Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ChangeLog =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ChangeLog (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ChangeLog (revision 276707) @@ -1,2887 +1,3817 @@ +20131006 + - (djm) Release OpenSSH-6.7 + +20141003 + - (djm) [sshd_config.5] typo; from Iain Morgan + +20141001 + - (djm) [openbsd-compat/Makefile.in openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c] + [openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Kludge around bad glibc + _FORTIFY_SOURCE check that doesn't grok heap-allocated fd_sets; + ok dtucker@ + +20140910 + - (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Allow mremap and exit for DietLibc; + patch from Felix von Leitner; ok dtucker + +20140908 + - (dtucker) [INSTALL] Update info about egd. ok djm@ + +20140904 + - (djm) [openbsd-compat/arc4random.c] Zero seed after keying PRNG + +20140903 + - (djm) [defines.h sshbuf.c] Move __predict_true|false to defines.h and + conditionalise to avoid duplicate definition. + - (djm) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] Fix old code leading to + permissions/ACLs; from Corinna Vinschen + +20140830 + - (djm) [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] add + OPENSSL_[RD]SA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS defines for OpenSSL that lacks them + - (djm) [misc.c] Missing newline between functions + - (djm) [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] add include guard + - (djm) [Makefile.in] Make TEST_SHELL a variable; "good idea" tim@ + +20140827 + - (djm) [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c] + [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c] Don't include openssl/ec.h + on !ECC OpenSSL systems + - (djm) [monitor.c sshd.c] SIGXFSZ needs to be ignored in postauth + monitor, not preauth; bz#2263 + - (djm) [openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c] implement explicit_bzero() + using memset_s() where possible; improve fallback to indirect bzero + via a volatile pointer to give it more of a chance to avoid being + optimised away. + +20140825 + - (djm) [bufec.c] Skip this file on !ECC OpenSSL + - (djm) [INSTALL] Recommend libcrypto be built -fPIC, mention LibreSSL, + update OpenSSL version requirement. + +20140824 + - (djm) [sftp-server.c] Some systems (e.g. Irix) have prctl() but not + PR_SET_DUMPABLE, so adjust ifdef; reported by Tom Christensen + +20140823 + - (djm) [sshd.c] Ignore SIGXFSZ in preauth monitor child; can explode on + lastlog writing on platforms with high UIDs; bz#2263 + - (djm) [configure.ac] We now require a working vsnprintf everywhere (not + just for systems that lack asprintf); check for it always and extend + test to catch more brokenness. Fixes builds on Solaris <= 9 + +20140822 + - (djm) [configure.ac] include leading zero characters in OpenSSL version + number; fixes test for unsupported versions + - (djm) [sshbuf-getput-crypto.c] Fix compilation when OpenSSL lacks ECC + - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c] Fix compilation failure (prototype/ + definition mismatch) and warning for broken/missing snprintf case. + - (djm) [configure.ac] double braces to appease autoconf + +20140821 + - (djm) [Makefile.in] fix reference to libtest_helper.a in sshkey test too. + - (djm) [key.h] Fix ifdefs for no-ECC OpenSSL + - (djm) [regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c] Fix for systems that + don't set __progname. Diagnosed by Tom Christensen. + +20140820 + - (djm) [configure.ac] Check OpenSSL version is supported at configure time; + suggested by Kevin Brott + - (djm) [Makefile.in] refer to libtest_helper.a by explicit path rather than + -L/-l; fixes linking problems on some platforms + - (djm) [sshkey.h] Fix compilation when OpenSSL lacks ECC + - (djm) [contrib/cygwin/README] Correct build instructions; from Corinna + +20140819 + - (djm) [serverloop.c] Fix syntax error on Cygwin; from Corinna Vinschen + - (djm) [sshbuf.h] Fix compilation on systems without OPENSSL_HAS_ECC. + - (djm) [ssh-dss.c] Include openssl/dsa.h for DSA_SIG + - (djm) [INSTALL contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/cygwin/README] + [contrib/redhat/openssh.spec contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Remove mentions + of TCP wrappers. + +20140811 + - (djm) [myproposal.h] Make curve25519 KEX dependent on + HAVE_EVP_SHA256 instead of OPENSSL_HAS_ECC. + +20140810 + - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec] + [contrib/redhat/openssh.spec contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Update versions + +20140801 + - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] Skip test for non-OpenBSD netcat. We need + a better solution, but this will have to do for now. + - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] Instruct nc not to quit as soon as stdin + is closed; avoid regress failures when stdin is /dev/null + - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] Use -d (detach stdin) flag to disassociate + nc from stdin, it's more portable + +20140730 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/24 22:57:10 + [ssh.1] + Mention UNIX-domain socket forwarding too. OK jmc@ deraadt@ + - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/25 21:22:03 + [ssh-agent.c] + Clear buffer used for handling messages. This prevents keys being + left in memory after they have been expired or deleted in some cases + (but note that ssh-agent is setgid so you would still need root to + access them). Pointed out by Kevin Burns, ok deraadt + - schwarze@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/28 15:40:08 + [sftp-server.8 sshd_config.5] + some systems no longer need /dev/log; + issue noticed by jirib; + ok deraadt + +20140725 + - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] restore incorrectly deleted line; + pointed out by Christian Hesse + +20140722 + - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] ssh mux master lost -N somehow; + put it back + - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] change the test for still-open Unix + domain sockets to be robust against nc implementations that produce + error messages. + - (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_{file,fuzz,sshkey}.c] Wrap ecdsa- + specific tests inside OPENSSL_HAS_ECC. + - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 01:18:50 + [key.c] + Prevent spam from key_load_private_pem during hostbased auth. ok djm@ + - guenther@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 07:13:42 + [umac.c] + Convert from to the shiney new + ok dtucker@, who also confirmed that -portable handles this already + (ID sync only, includes.h pulls in endian.h if available.) + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 01:32:12 + [regress/multiplex.sh] + change the test for still-open Unix domain sockets to be robust against + nc implementations that produce error messages. from -portable + (Id sync only) + - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 23:23:22 + [regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh] + Sign test certs with ed25519 instead of ecdsa so that they'll work in + -portable on platforms that don't have ECDSA in their OpenSSL. ok djm + - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 23:57:40 + [regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh] + Add $OpenBSD tag to make syncs easier + - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/22 23:35:38 + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/*] + Regenerate test keys with certs signed with ed25519 instead of ecdsa. + These can be used in -portable on platforms that don't support ECDSA. + +20140721 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/15 15:54:15 + [forwarding.sh multiplex.sh] + Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding. A remote TCP port + may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and vice versa or + both ends may be a Unix domain socket. This is a reimplementation + of the streamlocal patches by William Ahern from: + http://www.25thandclement.com/~william/projects/streamlocal.html + OK djm@ markus@ + - (djm) [regress/multiplex.sh] Not all netcat accept the -N option. + - (dtucker) [sshkey.c] ifdef out unused variable when compiling without + OPENSSL_HAS_ECC. + +20140721 + - (dtucker) [cipher.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Restore the bits + needed to build AES CTR mode against OpenSSL 0.9.8f and above. ok djm + - (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshkey/ + {common,test_file,test_fuzz,test_sshkey}.c] Wrap stdint.h includes in + ifdefs. + +20140719 + - (tim) [openbsd-compat/port-uw.c] Include misc.h for fwd_opts, used + in servconf.h. + +20140718 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - millert@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/15 15:54:14 + [PROTOCOL auth-options.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] + [auth-rsa.c auth.c auth1.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c] + [auth2-passwd.c auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c canohost.c channels.c channels.h] + [clientloop.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c mux.c packet.c readconf.c] + [readconf.h servconf.c servconf.h serverloop.c session.c ssh-agent.c] + [ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + [sshd_config.5 sshlogin.c] + Add support for Unix domain socket forwarding. A remote TCP port + may be forwarded to a local Unix domain socket and vice versa or + both ends may be a Unix domain socket. This is a reimplementation + of the streamlocal patches by William Ahern from: + http://www.25thandclement.com/~william/projects/streamlocal.html + OK djm@ markus@ + - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/16 14:48:57 + [ssh.1] + add the streamlocal* options to ssh's -o list; millert says they're + irrelevant for scp/sftp; + ok markus millert + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/17 00:10:56 + [sandbox-systrace.c] + ifdef SYS_sendsyslog so this will compile without patching on -stable + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/17 00:10:18 + [mux.c] + preserve errno across syscall + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/17 00:12:03 + [key.c] + silence "incorrect passphrase" error spam; reported and ok dtucker@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/17 07:22:19 + [mux.c ssh.c] + reflect stdio-forward ("ssh -W host:port ...") failures in exit status. + previously we were always returning 0. bz#2255 reported by Brendan + Germain; ok dtucker + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/18 02:46:01 + [ssh-agent.c] + restore umask around listener socket creation (dropped in streamlocal patch + merge) + - (dtucker) [auth2-gss.c gss-serv-krb5.c] Include misc.h for fwd_opts, used + in servconf.h. + - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Add a t-exec target to run just the executable + tests. + - (dtucker) [key.c sshkey.c] Put new ecdsa bits inside ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC. + +20140717 + - (djm) [digest-openssl.c] Preserve array order when disabling digests. + Reported by Petr Lautrbach. + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/11 08:09:54 + [sandbox-systrace.c] + Permit use of SYS_sendsyslog from inside the sandbox. Clock is ticking, + update your kernels and sshd soon.. libc will start using sendsyslog() + in about 4 days. + - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/11 13:54:34 + [myproposal.h] + by popular demand, add back hamc-sha1 to server proposal for better compat + with many clients still in use. ok deraadt + +20140715 + - (djm) [configure.ac] Delay checks for arc4random* until after libcrypto + has been located; fixes builds agains libressl-portable + +20140711 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - benno@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/09 14:15:56 + [ssh-add.c] + fix ssh-add crash while loading more than one key + ok markus@ + +20140709 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/07 08:19:12 + [ssh_config.5] + mention that ProxyCommand is executed using shell "exec" to avoid + a lingering process; bz#1977 + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/09 01:45:10 + [sftp.c] + more useful error message when GLOB_NOSPACE occurs; + bz#2254, patch from Orion Poplawski + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/09 03:02:15 + [key.c] + downgrade more error() to debug() to better match what old authfile.c + did; suppresses spurious errors with hostbased authentication enabled + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/06 07:42:03 + [multiplex.sh test-exec.sh] + add a hook to the cleanup() function to kill $SSH_PID if it is set + + use it to kill the mux master started in multiplex.sh (it was being left + around on fatal failures) + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/07 08:15:26 + [multiplex.sh] + remove forced-fatal that I stuck in there to test the new cleanup + logic and forgot to remove... + +20140706 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 23:18:35 + [authfile.h] + remove leakmalloc droppings + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/05 23:11:48 + [channels.c] + fix remote-forward cancel regression; ok markus@ + +20140704 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - jsing@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 12:42:16 + [cipher-chachapoly.c] + Call chacha_ivsetup() immediately before chacha_encrypt_bytes() - this + makes it easier to verify that chacha_encrypt_bytes() is only called once + per chacha_ivsetup() call. + ok djm@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 22:23:46 + [sshconnect.c] + when rekeying, skip file/DNS lookup if it is the same as the key sent + during initial key exchange. bz#2154 patch from Iain Morgan; ok markus@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 22:33:41 + [channels.c] + allow explicit ::1 and 127.0.0.1 forwarding bind addresses when + GatewayPorts=no; allows client to choose address family; + bz#2222 ok markus@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 22:40:43 + [servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd.8 sshd_config.5] + Add a sshd_config PermitUserRC option to control whether ~/.ssh/rc is + executed, mirroring the no-user-rc authorized_keys option; + bz#2160; ok markus@ + +20140703 + - (djm) [digest-openssl.c configure.ac] Disable RIPEMD160 if libcrypto + doesn't support it. + - (djm) [monitor_fdpass.c] Use sys/poll.h if poll.h doesn't exist; + bz#2237 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 01:45:38 + [sshkey.c] + make Ed25519 keys' title fit properly in the randomart border; bz#2247 + based on patch from Christian Hesse + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:11:03 + [ssh-agent.c] + Only cleanup agent socket in the main agent process and not in any + subprocesses it may have started (e.g. forked askpass). Fixes + agent sockets being zapped when askpass processes fatal(); + bz#2236 patch from Dmitry V. Levin + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:15:01 + [ssh-add.c] + make stdout line-buffered; saves partial output getting lost when + ssh-add fatal()s part-way through (e.g. when listing keys from an + agent that supports key types that ssh-add doesn't); + bz#2234, reported by Phil Pennock + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:26:43 + [digest-openssl.c] + use EVP_Digest() for one-shot hash instead of creating, updating, + finalising and destroying a context. + bz#2231, based on patch from Timo Teras + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:34:09 + [gss-serv.c session.c ssh-keygen.c] + standardise on NI_MAXHOST for gethostname() string lengths; about + 1/2 the cases were using it already. Fixes bz#2239 en passant + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 03:47:27 + [ssh-keygen.c] + When hashing or removing hosts using ssh-keygen, don't choke on + @revoked markers and don't remove @cert-authority markers; + bz#2241, reported by mlindgren AT runelind.net + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 04:36:45 + [digest.h] + forward-declare struct sshbuf so consumers don't need to include sshbuf.h + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 05:32:36 + [ssh_config.5] + mention '%%' escape sequence in HostName directives and how it may + be used to specify IPv6 link-local addresses + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 05:38:17 + [ssh.1] + document that -g will only work in the multiplexed case if applied to + the mux master + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 06:39:19 + [ssh.c ssh_config.5] + Add a %C escape sequence for LocalCommand and ControlPath that expands + to a unique identifer based on a has of the tuple of (local host, + remote user, hostname, port). + + Helps avoid exceeding sockaddr_un's miserly pathname limits for mux + control paths. + + bz#2220, based on patch from mancha1 AT zoho.com; ok markus@ + - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 07:45:27 + [ssh_config.5] + escape %C since groff thinks it part of an Rs/Re block; + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/03 11:16:55 + [auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2.c] + make the "Too many authentication failures" message include the + user, source address, port and protocol in a format similar to the + authentication success / failure messages; bz#2199, ok dtucker + +20140702 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/13 08:26:29 + [sandbox-systrace.c] + permit SYS_getentropy + from matthew + - matthew@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/18 02:59:13 + [sandbox-systrace.c] + Now that we have a dedicated getentropy(2) system call for + arc4random(3), we can disallow __sysctl(2) in OpenSSH's systrace + sandbox. + + ok djm + - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/18 15:42:09 + [sshbuf-getput-crypto.c] + The ssh_get_bignum functions must accept the same range of bignums + the corresponding ssh_put_bignum functions create. This fixes the + use of 16384-bit RSA keys (bug reported by Eivind Evensen). + ok djm@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 00:52:02 + [krl.c] + fix bug in KRL generation: multiple consecutive revoked certificate + serial number ranges could be serialised to an invalid format. + + Readers of a broken KRL caused by this bug will fail closed, so no + should-have-been-revoked key will be accepted. + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 01:13:21 + [Makefile.in auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-options.c auth-rsa.c + [auth2-none.c auth2-pubkey.c authfile.c authfile.h cipher-3des1.c + [cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly.h cipher.c cipher.h + [digest-libc.c digest-openssl.c digest.h dns.c entropy.c hmac.h + [hostfile.c key.c key.h krl.c monitor.c packet.c rsa.c rsa.h + [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c + [ssh-keygen.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-pkcs11.c + [ssh-rsa.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.h sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c + [sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshkey.c sshkey.h + [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] + New key API: refactor key-related functions to be more library-like, + existing API is offered as a set of wrappers. + + with and ok markus@ + + Thanks also to Ben Hawkes, David Tomaschik, Ivan Fratric, Matthew + Dempsky and Ron Bowes for a detailed review a few months ago. + NB. This commit also removes portable OpenSSH support for OpenSSL + <0.9.8e. + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 02:19:48 + [ssh.c] + don't fatal() when hostname canonicalisation fails with a + ProxyCommand in use; continue and allow the ProxyCommand to + connect anyway (e.g. to a host with a name outside the DNS + behind a bastion) + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 02:21:01 + [scp.c] + when copying local->remote fails during read, don't send uninitialised + heap to the remote end. Reported by Jann Horn + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/25 14:16:09 + [sshbuf.c] + unblock SIGSEGV before raising it + ok djm + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/27 16:41:56 + [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c ssh.c] + fix remote fwding with same listen port but different listen address + with gerhard@, ok djm@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/27 18:50:39 + [ssh-add.c] + fix loading of private keys + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/30 12:54:39 + [key.c] + suppress spurious error message when loading key with a passphrase; + reported by kettenis@ ok markus@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/07/02 04:59:06 + [cipher-3des1.c] + fix ssh protocol 1 on the server that regressed with the sshkey change + (sometimes fatal() after auth completed), make file return useful status + codes. + NB. Id sync only for these two. They were bundled into the sshkey merge + above, since it was easier to sync the entire file and then apply + portable-specific changed atop it. + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/30 05:32:00 + [regress/Makefile] + unit tests for new buffer API; including basic fuzz testing + NB. Id sync only. + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/21 07:04:21 + [regress/integrity.sh] + when failing because of unexpected output, show the offending output + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 01:04:43 + [regress/krl.sh] + regress test for broken consecutive revoked serial number ranges + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 01:14:17 + [Makefile.in regress/Makefile regress/unittests/Makefile] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/common.h] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.c] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.fp] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.pub] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp.bb] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.g] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.priv] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.pub] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.pub] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1_pw] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp.bb] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.pub] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n_pw] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.fp] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.pub] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp.bb] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.curve] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.priv] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.pub] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1_pw] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp.bb] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.curve] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.priv] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.pub] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n_pw] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.fp] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.pub] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp.bb] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.pub] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1_pw] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp.bb] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.pub] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/pw] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp.bb] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.param.n] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.pub] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1_pw] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp.bb] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.param.n] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.pub] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.fp] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.pub] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp.bb] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.n] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.p] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.q] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.pub] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_pw] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp.bb] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.n] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.p] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.q] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.pub] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n] + [regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n_pw] + unit and fuzz tests for new key API + - (djm) [sshkey.c] Conditionalise inclusion of util.h + - (djm) [regress/Makefile] fix execution of sshkey unit/fuzz test + +20140618 + - (tim) [openssh/session.c] Work around to get chroot sftp working on UnixWare + +20140617 + - (dtucker) [entropy.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.{c,h} + openbsd-compat/regress/{.cvsignore,Makefile.in,opensslvertest.c}] + Move the OpenSSL header/library version test into its own function and add + tests for it. Fix it to allow fix version upgrades (but not downgrades). + Prompted by chl@ via OpenSMTPD (issue #462) and Debian (bug #748150). + ok djm@ chl@ + +20140616 + - (dtucker) [defines.h] Fix undef of _PATH_MAILDIR. From rak at debian via + OpenSMTPD and chl@ + +20140612 + - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Remove tcpwrappers support, support has already + been removed from sshd.c. + +20140611 + - (dtucker) [defines.h] Add va_copy if we don't already have it, taken from + openbsd-compat/bsd-asprintf.c. + - (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.c regress/unittests/test_helper/*] + Wrap stdlib.h include an ifdef for platforms that don't have it. + - (tim) [regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h] Add includes.h for + u_intXX_t types. + +20140610 + - (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c + regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c] Only do NISTP256 + curve tests if OpenSSL has them. + - (dtucker) [myprosal.h] Don't include curve25519-sha256@libssh.org in + the proposal if the version of OpenSSL we're using doesn't support ECC. + - (dtucker) [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c] ifdef + ECC variable too. + - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/05 22:17:50 + [sshconnect2.c] + fix inverted test that caused PKCS#11 keys that were explicitly listed + not to be preferred. Reported by Dirk-Willem van Gulik + - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/10 21:46:11 + [sshbuf.h] + Group ECC functions together to make things a little easier in -portable. + "doesn't bother me" deraadt@ + - (dtucker) [sshbuf.h] Only declare ECC functions if building without + OpenSSL or if OpenSSL has ECC. + - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/arc4random.c] Use explicit_bzero instead of an + assigment that might get optimized out. ok djm@ + - (dtucker) [bufaux.c bufbn.c bufec.c buffer.c] Pull in includes.h for + compat stuff, specifically whether or not OpenSSL has ECC. + +20140527 + - (djm) [cipher.c] Fix merge botch. + - (djm) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] Updated Cygwin ssh-host-config + from Corinna Vinschen, fixing a number of bugs and preparing for + Cygwin 1.7.30. + - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c] + [openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h] On Cygwin, determine privilege + separation user at runtime, since it may need to be a domain account. + Patch from Corinna Vinschen. + +20140522 + - (djm) [Makefile.in] typo in path + +20140521 + - (djm) [commit configure.ac defines.h sshpty.c] don't attempt to use + vhangup on Linux. It doens't work for non-root users, and for them + it just messes up the tty settings. + - (djm) [misc.c] Use CLOCK_BOOTTIME in preference to CLOCK_MONOTONIC + when it is available. It takes into account time spent suspended, + thereby ensuring timeouts (e.g. for expiring agent keys) fire + correctly. bz#2228 reported by John Haxby + +20140519 + - (djm) [rijndael.c rijndael.h] Sync with newly-ressurected versions ine + OpenBSD + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/20 09:24:26 + [dns.c dns.h ssh-keygen.c] + Add support for SSHFP DNS records for ED25519 key types. + OK from djm@ + - logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/21 14:36:16 + [sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp.c] + Implement sftp upload resume support. + OK from djm@, with input from guenther@, mlarkin@ and + okan@ + - logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/22 10:07:12 + [sftp.c] + Sort the sftp command list. + OK from djm@ + - logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/22 12:42:04 + [sftp.1] + Document sftp upload resume. + OK from djm@, with feedback from okan@. + - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/22 14:16:30 + [sftp.1] + zap eol whitespace; + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/23 12:42:34 + [readconf.c] + don't record duplicate IdentityFiles + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/28 03:09:18 + [authfile.c bufaux.c buffer.h channels.c krl.c mux.c packet.c packet.h] + [ssh-keygen.c] + buffer_get_string_ptr's return should be const to remind + callers that futzing with it will futz with the actual buffer + contents + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 13:10:30 + [clientloop.c serverloop.c] + bz#1818 - don't send channel success/failre replies on channels that + have sent a close already; analysis and patch from Simon Tatham; + ok markus@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 18:01:49 + [auth.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c] + [kex.c key.c mac.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c myproposal.h packet.c] + [roaming_client.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c] + [ssh-pkcs11.h ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + make compiling against OpenSSL optional (make OPENSSL=no); + reduces algorithms to curve25519, aes-ctr, chacha, ed25519; + allows us to explore further options; with and ok djm + - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 19:58:50 + [sftp.c] + Move nulling of variable next to where it's freed. ok markus@ + - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/29 20:36:51 + [sftp.c] + Don't attempt to append a nul quote char to the filename. Should prevent + fatal'ing with "el_insertstr failed" when there's a single quote char + somewhere in the string. bz#2238, ok markus@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/30 05:29:56 + [bufaux.c bufbn.c bufec.c buffer.c buffer.h sshbuf-getput-basic.c] + [sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c sshbuf.h ssherr.c] + [ssherr.h] + New buffer API; the first installment of the conversion/replacement + of OpenSSH's internals to make them usable as a standalone library. + + This includes a set of wrappers to make it compatible with the + existing buffer API so replacement can occur incrementally. + + With and ok markus@ + + Thanks also to Ben Hawkes, David Tomaschik, Ivan Fratric, Matthew + Dempsky and Ron Bowes for a detailed review. + - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/30 19:07:48 + [mac.c myproposal.h umac.c] + UMAC can use our local fallback implementation of AES when OpenSSL isn't + available. Glue code straight from Ted Krovetz's original umac.c. + ok markus@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/02 03:27:54 + [chacha.h cipher-chachapoly.h digest.h hmac.h kex.h kexc25519.c] + [misc.h poly1305.h ssh-pkcs11.c defines.h] + revert __bounded change; it causes way more problems for portable than + it solves; pointed out by dtucker@ + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/03 17:20:34 + [monitor.c packet.c packet.h] + unbreak compression, by re-init-ing the compression code in the + post-auth child. the new buffer code is more strict, and requires + buffer_init() while the old code was happy after a bzero(); + originally from djm@ + - logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/05 07:02:30 + [sftp.c] + Zap extra whitespace. + + OK from djm@ and dtucker@ + - (djm) [configure.ac] Unconditionally define WITH_OPENSSL until we write + portability glue to support building without libcrypto + - (djm) [Makefile.in configure.ac sshbuf-getput-basic.c] + [sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf.c] compilation and portability fixes + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/13 20:44:49 + [login-timeout.sh] + this test is a sorry mess of race conditions; add another sleep + to avoid a failure on slow machines (at least until I find a + better way) + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/21 22:15:37 + [dhgex.sh integrity.sh kextype.sh rekey.sh try-ciphers.sh] + repair regress tests broken by server-side default cipher/kex/mac changes + by ensuring that the option under test is included in the server's + algorithm list + - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/03 18:46:14 + [proxy-connect.sh] + Add tests for with and without compression, with and without privsep. + - logan@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/05/04 10:40:59 + [connect-privsep.sh] + Remove the Z flag from the list of malloc options as it + was removed from malloc.c 10 days ago. + + OK from miod@ + - (djm) [regress/unittests/Makefile] + [regress/unittests/Makefile.inc] + [regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile] + [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.c] + [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.c] + [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c] + [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c] + [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c] + [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c] + [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c] + [regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c] + [regress/unittests/test_helper/Makefile] + [regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.c] + [regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c] + [regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h] + Import new unit tests from OpenBSD; not yet hooked up to build. + - (djm) [regress/Makefile Makefile.in] + [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.c + [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.c] + [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c] + [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c] + [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c] + [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c] + [regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c] + [regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c] + [regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.c] + [regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c] + Hook new unit tests into the build and "make tests" + - (djm) [sshbuf.c] need __predict_false + +20140430 + - (dtucker) [defines.h] Define __GNUC_PREREQ__ macro if we don't already + have it. Only attempt to use __attribute__(__bounded__) for gcc. + +20140420 + - OpenBSD CVS Sync + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/03 22:22:30 + [session.c] + ignore enviornment variables with embedded '=' or '\0' characters; + spotted by Jann Horn; ok deraadt@ + Id sync only - portable already has this. + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/12 04:44:58 + [ssh-keyscan.c] + scan for Ed25519 keys by default too + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/12 04:50:32 + [auth-bsdauth.c ssh-keygen.c] + don't count on things that accept arguments by reference to clear + things for us on error; most things do, but it's unsafe form. + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/12 04:51:12 + [authfile.c] + correct test that kdf name is not "none" or "bcrypt" + - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/12 13:06:59 + [ssh-keyscan.1] + scan for Ed25519 keys by default too + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/15 17:28:26 + [ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] + Improve usage() and documentation towards the standard form. + In particular, this line saves a lot of man page reading time. + usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1] + [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile] + ok schwarze jmc + - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/17 19:44:10 + [ssh.1] + old descriptions of des and blowfish are old. maybe ok deraadt + - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/19 14:42:44 + [scp.1] + there is no need for rcp anymore + ok deraadt millert + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/25 09:40:03 + [myproposal.h] + trimm default proposals. + + This commit removes the weaker pre-SHA2 hashes, the broken ciphers + (arcfour), and the broken modes (CBC) from the default configuration + (the patch only changes the default, all the modes are still available + for the config files). + + ok djm@, reminded by tedu@ & naddy@ and discussed with many + - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 17:16:26 + [myproposal.h] + The current sharing of myproposal[] between both client and server code + makes the previous diff highly unpallatable. We want to go in that + direction for the server, but not for the client. Sigh. + Brought up by naddy. + - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/27 23:01:27 + [myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] + disable weak proposals in sshd, but keep them in ssh; ok djm@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 04:55:35 + [chacha.h cipher-chachapoly.h digest.h hmac.h kex.h kexc25519.c + [misc.h poly1305.h ssh-pkcs11.c] + use __bounded(...) attribute recently added to sys/cdefs.h instead of + longform __attribute__(__bounded(...)); + + for brevity and a warning free compilation with llvm/clang + - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/26 19:58:37 + [sshd.8 sshd.c] + remove libwrap support. ok deraadt djm mfriedl + - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/28 05:17:11 + [ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] + sync available and default algorithms, improve algorithm list formatting + help from jmc@ and schwarze@, ok deraadt@ + - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/31 13:39:34 + [ssh-keygen.1] + the text for the -K option was inserted in the wrong place in -r1.108; + fix From: Matthew Clarke + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/01 02:05:27 + [ssh-keysign.c] + include fingerprint of key not found + use arc4random_buf() instead of loop+arc4random() + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/01 03:34:10 + [sshconnect.c] + When using VerifyHostKeyDNS with a DNSSEC resolver, down-convert any + certificate keys to plain keys and attempt SSHFP resolution. + + Prevents a server from skipping SSHFP lookup and forcing a new-hostkey + dialog by offering only certificate keys. + + Reported by mcv21 AT cam.ac.uk + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/01 05:32:57 + [packet.c] + demote a debug3 to PACKET_DEBUG; ok markus@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/12 04:55:53 + [sshd.c] + avoid crash at exit: check that pmonitor!=NULL before dereferencing; + bz#2225, patch from kavi AT juniper.net + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/16 23:22:45 + [bufaux.c] + skip leading zero bytes in buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(); + reported by jan AT mojzis.com; ok markus@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/16 23:28:12 + [ssh-agent.1] + remove the identity files from this manpage - ssh-agent doesn't deal + with them at all and the same information is duplicated in ssh-add.1 + (which does deal with them); prodded by deraadt@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/18 23:52:25 + [compat.c compat.h sshconnect2.c sshd.c version.h] + OpenSSH 6.5 and 6.6 have a bug that causes ~0.2% of connections + using the curve25519-sha256@libssh.org KEX exchange method to fail + when connecting with something that implements the spec properly. + + Disable this KEX method when speaking to one of the affected + versions. + + reported by Aris Adamantiadis; ok markus@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/19 05:54:59 + [compat.c] + missing wildcard; pointed out by naddy@ + - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/19 14:53:48 + [ssh-keysign.c sshd.c] + Delete futile calls to RAND_seed. ok djm + NB. Id sync only. This only applies to OpenBSD's libcrypto slashathon + - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/19 18:15:16 + [sshd.8] + remove some really old rsh references + - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/19 18:42:19 + [ssh.1] + delete .xr to hosts.equiv. there's still an unfortunate amount of + documentation referring to rhosts equivalency in here. + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/20 02:30:25 + [misc.c misc.h umac.c] + use get/put_u32 to load values rather than *((UINT32 *)p) that breaks on + strict-alignment architectures; reported by and ok stsp@ + - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/04/20 02:49:32 + [compat.c] + add a canonical 6.6 + curve25519 bignum fix fake version that I can + recommend people use ahead of the openssh-6.7 release + +20140401 + - (djm) On platforms that support it, use prctl() to prevent sftp-server + from accessing /proc/self/{mem,maps}; patch from jann AT thejh.net + - (djm) Use full release (e.g. 6.5p1) in debug output rather than just + version. From des@des.no + +20140317 + - (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Soft-fail stat() syscalls. Add XXX to + remind myself to add sandbox violation logging via the log socket. + +20140314 + - (tim) [opensshd.init.in] Add support for ed25519 + 20140313 - (djm) Release OpenSSH 6.6 20140304 - OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/03/03 22:22:30 [session.c] ignore enviornment variables with embedded '=' or '\0' characters; spotted by Jann Horn; ok deraadt@ 20140301 - (djm) [regress/Makefile] Disable dhgex regress test; it breaks when no moduli file exists at the expected location. 20140228 - OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 00:41:49 [bufbn.c] fix unsigned overflow that could lead to reading a short ssh protocol 1 bignum value; found by Ben Hawkes; ok deraadt@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 08:25:09 [bufbn.c] off by one in range check - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 22:47:07 [sshd_config.5] bz#2184 clarify behaviour of a keyword that appears in multiple matching Match blocks; ok dtucker@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 22:57:40 [version.h] openssh-6.6 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/19 23:43:02 [regress/sftp-chroot.sh] Don't use -q on sftp as it suppresses logging, instead redirect the output to the regress logfile. - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/20 00:00:30 [sregress/ftp-chroot.sh] append to rather than truncating the log file - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/25 04:35:32 [regress/Makefile regress/dhgex.sh] Add a test for DH GEX sizes - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/26 10:22:10 [regress/cert-hostkey.sh] automatically generate revoked keys from listed keys rather than manually specifying each type; from portable (Id sync only) - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/26 10:49:17 [scp-ssh-wrapper.sh scp.sh] make sure $SCP is tested on the remote end rather than whichever one happens to be in $PATH; from portable (Id sync only) - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 20:04:16 [login-timeout.sh] remove any existing LoginGraceTime from sshd_config before adding a specific one for the test back in - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/27 21:21:25 [agent-ptrace.sh agent.sh] keep return values that are printed in error messages; from portable (Id sync only) - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec] [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Crank version numbers - (djm) [regress/host-expand.sh] Add RCS Id 20140227 - OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/26 20:18:37 [ssh.c] bz#2205: avoid early hostname lookups unless canonicalisation is enabled; ok dtucker@ markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/26 20:28:44 [auth2-gss.c gss-serv.c ssh-gss.h sshd.c] bz#2107 - cache OIDs of supported GSSAPI mechanisms before privsep sandboxing, as running this code in the sandbox can cause violations; ok markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/26 20:29:29 [channels.c] don't assume that the socks4 username is \0 terminated; spotted by Ben Hawkes; ok markus@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/26 21:53:37 [sshd.c] ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids needs GSSAPI 20140224 - OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/07 06:55:54 [cipher.c mac.c] remove some logging that makes ssh debugging output very verbose; ok markus - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/15 23:05:36 [channels.c] avoid spurious "getsockname failed: Bad file descriptor" errors in ssh -W; bz#2200, debian#738692 via Colin Watson; ok dtucker@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/22 01:32:19 [readconf.c] when processing Match blocks, skip 'exec' clauses if previous predicates failed to match; ok markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/23 20:03:42 [ssh-ed25519.c] check for unsigned overflow; not reachable in OpenSSH but others might copy our code... - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/23 20:11:36 [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.c ssh_config.5] reparse ssh_config and ~/.ssh/config if hostname canonicalisation changes the hostname. This allows users to write configurations that always refer to canonical hostnames, e.g. CanonicalizeHostname yes CanonicalDomains int.example.org example.org CanonicalizeFallbackLocal no Host *.int.example.org Compression off Host *.example.org User djm ok markus@ 20140213 - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.{c,h}] Add compat code for older OpenSSL versions that don't have EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex. 20140207 - OpenBSD CVS Sync - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/05 20:13:25 [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] tweak synopsis: calling ssh-keygen without any arguments is fine; ok jmc@ while here, fix ordering in usage(); requested by jmc@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/06 22:21:01 [sshconnect.c] in ssh_create_socket(), only do the getaddrinfo for BindAddress when BindAddress is actually specified. Fixes regression in 6.5 for UsePrivilegedPort=yes; patch from Corinna Vinschen 20140206 - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c] Don't bother checking for non-NULL before freeing since free(NULL) is a no-op. ok djm. - (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Not all Linux architectures define __NR_shutdown; some go via the socketcall(2) multiplexer. 20140205 - (djm) [sandbox-capsicum.c] Don't fatal if Capsicum is offered by headers/libc but not supported by the kernel. Patch from Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC 20140204 - OpenBSD CVS Sync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/27 18:58:14 [Makefile.in digest.c digest.h hostfile.c kex.h mac.c hmac.c hmac.h] replace openssl HMAC with an implementation based on our ssh_digest_* ok and feedback djm@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/27 19:18:54 [auth-rsa.c cipher.c ssh-agent.c sshconnect1.c sshd.c] replace openssl MD5 with our ssh_digest_*; ok djm@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/27 20:13:46 [digest.c digest-openssl.c digest-libc.c Makefile.in] rename digest.c to digest-openssl.c and add libc variant; ok djm@ - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/28 14:13:39 [ssh-keyscan.1] kill some bad Pa; From: Jan Stary - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/29 00:19:26 [sshd.c] use kill(0, ...) instead of killpg(0, ...); on most operating systems they are equivalent, but SUSv2 describes the latter as having undefined behaviour; from portable; ok dtucker (Id sync only; change is already in portable) - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/29 06:18:35 [Makefile.in auth.h auth2-jpake.c auth2.c jpake.c jpake.h monitor.c] [monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h readconf.c readconf.h] [schnorr.c schnorr.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c] remove experimental, never-enabled JPAKE code; ok markus@ - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/29 14:04:51 [sshd_config.5] document kbdinteractiveauthentication; requested From: Ross L Richardson dtucker/markus helped explain its workings; - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/30 22:26:14 [sandbox-systrace.c] allow shutdown(2) syscall in sandbox - it may be called by packet_close() from portable (Id sync only; change is already in portable) - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/31 16:39:19 [auth2-chall.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufec.c canohost.c] [channels.c cipher-chachapoly.c clientloop.c configure.ac hostfile.c] [kexc25519.c krl.c monitor.c sandbox-systrace.c session.c] [sftp-client.c ssh-keygen.c ssh.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshlogin.c] [openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] replace most bzero with explicit_bzero, except a few that cna be memset ok djm dtucker - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/02 03:44:32 [auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-passwd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c cipher-3des1.c cipher.c clientloop.c gss-serv.c kex.c] [kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexecdhc.c kexgexc.c kexecdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c] [monitor.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c readpass.c rsa.c serverloop.c] [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c] [ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c] convert memset of potentially-private data to explicit_bzero() - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/03 23:28:00 [ssh-ecdsa.c] fix memory leak; ECDSA_SIG_new() allocates 'r' and 's' for us, unlike DSA_SIG_new. Reported by Batz Spear; ok markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/02 03:44:31 [digest-libc.c digest-openssl.c] convert memset of potentially-private data to explicit_bzero() - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/04 00:24:29 [ssh.c] delay lowercasing of hostname until right before hostname canonicalisation to unbreak case-sensitive matching of ssh_config; reported by Ike Devolder; ok markus@ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/Makefile.in] Add missing explicit_bzero.o - (djm) [regress/setuid-allowed.c] Missing string.h for strerror() 20140131 - (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c sandbox-systrace.c] Allow shutdown(2) syscall from sandboxes; it may be called by packet_close. - (dtucker) [readconf.c] Include for the hton macros. Fixes build with HP-UX's compiler. Patch from Kevin Brott. - (tim) [Makefile.in] build regress/setuid-allow. 20140130 - (djm) [configure.ac] Only check for width-specified integer types in headers that actually exist. patch from Tom G. Christensen; ok dtucker@ - (djm) [configure.ac atomicio.c] Kludge around NetBSD offering different symbols for 'read' when various compiler flags are in use, causing atomicio.c comparisons against it to break and read/write operations to hang; ok dtucker - (djm) Release openssh-6.5p1 20140129 - (djm) [configure.ac] Fix broken shell test '==' vs '='; patch from Tom G. Christensen 20140128 - (djm) [configure.ac] Search for inet_ntop in libnsl and libresovl; ok dtucker - (djm) [sshd.c] Use kill(0, ...) instead of killpg(0, ...); the latter being specified to have undefined behaviour in SUSv3; ok dtucker - (tim) [regress/agent.sh regress/agent-ptrace.sh] Assign $? to a variable when used as an error message inside an if statement so we display the correct into. agent.sh patch from Petr Lautrbach. 20140127 - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Remove trailing backslash which some make implementations (eg older Solaris) do not cope with. 20140126 - OpenBSD CVS Sync - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/25 10:12:50 [cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h kexgexc.c] Add a special case for the DH group size for 3des-cbc, which has an effective strength much lower than the key size. This causes problems with some cryptlib implementations, which don't support group sizes larger than 4k but also don't use the largest group size it does support as specified in the RFC. Based on a patch from Petr Lautrbach at Redhat, reduced by me with input from Markus. ok djm@ markus@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/25 20:35:37 [kex.c] dh_need needs to be set to max(seclen, blocksize, ivlen, mac_len) ok dtucker@, noted by mancha - (djm) [configure.ac sandbox-capsicum.c sandbox-rlimit.c] Disable RLIMIT_NOFILE pseudo-sandbox on FreeBSD. In some configurations, libc will attempt to open additional file descriptors for crypto offload and crash if they cannot be opened. - (djm) [configure.ac] correct AC_DEFINE for previous. 20140125 - (djm) [configure.ac] Fix detection of capsicum sandbox on FreeBSD - (djm) [configure.ac] Do not attempt to use capsicum sandbox unless sys/capability.h exists and cap_rights_limit is in libc. Fixes build on FreeBSD9x which provides the header but not the libc support. - (djm) [configure.ac] autoconf sets finds to 'yes' not '1', so test against the correct thing. 20140124 - (djm) [Makefile.in regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh regress/scp.sh] Make the scp regress test actually test the built scp rather than the one in $PATH. ok dtucker@ 20140123 - (tim) [session.c] Improve error reporting on set_id(). - (dtucker) [configure.ac] NetBSD's (and FreeBSD's) strnvis is gratuitously incompatible with OpenBSD's despite post-dating it by more than a decade. Declare it as broken, and document FreeBSD's as the same. ok djm@ 20140122 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c] Don't fail to compile if a platform that is expected to use the reuse-argv style setproctitle hack surprises us by providing a setproctitle in libc; ok dtucker - (djm) [configure.ac] Unless specifically requested, only attempt to build Position Independent Executables on gcc >= 4.x; ok dtucker - (djm) [configure.ac aclocal.m4] More tests to detect fallout from platform hardening options: include some long long int arithmatic to detect missing support functions for -ftrapv in libgcc and equivalents, actually test linking when -ftrapv is supplied and set either both -pie/-fPIE or neither. feedback and ok dtucker@ 20140121 - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Make PIE a configure-time option which defaults to on platforms where it's known to be reliably detected and off elsewhere. Works around platforms such as FreeBSD 9.1 where it does not interop with -ftrapv (it seems to work but fails when trying to link ssh). ok djm@ - (dtucker) [aclocal.m4] Differentiate between compile-time and link-time tests in the configure output. ok djm. - (tim) [platform.c session.c] Fix bug affecting SVR5 platforms introduced with sftp chroot support. Move set_id call after chroot. - (djm) [aclocal.m4] Flesh out the code run in the OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE and OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK tests to give them a better chance of detecting toolchain-related problems; ok dtucker 20140120 - (dtucker) [gss-serv-krb5.c] Fall back to krb5_cc_gen_new if the Kerberos implementation does not have krb5_cc_new_unique, similar to what we do in auth-krb5.c. - (djm) [regress/cert-hostkey.sh] Fix regress failure on platforms that skip one or more key types (e.g. RHEL/CentOS 6.5); ok dtucker@ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/20 00:08:48 [digest.c] memleak; found by Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC; ok markus@ 20140119 - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/17 06:23:24 [sftp-server.c] fix log message statvfs. ok djm - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/18 09:36:26 [session.c] explicitly define USE_PIPES to 1 to prevent redefinition warnings in portable on platforms that use pipes for everything. From vinschen at redhat. - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/19 04:17:29 [canohost.c addrmatch.c] Cast socklen_t when comparing to size_t and use socklen_t to iterate over the ip options, both to prevent signed/unsigned comparison warnings. Patch from vinschen at redhat via portable openssh, begrudging ok deraadt. - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/19 04:48:08 [ssh_config.5] fix inverted meaning of 'no' and 'yes' for CanonicalizeFallbackLocal - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/19 11:21:51 [addrmatch.c] Cast the sizeof to socklen_t so it'll work even if the supplied len is negative. Suggested by and ok djm, ok deraadt. 20140118 - (dtucker) [uidswap.c] Prevent unused variable warnings on Cygwin. Patch from vinschen at redhat.com - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h] Add missing function declarations that stopped being included when we stopped including from openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h. Patch from vinschen at redhat.com. - (dtucker) [configure.ac] On Cygwin the getopt variables (like optargs, optind) are defined in getopt.h already. Unfortunately they are defined as "declspec(dllimport)" for historical reasons, because the GNU linker didn't allow auto-import on PE/COFF targets way back when. The problem is the dllexport attributes collide with the definitions in the various source files in OpenSSH, which obviousy define the variables without declspec(dllimport). The least intrusive way to get rid of these warnings is to disable warnings for GCC compiler attributes when building on Cygwin. Patch from vinschen at redhat.com. - (dtucker) [sandbox-capsicum.c] Correct some error messages and make the return value check for cap_enter() consistent with the other uses in FreeBSD. From by Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC via bz#2140. 20140117 - (dtucker) [aclocal.m4 configure.ac] Add some additional compiler/toolchain hardening flags including -fstack-protector-strong. These default to on if the toolchain supports them, but there is a configure-time knob (--without-hardening) to disable them if necessary. ok djm@ - (djm) [sftp-client.c] signed/unsigned comparison fix - (dtucker) [loginrec.c] Cast to the types specfied in the format specification to prevent warnings. - (dtucker) [crypto_api.h] Wrap stdlib.h include inside #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H. - (dtucker) [poly1305.c] Wrap stdlib.h include inside #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H. - (dtucker) [blocks.c fe25519.c ge25519.c hash.c sc25519.c verify.c] Include includes.h to pull in all of the compatibility stuff. - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c] Wrap stdlib.h include inside #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H. - (dtucker) [defines.h] Add typedefs for uintXX_t types for platforms that don't have them. - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Split AC_CHECK_FUNCS for OpenSSL functions into separate lines and alphabetize for easier diffing of changes. - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/17 00:21:06 [sftp-client.c] signed/unsigned comparison warning fix; from portable (Id sync only) - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/17 05:26:41 [digest.c] remove unused includes. ok djm@ - (djm) [Makefile.in configure.ac sandbox-capsicum.c sandbox-darwin.c] [sandbox-null.c sandbox-rlimit.c sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] [sandbox-systrace.c ssh-sandbox.h sshd.c] Support preauth sandboxing using the Capsicum API introduced in FreeBSD 10. Patch by Dag-Erling Smorgrav, updated by Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC; ok dtucker@ - (dtucker) [configure.ac digest.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Add compatibility layer for older openssl versions. ok djm@ - (dtucker) Fix typo in #ifndef. - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h] Implement enough of statvfs on top of statfs to be useful (and for the regression tests to pass) on platforms that have statfs and fstatfs. ok djm@ - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h] Only start including headers if we need them to cut down on the name collisions. - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Also look in inttypes.h for uintXX_t types. - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Have --without-hardening not turn off stack-protector since that has a separate flag that's been around a while. - (dtucker) [readconf.c] Wrap paths.h inside an ifdef. Allows building on Solaris. - (dtucker) [defines.h] Move our definitions of uintXX_t types down to after they're defined if we have to define them ourselves. Fixes builds on old AIX. 20140118 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/16 07:31:09 [sftp-client.c] needless and incorrect cast to size_t can break resumption of large download; patch from tobias@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/16 07:32:00 [version.h] openssh-6.5 - (djm) [contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec] [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Crank RPM spec version numbers. - (djm) [README] update release notes URL. 20140112 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/10 05:59:19 [sshd_config] the /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key is loaded by default too - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/12 08:13:13 [bufaux.c buffer.h kex.c kex.h kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c kexc25519s.c] [kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c] avoid use of OpenSSL BIGNUM type and functions for KEX with Curve25519 by adding a buffer_put_bignum2_from_string() that stores a string using the bignum encoding rules. Will make it easier to build a reduced-feature OpenSSH without OpenSSL in the future; ok markus@ 20140110 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/04 17:50:55 [mac.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h xmalloc.c] use standard types and formats for size_t like variables. ok dtucker - guenther@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/09 03:26:00 [sftp-common.c] When formating the time for "ls -l"-style output, show dates in the future with the year, and rearrange a comparison to avoid a potentional signed arithmetic overflow that would give the wrong result. ok djm@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/09 23:20:00 [digest.c digest.h hostfile.c kex.c kex.h kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c] [kexc25519s.c kexdh.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c] [kexgexs.c key.c key.h roaming_client.c roaming_common.c schnorr.c] [schnorr.h ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect2.c] Introduce digest API and use it to perform all hashing operations rather than calling OpenSSL EVP_Digest* directly. Will make it easier to build a reduced-feature OpenSSH without OpenSSL in future; feedback, ok markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/09 23:26:48 [sshconnect.c sshd.c] ban clients/servers that suffer from SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY, they are ancient, deranged and might make some attacks on KEX easier; ok markus@ 20140108 - (djm) [regress/.cvsignore] Ignore regress test droppings; ok dtucker@ 20131231 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/30 23:52:28 [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-pubkey.c compat.c compat.h ssh-rsa.c] [sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients/servers that use the obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme. it will still be possible to connect with these clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and we'll deprecate them entirely in a future release. ok markus@ 20131229 - (djm) [loginrec.c] Check for username truncation when looking up lastlog entries - (djm) [regress/Makefile] Add some generated files for cleaning - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/19 00:10:30 [ssh-add.c] skip requesting smartcard PIN when removing keys from agent; bz#2187 patch from jay AT slushpupie.com; ok dtucker - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/19 00:19:12 [serverloop.c] Cast client_alive_interval to u_int64_t before assinging to max_time_milliseconds to avoid potential integer overflow in the timeout. bz#2170, patch from Loganaden Velvindron, ok djm@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/19 00:27:57 [auth-options.c] simplify freeing of source-address certificate restriction - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/19 01:04:36 [channels.c] bz#2147: fix multiple remote forwardings with dynamically assigned listen ports. In the s->c message to open the channel we were sending zero (the magic number to request a dynamic port) instead of the actual listen port. The client therefore had no way of discriminating between them. Diagnosis and fix by ronf AT timeheart.net - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/19 01:19:41 [ssh-agent.c] bz#2186: don't crash (NULL deref) when deleting PKCS#11 keys from an agent that has a mix of normal and PKCS#11 keys; fix from jay AT slushpupie.com; ok dtucker - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/19 22:57:13 [poly1305.c poly1305.h] use full name for author, with his permission - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/21 07:10:47 [ssh-keygen.1] small typo - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/27 22:30:17 [ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-rsa.c] make the original RSA and DSA signing/verification code look more like the ECDSA/Ed25519 ones: use key_type_plain() when checking the key type rather than tediously listing all variants, use __func__ for debug/ error messages - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/27 22:37:18 [ssh-rsa.c] correct comment - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 02:28:10 [key.c] allow ed25519 keys to appear as certificate authorities - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 02:37:04 [key.c] correct comment for key_to_certified() - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 02:49:52 [key.c] correct comment for key_drop_cert() - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 04:20:04 [key.c] to make sure we don't omit any key types as valid CA keys again, factor the valid key type check into a key_type_is_valid_ca() function - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 04:29:25 [authfd.c] allow deletion of ed25519 keys from the agent - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 04:35:50 [authfile.c] don't refuse to load Ed25519 certificates - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 05:42:16 [ssh.c] don't forget to load Ed25519 certs too - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/29 05:57:02 [sshconnect.c] when showing other hostkeys, don't forget Ed25519 keys 20131221 - (dtucker) [regress/keytype.sh] Actually test ecdsa key types. 20131219 - (dtucker) [configure.ac] bz#2178: Don't try to use BSM on Solaris versions greater than 11 either rather than just 11. Patch from Tomas Kuthan. - (dtucker) [auth-pam.c] bz#2163: check return value from pam_get_item(). Patch from Loganaden Velvindron. 20131218 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/07 08:08:26 [ssh-keygen.1] document -a and -o wrt new key format - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/07 11:58:46 [ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh.1] [ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd_config.5] add missing mentions of ed25519; ok djm@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/08 09:53:27 [sshd_config.5] Use a literal for the default value of KEXAlgorithms. ok deraadt jmc - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/09 11:03:45 [blocks.c ed25519.c fe25519.c fe25519.h ge25519.c ge25519.h] [ge25519_base.data hash.c sc25519.c sc25519.h verify.c] Add Authors for the public domain ed25519/nacl code. see also http://nacl.cr.yp.to/features.html All of the NaCl software is in the public domain. and http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/software.html The Ed25519 software is in the public domain. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/09 11:08:17 [crypto_api.h] remove unused defines - pascal@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/15 18:17:26 [ssh-add.c] Make ssh-add also add .ssh/id_ed25519; fixes lie in manual page. ok markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/15 21:42:35 [cipher-chachapoly.c] add some comments and constify a constant - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/17 10:36:38 [crypto_api.h] I've assempled the header file by cut&pasting from generated headers and the source files. 20131208 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c] Missing header; from Corinna Vinschen - (djm) [Makefile.in regress/Makefile regress/agent-ptrace.sh] [regress/setuid-allowed.c] Check that ssh-agent is not on a no-setuid filesystem before running agent-ptrace.sh; ok dtucker 20131207 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/05 22:59:45 [sftp-client.c] fix memory leak in error path in do_readdir(); pointed out by Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC in bz#2163 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 03:40:51 [ssh-keygen.c] remove duplicated character ('g') in getopt() string; document the (few) remaining option characters so we don't have to rummage next time. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 13:30:08 [authfd.c key.c key.h ssh-agent.c] move private key (de)serialization to key.c; ok djm - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 13:34:54 [authfile.c authfile.h cipher.c cipher.h key.c packet.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-keygen.c PROTOCOL.key] new private key format, bcrypt as KDF by default; details in PROTOCOL.key; feedback and lots help from djm; ok djm@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 13:39:49 [authfd.c authfile.c key.c key.h myproposal.h pathnames.h readconf.c] [servconf.c ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c] [ssh-keysign.c ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd.c verify.c ssh-ed25519.c] [sc25519.h sc25519.c hash.c ge25519_base.data ge25519.h ge25519.c] [fe25519.h fe25519.c ed25519.c crypto_api.h blocks.c] support ed25519 keys (hostkeys and user identities) using the public domain ed25519 reference code from SUPERCOP, see http://ed25519.cr.yp.to/software.html feedback, help & ok djm@ - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 15:29:07 [sshd.8] missing comma; - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/07 00:19:15 [key.c] set k->cert = NULL after freeing it - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/06 13:52:46 [regress/Makefile regress/agent.sh regress/cert-hostkey.sh] [regress/cert-userkey.sh regress/keytype.sh] test ed25519 support; from djm@ - (djm) [blocks.c ed25519.c fe25519.c fe25519.h ge25519.c ge25519.h] [ge25519_base.data hash.c sc25519.c sc25519.h verify.c] Fix RCS idents - (djm) [Makefile.in] Add ed25519 sources - (djm) [authfile.c] Conditionalise inclusion of util.h - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/Makefile.in openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c] [openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/blowfish.c] [openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Start at supporting bcrypt_pbkdf in portable. - (djm) [ed25519.c ssh-ed25519.c openbsd-compat/Makefile.in] [openbsd-compat/bcrypt_pbkdf.c] Make ed25519/new key format compile on Linux - (djm) [regress/cert-hostkey.sh] Fix merge botch - (djm) [Makefile.in] PATHSUBS and keygen bits for Ed25519; from Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC in bz#2179 20131205 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/21 08:05:09 [ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] no need for .Pp before displays; - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/25 18:04:21 [ssh.1 ssh.c] improve -Q usage and such. One usage change is that the option is now case-sensitive ok dtucker markus djm - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/26 12:14:54 [ssh.1 ssh.c] - put -Q in the right place - Ar was a poor choice for the arguments to -Q. i've chosen an admittedly equally poor Cm, at least consistent with the rest of the docs. also no need for multiple instances - zap a now redundant Nm - usage() sync - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/26 19:15:09 [pkcs11.h] cleanup 1 << 31 idioms. Resurrection of this issue pointed out by Eitan Adler ok markus for ssh, implies same change in kerberosV - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/01 23:19:05 [PROTOCOL] mention curve25519-sha256@libssh.org key exchange algorithm - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/02 02:50:27 [PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305] typo; from Jon Cave - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/02 02:56:17 [ssh-pkcs11-helper.c] use-after-free; bz#2175 patch from Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/02 03:09:22 [key.c] make key_to_blob() return a NULL blob on failure; part of bz#2175 from Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/02 03:13:14 [cipher.c] correct bzero of chacha20+poly1305 key context. bz#2177 from Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC Also make it a memset for consistency with the rest of cipher.c - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/04 04:20:01 [sftp-client.c] bz#2171: don't leak local_fd on error; from Loganaden Velvindron @ AfriNIC - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/05 01:16:41 [servconf.c servconf.h] bz#2161 - fix AuthorizedKeysCommand inside a Match block and rearrange things so the same error is harder to make next time; with and ok dtucker@ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] bz#2173: use pkg-config --libs to include correct -L location for libedit. Patch from Serge van den Boom. 20131121 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/08 11:15:19 [bufaux.c bufbn.c buffer.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c] [uidswap.c] Include stdlib.h for free() as per the man page. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/13 13:48:20 [ssh-pkcs11.c] add missing braces found by pedro - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/20 02:19:01 [sshd.c] delay closure of in/out fds until after "Bad protocol version identification..." message, as get_remote_ipaddr/get_remote_port require them open. - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/20 20:53:10 [scp.c] unsigned casts for ctype macros where neccessary ok guenther millert markus - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/20 20:54:10 [canohost.c clientloop.c match.c readconf.c sftp.c] unsigned casts for ctype macros where neccessary ok guenther millert markus - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/21 00:45:44 [Makefile.in PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 authfile.c chacha.c] [chacha.h cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly.h cipher.c cipher.h] [dh.c myproposal.h packet.c poly1305.c poly1305.h servconf.c ssh.1] [ssh.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] Add a new protocol 2 transport cipher "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" that combines Daniel Bernstein's ChaCha20 stream cipher and Poly1305 MAC to build an authenticated encryption mode. Inspired by and similar to Adam Langley's proposal for TLS: http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-chacha20poly1305-03 but differs in layout used for the MAC calculation and the use of a second ChaCha20 instance to separately encrypt packet lengths. Details are in the PROTOCOL.chacha20poly1305 file. Feedback markus@, naddy@; manpage bits Loganden Velvindron @ AfriNIC ok markus@ naddy@ - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/18 05:09:32 [regress/forward-control.sh] bump timeout to 10 seconds to allow slow machines (e.g. Alpha PC164) to successfully run this; ok djm@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/21 03:15:46 [regress/krl.sh] add some reminders for additional tests that I'd like to implement - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/21 03:16:47 [regress/modpipe.c] use unsigned long long instead of u_int64_t here to avoid warnings on some systems portable OpenSSH is built on. - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/21 03:18:51 [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/integrity.sh regress/rekey.sh] [regress/try-ciphers.sh] use new "ssh -Q cipher-auth" query to obtain lists of authenticated encryption ciphers instead of specifying them manually; ensures that the new chacha20poly1305@openssh.com mode is tested; ok markus@ and naddy@ as part of the diff to add chacha20poly1305@openssh.com 20131110 - (dtucker) [regress/keytype.sh] Populate ECDSA key types to be tested by querying the ones that are compiled in. 20131109 - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/09 05:41:34 [regress/test-exec.sh regress/rekey.sh] Use smaller test data files to speed up tests. Grow test datafiles where necessary for a specific test. - (dtucker) [configure.ac kex.c key.c myproposal.h] Test for the presence of NID_X9_62_prime256v1, NID_secp384r1 and NID_secp521r1 and test that the latter actually works before using it. Fedora (at least) has NID_secp521r1 that doesn't work (see https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1021897). - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Fix brackets in NID_secp521r1 test. - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Add missing "test". - (dtucker) [key.c] Check for the correct defines for NID_secp521r1. 20131108 - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/08 01:06:14 [regress/rekey.sh] Rekey less frequently during tests to speed them up - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/07 11:58:27 [cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h mac.c mac.h servconf.c ssh.c] Output the effective values of Ciphers, MACs and KexAlgorithms when the default has not been overridden. ok markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/08 00:39:15 [auth-options.c auth2-chall.c authfd.c channels.c cipher-3des1.c] [clientloop.c gss-genr.c monitor_mm.c packet.c schnorr.c umac.c] [sftp-client.c sftp-glob.c] use calloc for all structure allocations; from markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/08 01:38:11 [version.h] openssh-6.4 - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec] [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Update version numbers following release. - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Add null implementation of arc4random_stir for platforms that have arc4random but don't have arc4random_stir (right now this is only OpenBSD -current). - (dtucker) [kex.c] Only enable CURVE25519_SHA256 if we actually have EVP_sha256. - (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Conditionally enable CURVE25519_SHA256. - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.c] Add headers to prevent compile warnings. - (dtucker) [Makefile.in configure.ac] Set MALLOC_OPTIONS per platform and pass in TEST_ENV. use stderr to get polluted and the stderr-data test to fail. - (dtucker) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] Simplify host key generation: rather than testing and generating each key, call ssh-keygen -A. Patch from vinschen at redhat.com. - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/09 05:41:34 [regress/test-exec.sh regress/rekey.sh] Use smaller test data files to speed up tests. Grow test datafiles where necessary for a specific test. 20131107 - (djm) [ssh-pkcs11.c] Bring back "non-constant initialiser" fix (rev 1.5) that got lost in recent merge. - (djm) [Makefile.in monitor.c] Missed chunks of curve25519 KEX diff - (djm) [regress/modpipe.c regress/rekey.sh] Never intended to commit these - (djm) [configure.ac defines.h] Skip arc4random_stir() calls on platforms that lack it but have arc4random_uniform() - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/04 11:51:16 [monitor.c] fix rekeying for KEX_C25519_SHA256; noted by dtucker@ RCSID sync only; I thought this was a merge botch and fixed it already - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/06 16:52:11 [monitor_wrap.c] fix rekeying for AES-GCM modes; ok deraadt - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/06 23:05:59 [ssh-pkcs11.c] from portable: s/true/true_val/ to avoid name collisions on dump platforms RCSID sync only - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/09 23:44:14 [regress/Makefile] (ID sync only) regression test for sftp request white/blacklisting and readonly mode. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 22:39:53 [regress/kextype.sh] add curve25519-sha256@libssh.org - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/04 12:27:42 [regress/rekey.sh] Test rekeying with all KexAlgorithms. - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/07 00:12:05 [regress/rekey.sh] Test rekeying for every Cipher, MAC and KEX, plus test every KEX with the GCM ciphers. - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/07 01:12:51 [regress/rekey.sh] Factor out the data transfer rekey tests - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/07 02:48:38 [regress/integrity.sh regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh] Use ssh -Q instead of hardcoding lists of ciphers or MACs. - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/07 03:55:41 [regress/kextype.sh] Use ssh -Q to get kex types instead of a static list. - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/07 04:26:56 [regress/kextype.sh] trailing space - (dtucker) [Makefile.in configure.ac] Remove TEST_SSH_SHA256 environment variable. It's no longer used now that we get the supported MACs from ssh -Q. 20131104 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 20:03:54 [ssh-pkcs11.c] support pkcs#11 tokes that only provide x509 zerts instead of raw pubkeys; fixes bz#1908; based on patch from Laurent Barbe; ok djm - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 21:59:15 [kex.c kex.h myproposal.h ssh-keyscan.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] use curve25519 for default key exchange (curve25519-sha256@libssh.org); initial patch from Aris Adamantiadis; ok djm@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 22:10:15 [kexdhs.c kexecdhs.c] no need to include monitor_wrap.h - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 22:24:24 [kexdhs.c kexecdhs.c] no need to include ssh-gss.h - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 22:34:01 [auth-options.c] no need to include monitor_wrap.h and ssh-gss.h - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/02 22:39:19 [ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] the default kex is now curve25519-sha256@libssh.org - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/11/03 10:37:19 [roaming_common.c] fix a couple of function definitions foo() -> foo(void) (-Wold-style-definition) - (djm) [kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c kexc25519s.c] Import missed files from KEX/curve25519 change 20131103 - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c] Include time.h for nanosleep. From OpenSMTPD where it prevents "implicit declaration" warnings (it's a no-op in OpenSSH). From chl at openbsd. - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/setproctitle.c] Handle error case form the 2nd vsnprintf. From eric at openbsd via chl@. - (dtucker) [configure.ac defines.h] Add typedefs for intmax_t and uintmax_t for platforms that don't have them. 20131030 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/29 09:42:11 [key.c key.h] fix potential stack exhaustion caused by nested certificates; report by Mateusz Kocielski; ok dtucker@ markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/29 09:48:02 [servconf.c servconf.h session.c sshd_config sshd_config.5] shd_config PermitTTY to disallow TTY allocation, mirroring the longstanding no-pty authorized_keys option; bz#2070, patch from Teran McKinney; ok markus@ - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/29 18:49:32 [sshd_config.5] pty(4), not pty(7); 20131026 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/25 23:04:51 [ssh.c] fix crash when using ProxyCommand caused by previous commit - was calling freeaddrinfo(NULL); spotted by sthen@ and Tim Ruehsen, patch by sthen@ 20131025 - (djm) [ssh-keygen.c ssh-keysign.c sshconnect1.c sshd.c] Remove unnecessary arc4random_stir() calls. The only ones left are to ensure that the PRNG gets a different state after fork() for platforms that have broken the API. 20131024 - (djm) [auth-krb5.c] bz#2032 - use local username in krb5_kuserok check rather than full client name which may be of form user@REALM; patch from Miguel Sanders; ok dtucker@ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/23 05:40:58 [servconf.c] fix comment - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/23 23:35:32 [sshd.c] include local address and port in "Connection from ..." message (only shown at loglevel>=verbose) - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/24 00:49:49 [moduli.c] Periodically print progress and, if possible, expected time to completion when screening moduli for DH groups. ok deraadt djm - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/24 00:51:48 [readconf.c servconf.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] Disallow empty Match statements and add "Match all" which matches everything. ok djm, man page help jmc@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/24 08:19:36 [ssh.c] fix bug introduced in hostname canonicalisation commit: don't try to resolve hostnames when a ProxyCommand is set unless the user has forced canonicalisation; spotted by Iain Morgan - (tim) [regress/sftp-perm.sh] We need a shell that understands "! somecmd" 20131023 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/20 04:39:28 [ssh_config.5] document % expansions performed by "Match command ..." - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/20 06:19:28 [readconf.c ssh_config.5] rename "command" subclause of the recently-added "Match" keyword to "exec"; it's shorter, clearer in intent and we might want to add the ability to match against the command being executed at the remote end in the future. - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/20 09:51:26 [scp.1 sftp.1] add canonicalisation options to -o lists - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/20 18:00:13 [ssh_config.5] tweak the "exec" description, as worded by djm; - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/23 03:03:07 [readconf.c] Hostname may have %h sequences that should be expanded prior to Match evaluation; spotted by Iain Morgan - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/23 03:05:19 [readconf.c ssh.c] comment - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/23 04:16:22 [ssh-keygen.c] Make code match documentation: relative-specified certificate expiry time should be relative to current time and not the validity start time. Reported by Petr Lautrbach; ok deraadt@ 20131018 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/09 23:44:14 [regress/Makefile regress/sftp-perm.sh] regression test for sftp request white/blacklisting and readonly mode. - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/17 07:35:48 [sftp.1 sftp.c] tweak previous; - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/17 22:08:04 [sshd.c] include remote port in bad banner message; bz#2162 20131017 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/15 14:10:25 [ssh.1 ssh_config.5] tweak previous; - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/16 02:31:47 [readconf.c readconf.h roaming_client.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh_config.5] [sshconnect.c sshconnect.h] Implement client-side hostname canonicalisation to allow an explicit search path of domain suffixes to use to convert unqualified host names to fully-qualified ones for host key matching. This is particularly useful for host certificates, which would otherwise need to list unqualified names alongside fully-qualified ones (and this causes a number of problems). "looks fine" markus@ - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/16 06:42:25 [ssh_config.5] tweak previous; - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/16 22:49:39 [readconf.c readconf.h ssh.1 ssh.c ssh_config.5] s/canonicalise/canonicalize/ for consistency with existing spelling, e.g. authorized_keys; pointed out by naddy@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/16 22:58:01 [ssh.c ssh_config.5] one I missed in previous: s/isation/ization/ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/17 00:30:13 [PROTOCOL sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp-server.c sftp.1 sftp.c] fsync@openssh.com protocol extension for sftp-server client support to allow calling fsync() faster successful transfer patch mostly by imorgan AT nas.nasa.gov; bz#1798 "fine" markus@ "grumble OK" deraadt@ "doesn't sound bad to me" millert@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/17 00:46:49 [ssh.c] rearrange check to reduce diff against -portable (Id sync only) 20131015 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/09 23:42:17 [sftp-server.8 sftp-server.c] Add ability to whitelist and/or blacklist sftp protocol requests by name. Refactor dispatch loop and consolidate read-only mode checks. Make global variables static, since sftp-server is linked into sshd(8). ok dtucker@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/10 00:53:25 [sftp-server.c] add -Q, -P and -p to usage() before jmc@ catches me - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/10 01:43:03 [sshd.c] bz#2139: fix re-exec fallback by ensuring that startup_pipe is correctly updated; ok dtucker@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/11 02:45:36 [sftp-client.c] rename flag arguments to be more clear and consistent. reorder some internal function arguments to make adding additional flags easier. no functional change - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/11 02:52:23 [sftp-client.c] missed one arg reorder - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/11 02:53:45 [sftp-client.h] obsolete comment - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/14 14:18:56 [sftp-server.8 sftp-server.c] tweak previous; ok djm - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/14 21:20:52 [session.c session.h] Add logging of session starts in a useful format; ok markus@ feedback and ok dtucker@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/14 22:22:05 [readconf.c readconf.h ssh-keysign.c ssh.c ssh_config.5] add a "Match" keyword to ssh_config that allows matching on hostname, user and result of arbitrary commands. "nice work" markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/14 23:28:23 [canohost.c misc.c misc.h readconf.c sftp-server.c ssh.c] refactor client config code a little: add multistate option partsing to readconf.c, similar to servconf.c's existing code. move checking of options that accept "none" as an argument to readconf.c add a lowercase() function and use it instead of explicit tolower() in loops part of a larger diff that was ok markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/14 23:31:01 [ssh.c] whitespace at EOL; pointed out by markus@ - [ssh.c] g/c unused variable. 20131010 - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync - sthen@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/16 11:35:43 [ssh_config] Remove gssapi config parts from ssh_config, as was already done for sshd_config. Req by/ok ajacoutot@ ID SYNC ONLY for portable; kerberos/gssapi is still pretty popular - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/19 00:24:52 [progressmeter.c] store the initial file offset so the progress meter doesn't freak out when resuming sftp transfers. bz#2137; patch from Iain Morgan; ok dtucker@` - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/19 00:49:12 [sftp-client.c] fix swapped pflag and printflag in sftp upload_dir; from Iain Morgan - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/19 01:24:46 [channels.c] bz#1297 - tell the client (via packet_send_debug) when their preferred listen address has been overridden by the server's GatewayPorts; ok dtucker@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/19 01:26:29 [sshconnect.c] bz#1211: make BindAddress work with UsePrivilegedPort=yes; patch from swp AT swp.pp.ru; ok dtucker@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/10/08 11:42:13 [dh.c dh.h] Increase the size of the Diffie-Hellman groups requested for a each symmetric key size. New values from NIST Special Publication 800-57 with the upper limit specified by RFC4419. Pointed out by Peter Backes, ok djm@. 20131009 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/arc4random.c openbsd-compat/chacha_private.h] Pull in OpenBSD implementation of arc4random, shortly to replace the existing bsd-arc4random.c - (djm) [openbsd-compat/Makefile.in openbsd-compat/arc4random.c] [openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c] Replace old RC4-based arc4random implementation with recent OpenBSD's ChaCha-based PRNG. ok dtucker@, tested tim@ 20130922 - (dtucker) [platform.c platform.h sshd.c] bz#2156: restore Linux oom_adj setting when handling SIGHUP to maintain behaviour over retart. Patch from Matthew Ife. 20130918 - (dtucker) [sshd_config] Trailing whitespace; from jstjohn at purdue edu. 20130914 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/22 19:02:21 [sshd.c] Stir PRNG after post-accept fork. The child gets a different PRNG state anyway via rexec and explicit privsep reseeds, but it's good to be sure. ok markus@ - mikeb@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/28 12:34:27 [ssh-keygen.c] improve batch processing a bit by making use of the quite flag a bit more often and exit with a non zero code if asked to find a hostname in a known_hosts file and it wasn't there; originally from reyk@, ok djm - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/31 00:13:54 [sftp.c] make ^w match ksh behaviour (delete previous word instead of entire line) - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/02 22:00:34 [ssh-keygen.c sshconnect1.c sshd.c] All the instances of arc4random_stir() are bogus, since arc4random() does this itself, inside itself, and has for a very long time.. Actually, this was probably reducing the entropy available. ok djm ID SYNC ONLY for portable; we don't trust other arc4random implementations to do this right. - sthen@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/07 13:53:11 [sshd_config] Remove commented-out kerberos/gssapi config options from sample config, kerberos support is currently not enabled in ssh in OpenBSD. Discussed with various people; ok deraadt@ ID SYNC ONLY for portable; kerberos/gssapi is still pretty popular - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/12 01:41:12 [clientloop.c] fix connection crash when sending break (~B) on ControlPersist'd session; ok dtucker@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/09/13 06:54:34 [channels.c] avoid unaligned access in code that reused a buffer to send a struct in_addr in a reply; simpler just use use buffer_put_int(); from portable; spotted by and ok dtucker@ 20130828 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c] teach our local snprintf code the 'j' (intmax_t/uintmax_t) and 'z' (size_t/ssize_t) conversions in case we start to use them in the future. - (djm) [openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c] #ifdef noytet for intmax_t bits until we have configure support. 20130821 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/06 23:03:49 [sftp.c] fix some whitespace at EOL make list of commands an enum rather than a long list of defines add -a to usage() - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/06 23:05:01 [sftp.1] document top-level -a option (the -a option to 'get' was already documented) - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/06 23:06:01 [servconf.c] add cast to avoid format warning; from portable - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/07 06:24:51 [sftp.1 sftp.c] sort -a; - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/08 04:52:04 [sftp.c] fix two year old regression: symlinking a file would incorrectly canonicalise the target path. bz#2129 report from delphij AT freebsd.org - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/08 05:04:03 [sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp.c] add a "-l" flag for the rename command to force it to use the silly standard SSH_FXP_RENAME command instead of the POSIX-rename- like posix-rename@openssh.com extension. intended for use in regress tests, so no documentation. - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/09 03:37:25 [sftp.c] do getopt parsing for all sftp commands (with an empty optstring for commands without arguments) to ensure consistent behaviour - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/09 03:39:13 [sftp-client.c] two problems found by a to-be-committed regress test: 1) msg_id was not being initialised so was starting at a random value from the heap (harmless, but confusing). 2) some error conditions were not being propagated back to the caller - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/09 03:56:42 [sftp.c] enable ctrl-left-arrow and ctrl-right-arrow to move forward/back a word; matching ksh's relatively recent change. - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/13 18:32:08 [ssh-keygen.c] typo in error message; from Stephan Rickauer - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/13 18:33:08 [ssh-keygen.c] another of the same typo - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/14 08:39:27 [scp.1 ssh.1] some Bx/Ox conversion; From: Jan Stary - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/20 00:11:38 [readconf.c readconf.h ssh_config.5 sshconnect.c] Add a ssh_config ProxyUseFDPass option that supports the use of ProxyCommands that establish a connection and then pass a connected file descriptor back to ssh(1). This allows the ProxyCommand to exit rather than have to shuffle data back and forth and enables ssh to use getpeername, etc. to obtain address information just like it does with regular directly-connected sockets. ok markus@ - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/08/20 06:56:07 [ssh.1 ssh_config.5] some proxyusefdpass tweaks; 20130808 - (dtucker) [regress/Makefile regress/test-exec.sh] Don't try to use test -nt since some platforms (eg really old FreeBSD) don't have it. Instead, run "make clean" before a complete regress run. ok djm. - (dtucker) [misc.c] Fall back to time(2) at runtime if clock_gettime( CLOCK_MONOTONIC...) fails. Some older versions of RHEL have the CLOCK_MONOTONIC define but don't actually support it. Found and tested by Kevin Brott, ok djm. - (dtucker) [misc.c] Remove define added for fallback testing that was mistakenly included in the previous commit. - (dtucker) [regress/Makefile regress/test-exec.sh] Roll back the -nt removal. The "make clean" removes modpipe which is built by the top-level directory before running the tests. Spotted by tim@ - (djm) Release 6.3p1 20130804 - (dtucker) [auth-krb5.c configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h] Add support for building with older Heimdal versions. ok djm. 20130801 - (djm) [channels.c channels.h] bz#2135: On Solaris, isatty() on a non- blocking connecting socket will clear any stored errno that might otherwise have been retrievable via getsockopt(). A hack to limit writes to TTYs on AIX was triggering this. Since only AIX needs the hack, wrap it in an #ifdef. Diagnosis and patch from Ivo Raisr. - (djm) [sshlogin.h] Fix prototype merge botch from 2006; bz#2134 20130725 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/20 22:20:42 [krl.c] fix verification error in (as-yet usused) KRL signature checking path - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/22 05:00:17 [umac.c] make MAC key, data to be hashed and nonce for final hash const; checked with -Wcast-qual - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/22 12:20:02 [umac.h] oops, forgot to commit corresponding header change; spotted by jsg and jasper - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/25 00:29:10 [ssh.c] daemonise backgrounded (ControlPersist'ed) multiplexing master to ensure it is fully detached from its controlling terminal. based on debugging - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/25 00:56:52 [sftp-client.c sftp-client.h sftp.1 sftp.c] sftp support for resuming partial downloads; patch mostly by Loganaden Velvindron/AfriNIC with some tweaks by me; feedback and ok dtucker@ "Just be careful" deraadt@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/25 00:57:37 [version.h] openssh-6.3 for release - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/30 20:12:32 [regress/test-exec.sh] use ssh and sshd as testdata since it needs to be >256k for the rekey test - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/10 21:56:43 [regress/forwarding.sh] Add test for forward config parsing - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/21 02:26:26 [regress/sftp-cmds.sh regress/test-exec.sh] unbreak sftp-cmds for renamed test data (s/ls/data/) - (tim) [sftp-client.c] Use of a gcc extension trips up native compilers on Solaris and UnixWare. Feedback and OK djm@ - (tim) [regress/forwarding.sh] Fix for building outside source tree. 20130720 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/19 07:37:48 [auth.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexecdhs.c kexgexs.c monitor.c servconf.c] [servconf.h session.c sshd.c sshd_config.5] add ssh-agent(1) support to sshd(8); allows encrypted hostkeys, or hostkeys on smartcards; most of the work by Zev Weiss; bz #1974 ok djm@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/20 01:43:46 [umac.c] use a union to ensure correct alignment; ok deraadt - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/20 01:44:37 [ssh-keygen.c ssh.c] More useful error message on missing current user in /etc/passwd - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/20 01:50:20 [ssh-agent.c] call cleanup_handler on SIGINT when in debug mode to ensure sockets are cleaned up on manual exit; bz#2120 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/20 01:55:13 [auth-krb5.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c] fix kerberos/GSSAPI deprecation warnings and linking; "looks okay" millert@ 20130718 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/10 19:19:44 [readconf.c] revert 1.203 while we investigate crashes reported by okan@ - guenther@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/17 04:48:42 [scp.c] Handle time_t values as long long's when formatting them and when parsing them from remote servers. Improve error checking in parsing of 'T' lines. ok dtucker@ deraadt@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/20 19:15:06 [krl.c] don't leak the rdata blob on errors; ok djm@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/21 00:34:49 [auth-rsa.c auth.h auth2-hostbased.c auth2-pubkey.c monitor.c] for hostbased authentication, print the client host and user on the auth success/failure line; bz#2064, ok dtucker@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/21 00:37:49 [ssh_config.5] explicitly mention that IdentitiesOnly can be used with IdentityFile to control which keys are offered from an agent. - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/21 05:42:32 [dh.c] sprinkle in some error() to explain moduli(5) parse failures - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/21 05:43:10 [scp.c] make this -Wsign-compare clean after time_t conversion - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/22 06:31:57 [scp.c] improved time_t overflow check suggested by guenther@ - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/27 14:05:37 [ssh-keygen.1 ssh.1 ssh_config.5 sshd.8 sshd_config.5] do not use Sx for sections outwith the man page - ingo informs me that stuff like html will render with broken links; issue reported by Eric S. Raymond, via djm - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/02 12:31:43 [dh.c] remove extra whitespace - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/12 00:19:59 [auth-options.c auth-rsa.c bufaux.c buffer.h channels.c hostfile.c] [hostfile.h mux.c packet.c packet.h roaming_common.c serverloop.c] fix pointer-signedness warnings from clang/llvm-3.3; "seems nice" deraadt@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/12 00:20:00 [sftp.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-pkcs11.c] fix pointer-signedness warnings from clang/llvm-3.3; "seems nice" deraadt@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/12 00:43:50 [misc.c] in ssh_gai_strerror() don't fallback to strerror for EAI_SYSTEM when errno == 0. Avoids confusing error message in some broken resolver cases. bz#2122 patch from plautrba AT redhat.com; ok dtucker - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/12 05:42:03 [ssh-keygen.c] do_print_resource_record() can never be called with a NULL filename, so don't attempt (and bungle) asking for one if it has not been specified bz#2127 ok dtucker@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/12 05:48:55 [ssh.c] set TCP nodelay for connections started with -N; bz#2124 ok dtucker@ - schwarze@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/16 00:07:52 [scp.1 sftp-server.8 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8] use .Mt for email addresses; from Jan Stary ; ok jmc@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/07/18 01:12:26 [ssh.1] be more exact wrt perms for ~/.ssh/config; bz#2078 20130702 - (dtucker) [contrib/cygwin/README contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config contrib/cygwin/ssh-user-config] Modernizes and improve readability of the Cygwin README file (which hasn't been updated for ages), drop unsupported OSes from the ssh-host-config help text, and drop an unneeded option from ssh-user-config. Patch from vinschen at redhat com. 20130610 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/07 15:37:52 [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c] Add an "ABANDONED" channel state and use for mux sessions that are disconnected via the ~. escape sequence. Channels in this state will be able to close if the server responds, but do not count as active channels. This means that if you ~. all of the mux clients when using ControlPersist on a broken network, the backgrounded mux master will exit when the Control Persist time expires rather than hanging around indefinitely. bz#1917, also reported and tested by tedu@. ok djm@ markus@. - (dtucker) [Makefile.in configure.ac fixalgorithms] Remove unsupported algorithms (Ciphers, MACs and HostKeyAlgorithms) from man pages. - (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Do not advertise AES GSM ciphers if we don't have the required OpenSSL support. Patch from naddy at freebsd. - (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Make the conditional algorithm support consistent and add some comments so it's clear what goes where. 20130605 - (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Enable sha256 kex methods based on the presence of the necessary functions, not from the openssl version. - (dtucker) [contrib/ssh-copy-id] bz#2117: Use portable operator in test. Patch from cjwatson at debian. - (dtucker) [regress/forwarding.sh] For (as yet unknown) reason, the forwarding test is extremely slow copying data on some machines so switch back to copying the much smaller ls binary until we can figure out why this is. - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] append $CFLAGS to compiler options when building modpipe in case there's anything in there we need. - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/02 21:01:51 [channels.h] typo in comment - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/02 23:36:29 [clientloop.h clientloop.c mux.c] No need for the mux cleanup callback to be visible so restore it to static and call it through the detach_user function pointer. ok djm@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/03 00:03:18 [mac.c] force the MAC output to be 64-bit aligned so umac won't see unaligned accesses on strict-alignment architectures. bz#2101, patch from tomas.kuthan at oracle.com, ok djm@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/04 19:12:23 [scp.c] use MAXPATHLEN for buffer size instead of fixed value. ok markus - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/04 20:42:36 [sftp.c] Make sftp's libedit interface marginally multibyte aware by building up the quoted string by character instead of by byte. Prevents failures when linked against a libedit built with wide character support (bz#1990). "looks ok" djm - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/05 02:07:29 [mux.c] fix leaks in mux error paths, from Zhenbo Xu, found by Melton. bz#1967, ok djm - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/05 02:27:50 [sshd.c] When running sshd -D, close stderr unless we have explicitly requesting logging to stderr. From james.hunt at ubuntu.com via bz#1976, djm's patch so, err, ok dtucker. - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/05 12:52:38 [sshconnect2.c] Fix memory leaks found by Zhenbo Xu and the Melton tool. bz#1967, ok djm - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/05 22:00:28 [readconf.c] plug another memleak. bz#1967, from Zhenbo Xu, detected by Melton, ok djm - (dtucker) [configure.ac sftp.c openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Cater for platforms that don't have multibyte character support (specifically, mblen). 20130602 - (tim) [Makefile.in] Make Solaris, UnixWare, & OpenServer linkers happy linking regress/modpipe. - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/02 13:33:05 [progressmeter.c] Add misc.h for monotime prototype. (ID sync only). - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/02 13:35:58 [ssh-agent.c] Make parent_alive_interval time_t to avoid signed/unsigned comparison - (dtucker) [configure.ac] sys/un.h needs sys/socket.h on some platforms to prevent noise from configure. Patch from Nathan Osman. (bz#2114). - (dtucker) [configure.ac] bz#2111: don't try to use lastlog on Android. Patch from Nathan Osman. - (tim) [configure.ac regress/Makefile] With rev 1.47 of test-exec.sh we need a shell that can handle "[ file1 -nt file2 ]". Rather than keep dealing with shell portability issues in regression tests, we let configure find us a capable shell on those platforms with an old /bin/sh. - (tim) [aclocal.m4] Enhance OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE to check stderr. feedback and ok dtucker - (tim) [regress/sftp-chroot.sh] skip if no sudo. ok dtucker - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Some platforms need sys/types.h before sys/un.h. - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Some other platforms need sys/types.h before sys/socket.h. 20130601 - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/xcrypt.c] bz#2112: fall back to using openssl's DES_crypt function on platorms that don't have a native one, eg Android. Based on a patch from Nathan Osman. - (dtucker) [configure.ac defines.h] Test for fd_mask, howmany and NFDBITS rather than trying to enumerate the plaforms that don't have them. Based on a patch from Nathan Osman, with help from tim@. - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 00:13:13 [xmalloc.h cipher.c sftp-glob.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sftp-common.c ssh-ecdsa.c auth2-chall.c compat.c readconf.c kexgexs.c monitor.c gss-genr.c cipher-3des1.c kex.c monitor_wrap.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c auth-options.c rsa.c auth2-pubkey.c sftp.c hostfile.c auth2.c servconf.c auth.c authfile.c xmalloc.c uuencode.c sftp-client.c auth2-gss.c sftp-server.c bufaux.c mac.c session.c jpake.c kexgexc.c sshconnect.c auth-chall.c auth2-passwd.c sshconnect1.c buffer.c kexecdhs.c kexdhs.c ssh-rsa.c auth1.c ssh-pkcs11.c auth2-kbdint.c kexdhc.c sshd.c umac.c ssh-dss.c auth2-jpake.c bufbn.c clientloop.c monitor_mm.c scp.c roaming_client.c serverloop.c key.c auth-rsa.c ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-keygen.c match.c channels.c sshconnect2.c addrmatch.c mux.c canohost.c kexecdhc.c schnorr.c ssh-add.c misc.c auth2-hostbased.c ssh-agent.c bufec.c groupaccess.c dns.c packet.c readpass.c authfd.c moduli.c] bye, bye xfree(); ok markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/19 02:38:28 [auth2-pubkey.c] fix failure to recognise cert-authority keys if a key of a different type appeared in authorized_keys before it; ok markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/19 02:42:42 [auth.h auth.c key.c monitor.c auth-rsa.c auth2.c auth1.c key.h] Standardise logging of supplemental information during userauth. Keys and ruser is now logged in the auth success/failure message alongside the local username, remote host/port and protocol in use. Certificates contents and CA are logged too. Pushing all logging onto a single line simplifies log analysis as it is no longer necessary to relate information scattered across multiple log entries. "I like it" markus@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/31 12:28:10 [ssh-agent.c] Use time_t where appropriate. ok djm - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/01 13:15:52 [ssh-agent.c clientloop.c misc.h packet.c progressmeter.c misc.c channels.c sandbox-systrace.c] Use clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC ...) for ssh timers so that things like keepalives and rekeying will work properly over clock steps. Suggested by markus@, "looks good" djm@. - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/01 20:59:25 [scp.c sftp-client.c] Replace S_IWRITE, which isn't standardized, with S_IWUSR, which is. Patch from Nathan Osman via bz#2085. ok deraadt. - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/06/01 22:34:50 [sftp-client.c] Update progressmeter when data is acked, not when it's sent. bz#2108, from Debian via Colin Watson, ok djm@ - (dtucker) [M auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c auth-pam.c cipher-aes.c cipher-ctr.c groupaccess.c loginrec.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c session.c sshd.c sshlogin.c uidswap.c openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-linux.c] Replace portable-specific instances of xfree with the equivalent calls to free. - (dtucker) [configure.ac misc.c] Look for clock_gettime in librt and fall back to time(NULL) if we can't find it anywhere. - (dtucker) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Allow clock_gettimeofday. 20130529 - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h] bz#2087: Add a null implementation of endgrent for platforms that don't have it (eg Android). Loosely based on a patch from Nathan Osman, ok djm 20130517 - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/07 00:20:34 [regress/proxy-connect.sh] repeat test with a style appended to the username - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/23 11:09:43 [regress/test-exec.sh] Only regenerate host keys if they don't exist or if ssh-keygen has changed since they were. Reduces test runtime by 5-30% depending on machine speed. - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/06 06:00:22 [regress/rekey.sh regress/test-exec.sh regress/integrity.sh regress/multiplex.sh Makefile regress/cfgmatch.sh] Split the regress log into 3 parts: the debug output from ssh, the debug log from sshd and the output from the client command (ssh, scp or sftp). Somewhat functional now, will become more useful when ssh/sshd -E is added. - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/07 02:16:03 [regress/Makefile regress/rekey.sh regress/integrity.sh regress/sshd-log-wrapper.sh regress/forwarding.sh regress/test-exec.sh] use -E option for ssh and sshd to write debuging logs to ssh{,d}.log and save the output from any failing tests. If a test fails the debug output from ssh and sshd for the failing tests (and only the failing tests) should be available in failed-ssh{,d}.log. - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/18 02:46:12 [regress/Makefile regress/sftp-chroot.sh] test sshd ChrootDirectory+internal-sftp; feedback & ok dtucker@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/22 07:23:08 [regress/multiplex.sh] Write mux master logs to regress.log instead of ssh.log to keep separate - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/10 03:46:14 [regress/modpipe.c] sync some portability changes from portable OpenSSH (id sync only) - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 02:10:35 [regress/rekey.sh] Add test for time-based rekeying - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 03:33:30 [regress/rekey.sh] test rekeying when there's no data being transferred - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 04:26:10 [regress/rekey.sh] add server-side rekey test - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 05:48:31 [regress/rekey.sh] add tests for RekeyLimit parsing - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 00:37:40 [regress/agent.sh regress/keytype.sh regress/cfgmatch.sh regress/forcecommand.sh regress/proto-version.sh regress/test-exec.sh regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/cert-hostkey.sh regress/cert-userkey.sh regress/ssh-com.sh] replace 'echo -n' with 'printf' since it's more portable also remove "echon" hack. - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 01:16:09 [regress/agent-timeout.sh] Pull back some portability changes from -portable: - TIMEOUT is a read-only variable in some shells - not all greps have -q so redirect to /dev/null instead. (ID sync only) - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 01:32:11 [regress/integrity.sh] don't print output from ssh before getting it (it's available in ssh.log) - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 04:29:14 [regress/sftp.sh regress/putty-ciphers.sh regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/test-exec.sh regress/sftp-batch.sh regress/dynamic-forward.sh regress/putty-transfer.sh regress/conch-ciphers.sh regress/sftp-cmds.sh regress/scp.sh regress/ssh-com-sftp.sh regress/rekey.sh regress/putty-kex.sh regress/stderr-data.sh regress/stderr-after-eof.sh regress/sftp-badcmds.sh regress/reexec.sh regress/ssh-com-client.sh regress/sftp-chroot.sh regress/forwarding.sh regress/transfer.sh regress/multiplex.sh] Move the setting of DATA and COPY into test-exec.sh - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:16:26 [regress/try-ciphers.sh] use expr for math to keep diffs vs portable down (id sync only) - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:23:52 [regress/login-timeout.sh regress/reexec.sh regress/test-exec.sh] Use SUDO when cat'ing pid files and running the sshd log wrapper so that it works with a restrictive umask and the pid files are not world readable. Changes from -portable. (id sync only) - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:24:48 [regress/localcommand.sh] use backticks for portability. (id sync only) - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:26:26 [regress/sftp-badcmds.sh] remove unused BATCH variable. (id sync only) - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:28:11 [regress/sftp.sh] only compare copied data if sftp succeeds. from portable (id sync only) - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:30:07 [regress/test-exec.sh] wait a bit longer for startup and use case for absolute path. from portable (id sync only) - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:33:09 [regress/agent-getpeereid.sh] don't redirect stdout from sudo. from portable (id sync only) - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:34:30 [regress/portnum.sh] use a more portable negated if structure. from portable (id sync only) - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 10:35:43 [regress/scp.sh] use a file extention that's not special on some platforms. from portable (id sync only) - (dtucker) [regress/bsd.regress.mk] Remove unused file. We've never used it in portable and it's long gone in openbsd. - (dtucker) [regress/integrity.sh]. Force fixed Diffie-Hellman key exchange methods. When the openssl version doesn't support ECDH then next one on the list is DH group exchange, but that causes a bit more traffic which can mean that the tests flip bits in the initial exchange rather than the MACed traffic and we get different errors to what the tests look for. - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/getopt.h] Remove unneeded bits. - (dtucker) [regress/cfgmatch.sh] Resync config file setup with openbsd. - (dtucker) [regress/agent-getpeereid.sh] Resync spaces with openbsd. - (dtucker) [regress/integrity.sh regress/krl.sh regress/test-exec.sh] Move the jot helper function to portable-specific part of test-exec.sh. - (dtucker) [regress/test-exec.sh] Move the portable-specific functions together and add a couple of missing lines from openbsd. - (dtucker) [regress/stderr-after-eof.sh regress/test-exec.sh] Move the md5 helper function to the portable part of test-exec.sh. - (dtucker) [regress/runtests.sh] Remove obsolete test driver script. - (dtucker) [regress/cfgmatch.sh] Remove unneeded sleep renderd obsolete by rev 1.6 which calls wait. 20130516 - (djm) [contrib/ssh-copy-id] Fix bug that could cause "rm *" to be executed if mktemp failed; bz#2105 ok dtucker@ - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/23 17:49:45 [misc.c] use xasprintf instead of a series of strlcats and strdup. ok djm - tedu@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/24 16:01:46 [misc.c] remove extra parens noticed by nicm - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/06 07:35:12 [sftp-server.8] Reference the version of the sftp draft we actually implement. ok djm@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/10 03:40:07 [sshconnect2.c] fix bzero(ptr_to_struct, sizeof(ptr_to_struct)); bz#2100 from Colin Watson - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/10 04:08:01 [key.c] memleak in cert_free(), wasn't actually freeing the struct; bz#2096 from shm AT digitalsun.pl - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/10 10:13:50 [ssh-pkcs11-helper.c] remove unused extern optarg. ok markus@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 02:00:34 [ssh_config sshconnect2.c packet.c readconf.h readconf.c clientloop.c ssh_config.5 packet.h] Add an optional second argument to RekeyLimit in the client to allow rekeying based on elapsed time in addition to amount of traffic. with djm@ jmc@, ok djm - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 04:09:14 [sshd_config.5 servconf.c servconf.h packet.c serverloop.c monitor.c sshd_config sshd.c] Add RekeyLimit to sshd with the same syntax as the client allowing rekeying based on traffic volume or time. ok djm@, help & ok jmc@ for the man page. - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 04:27:50 [ssh_config.5 readconf.h readconf.c] add the ability to ignore specific unrecognised ssh_config options; bz#866; ok markus@ - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 06:28:45 [ssh_config.5] put IgnoreUnknown in the right place; - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 06:30:06 [sshd_config.5] oops! avoid Xr to self; - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 09:08:41 [log.c scp.c sshd.c serverloop.c schnorr.c sftp.c] Fix some "unused result" warnings found via clang and -portable. ok markus@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 09:12:31 [readconf.c servconf.c] switch RekeyLimit traffic volume parsing to scan_scaled. ok djm@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 10:43:34 [servconf.c readconf.c] remove now-unused variables - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/16 10:44:06 [servconf.c] remove another now-unused variable - (dtucker) [configure.ac readconf.c servconf.c openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Add compat bits for scan_scaled. 20130510 - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Enable -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess if the compiler supports it. Mentioned by Colin Watson in bz#2100, ok djm. - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/getopt.c] Factor out portibility changes to getopt.c. Preprocessed source is identical other than line numbers. - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c] Import from OpenBSD. No portability changes yet. - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/Makefile.in openbsd-compat/getopt.c openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c regress/modpipe.c] Remove getopt.c, add portability code to getopt_long.c and switch over Makefile and the ugly hack in modpipe.c. Fixes bz#1448. - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/getopt_long.c openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] pull in getopt.h from openbsd and plumb in to use it when we're using our own getopt. - (dtucker) [kex.c] Only include sha256 and ECC key exchange methods when the underlying libraries support them. - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Add -Werror to the -Qunused-arguments test so we don't get a warning on compilers that *don't* support it. Add -Wno-unknown-warning-option. Move both to the start of the list for maximum noise suppression. Tested with gcc 4.6.3, gcc 2.95.4 and clang 2.9. 20130423 - (djm) [auth.c configure.ac misc.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c] Support platforms, such as Android, that lack struct passwd.pw_gecos. Report and initial patch from Nathan Osman bz#2086; feedback tim@ ok dtucker@ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/05 20:16:09 [sshconnect2.c] reset pubkey order on partial success; ok djm@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/06 23:35:23 [session.c] fatal() when ChrootDirectory specified by running without root privileges; ok markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/06 23:36:53 [readconf.c] g/c unused variable (-Wunused) - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/07 00:19:59 [auth2-pubkey.c monitor.c] reconstruct the original username that was sent by the client, which may have included a style (e.g. "root:skey") when checking public key signatures. Fixes public key and hostbased auth when the client specified a style; ok markus@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/07 19:27:25 [auth.h auth2-chall.c auth2.c monitor.c sshd_config.5] add submethod support to AuthenticationMethods; ok and freedback djm@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/03/08 06:32:58 [ssh.c] allow "ssh -f none ..." ok markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/05 00:14:00 [auth2-gss.c krl.c sshconnect2.c] hush some {unused, printf type} warnings - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/05 00:31:49 [pathnames.h] use the existing _PATH_SSH_USER_RC define to construct the other pathnames; bz#2077, ok dtucker@ (no binary change) - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/05 00:58:51 [mux.c] cleanup mux-created channels that are in SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING state too (in addition to ones already in OPEN); bz#2079, ok dtucker@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/06 16:07:00 [channels.c sshd.c] handle ECONNABORTED for accept(); ok deraadt some time ago... - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/07 02:10:33 [log.c log.h ssh.1 ssh.c sshd.8 sshd.c] Add -E option to ssh and sshd to append debugging logs to a specified file instead of stderr or syslog. ok markus@, man page help jmc@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/07 09:40:27 [sshd.8] clarify -e text. suggested by & ok jmc@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/11 02:27:50 [packet.c] quiet disconnect notifications on the server from error() back to logit() if it is a normal client closure; bz#2057 ok+feedback dtucker@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/17 09:04:09 [session.c] revert rev 1.262; it fails because uid is already set here. ok djm@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/18 02:16:07 [sftp.c] make "sftp -q" do what it says on the sticker: hush everything but errors; ok dtucker@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 01:00:10 [sshd_config.5] document the requirment that the AuthorizedKeysCommand be owned by root; ok dtucker@ markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 01:01:00 [ssh-keygen.c] fix some memory leaks; bz#2088 ok dtucker@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 01:03:01 [session.c] reintroduce 1.262 without the connection-killing bug: fatal() when ChrootDirectory specified by running without root privileges; ok markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 01:06:50 [authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c] [key.c key.h mac.c mac.h packet.c ssh.1 ssh.c] add the ability to query supported ciphers, MACs, key type and KEX algorithms to ssh. Includes some refactoring of KEX and key type handling to be table-driven; ok markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 11:10:18 [ssh.c] add -Q to usage; reminded by jmc@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/19 12:07:08 [kex.c] remove duplicated list entry pointed out by naddy@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/04/22 01:17:18 [mux.c] typo in debug output: evitval->exitval 20130418 - (djm) [config.guess config.sub] Update to last versions before they switch to GPL3. ok dtucker@ - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Use -Qunused-arguments to suppress warnings from unused argument warnings (in particular, -fno-builtin-memset) from clang. 20130404 - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/17 23:16:57 [readconf.c ssh.c readconf.h sshconnect2.c] Keep track of which IndentityFile options were manually supplied and which were default options, and don't warn if the latter are missing. ok markus@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/19 02:12:47 [krl.c] Remove bogus include. ok djm - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/22 04:45:09 [ssh.c readconf.c readconf.h] Don't complain if IdentityFiles specified in system-wide configs are missing. ok djm, deraadt. - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/22 19:13:56 [sshconnect.c] support ProxyCommand=- (stdin/out already point to the proxy); ok djm@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/22 22:09:01 [ssh.c] Allow IdenityFile=none; ok markus deraadt (and dtucker for an earlier version) 20130401 - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.{c,h}] Don't include windows.h to avoid conflicting definitions of __int64, adding the required bits. Patch from Corinna Vinschen. 20130323 - (tim) [Makefile.in] remove some duplication introduced in 20130220 commit. 20130322 - (djm) [contrib/ssh-copy-id contrib/ssh-copy-id.1] Updated to Phil Hands' greatly revised version. - (djm) Release 6.2p1 - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Add stdlib.h to zlib check for exit() prototype. - (dtucker) [includes.h] Check if _GNU_SOURCE is already defined before defining it again. Prevents warnings if someone, eg, sets it in CFLAGS. 20130318 - (djm) [configure.ac log.c scp.c sshconnect2.c openbsd-compat/vis.c] [openbsd-compat/vis.h] FreeBSD's strnvis isn't compatible with OpenBSD's so mark it as broken. Patch from des AT des.no 20130317 - (tim) [configure.ac] OpenServer 5 wants lastlog even though it has none of the bits the configure test looks for. 20130316 - (djm) [configure.ac] Disable utmp, wtmp and/or lastlog if the platform is unable to successfully compile them. Based on patch from des AT des.no - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h] Add a usleep replacement for platforms that lack it; ok dtucker - (djm) [session.c] FreeBSD needs setusercontext(..., LOGIN_SETUMASK) to occur after UID switch; patch from John Marshall via des AT des.no; ok dtucker@ 20130312 - (dtucker) [regress/Makefile regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/test-exec.sh] Improve portability of cipher-speed test, based mostly on a patch from Iain Morgan. - (dtucker) [auth.c configure.ac platform.c platform.h] Accept uid 2 ("bin") in addition to root as an owner of system directories on AIX and HP-UX. ok djm@ 20130307 - (dtucker) [INSTALL] Bump documented autoconf version to what we're currently using. - (dtucker) [defines.h] Remove SIZEOF_CHAR bits since the test for it was removed in configure.ac rev 1.481 as it was redundant. - (tim) [Makefile.in] Add another missing $(EXEEXT) I should have seen 3 days ago. - (djm) [configure.ac] Add a timeout to the select/rlimit test to give it a chance to complete on broken systems; ok dtucker@ 20130306 - (dtucker) [regress/forward-control.sh] Wait longer for the forwarding connection to start so that the test works on slower machines. - (dtucker) [configure.ac] test that we can set number of file descriptors to zero with setrlimit before enabling the rlimit sandbox. This affects (at least) HPUX 11.11. 20130305 - (djm) [regress/modpipe.c] Compilation fix for AIX and parsing fix for HP/UX. Spotted by Kevin Brott - (dtucker) [configure.ac] use "=" for shell test and not "==". Spotted by Amit Kulkarni and Kevin Brott. - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Remove trailing "\" on PATHS, which caused obscure build breakage on (at least) HP-UX 11.11. Found by Amit Kulkarni and Kevin Brott. - (tim) [Makefile.in] Add missing $(EXEEXT). Found by Roumen Petrov. 20130227 - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec] [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Crank version numbers - (tim) [regress/forward-control.sh] use sh in case login shell is csh. - (tim) [regress/integrity.sh] shell portability fix. - (tim) [regress/integrity.sh] keep old solaris awk from hanging. - (tim) [regress/krl.sh] keep old solaris awk from hanging. 20130226 - OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/20 08:27:50 [integrity.sh] Add an option to modpipe that warns if the modification offset it not reached in it's stream and turn it on for t-integrity. This should catch cases where the session is not fuzzed for being too short (cf. my last "oops" commit) - (djm) [regress/integrity.sh] Run sshd via $SUDO; fixes tinderbox breakage for UsePAM=yes configuration 20130225 - (dtucker) [configure.ac ssh-gss.h] bz#2073: additional #includes needed to use Solaris native GSS libs. Patch from Pierre Ossman. 20130223 - (djm) [configure.ac includes.h loginrec.c mux.c sftp.c] Prefer bsd/libutil.h to libutil.h to avoid deprecation warnings on Ubuntu. ok tim 20130222 - (dtucker) [Makefile.in configure.ac] bz#2072: don't link krb5 libs to ssh(1) since they're not needed. Patch from Pierre Ossman, ok djm. - (dtucker) [configure.ac] bz#2073: look for Solaris' differently-named libgss too. Patch from Pierre Ossman, ok djm. - (djm) [configure.ac sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] Support for Linux seccomp-bpf sandbox on ARM. Patch from shawnlandden AT gmail.com; ok dtucker 20130221 - (tim) [regress/forward-control.sh] shell portability fix. 20130220 - (tim) [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh] shell portability fix. - (tim) [krl.c Makefile.in regress/Makefile regress/modpipe.c] remove unneeded err.h include from krl.c. Additional portability fixes for modpipe. OK djm - OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/20 08:27:50 [regress/integrity.sh regress/modpipe.c] Add an option to modpipe that warns if the modification offset it not reached in it's stream and turn it on for t-integrity. This should catch cases where the session is not fuzzed for being too short (cf. my last "oops" commit) - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/20 08:29:27 [regress/modpipe.c] s/Id/OpenBSD/ in RCS tag 20130219 - OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/18 22:26:47 [integrity.sh] crank the offset yet again; it was still fuzzing KEX one of Darren's portable test hosts at 2800 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/19 02:14:09 [integrity.sh] oops, forgot to increase the output of the ssh command to ensure that we actually reach $offset - (djm) [regress/integrity.sh] Skip SHA2-based MACs on configurations that lack support for SHA2. - (djm) [regress/modpipe.c] Add local err, and errx functions for platforms that do not have them. 20130217 - OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/17 23:16:55 [integrity.sh] make the ssh command generates some output to ensure that there are at least offset+tries bytes in the stream. 20130216 - OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/16 06:08:45 [integrity.sh] make sure the fuzz offset is actually past the end of KEX for all KEX types. diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 requires an offset around 2700. Noticed via test failures in portable OpenSSH on platforms that lack ECC and this the more byte-frugal ECDH KEX algorithms. 20130215 - (djm) [contrib/suse/rc.sshd] Use SSHD_BIN consistently; bz#2056 from Iain Morgan - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h] Use getpgrp() if we don't have getpgid() (old BSDs, maybe others). - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/Makefile.in openbsd-compat/strtoull.c openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Add strtoull to compat library for platforms that don't have it. - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Add prototype for strtoul, group strto* function prototypes together. - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c] Handle the case where setpgrp() takes an argument. Pointed out by djm. - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/14 21:35:59 [auth2-pubkey.c] Correct error message that had a typo and was logging the wrong thing; patch from Petr Lautrbach - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/15 00:21:01 [sshconnect2.c] Warn more loudly if an IdentityFile provided by the user cannot be read. bz #1981, ok djm@ 20130214 - (djm) [regress/krl.sh] Don't use ecdsa keys in environment that lack ECC. - (djm) [regress/krl.sh] typo; found by Iain Morgan - (djm) [regress/integrity.sh] Start fuzzing from offset 2500 (instead of 2300) to avoid clobbering the end of (non-MAC'd) KEX. Verified by Iain Morgan 20130212 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/24 21:45:37 [krl.c] fix handling of (unused) KRL signatures; skip string in correct buffer - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/24 22:08:56 [krl.c] skip serial lookup when cert's serial number is zero - krw@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/25 05:00:27 [krl.c] Revert last. Breaks due to likely typo. Let djm@ fix later. ok djm@ via dlg@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/25 10:22:19 [krl.c] redo last commit without the vi-vomit that snuck in: skip serial lookup when cert's serial number is zero (now with 100% better comment) - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/26 06:11:05 [Makefile.in acss.c acss.h cipher-acss.c cipher.c] [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] remove ACSS, now that it is gone from libcrypto too - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/27 10:06:12 [krl.c] actually use the xrealloc() return value; spotted by xi.wang AT gmail.com - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/06 00:20:42 [servconf.c sshd_config sshd_config.5] Change default of MaxStartups to 10:30:100 to start doing random early drop at 10 connections up to 100 connections. This will make it harder to DoS as CPUs have come a long way since the original value was set back in 2000. Prompted by nion at debian org, ok markus@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/06 00:22:21 [auth.c] Fix comment, from jfree.e1 at gmail - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/08 00:41:12 [sftp.c] fix NULL deref when built without libedit and control characters entered as command; debugging and patch from Iain Morgan an Loganaden Velvindron in bz#1956 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/10 21:19:34 [version.h] openssh 6.2 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/10 23:32:10 [ssh-keygen.c] append to moduli file when screening candidates rather than overwriting. allows resumption of interrupted screen; patch from Christophe Garault in bz#1957; ok dtucker@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/10 23:35:24 [packet.c] record "Received disconnect" messages at ERROR rather than INFO priority, since they are abnormal and result in a non-zero ssh exit status; patch from Iain Morgan in bz#2057; ok dtucker@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/11 21:21:58 [sshd.c] Add openssl version to debug output similar to the client. ok markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/02/11 23:58:51 [regress/try-ciphers.sh] remove acss here too - (djm) [regress/try-ciphers.sh] clean up CVS merge botch 20130211 - (djm) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Repair build on old libcrypto that lacks EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl 20130208 - (djm) [contrib/redhat/sshd.init] treat RETVAL as an integer; patch from Iain Morgan in bz#2059 - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h] Test if compiler allows __attribute__ on return values and work around if necessary. ok djm@ 20130207 - (djm) [configure.ac] Don't probe seccomp capability of running kernel at configure time; the seccomp sandbox will fall back to rlimit at runtime anyway. Patch from plautrba AT redhat.com in bz#2011 20130120 - (djm) [cipher-aes.c cipher-ctr.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Move prototypes for replacement ciphers to openssl-compat.h; fix EVP prototypes for openssl-1.0.0-fips. - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 07:57:47 [ssh-keygen.1] tweak previous; - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 07:59:46 [ssh-keygen.c] -u before -V in usage(); - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 08:00:49 [sshd_config.5] tweak previous; - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 08:39:04 [ssh-keygen.1] add -Q to the options list; ok djm - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 21:48:43 [ssh-keygen.1] command-line (adj.) -> command line (n.); - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/19 07:13:25 [ssh-keygen.1] fix some formatting; ok djm - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/19 12:34:55 [krl.c] RB_INSERT does not remove existing elments; ok djm@ - (djm) [openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h] Sync with OpenBSD. krl.c needs newer version. - (djm) [regress/krl.sh] replacement for jot; most platforms lack it 20130118 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/17 23:00:01 [auth.c key.c key.h ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c sshd_config.5] [krl.c krl.h PROTOCOL.krl] add support for Key Revocation Lists (KRLs). These are a compact way to represent lists of revoked keys and certificates, taking as little as a single bit of incremental cost to revoke a certificate by serial number. KRLs are loaded via the existing RevokedKeys sshd_config option. feedback and ok markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 00:45:29 [regress/Makefile regress/cert-userkey.sh regress/krl.sh] Tests for Key Revocation Lists (KRLs) - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/18 03:00:32 [krl.c] fix KRL generation bug for list sections 20130117 - (djm) [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/integrity.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh] check for GCM support before testing GCM ciphers. 20130112 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/12 11:22:04 [cipher.c] improve error message for integrity failure in AES-GCM modes; ok markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/12 11:23:53 [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/integrity.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh] test AES-GCM modes; feedback markus@ - (djm) [regress/integrity.sh] repair botched merge 20130109 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/14 05:26:43 [auth.c] use correct string in error message; from rustybsd at gmx.fr - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/02 00:32:07 [clientloop.c mux.c] channel_setup_local_fwd_listener() returns 0 on failure, not -ve bz#2055 reported by mathieu.lacage AT gmail.com - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/02 00:33:49 [PROTOCOL.agent] correct format description for SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED bz#2051 from david AT lechnology.com - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/03 05:49:36 [servconf.h] add a couple of ServerOptions members that should be copied to the privsep child (for consistency, in this case they happen only to be accessed in the monitor); ok dtucker@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/03 12:49:01 [PROTOCOL] fix description of MAC calculation for EtM modes; ok markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/03 12:54:49 [sftp-server.8 sftp-server.c] allow specification of an alternate start directory for sftp-server(8) "I like this" markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/03 23:22:58 [ssh-keygen.c] allow fingerprinting of keys hosted in PKCS#11 tokens: ssh-keygen -lD ... ok markus@ - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/04 19:26:38 [sftp-server.8 sftp-server.c] sftp-server.8: add argument name to -d sftp-server.c: add -d to usage() ok djm - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/08 18:49:04 [PROTOCOL authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.c kex.h monitor_wrap.c] [myproposal.h packet.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] support AES-GCM as defined in RFC 5647 (but with simpler KEX handling) ok and feedback djm@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/01/09 05:40:17 [ssh-keygen.c] correctly initialise fingerprint type for fingerprinting PKCS#11 keys - (djm) [cipher.c configure.ac openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] Fix merge botch, automatically detect AES-GCM in OpenSSL, move a little cipher compat code to openssl-compat.h 20121217 - (dtucker) [Makefile.in] Add some scaffolding so that the new regress tests will work with VPATH directories. 20121213 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/12 16:45:52 [packet.c] reset incoming_packet buffer for each new packet in EtM-case, too; this happens if packets are parsed only parially (e.g. ignore messages sent when su/sudo turn off echo); noted by sthen/millert - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/12 16:46:10 [cipher.c] use OpenSSL's EVP_aes_{128,192,256}_ctr() API and remove our hand-rolled counter mode code; ok djm@ - (djm) [configure.ac cipher-ctr.c] Adapt EVP AES CTR change to retain our compat code for older OpenSSL - (djm) [cipher.c] Fix missing prototype for compat code 20121212 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:16:21 [monitor.c] drain the log messages after receiving the keystate from the unpriv child. otherwise it might block while sending. ok djm@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:31:18 [PROTOCOL authfile.c cipher.c cipher.h kex.h mac.c myproposal.h] [packet.c ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] add encrypt-then-mac (EtM) modes to openssh by defining new mac algorithms that change the packet format and compute the MAC over the encrypted message (including the packet size) instead of the plaintext data; these EtM modes are considered more secure and used by default. feedback and ok djm@ - sthen@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:51:45 [mac.c] fix typo, s/tem/etm in hmac-ripemd160-tem. ok markus@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:32:56 [regress/try-ciphers.sh] add etm modes - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 22:42:11 [regress/Makefile regress/modpipe.c regress/integrity.sh] test the integrity of the packets; with djm@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/11 23:12:13 [try-ciphers.sh] add hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com - (djm) [mac.c] fix merge botch - (djm) [regress/Makefile regress/integrity.sh] Make the integrity.sh test work on platforms without 'jot' - (djm) [regress/integrity.sh] Fix awk quoting, packet length skip - (djm) [regress/Makefile] fix t-exec rule 20121207 - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/06 06:06:54 [regress/keys-command.sh] Fix some problems with the keys-command test: - use string comparison rather than numeric comparison - check for existing KEY_COMMAND file and don't clobber if it exists - clean up KEY_COMMAND file if we do create it. - check that KEY_COMMAND is executable (which it won't be if eg /var/run is mounted noexec). ok djm. - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/03 08:33:03 [ssh-add.1 sshd_config.5] tweak previous; - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/05 15:42:52 [ssh-add.c] prevent double-free of comment; ok djm@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/07 01:51:35 [serverloop.c] Cast signal to int for logging. A no-op on openbsd (they're always ints) but will prevent warnings in portable. ok djm@ 20121205 - (tim) [defines.h] Some platforms are missing ULLONG_MAX. Feedback djm@. 20121203 - (djm) [openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h] Sync with OpenBSD to get TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE needed for upcoming changes. - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/02 20:26:11 [ssh_config.5 sshconnect2.c] Make IdentitiesOnly apply to keys obtained from a PKCS11Provider. This allows control of which keys are offered from tokens using IdentityFile. ok markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/02 20:42:15 [ssh-add.1 ssh-add.c] make deleting explicit keys "ssh-add -d" symmetric with adding keys - try to delete the corresponding certificate too and respect the -k option to allow deleting of the key only; feedback and ok markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/02 20:46:11 [auth-options.c channels.c servconf.c servconf.h serverloop.c session.c] [sshd_config.5] make AllowTcpForwarding accept "local" and "remote" in addition to its current "yes"/"no" to allow the server to specify whether just local or remote TCP forwarding is enabled. ok markus@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/05 02:20:48 [regress/cipher-speed.sh regress/try-ciphers.sh] Add umac-128@openssh.com to the list of MACs to be tested - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/19 05:10:42 [regress/cert-userkey.sh] include a serial number when generating certs - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/11/22 22:49:30 [regress/Makefile regress/keys-command.sh] regress for AuthorizedKeysCommand; hints from markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/02 20:47:48 [Makefile regress/forward-control.sh] regress for AllowTcpForwarding local/remote; ok markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/03 00:14:06 [auth2-chall.c ssh-keygen.c] Fix compilation with -Wall -Werror (trivial type fixes) - (djm) [configure.ac] Turn on -g for gcc compilers. Helps pre-installation debugging. ok dtucker@ - (djm) [configure.ac] Revert previous. configure.ac already does this for us. 20121114 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/11/14 02:24:27 [auth2-pubkey.c] fix username passed to helper program prepare stdio fds before closefrom() spotted by landry@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/11/14 02:32:15 [ssh-keygen.c] allow the full range of unsigned serial numbers; 'fine' deraadt@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/12/02 20:34:10 [auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c auth2-jpake.c auth2.c] [monitor.c monitor.h] Fixes logging of partial authentication when privsep is enabled Previously, we recorded "Failed xxx" since we reset authenticated before calling auth_log() in auth2.c. This adds an explcit "Partial" state. Add a "submethod" to auth_log() to report which submethod is used for keyboard-interactive. Fix multiple authentication when one of the methods is keyboard-interactive. ok markus@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/05 02:05:30 [regress/multiplex.sh] Use 'kill -0' to test for the presence of a pid since it's more portable 20121107 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - eric@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/11/28 08:46:27 [moduli.5] fix formula ok djm@ - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/26 17:34:38 [moduli.5] last stage of rfc changes, using consistent Rs/Re blocks, and moving the references into a STANDARDS section; 20121105 - (dtucker) [uidswap.c openbsd-compat/Makefile.in openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.c openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h] Move the fallback code for setting uids and gids from uidswap.c to the compat library, which allows it to work with the new setresuid calls in auth2-pubkey. with tim@, ok djm@ - (dtucker) [auth2-pubkey.c] wrap paths.h in an ifdef for platforms that don't have it. Spotted by tim@. 20121104 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/31 08:04:50 [sshd_config.5] tweak previous; - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/11/04 10:38:43 [auth2-pubkey.c sshd.c sshd_config.5] Remove default of AuthorizedCommandUser. Administrators are now expected to explicitly specify a user. feedback and ok markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/11/04 11:09:15 [auth.h auth1.c auth2.c monitor.c servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c] [sshd_config.5] Support multiple required authentication via an AuthenticationMethods option. This option lists one or more comma-separated lists of authentication method names. Successful completion of all the methods in any list is required for authentication to complete; feedback and ok markus@ 20121030 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/05 12:34:39 [sftp.c] fix signed vs unsigned warning; feedback & ok: djm@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/30 21:29:55 [auth-rsa.c auth.c auth.h auth2-pubkey.c servconf.c servconf.h] [sshd.c sshd_config sshd_config.5] new sshd_config option AuthorizedKeysCommand to support fetching authorized_keys from a command in addition to (or instead of) from the filesystem. The command is run as the target server user unless another specified via a new AuthorizedKeysCommandUser option. patch originally by jchadima AT redhat.com, reworked by me; feedback and ok markus@ 20121019 - (tim) [buildpkg.sh.in] Double up on some backslashes so they end up in the generated file as intended. 20121005 - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/17 09:54:44 [sftp.c] an XXX for later - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/17 13:04:11 [packet.c] clear old keys on rekeing; ok djm - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/18 10:36:12 [sftp.c] Add bounds check on sftp tab-completion. Part of a patch from from Jean-Marc Robert via tech@, ok djm - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/21 10:53:07 [sftp.c] Fix improper handling of absolute paths when PWD is part of the completed path. Patch from Jean-Marc Robert via tech@, ok djm. - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/21 10:55:04 [sftp.c] Fix handling of filenames containing escaped globbing characters and escape "#" and "*". Patch from Jean-Marc Robert via tech@, ok djm. - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/26 16:12:13 [ssh.1] last stage of rfc changes, using consistent Rs/Re blocks, and moving the references into a STANDARDS section; - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/01 13:59:51 [monitor_wrap.c] pasto; ok djm@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/02 07:07:45 [ssh-keygen.c] fix -z option, broken in revision 1.215 - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/10/04 13:21:50 [myproposal.h ssh_config.5 umac.h sshd_config.5 ssh.1 sshd.8 mac.c] add umac128 variant; ok djm@ at n2k12 - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/06 04:11:07 [regress/try-ciphers.sh] Restore missing space. (Id sync only). - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/09 11:51:25 [regress/multiplex.sh] Add test for ssh -Ostop - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/10 00:49:21 [regress/multiplex.sh] Log -O cmd output to the log file and make logging consistent with the other tests. Test clean shutdown of an existing channel when testing "stop". - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/10 01:51:19 [regress/multiplex.sh] use -Ocheck and waiting for completions by PID to make multiplexing test less racy and (hopefully) more reliable on slow hardware. - [Makefile umac.c] Add special-case target to build umac128.o. - [umac.c] Enforce allowed umac output sizes. From djm@. - [Makefile.in] "Using $< in a non-suffix rule context is a GNUmake idiom". 20120917 - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/13 23:37:36 [servconf.c] Fix comment line length - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/14 16:51:34 [sshconnect.c] remove unused variable 20120907 - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/06 09:50:13 [clientloop.c] Make the escape command help (~?) context sensitive so that only commands that will work in the current session are shown. ok markus@ - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/06 13:57:42 [ssh.1] missing letter in previous; - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/07 00:30:19 [clientloop.c] Print '^Z' instead of a raw ^Z when the sequence is not supported. ok djm@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/07 01:10:21 [clientloop.c] Merge escape help text for ~v and ~V; ok djm@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/07 06:34:21 [clientloop.c] when muxmaster is run with -N, make it shut down gracefully when a client sends it "-O stop" rather than hanging around (bz#1985). ok djm@ 20120906 - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/08/15 18:25:50 [ssh-keygen.1] a little more info on certificate validity; requested by Ross L Richardson, and provided by djm - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/08/17 00:45:45 [clientloop.c clientloop.h mux.c] Force a clean shutdown of ControlMaster client sessions when the ~. escape sequence is used. This means that ~. should now work in mux clients even if the server is no longer responding. Found by tedu, ok djm. - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/08/17 01:22:56 [kex.c] add some comments about better handling first-KEX-follows notifications from the server. Nothing uses these right now. No binary change - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/08/17 01:25:58 [ssh-keygen.c] print details of which host lines were deleted when using "ssh-keygen -R host"; ok markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/08/17 01:30:00 [compat.c sshconnect.c] Send client banner immediately, rather than waiting for the server to move first for SSH protocol 2 connections (the default). Patch based on one in bz#1999 by tls AT panix.com, feedback dtucker@ ok markus@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/09/06 04:37:39 [clientloop.c log.c ssh.1 log.h] Add ~v and ~V escape sequences to raise and lower the logging level respectively. Man page help from jmc, ok deraadt jmc 20120830 - (dtucker) [moduli] Import new moduli file. 20120828 - (djm) Release openssh-6.1 20120828 - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h] define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN for compatibility with future mingw-w64 headers. Patch from vinschen at redhat com. 20120822 - (djm) [README contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec] [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Update version numbers 20120731 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/07/06 06:38:03 [ssh-keygen.c] missing full stop in usage(); - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/07/10 02:19:15 [servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c sshd_config] Turn on systrace sandboxing of pre-auth sshd by default for new installs by shipping a config that overrides the current UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes default. Make it easier to flip the default in the future by adding too. prodded markus@ feedback dtucker@ "get it in" deraadt@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/07/13 01:35:21 [servconf.c] handle long comments in config files better. bz#2025, ok markus - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/07/22 18:19:21 [version.h] openssh 6.1 20120720 - (dtucker) Import regened moduli file. 20120706 - (djm) [sandbox-seccomp-filter.c] fallback to rlimit if seccomp filter is not available. Allows use of sshd compiled on host with a filter-capable kernel on hosts that lack the support. bz#2011 ok dtucker@ - (djm) [configure.ac] Recursively expand $(bindir) to ensure it has no unexpanded $(prefix) embedded. bz#2007 patch from nix-corp AT esperi.org.uk; ok dtucker@ - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/07/06 00:41:59 [moduli.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c] Add options to specify starting line number and number of lines to process when screening moduli candidates. This allows processing of different parts of a candidate moduli file in parallel. man page help jmc@, ok djm@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/07/06 01:37:21 [mux.c] fix memory leak of passed-in environment variables and connection context when new session message is malformed; bz#2003 from Bert.Wesarg AT googlemail.com - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/07/06 01:47:38 [ssh.c] move setting of tty_flag to after config parsing so RequestTTY options are correctly picked up. bz#1995 patch from przemoc AT gmail.com; ok dtucker@ 20120704 - (dtucker) [configure.ac openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h] Add setlinebuf for platforms that don't have it. "looks good" tim@ 20120703 - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Detect platforms that can't use select(2) with setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, rl_zero) and disable the rlimit sandbox on those. - (dtucker) [configure.ac sandbox-rlimit.c] Test whether or not setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, rl_zero) and skip it if it's not supported. Its benefit is minor, so it's not worth disabling the sandbox if it doesn't work. 20120702 - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/29 13:57:25 [ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] match the documented MAC order of preference to the actual one; ok dtucker@ - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/30 14:35:09 [sandbox-systrace.c sshd.c] fix a during the load of the sandbox policies (child can still make the read-syscall and wait forever for systrace-answers) by replacing the read/write synchronisation with SIGSTOP/SIGCONT; report and help hshoexer@; ok djm@, dtucker@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/07/02 08:50:03 [ssh.c] set interactive ToS for forwarded X11 sessions. ok djm@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/07/02 12:13:26 [ssh-pkcs11-helper.c sftp-client.c] fix a couple of "assigned but not used" warnings. ok markus@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/07/02 14:37:06 [regress/connect-privsep.sh] remove exit from end of test since it prevents reporting failure - (dtucker) [regress/reexec.sh regress/sftp-cmds.sh regress/test-exec.sh] Move cygwin detection to test-exec and use to skip reexec test on cygwin. - (dtucker) [regress/test-exec.sh] Correct uname for cygwin/w2k. 20120629 - OpenBSD CVS Sync - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/21 00:16:07 [addrmatch.c] fix strlcpy truncation check. from carsten at debian org, ok markus - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/22 12:30:26 [monitor.c sshconnect2.c] remove dead code following 'for (;;)' loops. From Steve.McClellan at radisys com, ok markus@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/22 14:36:33 [sftp.c] Remove unused variable leftover from tab-completion changes. From Steve.McClellan at radisys com, ok markus@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/26 11:02:30 [sandbox-systrace.c] Add mquery to the list of allowed syscalls for "UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox" since malloc now uses it. From johnw.mail at gmail com. - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/28 05:07:45 [mac.c myproposal.h ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] Remove hmac-sha2-256-96 and hmac-sha2-512-96 MACs since they were removed from draft6 of the spec and will not be in the RFC when published. Patch from mdb at juniper net via bz#2023, ok markus. - naddy@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/29 13:57:25 [ssh_config.5 sshd_config.5] match the documented MAC order of preference to the actual one; ok dtucker@ - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/05/13 01:42:32 [regress/addrmatch.sh] Add "Match LocalAddress" and "Match LocalPort" to sshd and adjust tests to match. Feedback and ok djm@ markus@. - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/01 00:47:35 [regress/multiplex.sh regress/forwarding.sh] append to rather than truncate test log; bz#2013 from openssh AT roumenpetrov.info - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/01 00:52:52 [regress/sftp-cmds.sh] don't delete .* on cleanup due to unintended env expansion; pointed out in bz#2014 by openssh AT roumenpetrov.info - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/26 12:06:59 [regress/connect-privsep.sh] test sandbox with every malloc option - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/28 05:07:45 [regress/try-ciphers.sh regress/cipher-speed.sh] Remove hmac-sha2-256-96 and hmac-sha2-512-96 MACs since they were removed from draft6 of the spec and will not be in the RFC when published. Patch from mdb at juniper net via bz#2023, ok markus. - (dtucker) [myproposal.h] Remove trailing backslash to fix compile error. - (dtucker) [key.c] ifdef out sha256 key types on platforms that don't have the required functions in libcrypto. 20120628 - (dtucker) [openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname-ldns.c] bz #2022: prevent null pointer deref in the client when built with LDNS and using DNSSEC with a CNAME. Patch from gregdlg+mr at hochet info. 20120622 - (dtucker) [contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config] Ensure that user sshd runs as can logon as a service. Patch from vinschen at redhat com. 20120620 - (djm) OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/12/02 00:41:56 [mux.c] fix bz#1948: ssh -f doesn't fork for multiplexed connection. ok dtucker@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2011/12/04 23:16:12 [mux.c] revert: > revision 1.32 > date: 2011/12/02 00:41:56; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +4 -1 > fix bz#1948: ssh -f doesn't fork for multiplexed connection. > ok dtucker@ it interacts badly with ControlPersist - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/01/07 21:11:36 [mux.c] fix double-free in new session handler NB. Id sync only - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/05/23 03:28:28 [dns.c dns.h key.c key.h ssh-keygen.c] add support for RFC6594 SSHFP DNS records for ECDSA key types. patch from bugzilla-m67 AT nulld.me in bz#1978; ok + tweak markus@ (Original authors OndÅ™ej Surý, OndÅ™ej Caletka and Daniel Black) - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/01 00:49:35 [PROTOCOL.mux] correct types of port numbers (integers, not strings); bz#2004 from bert.wesarg AT googlemail.com - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/01 01:01:22 [mux.c] fix memory leak when mux socket creation fails; bz#2002 from bert.wesarg AT googlemail.com - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/18 11:43:53 [jpake.c] correct sizeof usage. patch from saw at online.de, ok deraadt - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/18 11:49:58 [ssh_config.5] RSA instead of DSA twice. From Steve.McClellan at radisys com - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/18 12:07:07 [ssh.1 sshd.8] Remove mention of 'three' key files since there are now four. From Steve.McClellan at radisys com. - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/18 12:17:18 [ssh.1] Clarify description of -W. Noted by Steve.McClellan at radisys com, ok jmc - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/19 18:25:28 [servconf.c servconf.h sshd_config.5] sshd_config: extend Match to allow AcceptEnv and {Allow,Deny}{Users,Groups} this allows 'Match LocalPort 1022' combined with 'AllowUser bauer' ok djm@ (back in March) - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/19 21:35:54 [sshd_config.5] tweak previous; ok markus - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/06/20 04:42:58 [clientloop.c serverloop.c] initialise accept() backoff timer to avoid EINVAL from select(2) in rekeying 20120519 - (dtucker) [configure.ac] bz#2010: fix non-portable shell construct. Patch from cjwatson at debian org. - (dtucker) [configure.ac contrib/Makefile] bz#1996: use AC_PATH_TOOL to find pkg-config so it does the right thing when cross-compiling. Patch from cjwatson at debian org. - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS Sync - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/05/13 01:42:32 [servconf.h servconf.c sshd.8 sshd.c auth.c sshd_config.5] Add "Match LocalAddress" and "Match LocalPort" to sshd and adjust tests to match. Feedback and ok djm@ markus@. - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/05/19 06:30:30 [sshd_config.5] Document PermitOpen none. bz#2001, patch from Loganaden Velvindron 20120504 - (dtucker) [configure.ac] Include rather than to fix building on some plaforms. Fom bowman at math utah edu and des at des no. 20120427 - (dtucker) [regress/addrmatch.sh] skip tests when running on a non-ipv6 platform rather than exiting early, so that we still clean up and return success or failure to test-exec.sh 20120426 - (djm) [auth-passwd.c] Handle crypt() returning NULL; from Paul Wouters via Niels - (djm) [auth-krb5.c] Save errno across calls that might modify it; ok dtucker@ 20120423 - OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/04/23 08:18:17 [channels.c] fix function proto/source mismatch 20120422 - OpenBSD CVS Sync - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/02/29 11:21:26 [ssh-keygen.c] allow conversion of RSA1 keys to public PEM and PKCS8; "nice" markus@ - guenther@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/03/15 03:10:27 [session.c] root should always be excluded from the test for /etc/nologin instead of having it always enforced even when marked as ignorenologin. This regressed when the logic was incompletely flipped around in rev 1.251 ok halex@ millert@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/03/28 07:23:22 [PROTOCOL.certkeys] explain certificate extensions/crit split rationale. Mention requirement that each appear at most once per cert. - dtucker@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/03/29 23:54:36 [channels.c channels.h servconf.c] Add PermitOpen none option based on patch from Loganaden Velvindron (bz #1949). ok djm@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/04/11 13:16:19 [channels.c channels.h clientloop.c serverloop.c] don't spin in accept() when out of fds (ENFILE/ENFILE) - back off for a while; ok deraadt@ markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/04/11 13:17:54 [auth.c] Support "none" as an argument for AuthorizedPrincipalsFile to indicate no file should be read. - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/04/11 13:26:40 [sshd.c] don't spin in accept() when out of fds (ENFILE/ENFILE) - back off for a while; ok deraadt@ markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/04/11 13:34:17 [ssh-keyscan.1 ssh-keyscan.c] now that sshd defaults to offering ECDSA keys, ssh-keyscan should also look for them by default; bz#1971 - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/04/12 02:42:32 [servconf.c servconf.h sshd.c sshd_config sshd_config.5] VersionAddendum option to allow server operators to append some arbitrary text to the SSH-... banner; ok deraadt@ "don't care" markus@ - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/04/12 02:43:55 [sshd_config sshd_config.5] mention AuthorizedPrincipalsFile=none default - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/04/20 03:24:23 [sftp.c] setlinebuf(3) is more readable than setvbuf(.., _IOLBF, ...) - jmc@cvs.openbsd.org 2012/04/20 16:26:22 [ssh.1] use "brackets" instead of "braces", for consistency; 20120420 - (djm) [contrib/caldera/openssh.spec contrib/redhat/openssh.spec] [contrib/suse/openssh.spec] Update for release 6.0 - (djm) [README] Update URL to release notes. - (djm) Release openssh-6.0 - Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/INSTALL =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/INSTALL (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/INSTALL (revision 276707) @@ -1,269 +1,262 @@ 1. Prerequisites ---------------- -You will need working installations of Zlib and OpenSSL. +You will need working installations of Zlib and libcrypto (LibreSSL / +OpenSSL) Zlib 1.1.4 or 1.2.1.2 or greater (ealier 1.2.x versions have problems): http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ -OpenSSL 0.9.6 or greater: -http://www.openssl.org/ +libcrypto (LibreSSL or OpenSSL >= 0.9.8f) +LibreSSL http://www.libressl.org/ ; or +OpenSSL http://www.openssl.org/ -(OpenSSL 0.9.5a is partially supported, but some ciphers (SSH protocol 1 -Blowfish) do not work correctly.) +LibreSSL/OpenSSL should be compiled as a position-independent library +(i.e. with -fPIC) otherwise OpenSSH will not be able to link with it. +If you must use a non-position-independent libcrypto, then you may need +to configure OpenSSH --without-pie. The remaining items are optional. NB. If you operating system supports /dev/random, you should configure -OpenSSL to use it. OpenSSH relies on OpenSSL's direct support of -/dev/random, or failing that, either prngd or egd +libcrypto (LibreSSL/OpenSSL) to use it. OpenSSH relies on libcrypto's +direct support of /dev/random, or failing that, either prngd or egd PRNGD: If your system lacks kernel-based random collection, the use of Lutz Jaenicke's PRNGd is recommended. http://prngd.sourceforge.net/ EGD: -The Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) is supported if you have a system which -lacks /dev/random and don't want to use OpenSSH's internal entropy collection. +If the kernel lacks /dev/random the Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) is +supported only if libcrypto supports it. -http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/ +http://egd.sourceforge.net/ PAM: OpenSSH can utilise Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) if your system supports it. PAM is standard most Linux distributions, Solaris, HP-UX 11, AIX >= 5.2, FreeBSD and NetBSD. Information about the various PAM implementations are available: Solaris PAM: http://www.sun.com/software/solaris/pam/ Linux PAM: http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/ OpenPAM: http://www.openpam.org/ If you wish to build the GNOME passphrase requester, you will need the GNOME libraries and headers. GNOME: http://www.gnome.org/ Alternatively, Jim Knoble has written an excellent X11 passphrase requester. This is maintained separately at: http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/ -TCP Wrappers: - -If you wish to use the TCP wrappers functionality you will need at least -tcpd.h and libwrap.a, either in the standard include and library paths, -or in the directory specified by --with-tcp-wrappers. Version 7.6 is -known to work. - -http://ftp.porcupine.org/pub/security/index.html - S/Key Libraries: If you wish to use --with-skey then you will need the library below installed. No other S/Key library is currently known to be supported. http://www.sparc.spb.su/solaris/skey/ LibEdit: sftp supports command-line editing via NetBSD's libedit. If your platform has it available natively you can use that, alternatively you might try these multi-platform ports: http://www.thrysoee.dk/editline/ http://sourceforge.net/projects/libedit/ LDNS: LDNS is a DNS BSD-licensed resolver library which supports DNSSEC. http://nlnetlabs.nl/projects/ldns/ Autoconf: If you modify configure.ac or configure doesn't exist (eg if you checked the code out of CVS yourself) then you will need autoconf-2.68 to rebuild the automatically generated files by running "autoreconf". Earlier versions may also work but this is not guaranteed. http://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/ Basic Security Module (BSM): Native BSM support is know to exist in Solaris from at least 2.5.1, FreeBSD 6.1 and OS X. Alternatively, you may use the OpenBSM implementation (http://www.openbsm.org). 2. Building / Installation -------------------------- To install OpenSSH with default options: ./configure make make install This will install the OpenSSH binaries in /usr/local/bin, configuration files in /usr/local/etc, the server in /usr/local/sbin, etc. To specify a different installation prefix, use the --prefix option to configure: ./configure --prefix=/opt make make install Will install OpenSSH in /opt/{bin,etc,lib,sbin}. You can also override specific paths, for example: ./configure --prefix=/opt --sysconfdir=/etc/ssh make make install This will install the binaries in /opt/{bin,lib,sbin}, but will place the configuration files in /etc/ssh. If you are using Privilege Separation (which is enabled by default) then you will also need to create the user, group and directory used by sshd for privilege separation. See README.privsep for details. If you are using PAM, you may need to manually install a PAM control file as "/etc/pam.d/sshd" (or wherever your system prefers to keep them). Note that the service name used to start PAM is __progname, which is the basename of the path of your sshd (e.g., the service name for /usr/sbin/osshd will be osshd). If you have renamed your sshd executable, your PAM configuration may need to be modified. A generic PAM configuration is included as "contrib/sshd.pam.generic", you may need to edit it before using it on your system. If you are using a recent version of Red Hat Linux, the config file in contrib/redhat/sshd.pam should be more useful. Failure to install a valid PAM file may result in an inability to use password authentication. On HP-UX 11 and Solaris, the standard /etc/pam.conf configuration will work with sshd (sshd will match the other service name). There are a few other options to the configure script: --with-audit=[module] enable additional auditing via the specified module. Currently, drivers for "debug" (additional info via syslog) and "bsm" (Sun's Basic Security Module) are supported. --with-pam enables PAM support. If PAM support is compiled in, it must also be enabled in sshd_config (refer to the UsePAM directive). --with-prngd-socket=/some/file allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD support and to specify a PRNGd socket. Use this if your Unix lacks /dev/random and you don't want to use OpenSSH's builtin entropy collection support. --with-prngd-port=portnum allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD support and to specify a EGD localhost TCP port. Use this if your Unix lacks /dev/random and you don't want to use OpenSSH's builtin entropy collection support. --with-lastlog=FILE will specify the location of the lastlog file. ./configure searches a few locations for lastlog, but may not find it if lastlog is installed in a different place. --without-lastlog will disable lastlog support entirely. --with-osfsia, --without-osfsia will enable or disable OSF1's Security Integration Architecture. The default for OSF1 machines is enable. --with-skey=PATH will enable S/Key one time password support. You will need the S/Key libraries and header files installed for this to work. ---with-tcp-wrappers will enable TCP Wrappers (/etc/hosts.allow|deny) -support. - --with-md5-passwords will enable the use of MD5 passwords. Enable this if your operating system uses MD5 passwords and the system crypt() does not support them directly (see the crypt(3/3c) man page). If enabled, the resulting binary will support both MD5 and traditional crypt passwords. --with-utmpx enables utmpx support. utmpx support is automatic for some platforms. --without-shadow disables shadow password support. --with-ipaddr-display forces the use of a numeric IP address in the $DISPLAY environment variable. Some broken systems need this. --with-default-path=PATH allows you to specify a default $PATH for sessions started by sshd. This replaces the standard path entirely. --with-pid-dir=PATH specifies the directory in which the sshd.pid file is created. --with-xauth=PATH specifies the location of the xauth binary ---with-ssl-dir=DIR allows you to specify where your OpenSSL libraries +--with-ssl-dir=DIR allows you to specify where your Libre/OpenSSL +libraries are installed. ---with-ssl-engine enables OpenSSL's (hardware) ENGINE support +--with-ssl-engine enables Libre/OpenSSL's (hardware) ENGINE support --with-4in6 Check for IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and convert them to real (AF_INET) IPv4 addresses. Works around some quirks on Linux. If you need to pass special options to the compiler or linker, you can specify these as environment variables before running ./configure. For example: CFLAGS="-O -m486" LDFLAGS="-s" LIBS="-lrubbish" LD="/usr/foo/ld" ./configure 3. Configuration ---------------- The runtime configuration files are installed by in ${prefix}/etc or whatever you specified as your --sysconfdir (/usr/local/etc by default). The default configuration should be instantly usable, though you should review it to ensure that it matches your security requirements. To generate a host key, run "make host-key". Alternately you can do so manually using the following commands: ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -N "" ssh-keygen -t rsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key -N "" ssh-keygen -t dsa -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key -N "" Replacing /etc/ssh with the correct path to the configuration directory. (${prefix}/etc or whatever you specified with --sysconfdir during configuration) If you have configured OpenSSH with EGD support, ensure that EGD is running and has collected some Entropy. For more information on configuration, please refer to the manual pages for sshd, ssh and ssh-agent. 4. (Optional) Send survey ------------------------- $ make survey [check the contents of the file "survey" to ensure there's no information that you consider sensitive] $ make send-survey This will send configuration information for the currently configured host to a survey address. This will help determine which configurations are actually in use, and what valid combinations of configure options exist. The raw data is available only to the OpenSSH developers, however summary data may be published. 5. Problems? ------------ If you experience problems compiling, installing or running OpenSSH. Please refer to the "reporting bugs" section of the webpage at http://www.openssh.com/ -$Id: INSTALL,v 1.88 2013/03/07 01:33:35 dtucker Exp $ +$Id: INSTALL,v 1.91 2014/09/09 02:23:11 dtucker Exp $ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/Makefile.in =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/Makefile.in (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/Makefile.in (revision 276707) @@ -1,476 +1,546 @@ -# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.356 2014/02/04 00:12:56 djm Exp $ +# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.365 2014/08/30 06:23:07 djm Exp $ # uncomment if you run a non bourne compatable shell. Ie. csh #SHELL = @SH@ AUTORECONF=autoreconf prefix=@prefix@ exec_prefix=@exec_prefix@ bindir=@bindir@ sbindir=@sbindir@ libexecdir=@libexecdir@ datadir=@datadir@ datarootdir=@datarootdir@ mandir=@mandir@ mansubdir=@mansubdir@ sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@ piddir=@piddir@ srcdir=@srcdir@ top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@ DESTDIR= VPATH=@srcdir@ SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@ SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@ STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@ +TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@ PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \ -D_PATH_SFTP_SERVER=\"$(SFTP_SERVER)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN=\"$(SSH_KEYSIGN)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=\"$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)\" \ -D_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR=\"$(piddir)\" \ -D_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR=\"$(PRIVSEP_PATH)\" CC=@CC@ LD=@LD@ CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@ CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@ LIBS=@LIBS@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@ GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@ SSHLIBS=@SSHLIBS@ SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@ LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@ AR=@AR@ AWK=@AWK@ RANLIB=@RANLIB@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@ PERL=@PERL@ SED=@SED@ ENT=@ENT@ XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@ LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ MANFMT=@MANFMT@ TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) -LIBSSH_OBJS=authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \ +LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\ + ssherr.o \ + sshbuf.o \ + sshkey.o \ + sshbuf-getput-basic.o \ + sshbuf-misc.o \ + sshbuf-getput-crypto.o + +LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \ + authfd.o authfile.o bufaux.o bufbn.o buffer.o \ canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o \ cipher-bf1.o cipher-ctr.o cipher-3des1.o cleanup.o \ compat.o compress.o crc32.o deattack.o fatal.o hostfile.o \ log.o match.o md-sha256.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \ readpass.o rsa.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \ atomicio.o key.o dispatch.o kex.o mac.o uidswap.o uuencode.o misc.o \ monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \ kexdh.o kexgex.o kexdhc.o kexgexc.o bufec.o kexecdh.o kexecdhc.o \ msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \ ssh-pkcs11.o krl.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \ kexc25519.o kexc25519c.o poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \ ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o hmac.o \ sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o blocks.o SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \ sshconnect.o sshconnect1.o sshconnect2.o mux.o \ roaming_common.o roaming_client.o SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o auth-rsa.o auth-rh-rsa.o \ audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \ sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o \ auth.o auth1.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o \ auth-chall.o auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \ auth-skey.o auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \ auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \ monitor_mm.o monitor.o monitor_wrap.o kexdhs.o kexgexs.o kexecdhs.o \ kexc25519s.o auth-krb5.o \ auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \ loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \ roaming_common.o roaming_serv.o \ sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \ sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5 MANTYPE = @MANTYPE@ CONFIGFILES=sshd_config.out ssh_config.out moduli.out CONFIGFILES_IN=sshd_config ssh_config moduli PATHSUBS = \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_config|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_known_hosts|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/sshd_config|$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config|g' \ -e 's|/usr/libexec|$(libexecdir)|g' \ -e 's|/etc/shosts.equiv|$(sysconfdir)/shosts.equiv|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key|g' \ -e 's|/var/run/sshd.pid|$(piddir)/sshd.pid|g' \ -e 's|/etc/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \ -e 's|/etc/ssh/sshrc|$(sysconfdir)/sshrc|g' \ -e 's|/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth|$(XAUTH_PATH)|g' \ -e 's|/var/empty|$(PRIVSEP_PATH)|g' \ -e 's|/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin|@user_path@|g' FIXPATHSCMD = $(SED) $(PATHSUBS) FIXALGORITHMSCMD= $(SHELL) $(srcdir)/fixalgorithms $(SED) \ @UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS@ all: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) $(LIBSSH_OBJS): Makefile.in config.h $(SSHOBJS): Makefile.in config.h $(SSHDOBJS): Makefile.in config.h .c.o: - $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< + $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@ LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a $(LIBCOMPAT): always (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE)) always: libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS) $(AR) rv $@ $(LIBSSH_OBJS) $(RANLIB) $@ ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o $(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o bufaux.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o roaming_dummy.o readconf.o $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o roaming_dummy.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o $(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o $(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT) # test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o $(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN) if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \ manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \ else \ manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.out$$//'`; \ fi; \ if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "man"; then \ $(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} | $(FIXALGORITHMSCMD) | \ $(AWK) -f $(srcdir)/mdoc2man.awk > $@; \ else \ $(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} | $(FIXALGORITHMSCMD) > $@; \ fi $(CONFIGFILES): $(CONFIGFILES_IN) conffile=`echo $@ | sed 's/.out$$//'`; \ $(FIXPATHSCMD) $(srcdir)/$${conffile} > $@ # fake rule to stop make trying to compile moduli.o into a binary "moduli.o" moduli: echo # special case target for umac128 umac128.o: umac.c $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o umac128.o -c $(srcdir)/umac.c \ -DUMAC_OUTPUT_LEN=16 -Dumac_new=umac128_new \ -Dumac_update=umac128_update -Dumac_final=umac128_final \ -Dumac_delete=umac128_delete clean: regressclean rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log rm -f *.out core survey + rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a + rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf + rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) clean) distclean: regressclean rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log rm -f *.out core opensshd.init openssh.xml rm -f Makefile buildpkg.sh config.h config.status rm -f survey.sh openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile *~ rm -rf autom4te.cache + rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a + rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf + rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o + rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey (cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean) if test -d pkg ; then \ rm -fr pkg ; \ fi veryclean: distclean rm -f configure config.h.in *.0 cleandir: veryclean mrproper: veryclean realclean: veryclean catman-do: @for f in $(MANPAGES_IN) ; do \ base=`echo $$f | sed 's/\..*$$//'` ; \ echo "$$f -> $$base.0" ; \ $(MANFMT) $$f | cat -v | sed -e 's/.\^H//g' \ >$$base.0 ; \ done distprep: catman-do $(AUTORECONF) -rm -rf autom4te.cache install: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf host-key check-config install-nokeys: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf install-nosysconf: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files check-config: -$(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd -t -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config install-files: $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(bindir) $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir) $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir) $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1 $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5 $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8 $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir) (umask 022 ; $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(PRIVSEP_PATH)) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) scp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/moduli.5 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh_config.5 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1 $(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8 $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin ln -s ./ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1 ln -s ./ssh.1 $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1 install-sysconf: if [ ! -d $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) ]; then \ $(srcdir)/mkinstalldirs $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir); \ fi @if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config ]; then \ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config; \ else \ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ fi @if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config ]; then \ $(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config; \ else \ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ fi @if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli ]; then \ if [ -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes ]; then \ echo "moving $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes to $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \ mv "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes" "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \ else \ $(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli; \ fi ; \ else \ echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli already exists, install will not overwrite"; \ fi host-key: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) @if [ -z "$(DESTDIR)" ] ; then \ if [ -f "$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key" ] ; then \ echo "$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key already exists, skipping." ; \ else \ ./ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key -N "" ; \ fi ; \ if [ -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key ] ; then \ echo "$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key already exists, skipping." ; \ else \ ./ssh-keygen -t dsa -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key -N "" ; \ fi ; \ if [ -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key ] ; then \ echo "$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key already exists, skipping." ; \ else \ ./ssh-keygen -t rsa -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key -N "" ; \ fi ; \ if [ -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key ] ; then \ echo "$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key already exists, skipping." ; \ else \ ./ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key -N "" ; \ fi ; \ if [ -z "@COMMENT_OUT_ECC@" ] ; then \ if [ -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key ] ; then \ echo "$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key already exists, skipping." ; \ else \ ./ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -f $(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -N "" ; \ fi ; \ fi ; \ fi ; host-key-force: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ./ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key -N "" ./ssh-keygen -t dsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key -N "" ./ssh-keygen -t rsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key -N "" ./ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key -N "" test -z "@COMMENT_OUT_ECC@" && ./ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -N "" uninstallall: uninstall -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir) -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(bindir) -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir) -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1 -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8 -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir) -rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir) uninstall: -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/slogin -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT) -rm -r $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT) -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/slogin.1 -regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c +regress-prep: [ -d `pwd`/regress ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress + [ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests + [ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper ] || \ + mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper + [ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf ] || \ + mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf + [ -d `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey ] || \ + mkdir -p `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey [ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \ ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile + +regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $? \ $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/setuid-allowed.c - [ -d `pwd`/regress ] || mkdir -p `pwd`/regress - [ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \ - ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $? \ $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) -tests interop-tests: $(TARGETS) regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT) +UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS=\ + regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.o \ + regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.o + +regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a: ${UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS} + $(AR) rv $@ $(UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS) + $(RANLIB) $@ + +UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS=\ + regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.o \ + regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.o \ + regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.o \ + regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.o \ + regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.o \ + regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.o \ + regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.o \ + regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.o + +regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS} \ + regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a + $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS) \ + regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ + -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS=\ + regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.o \ + regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.o \ + regress/unittests/sshkey/common.o \ + regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.o \ + regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.o + +regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS} \ + regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a + $(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS) \ + regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \ + -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) + +REGRESS_BINARIES=\ + regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) \ + regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT) \ + regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \ + regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) + +tests interop-tests t-exec: regress-prep $(TARGETS) $(REGRESS_BINARIES) BUILDDIR=`pwd`; \ - TEST_SHELL="@TEST_SHELL@"; \ TEST_SSH_SCP="$${BUILDDIR}/scp"; \ TEST_SSH_SSH="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh"; \ TEST_SSH_SSHD="$${BUILDDIR}/sshd"; \ TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-agent"; \ TEST_SSH_SSHADD="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-add"; \ TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-keygen"; \ TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-pkcs11-helper"; \ TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-keyscan"; \ TEST_SSH_SFTP="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp"; \ TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp-server"; \ TEST_SSH_PLINK="plink"; \ TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN="puttygen"; \ TEST_SSH_CONCH="conch"; \ TEST_SSH_IPV6="@TEST_SSH_IPV6@" ; \ TEST_SSH_ECC="@TEST_SSH_ECC@" ; \ cd $(srcdir)/regress || exit $$?; \ $(MAKE) \ .OBJDIR="$${BUILDDIR}/regress" \ .CURDIR="`pwd`" \ BUILDDIR="$${BUILDDIR}" \ OBJ="$${BUILDDIR}/regress/" \ PATH="$${BUILDDIR}:$${PATH}" \ TEST_ENV=MALLOC_OPTIONS="@TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS@" \ - TEST_SHELL="$${TEST_SHELL}" \ TEST_SSH_SCP="$${TEST_SSH_SCP}" \ TEST_SSH_SSH="$${TEST_SSH_SSH}" \ TEST_SSH_SSHD="$${TEST_SSH_SSHD}" \ TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT="$${TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT}" \ TEST_SSH_SSHADD="$${TEST_SSH_SSHADD}" \ TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN="$${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN}" \ TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$${TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER}" \ TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN="$${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN}" \ TEST_SSH_SFTP="$${TEST_SSH_SFTP}" \ TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$${TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER}" \ TEST_SSH_PLINK="$${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" \ TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN="$${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" \ TEST_SSH_CONCH="$${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" \ TEST_SSH_IPV6="$${TEST_SSH_IPV6}" \ TEST_SSH_ECC="$${TEST_SSH_ECC}" \ + TEST_SHELL="${TEST_SHELL}" \ EXEEXT="$(EXEEXT)" \ $@ && echo all tests passed compat-tests: $(LIBCOMPAT) (cd openbsd-compat/regress && $(MAKE)) regressclean: if [ -f regress/Makefile ] && [ -r regress/Makefile ]; then \ (cd regress && $(MAKE) clean) \ fi survey: survey.sh ssh @$(SHELL) ./survey.sh > survey @echo 'The survey results have been placed in the file "survey" in the' @echo 'current directory. Please review the file then send with' @echo '"make send-survey".' send-survey: survey mail portable-survey@mindrot.org This is the port of OpenBSD's excellent OpenSSH[0] to Linux and other Unices. OpenSSH is based on the last free version of Tatu Ylonen's sample implementation with all patent-encumbered algorithms removed (to external libraries), all known security bugs fixed, new features reintroduced and many other clean-ups. OpenSSH has been created by Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt, and Dug Song. It has a homepage at http://www.openssh.com/ This port consists of the re-introduction of autoconf support, PAM support, EGD[1]/PRNGD[2] support and replacements for OpenBSD library functions that are (regrettably) absent from other unices. This port has been best tested on AIX, Cygwin, HP-UX, Linux, MacOS/X, NetBSD, OpenBSD, OpenServer, Solaris, Unicos, and UnixWare. This version actively tracks changes in the OpenBSD CVS repository. The PAM support is now more functional than the popular packages of commercial ssh-1.2.x. It checks "account" and "session" modules for all logins, not just when using password authentication. OpenSSH depends on Zlib[3], OpenSSL[4] and optionally PAM[5]. There is now several mailing lists for this port of OpenSSH. Please refer to http://www.openssh.com/list.html for details on how to join. Please send bug reports and patches to the mailing list openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org. The list is open to posting by unsubscribed users.Code contribution are welcomed, but please follow the OpenBSD style guidelines[6]. Please refer to the INSTALL document for information on how to install OpenSSH on your system. There are a number of differences between this port of OpenSSH and F-Secure SSH 1.x, please refer to the OpenSSH FAQ[7] for details and general tips. Damien Miller Miscellania - This version of OpenSSH is based upon code retrieved from the OpenBSD CVS repository which in turn was based on the last free sample implementation released by Tatu Ylonen. References - [0] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html [1] http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/ [2] http://www.aet.tu-cottbus.de/personen/jaenicke/postfix_tls/prngd.html [3] http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ [4] http://www.openssl.org/ [5] http://www.openpam.org http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/ (PAM also is standard on Solaris and HP-UX 11) [6] http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=style&sektion=9 [7] http://www.openssh.com/faq.html -$Id: README,v 1.86 2014/02/27 23:03:53 djm Exp $ +$Id: README,v 1.87 2014/08/10 01:35:06 djm Exp $ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-bsdauth.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-bsdauth.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-bsdauth.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,138 +1,145 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.11 2007/09/21 08:15:29 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-bsdauth.c,v 1.13 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include +#include +#include #include #ifdef BSD_AUTH #include "xmalloc.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "log.h" #include "buffer.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" static void * bsdauth_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt) { return authctxt; } int bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctx; char *challenge = NULL; + + *infotxt = NULL; + *numprompts = 0; + *prompts = NULL; + *echo_on = NULL; if (authctxt->as != NULL) { debug2("bsdauth_query: try reuse session"); challenge = auth_getitem(authctxt->as, AUTHV_CHALLENGE); if (challenge == NULL) { auth_close(authctxt->as); authctxt->as = NULL; } } if (challenge == NULL) { debug2("bsdauth_query: new bsd auth session"); debug3("bsdauth_query: style %s", authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); authctxt->as = auth_userchallenge(authctxt->user, authctxt->style, "auth-ssh", &challenge); if (authctxt->as == NULL) challenge = NULL; debug2("bsdauth_query: <%s>", challenge ? challenge : "empty"); } if (challenge == NULL) return -1; *name = xstrdup(""); *infotxt = xstrdup(""); *numprompts = 1; *prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *)); *echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int)); (*prompts)[0] = xstrdup(challenge); return 0; } int bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctx; int authok; if (!authctxt->valid) return -1; if (authctxt->as == 0) error("bsdauth_respond: no bsd auth session"); if (numresponses != 1) return -1; authok = auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, responses[0], 0); authctxt->as = NULL; debug3("bsdauth_respond: <%s> = <%d>", responses[0], authok); return (authok == 0) ? -1 : 0; } static void bsdauth_free_ctx(void *ctx) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctx; if (authctxt && authctxt->as) { auth_close(authctxt->as); authctxt->as = NULL; } } KbdintDevice bsdauth_device = { "bsdauth", bsdauth_init_ctx, bsdauth_query, bsdauth_respond, bsdauth_free_ctx }; KbdintDevice mm_bsdauth_device = { "bsdauth", bsdauth_init_ctx, mm_bsdauth_query, mm_bsdauth_respond, bsdauth_free_ctx }; #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-chall.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-chall.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-chall.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,123 +1,127 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth-chall.c,v 1.13 2013/05/17 00:13:13 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-chall.c,v 1.14 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include +#include +#include +#include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" /* limited protocol v1 interface to kbd-interactive authentication */ extern KbdintDevice *devices[]; static KbdintDevice *device; extern ServerOptions options; char * get_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt) { char *challenge, *name, *info, **prompts; u_int i, numprompts; u_int *echo_on; #ifdef USE_PAM if (!options.use_pam) remove_kbdint_device("pam"); #endif device = devices[0]; /* we always use the 1st device for protocol 1 */ if (device == NULL) return NULL; if ((authctxt->kbdintctxt = device->init_ctx(authctxt)) == NULL) return NULL; if (device->query(authctxt->kbdintctxt, &name, &info, &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on)) { device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt); authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL; return NULL; } if (numprompts < 1) fatal("get_challenge: numprompts < 1"); challenge = xstrdup(prompts[0]); for (i = 0; i < numprompts; i++) free(prompts[i]); free(prompts); free(name); free(echo_on); free(info); return (challenge); } int verify_response(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *response) { char *resp[1], *name, *info, **prompts; u_int i, numprompts, *echo_on; int authenticated = 0; if (device == NULL) return 0; if (authctxt->kbdintctxt == NULL) return 0; resp[0] = (char *)response; switch (device->respond(authctxt->kbdintctxt, 1, resp)) { case 0: /* Success */ authenticated = 1; break; case 1: /* Postponed - retry with empty query for PAM */ if ((device->query(authctxt->kbdintctxt, &name, &info, &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on)) != 0) break; if (numprompts == 0 && device->respond(authctxt->kbdintctxt, 0, resp) == 0) authenticated = 1; for (i = 0; i < numprompts; i++) free(prompts[i]); free(prompts); free(name); free(echo_on); free(info); break; } device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt); authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL; return authenticated; } void abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *authctxt) { if (authctxt->kbdintctxt != NULL) { device->free_ctx(authctxt->kbdintctxt); authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL; } } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-krb5.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-krb5.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-krb5.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,272 +1,273 @@ /* $OpenBSD: auth-krb5.c,v 1.20 2013/07/20 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */ /* * Kerberos v5 authentication and ticket-passing routines. * * $FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth-krb5.c,v 1.6 2001/02/13 16:58:04 assar Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2002 Daniel Kouril. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "buffer.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #ifdef KRB5 #include #include #include #include extern ServerOptions options; static int krb5_init(void *context) { Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)context; krb5_error_code problem; if (authctxt->krb5_ctx == NULL) { problem = krb5_init_context(&authctxt->krb5_ctx); if (problem) return (problem); } return (0); } int auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) { #ifndef HEIMDAL krb5_creds creds; krb5_principal server; #endif krb5_error_code problem; krb5_ccache ccache = NULL; int len; char *client, *platform_client; const char *errmsg; /* get platform-specific kerberos client principal name (if it exists) */ platform_client = platform_krb5_get_principal_name(authctxt->pw->pw_name); client = platform_client ? platform_client : authctxt->pw->pw_name; temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); problem = krb5_init(authctxt); if (problem) goto out; problem = krb5_parse_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, client, &authctxt->krb5_user); if (problem) goto out; #ifdef HEIMDAL # ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx, krb5_mcc_ops.prefix, NULL, &ccache); # else problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_mcc_ops, &ccache); # endif if (problem) goto out; problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache, authctxt->krb5_user); if (problem) goto out; restore_uid(); problem = krb5_verify_user(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, ccache, password, 1, NULL); temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); if (problem) goto out; # ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx, krb5_fcc_ops.prefix, NULL, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); # else problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &krb5_fcc_ops, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); # endif if (problem) goto out; problem = krb5_cc_copy_cache(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache); ccache = NULL; if (problem) goto out; #else problem = krb5_get_init_creds_password(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &creds, authctxt->krb5_user, (char *)password, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); if (problem) goto out; problem = krb5_sname_to_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, NULL, NULL, KRB5_NT_SRV_HST, &server); if (problem) goto out; restore_uid(); problem = krb5_verify_init_creds(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &creds, server, NULL, NULL, NULL); krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, server); temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); if (problem) goto out; if (!krb5_kuserok(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user, authctxt->pw->pw_name)) { problem = -1; goto out; } problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); if (problem) goto out; problem = krb5_cc_initialize(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, authctxt->krb5_user); if (problem) goto out; problem= krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &creds); if (problem) goto out; #endif authctxt->krb5_ticket_file = (char *)krb5_cc_get_name(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); len = strlen(authctxt->krb5_ticket_file) + 6; authctxt->krb5_ccname = xmalloc(len); snprintf(authctxt->krb5_ccname, len, "FILE:%s", authctxt->krb5_ticket_file); #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname); #endif out: restore_uid(); free(platform_client); if (problem) { if (ccache) krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, ccache); if (authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL && problem!=-1) { errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(authctxt->krb5_ctx, problem); debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %s", errmsg); krb5_free_error_message(authctxt->krb5_ctx, errmsg); } else debug("Kerberos password authentication failed: %d", problem); krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt); if (options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) return (-1); else return (0); } return (authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0); } void krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt) { debug("krb5_cleanup_proc called"); if (authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache) { krb5_cc_destroy(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache); authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache = NULL; } if (authctxt->krb5_user) { krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user); authctxt->krb5_user = NULL; } if (authctxt->krb5_ctx) { krb5_free_context(authctxt->krb5_ctx); authctxt->krb5_ctx = NULL; } } #ifndef HEIMDAL krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) { int tmpfd, ret, oerrno; char ccname[40]; mode_t old_umask; ret = snprintf(ccname, sizeof(ccname), "FILE:/tmp/krb5cc_%d_XXXXXXXXXX", geteuid()); if (ret < 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(ccname)) return ENOMEM; old_umask = umask(0177); tmpfd = mkstemp(ccname + strlen("FILE:")); oerrno = errno; umask(old_umask); if (tmpfd == -1) { logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno)); return oerrno; } if (fchmod(tmpfd,S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR) == -1) { oerrno = errno; logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno)); close(tmpfd); return oerrno; } close(tmpfd); return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache)); } #endif /* !HEIMDAL */ #endif /* KRB5 */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-options.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-options.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-options.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,633 +1,634 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.62 2013/12/19 00:27:57 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.64 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "match.h" #include "log.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "buffer.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "channels.h" #include "servconf.h" -#include "misc.h" #include "key.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" /* Flags set authorized_keys flags */ int no_port_forwarding_flag = 0; int no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0; int no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0; int no_pty_flag = 0; int no_user_rc = 0; int key_is_cert_authority = 0; /* "command=" option. */ char *forced_command = NULL; /* "environment=" options. */ struct envstring *custom_environment = NULL; /* "tunnel=" option. */ int forced_tun_device = -1; /* "principals=" option. */ char *authorized_principals = NULL; extern ServerOptions options; void auth_clear_options(void) { no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0; no_port_forwarding_flag = 0; no_pty_flag = 0; no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0; no_user_rc = 0; key_is_cert_authority = 0; while (custom_environment) { struct envstring *ce = custom_environment; custom_environment = ce->next; free(ce->s); free(ce); } if (forced_command) { free(forced_command); forced_command = NULL; } if (authorized_principals) { free(authorized_principals); authorized_principals = NULL; } forced_tun_device = -1; channel_clear_permitted_opens(); } /* * return 1 if access is granted, 0 if not. * side effect: sets key option flags */ int auth_parse_options(struct passwd *pw, char *opts, char *file, u_long linenum) { const char *cp; int i; /* reset options */ auth_clear_options(); if (!opts) return 1; while (*opts && *opts != ' ' && *opts != '\t') { cp = "cert-authority"; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { key_is_cert_authority = 1; opts += strlen(cp); goto next_option; } cp = "no-port-forwarding"; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { auth_debug_add("Port forwarding disabled."); no_port_forwarding_flag = 1; opts += strlen(cp); goto next_option; } cp = "no-agent-forwarding"; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { auth_debug_add("Agent forwarding disabled."); no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1; opts += strlen(cp); goto next_option; } cp = "no-X11-forwarding"; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { auth_debug_add("X11 forwarding disabled."); no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1; opts += strlen(cp); goto next_option; } cp = "no-pty"; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { auth_debug_add("Pty allocation disabled."); no_pty_flag = 1; opts += strlen(cp); goto next_option; } cp = "no-user-rc"; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { auth_debug_add("User rc file execution disabled."); no_user_rc = 1; opts += strlen(cp); goto next_option; } cp = "command=\""; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { opts += strlen(cp); if (forced_command != NULL) free(forced_command); forced_command = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1); i = 0; while (*opts) { if (*opts == '"') break; if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') { opts += 2; forced_command[i++] = '"'; continue; } forced_command[i++] = *opts++; } if (!*opts) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); free(forced_command); forced_command = NULL; goto bad_option; } forced_command[i] = '\0'; auth_debug_add("Forced command."); opts++; goto next_option; } cp = "principals=\""; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { opts += strlen(cp); if (authorized_principals != NULL) free(authorized_principals); authorized_principals = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1); i = 0; while (*opts) { if (*opts == '"') break; if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') { opts += 2; authorized_principals[i++] = '"'; continue; } authorized_principals[i++] = *opts++; } if (!*opts) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); free(authorized_principals); authorized_principals = NULL; goto bad_option; } authorized_principals[i] = '\0'; auth_debug_add("principals: %.900s", authorized_principals); opts++; goto next_option; } cp = "environment=\""; if (options.permit_user_env && strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { char *s; struct envstring *new_envstring; opts += strlen(cp); s = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1); i = 0; while (*opts) { if (*opts == '"') break; if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') { opts += 2; s[i++] = '"'; continue; } s[i++] = *opts++; } if (!*opts) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); free(s); goto bad_option; } s[i] = '\0'; auth_debug_add("Adding to environment: %.900s", s); debug("Adding to environment: %.900s", s); opts++; new_envstring = xcalloc(1, sizeof(struct envstring)); new_envstring->s = s; new_envstring->next = custom_environment; custom_environment = new_envstring; goto next_option; } cp = "from=\""; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { const char *remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr(); const char *remote_host = get_canonical_hostname( options.use_dns); char *patterns = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1); opts += strlen(cp); i = 0; while (*opts) { if (*opts == '"') break; if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') { opts += 2; patterns[i++] = '"'; continue; } patterns[i++] = *opts++; } if (!*opts) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); free(patterns); goto bad_option; } patterns[i] = '\0'; opts++; switch (match_host_and_ip(remote_host, remote_ip, patterns)) { case 1: free(patterns); /* Host name matches. */ goto next_option; case -1: debug("%.100s, line %lu: invalid criteria", file, linenum); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: " "invalid criteria", file, linenum); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 0: free(patterns); logit("Authentication tried for %.100s with " "correct key but not from a permitted " "host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip); auth_debug_add("Your host '%.200s' is not " "permitted to use this key for login.", remote_host); break; } /* deny access */ return 0; } cp = "permitopen=\""; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { char *host, *p; int port; char *patterns = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1); opts += strlen(cp); i = 0; while (*opts) { if (*opts == '"') break; if (*opts == '\\' && opts[1] == '"') { opts += 2; patterns[i++] = '"'; continue; } patterns[i++] = *opts++; } if (!*opts) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing " "end quote", file, linenum); free(patterns); goto bad_option; } patterns[i] = '\0'; opts++; p = patterns; + /* XXX - add streamlocal support */ host = hpdelim(&p); if (host == NULL || strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: Bad permitopen " "specification <%.100s>", file, linenum, patterns); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: " "Bad permitopen specification", file, linenum); free(patterns); goto bad_option; } host = cleanhostname(host); if (p == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(p)) < 0) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: Bad permitopen port " "<%.100s>", file, linenum, p ? p : ""); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: " "Bad permitopen port", file, linenum); free(patterns); goto bad_option; } if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0) channel_add_permitted_opens(host, port); free(patterns); goto next_option; } cp = "tunnel=\""; if (strncasecmp(opts, cp, strlen(cp)) == 0) { char *tun = NULL; opts += strlen(cp); tun = xmalloc(strlen(opts) + 1); i = 0; while (*opts) { if (*opts == '"') break; tun[i++] = *opts++; } if (!*opts) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: missing end quote", file, linenum); free(tun); forced_tun_device = -1; goto bad_option; } tun[i] = '\0'; forced_tun_device = a2tun(tun, NULL); free(tun); if (forced_tun_device == SSH_TUNID_ERR) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: invalid tun device", file, linenum); auth_debug_add("%.100s, line %lu: invalid tun device", file, linenum); forced_tun_device = -1; goto bad_option; } auth_debug_add("Forced tun device: %d", forced_tun_device); opts++; goto next_option; } next_option: /* * Skip the comma, and move to the next option * (or break out if there are no more). */ if (!*opts) fatal("Bugs in auth-options.c option processing."); if (*opts == ' ' || *opts == '\t') break; /* End of options. */ if (*opts != ',') goto bad_option; opts++; /* Process the next option. */ } /* grant access */ return 1; bad_option: logit("Bad options in %.100s file, line %lu: %.50s", file, linenum, opts); auth_debug_add("Bad options in %.100s file, line %lu: %.50s", file, linenum, opts); /* deny access */ return 0; } #define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1 #define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2 static int parse_option_list(u_char *optblob, size_t optblob_len, struct passwd *pw, u_int which, int crit, int *cert_no_port_forwarding_flag, int *cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag, int *cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag, int *cert_no_pty_flag, int *cert_no_user_rc, char **cert_forced_command, int *cert_source_address_done) { char *command, *allowed; const char *remote_ip; char *name = NULL; u_char *data_blob = NULL; u_int nlen, dlen, clen; Buffer c, data; int ret = -1, result, found; buffer_init(&data); /* Make copy to avoid altering original */ buffer_init(&c); buffer_append(&c, optblob, optblob_len); while (buffer_len(&c) > 0) { if ((name = buffer_get_cstring_ret(&c, &nlen)) == NULL || (data_blob = buffer_get_string_ret(&c, &dlen)) == NULL) { error("Certificate options corrupt"); goto out; } buffer_append(&data, data_blob, dlen); debug3("found certificate option \"%.100s\" len %u", name, dlen); found = 0; if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0) { if (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0) { *cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag = 0; found = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0) { *cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag = 0; found = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0) { *cert_no_port_forwarding_flag = 0; found = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0) { *cert_no_pty_flag = 0; found = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0) { *cert_no_user_rc = 0; found = 1; } } if (!found && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0) { if (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0) { if ((command = buffer_get_cstring_ret(&data, &clen)) == NULL) { error("Certificate constraint \"%s\" " "corrupt", name); goto out; } if (*cert_forced_command != NULL) { error("Certificate has multiple " "force-command options"); free(command); goto out; } *cert_forced_command = command; found = 1; } if (strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0) { if ((allowed = buffer_get_cstring_ret(&data, &clen)) == NULL) { error("Certificate constraint " "\"%s\" corrupt", name); goto out; } if ((*cert_source_address_done)++) { error("Certificate has multiple " "source-address options"); free(allowed); goto out; } remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr(); result = addr_match_cidr_list(remote_ip, allowed); free(allowed); switch (result) { case 1: /* accepted */ break; case 0: /* no match */ logit("Authentication tried for %.100s " "with valid certificate but not " "from a permitted host " "(ip=%.200s).", pw->pw_name, remote_ip); auth_debug_add("Your address '%.200s' " "is not permitted to use this " "certificate for login.", remote_ip); goto out; case -1: default: error("Certificate source-address " "contents invalid"); goto out; } found = 1; } } if (!found) { if (crit) { error("Certificate critical option \"%s\" " "is not supported", name); goto out; } else { logit("Certificate extension \"%s\" " "is not supported", name); } } else if (buffer_len(&data) != 0) { error("Certificate option \"%s\" corrupt " "(extra data)", name); goto out; } buffer_clear(&data); free(name); free(data_blob); name = NULL; data_blob = NULL; } /* successfully parsed all options */ ret = 0; out: if (ret != 0 && cert_forced_command != NULL && *cert_forced_command != NULL) { free(*cert_forced_command); *cert_forced_command = NULL; } if (name != NULL) free(name); if (data_blob != NULL) free(data_blob); buffer_free(&data); buffer_free(&c); return ret; } /* * Set options from critical certificate options. These supersede user key * options so this must be called after auth_parse_options(). */ int auth_cert_options(Key *k, struct passwd *pw) { int cert_no_port_forwarding_flag = 1; int cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1; int cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1; int cert_no_pty_flag = 1; int cert_no_user_rc = 1; char *cert_forced_command = NULL; int cert_source_address_done = 0; if (key_cert_is_legacy(k)) { /* All options are in the one field for v00 certs */ - if (parse_option_list(buffer_ptr(&k->cert->critical), - buffer_len(&k->cert->critical), pw, + if (parse_option_list(buffer_ptr(k->cert->critical), + buffer_len(k->cert->critical), pw, OPTIONS_CRITICAL|OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 1, &cert_no_port_forwarding_flag, &cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag, &cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag, &cert_no_pty_flag, &cert_no_user_rc, &cert_forced_command, &cert_source_address_done) == -1) return -1; } else { /* Separate options and extensions for v01 certs */ - if (parse_option_list(buffer_ptr(&k->cert->critical), - buffer_len(&k->cert->critical), pw, + if (parse_option_list(buffer_ptr(k->cert->critical), + buffer_len(k->cert->critical), pw, OPTIONS_CRITICAL, 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &cert_forced_command, &cert_source_address_done) == -1) return -1; - if (parse_option_list(buffer_ptr(&k->cert->extensions), - buffer_len(&k->cert->extensions), pw, + if (parse_option_list(buffer_ptr(k->cert->extensions), + buffer_len(k->cert->extensions), pw, OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 1, &cert_no_port_forwarding_flag, &cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag, &cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag, &cert_no_pty_flag, &cert_no_user_rc, NULL, NULL) == -1) return -1; } no_port_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_port_forwarding_flag; no_agent_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_agent_forwarding_flag; no_x11_forwarding_flag |= cert_no_x11_forwarding_flag; no_pty_flag |= cert_no_pty_flag; no_user_rc |= cert_no_user_rc; /* CA-specified forced command supersedes key option */ if (cert_forced_command != NULL) { if (forced_command != NULL) free(forced_command); forced_command = cert_forced_command; } return 0; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-passwd.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-passwd.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-passwd.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,215 +1,216 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.43 2007/09/21 08:15:29 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-passwd.c,v 1.44 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Password authentication. This file contains the functions to check whether * the password is valid for the user. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "packet.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-options.h" extern Buffer loginmsg; extern ServerOptions options; #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP extern login_cap_t *lc; #endif #define DAY (24L * 60 * 60) /* 1 day in seconds */ #define TWO_WEEKS (2L * 7 * DAY) /* 2 weeks in seconds */ void disable_forwarding(void) { no_port_forwarding_flag = 1; no_agent_forwarding_flag = 1; no_x11_forwarding_flag = 1; } /* * Tries to authenticate the user using password. Returns true if * authentication succeeds. */ int auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) { struct passwd * pw = authctxt->pw; int result, ok = authctxt->valid; #if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE) static int expire_checked = 0; #endif #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES) ok = 0; #endif if (*password == '\0' && options.permit_empty_passwd == 0) return 0; #ifdef KRB5 if (options.kerberos_authentication == 1) { int ret = auth_krb5_password(authctxt, password); if (ret == 1 || ret == 0) return ret && ok; /* Fall back to ordinary passwd authentication. */ } #endif #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN { HANDLE hToken = cygwin_logon_user(pw, password); if (hToken == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) return 0; cygwin_set_impersonation_token(hToken); return ok; } #endif #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) return (sshpam_auth_passwd(authctxt, password) && ok); #endif #if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE) if (!expire_checked) { expire_checked = 1; if (auth_shadow_pwexpired(authctxt)) authctxt->force_pwchange = 1; } #endif result = sys_auth_passwd(authctxt, password); if (authctxt->force_pwchange) disable_forwarding(); return (result && ok); } #ifdef BSD_AUTH static void warn_expiry(Authctxt *authctxt, auth_session_t *as) { char buf[256]; quad_t pwtimeleft, actimeleft, daysleft, pwwarntime, acwarntime; pwwarntime = acwarntime = TWO_WEEKS; pwtimeleft = auth_check_change(as); actimeleft = auth_check_expire(as); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (authctxt->valid) { pwwarntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "password-warn", TWO_WEEKS, TWO_WEEKS); acwarntime = login_getcaptime(lc, "expire-warn", TWO_WEEKS, TWO_WEEKS); } #endif if (pwtimeleft != 0 && pwtimeleft < pwwarntime) { daysleft = pwtimeleft / DAY + 1; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Your password will expire in %lld day%s.\n", daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s"); buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf)); } if (actimeleft != 0 && actimeleft < acwarntime) { daysleft = actimeleft / DAY + 1; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Your account will expire in %lld day%s.\n", daysleft, daysleft == 1 ? "" : "s"); buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf)); } } int sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) { struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw; auth_session_t *as; static int expire_checked = 0; as = auth_usercheck(pw->pw_name, authctxt->style, "auth-ssh", (char *)password); if (as == NULL) return (0); if (auth_getstate(as) & AUTH_PWEXPIRED) { auth_close(as); disable_forwarding(); authctxt->force_pwchange = 1; return (1); } else { if (!expire_checked) { expire_checked = 1; warn_expiry(authctxt, as); } return (auth_close(as)); } } #elif !defined(CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD) int sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) { struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw; char *encrypted_password; /* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */ char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd; /* Check for users with no password. */ if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0) return (1); /* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. */ encrypted_password = xcrypt(password, (pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) ? pw_password : "xx"); /* * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords * are identical. */ return encrypted_password != NULL && strcmp(encrypted_password, pw_password) == 0; } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-rh-rsa.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-rh-rsa.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-rh-rsa.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,103 +1,104 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.43 2010/03/04 10:36:03 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-rh-rsa.c,v 1.44 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication combined with RSA host * authentication. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include "packet.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "log.h" #include "buffer.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "auth.h" #include "canohost.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; int auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *cuser, char *chost, Key *client_host_key) { HostStatus host_status; if (auth_key_is_revoked(client_host_key)) return 0; /* Check if we would accept it using rhosts authentication. */ if (!auth_rhosts(pw, cuser)) return 0; host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, client_host_key, chost, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE, options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE); return (host_status == HOST_OK); } /* * Tries to authenticate the user using the .rhosts file and the host using * its host key. Returns true if authentication succeeds. */ int auth_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, char *cuser, Key *client_host_key) { char *chost; struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw; debug("Trying rhosts with RSA host authentication for client user %.100s", cuser); if (!authctxt->valid || client_host_key == NULL || client_host_key->rsa == NULL) return 0; chost = (char *)get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns); debug("Rhosts RSA authentication: canonical host %.900s", chost); if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(pw, cuser, chost, client_host_key))) { debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication denied: unknown or invalid host key"); packet_send_debug("Your host key cannot be verified: unknown or invalid host key."); return 0; } /* A matching host key was found and is known. */ /* Perform the challenge-response dialog with the client for the host key. */ if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(client_host_key)) { logit("Client on %.800s failed to respond correctly to host authentication.", chost); return 0; } /* * We have authenticated the user using .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv, * and the host using RSA. We accept the authentication. */ verbose("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted for %.100s, %.100s on %.700s.", pw->pw_name, cuser, chost); packet_send_debug("Rhosts with RSA host authentication accepted."); return 1; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-rhosts.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-rhosts.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-rhosts.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,321 +1,321 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.44 2010/03/07 11:57:13 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.45 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Rhosts authentication. This file contains code to check whether to admit * the login based on rhosts authentication. This file also processes * /etc/hosts.equiv. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #ifdef HAVE_NETGROUP_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "packet.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" -#include "misc.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern int use_privsep; /* * This function processes an rhosts-style file (.rhosts, .shosts, or * /etc/hosts.equiv). This returns true if authentication can be granted * based on the file, and returns zero otherwise. */ static int check_rhosts_file(const char *filename, const char *hostname, const char *ipaddr, const char *client_user, const char *server_user) { FILE *f; char buf[1024]; /* Must not be larger than host, user, dummy below. */ int fd; struct stat st; /* Open the .rhosts file, deny if unreadable */ if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) return 0; if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) { close(fd); return 0; } if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { logit("User %s hosts file %s is not a regular file", server_user, filename); close(fd); return 0; } unset_nonblock(fd); if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) { close(fd); return 0; } while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) { /* All three must be at least as big as buf to avoid overflows. */ char hostbuf[1024], userbuf[1024], dummy[1024], *host, *user, *cp; int negated; for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\n' || !*cp) continue; /* * NO_PLUS is supported at least on OSF/1. We skip it (we * don't ever support the plus syntax). */ if (strncmp(cp, "NO_PLUS", 7) == 0) continue; /* * This should be safe because each buffer is as big as the * whole string, and thus cannot be overwritten. */ switch (sscanf(buf, "%1023s %1023s %1023s", hostbuf, userbuf, dummy)) { case 0: auth_debug_add("Found empty line in %.100s.", filename); continue; case 1: /* Host name only. */ strlcpy(userbuf, server_user, sizeof(userbuf)); break; case 2: /* Got both host and user name. */ break; case 3: auth_debug_add("Found garbage in %.100s.", filename); continue; default: /* Weird... */ continue; } host = hostbuf; user = userbuf; negated = 0; /* Process negated host names, or positive netgroups. */ if (host[0] == '-') { negated = 1; host++; } else if (host[0] == '+') host++; if (user[0] == '-') { negated = 1; user++; } else if (user[0] == '+') user++; /* Check for empty host/user names (particularly '+'). */ if (!host[0] || !user[0]) { /* We come here if either was '+' or '-'. */ auth_debug_add("Ignoring wild host/user names in %.100s.", filename); continue; } /* Verify that host name matches. */ if (host[0] == '@') { if (!innetgr(host + 1, hostname, NULL, NULL) && !innetgr(host + 1, ipaddr, NULL, NULL)) continue; } else if (strcasecmp(host, hostname) && strcmp(host, ipaddr) != 0) continue; /* Different hostname. */ /* Verify that user name matches. */ if (user[0] == '@') { if (!innetgr(user + 1, NULL, client_user, NULL)) continue; } else if (strcmp(user, client_user) != 0) continue; /* Different username. */ /* Found the user and host. */ fclose(f); /* If the entry was negated, deny access. */ if (negated) { auth_debug_add("Matched negative entry in %.100s.", filename); return 0; } /* Accept authentication. */ return 1; } /* Authentication using this file denied. */ fclose(f); return 0; } /* * Tries to authenticate the user using the .shosts or .rhosts file. Returns * true if authentication succeeds. If ignore_rhosts is true, only * /etc/hosts.equiv will be considered (.rhosts and .shosts are ignored). */ int auth_rhosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user) { const char *hostname, *ipaddr; hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns); ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr(); return auth_rhosts2(pw, client_user, hostname, ipaddr); } static int auth_rhosts2_raw(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname, const char *ipaddr) { char buf[1024]; struct stat st; static const char *rhosts_files[] = {".shosts", ".rhosts", NULL}; u_int rhosts_file_index; debug2("auth_rhosts2: clientuser %s hostname %s ipaddr %s", client_user, hostname, ipaddr); /* Switch to the user's uid. */ temporarily_use_uid(pw); /* * Quick check: if the user has no .shosts or .rhosts files, return * failure immediately without doing costly lookups from name * servers. */ for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]; rhosts_file_index++) { /* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s", pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]); if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0) break; } /* Switch back to privileged uid. */ restore_uid(); /* Deny if The user has no .shosts or .rhosts file and there are no system-wide files. */ if (!rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index] && stat(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0 && stat(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0) return 0; /* If not logging in as superuser, try /etc/hosts.equiv and shosts.equiv. */ if (pw->pw_uid != 0) { if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name)) { auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by /etc/hosts.equiv.", hostname, ipaddr); return 1; } if (check_rhosts_file(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name)) { auth_debug_add("Accepted for %.100s [%.100s] by %.100s.", hostname, ipaddr, _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV); return 1; } } /* * Check that the home directory is owned by root or the user, and is * not group or world writable. */ if (stat(pw->pw_dir, &st) < 0) { logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: " "no home directory %.200s", pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir); auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: " "no home directory %.200s", pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir); return 0; } if (options.strict_modes && ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) { logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: " "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name); auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: " "bad ownership or modes for home directory.", pw->pw_name); return 0; } /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */ temporarily_use_uid(pw); /* Check all .rhosts files (currently .shosts and .rhosts). */ for (rhosts_file_index = 0; rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]; rhosts_file_index++) { /* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s", pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]); if (stat(buf, &st) < 0) continue; /* * Make sure that the file is either owned by the user or by * root, and make sure it is not writable by anyone but the * owner. This is to help avoid novices accidentally * allowing access to their account by anyone. */ if (options.strict_modes && ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) { logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: bad modes for %.200s", pw->pw_name, buf); auth_debug_add("Bad file modes for %.200s", buf); continue; } /* Check if we have been configured to ignore .rhosts and .shosts files. */ if (options.ignore_rhosts) { auth_debug_add("Server has been configured to ignore %.100s.", rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]); continue; } /* Check if authentication is permitted by the file. */ if (check_rhosts_file(buf, hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name)) { auth_debug_add("Accepted by %.100s.", rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]); /* Restore the privileged uid. */ restore_uid(); auth_debug_add("Accepted host %s ip %s client_user %s server_user %s", hostname, ipaddr, client_user, pw->pw_name); return 1; } } /* Restore the privileged uid. */ restore_uid(); return 0; } int auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname, const char *ipaddr) { return auth_rhosts2_raw(pw, client_user, hostname, ipaddr); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-rsa.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-rsa.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth-rsa.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,342 +1,343 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.86 2014/01/27 19:18:54 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth-rsa.c,v 1.88 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * RSA-based authentication. This code determines whether to admit a login * based on RSA authentication. This file also contains functions to check * validity of the host key. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "packet.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "match.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "key.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "ssh.h" -#include "misc.h" #include "digest.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; /* * Session identifier that is used to bind key exchange and authentication * responses to a particular session. */ extern u_char session_id[16]; /* * The .ssh/authorized_keys file contains public keys, one per line, in the * following format: * options bits e n comment * where bits, e and n are decimal numbers, * and comment is any string of characters up to newline. The maximum * length of a line is SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES characters. See sshd(8) for a * description of the options. */ BIGNUM * auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key) { BIGNUM *challenge; BN_CTX *ctx; if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_new() failed"); /* Generate a random challenge. */ if (BN_rand(challenge, 256, 0, 0) == 0) fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_rand failed"); if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_CTX_new failed"); if (BN_mod(challenge, challenge, key->rsa->n, ctx) == 0) fatal("auth_rsa_generate_challenge: BN_mod failed"); BN_CTX_free(ctx); return challenge; } int auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char response[16]) { u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16]; struct ssh_digest_ctx *md; int len; /* don't allow short keys */ if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { error("%s: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits", __func__, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE); return (0); } /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */ len = BN_num_bytes(challenge); if (len <= 0 || len > 32) fatal("%s: bad challenge length %d", __func__, len); memset(buf, 0, 32); BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len); if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL || ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 32) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, 16) < 0 || ssh_digest_final(md, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf)) < 0) fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__); ssh_digest_free(md); /* Verify that the response is the original challenge. */ if (timingsafe_bcmp(response, mdbuf, 16) != 0) { /* Wrong answer. */ return (0); } /* Correct answer. */ return (1); } /* * Performs the RSA authentication challenge-response dialog with the client, * and returns true (non-zero) if the client gave the correct answer to * our challenge; returns zero if the client gives a wrong answer. */ int auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *key) { BIGNUM *challenge, *encrypted_challenge; u_char response[16]; int i, success; if ((encrypted_challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("auth_rsa_challenge_dialog: BN_new() failed"); challenge = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key)); /* Encrypt the challenge with the public key. */ - rsa_public_encrypt(encrypted_challenge, challenge, key->rsa); + if (rsa_public_encrypt(encrypted_challenge, challenge, key->rsa) != 0) + fatal("%s: rsa_public_encrypt failed", __func__); /* Send the encrypted challenge to the client. */ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE); packet_put_bignum(encrypted_challenge); packet_send(); BN_clear_free(encrypted_challenge); packet_write_wait(); /* Wait for a response. */ packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) response[i] = (u_char)packet_get_char(); packet_check_eom(); success = PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_verify_response(key, challenge, response)); BN_clear_free(challenge); return (success); } static int rsa_key_allowed_in_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file, const BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey) { char *fp, line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; int allowed = 0, bits; FILE *f; u_long linenum = 0; Key *key; debug("trying public RSA key file %s", file); if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) return 0; /* * Go though the accepted keys, looking for the current key. If * found, perform a challenge-response dialog to verify that the * user really has the corresponding private key. */ key = key_new(KEY_RSA1); while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { char *cp; char *key_options; int keybits; /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') continue; /* * Check if there are options for this key, and if so, * save their starting address and skip the option part * for now. If there are no options, set the starting * address to NULL. */ if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9') { int quoted = 0; key_options = cp; for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) { if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"') cp++; /* Skip both */ else if (*cp == '"') quoted = !quoted; } } else key_options = NULL; /* Parse the key from the line. */ if (hostfile_read_key(&cp, &bits, key) == 0) { debug("%.100s, line %lu: non ssh1 key syntax", file, linenum); continue; } /* cp now points to the comment part. */ /* * Check if the we have found the desired key (identified * by its modulus). */ if (BN_cmp(key->rsa->n, client_n) != 0) continue; /* check the real bits */ keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n); if (keybits < 0 || bits != keybits) logit("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch: " "actual %d vs. announced %d.", file, linenum, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits); fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s", file, linenum, key_type(key), fp); free(fp); /* Never accept a revoked key */ if (auth_key_is_revoked(key)) break; /* We have found the desired key. */ /* * If our options do not allow this key to be used, * do not send challenge. */ if (!auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum)) continue; if (key_is_cert_authority) continue; /* break out, this key is allowed */ allowed = 1; break; } /* Close the file. */ fclose(f); /* return key if allowed */ if (allowed && rkey != NULL) *rkey = key; else key_free(key); return allowed; } /* * check if there's user key matching client_n, * return key if login is allowed, NULL otherwise */ int auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey) { char *file; u_int i, allowed = 0; temporarily_use_uid(pw); for (i = 0; !allowed && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) { if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0) continue; file = expand_authorized_keys( options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw); allowed = rsa_key_allowed_in_file(pw, file, client_n, rkey); free(file); } restore_uid(); return allowed; } /* * Performs the RSA authentication dialog with the client. This returns * 0 if the client could not be authenticated, and 1 if authentication was * successful. This may exit if there is a serious protocol violation. */ int auth_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM *client_n) { Key *key; struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw; /* no user given */ if (!authctxt->valid) return 0; if (!PRIVSEP(auth_rsa_key_allowed(pw, client_n, &key))) { auth_clear_options(); return (0); } /* Perform the challenge-response dialog for this key. */ if (!auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(key)) { /* Wrong response. */ verbose("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge."); packet_send_debug("Wrong response to RSA authentication challenge."); /* * Break out of the loop. Otherwise we might send * another challenge and break the protocol. */ key_free(key); return (0); } /* * Correct response. The client has been successfully * authenticated. Note that we have not yet processed the * options; this will be reset if the options cause the * authentication to be rejected. */ pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL); packet_send_debug("RSA authentication accepted."); return (1); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,758 +1,776 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.103 2013/05/19 02:42:42 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.106 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H #include #endif #ifdef USE_SHADOW #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "match.h" #include "groupaccess.h" #include "log.h" #include "buffer.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "uidswap.h" -#include "misc.h" #include "packet.h" #include "loginrec.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "authfile.h" #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "krl.h" #include "compat.