRING_free 2057 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_T61STRING_new 2058 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_UTCTIME_new 2060 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS 2062 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA 2063 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose 2064 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_IA5STRING_free 2065 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_write_bio_X509_AUX 2066 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_PURPOSE_get_count 2067 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_add_info 2068 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_ENTRY_create_by_txt 2071 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_STRING_get_default_mask 2072 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_alias_get0 2074 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_STRING_data 2075 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION 2077 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_trust_set_bit 2078 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_BIT_STRING_free 2080 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_read_bio_RSA_PUBKEY 2081 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA X509_add1_reject_object 2082 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_check_trust 2083 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_read_bio_DSA_PUBKEY 2088 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA X509_PURPOSE_add 2090 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_STRING_TABLE_get 2091 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_UTF8STRING_free 2092 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_DSA_PUBKEY_bio 2093 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO,DSA PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY 2095 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:RSA d2i_OTHERNAME 2096 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_reject_set_bit 2098 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY 2101 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:DSA X509_PURPOSE_get0_sname 2105 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_set1_DH 2107 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup 2108 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_BIT_STRING_set 2109 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_TRUST_get_count 2110 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_INTEGER_free 2111 EXIST::FUNCTION: OTHERNAME_free 2112 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_fp 2113 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API,RSA ASN1_INTEGER_dup 2114 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_X509_CERT_AUX 2115 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_write_bio_PUBKEY 2117 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_free 2118 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_PURPOSE_cleanup 2119 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_mbstring_ncopy 2123 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new 2126 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_get1_DH 2128 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new 2130 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_INTEGER_new 2131 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_X509_AUX 2132 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_BIT_STRING_name_print 2134 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO X509_cmp 2135 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_STRING_length_set 2136 EXIST::FUNCTION: DIRECTORYSTRING_new 2137 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_add1_trust_object 2140 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_newpass 2141 EXIST::FUNCTION: SMIME_write_PKCS7 2142 EXIST::FUNCTION: SMIME_read_PKCS7 2143 EXIST::FUNCTION: DES_set_key_checked 2144 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES PKCS7_verify 2145 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_encrypt 2146 EXIST::FUNCTION: DES_set_key_unchecked 2147 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES SMIME_crlf_copy 2148 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING 2149 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_get0_signers 2150 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_decrypt 2151 EXIST::FUNCTION: SMIME_text 2152 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_simple_smimecap 2153 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_get_smimecap 2154 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_sign 2155 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_add_attrib_smimecap 2156 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_dbg_set_options 2157 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_remove_all_info 2158 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_get_mem_debug_functions 2159 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_is_mem_check_on 2160 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions 2161 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_pop_info 2162 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_push_info_ 2163 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_options 2164 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid 2165 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid 2166 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivKey_nid 2166 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio 2167 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_NULL_free 2168 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_NULL 2169 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_NULL_new 2170 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_bio 2171 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp 2172 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_NULL 2173 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_fp 2174 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PKCS8PrivateKey_fp 2175 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS8PrivateKey_nid_bio 2176 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS8PrivateKeyInfo_fp 2177 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API i2d_PKCS8PrivateKeyInfo_bio 2178 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO PEM_cb 2179 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PrivateKey_fp 2180 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API d2i_PrivateKey_bio 2181 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO d2i_PrivateKey_fp 2182 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API i2d_PrivateKey_bio 2183 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO X509_reject_clear 2184 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_TRUST_set_default 2185 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_AutoPrivateKey 2186 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_type 2187 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_data 2188 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509at_get_attr 2189 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509at_get_attr_count 2190 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_NID 2191 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_ATTRIBUTE_set1_object 2192 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_ATTRIBUTE_count 2193 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_OBJ 2194 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_object 2195 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509at_get_attr_by_NID 2196 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509at_add1_attr 2197 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_ATTRIBUTE_get0_data 2198 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509at_delete_attr 2199 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509at_get_attr_by_OBJ 2200 EXIST::FUNCTION: RAND_add 2201 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_number_written 2202 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_number_read 2203 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain 2204 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_load_RAND_strings 2205 EXIST::FUNCTION: RAND_pseudo_bytes 2206 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_get_attr_by_NID 2207 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_get_attr 2208 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_NID 2209 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_get_attr_by_OBJ 2210 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509at_add1_attr_by_NID 2211 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_OBJ 2212 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_get_attr_count 2213 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_add1_attr 2214 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_delete_attr 2215 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509at_add1_attr_by_OBJ 2216 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_add1_attr_by_txt 2217 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_ATTRIBUTE_create_by_txt 2218 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509at_add1_attr_by_txt 2219 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_pseudo_rand 2239 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_is_prime_fasttest 2240 EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATED BN_CTX_end 2241 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_CTX_start 2242 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_CTX_get 2243 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY2PKCS8_broken 2244 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_STRING_TABLE_add 2245 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_dbg_get_options 2246 EXIST::FUNCTION: AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS_new 2247 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_get_mem_debug_options 2248 EXIST::FUNCTION: DES_crypt 2249 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES PEM_write_bio_X509_REQ_NEW 2250 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_write_X509_REQ_NEW 2251 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION: BIO_callback_ctrl 2252 EXIST::FUNCTION: RAND_egd 2253 EXIST::FUNCTION: RAND_status 2254 EXIST::FUNCTION: bn_dump1 2255 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: DES_check_key_parity 2256 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES lh_num_items 2257 EXIST::FUNCTION: RAND_event 2258 EXIST:WIN32:FUNCTION: DSO_new 2259 EXIST::FUNCTION: DSO_new_method 2260 EXIST::FUNCTION: DSO_free 2261 EXIST::FUNCTION: DSO_flags 2262 EXIST::FUNCTION: DSO_up 2263 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: DSO_set_default_method 2264 EXIST::FUNCTION: DSO_get_default_method 2265 EXIST::FUNCTION: DSO_get_method 2266 EXIST::FUNCTION: DSO_set_method 2267 EXIST::FUNCTION: DSO_load 2268 EXIST::FUNCTION: DSO_bind_var 2269 EXIST::FUNCTION: DSO_METHOD_null 2270 EXIST::FUNCTION: DSO_METHOD_openssl 2271 EXIST::FUNCTION: DSO_METHOD_dlfcn 2272 EXIST::FUNCTION: DSO_METHOD_win32 2273 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_load_DSO_strings 2274 EXIST::FUNCTION: DSO_METHOD_dl 2275 EXIST::FUNCTION: NCONF_load 2276 EXIST::FUNCTION: NCONF_load_fp 2278 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API NCONF_new 2279 EXIST::FUNCTION: NCONF_get_string 2280 EXIST::FUNCTION: NCONF_free 2281 EXIST::FUNCTION: NCONF_get_number 2282 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: CONF_dump_fp 2283 EXIST::FUNCTION: NCONF_load_bio 2284 EXIST::FUNCTION: NCONF_dump_fp 2285 EXIST::FUNCTION: NCONF_get_section 2286 EXIST::FUNCTION: NCONF_dump_bio 2287 EXIST::FUNCTION: CONF_dump_bio 2288 EXIST::FUNCTION: NCONF_free_data 2289 EXIST::FUNCTION: CONF_set_default_method 2290 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_error_string_n 2291 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_snprintf 2292 EXIST::FUNCTION: DSO_ctrl 2293 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_SET_OF_ASN1_INTEGER 2317 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_SET_OF_PKCS12_SAFEBAG 2320 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_SET_OF_PKCS7 2328 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_vfree 2334 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_ASN1_INTEGER 2339 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_PKCS12_SAFEBAG 2341 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_UTCTIME_get 2350 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_digest 2362 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP X509_CRL_digest 2391 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP d2i_ASN1_SET_OF_PKCS7 2397 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: +X509_ALGOR_cmp 2398 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length 2399 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl 2400 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_mod_exp_mont_word 2401 EXIST::FUNCTION: RAND_egd_bytes 2402 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_get1_email 2403 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_get1_email 2404 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_email_free 2405 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_RSA_NET 2406 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC4,RSA d2i_RSA_NET_2 2407 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_RSA_NET 2408 EXIST::FUNCTION:RC4,RSA DSO_bind_func 2409 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_get_new_dynlockid 2410 EXIST::FUNCTION: sk_new_null 2411 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_set_dynlock_destroy_callback 2412 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: CRYPTO_set_dynlock_destroy_cb 2412 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid 2413 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_set_dynlock_size 2414 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_set_dynlock_create_callback 2415 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: CRYPTO_set_dynlock_create_cb 2415 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: CRYPTO_set_dynlock_lock_callback 2416 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: CRYPTO_set_dynlock_lock_cb 2416 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: CRYPTO_get_dynlock_lock_callback 2417 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: CRYPTO_get_dynlock_lock_cb 2417 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: CRYPTO_get_dynlock_destroy_callback 2418 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: CRYPTO_get_dynlock_destroy_cb 2418 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: CRYPTO_get_dynlock_value 2419 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_get_dynlock_create_callback 2420 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: CRYPTO_get_dynlock_create_cb 2420 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: c2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING 2421 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2c_ASN1_BIT_STRING 2422 EXIST::FUNCTION: RAND_poll 2423 EXIST::FUNCTION: c2i_ASN1_INTEGER 2424 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2c_ASN1_INTEGER 2425 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_dump_indent 2426 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_parse_dump 2427 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO c2i_ASN1_OBJECT 2428 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_NAME_print_ex_fp 2429 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API ASN1_STRING_print_ex_fp 2430 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API X509_NAME_print_ex 2431 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO ASN1_STRING_print_ex 2432 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO MD4 2433 EXIST::FUNCTION:MD4 MD4_Transform 2434 EXIST::FUNCTION:MD4 MD4_Final 2435 EXIST::FUNCTION:MD4 MD4_Update 2436 EXIST::FUNCTION:MD4 MD4_Init 2437 EXIST::FUNCTION:MD4 EVP_md4 2438 EXIST::FUNCTION:MD4 i2d_PUBKEY_bio 2439 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO i2d_PUBKEY_fp 2440 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API d2i_PUBKEY_bio 2441 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8 2442 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_vprintf 2443 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_vsnprintf 2444 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PUBKEY_fp 2445 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API X509_cmp_time 2446 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_set_time 2447 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer 2448 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_OBJECT_retrieve_match 2449 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_OBJECT_idx_by_subject 2450 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags 2451 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack 2452 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_time_adj 2453 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_check_issued 2454 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t 2455 EXIST::FUNCTION: DES_set_weak_key_flag 2456 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: DES_check_key 2457 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: DES_rw_mode 2458 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: RSA_PKCS1_RSAref 2459 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: X509_keyid_set1 2460 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_next 2461 EXIST::FUNCTION: DSO_METHOD_vms 2462 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_f_linebuffer 2463 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: BN_bntest_rand 2464 EXIST::FUNCTION: OPENSSL_issetugid 2465 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_rand_range 2466 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_load_ENGINE_strings 2467 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_set_DSA 2468 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_get_finish_function 2469 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_get_default_RSA 2470 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_get_BN_mod_exp 2471 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: DSA_get_default_openssl_method 2472 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_set_DH 2473 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_set_def_BN_mod_exp_crt 2474 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_set_default_BN_mod_exp_crt 2474 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_init 2475 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE DH_get_default_openssl_method 2476 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: RSA_set_default_openssl_method 2477 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_finish 2478 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_load_public_key 2479 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_get_DH 2480 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_ctrl 2481 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_get_init_function 2482 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_set_init_function 2483 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_set_default_DSA 2484 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_get_name 2485 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_get_last 2486 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_get_prev 2487 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_get_default_DH 2488 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_get_RSA 2489 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_set_default 2490 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_get_RAND 2491 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_get_first 2492 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_by_id 2493 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_set_finish_function 2494 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_get_def_BN_mod_exp_crt 2495 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_get_default_BN_mod_exp_crt 2495 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: RSA_get_default_openssl_method 2496 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_set_RSA 2497 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_load_private_key 2498 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_set_default_RAND 2499 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_set_BN_mod_exp 2500 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_remove 2501 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_free 2502 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_get_BN_mod_exp_crt 2503 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_get_next 2504 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_set_name 2505 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_get_default_DSA 2506 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_set_default_BN_mod_exp 2507 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_set_default_RSA 2508 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_get_default_RAND 2509 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_get_default_BN_mod_exp 2510 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_set_RAND 2511 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_set_id 2512 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_set_BN_mod_exp_crt 2513 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_set_default_DH 