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern int use_privsep; extern Buffer loginmsg; extern struct passwd *privsep_pw; /* Debugging messages */ Buffer auth_debug; int auth_debug_init; /* * Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed * in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false * will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed * there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't * listed there, false will be returned. * If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned. * Otherwise true is returned. */ int allowed_user(struct passwd * pw) { struct stat st; const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL; u_int i; #ifdef USE_SHADOW struct spwd *spw = NULL; #endif /* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */ if (!pw || !pw->pw_name) return 0; #ifdef USE_SHADOW if (!options.use_pam) spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name); #ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw)) return 0; #endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */ #endif /* USE_SHADOW */ /* grab passwd field for locked account check */ passwd = pw->pw_passwd; #ifdef USE_SHADOW if (spw != NULL) #ifdef USE_LIBIAF passwd = get_iaf_password(pw); #else passwd = spw->sp_pwdp; #endif /* USE_LIBIAF */ #endif /* check for locked account */ if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) { int locked = 0; #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0) locked = 1; #endif #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX, strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0) locked = 1; #endif #ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR)) locked = 1; #endif #ifdef USE_LIBIAF free((void *) passwd); #endif /* USE_LIBIAF */ if (locked) { logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked", pw->pw_name); return 0; } } /* * Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we * are chrooting. */ if (options.chroot_directory == NULL || strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) { char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */ if (stat(shell, &st) != 0) { logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s " "does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell); free(shell); return 0; } if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) { logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s " "is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell); free(shell); return 0; } free(shell); } if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 || options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) { hostname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns); ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr(); } /* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */ if (options.num_deny_users > 0) { for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++) if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr, options.deny_users[i])) { logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " "because listed in DenyUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } } /* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */ if (options.num_allow_users > 0) { for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++) if (match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr, options.allow_users[i])) break; /* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */ if (i >= options.num_allow_users) { logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because " "not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } } if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) { /* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */ if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) { logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because " "not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } /* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */ if (options.num_deny_groups > 0) if (ga_match(options.deny_groups, options.num_deny_groups)) { ga_free(); logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " "because a group is listed in DenyGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } /* * Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups * isn't listed there */ if (options.num_allow_groups > 0) if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups, options.num_allow_groups)) { ga_free(); logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed " "because none of user's groups are listed " "in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname); return 0; } ga_free(); } #ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, &loginmsg)) return 0; #endif /* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */ return 1; } void auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; int i; free(authctxt->info); authctxt->info = NULL; va_start(ap, fmt); i = vasprintf(&authctxt->info, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); if (i < 0 || authctxt->info == NULL) fatal("vasprintf failed"); } void auth_log(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, int partial, const char *method, const char *submethod) { void (*authlog) (const char *fmt,...) = verbose; char *authmsg; if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed) return; /* Raise logging level */ if (authenticated == 1 || !authctxt->valid || authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 || strcmp(method, "password") == 0) authlog = logit; if (authctxt->postponed) authmsg = "Postponed"; else if (partial) authmsg = "Partial"; else authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed"; authlog("%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d %s%s%s", authmsg, method, submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod, authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user, get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1", authctxt->info != NULL ? ": " : "", authctxt->info != NULL ? authctxt->info : ""); free(authctxt->info); authctxt->info = NULL; #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed && (strcmp(method, "password") == 0 || strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 || strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0)) record_failed_login(authctxt->user, get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh"); # ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE if (authenticated) sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user, get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh", &loginmsg); # endif #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed) audit_event(audit_classify_auth(method)); #endif } + +void +auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *authctxt) +{ + packet_disconnect("Too many authentication failures for " + "%s%.100s from %.200s port %d %s", + authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", + authctxt->user, + get_remote_ipaddr(), + get_remote_port(), + compat20 ? "ssh2" : "ssh1"); + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + /* * Check whether root logins are disallowed. */ int auth_root_allowed(const char *method) { switch (options.permit_root_login) { case PERMIT_YES: return 1; case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD: if (strcmp(method, "password") != 0) return 1; break; case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY: if (forced_command) { logit("Root login accepted for forced command."); return 1; } break; } logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr()); return 0; } /* * Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename * by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%', * %h becomes the home directory and %u the username. * * This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc. */ char * expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw) { char *file, ret[MAXPATHLEN]; int i; file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir, "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); /* * Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward * compatible and prepend the '%h/' */ if (*file == '/') return (file); i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file); if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret)) fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long"); free(file); return (xstrdup(ret)); } char * authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw) { if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL || strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_file, "none") == 0) return NULL; return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw); } /* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */ HostStatus check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, const char *host, const char *sysfile, const char *userfile) { char *user_hostfile; struct stat st; HostStatus host_status; struct hostkeys *hostkeys; const struct hostkey_entry *found; hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile); if (userfile != NULL) { user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid); if (options.strict_modes && (stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) && ((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) { logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: " "bad owner or modes for %.200s", pw->pw_name, user_hostfile); auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes", user_hostfile); } else { temporarily_use_uid(pw); load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile); restore_uid(); } free(user_hostfile); } host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found); if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED) error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication", found->host); else if (host_status == HOST_OK) debug("%s: key for %s found at %s:%ld", __func__, found->host, found->file, found->line); else debug("%s: key for host %s not found", __func__, host); free_hostkeys(hostkeys); return host_status; } /* * Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components * of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of * of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable. * * XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ? * * Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to * avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an * error buffer plus max size as arguments. * * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure */ int auth_secure_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir, uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen) { char buf[MAXPATHLEN], homedir[MAXPATHLEN]; char *cp; int comparehome = 0; struct stat st; if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) { snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL) comparehome = 1; if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) { snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf); return -1; } if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) || (stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) { snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s", buf); return -1; } /* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */ for (;;) { if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) { snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed"); return -1; } strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf)); if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 || (!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) { snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf); return -1; } /* If are past the homedir then we can stop */ if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) break; /* * dirname should always complete with a "/" path, * but we can be paranoid and check for "." too */ if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0)) break; } return 0; } /* * Version of secure_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to * avoid races. * * Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure */ static int secure_filename(FILE *f, const char *file, struct passwd *pw, char *err, size_t errlen) { struct stat st; /* check the open file to avoid races */ if (fstat(fileno(f), &st) < 0) { snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s", file, strerror(errno)); return -1; } return auth_secure_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen); } static FILE * auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes, int log_missing, char *file_type) { char line[1024]; struct stat st; int fd; FILE *f; if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) { if (log_missing || errno != ENOENT) debug("Could not open %s '%s': %s", file_type, file, strerror(errno)); return NULL; } if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) { close(fd); return NULL; } if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) { logit("User %s %s %s is not a regular file", pw->pw_name, file_type, file); close(fd); return NULL; } unset_nonblock(fd); if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) { close(fd); return NULL; } if (strict_modes && secure_filename(f, file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) { fclose(f); logit("Authentication refused: %s", line); auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line); return NULL; } return f; } FILE * auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes) { return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys"); } FILE * auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes) { return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0, "authorized principals"); } struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char *user) { #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP extern login_cap_t *lc; #ifdef BSD_AUTH auth_session_t *as; #endif #endif struct passwd *pw; struct connection_info *ci = get_connection_info(1, options.use_dns); ci->user = user; parse_server_match_config(&options, ci); #if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB) aix_setauthdb(user); #endif pw = getpwnam(user); #if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB) aix_restoreauthdb(); #endif #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN /* * Windows usernames are case-insensitive. To avoid later problems * when trying to match the username, the user is only allowed to * login if the username is given in the same case as stored in the * user database. */ if (pw != NULL && strcmp(user, pw->pw_name) != 0) { logit("Login name %.100s does not match stored username %.100s", user, pw->pw_name); pw = NULL; } #endif if (pw == NULL) { logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s", user, get_remote_ipaddr()); #ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN record_failed_login(user, get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns), "ssh"); #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER); #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ return (NULL); } if (!allowed_user(pw)) return (NULL); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) { debug("unable to get login class: %s", user); return (NULL); } #ifdef BSD_AUTH if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 || auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) { debug("Approval failure for %s", user); pw = NULL; } if (as != NULL) auth_close(as); #endif #endif if (pw != NULL) return (pwcopy(pw)); return (NULL); } /* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */ int auth_key_is_revoked(Key *key) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL char *key_fp; if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL) return 0; switch (ssh_krl_file_contains_key(options.revoked_keys_file, key)) { case 0: return 0; /* Not revoked */ case -2: break; /* Not a KRL */ default: goto revoked; } +#endif debug3("%s: treating %s as a key list", __func__, options.revoked_keys_file); switch (key_in_file(key, options.revoked_keys_file, 0)) { case 0: /* key not revoked */ return 0; case -1: /* Error opening revoked_keys_file: refuse all keys */ error("Revoked keys file is unreadable: refusing public key " "authentication"); return 1; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case 1: revoked: /* Key revoked */ key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); error("WARNING: authentication attempt with a revoked " "%s key %s ", key_type(key), key_fp); free(key_fp); return 1; +#endif } fatal("key_in_file returned junk"); } void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) { char buf[1024]; va_list args; if (!auth_debug_init) return; va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); buffer_put_cstring(&auth_debug, buf); } void auth_debug_send(void) { char *msg; if (!auth_debug_init) return; while (buffer_len(&auth_debug)) { msg = buffer_get_string(&auth_debug, NULL); packet_send_debug("%s", msg); free(msg); } } void auth_debug_reset(void) { if (auth_debug_init) buffer_clear(&auth_debug); else { buffer_init(&auth_debug); auth_debug_init = 1; } } struct passwd * fakepw(void) { static struct passwd fake; memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake)); fake.pw_name = "NOUSER"; fake.pw_passwd = "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK"; #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER"; #endif fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid; fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid; #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS fake.pw_class = ""; #endif fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist"; fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist"; return (&fake); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,221 +1,220 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.77 2014/01/29 06:18:35 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth.h,v 1.78 2014/07/03 11:16:55 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * */ #ifndef AUTH_H #define AUTH_H #include #include #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP #include #endif #ifdef BSD_AUTH #include #endif #ifdef KRB5 #include #endif typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt; typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod; typedef struct KbdintDevice KbdintDevice; struct Authctxt { sig_atomic_t success; int authenticated; /* authenticated and alarms cancelled */ int postponed; /* authentication needs another step */ int valid; /* user exists and is allowed to login */ int attempt; int failures; int server_caused_failure; int force_pwchange; char *user; /* username sent by the client */ char *service; struct passwd *pw; /* set if 'valid' */ char *style; void *kbdintctxt; char *info; /* Extra info for next auth_log */ #ifdef BSD_AUTH auth_session_t *as; #endif char **auth_methods; /* modified from server config */ u_int num_auth_methods; #ifdef KRB5 krb5_context krb5_ctx; krb5_ccache krb5_fwd_ccache; krb5_principal krb5_user; char *krb5_ticket_file; char *krb5_ccname; #endif Buffer *loginmsg; void *methoddata; }; /* * Every authentication method has to handle authentication requests for * non-existing users, or for users that are not allowed to login. In this * case 'valid' is set to 0, but 'user' points to the username requested by * the client. */ struct Authmethod { char *name; int (*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt); int *enabled; }; /* * Keyboard interactive device: * init_ctx returns: non NULL upon success * query returns: 0 - success, otherwise failure * respond returns: 0 - success, 1 - need further interaction, * otherwise - failure */ struct KbdintDevice { const char *name; void* (*init_ctx)(Authctxt*); int (*query)(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on); int (*respond)(void *ctx, u_int numresp, char **responses); void (*free_ctx)(void *ctx); }; int auth_rhosts(struct passwd *, const char *); int auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *, const char *, const char *, const char *); int auth_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *, char *, Key *); int auth_password(Authctxt *, const char *); int auth_rsa(Authctxt *, BIGNUM *); int auth_rsa_challenge_dialog(Key *); BIGNUM *auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *); int auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *, BIGNUM *, u_char[]); int auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, BIGNUM *, Key **); int auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *, char *, char *, Key *); int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *, const char *, char *, Key *); int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *, Key *); void pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *, const Key *, const char *, ...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 3, 4))); struct stat; int auth_secure_path(const char *, struct stat *, const char *, uid_t, char *, size_t); #ifdef KRB5 int auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char **client, krb5_data *); int auth_krb5_tgt(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *tgt); int auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password); void krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt); #endif /* KRB5 */ #if defined(USE_SHADOW) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE) #include int auth_shadow_acctexpired(struct spwd *); int auth_shadow_pwexpired(Authctxt *); #endif #include "auth-pam.h" #include "audit.h" void remove_kbdint_device(const char *); void disable_forwarding(void); void do_authentication(Authctxt *); void do_authentication2(Authctxt *); void auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *, ...) __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3))) __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2))); void auth_log(Authctxt *, int, int, const char *, const char *); +void auth_maxtries_exceeded(Authctxt *) __attribute__((noreturn)); void userauth_finish(Authctxt *, int, const char *, const char *); int auth_root_allowed(const char *); void userauth_send_banner(const char *); char *auth2_read_banner(void); int auth2_methods_valid(const char *, int); int auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *); int auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *); int auth2_method_allowed(Authctxt *, const char *, const char *); void privsep_challenge_enable(void); int auth2_challenge(Authctxt *, char *); void auth2_challenge_stop(Authctxt *); int bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **); int bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **); int skey_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **); int skey_respond(void *, u_int, char **); int allowed_user(struct passwd *); struct passwd * getpwnamallow(const char *user); char *get_challenge(Authctxt *); int verify_response(Authctxt *, const char *); void abandon_challenge_response(Authctxt *); char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw); char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *); FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int); FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int); int auth_key_is_revoked(Key *); HostStatus check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *, Key *, const char *, const char *, const char *); /* hostkey handling */ Key *get_hostkey_by_index(int); Key *get_hostkey_public_by_index(int); Key *get_hostkey_public_by_type(int); Key *get_hostkey_private_by_type(int); int get_hostkey_index(Key *); int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *); void sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *, Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int); /* debug messages during authentication */ void auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); void auth_debug_send(void); void auth_debug_reset(void); struct passwd *fakepw(void); int sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *); - -#define AUTH_FAIL_MSG "Too many authentication failures for %.100s" #define SKEY_PROMPT "\nS/Key Password: " #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL) #include krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *); #endif #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth1.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth1.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth1.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,439 +1,440 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.80 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth1.c,v 1.82 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "packet.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "channels.h" #include "session.h" #include "uidswap.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "buffer.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern Buffer loginmsg; static int auth1_process_password(Authctxt *); static int auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *); static int auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *); static int auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *); static int auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *); static char *client_user = NULL; /* Used to fill in remote user for PAM */ struct AuthMethod1 { int type; char *name; int *enabled; int (*method)(Authctxt *); }; const struct AuthMethod1 auth1_methods[] = { { SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD, "password", &options.password_authentication, auth1_process_password }, { SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA, "rsa", &options.rsa_authentication, auth1_process_rsa }, { SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA, "rhosts-rsa", &options.rhosts_rsa_authentication, auth1_process_rhosts_rsa }, { SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS, "challenge-response", &options.challenge_response_authentication, auth1_process_tis_challenge }, { SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE, "challenge-response", &options.challenge_response_authentication, auth1_process_tis_response }, { -1, NULL, NULL, NULL} }; static const struct AuthMethod1 *lookup_authmethod1(int type) { int i; for (i = 0; auth1_methods[i].name != NULL; i++) if (auth1_methods[i].type == type) return (&(auth1_methods[i])); return (NULL); } static char * get_authname(int type) { const struct AuthMethod1 *a; static char buf[64]; if ((a = lookup_authmethod1(type)) != NULL) return (a->name); snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "bad-auth-msg-%d", type); return (buf); } /*ARGSUSED*/ static int auth1_process_password(Authctxt *authctxt) { int authenticated = 0; char *password; u_int dlen; /* * Read user password. It is in plain text, but was * transmitted over the encrypted channel so it is * not visible to an outside observer. */ password = packet_get_string(&dlen); packet_check_eom(); /* Try authentication with the password. */ authenticated = PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password)); explicit_bzero(password, dlen); free(password); return (authenticated); } /*ARGSUSED*/ static int auth1_process_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt) { int authenticated = 0; BIGNUM *n; /* RSA authentication requested. */ if ((n = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("do_authloop: BN_new failed"); packet_get_bignum(n); packet_check_eom(); authenticated = auth_rsa(authctxt, n); BN_clear_free(n); return (authenticated); } /*ARGSUSED*/ static int auth1_process_rhosts_rsa(Authctxt *authctxt) { int keybits, authenticated = 0; u_int bits; Key *client_host_key; u_int ulen; /* * Get client user name. Note that we just have to * trust the client; root on the client machine can * claim to be any user. */ client_user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen); /* Get the client host key. */ client_host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1); bits = packet_get_int(); packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->e); packet_get_bignum(client_host_key->rsa->n); keybits = BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n); if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits) { verbose("Warning: keysize mismatch for client_host_key: " "actual %d, announced %d", BN_num_bits(client_host_key->rsa->n), bits); } packet_check_eom(); authenticated = auth_rhosts_rsa(authctxt, client_user, client_host_key); key_free(client_host_key); auth_info(authctxt, "ruser %.100s", client_user); return (authenticated); } /*ARGSUSED*/ static int auth1_process_tis_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt) { char *challenge; if ((challenge = get_challenge(authctxt)) == NULL) return (0); debug("sending challenge '%s'", challenge); packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE); packet_put_cstring(challenge); free(challenge); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); return (-1); } /*ARGSUSED*/ static int auth1_process_tis_response(Authctxt *authctxt) { int authenticated = 0; char *response; u_int dlen; response = packet_get_string(&dlen); packet_check_eom(); authenticated = verify_response(authctxt, response); explicit_bzero(response, dlen); free(response); return (authenticated); } /* * read packets, try to authenticate the user and * return only if authentication is successful */ static void do_authloop(Authctxt *authctxt) { int authenticated = 0; int prev = 0, type = 0; const struct AuthMethod1 *meth; debug("Attempting authentication for %s%.100s.", authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ", authctxt->user); /* If the user has no password, accept authentication immediately. */ if (options.permit_empty_passwd && options.password_authentication && #ifdef KRB5 (!options.kerberos_authentication || options.kerberos_or_local_passwd) && #endif PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, ""))) { #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam && (PRIVSEP(do_pam_account()))) #endif { auth_log(authctxt, 1, 0, "without authentication", NULL); return; } } /* Indicate that authentication is needed. */ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); for (;;) { /* default to fail */ authenticated = 0; /* Get a packet from the client. */ prev = type; type = packet_read(); /* * If we started challenge-response authentication but the * next packet is not a response to our challenge, release * the resources allocated by get_challenge() (which would * normally have been released by verify_response() had we * received such a response) */ if (prev == SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS && type != SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE) abandon_challenge_response(authctxt); if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) goto skip; if ((meth = lookup_authmethod1(type)) == NULL) { logit("Unknown message during authentication: " "type %d", type); goto skip; } if (!*(meth->enabled)) { verbose("%s authentication disabled.", meth->name); goto skip; } authenticated = meth->method(authctxt); if (authenticated == -1) continue; /* "postponed" */ #ifdef BSD_AUTH if (authctxt->as) { auth_close(authctxt->as); authctxt->as = NULL; } #endif if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated) fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s", authctxt->user); #ifdef _UNICOS if (authenticated && cray_access_denied(authctxt->user)) { authenticated = 0; fatal("Access denied for user %s.",authctxt->user); } #endif /* _UNICOS */ #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN /* Special handling for root */ if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && !auth_root_allowed(meth->name)) { authenticated = 0; # ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED)); # endif } #endif #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam && authenticated && !PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) { char *msg; size_t len; error("Access denied for user %s by PAM account " "configuration", authctxt->user); len = buffer_len(&loginmsg); buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1); msg = buffer_ptr(&loginmsg); /* strip trailing newlines */ if (len > 0) while (len > 0 && msg[--len] == '\n') msg[len] = '\0'; else msg = "Access denied."; packet_disconnect("%s", msg); } #endif skip: /* Log before sending the reply */ auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, 0, get_authname(type), NULL); free(client_user); client_user = NULL; if (authenticated) return; if (++authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) { #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES)); #endif - packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user); + auth_maxtries_exceeded(authctxt); } packet_start(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } } /* * Performs authentication of an incoming connection. Session key has already * been exchanged and encryption is enabled. */ void do_authentication(Authctxt *authctxt) { u_int ulen; char *user, *style = NULL; /* Get the name of the user that we wish to log in as. */ packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_USER); /* Get the user name. */ user = packet_get_cstring(&ulen); packet_check_eom(); if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) *style++ = '\0'; authctxt->user = user; authctxt->style = style; /* Verify that the user is a valid user. */ if ((authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user))) != NULL) authctxt->valid = 1; else { debug("do_authentication: invalid user %s", user); authctxt->pw = fakepw(); } /* Configuration may have changed as a result of Match */ if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported with SSH " "protocol 1"); setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown", use_privsep ? " [net]" : ""); #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt)); #endif /* * If we are not running as root, the user must have the same uid as * the server. */ #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN if (!use_privsep && getuid() != 0 && authctxt->pw && authctxt->pw->pw_uid != getuid()) packet_disconnect("Cannot change user when server not running as root."); #endif /* * Loop until the user has been authenticated or the connection is * closed, do_authloop() returns only if authentication is successful */ do_authloop(authctxt); /* The user has been authenticated and accepted. */ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-chall.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-chall.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-chall.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,374 +1,375 @@ /* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.41 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2001 Per Allansson. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "packet.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; static int auth2_challenge_start(Authctxt *); static int send_userauth_info_request(Authctxt *); static void input_userauth_info_response(int, u_int32_t, void *); #ifdef BSD_AUTH extern KbdintDevice bsdauth_device; #else #ifdef USE_PAM extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device; #endif #ifdef SKEY extern KbdintDevice skey_device; #endif #endif KbdintDevice *devices[] = { #ifdef BSD_AUTH &bsdauth_device, #else #ifdef USE_PAM &sshpam_device, #endif #ifdef SKEY &skey_device, #endif #endif NULL }; typedef struct KbdintAuthctxt KbdintAuthctxt; struct KbdintAuthctxt { char *devices; void *ctxt; KbdintDevice *device; u_int nreq; }; #ifdef USE_PAM void remove_kbdint_device(const char *devname) { int i, j; for (i = 0; devices[i] != NULL; i++) if (strcmp(devices[i]->name, devname) == 0) { for (j = i; devices[j] != NULL; j++) devices[j] = devices[j+1]; i--; } } #endif static KbdintAuthctxt * kbdint_alloc(const char *devs) { KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt; Buffer b; int i; #ifdef USE_PAM if (!options.use_pam) remove_kbdint_device("pam"); #endif kbdintctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(KbdintAuthctxt)); if (strcmp(devs, "") == 0) { buffer_init(&b); for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) { if (buffer_len(&b) > 0) buffer_append(&b, ",", 1); buffer_append(&b, devices[i]->name, strlen(devices[i]->name)); } buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1); kbdintctxt->devices = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b)); buffer_free(&b); } else { kbdintctxt->devices = xstrdup(devs); } debug("kbdint_alloc: devices '%s'", kbdintctxt->devices); kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL; kbdintctxt->device = NULL; kbdintctxt->nreq = 0; return kbdintctxt; } static void kbdint_reset_device(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt) { if (kbdintctxt->ctxt) { kbdintctxt->device->free_ctx(kbdintctxt->ctxt); kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL; } kbdintctxt->device = NULL; } static void kbdint_free(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt) { if (kbdintctxt->device) kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt); free(kbdintctxt->devices); explicit_bzero(kbdintctxt, sizeof(*kbdintctxt)); free(kbdintctxt); } /* get next device */ static int kbdint_next_device(Authctxt *authctxt, KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt) { size_t len; char *t; int i; if (kbdintctxt->device) kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt); do { len = kbdintctxt->devices ? strcspn(kbdintctxt->devices, ",") : 0; if (len == 0) break; for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) { if (!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt, "keyboard-interactive", devices[i]->name)) continue; if (strncmp(kbdintctxt->devices, devices[i]->name, len) == 0) kbdintctxt->device = devices[i]; } t = kbdintctxt->devices; kbdintctxt->devices = t[len] ? xstrdup(t+len+1) : NULL; free(t); debug2("kbdint_next_device: devices %s", kbdintctxt->devices ? kbdintctxt->devices : ""); } while (kbdintctxt->devices && !kbdintctxt->device); return kbdintctxt->device ? 1 : 0; } /* * try challenge-response, set authctxt->postponed if we have to * wait for the response. */ int auth2_challenge(Authctxt *authctxt, char *devs) { debug("auth2_challenge: user=%s devs=%s", authctxt->user ? authctxt->user : "", devs ? devs : ""); if (authctxt->user == NULL || !devs) return 0; if (authctxt->kbdintctxt == NULL) authctxt->kbdintctxt = kbdint_alloc(devs); return auth2_challenge_start(authctxt); } /* unregister kbd-int callbacks and context */ void auth2_challenge_stop(Authctxt *authctxt) { /* unregister callback */ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, NULL); if (authctxt->kbdintctxt != NULL) { kbdint_free(authctxt->kbdintctxt); authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL; } } /* side effect: sets authctxt->postponed if a reply was sent*/ static int auth2_challenge_start(Authctxt *authctxt) { KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt; debug2("auth2_challenge_start: devices %s", kbdintctxt->devices ? kbdintctxt->devices : ""); if (kbdint_next_device(authctxt, kbdintctxt) == 0) { auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt); return 0; } debug("auth2_challenge_start: trying authentication method '%s'", kbdintctxt->device->name); if ((kbdintctxt->ctxt = kbdintctxt->device->init_ctx(authctxt)) == NULL) { auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt); return 0; } if (send_userauth_info_request(authctxt) == 0) { auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt); return 0; } dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, &input_userauth_info_response); authctxt->postponed = 1; return 0; } static int send_userauth_info_request(Authctxt *authctxt) { KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt; char *name, *instr, **prompts; u_int i, *echo_on; kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt; if (kbdintctxt->device->query(kbdintctxt->ctxt, &name, &instr, &kbdintctxt->nreq, &prompts, &echo_on)) return 0; packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring(name); packet_put_cstring(instr); packet_put_cstring(""); /* language not used */ packet_put_int(kbdintctxt->nreq); for (i = 0; i < kbdintctxt->nreq; i++) { packet_put_cstring(prompts[i]); packet_put_char(echo_on[i]); } packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); for (i = 0; i < kbdintctxt->nreq; i++) free(prompts[i]); free(prompts); free(echo_on); free(name); free(instr); return 1; } static void input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt; int authenticated = 0, res; u_int i, nresp; const char *devicename = NULL; char **response = NULL; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no authctxt"); kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt; if (kbdintctxt == NULL || kbdintctxt->ctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no kbdintctxt"); if (kbdintctxt->device == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no device"); authctxt->postponed = 0; /* reset */ nresp = packet_get_int(); if (nresp != kbdintctxt->nreq) fatal("input_userauth_info_response: wrong number of replies"); if (nresp > 100) fatal("input_userauth_info_response: too many replies"); if (nresp > 0) { response = xcalloc(nresp, sizeof(char *)); for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) response[i] = packet_get_string(NULL); } packet_check_eom(); res = kbdintctxt->device->respond(kbdintctxt->ctxt, nresp, response); for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) { explicit_bzero(response[i], strlen(response[i])); free(response[i]); } free(response); switch (res) { case 0: /* Success! */ authenticated = authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0; break; case 1: /* Authentication needs further interaction */ if (send_userauth_info_request(authctxt) == 1) authctxt->postponed = 1; break; default: /* Failure! */ break; } devicename = kbdintctxt->device->name; if (!authctxt->postponed) { if (authenticated) { auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt); } else { /* start next device */ /* may set authctxt->postponed */ auth2_challenge_start(authctxt); } } userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "keyboard-interactive", devicename); } void privsep_challenge_enable(void) { #if defined(BSD_AUTH) || defined(USE_PAM) || defined(SKEY) int n = 0; #endif #ifdef BSD_AUTH extern KbdintDevice mm_bsdauth_device; #endif #ifdef USE_PAM extern KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device; #endif #ifdef SKEY extern KbdintDevice mm_skey_device; #endif #ifdef BSD_AUTH devices[n++] = &mm_bsdauth_device; #else #ifdef USE_PAM devices[n++] = &mm_sshpam_device; #endif #ifdef SKEY devices[n++] = &mm_skey_device; #endif #endif } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-gss.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-gss.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-gss.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,294 +1,295 @@ /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.21 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "log.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "buffer.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "packet.h" #include "ssh-gss.h" #include "monitor_wrap.h" extern ServerOptions options; static void input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt); static void input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt); static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt); static void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); /* * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know * how to check local user kuserok and the like) */ static int userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) { gss_OID_desc goid = {0, NULL}; Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL; int mechs; int present; OM_uint32 ms; u_int len; u_char *doid = NULL; if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) return (0); mechs = packet_get_int(); if (mechs == 0) { debug("Mechanism negotiation is not supported"); return (0); } do { mechs--; free(doid); present = 0; doid = packet_get_string(&len); if (len > 2 && doid[0] == SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE && doid[1] == len - 2) { goid.elements = doid + 2; goid.length = len - 2; ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(&ms, &goid, &present); } else { logit("Badly formed OID received"); } } while (mechs > 0 && !present); if (!present) { free(doid); authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1; return (0); } if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, &goid)))) { if (ctxt != NULL) ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt); free(doid); authctxt->server_caused_failure = 1; return (0); } authctxt->methoddata = (void *)ctxt; packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE); /* Return the OID that we received */ packet_put_string(doid, len); packet_send(); free(doid); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok); authctxt->postponed = 1; return (0); } static void input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, flags; u_int len; if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep)) fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context"); gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&len); recv_tok.length = len; /* u_int vs. size_t */ packet_check_eom(); maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &flags)); free(recv_tok.value); if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) { if (send_tok.length != 0) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK); packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); packet_send(); } authctxt->postponed = 0; dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); userauth_finish(authctxt, 0, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL); } else { if (send_tok.length != 0) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN); packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); packet_send(); } if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); if (flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG) dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, &input_gssapi_mic); else dispatch_set( SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, &input_gssapi_exchange_complete); } } gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok); } static void input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; OM_uint32 maj_status; u_int len; if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep)) fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context"); gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&len); recv_tok.length = len; packet_check_eom(); /* Push the error token into GSSAPI to see what it says */ maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gssctxt, &recv_tok, &send_tok, NULL)); free(recv_tok.value); /* We can't return anything to the client, even if we wanted to */ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL); /* The client will have already moved on to the next auth */ gss_release_buffer(&maj_status, &send_tok); } /* * This is called when the client thinks we've completed authentication. * It should only be enabled in the dispatch handler by the function above, * which only enables it once the GSSAPI exchange is complete. */ static void input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; int authenticated; if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep)) fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context"); /* * We don't need to check the status, because we're only enabled in * the dispatcher once the exchange is complete */ packet_check_eom(); authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); authctxt->postponed = 0; dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL); userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL); } static void input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; int authenticated = 0; Buffer b; gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf; u_int len; if (authctxt == NULL || (authctxt->methoddata == NULL && !use_privsep)) fatal("No authentication or GSSAPI context"); gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; mic.value = packet_get_string(&len); mic.length = len; ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service, "gssapi-with-mic"); gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))) authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user)); else logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed"); buffer_free(&b); free(mic.value); authctxt->postponed = 0; dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, NULL); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC, NULL); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL); userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, "gssapi-with-mic", NULL); } Authmethod method_gssapi = { "gssapi-with-mic", userauth_gssapi, &options.gss_authentication }; #endif /* GSSAPI */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-hostbased.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-hostbased.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-hostbased.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,230 +1,231 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.17 2013/12/30 23:52:27 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.18 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "canohost.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "pathnames.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern u_char *session_id2; extern u_int session_id2_len; static int userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) { Buffer b; Key *key = NULL; char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost, *service; u_char *pkblob, *sig; u_int alen, blen, slen; int pktype; int authenticated = 0; if (!authctxt->valid) { debug2("userauth_hostbased: disabled because of invalid user"); return 0; } pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen); pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); chost = packet_get_string(NULL); cuser = packet_get_string(NULL); sig = packet_get_string(&slen); debug("userauth_hostbased: cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %d", cuser, chost, pkalg, slen); #ifdef DEBUG_PK debug("signature:"); buffer_init(&b); buffer_append(&b, sig, slen); buffer_dump(&b); buffer_free(&b); #endif pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg); if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) { /* this is perfectly legal */ logit("userauth_hostbased: unsupported " "public key algorithm: %s", pkalg); goto done; } key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen); if (key == NULL) { error("userauth_hostbased: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg); goto done; } if (key->type != pktype) { error("userauth_hostbased: type mismatch for decoded key " "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype); goto done; } if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { error("Refusing RSA key because peer uses unsafe " "signature format"); goto done; } service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" : authctxt->service; buffer_init(&b); buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); /* reconstruct packet */ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->user); buffer_put_cstring(&b, service); buffer_put_cstring(&b, "hostbased"); buffer_put_string(&b, pkalg, alen); buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen); buffer_put_cstring(&b, chost); buffer_put_cstring(&b, cuser); #ifdef DEBUG_PK buffer_dump(&b); #endif pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost); /* test for allowed key and correct signature */ authenticated = 0; if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key)) && PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b))) == 1) authenticated = 1; buffer_free(&b); done: debug2("userauth_hostbased: authenticated %d", authenticated); if (key != NULL) key_free(key); free(pkalg); free(pkblob); free(cuser); free(chost); free(sig); return authenticated; } /* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */ int hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, const char *cuser, char *chost, Key *key) { const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup, *reason; HostStatus host_status; int len; char *fp; if (auth_key_is_revoked(key)) return 0; resolvedname = get_canonical_hostname(options.use_dns); ipaddr = get_remote_ipaddr(); debug2("userauth_hostbased: chost %s resolvedname %s ipaddr %s", chost, resolvedname, ipaddr); if (((len = strlen(chost)) > 0) && chost[len - 1] == '.') { debug2("stripping trailing dot from chost %s", chost); chost[len - 1] = '\0'; } if (options.hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only) { if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0) return 0; lookup = chost; } else { if (strcasecmp(resolvedname, chost) != 0) logit("userauth_hostbased mismatch: " "client sends %s, but we resolve %s to %s", chost, ipaddr, resolvedname); if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr) == 0) return 0; lookup = resolvedname; } debug2("userauth_hostbased: access allowed by auth_rhosts2"); if (key_is_cert(key) && key_cert_check_authority(key, 1, 0, lookup, &reason)) { error("%s", reason); auth_debug_add("%s", reason); return 0; } host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE, options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE); /* backward compat if no key has been found. */ if (host_status == HOST_NEW) { host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2, options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2); } if (host_status == HOST_OK) { if (key_is_cert(key)) { fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by " "%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id, key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp, cuser, lookup); } else { fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s", key_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup); } free(fp); } return (host_status == HOST_OK); } Authmethod method_hostbased = { "hostbased", userauth_hostbased, &options.hostbased_authentication }; Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-kbdint.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-kbdint.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-kbdint.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,68 +1,69 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-kbdint.c,v 1.6 2013/05/17 00:13:13 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-kbdint.c,v 1.7 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "packet.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "log.h" #include "buffer.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; static int userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt) { int authenticated = 0; char *lang, *devs; lang = packet_get_string(NULL); devs = packet_get_string(NULL); packet_check_eom(); debug("keyboard-interactive devs %s", devs); if (options.challenge_response_authentication) authenticated = auth2_challenge(authctxt, devs); free(devs); free(lang); return authenticated; } Authmethod method_kbdint = { "keyboard-interactive", userauth_kbdint, &options.kbd_interactive_authentication }; Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-none.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-none.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-none.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,73 +1,75 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.16 2010/06/25 08:46:17 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-none.c,v 1.18 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include -#include #include #include +#include +#include #include "atomicio.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "buffer.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssh2.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; /* "none" is allowed only one time */ static int none_enabled = 1; static int userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt) { none_enabled = 0; packet_check_eom(); if (options.permit_empty_passwd && options.password_authentication) return (PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, ""))); return (0); } Authmethod method_none = { "none", userauth_none, &none_enabled }; Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-passwd.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-passwd.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-passwd.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,80 +1,81 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.11 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-passwd.c,v 1.12 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "buffer.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; static int userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt) { char *password, *newpass; int authenticated = 0; int change; u_int len, newlen; change = packet_get_char(); password = packet_get_string(&len); if (change) { /* discard new password from packet */ newpass = packet_get_string(&newlen); explicit_bzero(newpass, newlen); free(newpass); } packet_check_eom(); if (change) logit("password change not supported"); else if (PRIVSEP(auth_password(authctxt, password)) == 1) authenticated = 1; explicit_bzero(password, len); free(password); return authenticated; } Authmethod method_passwd = { "password", userauth_passwd, &options.password_authentication }; Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-pubkey.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-pubkey.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2-pubkey.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,687 +1,687 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.39 2013/12/30 23:52:27 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.41 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "canohost.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" -#include "misc.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "match.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern u_char *session_id2; extern u_int session_id2_len; static int userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) { Buffer b; Key *key = NULL; char *pkalg, *userstyle; u_char *pkblob, *sig; u_int alen, blen, slen; int have_sig, pktype; int authenticated = 0; if (!authctxt->valid) { debug2("userauth_pubkey: disabled because of invalid user"); return 0; } have_sig = packet_get_char(); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { debug2("userauth_pubkey: SSH_BUG_PKAUTH"); /* no explicit pkalg given */ pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); buffer_init(&b); buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen); /* so we have to extract the pkalg from the pkblob */ pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen); buffer_free(&b); } else { pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen); pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); } pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg); if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) { /* this is perfectly legal */ logit("userauth_pubkey: unsupported public key algorithm: %s", pkalg); goto done; } key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen); if (key == NULL) { error("userauth_pubkey: cannot decode key: %s", pkalg); goto done; } if (key->type != pktype) { error("userauth_pubkey: type mismatch for decoded key " "(received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype); goto done; } if (key_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe " "signature scheme"); goto done; } if (have_sig) { sig = packet_get_string(&slen); packet_check_eom(); buffer_init(&b); if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); } else { buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); } /* reconstruct packet */ buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->style ? ":" : "", authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); buffer_put_cstring(&b, userstyle); free(userstyle); buffer_put_cstring(&b, datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" : authctxt->service); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); } else { buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey"); buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg); } buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen); #ifdef DEBUG_PK buffer_dump(&b); #endif pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL); /* test for correct signature */ authenticated = 0; if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key)) && PRIVSEP(key_verify(key, sig, slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b))) == 1) authenticated = 1; buffer_free(&b); free(sig); } else { debug("test whether pkalg/pkblob are acceptable"); packet_check_eom(); /* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */ /* * XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed * to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this * message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all * if a user is not allowed to login. is this an * issue? -markus */ if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key))) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK); packet_put_string(pkalg, alen); packet_put_string(pkblob, blen); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); authctxt->postponed = 1; } } if (authenticated != 1) auth_clear_options(); done: debug2("userauth_pubkey: authenticated %d pkalg %s", authenticated, pkalg); if (key != NULL) key_free(key); free(pkalg); free(pkblob); return authenticated; } void pubkey_auth_info(Authctxt *authctxt, const Key *key, const char *fmt, ...) { char *fp, *extra; va_list ap; int i; extra = NULL; if (fmt != NULL) { va_start(ap, fmt); i = vasprintf(&extra, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); if (i < 0 || extra == NULL) fatal("%s: vasprintf failed", __func__); } if (key_is_cert(key)) { fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); auth_info(authctxt, "%s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s", key_type(key), key->cert->key_id, (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial, key_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp, extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra); free(fp); } else { fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); auth_info(authctxt, "%s %s%s%s", key_type(key), fp, extra == NULL ? "" : ", ", extra == NULL ? "" : extra); free(fp); } free(extra); } static int -match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct KeyCert *cert) +match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert) { char *result; u_int i; /* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */ for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) { if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i], principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) { debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"", result); free(result); return 1; } } return 0; } static int -match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct KeyCert *cert) +match_principals_file(char *file, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey_cert *cert) { FILE *f; char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES], *cp, *ep, *line_opts; u_long linenum = 0; u_int i; temporarily_use_uid(pw); debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file); if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) { restore_uid(); return 0; } while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { /* Skip leading whitespace. */ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; /* Skip blank and comment lines. */ if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL) *ep = '\0'; if (!*cp || *cp == '\n') continue; /* Trim trailing whitespace. */ ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1; while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t')) *ep-- = '\0'; /* * If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has * key options. */ line_opts = NULL; if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL || (ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) { for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++) ; line_opts = cp; cp = ep; } for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) { if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) == 0) { debug3("matched principal \"%.100s\" " "from file \"%s\" on line %lu", cert->principals[i], file, linenum); if (auth_parse_options(pw, line_opts, file, linenum) != 1) continue; fclose(f); restore_uid(); return 1; } } } fclose(f); restore_uid(); return 0; } /* * Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file, * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. */ static int check_authkeys_file(FILE *f, char *file, Key* key, struct passwd *pw) { char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; const char *reason; int found_key = 0; u_long linenum = 0; Key *found; char *fp; found_key = 0; found = NULL; while (read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { char *cp, *key_options = NULL; if (found != NULL) key_free(found); found = key_new(key_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type); auth_clear_options(); /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') continue; if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) { /* no key? check if there are options for this key */ int quoted = 0; debug2("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp); key_options = cp; for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) { if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"') cp++; /* Skip both */ else if (*cp == '"') quoted = !quoted; } /* Skip remaining whitespace. */ for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (key_read(found, &cp) != 1) { debug2("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp); /* still no key? advance to next line*/ continue; } } if (key_is_cert(key)) { if (!key_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key)) continue; if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum) != 1) continue; if (!key_is_cert_authority) continue; fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); debug("matching CA found: file %s, line %lu, %s %s", file, linenum, key_type(found), fp); /* * If the user has specified a list of principals as * a key option, then prefer that list to matching * their username in the certificate principals list. */ if (authorized_principals != NULL && !match_principals_option(authorized_principals, key->cert)) { reason = "Certificate does not contain an " "authorized principal"; fail_reason: free(fp); error("%s", reason); auth_debug_add("%s", reason); continue; } if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0, authorized_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, &reason) != 0) goto fail_reason; if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0) { free(fp); continue; } verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" " "signed by %s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id, key_type(found), fp, file); free(fp); found_key = 1; break; } else if (key_equal(found, key)) { if (auth_parse_options(pw, key_options, file, linenum) != 1) continue; if (key_is_cert_authority) continue; found_key = 1; fp = key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); debug("matching key found: file %s, line %lu %s %s", file, linenum, key_type(found), fp); free(fp); break; } } if (found != NULL) key_free(found); if (!found_key) debug2("key not found"); return found_key; } /* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */ static int user_cert_trusted_ca(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) { char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL; const char *reason; int ret = 0; if (!key_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL) return 0; ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); if (key_in_file(key->cert->signature_key, options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1) != 1) { debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s", __func__, key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, options.trusted_user_ca_keys); goto out; } /* * If AuthorizedPrincipals is in use, then compare the certificate * principals against the names in that file rather than matching * against the username. */ if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) { if (!match_principals_file(principals_file, pw, key->cert)) { reason = "Certificate does not contain an " "authorized principal"; fail_reason: error("%s", reason); auth_debug_add("%s", reason); goto out; } } if (key_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1, principals_file == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, &reason) != 0) goto fail_reason; if (auth_cert_options(key, pw) != 0) goto out; verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by %s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id, key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp, options.trusted_user_ca_keys); ret = 1; out: free(principals_file); free(ca_fp); return ret; } /* * Checks whether key is allowed in file. * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. */ static int user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key *key, char *file) { FILE *f; int found_key = 0; /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */ temporarily_use_uid(pw); debug("trying public key file %s", file); if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) { found_key = check_authkeys_file(f, file, key, pw); fclose(f); } restore_uid(); return found_key; } /* * Checks whether key is allowed in output of command. * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise. */ static int user_key_command_allowed2(struct passwd *user_pw, Key *key) { FILE *f; int ok, found_key = 0; struct passwd *pw; struct stat st; int status, devnull, p[2], i; pid_t pid; char *username, errmsg[512]; if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL || options.authorized_keys_command[0] != '/') return 0; if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) { error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping"); return 0; } username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user, "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); pw = getpwnam(username); if (pw == NULL) { error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s", username, strerror(errno)); free(username); return 0; } free(username); temporarily_use_uid(pw); if (stat(options.authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) { error("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s", options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno)); goto out; } if (auth_secure_path(options.authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) { error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg); goto out; } if (pipe(p) != 0) { error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto out; } debug3("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s %s\" as \"%s\"", options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, pw->pw_name); /* * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and * run cleanup_exit() code. */ restore_uid(); switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: /* error */ error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(p[0]); close(p[1]); return 0; case 0: /* child */ for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++) signal(i, SIG_DFL); if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } /* Keep stderr around a while longer to catch errors */ if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) { error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); /* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */ if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) { error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) != 0) { error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int)pw->pw_uid, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } /* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */ if (dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) { error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } execl(options.authorized_keys_command, options.authorized_keys_command, user_pw->pw_name, NULL); error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s", options.authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno)); _exit(127); default: /* parent */ break; } temporarily_use_uid(pw); close(p[1]); if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) { error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(p[0]); /* Don't leave zombie child */ kill(pid, SIGTERM); while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR) ; goto out; } ok = check_authkeys_file(f, options.authorized_keys_command, key, pw); fclose(f); while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { if (errno != EINTR) { error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); goto out; } } if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d", options.authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status)); goto out; } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) { error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d", options.authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status)); goto out; } found_key = ok; out: restore_uid(); return found_key; } /* * Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user. */ int user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) { u_int success, i; char *file; if (auth_key_is_revoked(key)) return 0; if (key_is_cert(key) && auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key)) return 0; success = user_cert_trusted_ca(pw, key); if (success) return success; success = user_key_command_allowed2(pw, key); if (success > 0) return success; for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) { if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0) continue; file = expand_authorized_keys( options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw); success = user_key_allowed2(pw, key, file); free(file); } return success; } Authmethod method_pubkey = { "publickey", userauth_pubkey, &options.pubkey_authentication }; Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/auth2.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,618 +1,619 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.130 2014/01/29 06:18:35 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: auth2.c,v 1.132 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "atomicio.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "buffer.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "buffer.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern u_char *session_id2; extern u_int session_id2_len; extern Buffer loginmsg; /* methods */ extern Authmethod method_none; extern Authmethod method_pubkey; extern Authmethod method_passwd; extern Authmethod method_kbdint; extern Authmethod method_hostbased; #ifdef GSSAPI extern Authmethod method_gssapi; #endif Authmethod *authmethods[] = { &method_none, &method_pubkey, #ifdef GSSAPI &method_gssapi, #endif &method_passwd, &method_kbdint, &method_hostbased, NULL }; /* protocol */ static void input_service_request(int, u_int32_t, void *); static void input_userauth_request(int, u_int32_t, void *); /* helper */ static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *, const char *); static char *authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt); #define MATCH_NONE 0 /* method or submethod mismatch */ #define MATCH_METHOD 1 /* method matches (no submethod specified) */ #define MATCH_BOTH 2 /* method and submethod match */ #define MATCH_PARTIAL 3 /* method matches, submethod can't be checked */ static int list_starts_with(const char *, const char *, const char *); char * auth2_read_banner(void) { struct stat st; char *banner = NULL; size_t len, n; int fd; if ((fd = open(options.banner, O_RDONLY)) == -1) return (NULL); if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) { close(fd); return (NULL); } if (st.st_size <= 0 || st.st_size > 1*1024*1024) { close(fd); return (NULL); } len = (size_t)st.st_size; /* truncate */ banner = xmalloc(len + 1); n = atomicio(read, fd, banner, len); close(fd); if (n != len) { free(banner); return (NULL); } banner[n] = '\0'; return (banner); } void userauth_send_banner(const char *msg) { if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_BANNER) return; packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER); packet_put_cstring(msg); packet_put_cstring(""); /* language, unused */ packet_send(); debug("%s: sent", __func__); } static void userauth_banner(void) { char *banner = NULL; if (options.banner == NULL || strcasecmp(options.banner, "none") == 0 || (datafellows & SSH_BUG_BANNER) != 0) return; if ((banner = PRIVSEP(auth2_read_banner())) == NULL) goto done; userauth_send_banner(banner); done: free(banner); } /* * loop until authctxt->success == TRUE */ void do_authentication2(Authctxt *authctxt) { dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST, &input_service_request); dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt->success, authctxt); } /*ARGSUSED*/ static void input_service_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; u_int len; int acceptit = 0; char *service = packet_get_cstring(&len); packet_check_eom(); if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_service_request: no authctxt"); if (strcmp(service, "ssh-userauth") == 0) { if (!authctxt->success) { acceptit = 1; /* now we can handle user-auth requests */ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &input_userauth_request); } } /* XXX all other service requests are denied */ if (acceptit) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT); packet_put_cstring(service); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } else { debug("bad service request %s", service); packet_disconnect("bad service request %s", service); } free(service); } /*ARGSUSED*/ static void input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; Authmethod *m = NULL; char *user, *service, *method, *style = NULL; int authenticated = 0; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_request: no authctxt"); user = packet_get_cstring(NULL); service = packet_get_cstring(NULL); method = packet_get_cstring(NULL); debug("userauth-request for user %s service %s method %s", user, service, method); debug("attempt %d failures %d", authctxt->attempt, authctxt->failures); if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL) *style++ = 0; if (authctxt->attempt++ == 0) { /* setup auth context */ authctxt->pw = PRIVSEP(getpwnamallow(user)); authctxt->user = xstrdup(user); if (authctxt->pw && strcmp(service, "ssh-connection")==0) { authctxt->valid = 1; debug2("input_userauth_request: setting up authctxt for %s", user); } else { logit("input_userauth_request: invalid user %s", user); authctxt->pw = fakepw(); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_INVALID_USER)); #endif } #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) PRIVSEP(start_pam(authctxt)); #endif setproctitle("%s%s", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown", use_privsep ? " [net]" : ""); authctxt->service = xstrdup(service); authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL; if (use_privsep) mm_inform_authserv(service, style); userauth_banner(); if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) packet_disconnect("no authentication methods enabled"); } else if (strcmp(user, authctxt->user) != 0 || strcmp(service, authctxt->service) != 0) { packet_disconnect("Change of username or service not allowed: " "(%s,%s) -> (%s,%s)", authctxt->user, authctxt->service, user, service); } /* reset state */ auth2_challenge_stop(authctxt); #ifdef GSSAPI /* XXX move to auth2_gssapi_stop() */ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE, NULL); #endif authctxt->postponed = 0; authctxt->server_caused_failure = 0; /* try to authenticate user */ m = authmethod_lookup(authctxt, method); if (m != NULL && authctxt->failures < options.max_authtries) { debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method); authenticated = m->userauth(authctxt); } userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method, NULL); free(service); free(user); free(method); } void userauth_finish(Authctxt *authctxt, int authenticated, const char *method, const char *submethod) { char *methods; int partial = 0; if (!authctxt->valid && authenticated) fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated invalid user %s", authctxt->user); if (authenticated && authctxt->postponed) fatal("INTERNAL ERROR: authenticated and postponed"); /* Special handling for root */ if (authenticated && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && !auth_root_allowed(method)) { authenticated = 0; #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED)); #endif } if (authenticated && options.num_auth_methods != 0) { if (!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt, method, submethod)) { authenticated = 0; partial = 1; } } /* Log before sending the reply */ auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial, method, submethod); if (authctxt->postponed) return; #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam && authenticated) { if (!PRIVSEP(do_pam_account())) { /* if PAM returned a message, send it to the user */ if (buffer_len(&loginmsg) > 0) { buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1); userauth_send_banner(buffer_ptr(&loginmsg)); packet_write_wait(); } fatal("Access denied for user %s by PAM account " "configuration", authctxt->user); } } #endif #ifdef _UNICOS if (authenticated && cray_access_denied(authctxt->user)) { authenticated = 0; fatal("Access denied for user %s.", authctxt->user); } #endif /* _UNICOS */ if (authenticated == 1) { /* turn off userauth */ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST, &dispatch_protocol_ignore); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* now we can break out */ authctxt->success = 1; } else { /* Allow initial try of "none" auth without failure penalty */ if (!authctxt->server_caused_failure && (authctxt->attempt > 1 || strcmp(method, "none") != 0)) authctxt->failures++; if (authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries) { #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES)); #endif - packet_disconnect(AUTH_FAIL_MSG, authctxt->user); + auth_maxtries_exceeded(authctxt); } methods = authmethods_get(authctxt); debug3("%s: failure partial=%d next methods=\"%s\"", __func__, partial, methods); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE); packet_put_cstring(methods); packet_put_char(partial); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); free(methods); } } /* * Checks whether method is allowed by at least one AuthenticationMethods * methods list. Returns 1 if allowed, or no methods lists configured. * 0 otherwise. */ int auth2_method_allowed(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method, const char *submethod) { u_int i; /* * NB. authctxt->num_auth_methods might be zero as a result of * auth2_setup_methods_lists(), so check the configuration. */ if (options.num_auth_methods == 0) return 1; for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) { if (list_starts_with(authctxt->auth_methods[i], method, submethod) != MATCH_NONE) return 1; } return 0; } static char * authmethods_get(Authctxt *authctxt) { Buffer b; char *list; u_int i; buffer_init(&b); for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) { if (strcmp(authmethods[i]->name, "none") == 0) continue; if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL || *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0) continue; if (!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt, authmethods[i]->name, NULL)) continue; if (buffer_len(&b) > 0) buffer_append(&b, ",", 1); buffer_append(&b, authmethods[i]->name, strlen(authmethods[i]->name)); } buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1); list = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b)); buffer_free(&b); return list; } static Authmethod * authmethod_lookup(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *name) { int i; if (name != NULL) for (i = 0; authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) if (authmethods[i]->enabled != NULL && *(authmethods[i]->enabled) != 0 && strcmp(name, authmethods[i]->name) == 0 && auth2_method_allowed(authctxt, authmethods[i]->name, NULL)) return authmethods[i]; debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name ? name : "NULL"); return NULL; } /* * Check a comma-separated list of methods for validity. Is need_enable is * non-zero, then also require that the methods are enabled. * Returns 0 on success or -1 if the methods list is invalid. */ int auth2_methods_valid(const char *_methods, int need_enable) { char *methods, *omethods, *method, *p; u_int i, found; int ret = -1; if (*_methods == '\0') { error("empty authentication method list"); return -1; } omethods = methods = xstrdup(_methods); while ((method = strsep(&methods, ",")) != NULL) { for (found = i = 0; !found && authmethods[i] != NULL; i++) { if ((p = strchr(method, ':')) != NULL) *p = '\0'; if (strcmp(method, authmethods[i]->name) != 0) continue; if (need_enable) { if (authmethods[i]->enabled == NULL || *(authmethods[i]->enabled) == 0) { error("Disabled method \"%s\" in " "AuthenticationMethods list \"%s\"", method, _methods); goto out; } } found = 1; break; } if (!found) { error("Unknown authentication method \"%s\" in list", method); goto out; } } ret = 0; out: free(omethods); return ret; } /* * Prune the AuthenticationMethods supplied in the configuration, removing * any methods lists that include disabled methods. Note that this might * leave authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0, even when multiple required auth * has been requested. For this reason, all tests for whether multiple is * enabled should consult options.num_auth_methods directly. */ int auth2_setup_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt) { u_int i; if (options.num_auth_methods == 0) return 0; debug3("%s: checking methods", __func__); authctxt->auth_methods = xcalloc(options.num_auth_methods, sizeof(*authctxt->auth_methods)); authctxt->num_auth_methods = 0; for (i = 0; i < options.num_auth_methods; i++) { if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[i], 1) != 0) { logit("Authentication methods list \"%s\" contains " "disabled method, skipping", options.auth_methods[i]); continue; } debug("authentication methods list %d: %s", authctxt->num_auth_methods, options.auth_methods[i]); authctxt->auth_methods[authctxt->num_auth_methods++] = xstrdup(options.auth_methods[i]); } if (authctxt->num_auth_methods == 0) { error("No AuthenticationMethods left after eliminating " "disabled methods"); return -1; } return 0; } static int list_starts_with(const char *methods, const char *method, const char *submethod) { size_t l = strlen(method); int match; const char *p; if (strncmp(methods, method, l) != 0) return MATCH_NONE; p = methods + l; match = MATCH_METHOD; if (*p == ':') { if (!submethod) return MATCH_PARTIAL; l = strlen(submethod); p += 1; if (strncmp(submethod, p, l)) return MATCH_NONE; p += l; match = MATCH_BOTH; } if (*p != ',' && *p != '\0') return MATCH_NONE; return match; } /* * Remove method from the start of a comma-separated list of methods. * Returns 0 if the list of methods did not start with that method or 1 * if it did. */ static int remove_method(char **methods, const char *method, const char *submethod) { char *omethods = *methods, *p; size_t l = strlen(method); int match; match = list_starts_with(omethods, method, submethod); if (match != MATCH_METHOD && match != MATCH_BOTH) return 0; p = omethods + l; if (submethod && match == MATCH_BOTH) p += 1 + strlen(submethod); /* include colon */ if (*p == ',') p++; *methods = xstrdup(p); free(omethods); return 1; } /* * Called after successful authentication. Will remove the successful method * from the start of each list in which it occurs. If it was the last method * in any list, then authentication is deemed successful. * Returns 1 if the method completed any authentication list or 0 otherwise. */ int auth2_update_methods_lists(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *method, const char *submethod) { u_int i, found = 0; debug3("%s: updating methods list after \"%s\"", __func__, method); for (i = 0; i < authctxt->num_auth_methods; i++) { if (!remove_method(&(authctxt->auth_methods[i]), method, submethod)) continue; found = 1; if (*authctxt->auth_methods[i] == '\0') { debug2("authentication methods list %d complete", i); return 1; } debug3("authentication methods list %d remaining: \"%s\"", i, authctxt->auth_methods[i]); } /* This should not happen, but would be bad if it did */ if (!found) fatal("%s: method not in AuthenticationMethods", __func__); return 0; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/authfd.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/authfd.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/authfd.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,657 +1,669 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.92 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.93 2014/04/29 18:01:49 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions for connecting the local authentication agent. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 implementation, * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include -#include -#include - #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "key.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "compat.h" #include "log.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "misc.h" static int agent_present = 0; /* helper */ int decode_reply(int type); /* macro to check for "agent failure" message */ #define agent_failed(x) \ ((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || (x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \ (x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE)) int ssh_agent_present(void) { int authfd; if (agent_present) return 1; if ((authfd = ssh_get_authentication_socket()) == -1) return 0; else { ssh_close_authentication_socket(authfd); return 1; } } /* Returns the number of the authentication fd, or -1 if there is none. */ int ssh_get_authentication_socket(void) { const char *authsocket; int sock; struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); if (!authsocket) return -1; memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr)); sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)); sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (sock < 0) return -1; /* close on exec */ if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) { close(sock); return -1; } if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) { close(sock); return -1; } agent_present = 1; return sock; } static int ssh_request_reply(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Buffer *request, Buffer *reply) { u_int l, len; char buf[1024]; /* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */ len = buffer_len(request); put_u32(buf, len); /* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */ if (atomicio(vwrite, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4 || atomicio(vwrite, auth->fd, buffer_ptr(request), buffer_len(request)) != buffer_len(request)) { error("Error writing to authentication socket."); return 0; } /* * Wait for response from the agent. First read the length of the * response packet. */ if (atomicio(read, auth->fd, buf, 4) != 4) { error("Error reading response length from authentication socket."); return 0; } /* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */ len = get_u32(buf); if (len > 256 * 1024) fatal("Authentication response too long: %u", len); /* Read the rest of the response in to the buffer. */ buffer_clear(reply); while (len > 0) { l = len; if (l > sizeof(buf)) l = sizeof(buf); if (atomicio(read, auth->fd, buf, l) != l) { error("Error reading response from authentication socket."); return 0; } buffer_append(reply, buf, l); len -= l; } return 1; } /* * Closes the agent socket if it should be closed (depends on how it was * obtained). The argument must have been returned by * ssh_get_authentication_socket(). */ void ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock) { if (getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME)) close(sock); } /* * Opens and connects a private socket for communication with the * authentication agent. Returns the file descriptor (which must be * shut down and closed by the caller when no longer needed). * Returns NULL if an error occurred and the connection could not be * opened. */ AuthenticationConnection * ssh_get_authentication_connection(void) { AuthenticationConnection *auth; int sock; sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket(); /* * Fail if we couldn't obtain a connection. This happens if we * exited due to a timeout. */ if (sock < 0) return NULL; auth = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*auth)); auth->fd = sock; buffer_init(&auth->identities); auth->howmany = 0; return auth; } /* * Closes the connection to the authentication agent and frees any associated * memory. */ void ssh_close_authentication_connection(AuthenticationConnection *auth) { buffer_free(&auth->identities); close(auth->fd); free(auth); } /* Lock/unlock agent */ int ssh_lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int lock, const char *password) { int type; Buffer msg; buffer_init(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, lock ? SSH_AGENTC_LOCK : SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, password); if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { buffer_free(&msg); return 0; } type = buffer_get_char(&msg); buffer_free(&msg); return decode_reply(type); } /* * Returns the first authentication identity held by the agent. */ int ssh_get_num_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version) { int type, code1 = 0, code2 = 0; Buffer request; switch (version) { case 1: code1 = SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES; code2 = SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER; break; case 2: code1 = SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES; code2 = SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER; break; default: return 0; } /* * Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the * identities it can represent. */ buffer_init(&request); buffer_put_char(&request, code1); buffer_clear(&auth->identities); if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &request, &auth->identities) == 0) { buffer_free(&request); return 0; } buffer_free(&request); /* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */ type = buffer_get_char(&auth->identities); if (agent_failed(type)) { return 0; } else if (type != code2) { fatal("Bad authentication reply message type: %d", type); } /* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */ auth->howmany = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities); if ((u_int)auth->howmany > 1024) fatal("Too many identities in authentication reply: %d", auth->howmany); return auth->howmany; } Key * ssh_get_first_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version) { /* get number of identities and return the first entry (if any). */ if (ssh_get_num_identities(auth, version) > 0) return ssh_get_next_identity(auth, comment, version); return NULL; } Key * ssh_get_next_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, char **comment, int version) { +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 int keybits; u_int bits; +#endif u_char *blob; u_int blen; Key *key = NULL; /* Return failure if no more entries. */ if (auth->howmany <= 0) return NULL; /* * Get the next entry from the packet. These will abort with a fatal * error if the packet is too short or contains corrupt data. */ switch (version) { +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 case 1: key = key_new(KEY_RSA1); bits = buffer_get_int(&auth->identities); buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->e); buffer_get_bignum(&auth->identities, key->rsa->n); *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL); keybits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n); if (keybits < 0 || bits != (u_int)keybits) logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %d, announced %u", BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits); break; +#endif case 2: blob = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, &blen); *comment = buffer_get_string(&auth->identities, NULL); key = key_from_blob(blob, blen); free(blob); break; default: return NULL; } /* Decrement the number of remaining entries. */ auth->howmany--; return key; } /* * Generates a random challenge, sends it to the agent, and waits for * response from the agent. Returns true (non-zero) if the agent gave the * correct answer, zero otherwise. Response type selects the style of * response desired, with 0 corresponding to protocol version 1.0 (no longer * supported) and 1 corresponding to protocol version 1.1. */ +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 int ssh_decrypt_challenge(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key* key, BIGNUM *challenge, u_char session_id[16], u_int response_type, u_char response[16]) { Buffer buffer; int success = 0; int i; int type; if (key->type != KEY_RSA1) return 0; if (response_type == 0) { logit("Compatibility with ssh protocol version 1.0 no longer supported."); return 0; } buffer_init(&buffer); buffer_put_char(&buffer, SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE); buffer_put_int(&buffer, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)); buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->e); buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->n); buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, challenge); buffer_append(&buffer, session_id, 16); buffer_put_int(&buffer, response_type); if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &buffer, &buffer) == 0) { buffer_free(&buffer); return 0; } type = buffer_get_char(&buffer); if (agent_failed(type)) { logit("Agent admitted failure to authenticate using the key."); } else if (type != SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE) { fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type); } else { success = 1; /* * Get the response from the packet. This will abort with a * fatal error if the packet is corrupt. */ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) response[i] = (u_char)buffer_get_char(&buffer); } buffer_free(&buffer); return success; } +#endif /* ask agent to sign data, returns -1 on error, 0 on success */ int ssh_agent_sign(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, u_char *data, u_int datalen) { extern int datafellows; Buffer msg; u_char *blob; u_int blen; int type, flags = 0; int ret = -1; if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0) return -1; if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) flags = SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE; buffer_init(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST); buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen); buffer_put_string(&msg, data, datalen); buffer_put_int(&msg, flags); free(blob); if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { buffer_free(&msg); return -1; } type = buffer_get_char(&msg); if (agent_failed(type)) { logit("Agent admitted failure to sign using the key."); } else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) { fatal("Bad authentication response: %d", type); } else { ret = 0; *sigp = buffer_get_string(&msg, lenp); } buffer_free(&msg); return ret; } /* Encode key for a message to the agent. */ +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 static void ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(Buffer *b, RSA *key, const char *comment) { buffer_put_int(b, BN_num_bits(key->n)); buffer_put_bignum(b, key->n); buffer_put_bignum(b, key->e); buffer_put_bignum(b, key->d); /* To keep within the protocol: p < q for ssh. in SSL p > q */ buffer_put_bignum(b, key->iqmp); /* ssh key->u */ buffer_put_bignum(b, key->q); /* ssh key->p, SSL key->q */ buffer_put_bignum(b, key->p); /* ssh key->q, SSL key->p */ buffer_put_cstring(b, comment); } +#endif static void ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(Buffer *b, Key *key, const char *comment) { key_private_serialize(key, b); buffer_put_cstring(b, comment); } /* * Adds an identity to the authentication server. This call is not meant to * be used by normal applications. */ int ssh_add_identity_constrained(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key, const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm) { Buffer msg; int type, constrained = (life || confirm); buffer_init(&msg); switch (key->type) { +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 case KEY_RSA1: type = constrained ? SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED : SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY; buffer_put_char(&msg, type); ssh_encode_identity_rsa1(&msg, key->rsa, comment); break; +#endif +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA: case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: +#endif case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: type = constrained ? SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED : SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY; buffer_put_char(&msg, type); ssh_encode_identity_ssh2(&msg, key, comment); break; default: buffer_free(&msg); return 0; } if (constrained) { if (life != 0) { buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME); buffer_put_int(&msg, life); } if (confirm != 0) buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM); } if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { buffer_free(&msg); return 0; } type = buffer_get_char(&msg); buffer_free(&msg); return decode_reply(type); } /* * Removes an identity from the authentication server. This call is not * meant to be used by normal applications. */ int ssh_remove_identity(AuthenticationConnection *auth, Key *key) { Buffer msg; int type; u_char *blob; u_int blen; buffer_init(&msg); +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 if (key->type == KEY_RSA1) { buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY); buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)); buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->e); buffer_put_bignum(&msg, key->rsa->n); - } else if (key->type != KEY_UNSPEC) { + } else +#endif + if (key->type != KEY_UNSPEC) { key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen); buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY); buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen); free(blob); } else { buffer_free(&msg); return 0; } if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { buffer_free(&msg); return 0; } type = buffer_get_char(&msg); buffer_free(&msg); return decode_reply(type); } int ssh_update_card(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int add, const char *reader_id, const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm) { Buffer msg; int type, constrained = (life || confirm); if (add) { type = constrained ? SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED : SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY; } else type = SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY; buffer_init(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, type); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, reader_id); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, pin); if (constrained) { if (life != 0) { buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME); buffer_put_int(&msg, life); } if (confirm != 0) buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM); } if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { buffer_free(&msg); return 0; } type = buffer_get_char(&msg); buffer_free(&msg); return decode_reply(type); } /* * Removes all identities from the agent. This call is not meant to be used * by normal applications. */ int ssh_remove_all_identities(AuthenticationConnection *auth, int version) { Buffer msg; int type; int code = (version==1) ? SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES : SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES; buffer_init(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, code); if (ssh_request_reply(auth, &msg, &msg) == 0) { buffer_free(&msg); return 0; } type = buffer_get_char(&msg); buffer_free(&msg); return decode_reply(type); } int decode_reply(int type) { switch (type) { case SSH_AGENT_FAILURE: case SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE: case SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE: logit("SSH_AGENT_FAILURE"); return 0; case SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS: return 1; default: fatal("Bad response from authentication agent: %d", type); } /* NOTREACHED */ return 0; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/authfile.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/authfile.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/authfile.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,1308 +1,555 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.103 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.107 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ /* - * Author: Tatu Ylonen - * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland - * All rights reserved - * This file contains functions for reading and writing identity files, and - * for reading the passphrase from the user. - * - * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software - * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this - * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is - * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be - * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". - * - * * Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include -#include -#include -#include - -/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */ -#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" - -#include "crypto_api.h" - #include #include -#include #include +#include #include #include #include -#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H -#include -#endif - -#include "xmalloc.h" #include "cipher.h" -#include "buffer.h" #include "key.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "log.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "misc.h" #include "atomicio.h" -#include "uuencode.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" -/* openssh private key file format */ -#define MARK_BEGIN "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n" -#define MARK_END "-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n" -#define KDFNAME "bcrypt" -#define AUTH_MAGIC "openssh-key-v1" -#define SALT_LEN 16 -#define DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME "aes256-cbc" -#define DEFAULT_ROUNDS 16 - #define MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE (1024 * 1024) -/* Version identification string for SSH v1 identity files. */ -static const char authfile_id_string[] = - "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE FORMAT 1.1\n"; - -static int -key_private_to_blob2(Key *prv, Buffer *blob, const char *passphrase, - const char *comment, const char *ciphername, int rounds) -{ - u_char *key, *cp, salt[SALT_LEN]; - size_t keylen, ivlen, blocksize, authlen; - u_int len, check; - int i, n; - const Cipher *c; - Buffer encoded, b, kdf; - CipherContext ctx; - const char *kdfname = KDFNAME; - - if (rounds <= 0) - rounds = DEFAULT_ROUNDS; - if (passphrase == NULL || !strlen(passphrase)) { - ciphername = "none"; - kdfname = "none"; - } else if (ciphername == NULL) - ciphername = DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME; - else if (cipher_number(ciphername) != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) - fatal("invalid cipher"); - - if ((c = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) - fatal("unknown cipher name"); - buffer_init(&kdf); - blocksize = cipher_blocksize(c); - keylen = cipher_keylen(c); - ivlen = cipher_ivlen(c); - authlen = cipher_authlen(c); - key = xcalloc(1, keylen + ivlen); - if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0) { - arc4random_buf(salt, SALT_LEN); - if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), - salt, SALT_LEN, key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) - fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf failed"); - buffer_put_string(&kdf, salt, SALT_LEN); - buffer_put_int(&kdf, rounds); - } - cipher_init(&ctx, c, key, keylen, key + keylen , ivlen, 1); - explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen); - free(key); - - buffer_init(&encoded); - buffer_append(&encoded, AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC)); - buffer_put_cstring(&encoded, ciphername); - buffer_put_cstring(&encoded, kdfname); - buffer_put_string(&encoded, buffer_ptr(&kdf), buffer_len(&kdf)); - buffer_put_int(&encoded, 1); /* number of keys */ - key_to_blob(prv, &cp, &len); /* public key */ - buffer_put_string(&encoded, cp, len); - - explicit_bzero(cp, len); - free(cp); - - buffer_free(&kdf); - - /* set up the buffer that will be encrypted */ - buffer_init(&b); - - /* Random check bytes */ - check = arc4random(); - buffer_put_int(&b, check); - buffer_put_int(&b, check); - - /* append private key and comment*/ - key_private_serialize(prv, &b); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, comment); - - /* padding */ - i = 0; - while (buffer_len(&b) % blocksize) - buffer_put_char(&b, ++i & 0xff); - - /* length */ - buffer_put_int(&encoded, buffer_len(&b)); - - /* encrypt */ - cp = buffer_append_space(&encoded, buffer_len(&b) + authlen); - if (cipher_crypt(&ctx, 0, cp, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), 0, - authlen) != 0) - fatal("%s: cipher_crypt failed", __func__); - buffer_free(&b); - cipher_cleanup(&ctx); - - /* uuencode */ - len = 2 * buffer_len(&encoded); - cp = xmalloc(len); - n = uuencode(buffer_ptr(&encoded), buffer_len(&encoded), - (char *)cp, len); - if (n < 0) - fatal("%s: uuencode", __func__); - - buffer_clear(blob); - buffer_append(blob, MARK_BEGIN, sizeof(MARK_BEGIN) - 1); - for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { - buffer_put_char(blob, cp[i]); - if (i % 70 == 69) - buffer_put_char(blob, '\n'); - } - if (i % 70 != 69) - buffer_put_char(blob, '\n'); - buffer_append(blob, MARK_END, sizeof(MARK_END) - 1); - free(cp); - - return buffer_len(blob); -} - -static Key * -key_parse_private2(Buffer *blob, int type, const char *passphrase, - char **commentp) -{ - u_char *key = NULL, *cp, *salt = NULL, pad, last; - char *comment = NULL, *ciphername = NULL, *kdfname = NULL, *kdfp; - u_int keylen = 0, ivlen, blocksize, slen, klen, len, rounds, nkeys; - u_int check1, check2, m1len, m2len; - size_t authlen; - const Cipher *c; - Buffer b, encoded, copy, kdf; - CipherContext ctx; - Key *k = NULL; - int dlen, ret, i; - - buffer_init(&b); - buffer_init(&kdf); - buffer_init(&encoded); - buffer_init(©); - - /* uudecode */ - m1len = sizeof(MARK_BEGIN) - 1; - m2len = sizeof(MARK_END) - 1; - cp = buffer_ptr(blob); - len = buffer_len(blob); - if (len < m1len || memcmp(cp, MARK_BEGIN, m1len)) { - debug("%s: missing begin marker", __func__); - goto out; - } - cp += m1len; - len -= m1len; - while (len) { - if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') - buffer_put_char(&encoded, *cp); - last = *cp; - len--; - cp++; - if (last == '\n') { - if (len >= m2len && !memcmp(cp, MARK_END, m2len)) { - buffer_put_char(&encoded, '\0'); - break; - } - } - } - if (!len) { - debug("%s: no end marker", __func__); - goto out; - } - len = buffer_len(&encoded); - if ((cp = buffer_append_space(©, len)) == NULL) { - error("%s: buffer_append_space", __func__); - goto out; - } - if ((dlen = uudecode(buffer_ptr(&encoded), cp, len)) < 0) { - error("%s: uudecode failed", __func__); - goto out; - } - if ((u_int)dlen > len) { - error("%s: crazy uudecode length %d > %u", __func__, dlen, len); - goto out; - } - buffer_consume_end(©, len - dlen); - if (buffer_len(©) < sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC) || - memcmp(buffer_ptr(©), AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) { - error("%s: bad magic", __func__); - goto out; - } - buffer_consume(©, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC)); - - ciphername = buffer_get_cstring_ret(©, NULL); - if (ciphername == NULL || - (c = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) { - error("%s: unknown cipher name", __func__); - goto out; - } - if ((passphrase == NULL || !strlen(passphrase)) && - strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0) { - /* passphrase required */ - goto out; - } - kdfname = buffer_get_cstring_ret(©, NULL); - if (kdfname == NULL || - (!strcmp(kdfname, "none") && !strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt"))) { - error("%s: unknown kdf name", __func__); - goto out; - } - if (!strcmp(kdfname, "none") && strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0) { - error("%s: cipher %s requires kdf", __func__, ciphername); - goto out; - } - /* kdf options */ - kdfp = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(©, &klen); - if (kdfp == NULL) { - error("%s: kdf options not set", __func__); - goto out; - } - if (klen > 0) { - if ((cp = buffer_append_space(&kdf, klen)) == NULL) { - error("%s: kdf alloc failed", __func__); - goto out; - } - memcpy(cp, kdfp, klen); - } - /* number of keys */ - if (buffer_get_int_ret(&nkeys, ©) < 0) { - error("%s: key counter missing", __func__); - goto out; - } - if (nkeys != 1) { - error("%s: only one key supported", __func__); - goto out; - } - /* pubkey */ - if ((cp = buffer_get_string_ret(©, &len)) == NULL) { - error("%s: pubkey not found", __func__); - goto out; - } - free(cp); /* XXX check pubkey against decrypted private key */ - - /* size of encrypted key blob */ - len = buffer_get_int(©); - blocksize = cipher_blocksize(c); - authlen = cipher_authlen(c); - if (len < blocksize) { - error("%s: encrypted data too small", __func__); - goto out; - } - if (len % blocksize) { - error("%s: length not multiple of blocksize", __func__); - goto out; - } - - /* setup key */ - keylen = cipher_keylen(c); - ivlen = cipher_ivlen(c); - key = xcalloc(1, keylen + ivlen); - if (!strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt")) { - if ((salt = buffer_get_string_ret(&kdf, &slen)) == NULL) { - error("%s: salt not set", __func__); - goto out; - } - if (buffer_get_int_ret(&rounds, &kdf) < 0) { - error("%s: rounds not set", __func__); - goto out; - } - if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), salt, slen, - key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) { - error("%s: bcrypt_pbkdf failed", __func__); - goto out; - } - } - - cp = buffer_append_space(&b, len); - cipher_init(&ctx, c, key, keylen, key + keylen, ivlen, 0); - ret = cipher_crypt(&ctx, 0, cp, buffer_ptr(©), len, 0, authlen); - cipher_cleanup(&ctx); - buffer_consume(©, len); - - /* fail silently on decryption errors */ - if (ret != 0) { - debug("%s: decrypt failed", __func__); - goto out; - } - - if (buffer_len(©) != 0) { - error("%s: key blob has trailing data (len = %u)", __func__, - buffer_len(©)); - goto out; - } - - /* check bytes */ - if (buffer_get_int_ret(&check1, &b) < 0 || - buffer_get_int_ret(&check2, &b) < 0) { - error("check bytes missing"); - goto out; - } - if (check1 != check2) { - debug("%s: decrypt failed: 0x%08x != 0x%08x", __func__, - check1, check2); - goto out; - } - - k = key_private_deserialize(&b); - - /* comment */ - comment = buffer_get_cstring_ret(&b, NULL); - - i = 0; - while (buffer_len(&b)) { - if (buffer_get_char_ret(&pad, &b) == -1 || - pad != (++i & 0xff)) { - error("%s: bad padding", __func__); - key_free(k); - k = NULL; - goto out; - } - } - - if (k && commentp) { - *commentp = comment; - comment = NULL; - } - - /* XXX decode pubkey and check against private */ - out: - free(ciphername); - free(kdfname); - free(salt); - free(comment); - if (key) - explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen); - free(key); - buffer_free(&encoded); - buffer_free(©); - buffer_free(&kdf); - buffer_free(&b); - return k; -} - -/* - * Serialises the authentication (private) key to a blob, encrypting it with - * passphrase. The identification of the blob (lowest 64 bits of n) will - * precede the key to provide identification of the key without needing a - * passphrase. - */ -static int -key_private_rsa1_to_blob(Key *key, Buffer *blob, const char *passphrase, - const char *comment) -{ - Buffer buffer, encrypted; - u_char buf[100], *cp; - int i, cipher_num; - CipherContext ciphercontext; - const Cipher *cipher; - u_int32_t rnd; - - /* - * If the passphrase is empty, use SSH_CIPHER_NONE to ease converting - * to another cipher; otherwise use SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER. - */ - cipher_num = (strcmp(passphrase, "") == 0) ? - SSH_CIPHER_NONE : SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER; - if ((cipher = cipher_by_number(cipher_num)) == NULL) - fatal("save_private_key_rsa: bad cipher"); - - /* This buffer is used to built the secret part of the private key. */ - buffer_init(&buffer); - - /* Put checkbytes for checking passphrase validity. */ - rnd = arc4random(); - buf[0] = rnd & 0xff; - buf[1] = (rnd >> 8) & 0xff; - buf[2] = buf[0]; - buf[3] = buf[1]; - buffer_append(&buffer, buf, 4); - - /* - * Store the private key (n and e will not be stored because they - * will be stored in plain text, and storing them also in encrypted - * format would just give known plaintext). - */ - buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->d); - buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->iqmp); - buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->q); /* reverse from SSL p */ - buffer_put_bignum(&buffer, key->rsa->p); /* reverse from SSL q */ - - /* Pad the part to be encrypted until its size is a multiple of 8. */ - while (buffer_len(&buffer) % 8 != 0) - buffer_put_char(&buffer, 0); - - /* This buffer will be used to contain the data in the file. */ - buffer_init(&encrypted); - - /* First store keyfile id string. */ - for (i = 0; authfile_id_string[i]; i++) - buffer_put_char(&encrypted, authfile_id_string[i]); - buffer_put_char(&encrypted, 0); - - /* Store cipher type. */ - buffer_put_char(&encrypted, cipher_num); - buffer_put_int(&encrypted, 0); /* For future extension */ - - /* Store public key. This will be in plain text. */ - buffer_put_int(&encrypted, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)); - buffer_put_bignum(&encrypted, key->rsa->n); - buffer_put_bignum(&encrypted, key->rsa->e); - buffer_put_cstring(&encrypted, comment); - - /* Allocate space for the private part of the key in the buffer. */ - cp = buffer_append_space(&encrypted, buffer_len(&buffer)); - - cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, - CIPHER_ENCRYPT); - if (cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, cp, - buffer_ptr(&buffer), buffer_len(&buffer), 0, 0) != 0) - fatal("%s: cipher_crypt failed", __func__); - cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext); - explicit_bzero(&ciphercontext, sizeof(ciphercontext)); - - /* Destroy temporary data. */ - explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); - buffer_free(&buffer); - - buffer_append(blob, buffer_ptr(&encrypted), buffer_len(&encrypted)); - buffer_free(&encrypted); - - return 1; -} - -/* convert SSH v2 key in OpenSSL PEM format */ -static int -key_private_pem_to_blob(Key *key, Buffer *blob, const char *_passphrase, - const char *comment) -{ - int success = 0; - int blen, len = strlen(_passphrase); - u_char *passphrase = (len > 0) ? (u_char *)_passphrase : NULL; -#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L) - const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_des_ede3_cbc() : NULL; -#else - const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_aes_128_cbc() : NULL; -#endif - const u_char *bptr; - BIO *bio; - - if (len > 0 && len <= 4) { - error("passphrase too short: have %d bytes, need > 4", len); - return 0; - } - if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) { - error("%s: BIO_new failed", __func__); - return 0; - } - switch (key->type) { - case KEY_DSA: - success = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bio, key->dsa, - cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL); - break; -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - case KEY_ECDSA: - success = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key->ecdsa, - cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL); - break; -#endif - case KEY_RSA: - success = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio, key->rsa, - cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL); - break; - } - if (success) { - if ((blen = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &bptr)) <= 0) - success = 0; - else - buffer_append(blob, bptr, blen); - } - BIO_free(bio); - return success; -} - /* Save a key blob to a file */ static int -key_save_private_blob(Buffer *keybuf, const char *filename) +sshkey_save_private_blob(struct sshbuf *keybuf, const char *filename) { - int fd; + int fd, oerrno; - if ((fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600)) < 0) { - error("open %s failed: %s.", filename, strerror(errno)); - return 0; - } - if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buffer_ptr(keybuf), - buffer_len(keybuf)) != buffer_len(keybuf)) { - error("write to key file %s failed: %s", filename, - strerror(errno)); + if ((fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600)) < 0) + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, (u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(keybuf), + sshbuf_len(keybuf)) != sshbuf_len(keybuf)) { + oerrno = errno; close(fd); unlink(filename); - return 0; + errno = oerrno; + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; } close(fd); - return 1; + return 0; } -/* Serialise "key" to buffer "blob" */ -static int -key_private_to_blob(Key *key, Buffer *blob, const char *passphrase, - const char *comment, int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, - int new_format_rounds) -{ - switch (key->type) { - case KEY_RSA1: - return key_private_rsa1_to_blob(key, blob, passphrase, comment); - case KEY_DSA: - case KEY_ECDSA: - case KEY_RSA: - if (force_new_format) { - return key_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase, - comment, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds); - } - return key_private_pem_to_blob(key, blob, passphrase, comment); - case KEY_ED25519: - return key_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase, - comment, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds); - default: - error("%s: cannot save key type %d", __func__, key->type); - return 0; - } -} - int -key_save_private(Key *key, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, - const char *comment, int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, - int new_format_rounds) +sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, + const char *passphrase, const char *comment, + int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds) { - Buffer keyblob; - int success = 0; + struct sshbuf *keyblob = NULL; + int r; - buffer_init(&keyblob); - if (!key_private_to_blob(key, &keyblob, passphrase, comment, - force_new_format, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds)) + if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshkey_private_to_fileblob(key, keyblob, passphrase, comment, + force_new_format, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds)) != 0) goto out; - if (!key_save_private_blob(&keyblob, filename)) + if ((r = sshkey_save_private_blob(keyblob, filename)) != 0) goto out; - success = 1; + r = 0; out: - buffer_free(&keyblob); - return success; + sshbuf_free(keyblob); + return r; } -/* - * Parse the public, unencrypted portion of a RSA1 key. - */ -static Key * -key_parse_public_rsa1(Buffer *blob, char **commentp) -{ - Key *pub; - Buffer copy; - - /* Check that it is at least big enough to contain the ID string. */ - if (buffer_len(blob) < sizeof(authfile_id_string)) { - debug3("Truncated RSA1 identifier"); - return NULL; - } - - /* - * Make sure it begins with the id string. Consume the id string - * from the buffer. - */ - if (memcmp(buffer_ptr(blob), authfile_id_string, - sizeof(authfile_id_string)) != 0) { - debug3("Incorrect RSA1 identifier"); - return NULL; - } - buffer_init(©); - buffer_append(©, buffer_ptr(blob), buffer_len(blob)); - buffer_consume(©, sizeof(authfile_id_string)); - - /* Skip cipher type and reserved data. */ - (void) buffer_get_char(©); /* cipher type */ - (void) buffer_get_int(©); /* reserved */ - - /* Read the public key from the buffer. */ - (void) buffer_get_int(©); - pub = key_new(KEY_RSA1); - buffer_get_bignum(©, pub->rsa->n); - buffer_get_bignum(©, pub->rsa->e); - if (commentp) - *commentp = buffer_get_string(©, NULL); - /* The encrypted private part is not parsed by this function. */ - buffer_free(©); - - return pub; -} - /* Load a key from a fd into a buffer */ int -key_load_file(int fd, const char *filename, Buffer *blob) +sshkey_load_file(int fd, const char *filename, struct sshbuf *blob) { u_char buf[1024]; size_t len; struct stat st; + int r; - if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) { - error("%s: fstat of key file %.200s%sfailed: %.100s", __func__, - filename == NULL ? "" : filename, - filename == NULL ? "" : " ", - strerror(errno)); - return 0; - } + if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 && - st.st_size > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE) { - toobig: - error("%s: key file %.200s%stoo large", __func__, - filename == NULL ? "" : filename, - filename == NULL ? "" : " "); - return 0; - } - buffer_clear(blob); + st.st_size > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; for (;;) { if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0) { if (errno == EPIPE) break; - debug("%s: read from key file %.200s%sfailed: %.100s", - __func__, filename == NULL ? "" : filename, - filename == NULL ? "" : " ", strerror(errno)); - buffer_clear(blob); - explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); - return 0; + r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + goto out; } - buffer_append(blob, buf, len); - if (buffer_len(blob) > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE) { - buffer_clear(blob); - explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); - goto toobig; + if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, buf, len)) != 0) + goto out; + if (sshbuf_len(blob) > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; } } - explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 && - st.st_size != buffer_len(blob)) { - debug("%s: key file %.200s%schanged size while reading", - __func__, filename == NULL ? "" : filename, - filename == NULL ? "" : " "); - buffer_clear(blob); - return 0; + st.st_size != (off_t)sshbuf_len(blob)) { + r = SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED; + goto out; } + r = 0; - return 1; + out: + explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (r != 0) + sshbuf_reset(blob); + return r; } +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* * Loads the public part of the ssh v1 key file. Returns NULL if an error was * encountered (the file does not exist or is not readable), and the key * otherwise. */ -static Key * -key_load_public_rsa1(int fd, const char *filename, char **commentp) +static int +sshkey_load_public_rsa1(int fd, const char *filename, + struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { - Buffer buffer; - Key *pub; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + int r; - buffer_init(&buffer); - if (!key_load_file(fd, filename, &buffer)) { - buffer_free(&buffer); - return NULL; - } + *keyp = NULL; + if (commentp != NULL) + *commentp = NULL; - pub = key_parse_public_rsa1(&buffer, commentp); - if (pub == NULL) - debug3("Could not load \"%s\" as a RSA1 public key", filename); - buffer_free(&buffer); - return pub; + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, filename, b)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(b, keyp, commentp)) != 0) + goto out; + r = 0; + out: + sshbuf_free(b); + return r; } +#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ -/* load public key from private-key file, works only for SSH v1 */ -Key * -key_load_public_type(int type, const char *filename, char **commentp) +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +/* XXX Deprecate? */ +int +sshkey_load_private_pem(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase, + struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { - Key *pub; - int fd; + struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL; + int r; - if (type == KEY_RSA1) { - fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY); - if (fd < 0) - return NULL; - pub = key_load_public_rsa1(fd, filename, commentp); - close(fd); - return pub; - } - return NULL; -} - -static Key * -key_parse_private_rsa1(Buffer *blob, const char *passphrase, char **commentp) -{ - int check1, check2, cipher_type; - Buffer decrypted; - u_char *cp; - CipherContext ciphercontext; - const Cipher *cipher; - Key *prv = NULL; - Buffer copy; - - /* Check that it is at least big enough to contain the ID string. */ - if (buffer_len(blob) < sizeof(authfile_id_string)) { - debug3("Truncated RSA1 identifier"); - return NULL; - } - - /* - * Make sure it begins with the id string. Consume the id string - * from the buffer. - */ - if (memcmp(buffer_ptr(blob), authfile_id_string, - sizeof(authfile_id_string)) != 0) { - debug3("Incorrect RSA1 identifier"); - return NULL; - } - buffer_init(©); - buffer_append(©, buffer_ptr(blob), buffer_len(blob)); - buffer_consume(©, sizeof(authfile_id_string)); - - /* Read cipher type. */ - cipher_type = buffer_get_char(©); - (void) buffer_get_int(©); /* Reserved data. */ - - /* Read the public key from the buffer. */ - (void) buffer_get_int(©); - prv = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1); - - buffer_get_bignum(©, prv->rsa->n); - buffer_get_bignum(©, prv->rsa->e); - if (commentp) - *commentp = buffer_get_string(©, NULL); - else - (void)buffer_get_string_ptr(©, NULL); - - /* Check that it is a supported cipher. */ - cipher = cipher_by_number(cipher_type); - if (cipher == NULL) { - debug("Unsupported RSA1 cipher %d", cipher_type); - buffer_free(©); - goto fail; - } - /* Initialize space for decrypted data. */ - buffer_init(&decrypted); - cp = buffer_append_space(&decrypted, buffer_len(©)); - - /* Rest of the buffer is encrypted. Decrypt it using the passphrase. */ - cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, - CIPHER_DECRYPT); - if (cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, cp, - buffer_ptr(©), buffer_len(©), 0, 0) != 0) - fatal("%s: cipher_crypt failed", __func__); - cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext); - explicit_bzero(&ciphercontext, sizeof(ciphercontext)); - buffer_free(©); - - check1 = buffer_get_char(&decrypted); - check2 = buffer_get_char(&decrypted); - if (check1 != buffer_get_char(&decrypted) || - check2 != buffer_get_char(&decrypted)) { - if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) - debug("Bad passphrase supplied for RSA1 key"); - /* Bad passphrase. */ - buffer_free(&decrypted); - goto fail; - } - /* Read the rest of the private key. */ - buffer_get_bignum(&decrypted, prv->rsa->d); - buffer_get_bignum(&decrypted, prv->rsa->iqmp); /* u */ - /* in SSL and SSH v1 p and q are exchanged */ - buffer_get_bignum(&decrypted, prv->rsa->q); /* p */ - buffer_get_bignum(&decrypted, prv->rsa->p); /* q */ - - /* calculate p-1 and q-1 */ - rsa_generate_additional_parameters(prv->rsa); - - buffer_free(&decrypted); - - /* enable blinding */ - if (RSA_blinding_on(prv->rsa, NULL) != 1) { - error("%s: RSA_blinding_on failed", __func__); - goto fail; - } - return prv; - -fail: + *keyp = NULL; if (commentp != NULL) - free(*commentp); - key_free(prv); - return NULL; -} + *commentp = NULL; -static Key * -key_parse_private_pem(Buffer *blob, int type, const char *passphrase, - char **commentp) -{ - EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; - Key *prv = NULL; - char *name = ""; - BIO *bio; - - if ((bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(buffer_ptr(blob), - buffer_len(blob))) == NULL) { - error("%s: BIO_new_mem_buf failed", __func__); - return NULL; - } - - pk = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, NULL, (char *)passphrase); - BIO_free(bio); - if (pk == NULL) { - debug("%s: PEM_read_PrivateKey failed", __func__); - (void)ERR_get_error(); - } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && - (type == KEY_UNSPEC||type==KEY_RSA)) { - prv = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); - prv->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pk); - prv->type = KEY_RSA; - name = "rsa w/o comment"; -#ifdef DEBUG_PK - RSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->rsa, 8); -#endif - if (RSA_blinding_on(prv->rsa, NULL) != 1) { - error("%s: RSA_blinding_on failed", __func__); - key_free(prv); - prv = NULL; - } - } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA && - (type == KEY_UNSPEC||type==KEY_DSA)) { - prv = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); - prv->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pk); - prv->type = KEY_DSA; - name = "dsa w/o comment"; -#ifdef DEBUG_PK - DSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->dsa, 8); -#endif -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_EC && - (type == KEY_UNSPEC||type==KEY_ECDSA)) { - prv = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); - prv->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pk); - prv->type = KEY_ECDSA; - if ((prv->ecdsa_nid = key_ecdsa_key_to_nid(prv->ecdsa)) == -1 || - key_curve_nid_to_name(prv->ecdsa_nid) == NULL || - key_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(prv->ecdsa), - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(prv->ecdsa)) != 0 || - key_ec_validate_private(prv->ecdsa) != 0) { - error("%s: bad ECDSA key", __func__); - key_free(prv); - prv = NULL; - } - name = "ecdsa w/o comment"; -#ifdef DEBUG_PK - if (prv != NULL && prv->ecdsa != NULL) - key_dump_ec_key(prv->ecdsa); -#endif -#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ - } else { - error("%s: PEM_read_PrivateKey: mismatch or " - "unknown EVP_PKEY save_type %d", __func__, pk->save_type); - } - if (pk != NULL) - EVP_PKEY_free(pk); - if (prv != NULL && commentp) - *commentp = xstrdup(name); - debug("read PEM private key done: type %s", - prv ? key_type(prv) : ""); - return prv; + if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, NULL, buffer)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(buffer, type, passphrase, + keyp, commentp)) != 0) + goto out; + r = 0; + out: + sshbuf_free(buffer); + return r; } +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ -Key * -key_load_private_pem(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase, - char **commentp) -{ - Buffer buffer; - Key *prv; - - buffer_init(&buffer); - if (!key_load_file(fd, NULL, &buffer)) { - buffer_free(&buffer); - return NULL; - } - prv = key_parse_private_pem(&buffer, type, passphrase, commentp); - buffer_free(&buffer); - return prv; -} - +/* XXX remove error() calls from here? */ int -key_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename) +sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename) { struct stat st; if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) - return 0; + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; /* * if a key owned by the user is accessed, then we check the * permissions of the file. if the key owned by a different user, * then we don't care. */ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN if (check_ntsec(filename)) #endif if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) { error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("@ WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE! @"); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("Permissions 0%3.3o for '%s' are too open.", (u_int)st.st_mode & 0777, filename); - error("It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others."); + error("It is recommended that your private key files are NOT accessible by others."); error("This private key will be ignored."); - return 0; + return SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS; } - return 1; + return 0; } -static Key * -key_parse_private_type(Buffer *blob, int type, const char *passphrase, - char **commentp) +/* XXX kill perm_ok now that we have SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS? */ +int +sshkey_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, + struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp, int *perm_ok) { - Key *k; + int fd, r; + struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL; - switch (type) { - case KEY_RSA1: - return key_parse_private_rsa1(blob, passphrase, commentp); - case KEY_DSA: - case KEY_ECDSA: - case KEY_RSA: - return key_parse_private_pem(blob, type, passphrase, commentp); - case KEY_ED25519: - return key_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, commentp); - case KEY_UNSPEC: - if ((k = key_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, commentp))) - return k; - return key_parse_private_pem(blob, type, passphrase, commentp); - default: - error("%s: cannot parse key type %d", __func__, type); - break; - } - return NULL; -} + *keyp = NULL; + if (commentp != NULL) + *commentp = NULL; -Key * -key_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, - char **commentp, int *perm_ok) -{ - int fd; - Key *ret; - Buffer buffer; - - fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY); - if (fd < 0) { - debug("could not open key file '%s': %s", filename, - strerror(errno)); + if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { if (perm_ok != NULL) *perm_ok = 0; - return NULL; + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; } - if (!key_perm_ok(fd, filename)) { + if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) { if (perm_ok != NULL) *perm_ok = 0; - error("bad permissions: ignore key: %s", filename); - close(fd); - return NULL; + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS; + goto out; } if (perm_ok != NULL) *perm_ok = 1; - buffer_init(&buffer); - if (!key_load_file(fd, filename, &buffer)) { - buffer_free(&buffer); - close(fd); - return NULL; + if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; } + if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, filename, buffer)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, type, passphrase, + keyp, commentp)) != 0) + goto out; + r = 0; + out: close(fd); - ret = key_parse_private_type(&buffer, type, passphrase, commentp); - buffer_free(&buffer); - return ret; + if (buffer != NULL) + sshbuf_free(buffer); + return r; } -Key * -key_parse_private(Buffer *buffer, const char *filename, - const char *passphrase, char **commentp) +/* XXX this is almost identical to sshkey_load_private_type() */ +int +sshkey_load_private(const char *filename, const char *passphrase, + struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { - Key *pub, *prv; + struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL; + int r, fd; - /* it's a SSH v1 key if the public key part is readable */ - pub = key_parse_public_rsa1(buffer, commentp); - if (pub == NULL) { - prv = key_parse_private_type(buffer, KEY_UNSPEC, - passphrase, NULL); - /* use the filename as a comment for PEM */ - if (commentp && prv) - *commentp = xstrdup(filename); - } else { - key_free(pub); - /* key_parse_public_rsa1() has already loaded the comment */ - prv = key_parse_private_type(buffer, KEY_RSA1, passphrase, - NULL); - } - return prv; -} + *keyp = NULL; + if (commentp != NULL) + *commentp = NULL; -Key * -key_load_private(const char *filename, const char *passphrase, - char **commentp) -{ - Key *prv; - Buffer buffer; - int fd; - - fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY); - if (fd < 0) { - debug("could not open key file '%s': %s", filename, - strerror(errno)); - return NULL; + if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS; + goto out; } - if (!key_perm_ok(fd, filename)) { - error("bad permissions: ignore key: %s", filename); - close(fd); - return NULL; - } - buffer_init(&buffer); - if (!key_load_file(fd, filename, &buffer)) { - buffer_free(&buffer); - close(fd); - return NULL; + if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; } + if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, filename, buffer)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buffer, passphrase, filename, + keyp, commentp)) != 0) + goto out; + r = 0; + out: close(fd); - - prv = key_parse_private(&buffer, filename, passphrase, commentp); - buffer_free(&buffer); - return prv; + if (buffer != NULL) + sshbuf_free(buffer); + return r; } static int -key_try_load_public(Key *k, const char *filename, char **commentp) +sshkey_try_load_public(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename, char **commentp) { FILE *f; char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; char *cp; u_long linenum = 0; + int r; - f = fopen(filename, "r"); - if (f != NULL) { - while (read_keyfile_line(f, filename, line, sizeof(line), - &linenum) != -1) { - cp = line; - switch (*cp) { - case '#': - case '\n': - case '\0': - continue; - } - /* Abort loading if this looks like a private key */ - if (strncmp(cp, "-----BEGIN", 10) == 0) - break; - /* Skip leading whitespace. */ - for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++) - ; - if (*cp) { - if (key_read(k, &cp) == 1) { - cp[strcspn(cp, "\r\n")] = '\0'; - if (commentp) { - *commentp = xstrdup(*cp ? - cp : filename); - } - fclose(f); - return 1; + if (commentp != NULL) + *commentp = NULL; + if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + while (read_keyfile_line(f, filename, line, sizeof(line), + &linenum) != -1) { + cp = line; + switch (*cp) { + case '#': + case '\n': + case '\0': + continue; + } + /* Abort loading if this looks like a private key */ + if (strncmp(cp, "-----BEGIN", 10) == 0 || + strcmp(cp, "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE") == 0) + break; + /* Skip leading whitespace. */ + for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++) + ; + if (*cp) { + if ((r = sshkey_read(k, &cp)) == 0) { + cp[strcspn(cp, "\r\n")] = '\0'; + if (commentp) { + *commentp = strdup(*cp ? + cp : filename); + if (*commentp == NULL) + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; } + fclose(f); + return r; } } - fclose(f); } - return 0; + fclose(f); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; } /* load public key from ssh v1 private or any pubkey file */ -Key * -key_load_public(const char *filename, char **commentp) +int +sshkey_load_public(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) { - Key *pub; + struct sshkey *pub = NULL; char file[MAXPATHLEN]; + int r, fd; + if (keyp != NULL) + *keyp = NULL; + if (commentp != NULL) + *commentp = NULL; + + if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) + goto skip; +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* try rsa1 private key */ - pub = key_load_public_type(KEY_RSA1, filename, commentp); - if (pub != NULL) - return pub; + r = sshkey_load_public_rsa1(fd, filename, keyp, commentp); + close(fd); + switch (r) { + case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR: + case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL: + case SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: + case 0: + return r; + } +#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ + /* try ssh2 public key */ + if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp)) == 0) { + if (keyp != NULL) + *keyp = pub; + return 0; + } + sshkey_free(pub); + +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* try rsa1 public key */ - pub = key_new(KEY_RSA1); - if (key_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp) == 1) - return pub; - key_free(pub); + if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp)) == 0) { + if (keyp != NULL) + *keyp = pub; + return 0; + } + sshkey_free(pub); +#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ - /* try ssh2 public key */ - pub = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); - if (key_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp) == 1) - return pub; + skip: + /* try .pub suffix */ + if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* in case strlcpy or strlcat fail */ if ((strlcpy(file, filename, sizeof file) < sizeof(file)) && (strlcat(file, ".pub", sizeof file) < sizeof(file)) && - (key_try_load_public(pub, file, commentp) == 1)) - return pub; - key_free(pub); - return NULL; + (r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, file, commentp)) == 0) { + if (keyp != NULL) + *keyp = pub; + return 0; + } + sshkey_free(pub); + return r; } /* Load the certificate associated with the named private key */ -Key * -key_load_cert(const char *filename) +int +sshkey_load_cert(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp) { - Key *pub; - char *file; + struct sshkey *pub = NULL; + char *file = NULL; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - pub = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); - xasprintf(&file, "%s-cert.pub", filename); - if (key_try_load_public(pub, file, NULL) == 1) { - free(file); - return pub; + *keyp = NULL; + + if (asprintf(&file, "%s-cert.pub", filename) == -1) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + + if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { + goto out; } - free(file); - key_free(pub); - return NULL; + if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, file, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + + *keyp = pub; + pub = NULL; + r = 0; + + out: + if (file != NULL) + free(file); + if (pub != NULL) + sshkey_free(pub); + return r; } /* Load private key and certificate */ -Key * -key_load_private_cert(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, - int *perm_ok) +int +sshkey_load_private_cert(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, + struct sshkey **keyp, int *perm_ok) { - Key *key, *pub; + struct sshkey *key = NULL, *cert = NULL; + int r; + *keyp = NULL; + switch (type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case KEY_RSA: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ED25519: +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_UNSPEC: break; default: - error("%s: unsupported key type", __func__); - return NULL; + return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; } - if ((key = key_load_private_type(type, filename, - passphrase, NULL, perm_ok)) == NULL) - return NULL; + if ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(type, filename, + passphrase, &key, NULL, perm_ok)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_load_cert(filename, &cert)) != 0) + goto out; - if ((pub = key_load_cert(filename)) == NULL) { - key_free(key); - return NULL; - } - /* Make sure the private key matches the certificate */ - if (key_equal_public(key, pub) == 0) { - error("%s: certificate does not match private key %s", - __func__, filename); - } else if (key_to_certified(key, key_cert_is_legacy(pub)) != 0) { - error("%s: key_to_certified failed", __func__); - } else { - key_cert_copy(pub, key); - key_free(pub); - return key; + if (sshkey_equal_public(key, cert) == 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH; + goto out; } - key_free(key); - key_free(pub); - return NULL; + if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(key, sshkey_cert_is_legacy(cert))) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, key)) != 0) + goto out; + r = 0; + *keyp = key; + key = NULL; + out: + if (key != NULL) + sshkey_free(key); + if (cert != NULL) + sshkey_free(cert); + return r; } /* - * Returns 1 if the specified "key" is listed in the file "filename", - * 0 if the key is not listed or -1 on error. + * Returns success if the specified "key" is listed in the file "filename", + * SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND: if the key is not listed or another error. * If strict_type is set then the key type must match exactly, * otherwise a comparison that ignores certficiate data is performed. */ int -key_in_file(Key *key, const char *filename, int strict_type) +sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, int strict_type) { FILE *f; char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; char *cp; u_long linenum = 0; - int ret = 0; - Key *pub; - int (*key_compare)(const Key *, const Key *) = strict_type ? - key_equal : key_equal_public; + int r = 0; + struct sshkey *pub = NULL; + int (*sshkey_compare)(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *) = + strict_type ? sshkey_equal : sshkey_equal_public; if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) { - if (errno == ENOENT) { - debug("%s: keyfile \"%s\" missing", __func__, filename); - return 0; - } else { - error("%s: could not open keyfile \"%s\": %s", __func__, - filename, strerror(errno)); - return -1; - } + if (errno == ENOENT) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; + else + return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; } while (read_keyfile_line(f, filename, line, sizeof(line), - &linenum) != -1) { + &linenum) != -1) { cp = line; /* Skip leading whitespace. */ for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++) ; /* Skip comments and empty lines */ switch (*cp) { case '#': case '\n': case '\0': continue; } - pub = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); - if (key_read(pub, &cp) != 1) { - key_free(pub); - continue; + if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; } - if (key_compare(key, pub)) { - ret = 1; - key_free(pub); - break; + if ((r = sshkey_read(pub, &cp)) != 0) + goto out; + if (sshkey_compare(key, pub)) { + r = 0; + goto out; } - key_free(pub); + sshkey_free(pub); + pub = NULL; } + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; + out: + if (pub != NULL) + sshkey_free(pub); fclose(f); - return ret; + return r; } + Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/authfile.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/authfile.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/authfile.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,32 +1,47 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.17 2013/12/06 13:34:54 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.19 2014/07/03 23:18:35 djm Exp $ */ /* - * Author: Tatu Ylonen - * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland - * All rights reserved + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * - * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software - * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this - * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is - * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be - * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef AUTHFILE_H #define AUTHFILE_H -int key_save_private(Key *, const char *, const char *, const char *, - int, const char *, int); -int key_load_file(int, const char *, Buffer *); -Key *key_load_cert(const char *); -Key *key_load_public(const char *, char **); -Key *key_load_public_type(int, const char *, char **); -Key *key_parse_private(Buffer *, const char *, const char *, char **); -Key *key_load_private(const char *, const char *, char **); -Key *key_load_private_cert(int, const char *, const char *, int *); -Key *key_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *, char **, int *); -Key *key_load_private_pem(int, int, const char *, char **); -int key_perm_ok(int, const char *); -int key_in_file(Key *, const char *, int); +struct sshbuf; +struct sshkey; + +int sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *, const char *, + const char *, const char *, int, const char *, int); +int sshkey_load_file(int, const char *, struct sshbuf *); +int sshkey_load_cert(const char *, struct sshkey **); +int sshkey_load_public(const char *, struct sshkey **, char **); +int sshkey_load_private(const char *, const char *, struct sshkey **, char **); +int sshkey_load_private_cert(int, const char *, const char *, + struct sshkey **, int *); +int sshkey_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *, + struct sshkey **, char **, int *); +int sshkey_load_private_pem(int, int, const char *, struct sshkey **, char **); +int sshkey_perm_ok(int, const char *); +int sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *, const char *, int); #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/bufaux.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/bufaux.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/bufaux.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,393 +1,259 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.57 2014/04/16 23:22:45 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: bufaux.c,v 1.60 2014/04/30 05:29:56 djm Exp $ */ /* - * Author: Tatu Ylonen - * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland - * All rights reserved - * Auxiliary functions for storing and retrieving various data types to/from - * Buffers. + * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller * - * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software - * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this - * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is - * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be - * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * - * - * SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl - * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES - * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. - * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, - * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, - * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY - * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT - * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF - * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ +/* Emulation wrappers for legacy OpenSSH buffer API atop sshbuf */ + #include "includes.h" #include -#include - -#include -#include -#include - -#include "xmalloc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "log.h" -#include "misc.h" +#include "ssherr.h" -/* - * Returns integers from the buffer (msb first). - */ - int -buffer_get_short_ret(u_short *ret, Buffer *buffer) +buffer_get_short_ret(u_short *v, Buffer *buffer) { - u_char buf[2]; + int ret; - if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 2) == -1) - return (-1); - *ret = get_u16(buf); - return (0); + if ((ret = sshbuf_get_u16(buffer, v)) != 0) { + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); + return -1; + } + return 0; } u_short buffer_get_short(Buffer *buffer) { u_short ret; if (buffer_get_short_ret(&ret, buffer) == -1) - fatal("buffer_get_short: buffer error"); + fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__); return (ret); } int -buffer_get_int_ret(u_int *ret, Buffer *buffer) +buffer_get_int_ret(u_int *v, Buffer *buffer) { - u_char buf[4]; + int ret; - if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 4) == -1) - return (-1); - if (ret != NULL) - *ret = get_u32(buf); - return (0); + if ((ret = sshbuf_get_u32(buffer, v)) != 0) { + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); + return -1; + } + return 0; } u_int buffer_get_int(Buffer *buffer) { u_int ret; if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ret, buffer) == -1) - fatal("buffer_get_int: buffer error"); + fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__); return (ret); } int -buffer_get_int64_ret(u_int64_t *ret, Buffer *buffer) +buffer_get_int64_ret(u_int64_t *v, Buffer *buffer) { - u_char buf[8]; + int ret; - if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 8) == -1) - return (-1); - if (ret != NULL) - *ret = get_u64(buf); - return (0); + if ((ret = sshbuf_get_u64(buffer, v)) != 0) { + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); + return -1; + } + return 0; } u_int64_t buffer_get_int64(Buffer *buffer) { u_int64_t ret; if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&ret, buffer) == -1) - fatal("buffer_get_int: buffer error"); + fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__); return (ret); } -/* - * Stores integers in the buffer, msb first. - */ void buffer_put_short(Buffer *buffer, u_short value) { - char buf[2]; + int ret; - put_u16(buf, value); - buffer_append(buffer, buf, 2); + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u16(buffer, value)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); } void buffer_put_int(Buffer *buffer, u_int value) { - char buf[4]; + int ret; - put_u32(buf, value); - buffer_append(buffer, buf, 4); + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, value)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); } void buffer_put_int64(Buffer *buffer, u_int64_t value) { - char buf[8]; + int ret; - put_u64(buf, value); - buffer_append(buffer, buf, 8); + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u64(buffer, value)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); } -/* - * Returns an arbitrary binary string from the buffer. The string cannot - * be longer than 256k. The returned value points to memory allocated - * with xmalloc; it is the responsibility of the calling function to free - * the data. If length_ptr is non-NULL, the length of the returned data - * will be stored there. A null character will be automatically appended - * to the returned string, and is not counted in length. - */ void * buffer_get_string_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr) { + size_t len; + int ret; u_char *value; - u_int len; - /* Get the length. */ - if (buffer_get_int_ret(&len, buffer) != 0) { - error("buffer_get_string_ret: cannot extract length"); - return (NULL); + if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(buffer, &value, &len)) != 0) { + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); + return NULL; } - if (len > 256 * 1024) { - error("buffer_get_string_ret: bad string length %u", len); - return (NULL); - } - /* Allocate space for the string. Add one byte for a null character. */ - value = xmalloc(len + 1); - /* Get the string. */ - if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, value, len) == -1) { - error("buffer_get_string_ret: buffer_get failed"); - free(value); - return (NULL); - } - /* Append a null character to make processing easier. */ - value[len] = '\0'; - /* Optionally return the length of the string. */ - if (length_ptr) - *length_ptr = len; - return (value); + if (length_ptr != NULL) + *length_ptr = len; /* Safe: sshbuf never stores len > 2^31 */ + return value; } void * buffer_get_string(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr) { void *ret; if ((ret = buffer_get_string_ret(buffer, length_ptr)) == NULL) - fatal("buffer_get_string: buffer error"); + fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__); return (ret); } char * buffer_get_cstring_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr) { - u_int length; - char *cp, *ret = buffer_get_string_ret(buffer, &length); + size_t len; + int ret; + char *value; - if (ret == NULL) + if ((ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(buffer, &value, &len)) != 0) { + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); return NULL; - if ((cp = memchr(ret, '\0', length)) != NULL) { - /* XXX allow \0 at end-of-string for a while, remove later */ - if (cp == ret + length - 1) - error("buffer_get_cstring_ret: string contains \\0"); - else { - explicit_bzero(ret, length); - free(ret); - return NULL; - } } if (length_ptr != NULL) - *length_ptr = length; - return ret; + *length_ptr = len; /* Safe: sshbuf never stores len > 2^31 */ + return value; } char * buffer_get_cstring(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr) { char *ret; if ((ret = buffer_get_cstring_ret(buffer, length_ptr)) == NULL) - fatal("buffer_get_cstring: buffer error"); + fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__); return ret; } -void * +const void * buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr) { - void *ptr; - u_int len; + size_t len; + int ret; + const u_char *value; - if (buffer_get_int_ret(&len, buffer) != 0) + if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buffer, &value, &len)) != 0) { + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); return NULL; - if (len > 256 * 1024) { - error("buffer_get_string_ptr: bad string length %u", len); - return NULL; } - ptr = buffer_ptr(buffer); - buffer_consume(buffer, len); - if (length_ptr) - *length_ptr = len; - return (ptr); + if (length_ptr != NULL) + *length_ptr = len; /* Safe: sshbuf never stores len > 2^31 */ + return value; } -void * +const void * buffer_get_string_ptr(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr) { - void *ret; + const void *ret; if ((ret = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(buffer, length_ptr)) == NULL) - fatal("buffer_get_string_ptr: buffer error"); + fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__); return (ret); } -/* - * Stores and arbitrary binary string in the buffer. - */ void buffer_put_string(Buffer *buffer, const void *buf, u_int len) { - buffer_put_int(buffer, len); - buffer_append(buffer, buf, len); + int ret; + + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(buffer, buf, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); } + void buffer_put_cstring(Buffer *buffer, const char *s) { - if (s == NULL) - fatal("buffer_put_cstring: s == NULL"); - buffer_put_string(buffer, s, strlen(s)); + int ret; + + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, s)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); } -/* - * Returns a character from the buffer (0 - 255). - */ int -buffer_get_char_ret(u_char *ret, Buffer *buffer) +buffer_get_char_ret(char *v, Buffer *buffer) { - if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, ret, 1) == -1) { - error("buffer_get_char_ret: buffer_get_ret failed"); - return (-1); + int ret; + + if ((ret = sshbuf_get_u8(buffer, (u_char *)v)) != 0) { + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); + return -1; } - return (0); + return 0; } int buffer_get_char(Buffer *buffer) { - u_char ch; + char ch; if (buffer_get_char_ret(&ch, buffer) == -1) - fatal("buffer_get_char: buffer error"); - return ch; + fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__); + return (u_char) ch; } -/* - * Stores a character in the buffer. - */ void buffer_put_char(Buffer *buffer, int value) { - char ch = value; + int ret; - buffer_append(buffer, &ch, 1); + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u8(buffer, value)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); } -/* Pseudo bignum functions */ - -void * -buffer_get_bignum2_as_string_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int *length_ptr) -{ - u_int len; - u_char *bin, *p, *ret; - - if ((p = bin = buffer_get_string_ret(buffer, &len)) == NULL) { - error("%s: invalid bignum", __func__); - return NULL; - } - - if (len > 0 && (bin[0] & 0x80)) { - error("%s: negative numbers not supported", __func__); - free(bin); - return NULL; - } - if (len > 8 * 1024) { - error("%s: cannot handle BN of size %d", __func__, len); - free(bin); - return NULL; - } - /* Skip zero prefix on numbers with the MSB set */ - if (len > 1 && bin[0] == 0x00 && (bin[1] & 0x80) != 0) { - p++; - len--; - } - ret = xmalloc(len); - memcpy(ret, p, len); - explicit_bzero(p, len); - free(bin); - return ret; -} - -void * -buffer_get_bignum2_as_string(Buffer *buffer, u_int *l) -{ - void *ret = buffer_get_bignum2_as_string_ret(buffer, l); - - if (ret == NULL) - fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__); - return ret; -} - -/* - * Stores a string using the bignum encoding rules (\0 pad if MSB set). - */ void buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(Buffer *buffer, const u_char *s, u_int l) { - u_char *buf, *p; - int pad = 0; + int ret; - if (l > 8 * 1024) - fatal("%s: length %u too long", __func__, l); - /* Skip leading zero bytes */ - for (; l > 0 && *s == 0; l--, s++) - ; - p = buf = xmalloc(l + 1); - /* - * If most significant bit is set then prepend a zero byte to - * avoid interpretation as a negative number. - */ - if (l > 0 && (s[0] & 0x80) != 0) { - *p++ = '\0'; - pad = 1; - } - memcpy(p, s, l); - buffer_put_string(buffer, buf, l + pad); - explicit_bzero(buf, l + pad); - free(buf); + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(buffer, s, l)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); } - Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/bufbn.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/bufbn.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/bufbn.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,229 +1,103 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: bufbn.c,v 1.11 2014/02/27 08:25:09 djm Exp $*/ +/* $OpenBSD: bufbn.c,v 1.12 2014/04/30 05:29:56 djm Exp $ */ + /* - * Author: Tatu Ylonen - * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland - * All rights reserved - * Auxiliary functions for storing and retrieving various data types to/from - * Buffers. + * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller * - * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software - * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this - * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is - * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be - * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * - * - * SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl - * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES - * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. - * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, - * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, - * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY - * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT - * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF - * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ +/* Emulation wrappers for legacy OpenSSH buffer API atop sshbuf */ + #include "includes.h" #include -#include - -#include -#include -#include - -#include "xmalloc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "log.h" -#include "misc.h" +#include "ssherr.h" -/* - * Stores an BIGNUM in the buffer with a 2-byte msb first bit count, followed - * by (bits+7)/8 bytes of binary data, msb first. - */ int buffer_put_bignum_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value) { - int bits = BN_num_bits(value); - int bin_size = (bits + 7) / 8; - u_char *buf = xmalloc(bin_size); - int oi; - char msg[2]; + int ret; - /* Get the value of in binary */ - oi = BN_bn2bin(value, buf); - if (oi != bin_size) { - error("buffer_put_bignum_ret: BN_bn2bin() failed: oi %d != bin_size %d", - oi, bin_size); - free(buf); - return (-1); + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, value)) != 0) { + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); + return -1; } - - /* Store the number of bits in the buffer in two bytes, msb first. */ - put_u16(msg, bits); - buffer_append(buffer, msg, 2); - /* Store the binary data. */ - buffer_append(buffer, buf, oi); - - explicit_bzero(buf, bin_size); - free(buf); - - return (0); + return 0; } void buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value) { if (buffer_put_bignum_ret(buffer, value) == -1) - fatal("buffer_put_bignum: buffer error"); + fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__); } -/* - * Retrieves a BIGNUM from the buffer. - */ int buffer_get_bignum_ret(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value) { - u_int bits, bytes; - u_char buf[2], *bin; + int ret; - /* Get the number of bits. */ - if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, (char *) buf, 2) == -1) { - error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: invalid length"); - return (-1); + if ((ret = sshbuf_get_bignum1(buffer, value)) != 0) { + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); + return -1; } - bits = get_u16(buf); - if (bits > 65535-7) { - error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: cannot handle BN of size %d", - bits); - return (-1); - } - /* Compute the number of binary bytes that follow. */ - bytes = (bits + 7) / 8; - if (bytes > 8 * 1024) { - error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: cannot handle BN of size %d", bytes); - return (-1); - } - if (buffer_len(buffer) < bytes) { - error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: input buffer too small"); - return (-1); - } - bin = buffer_ptr(buffer); - if (BN_bin2bn(bin, bytes, value) == NULL) { - error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: BN_bin2bn failed"); - return (-1); - } - if (buffer_consume_ret(buffer, bytes) == -1) { - error("buffer_get_bignum_ret: buffer_consume failed"); - return (-1); - } - return (0); + return 0; } void buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value) { if (buffer_get_bignum_ret(buffer, value) == -1) - fatal("buffer_get_bignum: buffer error"); + fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__); } -/* - * Stores a BIGNUM in the buffer in SSH2 format. - */ int buffer_put_bignum2_ret(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value) { - u_int bytes; - u_char *buf; - int oi; - u_int hasnohigh = 0; + int ret; - if (BN_is_zero(value)) { - buffer_put_int(buffer, 0); - return 0; + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buffer, value)) != 0) { + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); + return -1; } - if (value->neg) { - error("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: negative numbers not supported"); - return (-1); - } - bytes = BN_num_bytes(value) + 1; /* extra padding byte */ - if (bytes < 2) { - error("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: BN too small"); - return (-1); - } - buf = xmalloc(bytes); - buf[0] = 0x00; - /* Get the value of in binary */ - oi = BN_bn2bin(value, buf+1); - if (oi < 0 || (u_int)oi != bytes - 1) { - error("buffer_put_bignum2_ret: BN_bn2bin() failed: " - "oi %d != bin_size %d", oi, bytes); - free(buf); - return (-1); - } - hasnohigh = (buf[1] & 0x80) ? 0 : 1; - buffer_put_string(buffer, buf+hasnohigh, bytes-hasnohigh); - explicit_bzero(buf, bytes); - free(buf); - return (0); + return 0; } void buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, const BIGNUM *value) { if (buffer_put_bignum2_ret(buffer, value) == -1) - fatal("buffer_put_bignum2: buffer error"); + fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__); } int buffer_get_bignum2_ret(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value) { - u_int len; - u_char *bin; + int ret; - if ((bin = buffer_get_string_ret(buffer, &len)) == NULL) { - error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: invalid bignum"); - return (-1); + if ((ret = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buffer, value)) != 0) { + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); + return -1; } - - if (len > 0 && (bin[0] & 0x80)) { - error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: negative numbers not supported"); - free(bin); - return (-1); - } - if (len > 8 * 1024) { - error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: cannot handle BN of size %d", - len); - free(bin); - return (-1); - } - if (BN_bin2bn(bin, len, value) == NULL) { - error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: BN_bin2bn failed"); - free(bin); - return (-1); - } - free(bin); - return (0); + return 0; } void buffer_get_bignum2(Buffer *buffer, BIGNUM *value) { if (buffer_get_bignum2_ret(buffer, value) == -1) - fatal("buffer_get_bignum2: buffer error"); + fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/bufec.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/bufec.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/bufec.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,146 +1,74 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: bufec.c,v 1.3 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: bufec.c,v 1.4 2014/04/30 05:29:56 djm Exp $ */ + /* - * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller + * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ +/* Emulation wrappers for legacy OpenSSH buffer API atop sshbuf */ + #include "includes.h" -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - #include -#include -#include - -#include -#include - -#include "xmalloc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "log.h" -#include "misc.h" +#include "ssherr.h" -/* - * Maximum supported EC GFp field length is 528 bits. SEC1 uncompressed - * encoding represents this as two bitstring points that should each - * be no longer than the field length, SEC1 specifies a 1 byte - * point type header. - * Being paranoid here may insulate us to parsing problems in - * EC_POINT_oct2point. - */ -#define BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN ((528*2 / 8) + 1) +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC -/* - * Append an EC_POINT to the buffer as a string containing a SEC1 encoded - * uncompressed point. Fortunately OpenSSL handles the gory details for us. - */ int buffer_put_ecpoint_ret(Buffer *buffer, const EC_GROUP *curve, const EC_POINT *point) { - u_char *buf = NULL; - size_t len; - BN_CTX *bnctx; - int ret = -1; + int ret; - /* Determine length */ - if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new failed", __func__); - len = EC_POINT_point2oct(curve, point, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, - NULL, 0, bnctx); - if (len > BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN) { - error("%s: giant EC point: len = %lu (max %u)", - __func__, (u_long)len, BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN); - goto out; + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_ec(buffer, point, curve)) != 0) { + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); + return -1; } - /* Convert */ - buf = xmalloc(len); - if (EC_POINT_point2oct(curve, point, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, - buf, len, bnctx) != len) { - error("%s: EC_POINT_point2oct length mismatch", __func__); - goto out; - } - /* Append */ - buffer_put_string(buffer, buf, len); - ret = 0; - out: - if (buf != NULL) { - explicit_bzero(buf, len); - free(buf); - } - BN_CTX_free(bnctx); - return ret; + return 0; } void buffer_put_ecpoint(Buffer *buffer, const EC_GROUP *curve, const EC_POINT *point) { if (buffer_put_ecpoint_ret(buffer, curve, point) == -1) fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__); } int buffer_get_ecpoint_ret(Buffer *buffer, const EC_GROUP *curve, EC_POINT *point) { - u_char *buf; - u_int len; - BN_CTX *bnctx; - int ret = -1; + int ret; - if ((buf = buffer_get_string_ret(buffer, &len)) == NULL) { - error("%s: invalid point", __func__); + if ((ret = sshbuf_get_ec(buffer, point, curve)) != 0) { + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); return -1; } - if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new failed", __func__); - if (len > BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN) { - error("%s: EC_POINT too long: %u > max %u", __func__, - len, BUFFER_MAX_ECPOINT_LEN); - goto out; - } - if (len == 0) { - error("%s: EC_POINT buffer is empty", __func__); - goto out; - } - if (buf[0] != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) { - error("%s: EC_POINT is in an incorrect form: " - "0x%02x (want 0x%02x)", __func__, buf[0], - POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED); - goto out; - } - if (EC_POINT_oct2point(curve, point, buf, len, bnctx) != 1) { - error("buffer_get_bignum2_ret: BN_bin2bn failed"); - goto out; - } - /* EC_POINT_oct2point verifies that the point is on the curve for us */ - ret = 0; - out: - BN_CTX_free(bnctx); - explicit_bzero(buf, len); - free(buf); - return ret; + return 0; } void buffer_get_ecpoint(Buffer *buffer, const EC_GROUP *curve, EC_POINT *point) { if (buffer_get_ecpoint_ret(buffer, curve, point) == -1) fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__); } #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/buffer.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/buffer.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/buffer.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,253 +1,118 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: buffer.c,v 1.35 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: buffer.c,v 1.36 2014/04/30 05:29:56 djm Exp $ */ + /* - * Author: Tatu Ylonen - * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland - * All rights reserved - * Functions for manipulating fifo buffers (that can grow if needed). + * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller * - * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software - * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this - * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is - * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be - * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ +/* Emulation wrappers for legacy OpenSSH buffer API atop sshbuf */ + #include "includes.h" -#include +#include -#include -#include -#include -#include - -#include "xmalloc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "log.h" +#include "ssherr.h" -#define BUFFER_MAX_CHUNK 0x100000 -#define BUFFER_MAX_LEN 0xa00000 -#define BUFFER_ALLOCSZ 0x008000 - -/* Initializes the buffer structure. */ - void -buffer_init(Buffer *buffer) -{ - const u_int len = 4096; - - buffer->alloc = 0; - buffer->buf = xmalloc(len); - buffer->alloc = len; - buffer->offset = 0; - buffer->end = 0; -} - -/* Frees any memory used for the buffer. */ - -void -buffer_free(Buffer *buffer) -{ - if (buffer->alloc > 0) { - explicit_bzero(buffer->buf, buffer->alloc); - buffer->alloc = 0; - free(buffer->buf); - } -} - -/* - * Clears any data from the buffer, making it empty. This does not actually - * zero the memory. - */ - -void -buffer_clear(Buffer *buffer) -{ - buffer->offset = 0; - buffer->end = 0; -} - -/* Appends data to the buffer, expanding it if necessary. */ - -void buffer_append(Buffer *buffer, const void *data, u_int len) { - void *p; - p = buffer_append_space(buffer, len); - memcpy(p, data, len); -} + int ret; -static int -buffer_compact(Buffer *buffer) -{ - /* - * If the buffer is quite empty, but all data is at the end, move the - * data to the beginning. - */ - if (buffer->offset > MIN(buffer->alloc, BUFFER_MAX_CHUNK)) { - memmove(buffer->buf, buffer->buf + buffer->offset, - buffer->end - buffer->offset); - buffer->end -= buffer->offset; - buffer->offset = 0; - return (1); - } - return (0); + if ((ret = sshbuf_put(buffer, data, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); } -/* - * Appends space to the buffer, expanding the buffer if necessary. This does - * not actually copy the data into the buffer, but instead returns a pointer - * to the allocated region. - */ - void * buffer_append_space(Buffer *buffer, u_int len) { - u_int newlen; - void *p; + int ret; + u_char *p; - if (len > BUFFER_MAX_CHUNK) - fatal("buffer_append_space: len %u not supported", len); - - /* If the buffer is empty, start using it from the beginning. */ - if (buffer->offset == buffer->end) { - buffer->offset = 0; - buffer->end = 0; - } -restart: - /* If there is enough space to store all data, store it now. */ - if (buffer->end + len < buffer->alloc) { - p = buffer->buf + buffer->end; - buffer->end += len; - return p; - } - - /* Compact data back to the start of the buffer if necessary */ - if (buffer_compact(buffer)) - goto restart; - - /* Increase the size of the buffer and retry. */ - newlen = roundup(buffer->alloc + len, BUFFER_ALLOCSZ); - if (newlen > BUFFER_MAX_LEN) - fatal("buffer_append_space: alloc %u not supported", - newlen); - buffer->buf = xrealloc(buffer->buf, 1, newlen); - buffer->alloc = newlen; - goto restart; - /* NOTREACHED */ + if ((ret = sshbuf_reserve(buffer, len, &p)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); + return p; } -/* - * Check whether an allocation of 'len' will fit in the buffer - * This must follow the same math as buffer_append_space - */ int buffer_check_alloc(Buffer *buffer, u_int len) { - if (buffer->offset == buffer->end) { - buffer->offset = 0; - buffer->end = 0; - } - restart: - if (buffer->end + len < buffer->alloc) - return (1); - if (buffer_compact(buffer)) - goto restart; - if (roundup(buffer->alloc + len, BUFFER_ALLOCSZ) <= BUFFER_MAX_LEN) - return (1); - return (0); -} + int ret = sshbuf_check_reserve(buffer, len); -/* Returns the number of bytes of data in the buffer. */ - -u_int -buffer_len(const Buffer *buffer) -{ - return buffer->end - buffer->offset; + if (ret == 0) + return 1; + if (ret == SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE) + return 0; + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); } -/* Gets data from the beginning of the buffer. */ - int buffer_get_ret(Buffer *buffer, void *buf, u_int len) { - if (len > buffer->end - buffer->offset) { - error("buffer_get_ret: trying to get more bytes %d than in buffer %d", - len, buffer->end - buffer->offset); - return (-1); + int ret; + + if ((ret = sshbuf_get(buffer, buf, len)) != 0) { + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); + return -1; } - memcpy(buf, buffer->buf + buffer->offset, len); - buffer->offset += len; - return (0); + return 0; } void buffer_get(Buffer *buffer, void *buf, u_int len) { if (buffer_get_ret(buffer, buf, len) == -1) - fatal("buffer_get: buffer error"); + fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__); } -/* Consumes the given number of bytes from the beginning of the buffer. */ - int buffer_consume_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int bytes) { - if (bytes > buffer->end - buffer->offset) { - error("buffer_consume_ret: trying to get more bytes than in buffer"); - return (-1); - } - buffer->offset += bytes; - return (0); + int ret = sshbuf_consume(buffer, bytes); + + if (ret == 0) + return 0; + if (ret == SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE) + return -1; + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); } void buffer_consume(Buffer *buffer, u_int bytes) { if (buffer_consume_ret(buffer, bytes) == -1) - fatal("buffer_consume: buffer error"); + fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__); } -/* Consumes the given number of bytes from the end of the buffer. */ - int buffer_consume_end_ret(Buffer *buffer, u_int bytes) { - if (bytes > buffer->end - buffer->offset) - return (-1); - buffer->end -= bytes; - return (0); + int ret = sshbuf_consume_end(buffer, bytes); + + if (ret == 0) + return 0; + if (ret == SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE) + return -1; + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(ret)); } void buffer_consume_end(Buffer *buffer, u_int bytes) { if (buffer_consume_end_ret(buffer, bytes) == -1) - fatal("buffer_consume_end: trying to get more bytes than in buffer"); + fatal("%s: buffer error", __func__); } -/* Returns a pointer to the first used byte in the buffer. */ -void * -buffer_ptr(const Buffer *buffer) -{ - return buffer->buf + buffer->offset; -} - -/* Dumps the contents of the buffer to stderr. */ - -void -buffer_dump(const Buffer *buffer) -{ - u_int i; - u_char *ucp = buffer->buf; - - for (i = buffer->offset; i < buffer->end; i++) { - fprintf(stderr, "%02x", ucp[i]); - if ((i-buffer->offset)%16==15) - fprintf(stderr, "\r\n"); - else if ((i-buffer->offset)%2==1) - fprintf(stderr, " "); - } - fprintf(stderr, "\r\n"); -} Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/buffer.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/buffer.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/buffer.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,102 +1,98 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: buffer.h,v 1.23 2014/01/12 08:13:13 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: buffer.h,v 1.25 2014/04/30 05:29:56 djm Exp $ */ /* - * Author: Tatu Ylonen - * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland - * All rights reserved - * Code for manipulating FIFO buffers. + * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller * - * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software - * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this - * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is - * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be - * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ +/* Emulation wrappers for legacy OpenSSH buffer API atop sshbuf */ + #ifndef BUFFER_H #define BUFFER_H -typedef struct { - u_char *buf; /* Buffer for data. */ - u_int alloc; /* Number of bytes allocated for data. */ - u_int offset; /* Offset of first byte containing data. */ - u_int end; /* Offset of last byte containing data. */ -} Buffer; +#include "sshbuf.h" -void buffer_init(Buffer *); -void buffer_clear(Buffer *); -void buffer_free(Buffer *); +typedef struct sshbuf Buffer; -u_int buffer_len(const Buffer *); -void *buffer_ptr(const Buffer *); +#define buffer_init(b) sshbuf_init(b) +#define buffer_clear(b) sshbuf_reset(b) +#define buffer_free(b) sshbuf_free(b) +#define buffer_dump(b) sshbuf_dump(b, stderr) +/* XXX cast is safe: sshbuf never stores more than len 2^31 */ +#define buffer_len(b) ((u_int) sshbuf_len(b)) +#define buffer_ptr(b) sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b) + void buffer_append(Buffer *, const void *, u_int); void *buffer_append_space(Buffer *, u_int); - int buffer_check_alloc(Buffer *, u_int); - void buffer_get(Buffer *, void *, u_int); void buffer_consume(Buffer *, u_int); void buffer_consume_end(Buffer *, u_int); -void buffer_dump(const Buffer *); int buffer_get_ret(Buffer *, void *, u_int); int buffer_consume_ret(Buffer *, u_int); int buffer_consume_end_ret(Buffer *, u_int); #include - void buffer_put_bignum(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *); void buffer_put_bignum2(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *); void buffer_get_bignum(Buffer *, BIGNUM *); void buffer_get_bignum2(Buffer *, BIGNUM *); +void buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(Buffer *, const u_char *, u_int); u_short buffer_get_short(Buffer *); void buffer_put_short(Buffer *, u_short); u_int buffer_get_int(Buffer *); void buffer_put_int(Buffer *, u_int); u_int64_t buffer_get_int64(Buffer *); void buffer_put_int64(Buffer *, u_int64_t); int buffer_get_char(Buffer *); void buffer_put_char(Buffer *, int); void *buffer_get_string(Buffer *, u_int *); -void *buffer_get_string_ptr(Buffer *, u_int *); +const void *buffer_get_string_ptr(Buffer *, u_int *); void buffer_put_string(Buffer *, const void *, u_int); char *buffer_get_cstring(Buffer *, u_int *); void buffer_put_cstring(Buffer *, const char *); -#define buffer_skip_string(b) \ - do { u_int l = buffer_get_int(b); buffer_consume(b, l); } while (0) +#define buffer_skip_string(b) (void)buffer_get_string_ptr(b, NULL); int buffer_put_bignum_ret(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *); int buffer_get_bignum_ret(Buffer *, BIGNUM *); int buffer_put_bignum2_ret(Buffer *, const BIGNUM *); int buffer_get_bignum2_ret(Buffer *, BIGNUM *); int buffer_get_short_ret(u_short *, Buffer *); int buffer_get_int_ret(u_int *, Buffer *); int buffer_get_int64_ret(u_int64_t *, Buffer *); void *buffer_get_string_ret(Buffer *, u_int *); char *buffer_get_cstring_ret(Buffer *, u_int *); -void *buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(Buffer *, u_int *); -int buffer_get_char_ret(u_char *, Buffer *); +const void *buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(Buffer *, u_int *); +int buffer_get_char_ret(char *, Buffer *); -void *buffer_get_bignum2_as_string_ret(Buffer *, u_int *); -void *buffer_get_bignum2_as_string(Buffer *, u_int *); -void buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(Buffer *, const u_char *, u_int); - #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC #include - int buffer_put_ecpoint_ret(Buffer *, const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); void buffer_put_ecpoint(Buffer *, const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); int buffer_get_ecpoint_ret(Buffer *, const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *); void buffer_get_ecpoint(Buffer *, const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *); #endif -#endif /* BUFFER_H */ +#endif /* BUFFER_H */ + Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/canohost.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/canohost.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/canohost.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,431 +1,441 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.70 2014/01/19 04:17:29 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: canohost.c,v 1.71 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions for returning the canonical host name of the remote site. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "misc.h" static void check_ip_options(int, char *); static char *canonical_host_ip = NULL; static int cached_port = -1; /* * Return the canonical name of the host at the other end of the socket. The * caller should free the returned string. */ static char * get_remote_hostname(int sock, int use_dns) { struct sockaddr_storage from; socklen_t fromlen; struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST]; /* Get IP address of client. */ fromlen = sizeof(from); memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(255); } if (from.ss_family == AF_INET) check_ip_options(sock, ntop); ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen); if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0) fatal("get_remote_hostname: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICHOST failed"); if (!use_dns) return xstrdup(ntop); debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop); /* Map the IP address to a host name. */ if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name), NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) { /* Host name not found. Use ip address. */ return xstrdup(ntop); } /* * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname, * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following: * 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5 */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/ hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring", name, ntop); freeaddrinfo(ai); return xstrdup(ntop); } /* Names are stores in lowercase. */ lowercase(name); /* * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given * address actually is an address of this host. This is * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of * the domain). */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = from.ss_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) { logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s " "[%s] failed - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!", name, ntop); return xstrdup(ntop); } /* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2, sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 && (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0)) break; } freeaddrinfo(aitop); /* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */ if (!ai) { /* Address not found for the host name. */ logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not " "map back to the address - POSSIBLE BREAK-IN ATTEMPT!", ntop, name); return xstrdup(ntop); } return xstrdup(name); } /* * If IP options are supported, make sure there are none (log and * disconnect them if any are found). Basically we are worried about * source routing; it can be used to pretend you are somebody * (ip-address) you are not. That itself may be "almost acceptable" * under certain circumstances, but rhosts autentication is useless * if source routing is accepted. Notice also that if we just dropped * source routing here, the other side could use IP spoofing to do * rest of the interaction and could still bypass security. So we * exit here if we detect any IP options. */ /* IPv4 only */ static void check_ip_options(int sock, char *ipaddr) { #ifdef IP_OPTIONS u_char options[200]; char text[sizeof(options) * 3 + 1]; socklen_t option_size, i; int ipproto; struct protoent *ip; if ((ip = getprotobyname("ip")) != NULL) ipproto = ip->p_proto; else ipproto = IPPROTO_IP; option_size = sizeof(options); if (getsockopt(sock, ipproto, IP_OPTIONS, options, &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) { text[0] = '\0'; for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++) snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3, " %2.2x", options[i]); fatal("Connection from %.100s with IP options:%.800s", ipaddr, text); } #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */ } void ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len) { struct sockaddr_in6 *a6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr; struct sockaddr_in *a4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)addr; struct in_addr inaddr; u_int16_t port; if (addr->ss_family != AF_INET6 || !IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&a6->sin6_addr)) return; debug3("Normalising mapped IPv4 in IPv6 address"); memcpy(&inaddr, ((char *)&a6->sin6_addr) + 12, sizeof(inaddr)); port = a6->sin6_port; memset(a4, 0, sizeof(*a4)); a4->sin_family = AF_INET; *len = sizeof(*a4); memcpy(&a4->sin_addr, &inaddr, sizeof(inaddr)); a4->sin_port = port; } /* * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current * connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this * several times. */ const char * get_canonical_hostname(int use_dns) { char *host; static char *canonical_host_name = NULL; static char *remote_ip = NULL; /* Check if we have previously retrieved name with same option. */ if (use_dns && canonical_host_name != NULL) return canonical_host_name; if (!use_dns && remote_ip != NULL) return remote_ip; /* Get the real hostname if socket; otherwise return UNKNOWN. */ if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) host = get_remote_hostname(packet_get_connection_in(), use_dns); else host = "UNKNOWN"; if (use_dns) canonical_host_name = host; else remote_ip = host; return host; } /* * Returns the local/remote IP-address/hostname of socket as a string. * The returned string must be freed. */ static char * get_socket_address(int sock, int remote, int flags) { struct sockaddr_storage addr; socklen_t addrlen; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; int r; /* Get IP address of client. */ addrlen = sizeof(addr); memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); if (remote) { if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen) < 0) return NULL; } else { if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen) < 0) return NULL; } /* Work around Linux IPv6 weirdness */ if (addr.ss_family == AF_INET6) addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); + if (addr.ss_family == AF_UNIX) { + /* Get the Unix domain socket path. */ + return xstrdup(((struct sockaddr_un *)&addr)->sun_path); + } + ipv64_normalise_mapped(&addr, &addrlen); /* Get the address in ascii. */ if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&addr, addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, flags)) != 0) { error("get_socket_address: getnameinfo %d failed: %s", flags, ssh_gai_strerror(r)); return NULL; } return xstrdup(ntop); } char * get_peer_ipaddr(int sock) { char *p; if ((p = get_socket_address(sock, 1, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != NULL) return p; return xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); } char * get_local_ipaddr(int sock) { char *p; if ((p = get_socket_address(sock, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != NULL) return p; return xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); } char * get_local_name(int fd) { char *host, myname[NI_MAXHOST]; /* Assume we were passed a socket */ if ((host = get_socket_address(fd, 0, NI_NAMEREQD)) != NULL) return host; /* Handle the case where we were passed a pipe */ if (gethostname(myname, sizeof(myname)) == -1) { verbose("get_local_name: gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); } else { host = xstrdup(myname); } return host; } void clear_cached_addr(void) { free(canonical_host_ip); canonical_host_ip = NULL; cached_port = -1; } /* * Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned * string must not be freed. */ const char * get_remote_ipaddr(void) { /* Check whether we have cached the ipaddr. */ if (canonical_host_ip == NULL) { if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { canonical_host_ip = get_peer_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in()); if (canonical_host_ip == NULL) cleanup_exit(255); } else { /* If not on socket, return UNKNOWN. */ canonical_host_ip = xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); } } return canonical_host_ip; } const char * get_remote_name_or_ip(u_int utmp_len, int use_dns) { static const char *remote = ""; if (utmp_len > 0) remote = get_canonical_hostname(use_dns); if (utmp_len == 0 || strlen(remote) > utmp_len) remote = get_remote_ipaddr(); return remote; } /* Returns the local/remote port for the socket. */ int get_sock_port(int sock, int local) { struct sockaddr_storage from; socklen_t fromlen; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int r; /* Get IP address of client. */ fromlen = sizeof(from); memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); if (local) { if (getsockname(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { error("getsockname failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); return 0; } } else { if (getpeername(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } } /* Work around Linux IPv6 weirdness */ if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6) fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); + + /* Unix domain sockets don't have a port number. */ + if (from.ss_family == AF_UNIX) + return 0; /* Return port number. */ if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, NULL, 0, strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) fatal("get_sock_port: getnameinfo NI_NUMERICSERV failed: %s", ssh_gai_strerror(r)); return atoi(strport); } /* Returns remote/local port number for the current connection. */ static int get_port(int local) { /* * If the connection is not a socket, return 65535. This is * intentionally chosen to be an unprivileged port number. */ if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket()) return 65535; /* Get socket and return the port number. */ return get_sock_port(packet_get_connection_in(), local); } int get_peer_port(int sock) { return get_sock_port(sock, 0); } int get_remote_port(void) { /* Cache to avoid getpeername() on a dead connection */ if (cached_port == -1) cached_port = get_port(0); return cached_port; } int get_local_port(void) { return get_port(1); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/chacha.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/chacha.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/chacha.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,35 +1,35 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: chacha.h,v 1.1 2013/11/21 00:45:44 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: chacha.h,v 1.3 2014/05/02 03:27:54 djm Exp $ */ /* chacha-merged.c version 20080118 D. J. Bernstein Public domain. */ #ifndef CHACHA_H #define CHACHA_H #include struct chacha_ctx { u_int input[16]; }; #define CHACHA_MINKEYLEN 16 #define CHACHA_NONCELEN 8 #define CHACHA_CTRLEN 8 #define CHACHA_STATELEN (CHACHA_NONCELEN+CHACHA_CTRLEN) #define CHACHA_BLOCKLEN 64 void chacha_keysetup(struct chacha_ctx *x, const u_char *k, u_int kbits) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CHACHA_MINKEYLEN))); void chacha_ivsetup(struct chacha_ctx *x, const u_char *iv, const u_char *ctr) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CHACHA_NONCELEN))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 3, CHACHA_CTRLEN))); void chacha_encrypt_bytes(struct chacha_ctx *x, const u_char *m, u_char *c, u_int bytes) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 4))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 3, 4))); #endif /* CHACHA_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/channels.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/channels.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/channels.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,3822 +1,4247 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.331 2014/02/26 20:29:29 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.336 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * This file contains functions for generic socket connection forwarding. * There is also code for initiating connection forwarding for X11 connections, * arbitrary tcp/ip connections, and the authentication agent connection. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include +#include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "channels.h" #include "compat.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "key.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "pathnames.h" /* -- channel core */ /* * Pointer to an array containing all allocated channels. The array is * dynamically extended as needed. */ static Channel **channels = NULL; /* * Size of the channel array. All slots of the array must always be * initialized (at least the type field); unused slots set to NULL */ static u_int channels_alloc = 0; /* * Maximum file descriptor value used in any of the channels. This is * updated in channel_new. */ static int channel_max_fd = 0; /* -- tcp forwarding */ /* * Data structure for storing which hosts are permitted for forward requests. * The local sides of any remote forwards are stored in this array to prevent * a corrupt remote server from accessing arbitrary TCP/IP ports on our local * network (which might be behind a firewall). */ +/* XXX: streamlocal wants a path instead of host:port */ +/* Overload host_to_connect; we could just make this match Forward */ +/* XXX - can we use listen_host instead of listen_path? */ typedef struct { char *host_to_connect; /* Connect to 'host'. */ - u_short port_to_connect; /* Connect to 'port'. */ - u_short listen_port; /* Remote side should listen port number. */ + int port_to_connect; /* Connect to 'port'. */ + char *listen_host; /* Remote side should listen address. */ + char *listen_path; /* Remote side should listen path. */ + int listen_port; /* Remote side should listen port. */ } ForwardPermission; /* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect by the user. */ static ForwardPermission *permitted_opens = NULL; /* List of all permitted host/port pairs to connect by the admin. */ static ForwardPermission *permitted_adm_opens = NULL; /* Number of permitted host/port pairs in the array permitted by the user. */ static int num_permitted_opens = 0; /* Number of permitted host/port pair in the array permitted by the admin. */ static int num_adm_permitted_opens = 0; /* special-case port number meaning allow any port */ #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT 0 /* * If this is true, all opens are permitted. This is the case on the server * on which we have to trust the client anyway, and the user could do * anything after logging in anyway. */ static int all_opens_permitted = 0; /* -- X11 forwarding */ /* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */ #define MAX_DISPLAYS 1000 /* Saved X11 local (client) display. */ static char *x11_saved_display = NULL; /* Saved X11 authentication protocol name. */ static char *x11_saved_proto = NULL; /* Saved X11 authentication data. This is the real data. */ static char *x11_saved_data = NULL; static u_int x11_saved_data_len = 0; /* * Fake X11 authentication data. This is what the server will be sending us; * we should replace any occurrences of this by the real data. */ static u_char *x11_fake_data = NULL; static u_int x11_fake_data_len; /* -- agent forwarding */ #define NUM_SOCKS 10 /* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */ static int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; /* helper */ static void port_open_helper(Channel *c, char *rtype); /* non-blocking connect helpers */ static int connect_next(struct channel_connect *); static void channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *); /* -- channel core */ Channel * channel_by_id(int id) { Channel *c; if (id < 0 || (u_int)id >= channels_alloc) { logit("channel_by_id: %d: bad id", id); return NULL; } c = channels[id]; if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_by_id: %d: bad id: channel free", id); return NULL; } return c; } /* * Returns the channel if it is allowed to receive protocol messages. * Private channels, like listening sockets, may not receive messages. */ Channel * channel_lookup(int id) { Channel *c; if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL) return (NULL); switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: return (c); } logit("Non-public channel %d, type %d.", id, c->type); return (NULL); } /* * Register filedescriptors for a channel, used when allocating a channel or * when the channel consumer/producer is ready, e.g. shell exec'd */ static void channel_register_fds(Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty) { /* Update the maximum file descriptor value. */ channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, rfd); channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, wfd); channel_max_fd = MAX(channel_max_fd, efd); if (rfd != -1) fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd) fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd) fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); c->rfd = rfd; c->wfd = wfd; c->sock = (rfd == wfd) ? rfd : -1; c->efd = efd; c->extended_usage = extusage; if ((c->isatty = is_tty) != 0) debug2("channel %d: rfd %d isatty", c->self, c->rfd); #ifdef _AIX /* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */ c->wfd_isatty = is_tty || isatty(c->wfd); #endif /* enable nonblocking mode */ if (nonblock) { if (rfd != -1) set_nonblock(rfd); if (wfd != -1) set_nonblock(wfd); if (efd != -1) set_nonblock(efd); } } /* * Allocate a new channel object and set its type and socket. This will cause * remote_name to be freed. */ Channel * channel_new(char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, u_int window, u_int maxpack, int extusage, char *remote_name, int nonblock) { int found; u_int i; Channel *c; /* Do initial allocation if this is the first call. */ if (channels_alloc == 0) { channels_alloc = 10; channels = xcalloc(channels_alloc, sizeof(Channel *)); for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) channels[i] = NULL; } /* Try to find a free slot where to put the new channel. */ for (found = -1, i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) if (channels[i] == NULL) { /* Found a free slot. */ found = (int)i; break; } if (found < 0) { /* There are no free slots. Take last+1 slot and expand the array. */ found = channels_alloc; if (channels_alloc > 10000) fatal("channel_new: internal error: channels_alloc %d " "too big.", channels_alloc); channels = xrealloc(channels, channels_alloc + 10, sizeof(Channel *)); channels_alloc += 10; debug2("channel: expanding %d", channels_alloc); for (i = found; i < channels_alloc; i++) channels[i] = NULL; } /* Initialize and return new channel. */ c = channels[found] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Channel)); buffer_init(&c->input); buffer_init(&c->output); buffer_init(&c->extended); c->path = NULL; c->listening_addr = NULL; c->listening_port = 0; c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN; c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_OPEN; c->flags = 0; channel_register_fds(c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, 0); c->notbefore = 0; c->self = found; c->type = type; c->ctype = ctype; c->local_window = window; c->local_window_max = window; c->local_consumed = 0; c->local_maxpacket = maxpack; c->remote_id = -1; c->remote_name = xstrdup(remote_name); c->remote_window = 0; c->remote_maxpacket = 0; c->force_drain = 0; c->single_connection = 0; c->detach_user = NULL; c->detach_close = 0; c->open_confirm = NULL; c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL; c->input_filter = NULL; c->output_filter = NULL; c->filter_ctx = NULL; c->filter_cleanup = NULL; c->ctl_chan = -1; c->mux_rcb = NULL; c->mux_ctx = NULL; c->mux_pause = 0; c->delayed = 1; /* prevent call to channel_post handler */ TAILQ_INIT(&c->status_confirms); debug("channel %d: new [%s]", found, remote_name); return c; } static int channel_find_maxfd(void) { u_int i; int max = 0; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { c = channels[i]; if (c != NULL) { max = MAX(max, c->rfd); max = MAX(max, c->wfd); max = MAX(max, c->efd); } } return max; } int channel_close_fd(int *fdp) { int ret = 0, fd = *fdp; if (fd != -1) { ret = close(fd); *fdp = -1; if (fd == channel_max_fd) channel_max_fd = channel_find_maxfd(); } return ret; } /* Close all channel fd/socket. */ static void channel_close_fds(Channel *c) { channel_close_fd(&c->sock); channel_close_fd(&c->rfd); channel_close_fd(&c->wfd); channel_close_fd(&c->efd); } /* Free the channel and close its fd/socket. */ void channel_free(Channel *c) { char *s; u_int i, n; struct channel_confirm *cc; for (n = 0, i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) if (channels[i]) n++; debug("channel %d: free: %s, nchannels %u", c->self, c->remote_name ? c->remote_name : "???", n); s = channel_open_message(); debug3("channel %d: status: %s", c->self, s); free(s); if (c->sock != -1) shutdown(c->sock, SHUT_RDWR); channel_close_fds(c); buffer_free(&c->input); buffer_free(&c->output); buffer_free(&c->extended); free(c->remote_name); c->remote_name = NULL; free(c->path); c->path = NULL; free(c->listening_addr); c->listening_addr = NULL; while ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) != NULL) { if (cc->abandon_cb != NULL) cc->abandon_cb(c, cc->ctx); TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry); explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc)); free(cc); } if (c->filter_cleanup != NULL && c->filter_ctx != NULL) c->filter_cleanup(c->self, c->filter_ctx); channels[c->self] = NULL; free(c); } void channel_free_all(void) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) if (channels[i] != NULL) channel_free(channels[i]); } /* * Closes the sockets/fds of all channels. This is used to close extra file * descriptors after a fork. */ void channel_close_all(void) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) if (channels[i] != NULL) channel_close_fds(channels[i]); } /* * Stop listening to channels. */ void channel_stop_listening(void) { u_int i; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { c = channels[i]; if (c != NULL) { switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: channel_close_fd(&c->sock); channel_free(c); break; } } } } /* * Returns true if no channel has too much buffered data, and false if one or * more channel is overfull. */ int channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(void) { u_int i; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { c = channels[i]; if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { #if 0 if (!compat20 && buffer_len(&c->input) > packet_get_maxsize()) { debug2("channel %d: big input buffer %d", c->self, buffer_len(&c->input)); return 0; } #endif if (buffer_len(&c->output) > packet_get_maxsize()) { debug2("channel %d: big output buffer %u > %u", c->self, buffer_len(&c->output), packet_get_maxsize()); return 0; } } } return 1; } /* Returns true if any channel is still open. */ int channel_still_open(void) { u_int i; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: + case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: if (!compat20) fatal("cannot happen: SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL"); continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT: return 1; case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING: if (!compat13) fatal("cannot happen: OUT_DRAIN"); return 1; default: fatal("channel_still_open: bad channel type %d", c->type); /* NOTREACHED */ } } return 0; } /* Returns the id of an open channel suitable for keepaliving */ int channel_find_open(void) { u_int i; Channel *c; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->remote_id < 0) continue; switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: + case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: return i; case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING: if (!compat13) fatal("cannot happen: OUT_DRAIN"); return i; default: fatal("channel_find_open: bad channel type %d", c->type); /* NOTREACHED */ } } return -1; } /* * Returns a message describing the currently open forwarded connections, * suitable for sending to the client. The message contains crlf pairs for * newlines. */ char * channel_open_message(void) { Buffer buffer; Channel *c; char buf[1024], *cp; u_int i; buffer_init(&buffer); snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "The following connections are open:\r\n"); buffer_append(&buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; switch (c->type) { case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER: case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED: case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET: case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE: case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT: case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: + case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: continue; case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING: case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING: case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC: case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN: case SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING: case SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING: snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, " #%d %.300s (t%d r%d i%d/%d o%d/%d fd %d/%d cc %d)\r\n", c->self, c->remote_name, c->type, c->remote_id, c->istate, buffer_len(&c->input), c->ostate, buffer_len(&c->output), c->rfd, c->wfd, c->ctl_chan); buffer_append(&buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); continue; default: fatal("channel_open_message: bad channel type %d", c->type); /* NOTREACHED */ } } buffer_append(&buffer, "\0", 1); cp = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&buffer)); buffer_free(&buffer); return cp; } void channel_send_open(int id) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_send_open: %d: bad id", id); return; } debug2("channel %d: send open", id); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN); packet_put_cstring(c->ctype); packet_put_int(c->self); packet_put_int(c->local_window); packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); packet_send(); } void channel_request_start(int id, char *service, int wantconfirm) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_request_start: %d: unknown channel id", id); return; } debug2("channel %d: request %s confirm %d", id, service, wantconfirm); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_cstring(service); packet_put_char(wantconfirm); } void channel_register_status_confirm(int id, channel_confirm_cb *cb, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb, void *ctx) { struct channel_confirm *cc; Channel *c; if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) fatal("channel_register_expect: %d: bad id", id); cc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cc)); cc->cb = cb; cc->abandon_cb = abandon_cb; cc->ctx = ctx; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry); } void channel_register_open_confirm(int id, channel_open_fn *fn, void *ctx) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_register_open_confirm: %d: bad id", id); return; } c->open_confirm = fn; c->open_confirm_ctx = ctx; } void channel_register_cleanup(int id, channel_callback_fn *fn, int do_close) { Channel *c = channel_by_id(id); if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_register_cleanup: %d: bad id", id); return; } c->detach_user = fn; c->detach_close = do_close; } void channel_cancel_cleanup(int id) { Channel *c = channel_by_id(id); if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_cancel_cleanup: %d: bad id", id); return; } c->detach_user = NULL; c->detach_close = 0; } void channel_register_filter(int id, channel_infilter_fn *ifn, channel_outfilter_fn *ofn, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *cfn, void *ctx) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) { logit("channel_register_filter: %d: bad id", id); return; } c->input_filter = ifn; c->output_filter = ofn; c->filter_ctx = ctx; c->filter_cleanup = cfn; } void channel_set_fds(int id, int rfd, int wfd, int efd, int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty, u_int window_max) { Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) fatal("channel_activate for non-larval channel %d.", id); channel_register_fds(c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, is_tty); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; c->local_window = c->local_window_max = window_max; packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_int(c->local_window); packet_send(); } /* * 'channel_pre*' are called just before select() to add any bits relevant to * channels in the select bitmasks. */ /* * 'channel_post*': perform any appropriate operations for channels which * have events pending. */ typedef void chan_fn(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset); chan_fn *channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE]; chan_fn *channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE]; /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_pre_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { FD_SET(c->sock, readset); } /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_pre_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { debug3("channel %d: waiting for connection", c->self); FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); } static void channel_pre_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { if (buffer_len(&c->input) < packet_get_maxsize()) FD_SET(c->sock, readset); if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); } static void channel_pre_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { u_int limit = compat20 ? c->remote_window : packet_get_maxsize(); if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && limit > 0 && buffer_len(&c->input) < limit && buffer_check_alloc(&c->input, CHAN_RBUF)) FD_SET(c->rfd, readset); if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN || c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) { FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset); } else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { if (CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c)) debug2("channel %d: obuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%d)", c->self, c->efd, buffer_len(&c->extended)); else chan_obuf_empty(c); } } /** XXX check close conditions, too */ if (compat20 && c->efd != -1 && !(c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED && c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)) { if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0) FD_SET(c->efd, writeset); else if (c->efd != -1 && !(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) && (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ || c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) && buffer_len(&c->extended) < c->remote_window) FD_SET(c->efd, readset); } /* XXX: What about efd? races? */ } /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_pre_input_draining(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { if (buffer_len(&c->input) == 0) { packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_send(); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED; debug2("channel %d: closing after input drain.", c->self); } } /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_pre_output_draining(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { if (buffer_len(&c->output) == 0) chan_mark_dead(c); else FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); } /* * This is a special state for X11 authentication spoofing. An opened X11 * connection (when authentication spoofing is being done) remains in this * state until the first packet has been completely read. The authentication * data in that packet is then substituted by the real data if it matches the * fake data, and the channel is put into normal mode. * XXX All this happens at the client side. * Returns: 0 = need more data, -1 = wrong cookie, 1 = ok */ static int x11_open_helper(Buffer *b) { u_char *ucp; u_int proto_len, data_len; /* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ if (buffer_len(b) < 12) return 0; /* Parse the lengths of variable-length fields. */ ucp = buffer_ptr(b); if (ucp[0] == 0x42) { /* Byte order MSB first. */ proto_len = 256 * ucp[6] + ucp[7]; data_len = 256 * ucp[8] + ucp[9]; } else if (ucp[0] == 0x6c) { /* Byte order LSB first. */ proto_len = ucp[6] + 256 * ucp[7]; data_len = ucp[8] + 256 * ucp[9]; } else { debug2("Initial X11 packet contains bad byte order byte: 0x%x", ucp[0]); return -1; } /* Check if the whole packet is in buffer. */ if (buffer_len(b) < 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3) + ((data_len + 3) & ~3)) return 0; /* Check if authentication protocol matches. */ if (proto_len != strlen(x11_saved_proto) || memcmp(ucp + 12, x11_saved_proto, proto_len) != 0) { debug2("X11 connection uses different authentication protocol."); return -1; } /* Check if authentication data matches our fake data. */ if (data_len != x11_fake_data_len || timingsafe_bcmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3), x11_fake_data, x11_fake_data_len) != 0) { debug2("X11 auth data does not match fake data."); return -1; } /* Check fake data length */ if (x11_fake_data_len != x11_saved_data_len) { error("X11 fake_data_len %d != saved_data_len %d", x11_fake_data_len, x11_saved_data_len); return -1; } /* * Received authentication protocol and data match * our fake data. Substitute the fake data with real * data. */ memcpy(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3), x11_saved_data, x11_saved_data_len); return 1; } static void channel_pre_x11_open_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { int ret = x11_open_helper(&c->output); if (ret == 1) { /* Start normal processing for the channel. */ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; channel_pre_open_13(c, readset, writeset); } else if (ret == -1) { /* * We have received an X11 connection that has bad * authentication information. */ logit("X11 connection rejected because of wrong authentication."); buffer_clear(&c->input); buffer_clear(&c->output); channel_close_fd(&c->sock); c->sock = -1; c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED; packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_send(); } } static void channel_pre_x11_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { int ret = x11_open_helper(&c->output); /* c->force_drain = 1; */ if (ret == 1) { c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; channel_pre_open(c, readset, writeset); } else if (ret == -1) { logit("X11 connection rejected because of wrong authentication."); debug2("X11 rejected %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate); chan_read_failed(c); buffer_clear(&c->input); chan_ibuf_empty(c); buffer_clear(&c->output); /* for proto v1, the peer will send an IEOF */ if (compat20) chan_write_failed(c); else c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; debug2("X11 closed %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate); } } static void channel_pre_mux_client(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && !c->mux_pause && buffer_check_alloc(&c->input, CHAN_RBUF)) FD_SET(c->rfd, readset); if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { /* clear buffer immediately (discard any partial packet) */ buffer_clear(&c->input); chan_ibuf_empty(c); /* Start output drain. XXX just kill chan? */ chan_rcvd_oclose(c); } if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN || c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { if (buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset); else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) chan_obuf_empty(c); } } /* try to decode a socks4 header */ /* ARGSUSED */ static int channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { char *p, *host; u_int len, have, i, found, need; char username[256]; struct { u_int8_t version; u_int8_t command; u_int16_t dest_port; struct in_addr dest_addr; } s4_req, s4_rsp; debug2("channel %d: decode socks4", c->self); have = buffer_len(&c->input); len = sizeof(s4_req); if (have < len) return 0; p = buffer_ptr(&c->input); need = 1; /* SOCKS4A uses an invalid IP address 0.0.0.x */ if (p[4] == 0 && p[5] == 0 && p[6] == 0 && p[7] != 0) { debug2("channel %d: socks4a request", c->self); /* ... and needs an extra string (the hostname) */ need = 2; } /* Check for terminating NUL on the string(s) */ for (found = 0, i = len; i < have; i++) { if (p[i] == '\0') { found++; if (found == need) break; } if (i > 1024) { /* the peer is probably sending garbage */ debug("channel %d: decode socks4: too long", c->self); return -1; } } if (found < need) return 0; buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.version, 1); buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.command, 1); buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.dest_port, 2); buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&s4_req.dest_addr, 4); have = buffer_len(&c->input); p = buffer_ptr(&c->input); if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL) fatal("channel %d: decode socks4: user not nul terminated", c->self); len = strlen(p); debug2("channel %d: decode socks4: user %s/%d", c->self, p, len); len++; /* trailing '\0' */ if (len > have) fatal("channel %d: decode socks4: len %d > have %d", c->self, len, have); strlcpy(username, p, sizeof(username)); buffer_consume(&c->input, len); free(c->path); c->path = NULL; if (need == 1) { /* SOCKS4: one string */ host = inet_ntoa(s4_req.dest_addr); c->path = xstrdup(host); } else { /* SOCKS4A: two strings */ have = buffer_len(&c->input); p = buffer_ptr(&c->input); len = strlen(p); debug2("channel %d: decode socks4a: host %s/%d", c->self, p, len); len++; /* trailing '\0' */ if (len > have) fatal("channel %d: decode socks4a: len %d > have %d", c->self, len, have); if (len > NI_MAXHOST) { error("channel %d: hostname \"%.100s\" too long", c->self, p); return -1; } c->path = xstrdup(p); buffer_consume(&c->input, len); } c->host_port = ntohs(s4_req.dest_port); debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks4 host %s port %u command %u", c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s4_req.command); if (s4_req.command != 1) { debug("channel %d: cannot handle: %s cn %d", c->self, need == 1 ? "SOCKS4" : "SOCKS4A", s4_req.command); return -1; } s4_rsp.version = 0; /* vn: 0 for reply */ s4_rsp.command = 90; /* cd: req granted */ s4_rsp.dest_port = 0; /* ignored */ s4_rsp.dest_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; /* ignored */ buffer_append(&c->output, &s4_rsp, sizeof(s4_rsp)); return 1; } /* try to decode a socks5 header */ #define SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE 0x1000 #define SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH 0x00 #define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4 0x01 #define SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN 0x03 #define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6 0x04 #define SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT 0x01 #define SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS 0x00 /* ARGSUSED */ static int channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { struct { u_int8_t version; u_int8_t command; u_int8_t reserved; u_int8_t atyp; } s5_req, s5_rsp; u_int16_t dest_port; char dest_addr[255+1], ntop[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN]; u_char *p; u_int have, need, i, found, nmethods, addrlen, af; debug2("channel %d: decode socks5", c->self); p = buffer_ptr(&c->input); if (p[0] != 0x05) return -1; have = buffer_len(&c->input); if (!(c->flags & SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE)) { /* format: ver | nmethods | methods */ if (have < 2) return 0; nmethods = p[1]; if (have < nmethods + 2) return 0; /* look for method: "NO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED" */ for (found = 0, i = 2; i < nmethods + 2; i++) { if (p[i] == SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH) { found = 1; break; } } if (!found) { debug("channel %d: method SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH not found", c->self); return -1; } buffer_consume(&c->input, nmethods + 2); buffer_put_char(&c->output, 0x05); /* version */ buffer_put_char(&c->output, SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH); /* method */ FD_SET(c->sock, writeset); c->flags |= SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE; debug2("channel %d: socks5 auth done", c->self); return 0; /* need more */ } debug2("channel %d: socks5 post auth", c->self); if (have < sizeof(s5_req)+1) return 0; /* need more */ memcpy(&s5_req, p, sizeof(s5_req)); if (s5_req.version != 0x05 || s5_req.command != SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT || s5_req.reserved != 0x00) { debug2("channel %d: only socks5 connect supported", c->self); return -1; } switch (s5_req.atyp){ case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4: addrlen = 4; af = AF_INET; break; case SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN: addrlen = p[sizeof(s5_req)]; af = -1; break; case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6: addrlen = 16; af = AF_INET6; break; default: debug2("channel %d: bad socks5 atyp %d", c->self, s5_req.atyp); return -1; } need = sizeof(s5_req) + addrlen + 2; if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) need++; if (have < need) return 0; buffer_consume(&c->input, sizeof(s5_req)); if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) buffer_consume(&c->input, 1); /* host string length */ buffer_get(&c->input, &dest_addr, addrlen); buffer_get(&c->input, (char *)&dest_port, 2); dest_addr[addrlen] = '\0'; free(c->path); c->path = NULL; if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) { if (addrlen >= NI_MAXHOST) { error("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 hostname " "\"%.100s\" too long", c->self, dest_addr); return -1; } c->path = xstrdup(dest_addr); } else { if (inet_ntop(af, dest_addr, ntop, sizeof(ntop)) == NULL) return -1; c->path = xstrdup(ntop); } c->host_port = ntohs(dest_port); debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 host %s port %u command %u", c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s5_req.command); s5_rsp.version = 0x05; s5_rsp.command = SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS; s5_rsp.reserved = 0; /* ignored */ s5_rsp.atyp = SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4; dest_port = 0; /* ignored */ buffer_append(&c->output, &s5_rsp, sizeof(s5_rsp)); buffer_put_int(&c->output, ntohl(INADDR_ANY)); /* bind address */ buffer_append(&c->output, &dest_port, sizeof(dest_port)); return 1; } Channel * channel_connect_stdio_fwd(const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int in, int out) { Channel *c; debug("channel_connect_stdio_fwd %s:%d", host_to_connect, port_to_connect); c = channel_new("stdio-forward", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "stdio-forward", /*nonblock*/0); c->path = xstrdup(host_to_connect); c->host_port = port_to_connect; c->listening_port = 0; c->force_drain = 1; channel_register_fds(c, in, out, -1, 0, 1, 0); port_open_helper(c, "direct-tcpip"); return c; } /* dynamic port forwarding */ static void channel_pre_dynamic(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { u_char *p; u_int have; int ret; have = buffer_len(&c->input); debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: have %d", c->self, have); /* buffer_dump(&c->input); */ /* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */ if (have < 3) { /* need more */ FD_SET(c->sock, readset); return; } /* try to guess the protocol */ p = buffer_ptr(&c->input); switch (p[0]) { case 0x04: ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, readset, writeset); break; case 0x05: ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, readset, writeset); break; default: ret = -1; break; } if (ret < 0) { chan_mark_dead(c); } else if (ret == 0) { debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: need more", c->self); /* need more */ FD_SET(c->sock, readset); } else { /* switch to the next state */ c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; port_open_helper(c, "direct-tcpip"); } } /* This is our fake X11 server socket. */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_post_x11_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { Channel *nc; struct sockaddr_storage addr; int newsock, oerrno; socklen_t addrlen; char buf[16384], *remote_ipaddr; int remote_port; if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) { debug("X11 connection requested."); addrlen = sizeof(addr); newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); if (c->single_connection) { oerrno = errno; debug2("single_connection: closing X11 listener."); channel_close_fd(&c->sock); chan_mark_dead(c); errno = oerrno; } if (newsock < 0) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && errno != ECONNABORTED) error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; return; } set_nodelay(newsock); remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(newsock); remote_port = get_peer_port(newsock); snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "X11 connection from %.200s port %d", remote_ipaddr, remote_port); nc = channel_new("accepted x11 socket", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, buf, 1); if (compat20) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN); packet_put_cstring("x11"); packet_put_int(nc->self); packet_put_int(nc->local_window_max); packet_put_int(nc->local_maxpacket); /* originator ipaddr and port */ packet_put_cstring(remote_ipaddr); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_X11FWD) { debug2("ssh2 x11 bug compat mode"); } else { packet_put_int(remote_port); } packet_send(); } else { packet_start(SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN); packet_put_int(nc->self); if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) packet_put_cstring(buf); packet_send(); } free(remote_ipaddr); } } static void port_open_helper(Channel *c, char *rtype) { - int direct; char buf[1024]; char *local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(c->sock); int local_port = c->sock == -1 ? 65536 : get_sock_port(c->sock, 1); char *remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(c->sock); int remote_port = get_peer_port(c->sock); if (remote_port == -1) { /* Fake addr/port to appease peers that validate it (Tectia) */ free(remote_ipaddr); remote_ipaddr = xstrdup("127.0.0.1"); remote_port = 65535; } - direct = (strcmp(rtype, "direct-tcpip") == 0); - snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s: listening port %d for %.100s port %d, " "connect from %.200s port %d to %.100s port %d", rtype, c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port, remote_ipaddr, remote_port, local_ipaddr, local_port); free(c->remote_name); c->remote_name = xstrdup(buf); if (compat20) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN); packet_put_cstring(rtype); packet_put_int(c->self); packet_put_int(c->local_window_max); packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); - if (direct) { + if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) { /* target host, port */ packet_put_cstring(c->path); packet_put_int(c->host_port); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { + /* target path */ + packet_put_cstring(c->path); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { + /* listen path */ + packet_put_cstring(c->path); } else { /* listen address, port */ packet_put_cstring(c->path); packet_put_int(local_port); } - /* originator host and port */ - packet_put_cstring(remote_ipaddr); - packet_put_int((u_int)remote_port); + if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { + /* reserved for future owner/mode info */ + packet_put_cstring(""); + } else { + /* originator host and port */ + packet_put_cstring(remote_ipaddr); + packet_put_int((u_int)remote_port); + } packet_send(); } else { packet_start(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN); packet_put_int(c->self); packet_put_cstring(c->path); packet_put_int(c->host_port); if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) packet_put_cstring(c->remote_name); packet_send(); } free(remote_ipaddr); free(local_ipaddr); } static void channel_set_reuseaddr(int fd) { int on = 1; /* * Set socket options. * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT. */ if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR fd %d: %s", fd, strerror(errno)); } /* * This socket is listening for connections to a forwarded TCP/IP port. */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_post_port_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { Channel *nc; struct sockaddr_storage addr; int newsock, nextstate; socklen_t addrlen; char *rtype; if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) { debug("Connection to port %d forwarding " "to %.100s port %d requested.", c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port); if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) { nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; rtype = "forwarded-tcpip"; + } else if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER) { + nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; + rtype = "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com"; + } else if (c->host_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) { + nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; + rtype = "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com"; + } else if (c->host_port == 0) { + nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC; + rtype = "dynamic-tcpip"; } else { - if (c->host_port == 0) { - nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC; - rtype = "dynamic-tcpip"; - } else { - nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; - rtype = "direct-tcpip"; - } + nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING; + rtype = "direct-tcpip"; } addrlen = sizeof(addr); newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); if (newsock < 0) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && errno != ECONNABORTED) error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; return; } - set_nodelay(newsock); + if (c->host_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL) + set_nodelay(newsock); nc = channel_new(rtype, nextstate, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, rtype, 1); nc->listening_port = c->listening_port; nc->host_port = c->host_port; if (c->path != NULL) nc->path = xstrdup(c->path); if (nextstate != SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC) port_open_helper(nc, rtype); } } /* * This is the authentication agent socket listening for connections from * clients. */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_post_auth_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { Channel *nc; int newsock; struct sockaddr_storage addr; socklen_t addrlen; if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) { addrlen = sizeof(addr); newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen); if (newsock < 0) { error("accept from auth socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; return; } nc = channel_new("accepted auth socket", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, "accepted auth socket", 1); if (compat20) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN); packet_put_cstring("auth-agent@openssh.com"); packet_put_int(nc->self); packet_put_int(c->local_window_max); packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); } else { packet_start(SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN); packet_put_int(nc->self); } packet_send(); } } /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_post_connecting(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { int err = 0, sock; socklen_t sz = sizeof(err); if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset)) { if (getsockopt(c->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &err, &sz) < 0) { err = errno; error("getsockopt SO_ERROR failed"); } if (err == 0) { debug("channel %d: connected to %s port %d", c->self, c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port); channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; if (compat20) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_int(c->self); packet_put_int(c->local_window); packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); } else { packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_int(c->self); } } else { debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s", c->self, strerror(err)); /* Try next address, if any */ if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) { close(c->sock); c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock; channel_max_fd = channel_find_maxfd(); return; } /* Exhausted all addresses */ error("connect_to %.100s port %d: failed.", c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port); channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx); if (compat20) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED); if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) { packet_put_cstring(strerror(err)); packet_put_cstring(""); } } else { packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); } chan_mark_dead(c); } packet_send(); } } /* ARGSUSED */ static int channel_handle_rfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { char buf[CHAN_RBUF]; int len, force; force = c->isatty && c->detach_close && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED; if (c->rfd != -1 && (force || FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset))) { errno = 0; len = read(c->rfd, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !force))) return 1; #ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD if (len <= 0) { #else if ((!c->isatty && len <= 0) || (c->isatty && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) { #endif debug2("channel %d: read<=0 rfd %d len %d", c->self, c->rfd, len); if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self); chan_mark_dead(c); return -1; } else if (compat13) { buffer_clear(&c->output); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING; debug2("channel %d: input draining.", c->self); } else { chan_read_failed(c); } return -1; } if (c->input_filter != NULL) { if (c->input_filter(c, buf, len) == -1) { debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self); chan_read_failed(c); } } else if (c->datagram) { buffer_put_string(&c->input, buf, len); } else { buffer_append(&c->input, buf, len); } } return 1; } /* ARGSUSED */ static int channel_handle_wfd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { struct termios tio; u_char *data = NULL, *buf; u_int dlen, olen = 0; int len; /* Send buffered output data to the socket. */ if (c->wfd != -1 && FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) && buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) { olen = buffer_len(&c->output); if (c->output_filter != NULL) { if ((buf = c->output_filter(c, &data, &dlen)) == NULL) { debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self); if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) chan_mark_dead(c); else chan_write_failed(c); return -1; } } else if (c->datagram) { buf = data = buffer_get_string(&c->output, &dlen); } else { buf = data = buffer_ptr(&c->output); dlen = buffer_len(&c->output); } if (c->datagram) { /* ignore truncated writes, datagrams might get lost */ len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen); free(data); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) return 1; if (len <= 0) { if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) chan_mark_dead(c); else chan_write_failed(c); return -1; } goto out; } #ifdef _AIX /* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */ if (compat20 && c->wfd_isatty) dlen = MIN(dlen, 8*1024); #endif len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) return 1; if (len <= 0) { if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self); chan_mark_dead(c); return -1; } else if (compat13) { buffer_clear(&c->output); debug2("channel %d: input draining.", c->self); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING; } else { chan_write_failed(c); } return -1; } #ifndef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON if (compat20 && c->isatty && dlen >= 1 && buf[0] != '\r') { if (tcgetattr(c->wfd, &tio) == 0 && !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) { /* * Simulate echo to reduce the impact of * traffic analysis. We need to match the * size of a SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA message * (4 byte channel id + buf) */ packet_send_ignore(4 + len); packet_send(); } } #endif buffer_consume(&c->output, len); } out: if (compat20 && olen > 0) c->local_consumed += olen - buffer_len(&c->output); return 1; } static int channel_handle_efd(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { char buf[CHAN_RBUF]; int len; /** XXX handle drain efd, too */ if (c->efd != -1) { if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && FD_ISSET(c->efd, writeset) && buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0) { len = write(c->efd, buffer_ptr(&c->extended), buffer_len(&c->extended)); debug2("channel %d: written %d to efd %d", c->self, len, c->efd); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) return 1; if (len <= 0) { debug2("channel %d: closing write-efd %d", c->self, c->efd); channel_close_fd(&c->efd); } else { buffer_consume(&c->extended, len); c->local_consumed += len; } } else if (c->efd != -1 && (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ || c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) && (c->detach_close || FD_ISSET(c->efd, readset))) { len = read(c->efd, buf, sizeof(buf)); debug2("channel %d: read %d from efd %d", c->self, len, c->efd); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !c->detach_close))) return 1; if (len <= 0) { debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d", c->self, c->efd); channel_close_fd(&c->efd); } else { if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) { debug3("channel %d: discard efd", c->self); } else buffer_append(&c->extended, buf, len); } } } return 1; } static int channel_check_window(Channel *c) { if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && !(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) && ((c->local_window_max - c->local_window > c->local_maxpacket*3) || c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) && c->local_consumed > 0) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_int(c->local_consumed); packet_send(); debug2("channel %d: window %d sent adjust %d", c->self, c->local_window, c->local_consumed); c->local_window += c->local_consumed; c->local_consumed = 0; } return 1; } static void channel_post_open(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { channel_handle_rfd(c, readset, writeset); channel_handle_wfd(c, readset, writeset); if (!compat20) return; channel_handle_efd(c, readset, writeset); channel_check_window(c); } static u_int read_mux(Channel *c, u_int need) { char buf[CHAN_RBUF]; int len; u_int rlen; if (buffer_len(&c->input) < need) { rlen = need - buffer_len(&c->input); len = read(c->rfd, buf, MIN(rlen, CHAN_RBUF)); if (len <= 0) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN) { debug2("channel %d: ctl read<=0 rfd %d len %d", c->self, c->rfd, len); chan_read_failed(c); return 0; } } else buffer_append(&c->input, buf, len); } return buffer_len(&c->input); } static void channel_post_mux_client(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { u_int need; ssize_t len; if (!compat20) fatal("%s: entered with !compat20", __func__); if (c->rfd != -1 && !c->mux_pause && FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset) && (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN || c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN)) { /* * Don't not read past the precise end of packets to * avoid disrupting fd passing. */ if (read_mux(c, 4) < 4) /* read header */ return; need = get_u32(buffer_ptr(&c->input)); #define CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET (256 * 1024) if (need > CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET) { debug2("channel %d: packet too big %u > %u", c->self, CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET, need); chan_rcvd_oclose(c); return; } if (read_mux(c, need + 4) < need + 4) /* read body */ return; if (c->mux_rcb(c) != 0) { debug("channel %d: mux_rcb failed", c->self); chan_mark_dead(c); return; } } if (c->wfd != -1 && FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) && buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) { len = write(c->wfd, buffer_ptr(&c->output), buffer_len(&c->output)); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) return; if (len <= 0) { chan_mark_dead(c); return; } buffer_consume(&c->output, len); } } static void channel_post_mux_listener(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { Channel *nc; struct sockaddr_storage addr; socklen_t addrlen; int newsock; uid_t euid; gid_t egid; if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset)) return; debug("multiplexing control connection"); /* * Accept connection on control socket */ memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addrlen = sizeof(addr); if ((newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, &addrlen)) == -1) { error("%s accept: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) c->notbefore = monotime() + 1; return; } if (getpeereid(newsock, &euid, &egid) < 0) { error("%s getpeereid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(newsock); return; } if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) { error("multiplex uid mismatch: peer euid %u != uid %u", (u_int)euid, (u_int)getuid()); close(newsock); return; } nc = channel_new("multiplex client", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT, newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, "mux-control", 1); nc->mux_rcb = c->mux_rcb; debug3("%s: new mux channel %d fd %d", __func__, nc->self, nc->sock); /* establish state */ nc->mux_rcb(nc); /* mux state transitions must not elicit protocol messages */ nc->flags |= CHAN_LOCAL; } /* ARGSUSED */ static void channel_post_output_drain_13(Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { int len; /* Send buffered output data to the socket. */ if (FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset) && buffer_len(&c->output) > 0) { len = write(c->sock, buffer_ptr(&c->output), buffer_len(&c->output)); if (len <= 0) buffer_clear(&c->output); else buffer_consume(&c->output, len); } } static void channel_handler_init_20(void) { channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; + channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_pre_mux_client; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; + channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; + channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_mux_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_post_mux_client; } static void channel_handler_init_13(void) { channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open_13; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open_13; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING] = &channel_pre_input_draining; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING] = &channel_pre_output_draining; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING] = &channel_post_output_drain_13; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open; } static void channel_handler_init_15(void) { channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting; channel_pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting; channel_post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open; } static void channel_handler_init(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE; i++) { channel_pre[i] = NULL; channel_post[i] = NULL; } if (compat20) channel_handler_init_20(); else if (compat13) channel_handler_init_13(); else channel_handler_init_15(); } /* gc dead channels */ static void channel_garbage_collect(Channel *c) { if (c == NULL) return; if (c->detach_user != NULL) { if (!chan_is_dead(c, c->detach_close)) return; debug2("channel %d: gc: notify user", c->self); c->detach_user(c->self, NULL); /* if we still have a callback */ if (c->detach_user != NULL) return; debug2("channel %d: gc: user detached", c->self); } if (!chan_is_dead(c, 1)) return; debug2("channel %d: garbage collecting", c->self); channel_free(c); } static void channel_handler(chan_fn *ftab[], fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset, time_t *unpause_secs) { static int did_init = 0; u_int i, oalloc; Channel *c; time_t now; if (!did_init) { channel_handler_init(); did_init = 1; } now = monotime(); if (unpause_secs != NULL) *unpause_secs = 0; for (i = 0, oalloc = channels_alloc; i < oalloc; i++) { c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; if (c->delayed) { if (ftab == channel_pre) c->delayed = 0; else continue; } if (ftab[c->type] != NULL) { /* * Run handlers that are not paused. */ if (c->notbefore <= now) (*ftab[c->type])(c, readset, writeset); else if (unpause_secs != NULL) { /* * Collect the time that the earliest * channel comes off pause. */ debug3("%s: chan %d: skip for %d more seconds", __func__, c->self, (int)(c->notbefore - now)); if (*unpause_secs == 0 || (c->notbefore - now) < *unpause_secs) *unpause_secs = c->notbefore - now; } } channel_garbage_collect(c); } if (unpause_secs != NULL && *unpause_secs != 0) debug3("%s: first channel unpauses in %d seconds", __func__, (int)*unpause_secs); } /* * Allocate/update select bitmasks and add any bits relevant to channels in * select bitmasks. */ void channel_prepare_select(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, time_t *minwait_secs, int rekeying) { u_int n, sz, nfdset; n = MAX(*maxfdp, channel_max_fd); nfdset = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS); /* Explicitly test here, because xrealloc isn't always called */ if (nfdset && SIZE_T_MAX / nfdset < sizeof(fd_mask)) fatal("channel_prepare_select: max_fd (%d) is too large", n); sz = nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask); /* perhaps check sz < nalloc/2 and shrink? */ if (*readsetp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) { *readsetp = xrealloc(*readsetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); *writesetp = xrealloc(*writesetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); *nallocp = sz; } *maxfdp = n; memset(*readsetp, 0, sz); memset(*writesetp, 0, sz); if (!rekeying) channel_handler(channel_pre, *readsetp, *writesetp, minwait_secs); } /* * After select, perform any appropriate operations for channels which have * events pending. */ void channel_after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { channel_handler(channel_post, readset, writeset, NULL); } /* If there is data to send to the connection, enqueue some of it now. */ void channel_output_poll(void) { Channel *c; u_int i, len; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL) continue; /* * We are only interested in channels that can have buffered * incoming data. */ if (compat13) { if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING) continue; } else { if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) continue; } if (compat20 && (c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD))) { /* XXX is this true? */ debug3("channel %d: will not send data after close", c->self); continue; } /* Get the amount of buffered data for this channel. */ if ((c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN || c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) && (len = buffer_len(&c->input)) > 0) { if (c->datagram) { if (len > 0) { u_char *data; u_int dlen; data = buffer_get_string(&c->input, &dlen); if (dlen > c->remote_window || dlen > c->remote_maxpacket) { debug("channel %d: datagram " "too big for channel", c->self); free(data); continue; } packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_string(data, dlen); packet_send(); c->remote_window -= dlen + 4; free(data); } continue; } /* * Send some data for the other side over the secure * connection. */ if (compat20) { if (len > c->remote_window) len = c->remote_window; if (len > c->remote_maxpacket) len = c->remote_maxpacket; } else { if (packet_is_interactive()) { if (len > 1024) len = 512; } else { /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */ if (len > packet_get_maxsize()/2) len = packet_get_maxsize()/2; } } if (len > 0) { packet_start(compat20 ? SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA : SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&c->input), len); packet_send(); buffer_consume(&c->input, len); c->remote_window -= len; } } else if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) { if (compat13) fatal("cannot happen: istate == INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN for proto 1.3"); /* * input-buffer is empty and read-socket shutdown: * tell peer, that we will not send more data: send IEOF. * hack for extended data: delay EOF if EFD still in use. */ if (CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c)) debug2("channel %d: ibuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%d)", c->self, c->efd, buffer_len(&c->extended)); else chan_ibuf_empty(c); } /* Send extended data, i.e. stderr */ if (compat20 && !(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) && c->remote_window > 0 && (len = buffer_len(&c->extended)) > 0 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ) { debug2("channel %d: rwin %u elen %u euse %d", c->self, c->remote_window, buffer_len(&c->extended), c->extended_usage); if (len > c->remote_window) len = c->remote_window; if (len > c->remote_maxpacket) len = c->remote_maxpacket; packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_int(SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR); packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&c->extended), len); packet_send(); buffer_consume(&c->extended, len); c->remote_window -= len; debug2("channel %d: sent ext data %d", c->self, len); } } } /* -- protocol input */ /* ARGSUSED */ void channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int id; - char *data; + const u_char *data; u_int data_len, win_len; Channel *c; /* Get the channel number and verify it. */ id = packet_get_int(); c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) packet_disconnect("Received data for nonexistent channel %d.", id); /* Ignore any data for non-open channels (might happen on close) */ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN) return; /* Get the data. */ data = packet_get_string_ptr(&data_len); win_len = data_len; if (c->datagram) win_len += 4; /* string length header */ /* * Ignore data for protocol > 1.3 if output end is no longer open. * For protocol 2 the sending side is reducing its window as it sends * data, so we must 'fake' consumption of the data in order to ensure * that window updates are sent back. Otherwise the connection might * deadlock. */ if (!compat13 && c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) { if (compat20) { c->local_window -= win_len; c->local_consumed += win_len; } return; } if (compat20) { if (win_len > c->local_maxpacket) { logit("channel %d: rcvd big packet %d, maxpack %d", c->self, win_len, c->local_maxpacket); } if (win_len > c->local_window) { logit("channel %d: rcvd too much data %d, win %d", c->self, win_len, c->local_window); return; } c->local_window -= win_len; } if (c->datagram) buffer_put_string(&c->output, data, data_len); else buffer_append(&c->output, data, data_len); packet_check_eom(); } /* ARGSUSED */ void channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int id; char *data; u_int data_len, tcode; Channel *c; /* Get the channel number and verify it. */ id = packet_get_int(); c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) packet_disconnect("Received extended_data for bad channel %d.", id); if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) { logit("channel %d: ext data for non open", id); return; } if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) { if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF) debug("channel %d: accepting ext data after eof", id); else packet_disconnect("Received extended_data after EOF " "on channel %d.", id); } tcode = packet_get_int(); if (c->efd == -1 || c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE || tcode != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR) { logit("channel %d: bad ext data", c->self); return; } data = packet_get_string(&data_len); packet_check_eom(); if (data_len > c->local_window) { logit("channel %d: rcvd too much extended_data %d, win %d", c->self, data_len, c->local_window); free(data); return; } debug2("channel %d: rcvd ext data %d", c->self, data_len); c->local_window -= data_len; buffer_append(&c->extended, data, data_len); free(data); } /* ARGSUSED */ void channel_input_ieof(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int id; Channel *c; id = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) packet_disconnect("Received ieof for nonexistent channel %d.", id); chan_rcvd_ieof(c); /* XXX force input close */ if (c->force_drain && c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) { debug("channel %d: FORCE input drain", c->self); c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN; if (buffer_len(&c->input) == 0) chan_ibuf_empty(c); } } /* ARGSUSED */ void channel_input_close(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int id; Channel *c; id = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) packet_disconnect("Received close for nonexistent channel %d.", id); /* * Send a confirmation that we have closed the channel and no more * data is coming for it. */ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_send(); /* * If the channel is in closed state, we have sent a close request, * and the other side will eventually respond with a confirmation. * Thus, we cannot free the channel here, because then there would be * no-one to receive the confirmation. The channel gets freed when * the confirmation arrives. */ if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED) { /* * Not a closed channel - mark it as draining, which will * cause it to be freed later. */ buffer_clear(&c->input); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING; } } /* proto version 1.5 overloads CLOSE_CONFIRMATION with OCLOSE */ /* ARGSUSED */ void channel_input_oclose(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int id = packet_get_int(); Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); packet_check_eom(); if (c == NULL) packet_disconnect("Received oclose for nonexistent channel %d.", id); chan_rcvd_oclose(c); } /* ARGSUSED */ void channel_input_close_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int id = packet_get_int(); Channel *c = channel_lookup(id); packet_check_eom(); if (c == NULL) packet_disconnect("Received close confirmation for " "out-of-range channel %d.", id); if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED && c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED) packet_disconnect("Received close confirmation for " "non-closed channel %d (type %d).", id, c->type); channel_free(c); } /* ARGSUSED */ void channel_input_open_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int id, remote_id; Channel *c; id = packet_get_int(); c = channel_lookup(id); if (c==NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) packet_disconnect("Received open confirmation for " "non-opening channel %d.", id); remote_id = packet_get_int(); /* Record the remote channel number and mark that the channel is now open. */ c->remote_id = remote_id; c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN; if (compat20) { c->remote_window = packet_get_int(); c->remote_maxpacket = packet_get_int(); if (c->open_confirm) { debug2("callback start"); c->open_confirm(c->self, 1, c->open_confirm_ctx); debug2("callback done"); } debug2("channel %d: open confirm rwindow %u rmax %u", c->self, c->remote_window, c->remote_maxpacket); } packet_check_eom(); } static char * reason2txt(int reason) { switch (reason) { case SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED: return "administratively prohibited"; case SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED: return "connect failed"; case SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE: return "unknown channel type"; case SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE: return "resource shortage"; } return "unknown reason"; } /* ARGSUSED */ void channel_input_open_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int id, reason; char *msg = NULL, *lang = NULL; Channel *c; id = packet_get_int(); c = channel_lookup(id); if (c==NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) packet_disconnect("Received open failure for " "non-opening channel %d.", id); if (compat20) { reason = packet_get_int(); if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) { msg = packet_get_string(NULL); lang = packet_get_string(NULL); } logit("channel %d: open failed: %s%s%s", id, reason2txt(reason), msg ? ": ": "", msg ? msg : ""); free(msg); free(lang); if (c->open_confirm) { debug2("callback start"); c->open_confirm(c->self, 0, c->open_confirm_ctx); debug2("callback done"); } } packet_check_eom(); /* Schedule the channel for cleanup/deletion. */ chan_mark_dead(c); } /* ARGSUSED */ void channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c; int id; u_int adjust; if (!compat20) return; /* Get the channel number and verify it. */ id = packet_get_int(); c = channel_lookup(id); if (c == NULL) { logit("Received window adjust for non-open channel %d.", id); return; } adjust = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %u", id, adjust); c->remote_window += adjust; } /* ARGSUSED */ void channel_input_port_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c = NULL; u_short host_port; char *host, *originator_string; int remote_id; remote_id = packet_get_int(); host = packet_get_string(NULL); host_port = packet_get_int(); if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) { originator_string = packet_get_string(NULL); } else { originator_string = xstrdup("unknown (remote did not supply name)"); } packet_check_eom(); - c = channel_connect_to(host, host_port, + c = channel_connect_to_port(host, host_port, "connected socket", originator_string); free(originator_string); free(host); if (c == NULL) { packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); packet_put_int(remote_id); packet_send(); } else c->remote_id = remote_id; } /* ARGSUSED */ void channel_input_status_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c; struct channel_confirm *cc; int id; /* Reset keepalive timeout */ packet_set_alive_timeouts(0); id = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); debug2("channel_input_status_confirm: type %d id %d", type, id); if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) { logit("channel_input_status_confirm: %d: unknown", id); return; } ; if ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) == NULL) return; cc->cb(type, c, cc->ctx); TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry); explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc)); free(cc); } /* -- tcp forwarding */ void channel_set_af(int af) { IPv4or6 = af; } /* * Determine whether or not a port forward listens to loopback, the * specified address or wildcard. On the client, a specified bind * address will always override gateway_ports. On the server, a * gateway_ports of 1 (``yes'') will override the client's specification * and force a wildcard bind, whereas a value of 2 (``clientspecified'') * will bind to whatever address the client asked for. * * Special-case listen_addrs are: * * "0.0.0.0" -> wildcard v4/v6 if SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR * "" (empty string), "*" -> wildcard v4/v6 * "localhost" -> loopback v4/v6 + * "127.0.0.1" / "::1" -> accepted even if gateway_ports isn't set */ static const char * channel_fwd_bind_addr(const char *listen_addr, int *wildcardp, - int is_client, int gateway_ports) + int is_client, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { const char *addr = NULL; int wildcard = 0; if (listen_addr == NULL) { /* No address specified: default to gateway_ports setting */ - if (gateway_ports) + if (fwd_opts->gateway_ports) wildcard = 1; - } else if (gateway_ports || is_client) { + } else if (fwd_opts->gateway_ports || is_client) { if (((datafellows & SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR) && strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") == 0 && is_client == 0) || *listen_addr == '\0' || strcmp(listen_addr, "*") == 0 || - (!is_client && gateway_ports == 1)) { + (!is_client && fwd_opts->gateway_ports == 1)) { wildcard = 1; /* * Notify client if they requested a specific listen * address and it was overridden. */ if (*listen_addr != '\0' && strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") != 0 && strcmp(listen_addr, "*") != 0) { packet_send_debug("Forwarding listen address " "\"%s\" overridden by server " "GatewayPorts", listen_addr); } - } - else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "localhost") != 0) + } else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "localhost") != 0 || + strcmp(listen_addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 || + strcmp(listen_addr, "::1") == 0) { + /* Accept localhost address when GatewayPorts=yes */ addr = listen_addr; + } + } else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 || + strcmp(listen_addr, "::1") == 0) { + /* + * If a specific IPv4/IPv6 localhost address has been + * requested then accept it even if gateway_ports is in + * effect. This allows the client to prefer IPv4 or IPv6. + */ + addr = listen_addr; } if (wildcardp != NULL) *wildcardp = wildcard; return addr; } static int -channel_setup_fwd_listener(int type, const char *listen_addr, - u_short listen_port, int *allocated_listen_port, - const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int gateway_ports) +channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(int type, struct Forward *fwd, + int *allocated_listen_port, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { Channel *c; int sock, r, success = 0, wildcard = 0, is_client; struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; const char *host, *addr; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; in_port_t *lport_p; host = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) ? - listen_addr : host_to_connect; + fwd->listen_host : fwd->connect_host; is_client = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER); if (host == NULL) { error("No forward host name."); return 0; } if (strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) { error("Forward host name too long."); return 0; } /* Determine the bind address, cf. channel_fwd_bind_addr() comment */ - addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(listen_addr, &wildcard, - is_client, gateway_ports); - debug3("channel_setup_fwd_listener: type %d wildcard %d addr %s", + addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(fwd->listen_host, &wildcard, + is_client, fwd_opts); + debug3("%s: type %d wildcard %d addr %s", __func__, type, wildcard, (addr == NULL) ? "NULL" : addr); /* * getaddrinfo returns a loopback address if the hostname is * set to NULL and hints.ai_flags is not AI_PASSIVE */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; hints.ai_flags = wildcard ? AI_PASSIVE : 0; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; - snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", listen_port); + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", fwd->listen_port); if ((r = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { if (addr == NULL) { /* This really shouldn't happen */ packet_disconnect("getaddrinfo: fatal error: %s", ssh_gai_strerror(r)); } else { - error("channel_setup_fwd_listener: " - "getaddrinfo(%.64s): %s", addr, + error("%s: getaddrinfo(%.64s): %s", __func__, addr, ssh_gai_strerror(r)); } return 0; } if (allocated_listen_port != NULL) *allocated_listen_port = 0; for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { switch (ai->ai_family) { case AF_INET: lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in *)ai->ai_addr)-> sin_port; break; case AF_INET6: lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)ai->ai_addr)-> sin6_port; break; default: continue; } /* * If allocating a port for -R forwards, then use the * same port for all address families. */ - if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && listen_port == 0 && + if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL && *allocated_listen_port > 0) *lport_p = htons(*allocated_listen_port); if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { - error("channel_setup_fwd_listener: getnameinfo failed"); + error("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__); continue; } /* Create a port to listen for the host. */ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock < 0) { /* this is no error since kernel may not support ipv6 */ verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } channel_set_reuseaddr(sock); if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) sock_set_v6only(sock); debug("Local forwarding listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport); /* Bind the socket to the address. */ if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { /* address can be in use ipv6 address is already bound */ if (!ai->ai_next) error("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno)); else verbose("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(sock); continue; } /* Start listening for connections on the socket. */ if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) { error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(sock); continue; } /* - * listen_port == 0 requests a dynamically allocated port - + * fwd->listen_port == 0 requests a dynamically allocated port - * record what we got. */ - if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && listen_port == 0 && + if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER && fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL && *allocated_listen_port == 0) { *allocated_listen_port = get_sock_port(sock, 1); debug("Allocated listen port %d", *allocated_listen_port); } /* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */ c = channel_new("port listener", type, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "port listener", 1); c->path = xstrdup(host); - c->host_port = port_to_connect; + c->host_port = fwd->connect_port; c->listening_addr = addr == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(addr); - if (listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL && + if (fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL && !(datafellows & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT)) c->listening_port = *allocated_listen_port; else - c->listening_port = listen_port; + c->listening_port = fwd->listen_port; success = 1; } if (success == 0) - error("channel_setup_fwd_listener: cannot listen to port: %d", - listen_port); + error("%s: cannot listen to port: %d", __func__, + fwd->listen_port); freeaddrinfo(aitop); return success; } -int -channel_cancel_rport_listener(const char *host, u_short port) +static int +channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(int type, struct Forward *fwd, + struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { + struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; + const char *path; + Channel *c; + int port, sock; + mode_t omask; + + switch (type) { + case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER: + if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) { + if (strlen(fwd->connect_path) > sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) { + error("Local connecting path too long: %s", + fwd->connect_path); + return 0; + } + path = fwd->connect_path; + port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; + } else { + if (fwd->connect_host == NULL) { + error("No forward host name."); + return 0; + } + if (strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) { + error("Forward host name too long."); + return 0; + } + path = fwd->connect_host; + port = fwd->connect_port; + } + break; + case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER: + path = fwd->listen_path; + port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; + break; + default: + error("%s: unexpected channel type %d", __func__, type); + return 0; + } + + if (fwd->listen_path == NULL) { + error("No forward path name."); + return 0; + } + if (strlen(fwd->listen_path) > sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) { + error("Local listening path too long: %s", fwd->listen_path); + return 0; + } + + debug3("%s: type %d path %s", __func__, type, fwd->listen_path); + + /* Start a Unix domain listener. */ + omask = umask(fwd_opts->streamlocal_bind_mask); + sock = unix_listener(fwd->listen_path, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, + fwd_opts->streamlocal_bind_unlink); + umask(omask); + if (sock < 0) + return 0; + + debug("Local forwarding listening on path %s.", fwd->listen_path); + + /* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */ + c = channel_new("unix listener", type, sock, sock, -1, + CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, + 0, "unix listener", 1); + c->path = xstrdup(path); + c->host_port = port; + c->listening_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; + c->listening_addr = xstrdup(fwd->listen_path); + return 1; +} + +static int +channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(const char *host, u_short port) +{ u_int i; int found = 0; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { Channel *c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) continue; if (strcmp(c->path, host) == 0 && c->listening_port == port) { debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i); channel_free(c); found = 1; } } return (found); } +static int +channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(const char *path) +{ + u_int i; + int found = 0; + + for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { + Channel *c = channels[i]; + if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER) + continue; + if (c->path == NULL) + continue; + if (strcmp(c->path, path) == 0) { + debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i); + channel_free(c); + found = 1; + } + } + + return (found); +} + int -channel_cancel_lport_listener(const char *lhost, u_short lport, - int cport, int gateway_ports) +channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct Forward *fwd) { + if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) + return channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(fwd->listen_path); + else + return channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port); +} + +static int +channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(const char *lhost, u_short lport, + int cport, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) +{ u_int i; int found = 0; - const char *addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(lhost, NULL, 1, gateway_ports); + const char *addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(lhost, NULL, 1, fwd_opts); for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { Channel *c = channels[i]; if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER) continue; if (c->listening_port != lport) continue; if (cport == CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC) { /* skip dynamic forwardings */ if (c->host_port == 0) continue; } else { if (c->host_port != cport) continue; } if ((c->listening_addr == NULL && addr != NULL) || (c->listening_addr != NULL && addr == NULL)) continue; if (addr == NULL || strcmp(c->listening_addr, addr) == 0) { debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i); channel_free(c); found = 1; } } return (found); } +static int +channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(const char *path) +{ + u_int i; + int found = 0; + + if (path == NULL) { + error("%s: no path specified.", __func__); + return 0; + } + + for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { + Channel *c = channels[i]; + if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER) + continue; + if (c->listening_addr == NULL) + continue; + if (strcmp(c->listening_addr, path) == 0) { + debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i); + channel_free(c); + found = 1; + } + } + + return (found); +} + +int +channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct Forward *fwd, int cport, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) +{ + if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) + return channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(fwd->listen_path); + else + return channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, cport, fwd_opts); +} + /* protocol local port fwd, used by ssh (and sshd in v1) */ int -channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(const char *listen_host, u_short listen_port, - const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int gateway_ports) +channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { - return channel_setup_fwd_listener(SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER, - listen_host, listen_port, NULL, host_to_connect, port_to_connect, - gateway_ports); + if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { + return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal( + SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts); + } else { + return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER, + fwd, NULL, fwd_opts); + } } /* protocol v2 remote port fwd, used by sshd */ int -channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(const char *listen_address, - u_short listen_port, int *allocated_listen_port, int gateway_ports) +channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct Forward *fwd, + int *allocated_listen_port, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { - return channel_setup_fwd_listener(SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER, - listen_address, listen_port, allocated_listen_port, - NULL, 0, gateway_ports); + if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { + return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal( + SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts); + } else { + return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip( + SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER, fwd, allocated_listen_port, + fwd_opts); + } } /* * Translate the requested rfwd listen host to something usable for * this server. */ static const char * channel_rfwd_bind_host(const char *listen_host) { if (listen_host == NULL) { if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR) return "127.0.0.1"; else return "localhost"; } else if (*listen_host == '\0' || strcmp(listen_host, "*") == 0) { if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR) return "0.0.0.0"; else return ""; } else return listen_host; } /* * Initiate forwarding of connections to port "port" on remote host through * the secure channel to host:port from local side. * Returns handle (index) for updating the dynamic listen port with * channel_update_permitted_opens(). */ int -channel_request_remote_forwarding(const char *listen_host, u_short listen_port, - const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect) +channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct Forward *fwd) { int type, success = 0, idx = -1; /* Send the forward request to the remote side. */ if (compat20) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); - packet_put_cstring("tcpip-forward"); - packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */ - packet_put_cstring(channel_rfwd_bind_host(listen_host)); - packet_put_int(listen_port); + if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { + packet_put_cstring("streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"); + packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */ + packet_put_cstring(fwd->listen_path); + } else { + packet_put_cstring("tcpip-forward"); + packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */ + packet_put_cstring(channel_rfwd_bind_host(fwd->listen_host)); + packet_put_int(fwd->listen_port); + } packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Assume that server accepts the request */ success = 1; - } else { + } else if (fwd->listen_path == NULL) { packet_start(SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST); - packet_put_int(listen_port); - packet_put_cstring(host_to_connect); - packet_put_int(port_to_connect); + packet_put_int(fwd->listen_port); + packet_put_cstring(fwd->connect_host); + packet_put_int(fwd->connect_port); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Wait for response from the remote side. */ type = packet_read(); switch (type) { case SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS: success = 1; break; case SSH_SMSG_FAILURE: break; default: /* Unknown packet */ packet_disconnect("Protocol error for port forward request:" "received packet type %d.", type); } + } else { + logit("Warning: Server does not support remote stream local forwarding."); } if (success) { /* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */ permitted_opens = xrealloc(permitted_opens, num_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_opens)); idx = num_permitted_opens++; - permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect = xstrdup(host_to_connect); - permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect = port_to_connect; - permitted_opens[idx].listen_port = listen_port; + if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) { + permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect = + xstrdup(fwd->connect_path); + permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect = + PORT_STREAMLOCAL; + } else { + permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect = + xstrdup(fwd->connect_host); + permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect = + fwd->connect_port; + } + if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { + permitted_opens[idx].listen_host = NULL; + permitted_opens[idx].listen_path = + xstrdup(fwd->listen_path); + permitted_opens[idx].listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; + } else { + permitted_opens[idx].listen_host = + fwd->listen_host ? xstrdup(fwd->listen_host) : NULL; + permitted_opens[idx].listen_path = NULL; + permitted_opens[idx].listen_port = fwd->listen_port; + } } return (idx); } +static int +open_match(ForwardPermission *allowed_open, const char *requestedhost, + int requestedport) +{ + if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL) + return 0; + if (allowed_open->port_to_connect != FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT && + allowed_open->port_to_connect != requestedport) + return 0; + if (strcmp(allowed_open->host_to_connect, requestedhost) != 0) + return 0; + return 1; +} + /* + * Note that in the listen host/port case + * we don't support FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT and + * need to translate between the configured-host (listen_host) + * and what we've sent to the remote server (channel_rfwd_bind_host) + */ +static int +open_listen_match_tcpip(ForwardPermission *allowed_open, + const char *requestedhost, u_short requestedport, int translate) +{ + const char *allowed_host; + + if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL) + return 0; + if (allowed_open->listen_port != requestedport) + return 0; + if (!translate && allowed_open->listen_host == NULL && + requestedhost == NULL) + return 1; + allowed_host = translate ? + channel_rfwd_bind_host(allowed_open->listen_host) : + allowed_open->listen_host; + if (allowed_host == NULL || + strcmp(allowed_host, requestedhost) != 0) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +static int +open_listen_match_streamlocal(ForwardPermission *allowed_open, + const char *requestedpath) +{ + if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL) + return 0; + if (allowed_open->listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL) + return 0; + if (allowed_open->listen_path == NULL || + strcmp(allowed_open->listen_path, requestedpath) != 0) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +/* * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of connection host:port from * local side. */ -int -channel_request_rforward_cancel(const char *host, u_short port) +static int +channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(const char *host, u_short port) { int i; if (!compat20) return -1; for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) { - if (permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL && - permitted_opens[i].listen_port == port) + if (open_listen_match_tcpip(&permitted_opens[i], host, port, 0)) break; } if (i >= num_permitted_opens) { debug("%s: requested forward not found", __func__); return -1; } packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring("cancel-tcpip-forward"); packet_put_char(0); packet_put_cstring(channel_rfwd_bind_host(host)); packet_put_int(port); packet_send(); permitted_opens[i].listen_port = 0; permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect = 0; free(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect); permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect = NULL; + free(permitted_opens[i].listen_host); + permitted_opens[i].listen_host = NULL; + permitted_opens[i].listen_path = NULL; return 0; } /* + * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of Unix domain socket + * path from local side. + */ +static int +channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(const char *path) +{ + int i; + + if (!compat20) + return -1; + + for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) { + if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(&permitted_opens[i], path)) + break; + } + if (i >= num_permitted_opens) { + debug("%s: requested forward not found", __func__); + return -1; + } + packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); + packet_put_cstring("cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"); + packet_put_char(0); + packet_put_cstring(path); + packet_send(); + + permitted_opens[i].listen_port = 0; + permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect = 0; + free(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect); + permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect = NULL; + permitted_opens[i].listen_host = NULL; + free(permitted_opens[i].listen_path); + permitted_opens[i].listen_path = NULL; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Request cancellation of remote forwarding of a connection from local side. + */ +int +channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct Forward *fwd) +{ + if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { + return (channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal( + fwd->listen_path)); + } else { + return (channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(fwd->listen_host, + fwd->listen_port ? fwd->listen_port : fwd->allocated_port)); + } +} + +/* * This is called after receiving CHANNEL_FORWARDING_REQUEST. This initates * listening for the port, and sends back a success reply (or disconnect * message if there was an error). */ int -channel_input_port_forward_request(int is_root, int gateway_ports) +channel_input_port_forward_request(int is_root, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts) { - u_short port, host_port; int success = 0; - char *hostname; + struct Forward fwd; /* Get arguments from the packet. */ - port = packet_get_int(); - hostname = packet_get_string(NULL); - host_port = packet_get_int(); + memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); + fwd.listen_port = packet_get_int(); + fwd.connect_host = packet_get_string(NULL); + fwd.connect_port = packet_get_int(); #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN /* * Check that an unprivileged user is not trying to forward a * privileged port. */ - if (port < IPPORT_RESERVED && !is_root) + if (fwd.listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED && !is_root) packet_disconnect( "Requested forwarding of port %d but user is not root.", - port); - if (host_port == 0) + fwd.listen_port); + if (fwd.connect_port == 0) packet_disconnect("Dynamic forwarding denied."); #endif /* Initiate forwarding */ - success = channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(NULL, port, hostname, - host_port, gateway_ports); + success = channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(&fwd, fwd_opts); /* Free the argument string. */ - free(hostname); + free(fwd.connect_host); return (success ? 0 : -1); } /* * Permits opening to any host/port if permitted_opens[] is empty. This is * usually called by the server, because the user could connect to any port * anyway, and the server has no way to know but to trust the client anyway. */ void channel_permit_all_opens(void) { if (num_permitted_opens == 0) all_opens_permitted = 1; } void channel_add_permitted_opens(char *host, int port) { debug("allow port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port); permitted_opens = xrealloc(permitted_opens, num_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_opens)); permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = xstrdup(host); permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port; + permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].listen_host = NULL; + permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].listen_path = NULL; + permitted_opens[num_permitted_opens].listen_port = 0; num_permitted_opens++; all_opens_permitted = 0; } /* * Update the listen port for a dynamic remote forward, after * the actual 'newport' has been allocated. If 'newport' < 0 is * passed then they entry will be invalidated. */ void channel_update_permitted_opens(int idx, int newport) { if (idx < 0 || idx >= num_permitted_opens) { debug("channel_update_permitted_opens: index out of range:" " %d num_permitted_opens %d", idx, num_permitted_opens); return; } debug("%s allowed port %d for forwarding to host %s port %d", newport > 0 ? "Updating" : "Removing", newport, permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect, permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect); if (newport >= 0) { permitted_opens[idx].listen_port = (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT) ? 0 : newport; } else { permitted_opens[idx].listen_port = 0; permitted_opens[idx].port_to_connect = 0; free(permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect); permitted_opens[idx].host_to_connect = NULL; + free(permitted_opens[idx].listen_host); + permitted_opens[idx].listen_host = NULL; + free(permitted_opens[idx].listen_path); + permitted_opens[idx].listen_path = NULL; } } int channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(char *host, int port) { debug("config allows port forwarding to host %s port %d", host, port); permitted_adm_opens = xrealloc(permitted_adm_opens, num_adm_permitted_opens + 1, sizeof(*permitted_adm_opens)); permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = xstrdup(host); permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].port_to_connect = port; + permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].listen_host = NULL; + permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].listen_path = NULL; + permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].listen_port = 0; return ++num_adm_permitted_opens; } void channel_disable_adm_local_opens(void) { channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(); permitted_adm_opens = xmalloc(sizeof(*permitted_adm_opens)); permitted_adm_opens[num_adm_permitted_opens].host_to_connect = NULL; num_adm_permitted_opens = 1; } void channel_clear_permitted_opens(void) { int i; - for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) + for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) { free(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect); + free(permitted_opens[i].listen_host); + free(permitted_opens[i].listen_path); + } free(permitted_opens); permitted_opens = NULL; num_permitted_opens = 0; } void channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(void) { int i; - for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++) + for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++) { free(permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect); + free(permitted_adm_opens[i].listen_host); + free(permitted_adm_opens[i].listen_path); + } free(permitted_adm_opens); permitted_adm_opens = NULL; num_adm_permitted_opens = 0; } void channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(void) { int i; printf("permitopen"); if (num_adm_permitted_opens == 0) { printf(" any\n"); return; } for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++) if (permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect == NULL) printf(" none"); else printf(" %s:%d", permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect, permitted_adm_opens[i].port_to_connect); printf("\n"); } /* returns port number, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT or -1 on error */ int permitopen_port(const char *p) { int port; if (strcmp(p, "*") == 0) return FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT; if ((port = a2port(p)) > 0) return port; return -1; } -static int -port_match(u_short allowedport, u_short requestedport) -{ - if (allowedport == FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT || - allowedport == requestedport) - return 1; - return 0; -} - /* Try to start non-blocking connect to next host in cctx list */ static int connect_next(struct channel_connect *cctx) { int sock, saved_errno; - char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; + struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr; + char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[MAX(NI_MAXSERV,sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path))]; for (; cctx->ai; cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next) { - if (cctx->ai->ai_family != AF_INET && - cctx->ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) + switch (cctx->ai->ai_family) { + case AF_UNIX: + /* unix:pathname instead of host:port */ + sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)cctx->ai->ai_addr; + strlcpy(ntop, "unix", sizeof(ntop)); + strlcpy(strport, sunaddr->sun_path, sizeof(strport)); + break; + case AF_INET: + case AF_INET6: + if (getnameinfo(cctx->ai->ai_addr, cctx->ai->ai_addrlen, + ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), + NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { + error("connect_next: getnameinfo failed"); + continue; + } + break; + default: continue; - if (getnameinfo(cctx->ai->ai_addr, cctx->ai->ai_addrlen, - ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), - NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { - error("connect_next: getnameinfo failed"); - continue; } if ((sock = socket(cctx->ai->ai_family, cctx->ai->ai_socktype, cctx->ai->ai_protocol)) == -1) { if (cctx->ai->ai_next == NULL) error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); else verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } if (set_nonblock(sock) == -1) fatal("%s: set_nonblock(%d)", __func__, sock); if (connect(sock, cctx->ai->ai_addr, cctx->ai->ai_addrlen) == -1 && errno != EINPROGRESS) { debug("connect_next: host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s): " "%.100s", cctx->host, ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); saved_errno = errno; close(sock); errno = saved_errno; continue; /* fail -- try next */ } + if (cctx->ai->ai_family != AF_UNIX) + set_nodelay(sock); debug("connect_next: host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s) " "in progress, fd=%d", cctx->host, ntop, strport, sock); cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next; - set_nodelay(sock); return sock; } return -1; } static void channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *cctx) { free(cctx->host); - if (cctx->aitop) - freeaddrinfo(cctx->aitop); + if (cctx->aitop) { + if (cctx->aitop->ai_family == AF_UNIX) + free(cctx->aitop); + else + freeaddrinfo(cctx->aitop); + } memset(cctx, 0, sizeof(*cctx)); } -/* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host, port */ +/* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path */ static Channel * -connect_to(const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype, char *rname) +connect_to(const char *name, int port, char *ctype, char *rname) { struct addrinfo hints; int gaierr; int sock = -1; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; struct channel_connect cctx; Channel *c; memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx)); - memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); - hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; - hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; - snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); - if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &cctx.aitop)) != 0) { - error("connect_to %.100s: unknown host (%s)", host, - ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); - return NULL; + + if (port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) { + struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr; + struct addrinfo *ai; + + if (strlen(name) > sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)) { + error("%.100s: %.100s", name, strerror(ENAMETOOLONG)); + return (NULL); + } + + /* + * Fake up a struct addrinfo for AF_UNIX connections. + * channel_connect_ctx_free() must check ai_family + * and use free() not freeaddirinfo() for AF_UNIX. + */ + ai = xmalloc(sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(*sunaddr)); + memset(ai, 0, sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(*sunaddr)); + ai->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)(ai + 1); + ai->ai_addrlen = sizeof(*sunaddr); + ai->ai_family = AF_UNIX; + ai->ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + ai->ai_protocol = PF_UNSPEC; + sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)ai->ai_addr; + sunaddr->sun_family = AF_UNIX; + strlcpy(sunaddr->sun_path, name, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)); + cctx.aitop = ai; + } else { + memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); + hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; + hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; + snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); + if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &cctx.aitop)) != 0) { + error("connect_to %.100s: unknown host (%s)", name, + ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); + return NULL; + } } - cctx.host = xstrdup(host); + cctx.host = xstrdup(name); cctx.port = port; cctx.ai = cctx.aitop; if ((sock = connect_next(&cctx)) == -1) { error("connect to %.100s port %d failed: %s", - host, port, strerror(errno)); + name, port, strerror(errno)); channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx); return NULL; } c = channel_new(ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1); c->connect_ctx = cctx; return c; } Channel * -channel_connect_by_listen_address(u_short listen_port, char *ctype, char *rname) +channel_connect_by_listen_address(const char *listen_host, + u_short listen_port, char *ctype, char *rname) { int i; for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) { - if (permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL && - port_match(permitted_opens[i].listen_port, listen_port)) { + if (open_listen_match_tcpip(&permitted_opens[i], listen_host, + listen_port, 1)) { return connect_to( permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect, permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect, ctype, rname); } } error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown listen_port %d", listen_port); return NULL; } +Channel * +channel_connect_by_listen_path(const char *path, char *ctype, char *rname) +{ + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) { + if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(&permitted_opens[i], path)) { + return connect_to( + permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect, + permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect, ctype, rname); + } + } + error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown path %.100s", + path); + return NULL; +} + /* Check if connecting to that port is permitted and connect. */ Channel * -channel_connect_to(const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype, char *rname) +channel_connect_to_port(const char *host, u_short port, char *ctype, char *rname) { int i, permit, permit_adm = 1; permit = all_opens_permitted; if (!permit) { for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) - if (permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL && - port_match(permitted_opens[i].port_to_connect, port) && - strcmp(permitted_opens[i].host_to_connect, host) == 0) + if (open_match(&permitted_opens[i], host, port)) { permit = 1; + break; + } } if (num_adm_permitted_opens > 0) { permit_adm = 0; for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++) - if (permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect != NULL && - port_match(permitted_adm_opens[i].port_to_connect, port) && - strcmp(permitted_adm_opens[i].host_to_connect, host) - == 0) + if (open_match(&permitted_adm_opens[i], host, port)) { permit_adm = 1; + break; + } } if (!permit || !permit_adm) { logit("Received request to connect to host %.100s port %d, " "but the request was denied.", host, port); return NULL; } return connect_to(host, port, ctype, rname); +} + +/* Check if connecting to that path is permitted and connect. */ +Channel * +channel_connect_to_path(const char *path, char *ctype, char *rname) +{ + int i, permit, permit_adm = 1; + + permit = all_opens_permitted; + if (!permit) { + for (i = 0; i < num_permitted_opens; i++) + if (open_match(&permitted_opens[i], path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) { + permit = 1; + break; + } + } + + if (num_adm_permitted_opens > 0) { + permit_adm = 0; + for (i = 0; i < num_adm_permitted_opens; i++) + if (open_match(&permitted_adm_opens[i], path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) { + permit_adm = 1; + break; + } + } + + if (!permit || !permit_adm) { + logit("Received request to connect to path %.100s, " + "but the request was denied.", path); + return NULL; + } + return connect_to(path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL, ctype, rname); } void channel_send_window_changes(void) { u_int i; struct winsize ws; for (i = 0; i < channels_alloc; i++) { if (channels[i] == NULL || !channels[i]->client_tty || channels[i]->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) continue; if (ioctl(channels[i]->rfd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0) continue; channel_request_start(i, "window-change", 0); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel); packet_send(); } } /* -- X11 forwarding */ /* * Creates an internet domain socket for listening for X11 connections. * Returns 0 and a suitable display number for the DISPLAY variable * stored in display_numberp , or -1 if an error occurs. */ int x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_offset, int x11_use_localhost, int single_connection, u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids) { Channel *nc = NULL; int display_number, sock; u_short port; struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int gaierr, n, num_socks = 0, socks[NUM_SOCKS]; if (chanids == NULL) return -1; for (display_number = x11_display_offset; display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS; display_number++) { port = 6000 + display_number; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { error("getaddrinfo: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return -1; } for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock < 0) { if ((errno != EINVAL) && (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT) #ifdef EPFNOSUPPORT && (errno != EPFNOSUPPORT) #endif ) { error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); freeaddrinfo(aitop); return -1; } else { debug("x11_create_display_inet: Socket family %d not supported", ai->ai_family); continue; } } if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) sock_set_v6only(sock); if (x11_use_localhost) channel_set_reuseaddr(sock); if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { debug2("bind port %d: %.100s", port, strerror(errno)); close(sock); for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) { close(socks[n]); } num_socks = 0; break; } socks[num_socks++] = sock; if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS) break; } freeaddrinfo(aitop); if (num_socks > 0) break; } if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) { error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket."); return -1; } /* Start listening for connections on the socket. */ for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) { sock = socks[n]; if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) { error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(sock); return -1; } } /* Allocate a channel for each socket. */ *chanids = xcalloc(num_socks + 1, sizeof(**chanids)); for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) { sock = socks[n]; nc = channel_new("x11 listener", SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "X11 inet listener", 1); nc->single_connection = single_connection; (*chanids)[n] = nc->self; } (*chanids)[n] = -1; /* Return the display number for the DISPLAY environment variable. */ *display_numberp = display_number; return (0); } static int connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname) { int sock; struct sockaddr_un addr; sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (sock < 0) error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path); if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0) return sock; close(sock); error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno)); return -1; } static int connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr) { char buf[1024]; snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr); return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf); } int x11_connect_display(void) { u_int display_number; const char *display; char buf[1024], *cp; struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int gaierr, sock = 0; /* Try to open a socket for the local X server. */ display = getenv("DISPLAY"); if (!display) { error("DISPLAY not set."); return -1; } /* * Now we decode the value of the DISPLAY variable and make a * connection to the real X server. */ /* Check if the display is from launchd. */ #ifdef __APPLE__ if (strncmp(display, "/tmp/launch", 11) == 0) { sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(display); if (sock < 0) return -1; /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */ return sock; } #endif /* * Check if it is a unix domain socket. Unix domain displays are in * one of the following formats: unix:d[.s], :d[.s], ::d[.s] */ if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0 || display[0] == ':') { /* Connect to the unix domain socket. */ if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) { error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s", display); return -1; } /* Create a socket. */ sock = connect_local_xsocket(display_number); if (sock < 0) return -1; /* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */ return sock; } /* * Connect to an inet socket. The DISPLAY value is supposedly * hostname:d[.s], where hostname may also be numeric IP address. */ strlcpy(buf, display, sizeof(buf)); cp = strchr(buf, ':'); if (!cp) { error("Could not find ':' in DISPLAY: %.100s", display); return -1; } *cp = 0; /* buf now contains the host name. But first we parse the display number. */ if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) { error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s", display); return -1; } /* Look up the host address */ memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) { error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return -1; } for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { /* Create a socket. */ sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock < 0) { debug2("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } /* Connect it to the display. */ if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno)); close(sock); continue; } /* Success */ break; } freeaddrinfo(aitop); if (!ai) { error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf, 6000 + display_number, strerror(errno)); return -1; } set_nodelay(sock); return sock; } /* * This is called when SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN is received. The packet contains * the remote channel number. We should do whatever we want, and respond * with either SSH_MSG_OPEN_CONFIRMATION or SSH_MSG_OPEN_FAILURE. */ /* ARGSUSED */ void x11_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c = NULL; int remote_id, sock = 0; char *remote_host; debug("Received X11 open request."); remote_id = packet_get_int(); if (packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN) { remote_host = packet_get_string(NULL); } else { remote_host = xstrdup("unknown (remote did not supply name)"); } packet_check_eom(); /* Obtain a connection to the real X display. */ sock = x11_connect_display(); if (sock != -1) { /* Allocate a channel for this connection. */ c = channel_new("connected x11 socket", SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, 0, 0, 0, remote_host, 1); c->remote_id = remote_id; c->force_drain = 1; } free(remote_host); if (c == NULL) { /* Send refusal to the remote host. */ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); packet_put_int(remote_id); } else { /* Send a confirmation to the remote host. */ packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); packet_put_int(remote_id); packet_put_int(c->self); } packet_send(); } /* dummy protocol handler that denies SSH-1 requests (agent/x11) */ /* ARGSUSED */ void deny_input_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { int rchan = packet_get_int(); switch (type) { case SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN: error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding."); break; case SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN: error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding."); break; default: error("deny_input_open: type %d", type); break; } error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a malicious server."); packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); packet_put_int(rchan); packet_send(); } /* * Requests forwarding of X11 connections, generates fake authentication * data, and enables authentication spoofing. * This should be called in the client only. */ void x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int client_session_id, const char *disp, const char *proto, const char *data, int want_reply) { u_int data_len = (u_int) strlen(data) / 2; u_int i, value; char *new_data; int screen_number; const char *cp; u_int32_t rnd = 0; if (x11_saved_display == NULL) x11_saved_display = xstrdup(disp); else if (strcmp(disp, x11_saved_display) != 0) { error("x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing: different " "$DISPLAY already forwarded"); return; } cp = strchr(disp, ':'); if (cp) cp = strchr(cp, '.'); if (cp) screen_number = (u_int)strtonum(cp + 1, 0, 400, NULL); else screen_number = 0; if (x11_saved_proto == NULL) { /* Save protocol name. */ x11_saved_proto = xstrdup(proto); /* * Extract real authentication data and generate fake data * of the same length. */ x11_saved_data = xmalloc(data_len); x11_fake_data = xmalloc(data_len); for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) { if (sscanf(data + 2 * i, "%2x", &value) != 1) fatal("x11_request_forwarding: bad " "authentication data: %.100s", data); if (i % 4 == 0) rnd = arc4random(); x11_saved_data[i] = value; x11_fake_data[i] = rnd & 0xff; rnd >>= 8; } x11_saved_data_len = data_len; x11_fake_data_len = data_len; } /* Convert the fake data into hex. */ new_data = tohex(x11_fake_data, data_len); /* Send the request packet. */ if (compat20) { channel_request_start(client_session_id, "x11-req", want_reply); packet_put_char(0); /* XXX bool single connection */ } else { packet_start(SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING); } packet_put_cstring(proto); packet_put_cstring(new_data); packet_put_int(screen_number); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); free(new_data); } /* -- agent forwarding */ /* Sends a message to the server to request authentication fd forwarding. */ void auth_request_forwarding(void) { packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/channels.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/channels.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/channels.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,309 +1,314 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.113 2013/06/07 15:37:52 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.115 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef CHANNEL_H #define CHANNEL_H /* Definitions for channel types. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER 1 /* Listening for inet X11 conn. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER 2 /* Listening on a port. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING 3 /* waiting for confirmation */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN 4 /* normal open two-way channel */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED 5 /* waiting for close confirmation */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET 6 /* authentication socket */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN 7 /* reading first X11 packet */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_INPUT_DRAINING 8 /* sending remaining data to conn */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_OUTPUT_DRAINING 9 /* sending remaining data to app */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL 10 /* larval session */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER 11 /* Listening to a R-style port */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING 12 #define SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC 13 #define SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE 14 /* Almost dead. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER 15 /* Listener for mux conn. */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT 16 /* Conn. to mux slave */ #define SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED 17 /* Abandoned session, eg mux */ -#define SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE 18 +#define SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER 18 /* Listening on a domain socket. */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER 19 /* Listening to a R-style domain socket. */ +#define SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE 20 #define CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC -1 struct Channel; typedef struct Channel Channel; typedef void channel_open_fn(int, int, void *); typedef void channel_callback_fn(int, void *); typedef int channel_infilter_fn(struct Channel *, char *, int); typedef void channel_filter_cleanup_fn(int, void *); typedef u_char *channel_outfilter_fn(struct Channel *, u_char **, u_int *); /* Channel success/failure callbacks */ typedef void channel_confirm_cb(int, struct Channel *, void *); typedef void channel_confirm_abandon_cb(struct Channel *, void *); struct channel_confirm { TAILQ_ENTRY(channel_confirm) entry; channel_confirm_cb *cb; channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb; void *ctx; }; TAILQ_HEAD(channel_confirms, channel_confirm); /* Context for non-blocking connects */ struct channel_connect { char *host; int port; struct addrinfo *ai, *aitop; }; /* Callbacks for mux channels back into client-specific code */ typedef int mux_callback_fn(struct Channel *); struct Channel { int type; /* channel type/state */ int self; /* my own channel identifier */ int remote_id; /* channel identifier for remote peer */ u_int istate; /* input from channel (state of receive half) */ u_int ostate; /* output to channel (state of transmit half) */ int flags; /* close sent/rcvd */ int rfd; /* read fd */ int wfd; /* write fd */ int efd; /* extended fd */ int sock; /* sock fd */ int ctl_chan; /* control channel (multiplexed connections) */ int isatty; /* rfd is a tty */ #ifdef _AIX int wfd_isatty; /* wfd is a tty */ #endif int client_tty; /* (client) TTY has been requested */ int force_drain; /* force close on iEOF */ time_t notbefore; /* Pause IO until deadline (time_t) */ int delayed; /* post-select handlers for newly created * channels are delayed until the first call * to a matching pre-select handler. * this way post-select handlers are not * accidentally called if a FD gets reused */ Buffer input; /* data read from socket, to be sent over * encrypted connection */ Buffer output; /* data received over encrypted connection for * send on socket */ Buffer extended; char *path; /* path for unix domain sockets, or host name for forwards */ int listening_port; /* port being listened for forwards */ char *listening_addr; /* addr being listened for forwards */ int host_port; /* remote port to connect for forwards */ char *remote_name; /* remote hostname */ u_int remote_window; u_int remote_maxpacket; u_int local_window; u_int local_window_max; u_int local_consumed; u_int local_maxpacket; int extended_usage; int single_connection; char *ctype; /* type */ /* callback */ channel_open_fn *open_confirm; void *open_confirm_ctx; channel_callback_fn *detach_user; int detach_close; struct channel_confirms status_confirms; /* filter */ channel_infilter_fn *input_filter; channel_outfilter_fn *output_filter; void *filter_ctx; channel_filter_cleanup_fn *filter_cleanup; /* keep boundaries */ int datagram; /* non-blocking connect */ struct channel_connect connect_ctx; /* multiplexing protocol hook, called for each packet received */ mux_callback_fn *mux_rcb; void *mux_ctx; int mux_pause; }; #define CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE 0 #define CHAN_EXTENDED_READ 1 #define CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE 2 /* default window/packet sizes for tcp/x11-fwd-channel */ #define CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT (32*1024) #define CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT (64*CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT) #define CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT (32*1024) #define CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT (64*CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT) #define CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT (16*1024) #define CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT (4*CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT) /* possible input states */ #define CHAN_INPUT_OPEN 0 #define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN 1 #define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_OCLOSE 2 #define CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED 3 /* possible output states */ #define CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN 0 #define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN 1 #define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_IEOF 2 #define CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED 3 #define CHAN_CLOSE_SENT 0x01 #define CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD 0x02 #define CHAN_EOF_SENT 0x04 #define CHAN_EOF_RCVD 0x08 #define CHAN_LOCAL 0x10 #define CHAN_RBUF 16*1024 /* check whether 'efd' is still in use */ #define CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c) \ (compat20 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ && \ (c->efd != -1 || \ buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0)) #define CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c) \ (compat20 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && \ c->efd != -1 && (!(c->flags & (CHAN_EOF_RCVD|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) || \ buffer_len(&c->extended) > 0)) /* channel management */ Channel *channel_by_id(int); Channel *channel_lookup(int); Channel *channel_new(char *, int, int, int, int, u_int, u_int, int, char *, int); void channel_set_fds(int, int, int, int, int, int, int, u_int); void channel_free(Channel *); void channel_free_all(void); void channel_stop_listening(void); void channel_send_open(int); void channel_request_start(int, char *, int); void channel_register_cleanup(int, channel_callback_fn *, int); void channel_register_open_confirm(int, channel_open_fn *, void *); void channel_register_filter(int, channel_infilter_fn *, channel_outfilter_fn *, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *, void *); void channel_register_status_confirm(int, channel_confirm_cb *, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *, void *); void channel_cancel_cleanup(int); int channel_close_fd(int *); void channel_send_window_changes(void); /* protocol handler */ void channel_input_close(int, u_int32_t, void *); void channel_input_close_confirmation(int, u_int32_t, void *); void channel_input_data(int, u_int32_t, void *); void channel_input_extended_data(int, u_int32_t, void *); void channel_input_ieof(int, u_int32_t, void *); void channel_input_oclose(int, u_int32_t, void *); void channel_input_open_confirmation(int, u_int32_t, void *); void channel_input_open_failure(int, u_int32_t, void *); void channel_input_port_open(int, u_int32_t, void *); void channel_input_window_adjust(int, u_int32_t, void *); void channel_input_status_confirm(int, u_int32_t, void *); /* file descriptor handling (read/write) */ void channel_prepare_select(fd_set **, fd_set **, int *, u_int*, time_t*, int); void channel_after_select(fd_set *, fd_set *); void channel_output_poll(void); int channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(void); void channel_close_all(void); int channel_still_open(void); char *channel_open_message(void); int channel_find_open(void); /* tcp forwarding */ +struct Forward; +struct ForwardOptions; void channel_set_af(int af); void channel_permit_all_opens(void); void channel_add_permitted_opens(char *, int); int channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(char *, int); void channel_disable_adm_local_opens(void); void channel_update_permitted_opens(int, int); void channel_clear_permitted_opens(void); void channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(void); void channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(void); -int channel_input_port_forward_request(int, int); -Channel *channel_connect_to(const char *, u_short, char *, char *); +int channel_input_port_forward_request(int, struct ForwardOptions *); +Channel *channel_connect_to_port(const char *, u_short, char *, char *); +Channel *channel_connect_to_path(const char *, char *, char *); Channel *channel_connect_stdio_fwd(const char*, u_short, int, int); -Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_address(u_short, char *, char *); -int channel_request_remote_forwarding(const char *, u_short, - const char *, u_short); -int channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(const char *, u_short, - const char *, u_short, int); -int channel_request_rforward_cancel(const char *host, u_short port); -int channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(const char *, u_short, int *, int); -int channel_cancel_rport_listener(const char *, u_short); -int channel_cancel_lport_listener(const char *, u_short, int, int); +Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_address(const char *, u_short, + char *, char *); +Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_path(const char *, char *, char *); +int channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct Forward *); +int channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct Forward *, struct ForwardOptions *); +int channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct Forward *); +int channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct Forward *, int *, struct ForwardOptions *); +int channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct Forward *); +int channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct Forward *, int, struct ForwardOptions *); int permitopen_port(const char *); /* x11 forwarding */ int x11_connect_display(void); int x11_create_display_inet(int, int, int, u_int *, int **); void x11_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *); void x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(int, const char *, const char *, const char *, int); void deny_input_open(int, u_int32_t, void *); /* agent forwarding */ void auth_request_forwarding(void); /* channel close */ int chan_is_dead(Channel *, int); void chan_mark_dead(Channel *); /* channel events */ void chan_rcvd_oclose(Channel *); void chan_rcvd_eow(Channel *); /* SSH2-only */ void chan_read_failed(Channel *); void chan_ibuf_empty(Channel *); void chan_rcvd_ieof(Channel *); void chan_write_failed(Channel *); void chan_obuf_empty(Channel *); #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-3des1.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-3des1.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-3des1.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,183 +1,164 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: cipher-3des1.c,v 1.10 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: cipher-3des1.c,v 1.11 2014/07/02 04:59:06 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include -#include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" +#include "ssherr.h" -#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" - /* * This is used by SSH1: * * What kind of triple DES are these 2 routines? * * Why is there a redundant initialization vector? * * If only iv3 was used, then, this would till effect have been * outer-cbc. However, there is also a private iv1 == iv2 which * perhaps makes differential analysis easier. On the other hand, the * private iv1 probably makes the CRC-32 attack ineffective. This is a * result of that there is no longer any known iv1 to use when * choosing the X block. */ struct ssh1_3des_ctx { EVP_CIPHER_CTX k1, k2, k3; }; const EVP_CIPHER * evp_ssh1_3des(void); -void ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int); +int ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int); static int ssh1_3des_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const u_char *key, const u_char *iv, int enc) { struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c; u_char *k1, *k2, *k3; if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) { - c = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*c)); + if ((c = calloc(1, sizeof(*c))) == NULL) + return 0; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c); } if (key == NULL) - return (1); + return 1; if (enc == -1) enc = ctx->encrypt; k1 = k2 = k3 = (u_char *) key; k2 += 8; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) >= 16+8) { if (enc) k3 += 16; else k1 += 16; } EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k1); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k2); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->k3); -#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP - EVP_CipherInit(&c->k1, EVP_des_cbc(), k1, NULL, enc); - EVP_CipherInit(&c->k2, EVP_des_cbc(), k2, NULL, !enc); - EVP_CipherInit(&c->k3, EVP_des_cbc(), k3, NULL, enc); -#else if (EVP_CipherInit(&c->k1, EVP_des_cbc(), k1, NULL, enc) == 0 || EVP_CipherInit(&c->k2, EVP_des_cbc(), k2, NULL, !enc) == 0 || EVP_CipherInit(&c->k3, EVP_des_cbc(), k3, NULL, enc) == 0) { explicit_bzero(c, sizeof(*c)); free(c); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL); - return (0); + return 0; } -#endif - return (1); + return 1; } static int -ssh1_3des_cbc(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, - LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE len) +ssh1_3des_cbc(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, size_t len) { struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c; - if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) { - error("ssh1_3des_cbc: no context"); - return (0); - } -#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP - EVP_Cipher(&c->k1, dest, (u_char *)src, len); - EVP_Cipher(&c->k2, dest, dest, len); - EVP_Cipher(&c->k3, dest, dest, len); -#else + if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL) + return 0; if (EVP_Cipher(&c->k1, dest, (u_char *)src, len) == 0 || EVP_Cipher(&c->k2, dest, dest, len) == 0 || EVP_Cipher(&c->k3, dest, dest, len) == 0) - return (0); -#endif - return (1); + return 0; + return 1; } static int ssh1_3des_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c; if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k1); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k2); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->k3); explicit_bzero(c, sizeof(*c)); free(c); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL); } - return (1); + return 1; } -void +int ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, int doset, u_char *iv, int len) { struct ssh1_3des_ctx *c; if (len != 24) - fatal("%s: bad 3des iv length: %d", __func__, len); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(evp)) == NULL) - fatal("%s: no 3des context", __func__); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (doset) { - debug3("%s: Installed 3DES IV", __func__); memcpy(c->k1.iv, iv, 8); memcpy(c->k2.iv, iv + 8, 8); memcpy(c->k3.iv, iv + 16, 8); } else { - debug3("%s: Copying 3DES IV", __func__); memcpy(iv, c->k1.iv, 8); memcpy(iv + 8, c->k2.iv, 8); memcpy(iv + 16, c->k3.iv, 8); } + return 0; } const EVP_CIPHER * evp_ssh1_3des(void) { static EVP_CIPHER ssh1_3des; memset(&ssh1_3des, 0, sizeof(EVP_CIPHER)); ssh1_3des.nid = NID_undef; ssh1_3des.block_size = 8; ssh1_3des.iv_len = 0; ssh1_3des.key_len = 16; ssh1_3des.init = ssh1_3des_init; ssh1_3des.cleanup = ssh1_3des_cleanup; ssh1_3des.do_cipher = ssh1_3des_cbc; -#ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP ssh1_3des.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH; -#endif - return (&ssh1_3des); + return &ssh1_3des; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-aesctr.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-aesctr.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-aesctr.c (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: cipher-aesctr.c,v 1.1 2014/04/29 15:39:33 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2003 Markus Friedl + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include +#include + +#include "cipher-aesctr.h" + +/* + * increment counter 'ctr', + * the counter is of size 'len' bytes and stored in network-byte-order. + * (LSB at ctr[len-1], MSB at ctr[0]) + */ +static __inline__ void +aesctr_inc(u8 *ctr, u32 len) +{ + ssize_t i; + +#ifndef CONSTANT_TIME_INCREMENT + for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) + if (++ctr[i]) /* continue on overflow */ + return; +#else + u8 x, add = 1; + + for (i = len - 1; i >= 0; i--) { + ctr[i] += add; + /* constant time for: x = ctr[i] ? 1 : 0 */ + x = ctr[i]; + x = (x | (x >> 4)) & 0xf; + x = (x | (x >> 2)) & 0x3; + x = (x | (x >> 1)) & 0x1; + add *= (x^1); + } +#endif +} + +void +aesctr_keysetup(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *k,u32 kbits,u32 ivbits) +{ + x->rounds = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(x->ek, k, kbits); +} + +void +aesctr_ivsetup(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *iv) +{ + memcpy(x->ctr, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); +} + +void +aesctr_encrypt_bytes(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *m,u8 *c,u32 bytes) +{ + u32 n = 0; + u8 buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; + + while ((bytes--) > 0) { + if (n == 0) { + rijndaelEncrypt(x->ek, x->rounds, x->ctr, buf); + aesctr_inc(x->ctr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); + } + *(c++) = *(m++) ^ buf[n]; + n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; + } +} Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-aesctr.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-aesctr.h (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-aesctr.h (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: cipher-aesctr.h,v 1.1 2014/04/29 15:39:33 markus Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#ifndef OPENSSH_AESCTR_H +#define OPENSSH_AESCTR_H + +#include "rijndael.h" + +#define AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16 + +typedef struct aesctr_ctx { + int rounds; /* keylen-dependent #rounds */ + u32 ek[4*(AES_MAXROUNDS + 1)]; /* encrypt key schedule */ + u8 ctr[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* counter */ +} aesctr_ctx; + +void aesctr_keysetup(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *k,u32 kbits,u32 ivbits); +void aesctr_ivsetup(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *iv); +void aesctr_encrypt_bytes(aesctr_ctx *x,const u8 *m,u8 *c,u32 bytes); + +#endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-chachapoly.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-chachapoly.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-chachapoly.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,114 +1,119 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ -/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.c,v 1.4 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.c,v 1.6 2014/07/03 12:42:16 jsing Exp $ */ #include "includes.h" #include #include /* needed for log.h */ #include #include /* needed for misc.h */ #include "log.h" -#include "misc.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" #include "cipher-chachapoly.h" -void chachapoly_init(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx, +int chachapoly_init(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx, const u_char *key, u_int keylen) { if (keylen != (32 + 32)) /* 2 x 256 bit keys */ - fatal("%s: invalid keylen %u", __func__, keylen); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; chacha_keysetup(&ctx->main_ctx, key, 256); chacha_keysetup(&ctx->header_ctx, key + 32, 256); + return 0; } /* * chachapoly_crypt() operates as following: * En/decrypt with header key 'aadlen' bytes from 'src', storing result * to 'dest'. The ciphertext here is treated as additional authenticated * data for MAC calculation. * En/decrypt 'len' bytes at offset 'aadlen' from 'src' to 'dest'. Use * POLY1305_TAGLEN bytes at offset 'len'+'aadlen' as the authentication * tag. This tag is written on encryption and verified on decryption. */ int chachapoly_crypt(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen, int do_encrypt) { u_char seqbuf[8]; const u_char one[8] = { 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }; /* NB little-endian */ u_char expected_tag[POLY1305_TAGLEN], poly_key[POLY1305_KEYLEN]; - int r = -1; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* * Run ChaCha20 once to generate the Poly1305 key. The IV is the * packet sequence number. */ memset(poly_key, 0, sizeof(poly_key)); - put_u64(seqbuf, seqnr); + POKE_U64(seqbuf, seqnr); chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->main_ctx, seqbuf, NULL); chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->main_ctx, poly_key, poly_key, sizeof(poly_key)); - /* Set Chacha's block counter to 1 */ - chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->main_ctx, seqbuf, one); /* If decrypting, check tag before anything else */ if (!do_encrypt) { const u_char *tag = src + aadlen + len; poly1305_auth(expected_tag, src, aadlen + len, poly_key); - if (timingsafe_bcmp(expected_tag, tag, POLY1305_TAGLEN) != 0) + if (timingsafe_bcmp(expected_tag, tag, POLY1305_TAGLEN) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID; goto out; + } } + /* Crypt additional data */ if (aadlen) { chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->header_ctx, seqbuf, NULL); chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->header_ctx, src, dest, aadlen); } + + /* Set Chacha's block counter to 1 */ + chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->main_ctx, seqbuf, one); chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->main_ctx, src + aadlen, dest + aadlen, len); /* If encrypting, calculate and append tag */ if (do_encrypt) { poly1305_auth(dest + aadlen + len, dest, aadlen + len, poly_key); } r = 0; - out: explicit_bzero(expected_tag, sizeof(expected_tag)); explicit_bzero(seqbuf, sizeof(seqbuf)); explicit_bzero(poly_key, sizeof(poly_key)); return r; } /* Decrypt and extract the encrypted packet length */ int chachapoly_get_length(struct chachapoly_ctx *ctx, u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, const u_char *cp, u_int len) { u_char buf[4], seqbuf[8]; if (len < 4) - return -1; /* Insufficient length */ - put_u64(seqbuf, seqnr); + return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + POKE_U64(seqbuf, seqnr); chacha_ivsetup(&ctx->header_ctx, seqbuf, NULL); chacha_encrypt_bytes(&ctx->header_ctx, cp, buf, 4); - *plenp = get_u32(buf); + *plenp = PEEK_U32(buf); return 0; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-chachapoly.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-chachapoly.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher-chachapoly.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,41 +1,41 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.h,v 1.1 2013/11/21 00:45:44 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: cipher-chachapoly.h,v 1.4 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) Damien Miller 2013 * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef CHACHA_POLY_AEAD_H #define CHACHA_POLY_AEAD_H #include #include "chacha.h" #include "poly1305.h" #define CHACHA_KEYLEN 32 /* Only 256 bit keys used here */ struct chachapoly_ctx { struct chacha_ctx main_ctx, header_ctx; }; -void chachapoly_init(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx, +int chachapoly_init(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx, const u_char *key, u_int keylen) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))); int chachapoly_crypt(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen, int do_encrypt); int chachapoly_get_length(struct chachapoly_ctx *cpctx, u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, const u_char *cp, u_int len) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 4, 5))); #endif /* CHACHA_POLY_AEAD_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,572 +1,649 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.97 2014/02/07 06:55:54 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.99 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include -#include "xmalloc.h" -#include "log.h" -#include "misc.h" #include "cipher.h" -#include "buffer.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" #include "digest.h" -/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_bf(void); extern const EVP_CIPHER *evp_ssh1_3des(void); -extern void ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int); +extern int ssh1_3des_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, int); +#endif -struct Cipher { +struct sshcipher { char *name; int number; /* for ssh1 only */ u_int block_size; u_int key_len; u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */ u_int auth_len; u_int discard_len; u_int flags; #define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0) #define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1) +#define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2) +#define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3) +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void); +#else + void *ignored; +#endif }; -static const struct Cipher ciphers[] = { - { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null }, +static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = { +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 { "des", SSH_CIPHER_DES, 8, 8, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_cbc }, { "3des", SSH_CIPHER_3DES, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_3des }, { "blowfish", SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH, 8, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, evp_ssh1_bf }, - +#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_enc_null }, { "3des-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_des_ede3_cbc }, { "blowfish-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_bf_cbc }, { "cast128-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_cast5_cbc }, { "arcfour", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_rc4 }, { "arcfour128", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 16, 0, 0, 1536, 0, EVP_rc4 }, { "arcfour256", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 32, 0, 0, 1536, 0, EVP_rc4 }, { "aes128-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_128_cbc }, { "aes192-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_192_cbc }, { "aes256-cbc", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, { "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 1, EVP_aes_256_cbc }, { "aes128-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr }, { "aes192-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr }, { "aes256-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr }, -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM { "aes128-gcm@openssh.com", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm }, { "aes256-gcm@openssh.com", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 12, 16, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm }, -#endif +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM */ +#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + { "aes128-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL }, + { "aes192-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL }, + { "aes256-ctr", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL }, + { "none", SSH_CIPHER_NONE, 8, 0, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_NONE, NULL }, +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ { "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com", SSH_CIPHER_SSH2, 8, 64, 0, 16, 0, CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY, NULL }, + { NULL, SSH_CIPHER_INVALID, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL } }; /*--*/ -/* Returns a list of supported ciphers separated by the specified char. */ +/* Returns a comma-separated list of supported ciphers. */ char * cipher_alg_list(char sep, int auth_only) { - char *ret = NULL; + char *tmp, *ret = NULL; size_t nlen, rlen = 0; - const Cipher *c; + const struct sshcipher *c; for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) { if (c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) continue; if (auth_only && c->auth_len == 0) continue; if (ret != NULL) ret[rlen++] = sep; nlen = strlen(c->name); - ret = xrealloc(ret, 1, rlen + nlen + 2); + if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) { + free(ret); + return NULL; + } + ret = tmp; memcpy(ret + rlen, c->name, nlen + 1); rlen += nlen; } return ret; } u_int -cipher_blocksize(const Cipher *c) +cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *c) { return (c->block_size); } u_int -cipher_keylen(const Cipher *c) +cipher_keylen(const struct sshcipher *c) { return (c->key_len); } u_int -cipher_seclen(const Cipher *c) +cipher_seclen(const struct sshcipher *c) { if (strcmp("3des-cbc", c->name) == 0) return 14; return cipher_keylen(c); } u_int -cipher_authlen(const Cipher *c) +cipher_authlen(const struct sshcipher *c) { return (c->auth_len); } u_int -cipher_ivlen(const Cipher *c) +cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *c) { /* * Default is cipher block size, except for chacha20+poly1305 that * needs no IV. XXX make iv_len == -1 default? */ return (c->iv_len != 0 || (c->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) ? c->iv_len : c->block_size; } u_int -cipher_get_number(const Cipher *c) +cipher_get_number(const struct sshcipher *c) { return (c->number); } u_int -cipher_is_cbc(const Cipher *c) +cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *c) { return (c->flags & CFLAG_CBC) != 0; } u_int cipher_mask_ssh1(int client) { u_int mask = 0; mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_3DES; /* Mandatory */ mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH; if (client) { mask |= 1 << SSH_CIPHER_DES; } return mask; } -const Cipher * +const struct sshcipher * cipher_by_name(const char *name) { - const Cipher *c; + const struct sshcipher *c; for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0) return c; return NULL; } -const Cipher * +const struct sshcipher * cipher_by_number(int id) { - const Cipher *c; + const struct sshcipher *c; for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) if (c->number == id) return c; return NULL; } #define CIPHER_SEP "," int ciphers_valid(const char *names) { - const Cipher *c; + const struct sshcipher *c; char *cipher_list, *cp; char *p; if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0) return 0; - cipher_list = cp = xstrdup(names); + if ((cipher_list = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL) + return 0; for ((p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP))) { c = cipher_by_name(p); if (c == NULL || c->number != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) { - debug("bad cipher %s [%s]", p, names); free(cipher_list); return 0; } } - debug3("ciphers ok: [%s]", names); free(cipher_list); return 1; } /* * Parses the name of the cipher. Returns the number of the corresponding * cipher, or -1 on error. */ int cipher_number(const char *name) { - const Cipher *c; + const struct sshcipher *c; if (name == NULL) return -1; for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) if (strcasecmp(c->name, name) == 0) return c->number; return -1; } char * cipher_name(int id) { - const Cipher *c = cipher_by_number(id); + const struct sshcipher *c = cipher_by_number(id); return (c==NULL) ? "" : c->name; } -void -cipher_init(CipherContext *cc, const Cipher *cipher, +const char * +cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc) +{ + if (cc == NULL || cc->cipher == NULL) + return NULL; + if (cc->cipher->number == SSH_CIPHER_DES) + return "use of DES is strongly discouraged due to " + "cryptographic weaknesses"; + return NULL; +} + +int +cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const struct sshcipher *cipher, const u_char *key, u_int keylen, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen, int do_encrypt) { - static int dowarn = 1; -#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP - EVP_CIPHER *type; -#else +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; const EVP_CIPHER *type; int klen; -#endif u_char *junk, *discard; if (cipher->number == SSH_CIPHER_DES) { - if (dowarn) { - error("Warning: use of DES is strongly discouraged " - "due to cryptographic weaknesses"); - dowarn = 0; - } if (keylen > 8) keylen = 8; } +#endif cc->plaintext = (cipher->number == SSH_CIPHER_NONE); cc->encrypt = do_encrypt; - if (keylen < cipher->key_len) - fatal("cipher_init: key length %d is insufficient for %s.", - keylen, cipher->name); - if (iv != NULL && ivlen < cipher_ivlen(cipher)) - fatal("cipher_init: iv length %d is insufficient for %s.", - ivlen, cipher->name); - cc->cipher = cipher; + if (keylen < cipher->key_len || + (iv != NULL && ivlen < cipher_ivlen(cipher))) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + cc->cipher = cipher; if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) { - chachapoly_init(&cc->cp_ctx, key, keylen); - return; + return chachapoly_init(&cc->cp_ctx, key, keylen); } - type = (*cipher->evptype)(); - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&cc->evp); -#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP - if (type->key_len > 0 && type->key_len != keylen) { - debug("cipher_init: set keylen (%d -> %d)", - type->key_len, keylen); - type->key_len = keylen; +#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) { + aesctr_keysetup(&cc->ac_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, 8 * ivlen); + aesctr_ivsetup(&cc->ac_ctx, iv); + return 0; } - EVP_CipherInit(&cc->evp, type, (u_char *)key, (u_char *)iv, - (do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT)); + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) + return 0; + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; #else + type = (*cipher->evptype)(); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&cc->evp); if (EVP_CipherInit(&cc->evp, type, NULL, (u_char *)iv, - (do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) == 0) - fatal("cipher_init: EVP_CipherInit failed for %s", - cipher->name); + (do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) == 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto bad; + } if (cipher_authlen(cipher) && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, - -1, (u_char *)iv)) - fatal("cipher_init: EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED failed for %s", - cipher->name); + -1, (u_char *)iv)) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto bad; + } klen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(&cc->evp); if (klen > 0 && keylen != (u_int)klen) { - debug2("cipher_init: set keylen (%d -> %d)", klen, keylen); - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&cc->evp, keylen) == 0) - fatal("cipher_init: set keylen failed (%d -> %d)", - klen, keylen); + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&cc->evp, keylen) == 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto bad; + } } - if (EVP_CipherInit(&cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)key, NULL, -1) == 0) - fatal("cipher_init: EVP_CipherInit: set key failed for %s", - cipher->name); -#endif + if (EVP_CipherInit(&cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)key, NULL, -1) == 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto bad; + } if (cipher->discard_len > 0) { - junk = xmalloc(cipher->discard_len); - discard = xmalloc(cipher->discard_len); - if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, discard, junk, - cipher->discard_len) == 0) - fatal("evp_crypt: EVP_Cipher failed during discard"); + if ((junk = malloc(cipher->discard_len)) == NULL || + (discard = malloc(cipher->discard_len)) == NULL) { + if (junk != NULL) + free(junk); + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto bad; + } + ret = EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, discard, junk, cipher->discard_len); explicit_bzero(discard, cipher->discard_len); free(junk); free(discard); + if (ret != 1) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + bad: + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cc->evp); + return ret; + } } +#endif + return 0; } /* * cipher_crypt() operates as following: * Copy 'aadlen' bytes (without en/decryption) from 'src' to 'dest'. * Theses bytes are treated as additional authenticated data for * authenticated encryption modes. * En/Decrypt 'len' bytes at offset 'aadlen' from 'src' to 'dest'. * Use 'authlen' bytes at offset 'len'+'aadlen' as the authentication tag. * This tag is written on encryption and verified on decryption. * Both 'aadlen' and 'authlen' can be set to 0. - * cipher_crypt() returns 0 on success and -1 if the decryption integrity - * check fails. */ int -cipher_crypt(CipherContext *cc, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest, const u_char *src, - u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen) +cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest, + const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen) { - if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) - return chachapoly_crypt(&cc->cp_ctx, seqnr, dest, src, len, - aadlen, authlen, cc->encrypt); + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) { + return chachapoly_crypt(&cc->cp_ctx, seqnr, dest, src, + len, aadlen, authlen, cc->encrypt); + } +#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) { + if (aadlen) + memcpy(dest, src, aadlen); + aesctr_encrypt_bytes(&cc->ac_ctx, src + aadlen, + dest + aadlen, len); + return 0; + } + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) { + memcpy(dest, src, aadlen + len); + return 0; + } + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; +#else if (authlen) { u_char lastiv[1]; if (authlen != cipher_authlen(cc->cipher)) - fatal("%s: authlen mismatch %d", __func__, authlen); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* increment IV */ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, 1, lastiv)) - fatal("%s: EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN", __func__); + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; /* set tag on decyption */ if (!cc->encrypt && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG, authlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen + len)) - fatal("%s: EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG", __func__); + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; } if (aadlen) { if (authlen && EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)src, aadlen) < 0) - fatal("%s: EVP_Cipher(aad) failed", __func__); + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; memcpy(dest, src, aadlen); } if (len % cc->cipher->block_size) - fatal("%s: bad plaintext length %d", __func__, len); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, dest + aadlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen, len) < 0) - fatal("%s: EVP_Cipher failed", __func__); + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; if (authlen) { /* compute tag (on encrypt) or verify tag (on decrypt) */ - if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, NULL, NULL, 0) < 0) { - if (cc->encrypt) - fatal("%s: EVP_Cipher(final) failed", __func__); - else - return -1; - } + if (EVP_Cipher(&cc->evp, NULL, NULL, 0) < 0) + return cc->encrypt ? + SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID; if (cc->encrypt && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG, authlen, dest + aadlen + len)) - fatal("%s: EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG", __func__); + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; } return 0; +#endif } /* Extract the packet length, including any decryption necessary beforehand */ int -cipher_get_length(CipherContext *cc, u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, +cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr, const u_char *cp, u_int len) { if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) return chachapoly_get_length(&cc->cp_ctx, plenp, seqnr, cp, len); if (len < 4) - return -1; + return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; *plenp = get_u32(cp); return 0; } -void -cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *cc) +int +cipher_cleanup(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc) { + if (cc == NULL || cc->cipher == NULL) + return 0; if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) explicit_bzero(&cc->cp_ctx, sizeof(cc->cp_ctx)); + else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) + explicit_bzero(&cc->ac_ctx, sizeof(cc->ac_ctx)); +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&cc->evp) == 0) - error("cipher_cleanup: EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup failed"); + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; +#endif + return 0; } /* * Selects the cipher, and keys if by computing the MD5 checksum of the * passphrase and using the resulting 16 bytes as the key. */ - -void -cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *cc, const Cipher *cipher, +int +cipher_set_key_string(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const struct sshcipher *cipher, const char *passphrase, int do_encrypt) { u_char digest[16]; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if (ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_MD5, passphrase, strlen(passphrase), - digest, sizeof(digest)) < 0) - fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__); + if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_MD5, + passphrase, strlen(passphrase), + digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) + goto out; - cipher_init(cc, cipher, digest, 16, NULL, 0, do_encrypt); - + r = cipher_init(cc, cipher, digest, 16, NULL, 0, do_encrypt); + out: explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); + return r; } /* - * Exports an IV from the CipherContext required to export the key + * Exports an IV from the sshcipher_ctx required to export the key * state back from the unprivileged child to the privileged parent * process. */ - int -cipher_get_keyiv_len(const CipherContext *cc) +cipher_get_keyiv_len(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc) { - const Cipher *c = cc->cipher; - int ivlen; + const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher; + int ivlen = 0; if (c->number == SSH_CIPHER_3DES) ivlen = 24; else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) ivlen = 0; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL else ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp); +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ return (ivlen); } -void -cipher_get_keyiv(CipherContext *cc, u_char *iv, u_int len) +int +cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_char *iv, u_int len) { - const Cipher *c = cc->cipher; - int evplen; + const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + int evplen; +#endif if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) { if (len != 0) - fatal("%s: wrong iv length %d != %d", __func__, len, 0); - return; + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + return 0; } + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) + return 0; switch (c->number) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2: case SSH_CIPHER_DES: case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH: evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp); - if (evplen <= 0) - return; + if (evplen == 0) + return 0; + else if (evplen < 0) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; if ((u_int)evplen != len) - fatal("%s: wrong iv length %d != %d", __func__, - evplen, len); -#ifdef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL - if (c->evptype == evp_rijndael) - ssh_rijndael_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, len); - else -#endif + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; #ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr) ssh_aes_ctr_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, len); else #endif - memcpy(iv, cc->evp.iv, len); + if (cipher_authlen(c)) { + if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN, + len, iv)) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + } else + memcpy(iv, cc->evp.iv, len); break; +#endif +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 case SSH_CIPHER_3DES: - ssh1_3des_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, 24); - break; + return ssh1_3des_iv(&cc->evp, 0, iv, 24); +#endif default: - fatal("%s: bad cipher %d", __func__, c->number); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } + return 0; } -void -cipher_set_keyiv(CipherContext *cc, u_char *iv) +int +cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const u_char *iv) { - const Cipher *c = cc->cipher; - int evplen = 0; + const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + int evplen = 0; +#endif if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) - return; + return 0; + if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) + return 0; switch (c->number) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL case SSH_CIPHER_SSH2: case SSH_CIPHER_DES: case SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH: evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&cc->evp); - if (evplen == 0) - return; -#ifdef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL - if (c->evptype == evp_rijndael) - ssh_rijndael_iv(&cc->evp, 1, iv, evplen); - else -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR - if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr) - ssh_aes_ctr_iv(&cc->evp, 1, iv, evplen); - else -#endif - memcpy(cc->evp.iv, iv, evplen); + if (evplen <= 0) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + if (cipher_authlen(c)) { + /* XXX iv arg is const, but EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl isn't */ + if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(&cc->evp, + EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, (void *)iv)) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + } else + memcpy(cc->evp.iv, iv, evplen); break; +#endif +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 case SSH_CIPHER_3DES: - ssh1_3des_iv(&cc->evp, 1, iv, 24); - break; + return ssh1_3des_iv(&cc->evp, 1, (u_char *)iv, 24); +#endif default: - fatal("%s: bad cipher %d", __func__, c->number); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; } + return 0; } +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#define EVP_X_STATE(evp) (evp).cipher_data +#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp) (evp).cipher->ctx_size +#endif + int -cipher_get_keycontext(const CipherContext *cc, u_char *dat) +cipher_get_keycontext(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_char *dat) { - const Cipher *c = cc->cipher; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher; int plen = 0; if (c->evptype == EVP_rc4) { plen = EVP_X_STATE_LEN(cc->evp); if (dat == NULL) return (plen); memcpy(dat, EVP_X_STATE(cc->evp), plen); } return (plen); +#else + return 0; +#endif } void -cipher_set_keycontext(CipherContext *cc, u_char *dat) +cipher_set_keycontext(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const u_char *dat) { - const Cipher *c = cc->cipher; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher; int plen; if (c->evptype == EVP_rc4) { plen = EVP_X_STATE_LEN(cc->evp); memcpy(EVP_X_STATE(cc->evp), dat, plen); } +#endif } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/cipher.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,103 +1,108 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.44 2014/01/25 10:12:50 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.46 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef CIPHER_H #define CIPHER_H +#include #include #include "cipher-chachapoly.h" +#include "cipher-aesctr.h" /* * Cipher types for SSH-1. New types can be added, but old types should not * be removed for compatibility. The maximum allowed value is 31. */ #define SSH_CIPHER_SSH2 -3 #define SSH_CIPHER_INVALID -2 /* No valid cipher selected. */ #define SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET -1 /* None selected (invalid number). */ #define SSH_CIPHER_NONE 0 /* no encryption */ #define SSH_CIPHER_IDEA 1 /* IDEA CFB */ #define SSH_CIPHER_DES 2 /* DES CBC */ #define SSH_CIPHER_3DES 3 /* 3DES CBC */ #define SSH_CIPHER_BROKEN_TSS 4 /* TRI's Simple Stream encryption CBC */ #define SSH_CIPHER_BROKEN_RC4 5 /* Alleged RC4 */ #define SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH 6 #define SSH_CIPHER_RESERVED 7 #define SSH_CIPHER_MAX 31 #define CIPHER_ENCRYPT 1 #define CIPHER_DECRYPT 0 -typedef struct Cipher Cipher; -typedef struct CipherContext CipherContext; - -struct Cipher; -struct CipherContext { +struct sshcipher; +struct sshcipher_ctx { int plaintext; int encrypt; EVP_CIPHER_CTX evp; struct chachapoly_ctx cp_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */ - const Cipher *cipher; + struct aesctr_ctx ac_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */ + const struct sshcipher *cipher; }; +typedef struct sshcipher Cipher ; +typedef struct sshcipher_ctx CipherContext ; + u_int cipher_mask_ssh1(int); -const Cipher *cipher_by_name(const char *); -const Cipher *cipher_by_number(int); +const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *); +const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_number(int); int cipher_number(const char *); char *cipher_name(int); int ciphers_valid(const char *); char *cipher_alg_list(char, int); -void cipher_init(CipherContext *, const Cipher *, const u_char *, u_int, - const u_char *, u_int, int); -int cipher_crypt(CipherContext *, u_int, u_char *, const u_char *, +int cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx *, const struct sshcipher *, + const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int, int); +const char* cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *); +int cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int, u_char *, const u_char *, u_int, u_int, u_int); -int cipher_get_length(CipherContext *, u_int *, u_int, +int cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); -void cipher_cleanup(CipherContext *); -void cipher_set_key_string(CipherContext *, const Cipher *, const char *, int); -u_int cipher_blocksize(const Cipher *); -u_int cipher_keylen(const Cipher *); -u_int cipher_seclen(const Cipher *); -u_int cipher_authlen(const Cipher *); -u_int cipher_ivlen(const Cipher *); -u_int cipher_is_cbc(const Cipher *); +int cipher_cleanup(struct sshcipher_ctx *); +int cipher_set_key_string(struct sshcipher_ctx *, const struct sshcipher *, + const char *, int); +u_int cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *); +u_int cipher_keylen(const struct sshcipher *); +u_int cipher_seclen(const struct sshcipher *); +u_int cipher_authlen(const struct sshcipher *); +u_int cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *); +u_int cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *); -u_int cipher_get_number(const Cipher *); -void cipher_get_keyiv(CipherContext *, u_char *, u_int); -void cipher_set_keyiv(CipherContext *, u_char *); -int cipher_get_keyiv_len(const CipherContext *); -int cipher_get_keycontext(const CipherContext *, u_char *); -void cipher_set_keycontext(CipherContext *, u_char *); +u_int cipher_get_number(const struct sshcipher *); +int cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_char *, u_int); +int cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *, const u_char *); +int cipher_get_keyiv_len(const struct sshcipher_ctx *); +int cipher_get_keycontext(const struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_char *); +void cipher_set_keycontext(struct sshcipher_ctx *, const u_char *); #endif /* CIPHER_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/clientloop.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/clientloop.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/clientloop.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,2273 +1,2283 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.258 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.261 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * The main loop for the interactive session (client side). * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * * * SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "packet.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "compat.h" #include "channels.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "key.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "clientloop.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "sshpty.h" -#include "misc.h" #include "match.h" #include "msg.h" #include "roaming.h" /* import options */ extern Options options; /* Flag indicating that stdin should be redirected from /dev/null. */ extern int stdin_null_flag; /* Flag indicating that no shell has been requested */ extern int no_shell_flag; /* Control socket */ extern int muxserver_sock; /* XXX use mux_client_cleanup() instead */ /* * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the * command line, or the HostName specified for the user-supplied name in a * configuration file. */ extern char *host; /* * Flag to indicate that we have received a window change signal which has * not yet been processed. This will cause a message indicating the new * window size to be sent to the server a little later. This is volatile * because this is updated in a signal handler. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_window_change_signal = 0; static volatile sig_atomic_t received_signal = 0; /* Flag indicating whether the user's terminal is in non-blocking mode. */ static int in_non_blocking_mode = 0; /* Time when backgrounded control master using ControlPersist should exit */ static time_t control_persist_exit_time = 0; /* Common data for the client loop code. */ volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; /* Set non-zero to quit the loop. */ static int escape_char1; /* Escape character. (proto1 only) */ static int escape_pending1; /* Last character was an escape (proto1 only) */ static int last_was_cr; /* Last character was a newline. */ static int exit_status; /* Used to store the command exit status. */ static int stdin_eof; /* EOF has been encountered on stderr. */ static Buffer stdin_buffer; /* Buffer for stdin data. */ static Buffer stdout_buffer; /* Buffer for stdout data. */ static Buffer stderr_buffer; /* Buffer for stderr data. */ static u_int buffer_high; /* Soft max buffer size. */ static int connection_in; /* Connection to server (input). */ static int connection_out; /* Connection to server (output). */ static int need_rekeying; /* Set to non-zero if rekeying is requested. */ static int session_closed; /* In SSH2: login session closed. */ static int x11_refuse_time; /* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */ static void client_init_dispatch(void); int session_ident = -1; int session_resumed = 0; /* Track escape per proto2 channel */ struct escape_filter_ctx { int escape_pending; int escape_char; }; /* Context for channel confirmation replies */ struct channel_reply_ctx { const char *request_type; int id; enum confirm_action action; }; /* Global request success/failure callbacks */ struct global_confirm { TAILQ_ENTRY(global_confirm) entry; global_confirm_cb *cb; void *ctx; int ref_count; }; TAILQ_HEAD(global_confirms, global_confirm); static struct global_confirms global_confirms = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(global_confirms); /*XXX*/ extern Kex *xxx_kex; void ssh_process_session2_setup(int, int, int, Buffer *); /* Restores stdin to blocking mode. */ static void leave_non_blocking(void) { if (in_non_blocking_mode) { unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin)); in_non_blocking_mode = 0; } } /* Puts stdin terminal in non-blocking mode. */ static void enter_non_blocking(void) { in_non_blocking_mode = 1; set_nonblock(fileno(stdin)); } /* * Signal handler for the window change signal (SIGWINCH). This just sets a * flag indicating that the window has changed. */ /*ARGSUSED */ static void window_change_handler(int sig) { received_window_change_signal = 1; signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler); } /* * Signal handler for signals that cause the program to terminate. These * signals must be trapped to restore terminal modes. */ /*ARGSUSED */ static void signal_handler(int sig) { received_signal = sig; quit_pending = 1; } /* * Returns current time in seconds from Jan 1, 1970 with the maximum * available resolution. */ static double get_current_time(void) { struct timeval tv; gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); return (double) tv.tv_sec + (double) tv.tv_usec / 1000000.0; } /* * Sets control_persist_exit_time to the absolute time when the * backgrounded control master should exit due to expiry of the * ControlPersist timeout. Sets it to 0 if we are not a backgrounded * control master process, or if there is no ControlPersist timeout. */ static void set_control_persist_exit_time(void) { if (muxserver_sock == -1 || !options.control_persist || options.control_persist_timeout == 0) { /* not using a ControlPersist timeout */ control_persist_exit_time = 0; } else if (channel_still_open()) { /* some client connections are still open */ if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) debug2("%s: cancel scheduled exit", __func__); control_persist_exit_time = 0; } else if (control_persist_exit_time <= 0) { /* a client connection has recently closed */ control_persist_exit_time = monotime() + (time_t)options.control_persist_timeout; debug2("%s: schedule exit in %d seconds", __func__, options.control_persist_timeout); } /* else we are already counting down to the timeout */ } #define SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS ":/.-_" static int client_x11_display_valid(const char *display) { size_t i, dlen; dlen = strlen(display); for (i = 0; i < dlen; i++) { if (!isalnum((u_char)display[i]) && strchr(SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS, display[i]) == NULL) { debug("Invalid character '%c' in DISPLAY", display[i]); return 0; } } return 1; } #define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1" void client_x11_get_proto(const char *display, const char *xauth_path, u_int trusted, u_int timeout, char **_proto, char **_data) { char cmd[1024]; char line[512]; char xdisplay[512]; static char proto[512], data[512]; FILE *f; int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, i; char *xauthdir, *xauthfile; struct stat st; u_int now; xauthdir = xauthfile = NULL; *_proto = proto; *_data = data; proto[0] = data[0] = '\0'; if (xauth_path == NULL ||(stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1)) { debug("No xauth program."); } else if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) { logit("DISPLAY '%s' invalid, falling back to fake xauth data", display); } else { if (display == NULL) { debug("x11_get_proto: DISPLAY not set"); return; } /* * Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does * not match an authorization entry. For this we * just try "xauth list unix:displaynum.screennum". * XXX: "localhost" match to determine FamilyLocal * is not perfect. */ if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) { snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s", display + 10); display = xdisplay; } if (trusted == 0) { xauthdir = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN); xauthfile = xmalloc(MAXPATHLEN); mktemp_proto(xauthdir, MAXPATHLEN); if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) != NULL) { do_unlink = 1; snprintf(xauthfile, MAXPATHLEN, "%s/xauthfile", xauthdir); snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "%s -f %s generate %s " SSH_X11_PROTO " untrusted timeout %u 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL, xauth_path, xauthfile, display, timeout); debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd); if (system(cmd) == 0) generated = 1; if (x11_refuse_time == 0) { now = monotime() + 1; if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now) x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX; else x11_refuse_time = now + timeout; } } } /* * When in untrusted mode, we read the cookie only if it was * successfully generated as an untrusted one in the step * above. */ if (trusted || generated) { snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd), "%s %s%s list %s 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL, xauth_path, generated ? "-f " : "" , generated ? xauthfile : "", display); debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd); f = popen(cmd, "r"); if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) && sscanf(line, "%*s %511s %511s", proto, data) == 2) got_data = 1; if (f) pclose(f); } else error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: " "xauth key data not generated"); } if (do_unlink) { unlink(xauthfile); rmdir(xauthdir); } free(xauthdir); free(xauthfile); /* * If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some * data. The forwarding code will check the validity of the * response anyway, and substitute this data. The X11 * server, however, will ignore this fake data and use * whatever authentication mechanisms it was using otherwise * for the local connection. */ if (!got_data) { u_int32_t rnd = 0; logit("Warning: No xauth data; " "using fake authentication data for X11 forwarding."); strlcpy(proto, SSH_X11_PROTO, sizeof proto); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { if (i % 4 == 0) rnd = arc4random(); snprintf(data + 2 * i, sizeof data - 2 * i, "%02x", rnd & 0xff); rnd >>= 8; } } } /* * This is called when the interactive is entered. This checks if there is * an EOF coming on stdin. We must check this explicitly, as select() does * not appear to wake up when redirecting from /dev/null. */ static void client_check_initial_eof_on_stdin(void) { int len; char buf[1]; /* * If standard input is to be "redirected from /dev/null", we simply * mark that we have seen an EOF and send an EOF message to the * server. Otherwise, we try to read a single character; it appears * that for some files, such /dev/null, select() never wakes up for * read for this descriptor, which means that we never get EOF. This * way we will get the EOF if stdin comes from /dev/null or similar. */ if (stdin_null_flag) { /* Fake EOF on stdin. */ debug("Sending eof."); stdin_eof = 1; packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); packet_send(); } else { enter_non_blocking(); /* Check for immediate EOF on stdin. */ len = read(fileno(stdin), buf, 1); if (len == 0) { /* * EOF. Record that we have seen it and send * EOF to server. */ debug("Sending eof."); stdin_eof = 1; packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); packet_send(); } else if (len > 0) { /* * Got data. We must store the data in the buffer, * and also process it as an escape character if * appropriate. */ if ((u_char) buf[0] == escape_char1) escape_pending1 = 1; else buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, buf, 1); } leave_non_blocking(); } } /* * Make packets from buffered stdin data, and buffer them for sending to the * connection. */ static void client_make_packets_from_stdin_data(void) { u_int len; /* Send buffered stdin data to the server. */ while (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0 && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) { len = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer); /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */ if (len > packet_get_maxsize()) len = packet_get_maxsize(); packet_start(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA); packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer), len); packet_send(); buffer_consume(&stdin_buffer, len); /* If we have a pending EOF, send it now. */ if (stdin_eof && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) { packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); packet_send(); } } } /* * Checks if the client window has changed, and sends a packet about it to * the server if so. The actual change is detected elsewhere (by a software * interrupt on Unix); this just checks the flag and sends a message if * appropriate. */ static void client_check_window_change(void) { struct winsize ws; if (! received_window_change_signal) return; /** XXX race */ received_window_change_signal = 0; debug2("client_check_window_change: changed"); if (compat20) { channel_send_window_changes(); } else { if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0) return; packet_start(SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel); packet_send(); } } static void client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct global_confirm *gc; if ((gc = TAILQ_FIRST(&global_confirms)) == NULL) return; if (gc->cb != NULL) gc->cb(type, seq, gc->ctx); if (--gc->ref_count <= 0) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&global_confirms, gc, entry); explicit_bzero(gc, sizeof(*gc)); free(gc); } packet_set_alive_timeouts(0); } static void server_alive_check(void) { if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.server_alive_count_max) { logit("Timeout, server %s not responding.", host); cleanup_exit(255); } packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring("keepalive@openssh.com"); packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */ packet_send(); /* Insert an empty placeholder to maintain ordering */ client_register_global_confirm(NULL, NULL); } /* * Waits until the client can do something (some data becomes available on * one of the file descriptors). */ static void client_wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, int rekeying) { struct timeval tv, *tvp; int timeout_secs; time_t minwait_secs = 0, server_alive_time = 0, now = monotime(); int ret; /* Add any selections by the channel mechanism. */ channel_prepare_select(readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, nallocp, &minwait_secs, rekeying); if (!compat20) { /* Read from the connection, unless our buffers are full. */ if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) < buffer_high && buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) < buffer_high && channel_not_very_much_buffered_data()) FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp); /* * Read from stdin, unless we have seen EOF or have very much * buffered data to send to the server. */ if (!stdin_eof && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) FD_SET(fileno(stdin), *readsetp); /* Select stdout/stderr if have data in buffer. */ if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0) FD_SET(fileno(stdout), *writesetp); if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0) FD_SET(fileno(stderr), *writesetp); } else { /* channel_prepare_select could have closed the last channel */ if (session_closed && !channel_still_open() && !packet_have_data_to_write()) { /* clear mask since we did not call select() */ memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp); memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp); return; } else { FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp); } } /* Select server connection if have data to write to the server. */ if (packet_have_data_to_write()) FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp); /* * Wait for something to happen. This will suspend the process until * some selected descriptor can be read, written, or has some other * event pending, or a timeout expires. */ timeout_secs = INT_MAX; /* we use INT_MAX to mean no timeout */ if (options.server_alive_interval > 0 && compat20) { timeout_secs = options.server_alive_interval; server_alive_time = now + options.server_alive_interval; } if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && compat20 && !rekeying) timeout_secs = MIN(timeout_secs, packet_get_rekey_timeout()); set_control_persist_exit_time(); if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) { timeout_secs = MIN(timeout_secs, control_persist_exit_time - now); if (timeout_secs < 0) timeout_secs = 0; } if (minwait_secs != 0) timeout_secs = MIN(timeout_secs, (int)minwait_secs); if (timeout_secs == INT_MAX) tvp = NULL; else { tv.tv_sec = timeout_secs; tv.tv_usec = 0; tvp = &tv; } ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp); if (ret < 0) { char buf[100]; /* * We have to clear the select masks, because we return. * We have to return, because the mainloop checks for the flags * set by the signal handlers. */ memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp); memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp); if (errno == EINTR) return; /* Note: we might still have data in the buffers. */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "select: %s\r\n", strerror(errno)); buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); quit_pending = 1; } else if (ret == 0) { /* * Timeout. Could have been either keepalive or rekeying. * Keepalive we check here, rekeying is checked in clientloop. */ if (server_alive_time != 0 && server_alive_time <= monotime()) server_alive_check(); } } static void client_suspend_self(Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr) { /* Flush stdout and stderr buffers. */ if (buffer_len(bout) > 0) atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(bout), buffer_len(bout)); if (buffer_len(berr) > 0) atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(berr), buffer_len(berr)); leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); /* * Free (and clear) the buffer to reduce the amount of data that gets * written to swap. */ buffer_free(bin); buffer_free(bout); buffer_free(berr); /* Send the suspend signal to the program itself. */ kill(getpid(), SIGTSTP); /* Reset window sizes in case they have changed */ received_window_change_signal = 1; /* OK, we have been continued by the user. Reinitialize buffers. */ buffer_init(bin); buffer_init(bout); buffer_init(berr); enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); } static void client_process_net_input(fd_set *readset) { int len, cont = 0; char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ]; /* * Read input from the server, and add any such data to the buffer of * the packet subsystem. */ if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) { /* Read as much as possible. */ len = roaming_read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf), &cont); if (len == 0 && cont == 0) { /* * Received EOF. The remote host has closed the * connection. */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "Connection to %.300s closed by remote host.\r\n", host); buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); quit_pending = 1; return; } /* * There is a kernel bug on Solaris that causes select to * sometimes wake up even though there is no data available. */ if (len < 0 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) len = 0; if (len < 0) { /* * An error has encountered. Perhaps there is a * network problem. */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "Read from remote host %.300s: %.100s\r\n", host, strerror(errno)); buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); quit_pending = 1; return; } packet_process_incoming(buf, len); } } static void client_status_confirm(int type, Channel *c, void *ctx) { struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = (struct channel_reply_ctx *)ctx; char errmsg[256]; int tochan; /* * If a TTY was explicitly requested, then a failure to allocate * one is fatal. */ if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY && (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE || options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES)) cr->action = CONFIRM_CLOSE; /* XXX supress on mux _client_ quietmode */ tochan = options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR && c->ctl_chan != -1 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE; if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) { debug2("%s request accepted on channel %d", cr->request_type, c->self); } else if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) { if (tochan) { snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), "%s request failed\r\n", cr->request_type); } else { snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), "%s request failed on channel %d", cr->request_type, c->self); } /* If error occurred on primary session channel, then exit */ if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE && c->self == session_ident) fatal("%s", errmsg); /* * If error occurred on mux client, append to * their stderr. */ if (tochan) { buffer_append(&c->extended, errmsg, strlen(errmsg)); } else error("%s", errmsg); if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY) { /* * If a TTY allocation error occurred, then arrange * for the correct TTY to leave raw mode. */ if (c->self == session_ident) leave_raw_mode(0); else mux_tty_alloc_failed(c); } else if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE) { chan_read_failed(c); chan_write_failed(c); } } free(cr); } static void client_abandon_status_confirm(Channel *c, void *ctx) { free(ctx); } void client_expect_confirm(int id, const char *request, enum confirm_action action) { struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cr)); cr->request_type = request; cr->action = action; channel_register_status_confirm(id, client_status_confirm, client_abandon_status_confirm, cr); } void client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *cb, void *ctx) { struct global_confirm *gc, *last_gc; /* Coalesce identical callbacks */ last_gc = TAILQ_LAST(&global_confirms, global_confirms); if (last_gc && last_gc->cb == cb && last_gc->ctx == ctx) { if (++last_gc->ref_count >= INT_MAX) fatal("%s: last_gc->ref_count = %d", __func__, last_gc->ref_count); return; } gc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*gc)); gc->cb = cb; gc->ctx = ctx; gc->ref_count = 1; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&global_confirms, gc, entry); } static void process_cmdline(void) { void (*handler)(int); - char *s, *cmd, *cancel_host; - int delete = 0, local = 0, remote = 0, dynamic = 0; - int cancel_port, ok; - Forward fwd; + char *s, *cmd; + int ok, delete = 0, local = 0, remote = 0, dynamic = 0; + struct Forward fwd; memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); - fwd.listen_host = fwd.connect_host = NULL; leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); handler = signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); cmd = s = read_passphrase("\r\nssh> ", RP_ECHO); if (s == NULL) goto out; while (isspace((u_char)*s)) s++; if (*s == '-') s++; /* Skip cmdline '-', if any */ if (*s == '\0') goto out; if (*s == 'h' || *s == 'H' || *s == '?') { logit("Commands:"); logit(" -L[bind_address:]port:host:hostport " "Request local forward"); logit(" -R[bind_address:]port:host:hostport " "Request remote forward"); logit(" -D[bind_address:]port " "Request dynamic forward"); logit(" -KL[bind_address:]port " "Cancel local forward"); logit(" -KR[bind_address:]port " "Cancel remote forward"); logit(" -KD[bind_address:]port " "Cancel dynamic forward"); if (!options.permit_local_command) goto out; logit(" !args " "Execute local command"); goto out; } if (*s == '!' && options.permit_local_command) { s++; ssh_local_cmd(s); goto out; } if (*s == 'K') { delete = 1; s++; } if (*s == 'L') local = 1; else if (*s == 'R') remote = 1; else if (*s == 'D') dynamic = 1; else { logit("Invalid command."); goto out; } if (delete && !compat20) { logit("Not supported for SSH protocol version 1."); goto out; } while (isspace((u_char)*++s)) ; /* XXX update list of forwards in options */ if (delete) { - cancel_port = 0; - cancel_host = hpdelim(&s); /* may be NULL */ - if (s != NULL) { - cancel_port = a2port(s); - cancel_host = cleanhostname(cancel_host); - } else { - cancel_port = a2port(cancel_host); - cancel_host = NULL; - } - if (cancel_port <= 0) { - logit("Bad forwarding close port"); + /* We pass 1 for dynamicfwd to restrict to 1 or 2 fields. */ + if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, 1, 0)) { + logit("Bad forwarding close specification."); goto out; } if (remote) - ok = channel_request_rforward_cancel(cancel_host, - cancel_port) == 0; + ok = channel_request_rforward_cancel(&fwd) == 0; else if (dynamic) - ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(cancel_host, - cancel_port, 0, options.gateway_ports) > 0; + ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(&fwd, + 0, &options.fwd_opts) > 0; else - ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(cancel_host, - cancel_port, CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC, - options.gateway_ports) > 0; + ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(&fwd, + CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC, + &options.fwd_opts) > 0; if (!ok) { logit("Unkown port forwarding."); goto out; } logit("Canceled forwarding."); } else { if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, dynamic, remote)) { logit("Bad forwarding specification."); goto out; } if (local || dynamic) { - if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(fwd.listen_host, - fwd.listen_port, fwd.connect_host, - fwd.connect_port, options.gateway_ports)) { + if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(&fwd, + &options.fwd_opts)) { logit("Port forwarding failed."); goto out; } } else { - if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(fwd.listen_host, - fwd.listen_port, fwd.connect_host, - fwd.connect_port) < 0) { + if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(&fwd) < 0) { logit("Port forwarding failed."); goto out; } } logit("Forwarding port."); } out: signal(SIGINT, handler); enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); free(cmd); free(fwd.listen_host); + free(fwd.listen_path); free(fwd.connect_host); + free(fwd.connect_path); } /* reasons to suppress output of an escape command in help output */ #define SUPPRESS_NEVER 0 /* never suppress, always show */ #define SUPPRESS_PROTO1 1 /* don't show in protocol 1 sessions */ #define SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT 2 /* don't show in mux client sessions */ #define SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER 4 /* don't show in mux master sessions */ #define SUPPRESS_SYSLOG 8 /* don't show when logging to syslog */ struct escape_help_text { const char *cmd; const char *text; unsigned int flags; }; static struct escape_help_text esc_txt[] = { {".", "terminate session", SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER}, {".", "terminate connection (and any multiplexed sessions)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"B", "send a BREAK to the remote system", SUPPRESS_PROTO1}, {"C", "open a command line", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"R", "request rekey", SUPPRESS_PROTO1}, {"V/v", "decrease/increase verbosity (LogLevel)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"^Z", "suspend ssh", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"#", "list forwarded connections", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, {"&", "background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT}, {"?", "this message", SUPPRESS_NEVER}, }; static void print_escape_help(Buffer *b, int escape_char, int protocol2, int mux_client, int using_stderr) { unsigned int i, suppress_flags; char string[1024]; snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c?\r\n" "Supported escape sequences:\r\n", escape_char); buffer_append(b, string, strlen(string)); suppress_flags = (protocol2 ? 0 : SUPPRESS_PROTO1) | (mux_client ? SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT : 0) | (mux_client ? 0 : SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER) | (using_stderr ? 0 : SUPPRESS_SYSLOG); for (i = 0; i < sizeof(esc_txt)/sizeof(esc_txt[0]); i++) { if (esc_txt[i].flags & suppress_flags) continue; snprintf(string, sizeof string, " %c%-3s - %s\r\n", escape_char, esc_txt[i].cmd, esc_txt[i].text); buffer_append(b, string, strlen(string)); } snprintf(string, sizeof string, " %c%c - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n" "(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after " "newline.)\r\n", escape_char, escape_char); buffer_append(b, string, strlen(string)); } /* * Process the characters one by one, call with c==NULL for proto1 case. */ static int process_escapes(Channel *c, Buffer *bin, Buffer *bout, Buffer *berr, char *buf, int len) { char string[1024]; pid_t pid; int bytes = 0; u_int i; u_char ch; char *s; int *escape_pendingp, escape_char; struct escape_filter_ctx *efc; if (c == NULL) { escape_pendingp = &escape_pending1; escape_char = escape_char1; } else { if (c->filter_ctx == NULL) return 0; efc = (struct escape_filter_ctx *)c->filter_ctx; escape_pendingp = &efc->escape_pending; escape_char = efc->escape_char; } if (len <= 0) return (0); for (i = 0; i < (u_int)len; i++) { /* Get one character at a time. */ ch = buf[i]; if (*escape_pendingp) { /* We have previously seen an escape character. */ /* Clear the flag now. */ *escape_pendingp = 0; /* Process the escaped character. */ switch (ch) { case '.': /* Terminate the connection. */ snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c.\r\n", escape_char); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) { chan_read_failed(c); chan_write_failed(c); if (c->detach_user) c->detach_user(c->self, NULL); c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED; buffer_clear(&c->input); chan_ibuf_empty(c); return 0; } else quit_pending = 1; return -1; case 'Z' - 64: /* XXX support this for mux clients */ if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) { char b[16]; noescape: if (ch == 'Z' - 64) snprintf(b, sizeof b, "^Z"); else snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%c", ch); snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c%s escape not available to " "multiplexed sessions\r\n", escape_char, b); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); continue; } /* Suspend the program. Inform the user */ snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c^Z [suspend ssh]\r\n", escape_char); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); /* Restore terminal modes and suspend. */ client_suspend_self(bin, bout, berr); /* We have been continued. */ continue; case 'B': if (compat20) { snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%cB\r\n", escape_char); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); channel_request_start(c->self, "break", 0); packet_put_int(1000); packet_send(); } continue; case 'R': if (compat20) { if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY) logit("Server does not " "support re-keying"); else need_rekeying = 1; } continue; case 'V': /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 'v': if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) goto noescape; if (!log_is_on_stderr()) { snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c%c [Logging to syslog]\r\n", escape_char, ch); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); continue; } if (ch == 'V' && options.log_level > SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) log_change_level(--options.log_level); if (ch == 'v' && options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) log_change_level(++options.log_level); snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c%c [LogLevel %s]\r\n", escape_char, ch, log_level_name(options.log_level)); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); continue; case '&': if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) goto noescape; /* * Detach the program (continue to serve * connections, but put in background and no * more new connections). */ /* Restore tty modes. */ leave_raw_mode( options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); /* Stop listening for new connections. */ channel_stop_listening(); snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c& [backgrounded]\n", escape_char); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); /* Fork into background. */ pid = fork(); if (pid < 0) { error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } if (pid != 0) { /* This is the parent. */ /* The parent just exits. */ exit(0); } /* The child continues serving connections. */ if (compat20) { buffer_append(bin, "\004", 1); /* fake EOF on stdin */ return -1; } else if (!stdin_eof) { /* * Sending SSH_CMSG_EOF alone does not * always appear to be enough. So we * try to send an EOF character first. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA); packet_put_string("\004", 1); packet_send(); /* Close stdin. */ stdin_eof = 1; if (buffer_len(bin) == 0) { packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); packet_send(); } } continue; case '?': print_escape_help(berr, escape_char, compat20, (c && c->ctl_chan != -1), log_is_on_stderr()); continue; case '#': snprintf(string, sizeof string, "%c#\r\n", escape_char); buffer_append(berr, string, strlen(string)); s = channel_open_message(); buffer_append(berr, s, strlen(s)); free(s); continue; case 'C': if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) goto noescape; process_cmdline(); continue; default: if (ch != escape_char) { buffer_put_char(bin, escape_char); bytes++; } /* Escaped characters fall through here */ break; } } else { /* * The previous character was not an escape char. * Check if this is an escape. */ if (last_was_cr && ch == escape_char) { /* * It is. Set the flag and continue to * next character. */ *escape_pendingp = 1; continue; } } /* * Normal character. Record whether it was a newline, * and append it to the buffer. */ last_was_cr = (ch == '\r' || ch == '\n'); buffer_put_char(bin, ch); bytes++; } return bytes; } static void client_process_input(fd_set *readset) { int len; char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ]; /* Read input from stdin. */ if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdin), readset)) { /* Read as much as possible. */ len = read(fileno(stdin), buf, sizeof(buf)); if (len < 0 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) return; /* we'll try again later */ if (len <= 0) { /* * Received EOF or error. They are treated * similarly, except that an error message is printed * if it was an error condition. */ if (len < 0) { snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "read: %.100s\r\n", strerror(errno)); buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); } /* Mark that we have seen EOF. */ stdin_eof = 1; /* * Send an EOF message to the server unless there is * data in the buffer. If there is data in the * buffer, no message will be sent now. Code * elsewhere will send the EOF when the buffer * becomes empty if stdin_eof is set. */ if (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) { packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EOF); packet_send(); } } else if (escape_char1 == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) { /* * Normal successful read, and no escape character. * Just append the data to buffer. */ buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, buf, len); } else { /* * Normal, successful read. But we have an escape * character and have to process the characters one * by one. */ if (process_escapes(NULL, &stdin_buffer, &stdout_buffer, &stderr_buffer, buf, len) == -1) return; } } } static void client_process_output(fd_set *writeset) { int len; char buf[100]; /* Write buffered output to stdout. */ if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stdout), writeset)) { /* Write as much data as possible. */ len = write(fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), buffer_len(&stdout_buffer)); if (len <= 0) { if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) len = 0; else { /* * An error or EOF was encountered. Put an * error message to stderr buffer. */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "write stdout: %.50s\r\n", strerror(errno)); buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); quit_pending = 1; return; } } /* Consume printed data from the buffer. */ buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len); } /* Write buffered output to stderr. */ if (FD_ISSET(fileno(stderr), writeset)) { /* Write as much data as possible. */ len = write(fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer), buffer_len(&stderr_buffer)); if (len <= 0) { if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) len = 0; else { /* * EOF or error, but can't even print * error message. */ quit_pending = 1; return; } } /* Consume printed characters from the buffer. */ buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len); } } /* * Get packets from the connection input buffer, and process them as long as * there are packets available. * * Any unknown packets received during the actual * session cause the session to terminate. This is * intended to make debugging easier since no * confirmations are sent. Any compatible protocol * extensions must be negotiated during the * preparatory phase. */ static void client_process_buffered_input_packets(void) { dispatch_run(DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, &quit_pending, compat20 ? xxx_kex : NULL); } /* scan buf[] for '~' before sending data to the peer */ /* Helper: allocate a new escape_filter_ctx and fill in its escape char */ void * client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int escape_char) { struct escape_filter_ctx *ret; ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret)); ret->escape_pending = 0; ret->escape_char = escape_char; return (void *)ret; } /* Free the escape filter context on channel free */ void client_filter_cleanup(int cid, void *ctx) { free(ctx); } int client_simple_escape_filter(Channel *c, char *buf, int len) { if (c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE) return 0; return process_escapes(c, &c->input, &c->output, &c->extended, buf, len); } static void client_channel_closed(int id, void *arg) { channel_cancel_cleanup(id); session_closed = 1; leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); } /* * Implements the interactive session with the server. This is called after * the user has been authenticated, and a command has been started on the * remote host. If escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, it is the character * used as an escape character for terminating or suspending the session. */ int client_loop(int have_pty, int escape_char_arg, int ssh2_chan_id) { fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL; double start_time, total_time; int max_fd = 0, max_fd2 = 0, len, rekeying = 0; u_int64_t ibytes, obytes; u_int nalloc = 0; char buf[100]; debug("Entering interactive session."); start_time = get_current_time(); /* Initialize variables. */ escape_pending1 = 0; last_was_cr = 1; exit_status = -1; stdin_eof = 0; buffer_high = 64 * 1024; connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out); if (!compat20) { /* enable nonblocking unless tty */ if (!isatty(fileno(stdin))) set_nonblock(fileno(stdin)); if (!isatty(fileno(stdout))) set_nonblock(fileno(stdout)); if (!isatty(fileno(stderr))) set_nonblock(fileno(stderr)); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fileno(stdin)); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fileno(stdout)); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fileno(stderr)); } quit_pending = 0; escape_char1 = escape_char_arg; /* Initialize buffers. */ buffer_init(&stdin_buffer); buffer_init(&stdout_buffer); buffer_init(&stderr_buffer); client_init_dispatch(); /* * Set signal handlers, (e.g. to restore non-blocking mode) * but don't overwrite SIG_IGN, matches behaviour from rsh(1) */ if (signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) signal(SIGHUP, signal_handler); if (signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) signal(SIGINT, signal_handler); if (signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) signal(SIGQUIT, signal_handler); if (signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN) signal(SIGTERM, signal_handler); signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler); if (have_pty) enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); if (compat20) { session_ident = ssh2_chan_id; if (session_ident != -1) { if (escape_char_arg != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) { channel_register_filter(session_ident, client_simple_escape_filter, NULL, client_filter_cleanup, client_new_escape_filter_ctx( escape_char_arg)); } channel_register_cleanup(session_ident, client_channel_closed, 0); } } else { /* Check if we should immediately send eof on stdin. */ client_check_initial_eof_on_stdin(); } /* Main loop of the client for the interactive session mode. */ while (!quit_pending) { /* Process buffered packets sent by the server. */ client_process_buffered_input_packets(); if (compat20 && session_closed && !channel_still_open()) break; rekeying = (xxx_kex != NULL && !xxx_kex->done); if (rekeying) { debug("rekeying in progress"); } else { /* * Make packets of buffered stdin data, and buffer * them for sending to the server. */ if (!compat20) client_make_packets_from_stdin_data(); /* * Make packets from buffered channel data, and * enqueue them for sending to the server. */ if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) channel_output_poll(); /* * Check if the window size has changed, and buffer a * message about it to the server if so. */ client_check_window_change(); if (quit_pending) break; } /* * Wait until we have something to do (something becomes * available on one of the descriptors). */ max_fd2 = max_fd; client_wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset, &max_fd2, &nalloc, rekeying); if (quit_pending) break; /* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */ if (!rekeying) { channel_after_select(readset, writeset); if (need_rekeying || packet_need_rekeying()) { debug("need rekeying"); xxx_kex->done = 0; kex_send_kexinit(xxx_kex); need_rekeying = 0; } } /* Buffer input from the connection. */ client_process_net_input(readset); if (quit_pending) break; if (!compat20) { /* Buffer data from stdin */ client_process_input(readset); /* * Process output to stdout and stderr. Output to * the connection is processed elsewhere (above). */ client_process_output(writeset); } if (session_resumed) { connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, connection_out); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, connection_in); session_resumed = 0; } /* * Send as much buffered packet data as possible to the * sender. */ if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset)) packet_write_poll(); /* * If we are a backgrounded control master, and the * timeout has expired without any active client * connections, then quit. */ if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) { if (monotime() >= control_persist_exit_time) { debug("ControlPersist timeout expired"); break; } } } free(readset); free(writeset); /* Terminate the session. */ /* Stop watching for window change. */ signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL); if (compat20) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT); packet_put_int(SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION); packet_put_cstring("disconnected by user"); packet_put_cstring(""); /* language tag */ packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } channel_free_all(); if (have_pty) leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); /* restore blocking io */ if (!isatty(fileno(stdin))) unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin)); if (!isatty(fileno(stdout))) unset_nonblock(fileno(stdout)); if (!isatty(fileno(stderr))) unset_nonblock(fileno(stderr)); /* * If there was no shell or command requested, there will be no remote * exit status to be returned. In that case, clear error code if the * connection was deliberately terminated at this end. */ if (no_shell_flag && received_signal == SIGTERM) { received_signal = 0; exit_status = 0; } if (received_signal) fatal("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal); /* * In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating * that the connection has been closed. */ if (have_pty && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) { snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "Connection to %.64s closed.\r\n", host); buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, strlen(buf)); } /* Output any buffered data for stdout. */ if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0) { len = atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stdout), buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), buffer_len(&stdout_buffer)); if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != buffer_len(&stdout_buffer)) error("Write failed flushing stdout buffer."); else buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len); } /* Output any buffered data for stderr. */ if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0) { len = atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr), buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer), buffer_len(&stderr_buffer)); if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != buffer_len(&stderr_buffer)) error("Write failed flushing stderr buffer."); else buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len); } /* Clear and free any buffers. */ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); buffer_free(&stdin_buffer); buffer_free(&stdout_buffer); buffer_free(&stderr_buffer); /* Report bytes transferred, and transfer rates. */ total_time = get_current_time() - start_time; packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes); packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes); verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes, in %.1f seconds", (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes, total_time); if (total_time > 0) verbose("Bytes per second: sent %.1f, received %.1f", obytes / total_time, ibytes / total_time); /* Return the exit status of the program. */ debug("Exit status %d", exit_status); return exit_status; } /*********/ static void client_input_stdout_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { u_int data_len; char *data = packet_get_string(&data_len); packet_check_eom(); buffer_append(&stdout_buffer, data, data_len); explicit_bzero(data, data_len); free(data); } static void client_input_stderr_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { u_int data_len; char *data = packet_get_string(&data_len); packet_check_eom(); buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, data, data_len); explicit_bzero(data, data_len); free(data); } static void client_input_exit_status(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { exit_status = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); /* Acknowledge the exit. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION); packet_send(); /* * Must wait for packet to be sent since we are * exiting the loop. */ packet_write_wait(); /* Flag that we want to exit. */ quit_pending = 1; } static void client_input_agent_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c = NULL; int remote_id, sock; /* Read the remote channel number from the message. */ remote_id = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); /* * Get a connection to the local authentication agent (this may again * get forwarded). */ sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket(); /* * If we could not connect the agent, send an error message back to * the server. This should never happen unless the agent dies, * because authentication forwarding is only enabled if we have an * agent. */ if (sock >= 0) { c = channel_new("", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, 0, 0, 0, "authentication agent connection", 1); c->remote_id = remote_id; c->force_drain = 1; } if (c == NULL) { packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); packet_put_int(remote_id); } else { /* Send a confirmation to the remote host. */ debug("Forwarding authentication connection."); packet_start(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); packet_put_int(remote_id); packet_put_int(c->self); } packet_send(); } static Channel * client_request_forwarded_tcpip(const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; char *listen_address, *originator_address; u_short listen_port, originator_port; /* Get rest of the packet */ listen_address = packet_get_string(NULL); listen_port = packet_get_int(); originator_address = packet_get_string(NULL); originator_port = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); - debug("client_request_forwarded_tcpip: listen %s port %d, " - "originator %s port %d", listen_address, listen_port, - originator_address, originator_port); + debug("%s: listen %s port %d, originator %s port %d", __func__, + listen_address, listen_port, originator_address, originator_port); - c = channel_connect_by_listen_address(listen_port, + c = channel_connect_by_listen_address(listen_address, listen_port, "forwarded-tcpip", originator_address); free(originator_address); free(listen_address); return c; } static Channel * +client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(const char *request_type, int rchan) +{ + Channel *c = NULL; + char *listen_path; + + /* Get the remote path. */ + listen_path = packet_get_string(NULL); + /* XXX: Skip reserved field for now. */ + if (packet_get_string_ptr(NULL) == NULL) + fatal("%s: packet_get_string_ptr failed", __func__); + packet_check_eom(); + + debug("%s: %s", __func__, listen_path); + + c = channel_connect_by_listen_path(listen_path, + "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com", "forwarded-streamlocal"); + free(listen_path); + return c; +} + +static Channel * client_request_x11(const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; char *originator; u_short originator_port; int sock; if (!options.forward_x11) { error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding."); error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a " "malicious server."); return NULL; } if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) { verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout " "expired"); return NULL; } originator = packet_get_string(NULL); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_X11FWD) { debug2("buggy server: x11 request w/o originator_port"); originator_port = 0; } else { originator_port = packet_get_int(); } packet_check_eom(); /* XXX check permission */ debug("client_request_x11: request from %s %d", originator, originator_port); free(originator); sock = x11_connect_display(); if (sock < 0) return NULL; c = channel_new("x11", SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1); c->force_drain = 1; return c; } static Channel * client_request_agent(const char *request_type, int rchan) { Channel *c = NULL; int sock; if (!options.forward_agent) { error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding."); error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a " "malicious server."); return NULL; } sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket(); if (sock < 0) return NULL; c = channel_new("authentication agent connection", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "authentication agent connection", 1); c->force_drain = 1; return c; } int client_request_tun_fwd(int tun_mode, int local_tun, int remote_tun) { Channel *c; int fd; if (tun_mode == SSH_TUNMODE_NO) return 0; if (!compat20) { error("Tunnel forwarding is not supported for protocol 1"); return -1; } debug("Requesting tun unit %d in mode %d", local_tun, tun_mode); /* Open local tunnel device */ if ((fd = tun_open(local_tun, tun_mode)) == -1) { error("Tunnel device open failed."); return -1; } c = channel_new("tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1); c->datagram = 1; #if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER) if (options.tun_open == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT) channel_register_filter(c->self, sys_tun_infilter, sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL); #endif packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN); packet_put_cstring("tun@openssh.com"); packet_put_int(c->self); packet_put_int(c->local_window_max); packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); packet_put_int(tun_mode); packet_put_int(remote_tun); packet_send(); return 0; } /* XXXX move to generic input handler */ static void client_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c = NULL; char *ctype; int rchan; u_int rmaxpack, rwindow, len; ctype = packet_get_string(&len); rchan = packet_get_int(); rwindow = packet_get_int(); rmaxpack = packet_get_int(); debug("client_input_channel_open: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d", ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack); if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-tcpip") == 0) { c = client_request_forwarded_tcpip(ctype, rchan); + } else if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { + c = client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(ctype, rchan); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "x11") == 0) { c = client_request_x11(ctype, rchan); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "auth-agent@openssh.com") == 0) { c = client_request_agent(ctype, rchan); } /* XXX duplicate : */ if (c != NULL) { debug("confirm %s", ctype); c->remote_id = rchan; c->remote_window = rwindow; c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack; if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_int(c->self); packet_put_int(c->local_window); packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); packet_send(); } } else { debug("failure %s", ctype); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); packet_put_int(rchan); packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED); if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) { packet_put_cstring("open failed"); packet_put_cstring(""); } packet_send(); } free(ctype); } static void client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c = NULL; int exitval, id, reply, success = 0; char *rtype; id = packet_get_int(); rtype = packet_get_string(NULL); reply = packet_get_char(); debug("client_input_channel_req: channel %d rtype %s reply %d", id, rtype, reply); if (id == -1) { error("client_input_channel_req: request for channel -1"); } else if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) { error("client_input_channel_req: channel %d: " "unknown channel", id); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com") == 0) { packet_check_eom(); chan_rcvd_eow(c); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exit-status") == 0) { exitval = packet_get_int(); if (c->ctl_chan != -1) { mux_exit_message(c, exitval); success = 1; } else if (id == session_ident) { /* Record exit value of local session */ success = 1; exit_status = exitval; } else { /* Probably for a mux channel that has already closed */ debug("%s: no sink for exit-status on channel %d", __func__, id); } packet_check_eom(); } - if (reply && c != NULL) { + if (reply && c != NULL && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) { packet_start(success ? SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_send(); } free(rtype); } static void client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { char *rtype; int want_reply; int success = 0; rtype = packet_get_string(NULL); want_reply = packet_get_char(); debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d", rtype, want_reply); if (want_reply) { packet_start(success ? SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } free(rtype); } void client_session2_setup(int id, int want_tty, int want_subsystem, const char *term, struct termios *tiop, int in_fd, Buffer *cmd, char **env) { int len; Channel *c = NULL; debug2("%s: id %d", __func__, id); if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) fatal("client_session2_setup: channel %d: unknown channel", id); packet_set_interactive(want_tty, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); if (want_tty) { struct winsize ws; /* Store window size in the packet. */ if (ioctl(in_fd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0) memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws)); channel_request_start(id, "pty-req", 1); client_expect_confirm(id, "PTY allocation", CONFIRM_TTY); packet_put_cstring(term != NULL ? term : ""); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel); if (tiop == NULL) tiop = get_saved_tio(); tty_make_modes(-1, tiop); packet_send(); /* XXX wait for reply */ c->client_tty = 1; } /* Transfer any environment variables from client to server */ if (options.num_send_env != 0 && env != NULL) { int i, j, matched; char *name, *val; debug("Sending environment."); for (i = 0; env[i] != NULL; i++) { /* Split */ name = xstrdup(env[i]); if ((val = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) { free(name); continue; } *val++ = '\0'; matched = 0; for (j = 0; j < options.num_send_env; j++) { if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[j])) { matched = 1; break; } } if (!matched) { debug3("Ignored env %s", name); free(name); continue; } debug("Sending env %s = %s", name, val); channel_request_start(id, "env", 0); packet_put_cstring(name); packet_put_cstring(val); packet_send(); free(name); } } len = buffer_len(cmd); if (len > 0) { if (len > 900) len = 900; if (want_subsystem) { debug("Sending subsystem: %.*s", len, (u_char*)buffer_ptr(cmd)); channel_request_start(id, "subsystem", 1); client_expect_confirm(id, "subsystem", CONFIRM_CLOSE); } else { debug("Sending command: %.*s", len, (u_char*)buffer_ptr(cmd)); channel_request_start(id, "exec", 1); client_expect_confirm(id, "exec", CONFIRM_CLOSE); } packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(cmd), buffer_len(cmd)); packet_send(); } else { channel_request_start(id, "shell", 1); client_expect_confirm(id, "shell", CONFIRM_CLOSE); packet_send(); } } static void client_init_dispatch_20(void) { dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &client_input_channel_open); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &client_input_channel_req); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &channel_input_status_confirm); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &channel_input_status_confirm); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &client_input_global_request); /* rekeying */ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); /* global request reply messages */ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &client_global_request_reply); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &client_global_request_reply); } static void client_init_dispatch_13(void) { dispatch_init(NULL); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_close); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_close_confirmation); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN, &channel_input_port_open); dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS, &client_input_exit_status); dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA, &client_input_stderr_data); dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA, &client_input_stdout_data); dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_AGENT_OPEN, options.forward_agent ? &client_input_agent_open : &deny_input_open); dispatch_set(SSH_SMSG_X11_OPEN, options.forward_x11 ? &x11_input_open : &deny_input_open); } static void client_init_dispatch_15(void) { client_init_dispatch_13(); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_ieof); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, & channel_input_oclose); } static void client_init_dispatch(void) { if (compat20) client_init_dispatch_20(); else if (compat13) client_init_dispatch_13(); else client_init_dispatch_15(); } void client_stop_mux(void) { if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1) unlink(options.control_path); /* * If we are in persist mode, or don't have a shell, signal that we * should close when all active channels are closed. */ if (options.control_persist || no_shell_flag) { session_closed = 1; setproctitle("[stopped mux]"); } } /* client specific fatal cleanup */ void cleanup_exit(int i) { leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); leave_non_blocking(); if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1) unlink(options.control_path); ssh_kill_proxy_command(); _exit(i); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/compat.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/compat.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/compat.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,282 +1,282 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.82 2013/12/30 23:52:27 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: compat.c,v 1.85 2014/04/20 02:49:32 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "packet.h" #include "compat.h" #include "log.h" #include "match.h" int compat13 = 0; int compat20 = 0; int datafellows = 0; void enable_compat20(void) { if (compat20) return; debug("Enabling compatibility mode for protocol 2.0"); compat20 = 1; } void enable_compat13(void) { debug("Enabling compatibility mode for protocol 1.3"); compat13 = 1; } /* datafellows bug compatibility */ void compat_datafellows(const char *version) { int i; static struct { char *pat; int bugs; } check[] = { { "OpenSSH-2.0*," "OpenSSH-2.1*," "OpenSSH_2.1*," "OpenSSH_2.2*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_BANNER| SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY| SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR}, { "OpenSSH_2.3.0*", SSH_BUG_BANNER|SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES| SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY| SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR}, { "OpenSSH_2.3.*", SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES|SSH_OLD_DHGEX| SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF| SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR}, { "OpenSSH_2.5.0p1*," "OpenSSH_2.5.1p1*", SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES|SSH_OLD_DHGEX| SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF| SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR}, { "OpenSSH_2.5.0*," "OpenSSH_2.5.1*," "OpenSSH_2.5.2*", SSH_OLD_DHGEX|SSH_BUG_NOREKEY| SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR}, { "OpenSSH_2.5.3*", SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF| SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR}, { "OpenSSH_2.*," "OpenSSH_3.0*," "OpenSSH_3.1*", SSH_BUG_EXTEOF|SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR}, { "OpenSSH_3.*", SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR }, { "Sun_SSH_1.0*", SSH_BUG_NOREKEY|SSH_BUG_EXTEOF}, { "OpenSSH_4*", 0 }, { "OpenSSH_5*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT}, { "OpenSSH_6.6.1*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH}, { "OpenSSH_6.5*," "OpenSSH_6.6*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH|SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD}, { "OpenSSH*", SSH_NEW_OPENSSH }, { "*MindTerm*", 0 }, { "2.1.0*", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC| SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG| SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE| SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX }, { "2.1 *", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC| SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG| SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE| SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX }, { "2.0.13*," "2.0.14*," "2.0.15*," "2.0.16*," "2.0.17*," "2.0.18*," "2.0.19*", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC| SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG| SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE|SSH_BUG_X11FWD| SSH_BUG_PKOK|SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5| SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE|SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE| SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN|SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX }, { "2.0.11*," "2.0.12*", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC| SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG| SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE|SSH_BUG_X11FWD| SSH_BUG_PKAUTH|SSH_BUG_PKOK| SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE| SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN|SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX }, { "2.0.*", SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB|SSH_BUG_HMAC| SSH_OLD_SESSIONID|SSH_BUG_DEBUG| SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE|SSH_BUG_X11FWD| SSH_BUG_PKAUTH|SSH_BUG_PKOK| SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE| SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY|SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN| SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX }, { "2.2.0*," "2.3.0*", SSH_BUG_HMAC|SSH_BUG_DEBUG| SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5|SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX }, { "2.3.*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG|SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5| SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX }, { "2.4", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID }, /* Van Dyke */ { "2.*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG|SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX| SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR }, { "3.0.*", SSH_BUG_DEBUG }, { "3.0 SecureCRT*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID }, { "1.7 SecureFX*", SSH_OLD_SESSIONID }, { "1.2.18*," "1.2.19*," "1.2.20*," "1.2.21*," "1.2.22*", SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG }, { "1.3.2*", /* F-Secure */ SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG }, { "*SSH Compatible Server*", /* Netscreen */ SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD }, { "*OSU_0*," "OSU_1.0*," "OSU_1.1*," "OSU_1.2*," "OSU_1.3*," "OSU_1.4*," "OSU_1.5alpha1*," "OSU_1.5alpha2*," "OSU_1.5alpha3*", SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD }, { "*SSH_Version_Mapper*", SSH_BUG_SCANNER }, { "Probe-*", SSH_BUG_PROBE }, { NULL, 0 } }; /* process table, return first match */ for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) { if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, strlen(check[i].pat), 0) == 1) { datafellows = check[i].bugs; debug("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x", version, check[i].pat, datafellows); return; } } debug("no match: %s", version); } #define SEP "," int proto_spec(const char *spec) { char *s, *p, *q; int ret = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN; if (spec == NULL) return ret; q = s = xstrdup(spec); for ((p = strsep(&q, SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&q, SEP))) { switch (atoi(p)) { case 1: if (ret == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) ret |= SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED; ret |= SSH_PROTO_1; break; case 2: ret |= SSH_PROTO_2; break; default: logit("ignoring bad proto spec: '%s'.", p); break; } } free(s); return ret; } /* * Filters a proposal string, excluding any algorithm matching the 'filter' * pattern list. */ static char * filter_proposal(char *proposal, const char *filter) { Buffer b; char *orig_prop, *fix_prop; char *cp, *tmp; buffer_init(&b); tmp = orig_prop = xstrdup(proposal); while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) { if (match_pattern_list(cp, filter, strlen(cp), 0) != 1) { if (buffer_len(&b) > 0) buffer_append(&b, ",", 1); buffer_append(&b, cp, strlen(cp)); } else debug2("Compat: skipping algorithm \"%s\"", cp); } buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1); fix_prop = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b)); buffer_free(&b); free(orig_prop); return fix_prop; } char * compat_cipher_proposal(char *cipher_prop) { if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES)) return cipher_prop; debug2("%s: original cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop); cipher_prop = filter_proposal(cipher_prop, "aes*"); debug2("%s: compat cipher proposal: %s", __func__, cipher_prop); if (*cipher_prop == '\0') fatal("No supported ciphers found"); return cipher_prop; } char * compat_pkalg_proposal(char *pkalg_prop) { if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5)) return pkalg_prop; debug2("%s: original public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop); pkalg_prop = filter_proposal(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa"); debug2("%s: compat public key proposal: %s", __func__, pkalg_prop); if (*pkalg_prop == '\0') fatal("No supported PK algorithms found"); return pkalg_prop; } char * compat_kex_proposal(char *kex_prop) { if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD)) return kex_prop; debug2("%s: original KEX proposal: %s", __func__, kex_prop); kex_prop = filter_proposal(kex_prop, "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"); debug2("%s: compat KEX proposal: %s", __func__, kex_prop); if (*kex_prop == '\0') fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found"); return kex_prop; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/compat.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/compat.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/compat.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,75 +1,75 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.44 2013/12/30 23:52:27 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: compat.h,v 1.45 2014/04/18 23:52:25 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef COMPAT_H #define COMPAT_H #define SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN 0x00 #define SSH_PROTO_1 0x01 #define SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED 0x02 #define SSH_PROTO_2 0x04 #define SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB 0x00000001 #define SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE 0x00000002 #define SSH_BUG_HMAC 0x00000004 #define SSH_BUG_X11FWD 0x00000008 #define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID 0x00000010 #define SSH_BUG_PKAUTH 0x00000020 #define SSH_BUG_DEBUG 0x00000040 #define SSH_BUG_BANNER 0x00000080 #define SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG 0x00000100 #define SSH_BUG_PKOK 0x00000200 #define SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD 0x00000400 #define SSH_BUG_SCANNER 0x00000800 #define SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES 0x00001000 #define SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 0x00002000 #define SSH_OLD_DHGEX 0x00004000 #define SSH_BUG_NOREKEY 0x00008000 #define SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE 0x00010000 #define SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE 0x00020000 #define SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY 0x00040000 #define SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN 0x00100000 #define SSH_BUG_EXTEOF 0x00200000 #define SSH_BUG_PROBE 0x00400000 #define SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX 0x00800000 #define SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR 0x01000000 #define SSH_BUG_RFWD_ADDR 0x02000000 #define SSH_NEW_OPENSSH 0x04000000 #define SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT 0x08000000 #define SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD 0x10000000 void enable_compat13(void); void enable_compat20(void); void compat_datafellows(const char *); int proto_spec(const char *); char *compat_cipher_proposal(char *); char *compat_pkalg_proposal(char *); char *compat_kex_proposal(char *); extern int compat13; extern int compat20; extern int datafellows; #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/config.h.in =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/config.h.in (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/config.h.in (revision 276707) @@ -1,1708 +1,1714 @@ /* config.h.in. Generated from configure.ac by autoheader. */ /* Define if building universal (internal helper macro) */ #undef AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD /* Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails for the all-zeros IPv6 address */ #undef AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK /* Define if your AIX loginfailed() function takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2) */ #undef AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG /* System only supports IPv4 audit records */ #undef AU_IPv4 /* Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname */ #undef BIND_8_COMPAT /* The system has incomplete BSM API */ #undef BROKEN_BSM_API /* Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly */ #undef BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE /* getaddrinfo is broken (if present) */ #undef BROKEN_GETADDRINFO /* getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1 */ #undef BROKEN_GETGROUPS /* FreeBSD glob does not do what we need */ #undef BROKEN_GLOB /* Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted (e.g. Irix gcc issue) */ #undef BROKEN_INET_NTOA /* ia_uinfo routines not supported by OS yet */ #undef BROKEN_LIBIAF /* Ultrix mmap can't map files */ #undef BROKEN_MMAP /* Define if your struct dirent expects you to allocate extra space for d_name */ #undef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME /* Can't do comparisons on readv */ #undef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON /* NetBSD read function is sometimes redirected, breaking atomicio comparisons against it */ #undef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON /* Define if you have a broken realpath. */ #undef BROKEN_REALPATH /* Needed for NeXT */ #undef BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS /* Define if your setregid() is broken */ #undef BROKEN_SETREGID /* Define if your setresgid() is broken */ #undef BROKEN_SETRESGID /* Define if your setresuid() is broken */ #undef BROKEN_SETRESUID /* Define if your setreuid() is broken */ #undef BROKEN_SETREUID /* LynxOS has broken setvbuf() implementation */ #undef BROKEN_SETVBUF /* QNX shadow support is broken */ #undef BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE /* Define if your snprintf is busted */ #undef BROKEN_SNPRINTF /* FreeBSD strnvis argument order is swapped compared to OpenBSD */ #undef BROKEN_STRNVIS /* tcgetattr with ICANON may hang */ #undef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON /* updwtmpx is broken (if present) */ #undef BROKEN_UPDWTMPX /* Define if you have BSD auth support */ #undef BSD_AUTH /* Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file */ #undef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE /* Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file */ #undef CONF_UTMP_FILE /* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file */ #undef CONF_WTMPX_FILE /* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file */ #undef CONF_WTMP_FILE /* Define if your platform needs to skip post auth file descriptor passing */ #undef DISABLE_FD_PASSING /* Define if you don't want to use lastlog */ #undef DISABLE_LASTLOG /* Define if you don't want to use your system's login() call */ #undef DISABLE_LOGIN /* Define if you don't want to use pututline() etc. to write [uw]tmp */ #undef DISABLE_PUTUTLINE /* Define if you don't want to use pututxline() etc. to write [uw]tmpx */ #undef DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE /* Define if you want to disable shadow passwords */ #undef DISABLE_SHADOW /* Define if you don't want to use utmp */ #undef DISABLE_UTMP /* Define if you don't want to use utmpx */ #undef DISABLE_UTMPX /* Define if you don't want to use wtmp */ #undef DISABLE_WTMP /* Define if you don't want to use wtmpx */ #undef DISABLE_WTMPX /* Enable for PKCS#11 support */ #undef ENABLE_PKCS11 /* File names may not contain backslash characters */ #undef FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH /* fsid_t has member val */ #undef FSID_HAS_VAL /* fsid_t has member __val */ #undef FSID_HAS___VAL /* Define to 1 if the `getpgrp' function requires zero arguments. */ #undef GETPGRP_VOID /* Conflicting defs for getspnam */ #undef GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS /* Define if your system glob() function has the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension */ #undef GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC /* Define if your system glob() function has gl_matchc options in glob_t */ #undef GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC /* Define if your system glob() function has gl_statv options in glob_t */ #undef GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV /* Define this if you want GSSAPI support in the version 2 protocol */ #undef GSSAPI /* Define if you want to use shadow password expire field */ #undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE /* Define if your system uses access rights style file descriptor passing */ #undef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR /* Define if you have ut_addr in utmp.h */ #undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP /* Define if you have ut_addr in utmpx.h */ #undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX /* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmp.h */ #undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP /* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmpx.h */ #undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX /* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random' function. */ #undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM /* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_buf' function. */ #undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF /* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_stir' function. */ #undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR /* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_uniform' function. */ #undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM /* Define to 1 if you have the `asprintf' function. */ #undef HAVE_ASPRINTF /* OpenBSD's gcc has bounded */ #undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__ /* Have attribute nonnull */ #undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__ /* OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel */ #undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__ /* Define to 1 if you have the `aug_get_machine' function. */ #undef HAVE_AUG_GET_MACHINE /* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_ntop' function. */ #undef HAVE_B64_NTOP /* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_pton' function. */ #undef HAVE_B64_PTON /* Define if you have the basename function. */ #undef HAVE_BASENAME /* Define to 1 if you have the `bcopy' function. */ #undef HAVE_BCOPY /* Define to 1 if you have the `bcrypt_pbkdf' function. */ #undef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF /* Define to 1 if you have the `bindresvport_sa' function. */ #undef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA /* Define to 1 if you have the `blf_enc' function. */ #undef HAVE_BLF_ENC /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_BLF_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_expand0state' function. */ #undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPAND0STATE /* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_expandstate' function. */ #undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPANDSTATE /* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_initstate' function. */ #undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_INITSTATE /* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_stream2word' function. */ #undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_STREAM2WORD /* Define to 1 if you have the `BN_is_prime_ex' function. */ #undef HAVE_BN_IS_PRIME_EX /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_BSD_LIBUTIL_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_BSM_AUDIT_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_BSTRING_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `cap_rights_limit' function. */ #undef HAVE_CAP_RIGHTS_LIMIT /* Define to 1 if you have the `clock' function. */ #undef HAVE_CLOCK /* Have clock_gettime */ #undef HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME /* define if you have clock_t data type */ #undef HAVE_CLOCK_T /* Define to 1 if you have the `closefrom' function. */ #undef HAVE_CLOSEFROM /* Define if gai_strerror() returns const char * */ #undef HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO /* Define if your system uses ancillary data style file descriptor passing */ #undef HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR /* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' function. */ #undef HAVE_CRYPT /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_CRYPTO_SHA2_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_CRYPT_H /* Define if you are on Cygwin */ #undef HAVE_CYGWIN /* Define if your libraries define daemon() */ #undef HAVE_DAEMON /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `authenticate', and to 0 if you don't. */ #undef HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `GLOB_NOMATCH', and to 0 if you don't. */ #undef HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE', and to 0 if you don't. */ #undef HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `howmany', and to 0 if you don't. */ #undef HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `h_errno', and to 0 if you don't. */ #undef HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginfailed', and to 0 if you don't. */ #undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginrestrictions', and to 0 if you don't. */ #undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginsuccess', and to 0 if you don't. */ #undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `MAXSYMLINKS', and to 0 if you don't. */ #undef HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `NFDBITS', and to 0 if you don't. */ #undef HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `offsetof', and to 0 if you don't. */ #undef HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `O_NONBLOCK', and to 0 if you don't. */ #undef HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `passwdexpired', and to 0 if you don't. */ #undef HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `setauthdb', and to 0 if you don't. */ #undef HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `SHUT_RD', and to 0 if you don't. */ #undef HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `writev', and to 0 if you don't. */ #undef HAVE_DECL_WRITEV /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getlong', and to 0 if you don't. */ #undef HAVE_DECL__GETLONG /* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getshort', and to 0 if you don't. */ #undef HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT /* Define to 1 if you have the `DES_crypt' function. */ #undef HAVE_DES_CRYPT /* Define if you have /dev/ptmx */ #undef HAVE_DEV_PTMX /* Define if you have /dev/ptc */ #undef HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_DIRENT_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `dirfd' function. */ #undef HAVE_DIRFD /* Define to 1 if you have the `dirname' function. */ #undef HAVE_DIRNAME /* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_generate_parameters_ex' function. */ #undef HAVE_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_ELF_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `endgrent' function. */ #undef HAVE_ENDGRENT /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_ENDIAN_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `endutent' function. */ #undef HAVE_ENDUTENT /* Define to 1 if you have the `endutxent' function. */ #undef HAVE_ENDUTXENT /* Define if your system has /etc/default/login */ #undef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN /* Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl */ #undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_DigestFinal_ex' function. */ #undef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTFINAL_EX /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_DigestInit_ex' function. */ #undef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup' function. */ #undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_CLEANUP /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex' function. */ #undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_init' function. */ #undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_INIT +/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_ripemd160' function. */ +#undef HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160 + /* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha256' function. */ #undef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 /* Define if you have ut_exit in utmp.h */ #undef HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP /* Define to 1 if you have the `explicit_bzero' function. */ #undef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO /* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmod' function. */ #undef HAVE_FCHMOD /* Define to 1 if you have the `fchown' function. */ #undef HAVE_FCHOWN /* Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom */ #undef HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_FCNTL_H /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fd_mask'. */ #undef HAVE_FD_MASK /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_FEATURES_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_FLOATINGPOINT_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `fmt_scaled' function. */ #undef HAVE_FMT_SCALED /* Define to 1 if you have the `freeaddrinfo' function. */ #undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsblkcnt_t'. */ #undef HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsfilcnt_t'. */ #undef HAVE_FSFILCNT_T /* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatfs' function. */ #undef HAVE_FSTATFS /* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatvfs' function. */ #undef HAVE_FSTATVFS /* Define to 1 if you have the `futimes' function. */ #undef HAVE_FUTIMES /* Define to 1 if you have the `gai_strerror' function. */ #undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR /* Define to 1 if you have the `getaddrinfo' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO /* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETAUDIT /* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit_addr' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR /* Define to 1 if you have the `getcwd' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETCWD /* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrouplist' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST /* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrset' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETGRSET /* Define to 1 if you have the `getlastlogxbyname' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME /* Define to 1 if you have the `getluid' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETLUID /* Define to 1 if you have the `getnameinfo' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO /* Define to 1 if you have the `getopt' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETOPT /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_GETOPT_H /* Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset */ #undef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET /* Define if your libraries define getpagesize() */ #undef HAVE_GETPAGESIZE /* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeereid' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETPEEREID /* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeerucred' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETPEERUCRED /* Define to 1 if you have the `getpgid' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETPGID /* Define to 1 if you have the `getpgrp' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETPGRP /* Define to 1 if you have the `getpwanam' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETPWANAM /* Define to 1 if you have the `getrlimit' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETRLIMIT /* Define if getrrsetbyname() exists */ #undef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME /* Define to 1 if you have the `getrusage' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETRUSAGE /* Define to 1 if you have the `getseuserbyname' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME /* Define to 1 if you have the `gettimeofday' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY /* Define to 1 if you have the `getttyent' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETTTYENT /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutent' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETUTENT /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutid' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETUTID /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutline' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETUTLINE /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxent' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETUTXENT /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxid' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETUTXID /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxline' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETUTXLINE /* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxuser' function. */ #undef HAVE_GETUTXUSER /* Define to 1 if you have the `get_default_context_with_level' function. */ #undef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL /* Define to 1 if you have the `glob' function. */ #undef HAVE_GLOB /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_GLOB_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `group_from_gid' function. */ #undef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H /* Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h */ #undef HAVE_HEADER_AD /* Define to 1 if you have the `HMAC_CTX_init' function. */ #undef HAVE_HMAC_CTX_INIT /* Define if you have ut_host in utmp.h */ #undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP /* Define if you have ut_host in utmpx.h */ #undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_IAF_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_IA_H /* Define if you have ut_id in utmp.h */ #undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP /* Define if you have ut_id in utmpx.h */ #undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX /* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_aton' function. */ #undef HAVE_INET_ATON /* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntoa' function. */ #undef HAVE_INET_NTOA /* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntop' function. */ #undef HAVE_INET_NTOP /* Define to 1 if you have the `innetgr' function. */ #undef HAVE_INNETGR /* define if you have int64_t data type */ #undef HAVE_INT64_T /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `intmax_t'. */ #undef HAVE_INTMAX_T /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_INTTYPES_H /* define if you have intxx_t data type */ #undef HAVE_INTXX_T /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_addr_t'. */ #undef HAVE_IN_ADDR_T /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_port_t'. */ #undef HAVE_IN_PORT_T /* Define if you have isblank(3C). */ #undef HAVE_ISBLANK /* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_cc_new_unique' function. */ #undef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE /* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_free_error_message' function. */ #undef HAVE_KRB5_FREE_ERROR_MESSAGE /* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_get_error_message' function. */ #undef HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LASTLOG_H /* Define if you want ldns support */ #undef HAVE_LDNS /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LIBAUDIT_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `bsm' library (-lbsm). */ #undef HAVE_LIBBSM /* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' library (-lcrypt). */ #undef HAVE_LIBCRYPT /* Define to 1 if you have the `dl' library (-ldl). */ #undef HAVE_LIBDL /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LIBGEN_H /* Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id */ #undef HAVE_LIBIAF /* Define to 1 if you have the `network' library (-lnetwork). */ #undef HAVE_LIBNETWORK /* Define to 1 if you have the `nsl' library (-lnsl). */ #undef HAVE_LIBNSL /* Define to 1 if you have the `pam' library (-lpam). */ #undef HAVE_LIBPAM /* Define to 1 if you have the `socket' library (-lsocket). */ #undef HAVE_LIBSOCKET /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `xnet' library (-lxnet). */ #undef HAVE_LIBXNET /* Define to 1 if you have the `z' library (-lz). */ #undef HAVE_LIBZ /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LIMITS_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LINUX_FILTER_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LINUX_SECCOMP_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LOCALE_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `login' function. */ #undef HAVE_LOGIN /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `login_getcapbool' function. */ #undef HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_LOGIN_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `logout' function. */ #undef HAVE_LOGOUT /* Define to 1 if you have the `logwtmp' function. */ #undef HAVE_LOGWTMP /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long double'. */ #undef HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long long'. */ #undef HAVE_LONG_LONG /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `mblen' function. */ #undef HAVE_MBLEN /* Define to 1 if you have the `md5_crypt' function. */ #undef HAVE_MD5_CRYPT /* Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords */ #undef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS /* Define to 1 if you have the `memmove' function. */ #undef HAVE_MEMMOVE /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_MEMORY_H +/* Define to 1 if you have the `memset_s' function. */ +#undef HAVE_MEMSET_S + /* Define to 1 if you have the `mkdtemp' function. */ #undef HAVE_MKDTEMP /* Define to 1 if you have the `mmap' function. */ #undef HAVE_MMAP /* define if you have mode_t data type */ #undef HAVE_MODE_T /* Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc */ #undef HAVE_NANOSLEEP /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_NDIR_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_NETDB_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_NETGROUP_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H /* Define if you are on NeXT */ #undef HAVE_NEXT /* Define to 1 if you have the `ngetaddrinfo' function. */ #undef HAVE_NGETADDRINFO /* Define to 1 if you have the `nsleep' function. */ #undef HAVE_NSLEEP /* Define to 1 if you have the `ogetaddrinfo' function. */ #undef HAVE_OGETADDRINFO /* Define if you have an old version of PAM which takes only one argument to pam_strerror */ #undef HAVE_OLD_PAM /* Define to 1 if you have the `openlog_r' function. */ #undef HAVE_OPENLOG_R /* Define to 1 if you have the `openpty' function. */ #undef HAVE_OPENPTY /* Define if your ssl headers are included with #include */ #undef HAVE_OPENSSL /* Define if you have Digital Unix Security Integration Architecture */ #undef HAVE_OSF_SIA /* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_getenvlist' function. */ #undef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_putenv' function. */ #undef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_PATHS_H /* Define if you have ut_pid in utmp.h */ #undef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP /* define if you have pid_t data type */ #undef HAVE_PID_T /* Define to 1 if you have the `poll' function. */ #undef HAVE_POLL /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_POLL_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `prctl' function. */ #undef HAVE_PRCTL /* Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd */ #undef HAVE_PROC_PID /* Define to 1 if you have the `pstat' function. */ #undef HAVE_PSTAT /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_PTY_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `pututline' function. */ #undef HAVE_PUTUTLINE /* Define to 1 if you have the `pututxline' function. */ #undef HAVE_PUTUTXLINE /* Define to 1 if you have the `readpassphrase' function. */ #undef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `realpath' function. */ #undef HAVE_REALPATH /* Define to 1 if you have the `recvmsg' function. */ #undef HAVE_RECVMSG /* sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC */ #undef HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `rresvport_af' function. */ #undef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_generate_key_ex' function. */ #undef HAVE_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX /* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get_default_method' function. */ #undef HAVE_RSA_GET_DEFAULT_METHOD /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SANDBOX_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `sandbox_init' function. */ #undef HAVE_SANDBOX_INIT /* define if you have sa_family_t data type */ #undef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T /* Define to 1 if you have the `scan_scaled' function. */ #undef HAVE_SCAN_SCALED /* Define if you have SecureWare-based protected password database */ #undef HAVE_SECUREWARE /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `sendmsg' function. */ #undef HAVE_SENDMSG /* Define to 1 if you have the `setauthdb' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETAUTHDB /* Define to 1 if you have the `setdtablesize' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE /* Define to 1 if you have the `setegid' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETEGID /* Define to 1 if you have the `setenv' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETENV /* Define to 1 if you have the `seteuid' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETEUID /* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroupent' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETGROUPENT /* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroups' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETGROUPS /* Define to 1 if you have the `setlinebuf' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETLINEBUF /* Define to 1 if you have the `setlogin' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETLOGIN /* Define to 1 if you have the `setluid' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETLUID /* Define to 1 if you have the `setpassent' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETPASSENT /* Define to 1 if you have the `setpcred' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETPCRED /* Define to 1 if you have the `setproctitle' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE /* Define to 1 if you have the `setregid' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETREGID /* Define to 1 if you have the `setresgid' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETRESGID /* Define to 1 if you have the `setresuid' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETRESUID /* Define to 1 if you have the `setreuid' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETREUID /* Define to 1 if you have the `setrlimit' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETRLIMIT /* Define to 1 if you have the `setsid' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETSID /* Define to 1 if you have the `setutent' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETUTENT /* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxdb' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETUTXDB /* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxent' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETUTXENT /* Define to 1 if you have the `setvbuf' function. */ #undef HAVE_SETVBUF /* Define to 1 if you have the `set_id' function. */ #undef HAVE_SET_ID /* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA256_Update' function. */ #undef HAVE_SHA256_UPDATE /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SHA2_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SHADOW_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `sigaction' function. */ #undef HAVE_SIGACTION /* Define to 1 if you have the `sigvec' function. */ #undef HAVE_SIGVEC /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `sig_atomic_t'. */ #undef HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T /* define if you have size_t data type */ #undef HAVE_SIZE_T /* Define to 1 if you have the `snprintf' function. */ #undef HAVE_SNPRINTF /* Define to 1 if you have the `socketpair' function. */ #undef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR /* Have PEERCRED socket option */ #undef HAVE_SO_PEERCRED /* define if you have ssize_t data type */ #undef HAVE_SSIZE_T /* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */ #undef HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS /* Define to 1 if you have the `statfs' function. */ #undef HAVE_STATFS /* Define to 1 if you have the `statvfs' function. */ #undef HAVE_STATVFS /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_STDDEF_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_STDINT_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_STDLIB_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `strdup' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRDUP /* Define to 1 if you have the `strerror' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRERROR /* Define to 1 if you have the `strftime' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRFTIME /* Silly mkstemp() */ #undef HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_STRINGS_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_STRING_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcat' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRLCAT /* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcpy' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRLCPY /* Define to 1 if you have the `strmode' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRMODE /* Define to 1 if you have the `strnlen' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRNLEN /* Define to 1 if you have the `strnvis' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRNVIS /* Define to 1 if you have the `strptime' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRPTIME /* Define to 1 if you have the `strsep' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRSEP /* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoll' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRTOLL /* Define to 1 if you have the `strtonum' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRTONUM /* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoul' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRTOUL /* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoull' function. */ #undef HAVE_STRTOULL /* define if you have struct addrinfo data type */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO /* define if you have struct in6_addr data type */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR /* Define to 1 if `pw_change' is a member of `struct passwd'. */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE /* Define to 1 if `pw_class' is a member of `struct passwd'. */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS /* Define to 1 if `pw_expire' is a member of `struct passwd'. */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE /* Define to 1 if `pw_gecos' is a member of `struct passwd'. */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS /* define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 /* Define to 1 if `sin6_scope_id' is a member of `struct sockaddr_in6'. */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID /* define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE /* Define to 1 if `st_blksize' is a member of `struct stat'. */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `struct timespec'. */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC /* define if you have struct timeval */ #undef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL /* Define to 1 if you have the `swap32' function. */ #undef HAVE_SWAP32 /* Define to 1 if you have the `sysconf' function. */ #undef HAVE_SYSCONF /* Define if you have syslen in utmpx.h */ #undef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_CAPABILITY_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_DIR_H /* Define if your system defines sys_errlist[] */ #undef HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_NDIR_H /* Define if your system defines sys_nerr */ #undef HAVE_SYS_NERR /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_PSTAT_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_STRTIO_H /* Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix */ #undef HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_TIMERS_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_SYS_UN_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `tcgetpgrp' function. */ #undef HAVE_TCGETPGRP /* Define to 1 if you have the `tcsendbreak' function. */ #undef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK /* Define to 1 if you have the `time' function. */ #undef HAVE_TIME /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_TIME_H /* Define if you have ut_time in utmp.h */ #undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP /* Define if you have ut_time in utmpx.h */ #undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX /* Define to 1 if you have the `timingsafe_bcmp' function. */ #undef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_TMPDIR_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `truncate' function. */ #undef HAVE_TRUNCATE /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_TTYENT_H /* Define if you have ut_tv in utmp.h */ #undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP /* Define if you have ut_tv in utmpx.h */ #undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX /* Define if you have ut_type in utmp.h */ #undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP /* Define if you have ut_type in utmpx.h */ #undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_UCRED_H /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `uintmax_t'. */ #undef HAVE_UINTMAX_T /* define if you have uintxx_t data type */ #undef HAVE_UINTXX_T /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_UNISTD_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `unsetenv' function. */ #undef HAVE_UNSETENV /* Define to 1 if the system has the type `unsigned long long'. */ #undef HAVE_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG /* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmp' function. */ #undef HAVE_UPDWTMP /* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmpx' function. */ #undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_USERSEC_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `user_from_uid' function. */ #undef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID /* Define to 1 if you have the `usleep' function. */ #undef HAVE_USLEEP /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_UTIL_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `utimes' function. */ #undef HAVE_UTIMES /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_UTIME_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpname' function. */ #undef HAVE_UTMPNAME /* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpxname' function. */ #undef HAVE_UTMPXNAME /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_UTMPX_H /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_UTMP_H /* define if you have u_char data type */ #undef HAVE_U_CHAR /* define if you have u_int data type */ #undef HAVE_U_INT /* define if you have u_int64_t data type */ #undef HAVE_U_INT64_T /* define if you have u_intxx_t data type */ #undef HAVE_U_INTXX_T /* Define to 1 if you have the `vasprintf' function. */ #undef HAVE_VASPRINTF /* Define if va_copy exists */ #undef HAVE_VA_COPY -/* Define to 1 if you have the `vhangup' function. */ -#undef HAVE_VHANGUP - /* Define to 1 if you have the header file. */ #undef HAVE_VIS_H /* Define to 1 if you have the `vsnprintf' function. */ #undef HAVE_VSNPRINTF /* Define to 1 if you have the `waitpid' function. */ #undef HAVE_WAITPID /* Define to 1 if you have the `_getlong' function. */ #undef HAVE__GETLONG /* Define to 1 if you have the `_getpty' function. */ #undef HAVE__GETPTY /* Define to 1 if you have the `_getshort' function. */ #undef HAVE__GETSHORT /* Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern */ #undef HAVE__RES_EXTERN /* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_ntop' function. */ #undef HAVE___B64_NTOP /* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_pton' function. */ #undef HAVE___B64_PTON /* Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__ */ #undef HAVE___FUNCTION__ /* Define if libc defines __progname */ #undef HAVE___PROGNAME /* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */ #undef HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS /* Define if __va_copy exists */ #undef HAVE___VA_COPY /* Define if compiler implements __func__ */ #undef HAVE___func__ /* Define this if you are using the Heimdal version of Kerberos V5 */ #undef HEIMDAL /* Define if you need to use IP address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY */ #undef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY /* Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and treat as IPv4 */ #undef IPV4_IN_IPV6 /* Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting */ #undef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN /* Define if you want Kerberos 5 support */ #undef KRB5 /* Define if pututxline updates lastlog too */ #undef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE -/* Define if you want TCP Wrappers support */ -#undef LIBWRAP - /* Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported" if it doesn't return EOPNOTSUPP. */ #undef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO /* Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer */ #undef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST /* max value of long long calculated by configure */ #undef LLONG_MAX /* min value of long long calculated by configure */ #undef LLONG_MIN /* Account locked with pw(1) */ #undef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX /* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */ #undef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING /* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */ #undef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR /* Some versions of /bin/login need the TERM supplied on the commandline */ #undef LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM /* Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work */ #undef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX /* Define if your login program cannot handle end of options ("--") */ #undef LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT /* If your header files don't define LOGIN_PROGRAM, then use this (detected) from environment and PATH */ #undef LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK /* Set this to your mail directory if you do not have _PATH_MAILDIR */ #undef MAIL_DIRECTORY /* Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty */ #undef NEED_SETPGRP /* compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types */ #undef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE /* Define if the concept of ports only accessible to superusers isn't known */ #undef NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT /* 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Now check whether nonexistent headers # can be detected and how. cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then : # Broken: success on invalid input. continue else # Passes both tests. ac_preproc_ok=: break fi rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext done # Because of `break', _AC_PREPROC_IFELSE's cleaning code was skipped. rm -f conftest.i conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext if $ac_preproc_ok; then : break fi done ac_cv_prog_CPP=$CPP fi CPP=$ac_cv_prog_CPP else ac_cv_prog_CPP=$CPP fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CPP" >&5 $as_echo "$CPP" >&6; } ac_preproc_ok=false for ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in '' yes do # Use a header file that comes with gcc, so configuring glibc # with a fresh cross-compiler works. # Prefer to if __STDC__ is defined, since # exists even on freestanding compilers. # On the NeXT, cc -E runs the code through the compiler's parser, # not just through cpp. "Syntax error" is here to catch this case. cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #ifdef __STDC__ # include #else # include #endif Syntax error _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then : else # Broken: fails on valid input. continue fi rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext # OK, works on sane cases. Now check whether nonexistent headers # can be detected and how. cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then : # Broken: success on invalid input. continue else # Passes both tests. ac_preproc_ok=: break fi rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext done # Because of `break', _AC_PREPROC_IFELSE's cleaning code was skipped. rm -f conftest.i conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext if $ac_preproc_ok; then : else { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5 $as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;} as_fn_error $? "C preprocessor \"$CPP\" fails sanity check See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; } fi ac_ext=c ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS' ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5' ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5' ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}ranlib", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}ranlib; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_prog_RANLIB+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else if test -n "$RANLIB"; then ac_cv_prog_RANLIB="$RANLIB" # Let the user override the test. else as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then ac_cv_prog_RANLIB="${ac_tool_prefix}ranlib" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS fi fi RANLIB=$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB if test -n "$RANLIB"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $RANLIB" >&5 $as_echo "$RANLIB" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi fi if test -z "$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB"; then ac_ct_RANLIB=$RANLIB # Extract the first word of "ranlib", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy ranlib; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else if test -n "$ac_ct_RANLIB"; then ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB="$ac_ct_RANLIB" # Let the user override the test. else as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB="ranlib" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS fi fi ac_ct_RANLIB=$ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB if test -n "$ac_ct_RANLIB"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_ct_RANLIB" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_ct_RANLIB" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi if test "x$ac_ct_RANLIB" = x; then RANLIB=":" else case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in yes:) { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5 $as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;} ac_tool_warned=yes ;; esac RANLIB=$ac_ct_RANLIB fi else RANLIB="$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB" fi # Find a good install program. We prefer a C program (faster), # so one script is as good as another. But avoid the broken or # incompatible versions: # SysV /etc/install, /usr/sbin/install # SunOS /usr/etc/install # IRIX /sbin/install # AIX /bin/install # AmigaOS /C/install, which installs bootblocks on floppy discs # AIX 4 /usr/bin/installbsd, which doesn't work without a -g flag # AFS /usr/afsws/bin/install, which mishandles nonexistent args # SVR4 /usr/ucb/install, which tries to use the nonexistent group "staff" # OS/2's system install, which has a completely different semantic # ./install, which can be erroneously created by make from ./install.sh. # Reject install programs that cannot install multiple files. { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for a BSD-compatible install" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for a BSD-compatible install... " >&6; } if test -z "$INSTALL"; then if ${ac_cv_path_install+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. # Account for people who put trailing slashes in PATH elements. case $as_dir/ in #(( ./ | .// | /[cC]/* | \ /etc/* | /usr/sbin/* | /usr/etc/* | /sbin/* | /usr/afsws/bin/* | \ ?:[\\/]os2[\\/]install[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]OS2[\\/]INSTALL[\\/]* | \ /usr/ucb/* ) ;; *) # OSF1 and SCO ODT 3.0 have their own names for install. # Don't use installbsd from OSF since it installs stuff as root # by default. for ac_prog in ginstall scoinst install; do for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext"; }; then if test $ac_prog = install && grep dspmsg "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" >/dev/null 2>&1; then # AIX install. It has an incompatible calling convention. : elif test $ac_prog = install && grep pwplus "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" >/dev/null 2>&1; then # program-specific install script used by HP pwplus--don't use. : else rm -rf conftest.one conftest.two conftest.dir echo one > conftest.one echo two > conftest.two mkdir conftest.dir if "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" -c conftest.one conftest.two "`pwd`/conftest.dir" && test -s conftest.one && test -s conftest.two && test -s conftest.dir/conftest.one && test -s conftest.dir/conftest.two then ac_cv_path_install="$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext -c" break 3 fi fi fi done done ;; esac done IFS=$as_save_IFS rm -rf conftest.one conftest.two conftest.dir fi if test "${ac_cv_path_install+set}" = set; then INSTALL=$ac_cv_path_install else # As a last resort, use the slow shell script. Don't cache a # value for INSTALL within a source directory, because that will # break other packages using the cache if that directory is # removed, or if the value is a relative name. INSTALL=$ac_install_sh fi fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $INSTALL" >&5 $as_echo "$INSTALL" >&6; } # Use test -z because SunOS4 sh mishandles braces in ${var-val}. # It thinks the first close brace ends the variable substitution. test -z "$INSTALL_PROGRAM" && INSTALL_PROGRAM='${INSTALL}' test -z "$INSTALL_SCRIPT" && INSTALL_SCRIPT='${INSTALL}' test -z "$INSTALL_DATA" && INSTALL_DATA='${INSTALL} -m 644' { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for egrep" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for egrep... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_EGREP+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else if echo a | $GREP -E '(a|b)' >/dev/null 2>&1 then ac_cv_path_EGREP="$GREP -E" else if test -z "$EGREP"; then ac_path_EGREP_found=false # Loop through the user's path and test for each of PROGNAME-LIST as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_prog in egrep; do for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do ac_path_EGREP="$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" { test -f "$ac_path_EGREP" && $as_test_x "$ac_path_EGREP"; } || continue # Check for GNU ac_path_EGREP and select it if it is found. # Check for GNU $ac_path_EGREP case `"$ac_path_EGREP" --version 2>&1` in *GNU*) ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP" ac_path_EGREP_found=:;; *) ac_count=0 $as_echo_n 0123456789 >"conftest.in" while : do cat "conftest.in" "conftest.in" >"conftest.tmp" mv "conftest.tmp" "conftest.in" cp "conftest.in" "conftest.nl" $as_echo 'EGREP' >> "conftest.nl" "$ac_path_EGREP" 'EGREP$' < "conftest.nl" >"conftest.out" 2>/dev/null || break diff "conftest.out" "conftest.nl" >/dev/null 2>&1 || break as_fn_arith $ac_count + 1 && ac_count=$as_val if test $ac_count -gt ${ac_path_EGREP_max-0}; then # Best one so far, save it but keep looking for a better one ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP" ac_path_EGREP_max=$ac_count fi # 10*(2^10) chars as input seems more than enough test $ac_count -gt 10 && break done rm -f conftest.in conftest.tmp conftest.nl conftest.out;; esac $ac_path_EGREP_found && break 3 done done done IFS=$as_save_IFS if test -z "$ac_cv_path_EGREP"; then as_fn_error $? "no acceptable egrep could be found in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin" "$LINENO" 5 fi else ac_cv_path_EGREP=$EGREP fi fi fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&6; } EGREP="$ac_cv_path_EGREP" # Extract the first word of "ar", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy ar; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_AR+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $AR in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_AR="$AR" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then ac_cv_path_AR="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi AR=$ac_cv_path_AR if test -n "$AR"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $AR" >&5 $as_echo "$AR" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "cat", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy cat; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_CAT+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $CAT in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_CAT="$CAT" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then ac_cv_path_CAT="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi CAT=$ac_cv_path_CAT if test -n "$CAT"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CAT" >&5 $as_echo "$CAT" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "kill", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy kill; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_KILL+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $KILL in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_KILL="$KILL" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then ac_cv_path_KILL="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi KILL=$ac_cv_path_KILL if test -n "$KILL"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $KILL" >&5 $as_echo "$KILL" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi for ac_prog in perl5 perl do # Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_PERL+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $PERL in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_PERL="$PERL" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then ac_cv_path_PERL="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi PERL=$ac_cv_path_PERL if test -n "$PERL"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PERL" >&5 $as_echo "$PERL" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi test -n "$PERL" && break done # Extract the first word of "sed", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy sed; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_SED+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $SED in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_SED="$SED" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then ac_cv_path_SED="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi SED=$ac_cv_path_SED if test -n "$SED"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $SED" >&5 $as_echo "$SED" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "ent", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy ent; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_ENT+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $ENT in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_ENT="$ENT" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then ac_cv_path_ENT="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi ENT=$ac_cv_path_ENT if test -n "$ENT"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ENT" >&5 $as_echo "$ENT" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "bash", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy bash; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5 $as_echo "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "ksh", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy ksh; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5 $as_echo "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "sh", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy sh; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5 $as_echo "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "sh", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy sh; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_SH+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $SH in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_SH="$SH" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then ac_cv_path_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi SH=$ac_cv_path_SH if test -n "$SH"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $SH" >&5 $as_echo "$SH" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "groff", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy groff; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_GROFF+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $GROFF in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_GROFF="$GROFF" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then ac_cv_path_GROFF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi GROFF=$ac_cv_path_GROFF if test -n "$GROFF"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $GROFF" >&5 $as_echo "$GROFF" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "nroff", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy nroff; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_NROFF+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $NROFF in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_NROFF="$NROFF" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then ac_cv_path_NROFF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi NROFF=$ac_cv_path_NROFF if test -n "$NROFF"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NROFF" >&5 $as_echo "$NROFF" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "mandoc", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy mandoc; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_MANDOC+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $MANDOC in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_MANDOC="$MANDOC" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then ac_cv_path_MANDOC="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi MANDOC=$ac_cv_path_MANDOC if test -n "$MANDOC"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $MANDOC" >&5 $as_echo "$MANDOC" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi TEST_SHELL=sh if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then MANFMT="$MANDOC" elif test "x$NROFF" != "x" ; then MANFMT="$NROFF -mandoc" elif test "x$GROFF" != "x" ; then MANFMT="$GROFF -mandoc -Tascii" else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: no manpage formatted found" >&5 $as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: no manpage formatted found" >&2;} MANFMT="false" fi # Extract the first word of "groupadd", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy groupadd; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $PATH_GROUPADD_PROG in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in /usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" && ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="groupadd" ;; esac fi PATH_GROUPADD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG if test -n "$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" >&5 $as_echo "$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "useradd", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy useradd; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $PATH_USERADD_PROG in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="$PATH_USERADD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in /usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG" && ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="useradd" ;; esac fi PATH_USERADD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG if test -n "$PATH_USERADD_PROG"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PATH_USERADD_PROG" >&5 $as_echo "$PATH_USERADD_PROG" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # Extract the first word of "pkgmk", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy pkgmk; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else if test -n "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED"; then ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" # Let the user override the test. else as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="yes" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" && ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="no" fi fi MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED=$ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED if test -n "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" >&5 $as_echo "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi if test -x /sbin/sh; then STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL=/sbin/sh else STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL=/bin/sh fi # System features # Check whether --enable-largefile was given. if test "${enable_largefile+set}" = set; then : enableval=$enable_largefile; fi if test "$enable_largefile" != no; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for special C compiler options needed for large files" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for special C compiler options needed for large files... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC=no if test "$GCC" != yes; then ac_save_CC=$CC while :; do # IRIX 6.2 and later do not support large files by default, # so use the C compiler's -n32 option if that helps. cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly. We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807, since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */ #define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62)) int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721 && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1) ? 1 : -1]; int main () { ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : break fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext CC="$CC -n32" if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC=' -n32'; break fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext break done CC=$ac_save_CC rm -f conftest.$ac_ext fi fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" >&6; } if test "$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" != no; then CC=$CC$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for _FILE_OFFSET_BITS value needed for large files" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for _FILE_OFFSET_BITS value needed for large files... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else while :; do cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly. We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807, since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */ #define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62)) int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721 && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1) ? 1 : -1]; int main () { ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=no; break fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS 64 #include /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly. We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807, since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */ #define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62)) int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721 && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1) ? 1 : -1]; int main () { ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=64; break fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=unknown break done fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits" >&6; } case $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits in #( no | unknown) ;; *) cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits _ACEOF ;; esac rm -rf conftest* if test $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits = unknown; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for _LARGE_FILES value needed for large files" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for _LARGE_FILES value needed for large files... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_sys_large_files+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else while :; do cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly. We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807, since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */ #define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62)) int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721 && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1) ? 1 : -1]; int main () { ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_sys_large_files=no; break fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #define _LARGE_FILES 1 #include /* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly. We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807, since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */ #define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62)) int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721 && LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1) ? 1 : -1]; int main () { ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_sys_large_files=1; break fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext ac_cv_sys_large_files=unknown break done fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sys_large_files" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_sys_large_files" >&6; } case $ac_cv_sys_large_files in #( no | unknown) ;; *) cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define _LARGE_FILES $ac_cv_sys_large_files _ACEOF ;; esac rm -rf conftest* fi fi if test -z "$AR" ; then as_fn_error $? "*** 'ar' missing, please install or fix your \$PATH ***" "$LINENO" 5 fi # Use LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment if possible if test ! -z "$LOGIN_PROGRAM" ; then cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK "$LOGIN_PROGRAM" _ACEOF else # Search for login # Extract the first word of "login", so it can be a program name with args. set dummy login; ac_word=$2 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... 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" >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $PATH_PASSWD_PROG in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG="$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $PATH do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi PATH_PASSWD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG if test -n "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PATH_PASSWD_PROG" >&5 $as_echo "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi if test ! -z "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" ; then cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define _PATH_PASSWD_PROG "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" _ACEOF fi if test -z "$LD" ; then LD=$CC fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for inline" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for inline... 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" >&6; } saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ int main(void) { return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } WERROR="-Werror" else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } WERROR="" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Qunused-arguments" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Qunused-arguments... 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" >&6; } saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wformat-security" _define_flag="" test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wformat-security" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc; float l = i * 2.1; double m = l / 0.5; long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc; printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o); exit(0); } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : if `grep -i "unrecognized option" conftest.err >/dev/null` then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag" fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext } { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess... 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"*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5 fi # next, we define all of the options specific to major releases case "$host" in *-*-hpux10*) if test -z "$GCC"; then CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae" fi ;; *-*-hpux11*) $as_echo "#define PAM_SUN_CODEBASE 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define USE_BTMP 1" >>confdefs.h check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo=1 check_for_conflicting_getspnam=1 ;; esac # lastly, we define options specific to minor releases case "$host" in *-*-hpux10.26) $as_echo "#define HAVE_SECUREWARE 1" >>confdefs.h disable_ptmx_check=yes LIBS="$LIBS -lsecpw" ;; esac ;; *-*-irix5*) PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc" $as_echo "#define BROKEN_INET_NTOA 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h ;; *-*-irix6*) PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc" $as_echo "#define WITH_IRIX_ARRAY 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define WITH_IRIX_PROJECT 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define WITH_IRIX_AUDIT 1" >>confdefs.h ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "jlimit_startjob" "ac_cv_func_jlimit_startjob" if test "x$ac_cv_func_jlimit_startjob" = xyes; then : $as_echo "#define WITH_IRIX_JOBS 1" >>confdefs.h fi $as_echo "#define BROKEN_INET_NTOA 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define BROKEN_UPDWTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h ;; *-*-k*bsd*-gnu | *-*-kopensolaris*-gnu) check_for_libcrypt_later=1 $as_echo "#define PAM_TTY_KLUDGE 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX \"!\"" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define _PATH_BTMP \"/var/log/btmp\"" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define USE_BTMP 1" >>confdefs.h ;; *-*-linux*) no_dev_ptmx=1 use_pie=auto check_for_libcrypt_later=1 check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1 $as_echo "#define PAM_TTY_KLUDGE 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX \"!\"" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO EPERM" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define _PATH_BTMP \"/var/log/btmp\"" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define USE_BTMP 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define LINUX_OOM_ADJUST 1" >>confdefs.h inet6_default_4in6=yes case `uname -r` in 1.*|2.0.*) $as_echo "#define BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE 1" >>confdefs.h ;; esac # tun(4) forwarding compat code for ac_header in linux/if_tun.h do : ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "linux/if_tun.h" "ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" "$ac_includes_default" if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H 1 _ACEOF fi done if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = "xyes" ; then $as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_LINUX 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF 1" >>confdefs.h $as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF 1" >>confdefs.h fi for ac_header in linux/seccomp.h linux/filter.h linux/audit.h do : as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "#include " if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF fi done for ac_func in prctl do : ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "prctl" "ac_cv_func_prctl" if test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_PRCTL 1 _ACEOF fi done { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for seccomp architecture" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for seccomp architecture... 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Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char utimes (); int main () { return utimes (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes=yes else ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes=no fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes" = xyes; then : $as_echo "#define HAVE_UTIMES 1" >>confdefs.h LIBS="$LIBS -lc89" fi fi done for ac_header in bsd/libutil.h libutil.h do : as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default" if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF fi done { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing fmt_scaled" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for library containing fmt_scaled... 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Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char fmt_scaled (); int main () { return fmt_scaled (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do if test -z "$ac_lib"; then ac_res="none required" else ac_res=-l$ac_lib LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" fi if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled=$ac_res fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext if ${ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled+:} false; then : break fi done if ${ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled+:} false; then : else ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled=no fi rm conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled" >&6; } ac_res=$ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled if test "$ac_res" != no; then : test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing scan_scaled" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for library containing scan_scaled... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_search_scan_scaled+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char scan_scaled (); int main () { return scan_scaled (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do if test -z "$ac_lib"; then ac_res="none required" else ac_res=-l$ac_lib LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" fi if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_search_scan_scaled=$ac_res fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext if ${ac_cv_search_scan_scaled+:} false; then : break fi done if ${ac_cv_search_scan_scaled+:} false; then : else ac_cv_search_scan_scaled=no fi rm conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_scan_scaled" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_search_scan_scaled" >&6; } ac_res=$ac_cv_search_scan_scaled if test "$ac_res" != no; then : test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing login" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for library containing login... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_search_login+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char login (); int main () { return login (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do if test -z "$ac_lib"; then ac_res="none required" else ac_res=-l$ac_lib LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" fi if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_search_login=$ac_res fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext if ${ac_cv_search_login+:} false; then : break fi done if ${ac_cv_search_login+:} false; then : else ac_cv_search_login=no fi rm conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_login" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_search_login" >&6; } ac_res=$ac_cv_search_login if test "$ac_res" != no; then : test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing logout" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for library containing logout... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_search_logout+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char logout (); int main () { return logout (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do if test -z "$ac_lib"; then ac_res="none required" else ac_res=-l$ac_lib LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" fi if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_search_logout=$ac_res fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext if ${ac_cv_search_logout+:} false; then : break fi done if ${ac_cv_search_logout+:} false; then : else ac_cv_search_logout=no fi rm conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_logout" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_search_logout" >&6; } ac_res=$ac_cv_search_logout if test "$ac_res" != no; then : test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing logwtmp" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for library containing logwtmp... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_search_logwtmp+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char logwtmp (); int main () { return logwtmp (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do if test -z "$ac_lib"; then ac_res="none required" else ac_res=-l$ac_lib LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" fi if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_search_logwtmp=$ac_res fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext if ${ac_cv_search_logwtmp+:} false; then : break fi done if ${ac_cv_search_logwtmp+:} false; then : else ac_cv_search_logwtmp=no fi rm conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_logwtmp" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_search_logwtmp" >&6; } ac_res=$ac_cv_search_logwtmp if test "$ac_res" != no; then : test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing openpty" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for library containing openpty... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_search_openpty+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char openpty (); int main () { return openpty (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do if test -z "$ac_lib"; then ac_res="none required" else ac_res=-l$ac_lib LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" fi if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_search_openpty=$ac_res fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext if ${ac_cv_search_openpty+:} false; then : break fi done if ${ac_cv_search_openpty+:} false; then : else ac_cv_search_openpty=no fi rm conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_openpty" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_search_openpty" >&6; } ac_res=$ac_cv_search_openpty if test "$ac_res" != no; then : test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing updwtmp" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for library containing updwtmp... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_search_updwtmp+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char updwtmp (); int main () { return updwtmp (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do if test -z "$ac_lib"; then ac_res="none required" else ac_res=-l$ac_lib LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" fi if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_search_updwtmp=$ac_res fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext if ${ac_cv_search_updwtmp+:} false; then : break fi done if ${ac_cv_search_updwtmp+:} false; then : else ac_cv_search_updwtmp=no fi rm conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_updwtmp" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_search_updwtmp" >&6; } ac_res=$ac_cv_search_updwtmp if test "$ac_res" != no; then : test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" fi for ac_func in fmt_scaled scan_scaled login logout openpty updwtmp logwtmp do : as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF fi done # On some platforms, inet_ntop may be found in libresolv or libnsl. { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing inet_ntop" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for library containing inet_ntop... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_search_inet_ntop+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char inet_ntop (); int main () { return inet_ntop (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF for ac_lib in '' resolv nsl; do if test -z "$ac_lib"; then ac_res="none required" else ac_res=-l$ac_lib LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" fi if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_search_inet_ntop=$ac_res fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext if ${ac_cv_search_inet_ntop+:} false; then : break fi done if ${ac_cv_search_inet_ntop+:} false; then : else ac_cv_search_inet_ntop=no fi rm conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_inet_ntop" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_search_inet_ntop" >&6; } ac_res=$ac_cv_search_inet_ntop if test "$ac_res" != no; then : test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" fi for ac_func in strftime do : ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strftime" "ac_cv_func_strftime" if test "x$ac_cv_func_strftime" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_STRFTIME 1 _ACEOF else # strftime is in -lintl on SCO UNIX. { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for strftime in -lintl" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for strftime in -lintl... 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Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char strftime (); int main () { return strftime (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime=yes else ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime=no fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime" = xyes; then : $as_echo "#define HAVE_STRFTIME 1" >>confdefs.h LIBS="-lintl $LIBS" fi fi done # Check for ALTDIRFUNC glob() extension { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support... 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"BSM enabled and required function not found" "$LINENO" 5 fi done # These are optional for ac_func in getaudit_addr aug_get_machine do : as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF fi done $as_echo "#define USE_BSM_AUDIT 1" >>confdefs.h if test "$sol2ver" -ge 11; then SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lscf" $as_echo "#define BROKEN_BSM_API 1" >>confdefs.h fi ;; linux) { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: linux" >&5 $as_echo "linux" >&6; } AUDIT_MODULE=linux for ac_header in libaudit.h do : ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "libaudit.h" "ac_cv_header_libaudit_h" "$ac_includes_default" if test "x$ac_cv_header_libaudit_h" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_LIBAUDIT_H 1 _ACEOF fi done SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -laudit" $as_echo "#define USE_LINUX_AUDIT 1" >>confdefs.h ;; debug) AUDIT_MODULE=debug { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: debug" >&5 $as_echo "debug" >&6; } $as_echo "#define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS 1" >>confdefs.h ;; no) { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } ;; *) as_fn_error $? "Unknown audit module $withval" "$LINENO" 5 ;; esac fi # Check whether --with-pie was given. if test "${with_pie+set}" = set; then : withval=$with_pie; if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then use_pie=no fi if test "x$withval" = "xyes"; then use_pie=yes fi fi if test "x$use_pie" = "x"; then use_pie=no fi if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" != "x1" && test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then # Turn off automatic PIE when toolchain hardening is off. use_pie=no fi if test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then # Automatic PIE requires gcc >= 4.x { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gcc >= 4.x" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for gcc >= 4.x... 