2514 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_new 2515 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_get_id 2516 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE DSA_set_default_openssl_method 2517 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_add 2518 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE DH_set_default_openssl_method 2519 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_get_DSA 2520 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_get_ctrl_function 2521 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_set_ctrl_function 2522 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE BN_pseudo_rand_range 2523 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb 2524 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_load_COMP_strings 2525 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_item_decrypt_d2i 2526 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_UTF8STRING_it 2527 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ASN1_UTF8STRING_it 2527 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: ENGINE_unregister_ciphers 2528 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_get_ciphers 2529 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE d2i_OCSP_BASICRESP 2530 EXIST::FUNCTION: KRB5_CHECKSUM_it 2531 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: KRB5_CHECKSUM_it 2531 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: EC_POINT_add 2532 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC ASN1_item_ex_i2d 2533 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_CERTID_it 2534 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: OCSP_CERTID_it 2534 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: d2i_OCSP_RESPBYTES 2535 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_add1_i2d 2536 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_ENVELOPE_it 2537 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PKCS7_ENVELOPE_it 2537 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: UI_add_input_boolean 2538 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_unregister_RSA 2539 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE X509V3_EXT_nconf 2540 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_GENERALSTRING_free 2541 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_OCSP_CERTSTATUS 2542 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber 2543 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_print_ex 2544 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO OCSP_ONEREQ_get1_ext_d2i 2545 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_register_all_RAND 2546 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_load_dynamic 2547 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE PBKDF2PARAM_it 2548 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PBKDF2PARAM_it 2548 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_new 2549 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_clear_free 2550 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC OCSP_sendreq_bio 2551 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_item_digest 2552 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP OCSP_BASICRESP_delete_ext 2553 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_SIGNATURE_it 2554 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: OCSP_SIGNATURE_it 2554 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: X509_CRL_it 2555 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: X509_CRL_it 2555 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: OCSP_BASICRESP_add_ext 2556 EXIST::FUNCTION: KRB5_ENCKEY_it 2557 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: KRB5_ENCKEY_it 2557 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: UI_method_set_closer 2558 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_set_purpose 2559 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_GENERALSTRING 2560 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_response_status 2561 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_OCSP_SERVICELOC 2562 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_get_digest_engine 2563 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp 2564 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_by_OBJ 2565 EXIST::FUNCTION: _ossl_old_des_random_key 2566 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES ASN1_T61STRING_it 2567 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ASN1_T61STRING_it 2567 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_method_of 2568 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC i2d_KRB5_APREQ 2569 EXIST::FUNCTION: _ossl_old_des_encrypt 2570 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES ASN1_PRINTABLE_new 2571 EXIST::FUNCTION: HMAC_Init_ex 2572 EXIST::FUNCTION:HMAC d2i_KRB5_AUTHENT 2573 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_archive_cutoff_new 2574 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp 2575 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:EC EC_POINT_set_Jproj_coords_GFp 2575 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:EC _ossl_old_des_is_weak_key 2576 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_by_OBJ 2577 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_POINT_oct2point 2578 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_count 2579 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_ctrl 2580 EXIST::FUNCTION: _shadow_DES_rw_mode 2581 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:DES _shadow_DES_rw_mode 2581 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:DES asn1_do_adb 2582 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_template_i2d 2583 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_register_DH 2584 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE UI_construct_prompt 2585 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_set_trust 2586 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_dup_input_string 2587 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_KRB5_APREQ 2588 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex 2589 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_request_is_signed 2590 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_OCSP_REQINFO 2591 EXIST::FUNCTION: KRB5_ENCKEY_free 2592 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_resp_get0 2593 EXIST::FUNCTION: GENERAL_NAME_it 2594 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: GENERAL_NAME_it 2594 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_it 2595 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_it 2595 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: X509_STORE_set_flags 2596 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp 2597 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:EC EC_POINT_set_compr_coords_GFp 2597 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:EC OCSP_response_status_str 2598 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_OCSP_REVOKEDINFO 2599 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_basic_add1_cert 2600 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_get_implementation 2601 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_CipherFinal_ex 2602 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_CERTSTATUS_new 2603 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data 2604 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_resp_find 2605 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_nnmod 2606 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CRL_sort 2607 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate 2608 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_register_RAND 2609 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE OCSP_SERVICELOC_new 2610 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp 2611 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:EC EC_POINT_set_affine_coords_GFp 2611 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:EC _ossl_old_des_options 2612 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES SXNET_it 2613 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: SXNET_it 2613 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: UI_dup_input_boolean 2614 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_add_CSPName_asc 2615 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_POINT_is_at_infinity 2616 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC ENGINE_load_cryptodev 2617 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE DSO_convert_filename 2618 EXIST::FUNCTION: POLICYQUALINFO_it 2619 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: POLICYQUALINFO_it 2619 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: ENGINE_register_ciphers 2620 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE BN_mod_lshift_quick 2621 EXIST::FUNCTION: DSO_set_filename 2622 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_item_free 2623 EXIST::FUNCTION: KRB5_TKTBODY_free 2624 EXIST::FUNCTION: AUTHORITY_KEYID_it 2625 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: AUTHORITY_KEYID_it 2625 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: KRB5_APREQBODY_new 2626 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_EXT_REQ_add_nconf 2627 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string 2628 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE i2d_OCSP_RESPDATA 2629 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_MD_CTX_init 2630 EXIST::FUNCTION: EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_free 2631 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN_it 2632 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN_it 2632 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: UI_add_error_string 2633 EXIST::FUNCTION: KRB5_CHECKSUM_free 2634 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext 2635 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_load_ubsec 2636 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE,STATIC_ENGINE ENGINE_register_all_digests 2637 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD_it 2638 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD_it 2638 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: PKCS12_unpack_authsafes 2639 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_item_unpack 2640 EXIST::FUNCTION: NETSCAPE_SPKAC_it 2641 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: NETSCAPE_SPKAC_it 2641 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: X509_REVOKED_it 2642 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: X509_REVOKED_it 2642 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: ASN1_STRING_encode 2643 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_aes_128_ecb 2644 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES KRB5_AUTHENT_free 2645 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_by_critical 2646 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_by_crit 2646 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: OCSP_cert_status_str 2647 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_OCSP_REQUEST 2648 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_dup_info_string 2649 EXIST::FUNCTION: _ossl_old_des_xwhite_in2out 2650 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_it 2651 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PKCS12_it 2651 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_by_critical 2652 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_by_crit 2652 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: OCSP_CERTSTATUS_free 2653 EXIST::FUNCTION: _ossl_old_des_crypt 2654 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES ASN1_item_i2d 2655 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_DecryptFinal_ex 2656 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_load_openssl 2657 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_get_cmd_defns 2658 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function 2659 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_set_load_privkey_fn 2659 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:ENGINE EVP_EncryptFinal_ex 2660 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_set_default_digests 2661 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr 2662 EXIST::FUNCTION: asn1_ex_i2c 2663 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_register_RSA 2664 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_unregister_DSA 2665 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE _ossl_old_des_key_sched 2666 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES X509_EXTENSION_it 2667 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: X509_EXTENSION_it 2667 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: i2d_KRB5_AUTHENT 2668 EXIST::FUNCTION: SXNETID_it 2669 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: SXNETID_it 2669 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: d2i_OCSP_SINGLERESP 2670 EXIST::FUNCTION: EDIPARTYNAME_new 2671 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_certbag2x509 2672 EXIST::FUNCTION: _ossl_old_des_ofb64_encrypt 2673 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES d2i_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE 2674 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_print_errors_cb 2675 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_set_ciphers 2676 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE d2i_KRB5_APREQBODY 2677 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_method_get_flusher 2678 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_PUBKEY_it 2679 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: X509_PUBKEY_it 2679 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: _ossl_old_des_enc_read 2680 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES PKCS7_ENCRYPT_it 2681 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PKCS7_ENCRYPT_it 2681 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE 2682 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_get_cofactor 2683 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC PKCS12_unpack_p7data 2684 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_KRB5_AUTHDATA 2685 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_copy_nonce 2686 EXIST::FUNCTION: KRB5_AUTHDATA_new 2687 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_RESPDATA_new 2688 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_GFp_mont_method 2689 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC OCSP_REVOKEDINFO_free 2690 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_get_ex_data 2691 EXIST::FUNCTION: KRB5_APREQBODY_free 2692 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_get0_generator 2693 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC UI_get_default_method 2694 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509V3_set_nconf 2695 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_item_i2d_encrypt 2696 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_add1_ext_i2d 2697 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_it 2698 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO_it 2698 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: KRB5_PRINCNAME_new 2699 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_SAFEBAG_it 2700 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PKCS12_SAFEBAG_it 2700 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_get_order 2701 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC d2i_OCSP_RESPID 2702 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_request_verify 2703 EXIST::FUNCTION: NCONF_get_number_e 2704 EXIST::FUNCTION: _ossl_old_des_decrypt3 2705 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES X509_signature_print 2706 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP OCSP_SINGLERESP_free 2707 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_load_builtin_engines 2708 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE i2d_OCSP_ONEREQ 2709 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_REQUEST_add_ext 2710 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_RESPBYTES_new 2711 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_MD_CTX_create 2712 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_resp_find_status 2713 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_ALGOR_it 2714 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: X509_ALGOR_it 2714 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: ASN1_TIME_it 2715 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ASN1_TIME_it 2715 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: OCSP_request_set1_name 2716 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext_count 2717 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_get0_result 2718 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_AUTHSAFES_it 2719 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PKCS12_AUTHSAFES_it 2719 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: EVP_aes_256_ecb 2720 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES PKCS12_pack_authsafes 2721 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_IA5STRING_it 2722 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ASN1_IA5STRING_it 2722 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: UI_get_input_flags 2723 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_set_generator 2724 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC _ossl_old_des_string_to_2keys 2725 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES OCSP_CERTID_free 2726 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CERT_AUX_it 2727 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: X509_CERT_AUX_it 2727 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: CERTIFICATEPOLICIES_it 2728 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: CERTIFICATEPOLICIES_it 2728 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: _ossl_old_des_ede3_cbc_encrypt 2729 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES RAND_set_rand_engine 2730 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE DSO_get_loaded_filename 2731 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_ATTRIBUTE_it 2732 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: X509_ATTRIBUTE_it 2732 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext_by_NID 2733 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_decrypt_skey 2734 EXIST::FUNCTION: KRB5_AUTHENT_it 2735 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: KRB5_AUTHENT_it 2735 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: UI_dup_error_string 2736 EXIST::FUNCTION: RSAPublicKey_it 2737 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:RSA RSAPublicKey_it 2737 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:RSA i2d_OCSP_REQUEST 2738 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_x509crl2certbag 2739 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_SERVICELOC_it 2740 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: OCSP_SERVICELOC_it 2740 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: ASN1_item_sign 2741 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP X509_CRL_set_issuer_name 2742 EXIST::FUNCTION: OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted 2743 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_OCSP_BASICRESP 2744 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_OCSP_RESPBYTES 2745 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_unpack_p7encdata 2746 EXIST::FUNCTION: HMAC_CTX_init 2747 EXIST::FUNCTION:HMAC ENGINE_get_digest 2748 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE OCSP_RESPONSE_print 2749 EXIST::FUNCTION: KRB5_TKTBODY_it 2750 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: KRB5_TKTBODY_it 2750 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_it 2751 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_it 2751 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_it 2752 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL_it 2752 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: PBE2PARAM_it 2753 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PBE2PARAM_it 2753 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: PKCS12_certbag2x509crl 2754 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_SIGNED_it 2755 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PKCS7_SIGNED_it 2755 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: ENGINE_get_cipher 2756 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE i2d_OCSP_CRLID 2757 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_SINGLERESP_new 2758 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_cmd_is_executable 2759 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE RSA_up_ref 2760 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA ASN1_GENERALSTRING_it 2761 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ASN1_GENERALSTRING_it 2761 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: ENGINE_register_DSA 2762 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE X509V3_EXT_add_nconf_sk 2763 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function 2764 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE PKCS8_decrypt 2765 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_bytes_read_bio 2766 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO DIRECTORYSTRING_it 2767 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: DIRECTORYSTRING_it 2767 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: d2i_OCSP_CRLID 2768 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_POINT_is_on_curve 2769 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC CRYPTO_set_locked_mem_ex_functions 2770 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: CRYPTO_set_locked_mem_ex_funcs 2770 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: d2i_KRB5_CHECKSUM 2771 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_item_dup 2772 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_it 2773 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: X509_it 2773 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: BN_mod_add 2774 EXIST::FUNCTION: KRB5_AUTHDATA_free 2775 EXIST::FUNCTION: _ossl_old_des_cbc_cksum 2776 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES ASN1_item_verify 2777 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP CRYPTO_set_mem_ex_functions 2778 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp 2779 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:EC EC_POINT_get_Jproj_coords_GFp 2779 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:EC ZLONG_it 2780 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ZLONG_it 2780 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: CRYPTO_get_locked_mem_ex_functions 2781 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: CRYPTO_get_locked_mem_ex_funcs 2781 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: ASN1_TIME_check 2782 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_get0_user_data 2783 EXIST::FUNCTION: HMAC_CTX_cleanup 2784 EXIST::FUNCTION:HMAC DSA_up_ref 2785 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA _ossl_old_des_ede3_cfb64_encrypt 2786 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:DES _ossl_odes_ede3_cfb64_encrypt 2786 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:DES ASN1_BMPSTRING_it 2787 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ASN1_BMPSTRING_it 2787 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: ASN1_tag2bit 2788 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_method_set_flusher 2789 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_ocspid_print 2790 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO KRB5_ENCDATA_it 2791 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: KRB5_ENCDATA_it 2791 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: ENGINE_get_load_pubkey_function 2792 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE UI_add_user_data 2793 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_REQUEST_delete_ext 2794 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_get_method 2795 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_ONEREQ_free 2796 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING_it 2797 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING_it 2797 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate 2798 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_REQUEST_it 2799 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: OCSP_REQUEST_it 2799 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: OCSP_BASICRESP_it 2800 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: OCSP_BASICRESP_it 2800 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: AES_ecb_encrypt 2801 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES BN_mod_sqr 2802 EXIST::FUNCTION: NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE_it 2803 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE_it 2803 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: GENERAL_NAMES_it 2804 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: GENERAL_NAMES_it 2804 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS_it 2805 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS_it 2805 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: ASN1_FBOOLEAN_it 2806 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ASN1_FBOOLEAN_it 2806 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: UI_set_ex_data 2807 EXIST::FUNCTION: _ossl_old_des_string_to_key 2808 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES ENGINE_register_all_RSA 2809 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE d2i_KRB5_PRINCNAME 2810 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_RESPBYTES_it 2811 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: OCSP_RESPBYTES_it 2811 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: X509_CINF_it 2812 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: X509_CINF_it 2812 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: ENGINE_unregister_digests 2813 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE d2i_EDIPARTYNAME 2814 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_OCSP_SERVICELOC 2815 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_get_digests 2816 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE _ossl_old_des_set_odd_parity 2817 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES OCSP_RESPDATA_free 2818 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_KRB5_TICKET 2819 EXIST::FUNCTION: OTHERNAME_it 2820 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: OTHERNAME_it 2820 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup 2821 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_GENERALSTRING 2822 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CRL_set_version 2823 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_mod_sub 2824 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_by_NID 2825 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_get_ex_new_index 2826 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE OCSP_REQUEST_free 2827 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_REQUEST_add1_ext_i2d 2828 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_VAL_it 2829 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: X509_VAL_it 2829 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: EC_POINTs_make_affine 2830 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC EC_POINT_mul 2831 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC X509V3_EXT_add_nconf 2832 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_TRUST_set 2833 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d 2834 EXIST::FUNCTION: _ossl_old_des_fcrypt 2835 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DISPLAYTEXT_it 2836 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: DISPLAYTEXT_it 2836 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate 2837 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_BASICRESP_free 2838 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_BASICRESP_add1_ext_i2d 2839 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_KRB5_AUTHENTBODY 2840 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_set_ex_data_implementation 2841 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: CRYPTO_set_ex_data_impl 2841 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: KRB5_ENCDATA_new 2842 EXIST::FUNCTION: DSO_up_ref 2843 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_crl_reason_str 2844 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_get0_result_string 2845 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_GENERALSTRING_new 2846 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_SIG_it 2847 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: X509_SIG_it 2847 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: ERR_set_implementation 2848 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_load_EC_strings 2849 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC UI_get0_action_string 2850 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext 2851 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_POINT_method_of 2852 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC i2d_KRB5_APREQBODY 2853 EXIST::FUNCTION: _ossl_old_des_ecb3_encrypt 2854 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES CRYPTO_get_mem_ex_functions 2855 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_get_ex_data 2856 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE UI_destroy_method 2857 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_item_i2d_bio 2858 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext_by_OBJ 2859 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_primitive_new 2860 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_PRINTABLE_it 2861 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ASN1_PRINTABLE_it 2861 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: EVP_aes_192_ecb 2862 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES OCSP_SIGNATURE_new 2863 EXIST::FUNCTION: LONG_it 2864 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: LONG_it 2864 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_it 2865 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ASN1_VISIBLESTRING_it 2865 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: OCSP_SINGLERESP_add1_ext_i2d 2866 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_OCSP_CERTID 2867 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_item_d2i_fp 2868 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API CRL_DIST_POINTS_it 2869 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: CRL_DIST_POINTS_it 2869 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: GENERAL_NAME_print 2870 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_SINGLERESP_delete_ext 2871 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_SAFEBAGS_it 2872 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PKCS12_SAFEBAGS_it 2872 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: d2i_OCSP_SIGNATURE 2873 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_request_add1_nonce 2874 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_set_cmd_defns 2875 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE OCSP_SERVICELOC_free 2876 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_free 2877 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC ASN1_BIT_STRING_it 2878 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ASN1_BIT_STRING_it 2878 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: X509_REQ_it 2879 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: X509_REQ_it 2879 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: _ossl_old_des_cbc_encrypt 2880 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES ERR_unload_strings 2881 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE_it 2882 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE_it 2882 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: EDIPARTYNAME_free 2883 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_REQINFO_free 2884 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp 2885 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC OCSP_REQUEST_get1_ext_d2i 2886 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_item_pack_safebag 2887 EXIST::FUNCTION: asn1_ex_c2i 2888 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_register_digests 2889 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE i2d_OCSP_REVOKEDINFO 2890 EXIST::FUNCTION: asn1_enc_restore 2891 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_free 2892 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_new_method 2893 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_EncryptInit_ex 2894 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_pubkey_digest 2895 EXIST::FUNCTION:EVP EC_POINT_invert 2896 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC OCSP_basic_sign 2897 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_OCSP_RESPID 2898 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_check_nonce 2899 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_ctrl_cmd 2900 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE d2i_KRB5_ENCKEY 2901 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_parse_url 2902 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext 2903 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_CRLID_free 2904 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_BASICRESP_get1_ext_d2i 2905 EXIST::FUNCTION: RSAPrivateKey_it 2906 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:RSA RSAPrivateKey_it 2906 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:RSA ENGINE_register_all_DH 2907 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE i2d_EDIPARTYNAME 2908 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp 2909 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:EC EC_POINT_get_affine_coords_GFp 2909 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:EC OCSP_CRLID_new 2910 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_get_flags 2911 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE OCSP_ONEREQ_it 2912 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: OCSP_ONEREQ_it 2912 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: UI_process 2913 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_INTEGER_it 2914 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ASN1_INTEGER_it 2914 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: EVP_CipherInit_ex 2915 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_get_string_type 2916 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_unregister_DH 2917 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_register_all_DSA 2918 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE OCSP_ONEREQ_get_ext_by_critical 2919 EXIST::FUNCTION: bn_dup_expand 2920 EXIST::FUNCTION:DEPRECATED OCSP_cert_id_new 2921 EXIST::FUNCTION: BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_it 2922 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_it 2922 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: BN_mod_add_quick 2923 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_POINT_new 2924 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC EVP_MD_CTX_destroy 2925 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_RESPBYTES_free 2926 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_aes_128_cbc 2927 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES OCSP_SINGLERESP_get1_ext_d2i 2928 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_POINT_free 2929 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC DH_up_ref 2930 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH X509_NAME_ENTRY_it 2931 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: X509_NAME_ENTRY_it 2931 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: UI_get_ex_new_index 2932 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_mod_sub_quick 2933 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_ONEREQ_add_ext 2934 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_request_sign 2935 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_DigestFinal_ex 2936 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_set_digests 2937 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE OCSP_id_issuer_cmp 2938 EXIST::FUNCTION: OBJ_NAME_do_all 2939 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_POINTs_mul 2940 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC ENGINE_register_complete 2941 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE X509V3_EXT_nconf_nid 2942 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_SEQUENCE_it 2943 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ASN1_SEQUENCE_it 2943 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: UI_set_default_method 2944 EXIST::FUNCTION: RAND_query_egd_bytes 2945 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_method_get_writer 2946 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_OpenSSL 2947 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_def_callback 2948 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_cleanup 2949 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE DIST_POINT_it 2950 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: DIST_POINT_it 2950 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: OCSP_SINGLERESP_it 2951 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: OCSP_SINGLERESP_it 2951 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: d2i_KRB5_TKTBODY 2952 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_POINT_cmp 2953 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC OCSP_REVOKEDINFO_new 2954 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_OCSP_CERTSTATUS 2955 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_basic_add1_nonce 2956 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_item_ex_d2i 2957 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_mod_lshift1_quick 2958 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_set_method 2959 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_id_get0_info 2960 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_mod_sqrt 2961 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_copy 2962 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC KRB5_ENCDATA_free 2963 EXIST::FUNCTION: _ossl_old_des_cfb_encrypt 2964 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES OCSP_SINGLERESP_get_ext_by_OBJ 2965 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_cert_to_id 2966 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_RESPID_new 2967 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_RESPDATA_it 2968 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: OCSP_RESPDATA_it 2968 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: d2i_OCSP_RESPDATA 2969 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_register_all_complete 2970 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE OCSP_check_validity 2971 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_BAGS_it 2972 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PKCS12_BAGS_it 2972 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: OCSP_url_svcloc_new 2973 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_template_free 2974 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_SINGLERESP_add_ext 2975 EXIST::FUNCTION: KRB5_AUTHENTBODY_it 2976 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: KRB5_AUTHENTBODY_it 2976 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: X509_supported_extension 2977 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_KRB5_AUTHDATA 2978 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_method_get_opener 2979 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_set_ex_data 2980 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE OCSP_REQUEST_print 2981 EXIST::FUNCTION: CBIGNUM_it 2982 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: CBIGNUM_it 2982 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: KRB5_TICKET_new 2983 EXIST::FUNCTION: KRB5_APREQ_new 2984 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp 2985 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC KRB5_ENCKEY_new 2986 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_template_d2i 2987 EXIST::FUNCTION: _ossl_old_des_quad_cksum 2988 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES OCSP_single_get0_status 2989 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_swap 2990 EXIST::FUNCTION: POLICYINFO_it 2991 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: POLICYINFO_it 2991 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: ENGINE_set_destroy_function 2992 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE asn1_enc_free 2993 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_RESPID_it 2994 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: OCSP_RESPID_it 2994 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_new 2995 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC EVP_aes_256_cbc 2996 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES i2d_KRB5_PRINCNAME 2997 EXIST::FUNCTION: _ossl_old_des_encrypt2 2998 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES _ossl_old_des_encrypt3 2999 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_it 3000 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_it 3000 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: OCSP_REQINFO_it 3001 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: OCSP_REQINFO_it 3001 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: PBEPARAM_it 3002 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PBEPARAM_it 3002 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: KRB5_AUTHENTBODY_new 3003 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CRL_add0_revoked 3004 EXIST::FUNCTION: EDIPARTYNAME_it 3005 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: EDIPARTYNAME_it 3005 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: NETSCAPE_SPKI_it 3006 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: NETSCAPE_SPKI_it 3006 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: UI_get0_test_string 3007 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_get_cipher_engine 3008 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_register_all_ciphers 3009 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE EC_POINT_copy 3010 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC BN_kronecker 3011 EXIST::FUNCTION: _ossl_old_des_ede3_ofb64_encrypt 3012 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:DES _ossl_odes_ede3_ofb64_encrypt 3012 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:DES UI_method_get_reader 3013 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_count 3014 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_ENUMERATED_it 3015 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ASN1_ENUMERATED_it 3015 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: UI_set_result 3016 