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then : for ac_func in getrusage do : ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getrusage" "ac_cv_func_getrusage" if test "x$ac_cv_func_getrusage" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_GETRUSAGE 1 _ACEOF fi done fi ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "strsep" "ac_cv_have_decl_strsep" " #ifdef HAVE_STRING_H # include #endif " if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_strsep" = xyes; then : for ac_func in strsep do : ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strsep" "ac_cv_func_strsep" if test "x$ac_cv_func_strsep" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_STRSEP 1 _ACEOF fi done fi ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "tcsendbreak" "ac_cv_have_decl_tcsendbreak" "#include " if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_tcsendbreak" = xyes; then : $as_echo "#define HAVE_TCSENDBREAK 1" >>confdefs.h else for ac_func in tcsendbreak do : ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "tcsendbreak" "ac_cv_func_tcsendbreak" if test "x$ac_cv_func_tcsendbreak" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_TCSENDBREAK 1 _ACEOF fi done fi ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "h_errno" "ac_cv_have_decl_h_errno" "#include " if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_h_errno" = xyes; then : ac_have_decl=1 else ac_have_decl=0 fi cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO $ac_have_decl _ACEOF ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "SHUT_RD" "ac_cv_have_decl_SHUT_RD" " #include #include " if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_SHUT_RD" = xyes; then : ac_have_decl=1 else ac_have_decl=0 fi cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD $ac_have_decl _ACEOF ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "O_NONBLOCK" "ac_cv_have_decl_O_NONBLOCK" " #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H # include #endif " if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_O_NONBLOCK" = xyes; then : ac_have_decl=1 else ac_have_decl=0 fi cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK $ac_have_decl _ACEOF ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "writev" "ac_cv_have_decl_writev" " #include #include #include " if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_writev" = xyes; then : ac_have_decl=1 else ac_have_decl=0 fi cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_DECL_WRITEV $ac_have_decl _ACEOF ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "MAXSYMLINKS" "ac_cv_have_decl_MAXSYMLINKS" " #include " if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_MAXSYMLINKS" = xyes; then : ac_have_decl=1 else ac_have_decl=0 fi cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS $ac_have_decl _ACEOF ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "offsetof" "ac_cv_have_decl_offsetof" " #include " if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_offsetof" = xyes; then : ac_have_decl=1 else ac_have_decl=0 fi cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF $ac_have_decl _ACEOF # extra bits for select(2) ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "howmany" "ac_cv_have_decl_howmany" " #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H #include #endif " if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_howmany" = xyes; then : ac_have_decl=1 else ac_have_decl=0 fi cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY $ac_have_decl _ACEOF ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "NFDBITS" "ac_cv_have_decl_NFDBITS" " #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H #include #endif " if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_NFDBITS" = xyes; then : ac_have_decl=1 else ac_have_decl=0 fi cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS $ac_have_decl _ACEOF ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "fd_mask" "ac_cv_type_fd_mask" " #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H #include #endif " if test "x$ac_cv_type_fd_mask" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_FD_MASK 1 _ACEOF fi for ac_func in setresuid do : ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setresuid" "ac_cv_func_setresuid" if test "x$ac_cv_func_setresuid" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_SETRESUID 1 _ACEOF { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if setresuid seems to work" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if setresuid seems to work... 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" "$LINENO" 5 else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Your OpenSSL headers do not match your library. Check config.log for details. Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches." >&5 $as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Your OpenSSL headers do not match your library. Check config.log for details. Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches." >&2;} fi fi rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if programs using OpenSSL functions will link" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if programs using OpenSSL functions will link... 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" >&6; } cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include int main () { SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } LIBS="$saved_LIBS" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext for ac_func in \ BN_is_prime_ex \ DSA_generate_parameters_ex \ EVP_DigestInit_ex \ EVP_DigestFinal_ex \ EVP_MD_CTX_init \ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup \ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex \ HMAC_CTX_init \ RSA_generate_key_ex \ RSA_get_default_method \ do : as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF fi done # Check whether --with-ssl-engine was given. if test "${with_ssl_engine+set}" = set; then : withval=$with_ssl_engine; if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for OpenSSL ENGINE support" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for OpenSSL ENGINE support... " >&6; } cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include int main () { ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); ENGINE_register_all_complete(); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } $as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE 1" >>confdefs.h else as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL ENGINE support not found" "$LINENO" 5 fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext fi fi # Check for OpenSSL without EVP_aes_{192,256}_cbc { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support... " >&6; } cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main () { exit(EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } $as_echo "#define OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES 1" >>confdefs.h fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext # Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*ctr { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP... " >&6; } cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main () { exit(EVP_aes_128_ctr() == NULL || EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } $as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR 1" >>confdefs.h else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext # Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*gcm { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP... " >&6; } cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main () { exit(EVP_aes_128_gcm() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_gcm() == NULL || EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED == 0 || EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN == 0 || EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG == 0 || EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG == 0 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(NULL, 0, 0, NULL) == 0); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } $as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM 1" >>confdefs.h else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_cipers \ aes128-gcm@openssh.com aes256-gcm@openssh.com" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for library containing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl (); int main () { return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF for ac_lib in '' crypto; do if test -z "$ac_lib"; then ac_res="none required" else ac_res=-l$ac_lib LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS" fi if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl=$ac_res fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl+:} false; then : break fi done if ${ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl+:} false; then : else ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl=no fi rm conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl" >&6; } ac_res=$ac_cv_search_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl if test "$ac_res" != no; then : test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS" $as_echo "#define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL 1" >>confdefs.h fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int... " >&6; } cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main () { if(EVP_DigestUpdate(NULL, NULL,0)) exit(0); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } $as_echo "#define OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID 1" >>confdefs.h fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext # Some systems want crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the version in OpenSSL, # because the system crypt() is more featureful. if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_before" = "x1"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for crypt in -lcrypt" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for crypt in -lcrypt... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char crypt (); int main () { return crypt (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=yes else ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=no fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_LIBCRYPT 1 _ACEOF LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS" fi fi # Some Linux systems (Slackware) need crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the # version in OpenSSL. if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_later" = "x1"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for crypt in -lcrypt" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for crypt in -lcrypt... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char crypt (); int main () { return crypt (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=yes else ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=no fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" = xyes; then : LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt" fi fi for ac_func in crypt DES_crypt do : as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF fi done # Search for SHA256 support in libc and/or OpenSSL for ac_func in SHA256_Update EVP_sha256 do : as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512 \ diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 \ hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com" fi done +# Search for RIPE-MD support in OpenSSL +for ac_func in EVP_ripemd160 +do : + ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EVP_ripemd160" "ac_cv_func_EVP_ripemd160" +if test "x$ac_cv_func_EVP_ripemd160" = xyes; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160 1 +_ACEOF +else + unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ + hmac-ripemd160 + hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com + hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com" + + +fi +done + + # Check complete ECC support in OpenSSL { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1... " >&6; } cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */ # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code" #endif int main () { EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha256(); /* We need this too */ ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } enable_nistp256=1 else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1... " >&6; } cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */ # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code" #endif int main () { EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha384(); /* We need this too */ ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } enable_nistp384=1 else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1... " >&6; } cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */ # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code" #endif int main () { EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */ ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional... " >&6; } if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross-compiling: assuming yes" >&5 $as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross-compiling: assuming yes" >&2;} enable_nistp521=1 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include #include #include #include #include int main () { EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */ exit(e == NULL || m == NULL); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } enable_nistp521=1 else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext COMMENT_OUT_ECC="#no ecc#" TEST_SSH_ECC=no if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1 || test x$enable_nistp384 = x1 || \ test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then $as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_ECC 1" >>confdefs.h fi if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1; then $as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 1" >>confdefs.h TEST_SSH_ECC=yes COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 \ ecdh-sha2-nistp256 ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" fi if test x$enable_nistp384 = x1; then $as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384 1" >>confdefs.h TEST_SSH_ECC=yes COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \ ecdh-sha2-nistp384 ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" fi if test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then $as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 1" >>confdefs.h TEST_SSH_ECC=yes COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms ecdh-sha2-nistp521 \ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" fi +for ac_func in \ + arc4random \ + arc4random_buf \ + arc4random_stir \ + arc4random_uniform \ + +do : + as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh` +ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var" +if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then : + cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF +#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 +_ACEOF + +fi +done + + saved_LIBS="$LIBS" { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ia_openinfo in -liaf" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for ia_openinfo in -liaf... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS LIBS="-liaf $LIBS" cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ /* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error. Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char ia_openinfo (); int main () { return ia_openinfo (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo=yes else ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo=no fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo" = xyes; then : LIBS="$LIBS -liaf" for ac_func in set_id do : ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "set_id" "ac_cv_func_set_id" if test "x$ac_cv_func_set_id" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_SET_ID 1 _ACEOF SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -liaf" $as_echo "#define HAVE_LIBIAF 1" >>confdefs.h fi done fi LIBS="$saved_LIBS" ### Configure cryptographic random number support # Check wheter OpenSSL seeds itself { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded... 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OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main () { exit(RAND_status() == 1 ? 0 : 1); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5 $as_echo "yes" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext fi # PRNGD TCP socket # Check whether --with-prngd-port was given. if test "${with_prngd_port+set}" = set; then : withval=$with_prngd_port; case "$withval" in no) withval="" ;; [0-9]*) ;; *) as_fn_error $? "You must specify a numeric port number for --with-prngd-port" "$LINENO" 5 ;; esac if test ! -z "$withval" ; then PRNGD_PORT="$withval" cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define PRNGD_PORT $PRNGD_PORT _ACEOF fi fi # PRNGD Unix domain socket # Check whether --with-prngd-socket was given. if test "${with_prngd_socket+set}" = set; then : withval=$with_prngd_socket; case "$withval" in yes) withval="/var/run/egd-pool" ;; no) withval="" ;; /*) ;; *) as_fn_error $? "You must specify an absolute path to the entropy socket" "$LINENO" 5 ;; esac if test ! -z "$withval" ; then if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then as_fn_error $? "You may not specify both a PRNGD/EGD port and socket" "$LINENO" 5 fi if test ! -r "$withval" ; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Entropy socket is not readable" >&5 $as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Entropy socket is not readable" >&2;} fi PRNGD_SOCKET="$withval" cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define PRNGD_SOCKET "$PRNGD_SOCKET" _ACEOF fi else # Check for existing socket only if we don't have a random device already if test "x$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" != "xyes" ; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PRNGD/EGD socket" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for PRNGD/EGD socket... 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"*** libpam missing" "$LINENO" 5 fi for ac_func in pam_getenvlist do : ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "pam_getenvlist" "ac_cv_func_pam_getenvlist" if test "x$ac_cv_func_pam_getenvlist" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST 1 _ACEOF fi done for ac_func in pam_putenv do : ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "pam_putenv" "ac_cv_func_pam_putenv" if test "x$ac_cv_func_pam_putenv" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_PAM_PUTENV 1 _ACEOF fi done LIBS="$saved_LIBS" PAM_MSG="yes" SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam" $as_echo "#define USE_PAM 1" >>confdefs.h if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen = yes; then case "$LIBS" in *-ldl*) # libdl already in LIBS ;; *) SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl" ;; esac fi fi fi # Check for older PAM if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then # Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM) { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether pam_strerror takes only one argument" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking whether pam_strerror takes only one argument... 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"seccomp_filter sandbox requires prctl function" "$LINENO" 5 SANDBOX_STYLE="seccomp_filter" $as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER 1" >>confdefs.h elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capability_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capability_h" != "xyes" && \ as_fn_error $? "capsicum sandbox requires sys/capability.h header" "$LINENO" 5 test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \ as_fn_error $? "capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function" "$LINENO" 5 SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum" $as_echo "#define SANDBOX_CAPSICUM 1" >>confdefs.h elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" && \ test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" = "xyes" && \ test "x$rlimit_nofile_zero_works" = "xyes" ) ; then test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \ as_fn_error $? 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((a) * -1) : (a)) /* * printf in libc on some platforms (eg old Tru64) does not understand %lld so * we do this the hard way. */ static int fprint_ll(FILE *f, long long n) { unsigned int i; int l[sizeof(long long) * 8]; if (n < 0) if (fprintf(f, "-") < 0) return -1; for (i = 0; n != 0; i++) { l[i] = my_abs(n % 10); n /= 10; } do { if (fprintf(f, "%d", l[--i]) < 0) return -1; } while (i != 0); if (fprintf(f, " ") < 0) return -1; return 0; } int main () { FILE *f; long long i, llmin, llmax = 0; if((f = fopen(DATA,"w")) == NULL) exit(1); #if defined(LLONG_MIN) && defined(LLONG_MAX) fprintf(stderr, "Using system header for LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n"); llmin = LLONG_MIN; llmax = LLONG_MAX; #else fprintf(stderr, "Calculating LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n"); /* This will work on one's complement and two's complement */ for (i = 1; i > llmax; i <<= 1, i++) llmax = i; llmin = llmax + 1LL; /* wrap */ #endif /* Sanity check */ if (llmin + 1 < llmin || llmin - 1 < llmin || llmax + 1 > llmax || llmax - 1 > llmax || llmin == llmax || llmin == 0 || llmax == 0 || llmax < LONG_MAX || llmin > LONG_MIN) { fprintf(f, "unknown unknown\n"); exit(2); } if (fprint_ll(f, llmin) < 0) exit(3); if (fprint_ll(f, llmax) < 0) exit(4); if (fclose(f) < 0) exit(5); exit(0); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : llong_min=`$AWK '{print $1}' conftest.llminmax` llong_max=`$AWK '{print $2}' conftest.llminmax` { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $llong_max" >&5 $as_echo "$llong_max" >&6; } cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define LLONG_MAX ${llong_max}LL _ACEOF { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for min value of long long" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for min value of long long... 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"Cannot find a type to use in place of socklen_t" "$LINENO" 5 fi fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" >&5 $as_echo "$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" >&6; } cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define socklen_t $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv _ACEOF fi ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "sig_atomic_t" "ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t" "#include " if test "x$ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T 1 _ACEOF fi ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "fsblkcnt_t" "ac_cv_type_fsblkcnt_t" " #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif " if test "x$ac_cv_type_fsblkcnt_t" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T 1 _ACEOF fi ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "fsfilcnt_t" "ac_cv_type_fsfilcnt_t" " #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif " if test "x$ac_cv_type_fsfilcnt_t" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_FSFILCNT_T 1 _ACEOF fi ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "in_addr_t" "ac_cv_type_in_addr_t" "#include #include " if test "x$ac_cv_type_in_addr_t" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_IN_ADDR_T 1 _ACEOF fi ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "in_port_t" "ac_cv_type_in_port_t" "#include #include " if test "x$ac_cv_type_in_port_t" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_IN_PORT_T 1 _ACEOF fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for size_t" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for size_t... 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" >&6; } if ${ac_cv_have_ssize_t+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include int main () { ssize_t foo; foo = 1235; ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_have_ssize_t="yes" else ac_cv_have_ssize_t="no" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_ssize_t" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" = "xyes" ; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_SSIZE_T 1" >>confdefs.h fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for clock_t" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for clock_t... 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" >&6; } if ${ac_cv_have_sa_family_t+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main () { sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include #include int main () { sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" else ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="no" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" = "xyes" ; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T 1" >>confdefs.h fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pid_t" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for pid_t... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_have_pid_t+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include int main () { pid_t foo; foo = 1235; ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_have_pid_t="yes" else ac_cv_have_pid_t="no" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_pid_t" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_have_pid_t" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_have_pid_t" = "xyes" ; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_PID_T 1" >>confdefs.h fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for mode_t" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for mode_t... 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" >&6; } if ${ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include int main () { struct in6_addr s; s.s6_addr[0] = 0; ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="yes" else ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="no" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" = "xyes" ; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR 1" >>confdefs.h ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct sockaddr_in6" "sin6_scope_id" "ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id" " #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H #include #endif #include " if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID 1 _ACEOF fi fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct addrinfo" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for struct addrinfo... " >&6; } if ${ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include #include int main () { struct addrinfo s; s.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="yes" else ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="no" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" = "xyes" ; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct timeval" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for struct timeval... 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Contact your vendor or install" echo "an alternative compiler (I.E., GCC) before continuing." echo "" exit 1; else if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then : { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&5 $as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&2;} else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF main() { char buf[50]; char expected_out[50]; int mazsize = 50 ; #if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8) long int num = 0x7fffffffffffffff; #else long long num = 0x7fffffffffffffffll; #endif strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807"); snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num); if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0) exit(1); exit(0); } #else main() { exit(0); } #endif _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then : true else $as_echo "#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h fi rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \ conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext fi fi # look for field 'ut_host' in header 'utmp.h' ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_host { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_host field in utmp.h" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for ut_host field in utmp.h... 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" >&6; } if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include _ACEOF if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | $EGREP "ut_id" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : eval "$ossh_varname=yes" else eval "$ossh_varname=no" fi rm -f conftest* fi ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 $as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # look for field 'ut_id' in header 'utmpx.h' ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_id { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_id field in utmpx.h" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for ut_id field in utmpx.h... 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" >&6; } if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include _ACEOF if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | $EGREP "ut_addr" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : eval "$ossh_varname=yes" else eval "$ossh_varname=no" fi rm -f conftest* fi ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 $as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # look for field 'ut_addr' in header 'utmpx.h' ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr field in utmpx.h" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for ut_addr field in utmpx.h... " >&6; } if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include _ACEOF if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | $EGREP "ut_addr" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : eval "$ossh_varname=yes" else eval "$ossh_varname=no" fi rm -f conftest* fi ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 $as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # look for field 'ut_addr_v6' in header 'utmp.h' ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr_v6 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmp.h" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmp.h... " >&6; } if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include _ACEOF if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 | $EGREP "ut_addr_v6" >/dev/null 2>&1; then : eval "$ossh_varname=yes" else eval "$ossh_varname=no" fi rm -f conftest* fi ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"` if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5 $as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; } if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi # look for field 'ut_addr_v6' in header 'utmpx.h' ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'` ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr_v6 { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmpx.h" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmpx.h... 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" >&6; } if ${ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext /* end confdefs.h. */ #include #include #include int main () { #ifdef msg_accrights #error "msg_accrights is a macro" exit(1); #endif struct msghdr m; m.msg_accrights = 0; exit(0); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="yes" else ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="no" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then $as_echo "#define HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR 1" >>confdefs.h fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type... 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Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char des_cbc_encrypt (); int main () { return des_cbc_encrypt (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt=yes else ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt=no fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt" = xyes; then : K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -ldes" fi else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } K5LIBS="-lkrb5 -lk5crypto -lcom_err" fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing dn_expand" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for library containing dn_expand... 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Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char gss_init_sec_context (); int main () { return gss_init_sec_context (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context=yes else ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context=no fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context" = xyes; then : $as_echo "#define GSSAPI 1" >>confdefs.h GSSLIBS="-lgssapi" else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgss" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgss... 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Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */ #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" #endif char gss_init_sec_context (); int main () { return gss_init_sec_context (); ; return 0; } _ACEOF if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then : ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context=yes else ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context=no fi rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS fi { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context" >&5 $as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context" >&6; } if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context" = xyes; then : $as_echo "#define GSSAPI 1" >>confdefs.h GSSLIBS="-lgss" else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail" >&5 $as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail" >&2;} fi fi fi ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "gssapi.h" "ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" "$ac_includes_default" if test "x$ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" = xyes; then : else unset ac_cv_header_gssapi_h CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi" for ac_header in gssapi.h do : ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "gssapi.h" "ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" "$ac_includes_default" if test "x$ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" = xyes; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define HAVE_GSSAPI_H 1 _ACEOF else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail" >&5 $as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail" >&2;} fi done fi oldCPP="$CPPFLAGS" CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi" ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "gssapi_krb5.h" "ac_cv_header_gssapi_krb5_h" "$ac_includes_default" if test "x$ac_cv_header_gssapi_krb5_h" = xyes; then : else CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP" fi fi if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -R${KRB5ROOT}/lib" fi if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then blibpath="$blibpath:${KRB5ROOT}/lib" fi for ac_header in gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h do : as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default" if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF fi done for ac_header in gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h do : as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default" if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF fi done for ac_header in gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h do : as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh` ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default" if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then : cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1 _ACEOF fi done { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing k_hasafs" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking for library containing k_hasafs... 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" >&6; } if ${ac_cv_path_xauth_path+:} false; then : $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6 else case $xauth_path in [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*) ac_cv_path_xauth_path="$xauth_path" # Let the user override the test with a path. ;; *) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR for as_dir in $TestPath do IFS=$as_save_IFS test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=. for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do if { test -f "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" && $as_test_x "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; }; then ac_cv_path_xauth_path="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5 break 2 fi done done IFS=$as_save_IFS ;; esac fi xauth_path=$ac_cv_path_xauth_path if test -n "$xauth_path"; then { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $xauth_path" >&5 $as_echo "$xauth_path" >&6; } else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5 $as_echo "no" >&6; } fi if (test ! -z "$xauth_path" && test -x "/usr/openwin/bin/xauth") ; then xauth_path="/usr/openwin/bin/xauth" fi fi STRIP_OPT=-s # Check whether --enable-strip was given. if test "${enable_strip+set}" = set; then : enableval=$enable_strip; if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then STRIP_OPT= fi fi if test -z "$xauth_path" ; then XAUTH_PATH="undefined" else cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define XAUTH_PATH "$xauth_path" _ACEOF XAUTH_PATH=$xauth_path fi # Check for mail directory # Check whether --with-maildir was given. if test "${with_maildir+set}" = set; then : withval=$with_maildir; if test "X$withval" != X && test "x$withval" != xno && \ test "x${withval}" != xyes; then cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define MAIL_DIRECTORY "$withval" _ACEOF fi else if test "X$maildir" != "X"; then cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF #define MAIL_DIRECTORY "$maildir" _ACEOF else { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking Discovering system mail directory" >&5 $as_echo_n "checking Discovering system mail directory... 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If" echo " used, ensure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work.)" fi fi if test ! -z "$superuser_path" ; then echo " sshd superuser user PATH: $J" fi echo " Manpage format: $MANTYPE" echo " PAM support: $PAM_MSG" echo " OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG" echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG" echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG" echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG" echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG" -echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG" echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG" echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG" echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG" echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG" echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG" echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG" echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG" echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG" echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE" echo "" echo " Host: ${host}" echo " Compiler: ${CC}" echo " Compiler flags: ${CFLAGS}" echo "Preprocessor flags: ${CPPFLAGS}" echo " Linker flags: ${LDFLAGS}" echo " Libraries: ${LIBS}" if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then echo " +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}" fi if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then echo " +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}" fi echo "" if test "x$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" = "xyes" ; then echo "SVR4 style packages are supported with \"make package\"" echo "" fi if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then echo "PAM is enabled. You may need to install a PAM control file " echo "for sshd, otherwise password authentication may fail. " echo "Example PAM control files can be found in the contrib/ " echo "subdirectory" echo "" fi if test ! -z "$NO_PEERCHECK" ; then echo "WARNING: the operating system that you are using does not" echo "appear to support getpeereid(), getpeerucred() or the" echo "SO_PEERCRED getsockopt() option. These facilities are used to" echo "enforce security checks to prevent unauthorised connections to" echo "ssh-agent. Their absence increases the risk that a malicious" echo "user can connect to your agent." echo "" fi if test "$AUDIT_MODULE" = "bsm" ; then echo "WARNING: BSM audit support is currently considered EXPERIMENTAL." echo "See the Solaris section in README.platform for details." fi Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/configure.ac =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/configure.ac (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/configure.ac (revision 276707) @@ -1,4901 +1,4885 @@ -# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.571 2014/02/21 17:09:34 tim Exp $ +# $Id: configure.ac,v 1.583 2014/08/26 20:32:01 djm Exp $ # # Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller # # Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any # purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above # copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. # # THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES # WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF # MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR # ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES # WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN # ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF # OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org]) -AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.571 $) +AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.583 $) AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c]) AC_LANG([C]) AC_CONFIG_HEADER([config.h]) AC_PROG_CC AC_CANONICAL_HOST AC_C_BIGENDIAN # Checks for programs. AC_PROG_AWK AC_PROG_CPP AC_PROG_RANLIB AC_PROG_INSTALL AC_PROG_EGREP AC_PATH_PROG([AR], [ar]) AC_PATH_PROG([CAT], [cat]) AC_PATH_PROG([KILL], [kill]) AC_PATH_PROGS([PERL], [perl5 perl]) AC_PATH_PROG([SED], [sed]) AC_SUBST([PERL]) AC_PATH_PROG([ENT], [ent]) AC_SUBST([ENT]) AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [bash]) AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [ksh]) AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [sh]) AC_PATH_PROG([SH], [sh]) AC_PATH_PROG([GROFF], [groff]) AC_PATH_PROG([NROFF], [nroff]) AC_PATH_PROG([MANDOC], [mandoc]) AC_SUBST([TEST_SHELL], [sh]) dnl select manpage formatter if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then MANFMT="$MANDOC" elif test "x$NROFF" != "x" ; then MANFMT="$NROFF -mandoc" elif test "x$GROFF" != "x" ; then MANFMT="$GROFF -mandoc -Tascii" else AC_MSG_WARN([no manpage formatted found]) MANFMT="false" fi AC_SUBST([MANFMT]) dnl for buildpkg.sh AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_GROUPADD_PROG], [groupadd], [groupadd], [/usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc]) AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_USERADD_PROG], [useradd], [useradd], [/usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc]) AC_CHECK_PROG([MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED], [pkgmk], [yes], [no]) if test -x /sbin/sh; then AC_SUBST([STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL], [/sbin/sh]) else AC_SUBST([STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL], [/bin/sh]) fi # System features AC_SYS_LARGEFILE if test -z "$AR" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([*** 'ar' missing, please install or fix your \$PATH ***]) fi # Use LOGIN_PROGRAM from environment if possible if test ! -z "$LOGIN_PROGRAM" ; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK], ["$LOGIN_PROGRAM"], [If your header files don't define LOGIN_PROGRAM, then use this (detected) from environment and PATH]) else # Search for login AC_PATH_PROG([LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK], [login]) if test ! -z "$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK" ; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK], ["$LOGIN_PROGRAM_FALLBACK"]) fi fi AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_PASSWD_PROG], [passwd]) if test ! -z "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" ; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([_PATH_PASSWD_PROG], ["$PATH_PASSWD_PROG"], [Full path of your "passwd" program]) fi if test -z "$LD" ; then LD=$CC fi AC_SUBST([LD]) AC_C_INLINE AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX], [have_llong_max=1], , [#include ]) AC_CHECK_DECL([SYSTR_POLICY_KILL], [have_systr_policy_kill=1], , [ #include #include #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECL([RLIMIT_NPROC], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC], [], [sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC])], , [ #include #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECL([PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS], [have_linux_no_new_privs=1], , [ #include #include ]) use_stack_protector=1 use_toolchain_hardening=1 AC_ARG_WITH([stackprotect], [ --without-stackprotect Don't use compiler's stack protection], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then use_stack_protector=0 fi ]) AC_ARG_WITH([hardening], [ --without-hardening Don't use toolchain hardening flags], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then use_toolchain_hardening=0 fi ]) # We use -Werror for the tests only so that we catch warnings like "this is # on by default" for things like -fPIE. AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports -Werror]) saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror" AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[int main(void) { return 0; }]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) WERROR="-Werror"], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) WERROR="" ] ) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Qunused-arguments]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunknown-warning-option]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wall]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-arith]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wuninitialized]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wsign-compare]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wformat-security]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-sign], [-Wno-pointer-sign]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunused-result], [-Wno-unused-result]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fno-strict-aliasing]) OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2]) if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" = "x1"; then OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,relro]) OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,now]) OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,noexecstack]) # NB. -ftrapv expects certain support functions to be present in # the compiler library (libgcc or similar) to detect integer operations # that can overflow. We must check that the result of enabling it # actually links. The test program compiled/linked includes a number # of integer operations that should exercise this. OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK([-ftrapv]) fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([gcc version]) GCC_VER=`$CC -v 2>&1 | $AWK '/gcc version /{print $3}'` case $GCC_VER in 1.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;; 2.8* | 2.9*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;; 2.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;; *) ;; esac AC_MSG_RESULT([$GCC_VER]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC accepts -fno-builtin-memset]) saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fno-builtin-memset" AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char b[10]; memset(b, 0, sizeof(b)); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ] ) # -fstack-protector-all doesn't always work for some GCC versions # and/or platforms, so we test if we can. If it's not supported # on a given platform gcc will emit a warning so we use -Werror. if test "x$use_stack_protector" = "x1"; then for t in -fstack-protector-strong -fstack-protector-all \ -fstack-protector; do AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports $t]) saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $t -Werror" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $t -Werror" AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char x[256]; snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX"); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $t" LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $t" AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $t works]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char x[256]; snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX"); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) break ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: cannot test]) break ] ) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" done fi if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then # retry LLONG_MAX with -std=gnu99, needed on some Linuxes unset ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -std=gnu99" AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX], [have_llong_max=1], [CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"], [#include ] ) fi fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include __attribute__((__unused__)) static void foo(void){return;}]], [[ exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE(NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE, 1, [compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types]) ] ) if test "x$no_attrib_nonnull" != "x1" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__], [1], [Have attribute nonnull]) fi AC_ARG_WITH([rpath], [ --without-rpath Disable auto-added -R linker paths], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then need_dash_r="" fi if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then need_dash_r=1 fi ] ) # Allow user to specify flags AC_ARG_WITH([cflags], [ --with-cflags Specify additional flags to pass to compiler], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $withval" fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([cppflags], [ --with-cppflags Specify additional flags to pass to preprocessor] , [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $withval" fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([ldflags], [ --with-ldflags Specify additional flags to pass to linker], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $withval" fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([libs], [ --with-libs Specify additional libraries to link with], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then LIBS="$LIBS $withval" fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([Werror], [ --with-Werror Build main code with -Werror], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno"; then werror_flags="-Werror" if test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then werror_flags="$withval" fi fi ] ) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \ blf.h \ bstring.h \ crypt.h \ crypto/sha2.h \ dirent.h \ endian.h \ elf.h \ features.h \ fcntl.h \ floatingpoint.h \ getopt.h \ glob.h \ ia.h \ iaf.h \ inttypes.h \ limits.h \ locale.h \ login.h \ maillock.h \ ndir.h \ net/if_tun.h \ netdb.h \ netgroup.h \ pam/pam_appl.h \ paths.h \ poll.h \ pty.h \ readpassphrase.h \ rpc/types.h \ security/pam_appl.h \ sha2.h \ shadow.h \ stddef.h \ stdint.h \ string.h \ strings.h \ sys/audit.h \ sys/bitypes.h \ sys/bsdtty.h \ sys/capability.h \ sys/cdefs.h \ sys/dir.h \ sys/mman.h \ sys/ndir.h \ sys/poll.h \ sys/prctl.h \ sys/pstat.h \ sys/select.h \ sys/stat.h \ sys/stream.h \ sys/stropts.h \ sys/strtio.h \ sys/statvfs.h \ sys/sysmacros.h \ sys/time.h \ sys/timers.h \ time.h \ tmpdir.h \ ttyent.h \ ucred.h \ unistd.h \ usersec.h \ util.h \ utime.h \ utmp.h \ utmpx.h \ vis.h \ ]) # lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris AC_CHECK_HEADERS([lastlog.h], [], [], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif ]) # sys/ptms.h requires sys/stream.h to be included first on Solaris AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/ptms.h], [], [], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H # include #endif ]) # login_cap.h requires sys/types.h on NetBSD AC_CHECK_HEADERS([login_cap.h], [], [], [ #include ]) # older BSDs need sys/param.h before sys/mount.h AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/mount.h], [], [], [ #include ]) # Android requires sys/socket.h to be included before sys/un.h AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/un.h], [], [], [ #include #include ]) # Messages for features tested for in target-specific section SIA_MSG="no" SPC_MSG="no" SP_MSG="no" # Check for some target-specific stuff case "$host" in *-*-aix*) # Some versions of VAC won't allow macro redefinitions at # -qlanglevel=ansi, and autoconf 2.60 sometimes insists on using that # particularly with older versions of vac or xlc. # It also throws errors about null macro argments, but these are # not fatal. AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows macro redefinitions]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #define testmacro foo #define testmacro bar]], [[ exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) CC="`echo $CC | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`" LD="`echo $LD | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`" CFLAGS="`echo $CFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`" CPPFLAGS="`echo $CPPFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`" ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)]) if (test -z "$blibpath"); then blibpath="/usr/lib:/lib" fi saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" if test "$GCC" = "yes"; then flags="-Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath, -blibpath:" else flags="-blibpath: -Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath," fi for tryflags in $flags ;do if (test -z "$blibflags"); then LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $tryflags$blibpath" AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[]])], [blibflags=$tryflags], []) fi done if (test -z "$blibflags"); then AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) AC_MSG_ERROR([*** must be able to specify blibpath on AIX - check config.log]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([$blibflags]) fi LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS" dnl Check for authenticate. Might be in libs.a on older AIXes AC_CHECK_FUNC([authenticate], [AC_DEFINE([WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE], [1], [Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function])], [AC_CHECK_LIB([s], [authenticate], [ AC_DEFINE([WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE]) LIBS="$LIBS -ls" ]) ]) dnl Check for various auth function declarations in headers. AC_CHECK_DECLS([authenticate, loginrestrictions, loginsuccess, passwdexpired, setauthdb], , , [#include ]) dnl Check if loginfailed is declared and takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2) AC_CHECK_DECLS([loginfailed], [AC_MSG_CHECKING([if loginfailed takes 4 arguments]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ (void)loginfailed("user","host","tty",0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG], [1], [Define if your AIX loginfailed() function takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2)])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ])], [], [#include ] ) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getgrset setauthdb]) AC_CHECK_DECL([F_CLOSEM], AC_DEFINE([HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM], [1], [Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom]), [], [ #include #include ] ) check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo=1 AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_REALPATH], [1], [Define if you have a broken realpath.]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID], [1], [Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID], [1], [Define if your setreuid() is broken]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID], [1], [Define if your setregid() is broken]) dnl AIX handles lastlog as part of its login message AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG], [1], [Define if you don't want to use lastlog]) AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX], [1], [Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work]) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV], [Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is supported by bsd-setproctitle.c]) AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1], [AIX 5.2 and 5.3 (and presumably newer) require this]) AC_DEFINE([PTY_ZEROREAD], [1], [read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd]) AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)]) ;; *-*-android*) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use utmp]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use wtmp]) ;; *-*-cygwin*) check_for_libcrypt_later=1 LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textreadmode.o" AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CYGWIN], [1], [Define if you are on Cygwin]) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES], [1], [Use PIPES instead of a socketpair()]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW], [1], [Define if you want to disable shadow passwords]) AC_DEFINE([NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS], [1], [Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system]) AC_DEFINE([NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT], [1], [Define if the concept of ports only accessible to superusers isn't known]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING], [1], [Define if your platform needs to skip post auth file descriptor passing]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_IOBUFSZ], [65535], [Windows is sensitive to read buffer size]) AC_DEFINE([FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH], [1], [File names may not contain backslash characters]) # Cygwin defines optargs, optargs as declspec(dllimport) for historical # reasons which cause compile warnings, so we disable those warnings. OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wno-attributes]) ;; *-*-dgux*) AC_DEFINE([IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN], [1], [Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) ;; *-*-darwin*) use_pie=auto AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have working getaddrinfo]) AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16)) exit(0); else exit(1); } ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([working])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([buggy]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO], [1], [getaddrinfo is broken (if present)]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([assume it is working])]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [OS X glob does not do what we expect]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([BIND_8_COMPAT], [1], [Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1], [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv]) AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [], AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records]) [#include ] AC_DEFINE([LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE], [1], [Define if pututxline updates lastlog too]) ) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV], [Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is supported by bsd-setproctitle.c]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([sandbox_init]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sandbox.h]) ;; *-*-dragonfly*) SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcrypt" TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX" ;; *-*-haiku*) LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd " AC_CHECK_LIB([network], [socket]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T]) MANTYPE=man ;; *-*-hpux*) # first we define all of the options common to all HP-UX releases CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1" IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT], [1], [Define if your login program cannot handle end of options ("--")]) AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*"], [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account]) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_PSTAT]) AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)]) maildir="/var/mail" LIBS="$LIBS -lsec" AC_CHECK_LIB([xnet], [t_error], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***])]) # next, we define all of the options specific to major releases case "$host" in *-*-hpux10*) if test -z "$GCC"; then CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae" fi ;; *-*-hpux11*) AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE], [1], [Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which passes pam_messages to the conversation function with an extra level of indirection]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use utmp]) AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins]) check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo=1 check_for_conflicting_getspnam=1 ;; esac # lastly, we define options specific to minor releases case "$host" in *-*-hpux10.26) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE], [1], [Define if you have SecureWare-based protected password database]) disable_ptmx_check=yes LIBS="$LIBS -lsecpw" ;; esac ;; *-*-irix5*) PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc" AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA], [1], [Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted (e.g. Irix gcc issue)]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY], [1], [Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your ttyname in [uw]tmp]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) ;; *-*-irix6*) PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc" AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_ARRAY], [1], [Define if you have/want arrays (cluster-wide session managment, not C arrays)]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_PROJECT], [1], [Define if you want IRIX project management]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_AUDIT], [1], [Define if you want IRIX audit trails]) AC_CHECK_FUNC([jlimit_startjob], [AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_JOBS], [1], [Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs])]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX], [1], [updwtmpx is broken (if present)]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) ;; *-*-k*bsd*-gnu | *-*-kopensolaris*-gnu) check_for_libcrypt_later=1 AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"]) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV]) AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts]) AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins]) ;; *-*-linux*) no_dev_ptmx=1 use_pie=auto check_for_libcrypt_later=1 check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1 AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE], [1], [Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"], [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account]) AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV]) AC_DEFINE([LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO], [EPERM], [Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported" if it doesn't return EOPNOTSUPP.]) AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts]) AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP]) AC_DEFINE([LINUX_OOM_ADJUST], [1], [Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer]) inet6_default_4in6=yes case `uname -r` in 1.*|2.0.*) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE], [1], [Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly]) ;; esac # tun(4) forwarding compat code AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/if_tun.h]) if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_LINUX], [1], [Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1], [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) fi AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/seccomp.h linux/filter.h linux/audit.h], [], [], [#include ]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([prctl]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for seccomp architecture]) seccomp_audit_arch= case "$host" in x86_64-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 ;; i*86-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386 ;; arm*-*) seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM ;; esac if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT(["$seccomp_audit_arch"]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH], [$seccomp_audit_arch], [Specify the system call convention in use]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([architecture not supported]) fi ;; mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4) AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP], [1], [Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty]) SONY=1 ;; *-*-netbsd*) check_for_libcrypt_before=1 if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then need_dash_r=1 fi AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way]) AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], , AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support])) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1], [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic]) TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX" AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1], [NetBSD strnvis argument order is swapped compared to OpenBSD]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON], [1], [NetBSD read function is sometimes redirected, breaking atomicio comparisons against it]) ;; *-*-freebsd*) check_for_libcrypt_later=1 AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["*LOCKED*"], [Account locked with pw(1)]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way]) AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], , AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support])) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [FreeBSD glob does not do what we need]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1], [FreeBSD strnvis argument order is swapped compared to OpenBSD]) TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX" # Preauth crypto occasionally uses file descriptors for crypto offload # and will crash if they cannot be opened. AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE], [1], [define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things]) ;; *-*-bsdi*) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) ;; *-next-*) conf_lastlog_location="/usr/adm/lastlog" conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp conf_wtmp_location=/usr/adm/wtmp maildir=/usr/spool/mail AC_DEFINE([HAVE_NEXT], [1], [Define if you are on NeXT]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_REALPATH]) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS], [1], [Needed for NeXT]) ;; *-*-openbsd*) use_pie=auto AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__], [1], [OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__], [1], [OpenBSD's gcc has bounded]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_OPENBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way]) AC_DEFINE([SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND], [1], [syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler]) TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX" ;; *-*-solaris*) if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then need_dash_r=1 fi AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE]) AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX]) AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM], [1], [Some versions of /bin/login need the TERM supplied on the commandline]) AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE]) AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1], [Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set to the unpriv'ed user]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) # Pushing STREAMS modules will cause sshd to acquire a controlling tty. AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY], [1], [Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY after setsid()]) AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME], [1], [must supply username to passwd in case the name is longer than 8 chars]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON], [1], [tcgetattr with ICANON may hang]) external_path_file=/etc/default/login # hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions) conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x]) sol2ver=`echo "$host"| sed -e 's/.*[[0-9]]\.//'` if test "$sol2ver" -ge 8; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use wtmp]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-contracts], [ --with-solaris-contracts Enable Solaris process contracts (experimental)], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([contract], [ct_tmpl_activate], [ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS], [1], [Define if you have Solaris process contracts]) SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcontract" SPC_MSG="yes" ], ) ], ) AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-projects], [ --with-solaris-projects Enable Solaris projects (experimental)], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([project], [setproject], [ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS], [1], [Define if you have Solaris projects]) SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lproject" SP_MSG="yes" ], ) ], ) TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell ;; *-*-sunos4*) CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DSUNOS4" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getpwanam]) AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE]) conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp conf_wtmp_location=/var/adm/wtmp conf_lastlog_location=/var/adm/lastlog AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) ;; *-ncr-sysv*) LIBS="$LIBS -lc89" AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) ;; *-sni-sysv*) # /usr/ucblib MUST NOT be searched on ReliantUNIX AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlsym], ,) # -lresolv needs to be at the end of LIBS or DNS lookups break AC_CHECK_LIB([resolv], [res_query], [ LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv" ]) IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY]) external_path_file=/etc/default/login # /usr/ucblib/libucb.a no longer needed on ReliantUNIX # Attention: always take care to bind libsocket and libnsl before libc, # otherwise you will find lots of "SIOCGPGRP errno 22" on syslog ;; # UnixWare 1.x, UnixWare 2.x, and others based on code from Univel. *-*-sysv4.2*) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME], [1], [must supply username to passwd]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell ;; # UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX 8 *-*-sysv5*) CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -Dvsnprintf=_xvsnprintf -Dsnprintf=_xsnprintf" AC_DEFINE([UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS], [1], [Support passwords > 8 chars]) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME]) TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell case "$host" in *-*-sysv5SCO_SV*) # SCO OpenServer 6.x maildir=/var/spool/mail AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_LIBIAF], [1], [ia_uinfo routines not supported by OS yet]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX]) AC_CHECK_LIB([prot], [getluid], [ LIBS="$LIBS -lprot" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid], , , [-lprot]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW]) ], , ) ;; *) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"]) check_for_libcrypt_later=1 ;; esac ;; *-*-sysv*) ;; # SCO UNIX and OEM versions of SCO UNIX *-*-sco3.2v4*) AC_MSG_ERROR("This Platform is no longer supported.") ;; # SCO OpenServer 5.x *-*-sco3.2v5*) if test -z "$GCC"; then CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -belf" fi LIBS="$LIBS -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm" no_dev_ptmx=1 AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX]) AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid]) MANTYPE=man TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE=yes ;; *-*-unicosmk*) AC_DEFINE([NO_SSH_LASTLOG], [1], [Define if you don't want to use lastlog in session.c]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lrsc -lshare -luex -lacm" MANTYPE=cat ;; *-*-unicosmp*) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY]) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lacid -ldb" MANTYPE=cat ;; *-*-unicos*) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) AC_DEFINE([NO_SSH_LASTLOG]) LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -Wl,-Dmsglevel=334:fatal" LIBS="$LIBS -lgen -lrsc -lshare -luex -lacm" MANTYPE=cat ;; *-dec-osf*) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Digital Unix SIA]) no_osfsia="" AC_ARG_WITH([osfsia], [ --with-osfsia Enable Digital Unix SIA], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([disabled]) no_osfsia=1 fi ], ) if test -z "$no_osfsia" ; then if test -f /etc/sia/matrix.conf; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OSF_SIA], [1], [Define if you have Digital Unix Security Integration Architecture]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LOGIN], [1], [Define if you don't want to use your system's login() call]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) LIBS="$LIBS -lsecurity -ldb -lm -laud" SIA_MSG="yes" else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR], ["Nologin"], [String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account]) fi fi AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON], [1], [Can't do comparisons on readv]) ;; *-*-nto-qnx*) AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES]) AC_DEFINE([NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG]) AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE], [1], [QNX shadow support is broken]) enable_etc_default_login=no # has incompatible /etc/default/login case "$host" in *-*-nto-qnx6*) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING]) ;; esac ;; *-*-ultrix*) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETGROUPS], [1], [getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_MMAP], [1], [Ultrix mmap can't map files]) AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H], [1], [Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix]) ;; *-*-lynxos) CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D__NO_INCLUDE_WARN__" AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETVBUF], [1], [LynxOS has broken setvbuf() implementation]) ;; esac AC_MSG_CHECKING([compiler and flags for sanity]) AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_MSG_ERROR([*** compiler cannot create working executables, check config.log ***]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity]) ] ) dnl Checks for header files. # Checks for libraries. AC_CHECK_FUNC([yp_match], , [AC_CHECK_LIB([nsl], [yp_match])]) AC_CHECK_FUNC([setsockopt], , [AC_CHECK_LIB([socket], [setsockopt])]) dnl IRIX and Solaris 2.5.1 have dirname() in libgen AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dirname], [AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libgen.h])] , [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gen], [dirname], [ AC_CACHE_CHECK([for broken dirname], ac_cv_have_broken_dirname, [ save_LIBS="$LIBS" LIBS="$LIBS -lgen" AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { char *s, buf[32]; strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32); s = dirname(buf); if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) { exit(1); } else { exit(0); } } ]])], [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ], [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ], ) LIBS="$save_LIBS" ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" = "xno" ; then LIBS="$LIBS -lgen" AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DIRNAME]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libgen.h]) fi ]) ]) AC_CHECK_FUNC([getspnam], , [AC_CHECK_LIB([gen], [getspnam], [LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"])]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([basename], [gen], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_BASENAME], [1], [Define if you have the basename function.])]) dnl zlib is required AC_ARG_WITH([zlib], [ --with-zlib=PATH Use zlib in PATH], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib is required ***]) elif test "x$withval" != "xyes"; then if test -d "$withval/lib"; then if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" fi else if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" fi fi if test -d "$withval/include"; then CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}" else CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}" fi fi ] ) AC_CHECK_HEADER([zlib.h], ,[AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib.h missing - please install first or check config.log ***])]) AC_CHECK_LIB([z], [deflate], , [ saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" save_LIBS="$LIBS" dnl Check default zlib install dir if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib -R/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}" fi CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}" LIBS="$LIBS -lz" AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([deflate], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBZ])], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib missing - please install first or check config.log ***]) ] ) ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([zlib-version-check], [ --without-zlib-version-check Disable zlib version check], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then zlib_check_nonfatal=1 fi ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for possibly buggy zlib]) AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ int a=0, b=0, c=0, d=0, n, v; n = sscanf(ZLIB_VERSION, "%d.%d.%d.%d", &a, &b, &c, &d); if (n != 3 && n != 4) exit(1); v = a*1000000 + b*10000 + c*100 + d; fprintf(stderr, "found zlib version %s (%d)\n", ZLIB_VERSION, v); /* 1.1.4 is OK */ if (a == 1 && b == 1 && c >= 4) exit(0); /* 1.2.3 and up are OK */ if (v >= 1020300) exit(0); exit(2); ]])], AC_MSG_RESULT([no]), [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) if test -z "$zlib_check_nonfatal" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib too old - check config.log *** Your reported zlib version has known security problems. It's possible your vendor has fixed these problems without changing the version number. If you are sure this is the case, you can disable the check by running "./configure --without-zlib-version-check". If you are in doubt, upgrade zlib to version 1.2.3 or greater. See http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ for details.]) else AC_MSG_WARN([zlib version may have security problems]) fi ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking zlib version]) ] ) dnl UnixWare 2.x AC_CHECK_FUNC([strcasecmp], [], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([resolv], [strcasecmp], [LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"]) ] ) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utimes], [], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([c89], [utimes], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UTIMES]) LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"]) ] ) dnl Checks for libutil functions AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsd/libutil.h libutil.h]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([fmt_scaled], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([scan_scaled], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([login], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logout], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logwtmp], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([openpty], [util bsd]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([updwtmp], [util bsd]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([fmt_scaled scan_scaled login logout openpty updwtmp logwtmp]) # On some platforms, inet_ntop may be found in libresolv or libnsl. AC_SEARCH_LIBS([inet_ntop], [resolv nsl]) AC_FUNC_STRFTIME # Check for ALTDIRFUNC glob() extension AC_MSG_CHECKING([for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support]) AC_EGREP_CPP([FOUNDIT], [ #include #ifdef GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC FOUNDIT #endif ], [ AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC], [1], [Define if your system glob() function has the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) # Check for g.gl_matchc glob() extension AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gl_matchc field in glob_t]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ glob_t g; g.gl_matchc = 1; ]])], [ AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC], [1], [Define if your system glob() function has gl_matchc options in glob_t]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) # Check for g.gl_statv glob() extension AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gl_statv and GLOB_KEEPSTAT extensions for glob]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ #ifndef GLOB_KEEPSTAT #error "glob does not support GLOB_KEEPSTAT extension" #endif glob_t g; g.gl_statv = NULL; ]])], [ AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV], [1], [Define if your system glob() function has gl_statv options in glob_t]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([GLOB_NOMATCH], , , [#include ]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct dirent d; exit(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char)); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME], [1], [Define if your struct dirent expects you to allocate extra space for d_name]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME]) ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for /proc/pid/fd directory]) if test -d "/proc/$$/fd" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PROC_PID], [1], [Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi # Check whether user wants S/Key support SKEY_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([skey], [ --with-skey[[=PATH]] Enable S/Key support (optionally in PATH)], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib" fi AC_DEFINE([SKEY], [1], [Define if you want S/Key support]) LIBS="-lskey $LIBS" SKEY_MSG="yes" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for s/key support]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ char *ff = skey_keyinfo(""); ff=""; exit(0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing s/key libraries.]) ]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if skeychallenge takes 4 arguments]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ (void)skeychallenge(NULL,"name","",0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([SKEYCHALLENGE_4ARG], [1], [Define if your skeychallenge() function takes 4 arguments (NetBSD)])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi ] ) -# Check whether user wants TCP wrappers support -TCPW_MSG="no" -AC_ARG_WITH([tcp-wrappers], - [ --with-tcp-wrappers[[=PATH]] Enable tcpwrappers support (optionally in PATH)], - [ - if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then - saved_LIBS="$LIBS" - saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" - saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" - if test -n "${withval}" && \ - test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then - if test -d "${withval}/lib"; then - if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then - LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" - else - LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" - fi - else - if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then - LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" - else - LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" - fi - fi - if test -d "${withval}/include"; then - CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}" - else - CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}" - fi - fi - LIBS="-lwrap $LIBS" - AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libwrap]) - AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ -#include -#include -#include -#include -int deny_severity = 0, allow_severity = 0; - ]], [[ - hosts_access(0); - ]])], [ - AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) - AC_DEFINE([LIBWRAP], [1], - [Define if you want - TCP Wrappers support]) - SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lwrap" - TCPW_MSG="yes" - ], [ - AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libwrap missing]) - - ]) - LIBS="$saved_LIBS" - fi - ] -) - # Check whether user wants to use ldns LDNS_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH(ldns, [ --with-ldns[[=PATH]] Use ldns for DNSSEC support (optionally in PATH)], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib" fi AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LDNS, 1, [Define if you want ldns support]) LIBS="-lldns $LIBS" LDNS_MSG="yes" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for ldns support]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include #include #include #include int main() { ldns_status status = ldns_verify_trusted(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); status=LDNS_STATUS_OK; exit(0); } ]]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)], [ AC_MSG_RESULT(no) AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing ldns libraries.]) ]) fi ] ) # Check whether user wants libedit support LIBEDIT_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([libedit], [ --with-libedit[[=PATH]] Enable libedit support for sftp], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no]) if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $PKGCONFIG knows about libedit]) if "$PKGCONFIG" libedit; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) use_pkgconfig_for_libedit=yes else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi fi else CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include" if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" fi fi if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libedit" = "xyes"; then LIBEDIT=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libedit` CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libedit`" else LIBEDIT="-ledit -lcurses" fi OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBEDIT | sed 's/-ledit//'` AC_CHECK_LIB([edit], [el_init], [ AC_DEFINE([USE_LIBEDIT], [1], [Use libedit for sftp]) LIBEDIT_MSG="yes" AC_SUBST([LIBEDIT]) ], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([libedit not found]) ], [ $OTHERLIBS ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if libedit version is compatible]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ int i = H_SETSIZE; el_init("", NULL, NULL, NULL); exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_MSG_ERROR([libedit version is not compatible]) ] ) fi ] ) AUDIT_MODULE=none AC_ARG_WITH([audit], [ --with-audit=module Enable audit support (modules=debug,bsm,linux)], [ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for supported audit module]) case "$withval" in bsm) AC_MSG_RESULT([bsm]) AUDIT_MODULE=bsm dnl Checks for headers, libs and functions AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsm/audit.h], [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and bsm/audit.h not found])], [ #ifdef HAVE_TIME_H # include #endif ] ) AC_CHECK_LIB([bsm], [getaudit], [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and required library not found])]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getaudit], [], [AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and required function not found])]) # These are optional AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getaudit_addr aug_get_machine]) AC_DEFINE([USE_BSM_AUDIT], [1], [Use BSM audit module]) if test "$sol2ver" -ge 11; then SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lscf" AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_BSM_API], [1], [The system has incomplete BSM API]) fi ;; linux) AC_MSG_RESULT([linux]) AUDIT_MODULE=linux dnl Checks for headers, libs and functions AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libaudit.h]) SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -laudit" AC_DEFINE([USE_LINUX_AUDIT], [1], [Use Linux audit module]) ;; debug) AUDIT_MODULE=debug AC_MSG_RESULT([debug]) AC_DEFINE([SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS], [1], [Use audit debugging module]) ;; no) AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ;; *) AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown audit module $withval]) ;; esac ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([pie], [ --with-pie Build Position Independent Executables if possible], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then use_pie=no fi if test "x$withval" = "xyes"; then use_pie=yes fi ] ) if test "x$use_pie" = "x"; then use_pie=no fi if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" != "x1" && test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then # Turn off automatic PIE when toolchain hardening is off. use_pie=no fi if test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then # Automatic PIE requires gcc >= 4.x AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gcc >= 4.x]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #if !defined(__GNUC__) || __GNUC__ < 4 #error gcc is too old #endif ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) use_pie=no ] ) fi if test "x$use_pie" != "xno"; then SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS" SAVED_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fPIE]) OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-pie]) # We use both -fPIE and -pie or neither. AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether both -fPIE and -pie are supported]) if echo "x $CFLAGS" | grep ' -fPIE' >/dev/null 2>&1 && \ echo "x $LDFLAGS" | grep ' -pie' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS" LDFLAGS="$SAVED_LDFLAGS" fi fi dnl Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ Blowfish_initstate \ Blowfish_expandstate \ Blowfish_expand0state \ Blowfish_stream2word \ - arc4random \ - arc4random_buf \ - arc4random_stir \ - arc4random_uniform \ asprintf \ b64_ntop \ __b64_ntop \ b64_pton \ __b64_pton \ bcopy \ bcrypt_pbkdf \ bindresvport_sa \ blf_enc \ cap_rights_limit \ clock \ closefrom \ dirfd \ endgrent \ explicit_bzero \ fchmod \ fchown \ freeaddrinfo \ fstatfs \ fstatvfs \ futimes \ getaddrinfo \ getcwd \ getgrouplist \ getnameinfo \ getopt \ getpeereid \ getpeerucred \ getpgid \ getpgrp \ _getpty \ getrlimit \ getttyent \ glob \ group_from_gid \ inet_aton \ inet_ntoa \ inet_ntop \ innetgr \ login_getcapbool \ mblen \ md5_crypt \ memmove \ + memset_s \ mkdtemp \ mmap \ ngetaddrinfo \ nsleep \ ogetaddrinfo \ openlog_r \ poll \ prctl \ pstat \ readpassphrase \ realpath \ recvmsg \ rresvport_af \ sendmsg \ setdtablesize \ setegid \ setenv \ seteuid \ setgroupent \ setgroups \ setlinebuf \ setlogin \ setpassent\ setpcred \ setproctitle \ setregid \ setreuid \ setrlimit \ setsid \ setvbuf \ sigaction \ sigvec \ snprintf \ socketpair \ statfs \ statvfs \ strdup \ strerror \ strlcat \ strlcpy \ strmode \ strnlen \ strnvis \ strptime \ strtonum \ strtoll \ strtoul \ strtoull \ swap32 \ sysconf \ tcgetpgrp \ timingsafe_bcmp \ truncate \ unsetenv \ updwtmpx \ user_from_uid \ usleep \ vasprintf \ - vhangup \ vsnprintf \ waitpid \ ]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM( [[ #include ]], [[ return (isblank('a')); ]])], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ISBLANK], [1], [Define if you have isblank(3C).]) ]) # PKCS#11 support requires dlopen() and co AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlopen], [dl], [AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_PKCS11], [], [Enable for PKCS#11 support])] ) # IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror() AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gai_strerror], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GAI_STRERROR]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include const char *gai_strerror(int); ]], [[ char *str; str = gai_strerror(0); ]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO], [1], [Define if gai_strerror() returns const char *])], [])]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([nanosleep], [rt posix4], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_NANOSLEEP], [1], [Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc])]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([clock_gettime], [rt], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME], [1], [Have clock_gettime])]) dnl Make sure prototypes are defined for these before using them. AC_CHECK_DECL([getrusage], [AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getrusage])]) AC_CHECK_DECL([strsep], [AC_CHECK_FUNCS([strsep])], [], [ #ifdef HAVE_STRING_H # include #endif ]) dnl tcsendbreak might be a macro AC_CHECK_DECL([tcsendbreak], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_TCSENDBREAK])], [AC_CHECK_FUNCS([tcsendbreak])], [#include ] ) AC_CHECK_DECLS([h_errno], , ,[#include ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([SHUT_RD], , , [ #include #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([O_NONBLOCK], , , [ #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H # include #endif ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([writev], , , [ #include #include #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([MAXSYMLINKS], , , [ #include ]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([offsetof], , , [ #include ]) # extra bits for select(2) AC_CHECK_DECLS([howmany, NFDBITS], [], [], [[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H #include #endif ]]) AC_CHECK_TYPES([fd_mask], [], [], [[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H #include #endif ]]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setresuid], [ dnl Some platorms have setresuid that isn't implemented, test for this AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setresuid seems to work]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ errno=0; setresuid(0,0,0); if (errno==ENOSYS) exit(1); else exit(0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETRESUID], [1], [Define if your setresuid() is broken]) AC_MSG_RESULT([not implemented])], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking setresuid])] ) ]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setresgid], [ dnl Some platorms have setresgid that isn't implemented, test for this AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setresgid seems to work]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ errno=0; setresgid(0,0,0); if (errno==ENOSYS) exit(1); else exit(0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETRESGID], [1], [Define if your setresgid() is broken]) AC_MSG_RESULT([not implemented])], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking setresuid])] ) ]) dnl Checks for time functions AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gettimeofday time]) dnl Checks for utmp functions AC_CHECK_FUNCS([endutent getutent getutid getutline pututline setutent]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utmpname]) dnl Checks for utmpx functions AC_CHECK_FUNCS([endutxent getutxent getutxid getutxline getutxuser pututxline]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setutxdb setutxent utmpxname]) dnl Checks for lastlog functions AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getlastlogxbyname]) AC_CHECK_FUNC([daemon], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DAEMON], [1], [Define if your libraries define daemon()])], [AC_CHECK_LIB([bsd], [daemon], [LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd"; AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DAEMON])])] ) AC_CHECK_FUNC([getpagesize], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETPAGESIZE], [1], [Define if your libraries define getpagesize()])], [AC_CHECK_LIB([ucb], [getpagesize], [LIBS="$LIBS -lucb"; AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETPAGESIZE])])] ) # Check for broken snprintf if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char b[5]; snprintf(b,5,"123456789"); exit(b[4]!='\0'); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1], [Define if your snprintf is busted]) AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) ] ) fi -# If we don't have a working asprintf, then we strongly depend on vsnprintf -# returning the right thing on overflow: the number of characters it tried to -# create (as per SUSv3) -if test "x$ac_cv_func_asprintf" != "xyes" && \ - test "x$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf" = "xyes" ; then +# We depend on vsnprintf returning the right thing on overflow: the +# number of characters it tried to create (as per SUSv3) +if test "x$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include -int x_snprintf(char *str,size_t count,const char *fmt,...) +int x_snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...) { - size_t ret; va_list ap; - va_start(ap, fmt); ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); + size_t ret; + va_list ap; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); return ret; } ]], [[ - char x[1]; - exit(x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) == 11 ? 0 : 1); +char x[1]; +if (x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11) + return 1; +if (x_snprintf(NULL, 0, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11) + return 1; +return 0; ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1], [Define if your snprintf is busted]) AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your vsnprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working vsnprintf()]) ] ) fi # On systems where [v]snprintf is broken, but is declared in stdio, # check that the fmt argument is const char * or just char *. # This is only useful for when BROKEN_SNPRINTF AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf can declare const char *fmt]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include int snprintf(char *a, size_t b, const char *c, ...) { return 0; } ]], [[ snprintf(0, 0, 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([SNPRINTF_CONST], [const], [Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([SNPRINTF_CONST], [/* not const */])]) # Check for missing getpeereid (or equiv) support NO_PEERCHECK="" if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpeereid" != "xyes" -a "x$ac_cv_func_getpeerucred" != "xyes"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[int i = SO_PEERCRED;]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SO_PEERCRED], [1], [Have PEERCRED socket option]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) NO_PEERCHECK=1 ]) fi dnl see whether mkstemp() requires XXXXXX if test "x$ac_cv_func_mkdtemp" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for (overly) strict mkstemp]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char template[]="conftest.mkstemp-test"; if (mkstemp(template) == -1) exit(1); unlink(template); exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP], [1], [Silly mkstemp()]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP]) ] ) fi dnl make sure that openpty does not reacquire controlling terminal if test ! -z "$check_for_openpty_ctty_bug"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if openpty correctly handles controlling tty]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include ]], [[ pid_t pid; int fd, ptyfd, ttyfd, status; pid = fork(); if (pid < 0) { /* failed */ exit(1); } else if (pid > 0) { /* parent */ waitpid(pid, &status, 0); if (WIFEXITED(status)) exit(WEXITSTATUS(status)); else exit(2); } else { /* child */ close(0); close(1); close(2); setsid(); openpty(&ptyfd, &ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL); fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); if (fd >= 0) exit(3); /* Acquired ctty: broken */ else exit(0); /* Did not acquire ctty: OK */ } ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes]) ] ) fi if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \ test "x$check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #define TEST_PORT "2222" ]], [[ int err, sock; struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai); if (err != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err)); exit(1); } for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV); if (err != 0) { if (err == EAI_SYSTEM) perror("getnameinfo EAI_SYSTEM"); else fprintf(stderr, "getnameinfo failed: %s\n", gai_strerror(err)); exit(2); } sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock < 0) perror("socket"); if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { if (errno == EBADF) exit(3); } } exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes]) ] ) fi if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \ test "x$check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #define TEST_PORT "2222" ]], [[ int err, sock; struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai); if (err != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err)); exit(1); } for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV); if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET && err != 0) { perror("getnameinfo"); exit(2); } } exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK], [1], [Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails for the all-zeros IPv6 address]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming no]) ] ) fi if test "x$check_for_conflicting_getspnam" = "x1"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS], [1], [Conflicting defs for getspnam]) ] ) fi AC_FUNC_GETPGRP # Search for OpenSSL saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS" saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS" AC_ARG_WITH([ssl-dir], [ --with-ssl-dir=PATH Specify path to OpenSSL installation ], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then case "$withval" in # Relative paths ./*|../*) withval="`pwd`/$withval" esac if test -d "$withval/lib"; then if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib -R${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}" fi elif test -d "$withval/lib64"; then if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 -R${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}" fi else if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L${withval} -R${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}" fi fi if test -d "$withval/include"; then CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}" else CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}" fi fi ] ) LIBS="-lcrypto $LIBS" AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([RAND_add], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OPENSSL], [1], [Define if your ssl headers are included with #include ])], [ dnl Check default openssl install dir if test -n "${need_dash_r}"; then LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/ssl/lib -R/usr/local/ssl/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}" else LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/ssl/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}" fi CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/ssl/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}" AC_CHECK_HEADER([openssl/opensslv.h], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** OpenSSL headers missing - please install first or check config.log ***])]) AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([RAND_add], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OPENSSL])], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([*** Can't find recent OpenSSL libcrypto (see config.log for details) ***]) ] ) ] ) # Determine OpenSSL header version AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL header version]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #define DATA "conftest.sslincver" ]], [[ FILE *fd; int rc; fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); if(fd == NULL) exit(1); - if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%x (%s)\n", OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) <0) + if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%08x (%s)\n", OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) <0) exit(1); exit(0); ]])], [ ssl_header_ver=`cat conftest.sslincver` AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_header_ver]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL version header not found.]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking]) ] ) # Determine OpenSSL library version AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL library version]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #define DATA "conftest.ssllibver" ]], [[ FILE *fd; int rc; fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); if(fd == NULL) exit(1); - if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%x (%s)\n", SSLeay(), SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION))) <0) + if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"%08x (%s)\n", SSLeay(), + SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION))) <0) exit(1); exit(0); ]])], [ ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver` + # Check version is supported. + case "$ssl_library_ver" in + 0090[[0-7]]*|009080[[0-5]]*) + AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL >= 0.9.8f required]) + ;; + *) ;; + esac AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_library_ver]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL library not found.]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking]) ] ) +# XXX make --without-openssl work +AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([WITH_OPENSSL], [1], [use libcrypto for cryptography]) +AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([WITH_SSH1], [1], [include SSH protocol version 1 support]) + AC_ARG_WITH([openssl-header-check], [ --without-openssl-header-check Disable OpenSSL version consistency check], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then openssl_check_nonfatal=1 fi ] ) # Sanity check OpenSSL headers AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's headers match the library]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ exit(SSLeay() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) if test "x$openssl_check_nonfatal" = "x"; then AC_MSG_ERROR([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your library. Check config.log for details. If you are sure your installation is consistent, you can disable the check by running "./configure --without-openssl-header-check". Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches. ]) else AC_MSG_WARN([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your library. Check config.log for details. Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.]) fi ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking]) ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL functions will link]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) saved_LIBS="$LIBS" LIBS="$LIBS -ldl" AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ SSLeay_add_all_algorithms(); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) LIBS="$saved_LIBS" ] ) ] ) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ BN_is_prime_ex \ DSA_generate_parameters_ex \ EVP_DigestInit_ex \ EVP_DigestFinal_ex \ EVP_MD_CTX_init \ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup \ EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex \ HMAC_CTX_init \ RSA_generate_key_ex \ RSA_get_default_method \ ]) AC_ARG_WITH([ssl-engine], [ --with-ssl-engine Enable OpenSSL (hardware) ENGINE support ], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for OpenSSL ENGINE support]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); ENGINE_register_all_complete(); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE], [1], [Enable OpenSSL engine support]) ], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL ENGINE support not found]) ]) fi ] ) # Check for OpenSSL without EVP_aes_{192,256}_cbc AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ exit(EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES], [1], [libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions]) ] ) # Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*ctr AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ exit(EVP_aes_128_ctr() == NULL || EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR], [1], [libcrypto has EVP AES CTR]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) # Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*gcm AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ exit(EVP_aes_128_gcm() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_gcm() == NULL || EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED == 0 || EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN == 0 || EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG == 0 || EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG == 0 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(NULL, 0, 0, NULL) == 0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM], [1], [libcrypto has EVP AES GCM]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_cipers \ aes128-gcm@openssh.com aes256-gcm@openssh.com" ] ) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl], [crypto], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL], [1], [Define if libcrypto has EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl])]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ if(EVP_DigestUpdate(NULL, NULL,0)) exit(0); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID], [1], [Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void]) ] ) # Some systems want crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the version in OpenSSL, # because the system crypt() is more featureful. if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_before" = "x1"; then AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt]) fi # Some Linux systems (Slackware) need crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the # version in OpenSSL. if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_later" = "x1"; then AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt], [LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"]) fi AC_CHECK_FUNCS([crypt DES_crypt]) # Search for SHA256 support in libc and/or OpenSSL AC_CHECK_FUNCS([SHA256_Update EVP_sha256], , [unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ hmac-sha2-256 hmac-sha2-512 \ diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 \ hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com" ] ) +# Search for RIPE-MD support in OpenSSL +AC_CHECK_FUNCS([EVP_ripemd160], , + [unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \ + hmac-ripemd160 + hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com + hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com" + ] +) # Check complete ECC support in OpenSSL AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */ # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code" #endif ]], [[ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha256(); /* We need this too */ ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) enable_nistp256=1 ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */ # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code" #endif ]], [[ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha384(); /* We need this too */ ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) enable_nistp384=1 ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1]) AC_LINK_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090807f /* 0.9.8g */ # error "OpenSSL < 0.9.8g has unreliable ECC code" #endif ]], [[ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */ ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include ]],[[ EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1); const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */ exit(e == NULL || m == NULL); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) enable_nistp521=1 ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross-compiling: assuming yes]) enable_nistp521=1 ] )], AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ) COMMENT_OUT_ECC="#no ecc#" TEST_SSH_ECC=no if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1 || test x$enable_nistp384 = x1 || \ test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC, [1], [OpenSSL has ECC]) fi if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1; then AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256], [1], [libcrypto has NID_X9_62_prime256v1]) TEST_SSH_ECC=yes COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 \ ecdh-sha2-nistp256 ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" fi if test x$enable_nistp384 = x1; then AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384], [1], [libcrypto has NID_secp384r1]) TEST_SSH_ECC=yes COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \ ecdh-sha2-nistp384 ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" fi if test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521], [1], [libcrypto has NID_secp521r1]) TEST_SSH_ECC=yes COMMENT_OUT_ECC="" else unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms ecdh-sha2-nistp521 \ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" fi AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_ECC]) AC_SUBST([COMMENT_OUT_ECC]) +AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \ + arc4random \ + arc4random_buf \ + arc4random_stir \ + arc4random_uniform \ +]) + saved_LIBS="$LIBS" AC_CHECK_LIB([iaf], [ia_openinfo], [ LIBS="$LIBS -liaf" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([set_id], [SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -liaf" AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBIAF], [1], [Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id]) ]) ]) LIBS="$saved_LIBS" ### Configure cryptographic random number support # Check wheter OpenSSL seeds itself AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ exit(RAND_status() == 1 ? 0 : 1); ]])], [ OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes]) # This is safe, since we will fatal() at runtime if # OpenSSL is not seeded correctly. OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes ] ) # PRNGD TCP socket AC_ARG_WITH([prngd-port], [ --with-prngd-port=PORT read entropy from PRNGD/EGD TCP localhost:PORT], [ case "$withval" in no) withval="" ;; [[0-9]]*) ;; *) AC_MSG_ERROR([You must specify a numeric port number for --with-prngd-port]) ;; esac if test ! -z "$withval" ; then PRNGD_PORT="$withval" AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_PORT], [$PRNGD_PORT], [Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket]) fi ] ) # PRNGD Unix domain socket AC_ARG_WITH([prngd-socket], [ --with-prngd-socket=FILE read entropy from PRNGD/EGD socket FILE (default=/var/run/egd-pool)], [ case "$withval" in yes) withval="/var/run/egd-pool" ;; no) withval="" ;; /*) ;; *) AC_MSG_ERROR([You must specify an absolute path to the entropy socket]) ;; esac if test ! -z "$withval" ; then if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([You may not specify both a PRNGD/EGD port and socket]) fi if test ! -r "$withval" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([Entropy socket is not readable]) fi PRNGD_SOCKET="$withval" AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_SOCKET], ["$PRNGD_SOCKET"], [Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket]) fi ], [ # Check for existing socket only if we don't have a random device already if test "x$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" != "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for PRNGD/EGD socket]) # Insert other locations here for sock in /var/run/egd-pool /dev/egd-pool /etc/entropy; do if test -r $sock && $TEST_MINUS_S_SH -c "test -S $sock -o -p $sock" ; then PRNGD_SOCKET="$sock" AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_SOCKET], ["$PRNGD_SOCKET"]) break; fi done if test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([$PRNGD_SOCKET]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) fi fi ] ) # Which randomness source do we use? if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then RAND_MSG="PRNGd port $PRNGD_PORT" elif test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then RAND_MSG="PRNGd socket $PRNGD_SOCKET" elif test ! -z "$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" ; then AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY], [1], [Define if you want OpenSSL's internally seeded PRNG only]) RAND_MSG="OpenSSL internal ONLY" else AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSH has no source of random numbers. Please configure OpenSSL with an entropy source or re-run configure using one of the --with-prngd-port or --with-prngd-socket options]) fi # Check for PAM libs PAM_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([pam], [ --with-pam Enable PAM support ], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_ERROR([PAM headers not found]) fi saved_LIBS="$LIBS" AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlopen], , ) AC_CHECK_LIB([pam], [pam_set_item], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libpam missing])]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pam_getenvlist]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pam_putenv]) LIBS="$saved_LIBS" PAM_MSG="yes" SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam" AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1], [Define if you want to enable PAM support]) if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen = yes; then case "$LIBS" in *-ldl*) # libdl already in LIBS ;; *) SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl" ;; esac fi fi ] ) # Check for older PAM if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then # Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM) AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether pam_strerror takes only one argument]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H) #include #elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H) #include #endif ]], [[ (void)pam_strerror((pam_handle_t *)NULL, -1); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OLD_PAM], [1], [Define if you have an old version of PAM which takes only one argument to pam_strerror]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) PAM_MSG="yes (old library)" ]) fi -SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd +case "$host" in +*-*-cygwin*) + SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER + ;; +*) + SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd + ;; +esac AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-user], [ --with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=$withval fi ] ) -AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], ["$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER"], - [non-privileged user for privilege separation]) +if test "x$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" = "xCYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ; then + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], [CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], + [Cygwin function to fetch non-privileged user for privilege separation]) +else + AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], ["$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER"], + [non-privileged user for privilege separation]) +fi AC_SUBST([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER]) if test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" ; then AC_CHECK_DECL([SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER], [have_seccomp_filter=1], , [ #include #include ]) fi if test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([kernel for seccomp_filter support]) AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include #include ]], [[ int i = $seccomp_audit_arch; errno = 0; prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, 0, 0); exit(errno == EFAULT ? 0 : 1); ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) # Disable seccomp filter as a target have_seccomp_filter=0 ] ) fi # Decide which sandbox style to use sandbox_arg="" AC_ARG_WITH([sandbox], [ --with-sandbox=style Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, darwin, rlimit, systrace, seccomp_filter, capsicum)], [ if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then sandbox_arg="" else sandbox_arg="$withval" fi ] ) # Some platforms (seems to be the ones that have a kernel poll(2)-type # function with which they implement select(2)) use an extra file descriptor # when calling select(2), which means we can't use the rlimit sandbox. AC_MSG_CHECKING([if select works with descriptor rlimit]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H # include #endif #include #include #include ]],[[ struct rlimit rl_zero; int fd, r; fd_set fds; struct timeval tv; fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY); FD_ZERO(&fds); FD_SET(fd, &fds); rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero); setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero); tv.tv_sec = 1; tv.tv_usec = 0; r = select(fd+1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv); exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) select_works_with_rlimit=yes], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) select_works_with_rlimit=no], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include ]],[[ struct rlimit rl_zero; int fd, r; fd_set fds; rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; r = setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero); exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) rlimit_nofile_zero_works=no], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]],[[ struct rlimit rl_zero; rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; exit(setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) != 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_DEFINE(SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE, 1, [setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works])], [AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])] ) if test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsystrace" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" = "x1" ) ; then test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" != "x1" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([systrace sandbox requires systrace headers and SYSTR_POLICY_KILL support]) SANDBOX_STYLE="systrace" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SYSTRACE], [1], [Sandbox using systrace(4)]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xdarwin" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" = "xyes") ; then test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" != "xyes" -o \ "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([Darwin seatbelt sandbox requires sandbox.h and sandbox_init function]) SANDBOX_STYLE="darwin" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_DARWIN], [1], [Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3)]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xseccomp_filter" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \ test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_elf_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_audit_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_filter_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" && \ test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" && \ test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" = "xyes" ) ; then test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" = "x" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox not supported on $host]) test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" != "x1" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS]) test "x$have_seccomp_filter" != "x1" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires seccomp headers]) test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires prctl function]) SANDBOX_STYLE="seccomp_filter" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER], [1], [Sandbox using seccomp filter]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capability_h" = "xyes" && \ test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capability_h" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires sys/capability.h header]) test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function]) SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_CAPSICUM], [1], [Sandbox using capsicum]) elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \ ( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" && \ test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" = "xyes" && \ test "x$rlimit_nofile_zero_works" = "xyes" ) ; then test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires setrlimit function]) test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" != "xyes" && \ AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires select to work with rlimit]) SANDBOX_STYLE="rlimit" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_RLIMIT], [1], [Sandbox using setrlimit(2)]) elif test -z "$sandbox_arg" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xno" || \ test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnone" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnull" ; then SANDBOX_STYLE="none" AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_NULL], [1], [no privsep sandboxing]) else AC_MSG_ERROR([unsupported --with-sandbox]) fi # Cheap hack to ensure NEWS-OS libraries are arranged right. if test ! -z "$SONY" ; then LIBS="$LIBS -liberty"; fi # Check for long long datatypes AC_CHECK_TYPES([long long, unsigned long long, long double]) # Check datatype sizes AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([short int], [2]) AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([int], [4]) AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long int], [4]) AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long long int], [8]) # Sanity check long long for some platforms (AIX) if test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x4" ; then ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0 fi # compute LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX if we don't know them. if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for max value of long long]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include /* Why is this so damn hard? */ #ifdef __GNUC__ # undef __GNUC__ #endif #define __USE_ISOC99 #include #define DATA "conftest.llminmax" #define my_abs(a) ((a) < 0 ? ((a) * -1) : (a)) /* * printf in libc on some platforms (eg old Tru64) does not understand %lld so * we do this the hard way. */ static int fprint_ll(FILE *f, long long n) { unsigned int i; int l[sizeof(long long) * 8]; if (n < 0) if (fprintf(f, "-") < 0) return -1; for (i = 0; n != 0; i++) { l[i] = my_abs(n % 10); n /= 10; } do { if (fprintf(f, "%d", l[--i]) < 0) return -1; } while (i != 0); if (fprintf(f, " ") < 0) return -1; return 0; } ]], [[ FILE *f; long long i, llmin, llmax = 0; if((f = fopen(DATA,"w")) == NULL) exit(1); #if defined(LLONG_MIN) && defined(LLONG_MAX) fprintf(stderr, "Using system header for LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n"); llmin = LLONG_MIN; llmax = LLONG_MAX; #else fprintf(stderr, "Calculating LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n"); /* This will work on one's complement and two's complement */ for (i = 1; i > llmax; i <<= 1, i++) llmax = i; llmin = llmax + 1LL; /* wrap */ #endif /* Sanity check */ if (llmin + 1 < llmin || llmin - 1 < llmin || llmax + 1 > llmax || llmax - 1 > llmax || llmin == llmax || llmin == 0 || llmax == 0 || llmax < LONG_MAX || llmin > LONG_MIN) { fprintf(f, "unknown unknown\n"); exit(2); } if (fprint_ll(f, llmin) < 0) exit(3); if (fprint_ll(f, llmax) < 0) exit(4); if (fclose(f) < 0) exit(5); exit(0); ]])], [ llong_min=`$AWK '{print $1}' conftest.llminmax` llong_max=`$AWK '{print $2}' conftest.llminmax` AC_MSG_RESULT([$llong_max]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LLONG_MAX], [${llong_max}LL], [max value of long long calculated by configure]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([for min value of long long]) AC_MSG_RESULT([$llong_min]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LLONG_MIN], [${llong_min}LL], [min value of long long calculated by configure]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([not found]) ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking]) ] ) fi # More checks for data types AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int type], ac_cv_have_u_int, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int a; a = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_u_int="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_int="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT], [1], [define if you have u_int data type]) have_u_int=1 fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_intxx_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T], [1], [define if you have intxx_t data type]) have_intxx_t=1 fi if (test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t types in stdint.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for int64_t type], ac_cv_have_int64_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H # include #endif #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H # include #endif ]], [[ int64_t a; a = 1; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INT64_T], [1], [define if you have int64_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T], [1], [define if you have u_intxx_t data type]) have_u_intxx_t=1 fi if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int64_t types], ac_cv_have_u_int64_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int64_t a; a = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T], [1], [define if you have u_int64_t data type]) have_u_int64_t=1 fi if (test -z "$have_u_int64_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_int64_t a; a = 1]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then AC_CACHE_CHECK([for uintXX_t types], ac_cv_have_uintxx_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T], [1], [define if you have uintxx_t data type]) fi fi if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in stdint.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_inttypes_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in inttypes.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi if (test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" || test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \ test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes") then AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; u_int8_t e; u_int16_t f; u_int32_t g; a = b = c = e = f = g = 1; ]])], [ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T]) AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_char], ac_cv_have_u_char, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ u_char foo; foo = 125; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_u_char="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_char="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_char" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_CHAR], [1], [define if you have u_char data type]) fi AC_CHECK_TYPES([intmax_t, uintmax_t], , , [ #include #include ]) TYPE_SOCKLEN_T AC_CHECK_TYPES([sig_atomic_t], , , [#include ]) AC_CHECK_TYPES([fsblkcnt_t, fsfilcnt_t], , , [ #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif ]) AC_CHECK_TYPES([in_addr_t, in_port_t], , , [#include #include ]) AC_CACHE_CHECK([for size_t], ac_cv_have_size_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ size_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_size_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_size_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_size_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SIZE_T], [1], [define if you have size_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ssize_t], ac_cv_have_ssize_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ ssize_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SSIZE_T], [1], [define if you have ssize_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for clock_t], ac_cv_have_clock_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ clock_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_clock_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_clock_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_clock_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CLOCK_T], [1], [define if you have clock_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for sa_family_t], ac_cv_have_sa_family_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ], [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="no" ] ) ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T], [1], [define if you have sa_family_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for pid_t], ac_cv_have_pid_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ pid_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_pid_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_pid_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_pid_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PID_T], [1], [define if you have pid_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for mode_t], ac_cv_have_mode_t, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ mode_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_mode_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_mode_t="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_mode_t" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MODE_T], [1], [define if you have mode_t data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_storage], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE], [1], [define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_in6], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct sockaddr_in6 s; s.sin6_family = 0; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6], [1], [define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct in6_addr], ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct in6_addr s; s.s6_addr[0] = 0; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR], [1], [define if you have struct in6_addr data type]) dnl Now check for sin6_scope_id AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct sockaddr_in6.sin6_scope_id], , , [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H #include #endif #include ]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct addrinfo], ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ struct addrinfo s; s.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO], [1], [define if you have struct addrinfo data type]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct timeval], ac_cv_have_struct_timeval, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ struct timeval tv; tv.tv_sec = 1;]])], [ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL], [1], [define if you have struct timeval]) have_struct_timeval=1 fi AC_CHECK_TYPES([struct timespec]) # We need int64_t or else certian parts of the compile will fail. if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xno" && \ test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" != "x8" && \ test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x0" ; then echo "OpenSSH requires int64_t support. Contact your vendor or install" echo "an alternative compiler (I.E., GCC) before continuing." echo "" exit 1; else dnl test snprintf (broken on SCO w/gcc) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF main() { char buf[50]; char expected_out[50]; int mazsize = 50 ; #if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8) long int num = 0x7fffffffffffffff; #else long long num = 0x7fffffffffffffffll; #endif strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807"); snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num); if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0) exit(1); exit(0); } #else main() { exit(0); } #endif ]])], [ true ], [ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF]) ], AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) ) fi dnl Checks for structure members OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_host], [utmp.h], [HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_host], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([syslen], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_pid], [utmp.h], [HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_type], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_type], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_id], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_id], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr_v6], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr_v6], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_exit], [utmp.h], [HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX]) OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX]) AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_blksize]) AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct passwd.pw_gecos, struct passwd.pw_class, struct passwd.pw_change, struct passwd.pw_expire], [], [], [[ #include #include ]]) AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct __res_state.retrans], [], [AC_DEFINE([__res_state], [state], [Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h])], [[ #include #if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif #include #include #include ]]) AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage], ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.ss_family = 1; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS], [1], [Fields in struct sockaddr_storage]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage], ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.__ss_family = 1; ]])], [ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS], [1], [Fields in struct sockaddr_storage]) fi dnl make sure we're using the real structure members and not defines AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr], ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ #ifdef msg_accrights #error "msg_accrights is a macro" exit(1); #endif struct msghdr m; m.msg_accrights = 0; exit(0); ]])], [ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="no" ] ) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR], [1], [Define if your system uses access rights style file descriptor passing]) fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif ]], [[ struct statvfs s; s.f_fsid = 0; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if fsid_t has member val]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ fsid_t t; t.val[0] = 0; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([FSID_HAS_VAL], [1], [fsid_t has member val]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if f_fsid has member __val]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include ]], [[ fsid_t t; t.__val[0] = 0; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([FSID_HAS___VAL], [1], [fsid_t has member __val]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) ]) AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_control field in struct msghdr], ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr, [ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include ]], [[ #ifdef msg_control #error "msg_control is a macro" exit(1); #endif struct msghdr m; m.msg_control = 0; exit(0); ]])], [ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="no" ] ) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR], [1], [Define if your system uses ancillary data style file descriptor passing]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines __progname], ac_cv_libc_defines___progname, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[ extern char *__progname; printf("%s", __progname); ]])], [ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="yes" ], [ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___PROGNAME], [1], [Define if libc defines __progname]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether $CC implements __FUNCTION__], ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ printf("%s", __FUNCTION__); ]])], [ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="yes" ], [ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___FUNCTION__], [1], [Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether $CC implements __func__], ac_cv_cc_implements___func__, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ printf("%s", __func__); ]])], [ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="yes" ], [ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___func__], [1], [Define if compiler implements __func__]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether va_copy exists], ac_cv_have_va_copy, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include va_list x,y; ]], [[ va_copy(x,y); ]])], [ ac_cv_have_va_copy="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_va_copy="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_va_copy" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_VA_COPY], [1], [Define if va_copy exists]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether __va_copy exists], ac_cv_have___va_copy, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include va_list x,y; ]], [[ __va_copy(x,y); ]])], [ ac_cv_have___va_copy="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have___va_copy="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have___va_copy" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE___VA_COPY], [1], [Define if __va_copy exists]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether getopt has optreset support], ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ extern int optreset; optreset = 0; ]])], [ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET], [1], [Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_errlist], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[ extern const char *const sys_errlist[]; printf("%s", sys_errlist[0]);]])], [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="yes" ], [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST], [1], [Define if your system defines sys_errlist[]]) fi AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_nerr], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr, [ AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[ extern int sys_nerr; printf("%i", sys_nerr);]])], [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="yes" ], [ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="no" ]) ]) if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" = "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_NERR], [1], [Define if your system defines sys_nerr]) fi # Check libraries needed by DNS fingerprint support AC_SEARCH_LIBS([getrrsetbyname], [resolv], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME], [1], [Define if getrrsetbyname() exists])], [ # Needed by our getrrsetbyname() AC_SEARCH_LIBS([res_query], [resolv]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if res_query will link]) AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include ]], [[ res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0); ]])], AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]), [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) saved_LIBS="$LIBS" LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for res_query in -lresolv]) AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #include #include #include ]], [[ res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0); ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])], [LIBS="$saved_LIBS" AC_MSG_RESULT([no])]) ]) AC_CHECK_FUNCS([_getshort _getlong]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([_getshort, _getlong], , , [#include #include ]) AC_CHECK_MEMBER([HEADER.ad], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_HEADER_AD], [1], [Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h])], , [#include ]) ]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if struct __res_state _res is an extern]) AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H # include #endif #include #include #include extern struct __res_state _res; ]], [[ ]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAVE__RES_EXTERN], [1], [Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ] ) # Check whether user wants SELinux support SELINUX_MSG="no" LIBSELINUX="" AC_ARG_WITH([selinux], [ --with-selinux Enable SELinux support], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then save_LIBS="$LIBS" AC_DEFINE([WITH_SELINUX], [1], [Define if you want SELinux support.]) SELINUX_MSG="yes" AC_CHECK_HEADER([selinux/selinux.h], , AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires selinux.h header])) AC_CHECK_LIB([selinux], [setexeccon], [ LIBSELINUX="-lselinux" LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux" ], AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires libselinux library])) SSHLIBS="$SSHLIBS $LIBSELINUX" SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level]) LIBS="$save_LIBS" fi ] ) AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS]) AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS]) # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support KRB5_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5], [ --with-kerberos5=PATH Enable Kerberos 5 support], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then KRB5ROOT="/usr/local" else KRB5ROOT=${withval} fi AC_DEFINE([KRB5], [1], [Define if you want Kerberos 5 support]) KRB5_MSG="yes" AC_PATH_PROG([KRB5CONF], [krb5-config], [$KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config], [$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH]) if test -x $KRB5CONF ; then K5CFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags`" K5LIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs`" CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $K5CFLAGS" AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gssapi support]) if $KRB5CONF | grep gssapi >/dev/null ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI], [1], [Define this if you want GSSAPI support in the version 2 protocol]) GSSCFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags gssapi`" GSSLIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs gssapi`" CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $GSSCFLAGS" else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL], [1], [Define this if you are using the Heimdal version of Kerberos V5]) ], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]) else CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include" LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${KRB5ROOT}/lib" AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include ]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL]) K5LIBS="-lkrb5" K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lcom_err -lasn1" AC_CHECK_LIB([roken], [net_write], [K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lroken"]) AC_CHECK_LIB([des], [des_cbc_encrypt], [K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -ldes"]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) K5LIBS="-lkrb5 -lk5crypto -lcom_err" ]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv]) AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi_krb5], [gss_init_sec_context], [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI]) GSSLIBS="-lgssapi_krb5" ], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi], [gss_init_sec_context], [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI]) GSSLIBS="-lgssapi" ], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([gss], [gss_init_sec_context], [ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI]) GSSLIBS="-lgss" ], AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail])) ]) ]) AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi.h], , [ unset ac_cv_header_gssapi_h CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi" AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h], , AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail]) ) ] ) oldCPP="$CPPFLAGS" CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi" AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi_krb5.h], , [ CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP" ]) fi if test ! -z "$need_dash_r" ; then LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -R${KRB5ROOT}/lib" fi if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then blibpath="$blibpath:${KRB5ROOT}/lib" fi AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h]) AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h]) AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1], [Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])]) AC_CHECK_DECLS([GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE], [], [], [[ #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H # include #elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H) # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H # include #elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H) # include #endif ]]) saved_LIBS="$LIBS" LIBS="$LIBS $K5LIBS" AC_CHECK_FUNCS([krb5_cc_new_unique krb5_get_error_message krb5_free_error_message]) LIBS="$saved_LIBS" fi ] ) AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS]) AC_SUBST([K5LIBS]) # Looking for programs, paths and files PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-path], [ --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot (default=/var/empty)], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then PRIVSEP_PATH=$withval fi ] ) AC_SUBST([PRIVSEP_PATH]) AC_ARG_WITH([xauth], [ --with-xauth=PATH Specify path to xauth program ], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then xauth_path=$withval fi ], [ TestPath="$PATH" TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X/bin" TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/bin/X11" TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X11R6/bin" TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/openwin/bin" AC_PATH_PROG([xauth_path], [xauth], , [$TestPath]) if (test ! -z "$xauth_path" && test -x "/usr/openwin/bin/xauth") ; then xauth_path="/usr/openwin/bin/xauth" fi ] ) STRIP_OPT=-s AC_ARG_ENABLE([strip], [ --disable-strip Disable calling strip(1) on install], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then STRIP_OPT= fi ] ) AC_SUBST([STRIP_OPT]) if test -z "$xauth_path" ; then XAUTH_PATH="undefined" AC_SUBST([XAUTH_PATH]) else AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([XAUTH_PATH], ["$xauth_path"], [Define if xauth is found in your path]) XAUTH_PATH=$xauth_path AC_SUBST([XAUTH_PATH]) fi dnl # --with-maildir=/path/to/mail gets top priority. dnl # if maildir is set in the platform case statement above we use that. dnl # Otherwise we run a program to get the dir from system headers. dnl # We first look for _PATH_MAILDIR then MAILDIR then _PATH_MAIL dnl # If we find _PATH_MAILDIR we do nothing because that is what dnl # session.c expects anyway. Otherwise we set to the value found dnl # stripping any trailing slash. If for some strage reason our program dnl # does not find what it needs, we default to /var/spool/mail. # Check for mail directory AC_ARG_WITH([maildir], [ --with-maildir=/path/to/mail Specify your system mail directory], [ if test "X$withval" != X && test "x$withval" != xno && \ test "x${withval}" != xyes; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$withval"], [Set this to your mail directory if you do not have _PATH_MAILDIR]) fi ],[ if test "X$maildir" != "X"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$maildir"]) else AC_MSG_CHECKING([Discovering system mail directory]) AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H #include #endif #define DATA "conftest.maildir" ]], [[ FILE *fd; int rc; fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); if(fd == NULL) exit(1); #if defined (_PATH_MAILDIR) if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAILDIR:%s\n", _PATH_MAILDIR)) <0) exit(1); #elif defined (MAILDIR) if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"MAILDIR:%s\n", MAILDIR)) <0) exit(1); #elif defined (_PATH_MAIL) if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAIL:%s\n", _PATH_MAIL)) <0) exit(1); #else exit (2); #endif exit(0); ]])], [ maildir_what=`awk -F: '{print $1}' conftest.maildir` maildir=`awk -F: '{print $2}' conftest.maildir \ | sed 's|/$||'` AC_MSG_RESULT([Using: $maildir from $maildir_what]) if test "x$maildir_what" != "x_PATH_MAILDIR"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$maildir"]) fi ], [ if test "X$ac_status" = "X2";then # our test program didn't find it. Default to /var/spool/mail AC_MSG_RESULT([Using: default value of /var/spool/mail]) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["/var/spool/mail"]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([*** not found ***]) fi ], [ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: use --with-maildir=/path/to/mail]) ] ) fi ] ) # maildir if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test]) disable_ptmx_check=yes fi if test -z "$no_dev_ptmx" ; then if test "x$disable_ptmx_check" != "xyes" ; then AC_CHECK_FILE(["/dev/ptmx"], [ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_DEV_PTMX], [1], [Define if you have /dev/ptmx]) have_dev_ptmx=1 ] ) fi fi if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" != "xyes"; then AC_CHECK_FILE(["/dev/ptc"], [ AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC], [1], [Define if you have /dev/ptc]) have_dev_ptc=1 ] ) else AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptc test]) fi # Options from here on. Some of these are preset by platform above AC_ARG_WITH([mantype], [ --with-mantype=man|cat|doc Set man page type], [ case "$withval" in man|cat|doc) MANTYPE=$withval ;; *) AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid man type: $withval]) ;; esac ] ) if test -z "$MANTYPE"; then TestPath="/usr/bin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/ucb" AC_PATH_PROGS([NROFF], [nroff awf], [/bin/false], [$TestPath]) if ${NROFF} -mdoc ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then MANTYPE=doc elif ${NROFF} -man ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then MANTYPE=man else MANTYPE=cat fi fi AC_SUBST([MANTYPE]) if test "$MANTYPE" = "doc"; then mansubdir=man; else mansubdir=$MANTYPE; fi AC_SUBST([mansubdir]) # Check whether to enable MD5 passwords MD5_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([md5-passwords], [ --with-md5-passwords Enable use of MD5 passwords], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS], [1], [Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords]) MD5_MSG="yes" fi ] ) # Whether to disable shadow password support AC_ARG_WITH([shadow], [ --without-shadow Disable shadow password support], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW]) disable_shadow=yes fi ] ) if test -z "$disable_shadow" ; then AC_MSG_CHECKING([if the systems has expire shadow information]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include struct spwd sp; ]], [[ sp.sp_expire = sp.sp_lstchg = sp.sp_inact = 0; ]])], [ sp_expire_available=yes ], [ ]) if test "x$sp_expire_available" = "xyes" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE], [1], [Define if you want to use shadow password expire field]) else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi fi # Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY if test ! -z "$IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY" ; then DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes" AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY], [1], [Define if you need to use IP address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY]) else DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH([ipaddr-display], [ --with-ipaddr-display Use ip address instead of hostname in \$DISPLAY], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY]) DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes" fi ] ) fi # check for /etc/default/login and use it if present. AC_ARG_ENABLE([etc-default-login], [ --disable-etc-default-login Disable using PATH from /etc/default/login [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno"; then AC_MSG_NOTICE([/etc/default/login handling disabled]) etc_default_login=no else etc_default_login=yes fi ], [ if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking /etc/default/login]) etc_default_login=no else etc_default_login=yes fi ] ) if test "x$etc_default_login" != "xno"; then AC_CHECK_FILE(["/etc/default/login"], [ external_path_file=/etc/default/login ]) if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/default/login"; then AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN], [1], [Define if your system has /etc/default/login]) fi fi dnl BSD systems use /etc/login.conf so --with-default-path= has no effect if test $ac_cv_func_login_getcapbool = "yes" && \ test $ac_cv_header_login_cap_h = "yes" ; then external_path_file=/etc/login.conf fi # Whether to mess with the default path SERVER_PATH_MSG="(default)" AC_ARG_WITH([default-path], [ --with-default-path= Specify default \$PATH environment for server], [ if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([ --with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system. Edit /etc/login.conf instead.]) elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([ --with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in $external_path_file .]) fi user_path="$withval" SERVER_PATH_MSG="$withval" fi ], [ if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf]) else if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then AC_MSG_WARN([ If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included, otherwise scp will not work.]) fi AC_RUN_IFELSE( [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ /* find out what STDPATH is */ #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #ifndef _PATH_STDPATH # ifdef _PATH_USERPATH /* Irix */ # define _PATH_STDPATH _PATH_USERPATH # else # define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" # endif #endif #include #include #include #define DATA "conftest.stdpath" ]], [[ FILE *fd; int rc; fd = fopen(DATA,"w"); if(fd == NULL) exit(1); if ((rc = fprintf(fd,"%s", _PATH_STDPATH)) < 0) exit(1); exit(0); ]])], [ user_path=`cat conftest.stdpath` ], [ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ], [ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ] ) # make sure $bindir is in USER_PATH so scp will work t_bindir="${bindir}" while echo "${t_bindir}" | egrep '\$\{|NONE/' >/dev/null 2>&1; do t_bindir=`eval echo ${t_bindir}` case $t_bindir in NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$prefix~"` ;; esac case $t_bindir in NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;; esac done echo $user_path | grep ":$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1 if test $? -ne 0 ; then echo $user_path | grep "^$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1 if test $? -ne 0 ; then user_path=$user_path:$t_bindir AC_MSG_RESULT([Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work]) fi fi fi ] ) if test "x$external_path_file" != "x/etc/login.conf" ; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([USER_PATH], ["$user_path"], [Specify default $PATH]) AC_SUBST([user_path]) fi # Set superuser path separately to user path AC_ARG_WITH([superuser-path], [ --with-superuser-path= Specify different path for super-user], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SUPERUSER_PATH], ["$withval"], [Define if you want a different $PATH for the superuser]) superuser_path=$withval fi ] ) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses]) IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="no" AC_ARG_WITH(4in6, [ --with-4in6 Check for and convert IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) AC_DEFINE([IPV4_IN_IPV6], [1], [Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and treat as IPv4]) IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes" else AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) fi ], [ if test "x$inet6_default_4in6" = "xyes"; then AC_MSG_RESULT([yes (default)]) AC_DEFINE([IPV4_IN_IPV6]) IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes" else AC_MSG_RESULT([no (default)]) fi ] ) # Whether to enable BSD auth support BSD_AUTH_MSG=no AC_ARG_WITH([bsd-auth], [ --with-bsd-auth Enable BSD auth support], [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([BSD_AUTH], [1], [Define if you have BSD auth support]) BSD_AUTH_MSG=yes fi ] ) # Where to place sshd.pid piddir=/var/run # make sure the directory exists if test ! -d $piddir ; then piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` case $piddir in NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;; esac fi AC_ARG_WITH([pid-dir], [ --with-pid-dir=PATH Specify location of ssh.pid file], [ if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \ test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then piddir=$withval if test ! -d $piddir ; then AC_MSG_WARN([** no $piddir directory on this system **]) fi fi ] ) AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR], ["$piddir"], [Specify location of ssh.pid]) AC_SUBST([piddir]) dnl allow user to disable some login recording features AC_ARG_ENABLE([lastlog], [ --disable-lastlog disable use of lastlog even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([utmp], [ --disable-utmp disable use of utmp even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([utmpx], [ --disable-utmpx disable use of utmpx even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], [Define if you don't want to use utmpx]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([wtmp], [ --disable-wtmp disable use of wtmp even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([wtmpx], [ --disable-wtmpx disable use of wtmpx even if detected [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMPX], [1], [Define if you don't want to use wtmpx]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([libutil], [ --disable-libutil disable use of libutil (login() etc.) [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LOGIN]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([pututline], [ --disable-pututline disable use of pututline() etc. ([uw]tmp) [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PUTUTLINE], [1], [Define if you don't want to use pututline() etc. to write [uw]tmp]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_ENABLE([pututxline], [ --disable-pututxline disable use of pututxline() etc. ([uw]tmpx) [no]], [ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE], [1], [Define if you don't want to use pututxline() etc. to write [uw]tmpx]) fi ] ) AC_ARG_WITH([lastlog], [ --with-lastlog=FILE|DIR specify lastlog location [common locations]], [ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG]) elif test -n "$withval" && test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then conf_lastlog_location=$withval fi ] ) dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection dnl NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the dnl need for command-line parameters dnl lastlog and [uw]tmp are subject to a file search if all else fails dnl lastlog detection dnl NOTE: the code itself will detect if lastlog is a directory AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *lastlog = LASTLOG_FILE; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *lastlog = _PATH_LASTLOG; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) system_lastlog_path=no ]) ]) if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then if test x"$system_lastlog_path" = x"no" ; then for f in /var/log/lastlog /usr/adm/lastlog /var/adm/lastlog /etc/security/lastlog ; do if (test -d "$f" || test -f "$f") ; then conf_lastlog_location=$f fi done if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then AC_MSG_WARN([** Cannot find lastlog **]) dnl Don't define DISABLE_LASTLOG - that means we don't try wtmp/wtmpx fi fi fi if test -n "$conf_lastlog_location"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_LASTLOG_FILE], ["$conf_lastlog_location"], [Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file]) fi dnl utmp detection AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines UTMP_FILE]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *utmp = UTMP_FILE; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) system_utmp_path=no ]) if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then if test x"$system_utmp_path" = x"no" ; then for f in /etc/utmp /usr/adm/utmp /var/run/utmp; do if test -f $f ; then conf_utmp_location=$f fi done if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP]) fi fi fi if test -n "$conf_utmp_location"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_UTMP_FILE], ["$conf_utmp_location"], [Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file]) fi dnl wtmp detection AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMP_FILE]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *wtmp = WTMP_FILE; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) system_wtmp_path=no ]) if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then if test x"$system_wtmp_path" = x"no" ; then for f in /usr/adm/wtmp /var/log/wtmp; do if test -f $f ; then conf_wtmp_location=$f fi done if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP]) fi fi fi if test -n "$conf_wtmp_location"; then AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMP_FILE], ["$conf_wtmp_location"], [Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file]) fi dnl wtmpx detection AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMPX_FILE]) AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif ]], [[ char *wtmpx = WTMPX_FILE; ]])], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) system_wtmpx_path=no ]) if test -z "$conf_wtmpx_location"; then if test x"$system_wtmpx_path" = x"no" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMPX]) fi else AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMPX_FILE], ["$conf_wtmpx_location"], [Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file]) fi if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $blibflags$blibpath" AC_MSG_WARN([Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile]) fi AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct lastlog.ll_line], [], [ if test x$SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE != "xyes" ; then AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG]) fi ], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H #include #endif ]) AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct utmp.ut_line], [], [ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP]) AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP]) ], [ #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H #include #endif ]) dnl Adding -Werror to CFLAGS early prevents configure tests from running. dnl Add now. CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags" if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" != "xyes" ; then TEST_SSH_IPV6=no else TEST_SSH_IPV6=yes fi AC_CHECK_DECL([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO], [TEST_SSH_IPV6=no]) AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_IPV6], [$TEST_SSH_IPV6]) AC_SUBST([TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS], [$TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS]) AC_SUBST([UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS], [$unsupported_algorithms]) AC_EXEEXT AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml \ openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile \ survey.sh]) AC_OUTPUT # Print summary of options # Someone please show me a better way :) A=`eval echo ${prefix}` ; A=`eval echo ${A}` B=`eval echo ${bindir}` ; B=`eval echo ${B}` C=`eval echo ${sbindir}` ; C=`eval echo ${C}` D=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` ; D=`eval echo ${D}` E=`eval echo ${libexecdir}/ssh-askpass` ; E=`eval echo ${E}` F=`eval echo ${mandir}/${mansubdir}X` ; F=`eval echo ${F}` G=`eval echo ${piddir}` ; G=`eval echo ${G}` H=`eval echo ${PRIVSEP_PATH}` ; H=`eval echo ${H}` I=`eval echo ${user_path}` ; I=`eval echo ${I}` J=`eval echo ${superuser_path}` ; J=`eval echo ${J}` echo "" echo "OpenSSH has been configured with the following options:" echo " User binaries: $B" echo " System binaries: $C" echo " Configuration files: $D" echo " Askpass program: $E" echo " Manual pages: $F" echo " PID file: $G" echo " Privilege separation chroot path: $H" if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then echo " At runtime, sshd will use the path defined in $external_path_file" echo " Make sure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work" else echo " sshd default user PATH: $I" if test ! -z "$external_path_file"; then echo " (If PATH is set in $external_path_file it will be used instead. If" echo " used, ensure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work.)" fi fi if test ! -z "$superuser_path" ; then echo " sshd superuser user PATH: $J" fi echo " Manpage format: $MANTYPE" echo " PAM support: $PAM_MSG" echo " OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG" echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG" echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG" echo " Smartcard support: $SCARD_MSG" echo " S/KEY support: $SKEY_MSG" -echo " TCP Wrappers support: $TCPW_MSG" echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG" echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG" echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG" echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG" echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG" echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG" echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG" echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG" echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE" echo "" echo " Host: ${host}" echo " Compiler: ${CC}" echo " Compiler flags: ${CFLAGS}" echo "Preprocessor flags: ${CPPFLAGS}" echo " Linker flags: ${LDFLAGS}" echo " Libraries: ${LIBS}" if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then echo " +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}" fi if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then echo " +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}" fi echo "" if test "x$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" = "xyes" ; then echo "SVR4 style packages are supported with \"make package\"" echo "" fi if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then echo "PAM is enabled. You may need to install a PAM control file " echo "for sshd, otherwise password authentication may fail. " echo "Example PAM control files can be found in the contrib/ " echo "subdirectory" echo "" fi if test ! -z "$NO_PEERCHECK" ; then echo "WARNING: the operating system that you are using does not" echo "appear to support getpeereid(), getpeerucred() or the" echo "SO_PEERCRED getsockopt() option. These facilities are used to" echo "enforce security checks to prevent unauthorised connections to" echo "ssh-agent. Their absence increases the risk that a malicious" echo "user can connect to your agent." echo "" fi if test "$AUDIT_MODULE" = "bsm" ; then echo "WARNING: BSM audit support is currently considered EXPERIMENTAL." echo "See the Solaris section in README.platform for details." fi Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/caldera/openssh.spec =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/caldera/openssh.spec (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/caldera/openssh.spec (revision 276707) @@ -1,366 +1,365 @@ # Some of this will need re-evaluation post-LSB. The SVIdir is there # because the link appeared broken. The rest is for easy compilation, # the tradeoff open to discussion. (LC957) %define SVIdir /etc/rc.d/init.d %{!?_defaultdocdir:%define _defaultdocdir %{_prefix}/share/doc/packages} %{!?SVIcdir:%define SVIcdir /etc/sysconfig/daemons} %define _mandir %{_prefix}/share/man/en %define _sysconfdir /etc/ssh %define _libexecdir %{_libdir}/ssh # Do we want to disable root_login? (1=yes 0=no) %define no_root_login 0 #old cvs stuff. please update before use. may be deprecated. %define use_stable 1 -%define version 6.6p1 +%define version 6.7p1 %if %{use_stable} %define cvs %{nil} %define release 1 %else %define cvs cvs20050315 %define release 0r1 %endif %define xsa x11-ssh-askpass %define askpass %{xsa}-1.2.4.1 # OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID %define sshd_uid 67 %define sshd_gid 67 Name : openssh Version : %{version}%{cvs} Release : %{release} Group : System/Network Summary : OpenSSH free Secure Shell (SSH) implementation. Summary(de) : OpenSSH - freie Implementation der Secure Shell (SSH). Summary(es) : OpenSSH implementación libre de Secure Shell (SSH). Summary(fr) : Implémentation libre du shell sécurisé OpenSSH (SSH). Summary(it) : Implementazione gratuita OpenSSH della Secure Shell. Summary(pt) : Implementação livre OpenSSH do protocolo 'Secure Shell' (SSH). Summary(pt_BR) : Implementação livre OpenSSH do protocolo Secure Shell (SSH). Copyright : BSD Packager : Raymund Will URL : http://www.openssh.com/ Obsoletes : ssh, ssh-clients, openssh-clients BuildRoot : /tmp/%{name}-%{version} BuildRequires : XFree86-imake # %{use_stable}==1: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable # %{use_stable}==0: :pserver:cvs@bass.directhit.com:/cvs/openssh_cvs Source0: see-above:/.../openssh-%{version}.tar.gz %if %{use_stable} Source1: see-above:/.../openssh-%{version}.tar.gz.asc %endif Source2: http://www.jmknoble.net/software/%{xsa}/%{askpass}.tar.gz Source3: http://www.openssh.com/faq.html %Package server Group : System/Network Requires : openssh = %{version} Obsoletes : ssh-server Summary : OpenSSH Secure Shell protocol server (sshd). Summary(de) : OpenSSH Secure Shell Protocol-Server (sshd). Summary(es) : Servidor del protocolo OpenSSH Secure Shell (sshd). Summary(fr) : Serveur de protocole du shell sécurisé OpenSSH (sshd). Summary(it) : Server OpenSSH per il protocollo Secure Shell (sshd). Summary(pt) : Servidor do protocolo 'Secure Shell' OpenSSH (sshd). Summary(pt_BR) : Servidor do protocolo Secure Shell OpenSSH (sshd). %Package askpass Group : System/Network Requires : openssh = %{version} URL : http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/ Obsoletes : ssh-extras Summary : OpenSSH X11 pass-phrase dialog. Summary(de) : OpenSSH X11 Passwort-Dialog. Summary(es) : Aplicación de petición de frase clave OpenSSH X11. Summary(fr) : Dialogue pass-phrase X11 d'OpenSSH. Summary(it) : Finestra di dialogo X11 per la frase segreta di OpenSSH. Summary(pt) : Diálogo de pedido de senha para X11 do OpenSSH. Summary(pt_BR) : Diálogo de pedido de senha para X11 do OpenSSH. %Description OpenSSH (Secure Shell) provides access to a remote system. It replaces telnet, rlogin, rexec, and rsh, and provides secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. %Description -l de OpenSSH (Secure Shell) stellt den Zugang zu anderen Rechnern her. Es ersetzt telnet, rlogin, rexec und rsh und stellt eine sichere, verschlüsselte Verbindung zwischen zwei nicht vertrauenswürdigen Hosts über eine unsicheres Netzwerk her. X11 Verbindungen und beliebige andere TCP/IP Ports können ebenso über den sicheren Channel weitergeleitet werden. %Description -l es OpenSSH (Secure Shell) proporciona acceso a sistemas remotos. Reemplaza a telnet, rlogin, rexec, y rsh, y proporciona comunicaciones seguras encriptadas entre dos equipos entre los que no se ha establecido confianza a través de una red insegura. Las conexiones X11 y puertos TCP/IP arbitrarios también pueden ser canalizadas sobre el canal seguro. %Description -l fr OpenSSH (Secure Shell) fournit un accès à un système distant. Il remplace telnet, rlogin, rexec et rsh, tout en assurant des communications cryptées securisées entre deux hôtes non fiabilisés sur un réseau non sécurisé. Des connexions X11 et des ports TCP/IP arbitraires peuvent également être transmis sur le canal sécurisé. %Description -l it OpenSSH (Secure Shell) fornisce l'accesso ad un sistema remoto. Sostituisce telnet, rlogin, rexec, e rsh, e fornisce comunicazioni sicure e crittate tra due host non fidati su una rete non sicura. Le connessioni X11 ad una porta TCP/IP arbitraria possono essere inoltrate attraverso un canale sicuro. %Description -l pt OpenSSH (Secure Shell) fornece acesso a um sistema remoto. Substitui o telnet, rlogin, rexec, e o rsh e fornece comunicações seguras e cifradas entre duas máquinas sem confiança mútua sobre uma rede insegura. Ligações X11 e portos TCP/IP arbitrários também poder ser reenviados pelo canal seguro. %Description -l pt_BR O OpenSSH (Secure Shell) fornece acesso a um sistema remoto. Substitui o telnet, rlogin, rexec, e o rsh e fornece comunicações seguras e criptografadas entre duas máquinas sem confiança mútua sobre uma rede insegura. Ligações X11 e portas TCP/IP arbitrárias também podem ser reenviadas pelo canal seguro. %Description server This package installs the sshd, the server portion of OpenSSH. %Description -l de server Dieses Paket installiert den sshd, den Server-Teil der OpenSSH. %Description -l es server Este paquete instala sshd, la parte servidor de OpenSSH. %Description -l fr server Ce paquetage installe le 'sshd', partie serveur de OpenSSH. %Description -l it server Questo pacchetto installa sshd, il server di OpenSSH. %Description -l pt server Este pacote intala o sshd, o servidor do OpenSSH. %Description -l pt_BR server Este pacote intala o sshd, o servidor do OpenSSH. %Description askpass This package contains an X11-based pass-phrase dialog used per default by ssh-add(1). It is based on %{askpass} by Jim Knoble . %Prep %setup %([ -z "%{cvs}" ] || echo "-n %{name}_cvs") -a2 %if ! %{use_stable} autoreconf %endif %Build CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" \ %configure \ --with-pam \ - --with-tcp-wrappers \ --with-privsep-path=%{_var}/empty/sshd \ #leave this line for easy edits. %__make cd %{askpass} %configure \ #leave this line for easy edits. xmkmf %__make includes %__make %Install [ %{buildroot} != "/" ] && rm -rf %{buildroot} make install DESTDIR=%{buildroot} %makeinstall -C %{askpass} \ BINDIR=%{_libexecdir} \ MANPATH=%{_mandir} \ DESTDIR=%{buildroot} # OpenLinux specific configuration mkdir -p %{buildroot}{/etc/pam.d,%{SVIcdir},%{SVIdir}} mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_var}/empty/sshd # enabling X11 forwarding on the server is convenient and okay, # on the client side it's a potential security risk! %__perl -pi -e 's:#X11Forwarding no:X11Forwarding yes:g' \ %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/sshd_config %if %{no_root_login} %__perl -pi -e 's:#PermitRootLogin yes:PermitRootLogin no:g' \ %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/sshd_config %endif install -m644 contrib/caldera/sshd.pam %{buildroot}/etc/pam.d/sshd # FIXME: disabled, find out why this doesn't work with nis %__perl -pi -e 's:(.*pam_limits.*):#$1:' \ %{buildroot}/etc/pam.d/sshd install -m 0755 contrib/caldera/sshd.init %{buildroot}%{SVIdir}/sshd # the last one is needless, but more future-proof find %{buildroot}%{SVIdir} -type f -exec \ %__perl -pi -e 's:\@SVIdir\@:%{SVIdir}:g;\ s:\@sysconfdir\@:%{_sysconfdir}:g; \ s:/usr/sbin:%{_sbindir}:g'\ \{\} \; cat <<-EoD > %{buildroot}%{SVIcdir}/sshd IDENT=sshd DESCRIPTIVE="OpenSSH secure shell daemon" # This service will be marked as 'skipped' on boot if there # is no host key. Use ssh-host-keygen to generate one ONBOOT="yes" OPTIONS="" EoD SKG=%{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/ssh-host-keygen install -m 0755 contrib/caldera/ssh-host-keygen $SKG # Fix up some path names in the keygen toy^Hol %__perl -pi -e 's:\@sysconfdir\@:%{_sysconfdir}:g; \ s:\@sshkeygen\@:%{_bindir}/ssh-keygen:g' \ %{buildroot}%{_sbindir}/ssh-host-keygen # This looks terrible. Expect it to change. # install remaining docs DocD="%{buildroot}%{_defaultdocdir}/%{name}-%{version}" mkdir -p $DocD/%{askpass} cp -a CREDITS ChangeLog LICENCE OVERVIEW README* TODO PROTOCOL* $DocD install -p -m 0444 %{SOURCE3} $DocD/faq.html cp -a %{askpass}/{README,ChangeLog,TODO,SshAskpass*.ad} $DocD/%{askpass} %if %{use_stable} cp -p %{askpass}/%{xsa}.man $DocD/%{askpass}/%{xsa}.1 %else cp -p %{askpass}/%{xsa}.man %{buildroot}%{_mandir}man1/%{xsa}.1 ln -s %{xsa}.1 %{buildroot}%{_mandir}man1/ssh-askpass.1 %endif find %{buildroot}%{_mandir} -type f -not -name '*.gz' -print0 | xargs -0r %__gzip -9nf rm %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man1/slogin.1 && \ ln -s %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1.gz \ %{buildroot}%{_mandir}/man1/slogin.1.gz %Clean #%{rmDESTDIR} [ %{buildroot} != "/" ] && rm -rf %{buildroot} %Post # Generate host key when none is present to get up and running, # both client and server require this for host-based auth! # ssh-host-keygen checks for existing keys. /usr/sbin/ssh-host-keygen : # to protect the rpm database %pre server %{_sbindir}/groupadd -g %{sshd_gid} sshd 2>/dev/null || : %{_sbindir}/useradd -d /var/empty/sshd -s /bin/false -u %{sshd_uid} \ -c "SSH Daemon virtual user" -g sshd sshd 2>/dev/null || : : # to protect the rpm database %Post server if [ -x %{LSBinit}-install ]; then %{LSBinit}-install sshd else lisa --SysV-init install sshd S55 2:3:4:5 K45 0:1:6 fi ! %{SVIdir}/sshd status || %{SVIdir}/sshd restart : # to protect the rpm database %PreUn server [ "$1" = 0 ] || exit 0 ! %{SVIdir}/sshd status || %{SVIdir}/sshd stop if [ -x %{LSBinit}-remove ]; then %{LSBinit}-remove sshd else lisa --SysV-init remove sshd $1 fi : # to protect the rpm database %Files %defattr(-,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir} %config %{_sysconfdir}/ssh_config %{_bindir}/scp %{_bindir}/sftp %{_bindir}/ssh %{_bindir}/slogin %{_bindir}/ssh-add %attr(2755,root,nobody) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan %dir %{_libexecdir} %attr(4711,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh-keysign %{_libexecdir}/ssh-pkcs11-helper %{_sbindir}/ssh-host-keygen %dir %{_defaultdocdir}/%{name}-%{version} %{_defaultdocdir}/%{name}-%{version}/CREDITS %{_defaultdocdir}/%{name}-%{version}/ChangeLog %{_defaultdocdir}/%{name}-%{version}/LICENCE %{_defaultdocdir}/%{name}-%{version}/OVERVIEW %{_defaultdocdir}/%{name}-%{version}/README* %{_defaultdocdir}/%{name}-%{version}/TODO %{_defaultdocdir}/%{name}-%{version}/faq.html %{_mandir}/man1/* %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8.gz %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.gz %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5.gz %Files server %defattr(-,root,root) %dir %{_var}/empty/sshd %config %{SVIdir}/sshd %config /etc/pam.d/sshd %config %{_sysconfdir}/moduli %config %{_sysconfdir}/sshd_config %config %{SVIcdir}/sshd %{_libexecdir}/sftp-server %{_sbindir}/sshd %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5.gz %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5.gz %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8.gz %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8.gz %Files askpass %defattr(-,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/ssh-askpass %{_libexecdir}/x11-ssh-askpass %{_defaultdocdir}/%{name}-%{version}/%{askpass} %ChangeLog * Tue Jan 18 2011 Tim Rice - Use CFLAGS from Makefile instead of RPM so build completes. - Signatures were changed to .asc since 4.1p1. * Mon Jan 01 1998 ... Template Version: 1.31 -$Id: openssh.spec,v 1.83 2014/02/27 23:03:55 djm Exp $ +$Id: openssh.spec,v 1.85 2014/08/19 01:36:08 djm Exp $ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/README =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/README (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/README (revision 276707) @@ -1,91 +1,90 @@ This package describes important Cygwin specific stuff concerning OpenSSH. The binary package is usually built for recent Cygwin versions and might not run on older versions. Please check http://cygwin.com/ for information about current Cygwin releases. ================== Host configuration ================== If you are installing OpenSSH the first time, you can generate global config files and server keys, as well as installing sshd as a service, by running /usr/bin/ssh-host-config Note that this binary archive doesn't contain default config files in /etc. That files are only created if ssh-host-config is started. To support testing and unattended installation ssh-host-config got some options: usage: ssh-host-config [OPTION]... Options: --debug -d Enable shell's debug output. --yes -y Answer all questions with "yes" automatically. --no -n Answer all questions with "no" automatically. --cygwin -c Use "options" as value for CYGWIN environment var. --port -p sshd listens on port n. --user -u privileged user for service, default 'cyg_server'. --pwd -w Use "pwd" as password for privileged user. --privileged On Windows XP, require privileged user instead of LocalSystem for sshd service. Installing sshd as daemon via ssh-host-config is recommended. Alternatively you can start sshd via inetd, if you have the inetutils package installed. Just run ssh-host-config, but answer "no" when asked to install sshd as service. The ssh-host-config script also adds the required lines to /etc/inetd.conf and /etc/services. ================== User configuration ================== Any user can simplify creating the own private and public keys by running /usr/bin/ssh-user-config To support testing and unattended installation ssh-user-config got some options as well: usage: ssh-user-config [OPTION]... Options: --debug -d Enable shell's debug output. --yes -y Answer all questions with "yes" automatically. --no -n Answer all questions with "no" automatically. --passphrase -p word Use "word" as passphrase automatically. Please note that OpenSSH does never use the value of $HOME to search for the users configuration files! It always uses the value of the pw_dir field in /etc/passwd as the home directory. If no home diretory is set in /etc/passwd, the root directory is used instead! ================ Building OpenSSH ================ Building from source is easy. Just unpack the source archive, cd to that directory, and call cygport: - cygport openssh.cygport almostall + cygport openssh.cygport all You must have installed the following packages to be able to build OpenSSH with the aforementioned cygport script: zlib crypt openssl-devel - libwrap-devel libedit-devel libkrb5-devel Please send requests, error reports etc. to cygwin@cygwin.com. Have fun, Corinna Vinschen Cygwin Developer Red Hat Inc. Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/cygwin/ssh-host-config (revision 276707) @@ -1,710 +1,716 @@ #!/bin/bash # # ssh-host-config, Copyright 2000-2011 Red Hat Inc. # # This file is part of the Cygwin port of OpenSSH. # # Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any # purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above # copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. # # THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS # OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF # MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. # IN NO EVENT SHALL THE ABOVE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, # DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR # OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR # THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. # ====================================================================== # Initialization # ====================================================================== CSIH_SCRIPT=/usr/share/csih/cygwin-service-installation-helper.sh # List of apps used. This is checkad for existance in csih_sanity_check # Don't use *any* transient commands before sourcing the csih helper script, # otherwise the sanity checks are short-circuited. declare -a csih_required_commands=( /usr/bin/basename coreutils /usr/bin/cat coreutils /usr/bin/chmod coreutils /usr/bin/dirname coreutils /usr/bin/id coreutils /usr/bin/mv coreutils /usr/bin/rm coreutils /usr/bin/cygpath cygwin + /usr/bin/mkpasswd cygwin /usr/bin/mount cygwin /usr/bin/ps cygwin - /usr/bin/setfacl cygwin /usr/bin/umount cygwin /usr/bin/cmp diffutils /usr/bin/grep grep /usr/bin/awk gawk /usr/bin/ssh-keygen openssh /usr/sbin/sshd openssh /usr/bin/sed sed ) csih_sanity_check_server=yes source ${CSIH_SCRIPT} PROGNAME=$(/usr/bin/basename $0) _tdir=$(/usr/bin/dirname $0) PROGDIR=$(cd $_tdir && pwd) # Subdirectory where the new package is being installed PREFIX=/usr # Directory where the config files are stored SYSCONFDIR=/etc LOCALSTATEDIR=/var +sshd_config_configured=no port_number=22 -privsep_configured=no +strictmodes=yes privsep_used=yes cygwin_value="" user_account= password_value= opt_force=no # ====================================================================== # Routine: update_services_file # ====================================================================== update_services_file() { local _my_etcdir="/ssh-host-config.$$" local _win_etcdir local _services local _spaces local _serv_tmp local _wservices local ret=0 _win_etcdir="${SYSTEMROOT}\\system32\\drivers\\etc" _services="${_my_etcdir}/services" _spaces=" #" _serv_tmp="${_my_etcdir}/srv.out.$$" /usr/bin/mount -o text,posix=0,noacl -f "${_win_etcdir}" "${_my_etcdir}" # Depends on the above mount _wservices=`cygpath -w "${_services}"` - # Remove sshd 22/port from services - if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q 'sshd[ \t][ \t]*22' "${_services}"; echo $?` -eq 0 ] - then - /usr/bin/grep -v 'sshd[ \t][ \t]*22' "${_services}" > "${_serv_tmp}" - if [ -f "${_serv_tmp}" ] - then - if /usr/bin/mv "${_serv_tmp}" "${_services}" - then - csih_inform "Removing sshd from ${_wservices}" - else - csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_wservices} failed!" - let ++ret - fi - /usr/bin/rm -f "${_serv_tmp}" - else - csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_wservices} failed!" - let ++ret - fi - fi - # Add ssh 22/tcp and ssh 22/udp to services - if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q 'ssh[ \t][ \t]*22' "${_services}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ] + if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q 'ssh[[:space:]][[:space:]]*22' "${_services}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ] then if /usr/bin/awk '{ if ( $2 ~ /^23\/tcp/ ) print "ssh 22/tcp'"${_spaces}"'SSH Remote Login Protocol\nssh 22/udp'"${_spaces}"'SSH Remote Login Protocol"; print $0; }' < "${_services}" > "${_serv_tmp}" then if /usr/bin/mv "${_serv_tmp}" "${_services}" then csih_inform "Added ssh to ${_wservices}" else csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_wservices} failed!" let ++ret fi /usr/bin/rm -f "${_serv_tmp}" else csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_wservices} failed!" let ++ret fi fi /usr/bin/umount "${_my_etcdir}" return $ret } # --- End of update_services_file --- # # ====================================================================== +# Routine: sshd_strictmodes +# MODIFIES: strictmodes +# ====================================================================== +sshd_strictmodes() { + if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ] + then + echo + csih_inform "StrictModes is set to 'yes' by default." + csih_inform "This is the recommended setting, but it requires that the POSIX" + csih_inform "permissions of the user's home directory, the user's .ssh" + csih_inform "directory, and the user's ssh key files are tight so that" + csih_inform "only the user has write permissions." + csih_inform "On the other hand, StrictModes don't work well with default" + csih_inform "Windows permissions of a home directory mounted with the" + csih_inform "'noacl' option, and they don't work at all if the home" + csih_inform "directory is on a FAT or FAT32 partition." + if ! csih_request "Should StrictModes be used?" + then + strictmodes=no + fi + fi + return 0 +} + +# ====================================================================== # Routine: sshd_privsep -# MODIFIES: privsep_configured privsep_used +# MODIFIES: privsep_used # ====================================================================== sshd_privsep() { - local sshdconfig_tmp local ret=0 - if [ "${privsep_configured}" != "yes" ] + if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ] then - csih_inform "Privilege separation is set to yes by default since OpenSSH 3.3." - csih_inform "However, this requires a non-privileged account called 'sshd'." + echo + csih_inform "Privilege separation is set to 'sandbox' by default since" + csih_inform "OpenSSH 6.1. This is unsupported by Cygwin and has to be set" + csih_inform "to 'yes' or 'no'." + csih_inform "However, using privilege separation requires a non-privileged account" + csih_inform "called 'sshd'." csih_inform "For more info on privilege separation read /usr/share/doc/openssh/README.privsep." if csih_request "Should privilege separation be used?" then privsep_used=yes if ! csih_create_unprivileged_user sshd then csih_error_recoverable "Couldn't create user 'sshd'!" csih_error_recoverable "Privilege separation set to 'no' again!" csih_error_recoverable "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!" let ++ret privsep_used=no fi else privsep_used=no fi fi + return $ret +} # --- End of sshd_privsep --- # - # Create default sshd_config from skeleton files in /etc/defaults/etc or - # modify to add the missing privsep configuration option - if /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults/${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" >/dev/null 2>&1 +# ====================================================================== +# Routine: sshd_config_tweak +# ====================================================================== +sshd_config_tweak() { + local ret=0 + + # Modify sshd_config + csih_inform "Updating ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file" + if [ "${port_number}" -ne 22 ] then - csih_inform "Updating ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file" - sshdconfig_tmp=${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config.$$ - /usr/bin/sed -e "s/^#UsePrivilegeSeparation yes/UsePrivilegeSeparation ${privsep_used}/ - s/^#Port 22/Port ${port_number}/ - s/^#StrictModes yes/StrictModes no/" \ - < ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config \ - > "${sshdconfig_tmp}" - if ! /usr/bin/mv "${sshdconfig_tmp}" ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config + /usr/bin/sed -i -e "s/^#\?[[:space:]]*Port[[:space:]].*/Port ${port_number}/" \ + ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config + if [ $? -ne 0 ] then - csih_warning "Setting privilege separation to 'yes' failed!" - csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!" - let ++ret + csih_warning "Setting listening port to ${port_number} failed!" + csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!" + let ++ret fi - elif [ "${privsep_configured}" != "yes" ] + fi + if [ "${strictmodes}" = "no" ] then - echo >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config - if ! echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation ${privsep_used}" >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config + /usr/bin/sed -i -e "s/^#\?[[:space:]]*StrictModes[[:space:]].*/StrictModes no/" \ + ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config + if [ $? -ne 0 ] then - csih_warning "Setting privilege separation to 'yes' failed!" - csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!" - let ++ret + csih_warning "Setting StrictModes to 'no' failed!" + csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!" + let ++ret fi fi + if [ "${sshd_config_configured}" != "yes" ] + then + /usr/bin/sed -i -e " + s/^#\?UsePrivilegeSeparation .*/UsePrivilegeSeparation ${privsep_used}/" \ + ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config + if [ $? -ne 0 ] + then + csih_warning "Setting privilege separation failed!" + csih_warning "Check your ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config file!" + let ++ret + fi + fi return $ret -} # --- End of sshd_privsep --- # +} # --- End of sshd_config_tweak --- # # ====================================================================== # Routine: update_inetd_conf # ====================================================================== update_inetd_conf() { local _inetcnf="${SYSCONFDIR}/inetd.conf" local _inetcnf_tmp="${SYSCONFDIR}/inetd.conf.$$" local _inetcnf_dir="${SYSCONFDIR}/inetd.d" local _sshd_inetd_conf="${_inetcnf_dir}/sshd-inetd" local _sshd_inetd_conf_tmp="${_inetcnf_dir}/sshd-inetd.$$" local _with_comment=1 local ret=0 if [ -d "${_inetcnf_dir}" ] then # we have inetutils-1.5 inetd.d support if [ -f "${_inetcnf}" ] then - /usr/bin/grep -q '^[ \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}" && _with_comment=0 + /usr/bin/grep -q '^[[:space:]]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}" && _with_comment=0 # check for sshd OR ssh in top-level inetd.conf file, and remove # will be replaced by a file in inetd.d/ - if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -eq 0 ] + if [ $(/usr/bin/grep -q '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?) -eq 0 ] then /usr/bin/grep -v '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}" if [ -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" ] then if /usr/bin/mv "${_inetcnf_tmp}" "${_inetcnf}" then csih_inform "Removed ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf}" else csih_warning "Removing ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf} failed!" let ++ret fi /usr/bin/rm -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" else csih_warning "Removing ssh[d] from ${_inetcnf} failed!" let ++ret fi fi fi csih_install_config "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults" if /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults${_sshd_inetd_conf}" "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" >/dev/null 2>&1 then if [ "${_with_comment}" -eq 0 ] then - /usr/bin/sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[ \t]*//' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}" + /usr/bin/sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[[:space:]]*//' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}" else - /usr/bin/sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[ \t]*/# /' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}" + /usr/bin/sed -e 's/@COMMENT@[[:space:]]*/# /' < "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" > "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}" fi if /usr/bin/mv "${_sshd_inetd_conf_tmp}" "${_sshd_inetd_conf}" then csih_inform "Updated ${_sshd_inetd_conf}" else csih_warning "Updating ${_sshd_inetd_conf} failed!" let ++ret fi fi elif [ -f "${_inetcnf}" ] then - /usr/bin/grep -q '^[ \t]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" && _with_comment=0 + /usr/bin/grep -q '^[[:space:]]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" && _with_comment=0 # check for sshd in top-level inetd.conf file, and remove # will be replaced by a file in inetd.d/ - if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q '^[# \t]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -eq 0 ] + if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q '^#\?[[:space:]]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -eq 0 ] then - /usr/bin/grep -v '^[# \t]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}" + /usr/bin/grep -v '^#\?[[:space:]]*sshd' "${_inetcnf}" >> "${_inetcnf_tmp}" if [ -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" ] then if /usr/bin/mv "${_inetcnf_tmp}" "${_inetcnf}" then csih_inform "Removed sshd from ${_inetcnf}" else csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_inetcnf} failed!" let ++ret fi /usr/bin/rm -f "${_inetcnf_tmp}" else csih_warning "Removing sshd from ${_inetcnf} failed!" let ++ret fi fi # Add ssh line to inetd.conf if [ `/usr/bin/grep -q '^[# \t]*ssh' "${_inetcnf}"; echo $?` -ne 0 ] then if [ "${_with_comment}" -eq 0 ] then echo 'ssh stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/sshd sshd -i' >> "${_inetcnf}" else echo '# ssh stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/sshd sshd -i' >> "${_inetcnf}" fi if [ $? -eq 0 ] then csih_inform "Added ssh to ${_inetcnf}" else csih_warning "Adding ssh to ${_inetcnf} failed!" let ++ret fi fi fi return $ret } # --- End of update_inetd_conf --- # # ====================================================================== # Routine: check_service_files_ownership # Checks that the files in /etc and /var belong to the right owner # ====================================================================== check_service_files_ownership() { local run_service_as=$1 local ret=0 if [ -z "${run_service_as}" ] then - accnt_name=$(/usr/bin/cygrunsrv -VQ sshd | /usr/bin/sed -ne 's/^Account *: *//gp') + accnt_name=$(/usr/bin/cygrunsrv -VQ sshd | + /usr/bin/sed -ne 's/^Account *: *//gp') if [ "${accnt_name}" = "LocalSystem" ] then # Convert "LocalSystem" to "SYSTEM" as is the correct account name - accnt_name="SYSTEM:" - elif [[ "${accnt_name}" =~ ^\.\\ ]] - then - # Convert "." domain to local machine name - accnt_name="U-${COMPUTERNAME}${accnt_name#.}," + run_service_as="SYSTEM" + else + dom="${accnt_name%%\\*}" + accnt_name="${accnt_name#*\\}" + if [ "${dom}" = '.' ] + then + # Check local account + run_service_as=$(/usr/bin/mkpasswd -l -u "${accnt_name}" | + /usr/bin/awk -F: '{print $1;}') + else + # Check domain + run_service_as=$(/usr/bin/mkpasswd -d "${dom}" -u "${accnt_name}" | + /usr/bin/awk -F: '{print $1;}') + fi fi - run_service_as=$(/usr/bin/grep -Fi "${accnt_name}" /etc/passwd | /usr/bin/awk -F: '{print $1;}') if [ -z "${run_service_as}" ] then csih_warning "Couldn't determine name of user running sshd service from /etc/passwd!" csih_warning "As a result, this script cannot make sure that the files used" csih_warning "by the sshd service belong to the user running the service." csih_warning "Please re-run the mkpasswd tool to make sure the /etc/passwd" csih_warning "file is in a good shape." return 1 fi fi for i in "${SYSCONFDIR}"/ssh_config "${SYSCONFDIR}"/sshd_config "${SYSCONFDIR}"/ssh_host_*key "${SYSCONFDIR}"/ssh_host_*key.pub do if [ -f "$i" ] then if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 "$i" >/dev/null 2>&1 then csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of $i!" let ++ret fi fi done if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty >/dev/null 2>&1 then csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty!" let ++ret fi if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog >/dev/null 2>&1 then csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog!" let ++ret fi if [ -f ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log ] then if ! chown "${run_service_as}".544 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log >/dev/null 2>&1 then csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/sshd.log!" let ++ret fi fi if [ $ret -ne 0 ] then csih_warning "Couldn't change owner of important files to ${run_service_as}!" csih_warning "This may cause the sshd service to fail! Please make sure that" csih_warning "you have suufficient permissions to change the ownership of files" csih_warning "and try to run the ssh-host-config script again." fi return $ret } # --- End of check_service_files_ownership --- # # ====================================================================== # Routine: install_service # Install sshd as a service # ====================================================================== install_service() { local run_service_as local password local ret=0 echo if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -Q sshd >/dev/null 2>&1 then csih_inform "Sshd service is already installed." check_service_files_ownership "" || let ret+=$? else echo -e "${_csih_QUERY_STR} Do you want to install sshd as a service?" if csih_request "(Say \"no\" if it is already installed as a service)" then csih_get_cygenv "${cygwin_value}" if ( csih_is_nt2003 || [ "$csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER" = "yes" ] ) then csih_inform "On Windows Server 2003, Windows Vista, and above, the" csih_inform "SYSTEM account cannot setuid to other users -- a capability" csih_inform "sshd requires. You need to have or to create a privileged" csih_inform "account. This script will help you do so." echo [ "${opt_force}" = "yes" ] && opt_f=-f [ -n "${user_account}" ] && opt_u="-u ""${user_account}""" csih_select_privileged_username ${opt_f} ${opt_u} sshd if ! csih_create_privileged_user "${password_value}" then csih_error_recoverable "There was a serious problem creating a privileged user." csih_request "Do you want to proceed anyway?" || exit 1 let ++ret fi fi # Never returns empty if NT or above run_service_as=$(csih_service_should_run_as) if [ "${run_service_as}" = "${csih_PRIVILEGED_USERNAME}" ] then password="${csih_PRIVILEGED_PASSWORD}" if [ -z "${password}" ] then csih_get_value "Please enter the password for user '${run_service_as}':" "-s" password="${csih_value}" fi fi # At this point, we either have $run_service_as = "system" and # $password is empty, or $run_service_as is some privileged user and # (hopefully) $password contains the correct password. So, from here # out, we use '-z "${password}"' to discriminate the two cases. csih_check_user "${run_service_as}" if [ -n "${csih_cygenv}" ] then cygwin_env=( -e "CYGWIN=${csih_cygenv}" ) fi if [ -z "${password}" ] then if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -I sshd -d "CYGWIN sshd" -p /usr/sbin/sshd \ -a "-D" -y tcpip "${cygwin_env[@]}" then echo csih_inform "The sshd service has been installed under the LocalSystem" csih_inform "account (also known as SYSTEM). To start the service now, call" csih_inform "\`net start sshd' or \`cygrunsrv -S sshd'. Otherwise, it" csih_inform "will start automatically after the next reboot." fi else if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -I sshd -d "CYGWIN sshd" -p /usr/sbin/sshd \ -a "-D" -y tcpip "${cygwin_env[@]}" \ -u "${run_service_as}" -w "${password}" then /usr/bin/editrights -u "${run_service_as}" -a SeServiceLogonRight echo csih_inform "The sshd service has been installed under the '${run_service_as}'" csih_inform "account. To start the service now, call \`net start sshd' or" csih_inform "\`cygrunsrv -S sshd'. Otherwise, it will start automatically" csih_inform "after the next reboot." fi fi if /usr/bin/cygrunsrv -Q sshd >/dev/null 2>&1 then check_service_files_ownership "${run_service_as}" || let ret+=$? else csih_error_recoverable "Installing sshd as a service failed!" let ++ret fi fi # user allowed us to install as service fi # service not yet installed return $ret } # --- End of install_service --- # # ====================================================================== # Main Entry Point # ====================================================================== # Check how the script has been started. If # (1) it has been started by giving the full path and # that path is /etc/postinstall, OR # (2) Otherwise, if the environment variable # SSH_HOST_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO is set # then set auto_answer to "no". This allows automatic # creation of the config files in /etc w/o overwriting # them if they already exist. In both cases, color # escape sequences are suppressed, so as to prevent # cluttering setup's logfiles. if [ "$PROGDIR" = "/etc/postinstall" ] then csih_auto_answer="no" csih_disable_color opt_force=yes fi if [ -n "${SSH_HOST_CONFIG_AUTO_ANSWER_NO}" ] then csih_auto_answer="no" csih_disable_color opt_force=yes fi # ====================================================================== # Parse options # ====================================================================== while : do case $# in 0) break ;; esac option=$1 shift case "${option}" in -d | --debug ) set -x csih_trace_on ;; -y | --yes ) csih_auto_answer=yes opt_force=yes ;; -n | --no ) csih_auto_answer=no opt_force=yes ;; -c | --cygwin ) cygwin_value="$1" shift ;; -p | --port ) port_number=$1 shift ;; -u | --user ) user_account="$1" shift ;; -w | --pwd ) password_value="$1" shift ;; --privileged ) csih_FORCE_PRIVILEGED_USER=yes ;; *) echo "usage: ${progname} [OPTION]..." echo echo "This script creates an OpenSSH host configuration." echo echo "Options:" echo " --debug -d Enable shell's debug output." echo " --yes -y Answer all questions with \"yes\" automatically." echo " --no -n Answer all questions with \"no\" automatically." echo " --cygwin -c Use \"options\" as value for CYGWIN environment var." echo " --port -p sshd listens on port n." echo " --user -u privileged user for service, default 'cyg_server'." echo " --pwd -w Use \"pwd\" as password for privileged user." echo " --privileged On Windows XP, require privileged user" echo " instead of LocalSystem for sshd service." echo exit 1 ;; esac done # ====================================================================== # Action! # ====================================================================== # Check for running ssh/sshd processes first. Refuse to do anything while # some ssh processes are still running if /usr/bin/ps -ef | /usr/bin/grep -q '/sshd\?$' then echo csih_error "There are still ssh processes running. Please shut them down first." fi # Make sure the user is running in an administrative context admin=$(/usr/bin/id -G | /usr/bin/grep -Eq '\<544\>' && echo yes || echo no) if [ "${admin}" != "yes" ] then echo csih_warning "Running this script typically requires administrator privileges!" csih_warning "However, it seems your account does not have these privileges." csih_warning "Here's the list of groups in your user token:" echo for i in $(/usr/bin/id -G) do /usr/bin/awk -F: "/[^:]*:[^:]*:$i:/{ print \" \" \$1; }" /etc/group done echo csih_warning "This usually means you're running this script from a non-admin" csih_warning "desktop session, or in a non-elevated shell under UAC control." echo csih_warning "Make sure you have the appropriate privileges right now," csih_warning "otherwise parts of this script will probably fail!" echo echo -e "${_csih_QUERY_STR} Are you sure you want to continue? (Say \"no\" if you're not sure" if ! csih_request "you have the required privileges)" then echo csih_inform "Ok. Exiting. Make sure to switch to an administrative account" csih_inform "or to start this script from an elevated shell." exit 1 fi fi echo warning_cnt=0 -# Check for ${SYSCONFDIR} directory -csih_make_dir "${SYSCONFDIR}" "Cannot create global configuration files." -if ! /usr/bin/chmod 775 "${SYSCONFDIR}" >/dev/null 2>&1 -then - csih_warning "Can't set permissions on ${SYSCONFDIR}!" - let ++warning_cnt -fi -if ! /usr/bin/setfacl -m u:system:rwx "${SYSCONFDIR}" >/dev/null 2>&1 -then - csih_warning "Can't set extended permissions on ${SYSCONFDIR}!" - let ++warning_cnt -fi - -# Check for /var/log directory -csih_make_dir "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log" "Cannot create log directory." -if ! /usr/bin/chmod 775 "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log" >/dev/null 2>&1 -then - csih_warning "Can't set permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log!" - let ++warning_cnt -fi -if ! /usr/bin/setfacl -m u:system:rwx "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log" >/dev/null 2>&1 -then - csih_warning "Can't set extended permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log!" - let ++warning_cnt -fi - # Create /var/log/lastlog if not already exists if [ -e ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog -a ! -f ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog ] then echo csih_error_multi "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog exists, but is not a file." \ "Cannot create ssh host configuration." fi if [ ! -e ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog ] then /usr/bin/cat /dev/null > ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog if ! /usr/bin/chmod 644 ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog >/dev/null 2>&1 then csih_warning "Can't set permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/log/lastlog!" let ++warning_cnt fi fi # Create /var/empty file used as chroot jail for privilege separation csih_make_dir "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty" "Cannot create ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty directory." if ! /usr/bin/chmod 755 "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty" >/dev/null 2>&1 then csih_warning "Can't set permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty!" let ++warning_cnt fi -if ! /usr/bin/setfacl -m u:system:rwx "${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty" >/dev/null 2>&1 -then - csih_warning "Can't set extended permissions on ${LOCALSTATEDIR}/empty!" - let ++warning_cnt -fi # generate missing host keys +csih_inform "Generating missing SSH host keys" /usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A || let warning_cnt+=$? # handle ssh_config csih_install_config "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults" || let ++warning_cnt if /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults/${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config" >/dev/null 2>&1 then if [ "${port_number}" != "22" ] then csih_inform "Updating ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config file with requested port" echo "Host localhost" >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config echo " Port ${port_number}" >> ${SYSCONFDIR}/ssh_config fi fi # handle sshd_config (and privsep) csih_install_config "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults" || let ++warning_cnt if ! /usr/bin/cmp "${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" "${SYSCONFDIR}/defaults/${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config" >/dev/null 2>&1 then - /usr/bin/grep -q UsePrivilegeSeparation ${SYSCONFDIR}/sshd_config && privsep_configured=yes + sshd_config_configured=yes fi +sshd_strictmodes || let warning_cnt+=$? sshd_privsep || let warning_cnt+=$? - +sshd_config_tweak || let warning_cnt+=$? update_services_file || let warning_cnt+=$? update_inetd_conf || let warning_cnt+=$? install_service || let warning_cnt+=$? echo if [ $warning_cnt -eq 0 ] then csih_inform "Host configuration finished. Have fun!" else csih_warning "Host configuration exited with ${warning_cnt} errors or warnings!" csih_warning "Make sure that all problems reported are fixed," csih_warning "then re-run ssh-host-config." fi exit $warning_cnt Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec (revision 276707) @@ -1,812 +1,811 @@ -%define ver 6.6p1 +%define ver 6.7p1 %define rel 1 # OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID %define sshd_uid 74 %define sshd_gid 74 # Version of ssh-askpass %define aversion 1.2.4.1 # Do we want to disable building of x11-askpass? (1=yes 0=no) %define no_x11_askpass 0 # Do we want to disable building of gnome-askpass? (1=yes 0=no) %define no_gnome_askpass 0 # Do we want to link against a static libcrypto? (1=yes 0=no) %define static_libcrypto 0 # Do we want smartcard support (1=yes 0=no) %define scard 0 # Use GTK2 instead of GNOME in gnome-ssh-askpass %define gtk2 1 # Is this build for RHL 6.x? %define build6x 0 # Do we want kerberos5 support (1=yes 0=no) %define kerberos5 1 # Reserve options to override askpass settings with: # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'skip_xxx 1' %{?skip_x11_askpass:%define no_x11_askpass 1} %{?skip_gnome_askpass:%define no_gnome_askpass 1} # Add option to build without GTK2 for older platforms with only GTK+. # RedHat <= 7.2 and Red Hat Advanced Server 2.1 are examples. # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'no_gtk2 1' %{?no_gtk2:%define gtk2 0} # Is this a build for RHL 6.x or earlier? %{?build_6x:%define build6x 1} # If this is RHL 6.x, the default configuration has sysconfdir in /usr/etc. %if %{build6x} %define _sysconfdir /etc %endif # Options for static OpenSSL link: # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "static_openssl 1" %{?static_openssl:%define static_libcrypto 1} # Options for Smartcard support: (needs libsectok and openssl-engine) # rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "smartcard 1" %{?smartcard:%define scard 1} # Is this a build for the rescue CD (without PAM, with MD5)? (1=yes 0=no) %define rescue 0 %{?build_rescue:%define rescue 1} # Turn off some stuff for resuce builds %if %{rescue} %define kerberos5 0 %endif Summary: The OpenSSH implementation of SSH protocol versions 1 and 2. Name: openssh Version: %{ver} %if %{rescue} Release: %{rel}rescue %else Release: %{rel} %endif URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} Source1: http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}.tar.gz %endif License: BSD Group: Applications/Internet BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-buildroot Obsoletes: ssh %if %{build6x} PreReq: initscripts >= 5.00 %else Requires: initscripts >= 5.20 %endif -BuildRequires: perl, openssl-devel, tcp_wrappers +BuildRequires: perl, openssl-devel BuildRequires: /bin/login %if ! %{build6x} BuildPreReq: glibc-devel, pam %else BuildRequires: /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h %endif %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} BuildRequires: /usr/include/X11/Xlib.h %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} BuildRequires: pkgconfig %endif %if %{kerberos5} BuildRequires: krb5-devel BuildRequires: krb5-libs %endif %package clients Summary: OpenSSH clients. Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} Group: Applications/Internet Obsoletes: ssh-clients %package server Summary: The OpenSSH server daemon. Group: System Environment/Daemons Obsoletes: ssh-server Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}, chkconfig >= 0.9 %if ! %{build6x} Requires: /etc/pam.d/system-auth %endif %package askpass Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and X. Group: Applications/Internet Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} Obsoletes: ssh-extras %package askpass-gnome Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH, X, and GNOME. Group: Applications/Internet Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release} Obsoletes: ssh-extras %description SSH (Secure SHell) is a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. SSH is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and to provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. OpenSSH is OpenBSD's version of the last free version of SSH, bringing it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all patented algorithms to separate libraries. This package includes the core files necessary for both the OpenSSH client and server. To make this package useful, you should also install openssh-clients, openssh-server, or both. %description clients OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package includes the clients necessary to make encrypted connections to SSH servers. You'll also need to install the openssh package on OpenSSH clients. %description server OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains the secure shell daemon (sshd). The sshd daemon allows SSH clients to securely connect to your SSH server. You also need to have the openssh package installed. %description askpass OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH. %description askpass-gnome OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the GNOME GUI desktop environment. %prep %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} %setup -q -a 1 %else %setup -q %endif %build %if %{rescue} CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -Os"; export CFLAGS %endif %if %{kerberos5} K5DIR=`rpm -ql krb5-devel | grep include/krb5.h | sed 's,\/include\/krb5.h,,'` echo K5DIR=$K5DIR %endif %configure \ --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \ --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh \ --datadir=%{_datadir}/openssh \ - --with-tcp-wrappers \ --with-rsh=%{_bindir}/rsh \ --with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/bin:/usr/bin \ --with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \ --with-privsep-path=%{_var}/empty/sshd \ --with-md5-passwords \ %if %{scard} --with-smartcard \ %endif %if %{rescue} --without-pam \ %else --with-pam \ %endif %if %{kerberos5} --with-kerberos5=$K5DIR \ %endif %if %{static_libcrypto} perl -pi -e "s|-lcrypto|%{_libdir}/libcrypto.a|g" Makefile %endif make %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} pushd x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion} %configure --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh xmkmf -a make popd %endif # Define a variable to toggle gnome1/gtk2 building. This is necessary # because RPM doesn't handle nested %if statements. %if %{gtk2} gtk2=yes %else gtk2=no %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} pushd contrib if [ $gtk2 = yes ] ; then make gnome-ssh-askpass2 mv gnome-ssh-askpass2 gnome-ssh-askpass else make gnome-ssh-askpass1 mv gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass fi popd %endif %install rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_var}/empty/sshd make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh %if %{build6x} install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam.old $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd %else install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd %endif install -m755 contrib/redhat/sshd.init $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} install -s x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass ln -s x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} install -s contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass %endif %if ! %{scard} rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/openssh/Ssh.bin %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} install -m 755 -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/ %endif perl -pi -e "s|$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||g" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/* %clean rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT %triggerun server -- ssh-server if [ "$1" != 0 -a -r /var/run/sshd.pid ] ; then touch /var/run/sshd.restart fi %triggerun server -- openssh-server < 2.5.0p1 # Count the number of HostKey and HostDsaKey statements we have. gawk 'BEGIN {IGNORECASE=1} /^hostkey/ || /^hostdsakey/ {sawhostkey = sawhostkey + 1} END {exit sawhostkey}' /etc/ssh/sshd_config # And if we only found one, we know the client was relying on the old default # behavior, which loaded the the SSH2 DSA host key when HostDsaKey wasn't # specified. Now that HostKey is used for both SSH1 and SSH2 keys, specifying # one nullifies the default, which would have loaded both. if [ $? -eq 1 ] ; then echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config fi %triggerpostun server -- ssh-server if [ "$1" != 0 ] ; then /sbin/chkconfig --add sshd if test -f /var/run/sshd.restart ; then rm -f /var/run/sshd.restart /sbin/service sshd start > /dev/null 2>&1 || : fi fi %pre server %{_sbindir}/groupadd -r -g %{sshd_gid} sshd 2>/dev/null || : %{_sbindir}/useradd -d /var/empty/sshd -s /bin/false -u %{sshd_uid} \ -g sshd -M -r sshd 2>/dev/null || : %post server /sbin/chkconfig --add sshd %postun server /sbin/service sshd condrestart > /dev/null 2>&1 || : %preun server if [ "$1" = 0 ] then /sbin/service sshd stop > /dev/null 2>&1 || : /sbin/chkconfig --del sshd fi %files %defattr(-,root,root) %doc CREDITS ChangeLog INSTALL LICENCE OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL* TODO %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1* %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli %if ! %{rescue} %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1* %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh %attr(4711,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8* %endif %if %{scard} %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_datadir}/openssh %attr(0644,root,root) %{_datadir}/openssh/Ssh.bin %endif %files clients %defattr(-,root,root) %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config %attr(-,root,root) %{_bindir}/slogin %attr(-,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/slogin.1* %if ! %{rescue} %attr(2755,root,nobody) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1* %endif %if ! %{rescue} %files server %defattr(-,root,root) %dir %attr(0111,root,root) %{_var}/empty/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8* %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd %endif %if ! %{no_x11_askpass} %files askpass %defattr(-,root,root) %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/README %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/ChangeLog %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/SshAskpass*.ad %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass %endif %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} %files askpass-gnome %defattr(-,root,root) %attr(0755,root,root) %config %{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.* %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass %endif %changelog * Wed Jul 14 2010 Tim Rice - test for skip_x11_askpass (line 77) should have been for no_x11_askpass * Mon Jun 2 2003 Damien Miller - Remove noip6 option. This may be controlled at run-time in client config file using new AddressFamily directive * Mon May 12 2003 Damien Miller - Don't install profile.d scripts when not building with GNOME/GTK askpass (patch from bet@rahul.net) * Wed Oct 01 2002 Damien Miller - Install ssh-agent setgid nobody to prevent ptrace() key theft attacks * Mon Sep 30 2002 Damien Miller - Use contrib/ Makefile for building askpass programs * Fri Jun 21 2002 Damien Miller - Merge in spec changes from seba@iq.pl (Sebastian Pachuta) - Add new {ssh,sshd}_config.5 manpages - Add new ssh-keysign program and remove setuid from ssh client * Fri May 10 2002 Damien Miller - Merge in spec changes from RedHat, reorgansie a little - Add Privsep user, group and directory * Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-2 - bump and grind (through the build system) * Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-1 - require sharutils for building (mindrot #137) - require db1-devel only when building for 6.x (#55105), which probably won't work anyway (3.1 requires OpenSSL 0.9.6 to build), but what the heck - require pam-devel by file (not by package name) again - add Markus's patch to compile with OpenSSL 0.9.5a (from http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=141) and apply it if we're building for 6.x * Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.1p1-0 - update to 3.1p1 * Tue Mar 5 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai SNAP-20020305 - update to SNAP-20020305 - drop debug patch, fixed upstream * Wed Feb 20 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai SNAP-20020220 - update to SNAP-20020220 for testing purposes (you've been warned, if there's anything to be warned about, gss patches won't apply, I don't mind) * Wed Feb 13 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-3 - add patches from Simon Wilkinson and Nicolas Williams for GSSAPI key exchange, authentication, and named key support * Wed Jan 23 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-2 - remove dependency on db1-devel, which has just been swallowed up whole by gnome-libs-devel * Sun Dec 29 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - adjust build dependencies so that build6x actually works right (fix from Hugo van der Kooij) * Tue Dec 4 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.2p1-1 - update to 3.0.2p1 * Fri Nov 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0.1p1-1 - update to 3.0.1p1 * Tue Nov 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to current CVS (not for use in distribution) * Thu Nov 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 3.0p1-1 - merge some of Damien Miller changes from the upstream 3.0p1 spec file and init script * Wed Nov 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 3.0p1 - update to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.4.1 - change build dependency on a file from pam-devel to the pam-devel package - replace primes with moduli * Thu Sep 27 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-9 - incorporate fix from Markus Friedl's advisory for IP-based authorization bugs * Thu Sep 13 2001 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer 2.9p2-8 - Merge changes to rescue build from current sysadmin survival cd * Thu Sep 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-7 - fix scp's server's reporting of file sizes, and build with the proper preprocessor define to get large-file capable open(), stat(), etc. (sftp has been doing this correctly all along) (#51827) - configure without --with-ipv4-default on RHL 7.x and newer (#45987,#52247) - pull cvs patch to fix support for /etc/nologin for non-PAM logins (#47298) - mark profile.d scriptlets as config files (#42337) - refer to Jason Stone's mail for zsh workaround for exit-hanging quasi-bug - change a couple of log() statements to debug() statements (#50751) - pull cvs patch to add -t flag to sshd (#28611) - clear fd_sets correctly (one bit per FD, not one byte per FD) (#43221) * Mon Aug 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai 2.9p2-6 - add db1-devel as a BuildPrerequisite (noted by Hans Ecke) * Thu Aug 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - pull cvs patch to fix remote port forwarding with protocol 2 * Thu Aug 9 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - pull cvs patch to add session initialization to no-pty sessions - pull cvs patch to not cut off challengeresponse auth needlessly - refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed (#49263) * Wed Aug 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - don't apply patches to code we don't intend to build (spotted by Matt Galgoci) * Mon Aug 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - pass OPTIONS correctly to initlog (#50151) * Wed Jul 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - switch to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.2 * Wed Jul 11 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - rebuild in new environment * Mon Jun 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - disable the gssapi patch * Mon Jun 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 2.9p2 - refresh to a new version of the gssapi patch * Thu Jun 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - change Copyright: BSD to License: BSD - add Markus Friedl's unverified patch for the cookie file deletion problem so that we can verify it - drop patch to check if xauth is present (was folded into cookie patch) - don't apply gssapi patches for the errata candidate - clear supplemental groups list at startup * Fri May 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - fix an error parsing the new default sshd_config - add a fix from Markus Friedl (via openssh-unix-dev) for ssh-keygen not dealing with comments right * Thu May 24 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - add in Simon Wilkinson's GSSAPI patch to give it some testing in-house, to be removed before the next beta cycle because it's a big departure from the upstream version * Thu May 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - finish marking strings in the init script for translation - modify init script to source /etc/sysconfig/sshd and pass $OPTIONS to sshd at startup (change merged from openssh.com init script, originally by Pekka Savola) - refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed * Wed May 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 2.9 - drop various patches that came from or went upstream or to or from CVS * Wed Apr 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - only require initscripts 5.00 on 6.2 (reported by Peter Bieringer) * Sun Apr 8 2001 Preston Brown - remove explicit openssl requirement, fixes builddistro issue - make initscript stop() function wait until sshd really dead to avoid races in condrestart * Mon Apr 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - mention that challengereponse supports PAM, so disabling password doesn't limit users to pubkey and rsa auth (#34378) - bypass the daemon() function in the init script and call initlog directly, because daemon() won't start a daemon it detects is already running (like open connections) - require the version of openssl we had when we were built * Fri Mar 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - make do_pam_setcred() smart enough to know when to establish creds and when to reinitialize them - add in a couple of other fixes from Damien for inclusion in the errata * Thu Mar 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 2.5.2p2 - call setcred() again after initgroups, because the "creds" could actually be group memberships * Tue Mar 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - update to 2.5.2p1 (includes endianness fixes in the rijndael implementation) - don't enable challenge-response by default until we find a way to not have too many userauth requests (we may make up to six pubkey and up to three password attempts as it is) - remove build dependency on rsh to match openssh.com's packages more closely * Sat Mar 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - remove dependency on openssl -- would need to be too precise * Fri Mar 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - rebuild in new environment * Mon Feb 26 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Revert the patch to move pam_open_session. - Init script and spec file changes from Pekka Savola. (#28750) - Patch sftp to recognize '-o protocol' arguments. (#29540) * Thu Feb 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Chuck the closing patch. - Add a trigger to add host keys for protocol 2 to the config file, now that configuration file syntax requires us to specify it with HostKey if we specify any other HostKey values, which we do. * Tue Feb 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Redo patch to move pam_open_session after the server setuid()s to the user. - Rework the nopam patch to use be picked up by autoconf. * Mon Feb 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update for 2.5.1p1. - Add init script mods from Pekka Savola. - Tweak the init script to match the CVS contrib script more closely. - Redo patch to ssh-add to try to adding both identity and id_dsa to also try adding id_rsa. * Fri Feb 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update for 2.5.0p1. - Use $RPM_OPT_FLAGS instead of -O when building gnome-ssh-askpass - Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS, including update of x11 askpass to 1.2.0. - Only require openssl (don't prereq) because we generate keys in the init script now. * Tue Feb 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Don't open a PAM session until we've forked and become the user (#25690). - Apply Andrew Bartlett's patch for letting pam_authenticate() know which host the user is attempting a login from. - Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS. - Don't expose KbdInt responses in debug messages (from CVS). - Detect and handle errors in rsa_{public,private}_decrypt (from CVS). * Wed Feb 7 2001 Trond Eivind Glomsrxd - i18n-tweak to initscript. * Tue Jan 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - More gettextizing. - Close all files after going into daemon mode (needs more testing). - Extract patch from CVS to handle auth banners (in the client). - Extract patch from CVS to handle compat weirdness. * Fri Jan 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Finish with the gettextizing. * Thu Jan 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai - Fix a bug in auth2-pam.c (#23877) - Gettextize the init script. * Wed Dec 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Incorporate a switch for using PAM configs for 6.x, just in case. * Tue Dec 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Incorporate Bero's changes for a build specifically for rescue CDs. * Wed Nov 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Don't treat pam_setcred() failure as fatal unless pam_authenticate() has succeeded, to allow public-key authentication after a failure with "none" authentication. (#21268) * Tue Nov 28 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to x11-askpass 1.1.1. (#21301) - Don't second-guess fixpaths, which causes paths to get fixed twice. (#21290) * Mon Nov 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Merge multiple PAM text messages into subsequent prompts when possible when doing keyboard-interactive authentication. * Sun Nov 26 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Disable the built-in MD5 password support. We're using PAM. - Take a crack at doing keyboard-interactive authentication with PAM, and enable use of it in the default client configuration so that the client will try it when the server disallows password authentication. - Build with debugging flags. Build root policies strip all binaries anyway. * Tue Nov 21 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Use DESTDIR instead of %%makeinstall. - Remove /usr/X11R6/bin from the path-fixing patch. * Mon Nov 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Add the primes file from the latest snapshot to the main package (#20884). - Add the dev package to the prereq list (#19984). - Remove the default path and mimic login's behavior in the server itself. * Fri Nov 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Resync with conditional options in Damien Miller's .spec file for an errata. - Change libexecdir from %%{_libexecdir}/ssh to %%{_libexecdir}/openssh. * Tue Nov 7 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to OpenSSH 2.3.0p1. - Update to x11-askpass 1.1.0. - Enable keyboard-interactive authentication. * Mon Oct 30 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to ssh-askpass-x11 1.0.3. - Change authentication related messages to be private (#19966). * Tue Oct 10 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Patch ssh-keygen to be able to list signatures for DSA public key files it generates. * Thu Oct 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Add BuildRequires on /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h to be sure we always build PAM authentication in. - Try setting SSH_ASKPASS if gnome-ssh-askpass is installed. - Clean out no-longer-used patches. - Patch ssh-add to try to add both identity and id_dsa, and to error only when neither exists. * Mon Oct 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update x11-askpass to 1.0.2. (#17835) - Add BuildRequiress for /bin/login and /usr/bin/rsh so that configure will always find them in the right place. (#17909) - Set the default path to be the same as the one supplied by /bin/login, but add /usr/X11R6/bin. (#17909) - Try to handle obsoletion of ssh-server more cleanly. Package names are different, but init script name isn't. (#17865) * Wed Sep 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.2.0p1. (#17835) - Tweak the init script to allow proper restarting. (#18023) * Wed Aug 23 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 20000823 snapshot. - Change subpackage requirements from %%{version} to %%{version}-%%{release} - Back out the pipe patch. * Mon Jul 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.1.1p4, which includes fixes for config file parsing problems. - Move the init script back. - Add Damien's quick fix for wackiness. * Wed Jul 12 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.1.1p3, which includes fixes for X11 forwarding and strtok(). * Thu Jul 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Move condrestart to server postun. - Move key generation to init script. - Actually use the right patch for moving the key generation to the init script. - Clean up the init script a bit. * Wed Jul 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Fix X11 forwarding, from mail post by Chan Shih-Ping Richard. * Sun Jul 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.1.1p2. - Use of strtok() considered harmful. * Sat Jul 1 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Get the build root out of the man pages. * Thu Jun 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Add and use condrestart support in the init script. - Add newer initscripts as a prereq. * Tue Jun 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Build in new environment (release 2) - Move -clients subpackage to Applications/Internet group * Fri Jun 9 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Update to 2.2.1p1 * Sat Jun 3 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai - Patch to build with neither RSA nor RSAref. - Miscellaneous FHS-compliance tweaks. - Fix for possibly-compressed man pages. * Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller - Updated for new location - Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build * Sun Dec 26 1999 Damien Miller - Added Jim Knoble's askpass * Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller - Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble * Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller - Added 'Obsoletes' directives * Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller - Use make install - Subpackages * Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller - Added links for slogin - Fixed perms on manpages * Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller - Renamed init script * Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller - Back to old binary names * Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller - Use autoconf - New binary names * Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller - Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's spec. Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/suse/openssh.spec =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/suse/openssh.spec (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/contrib/suse/openssh.spec (revision 276707) @@ -1,246 +1,243 @@ # Default values for additional components %define build_x11_askpass 1 # Define the UID/GID to use for privilege separation %define sshd_gid 65 %define sshd_uid 71 # The version of x11-ssh-askpass to use %define xversion 1.2.4.1 # Allow the ability to override defaults with -D skip_xxx=1 %{?skip_x11_askpass:%define build_x11_askpass 0} Summary: OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation Name: openssh -Version: 6.6p1 +Version: 6.7p1 URL: http://www.openssh.com/ Release: 1 Source0: openssh-%{version}.tar.gz Source1: x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}.tar.gz License: BSD Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/openssh-%{version}-buildroot PreReq: openssl Obsoletes: ssh Provides: ssh # # (Build[ing] Prereq[uisites] only work for RPM 2.95 and newer.) # building prerequisites -- stuff for # OpenSSL (openssl-devel), -# TCP Wrappers (tcpd-devel), # and Gnome (glibdev, gtkdev, and gnlibsd) # BuildPrereq: openssl -BuildPrereq: tcpd-devel BuildPrereq: zlib-devel #BuildPrereq: glibdev #BuildPrereq: gtkdev #BuildPrereq: gnlibsd %package askpass Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the X window System. Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH Requires: openssh = %{version} Obsoletes: ssh-extras Provides: openssh:${_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass %if %{build_x11_askpass} BuildPrereq: XFree86-devel %endif %description Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all patented algorithms to seperate libraries (OpenSSL). This package includes all files necessary for both the OpenSSH client and server. %description askpass Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all patented algorithms to seperate libraries (OpenSSL). This package contains an X Window System passphrase dialog for OpenSSH. %changelog * Wed Oct 26 2005 Iain Morgan - Removed accidental inclusion of --without-zlib-version-check * Tue Oct 25 2005 Iain Morgan - Overhaul to deal with newer versions of SuSE and OpenSSH * Mon Jun 12 2000 Damien Miller - Glob manpages to catch compressed files * Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller - Updated for new location - Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build * Sun Dec 26 1999 Chris Saia - Made symlink to gnome-ssh-askpass called ssh-askpass * Wed Nov 24 1999 Chris Saia - Removed patches that included /etc/pam.d/sshd, /sbin/init.d/rc.sshd, and /var/adm/fillup-templates/rc.config.sshd, since Damien merged these into his released tarfile - Changed permissions on ssh_config in the install procedure to 644 from 600 even though it was correct in the %files section and thus right in the RPMs - Postinstall script for the server now only prints "Generating SSH host key..." if we need to actually do this, in order to eliminate a confusing message if an SSH host key is already in place - Marked all manual pages as %doc(umentation) * Mon Nov 22 1999 Chris Saia - Added flag to configure daemon with TCP Wrappers support - Added building prerequisites (works in RPM 3.0 and newer) * Thu Nov 18 1999 Chris Saia - Made this package correct for SuSE. - Changed instances of pam_pwdb.so to pam_unix.so, since it works more properly with SuSE, and lib_pwdb.so isn't installed by default. * Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller - Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble * Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller - Added 'Obsoletes' directives * Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller - Use make install - Subpackages * Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller - Added links for slogin - Fixed perms on manpages * Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller - Renamed init script * Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller - Back to old binary names * Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller - Use autoconf - New binary names * Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller - Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's spec. %prep %if %{build_x11_askpass} %setup -q -a 1 %else %setup -q %endif %build CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" \ %configure --prefix=/usr \ --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \ --mandir=%{_mandir} \ --with-privsep-path=/var/lib/empty \ --with-pam \ - --with-tcp-wrappers \ --libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh make %if %{build_x11_askpass} cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion} %configure --mandir=/usr/X11R6/man \ --libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh xmkmf -a make cd .. %endif %install rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/ install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates install -m644 contrib/sshd.pam.generic $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd install -m744 contrib/suse/rc.sshd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/sshd install -m744 contrib/suse/sysconfig.ssh \ $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates %if %{build_x11_askpass} cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion} make install install.man BINDIR=%{_libdir}/ssh DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/Ssh.bin %endif %clean rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT %pre /usr/sbin/groupadd -g %{sshd_gid} -o -r sshd 2> /dev/null || : /usr/sbin/useradd -r -o -g sshd -u %{sshd_uid} -s /bin/false -c "SSH Privilege Separation User" -d /var/lib/sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || : %post /usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A %{fillup_and_insserv -n -y ssh sshd} %run_permissions %verifyscript %verify_permissions -e /etc/ssh/sshd_config -e /etc/ssh/ssh_config -e /usr/bin/ssh %preun %stop_on_removal sshd %postun %restart_on_update sshd %{insserv_cleanup} %files %defattr(-,root,root) %doc ChangeLog OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL* %doc TODO CREDITS LICENCE %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config %attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli %attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/init.d/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh %attr(-,root,root) %{_bindir}/slogin %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libdir}/ssh %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/sftp-server %attr(4711,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-keysign %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1* %attr(-,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/slogin.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8* %attr(0644,root,root) /var/adm/fillup-templates/sysconfig.ssh %if %{build_x11_askpass} %files askpass %defattr(-,root,root) %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/README %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/ChangeLog %doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/SshAskpass*.ad %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/x11-ssh-askpass %attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/ssh-askpass.1x* %attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/x11-ssh-askpass.1x* %attr(0644,root,root) %config /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/app-defaults/SshAskpass %endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/defines.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/defines.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/defines.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,829 +1,844 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _DEFINES_H #define _DEFINES_H -/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.176 2014/01/17 13:12:38 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $Id: defines.h,v 1.183 2014/09/02 19:33:26 djm Exp $ */ /* Constants */ #if defined(HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD) && HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD == 0 enum { SHUT_RD = 0, /* No more receptions. */ SHUT_WR, /* No more transmissions. */ SHUT_RDWR /* No more receptions or transmissions. */ }; # define SHUT_RD SHUT_RD # define SHUT_WR SHUT_WR # define SHUT_RDWR SHUT_RDWR #endif /* * Definitions for IP type of service (ip_tos) */ #include #include #ifndef IPTOS_LOWDELAY # define IPTOS_LOWDELAY 0x10 # define IPTOS_THROUGHPUT 0x08 # define IPTOS_RELIABILITY 0x04 # define IPTOS_LOWCOST 0x02 # define IPTOS_MINCOST IPTOS_LOWCOST #endif /* IPTOS_LOWDELAY */ /* * Definitions for DiffServ Codepoints as per RFC2474 */ #ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 0x28 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 0x30 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 0x38 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 0x48 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 0x50 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 0x58 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 0x68 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 0x70 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 0x78 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 0x88 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 0x90 # define IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 0x98 # define IPTOS_DSCP_EF 0xb8 #endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 */ #ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 # define IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 0x00 # define IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 0x20 # define IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 0x40 # define IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 0x60 # define IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 0x80 # define IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 0xa0 # define IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 0xc0 # define IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 0xe0 #endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 */ #ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_EF # define IPTOS_DSCP_EF 0xb8 #endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_EF */ #ifndef PATH_MAX # ifdef _POSIX_PATH_MAX # define PATH_MAX _POSIX_PATH_MAX # endif #endif #ifndef MAXPATHLEN # ifdef PATH_MAX # define MAXPATHLEN PATH_MAX # else /* PATH_MAX */ # define MAXPATHLEN 64 /* realpath uses a fixed buffer of size MAXPATHLEN, so force use of ours */ # ifndef BROKEN_REALPATH # define BROKEN_REALPATH 1 # endif /* BROKEN_REALPATH */ # endif /* PATH_MAX */ #endif /* MAXPATHLEN */ #if defined(HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS) && HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS == 0 # define MAXSYMLINKS 5 #endif #ifndef STDIN_FILENO # define STDIN_FILENO 0 #endif #ifndef STDOUT_FILENO # define STDOUT_FILENO 1 #endif #ifndef STDERR_FILENO # define STDERR_FILENO 2 #endif #ifndef NGROUPS_MAX /* Disable groupaccess if NGROUP_MAX is not set */ #ifdef NGROUPS #define NGROUPS_MAX NGROUPS #else #define NGROUPS_MAX 0 #endif #endif #if defined(HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK) && HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK == 0 # define O_NONBLOCK 00004 /* Non Blocking Open */ #endif #ifndef S_IFSOCK # define S_IFSOCK 0 #endif /* S_IFSOCK */ #ifndef S_ISDIR # define S_ISDIR(mode) (((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFDIR)) #endif /* S_ISDIR */ #ifndef S_ISREG # define S_ISREG(mode) (((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFREG)) #endif /* S_ISREG */ #ifndef S_ISLNK # define S_ISLNK(mode) (((mode) & S_IFMT) == S_IFLNK) #endif /* S_ISLNK */ #ifndef S_IXUSR # define S_IXUSR 0000100 /* execute/search permission, */ # define S_IXGRP 0000010 /* execute/search permission, */ # define S_IXOTH 0000001 /* execute/search permission, */ # define _S_IWUSR 0000200 /* write permission, */ # define S_IWUSR _S_IWUSR /* write permission, owner */ # define S_IWGRP 0000020 /* write permission, group */ # define S_IWOTH 0000002 /* write permission, other */ # define S_IRUSR 0000400 /* read permission, owner */ # define S_IRGRP 0000040 /* read permission, group */ # define S_IROTH 0000004 /* read permission, other */ # define S_IRWXU 0000700 /* read, write, execute */ # define S_IRWXG 0000070 /* read, write, execute */ # define S_IRWXO 0000007 /* read, write, execute */ #endif /* S_IXUSR */ #if !defined(MAP_ANON) && defined(MAP_ANONYMOUS) #define MAP_ANON MAP_ANONYMOUS #endif #ifndef MAP_FAILED # define MAP_FAILED ((void *)-1) #endif /* SCO Open Server 3 has INADDR_LOOPBACK defined in rpc/rpc.h but including rpc/rpc.h breaks Solaris 6 */ #ifndef INADDR_LOOPBACK #define INADDR_LOOPBACK ((u_long)0x7f000001) #endif /* Types */ /* If sys/types.h does not supply intXX_t, supply them ourselves */ /* (or die trying) */ #ifndef HAVE_U_INT typedef unsigned int u_int; #endif #ifndef HAVE_INTXX_T typedef signed char int8_t; # if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2) typedef short int int16_t; # else # ifdef _UNICOS # if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 4) typedef short int16_t; # else typedef long int16_t; # endif # else # error "16 bit int type not found." # endif /* _UNICOS */ # endif # if (SIZEOF_INT == 4) typedef int int32_t; # else # ifdef _UNICOS typedef long int32_t; # else # error "32 bit int type not found." # endif /* _UNICOS */ # endif #endif /* If sys/types.h does not supply u_intXX_t, supply them ourselves */ #ifndef HAVE_U_INTXX_T # ifdef HAVE_UINTXX_T typedef uint8_t u_int8_t; typedef uint16_t u_int16_t; typedef uint32_t u_int32_t; # define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1 # else typedef unsigned char u_int8_t; # if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2) typedef unsigned short int u_int16_t; # else # ifdef _UNICOS # if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 4) typedef unsigned short u_int16_t; # else typedef unsigned long u_int16_t; # endif # else # error "16 bit int type not found." # endif # endif # if (SIZEOF_INT == 4) typedef unsigned int u_int32_t; # else # ifdef _UNICOS typedef unsigned long u_int32_t; # else # error "32 bit int type not found." # endif # endif # endif #define __BIT_TYPES_DEFINED__ #endif /* 64-bit types */ #ifndef HAVE_INT64_T # if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8) typedef long int int64_t; # else # if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8) typedef long long int int64_t; # endif # endif #endif #ifndef HAVE_U_INT64_T # if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8) typedef unsigned long int u_int64_t; # else # if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8) typedef unsigned long long int u_int64_t; # endif # endif #endif #ifndef HAVE_UINTXX_T typedef u_int8_t uint8_t; typedef u_int16_t uint16_t; typedef u_int32_t uint32_t; typedef u_int64_t uint64_t; #endif #ifndef HAVE_INTMAX_T typedef long long intmax_t; #endif #ifndef HAVE_UINTMAX_T typedef unsigned long long uintmax_t; #endif #ifndef HAVE_U_CHAR typedef unsigned char u_char; # define HAVE_U_CHAR #endif /* HAVE_U_CHAR */ #ifndef ULLONG_MAX # define ULLONG_MAX ((unsigned long long)-1) #endif #ifndef SIZE_T_MAX #define SIZE_T_MAX ULONG_MAX #endif /* SIZE_T_MAX */ #ifndef HAVE_SIZE_T typedef unsigned int size_t; # define HAVE_SIZE_T # define SIZE_T_MAX UINT_MAX #endif /* HAVE_SIZE_T */ #ifndef SIZE_MAX #define SIZE_MAX SIZE_T_MAX #endif #ifndef HAVE_SSIZE_T typedef int ssize_t; # define HAVE_SSIZE_T #endif /* HAVE_SSIZE_T */ #ifndef HAVE_CLOCK_T typedef long clock_t; # define HAVE_CLOCK_T #endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_T */ #ifndef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T typedef int sa_family_t; # define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T #endif /* HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T */ #ifndef HAVE_PID_T typedef int pid_t; # define HAVE_PID_T #endif /* HAVE_PID_T */ #ifndef HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T typedef int sig_atomic_t; # define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T #endif /* HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T */ #ifndef HAVE_MODE_T typedef int mode_t; # define HAVE_MODE_T #endif /* HAVE_MODE_T */ #if !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) # define ss_family __ss_family #endif /* !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE_SA_FAMILY_IN_SS) */ #ifndef HAVE_SYS_UN_H struct sockaddr_un { short sun_family; /* AF_UNIX */ char sun_path[108]; /* path name (gag) */ }; #endif /* HAVE_SYS_UN_H */ #ifndef HAVE_IN_ADDR_T typedef u_int32_t in_addr_t; #endif #ifndef HAVE_IN_PORT_T typedef u_int16_t in_port_t; #endif #if defined(BROKEN_SYS_TERMIO_H) && !defined(_STRUCT_WINSIZE) #define _STRUCT_WINSIZE struct winsize { unsigned short ws_row; /* rows, in characters */ unsigned short ws_col; /* columns, in character */ unsigned short ws_xpixel; /* horizontal size, pixels */ unsigned short ws_ypixel; /* vertical size, pixels */ }; #endif /* bits needed for select that may not be in the system headers */ #ifndef HAVE_FD_MASK typedef unsigned long int fd_mask; #endif #if defined(HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS) && HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS == 0 # define NFDBITS (8 * sizeof(unsigned long)) #endif #if defined(HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY) && HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY == 0 # define howmany(x,y) (((x)+((y)-1))/(y)) #endif /* Paths */ #ifndef _PATH_BSHELL # define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh" #endif #ifdef USER_PATH # ifdef _PATH_STDPATH # undef _PATH_STDPATH # endif # define _PATH_STDPATH USER_PATH #endif #ifndef _PATH_STDPATH # define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" #endif #ifndef SUPERUSER_PATH # define SUPERUSER_PATH _PATH_STDPATH #endif #ifndef _PATH_DEVNULL # define _PATH_DEVNULL "/dev/null" #endif /* user may have set a different path */ #if defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAIL_DIRECTORY) -# undef _PATH_MAILDIR MAILDIR +# undef _PATH_MAILDIR #endif /* defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAIL_DIRECTORY) */ #ifdef MAIL_DIRECTORY # define _PATH_MAILDIR MAIL_DIRECTORY #endif #ifndef _PATH_NOLOGIN # define _PATH_NOLOGIN "/etc/nologin" #endif /* Define this to be the path of the xauth program. */ #ifdef XAUTH_PATH #define _PATH_XAUTH XAUTH_PATH #endif /* XAUTH_PATH */ /* derived from XF4/xc/lib/dps/Xlibnet.h */ #ifndef X_UNIX_PATH # ifdef __hpux # define X_UNIX_PATH "/var/spool/sockets/X11/%u" # else # define X_UNIX_PATH "/tmp/.X11-unix/X%u" # endif #endif /* X_UNIX_PATH */ #define _PATH_UNIX_X X_UNIX_PATH #ifndef _PATH_TTY # define _PATH_TTY "/dev/tty" #endif /* Macros */ #if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL) && defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H) # define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP #endif #ifndef MAX # define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b)) # define MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b)) #endif #ifndef roundup # define roundup(x, y) ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y)) #endif #ifndef timersub #define timersub(a, b, result) \ do { \ (result)->tv_sec = (a)->tv_sec - (b)->tv_sec; \ (result)->tv_usec = (a)->tv_usec - (b)->tv_usec; \ if ((result)->tv_usec < 0) { \ --(result)->tv_sec; \ (result)->tv_usec += 1000000; \ } \ } while (0) #endif #ifndef TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC #define TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(tv, ts) { \ (ts)->tv_sec = (tv)->tv_sec; \ (ts)->tv_nsec = (tv)->tv_usec * 1000; \ } #endif #ifndef TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL #define TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(tv, ts) { \ (tv)->tv_sec = (ts)->tv_sec; \ (tv)->tv_usec = (ts)->tv_nsec / 1000; \ } #endif #ifndef __P # define __P(x) x #endif #if !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED) # define IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(a) \ ((((u_int32_t *) (a))[0] == 0) && (((u_int32_t *) (a))[1] == 0) && \ (((u_int32_t *) (a))[2] == htonl (0xffff))) #endif /* !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED) */ #if !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2) # define __attribute__(x) #endif /* !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2) */ #if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__) && !defined(__sentinel__) # define __sentinel__ #endif #if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__) && !defined(__bounded__) # define __bounded__(x, y, z) #endif #if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__) && !defined(__nonnull__) # define __nonnull__(x) #endif #ifndef OSSH_ALIGNBYTES #define OSSH_ALIGNBYTES (sizeof(int) - 1) #endif #ifndef __CMSG_ALIGN #define __CMSG_ALIGN(p) (((u_int)(p) + OSSH_ALIGNBYTES) &~ OSSH_ALIGNBYTES) #endif /* Length of the contents of a control message of length len */ #ifndef CMSG_LEN #define CMSG_LEN(len) (__CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + (len)) #endif /* Length of the space taken up by a padded control message of length len */ #ifndef CMSG_SPACE #define CMSG_SPACE(len) (__CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + __CMSG_ALIGN(len)) #endif /* given pointer to struct cmsghdr, return pointer to data */ #ifndef CMSG_DATA #define CMSG_DATA(cmsg) ((u_char *)(cmsg) + __CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr))) #endif /* CMSG_DATA */ /* * RFC 2292 requires to check msg_controllen, in case that the kernel returns * an empty list for some reasons. */ #ifndef CMSG_FIRSTHDR #define CMSG_FIRSTHDR(mhdr) \ ((mhdr)->msg_controllen >= sizeof(struct cmsghdr) ? \ (struct cmsghdr *)(mhdr)->msg_control : \ (struct cmsghdr *)NULL) #endif /* CMSG_FIRSTHDR */ #if defined(HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF) && HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF == 0 # define offsetof(type, member) ((size_t) &((type *)0)->member) #endif /* Set up BSD-style BYTE_ORDER definition if it isn't there already */ /* XXX: doesn't try to cope with strange byte orders (PDP_ENDIAN) */ #ifndef BYTE_ORDER # ifndef LITTLE_ENDIAN # define LITTLE_ENDIAN 1234 # endif /* LITTLE_ENDIAN */ # ifndef BIG_ENDIAN # define BIG_ENDIAN 4321 # endif /* BIG_ENDIAN */ # ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN # define BYTE_ORDER BIG_ENDIAN # else /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */ # define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN # endif /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */ #endif /* BYTE_ORDER */ /* Function replacement / compatibility hacks */ #if !defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) && (defined(HAVE_OGETADDRINFO) || defined(HAVE_NGETADDRINFO)) # define HAVE_GETADDRINFO #endif #ifndef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET # undef getopt # undef opterr # undef optind # undef optopt # undef optreset # undef optarg # define getopt(ac, av, o) BSDgetopt(ac, av, o) # define opterr BSDopterr # define optind BSDoptind # define optopt BSDoptopt # define optreset BSDoptreset # define optarg BSDoptarg #endif #if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) # undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO #endif #if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_FREEADDRINFO) # undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO #endif #if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GAI_STRERROR) # undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR #endif #if defined(BROKEN_UPDWTMPX) && defined(HAVE_UPDWTMPX) # undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX #endif #if defined(BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE) # undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE #endif #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) && \ defined(SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND) # define DO_LOG_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND #endif #if !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY) # define memmove(s1, s2, n) bcopy((s2), (s1), (n)) #endif /* !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY) */ -#if defined(HAVE_VHANGUP) && !defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) -# define USE_VHANGUP -#endif /* defined(HAVE_VHANGUP) && !defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) */ - #ifndef GETPGRP_VOID # include # define getpgrp() getpgrp(0) #endif #ifdef USE_BSM_AUDIT # define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS # define CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS #endif #ifdef USE_LINUX_AUDIT # define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS # define CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS #endif #if !defined(HAVE___func__) && defined(HAVE___FUNCTION__) # define __func__ __FUNCTION__ #elif !defined(HAVE___func__) # define __func__ "" #endif #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL) # define krb5_get_err_text(context,code) error_message(code) #endif #if defined(SKEYCHALLENGE_4ARG) # define _compat_skeychallenge(a,b,c,d) skeychallenge(a,b,c,d) #else # define _compat_skeychallenge(a,b,c,d) skeychallenge(a,b,c) #endif /* Maximum number of file descriptors available */ #ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF # define SSH_SYSFDMAX sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX) #else # define SSH_SYSFDMAX 10000 #endif #ifdef FSID_HAS_VAL /* encode f_fsid into a 64 bit value */ #define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \ ((((u_int64_t)(f).val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \ ((f).val[1] & 0xffffffffUL)) #elif defined(FSID_HAS___VAL) #define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \ ((((u_int64_t)(f).__val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \ ((f).__val[1] & 0xffffffffUL)) #else # define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) ((f)) #endif #if defined(__Lynx__) /* * LynxOS defines these in param.h which we do not want to include since * it will also pull in a bunch of kernel definitions. */ # define ALIGNBYTES (sizeof(int) - 1) # define ALIGN(p) (((unsigned)p + ALIGNBYTES) & ~ALIGNBYTES) /* Missing prototypes on LynxOS */ int snprintf (char *, size_t, const char *, ...); int mkstemp (char *); char *crypt (const char *, const char *); int seteuid (uid_t); int setegid (gid_t); char *mkdtemp (char *); int rresvport_af (int *, sa_family_t); int innetgr (const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *); #endif /* * Define this to use pipes instead of socketpairs for communicating with the * client program. Socketpairs do not seem to work on all systems. * * configure.ac sets this for a few OS's which are known to have problems * but you may need to set it yourself */ /* #define USE_PIPES 1 */ /** ** login recorder definitions **/ /* FIXME: put default paths back in */ #ifndef UTMP_FILE # ifdef _PATH_UTMP # define UTMP_FILE _PATH_UTMP # else # ifdef CONF_UTMP_FILE # define UTMP_FILE CONF_UTMP_FILE # endif # endif #endif #ifndef WTMP_FILE # ifdef _PATH_WTMP # define WTMP_FILE _PATH_WTMP # else # ifdef CONF_WTMP_FILE # define WTMP_FILE CONF_WTMP_FILE # endif # endif #endif /* pick up the user's location for lastlog if given */ #ifndef LASTLOG_FILE # ifdef _PATH_LASTLOG # define LASTLOG_FILE _PATH_LASTLOG # else # ifdef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE # define LASTLOG_FILE CONF_LASTLOG_FILE # endif # endif #endif #if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW) # define USE_SHADOW #endif /* The login() library function in libutil is first choice */ #if defined(HAVE_LOGIN) && !defined(DISABLE_LOGIN) # define USE_LOGIN #else /* Simply select your favourite login types. */ /* Can't do if-else because some systems use several... */ # if !defined(DISABLE_UTMPX) # define USE_UTMPX # endif # if defined(UTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_UTMP) # define USE_UTMP # endif # if defined(WTMPX_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMPX) # define USE_WTMPX # endif # if defined(WTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMP) # define USE_WTMP # endif #endif #ifndef UT_LINESIZE # define UT_LINESIZE 8 #endif /* I hope that the presence of LASTLOG_FILE is enough to detect this */ #if defined(LASTLOG_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG) # define USE_LASTLOG #endif #ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA # ifdef USE_SHADOW # undef USE_SHADOW # endif # define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1 #endif #if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE) # define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1 #endif #if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF) # define USE_LIBIAF #endif /* HP-UX 11.11 */ #ifdef BTMP_FILE # define _PATH_BTMP BTMP_FILE #endif #if defined(USE_BTMP) && defined(_PATH_BTMP) # define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN #endif /** end of login recorder definitions */ #ifdef BROKEN_GETGROUPS # define getgroups(a,b) ((a)==0 && (b)==NULL ? NGROUPS_MAX : getgroups((a),(b))) #endif #if defined(HAVE_MMAP) && defined(BROKEN_MMAP) # undef HAVE_MMAP #endif #ifndef IOV_MAX # if defined(_XOPEN_IOV_MAX) # define IOV_MAX _XOPEN_IOV_MAX # elif defined(DEF_IOV_MAX) # define IOV_MAX DEF_IOV_MAX # else # define IOV_MAX 16 # endif #endif #ifndef EWOULDBLOCK # define EWOULDBLOCK EAGAIN #endif #ifndef INET6_ADDRSTRLEN /* for non IPv6 machines */ #define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46 #endif #ifndef SSH_IOBUFSZ # define SSH_IOBUFSZ 8192 #endif #ifndef _NSIG # ifdef NSIG # define _NSIG NSIG # else # define _NSIG 128 # endif #endif /* * Platforms that have arc4random_uniform() and not arc4random_stir() * shouldn't need the latter. */ #if defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM) && \ !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR) # define arc4random_stir() #endif + +#ifndef HAVE_VA_COPY +# ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY +# define va_copy(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src) +# else +# define va_copy(dest, src) (dest) = (src) +# endif +#endif + +#ifndef __predict_true +# if defined(__GNUC__) && \ + ((__GNUC__ > (2)) || (__GNUC__ == (2) && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= (96))) +# define __predict_true(exp) __builtin_expect(((exp) != 0), 1) +# define __predict_false(exp) __builtin_expect(((exp) != 0), 0) +# else +# define __predict_true(exp) ((exp) != 0) +# define __predict_false(exp) ((exp) != 0) +# endif /* gcc version */ +#endif /* __predict_true */ #endif /* _DEFINES_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/digest-libc.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/digest-libc.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/digest-libc.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,238 +1,239 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: digest-libc.c,v 1.2 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: digest-libc.c,v 1.3 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include -#include "buffer.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" typedef void md_init_fn(void *mdctx); typedef void md_update_fn(void *mdctx, const u_int8_t *m, size_t mlen); typedef void md_final_fn(u_int8_t[], void *mdctx); struct ssh_digest_ctx { int alg; void *mdctx; }; struct ssh_digest { int id; const char *name; size_t block_len; size_t digest_len; size_t ctx_len; md_init_fn *md_init; md_update_fn *md_update; md_final_fn *md_final; }; /* NB. Indexed directly by algorithm number */ const struct ssh_digest digests[SSH_DIGEST_MAX] = { { SSH_DIGEST_MD5, "MD5", MD5_BLOCK_LENGTH, MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(MD5_CTX), (md_init_fn *) MD5Init, (md_update_fn *) MD5Update, (md_final_fn *) MD5Final }, { SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160, "RIPEMD160", RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH, RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(RMD160_CTX), (md_init_fn *) RMD160Init, (md_update_fn *) RMD160Update, (md_final_fn *) RMD160Final }, { SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, "SHA1", SHA1_BLOCK_LENGTH, SHA1_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA1_CTX), (md_init_fn *) SHA1Init, (md_update_fn *) SHA1Update, (md_final_fn *) SHA1Final }, { SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, "SHA256", SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA2_CTX), (md_init_fn *) SHA256Init, (md_update_fn *) SHA256Update, (md_final_fn *) SHA256Final }, { SSH_DIGEST_SHA384, "SHA384", SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA2_CTX), (md_init_fn *) SHA384Init, (md_update_fn *) SHA384Update, (md_final_fn *) SHA384Final }, { SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, "SHA512", SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH, sizeof(SHA2_CTX), (md_init_fn *) SHA512Init, (md_update_fn *) SHA512Update, (md_final_fn *) SHA512Final } }; static const struct ssh_digest * ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg) { if (alg < 0 || alg >= SSH_DIGEST_MAX) return NULL; if (digests[alg].id != alg) /* sanity */ return NULL; return &(digests[alg]); } size_t ssh_digest_bytes(int alg) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg); return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->digest_len; } size_t ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg); return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->block_len; } struct ssh_digest_ctx * ssh_digest_start(int alg) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg); struct ssh_digest_ctx *ret; if (digest == NULL || (ret = calloc(1, sizeof(ret))) == NULL) return NULL; if ((ret->mdctx = calloc(1, digest->ctx_len)) == NULL) { free(ret); return NULL; } ret->alg = alg; digest->md_init(ret->mdctx); return ret; } int ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(from->alg); if (digest == NULL || from->alg != to->alg) - return -1; + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; memcpy(to->mdctx, from->mdctx, digest->ctx_len); return 0; } int ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg); if (digest == NULL) - return -1; + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; digest->md_update(ctx->mdctx, m, mlen); return 0; } int -ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const Buffer *b) +ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b) { - return ssh_digest_update(ctx, buffer_ptr(b), buffer_len(b)); + return ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)); } int ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg); if (digest == NULL) - return -1; + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (dlen > UINT_MAX) - return -1; + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */ - return -1; + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; digest->md_final(d, ctx->mdctx); return 0; } void ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx) { const struct ssh_digest *digest; if (ctx != NULL) { digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg); if (digest) { explicit_bzero(ctx->mdctx, digest->ctx_len); free(ctx->mdctx); explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); free(ctx); } } } int ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen) { struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx = ssh_digest_start(alg); if (ctx == NULL) - return -1; + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, m, mlen) != 0 || ssh_digest_final(ctx, d, dlen) != 0) - return -1; + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; ssh_digest_free(ctx); return 0; } int -ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const Buffer *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen) +ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const struct sshbuf *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen) { - return ssh_digest_memory(alg, buffer_ptr(b), buffer_len(b), d, dlen); + return ssh_digest_memory(alg, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), d, dlen); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/digest-openssl.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/digest-openssl.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/digest-openssl.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,166 +1,182 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: digest-openssl.c,v 1.2 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: digest-openssl.c,v 1.4 2014/07/03 03:26:43 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" -#include "buffer.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" #include "digest.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#ifndef HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160 +# define EVP_ripemd160 NULL +#endif /* HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160 */ +#ifndef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 +# define EVP_sha256 NULL +# define EVP_sha384 NULL +# define EVP_sha512 NULL +#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */ + struct ssh_digest_ctx { int alg; EVP_MD_CTX mdctx; }; struct ssh_digest { int id; const char *name; size_t digest_len; const EVP_MD *(*mdfunc)(void); }; /* NB. Indexed directly by algorithm number */ const struct ssh_digest digests[] = { { SSH_DIGEST_MD5, "MD5", 16, EVP_md5 }, { SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160, "RIPEMD160", 20, EVP_ripemd160 }, { SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, "SHA1", 20, EVP_sha1 }, -#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 /* XXX replace with local if missing */ { SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, "SHA256", 32, EVP_sha256 }, { SSH_DIGEST_SHA384, "SHA384", 48, EVP_sha384 }, { SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, "SHA512", 64, EVP_sha512 }, -#endif { -1, NULL, 0, NULL }, }; static const struct ssh_digest * ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg) { if (alg < 0 || alg >= SSH_DIGEST_MAX) return NULL; if (digests[alg].id != alg) /* sanity */ return NULL; + if (digests[alg].mdfunc == NULL) + return NULL; return &(digests[alg]); } size_t ssh_digest_bytes(int alg) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg); return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->digest_len; } size_t ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx) { return EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(&ctx->mdctx); } struct ssh_digest_ctx * ssh_digest_start(int alg) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg); struct ssh_digest_ctx *ret; if (digest == NULL || ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)) return NULL; ret->alg = alg; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ret->mdctx); if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ret->mdctx, digest->mdfunc(), NULL) != 1) { free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } int ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to) { + if (from->alg != to->alg) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* we have bcopy-style order while openssl has memcpy-style */ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&to->mdctx, &from->mdctx)) - return -1; + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; return 0; } int ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen) { if (EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->mdctx, m, mlen) != 1) - return -1; + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; return 0; } int -ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const Buffer *b) +ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b) { - return ssh_digest_update(ctx, buffer_ptr(b), buffer_len(b)); + return ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)); } int ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen) { const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg); u_int l = dlen; if (dlen > UINT_MAX) - return -1; + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */ - return -1; + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx->mdctx, d, &l) != 1) - return -1; + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; if (l != digest->digest_len) /* sanity */ - return -1; + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; } void ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx) { if (ctx != NULL) { EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx->mdctx); explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); free(ctx); } } int ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen) { - struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx = ssh_digest_start(alg); + const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg); + u_int mdlen; - if (ctx == NULL) - return -1; - if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, m, mlen) != 0 || - ssh_digest_final(ctx, d, dlen) != 0) - return -1; - ssh_digest_free(ctx); + if (digest == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (dlen > UINT_MAX) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (dlen < digest->digest_len) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + mdlen = dlen; + if (!EVP_Digest(m, mlen, d, &mdlen, digest->mdfunc(), NULL)) + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; return 0; } int -ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const Buffer *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen) +ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const struct sshbuf *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen) { - return ssh_digest_memory(alg, buffer_ptr(b), buffer_len(b), d, dlen); + return ssh_digest_memory(alg, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), d, dlen); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/digest.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/digest.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/digest.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,63 +1,65 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: digest.h,v 1.2 2014/01/27 18:58:14 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: digest.h,v 1.6 2014/07/03 04:36:45 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef _DIGEST_H #define _DIGEST_H /* Maximum digest output length */ #define SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH 64 /* Digest algorithms */ #define SSH_DIGEST_MD5 0 #define SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160 1 #define SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 2 #define SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 3 #define SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 4 #define SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 5 #define SSH_DIGEST_MAX 6 +struct sshbuf; struct ssh_digest_ctx; /* Returns the algorithm's digest length in bytes or 0 for invalid algorithm */ size_t ssh_digest_bytes(int alg); /* Returns the block size of the digest, e.g. for implementing HMAC */ size_t ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx); /* Copies internal state of digest of 'from' to 'to' */ int ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to); /* One-shot API */ int ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 4, 5))); -int ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const Buffer *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen) +int ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const struct sshbuf *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 3, 4))); /* Update API */ struct ssh_digest_ctx *ssh_digest_start(int alg); int ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))); -int ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const Buffer *b); +int ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, + const struct sshbuf *b); int ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))); void ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx); #endif /* _DIGEST_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/dns.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/dns.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/dns.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,341 +1,348 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.29 2013/05/17 00:13:13 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dns.c,v 1.31 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2003 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include +#include +#include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "key.h" #include "dns.h" #include "log.h" static const char *errset_text[] = { "success", /* 0 ERRSET_SUCCESS */ "out of memory", /* 1 ERRSET_NOMEMORY */ "general failure", /* 2 ERRSET_FAIL */ "invalid parameter", /* 3 ERRSET_INVAL */ "name does not exist", /* 4 ERRSET_NONAME */ "data does not exist", /* 5 ERRSET_NODATA */ }; static const char * dns_result_totext(unsigned int res) { switch (res) { case ERRSET_SUCCESS: return errset_text[ERRSET_SUCCESS]; case ERRSET_NOMEMORY: return errset_text[ERRSET_NOMEMORY]; case ERRSET_FAIL: return errset_text[ERRSET_FAIL]; case ERRSET_INVAL: return errset_text[ERRSET_INVAL]; case ERRSET_NONAME: return errset_text[ERRSET_NONAME]; case ERRSET_NODATA: return errset_text[ERRSET_NODATA]; default: return "unknown error"; } } /* * Read SSHFP parameters from key buffer. */ static int dns_read_key(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type, u_char **digest, u_int *digest_len, Key *key) { int success = 0; enum fp_type fp_type = 0; switch (key->type) { case KEY_RSA: *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RSA; if (!*digest_type) *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1; break; case KEY_DSA: *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_DSA; if (!*digest_type) *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1; break; case KEY_ECDSA: *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_ECDSA; + if (!*digest_type) + *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA256; + break; + case KEY_ED25519: + *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_ED25519; if (!*digest_type) *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_SHA256; break; default: *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED; /* 0 */ *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; /* 0 */ } switch (*digest_type) { case SSHFP_HASH_SHA1: fp_type = SSH_FP_SHA1; break; case SSHFP_HASH_SHA256: fp_type = SSH_FP_SHA256; break; default: *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; /* 0 */ } if (*algorithm && *digest_type) { *digest = key_fingerprint_raw(key, fp_type, digest_len); if (*digest == NULL) fatal("dns_read_key: null from key_fingerprint_raw()"); success = 1; } else { *digest = NULL; *digest_len = 0; success = 0; } return success; } /* * Read SSHFP parameters from rdata buffer. */ static int dns_read_rdata(u_int8_t *algorithm, u_int8_t *digest_type, u_char **digest, u_int *digest_len, u_char *rdata, int rdata_len) { int success = 0; *algorithm = SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED; *digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; if (rdata_len >= 2) { *algorithm = rdata[0]; *digest_type = rdata[1]; *digest_len = rdata_len - 2; if (*digest_len > 0) { *digest = (u_char *) xmalloc(*digest_len); memcpy(*digest, rdata + 2, *digest_len); } else { *digest = (u_char *)xstrdup(""); } success = 1; } return success; } /* * Check if hostname is numerical. * Returns -1 if hostname is numeric, 0 otherwise */ static int is_numeric_hostname(const char *hostname) { struct addrinfo hints, *ai; /* * We shouldn't ever get a null host but if we do then log an error * and return -1 which stops DNS key fingerprint processing. */ if (hostname == NULL) { error("is_numeric_hostname called with NULL hostname"); return -1; } memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST; if (getaddrinfo(hostname, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) { freeaddrinfo(ai); return -1; } return 0; } /* * Verify the given hostname, address and host key using DNS. * Returns 0 if lookup succeeds, -1 otherwise */ int verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address, Key *hostkey, int *flags) { u_int counter; int result; struct rrsetinfo *fingerprints = NULL; u_int8_t hostkey_algorithm; u_int8_t hostkey_digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; u_char *hostkey_digest; u_int hostkey_digest_len; u_int8_t dnskey_algorithm; u_int8_t dnskey_digest_type; u_char *dnskey_digest; u_int dnskey_digest_len; *flags = 0; debug3("verify_host_key_dns"); if (hostkey == NULL) fatal("No key to look up!"); if (is_numeric_hostname(hostname)) { debug("skipped DNS lookup for numerical hostname"); return -1; } result = getrrsetbyname(hostname, DNS_RDATACLASS_IN, DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 0, &fingerprints); if (result) { verbose("DNS lookup error: %s", dns_result_totext(result)); return -1; } if (fingerprints->rri_flags & RRSET_VALIDATED) { *flags |= DNS_VERIFY_SECURE; debug("found %d secure fingerprints in DNS", fingerprints->rri_nrdatas); } else { debug("found %d insecure fingerprints in DNS", fingerprints->rri_nrdatas); } /* Initialize default host key parameters */ if (!dns_read_key(&hostkey_algorithm, &hostkey_digest_type, &hostkey_digest, &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) { error("Error calculating host key fingerprint."); freerrset(fingerprints); return -1; } if (fingerprints->rri_nrdatas) *flags |= DNS_VERIFY_FOUND; for (counter = 0; counter < fingerprints->rri_nrdatas; counter++) { /* * Extract the key from the answer. Ignore any badly * formatted fingerprints. */ if (!dns_read_rdata(&dnskey_algorithm, &dnskey_digest_type, &dnskey_digest, &dnskey_digest_len, fingerprints->rri_rdatas[counter].rdi_data, fingerprints->rri_rdatas[counter].rdi_length)) { verbose("Error parsing fingerprint from DNS."); continue; } if (hostkey_digest_type != dnskey_digest_type) { hostkey_digest_type = dnskey_digest_type; free(hostkey_digest); /* Initialize host key parameters */ if (!dns_read_key(&hostkey_algorithm, &hostkey_digest_type, &hostkey_digest, &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) { error("Error calculating key fingerprint."); freerrset(fingerprints); return -1; } } /* Check if the current key is the same as the given key */ if (hostkey_algorithm == dnskey_algorithm && hostkey_digest_type == dnskey_digest_type) { if (hostkey_digest_len == dnskey_digest_len && timingsafe_bcmp(hostkey_digest, dnskey_digest, hostkey_digest_len) == 0) *flags |= DNS_VERIFY_MATCH; } free(dnskey_digest); } free(hostkey_digest); /* from key_fingerprint_raw() */ freerrset(fingerprints); if (*flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) if (*flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) debug("matching host key fingerprint found in DNS"); else debug("mismatching host key fingerprint found in DNS"); else debug("no host key fingerprint found in DNS"); return 0; } /* * Export the fingerprint of a key as a DNS resource record */ int export_dns_rr(const char *hostname, Key *key, FILE *f, int generic) { u_int8_t rdata_pubkey_algorithm = 0; u_int8_t rdata_digest_type = SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED; u_int8_t dtype; u_char *rdata_digest; u_int i, rdata_digest_len; int success = 0; for (dtype = SSHFP_HASH_SHA1; dtype < SSHFP_HASH_MAX; dtype++) { rdata_digest_type = dtype; if (dns_read_key(&rdata_pubkey_algorithm, &rdata_digest_type, &rdata_digest, &rdata_digest_len, key)) { if (generic) { fprintf(f, "%s IN TYPE%d \\# %d %02x %02x ", hostname, DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP, 2 + rdata_digest_len, rdata_pubkey_algorithm, rdata_digest_type); } else { fprintf(f, "%s IN SSHFP %d %d ", hostname, rdata_pubkey_algorithm, rdata_digest_type); } for (i = 0; i < rdata_digest_len; i++) fprintf(f, "%02x", rdata_digest[i]); fprintf(f, "\n"); free(rdata_digest); /* from key_fingerprint_raw() */ success = 1; } } /* No SSHFP record was generated at all */ if (success == 0) { error("%s: unsupported algorithm and/or digest_type", __func__); } return success; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/dns.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/dns.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/dns.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,55 +1,56 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.12 2012/05/23 03:28:28 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: dns.h,v 1.13 2014/04/20 09:24:26 logan Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2003 Wesley Griffin. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2003 Jakob Schlyter. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef DNS_H #define DNS_H enum sshfp_types { SSHFP_KEY_RESERVED = 0, SSHFP_KEY_RSA = 1, SSHFP_KEY_DSA = 2, - SSHFP_KEY_ECDSA = 3 + SSHFP_KEY_ECDSA = 3, + SSHFP_KEY_ED25519 = 4 }; enum sshfp_hashes { SSHFP_HASH_RESERVED = 0, SSHFP_HASH_SHA1 = 1, SSHFP_HASH_SHA256 = 2, SSHFP_HASH_MAX = 3 }; #define DNS_RDATACLASS_IN 1 #define DNS_RDATATYPE_SSHFP 44 #define DNS_VERIFY_FOUND 0x00000001 #define DNS_VERIFY_MATCH 0x00000002 #define DNS_VERIFY_SECURE 0x00000004 int verify_host_key_dns(const char *, struct sockaddr *, Key *, int *); int export_dns_rr(const char *, Key *, FILE *, int); #endif /* DNS_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/entropy.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/entropy.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/entropy.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,239 +1,232 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* for offsetof */ #include #include #include +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" + #include "ssh.h" #include "misc.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "buffer.h" /* * Portable OpenSSH PRNG seeding: * If OpenSSL has not "internally seeded" itself (e.g. pulled data from * /dev/random), then collect RANDOM_SEED_SIZE bytes of randomness from * PRNGd. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY #define RANDOM_SEED_SIZE 48 /* * Collect 'len' bytes of entropy into 'buf' from PRNGD/EGD daemon * listening either on 'tcp_port', or via Unix domain socket at * * 'socket_path'. * Either a non-zero tcp_port or a non-null socket_path must be * supplied. * Returns 0 on success, -1 on error */ int get_random_bytes_prngd(unsigned char *buf, int len, unsigned short tcp_port, char *socket_path) { int fd, addr_len, rval, errors; u_char msg[2]; struct sockaddr_storage addr; struct sockaddr_in *addr_in = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr; struct sockaddr_un *addr_un = (struct sockaddr_un *)&addr; mysig_t old_sigpipe; /* Sanity checks */ if (socket_path == NULL && tcp_port == 0) fatal("You must specify a port or a socket"); if (socket_path != NULL && strlen(socket_path) >= sizeof(addr_un->sun_path)) fatal("Random pool path is too long"); if (len <= 0 || len > 255) fatal("Too many bytes (%d) to read from PRNGD", len); memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr)); if (tcp_port != 0) { addr_in->sin_family = AF_INET; addr_in->sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK); addr_in->sin_port = htons(tcp_port); addr_len = sizeof(*addr_in); } else { addr_un->sun_family = AF_UNIX; strlcpy(addr_un->sun_path, socket_path, sizeof(addr_un->sun_path)); addr_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(socket_path) + 1; } old_sigpipe = mysignal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); errors = 0; rval = -1; reopen: fd = socket(addr.ss_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0); if (fd == -1) { error("Couldn't create socket: %s", strerror(errno)); goto done; } if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1) { if (tcp_port != 0) { error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD port %d: %s", tcp_port, strerror(errno)); } else { error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD socket \"%s\": %s", addr_un->sun_path, strerror(errno)); } goto done; } /* Send blocking read request to PRNGD */ msg[0] = 0x02; msg[1] = len; if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, msg, sizeof(msg)) != sizeof(msg)) { if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) { close(fd); errors++; goto reopen; } error("Couldn't write to PRNGD socket: %s", strerror(errno)); goto done; } if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, len) != (size_t)len) { if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) { close(fd); errors++; goto reopen; } error("Couldn't read from PRNGD socket: %s", strerror(errno)); goto done; } rval = 0; done: mysignal(SIGPIPE, old_sigpipe); if (fd != -1) close(fd); return rval; } static int seed_from_prngd(unsigned char *buf, size_t bytes) { #ifdef PRNGD_PORT debug("trying egd/prngd port %d", PRNGD_PORT); if (get_random_bytes_prngd(buf, bytes, PRNGD_PORT, NULL) == 0) return 0; #endif #ifdef PRNGD_SOCKET debug("trying egd/prngd socket %s", PRNGD_SOCKET); if (get_random_bytes_prngd(buf, bytes, 0, PRNGD_SOCKET) == 0) return 0; #endif return -1; } void rexec_send_rng_seed(Buffer *m) { u_char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE]; if (RAND_bytes(buf, sizeof(buf)) <= 0) { error("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)", ERR_get_error()); buffer_put_string(m, "", 0); } else buffer_put_string(m, buf, sizeof(buf)); } void rexec_recv_rng_seed(Buffer *m) { u_char *buf; u_int len; buf = buffer_get_string_ret(m, &len); if (buf != NULL) { debug3("rexec_recv_rng_seed: seeding rng with %u bytes", len); RAND_add(buf, len, len); } } #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */ void seed_rng(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY unsigned char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE]; #endif - /* - * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status - * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0. - * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we - * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed - * within a patch series. - */ - u_long version_mask = SSLeay() >= 0x1000000f ? ~0xffff0L : ~0xff0L; - if (((SSLeay() ^ OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) & version_mask) || - (SSLeay() >> 12) < (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >> 12)) + if (!ssh_compatible_openssl(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay())) fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you " "have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER, SSLeay()); #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY if (RAND_status() == 1) { debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding"); return; } if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1) fatal("Could not obtain seed from PRNGd"); RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf)); memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf)); #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */ if (RAND_status() != 1) fatal("PRNG is not seeded"); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/gss-serv-krb5.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/gss-serv-krb5.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/gss-serv-krb5.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,211 +1,212 @@ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.8 2013/07/20 01:55:13 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #ifdef KRB5 #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "ssh-gss.h" extern ServerOptions options; #ifdef HEIMDAL # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H # include #elif HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H # include #endif static krb5_context krb_context = NULL; /* Initialise the krb5 library, for the stuff that GSSAPI won't do */ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void) { krb5_error_code problem; if (krb_context != NULL) return 1; problem = krb5_init_context(&krb_context); if (problem) { logit("Cannot initialize krb5 context"); return 0; } return 1; } /* Check if this user is OK to login. This only works with krb5 - other * GSSAPI mechanisms will need their own. * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0 */ static int ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name) { krb5_principal princ; int retval; const char *errmsg; if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0) return 0; if ((retval = krb5_parse_name(krb_context, client->exportedname.value, &princ))) { errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, retval); logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg); krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); return 0; } if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name)) { retval = 1; logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)", name, (char *)client->displayname.value); } else retval = 0; krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ); return retval; } /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */ static void ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client) { krb5_ccache ccache; krb5_error_code problem; krb5_principal princ; OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status; int len; const char *errmsg; if (client->creds == NULL) { debug("No credentials stored"); return; } if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_init() == 0) return; #ifdef HEIMDAL # ifdef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE if ((problem = krb5_cc_new_unique(krb_context, krb5_fcc_ops.prefix, NULL, &ccache)) != 0) { errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem); logit("krb5_cc_new_unique(): %.100s", errmsg); # else if ((problem = krb5_cc_gen_new(krb_context, &krb5_fcc_ops, &ccache))) { logit("krb5_cc_gen_new(): %.100s", krb5_get_err_text(krb_context, problem)); # endif krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); return; } #else if ((problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb_context, &ccache))) { errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem); logit("ssh_krb5_cc_gen(): %.100s", errmsg); krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); return; } #endif /* #ifdef HEIMDAL */ if ((problem = krb5_parse_name(krb_context, client->exportedname.value, &princ))) { errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem); logit("krb5_parse_name(): %.100s", errmsg); krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); return; } if ((problem = krb5_cc_initialize(krb_context, ccache, princ))) { errmsg = krb5_get_error_message(krb_context, problem); logit("krb5_cc_initialize(): %.100s", errmsg); krb5_free_error_message(krb_context, errmsg); krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ); krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache); return; } krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ); if ((maj_status = gss_krb5_copy_ccache(&min_status, client->creds, ccache))) { logit("gss_krb5_copy_ccache() failed"); krb5_cc_destroy(krb_context, ccache); return; } client->store.filename = xstrdup(krb5_cc_get_name(krb_context, ccache)); client->store.envvar = "KRB5CCNAME"; len = strlen(client->store.filename) + 6; client->store.envval = xmalloc(len); snprintf(client->store.envval, len, "FILE:%s", client->store.filename); #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval); #endif krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache); return; } ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech = { "toWM5Slw5Ew8Mqkay+al2g==", "Kerberos", {9, "\x2A\x86\x48\x86\xF7\x12\x01\x02\x02"}, NULL, &ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok, NULL, &ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds }; #endif /* KRB5 */ #endif /* GSSAPI */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/gss-serv.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/gss-serv.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/gss-serv.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,387 +1,387 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.26 2014/02/26 20:28:44 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.27 2014/07/03 03:34:09 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR `AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "log.h" #include "channels.h" #include "session.h" #include "misc.h" #include "ssh-gss.h" static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client = { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}}; ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech = { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; #ifdef KRB5 extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech; #endif ssh_gssapi_mech* supported_mechs[]= { #ifdef KRB5 &gssapi_kerberos_mech, #endif &gssapi_null_mech, }; /* * ssh_gssapi_supported_oids() can cause sandbox violations, so prepare the * list of supported mechanisms before privsep is set up. */ static gss_OID_set supported_oids; void ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(void) { ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(&supported_oids); } OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *ms, gss_OID member, int *present) { if (supported_oids == NULL) ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(); return gss_test_oid_set_member(ms, member, supported_oids, present); } /* * Acquire credentials for a server running on the current host. * Requires that the context structure contains a valid OID */ /* Returns a GSSAPI error code */ /* Privileged (called from ssh_gssapi_server_ctx) */ static OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(Gssctxt *ctx) { OM_uint32 status; - char lname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + char lname[NI_MAXHOST]; gss_OID_set oidset; gss_create_empty_oid_set(&status, &oidset); gss_add_oid_set_member(&status, ctx->oid, &oidset); - if (gethostname(lname, MAXHOSTNAMELEN)) { + if (gethostname(lname, sizeof(lname))) { gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); return (-1); } if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctx, lname))) { gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); return (ctx->major); } if ((ctx->major = gss_acquire_cred(&ctx->minor, ctx->name, 0, oidset, GSS_C_ACCEPT, &ctx->creds, NULL, NULL))) ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); gss_release_oid_set(&status, &oidset); return (ctx->major); } /* Privileged */ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid) { if (*ctx) ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx); ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx); ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid); return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx)); } /* Unprivileged */ void ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset) { int i = 0; OM_uint32 min_status; int present; gss_OID_set supported; gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset); gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported); while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) { if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status, &supported_mechs[i]->oid, supported, &present))) present = 0; if (present) gss_add_oid_set_member(&min_status, &supported_mechs[i]->oid, oidset); i++; } gss_release_oid_set(&min_status, &supported); } /* Wrapper around accept_sec_context * Requires that the context contains: * oid * credentials (from ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred) */ /* Privileged */ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok, gss_buffer_desc *send_tok, OM_uint32 *flags) { OM_uint32 status; gss_OID mech; ctx->major = gss_accept_sec_context(&ctx->minor, &ctx->context, ctx->creds, recv_tok, GSS_C_NO_CHANNEL_BINDINGS, &ctx->client, &mech, send_tok, flags, NULL, &ctx->client_creds); if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); if (ctx->client_creds) debug("Received some client credentials"); else debug("Got no client credentials"); status = ctx->major; /* Now, if we're complete and we have the right flags, then * we flag the user as also having been authenticated */ if (((flags == NULL) || ((*flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG) && (*flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))) && (ctx->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)) { if (ssh_gssapi_getclient(ctx, &gssapi_client)) fatal("Couldn't convert client name"); } return (status); } /* * This parses an exported name, extracting the mechanism specific portion * to use for ACL checking. It verifies that the name belongs the mechanism * originally selected. */ static OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name) { u_char *tok; OM_uint32 offset; OM_uint32 oidl; tok = ename->value; /* * Check that ename is long enough for all of the fixed length * header, and that the initial ID bytes are correct */ if (ename->length < 6 || memcmp(tok, "\x04\x01", 2) != 0) return GSS_S_FAILURE; /* * Extract the OID, and check it. Here GSSAPI breaks with tradition * and does use the OID type and length bytes. To confuse things * there are two lengths - the first including these, and the * second without. */ oidl = get_u16(tok+2); /* length including next two bytes */ oidl = oidl-2; /* turn it into the _real_ length of the variable OID */ /* * Check the BER encoding for correct type and length, that the * string is long enough and that the OID matches that in our context */ if (tok[4] != 0x06 || tok[5] != oidl || ename->length < oidl+6 || !ssh_gssapi_check_oid(ctx, tok+6, oidl)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; offset = oidl+6; if (ename->length < offset+4) return GSS_S_FAILURE; name->length = get_u32(tok+offset); offset += 4; if (UINT_MAX - offset < name->length) return GSS_S_FAILURE; if (ename->length < offset+name->length) return GSS_S_FAILURE; name->value = xmalloc(name->length+1); memcpy(name->value, tok+offset, name->length); ((char *)name->value)[name->length] = 0; return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } /* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably * be called once for a context */ /* Privileged (called from accept_secure_ctx) */ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client) { int i = 0; gss_buffer_desc ename; client->mech = NULL; while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) { if (supported_mechs[i]->oid.length == ctx->oid->length && (memcmp(supported_mechs[i]->oid.elements, ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) == 0)) client->mech = supported_mechs[i]; i++; } if (client->mech == NULL) return GSS_S_FAILURE; if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client, &client->displayname, NULL))) { ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); return (ctx->major); } if ((ctx->major = gss_export_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client, &ename))) { ssh_gssapi_error(ctx); return (ctx->major); } if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(ctx,&ename, &client->exportedname))) { return (ctx->major); } /* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */ client->creds = ctx->client_creds; ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL; return (ctx->major); } /* As user - called on fatal/exit */ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void) { if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) { /* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */ debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"", gssapi_client.store.filename); unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename); } } /* As user */ void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void) { if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) { (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client); } else debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism"); } /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the childs environment based * on the passed authentication process and credentials. */ /* As user */ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep) { if (gssapi_client.store.envvar != NULL && gssapi_client.store.envval != NULL) { debug("Setting %s to %s", gssapi_client.store.envvar, gssapi_client.store.envval); child_set_env(envp, envsizep, gssapi_client.store.envvar, gssapi_client.store.envval); } } /* Privileged */ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) { OM_uint32 lmin; if (gssapi_client.exportedname.length == 0 || gssapi_client.exportedname.value == NULL) { debug("No suitable client data"); return 0; } if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok) if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) return 1; else { /* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */ gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname); gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname); gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds); explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client, sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client)); return 0; } else debug("ssh_gssapi_userok: Unknown GSSAPI mechanism"); return (0); } /* Privileged */ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) { ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context, gssbuf, gssmic, NULL); return (ctx->major); } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/hmac.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/hmac.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/hmac.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,37 +1,38 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: hmac.h,v 1.6 2014/01/27 18:58:14 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: hmac.h,v 1.9 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2014 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #ifndef _HMAC_H #define _HMAC_H /* Returns the algorithm's digest length in bytes or 0 for invalid algorithm */ size_t ssh_hmac_bytes(int alg); +struct sshbuf; struct ssh_hmac_ctx; struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ssh_hmac_start(int alg); /* Sets the state of the HMAC or resets the state if key == NULL */ int ssh_hmac_init(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *key, size_t klen) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))); int ssh_hmac_update(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))); -int ssh_hmac_update_buffer(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const Buffer *b); +int ssh_hmac_update_buffer(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b); int ssh_hmac_final(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))); void ssh_hmac_free(struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx); #endif /* _HMAC_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/hostfile.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/hostfile.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/hostfile.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,489 +1,496 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.55 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.57 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions for manipulating the known hosts files. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * * Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include +#include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "match.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "digest.h" #include "hmac.h" struct hostkeys { struct hostkey_entry *entries; u_int num_entries; }; static int extract_salt(const char *s, u_int l, u_char *salt, size_t salt_len) { char *p, *b64salt; u_int b64len; int ret; if (l < sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) { debug2("extract_salt: string too short"); return (-1); } if (strncmp(s, HASH_MAGIC, sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) { debug2("extract_salt: invalid magic identifier"); return (-1); } s += sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1; l -= sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1; if ((p = memchr(s, HASH_DELIM, l)) == NULL) { debug2("extract_salt: missing salt termination character"); return (-1); } b64len = p - s; /* Sanity check */ if (b64len == 0 || b64len > 1024) { debug2("extract_salt: bad encoded salt length %u", b64len); return (-1); } b64salt = xmalloc(1 + b64len); memcpy(b64salt, s, b64len); b64salt[b64len] = '\0'; ret = __b64_pton(b64salt, salt, salt_len); free(b64salt); if (ret == -1) { debug2("extract_salt: salt decode error"); return (-1); } if (ret != (int)ssh_hmac_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) { debug2("extract_salt: expected salt len %zd, got %d", ssh_hmac_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1), ret); return (-1); } return (0); } char * host_hash(const char *host, const char *name_from_hostfile, u_int src_len) { struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx; u_char salt[256], result[256]; char uu_salt[512], uu_result[512]; static char encoded[1024]; u_int i, len; len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); if (name_from_hostfile == NULL) { /* Create new salt */ for (i = 0; i < len; i++) salt[i] = arc4random(); } else { /* Extract salt from known host entry */ if (extract_salt(name_from_hostfile, src_len, salt, sizeof(salt)) == -1) return (NULL); } if ((ctx = ssh_hmac_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL || ssh_hmac_init(ctx, salt, len) < 0 || ssh_hmac_update(ctx, host, strlen(host)) < 0 || ssh_hmac_final(ctx, result, sizeof(result))) fatal("%s: ssh_hmac failed", __func__); ssh_hmac_free(ctx); if (__b64_ntop(salt, len, uu_salt, sizeof(uu_salt)) == -1 || __b64_ntop(result, len, uu_result, sizeof(uu_result)) == -1) fatal("%s: __b64_ntop failed", __func__); snprintf(encoded, sizeof(encoded), "%s%s%c%s", HASH_MAGIC, uu_salt, HASH_DELIM, uu_result); return (encoded); } /* * Parses an RSA (number of bits, e, n) or DSA key from a string. Moves the * pointer over the key. Skips any whitespace at the beginning and at end. */ int hostfile_read_key(char **cpp, int *bitsp, Key *ret) { char *cp; /* Skip leading whitespace. */ for (cp = *cpp; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (key_read(ret, &cp) != 1) return 0; /* Skip trailing whitespace. */ for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; /* Return results. */ *cpp = cp; if (bitsp != NULL) { if ((*bitsp = key_size(ret)) <= 0) return 0; } return 1; } static int hostfile_check_key(int bits, const Key *key, const char *host, const char *filename, u_long linenum) { +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 if (key == NULL || key->type != KEY_RSA1 || key->rsa == NULL) return 1; if (bits != BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) { logit("Warning: %s, line %lu: keysize mismatch for host %s: " "actual %d vs. announced %d.", filename, linenum, host, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), bits); logit("Warning: replace %d with %d in %s, line %lu.", bits, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), filename, linenum); } +#endif return 1; } static HostkeyMarker check_markers(char **cpp) { char marker[32], *sp, *cp = *cpp; int ret = MRK_NONE; while (*cp == '@') { /* Only one marker is allowed */ if (ret != MRK_NONE) return MRK_ERROR; /* Markers are terminated by whitespace */ if ((sp = strchr(cp, ' ')) == NULL && (sp = strchr(cp, '\t')) == NULL) return MRK_ERROR; /* Extract marker for comparison */ if (sp <= cp + 1 || sp >= cp + sizeof(marker)) return MRK_ERROR; memcpy(marker, cp, sp - cp); marker[sp - cp] = '\0'; if (strcmp(marker, CA_MARKER) == 0) ret = MRK_CA; else if (strcmp(marker, REVOKE_MARKER) == 0) ret = MRK_REVOKE; else return MRK_ERROR; /* Skip past marker and any whitespace that follows it */ cp = sp; for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; } *cpp = cp; return ret; } struct hostkeys * init_hostkeys(void) { struct hostkeys *ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret)); ret->entries = NULL; return ret; } void load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *host, const char *path) { FILE *f; char line[8192]; u_long linenum = 0, num_loaded = 0; char *cp, *cp2, *hashed_host; HostkeyMarker marker; Key *key; int kbits; if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) return; debug3("%s: loading entries for host \"%.100s\" from file \"%s\"", __func__, host, path); while (read_keyfile_line(f, path, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) == 0) { cp = line; /* Skip any leading whitespace, comments and empty lines. */ for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n') continue; if ((marker = check_markers(&cp)) == MRK_ERROR) { verbose("%s: invalid marker at %s:%lu", __func__, path, linenum); continue; } /* Find the end of the host name portion. */ for (cp2 = cp; *cp2 && *cp2 != ' ' && *cp2 != '\t'; cp2++) ; /* Check if the host name matches. */ if (match_hostname(host, cp, (u_int) (cp2 - cp)) != 1) { if (*cp != HASH_DELIM) continue; hashed_host = host_hash(host, cp, (u_int) (cp2 - cp)); if (hashed_host == NULL) { debug("Invalid hashed host line %lu of %s", linenum, path); continue; } if (strncmp(hashed_host, cp, (u_int) (cp2 - cp)) != 0) continue; } /* Got a match. Skip host name. */ cp = cp2; /* * Extract the key from the line. This will skip any leading * whitespace. Ignore badly formatted lines. */ key = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, key)) { key_free(key); +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 key = key_new(KEY_RSA1); if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, key)) { key_free(key); continue; } +#else + continue; +#endif } if (!hostfile_check_key(kbits, key, host, path, linenum)) continue; debug3("%s: found %skey type %s in file %s:%lu", __func__, marker == MRK_NONE ? "" : (marker == MRK_CA ? "ca " : "revoked "), key_type(key), path, linenum); hostkeys->entries = xrealloc(hostkeys->entries, hostkeys->num_entries + 1, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries)); hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].host = xstrdup(host); hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].file = xstrdup(path); hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].line = linenum; hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].key = key; hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].marker = marker; hostkeys->num_entries++; num_loaded++; } debug3("%s: loaded %lu keys", __func__, num_loaded); fclose(f); return; } void free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) { free(hostkeys->entries[i].host); free(hostkeys->entries[i].file); key_free(hostkeys->entries[i].key); explicit_bzero(hostkeys->entries + i, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries)); } free(hostkeys->entries); explicit_bzero(hostkeys, sizeof(*hostkeys)); free(hostkeys); } static int check_key_not_revoked(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, Key *k) { int is_cert = key_is_cert(k); u_int i; for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) { if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != MRK_REVOKE) continue; if (key_equal_public(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) return -1; if (is_cert && key_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) return -1; } return 0; } /* * Match keys against a specified key, or look one up by key type. * * If looking for a keytype (key == NULL) and one is found then return * HOST_FOUND, otherwise HOST_NEW. * * If looking for a key (key != NULL): * 1. If the key is a cert and a matching CA is found, return HOST_OK * 2. If the key is not a cert and a matching key is found, return HOST_OK * 3. If no key matches but a key with a different type is found, then * return HOST_CHANGED * 4. If no matching keys are found, then return HOST_NEW. * * Finally, check any found key is not revoked. */ static HostStatus check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, Key *k, int keytype, const struct hostkey_entry **found) { u_int i; HostStatus end_return = HOST_NEW; int want_cert = key_is_cert(k); HostkeyMarker want_marker = want_cert ? MRK_CA : MRK_NONE; int proto = (k ? k->type : keytype) == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2; if (found != NULL) *found = NULL; for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) { if (proto == 1 && hostkeys->entries[i].key->type != KEY_RSA1) continue; if (proto == 2 && hostkeys->entries[i].key->type == KEY_RSA1) continue; if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != want_marker) continue; if (k == NULL) { if (hostkeys->entries[i].key->type != keytype) continue; end_return = HOST_FOUND; if (found != NULL) *found = hostkeys->entries + i; k = hostkeys->entries[i].key; break; } if (want_cert) { if (key_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) { /* A matching CA exists */ end_return = HOST_OK; if (found != NULL) *found = hostkeys->entries + i; break; } } else { if (key_equal(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) { end_return = HOST_OK; if (found != NULL) *found = hostkeys->entries + i; break; } /* A non-maching key exists */ end_return = HOST_CHANGED; if (found != NULL) *found = hostkeys->entries + i; } } if (check_key_not_revoked(hostkeys, k) != 0) { end_return = HOST_REVOKED; if (found != NULL) *found = NULL; } return end_return; } HostStatus check_key_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, Key *key, const struct hostkey_entry **found) { if (key == NULL) fatal("no key to look up"); return check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, key, 0, found); } int lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, int keytype, const struct hostkey_entry **found) { return (check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, NULL, keytype, found) == HOST_FOUND); } /* * Appends an entry to the host file. Returns false if the entry could not * be appended. */ int add_host_to_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host, const Key *key, int store_hash) { FILE *f; int success = 0; char *hashed_host = NULL; if (key == NULL) return 1; /* XXX ? */ f = fopen(filename, "a"); if (!f) return 0; if (store_hash) { if ((hashed_host = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL) { error("add_host_to_hostfile: host_hash failed"); fclose(f); return 0; } } fprintf(f, "%s ", store_hash ? hashed_host : host); if (key_write(key, f)) { success = 1; } else { error("add_host_to_hostfile: saving key in %s failed", filename); } fprintf(f, "\n"); fclose(f); return success; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kex.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kex.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kex.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,689 +1,697 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.98 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.99 2014/04/29 18:01:49 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include +#endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "packet.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "key.h" #include "kex.h" #include "log.h" #include "mac.h" #include "match.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "monitor.h" #include "roaming.h" #include "digest.h" #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L # if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) # define evp_ssh_sha256 EVP_sha256 # else extern const EVP_MD *evp_ssh_sha256(void); # endif #endif /* prototype */ static void kex_kexinit_finish(Kex *); static void kex_choose_conf(Kex *); struct kexalg { char *name; int type; int ec_nid; int hash_alg; }; static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL { KEX_DH1, KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, { KEX_DH14, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, { KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 { KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, -#endif +#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 }, # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 { KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 }, -# endif -#endif +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ { KEX_DH1, KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 }, +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 { KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 }, -#endif +#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */ { NULL, -1, -1, -1}, }; char * kex_alg_list(char sep) { char *ret = NULL; size_t nlen, rlen = 0; const struct kexalg *k; for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { if (ret != NULL) ret[rlen++] = sep; nlen = strlen(k->name); ret = xrealloc(ret, 1, rlen + nlen + 2); memcpy(ret + rlen, k->name, nlen + 1); rlen += nlen; } return ret; } static const struct kexalg * kex_alg_by_name(const char *name) { const struct kexalg *k; for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) { if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0) return k; } return NULL; } /* Validate KEX method name list */ int kex_names_valid(const char *names) { char *s, *cp, *p; if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0) return 0; s = cp = xstrdup(names); for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) { error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p); free(s); return 0; } } debug3("kex names ok: [%s]", names); free(s); return 1; } /* put algorithm proposal into buffer */ static void kex_prop2buf(Buffer *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]) { u_int i; buffer_clear(b); /* * add a dummy cookie, the cookie will be overwritten by * kex_send_kexinit(), each time a kexinit is set */ for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) buffer_put_char(b, 0); for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) buffer_put_cstring(b, proposal[i]); buffer_put_char(b, 0); /* first_kex_packet_follows */ buffer_put_int(b, 0); /* uint32 reserved */ } /* parse buffer and return algorithm proposal */ static char ** kex_buf2prop(Buffer *raw, int *first_kex_follows) { Buffer b; u_int i; char **proposal; proposal = xcalloc(PROPOSAL_MAX, sizeof(char *)); buffer_init(&b); buffer_append(&b, buffer_ptr(raw), buffer_len(raw)); /* skip cookie */ for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) buffer_get_char(&b); /* extract kex init proposal strings */ for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) { proposal[i] = buffer_get_cstring(&b,NULL); debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: %s", proposal[i]); } /* first kex follows / reserved */ i = buffer_get_char(&b); if (first_kex_follows != NULL) *first_kex_follows = i; debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: first_kex_follows %d ", i); i = buffer_get_int(&b); debug2("kex_parse_kexinit: reserved %u ", i); buffer_free(&b); return proposal; } static void kex_prop_free(char **proposal) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) free(proposal[i]); free(proposal); } /* ARGSUSED */ static void kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { error("Hm, kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq); } static void kex_reset_dispatch(void) { dispatch_range(SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN, SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX, &kex_protocol_error); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); } void kex_finish(Kex *kex) { kex_reset_dispatch(); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS); packet_send(); /* packet_write_wait(); */ debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS sent"); debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS"); packet_read_expect(SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS); packet_check_eom(); debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received"); kex->done = 1; buffer_clear(&kex->peer); /* buffer_clear(&kex->my); */ kex->flags &= ~KEX_INIT_SENT; free(kex->name); kex->name = NULL; } void kex_send_kexinit(Kex *kex) { u_int32_t rnd = 0; u_char *cookie; u_int i; if (kex == NULL) { error("kex_send_kexinit: no kex, cannot rekey"); return; } if (kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT) { debug("KEX_INIT_SENT"); return; } kex->done = 0; /* generate a random cookie */ if (buffer_len(&kex->my) < KEX_COOKIE_LEN) fatal("kex_send_kexinit: kex proposal too short"); cookie = buffer_ptr(&kex->my); for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) { if (i % 4 == 0) rnd = arc4random(); cookie[i] = rnd; rnd >>= 8; } packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT); packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my)); packet_send(); debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT sent"); kex->flags |= KEX_INIT_SENT; } /* ARGSUSED */ void kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { char *ptr; u_int i, dlen; Kex *kex = (Kex *)ctxt; debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received"); if (kex == NULL) fatal("kex_input_kexinit: no kex, cannot rekey"); ptr = packet_get_raw(&dlen); buffer_append(&kex->peer, ptr, dlen); /* discard packet */ for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) packet_get_char(); for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) free(packet_get_string(NULL)); /* * XXX RFC4253 sec 7: "each side MAY guess" - currently no supported * KEX method has the server move first, but a server might be using * a custom method or one that we otherwise don't support. We should * be prepared to remember first_kex_follows here so we can eat a * packet later. * XXX2 - RFC4253 is kind of ambiguous on what first_kex_follows means * for cases where the server *doesn't* go first. I guess we should * ignore it when it is set for these cases, which is what we do now. */ (void) packet_get_char(); /* first_kex_follows */ (void) packet_get_int(); /* reserved */ packet_check_eom(); kex_kexinit_finish(kex); } Kex * kex_setup(char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX]) { Kex *kex; kex = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*kex)); buffer_init(&kex->peer); buffer_init(&kex->my); kex_prop2buf(&kex->my, proposal); kex->done = 0; kex_send_kexinit(kex); /* we start */ kex_reset_dispatch(); return kex; } static void kex_kexinit_finish(Kex *kex) { if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT)) kex_send_kexinit(kex); kex_choose_conf(kex); if (kex->kex_type >= 0 && kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL) { (kex->kex[kex->kex_type])(kex); } else { fatal("Unsupported key exchange %d", kex->kex_type); } } static void choose_enc(Enc *enc, char *client, char *server) { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); if (name == NULL) fatal("no matching cipher found: client %s server %s", client, server); if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) fatal("matching cipher is not supported: %s", name); enc->name = name; enc->enabled = 0; enc->iv = NULL; enc->iv_len = cipher_ivlen(enc->cipher); enc->key = NULL; enc->key_len = cipher_keylen(enc->cipher); enc->block_size = cipher_blocksize(enc->cipher); } static void choose_mac(Mac *mac, char *client, char *server) { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); if (name == NULL) fatal("no matching mac found: client %s server %s", client, server); if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) fatal("unsupported mac %s", name); /* truncate the key */ if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_HMAC) mac->key_len = 16; mac->name = name; mac->key = NULL; mac->enabled = 0; } static void choose_comp(Comp *comp, char *client, char *server) { char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL); if (name == NULL) fatal("no matching comp found: client %s server %s", client, server); if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) { comp->type = COMP_DELAYED; } else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) { comp->type = COMP_ZLIB; } else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) { comp->type = COMP_NONE; } else { fatal("unsupported comp %s", name); } comp->name = name; } static void choose_kex(Kex *k, char *client, char *server) { const struct kexalg *kexalg; k->name = match_list(client, server, NULL); if (k->name == NULL) fatal("Unable to negotiate a key exchange method"); if ((kexalg = kex_alg_by_name(k->name)) == NULL) fatal("unsupported kex alg %s", k->name); k->kex_type = kexalg->type; k->hash_alg = kexalg->hash_alg; k->ec_nid = kexalg->ec_nid; } static void choose_hostkeyalg(Kex *k, char *client, char *server) { char *hostkeyalg = match_list(client, server, NULL); if (hostkeyalg == NULL) fatal("no hostkey alg"); k->hostkey_type = key_type_from_name(hostkeyalg); if (k->hostkey_type == KEY_UNSPEC) fatal("bad hostkey alg '%s'", hostkeyalg); free(hostkeyalg); } static int proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX]) { static int check[] = { PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS, PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS, -1 }; int *idx; char *p; for (idx = &check[0]; *idx != -1; idx++) { if ((p = strchr(my[*idx], ',')) != NULL) *p = '\0'; if ((p = strchr(peer[*idx], ',')) != NULL) *p = '\0'; if (strcmp(my[*idx], peer[*idx]) != 0) { debug2("proposal mismatch: my %s peer %s", my[*idx], peer[*idx]); return (0); } } debug2("proposals match"); return (1); } static void kex_choose_conf(Kex *kex) { Newkeys *newkeys; char **my, **peer; char **cprop, **sprop; int nenc, nmac, ncomp; u_int mode, ctos, need, dh_need, authlen; int first_kex_follows, type; my = kex_buf2prop(&kex->my, NULL); peer = kex_buf2prop(&kex->peer, &first_kex_follows); if (kex->server) { cprop=peer; sprop=my; } else { cprop=my; sprop=peer; } /* Check whether server offers roaming */ if (!kex->server) { char *roaming; roaming = match_list(KEX_RESUME, peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL); if (roaming) { kex->roaming = 1; free(roaming); } } /* Algorithm Negotiation */ for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { newkeys = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*newkeys)); kex->newkeys[mode] = newkeys; ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) || (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN); nenc = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC; nmac = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC; ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC; choose_enc(&newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc], sprop[nenc]); /* ignore mac for authenticated encryption */ authlen = cipher_authlen(newkeys->enc.cipher); if (authlen == 0) choose_mac(&newkeys->mac, cprop[nmac], sprop[nmac]); choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp], sprop[ncomp]); debug("kex: %s %s %s %s", ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client", newkeys->enc.name, authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "", newkeys->comp.name); } choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]); choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS], sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]); need = dh_need = 0; for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode]; need = MAX(need, newkeys->enc.key_len); need = MAX(need, newkeys->enc.block_size); need = MAX(need, newkeys->enc.iv_len); need = MAX(need, newkeys->mac.key_len); dh_need = MAX(dh_need, cipher_seclen(newkeys->enc.cipher)); dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size); dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len); dh_need = MAX(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len); } /* XXX need runden? */ kex->we_need = need; kex->dh_need = dh_need; /* ignore the next message if the proposals do not match */ if (first_kex_follows && !proposals_match(my, peer) && !(datafellows & SSH_BUG_FIRSTKEX)) { type = packet_read(); debug2("skipping next packet (type %u)", type); } kex_prop_free(my); kex_prop_free(peer); } static u_char * derive_key(Kex *kex, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, const u_char *shared_secret, u_int slen) { Buffer b; struct ssh_digest_ctx *hashctx; char c = id; u_int have; size_t mdsz; u_char *digest; if ((mdsz = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0) fatal("bad kex md size %zu", mdsz); digest = xmalloc(roundup(need, mdsz)); buffer_init(&b); buffer_append(&b, shared_secret, slen); /* K1 = HASH(K || H || "A" || session_id) */ if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL) fatal("%s: ssh_digest_start failed", __func__); if (ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, &b) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, &c, 1) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len) != 0) fatal("%s: ssh_digest_update failed", __func__); if (ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest, mdsz) != 0) fatal("%s: ssh_digest_final failed", __func__); ssh_digest_free(hashctx); /* * expand key: * Kn = HASH(K || H || K1 || K2 || ... || Kn-1) * Key = K1 || K2 || ... || Kn */ for (have = mdsz; need > have; have += mdsz) { if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL) fatal("%s: ssh_digest_start failed", __func__); if (ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, &b) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, digest, have) != 0) fatal("%s: ssh_digest_update failed", __func__); if (ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest + have, mdsz) != 0) fatal("%s: ssh_digest_final failed", __func__); ssh_digest_free(hashctx); } buffer_free(&b); #ifdef DEBUG_KEX fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", c); dump_digest("key", digest, need); #endif return digest; } Newkeys *current_keys[MODE_MAX]; #define NKEYS 6 void kex_derive_keys(Kex *kex, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, const u_char *shared_secret, u_int slen) { u_char *keys[NKEYS]; u_int i, mode, ctos; for (i = 0; i < NKEYS; i++) { keys[i] = derive_key(kex, 'A'+i, kex->we_need, hash, hashlen, shared_secret, slen); } debug2("kex_derive_keys"); for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { current_keys[mode] = kex->newkeys[mode]; kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL; ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) || (kex->server && mode == MODE_IN); current_keys[mode]->enc.iv = keys[ctos ? 0 : 1]; current_keys[mode]->enc.key = keys[ctos ? 2 : 3]; current_keys[mode]->mac.key = keys[ctos ? 4 : 5]; } } +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL void kex_derive_keys_bn(Kex *kex, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, const BIGNUM *secret) { Buffer shared_secret; buffer_init(&shared_secret); buffer_put_bignum2(&shared_secret, secret); kex_derive_keys(kex, hash, hashlen, buffer_ptr(&shared_secret), buffer_len(&shared_secret)); buffer_free(&shared_secret); } +#endif Newkeys * kex_get_newkeys(int mode) { Newkeys *ret; ret = current_keys[mode]; current_keys[mode] = NULL; return ret; } +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 void derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *host_modulus, BIGNUM *server_modulus, u_int8_t cookie[8], u_int8_t id[16]) { u_int8_t nbuf[2048], obuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; int len; struct ssh_digest_ctx *hashctx; if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL) fatal("%s: ssh_digest_start", __func__); len = BN_num_bytes(host_modulus); if (len < (512 / 8) || (u_int)len > sizeof(nbuf)) fatal("%s: bad host modulus (len %d)", __func__, len); BN_bn2bin(host_modulus, nbuf); if (ssh_digest_update(hashctx, nbuf, len) != 0) fatal("%s: ssh_digest_update failed", __func__); len = BN_num_bytes(server_modulus); if (len < (512 / 8) || (u_int)len > sizeof(nbuf)) fatal("%s: bad server modulus (len %d)", __func__, len); BN_bn2bin(server_modulus, nbuf); if (ssh_digest_update(hashctx, nbuf, len) != 0 || ssh_digest_update(hashctx, cookie, 8) != 0) fatal("%s: ssh_digest_update failed", __func__); if (ssh_digest_final(hashctx, obuf, sizeof(obuf)) != 0) fatal("%s: ssh_digest_final failed", __func__); memcpy(id, obuf, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)); explicit_bzero(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf)); explicit_bzero(obuf, sizeof(obuf)); } +#endif #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) void dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, int len) { int i; fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg); for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { fprintf(stderr, "%02x", digest[i]); if (i%32 == 31) fprintf(stderr, "\n"); else if (i%8 == 7) fprintf(stderr, " "); } fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kex.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kex.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kex.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,204 +1,204 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.62 2014/01/27 18:58:14 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kex.h,v 1.64 2014/05/02 03:27:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef KEX_H #define KEX_H #include #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC #include #endif #define KEX_COOKIE_LEN 16 #define KEX_DH1 "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" #define KEX_DH14 "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" #define KEX_DHGEX_SHA1 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1" #define KEX_DHGEX_SHA256 "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256" #define KEX_RESUME "resume@appgate.com" #define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256 "ecdh-sha2-nistp256" #define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384 "ecdh-sha2-nistp384" #define KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521 "ecdh-sha2-nistp521" #define KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256 "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org" #define COMP_NONE 0 #define COMP_ZLIB 1 #define COMP_DELAYED 2 enum kex_init_proposals { PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS, PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS, PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS, PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC, PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS, PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC, PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS, PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC, PROPOSAL_LANG_CTOS, PROPOSAL_LANG_STOC, PROPOSAL_MAX }; enum kex_modes { MODE_IN, MODE_OUT, MODE_MAX }; enum kex_exchange { KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, KEX_C25519_SHA256, KEX_MAX }; #define KEX_INIT_SENT 0x0001 typedef struct Kex Kex; typedef struct Mac Mac; typedef struct Comp Comp; typedef struct Enc Enc; typedef struct Newkeys Newkeys; struct Enc { char *name; const Cipher *cipher; int enabled; u_int key_len; u_int iv_len; u_int block_size; u_char *key; u_char *iv; }; struct Mac { char *name; int enabled; u_int mac_len; u_char *key; u_int key_len; int type; int etm; /* Encrypt-then-MAC */ struct ssh_hmac_ctx *hmac_ctx; struct umac_ctx *umac_ctx; }; struct Comp { int type; int enabled; char *name; }; struct Newkeys { Enc enc; Mac mac; Comp comp; }; struct Kex { u_char *session_id; u_int session_id_len; Newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX]; u_int we_need; u_int dh_need; int server; char *name; int hostkey_type; int kex_type; int roaming; Buffer my; Buffer peer; sig_atomic_t done; int flags; int hash_alg; int ec_nid; char *client_version_string; char *server_version_string; int (*verify_host_key)(Key *); Key *(*load_host_public_key)(int); Key *(*load_host_private_key)(int); int (*host_key_index)(Key *); void (*sign)(Key *, Key *, u_char **, u_int *, u_char *, u_int); void (*kex[KEX_MAX])(Kex *); }; int kex_names_valid(const char *); char *kex_alg_list(char); Kex *kex_setup(char *[PROPOSAL_MAX]); void kex_finish(Kex *); void kex_send_kexinit(Kex *); void kex_input_kexinit(int, u_int32_t, void *); void kex_derive_keys(Kex *, u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); void kex_derive_keys_bn(Kex *, u_char *, u_int, const BIGNUM *); Newkeys *kex_get_newkeys(int); void kexdh_client(Kex *); void kexdh_server(Kex *); void kexgex_client(Kex *); void kexgex_server(Kex *); void kexecdh_client(Kex *); void kexecdh_server(Kex *); void kexc25519_client(Kex *); void kexc25519_server(Kex *); void kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *); void kexgex_hash(int, char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int, int, int, int, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC void kex_ecdh_hash(int, const EC_GROUP *, char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int, const EC_POINT *, const EC_POINT *, const BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *); #endif void kex_c25519_hash(int, char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int, const u_char *, const u_char *, const u_char *, u_int, u_char **, u_int *); #define CURVE25519_SIZE 32 void kexc25519_keygen(u_char[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char[CURVE25519_SIZE]) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE))); void kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], Buffer *out) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE))); void derive_ssh1_session_id(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_int8_t[8], u_int8_t[16]); #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) void dump_digest(char *, u_char *, int); #endif #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexc25519.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexc25519.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/kexc25519.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,122 +1,122 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519.c,v 1.5 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: kexc25519.c,v 1.7 2014/05/02 03:27:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2013 Aris Adamantiadis. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "buffer.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "key.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "log.h" #include "digest.h" extern int crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(u_char a[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char b[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char c[CURVE25519_SIZE]) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 3, CURVE25519_SIZE))); void kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE]) { static const u_char basepoint[CURVE25519_SIZE] = {9}; arc4random_buf(key, CURVE25519_SIZE); crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(pub, key, basepoint); } void kexc25519_shared_key(const u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], Buffer *out) { u_char shared_key[CURVE25519_SIZE]; crypto_scalarmult_curve25519(shared_key, key, pub); #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH dump_digest("shared secret", shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE); #endif buffer_clear(out); buffer_put_bignum2_from_string(out, shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE); explicit_bzero(shared_key, CURVE25519_SIZE); } void kex_c25519_hash( int hash_alg, char *client_version_string, char *server_version_string, char *ckexinit, int ckexinitlen, char *skexinit, int skexinitlen, u_char *serverhostkeyblob, int sbloblen, const u_char client_dh_pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char server_dh_pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], const u_char *shared_secret, u_int secretlen, u_char **hash, u_int *hashlen) { Buffer b; static u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; buffer_init(&b); buffer_put_cstring(&b, client_version_string); buffer_put_cstring(&b, server_version_string); /* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */ buffer_put_int(&b, ckexinitlen+1); buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT); buffer_append(&b, ckexinit, ckexinitlen); buffer_put_int(&b, skexinitlen+1); buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT); buffer_append(&b, skexinit, skexinitlen); buffer_put_string(&b, serverhostkeyblob, sbloblen); buffer_put_string(&b, client_dh_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE); buffer_put_string(&b, server_dh_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE); buffer_append(&b, shared_secret, secretlen); #ifdef DEBUG_KEX buffer_dump(&b); #endif if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, &b, digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0) fatal("%s: digest_buffer failed", __func__); buffer_free(&b); #ifdef DEBUG_KEX dump_digest("hash", digest, ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)); #endif *hash = digest; *hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/key.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/key.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/key.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,2625 +1,479 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.116 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: key.c,v 1.122 2014/07/22 01:18:50 dtucker Exp $ */ /* - * read_bignum(): - * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland - * - * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software - * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this - * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is - * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be - * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". - * - * - * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. - * Copyright (c) 2008 Alexander von Gernler. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the - * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES - * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. - * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, - * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, - * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY - * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT - * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF - * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + * placed in the public domain */ #include "includes.h" #include #include - -#include "crypto_api.h" - -#include -#include - +#include #include #include -#include -#include "xmalloc.h" +#define SSH_KEY_NO_DEFINE #include "key.h" -#include "rsa.h" -#include "uuencode.h" -#include "buffer.h" + +#include "compat.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "ssherr.h" #include "log.h" -#include "misc.h" -#include "ssh2.h" -#include "digest.h" +#include "authfile.h" -static int to_blob(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, int); -static Key *key_from_blob2(const u_char *, u_int, int); - -static struct KeyCert * -cert_new(void) -{ - struct KeyCert *cert; - - cert = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cert)); - buffer_init(&cert->certblob); - buffer_init(&cert->critical); - buffer_init(&cert->extensions); - cert->key_id = NULL; - cert->principals = NULL; - cert->signature_key = NULL; - return cert; -} - -Key * -key_new(int type) -{ - Key *k; - RSA *rsa; - DSA *dsa; - k = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k)); - k->type = type; - k->ecdsa = NULL; - k->ecdsa_nid = -1; - k->dsa = NULL; - k->rsa = NULL; - k->cert = NULL; - k->ed25519_sk = NULL; - k->ed25519_pk = NULL; - switch (k->type) { - case KEY_RSA1: - case KEY_RSA: - case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_RSA_CERT: - if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) - fatal("key_new: RSA_new failed"); - if ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("key_new: BN_new failed"); - if ((rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("key_new: BN_new failed"); - k->rsa = rsa; - break; - case KEY_DSA: - case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_DSA_CERT: - if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL) - fatal("key_new: DSA_new failed"); - if ((dsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("key_new: BN_new failed"); - if ((dsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("key_new: BN_new failed"); - if ((dsa->g = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("key_new: BN_new failed"); - if ((dsa->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("key_new: BN_new failed"); - k->dsa = dsa; - break; -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - case KEY_ECDSA: - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: - /* Cannot do anything until we know the group */ - break; -#endif - case KEY_ED25519: - case KEY_ED25519_CERT: - /* no need to prealloc */ - break; - case KEY_UNSPEC: - break; - default: - fatal("key_new: bad key type %d", k->type); - break; - } - - if (key_is_cert(k)) - k->cert = cert_new(); - - return k; -} - void key_add_private(Key *k) { - switch (k->type) { - case KEY_RSA1: - case KEY_RSA: - case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_RSA_CERT: - if ((k->rsa->d = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed"); - if ((k->rsa->iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed"); - if ((k->rsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed"); - if ((k->rsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed"); - if ((k->rsa->dmq1 = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed"); - if ((k->rsa->dmp1 = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed"); - break; - case KEY_DSA: - case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_DSA_CERT: - if ((k->dsa->priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("key_new_private: BN_new failed"); - break; - case KEY_ECDSA: - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: - /* Cannot do anything until we know the group */ - break; - case KEY_ED25519: - case KEY_ED25519_CERT: - /* no need to prealloc */ - break; - case KEY_UNSPEC: - break; - default: - break; - } + int r; + + if ((r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } Key * key_new_private(int type) { - Key *k = key_new(type); + Key *ret = NULL; - key_add_private(k); - return k; + if ((ret = sshkey_new_private(type)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: failed", __func__); + return ret; } -static void -cert_free(struct KeyCert *cert) -{ - u_int i; - - buffer_free(&cert->certblob); - buffer_free(&cert->critical); - buffer_free(&cert->extensions); - free(cert->key_id); - for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) - free(cert->principals[i]); - free(cert->principals); - if (cert->signature_key != NULL) - key_free(cert->signature_key); - free(cert); -} - -void -key_free(Key *k) -{ - if (k == NULL) - fatal("key_free: key is NULL"); - switch (k->type) { - case KEY_RSA1: - case KEY_RSA: - case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_RSA_CERT: - if (k->rsa != NULL) - RSA_free(k->rsa); - k->rsa = NULL; - break; - case KEY_DSA: - case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_DSA_CERT: - if (k->dsa != NULL) - DSA_free(k->dsa); - k->dsa = NULL; - break; -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - case KEY_ECDSA: - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: - if (k->ecdsa != NULL) - EC_KEY_free(k->ecdsa); - k->ecdsa = NULL; - break; -#endif - case KEY_ED25519: - case KEY_ED25519_CERT: - if (k->ed25519_pk) { - explicit_bzero(k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ); - free(k->ed25519_pk); - k->ed25519_pk = NULL; - } - if (k->ed25519_sk) { - explicit_bzero(k->ed25519_sk, ED25519_SK_SZ); - free(k->ed25519_sk); - k->ed25519_sk = NULL; - } - break; - case KEY_UNSPEC: - break; - default: - fatal("key_free: bad key type %d", k->type); - break; - } - if (key_is_cert(k)) { - if (k->cert != NULL) - cert_free(k->cert); - k->cert = NULL; - } - - free(k); -} - -static int -cert_compare(struct KeyCert *a, struct KeyCert *b) -{ - if (a == NULL && b == NULL) - return 1; - if (a == NULL || b == NULL) - return 0; - if (buffer_len(&a->certblob) != buffer_len(&b->certblob)) - return 0; - if (timingsafe_bcmp(buffer_ptr(&a->certblob), buffer_ptr(&b->certblob), - buffer_len(&a->certblob)) != 0) - return 0; - return 1; -} - -/* - * Compare public portions of key only, allowing comparisons between - * certificates and plain keys too. - */ -int -key_equal_public(const Key *a, const Key *b) -{ -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - BN_CTX *bnctx; -#endif - - if (a == NULL || b == NULL || - key_type_plain(a->type) != key_type_plain(b->type)) - return 0; - - switch (a->type) { - case KEY_RSA1: - case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_RSA_CERT: - case KEY_RSA: - return a->rsa != NULL && b->rsa != NULL && - BN_cmp(a->rsa->e, b->rsa->e) == 0 && - BN_cmp(a->rsa->n, b->rsa->n) == 0; - case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_DSA_CERT: - case KEY_DSA: - return a->dsa != NULL && b->dsa != NULL && - BN_cmp(a->dsa->p, b->dsa->p) == 0 && - BN_cmp(a->dsa->q, b->dsa->q) == 0 && - BN_cmp(a->dsa->g, b->dsa->g) == 0 && - BN_cmp(a->dsa->pub_key, b->dsa->pub_key) == 0; -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: - case KEY_ECDSA: - if (a->ecdsa == NULL || b->ecdsa == NULL || - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa) == NULL || - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa) == NULL) - return 0; - if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new failed", __func__); - if (EC_GROUP_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa), - EC_KEY_get0_group(b->ecdsa), bnctx) != 0 || - EC_POINT_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa), - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa), - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa), bnctx) != 0) { - BN_CTX_free(bnctx); - return 0; - } - BN_CTX_free(bnctx); - return 1; -#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ - case KEY_ED25519: - case KEY_ED25519_CERT: - return a->ed25519_pk != NULL && b->ed25519_pk != NULL && - memcmp(a->ed25519_pk, b->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ) == 0; - default: - fatal("key_equal: bad key type %d", a->type); - } - /* NOTREACHED */ -} - -int -key_equal(const Key *a, const Key *b) -{ - if (a == NULL || b == NULL || a->type != b->type) - return 0; - if (key_is_cert(a)) { - if (!cert_compare(a->cert, b->cert)) - return 0; - } - return key_equal_public(a, b); -} - u_char* key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, u_int *dgst_raw_length) { - u_char *blob = NULL; - u_char *retval = NULL; - u_int len = 0; - int nlen, elen, hash_alg = -1; + u_char *ret = NULL; + size_t dlen; + int r; - *dgst_raw_length = 0; - - /* XXX switch to DIGEST_* directly? */ - switch (dgst_type) { - case SSH_FP_MD5: - hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_MD5; - break; - case SSH_FP_SHA1: - hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; - break; - case SSH_FP_SHA256: - hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256; - break; - default: - fatal("%s: bad digest type %d", __func__, dgst_type); - } - switch (k->type) { - case KEY_RSA1: - nlen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->n); - elen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->e); - len = nlen + elen; - blob = xmalloc(len); - BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->n, blob); - BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->e, blob + nlen); - break; - case KEY_DSA: - case KEY_ECDSA: - case KEY_RSA: - case KEY_ED25519: - key_to_blob(k, &blob, &len); - break; - case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_DSA_CERT: - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: - case KEY_RSA_CERT: - case KEY_ED25519_CERT: - /* We want a fingerprint of the _key_ not of the cert */ - to_blob(k, &blob, &len, 1); - break; - case KEY_UNSPEC: - return retval; - default: - fatal("%s: bad key type %d", __func__, k->type); - break; - } - if (blob != NULL) { - retval = xmalloc(SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH); - if ((ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, blob, len, - retval, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0) - fatal("%s: digest_memory failed", __func__); - explicit_bzero(blob, len); - free(blob); - *dgst_raw_length = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg); - } else { - fatal("%s: blob is null", __func__); - } - return retval; + if (dgst_raw_length != NULL) + *dgst_raw_length = 0; + if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(k, dgst_type, &ret, &dlen)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + if (dlen > INT_MAX) + fatal("%s: giant len %zu", __func__, dlen); + *dgst_raw_length = dlen; + return ret; } -static char * -key_fingerprint_hex(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len) -{ - char *retval; - u_int i; - - retval = xcalloc(1, dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1); - for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) { - char hex[4]; - snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%02x:", dgst_raw[i]); - strlcat(retval, hex, dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1); - } - - /* Remove the trailing ':' character */ - retval[(dgst_raw_len * 3) - 1] = '\0'; - return retval; -} - -static char * -key_fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len) -{ - char vowels[] = { 'a', 'e', 'i', 'o', 'u', 'y' }; - char consonants[] = { 'b', 'c', 'd', 'f', 'g', 'h', 'k', 'l', 'm', - 'n', 'p', 'r', 's', 't', 'v', 'z', 'x' }; - u_int i, j = 0, rounds, seed = 1; - char *retval; - - rounds = (dgst_raw_len / 2) + 1; - retval = xcalloc((rounds * 6), sizeof(char)); - retval[j++] = 'x'; - for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) { - u_int idx0, idx1, idx2, idx3, idx4; - if ((i + 1 < rounds) || (dgst_raw_len % 2 != 0)) { - idx0 = (((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 6) & 3) + - seed) % 6; - idx1 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 2) & 15; - idx2 = ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) & 3) + - (seed / 6)) % 6; - retval[j++] = vowels[idx0]; - retval[j++] = consonants[idx1]; - retval[j++] = vowels[idx2]; - if ((i + 1) < rounds) { - idx3 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])) >> 4) & 15; - idx4 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1]))) & 15; - retval[j++] = consonants[idx3]; - retval[j++] = '-'; - retval[j++] = consonants[idx4]; - seed = ((seed * 5) + - ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) * 7) + - ((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])))) % 36; - } - } else { - idx0 = seed % 6; - idx1 = 16; - idx2 = seed / 6; - retval[j++] = vowels[idx0]; - retval[j++] = consonants[idx1]; - retval[j++] = vowels[idx2]; - } - } - retval[j++] = 'x'; - retval[j++] = '\0'; - return retval; -} - -/* - * Draw an ASCII-Art representing the fingerprint so human brain can - * profit from its built-in pattern recognition ability. - * This technique is called "random art" and can be found in some - * scientific publications like this original paper: - * - * "Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security", - * Perrig A. and Song D., 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic - * Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99) - * sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/projects/validation/validation.pdf - * - * The subject came up in a talk by Dan Kaminsky, too. - * - * If you see the picture is different, the key is different. - * If the picture looks the same, you still know nothing. - * - * The algorithm used here is a worm crawling over a discrete plane, - * leaving a trace (augmenting the field) everywhere it goes. - * Movement is taken from dgst_raw 2bit-wise. Bumping into walls - * makes the respective movement vector be ignored for this turn. - * Graphs are not unambiguous, because circles in graphs can be - * walked in either direction. - */ - -/* - * Field sizes for the random art. Have to be odd, so the starting point - * can be in the exact middle of the picture, and FLDBASE should be >=8 . - * Else pictures would be too dense, and drawing the frame would - * fail, too, because the key type would not fit in anymore. - */ -#define FLDBASE 8 -#define FLDSIZE_Y (FLDBASE + 1) -#define FLDSIZE_X (FLDBASE * 2 + 1) -static char * -key_fingerprint_randomart(u_char *dgst_raw, u_int dgst_raw_len, const Key *k) -{ - /* - * Chars to be used after each other every time the worm - * intersects with itself. Matter of taste. - */ - char *augmentation_string = " .o+=*BOX@%&#/^SE"; - char *retval, *p; - u_char field[FLDSIZE_X][FLDSIZE_Y]; - u_int i, b; - int x, y; - size_t len = strlen(augmentation_string) - 1; - - retval = xcalloc(1, (FLDSIZE_X + 3) * (FLDSIZE_Y + 2)); - - /* initialize field */ - memset(field, 0, FLDSIZE_X * FLDSIZE_Y * sizeof(char)); - x = FLDSIZE_X / 2; - y = FLDSIZE_Y / 2; - - /* process raw key */ - for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) { - int input; - /* each byte conveys four 2-bit move commands */ - input = dgst_raw[i]; - for (b = 0; b < 4; b++) { - /* evaluate 2 bit, rest is shifted later */ - x += (input & 0x1) ? 1 : -1; - y += (input & 0x2) ? 1 : -1; - - /* assure we are still in bounds */ - x = MAX(x, 0); - y = MAX(y, 0); - x = MIN(x, FLDSIZE_X - 1); - y = MIN(y, FLDSIZE_Y - 1); - - /* augment the field */ - if (field[x][y] < len - 2) - field[x][y]++; - input = input >> 2; - } - } - - /* mark starting point and end point*/ - field[FLDSIZE_X / 2][FLDSIZE_Y / 2] = len - 1; - field[x][y] = len; - - /* fill in retval */ - snprintf(retval, FLDSIZE_X, "+--[%4s %4u]", key_type(k), key_size(k)); - p = strchr(retval, '\0'); - - /* output upper border */ - for (i = p - retval - 1; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++) - *p++ = '-'; - *p++ = '+'; - *p++ = '\n'; - - /* output content */ - for (y = 0; y < FLDSIZE_Y; y++) { - *p++ = '|'; - for (x = 0; x < FLDSIZE_X; x++) - *p++ = augmentation_string[MIN(field[x][y], len)]; - *p++ = '|'; - *p++ = '\n'; - } - - /* output lower border */ - *p++ = '+'; - for (i = 0; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++) - *p++ = '-'; - *p++ = '+'; - - return retval; -} - -char * -key_fingerprint(const Key *k, enum fp_type dgst_type, enum fp_rep dgst_rep) -{ - char *retval = NULL; - u_char *dgst_raw; - u_int dgst_raw_len; - - dgst_raw = key_fingerprint_raw(k, dgst_type, &dgst_raw_len); - if (!dgst_raw) - fatal("key_fingerprint: null from key_fingerprint_raw()"); - switch (dgst_rep) { - case SSH_FP_HEX: - retval = key_fingerprint_hex(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); - break; - case SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE: - retval = key_fingerprint_bubblebabble(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); - break; - case SSH_FP_RANDOMART: - retval = key_fingerprint_randomart(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, k); - break; - default: - fatal("key_fingerprint: bad digest representation %d", - dgst_rep); - break; - } - explicit_bzero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); - free(dgst_raw); - return retval; -} - -/* - * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances - * the pointer. The integer must already be initialized. This function is - * permitted to modify the buffer. This leaves *cpp to point just beyond the - * last processed (and maybe modified) character. Note that this may modify - * the buffer containing the number. - */ -static int -read_bignum(char **cpp, BIGNUM * value) -{ - char *cp = *cpp; - int old; - - /* Skip any leading whitespace. */ - for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) - ; - - /* Check that it begins with a decimal digit. */ - if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9') - return 0; - - /* Save starting position. */ - *cpp = cp; - - /* Move forward until all decimal digits skipped. */ - for (; *cp >= '0' && *cp <= '9'; cp++) - ; - - /* Save the old terminating character, and replace it by \0. */ - old = *cp; - *cp = 0; - - /* Parse the number. */ - if (BN_dec2bn(&value, *cpp) == 0) - return 0; - - /* Restore old terminating character. */ - *cp = old; - - /* Move beyond the number and return success. */ - *cpp = cp; - return 1; -} - -static int -write_bignum(FILE *f, BIGNUM *num) -{ - char *buf = BN_bn2dec(num); - if (buf == NULL) { - error("write_bignum: BN_bn2dec() failed"); - return 0; - } - fprintf(f, " %s", buf); - OPENSSL_free(buf); - return 1; -} - -/* returns 1 ok, -1 error */ int key_read(Key *ret, char **cpp) { - Key *k; - int success = -1; - char *cp, *space; - int len, n, type; - u_int bits; - u_char *blob; -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - int curve_nid = -1; -#endif - - cp = *cpp; - - switch (ret->type) { - case KEY_RSA1: - /* Get number of bits. */ - if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '9') - return -1; /* Bad bit count... */ - for (bits = 0; *cp >= '0' && *cp <= '9'; cp++) - bits = 10 * bits + *cp - '0'; - if (bits == 0) - return -1; - *cpp = cp; - /* Get public exponent, public modulus. */ - if (!read_bignum(cpp, ret->rsa->e)) - return -1; - if (!read_bignum(cpp, ret->rsa->n)) - return -1; - /* validate the claimed number of bits */ - if ((u_int)BN_num_bits(ret->rsa->n) != bits) { - verbose("key_read: claimed key size %d does not match " - "actual %d", bits, BN_num_bits(ret->rsa->n)); - return -1; - } - success = 1; - break; - case KEY_UNSPEC: - case KEY_RSA: - case KEY_DSA: - case KEY_ECDSA: - case KEY_ED25519: - case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_DSA_CERT: - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: - case KEY_RSA_CERT: - case KEY_ED25519_CERT: - space = strchr(cp, ' '); - if (space == NULL) { - debug3("key_read: missing whitespace"); - return -1; - } - *space = '\0'; - type = key_type_from_name(cp); -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - if (key_type_plain(type) == KEY_ECDSA && - (curve_nid = key_ecdsa_nid_from_name(cp)) == -1) { - debug("key_read: invalid curve"); - return -1; - } -#endif - *space = ' '; - if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) { - debug3("key_read: missing keytype"); - return -1; - } - cp = space+1; - if (*cp == '\0') { - debug3("key_read: short string"); - return -1; - } - if (ret->type == KEY_UNSPEC) { - ret->type = type; - } else if (ret->type != type) { - /* is a key, but different type */ - debug3("key_read: type mismatch"); - return -1; - } - len = 2*strlen(cp); - blob = xmalloc(len); - n = uudecode(cp, blob, len); - if (n < 0) { - error("key_read: uudecode %s failed", cp); - free(blob); - return -1; - } - k = key_from_blob(blob, (u_int)n); - free(blob); - if (k == NULL) { - error("key_read: key_from_blob %s failed", cp); - return -1; - } - if (k->type != type) { - error("key_read: type mismatch: encoding error"); - key_free(k); - return -1; - } -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - if (key_type_plain(type) == KEY_ECDSA && - curve_nid != k->ecdsa_nid) { - error("key_read: type mismatch: EC curve mismatch"); - key_free(k); - return -1; - } -#endif -/*XXXX*/ - if (key_is_cert(ret)) { - if (!key_is_cert(k)) { - error("key_read: loaded key is not a cert"); - key_free(k); - return -1; - } - if (ret->cert != NULL) - cert_free(ret->cert); - ret->cert = k->cert; - k->cert = NULL; - } - if (key_type_plain(ret->type) == KEY_RSA) { - if (ret->rsa != NULL) - RSA_free(ret->rsa); - ret->rsa = k->rsa; - k->rsa = NULL; -#ifdef DEBUG_PK - RSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->rsa, 8); -#endif - } - if (key_type_plain(ret->type) == KEY_DSA) { - if (ret->dsa != NULL) - DSA_free(ret->dsa); - ret->dsa = k->dsa; - k->dsa = NULL; -#ifdef DEBUG_PK - DSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->dsa, 8); -#endif - } -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - if (key_type_plain(ret->type) == KEY_ECDSA) { - if (ret->ecdsa != NULL) - EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdsa); - ret->ecdsa = k->ecdsa; - ret->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid; - k->ecdsa = NULL; - k->ecdsa_nid = -1; -#ifdef DEBUG_PK - key_dump_ec_key(ret->ecdsa); -#endif - } -#endif - if (key_type_plain(ret->type) == KEY_ED25519) { - free(ret->ed25519_pk); - ret->ed25519_pk = k->ed25519_pk; - k->ed25519_pk = NULL; -#ifdef DEBUG_PK - /* XXX */ -#endif - } - success = 1; -/*XXXX*/ - key_free(k); - if (success != 1) - break; - /* advance cp: skip whitespace and data */ - while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t') - cp++; - while (*cp != '\0' && *cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t') - cp++; - *cpp = cp; - break; - default: - fatal("key_read: bad key type: %d", ret->type); - break; - } - return success; + return sshkey_read(ret, cpp) == 0 ? 1 : -1; } int key_write(const Key *key, FILE *f) { - int n, success = 0; - u_int len, bits = 0; - u_char *blob; - char *uu; - - if (key_is_cert(key)) { - if (key->cert == NULL) { - error("%s: no cert data", __func__); - return 0; - } - if (buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob) == 0) { - error("%s: no signed certificate blob", __func__); - return 0; - } - } - - switch (key->type) { - case KEY_RSA1: - if (key->rsa == NULL) - return 0; - /* size of modulus 'n' */ - bits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n); - fprintf(f, "%u", bits); - if (write_bignum(f, key->rsa->e) && - write_bignum(f, key->rsa->n)) - return 1; - error("key_write: failed for RSA key"); - return 0; - case KEY_DSA: - case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_DSA_CERT: - if (key->dsa == NULL) - return 0; - break; -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - case KEY_ECDSA: - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: - if (key->ecdsa == NULL) - return 0; - break; -#endif - case KEY_ED25519: - case KEY_ED25519_CERT: - if (key->ed25519_pk == NULL) - return 0; - break; - case KEY_RSA: - case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_RSA_CERT: - if (key->rsa == NULL) - return 0; - break; - default: - return 0; - } - - key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len); - uu = xmalloc(2*len); - n = uuencode(blob, len, uu, 2*len); - if (n > 0) { - fprintf(f, "%s %s", key_ssh_name(key), uu); - success = 1; - } - free(blob); - free(uu); - - return success; + return sshkey_write(key, f) == 0 ? 1 : 0; } -const char * -key_cert_type(const Key *k) +Key * +key_generate(int type, u_int bits) { - switch (k->cert->type) { - case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER: - return "user"; - case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST: - return "host"; - default: - return "unknown"; - } -} + int r; + Key *ret = NULL; -struct keytype { - char *name; - char *shortname; - int type; - int nid; - int cert; -}; -static const struct keytype keytypes[] = { - { NULL, "RSA1", KEY_RSA1, 0, 0 }, - { "ssh-rsa", "RSA", KEY_RSA, 0, 0 }, - { "ssh-dss", "DSA", KEY_DSA, 0, 0 }, - { "ssh-ed25519", "ED25519", KEY_ED25519, 0, 0 }, -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256", "ECDSA", KEY_ECDSA, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 0 }, - { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384", "ECDSA", KEY_ECDSA, NID_secp384r1, 0 }, -# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 - { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521", "ECDSA", KEY_ECDSA, NID_secp521r1, 0 }, -# endif -#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ - { "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT", KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, 1 }, - { "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com", "DSA-CERT", KEY_DSA_CERT, 0, 1 }, -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", - KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1 }, - { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", - KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp384r1, 1 }, -# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 - { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", - KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp521r1, 1 }, -# endif -#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ - { "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT-V00", - KEY_RSA_CERT_V00, 0, 1 }, - { "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com", "DSA-CERT-V00", - KEY_DSA_CERT_V00, 0, 1 }, - { "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ED25519-CERT", - KEY_ED25519_CERT, 0, 1 }, - { NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0 } -}; - -const char * -key_type(const Key *k) -{ - const struct keytype *kt; - - for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { - if (kt->type == k->type) - return kt->shortname; - } - return "unknown"; -} - -static const char * -key_ssh_name_from_type_nid(int type, int nid) -{ - const struct keytype *kt; - - for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { - if (kt->type == type && (kt->nid == 0 || kt->nid == nid)) - return kt->name; - } - return "ssh-unknown"; -} - -const char * -key_ssh_name(const Key *k) -{ - return key_ssh_name_from_type_nid(k->type, k->ecdsa_nid); -} - -const char * -key_ssh_name_plain(const Key *k) -{ - return key_ssh_name_from_type_nid(key_type_plain(k->type), - k->ecdsa_nid); -} - -int -key_type_from_name(char *name) -{ - const struct keytype *kt; - - for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { - /* Only allow shortname matches for plain key types */ - if ((kt->name != NULL && strcmp(name, kt->name) == 0) || - (!kt->cert && strcasecmp(kt->shortname, name) == 0)) - return kt->type; - } - debug2("key_type_from_name: unknown key type '%s'", name); - return KEY_UNSPEC; -} - -int -key_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *name) -{ - const struct keytype *kt; - - for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { - if (kt->type != KEY_ECDSA && kt->type != KEY_ECDSA_CERT) - continue; - if (kt->name != NULL && strcmp(name, kt->name) == 0) - return kt->nid; - } - debug2("%s: unknown/non-ECDSA key type '%s'", __func__, name); - return -1; -} - -char * -key_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only) -{ - char *ret = NULL; - size_t nlen, rlen = 0; - const struct keytype *kt; - - for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { - if (kt->name == NULL) - continue; - if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert)) - continue; - if (ret != NULL) - ret[rlen++] = '\n'; - nlen = strlen(kt->name); - ret = xrealloc(ret, 1, rlen + nlen + 2); - memcpy(ret + rlen, kt->name, nlen + 1); - rlen += nlen; - } + if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &ret)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return ret; } -int -key_type_is_cert(int type) -{ - const struct keytype *kt; - - for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { - if (kt->type == type) - return kt->cert; - } - return 0; -} - -static int -key_type_is_valid_ca(int type) -{ - switch (type) { - case KEY_RSA: - case KEY_DSA: - case KEY_ECDSA: - case KEY_ED25519: - return 1; - default: - return 0; - } -} - -u_int -key_size(const Key *k) -{ - switch (k->type) { - case KEY_RSA1: - case KEY_RSA: - case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_RSA_CERT: - return BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n); - case KEY_DSA: - case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_DSA_CERT: - return BN_num_bits(k->dsa->p); - case KEY_ED25519: - return 256; /* XXX */ -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - case KEY_ECDSA: - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: - return key_curve_nid_to_bits(k->ecdsa_nid); -#endif - } - return 0; -} - -static RSA * -rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits) -{ - RSA *private = RSA_new(); - BIGNUM *f4 = BN_new(); - - if (private == NULL) - fatal("%s: RSA_new failed", __func__); - if (f4 == NULL) - fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); - if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4)) - fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); - if (!RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) - fatal("%s: key generation failed.", __func__); - BN_free(f4); - return private; -} - -static DSA* -dsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits) -{ - DSA *private = DSA_new(); - - if (private == NULL) - fatal("%s: DSA_new failed", __func__); - if (!DSA_generate_parameters_ex(private, bits, NULL, 0, NULL, - NULL, NULL)) - fatal("%s: DSA_generate_parameters failed", __func__); - if (!DSA_generate_key(private)) - fatal("%s: DSA_generate_key failed.", __func__); - return private; -} - -int -key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int bits) -{ - switch (bits) { -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - case 256: - return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; - case 384: - return NID_secp384r1; -# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 - case 521: - return NID_secp521r1; -# endif -#endif - default: - return -1; - } -} - -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC -int -key_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *k) -{ - EC_GROUP *eg; - int nids[] = { - NID_X9_62_prime256v1, - NID_secp384r1, -# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 - NID_secp521r1, -# endif - -1 - }; - int nid; - u_int i; - BN_CTX *bnctx; - const EC_GROUP *g = EC_KEY_get0_group(k); - - /* - * The group may be stored in a ASN.1 encoded private key in one of two - * ways: as a "named group", which is reconstituted by ASN.1 object ID - * or explicit group parameters encoded into the key blob. Only the - * "named group" case sets the group NID for us, but we can figure - * it out for the other case by comparing against all the groups that - * are supported. - */ - if ((nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(g)) > 0) - return nid; - if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new() failed", __func__); - for (i = 0; nids[i] != -1; i++) { - if ((eg = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nids[i])) == NULL) - fatal("%s: EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name failed", - __func__); - if (EC_GROUP_cmp(g, eg, bnctx) == 0) - break; - EC_GROUP_free(eg); - } - BN_CTX_free(bnctx); - debug3("%s: nid = %d", __func__, nids[i]); - if (nids[i] != -1) { - /* Use the group with the NID attached */ - EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(eg, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE); - if (EC_KEY_set_group(k, eg) != 1) - fatal("%s: EC_KEY_set_group", __func__); - } - return nids[i]; -} - -static EC_KEY* -ecdsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, int *nid) -{ - EC_KEY *private; - - if ((*nid = key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits)) == -1) - fatal("%s: invalid key length", __func__); - if ((private = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(*nid)) == NULL) - fatal("%s: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed", __func__); - if (EC_KEY_generate_key(private) != 1) - fatal("%s: EC_KEY_generate_key failed", __func__); - EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(private, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE); - return private; -} -#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ - -Key * -key_generate(int type, u_int bits) -{ - Key *k = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); - switch (type) { - case KEY_DSA: - k->dsa = dsa_generate_private_key(bits); - break; -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - case KEY_ECDSA: - k->ecdsa = ecdsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->ecdsa_nid); - break; -#endif - case KEY_RSA: - case KEY_RSA1: - k->rsa = rsa_generate_private_key(bits); - break; - case KEY_ED25519: - k->ed25519_pk = xmalloc(ED25519_PK_SZ); - k->ed25519_sk = xmalloc(ED25519_SK_SZ); - crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(k->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_sk); - break; - case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_RSA_CERT: - case KEY_DSA_CERT: - fatal("key_generate: cert keys cannot be generated directly"); - default: - fatal("key_generate: unknown type %d", type); - } - k->type = type; - return k; -} - void -key_cert_copy(const Key *from_key, struct Key *to_key) +key_cert_copy(const Key *from_key, Key *to_key) { - u_int i; - const struct KeyCert *from; - struct KeyCert *to; + int r; - if (to_key->cert != NULL) { - cert_free(to_key->cert); - to_key->cert = NULL; - } - - if ((from = from_key->cert) == NULL) - return; - - to = to_key->cert = cert_new(); - - buffer_append(&to->certblob, buffer_ptr(&from->certblob), - buffer_len(&from->certblob)); - - buffer_append(&to->critical, - buffer_ptr(&from->critical), buffer_len(&from->critical)); - buffer_append(&to->extensions, - buffer_ptr(&from->extensions), buffer_len(&from->extensions)); - - to->serial = from->serial; - to->type = from->type; - to->key_id = from->key_id == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(from->key_id); - to->valid_after = from->valid_after; - to->valid_before = from->valid_before; - to->signature_key = from->signature_key == NULL ? - NULL : key_from_private(from->signature_key); - - to->nprincipals = from->nprincipals; - if (to->nprincipals > CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) - fatal("%s: nprincipals (%u) > CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS (%u)", - __func__, to->nprincipals, CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS); - if (to->nprincipals > 0) { - to->principals = xcalloc(from->nprincipals, - sizeof(*to->principals)); - for (i = 0; i < to->nprincipals; i++) - to->principals[i] = xstrdup(from->principals[i]); - } + if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(from_key, to_key)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } Key * key_from_private(const Key *k) { - Key *n = NULL; - switch (k->type) { - case KEY_DSA: - case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_DSA_CERT: - n = key_new(k->type); - if ((BN_copy(n->dsa->p, k->dsa->p) == NULL) || - (BN_copy(n->dsa->q, k->dsa->q) == NULL) || - (BN_copy(n->dsa->g, k->dsa->g) == NULL) || - (BN_copy(n->dsa->pub_key, k->dsa->pub_key) == NULL)) - fatal("key_from_private: BN_copy failed"); - break; -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - case KEY_ECDSA: - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: - n = key_new(k->type); - n->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid; - if ((n->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid)) == NULL) - fatal("%s: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed", __func__); - if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(n->ecdsa, - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 1) - fatal("%s: EC_KEY_set_public_key failed", __func__); - break; -#endif - case KEY_RSA: - case KEY_RSA1: - case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_RSA_CERT: - n = key_new(k->type); - if ((BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n) == NULL) || - (BN_copy(n->rsa->e, k->rsa->e) == NULL)) - fatal("key_from_private: BN_copy failed"); - break; - case KEY_ED25519: - case KEY_ED25519_CERT: - n = key_new(k->type); - if (k->ed25519_pk != NULL) { - n->ed25519_pk = xmalloc(ED25519_PK_SZ); - memcpy(n->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ); - } - break; - default: - fatal("key_from_private: unknown type %d", k->type); - break; - } - if (key_is_cert(k)) - key_cert_copy(k, n); - return n; -} + int r; + Key *ret = NULL; -int -key_names_valid2(const char *names) -{ - char *s, *cp, *p; - - if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0) - return 0; - s = cp = xstrdup(names); - for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; - (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { - switch (key_type_from_name(p)) { - case KEY_RSA1: - case KEY_UNSPEC: - free(s); - return 0; - } - } - debug3("key names ok: [%s]", names); - free(s); - return 1; -} - -static int -cert_parse(Buffer *b, Key *key, const u_char *blob, u_int blen) -{ - u_char *principals, *critical, *exts, *sig_key, *sig; - u_int signed_len, plen, clen, sklen, slen, kidlen, elen; - Buffer tmp; - char *principal; - int ret = -1; - int v00 = key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00 || - key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00; - - buffer_init(&tmp); - - /* Copy the entire key blob for verification and later serialisation */ - buffer_append(&key->cert->certblob, blob, blen); - - elen = 0; /* Not touched for v00 certs */ - principals = exts = critical = sig_key = sig = NULL; - if ((!v00 && buffer_get_int64_ret(&key->cert->serial, b) != 0) || - buffer_get_int_ret(&key->cert->type, b) != 0 || - (key->cert->key_id = buffer_get_cstring_ret(b, &kidlen)) == NULL || - (principals = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &plen)) == NULL || - buffer_get_int64_ret(&key->cert->valid_after, b) != 0 || - buffer_get_int64_ret(&key->cert->valid_before, b) != 0 || - (critical = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &clen)) == NULL || - (!v00 && (exts = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &elen)) == NULL) || - (v00 && buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(b, NULL) == NULL) || /* nonce */ - buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(b, NULL) == NULL || /* reserved */ - (sig_key = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &sklen)) == NULL) { - error("%s: parse error", __func__); - goto out; - } - - /* Signature is left in the buffer so we can calculate this length */ - signed_len = buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob) - buffer_len(b); - - if ((sig = buffer_get_string_ret(b, &slen)) == NULL) { - error("%s: parse error", __func__); - goto out; - } - - if (key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER && - key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) { - error("Unknown certificate type %u", key->cert->type); - goto out; - } - - buffer_append(&tmp, principals, plen); - while (buffer_len(&tmp) > 0) { - if (key->cert->nprincipals >= CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) { - error("%s: Too many principals", __func__); - goto out; - } - if ((principal = buffer_get_cstring_ret(&tmp, &plen)) == NULL) { - error("%s: Principals data invalid", __func__); - goto out; - } - key->cert->principals = xrealloc(key->cert->principals, - key->cert->nprincipals + 1, sizeof(*key->cert->principals)); - key->cert->principals[key->cert->nprincipals++] = principal; - } - - buffer_clear(&tmp); - - buffer_append(&key->cert->critical, critical, clen); - buffer_append(&tmp, critical, clen); - /* validate structure */ - while (buffer_len(&tmp) != 0) { - if (buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&tmp, NULL) == NULL || - buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&tmp, NULL) == NULL) { - error("%s: critical option data invalid", __func__); - goto out; - } - } - buffer_clear(&tmp); - - buffer_append(&key->cert->extensions, exts, elen); - buffer_append(&tmp, exts, elen); - /* validate structure */ - while (buffer_len(&tmp) != 0) { - if (buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&tmp, NULL) == NULL || - buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&tmp, NULL) == NULL) { - error("%s: extension data invalid", __func__); - goto out; - } - } - buffer_clear(&tmp); - - if ((key->cert->signature_key = key_from_blob2(sig_key, sklen, 0)) - == NULL) { - error("%s: Signature key invalid", __func__); - goto out; - } - if (!key_type_is_valid_ca(key->cert->signature_key->type)) { - error("%s: Invalid signature key type %s (%d)", __func__, - key_type(key->cert->signature_key), - key->cert->signature_key->type); - goto out; - } - - switch (key_verify(key->cert->signature_key, sig, slen, - buffer_ptr(&key->cert->certblob), signed_len)) { - case 1: - ret = 0; - break; /* Good signature */ - case 0: - error("%s: Invalid signature on certificate", __func__); - goto out; - case -1: - error("%s: Certificate signature verification failed", - __func__); - goto out; - } - - out: - buffer_free(&tmp); - free(principals); - free(critical); - free(exts); - free(sig_key); - free(sig); + if ((r = sshkey_from_private(k, &ret)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return ret; } -static Key * -key_from_blob2(const u_char *blob, u_int blen, int allow_cert) +static void +fatal_on_fatal_errors(int r, const char *func, int extra_fatal) { - Buffer b; - int rlen, type; - u_int len; - char *ktype = NULL, *curve = NULL; - u_char *pk = NULL; - Key *key = NULL; -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - EC_POINT *q = NULL; - int nid = -1; -#endif - -#ifdef DEBUG_PK - dump_base64(stderr, blob, blen); -#endif - buffer_init(&b); - buffer_append(&b, blob, blen); - if ((ktype = buffer_get_cstring_ret(&b, NULL)) == NULL) { - error("key_from_blob: can't read key type"); - goto out; - } - - type = key_type_from_name(ktype); -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - if (key_type_plain(type) == KEY_ECDSA) - nid = key_ecdsa_nid_from_name(ktype); -#endif - if (!allow_cert && key_type_is_cert(type)) { - error("key_from_blob: certificate not allowed in this context"); - goto out; - } - switch (type) { - case KEY_RSA_CERT: - (void)buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&b, NULL); /* Skip nonce */ - /* FALLTHROUGH */ - case KEY_RSA: - case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: - key = key_new(type); - if (buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->rsa->e) == -1 || - buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->rsa->n) == -1) { - error("key_from_blob: can't read rsa key"); - badkey: - key_free(key); - key = NULL; - goto out; - } -#ifdef DEBUG_PK - RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8); -#endif - break; - case KEY_DSA_CERT: - (void)buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&b, NULL); /* Skip nonce */ - /* FALLTHROUGH */ - case KEY_DSA: - case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: - key = key_new(type); - if (buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->p) == -1 || - buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->q) == -1 || - buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->g) == -1 || - buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&b, key->dsa->pub_key) == -1) { - error("key_from_blob: can't read dsa key"); - goto badkey; - } -#ifdef DEBUG_PK - DSA_print_fp(stderr, key->dsa, 8); -#endif - break; -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: - (void)buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&b, NULL); /* Skip nonce */ - /* FALLTHROUGH */ - case KEY_ECDSA: - key = key_new(type); - key->ecdsa_nid = nid; - if ((curve = buffer_get_string_ret(&b, NULL)) == NULL) { - error("key_from_blob: can't read ecdsa curve"); - goto badkey; - } - if (key->ecdsa_nid != key_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) { - error("key_from_blob: ecdsa curve doesn't match type"); - goto badkey; - } - if (key->ecdsa != NULL) - EC_KEY_free(key->ecdsa); - if ((key->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(key->ecdsa_nid)) - == NULL) - fatal("key_from_blob: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed"); - if ((q = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa))) == NULL) - fatal("key_from_blob: EC_POINT_new failed"); - if (buffer_get_ecpoint_ret(&b, EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), - q) == -1) { - error("key_from_blob: can't read ecdsa key point"); - goto badkey; - } - if (key_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), - q) != 0) - goto badkey; - if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(key->ecdsa, q) != 1) - fatal("key_from_blob: EC_KEY_set_public_key failed"); -#ifdef DEBUG_PK - key_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), q); -#endif - break; -#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ - case KEY_ED25519_CERT: - (void)buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&b, NULL); /* Skip nonce */ - /* FALLTHROUGH */ - case KEY_ED25519: - if ((pk = buffer_get_string_ret(&b, &len)) == NULL) { - error("key_from_blob: can't read ed25519 key"); - goto badkey; - } - if (len != ED25519_PK_SZ) { - error("key_from_blob: ed25519 len %d != %d", - len, ED25519_PK_SZ); - goto badkey; - } - key = key_new(type); - key->ed25519_pk = pk; - pk = NULL; - break; - case KEY_UNSPEC: - key = key_new(type); - break; - default: - error("key_from_blob: cannot handle type %s", ktype); - goto out; - } - if (key_is_cert(key) && cert_parse(&b, key, blob, blen) == -1) { - error("key_from_blob: can't parse cert data"); - goto badkey; - } - rlen = buffer_len(&b); - if (key != NULL && rlen != 0) - error("key_from_blob: remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen); - out: - free(ktype); - free(curve); - free(pk); -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - if (q != NULL) - EC_POINT_free(q); -#endif - buffer_free(&b); - return key; + if (r == SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR || + r == SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL || + (extra_fatal != 0 && r == extra_fatal)) + fatal("%s: %s", func, ssh_err(r)); } Key * key_from_blob(const u_char *blob, u_int blen) { - return key_from_blob2(blob, blen, 1); + int r; + Key *ret = NULL; + + if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &ret)) != 0) { + fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0); + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return NULL; + } + return ret; } -static int -to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp, int force_plain) +int +key_to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp) { - Buffer b; - int len, type; + u_char *blob; + size_t blen; + int r; if (blobp != NULL) *blobp = NULL; if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = 0; - if (key == NULL) { - error("key_to_blob: key == NULL"); + if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) { + fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0); + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return 0; } - buffer_init(&b); - type = force_plain ? key_type_plain(key->type) : key->type; - switch (type) { - case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_DSA_CERT: - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: - case KEY_RSA_CERT: - case KEY_ED25519_CERT: - /* Use the existing blob */ - buffer_append(&b, buffer_ptr(&key->cert->certblob), - buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob)); - break; - case KEY_DSA: - buffer_put_cstring(&b, - key_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid)); - buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->p); - buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->q); - buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->g); - buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->dsa->pub_key); - break; -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - case KEY_ECDSA: - buffer_put_cstring(&b, - key_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid)); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid)); - buffer_put_ecpoint(&b, EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key->ecdsa)); - break; -#endif - case KEY_RSA: - buffer_put_cstring(&b, - key_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid)); - buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->rsa->e); - buffer_put_bignum2(&b, key->rsa->n); - break; - case KEY_ED25519: - buffer_put_cstring(&b, - key_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid)); - buffer_put_string(&b, key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ); - break; - default: - error("key_to_blob: unsupported key type %d", key->type); - buffer_free(&b); - return 0; - } - len = buffer_len(&b); + if (blen > INT_MAX) + fatal("%s: giant len %zu", __func__, blen); + if (blobp != NULL) + *blobp = blob; if (lenp != NULL) - *lenp = len; - if (blobp != NULL) { - *blobp = xmalloc(len); - memcpy(*blobp, buffer_ptr(&b), len); - } - explicit_bzero(buffer_ptr(&b), len); - buffer_free(&b); - return len; + *lenp = blen; + return blen; } int -key_to_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp) -{ - return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 0); -} - -int -key_sign( - const Key *key, - u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, +key_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, const u_char *data, u_int datalen) { - switch (key->type) { - case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_DSA_CERT: - case KEY_DSA: - return ssh_dss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen); -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: - case KEY_ECDSA: - return ssh_ecdsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen); -#endif - case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_RSA_CERT: - case KEY_RSA: - return ssh_rsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen); - case KEY_ED25519: - case KEY_ED25519_CERT: - return ssh_ed25519_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen); - default: - error("key_sign: invalid key type %d", key->type); + int r; + u_char *sig; + size_t siglen; + + if (sigp != NULL) + *sigp = NULL; + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &siglen, + data, datalen, datafellows)) != 0) { + fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0); + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return -1; } + if (siglen > INT_MAX) + fatal("%s: giant len %zu", __func__, siglen); + if (sigp != NULL) + *sigp = sig; + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = siglen; + return 0; } -/* - * key_verify returns 1 for a correct signature, 0 for an incorrect signature - * and -1 on error. - */ int -key_verify( - const Key *key, - const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen, +key_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen, const u_char *data, u_int datalen) { - if (signaturelen == 0) - return -1; + int r; - switch (key->type) { - case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_DSA_CERT: - case KEY_DSA: - return ssh_dss_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: - case KEY_ECDSA: - return ssh_ecdsa_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); -#endif - case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_RSA_CERT: - case KEY_RSA: - return ssh_rsa_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); - case KEY_ED25519: - case KEY_ED25519_CERT: - return ssh_ed25519_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); - default: - error("key_verify: invalid key type %d", key->type); - return -1; + if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, + data, datalen, datafellows)) != 0) { + fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0); + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return r == SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID ? 0 : -1; } + return 1; } -/* Converts a private to a public key */ Key * key_demote(const Key *k) { - Key *pk; + int r; + Key *ret = NULL; - pk = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*pk)); - pk->type = k->type; - pk->flags = k->flags; - pk->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid; - pk->dsa = NULL; - pk->ecdsa = NULL; - pk->rsa = NULL; - pk->ed25519_pk = NULL; - pk->ed25519_sk = NULL; - - switch (k->type) { - case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_RSA_CERT: - key_cert_copy(k, pk); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ - case KEY_RSA1: - case KEY_RSA: - if ((pk->rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) - fatal("key_demote: RSA_new failed"); - if ((pk->rsa->e = BN_dup(k->rsa->e)) == NULL) - fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed"); - if ((pk->rsa->n = BN_dup(k->rsa->n)) == NULL) - fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed"); - break; - case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_DSA_CERT: - key_cert_copy(k, pk); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ - case KEY_DSA: - if ((pk->dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL) - fatal("key_demote: DSA_new failed"); - if ((pk->dsa->p = BN_dup(k->dsa->p)) == NULL) - fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed"); - if ((pk->dsa->q = BN_dup(k->dsa->q)) == NULL) - fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed"); - if ((pk->dsa->g = BN_dup(k->dsa->g)) == NULL) - fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed"); - if ((pk->dsa->pub_key = BN_dup(k->dsa->pub_key)) == NULL) - fatal("key_demote: BN_dup failed"); - break; -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: - key_cert_copy(k, pk); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ - case KEY_ECDSA: - if ((pk->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(pk->ecdsa_nid)) == NULL) - fatal("key_demote: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed"); - if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(pk->ecdsa, - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 1) - fatal("key_demote: EC_KEY_set_public_key failed"); - break; -#endif - case KEY_ED25519_CERT: - key_cert_copy(k, pk); - /* FALLTHROUGH */ - case KEY_ED25519: - if (k->ed25519_pk != NULL) { - pk->ed25519_pk = xmalloc(ED25519_PK_SZ); - memcpy(pk->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ); - } - break; - default: - fatal("key_demote: bad key type %d", k->type); - break; - } - - return (pk); + if ((r = sshkey_demote(k, &ret)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return ret; } int -key_is_cert(const Key *k) -{ - if (k == NULL) - return 0; - return key_type_is_cert(k->type); -} - -/* Return the cert-less equivalent to a certified key type */ -int -key_type_plain(int type) -{ - switch (type) { - case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_RSA_CERT: - return KEY_RSA; - case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_DSA_CERT: - return KEY_DSA; - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: - return KEY_ECDSA; - case KEY_ED25519_CERT: - return KEY_ED25519; - default: - return type; - } -} - -/* Convert a plain key to their _CERT equivalent */ -int key_to_certified(Key *k, int legacy) { - switch (k->type) { - case KEY_RSA: - k->cert = cert_new(); - k->type = legacy ? KEY_RSA_CERT_V00 : KEY_RSA_CERT; - return 0; - case KEY_DSA: - k->cert = cert_new(); - k->type = legacy ? KEY_DSA_CERT_V00 : KEY_DSA_CERT; - return 0; - case KEY_ECDSA: - if (legacy) - fatal("%s: legacy ECDSA certificates are not supported", - __func__); - k->cert = cert_new(); - k->type = KEY_ECDSA_CERT; - return 0; - case KEY_ED25519: - if (legacy) - fatal("%s: legacy ED25519 certificates are not " - "supported", __func__); - k->cert = cert_new(); - k->type = KEY_ED25519_CERT; - return 0; - default: - error("%s: key has incorrect type %s", __func__, key_type(k)); + int r; + + if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(k, legacy)) != 0) { + fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0); + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return -1; } + return 0; } -/* Convert a certificate to its raw key equivalent */ int key_drop_cert(Key *k) { - if (!key_type_is_cert(k->type)) { - error("%s: key has incorrect type %s", __func__, key_type(k)); + int r; + + if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(k)) != 0) { + fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0); + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return -1; } - cert_free(k->cert); - k->cert = NULL; - k->type = key_type_plain(k->type); return 0; } -/* Sign a certified key, (re-)generating the signed certblob. */ int key_certify(Key *k, Key *ca) { - Buffer principals; - u_char *ca_blob, *sig_blob, nonce[32]; - u_int i, ca_len, sig_len; + int r; - if (k->cert == NULL) { - error("%s: key lacks cert info", __func__); + if ((r = sshkey_certify(k, ca)) != 0) { + fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0); + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return -1; } - - if (!key_is_cert(k)) { - error("%s: certificate has unknown type %d", __func__, - k->cert->type); - return -1; - } - - if (!key_type_is_valid_ca(ca->type)) { - error("%s: CA key has unsupported type %s", __func__, - key_type(ca)); - return -1; - } - - key_to_blob(ca, &ca_blob, &ca_len); - - buffer_clear(&k->cert->certblob); - buffer_put_cstring(&k->cert->certblob, key_ssh_name(k)); - - /* -v01 certs put nonce first */ - arc4random_buf(&nonce, sizeof(nonce)); - if (!key_cert_is_legacy(k)) - buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, nonce, sizeof(nonce)); - - /* XXX this substantially duplicates to_blob(); refactor */ - switch (k->type) { - case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_DSA_CERT: - buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->dsa->p); - buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->dsa->q); - buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->dsa->g); - buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->dsa->pub_key); - break; -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: - buffer_put_cstring(&k->cert->certblob, - key_curve_nid_to_name(k->ecdsa_nid)); - buffer_put_ecpoint(&k->cert->certblob, - EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa), - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)); - break; -#endif - case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_RSA_CERT: - buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->rsa->e); - buffer_put_bignum2(&k->cert->certblob, k->rsa->n); - break; - case KEY_ED25519_CERT: - buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, - k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ); - break; - default: - error("%s: key has incorrect type %s", __func__, key_type(k)); - buffer_clear(&k->cert->certblob); - free(ca_blob); - return -1; - } - - /* -v01 certs have a serial number next */ - if (!key_cert_is_legacy(k)) - buffer_put_int64(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->serial); - - buffer_put_int(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->type); - buffer_put_cstring(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->key_id); - - buffer_init(&principals); - for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) - buffer_put_cstring(&principals, k->cert->principals[i]); - buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, buffer_ptr(&principals), - buffer_len(&principals)); - buffer_free(&principals); - - buffer_put_int64(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->valid_after); - buffer_put_int64(&k->cert->certblob, k->cert->valid_before); - buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, - buffer_ptr(&k->cert->critical), buffer_len(&k->cert->critical)); - - /* -v01 certs have non-critical options here */ - if (!key_cert_is_legacy(k)) { - buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, - buffer_ptr(&k->cert->extensions), - buffer_len(&k->cert->extensions)); - } - - /* -v00 certs put the nonce at the end */ - if (key_cert_is_legacy(k)) - buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, nonce, sizeof(nonce)); - - buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, NULL, 0); /* reserved */ - buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, ca_blob, ca_len); - free(ca_blob); - - /* Sign the whole mess */ - if (key_sign(ca, &sig_blob, &sig_len, buffer_ptr(&k->cert->certblob), - buffer_len(&k->cert->certblob)) != 0) { - error("%s: signature operation failed", __func__); - buffer_clear(&k->cert->certblob); - return -1; - } - /* Append signature and we are done */ - buffer_put_string(&k->cert->certblob, sig_blob, sig_len); - free(sig_blob); - return 0; } int key_cert_check_authority(const Key *k, int want_host, int require_principal, const char *name, const char **reason) { - u_int i, principal_matches; - time_t now = time(NULL); + int r; - if (want_host) { - if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) { - *reason = "Certificate invalid: not a host certificate"; - return -1; - } - } else { - if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) { - *reason = "Certificate invalid: not a user certificate"; - return -1; - } - } - if (now < 0) { - error("%s: system clock lies before epoch", __func__); - *reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid"; + if ((r = sshkey_cert_check_authority(k, want_host, require_principal, + name, reason)) != 0) { + fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, 0); + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); return -1; } - if ((u_int64_t)now < k->cert->valid_after) { - *reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid"; - return -1; - } - if ((u_int64_t)now >= k->cert->valid_before) { - *reason = "Certificate invalid: expired"; - return -1; - } - if (k->cert->nprincipals == 0) { - if (require_principal) { - *reason = "Certificate lacks principal list"; - return -1; - } - } else if (name != NULL) { - principal_matches = 0; - for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) { - if (strcmp(name, k->cert->principals[i]) == 0) { - principal_matches = 1; - break; - } - } - if (!principal_matches) { - *reason = "Certificate invalid: name is not a listed " - "principal"; - return -1; - } - } return 0; } +#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) int -key_cert_is_legacy(const Key *k) +key_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *public) { - switch (k->type) { - case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: - return 1; - default: - return 0; + int r; + + if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, public)) != 0) { + fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return -1; } + return 0; } -/* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */ int -key_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name) +key_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *key) { -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - if (strcmp(name, "nistp256") == 0) - return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; - else if (strcmp(name, "nistp384") == 0) - return NID_secp384r1; -# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 - else if (strcmp(name, "nistp521") == 0) - return NID_secp521r1; -# endif -#endif + int r; - debug("%s: unsupported EC curve name \"%.100s\"", __func__, name); - return -1; + if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_private(key)) != 0) { + fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return -1; + } + return 0; } +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ -u_int -key_curve_nid_to_bits(int nid) +void +key_private_serialize(const Key *key, struct sshbuf *b) { - switch (nid) { -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: - return 256; - case NID_secp384r1: - return 384; -# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 - case NID_secp521r1: - return 521; -# endif -#endif - default: - error("%s: unsupported EC curve nid %d", __func__, nid); - return 0; - } + int r; + + if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, b)) != 0) + fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } -const char * -key_curve_nid_to_name(int nid) +Key * +key_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *blob) { -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - if (nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) - return "nistp256"; - else if (nid == NID_secp384r1) - return "nistp384"; -# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 - else if (nid == NID_secp521r1) - return "nistp521"; -# endif -#endif - error("%s: unsupported EC curve nid %d", __func__, nid); - return NULL; + int r; + Key *ret = NULL; + + if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(blob, &ret)) != 0) { + fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return NULL; + } + return ret; } -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC +/* authfile.c */ + int -key_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid) +key_save_private(Key *key, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, + const char *comment, int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, + int new_format_rounds) { - int kbits = key_curve_nid_to_bits(nid); + int r; - if (kbits == 0) - fatal("%s: invalid nid %d", __func__, nid); - /* RFC5656 section 6.2.1 */ - if (kbits <= 256) - return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256; - else if (kbits <= 384) - return SSH_DIGEST_SHA384; - else - return SSH_DIGEST_SHA512; + if ((r = sshkey_save_private(key, filename, passphrase, comment, + force_new_format, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds)) != 0) { + fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return 0; + } + return 1; } int -key_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *public) +key_load_file(int fd, const char *filename, struct sshbuf *blob) { - BN_CTX *bnctx; - EC_POINT *nq = NULL; - BIGNUM *order, *x, *y, *tmp; - int ret = -1; + int r; - if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new failed", __func__); - BN_CTX_start(bnctx); - - /* - * We shouldn't ever hit this case because bignum_get_ecpoint() - * refuses to load GF2m points. - */ - if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) != - NID_X9_62_prime_field) { - error("%s: group is not a prime field", __func__); - goto out; + if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, filename, blob)) != 0) { + fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return 0; } + return 1; +} - /* Q != infinity */ - if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, public)) { - error("%s: received degenerate public key (infinity)", - __func__); - goto out; +Key * +key_load_cert(const char *filename) +{ + int r; + Key *ret = NULL; + + if ((r = sshkey_load_cert(filename, &ret)) != 0) { + fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); + /* Old authfile.c ignored all file errors. */ + if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR) + debug("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + else + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return NULL; } + return ret; - if ((x = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || - (y = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || - (order = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || - (tmp = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL) - fatal("%s: BN_CTX_get failed", __func__); +} - /* log2(x) > log2(order)/2, log2(y) > log2(order)/2 */ - if (EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, bnctx) != 1) - fatal("%s: EC_GROUP_get_order failed", __func__); - if (EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, public, - x, y, bnctx) != 1) - fatal("%s: EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp", __func__); - if (BN_num_bits(x) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2) { - error("%s: public key x coordinate too small: " - "bits(x) = %d, bits(order)/2 = %d", __func__, - BN_num_bits(x), BN_num_bits(order) / 2); - goto out; - } - if (BN_num_bits(y) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2) { - error("%s: public key y coordinate too small: " - "bits(y) = %d, bits(order)/2 = %d", __func__, - BN_num_bits(x), BN_num_bits(order) / 2); - goto out; - } +Key * +key_load_public(const char *filename, char **commentp) +{ + int r; + Key *ret = NULL; - /* nQ == infinity (n == order of subgroup) */ - if ((nq = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) - fatal("%s: BN_CTX_tmp failed", __func__); - if (EC_POINT_mul(group, nq, NULL, public, order, bnctx) != 1) - fatal("%s: EC_GROUP_mul failed", __func__); - if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, nq) != 1) { - error("%s: received degenerate public key (nQ != infinity)", - __func__); - goto out; + if ((r = sshkey_load_public(filename, &ret, commentp)) != 0) { + fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); + /* Old authfile.c ignored all file errors. */ + if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR) + debug("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + else + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return NULL; } + return ret; +} - /* x < order - 1, y < order - 1 */ - if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one())) - fatal("%s: BN_sub failed", __func__); - if (BN_cmp(x, tmp) >= 0) { - error("%s: public key x coordinate >= group order - 1", - __func__); - goto out; +Key * +key_load_private(const char *path, const char *passphrase, + char **commentp) +{ + int r; + Key *ret = NULL; + + if ((r = sshkey_load_private(path, passphrase, &ret, commentp)) != 0) { + fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); + /* Old authfile.c ignored all file errors. */ + if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || + r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) + debug("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + else + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return NULL; } - if (BN_cmp(y, tmp) >= 0) { - error("%s: public key y coordinate >= group order - 1", - __func__); - goto out; - } - ret = 0; - out: - BN_CTX_free(bnctx); - EC_POINT_free(nq); return ret; } -int -key_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *key) +Key * +key_load_private_cert(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, + int *perm_ok) { - BN_CTX *bnctx; - BIGNUM *order, *tmp; - int ret = -1; + int r; + Key *ret = NULL; - if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new failed", __func__); - BN_CTX_start(bnctx); - - if ((order = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || - (tmp = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL) - fatal("%s: BN_CTX_get failed", __func__); - - /* log2(private) > log2(order)/2 */ - if (EC_GROUP_get_order(EC_KEY_get0_group(key), order, bnctx) != 1) - fatal("%s: EC_GROUP_get_order failed", __func__); - if (BN_num_bits(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) <= - BN_num_bits(order) / 2) { - error("%s: private key too small: " - "bits(y) = %d, bits(order)/2 = %d", __func__, - BN_num_bits(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)), - BN_num_bits(order) / 2); - goto out; + if ((r = sshkey_load_private_cert(type, filename, passphrase, + &ret, perm_ok)) != 0) { + fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); + /* Old authfile.c ignored all file errors. */ + if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || + r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) + debug("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + else + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return NULL; } - - /* private < order - 1 */ - if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one())) - fatal("%s: BN_sub failed", __func__); - if (BN_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key), tmp) >= 0) { - error("%s: private key >= group order - 1", __func__); - goto out; - } - ret = 0; - out: - BN_CTX_free(bnctx); return ret; } -#if defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) || defined(DEBUG_PK) -void -key_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point) +Key * +key_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase, + char **commentp, int *perm_ok) { - BIGNUM *x, *y; - BN_CTX *bnctx; + int r; + Key *ret = NULL; - if (point == NULL) { - fputs("point=(NULL)\n", stderr); - return; + if ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(type, filename, passphrase, + &ret, commentp, perm_ok)) != 0) { + fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); + /* Old authfile.c ignored all file errors. */ + if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || + (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)) + debug("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + else + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return NULL; } - if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: BN_CTX_new failed", __func__); - BN_CTX_start(bnctx); - if ((x = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || (y = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL) - fatal("%s: BN_CTX_get failed", __func__); - if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) != - NID_X9_62_prime_field) - fatal("%s: group is not a prime field", __func__); - if (EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, bnctx) != 1) - fatal("%s: EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp", __func__); - fputs("x=", stderr); - BN_print_fp(stderr, x); - fputs("\ny=", stderr); - BN_print_fp(stderr, y); - fputs("\n", stderr); - BN_CTX_free(bnctx); + return ret; } -void -key_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *key) +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +Key * +key_load_private_pem(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase, + char **commentp) { - const BIGNUM *exponent; + int r; + Key *ret = NULL; - key_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key)); - fputs("exponent=", stderr); - if ((exponent = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) == NULL) - fputs("(NULL)", stderr); - else - BN_print_fp(stderr, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)); - fputs("\n", stderr); + if ((r = sshkey_load_private_pem(fd, type, passphrase, + &ret, commentp)) != 0) { + fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); + if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) + debug("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + else + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return NULL; + } + return ret; } -#endif /* defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) || defined(DEBUG_PK) */ -#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ -void -key_private_serialize(const Key *key, Buffer *b) +int +key_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename) { - buffer_put_cstring(b, key_ssh_name(key)); - switch (key->type) { - case KEY_RSA: - buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n); - buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e); - buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d); - buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp); - buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p); - buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q); - break; - case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_RSA_CERT: - if (key->cert == NULL || buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob) == 0) - fatal("%s: no cert/certblob", __func__); - buffer_put_string(b, buffer_ptr(&key->cert->certblob), - buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob)); - buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d); - buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp); - buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p); - buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q); - break; - case KEY_DSA: - buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p); - buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q); - buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g); - buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key); - buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key); - break; - case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_DSA_CERT: - if (key->cert == NULL || buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob) == 0) - fatal("%s: no cert/certblob", __func__); - buffer_put_string(b, buffer_ptr(&key->cert->certblob), - buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob)); - buffer_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key); - break; -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - case KEY_ECDSA: - buffer_put_cstring(b, key_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid)); - buffer_put_ecpoint(b, EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key->ecdsa)); - buffer_put_bignum2(b, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa)); - break; - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: - if (key->cert == NULL || buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob) == 0) - fatal("%s: no cert/certblob", __func__); - buffer_put_string(b, buffer_ptr(&key->cert->certblob), - buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob)); - buffer_put_bignum2(b, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa)); - break; -#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ - case KEY_ED25519: - buffer_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ); - buffer_put_string(b, key->ed25519_sk, ED25519_SK_SZ); - break; - case KEY_ED25519_CERT: - if (key->cert == NULL || buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob) == 0) - fatal("%s: no cert/certblob", __func__); - buffer_put_string(b, buffer_ptr(&key->cert->certblob), - buffer_len(&key->cert->certblob)); - buffer_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ); - buffer_put_string(b, key->ed25519_sk, ED25519_SK_SZ); - break; - } + return sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) == 0 ? 1 : 0; } -Key * -key_private_deserialize(Buffer *blob) +int +key_in_file(Key *key, const char *filename, int strict_type) { - char *type_name; - Key *k = NULL; - u_char *cert; - u_int len, pklen, sklen; - int type; -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - char *curve; - BIGNUM *exponent; - EC_POINT *q; -#endif + int r; - type_name = buffer_get_string(blob, NULL); - type = key_type_from_name(type_name); - switch (type) { - case KEY_DSA: - k = key_new_private(type); - buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->dsa->p); - buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->dsa->q); - buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->dsa->g); - buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->dsa->pub_key); - buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->dsa->priv_key); - break; - case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_DSA_CERT: - cert = buffer_get_string(blob, &len); - if ((k = key_from_blob(cert, len)) == NULL) - fatal("Certificate parse failed"); - free(cert); - key_add_private(k); - buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->dsa->priv_key); - break; -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - case KEY_ECDSA: - k = key_new_private(type); - k->ecdsa_nid = key_ecdsa_nid_from_name(type_name); - curve = buffer_get_string(blob, NULL); - if (k->ecdsa_nid != key_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) - fatal("%s: curve names mismatch", __func__); - free(curve); - k->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid); - if (k->ecdsa == NULL) - fatal("%s: EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name failed", - __func__); - q = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa)); - if (q == NULL) - fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); - if ((exponent = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); - buffer_get_ecpoint(blob, - EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa), q); - buffer_get_bignum2(blob, exponent); - if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(k->ecdsa, q) != 1) - fatal("%s: EC_KEY_set_public_key failed", - __func__); - if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, exponent) != 1) - fatal("%s: EC_KEY_set_private_key failed", - __func__); - if (key_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa), - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 0) - fatal("%s: bad ECDSA public key", __func__); - if (key_ec_validate_private(k->ecdsa) != 0) - fatal("%s: bad ECDSA private key", __func__); - BN_clear_free(exponent); - EC_POINT_free(q); - break; - case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: - cert = buffer_get_string(blob, &len); - if ((k = key_from_blob(cert, len)) == NULL) - fatal("Certificate parse failed"); - free(cert); - key_add_private(k); - if ((exponent = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); - buffer_get_bignum2(blob, exponent); - if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, exponent) != 1) - fatal("%s: EC_KEY_set_private_key failed", - __func__); - if (key_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa), - EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 0 || - key_ec_validate_private(k->ecdsa) != 0) - fatal("%s: bad ECDSA key", __func__); - BN_clear_free(exponent); - break; -#endif - case KEY_RSA: - k = key_new_private(type); - buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->rsa->n); - buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->rsa->e); - buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->rsa->d); - buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->rsa->iqmp); - buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->rsa->p); - buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->rsa->q); - - /* Generate additional parameters */ - rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa); - break; - case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_RSA_CERT: - cert = buffer_get_string(blob, &len); - if ((k = key_from_blob(cert, len)) == NULL) - fatal("Certificate parse failed"); - free(cert); - key_add_private(k); - buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->rsa->d); - buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->rsa->iqmp); - buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->rsa->p); - buffer_get_bignum2(blob, k->rsa->q); - break; - case KEY_ED25519: - k = key_new_private(type); - k->ed25519_pk = buffer_get_string(blob, &pklen); - k->ed25519_sk = buffer_get_string(blob, &sklen); - if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ) - fatal("%s: ed25519 pklen %d != %d", - __func__, pklen, ED25519_PK_SZ); - if (sklen != ED25519_SK_SZ) - fatal("%s: ed25519 sklen %d != %d", - __func__, sklen, ED25519_SK_SZ); - break; - case KEY_ED25519_CERT: - cert = buffer_get_string(blob, &len); - if ((k = key_from_blob(cert, len)) == NULL) - fatal("Certificate parse failed"); - free(cert); - key_add_private(k); - k->ed25519_pk = buffer_get_string(blob, &pklen); - k->ed25519_sk = buffer_get_string(blob, &sklen); - if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ) - fatal("%s: ed25519 pklen %d != %d", - __func__, pklen, ED25519_PK_SZ); - if (sklen != ED25519_SK_SZ) - fatal("%s: ed25519 sklen %d != %d", - __func__, sklen, ED25519_SK_SZ); - break; - default: - free(type_name); - buffer_clear(blob); - return NULL; + if ((r = sshkey_in_file(key, filename, strict_type)) != 0) { + fatal_on_fatal_errors(r, __func__, SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR); + if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno == ENOENT) + return 0; + error("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); + return r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND ? 0 : -1; } - free(type_name); - - /* enable blinding */ - switch (k->type) { - case KEY_RSA: - case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: - case KEY_RSA_CERT: - case KEY_RSA1: - if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) { - error("%s: RSA_blinding_on failed", __func__); - key_free(k); - return NULL; - } - break; - } - return k; + return 1; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/key.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/key.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/key.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,166 +1,111 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.41 2014/01/09 23:20:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: key.h,v 1.42 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef KEY_H #define KEY_H -#include "buffer.h" -#include -#include -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC -#include -#endif +#include "sshkey.h" -typedef struct Key Key; -enum types { - KEY_RSA1, - KEY_RSA, - KEY_DSA, - KEY_ECDSA, - KEY_ED25519, - KEY_RSA_CERT, - KEY_DSA_CERT, - KEY_ECDSA_CERT, - KEY_ED25519_CERT, - KEY_RSA_CERT_V00, - KEY_DSA_CERT_V00, - KEY_UNSPEC -}; -enum fp_type { - SSH_FP_SHA1, - SSH_FP_MD5, - SSH_FP_SHA256 -}; -enum fp_rep { - SSH_FP_HEX, - SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE, - SSH_FP_RANDOMART -}; +typedef struct sshkey Key; -/* key is stored in external hardware */ -#define KEY_FLAG_EXT 0x0001 +#define types sshkey_types +#define fp_type sshkey_fp_type +#define fp_rep sshkey_fp_rep -#define CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS 256 -struct KeyCert { - Buffer certblob; /* Kept around for use on wire */ - u_int type; /* SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER or SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST */ - u_int64_t serial; - char *key_id; - u_int nprincipals; - char **principals; - u_int64_t valid_after, valid_before; - Buffer critical; - Buffer extensions; - Key *signature_key; -}; - -struct Key { - int type; - int flags; - RSA *rsa; - DSA *dsa; - int ecdsa_nid; /* NID of curve */ -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC - EC_KEY *ecdsa; -#else - void *ecdsa; +#ifndef SSH_KEY_NO_DEFINE +#define key_new sshkey_new +#define key_free sshkey_free +#define key_equal_public sshkey_equal_public +#define key_equal sshkey_equal +#define key_fingerprint sshkey_fingerprint +#define key_type sshkey_type +#define key_cert_type sshkey_cert_type +#define key_ssh_name sshkey_ssh_name +#define key_ssh_name_plain sshkey_ssh_name_plain +#define key_type_from_name sshkey_type_from_name +#define key_ecdsa_nid_from_name sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name +#define key_type_is_cert sshkey_type_is_cert +#define key_size sshkey_size +#define key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid +#define key_ecdsa_key_to_nid sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid +#define key_names_valid2 sshkey_names_valid2 +#define key_is_cert sshkey_is_cert +#define key_type_plain sshkey_type_plain +#define key_cert_is_legacy sshkey_cert_is_legacy +#define key_curve_name_to_nid sshkey_curve_name_to_nid +#define key_curve_nid_to_bits sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits +#define key_curve_nid_to_name sshkey_curve_nid_to_name +#define key_ec_nid_to_hash_alg sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg +#define key_dump_ec_point sshkey_dump_ec_point +#define key_dump_ec_key sshkey_dump_ec_key +#define key_fingerprint sshkey_fingerprint #endif - struct KeyCert *cert; - u_char *ed25519_sk; - u_char *ed25519_pk; -}; -#define ED25519_SK_SZ crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES -#define ED25519_PK_SZ crypto_sign_ed25519_PUBLICKEYBYTES +void key_add_private(Key *); +Key *key_new_private(int); +void key_free(Key *); +Key *key_demote(const Key *); +u_char *key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *); +int key_write(const Key *, FILE *); +int key_read(Key *, char **); -Key *key_new(int); -void key_add_private(Key *); -Key *key_new_private(int); -void key_free(Key *); -Key *key_demote(const Key *); -int key_equal_public(const Key *, const Key *); -int key_equal(const Key *, const Key *); -char *key_fingerprint(const Key *, enum fp_type, enum fp_rep); -u_char *key_fingerprint_raw(const Key *, enum fp_type, u_int *); -const char *key_type(const Key *); -const char *key_cert_type(const Key *); -int key_write(const Key *, FILE *); -int key_read(Key *, char **); -u_int key_size(const Key *); - Key *key_generate(int, u_int); Key *key_from_private(const Key *); -int key_type_from_name(char *); -int key_is_cert(const Key *); -int key_type_is_cert(int); -int key_type_plain(int); int key_to_certified(Key *, int); int key_drop_cert(Key *); int key_certify(Key *, Key *); -void key_cert_copy(const Key *, struct Key *); +void key_cert_copy(const Key *, Key *); int key_cert_check_authority(const Key *, int, int, const char *, const char **); -int key_cert_is_legacy(const Key *); +char *key_alg_list(int, int); -int key_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *); -int key_curve_name_to_nid(const char *); -const char *key_curve_nid_to_name(int); -u_int key_curve_nid_to_bits(int); -int key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int); -#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC -int key_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *); -int key_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid); -int key_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); -int key_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *); -#endif -char *key_alg_list(int, int); +#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) +int key_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); +int key_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *); +#endif /* defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) */ -Key *key_from_blob(const u_char *, u_int); -int key_to_blob(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *); -const char *key_ssh_name(const Key *); -const char *key_ssh_name_plain(const Key *); -int key_names_valid2(const char *); +Key *key_from_blob(const u_char *, u_int); +int key_to_blob(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *); int key_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int); int key_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); -int ssh_dss_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int); -int ssh_dss_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); -int ssh_ecdsa_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int); -int ssh_ecdsa_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); -int ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int); -int ssh_rsa_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); -int ssh_ed25519_sign(const Key *, u_char **, u_int *, const u_char *, u_int); -int ssh_ed25519_verify(const Key *, const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int); +void key_private_serialize(const Key *, struct sshbuf *); +Key *key_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *); -#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && (defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH) || defined(DEBUG_PK)) -void key_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); -void key_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *); -#endif - -void key_private_serialize(const Key *, Buffer *); -Key *key_private_deserialize(Buffer *); +/* authfile.c */ +int key_save_private(Key *, const char *, const char *, const char *, + int, const char *, int); +int key_load_file(int, const char *, struct sshbuf *); +Key *key_load_cert(const char *); +Key *key_load_public(const char *, char **); +Key *key_load_private(const char *, const char *, char **); +Key *key_load_private_cert(int, const char *, const char *, int *); +Key *key_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *, char **, int *); +Key *key_load_private_pem(int, int, const char *, char **); +int key_perm_ok(int, const char *); +int key_in_file(Key *, const char *, int); #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/krl.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/krl.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/krl.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,1237 +1,1240 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ -/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.14 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.17 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "buffer.h" #include "key.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "misc.h" #include "log.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "krl.h" /* #define DEBUG_KRL */ #ifdef DEBUG_KRL # define KRL_DBG(x) debug3 x #else # define KRL_DBG(x) #endif /* * Trees of revoked serial numbers, key IDs and keys. This allows * quick searching, querying and producing lists in canonical order. */ /* Tree of serial numbers. XXX make smarter: really need a real sparse bitmap */ struct revoked_serial { u_int64_t lo, hi; RB_ENTRY(revoked_serial) tree_entry; }; static int serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b); RB_HEAD(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial); RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial, tree_entry, serial_cmp); /* Tree of key IDs */ struct revoked_key_id { char *key_id; RB_ENTRY(revoked_key_id) tree_entry; }; static int key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b); RB_HEAD(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id); RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id, tree_entry, key_id_cmp); /* Tree of blobs (used for keys and fingerprints) */ struct revoked_blob { u_char *blob; u_int len; RB_ENTRY(revoked_blob) tree_entry; }; static int blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b); RB_HEAD(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob); RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob, tree_entry, blob_cmp); /* Tracks revoked certs for a single CA */ struct revoked_certs { Key *ca_key; struct revoked_serial_tree revoked_serials; struct revoked_key_id_tree revoked_key_ids; TAILQ_ENTRY(revoked_certs) entry; }; TAILQ_HEAD(revoked_certs_list, revoked_certs); struct ssh_krl { u_int64_t krl_version; u_int64_t generated_date; u_int64_t flags; char *comment; struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_keys; struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha1s; struct revoked_certs_list revoked_certs; }; /* Return equal if a and b overlap */ static int serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b) { if (a->hi >= b->lo && a->lo <= b->hi) return 0; return a->lo < b->lo ? -1 : 1; } static int key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b) { return strcmp(a->key_id, b->key_id); } static int blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b) { int r; if (a->len != b->len) { if ((r = memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, MIN(a->len, b->len))) != 0) return r; return a->len > b->len ? 1 : -1; } else return memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, a->len); } struct ssh_krl * ssh_krl_init(void) { struct ssh_krl *krl; if ((krl = calloc(1, sizeof(*krl))) == NULL) return NULL; RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_keys); RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha1s); TAILQ_INIT(&krl->revoked_certs); return krl; } static void revoked_certs_free(struct revoked_certs *rc) { struct revoked_serial *rs, *trs; struct revoked_key_id *rki, *trki; RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rs, revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, trs) { RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs); free(rs); } RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, trki) { RB_REMOVE(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki); free(rki->key_id); free(rki); } if (rc->ca_key != NULL) key_free(rc->ca_key); } void ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl) { struct revoked_blob *rb, *trb; struct revoked_certs *rc, *trc; if (krl == NULL) return; free(krl->comment); RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, trb) { RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, rb); free(rb->blob); free(rb); } RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, trb) { RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, rb); free(rb->blob); free(rb); } TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry, trc) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry); revoked_certs_free(rc); } } void ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version) { krl->krl_version = version; } void ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment) { free(krl->comment); if ((krl->comment = strdup(comment)) == NULL) fatal("%s: strdup", __func__); } /* * Find the revoked_certs struct for a CA key. If allow_create is set then * create a new one in the tree if one did not exist already. */ static int revoked_certs_for_ca_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key, struct revoked_certs **rcp, int allow_create) { struct revoked_certs *rc; *rcp = NULL; TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) { if (key_equal(rc->ca_key, ca_key)) { *rcp = rc; return 0; } } if (!allow_create) return 0; /* If this CA doesn't exist in the list then add it now */ if ((rc = calloc(1, sizeof(*rc))) == NULL) return -1; if ((rc->ca_key = key_from_private(ca_key)) == NULL) { free(rc); return -1; } RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_serials); RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_key_ids); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry); debug3("%s: new CA %s", __func__, key_type(ca_key)); *rcp = rc; return 0; } static int insert_serial_range(struct revoked_serial_tree *rt, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi) { struct revoked_serial rs, *ers, *crs, *irs; KRL_DBG(("%s: insert %llu:%llu", __func__, lo, hi)); memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs)); rs.lo = lo; rs.hi = hi; ers = RB_NFIND(revoked_serial_tree, rt, &rs); if (ers == NULL || serial_cmp(ers, &rs) != 0) { /* No entry matches. Just insert */ if ((irs = malloc(sizeof(rs))) == NULL) return -1; memcpy(irs, &rs, sizeof(*irs)); ers = RB_INSERT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, irs); if (ers != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: bad: ers != NULL", __func__)); /* Shouldn't happen */ free(irs); return -1; } ers = irs; } else { KRL_DBG(("%s: overlap found %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi)); /* * The inserted entry overlaps an existing one. Grow the * existing entry. */ if (ers->lo > lo) ers->lo = lo; if (ers->hi < hi) ers->hi = hi; } /* * The inserted or revised range might overlap or abut adjacent ones; * coalesce as necessary. */ /* Check predecessors */ while ((crs = RB_PREV(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: pred %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi)); if (ers->lo != 0 && crs->hi < ers->lo - 1) break; /* This entry overlaps. */ if (crs->lo < ers->lo) { ers->lo = crs->lo; KRL_DBG(("%s: pred extend %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi)); } RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs); free(crs); } /* Check successors */ while ((crs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: succ %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi)); if (ers->hi != (u_int64_t)-1 && crs->lo > ers->hi + 1) break; /* This entry overlaps. */ if (crs->hi > ers->hi) { ers->hi = crs->hi; KRL_DBG(("%s: succ extend %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi)); } RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs); free(crs); } KRL_DBG(("%s: done, final %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi)); return 0; } int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key, u_int64_t serial) { return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key, serial, serial); } int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi) { struct revoked_certs *rc; if (lo > hi || lo == 0) return -1; if (revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1) != 0) return -1; return insert_serial_range(&rc->revoked_serials, lo, hi); } int ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *ca_key, const char *key_id) { struct revoked_key_id *rki, *erki; struct revoked_certs *rc; if (revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1) != 0) return -1; debug3("%s: revoke %s", __func__, key_id); if ((rki = calloc(1, sizeof(*rki))) == NULL || (rki->key_id = strdup(key_id)) == NULL) { free(rki); fatal("%s: strdup", __func__); } erki = RB_INSERT(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki); if (erki != NULL) { free(rki->key_id); free(rki); } return 0; } /* Convert "key" to a public key blob without any certificate information */ static int plain_key_blob(const Key *key, u_char **blob, u_int *blen) { Key *kcopy; int r; if ((kcopy = key_from_private(key)) == NULL) return -1; if (key_is_cert(kcopy)) { if (key_drop_cert(kcopy) != 0) { error("%s: key_drop_cert", __func__); key_free(kcopy); return -1; } } r = key_to_blob(kcopy, blob, blen); free(kcopy); - return r == 0 ? -1 : 0; + return r; } /* Revoke a key blob. Ownership of blob is transferred to the tree */ static int revoke_blob(struct revoked_blob_tree *rbt, u_char *blob, u_int len) { struct revoked_blob *rb, *erb; if ((rb = calloc(1, sizeof(*rb))) == NULL) return -1; rb->blob = blob; rb->len = len; erb = RB_INSERT(revoked_blob_tree, rbt, rb); if (erb != NULL) { free(rb->blob); free(rb); } return 0; } int ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key) { u_char *blob; u_int len; debug3("%s: revoke type %s", __func__, key_type(key)); - if (plain_key_blob(key, &blob, &len) != 0) + if (plain_key_blob(key, &blob, &len) < 0) return -1; return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_keys, blob, len); } int ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key) { u_char *blob; u_int len; debug3("%s: revoke type %s by sha1", __func__, key_type(key)); if ((blob = key_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_FP_SHA1, &len)) == NULL) return -1; return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_sha1s, blob, len); } int ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key) { if (!key_is_cert(key)) return ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, key); if (key_cert_is_legacy(key) || key->cert->serial == 0) { return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, key->cert->signature_key, key->cert->key_id); } else { return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, key->cert->signature_key, key->cert->serial); } } /* * Select a copact next section type to emit in a KRL based on the * current section type, the run length of contiguous revoked serial * numbers and the gaps from the last and to the next revoked serial. * Applies a mostly-accurate bit cost model to select the section type * that will minimise the size of the resultant KRL. */ static int choose_next_state(int current_state, u_int64_t contig, int final, u_int64_t last_gap, u_int64_t next_gap, int *force_new_section) { int new_state; u_int64_t cost, cost_list, cost_range, cost_bitmap, cost_bitmap_restart; /* * Avoid unsigned overflows. * The limits are high enough to avoid confusing the calculations. */ contig = MIN(contig, 1ULL<<31); last_gap = MIN(last_gap, 1ULL<<31); next_gap = MIN(next_gap, 1ULL<<31); /* * Calculate the cost to switch from the current state to candidates. * NB. range sections only ever contain a single range, so their * switching cost is independent of the current_state. */ cost_list = cost_bitmap = cost_bitmap_restart = 0; cost_range = 8; switch (current_state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64; break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: cost_list = 8; cost_bitmap_restart = 8 + 64; break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: case 0: cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64; cost_list = 8; } /* Estimate base cost in bits of each section type */ cost_list += 64 * contig + (final ? 0 : 8+64); cost_range += (2 * 64) + (final ? 0 : 8+64); cost_bitmap += last_gap + contig + (final ? 0 : MIN(next_gap, 8+64)); cost_bitmap_restart += contig + (final ? 0 : MIN(next_gap, 8+64)); /* Convert to byte costs for actual comparison */ cost_list = (cost_list + 7) / 8; cost_bitmap = (cost_bitmap + 7) / 8; cost_bitmap_restart = (cost_bitmap_restart + 7) / 8; cost_range = (cost_range + 7) / 8; /* Now pick the best choice */ *force_new_section = 0; new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP; cost = cost_bitmap; if (cost_range < cost) { new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE; cost = cost_range; } if (cost_list < cost) { new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST; cost = cost_list; } if (cost_bitmap_restart < cost) { new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP; *force_new_section = 1; cost = cost_bitmap_restart; } debug3("%s: contig %llu last_gap %llu next_gap %llu final %d, costs:" "list %llu range %llu bitmap %llu new bitmap %llu, " "selected 0x%02x%s", __func__, (long long unsigned)contig, (long long unsigned)last_gap, (long long unsigned)next_gap, final, (long long unsigned)cost_list, (long long unsigned)cost_range, (long long unsigned)cost_bitmap, (long long unsigned)cost_bitmap_restart, new_state, *force_new_section ? " restart" : ""); return new_state; } /* Generate a KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES KRL section */ static int revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, Buffer *buf) { int final, force_new_sect, r = -1; u_int64_t i, contig, gap, last = 0, bitmap_start = 0; struct revoked_serial *rs, *nrs; struct revoked_key_id *rki; int next_state, state = 0; Buffer sect; u_char *kblob = NULL; u_int klen; BIGNUM *bitmap = NULL; /* Prepare CA scope key blob if we have one supplied */ if (key_to_blob(rc->ca_key, &kblob, &klen) == 0) return -1; buffer_init(§); /* Store the header */ buffer_put_string(buf, kblob, klen); buffer_put_string(buf, NULL, 0); /* Reserved */ free(kblob); /* Store the revoked serials. */ for (rs = RB_MIN(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials); rs != NULL; rs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs)) { debug3("%s: serial %llu:%llu state 0x%02x", __func__, (long long unsigned)rs->lo, (long long unsigned)rs->hi, state); /* Check contiguous length and gap to next section (if any) */ nrs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs); final = nrs == NULL; gap = nrs == NULL ? 0 : nrs->lo - rs->hi; contig = 1 + (rs->hi - rs->lo); /* Choose next state based on these */ next_state = choose_next_state(state, contig, final, state == 0 ? 0 : rs->lo - last, gap, &force_new_sect); /* * If the current section is a range section or has a different * type to the next section, then finish it off now. */ if (state != 0 && (force_new_sect || next_state != state || state == KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE)) { debug3("%s: finish state 0x%02x", __func__, state); switch (state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: buffer_put_bignum2(§, bitmap); BN_free(bitmap); bitmap = NULL; break; } buffer_put_char(buf, state); buffer_put_string(buf, buffer_ptr(§), buffer_len(§)); + buffer_clear(§); } /* If we are starting a new section then prepare it now */ if (next_state != state || force_new_sect) { debug3("%s: start state 0x%02x", __func__, next_state); state = next_state; buffer_clear(§); switch (state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: if ((bitmap = BN_new()) == NULL) goto out; bitmap_start = rs->lo; buffer_put_int64(§, bitmap_start); break; } } /* Perform section-specific processing */ switch (state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) buffer_put_int64(§, rs->lo + i); break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: buffer_put_int64(§, rs->lo); buffer_put_int64(§, rs->hi); break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: if (rs->lo - bitmap_start > INT_MAX) { error("%s: insane bitmap gap", __func__); goto out; } for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) { if (BN_set_bit(bitmap, rs->lo + i - bitmap_start) != 1) goto out; } break; } last = rs->hi; } /* Flush the remaining section, if any */ if (state != 0) { debug3("%s: serial final flush for state 0x%02x", __func__, state); switch (state) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: buffer_put_bignum2(§, bitmap); BN_free(bitmap); bitmap = NULL; break; } buffer_put_char(buf, state); buffer_put_string(buf, buffer_ptr(§), buffer_len(§)); } debug3("%s: serial done ", __func__); /* Now output a section for any revocations by key ID */ buffer_clear(§); RB_FOREACH(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids) { debug3("%s: key ID %s", __func__, rki->key_id); buffer_put_cstring(§, rki->key_id); } if (buffer_len(§) != 0) { buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID); buffer_put_string(buf, buffer_ptr(§), buffer_len(§)); } r = 0; out: if (bitmap != NULL) BN_free(bitmap); buffer_free(§); return r; } int ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, Buffer *buf, const Key **sign_keys, u_int nsign_keys) { int r = -1; struct revoked_certs *rc; struct revoked_blob *rb; Buffer sect; u_char *kblob = NULL, *sblob = NULL; u_int klen, slen, i; if (krl->generated_date == 0) krl->generated_date = time(NULL); buffer_init(§); /* Store the header */ buffer_append(buf, KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1); buffer_put_int(buf, KRL_FORMAT_VERSION); buffer_put_int64(buf, krl->krl_version); buffer_put_int64(buf, krl->generated_date); buffer_put_int64(buf, krl->flags); buffer_put_string(buf, NULL, 0); buffer_put_cstring(buf, krl->comment ? krl->comment : ""); /* Store sections for revoked certificates */ TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) { if (revoked_certs_generate(rc, §) != 0) goto out; buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES); buffer_put_string(buf, buffer_ptr(§), buffer_len(§)); } /* Finally, output sections for revocations by public key/hash */ buffer_clear(§); RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys) { debug3("%s: key len %u ", __func__, rb->len); buffer_put_string(§, rb->blob, rb->len); } if (buffer_len(§) != 0) { buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY); buffer_put_string(buf, buffer_ptr(§), buffer_len(§)); } buffer_clear(§); RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s) { debug3("%s: hash len %u ", __func__, rb->len); buffer_put_string(§, rb->blob, rb->len); } if (buffer_len(§) != 0) { buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1); buffer_put_string(buf, buffer_ptr(§), buffer_len(§)); } for (i = 0; i < nsign_keys; i++) { if (key_to_blob(sign_keys[i], &kblob, &klen) == 0) goto out; debug3("%s: signature key len %u", __func__, klen); buffer_put_char(buf, KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE); buffer_put_string(buf, kblob, klen); if (key_sign(sign_keys[i], &sblob, &slen, buffer_ptr(buf), buffer_len(buf)) == -1) goto out; debug3("%s: signature sig len %u", __func__, slen); buffer_put_string(buf, sblob, slen); } r = 0; out: free(kblob); free(sblob); buffer_free(§); return r; } static void format_timestamp(u_int64_t timestamp, char *ts, size_t nts) { time_t t; struct tm *tm; t = timestamp; tm = localtime(&t); *ts = '\0'; strftime(ts, nts, "%Y%m%dT%H%M%S", tm); } static int parse_revoked_certs(Buffer *buf, struct ssh_krl *krl) { int ret = -1, nbits; - u_char type, *blob; + u_char type; + const u_char *blob; u_int blen; Buffer subsect; u_int64_t serial, serial_lo, serial_hi; BIGNUM *bitmap = NULL; char *key_id = NULL; Key *ca_key = NULL; buffer_init(&subsect); if ((blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(buf, &blen)) == NULL || buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(buf, NULL) == NULL) { /* reserved */ error("%s: buffer error", __func__); goto out; } if ((ca_key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL) goto out; while (buffer_len(buf) > 0) { if (buffer_get_char_ret(&type, buf) != 0 || (blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(buf, &blen)) == NULL) { error("%s: buffer error", __func__); goto out; } buffer_clear(&subsect); buffer_append(&subsect, blob, blen); debug3("%s: subsection type 0x%02x", __func__, type); /* buffer_dump(&subsect); */ switch (type) { case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST: while (buffer_len(&subsect) > 0) { if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&serial, &subsect) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error", __func__); goto out; } if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, ca_key, serial) != 0) { error("%s: update failed", __func__); goto out; } } break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE: if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&serial_lo, &subsect) != 0 || buffer_get_int64_ret(&serial_hi, &subsect) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error", __func__); goto out; } if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key, serial_lo, serial_hi) != 0) { error("%s: update failed", __func__); goto out; } break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP: if ((bitmap = BN_new()) == NULL) { error("%s: BN_new", __func__); goto out; } if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&serial_lo, &subsect) != 0 || buffer_get_bignum2_ret(&subsect, bitmap) != 0) { error("%s: buffer error", __func__); goto out; } if ((nbits = BN_num_bits(bitmap)) < 0) { error("%s: bitmap bits < 0", __func__); goto out; } for (serial = 0; serial < (u_int)nbits; serial++) { if (serial > 0 && serial_lo + serial == 0) { error("%s: bitmap wraps u64", __func__); goto out; } if (!BN_is_bit_set(bitmap, serial)) continue; if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl, ca_key, serial_lo + serial) != 0) { error("%s: update failed", __func__); goto out; } } BN_free(bitmap); bitmap = NULL; break; case KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID: while (buffer_len(&subsect) > 0) { if ((key_id = buffer_get_cstring_ret(&subsect, NULL)) == NULL) { error("%s: buffer error", __func__); goto out; } if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca_key, key_id) != 0) { error("%s: update failed", __func__); goto out; } free(key_id); key_id = NULL; } break; default: error("Unsupported KRL certificate section %u", type); goto out; } if (buffer_len(&subsect) > 0) { error("KRL certificate section contains unparsed data"); goto out; } } ret = 0; out: if (ca_key != NULL) key_free(ca_key); if (bitmap != NULL) BN_free(bitmap); free(key_id); buffer_free(&subsect); return ret; } /* Attempt to parse a KRL, checking its signature (if any) with sign_ca_keys. */ int ssh_krl_from_blob(Buffer *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp, const Key **sign_ca_keys, u_int nsign_ca_keys) { Buffer copy, sect; struct ssh_krl *krl; char timestamp[64]; int ret = -1, r, sig_seen; Key *key = NULL, **ca_used = NULL; - u_char type, *blob, *rdata = NULL; + u_char type, *rdata = NULL; + const u_char *blob; u_int i, j, sig_off, sects_off, rlen, blen, format_version, nca_used; nca_used = 0; *krlp = NULL; if (buffer_len(buf) < sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1 || memcmp(buffer_ptr(buf), KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) { debug3("%s: not a KRL", __func__); /* * Return success but a NULL *krlp here to signal that the * file might be a simple list of keys. */ return 0; } /* Take a copy of the KRL buffer so we can verify its signature later */ buffer_init(©); buffer_append(©, buffer_ptr(buf), buffer_len(buf)); buffer_init(§); buffer_consume(©, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1); if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) { error("%s: alloc failed", __func__); goto out; } if (buffer_get_int_ret(&format_version, ©) != 0) { error("%s: KRL truncated", __func__); goto out; } if (format_version != KRL_FORMAT_VERSION) { error("%s: KRL unsupported format version %u", __func__, format_version); goto out; } if (buffer_get_int64_ret(&krl->krl_version, ©) != 0 || buffer_get_int64_ret(&krl->generated_date, ©) != 0 || buffer_get_int64_ret(&krl->flags, ©) != 0 || buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(©, NULL) == NULL || /* reserved */ (krl->comment = buffer_get_cstring_ret(©, NULL)) == NULL) { error("%s: buffer error", __func__); goto out; } format_timestamp(krl->generated_date, timestamp, sizeof(timestamp)); debug("KRL version %llu generated at %s%s%s", (long long unsigned)krl->krl_version, timestamp, *krl->comment ? ": " : "", krl->comment); /* * 1st pass: verify signatures, if any. This is done to avoid * detailed parsing of data whose provenance is unverified. */ sig_seen = 0; sects_off = buffer_len(buf) - buffer_len(©); while (buffer_len(©) > 0) { if (buffer_get_char_ret(&type, ©) != 0 || (blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(©, &blen)) == NULL) { error("%s: buffer error", __func__); goto out; } debug3("%s: first pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type); if (type != KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE) { if (sig_seen) { error("KRL contains non-signature section " "after signature"); goto out; } /* Not interested for now. */ continue; } sig_seen = 1; /* First string component is the signing key */ if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL) { error("%s: invalid signature key", __func__); goto out; } sig_off = buffer_len(buf) - buffer_len(©); /* Second string component is the signature itself */ if ((blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(©, &blen)) == NULL) { error("%s: buffer error", __func__); goto out; } /* Check signature over entire KRL up to this point */ if (key_verify(key, blob, blen, buffer_ptr(buf), buffer_len(buf) - sig_off) != 1) { error("bad signaure on KRL"); goto out; } /* Check if this key has already signed this KRL */ for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) { if (key_equal(ca_used[i], key)) { error("KRL signed more than once with " "the same key"); goto out; } } /* Record keys used to sign the KRL */ ca_used = xrealloc(ca_used, nca_used + 1, sizeof(*ca_used)); ca_used[nca_used++] = key; key = NULL; break; } /* * 2nd pass: parse and load the KRL, skipping the header to the point * where the section start. */ buffer_append(©, (u_char*)buffer_ptr(buf) + sects_off, buffer_len(buf) - sects_off); while (buffer_len(©) > 0) { if (buffer_get_char_ret(&type, ©) != 0 || (blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(©, &blen)) == NULL) { error("%s: buffer error", __func__); goto out; } debug3("%s: second pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type); buffer_clear(§); buffer_append(§, blob, blen); switch (type) { case KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES: if ((r = parse_revoked_certs(§, krl)) != 0) goto out; break; case KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY: case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1: while (buffer_len(§) > 0) { if ((rdata = buffer_get_string_ret(§, &rlen)) == NULL) { error("%s: buffer error", __func__); goto out; } if (type == KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1 && rlen != 20) { error("%s: bad SHA1 length", __func__); goto out; } if (revoke_blob( type == KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY ? &krl->revoked_keys : &krl->revoked_sha1s, rdata, rlen) != 0) goto out; rdata = NULL; /* revoke_blob frees blob */ } break; case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE: /* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */ buffer_clear(§); if ((blob = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(©, &blen)) == NULL) { error("%s: buffer error", __func__); goto out; } break; default: error("Unsupported KRL section %u", type); goto out; } if (buffer_len(§) > 0) { error("KRL section contains unparsed data"); goto out; } } /* Check that the key(s) used to sign the KRL weren't revoked */ sig_seen = 0; for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) { if (ssh_krl_check_key(krl, ca_used[i]) == 0) sig_seen = 1; else { key_free(ca_used[i]); ca_used[i] = NULL; } } if (nca_used && !sig_seen) { error("All keys used to sign KRL were revoked"); goto out; } /* If we have CA keys, then verify that one was used to sign the KRL */ if (sig_seen && nsign_ca_keys != 0) { sig_seen = 0; for (i = 0; !sig_seen && i < nsign_ca_keys; i++) { for (j = 0; j < nca_used; j++) { if (ca_used[j] == NULL) continue; if (key_equal(ca_used[j], sign_ca_keys[i])) { sig_seen = 1; break; } } } if (!sig_seen) { error("KRL not signed with any trusted key"); goto out; } } *krlp = krl; ret = 0; out: if (ret != 0) ssh_krl_free(krl); for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) { if (ca_used[i] != NULL) key_free(ca_used[i]); } free(ca_used); free(rdata); if (key != NULL) key_free(key); buffer_free(©); buffer_free(§); return ret; } /* Checks whether a given key/cert is revoked. Does not check its CA */ static int is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key) { struct revoked_blob rb, *erb; struct revoked_serial rs, *ers; struct revoked_key_id rki, *erki; struct revoked_certs *rc; /* Check explicitly revoked hashes first */ memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb)); if ((rb.blob = key_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_FP_SHA1, &rb.len)) == NULL) return -1; erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb); free(rb.blob); if (erb != NULL) { debug("%s: revoked by key SHA1", __func__); return -1; } /* Next, explicit keys */ memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb)); - if (plain_key_blob(key, &rb.blob, &rb.len) != 0) + if (plain_key_blob(key, &rb.blob, &rb.len) < 0) return -1; erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb); free(rb.blob); if (erb != NULL) { debug("%s: revoked by explicit key", __func__); return -1; } if (!key_is_cert(key)) return 0; /* Check cert revocation */ if (revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, key->cert->signature_key, &rc, 0) != 0) return -1; if (rc == NULL) return 0; /* No entry for this CA */ /* Check revocation by cert key ID */ memset(&rki, 0, sizeof(rki)); rki.key_id = key->cert->key_id; erki = RB_FIND(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, &rki); if (erki != NULL) { debug("%s: revoked by key ID", __func__); return -1; } /* * Legacy cert formats lack serial numbers. Zero serials numbers * are ignored (it's the default when the CA doesn't specify one). */ if (key_cert_is_legacy(key) || key->cert->serial == 0) return 0; memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs)); rs.lo = rs.hi = key->cert->serial; ers = RB_FIND(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, &rs); if (ers != NULL) { KRL_DBG(("%s: %llu matched %llu:%llu", __func__, key->cert->serial, ers->lo, ers->hi)); debug("%s: revoked by serial", __func__); return -1; } KRL_DBG(("%s: %llu no match", __func__, key->cert->serial)); return 0; } int ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const Key *key) { int r; debug2("%s: checking key", __func__); if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key)) != 0) return r; if (key_is_cert(key)) { debug2("%s: checking CA key", __func__); if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key->cert->signature_key)) != 0) return r; } debug3("%s: key okay", __func__); return 0; } /* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error or key revoked, -2 if path is not a KRL */ int ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const Key *key) { Buffer krlbuf; struct ssh_krl *krl; int revoked, fd; if (path == NULL) return 0; if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1) { error("open %s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); error("Revoked keys file not accessible - refusing public key " "authentication"); return -1; } buffer_init(&krlbuf); if (!key_load_file(fd, path, &krlbuf)) { close(fd); buffer_free(&krlbuf); error("Revoked keys file not readable - refusing public key " "authentication"); return -1; } close(fd); if (ssh_krl_from_blob(&krlbuf, &krl, NULL, 0) != 0) { buffer_free(&krlbuf); error("Invalid KRL, refusing public key " "authentication"); return -1; } buffer_free(&krlbuf); if (krl == NULL) { debug3("%s: %s is not a KRL file", __func__, path); return -2; } debug2("%s: checking KRL %s", __func__, path); revoked = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key) != 0; ssh_krl_free(krl); return revoked ? -1 : 0; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/mac.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/mac.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/mac.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,246 +1,247 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.28 2014/02/07 06:55:54 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: mac.c,v 1.30 2014/04/30 19:07:48 naddy Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "key.h" #include "kex.h" #include "mac.h" #include "misc.h" #include "digest.h" #include "hmac.h" #include "umac.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #define SSH_DIGEST 1 /* SSH_DIGEST_XXX */ #define SSH_UMAC 2 /* UMAC (not integrated with OpenSSL) */ #define SSH_UMAC128 3 struct macalg { char *name; int type; int alg; int truncatebits; /* truncate digest if != 0 */ int key_len; /* just for UMAC */ int len; /* just for UMAC */ int etm; /* Encrypt-then-MAC */ }; static const struct macalg macs[] = { /* Encrypt-and-MAC (encrypt-and-authenticate) variants */ { "hmac-sha1", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, { "hmac-sha1-96", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 96, 0, 0, 0 }, #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 { "hmac-sha2-256", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, { "hmac-sha2-512", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, #endif { "hmac-md5", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, { "hmac-md5-96", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 96, 0, 0, 0 }, { "hmac-ripemd160", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, { "hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160, 0, 0, 0, 0 }, { "umac-64@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC, 0, 0, 128, 64, 0 }, { "umac-128@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 0 }, /* Encrypt-then-MAC variants */ { "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, { "hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, 96, 0, 0, 1 }, #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 { "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, { "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, #endif { "hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, { "hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_MD5, 96, 0, 0, 1 }, { "hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com", SSH_DIGEST, SSH_DIGEST_RIPEMD160, 0, 0, 0, 1 }, { "umac-64-etm@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC, 0, 0, 128, 64, 1 }, { "umac-128-etm@openssh.com", SSH_UMAC128, 0, 0, 128, 128, 1 }, { NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 } }; /* Returns a list of supported MACs separated by the specified char. */ char * mac_alg_list(char sep) { char *ret = NULL; size_t nlen, rlen = 0; const struct macalg *m; for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) { if (ret != NULL) ret[rlen++] = sep; nlen = strlen(m->name); ret = xrealloc(ret, 1, rlen + nlen + 2); memcpy(ret + rlen, m->name, nlen + 1); rlen += nlen; } return ret; } static void mac_setup_by_alg(Mac *mac, const struct macalg *macalg) { mac->type = macalg->type; if (mac->type == SSH_DIGEST) { if ((mac->hmac_ctx = ssh_hmac_start(macalg->alg)) == NULL) fatal("ssh_hmac_start(alg=%d) failed", macalg->alg); mac->key_len = mac->mac_len = ssh_hmac_bytes(macalg->alg); } else { mac->mac_len = macalg->len / 8; mac->key_len = macalg->key_len / 8; mac->umac_ctx = NULL; } if (macalg->truncatebits != 0) mac->mac_len = macalg->truncatebits / 8; mac->etm = macalg->etm; } int mac_setup(Mac *mac, char *name) { const struct macalg *m; for (m = macs; m->name != NULL; m++) { if (strcmp(name, m->name) != 0) continue; if (mac != NULL) { mac_setup_by_alg(mac, m); debug2("mac_setup: setup %s", name); } return (0); } debug2("mac_setup: unknown %s", name); return (-1); } int mac_init(Mac *mac) { if (mac->key == NULL) fatal("%s: no key", __func__); switch (mac->type) { case SSH_DIGEST: if (mac->hmac_ctx == NULL || ssh_hmac_init(mac->hmac_ctx, mac->key, mac->key_len) < 0) return -1; return 0; case SSH_UMAC: mac->umac_ctx = umac_new(mac->key); return 0; case SSH_UMAC128: mac->umac_ctx = umac128_new(mac->key); return 0; default: return -1; } } u_char * mac_compute(Mac *mac, u_int32_t seqno, u_char *data, int datalen) { static union { u_char m[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; u_int64_t for_align; } u; - u_char b[4], nonce[8]; + u_char b[4]; + u_char nonce[8]; if (mac->mac_len > sizeof(u)) fatal("mac_compute: mac too long %u %zu", mac->mac_len, sizeof(u)); switch (mac->type) { case SSH_DIGEST: put_u32(b, seqno); /* reset HMAC context */ if (ssh_hmac_init(mac->hmac_ctx, NULL, 0) < 0 || ssh_hmac_update(mac->hmac_ctx, b, sizeof(b)) < 0 || ssh_hmac_update(mac->hmac_ctx, data, datalen) < 0 || ssh_hmac_final(mac->hmac_ctx, u.m, sizeof(u.m)) < 0) fatal("ssh_hmac failed"); break; case SSH_UMAC: put_u64(nonce, seqno); umac_update(mac->umac_ctx, data, datalen); umac_final(mac->umac_ctx, u.m, nonce); break; case SSH_UMAC128: put_u64(nonce, seqno); umac128_update(mac->umac_ctx, data, datalen); umac128_final(mac->umac_ctx, u.m, nonce); break; default: fatal("mac_compute: unknown MAC type"); } return (u.m); } void mac_clear(Mac *mac) { if (mac->type == SSH_UMAC) { if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL) umac_delete(mac->umac_ctx); } else if (mac->type == SSH_UMAC128) { if (mac->umac_ctx != NULL) umac128_delete(mac->umac_ctx); } else if (mac->hmac_ctx != NULL) ssh_hmac_free(mac->hmac_ctx); mac->hmac_ctx = NULL; mac->umac_ctx = NULL; } /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */ #define MAC_SEP "," int mac_valid(const char *names) { char *maclist, *cp, *p; if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0) return (0); maclist = cp = xstrdup(names); for ((p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP)); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, MAC_SEP))) { if (mac_setup(NULL, p) < 0) { debug("bad mac %s [%s]", p, names); free(maclist); return (0); } } debug3("macs ok: [%s]", names); free(maclist); return (1); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/misc.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/misc.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/misc.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,1038 +1,1117 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.92 2013/10/14 23:28:23 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.94 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #include #endif #ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD #include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "misc.h" #include "log.h" #include "ssh.h" /* remove newline at end of string */ char * chop(char *s) { char *t = s; while (*t) { if (*t == '\n' || *t == '\r') { *t = '\0'; return s; } t++; } return s; } /* set/unset filedescriptor to non-blocking */ int set_nonblock(int fd) { int val; val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0); if (val < 0) { error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL, 0): %s", fd, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } if (val & O_NONBLOCK) { debug3("fd %d is O_NONBLOCK", fd); return (0); } debug2("fd %d setting O_NONBLOCK", fd); val |= O_NONBLOCK; if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) { debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK): %s", fd, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } return (0); } int unset_nonblock(int fd) { int val; val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0); if (val < 0) { error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL, 0): %s", fd, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } if (!(val & O_NONBLOCK)) { debug3("fd %d is not O_NONBLOCK", fd); return (0); } debug("fd %d clearing O_NONBLOCK", fd); val &= ~O_NONBLOCK; if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) { debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, ~O_NONBLOCK): %s", fd, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } return (0); } const char * ssh_gai_strerror(int gaierr) { if (gaierr == EAI_SYSTEM && errno != 0) return strerror(errno); return gai_strerror(gaierr); } /* disable nagle on socket */ void set_nodelay(int fd) { int opt; socklen_t optlen; optlen = sizeof opt; if (getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, &optlen) == -1) { debug("getsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno)); return; } if (opt == 1) { debug2("fd %d is TCP_NODELAY", fd); return; } opt = 1; debug2("fd %d setting TCP_NODELAY", fd); if (setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, sizeof opt) == -1) error("setsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno)); } /* Characters considered whitespace in strsep calls. */ #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" #define QUOTE "\"" /* return next token in configuration line */ char * strdelim(char **s) { char *old; int wspace = 0; if (*s == NULL) return NULL; old = *s; *s = strpbrk(*s, WHITESPACE QUOTE "="); if (*s == NULL) return (old); if (*s[0] == '\"') { memmove(*s, *s + 1, strlen(*s)); /* move nul too */ /* Find matching quote */ if ((*s = strpbrk(*s, QUOTE)) == NULL) { return (NULL); /* no matching quote */ } else { *s[0] = '\0'; *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; return (old); } } /* Allow only one '=' to be skipped */ if (*s[0] == '=') wspace = 1; *s[0] = '\0'; /* Skip any extra whitespace after first token */ *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; if (*s[0] == '=' && !wspace) *s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1; return (old); } struct passwd * pwcopy(struct passwd *pw) { struct passwd *copy = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*copy)); copy->pw_name = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); copy->pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd); #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS copy->pw_gecos = xstrdup(pw->pw_gecos); #endif copy->pw_uid = pw->pw_uid; copy->pw_gid = pw->pw_gid; #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE copy->pw_expire = pw->pw_expire; #endif #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE copy->pw_change = pw->pw_change; #endif #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS copy->pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class); #endif copy->pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir); copy->pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell); return copy; } /* * Convert ASCII string to TCP/IP port number. * Port must be >=0 and <=65535. * Return -1 if invalid. */ int a2port(const char *s) { long long port; const char *errstr; port = strtonum(s, 0, 65535, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) return -1; return (int)port; } int a2tun(const char *s, int *remote) { const char *errstr = NULL; char *sp, *ep; int tun; if (remote != NULL) { *remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY; sp = xstrdup(s); if ((ep = strchr(sp, ':')) == NULL) { free(sp); return (a2tun(s, NULL)); } ep[0] = '\0'; ep++; *remote = a2tun(ep, NULL); tun = a2tun(sp, NULL); free(sp); return (*remote == SSH_TUNID_ERR ? *remote : tun); } if (strcasecmp(s, "any") == 0) return (SSH_TUNID_ANY); tun = strtonum(s, 0, SSH_TUNID_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) return (SSH_TUNID_ERR); return (tun); } #define SECONDS 1 #define MINUTES (SECONDS * 60) #define HOURS (MINUTES * 60) #define DAYS (HOURS * 24) #define WEEKS (DAYS * 7) /* * Convert a time string into seconds; format is * a sequence of: * time[qualifier] * * Valid time qualifiers are: * seconds * s|S seconds * m|M minutes * h|H hours * d|D days * w|W weeks * * Examples: * 90m 90 minutes * 1h30m 90 minutes * 2d 2 days * 1w 1 week * * Return -1 if time string is invalid. */ long convtime(const char *s) { long total, secs; const char *p; char *endp; errno = 0; total = 0; p = s; if (p == NULL || *p == '\0') return -1; while (*p) { secs = strtol(p, &endp, 10); if (p == endp || (errno == ERANGE && (secs == LONG_MIN || secs == LONG_MAX)) || secs < 0) return -1; switch (*endp++) { case '\0': endp--; break; case 's': case 'S': break; case 'm': case 'M': secs *= MINUTES; break; case 'h': case 'H': secs *= HOURS; break; case 'd': case 'D': secs *= DAYS; break; case 'w': case 'W': secs *= WEEKS; break; default: return -1; } total += secs; if (total < 0) return -1; p = endp; } return total; } /* * Returns a standardized host+port identifier string. * Caller must free returned string. */ char * put_host_port(const char *host, u_short port) { char *hoststr; if (port == 0 || port == SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) return(xstrdup(host)); if (asprintf(&hoststr, "[%s]:%d", host, (int)port) < 0) fatal("put_host_port: asprintf: %s", strerror(errno)); debug3("put_host_port: %s", hoststr); return hoststr; } /* * Search for next delimiter between hostnames/addresses and ports. * Argument may be modified (for termination). * Returns *cp if parsing succeeds. * *cp is set to the start of the next delimiter, if one was found. * If this is the last field, *cp is set to NULL. */ char * hpdelim(char **cp) { char *s, *old; if (cp == NULL || *cp == NULL) return NULL; old = s = *cp; if (*s == '[') { if ((s = strchr(s, ']')) == NULL) return NULL; else s++; } else if ((s = strpbrk(s, ":/")) == NULL) s = *cp + strlen(*cp); /* skip to end (see first case below) */ switch (*s) { case '\0': *cp = NULL; /* no more fields*/ break; case ':': case '/': *s = '\0'; /* terminate */ *cp = s + 1; break; default: return NULL; } return old; } char * cleanhostname(char *host) { if (*host == '[' && host[strlen(host) - 1] == ']') { host[strlen(host) - 1] = '\0'; return (host + 1); } else return host; } char * colon(char *cp) { int flag = 0; if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */ return NULL; if (*cp == '[') flag = 1; for (; *cp; ++cp) { if (*cp == '@' && *(cp+1) == '[') flag = 1; if (*cp == ']' && *(cp+1) == ':' && flag) return (cp+1); if (*cp == ':' && !flag) return (cp); if (*cp == '/') return NULL; } return NULL; } /* function to assist building execv() arguments */ void addargs(arglist *args, char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; char *cp; u_int nalloc; int r; va_start(ap, fmt); r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); if (r == -1) fatal("addargs: argument too long"); nalloc = args->nalloc; if (args->list == NULL) { nalloc = 32; args->num = 0; } else if (args->num+2 >= nalloc) nalloc *= 2; args->list = xrealloc(args->list, nalloc, sizeof(char *)); args->nalloc = nalloc; args->list[args->num++] = cp; args->list[args->num] = NULL; } void replacearg(arglist *args, u_int which, char *fmt, ...) { va_list ap; char *cp; int r; va_start(ap, fmt); r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); if (r == -1) fatal("replacearg: argument too long"); if (which >= args->num) fatal("replacearg: tried to replace invalid arg %d >= %d", which, args->num); free(args->list[which]); args->list[which] = cp; } void freeargs(arglist *args) { u_int i; if (args->list != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < args->num; i++) free(args->list[i]); free(args->list); args->nalloc = args->num = 0; args->list = NULL; } } /* * Expands tildes in the file name. Returns data allocated by xmalloc. * Warning: this calls getpw*. */ char * tilde_expand_filename(const char *filename, uid_t uid) { const char *path, *sep; char user[128], *ret; struct passwd *pw; u_int len, slash; if (*filename != '~') return (xstrdup(filename)); filename++; path = strchr(filename, '/'); if (path != NULL && path > filename) { /* ~user/path */ slash = path - filename; if (slash > sizeof(user) - 1) fatal("tilde_expand_filename: ~username too long"); memcpy(user, filename, slash); user[slash] = '\0'; if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such user %s", user); } else if ((pw = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) /* ~/path */ fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such uid %ld", (long)uid); /* Make sure directory has a trailing '/' */ len = strlen(pw->pw_dir); if (len == 0 || pw->pw_dir[len - 1] != '/') sep = "/"; else sep = ""; /* Skip leading '/' from specified path */ if (path != NULL) filename = path + 1; if (xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir, sep, filename) >= MAXPATHLEN) fatal("tilde_expand_filename: Path too long"); return (ret); } /* * Expand a string with a set of %[char] escapes. A number of escapes may be * specified as (char *escape_chars, char *replacement) pairs. The list must * be terminated by a NULL escape_char. Returns replaced string in memory * allocated by xmalloc. */ char * percent_expand(const char *string, ...) { #define EXPAND_MAX_KEYS 16 u_int num_keys, i, j; struct { const char *key; const char *repl; } keys[EXPAND_MAX_KEYS]; char buf[4096]; va_list ap; /* Gather keys */ va_start(ap, string); for (num_keys = 0; num_keys < EXPAND_MAX_KEYS; num_keys++) { keys[num_keys].key = va_arg(ap, char *); if (keys[num_keys].key == NULL) break; keys[num_keys].repl = va_arg(ap, char *); if (keys[num_keys].repl == NULL) fatal("%s: NULL replacement", __func__); } if (num_keys == EXPAND_MAX_KEYS && va_arg(ap, char *) != NULL) fatal("%s: too many keys", __func__); va_end(ap); /* Expand string */ *buf = '\0'; for (i = 0; *string != '\0'; string++) { if (*string != '%') { append: buf[i++] = *string; if (i >= sizeof(buf)) fatal("%s: string too long", __func__); buf[i] = '\0'; continue; } string++; /* %% case */ if (*string == '%') goto append; for (j = 0; j < num_keys; j++) { if (strchr(keys[j].key, *string) != NULL) { i = strlcat(buf, keys[j].repl, sizeof(buf)); if (i >= sizeof(buf)) fatal("%s: string too long", __func__); break; } } if (j >= num_keys) fatal("%s: unknown key %%%c", __func__, *string); } return (xstrdup(buf)); #undef EXPAND_MAX_KEYS } /* * Read an entire line from a public key file into a static buffer, discarding * lines that exceed the buffer size. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure. */ int read_keyfile_line(FILE *f, const char *filename, char *buf, size_t bufsz, u_long *lineno) { while (fgets(buf, bufsz, f) != NULL) { if (buf[0] == '\0') continue; (*lineno)++; if (buf[strlen(buf) - 1] == '\n' || feof(f)) { return 0; } else { debug("%s: %s line %lu exceeds size limit", __func__, filename, *lineno); /* discard remainder of line */ while (fgetc(f) != '\n' && !feof(f)) ; /* nothing */ } } return -1; } int tun_open(int tun, int mode) { #if defined(CUSTOM_SYS_TUN_OPEN) return (sys_tun_open(tun, mode)); #elif defined(SSH_TUN_OPENBSD) struct ifreq ifr; char name[100]; int fd = -1, sock; /* Open the tunnel device */ if (tun <= SSH_TUNID_MAX) { snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/tun%d", tun); fd = open(name, O_RDWR); } else if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) { for (tun = 100; tun >= 0; tun--) { snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/tun%d", tun); if ((fd = open(name, O_RDWR)) >= 0) break; } } else { debug("%s: invalid tunnel %u", __func__, tun); return (-1); } if (fd < 0) { debug("%s: %s open failed: %s", __func__, name, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, name, mode, fd); /* Set the tunnel device operation mode */ snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "tun%d", tun); if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1) goto failed; if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) goto failed; /* Set interface mode */ ifr.ifr_flags &= ~IFF_UP; if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_LINK0; else ifr.ifr_flags &= ~IFF_LINK0; if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) goto failed; /* Bring interface up */ ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP; if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) goto failed; close(sock); return (fd); failed: if (fd >= 0) close(fd); if (sock >= 0) close(sock); debug("%s: failed to set %s mode %d: %s", __func__, name, mode, strerror(errno)); return (-1); #else error("Tunnel interfaces are not supported on this platform"); return (-1); #endif } void sanitise_stdfd(void) { int nullfd, dupfd; if ((nullfd = dupfd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open /dev/null: %s\n", strerror(errno)); exit(1); } while (++dupfd <= 2) { /* Only clobber closed fds */ if (fcntl(dupfd, F_GETFL, 0) >= 0) continue; if (dup2(nullfd, dupfd) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno)); exit(1); } } if (nullfd > 2) close(nullfd); } char * tohex(const void *vp, size_t l) { const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; char b[3], *r; size_t i, hl; if (l > 65536) return xstrdup("tohex: length > 65536"); hl = l * 2 + 1; r = xcalloc(1, hl); for (i = 0; i < l; i++) { snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%02x", p[i]); strlcat(r, b, hl); } return (r); } u_int64_t get_u64(const void *vp) { const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; u_int64_t v; v = (u_int64_t)p[0] << 56; v |= (u_int64_t)p[1] << 48; v |= (u_int64_t)p[2] << 40; v |= (u_int64_t)p[3] << 32; v |= (u_int64_t)p[4] << 24; v |= (u_int64_t)p[5] << 16; v |= (u_int64_t)p[6] << 8; v |= (u_int64_t)p[7]; return (v); } u_int32_t get_u32(const void *vp) { const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; u_int32_t v; v = (u_int32_t)p[0] << 24; v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 16; v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 8; v |= (u_int32_t)p[3]; return (v); } +u_int32_t +get_u32_le(const void *vp) +{ + const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; + u_int32_t v; + + v = (u_int32_t)p[0]; + v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 8; + v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 16; + v |= (u_int32_t)p[3] << 24; + + return (v); +} + u_int16_t get_u16(const void *vp) { const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp; u_int16_t v; v = (u_int16_t)p[0] << 8; v |= (u_int16_t)p[1]; return (v); } void put_u64(void *vp, u_int64_t v) { u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 56) & 0xff; p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 48) & 0xff; p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 40) & 0xff; p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 32) & 0xff; p[4] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff; p[5] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff; p[6] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; p[7] = (u_char)v & 0xff; } void put_u32(void *vp, u_int32_t v) { u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff; p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff; p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; p[3] = (u_char)v & 0xff; } +void +put_u32_le(void *vp, u_int32_t v) +{ + u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; + p[0] = (u_char)v & 0xff; + p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; + p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff; + p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff; +} + void put_u16(void *vp, u_int16_t v) { u_char *p = (u_char *)vp; p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff; p[1] = (u_char)v & 0xff; } void ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *start, int *ms) { struct timeval diff, finish; gettimeofday(&finish, NULL); timersub(&finish, start, &diff); *ms -= (diff.tv_sec * 1000) + (diff.tv_usec / 1000); } void ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *tv, int ms) { if (ms < 0) ms = 0; tv->tv_sec = ms / 1000; tv->tv_usec = (ms % 1000) * 1000; } time_t monotime(void) { -#if defined(HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME) && defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) +#if defined(HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME) && \ + (defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) || defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME)) struct timespec ts; static int gettime_failed = 0; if (!gettime_failed) { +#if defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME) + if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, &ts) == 0) + return (ts.tv_sec); +#endif +#if defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts) == 0) return (ts.tv_sec); +#endif debug3("clock_gettime: %s", strerror(errno)); gettime_failed = 1; } -#endif +#endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME && (CLOCK_MONOTONIC || CLOCK_BOOTTIME */ return time(NULL); } void bandwidth_limit_init(struct bwlimit *bw, u_int64_t kbps, size_t buflen) { bw->buflen = buflen; bw->rate = kbps; bw->thresh = bw->rate; bw->lamt = 0; timerclear(&bw->bwstart); timerclear(&bw->bwend); } /* Callback from read/write loop to insert bandwidth-limiting delays */ void bandwidth_limit(struct bwlimit *bw, size_t read_len) { u_int64_t waitlen; struct timespec ts, rm; if (!timerisset(&bw->bwstart)) { gettimeofday(&bw->bwstart, NULL); return; } bw->lamt += read_len; if (bw->lamt < bw->thresh) return; gettimeofday(&bw->bwend, NULL); timersub(&bw->bwend, &bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend); if (!timerisset(&bw->bwend)) return; bw->lamt *= 8; waitlen = (double)1000000L * bw->lamt / bw->rate; bw->bwstart.tv_sec = waitlen / 1000000L; bw->bwstart.tv_usec = waitlen % 1000000L; if (timercmp(&bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend, >)) { timersub(&bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend, &bw->bwend); /* Adjust the wait time */ if (bw->bwend.tv_sec) { bw->thresh /= 2; if (bw->thresh < bw->buflen / 4) bw->thresh = bw->buflen / 4; } else if (bw->bwend.tv_usec < 10000) { bw->thresh *= 2; if (bw->thresh > bw->buflen * 8) bw->thresh = bw->buflen * 8; } TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&bw->bwend, &ts); while (nanosleep(&ts, &rm) == -1) { if (errno != EINTR) break; ts = rm; } } bw->lamt = 0; gettimeofday(&bw->bwstart, NULL); } /* Make a template filename for mk[sd]temp() */ void mktemp_proto(char *s, size_t len) { const char *tmpdir; int r; if ((tmpdir = getenv("TMPDIR")) != NULL) { r = snprintf(s, len, "%s/ssh-XXXXXXXXXXXX", tmpdir); if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < len) return; } r = snprintf(s, len, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXXXX"); if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= len) fatal("%s: template string too short", __func__); } static const struct { const char *name; int value; } ipqos[] = { { "af11", IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 }, { "af12", IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 }, { "af13", IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 }, { "af21", IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 }, { "af22", IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 }, { "af23", IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 }, { "af31", IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 }, { "af32", IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 }, { "af33", IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 }, { "af41", IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 }, { "af42", IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 }, { "af43", IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 }, { "cs0", IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 }, { "cs1", IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 }, { "cs2", IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 }, { "cs3", IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 }, { "cs4", IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 }, { "cs5", IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 }, { "cs6", IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 }, { "cs7", IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 }, { "ef", IPTOS_DSCP_EF }, { "lowdelay", IPTOS_LOWDELAY }, { "throughput", IPTOS_THROUGHPUT }, { "reliability", IPTOS_RELIABILITY }, { NULL, -1 } }; int parse_ipqos(const char *cp) { u_int i; char *ep; long val; if (cp == NULL) return -1; for (i = 0; ipqos[i].name != NULL; i++) { if (strcasecmp(cp, ipqos[i].name) == 0) return ipqos[i].value; } /* Try parsing as an integer */ val = strtol(cp, &ep, 0); if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0' || val < 0 || val > 255) return -1; return val; } const char * iptos2str(int iptos) { int i; static char iptos_str[sizeof "0xff"]; for (i = 0; ipqos[i].name != NULL; i++) { if (ipqos[i].value == iptos) return ipqos[i].name; } snprintf(iptos_str, sizeof iptos_str, "0x%02x", iptos); return iptos_str; } void lowercase(char *s) { for (; *s; s++) *s = tolower((u_char)*s); } + +int +unix_listener(const char *path, int backlog, int unlink_first) +{ + struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; + int saved_errno, sock; + + memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr)); + sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; + if (strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, path, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) { + error("%s: \"%s\" too long for Unix domain socket", __func__, + path); + errno = ENAMETOOLONG; + return -1; + } + + sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + if (sock < 0) { + saved_errno = errno; + error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + errno = saved_errno; + return -1; + } + if (unlink_first == 1) { + if (unlink(path) != 0 && errno != ENOENT) + error("unlink(%s): %.100s", path, strerror(errno)); + } + if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) { + saved_errno = errno; + error("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + close(sock); + error("%s: cannot bind to path: %s", __func__, path); + errno = saved_errno; + return -1; + } + if (listen(sock, backlog) < 0) { + saved_errno = errno; + error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + close(sock); + unlink(path); + error("%s: cannot listen on path: %s", __func__, path); + errno = saved_errno; + return -1; + } + return sock; +} + void sock_set_v6only(int s) { #ifdef IPV6_V6ONLY int on = 1; debug3("%s: set socket %d IPV6_V6ONLY", __func__, s); if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) error("setsockopt IPV6_V6ONLY: %s", strerror(errno)); #endif } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/misc.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/misc.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/misc.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,109 +1,138 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.50 2013/10/14 23:28:23 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.54 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #ifndef _MISC_H #define _MISC_H +/* Data structure for representing a forwarding request. */ +struct Forward { + char *listen_host; /* Host (address) to listen on. */ + int listen_port; /* Port to forward. */ + char *listen_path; /* Path to bind domain socket. */ + char *connect_host; /* Host to connect. */ + int connect_port; /* Port to connect on connect_host. */ + char *connect_path; /* Path to connect domain socket. */ + int allocated_port; /* Dynamically allocated listen port */ + int handle; /* Handle for dynamic listen ports */ +}; + +/* Common server and client forwarding options. */ +struct ForwardOptions { + int gateway_ports; /* Allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */ + mode_t streamlocal_bind_mask; /* umask for streamlocal binds */ + int streamlocal_bind_unlink; /* unlink socket before bind */ +}; + /* misc.c */ char *chop(char *); char *strdelim(char **); int set_nonblock(int); int unset_nonblock(int); void set_nodelay(int); int a2port(const char *); int a2tun(const char *, int *); char *put_host_port(const char *, u_short); char *hpdelim(char **); char *cleanhostname(char *); char *colon(char *); long convtime(const char *); char *tilde_expand_filename(const char *, uid_t); char *percent_expand(const char *, ...) __attribute__((__sentinel__)); char *tohex(const void *, size_t); void sanitise_stdfd(void); void ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *, int *); void ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *, int); time_t monotime(void); void lowercase(char *s); +int unix_listener(const char *, int, int); void sock_set_v6only(int); struct passwd *pwcopy(struct passwd *); const char *ssh_gai_strerror(int); typedef struct arglist arglist; struct arglist { char **list; u_int num; u_int nalloc; }; void addargs(arglist *, char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); void replacearg(arglist *, u_int, char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4))); void freeargs(arglist *); int tun_open(int, int); /* Common definitions for ssh tunnel device forwarding */ #define SSH_TUNMODE_NO 0x00 #define SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT 0x01 #define SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET 0x02 #define SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT #define SSH_TUNMODE_YES (SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT|SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) #define SSH_TUNID_ANY 0x7fffffff #define SSH_TUNID_ERR (SSH_TUNID_ANY - 1) #define SSH_TUNID_MAX (SSH_TUNID_ANY - 2) +/* Fake port to indicate that host field is really a path. */ +#define PORT_STREAMLOCAL -2 + /* Functions to extract or store big-endian words of various sizes */ u_int64_t get_u64(const void *) __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8))); u_int32_t get_u32(const void *) __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 4))); u_int16_t get_u16(const void *) __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2))); void put_u64(void *, u_int64_t) __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8))); void put_u32(void *, u_int32_t) __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 4))); void put_u16(void *, u_int16_t) __attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2))); + +/* Little-endian store/load, used by umac.c */ +u_int32_t get_u32_le(const void *) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4))); +void put_u32_le(void *, u_int32_t) + __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4))); struct bwlimit { size_t buflen; u_int64_t rate, thresh, lamt; struct timeval bwstart, bwend; }; void bandwidth_limit_init(struct bwlimit *, u_int64_t, size_t); void bandwidth_limit(struct bwlimit *, size_t); int parse_ipqos(const char *); const char *iptos2str(int); void mktemp_proto(char *, size_t); /* readpass.c */ #define RP_ECHO 0x0001 #define RP_ALLOW_STDIN 0x0002 #define RP_ALLOW_EOF 0x0004 #define RP_USE_ASKPASS 0x0008 char *read_passphrase(const char *, int); int ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); int read_keyfile_line(FILE *, const char *, char *, size_t, u_long *); #endif /* _MISC_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/moduli.0 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/moduli.0 (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/moduli.0 (revision 276707) @@ -1,74 +1,74 @@ -MODULI(5) OpenBSD Programmer's Manual MODULI(5) +MODULI(5) File Formats Manual MODULI(5) NAME moduli - Diffie-Hellman moduli DESCRIPTION The /etc/moduli file contains prime numbers and generators for use by sshd(8) in the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange key exchange method. New moduli may be generated with ssh-keygen(1) using a two-step process. An initial candidate generation pass, using ssh-keygen -G, calculates numbers that are likely to be useful. A second primality testing pass, using ssh-keygen -T, provides a high degree of assurance that the numbers are prime and are safe for use in Diffie-Hellman operations by sshd(8). This moduli format is used as the output from each pass. The file consists of newline-separated records, one per modulus, containing seven space-separated fields. These fields are as follows: timestamp The time that the modulus was last processed as YYYYMMDDHHMMSS. type Decimal number specifying the internal structure of the prime modulus. Supported types are: 0 Unknown, not tested. 2 "Safe" prime; (p-1)/2 is also prime. 4 Sophie Germain; 2p+1 is also prime. Moduli candidates initially produced by ssh-keygen(1) are Sophie Germain primes (type 4). Further primality testing with ssh-keygen(1) produces safe prime moduli (type 2) that are ready for use in sshd(8). Other types are not used by OpenSSH. tests Decimal number indicating the type of primality tests that the number has been subjected to represented as a bitmask of the following values: 0x00 Not tested. 0x01 Composite number - not prime. 0x02 Sieve of Eratosthenes. 0x04 Probabilistic Miller-Rabin primality tests. The ssh-keygen(1) moduli candidate generation uses the Sieve of Eratosthenes (flag 0x02). Subsequent ssh-keygen(1) primality tests are Miller-Rabin tests (flag 0x04). trials Decimal number indicating the number of primality trials that have been performed on the modulus. size Decimal number indicating the size of the prime in bits. generator The recommended generator for use with this modulus (hexadecimal). modulus The modulus itself in hexadecimal. When performing Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange, sshd(8) first estimates the size of the modulus required to produce enough Diffie-Hellman output to sufficiently key the selected symmetric cipher. sshd(8) then randomly selects a modulus from /etc/moduli that best meets the size requirement. SEE ALSO ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8) STANDARDS M. Friedl, N. Provos, and W. Simpson, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, March 2006, 2006. -OpenBSD 5.5 September 26, 2012 OpenBSD 5.5 +OpenBSD 5.6 September 26, 2012 OpenBSD 5.6 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/monitor.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/monitor.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/monitor.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,2139 +1,2166 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.131 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.135 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include -#include #include #include +#include +#include #include #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #else # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H # include # endif #endif #ifdef SKEY #include #endif +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include +#endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "key.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "dh.h" #ifdef TARGET_OS_MAC /* XXX Broken krb5 headers on Mac */ #undef TARGET_OS_MAC #include "zlib.h" #define TARGET_OS_MAC 1 #else #include "zlib.h" #endif #include "packet.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "channels.h" #include "session.h" #include "sshlogin.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "monitor.h" #include "monitor_mm.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "monitor_fdpass.h" -#include "misc.