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_KRB5_TICKET 3017 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_print_ex_fp 3018 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding 3019 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE 3020 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_UTCTIME_it 3021 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ASN1_UTCTIME_it 3021 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: _ossl_old_des_enc_write 3022 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES OCSP_RESPONSE_new 3023 EXIST::FUNCTION: AES_set_encrypt_key 3024 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES OCSP_resp_count 3025 EXIST::FUNCTION: KRB5_CHECKSUM_new 3026 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_load_cswift 3027 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE,STATIC_ENGINE OCSP_onereq_get0_id 3028 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_set_default_ciphers 3029 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE NOTICEREF_it 3030 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: NOTICEREF_it 3030 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: X509V3_EXT_CRL_add_nconf 3031 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_REVOKEDINFO_it 3032 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: OCSP_REVOKEDINFO_it 3032 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: AES_encrypt 3033 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES OCSP_REQUEST_new 3034 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_ANY_it 3035 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ASN1_ANY_it 3035 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: CRYPTO_ex_data_new_class 3036 EXIST::FUNCTION: _ossl_old_des_ncbc_encrypt 3037 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES i2d_KRB5_TKTBODY 3038 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_POINT_clear_free 3039 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC AES_decrypt 3040 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES asn1_enc_init 3041 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_get_result_maxsize 3042 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_CERTID_new 3043 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_unregister_RAND 3044 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE UI_method_get_closer 3045 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_KRB5_ENCDATA 3046 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_request_onereq_count 3047 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_basic_verify 3048 EXIST::FUNCTION: KRB5_AUTHENTBODY_free 3049 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_item_d2i 3050 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_primitive_free 3051 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE 3052 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_OCSP_SIGNATURE 3053 EXIST::FUNCTION: asn1_enc_save 3054 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_load_nuron 3055 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE,STATIC_ENGINE _ossl_old_des_pcbc_encrypt 3056 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES PKCS12_MAC_DATA_it 3057 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PKCS12_MAC_DATA_it 3057 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: OCSP_accept_responses_new 3058 EXIST::FUNCTION: asn1_do_lock 3059 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY_it 3060 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY_it 3060 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: KRB5_APREQBODY_it 3061 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: KRB5_APREQBODY_it 3061 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: i2d_OCSP_SINGLERESP 3062 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_item_ex_new 3063 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_add_verify_string 3064 EXIST::FUNCTION: _ossl_old_des_set_key 3065 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES KRB5_PRINCNAME_it 3066 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: KRB5_PRINCNAME_it 3066 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: EVP_DecryptInit_ex 3067 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_OCSP_CERTID 3068 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_item_d2i_bio 3069 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO EC_POINT_dbl 3070 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC asn1_get_choice_selector 3071 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_KRB5_CHECKSUM 3072 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_set_table_flags 3073 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE AES_options 3074 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES ENGINE_load_chil 3075 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE,STATIC_ENGINE OCSP_id_cmp 3076 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_BASICRESP_new 3077 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_by_NID 3078 EXIST::FUNCTION: KRB5_APREQ_it 3079 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: KRB5_APREQ_it 3079 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: ENGINE_get_destroy_function 3080 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE CONF_set_nconf 3081 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_PRINTABLE_free 3082 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext_by_NID 3083 EXIST::FUNCTION: DIST_POINT_NAME_it 3084 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: DIST_POINT_NAME_it 3084 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: X509V3_extensions_print 3085 EXIST::FUNCTION: _ossl_old_des_cfb64_encrypt 3086 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES X509_REVOKED_add1_ext_i2d 3087 EXIST::FUNCTION: _ossl_old_des_ofb_encrypt 3088 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES KRB5_TKTBODY_new 3089 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_OCTET_STRING_it 3090 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ASN1_OCTET_STRING_it 3090 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: ERR_load_UI_strings 3091 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_KRB5_ENCKEY 3092 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_template_new 3093 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_SIGNATURE_free 3094 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_item_i2d_fp 3095 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API KRB5_PRINCNAME_free 3096 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_it 3097 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_it 3097 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_it 3098 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE_it 3098 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: EC_GFp_simple_method 3099 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC EC_GROUP_precompute_mult 3100 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC OCSP_request_onereq_get0 3101 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_method_set_writer 3102 EXIST::FUNCTION: KRB5_AUTHENT_new 3103 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CRL_INFO_it 3104 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: X509_CRL_INFO_it 3104 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: DSO_set_name_converter 3105 EXIST::FUNCTION: AES_set_decrypt_key 3106 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES PKCS7_DIGEST_it 3107 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PKCS7_DIGEST_it 3107 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: PKCS12_x5092certbag 3108 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_DigestInit_ex 3109 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2a_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION 3110 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_RESPONSE_it 3111 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: OCSP_RESPONSE_it 3111 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT_it 3112 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT_it 3112 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: OCSP_request_add0_id 3113 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_POINT_make_affine 3114 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC DSO_get_filename 3115 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_CERTSTATUS_it 3116 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: OCSP_CERTSTATUS_it 3116 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: OCSP_request_add1_cert 3117 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_get0_output_string 3118 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_dup_verify_string 3119 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_mod_lshift 3120 EXIST::FUNCTION: KRB5_AUTHDATA_it 3121 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: KRB5_AUTHDATA_it 3121 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: asn1_set_choice_selector 3122 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_basic_add1_status 3123 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_RESPID_free 3124 EXIST::FUNCTION: asn1_get_field_ptr 3125 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_add_input_string 3126 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_CRLID_it 3127 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: OCSP_CRLID_it 3127 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: i2d_KRB5_AUTHENTBODY 3128 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_count 3129 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_load_atalla 3130 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE,STATIC_ENGINE X509_NAME_it 3131 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: X509_NAME_it 3131 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: USERNOTICE_it 3132 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: USERNOTICE_it 3132 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: OCSP_REQINFO_new 3133 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_BASICRESP_get_ext 3134 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_get_ex_data_implementation 3135 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: CRYPTO_get_ex_data_impl 3135 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: ASN1_item_pack 3136 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_KRB5_ENCDATA 3137 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_PURPOSE_set 3138 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_INFO_it 3139 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: X509_REQ_INFO_it 3139 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: UI_method_set_opener 3140 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_item_ex_free 3141 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_BOOLEAN_it 3142 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ASN1_BOOLEAN_it 3142 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: ENGINE_get_table_flags 3143 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE UI_create_method 3144 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_ONEREQ_add1_ext_i2d 3145 EXIST::FUNCTION: _shadow_DES_check_key 3146 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:DES _shadow_DES_check_key 3146 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:DES d2i_OCSP_REQINFO 3147 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_add_info_string 3148 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_get_result_minsize 3149 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_NULL_it 3150 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ASN1_NULL_it 3150 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: BN_mod_lshift1 3151 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_OCSP_ONEREQ 3152 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_ONEREQ_new 3153 EXIST::FUNCTION: KRB5_TICKET_it 3154 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: KRB5_TICKET_it 3154 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: EVP_aes_192_cbc 3155 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES KRB5_TICKET_free 3156 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_new 3157 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_response_create 3158 EXIST::FUNCTION: _ossl_old_des_xcbc_encrypt 3159 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES PKCS7_it 3160 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PKCS7_it 3160 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_by_critical 3161 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: OCSP_REQUEST_get_ext_by_crit 3161 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: ENGINE_set_flags 3162 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE _ossl_old_des_ecb_encrypt 3163 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES OCSP_response_get1_basic 3164 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_Digest 3165 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_ONEREQ_delete_ext 3166 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_TBOOLEAN_it 3167 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ASN1_TBOOLEAN_it 3167 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: ASN1_item_new 3168 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_TIME_to_generalizedtime 3169 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIGNUM_it 3170 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: BIGNUM_it 3170 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: AES_cbc_encrypt 3171 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES ENGINE_get_load_privkey_function 3172 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_get_load_privkey_fn 3172 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:ENGINE OCSP_RESPONSE_free 3173 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_method_set_reader 3174 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASN1_T61STRING 3175 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_POINT_set_to_infinity 3176 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC ERR_load_OCSP_strings 3177 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_POINT_point2oct 3178 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC KRB5_APREQ_free 3179 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_OBJECT_it 3180 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ASN1_OBJECT_it 3180 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: OCSP_crlID_new 3181 EXIST:!OS2,!VMS,!WIN16:FUNCTION: OCSP_crlID2_new 3181 EXIST:OS2,VMS,WIN16:FUNCTION: CONF_modules_load_file 3182 EXIST::FUNCTION: CONF_imodule_set_usr_data 3183 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_set_default_string 3184 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE CONF_module_get_usr_data 3185 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_add_oid_module 3186 EXIST::FUNCTION: CONF_modules_finish 3187 EXIST::FUNCTION: OPENSSL_config 3188 EXIST::FUNCTION: CONF_modules_unload 3189 EXIST::FUNCTION: CONF_imodule_get_value 3190 EXIST::FUNCTION: CONF_module_set_usr_data 3191 EXIST::FUNCTION: CONF_parse_list 3192 EXIST::FUNCTION: CONF_module_add 3193 EXIST::FUNCTION: CONF_get1_default_config_file 3194 EXIST::FUNCTION: CONF_imodule_get_flags 3195 EXIST::FUNCTION: CONF_imodule_get_module 3196 EXIST::FUNCTION: CONF_modules_load 3197 EXIST::FUNCTION: CONF_imodule_get_name 3198 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_peek_top_error 3199 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: CONF_imodule_get_usr_data 3200 EXIST::FUNCTION: CONF_imodule_set_flags 3201 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_add_conf_module 3202 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ERR_peek_last_error_line 3203 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_peek_last_error_line_data 3204 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_peek_last_error 3205 EXIST::FUNCTION: DES_read_2passwords 3206 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES DES_read_password 3207 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES UI_UTIL_read_pw 3208 EXIST::FUNCTION: UI_UTIL_read_pw_string 3209 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_load_aep 3210 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE,STATIC_ENGINE ENGINE_load_sureware 3211 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE,STATIC_ENGINE OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_noconf 3212 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: OPENSSL_add_all_algo_noconf 3212 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_conf 3213 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: OPENSSL_add_all_algo_conf 3213 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules 3214 EXIST::FUNCTION: AES_ofb128_encrypt 3215 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES AES_ctr128_encrypt 3216 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES AES_cfb128_encrypt 3217 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES ENGINE_load_4758cca 3218 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE,STATIC_ENGINE _ossl_096_des_random_seed 3219 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES EVP_aes_256_ofb 3220 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES EVP_aes_192_ofb 3221 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES EVP_aes_128_cfb128 3222 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES EVP_aes_256_cfb128 3223 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES EVP_aes_128_ofb 3224 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES EVP_aes_192_cfb128 3225 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES CONF_modules_free 3226 EXIST::FUNCTION: NCONF_default 3227 EXIST::FUNCTION: OPENSSL_no_config 3228 EXIST::FUNCTION: NCONF_WIN32 3229 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_new 3230 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_des_ede_ecb 3231 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES i2d_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING 3232 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_free 3233 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_it 3234 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_it 3234 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: d2i_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING 3235 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_des_ede3_ecb 3236 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES X509_REQ_print_ex 3237 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO ENGINE_up_ref 3238 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE BUF_MEM_grow_clean 3239 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_realloc_clean 3240 EXIST::FUNCTION: BUF_strlcat 3241 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_indent 3242 EXIST::FUNCTION: BUF_strlcpy 3243 EXIST::FUNCTION: OpenSSLDie 3244 EXIST::FUNCTION: OPENSSL_cleanse 3245 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_setup_bsd_cryptodev 3246 EXIST:__FreeBSD__:FUNCTION:ENGINE ERR_release_err_state_table 3247 EXIST::FUNCTION:LHASH EVP_aes_128_cfb8 3248 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES FIPS_corrupt_rsa 3249 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: FIPS_selftest_des 3250 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: EVP_aes_128_cfb1 3251 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES EVP_aes_192_cfb8 3252 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES FIPS_mode_set 3253 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: FIPS_selftest_dsa 3254 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: EVP_aes_256_cfb8 3255 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES FIPS_allow_md5 3256 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: DES_ede3_cfb_encrypt 3257 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES EVP_des_ede3_cfb8 3258 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES FIPS_rand_seeded 3259 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: AES_cfbr_encrypt_block 3260 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES AES_cfb8_encrypt 3261 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES FIPS_rand_seed 3262 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: FIPS_corrupt_des 3263 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: EVP_aes_192_cfb1 3264 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES FIPS_selftest_aes 3265 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: FIPS_set_prng_key 3266 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_des_cfb8 3267 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES FIPS_corrupt_dsa 3268 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: FIPS_test_mode 3269 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: FIPS_rand_method 3270 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: EVP_aes_256_cfb1 3271 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES ERR_load_FIPS_strings 3272 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: FIPS_corrupt_aes 3273 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: FIPS_selftest_sha1 3274 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: FIPS_selftest_rsa 3275 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: FIPS_corrupt_sha1 3276 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: EVP_des_cfb1 3277 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES FIPS_dsa_check 3278 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: AES_cfb1_encrypt 3279 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES EVP_des_ede3_cfb1 3280 EXIST::FUNCTION:DES FIPS_rand_check 3281 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: FIPS_md5_allowed 3282 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: FIPS_mode 3283 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: FIPS_selftest_failed 3284 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: sk_is_sorted 3285 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_check_ca 3286 EXIST::FUNCTION: private_idea_set_encrypt_key 3287 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:IDEA HMAC_CTX_set_flags 3288 EXIST::FUNCTION:HMAC private_SHA_Init 3289 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:SHA,SHA0 private_CAST_set_key 3290 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:CAST private_RIPEMD160_Init 3291 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:RIPEMD private_RC5_32_set_key 3292 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:RC5 private_MD5_Init 3293 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:MD5 private_RC4_set_key 3294 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:RC4 private_MDC2_Init 3295 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:MDC2 private_RC2_set_key 3296 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:RC2 private_MD4_Init 3297 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:MD4 private_BF_set_key 3298 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:BF private_MD2_Init 3299 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:MD2 d2i_PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION 3300 EXIST::FUNCTION: PROXY_POLICY_it 3301 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PROXY_POLICY_it 3301 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: i2d_PROXY_POLICY 3302 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION 3303 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_PROXY_POLICY 3304 EXIST::FUNCTION: PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_new 3305 EXIST::FUNCTION: PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_free 3306 EXIST::FUNCTION: PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_it 3307 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION_it 3307 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: PROXY_POLICY_free 3308 EXIST::FUNCTION: PROXY_POLICY_new 3309 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked 3310 EXIST::FUNCTION: FIPS_selftest_rng 3311 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: EVP_sha384 3312 EXIST:!VMSVAX:FUNCTION:SHA,SHA512 EVP_sha512 3313 EXIST:!VMSVAX:FUNCTION:SHA,SHA512 EVP_sha224 3314 EXIST::FUNCTION:SHA,SHA256 EVP_sha256 3315 EXIST::FUNCTION:SHA,SHA256 FIPS_selftest_hmac 3316 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: FIPS_corrupt_rng 3317 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime 3318 EXIST::FUNCTION: RSA_X931_hash_id 3319 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_padding_check_X931 3320 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS 3321 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_padding_add_X931 3322 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS 3323 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA PKCS1_MGF1 3324 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA BN_X931_generate_Xpq 3325 EXIST::FUNCTION: RSA_X931_generate_key 3326 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: BN_X931_derive_prime 3327 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: BN_X931_generate_prime 3328 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: RSA_X931_derive 3329 NOEXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_new_dgram 3330 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_get0_nist_prime_384 3331 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_set_mark 3332 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls 3333 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_set_STORE 3334 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_register_ECDSA 3335 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE STORE_method_set_list_start_function 3336 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_meth_set_list_start_fn 3336 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: BN_BLINDING_invert_ex 3337 EXIST::FUNCTION: NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free 3338 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_ATTR_INFO_set_number 3339 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_BLINDING_get_thread_id 3340 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param 3341 EXIST::FUNCTION: POLICY_MAPPING_it 3342 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: POLICY_MAPPING_it 3342 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: STORE_parse_attrs_start 3343 EXIST::FUNCTION: POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_free 3344 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_NID 3345 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_nist_mod_192 3346 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis 3347 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC STORE_set_method 3348 EXIST::FUNCTION: GENERAL_SUBTREE_free 3349 EXIST::FUNCTION: NAME_CONSTRAINTS_it 3350 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: NAME_CONSTRAINTS_it 3350 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: ECDH_get_default_method 3351 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDH PKCS12_add_safe 3352 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name 3353 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC STORE_method_get_update_store_function 3354 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_meth_get_update_store_fn 3354 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: ENGINE_register_ECDH 3355 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE SHA512_Update 3356 EXIST:!VMSVAX:FUNCTION:SHA,SHA512 i2d_ECPrivateKey 3357 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC BN_get0_nist_prime_192 3358 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_modify_certificate 3359 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m 3360 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:EC EC_POINT_set_affine_coords_GF2m 3360 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:EC BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr 3361 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_ATTR_INFO_modify_number 3362 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_keyid_get0 3363 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_load_gmp 3364 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE,GMP,STATIC_ENGINE pitem_new 3365 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr 3366 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_list_public_key_endp 3367 EXIST::FUNCTION: o2i_ECPublicKey 3368 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC EC_KEY_copy 3369 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC BIO_dump_fp 3370 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API X509_policy_node_get0_parent 3371 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_check_discriminant 3372 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC i2o_ECPublicKey 3373 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC EC_KEY_precompute_mult 3374 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC a2i_IPADDRESS 3375 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_method_set_initialise_function 3376 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_meth_set_initialise_fn 3376 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth 3377 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit 3378 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_POINT_point2bn 3379 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC STORE_ATTR_INFO_set_dn 3380 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_policy_tree_get0_policies 3381 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m 3382 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC STORE_destroy_method 3383 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_unregister_STORE 3384 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY 3385 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC STORE_ATTR_INFO_get0_number 3386 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_get_default_ECDH 3387 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE EC_KEY_get_conv_form 3388 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF_it 3389 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: ASN1_OCTET_STRING_NDEF_it 3389 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: STORE_delete_public_key 3390 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_get_public_key 3391 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_modify_arbitrary 3392 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_get_static_state 3393 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE pqueue_iterator 3394 EXIST::FUNCTION: ECDSA_SIG_new 3395 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDSA OPENSSL_DIR_end 3396 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_GF2m_mod_sqr 3397 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_POINT_bn2point 3398 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth 3399 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag 3400 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC STORE_get_method 3401 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_KEY_get_key_method_data 3402 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC ECDSA_sign_ex 3403 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDSA STORE_parse_attrs_end 3404 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form 3405 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:EC EC_GROUP_get_point_conv_form 3405 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:EC STORE_method_set_store_function 3406 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_ATTR_INFO_in 3407 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_read_bio_ECPKParameters 3408 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis 3409 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_txt 3410 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_BLINDING_set_flags 3411 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies 3412 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_name 3413 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose 3414 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_get_number 3415 EXIST::FUNCTION: ECDSA_sign_setup 3416 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDSA BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr 3417 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_KEY_up_ref 3418 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC POLICY_MAPPING_free 3419 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_GF2m_mod_div 3420 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags 3421 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_KEY_free 3422 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC STORE_method_set_list_next_function 3423 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_meth_set_list_next_fn 3423 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey 3424 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC d2i_EC_PUBKEY 3425 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC STORE_method_get_generate_function 3426 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_meth_get_generate_fn 3426 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_method_set_list_end_function 3427 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_meth_set_list_end_fn 3427 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: pqueue_print 3428 EXIST:!VMSVAX:FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult 3429 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC EC_KEY_print_fp 3430 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,FP_API BN_GF2m_mod_arr 3431 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_write_bio_X509_CERT_PAIR 3432 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_cmp 3433 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_policy_level_node_count 3434 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_new_engine 3435 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_list_public_key_start 3436 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new 3437 EXIST::FUNCTION: ECDH_get_ex_data 3438 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDH EVP_PKEY_get_attr 3439 EXIST::FUNCTION: ECDSA_do_sign 3440 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDSA ENGINE_unregister_ECDH 3441 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ECDH_OpenSSL 3442 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDH EC_KEY_set_conv_form 3443 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC EC_POINT_dup 3444 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC GENERAL_SUBTREE_new 3445 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_list_crl_endp 3446 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_get_builtin_curves 3447 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC X509_policy_node_get0_qualifiers 3448 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: X509_pcy_node_get0_qualifiers 3448 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_list_crl_end 3449 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY 3450 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr 3451 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ECPrivateKey_bio 3452 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO,EC ECPKParameters_print_fp 3453 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,FP_API pqueue_find 3454 EXIST::FUNCTION: ECDSA_SIG_free 3455 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDSA PEM_write_bio_ECPKParameters 3456 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC STORE_method_set_ctrl_function 3457 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_list_public_key_end 3458 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_KEY_set_private_key 3459 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC pqueue_peek 3460 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_get_arbitrary 3461 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_store_crl 3462 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_policy_node_get0_policy 3463 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_add_safes 3464 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_BLINDING_convert_ex 3465 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_policy_tree_free 3466 EXIST::FUNCTION: OPENSSL_ia32cap_loc 3467 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_GF2m_poly2arr 3468 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_ctrl 3469 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_ATTR_INFO_compare 3470 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_get0_nist_prime_224 3471 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ECParameters 3472 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC i2d_ECPKParameters 3473 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC BN_GENCB_call 3474 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ECPKParameters 3475 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC STORE_method_set_generate_function 3476 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_meth_set_generate_fn 3476 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: ENGINE_set_ECDH 3477 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE NAME_CONSTRAINTS_new 3478 EXIST::FUNCTION: SHA256_Init 3479 EXIST::FUNCTION:SHA,SHA256 EC_KEY_get0_public_key 3480 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC PEM_write_bio_EC_PUBKEY 3481 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC STORE_ATTR_INFO_set_cstr 3482 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_list_crl_next 3483 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_ATTR_INFO_in_range 3484 EXIST::FUNCTION: ECParameters_print 3485 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO,EC STORE_method_set_delete_function 3486 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_meth_set_delete_fn 3486 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_list_certificate_next 3487 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_generate_nconf 3488 EXIST::FUNCTION: BUF_memdup 3489 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_GF2m_mod_mul 3490 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_method_get_list_next_function 3491 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_meth_get_list_next_fn 3491 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_ATTR_INFO_get0_dn 3492 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_list_private_key_next 3493 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_set_seed 3494 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust 3495 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_ATTR_INFO_free 3496 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_get_private_key 3497 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_get_attr_count 3498 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_ATTR_INFO_new 3499 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m 3500 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC STORE_method_set_revoke_function 3501 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_meth_set_revoke_fn 3501 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_store_number 3502 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_is_prime_ex 3503 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_revoke_public_key 3504 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param 3505 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_delete_arbitrary 3506 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_read_X509_CERT_PAIR 3507 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION: X509_STORE_set_depth 3508 EXIST::FUNCTION: ECDSA_get_ex_data 3509 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDSA SHA224 3510 EXIST::FUNCTION:SHA,SHA256 BIO_dump_indent_fp 3511 EXIST::FUNCTION:FP_API EC_KEY_set_group 3512 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC BUF_strndup 3513 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_list_certificate_start 3514 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_GF2m_mod 3515 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_REQ_check_private_key 3516 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_get_seed_len 3517 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC ERR_load_STORE_strings 3518 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_read_bio_EC_PUBKEY 3519 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC STORE_list_private_key_end 3520 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_EC_PUBKEY 3521 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC ECDSA_get_default_method 3522 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDSA ASN1_put_eoc 3523 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy 3524 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_get_expl_policy 3524 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_table_cleanup 3525 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_modify_private_key 3526 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free 3527 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_METHOD_get_field_type 3528 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC EC_GFp_nist_method 3529 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC STORE_method_set_modify_function 3530 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_meth_set_modify_fn 3530 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_parse_attrs_next 3531 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_load_padlock 3532 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE EC_GROUP_set_curve_name 3533 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC X509_CERT_PAIR_it 3534 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: X509_CERT_PAIR_it 3534 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: STORE_method_get_revoke_function 3535 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_meth_get_revoke_fn 3535 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_method_set_get_function 3536 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_modify_number 3537 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_method_get_store_function 3538 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_store_private_key 3539 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr 3540 EXIST::FUNCTION: RSA_setup_blinding 3541 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA BIO_s_datagram 3542 EXIST::FUNCTION:DGRAM STORE_Memory 3543 EXIST::FUNCTION: sk_find_ex 3544 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m 3545 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC ENGINE_set_default_ECDSA 3546 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_new 3547 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt 3548 EXIST::FUNCTION: ECDH_set_default_method 3549 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDH EC_KEY_generate_key 3550 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC SHA384_Update 3551 EXIST:!VMSVAX:FUNCTION:SHA,SHA512 BN_GF2m_arr2poly 3552 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_method_get_get_function 3553 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_method_set_cleanup_function 3554 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_meth_set_cleanup_fn 3554 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_check 3555 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC d2i_ECPrivateKey_bio 3556 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO,EC EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data 3557 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC STORE_method_get_lock_store_function 3558 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_meth_get_lock_store_fn 3558 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth 3559 EXIST::FUNCTION: SHA224_Final 3560 EXIST::FUNCTION:SHA,SHA256 STORE_method_set_update_store_function 3561 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_meth_set_update_store_fn 3561 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: SHA224_Update 3562 EXIST::FUNCTION:SHA,SHA256 d2i_ECPrivateKey 3563 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC ASN1_item_ndef_i2d 3564 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_delete_private_key 3565 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_pop_to_mark 3566 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_register_all_STORE 3567 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE X509_policy_level_get0_node 3568 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_PKCS7_NDEF 3569 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_get_degree 3570 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC ASN1_generate_v3 3571 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_ATTR_INFO_modify_cstr 3572 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_policy_tree_level_count 3573 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_GF2m_add 3574 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_KEY_get0_group 3575 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC STORE_generate_crl 3576 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_store_public_key 3577 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_CERT_PAIR_free 3578 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_revoke_private_key 3579 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_nist_mod_224 3580 EXIST::FUNCTION: SHA512_Final 3581 EXIST:!VMSVAX:FUNCTION:SHA,SHA512 STORE_ATTR_INFO_modify_dn 3582 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_method_get_initialise_function 3583 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_meth_get_initialise_fn 3583 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_delete_number 3584 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_EC_PUBKEY_bio 3585 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO,EC BIO_dgram_non_fatal_error 3586 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag 3587 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC STORE_ATTR_INFO_in_ex 3588 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_list_crl_start 3589 EXIST::FUNCTION: ECDH_get_ex_new_index 3590 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDH STORE_method_get_modify_function 3591 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_meth_get_modify_fn 3591 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: v2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING 3592 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_store_certificate 3593 EXIST::FUNCTION: OBJ_bsearch_ex 3594 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_set_default 3595 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_ATTR_INFO_set_sha1str 3596 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_GF2m_mod_inv 3597 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_GF2m_mod_exp 3598 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_modify_public_key 3599 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_method_get_list_start_function 3600 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_meth_get_list_start_fn 3600 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_get0_seed 3601 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC STORE_store_arbitrary 3602 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_method_set_unlock_store_function 3603 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_meth_set_unlock_store_fn 3603 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: BN_GF2m_mod_div_arr 3604 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_set_ECDSA 3605 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE STORE_create_method 3606 EXIST::FUNCTION: ECPKParameters_print 3607 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO,EC EC_KEY_get0_private_key 3608 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY 3609 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:EC X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1 3610 EXIST::FUNCTION: ECDH_set_method 3611 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDH v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex 3612 EXIST::FUNCTION: ECDH_set_ex_data 3613 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDH STORE_generate_key 3614 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_nist_mod_521 3615 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_policy_tree_get0_level 3616 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form 3617 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:EC EC_GROUP_set_point_conv_form 3617 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:EC PEM_read_EC_PUBKEY 3618 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:EC i2d_ECDSA_SIG 3619 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDSA ECDSA_OpenSSL 3620 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDSA STORE_delete_crl 3621 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_KEY_get_enc_flags 3622 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC ASN1_const_check_infinite_end 3623 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_delete_attr 3624 EXIST::FUNCTION: ECDSA_set_default_method 3625 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDSA EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m 3626 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:EC EC_POINT_set_compr_coords_GF2m 3626 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:EC EC_GROUP_cmp 3627 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC STORE_revoke_certificate 3628 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_get0_nist_prime_256 3629 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_method_get_delete_function 3630 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_meth_get_delete_fn 3630 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: SHA224_Init 3631 EXIST::FUNCTION:SHA,SHA256 PEM_read_ECPrivateKey 3632 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:EC SHA512_Init 3633 EXIST:!VMSVAX:FUNCTION:SHA,SHA512 STORE_parse_attrs_endp 3634 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_set_negative 3635 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_load_ECDSA_strings 3636 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDSA EC_GROUP_get_basis_type 3637 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC STORE_list_public_key_next 3638 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2v_ASN1_BIT_STRING 3639 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_OBJECT_free 3640 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_nist_mod_384 3641 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_X509_CERT_PAIR 3642 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_write_ECPKParameters 3643 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:EC ECDH_compute_key 3644 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDH STORE_ATTR_INFO_get0_sha1str 3645 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_register_all_ECDH 3646 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE pqueue_pop 3647 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_ATTR_INFO_get0_cstr 3648 EXIST::FUNCTION: POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_it 3649 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: POLICY_CONSTRAINTS_it 3649 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: STORE_get_ex_new_index 3650 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_get_attr_by_OBJ 3651 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy 3652 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad 3653 EXIST::FUNCTION: SHA256 3654 EXIST::FUNCTION:SHA,SHA256 i2d_ECPrivateKey_fp 3655 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,FP_API X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies 3656 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: X509_pcy_tree_get0_usr_policies 3656 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: OPENSSL_DIR_read 3657 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_register_all_ECDSA 3658 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup 3659 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m 3660 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:EC EC_POINT_get_affine_coords_GF2m 3660 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:EC EC_GROUP_dup 3661 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC ENGINE_get_default_ECDSA 3662 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE EC_KEY_new 3663 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC SHA256_Transform 3664 EXIST::FUNCTION:SHA,SHA256 EC_KEY_set_enc_flags 3665 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC ECDSA_verify 3666 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDSA EC_POINT_point2hex 3667 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC ENGINE_get_STORE 3668 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE SHA512 3669 EXIST:!VMSVAX:FUNCTION:SHA,SHA512 STORE_get_certificate 3670 EXIST::FUNCTION: ECDSA_do_sign_ex 3671 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDSA ECDSA_do_verify 3672 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDSA d2i_ECPrivateKey_fp 3673 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,FP_API STORE_delete_certificate 3674 EXIST::FUNCTION: SHA512_Transform 3675 EXIST:!VMSVAX:FUNCTION:SHA,SHA512 X509_STORE_set1_param 3676 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_method_get_ctrl_function 3677 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_free 3678 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_write_ECPrivateKey 3679 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:EC STORE_method_get_unlock_store_function 3680 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_meth_get_unlock_store_fn 3680 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_get_ex_data 3681 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_KEY_set_public_key 3682 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC PEM_read_ECPKParameters 3683 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:EC X509_CERT_PAIR_new 3684 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_register_STORE 3685 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE RSA_generate_key_ex 3686 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA DSA_generate_parameters_ex 3687 EXIST::FUNCTION:DSA ECParameters_print_fp 3688 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,FP_API X509V3_NAME_from_section 3689 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_add1_attr 3690 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_modify_crl 3691 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_list_private_key_start 3692 EXIST::FUNCTION: POLICY_MAPPINGS_it 3693 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: POLICY_MAPPINGS_it 3693 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: GENERAL_SUBTREE_it 3694 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: GENERAL_SUBTREE_it 3694 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_get_curve_name 3695 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC PEM_write_X509_CERT_PAIR 3696 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION: BIO_dump_indent_cb 3697 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_X509_CERT_PAIR 3698 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_list_private_key_endp 3699 EXIST::FUNCTION: asn1_const_Finish 3700 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_EC_PUBKEY_fp 3701 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,FP_API BN_nist_mod_256 3702 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_table 3703 EXIST::FUNCTION: pqueue_free 3704 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_BLINDING_create_param 3705 EXIST::FUNCTION: ECDSA_size 3706 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDSA d2i_EC_PUBKEY_bio 3707 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO,EC BN_get0_nist_prime_521 3708 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_ATTR_INFO_modify_sha1str 3709 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_generate_prime_ex 3710 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name 3711 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC SHA256_Final 3712 EXIST::FUNCTION:SHA,SHA256 DH_generate_parameters_ex 3713 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH PEM_read_bio_ECPrivateKey 3714 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC STORE_method_get_cleanup_function 3715 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_meth_get_cleanup_fn 3715 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: ENGINE_get_ECDH 3716 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE d2i_ECDSA_SIG 3717 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDSA BN_is_prime_fasttest_ex 3718 EXIST::FUNCTION: ECDSA_sign 3719 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDSA X509_policy_check 3720 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_get_attr_by_NID 3721 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_set_ex_data 3722 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_get_ECDSA 3723 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE EVP_ecdsa 3724 EXIST::FUNCTION:SHA BN_BLINDING_get_flags 3725 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_add_cert 3726 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_OBJECT_new 3727 EXIST::FUNCTION: ERR_load_ECDH_strings 3728 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDH EC_KEY_dup 3729 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key 3730 EXIST::FUNCTION: ECDSA_set_method 3731 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDSA a2i_IPADDRESS_NC 3732 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ECParameters 3733 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC STORE_list_certificate_end 3734 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_get_crl 3735 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_POLICY_NODE_print 3736 EXIST::FUNCTION: SHA384_Init 3737 EXIST:!VMSVAX:FUNCTION:SHA,SHA512 EC_GF2m_simple_method 3738 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC ECDSA_set_ex_data 3739 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDSA SHA384_Final 3740 EXIST:!VMSVAX:FUNCTION:SHA,SHA512 PKCS7_set_digest 3741 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_KEY_print 3742 EXIST::FUNCTION:BIO,EC STORE_method_set_lock_store_function 3743 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_meth_set_lock_store_fn 3743 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: ECDSA_get_ex_new_index 3744 EXIST::FUNCTION:ECDSA SHA384 3745 EXIST:!VMSVAX:FUNCTION:SHA,SHA512 POLICY_MAPPING_new 3746 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_list_certificate_endp 3747 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree 3748 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag 3749 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC EC_KEY_check_key 3750 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC d2i_EC_PUBKEY_fp 3751 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC,FP_API PKCS7_set0_type_other 3752 EXIST::FUNCTION: PEM_read_bio_X509_CERT_PAIR 3753 EXIST::FUNCTION: pqueue_next 3754 EXIST::FUNCTION: STORE_method_get_list_end_function 3755 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: STORE_meth_get_list_end_fn 3755 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: EVP_PKEY_add1_attr_by_OBJ 3756 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time 3757 EXIST::FUNCTION: pqueue_new 3758 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_set_default_ECDH 3759 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE STORE_new_method 3760 EXIST::FUNCTION: PKCS12_add_key 3761 EXIST::FUNCTION: DSO_merge 3762 EXIST::FUNCTION: EC_POINT_hex2point 3763 EXIST::FUNCTION:EC BIO_dump_cb 3764 EXIST::FUNCTION: SHA256_Update 3765 EXIST::FUNCTION:SHA,SHA256 pqueue_insert 3766 EXIST::FUNCTION: pitem_free 3767 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_GF2m_mod_inv_arr 3768 EXIST::FUNCTION: ENGINE_unregister_ECDSA 3769 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE BN_BLINDING_set_thread_id 3770 EXIST::FUNCTION: get_rfc3526_prime_8192 3771 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_clear_flags 3772 EXIST::FUNCTION: get_rfc2409_prime_1024 3773 EXIST::FUNCTION: DH_check_pub_key 3774 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH get_rfc3526_prime_2048 3775 EXIST::FUNCTION: get_rfc3526_prime_6144 3776 EXIST::FUNCTION: get_rfc3526_prime_1536 3777 EXIST::FUNCTION: get_rfc3526_prime_3072 3778 EXIST::FUNCTION: get_rfc3526_prime_4096 3779 EXIST::FUNCTION: get_rfc2409_prime_768 3780 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_flags 3781 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new 3782 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free 3783 EXIST::FUNCTION: Camellia_cbc_encrypt 3784 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA Camellia_cfb128_encrypt 3785 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA Camellia_cfb1_encrypt 3786 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA Camellia_cfb8_encrypt 3787 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA Camellia_ctr128_encrypt 3788 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA Camellia_cfbr_encrypt_block 3789 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA Camellia_decrypt 3790 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA Camellia_ecb_encrypt 3791 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA Camellia_encrypt 3792 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA Camellia_ofb128_encrypt 3793 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA Camellia_set_key 3794 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA EVP_camellia_128_cbc 3795 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA EVP_camellia_128_cfb128 3796 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA EVP_camellia_128_cfb1 3797 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA EVP_camellia_128_cfb8 3798 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA EVP_camellia_128_ecb 3799 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA EVP_camellia_128_ofb 3800 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA EVP_camellia_192_cbc 3801 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA EVP_camellia_192_cfb128 3802 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA EVP_camellia_192_cfb1 3803 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA EVP_camellia_192_cfb8 3804 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA EVP_camellia_192_ecb 3805 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA EVP_camellia_192_ofb 3806 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA EVP_camellia_256_cbc 3807 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA EVP_camellia_256_cfb128 3808 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA EVP_camellia_256_cfb1 3809 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA EVP_camellia_256_cfb8 3810 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA EVP_camellia_256_ecb 3811 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA EVP_camellia_256_ofb 3812 EXIST::FUNCTION:CAMELLIA a2i_ipadd 3813 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASIdentifiers_free 3814 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 i2d_ASIdOrRange 3815 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 EVP_CIPHER_block_size 3816 EXIST::FUNCTION: v3_asid_is_canonical 3817 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 IPAddressChoice_free 3818 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data 3819 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_set_callback_arg 3820 EXIST::FUNCTION: v3_addr_add_prefix 3821 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 IPAddressOrRange_it 3822 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:RFC3779 IPAddressOrRange_it 3822 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:RFC3779 BIO_set_flags 3823 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASIdentifiers_it 3824 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:RFC3779 ASIdentifiers_it 3824 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:RFC3779 v3_addr_get_range 3825 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 BIO_method_type 3826 EXIST::FUNCTION: v3_addr_inherits 3827 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 IPAddressChoice_it 3828 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:RFC3779 IPAddressChoice_it 3828 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:RFC3779 AES_ige_encrypt 3829 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES v3_addr_add_range 3830 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid 3831 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASRange 3832 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 v3_addr_add_inherit 3833 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 v3_asid_add_id_or_range 3834 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 v3_addr_validate_resource_set 