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "roaming.h" #include "authfd.h" #ifdef GSSAPI static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL; #endif /* Imports */ extern ServerOptions options; extern u_int utmp_len; extern Newkeys *current_keys[]; extern z_stream incoming_stream; extern z_stream outgoing_stream; extern u_char session_id[]; extern Buffer auth_debug; extern int auth_debug_init; extern Buffer loginmsg; /* State exported from the child */ struct { z_stream incoming; z_stream outgoing; u_char *keyin; u_int keyinlen; u_char *keyout; u_int keyoutlen; u_char *ivin; u_int ivinlen; u_char *ivout; u_int ivoutlen; u_char *ssh1key; u_int ssh1keylen; int ssh1cipher; int ssh1protoflags; u_char *input; u_int ilen; u_char *output; u_int olen; u_int64_t sent_bytes; u_int64_t recv_bytes; } child_state; /* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */ int mm_answer_moduli(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_sign(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_authserv(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_authpassword(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_skeyquery(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_keyallowed(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_keyverify(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pty(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_term(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_rsa_response(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_sesskey(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_sessid(int, Buffer *); #ifdef USE_PAM int mm_answer_pam_start(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pam_account(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pam_query(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pam_respond(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int, Buffer *); #endif #ifdef GSSAPI int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_gss_userok(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int, Buffer *); #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS int mm_answer_audit_event(int, Buffer *); int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer *); #endif static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *); static Authctxt *authctxt; + +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 static BIGNUM *ssh1_challenge = NULL; /* used for ssh1 rsa auth */ +#endif /* local state for key verify */ static u_char *key_blob = NULL; static u_int key_bloblen = 0; static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY; static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL; static char *hostbased_chost = NULL; static char *auth_method = "unknown"; static char *auth_submethod = NULL; static u_int session_id2_len = 0; static u_char *session_id2 = NULL; static pid_t monitor_child_pid; struct mon_table { enum monitor_reqtype type; int flags; int (*f)(int, Buffer *); }; #define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */ #define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */ #define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */ #define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */ #define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE) #define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli}, +#endif {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign}, {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword}, #ifdef USE_PAM {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx}, #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, #endif #ifdef BSD_AUTH {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery}, {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond}, #endif #ifdef SKEY {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery}, {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond}, #endif {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed}, {MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify}, #ifdef GSSAPI {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_gss_userok}, {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_checkmic}, #endif {0, 0, NULL} }; struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli}, +#endif {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign}, {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty}, {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup}, {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term}, #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command}, #endif {0, 0, NULL} }; struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[] = { +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow}, {MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sesskey}, {MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sessid}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword}, {MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed}, {MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH|MON_ALOG, mm_answer_keyallowed}, {MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_rsa_challenge}, {MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_rsa_response}, #ifdef BSD_AUTH {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery}, {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond}, #endif #ifdef SKEY {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_skeyquery}, {MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_skeyrespond}, #endif #ifdef USE_PAM {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_query}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_pam_respond}, {MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx}, #endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, #endif +#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ {0, 0, NULL} }; struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15[] = { +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 {MONITOR_REQ_PTY, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty}, {MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pty_cleanup}, {MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term}, #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event}, {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT|MON_ONCE, mm_answer_audit_command}, #endif +#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ {0, 0, NULL} }; struct mon_table *mon_dispatch; /* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */ static void monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit) { while (ent->f != NULL) { if (ent->type == type) { ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT; ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0; return; } ent++; } } static void monitor_permit_authentications(int permit) { struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch; while (ent->f != NULL) { if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) { ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT; ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0; } ent++; } } void monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctxt, struct monitor *pmonitor) { struct mon_table *ent; int authenticated = 0, partial = 0; debug3("preauth child monitor started"); close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd); pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1; authctxt = _authctxt; memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt)); authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg; if (compat20) { mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20; /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); } else { mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto15; monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 1); } /* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */ while (!authenticated) { partial = 0; auth_method = "unknown"; auth_submethod = NULL; authenticated = (monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1); /* Special handling for multiple required authentications */ if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) { if (!compat20) fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported" "with SSH protocol 1"); if (authenticated && !auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt, auth_method, auth_submethod)) { debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__, auth_method); authenticated = 0; partial = 1; } } if (authenticated) { if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE)) fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d", __func__, ent->type); if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 && !auth_root_allowed(auth_method)) authenticated = 0; #ifdef USE_PAM /* PAM needs to perform account checks after auth */ if (options.use_pam && authenticated) { Buffer m; buffer_init(&m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m); authenticated = mm_answer_pam_account(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m); buffer_free(&m); } #endif } if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) { auth_log(authctxt, authenticated, partial, auth_method, auth_submethod); if (!authenticated) authctxt->failures++; } } if (!authctxt->valid) fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__); if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0) fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__); debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process", __func__, authctxt->user); mm_get_keystate(pmonitor); /* Drain any buffered messages from the child */ while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0) ; close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd); pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1; } static void monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid) { monitor_child_pid = pid; } static void monitor_child_handler(int sig) { kill(monitor_child_pid, sig); } void monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *pmonitor) { close(pmonitor->m_recvfd); pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1; monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid); signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler); signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler); signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler); +#ifdef SIGXFSZ + signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN); +#endif if (compat20) { mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20; /* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); } else { mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth15; monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1); } if (!no_pty_flag) { monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1); } for (;;) monitor_read(pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL); } void monitor_sync(struct monitor *pmonitor) { if (options.compression) { /* The member allocation is not visible, so sync it */ mm_share_sync(&pmonitor->m_zlib, &pmonitor->m_zback); } } static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor) { Buffer logmsg; u_int len, level; char *msg; buffer_init(&logmsg); /* Read length */ buffer_append_space(&logmsg, 4); if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) { if (errno == EPIPE) { buffer_free(&logmsg); debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__); close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd); pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1; return -1; } fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } len = buffer_get_int(&logmsg); if (len <= 4 || len > 8192) fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len); /* Read severity, message */ buffer_clear(&logmsg); buffer_append_space(&logmsg, len); if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, buffer_ptr(&logmsg), buffer_len(&logmsg)) != buffer_len(&logmsg)) fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); /* Log it */ level = buffer_get_int(&logmsg); msg = buffer_get_string(&logmsg, NULL); if (log_level_name(level) == NULL) fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", __func__, level); do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg); buffer_free(&logmsg); free(msg); return 0; } int monitor_read(struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent, struct mon_table **pent) { Buffer m; int ret; u_char type; struct pollfd pfd[2]; for (;;) { memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd)); pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd; pfd[0].events = POLLIN; pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd; pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN; if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) { if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN) continue; fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } if (pfd[1].revents) { /* * Drain all log messages before processing next * monitor request. */ monitor_read_log(pmonitor); continue; } if (pfd[0].revents) break; /* Continues below */ } buffer_init(&m); mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m); type = buffer_get_char(&m); debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type); while (ent->f != NULL) { if (ent->type == type) break; ent++; } if (ent->f != NULL) { if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT)) fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__, type); ret = (*ent->f)(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m); buffer_free(&m); /* The child may use this request only once, disable it */ if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) { debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__, type); ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT; } if (pent != NULL) *pent = ent; return ret; } fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type); /* NOTREACHED */ return (-1); } /* allowed key state */ static int monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen) { /* make sure key is allowed */ if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen || timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen)) return (0); return (1); } static void monitor_reset_key_state(void) { /* reset state */ free(key_blob); free(hostbased_cuser); free(hostbased_chost); key_blob = NULL; key_bloblen = 0; key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY; hostbased_cuser = NULL; hostbased_chost = NULL; } +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL int mm_answer_moduli(int sock, Buffer *m) { DH *dh; int min, want, max; min = buffer_get_int(m); want = buffer_get_int(m); max = buffer_get_int(m); debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d", __func__, min, want, max); /* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */ if (max < min || want < min || max < want) fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d", __func__, min, want, max); buffer_clear(m); dh = choose_dh(min, want, max); if (dh == NULL) { buffer_put_char(m, 0); return (0); } else { /* Send first bignum */ buffer_put_char(m, 1); buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->p); buffer_put_bignum2(m, dh->g); DH_free(dh); } mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m); return (0); } +#endif extern AuthenticationConnection *auth_conn; int mm_answer_sign(int sock, Buffer *m) { Key *key; u_char *p; u_char *signature; u_int siglen, datlen; int keyid; debug3("%s", __func__); keyid = buffer_get_int(m); p = buffer_get_string(m, &datlen); /* * Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes), * SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes). */ if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) fatal("%s: data length incorrect: %u", __func__, datlen); /* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */ if (session_id2_len == 0) { session_id2_len = datlen; session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len); memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len); } if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) { if (key_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen) < 0) fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__); } else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid)) != NULL && auth_conn != NULL) { if (ssh_agent_sign(auth_conn, key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen) < 0) fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed", __func__); } else fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid); debug3("%s: signature %p(%u)", __func__, signature, siglen); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_string(m, signature, siglen); free(p); free(signature); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m); /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1); return (0); } /* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */ int mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, Buffer *m) { char *username; struct passwd *pwent; int allowed = 0; u_int i; debug3("%s", __func__); if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0) fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__); username = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); pwent = getpwnamallow(username); authctxt->user = xstrdup(username); setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown"); free(username); buffer_clear(m); if (pwent == NULL) { buffer_put_char(m, 0); authctxt->pw = fakepw(); goto out; } allowed = 1; authctxt->pw = pwent; authctxt->valid = 1; buffer_put_char(m, 1); buffer_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(struct passwd)); buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name); buffer_put_cstring(m, "*"); #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos); #endif #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class); #endif buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir); buffer_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell); out: buffer_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options)); #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \ if (options.x != NULL) \ buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x); \ } while (0) #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \ for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) \ buffer_put_cstring(m, options.x[i]); \ } while (0) /* See comment in servconf.h */ COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS(); #undef M_CP_STROPT #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT /* Create valid auth method lists */ if (compat20 && auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) { /* * The monitor will continue long enough to let the child * run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any * authentication to succeed. */ debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__); } debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m); /* For SSHv1 allow authentication now */ if (!compat20) monitor_permit_authentications(1); else { /* Allow service/style information on the auth context */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1); } #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1); #endif return (0); } int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(int sock, Buffer *m) { char *banner; buffer_clear(m); banner = auth2_read_banner(); buffer_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : ""); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m); free(banner); return (0); } int mm_answer_authserv(int sock, Buffer *m) { monitor_permit_authentications(1); authctxt->service = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); authctxt->style = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s", __func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style); if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) { free(authctxt->style); authctxt->style = NULL; } return (0); } int mm_answer_authpassword(int sock, Buffer *m) { static int call_count; char *passwd; int authenticated; u_int plen; passwd = buffer_get_string(m, &plen); /* Only authenticate if the context is valid */ authenticated = options.password_authentication && auth_password(authctxt, passwd); explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd)); free(passwd); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, authenticated); debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m); call_count++; if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1) auth_method = "none"; else auth_method = "password"; /* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */ return (authenticated); } #ifdef BSD_AUTH int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(int sock, Buffer *m) { char *name, *infotxt; u_int numprompts; u_int *echo_on; char **prompts; u_int success; success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts, &prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1; buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, success); if (success) buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[0]); debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m); if (success) { free(name); free(infotxt); free(prompts); free(echo_on); } return (0); } int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(int sock, Buffer *m) { char *response; int authok; if (authctxt->as == 0) fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__); response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); authok = options.challenge_response_authentication && auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0); authctxt->as = NULL; debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok); free(response); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, authok); debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m); if (compat20) { auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; auth_submethod = "bsdauth"; } else auth_method = "bsdauth"; return (authok != 0); } #endif #ifdef SKEY int mm_answer_skeyquery(int sock, Buffer *m) { struct skey skey; char challenge[1024]; u_int success; success = _compat_skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge, sizeof(challenge)) < 0 ? 0 : 1; buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, success); if (success) buffer_put_cstring(m, challenge); debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY, m); return (0); } int mm_answer_skeyrespond(int sock, Buffer *m) { char *response; int authok; response = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); authok = (options.challenge_response_authentication && authctxt->valid && skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 && skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, response) != -1); free(response); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, authok); debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, m); auth_method = "skey"; return (authok != 0); } #endif #ifdef USE_PAM int mm_answer_pam_start(int sock, Buffer *m) { if (!options.use_pam) fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__); start_pam(authctxt); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 1); return (0); } int mm_answer_pam_account(int sock, Buffer *m) { u_int ret; if (!options.use_pam) fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__); ret = do_pam_account(); buffer_put_int(m, ret); buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg)); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m); return (ret); } static void *sshpam_ctxt, *sshpam_authok; extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device; int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m) { debug3("%s", __func__); authctxt->user = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt); sshpam_authok = NULL; buffer_clear(m); if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) { monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1); buffer_put_int(m, 1); } else { buffer_put_int(m, 0); } mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m); return (0); } int mm_answer_pam_query(int sock, Buffer *m) { char *name = NULL, *info = NULL, **prompts = NULL; u_int i, num = 0, *echo_on = 0; int ret; debug3("%s", __func__); sshpam_authok = NULL; ret = (sshpam_device.query)(sshpam_ctxt, &name, &info, &num, &prompts, &echo_on); if (ret == 0 && num == 0) sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt; if (num > 1 || name == NULL || info == NULL) ret = -1; buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, ret); buffer_put_cstring(m, name); free(name); buffer_put_cstring(m, info); free(info); buffer_put_int(m, num); for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { buffer_put_cstring(m, prompts[i]); free(prompts[i]); buffer_put_int(m, echo_on[i]); } free(prompts); free(echo_on); auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; auth_submethod = "pam"; mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m); return (0); } int mm_answer_pam_respond(int sock, Buffer *m) { char **resp; u_int i, num; int ret; debug3("%s", __func__); sshpam_authok = NULL; num = buffer_get_int(m); if (num > 0) { resp = xcalloc(num, sizeof(char *)); for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) resp[i] = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp); for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) free(resp[i]); free(resp); } else { ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, NULL); } buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, ret); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m); auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; auth_submethod = "pam"; if (ret == 0) sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt; return (0); } int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m) { debug3("%s", __func__); (sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt); buffer_clear(m); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m); auth_method = "keyboard-interactive"; auth_submethod = "pam"; return (sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt); } #endif int mm_answer_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m) { Key *key; char *cuser, *chost; u_char *blob; u_int bloblen; enum mm_keytype type = 0; int allowed = 0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); type = buffer_get_int(m); cuser = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); chost = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen); key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen); if ((compat20 && type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) || (!compat20 && type != MM_RSAHOSTKEY)) fatal("%s: key type and protocol mismatch", __func__); debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key); if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) { switch (type) { case MM_USERKEY: allowed = options.pubkey_authentication && user_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, key); pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, NULL); auth_method = "publickey"; if (options.pubkey_authentication && allowed != 1) auth_clear_options(); break; case MM_HOSTKEY: allowed = options.hostbased_authentication && hostbased_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key); pubkey_auth_info(authctxt, key, "client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost); auth_method = "hostbased"; break; +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 case MM_RSAHOSTKEY: key->type = KEY_RSA1; /* XXX */ allowed = options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, cuser, chost, key); if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication && allowed != 1) auth_clear_options(); auth_method = "rsa"; break; +#endif default: fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type); break; } } if (key != NULL) key_free(key); /* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */ monitor_reset_key_state(); if (allowed) { /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */ key_blob = blob; key_bloblen = bloblen; key_blobtype = type; hostbased_cuser = cuser; hostbased_chost = chost; } else { /* Log failed attempt */ auth_log(authctxt, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL); free(blob); free(cuser); free(chost); } debug3("%s: key %p is %s", __func__, key, allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed"); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, allowed); buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m); if (type == MM_RSAHOSTKEY) monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed); return (0); } static int monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen) { Buffer b; char *p, *userstyle; u_int len; int fail = 0; buffer_init(&b); buffer_append(&b, data, datalen); if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { p = buffer_ptr(&b); len = buffer_len(&b); if ((session_id2 == NULL) || (len < session_id2_len) || (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)) fail++; buffer_consume(&b, session_id2_len); } else { p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len); if ((session_id2 == NULL) || (len != session_id2_len) || (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)) fail++; free(p); } if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) fail++; p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL); xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->style ? ":" : "", authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) { logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, p); fail++; } free(userstyle); free(p); buffer_skip_string(&b); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { if (!buffer_get_char(&b)) fail++; } else { p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL); if (strcmp("publickey", p) != 0) fail++; free(p); if (!buffer_get_char(&b)) fail++; buffer_skip_string(&b); } buffer_skip_string(&b); if (buffer_len(&b) != 0) fail++; buffer_free(&b); return (fail == 0); } static int monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser, char *chost) { Buffer b; char *p, *userstyle; u_int len; int fail = 0; buffer_init(&b); buffer_append(&b, data, datalen); p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len); if ((session_id2 == NULL) || (len != session_id2_len) || (timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0)) fail++; free(p); if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) fail++; p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL); xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user, authctxt->style ? ":" : "", authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : ""); if (strcmp(userstyle, p) != 0) { logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, p); fail++; } free(userstyle); free(p); buffer_skip_string(&b); /* service */ p = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL); if (strcmp(p, "hostbased") != 0) fail++; free(p); buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkalg */ buffer_skip_string(&b); /* pkblob */ /* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */ p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); if (((len = strlen(p)) > 0) && p[len - 1] == '.') p[len - 1] = '\0'; if (strcmp(p, chost) != 0) fail++; free(p); /* verify client user */ p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); if (strcmp(p, cuser) != 0) fail++; free(p); if (buffer_len(&b) != 0) fail++; buffer_free(&b); return (fail == 0); } int mm_answer_keyverify(int sock, Buffer *m) { Key *key; u_char *signature, *data, *blob; u_int signaturelen, datalen, bloblen; int verified = 0; int valid_data = 0; blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen); signature = buffer_get_string(m, &signaturelen); data = buffer_get_string(m, &datalen); if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL || !monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen)) fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__); key = key_from_blob(blob, bloblen); if (key == NULL) fatal("%s: bad public key blob", __func__); switch (key_blobtype) { case MM_USERKEY: valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen); break; case MM_HOSTKEY: valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen, hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost); break; default: valid_data = 0; break; } if (!valid_data) fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__); verified = key_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen); debug3("%s: key %p signature %s", __func__, key, (verified == 1) ? "verified" : "unverified"); key_free(key); free(blob); free(signature); free(data); auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY ? "publickey" : "hostbased"; monitor_reset_key_state(); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, verified); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m); return (verified == 1); } static void mm_record_login(Session *s, struct passwd *pw) { socklen_t fromlen; struct sockaddr_storage from; /* * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let * the address be 0.0.0.0. */ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); fromlen = sizeof(from); if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(255); } } /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */ record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen); } static void mm_session_close(Session *s) { debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid); if (s->ttyfd != -1) { debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd); session_pty_cleanup2(s); } session_unused(s->self); } int mm_answer_pty(int sock, Buffer *m) { extern struct monitor *pmonitor; Session *s; int res, fd0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_clear(m); s = session_new(); if (s == NULL) goto error; s->authctxt = authctxt; s->pw = authctxt->pw; s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid; res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty)); if (res == 0) goto error; pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty); buffer_put_int(m, 1); buffer_put_cstring(m, s->tty); /* We need to trick ttyslot */ if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1) fatal("%s: dup2", __func__); mm_record_login(s, authctxt->pw); /* Now we can close the file descriptor again */ close(0); /* send messages generated by record_login */ buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&loginmsg), buffer_len(&loginmsg)); buffer_clear(&loginmsg); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m); if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 || mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1) fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__); /* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */ if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) < 0) fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (fd0 != 0) error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0); /* slave is not needed */ close(s->ttyfd); s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd; /* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */ s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd; debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd); return (0); error: if (s != NULL) mm_session_close(s); buffer_put_int(m, 0); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m); return (0); } int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(int sock, Buffer *m) { Session *s; char *tty; debug3("%s entering", __func__); tty = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL) mm_session_close(s); buffer_clear(m); free(tty); return (0); } +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 int mm_answer_sesskey(int sock, Buffer *m) { BIGNUM *p; int rsafail; /* Turn off permissions */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, 0); if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__); buffer_get_bignum2(m, p); rsafail = ssh1_session_key(p); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, rsafail); buffer_put_bignum2(m, p); BN_clear_free(p); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, m); /* Turn on permissions for sessid passing */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, 1); return (0); } int mm_answer_sessid(int sock, Buffer *m) { int i; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (buffer_len(m) != 16) fatal("%s: bad ssh1 session id", __func__); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) session_id[i] = buffer_get_char(m); /* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1); return (0); } int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(int sock, Buffer *m) { BIGNUM *client_n; Key *key = NULL; u_char *blob = NULL; u_int blen = 0; int allowed = 0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); auth_method = "rsa"; if (options.rsa_authentication && authctxt->valid) { if ((client_n = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__); buffer_get_bignum2(m, client_n); allowed = auth_rsa_key_allowed(authctxt->pw, client_n, &key); BN_clear_free(client_n); } buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, allowed); buffer_put_int(m, forced_command != NULL); /* clear temporarily storage (used by generate challenge) */ monitor_reset_key_state(); if (allowed && key != NULL) { key->type = KEY_RSA; /* cheat for key_to_blob */ if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0) fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__); buffer_put_string(m, blob, blen); /* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */ key_blob = blob; key_bloblen = blen; key_blobtype = MM_RSAUSERKEY; } if (key != NULL) key_free(key); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, m); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, allowed); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 0); return (0); } int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(int sock, Buffer *m) { Key *key = NULL; u_char *blob; u_int blen; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (!authctxt->valid) fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__); blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen); if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen)) fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__); if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY) fatal("%s: key type mismatch", __func__); if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL) fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__); if (key->type != KEY_RSA) fatal("%s: received bad key type %d", __func__, key->type); key->type = KEY_RSA1; if (ssh1_challenge) BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge); ssh1_challenge = auth_rsa_generate_challenge(key); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_bignum2(m, ssh1_challenge); debug3("%s sending reply", __func__); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, m); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, 1); free(blob); key_free(key); return (0); } int mm_answer_rsa_response(int sock, Buffer *m) { Key *key = NULL; u_char *blob, *response; u_int blen, len; int success; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (!authctxt->valid) fatal("%s: authctxt not valid", __func__); if (ssh1_challenge == NULL) fatal("%s: no ssh1_challenge", __func__); blob = buffer_get_string(m, &blen); if (!monitor_allowed_key(blob, blen)) fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__); if (key_blobtype != MM_RSAUSERKEY && key_blobtype != MM_RSAHOSTKEY) fatal("%s: key type mismatch: %d", __func__, key_blobtype); if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL) fatal("%s: received bad key", __func__); response = buffer_get_string(m, &len); if (len != 16) fatal("%s: received bad response to challenge", __func__); success = auth_rsa_verify_response(key, ssh1_challenge, response); free(blob); key_free(key); free(response); auth_method = key_blobtype == MM_RSAUSERKEY ? "rsa" : "rhosts-rsa"; /* reset state */ BN_clear_free(ssh1_challenge); ssh1_challenge = NULL; monitor_reset_key_state(); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, success); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, m); return (success); } +#endif int mm_answer_term(int sock, Buffer *req) { extern struct monitor *pmonitor; int res, status; debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__); /* The child is terminating */ session_destroy_all(&mm_session_close); #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) sshpam_cleanup(); #endif while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) exit(1); res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1; /* Terminate process */ exit(res); } #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS /* Report that an audit event occurred */ int mm_answer_audit_event(int socket, Buffer *m) { ssh_audit_event_t event; debug3("%s entering", __func__); event = buffer_get_int(m); switch(event) { case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED: case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI: case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES: case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED: case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE: case SSH_INVALID_USER: audit_event(event); break; default: fatal("Audit event type %d not permitted", event); } return (0); } int mm_answer_audit_command(int socket, Buffer *m) { u_int len; char *cmd; debug3("%s entering", __func__); cmd = buffer_get_string(m, &len); /* sanity check command, if so how? */ audit_run_command(cmd); free(cmd); return (0); } #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ void monitor_apply_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) { if (compat20) { set_newkeys(MODE_IN); set_newkeys(MODE_OUT); } else { packet_set_protocol_flags(child_state.ssh1protoflags); packet_set_encryption_key(child_state.ssh1key, child_state.ssh1keylen, child_state.ssh1cipher); free(child_state.ssh1key); } /* for rc4 and other stateful ciphers */ packet_set_keycontext(MODE_OUT, child_state.keyout); free(child_state.keyout); packet_set_keycontext(MODE_IN, child_state.keyin); free(child_state.keyin); if (!compat20) { packet_set_iv(MODE_OUT, child_state.ivout); free(child_state.ivout); packet_set_iv(MODE_IN, child_state.ivin); free(child_state.ivin); } memcpy(&incoming_stream, &child_state.incoming, sizeof(incoming_stream)); memcpy(&outgoing_stream, &child_state.outgoing, sizeof(outgoing_stream)); /* Update with new address */ if (options.compression) mm_init_compression(pmonitor->m_zlib); + packet_set_postauth(); + if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit, (time_t)options.rekey_interval); /* Network I/O buffers */ /* XXX inefficient for large buffers, need: buffer_init_from_string */ buffer_clear(packet_get_input()); buffer_append(packet_get_input(), child_state.input, child_state.ilen); explicit_bzero(child_state.input, child_state.ilen); free(child_state.input); buffer_clear(packet_get_output()); buffer_append(packet_get_output(), child_state.output, child_state.olen); explicit_bzero(child_state.output, child_state.olen); free(child_state.output); /* Roaming */ if (compat20) roam_set_bytes(child_state.sent_bytes, child_state.recv_bytes); } static Kex * mm_get_kex(Buffer *m) { Kex *kex; void *blob; u_int bloblen; kex = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*kex)); kex->session_id = buffer_get_string(m, &kex->session_id_len); if (session_id2 == NULL || kex->session_id_len != session_id2_len || timingsafe_bcmp(kex->session_id, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0) fatal("mm_get_get: internal error: bad session id"); kex->we_need = buffer_get_int(m); +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; +#endif kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server; kex->server = 1; kex->hostkey_type = buffer_get_int(m); kex->kex_type = buffer_get_int(m); blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen); buffer_init(&kex->my); buffer_append(&kex->my, blob, bloblen); free(blob); blob = buffer_get_string(m, &bloblen); buffer_init(&kex->peer); buffer_append(&kex->peer, blob, bloblen); free(blob); kex->done = 1; kex->flags = buffer_get_int(m); kex->client_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); kex->server_version_string = buffer_get_string(m, NULL); kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type; kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type; kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index; kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign; return (kex); } /* This function requries careful sanity checking */ void mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor) { Buffer m; u_char *blob, *p; u_int bloblen, plen; u_int32_t seqnr, packets; u_int64_t blocks, bytes; debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m); if (!compat20) { child_state.ssh1protoflags = buffer_get_int(&m); child_state.ssh1cipher = buffer_get_int(&m); child_state.ssh1key = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ssh1keylen); child_state.ivout = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ivoutlen); child_state.ivin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ivinlen); goto skip; } else { /* Get the Kex for rekeying */ *pmonitor->m_pkex = mm_get_kex(&m); } blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen); current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen); free(blob); debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__); blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen); current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen); free(blob); /* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */ seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m); blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m); packets = buffer_get_int(&m); bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m); packet_set_state(MODE_OUT, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes); seqnr = buffer_get_int(&m); blocks = buffer_get_int64(&m); packets = buffer_get_int(&m); bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m); packet_set_state(MODE_IN, seqnr, blocks, packets, bytes); skip: /* Get the key context */ child_state.keyout = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyoutlen); child_state.keyin = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.keyinlen); debug3("%s: Getting compression state", __func__); /* Get compression state */ p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen); if (plen != sizeof(child_state.outgoing)) fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__); memcpy(&child_state.outgoing, p, sizeof(child_state.outgoing)); free(p); p = buffer_get_string(&m, &plen); if (plen != sizeof(child_state.incoming)) fatal("%s: bad request size", __func__); memcpy(&child_state.incoming, p, sizeof(child_state.incoming)); free(p); /* Network I/O buffers */ debug3("%s: Getting Network I/O buffers", __func__); child_state.input = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.ilen); child_state.output = buffer_get_string(&m, &child_state.olen); /* Roaming */ if (compat20) { child_state.sent_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m); child_state.recv_bytes = buffer_get_int64(&m); } buffer_free(&m); } /* Allocation functions for zlib */ void * mm_zalloc(struct mm_master *mm, u_int ncount, u_int size) { size_t len = (size_t) size * ncount; void *address; if (len == 0 || ncount > SIZE_T_MAX / size) fatal("%s: mm_zalloc(%u, %u)", __func__, ncount, size); address = mm_malloc(mm, len); return (address); } void mm_zfree(struct mm_master *mm, void *address) { mm_free(mm, address); } void mm_init_compression(struct mm_master *mm) { outgoing_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc; outgoing_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree; outgoing_stream.opaque = mm; incoming_stream.zalloc = (alloc_func)mm_zalloc; incoming_stream.zfree = (free_func)mm_zfree; incoming_stream.opaque = mm; } /* XXX */ #define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \ if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \ fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \ } while (0) static void monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds) { int pair[2]; if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]); FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]); mon->m_recvfd = pair[0]; mon->m_sendfd = pair[1]; if (do_logfds) { if (pipe(pair) == -1) fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]); FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]); mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0]; mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1]; } else mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1; } #define MM_MEMSIZE 65536 struct monitor * monitor_init(void) { struct monitor *mon; mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon)); monitor_openfds(mon, 1); /* Used to share zlib space across processes */ if (options.compression) { mon->m_zback = mm_create(NULL, MM_MEMSIZE); mon->m_zlib = mm_create(mon->m_zback, 20 * MM_MEMSIZE); /* Compression needs to share state across borders */ mm_init_compression(mon->m_zlib); } return mon; } void monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon) { monitor_openfds(mon, 0); } #ifdef GSSAPI int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m) { gss_OID_desc goid; OM_uint32 major; u_int len; goid.elements = buffer_get_string(m, &len); goid.length = len; major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid); free(goid.elements); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, major); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m); /* Now we have a context, enable the step */ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1); return (0); } int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(int sock, Buffer *m) { gss_buffer_desc in; gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; OM_uint32 major, minor; OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */ u_int len; in.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); in.length = len; major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags); free(in.value); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, major); buffer_put_string(m, out.value, out.length); buffer_put_int(m, flags); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m); gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out); if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1); } return (0); } int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(int sock, Buffer *m) { gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic; OM_uint32 ret; u_int len; gssbuf.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); gssbuf.length = len; mic.value = buffer_get_string(m, &len); mic.length = len; ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic); free(gssbuf.value); free(mic.value); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, ret); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m); if (!GSS_ERROR(ret)) monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1); return (0); } int mm_answer_gss_userok(int sock, Buffer *m) { int authenticated; authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user); buffer_clear(m); buffer_put_int(m, authenticated); debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated); mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m); auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic"; /* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */ return (authenticated); } #endif /* GSSAPI */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/monitor_fdpass.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/monitor_fdpass.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/monitor_fdpass.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,182 +1,187 @@ /* $OpenBSD: monitor_fdpass.c,v 1.19 2010/01/12 00:58:25 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2001 Niels Provos * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H #include #endif #include -#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H -#include -#endif #include #include + +#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H +# include +#else +# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H +# include +# endif +#endif #include "log.h" #include "monitor_fdpass.h" int mm_send_fd(int sock, int fd) { #if defined(HAVE_SENDMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR)) struct msghdr msg; #ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR union { struct cmsghdr hdr; char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))]; } cmsgbuf; struct cmsghdr *cmsg; #endif struct iovec vec; char ch = '\0'; ssize_t n; struct pollfd pfd; memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); #ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&fd; msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(fd); #else msg.msg_control = (caddr_t)&cmsgbuf.buf; msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf); cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int)); cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET; cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS; *(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg) = fd; #endif vec.iov_base = &ch; vec.iov_len = 1; msg.msg_iov = &vec; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; pfd.fd = sock; pfd.events = POLLOUT; while ((n = sendmsg(sock, &msg, 0)) == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) { debug3("%s: sendmsg(%d): %s", __func__, fd, strerror(errno)); (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1); } if (n == -1) { error("%s: sendmsg(%d): %s", __func__, fd, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (n != 1) { error("%s: sendmsg: expected sent 1 got %ld", __func__, (long)n); return -1; } return 0; #else error("%s: file descriptor passing not supported", __func__); return -1; #endif } int mm_receive_fd(int sock) { #if defined(HAVE_RECVMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR)) struct msghdr msg; #ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR union { struct cmsghdr hdr; char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))]; } cmsgbuf; struct cmsghdr *cmsg; #endif struct iovec vec; ssize_t n; char ch; int fd; struct pollfd pfd; memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg)); vec.iov_base = &ch; vec.iov_len = 1; msg.msg_iov = &vec; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; #ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&fd; msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(fd); #else msg.msg_control = &cmsgbuf.buf; msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf); #endif pfd.fd = sock; pfd.events = POLLIN; while ((n = recvmsg(sock, &msg, 0)) == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)) { debug3("%s: recvmsg: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1); } if (n == -1) { error("%s: recvmsg: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (n != 1) { error("%s: recvmsg: expected received 1 got %ld", __func__, (long)n); return -1; } #ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR if (msg.msg_accrightslen != sizeof(fd)) { error("%s: no fd", __func__); return -1; } #else cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); if (cmsg == NULL) { error("%s: no message header", __func__); return -1; } #ifndef BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE if (cmsg->cmsg_type != SCM_RIGHTS) { error("%s: expected type %d got %d", __func__, SCM_RIGHTS, cmsg->cmsg_type); return -1; } #endif fd = (*(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg)); #endif return fd; #else error("%s: file descriptor passing not supported", __func__); return -1; #endif } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/monitor_wrap.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/monitor_wrap.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/monitor_wrap.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,1292 +1,1302 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.79 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.80 2014/04/29 18:01:49 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 2002 Niels Provos * Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl * All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include +#endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include "dh.h" +#endif #include "buffer.h" #include "key.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "packet.h" #include "mac.h" #include "log.h" #ifdef TARGET_OS_MAC /* XXX Broken krb5 headers on Mac */ #undef TARGET_OS_MAC #include "zlib.h" #define TARGET_OS_MAC 1 #else #include "zlib.h" #endif #include "monitor.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "monitor_fdpass.h" #include "misc.h" #include "uuencode.h" #include "channels.h" #include "session.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "roaming.h" /* Imports */ extern int compat20; extern z_stream incoming_stream; extern z_stream outgoing_stream; extern struct monitor *pmonitor; extern Buffer loginmsg; extern ServerOptions options; void mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, const char *msg, void *ctx) { Buffer log_msg; struct monitor *mon = (struct monitor *)ctx; if (mon->m_log_sendfd == -1) fatal("%s: no log channel", __func__); buffer_init(&log_msg); /* * Placeholder for packet length. Will be filled in with the actual * packet length once the packet has been constucted. This saves * fragile math. */ buffer_put_int(&log_msg, 0); buffer_put_int(&log_msg, level); buffer_put_cstring(&log_msg, msg); put_u32(buffer_ptr(&log_msg), buffer_len(&log_msg) - 4); if (atomicio(vwrite, mon->m_log_sendfd, buffer_ptr(&log_msg), buffer_len(&log_msg)) != buffer_len(&log_msg)) fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_free(&log_msg); } int mm_is_monitor(void) { /* * m_pid is only set in the privileged part, and * points to the unprivileged child. */ return (pmonitor && pmonitor->m_pid > 0); } void mm_request_send(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m) { u_int mlen = buffer_len(m); u_char buf[5]; debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type); put_u32(buf, mlen + 1); buf[4] = (u_char) type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */ if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buffer_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen) fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } void mm_request_receive(int sock, Buffer *m) { u_char buf[4]; u_int msg_len; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) { if (errno == EPIPE) cleanup_exit(255); fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } msg_len = get_u32(buf); if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len); buffer_clear(m); buffer_append_space(m, msg_len); if (atomicio(read, sock, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } void mm_request_receive_expect(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, Buffer *m) { u_char rtype; debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type); mm_request_receive(sock, m); rtype = buffer_get_char(m); if (rtype != type) fatal("%s: read: rtype %d != type %d", __func__, rtype, type); } +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL DH * mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max) { BIGNUM *p, *g; int success = 0; Buffer m; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, min); buffer_put_int(&m, nbits); buffer_put_int(&m, max); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_MODULI", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, &m); success = buffer_get_char(&m); if (success == 0) fatal("%s: MONITOR_ANS_MODULI failed", __func__); if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); if ((g = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); buffer_get_bignum2(&m, p); buffer_get_bignum2(&m, g); debug3("%s: remaining %d", __func__, buffer_len(&m)); buffer_free(&m); return (dh_new_group(g, p)); } +#endif int mm_key_sign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, u_char *data, u_int datalen) { Kex *kex = *pmonitor->m_pkex; Buffer m; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, kex->host_key_index(key)); buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_SIGN", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, &m); *sigp = buffer_get_string(&m, lenp); buffer_free(&m); return (0); } struct passwd * mm_getpwnamallow(const char *username) { Buffer m; struct passwd *pw; u_int len, i; ServerOptions *newopts; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, username); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, &m); if (buffer_get_char(&m) == 0) { pw = NULL; goto out; } pw = buffer_get_string(&m, &len); if (len != sizeof(struct passwd)) fatal("%s: struct passwd size mismatch", __func__); pw->pw_name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); pw->pw_passwd = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS pw->pw_gecos = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); #endif #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS pw->pw_class = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); #endif pw->pw_dir = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); pw->pw_shell = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); out: /* copy options block as a Match directive may have changed some */ newopts = buffer_get_string(&m, &len); if (len != sizeof(*newopts)) fatal("%s: option block size mismatch", __func__); #define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \ if (newopts->x != NULL) \ newopts->x = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); \ } while (0) #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \ for (i = 0; i < newopts->nx; i++) \ newopts->x[i] = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); \ } while (0) /* See comment in servconf.h */ COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS(); #undef M_CP_STROPT #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT copy_set_server_options(&options, newopts, 1); free(newopts); buffer_free(&m); return (pw); } char * mm_auth2_read_banner(void) { Buffer m; char *banner; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, &m); buffer_clear(&m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, &m); banner = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); /* treat empty banner as missing banner */ if (strlen(banner) == 0) { free(banner); banner = NULL; } return (banner); } /* Inform the privileged process about service and style */ void mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style) { Buffer m; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, service); buffer_put_cstring(&m, style ? style : ""); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, &m); buffer_free(&m); } /* Do the password authentication */ int mm_auth_password(Authctxt *authctxt, char *password) { Buffer m; int authenticated = 0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, password); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, &m); authenticated = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated", __func__, authenticated ? "" : "not "); return (authenticated); } int mm_user_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, Key *key) { return (mm_key_allowed(MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, key)); } int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *user, char *host, Key *key) { return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key)); } int mm_auth_rhosts_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, char *user, char *host, Key *key) { int ret; key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX hack for key_to_blob */ ret = mm_key_allowed(MM_RSAHOSTKEY, user, host, key); key->type = KEY_RSA1; return (ret); } int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, char *user, char *host, Key *key) { Buffer m; u_char *blob; u_int len; int allowed = 0, have_forced = 0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); /* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */ if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len)) return (0); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, type); buffer_put_cstring(&m, user ? user : ""); buffer_put_cstring(&m, host ? host : ""); buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len); free(blob); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, &m); allowed = buffer_get_int(&m); /* fake forced command */ auth_clear_options(); have_forced = buffer_get_int(&m); forced_command = have_forced ? xstrdup("true") : NULL; buffer_free(&m); return (allowed); } /* * This key verify needs to send the key type along, because the * privileged parent makes the decision if the key is allowed * for authentication. */ int mm_key_verify(Key *key, u_char *sig, u_int siglen, u_char *data, u_int datalen) { Buffer m; u_char *blob; u_int len; int verified = 0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); /* Convert the key to a blob and the pass it over */ if (!key_to_blob(key, &blob, &len)) return (0); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_string(&m, blob, len); buffer_put_string(&m, sig, siglen); buffer_put_string(&m, data, datalen); free(blob); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, &m); verified = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); return (verified); } /* Export key state after authentication */ Newkeys * mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *blob, int blen) { Buffer b; u_int len; Newkeys *newkey = NULL; Enc *enc; Mac *mac; Comp *comp; debug3("%s: %p(%d)", __func__, blob, blen); #ifdef DEBUG_PK dump_base64(stderr, blob, blen); #endif buffer_init(&b); buffer_append(&b, blob, blen); newkey = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*newkey)); enc = &newkey->enc; mac = &newkey->mac; comp = &newkey->comp; /* Enc structure */ enc->name = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); buffer_get(&b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher)); enc->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b); enc->block_size = buffer_get_int(&b); enc->key = buffer_get_string(&b, &enc->key_len); enc->iv = buffer_get_string(&b, &enc->iv_len); if (enc->name == NULL || cipher_by_name(enc->name) != enc->cipher) fatal("%s: bad cipher name %s or pointer %p", __func__, enc->name, enc->cipher); /* Mac structure */ if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) { mac->name = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); if (mac->name == NULL || mac_setup(mac, mac->name) == -1) fatal("%s: can not setup mac %s", __func__, mac->name); mac->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b); mac->key = buffer_get_string(&b, &len); if (len > mac->key_len) fatal("%s: bad mac key length: %u > %d", __func__, len, mac->key_len); mac->key_len = len; } /* Comp structure */ comp->type = buffer_get_int(&b); comp->enabled = buffer_get_int(&b); comp->name = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); len = buffer_len(&b); if (len != 0) error("newkeys_from_blob: remaining bytes in blob %u", len); buffer_free(&b); return (newkey); } int mm_newkeys_to_blob(int mode, u_char **blobp, u_int *lenp) { Buffer b; int len; Enc *enc; Mac *mac; Comp *comp; Newkeys *newkey = (Newkeys *)packet_get_newkeys(mode); debug3("%s: converting %p", __func__, newkey); if (newkey == NULL) { error("%s: newkey == NULL", __func__); return 0; } enc = &newkey->enc; mac = &newkey->mac; comp = &newkey->comp; buffer_init(&b); /* Enc structure */ buffer_put_cstring(&b, enc->name); /* The cipher struct is constant and shared, you export pointer */ buffer_append(&b, &enc->cipher, sizeof(enc->cipher)); buffer_put_int(&b, enc->enabled); buffer_put_int(&b, enc->block_size); buffer_put_string(&b, enc->key, enc->key_len); packet_get_keyiv(mode, enc->iv, enc->iv_len); buffer_put_string(&b, enc->iv, enc->iv_len); /* Mac structure */ if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) { buffer_put_cstring(&b, mac->name); buffer_put_int(&b, mac->enabled); buffer_put_string(&b, mac->key, mac->key_len); } /* Comp structure */ buffer_put_int(&b, comp->type); buffer_put_int(&b, comp->enabled); buffer_put_cstring(&b, comp->name); len = buffer_len(&b); if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; if (blobp != NULL) { *blobp = xmalloc(len); memcpy(*blobp, buffer_ptr(&b), len); } explicit_bzero(buffer_ptr(&b), len); buffer_free(&b); return len; } static void mm_send_kex(Buffer *m, Kex *kex) { buffer_put_string(m, kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len); buffer_put_int(m, kex->we_need); buffer_put_int(m, kex->hostkey_type); buffer_put_int(m, kex->kex_type); buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&kex->my), buffer_len(&kex->my)); buffer_put_string(m, buffer_ptr(&kex->peer), buffer_len(&kex->peer)); buffer_put_int(m, kex->flags); buffer_put_cstring(m, kex->client_version_string); buffer_put_cstring(m, kex->server_version_string); } void mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor) { Buffer m, *input, *output; u_char *blob, *p; u_int bloblen, plen; u_int32_t seqnr, packets; u_int64_t blocks, bytes; buffer_init(&m); if (!compat20) { u_char iv[24]; u_char *key; u_int ivlen, keylen; buffer_put_int(&m, packet_get_protocol_flags()); buffer_put_int(&m, packet_get_ssh1_cipher()); debug3("%s: Sending ssh1 KEY+IV", __func__); keylen = packet_get_encryption_key(NULL); key = xmalloc(keylen+1); /* add 1 if keylen == 0 */ keylen = packet_get_encryption_key(key); buffer_put_string(&m, key, keylen); explicit_bzero(key, keylen); free(key); ivlen = packet_get_keyiv_len(MODE_OUT); packet_get_keyiv(MODE_OUT, iv, ivlen); buffer_put_string(&m, iv, ivlen); ivlen = packet_get_keyiv_len(MODE_IN); packet_get_keyiv(MODE_IN, iv, ivlen); buffer_put_string(&m, iv, ivlen); goto skip; } else { /* Kex for rekeying */ mm_send_kex(&m, *monitor->m_pkex); } debug3("%s: Sending new keys: %p %p", __func__, packet_get_newkeys(MODE_OUT), packet_get_newkeys(MODE_IN)); /* Keys from Kex */ if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_OUT, &blob, &bloblen)) fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__); buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen); free(blob); if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_IN, &blob, &bloblen)) fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__); buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen); free(blob); packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes); buffer_put_int(&m, seqnr); buffer_put_int64(&m, blocks); buffer_put_int(&m, packets); buffer_put_int64(&m, bytes); packet_get_state(MODE_IN, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes); buffer_put_int(&m, seqnr); buffer_put_int64(&m, blocks); buffer_put_int(&m, packets); buffer_put_int64(&m, bytes); debug3("%s: New keys have been sent", __func__); skip: /* More key context */ plen = packet_get_keycontext(MODE_OUT, NULL); p = xmalloc(plen+1); packet_get_keycontext(MODE_OUT, p); buffer_put_string(&m, p, plen); free(p); plen = packet_get_keycontext(MODE_IN, NULL); p = xmalloc(plen+1); packet_get_keycontext(MODE_IN, p); buffer_put_string(&m, p, plen); free(p); /* Compression state */ debug3("%s: Sending compression state", __func__); buffer_put_string(&m, &outgoing_stream, sizeof(outgoing_stream)); buffer_put_string(&m, &incoming_stream, sizeof(incoming_stream)); /* Network I/O buffers */ input = (Buffer *)packet_get_input(); output = (Buffer *)packet_get_output(); buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(input), buffer_len(input)); buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(output), buffer_len(output)); /* Roaming */ if (compat20) { buffer_put_int64(&m, get_sent_bytes()); buffer_put_int64(&m, get_recv_bytes()); } mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, &m); debug3("%s: Finished sending state", __func__); buffer_free(&m); } int mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen) { Buffer m; char *p, *msg; int success = 0, tmp1 = -1, tmp2 = -1; /* Kludge: ensure there are fds free to receive the pty/tty */ if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 || (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) { error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__); if (tmp1 > 0) close(tmp1); if (tmp2 > 0) close(tmp2); return 0; } close(tmp1); close(tmp2); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PTY", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, &m); success = buffer_get_int(&m); if (success == 0) { debug3("%s: pty alloc failed", __func__); buffer_free(&m); return (0); } p = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); msg = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); strlcpy(namebuf, p, namebuflen); /* Possible truncation */ free(p); buffer_append(&loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg)); free(msg); if ((*ptyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 || (*ttyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) fatal("%s: receive fds failed", __func__); /* Success */ return (1); } void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s) { Buffer m; if (s->ttyfd == -1) return; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, s->tty); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, &m); buffer_free(&m); /* closed dup'ed master */ if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) < 0) error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s", s->ptymaster, strerror(errno)); /* unlink pty from session */ s->ttyfd = -1; } #ifdef USE_PAM void mm_start_pam(Authctxt *authctxt) { Buffer m; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (!options.use_pam) fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, &m); buffer_free(&m); } u_int mm_do_pam_account(void) { Buffer m; u_int ret; char *msg; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if (!options.use_pam) fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, &m); ret = buffer_get_int(&m); msg = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_append(&loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg)); free(msg); buffer_free(&m); debug3("%s returning %d", __func__, ret); return (ret); } void * mm_sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt) { Buffer m; int success; debug3("%s", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, authctxt->user); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, &m); success = buffer_get_int(&m); if (success == 0) { debug3("%s: pam_init_ctx failed", __func__); buffer_free(&m); return (NULL); } buffer_free(&m); return (authctxt); } int mm_sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info, u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) { Buffer m; u_int i; int ret; debug3("%s", __func__); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, &m); ret = buffer_get_int(&m); debug3("%s: pam_query returned %d", __func__, ret); *name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); *info = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); *num = buffer_get_int(&m); if (*num > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG) fatal("%s: recieved %u PAM messages, expected <= %u", __func__, *num, PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG); *prompts = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(char *)); *echo_on = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(u_int)); for (i = 0; i < *num; ++i) { (*prompts)[i] = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); (*echo_on)[i] = buffer_get_int(&m); } buffer_free(&m); return (ret); } int mm_sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp) { Buffer m; u_int i; int ret; debug3("%s", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, num); for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) buffer_put_cstring(&m, resp[i]); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, &m); ret = buffer_get_int(&m); debug3("%s: pam_respond returned %d", __func__, ret); buffer_free(&m); return (ret); } void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp) { Buffer m; debug3("%s", __func__); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, &m); debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX", __func__); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, &m); buffer_free(&m); } #endif /* USE_PAM */ /* Request process termination */ void mm_terminate(void) { Buffer m; buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, &m); buffer_free(&m); } +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 int mm_ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *num) { int rsafail; Buffer m; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_bignum2(&m, num); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SESSKEY, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SESSKEY, &m); rsafail = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_get_bignum2(&m, num); buffer_free(&m); return (rsafail); } +#endif static void mm_chall_setup(char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) { *name = xstrdup(""); *infotxt = xstrdup(""); *numprompts = 1; *prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *)); *echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int)); (*echo_on)[0] = 0; } int mm_bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) { Buffer m; u_int success; char *challenge; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, &m); success = buffer_get_int(&m); if (success == 0) { debug3("%s: no challenge", __func__); buffer_free(&m); return (-1); } /* Get the challenge, and format the response */ challenge = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on); (*prompts)[0] = challenge; debug3("%s: received challenge: %s", __func__, challenge); return (0); } int mm_bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses) { Buffer m; int authok; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); if (numresponses != 1) return (-1); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, responses[0]); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, &m); authok = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); return ((authok == 0) ? -1 : 0); } #ifdef SKEY int mm_skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on) { Buffer m; u_int success; char *challenge; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SKEYQUERY, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYQUERY, &m); success = buffer_get_int(&m); if (success == 0) { debug3("%s: no challenge", __func__); buffer_free(&m); return (-1); } /* Get the challenge, and format the response */ challenge = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); debug3("%s: received challenge: %s", __func__, challenge); mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on); xasprintf(*prompts, "%s%s", challenge, SKEY_PROMPT); free(challenge); return (0); } int mm_skey_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses) { Buffer m; int authok; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); if (numresponses != 1) return (-1); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, responses[0]); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SKEYRESPOND, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SKEYRESPOND, &m); authok = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); return ((authok == 0) ? -1 : 0); } #endif /* SKEY */ void mm_ssh1_session_id(u_char session_id[16]) { Buffer m; int i; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) buffer_put_char(&m, session_id[i]); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SESSID, &m); buffer_free(&m); } +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 int mm_auth_rsa_key_allowed(struct passwd *pw, BIGNUM *client_n, Key **rkey) { Buffer m; Key *key; u_char *blob; u_int blen; int allowed = 0, have_forced = 0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_bignum2(&m, client_n); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSAKEYALLOWED, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSAKEYALLOWED, &m); allowed = buffer_get_int(&m); /* fake forced command */ auth_clear_options(); have_forced = buffer_get_int(&m); forced_command = have_forced ? xstrdup("true") : NULL; if (allowed && rkey != NULL) { blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &blen); if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) == NULL) fatal("%s: key_from_blob failed", __func__); *rkey = key; free(blob); } buffer_free(&m); return (allowed); } BIGNUM * mm_auth_rsa_generate_challenge(Key *key) { Buffer m; BIGNUM *challenge; u_char *blob; u_int blen; debug3("%s entering", __func__); if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX cheat for key_to_blob */ if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0) fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__); key->type = KEY_RSA1; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_string(&m, blob, blen); free(blob); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSACHALLENGE, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSACHALLENGE, &m); buffer_get_bignum2(&m, challenge); buffer_free(&m); return (challenge); } int mm_auth_rsa_verify_response(Key *key, BIGNUM *p, u_char response[16]) { Buffer m; u_char *blob; u_int blen; int success = 0; debug3("%s entering", __func__); key->type = KEY_RSA; /* XXX cheat for key_to_blob */ if (key_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen) == 0) fatal("%s: key_to_blob failed", __func__); key->type = KEY_RSA1; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_string(&m, blob, blen); buffer_put_string(&m, response, 16); free(blob); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_RSARESPONSE, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_RSARESPONSE, &m); success = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); return (success); } +#endif #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS void mm_audit_event(ssh_audit_event_t event) { Buffer m; debug3("%s entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, event); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, &m); buffer_free(&m); } void mm_audit_run_command(const char *command) { Buffer m; debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, command); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, &m); buffer_free(&m); } #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */ #ifdef GSSAPI OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID goid) { Buffer m; OM_uint32 major; /* Client doesn't get to see the context */ *ctx = NULL; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_string(&m, goid->elements, goid->length); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, &m); major = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); return (major); } OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *in, gss_buffer_desc *out, OM_uint32 *flags) { Buffer m; OM_uint32 major; u_int len; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_string(&m, in->value, in->length); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, &m); major = buffer_get_int(&m); out->value = buffer_get_string(&m, &len); out->length = len; if (flags) *flags = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); return (major); } OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic) { Buffer m; OM_uint32 major; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_string(&m, gssbuf->value, gssbuf->length); buffer_put_string(&m, gssmic->value, gssmic->length); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, &m); major = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); return(major); } int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user) { Buffer m; int authenticated = 0; buffer_init(&m); mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, &m); mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, &m); authenticated = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not "); return (authenticated); } #endif /* GSSAPI */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/mux.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/mux.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/mux.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,2102 +1,2187 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.44 2013/07/12 00:19:58 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.48 2014/07/17 07:22:19 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* ssh session multiplexing support */ /* * TODO: * - Better signalling from master to slave, especially passing of * error messages * - Better fall-back from mux slave error to new connection. * - ExitOnForwardingFailure * - Maybe extension mechanisms for multi-X11/multi-agent forwarding * - Support ~^Z in mux slaves. * - Inspect or control sessions in master. * - If we ever support the "signal" channel request, send signals on * sessions in master. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #else # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H # include # endif #endif #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H # include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "misc.h" #include "match.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "channels.h" #include "msg.h" #include "packet.h" #include "monitor_fdpass.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "key.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "clientloop.h" /* from ssh.c */ extern int tty_flag; extern Options options; extern int stdin_null_flag; extern char *host; extern int subsystem_flag; extern Buffer command; extern volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; extern char *stdio_forward_host; extern int stdio_forward_port; /* Context for session open confirmation callback */ struct mux_session_confirm_ctx { u_int want_tty; u_int want_subsys; u_int want_x_fwd; u_int want_agent_fwd; Buffer cmd; char *term; struct termios tio; char **env; u_int rid; }; +/* Context for stdio fwd open confirmation callback */ +struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx { + u_int rid; +}; + /* Context for global channel callback */ struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx { u_int cid; /* channel id */ u_int rid; /* request id */ int fid; /* forward id */ }; /* fd to control socket */ int muxserver_sock = -1; /* client request id */ u_int muxclient_request_id = 0; /* Multiplexing control command */ u_int muxclient_command = 0; /* Set when signalled. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t muxclient_terminate = 0; /* PID of multiplex server */ static u_int muxserver_pid = 0; static Channel *mux_listener_channel = NULL; struct mux_master_state { int hello_rcvd; }; /* mux protocol messages */ #define MUX_MSG_HELLO 0x00000001 #define MUX_C_NEW_SESSION 0x10000002 #define MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK 0x10000004 #define MUX_C_TERMINATE 0x10000005 #define MUX_C_OPEN_FWD 0x10000006 #define MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD 0x10000007 #define MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD 0x10000008 #define MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING 0x10000009 #define MUX_S_OK 0x80000001 #define MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED 0x80000002 #define MUX_S_FAILURE 0x80000003 #define MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE 0x80000004 #define MUX_S_ALIVE 0x80000005 #define MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED 0x80000006 #define MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT 0x80000007 #define MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL 0x80000008 /* type codes for MUX_C_OPEN_FWD and MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD */ #define MUX_FWD_LOCAL 1 #define MUX_FWD_REMOTE 2 #define MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC 3 static void mux_session_confirm(int, int, void *); +static void mux_stdio_confirm(int, int, void *); static int process_mux_master_hello(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); static int process_mux_new_session(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); static int process_mux_alive_check(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); static int process_mux_terminate(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); static int process_mux_open_fwd(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); static int process_mux_close_fwd(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); static int process_mux_stdio_fwd(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); static int process_mux_stop_listening(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); static const struct { u_int type; int (*handler)(u_int, Channel *, Buffer *, Buffer *); } mux_master_handlers[] = { { MUX_MSG_HELLO, process_mux_master_hello }, { MUX_C_NEW_SESSION, process_mux_new_session }, { MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK, process_mux_alive_check }, { MUX_C_TERMINATE, process_mux_terminate }, { MUX_C_OPEN_FWD, process_mux_open_fwd }, { MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD, process_mux_close_fwd }, { MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD, process_mux_stdio_fwd }, { MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING, process_mux_stop_listening }, { 0, NULL } }; /* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux slave _session_ channel */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void mux_master_session_cleanup_cb(int cid, void *unused) { Channel *cc, *c = channel_by_id(cid); debug3("%s: entering for channel %d", __func__, cid); if (c == NULL) fatal("%s: channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", __func__, cid); if (c->ctl_chan != -1) { if ((cc = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d missing control channel %d", __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan); c->ctl_chan = -1; cc->remote_id = -1; chan_rcvd_oclose(cc); } channel_cancel_cleanup(c->self); } /* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux slave _control_ channel */ /* ARGSUSED */ static void mux_master_control_cleanup_cb(int cid, void *unused) { Channel *sc, *c = channel_by_id(cid); debug3("%s: entering for channel %d", __func__, cid); if (c == NULL) fatal("%s: channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", __func__, cid); if (c->remote_id != -1) { if ((sc = channel_by_id(c->remote_id)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d missing session channel %d", __func__, c->self, c->remote_id); c->remote_id = -1; sc->ctl_chan = -1; if (sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN && sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) { debug2("%s: channel %d: not open", __func__, sc->self); chan_mark_dead(sc); } else { if (sc->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) chan_read_failed(sc); if (sc->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) chan_write_failed(sc); } } channel_cancel_cleanup(c->self); } /* Check mux client environment variables before passing them to mux master. */ static int env_permitted(char *env) { int i, ret; char name[1024], *cp; if ((cp = strchr(env, '=')) == NULL || cp == env) return 0; ret = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%.*s", (int)(cp - env), env); if (ret <= 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(name)) { error("env_permitted: name '%.100s...' too long", env); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_send_env; i++) if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[i])) return 1; return 0; } /* Mux master protocol message handlers */ static int process_mux_master_hello(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { u_int ver; struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx; if (state == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d: c->mux_ctx == NULL", __func__, c->self); if (state->hello_rcvd) { error("%s: HELLO received twice", __func__); return -1; } if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ver, m) != 0) { malf: error("%s: malformed message", __func__); return -1; } if (ver != SSHMUX_VER) { error("Unsupported multiplexing protocol version %d " "(expected %d)", ver, SSHMUX_VER); return -1; } debug2("%s: channel %d slave version %u", __func__, c->self, ver); /* No extensions are presently defined */ while (buffer_len(m) > 0) { char *name = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL); char *value = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL); if (name == NULL || value == NULL) { free(name); free(value); goto malf; } debug2("Unrecognised slave extension \"%s\"", name); free(name); free(value); } state->hello_rcvd = 1; return 0; } static int process_mux_new_session(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { Channel *nc; struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx; char *reserved, *cmd, *cp; u_int i, j, len, env_len, escape_char, window, packetmax; int new_fd[3]; /* Reply for SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN */ cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx)); cctx->term = NULL; cctx->rid = rid; cmd = reserved = NULL; cctx->env = NULL; env_len = 0; if ((reserved = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || buffer_get_int_ret(&cctx->want_tty, m) != 0 || buffer_get_int_ret(&cctx->want_x_fwd, m) != 0 || buffer_get_int_ret(&cctx->want_agent_fwd, m) != 0 || buffer_get_int_ret(&cctx->want_subsys, m) != 0 || buffer_get_int_ret(&escape_char, m) != 0 || (cctx->term = buffer_get_string_ret(m, &len)) == NULL || (cmd = buffer_get_string_ret(m, &len)) == NULL) { malf: free(cmd); free(reserved); for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++) free(cctx->env[j]); free(cctx->env); free(cctx->term); free(cctx); error("%s: malformed message", __func__); return -1; } free(reserved); reserved = NULL; while (buffer_len(m) > 0) { #define MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS 4096 if ((cp = buffer_get_string_ret(m, &len)) == NULL) goto malf; if (!env_permitted(cp)) { free(cp); continue; } cctx->env = xrealloc(cctx->env, env_len + 2, sizeof(*cctx->env)); cctx->env[env_len++] = cp; cctx->env[env_len] = NULL; if (env_len > MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS) { error(">%d environment variables received, ignoring " "additional", MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS); break; } } debug2("%s: channel %d: request tty %d, X %d, agent %d, subsys %d, " "term \"%s\", cmd \"%s\", env %u", __func__, c->self, cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_x_fwd, cctx->want_agent_fwd, cctx->want_subsys, cctx->term, cmd, env_len); buffer_init(&cctx->cmd); buffer_append(&cctx->cmd, cmd, strlen(cmd)); free(cmd); cmd = NULL; /* Gather fds from client */ for(i = 0; i < 3; i++) { if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(c->sock)) == -1) { error("%s: failed to receive fd %d from slave", __func__, i); for (j = 0; j < i; j++) close(new_fd[j]); for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++) free(cctx->env[j]); free(cctx->env); free(cctx->term); buffer_free(&cctx->cmd); free(cctx); /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "did not receive file descriptors"); return -1; } } debug3("%s: got fds stdin %d, stdout %d, stderr %d", __func__, new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2]); /* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */ if (c->remote_id != -1) { debug2("%s: session already open", __func__); /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Multiple sessions not supported"); cleanup: close(new_fd[0]); close(new_fd[1]); close(new_fd[2]); free(cctx->term); if (env_len != 0) { for (i = 0; i < env_len; i++) free(cctx->env[i]); free(cctx->env); } buffer_free(&cctx->cmd); free(cctx); return 0; } if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Allow shared connection to %s? ", host)) { debug2("%s: session refused by user", __func__); /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied"); goto cleanup; } } /* Try to pick up ttymodes from client before it goes raw */ if (cctx->want_tty && tcgetattr(new_fd[0], &cctx->tio) == -1) error("%s: tcgetattr: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); /* enable nonblocking unless tty */ if (!isatty(new_fd[0])) set_nonblock(new_fd[0]); if (!isatty(new_fd[1])) set_nonblock(new_fd[1]); if (!isatty(new_fd[2])) set_nonblock(new_fd[2]); window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT; packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT; if (cctx->want_tty) { window >>= 1; packetmax >>= 1; } nc = channel_new("session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2], window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", /*nonblock*/0); nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */ c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */ if (cctx->want_tty && escape_char != 0xffffffff) { channel_register_filter(nc->self, client_simple_escape_filter, NULL, client_filter_cleanup, client_new_escape_filter_ctx((int)escape_char)); } debug2("%s: channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d", __func__, nc->self, nc->ctl_chan); channel_send_open(nc->self); channel_register_open_confirm(nc->self, mux_session_confirm, cctx); c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */ channel_register_cleanup(nc->self, mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1); /* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */ return 0; } static int process_mux_alive_check(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { debug2("%s: channel %d: alive check", __func__, c->self); /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_ALIVE); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_int(r, (u_int)getpid()); return 0; } static int process_mux_terminate(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { debug2("%s: channel %d: terminate request", __func__, c->self); if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Terminate shared connection to %s? ", host)) { debug2("%s: termination refused by user", __func__); buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied"); return 0; } } quit_pending = 1; buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK); buffer_put_int(r, rid); /* XXX exit happens too soon - message never makes it to client */ return 0; } static char * -format_forward(u_int ftype, Forward *fwd) +format_forward(u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd) { char *ret; switch (ftype) { case MUX_FWD_LOCAL: xasprintf(&ret, "local forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d", + (fwd->listen_path != NULL) ? fwd->listen_path : (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ? - (options.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") : + (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") : fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, + (fwd->connect_path != NULL) ? fwd->connect_path : fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port); break; case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC: xasprintf(&ret, "dynamic forward %.200s:%d -> *", (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ? - (options.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") : + (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") : fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port); break; case MUX_FWD_REMOTE: xasprintf(&ret, "remote forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d", + (fwd->listen_path != NULL) ? fwd->listen_path : (fwd->listen_host == NULL) ? "LOCALHOST" : fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, + (fwd->connect_path != NULL) ? fwd->connect_path : fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port); break; default: fatal("%s: unknown forward type %u", __func__, ftype); } return ret; } static int compare_host(const char *a, const char *b) { if (a == NULL && b == NULL) return 1; if (a == NULL || b == NULL) return 0; return strcmp(a, b) == 0; } static int -compare_forward(Forward *a, Forward *b) +compare_forward(struct Forward *a, struct Forward *b) { if (!compare_host(a->listen_host, b->listen_host)) return 0; + if (!compare_host(a->listen_path, b->listen_path)) + return 0; if (a->listen_port != b->listen_port) return 0; if (!compare_host(a->connect_host, b->connect_host)) return 0; + if (!compare_host(a->connect_path, b->connect_path)) + return 0; if (a->connect_port != b->connect_port) return 0; return 1; } static void mux_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx = ctxt; char *failmsg = NULL; - Forward *rfwd; + struct Forward *rfwd; Channel *c; Buffer out; if ((c = channel_by_id(fctx->cid)) == NULL) { /* no channel for reply */ error("%s: unknown channel", __func__); return; } buffer_init(&out); if (fctx->fid >= options.num_remote_forwards) { xasprintf(&failmsg, "unknown forwarding id %d", fctx->fid); goto fail; } rfwd = &options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid]; debug("%s: %s for: listen %d, connect %s:%d", __func__, type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure", - rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); + rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path : + rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) { if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) { rfwd->allocated_port = packet_get_int(); logit("Allocated port %u for mux remote forward" " to %s:%d", rfwd->allocated_port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT); buffer_put_int(&out, fctx->rid); buffer_put_int(&out, rfwd->allocated_port); channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle, rfwd->allocated_port); } else { buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_OK); buffer_put_int(&out, fctx->rid); } goto out; } else { if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle, -1); - xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for " - "listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); + if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL) + xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for " + "listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path); + else + xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for " + "listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); } fail: error("%s: %s", __func__, failmsg); buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(&out, fctx->rid); buffer_put_cstring(&out, failmsg); free(failmsg); out: buffer_put_string(&c->output, buffer_ptr(&out), buffer_len(&out)); buffer_free(&out); if (c->mux_pause <= 0) fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, c->mux_pause); c->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */ } static int process_mux_open_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { - Forward fwd; + struct Forward fwd; char *fwd_desc = NULL; + char *listen_addr, *connect_addr; u_int ftype; u_int lport, cport; int i, ret = 0, freefwd = 1; - fwd.listen_host = fwd.connect_host = NULL; + /* XXX - lport/cport check redundant */ if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ftype, m) != 0 || - (fwd.listen_host = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || + (listen_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || buffer_get_int_ret(&lport, m) != 0 || - (fwd.connect_host = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || + (connect_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || buffer_get_int_ret(&cport, m) != 0 || - lport > 65535 || cport > 65535) { + (lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) || + (cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) { error("%s: malformed message", __func__); ret = -1; goto out; } - fwd.listen_port = lport; - fwd.connect_port = cport; - if (*fwd.listen_host == '\0') { - free(fwd.listen_host); - fwd.listen_host = NULL; + if (*listen_addr == '\0') { + free(listen_addr); + listen_addr = NULL; } - if (*fwd.connect_host == '\0') { - free(fwd.connect_host); - fwd.connect_host = NULL; + if (*connect_addr == '\0') { + free(connect_addr); + connect_addr = NULL; } + memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); + fwd.listen_port = lport; + if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) + fwd.listen_path = listen_addr; + else + fwd.listen_host = listen_addr; + fwd.connect_port = cport; + if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) + fwd.connect_path = connect_addr; + else + fwd.connect_host = connect_addr; + debug2("%s: channel %d: request %s", __func__, c->self, (fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd))); if (ftype != MUX_FWD_LOCAL && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE && ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) { logit("%s: invalid forwarding type %u", __func__, ftype); invalid: - free(fwd.listen_host); - free(fwd.connect_host); + free(listen_addr); + free(connect_addr); buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Invalid forwarding request"); return 0; } - if (fwd.listen_port >= 65536) { + if (ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.listen_path) { + logit("%s: streamlocal and dynamic forwards " + "are mutually exclusive", __func__); + goto invalid; + } + if (fwd.listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && fwd.listen_port >= 65536) { logit("%s: invalid listen port %u", __func__, fwd.listen_port); goto invalid; } - if (fwd.connect_port >= 65536 || (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && - ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE && fwd.connect_port == 0)) { + if ((fwd.connect_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && fwd.connect_port >= 65536) + || (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE && fwd.connect_port == 0)) { logit("%s: invalid connect port %u", __func__, fwd.connect_port); goto invalid; } - if (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.connect_host == NULL) { + if (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.connect_host == NULL && fwd.connect_path == NULL) { logit("%s: missing connect host", __func__); goto invalid; } /* Skip forwards that have already been requested */ switch (ftype) { case MUX_FWD_LOCAL: case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC: for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { if (compare_forward(&fwd, options.local_forwards + i)) { exists: debug2("%s: found existing forwarding", __func__); buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK); buffer_put_int(r, rid); goto out; } } break; case MUX_FWD_REMOTE: for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { if (compare_forward(&fwd, options.remote_forwards + i)) { if (fwd.listen_port != 0) goto exists; debug2("%s: found allocated port", __func__); buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_int(r, options.remote_forwards[i].allocated_port); goto out; } } break; } if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Open %s on %s?", fwd_desc, host)) { debug2("%s: forwarding refused by user", __func__); buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied"); goto out; } } if (ftype == MUX_FWD_LOCAL || ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) { - if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(fwd.listen_host, - fwd.listen_port, fwd.connect_host, fwd.connect_port, - options.gateway_ports)) { + if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(&fwd, + &options.fwd_opts)) { fail: logit("slave-requested %s failed", fwd_desc); buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Port forwarding failed"); goto out; } add_local_forward(&options, &fwd); freefwd = 0; } else { struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx; - fwd.handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding(fwd.listen_host, - fwd.listen_port, fwd.connect_host, fwd.connect_port); + fwd.handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding(&fwd); if (fwd.handle < 0) goto fail; add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd); fctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*fctx)); fctx->cid = c->self; fctx->rid = rid; fctx->fid = options.num_remote_forwards - 1; client_register_global_confirm(mux_confirm_remote_forward, fctx); freefwd = 0; c->mux_pause = 1; /* wait for mux_confirm_remote_forward */ /* delayed reply in mux_confirm_remote_forward */ goto out; } buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK); buffer_put_int(r, rid); out: free(fwd_desc); if (freefwd) { free(fwd.listen_host); + free(fwd.listen_path); free(fwd.connect_host); + free(fwd.connect_path); } return ret; } static int process_mux_close_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { - Forward fwd, *found_fwd; + struct Forward fwd, *found_fwd; char *fwd_desc = NULL; const char *error_reason = NULL; + char *listen_addr = NULL, *connect_addr = NULL; u_int ftype; - int i, listen_port, ret = 0; + int i, ret = 0; u_int lport, cport; - fwd.listen_host = fwd.connect_host = NULL; if (buffer_get_int_ret(&ftype, m) != 0 || - (fwd.listen_host = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || + (listen_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || buffer_get_int_ret(&lport, m) != 0 || - (fwd.connect_host = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || + (connect_addr = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || buffer_get_int_ret(&cport, m) != 0 || - lport > 65535 || cport > 65535) { + (lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) || + (cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) { error("%s: malformed message", __func__); ret = -1; goto out; } - fwd.listen_port = lport; - fwd.connect_port = cport; - if (*fwd.listen_host == '\0') { - free(fwd.listen_host); - fwd.listen_host = NULL; + if (*listen_addr == '\0') { + free(listen_addr); + listen_addr = NULL; } - if (*fwd.connect_host == '\0') { - free(fwd.connect_host); - fwd.connect_host = NULL; + if (*connect_addr == '\0') { + free(connect_addr); + connect_addr = NULL; } + memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); + fwd.listen_port = lport; + if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) + fwd.listen_path = listen_addr; + else + fwd.listen_host = listen_addr; + fwd.connect_port = cport; + if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) + fwd.connect_path = connect_addr; + else + fwd.connect_host = connect_addr; + debug2("%s: channel %d: request cancel %s", __func__, c->self, (fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd))); /* make sure this has been requested */ found_fwd = NULL; switch (ftype) { case MUX_FWD_LOCAL: case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC: for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { if (compare_forward(&fwd, options.local_forwards + i)) { found_fwd = options.local_forwards + i; break; } } break; case MUX_FWD_REMOTE: for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { if (compare_forward(&fwd, options.remote_forwards + i)) { found_fwd = options.remote_forwards + i; break; } } break; } if (found_fwd == NULL) error_reason = "port not forwarded"; else if (ftype == MUX_FWD_REMOTE) { /* * This shouldn't fail unless we confused the host/port * between options.remote_forwards and permitted_opens. * However, for dynamic allocated listen ports we need - * to lookup the actual listen port. + * to use the actual listen port. */ - listen_port = (fwd.listen_port == 0) ? - found_fwd->allocated_port : fwd.listen_port; - if (channel_request_rforward_cancel(fwd.listen_host, - listen_port) == -1) + if (channel_request_rforward_cancel(found_fwd) == -1) error_reason = "port not in permitted opens"; } else { /* local and dynamic forwards */ /* Ditto */ - if (channel_cancel_lport_listener(fwd.listen_host, - fwd.listen_port, fwd.connect_port, - options.gateway_ports) == -1) + if (channel_cancel_lport_listener(&fwd, fwd.connect_port, + &options.fwd_opts) == -1) error_reason = "port not found"; } if (error_reason == NULL) { buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK); buffer_put_int(r, rid); free(found_fwd->listen_host); + free(found_fwd->listen_path); free(found_fwd->connect_host); + free(found_fwd->connect_path); found_fwd->listen_host = found_fwd->connect_host = NULL; + found_fwd->listen_path = found_fwd->connect_path = NULL; found_fwd->listen_port = found_fwd->connect_port = 0; } else { buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, error_reason); } out: free(fwd_desc); - free(fwd.listen_host); - free(fwd.connect_host); + free(listen_addr); + free(connect_addr); return ret; } static int process_mux_stdio_fwd(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { Channel *nc; char *reserved, *chost; u_int cport, i, j; int new_fd[2]; + struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx; chost = reserved = NULL; if ((reserved = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || (chost = buffer_get_string_ret(m, NULL)) == NULL || buffer_get_int_ret(&cport, m) != 0) { free(reserved); free(chost); error("%s: malformed message", __func__); return -1; } free(reserved); debug2("%s: channel %d: request stdio fwd to %s:%u", __func__, c->self, chost, cport); /* Gather fds from client */ for(i = 0; i < 2; i++) { if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(c->sock)) == -1) { error("%s: failed to receive fd %d from slave", __func__, i); for (j = 0; j < i; j++) close(new_fd[j]); free(chost); /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "did not receive file descriptors"); return -1; } } debug3("%s: got fds stdin %d, stdout %d", __func__, new_fd[0], new_fd[1]); /* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */ if (c->remote_id != -1) { debug2("%s: session already open", __func__); /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Multiple sessions not supported"); cleanup: close(new_fd[0]); close(new_fd[1]); free(chost); return 0; } if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Allow forward to %s:%u? ", chost, cport)) { debug2("%s: stdio fwd refused by user", __func__); /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied"); goto cleanup; } } /* enable nonblocking unless tty */ if (!isatty(new_fd[0])) set_nonblock(new_fd[0]); if (!isatty(new_fd[1])) set_nonblock(new_fd[1]); nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1]); nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */ c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */ debug2("%s: channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d", __func__, nc->self, nc->ctl_chan); channel_register_cleanup(nc->self, mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1); - /* prepare reply */ - /* XXX defer until channel confirmed */ - buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED); - buffer_put_int(r, rid); - buffer_put_int(r, nc->self); + cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx)); + cctx->rid = rid; + channel_register_open_confirm(nc->self, mux_stdio_confirm, cctx); + c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */ + /* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */ return 0; } +/* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux stdio fwd session. */ +static void +mux_stdio_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg) +{ + struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg; + Channel *c, *cc; + Buffer reply; + + if (cctx == NULL) + fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__); + if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id); + if ((cc = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) + fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__, + id, c->ctl_chan); + + if (!success) { + debug3("%s: sending failure reply", __func__); + /* prepare reply */ + buffer_init(&reply); + buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_FAILURE); + buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid); + buffer_put_cstring(&reply, "Session open refused by peer"); + goto done; + } + + debug3("%s: sending success reply", __func__); + /* prepare reply */ + buffer_init(&reply); + buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED); + buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid); + buffer_put_int(&reply, c->self); + + done: + /* Send reply */ + buffer_put_string(&cc->output, buffer_ptr(&reply), buffer_len(&reply)); + buffer_free(&reply); + + if (cc->mux_pause <= 0) + fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, cc->mux_pause); + cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */ + c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL; + free(cctx); +} + static int process_mux_stop_listening(u_int rid, Channel *c, Buffer *m, Buffer *r) { debug("%s: channel %d: stop listening", __func__, c->self); if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) { if (!ask_permission("Disable further multiplexing on shared " "connection to %s? ", host)) { debug2("%s: stop listen refused by user", __func__); buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED); buffer_put_int(r, rid); buffer_put_cstring(r, "Permission denied"); return 0; } } if (mux_listener_channel != NULL) { channel_free(mux_listener_channel); client_stop_mux(); free(options.control_path); options.control_path = NULL; mux_listener_channel = NULL; muxserver_sock = -1; } /* prepare reply */ buffer_put_int(r, MUX_S_OK); buffer_put_int(r, rid); return 0; } /* Channel callbacks fired on read/write from mux slave fd */ static int mux_master_read_cb(Channel *c) { struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx; Buffer in, out; - void *ptr; + const u_char *ptr; u_int type, rid, have, i; int ret = -1; /* Setup ctx and */ if (c->mux_ctx == NULL) { state = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*state)); c->mux_ctx = state; channel_register_cleanup(c->self, mux_master_control_cleanup_cb, 0); /* Send hello */ buffer_init(&out); buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_MSG_HELLO); buffer_put_int(&out, SSHMUX_VER); /* no extensions */ buffer_put_string(&c->output, buffer_ptr(&out), buffer_len(&out)); buffer_free(&out); debug3("%s: channel %d: hello sent", __func__, c->self); return 0; } buffer_init(&in); buffer_init(&out); /* Channel code ensures that we receive whole packets */ if ((ptr = buffer_get_string_ptr_ret(&c->input, &have)) == NULL) { malf: error("%s: malformed message", __func__); goto out; } buffer_append(&in, ptr, have); if (buffer_get_int_ret(&type, &in) != 0) goto malf; debug3("%s: channel %d packet type 0x%08x len %u", __func__, c->self, type, buffer_len(&in)); if (type == MUX_MSG_HELLO) rid = 0; else { if (!state->hello_rcvd) { error("%s: expected MUX_MSG_HELLO(0x%08x), " "received 0x%08x", __func__, MUX_MSG_HELLO, type); goto out; } if (buffer_get_int_ret(&rid, &in) != 0) goto malf; } for (i = 0; mux_master_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) { if (type == mux_master_handlers[i].type) { ret = mux_master_handlers[i].handler(rid, c, &in, &out); break; } } if (mux_master_handlers[i].handler == NULL) { error("%s: unsupported mux message 0x%08x", __func__, type); buffer_put_int(&out, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(&out, rid); buffer_put_cstring(&out, "unsupported request"); ret = 0; } /* Enqueue reply packet */ if (buffer_len(&out) != 0) { buffer_put_string(&c->output, buffer_ptr(&out), buffer_len(&out)); } out: buffer_free(&in); buffer_free(&out); return ret; } void mux_exit_message(Channel *c, int exitval) { Buffer m; Channel *mux_chan; debug3("%s: channel %d: exit message, exitval %d", __func__, c->self, exitval); if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d missing mux channel %d", __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan); /* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */ buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE); buffer_put_int(&m, c->self); buffer_put_int(&m, exitval); buffer_put_string(&mux_chan->output, buffer_ptr(&m), buffer_len(&m)); buffer_free(&m); } void mux_tty_alloc_failed(Channel *c) { Buffer m; Channel *mux_chan; debug3("%s: channel %d: TTY alloc failed", __func__, c->self); if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d missing mux channel %d", __func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan); /* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */ buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL); buffer_put_int(&m, c->self); buffer_put_string(&mux_chan->output, buffer_ptr(&m), buffer_len(&m)); buffer_free(&m); } /* Prepare a mux master to listen on a Unix domain socket. */ void muxserver_listen(void) { - struct sockaddr_un addr; - socklen_t sun_len; mode_t old_umask; char *orig_control_path = options.control_path; char rbuf[16+1]; u_int i, r; + int oerrno; if (options.control_path == NULL || options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO) return; debug("setting up multiplex master socket"); /* * Use a temporary path before listen so we can pseudo-atomically * establish the listening socket in its final location to avoid * other processes racing in between bind() and listen() and hitting * an unready socket. */ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rbuf) - 1; i++) { r = arc4random_uniform(26+26+10); rbuf[i] = (r < 26) ? 'a' + r : (r < 26*2) ? 'A' + r - 26 : '0' + r - 26 - 26; } rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] = '\0'; options.control_path = NULL; xasprintf(&options.control_path, "%s.%s", orig_control_path, rbuf); debug3("%s: temporary control path %s", __func__, options.control_path); - memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr)); - addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; - sun_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + - strlen(options.control_path) + 1; - - if (strlcpy(addr.sun_path, options.control_path, - sizeof(addr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path)) { - error("ControlPath \"%s\" too long for Unix domain socket", - options.control_path); - goto disable_mux_master; - } - - if ((muxserver_sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) - fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); - old_umask = umask(0177); - if (bind(muxserver_sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sun_len) == -1) { - if (errno == EINVAL || errno == EADDRINUSE) { + muxserver_sock = unix_listener(options.control_path, 64, 0); + oerrno = errno; + umask(old_umask); + if (muxserver_sock < 0) { + if (oerrno == EINVAL || oerrno == EADDRINUSE) { error("ControlSocket %s already exists, " "disabling multiplexing", options.control_path); disable_mux_master: if (muxserver_sock != -1) { close(muxserver_sock); muxserver_sock = -1; } free(orig_control_path); free(options.control_path); options.control_path = NULL; options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO; return; - } else - fatal("%s bind(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); + } else { + /* unix_listener() logs the error */ + cleanup_exit(255); + } } - umask(old_umask); - if (listen(muxserver_sock, 64) == -1) - fatal("%s listen(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); - /* Now atomically "move" the mux socket into position */ if (link(options.control_path, orig_control_path) != 0) { if (errno != EEXIST) { fatal("%s: link mux listener %s => %s: %s", __func__, options.control_path, orig_control_path, strerror(errno)); } error("ControlSocket %s already exists, disabling multiplexing", orig_control_path); unlink(options.control_path); goto disable_mux_master; } unlink(options.control_path); free(options.control_path); options.control_path = orig_control_path; set_nonblock(muxserver_sock); mux_listener_channel = channel_new("mux listener", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER, muxserver_sock, muxserver_sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, options.control_path, 1); mux_listener_channel->mux_rcb = mux_master_read_cb; debug3("%s: mux listener channel %d fd %d", __func__, mux_listener_channel->self, mux_listener_channel->sock); } /* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux client session. */ static void mux_session_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg) { struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg; const char *display; Channel *c, *cc; int i; Buffer reply; if (cctx == NULL) fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__); if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL) fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id); if ((cc = channel_by_id(c->ctl_chan)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__, id, c->ctl_chan); if (!success) { debug3("%s: sending failure reply", __func__); /* prepare reply */ buffer_init(&reply); buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_FAILURE); buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid); buffer_put_cstring(&reply, "Session open refused by peer"); goto done; } display = getenv("DISPLAY"); if (cctx->want_x_fwd && options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) { char *proto, *data; /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */ client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data); /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " "spoofing."); x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto, data, 1); client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN); /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */ } if (cctx->want_agent_fwd && options.forward_agent) { debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding."); channel_request_start(id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0); packet_send(); } client_session2_setup(id, cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_subsys, cctx->term, &cctx->tio, c->rfd, &cctx->cmd, cctx->env); debug3("%s: sending success reply", __func__); /* prepare reply */ buffer_init(&reply); buffer_put_int(&reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED); buffer_put_int(&reply, cctx->rid); buffer_put_int(&reply, c->self); done: /* Send reply */ buffer_put_string(&cc->output, buffer_ptr(&reply), buffer_len(&reply)); buffer_free(&reply); if (cc->mux_pause <= 0) fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, cc->mux_pause); cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */ c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL; buffer_free(&cctx->cmd); free(cctx->term); if (cctx->env != NULL) { for (i = 0; cctx->env[i] != NULL; i++) free(cctx->env[i]); free(cctx->env); } free(cctx); } /* ** Multiplexing client support */ /* Exit signal handler */ static void control_client_sighandler(int signo) { muxclient_terminate = signo; } /* * Relay signal handler - used to pass some signals from mux client to * mux master. */ static void control_client_sigrelay(int signo) { int save_errno = errno; if (muxserver_pid > 1) kill(muxserver_pid, signo); errno = save_errno; } static int mux_client_read(int fd, Buffer *b, u_int need) { u_int have; ssize_t len; u_char *p; struct pollfd pfd; pfd.fd = fd; pfd.events = POLLIN; p = buffer_append_space(b, need); for (have = 0; have < need; ) { if (muxclient_terminate) { errno = EINTR; return -1; } len = read(fd, p + have, need - have); if (len < 0) { switch (errno) { #if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN) case EWOULDBLOCK: #endif case EAGAIN: (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case EINTR: continue; default: return -1; } } if (len == 0) { errno = EPIPE; return -1; } have += (u_int)len; } return 0; } static int mux_client_write_packet(int fd, Buffer *m) { Buffer queue; u_int have, need; int oerrno, len; u_char *ptr; struct pollfd pfd; pfd.fd = fd; pfd.events = POLLOUT; buffer_init(&queue); buffer_put_string(&queue, buffer_ptr(m), buffer_len(m)); need = buffer_len(&queue); ptr = buffer_ptr(&queue); for (have = 0; have < need; ) { if (muxclient_terminate) { buffer_free(&queue); errno = EINTR; return -1; } len = write(fd, ptr + have, need - have); if (len < 0) { switch (errno) { #if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN) case EWOULDBLOCK: #endif case EAGAIN: (void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case EINTR: continue; default: oerrno = errno; buffer_free(&queue); errno = oerrno; return -1; } } if (len == 0) { buffer_free(&queue); errno = EPIPE; return -1; } have += (u_int)len; } buffer_free(&queue); return 0; } static int mux_client_read_packet(int fd, Buffer *m) { Buffer queue; u_int need, have; - void *ptr; + const u_char *ptr; int oerrno; buffer_init(&queue); if (mux_client_read(fd, &queue, 4) != 0) { if ((oerrno = errno) == EPIPE) debug3("%s: read header failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_free(&queue); errno = oerrno; return -1; } need = get_u32(buffer_ptr(&queue)); if (mux_client_read(fd, &queue, need) != 0) { oerrno = errno; debug3("%s: read body failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_free(&queue); errno = oerrno; return -1; } ptr = buffer_get_string_ptr(&queue, &have); buffer_append(m, ptr, have); buffer_free(&queue); return 0; } static int mux_client_hello_exchange(int fd) { Buffer m; u_int type, ver; buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_MSG_HELLO); buffer_put_int(&m, SSHMUX_VER); /* no extensions */ if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_clear(&m); /* Read their HELLO */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) { buffer_free(&m); return -1; } type = buffer_get_int(&m); if (type != MUX_MSG_HELLO) fatal("%s: expected HELLO (%u) received %u", __func__, MUX_MSG_HELLO, type); ver = buffer_get_int(&m); if (ver != SSHMUX_VER) fatal("Unsupported multiplexing protocol version %d " "(expected %d)", ver, SSHMUX_VER); debug2("%s: master version %u", __func__, ver); /* No extensions are presently defined */ while (buffer_len(&m) > 0) { char *name = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); char *value = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); debug2("Unrecognised master extension \"%s\"", name); free(name); free(value); } buffer_free(&m); return 0; } static u_int mux_client_request_alive(int fd) { Buffer m; char *e; u_int pid, type, rid; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK); buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_clear(&m); /* Read their reply */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) { buffer_free(&m); return 0; } type = buffer_get_int(&m); if (type != MUX_S_ALIVE) { e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e); } if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); pid = buffer_get_int(&m); buffer_free(&m); debug3("%s: done pid = %u", __func__, pid); muxclient_request_id++; return pid; } static void mux_client_request_terminate(int fd) { Buffer m; char *e; u_int type, rid; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_TERMINATE); buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_clear(&m); /* Read their reply */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) { /* Remote end exited already */ if (errno == EPIPE) { buffer_free(&m); return; } fatal("%s: read from master failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } type = buffer_get_int(&m); if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_OK: break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); fatal("Master refused termination request: %s", e); case MUX_S_FAILURE: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); fatal("%s: termination request failed: %s", __func__, e); default: fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", __func__, type); } buffer_free(&m); muxclient_request_id++; } static int -mux_client_forward(int fd, int cancel_flag, u_int ftype, Forward *fwd) +mux_client_forward(int fd, int cancel_flag, u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd) { Buffer m; char *e, *fwd_desc; u_int type, rid; fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, fwd); debug("Requesting %s %s", cancel_flag ? "cancellation of" : "forwarding of", fwd_desc); free(fwd_desc); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, cancel_flag ? MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD : MUX_C_OPEN_FWD); buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id); buffer_put_int(&m, ftype); - buffer_put_cstring(&m, - fwd->listen_host == NULL ? "" : fwd->listen_host); + if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) { + buffer_put_cstring(&m, fwd->listen_path); + } else { + buffer_put_cstring(&m, + fwd->listen_host == NULL ? "" : fwd->listen_host); + } buffer_put_int(&m, fwd->listen_port); - buffer_put_cstring(&m, - fwd->connect_host == NULL ? "" : fwd->connect_host); + if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) { + buffer_put_cstring(&m, fwd->connect_path); + } else { + buffer_put_cstring(&m, + fwd->connect_host == NULL ? "" : fwd->connect_host); + } buffer_put_int(&m, fwd->connect_port); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_clear(&m); /* Read their reply */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) { buffer_free(&m); return -1; } type = buffer_get_int(&m); if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_OK: break; case MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT: if (cancel_flag) fatal("%s: got MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT for cancel", __func__); fwd->allocated_port = buffer_get_int(&m); logit("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d", fwd->allocated_port, fwd->connect_host ? fwd->connect_host : "", fwd->connect_port); if (muxclient_command == SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD) fprintf(stdout, "%u\n", fwd->allocated_port); break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); error("Master refused forwarding request: %s", e); return -1; case MUX_S_FAILURE: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); error("%s: forwarding request failed: %s", __func__, e); return -1; default: fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", __func__, type); } buffer_free(&m); muxclient_request_id++; return 0; } static int mux_client_forwards(int fd, int cancel_flag) { int i, ret = 0; debug3("%s: %s forwardings: %d local, %d remote", __func__, cancel_flag ? "cancel" : "request", options.num_local_forwards, options.num_remote_forwards); /* XXX ExitOnForwardingFailure */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { if (mux_client_forward(fd, cancel_flag, options.local_forwards[i].connect_port == 0 ? MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC : MUX_FWD_LOCAL, options.local_forwards + i) != 0) ret = -1; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { if (mux_client_forward(fd, cancel_flag, MUX_FWD_REMOTE, options.remote_forwards + i) != 0) ret = -1; } return ret; } static int mux_client_request_session(int fd) { Buffer m; char *e, *term; u_int i, rid, sid, esid, exitval, type, exitval_seen; extern char **environ; int devnull, rawmode; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) { error("%s: master alive request failed", __func__); return -1; } signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); if (stdin_null_flag) { if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1) fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno)); if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) close(devnull); } term = getenv("TERM"); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_NEW_SESSION); buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id); buffer_put_cstring(&m, ""); /* reserved */ buffer_put_int(&m, tty_flag); buffer_put_int(&m, options.forward_x11); buffer_put_int(&m, options.forward_agent); buffer_put_int(&m, subsystem_flag); buffer_put_int(&m, options.escape_char == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE ? 0xffffffff : (u_int)options.escape_char); buffer_put_cstring(&m, term == NULL ? "" : term); buffer_put_string(&m, buffer_ptr(&command), buffer_len(&command)); if (options.num_send_env > 0 && environ != NULL) { /* Pass environment */ for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) { if (env_permitted(environ[i])) { buffer_put_cstring(&m, environ[i]); } } } if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); /* Send the stdio file descriptors */ if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 || mm_send_fd(fd, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__); debug3("%s: session request sent", __func__); /* Read their reply */ buffer_clear(&m); if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) { error("%s: read from master failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_free(&m); return -1; } type = buffer_get_int(&m); if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED: sid = buffer_get_int(&m); debug("%s: master session id: %u", __func__, sid); break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); error("Master refused session request: %s", e); return -1; case MUX_S_FAILURE: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); error("%s: session request failed: %s", __func__, e); return -1; default: buffer_free(&m); error("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", __func__, type); return -1; } muxclient_request_id++; signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler); signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler); signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler); signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay); rawmode = tty_flag; if (tty_flag) enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); /* * Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd. * Before it does, it is expected to write an exit message. * This process must read the value and wait for the closure of * the client_fd; if this one closes early, the multiplex master will * terminate early too (possibly losing data). */ for (exitval = 255, exitval_seen = 0;;) { buffer_clear(&m); if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) break; type = buffer_get_int(&m); switch (type) { case MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL: if ((esid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != sid) fatal("%s: tty alloc fail on unknown session: " "my id %u theirs %u", __func__, sid, esid); leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); rawmode = 0; continue; case MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE: if ((esid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != sid) fatal("%s: exit on unknown session: " "my id %u theirs %u", __func__, sid, esid); if (exitval_seen) fatal("%s: exitval sent twice", __func__); exitval = buffer_get_int(&m); exitval_seen = 1; continue; default: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e); } } close(fd); if (rawmode) leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE); if (muxclient_terminate) { debug2("Exiting on signal %d", muxclient_terminate); exitval = 255; } else if (!exitval_seen) { debug2("Control master terminated unexpectedly"); exitval = 255; } else debug2("Received exit status from master %d", exitval); if (tty_flag && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) fprintf(stderr, "Shared connection to %s closed.\r\n", host); exit(exitval); } static int mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(int fd) { Buffer m; char *e; u_int type, rid, sid; int devnull; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) { error("%s: master alive request failed", __func__); return -1; } signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); if (stdin_null_flag) { if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1) fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno)); if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) close(devnull); } buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD); buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id); buffer_put_cstring(&m, ""); /* reserved */ buffer_put_cstring(&m, stdio_forward_host); buffer_put_int(&m, stdio_forward_port); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); /* Send the stdio file descriptors */ if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__); debug3("%s: stdio forward request sent", __func__); /* Read their reply */ buffer_clear(&m); if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) { error("%s: read from master failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_free(&m); return -1; } type = buffer_get_int(&m); if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED: sid = buffer_get_int(&m); debug("%s: master session id: %u", __func__, sid); break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); fatal("Master refused stdio forwarding request: %s", e); case MUX_S_FAILURE: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); buffer_free(&m); - fatal("%s: stdio forwarding request failed: %s", __func__, e); + fatal("Stdio forwarding request failed: %s", e); default: buffer_free(&m); error("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", __func__, type); return -1; } muxclient_request_id++; signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler); signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler); signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler); signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay); /* * Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd. */ buffer_clear(&m); if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) { if (errno == EPIPE || (errno == EINTR && muxclient_terminate != 0)) return 0; fatal("%s: mux_client_read_packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } fatal("%s: master returned unexpected message %u", __func__, type); } static void mux_client_request_stop_listening(int fd) { Buffer m; char *e; u_int type, rid; debug3("%s: entering", __func__); buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_int(&m, MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING); buffer_put_int(&m, muxclient_request_id); if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, &m) != 0) fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); buffer_clear(&m); /* Read their reply */ if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, &m) != 0) fatal("%s: read from master failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); type = buffer_get_int(&m); if ((rid = buffer_get_int(&m)) != muxclient_request_id) fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u", __func__, muxclient_request_id, rid); switch (type) { case MUX_S_OK: break; case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); fatal("Master refused stop listening request: %s", e); case MUX_S_FAILURE: e = buffer_get_string(&m, NULL); fatal("%s: stop listening request failed: %s", __func__, e); default: fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x", __func__, type); } buffer_free(&m); muxclient_request_id++; } /* Multiplex client main loop. */ void muxclient(const char *path) { struct sockaddr_un addr; socklen_t sun_len; int sock; u_int pid; if (muxclient_command == 0) { if (stdio_forward_host != NULL) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD; else muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN; } switch (options.control_master) { case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO: case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK: debug("auto-mux: Trying existing master"); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case SSHCTL_MASTER_NO: break; default: return; } memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr)); addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; sun_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(path) + 1; if (strlcpy(addr.sun_path, path, sizeof(addr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path)) fatal("ControlPath too long"); if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0) fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sun_len) == -1) { switch (muxclient_command) { case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN: case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD: break; default: fatal("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path, strerror(errno)); } if (errno == ECONNREFUSED && options.control_master != SSHCTL_MASTER_NO) { debug("Stale control socket %.100s, unlinking", path); unlink(path); } else if (errno == ENOENT) { debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path); } else { error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path, strerror(errno)); } close(sock); return; } set_nonblock(sock); if (mux_client_hello_exchange(sock) != 0) { error("%s: master hello exchange failed", __func__); close(sock); return; } switch (muxclient_command) { case SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK: if ((pid = mux_client_request_alive(sock)) == 0) fatal("%s: master alive check failed", __func__); fprintf(stderr, "Master running (pid=%d)\r\n", pid); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE: mux_client_request_terminate(sock); fprintf(stderr, "Exit request sent.\r\n"); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD: if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 0) != 0) fatal("%s: master forward request failed", __func__); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN: if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 0) != 0) { error("%s: master forward request failed", __func__); return; } mux_client_request_session(sock); return; case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD: mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(sock); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP: mux_client_request_stop_listening(sock); fprintf(stderr, "Stop listening request sent.\r\n"); exit(0); case SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD: if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 1) != 0) error("%s: master cancel forward request failed", __func__); exit(0); default: fatal("unrecognised muxclient_command %d", muxclient_command); } } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/myproposal.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/myproposal.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/myproposal.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,148 +1,197 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.35 2013/12/06 13:39:49 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.41 2014/07/11 13:54:34 tedu Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include /* conditional algorithm support */ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 # define KEX_ECDH_METHODS \ "ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \ "ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \ "ecdh-sha2-nistp521," # define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," # define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," #else # define KEX_ECDH_METHODS \ "ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \ "ecdh-sha2-nistp384," # define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," # define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," #endif #else # define KEX_ECDH_METHODS # define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS # define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM # define AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES \ "aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com," #else # define AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES #endif #ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 # define KEX_SHA256_METHODS \ "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," -#define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS \ - "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org," #define SHA2_HMAC_MODES \ "hmac-sha2-256," \ "hmac-sha2-512," #else # define KEX_SHA256_METHODS -# define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS # define SHA2_HMAC_MODES #endif -# define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX \ +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +# ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256 +# define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org," +# else +# define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS "" +# endif +#define KEX_SERVER_KEX \ KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS \ KEX_ECDH_METHODS \ KEX_SHA256_METHODS \ + "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" + +#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_SERVER_KEX "," \ "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1," \ - "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1," \ "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" #define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \ HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \ "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com," \ "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com," \ HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \ "ssh-ed25519," \ "ssh-rsa," \ "ssh-dss" /* the actual algorithms */ -#define KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT \ +#define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \ "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \ - "arcfour256,arcfour128," \ AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES \ - "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \ + "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" + +#define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT "," \ + "arcfour256,arcfour128," \ "aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc," \ "aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,arcfour,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se" -#define KEX_DEFAULT_MAC \ - "hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com," \ - "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \ +#define KEX_SERVER_MAC \ "umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \ "umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com," \ + "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \ + "umac-64@openssh.com," \ + "umac-128@openssh.com," \ + "hmac-sha2-256," \ + "hmac-sha2-512," \ + "hmac-sha1" + +#define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC "," \ + "hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com," \ "hmac-md5," \ - "hmac-sha1," \ - "umac-64@openssh.com," \ - "umac-128@openssh.com," \ - SHA2_HMAC_MODES \ "hmac-ripemd160," \ "hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com," \ "hmac-sha1-96," \ "hmac-md5-96" +#else + +#define KEX_SERVER_KEX \ + "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org" +#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \ + "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \ + "ssh-ed25519" +#define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \ + "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \ + "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" +#define KEX_SERVER_MAC \ + "umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \ + "umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \ + "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \ + "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com," \ + "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \ + "umac-64@openssh.com," \ + "umac-128@openssh.com," \ + "hmac-sha2-256," \ + "hmac-sha2-512," \ + "hmac-sha1" + +#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_SERVER_KEX +#define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT +#define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC + +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + #define KEX_DEFAULT_COMP "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib" #define KEX_DEFAULT_LANG "" +#define KEX_CLIENT \ + KEX_CLIENT_KEX, \ + KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \ + KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, \ + KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, \ + KEX_CLIENT_MAC, \ + KEX_CLIENT_MAC, \ + KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \ + KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \ + KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, \ + KEX_DEFAULT_LANG -static char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { - KEX_DEFAULT_KEX, - KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, - KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT, - KEX_DEFAULT_ENCRYPT, - KEX_DEFAULT_MAC, - KEX_DEFAULT_MAC, - KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, - KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, - KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, +#define KEX_SERVER \ + KEX_SERVER_KEX, \ + KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \ + KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, \ + KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, \ + KEX_SERVER_MAC, \ + KEX_SERVER_MAC, \ + KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \ + KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \ + KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, \ KEX_DEFAULT_LANG -}; + Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in (revision 276707) @@ -1,42 +1,42 @@ -# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.55 2014/02/04 00:37:50 djm Exp $ +# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.56 2014/09/30 23:43:08 djm Exp $ sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@ piddir=@piddir@ srcdir=@srcdir@ top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@ VPATH=@srcdir@ CC=@CC@ LD=@LD@ CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@ CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@ LIBS=@LIBS@ AR=@AR@ RANLIB=@RANLIB@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@ LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o dirname.o fmt_scaled.o getcwd.o getgrouplist.o getopt_long.o getrrsetbyname.o glob.o inet_aton.o inet_ntoa.o inet_ntop.o mktemp.o pwcache.o readpassphrase.o realpath.o rresvport.o setenv.o setproctitle.o sha2.o sigact.o strlcat.o strlcpy.o strmode.o strnlen.o strptime.o strsep.o strtonum.o strtoll.o strtoul.o strtoull.o timingsafe_bcmp.o vis.o blowfish.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o explicit_bzero.o -COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o +COMPAT=arc4random.o bsd-asprintf.o bsd-closefrom.o bsd-cray.o bsd-cygwin_util.o bsd-getpeereid.o getrrsetbyname-ldns.o bsd-misc.o bsd-nextstep.o bsd-openpty.o bsd-poll.o bsd-setres_id.o bsd-snprintf.o bsd-statvfs.o bsd-waitpid.o fake-rfc2553.o openssl-compat.o xmmap.o xcrypt.o kludge-fd_set.o PORTS=port-aix.o port-irix.o port-linux.o port-solaris.o port-tun.o port-uw.o .c.o: $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< all: libopenbsd-compat.a $(COMPAT): ../config.h $(OPENBSD): ../config.h $(PORTS): ../config.h libopenbsd-compat.a: $(COMPAT) $(OPENBSD) $(PORTS) $(AR) rv $@ $(COMPAT) $(OPENBSD) $(PORTS) $(RANLIB) $@ clean: rm -f *.o *.a core distclean: clean rm -f Makefile *~ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/arc4random.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,294 +1,294 @@ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/crypto/arc4random.c */ /* $OpenBSD: arc4random.c,v 1.25 2013/10/01 18:34:57 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1996, David Mazieres * Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller * Copyright (c) 2013, Markus Friedl * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* * ChaCha based random number generator for OpenBSD. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM #include #include #include "log.h" #define KEYSTREAM_ONLY #include "chacha_private.h" #ifdef __GNUC__ #define inline __inline #else /* !__GNUC__ */ #define inline #endif /* !__GNUC__ */ /* OpenSSH isn't multithreaded */ #define _ARC4_LOCK() #define _ARC4_UNLOCK() #define KEYSZ 32 #define IVSZ 8 #define BLOCKSZ 64 #define RSBUFSZ (16*BLOCKSZ) static int rs_initialized; static pid_t rs_stir_pid; static chacha_ctx rs; /* chacha context for random keystream */ static u_char rs_buf[RSBUFSZ]; /* keystream blocks */ static size_t rs_have; /* valid bytes at end of rs_buf */ static size_t rs_count; /* bytes till reseed */ static inline void _rs_rekey(u_char *dat, size_t datlen); static inline void _rs_init(u_char *buf, size_t n) { if (n < KEYSZ + IVSZ) return; chacha_keysetup(&rs, buf, KEYSZ * 8, 0); chacha_ivsetup(&rs, buf + KEYSZ); } static void _rs_stir(void) { u_char rnd[KEYSZ + IVSZ]; if (RAND_bytes(rnd, sizeof(rnd)) <= 0) fatal("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)", ERR_get_error()); if (!rs_initialized) { rs_initialized = 1; _rs_init(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); } else _rs_rekey(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); - memset(rnd, 0, sizeof(rnd)); + explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); /* invalidate rs_buf */ rs_have = 0; memset(rs_buf, 0, RSBUFSZ); rs_count = 1600000; } static inline void _rs_stir_if_needed(size_t len) { pid_t pid = getpid(); if (rs_count <= len || !rs_initialized || rs_stir_pid != pid) { rs_stir_pid = pid; _rs_stir(); } else rs_count -= len; } static inline void _rs_rekey(u_char *dat, size_t datlen) { #ifndef KEYSTREAM_ONLY memset(rs_buf, 0,RSBUFSZ); #endif /* fill rs_buf with the keystream */ chacha_encrypt_bytes(&rs, rs_buf, rs_buf, RSBUFSZ); /* mix in optional user provided data */ if (dat) { size_t i, m; m = MIN(datlen, KEYSZ + IVSZ); for (i = 0; i < m; i++) rs_buf[i] ^= dat[i]; } /* immediately reinit for backtracking resistance */ _rs_init(rs_buf, KEYSZ + IVSZ); memset(rs_buf, 0, KEYSZ + IVSZ); rs_have = RSBUFSZ - KEYSZ - IVSZ; } static inline void _rs_random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n) { u_char *buf = (u_char *)_buf; size_t m; _rs_stir_if_needed(n); while (n > 0) { if (rs_have > 0) { m = MIN(n, rs_have); memcpy(buf, rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, m); memset(rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, 0, m); buf += m; n -= m; rs_have -= m; } if (rs_have == 0) _rs_rekey(NULL, 0); } } static inline void _rs_random_u32(u_int32_t *val) { _rs_stir_if_needed(sizeof(*val)); if (rs_have < sizeof(*val)) _rs_rekey(NULL, 0); memcpy(val, rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, sizeof(*val)); memset(rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, 0, sizeof(*val)); rs_have -= sizeof(*val); return; } void arc4random_stir(void) { _ARC4_LOCK(); _rs_stir(); _ARC4_UNLOCK(); } void arc4random_addrandom(u_char *dat, int datlen) { int m; _ARC4_LOCK(); if (!rs_initialized) _rs_stir(); while (datlen > 0) { m = MIN(datlen, KEYSZ + IVSZ); _rs_rekey(dat, m); dat += m; datlen -= m; } _ARC4_UNLOCK(); } u_int32_t arc4random(void) { u_int32_t val; _ARC4_LOCK(); _rs_random_u32(&val); _ARC4_UNLOCK(); return val; } /* * If we are providing arc4random, then we can provide a more efficient * arc4random_buf(). */ # ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF void arc4random_buf(void *buf, size_t n) { _ARC4_LOCK(); _rs_random_buf(buf, n); _ARC4_UNLOCK(); } # endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF */ #endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */ /* arc4random_buf() that uses platform arc4random() */ #if !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) void arc4random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n) { size_t i; u_int32_t r = 0; char *buf = (char *)_buf; for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { if (i % 4 == 0) r = arc4random(); buf[i] = r & 0xff; r >>= 8; } - i = r = 0; + explicit_bzero(&r, sizeof(r)); } #endif /* !defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) */ #ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM /* * Calculate a uniformly distributed random number less than upper_bound * avoiding "modulo bias". * * Uniformity is achieved by generating new random numbers until the one * returned is outside the range [0, 2**32 % upper_bound). This * guarantees the selected random number will be inside * [2**32 % upper_bound, 2**32) which maps back to [0, upper_bound) * after reduction modulo upper_bound. */ u_int32_t arc4random_uniform(u_int32_t upper_bound) { u_int32_t r, min; if (upper_bound < 2) return 0; /* 2**32 % x == (2**32 - x) % x */ min = -upper_bound % upper_bound; /* * This could theoretically loop forever but each retry has * p > 0.5 (worst case, usually far better) of selecting a * number inside the range we need, so it should rarely need * to re-roll. */ for (;;) { r = arc4random(); if (r >= min) break; } return r % upper_bound; } #endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM */ #if 0 /*-------- Test code for i386 --------*/ #include #include int main(int argc, char **argv) { const int iter = 1000000; int i; pctrval v; v = rdtsc(); for (i = 0; i < iter; i++) arc4random(); v = rdtsc() - v; v /= iter; printf("%qd cycles\n", v); exit(0); } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,103 +1,119 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2011, 2013 Corinna Vinschen * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * * Created: Sat Sep 02 12:17:00 2000 cv * * This file contains functions for forcing opened file descriptors to * binary mode on Windows systems. */ #define NO_BINARY_OPEN /* Avoid redefining open to binary_open for this file */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" int binary_open(const char *filename, int flags, ...) { va_list ap; mode_t mode; va_start(ap, flags); mode = va_arg(ap, mode_t); va_end(ap); return (open(filename, flags | O_BINARY, mode)); } int check_ntsec(const char *filename) { return (pathconf(filename, _PC_POSIX_PERMISSIONS)); } +const char * +cygwin_ssh_privsep_user() +{ + static char cyg_privsep_user[DNLEN + UNLEN + 2]; + + if (!cyg_privsep_user[0]) + { +#ifdef CW_CYGNAME_FROM_WINNAME + if (cygwin_internal (CW_CYGNAME_FROM_WINNAME, "sshd", cyg_privsep_user, + sizeof cyg_privsep_user) != 0) +#endif + strcpy (cyg_privsep_user, "sshd"); + } + return cyg_privsep_user; +} + #define NL(x) x, (sizeof (x) - 1) #define WENV_SIZ (sizeof (wenv_arr) / sizeof (wenv_arr[0])) static struct wenv { const char *name; size_t namelen; } wenv_arr[] = { { NL("ALLUSERSPROFILE=") }, { NL("COMPUTERNAME=") }, { NL("COMSPEC=") }, { NL("CYGWIN=") }, { NL("OS=") }, { NL("PATH=") }, { NL("PATHEXT=") }, { NL("PROGRAMFILES=") }, { NL("SYSTEMDRIVE=") }, { NL("SYSTEMROOT=") }, { NL("WINDIR=") } }; char ** fetch_windows_environment(void) { char **e, **p; unsigned int i, idx = 0; p = xcalloc(WENV_SIZ + 1, sizeof(char *)); for (e = environ; *e != NULL; ++e) { for (i = 0; i < WENV_SIZ; ++i) { if (!strncmp(*e, wenv_arr[i].name, wenv_arr[i].namelen)) p[idx++] = *e; } } p[idx] = NULL; return p; } void free_windows_environment(char **p) { free(p); } #endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,63 +1,67 @@ -/* $Id: bsd-cygwin_util.h,v 1.17 2014/01/18 10:04:00 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $Id: bsd-cygwin_util.h,v 1.18 2014/05/27 04:34:43 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2011, 2013 Corinna Vinschen * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * * Created: Sat Sep 02 12:17:00 2000 cv * * This file contains functions for forcing opened file descriptors to * binary mode on Windows systems. */ #ifndef _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H #define _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN #undef ERROR /* Avoid including windows headers. */ typedef void *HANDLE; #define INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE ((HANDLE) -1) +#define DNLEN 16 +#define UNLEN 256 /* Cygwin functions for which declarations are only available when including windows headers, so we have to define them here explicitely. */ extern HANDLE cygwin_logon_user (const struct passwd *, const char *); extern void cygwin_set_impersonation_token (const HANDLE); #include #include +#define CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER (cygwin_ssh_privsep_user()) +const char *cygwin_ssh_privsep_user(); int binary_open(const char *, int , ...); int check_ntsec(const char *); char **fetch_windows_environment(void); void free_windows_environment(char **); #ifndef NO_BINARY_OPEN #define open binary_open #endif #endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ #endif /* _BSD_CYGWIN_UTIL_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,892 +1,892 @@ /* * Copyright Patrick Powell 1995 * This code is based on code written by Patrick Powell (papowell@astart.com) * It may be used for any purpose as long as this notice remains intact * on all source code distributions */ /************************************************************** * Original: * Patrick Powell Tue Apr 11 09:48:21 PDT 1995 * A bombproof version of doprnt (dopr) included. * Sigh. This sort of thing is always nasty do deal with. Note that * the version here does not include floating point... * * snprintf() is used instead of sprintf() as it does limit checks * for string length. This covers a nasty loophole. * * The other functions are there to prevent NULL pointers from * causing nast effects. * * More Recently: * Brandon Long 9/15/96 for mutt 0.43 * This was ugly. It is still ugly. I opted out of floating point * numbers, but the formatter understands just about everything * from the normal C string format, at least as far as I can tell from * the Solaris 2.5 printf(3S) man page. * * Brandon Long 10/22/97 for mutt 0.87.1 * Ok, added some minimal floating point support, which means this * probably requires libm on most operating systems. Don't yet * support the exponent (e,E) and sigfig (g,G). Also, fmtint() * was pretty badly broken, it just wasn't being exercised in ways * which showed it, so that's been fixed. Also, formated the code * to mutt conventions, and removed dead code left over from the * original. Also, there is now a builtin-test, just compile with: * gcc -DTEST_SNPRINTF -o snprintf snprintf.c -lm * and run snprintf for results. * * Thomas Roessler 01/27/98 for mutt 0.89i * The PGP code was using unsigned hexadecimal formats. * Unfortunately, unsigned formats simply didn't work. * * Michael Elkins 03/05/98 for mutt 0.90.8 * The original code assumed that both snprintf() and vsnprintf() were * missing. Some systems only have snprintf() but not vsnprintf(), so * the code is now broken down under HAVE_SNPRINTF and HAVE_VSNPRINTF. * * Andrew Tridgell (tridge@samba.org) Oct 1998 * fixed handling of %.0f * added test for HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE * * tridge@samba.org, idra@samba.org, April 2001 * got rid of fcvt code (twas buggy and made testing harder) * added C99 semantics * * date: 2002/12/19 19:56:31; author: herb; state: Exp; lines: +2 -0 * actually print args for %g and %e * * date: 2002/06/03 13:37:52; author: jmcd; state: Exp; lines: +8 -0 * Since includes.h isn't included here, VA_COPY has to be defined here. I don't * see any include file that is guaranteed to be here, so I'm defining it * locally. Fixes AIX and Solaris builds. * * date: 2002/06/03 03:07:24; author: tridge; state: Exp; lines: +5 -13 * put the ifdef for HAVE_VA_COPY in one place rather than in lots of * functions * * date: 2002/05/17 14:51:22; author: jmcd; state: Exp; lines: +21 -4 * Fix usage of va_list passed as an arg. Use __va_copy before using it * when it exists. * * date: 2002/04/16 22:38:04; author: idra; state: Exp; lines: +20 -14 * Fix incorrect zpadlen handling in fmtfp. * Thanks to Ollie Oldham for spotting it. * few mods to make it easier to compile the tests. * addedd the "Ollie" test to the floating point ones. * * Martin Pool (mbp@samba.org) April 2003 * Remove NO_CONFIG_H so that the test case can be built within a source * tree with less trouble. * Remove unnecessary SAFE_FREE() definition. * * Martin Pool (mbp@samba.org) May 2003 * Put in a prototype for dummy_snprintf() to quiet compiler warnings. * * Move #endif to make sure VA_COPY, LDOUBLE, etc are defined even * if the C library has some snprintf functions already. * * Damien Miller (djm@mindrot.org) Jan 2007 * Fix integer overflows in return value. * Make formatting quite a bit faster by inlining dopr_outch() * **************************************************************/ #include "includes.h" #if defined(BROKEN_SNPRINTF) /* For those with broken snprintf() */ # undef HAVE_SNPRINTF # undef HAVE_VSNPRINTF #endif #ifndef VA_COPY # ifdef HAVE_VA_COPY # define VA_COPY(dest, src) va_copy(dest, src) # else # ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY # define VA_COPY(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src) # else # define VA_COPY(dest, src) (dest) = (src) # endif # endif #endif #if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE # define LDOUBLE long double #else # define LDOUBLE double #endif #ifdef HAVE_LONG_LONG # define LLONG long long #else # define LLONG long #endif /* * dopr(): poor man's version of doprintf */ /* format read states */ #define DP_S_DEFAULT 0 #define DP_S_FLAGS 1 #define DP_S_MIN 2 #define DP_S_DOT 3 #define DP_S_MAX 4 #define DP_S_MOD 5 #define DP_S_CONV 6 #define DP_S_DONE 7 /* format flags - Bits */ #define DP_F_MINUS (1 << 0) #define DP_F_PLUS (1 << 1) #define DP_F_SPACE (1 << 2) #define DP_F_NUM (1 << 3) #define DP_F_ZERO (1 << 4) #define DP_F_UP (1 << 5) #define DP_F_UNSIGNED (1 << 6) /* Conversion Flags */ #define DP_C_SHORT 1 #define DP_C_LONG 2 #define DP_C_LDOUBLE 3 #define DP_C_LLONG 4 #define DP_C_SIZE 5 #define DP_C_INTMAX 6 #define char_to_int(p) ((p)- '0') #ifndef MAX # define MAX(p,q) (((p) >= (q)) ? (p) : (q)) #endif #define DOPR_OUTCH(buf, pos, buflen, thechar) \ do { \ if (pos + 1 >= INT_MAX) { \ errno = ERANGE; \ return -1; \ } \ if (pos < buflen) \ buf[pos] = thechar; \ (pos)++; \ } while (0) static int dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format, va_list args_in); static int fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, char *value, int flags, int min, int max); static int fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, intmax_t value, int base, int min, int max, int flags); static int fmtfp(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, LDOUBLE fvalue, int min, int max, int flags); static int dopr(char *buffer, size_t maxlen, const char *format, va_list args_in) { char ch; intmax_t value; LDOUBLE fvalue; char *strvalue; int min; int max; int state; int flags; int cflags; size_t currlen; va_list args; VA_COPY(args, args_in); state = DP_S_DEFAULT; currlen = flags = cflags = min = 0; max = -1; ch = *format++; while (state != DP_S_DONE) { if (ch == '\0') state = DP_S_DONE; switch(state) { case DP_S_DEFAULT: if (ch == '%') state = DP_S_FLAGS; else DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ch); ch = *format++; break; case DP_S_FLAGS: switch (ch) { case '-': flags |= DP_F_MINUS; ch = *format++; break; case '+': flags |= DP_F_PLUS; ch = *format++; break; case ' ': flags |= DP_F_SPACE; ch = *format++; break; case '#': flags |= DP_F_NUM; ch = *format++; break; case '0': flags |= DP_F_ZERO; ch = *format++; break; default: state = DP_S_MIN; break; } break; case DP_S_MIN: if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) { min = 10*min + char_to_int (ch); ch = *format++; } else if (ch == '*') { min = va_arg (args, int); ch = *format++; state = DP_S_DOT; } else { state = DP_S_DOT; } break; case DP_S_DOT: if (ch == '.') { state = DP_S_MAX; ch = *format++; } else { state = DP_S_MOD; } break; case DP_S_MAX: if (isdigit((unsigned char)ch)) { if (max < 0) max = 0; max = 10*max + char_to_int (ch); ch = *format++; } else if (ch == '*') { max = va_arg (args, int); ch = *format++; state = DP_S_MOD; } else { state = DP_S_MOD; } break; case DP_S_MOD: switch (ch) { case 'h': cflags = DP_C_SHORT; ch = *format++; break; case 'j': cflags = DP_C_INTMAX; ch = *format++; break; case 'l': cflags = DP_C_LONG; ch = *format++; if (ch == 'l') { /* It's a long long */ cflags = DP_C_LLONG; ch = *format++; } break; case 'L': cflags = DP_C_LDOUBLE; ch = *format++; break; case 'z': cflags = DP_C_SIZE; ch = *format++; break; default: break; } state = DP_S_CONV; break; case DP_S_CONV: switch (ch) { case 'd': case 'i': if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) value = va_arg (args, int); else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) value = va_arg (args, long int); else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) value = va_arg (args, LLONG); else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) value = va_arg (args, ssize_t); else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) value = va_arg (args, intmax_t); else value = va_arg (args, int); if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 10, min, max, flags) == -1) return -1; break; case 'o': flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED; if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) value = va_arg (args, unsigned int); else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int); else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG); else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) value = va_arg (args, size_t); #ifdef notyet else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t); #endif else value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int); if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 8, min, max, flags) == -1) return -1; break; case 'u': flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED; if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) value = va_arg (args, unsigned int); else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int); else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) value = (LLONG)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG); else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) value = va_arg (args, size_t); #ifdef notyet else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t); #endif else value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int); if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 10, min, max, flags) == -1) return -1; break; case 'X': flags |= DP_F_UP; case 'x': flags |= DP_F_UNSIGNED; if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) value = va_arg (args, unsigned int); else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned long int); else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) value = (LLONG)va_arg (args, unsigned LLONG); else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) value = va_arg (args, size_t); #ifdef notyet else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) value = va_arg (args, uintmax_t); #endif else value = (long)va_arg (args, unsigned int); if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, value, 16, min, max, flags) == -1) return -1; break; case 'f': if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE) fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE); else fvalue = va_arg (args, double); if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, min, max, flags) == -1) return -1; break; case 'E': flags |= DP_F_UP; case 'e': if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE) fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE); else fvalue = va_arg (args, double); if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, min, max, flags) == -1) return -1; break; case 'G': flags |= DP_F_UP; case 'g': if (cflags == DP_C_LDOUBLE) fvalue = va_arg (args, LDOUBLE); else fvalue = va_arg (args, double); if (fmtfp(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, fvalue, min, max, flags) == -1) return -1; break; case 'c': DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen, va_arg (args, int)); break; case 's': strvalue = va_arg (args, char *); if (!strvalue) strvalue = "(NULL)"; if (max == -1) { max = strlen(strvalue); } if (min > 0 && max >= 0 && min > max) max = min; if (fmtstr(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, strvalue, flags, min, max) == -1) return -1; break; case 'p': strvalue = va_arg (args, void *); if (fmtint(buffer, &currlen, maxlen, (long) strvalue, 16, min, max, flags) == -1) return -1; break; #if we_dont_want_this_in_openssh case 'n': if (cflags == DP_C_SHORT) { short int *num; num = va_arg (args, short int *); *num = currlen; } else if (cflags == DP_C_LONG) { long int *num; num = va_arg (args, long int *); *num = (long int)currlen; } else if (cflags == DP_C_LLONG) { LLONG *num; num = va_arg (args, LLONG *); *num = (LLONG)currlen; } else if (cflags == DP_C_SIZE) { ssize_t *num; num = va_arg (args, ssize_t *); *num = (ssize_t)currlen; } else if (cflags == DP_C_INTMAX) { intmax_t *num; num = va_arg (args, intmax_t *); *num = (intmax_t)currlen; } else { int *num; num = va_arg (args, int *); *num = currlen; } break; #endif case '%': DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, currlen, maxlen, ch); break; case 'w': /* not supported yet, treat as next char */ ch = *format++; break; default: /* Unknown, skip */ break; } ch = *format++; state = DP_S_DEFAULT; flags = cflags = min = 0; max = -1; break; case DP_S_DONE: break; default: /* hmm? */ break; /* some picky compilers need this */ } } if (maxlen != 0) { if (currlen < maxlen - 1) buffer[currlen] = '\0'; else if (maxlen > 0) buffer[maxlen - 1] = '\0'; } return currlen < INT_MAX ? (int)currlen : -1; } static int fmtstr(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, char *value, int flags, int min, int max) { int padlen, strln; /* amount to pad */ int cnt = 0; #ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF printf("fmtstr min=%d max=%d s=[%s]\n", min, max, value); #endif if (value == 0) { value = ""; } for (strln = 0; strln < max && value[strln]; ++strln); /* strlen */ padlen = min - strln; if (padlen < 0) padlen = 0; if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) padlen = -padlen; /* Left Justify */ while ((padlen > 0) && (cnt < max)) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' '); --padlen; ++cnt; } while (*value && (cnt < max)) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, *value); - *value++; + value++; ++cnt; } while ((padlen < 0) && (cnt < max)) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' '); ++padlen; ++cnt; } return 0; } /* Have to handle DP_F_NUM (ie 0x and 0 alternates) */ static int fmtint(char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, - LLONG value, int base, int min, int max, int flags) + intmax_t value, int base, int min, int max, int flags) { int signvalue = 0; unsigned LLONG uvalue; char convert[20]; int place = 0; int spadlen = 0; /* amount to space pad */ int zpadlen = 0; /* amount to zero pad */ int caps = 0; if (max < 0) max = 0; uvalue = value; if(!(flags & DP_F_UNSIGNED)) { if( value < 0 ) { signvalue = '-'; uvalue = -value; } else { if (flags & DP_F_PLUS) /* Do a sign (+/i) */ signvalue = '+'; else if (flags & DP_F_SPACE) signvalue = ' '; } } if (flags & DP_F_UP) caps = 1; /* Should characters be upper case? */ do { convert[place++] = (caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef") [uvalue % (unsigned)base ]; uvalue = (uvalue / (unsigned)base ); } while(uvalue && (place < 20)); if (place == 20) place--; convert[place] = 0; zpadlen = max - place; spadlen = min - MAX (max, place) - (signvalue ? 1 : 0); if (zpadlen < 0) zpadlen = 0; if (spadlen < 0) spadlen = 0; if (flags & DP_F_ZERO) { zpadlen = MAX(zpadlen, spadlen); spadlen = 0; } if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) spadlen = -spadlen; /* Left Justifty */ #ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF printf("zpad: %d, spad: %d, min: %d, max: %d, place: %d\n", zpadlen, spadlen, min, max, place); #endif /* Spaces */ while (spadlen > 0) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' '); --spadlen; } /* Sign */ if (signvalue) DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue); /* Zeros */ if (zpadlen > 0) { while (zpadlen > 0) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0'); --zpadlen; } } /* Digits */ while (place > 0) { --place; DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, convert[place]); } /* Left Justified spaces */ while (spadlen < 0) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' '); ++spadlen; } return 0; } static LDOUBLE abs_val(LDOUBLE value) { LDOUBLE result = value; if (value < 0) result = -value; return result; } static LDOUBLE POW10(int val) { LDOUBLE result = 1; while (val) { result *= 10; val--; } return result; } static LLONG ROUND(LDOUBLE value) { LLONG intpart; intpart = (LLONG)value; value = value - intpart; if (value >= 0.5) intpart++; return intpart; } /* a replacement for modf that doesn't need the math library. Should be portable, but slow */ static double my_modf(double x0, double *iptr) { int i; long l; double x = x0; double f = 1.0; for (i=0;i<100;i++) { l = (long)x; if (l <= (x+1) && l >= (x-1)) break; x *= 0.1; f *= 10.0; } if (i == 100) { /* * yikes! the number is beyond what we can handle. * What do we do? */ (*iptr) = 0; return 0; } if (i != 0) { double i2; double ret; ret = my_modf(x0-l*f, &i2); (*iptr) = l*f + i2; return ret; } (*iptr) = l; return x - (*iptr); } static int fmtfp (char *buffer, size_t *currlen, size_t maxlen, LDOUBLE fvalue, int min, int max, int flags) { int signvalue = 0; double ufvalue; char iconvert[311]; char fconvert[311]; int iplace = 0; int fplace = 0; int padlen = 0; /* amount to pad */ int zpadlen = 0; int caps = 0; int idx; double intpart; double fracpart; double temp; /* * AIX manpage says the default is 0, but Solaris says the default * is 6, and sprintf on AIX defaults to 6 */ if (max < 0) max = 6; ufvalue = abs_val (fvalue); if (fvalue < 0) { signvalue = '-'; } else { if (flags & DP_F_PLUS) { /* Do a sign (+/i) */ signvalue = '+'; } else { if (flags & DP_F_SPACE) signvalue = ' '; } } #if 0 if (flags & DP_F_UP) caps = 1; /* Should characters be upper case? */ #endif #if 0 if (max == 0) ufvalue += 0.5; /* if max = 0 we must round */ #endif /* * Sorry, we only support 16 digits past the decimal because of our * conversion method */ if (max > 16) max = 16; /* We "cheat" by converting the fractional part to integer by * multiplying by a factor of 10 */ temp = ufvalue; my_modf(temp, &intpart); fracpart = ROUND((POW10(max)) * (ufvalue - intpart)); if (fracpart >= POW10(max)) { intpart++; fracpart -= POW10(max); } /* Convert integer part */ do { temp = intpart*0.1; my_modf(temp, &intpart); idx = (int) ((temp -intpart +0.05)* 10.0); /* idx = (int) (((double)(temp*0.1) -intpart +0.05) *10.0); */ /* printf ("%llf, %f, %x\n", temp, intpart, idx); */ iconvert[iplace++] = (caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")[idx]; } while (intpart && (iplace < 311)); if (iplace == 311) iplace--; iconvert[iplace] = 0; /* Convert fractional part */ if (fracpart) { do { temp = fracpart*0.1; my_modf(temp, &fracpart); idx = (int) ((temp -fracpart +0.05)* 10.0); /* idx = (int) ((((temp/10) -fracpart) +0.05) *10); */ /* printf ("%lf, %lf, %ld\n", temp, fracpart, idx ); */ fconvert[fplace++] = (caps? "0123456789ABCDEF":"0123456789abcdef")[idx]; } while(fracpart && (fplace < 311)); if (fplace == 311) fplace--; } fconvert[fplace] = 0; /* -1 for decimal point, another -1 if we are printing a sign */ padlen = min - iplace - max - 1 - ((signvalue) ? 1 : 0); zpadlen = max - fplace; if (zpadlen < 0) zpadlen = 0; if (padlen < 0) padlen = 0; if (flags & DP_F_MINUS) padlen = -padlen; /* Left Justifty */ if ((flags & DP_F_ZERO) && (padlen > 0)) { if (signvalue) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue); --padlen; signvalue = 0; } while (padlen > 0) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0'); --padlen; } } while (padlen > 0) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' '); --padlen; } if (signvalue) DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, signvalue); while (iplace > 0) { --iplace; DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, iconvert[iplace]); } #ifdef DEBUG_SNPRINTF printf("fmtfp: fplace=%d zpadlen=%d\n", fplace, zpadlen); #endif /* * Decimal point. This should probably use locale to find the correct * char to print out. */ if (max > 0) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '.'); while (zpadlen > 0) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, '0'); --zpadlen; } while (fplace > 0) { --fplace; DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, fconvert[fplace]); } } while (padlen < 0) { DOPR_OUTCH(buffer, *currlen, maxlen, ' '); ++padlen; } return 0; } #endif /* !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) */ #if !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) int vsnprintf (char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, va_list args) { return dopr(str, count, fmt, args); } #endif #if !defined(HAVE_SNPRINTF) int snprintf(char *str, size_t count, SNPRINTF_CONST char *fmt, ...) { size_t ret; va_list ap; va_start(ap, fmt); ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); return ret; } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/explicit_bzero.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,20 +1,40 @@ /* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/string/explicit_bzero.c */ /* $OpenBSD: explicit_bzero.c,v 1.1 2014/01/22 21:06:45 tedu Exp $ */ /* * Public domain. * Written by Ted Unangst */ #include "includes.h" +/* + * explicit_bzero - don't let the compiler optimize away bzero + */ + #ifndef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO +#ifdef HAVE_MEMSET_S + +void +explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n) +{ + (void)memset_s(p, n, 0, n); +} + +#else /* HAVE_MEMSET_S */ + /* - * explicit_bzero - don't let the compiler optimize away bzero + * Indirect bzero through a volatile pointer to hopefully avoid + * dead-store optimisation eliminating the call. */ +static void (* volatile ssh_bzero)(void *, size_t) = bzero; + void explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n) { - bzero(p, n); + ssh_bzero(p, n); } -#endif + +#endif /* HAVE_MEMSET_S */ + +#endif /* HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/kludge-fd_set.c (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +/* Placed in the public domain. */ + +/* + * _FORTIFY_SOURCE includes a misguided check for FD_SET(n)/FD_ISSET(b) + * where n > FD_SETSIZE. This breaks OpenSSH and other programs that + * explicitly allocate fd_sets. To avoid this, we wrap FD_SET in a + * function compiled without _FORTIFY_SOURCE. + */ + +#include "config.h" + +#if defined(HAVE_FEATURES_H) && defined(_FORTIFY_SOURCE) +# include +# if defined(__GNU_LIBRARY__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ) +# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) +# undef _FORTIFY_SOURCE +# undef __USE_FORTIFY_LEVEL +# include +void kludge_FD_SET(int n, fd_set *set) { + FD_SET(n, set); +} +int kludge_FD_ISSET(int n, fd_set *set) { + return FD_ISSET(n, set); +} +# endif /* __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) */ +# endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ && __GLIBC_PREREQ */ +#endif /* HAVE_FEATURES_H && _FORTIFY_SOURCE */ + Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,271 +1,287 @@ -/* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.61 2014/02/04 00:18:23 djm Exp $ */ +/* $Id: openbsd-compat.h,v 1.62 2014/09/30 23:43:08 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2003 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002 Tim Rice. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #ifndef _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H #define _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H #include "includes.h" #include #include #include /* OpenBSD function replacements */ #include "base64.h" #include "sigact.h" #include "glob.h" #include "readpassphrase.h" #include "vis.h" #include "getrrsetbyname.h" #include "sha2.h" #include "blf.h" #ifndef HAVE_BASENAME char *basename(const char *path); #endif #ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA int bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa); #endif #ifndef HAVE_CLOSEFROM void closefrom(int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_GETCWD char *getcwd(char *pt, size_t size); #endif #if !defined(HAVE_REALPATH) || defined(BROKEN_REALPATH) char *realpath(const char *path, char *resolved); #endif #ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF int rresvport_af(int *alport, sa_family_t af); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY /* #include XXX Still needed? */ size_t strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT /* #include XXX Still needed? */ size_t strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz); #endif #ifndef HAVE_SETENV int setenv(register const char *name, register const char *value, int rewrite); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRMODE void strmode(int mode, char *p); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRPTIME #include char *strptime(const char *buf, const char *fmt, struct tm *tm); #endif #if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP) int mkstemps(char *path, int slen); int mkstemp(char *path); char *mkdtemp(char *path); #endif #ifndef HAVE_DAEMON int daemon(int nochdir, int noclose); #endif #ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME char *dirname(const char *path); #endif #ifndef HAVE_FMT_SCALED #define FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE 7 int fmt_scaled(long long number, char *result); #endif #ifndef HAVE_SCAN_SCALED int scan_scaled(char *, long long *); #endif #if defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA) char *inet_ntoa(struct in_addr in); #endif #ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP const char *inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, socklen_t size); #endif #ifndef HAVE_INET_ATON int inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRSEP char *strsep(char **stringp, const char *delim); #endif #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE void setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...); void compat_init_setproctitle(int argc, char *argv[]); #endif #ifndef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST /* #include XXXX Still needed ? */ int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *); #endif #if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET) int BSDgetopt(int argc, char * const *argv, const char *opts); #include "openbsd-compat/getopt.h" #endif #if defined(HAVE_DECL_WRITEV) && HAVE_DECL_WRITEV == 0 # include # include int writev(int, struct iovec *, int); #endif /* Home grown routines */ #include "bsd-misc.h" #include "bsd-setres_id.h" #include "bsd-statvfs.h" #include "bsd-waitpid.h" #include "bsd-poll.h" #ifndef HAVE_GETPEEREID int getpeereid(int , uid_t *, gid_t *); #endif #ifdef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM # ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR # define arc4random_stir() # endif #else unsigned int arc4random(void); void arc4random_stir(void); #endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */ #ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF void arc4random_buf(void *, size_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM u_int32_t arc4random_uniform(u_int32_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF int asprintf(char **, const char *, ...); #endif #ifndef HAVE_OPENPTY # include /* for struct winsize */ int openpty(int *, int *, char *, struct termios *, struct winsize *); #endif /* HAVE_OPENPTY */ /* #include XXX needed? For size_t */ #ifndef HAVE_SNPRINTF int snprintf(char *, size_t, SNPRINTF_CONST char *, ...); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRTOLL long long strtoll(const char *, char **, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRTOUL unsigned long strtoul(const char *, char **, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRTOULL unsigned long long strtoull(const char *, char **, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_STRTONUM long long strtonum(const char *, long long, long long, const char **); #endif /* multibyte character support */ #ifndef HAVE_MBLEN # define mblen(x, y) 1 #endif #if !defined(HAVE_VASPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF) # include #endif #ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF int vasprintf(char **, const char *, va_list); #endif #ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF int vsnprintf(char *, size_t, const char *, va_list); #endif #ifndef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID char *user_from_uid(uid_t, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID char *group_from_gid(gid_t, int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP int timingsafe_bcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t); #endif #ifndef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF int bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *, size_t, const u_int8_t *, size_t, u_int8_t *, size_t, unsigned int); #endif #ifndef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO void explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n); #endif void *xmmap(size_t size); char *xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt); char *shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw); /* rfc2553 socket API replacements */ #include "fake-rfc2553.h" /* Routines for a single OS platform */ #include "bsd-cray.h" #include "bsd-cygwin_util.h" #include "port-aix.h" #include "port-irix.h" #include "port-linux.h" #include "port-solaris.h" #include "port-tun.h" #include "port-uw.h" + +/* _FORTIFY_SOURCE breaks FD_ISSET(n)/FD_SET(n) for n > FD_SETSIZE. Avoid. */ +#if defined(HAVE_FEATURES_H) && defined(_FORTIFY_SOURCE) +# include +# if defined(__GNU_LIBRARY__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ) +# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) +# include /* Ensure include guard is defined */ +# undef FD_SET +# undef FD_ISSET +# define FD_SET(n, set) kludge_FD_SET(n, set) +# define FD_ISSET(n, set) kludge_FD_ISSET(n, set) +void kludge_FD_SET(int, fd_set *); +int kludge_FD_ISSET(int, fd_set *); +# endif /* __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) */ +# endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ && __GLIBC_PREREQ */ +#endif /* HAVE_FEATURES_H && _FORTIFY_SOURCE */ #endif /* _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,182 +1,80 @@ -/* $Id: openssl-compat.c,v 1.17 2014/02/13 05:38:33 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $Id: openssl-compat.c,v 1.19 2014/07/02 05:28:07 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ +#define SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS #include "includes.h" #include #include #ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE # include # include #endif -#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET_DEFAULT_METHOD -# include -#endif - #include "log.h" -#define SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS #include "openssl-compat.h" -#ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP -int -ssh_EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, const EVP_CIPHER *type, - unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv, int enc) -{ - EVP_CipherInit(evp, type, key, iv, enc); - return 1; -} +/* + * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status + * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0. + * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we + * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed + * within a patch series. + */ int -ssh_EVP_Cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp, char *dst, char *src, int len) +ssh_compatible_openssl(long headerver, long libver) { - EVP_Cipher(evp, dst, src, len); - return 1; -} + long mask, hfix, lfix; -int -ssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp) -{ - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(evp); - return 1; -} -#endif + /* exact match is always OK */ + if (headerver == libver) + return 1; -#ifndef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX -int -EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md, void *engine) -{ - if (engine != NULL) - fatal("%s: ENGINE is not supported", __func__); -# ifdef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID - EVP_DigestInit(ctx, md); - return 1; -# else - return EVP_DigestInit(ctx, md); -# endif + /* for versions < 1.0.0, major,minor,fix,status must match */ + if (headerver < 0x1000000f) { + mask = 0xfffff00fL; /* major,minor,fix,status */ + return (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask); + } + + /* + * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library + * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header. + */ + mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */ + hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12; + lfix = (libver & 0x000ff000) >> 12; + if ( (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask) && lfix >= hfix) + return 1; + return 0; } -#endif - -#ifndef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTFINAL_EX -int -EVP_DigestFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *s) -{ -# ifdef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID - EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, md, s); - return 1; -# else - return EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, md, s); -# endif -} -#endif - -#ifdef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID -int -ssh_EVP_DigestUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *d, unsigned int cnt) -{ - EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, d, cnt); - return 1; -} -#endif - -#ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX -int -EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in) -{ - return EVP_MD_CTX_copy(out, in); -} -#endif - -#ifndef HAVE_BN_IS_PRIME_EX -int -BN_is_prime_ex(const BIGNUM *p, int nchecks, BN_CTX *ctx, void *cb) -{ - if (cb != NULL) - fatal("%s: callback args not supported", __func__); - return BN_is_prime(p, nchecks, NULL, ctx, NULL); -} -#endif - -#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX -int -RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *bn_e, void *cb) -{ - RSA *new_rsa, tmp_rsa; - unsigned long e; - - if (cb != NULL) - fatal("%s: callback args not supported", __func__); - e = BN_get_word(bn_e); - if (e == 0xffffffffL) - fatal("%s: value of e too large", __func__); - new_rsa = RSA_generate_key(bits, e, NULL, NULL); - if (new_rsa == NULL) - return 0; - /* swap rsa/new_rsa then free new_rsa */ - tmp_rsa = *rsa; - *rsa = *new_rsa; - *new_rsa = tmp_rsa; - RSA_free(new_rsa); - return 1; -} -#endif - -#ifndef HAVE_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX -int -DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *dsa, int bits, const unsigned char *seed, - int seed_len, int *counter_ret, unsigned long *h_ret, void *cb) -{ - DSA *new_dsa, tmp_dsa; - - if (cb != NULL) - fatal("%s: callback args not supported", __func__); - new_dsa = DSA_generate_parameters(bits, (unsigned char *)seed, seed_len, - counter_ret, h_ret, NULL, NULL); - if (new_dsa == NULL) - return 0; - /* swap dsa/new_dsa then free new_dsa */ - tmp_dsa = *dsa; - *dsa = *new_dsa; - *new_dsa = tmp_dsa; - DSA_free(new_dsa); - return 1; -} -#endif - -#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET_DEFAULT_METHOD -RSA_METHOD * -RSA_get_default_method(void) -{ - return RSA_PKCS1_SSLeay(); -} -#endif #ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE void ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(void) { OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); /* Enable use of crypto hardware */ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); ENGINE_register_all_complete(); OPENSSL_config(NULL); } #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,182 +1,93 @@ -/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.26 2014/02/13 05:38:33 dtucker Exp $ */ +/* $Id: openssl-compat.h,v 1.31 2014/08/29 18:18:29 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER * IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ +#ifndef _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H +#define _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H + #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include -/* Only in 0.9.8 */ -#ifndef OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS -# define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000 -#endif -#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS -# define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 16384 -#endif +int ssh_compatible_openssl(long, long); -/* OPENSSL_free() is Free() in versions before OpenSSL 0.9.6 */ -#if !defined(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER) || (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x0090600f) -# define OPENSSL_free(x) Free(x) +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER <= 0x0090805fL) +# error OpenSSL 0.9.8f or greater is required #endif -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00906000L -# define SSH_OLD_EVP -# define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(e) ((e)->app_data) -#endif - #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000001L # define LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE unsigned int #else # define LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE size_t #endif -#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L) || defined(OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES) -# define USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL +#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS +# define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 16384 #endif - -#ifdef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL -# include "rijndael.h" -# define AES_KEY rijndael_ctx -# define AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16 -# define AES_encrypt(a, b, c) rijndael_encrypt(c, a, b) -# define AES_set_encrypt_key(a, b, c) rijndael_set_key(c, (char *)a, b, 1) -# define EVP_aes_128_cbc evp_rijndael -# define EVP_aes_192_cbc evp_rijndael -# define EVP_aes_256_cbc evp_rijndael -const EVP_CIPHER *evp_rijndael(void); -void ssh_rijndael_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, u_int); +#ifndef OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS +# define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000 #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR -#define EVP_aes_128_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr -#define EVP_aes_192_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr -#define EVP_aes_256_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr +# define EVP_aes_128_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr +# define EVP_aes_192_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr +# define EVP_aes_256_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_128_ctr(void); void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, size_t); #endif /* Avoid some #ifdef. Code that uses these is unreachable without GCM */ #if !defined(OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM) && !defined(EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED) # define EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED -1 # define EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN -1 # define EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG -1 # define EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG -1 #endif /* Replace missing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl() with something that returns failure */ #ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL # ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM # error AES-GCM enabled without EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl /* shouldn't happen */ # else # define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(a,b,c,d) (0) # endif #endif -#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L -#define EVP_X_STATE(evp) &(evp).c -#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp) sizeof((evp).c) -#else -#define EVP_X_STATE(evp) (evp).cipher_data -#define EVP_X_STATE_LEN(evp) (evp).cipher->ctx_size -#endif - -/* OpenSSL 0.9.8e returns cipher key len not context key len */ -#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER == 0x0090805fL) -# define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(c) ((c)->key_len) -#endif - -#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET_DEFAULT_METHOD -RSA_METHOD *RSA_get_default_method(void); -#endif - /* * We overload some of the OpenSSL crypto functions with ssh_* equivalents - * which cater for older and/or less featureful OpenSSL version. + * to automatically handle OpenSSL engine initialisation. * * In order for the compat library to call the real functions, it must * define SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS before including this file and * implement the ssh_* equivalents. */ #ifndef SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS -# ifdef SSH_OLD_EVP -# ifdef EVP_Cipher -# undef EVP_Cipher -# endif -# define EVP_CipherInit(a,b,c,d,e) ssh_EVP_CipherInit((a),(b),(c),(d),(e)) -# define EVP_Cipher(a,b,c,d) ssh_EVP_Cipher((a),(b),(c),(d)) -# define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(a) ssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup((a)) -# endif /* SSH_OLD_EVP */ - -# ifdef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID -# define EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c) ssh_EVP_DigestUpdate((a),(b),(c)) -# endif - # ifdef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE # ifdef OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms # undef OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms # endif # define OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() # endif -# ifndef HAVE_BN_IS_PRIME_EX -int BN_is_prime_ex(const BIGNUM *, int, BN_CTX *, void *); -# endif - -# ifndef HAVE_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX -int DSA_generate_parameters_ex(DSA *, int, const unsigned char *, int, int *, - unsigned long *, void *); -# endif - -# ifndef HAVE_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX -int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *, int, BIGNUM *, void *); -# endif - -# ifndef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX -int EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *, const EVP_MD *, void *); -# endif - -# ifndef HAVE_EVP_DISESTFINAL_EX -int EVP_DigestFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *, unsigned char *, unsigned int *); -# endif - -# ifndef EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX -int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *, const EVP_MD_CTX *); -# endif - -int ssh_EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, const EVP_CIPHER *, unsigned char *, - unsigned char *, int); -int ssh_EVP_Cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, char *, char *, int); -int ssh_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *); void ssh_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(void); -# ifndef HAVE_HMAC_CTX_INIT -# define HMAC_CTX_init(a) -# endif - -# ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_INIT -# define EVP_MD_CTX_init(a) -# endif - -# ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_CLEANUP -# define EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(a) -# endif - #endif /* SSH_DONT_OVERLOAD_OPENSSL_FUNCS */ +#endif /* _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/port-uw.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,149 +1,150 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 2005 The SCO Group. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2005 Tim Rice. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE) #include #ifdef HAVE_CRYPT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "packet.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "key.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" /* servconf.h needs misc.h for struct ForwardOptions */ #include "servconf.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "ssh.h" int nischeck(char *); int sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password) { struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw; char *salt; int result; /* Just use the supplied fake password if authctxt is invalid */ char *pw_password = authctxt->valid ? shadow_pw(pw) : pw->pw_passwd; /* Check for users with no password. */ if (strcmp(pw_password, "") == 0 && strcmp(password, "") == 0) return (1); /* Encrypt the candidate password using the proper salt. */ salt = (pw_password[0] && pw_password[1]) ? pw_password : "xx"; /* * Authentication is accepted if the encrypted passwords * are identical. */ #ifdef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS if (!nischeck(pw->pw_name)) { result = ((strcmp(bigcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0) || (strcmp(osr5bigcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0)); } else #endif /* UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS */ result = (strcmp(xcrypt(password, salt), pw_password) == 0); #ifdef USE_LIBIAF if (authctxt->valid) free(pw_password); #endif return(result); } #ifdef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS int nischeck(char *namep) { char password_file[] = "/etc/passwd"; FILE *fd; struct passwd *ent = NULL; if ((fd = fopen (password_file, "r")) == NULL) { /* * If the passwd file has dissapeared we are in a bad state. * However, returning 0 will send us back through the * authentication scheme that has checked the ia database for * passwords earlier. */ return(0); } /* * fgetpwent() only reads from password file, so we know for certain * that the user is local. */ while (ent = fgetpwent(fd)) { if (strcmp (ent->pw_name, namep) == 0) { /* Local user */ fclose (fd); return(0); } } fclose (fd); return (1); } #endif /* UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS */ /* NOTE: ia_get_logpwd() allocates memory for arg 2 functions that call shadow_pw() will need to free */ #ifdef USE_LIBIAF char * get_iaf_password(struct passwd *pw) { char *pw_password = NULL; uinfo_t uinfo; if (!ia_openinfo(pw->pw_name,&uinfo)) { ia_get_logpwd(uinfo, &pw_password); if (pw_password == NULL) fatal("ia_get_logpwd: Unable to get the shadow passwd"); ia_closeinfo(uinfo); return pw_password; } else fatal("ia_openinfo: Unable to open the shadow passwd file"); } #endif /* USE_LIBIAF */ #endif /* HAVE_LIBIAF and not HAVE_SECUREWARE */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile.in (revision 276707) @@ -1,38 +1,38 @@ -# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.4 2006/08/19 09:12:14 dtucker Exp $ +# $Id: Makefile.in,v 1.5 2014/06/17 13:06:08 dtucker Exp $ sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@ piddir=@piddir@ srcdir=@srcdir@ top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@ VPATH=@srcdir@ CC=@CC@ LD=@LD@ CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@ CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@ LIBCOMPAT=../libopenbsd-compat.a LIBS=@LIBS@ LDFLAGS=@LDFLAGS@ $(LIBCOMPAT) TESTPROGS=closefromtest$(EXEEXT) snprintftest$(EXEEXT) strduptest$(EXEEXT) \ - strtonumtest$(EXEEXT) + strtonumtest$(EXEEXT) opensslvertest$(EXEEXT) all: t-exec ${OTHERTESTS} -%$(EXEEXT): %.c +%$(EXEEXT): %.c $(LIBCOMPAT) $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@ $< $(LIBCOMPAT) $(LIBS) t-exec: $(TESTPROGS) @echo running compat regress tests @for TEST in ""$?; do \ echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \ ./$${TEST}$(EXEEXT) || exit $$? ; \ done @echo finished compat regress tests clean: rm -f *.o *.a core $(TESTPROGS) valid.out distclean: clean rm -f Makefile *~ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/openbsd-compat/regress/opensslvertest.c (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2014 Darren Tucker + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include +#include + +int ssh_compatible_openssl(long, long); + +struct version_test { + long headerver; + long libver; + int result; +} version_tests[] = { + /* built with 0.9.8b release headers */ + { 0x0090802fL, 0x0090802fL, 1}, /* exact match */ + { 0x0090802fL, 0x0090804fL, 1}, /* newer library fix version: ok */ + { 0x0090802fL, 0x0090801fL, 1}, /* older library fix version: ok */ + { 0x0090802fL, 0x0090702fL, 0}, /* older library minor version: NO */ + { 0x0090802fL, 0x0090902fL, 0}, /* newer library minor version: NO */ + { 0x0090802fL, 0x0080802fL, 0}, /* older library major version: NO */ + { 0x0090802fL, 0x1000100fL, 0}, /* newer library major version: NO */ + + /* built with 1.0.1b release headers */ + { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000101fL, 1},/* exact match */ + { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000102fL, 1}, /* newer library patch version: ok */ + { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000100fL, 1}, /* older library patch version: ok */ + { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000201fL, 1}, /* newer library fix version: ok */ + { 0x1000101fL, 0x1000001fL, 0}, /* older library fix version: NO */ + { 0x1000101fL, 0x1010101fL, 0}, /* newer library minor version: NO */ + { 0x1000101fL, 0x0000101fL, 0}, /* older library major version: NO */ + { 0x1000101fL, 0x2000101fL, 0}, /* newer library major version: NO */ +}; + +void +fail(long hver, long lver, int result) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "opensslver: header %lx library %lx != %d \n", hver, lver, result); + exit(1); +} + +int +main(void) +{ + unsigned int i; + int res; + long hver, lver; + + for (i = 0; i < sizeof(version_tests) / sizeof(version_tests[0]); i++) { + hver = version_tests[i].headerver; + lver = version_tests[i].libver; + res = version_tests[i].result; + if (ssh_compatible_openssl(hver, lver) != res) + fail(hver, lver, res); + } + exit(0); +} Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/opensshd.init.in =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/opensshd.init.in (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/opensshd.init.in (revision 276707) @@ -1,88 +1,92 @@ #!@STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL@ # Donated code that was put under PD license. # # Stripped PRNGd out of it for the time being. umask 022 CAT=@CAT@ KILL=@KILL@ prefix=@prefix@ sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@ piddir=@piddir@ SSHD=$prefix/sbin/sshd PIDFILE=$piddir/sshd.pid PidFile=`grep "^PidFile" ${sysconfdir}/sshd_config | tr "=" " " | awk '{print $2}'` [ X$PidFile = X ] || PIDFILE=$PidFile SSH_KEYGEN=$prefix/bin/ssh-keygen HOST_KEY_RSA1=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_key HOST_KEY_DSA=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_dsa_key HOST_KEY_RSA=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_rsa_key @COMMENT_OUT_ECC@HOST_KEY_ECDSA=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_ecdsa_key +HOST_KEY_ED25519=$sysconfdir/ssh_host_ed25519_key checkkeys() { if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_RSA1 ]; then ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t rsa1 -f ${HOST_KEY_RSA1} -N "" fi if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_DSA ]; then ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t dsa -f ${HOST_KEY_DSA} -N "" fi if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_RSA ]; then ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t rsa -f ${HOST_KEY_RSA} -N "" fi @COMMENT_OUT_ECC@ if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_ECDSA ]; then @COMMENT_OUT_ECC@ ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t ecdsa -f ${HOST_KEY_ECDSA} -N "" @COMMENT_OUT_ECC@ fi + if [ ! -f $HOST_KEY_ED25519 ]; then + ${SSH_KEYGEN} -t ed25519 -f ${HOST_KEY_ED25519} -N "" + fi } stop_service() { if [ -r $PIDFILE -a ! -z ${PIDFILE} ]; then PID=`${CAT} ${PIDFILE}` fi if [ ${PID:=0} -gt 1 -a ! "X$PID" = "X " ]; then ${KILL} ${PID} else echo "Unable to read PID file" fi } start_service() { # XXX We really should check if the service is already going, but # XXX we will opt out at this time. - Bal # Check to see if we have keys that need to be made checkkeys # Start SSHD echo "starting $SSHD... \c" ; $SSHD sshd_rc=$? if [ $sshd_rc -ne 0 ]; then echo "$0: Error ${sshd_rc} starting ${SSHD}... bailing." exit $sshd_rc fi echo done. } case $1 in 'start') start_service ;; 'stop') stop_service ;; 'restart') stop_service start_service ;; *) echo "$0: usage: $0 {start|stop|restart}" ;; esac Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/packet.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/packet.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/packet.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,2057 +1,2091 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.192 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.198 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * This file contains code implementing the packet protocol and communication * with the other side. This same code is used both on client and server side. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * * SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "packet.h" #include "crc32.h" #include "compress.h" #include "deattack.h" -#include "channels.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "key.h" #include "kex.h" #include "mac.h" #include "log.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "misc.h" +#include "channels.h" #include "ssh.h" +#include "ssherr.h" #include "roaming.h" #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG #define DBG(x) x #else #define DBG(x) #endif #define PACKET_MAX_SIZE (256 * 1024) struct packet_state { u_int32_t seqnr; u_int32_t packets; u_int64_t blocks; u_int64_t bytes; }; struct packet { TAILQ_ENTRY(packet) next; u_char type; Buffer payload; }; struct session_state { /* * This variable contains the file descriptors used for * communicating with the other side. connection_in is used for * reading; connection_out for writing. These can be the same * descriptor, in which case it is assumed to be a socket. */ int connection_in; int connection_out; /* Protocol flags for the remote side. */ u_int remote_protocol_flags; /* Encryption context for receiving data. Only used for decryption. */ CipherContext receive_context; /* Encryption context for sending data. Only used for encryption. */ CipherContext send_context; /* Buffer for raw input data from the socket. */ Buffer input; /* Buffer for raw output data going to the socket. */ Buffer output; /* Buffer for the partial outgoing packet being constructed. */ Buffer outgoing_packet; /* Buffer for the incoming packet currently being processed. */ Buffer incoming_packet; /* Scratch buffer for packet compression/decompression. */ Buffer compression_buffer; int compression_buffer_ready; /* * Flag indicating whether packet compression/decompression is * enabled. */ int packet_compression; /* default maximum packet size */ u_int max_packet_size; /* Flag indicating whether this module has been initialized. */ int initialized; /* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */ int interactive_mode; /* Set to true if we are the server side. */ int server_side; /* Set to true if we are authenticated. */ int after_authentication; int keep_alive_timeouts; /* The maximum time that we will wait to send or receive a packet */ int packet_timeout_ms; /* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */ Newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX]; struct packet_state p_read, p_send; /* Volume-based rekeying */ u_int64_t max_blocks_in, max_blocks_out; u_int32_t rekey_limit; /* Time-based rekeying */ time_t rekey_interval; /* how often in seconds */ time_t rekey_time; /* time of last rekeying */ /* Session key for protocol v1 */ u_char ssh1_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; u_int ssh1_keylen; /* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */ u_char extra_pad; /* XXX discard incoming data after MAC error */ u_int packet_discard; Mac *packet_discard_mac; /* Used in packet_read_poll2() */ u_int packlen; /* Used in packet_send2 */ int rekeying; /* Used in packet_set_interactive */ int set_interactive_called; /* Used in packet_set_maxsize */ int set_maxsize_called; TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing; }; static struct session_state *active_state, *backup_state; static struct session_state * alloc_session_state(void) { struct session_state *s = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*s)); s->connection_in = -1; s->connection_out = -1; s->max_packet_size = 32768; s->packet_timeout_ms = -1; return s; } /* * Sets the descriptors used for communication. Disables encryption until * packet_set_encryption_key is called. */ void packet_set_connection(int fd_in, int fd_out) { const Cipher *none = cipher_by_name("none"); + int r; if (none == NULL) fatal("packet_set_connection: cannot load cipher 'none'"); if (active_state == NULL) active_state = alloc_session_state(); active_state->connection_in = fd_in; active_state->connection_out = fd_out; - cipher_init(&active_state->send_context, none, (const u_char *)"", - 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT); - cipher_init(&active_state->receive_context, none, (const u_char *)"", - 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT); + if ((r = cipher_init(&active_state->send_context, none, + (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 || + (r = cipher_init(&active_state->receive_context, none, + (const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0) + fatal("%s: cipher_init: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL; if (!active_state->initialized) { active_state->initialized = 1; buffer_init(&active_state->input); buffer_init(&active_state->output); buffer_init(&active_state->outgoing_packet); buffer_init(&active_state->incoming_packet); TAILQ_INIT(&active_state->outgoing); active_state->p_send.packets = active_state->p_read.packets = 0; } } void packet_set_timeout(int timeout, int count) { if (timeout <= 0 || count <= 0) { active_state->packet_timeout_ms = -1; return; } if ((INT_MAX / 1000) / count < timeout) active_state->packet_timeout_ms = INT_MAX; else active_state->packet_timeout_ms = timeout * count * 1000; } static void packet_stop_discard(void) { if (active_state->packet_discard_mac) { char buf[1024]; memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf)); while (buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet) < PACKET_MAX_SIZE) buffer_append(&active_state->incoming_packet, buf, sizeof(buf)); (void) mac_compute(active_state->packet_discard_mac, active_state->p_read.seqnr, buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet), PACKET_MAX_SIZE); } logit("Finished discarding for %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr()); cleanup_exit(255); } static void packet_start_discard(Enc *enc, Mac *mac, u_int packet_length, u_int discard) { if (enc == NULL || !cipher_is_cbc(enc->cipher) || (mac && mac->etm)) packet_disconnect("Packet corrupt"); if (packet_length != PACKET_MAX_SIZE && mac && mac->enabled) active_state->packet_discard_mac = mac; if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) >= discard) packet_stop_discard(); active_state->packet_discard = discard - buffer_len(&active_state->input); } /* Returns 1 if remote host is connected via socket, 0 if not. */ int packet_connection_is_on_socket(void) { struct sockaddr_storage from, to; socklen_t fromlen, tolen; /* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */ if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) return 1; fromlen = sizeof(from); memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); if (getpeername(active_state->connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) return 0; tolen = sizeof(to); memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to)); if (getpeername(active_state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to, &tolen) < 0) return 0; if (fromlen != tolen || memcmp(&from, &to, fromlen) != 0) return 0; if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6) return 0; return 1; } /* * Exports an IV from the CipherContext required to export the key * state back from the unprivileged child to the privileged parent * process. */ void packet_get_keyiv(int mode, u_char *iv, u_int len) { CipherContext *cc; + int r; if (mode == MODE_OUT) cc = &active_state->send_context; else cc = &active_state->receive_context; - cipher_get_keyiv(cc, iv, len); + if ((r = cipher_get_keyiv(cc, iv, len)) != 0) + fatal("%s: cipher_get_keyiv: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } int packet_get_keycontext(int mode, u_char *dat) { CipherContext *cc; if (mode == MODE_OUT) cc = &active_state->send_context; else cc = &active_state->receive_context; return (cipher_get_keycontext(cc, dat)); } void packet_set_keycontext(int mode, u_char *dat) { CipherContext *cc; if (mode == MODE_OUT) cc = &active_state->send_context; else cc = &active_state->receive_context; cipher_set_keycontext(cc, dat); } int packet_get_keyiv_len(int mode) { CipherContext *cc; if (mode == MODE_OUT) cc = &active_state->send_context; else cc = &active_state->receive_context; return (cipher_get_keyiv_len(cc)); } void packet_set_iv(int mode, u_char *dat) { CipherContext *cc; + int r; if (mode == MODE_OUT) cc = &active_state->send_context; else cc = &active_state->receive_context; - cipher_set_keyiv(cc, dat); + if ((r = cipher_set_keyiv(cc, dat)) != 0) + fatal("%s: cipher_set_keyiv: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } int packet_get_ssh1_cipher(void) { return (cipher_get_number(active_state->receive_context.cipher)); } void packet_get_state(int mode, u_int32_t *seqnr, u_int64_t *blocks, u_int32_t *packets, u_int64_t *bytes) { struct packet_state *state; state = (mode == MODE_IN) ? &active_state->p_read : &active_state->p_send; if (seqnr) *seqnr = state->seqnr; if (blocks) *blocks = state->blocks; if (packets) *packets = state->packets; if (bytes) *bytes = state->bytes; } void packet_set_state(int mode, u_int32_t seqnr, u_int64_t blocks, u_int32_t packets, u_int64_t bytes) { struct packet_state *state; state = (mode == MODE_IN) ? &active_state->p_read : &active_state->p_send; state->seqnr = seqnr; state->blocks = blocks; state->packets = packets; state->bytes = bytes; } static int packet_connection_af(void) { struct sockaddr_storage to; socklen_t tolen = sizeof(to); memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to)); if (getsockname(active_state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to, &tolen) < 0) return 0; #ifdef IPV4_IN_IPV6 if (to.ss_family == AF_INET6 && IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&to)->sin6_addr)) return AF_INET; #endif return to.ss_family; } /* Sets the connection into non-blocking mode. */ void packet_set_nonblocking(void) { /* Set the socket into non-blocking mode. */ set_nonblock(active_state->connection_in); if (active_state->connection_out != active_state->connection_in) set_nonblock(active_state->connection_out); } /* Returns the socket used for reading. */ int packet_get_connection_in(void) { return active_state->connection_in; } /* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */ int packet_get_connection_out(void) { return active_state->connection_out; } /* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */ void packet_close(void) { if (!active_state->initialized) return; active_state->initialized = 0; if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) { shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR); close(active_state->connection_out); } else { close(active_state->connection_in); close(active_state->connection_out); } buffer_free(&active_state->input); buffer_free(&active_state->output); buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet); buffer_free(&active_state->incoming_packet); if (active_state->compression_buffer_ready) { buffer_free(&active_state->compression_buffer); buffer_compress_uninit(); } cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context); cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context); } /* Sets remote side protocol flags. */ void packet_set_protocol_flags(u_int protocol_flags) { active_state->remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags; } /* Returns the remote protocol flags set earlier by the above function. */ u_int packet_get_protocol_flags(void) { return active_state->remote_protocol_flags; } /* * Starts packet compression from the next packet on in both directions. * Level is compression level 1 (fastest) - 9 (slow, best) as in gzip. */ static void packet_init_compression(void) { if (active_state->compression_buffer_ready == 1) return; active_state->compression_buffer_ready = 1; buffer_init(&active_state->compression_buffer); } void packet_start_compression(int level) { if (active_state->packet_compression && !compat20) fatal("Compression already enabled."); active_state->packet_compression = 1; packet_init_compression(); buffer_compress_init_send(level); buffer_compress_init_recv(); } /* * Causes any further packets to be encrypted using the given key. The same * key is used for both sending and reception. However, both directions are * encrypted independently of each other. */ void packet_set_encryption_key(const u_char *key, u_int keylen, int number) { const Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_number(number); + int r; if (cipher == NULL) fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: unknown cipher number %d", number); if (keylen < 20) fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: keylen too small: %d", keylen); if (keylen > SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH) fatal("packet_set_encryption_key: keylen too big: %d", keylen); memcpy(active_state->ssh1_key, key, keylen); active_state->ssh1_keylen = keylen; - cipher_init(&active_state->send_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL, - 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT); - cipher_init(&active_state->receive_context, cipher, key, keylen, NULL, - 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT); + if ((r = cipher_init(&active_state->send_context, cipher, + key, keylen, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 || + (r = cipher_init(&active_state->receive_context, cipher, + key, keylen, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0) + fatal("%s: cipher_init: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); } u_int packet_get_encryption_key(u_char *key) { if (key == NULL) return (active_state->ssh1_keylen); memcpy(key, active_state->ssh1_key, active_state->ssh1_keylen); return (active_state->ssh1_keylen); } /* Start constructing a packet to send. */ void packet_start(u_char type) { u_char buf[9]; int len; DBG(debug("packet_start[%d]", type)); len = compat20 ? 6 : 9; memset(buf, 0, len - 1); buf[len - 1] = type; buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet); buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, buf, len); } /* Append payload. */ void packet_put_char(int value) { char ch = value; buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, &ch, 1); } void packet_put_int(u_int value) { buffer_put_int(&active_state->outgoing_packet, value); } void packet_put_int64(u_int64_t value) { buffer_put_int64(&active_state->outgoing_packet, value); } void packet_put_string(const void *buf, u_int len) { buffer_put_string(&active_state->outgoing_packet, buf, len); } void packet_put_cstring(const char *str) { buffer_put_cstring(&active_state->outgoing_packet, str); } void packet_put_raw(const void *buf, u_int len) { buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, buf, len); } +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL void packet_put_bignum(BIGNUM * value) { buffer_put_bignum(&active_state->outgoing_packet, value); } void packet_put_bignum2(BIGNUM * value) { buffer_put_bignum2(&active_state->outgoing_packet, value); } +#endif #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC void packet_put_ecpoint(const EC_GROUP *curve, const EC_POINT *point) { buffer_put_ecpoint(&active_state->outgoing_packet, curve, point); } #endif /* * Finalizes and sends the packet. If the encryption key has been set, * encrypts the packet before sending. */ static void packet_send1(void) { u_char buf[8], *cp; int i, padding, len; u_int checksum; u_int32_t rnd = 0; /* * If using packet compression, compress the payload of the outgoing * packet. */ if (active_state->packet_compression) { buffer_clear(&active_state->compression_buffer); /* Skip padding. */ buffer_consume(&active_state->outgoing_packet, 8); /* padding */ buffer_append(&active_state->compression_buffer, "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0", 8); buffer_compress(&active_state->outgoing_packet, &active_state->compression_buffer); buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet); buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, buffer_ptr(&active_state->compression_buffer), buffer_len(&active_state->compression_buffer)); } /* Compute packet length without padding (add checksum, remove padding). */ len = buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet) + 4 - 8; /* Insert padding. Initialized to zero in packet_start1() */ padding = 8 - len % 8; if (!active_state->send_context.plaintext) { cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet); for (i = 0; i < padding; i++) { if (i % 4 == 0) rnd = arc4random(); cp[7 - i] = rnd & 0xff; rnd >>= 8; } } buffer_consume(&active_state->outgoing_packet, 8 - padding); /* Add check bytes. */ checksum = ssh_crc32(buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet), buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet)); put_u32(buf, checksum); buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, buf, 4); #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "packet_send plain: "); buffer_dump(&active_state->outgoing_packet); #endif /* Append to output. */ put_u32(buf, len); buffer_append(&active_state->output, buf, 4); cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->output, buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet)); if (cipher_crypt(&active_state->send_context, 0, cp, buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet), buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet), 0, 0) != 0) fatal("%s: cipher_crypt failed", __func__); #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: "); buffer_dump(&active_state->output); #endif active_state->p_send.packets++; active_state->p_send.bytes += len + buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet); buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet); /* * Note that the packet is now only buffered in output. It won't be * actually sent until packet_write_wait or packet_write_poll is * called. */ } void set_newkeys(int mode) { Enc *enc; Mac *mac; Comp *comp; CipherContext *cc; u_int64_t *max_blocks; - int crypt_type; + int r, crypt_type; debug2("set_newkeys: mode %d", mode); if (mode == MODE_OUT) { cc = &active_state->send_context; crypt_type = CIPHER_ENCRYPT; active_state->p_send.packets = active_state->p_send.blocks = 0; max_blocks = &active_state->max_blocks_out; } else { cc = &active_state->receive_context; crypt_type = CIPHER_DECRYPT; active_state->p_read.packets = active_state->p_read.blocks = 0; max_blocks = &active_state->max_blocks_in; } if (active_state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) { debug("set_newkeys: rekeying"); cipher_cleanup(cc); enc = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc; mac = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac; comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp; mac_clear(mac); explicit_bzero(enc->iv, enc->iv_len); explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len); explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len); free(enc->name); free(enc->iv); free(enc->key); free(mac->name); free(mac->key); free(comp->name); free(active_state->newkeys[mode]); } active_state->newkeys[mode] = kex_get_newkeys(mode); if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL) fatal("newkeys: no keys for mode %d", mode); enc = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc; mac = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac; comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp; if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0 && mac_init(mac) == 0) mac->enabled = 1; DBG(debug("cipher_init_context: %d", mode)); - cipher_init(cc, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len, - enc->iv, enc->iv_len, crypt_type); + if ((r = cipher_init(cc, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len, + enc->iv, enc->iv_len, crypt_type)) != 0) + fatal("%s: cipher_init: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r)); /* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */ /* explicit_bzero(enc->iv, enc->block_size); explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len); explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len); */ if ((comp->type == COMP_ZLIB || (comp->type == COMP_DELAYED && active_state->after_authentication)) && comp->enabled == 0) { packet_init_compression(); if (mode == MODE_OUT) buffer_compress_init_send(6); else buffer_compress_init_recv(); comp->enabled = 1; } /* * The 2^(blocksize*2) limit is too expensive for 3DES, * blowfish, etc, so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes. */ if (enc->block_size >= 16) *max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2); else *max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size; if (active_state->rekey_limit) *max_blocks = MIN(*max_blocks, active_state->rekey_limit / enc->block_size); } /* * Delayed compression for SSH2 is enabled after authentication: * This happens on the server side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is sent, * and on the client side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is received. */ static void packet_enable_delayed_compress(void) { Comp *comp = NULL; int mode; /* * Remember that we are past the authentication step, so rekeying * with COMP_DELAYED will turn on compression immediately. */ active_state->after_authentication = 1; for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { /* protocol error: USERAUTH_SUCCESS received before NEWKEYS */ if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL) continue; comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp; if (comp && !comp->enabled && comp->type == COMP_DELAYED) { packet_init_compression(); if (mode == MODE_OUT) buffer_compress_init_send(6); else buffer_compress_init_recv(); comp->enabled = 1; } } } /* * Finalize packet in SSH2 format (compress, mac, encrypt, enqueue) */ static void packet_send2_wrapped(void) { u_char type, *cp, *macbuf = NULL; u_char padlen, pad = 0; u_int i, len, authlen = 0, aadlen = 0; u_int32_t rnd = 0; Enc *enc = NULL; Mac *mac = NULL; Comp *comp = NULL; int block_size; if (active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL) { enc = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc; mac = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->mac; comp = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp; /* disable mac for authenticated encryption */ if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0) mac = NULL; } block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8; aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0; cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet); type = cp[5]; #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "plain: "); buffer_dump(&active_state->outgoing_packet); #endif if (comp && comp->enabled) { len = buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet); /* skip header, compress only payload */ buffer_consume(&active_state->outgoing_packet, 5); buffer_clear(&active_state->compression_buffer); buffer_compress(&active_state->outgoing_packet, &active_state->compression_buffer); buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet); buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, "\0\0\0\0\0", 5); buffer_append(&active_state->outgoing_packet, buffer_ptr(&active_state->compression_buffer), buffer_len(&active_state->compression_buffer)); DBG(debug("compression: raw %d compressed %d", len, buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet))); } /* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload) */ len = buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet); /* * calc size of padding, alloc space, get random data, * minimum padding is 4 bytes */ len -= aadlen; /* packet length is not encrypted for EtM modes */ padlen = block_size - (len % block_size); if (padlen < 4) padlen += block_size; if (active_state->extra_pad) { /* will wrap if extra_pad+padlen > 255 */ active_state->extra_pad = roundup(active_state->extra_pad, block_size); pad = active_state->extra_pad - ((len + padlen) % active_state->extra_pad); - debug3("packet_send2: adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)", - pad, len, padlen, active_state->extra_pad); + DBG(debug3("%s: adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)", + __func__, pad, len, padlen, active_state->extra_pad)); padlen += pad; active_state->extra_pad = 0; } cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->outgoing_packet, padlen); if (enc && !active_state->send_context.plaintext) { /* random padding */ for (i = 0; i < padlen; i++) { if (i % 4 == 0) rnd = arc4random(); cp[i] = rnd & 0xff; rnd >>= 8; } } else { /* clear padding */ explicit_bzero(cp, padlen); } /* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload + padding) */ len = buffer_len(&active_state->outgoing_packet); cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet); /* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */ put_u32(cp, len - 4); cp[4] = padlen; DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d, aadlen %d)", len, padlen, aadlen)); /* compute MAC over seqnr and packet(length fields, payload, padding) */ if (mac && mac->enabled && !mac->etm) { macbuf = mac_compute(mac, active_state->p_send.seqnr, buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet), len); DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", active_state->p_send.seqnr)); } /* encrypt packet and append to output buffer. */ cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->output, len + authlen); if (cipher_crypt(&active_state->send_context, active_state->p_send.seqnr, cp, buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet), len - aadlen, aadlen, authlen) != 0) fatal("%s: cipher_crypt failed", __func__); /* append unencrypted MAC */ if (mac && mac->enabled) { if (mac->etm) { /* EtM: compute mac over aadlen + cipher text */ macbuf = mac_compute(mac, active_state->p_send.seqnr, cp, len); DBG(debug("done calc MAC(EtM) out #%d", active_state->p_send.seqnr)); } buffer_append(&active_state->output, macbuf, mac->mac_len); } #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: "); buffer_dump(&active_state->output); #endif /* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */ if (++active_state->p_send.seqnr == 0) logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around"); if (++active_state->p_send.packets == 0) if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)) fatal("XXX too many packets with same key"); active_state->p_send.blocks += len / block_size; active_state->p_send.bytes += len; buffer_clear(&active_state->outgoing_packet); if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) set_newkeys(MODE_OUT); else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && active_state->server_side) packet_enable_delayed_compress(); } static void packet_send2(void) { struct packet *p; u_char type, *cp; cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->outgoing_packet); type = cp[5]; /* during rekeying we can only send key exchange messages */ if (active_state->rekeying) { if ((type < SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN) || (type > SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX) || (type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST) || (type == SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT)) { debug("enqueue packet: %u", type); p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p)); p->type = type; memcpy(&p->payload, &active_state->outgoing_packet, sizeof(Buffer)); buffer_init(&active_state->outgoing_packet); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&active_state->outgoing, p, next); return; } } /* rekeying starts with sending KEXINIT */ if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) active_state->rekeying = 1; packet_send2_wrapped(); /* after a NEWKEYS message we can send the complete queue */ if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) { active_state->rekeying = 0; active_state->rekey_time = monotime(); while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&active_state->outgoing))) { type = p->type; debug("dequeue packet: %u", type); buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet); memcpy(&active_state->outgoing_packet, &p->payload, sizeof(Buffer)); TAILQ_REMOVE(&active_state->outgoing, p, next); free(p); packet_send2_wrapped(); } } } void packet_send(void) { if (compat20) packet_send2(); else packet_send1(); DBG(debug("packet_send done")); } /* * Waits until a packet has been received, and returns its type. Note that * no other data is processed until this returns, so this function should not * be used during the interactive session. */ int packet_read_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p) { int type, len, ret, cont, ms_remain = 0; fd_set *setp; char buf[8192]; struct timeval timeout, start, *timeoutp = NULL; DBG(debug("packet_read()")); setp = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(active_state->connection_in + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask)); /* Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have been sent. */ packet_write_wait(); /* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */ for (;;) { /* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */ type = packet_read_poll_seqnr(seqnr_p); if (!compat20 && ( type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS || type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE || type == SSH_CMSG_EOF || type == SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION)) packet_check_eom(); /* If we got a packet, return it. */ if (type != SSH_MSG_NONE) { free(setp); return type; } /* * Otherwise, wait for some data to arrive, add it to the * buffer, and try again. */ memset(setp, 0, howmany(active_state->connection_in + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask)); FD_SET(active_state->connection_in, setp); if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) { ms_remain = active_state->packet_timeout_ms; timeoutp = &timeout; } /* Wait for some data to arrive. */ for (;;) { if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) { ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain); gettimeofday(&start, NULL); } if ((ret = select(active_state->connection_in + 1, setp, NULL, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0) break; if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) break; if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms == -1) continue; ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain); if (ms_remain <= 0) { ret = 0; break; } } if (ret == 0) { logit("Connection to %.200s timed out while " "waiting to read", get_remote_ipaddr()); cleanup_exit(255); } /* Read data from the socket. */ do { cont = 0; len = roaming_read(active_state->connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf), &cont); } while (len == 0 && cont); if (len == 0) { logit("Connection closed by %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr()); cleanup_exit(255); } if (len < 0) fatal("Read from socket failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); /* Append it to the buffer. */ packet_process_incoming(buf, len); } /* NOTREACHED */ } int packet_read(void) { return packet_read_seqnr(NULL); } /* * Waits until a packet has been received, verifies that its type matches * that given, and gives a fatal error and exits if there is a mismatch. */ void packet_read_expect(int expected_type) { int type; type = packet_read(); if (type != expected_type) packet_disconnect("Protocol error: expected packet type %d, got %d", expected_type, type); } /* Checks if a full packet is available in the data received so far via * packet_process_incoming. If so, reads the packet; otherwise returns * SSH_MSG_NONE. This does not wait for data from the connection. * * SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT is handled specially here. Also, * SSH_MSG_IGNORE messages are skipped by this function and are never returned * to higher levels. */ static int packet_read_poll1(void) { u_int len, padded_len; u_char *cp, type; u_int checksum, stored_checksum; /* Check if input size is less than minimum packet size. */ if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < 4 + 8) return SSH_MSG_NONE; /* Get length of incoming packet. */ cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->input); len = get_u32(cp); if (len < 1 + 2 + 2 || len > 256 * 1024) packet_disconnect("Bad packet length %u.", len); padded_len = (len + 8) & ~7; /* Check if the packet has been entirely received. */ if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < 4 + padded_len) return SSH_MSG_NONE; /* The entire packet is in buffer. */ /* Consume packet length. */ buffer_consume(&active_state->input, 4); /* * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh * (C)1998 CORE-SDI, Buenos Aires Argentina * Ariel Futoransky(futo@core-sdi.com) */ if (!active_state->receive_context.plaintext) { switch (detect_attack(buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), padded_len)) { case DEATTACK_DETECTED: packet_disconnect("crc32 compensation attack: " "network attack detected"); case DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED: packet_disconnect("deattack denial of " "service detected"); } } /* Decrypt data to incoming_packet. */ buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet); cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->incoming_packet, padded_len); if (cipher_crypt(&active_state->receive_context, 0, cp, buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), padded_len, 0, 0) != 0) fatal("%s: cipher_crypt failed", __func__); buffer_consume(&active_state->input, padded_len); #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "read_poll plain: "); buffer_dump(&active_state->incoming_packet); #endif /* Compute packet checksum. */ checksum = ssh_crc32(buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet), buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet) - 4); /* Skip padding. */ buffer_consume(&active_state->incoming_packet, 8 - len % 8); /* Test check bytes. */ if (len != buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet)) packet_disconnect("packet_read_poll1: len %d != buffer_len %d.", len, buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet)); cp = (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet) + len - 4; stored_checksum = get_u32(cp); if (checksum != stored_checksum) packet_disconnect("Corrupted check bytes on input."); buffer_consume_end(&active_state->incoming_packet, 4); if (active_state->packet_compression) { buffer_clear(&active_state->compression_buffer); buffer_uncompress(&active_state->incoming_packet, &active_state->compression_buffer); buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet); buffer_append(&active_state->incoming_packet, buffer_ptr(&active_state->compression_buffer), buffer_len(&active_state->compression_buffer)); } active_state->p_read.packets++; active_state->p_read.bytes += padded_len + 4; type = buffer_get_char(&active_state->incoming_packet); if (type < SSH_MSG_MIN || type > SSH_MSG_MAX) packet_disconnect("Invalid ssh1 packet type: %d", type); return type; } static int packet_read_poll2(u_int32_t *seqnr_p) { u_int padlen, need; u_char *macbuf = NULL, *cp, type; u_int maclen, authlen = 0, aadlen = 0, block_size; Enc *enc = NULL; Mac *mac = NULL; Comp *comp = NULL; if (active_state->packet_discard) return SSH_MSG_NONE; if (active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) { enc = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc; mac = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac; comp = &active_state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp; /* disable mac for authenticated encryption */ if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0) mac = NULL; } maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0; block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8; aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0; if (aadlen && active_state->packlen == 0) { if (cipher_get_length(&active_state->receive_context, &active_state->packlen, active_state->p_read.seqnr, buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), buffer_len(&active_state->input)) != 0) return SSH_MSG_NONE; if (active_state->packlen < 1 + 4 || active_state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) { #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG buffer_dump(&active_state->input); #endif logit("Bad packet length %u.", active_state->packlen); packet_disconnect("Packet corrupt"); } buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet); } else if (active_state->packlen == 0) { /* * check if input size is less than the cipher block size, * decrypt first block and extract length of incoming packet */ if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < block_size) return SSH_MSG_NONE; buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet); cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->incoming_packet, block_size); if (cipher_crypt(&active_state->receive_context, active_state->p_read.seqnr, cp, buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), block_size, 0, 0) != 0) fatal("Decryption integrity check failed"); cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet); active_state->packlen = get_u32(cp); if (active_state->packlen < 1 + 4 || active_state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) { #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG buffer_dump(&active_state->incoming_packet); #endif logit("Bad packet length %u.", active_state->packlen); packet_start_discard(enc, mac, active_state->packlen, PACKET_MAX_SIZE); return SSH_MSG_NONE; } buffer_consume(&active_state->input, block_size); } DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", active_state->packlen+4)); if (aadlen) { /* only the payload is encrypted */ need = active_state->packlen; } else { /* * the payload size and the payload are encrypted, but we * have a partial packet of block_size bytes */ need = 4 + active_state->packlen - block_size; } DBG(debug("partial packet: block %d, need %d, maclen %d, authlen %d," " aadlen %d", block_size, need, maclen, authlen, aadlen)); if (need % block_size != 0) { logit("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d", need, block_size, need % block_size); packet_start_discard(enc, mac, active_state->packlen, PACKET_MAX_SIZE - block_size); return SSH_MSG_NONE; } /* * check if the entire packet has been received and * decrypt into incoming_packet: * 'aadlen' bytes are unencrypted, but authenticated. * 'need' bytes are encrypted, followed by either * 'authlen' bytes of authentication tag or * 'maclen' bytes of message authentication code. */ if (buffer_len(&active_state->input) < aadlen + need + authlen + maclen) return SSH_MSG_NONE; #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "read_poll enc/full: "); buffer_dump(&active_state->input); #endif /* EtM: compute mac over encrypted input */ if (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) macbuf = mac_compute(mac, active_state->p_read.seqnr, buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), aadlen + need); cp = buffer_append_space(&active_state->incoming_packet, aadlen + need); if (cipher_crypt(&active_state->receive_context, active_state->p_read.seqnr, cp, buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), need, aadlen, authlen) != 0) fatal("Decryption integrity check failed"); buffer_consume(&active_state->input, aadlen + need + authlen); /* * compute MAC over seqnr and packet, * increment sequence number for incoming packet */ if (mac && mac->enabled) { if (!mac->etm) macbuf = mac_compute(mac, active_state->p_read.seqnr, buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet), buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet)); if (timingsafe_bcmp(macbuf, buffer_ptr(&active_state->input), mac->mac_len) != 0) { logit("Corrupted MAC on input."); if (need > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) fatal("internal error need %d", need); packet_start_discard(enc, mac, active_state->packlen, PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need); return SSH_MSG_NONE; } DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", active_state->p_read.seqnr)); buffer_consume(&active_state->input, mac->mac_len); } /* XXX now it's safe to use fatal/packet_disconnect */ if (seqnr_p != NULL) *seqnr_p = active_state->p_read.seqnr; if (++active_state->p_read.seqnr == 0) logit("incoming seqnr wraps around"); if (++active_state->p_read.packets == 0) if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)) fatal("XXX too many packets with same key"); active_state->p_read.blocks += (active_state->packlen + 4) / block_size; active_state->p_read.bytes += active_state->packlen + 4; /* get padlen */ cp = buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet); padlen = cp[4]; DBG(debug("input: padlen %d", padlen)); if (padlen < 4) packet_disconnect("Corrupted padlen %d on input.", padlen); /* skip packet size + padlen, discard padding */ buffer_consume(&active_state->incoming_packet, 4 + 1); buffer_consume_end(&active_state->incoming_packet, padlen); DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %d", buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet))); if (comp && comp->enabled) { buffer_clear(&active_state->compression_buffer); buffer_uncompress(&active_state->incoming_packet, &active_state->compression_buffer); buffer_clear(&active_state->incoming_packet); buffer_append(&active_state->incoming_packet, buffer_ptr(&active_state->compression_buffer), buffer_len(&active_state->compression_buffer)); DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %d", buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet))); } /* * get packet type, implies consume. * return length of payload (without type field) */ type = buffer_get_char(&active_state->incoming_packet); if (type < SSH2_MSG_MIN || type >= SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN) packet_disconnect("Invalid ssh2 packet type: %d", type); if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) set_newkeys(MODE_IN); else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && !active_state->server_side) packet_enable_delayed_compress(); #ifdef PACKET_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "read/plain[%d]:\r\n", type); buffer_dump(&active_state->incoming_packet); #endif /* reset for next packet */ active_state->packlen = 0; return type; } int packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p) { u_int reason, seqnr; u_char type; char *msg; for (;;) { if (compat20) { type = packet_read_poll2(seqnr_p); if (type) { active_state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; DBG(debug("received packet type %d", type)); } switch (type) { case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE: debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE"); break; case SSH2_MSG_DEBUG: packet_get_char(); msg = packet_get_string(NULL); debug("Remote: %.900s", msg); free(msg); msg = packet_get_string(NULL); free(msg); break; case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: reason = packet_get_int(); msg = packet_get_string(NULL); /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */ do_log2(active_state->server_side && reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, "Received disconnect from %s: %u: %.400s", get_remote_ipaddr(), reason, msg); free(msg); cleanup_exit(255); break; case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED: seqnr = packet_get_int(); debug("Received SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for %u", seqnr); break; default: return type; } } else { type = packet_read_poll1(); switch (type) { case SSH_MSG_NONE: return SSH_MSG_NONE; case SSH_MSG_IGNORE: break; case SSH_MSG_DEBUG: msg = packet_get_string(NULL); debug("Remote: %.900s", msg); free(msg); break; case SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT: msg = packet_get_string(NULL); error("Received disconnect from %s: %.400s", get_remote_ipaddr(), msg); cleanup_exit(255); break; default: DBG(debug("received packet type %d", type)); return type; } } } } /* * Buffers the given amount of input characters. This is intended to be used * together with packet_read_poll. */ void packet_process_incoming(const char *buf, u_int len) { if (active_state->packet_discard) { active_state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; /* ?? */ if (len >= active_state->packet_discard) packet_stop_discard(); active_state->packet_discard -= len; return; } buffer_append(&active_state->input, buf, len); } /* Returns a character from the packet. */ u_int packet_get_char(void) { char ch; buffer_get(&active_state->incoming_packet, &ch, 1); return (u_char) ch; } /* Returns an integer from the packet data. */ u_int packet_get_int(void) { return buffer_get_int(&active_state->incoming_packet); } /* Returns an 64 bit integer from the packet data. */ u_int64_t packet_get_int64(void) { return buffer_get_int64(&active_state->incoming_packet); } /* * Returns an arbitrary precision integer from the packet data. The integer * must have been initialized before this call. */ +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL void packet_get_bignum(BIGNUM * value) { buffer_get_bignum(&active_state->incoming_packet, value); } void packet_get_bignum2(BIGNUM * value) { buffer_get_bignum2(&active_state->incoming_packet, value); } #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC void packet_get_ecpoint(const EC_GROUP *curve, EC_POINT *point) { buffer_get_ecpoint(&active_state->incoming_packet, curve, point); } #endif void * packet_get_raw(u_int *length_ptr) { u_int bytes = buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet); if (length_ptr != NULL) *length_ptr = bytes; return buffer_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet); } +#endif int packet_remaining(void) { return buffer_len(&active_state->incoming_packet); } /* * Returns a string from the packet data. The string is allocated using * xmalloc; it is the responsibility of the calling program to free it when * no longer needed. The length_ptr argument may be NULL, or point to an * integer into which the length of the string is stored. */ void * packet_get_string(u_int *length_ptr) { return buffer_get_string(&active_state->incoming_packet, length_ptr); } -void * +const void * packet_get_string_ptr(u_int *length_ptr) { return buffer_get_string_ptr(&active_state->incoming_packet, length_ptr); } /* Ensures the returned string has no embedded \0 characters in it. */ char * packet_get_cstring(u_int *length_ptr) { return buffer_get_cstring(&active_state->incoming_packet, length_ptr); } /* * Sends a diagnostic message from the server to the client. This message * can be sent at any time (but not while constructing another message). The * message is printed immediately, but only if the client is being executed * in verbose mode. These messages are primarily intended to ease debugging * authentication problems. The length of the formatted message must not * exceed 1024 bytes. This will automatically call packet_write_wait. */ void packet_send_debug(const char *fmt,...) { char buf[1024]; va_list args; if (compat20 && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DEBUG)) return; va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); if (compat20) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DEBUG); packet_put_char(0); /* bool: always display */ packet_put_cstring(buf); packet_put_cstring(""); } else { packet_start(SSH_MSG_DEBUG); packet_put_cstring(buf); } packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } /* * Logs the error plus constructs and sends a disconnect packet, closes the * connection, and exits. This function never returns. The error message * should not contain a newline. The length of the formatted message must * not exceed 1024 bytes. */ void packet_disconnect(const char *fmt,...) { char buf[1024]; va_list args; static int disconnecting = 0; if (disconnecting) /* Guard against recursive invocations. */ fatal("packet_disconnect called recursively."); disconnecting = 1; /* * Format the message. Note that the caller must make sure the * message is of limited size. */ va_start(args, fmt); vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); va_end(args); /* Display the error locally */ logit("Disconnecting: %.100s", buf); /* Send the disconnect message to the other side, and wait for it to get sent. */ if (compat20) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT); packet_put_int(SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR); packet_put_cstring(buf); packet_put_cstring(""); } else { packet_start(SSH_MSG_DISCONNECT); packet_put_cstring(buf); } packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Stop listening for connections. */ channel_close_all(); /* Close the connection. */ packet_close(); cleanup_exit(255); } /* Checks if there is any buffered output, and tries to write some of the output. */ void packet_write_poll(void) { int len = buffer_len(&active_state->output); int cont; if (len > 0) { cont = 0; len = roaming_write(active_state->connection_out, buffer_ptr(&active_state->output), len, &cont); if (len == -1) { if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) return; fatal("Write failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); } if (len == 0 && !cont) fatal("Write connection closed"); buffer_consume(&active_state->output, len); } } /* * Calls packet_write_poll repeatedly until all pending output data has been * written. */ void packet_write_wait(void) { fd_set *setp; int ret, ms_remain = 0; struct timeval start, timeout, *timeoutp = NULL; setp = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(active_state->connection_out + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask)); packet_write_poll(); while (packet_have_data_to_write()) { memset(setp, 0, howmany(active_state->connection_out + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask)); FD_SET(active_state->connection_out, setp); if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) { ms_remain = active_state->packet_timeout_ms; timeoutp = &timeout; } for (;;) { if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) { ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain); gettimeofday(&start, NULL); } if ((ret = select(active_state->connection_out + 1, NULL, setp, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0) break; if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) break; if (active_state->packet_timeout_ms == -1) continue; ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain); if (ms_remain <= 0) { ret = 0; break; } } if (ret == 0) { logit("Connection to %.200s timed out while " "waiting to write", get_remote_ipaddr()); cleanup_exit(255); } packet_write_poll(); } free(setp); } /* Returns true if there is buffered data to write to the connection. */ int packet_have_data_to_write(void) { return buffer_len(&active_state->output) != 0; } /* Returns true if there is not too much data to write to the connection. */ int packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(void) { if (active_state->interactive_mode) return buffer_len(&active_state->output) < 16384; else return buffer_len(&active_state->output) < 128 * 1024; } static void packet_set_tos(int tos) { #ifndef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket()) return; switch (packet_connection_af()) { # ifdef IP_TOS case AF_INET: debug3("%s: set IP_TOS 0x%02x", __func__, tos); if (setsockopt(active_state->connection_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) < 0) error("setsockopt IP_TOS %d: %.100s:", tos, strerror(errno)); break; # endif /* IP_TOS */ # ifdef IPV6_TCLASS case AF_INET6: debug3("%s: set IPV6_TCLASS 0x%02x", __func__, tos); if (setsockopt(active_state->connection_in, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_TCLASS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) < 0) error("setsockopt IPV6_TCLASS %d: %.100s:", tos, strerror(errno)); break; # endif /* IPV6_TCLASS */ } #endif /* IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN */ } /* Informs that the current session is interactive. Sets IP flags for that. */ void packet_set_interactive(int interactive, int qos_interactive, int qos_bulk) { if (active_state->set_interactive_called) return; active_state->set_interactive_called = 1; /* Record that we are in interactive mode. */ active_state->interactive_mode = interactive; /* Only set socket options if using a socket. */ if (!packet_connection_is_on_socket()) return; set_nodelay(active_state->connection_in); packet_set_tos(interactive ? qos_interactive : qos_bulk); } /* Returns true if the current connection is interactive. */ int packet_is_interactive(void) { return active_state->interactive_mode; } int packet_set_maxsize(u_int s) { if (active_state->set_maxsize_called) { logit("packet_set_maxsize: called twice: old %d new %d", active_state->max_packet_size, s); return -1; } if (s < 4 * 1024 || s > 1024 * 1024) { logit("packet_set_maxsize: bad size %d", s); return -1; } active_state->set_maxsize_called = 1; debug("packet_set_maxsize: setting to %d", s); active_state->max_packet_size = s; return s; } int packet_inc_alive_timeouts(void) { return ++active_state->keep_alive_timeouts; } void packet_set_alive_timeouts(int ka) { active_state->keep_alive_timeouts = ka; } u_int packet_get_maxsize(void) { return active_state->max_packet_size; } /* roundup current message to pad bytes */ void packet_add_padding(u_char pad) { active_state->extra_pad = pad; } /* * 9.2. Ignored Data Message * * byte SSH_MSG_IGNORE * string data * * All implementations MUST understand (and ignore) this message at any * time (after receiving the protocol version). No implementation is * required to send them. This message can be used as an additional * protection measure against advanced traffic analysis techniques. */ void packet_send_ignore(int nbytes) { u_int32_t rnd = 0; int i; packet_start(compat20 ? SSH2_MSG_IGNORE : SSH_MSG_IGNORE); packet_put_int(nbytes); for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) { if (i % 4 == 0) rnd = arc4random(); packet_put_char((u_char)rnd & 0xff); rnd >>= 8; } } #define MAX_PACKETS (1U<<31) int packet_need_rekeying(void) { if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY) return 0; return (active_state->p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS) || (active_state->p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS) || (active_state->max_blocks_out && (active_state->p_send.blocks > active_state->max_blocks_out)) || (active_state->max_blocks_in && (active_state->p_read.blocks > active_state->max_blocks_in)) || (active_state->rekey_interval != 0 && active_state->rekey_time + active_state->rekey_interval <= monotime()); } void packet_set_rekey_limits(u_int32_t bytes, time_t seconds) { debug3("rekey after %lld bytes, %d seconds", (long long)bytes, (int)seconds); active_state->rekey_limit = bytes; active_state->rekey_interval = seconds; /* * We set the time here so that in post-auth privsep slave we count * from the completion of the authentication. */ active_state->rekey_time = monotime(); } time_t packet_get_rekey_timeout(void) { time_t seconds; seconds = active_state->rekey_time + active_state->rekey_interval - monotime(); return (seconds <= 0 ? 1 : seconds); } void packet_set_server(void) { active_state->server_side = 1; } void packet_set_authenticated(void) { active_state->after_authentication = 1; } void * packet_get_input(void) { return (void *)&active_state->input; } void * packet_get_output(void) { return (void *)&active_state->output; } void * packet_get_newkeys(int mode) { return (void *)active_state->newkeys[mode]; } /* * Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when * resuming a suspended connection. */ void packet_backup_state(void) { struct session_state *tmp; close(active_state->connection_in); active_state->connection_in = -1; close(active_state->connection_out); active_state->connection_out = -1; if (backup_state) tmp = backup_state; else tmp = alloc_session_state(); backup_state = active_state; active_state = tmp; } /* * Swap in the old state when resuming a connecion. */ void packet_restore_state(void) { struct session_state *tmp; void *buf; u_int len; tmp = backup_state; backup_state = active_state; active_state = tmp; active_state->connection_in = backup_state->connection_in; backup_state->connection_in = -1; active_state->connection_out = backup_state->connection_out; backup_state->connection_out = -1; len = buffer_len(&backup_state->input); if (len > 0) { buf = buffer_ptr(&backup_state->input); buffer_append(&active_state->input, buf, len); buffer_clear(&backup_state->input); add_recv_bytes(len); + } +} + +/* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */ +void +packet_set_postauth(void) +{ + Comp *comp; + int mode; + + debug("%s: called", __func__); + /* This was set in net child, but is not visible in user child */ + active_state->after_authentication = 1; + active_state->rekeying = 0; + for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) { + if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL) + continue; + comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp; + if (comp && comp->enabled) + packet_init_compression(); } } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/packet.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/packet.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/packet.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,127 +1,128 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.59 2013/07/12 00:19:59 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: packet.h,v 1.61 2014/05/03 17:20:34 markus Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Interface for the packet protocol functions. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #ifndef PACKET_H #define PACKET_H #include #include #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC #include #endif void packet_set_connection(int, int); void packet_set_timeout(int, int); void packet_set_nonblocking(void); int packet_get_connection_in(void); int packet_get_connection_out(void); void packet_close(void); void packet_set_encryption_key(const u_char *, u_int, int); u_int packet_get_encryption_key(u_char *); void packet_set_protocol_flags(u_int); u_int packet_get_protocol_flags(void); void packet_start_compression(int); void packet_set_interactive(int, int, int); int packet_is_interactive(void); void packet_set_server(void); void packet_set_authenticated(void); void packet_start(u_char); void packet_put_char(int ch); void packet_put_int(u_int value); void packet_put_int64(u_int64_t value); void packet_put_bignum(BIGNUM * value); void packet_put_bignum2(BIGNUM * value); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC void packet_put_ecpoint(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); #endif void packet_put_string(const void *buf, u_int len); void packet_put_cstring(const char *str); void packet_put_raw(const void *buf, u_int len); void packet_send(void); int packet_read(void); void packet_read_expect(int type); void packet_process_incoming(const char *buf, u_int len); int packet_read_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p); int packet_read_poll_seqnr(u_int32_t *seqnr_p); u_int packet_get_char(void); u_int packet_get_int(void); u_int64_t packet_get_int64(void); void packet_get_bignum(BIGNUM * value); void packet_get_bignum2(BIGNUM * value); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC void packet_get_ecpoint(const EC_GROUP *, EC_POINT *); #endif void *packet_get_raw(u_int *length_ptr); void *packet_get_string(u_int *length_ptr); char *packet_get_cstring(u_int *length_ptr); -void *packet_get_string_ptr(u_int *length_ptr); +const void *packet_get_string_ptr(u_int *length_ptr); void packet_disconnect(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((noreturn)) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); void packet_send_debug(const char *fmt,...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2))); void set_newkeys(int mode); int packet_get_keyiv_len(int); void packet_get_keyiv(int, u_char *, u_int); int packet_get_keycontext(int, u_char *); void packet_set_keycontext(int, u_char *); void packet_get_state(int, u_int32_t *, u_int64_t *, u_int32_t *, u_int64_t *); void packet_set_state(int, u_int32_t, u_int64_t, u_int32_t, u_int64_t); int packet_get_ssh1_cipher(void); void packet_set_iv(int, u_char *); void *packet_get_newkeys(int); void packet_write_poll(void); void packet_write_wait(void); int packet_have_data_to_write(void); int packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(void); int packet_connection_is_on_socket(void); int packet_remaining(void); void packet_send_ignore(int); void packet_add_padding(u_char); void tty_make_modes(int, struct termios *); void tty_parse_modes(int, int *); void packet_set_alive_timeouts(int); int packet_inc_alive_timeouts(void); int packet_set_maxsize(u_int); u_int packet_get_maxsize(void); /* don't allow remaining bytes after the end of the message */ #define packet_check_eom() \ do { \ int _len = packet_remaining(); \ if (_len > 0) { \ logit("Packet integrity error (%d bytes remaining) at %s:%d", \ _len ,__FILE__, __LINE__); \ packet_disconnect("Packet integrity error."); \ } \ } while (0) int packet_need_rekeying(void); void packet_set_rekey_limits(u_int32_t, time_t); time_t packet_get_rekey_timeout(void); void packet_backup_state(void); void packet_restore_state(void); +void packet_set_postauth(void); void *packet_get_input(void); void *packet_get_output(void); #endif /* PACKET_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/platform.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/platform.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/platform.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,214 +1,215 @@ -/* $Id: platform.c,v 1.21 2014/01/21 01:59:29 tim Exp $ */ +/* $Id: platform.c,v 1.22 2014/07/18 04:11:26 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2006 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include "log.h" #include "buffer.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-pam.h" #include "platform.h" #include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h" extern int use_privsep; extern ServerOptions options; void platform_pre_listen(void) { #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST /* Adjust out-of-memory killer so listening process is not killed */ oom_adjust_setup(); #endif } void platform_pre_fork(void) { #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS solaris_contract_pre_fork(); #endif } void platform_pre_restart(void) { #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST oom_adjust_restore(); #endif } void platform_post_fork_parent(pid_t child_pid) { #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS solaris_contract_post_fork_parent(child_pid); #endif } void platform_post_fork_child(void) { #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS solaris_contract_post_fork_child(); #endif #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST oom_adjust_restore(); #endif } /* return 1 if we are running with privilege to swap UIDs, 0 otherwise */ int platform_privileged_uidswap(void) { #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN /* uid 0 is not special on Cygwin so always try */ return 1; #else return (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0); #endif } /* * This gets called before switching UIDs, and is called even when sshd is * not running as root. */ void platform_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) { #ifdef WITH_SELINUX /* Cache selinux status for later use */ (void)ssh_selinux_enabled(); #endif #ifdef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS /* if solaris projects were detected, set the default now */ if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) solaris_set_default_project(pw); #endif #if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined (__bsdi__) if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) setpgid(0, 0); # endif #if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM) /* * If we have both LOGIN_CAP and PAM, we want to establish creds * before calling setusercontext (in session.c:do_setusercontext). */ if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) { if (options.use_pam) { do_pam_setcred(use_privsep); } } # endif /* USE_PAM */ #if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(HAVE_GETLUID) && defined(HAVE_SETLUID) if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) { /* Sets login uid for accounting */ if (getluid() == -1 && setluid(pw->pw_uid) == -1) error("setluid: %s", strerror(errno)); } #endif } /* * This gets called after we've established the user's groups, and is only * called if sshd is running as root. */ void platform_setusercontext_post_groups(struct passwd *pw) { #if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && defined(USE_PAM) /* * PAM credentials may take the form of supplementary groups. * These will have been wiped by the above initgroups() call. * Reestablish them here. */ if (options.use_pam) { do_pam_setcred(use_privsep); } #endif /* USE_PAM */ #if !defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && (defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || \ defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY)) irix_setusercontext(pw); #endif /* defined(WITH_IRIX_PROJECT) || defined(WITH_IRIX_JOBS) || defined(WITH_IRIX_ARRAY) */ #ifdef _AIX aix_usrinfo(pw); #endif /* _AIX */ #ifdef HAVE_SETPCRED /* * If we have a chroot directory, we set all creds except real * uid which we will need for chroot. If we don't have a * chroot directory, we don't override anything. */ { char **creds = NULL, *chroot_creds[] = { "REAL_USER=root", NULL }; if (options.chroot_directory != NULL && strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) creds = chroot_creds; if (setpcred(pw->pw_name, creds) == -1) fatal("Failed to set process credentials"); } #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */ #ifdef WITH_SELINUX ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name); #endif } char * platform_krb5_get_principal_name(const char *pw_name) { #ifdef USE_AIX_KRB_NAME return aix_krb5_get_principal_name(pw_name); #else return NULL; #endif } /* * return 1 if the specified uid is a uid that may own a system directory * otherwise 0. */ int platform_sys_dir_uid(uid_t uid) { if (uid == 0) return 1; #ifdef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID if (uid == PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID) return 1; #endif return 0; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/poly1305.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/poly1305.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/poly1305.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,22 +1,22 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: poly1305.h,v 1.2 2013/12/19 22:57:13 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: poly1305.h,v 1.4 2014/05/02 03:27:54 djm Exp $ */ /* * Public Domain poly1305 from Andrew Moon * poly1305-donna-unrolled.c from https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna */ #ifndef POLY1305_H #define POLY1305_H #include #define POLY1305_KEYLEN 32 #define POLY1305_TAGLEN 16 void poly1305_auth(u_char out[POLY1305_TAGLEN], const u_char *m, size_t inlen, const u_char key[POLY1305_KEYLEN]) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, POLY1305_TAGLEN))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__buffer__, 2, 3))) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 4, POLY1305_KEYLEN))); #endif /* POLY1305_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/readconf.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/readconf.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/readconf.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,1852 +1,2011 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.218 2014/02/23 20:11:36 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.220 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions for reading the configuration files. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H #include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "key.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "match.h" -#include "misc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "kex.h" #include "mac.h" #include "uidswap.h" /* Format of the configuration file: # Configuration data is parsed as follows: # 1. command line options # 2. user-specific file # 3. system-wide file # Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set. # Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the # configuration file, and defaults at the end. # Host-specific declarations. These may override anything above. A single # host may match multiple declarations; these are processed in the order # that they are given in. Host *.ngs.fi ngs.fi User foo Host fake.com HostName another.host.name.real.org User blaah Port 34289 ForwardX11 no ForwardAgent no Host books.com RemoteForward 9999 shadows.cs.hut.fi:9999 Cipher 3des Host fascist.blob.com Port 23123 User tylonen PasswordAuthentication no Host puukko.hut.fi User t35124p ProxyCommand ssh-proxy %h %p Host *.fr PublicKeyAuthentication no Host *.su Cipher none PasswordAuthentication no Host vpn.fake.com Tunnel yes TunnelDevice 3 # Defaults for various options Host * ForwardAgent no ForwardX11 no PasswordAuthentication yes RSAAuthentication yes RhostsRSAAuthentication yes StrictHostKeyChecking yes TcpKeepAlive no IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity Port 22 EscapeChar ~ */ /* Keyword tokens. */ typedef enum { oBadOption, oHost, oMatch, oForwardAgent, oForwardX11, oForwardX11Trusted, oForwardX11Timeout, oGatewayPorts, oExitOnForwardFailure, oPasswordAuthentication, oRSAAuthentication, oChallengeResponseAuthentication, oXAuthLocation, oIdentityFile, oHostName, oPort, oCipher, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward, oUser, oEscapeChar, oRhostsRSAAuthentication, oProxyCommand, oGlobalKnownHostsFile, oUserKnownHostsFile, oConnectionAttempts, oBatchMode, oCheckHostIP, oStrictHostKeyChecking, oCompression, oCompressionLevel, oTCPKeepAlive, oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, oUsePrivilegedPort, oLogLevel, oCiphers, oProtocol, oMacs, oGlobalKnownHostsFile2, oUserKnownHostsFile2, oPubkeyAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias, oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication, oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oPKCS11Provider, oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout, oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds, oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly, oSendEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist, oHashKnownHosts, oTunnel, oTunnelDevice, oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oVisualHostKey, oUseRoaming, oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass, oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots, oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs, + oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported } OpCodes; /* Textual representations of the tokens. */ static struct { const char *name; OpCodes opcode; } keywords[] = { { "forwardagent", oForwardAgent }, { "forwardx11", oForwardX11 }, { "forwardx11trusted", oForwardX11Trusted }, { "forwardx11timeout", oForwardX11Timeout }, { "exitonforwardfailure", oExitOnForwardFailure }, { "xauthlocation", oXAuthLocation }, { "gatewayports", oGatewayPorts }, { "useprivilegedport", oUsePrivilegedPort }, { "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated }, { "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication }, { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication }, { "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices }, { "rsaauthentication", oRSAAuthentication }, { "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, { "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, /* alias */ { "rhostsrsaauthentication", oRhostsRSAAuthentication }, { "hostbasedauthentication", oHostbasedAuthentication }, { "challengeresponseauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, { "skeyauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */ { "tisauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */ { "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported }, { "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported }, { "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported }, #if defined(GSSAPI) { "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication }, { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds }, #else { "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported }, { "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported }, #endif { "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated }, { "usersh", oDeprecated }, { "identityfile", oIdentityFile }, { "identityfile2", oIdentityFile }, /* obsolete */ { "identitiesonly", oIdentitiesOnly }, { "hostname", oHostName }, { "hostkeyalias", oHostKeyAlias }, { "proxycommand", oProxyCommand }, { "port", oPort }, { "cipher", oCipher }, { "ciphers", oCiphers }, { "macs", oMacs }, { "protocol", oProtocol }, { "remoteforward", oRemoteForward }, { "localforward", oLocalForward }, { "user", oUser }, { "host", oHost }, { "match", oMatch }, { "escapechar", oEscapeChar }, { "globalknownhostsfile", oGlobalKnownHostsFile }, { "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated }, { "userknownhostsfile", oUserKnownHostsFile }, { "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated }, { "connectionattempts", oConnectionAttempts }, { "batchmode", oBatchMode }, { "checkhostip", oCheckHostIP }, { "stricthostkeychecking", oStrictHostKeyChecking }, { "compression", oCompression }, { "compressionlevel", oCompressionLevel }, { "tcpkeepalive", oTCPKeepAlive }, { "keepalive", oTCPKeepAlive }, /* obsolete */ { "numberofpasswordprompts", oNumberOfPasswordPrompts }, { "loglevel", oLogLevel }, { "dynamicforward", oDynamicForward }, { "preferredauthentications", oPreferredAuthentications }, { "hostkeyalgorithms", oHostKeyAlgorithms }, { "bindaddress", oBindAddress }, #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 { "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider }, { "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider }, #else { "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported }, { "pkcs11provider", oUnsupported }, #endif { "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings }, { "enablesshkeysign", oEnableSSHKeysign }, { "verifyhostkeydns", oVerifyHostKeyDNS }, { "nohostauthenticationforlocalhost", oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost }, { "rekeylimit", oRekeyLimit }, { "connecttimeout", oConnectTimeout }, { "addressfamily", oAddressFamily }, { "serveraliveinterval", oServerAliveInterval }, { "serveralivecountmax", oServerAliveCountMax }, { "sendenv", oSendEnv }, { "controlpath", oControlPath }, { "controlmaster", oControlMaster }, { "controlpersist", oControlPersist }, { "hashknownhosts", oHashKnownHosts }, { "tunnel", oTunnel }, { "tunneldevice", oTunnelDevice }, { "localcommand", oLocalCommand }, { "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand }, { "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey }, { "useroaming", oUseRoaming }, { "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms }, { "ipqos", oIPQoS }, { "requesttty", oRequestTTY }, { "proxyusefdpass", oProxyUseFdpass }, { "canonicaldomains", oCanonicalDomains }, { "canonicalizefallbacklocal", oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal }, { "canonicalizehostname", oCanonicalizeHostname }, { "canonicalizemaxdots", oCanonicalizeMaxDots }, { "canonicalizepermittedcnames", oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs }, + { "streamlocalbindmask", oStreamLocalBindMask }, + { "streamlocalbindunlink", oStreamLocalBindUnlink }, { "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown }, { NULL, oBadOption } }; /* * Adds a local TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is an * error. */ void -add_local_forward(Options *options, const Forward *newfwd) +add_local_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd) { - Forward *fwd; + struct Forward *fwd; #ifndef NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT extern uid_t original_real_uid; - if (newfwd->listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED && original_real_uid != 0) + if (newfwd->listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED && original_real_uid != 0 && + newfwd->listen_path == NULL) fatal("Privileged ports can only be forwarded by root."); #endif options->local_forwards = xrealloc(options->local_forwards, options->num_local_forwards + 1, sizeof(*options->local_forwards)); fwd = &options->local_forwards[options->num_local_forwards++]; fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host; fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port; + fwd->listen_path = newfwd->listen_path; fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host; fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port; + fwd->connect_path = newfwd->connect_path; } /* * Adds a remote TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is * an error. */ void -add_remote_forward(Options *options, const Forward *newfwd) +add_remote_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd) { - Forward *fwd; + struct Forward *fwd; options->remote_forwards = xrealloc(options->remote_forwards, options->num_remote_forwards + 1, sizeof(*options->remote_forwards)); fwd = &options->remote_forwards[options->num_remote_forwards++]; fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host; fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port; + fwd->listen_path = newfwd->listen_path; fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host; fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port; + fwd->connect_path = newfwd->connect_path; fwd->handle = newfwd->handle; fwd->allocated_port = 0; } static void clear_forwardings(Options *options) { int i; for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) { free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_host); + free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_path); free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_host); + free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_path); } if (options->num_local_forwards > 0) { free(options->local_forwards); options->local_forwards = NULL; } options->num_local_forwards = 0; for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) { free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_host); + free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_path); free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_host); + free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_path); } if (options->num_remote_forwards > 0) { free(options->remote_forwards); options->remote_forwards = NULL; } options->num_remote_forwards = 0; options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; } void add_identity_file(Options *options, const char *dir, const char *filename, int userprovided) { char *path; + int i; if (options->num_identity_files >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) fatal("Too many identity files specified (max %d)", SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES); if (dir == NULL) /* no dir, filename is absolute */ path = xstrdup(filename); else (void)xasprintf(&path, "%.100s%.100s", dir, filename); + /* Avoid registering duplicates */ + for (i = 0; i < options->num_identity_files; i++) { + if (options->identity_file_userprovided[i] == userprovided && + strcmp(options->identity_files[i], path) == 0) { + debug2("%s: ignoring duplicate key %s", __func__, path); + free(path); + return; + } + } + options->identity_file_userprovided[options->num_identity_files] = userprovided; options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files++] = path; } int default_ssh_port(void) { static int port; struct servent *sp; if (port == 0) { sp = getservbyname(SSH_SERVICE_NAME, "tcp"); port = sp ? ntohs(sp->s_port) : SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; } return port; } /* * Execute a command in a shell. * Return its exit status or -1 on abnormal exit. */ static int execute_in_shell(const char *cmd) { char *shell, *command_string; pid_t pid; int devnull, status; extern uid_t original_real_uid; if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL) shell = _PATH_BSHELL; /* * Use "exec" to avoid "sh -c" processes on some platforms * (e.g. Solaris) */ xasprintf(&command_string, "exec %s", cmd); /* Need this to redirect subprocess stdin/out */ if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno)); debug("Executing command: '%.500s'", cmd); /* Fork and execute the command. */ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { char *argv[4]; /* Child. Permanently give up superuser privileges. */ permanently_drop_suid(original_real_uid); /* Redirect child stdin and stdout. Leave stderr */ if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); if (dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) close(devnull); closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); argv[0] = shell; argv[1] = "-c"; argv[2] = command_string; argv[3] = NULL; execv(argv[0], argv); error("Unable to execute '%.100s': %s", cmd, strerror(errno)); /* Die with signal to make this error apparent to parent. */ signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); kill(getpid(), SIGTERM); _exit(1); } /* Parent. */ if (pid < 0) fatal("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(devnull); free(command_string); while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN) fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } if (!WIFEXITED(status)) { error("command '%.100s' exited abnormally", cmd); return -1; } debug3("command returned status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status)); return WEXITSTATUS(status); } /* * Parse and execute a Match directive. */ static int match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **condition, struct passwd *pw, const char *host_arg, const char *filename, int linenum) { char *arg, *attrib, *cmd, *cp = *condition, *host; const char *ruser; int r, port, result = 1, attributes = 0; size_t len; char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; /* * Configuration is likely to be incomplete at this point so we * must be prepared to use default values. */ port = options->port <= 0 ? default_ssh_port() : options->port; ruser = options->user == NULL ? pw->pw_name : options->user; if (options->hostname != NULL) { /* NB. Please keep in sync with ssh.c:main() */ host = percent_expand(options->hostname, "h", host_arg, (char *)NULL); } else host = xstrdup(host_arg); debug3("checking match for '%s' host %s", cp, host); while ((attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') { attributes++; if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) { if (attributes != 1 || ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')) { error("'all' cannot be combined with other " "Match attributes"); result = -1; goto out; } *condition = cp; result = 1; goto out; } if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') { error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib); result = -1; goto out; } len = strlen(arg); if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) { if (match_hostname(host, arg, len) != 1) result = 0; else debug("%.200s line %d: matched 'Host %.100s' ", filename, linenum, host); } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "originalhost") == 0) { if (match_hostname(host_arg, arg, len) != 1) result = 0; else debug("%.200s line %d: matched " "'OriginalHost %.100s' ", filename, linenum, host_arg); } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) { if (match_pattern_list(ruser, arg, len, 0) != 1) result = 0; else debug("%.200s line %d: matched 'User %.100s' ", filename, linenum, ruser); } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localuser") == 0) { if (match_pattern_list(pw->pw_name, arg, len, 0) != 1) result = 0; else debug("%.200s line %d: matched " "'LocalUser %.100s' ", filename, linenum, pw->pw_name); } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "exec") == 0) { if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1) fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); strlcpy(shorthost, thishost, sizeof(shorthost)); shorthost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0'; snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", port); cmd = percent_expand(arg, "L", shorthost, "d", pw->pw_dir, "h", host, "l", thishost, "n", host_arg, "p", portstr, "r", ruser, "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); if (result != 1) { /* skip execution if prior predicate failed */ debug("%.200s line %d: skipped exec \"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, cmd); } else { r = execute_in_shell(cmd); if (r == -1) { fatal("%.200s line %d: match exec " "'%.100s' error", filename, linenum, cmd); } else if (r == 0) { debug("%.200s line %d: matched " "'exec \"%.100s\"'", filename, linenum, cmd); } else { debug("%.200s line %d: no match " "'exec \"%.100s\"'", filename, linenum, cmd); result = 0; } } free(cmd); } else { error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib); result = -1; goto out; } } if (attributes == 0) { error("One or more attributes required for Match"); result = -1; goto out; } debug3("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not "); *condition = cp; out: free(host); return result; } /* Check and prepare a domain name: removes trailing '.' and lowercases */ static void valid_domain(char *name, const char *filename, int linenum) { size_t i, l = strlen(name); u_char c, last = '\0'; if (l == 0) fatal("%s line %d: empty hostname suffix", filename, linenum); if (!isalpha((u_char)name[0]) && !isdigit((u_char)name[0])) fatal("%s line %d: hostname suffix \"%.100s\" " "starts with invalid character", filename, linenum, name); for (i = 0; i < l; i++) { c = tolower((u_char)name[i]); name[i] = (char)c; if (last == '.' && c == '.') fatal("%s line %d: hostname suffix \"%.100s\" contains " "consecutive separators", filename, linenum, name); if (c != '.' && c != '-' && !isalnum(c) && c != '_') /* technically invalid, but common */ fatal("%s line %d: hostname suffix \"%.100s\" contains " "invalid characters", filename, linenum, name); last = c; } if (name[l - 1] == '.') name[l - 1] = '\0'; } /* * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or oBadOption. */ static OpCodes parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum, const char *ignored_unknown) { int i; for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) if (strcmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) return keywords[i].opcode; if (ignored_unknown != NULL && match_pattern_list(cp, ignored_unknown, strlen(ignored_unknown), 1) == 1) return oIgnoredUnknownOption; error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s", filename, linenum, cp); return oBadOption; } /* Multistate option parsing */ struct multistate { char *key; int value; }; static const struct multistate multistate_flag[] = { { "true", 1 }, { "false", 0 }, { "yes", 1 }, { "no", 0 }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoask[] = { { "true", 1 }, { "false", 0 }, { "yes", 1 }, { "no", 0 }, { "ask", 2 }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = { { "inet", AF_INET }, { "inet6", AF_INET6 }, { "any", AF_UNSPEC }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_controlmaster[] = { { "true", SSHCTL_MASTER_YES }, { "yes", SSHCTL_MASTER_YES }, { "false", SSHCTL_MASTER_NO }, { "no", SSHCTL_MASTER_NO }, { "auto", SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO }, { "ask", SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK }, { "autoask", SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_tunnel[] = { { "ethernet", SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET }, { "point-to-point", SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT }, { "true", SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT }, { "yes", SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT }, { "false", SSH_TUNMODE_NO }, { "no", SSH_TUNMODE_NO }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_requesttty[] = { { "true", REQUEST_TTY_YES }, { "yes", REQUEST_TTY_YES }, { "false", REQUEST_TTY_NO }, { "no", REQUEST_TTY_NO }, { "force", REQUEST_TTY_FORCE }, { "auto", REQUEST_TTY_AUTO }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_canonicalizehostname[] = { { "true", SSH_CANONICALISE_YES }, { "false", SSH_CANONICALISE_NO }, { "yes", SSH_CANONICALISE_YES }, { "no", SSH_CANONICALISE_NO }, { "always", SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS }, { NULL, -1 } }; /* * Processes a single option line as used in the configuration files. This * only sets those values that have not already been set. */ #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" int process_config_line(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, int userconfig) { char *s, **charptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg, *arg2; char **cpptr, fwdarg[256]; u_int i, *uintptr, max_entries = 0; int negated, opcode, *intptr, value, value2, cmdline = 0; LogLevel *log_level_ptr; long long val64; size_t len; - Forward fwd; + struct Forward fwd; const struct multistate *multistate_ptr; struct allowed_cname *cname; if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */ cmdline = 1; activep = &cmdline; } /* Strip trailing whitespace */ for (len = strlen(line) - 1; len > 0; len--) { if (strchr(WHITESPACE, line[len]) == NULL) break; line[len] = '\0'; } s = line; /* Get the keyword. (Each line is supposed to begin with a keyword). */ if ((keyword = strdelim(&s)) == NULL) return 0; /* Ignore leading whitespace. */ if (*keyword == '\0') keyword = strdelim(&s); if (keyword == NULL || !*keyword || *keyword == '\n' || *keyword == '#') return 0; /* Match lowercase keyword */ lowercase(keyword); opcode = parse_token(keyword, filename, linenum, options->ignored_unknown); switch (opcode) { case oBadOption: /* don't panic, but count bad options */ return -1; /* NOTREACHED */ case oIgnoredUnknownOption: debug("%s line %d: Ignored unknown option \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword); return 0; case oConnectTimeout: intptr = &options->connection_timeout; parse_time: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.", filename, linenum); if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oForwardAgent: intptr = &options->forward_agent; parse_flag: multistate_ptr = multistate_flag; parse_multistate: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = -1; for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) { value = multistate_ptr[i].value; break; } } if (value == -1) fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oForwardX11: intptr = &options->forward_x11; goto parse_flag; case oForwardX11Trusted: intptr = &options->forward_x11_trusted; goto parse_flag; case oForwardX11Timeout: intptr = &options->forward_x11_timeout; goto parse_time; case oGatewayPorts: - intptr = &options->gateway_ports; + intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports; goto parse_flag; case oExitOnForwardFailure: intptr = &options->exit_on_forward_failure; goto parse_flag; case oUsePrivilegedPort: intptr = &options->use_privileged_port; goto parse_flag; case oPasswordAuthentication: intptr = &options->password_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oKbdInteractiveAuthentication: intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oKbdInteractiveDevices: charptr = &options->kbd_interactive_devices; goto parse_string; case oPubkeyAuthentication: intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oRSAAuthentication: intptr = &options->rsa_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oRhostsRSAAuthentication: intptr = &options->rhosts_rsa_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oHostbasedAuthentication: intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oChallengeResponseAuthentication: intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oGssAuthentication: intptr = &options->gss_authentication; goto parse_flag; case oGssDelegateCreds: intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds; goto parse_flag; case oBatchMode: intptr = &options->batch_mode; goto parse_flag; case oCheckHostIP: intptr = &options->check_host_ip; goto parse_flag; case oVerifyHostKeyDNS: intptr = &options->verify_host_key_dns; multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask; goto parse_multistate; case oStrictHostKeyChecking: intptr = &options->strict_host_key_checking; multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask; goto parse_multistate; case oCompression: intptr = &options->compression; goto parse_flag; case oTCPKeepAlive: intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive; goto parse_flag; case oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost: intptr = &options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost; goto parse_flag; case oNumberOfPasswordPrompts: intptr = &options->number_of_password_prompts; goto parse_int; case oCompressionLevel: intptr = &options->compression_level; goto parse_int; case oRekeyLimit: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) { val64 = 0; } else { if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s", filename, linenum, arg, strerror(errno)); /* check for too-large or too-small limits */ if (val64 > UINT_MAX) fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too large", filename, linenum); if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16) fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small", filename, linenum); } if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1) options->rekey_limit = (u_int32_t)val64; if (s != NULL) { /* optional rekey interval present */ if (strcmp(s, "none") == 0) { (void)strdelim(&s); /* discard */ break; } intptr = &options->rekey_interval; goto parse_time; } break; case oIdentityFile: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (*activep) { intptr = &options->num_identity_files; if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) fatal("%.200s line %d: Too many identity files specified (max %d).", filename, linenum, SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES); add_identity_file(options, NULL, arg, userconfig); } break; case oXAuthLocation: charptr=&options->xauth_location; goto parse_string; case oUser: charptr = &options->user; parse_string: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case oGlobalKnownHostsFile: cpptr = (char **)&options->system_hostfiles; uintptr = &options->num_system_hostfiles; max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES; parse_char_array: if (*activep && *uintptr == 0) { while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { if ((*uintptr) >= max_entries) fatal("%s line %d: " "too many authorized keys files.", filename, linenum); cpptr[(*uintptr)++] = xstrdup(arg); } } return 0; case oUserKnownHostsFile: cpptr = (char **)&options->user_hostfiles; uintptr = &options->num_user_hostfiles; max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES; goto parse_char_array; case oHostName: charptr = &options->hostname; goto parse_string; case oHostKeyAlias: charptr = &options->host_key_alias; goto parse_string; case oPreferredAuthentications: charptr = &options->preferred_authentications; goto parse_string; case oBindAddress: charptr = &options->bind_address; goto parse_string; case oPKCS11Provider: charptr = &options->pkcs11_provider; goto parse_string; case oProxyCommand: charptr = &options->proxy_command; parse_command: if (s == NULL) fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); len = strspn(s, WHITESPACE "="); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(s + len); return 0; case oPort: intptr = &options->port; parse_int: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (arg[0] < '0' || arg[0] > '9') fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum); /* Octal, decimal, or hex format? */ value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 0); if (arg == endofnumber) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oConnectionAttempts: intptr = &options->connection_attempts; goto parse_int; case oCipher: intptr = &options->cipher; arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = cipher_number(arg); if (value == -1) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad cipher '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oCiphers: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (!ciphers_valid(arg)) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && options->ciphers == NULL) options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg); break; case oMacs: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (!mac_valid(arg)) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 Mac spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && options->macs == NULL) options->macs = xstrdup(arg); break; case oKexAlgorithms: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (!kex_names_valid(arg)) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL) options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); break; case oHostKeyAlgorithms: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (!key_names_valid2(arg)) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad protocol 2 host key algorithms '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && options->hostkeyalgorithms == NULL) options->hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup(arg); break; case oProtocol: intptr = &options->protocol; arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = proto_spec(arg); if (value == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad protocol spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *intptr == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) *intptr = value; break; case oLogLevel: log_level_ptr = &options->log_level; arg = strdelim(&s); value = log_level_number(arg); if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*activep && *log_level_ptr == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) *log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value; break; case oLocalForward: case oRemoteForward: case oDynamicForward: arg = strdelim(&s); if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing port argument.", filename, linenum); if (opcode == oLocalForward || opcode == oRemoteForward) { arg2 = strdelim(&s); if (arg2 == NULL || *arg2 == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing target argument.", filename, linenum); /* construct a string for parse_forward */ snprintf(fwdarg, sizeof(fwdarg), "%s:%s", arg, arg2); } else if (opcode == oDynamicForward) { strlcpy(fwdarg, arg, sizeof(fwdarg)); } if (parse_forward(&fwd, fwdarg, opcode == oDynamicForward ? 1 : 0, opcode == oRemoteForward ? 1 : 0) == 0) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding specification.", filename, linenum); if (*activep) { if (opcode == oLocalForward || opcode == oDynamicForward) add_local_forward(options, &fwd); else if (opcode == oRemoteForward) add_remote_forward(options, &fwd); } break; case oClearAllForwardings: intptr = &options->clear_forwardings; goto parse_flag; case oHost: if (cmdline) fatal("Host directive not supported as a command-line " "option"); *activep = 0; arg2 = NULL; while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { negated = *arg == '!'; if (negated) arg++; if (match_pattern(host, arg)) { if (negated) { debug("%.200s line %d: Skipping Host " "block because of negated match " "for %.100s", filename, linenum, arg); *activep = 0; break; } if (!*activep) arg2 = arg; /* logged below */ *activep = 1; } } if (*activep) debug("%.200s line %d: Applying options for %.100s", filename, linenum, arg2); /* Avoid garbage check below, as strdelim is done. */ return 0; case oMatch: if (cmdline) fatal("Host directive not supported as a command-line " "option"); value = match_cfg_line(options, &s, pw, host, filename, linenum); if (value < 0) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename, linenum); *activep = value; break; case oEscapeChar: intptr = &options->escape_char; arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (arg[0] == '^' && arg[2] == 0 && (u_char) arg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) arg[1] < 128) value = (u_char) arg[1] & 31; else if (strlen(arg) == 1) value = (u_char) arg[0]; else if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) value = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE; else { fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad escape character.", filename, linenum); /* NOTREACHED */ value = 0; /* Avoid compiler warning. */ } if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case oAddressFamily: intptr = &options->address_family; multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily; goto parse_multistate; case oEnableSSHKeysign: intptr = &options->enable_ssh_keysign; goto parse_flag; case oIdentitiesOnly: intptr = &options->identities_only; goto parse_flag; case oServerAliveInterval: intptr = &options->server_alive_interval; goto parse_time; case oServerAliveCountMax: intptr = &options->server_alive_count_max; goto parse_int; case oSendEnv: while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { if (strchr(arg, '=') != NULL) fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) continue; if (options->num_send_env >= MAX_SEND_ENV) fatal("%s line %d: too many send env.", filename, linenum); options->send_env[options->num_send_env++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case oControlPath: charptr = &options->control_path; goto parse_string; case oControlMaster: intptr = &options->control_master; multistate_ptr = multistate_controlmaster; goto parse_multistate; case oControlPersist: /* no/false/yes/true, or a time spec */ intptr = &options->control_persist; arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing ControlPersist" " argument.", filename, linenum); value = 0; value2 = 0; /* timeout */ if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "false") == 0) value = 0; else if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "true") == 0) value = 1; else if ((value2 = convtime(arg)) >= 0) value = 1; else fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad ControlPersist argument.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) { *intptr = value; options->control_persist_timeout = value2; } break; case oHashKnownHosts: intptr = &options->hash_known_hosts; goto parse_flag; case oTunnel: intptr = &options->tun_open; multistate_ptr = multistate_tunnel; goto parse_multistate; case oTunnelDevice: arg = strdelim(&s); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = a2tun(arg, &value2); if (value == SSH_TUNID_ERR) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad tun device.", filename, linenum); if (*activep) { options->tun_local = value; options->tun_remote = value2; } break; case oLocalCommand: charptr = &options->local_command; goto parse_command; case oPermitLocalCommand: intptr = &options->permit_local_command; goto parse_flag; case oVisualHostKey: intptr = &options->visual_host_key; goto parse_flag; case oIPQoS: arg = strdelim(&s); if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s", filename, linenum, arg); arg = strdelim(&s); if (arg == NULL) value2 = value; else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep) { options->ip_qos_interactive = value; options->ip_qos_bulk = value2; } break; case oUseRoaming: intptr = &options->use_roaming; goto parse_flag; case oRequestTTY: intptr = &options->request_tty; multistate_ptr = multistate_requesttty; goto parse_multistate; case oIgnoreUnknown: charptr = &options->ignored_unknown; goto parse_string; case oProxyUseFdpass: intptr = &options->proxy_use_fdpass; goto parse_flag; case oCanonicalDomains: value = options->num_canonical_domains != 0; while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { valid_domain(arg, filename, linenum); if (!*activep || value) continue; if (options->num_canonical_domains >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS) fatal("%s line %d: too many hostname suffixes.", filename, linenum); options->canonical_domains[ options->num_canonical_domains++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs: value = options->num_permitted_cnames != 0; while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { /* Either '*' for everything or 'list:list' */ if (strcmp(arg, "*") == 0) arg2 = arg; else { lowercase(arg); if ((arg2 = strchr(arg, ':')) == NULL || arg2[1] == '\0') { fatal("%s line %d: " "Invalid permitted CNAME \"%s\"", filename, linenum, arg); } *arg2 = '\0'; arg2++; } if (!*activep || value) continue; if (options->num_permitted_cnames >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS) fatal("%s line %d: too many permitted CNAMEs.", filename, linenum); cname = options->permitted_cnames + options->num_permitted_cnames++; cname->source_list = xstrdup(arg); cname->target_list = xstrdup(arg2); } break; case oCanonicalizeHostname: intptr = &options->canonicalize_hostname; multistate_ptr = multistate_canonicalizehostname; goto parse_multistate; case oCanonicalizeMaxDots: intptr = &options->canonicalize_max_dots; goto parse_int; case oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal: intptr = &options->canonicalize_fallback_local; goto parse_flag; + case oStreamLocalBindMask: + arg = strdelim(&s); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing StreamLocalBindMask argument.", filename, linenum); + /* Parse mode in octal format */ + value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 8); + if (arg == endofnumber || value < 0 || value > 0777) + fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum); + options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value; + break; + + case oStreamLocalBindUnlink: + intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink; + goto parse_flag; + case oDeprecated: debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword); return 0; case oUnsupported: error("%s line %d: Unsupported option \"%s\"", filename, linenum, keyword); return 0; default: fatal("process_config_line: Unimplemented opcode %d", opcode); } /* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */ if ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { fatal("%.200s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".", filename, linenum, arg); } return 0; } /* * Reads the config file and modifies the options accordingly. Options * should already be initialized before this call. This never returns if * there is an error. If the file does not exist, this returns 0. */ int read_config_file(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, const char *host, Options *options, int flags) { FILE *f; char line[1024]; int active, linenum; int bad_options = 0; if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) return 0; if (flags & SSHCONF_CHECKPERM) { struct stat sb; if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1) fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) || (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0)) fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename); } debug("Reading configuration data %.200s", filename); /* * Mark that we are now processing the options. This flag is turned * on/off by Host specifications. */ active = 1; linenum = 0; while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { /* Update line number counter. */ linenum++; if (process_config_line(options, pw, host, line, filename, linenum, &active, flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF) != 0) bad_options++; } fclose(f); if (bad_options > 0) fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options", filename, bad_options); return 1; } /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */ int option_clear_or_none(const char *o) { return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0; } /* * Initializes options to special values that indicate that they have not yet * been set. Read_config_file will only set options with this value. Options * are processed in the following order: command line, user config file, * system config file. Last, fill_default_options is called. */ void initialize_options(Options * options) { memset(options, 'X', sizeof(*options)); options->forward_agent = -1; options->forward_x11 = -1; options->forward_x11_trusted = -1; options->forward_x11_timeout = -1; options->exit_on_forward_failure = -1; options->xauth_location = NULL; - options->gateway_ports = -1; + options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1; + options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1; + options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1; options->use_privileged_port = -1; options->rsa_authentication = -1; options->pubkey_authentication = -1; options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; options->gss_authentication = -1; options->gss_deleg_creds = -1; options->password_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL; options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = -1; options->hostbased_authentication = -1; options->batch_mode = -1; options->check_host_ip = -1; options->strict_host_key_checking = -1; options->compression = -1; options->tcp_keep_alive = -1; options->compression_level = -1; options->port = -1; options->address_family = -1; options->connection_attempts = -1; options->connection_timeout = -1; options->number_of_password_prompts = -1; options->cipher = -1; options->ciphers = NULL; options->macs = NULL; options->kex_algorithms = NULL; options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL; options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN; options->num_identity_files = 0; options->hostname = NULL; options->host_key_alias = NULL; options->proxy_command = NULL; options->user = NULL; options->escape_char = -1; options->num_system_hostfiles = 0; options->num_user_hostfiles = 0; options->local_forwards = NULL; options->num_local_forwards = 0; options->remote_forwards = NULL; options->num_remote_forwards = 0; options->clear_forwardings = -1; options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET; options->preferred_authentications = NULL; options->bind_address = NULL; options->pkcs11_provider = NULL; options->enable_ssh_keysign = - 1; options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = - 1; options->identities_only = - 1; options->rekey_limit = - 1; options->rekey_interval = -1; options->verify_host_key_dns = -1; options->server_alive_interval = -1; options->server_alive_count_max = -1; options->num_send_env = 0; options->control_path = NULL; options->control_master = -1; options->control_persist = -1; options->control_persist_timeout = 0; options->hash_known_hosts = -1; options->tun_open = -1; options->tun_local = -1; options->tun_remote = -1; options->local_command = NULL; options->permit_local_command = -1; options->use_roaming = -1; options->visual_host_key = -1; options->ip_qos_interactive = -1; options->ip_qos_bulk = -1; options->request_tty = -1; options->proxy_use_fdpass = -1; options->ignored_unknown = NULL; options->num_canonical_domains = 0; options->num_permitted_cnames = 0; options->canonicalize_max_dots = -1; options->canonicalize_fallback_local = -1; options->canonicalize_hostname = -1; } /* * A petite version of fill_default_options() that just fills the options * needed for hostname canonicalization to proceed. */ void fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *options) { if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1) options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1; if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1) options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1; if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1) options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO; } /* * Called after processing other sources of option data, this fills those * options for which no value has been specified with their default values. */ void fill_default_options(Options * options) { if (options->forward_agent == -1) options->forward_agent = 0; if (options->forward_x11 == -1) options->forward_x11 = 0; if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1) options->forward_x11_trusted = 0; if (options->forward_x11_timeout == -1) options->forward_x11_timeout = 1200; if (options->exit_on_forward_failure == -1) options->exit_on_forward_failure = 0; if (options->xauth_location == NULL) options->xauth_location = _PATH_XAUTH; - if (options->gateway_ports == -1) - options->gateway_ports = 0; + if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1) + options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0; + if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1) + options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177; + if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1) + options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0; if (options->use_privileged_port == -1) options->use_privileged_port = 0; if (options->rsa_authentication == -1) options->rsa_authentication = 1; if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1) options->pubkey_authentication = 1; if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1) options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; if (options->gss_authentication == -1) options->gss_authentication = 0; if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1) options->gss_deleg_creds = 0; if (options->password_authentication == -1) options->password_authentication = 1; if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1) options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0; if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1) options->hostbased_authentication = 0; if (options->batch_mode == -1) options->batch_mode = 0; if (options->check_host_ip == -1) options->check_host_ip = 1; if (options->strict_host_key_checking == -1) options->strict_host_key_checking = 2; /* 2 is default */ if (options->compression == -1) options->compression = 0; if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1) options->tcp_keep_alive = 1; if (options->compression_level == -1) options->compression_level = 6; if (options->port == -1) options->port = 0; /* Filled in ssh_connect. */ if (options->address_family == -1) options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; if (options->connection_attempts == -1) options->connection_attempts = 1; if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1) options->number_of_password_prompts = 3; /* Selected in ssh_login(). */ if (options->cipher == -1) options->cipher = SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET; /* options->ciphers, default set in myproposals.h */ /* options->macs, default set in myproposals.h */ /* options->kex_algorithms, default set in myproposals.h */ /* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */ if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2; if (options->num_identity_files == 0) { if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) { add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY, 0); } if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA, 0); add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA, 0); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA, 0); #endif add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519, 0); } } if (options->escape_char == -1) options->escape_char = '~'; if (options->num_system_hostfiles == 0) { options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE); options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2); } if (options->num_user_hostfiles == 0) { options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE); options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2); } if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; if (options->clear_forwardings == 1) clear_forwardings(options); if (options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost == - 1) options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = 0; if (options->identities_only == -1) options->identities_only = 0; if (options->enable_ssh_keysign == -1) options->enable_ssh_keysign = 0; if (options->rekey_limit == -1) options->rekey_limit = 0; if (options->rekey_interval == -1) options->rekey_interval = 0; if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1) options->verify_host_key_dns = 0; if (options->server_alive_interval == -1) options->server_alive_interval = 0; if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1) options->server_alive_count_max = 3; if (options->control_master == -1) options->control_master = 0; if (options->control_persist == -1) { options->control_persist = 0; options->control_persist_timeout = 0; } if (options->hash_known_hosts == -1) options->hash_known_hosts = 0; if (options->tun_open == -1) options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; if (options->tun_local == -1) options->tun_local = SSH_TUNID_ANY; if (options->tun_remote == -1) options->tun_remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY; if (options->permit_local_command == -1) options->permit_local_command = 0; if (options->use_roaming == -1) options->use_roaming = 1; if (options->visual_host_key == -1) options->visual_host_key = 0; if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_LOWDELAY; if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1) options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT; if (options->request_tty == -1) options->request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_AUTO; if (options->proxy_use_fdpass == -1) options->proxy_use_fdpass = 0; if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1) options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1; if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1) options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1; if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1) options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO; #define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \ do { \ if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \ free(v); \ v = NULL; \ } \ } while(0) CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->local_command); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->proxy_command); CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->control_path); /* options->user will be set in the main program if appropriate */ /* options->hostname will be set in the main program if appropriate */ /* options->host_key_alias should not be set by default */ /* options->preferred_authentications will be set in ssh */ } +struct fwdarg { + char *arg; + int ispath; +}; + /* + * parse_fwd_field + * parses the next field in a port forwarding specification. + * sets fwd to the parsed field and advances p past the colon + * or sets it to NULL at end of string. + * returns 0 on success, else non-zero. + */ +static int +parse_fwd_field(char **p, struct fwdarg *fwd) +{ + char *ep, *cp = *p; + int ispath = 0; + + if (*cp == '\0') { + *p = NULL; + return -1; /* end of string */ + } + + /* + * A field escaped with square brackets is used literally. + * XXX - allow ']' to be escaped via backslash? + */ + if (*cp == '[') { + /* find matching ']' */ + for (ep = cp + 1; *ep != ']' && *ep != '\0'; ep++) { + if (*ep == '/') + ispath = 1; + } + /* no matching ']' or not at end of field. */ + if (ep[0] != ']' || (ep[1] != ':' && ep[1] != '\0')) + return -1; + /* NUL terminate the field and advance p past the colon */ + *ep++ = '\0'; + if (*ep != '\0') + *ep++ = '\0'; + fwd->arg = cp + 1; + fwd->ispath = ispath; + *p = ep; + return 0; + } + + for (cp = *p; *cp != '\0'; cp++) { + switch (*cp) { + case '\\': + memmove(cp, cp + 1, strlen(cp + 1) + 1); + cp++; + break; + case '/': + ispath = 1; + break; + case ':': + *cp++ = '\0'; + goto done; + } + } +done: + fwd->arg = *p; + fwd->ispath = ispath; + *p = cp; + return 0; +} + +/* * parse_forward * parses a string containing a port forwarding specification of the form: * dynamicfwd == 0 - * [listenhost:]listenport:connecthost:connectport + * [listenhost:]listenport|listenpath:connecthost:connectport|connectpath + * listenpath:connectpath * dynamicfwd == 1 * [listenhost:]listenport * returns number of arguments parsed or zero on error */ int -parse_forward(Forward *fwd, const char *fwdspec, int dynamicfwd, int remotefwd) +parse_forward(struct Forward *fwd, const char *fwdspec, int dynamicfwd, int remotefwd) { + struct fwdarg fwdargs[4]; + char *p, *cp; int i; - char *p, *cp, *fwdarg[4]; - memset(fwd, '\0', sizeof(*fwd)); + memset(fwd, 0, sizeof(*fwd)); + memset(fwdargs, 0, sizeof(fwdargs)); cp = p = xstrdup(fwdspec); /* skip leading spaces */ while (isspace((u_char)*cp)) cp++; - for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) - if ((fwdarg[i] = hpdelim(&cp)) == NULL) + for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) { + if (parse_fwd_field(&cp, &fwdargs[i]) != 0) break; + } /* Check for trailing garbage */ - if (cp != NULL) + if (cp != NULL && *cp != '\0') { i = 0; /* failure */ + } switch (i) { case 1: - fwd->listen_host = NULL; - fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdarg[0]); + if (fwdargs[0].ispath) { + fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); + fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; + } else { + fwd->listen_host = NULL; + fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg); + } fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks"); break; case 2: - fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(fwdarg[0])); - fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdarg[1]); - fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks"); + if (fwdargs[0].ispath && fwdargs[1].ispath) { + fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); + fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; + fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); + fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; + } else if (fwdargs[1].ispath) { + fwd->listen_host = NULL; + fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg); + fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); + fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; + } else { + fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); + fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg); + fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks"); + } break; case 3: - fwd->listen_host = NULL; - fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdarg[0]); - fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(fwdarg[1])); - fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdarg[2]); + if (fwdargs[0].ispath) { + fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); + fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; + fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); + fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[2].arg); + } else if (fwdargs[2].ispath) { + fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); + fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg); + fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[2].arg); + fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL; + } else { + fwd->listen_host = NULL; + fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg); + fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg); + fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[2].arg); + } break; case 4: - fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(fwdarg[0])); - fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdarg[1]); - fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(fwdarg[2])); - fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdarg[3]); + fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg); + fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg); + fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[2].arg); + fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[3].arg); break; default: i = 0; /* failure */ } free(p); if (dynamicfwd) { if (!(i == 1 || i == 2)) goto fail_free; } else { - if (!(i == 3 || i == 4)) + if (!(i == 3 || i == 4)) { + if (fwd->connect_path == NULL && + fwd->listen_path == NULL) + goto fail_free; + } + if (fwd->connect_port <= 0 && fwd->connect_path == NULL) goto fail_free; - if (fwd->connect_port <= 0) - goto fail_free; } - if (fwd->listen_port < 0 || (!remotefwd && fwd->listen_port == 0)) + if ((fwd->listen_port < 0 && fwd->listen_path == NULL) || + (!remotefwd && fwd->listen_port == 0)) goto fail_free; - if (fwd->connect_host != NULL && strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) goto fail_free; + /* XXX - if connecting to a remote socket, max sun len may not match this host */ + if (fwd->connect_path != NULL && + strlen(fwd->connect_path) >= PATH_MAX_SUN) + goto fail_free; if (fwd->listen_host != NULL && strlen(fwd->listen_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) goto fail_free; + if (fwd->listen_path != NULL && + strlen(fwd->listen_path) >= PATH_MAX_SUN) + goto fail_free; - return (i); fail_free: free(fwd->connect_host); fwd->connect_host = NULL; + free(fwd->connect_path); + fwd->connect_path = NULL; free(fwd->listen_host); fwd->listen_host = NULL; + free(fwd->listen_path); + fwd->listen_path = NULL; return (0); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/readconf.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/readconf.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/readconf.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,192 +1,183 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.101 2014/02/23 20:11:36 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.102 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Functions for reading the configuration file. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #ifndef READCONF_H #define READCONF_H -/* Data structure for representing a forwarding request. */ - -typedef struct { - char *listen_host; /* Host (address) to listen on. */ - int listen_port; /* Port to forward. */ - char *connect_host; /* Host to connect. */ - int connect_port; /* Port to connect on connect_host. */ - int allocated_port; /* Dynamically allocated listen port */ - int handle; /* Handle for dynamic listen ports */ -} Forward; /* Data structure for representing option data. */ #define MAX_SEND_ENV 256 #define SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES 32 #define MAX_CANON_DOMAINS 32 +#define PATH_MAX_SUN (sizeof((struct sockaddr_un *)0)->sun_path) struct allowed_cname { char *source_list; char *target_list; }; typedef struct { int forward_agent; /* Forward authentication agent. */ int forward_x11; /* Forward X11 display. */ int forward_x11_timeout; /* Expiration for Cookies */ int forward_x11_trusted; /* Trust Forward X11 display. */ int exit_on_forward_failure; /* Exit if bind(2) fails for -L/-R */ char *xauth_location; /* Location for xauth program */ - int gateway_ports; /* Allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */ + struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts; /* forwarding options */ int use_privileged_port; /* Don't use privileged port if false. */ int rhosts_rsa_authentication; /* Try rhosts with RSA * authentication. */ int rsa_authentication; /* Try RSA authentication. */ int pubkey_authentication; /* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */ int hostbased_authentication; /* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */ int challenge_response_authentication; /* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */ int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */ int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */ int password_authentication; /* Try password * authentication. */ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */ char *kbd_interactive_devices; /* Keyboard-interactive auth devices. */ int batch_mode; /* Batch mode: do not ask for passwords. */ int check_host_ip; /* Also keep track of keys for IP address */ int strict_host_key_checking; /* Strict host key checking. */ int compression; /* Compress packets in both directions. */ int compression_level; /* Compression level 1 (fast) to 9 * (best). */ int tcp_keep_alive; /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE. */ int ip_qos_interactive; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */ int ip_qos_bulk; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */ LogLevel log_level; /* Level for logging. */ int port; /* Port to connect. */ int address_family; int connection_attempts; /* Max attempts (seconds) before * giving up */ int connection_timeout; /* Max time (seconds) before * aborting connection attempt */ int number_of_password_prompts; /* Max number of password * prompts. */ int cipher; /* Cipher to use. */ char *ciphers; /* SSH2 ciphers in order of preference. */ char *macs; /* SSH2 macs in order of preference. */ char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types in order of preference. */ char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */ int protocol; /* Protocol in order of preference. */ char *hostname; /* Real host to connect. */ char *host_key_alias; /* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */ char *proxy_command; /* Proxy command for connecting the host. */ char *user; /* User to log in as. */ int escape_char; /* Escape character; -2 = none */ u_int num_system_hostfiles; /* Paths for /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts */ char *system_hostfiles[SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES]; u_int num_user_hostfiles; /* Path for $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts */ char *user_hostfiles[SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES]; char *preferred_authentications; char *bind_address; /* local socket address for connection to sshd */ char *pkcs11_provider; /* PKCS#11 provider */ int verify_host_key_dns; /* Verify host key using DNS */ int num_identity_files; /* Number of files for RSA/DSA identities. */ char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; int identity_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; Key *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; /* Local TCP/IP forward requests. */ int num_local_forwards; - Forward *local_forwards; + struct Forward *local_forwards; /* Remote TCP/IP forward requests. */ int num_remote_forwards; - Forward *remote_forwards; + struct Forward *remote_forwards; int clear_forwardings; int enable_ssh_keysign; int64_t rekey_limit; int rekey_interval; int no_host_authentication_for_localhost; int identities_only; int server_alive_interval; int server_alive_count_max; int num_send_env; char *send_env[MAX_SEND_ENV]; char *control_path; int control_master; int control_persist; /* ControlPersist flag */ int control_persist_timeout; /* ControlPersist timeout (seconds) */ int hash_known_hosts; int tun_open; /* tun(4) */ int tun_local; /* force tun device (optional) */ int tun_remote; /* force tun device (optional) */ char *local_command; int permit_local_command; int visual_host_key; int use_roaming; int request_tty; int proxy_use_fdpass; int num_canonical_domains; char *canonical_domains[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS]; int canonicalize_hostname; int canonicalize_max_dots; int canonicalize_fallback_local; int num_permitted_cnames; struct allowed_cname permitted_cnames[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS]; char *ignored_unknown; /* Pattern list of unknown tokens to ignore */ } Options; #define SSH_CANONICALISE_NO 0 #define SSH_CANONICALISE_YES 1 #define SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS 2 #define SSHCTL_MASTER_NO 0 #define SSHCTL_MASTER_YES 1 #define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO 2 #define SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK 3 #define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK 4 #define REQUEST_TTY_AUTO 0 #define REQUEST_TTY_NO 1 #define REQUEST_TTY_YES 2 #define REQUEST_TTY_FORCE 3 #define SSHCONF_CHECKPERM 1 /* check permissions on config file */ #define SSHCONF_USERCONF 2 /* user provided config file not system */ void initialize_options(Options *); void fill_default_options(Options *); void fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *); int process_config_line(Options *, struct passwd *, const char *, char *, const char *, int, int *, int); int read_config_file(const char *, struct passwd *, const char *, Options *, int); -int parse_forward(Forward *, const char *, int, int); +int parse_forward(struct Forward *, const char *, int, int); int default_ssh_port(void); int option_clear_or_none(const char *); -void add_local_forward(Options *, const Forward *); -void add_remote_forward(Options *, const Forward *); +void add_local_forward(Options *, const struct Forward *); +void add_remote_forward(Options *, const struct Forward *); void add_identity_file(Options *, const char *, const char *, int); #endif /* READCONF_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/Makefile =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/Makefile (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/Makefile (revision 276707) @@ -1,182 +1,190 @@ -# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.68 2014/01/25 04:35:32 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.70 2014/06/24 01:14:17 djm Exp $ -REGRESS_TARGETS= t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t-exec +REGRESS_TARGETS= unit t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t-exec tests: $(REGRESS_TARGETS) # Interop tests are not run by default interop interop-tests: t-exec-interop clean: for F in $(CLEANFILES); do rm -f $(OBJ)$$F; done test -z "${SUDO}" || ${SUDO} rm -f ${SUDO_CLEAN} rm -rf $(OBJ).putty distclean: clean LTESTS= connect \ proxy-connect \ connect-privsep \ proto-version \ proto-mismatch \ exit-status \ envpass \ transfer \ banner \ rekey \ stderr-data \ stderr-after-eof \ broken-pipe \ try-ciphers \ yes-head \ login-timeout \ agent \ agent-getpeereid \ agent-timeout \ agent-ptrace \ keyscan \ keygen-change \ keygen-convert \ key-options \ scp \ sftp \ sftp-chroot \ sftp-cmds \ sftp-badcmds \ sftp-batch \ sftp-glob \ sftp-perm \ reconfigure \ dynamic-forward \ forwarding \ multiplex \ reexec \ brokenkeys \ cfgmatch \ addrmatch \ localcommand \ forcecommand \ portnum \ keytype \ kextype \ cert-hostkey \ cert-userkey \ host-expand \ keys-command \ forward-control \ integrity \ krl # dhgex \ INTEROP_TESTS= putty-transfer putty-ciphers putty-kex conch-ciphers #INTEROP_TESTS+=ssh-com ssh-com-client ssh-com-keygen ssh-com-sftp #LTESTS= cipher-speed USER!= id -un CLEANFILES= t2.out t3.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub copy.1 copy.2 \ t8.out t8.out.pub t9.out t9.out.pub t10.out t10.out.pub \ authorized_keys_${USER} known_hosts pidfile testdata \ ssh_config sshd_config.orig ssh_proxy sshd_config sshd_proxy \ rsa.pub rsa rsa1.pub rsa1 host.rsa host.rsa1 \ rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa1-agent rsa1-agent.pub \ ls.copy banner.in banner.out empty.in \ scp-ssh-wrapper.scp ssh_proxy_envpass remote_pid \ sshd_proxy_bak rsa_ssh2_cr.prv rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv \ known_hosts-cert host_ca_key* cert_host_key* cert_user_key* \ putty.rsa2 sshd_proxy_orig ssh_proxy_bak \ key.rsa-* key.dsa-* key.ecdsa-* \ authorized_principals_${USER} expect actual ready \ sshd_proxy.* authorized_keys_${USER}.* modpipe revoked-* krl-* \ ssh.log failed-ssh.log sshd.log failed-sshd.log \ regress.log failed-regress.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh \ sftp-server.sh sftp-server.log sftp.log setuid-allowed \ data ed25519-agent ed25519-agent.pub key.ed25519-512 \ key.ed25519-512.pub SUDO_CLEAN+= /var/run/testdata_${USER} /var/run/keycommand_${USER} # Enable all malloc(3) randomisations and checks TEST_ENV= "MALLOC_OPTIONS=AFGJPRX" TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN?=ssh-keygen CPPFLAGS=-I.. t1: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv tr '\n' '\r' <${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv awk '{print $$0 "\r"}' ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv t2: cat ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv > $(OBJ)/t2.out chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t2.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t2.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub t3: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -ef ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub >$(OBJ)/t3.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if $(OBJ)/t3.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub t4: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\ awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t4.ok t5: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\ awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t5.ok t6: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.prv > $(OBJ)/t6.out1 ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.pub > $(OBJ)/t6.out2 chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t6.out1 ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t6.out1 | diff - $(OBJ)/t6.out2 $(OBJ)/t7.out: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t rsa -N '' -f $@ t7: $(OBJ)/t7.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null $(OBJ)/t8.out: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t dsa -N '' -f $@ t8: $(OBJ)/t8.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null $(OBJ)/t9.out: test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ecdsa -N '' -f $@ t9: $(OBJ)/t9.out test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \ ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null $(OBJ)/t10.out: ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -f $@ t10: $(OBJ)/t10.out ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null ${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null t-exec: ${LTESTS:=.sh} @if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \ for TEST in ""$?; do \ echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \ (env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \ done t-exec-interop: ${INTEROP_TESTS:=.sh} @if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \ for TEST in ""$?; do \ echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \ (env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \ done # Not run by default interop: ${INTEROP_TARGETS} + +# Unit tests, built by top-level Makefile +unit: + set -e ; if test -z "${SKIP_UNIT}" ; then \ + ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf ; \ + ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \ + -d ${.CURDIR}//unittests/sshkey/testdata ; \ + fi Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/connect-privsep.sh =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/connect-privsep.sh (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/connect-privsep.sh (revision 276707) @@ -1,36 +1,36 @@ -# $OpenBSD: connect-privsep.sh,v 1.4 2012/07/02 14:37:06 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: connect-privsep.sh,v 1.5 2014/05/04 10:40:59 logan Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="proxy connect with privsep" cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig echo 'UsePrivilegeSeparation yes' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy for p in 1 2; do ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh privsep+proxyconnect protocol $p failed" fi done cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy echo 'UsePrivilegeSeparation sandbox' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy for p in 1 2; do ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then # XXX replace this with fail once sandbox has stabilised warn "ssh privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect protocol $p failed" fi done # Because sandbox is sensitive to changes in libc, especially malloc, retest # with every malloc.conf option (and none). -for m in '' A F G H J P R S X Z '<' '>'; do +for m in '' A F G H J P R S X '<' '>'; do for p in 1 2; do env MALLOC_OPTIONS="$m" ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh privsep/sandbox+proxyconnect protocol $p mopt '$m' failed" fi done done Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/dhgex.sh =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/dhgex.sh (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/dhgex.sh (revision 276707) @@ -1,54 +1,58 @@ -# $OpenBSD: dhgex.sh,v 1.1 2014/01/25 04:35:32 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: dhgex.sh,v 1.2 2014/04/21 22:15:37 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="dhgex" LOG=${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} rm -f ${LOG} +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak kexs=`${SSH} -Q kex | grep diffie-hellman-group-exchange` ssh_test_dhgex() { bits="$1"; shift cipher="$1"; shift kex="$1"; shift + cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy + echo "KexAlgorithms=$kex" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + echo "Ciphers=$cipher" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy rm -f ${LOG} opts="-oKexAlgorithms=$kex -oCiphers=$cipher" groupsz="1024<$bits<8192" verbose "$tid bits $bits $kex $cipher" ${SSH} ${opts} $@ -vvv -F ${OBJ}/ssh_proxy somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh failed ($@)" fi # check what we request grep "SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST($groupsz) sent" ${LOG} >/dev/null if [ $? != 0 ]; then got=`egrep "SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(.*) sent" ${LOG}` fail "$tid unexpected GEX sizes, expected $groupsz, got $got" fi # check what we got (depends on contents of system moduli file) gotbits="`awk '/bits set:/{print $4}' ${LOG} | head -1 | cut -f2 -d/`" if [ "$gotbits" -lt "$bits" ]; then fatal "$tid expected $bits bit group, got $gotbits" fi } check() { bits="$1"; shift for c in $@; do for k in $kexs; do ssh_test_dhgex $bits $c $k done done } #check 2048 3des-cbc check 3072 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 128` check 3072 arcfour blowfish-cbc check 7680 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 192` check 8192 `${SSH} -Q cipher | grep 256` check 8192 rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/forwarding.sh =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/forwarding.sh (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/forwarding.sh (revision 276707) @@ -1,121 +1,137 @@ -# $OpenBSD: forwarding.sh,v 1.11 2013/06/10 21:56:43 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: forwarding.sh,v 1.12 2014/07/15 15:54:15 millert Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="local and remote forwarding" DATA=/bin/ls${EXEEXT} start_sshd base=33 last=$PORT fwd="" for j in 0 1 2; do for i in 0 1 2; do a=$base$j$i b=`expr $a + 50` c=$last # fwd chain: $a -> $b -> $c fwd="$fwd -L$a:127.0.0.1:$b -R$b:127.0.0.1:$c" last=$a done done for p in 1 2; do q=`expr 3 - $p` trace "start forwarding, fork to background" ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f $fwd somehost sleep 10 trace "transfer over forwarded channels and check result" ${SSH} -$q -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$last -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \ somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} - test -f ${COPY} || fail "failed copy of ${DATA}" + test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy of ${DATA}" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}" sleep 10 done for p in 1 2; do for d in L R; do trace "exit on -$d forward failure, proto $p" # this one should succeed ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config \ -$d ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -$d ${base}02:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -$d ${base}03:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -$d ${base}04:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost true if [ $? != 0 ]; then fail "connection failed, should not" else # this one should fail ${SSH} -q -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config \ -$d ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -$d ${base}02:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -$d ${base}03:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -$d ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -$d ${base}04:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -oExitOnForwardFailure=yes somehost true r=$? if [ $r != 255 ]; then fail "connection not termintated, but should ($r)" fi fi done done for p in 1 2; do trace "simple clear forwarding proto $p" ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost true trace "clear local forward proto $p" ${SSH} -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10 if [ $? != 0 ]; then fail "connection failed with cleared local forwarding" else # this one should fail ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 true \ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \ fail "local forwarding not cleared" fi sleep 10 trace "clear remote forward proto $p" ${SSH} -$p -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R ${base}01:127.0.0.1:$PORT \ -oClearAllForwardings=yes somehost sleep 10 if [ $? != 0 ]; then fail "connection failed with cleared remote forwarding" else # this one should fail ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p ${base}01 true \ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 && \ fail "remote forwarding not cleared" fi sleep 10 done for p in 2; do trace "stdio forwarding proto $p" cmd="${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config" $cmd -o "ProxyCommand $cmd -q -W localhost:$PORT somehost" \ somehost true if [ $? != 0 ]; then fail "stdio forwarding proto $p" fi done echo "LocalForward ${base}01 127.0.0.1:$PORT" >> $OBJ/ssh_config echo "RemoteForward ${base}02 127.0.0.1:${base}01" >> $OBJ/ssh_config for p in 1 2; do trace "config file: start forwarding, fork to background" ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_config -f somehost sleep 10 trace "config file: transfer over forwarded channels and check result" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}02 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \ somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} - test -f ${COPY} || fail "failed copy of ${DATA}" + test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy of ${DATA}" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}" wait +done + +for p in 2; do + trace "transfer over chained unix domain socket forwards and check result" + rm -f $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd + ${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R${base}01:[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd] somehost sleep 10 + ${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-1.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd] somehost sleep 10 + ${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -R[$OBJ/unix-2.fwd]:[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd] somehost sleep 10 + ${SSH} -f -F $OBJ/ssh_config -L[$OBJ/unix-3.fwd]:127.0.0.1:$PORT somehost sleep 10 + ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p${base}01 -o 'ConnectionAttempts=4' \ + somehost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} + test -s ${COPY} || fail "failed copy ${DATA}" + cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy of ${DATA}" + + #wait + sleep 10 done Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/integrity.sh =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/integrity.sh (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/integrity.sh (revision 276707) @@ -1,70 +1,75 @@ -# $OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.12 2013/11/21 03:18:51 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.14 2014/05/21 07:04:21 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="integrity" +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak # start at byte 2900 (i.e. after kex) and corrupt at different offsets # XXX the test hangs if we modify the low bytes of the packet length # XXX and ssh tries to read... tries=10 startoffset=2900 macs=`${SSH} -Q mac` # The following are not MACs, but ciphers with integrated integrity. They are # handled specially below. macs="$macs `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`" # avoid DH group exchange as the extra traffic makes it harder to get the # offset into the stream right. echo "KexAlgorithms diffie-hellman-group14-sha1,diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" \ >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy # sshd-command for proxy (see test-exec.sh) cmd="$SUDO sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${SSHD} ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy" for m in $macs; do trace "test $tid: mac $m" elen=0 epad=0 emac=0 ecnt=0 skip=0 for off in `jot $tries $startoffset`; do skip=`expr $skip - 1` if [ $skip -gt 0 ]; then # avoid modifying the high bytes of the length continue fi + cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy # modify output from sshd at offset $off pxy="proxycommand=$cmd | $OBJ/modpipe -wm xor:$off:1" if ssh -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${m}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then + echo "Ciphers=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy macopt="-c $m" else + echo "Ciphers=aes128-ctr" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + echo "MACs=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy macopt="-m $m -c aes128-ctr" fi verbose "test $tid: $m @$off" ${SSH} $macopt -2F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o "$pxy" \ -oServerAliveInterval=1 -oServerAliveCountMax=30 \ 999.999.999.999 'printf "%4096s" " "' >/dev/null if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then fail "ssh -m $m succeeds with bit-flip at $off" fi ecnt=`expr $ecnt + 1` - output=$(tail -2 $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE | egrep -v "^debug" | \ + out=$(tail -2 $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE | egrep -v "^debug" | \ tr -s '\r\n' '.') - case "$output" in + case "$out" in Bad?packet*) elen=`expr $elen + 1`; skip=3;; Corrupted?MAC* | Decryption?integrity?check?failed*) emac=`expr $emac + 1`; skip=0;; padding*) epad=`expr $epad + 1`; skip=0;; - *) fail "unexpected error mac $m at $off";; + *) fail "unexpected error mac $m at $off: $out";; esac done verbose "test $tid: $ecnt errors: mac $emac padding $epad length $elen" if [ $emac -eq 0 ]; then fail "$m: no mac errors" fi expect=`expr $ecnt - $epad - $elen` if [ $emac -ne $expect ]; then fail "$m: expected $expect mac errors, got $emac" fi done Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/kextype.sh =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/kextype.sh (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/kextype.sh (revision 276707) @@ -1,20 +1,25 @@ -# $OpenBSD: kextype.sh,v 1.4 2013/11/07 04:26:56 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: kextype.sh,v 1.5 2014/04/21 22:15:37 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="login with different key exchange algorithms" TIME=/usr/bin/time cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak + +# Make server accept all key exchanges. +ALLKEX=`ssh -Q kex` +KEXOPT=`echo $ALLKEX | tr ' ' ,` +echo "KexAlgorithms=$KEXOPT" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy tries="1 2 3 4" for k in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do verbose "kex $k" for i in $tries; do ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o KexAlgorithms=$k x true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh kex $k" fi done done Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/krl.sh =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/krl.sh (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/krl.sh (revision 276707) @@ -1,160 +1,163 @@ -# $OpenBSD: krl.sh,v 1.2 2013/11/21 03:15:46 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: krl.sh,v 1.3 2014/06/24 01:04:43 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="key revocation lists" # If we don't support ecdsa keys then this tell will be much slower. ECDSA=ecdsa if test "x$TEST_SSH_ECC" != "xyes"; then ECDSA=rsa fi # Do most testing with ssh-keygen; it uses the same verification code as sshd. # Old keys will interfere with ssh-keygen. rm -f $OBJ/revoked-* $OBJ/krl-* # Generate a CA key $SSHKEYGEN -t $ECDSA -f $OBJ/revoked-ca -C "" -N "" > /dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN CA failed" # A specification that revokes some certificates by serial numbers # The serial pattern is chosen to ensure the KRL includes list, range and # bitmap sections. cat << EOF >> $OBJ/revoked-serials serial: 1-4 serial: 10 serial: 15 serial: 30 serial: 50 serial: 999 # The following sum to 500-799 serial: 500 serial: 501 serial: 502 serial: 503-600 serial: 700-797 serial: 798 serial: 799 serial: 599-701 +# Some multiple consecutive serial number ranges +serial: 10000-20000 +serial: 30000-40000 EOF # A specification that revokes some certificated by key ID. touch $OBJ/revoked-keyid for n in 1 2 3 4 10 15 30 50 `jot 500 300` 999 1000 1001 1002; do # Fill in by-ID revocation spec. echo "id: revoked $n" >> $OBJ/revoked-keyid done keygen() { N=$1 f=$OBJ/revoked-`printf "%04d" $N` # Vary the keytype. We use mostly ECDSA since this is fastest by far. keytype=$ECDSA case $N in 2 | 10 | 510 | 1001) keytype=rsa;; 4 | 30 | 520 | 1002) keytype=dsa;; esac $SSHKEYGEN -t $keytype -f $f -C "" -N "" > /dev/null \ || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN failed" # Sign cert $SSHKEYGEN -s $OBJ/revoked-ca -z $n -I "revoked $N" $f >/dev/null 2>&1 \ || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN sign failed" echo $f } # Generate some keys. verbose "$tid: generating test keys" REVOKED_SERIALS="1 4 10 50 500 510 520 799 999" for n in $REVOKED_SERIALS ; do f=`keygen $n` REVOKED_KEYS="$REVOKED_KEYS ${f}.pub" REVOKED_CERTS="$REVOKED_CERTS ${f}-cert.pub" done NOTREVOKED_SERIALS="5 9 14 16 29 30 49 51 499 800 1000 1001" NOTREVOKED="" for n in $NOTREVOKED_SERIALS ; do NOTREVOKED_KEYS="$NOTREVOKED_KEYS ${f}.pub" NOTREVOKED_CERTS="$NOTREVOKED_CERTS ${f}-cert.pub" done genkrls() { OPTS=$1 $SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-empty - /dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" $SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keys $REVOKED_KEYS \ >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" $SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-cert $REVOKED_CERTS \ >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" $SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-all $REVOKED_KEYS $REVOKED_CERTS \ >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" $SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-ca $OBJ/revoked-ca.pub \ >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" # KRLs from serial/key-id spec need the CA specified. $SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial $OBJ/revoked-serials \ >/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL succeeded unexpectedly" $SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid $OBJ/revoked-keyid \ >/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL succeeded unexpectedly" $SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial -s $OBJ/revoked-ca $OBJ/revoked-serials \ >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" $SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid -s $OBJ/revoked-ca.pub $OBJ/revoked-keyid \ >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed" } ## XXX dump with trace and grep for set cert serials ## XXX test ranges near (u64)-1, etc. verbose "$tid: generating KRLs" genkrls check_krl() { KEY=$1 KRL=$2 EXPECT_REVOKED=$3 TAG=$4 $SSHKEYGEN -Qf $KRL $KEY >/dev/null result=$? if test "x$EXPECT_REVOKED" = "xyes" -a $result -eq 0 ; then fatal "key $KEY not revoked by KRL $KRL: $TAG" elif test "x$EXPECT_REVOKED" = "xno" -a $result -ne 0 ; then fatal "key $KEY unexpectedly revoked by KRL $KRL: $TAG" fi } test_all() { FILES=$1 TAG=$2 KEYS_RESULT=$3 ALL_RESULT=$4 SERIAL_RESULT=$5 KEYID_RESULT=$6 CERTS_RESULT=$7 CA_RESULT=$8 verbose "$tid: checking revocations for $TAG" for f in $FILES ; do check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-empty no "$TAG" check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keys $KEYS_RESULT "$TAG" check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-all $ALL_RESULT "$TAG" check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-serial $SERIAL_RESULT "$TAG" check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keyid $KEYID_RESULT "$TAG" check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-cert $CERTS_RESULT "$TAG" check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-ca $CA_RESULT "$TAG" done } # keys all serial keyid certs CA test_all "$REVOKED_KEYS" "revoked keys" yes yes no no no no test_all "$UNREVOKED_KEYS" "unrevoked keys" no no no no no no test_all "$REVOKED_CERTS" "revoked certs" yes yes yes yes yes yes test_all "$UNREVOKED_CERTS" "unrevoked certs" no no no no no yes # Check update. Results should be identical. verbose "$tid: testing KRL update" for f in $OBJ/krl-keys $OBJ/krl-cert $OBJ/krl-all \ $OBJ/krl-ca $OBJ/krl-serial $OBJ/krl-keyid ; do cp -f $OBJ/krl-empty $f genkrls -u done # keys all serial keyid certs CA test_all "$REVOKED_KEYS" "revoked keys" yes yes no no no no test_all "$UNREVOKED_KEYS" "unrevoked keys" no no no no no no test_all "$REVOKED_CERTS" "revoked certs" yes yes yes yes yes yes test_all "$UNREVOKED_CERTS" "unrevoked certs" no no no no no yes Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/login-timeout.sh =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/login-timeout.sh (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/login-timeout.sh (revision 276707) @@ -1,31 +1,32 @@ -# $OpenBSD: login-timeout.sh,v 1.6 2014/02/27 20:04:16 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: login-timeout.sh,v 1.7 2014/03/13 20:44:49 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="connect after login grace timeout" trace "test login grace with privsep" cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_config.orig grep -vi LoginGraceTime $OBJ/sshd_config.orig > $OBJ/sshd_config echo "LoginGraceTime 10s" >> $OBJ/sshd_config echo "MaxStartups 1" >> $OBJ/sshd_config start_sshd (echo SSH-2.0-fake; sleep 60) | telnet 127.0.0.1 ${PORT} >/dev/null 2>&1 & sleep 15 ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh connect after login grace timeout failed with privsep" fi $SUDO kill `$SUDO cat $PIDFILE` trace "test login grace without privsep" echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config start_sshd +sleep 1 (echo SSH-2.0-fake; sleep 60) | telnet 127.0.0.1 ${PORT} >/dev/null 2>&1 & sleep 15 ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh connect after login grace timeout failed without privsep" fi Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/multiplex.sh =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/multiplex.sh (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/multiplex.sh (revision 276707) @@ -1,143 +1,203 @@ -# $OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.21 2013/05/17 04:29:14 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.25 2014/07/22 01:32:12 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. CTL=/tmp/openssh.regress.ctl-sock.$$ tid="connection multiplexing" +if have_prog nc ; then + if nc -h 2>&1 | grep -- -N >/dev/null; then + NC="nc -N"; + elif nc -h 2>&1 | grep -- "-U.*Use UNIX" >/dev/null ; then + NC="nc" + else + echo "nc is incompatible" + fi +fi + +if test -z "$NC" ; then + echo "skipped (no compatible nc found)" + exit 0 +fi + +trace "will use ProxyCommand $proxycmd" if config_defined DISABLE_FD_PASSING ; then echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)" exit 0 fi P=3301 # test port wait_for_mux_master_ready() { for i in 1 2 3 4 5; do ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost \ >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0 sleep $i done fatal "mux master never becomes ready" } start_sshd start_mux_master() { trace "start master, fork to background" ${SSH} -Nn2 -MS$CTL -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" somehost \ -E $TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 & - MASTER_PID=$! + # NB. $SSH_PID will be killed by test-exec.sh:cleanup on fatal errors. + SSH_PID=$! wait_for_mux_master_ready } start_mux_master verbose "test $tid: envpass" trace "env passing over multiplexed connection" _XXX_TEST=blah ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" -S$CTL otherhost sh << 'EOF' test X"$_XXX_TEST" = X"blah" EOF if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "environment not found" fi verbose "test $tid: transfer" rm -f ${COPY} trace "ssh transfer over multiplexed connection and check result" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S$CTL otherhost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} test -f ${COPY} || fail "ssh -Sctl: failed copy ${DATA}" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh -Sctl: corrupted copy of ${DATA}" rm -f ${COPY} trace "ssh transfer over multiplexed connection and check result" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY} test -f ${COPY} || fail "ssh -S ctl: failed copy ${DATA}" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh -S ctl: corrupted copy of ${DATA}" rm -f ${COPY} trace "sftp transfer over multiplexed connection and check result" echo "get ${DATA} ${COPY}" | \ ${SFTP} -S ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oControlPath=$CTL otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 test -f ${COPY} || fail "sftp: failed copy ${DATA}" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "sftp: corrupted copy of ${DATA}" rm -f ${COPY} trace "scp transfer over multiplexed connection and check result" ${SCP} -S ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oControlPath=$CTL otherhost:${DATA} ${COPY} >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 test -f ${COPY} || fail "scp: failed copy ${DATA}" cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "scp: corrupted copy of ${DATA}" rm -f ${COPY} +verbose "test $tid: forward" +trace "forward over TCP/IP and check result" +$NC -l 127.0.0.1 $((${PORT} + 1)) < ${DATA} & +netcat_pid=$! +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L127.0.0.1:$((${PORT} + 2)):127.0.0.1:$((${PORT} + 1)) otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1 +$NC -d 127.0.0.1 $((${PORT} + 2)) > ${COPY} < /dev/null +cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh: corrupted copy of ${DATA}" +kill $netcat_pid 2>/dev/null +rm -f ${COPY} $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd +trace "forward over UNIX and check result" +$NC -Ul $OBJ/unix-1.fwd < ${DATA} & +netcat_pid=$! +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L$OBJ/unix-2.fwd:$OBJ/unix-1.fwd otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1 +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R$OBJ/unix-3.fwd:$OBJ/unix-2.fwd otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1 +$NC -d -U $OBJ/unix-3.fwd > ${COPY} /dev/null +rm -f ${COPY} $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd + for s in 0 1 4 5 44; do trace "exit status $s over multiplexed connection" verbose "test $tid: status $s" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost exit $s r=$? if [ $r -ne $s ]; then fail "exit code mismatch for protocol $p: $r != $s" fi # same with early close of stdout/err trace "exit status $s with early close over multiplexed connection" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -n otherhost \ exec sh -c \'"sleep 2; exec > /dev/null 2>&1; sleep 3; exit $s"\' r=$? if [ $r -ne $s ]; then fail "exit code (with sleep) mismatch for protocol $p: $r != $s" fi done verbose "test $tid: cmd check" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \ || fail "check command failed" -verbose "test $tid: cmd forward local" +verbose "test $tid: cmd forward local (TCP)" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ || fail "request local forward failed" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \ || fail "connect to local forward port failed" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -L $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ || fail "cancel local forward failed" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \ && fail "local forward port still listening" -verbose "test $tid: cmd forward remote" +verbose "test $tid: cmd forward remote (TCP)" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ || fail "request remote forward failed" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \ || fail "connect to remote forwarded port failed" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -R $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ || fail "cancel remote forward failed" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \ && fail "remote forward port still listening" +verbose "test $tid: cmd forward local (UNIX)" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ + || fail "request local forward failed" +echo "" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd | grep "Protocol mismatch" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "connect to local forward path failed" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -L $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ + || fail "cancel local forward failed" +N=$(echo "xyzzy" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd 2>&1 | grep "xyzzy" | wc -l) +test ${N} -eq 0 || fail "local forward path still listening" +rm -f $OBJ/unix-1.fwd + +verbose "test $tid: cmd forward remote (UNIX)" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ + || fail "request remote forward failed" +echo "" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd | grep "Protocol mismatch" >/dev/null 2>&1 \ + || fail "connect to remote forwarded path failed" +${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -R $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \ + || fail "cancel remote forward failed" +N=$(echo "xyzzy" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd 2>&1 | grep "xyzzy" | wc -l) +test ${N} -eq 0 || fail "remote forward path still listening" +rm -f $OBJ/unix-1.fwd + verbose "test $tid: cmd exit" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oexit otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \ || fail "send exit command failed" # Wait for master to exit -wait $MASTER_PID -kill -0 $MASTER_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail "exit command failed" +wait $SSH_PID +kill -0 $SSH_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail "exit command failed" # Restart master and test -O stop command with master using -N verbose "test $tid: cmd stop" trace "restart master, fork to background" start_mux_master # start a long-running command then immediately request a stop ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost "sleep 10; exit 0" \ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 & SLEEP_PID=$! ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ostop otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \ || fail "send stop command failed" # wait until both long-running command and master have exited. wait $SLEEP_PID [ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for concurrent command" -wait $MASTER_PID +wait $SSH_PID [ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for master stop" -kill -0 $MASTER_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail "stop command failed" +kill -0 $SSH_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "stop command failed" +SSH_PID="" # Already gone, so don't kill in cleanup + Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/proxy-connect.sh =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/proxy-connect.sh (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/proxy-connect.sh (revision 276707) @@ -1,26 +1,31 @@ -# $OpenBSD: proxy-connect.sh,v 1.6 2013/03/07 00:20:34 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: proxy-connect.sh,v 1.7 2014/05/03 18:46:14 dtucker Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="proxy connect" -verbose "plain username" -for p in 1 2; do - ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true +mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig + +for ps in no yes; do + cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy + echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $ps" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + + for p in 1 2; do + for c in no yes; do + verbose "plain username protocol $p privsep=$ps comp=$c" + opts="-$p -oCompression=$c -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy" + SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts 999.999.999.999 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'` if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then - fail "ssh proxyconnect protocol $p failed" + fail "ssh proxyconnect protocol $p privsep=$ps comp=$c failed" fi - SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'` - if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then - fail "ssh proxyconnect protocol $p failed" - fi if [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then - fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION" + fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION protocol $p privsep=$ps comp=$c" fi + done + done done -verbose "username with style" for p in 1 2; do + verbose "username with style protocol $p" ${SSH} -$p -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy ${USER}:style@999.999.999.999 true || \ fail "ssh proxyconnect protocol $p failed" done - Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/rekey.sh =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/rekey.sh (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/rekey.sh (revision 276707) @@ -1,142 +1,150 @@ -# $OpenBSD: rekey.sh,v 1.14 2013/11/21 03:18:51 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: rekey.sh,v 1.15 2014/04/21 22:15:37 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="rekey" LOG=${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} rm -f ${LOG} +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak # Test rekeying based on data volume only. # Arguments will be passed to ssh. ssh_data_rekeying() { + _kexopt=$1 ; shift + _opts="$@" + if ! test -z "$_kexopts" ; then + cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy + echo "$_kexopt" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + _opts="$_opts -o$_kexopt" + fi rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG} - ${SSH} <${DATA} -oCompression=no $@ -v -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost \ - "cat > ${COPY}" + _opts="$_opts -oCompression=no" + ${SSH} <${DATA} $_opts -v -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat > ${COPY}" if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh failed ($@)" fi cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy ($@)" n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l` n=`expr $n - 1` trace "$n rekeying(s)" if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then fail "no rekeying occured ($@)" fi } increase_datafile_size 300 opts="" for i in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do opts="$opts KexAlgorithms=$i" done for i in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do opts="$opts Ciphers=$i" done for i in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do opts="$opts MACs=$i" done for opt in $opts; do verbose "client rekey $opt" - ssh_data_rekeying -oRekeyLimit=256k -o$opt + ssh_data_rekeying "$opt" -oRekeyLimit=256k done # AEAD ciphers are magical so test with all KexAlgorithms if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep '^.*$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`; do for kex in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do verbose "client rekey $c $kex" - ssh_data_rekeying -oRekeyLimit=256k -oCiphers=$c -oKexAlgorithms=$kex + ssh_data_rekeying "KexAlgorithms=$kex" -oRekeyLimit=256k -oCiphers=$c done done fi for s in 16 1k 128k 256k; do verbose "client rekeylimit ${s}" - ssh_data_rekeying -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit=$s + ssh_data_rekeying "" -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit=$s done for s in 5 10; do verbose "client rekeylimit default ${s}" rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG} ${SSH} < ${DATA} -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit="default $s" -F \ $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "cat >${COPY};sleep $s;sleep 3" if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh failed" fi cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy" n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l` n=`expr $n - 1` trace "$n rekeying(s)" if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then fail "no rekeying occured" fi done for s in 5 10; do verbose "client rekeylimit default ${s} no data" rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG} ${SSH} -oCompression=no -oRekeyLimit="default $s" -F \ $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "sleep $s;sleep 3" if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh failed" fi n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l` n=`expr $n - 1` trace "$n rekeying(s)" if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then fail "no rekeying occured" fi done echo "rekeylimit default 5" >>$OBJ/sshd_proxy for s in 5 10; do verbose "server rekeylimit default ${s} no data" rm -f ${COPY} ${LOG} ${SSH} -oCompression=no -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost "sleep $s;sleep 3" if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh failed" fi n=`grep 'NEWKEYS sent' ${LOG} | wc -l` n=`expr $n - 1` trace "$n rekeying(s)" if [ $n -lt 1 ]; then fail "no rekeying occured" fi done verbose "rekeylimit parsing" for size in 16 1k 1K 1m 1M 1g 1G; do for time in 1 1m 1M 1h 1H 1d 1D 1w 1W; do case $size in 16) bytes=16 ;; 1k|1K) bytes=1024 ;; 1m|1M) bytes=1048576 ;; 1g|1G) bytes=1073741824 ;; esac case $time in 1) seconds=1 ;; 1m|1M) seconds=60 ;; 1h|1H) seconds=3600 ;; 1d|1D) seconds=86400 ;; 1w|1W) seconds=604800 ;; esac b=`$SUDO ${SSHD} -T -o "rekeylimit $size $time" -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy | \ awk '/rekeylimit/{print $2}'` s=`$SUDO ${SSHD} -T -o "rekeylimit $size $time" -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy | \ awk '/rekeylimit/{print $3}'` if [ "$bytes" != "$b" ]; then fatal "rekeylimit size: expected $bytes bytes got $b" fi if [ "$seconds" != "$s" ]; then fatal "rekeylimit time: expected $time seconds got $s" fi done done rm -f ${COPY} ${DATA} Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/test-exec.sh =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/test-exec.sh (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/test-exec.sh (revision 276707) @@ -1,487 +1,494 @@ -# $OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.47 2013/11/09 05:41:34 dtucker Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.48 2014/07/06 07:42:03 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. #SUDO=sudo # Unbreak GNU head(1) _POSIX2_VERSION=199209 export _POSIX2_VERSION case `uname -s 2>/dev/null` in OSF1*) BIN_SH=xpg4 export BIN_SH ;; CYGWIN_NT-5.0) os=cygwin TEST_SSH_IPV6=no ;; CYGWIN*) os=cygwin ;; esac if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_PORT" ]; then PORT="$TEST_SSH_PORT" else PORT=4242 fi if [ -x /usr/ucb/whoami ]; then USER=`/usr/ucb/whoami` elif whoami >/dev/null 2>&1; then USER=`whoami` elif logname >/dev/null 2>&1; then USER=`logname` else USER=`id -un` fi OBJ=$1 if [ "x$OBJ" = "x" ]; then echo '$OBJ not defined' exit 2 fi if [ ! -d $OBJ ]; then echo "not a directory: $OBJ" exit 2 fi SCRIPT=$2 if [ "x$SCRIPT" = "x" ]; then echo '$SCRIPT not defined' exit 2 fi if [ ! -f $SCRIPT ]; then echo "not a file: $SCRIPT" exit 2 fi if $TEST_SHELL -n $SCRIPT; then true else echo "syntax error in $SCRIPT" exit 2 fi unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}` # defaults SSH=ssh SSHD=sshd SSHAGENT=ssh-agent SSHADD=ssh-add SSHKEYGEN=ssh-keygen SSHKEYSCAN=ssh-keyscan SFTP=sftp SFTPSERVER=/usr/libexec/openssh/sftp-server SCP=scp # Interop testing PLINK=plink PUTTYGEN=puttygen CONCH=conch if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSH" != "x" ]; then SSH="${TEST_SSH_SSH}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHD" != "x" ]; then SSHD="${TEST_SSH_SSHD}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT" != "x" ]; then SSHAGENT="${TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHADD" != "x" ]; then SSHADD="${TEST_SSH_SSHADD}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN" != "x" ]; then SSHKEYGEN="${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN" != "x" ]; then SSHKEYSCAN="${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SFTP" != "x" ]; then SFTP="${TEST_SSH_SFTP}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER" != "x" ]; then SFTPSERVER="${TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SCP" != "x" ]; then SCP="${TEST_SSH_SCP}" fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PLINK" != "x" ]; then # Find real binary, if it exists case "${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" in /*) PLINK="${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" ;; *) PLINK=`which ${TEST_SSH_PLINK} 2>/dev/null` ;; esac fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN" != "x" ]; then # Find real binary, if it exists case "${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" in /*) PUTTYGEN="${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" ;; *) PUTTYGEN=`which ${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN} 2>/dev/null` ;; esac fi if [ "x$TEST_SSH_CONCH" != "x" ]; then # Find real binary, if it exists case "${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" in /*) CONCH="${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" ;; *) CONCH=`which ${TEST_SSH_CONCH} 2>/dev/null` ;; esac fi # Path to sshd must be absolute for rexec case "$SSHD" in /*) ;; *) SSHD=`which $SSHD` ;; esac case "$SSHAGENT" in /*) ;; *) SSHAGENT=`which $SSHAGENT` ;; esac # Logfiles. # SSH_LOGFILE should be the debug output of ssh(1) only # SSHD_LOGFILE should be the debug output of sshd(8) only # REGRESS_LOGFILE is the output of the test itself stdout and stderr if [ "x$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then TEST_SSH_LOGFILE=$OBJ/ssh.log fi if [ "x$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE=$OBJ/sshd.log fi if [ "x$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE=$OBJ/regress.log fi # truncate logfiles >$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE >$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE >$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE # Create wrapper ssh with logging. We can't just specify "SSH=ssh -E..." # because sftp and scp don't handle spaces in arguments. SSHLOGWRAP=$OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh echo "#!/bin/sh" > $SSHLOGWRAP echo "exec ${SSH} -E${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} "'"$@"' >>$SSHLOGWRAP chmod a+rx $OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh SSH="$SSHLOGWRAP" # Some test data. We make a copy because some tests will overwrite it. # The tests may assume that $DATA exists and is writable and $COPY does # not exist. Tests requiring larger data files can call increase_datafile_size # [kbytes] to ensure the file is at least that large. DATANAME=data DATA=$OBJ/${DATANAME} cat ${SSHAGENT} >${DATA} chmod u+w ${DATA} COPY=$OBJ/copy rm -f ${COPY} increase_datafile_size() { while [ `du -k ${DATA} | cut -f1` -lt $1 ]; do cat ${SSHAGENT} >>${DATA} done } # these should be used in tests export SSH SSHD SSHAGENT SSHADD SSHKEYGEN SSHKEYSCAN SFTP SFTPSERVER SCP #echo $SSH $SSHD $SSHAGENT $SSHADD $SSHKEYGEN $SSHKEYSCAN $SFTP $SFTPSERVER $SCP # Portable specific functions have_prog() { saved_IFS="$IFS" IFS=":" for i in $PATH do if [ -x $i/$1 ]; then IFS="$saved_IFS" return 0 fi done IFS="$saved_IFS" return 1 } jot() { awk "BEGIN { for (i = $2; i < $2 + $1; i++) { printf \"%d\n\", i } exit }" } # Check whether preprocessor symbols are defined in config.h. config_defined () { str=$1 while test "x$2" != "x" ; do str="$str|$2" shift done egrep "^#define.*($str)" ${BUILDDIR}/config.h >/dev/null 2>&1 } md5 () { if have_prog md5sum; then md5sum elif have_prog openssl; then openssl md5 elif have_prog cksum; then cksum elif have_prog sum; then sum else wc -c fi } # End of portable specific functions # helper cleanup () { + if [ "x$SSH_PID" != "x" ]; then + if [ $SSH_PID -lt 2 ]; then + echo bad pid for ssh: $SSH_PID + else + kill $SSH_PID + fi + fi if [ -f $PIDFILE ]; then pid=`$SUDO cat $PIDFILE` if [ "X$pid" = "X" ]; then echo no sshd running else if [ $pid -lt 2 ]; then - echo bad pid for ssh: $pid + echo bad pid for sshd: $pid else $SUDO kill $pid trace "wait for sshd to exit" i=0; while [ -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 5 ]; do i=`expr $i + 1` sleep $i done test -f $PIDFILE && \ fatal "sshd didn't exit port $PORT pid $pid" fi fi fi } start_debug_log () { echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE } save_debug_log () { echo $@ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE echo $@ >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE echo $@ >>$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE (cat $TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-regress.log (cat $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-ssh.log (cat $TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-sshd.log } trace () { start_debug_log $@ if [ "X$TEST_SSH_TRACE" = "Xyes" ]; then echo "$@" fi } verbose () { start_debug_log $@ if [ "X$TEST_SSH_QUIET" != "Xyes" ]; then echo "$@" fi } warn () { echo "WARNING: $@" >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE echo "WARNING: $@" } fail () { save_debug_log "FAIL: $@" RESULT=1 echo "$@" } fatal () { save_debug_log "FATAL: $@" printf "FATAL: " fail "$@" cleanup exit $RESULT } RESULT=0 PIDFILE=$OBJ/pidfile trap fatal 3 2 # create server config cat << EOF > $OBJ/sshd_config StrictModes no Port $PORT Protocol 2,1 AddressFamily inet ListenAddress 127.0.0.1 #ListenAddress ::1 PidFile $PIDFILE AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/authorized_keys_%u LogLevel DEBUG3 AcceptEnv _XXX_TEST_* AcceptEnv _XXX_TEST Subsystem sftp $SFTPSERVER EOF if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" ]; then trace "adding sshd_config option $TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" echo "$TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/sshd_config fi # server config for proxy connects cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_proxy # allow group-writable directories in proxy-mode echo 'StrictModes no' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy # create client config cat << EOF > $OBJ/ssh_config Host * Protocol 2,1 Hostname 127.0.0.1 HostKeyAlias localhost-with-alias Port $PORT User $USER GlobalKnownHostsFile $OBJ/known_hosts UserKnownHostsFile $OBJ/known_hosts RSAAuthentication yes PubkeyAuthentication yes ChallengeResponseAuthentication no HostbasedAuthentication no PasswordAuthentication no RhostsRSAAuthentication no BatchMode yes StrictHostKeyChecking yes LogLevel DEBUG3 EOF if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" ]; then trace "adding ssh_config option $TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" echo "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/ssh_config fi rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER trace "generate keys" for t in rsa rsa1; do # generate user key if [ ! -f $OBJ/$t ] || [ ${SSHKEYGEN} -nt $OBJ/$t ]; then rm -f $OBJ/$t ${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t -f $OBJ/$t ||\ fail "ssh-keygen for $t failed" fi # known hosts file for client ( printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' cat $OBJ/$t.pub ) >> $OBJ/known_hosts # setup authorized keys cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER echo IdentityFile $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/ssh_config # use key as host key, too $SUDO cp $OBJ/$t $OBJ/host.$t echo HostKey $OBJ/host.$t >> $OBJ/sshd_config # don't use SUDO for proxy connect echo HostKey $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy done chmod 644 $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER # Activate Twisted Conch tests if the binary is present REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=no if test -x "$CONCH" ; then REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=yes fi # If PuTTY is present and we are running a PuTTY test, prepare keys and # configuration REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=no if test -x "$PUTTYGEN" -a -x "$PLINK" ; then REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=yes fi case "$SCRIPT" in *putty*) ;; *) REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=no ;; esac if test "$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" = "yes" ; then mkdir -p ${OBJ}/.putty # Add a PuTTY key to authorized_keys rm -f ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 puttygen -t rsa -o ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 < /dev/null > /dev/null puttygen -O public-openssh ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \ >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER # Convert rsa2 host key to PuTTY format ${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 $PORT $OBJ/rsa > \ ${OBJ}/.putty/sshhostkeys ${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 22 $OBJ/rsa >> \ ${OBJ}/.putty/sshhostkeys # Setup proxied session mkdir -p ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions rm -f ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "Hostname=127.0.0.1" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "PortNumber=$PORT" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "ProxyMethod=5" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy echo "ProxyTelnetCommand=sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${SSHD} ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=yes fi # create a proxy version of the client config ( cat $OBJ/ssh_config echo proxycommand ${SUDO} sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${SSHD} ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy ) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy # check proxy config ${SSHD} -t -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy || fatal "sshd_proxy broken" start_sshd () { # start sshd $SUDO ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -t || fatal "sshd_config broken" $SUDO ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -E$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE trace "wait for sshd" i=0; while [ ! -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 10 ]; do i=`expr $i + 1` sleep $i done test -f $PIDFILE || fatal "no sshd running on port $PORT" } # source test body . $SCRIPT # kill sshd cleanup if [ $RESULT -eq 0 ]; then verbose ok $tid else echo failed $tid fi exit $RESULT Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/try-ciphers.sh =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/try-ciphers.sh (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/try-ciphers.sh (revision 276707) @@ -1,33 +1,38 @@ -# $OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.22 2013/11/21 03:18:51 djm Exp $ +# $OpenBSD: try-ciphers.sh,v 1.23 2014/04/21 22:15:37 djm Exp $ # Placed in the Public Domain. tid="try ciphers" +cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak + for c in `${SSH} -Q cipher`; do n=0 for m in `${SSH} -Q mac`; do trace "proto 2 cipher $c mac $m" verbose "test $tid: proto 2 cipher $c mac $m" + cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy + echo "Ciphers=$c" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy + echo "MACs=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -2 -m $m -c $c somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh -2 failed with mac $m cipher $c" fi # No point trying all MACs for AEAD ciphers since they # are ignored. if ssh -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${c}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then break fi n=`expr $n + 1` done done ciphers="3des blowfish" for c in $ciphers; do trace "proto 1 cipher $c" verbose "test $tid: proto 1 cipher $c" ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -1 -c $c somehost true if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then fail "ssh -1 failed with cipher $c" fi done Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/Makefile =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/Makefile (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/Makefile (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ + +SUBDIR= test_helper sshbuf sshkey + +.include Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile.inc,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ + +.include +.include + +# enable warnings +WARNINGS=Yes + +DEBUG=-g +CFLAGS+= -fstack-protector-all +CDIAGFLAGS= -Wall +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wextra +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Werror +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wchar-subscripts +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wcomment +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wformat +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wformat-security +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wimplicit +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Winline +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wmissing-declarations +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wmissing-prototypes +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wparentheses +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wpointer-arith +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wpointer-sign +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wreturn-type +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wshadow +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wsign-compare +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wstrict-aliasing +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wstrict-prototypes +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wswitch +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wtrigraphs +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wuninitialized +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wunused +.if ${COMPILER_VERSION} == "gcc4" +CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wold-style-definition +.endif + +SSHREL=../../../../../usr.bin/ssh + +CFLAGS+=-I${.CURDIR}/../test_helper -I${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL} + +.if exists(${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/${__objdir}) +LDADD+=-L${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/${__objdir} -ltest_helper +DPADD+=${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/${__objdir}/libtest_helper.a +.else +LDADD+=-L${.CURDIR}/../test_helper -ltest_helper +DPADD+=${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/libtest_helper.a +.endif + +.if exists(${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL}/lib/${__objdir}) +LDADD+=-L${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL}/lib/${__objdir} -lssh +DPADD+=${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL}/lib/${__objdir}/libssh.a +.else +LDADD+=-L${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL}/lib -lssh +DPADD+=${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL}/lib/libssh.a +.endif + +LDADD+= -lcrypto +DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPTO} Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ + +PROG=test_sshbuf +SRCS=tests.c +SRCS+=test_sshbuf.c +SRCS+=test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c +SRCS+=test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c +SRCS+=test_sshbuf_misc.c +SRCS+=test_sshbuf_fuzz.c +SRCS+=test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c +SRCS+=test_sshbuf_fixed.c + +.include + Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.c (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL 1 /* access internals for testing */ +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +void sshbuf_tests(void); + +void +sshbuf_tests(void) +{ + struct sshbuf *p1; + const u_char *cdp; + u_char *dp; + size_t sz; + int r; + + TEST_START("allocate sshbuf"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("max size on fresh buffer"); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 0); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("available on fresh buffer"); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(sshbuf_avail(p1), 0); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("len = 0 on empty buffer"); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("set valid max size"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 65536), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 65536); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("available on limited buffer"); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 65536); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("free"); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("consume on empty buffer"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 0), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 1), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("consume_end on empty buffer"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 0), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 1), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("reserve space"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1, &dp); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL); + *dp = 0x11; + r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 3, &dp); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL); + *dp++ = 0x22; + *dp++ = 0x33; + *dp++ = 0x44; + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_len on filled buffer"); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_ptr on filled buffer"); + cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cdp, NULL); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[0], 0x11); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[1], 0x22); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[2], 0x33); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[3], 0x44); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("consume on filled buffer"); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 0), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); + r = sshbuf_consume(p1, 64); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 1), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 3); + cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[0], 0x22); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 2), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); + cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(cdp[0], 0x44); + r = sshbuf_consume(p1, 2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 1), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + r = sshbuf_consume(p1, 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("consume_end on filled buffer"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 4, &dp); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL); + *dp++ = 0x11; + *dp++ = 0x22; + *dp++ = 0x33; + *dp++ = 0x44; + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); + r = sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 5); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 3), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); + cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cdp, NULL); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(*cdp, 0x11); + r = sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 1), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fill limited buffer"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 1223), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 1223); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 1223); + r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1223, &dp); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL); + memset(dp, 0xd7, 1223); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1223); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 0); + r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1, &dp); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(dp, NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("consume and force compaction"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume(p1, 223), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1000); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 223); + r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 224, &dp); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(dp, NULL); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1000); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 223); + r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 223, &dp); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL); + memset(dp, 0x7d, 223); + cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cdp, NULL); + ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp, 0xd7, 1000); + ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp + 1000, 0x7d, 223); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("resize full buffer"); + r = sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 1000); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + sz = roundup(1223 + SSHBUF_SIZE_INC * 3, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sz), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), sz); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz - 1223); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1223); + TEST_DONE(); + + /* NB. uses sshbuf internals */ + TEST_START("alloc chunking"); + r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1, &dp); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL); + *dp = 0xff; + cdp = sshbuf_ptr(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cdp, NULL); + ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp, 0xd7, 1000); + ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp + 1000, 0x7d, 223); + ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(cdp + 1223, 0xff, 1); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_alloc(p1) % SSHBUF_SIZE_INC, 0); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("reset buffer"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 1223), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 1223); + r = sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1223, &dp); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL); + memset(dp, 0xd7, 1223); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1223); + sshbuf_reset(p1); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 1223); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 1223); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); +} Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.c (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,126 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_fixed.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL 1 /* access internals for testing */ +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" + +void sshbuf_fixed(void); + +const u_char test_buf[] = "\x01\x12\x34\x56\x78\x00\x00\x00\x05hello"; + +void +sshbuf_fixed(void) +{ + struct sshbuf *p1, *p2, *p3; + u_char c; + char *s; + u_int i; + size_t l; + + TEST_START("sshbuf_from"); + p1 = sshbuf_from(test_buf, sizeof(test_buf)); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(p1), NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_check_reserve(p1, 1), SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 1, NULL), SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 200), SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x12345678), SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), test_buf); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_from data"); + p1 = sshbuf_from(test_buf, sizeof(test_buf) - 1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), test_buf); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &c), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), test_buf + 1); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(c, 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &i), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), test_buf + 5); + ASSERT_U32_EQ(i, 0x12345678); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_cstring(p1, &s, &l), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s, "hello"); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(l, 5); + sshbuf_free(p1); + free(s); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_fromb "); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(sshbuf_refcount(p1), 1); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_parent(p1), NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, test_buf, sizeof(test_buf) - 1), 0); + p2 = sshbuf_fromb(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p2, NULL); + ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(sshbuf_refcount(p1), 2); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_parent(p1), NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_parent(p2), p1); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p2), sshbuf_ptr(p1)); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p2), NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(p1), NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(p2), NULL); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sshbuf_len(p2)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u8(p2, &c), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p2), sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 1); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(c, 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u32(p2, &i), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p2), sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 5); + ASSERT_U32_EQ(i, 0x12345678); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_cstring(p2, &s, &l), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p2), 0); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(s, "hello"); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(l, 5); + sshbuf_free(p1); + ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(sshbuf_refcount(p1), 1); + sshbuf_free(p2); + free(s); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_froms"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x01), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x12345678), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(p1, "hello"), 0); + p2 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p2, NULL); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(test_buf) - 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(p2, p1), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p2), sizeof(test_buf) + 4 - 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_froms(p2, &p3), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p2), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p3, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p3), NULL); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p3), sizeof(test_buf) - 1); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p3), test_buf, sizeof(test_buf) - 1); + sshbuf_free(p3); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(p2, p1), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p2, 1), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_froms(p2, &p3), SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(p3, NULL); + sshbuf_free(p2); + sshbuf_free(p1); +} Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.c (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_fuzz.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +#define NUM_FUZZ_TESTS (1 << 18) + +void sshbuf_fuzz_tests(void); + +void +sshbuf_fuzz_tests(void) +{ + struct sshbuf *p1; + u_char *dp; + size_t sz, sz2, i; + u_int32_t r; + int ret; + + /* NB. uses sshbuf internals */ + TEST_START("fuzz alloc/dealloc"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 16 * 1024), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL); + ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), sshbuf_len(p1)); + for (i = 0; i < NUM_FUZZ_TESTS; i++) { + r = arc4random_uniform(10); + if (r == 0) { + /* 10% chance: small reserve */ + r = arc4random_uniform(10); + fuzz_reserve: + sz = sshbuf_avail(p1); + sz2 = sshbuf_len(p1); + ret = sshbuf_reserve(p1, r, &dp); + if (ret < 0) { + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(dp, NULL); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_LT(sz, r); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sz2); + } else { + ASSERT_PTR_NE(dp, NULL); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_GE(sz, r); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz - r); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sz2 + r); + memset(dp, arc4random_uniform(255) + 1, r); + } + } else if (r < 3) { + /* 20% chance: big reserve */ + r = arc4random_uniform(8 * 1024); + goto fuzz_reserve; + } else if (r == 3) { + /* 10% chance: small consume */ + r = arc4random_uniform(10); + fuzz_consume: + sz = sshbuf_avail(p1); + sz2 = sshbuf_len(p1); + /* 50% change consume from end, otherwise start */ + ret = ((arc4random() & 1) ? + sshbuf_consume : sshbuf_consume_end)(p1, r); + if (ret < 0) { + ASSERT_SIZE_T_LT(sz2, r); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sz2); + } else { + ASSERT_SIZE_T_GE(sz2, r); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_avail(p1), sz + r); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sz2 - r); + } + } else if (r < 8) { + /* 40% chance: big consume */ + r = arc4random_uniform(2 * 1024); + goto fuzz_consume; + } else if (r == 8) { + /* 10% chance: reset max size */ + r = arc4random_uniform(16 * 1024); + sz = sshbuf_max_size(p1); + if (sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, r) < 0) + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), sz); + else + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_max_size(p1), r); + } else { + if (arc4random_uniform(8192) == 0) { + /* tiny chance: new buffer */ + ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL); + ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), sshbuf_len(p1)); + sshbuf_free(p1); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, + 16 * 1024), 0); + } else { + /* Almost 10%: giant reserve */ + /* use arc4random_buf for r > 2^32 on 64 bit */ + arc4random_buf(&r, sizeof(r)); + while (r < SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX / 2) { + r <<= 1; + r |= arc4random() & 1; + } + goto fuzz_reserve; + } + } + ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_LE(sshbuf_max_size(p1), 16 * 1024); + } + ASSERT_PTR_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), NULL); + ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_NE(sshbuf_ptr(p1), sshbuf_len(p1)); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); +} Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,484 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +void sshbuf_getput_basic_tests(void); + +void +sshbuf_getput_basic_tests(void) +{ + struct sshbuf *p1, *p2; + const u_char *cd; + u_char *d, d2[32], x[] = { + 0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x00, 0x99 + }; + u_int64_t v64; + u_int32_t v32; + u_int16_t v16; + u_char v8; + size_t s; + char *s2; + int r; + u_char bn1[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; + u_char bn2[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x02 }; + u_char bn3[] = { 0x00, 0x80, 0x09 }; + u_char bn_exp1[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; + u_char bn_exp2[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02 }; + u_char bn_exp3[] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x00, 0x80, 0x09 }; + + TEST_START("PEEK_U64"); + ASSERT_U64_EQ(PEEK_U64(x), 0x1122334455667788ULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("PEEK_U32"); + ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(x), 0x11223344); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("PEEK_U16"); + ASSERT_U16_EQ(PEEK_U16(x), 0x1122); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("POKE_U64"); + bzero(d2, sizeof(d2)); + POKE_U64(d2, 0x1122334455667788ULL); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d2, x, 8); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("POKE_U32"); + bzero(d2, sizeof(d2)); + POKE_U32(d2, 0x11223344); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d2, x, 4); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("POKE_U16"); + bzero(d2, sizeof(d2)); + POKE_U16(d2, 0x1122); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d2, x, 2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 5), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 5); + cd = sshbuf_ptr(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cd, NULL); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[0], 0x11); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[1], 0x22); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[2], 0x33); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[3], 0x44); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(cd[4], 0x55); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get(p1, d2, 4), 0); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d2, x, 4); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(*(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), 0x55); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get truncated"); + r = sshbuf_get(p1, d2, 4); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(*(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), 0x55); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put truncated"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 4), 0); + r = sshbuf_put(p1, x, 5); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u64"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 10), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 10); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u64(p1, &v64), 0); + ASSERT_U64_EQ(v64, 0x1122334455667788ULL); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u64 truncated"); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + r = sshbuf_get_u64(p1, &v64); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u32"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 10), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 10); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &v32), 0); + ASSERT_U32_EQ(v32, 0x11223344); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 6); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &v32), 0); + ASSERT_U32_EQ(v32, 0x55667788); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u32 truncated"); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + r = sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &v32); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u16"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 9), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 9); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16), 0); + ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x1122); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 7); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16), 0); + ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x3344); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 5); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16), 0); + ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x5566); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 3); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16), 0); + ASSERT_U16_EQ(v16, 0x7788); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u16 truncated"); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); + r = sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &v16); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u8"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, 2), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &v8), 0); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(v8, 0x11); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &v8), 0); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(v8, 0x22); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_u8 truncated"); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + r = sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &v8); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u64"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(p1, 0x1122334455667788ULL), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 8); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 8); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u64 exact"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 8), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(p1, 0x1122334455667788ULL), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 8); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 8); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u64 limited"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 7), 0); + r = sshbuf_put_u64(p1, 0x1122334455667788ULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u32"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x11223344), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 4); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u32 exact"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 4), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x11223344), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 4); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u32 limited"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 3), 0); + r = sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x11223344); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u16"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0x1122), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u16"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 2), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0x1122), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), x, 2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_u16 limited"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, 1), 0); + r = sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0x1122); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_string"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4 + 4); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_string(p1, &d, &s), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(s, sizeof(x)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d, x, sizeof(x)); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); + free(d); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_string exact"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(x) + 4), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_string(p1, &d, &s), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(s, sizeof(x)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d, x, sizeof(x)); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + free(d); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_string truncated"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(p1, 1), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 3); + r = sshbuf_get_string(p1, &d, &s); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 3); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_string giant"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0xffffffff), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4); + r = sshbuf_get_string(p1, &d, &s); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_cstring giant"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0xffffffff), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4); + r = sshbuf_get_cstring(p1, &s2, &s); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_cstring embedded \\0"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x)), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4); + r = sshbuf_get_cstring(p1, &s2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_cstring trailing \\0"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, sizeof(x) - 1), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, x, sizeof(x) - 1), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4 - 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_cstring(p1, &s2, &s), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(s, sizeof(x) - 1); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(s2, x, s); + free(s2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_string"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(p1, x, sizeof(x)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(x) + 4); + ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), sizeof(x)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 4, x, sizeof(x)); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_string limited"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(x) + 4 - 1), 0); + r = sshbuf_put_string(p1, x, sizeof(x)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_string giant"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + r = sshbuf_put_string(p1, (void *)0x01, 0xfffffffc); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_putf"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + r = sshbuf_putf(p1, "%s %d %x", "hello", 23, 0x5f); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 11); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), "hello 23 5f", 11); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_putb"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + p2 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, "blahblahblah", 12), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_putb(p2, p1), 0); + sshbuf_free(p1); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p2), 12); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p2), "blahblahblah", 12); + sshbuf_free(p2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes empty buf"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, NULL, 0), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp1)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp1, sizeof(bn_exp1)); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes all zeroes"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn1, sizeof(bn1)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp1)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp1, sizeof(bn_exp1)); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes simple"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn2+2, sizeof(bn2)-2), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp2)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp2, sizeof(bn_exp2)); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes leading zero"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn2, sizeof(bn2)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp2)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp2, sizeof(bn_exp2)); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes neg"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn3+1, sizeof(bn3)-1), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp3)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp3, sizeof(bn_exp3)); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes neg and leading zero"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(p1, bn3, sizeof(bn3)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(bn_exp3)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1), bn_exp3, sizeof(bn_exp3)); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); +} Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,409 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 +# include +#endif + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +void sshbuf_getput_crypto_tests(void); + +void +sshbuf_getput_crypto_tests(void) +{ + struct sshbuf *p1; + const u_char *d; + size_t s; + BIGNUM *bn, *bn2; + /* This one has num_bits != num_bytes * 8 to test bignum1 encoding */ + const char *hexbn1 = "0102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f10"; + /* This one has MSB set to test bignum2 encoding negative-avoidance */ + const char *hexbn2 = "f0e0d0c0b0a0908070605040302010007fff11"; + u_char expbn1[] = { + 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, + 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, + }; + u_char expbn2[] = { + 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xd0, 0xc0, 0xb0, 0xa0, 0x90, 0x80, + 0x70, 0x60, 0x50, 0x40, 0x30, 0x20, 0x10, 0x00, + 0x7f, 0xff, 0x11 + }; +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 + BIGNUM *bn_x, *bn_y; + int ec256_nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1; + char *ec256_x = "0C828004839D0106AA59575216191357" + "34B451459DADB586677EF9DF55784999"; + char *ec256_y = "4D196B50F0B4E94B3C73E3A9D4CD9DF2" + "C8F9A35E42BDD047550F69D80EC23CD4"; + u_char expec256[] = { + 0x04, + 0x0c, 0x82, 0x80, 0x04, 0x83, 0x9d, 0x01, 0x06, + 0xaa, 0x59, 0x57, 0x52, 0x16, 0x19, 0x13, 0x57, + 0x34, 0xb4, 0x51, 0x45, 0x9d, 0xad, 0xb5, 0x86, + 0x67, 0x7e, 0xf9, 0xdf, 0x55, 0x78, 0x49, 0x99, + 0x4d, 0x19, 0x6b, 0x50, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe9, 0x4b, + 0x3c, 0x73, 0xe3, 0xa9, 0xd4, 0xcd, 0x9d, 0xf2, + 0xc8, 0xf9, 0xa3, 0x5e, 0x42, 0xbd, 0xd0, 0x47, + 0x55, 0x0f, 0x69, 0xd8, 0x0e, 0xc2, 0x3c, 0xd4 + }; + EC_KEY *eck; + EC_POINT *ecp; +#endif + int r; + +#define MKBN(b, bnn) \ + do { \ + bnn = NULL; \ + ASSERT_INT_GT(BN_hex2bn(&bnn, b), 0); \ + } while (0) + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum1"); + MKBN(hexbn1, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum1(p1, bn), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn1) + 2); + ASSERT_U16_EQ(PEEK_U16(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), (u_int16_t)BN_num_bits(bn)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 2, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1)); + BN_free(bn); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum1 limited"); + MKBN(hexbn1, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(expbn1) + 1), 0); + r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(p1, bn); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + BN_free(bn); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum1 bn2"); + MKBN(hexbn2, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum1(p1, bn), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn2) + 2); + ASSERT_U16_EQ(PEEK_U16(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), (u_int16_t)BN_num_bits(bn)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 2, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2)); + BN_free(bn); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum1 bn2 limited"); + MKBN(hexbn2, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(expbn1) + 1), 0); + r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(p1, bn); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + BN_free(bn); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2"); + MKBN(hexbn1, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2(p1, bn), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn1) + 4); + ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), (u_int32_t)BN_num_bytes(bn)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 4, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1)); + BN_free(bn); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2 limited"); + MKBN(hexbn1, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(expbn1) + 3), 0); + r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(p1, bn); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + BN_free(bn); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2 bn2"); + MKBN(hexbn2, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_bignum2(p1, bn), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn2) + 4 + 1); /* MSB */ + ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), (u_int32_t)BN_num_bytes(bn) + 1); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(*(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 4), 0x00); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(sshbuf_ptr(p1) + 5, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2)); + BN_free(bn); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_bignum2 bn2 limited"); + MKBN(hexbn2, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_set_max_size(p1, sizeof(expbn2) + 3), 0); + r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(p1, bn); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 0); + BN_free(bn); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum1"); + MKBN(hexbn1, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, BN_num_bits(bn)), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + sizeof(expbn1)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0xd00f), 0); + bn2 = BN_new(); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_bignum1(p1, bn2), 0); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(bn, bn2); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + BN_free(bn); + BN_free(bn2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum1 truncated"); + MKBN(hexbn1, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, BN_num_bits(bn)), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1) - 1), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + sizeof(expbn1) - 1); + bn2 = BN_new(); + r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(p1, bn2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + sizeof(expbn1) - 1); + BN_free(bn); + BN_free(bn2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum1 giant"); + MKBN(hexbn1, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0xffff), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, (0xffff + 7) / 8, NULL), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + ((0xffff + 7) / 8)); + bn2 = BN_new(); + r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(p1, bn2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + ((0xffff + 7) / 8)); + BN_free(bn); + BN_free(bn2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum1 bn2"); + MKBN(hexbn2, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, BN_num_bits(bn)), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + sizeof(expbn2)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0xd00f), 0); + bn2 = BN_new(); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_bignum1(p1, bn2), 0); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(bn, bn2); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + BN_free(bn); + BN_free(bn2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum1 bn2 truncated"); + MKBN(hexbn2, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, BN_num_bits(bn)), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2) - 1), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + sizeof(expbn2) - 1); + bn2 = BN_new(); + r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(p1, bn2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2 + sizeof(expbn2) - 1); + BN_free(bn); + BN_free(bn2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2"); + MKBN(hexbn1, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn)), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4 + sizeof(expbn1)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0xd00f), 0); + bn2 = BN_new(); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn2), 0); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(bn, bn2); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + BN_free(bn); + BN_free(bn2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 truncated"); + MKBN(hexbn1, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn)), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn1, sizeof(expbn1) - 1), 0); + bn2 = BN_new(); + r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn1) + 3); + BN_free(bn); + BN_free(bn2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 giant"); + MKBN(hexbn1, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 65536), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 65536, NULL), 0); + bn2 = BN_new(); + r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 65536 + 4); + BN_free(bn); + BN_free(bn2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 bn2"); + MKBN(hexbn2, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn) + 1), 0); /* MSB */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x00), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4 + 1 + sizeof(expbn2)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u16(p1, 0xd00f), 0); + bn2 = BN_new(); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn2), 0); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(bn, bn2); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + BN_free(bn); + BN_free(bn2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 bn2 truncated"); + MKBN(hexbn2, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn) + 1), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x00), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2) - 1), 0); + bn2 = BN_new(); + r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn2) + 1 + 4 - 1); + BN_free(bn); + BN_free(bn2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_bignum2 bn2 negative"); + MKBN(hexbn2, bn); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, BN_num_bytes(bn)), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, expbn2, sizeof(expbn2)), 0); + bn2 = BN_new(); + r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expbn2) + 4); + BN_free(bn); + BN_free(bn2); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 + TEST_START("sshbuf_put_ec"); + eck = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(ec256_nid); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(eck, NULL); + ecp = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(eck)); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(ecp, NULL); + MKBN(ec256_x, bn_x); + MKBN(ec256_y, bn_y); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp( + EC_KEY_get0_group(eck), ecp, bn_x, bn_y, NULL), 1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(EC_KEY_set_public_key(eck, ecp), 1); + BN_free(bn_x); + BN_free(bn_y); + EC_POINT_free(ecp); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_eckey(p1, eck), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_string_direct(p1, &d, &s), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(s, sizeof(expec256)); + ASSERT_MEM_EQ(d, expec256, sizeof(expec256)); + sshbuf_free(p1); + EC_KEY_free(eck); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_get_ec"); + eck = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(ec256_nid); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(eck, NULL); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(p1, expec256, sizeof(expec256)), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), sizeof(expec256) + 4); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x00), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_get_eckey(p1, eck), 0); + bn_x = BN_new(); + bn_y = BN_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(bn_x, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(bn_y, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp( + EC_KEY_get0_group(eck), EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eck), + bn_x, bn_y, NULL), 1); + MKBN(ec256_x, bn); + MKBN(ec256_y, bn2); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_cmp(bn_x, bn), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_cmp(bn_y, bn2), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); + sshbuf_free(p1); + EC_KEY_free(eck); + BN_free(bn_x); + BN_free(bn_y); + BN_free(bn); + BN_free(bn2); + TEST_DONE(); +#endif +} + Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c,v 1.2 2014/05/02 02:54:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 +# include +#endif + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +void sshbuf_getput_fuzz_tests(void); + +static void +attempt_parse_blob(u_char *blob, size_t len) +{ + struct sshbuf *p1; + BIGNUM *bn; +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 + EC_KEY *eck; +#endif + u_char *s; + size_t l; + u_int8_t u8; + u_int16_t u16; + u_int32_t u32; + u_int64_t u64; + + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put(p1, blob, len), 0); + sshbuf_get_u8(p1, &u8); + sshbuf_get_u16(p1, &u16); + sshbuf_get_u32(p1, &u32); + sshbuf_get_u64(p1, &u64); + if (sshbuf_get_string(p1, &s, &l) == 0) { + bzero(s, l); + free(s); + } + bn = BN_new(); + sshbuf_get_bignum1(p1, bn); + BN_clear_free(bn); + bn = BN_new(); + sshbuf_get_bignum2(p1, bn); + BN_clear_free(bn); +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 + eck = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(eck, NULL); + sshbuf_get_eckey(p1, eck); + EC_KEY_free(eck); +#endif + sshbuf_free(p1); +} + + +static void +onerror(void *fuzz) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "Failed during fuzz:\n"); + fuzz_dump((struct fuzz *)fuzz); +} + +void +sshbuf_getput_fuzz_tests(void) +{ + u_char blob[] = { + /* u8 */ + 0xd0, + /* u16 */ + 0xc0, 0xde, + /* u32 */ + 0xfa, 0xce, 0xde, 0xad, + /* u64 */ + 0xfe, 0xed, 0xac, 0x1d, 0x1f, 0x1c, 0xbe, 0xef, + /* string */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x09, + 'O', ' ', 'G', 'o', 'r', 'g', 'o', 'n', '!', + /* bignum1 */ + 0x79, + 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, + 0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, + /* bignum2 */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x14, + 0x00, + 0xf0, 0xe0, 0xd0, 0xc0, 0xb0, 0xa0, 0x90, 0x80, + 0x70, 0x60, 0x50, 0x40, 0x30, 0x20, 0x10, 0x00, + 0x7f, 0xff, 0x11, + /* EC point (NIST-256 curve) */ + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x41, + 0x04, + 0x0c, 0x82, 0x80, 0x04, 0x83, 0x9d, 0x01, 0x06, + 0xaa, 0x59, 0x57, 0x52, 0x16, 0x19, 0x13, 0x57, + 0x34, 0xb4, 0x51, 0x45, 0x9d, 0xad, 0xb5, 0x86, + 0x67, 0x7e, 0xf9, 0xdf, 0x55, 0x78, 0x49, 0x99, + 0x4d, 0x19, 0x6b, 0x50, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0xe9, 0x4b, + 0x3c, 0x73, 0xe3, 0xa9, 0xd4, 0xcd, 0x9d, 0xf2, + 0xc8, 0xf9, 0xa3, 0x5e, 0x42, 0xbd, 0xd0, 0x47, + 0x55, 0x0f, 0x69, 0xd8, 0x0e, 0xc2, 0x3c, 0xd4, + }; + struct fuzz *fuzz; + + TEST_START("fuzz blob parsing"); + fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP | + FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP | + FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END, blob, sizeof(blob)); + TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); + for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) + attempt_parse_blob(blob, sizeof(blob)); + fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); + TEST_DONE(); + TEST_ONERROR(NULL, NULL); +} + Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.c (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_sshbuf_misc.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +#include "sshbuf.h" + +void sshbuf_misc_tests(void); + +void +sshbuf_misc_tests(void) +{ + struct sshbuf *p1; + char tmp[512], *p; + FILE *out; + size_t sz; + + TEST_START("sshbuf_dump"); + out = tmpfile(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(out, NULL); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x12345678), 0); + sshbuf_dump(p1, out); + fflush(out); + rewind(out); + sz = fread(tmp, 1, sizeof(tmp), out); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(ferror(out), 0); + ASSERT_INT_NE(feof(out), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(sz, 0); + tmp[sz] = '\0'; + ASSERT_PTR_NE(strstr(tmp, "12 34 56 78"), NULL); + fclose(out); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob16"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(p1, 0x12345678), 0); + p = sshbuf_dtob16(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "12345678"); + free(p); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64 len 1"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x11), 0); + p = sshbuf_dtob64(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "EQ=="); + free(p); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64 len 2"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x11), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x22), 0); + p = sshbuf_dtob64(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "ESI="); + free(p); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64 len 3"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x11), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x22), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(p1, 0x33), 0); + p = sshbuf_dtob64(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(p, "ESIz"); + free(p); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_dtob64 len 8191"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_reserve(p1, 8192, NULL), 0); + bzero(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(p1), 8192); + p = sshbuf_dtob64(p1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p, NULL); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(strlen(p), ((8191 + 2) / 3) * 4); + free(p); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_b64tod len 1"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_b64tod(p1, "0A=="), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 1); + ASSERT_U8_EQ(*sshbuf_ptr(p1), 0xd0); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_b64tod len 2"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_b64tod(p1, "0A8="), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 2); + ASSERT_U16_EQ(PEEK_U16(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), 0xd00f); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("sshbuf_b64tod len 4"); + p1 = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(p1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_b64tod(p1, "0A/QDw=="), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(sshbuf_len(p1), 4); + ASSERT_U32_EQ(PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(p1)), 0xd00fd00f); + sshbuf_free(p1); + TEST_DONE(); +} + Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.c (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +void sshbuf_tests(void); +void sshbuf_getput_basic_tests(void); +void sshbuf_getput_crypto_tests(void); +void sshbuf_misc_tests(void); +void sshbuf_fuzz_tests(void); +void sshbuf_getput_fuzz_tests(void); +void sshbuf_fixed(void); + +void +tests(void) +{ + sshbuf_tests(); + sshbuf_getput_basic_tests(); + sshbuf_getput_crypto_tests(); + sshbuf_misc_tests(); + sshbuf_fuzz_tests(); + sshbuf_getput_fuzz_tests(); + sshbuf_fixed(); +} Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2014/06/24 01:14:18 djm Exp $ + +TEST_ENV= "MALLOC_OPTIONS=AFGJPRX" + +PROG=test_sshkey +SRCS=tests.c test_sshkey.c test_file.c test_fuzz.c common.c +REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG} + +run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG} + env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} -d ${.CURDIR}/testdata + +.include + Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,84 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: common.c,v 1.1 2014/06/24 01:14:18 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Helpers for key API tests + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 +# include +#endif + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +#include "common.h" + +struct sshbuf * +load_file(const char *name) +{ + int fd; + struct sshbuf *ret; + + ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret = sshbuf_new(), NULL); + ASSERT_INT_NE(fd = open(test_data_file(name), O_RDONLY), -1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_file(fd, name, ret), 0); + close(fd); + return ret; +} + +struct sshbuf * +load_text_file(const char *name) +{ + struct sshbuf *ret = load_file(name); + const u_char *p; + + /* Trim whitespace at EOL */ + for (p = sshbuf_ptr(ret); sshbuf_len(ret) > 0;) { + if (p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == '\r' || + p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == '\t' || + p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == ' ' || + p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == '\n') + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(ret, 1), 0); + else + break; + } + /* \0 terminate */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(ret, 0), 0); + return ret; +} + +BIGNUM * +load_bignum(const char *name) +{ + BIGNUM *ret = NULL; + struct sshbuf *buf; + + buf = load_text_file(name); + ASSERT_INT_NE(BN_hex2bn(&ret, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + return ret; +} + Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.h (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.h (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: common.h,v 1.1 2014/06/24 01:14:18 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Helpers for key API tests + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +/* Load a binary file into a buffer */ +struct sshbuf *load_file(const char *name); + +/* Load a text file into a buffer */ +struct sshbuf *load_text_file(const char *name); + +/* Load a bignum from a file */ +BIGNUM *load_bignum(const char *name); + Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +#!/bin/sh +# $OpenBSD: mktestdata.sh,v 1.3 2014/07/22 23:57:40 dtucker Exp $ + +PW=mekmitasdigoat + +rsa1_params() { + _in="$1" + _outbase="$2" + set -e + ssh-keygen -f $_in -e -m pkcs8 | \ + openssl rsa -noout -text -pubin | \ + awk '/^Modulus:$/,/^Exponent:/' | \ + grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.n + # XXX need conversion support in ssh-keygen for the other params + for x in n ; do + echo "" >> ${_outbase}.$x + echo ============ ${_outbase}.$x + cat ${_outbase}.$x + echo ============ + done +} + +rsa_params() { + _in="$1" + _outbase="$2" + set -e + openssl rsa -noout -text -in $_in | \ + awk '/^modulus:$/,/^publicExponent:/' | \ + grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.n + openssl rsa -noout -text -in $_in | \ + awk '/^prime1:$/,/^prime2:/' | \ + grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.p + openssl rsa -noout -text -in $_in | \ + awk '/^prime2:$/,/^exponent1:/' | \ + grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.q + for x in n p q ; do + echo "" >> ${_outbase}.$x + echo ============ ${_outbase}.$x + cat ${_outbase}.$x + echo ============ + done +} + +dsa_params() { + _in="$1" + _outbase="$2" + set -e + openssl dsa -noout -text -in $_in | \ + awk '/^priv:$/,/^pub:/' | \ + grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.priv + openssl dsa -noout -text -in $_in | \ + awk '/^pub:/,/^P:/' | #\ + grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.pub + openssl dsa -noout -text -in $_in | \ + awk '/^G:/,0' | \ + grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.g + for x in priv pub g ; do + echo "" >> ${_outbase}.$x + echo ============ ${_outbase}.$x + cat ${_outbase}.$x + echo ============ + done +} + +ecdsa_params() { + _in="$1" + _outbase="$2" + set -e + openssl ec -noout -text -in $_in | \ + awk '/^priv:$/,/^pub:/' | \ + grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.priv + openssl ec -noout -text -in $_in | \ + awk '/^pub:/,/^ASN1 OID:/' | #\ + grep -v '^[a-zA-Z]' | tr -d ' \n:' > ${_outbase}.pub + openssl ec -noout -text -in $_in | \ + grep "ASN1 OID:" | tr -d '\n' | \ + sed 's/.*: //;s/ *$//' > ${_outbase}.curve + for x in priv pub curve ; do + echo "" >> ${_outbase}.$x + echo ============ ${_outbase}.$x + cat ${_outbase}.$x + echo ============ + done +} + +set -ex + +cd testdata + +rm -f rsa1_1 rsa_1 dsa_1 ecdsa_1 ed25519_1 +rm -f rsa1_2 rsa_2 dsa_2 ecdsa_2 ed25519_2 +rm -f rsa_n dsa_n ecdsa_n # new-format keys +rm -f rsa1_1_pw rsa_1_pw dsa_1_pw ecdsa_1_pw ed25519_1_pw +rm -f rsa_n_pw dsa_n_pw ecdsa_n_pw +rm -f pw *.pub *.bn.* *.param.* *.fp *.fp.bb + +ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -b 768 -C "RSA1 test key #1" -N "" -f rsa1_1 +ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 768 -C "RSA test key #1" -N "" -f rsa_1 +ssh-keygen -t dsa -b 1024 -C "DSA test key #1" -N "" -f dsa_1 +ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 256 -C "ECDSA test key #1" -N "" -f ecdsa_1 +ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "ED25519 test key #1" -N "" -f ed25519_1 + +ssh-keygen -t rsa1 -b 2048 -C "RSA1 test key #2" -N "" -f rsa1_2 +ssh-keygen -t rsa -b 2048 -C "RSA test key #2" -N "" -f rsa_2 +ssh-keygen -t dsa -b 1024 -C "DSA test key #2" -N "" -f dsa_2 +ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -b 521 -C "ECDSA test key #2" -N "" -f ecdsa_2 +ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -C "ED25519 test key #1" -N "" -f ed25519_2 + +cp rsa_1 rsa_n +cp dsa_1 dsa_n +cp ecdsa_1 ecdsa_n + +cp rsa1_1 rsa1_1_pw +cp rsa_1 rsa_1_pw +cp dsa_1 dsa_1_pw +cp ecdsa_1 ecdsa_1_pw +cp ed25519_1 ed25519_1_pw +cp rsa_1 rsa_n_pw +cp dsa_1 dsa_n_pw +cp ecdsa_1 ecdsa_n_pw + +ssh-keygen -pf rsa1_1_pw -N "$PW" +ssh-keygen -pf rsa_1_pw -N "$PW" +ssh-keygen -pf dsa_1_pw -N "$PW" +ssh-keygen -pf ecdsa_1_pw -N "$PW" +ssh-keygen -pf ed25519_1_pw -N "$PW" +ssh-keygen -opf rsa_n_pw -N "$PW" +ssh-keygen -opf dsa_n_pw -N "$PW" +ssh-keygen -opf ecdsa_n_pw -N "$PW" + +rsa1_params rsa1_1 rsa1_1.param +rsa1_params rsa1_2 rsa1_2.param +rsa_params rsa_1 rsa_1.param +rsa_params rsa_2 rsa_2.param +dsa_params dsa_1 dsa_1.param +dsa_params dsa_1 dsa_1.param +ecdsa_params ecdsa_1 ecdsa_1.param +ecdsa_params ecdsa_2 ecdsa_2.param +# XXX ed25519 params + +ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \ + -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \ + -V 19990101:20110101 -z 1 rsa_1.pub +ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \ + -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \ + -V 19990101:20110101 -z 2 dsa_1.pub +ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \ + -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \ + -V 19990101:20110101 -z 3 ecdsa_1.pub +ssh-keygen -s rsa_2 -I hugo -n user1,user2 \ + -Oforce-command=/bin/ls -Ono-port-forwarding -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8 \ + -V 19990101:20110101 -z 4 ed25519_1.pub + +ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \ + -V 19990101:20110101 -z 5 rsa_1.pub +ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \ + -V 19990101:20110101 -z 6 dsa_1.pub +ssh-keygen -s ecdsa_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \ + -V 19990101:20110101 -z 7 ecdsa_1.pub +ssh-keygen -s ed25519_1 -I julius -n host1,host2 -h \ + -V 19990101:20110101 -z 8 ed25519_1.pub + +ssh-keygen -lf rsa1_1 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa1_1.fp +ssh-keygen -lf rsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1.fp +ssh-keygen -lf dsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_1.fp +ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_1.fp +ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_1.fp +ssh-keygen -lf rsa1_2 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa1_2.fp +ssh-keygen -lf rsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_2.fp +ssh-keygen -lf dsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_2.fp +ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_2.fp +ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_2.fp + +ssh-keygen -lf dsa_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_1-cert.fp +ssh-keygen -lf ecdsa_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_1-cert.fp +ssh-keygen -lf ed25519_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_1-cert.fp +ssh-keygen -lf rsa_1-cert.pub | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1-cert.fp + +ssh-keygen -Bf rsa1_1 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa1_1.fp.bb +ssh-keygen -Bf rsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_1.fp.bb +ssh-keygen -Bf dsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_1.fp.bb +ssh-keygen -Bf ecdsa_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_1.fp.bb +ssh-keygen -Bf ed25519_1 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_1.fp.bb +ssh-keygen -Bf rsa1_2 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa1_2.fp.bb +ssh-keygen -Bf rsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > rsa_2.fp.bb +ssh-keygen -Bf dsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > dsa_2.fp.bb +ssh-keygen -Bf ecdsa_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ecdsa_2.fp.bb +ssh-keygen -Bf ed25519_2 | awk '{print $2}' > ed25519_2.fp.bb + +echo "$PW" > pw Property changes on: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/mktestdata.sh ___________________________________________________________________ Added: svn:executable ## -0,0 +1 ## +* \ No newline at end of property Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,457 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_file.c,v 1.1 2014/06/24 01:14:18 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for sshkey.h key management API + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 +# include +#endif + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +#include "common.h" + +void sshkey_file_tests(void); + +void +sshkey_file_tests(void) +{ + struct sshkey *k1, *k2; + struct sshbuf *buf, *pw; + BIGNUM *a, *b, *c; + char *cp; + + TEST_START("load passphrase"); + pw = load_text_file("pw"); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("parse RSA1 from private"); + buf = load_file("rsa1_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "rsa1_1", + &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + a = load_bignum("rsa1_1.param.n"); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->n, a); + BN_free(a); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("parse RSA1 from private w/ passphrase"); + buf = load_file("rsa1_1_pw"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, + (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), "rsa1_1_pw", &k2, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("load RSA1 from public"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa1_1.pub"), &k2, + NULL), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("RSA1 key hex fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("rsa1_1.fp"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("RSA1 key bubblebabble fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("rsa1_1.fp.bb"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_FP_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + TEST_DONE(); + + sshkey_free(k1); + + TEST_START("parse RSA from private"); + buf = load_file("rsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "rsa_1", + &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + a = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.n"); + b = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.p"); + c = load_bignum("rsa_1.param.q"); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->n, a); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->p, b); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->rsa->q, c); + BN_free(a); + BN_free(b); + BN_free(c); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("parse RSA from private w/ passphrase"); + buf = load_file("rsa_1_pw"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, + (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), "rsa_1_pw", &k2, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("parse RSA from new-format"); + buf = load_file("rsa_n"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, + "", "rsa_n", &k2, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("parse RSA from new-format w/ passphrase"); + buf = load_file("rsa_n_pw"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, + (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), "rsa_n_pw", &k2, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("load RSA from public"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2, + NULL), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("load RSA cert"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k2), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_RSA_CERT); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("RSA key hex fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("rsa_1.fp"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("RSA cert hex fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("rsa_1-cert.fp"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("RSA key bubblebabble fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("rsa_1.fp.bb"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_FP_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + TEST_DONE(); + + sshkey_free(k1); + + TEST_START("parse DSA from private"); + buf = load_file("dsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "dsa_1", + &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + a = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.g"); + b = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.priv"); + c = load_bignum("dsa_1.param.pub"); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->dsa->g, a); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->dsa->priv_key, b); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(k1->dsa->pub_key, c); + BN_free(a); + BN_free(b); + BN_free(c); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("parse DSA from private w/ passphrase"); + buf = load_file("dsa_1_pw"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, + (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), "dsa_1_pw", &k2, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("parse DSA from new-format"); + buf = load_file("dsa_n"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, + "", "dsa_n", &k2, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("parse DSA from new-format w/ passphrase"); + buf = load_file("dsa_n_pw"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, + (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), "dsa_n_pw", &k2, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("load DSA from public"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("dsa_1.pub"), &k2, + NULL), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("load DSA cert"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("dsa_1"), &k2), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_DSA_CERT); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("DSA key hex fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("dsa_1.fp"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("DSA cert hex fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("dsa_1-cert.fp"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("DSA key bubblebabble fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("dsa_1.fp.bb"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_FP_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + TEST_DONE(); + + sshkey_free(k1); + +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + TEST_START("parse ECDSA from private"); + buf = load_file("ecdsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "ecdsa_1", + &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1.param.curve"); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ((const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf), + OBJ_nid2sn(k1->ecdsa_nid)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + a = load_bignum("ecdsa_1.param.priv"); + b = load_bignum("ecdsa_1.param.pub"); + c = EC_POINT_point2bn(EC_KEY_get0_group(k1->ecdsa), + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k1->ecdsa), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, + NULL, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(c, NULL); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k1->ecdsa), a); + ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(b, c); + BN_free(a); + BN_free(b); + BN_free(c); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("parse ECDSA from private w/ passphrase"); + buf = load_file("ecdsa_1_pw"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, + (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), "ecdsa_1_pw", &k2, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("parse ECDSA from new-format"); + buf = load_file("ecdsa_n"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, + "", "ecdsa_n", &k2, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("parse ECDSA from new-format w/ passphrase"); + buf = load_file("ecdsa_n_pw"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, + (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), "ecdsa_n_pw", &k2, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("load ECDSA from public"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ecdsa_1.pub"), &k2, + NULL), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("load ECDSA cert"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ecdsa_1"), &k2), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_ECDSA_CERT); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("ECDSA key hex fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1.fp"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("ECDSA cert hex fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1-cert.fp"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("ECDSA key bubblebabble fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("ecdsa_1.fp.bb"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_FP_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + TEST_DONE(); + + sshkey_free(k1); +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + + TEST_START("parse Ed25519 from private"); + buf = load_file("ed25519_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "ed25519_1", + &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ED25519); + /* XXX check key contents */ + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("parse Ed25519 from private w/ passphrase"); + buf = load_file("ed25519_1_pw"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, + (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(pw), "ed25519_1_pw", &k2, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("load Ed25519 from public"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_1.pub"), &k2, + NULL), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 1); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("load Ed25519 cert"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ed25519_1"), &k2), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(k2->type, KEY_ED25519_CERT); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(k1, k2), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("Ed25519 key hex fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("ed25519_1.fp"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("Ed25519 cert hex fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("ed25519_1-cert.fp"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k2, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + sshkey_free(k2); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("Ed25519 key bubblebabble fingerprint"); + buf = load_text_file("ed25519_1.fp.bb"); + cp = sshkey_fingerprint(k1, SSH_FP_SHA1, SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(cp, NULL); + ASSERT_STRING_EQ(cp, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)); + sshbuf_free(buf); + free(cp); + TEST_DONE(); + + sshkey_free(k1); + + sshbuf_free(pw); + +} Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,406 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_fuzz.c,v 1.1 2014/06/24 01:14:18 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Fuzz tests for key parsing + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 +# include +#endif + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "authfile.h" +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +#include "common.h" + +void sshkey_fuzz_tests(void); + +static void +onerror(void *fuzz) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "Failed during fuzz:\n"); + fuzz_dump((struct fuzz *)fuzz); +} + +static void +public_fuzz(struct sshkey *k) +{ + struct sshkey *k1; + struct sshbuf *buf; + struct fuzz *fuzz; + + ASSERT_PTR_NE(buf = sshbuf_new(), NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_to_blob_buf(k, buf), 0); + /* XXX need a way to run the tests in "slow, but complete" mode */ + fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | /* XXX too slow FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP | */ + FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | /* XXX too slow FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP | */ + FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END, + sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), + &k1), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_free(buf); + TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); + for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { + if (sshkey_from_blob(fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz), &k1) == 0) + sshkey_free(k1); + } + fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); +} + +static void +sig_fuzz(struct sshkey *k) +{ + struct fuzz *fuzz; + u_char *sig, c[] = "some junk to be signed"; + size_t l; + + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &l, c, sizeof(c), 0), 0); + ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(l, 0); + fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | /* too slow FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP | */ + FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP | + FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END, sig, l); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, l, c, sizeof(c), 0), 0); + free(sig); + TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); + for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { + sshkey_verify(k, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz), + c, sizeof(c), 0); + } + fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); +} + +void +sshkey_fuzz_tests(void) +{ + struct sshkey *k1; + struct sshbuf *buf, *fuzzed; + struct fuzz *fuzz; + int r; + + TEST_START("fuzz RSA1 private"); + buf = load_file("rsa1_1"); + fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | + FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END, + sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", + &k1, NULL), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); + TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); + for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { + r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", "key", + &k1, NULL) == 0) + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); + } + sshbuf_free(fuzzed); + fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz RSA1 public"); + buf = load_file("rsa1_1_pw"); + fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | + FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END, + sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(buf, &k1, NULL), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); + TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); + for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { + r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + if (sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(fuzzed, &k1, NULL) == 0) + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); + } + sshbuf_free(fuzzed); + fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz RSA private"); + buf = load_file("rsa_1"); + fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), + sshbuf_len(buf)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", + &k1, NULL), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); + TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); + for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { + r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", "key", + &k1, NULL) == 0) + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); + } + sshbuf_free(fuzzed); + fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz RSA new-format private"); + buf = load_file("rsa_n"); + fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), + sshbuf_len(buf)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", + &k1, NULL), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); + TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); + for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { + r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", "key", + &k1, NULL) == 0) + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); + } + sshbuf_free(fuzzed); + fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz DSA private"); + buf = load_file("dsa_1"); + fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), + sshbuf_len(buf)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", + &k1, NULL), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); + TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); + for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { + r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", "key", + &k1, NULL) == 0) + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); + } + sshbuf_free(fuzzed); + fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz DSA new-format private"); + buf = load_file("dsa_n"); + fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), + sshbuf_len(buf)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", + &k1, NULL), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); + TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); + for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { + r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", "key", + &k1, NULL) == 0) + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); + } + sshbuf_free(fuzzed); + fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); + TEST_DONE(); + +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA private"); + buf = load_file("ecdsa_1"); + fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), + sshbuf_len(buf)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", + &k1, NULL), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); + TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); + for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { + r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", "key", + &k1, NULL) == 0) + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); + } + sshbuf_free(fuzzed); + fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA new-format private"); + buf = load_file("ecdsa_n"); + fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), + sshbuf_len(buf)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", + &k1, NULL), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); + TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); + for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { + r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", "key", + &k1, NULL) == 0) + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); + } + sshbuf_free(fuzzed); + fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); + TEST_DONE(); +#endif + + TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 private"); + buf = load_file("ed25519_1"); + fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), + sshbuf_len(buf)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", + &k1, NULL), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_free(buf); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL); + TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz); + for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) { + r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz)); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0); + if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", "key", + &k1, NULL) == 0) + sshkey_free(k1); + sshbuf_reset(fuzzed); + } + sshbuf_free(fuzzed); + fuzz_cleanup(fuzz); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz RSA public"); + buf = load_file("rsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", + &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + public_fuzz(k1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz RSA cert"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k1), 0); + public_fuzz(k1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz DSA public"); + buf = load_file("dsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", + &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + public_fuzz(k1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz DSA cert"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("dsa_1"), &k1), 0); + public_fuzz(k1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA public"); + buf = load_file("ecdsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", + &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + public_fuzz(k1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA cert"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ecdsa_1"), &k1), 0); + public_fuzz(k1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); +#endif + + TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 public"); + buf = load_file("ed25519_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", + &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + public_fuzz(k1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 cert"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ed25519_1"), &k1), 0); + public_fuzz(k1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz RSA sig"); + buf = load_file("rsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", + &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + sig_fuzz(k1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("fuzz DSA sig"); + buf = load_file("dsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", + &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + sig_fuzz(k1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA sig"); + buf = load_file("ecdsa_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", + &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + sig_fuzz(k1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); +#endif + + TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 sig"); + buf = load_file("ed25519_1"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", "key", + &k1, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_free(buf); + sig_fuzz(k1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + +/* XXX fuzz decoded new-format blobs too */ + +} Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,357 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_sshkey.c,v 1.1 2014/06/24 01:14:18 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for sshkey.h key management API + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +#include +#endif +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 +# include +#endif + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL 1 /* access internals for testing */ +#include "sshkey.h" + +#include "authfile.h" +#include "common.h" +#include "ssh2.h" + +void sshkey_tests(void); + +static void +build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, const struct sshkey *k, const char *type, + const struct sshkey *sign_key, const struct sshkey *ca_key) +{ + struct sshbuf *ca_buf, *pk, *principals, *critopts, *exts; + u_char *sigblob; + size_t siglen; + + ca_buf = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_to_blob_buf(ca_key, ca_buf), 0); + + /* + * Get the public key serialisation by rendering the key and skipping + * the type string. This is a bit of a hack :/ + */ + pk = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_plain_to_blob_buf(k, pk), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_skip_string(pk), 0); + + principals = sshbuf_new(); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, "gsamsa"), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, "gregor"), 0); + + critopts = sshbuf_new(); + /* XXX fill this in */ + + exts = sshbuf_new(); + /* XXX fill this in */ + + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, type), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "noncenoncenonce!"), 0); /* nonce */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_putb(b, pk), 0); /* public key serialisation */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 1234), 0); /* serial */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(b, SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER), 0); /* type */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "gregor"), 0); /* key ID */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, principals), 0); /* principals */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 0), 0); /* start */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 0xffffffffffffffffULL), 0); /* end */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, critopts), 0); /* options */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, exts), 0); /* extensions */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0), 0); /* reserved */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ca_buf), 0); /* signature key */ + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(sign_key, &sigblob, &siglen, + sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), 0), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */ + + free(sigblob); + sshbuf_free(ca_buf); + sshbuf_free(exts); + sshbuf_free(critopts); + sshbuf_free(principals); + sshbuf_free(pk); +} + +void +sshkey_tests(void) +{ + struct sshkey *k1, *k2, *k3, *k4, *kr, *kd, *ke, *kf; + struct sshbuf *b; + + TEST_START("new invalid"); + k1 = sshkey_new(-42); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("new/free KEY_UNSPEC"); + k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("new/free KEY_RSA1"); + k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->rsa->p, NULL); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("new/free KEY_RSA"); + k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->rsa->p, NULL); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("new/free KEY_DSA"); + k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_DSA); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->g, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->dsa->priv_key, NULL); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("new/free KEY_ECDSA"); + k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_ECDSA); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ecdsa, NULL); /* Can't allocate without NID */ + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("new/free KEY_ED25519"); + k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_ED25519); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + /* These should be blank until key loaded or generated */ + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_sk, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_pk, NULL); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("new_private KEY_RSA"); + k1 = sshkey_new_private(KEY_RSA); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->p, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_add_private(k1), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("new_private KEY_DSA"); + k1 = sshkey_new_private(KEY_DSA); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->g, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->priv_key, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_add_private(k1), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA too small modulus"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 128, &k1), + SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA too large modulus"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1 << 20, &k1), + SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA wrong bits"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 2048, &k1), + SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("generate KEY_ECDSA wrong bits"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 42, &k1), + SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 768, &kr), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa->n, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa->e, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa->p, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_num_bits(kr->rsa->n), 768); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 1024, &kd), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa->g, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa->priv_key, NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + TEST_START("generate KEY_ECDSA"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 256, &ke), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke->ecdsa, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL); + TEST_DONE(); +#endif + + TEST_START("generate KEY_ED25519"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ED25519, 256, &kf), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(kf->type, KEY_ED25519); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf->ed25519_pk, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf->ed25519_sk, NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("demote KEY_RSA"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_demote(kr, &k1), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, k1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_RSA); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->n, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa->e, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->rsa->p, NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("equal KEY_RSA/demoted KEY_RSA"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, k1), 1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("demote KEY_DSA"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_demote(kd, &k1), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, k1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_DSA); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa->g, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->dsa->priv_key, NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("equal KEY_DSA/demoted KEY_DSA"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, k1), 1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + TEST_START("demote KEY_ECDSA"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_demote(ke, &k1), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke, k1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ECDSA); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->ecdsa, NULL); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->ecdsa_nid, ke->ecdsa_nid); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k1->ecdsa), NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("equal KEY_ECDSA/demoted KEY_ECDSA"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, k1), 1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); +#endif + + TEST_START("demote KEY_ED25519"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_demote(kf, &k1), 0); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf, k1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ED25519); + ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->ed25519_pk, NULL); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_sk, NULL); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("equal KEY_ED25519/demoted KEY_ED25519"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kf, k1), 1); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("equal mismatched key types"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, kr), 0); +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, ke), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, ke), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, kf), 0); +#endif + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, kf), 0); + TEST_DONE(); + + TEST_START("equal different keys"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 768, &k1), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, k1), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 1024, &k1), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, k1), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 256, &k1), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, k1), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); +#endif + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ED25519, 256, &k1), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kf, k1), 0); + sshkey_free(k1); + TEST_DONE(); + + sshkey_free(kr); + sshkey_free(kd); +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + sshkey_free(ke); +#endif + sshkey_free(kf); + +/* XXX certify test */ +/* XXX sign test */ +/* XXX verify test */ + + TEST_START("nested certificate"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k1), 0); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2, + NULL), 0); + b = load_file("rsa_2"); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(b, "", "rsa_1", + &k3, NULL), 0); + sshbuf_reset(b); + build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1); + ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4), + SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY); + ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL); + sshbuf_free(b); + sshkey_free(k1); + sshkey_free(k2); + sshkey_free(k3); + TEST_DONE(); + +} Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1 (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1 (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIIBuwIBAAKBgQCxBNwH8TmLXqiZa0b9pxC6W+zS4Voqp8S+QwecYpNPTmhjaUYI +E/aJWAzFVtdbysLM89ukvw/z8qBkbMSefdypKmjUtgv51ZD4nfV4Wxb+G+1QExHr +M+kowOOL3XbcsdbPLUt8vxDJbBlQRch4zyai7CWjQR3JFXpR8sevUFJxSQIVAIdE +oncp2DEY2U/ZZnIyGCwApCzfAoGARW+eewZTv1Eosxv3ANKx372pf5+fQKwnWizI +j5z/GY3w3xobRCP9FiL4K3Nip2FvHLTGpRrlfm19RWYAg77VsNgztC4V9C8QrKWc +WJdkUkoQpZ3VoO25rO13hmIelkal3omKCF4ZE/edeF3d2B8DlzYs0aBcjTCMDrub +/CJILcYCgYEAgJt9jefGQi4Sl5F8h3jYo52LygE8sNYyurElMKVmyhFSKJ1Ifi9j +4hNp2jZzu7jpZWhYndUoPaG6gbRB7fL3p5knlRo3P2Dznd6u6NAdhrADWW+JX9n1 +/EMKUv0h8rRFI/3b9RY1HVVzBQH7V3sNJ6iekH8JqOy1liCMaMylw4gCFBl7Lc6V +hmTiTuhLXjoRdCZS/p/m +-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.fp =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.fp (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.fp (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +5a:4a:41:8c:4e:fa:4c:52:19:f9:39:49:31:fb:fd:74 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.pub =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.pub (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1-cert.pub (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 dsa_1.pub Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +5a:4a:41:8c:4e:fa:4c:52:19:f9:39:49:31:fb:fd:74 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp.bb =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp.bb (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.fp.bb (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +xosat-baneh-gocad-relek-kepur-mibip-motog-bykyb-hisug-mysus-tuxix Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.g =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.g (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.g (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +456f9e7b0653bf5128b31bf700d2b1dfbda97f9f9f40ac275a2cc88f9cff198df0df1a1b4423fd1622f82b7362a7616f1cb4c6a51ae57e6d7d45660083bed5b0d833b42e15f42f10aca59c589764524a10a59dd5a0edb9aced7786621e9646a5de898a085e1913f79d785dddd81f0397362cd1a05c8d308c0ebb9bfc22482dc6 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.priv =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.priv (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.priv (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +197b2dce958664e24ee84b5e3a11742652fe9fe6 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.pub =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.pub (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.param.pub (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +00809b7d8de7c6422e1297917c8778d8a39d8bca013cb0d632bab12530a566ca1152289d487e2f63e21369da3673bbb8e96568589dd5283da1ba81b441edf2f7a79927951a373f60f39ddeaee8d01d86b003596f895fd9f5fc430a52fd21f2b44523fddbf516351d55730501fb577b0d27a89e907f09a8ecb596208c68cca5c388 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.pub =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.pub (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1.pub (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-dss 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 DSA test key #1 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1_pw =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1_pw (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_1_pw (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- +Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED +DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,9E668E24E7B9D658E3E7D0446B32B376 + +hDjDLbfCAQutblxLuyNzSLxISSgXTgyzq8St9GE0lUtEc7i0xGNWwoWpFSbtD9y1 +yTG5UkhATQt56SY1ABfXZ21wieYuEEQeSJi0gwUQNNt2SwwITx4EdzDedWiHjikt +jbzH3v33agp/odw2X9wY6zu75y9CeW9o7SszRl286DliWIHJmhMlbb8r7jRqu62H +s5YYxD0xS1ipWauxklmIXMWNZHcARo8ZiJOuNdLshrSrl8DUW9P6F89FvxclQzKr +44u3OBm7KbgPvPURDFLgNP6uCGBjzHvhHTpzVBxmQzCl3aGgsTKXiwJ1eupNjntB +ji0EnbznvoxR6qhXxw/WQ+MnWlWqTXka/2qaB6m3oJv+Zn7cPCJ5kvHnhr2JmNMl +igTh4Ov4LZLyNgO0Lbec4KyxW9QInRV5CY4Pu5lhqHteiPmOIGMWFtuh8Bb8Kg2q +VvXnPo5I3FjqV7UhDduO1Wn558sBZWQPqRbHVPN6wXJuM3HGkBl+aNjn0qddv9tr +VFJd/xdly2Ne81g3CB8jysE+3WEOrV9kdybocp/EhSOzP4i6pjWlyWdR5+CgbvRm +TUIeIaQbmPIB5251o5YK+Q== +-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2 (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2 (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIIBuwIBAAKBgQDoMxCTyBnLPSO7CRU3RyfJLANLKBZ3/LdcsyNaARctaRA5gzRb +XdTFFU+rWKfxv+otm0KyCOepLtWy8tjKRYb7Ni46USlGwtM0Adx/3vR4iWNfipDP +K2V4O97JyMe3wsbF7siC01U4b8Ki+J44iFG9nuRnOTHqUWI615mraQRwlQIVAMsX +nsPGH8QrU11F1ScAIfZC165dAoGACCXyOHFkxABpJDtJs6AE7Hl3XjI4dnlim/XH +Y60W6gcO7gHSE2r2ljCubJqoUXmxd5mLKgnu91jIG/4URwDM4V7pb2k99sXpAi8I +L52eQl88C0bRD9+lEJfR4PMT39EccDRPB4+E055RoYQZ/McIyad8sF3Qwt084Eq+ +IkUt2coCgYEAxZRpCY82sM9Mu4B0EcH6O8seRqIRScmelljhUtKxuvf2PChwIWkR +HK9lORHBE3iKyurC5Muf3abuHKwMFjrOjHKOTqXBRrDZ7RgLQA0aUAQD3lWc9OTP +NShjphpq5xr0HZB31eJg3/Mo6KxYlRpzMXbTyenZP0XLICSSAywvTDoCFG5whl2k +Y2FLGfi9V6ylUVH6jKgE +-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +72:5f:50:6b:e5:64:c5:62:21:92:3f:8b:10:9b:9f:1a Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp.bb =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp.bb (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.fp.bb (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +xesoh-mebaf-feced-lenuz-sicam-pevok-bosak-nogaz-ligen-fekef-fixex Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.pub =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.pub (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_2.pub (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-dss 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 DSA test key #2 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +-----BEGIN DSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIIBuwIBAAKBgQCxBNwH8TmLXqiZa0b9pxC6W+zS4Voqp8S+QwecYpNPTmhjaUYI +E/aJWAzFVtdbysLM89ukvw/z8qBkbMSefdypKmjUtgv51ZD4nfV4Wxb+G+1QExHr +M+kowOOL3XbcsdbPLUt8vxDJbBlQRch4zyai7CWjQR3JFXpR8sevUFJxSQIVAIdE +oncp2DEY2U/ZZnIyGCwApCzfAoGARW+eewZTv1Eosxv3ANKx372pf5+fQKwnWizI +j5z/GY3w3xobRCP9FiL4K3Nip2FvHLTGpRrlfm19RWYAg77VsNgztC4V9C8QrKWc +WJdkUkoQpZ3VoO25rO13hmIelkal3omKCF4ZE/edeF3d2B8DlzYs0aBcjTCMDrub +/CJILcYCgYEAgJt9jefGQi4Sl5F8h3jYo52LygE8sNYyurElMKVmyhFSKJ1Ifi9j +4hNp2jZzu7jpZWhYndUoPaG6gbRB7fL3p5knlRo3P2Dznd6u6NAdhrADWW+JX9n1 +/EMKUv0h8rRFI/3b9RY1HVVzBQH7V3sNJ6iekH8JqOy1liCMaMylw4gCFBl7Lc6V +hmTiTuhLXjoRdCZS/p/m +-----END DSA PRIVATE KEY----- Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n_pw =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n_pw (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/dsa_n_pw (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- +b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAACmFlczI1Ni1jYmMAAAAGYmNyeXB0AAAAGAAAABD5nB+Nkw +LNoPtAG7C3IdXmAAAAEAAAAAEAAAGyAAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAACBALEE3AfxOYteqJlrRv2n +ELpb7NLhWiqnxL5DB5xik09OaGNpRggT9olYDMVW11vKwszz26S/D/PyoGRsxJ593KkqaN +S2C/nVkPid9XhbFv4b7VATEesz6SjA44vddtyx1s8tS3y/EMlsGVBFyHjPJqLsJaNBHckV +elHyx69QUnFJAAAAFQCHRKJ3KdgxGNlP2WZyMhgsAKQs3wAAAIBFb557BlO/USizG/cA0r +Hfval/n59ArCdaLMiPnP8ZjfDfGhtEI/0WIvgrc2KnYW8ctMalGuV+bX1FZgCDvtWw2DO0 +LhX0LxCspZxYl2RSShClndWg7bms7XeGYh6WRqXeiYoIXhkT9514Xd3YHwOXNizRoFyNMI +wOu5v8IkgtxgAAAIEAgJt9jefGQi4Sl5F8h3jYo52LygE8sNYyurElMKVmyhFSKJ1Ifi9j +4hNp2jZzu7jpZWhYndUoPaG6gbRB7fL3p5knlRo3P2Dznd6u6NAdhrADWW+JX9n1/EMKUv +0h8rRFI/3b9RY1HVVzBQH7V3sNJ6iekH8JqOy1liCMaMylw4gAAAHw8P1DtkBulOGv85qf +P+md2+LL+NKufVzHl9k2UKQFjeqY6uqs4HSDqvhXe7oiXd5mz6I7orxjtKU9hGjNF4ABUD +OawVGe/GCRUQ4WgpAgDnqQLeFcdIwtMSIrRZU6xjs314EI7TM7IIiG26JEuXDfZI1e7C3y +Cc38ZsP3zmg/UjgcCQar5c4n++vhOmeO36+fcUyZ1QlR05SaEtFYJA+otP3RmKTiDwob8Q +zRMr8Y57i2NTTtFjkmnnnQCibP62yz7N22Dve7RTOH8jiaW7p02Vn/6WmCarevN1rxtLLR +lkuWtPoKY8z/Ktcev8YE9f2+9H2TfXDRKYqIEfxgZLCJ4yP2gxDe6zurabS0hAO1CP+ej5 +htdJM3/rTqHAIevXX5uhIDmMvRHnLGldaIX1xux8TIJvSfMkYNIwscIP4kx7BGMk04vXtW +5DLm6IZhzw9T3hjr8R0kBugmT6/h9vD5iN1D+wiHIhHYzQKMU9nOeFNsMBFWgJjU0l8VlF +gEjEMgAEfwynnmIoKB1iA/0em1tdU3naS59DBK+buE0trxUpTAAB5z8yPhAm6DdqrPE8cA +N3HlMoWrbCuak2A0uyOlEJjPg4UJUnv12ve2c9pAMsAu/4CAszCEM0prR+qd/RA4nn4M5u +Xrny2wNtt/DybCkA== +-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1 (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1 (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- +MHcCAQEEIFghsFR1K95tz8qOl3+tX6fv8a/O6AfNbxOSFZX3ihxooAoGCCqGSM49 +AwEHoUQDQgAEalpgP0BOePHtTw0Pus4tdhTb8P9yWUZluvLf1D8vrHImT+G4vr/W +xo5iXGKQVEifuUVyLkAW2kDrq8J/szeRiQ== +-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.fp =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.fp (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.fp (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +f7:be:4c:02:65:ed:4c:11:af:ab:a8:dd:0a:92:e7:44 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.pub =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.pub (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1-cert.pub (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 ecdsa_1.pub Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +f7:be:4c:02:65:ed:4c:11:af:ab:a8:dd:0a:92:e7:44 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp.bb =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp.bb (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.fp.bb (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +xotah-hecal-zibyb-nadug-romuc-hator-venum-hobip-ruluh-ripus-naxix Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.curve =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.curve (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.curve (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +prime256v1 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.priv =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.priv (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.priv (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +5821b054752bde6dcfca8e977fad5fa7eff1afcee807cd6f13921595f78a1c68 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.pub =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.pub (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.param.pub (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +046a5a603f404e78f1ed4f0d0fbace2d7614dbf0ff72594665baf2dfd43f2fac72264fe1b8bebfd6c68e625c629054489fb945722e4016da40ebabc27fb3379189 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1.pub (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBGpaYD9ATnjx7U8ND7rOLXYU2/D/cllGZbry39Q/L6xyJk/huL6/1saOYlxikFRIn7lFci5AFtpA66vCf7M3kYk= ECDSA test key #1 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1_pw =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1_pw (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_1_pw (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- +Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED +DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,74C8AEA5BFAFCC2B1C8B13DE671F5610 + +vUsgOvCqezxPmcZcFqrSy9Y1MMlVguY0h9cfSPFC7gUrRr+45uCOYX5bOwEXecKn +/9uCXZtlBwwqDS9iK5IPoUrjEHvzI5rVbHWUxDrEOVbsfiDuCxrQM19It6QIqC1v +OSQEdXuBWR5WmhKNc3dqLbWsU8u2s60YwKQmZrj9nM4= +-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2 (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2 (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- +MIHcAgEBBEIBg4kVxUfoo/RE/78/QBRqG6PZuHZ82eLnhmZVzBa7XREUiYI/Jw7r +Qwp4FTBVfXL76Pt5AyBMf+52aVeOUlLRERSgBwYFK4EEACOhgYkDgYYABACNTJ5O +uNo5dNgIQRLHzKU91m7immKFiutJ6BlDbkRkKr+Envj13J6HOgYvOTm0n7SPlKHS +STZ4/T36d/rzQOAbIwEnbbwD9HMj6IzE4WH9lJzH7Zy7Tcyu6dOM8L7nOxCp3DUk +F3aAnPSFJhD7NN0jBWOFsD6uy1OmaTklPfRAnCt1MQ== +-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +51:bd:ff:2b:6d:26:9b:90:f9:e1:4a:ca:a0:29:8e:70 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp.bb =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp.bb (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.fp.bb (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +xuzaz-zuzuk-virop-vypah-zumel-gylak-selih-fevad-varag-zynif-haxox Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.curve =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.curve (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.curve (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +secp521r1 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.priv =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.priv (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.priv (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +01838915c547e8a3f444ffbf3f40146a1ba3d9b8767cd9e2e7866655cc16bb5d111489823f270eeb430a781530557d72fbe8fb7903204c7fee7669578e5252d11114 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.pub =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.pub (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.param.pub (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +04008d4c9e4eb8da3974d8084112c7cca53dd66ee29a62858aeb49e819436e44642abf849ef8f5dc9e873a062f3939b49fb48f94a1d2493678fd3dfa77faf340e01b2301276dbc03f47323e88cc4e161fd949cc7ed9cbb4dccaee9d38cf0bee73b10a9dc35241776809cf4852610fb34dd23056385b03eaecb53a66939253df4409c2b7531 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_2.pub (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHA1MjEAAAAIbmlzdHA1MjEAAACFBACNTJ5OuNo5dNgIQRLHzKU91m7immKFiutJ6BlDbkRkKr+Envj13J6HOgYvOTm0n7SPlKHSSTZ4/T36d/rzQOAbIwEnbbwD9HMj6IzE4WH9lJzH7Zy7Tcyu6dOM8L7nOxCp3DUkF3aAnPSFJhD7NN0jBWOFsD6uy1OmaTklPfRAnCt1MQ== ECDSA test key #2 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY----- +MHcCAQEEIFghsFR1K95tz8qOl3+tX6fv8a/O6AfNbxOSFZX3ihxooAoGCCqGSM49 +AwEHoUQDQgAEalpgP0BOePHtTw0Pus4tdhTb8P9yWUZluvLf1D8vrHImT+G4vr/W +xo5iXGKQVEifuUVyLkAW2kDrq8J/szeRiQ== +-----END EC PRIVATE KEY----- Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n_pw =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n_pw (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ecdsa_n_pw (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- +b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAACmFlczI1Ni1jYmMAAAAGYmNyeXB0AAAAGAAAABBXqI6Z6o +uRM+jAwdhnDoIMAAAAEAAAAAEAAABoAAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlz +dHAyNTYAAABBBGpaYD9ATnjx7U8ND7rOLXYU2/D/cllGZbry39Q/L6xyJk/huL6/1saOYl +xikFRIn7lFci5AFtpA66vCf7M3kYkAAACwYMnoCTqvUTG0ktSSMNsOZLCdal5J4avEpM1L +sV9SL/RVcwo3ChprhwsnQsaAtMiJCRcHerKgD9qy1MNNaE5VNfVJ0Ih/7ut04cbFKed8p6 +0V+w8WP7WvFffBPoHn+GGbQd1FDGzHhXUB61pH8Qzd1bI/sld/XEtMk7iYjNGQe9Rt0RaK +Wi8trwaA0Fb2w/EFnrdsFFxrIhQEqYBdEQJo782IqAsMG9OwUaM0vy+8bcI= +-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1 (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1 (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- +b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW +QyNTUxOQAAACC5PeVeSdyylcfG3C0geNO90e3dGgL0fICaz751dA9zEAAAAJglsAcYJbAH +GAAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACC5PeVeSdyylcfG3C0geNO90e3dGgL0fICaz751dA9zEA +AAAED6HJ8Bh8tdQvhMd5o8IxtIwBv8/FV48FpBFWAbYdsIsLk95V5J3LKVx8bcLSB4073R +7d0aAvR8gJrPvnV0D3MQAAAAE0VEMjU1MTkgdGVzdCBrZXkgIzEBAg== +-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.fp =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.fp (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.fp (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +19:08:8e:7e:4d:e5:de:86:2a:09:47:65:eb:0a:51:2f Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.pub =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.pub (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1-cert.pub (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAIHNzaC1lZDI1NTE5LWNlcnQtdjAxQG9wZW5zc2guY29tAAAAIHmdL66MkkOvncpc0W4MdvlJZMfQthHiOUv+XKm7gvzOAAAAILk95V5J3LKVx8bcLSB4073R7d0aAvR8gJrPvnV0D3MQAAAAAAAAAAgAAAACAAAABmp1bGl1cwAAABIAAAAFaG9zdDEAAAAFaG9zdDIAAAAANouDYAAAAABNHeHgAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACC5PeVeSdyylcfG3C0geNO90e3dGgL0fICaz751dA9zEAAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABAsUStKm1z3Rtvwy3eXE1DrgVp6kix2iEQXfB66IHX2UpAj5yl0eQGXWTSEDIxHDIb0SJvUH43OWX0PrEeAs0mAA== ed25519_1.pub Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +19:08:8e:7e:4d:e5:de:86:2a:09:47:65:eb:0a:51:2f Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp.bb =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp.bb (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.fp.bb (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +xofip-nuhoh-botam-cypeg-panig-tunef-bimav-numeb-nikic-gocyf-paxax Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.pub =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.pub (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1.pub (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAILk95V5J3LKVx8bcLSB4073R7d0aAvR8gJrPvnV0D3MQ ED25519 test key #1 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1_pw =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1_pw (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_1_pw (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- +b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAACmFlczI1Ni1jYmMAAAAGYmNyeXB0AAAAGAAAABAlT1eewp +9gl0gue+sSrBWKAAAAEAAAAAEAAAAzAAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAILk95V5J3LKVx8bc +LSB4073R7d0aAvR8gJrPvnV0D3MQAAAAoMrL9ixIQHoJ86DcKMGt26+bCeaoyGjW5hha2Y +IxAZ+rRvNjUuv3MGvbUxtUpPZkTP/vk2fVSCuCD9St5Lbt/LKdIk2MfWIFbjZ6iEfdzxz0 +DHmsSDMps8dbePqqIPULR8av447jEzQEkUc8GSR6WqFSJOjJ8OvrJat1KcEK7V2tjZnLS1 +GoLMqVAtCVhuXwUkeJiRQE/JRl172hxB+LAVw= +-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2 (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2 (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- +b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAABG5vbmUAAAAEbm9uZQAAAAAAAAABAAAAMwAAAAtzc2gtZW +QyNTUxOQAAACBXUfO5Kid+jhRnyVt+1r9wj2FN/mZ6RfgGdySeYoq4WAAAAJjGeKsZxnir +GQAAAAtzc2gtZWQyNTUxOQAAACBXUfO5Kid+jhRnyVt+1r9wj2FN/mZ6RfgGdySeYoq4WA +AAAEB+gn4gGClQl2WMeOkikY+w0A0kSw1KH4Oyami7hlypsFdR87kqJ36OFGfJW37Wv3CP +YU3+ZnpF+AZ3JJ5iirhYAAAAE0VEMjU1MTkgdGVzdCBrZXkgIzEBAg== +-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +5c:c9:ae:a3:0c:aa:28:29:b8:fc:7c:64:ba:6e:e9:c9 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp.bb =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp.bb (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.fp.bb (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +xenoz-tovup-zecyt-hohar-motam-sugid-fecyz-tutyk-gosom-ginar-kixux Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.pub =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.pub (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/ed25519_2.pub (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIFdR87kqJ36OFGfJW37Wv3CPYU3+ZnpF+AZ3JJ5iirhY ED25519 test key #1 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/pw =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/pw (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/pw (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +mekmitasdigoat Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1 =================================================================== Cannot display: file marked as a binary type. svn:mime-type = application/octet-stream Property changes on: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1 ___________________________________________________________________ Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +application/octet-stream \ No newline at end of property Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +a8:82:9b:98:c5:e6:19:d6:83:39:9f:4d:3a:8f:7c:80 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp.bb =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp.bb (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.fp.bb (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +xukib-cymuf-mylib-kecih-rogyb-sorid-belys-kytem-dinin-cicil-kyxex Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.param.n =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.param.n (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.param.n (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +00cf68059e5c7743318d740d3ebb55eb577891c9c3098817703f4c3157285055c2daa50102509ebdcade324e541c965e2931fd3459052fe65d013722da805d7ec8ef5b97cc006789d0566c5578b23e7aaa5be2b055d85798030cdead2eb2cc4eb3 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.pub =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.pub (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1.pub (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +768 65537 1257820658919101781627826212425999371251377782154008557690434337796299274692579921603319269571889066123773172648045269780061837011867522525764583065919572648969392756890567918758763032103894830246827894023662422727333291801518558899 RSA1 test key #1 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1_pw =================================================================== Cannot display: file marked as a binary type. svn:mime-type = application/octet-stream Property changes on: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_1_pw ___________________________________________________________________ Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +application/octet-stream \ No newline at end of property Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2 =================================================================== Cannot display: file marked as a binary type. svn:mime-type = application/octet-stream Property changes on: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2 ___________________________________________________________________ Added: svn:mime-type ## -0,0 +1 ## +application/octet-stream \ No newline at end of property Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +c0:83:1c:97:5f:32:77:7e:e4:e3:e9:29:b9:eb:76:9c Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp.bb =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp.bb (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.fp.bb (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +xifad-vevot-sozyl-fapeb-meryf-kylut-cydiv-firik-gavyb-lanad-kaxox Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.param.n =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.param.n (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.param.n (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +00b08a9fa386aceaab2ec3e9cdc7e6cb4eac9e98620279eed6762e1f513739a417ac8a86231fad3b8727a9de994973a7aae674a132547341984ade91aa1c22f01d2f0204ea7fa121969c367a5d04bda384066cf94e0b56d1efc47f50ca28e90603547df41c0676550d82d369f699b457d4f0f077999d9e76ab679fbf4206d418dbabed1823f14e4ddf3aac987686e6b006f8a23ea6af13b4c0e5b1fb5b1eb4db2f47b229422c450574cae9c64db5dcfce050836b6bdfa8fb541b4d426444a5ea20ad51a25d3048414ced2e199da2997968273e8beb10f3a351e98a57b00dadfa8f00a39bb55be94dae898fda6021d728f32b2ec93edd16e51073be3ac7511e5085 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.pub =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.pub (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa1_2.pub (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +2048 65537 22286299513474010485021611215236051675183880694440075228245854420062562171290421803318459093678819161498086077099067169041536315773126601869537036602014639497662916952995546870691495931205282427606841521014293638607226118353743812583642616889028731910222603216563207637006843580936568089467160095319593442255227365472917576488012409542775346105980501967996562422764758836868135158147777193940857952623773420292946843206784104932927528915610322518810753953608862466374219925252817405397507396462117715293725218947744085154122395590957537510003558169729949140038634486299736757269280065662263306737701939154762092925061 RSA1 test key #2 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1 (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1 (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIIBywIBAAJhAM/6MDmVVm/uNQmZpOcthoAAgMDUg7G4H6ZLLyPEhboKaBBHvIdw +ZdDmB+0LDf3D1aWXyUd2/pCkCysiBzqd/523zAzjY7HayqL6A940AxKBBbWLn+X6 +i2yJR7dTOYkk6QIDAQABAmAgKanBjfWzE5yCIo+c7K5rJyjCKVtAZaAHYIMmveKM +VcWoFt/x9hDY0GoTX21HfDxLX8oDxnsmhsOrnvSmgUChFwkm45eSETqeVDWwIVFA +FGL1s38xQsciWZWBFNppAIECMQD7nslReAxwz/Ad++ACXswfJg1l2wUQ1gJA3zh3 +jln6a4s3aV1zxbKlIn8iqBv0BZkCMQDTmO4WqyNnin73XCZs0DWu7GsfcuaH8QnD +wqPjJgrclTZXedxHkeqO2oyZW4mLC9ECMBb/blsZ49kzyDiVWuYcj/+Q1MyodhAR +32bagCi9RBAVYEYSRU5dlXRucLxULSnikQIxAJ5teY5Vcru6kZfJUifUuO0QrKAu +WnbcPVBqMmUHfchsm/RhFFIt6W4uKmlEhTYrkQIxAMAStb7QCU3yU6ZkN7uL22Zs +498i4jY6y+VEXv+L9O09VdlEnXhbUisOhy1bhyS3yg== +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.fp =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.fp (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.fp (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +be:27:4c:16:27:f5:04:03:62:a8:b7:91:df:a5:b1:3b Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.pub =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.pub (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1-cert.pub (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com 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 rsa_1.pub Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +be:27:4c:16:27:f5:04:03:62:a8:b7:91:df:a5:b1:3b Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp.bb =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp.bb (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.fp.bb (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +xetif-zuvul-nylyc-vykor-lumac-gyhyv-bacih-cimyk-sycen-gikym-pixax Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.n =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.n (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.n (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +00cffa303995566fee350999a4e72d86800080c0d483b1b81fa64b2f23c485ba0a681047bc877065d0e607ed0b0dfdc3d5a597c94776fe90a40b2b22073a9dff9db7cc0ce363b1dacaa2fa03de3403128105b58b9fe5fa8b6c8947b753398924e9 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.p =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.p (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.p (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +00fb9ec951780c70cff01dfbe0025ecc1f260d65db0510d60240df38778e59fa6b8b37695d73c5b2a5227f22a81bf40599 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.q =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.q (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.param.q (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +00d398ee16ab23678a7ef75c266cd035aeec6b1f72e687f109c3c2a3e3260adc95365779dc4791ea8eda8c995b898b0bd1 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.pub =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.pub (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1.pub (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAYQDP+jA5lVZv7jUJmaTnLYaAAIDA1IOxuB+mSy8jxIW6CmgQR7yHcGXQ5gftCw39w9Wll8lHdv6QpAsrIgc6nf+dt8wM42Ox2sqi+gPeNAMSgQW1i5/l+otsiUe3UzmJJOk= RSA test key #1 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_pw =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_pw (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_1_pw (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +Proc-Type: 4,ENCRYPTED +DEK-Info: AES-128-CBC,1E851A01F12A49FDC256E7A665C61D4B + ++sfWU7kg3idmHL6vShby5LXnfF4bZDPhJjv89uldae7qPEgEW8qS8o0Ssokxf7Au +/vTQnbSB+gy/qZaUOykOzqiV1YL7UfkbOkM2QYnzzrVeGzI5RZ0G9iH8HBn2owQ+ +Ejf1UKDUVZEea5X0IwQRfE0zaZqFS4tyEex0iKz8dI4FvyabKLZsCs1DBGO7A3ml +LgP947mh10yKWTP2fbq8LOhDUEWCXrh2NzuH6Rl5nNyC4MNQEkLzK1wL7J/WCNaL +sciYmuqEQRDikDDQQFZw2wjBD638fhK+IhuN3VGegiXFnu5C+p9kzUvqVk4X9g2r +BMmlP0pceFv/fEwtNNaeI2Tt7mIsWsZTmCqdzOUAYqGIiNjzykWw64nMO3TpVpbA +i4854RhblbeiyjENbMVPU6BAk4fx7OJvDElLxwN43CS3U0MldbI7A4uG3B3RTSCj +1rGxRNAHWC3q3zzrn6gLwrUVje4iTedaKItLIHQeo1A091Tr8AqQdZi/Ck2Ju0Hl +4Qdwzjw1Y5n1Akm+EWh31ydxtUQ0YBOz/W6DKwTNA1D8oH9bZBG4f0pnvVhtttAO +WKj+DUqMa+f3OOmQ9UXlitk2pEgjeMngTgfQnhZiCts= +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2 (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2 (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIIEowIBAAKCAQEAlDS/ygeFfsR/mhZK/XMHU/gzRogPuMQIYUd17WDjMprA6dQb +ckTDrNm/mrf09I6YAhjgooEL16oWM1z6cesDE0KwaJsy6uTmXFMLO+Ha4mtFHhmu +tiyJcQ9MKKr0vC64384WQZygZk0OlVz7x9WSPiGXzal5MzsX4TYq5B05o2Cb+epA +FxK0c8cdYZD0Sy57gWRpRA3yJq4zh/hks98jzn0XA3HAJA39MKhUG5tf5e6z5BeP +Yi5FvdnDQ9WcasRiEvkmHbg59pbgg/Lbsl6OgZQruS8hKiJ3YBARt2euCCeg7qAF +KbXRR9TMwfphH3Ai4Oi/w6HPRAhdrwooA/gKkQIDAQABAoIBAH22OLB/rMaYmrvz +COzvM1oQgD3lj6Bj98+8M9WEh3MXPWeaGSXWGjx1/0aXn1oJ0fqFa5Wr7IWkqmwr +A+y5McSWntg8PPZt7tCFSFQlAetonhooIsA4CuUx2qHsUOeGoh6EyvAgkRX1atdb +Jd6d1AyLph43EK1aBKltrvgLqiZfs7mcuwyvKtN9ktdKY2FDhn6DHpm9pE9MEHJV +Xv1isNc6a0qNoRlKqxrSZHNEN4fbjLw31wBySzmmnIog5wVEwaHeASwLJT6TmuIZ +eZxnd7/jMwRZWH8ZIGKvkTMp4fYzK9QkehO7A2HFD3FPDBVrkSJjqRdkujF8vu1C +0RwrD1kCgYEAxFXUoE1ero6vp9akvR/mw94kYjXE/YOz1yi0KTkZUs6gURc8Kzsm +MzlEZ31rnngE4jQHYAvuPEfiqcnUgylW3QuevMgo2hCLYO7aG5C0fk8TeOiuvnrF +YPO8rSJWk/BgdrPtzu45P7jmWsjkHn+y+t8cKvq1sZY40sn2YgIhYK8CgYEAwT6j +5tReI6sxpHltPUbvOdpD04eL6ggBAKwzb5aBoa/Dj+sU1zg5uyY8diggQEEznlBW +iWTQmmmfy1ef9i6YAwNuZveKOrVwNMcdubQJ2X26XoFrmA59PjsbLtr1bdUb02gz +6P5x6pcw5qzEq0mddgvHiU3RhL24xdc1LW8nmL8CgYEAmgaT1macPuklmNBlURGz +4jll5b41GoW2EreWDzkCStpbHwLRa0DuCQWGSoI0aY/SlPsoRgtWDOiAQ59ZHsTR +pnw1PfjxQ5HzJkp7xWBSmTzEE/jHDhwWuKa+gD0OGuVbaARkLhDpzLnrzZEIlXyt +Fu7tlDI3VGh7j7Jtnhn5wXUCgYBKmPbGfcaVeFmih2lfFUn2CEbUmmetgUd5zf/R +HMWP9/zDStlxt3e5winm5tiEVWcqvxKY2T0Zzppr8biDXTs7NpDg2MAYp7/X7+GO +tWxz8/AE2WsCeN1qL4Dv1oCV1IV4V6pqUAcDqzeqZJlLEhDh5+wwGcU+u8pfPRN/ +JYCgmwKBgDa+kXPqzcc6vzD9cwEEk4ftn9/Vk2yBx0XOu8RdEkRhXj1QXGJckCqh +FkXzVbuurFhsBt+H0B4arw+51T9fVCZqfcaU34u+Qa/FQvTod4OJUSRxYUaDqygs +VTyuP+zGZlIw7JWktxjVazENsM/ef5wBH0Nf839OZbPVDLfn7K0j +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +fb:8f:7b:26:3d:42:40:ef:ed:f1:ed:ee:66:9e:ba:b0 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp.bb =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp.bb (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.fp.bb (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +xepev-gupub-vuvyg-femiv-gonat-defiv-hirak-betub-pahut-veryd-hexix Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.n =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.n (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.n (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ 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 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.p =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.p (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.p (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +00c455d4a04d5eae8eafa7d6a4bd1fe6c3de246235c4fd83b3d728b429391952cea051173c2b3b26333944677d6b9e7804e23407600bee3c47e2a9c9d4832956dd0b9ebcc828da108b60eeda1b90b47e4f1378e8aebe7ac560f3bcad225693f06076b3edceee393fb8e65ac8e41e7fb2fadf1c2afab5b19638d2c9f662022160af Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.q =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.q (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.param.q (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +00c13ea3e6d45e23ab31a4796d3d46ef39da43d3878bea080100ac336f9681a1afc38feb14d73839bb263c7628204041339e50568964d09a699fcb579ff62e9803036e66f78a3ab57034c71db9b409d97dba5e816b980e7d3e3b1b2edaf56dd51bd36833e8fe71ea9730e6acc4ab499d760bc7894dd184bdb8c5d7352d6f2798bf Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.pub =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.pub (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_2.pub (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQCUNL/KB4V+xH+aFkr9cwdT+DNGiA+4xAhhR3XtYOMymsDp1BtyRMOs2b+at/T0jpgCGOCigQvXqhYzXPpx6wMTQrBomzLq5OZcUws74dria0UeGa62LIlxD0woqvS8LrjfzhZBnKBmTQ6VXPvH1ZI+IZfNqXkzOxfhNirkHTmjYJv56kAXErRzxx1hkPRLLnuBZGlEDfImrjOH+GSz3yPOfRcDccAkDf0wqFQbm1/l7rPkF49iLkW92cND1ZxqxGIS+SYduDn2luCD8tuyXo6BlCu5LyEqIndgEBG3Z64IJ6DuoAUptdFH1MzB+mEfcCLg6L/Doc9ECF2vCigD+AqR RSA test key #2 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- +MIIBywIBAAJhAM/6MDmVVm/uNQmZpOcthoAAgMDUg7G4H6ZLLyPEhboKaBBHvIdw +ZdDmB+0LDf3D1aWXyUd2/pCkCysiBzqd/523zAzjY7HayqL6A940AxKBBbWLn+X6 +i2yJR7dTOYkk6QIDAQABAmAgKanBjfWzE5yCIo+c7K5rJyjCKVtAZaAHYIMmveKM +VcWoFt/x9hDY0GoTX21HfDxLX8oDxnsmhsOrnvSmgUChFwkm45eSETqeVDWwIVFA +FGL1s38xQsciWZWBFNppAIECMQD7nslReAxwz/Ad++ACXswfJg1l2wUQ1gJA3zh3 +jln6a4s3aV1zxbKlIn8iqBv0BZkCMQDTmO4WqyNnin73XCZs0DWu7GsfcuaH8QnD +wqPjJgrclTZXedxHkeqO2oyZW4mLC9ECMBb/blsZ49kzyDiVWuYcj/+Q1MyodhAR +32bagCi9RBAVYEYSRU5dlXRucLxULSnikQIxAJ5teY5Vcru6kZfJUifUuO0QrKAu +WnbcPVBqMmUHfchsm/RhFFIt6W4uKmlEhTYrkQIxAMAStb7QCU3yU6ZkN7uL22Zs +498i4jY6y+VEXv+L9O09VdlEnXhbUisOhy1bhyS3yg== +-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n_pw =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n_pw (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/testdata/rsa_n_pw (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,14 @@ +-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- +b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAAACmFlczI1Ni1jYmMAAAAGYmNyeXB0AAAAGAAAABClELgtaZ +qAmMwESpqXDN0uAAAAEAAAAAEAAAB3AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAAAYQDP+jA5lVZv +7jUJmaTnLYaAAIDA1IOxuB+mSy8jxIW6CmgQR7yHcGXQ5gftCw39w9Wll8lHdv6QpAsrIg +c6nf+dt8wM42Ox2sqi+gPeNAMSgQW1i5/l+otsiUe3UzmJJOkAAAGgwJpHy/nshQa9+Jbw +yomvgNMYvuuoD7Ll7iCY/RFFGXivTkki27C9q0qx3afauSLQQWFanGhjeJn7JPy98lMcVl +qnn5XOE5+xxZqA8ONOBD8eH0KBcTH17DH1A1z94p5zZ1VJKIWsBZ0krxgHIXcdv9ucAckj +N0vAEBm+0wsfy2TTOtuqXvcj65wFwknpyy/SSvU0QTr99FiYe9PIhIslBHO6wlqxfKj+Tm +E/nCb75dAVu6gTtS2P0pdOqV/V7VHX5C0z3BROqpKDJJcVeoc7vRkEl+MWfvvQrG66IPEW +luohFXPDPDrxu1zDduyRsmNwpBHChi2rFhxtsjxNK0svMwESeCCKAWmPxnzLJfvMbTCv00 +SpaCr7WhtzsGt73axqSkeOdynp5NNrN7MEdwruMZFirF4BcI2z2H9ugpS+qbLPuE2H5vln +h7NSwBUNwmZ+4TC8MXFH9KIpRg8dNhf66OU610LYiN4+ZfOYCmfQfgQuBGhMTYFMY6O4SB +NCdIavvWY6rDSBq7QC1f4rHpwiXxpkiE43Rd8fM32TaPlBPtA= +-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.c (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2014/06/24 01:14:18 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Regress test for sshbuf.h buffer API + * + * Placed in the public domain + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h" + +void sshkey_tests(void); +void sshkey_file_tests(void); +void sshkey_fuzz_tests(void); + +void +tests(void) +{ + OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); + ERR_load_CRYPTO_strings(); + + sshkey_tests(); + sshkey_file_tests(); + sshkey_fuzz_tests(); +} Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/test_helper/Makefile =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/test_helper/Makefile (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/test_helper/Makefile (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:32:00 djm Exp $ + +LIB= test_helper +SRCS= test_helper.c fuzz.c + +DEBUGLIBS= no +NOPROFILE= yes +NOPIC= yes + +install: + @echo -n + +.include Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.c (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,378 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: fuzz.c,v 1.3 2014/05/02 09:41:32 andre Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* Utility functions/framework for fuzz tests */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include + +#include "test_helper.h" + +/* #define FUZZ_DEBUG */ + +#ifdef FUZZ_DEBUG +# define FUZZ_DBG(x) do { \ + printf("%s:%d %s: ", __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__); \ + printf x; \ + printf("\n"); \ + fflush(stdout); \ + } while (0) +#else +# define FUZZ_DBG(x) +#endif + +/* For brevity later */ +typedef unsigned long long fuzz_ullong; + +/* For base-64 fuzzing */ +static const char fuzz_b64chars[] = + "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/"; + +struct fuzz { + /* Fuzz method currently in use */ + int strategy; + + /* Fuzz methods remaining */ + int strategies; + + /* Original seed data blob */ + void *seed; + size_t slen; + + /* Current working copy of seed with fuzz mutations applied */ + u_char *fuzzed; + + /* Used by fuzz methods */ + size_t o1, o2; +}; + +static const char * +fuzz_ntop(u_int n) +{ + switch (n) { + case 0: + return "NONE"; + case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP: + return "FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP"; + case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP: + return "FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP"; + case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP: + return "FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP"; + case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP: + return "FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP"; + case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START: + return "FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START"; + case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END: + return "FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END"; + case FUZZ_BASE64: + return "FUZZ_BASE64"; + default: + abort(); + } +} + +void +fuzz_dump(struct fuzz *fuzz) +{ + u_char *p = fuzz_ptr(fuzz); + size_t i, j, len = fuzz_len(fuzz); + + switch (fuzz->strategy) { + case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP: + fprintf(stderr, "%s case %zu of %zu (bit: %zu)\n", + fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), + fuzz->o1, fuzz->slen * 8, fuzz->o1); + break; + case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP: + fprintf(stderr, "%s case %llu of %llu (bits: %zu, %zu)\n", + fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), + (((fuzz_ullong)fuzz->o2) * fuzz->slen * 8) + fuzz->o1, + ((fuzz_ullong)fuzz->slen * 8) * fuzz->slen * 8, + fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2); + break; + case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP: + fprintf(stderr, "%s case %zu of %zu (byte: %zu)\n", + fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), + fuzz->o1, fuzz->slen, fuzz->o1); + break; + case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP: + fprintf(stderr, "%s case %llu of %llu (bytes: %zu, %zu)\n", + fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), + (((fuzz_ullong)fuzz->o2) * fuzz->slen) + fuzz->o1, + ((fuzz_ullong)fuzz->slen) * fuzz->slen, + fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2); + break; + case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START: + fprintf(stderr, "%s case %zu of %zu (offset: %zu)\n", + fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), + fuzz->o1, fuzz->slen, fuzz->o1); + break; + case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END: + fprintf(stderr, "%s case %zu of %zu (offset: %zu)\n", + fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), + fuzz->o1, fuzz->slen, fuzz->o1); + break; + case FUZZ_BASE64: + assert(fuzz->o2 < sizeof(fuzz_b64chars) - 1); + fprintf(stderr, "%s case %llu of %llu (offset: %zu char: %c)\n", + fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), + (fuzz->o1 * (fuzz_ullong)64) + fuzz->o2, + fuzz->slen * (fuzz_ullong)64, fuzz->o1, + fuzz_b64chars[fuzz->o2]); + break; + default: + abort(); + } + + fprintf(stderr, "fuzz context %p len = %zu\n", fuzz, len); + for (i = 0; i < len; i += 16) { + fprintf(stderr, "%.4zd: ", i); + for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) { + if (j < len) + fprintf(stderr, "%02x ", p[j]); + else + fprintf(stderr, " "); + } + fprintf(stderr, " "); + for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) { + if (j < len) { + if (isascii(p[j]) && isprint(p[j])) + fprintf(stderr, "%c", p[j]); + else + fprintf(stderr, "."); + } + } + fprintf(stderr, "\n"); + } +} + +struct fuzz * +fuzz_begin(u_int strategies, const void *p, size_t l) +{ + struct fuzz *ret = calloc(sizeof(*ret), 1); + + assert(p != NULL); + assert(ret != NULL); + ret->seed = malloc(l); + assert(ret->seed != NULL); + memcpy(ret->seed, p, l); + ret->slen = l; + ret->strategies = strategies; + + assert(ret->slen < SIZE_MAX / 8); + assert(ret->strategies <= (FUZZ_MAX|(FUZZ_MAX-1))); + + FUZZ_DBG(("begin, ret = %p", ret)); + + fuzz_next(ret); + return ret; +} + +void +fuzz_cleanup(struct fuzz *fuzz) +{ + FUZZ_DBG(("cleanup, fuzz = %p", fuzz)); + assert(fuzz != NULL); + assert(fuzz->seed != NULL); + assert(fuzz->fuzzed != NULL); + free(fuzz->seed); + free(fuzz->fuzzed); + free(fuzz); +} + +static int +fuzz_strategy_done(struct fuzz *fuzz) +{ + FUZZ_DBG(("fuzz = %p, strategy = %s, o1 = %zu, o2 = %zu, slen = %zu", + fuzz, fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2, fuzz->slen)); + + switch (fuzz->strategy) { + case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP: + return fuzz->o1 >= fuzz->slen * 8; + case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP: + return fuzz->o2 >= fuzz->slen * 8; + case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP: + return fuzz->o2 >= fuzz->slen; + case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP: + case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START: + case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END: + case FUZZ_BASE64: + return fuzz->o1 >= fuzz->slen; + default: + abort(); + } +} + +void +fuzz_next(struct fuzz *fuzz) +{ + u_int i; + + FUZZ_DBG(("start, fuzz = %p, strategy = %s, strategies = 0x%lx, " + "o1 = %zu, o2 = %zu, slen = %zu", fuzz, fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), + (u_long)fuzz->strategies, fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2, fuzz->slen)); + + if (fuzz->strategy == 0 || fuzz_strategy_done(fuzz)) { + /* If we are just starting out, we need to allocate too */ + if (fuzz->fuzzed == NULL) { + FUZZ_DBG(("alloc")); + fuzz->fuzzed = calloc(fuzz->slen, 1); + } + /* Pick next strategy */ + FUZZ_DBG(("advance")); + for (i = 1; i <= FUZZ_MAX; i <<= 1) { + if ((fuzz->strategies & i) != 0) { + fuzz->strategy = i; + break; + } + } + FUZZ_DBG(("selected = %u", fuzz->strategy)); + if (fuzz->strategy == 0) { + FUZZ_DBG(("done, no more strategies")); + return; + } + fuzz->strategies &= ~(fuzz->strategy); + fuzz->o1 = fuzz->o2 = 0; + } + + assert(fuzz->fuzzed != NULL); + + switch (fuzz->strategy) { + case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP: + assert(fuzz->o1 / 8 < fuzz->slen); + memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen); + fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1 / 8] ^= 1 << (fuzz->o1 % 8); + fuzz->o1++; + break; + case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP: + assert(fuzz->o1 / 8 < fuzz->slen); + assert(fuzz->o2 / 8 < fuzz->slen); + memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen); + fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1 / 8] ^= 1 << (fuzz->o1 % 8); + fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o2 / 8] ^= 1 << (fuzz->o2 % 8); + fuzz->o1++; + if (fuzz->o1 >= fuzz->slen * 8) { + fuzz->o1 = 0; + fuzz->o2++; + } + break; + case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP: + assert(fuzz->o1 < fuzz->slen); + memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen); + fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1] ^= 0xff; + fuzz->o1++; + break; + case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP: + assert(fuzz->o1 < fuzz->slen); + assert(fuzz->o2 < fuzz->slen); + memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen); + fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1] ^= 0xff; + fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o2] ^= 0xff; + fuzz->o1++; + if (fuzz->o1 >= fuzz->slen) { + fuzz->o1 = 0; + fuzz->o2++; + } + break; + case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START: + case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END: + assert(fuzz->o1 < fuzz->slen); + memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen); + fuzz->o1++; + break; + case FUZZ_BASE64: + assert(fuzz->o1 < fuzz->slen); + assert(fuzz->o2 < sizeof(fuzz_b64chars) - 1); + memcpy(fuzz->fuzzed, fuzz->seed, fuzz->slen); + fuzz->fuzzed[fuzz->o1] = fuzz_b64chars[fuzz->o2]; + fuzz->o2++; + if (fuzz->o2 >= sizeof(fuzz_b64chars) - 1) { + fuzz->o2 = 0; + fuzz->o1++; + } + break; + default: + abort(); + } + + FUZZ_DBG(("done, fuzz = %p, strategy = %s, strategies = 0x%lx, " + "o1 = %zu, o2 = %zu, slen = %zu", fuzz, fuzz_ntop(fuzz->strategy), + (u_long)fuzz->strategies, fuzz->o1, fuzz->o2, fuzz->slen)); +} + +int +fuzz_done(struct fuzz *fuzz) +{ + FUZZ_DBG(("fuzz = %p, strategies = 0x%lx", fuzz, + (u_long)fuzz->strategies)); + + return fuzz_strategy_done(fuzz) && fuzz->strategies == 0; +} + +size_t +fuzz_len(struct fuzz *fuzz) +{ + assert(fuzz->fuzzed != NULL); + switch (fuzz->strategy) { + case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP: + case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP: + case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP: + case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP: + case FUZZ_BASE64: + return fuzz->slen; + case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START: + case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END: + assert(fuzz->o1 <= fuzz->slen); + return fuzz->slen - fuzz->o1; + default: + abort(); + } +} + +u_char * +fuzz_ptr(struct fuzz *fuzz) +{ + assert(fuzz->fuzzed != NULL); + switch (fuzz->strategy) { + case FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP: + case FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP: + case FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP: + case FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP: + case FUZZ_BASE64: + return fuzz->fuzzed; + case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START: + assert(fuzz->o1 <= fuzz->slen); + return fuzz->fuzzed + fuzz->o1; + case FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END: + assert(fuzz->o1 <= fuzz->slen); + return fuzz->fuzzed; + default: + abort(); + } +} + Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.c (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,471 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_helper.c,v 1.2 2014/05/02 09:41:32 andre Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* Utility functions/framework for regress tests */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include + +#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) +# include +#endif + +#include "test_helper.h" + +#define TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred) do { \ + switch (pred) { \ + case TEST_EQ: \ + if (r == 0) \ + return; \ + break; \ + case TEST_NE: \ + if (r != 0) \ + return; \ + break; \ + case TEST_LT: \ + if (r < 0) \ + return; \ + break; \ + case TEST_LE: \ + if (r <= 0) \ + return; \ + break; \ + case TEST_GT: \ + if (r > 0) \ + return; \ + break; \ + case TEST_GE: \ + if (r >= 0) \ + return; \ + break; \ + default: \ + abort(); \ + } \ + } while (0) + +#define TEST_CHECK(x1, x2, pred) do { \ + switch (pred) { \ + case TEST_EQ: \ + if (x1 == x2) \ + return; \ + break; \ + case TEST_NE: \ + if (x1 != x2) \ + return; \ + break; \ + case TEST_LT: \ + if (x1 < x2) \ + return; \ + break; \ + case TEST_LE: \ + if (x1 <= x2) \ + return; \ + break; \ + case TEST_GT: \ + if (x1 > x2) \ + return; \ + break; \ + case TEST_GE: \ + if (x1 >= x2) \ + return; \ + break; \ + default: \ + abort(); \ + } \ + } while (0) + +extern char *__progname; + +static int verbose_mode = 0; +static int quiet_mode = 0; +static char *active_test_name = NULL; +static u_int test_number = 0; +static test_onerror_func_t *test_onerror = NULL; +static void *onerror_ctx = NULL; +static const char *data_dir = NULL; + +int +main(int argc, char **argv) +{ + int ch; + + /* Handle systems without __progname */ + if (__progname == NULL) { + __progname = strrchr(argv[0], '/'); + if (__progname == NULL || __progname[1] == '\0') + __progname = argv[0]; + else + __progname++; + if ((__progname = strdup(__progname)) == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "strdup failed\n"); + exit(1); + } + } + + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "vqd:")) != -1) { + switch (ch) { + case 'd': + data_dir = optarg; + break; + case 'q': + verbose_mode = 0; + quiet_mode = 1; + break; + case 'v': + verbose_mode = 1; + quiet_mode = 0; + break; + default: + fprintf(stderr, "Unrecognised command line option\n"); + fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [-v]\n", __progname); + exit(1); + } + } + setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0); + if (!quiet_mode) + printf("%s: ", __progname); + if (verbose_mode) + printf("\n"); + + tests(); + + if (!quiet_mode) + printf(" %u tests ok\n", test_number); + return 0; +} + +const char * +test_data_file(const char *name) +{ + static char ret[PATH_MAX]; + + if (data_dir != NULL) + snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", data_dir, name); + else + strlcpy(ret, name, sizeof(ret)); + if (access(ret, F_OK) != 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "Cannot access data file %s: %s\n", + ret, strerror(errno)); + exit(1); + } + return ret; +} + +void +test_start(const char *n) +{ + assert(active_test_name == NULL); + assert((active_test_name = strdup(n)) != NULL); + if (verbose_mode) + printf("test %u - \"%s\": ", test_number, active_test_name); + test_number++; +} + +void +set_onerror_func(test_onerror_func_t *f, void *ctx) +{ + test_onerror = f; + onerror_ctx = ctx; +} + +void +test_done(void) +{ + assert(active_test_name != NULL); + free(active_test_name); + active_test_name = NULL; + if (verbose_mode) + printf("OK\n"); + else if (!quiet_mode) { + printf("."); + fflush(stdout); + } +} + +void +ssl_err_check(const char *file, int line) +{ + long openssl_error = ERR_get_error(); + + if (openssl_error == 0) + return; + + fprintf(stderr, "\n%s:%d: uncaught OpenSSL error: %s", + file, line, ERR_error_string(openssl_error, NULL)); + abort(); +} + +static const char * +pred_name(enum test_predicate p) +{ + switch (p) { + case TEST_EQ: + return "EQ"; + case TEST_NE: + return "NE"; + case TEST_LT: + return "LT"; + case TEST_LE: + return "LE"; + case TEST_GT: + return "GT"; + case TEST_GE: + return "GE"; + default: + return "UNKNOWN"; + } +} + +static void +test_die(void) +{ + if (test_onerror != NULL) + test_onerror(onerror_ctx); + abort(); +} + +static void +test_header(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + const char *name, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + fprintf(stderr, "\n%s:%d test #%u \"%s\"\n", + file, line, test_number, active_test_name); + fprintf(stderr, "ASSERT_%s_%s(%s%s%s) failed:\n", + name, pred_name(pred), a1, + a2 != NULL ? ", " : "", a2 != NULL ? a2 : ""); +} + +void +assert_bignum(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + const BIGNUM *aa1, const BIGNUM *aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + int r = BN_cmp(aa1, aa2); + + TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "BIGNUM", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%s\n", a1, BN_bn2hex(aa1)); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%s\n", a2, BN_bn2hex(aa2)); + test_die(); +} + +void +assert_string(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + const char *aa1, const char *aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + int r = strcmp(aa1, aa2); + + TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "STRING", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a1, aa1, strlen(aa1)); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a2, aa2, strlen(aa2)); + test_die(); +} + +static char * +tohex(const void *_s, size_t l) +{ + u_int8_t *s = (u_int8_t *)_s; + size_t i, j; + const char *hex = "0123456789abcdef"; + char *r = malloc((l * 2) + 1); + + assert(r != NULL); + for (i = j = 0; i < l; i++) { + r[j++] = hex[(s[i] >> 4) & 0xf]; + r[j++] = hex[s[i] & 0xf]; + } + r[j] = '\0'; + return r; +} + +void +assert_mem(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + const void *aa1, const void *aa2, size_t l, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + int r = memcmp(aa1, aa2, l); + + TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "STRING", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a1, tohex(aa1, MIN(l, 256)), l); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %s (len %zu)\n", a2, tohex(aa2, MIN(l, 256)), l); + test_die(); +} + +static int +memvalcmp(const u_int8_t *s, u_char v, size_t l, size_t *where) +{ + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < l; i++) { + if (s[i] != v) { + *where = i; + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +void +assert_mem_filled(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, + const void *aa1, u_char v, size_t l, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + size_t where = -1; + int r = memvalcmp(aa1, v, l, &where); + char tmp[64]; + + if (l == 0) + return; + TEST_CHECK_INT(r, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, NULL, "MEM_ZERO", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%20s = %s%s (len %zu)\n", a1, + tohex(aa1, MIN(l, 20)), l > 20 ? "..." : "", l); + snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "(%s)[%zu]", a1, where); + fprintf(stderr, "%20s = 0x%02x (expected 0x%02x)\n", tmp, + ((u_char *)aa1)[where], v); + test_die(); +} + +void +assert_int(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + int aa1, int aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "INT", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %d\n", a1, aa1); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %d\n", a2, aa2); + test_die(); +} + +void +assert_size_t(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + size_t aa1, size_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "SIZE_T", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %zu\n", a1, aa1); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %zu\n", a2, aa2); + test_die(); +} + +void +assert_u_int(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + u_int aa1, u_int aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U_INT", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %u / 0x%x\n", a1, aa1, aa1); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %u / 0x%x\n", a2, aa2, aa2); + test_die(); +} + +void +assert_long_long(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + long long aa1, long long aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "LONG LONG", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %lld / 0x%llx\n", a1, aa1, aa1); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %lld / 0x%llx\n", a2, aa2, aa2); + test_die(); +} + +void +assert_char(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + char aa1, char aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + char buf[8]; + + TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "CHAR", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = '%s' / 0x02%x\n", a1, + vis(buf, aa1, VIS_SAFE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL, 0), aa1); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = '%s' / 0x02%x\n", a1, + vis(buf, aa2, VIS_SAFE|VIS_NL|VIS_TAB|VIS_OCTAL, 0), aa2); + test_die(); +} + +void +assert_u8(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + u_int8_t aa1, u_int8_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U8", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%02x %u\n", a1, aa1, aa1); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%02x %u\n", a2, aa2, aa2); + test_die(); +} + +void +assert_u16(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + u_int16_t aa1, u_int16_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U16", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%04x %u\n", a1, aa1, aa1); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%04x %u\n", a2, aa2, aa2); + test_die(); +} + +void +assert_u32(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + u_int32_t aa1, u_int32_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U32", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%08x %u\n", a1, aa1, aa1); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%08x %u\n", a2, aa2, aa2); + test_die(); +} + +void +assert_u64(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + u_int64_t aa1, u_int64_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "U64", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%016llx %llu\n", a1, + (unsigned long long)aa1, (unsigned long long)aa1); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = 0x%016llx %llu\n", a2, + (unsigned long long)aa2, (unsigned long long)aa2); + test_die(); +} + +void +assert_ptr(const char *file, int line, const char *a1, const char *a2, + const void *aa1, const void *aa2, enum test_predicate pred) +{ + TEST_CHECK(aa1, aa2, pred); + test_header(file, line, a1, a2, "PTR", pred); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %p\n", a1, aa1); + fprintf(stderr, "%12s = %p\n", a2, aa2); + test_die(); +} + Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.h (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,292 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: test_helper.h,v 1.3 2014/05/02 09:41:32 andre Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +/* Utility functions/framework for regress tests */ + +#ifndef _TEST_HELPER_H +#define _TEST_HELPER_H + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H +# include +#endif + +#include +#include + +enum test_predicate { + TEST_EQ, TEST_NE, TEST_LT, TEST_LE, TEST_GT, TEST_GE +}; +typedef void (test_onerror_func_t)(void *); + +/* Supplied by test suite */ +void tests(void); + +const char *test_data_file(const char *name); +void test_start(const char *n); +void set_onerror_func(test_onerror_func_t *f, void *ctx); +void test_done(void); +void ssl_err_check(const char *file, int line); +void assert_bignum(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + const BIGNUM *aa1, const BIGNUM *aa2, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_string(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + const char *aa1, const char *aa2, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_mem(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + const void *aa1, const void *aa2, size_t l, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_mem_filled(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, + const void *aa1, u_char v, size_t l, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_int(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + int aa1, int aa2, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_size_t(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + size_t aa1, size_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_u_int(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + u_int aa1, u_int aa2, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_long_long(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + long long aa1, long long aa2, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_char(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + char aa1, char aa2, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_ptr(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + const void *aa1, const void *aa2, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_u8(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + u_int8_t aa1, u_int8_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_u16(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + u_int16_t aa1, u_int16_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_u32(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + u_int32_t aa1, u_int32_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred); +void assert_u64(const char *file, int line, + const char *a1, const char *a2, + u_int64_t aa1, u_int64_t aa2, enum test_predicate pred); + +#define TEST_START(n) test_start(n) +#define TEST_DONE() test_done() +#define TEST_ONERROR(f, c) set_onerror_func(f, c) +#define SSL_ERR_CHECK() ssl_err_check(__FILE__, __LINE__) + +#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_MEM_EQ(a1, a2, l) \ + assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_MEM_FILLED_EQ(a1, c, l) \ + assert_mem_filled(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, a1, c, l, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_EQ(a1, l) \ + assert_mem_filled(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, a1, '\0', l, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_INT_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_U_INT_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_CHAR_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_U8_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_U16_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_U32_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) +#define ASSERT_U64_EQ(a1, a2) \ + assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_EQ) + +#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_STRING_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_MEM_NE(a1, a2, l) \ + assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_MEM_ZERO_NE(a1, l) \ + assert_mem_filled(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, a1, '\0', l, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_INT_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_U_INT_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_CHAR_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_PTR_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_U8_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_U16_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_U32_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) +#define ASSERT_U64_NE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_NE) + +#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_STRING_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_MEM_LT(a1, a2, l) \ + assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_INT_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_U_INT_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_CHAR_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_PTR_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_U8_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_U16_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_U32_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) +#define ASSERT_U64_LT(a1, a2) \ + assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LT) + +#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_STRING_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_MEM_LE(a1, a2, l) \ + assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_INT_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_U_INT_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_CHAR_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_PTR_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_U8_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_U16_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_U32_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) +#define ASSERT_U64_LE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_LE) + +#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_STRING_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_MEM_GT(a1, a2, l) \ + assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_INT_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_U_INT_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_CHAR_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_PTR_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_U8_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_U16_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_U32_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) +#define ASSERT_U64_GT(a1, a2) \ + assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GT) + +#define ASSERT_BIGNUM_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_bignum(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_STRING_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_string(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_MEM_GE(a1, a2, l) \ + assert_mem(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, l, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_INT_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_SIZE_T_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_size_t(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_U_INT_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u_int(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_LONG_LONG_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_long_long(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_CHAR_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_char(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_PTR_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_ptr(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_U8_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u8(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_U16_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u16(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_U32_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u32(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) +#define ASSERT_U64_GE(a1, a2) \ + assert_u64(__FILE__, __LINE__, #a1, #a2, a1, a2, TEST_GE) + +/* Fuzzing support */ + +struct fuzz; +#define FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP 0x00000001 /* Flip one bit at a time */ +#define FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP 0x00000002 /* Flip two bits at a time */ +#define FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP 0x00000004 /* Flip one byte at a time */ +#define FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP 0x00000008 /* Flip two bytes at a time */ +#define FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START 0x00000010 /* Truncate from beginning */ +#define FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END 0x00000020 /* Truncate from end */ +#define FUZZ_BASE64 0x00000040 /* Try all base64 chars */ +#define FUZZ_MAX FUZZ_BASE64 + +/* Start fuzzing a blob of data with selected strategies (bitmask) */ +struct fuzz *fuzz_begin(u_int strategies, const void *p, size_t l); + +/* Free a fuzz context */ +void fuzz_cleanup(struct fuzz *fuzz); + +/* Prepare the next fuzz case in the series */ +void fuzz_next(struct fuzz *fuzz); + +/* Determine whether the current fuzz sequence is exhausted (nonzero = yes) */ +int fuzz_done(struct fuzz *fuzz); + +/* Return the length and a pointer to the current fuzzed case */ +size_t fuzz_len(struct fuzz *fuzz); +u_char *fuzz_ptr(struct fuzz *fuzz); + +/* Dump the current fuzz case to stderr */ +void fuzz_dump(struct fuzz *fuzz); +#endif /* _TEST_HELPER_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/rijndael.