3835 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 EVP_CIPHER_iv_length 3836 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_MD_type 3837 EXIST::FUNCTION: v3_asid_canonize 3838 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 IPAddressRange_free 3839 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 v3_asid_add_inherit 3840 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length 3841 EXIST::FUNCTION: IPAddressRange_new 3842 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 ASIdOrRange_new 3843 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 EVP_MD_size 3844 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags 3845 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_clear_flags 3846 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASRange 3847 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 IPAddressRange_it 3848 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:RFC3779 IPAddressRange_it 3848 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:RFC3779 IPAddressChoice_new 3849 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 ASIdentifierChoice_new 3850 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 ASRange_free 3851 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 EVP_MD_pkey_type 3852 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_MD_CTX_clear_flags 3853 EXIST::FUNCTION: IPAddressFamily_free 3854 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 i2d_IPAddressFamily 3855 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 IPAddressOrRange_new 3856 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 EVP_CIPHER_flags 3857 EXIST::FUNCTION: v3_asid_validate_resource_set 3858 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 d2i_IPAddressRange 3859 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 AES_bi_ige_encrypt 3860 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES BIO_get_callback 3861 EXIST::FUNCTION: IPAddressOrRange_free 3862 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 v3_addr_subset 3863 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 d2i_IPAddressFamily 3864 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 v3_asid_subset 3865 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 BIO_test_flags 3866 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_ASIdentifierChoice 3867 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 ASRange_it 3868 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:RFC3779 ASRange_it 3868 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:RFC3779 d2i_ASIdentifiers 3869 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 ASRange_new 3870 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 d2i_IPAddressChoice 3871 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 v3_addr_get_afi 3872 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 EVP_CIPHER_key_length 3873 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_Cipher 3874 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_IPAddressOrRange 3875 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 ASIdOrRange_it 3876 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:RFC3779 ASIdOrRange_it 3876 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:RFC3779 EVP_CIPHER_nid 3877 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_IPAddressChoice 3878 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size 3879 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASIdentifiers_new 3880 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 v3_addr_validate_path 3881 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 IPAddressFamily_new 3882 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags 3883 EXIST::FUNCTION: v3_addr_is_canonical 3884 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 i2d_IPAddressRange 3885 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 IPAddressFamily_it 3886 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:RFC3779 IPAddressFamily_it 3886 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:RFC3779 v3_asid_inherits 3887 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher 3888 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data 3889 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_MD_block_size 3890 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags 3891 EXIST::FUNCTION: v3_asid_validate_path 3892 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 d2i_IPAddressOrRange 3893 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 v3_addr_canonize 3894 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 ASIdentifierChoice_it 3895 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:RFC3779 ASIdentifierChoice_it 3895 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:RFC3779 EVP_MD_CTX_md 3896 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASIdentifierChoice 3897 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 BIO_method_name 3898 EXIST::FUNCTION: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length 3899 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASIdOrRange_free 3900 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 ASIdentifierChoice_free 3901 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 BIO_get_callback_arg 3902 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_set_callback 3903 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_ASIdOrRange 3904 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 i2d_ASIdentifiers 3905 EXIST::FUNCTION:RFC3779 CRYPTO_memcmp 3906 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_consttime_swap 3907 EXIST::FUNCTION: SEED_decrypt 3908 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED SEED_encrypt 3909 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED SEED_cbc_encrypt 3910 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED EVP_seed_ofb 3911 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED SEED_cfb128_encrypt 3912 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED SEED_ofb128_encrypt 3913 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED EVP_seed_cbc 3914 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED SEED_ecb_encrypt 3915 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED EVP_seed_ecb 3916 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED SEED_set_key 3917 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED EVP_seed_cfb128 3918 EXIST::FUNCTION:SEED X509_EXTENSIONS_it 3919 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: X509_EXTENSIONS_it 3919 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: X509_get1_ocsp 3920 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_REQ_CTX_free 3921 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS 3922 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_sendreq_nbio 3923 EXIST::FUNCTION: OCSP_sendreq_new 3924 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS 3925 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_ALGORS_it 3926 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE: X509_ALGORS_it 3926 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION: X509_ALGOR_get0 3927 EXIST::FUNCTION: X509_ALGOR_set0 3928 EXIST::FUNCTION: AES_unwrap_key 3929 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES AES_wrap_key 3930 EXIST::FUNCTION:AES X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ 3931 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_TYPE_set1 3932 EXIST::FUNCTION: ASN1_STRING_set0 3933 EXIST::FUNCTION: i2d_X509_ALGORS 3934 EXIST::FUNCTION: BIO_f_zlib 3935 EXIST:ZLIB:FUNCTION: COMP_zlib_cleanup 3936 EXIST::FUNCTION: d2i_X509_ALGORS 3937 EXIST::FUNCTION: CMS_ReceiptRequest_free 3938 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS PEM_write_CMS 3939 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:CMS CMS_add0_CertificateChoices 3940 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_unsigned_add1_attr_by_OBJ 3941 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS ERR_load_CMS_strings 3942 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_sign_receipt 3943 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS i2d_CMS_ContentInfo 3944 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_signed_delete_attr 3945 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS d2i_CMS_bio 3946 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_unsigned_get_attr_by_NID 3947 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_verify 3948 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS SMIME_read_CMS 3949 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_decrypt_set1_key 3950 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs 3951 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_add1_cert 3952 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_set_detached 3953 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_encrypt 3954 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_EnvelopedData_create 3955 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_uncompress 3956 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_add0_crl 3957 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content 3958 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_unsigned_get0_data_by_OBJ 3959 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS PEM_write_bio_CMS 3960 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_unsigned_get_attr 3961 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp 3962 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs 3963 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:CMS CMS_RecipInfo_ktri_get0_algs 3963 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:CMS CMS_ContentInfo_free 3964 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_final 3965 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_add_simple_smimecap 3966 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_SignerInfo_verify 3967 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_data 3968 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_ContentInfo_it 3969 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:CMS CMS_ContentInfo_it 3969 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:CMS d2i_CMS_ReceiptRequest 3970 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_compress 3971 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_digest_create 3972 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_SignerInfo_cert_cmp 3973 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_SignerInfo_sign 3974 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_data_create 3975 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS i2d_CMS_bio 3976 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_EncryptedData_set1_key 3977 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_decrypt 3978 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS int_smime_write_ASN1 3979 EXIST::FUNCTION: CMS_unsigned_delete_attr 3980 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_unsigned_get_attr_count 3981 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_add_smimecap 3982 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS PEM_read_CMS 3983 EXIST:!WIN16:FUNCTION:CMS CMS_signed_get_attr_by_OBJ 3984 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS d2i_CMS_ContentInfo 3985 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_add_standard_smimecap 3986 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_ContentInfo_new 3987 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_RecipientInfo_type 3988 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_get0_type 3989 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_is_detached 3990 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_sign 3991 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_signed_add1_attr 3992 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_unsigned_get_attr_by_OBJ 3993 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS SMIME_write_CMS 3994 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_EncryptedData_decrypt 3995 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_get0_RecipientInfos 3996 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_add0_RevocationInfoChoice 3997 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey 3998 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_SignerInfo_set1_signer_cert 3999 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_get0_signers 4000 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_ReceiptRequest_get0_values 4001 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_signed_get0_data_by_OBJ 4002 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_get0_SignerInfos 4003 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_add0_cert 4004 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_EncryptedData_encrypt 4005 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_digest_verify 4006 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_set1_signers_certs 4007 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_signed_get_attr 4008 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key 4009 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_SignedData_init 4010 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_get0_id 4011 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_verify_receipt 4012 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_ReceiptRequest_it 4013 EXIST:!EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:VARIABLE:CMS CMS_ReceiptRequest_it 4013 EXIST:EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION:FUNCTION:CMS PEM_read_bio_CMS 4014 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_get1_crls 4015 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_add0_recipient_key 4016 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS SMIME_read_ASN1 4017 EXIST::FUNCTION: CMS_ReceiptRequest_new 4018 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_get0_content 4019 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_get1_ReceiptRequest 4020 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_OBJ 4021 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_id_cmp 4022 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_add1_ReceiptRequest 4023 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_SignerInfo_get0_signer_id 4024 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_unsigned_add1_attr_by_NID 4025 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_unsigned_add1_attr 4026 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_signed_get_attr_by_NID 4027 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_get1_certs 4028 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_NID 4029 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_unsigned_add1_attr_by_txt 4030 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_dataFinal 4031 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_signer_id 4032 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:CMS CMS_RecipInfo_ktri_get0_sigr_id 4032 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:CMS i2d_CMS_ReceiptRequest 4033 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_add1_recipient_cert 4034 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_dataInit 4035 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_signed_add1_attr_by_txt 4036 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt 4037 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_signed_get_attr_count 4038 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_get0_eContentType 4039 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_set1_eContentType 4040 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_ReceiptRequest_create0 4041 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_add1_signer 4042 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey 4043 EXIST::FUNCTION:CMS ENGINE_set_load_ssl_client_cert_function 4044 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_set_ld_ssl_clnt_cert_fn 4044 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_get_ssl_client_cert_function 4045 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_get_ssl_client_cert_fn 4045 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert 4046 EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE ENGINE_load_capi 4047 EXIST:WIN32:FUNCTION:CAPIENG,ENGINE,STATIC_ENGINE OPENSSL_isservice 4048 EXIST::FUNCTION: FIPS_dsa_sig_decode 4049 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:DSA EVP_CIPHER_CTX_clear_flags 4050 EXIST::FUNCTION: FIPS_rand_status 4051 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: FIPS_rand_set_key 4052 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: CRYPTO_set_mem_info_functions 4053 EXIST::FUNCTION: RSA_X931_generate_key_ex 4054 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA int_ERR_set_state_func 4055 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: int_EVP_MD_set_engine_callbacks 4056 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:ENGINE int_CRYPTO_set_do_dynlock_callback 4057 EXIST:!VMS:FUNCTION: int_CRYPTO_set_do_dynlock_cb 4057 EXIST:VMS:FUNCTION: FIPS_rng_stick 4058 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags 4059 EXIST::FUNCTION: BN_X931_generate_prime_ex 4060 EXIST::FUNCTION: FIPS_selftest_check 4061 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: FIPS_rand_set_dt 4062 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: CRYPTO_dbg_pop_info 4063 EXIST::FUNCTION: FIPS_dsa_free 4064 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:DSA RSA_X931_derive_ex 4065 EXIST::FUNCTION:RSA FIPS_rsa_new 4066 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:RSA FIPS_rand_bytes 4067 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: fips_cipher_test 4068 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags 4069 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init 4070 EXIST::FUNCTION: CRYPTO_dbg_push_info 4071 EXIST::FUNCTION: FIPS_corrupt_rsa_keygen 4072 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: FIPS_dh_new 4073 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:DH FIPS_corrupt_dsa_keygen 4074 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: FIPS_dh_free 4075 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:DH fips_pkey_signature_test 4076 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: EVP_add_alg_module 4077 EXIST::FUNCTION: int_RAND_init_engine_callbacks 4078 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:ENGINE int_EVP_CIPHER_set_engine_callbacks 4079 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:ENGINE int_EVP_MD_init_engine_callbacks 4080 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:ENGINE FIPS_rand_test_mode 4081 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: FIPS_rand_reset 4082 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: FIPS_dsa_new 4083 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:DSA int_RAND_set_callbacks 4084 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:ENGINE BN_X931_derive_prime_ex 4085 EXIST::FUNCTION: int_ERR_lib_init 4086 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION: int_EVP_CIPHER_init_engine_callbacks 4087 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:ENGINE FIPS_rsa_free 4088 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:RSA FIPS_dsa_sig_encode 4089 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:DSA CRYPTO_dbg_remove_all_info 4090 EXIST::FUNCTION: OPENSSL_init 4091 EXIST::FUNCTION: private_Camellia_set_key 4092 EXIST:OPENSSL_FIPS:FUNCTION:CAMELLIA CRYPTO_strdup 4093 EXIST::FUNCTION: JPAKE_STEP3A_process 4094 EXIST::FUNCTION:JPAKE JPAKE_STEP1_release 4095 EXIST::FUNCTION:JPAKE JPAKE_get_shared_key 4096 EXIST::FUNCTION:JPAKE JPAKE_STEP3B_init 4097 EXIST::FUNCTION:JPAKE JPAKE_STEP1_generate 4098 EXIST::FUNCTION:JPAKE JPAKE_STEP1_init 4099 EXIST::FUNCTION:JPAKE JPAKE_STEP3B_process 4100 EXIST::FUNCTION:JPAKE JPAKE_STEP2_generate 4101 EXIST::FUNCTION:JPAKE JPAKE_CTX_new 4102 EXIST::FUNCTION:JPAKE JPAKE_CTX_free 4103 EXIST::FUNCTION:JPAKE JPAKE_STEP3B_release 4104 EXIST::FUNCTION:JPAKE JPAKE_STEP3A_release 4105 EXIST::FUNCTION:JPAKE JPAKE_STEP2_process 4106 EXIST::FUNCTION:JPAKE JPAKE_STEP3B_generate 4107 EXIST::FUNCTION:JPAKE JPAKE_STEP1_process 4108 EXIST::FUNCTION:JPAKE JPAKE_STEP3A_generate 4109 EXIST::FUNCTION:JPAKE JPAKE_STEP2_release 4110 EXIST::FUNCTION:JPAKE JPAKE_STEP3A_init 4111 EXIST::FUNCTION:JPAKE ERR_load_JPAKE_strings 4112 EXIST::FUNCTION:JPAKE JPAKE_STEP2_init 4113 EXIST::FUNCTION:JPAKE pqueue_size 4114 EXIST::FUNCTION: OPENSSL_uni2asc 4115 EXIST:NETWARE:FUNCTION: OPENSSL_asc2uni 4116 EXIST:NETWARE:FUNCTION: +ASN1_TYPE_cmp 4428 EXIST::FUNCTION: Index: vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/util/mk1mf.pl =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/util/mk1mf.pl (revision 276858) +++ vendor-crypto/openssl/dist-0.9.8/util/mk1mf.pl (revision 276859) @@ -1,1428 +1,1422 @@ #!/usr/local/bin/perl # A bit of an evil hack but it post processes the file ../MINFO which # is generated by `make files` in the top directory. # This script outputs one mega makefile that has no shell stuff or any # funny stuff # $INSTALLTOP="/usr/local/ssl"; $OPTIONS=""; $ssl_version=""; $banner="\t\@echo Building OpenSSL"; my $no_static_engine = 0; my $engines = ""; local $zlib_opt = 0; # 0 = no zlib, 1 = static, 2 = dynamic local $zlib_lib = ""; local $fips_canister_path = ""; my $fips_premain_dso_exe_path = ""; my $fips_premain_c_path = ""; my $fips_sha1_exe_path = ""; local $fipscanisterbuild = 0; local $fipsdso = 0; my $fipslibdir = ""; my $baseaddr = ""; my $ex_l_libs = ""; open(IN,") { $ssl_version=$1 if (/^VERSION=(.*)$/); $OPTIONS=$1 if (/^OPTIONS=(.*)$/); $INSTALLTOP=$1 if (/^INSTALLTOP=(.*$)/); } close(IN); die "Makefile is not the toplevel Makefile!\n" if $ssl_version eq ""; $infile="MINFO"; %ops=( "VC-WIN32", "Microsoft Visual C++ [4-6] - Windows NT or 9X", "VC-WIN64I", "Microsoft C/C++ - Win64/IA-64", "VC-WIN64A", "Microsoft C/C++ - Win64/x64", "VC-CE", "Microsoft eMbedded Visual C++ 3.0 - Windows CE ONLY", "VC-NT", "Microsoft Visual C++ [4-6] - Windows NT ONLY", "Mingw32", "GNU C++ - Windows NT or 9x", "Mingw32-files", "Create files with DOS copy ...", "BC-NT", "Borland C++ 4.5 - Windows NT", "linux-elf","Linux elf", "ultrix-mips","DEC mips ultrix", "FreeBSD","FreeBSD distribution", "OS2-EMX", "EMX GCC OS/2", "netware-clib", "CodeWarrior for NetWare - CLib - with WinSock Sockets", "netware-clib-bsdsock", "CodeWarrior for NetWare - CLib - with BSD Sockets", "netware-libc", "CodeWarrior for NetWare - LibC - with WinSock Sockets", "netware-libc-bsdsock", "CodeWarrior for NetWare - LibC - with BSD Sockets", "default","cc under unix", ); $platform=""; my $xcflags=""; foreach (@ARGV) { if (!&read_options && !defined($ops{$_})) { print STDERR "unknown option - $_\n"; print STDERR "usage: perl mk1mf.pl [options] [system]\n"; print STDERR "\nwhere [system] can be one of the following\n"; foreach $i (sort keys %ops) { printf STDERR "\t%-10s\t%s\n",$i,$ops{$i}; } print STDERR <<"EOF"; and [options] can be one of no-md2 no-md4 no-md5 no-sha no-mdc2 - Skip this digest no-ripemd no-rc2 no-rc4 no-rc5 no-idea no-des - Skip this symetric cipher no-bf no-cast no-aes no-camellia no-seed no-rsa no-dsa no-dh - Skip this public key cipher no-ssl2 no-ssl3 - Skip this version of SSL just-ssl - remove all non-ssl keys/digest no-asm - No x86 asm no-krb5 - No KRB5 no-ec - No EC no-ecdsa - No ECDSA no-ecdh - No ECDH no-engine - No engine no-hw - No hw nasm - Use NASM for x86 asm nw-nasm - Use NASM x86 asm for NetWare nw-mwasm - Use Metrowerks x86 asm for NetWare gaswin - Use GNU as with Mingw32 no-socks - No socket code no-err - No error strings dll/shlib - Build shared libraries (MS) debug - Debug build profile - Profiling build gcc - Use Gcc (unix) Values that can be set TMP=tmpdir OUT=outdir SRC=srcdir BIN=binpath INC=header-outdir CC=C-compiler -L -l - extra library flags (unix) - - extra 'cc' flags, added (MS), or replace (unix) EOF exit(1); } $platform=$_; } foreach (grep(!/^$/, split(/ /, $OPTIONS))) { print STDERR "unknown option - $_\n" if !&read_options; } $no_static_engine = 0 if (!$shlib); $no_mdc2=1 if ($no_des); $no_ssl3=1 if ($no_md5 || $no_sha); $no_ssl3=1 if ($no_rsa && $no_dh); $no_ssl2=1 if ($no_md5); $no_ssl2=1 if ($no_rsa); $out_def="out"; $inc_def="outinc"; $tmp_def="tmp"; $perl="perl" unless defined $perl; $mkdir="-mkdir" unless defined $mkdir; ($ssl,$crypto)=("ssl","crypto"); $ranlib="echo ranlib"; $cc=(defined($VARS{'CC'}))?$VARS{'CC'}:'cc'; $src_dir=(defined($VARS{'SRC'}))?$VARS{'SRC'}:'.'; $bin_dir=(defined($VARS{'BIN'}))?$VARS{'BIN'}:''; # $bin_dir.=$o causes a core dump on my sparc :-( $NT=0; push(@INC,"util/pl","pl"); if (($platform =~ /VC-(.+)/)) { $FLAVOR=$1; $NT = 1 if $1 eq "NT"; require 'VC-32.pl'; } elsif ($platform eq "Mingw32") { require 'Mingw32.pl'; } elsif ($platform eq "Mingw32-files") { require 'Mingw32f.pl'; } elsif ($platform eq "BC-NT") { $bc=1; require 'BC-32.pl'; } elsif ($platform eq "FreeBSD") { require 'unix.pl'; $cflags='-DTERMIO -D_ANSI_SOURCE -O2 -fomit-frame-pointer'; } elsif ($platform eq "linux-elf") { require "unix.pl"; require "linux.pl"; $unix=1; } elsif ($platform eq "ultrix-mips") { require "unix.pl"; require "ultrix.pl"; $unix=1; } elsif ($platform eq "OS2-EMX") { $wc=1; require 'OS2-EMX.pl'; } elsif (($platform eq "netware-clib") || ($platform eq "netware-libc") || ($platform eq "netware-clib-bsdsock") || ($platform eq "netware-libc-bsdsock")) { $LIBC=1 if $platform eq "netware-libc" || $platform eq "netware-libc-bsdsock"; $BSDSOCK=1 if ($platform eq "netware-libc-bsdsock") || ($platform eq "netware-clib-bsdsock"); require 'netware.pl'; } else { require "unix.pl"; $unix=1; $cflags.=' -DTERMIO'; } $out_dir=(defined($VARS{'OUT'}))?$VARS{'OUT'}:$out_def.($debug?".dbg":""); $tmp_dir=(defined($VARS{'TMP'}))?$VARS{'TMP'}:$tmp_def.($debug?".dbg":""); $inc_dir=(defined($VARS{'INC'}))?$VARS{'INC'}:$inc_def; $bin_dir=$bin_dir.$o unless ((substr($bin_dir,-1,1) eq $o) || ($bin_dir eq '')); $cflags= "$xcflags$cflags" if $xcflags ne ""; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_IDEA" if $no_idea; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_AES" if $no_aes; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA" if $no_camellia; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SEED" if $no_seed; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_RC2" if $no_rc2; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_RC4" if $no_rc4; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_RC5" if $no_rc5; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_MD2" if $no_md2; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_MD4" if $no_md4; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_MD5" if $no_md5; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SHA" if $no_sha; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SHA1" if $no_sha1; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD" if $no_ripemd; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_MDC2" if $no_mdc2; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_BF" if $no_bf; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_CAST" if $no_cast; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_DES" if $no_des; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_RSA" if $no_rsa; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_DSA" if $no_dsa; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_DH" if $no_dh; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SOCK" if $no_sock; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL2" if $no_ssl2; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_SSL3" if $no_ssl3; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT" if $no_tlsext; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_CMS" if $no_cms; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_JPAKE" if $no_jpake; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_CAPIENG" if $no_capieng; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ERR" if $no_err; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_KRB5" if $no_krb5; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_EC" if $no_ec; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ECDSA" if $no_ecdsa; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ECDH" if $no_ecdh; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_ENGINE" if $no_engine; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_NO_HW" if $no_hw; $cflags.=" -DOPENSSL_FIPS" if $fips; $cflags.= " -DZLIB" if $zlib_opt; $cflags.= " -DZLIB_SHARED" if $zlib_opt == 2; if ($no_static_engine) { $cflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE"; } else { $cflags .= " -DOPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE"; } #$cflags.=" -DRSAref" if $rsaref ne ""; ## if ($unix) ## { $cflags="$c_flags" if ($c_flags ne ""); } ##else { $cflags="$c_flags$cflags" if ($c_flags ne ""); } $ex_libs="$l_flags$ex_libs" if ($l_flags ne ""); %shlib_ex_cflags=("SSL" => " -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL", "CRYPTO" => " -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO", "FIPS" => " -DOPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO"); if ($msdos) { $banner ="\t\@echo Make sure you have run 'perl Configure $platform' in the\n"; $banner.="\t\@echo top level directory, if you don't have perl, you will\n"; $banner.="\t\@echo need to probably edit crypto/bn/bn.h, check the\n"; $banner.="\t\@echo documentation for details.\n"; } # have to do this to allow $(CC) under unix $link="$bin_dir$link" if ($link !~ /^\$/); $INSTALLTOP =~ s|/|$o|g; ############################################# # We parse in input file and 'store' info for later printing. open(IN,"<$infile") || die "unable to open $infile:$!\n"; $_=; for (;;) { chop; ($key,$val)=/^([^=]+)=(.*)/; if ($key eq "RELATIVE_DIRECTORY") { if ($lib ne "") { if ($fips && $dir =~ /^fips/) { $uc = "FIPS"; } else { $uc=$lib; $uc =~ s/^lib(.*)\.a/$1/; $uc =~ tr/a-z/A-Z/; } if (($uc ne "FIPS") || $fipscanisterbuild) { $lib_nam{$uc}=$uc; $lib_obj{$uc}.=$libobj." "; } } last if ($val eq "FINISHED"); $lib=""; $libobj=""; $dir=$val; } if ($key eq "KRB5_INCLUDES") { $cflags .= " $val";} if ($key eq "ZLIB_INCLUDE") { $cflags .= " $val" if $val ne "";} if ($key eq "LIBZLIB") { $zlib_lib = "$val" if $val ne "";} if ($key eq "LIBKRB5") { $ex_libs .= " $val" if $val ne "";} if ($key eq "TEST") { $test.=&var_add($dir,$val, 0); } if (($key eq "PROGS") || ($key eq "E_OBJ")) { $e_exe.=&var_add($dir,$val, 0); } if ($key eq "LIB") { $lib=$val; $lib =~ s/^.*\/([^\/]+)$/$1/; } if ($key eq "EXHEADER") { $exheader.=&var_add($dir,$val, 1); } if ($key eq "HEADER") { $header.=&var_add($dir,$val, 1); } if ($key eq "LIBOBJ" && ($dir ne "engines" || !$no_static_engine)) { $libobj=&var_add($dir,$val, 0); } if ($key eq "LIBNAMES" && $dir eq "engines" && $no_static_engine) { $engines.=$val } if ($key eq "FIPS_EX_OBJ") { $fips_ex_obj=&var_add("crypto",$val,0); } if ($key eq "FIPSLIBDIR") { $fipslibdir=$val; $fipslibdir =~ s/\/$//; $fipslibdir =~ s/\//$o/g; } if ($key eq "BASEADDR") { $baseaddr=$val;} if (!($_=)) { $_="RELATIVE_DIRECTORY=FINISHED\n"; } } close(IN); if ($fips) { foreach (split " ", $fips_ex_obj) { $fips_exclude_obj{$1} = 1 if (/\/([^\/]*)$/); } $fips_exclude_obj{"cpu_win32"} = 1; $fips_exclude_obj{"bn_asm"} = 1; $fips_exclude_obj{"des_enc"} = 1; $fips_exclude_obj{"fcrypt_b"} = 1; $fips_exclude_obj{"aes_core"} = 1; $fips_exclude_obj{"aes_cbc"} = 1; my @ltmp = split " ", $lib_obj{"CRYPTO"}; $lib_obj{"CRYPTO"} = ""; foreach(@ltmp) { if (/\/([^\/]*)$/ && exists $fips_exclude_obj{$1}) { if ($fipscanisterbuild) { $lib_obj{"FIPS"} .= "$_ "; } } else { $lib_obj{"CRYPTO"} .= "$_ "; } } } if ($fipscanisterbuild) { $fips_canister_path = "\$(LIB_D)${o}fipscanister.lib" if $fips_canister_path eq ""; $fips_premain_c_path = "\$(LIB_D)${o}fips_premain.c"; } else { if ($fips_canister_path eq "") { $fips_canister_path = "\$(FIPSLIB_D)${o}fipscanister.lib"; } if ($fips_premain_c_path eq "") { $fips_premain_c_path = "\$(FIPSLIB_D)${o}fips_premain.c"; } } if ($fips) { if ($fips_sha1_exe_path eq "") { $fips_sha1_exe_path = "\$(BIN_D)${o}fips_standalone_sha1$exep"; } } else { $fips_sha1_exe_path = ""; } if ($fips_premain_dso_exe_path eq "") { $fips_premain_dso_exe_path = "\$(BIN_D)${o}fips_premain_dso$exep"; } # $ex_build_targets .= "\$(BIN_D)${o}\$(E_PREMAIN_DSO)$exep" if ($fips); #$ex_l_libs .= " \$(L_FIPS)" if $fipsdso; if ($fips) { if (!$shlib) { $ex_build_targets .= " \$(LIB_D)$o$crypto_compat \$(PREMAIN_DSO_EXE)"; $ex_l_libs .= " \$(O_FIPSCANISTER)"; $ex_libs_dep .= " \$(O_FIPSCANISTER)" if $fipscanisterbuild; } if ($fipscanisterbuild) { $fipslibdir = "\$(LIB_D)"; } else { if ($fipslibdir eq "") { open (IN, "util/fipslib_path.txt") || fipslib_error(); $fipslibdir = ; chomp $fipslibdir; close IN; } fips_check_files($fipslibdir, "fipscanister.lib", "fipscanister.lib.sha1", "fips_premain.c", "fips_premain.c.sha1"); } } if ($shlib) { $extra_install= <<"EOF"; \$(CP) \"\$(O_SSL)\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}bin\" \$(CP) \"\$(O_CRYPTO)\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}bin\" \$(CP) \"\$(L_SSL)\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}lib\" \$(CP) \"\$(L_CRYPTO)\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}lib\" EOF if ($no_static_engine) { $extra_install .= <<"EOF" \$(MKDIR) \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}lib${o}engines\" \$(CP) \"\$(E_SHLIB)\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}lib${o}engines\" EOF } } else { $extra_install= <<"EOF"; \$(CP) \"\$(O_SSL)\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}lib\" \$(CP) \"\$(O_CRYPTO)\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}lib\" EOF $ex_libs .= " $zlib_lib" if $zlib_opt == 1; } $defs= <<"EOF"; # This makefile has been automatically generated from the OpenSSL distribution. # This single makefile will build the complete OpenSSL distribution and # by default leave the 'intertesting' output files in .${o}out and the stuff # that needs deleting in .${o}tmp. # The file was generated by running 'make makefile.one', which # does a 'make files', which writes all the environment variables from all # the makefiles to the file call MINFO. This file is used by # util${o}mk1mf.pl to generate makefile.one. # The 'makefile per directory' system suites me when developing this # library and also so I can 'distribute' indervidual library sections. # The one monster makefile better suits building in non-unix # environments. EOF $defs .= $preamble if defined $preamble; $defs.= <<"EOF"; INSTALLTOP=$INSTALLTOP # Set your compiler options PLATFORM=$platform CC=$bin_dir${cc} CFLAG=$cflags APP_CFLAG=$app_cflag LIB_CFLAG=$lib_cflag SHLIB_CFLAG=$shl_cflag APP_EX_OBJ=$app_ex_obj SHLIB_EX_OBJ=$shlib_ex_obj # add extra libraries to this define, for solaris -lsocket -lnsl would # be added EX_LIBS=$ex_libs # The OpenSSL directory SRC_D=$src_dir LINK=$link LFLAGS=$lflags RSC=$rsc FIPSLINK=\$(PERL) util${o}fipslink.pl AES_ASM_OBJ=$aes_asm_obj AES_ASM_SRC=$aes_asm_src BN_ASM_OBJ=$bn_asm_obj BN_ASM_SRC=$bn_asm_src BNCO_ASM_OBJ=$bnco_asm_obj BNCO_ASM_SRC=$bnco_asm_src DES_ENC_OBJ=$des_enc_obj DES_ENC_SRC=$des_enc_src BF_ENC_OBJ=$bf_enc_obj BF_ENC_SRC=$bf_enc_src CAST_ENC_OBJ=$cast_enc_obj CAST_ENC_SRC=$cast_enc_src RC4_ENC_OBJ=$rc4_enc_obj RC4_ENC_SRC=$rc4_enc_src RC5_ENC_OBJ=$rc5_enc_obj RC5_ENC_SRC=$rc5_enc_src MD5_ASM_OBJ=$md5_asm_obj MD5_ASM_SRC=$md5_asm_src SHA1_ASM_OBJ=$sha1_asm_obj SHA1_ASM_SRC=$sha1_asm_src RMD160_ASM_OBJ=$rmd160_asm_obj RMD160_ASM_SRC=$rmd160_asm_src CPUID_ASM_OBJ=$cpuid_asm_obj CPUID_ASM_SRC=$cpuid_asm_src # The output directory for everything intersting OUT_D=$out_dir # The output directory for all the temporary muck TMP_D=$tmp_dir # The output directory for the header files INC_D=$inc_dir INCO_D=$inc_dir${o}openssl PERL=$perl CP=$cp RM=$rm RANLIB=$ranlib MKDIR=$mkdir MKLIB=$bin_dir$mklib MLFLAGS=$mlflags ASM=$bin_dir$asm # FIPS validated module and support file locations E_PREMAIN_DSO=fips_premain_dso FIPSLIB_D=$fipslibdir BASEADDR=$baseaddr FIPS_PREMAIN_SRC=$fips_premain_c_path O_FIPSCANISTER=$fips_canister_path FIPS_SHA1_EXE=$fips_sha1_exe_path PREMAIN_DSO_EXE=$fips_premain_dso_exe_path ###################################################### # You should not need to touch anything below this point ###################################################### E_EXE=openssl SSL=$ssl CRYPTO=$crypto LIBFIPS=libosslfips # BIN_D - Binary output directory # TEST_D - Binary test file output directory # LIB_D - library output directory # ENG_D - dynamic engine output directory # Note: if you change these point to different directories then uncomment out # the lines around the 'NB' comment below. # BIN_D=\$(OUT_D) TEST_D=\$(OUT_D) LIB_D=\$(OUT_D) ENG_D=\$(OUT_D) # INCL_D - local library directory # OBJ_D - temp object file directory OBJ_D=\$(TMP_D) INCL_D=\$(TMP_D) O_SSL= \$(LIB_D)$o$plib\$(SSL)$shlibp O_CRYPTO= \$(LIB_D)$o$plib\$(CRYPTO)$shlibp O_FIPS= \$(LIB_D)$o$plib\$(LIBFIPS)$shlibp SO_SSL= $plib\$(SSL)$so_shlibp SO_CRYPTO= $plib\$(CRYPTO)$so_shlibp L_SSL= \$(LIB_D)$o$plib\$(SSL)$libp L_CRYPTO= \$(LIB_D)$o$plib\$(CRYPTO)$libp L_FIPS= \$(LIB_D)$o$plib\$(LIBFIPS)$libp L_LIBS= \$(L_SSL) \$(L_CRYPTO) $ex_l_libs ###################################################### # Don't touch anything below this point ###################################################### INC=-I\$(INC_D) -I\$(INCL_D) APP_CFLAGS=\$(INC) \$(CFLAG) \$(APP_CFLAG) LIB_CFLAGS=\$(INC) \$(CFLAG) \$(LIB_CFLAG) SHLIB_CFLAGS=\$(INC) \$(CFLAG) \$(LIB_CFLAG) \$(SHLIB_CFLAG) LIBS_DEP=\$(O_CRYPTO) \$(O_SSL) $ex_libs_dep ############################################# EOF $rules=<<"EOF"; all: banner \$(TMP_D) \$(BIN_D) \$(TEST_D) \$(LIB_D) \$(INCO_D) headers \$(FIPS_SHA1_EXE) lib exe $ex_build_targets banner: $banner \$(TMP_D): \$(MKDIR) \"\$(TMP_D)\" # NB: uncomment out these lines if BIN_D, TEST_D and LIB_D are different #\$(BIN_D): # \$(MKDIR) \$(BIN_D) # #\$(TEST_D): # \$(MKDIR) \$(TEST_D) \$(LIB_D): \$(MKDIR) \"\$(LIB_D)\" \$(INCO_D): \$(INC_D) \$(MKDIR) \"\$(INCO_D)\" \$(INC_D): \$(MKDIR) \"\$(INC_D)\" headers: \$(HEADER) \$(EXHEADER) @ lib: \$(LIBS_DEP) \$(E_SHLIB) exe: \$(T_EXE) \$(BIN_D)$o\$(E_EXE)$exep install: all \$(MKDIR) \"\$(INSTALLTOP)\" \$(MKDIR) \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}bin\" \$(MKDIR) \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}include\" \$(MKDIR) \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}include${o}openssl\" \$(MKDIR) \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}lib\" \$(CP) \"\$(INCO_D)${o}*.\[ch\]\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}include${o}openssl\" \$(CP) \"\$(BIN_D)$o\$(E_EXE)$exep\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)${o}bin\" \$(CP) \"apps${o}openssl.cnf\" \"\$(INSTALLTOP)\" $extra_install test: \$(T_EXE) cd \$(BIN_D) ..${o}ms${o}test clean: \$(RM) \$(TMP_D)$o*.* vclean: \$(RM) \$(TMP_D)$o*.* \$(RM) \$(OUT_D)$o*.* EOF my $platform_cpp_symbol = "MK1MF_PLATFORM_$platform"; $platform_cpp_symbol =~ s/-/_/g; if (open(IN,"crypto/buildinf.h")) { # Remove entry for this platform in existing file buildinf.h. my $old_buildinf_h = ""; while () { if (/^\#ifdef $platform_cpp_symbol$/) { while () { last if (/^\#endif/); } } else { $old_buildinf_h .= $_; } } close(IN); open(OUT,">crypto/buildinf.h") || die "Can't open buildinf.h"; print OUT $old_buildinf_h; close(OUT); } open (OUT,">>crypto/buildinf.h") || die "Can't open buildinf.h"; printf OUT < \$no_rc2, "no-rc4" => \$no_rc4, "no-rc5" => \$no_rc5, "no-idea" => \$no_idea, "no-aes" => \$no_aes, "no-camellia" => \$no_camellia, "no-seed" => \$no_seed, "no-des" => \$no_des, "no-bf" => \$no_bf, "no-cast" => \$no_cast, "no-md2" => \$no_md2, "no-md4" => \$no_md4, "no-md5" => \$no_md5, "no-sha" => \$no_sha, "no-sha1" => \$no_sha1, "no-ripemd" => \$no_ripemd, "no-mdc2" => \$no_mdc2, "no-patents" => [\$no_rc2, \$no_rc4, \$no_rc5, \$no_idea, \$no_rsa], "no-rsa" => \$no_rsa, "no-dsa" => \$no_dsa, "no-dh" => \$no_dh, "no-hmac" => \$no_hmac, "no-asm" => \$no_asm, "nasm" => \$nasm, "ml64" => \$ml64, "nw-nasm" => \$nw_nasm, "nw-mwasm" => \$nw_mwasm, "gaswin" => \$gaswin, "no-ssl2" => \$no_ssl2, "no-ssl3" => \$no_ssl3, "no-tlsext" => \$no_tlsext, "no-cms" => \$no_cms, "no-jpake" => \$no_jpake, "no-capieng" => \$no_capieng, "no-err" => \$no_err, "no-sock" => \$no_sock, "no-krb5" => \$no_krb5, "no-ec" => \$no_ec, "no-ecdsa" => \$no_ecdsa, "no-ecdh" => \$no_ecdh, "no-engine" => \$no_engine, "no-hw" => \$no_hw, "just-ssl" => [\$no_rc2, \$no_idea, \$no_des, \$no_bf, \$no_cast, \$no_md2, \$no_sha, \$no_mdc2, \$no_dsa, \$no_dh, \$no_ssl2, \$no_err, \$no_ripemd, \$no_rc5, \$no_aes, \$no_camellia, \$no_seed], "rsaref" => 0, "gcc" => \$gcc, "debug" => \$debug, "profile" => \$profile, "shlib" => \$shlib, "dll" => \$shlib, "shared" => 0, "no-gmp" => 0, "no-rfc3779" => 0, "no-montasm" => 0, "no-shared" => 0, "no-zlib" => 0, "no-zlib-dynamic" => 0, "fips" => \$fips, "fipscanisterbuild" => [\$fips, \$fipscanisterbuild], "fipsdso" => [\$fips, \$fipscanisterbuild, \$fipsdso], ); if (exists $valid_options{$_}) { my $r = $valid_options{$_}; if ( ref $r eq "SCALAR") { $$r = 1;} elsif ( ref $r eq "ARRAY") { my $r2; foreach $r2 (@$r) { $$r2 = 1; } } } elsif (/^no-comp$/) { $xcflags = "-DOPENSSL_NO_COMP $xcflags"; } elsif (/^enable-zlib$/) { $zlib_opt = 1 if $zlib_opt == 0 } elsif (/^enable-zlib-dynamic$/) { $zlib_opt = 2; } elsif (/^no-static-engine/) { $no_static_engine = 1; } elsif (/^enable-static-engine/) { $no_static_engine = 0; } # There are also enable-xxx options which correspond to # the no-xxx. Since the scalars are enabled by default # these can be ignored. elsif (/^enable-/) { my $t = $_; $t =~ s/^enable/no/; if (exists $valid_options{$t}) {return 1;} return 0; } # experimental-xxx is mostly like enable-xxx, but opensslconf.v # will still set OPENSSL_NO_xxx unless we set OPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_xxx. # (No need to fail if we don't know the algorithm -- this is for adventurous users only.) elsif (/^experimental-/) { my $algo, $ALGO; ($algo = $_) =~ s/^experimental-//; ($ALGO = $algo) =~ tr/[a-z]/[A-Z]/; $xcflags="-DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_$ALGO $xcflags"; } elsif (/^--with-krb5-flavor=(.*)$/) { my $krb5_flavor = $1; if ($krb5_flavor =~ /^force-[Hh]eimdal$/) { $xcflags="-DKRB5_HEIMDAL $xcflags"; } elsif ($krb5_flavor =~ /^MIT/i) { $xcflags="-DKRB5_MIT $xcflags"; if ($krb5_flavor =~ /^MIT[._-]*1[._-]*[01]/i) { $xcflags="-DKRB5_MIT_OLD11 $xcflags" } } } elsif (/^([^=]*)=(.*)$/){ $VARS{$1}=$2; } elsif (/^-[lL].*$/) { $l_flags.="$_ "; } elsif ((!/^-help/) && (!/^-h/) && (!/^-\?/) && /^-.*$/) { $c_flags.="$_ "; } else { return(0); } return(1); } sub fipslib_error { print STDERR "***FIPS module directory sanity check failed***\n"; print STDERR "FIPS module build failed, or was deleted\n"; print STDERR "Please rebuild FIPS module.\n"; exit 1; } sub fips_check_files { my $dir = shift @_; my $ret = 1; if (!-d $dir) { print STDERR "FIPS module directory $dir does not exist\n"; fipslib_error(); } foreach (@_) { if (!-f "$dir${o}$_") { print STDERR "FIPS module file $_ does not exist!\n"; $ret = 0; } } fipslib_error() if ($ret == 0); }