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/rijndael.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/rijndael.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,1244 +1,1254 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: rijndael.c,v 1.16 2004/06/23 00:39:38 mouring Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: rijndael.c,v 1.18 2014/04/29 15:42:07 markus Exp $ */ /** * rijndael-alg-fst.c * * @version 3.0 (December 2000) * * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES) * * @author Vincent Rijmen * @author Antoon Bosselaers * @author Paulo Barreto * * This code is hereby placed in the public domain. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ + #include "includes.h" #include #include #include "rijndael.h" -#define FULL_UNROLL +#undef FULL_UNROLL /* Te0[x] = S [x].[02, 01, 01, 03]; Te1[x] = S [x].[03, 02, 01, 01]; Te2[x] = S [x].[01, 03, 02, 01]; Te3[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 03, 02]; Te4[x] = S [x].[01, 01, 01, 01]; Td0[x] = Si[x].[0e, 09, 0d, 0b]; Td1[x] = Si[x].[0b, 0e, 09, 0d]; Td2[x] = Si[x].[0d, 0b, 0e, 09]; Td3[x] = Si[x].[09, 0d, 0b, 0e]; Td4[x] = Si[x].[01, 01, 01, 01]; */ static const u32 Te0[256] = { 0xc66363a5U, 0xf87c7c84U, 0xee777799U, 0xf67b7b8dU, 0xfff2f20dU, 0xd66b6bbdU, 0xde6f6fb1U, 0x91c5c554U, 0x60303050U, 0x02010103U, 0xce6767a9U, 0x562b2b7dU, 0xe7fefe19U, 0xb5d7d762U, 0x4dababe6U, 0xec76769aU, 0x8fcaca45U, 0x1f82829dU, 0x89c9c940U, 0xfa7d7d87U, 0xeffafa15U, 0xb25959ebU, 0x8e4747c9U, 0xfbf0f00bU, 0x41adadecU, 0xb3d4d467U, 0x5fa2a2fdU, 0x45afafeaU, 0x239c9cbfU, 0x53a4a4f7U, 0xe4727296U, 0x9bc0c05bU, 0x75b7b7c2U, 0xe1fdfd1cU, 0x3d9393aeU, 0x4c26266aU, 0x6c36365aU, 0x7e3f3f41U, 0xf5f7f702U, 0x83cccc4fU, 0x6834345cU, 0x51a5a5f4U, 0xd1e5e534U, 0xf9f1f108U, 0xe2717193U, 0xabd8d873U, 0x62313153U, 0x2a15153fU, 0x0804040cU, 0x95c7c752U, 0x46232365U, 0x9dc3c35eU, 0x30181828U, 0x379696a1U, 0x0a05050fU, 0x2f9a9ab5U, 0x0e070709U, 0x24121236U, 0x1b80809bU, 0xdfe2e23dU, 0xcdebeb26U, 0x4e272769U, 0x7fb2b2cdU, 0xea75759fU, 0x1209091bU, 0x1d83839eU, 0x582c2c74U, 0x341a1a2eU, 0x361b1b2dU, 0xdc6e6eb2U, 0xb45a5aeeU, 0x5ba0a0fbU, 0xa45252f6U, 0x763b3b4dU, 0xb7d6d661U, 0x7db3b3ceU, 0x5229297bU, 0xdde3e33eU, 0x5e2f2f71U, 0x13848497U, 0xa65353f5U, 0xb9d1d168U, 0x00000000U, 0xc1eded2cU, 0x40202060U, 0xe3fcfc1fU, 0x79b1b1c8U, 0xb65b5bedU, 0xd46a6abeU, 0x8dcbcb46U, 0x67bebed9U, 0x7239394bU, 0x944a4adeU, 0x984c4cd4U, 0xb05858e8U, 0x85cfcf4aU, 0xbbd0d06bU, 0xc5efef2aU, 0x4faaaae5U, 0xedfbfb16U, 0x864343c5U, 0x9a4d4dd7U, 0x66333355U, 0x11858594U, 0x8a4545cfU, 0xe9f9f910U, 0x04020206U, 0xfe7f7f81U, 0xa05050f0U, 0x783c3c44U, 0x259f9fbaU, 0x4ba8a8e3U, 0xa25151f3U, 0x5da3a3feU, 0x804040c0U, 0x058f8f8aU, 0x3f9292adU, 0x219d9dbcU, 0x70383848U, 0xf1f5f504U, 0x63bcbcdfU, 0x77b6b6c1U, 0xafdada75U, 0x42212163U, 0x20101030U, 0xe5ffff1aU, 0xfdf3f30eU, 0xbfd2d26dU, 0x81cdcd4cU, 0x180c0c14U, 0x26131335U, 0xc3ecec2fU, 0xbe5f5fe1U, 0x359797a2U, 0x884444ccU, 0x2e171739U, 0x93c4c457U, 0x55a7a7f2U, 0xfc7e7e82U, 0x7a3d3d47U, 0xc86464acU, 0xba5d5de7U, 0x3219192bU, 0xe6737395U, 0xc06060a0U, 0x19818198U, 0x9e4f4fd1U, 0xa3dcdc7fU, 0x44222266U, 0x542a2a7eU, 0x3b9090abU, 0x0b888883U, 0x8c4646caU, 0xc7eeee29U, 0x6bb8b8d3U, 0x2814143cU, 0xa7dede79U, 0xbc5e5ee2U, 0x160b0b1dU, 0xaddbdb76U, 0xdbe0e03bU, 0x64323256U, 0x743a3a4eU, 0x140a0a1eU, 0x924949dbU, 0x0c06060aU, 0x4824246cU, 0xb85c5ce4U, 0x9fc2c25dU, 0xbdd3d36eU, 0x43acacefU, 0xc46262a6U, 0x399191a8U, 0x319595a4U, 0xd3e4e437U, 0xf279798bU, 0xd5e7e732U, 0x8bc8c843U, 0x6e373759U, 0xda6d6db7U, 0x018d8d8cU, 0xb1d5d564U, 0x9c4e4ed2U, 0x49a9a9e0U, 0xd86c6cb4U, 0xac5656faU, 0xf3f4f407U, 0xcfeaea25U, 0xca6565afU, 0xf47a7a8eU, 0x47aeaee9U, 0x10080818U, 0x6fbabad5U, 0xf0787888U, 0x4a25256fU, 0x5c2e2e72U, 0x381c1c24U, 0x57a6a6f1U, 0x73b4b4c7U, 0x97c6c651U, 0xcbe8e823U, 0xa1dddd7cU, 0xe874749cU, 0x3e1f1f21U, 0x964b4bddU, 0x61bdbddcU, 0x0d8b8b86U, 0x0f8a8a85U, 0xe0707090U, 0x7c3e3e42U, 0x71b5b5c4U, 0xcc6666aaU, 0x904848d8U, 0x06030305U, 0xf7f6f601U, 0x1c0e0e12U, 0xc26161a3U, 0x6a35355fU, 0xae5757f9U, 0x69b9b9d0U, 0x17868691U, 0x99c1c158U, 0x3a1d1d27U, 0x279e9eb9U, 0xd9e1e138U, 0xebf8f813U, 0x2b9898b3U, 0x22111133U, 0xd26969bbU, 0xa9d9d970U, 0x078e8e89U, 0x339494a7U, 0x2d9b9bb6U, 0x3c1e1e22U, 0x15878792U, 0xc9e9e920U, 0x87cece49U, 0xaa5555ffU, 0x50282878U, 0xa5dfdf7aU, 0x038c8c8fU, 0x59a1a1f8U, 0x09898980U, 0x1a0d0d17U, 0x65bfbfdaU, 0xd7e6e631U, 0x844242c6U, 0xd06868b8U, 0x824141c3U, 0x299999b0U, 0x5a2d2d77U, 0x1e0f0f11U, 0x7bb0b0cbU, 0xa85454fcU, 0x6dbbbbd6U, 0x2c16163aU, }; static const u32 Te1[256] = { 0xa5c66363U, 0x84f87c7cU, 0x99ee7777U, 0x8df67b7bU, 0x0dfff2f2U, 0xbdd66b6bU, 0xb1de6f6fU, 0x5491c5c5U, 0x50603030U, 0x03020101U, 0xa9ce6767U, 0x7d562b2bU, 0x19e7fefeU, 0x62b5d7d7U, 0xe64dababU, 0x9aec7676U, 0x458fcacaU, 0x9d1f8282U, 0x4089c9c9U, 0x87fa7d7dU, 0x15effafaU, 0xebb25959U, 0xc98e4747U, 0x0bfbf0f0U, 0xec41adadU, 0x67b3d4d4U, 0xfd5fa2a2U, 0xea45afafU, 0xbf239c9cU, 0xf753a4a4U, 0x96e47272U, 0x5b9bc0c0U, 0xc275b7b7U, 0x1ce1fdfdU, 0xae3d9393U, 0x6a4c2626U, 0x5a6c3636U, 0x417e3f3fU, 0x02f5f7f7U, 0x4f83ccccU, 0x5c683434U, 0xf451a5a5U, 0x34d1e5e5U, 0x08f9f1f1U, 0x93e27171U, 0x73abd8d8U, 0x53623131U, 0x3f2a1515U, 0x0c080404U, 0x5295c7c7U, 0x65462323U, 0x5e9dc3c3U, 0x28301818U, 0xa1379696U, 0x0f0a0505U, 0xb52f9a9aU, 0x090e0707U, 0x36241212U, 0x9b1b8080U, 0x3ddfe2e2U, 0x26cdebebU, 0x694e2727U, 0xcd7fb2b2U, 0x9fea7575U, 0x1b120909U, 0x9e1d8383U, 0x74582c2cU, 0x2e341a1aU, 0x2d361b1bU, 0xb2dc6e6eU, 0xeeb45a5aU, 0xfb5ba0a0U, 0xf6a45252U, 0x4d763b3bU, 0x61b7d6d6U, 0xce7db3b3U, 0x7b522929U, 0x3edde3e3U, 0x715e2f2fU, 0x97138484U, 0xf5a65353U, 0x68b9d1d1U, 0x00000000U, 0x2cc1ededU, 0x60402020U, 0x1fe3fcfcU, 0xc879b1b1U, 0xedb65b5bU, 0xbed46a6aU, 0x468dcbcbU, 0xd967bebeU, 0x4b723939U, 0xde944a4aU, 0xd4984c4cU, 0xe8b05858U, 0x4a85cfcfU, 0x6bbbd0d0U, 0x2ac5efefU, 0xe54faaaaU, 0x16edfbfbU, 0xc5864343U, 0xd79a4d4dU, 0x55663333U, 0x94118585U, 0xcf8a4545U, 0x10e9f9f9U, 0x06040202U, 0x81fe7f7fU, 0xf0a05050U, 0x44783c3cU, 0xba259f9fU, 0xe34ba8a8U, 0xf3a25151U, 0xfe5da3a3U, 0xc0804040U, 0x8a058f8fU, 0xad3f9292U, 0xbc219d9dU, 0x48703838U, 0x04f1f5f5U, 0xdf63bcbcU, 0xc177b6b6U, 0x75afdadaU, 0x63422121U, 0x30201010U, 0x1ae5ffffU, 0x0efdf3f3U, 0x6dbfd2d2U, 0x4c81cdcdU, 0x14180c0cU, 0x35261313U, 0x2fc3ececU, 0xe1be5f5fU, 0xa2359797U, 0xcc884444U, 0x392e1717U, 0x5793c4c4U, 0xf255a7a7U, 0x82fc7e7eU, 0x477a3d3dU, 0xacc86464U, 0xe7ba5d5dU, 0x2b321919U, 0x95e67373U, 0xa0c06060U, 0x98198181U, 0xd19e4f4fU, 0x7fa3dcdcU, 0x66442222U, 0x7e542a2aU, 0xab3b9090U, 0x830b8888U, 0xca8c4646U, 0x29c7eeeeU, 0xd36bb8b8U, 0x3c281414U, 0x79a7dedeU, 0xe2bc5e5eU, 0x1d160b0bU, 0x76addbdbU, 0x3bdbe0e0U, 0x56643232U, 0x4e743a3aU, 0x1e140a0aU, 0xdb924949U, 0x0a0c0606U, 0x6c482424U, 0xe4b85c5cU, 0x5d9fc2c2U, 0x6ebdd3d3U, 0xef43acacU, 0xa6c46262U, 0xa8399191U, 0xa4319595U, 0x37d3e4e4U, 0x8bf27979U, 0x32d5e7e7U, 0x438bc8c8U, 0x596e3737U, 0xb7da6d6dU, 0x8c018d8dU, 0x64b1d5d5U, 0xd29c4e4eU, 0xe049a9a9U, 0xb4d86c6cU, 0xfaac5656U, 0x07f3f4f4U, 0x25cfeaeaU, 0xafca6565U, 0x8ef47a7aU, 0xe947aeaeU, 0x18100808U, 0xd56fbabaU, 0x88f07878U, 0x6f4a2525U, 0x725c2e2eU, 0x24381c1cU, 0xf157a6a6U, 0xc773b4b4U, 0x5197c6c6U, 0x23cbe8e8U, 0x7ca1ddddU, 0x9ce87474U, 0x213e1f1fU, 0xdd964b4bU, 0xdc61bdbdU, 0x860d8b8bU, 0x850f8a8aU, 0x90e07070U, 0x427c3e3eU, 0xc471b5b5U, 0xaacc6666U, 0xd8904848U, 0x05060303U, 0x01f7f6f6U, 0x121c0e0eU, 0xa3c26161U, 0x5f6a3535U, 0xf9ae5757U, 0xd069b9b9U, 0x91178686U, 0x5899c1c1U, 0x273a1d1dU, 0xb9279e9eU, 0x38d9e1e1U, 0x13ebf8f8U, 0xb32b9898U, 0x33221111U, 0xbbd26969U, 0x70a9d9d9U, 0x89078e8eU, 0xa7339494U, 0xb62d9b9bU, 0x223c1e1eU, 0x92158787U, 0x20c9e9e9U, 0x4987ceceU, 0xffaa5555U, 0x78502828U, 0x7aa5dfdfU, 0x8f038c8cU, 0xf859a1a1U, 0x80098989U, 0x171a0d0dU, 0xda65bfbfU, 0x31d7e6e6U, 0xc6844242U, 0xb8d06868U, 0xc3824141U, 0xb0299999U, 0x775a2d2dU, 0x111e0f0fU, 0xcb7bb0b0U, 0xfca85454U, 0xd66dbbbbU, 0x3a2c1616U, }; static const u32 Te2[256] = { 0x63a5c663U, 0x7c84f87cU, 0x7799ee77U, 0x7b8df67bU, 0xf20dfff2U, 0x6bbdd66bU, 0x6fb1de6fU, 0xc55491c5U, 0x30506030U, 0x01030201U, 0x67a9ce67U, 0x2b7d562bU, 0xfe19e7feU, 0xd762b5d7U, 0xabe64dabU, 0x769aec76U, 0xca458fcaU, 0x829d1f82U, 0xc94089c9U, 0x7d87fa7dU, 0xfa15effaU, 0x59ebb259U, 0x47c98e47U, 0xf00bfbf0U, 0xadec41adU, 0xd467b3d4U, 0xa2fd5fa2U, 0xafea45afU, 0x9cbf239cU, 0xa4f753a4U, 0x7296e472U, 0xc05b9bc0U, 0xb7c275b7U, 0xfd1ce1fdU, 0x93ae3d93U, 0x266a4c26U, 0x365a6c36U, 0x3f417e3fU, 0xf702f5f7U, 0xcc4f83ccU, 0x345c6834U, 0xa5f451a5U, 0xe534d1e5U, 0xf108f9f1U, 0x7193e271U, 0xd873abd8U, 0x31536231U, 0x153f2a15U, 0x040c0804U, 0xc75295c7U, 0x23654623U, 0xc35e9dc3U, 0x18283018U, 0x96a13796U, 0x050f0a05U, 0x9ab52f9aU, 0x07090e07U, 0x12362412U, 0x809b1b80U, 0xe23ddfe2U, 0xeb26cdebU, 0x27694e27U, 0xb2cd7fb2U, 0x759fea75U, 0x091b1209U, 0x839e1d83U, 0x2c74582cU, 0x1a2e341aU, 0x1b2d361bU, 0x6eb2dc6eU, 0x5aeeb45aU, 0xa0fb5ba0U, 0x52f6a452U, 0x3b4d763bU, 0xd661b7d6U, 0xb3ce7db3U, 0x297b5229U, 0xe33edde3U, 0x2f715e2fU, 0x84971384U, 0x53f5a653U, 0xd168b9d1U, 0x00000000U, 0xed2cc1edU, 0x20604020U, 0xfc1fe3fcU, 0xb1c879b1U, 0x5bedb65bU, 0x6abed46aU, 0xcb468dcbU, 0xbed967beU, 0x394b7239U, 0x4ade944aU, 0x4cd4984cU, 0x58e8b058U, 0xcf4a85cfU, 0xd06bbbd0U, 0xef2ac5efU, 0xaae54faaU, 0xfb16edfbU, 0x43c58643U, 0x4dd79a4dU, 0x33556633U, 0x85941185U, 0x45cf8a45U, 0xf910e9f9U, 0x02060402U, 0x7f81fe7fU, 0x50f0a050U, 0x3c44783cU, 0x9fba259fU, 0xa8e34ba8U, 0x51f3a251U, 0xa3fe5da3U, 0x40c08040U, 0x8f8a058fU, 0x92ad3f92U, 0x9dbc219dU, 0x38487038U, 0xf504f1f5U, 0xbcdf63bcU, 0xb6c177b6U, 0xda75afdaU, 0x21634221U, 0x10302010U, 0xff1ae5ffU, 0xf30efdf3U, 0xd26dbfd2U, 0xcd4c81cdU, 0x0c14180cU, 0x13352613U, 0xec2fc3ecU, 0x5fe1be5fU, 0x97a23597U, 0x44cc8844U, 0x17392e17U, 0xc45793c4U, 0xa7f255a7U, 0x7e82fc7eU, 0x3d477a3dU, 0x64acc864U, 0x5de7ba5dU, 0x192b3219U, 0x7395e673U, 0x60a0c060U, 0x81981981U, 0x4fd19e4fU, 0xdc7fa3dcU, 0x22664422U, 0x2a7e542aU, 0x90ab3b90U, 0x88830b88U, 0x46ca8c46U, 0xee29c7eeU, 0xb8d36bb8U, 0x143c2814U, 0xde79a7deU, 0x5ee2bc5eU, 0x0b1d160bU, 0xdb76addbU, 0xe03bdbe0U, 0x32566432U, 0x3a4e743aU, 0x0a1e140aU, 0x49db9249U, 0x060a0c06U, 0x246c4824U, 0x5ce4b85cU, 0xc25d9fc2U, 0xd36ebdd3U, 0xacef43acU, 0x62a6c462U, 0x91a83991U, 0x95a43195U, 0xe437d3e4U, 0x798bf279U, 0xe732d5e7U, 0xc8438bc8U, 0x37596e37U, 0x6db7da6dU, 0x8d8c018dU, 0xd564b1d5U, 0x4ed29c4eU, 0xa9e049a9U, 0x6cb4d86cU, 0x56faac56U, 0xf407f3f4U, 0xea25cfeaU, 0x65afca65U, 0x7a8ef47aU, 0xaee947aeU, 0x08181008U, 0xbad56fbaU, 0x7888f078U, 0x256f4a25U, 0x2e725c2eU, 0x1c24381cU, 0xa6f157a6U, 0xb4c773b4U, 0xc65197c6U, 0xe823cbe8U, 0xdd7ca1ddU, 0x749ce874U, 0x1f213e1fU, 0x4bdd964bU, 0xbddc61bdU, 0x8b860d8bU, 0x8a850f8aU, 0x7090e070U, 0x3e427c3eU, 0xb5c471b5U, 0x66aacc66U, 0x48d89048U, 0x03050603U, 0xf601f7f6U, 0x0e121c0eU, 0x61a3c261U, 0x355f6a35U, 0x57f9ae57U, 0xb9d069b9U, 0x86911786U, 0xc15899c1U, 0x1d273a1dU, 0x9eb9279eU, 0xe138d9e1U, 0xf813ebf8U, 0x98b32b98U, 0x11332211U, 0x69bbd269U, 0xd970a9d9U, 0x8e89078eU, 0x94a73394U, 0x9bb62d9bU, 0x1e223c1eU, 0x87921587U, 0xe920c9e9U, 0xce4987ceU, 0x55ffaa55U, 0x28785028U, 0xdf7aa5dfU, 0x8c8f038cU, 0xa1f859a1U, 0x89800989U, 0x0d171a0dU, 0xbfda65bfU, 0xe631d7e6U, 0x42c68442U, 0x68b8d068U, 0x41c38241U, 0x99b02999U, 0x2d775a2dU, 0x0f111e0fU, 0xb0cb7bb0U, 0x54fca854U, 0xbbd66dbbU, 0x163a2c16U, }; static const u32 Te3[256] = { - 0x6363a5c6U, 0x7c7c84f8U, 0x777799eeU, 0x7b7b8df6U, 0xf2f20dffU, 0x6b6bbdd6U, 0x6f6fb1deU, 0xc5c55491U, 0x30305060U, 0x01010302U, 0x6767a9ceU, 0x2b2b7d56U, 0xfefe19e7U, 0xd7d762b5U, 0xababe64dU, 0x76769aecU, 0xcaca458fU, 0x82829d1fU, 0xc9c94089U, 0x7d7d87faU, 0xfafa15efU, 0x5959ebb2U, 0x4747c98eU, 0xf0f00bfbU, 0xadadec41U, 0xd4d467b3U, 0xa2a2fd5fU, 0xafafea45U, 0x9c9cbf23U, 0xa4a4f753U, 0x727296e4U, 0xc0c05b9bU, 0xb7b7c275U, 0xfdfd1ce1U, 0x9393ae3dU, 0x26266a4cU, 0x36365a6cU, 0x3f3f417eU, 0xf7f702f5U, 0xcccc4f83U, 0x34345c68U, 0xa5a5f451U, 0xe5e534d1U, 0xf1f108f9U, 0x717193e2U, 0xd8d873abU, 0x31315362U, 0x15153f2aU, 0x04040c08U, 0xc7c75295U, 0x23236546U, 0xc3c35e9dU, 0x18182830U, 0x9696a137U, 0x05050f0aU, 0x9a9ab52fU, 0x0707090eU, 0x12123624U, 0x80809b1bU, 0xe2e23ddfU, 0xebeb26cdU, 0x2727694eU, 0xb2b2cd7fU, 0x75759feaU, 0x09091b12U, 0x83839e1dU, 0x2c2c7458U, 0x1a1a2e34U, 0x1b1b2d36U, 0x6e6eb2dcU, 0x5a5aeeb4U, 0xa0a0fb5bU, 0x5252f6a4U, 0x3b3b4d76U, 0xd6d661b7U, 0xb3b3ce7dU, 0x29297b52U, 0xe3e33eddU, 0x2f2f715eU, 0x84849713U, 0x5353f5a6U, 0xd1d168b9U, 0x00000000U, 0xeded2cc1U, 0x20206040U, 0xfcfc1fe3U, 0xb1b1c879U, 0x5b5bedb6U, 0x6a6abed4U, 0xcbcb468dU, 0xbebed967U, 0x39394b72U, 0x4a4ade94U, 0x4c4cd498U, 0x5858e8b0U, 0xcfcf4a85U, 0xd0d06bbbU, 0xefef2ac5U, 0xaaaae54fU, 0xfbfb16edU, 0x4343c586U, 0x4d4dd79aU, 0x33335566U, 0x85859411U, 0x4545cf8aU, 0xf9f910e9U, 0x02020604U, 0x7f7f81feU, 0x5050f0a0U, 0x3c3c4478U, 0x9f9fba25U, 0xa8a8e34bU, 0x5151f3a2U, 0xa3a3fe5dU, 0x4040c080U, 0x8f8f8a05U, 0x9292ad3fU, 0x9d9dbc21U, 0x38384870U, 0xf5f504f1U, 0xbcbcdf63U, 0xb6b6c177U, 0xdada75afU, 0x21216342U, 0x10103020U, 0xffff1ae5U, 0xf3f30efdU, 0xd2d26dbfU, 0xcdcd4c81U, 0x0c0c1418U, 0x13133526U, 0xecec2fc3U, 0x5f5fe1beU, 0x9797a235U, 0x4444cc88U, 0x1717392eU, 0xc4c45793U, 0xa7a7f255U, 0x7e7e82fcU, 0x3d3d477aU, 0x6464acc8U, 0x5d5de7baU, 0x19192b32U, 0x737395e6U, 0x6060a0c0U, 0x81819819U, 0x4f4fd19eU, 0xdcdc7fa3U, 0x22226644U, 0x2a2a7e54U, 0x9090ab3bU, 0x8888830bU, 0x4646ca8cU, 0xeeee29c7U, 0xb8b8d36bU, 0x14143c28U, 0xdede79a7U, 0x5e5ee2bcU, 0x0b0b1d16U, 0xdbdb76adU, 0xe0e03bdbU, 0x32325664U, 0x3a3a4e74U, 0x0a0a1e14U, 0x4949db92U, 0x06060a0cU, 0x24246c48U, 0x5c5ce4b8U, 0xc2c25d9fU, 0xd3d36ebdU, 0xacacef43U, 0x6262a6c4U, 0x9191a839U, 0x9595a431U, 0xe4e437d3U, 0x79798bf2U, 0xe7e732d5U, 0xc8c8438bU, 0x3737596eU, 0x6d6db7daU, 0x8d8d8c01U, 0xd5d564b1U, 0x4e4ed29cU, 0xa9a9e049U, 0x6c6cb4d8U, 0x5656faacU, 0xf4f407f3U, 0xeaea25cfU, 0x6565afcaU, 0x7a7a8ef4U, 0xaeaee947U, 0x08081810U, 0xbabad56fU, 0x787888f0U, 0x25256f4aU, 0x2e2e725cU, 0x1c1c2438U, 0xa6a6f157U, 0xb4b4c773U, 0xc6c65197U, 0xe8e823cbU, 0xdddd7ca1U, 0x74749ce8U, 0x1f1f213eU, 0x4b4bdd96U, 0xbdbddc61U, 0x8b8b860dU, 0x8a8a850fU, 0x707090e0U, 0x3e3e427cU, 0xb5b5c471U, 0x6666aaccU, 0x4848d890U, 0x03030506U, 0xf6f601f7U, 0x0e0e121cU, 0x6161a3c2U, 0x35355f6aU, 0x5757f9aeU, 0xb9b9d069U, 0x86869117U, 0xc1c15899U, 0x1d1d273aU, 0x9e9eb927U, 0xe1e138d9U, 0xf8f813ebU, 0x9898b32bU, 0x11113322U, 0x6969bbd2U, 0xd9d970a9U, 0x8e8e8907U, 0x9494a733U, 0x9b9bb62dU, 0x1e1e223cU, 0x87879215U, 0xe9e920c9U, 0xcece4987U, 0x5555ffaaU, 0x28287850U, 0xdfdf7aa5U, 0x8c8c8f03U, 0xa1a1f859U, 0x89898009U, 0x0d0d171aU, 0xbfbfda65U, 0xe6e631d7U, 0x4242c684U, 0x6868b8d0U, 0x4141c382U, 0x9999b029U, 0x2d2d775aU, 0x0f0f111eU, 0xb0b0cb7bU, 0x5454fca8U, 0xbbbbd66dU, 0x16163a2cU, }; static const u32 Te4[256] = { 0x63636363U, 0x7c7c7c7cU, 0x77777777U, 0x7b7b7b7bU, 0xf2f2f2f2U, 0x6b6b6b6bU, 0x6f6f6f6fU, 0xc5c5c5c5U, 0x30303030U, 0x01010101U, 0x67676767U, 0x2b2b2b2bU, 0xfefefefeU, 0xd7d7d7d7U, 0xababababU, 0x76767676U, 0xcacacacaU, 0x82828282U, 0xc9c9c9c9U, 0x7d7d7d7dU, 0xfafafafaU, 0x59595959U, 0x47474747U, 0xf0f0f0f0U, 0xadadadadU, 0xd4d4d4d4U, 0xa2a2a2a2U, 0xafafafafU, 0x9c9c9c9cU, 0xa4a4a4a4U, 0x72727272U, 0xc0c0c0c0U, 0xb7b7b7b7U, 0xfdfdfdfdU, 0x93939393U, 0x26262626U, 0x36363636U, 0x3f3f3f3fU, 0xf7f7f7f7U, 0xccccccccU, 0x34343434U, 0xa5a5a5a5U, 0xe5e5e5e5U, 0xf1f1f1f1U, 0x71717171U, 0xd8d8d8d8U, 0x31313131U, 0x15151515U, 0x04040404U, 0xc7c7c7c7U, 0x23232323U, 0xc3c3c3c3U, 0x18181818U, 0x96969696U, 0x05050505U, 0x9a9a9a9aU, 0x07070707U, 0x12121212U, 0x80808080U, 0xe2e2e2e2U, 0xebebebebU, 0x27272727U, 0xb2b2b2b2U, 0x75757575U, 0x09090909U, 0x83838383U, 0x2c2c2c2cU, 0x1a1a1a1aU, 0x1b1b1b1bU, 0x6e6e6e6eU, 0x5a5a5a5aU, 0xa0a0a0a0U, 0x52525252U, 0x3b3b3b3bU, 0xd6d6d6d6U, 0xb3b3b3b3U, 0x29292929U, 0xe3e3e3e3U, 0x2f2f2f2fU, 0x84848484U, 0x53535353U, 0xd1d1d1d1U, 0x00000000U, 0xededededU, 0x20202020U, 0xfcfcfcfcU, 0xb1b1b1b1U, 0x5b5b5b5bU, 0x6a6a6a6aU, 0xcbcbcbcbU, 0xbebebebeU, 0x39393939U, 0x4a4a4a4aU, 0x4c4c4c4cU, 0x58585858U, 0xcfcfcfcfU, 0xd0d0d0d0U, 0xefefefefU, 0xaaaaaaaaU, 0xfbfbfbfbU, 0x43434343U, 0x4d4d4d4dU, 0x33333333U, 0x85858585U, 0x45454545U, 0xf9f9f9f9U, 0x02020202U, 0x7f7f7f7fU, 0x50505050U, 0x3c3c3c3cU, 0x9f9f9f9fU, 0xa8a8a8a8U, 0x51515151U, 0xa3a3a3a3U, 0x40404040U, 0x8f8f8f8fU, 0x92929292U, 0x9d9d9d9dU, 0x38383838U, 0xf5f5f5f5U, 0xbcbcbcbcU, 0xb6b6b6b6U, 0xdadadadaU, 0x21212121U, 0x10101010U, 0xffffffffU, 0xf3f3f3f3U, 0xd2d2d2d2U, 0xcdcdcdcdU, 0x0c0c0c0cU, 0x13131313U, 0xececececU, 0x5f5f5f5fU, 0x97979797U, 0x44444444U, 0x17171717U, 0xc4c4c4c4U, 0xa7a7a7a7U, 0x7e7e7e7eU, 0x3d3d3d3dU, 0x64646464U, 0x5d5d5d5dU, 0x19191919U, 0x73737373U, 0x60606060U, 0x81818181U, 0x4f4f4f4fU, 0xdcdcdcdcU, 0x22222222U, 0x2a2a2a2aU, 0x90909090U, 0x88888888U, 0x46464646U, 0xeeeeeeeeU, 0xb8b8b8b8U, 0x14141414U, 0xdedededeU, 0x5e5e5e5eU, 0x0b0b0b0bU, 0xdbdbdbdbU, 0xe0e0e0e0U, 0x32323232U, 0x3a3a3a3aU, 0x0a0a0a0aU, 0x49494949U, 0x06060606U, 0x24242424U, 0x5c5c5c5cU, 0xc2c2c2c2U, 0xd3d3d3d3U, 0xacacacacU, 0x62626262U, 0x91919191U, 0x95959595U, 0xe4e4e4e4U, 0x79797979U, 0xe7e7e7e7U, 0xc8c8c8c8U, 0x37373737U, 0x6d6d6d6dU, 0x8d8d8d8dU, 0xd5d5d5d5U, 0x4e4e4e4eU, 0xa9a9a9a9U, 0x6c6c6c6cU, 0x56565656U, 0xf4f4f4f4U, 0xeaeaeaeaU, 0x65656565U, 0x7a7a7a7aU, 0xaeaeaeaeU, 0x08080808U, 0xbabababaU, 0x78787878U, 0x25252525U, 0x2e2e2e2eU, 0x1c1c1c1cU, 0xa6a6a6a6U, 0xb4b4b4b4U, 0xc6c6c6c6U, 0xe8e8e8e8U, 0xddddddddU, 0x74747474U, 0x1f1f1f1fU, 0x4b4b4b4bU, 0xbdbdbdbdU, 0x8b8b8b8bU, 0x8a8a8a8aU, 0x70707070U, 0x3e3e3e3eU, 0xb5b5b5b5U, 0x66666666U, 0x48484848U, 0x03030303U, 0xf6f6f6f6U, 0x0e0e0e0eU, 0x61616161U, 0x35353535U, 0x57575757U, 0xb9b9b9b9U, 0x86868686U, 0xc1c1c1c1U, 0x1d1d1d1dU, 0x9e9e9e9eU, 0xe1e1e1e1U, 0xf8f8f8f8U, 0x98989898U, 0x11111111U, 0x69696969U, 0xd9d9d9d9U, 0x8e8e8e8eU, 0x94949494U, 0x9b9b9b9bU, 0x1e1e1e1eU, 0x87878787U, 0xe9e9e9e9U, 0xcecececeU, 0x55555555U, 0x28282828U, 0xdfdfdfdfU, 0x8c8c8c8cU, 0xa1a1a1a1U, 0x89898989U, 0x0d0d0d0dU, 0xbfbfbfbfU, 0xe6e6e6e6U, 0x42424242U, 0x68686868U, 0x41414141U, 0x99999999U, 0x2d2d2d2dU, 0x0f0f0f0fU, 0xb0b0b0b0U, 0x54545454U, 0xbbbbbbbbU, 0x16161616U, }; static const u32 Td0[256] = { 0x51f4a750U, 0x7e416553U, 0x1a17a4c3U, 0x3a275e96U, 0x3bab6bcbU, 0x1f9d45f1U, 0xacfa58abU, 0x4be30393U, 0x2030fa55U, 0xad766df6U, 0x88cc7691U, 0xf5024c25U, 0x4fe5d7fcU, 0xc52acbd7U, 0x26354480U, 0xb562a38fU, 0xdeb15a49U, 0x25ba1b67U, 0x45ea0e98U, 0x5dfec0e1U, 0xc32f7502U, 0x814cf012U, 0x8d4697a3U, 0x6bd3f9c6U, 0x038f5fe7U, 0x15929c95U, 0xbf6d7aebU, 0x955259daU, 0xd4be832dU, 0x587421d3U, 0x49e06929U, 0x8ec9c844U, 0x75c2896aU, 0xf48e7978U, 0x99583e6bU, 0x27b971ddU, 0xbee14fb6U, 0xf088ad17U, 0xc920ac66U, 0x7dce3ab4U, 0x63df4a18U, 0xe51a3182U, 0x97513360U, 0x62537f45U, 0xb16477e0U, 0xbb6bae84U, 0xfe81a01cU, 0xf9082b94U, 0x70486858U, 0x8f45fd19U, 0x94de6c87U, 0x527bf8b7U, 0xab73d323U, 0x724b02e2U, 0xe31f8f57U, 0x6655ab2aU, 0xb2eb2807U, 0x2fb5c203U, 0x86c57b9aU, 0xd33708a5U, 0x302887f2U, 0x23bfa5b2U, 0x02036abaU, 0xed16825cU, 0x8acf1c2bU, 0xa779b492U, 0xf307f2f0U, 0x4e69e2a1U, 0x65daf4cdU, 0x0605bed5U, 0xd134621fU, 0xc4a6fe8aU, 0x342e539dU, 0xa2f355a0U, 0x058ae132U, 0xa4f6eb75U, 0x0b83ec39U, 0x4060efaaU, 0x5e719f06U, 0xbd6e1051U, 0x3e218af9U, 0x96dd063dU, 0xdd3e05aeU, 0x4de6bd46U, 0x91548db5U, 0x71c45d05U, 0x0406d46fU, 0x605015ffU, 0x1998fb24U, 0xd6bde997U, 0x894043ccU, 0x67d99e77U, 0xb0e842bdU, 0x07898b88U, 0xe7195b38U, 0x79c8eedbU, 0xa17c0a47U, 0x7c420fe9U, 0xf8841ec9U, 0x00000000U, 0x09808683U, 0x322bed48U, 0x1e1170acU, 0x6c5a724eU, 0xfd0efffbU, 0x0f853856U, 0x3daed51eU, 0x362d3927U, 0x0a0fd964U, 0x685ca621U, 0x9b5b54d1U, 0x24362e3aU, 0x0c0a67b1U, 0x9357e70fU, 0xb4ee96d2U, 0x1b9b919eU, 0x80c0c54fU, 0x61dc20a2U, 0x5a774b69U, 0x1c121a16U, 0xe293ba0aU, 0xc0a02ae5U, 0x3c22e043U, 0x121b171dU, 0x0e090d0bU, 0xf28bc7adU, 0x2db6a8b9U, 0x141ea9c8U, 0x57f11985U, 0xaf75074cU, 0xee99ddbbU, 0xa37f60fdU, 0xf701269fU, 0x5c72f5bcU, 0x44663bc5U, 0x5bfb7e34U, 0x8b432976U, 0xcb23c6dcU, 0xb6edfc68U, 0xb8e4f163U, 0xd731dccaU, 0x42638510U, 0x13972240U, 0x84c61120U, 0x854a247dU, 0xd2bb3df8U, 0xaef93211U, 0xc729a16dU, 0x1d9e2f4bU, 0xdcb230f3U, 0x0d8652ecU, 0x77c1e3d0U, 0x2bb3166cU, 0xa970b999U, 0x119448faU, 0x47e96422U, 0xa8fc8cc4U, 0xa0f03f1aU, 0x567d2cd8U, 0x223390efU, 0x87494ec7U, 0xd938d1c1U, 0x8ccaa2feU, 0x98d40b36U, 0xa6f581cfU, 0xa57ade28U, 0xdab78e26U, 0x3fadbfa4U, 0x2c3a9de4U, 0x5078920dU, 0x6a5fcc9bU, 0x547e4662U, 0xf68d13c2U, 0x90d8b8e8U, 0x2e39f75eU, 0x82c3aff5U, 0x9f5d80beU, 0x69d0937cU, 0x6fd52da9U, 0xcf2512b3U, 0xc8ac993bU, 0x10187da7U, 0xe89c636eU, 0xdb3bbb7bU, 0xcd267809U, 0x6e5918f4U, 0xec9ab701U, 0x834f9aa8U, 0xe6956e65U, 0xaaffe67eU, 0x21bccf08U, 0xef15e8e6U, 0xbae79bd9U, 0x4a6f36ceU, 0xea9f09d4U, 0x29b07cd6U, 0x31a4b2afU, 0x2a3f2331U, 0xc6a59430U, 0x35a266c0U, 0x744ebc37U, 0xfc82caa6U, 0xe090d0b0U, 0x33a7d815U, 0xf104984aU, 0x41ecdaf7U, 0x7fcd500eU, 0x1791f62fU, 0x764dd68dU, 0x43efb04dU, 0xccaa4d54U, 0xe49604dfU, 0x9ed1b5e3U, 0x4c6a881bU, 0xc12c1fb8U, 0x4665517fU, 0x9d5eea04U, 0x018c355dU, 0xfa877473U, 0xfb0b412eU, 0xb3671d5aU, 0x92dbd252U, 0xe9105633U, 0x6dd64713U, 0x9ad7618cU, 0x37a10c7aU, 0x59f8148eU, 0xeb133c89U, 0xcea927eeU, 0xb761c935U, 0xe11ce5edU, 0x7a47b13cU, 0x9cd2df59U, 0x55f2733fU, 0x1814ce79U, 0x73c737bfU, 0x53f7cdeaU, 0x5ffdaa5bU, 0xdf3d6f14U, 0x7844db86U, 0xcaaff381U, 0xb968c43eU, 0x3824342cU, 0xc2a3405fU, 0x161dc372U, 0xbce2250cU, 0x283c498bU, 0xff0d9541U, 0x39a80171U, 0x080cb3deU, 0xd8b4e49cU, 0x6456c190U, 0x7bcb8461U, 0xd532b670U, 0x486c5c74U, 0xd0b85742U, }; static const u32 Td1[256] = { 0x5051f4a7U, 0x537e4165U, 0xc31a17a4U, 0x963a275eU, 0xcb3bab6bU, 0xf11f9d45U, 0xabacfa58U, 0x934be303U, 0x552030faU, 0xf6ad766dU, 0x9188cc76U, 0x25f5024cU, 0xfc4fe5d7U, 0xd7c52acbU, 0x80263544U, 0x8fb562a3U, 0x49deb15aU, 0x6725ba1bU, 0x9845ea0eU, 0xe15dfec0U, 0x02c32f75U, 0x12814cf0U, 0xa38d4697U, 0xc66bd3f9U, 0xe7038f5fU, 0x9515929cU, 0xebbf6d7aU, 0xda955259U, 0x2dd4be83U, 0xd3587421U, 0x2949e069U, 0x448ec9c8U, 0x6a75c289U, 0x78f48e79U, 0x6b99583eU, 0xdd27b971U, 0xb6bee14fU, 0x17f088adU, 0x66c920acU, 0xb47dce3aU, 0x1863df4aU, 0x82e51a31U, 0x60975133U, 0x4562537fU, 0xe0b16477U, 0x84bb6baeU, 0x1cfe81a0U, 0x94f9082bU, 0x58704868U, 0x198f45fdU, 0x8794de6cU, 0xb7527bf8U, 0x23ab73d3U, 0xe2724b02U, 0x57e31f8fU, 0x2a6655abU, 0x07b2eb28U, 0x032fb5c2U, 0x9a86c57bU, 0xa5d33708U, 0xf2302887U, 0xb223bfa5U, 0xba02036aU, 0x5ced1682U, 0x2b8acf1cU, 0x92a779b4U, 0xf0f307f2U, 0xa14e69e2U, 0xcd65daf4U, 0xd50605beU, 0x1fd13462U, 0x8ac4a6feU, 0x9d342e53U, 0xa0a2f355U, 0x32058ae1U, 0x75a4f6ebU, 0x390b83ecU, 0xaa4060efU, 0x065e719fU, 0x51bd6e10U, 0xf93e218aU, 0x3d96dd06U, 0xaedd3e05U, 0x464de6bdU, 0xb591548dU, 0x0571c45dU, 0x6f0406d4U, 0xff605015U, 0x241998fbU, 0x97d6bde9U, 0xcc894043U, 0x7767d99eU, 0xbdb0e842U, 0x8807898bU, 0x38e7195bU, 0xdb79c8eeU, 0x47a17c0aU, 0xe97c420fU, 0xc9f8841eU, 0x00000000U, 0x83098086U, 0x48322bedU, 0xac1e1170U, 0x4e6c5a72U, 0xfbfd0effU, 0x560f8538U, 0x1e3daed5U, 0x27362d39U, 0x640a0fd9U, 0x21685ca6U, 0xd19b5b54U, 0x3a24362eU, 0xb10c0a67U, 0x0f9357e7U, 0xd2b4ee96U, 0x9e1b9b91U, 0x4f80c0c5U, 0xa261dc20U, 0x695a774bU, 0x161c121aU, 0x0ae293baU, 0xe5c0a02aU, 0x433c22e0U, 0x1d121b17U, 0x0b0e090dU, 0xadf28bc7U, 0xb92db6a8U, 0xc8141ea9U, 0x8557f119U, 0x4caf7507U, 0xbbee99ddU, 0xfda37f60U, 0x9ff70126U, 0xbc5c72f5U, 0xc544663bU, 0x345bfb7eU, 0x768b4329U, 0xdccb23c6U, 0x68b6edfcU, 0x63b8e4f1U, 0xcad731dcU, 0x10426385U, 0x40139722U, 0x2084c611U, 0x7d854a24U, 0xf8d2bb3dU, 0x11aef932U, 0x6dc729a1U, 0x4b1d9e2fU, 0xf3dcb230U, 0xec0d8652U, 0xd077c1e3U, 0x6c2bb316U, 0x99a970b9U, 0xfa119448U, 0x2247e964U, 0xc4a8fc8cU, 0x1aa0f03fU, 0xd8567d2cU, 0xef223390U, 0xc787494eU, 0xc1d938d1U, 0xfe8ccaa2U, 0x3698d40bU, 0xcfa6f581U, 0x28a57adeU, 0x26dab78eU, 0xa43fadbfU, 0xe42c3a9dU, 0x0d507892U, 0x9b6a5fccU, 0x62547e46U, 0xc2f68d13U, 0xe890d8b8U, 0x5e2e39f7U, 0xf582c3afU, 0xbe9f5d80U, 0x7c69d093U, 0xa96fd52dU, 0xb3cf2512U, 0x3bc8ac99U, 0xa710187dU, 0x6ee89c63U, 0x7bdb3bbbU, 0x09cd2678U, 0xf46e5918U, 0x01ec9ab7U, 0xa8834f9aU, 0x65e6956eU, 0x7eaaffe6U, 0x0821bccfU, 0xe6ef15e8U, 0xd9bae79bU, 0xce4a6f36U, 0xd4ea9f09U, 0xd629b07cU, 0xaf31a4b2U, 0x312a3f23U, 0x30c6a594U, 0xc035a266U, 0x37744ebcU, 0xa6fc82caU, 0xb0e090d0U, 0x1533a7d8U, 0x4af10498U, 0xf741ecdaU, 0x0e7fcd50U, 0x2f1791f6U, 0x8d764dd6U, 0x4d43efb0U, 0x54ccaa4dU, 0xdfe49604U, 0xe39ed1b5U, 0x1b4c6a88U, 0xb8c12c1fU, 0x7f466551U, 0x049d5eeaU, 0x5d018c35U, 0x73fa8774U, 0x2efb0b41U, 0x5ab3671dU, 0x5292dbd2U, 0x33e91056U, 0x136dd647U, 0x8c9ad761U, 0x7a37a10cU, 0x8e59f814U, 0x89eb133cU, 0xeecea927U, 0x35b761c9U, 0xede11ce5U, 0x3c7a47b1U, 0x599cd2dfU, 0x3f55f273U, 0x791814ceU, 0xbf73c737U, 0xea53f7cdU, 0x5b5ffdaaU, 0x14df3d6fU, 0x867844dbU, 0x81caaff3U, 0x3eb968c4U, 0x2c382434U, 0x5fc2a340U, 0x72161dc3U, 0x0cbce225U, 0x8b283c49U, 0x41ff0d95U, 0x7139a801U, 0xde080cb3U, 0x9cd8b4e4U, 0x906456c1U, 0x617bcb84U, 0x70d532b6U, 0x74486c5cU, 0x42d0b857U, }; static const u32 Td2[256] = { 0xa75051f4U, 0x65537e41U, 0xa4c31a17U, 0x5e963a27U, 0x6bcb3babU, 0x45f11f9dU, 0x58abacfaU, 0x03934be3U, 0xfa552030U, 0x6df6ad76U, 0x769188ccU, 0x4c25f502U, 0xd7fc4fe5U, 0xcbd7c52aU, 0x44802635U, 0xa38fb562U, 0x5a49deb1U, 0x1b6725baU, 0x0e9845eaU, 0xc0e15dfeU, 0x7502c32fU, 0xf012814cU, 0x97a38d46U, 0xf9c66bd3U, 0x5fe7038fU, 0x9c951592U, 0x7aebbf6dU, 0x59da9552U, 0x832dd4beU, 0x21d35874U, 0x692949e0U, 0xc8448ec9U, 0x896a75c2U, 0x7978f48eU, 0x3e6b9958U, 0x71dd27b9U, 0x4fb6bee1U, 0xad17f088U, 0xac66c920U, 0x3ab47dceU, 0x4a1863dfU, 0x3182e51aU, 0x33609751U, 0x7f456253U, 0x77e0b164U, 0xae84bb6bU, 0xa01cfe81U, 0x2b94f908U, 0x68587048U, 0xfd198f45U, 0x6c8794deU, 0xf8b7527bU, 0xd323ab73U, 0x02e2724bU, 0x8f57e31fU, 0xab2a6655U, 0x2807b2ebU, 0xc2032fb5U, 0x7b9a86c5U, 0x08a5d337U, 0x87f23028U, 0xa5b223bfU, 0x6aba0203U, 0x825ced16U, 0x1c2b8acfU, 0xb492a779U, 0xf2f0f307U, 0xe2a14e69U, 0xf4cd65daU, 0xbed50605U, 0x621fd134U, 0xfe8ac4a6U, 0x539d342eU, 0x55a0a2f3U, 0xe132058aU, 0xeb75a4f6U, 0xec390b83U, 0xefaa4060U, 0x9f065e71U, 0x1051bd6eU, - 0x8af93e21U, 0x063d96ddU, 0x05aedd3eU, 0xbd464de6U, 0x8db59154U, 0x5d0571c4U, 0xd46f0406U, 0x15ff6050U, 0xfb241998U, 0xe997d6bdU, 0x43cc8940U, 0x9e7767d9U, 0x42bdb0e8U, 0x8b880789U, 0x5b38e719U, 0xeedb79c8U, 0x0a47a17cU, 0x0fe97c42U, 0x1ec9f884U, 0x00000000U, 0x86830980U, 0xed48322bU, 0x70ac1e11U, 0x724e6c5aU, 0xfffbfd0eU, 0x38560f85U, 0xd51e3daeU, 0x3927362dU, 0xd9640a0fU, 0xa621685cU, 0x54d19b5bU, 0x2e3a2436U, 0x67b10c0aU, 0xe70f9357U, 0x96d2b4eeU, 0x919e1b9bU, 0xc54f80c0U, 0x20a261dcU, 0x4b695a77U, 0x1a161c12U, 0xba0ae293U, 0x2ae5c0a0U, 0xe0433c22U, 0x171d121bU, 0x0d0b0e09U, 0xc7adf28bU, 0xa8b92db6U, 0xa9c8141eU, 0x198557f1U, 0x074caf75U, 0xddbbee99U, 0x60fda37fU, 0x269ff701U, 0xf5bc5c72U, 0x3bc54466U, 0x7e345bfbU, 0x29768b43U, 0xc6dccb23U, 0xfc68b6edU, 0xf163b8e4U, 0xdccad731U, 0x85104263U, 0x22401397U, 0x112084c6U, 0x247d854aU, 0x3df8d2bbU, 0x3211aef9U, 0xa16dc729U, 0x2f4b1d9eU, 0x30f3dcb2U, 0x52ec0d86U, 0xe3d077c1U, 0x166c2bb3U, 0xb999a970U, 0x48fa1194U, 0x642247e9U, 0x8cc4a8fcU, 0x3f1aa0f0U, 0x2cd8567dU, 0x90ef2233U, 0x4ec78749U, 0xd1c1d938U, 0xa2fe8ccaU, 0x0b3698d4U, 0x81cfa6f5U, 0xde28a57aU, 0x8e26dab7U, 0xbfa43fadU, 0x9de42c3aU, 0x920d5078U, 0xcc9b6a5fU, 0x4662547eU, 0x13c2f68dU, 0xb8e890d8U, 0xf75e2e39U, 0xaff582c3U, 0x80be9f5dU, 0x937c69d0U, 0x2da96fd5U, 0x12b3cf25U, 0x993bc8acU, 0x7da71018U, 0x636ee89cU, 0xbb7bdb3bU, 0x7809cd26U, 0x18f46e59U, 0xb701ec9aU, 0x9aa8834fU, 0x6e65e695U, 0xe67eaaffU, 0xcf0821bcU, 0xe8e6ef15U, 0x9bd9bae7U, 0x36ce4a6fU, 0x09d4ea9fU, 0x7cd629b0U, 0xb2af31a4U, 0x23312a3fU, 0x9430c6a5U, 0x66c035a2U, 0xbc37744eU, 0xcaa6fc82U, 0xd0b0e090U, 0xd81533a7U, 0x984af104U, 0xdaf741ecU, 0x500e7fcdU, 0xf62f1791U, 0xd68d764dU, 0xb04d43efU, 0x4d54ccaaU, 0x04dfe496U, 0xb5e39ed1U, 0x881b4c6aU, 0x1fb8c12cU, 0x517f4665U, 0xea049d5eU, 0x355d018cU, 0x7473fa87U, 0x412efb0bU, 0x1d5ab367U, 0xd25292dbU, 0x5633e910U, 0x47136dd6U, 0x618c9ad7U, 0x0c7a37a1U, 0x148e59f8U, 0x3c89eb13U, 0x27eecea9U, 0xc935b761U, 0xe5ede11cU, 0xb13c7a47U, 0xdf599cd2U, 0x733f55f2U, 0xce791814U, 0x37bf73c7U, 0xcdea53f7U, 0xaa5b5ffdU, 0x6f14df3dU, 0xdb867844U, 0xf381caafU, 0xc43eb968U, 0x342c3824U, 0x405fc2a3U, 0xc372161dU, 0x250cbce2U, 0x498b283cU, 0x9541ff0dU, 0x017139a8U, 0xb3de080cU, 0xe49cd8b4U, 0xc1906456U, 0x84617bcbU, 0xb670d532U, 0x5c74486cU, 0x5742d0b8U, }; static const u32 Td3[256] = { 0xf4a75051U, 0x4165537eU, 0x17a4c31aU, 0x275e963aU, 0xab6bcb3bU, 0x9d45f11fU, 0xfa58abacU, 0xe303934bU, 0x30fa5520U, 0x766df6adU, 0xcc769188U, 0x024c25f5U, 0xe5d7fc4fU, 0x2acbd7c5U, 0x35448026U, 0x62a38fb5U, 0xb15a49deU, 0xba1b6725U, 0xea0e9845U, 0xfec0e15dU, 0x2f7502c3U, 0x4cf01281U, 0x4697a38dU, 0xd3f9c66bU, 0x8f5fe703U, 0x929c9515U, 0x6d7aebbfU, 0x5259da95U, 0xbe832dd4U, 0x7421d358U, 0xe0692949U, 0xc9c8448eU, 0xc2896a75U, 0x8e7978f4U, 0x583e6b99U, 0xb971dd27U, 0xe14fb6beU, 0x88ad17f0U, 0x20ac66c9U, 0xce3ab47dU, 0xdf4a1863U, 0x1a3182e5U, 0x51336097U, 0x537f4562U, 0x6477e0b1U, 0x6bae84bbU, 0x81a01cfeU, 0x082b94f9U, 0x48685870U, 0x45fd198fU, 0xde6c8794U, 0x7bf8b752U, 0x73d323abU, 0x4b02e272U, 0x1f8f57e3U, 0x55ab2a66U, 0xeb2807b2U, 0xb5c2032fU, 0xc57b9a86U, 0x3708a5d3U, 0x2887f230U, 0xbfa5b223U, 0x036aba02U, 0x16825cedU, 0xcf1c2b8aU, 0x79b492a7U, 0x07f2f0f3U, 0x69e2a14eU, 0xdaf4cd65U, 0x05bed506U, 0x34621fd1U, 0xa6fe8ac4U, 0x2e539d34U, 0xf355a0a2U, 0x8ae13205U, 0xf6eb75a4U, 0x83ec390bU, 0x60efaa40U, 0x719f065eU, 0x6e1051bdU, 0x218af93eU, 0xdd063d96U, 0x3e05aeddU, 0xe6bd464dU, 0x548db591U, 0xc45d0571U, 0x06d46f04U, 0x5015ff60U, 0x98fb2419U, 0xbde997d6U, 0x4043cc89U, 0xd99e7767U, 0xe842bdb0U, 0x898b8807U, 0x195b38e7U, 0xc8eedb79U, 0x7c0a47a1U, 0x420fe97cU, 0x841ec9f8U, 0x00000000U, 0x80868309U, 0x2bed4832U, 0x1170ac1eU, 0x5a724e6cU, 0x0efffbfdU, 0x8538560fU, 0xaed51e3dU, 0x2d392736U, 0x0fd9640aU, 0x5ca62168U, 0x5b54d19bU, 0x362e3a24U, 0x0a67b10cU, 0x57e70f93U, 0xee96d2b4U, 0x9b919e1bU, 0xc0c54f80U, 0xdc20a261U, 0x774b695aU, 0x121a161cU, 0x93ba0ae2U, 0xa02ae5c0U, 0x22e0433cU, 0x1b171d12U, 0x090d0b0eU, 0x8bc7adf2U, 0xb6a8b92dU, 0x1ea9c814U, 0xf1198557U, 0x75074cafU, 0x99ddbbeeU, 0x7f60fda3U, 0x01269ff7U, 0x72f5bc5cU, 0x663bc544U, 0xfb7e345bU, 0x4329768bU, 0x23c6dccbU, 0xedfc68b6U, 0xe4f163b8U, 0x31dccad7U, 0x63851042U, 0x97224013U, 0xc6112084U, 0x4a247d85U, 0xbb3df8d2U, 0xf93211aeU, 0x29a16dc7U, 0x9e2f4b1dU, 0xb230f3dcU, 0x8652ec0dU, 0xc1e3d077U, 0xb3166c2bU, 0x70b999a9U, 0x9448fa11U, 0xe9642247U, 0xfc8cc4a8U, 0xf03f1aa0U, 0x7d2cd856U, 0x3390ef22U, 0x494ec787U, 0x38d1c1d9U, 0xcaa2fe8cU, 0xd40b3698U, 0xf581cfa6U, 0x7ade28a5U, 0xb78e26daU, 0xadbfa43fU, 0x3a9de42cU, 0x78920d50U, 0x5fcc9b6aU, 0x7e466254U, 0x8d13c2f6U, 0xd8b8e890U, 0x39f75e2eU, 0xc3aff582U, 0x5d80be9fU, 0xd0937c69U, 0xd52da96fU, 0x2512b3cfU, 0xac993bc8U, 0x187da710U, 0x9c636ee8U, 0x3bbb7bdbU, 0x267809cdU, 0x5918f46eU, 0x9ab701ecU, 0x4f9aa883U, 0x956e65e6U, 0xffe67eaaU, 0xbccf0821U, 0x15e8e6efU, 0xe79bd9baU, 0x6f36ce4aU, 0x9f09d4eaU, 0xb07cd629U, 0xa4b2af31U, 0x3f23312aU, 0xa59430c6U, 0xa266c035U, 0x4ebc3774U, 0x82caa6fcU, 0x90d0b0e0U, 0xa7d81533U, 0x04984af1U, 0xecdaf741U, 0xcd500e7fU, 0x91f62f17U, 0x4dd68d76U, 0xefb04d43U, 0xaa4d54ccU, 0x9604dfe4U, 0xd1b5e39eU, 0x6a881b4cU, 0x2c1fb8c1U, 0x65517f46U, 0x5eea049dU, 0x8c355d01U, 0x877473faU, 0x0b412efbU, 0x671d5ab3U, 0xdbd25292U, 0x105633e9U, 0xd647136dU, 0xd7618c9aU, 0xa10c7a37U, 0xf8148e59U, 0x133c89ebU, 0xa927eeceU, 0x61c935b7U, 0x1ce5ede1U, 0x47b13c7aU, 0xd2df599cU, 0xf2733f55U, 0x14ce7918U, 0xc737bf73U, 0xf7cdea53U, 0xfdaa5b5fU, 0x3d6f14dfU, 0x44db8678U, 0xaff381caU, 0x68c43eb9U, 0x24342c38U, 0xa3405fc2U, 0x1dc37216U, 0xe2250cbcU, 0x3c498b28U, 0x0d9541ffU, 0xa8017139U, 0x0cb3de08U, 0xb4e49cd8U, 0x56c19064U, 0xcb84617bU, 0x32b670d5U, 0x6c5c7448U, 0xb85742d0U, }; static const u32 Td4[256] = { 0x52525252U, 0x09090909U, 0x6a6a6a6aU, 0xd5d5d5d5U, 0x30303030U, 0x36363636U, 0xa5a5a5a5U, 0x38383838U, 0xbfbfbfbfU, 0x40404040U, 0xa3a3a3a3U, 0x9e9e9e9eU, 0x81818181U, 0xf3f3f3f3U, 0xd7d7d7d7U, 0xfbfbfbfbU, 0x7c7c7c7cU, 0xe3e3e3e3U, 0x39393939U, 0x82828282U, 0x9b9b9b9bU, 0x2f2f2f2fU, 0xffffffffU, 0x87878787U, 0x34343434U, 0x8e8e8e8eU, 0x43434343U, 0x44444444U, 0xc4c4c4c4U, 0xdedededeU, 0xe9e9e9e9U, 0xcbcbcbcbU, 0x54545454U, 0x7b7b7b7bU, 0x94949494U, 0x32323232U, 0xa6a6a6a6U, 0xc2c2c2c2U, 0x23232323U, 0x3d3d3d3dU, 0xeeeeeeeeU, 0x4c4c4c4cU, 0x95959595U, 0x0b0b0b0bU, 0x42424242U, 0xfafafafaU, 0xc3c3c3c3U, 0x4e4e4e4eU, 0x08080808U, 0x2e2e2e2eU, 0xa1a1a1a1U, 0x66666666U, 0x28282828U, 0xd9d9d9d9U, 0x24242424U, 0xb2b2b2b2U, 0x76767676U, 0x5b5b5b5bU, 0xa2a2a2a2U, 0x49494949U, 0x6d6d6d6dU, 0x8b8b8b8bU, 0xd1d1d1d1U, 0x25252525U, 0x72727272U, 0xf8f8f8f8U, 0xf6f6f6f6U, 0x64646464U, 0x86868686U, 0x68686868U, 0x98989898U, 0x16161616U, 0xd4d4d4d4U, 0xa4a4a4a4U, 0x5c5c5c5cU, 0xccccccccU, 0x5d5d5d5dU, 0x65656565U, 0xb6b6b6b6U, 0x92929292U, 0x6c6c6c6cU, 0x70707070U, 0x48484848U, 0x50505050U, 0xfdfdfdfdU, 0xededededU, 0xb9b9b9b9U, 0xdadadadaU, 0x5e5e5e5eU, 0x15151515U, 0x46464646U, 0x57575757U, 0xa7a7a7a7U, 0x8d8d8d8dU, 0x9d9d9d9dU, 0x84848484U, 0x90909090U, 0xd8d8d8d8U, 0xababababU, 0x00000000U, 0x8c8c8c8cU, 0xbcbcbcbcU, 0xd3d3d3d3U, 0x0a0a0a0aU, 0xf7f7f7f7U, 0xe4e4e4e4U, 0x58585858U, 0x05050505U, 0xb8b8b8b8U, 0xb3b3b3b3U, 0x45454545U, 0x06060606U, 0xd0d0d0d0U, 0x2c2c2c2cU, 0x1e1e1e1eU, 0x8f8f8f8fU, 0xcacacacaU, 0x3f3f3f3fU, 0x0f0f0f0fU, 0x02020202U, 0xc1c1c1c1U, 0xafafafafU, 0xbdbdbdbdU, 0x03030303U, 0x01010101U, 0x13131313U, 0x8a8a8a8aU, 0x6b6b6b6bU, 0x3a3a3a3aU, 0x91919191U, 0x11111111U, 0x41414141U, 0x4f4f4f4fU, 0x67676767U, 0xdcdcdcdcU, 0xeaeaeaeaU, 0x97979797U, 0xf2f2f2f2U, 0xcfcfcfcfU, 0xcecececeU, 0xf0f0f0f0U, 0xb4b4b4b4U, 0xe6e6e6e6U, 0x73737373U, 0x96969696U, 0xacacacacU, 0x74747474U, 0x22222222U, 0xe7e7e7e7U, 0xadadadadU, 0x35353535U, 0x85858585U, 0xe2e2e2e2U, 0xf9f9f9f9U, 0x37373737U, 0xe8e8e8e8U, 0x1c1c1c1cU, 0x75757575U, 0xdfdfdfdfU, 0x6e6e6e6eU, 0x47474747U, 0xf1f1f1f1U, 0x1a1a1a1aU, 0x71717171U, 0x1d1d1d1dU, 0x29292929U, 0xc5c5c5c5U, 0x89898989U, 0x6f6f6f6fU, 0xb7b7b7b7U, 0x62626262U, 0x0e0e0e0eU, 0xaaaaaaaaU, 0x18181818U, 0xbebebebeU, 0x1b1b1b1bU, 0xfcfcfcfcU, 0x56565656U, 0x3e3e3e3eU, 0x4b4b4b4bU, 0xc6c6c6c6U, 0xd2d2d2d2U, 0x79797979U, 0x20202020U, 0x9a9a9a9aU, 0xdbdbdbdbU, 0xc0c0c0c0U, 0xfefefefeU, 0x78787878U, 0xcdcdcdcdU, 0x5a5a5a5aU, 0xf4f4f4f4U, 0x1f1f1f1fU, 0xddddddddU, 0xa8a8a8a8U, 0x33333333U, 0x88888888U, 0x07070707U, 0xc7c7c7c7U, 0x31313131U, 0xb1b1b1b1U, 0x12121212U, 0x10101010U, 0x59595959U, 0x27272727U, 0x80808080U, 0xececececU, 0x5f5f5f5fU, 0x60606060U, 0x51515151U, 0x7f7f7f7fU, 0xa9a9a9a9U, 0x19191919U, 0xb5b5b5b5U, 0x4a4a4a4aU, 0x0d0d0d0dU, 0x2d2d2d2dU, 0xe5e5e5e5U, 0x7a7a7a7aU, 0x9f9f9f9fU, 0x93939393U, 0xc9c9c9c9U, 0x9c9c9c9cU, 0xefefefefU, 0xa0a0a0a0U, 0xe0e0e0e0U, 0x3b3b3b3bU, 0x4d4d4d4dU, 0xaeaeaeaeU, 0x2a2a2a2aU, 0xf5f5f5f5U, 0xb0b0b0b0U, 0xc8c8c8c8U, 0xebebebebU, 0xbbbbbbbbU, 0x3c3c3c3cU, 0x83838383U, 0x53535353U, 0x99999999U, 0x61616161U, 0x17171717U, 0x2b2b2b2bU, 0x04040404U, 0x7e7e7e7eU, 0xbabababaU, 0x77777777U, 0xd6d6d6d6U, 0x26262626U, 0xe1e1e1e1U, 0x69696969U, 0x14141414U, 0x63636363U, 0x55555555U, 0x21212121U, 0x0c0c0c0cU, 0x7d7d7d7dU, }; static const u32 rcon[] = { 0x01000000, 0x02000000, 0x04000000, 0x08000000, 0x10000000, 0x20000000, 0x40000000, 0x80000000, 0x1B000000, 0x36000000, /* for 128-bit blocks, Rijndael never uses more than 10 rcon values */ }; #define GETU32(pt) (((u32)(pt)[0] << 24) ^ ((u32)(pt)[1] << 16) ^ ((u32)(pt)[2] << 8) ^ ((u32)(pt)[3])) #define PUTU32(ct, st) { (ct)[0] = (u8)((st) >> 24); (ct)[1] = (u8)((st) >> 16); (ct)[2] = (u8)((st) >> 8); (ct)[3] = (u8)(st); } /** * Expand the cipher key into the encryption key schedule. * * @return the number of rounds for the given cipher key size. */ -static int rijndaelKeySetupEnc(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits) { - int i = 0; +int +rijndaelKeySetupEnc(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits) +{ + int i = 0; u32 temp; rk[0] = GETU32(cipherKey ); rk[1] = GETU32(cipherKey + 4); rk[2] = GETU32(cipherKey + 8); rk[3] = GETU32(cipherKey + 12); if (keyBits == 128) { for (;;) { temp = rk[3]; rk[4] = rk[0] ^ (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^ rcon[i]; rk[5] = rk[1] ^ rk[4]; rk[6] = rk[2] ^ rk[5]; rk[7] = rk[3] ^ rk[6]; if (++i == 10) { return 10; } rk += 4; } } rk[4] = GETU32(cipherKey + 16); rk[5] = GETU32(cipherKey + 20); if (keyBits == 192) { for (;;) { temp = rk[ 5]; rk[ 6] = rk[ 0] ^ (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^ rcon[i]; rk[ 7] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 6]; rk[ 8] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 7]; rk[ 9] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[ 8]; if (++i == 8) { return 12; } rk[10] = rk[ 4] ^ rk[ 9]; rk[11] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[10]; rk += 6; } } rk[6] = GETU32(cipherKey + 24); rk[7] = GETU32(cipherKey + 28); if (keyBits == 256) { for (;;) { temp = rk[ 7]; rk[ 8] = rk[ 0] ^ (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] & 0x000000ff) ^ rcon[i]; rk[ 9] = rk[ 1] ^ rk[ 8]; rk[10] = rk[ 2] ^ rk[ 9]; rk[11] = rk[ 3] ^ rk[10]; - if (++i == 7) { - return 14; - } + if (++i == 7) { + return 14; + } temp = rk[11]; rk[12] = rk[ 4] ^ (Te4[(temp >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te4[(temp >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te4[(temp >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te4[(temp ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff); rk[13] = rk[ 5] ^ rk[12]; rk[14] = rk[ 6] ^ rk[13]; - rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14]; + rk[15] = rk[ 7] ^ rk[14]; rk += 8; } } return 0; } /** * Expand the cipher key into the decryption key schedule. * * @return the number of rounds for the given cipher key size. */ -static int +int rijndaelKeySetupDec(u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], const u8 cipherKey[], int keyBits, - int have_encrypt) { + int have_encrypt) +{ int Nr, i, j; u32 temp; - if (have_encrypt) { + /* expand the cipher key: */ + if (have_encrypt > 0) { + /* Already done */ Nr = have_encrypt; } else { - /* expand the cipher key: */ Nr = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(rk, cipherKey, keyBits); } + /* invert the order of the round keys: */ for (i = 0, j = 4*Nr; i < j; i += 4, j -= 4) { temp = rk[i ]; rk[i ] = rk[j ]; rk[j ] = temp; temp = rk[i + 1]; rk[i + 1] = rk[j + 1]; rk[j + 1] = temp; temp = rk[i + 2]; rk[i + 2] = rk[j + 2]; rk[j + 2] = temp; temp = rk[i + 3]; rk[i + 3] = rk[j + 3]; rk[j + 3] = temp; } /* apply the inverse MixColumn transform to all round keys but the first and the last: */ for (i = 1; i < Nr; i++) { rk += 4; rk[0] = Td0[Te4[(rk[0] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ Td1[Te4[(rk[0] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td2[Te4[(rk[0] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td3[Te4[(rk[0] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; rk[1] = Td0[Te4[(rk[1] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ Td1[Te4[(rk[1] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td2[Te4[(rk[1] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td3[Te4[(rk[1] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; rk[2] = Td0[Te4[(rk[2] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ Td1[Te4[(rk[2] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td2[Te4[(rk[2] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td3[Te4[(rk[2] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; rk[3] = Td0[Te4[(rk[3] >> 24) ] & 0xff] ^ Td1[Te4[(rk[3] >> 16) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td2[Te4[(rk[3] >> 8) & 0xff] & 0xff] ^ Td3[Te4[(rk[3] ) & 0xff] & 0xff]; } return Nr; } -static void rijndaelEncrypt(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 pt[16], u8 ct[16]) { +void +rijndaelEncrypt(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 pt[16], + u8 ct[16]) +{ u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3; #ifndef FULL_UNROLL int r; #endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ /* * map byte array block to cipher state * and add initial round key: */ s0 = GETU32(pt ) ^ rk[0]; s1 = GETU32(pt + 4) ^ rk[1]; s2 = GETU32(pt + 8) ^ rk[2]; s3 = GETU32(pt + 12) ^ rk[3]; #ifdef FULL_UNROLL /* round 1: */ - t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4]; - t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5]; - t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6]; - t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7]; - /* round 2: */ - s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8]; - s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9]; - s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[10]; - s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[11]; + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7]; + /* round 2: */ + s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8]; + s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9]; + s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[10]; + s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[11]; /* round 3: */ - t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[12]; - t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[13]; - t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[14]; - t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[15]; - /* round 4: */ - s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[16]; - s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[17]; - s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[18]; - s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[19]; + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[12]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[13]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[14]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[15]; + /* round 4: */ + s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[16]; + s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[17]; + s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[18]; + s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[19]; /* round 5: */ - t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[20]; - t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[21]; - t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[22]; - t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[23]; - /* round 6: */ - s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[24]; - s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[25]; - s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[26]; - s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[27]; + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[20]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[21]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[22]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[23]; + /* round 6: */ + s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[24]; + s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[25]; + s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[26]; + s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[27]; /* round 7: */ - t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[28]; - t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[29]; - t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[30]; - t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[31]; - /* round 8: */ - s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[32]; - s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[33]; - s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[34]; - s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[35]; + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[28]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[29]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[30]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[31]; + /* round 8: */ + s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[32]; + s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[33]; + s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[34]; + s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[35]; /* round 9: */ - t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[36]; - t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[37]; - t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[38]; - t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[39]; + t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[36]; + t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[37]; + t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[38]; + t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[39]; if (Nr > 10) { /* round 10: */ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[40]; s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[41]; s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[42]; s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[43]; /* round 11: */ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[44]; t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[45]; t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[46]; t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[47]; if (Nr > 12) { /* round 12: */ s0 = Te0[t0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[48]; s1 = Te0[t1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[49]; s2 = Te0[t2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[50]; s3 = Te0[t3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[51]; /* round 13: */ t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[52]; t1 = Te0[s1 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[53]; t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[54]; t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[55]; } } rk += Nr << 2; #else /* !FULL_UNROLL */ /* * Nr - 1 full rounds: */ r = Nr >> 1; for (;;) { t0 = Te0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[4]; t1 = Te0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[5]; t2 = Te0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[6]; t3 = Te0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[7]; rk += 8; if (--r == 0) { break; } s0 = Te0[(t0 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(t3 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[0]; s1 = Te0[(t1 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(t0 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[1]; s2 = Te0[(t2 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(t1 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[2]; s3 = Te0[(t3 >> 24) ] ^ Te1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[(t2 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[3]; } #endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ /* * apply last round and * map cipher state to byte array block: */ s0 = (Te4[(t0 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te4[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te4[(t3 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ rk[0]; PUTU32(ct , s0); s1 = (Te4[(t1 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te4[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te4[(t0 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ rk[1]; PUTU32(ct + 4, s1); s2 = (Te4[(t2 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te4[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te4[(t1 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ rk[2]; PUTU32(ct + 8, s2); s3 = (Te4[(t3 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ (Te4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ (Te4[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ (Te4[(t2 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ rk[3]; PUTU32(ct + 12, s3); } -static void rijndaelDecrypt(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 ct[16], u8 pt[16]) { +static void +rijndaelDecrypt(const u32 rk[/*4*(Nr + 1)*/], int Nr, const u8 ct[16], + u8 pt[16]) +{ u32 s0, s1, s2, s3, t0, t1, t2, t3; #ifndef FULL_UNROLL int r; #endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ /* * map byte array block to cipher state * and add initial round key: */ s0 = GETU32(ct ) ^ rk[0]; s1 = GETU32(ct + 4) ^ rk[1]; s2 = GETU32(ct + 8) ^ rk[2]; s3 = GETU32(ct + 12) ^ rk[3]; #ifdef FULL_UNROLL /* round 1: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 4]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 5]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 6]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 7]; /* round 2: */ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 8]; s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[ 9]; s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[10]; s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[11]; /* round 3: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[12]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[13]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[14]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[15]; /* round 4: */ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[16]; s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[17]; s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[18]; s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[19]; /* round 5: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[20]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[21]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[22]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[23]; /* round 6: */ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[24]; s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[25]; s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[26]; s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[27]; /* round 7: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[28]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[29]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[30]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[31]; /* round 8: */ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[32]; s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[33]; s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[34]; s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[35]; /* round 9: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[36]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[37]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[38]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[39]; if (Nr > 10) { /* round 10: */ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[40]; s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[41]; s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[42]; s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[43]; /* round 11: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[44]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[45]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[46]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[47]; if (Nr > 12) { /* round 12: */ s0 = Td0[t0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[48]; s1 = Td0[t1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[49]; s2 = Td0[t2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[50]; s3 = Td0[t3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[51]; /* round 13: */ t0 = Td0[s0 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s1 & 0xff] ^ rk[52]; t1 = Td0[s1 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s2 & 0xff] ^ rk[53]; t2 = Td0[s2 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[54]; t3 = Td0[s3 >> 24] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[s0 & 0xff] ^ rk[55]; } } rk += Nr << 2; #else /* !FULL_UNROLL */ /* * Nr - 1 full rounds: */ r = Nr >> 1; for (;;) { t0 = Td0[(s0 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(s3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(s1 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[4]; t1 = Td0[(s1 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(s0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(s2 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[5]; t2 = Td0[(s2 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(s1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(s3 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[6]; t3 = Td0[(s3 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(s2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(s1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(s0 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[7]; rk += 8; if (--r == 0) { break; } s0 = Td0[(t0 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(t1 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[0]; s1 = Td0[(t1 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(t2 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[1]; s2 = Td0[(t2 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(t3 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[2]; s3 = Td0[(t3 >> 24) ] ^ Td1[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] ^ Td2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Td3[(t0 ) & 0xff] ^ rk[3]; } #endif /* ?FULL_UNROLL */ /* * apply last round and * map cipher state to byte array block: */ - s0 = - (Td4[(t0 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ - (Td4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ - (Td4[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ - (Td4[(t1 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ - rk[0]; + s0 = + (Td4[(t0 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Td4[(t3 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Td4[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Td4[(t1 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[0]; PUTU32(pt , s0); - s1 = - (Td4[(t1 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ - (Td4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ - (Td4[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ - (Td4[(t2 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ - rk[1]; + s1 = + (Td4[(t1 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Td4[(t0 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Td4[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Td4[(t2 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[1]; PUTU32(pt + 4, s1); - s2 = - (Td4[(t2 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ - (Td4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ - (Td4[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ - (Td4[(t3 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ - rk[2]; + s2 = + (Td4[(t2 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Td4[(t1 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Td4[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Td4[(t3 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[2]; PUTU32(pt + 8, s2); - s3 = - (Td4[(t3 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ - (Td4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ - (Td4[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ - (Td4[(t0 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ - rk[3]; + s3 = + (Td4[(t3 >> 24) ] & 0xff000000) ^ + (Td4[(t2 >> 16) & 0xff] & 0x00ff0000) ^ + (Td4[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] & 0x0000ff00) ^ + (Td4[(t0 ) & 0xff] & 0x000000ff) ^ + rk[3]; PUTU32(pt + 12, s3); } void rijndael_set_key(rijndael_ctx *ctx, u_char *key, int bits, int do_encrypt) { ctx->Nr = rijndaelKeySetupEnc(ctx->ek, key, bits); if (do_encrypt) { ctx->decrypt = 0; memset(ctx->dk, 0, sizeof(ctx->dk)); } else { ctx->decrypt = 1; memcpy(ctx->dk, ctx->ek, sizeof(ctx->dk)); rijndaelKeySetupDec(ctx->dk, key, bits, ctx->Nr); } } void rijndael_decrypt(rijndael_ctx *ctx, u_char *src, u_char *dst) { rijndaelDecrypt(ctx->dk, ctx->Nr, src, dst); } void rijndael_encrypt(rijndael_ctx *ctx, u_char *src, u_char *dst) { rijndaelEncrypt(ctx->ek, ctx->Nr, src, dst); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/rijndael.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/rijndael.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/rijndael.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,51 +1,56 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: rijndael.h,v 1.12 2001/12/19 07:18:56 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: rijndael.h,v 1.14 2014/04/29 15:42:07 markus Exp $ */ /** * rijndael-alg-fst.h * * @version 3.0 (December 2000) * * Optimised ANSI C code for the Rijndael cipher (now AES) * * @author Vincent Rijmen * @author Antoon Bosselaers * @author Paulo Barreto * * This code is hereby placed in the public domain. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS ''AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS * OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED * WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF * SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, * WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE * OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, * EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ -#ifndef __RIJNDAEL_H -#define __RIJNDAEL_H +#ifndef _PRIVATE_RIJNDAEL_H +#define _PRIVATE_RIJNDAEL_H -#define MAXKC (256/32) -#define MAXKB (256/8) -#define MAXNR 14 +#define AES_MAXKEYBITS (256) +#define AES_MAXKEYBYTES (AES_MAXKEYBITS/8) +/* for 256-bit keys, fewer for less */ +#define AES_MAXROUNDS 14 typedef unsigned char u8; typedef unsigned short u16; typedef unsigned int u32; +int rijndaelKeySetupEnc(unsigned int [], const unsigned char [], int); +void rijndaelEncrypt(const unsigned int [], int, const unsigned char [], + unsigned char []); + /* The structure for key information */ typedef struct { int decrypt; - int Nr; /* key-length-dependent number of rounds */ - u32 ek[4*(MAXNR + 1)]; /* encrypt key schedule */ - u32 dk[4*(MAXNR + 1)]; /* decrypt key schedule */ + int Nr; /* key-length-dependent number of rounds */ + u32 ek[4*(AES_MAXROUNDS + 1)]; /* encrypt key schedule */ + u32 dk[4*(AES_MAXROUNDS + 1)]; /* decrypt key schedule */ } rijndael_ctx; void rijndael_set_key(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, int, int); void rijndael_decrypt(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, u_char *); void rijndael_encrypt(rijndael_ctx *, u_char *, u_char *); -#endif /* __RIJNDAEL_H */ +#endif /* _PRIVATE_RIJNDAEL_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/roaming_client.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/roaming_client.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/roaming_client.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,277 +1,274 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: roaming_client.c,v 1.7 2014/01/09 23:20:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: roaming_client.c,v 1.8 2014/04/29 18:01:49 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2004-2009 AppGate Network Security AB * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include #include #ifdef HAVE_INTTYPES_H #include #endif #include #include #include - -#include -#include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "channels.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "clientloop.h" #include "log.h" #include "match.h" #include "misc.h" #include "packet.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "key.h" #include "kex.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "roaming.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "digest.h" /* import */ extern Options options; extern char *host; extern struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; extern int session_resumed; static u_int32_t roaming_id; static u_int64_t cookie; static u_int64_t lastseenchall; static u_int64_t key1, key2, oldkey1, oldkey2; void roaming_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE) { logit("Server denied roaming"); return; } verbose("Roaming enabled"); roaming_id = packet_get_int(); cookie = packet_get_int64(); key1 = oldkey1 = packet_get_int64(); key2 = oldkey2 = packet_get_int64(); set_out_buffer_size(packet_get_int() + get_snd_buf_size()); roaming_enabled = 1; } void request_roaming(void) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring(ROAMING_REQUEST); packet_put_char(1); packet_put_int(get_recv_buf_size()); packet_send(); client_register_global_confirm(roaming_reply, NULL); } static void roaming_auth_required(void) { u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; Buffer b; u_int64_t chall, oldchall; chall = packet_get_int64(); oldchall = packet_get_int64(); if (oldchall != lastseenchall) { key1 = oldkey1; key2 = oldkey2; } lastseenchall = chall; buffer_init(&b); buffer_put_int64(&b, cookie); buffer_put_int64(&b, chall); if (ssh_digest_buffer(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &b, digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0) fatal("%s: ssh_digest_buffer failed", __func__); buffer_free(&b); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ROAMING_AUTH); packet_put_int64(key1 ^ get_recv_bytes()); packet_put_raw(digest, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)); packet_send(); oldkey1 = key1; oldkey2 = key2; calculate_new_key(&key1, cookie, chall); calculate_new_key(&key2, cookie, chall); debug("Received %llu bytes", (unsigned long long)get_recv_bytes()); debug("Sent roaming_auth packet"); } int resume_kex(void) { /* * This should not happen - if the client sends the kex method * resume@appgate.com then the kex is done in roaming_resume(). */ return 1; } static int roaming_resume(void) { u_int64_t recv_bytes; char *str = NULL, *kexlist = NULL, *c; int i, type; int timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000; u_int len; u_int32_t rnd = 0; resume_in_progress = 1; /* Exchange banners */ ssh_exchange_identification(timeout_ms); packet_set_nonblocking(); /* Send a kexinit message with resume@appgate.com as only kex algo */ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT); for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) { if (i % 4 == 0) rnd = arc4random(); packet_put_char(rnd & 0xff); rnd >>= 8; } packet_put_cstring(KEX_RESUME); for (i = 1; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) { /* kex algorithm added so start with i=1 and not 0 */ packet_put_cstring(""); /* Not used when we resume */ } packet_put_char(1); /* first kex_packet follows */ packet_put_int(0); /* reserved */ packet_send(); /* Assume that resume@appgate.com will be accepted */ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_KEX_ROAMING_RESUME); packet_put_int(roaming_id); packet_send(); /* Read the server's kexinit and check for resume@appgate.com */ if ((type = packet_read()) != SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT) { debug("expected kexinit on resume, got %d", type); goto fail; } for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) (void)packet_get_char(); kexlist = packet_get_string(&len); if (!kexlist || (str = match_list(KEX_RESUME, kexlist, NULL)) == NULL) { debug("server doesn't allow resume"); goto fail; } free(str); for (i = 1; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) { /* kex algorithm taken care of so start with i=1 and not 0 */ free(packet_get_string(&len)); } i = packet_get_char(); /* first_kex_packet_follows */ if (i && (c = strchr(kexlist, ','))) *c = 0; if (i && strcmp(kexlist, KEX_RESUME)) { debug("server's kex guess (%s) was wrong, skipping", kexlist); (void)packet_read(); /* Wrong guess - discard packet */ } /* * Read the ROAMING_AUTH_REQUIRED challenge from the server and * send ROAMING_AUTH */ if ((type = packet_read()) != SSH2_MSG_KEX_ROAMING_AUTH_REQUIRED) { debug("expected roaming_auth_required, got %d", type); goto fail; } roaming_auth_required(); /* Read ROAMING_AUTH_OK from the server */ if ((type = packet_read()) != SSH2_MSG_KEX_ROAMING_AUTH_OK) { debug("expected roaming_auth_ok, got %d", type); goto fail; } recv_bytes = packet_get_int64() ^ oldkey2; debug("Peer received %llu bytes", (unsigned long long)recv_bytes); resend_bytes(packet_get_connection_out(), &recv_bytes); resume_in_progress = 0; session_resumed = 1; /* Tell clientloop */ return 0; fail: free(kexlist); if (packet_get_connection_in() == packet_get_connection_out()) close(packet_get_connection_in()); else { close(packet_get_connection_in()); close(packet_get_connection_out()); } return 1; } int wait_for_roaming_reconnect(void) { static int reenter_guard = 0; int timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000; int c; if (reenter_guard != 0) fatal("Server refused resume, roaming timeout may be exceeded"); reenter_guard = 1; fprintf(stderr, "[connection suspended, press return to resume]"); fflush(stderr); packet_backup_state(); /* TODO Perhaps we should read from tty here */ while ((c = fgetc(stdin)) != EOF) { if (c == 'Z' - 64) { kill(getpid(), SIGTSTP); continue; } if (c != '\n' && c != '\r') continue; if (ssh_connect(host, NULL, &hostaddr, options.port, options.address_family, 1, &timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive, options.use_privileged_port) == 0 && roaming_resume() == 0) { packet_restore_state(); reenter_guard = 0; fprintf(stderr, "[connection resumed]\n"); fflush(stderr); return 0; } fprintf(stderr, "[reconnect failed, press return to retry]"); fflush(stderr); } fprintf(stderr, "[exiting]\n"); fflush(stderr); exit(0); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/rsa.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/rsa.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/rsa.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,151 +1,188 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: rsa.c,v 1.31 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: rsa.c,v 1.32 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * * * Description of the RSA algorithm can be found e.g. from the following * sources: * * Bruce Schneier: Applied Cryptography. John Wiley & Sons, 1994. * * Jennifer Seberry and Josed Pieprzyk: Cryptography: An Introduction to * Computer Security. Prentice-Hall, 1989. * * Man Young Rhee: Cryptography and Secure Data Communications. McGraw-Hill, * 1994. * * R. Rivest, A. Shamir, and L. M. Adleman: Cryptographic Communications * System and Method. US Patent 4,405,829, 1983. * * Hans Riesel: Prime Numbers and Computer Methods for Factorization. * Birkhauser, 1994. * * The RSA Frequently Asked Questions document by RSA Data Security, * Inc., 1995. * * RSA in 3 lines of perl by Adam Back , 1995, as * included below: * * [gone - had to be deleted - what a pity] */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include -#include "xmalloc.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "log.h" +#include "ssherr.h" -void +int rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key) { - u_char *inbuf, *outbuf; - int len, ilen, olen; + u_char *inbuf = NULL, *outbuf = NULL; + int len, ilen, olen, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; if (BN_num_bits(key->e) < 2 || !BN_is_odd(key->e)) - fatal("rsa_public_encrypt() exponent too small or not odd"); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; olen = BN_num_bytes(key->n); - outbuf = xmalloc(olen); + if ((outbuf = malloc(olen)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } ilen = BN_num_bytes(in); - inbuf = xmalloc(ilen); + if ((inbuf = malloc(ilen)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } BN_bn2bin(in, inbuf); if ((len = RSA_public_encrypt(ilen, inbuf, outbuf, key, - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) <= 0) - fatal("rsa_public_encrypt() failed"); + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) <= 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } - if (BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out) == NULL) - fatal("rsa_public_encrypt: BN_bin2bn failed"); + if (BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + r = 0; - explicit_bzero(outbuf, olen); - explicit_bzero(inbuf, ilen); - free(outbuf); - free(inbuf); + out: + if (outbuf != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(outbuf, olen); + free(outbuf); + } + if (inbuf != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(inbuf, ilen); + free(inbuf); + } + return r; } int rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *out, BIGNUM *in, RSA *key) { - u_char *inbuf, *outbuf; - int len, ilen, olen; + u_char *inbuf = NULL, *outbuf = NULL; + int len, ilen, olen, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; olen = BN_num_bytes(key->n); - outbuf = xmalloc(olen); + if ((outbuf = malloc(olen)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } ilen = BN_num_bytes(in); - inbuf = xmalloc(ilen); + if ((inbuf = malloc(ilen)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } BN_bn2bin(in, inbuf); if ((len = RSA_private_decrypt(ilen, inbuf, outbuf, key, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) <= 0) { - error("rsa_private_decrypt() failed"); - } else { - if (BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out) == NULL) - fatal("rsa_private_decrypt: BN_bin2bn failed"); + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } else if (BN_bin2bn(outbuf, len, out) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; } - explicit_bzero(outbuf, olen); - explicit_bzero(inbuf, ilen); - free(outbuf); - free(inbuf); - return len; + r = 0; + out: + if (outbuf != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(outbuf, olen); + free(outbuf); + } + if (inbuf != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(inbuf, ilen); + free(inbuf); + } + return r; } /* calculate p-1 and q-1 */ -void +int rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *rsa) { - BIGNUM *aux; - BN_CTX *ctx; + BIGNUM *aux = NULL; + BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; + int r; - if ((aux = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("rsa_generate_additional_parameters: BN_new failed"); if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) - fatal("rsa_generate_additional_parameters: BN_CTX_new failed"); + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((aux = BN_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } if ((BN_sub(aux, rsa->q, BN_value_one()) == 0) || (BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, rsa->d, aux, ctx) == 0) || (BN_sub(aux, rsa->p, BN_value_one()) == 0) || - (BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, aux, ctx) == 0)) - fatal("rsa_generate_additional_parameters: BN_sub/mod failed"); - + (BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, rsa->d, aux, ctx) == 0)) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + r = 0; + out: BN_clear_free(aux); BN_CTX_free(ctx); + return r; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/rsa.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/rsa.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/rsa.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,26 +1,26 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: rsa.h,v 1.16 2006/03/25 22:22:43 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: rsa.h,v 1.17 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * RSA key generation, encryption and decryption. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #ifndef RSA_H #define RSA_H #include #include -void rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, RSA *); +int rsa_public_encrypt(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, RSA *); int rsa_private_decrypt(BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, RSA *); -void rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *); +int rsa_generate_additional_parameters(RSA *); #endif /* RSA_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,240 +1,247 @@ /* * Copyright (c) 2012 Will Drewry * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* * Uncomment the SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG macro below to help diagnose * filter breakage during development. *Do not* use this in production, * as it relies on making library calls that are unsafe in signal context. * * Instead, live systems the auditctl(8) may be used to monitor failures. * E.g. * auditctl -a task,always -F uid= */ /* #define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG 1 */ +/* XXX it should be possible to do logging via the log socket safely */ + #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG /* Use the kernel headers in case of an older toolchain. */ # include # define __have_siginfo_t 1 # define __have_sigval_t 1 # define __have_sigevent_t 1 #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include /* for offsetof */ #include #include #include #include #include "log.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "xmalloc.h" /* Linux seccomp_filter sandbox */ #define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_KILL /* Use a signal handler to emit violations when debugging */ #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG # undef SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL # define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ /* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */ #define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno)) #define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \ BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, __NR_ ## _nr, 0, 1), \ BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW) /* Syscall filtering set for preauth. */ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = { /* Ensure the syscall arch convention is as expected. */ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch)), BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH, 1, 0), BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL), /* Load the syscall number for checking. */ BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)), SC_DENY(open, EACCES), + SC_DENY(stat, EACCES), SC_ALLOW(getpid), SC_ALLOW(gettimeofday), SC_ALLOW(clock_gettime), #ifdef __NR_time /* not defined on EABI ARM */ SC_ALLOW(time), #endif SC_ALLOW(read), SC_ALLOW(write), SC_ALLOW(close), #ifdef __NR_shutdown /* not defined on archs that go via socketcall(2) */ SC_ALLOW(shutdown), #endif SC_ALLOW(brk), SC_ALLOW(poll), #ifdef __NR__newselect SC_ALLOW(_newselect), #else SC_ALLOW(select), #endif SC_ALLOW(madvise), #ifdef __NR_mmap2 /* EABI ARM only has mmap2() */ SC_ALLOW(mmap2), #endif #ifdef __NR_mmap SC_ALLOW(mmap), +#endif +#ifdef __dietlibc__ + SC_ALLOW(mremap), + SC_ALLOW(exit), #endif SC_ALLOW(munmap), SC_ALLOW(exit_group), #ifdef __NR_rt_sigprocmask SC_ALLOW(rt_sigprocmask), #else SC_ALLOW(sigprocmask), #endif BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL), }; static const struct sock_fprog preauth_program = { .len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(preauth_insns)/sizeof(preauth_insns[0])), .filter = (struct sock_filter *)preauth_insns, }; struct ssh_sandbox { pid_t child_pid; }; struct ssh_sandbox * ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) { struct ssh_sandbox *box; /* * Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need * to return non-NULL to satisfy the API. */ debug3("%s: preparing seccomp filter sandbox", __func__); box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); box->child_pid = 0; return box; } #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG extern struct monitor *pmonitor; void mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, const char *msg, void *ctx); static void ssh_sandbox_violation(int signum, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context) { char msg[256]; snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "%s: unexpected system call (arch:0x%x,syscall:%d @ %p)", __func__, info->si_arch, info->si_syscall, info->si_call_addr); mm_log_handler(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, msg, pmonitor); _exit(1); } static void ssh_sandbox_child_debugging(void) { struct sigaction act; sigset_t mask; debug3("%s: installing SIGSYS handler", __func__); memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act)); sigemptyset(&mask); sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS); act.sa_sigaction = &ssh_sandbox_violation; act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO; if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL) == -1) fatal("%s: sigaction(SIGSYS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL) == -1) fatal("%s: sigprocmask(SIGSYS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ void ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { struct rlimit rl_zero; int nnp_failed = 0; /* Set rlimits for completeness if possible. */ rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0; if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1) fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1) fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1) fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); #ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG ssh_sandbox_child_debugging(); #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */ debug3("%s: setting PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS", __func__); if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1) { debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); nnp_failed = 1; } debug3("%s: attaching seccomp filter program", __func__); if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &preauth_program) == -1) debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); else if (nnp_failed) fatal("%s: SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER activated but " "PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS failed", __func__); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { free(box); debug3("%s: finished", __func__); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) { box->child_pid = child_pid; } #endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sandbox-systrace.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sandbox-systrace.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sandbox-systrace.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,200 +1,210 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-systrace.c,v 1.9 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-systrace.c,v 1.13 2014/07/17 00:10:56 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef SANDBOX_SYSTRACE #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "atomicio.h" #include "log.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "xmalloc.h" struct sandbox_policy { int syscall; int action; }; /* Permitted syscalls in preauth. Unlisted syscalls get SYSTR_POLICY_KILL */ static const struct sandbox_policy preauth_policy[] = { { SYS_open, SYSTR_POLICY_NEVER }, +#ifdef SYS_getentropy + /* OpenBSD 5.6 and newer use getentropy(2) to seed arc4random(3). */ + { SYS_getentropy, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, +#else + /* Previous releases used sysctl(3)'s kern.arnd variable. */ { SYS___sysctl, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, +#endif + +#ifdef SYS_sendsyslog + { SYS_sendsyslog, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, +#endif { SYS_close, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_exit, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_getpid, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_gettimeofday, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_clock_gettime, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_madvise, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_mmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_mprotect, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_mquery, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_poll, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_munmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_read, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_select, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_shutdown, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_sigprocmask, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { SYS_write, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT }, { -1, -1 } }; struct ssh_sandbox { int systrace_fd; pid_t child_pid; void (*osigchld)(int); }; struct ssh_sandbox * ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor) { struct ssh_sandbox *box; debug3("%s: preparing systrace sandbox", __func__); box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box)); box->systrace_fd = -1; box->child_pid = 0; box->osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN); return box; } void ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { debug3("%s: ready", __func__); signal(SIGCHLD, box->osigchld); if (kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP) != 0) fatal("%s: kill(%d, SIGSTOP)", __func__, getpid()); debug3("%s: started", __func__); } static void ssh_sandbox_parent(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid, const struct sandbox_policy *allowed_syscalls) { int dev_systrace, i, j, found, status; pid_t pid; struct systrace_policy policy; /* Wait for the child to send itself a SIGSTOP */ debug3("%s: wait for child %ld", __func__, (long)child_pid); do { pid = waitpid(child_pid, &status, WUNTRACED); } while (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR); signal(SIGCHLD, box->osigchld); if (!WIFSTOPPED(status)) { if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) fatal("%s: child terminated with signal %d", __func__, WTERMSIG(status)); if (WIFEXITED(status)) fatal("%s: child exited with status %d", __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status)); fatal("%s: child not stopped", __func__); } debug3("%s: child %ld stopped", __func__, (long)child_pid); box->child_pid = child_pid; /* Set up systracing of child */ if ((dev_systrace = open("/dev/systrace", O_RDONLY)) == -1) fatal("%s: open(\"/dev/systrace\"): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (ioctl(dev_systrace, STRIOCCLONE, &box->systrace_fd) == -1) fatal("%s: ioctl(STRIOCCLONE, %d): %s", __func__, dev_systrace, strerror(errno)); close(dev_systrace); debug3("%s: systrace attach, fd=%d", __func__, box->systrace_fd); if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCATTACH, &child_pid) == -1) fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCATTACH, %d): %s", __func__, box->systrace_fd, child_pid, strerror(errno)); /* Allocate and assign policy */ memset(&policy, 0, sizeof(policy)); policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_NEW; policy.strp_maxents = SYS_MAXSYSCALL; if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1) fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (new)): %s", __func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno)); policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_ASSIGN; policy.strp_pid = box->child_pid; if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1) fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (assign)): %s", __func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno)); /* Set per-syscall policy */ for (i = 0; i < SYS_MAXSYSCALL; i++) { found = 0; for (j = 0; allowed_syscalls[j].syscall != -1; j++) { if (allowed_syscalls[j].syscall == i) { found = 1; break; } } policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_MODIFY; policy.strp_code = i; policy.strp_policy = found ? allowed_syscalls[j].action : SYSTR_POLICY_KILL; if (found) debug3("%s: policy: enable syscall %d", __func__, i); if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1) fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (modify)): %s", __func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno)); } /* Signal the child to start running */ debug3("%s: start child %ld", __func__, (long)child_pid); if (kill(box->child_pid, SIGCONT) != 0) fatal("%s: kill(%d, SIGCONT)", __func__, box->child_pid); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box) { /* Closing this before the child exits will terminate it */ close(box->systrace_fd); free(box); debug3("%s: finished", __func__); } void ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid) { ssh_sandbox_parent(box, child_pid, preauth_policy); } #endif /* SANDBOX_SYSTRACE */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/scp.0 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/scp.0 (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/scp.0 (revision 276707) @@ -1,163 +1,162 @@ -SCP(1) OpenBSD Reference Manual SCP(1) +SCP(1) General Commands Manual SCP(1) NAME scp - secure copy (remote file copy program) SYNOPSIS scp [-12346BCpqrv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program] [[user@]host1:]file1 ... [[user@]host2:]file2 DESCRIPTION scp copies files between hosts on a network. It uses ssh(1) for data transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the same security - as ssh(1). Unlike rcp(1), scp will ask for passwords or passphrases if - they are needed for authentication. + as ssh(1). scp will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed + for authentication. File names may contain a user and host specification to indicate that the file is to be copied to/from that host. Local file names can be made explicit using absolute or relative pathnames to avoid scp treating file names containing `:' as host specifiers. Copies between two remote hosts are also permitted. The options are as follows: -1 Forces scp to use protocol 1. -2 Forces scp to use protocol 2. -3 Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local host. Without this option the data is copied directly between the two remote hosts. Note that this option disables the progress meter. -4 Forces scp to use IPv4 addresses only. -6 Forces scp to use IPv6 addresses only. -B Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or passphrases). -C Compression enable. Passes the -C flag to ssh(1) to enable compression. -c cipher Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer. This option is directly passed to ssh(1). -F ssh_config Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for ssh. This option is directly passed to ssh(1). -i identity_file Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key authentication is read. This option is directly passed to ssh(1). -l limit Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s. -o ssh_option Can be used to pass options to ssh in the format used in ssh_config(5). This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate scp command-line flag. For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see ssh_config(5). AddressFamily BatchMode BindAddress CanonicalDomains CanonicalizeFallbackLocal CanonicalizeHostname CanonicalizeMaxDots CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs ChallengeResponseAuthentication CheckHostIP Cipher Ciphers Compression CompressionLevel ConnectionAttempts ConnectTimeout ControlMaster ControlPath ControlPersist GlobalKnownHostsFile GSSAPIAuthentication GSSAPIDelegateCredentials HashKnownHosts Host HostbasedAuthentication HostKeyAlgorithms HostKeyAlias HostName IdentityFile IdentitiesOnly IPQoS KbdInteractiveAuthentication KbdInteractiveDevices KexAlgorithms LogLevel MACs NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost NumberOfPasswordPrompts PasswordAuthentication PKCS11Provider Port PreferredAuthentications Protocol ProxyCommand PubkeyAuthentication RekeyLimit RhostsRSAAuthentication RSAAuthentication SendEnv ServerAliveInterval ServerAliveCountMax StrictHostKeyChecking TCPKeepAlive UsePrivilegedPort User UserKnownHostsFile VerifyHostKeyDNS -P port Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host. Note that this option is written with a capital `P', because -p is already - reserved for preserving the times and modes of the file in - rcp(1). + reserved for preserving the times and modes of the file. -p Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the original file. -q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and diagnostic messages from ssh(1). -r Recursively copy entire directories. Note that scp follows symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal. -S program Name of program to use for the encrypted connection. The program must understand ssh(1) options. -v Verbose mode. Causes scp and ssh(1) to print debugging messages about their progress. This is helpful in debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems. EXIT STATUS The scp utility exits 0 on success, and >0 if an error occurs. SEE ALSO - rcp(1), sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), - ssh_config(5), sshd(8) + sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5), + sshd(8) HISTORY - scp is based on the rcp(1) program in BSD source code from the Regents of + scp is based on the rcp program in BSD source code from the Regents of the University of California. AUTHORS Timo Rinne Tatu Ylonen -OpenBSD 5.5 October 20, 2013 OpenBSD 5.5 +OpenBSD 5.6 March 19, 2014 OpenBSD 5.6 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/scp.1 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/scp.1 (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/scp.1 (revision 276707) @@ -1,245 +1,239 @@ .\" .\" scp.1 .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" Created: Sun May 7 00:14:37 1995 ylo .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.61 2013/10/20 09:51:26 djm Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.62 2014/03/19 14:42:44 tedu Exp $ .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: October 20 2013 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: March 19 2014 $ .Dt SCP 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm scp .Nd secure copy (remote file copy program) .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm scp .Bk -words .Op Fl 12346BCpqrv .Op Fl c Ar cipher .Op Fl F Ar ssh_config .Op Fl i Ar identity_file .Op Fl l Ar limit .Op Fl o Ar ssh_option .Op Fl P Ar port .Op Fl S Ar program .Sm off .Oo .Op Ar user No @ .Ar host1 No : .Oc Ar file1 .Sm on .Ar ... .Sm off .Oo .Op Ar user No @ .Ar host2 No : .Oc Ar file2 .Sm on .Ek .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm copies files between hosts on a network. It uses .Xr ssh 1 for data transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the same security as .Xr ssh 1 . -Unlike -.Xr rcp 1 , .Nm will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed for authentication. .Pp File names may contain a user and host specification to indicate that the file is to be copied to/from that host. Local file names can be made explicit using absolute or relative pathnames to avoid .Nm treating file names containing .Sq :\& as host specifiers. Copies between two remote hosts are also permitted. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl 1 Forces .Nm to use protocol 1. .It Fl 2 Forces .Nm to use protocol 2. .It Fl 3 Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local host. Without this option the data is copied directly between the two remote hosts. Note that this option disables the progress meter. .It Fl 4 Forces .Nm to use IPv4 addresses only. .It Fl 6 Forces .Nm to use IPv6 addresses only. .It Fl B Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or passphrases). .It Fl C Compression enable. Passes the .Fl C flag to .Xr ssh 1 to enable compression. .It Fl c Ar cipher Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer. This option is directly passed to .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl F Ar ssh_config Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for .Nm ssh . This option is directly passed to .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl i Ar identity_file Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key authentication is read. This option is directly passed to .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl l Ar limit Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s. .It Fl o Ar ssh_option Can be used to pass options to .Nm ssh in the format used in .Xr ssh_config 5 . This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate .Nm scp command-line flag. For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact .It AddressFamily .It BatchMode .It BindAddress .It CanonicalDomains .It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal .It CanonicalizeHostname .It CanonicalizeMaxDots .It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs .It ChallengeResponseAuthentication .It CheckHostIP .It Cipher .It Ciphers .It Compression .It CompressionLevel .It ConnectionAttempts .It ConnectTimeout .It ControlMaster .It ControlPath .It ControlPersist .It GlobalKnownHostsFile .It GSSAPIAuthentication .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials .It HashKnownHosts .It Host .It HostbasedAuthentication .It HostKeyAlgorithms .It HostKeyAlias .It HostName .It IdentityFile .It IdentitiesOnly .It IPQoS .It KbdInteractiveAuthentication .It KbdInteractiveDevices .It KexAlgorithms .It LogLevel .It MACs .It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost .It NumberOfPasswordPrompts .It PasswordAuthentication .It PKCS11Provider .It Port .It PreferredAuthentications .It Protocol .It ProxyCommand .It PubkeyAuthentication .It RekeyLimit .It RhostsRSAAuthentication .It RSAAuthentication .It SendEnv .It ServerAliveInterval .It ServerAliveCountMax .It StrictHostKeyChecking .It TCPKeepAlive .It UsePrivilegedPort .It User .It UserKnownHostsFile .It VerifyHostKeyDNS .El .It Fl P Ar port Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host. Note that this option is written with a capital .Sq P , because .Fl p -is already reserved for preserving the times and modes of the file in -.Xr rcp 1 . +is already reserved for preserving the times and modes of the file. .It Fl p Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the original file. .It Fl q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and diagnostic messages from .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl r Recursively copy entire directories. Note that .Nm follows symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal. .It Fl S Ar program Name of .Ar program to use for the encrypted connection. The program must understand .Xr ssh 1 options. .It Fl v Verbose mode. Causes .Nm and .Xr ssh 1 to print debugging messages about their progress. This is helpful in debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems. .El .Sh EXIT STATUS .Ex -std scp .Sh SEE ALSO -.Xr rcp 1 , .Xr sftp 1 , .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr ssh_config 5 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh HISTORY .Nm -is based on the -.Xr rcp 1 -program in +is based on the rcp program in .Bx source code from the Regents of the University of California. .Sh AUTHORS .An Timo Rinne Aq Mt tri@iki.fi .An Tatu Ylonen Aq Mt ylo@cs.hut.fi Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/scp.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/scp.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/scp.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,1346 +1,1350 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.179 2013/11/20 20:53:10 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.180 2014/06/24 02:21:01 djm Exp $ */ /* * scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd). * * NOTE: This version should NOT be suid root. (This uses ssh to * do the transfer and ssh has the necessary privileges.) * * 1995 Timo Rinne , Tatu Ylonen * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ /* * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * Parts from: * * Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_POLL_H #include #else # ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H # include # endif #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) #include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "progressmeter.h" extern char *__progname; #define COPY_BUFLEN 16384 int do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout); int do_cmd2(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int fdin, int fdout); /* Struct for addargs */ arglist args; arglist remote_remote_args; /* Bandwidth limit */ long long limit_kbps = 0; struct bwlimit bwlimit; /* Name of current file being transferred. */ char *curfile; /* This is set to non-zero to enable verbose mode. */ int verbose_mode = 0; /* This is set to zero if the progressmeter is not desired. */ int showprogress = 1; /* * This is set to non-zero if remote-remote copy should be piped * through this process. */ int throughlocal = 0; /* This is the program to execute for the secured connection. ("ssh" or -S) */ char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM; /* This is used to store the pid of ssh_program */ pid_t do_cmd_pid = -1; static void killchild(int signo) { if (do_cmd_pid > 1) { kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM); waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0); } if (signo) _exit(1); exit(1); } static void suspchild(int signo) { int status; if (do_cmd_pid > 1) { kill(do_cmd_pid, signo); while (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, WUNTRACED) == -1 && errno == EINTR) ; kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP); } } static int do_local_cmd(arglist *a) { u_int i; int status; pid_t pid; if (a->num == 0) fatal("do_local_cmd: no arguments"); if (verbose_mode) { fprintf(stderr, "Executing:"); for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++) fprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } if ((pid = fork()) == -1) fatal("do_local_cmd: fork: %s", strerror(errno)); if (pid == 0) { execvp(a->list[0], a->list); perror(a->list[0]); exit(1); } do_cmd_pid = pid; signal(SIGTERM, killchild); signal(SIGINT, killchild); signal(SIGHUP, killchild); while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("do_local_cmd: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno)); do_cmd_pid = -1; if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) return (-1); return (0); } /* * This function executes the given command as the specified user on the * given host. This returns < 0 if execution fails, and >= 0 otherwise. This * assigns the input and output file descriptors on success. */ int do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout) { int pin[2], pout[2], reserved[2]; if (verbose_mode) fprintf(stderr, "Executing: program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n", ssh_program, host, remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd); /* * Reserve two descriptors so that the real pipes won't get * descriptors 0 and 1 because that will screw up dup2 below. */ if (pipe(reserved) < 0) fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Create a socket pair for communicating with ssh. */ if (pipe(pin) < 0) fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); if (pipe(pout) < 0) fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Free the reserved descriptors. */ close(reserved[0]); close(reserved[1]); signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild); signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild); signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild); /* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */ do_cmd_pid = fork(); if (do_cmd_pid == 0) { /* Child. */ close(pin[1]); close(pout[0]); dup2(pin[0], 0); dup2(pout[1], 1); close(pin[0]); close(pout[1]); replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program); if (remuser != NULL) { addargs(&args, "-l"); addargs(&args, "%s", remuser); } addargs(&args, "--"); addargs(&args, "%s", host); addargs(&args, "%s", cmd); execvp(ssh_program, args.list); perror(ssh_program); exit(1); } else if (do_cmd_pid == -1) { fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); } /* Parent. Close the other side, and return the local side. */ close(pin[0]); *fdout = pin[1]; close(pout[1]); *fdin = pout[0]; signal(SIGTERM, killchild); signal(SIGINT, killchild); signal(SIGHUP, killchild); return 0; } /* * This functions executes a command simlar to do_cmd(), but expects the * input and output descriptors to be setup by a previous call to do_cmd(). * This way the input and output of two commands can be connected. */ int do_cmd2(char *host, char *remuser, char *cmd, int fdin, int fdout) { pid_t pid; int status; if (verbose_mode) fprintf(stderr, "Executing: 2nd program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n", ssh_program, host, remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd); /* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */ pid = fork(); if (pid == 0) { dup2(fdin, 0); dup2(fdout, 1); replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program); if (remuser != NULL) { addargs(&args, "-l"); addargs(&args, "%s", remuser); } addargs(&args, "--"); addargs(&args, "%s", host); addargs(&args, "%s", cmd); execvp(ssh_program, args.list); perror(ssh_program); exit(1); } else if (pid == -1) { fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); } while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("do_cmd2: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno)); return 0; } typedef struct { size_t cnt; char *buf; } BUF; BUF *allocbuf(BUF *, int, int); void lostconn(int); int okname(char *); void run_err(const char *,...); void verifydir(char *); struct passwd *pwd; uid_t userid; int errs, remin, remout; int pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory; #define CMDNEEDS 64 char cmd[CMDNEEDS]; /* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */ int response(void); void rsource(char *, struct stat *); void sink(int, char *[]); void source(int, char *[]); void tolocal(int, char *[]); void toremote(char *, int, char *[]); void usage(void); int main(int argc, char **argv) { int ch, fflag, tflag, status, n; char *targ, **newargv; const char *errstr; extern char *optarg; extern int optind; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); /* Copy argv, because we modify it */ newargv = xcalloc(MAX(argc + 1, 1), sizeof(*newargv)); for (n = 0; n < argc; n++) newargv[n] = xstrdup(argv[n]); argv = newargv; __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args)); memset(&remote_remote_args, '\0', sizeof(remote_remote_args)); args.list = remote_remote_args.list = NULL; addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program); addargs(&args, "-x"); addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent=no"); addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand=no"); addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes"); fflag = tflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "dfl:prtvBCc:i:P:q12346S:o:F:")) != -1) switch (ch) { /* User-visible flags. */ case '1': case '2': case '4': case '6': case 'C': addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch); break; case '3': throughlocal = 1; break; case 'o': case 'c': case 'i': case 'F': addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "%s", optarg); addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); addargs(&args, "%s", optarg); break; case 'P': addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-p"); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "%s", optarg); addargs(&args, "-p"); addargs(&args, "%s", optarg); break; case 'B': addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-oBatchmode=yes"); addargs(&args, "-oBatchmode=yes"); break; case 'l': limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) usage(); limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */ bandwidth_limit_init(&bwlimit, limit_kbps, COPY_BUFLEN); break; case 'p': pflag = 1; break; case 'r': iamrecursive = 1; break; case 'S': ssh_program = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'v': addargs(&args, "-v"); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-v"); verbose_mode = 1; break; case 'q': addargs(&args, "-q"); addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-q"); showprogress = 0; break; /* Server options. */ case 'd': targetshouldbedirectory = 1; break; case 'f': /* "from" */ iamremote = 1; fflag = 1; break; case 't': /* "to" */ iamremote = 1; tflag = 1; #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN setmode(0, O_BINARY); #endif break; default: usage(); } argc -= optind; argv += optind; if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL) fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid); if (!isatty(STDOUT_FILENO)) showprogress = 0; remin = STDIN_FILENO; remout = STDOUT_FILENO; if (fflag) { /* Follow "protocol", send data. */ (void) response(); source(argc, argv); exit(errs != 0); } if (tflag) { /* Receive data. */ sink(argc, argv); exit(errs != 0); } if (argc < 2) usage(); if (argc > 2) targetshouldbedirectory = 1; remin = remout = -1; do_cmd_pid = -1; /* Command to be executed on remote system using "ssh". */ (void) snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "scp%s%s%s%s", verbose_mode ? " -v" : "", iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "", targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : ""); (void) signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn); if ((targ = colon(argv[argc - 1]))) /* Dest is remote host. */ toremote(targ, argc, argv); else { if (targetshouldbedirectory) verifydir(argv[argc - 1]); tolocal(argc, argv); /* Dest is local host. */ } /* * Finally check the exit status of the ssh process, if one was forked * and no error has occurred yet */ if (do_cmd_pid != -1 && errs == 0) { if (remin != -1) (void) close(remin); if (remout != -1) (void) close(remout); if (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, 0) == -1) errs = 1; else { if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) errs = 1; } } exit(errs != 0); } /* Callback from atomicio6 to update progress meter and limit bandwidth */ static int scpio(void *_cnt, size_t s) { off_t *cnt = (off_t *)_cnt; *cnt += s; if (limit_kbps > 0) bandwidth_limit(&bwlimit, s); return 0; } static int do_times(int fd, int verb, const struct stat *sb) { /* strlen(2^64) == 20; strlen(10^6) == 7 */ char buf[(20 + 7 + 2) * 2 + 2]; (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "T%llu 0 %llu 0\n", (unsigned long long) (sb->st_mtime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_mtime), (unsigned long long) (sb->st_atime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_atime)); if (verb) { fprintf(stderr, "File mtime %lld atime %lld\n", (long long)sb->st_mtime, (long long)sb->st_atime); fprintf(stderr, "Sending file timestamps: %s", buf); } (void) atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, strlen(buf)); return (response()); } void toremote(char *targ, int argc, char **argv) { char *bp, *host, *src, *suser, *thost, *tuser, *arg; arglist alist; int i; u_int j; memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist)); alist.list = NULL; *targ++ = 0; if (*targ == 0) targ = "."; arg = xstrdup(argv[argc - 1]); if ((thost = strrchr(arg, '@'))) { /* user@host */ *thost++ = 0; tuser = arg; if (*tuser == '\0') tuser = NULL; } else { thost = arg; tuser = NULL; } if (tuser != NULL && !okname(tuser)) { free(arg); return; } for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) { src = colon(argv[i]); if (src && throughlocal) { /* extended remote to remote */ *src++ = 0; if (*src == 0) src = "."; host = strrchr(argv[i], '@'); if (host) { *host++ = 0; host = cleanhostname(host); suser = argv[i]; if (*suser == '\0') suser = pwd->pw_name; else if (!okname(suser)) continue; } else { host = cleanhostname(argv[i]); suser = NULL; } xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s", cmd, *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src); if (do_cmd(host, suser, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) exit(1); free(bp); host = cleanhostname(thost); xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd, *targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ); if (do_cmd2(host, tuser, bp, remin, remout) < 0) exit(1); free(bp); (void) close(remin); (void) close(remout); remin = remout = -1; } else if (src) { /* standard remote to remote */ freeargs(&alist); addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program); addargs(&alist, "-x"); addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes"); addargs(&alist, "-n"); for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) { addargs(&alist, "%s", remote_remote_args.list[j]); } *src++ = 0; if (*src == 0) src = "."; host = strrchr(argv[i], '@'); if (host) { *host++ = 0; host = cleanhostname(host); suser = argv[i]; if (*suser == '\0') suser = pwd->pw_name; else if (!okname(suser)) continue; addargs(&alist, "-l"); addargs(&alist, "%s", suser); } else { host = cleanhostname(argv[i]); } addargs(&alist, "--"); addargs(&alist, "%s", host); addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd); addargs(&alist, "%s", src); addargs(&alist, "%s%s%s:%s", tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "", thost, targ); if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0) errs = 1; } else { /* local to remote */ if (remin == -1) { xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd, *targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ); host = cleanhostname(thost); if (do_cmd(host, tuser, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) exit(1); if (response() < 0) exit(1); free(bp); } source(1, argv + i); } } free(arg); } void tolocal(int argc, char **argv) { char *bp, *host, *src, *suser; arglist alist; int i; memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist)); alist.list = NULL; for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) { if (!(src = colon(argv[i]))) { /* Local to local. */ freeargs(&alist); addargs(&alist, "%s", _PATH_CP); if (iamrecursive) addargs(&alist, "-r"); if (pflag) addargs(&alist, "-p"); addargs(&alist, "--"); addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[i]); addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[argc-1]); if (do_local_cmd(&alist)) ++errs; continue; } *src++ = 0; if (*src == 0) src = "."; if ((host = strrchr(argv[i], '@')) == NULL) { host = argv[i]; suser = NULL; } else { *host++ = 0; suser = argv[i]; if (*suser == '\0') suser = pwd->pw_name; } host = cleanhostname(host); xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s", cmd, *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src); if (do_cmd(host, suser, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) { free(bp); ++errs; continue; } free(bp); sink(1, argv + argc - 1); (void) close(remin); remin = remout = -1; } } void source(int argc, char **argv) { struct stat stb; static BUF buffer; BUF *bp; off_t i, statbytes; - size_t amt; + size_t amt, nr; int fd = -1, haderr, indx; char *last, *name, buf[2048], encname[MAXPATHLEN]; int len; for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) { name = argv[indx]; statbytes = 0; len = strlen(name); while (len > 1 && name[len-1] == '/') name[--len] = '\0'; if ((fd = open(name, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK, 0)) < 0) goto syserr; if (strchr(name, '\n') != NULL) { strnvis(encname, name, sizeof(encname), VIS_NL); name = encname; } if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) { syserr: run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno)); goto next; } if (stb.st_size < 0) { run_err("%s: %s", name, "Negative file size"); goto next; } unset_nonblock(fd); switch (stb.st_mode & S_IFMT) { case S_IFREG: break; case S_IFDIR: if (iamrecursive) { rsource(name, &stb); goto next; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: run_err("%s: not a regular file", name); goto next; } if ((last = strrchr(name, '/')) == NULL) last = name; else ++last; curfile = last; if (pflag) { if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, &stb) < 0) goto next; } #define FILEMODEMASK (S_ISUID|S_ISGID|S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO) snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lld %s\n", (u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), (long long)stb.st_size, last); if (verbose_mode) { fprintf(stderr, "Sending file modes: %s", buf); } (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, buf, strlen(buf)); if (response() < 0) goto next; if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, fd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) { next: if (fd != -1) { (void) close(fd); fd = -1; } continue; } if (showprogress) start_progress_meter(curfile, stb.st_size, &statbytes); set_nonblock(remout); for (haderr = i = 0; i < stb.st_size; i += bp->cnt) { amt = bp->cnt; if (i + (off_t)amt > stb.st_size) amt = stb.st_size - i; if (!haderr) { - if (atomicio(read, fd, bp->buf, amt) != amt) + if ((nr = atomicio(read, fd, + bp->buf, amt)) != amt) { haderr = errno; + memset(bp->buf + nr, 0, amt - nr); + } } /* Keep writing after error to retain sync */ if (haderr) { (void)atomicio(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt); + memset(bp->buf, 0, amt); continue; } if (atomicio6(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt, scpio, &statbytes) != amt) haderr = errno; } unset_nonblock(remout); if (showprogress) stop_progress_meter(); if (fd != -1) { if (close(fd) < 0 && !haderr) haderr = errno; fd = -1; } if (!haderr) (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); else run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(haderr)); (void) response(); } } void rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp) { DIR *dirp; struct dirent *dp; char *last, *vect[1], path[MAXPATHLEN]; if (!(dirp = opendir(name))) { run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno)); return; } last = strrchr(name, '/'); if (last == 0) last = name; else last++; if (pflag) { if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, statp) < 0) { closedir(dirp); return; } } (void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "D%04o %d %.1024s\n", (u_int) (statp->st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), 0, last); if (verbose_mode) fprintf(stderr, "Entering directory: %s", path); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, path, strlen(path)); if (response() < 0) { closedir(dirp); return; } while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) { if (dp->d_ino == 0) continue; if (!strcmp(dp->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(dp->d_name, "..")) continue; if (strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(dp->d_name) >= sizeof(path) - 1) { run_err("%s/%s: name too long", name, dp->d_name); continue; } (void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/%s", name, dp->d_name); vect[0] = path; source(1, vect); } (void) closedir(dirp); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "E\n", 2); (void) response(); } void sink(int argc, char **argv) { static BUF buffer; struct stat stb; enum { YES, NO, DISPLAYED } wrerr; BUF *bp; off_t i; size_t j, count; int amt, exists, first, ofd; mode_t mode, omode, mask; off_t size, statbytes; unsigned long long ull; int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0; char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048]; struct timeval tv[2]; #define atime tv[0] #define mtime tv[1] #define SCREWUP(str) { why = str; goto screwup; } setimes = targisdir = 0; mask = umask(0); if (!pflag) (void) umask(mask); if (argc != 1) { run_err("ambiguous target"); exit(1); } targ = *argv; if (targetshouldbedirectory) verifydir(targ); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) targisdir = 1; for (first = 1;; first = 0) { cp = buf; if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1) return; if (*cp++ == '\n') SCREWUP("unexpected "); do { if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch)) SCREWUP("lost connection"); *cp++ = ch; } while (cp < &buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] && ch != '\n'); *cp = 0; if (verbose_mode) fprintf(stderr, "Sink: %s", buf); if (buf[0] == '\01' || buf[0] == '\02') { if (iamremote == 0) (void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, buf + 1, strlen(buf + 1)); if (buf[0] == '\02') exit(1); ++errs; continue; } if (buf[0] == 'E') { (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); return; } if (ch == '\n') *--cp = 0; cp = buf; if (*cp == 'T') { setimes++; cp++; if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp)) SCREWUP("mtime.sec not present"); ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("mtime.sec not delimited"); if ((time_t)ull < 0 || (unsigned long long)(time_t)ull != ull) setimes = 0; /* out of range */ mtime.tv_sec = ull; mtime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ' || mtime.tv_usec < 0 || mtime.tv_usec > 999999) SCREWUP("mtime.usec not delimited"); if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp)) SCREWUP("atime.sec not present"); ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("atime.sec not delimited"); if ((time_t)ull < 0 || (unsigned long long)(time_t)ull != ull) setimes = 0; /* out of range */ atime.tv_sec = ull; atime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10); if (!cp || *cp++ != '\0' || atime.tv_usec < 0 || atime.tv_usec > 999999) SCREWUP("atime.usec not delimited"); (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); continue; } if (*cp != 'C' && *cp != 'D') { /* * Check for the case "rcp remote:foo\* local:bar". * In this case, the line "No match." can be returned * by the shell before the rcp command on the remote is * executed so the ^Aerror_message convention isn't * followed. */ if (first) { run_err("%s", cp); exit(1); } SCREWUP("expected control record"); } mode = 0; for (++cp; cp < buf + 5; cp++) { if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '7') SCREWUP("bad mode"); mode = (mode << 3) | (*cp - '0'); } if (*cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("mode not delimited"); for (size = 0; isdigit((unsigned char)*cp);) size = size * 10 + (*cp++ - '0'); if (*cp++ != ' ') SCREWUP("size not delimited"); if ((strchr(cp, '/') != NULL) || (strcmp(cp, "..") == 0)) { run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp); exit(1); } if (targisdir) { static char *namebuf; static size_t cursize; size_t need; need = strlen(targ) + strlen(cp) + 250; if (need > cursize) { free(namebuf); namebuf = xmalloc(need); cursize = need; } (void) snprintf(namebuf, need, "%s%s%s", targ, strcmp(targ, "/") ? "/" : "", cp); np = namebuf; } else np = targ; curfile = cp; exists = stat(np, &stb) == 0; if (buf[0] == 'D') { int mod_flag = pflag; if (!iamrecursive) SCREWUP("received directory without -r"); if (exists) { if (!S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) { errno = ENOTDIR; goto bad; } if (pflag) (void) chmod(np, mode); } else { /* Handle copying from a read-only directory */ mod_flag = 1; if (mkdir(np, mode | S_IRWXU) < 0) goto bad; } vect[0] = xstrdup(np); sink(1, vect); if (setimes) { setimes = 0; if (utimes(vect[0], tv) < 0) run_err("%s: set times: %s", vect[0], strerror(errno)); } if (mod_flag) (void) chmod(vect[0], mode); free(vect[0]); continue; } omode = mode; mode |= S_IWUSR; if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) < 0) { bad: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno)); continue; } (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, ofd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) { (void) close(ofd); continue; } cp = bp->buf; wrerr = NO; statbytes = 0; if (showprogress) start_progress_meter(curfile, size, &statbytes); set_nonblock(remin); for (count = i = 0; i < size; i += bp->cnt) { amt = bp->cnt; if (i + amt > size) amt = size - i; count += amt; do { j = atomicio6(read, remin, cp, amt, scpio, &statbytes); if (j == 0) { run_err("%s", j != EPIPE ? strerror(errno) : "dropped connection"); exit(1); } amt -= j; cp += j; } while (amt > 0); if (count == bp->cnt) { /* Keep reading so we stay sync'd up. */ if (wrerr == NO) { if (atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count) != count) { wrerr = YES; wrerrno = errno; } } count = 0; cp = bp->buf; } } unset_nonblock(remin); if (showprogress) stop_progress_meter(); if (count != 0 && wrerr == NO && atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count) != count) { wrerr = YES; wrerrno = errno; } if (wrerr == NO && (!exists || S_ISREG(stb.st_mode)) && ftruncate(ofd, size) != 0) { run_err("%s: truncate: %s", np, strerror(errno)); wrerr = DISPLAYED; } if (pflag) { if (exists || omode != mode) #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD if (fchmod(ofd, omode)) { #else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ if (chmod(np, omode)) { #endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ run_err("%s: set mode: %s", np, strerror(errno)); wrerr = DISPLAYED; } } else { if (!exists && omode != mode) #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD if (fchmod(ofd, omode & ~mask)) { #else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ if (chmod(np, omode & ~mask)) { #endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ run_err("%s: set mode: %s", np, strerror(errno)); wrerr = DISPLAYED; } } if (close(ofd) == -1) { wrerr = YES; wrerrno = errno; } (void) response(); if (setimes && wrerr == NO) { setimes = 0; if (utimes(np, tv) < 0) { run_err("%s: set times: %s", np, strerror(errno)); wrerr = DISPLAYED; } } switch (wrerr) { case YES: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(wrerrno)); break; case NO: (void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1); break; case DISPLAYED: break; } } screwup: run_err("protocol error: %s", why); exit(1); } int response(void) { char ch, *cp, resp, rbuf[2048]; if (atomicio(read, remin, &resp, sizeof(resp)) != sizeof(resp)) lostconn(0); cp = rbuf; switch (resp) { case 0: /* ok */ return (0); default: *cp++ = resp; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 1: /* error, followed by error msg */ case 2: /* fatal error, "" */ do { if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch)) lostconn(0); *cp++ = ch; } while (cp < &rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] && ch != '\n'); if (!iamremote) (void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO, rbuf, cp - rbuf); ++errs; if (resp == 1) return (-1); exit(1); } /* NOTREACHED */ } void usage(void) { (void) fprintf(stderr, "usage: scp [-12346BCpqrv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]\n" " [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program]\n" " [[user@]host1:]file1 ... [[user@]host2:]file2\n"); exit(1); } void run_err(const char *fmt,...) { static FILE *fp; va_list ap; ++errs; if (fp != NULL || (remout != -1 && (fp = fdopen(remout, "w")))) { (void) fprintf(fp, "%c", 0x01); (void) fprintf(fp, "scp: "); va_start(ap, fmt); (void) vfprintf(fp, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); (void) fprintf(fp, "\n"); (void) fflush(fp); } if (!iamremote) { va_start(ap, fmt); vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap); va_end(ap); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } } void verifydir(char *cp) { struct stat stb; if (!stat(cp, &stb)) { if (S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) return; errno = ENOTDIR; } run_err("%s: %s", cp, strerror(errno)); killchild(0); } int okname(char *cp0) { int c; char *cp; cp = cp0; do { c = (int)*cp; if (c & 0200) goto bad; if (!isalpha(c) && !isdigit((unsigned char)c)) { switch (c) { case '\'': case '"': case '`': case ' ': case '#': goto bad; default: break; } } } while (*++cp); return (1); bad: fprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid user name\n", cp0); return (0); } BUF * allocbuf(BUF *bp, int fd, int blksize) { size_t size; #ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE struct stat stb; if (fstat(fd, &stb) < 0) { run_err("fstat: %s", strerror(errno)); return (0); } size = roundup(stb.st_blksize, blksize); if (size == 0) size = blksize; #else /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */ size = blksize; #endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */ if (bp->cnt >= size) return (bp); if (bp->buf == NULL) bp->buf = xmalloc(size); else bp->buf = xrealloc(bp->buf, 1, size); memset(bp->buf, 0, size); bp->cnt = size; return (bp); } void lostconn(int signo) { if (!iamremote) (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "lost connection\n", 16); if (signo) _exit(1); else exit(1); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/servconf.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/servconf.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/servconf.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,2082 +1,2131 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.249 2014/01/29 06:18:35 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.251 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "log.h" #include "buffer.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "compat.h" #include "pathnames.h" -#include "misc.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "key.h" #include "kex.h" #include "mac.h" #include "match.h" #include "channels.h" #include "groupaccess.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "packet.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int); static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, char *, int); /* Use of privilege separation or not */ extern int use_privsep; extern Buffer cfg; /* Initializes the server options to their default values. */ void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options) { memset(options, 0, sizeof(*options)); /* Portable-specific options */ options->use_pam = -1; /* Standard Options */ options->num_ports = 0; options->ports_from_cmdline = 0; options->listen_addrs = NULL; options->address_family = -1; options->num_host_key_files = 0; options->num_host_cert_files = 0; options->host_key_agent = NULL; options->pid_file = NULL; options->server_key_bits = -1; options->login_grace_time = -1; options->key_regeneration_time = -1; options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NOT_SET; options->ignore_rhosts = -1; options->ignore_user_known_hosts = -1; options->print_motd = -1; options->print_lastlog = -1; options->x11_forwarding = -1; options->x11_display_offset = -1; options->x11_use_localhost = -1; options->permit_tty = -1; + options->permit_user_rc = -1; options->xauth_location = NULL; options->strict_modes = -1; options->tcp_keep_alive = -1; options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET; options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET; options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = -1; options->hostbased_authentication = -1; options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = -1; options->rsa_authentication = -1; options->pubkey_authentication = -1; options->kerberos_authentication = -1; options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1; options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1; options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1; options->gss_authentication=-1; options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1; options->password_authentication = -1; options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1; options->challenge_response_authentication = -1; options->permit_empty_passwd = -1; options->permit_user_env = -1; options->use_login = -1; options->compression = -1; options->rekey_limit = -1; options->rekey_interval = -1; options->allow_tcp_forwarding = -1; + options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = -1; options->allow_agent_forwarding = -1; options->num_allow_users = 0; options->num_deny_users = 0; options->num_allow_groups = 0; options->num_deny_groups = 0; options->ciphers = NULL; options->macs = NULL; options->kex_algorithms = NULL; options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN; - options->gateway_ports = -1; + options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1; + options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1; + options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1; options->num_subsystems = 0; options->max_startups_begin = -1; options->max_startups_rate = -1; options->max_startups = -1; options->max_authtries = -1; options->max_sessions = -1; options->banner = NULL; options->use_dns = -1; options->client_alive_interval = -1; options->client_alive_count_max = -1; options->num_authkeys_files = 0; options->num_accept_env = 0; options->permit_tun = -1; options->num_permitted_opens = -1; options->adm_forced_command = NULL; options->chroot_directory = NULL; options->authorized_keys_command = NULL; options->authorized_keys_command_user = NULL; options->revoked_keys_file = NULL; options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL; options->authorized_principals_file = NULL; options->ip_qos_interactive = -1; options->ip_qos_bulk = -1; options->version_addendum = NULL; } void fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options) { /* Portable-specific options */ if (options->use_pam == -1) options->use_pam = 0; /* Standard Options */ if (options->protocol == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) options->protocol = SSH_PROTO_2; if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) { /* fill default hostkeys for protocols */ if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] = _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE; if (options->protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] = _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE; options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] = _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] = _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE; #endif options->host_key_files[options->num_host_key_files++] = _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE; } } /* No certificates by default */ if (options->num_ports == 0) options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; if (options->listen_addrs == NULL) add_listen_addr(options, NULL, 0); if (options->pid_file == NULL) options->pid_file = _PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE; if (options->server_key_bits == -1) options->server_key_bits = 1024; if (options->login_grace_time == -1) options->login_grace_time = 120; if (options->key_regeneration_time == -1) options->key_regeneration_time = 3600; if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET) options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_YES; if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1) options->ignore_rhosts = 1; if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1) options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0; if (options->print_motd == -1) options->print_motd = 1; if (options->print_lastlog == -1) options->print_lastlog = 1; if (options->x11_forwarding == -1) options->x11_forwarding = 0; if (options->x11_display_offset == -1) options->x11_display_offset = 10; if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1) options->x11_use_localhost = 1; if (options->xauth_location == NULL) options->xauth_location = _PATH_XAUTH; if (options->permit_tty == -1) options->permit_tty = 1; + if (options->permit_user_rc == -1) + options->permit_user_rc = 1; if (options->strict_modes == -1) options->strict_modes = 1; if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1) options->tcp_keep_alive = 1; if (options->log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH; if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; if (options->rhosts_rsa_authentication == -1) options->rhosts_rsa_authentication = 0; if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1) options->hostbased_authentication = 0; if (options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only == -1) options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = 0; if (options->rsa_authentication == -1) options->rsa_authentication = 1; if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1) options->pubkey_authentication = 1; if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1) options->kerberos_authentication = 0; if (options->kerberos_or_local_passwd == -1) options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = 1; if (options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup == -1) options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1; if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1) options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0; if (options->gss_authentication == -1) options->gss_authentication = 0; if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1) options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1; if (options->password_authentication == -1) options->password_authentication = 1; if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1) options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 0; if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1) options->challenge_response_authentication = 1; if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1) options->permit_empty_passwd = 0; if (options->permit_user_env == -1) options->permit_user_env = 0; if (options->use_login == -1) options->use_login = 0; if (options->compression == -1) options->compression = COMP_DELAYED; if (options->rekey_limit == -1) options->rekey_limit = 0; if (options->rekey_interval == -1) options->rekey_interval = 0; if (options->allow_tcp_forwarding == -1) options->allow_tcp_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW; + if (options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding == -1) + options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW; if (options->allow_agent_forwarding == -1) options->allow_agent_forwarding = 1; - if (options->gateway_ports == -1) - options->gateway_ports = 0; + if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1) + options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0; if (options->max_startups == -1) options->max_startups = 100; if (options->max_startups_rate == -1) options->max_startups_rate = 30; /* 30% */ if (options->max_startups_begin == -1) options->max_startups_begin = 10; if (options->max_authtries == -1) options->max_authtries = DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX; if (options->max_sessions == -1) options->max_sessions = DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX; if (options->use_dns == -1) options->use_dns = 1; if (options->client_alive_interval == -1) options->client_alive_interval = 0; if (options->client_alive_count_max == -1) options->client_alive_count_max = 3; if (options->num_authkeys_files == 0) { options->authorized_keys_files[options->num_authkeys_files++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS); options->authorized_keys_files[options->num_authkeys_files++] = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2); } if (options->permit_tun == -1) options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1) options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_LOWDELAY; if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1) options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_THROUGHPUT; if (options->version_addendum == NULL) options->version_addendum = xstrdup(""); + if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1) + options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177; + if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1) + options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0; /* Turn privilege separation on by default */ if (use_privsep == -1) use_privsep = PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX; #ifndef HAVE_MMAP if (use_privsep && options->compression == 1) { error("This platform does not support both privilege " "separation and compression"); error("Compression disabled"); options->compression = 0; } #endif } /* Keyword tokens. */ typedef enum { sBadOption, /* == unknown option */ /* Portable-specific options */ sUsePAM, /* Standard Options */ sPort, sHostKeyFile, sServerKeyBits, sLoginGraceTime, sKeyRegenerationTime, sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication, sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup, sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosTgtPassing, sChallengeResponseAuthentication, sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily, sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts, sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost, sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive, sPermitUserEnvironment, sUseLogin, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression, sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups, sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sProtocol, sPidFile, sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem, sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions, sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication, sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile, sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sAcceptEnv, sPermitTunnel, sMatch, sPermitOpen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory, sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding, sHostCertificate, sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, sKexAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum, sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, - sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, + sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC, + sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink, + sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sDeprecated, sUnsupported } ServerOpCodes; #define SSHCFG_GLOBAL 0x01 /* allowed in main section of sshd_config */ #define SSHCFG_MATCH 0x02 /* allowed inside a Match section */ #define SSHCFG_ALL (SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH) /* Textual representation of the tokens. */ static struct { const char *name; ServerOpCodes opcode; u_int flags; } keywords[] = { /* Portable-specific options */ #ifdef USE_PAM { "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* Standard Options */ { "port", sPort, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "hostkey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */ { "hostkeyagent", sHostKeyAgent, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "serverkeybits", sServerKeyBits, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "logingracetime", sLoginGraceTime, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "keyregenerationinterval", sKeyRegenerationTime, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "permitrootlogin", sPermitRootLogin, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "syslogfacility", sLogFacility, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "loglevel", sLogLevel, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "rhostsauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "rhostsrsaauthentication", sRhostsRSAAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostbasedauthentication", sHostbasedAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "rsaauthentication", sRSAAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */ #ifdef KRB5 { "kerberosauthentication", sKerberosAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "kerberosticketcleanup", sKerberosTicketCleanup, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #ifdef USE_AFS { "kerberosgetafstoken", sKerberosGetAFSToken, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif #else { "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #ifdef GSSAPI { "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #else { "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, #endif { "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "skeyauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */ { "checkmail", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "listenaddress", sListenAddress, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "addressfamily", sAddressFamily, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "printmotd", sPrintMotd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "printlastlog", sPrintLastLog, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "ignorerhosts", sIgnoreRhosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "uselogin", sUseLogin, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "compression", sCompression, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "rekeylimit", sRekeyLimit, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "tcpkeepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "keepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* obsolete alias */ { "allowtcpforwarding", sAllowTcpForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "allowagentforwarding", sAllowAgentForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "allowusers", sAllowUsers, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "denyusers", sDenyUsers, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "allowgroups", sAllowGroups, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "denygroups", sDenyGroups, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "ciphers", sCiphers, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "macs", sMacs, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "protocol", sProtocol, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "gatewayports", sGatewayPorts, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "subsystem", sSubsystem, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "maxstartups", sMaxStartups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "clientaliveinterval", sClientAliveInterval, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeysfile2", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "useprivilegeseparation", sUsePrivilegeSeparation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL}, { "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permittty", sPermitTTY, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "permituserrc", sPermitUserRC, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "match", sMatch, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "hostcertificate", sHostCertificate, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL }, { "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, { "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "streamlocalbindmask", sStreamLocalBindMask, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "streamlocalbindunlink", sStreamLocalBindUnlink, SSHCFG_ALL }, + { "allowstreamlocalforwarding", sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL }, { NULL, sBadOption, 0 } }; static struct { int val; char *text; } tunmode_desc[] = { { SSH_TUNMODE_NO, "no" }, { SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT, "point-to-point" }, { SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET, "ethernet" }, { SSH_TUNMODE_YES, "yes" }, { -1, NULL } }; /* * Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or sBadOption. */ static ServerOpCodes parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum, u_int *flags) { u_int i; for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++) if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) { *flags = keywords[i].flags; return keywords[i].opcode; } error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s", filename, linenum, cp); return sBadOption; } char * derelativise_path(const char *path) { char *expanded, *ret, cwd[MAXPATHLEN]; expanded = tilde_expand_filename(path, getuid()); if (*expanded == '/') return expanded; if (getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)) == NULL) fatal("%s: getcwd: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); xasprintf(&ret, "%s/%s", cwd, expanded); free(expanded); return ret; } static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, int port) { u_int i; if (options->num_ports == 0) options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; if (options->address_family == -1) options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC; if (port == 0) for (i = 0; i < options->num_ports; i++) add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, options->ports[i]); else add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, port); } static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, char *addr, int port) { struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int gaierr; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = options->address_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; hints.ai_flags = (addr == NULL) ? AI_PASSIVE : 0; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) fatal("bad addr or host: %s (%s)", addr ? addr : "", ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); for (ai = aitop; ai->ai_next; ai = ai->ai_next) ; ai->ai_next = options->listen_addrs; options->listen_addrs = aitop; } struct connection_info * get_connection_info(int populate, int use_dns) { static struct connection_info ci; if (!populate) return &ci; ci.host = get_canonical_hostname(use_dns); ci.address = get_remote_ipaddr(); ci.laddress = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in()); ci.lport = get_local_port(); return &ci; } /* * The strategy for the Match blocks is that the config file is parsed twice. * * The first time is at startup. activep is initialized to 1 and the * directives in the global context are processed and acted on. Hitting a * Match directive unsets activep and the directives inside the block are * checked for syntax only. * * The second time is after a connection has been established but before * authentication. activep is initialized to 2 and global config directives * are ignored since they have already been processed. If the criteria in a * Match block is met, activep is set and the subsequent directives * processed and actioned until EOF or another Match block unsets it. Any * options set are copied into the main server config. * * Potential additions/improvements: * - Add Match support for pre-kex directives, eg Protocol, Ciphers. * * - Add a Tag directive (idea from David Leonard) ala pf, eg: * Match Address 192.168.0.* * Tag trusted * Match Group wheel * Tag trusted * Match Tag trusted * AllowTcpForwarding yes * GatewayPorts clientspecified * [...] * * - Add a PermittedChannelRequests directive * Match Group shell * PermittedChannelRequests session,forwarded-tcpip */ static int match_cfg_line_group(const char *grps, int line, const char *user) { int result = 0; struct passwd *pw; if (user == NULL) goto out; if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) { debug("Can't match group at line %d because user %.100s does " "not exist", line, user); } else if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) { debug("Can't Match group because user %.100s not in any group " "at line %d", user, line); } else if (ga_match_pattern_list(grps) != 1) { debug("user %.100s does not match group list %.100s at line %d", user, grps, line); } else { debug("user %.100s matched group list %.100s at line %d", user, grps, line); result = 1; } out: ga_free(); return result; } /* * All of the attributes on a single Match line are ANDed together, so we need * to check every attribute and set the result to zero if any attribute does * not match. */ static int match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci) { int result = 1, attributes = 0, port; char *arg, *attrib, *cp = *condition; size_t len; if (ci == NULL) debug3("checking syntax for 'Match %s'", cp); else debug3("checking match for '%s' user %s host %s addr %s " "laddr %s lport %d", cp, ci->user ? ci->user : "(null)", ci->host ? ci->host : "(null)", ci->address ? ci->address : "(null)", ci->laddress ? ci->laddress : "(null)", ci->lport); while ((attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') { attributes++; if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) { if (attributes != 1 || ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')) { error("'all' cannot be combined with other " "Match attributes"); return -1; } *condition = cp; return 1; } if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') { error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib); return -1; } len = strlen(arg); if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || ci->user == NULL) { result = 0; continue; } if (match_pattern_list(ci->user, arg, len, 0) != 1) result = 0; else debug("user %.100s matched 'User %.100s' at " "line %d", ci->user, arg, line); } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "group") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || ci->user == NULL) { result = 0; continue; } switch (match_cfg_line_group(arg, line, ci->user)) { case -1: return -1; case 0: result = 0; } } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || ci->host == NULL) { result = 0; continue; } if (match_hostname(ci->host, arg, len) != 1) result = 0; else debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Host " "%.100s' at line %d", ci->host, arg, line); } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "address") == 0) { if (ci == NULL || ci->address == NULL) { result = 0; continue; } switch (addr_match_list(ci->address, arg)) { case 1: debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Address " "%.100s' at line %d", ci->address, arg, line); break; case 0: case -1: result = 0; break; case -2: return -1; } } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localaddress") == 0){ if (ci == NULL || ci->laddress == NULL) { result = 0; continue; } switch (addr_match_list(ci->laddress, arg)) { case 1: debug("connection from %.100s matched " "'LocalAddress %.100s' at line %d", ci->laddress, arg, line); break; case 0: case -1: result = 0; break; case -2: return -1; } } else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localport") == 0) { if ((port = a2port(arg)) == -1) { error("Invalid LocalPort '%s' on Match line", arg); return -1; } if (ci == NULL || ci->lport == 0) { result = 0; continue; } /* TODO support port lists */ if (port == ci->lport) debug("connection from %.100s matched " "'LocalPort %d' at line %d", ci->laddress, port, line); else result = 0; } else { error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib); return -1; } } if (attributes == 0) { error("One or more attributes required for Match"); return -1; } if (ci != NULL) debug3("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not "); *condition = cp; return result; } #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" /* Multistate option parsing */ struct multistate { char *key; int value; }; static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = { { "inet", AF_INET }, { "inet6", AF_INET6 }, { "any", AF_UNSPEC }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_permitrootlogin[] = { { "without-password", PERMIT_NO_PASSWD }, { "forced-commands-only", PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY }, { "yes", PERMIT_YES }, { "no", PERMIT_NO }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_compression[] = { { "delayed", COMP_DELAYED }, { "yes", COMP_ZLIB }, { "no", COMP_NONE }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_gatewayports[] = { { "clientspecified", 2 }, { "yes", 1 }, { "no", 0 }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_privsep[] = { { "yes", PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX }, { "sandbox", PRIVSEP_ON }, { "nosandbox", PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX }, { "no", PRIVSEP_OFF }, { NULL, -1 } }; static const struct multistate multistate_tcpfwd[] = { { "yes", FORWARD_ALLOW }, { "all", FORWARD_ALLOW }, { "no", FORWARD_DENY }, { "remote", FORWARD_REMOTE }, { "local", FORWARD_LOCAL }, { NULL, -1 } }; int process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line, const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, struct connection_info *connectinfo) { char *cp, **charptr, *arg, *p; int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port; SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr; LogLevel *log_level_ptr; ServerOpCodes opcode; u_int i, flags = 0; size_t len; long long val64; const struct multistate *multistate_ptr; cp = line; if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL) return 0; /* Ignore leading whitespace */ if (*arg == '\0') arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || !*arg || *arg == '#') return 0; intptr = NULL; charptr = NULL; opcode = parse_token(arg, filename, linenum, &flags); if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */ cmdline = 1; activep = &cmdline; } if (*activep && opcode != sMatch) debug3("%s:%d setting %s %s", filename, linenum, arg, cp); if (*activep == 0 && !(flags & SSHCFG_MATCH)) { if (connectinfo == NULL) { fatal("%s line %d: Directive '%s' is not allowed " "within a Match block", filename, linenum, arg); } else { /* this is a directive we have already processed */ while (arg) arg = strdelim(&cp); return 0; } } switch (opcode) { /* Portable-specific options */ case sUsePAM: intptr = &options->use_pam; goto parse_flag; /* Standard Options */ case sBadOption: return -1; case sPort: /* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */ if (options->ports_from_cmdline) return 0; if (options->listen_addrs != NULL) fatal("%s line %d: ports must be specified before " "ListenAddress.", filename, linenum); if (options->num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) fatal("%s line %d: too many ports.", filename, linenum); arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing port number.", filename, linenum); options->ports[options->num_ports++] = a2port(arg); if (options->ports[options->num_ports-1] <= 0) fatal("%s line %d: Badly formatted port number.", filename, linenum); break; case sServerKeyBits: intptr = &options->server_key_bits; parse_int: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing integer value.", filename, linenum); value = atoi(arg); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sLoginGraceTime: intptr = &options->login_grace_time; parse_time: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.", filename, linenum); if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.", filename, linenum); if (*intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sKeyRegenerationTime: intptr = &options->key_regeneration_time; goto parse_time; case sListenAddress: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing address", filename, linenum); /* check for bare IPv6 address: no "[]" and 2 or more ":" */ if (strchr(arg, '[') == NULL && (p = strchr(arg, ':')) != NULL && strchr(p+1, ':') != NULL) { add_listen_addr(options, arg, 0); break; } p = hpdelim(&arg); if (p == NULL) fatal("%s line %d: bad address:port usage", filename, linenum); p = cleanhostname(p); if (arg == NULL) port = 0; else if ((port = a2port(arg)) <= 0) fatal("%s line %d: bad port number", filename, linenum); add_listen_addr(options, p, port); break; case sAddressFamily: intptr = &options->address_family; multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily; if (options->listen_addrs != NULL) fatal("%s line %d: address family must be specified " "before ListenAddress.", filename, linenum); parse_multistate: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = -1; for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) { value = multistate_ptr[i].value; break; } } if (value == -1) fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sHostKeyFile: intptr = &options->num_host_key_files; if (*intptr >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) fatal("%s line %d: too many host keys specified (max %d).", filename, linenum, MAX_HOSTKEYS); charptr = &options->host_key_files[*intptr]; parse_filename: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) { *charptr = derelativise_path(arg); /* increase optional counter */ if (intptr != NULL) *intptr = *intptr + 1; } break; case sHostKeyAgent: charptr = &options->host_key_agent; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing socket name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = !strcmp(arg, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) ? xstrdup(arg) : derelativise_path(arg); break; case sHostCertificate: intptr = &options->num_host_cert_files; if (*intptr >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) fatal("%s line %d: too many host certificates " "specified (max %d).", filename, linenum, MAX_HOSTCERTS); charptr = &options->host_cert_files[*intptr]; goto parse_filename; break; case sPidFile: charptr = &options->pid_file; goto parse_filename; case sPermitRootLogin: intptr = &options->permit_root_login; multistate_ptr = multistate_permitrootlogin; goto parse_multistate; case sIgnoreRhosts: intptr = &options->ignore_rhosts; parse_flag: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing yes/no argument.", filename, linenum); value = 0; /* silence compiler */ if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0) value = 1; else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0) value = 0; else fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/no argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep && *intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sIgnoreUserKnownHosts: intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts; goto parse_flag; case sRhostsRSAAuthentication: intptr = &options->rhosts_rsa_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sHostbasedAuthentication: intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly: intptr = &options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; goto parse_flag; case sRSAAuthentication: intptr = &options->rsa_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sPubkeyAuthentication: intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sKerberosAuthentication: intptr = &options->kerberos_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sKerberosOrLocalPasswd: intptr = &options->kerberos_or_local_passwd; goto parse_flag; case sKerberosTicketCleanup: intptr = &options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup; goto parse_flag; case sKerberosGetAFSToken: intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token; goto parse_flag; case sGssAuthentication: intptr = &options->gss_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sGssCleanupCreds: intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds; goto parse_flag; case sPasswordAuthentication: intptr = &options->password_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sKbdInteractiveAuthentication: intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sChallengeResponseAuthentication: intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication; goto parse_flag; case sPrintMotd: intptr = &options->print_motd; goto parse_flag; case sPrintLastLog: intptr = &options->print_lastlog; goto parse_flag; case sX11Forwarding: intptr = &options->x11_forwarding; goto parse_flag; case sX11DisplayOffset: intptr = &options->x11_display_offset; goto parse_int; case sX11UseLocalhost: intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost; goto parse_flag; case sXAuthLocation: charptr = &options->xauth_location; goto parse_filename; case sPermitTTY: intptr = &options->permit_tty; goto parse_flag; + case sPermitUserRC: + intptr = &options->permit_user_rc; + goto parse_flag; + case sStrictModes: intptr = &options->strict_modes; goto parse_flag; case sTCPKeepAlive: intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive; goto parse_flag; case sEmptyPasswd: intptr = &options->permit_empty_passwd; goto parse_flag; case sPermitUserEnvironment: intptr = &options->permit_user_env; goto parse_flag; case sUseLogin: intptr = &options->use_login; goto parse_flag; case sCompression: intptr = &options->compression; multistate_ptr = multistate_compression; goto parse_multistate; case sRekeyLimit: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) { val64 = 0; } else { if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1) fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s", filename, linenum, arg, strerror(errno)); /* check for too-large or too-small limits */ if (val64 > UINT_MAX) fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too large", filename, linenum); if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16) fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small", filename, linenum); } if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1) options->rekey_limit = (u_int32_t)val64; if (cp != NULL) { /* optional rekey interval present */ if (strcmp(cp, "none") == 0) { (void)strdelim(&cp); /* discard */ break; } intptr = &options->rekey_interval; goto parse_time; } break; case sGatewayPorts: - intptr = &options->gateway_ports; + intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports; multistate_ptr = multistate_gatewayports; goto parse_multistate; case sUseDNS: intptr = &options->use_dns; goto parse_flag; case sLogFacility: log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility; arg = strdelim(&cp); value = log_facility_number(arg); if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*log_facility_ptr == -1) *log_facility_ptr = (SyslogFacility) value; break; case sLogLevel: log_level_ptr = &options->log_level; arg = strdelim(&cp); value = log_level_number(arg); if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*log_level_ptr == -1) *log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value; break; case sAllowTcpForwarding: intptr = &options->allow_tcp_forwarding; multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd; goto parse_multistate; + case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding: + intptr = &options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding; + multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd; + goto parse_multistate; + case sAllowAgentForwarding: intptr = &options->allow_agent_forwarding; goto parse_flag; case sUsePrivilegeSeparation: intptr = &use_privsep; multistate_ptr = multistate_privsep; goto parse_multistate; case sAllowUsers: while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (options->num_allow_users >= MAX_ALLOW_USERS) fatal("%s line %d: too many allow users.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) continue; options->allow_users[options->num_allow_users++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case sDenyUsers: while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (options->num_deny_users >= MAX_DENY_USERS) fatal("%s line %d: too many deny users.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) continue; options->deny_users[options->num_deny_users++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case sAllowGroups: while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (options->num_allow_groups >= MAX_ALLOW_GROUPS) fatal("%s line %d: too many allow groups.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) continue; options->allow_groups[options->num_allow_groups++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case sDenyGroups: while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (options->num_deny_groups >= MAX_DENY_GROUPS) fatal("%s line %d: too many deny groups.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) continue; options->deny_groups[options->num_deny_groups++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case sCiphers: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (!ciphers_valid(arg)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (options->ciphers == NULL) options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg); break; case sMacs: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (!mac_valid(arg)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (options->macs == NULL) options->macs = xstrdup(arg); break; case sKexAlgorithms: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); if (!kex_names_valid(arg)) fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL) options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg); break; case sProtocol: intptr = &options->protocol; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); value = proto_spec(arg); if (value == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) fatal("%s line %d: Bad protocol spec '%s'.", filename, linenum, arg ? arg : ""); if (*intptr == SSH_PROTO_UNKNOWN) *intptr = value; break; case sSubsystem: if (options->num_subsystems >= MAX_SUBSYSTEMS) { fatal("%s line %d: too many subsystems defined.", filename, linenum); } arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) { arg = strdelim(&cp); break; } for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++) if (strcmp(arg, options->subsystem_name[i]) == 0) fatal("%s line %d: Subsystem '%s' already defined.", filename, linenum, arg); options->subsystem_name[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg); arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem command.", filename, linenum); options->subsystem_command[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg); /* Collect arguments (separate to executable) */ p = xstrdup(arg); len = strlen(p) + 1; while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') { len += 1 + strlen(arg); p = xrealloc(p, 1, len); strlcat(p, " ", len); strlcat(p, arg, len); } options->subsystem_args[options->num_subsystems] = p; options->num_subsystems++; break; case sMaxStartups: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing MaxStartups spec.", filename, linenum); if ((n = sscanf(arg, "%d:%d:%d", &options->max_startups_begin, &options->max_startups_rate, &options->max_startups)) == 3) { if (options->max_startups_begin > options->max_startups || options->max_startups_rate > 100 || options->max_startups_rate < 1) fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.", filename, linenum); } else if (n != 1) fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.", filename, linenum); else options->max_startups = options->max_startups_begin; break; case sMaxAuthTries: intptr = &options->max_authtries; goto parse_int; case sMaxSessions: intptr = &options->max_sessions; goto parse_int; case sBanner: charptr = &options->banner; goto parse_filename; /* * These options can contain %X options expanded at * connect time, so that you can specify paths like: * * AuthorizedKeysFile /etc/ssh_keys/%u */ case sAuthorizedKeysFile: if (*activep && options->num_authkeys_files == 0) { while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (options->num_authkeys_files >= MAX_AUTHKEYS_FILES) fatal("%s line %d: " "too many authorized keys files.", filename, linenum); options->authorized_keys_files[ options->num_authkeys_files++] = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid()); } } return 0; case sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile: charptr = &options->authorized_principals_file; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) { *charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid()); /* increase optional counter */ if (intptr != NULL) *intptr = *intptr + 1; } break; case sClientAliveInterval: intptr = &options->client_alive_interval; goto parse_time; case sClientAliveCountMax: intptr = &options->client_alive_count_max; goto parse_int; case sAcceptEnv: while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (strchr(arg, '=') != NULL) fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.", filename, linenum); if (options->num_accept_env >= MAX_ACCEPT_ENV) fatal("%s line %d: too many allow env.", filename, linenum); if (!*activep) continue; options->accept_env[options->num_accept_env++] = xstrdup(arg); } break; case sPermitTunnel: intptr = &options->permit_tun; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: Missing yes/point-to-point/" "ethernet/no argument.", filename, linenum); value = -1; for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++) if (strcmp(tunmode_desc[i].text, arg) == 0) { value = tunmode_desc[i].val; break; } if (value == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/point-to-point/ethernet/" "no argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg); if (*intptr == -1) *intptr = value; break; case sMatch: if (cmdline) fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line " "option"); value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum, connectinfo); if (value < 0) fatal("%s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename, linenum); *activep = value; break; case sPermitOpen: arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing PermitOpen specification", filename, linenum); n = options->num_permitted_opens; /* modified later */ if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) { if (*activep && n == -1) { channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(); options->num_permitted_opens = 0; } break; } if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) { if (*activep && n == -1) { options->num_permitted_opens = 1; channel_disable_adm_local_opens(); } break; } if (*activep && n == -1) channel_clear_adm_permitted_opens(); for (; arg != NULL && *arg != '\0'; arg = strdelim(&cp)) { p = hpdelim(&arg); if (p == NULL) fatal("%s line %d: missing host in PermitOpen", filename, linenum); p = cleanhostname(p); if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0)) fatal("%s line %d: bad port number in " "PermitOpen", filename, linenum); if (*activep && n == -1) options->num_permitted_opens = channel_add_adm_permitted_opens(p, port); } break; case sForceCommand: if (cp == NULL) fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); if (*activep && options->adm_forced_command == NULL) options->adm_forced_command = xstrdup(cp + len); return 0; case sChrootDirectory: charptr = &options->chroot_directory; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (!arg || *arg == '\0') fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.", filename, linenum); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case sTrustedUserCAKeys: charptr = &options->trusted_user_ca_keys; goto parse_filename; case sRevokedKeys: charptr = &options->revoked_keys_file; goto parse_filename; case sIPQoS: arg = strdelim(&cp); if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s", filename, linenum, arg); arg = strdelim(&cp); if (arg == NULL) value2 = value; else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1) fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s", filename, linenum, arg); if (*activep) { options->ip_qos_interactive = value; options->ip_qos_bulk = value2; } break; case sVersionAddendum: if (cp == NULL) fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum); len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); if (*activep && options->version_addendum == NULL) { if (strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") == 0) options->version_addendum = xstrdup(""); else if (strchr(cp + len, '\r') != NULL) fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid argument", filename, linenum); else options->version_addendum = xstrdup(cp + len); } return 0; case sAuthorizedKeysCommand: len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); if (*activep && options->authorized_keys_command == NULL) { if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0) fatal("%.200s line %d: AuthorizedKeysCommand " "must be an absolute path", filename, linenum); options->authorized_keys_command = xstrdup(cp + len); } return 0; case sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser: charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command_user; arg = strdelim(&cp); if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) *charptr = xstrdup(arg); break; case sAuthenticationMethods: if (*activep && options->num_auth_methods == 0) { while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') { if (options->num_auth_methods >= MAX_AUTH_METHODS) fatal("%s line %d: " "too many authentication methods.", filename, linenum); if (auth2_methods_valid(arg, 0) != 0) fatal("%s line %d: invalid " "authentication method list.", filename, linenum); options->auth_methods[ options->num_auth_methods++] = xstrdup(arg); } } return 0; + case sStreamLocalBindMask: + arg = strdelim(&cp); + if (!arg || *arg == '\0') + fatal("%s line %d: missing StreamLocalBindMask argument.", + filename, linenum); + /* Parse mode in octal format */ + value = strtol(arg, &p, 8); + if (arg == p || value < 0 || value > 0777) + fatal("%s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum); + options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value; + break; + + case sStreamLocalBindUnlink: + intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink; + goto parse_flag; + case sDeprecated: logit("%s line %d: Deprecated option %s", filename, linenum, arg); while (arg) arg = strdelim(&cp); break; case sUnsupported: logit("%s line %d: Unsupported option %s", filename, linenum, arg); while (arg) arg = strdelim(&cp); break; default: fatal("%s line %d: Missing handler for opcode %s (%d)", filename, linenum, arg, opcode); } if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') fatal("%s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".", filename, linenum, arg); return 0; } /* Reads the server configuration file. */ void load_server_config(const char *filename, Buffer *conf) { char line[4096], *cp; FILE *f; int lineno = 0; debug2("%s: filename %s", __func__, filename); if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) { perror(filename); exit(1); } buffer_clear(conf); while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { lineno++; if (strlen(line) == sizeof(line) - 1) fatal("%s line %d too long", filename, lineno); /* * Trim out comments and strip whitespace * NB - preserve newlines, they are needed to reproduce * line numbers later for error messages */ if ((cp = strchr(line, '#')) != NULL) memcpy(cp, "\n", 2); cp = line + strspn(line, " \t\r"); buffer_append(conf, cp, strlen(cp)); } buffer_append(conf, "\0", 1); fclose(f); debug2("%s: done config len = %d", __func__, buffer_len(conf)); } void parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *options, struct connection_info *connectinfo) { ServerOptions mo; initialize_server_options(&mo); parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", &cfg, connectinfo); copy_set_server_options(options, &mo, 0); } int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *ci, char *spec) { char *p; while ((p = strsep(&spec, ",")) && *p != '\0') { if (strncmp(p, "addr=", 5) == 0) { ci->address = xstrdup(p + 5); } else if (strncmp(p, "host=", 5) == 0) { ci->host = xstrdup(p + 5); } else if (strncmp(p, "user=", 5) == 0) { ci->user = xstrdup(p + 5); } else if (strncmp(p, "laddr=", 6) == 0) { ci->laddress = xstrdup(p + 6); } else if (strncmp(p, "lport=", 6) == 0) { ci->lport = a2port(p + 6); if (ci->lport == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid port '%s' in test mode" " specification %s\n", p+6, p); return -1; } } else { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid test mode specification %s\n", p); return -1; } } return 0; } /* * returns 1 for a complete spec, 0 for partial spec and -1 for an * empty spec. */ int server_match_spec_complete(struct connection_info *ci) { if (ci->user && ci->host && ci->address) return 1; /* complete */ if (!ci->user && !ci->host && !ci->address) return -1; /* empty */ return 0; /* partial */ } /* * Copy any supported values that are set. * * If the preauth flag is set, we do not bother copying the string or * array values that are not used pre-authentication, because any that we * do use must be explictly sent in mm_getpwnamallow(). */ void copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth) { #define M_CP_INTOPT(n) do {\ if (src->n != -1) \ dst->n = src->n; \ } while (0) M_CP_INTOPT(password_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(rsa_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(kerberos_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only); M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_root_login); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_empty_passwd); M_CP_INTOPT(allow_tcp_forwarding); + M_CP_INTOPT(allow_streamlocal_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(allow_agent_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tun); - M_CP_INTOPT(gateway_ports); + M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.gateway_ports); M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset); M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding); M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost); M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty); + M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc); M_CP_INTOPT(max_sessions); M_CP_INTOPT(max_authtries); M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive); M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk); M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit); M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval); /* M_CP_STROPT and M_CP_STRARRAYOPT should not appear before here */ #define M_CP_STROPT(n) do {\ if (src->n != NULL && dst->n != src->n) { \ free(dst->n); \ dst->n = src->n; \ } \ } while(0) #define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(n, num_n) do {\ if (src->num_n != 0) { \ for (dst->num_n = 0; dst->num_n < src->num_n; dst->num_n++) \ dst->n[dst->num_n] = xstrdup(src->n[dst->num_n]); \ } \ } while(0) /* See comment in servconf.h */ COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS(); /* * The only things that should be below this point are string options * which are only used after authentication. */ if (preauth) return; M_CP_STROPT(adm_forced_command); M_CP_STROPT(chroot_directory); } #undef M_CP_INTOPT #undef M_CP_STROPT #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT void parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename, Buffer *conf, struct connection_info *connectinfo) { int active, linenum, bad_options = 0; char *cp, *obuf, *cbuf; debug2("%s: config %s len %d", __func__, filename, buffer_len(conf)); obuf = cbuf = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(conf)); active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1; linenum = 1; while ((cp = strsep(&cbuf, "\n")) != NULL) { if (process_server_config_line(options, cp, filename, linenum++, &active, connectinfo) != 0) bad_options++; } free(obuf); if (bad_options > 0) fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options", filename, bad_options); } static const char * fmt_multistate_int(int val, const struct multistate *m) { u_int i; for (i = 0; m[i].key != NULL; i++) { if (m[i].value == val) return m[i].key; } return "UNKNOWN"; } static const char * fmt_intarg(ServerOpCodes code, int val) { if (val == -1) return "unset"; switch (code) { case sAddressFamily: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily); case sPermitRootLogin: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_permitrootlogin); case sGatewayPorts: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_gatewayports); case sCompression: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_compression); case sUsePrivilegeSeparation: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_privsep); case sAllowTcpForwarding: return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd); + case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding: + return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd); case sProtocol: switch (val) { case SSH_PROTO_1: return "1"; case SSH_PROTO_2: return "2"; case (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2): return "2,1"; default: return "UNKNOWN"; } default: switch (val) { case 0: return "no"; case 1: return "yes"; default: return "UNKNOWN"; } } } static const char * lookup_opcode_name(ServerOpCodes code) { u_int i; for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++) if (keywords[i].opcode == code) return(keywords[i].name); return "UNKNOWN"; } static void dump_cfg_int(ServerOpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); } static void dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val) { printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val)); } static void dump_cfg_string(ServerOpCodes code, const char *val) { if (val == NULL) return; printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val); } static void dump_cfg_strarray(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < count; i++) printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]); } static void dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals) { u_int i; printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code)); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) printf(" %s", vals[i]); printf("\n"); } void dump_config(ServerOptions *o) { u_int i; int ret; struct addrinfo *ai; char addr[NI_MAXHOST], port[NI_MAXSERV], *s = NULL; /* these are usually at the top of the config */ for (i = 0; i < o->num_ports; i++) printf("port %d\n", o->ports[i]); dump_cfg_fmtint(sProtocol, o->protocol); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAddressFamily, o->address_family); /* ListenAddress must be after Port */ for (ai = o->listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, addr, sizeof(addr), port, sizeof(port), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) { error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s", (ret != EAI_SYSTEM) ? gai_strerror(ret) : strerror(errno)); } else { if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) printf("listenaddress [%s]:%s\n", addr, port); else printf("listenaddress %s:%s\n", addr, port); } } /* integer arguments */ #ifdef USE_PAM dump_cfg_int(sUsePAM, o->use_pam); #endif dump_cfg_int(sServerKeyBits, o->server_key_bits); dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time); dump_cfg_int(sKeyRegenerationTime, o->key_regeneration_time); dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset); dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries); dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions); dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval); dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max); /* formatted integer arguments */ dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitRootLogin, o->permit_root_login); dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreRhosts, o->ignore_rhosts); dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, o->ignore_user_known_hosts); dump_cfg_fmtint(sRhostsRSAAuthentication, o->rhosts_rsa_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, o->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only); dump_cfg_fmtint(sRSAAuthentication, o->rsa_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication); #ifdef KRB5 dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosAuthentication, o->kerberos_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, o->kerberos_or_local_passwd); dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosTicketCleanup, o->kerberos_ticket_cleanup); # ifdef USE_AFS dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token); # endif #endif #ifdef GSSAPI dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds); #endif dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, o->kbd_interactive_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sChallengeResponseAuthentication, o->challenge_response_authentication); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintMotd, o->print_motd); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintLastLog, o->print_lastlog); dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11Forwarding, o->x11_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11UseLocalhost, o->x11_use_localhost); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitTTY, o->permit_tty); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserRC, o->permit_user_rc); dump_cfg_fmtint(sStrictModes, o->strict_modes); dump_cfg_fmtint(sTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive); dump_cfg_fmtint(sEmptyPasswd, o->permit_empty_passwd); dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserEnvironment, o->permit_user_env); dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseLogin, o->use_login); dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression); - dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->gateway_ports); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports); dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns); dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding); + dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, o->allow_streamlocal_forwarding); dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePrivilegeSeparation, use_privsep); /* string arguments */ dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file); dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location); dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : cipher_alg_list(',', 0)); dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : mac_alg_list(',')); dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner); dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command); dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory); dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys); dump_cfg_string(sRevokedKeys, o->revoked_keys_file); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, o->authorized_principals_file); dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, o->version_addendum); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command); dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, o->authorized_keys_command_user); dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAgent, o->host_key_agent); dump_cfg_string(sKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms ? o->kex_algorithms : kex_alg_list(',')); /* string arguments requiring a lookup */ dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level)); dump_cfg_string(sLogFacility, log_facility_name(o->log_facility)); /* string array arguments */ dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthorizedKeysFile, o->num_authkeys_files, o->authorized_keys_files); dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_key_files, o->host_key_files); dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_cert_files, o->host_cert_files); dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowUsers, o->num_allow_users, o->allow_users); dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyUsers, o->num_deny_users, o->deny_users); dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowGroups, o->num_allow_groups, o->allow_groups); dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyGroups, o->num_deny_groups, o->deny_groups); dump_cfg_strarray(sAcceptEnv, o->num_accept_env, o->accept_env); dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthenticationMethods, o->num_auth_methods, o->auth_methods); /* other arguments */ for (i = 0; i < o->num_subsystems; i++) printf("subsystem %s %s\n", o->subsystem_name[i], o->subsystem_args[i]); printf("maxstartups %d:%d:%d\n", o->max_startups_begin, o->max_startups_rate, o->max_startups); for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++) if (tunmode_desc[i].val == o->permit_tun) { s = tunmode_desc[i].text; break; } dump_cfg_string(sPermitTunnel, s); printf("ipqos %s ", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_interactive)); printf("%s\n", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_bulk)); printf("rekeylimit %lld %d\n", (long long)o->rekey_limit, o->rekey_interval); channel_print_adm_permitted_opens(); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/servconf.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/servconf.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/servconf.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,238 +1,240 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.112 2014/01/29 06:18:35 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.114 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Definitions for server configuration data and for the functions reading it. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #ifndef SERVCONF_H #define SERVCONF_H #define MAX_PORTS 256 /* Max # ports. */ #define MAX_ALLOW_USERS 256 /* Max # users on allow list. */ #define MAX_DENY_USERS 256 /* Max # users on deny list. */ #define MAX_ALLOW_GROUPS 256 /* Max # groups on allow list. */ #define MAX_DENY_GROUPS 256 /* Max # groups on deny list. */ #define MAX_SUBSYSTEMS 256 /* Max # subsystems. */ #define MAX_HOSTKEYS 256 /* Max # hostkeys. */ #define MAX_HOSTCERTS 256 /* Max # host certificates. */ #define MAX_ACCEPT_ENV 256 /* Max # of env vars. */ #define MAX_MATCH_GROUPS 256 /* Max # of groups for Match. */ #define MAX_AUTHKEYS_FILES 256 /* Max # of authorized_keys files. */ #define MAX_AUTH_METHODS 256 /* Max # of AuthenticationMethods. */ /* permit_root_login */ #define PERMIT_NOT_SET -1 #define PERMIT_NO 0 #define PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY 1 #define PERMIT_NO_PASSWD 2 #define PERMIT_YES 3 /* use_privsep */ #define PRIVSEP_OFF 0 #define PRIVSEP_ON 1 #define PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX 2 /* AllowTCPForwarding */ #define FORWARD_DENY 0 #define FORWARD_REMOTE (1) #define FORWARD_LOCAL (1<<1) #define FORWARD_ALLOW (FORWARD_REMOTE|FORWARD_LOCAL) #define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX 6 /* Default for MaxAuthTries */ #define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX 10 /* Default for MaxSessions */ /* Magic name for internal sftp-server */ #define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME "internal-sftp" typedef struct { u_int num_ports; u_int ports_from_cmdline; int ports[MAX_PORTS]; /* Port number to listen on. */ char *listen_addr; /* Address on which the server listens. */ struct addrinfo *listen_addrs; /* Addresses on which the server listens. */ int address_family; /* Address family used by the server. */ char *host_key_files[MAX_HOSTKEYS]; /* Files containing host keys. */ int num_host_key_files; /* Number of files for host keys. */ char *host_cert_files[MAX_HOSTCERTS]; /* Files containing host certs. */ int num_host_cert_files; /* Number of files for host certs. */ char *host_key_agent; /* ssh-agent socket for host keys. */ char *pid_file; /* Where to put our pid */ int server_key_bits;/* Size of the server key. */ int login_grace_time; /* Disconnect if no auth in this time * (sec). */ int key_regeneration_time; /* Server key lifetime (seconds). */ int permit_root_login; /* PERMIT_*, see above */ int ignore_rhosts; /* Ignore .rhosts and .shosts. */ int ignore_user_known_hosts; /* Ignore ~/.ssh/known_hosts * for RhostsRsaAuth */ int print_motd; /* If true, print /etc/motd. */ int print_lastlog; /* If true, print lastlog */ int x11_forwarding; /* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */ int x11_display_offset; /* What DISPLAY number to start * searching at */ int x11_use_localhost; /* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */ char *xauth_location; /* Location of xauth program */ int permit_tty; /* If false, deny pty allocation */ + int permit_user_rc; /* If false, deny ~/.ssh/rc execution */ int strict_modes; /* If true, require string home dir modes. */ int tcp_keep_alive; /* If true, set SO_KEEPALIVE. */ int ip_qos_interactive; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */ int ip_qos_bulk; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */ char *ciphers; /* Supported SSH2 ciphers. */ char *macs; /* Supported SSH2 macs. */ char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */ int protocol; /* Supported protocol versions. */ - int gateway_ports; /* If true, allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */ + struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts; /* forwarding options */ SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */ LogLevel log_level; /* Level for system logging. */ int rhosts_rsa_authentication; /* If true, permit rhosts RSA * authentication. */ int hostbased_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 hostbased auth */ int hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; /* experimental */ int rsa_authentication; /* If true, permit RSA authentication. */ int pubkey_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 pubkey authentication. */ int kerberos_authentication; /* If true, permit Kerberos * authentication. */ int kerberos_or_local_passwd; /* If true, permit kerberos * and any other password * authentication mechanism, * such as SecurID or * /etc/passwd */ int kerberos_ticket_cleanup; /* If true, destroy ticket * file on logout. */ int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if * authenticated with Kerberos. */ int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */ int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */ int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password * authentication. */ int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */ int challenge_response_authentication; int permit_empty_passwd; /* If false, do not permit empty * passwords. */ int permit_user_env; /* If true, read ~/.ssh/environment */ int use_login; /* If true, login(1) is used */ int compression; /* If true, compression is allowed */ int allow_tcp_forwarding; /* One of FORWARD_* */ + int allow_streamlocal_forwarding; /* One of FORWARD_* */ int allow_agent_forwarding; u_int num_allow_users; char *allow_users[MAX_ALLOW_USERS]; u_int num_deny_users; char *deny_users[MAX_DENY_USERS]; u_int num_allow_groups; char *allow_groups[MAX_ALLOW_GROUPS]; u_int num_deny_groups; char *deny_groups[MAX_DENY_GROUPS]; u_int num_subsystems; char *subsystem_name[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS]; char *subsystem_command[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS]; char *subsystem_args[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS]; u_int num_accept_env; char *accept_env[MAX_ACCEPT_ENV]; int max_startups_begin; int max_startups_rate; int max_startups; int max_authtries; int max_sessions; char *banner; /* SSH-2 banner message */ int use_dns; int client_alive_interval; /* * poke the client this often to * see if it's still there */ int client_alive_count_max; /* * If the client is unresponsive * for this many intervals above, * disconnect the session */ u_int num_authkeys_files; /* Files containing public keys */ char *authorized_keys_files[MAX_AUTHKEYS_FILES]; char *adm_forced_command; int use_pam; /* Enable auth via PAM */ int permit_tun; int num_permitted_opens; char *chroot_directory; char *revoked_keys_file; char *trusted_user_ca_keys; char *authorized_principals_file; char *authorized_keys_command; char *authorized_keys_command_user; int64_t rekey_limit; int rekey_interval; char *version_addendum; /* Appended to SSH banner */ u_int num_auth_methods; char *auth_methods[MAX_AUTH_METHODS]; } ServerOptions; /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */ struct connection_info { const char *user; const char *host; /* possibly resolved hostname */ const char *address; /* remote address */ const char *laddress; /* local address */ int lport; /* local port */ }; /* * These are string config options that must be copied between the * Match sub-config and the main config, and must be sent from the * privsep slave to the privsep master. We use a macro to ensure all * the options are copied and the copies are done in the correct order. * * NB. an option must appear in servconf.c:copy_set_server_options() or * COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS here but never both. */ #define COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS() do { \ M_CP_STROPT(banner); \ M_CP_STROPT(trusted_user_ca_keys); \ M_CP_STROPT(revoked_keys_file); \ M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_file); \ M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command); \ M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command_user); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_users, num_allow_users); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_users, num_deny_users); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_groups, num_allow_groups); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_groups, num_deny_groups); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(accept_env, num_accept_env); \ M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(auth_methods, num_auth_methods); \ } while (0) struct connection_info *get_connection_info(int, int); void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *); void fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *); int process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *, char *, const char *, int, int *, struct connection_info *); void load_server_config(const char *, Buffer *); void parse_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, Buffer *, struct connection_info *); void parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *, struct connection_info *); int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *, char *); int server_match_spec_complete(struct connection_info *); void copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *, ServerOptions *, int); void dump_config(ServerOptions *); char *derelativise_path(const char *); #endif /* SERVCONF_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/serverloop.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/serverloop.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/serverloop.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,1271 +1,1332 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.170 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.172 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Server main loop for handling the interactive session. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "packet.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "channels.h" #include "compat.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "key.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "session.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "serverloop.h" -#include "misc.h" #include "roaming.h" extern ServerOptions options; /* XXX */ extern Kex *xxx_kex; extern Authctxt *the_authctxt; extern int use_privsep; static Buffer stdin_buffer; /* Buffer for stdin data. */ static Buffer stdout_buffer; /* Buffer for stdout data. */ static Buffer stderr_buffer; /* Buffer for stderr data. */ static int fdin; /* Descriptor for stdin (for writing) */ static int fdout; /* Descriptor for stdout (for reading); May be same number as fdin. */ static int fderr; /* Descriptor for stderr. May be -1. */ static long stdin_bytes = 0; /* Number of bytes written to stdin. */ static long stdout_bytes = 0; /* Number of stdout bytes sent to client. */ static long stderr_bytes = 0; /* Number of stderr bytes sent to client. */ static long fdout_bytes = 0; /* Number of stdout bytes read from program. */ static int stdin_eof = 0; /* EOF message received from client. */ static int fdout_eof = 0; /* EOF encountered reading from fdout. */ static int fderr_eof = 0; /* EOF encountered readung from fderr. */ static int fdin_is_tty = 0; /* fdin points to a tty. */ static int connection_in; /* Connection to client (input). */ static int connection_out; /* Connection to client (output). */ static int connection_closed = 0; /* Connection to client closed. */ static u_int buffer_high; /* "Soft" max buffer size. */ static int no_more_sessions = 0; /* Disallow further sessions. */ /* * This SIGCHLD kludge is used to detect when the child exits. The server * will exit after that, as soon as forwarded connections have terminated. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t child_terminated = 0; /* The child has terminated. */ /* Cleanup on signals (!use_privsep case only) */ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0; /* prototypes */ static void server_init_dispatch(void); /* * we write to this pipe if a SIGCHLD is caught in order to avoid * the race between select() and child_terminated */ static int notify_pipe[2]; static void notify_setup(void) { if (pipe(notify_pipe) < 0) { error("pipe(notify_pipe) failed %s", strerror(errno)); } else if ((fcntl(notify_pipe[0], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) || (fcntl(notify_pipe[1], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1)) { error("fcntl(notify_pipe, F_SETFD) failed %s", strerror(errno)); close(notify_pipe[0]); close(notify_pipe[1]); } else { set_nonblock(notify_pipe[0]); set_nonblock(notify_pipe[1]); return; } notify_pipe[0] = -1; /* read end */ notify_pipe[1] = -1; /* write end */ } static void notify_parent(void) { if (notify_pipe[1] != -1) (void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1); } static void notify_prepare(fd_set *readset) { if (notify_pipe[0] != -1) FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset); } static void notify_done(fd_set *readset) { char c; if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1) debug2("notify_done: reading"); } /*ARGSUSED*/ static void sigchld_handler(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; child_terminated = 1; #ifndef _UNICOS mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler); #endif notify_parent(); errno = save_errno; } /*ARGSUSED*/ static void sigterm_handler(int sig) { received_sigterm = sig; } /* * Make packets from buffered stderr data, and buffer it for sending * to the client. */ static void make_packets_from_stderr_data(void) { u_int len; /* Send buffered stderr data to the client. */ while (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0 && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) { len = buffer_len(&stderr_buffer); if (packet_is_interactive()) { if (len > 512) len = 512; } else { /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */ if (len > packet_get_maxsize()) len = packet_get_maxsize(); } packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA); packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer), len); packet_send(); buffer_consume(&stderr_buffer, len); stderr_bytes += len; } } /* * Make packets from buffered stdout data, and buffer it for sending to the * client. */ static void make_packets_from_stdout_data(void) { u_int len; /* Send buffered stdout data to the client. */ while (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0 && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) { len = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer); if (packet_is_interactive()) { if (len > 512) len = 512; } else { /* Keep the packets at reasonable size. */ if (len > packet_get_maxsize()) len = packet_get_maxsize(); } packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA); packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), len); packet_send(); buffer_consume(&stdout_buffer, len); stdout_bytes += len; } } static void client_alive_check(void) { int channel_id; /* timeout, check to see how many we have had */ if (packet_inc_alive_timeouts() > options.client_alive_count_max) { logit("Timeout, client not responding."); cleanup_exit(255); } /* * send a bogus global/channel request with "wantreply", * we should get back a failure */ if ((channel_id = channel_find_open()) == -1) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring("keepalive@openssh.com"); packet_put_char(1); /* boolean: want reply */ } else { channel_request_start(channel_id, "keepalive@openssh.com", 1); } packet_send(); } /* * Sleep in select() until we can do something. This will initialize the * select masks. Upon return, the masks will indicate which descriptors * have data or can accept data. Optionally, a maximum time can be specified * for the duration of the wait (0 = infinite). */ static void wait_until_can_do_something(fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, u_int64_t max_time_milliseconds) { struct timeval tv, *tvp; int ret; time_t minwait_secs = 0; int client_alive_scheduled = 0; int program_alive_scheduled = 0; /* Allocate and update select() masks for channel descriptors. */ channel_prepare_select(readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp, nallocp, &minwait_secs, 0); if (minwait_secs != 0) max_time_milliseconds = MIN(max_time_milliseconds, (u_int)minwait_secs * 1000); /* * if using client_alive, set the max timeout accordingly, * and indicate that this particular timeout was for client * alive by setting the client_alive_scheduled flag. * * this could be randomized somewhat to make traffic * analysis more difficult, but we're not doing it yet. */ if (compat20 && max_time_milliseconds == 0 && options.client_alive_interval) { client_alive_scheduled = 1; max_time_milliseconds = (u_int64_t)options.client_alive_interval * 1000; } if (compat20) { #if 0 /* wrong: bad condition XXX */ if (channel_not_very_much_buffered_data()) #endif FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp); } else { /* * Read packets from the client unless we have too much * buffered stdin or channel data. */ if (buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) < buffer_high && channel_not_very_much_buffered_data()) FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp); /* * If there is not too much data already buffered going to * the client, try to get some more data from the program. */ if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) { program_alive_scheduled = child_terminated; if (!fdout_eof) FD_SET(fdout, *readsetp); if (!fderr_eof) FD_SET(fderr, *readsetp); } /* * If we have buffered data, try to write some of that data * to the program. */ if (fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) > 0) FD_SET(fdin, *writesetp); } notify_prepare(*readsetp); /* * If we have buffered packet data going to the client, mark that * descriptor. */ if (packet_have_data_to_write()) FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp); /* * If child has terminated and there is enough buffer space to read * from it, then read as much as is available and exit. */ if (child_terminated && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) if (max_time_milliseconds == 0 || client_alive_scheduled) max_time_milliseconds = 100; if (max_time_milliseconds == 0) tvp = NULL; else { tv.tv_sec = max_time_milliseconds / 1000; tv.tv_usec = 1000 * (max_time_milliseconds % 1000); tvp = &tv; } /* Wait for something to happen, or the timeout to expire. */ ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp); if (ret == -1) { memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp); memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp); if (errno != EINTR) error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno)); } else { if (ret == 0 && client_alive_scheduled) client_alive_check(); if (!compat20 && program_alive_scheduled && fdin_is_tty) { if (!fdout_eof) FD_SET(fdout, *readsetp); if (!fderr_eof) FD_SET(fderr, *readsetp); } } notify_done(*readsetp); } /* * Processes input from the client and the program. Input data is stored * in buffers and processed later. */ static void process_input(fd_set *readset) { int len; char buf[16384]; /* Read and buffer any input data from the client. */ if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) { int cont = 0; len = roaming_read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf), &cont); if (len == 0) { if (cont) return; verbose("Connection closed by %.100s", get_remote_ipaddr()); connection_closed = 1; if (compat20) return; cleanup_exit(255); } else if (len < 0) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN && errno != EWOULDBLOCK) { verbose("Read error from remote host " "%.100s: %.100s", get_remote_ipaddr(), strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(255); } } else { /* Buffer any received data. */ packet_process_incoming(buf, len); } } if (compat20) return; /* Read and buffer any available stdout data from the program. */ if (!fdout_eof && FD_ISSET(fdout, readset)) { errno = 0; len = read(fdout, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !child_terminated))) { /* do nothing */ #ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD } else if (len <= 0) { #else } else if ((!isatty(fdout) && len <= 0) || (isatty(fdout) && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) { #endif fdout_eof = 1; } else { buffer_append(&stdout_buffer, buf, len); fdout_bytes += len; } } /* Read and buffer any available stderr data from the program. */ if (!fderr_eof && FD_ISSET(fderr, readset)) { errno = 0; len = read(fderr, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !child_terminated))) { /* do nothing */ #ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD } else if (len <= 0) { #else } else if ((!isatty(fderr) && len <= 0) || (isatty(fderr) && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) { #endif fderr_eof = 1; } else { buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, buf, len); } } } /* * Sends data from internal buffers to client program stdin. */ static void process_output(fd_set *writeset) { struct termios tio; u_char *data; u_int dlen; int len; /* Write buffered data to program stdin. */ if (!compat20 && fdin != -1 && FD_ISSET(fdin, writeset)) { data = buffer_ptr(&stdin_buffer); dlen = buffer_len(&stdin_buffer); len = write(fdin, data, dlen); if (len < 0 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) { /* do nothing */ } else if (len <= 0) { if (fdin != fdout) close(fdin); else shutdown(fdin, SHUT_WR); /* We will no longer send. */ fdin = -1; } else { /* Successful write. */ if (fdin_is_tty && dlen >= 1 && data[0] != '\r' && tcgetattr(fdin, &tio) == 0 && !(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) { /* * Simulate echo to reduce the impact of * traffic analysis */ packet_send_ignore(len); packet_send(); } /* Consume the data from the buffer. */ buffer_consume(&stdin_buffer, len); /* Update the count of bytes written to the program. */ stdin_bytes += len; } } /* Send any buffered packet data to the client. */ if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset)) packet_write_poll(); } /* * Wait until all buffered output has been sent to the client. * This is used when the program terminates. */ static void drain_output(void) { /* Send any buffered stdout data to the client. */ if (buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) > 0) { packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDOUT_DATA); packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stdout_buffer), buffer_len(&stdout_buffer)); packet_send(); /* Update the count of sent bytes. */ stdout_bytes += buffer_len(&stdout_buffer); } /* Send any buffered stderr data to the client. */ if (buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) > 0) { packet_start(SSH_SMSG_STDERR_DATA); packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&stderr_buffer), buffer_len(&stderr_buffer)); packet_send(); /* Update the count of sent bytes. */ stderr_bytes += buffer_len(&stderr_buffer); } /* Wait until all buffered data has been written to the client. */ packet_write_wait(); } static void process_buffered_input_packets(void) { dispatch_run(DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, NULL, compat20 ? xxx_kex : NULL); } /* * Performs the interactive session. This handles data transmission between * the client and the program. Note that the notion of stdin, stdout, and * stderr in this function is sort of reversed: this function writes to * stdin (of the child program), and reads from stdout and stderr (of the * child program). */ void server_loop(pid_t pid, int fdin_arg, int fdout_arg, int fderr_arg) { fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL; int max_fd = 0; u_int nalloc = 0; int wait_status; /* Status returned by wait(). */ pid_t wait_pid; /* pid returned by wait(). */ int waiting_termination = 0; /* Have displayed waiting close message. */ u_int64_t max_time_milliseconds; u_int previous_stdout_buffer_bytes; u_int stdout_buffer_bytes; int type; debug("Entering interactive session."); /* Initialize the SIGCHLD kludge. */ child_terminated = 0; mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler); if (!use_privsep) { signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler); signal(SIGINT, sigterm_handler); signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler); } /* Initialize our global variables. */ fdin = fdin_arg; fdout = fdout_arg; fderr = fderr_arg; /* nonblocking IO */ set_nonblock(fdin); set_nonblock(fdout); /* we don't have stderr for interactive terminal sessions, see below */ if (fderr != -1) set_nonblock(fderr); if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_IGNOREMSG) && isatty(fdin)) fdin_is_tty = 1; connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); notify_setup(); previous_stdout_buffer_bytes = 0; /* Set approximate I/O buffer size. */ if (packet_is_interactive()) buffer_high = 4096; else buffer_high = 64 * 1024; #if 0 /* Initialize max_fd to the maximum of the known file descriptors. */ max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout); if (fderr != -1) max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr); #endif /* Initialize Initialize buffers. */ buffer_init(&stdin_buffer); buffer_init(&stdout_buffer); buffer_init(&stderr_buffer); /* * If we have no separate fderr (which is the case when we have a pty * - there we cannot make difference between data sent to stdout and * stderr), indicate that we have seen an EOF from stderr. This way * we don't need to check the descriptor everywhere. */ if (fderr == -1) fderr_eof = 1; server_init_dispatch(); /* Main loop of the server for the interactive session mode. */ for (;;) { /* Process buffered packets from the client. */ process_buffered_input_packets(); /* * If we have received eof, and there is no more pending * input data, cause a real eof by closing fdin. */ if (stdin_eof && fdin != -1 && buffer_len(&stdin_buffer) == 0) { if (fdin != fdout) close(fdin); else shutdown(fdin, SHUT_WR); /* We will no longer send. */ fdin = -1; } /* Make packets from buffered stderr data to send to the client. */ make_packets_from_stderr_data(); /* * Make packets from buffered stdout data to send to the * client. If there is very little to send, this arranges to * not send them now, but to wait a short while to see if we * are getting more data. This is necessary, as some systems * wake up readers from a pty after each separate character. */ max_time_milliseconds = 0; stdout_buffer_bytes = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer); if (stdout_buffer_bytes != 0 && stdout_buffer_bytes < 256 && stdout_buffer_bytes != previous_stdout_buffer_bytes) { /* try again after a while */ max_time_milliseconds = 10; } else { /* Send it now. */ make_packets_from_stdout_data(); } previous_stdout_buffer_bytes = buffer_len(&stdout_buffer); /* Send channel data to the client. */ if (packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) channel_output_poll(); /* * Bail out of the loop if the program has closed its output * descriptors, and we have no more data to send to the * client, and there is no pending buffered data. */ if (fdout_eof && fderr_eof && !packet_have_data_to_write() && buffer_len(&stdout_buffer) == 0 && buffer_len(&stderr_buffer) == 0) { if (!channel_still_open()) break; if (!waiting_termination) { const char *s = "Waiting for forwarded connections to terminate...\r\n"; char *cp; waiting_termination = 1; buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, s, strlen(s)); /* Display list of open channels. */ cp = channel_open_message(); buffer_append(&stderr_buffer, cp, strlen(cp)); free(cp); } } max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdin); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fdout); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, fderr); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, notify_pipe[0]); /* Sleep in select() until we can do something. */ wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset, &max_fd, &nalloc, max_time_milliseconds); if (received_sigterm) { logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm); /* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */ cleanup_exit(255); } /* Process any channel events. */ channel_after_select(readset, writeset); /* Process input from the client and from program stdout/stderr. */ process_input(readset); /* Process output to the client and to program stdin. */ process_output(writeset); } free(readset); free(writeset); /* Cleanup and termination code. */ /* Wait until all output has been sent to the client. */ drain_output(); debug("End of interactive session; stdin %ld, stdout (read %ld, sent %ld), stderr %ld bytes.", stdin_bytes, fdout_bytes, stdout_bytes, stderr_bytes); /* Free and clear the buffers. */ buffer_free(&stdin_buffer); buffer_free(&stdout_buffer); buffer_free(&stderr_buffer); /* Close the file descriptors. */ if (fdout != -1) close(fdout); fdout = -1; fdout_eof = 1; if (fderr != -1) close(fderr); fderr = -1; fderr_eof = 1; if (fdin != -1) close(fdin); fdin = -1; channel_free_all(); /* We no longer want our SIGCHLD handler to be called. */ mysignal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); while ((wait_pid = waitpid(-1, &wait_status, 0)) < 0) if (errno != EINTR) packet_disconnect("wait: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (wait_pid != pid) error("Strange, wait returned pid %ld, expected %ld", (long)wait_pid, (long)pid); /* Check if it exited normally. */ if (WIFEXITED(wait_status)) { /* Yes, normal exit. Get exit status and send it to the client. */ debug("Command exited with status %d.", WEXITSTATUS(wait_status)); packet_start(SSH_SMSG_EXITSTATUS); packet_put_int(WEXITSTATUS(wait_status)); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* * Wait for exit confirmation. Note that there might be * other packets coming before it; however, the program has * already died so we just ignore them. The client is * supposed to respond with the confirmation when it receives * the exit status. */ do { type = packet_read(); } while (type != SSH_CMSG_EXIT_CONFIRMATION); debug("Received exit confirmation."); return; } /* Check if the program terminated due to a signal. */ if (WIFSIGNALED(wait_status)) packet_disconnect("Command terminated on signal %d.", WTERMSIG(wait_status)); /* Some weird exit cause. Just exit. */ packet_disconnect("wait returned status %04x.", wait_status); /* NOTREACHED */ } static void collect_children(void) { pid_t pid; sigset_t oset, nset; int status; /* block SIGCHLD while we check for dead children */ sigemptyset(&nset); sigaddset(&nset, SIGCHLD); sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nset, &oset); if (child_terminated) { debug("Received SIGCHLD."); while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 || (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR)) if (pid > 0) session_close_by_pid(pid, status); child_terminated = 0; } sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL); } void server_loop2(Authctxt *authctxt) { fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL; int rekeying = 0, max_fd; u_int nalloc = 0; u_int64_t rekey_timeout_ms = 0; debug("Entering interactive session for SSH2."); mysignal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler); child_terminated = 0; connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); if (!use_privsep) { signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler); signal(SIGINT, sigterm_handler); signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler); } notify_setup(); max_fd = MAX(connection_in, connection_out); max_fd = MAX(max_fd, notify_pipe[0]); server_init_dispatch(); for (;;) { process_buffered_input_packets(); rekeying = (xxx_kex != NULL && !xxx_kex->done); if (!rekeying && packet_not_very_much_data_to_write()) channel_output_poll(); if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && compat20 && !rekeying) rekey_timeout_ms = packet_get_rekey_timeout() * 1000; else rekey_timeout_ms = 0; wait_until_can_do_something(&readset, &writeset, &max_fd, &nalloc, rekey_timeout_ms); if (received_sigterm) { logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm); /* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */ cleanup_exit(255); } collect_children(); if (!rekeying) { channel_after_select(readset, writeset); if (packet_need_rekeying()) { debug("need rekeying"); xxx_kex->done = 0; kex_send_kexinit(xxx_kex); } } process_input(readset); if (connection_closed) break; process_output(writeset); } collect_children(); free(readset); free(writeset); /* free all channels, no more reads and writes */ channel_free_all(); /* free remaining sessions, e.g. remove wtmp entries */ session_destroy_all(NULL); } static void server_input_keep_alive(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { debug("Got %d/%u for keepalive", type, seq); /* * reset timeout, since we got a sane answer from the client. * even if this was generated by something other than * the bogus CHANNEL_REQUEST we send for keepalives. */ packet_set_alive_timeouts(0); } static void server_input_stdin_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { char *data; u_int data_len; /* Stdin data from the client. Append it to the buffer. */ /* Ignore any data if the client has closed stdin. */ if (fdin == -1) return; data = packet_get_string(&data_len); packet_check_eom(); buffer_append(&stdin_buffer, data, data_len); explicit_bzero(data, data_len); free(data); } static void server_input_eof(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { /* * Eof from the client. The stdin descriptor to the * program will be closed when all buffered data has * drained. */ debug("EOF received for stdin."); packet_check_eom(); stdin_eof = 1; } static void server_input_window_size(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { u_int row = packet_get_int(); u_int col = packet_get_int(); u_int xpixel = packet_get_int(); u_int ypixel = packet_get_int(); debug("Window change received."); packet_check_eom(); if (fdin != -1) pty_change_window_size(fdin, row, col, xpixel, ypixel); } static Channel * server_request_direct_tcpip(void) { Channel *c = NULL; char *target, *originator; u_short target_port, originator_port; target = packet_get_string(NULL); target_port = packet_get_int(); originator = packet_get_string(NULL); originator_port = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); debug("server_request_direct_tcpip: originator %s port %d, target %s " "port %d", originator, originator_port, target, target_port); /* XXX fine grained permissions */ if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 && !no_port_forwarding_flag) { - c = channel_connect_to(target, target_port, + c = channel_connect_to_port(target, target_port, "direct-tcpip", "direct-tcpip"); } else { logit("refused local port forward: " "originator %s port %d, target %s port %d", originator, originator_port, target, target_port); } free(originator); free(target); return c; } static Channel * +server_request_direct_streamlocal(void) +{ + Channel *c = NULL; + char *target, *originator; + u_short originator_port; + + target = packet_get_string(NULL); + originator = packet_get_string(NULL); + originator_port = packet_get_int(); + packet_check_eom(); + + debug("server_request_direct_streamlocal: originator %s port %d, target %s", + originator, originator_port, target); + + /* XXX fine grained permissions */ + if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 && + !no_port_forwarding_flag) { + c = channel_connect_to_path(target, + "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", "direct-streamlocal"); + } else { + logit("refused streamlocal port forward: " + "originator %s port %d, target %s", + originator, originator_port, target); + } + + free(originator); + free(target); + + return c; +} + +static Channel * server_request_tun(void) { Channel *c = NULL; int mode, tun; int sock; mode = packet_get_int(); switch (mode) { case SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT: case SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET: break; default: packet_send_debug("Unsupported tunnel device mode."); return NULL; } if ((options.permit_tun & mode) == 0) { packet_send_debug("Server has rejected tunnel device " "forwarding"); return NULL; } tun = packet_get_int(); if (forced_tun_device != -1) { if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY && forced_tun_device != tun) goto done; tun = forced_tun_device; } sock = tun_open(tun, mode); if (sock < 0) goto done; c = channel_new("tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1); c->datagram = 1; #if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER) if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT) channel_register_filter(c->self, sys_tun_infilter, sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL); #endif done: if (c == NULL) packet_send_debug("Failed to open the tunnel device."); return c; } static Channel * server_request_session(void) { Channel *c; debug("input_session_request"); packet_check_eom(); if (no_more_sessions) { packet_disconnect("Possible attack: attempt to open a session " "after additional sessions disabled"); } /* * A server session has no fd to read or write until a * CHANNEL_REQUEST for a shell is made, so we set the type to * SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL. Additionally, a callback for handling all * CHANNEL_REQUEST messages is registered. */ c = channel_new("session", SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL, -1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "server-session", 1); if (session_open(the_authctxt, c->self) != 1) { debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self); channel_free(c); return NULL; } channel_register_cleanup(c->self, session_close_by_channel, 0); return c; } static void server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c = NULL; char *ctype; int rchan; u_int rmaxpack, rwindow, len; ctype = packet_get_string(&len); rchan = packet_get_int(); rwindow = packet_get_int(); rmaxpack = packet_get_int(); debug("server_input_channel_open: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d", ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack); if (strcmp(ctype, "session") == 0) { c = server_request_session(); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) { c = server_request_direct_tcpip(); + } else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) { + c = server_request_direct_streamlocal(); } else if (strcmp(ctype, "tun@openssh.com") == 0) { c = server_request_tun(); } if (c != NULL) { debug("server_input_channel_open: confirm %s", ctype); c->remote_id = rchan; c->remote_window = rwindow; c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack; if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_put_int(c->self); packet_put_int(c->local_window); packet_put_int(c->local_maxpacket); packet_send(); } } else { debug("server_input_channel_open: failure %s", ctype); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE); packet_put_int(rchan); packet_put_int(SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED); if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_OPENFAILURE)) { packet_put_cstring("open failed"); packet_put_cstring(""); } packet_send(); } free(ctype); } static void server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { char *rtype; int want_reply; int success = 0, allocated_listen_port = 0; rtype = packet_get_string(NULL); want_reply = packet_get_char(); debug("server_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d", rtype, want_reply); /* -R style forwarding */ if (strcmp(rtype, "tcpip-forward") == 0) { struct passwd *pw; - char *listen_address; - u_short listen_port; + struct Forward fwd; pw = the_authctxt->pw; if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid) fatal("server_input_global_request: no/invalid user"); - listen_address = packet_get_string(NULL); - listen_port = (u_short)packet_get_int(); + memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); + fwd.listen_host = packet_get_string(NULL); + fwd.listen_port = (u_short)packet_get_int(); debug("server_input_global_request: tcpip-forward listen %s port %d", - listen_address, listen_port); + fwd.listen_host, fwd.listen_port); /* check permissions */ if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0 || no_port_forwarding_flag || - (!want_reply && listen_port == 0) + (!want_reply && fwd.listen_port == 0) #ifndef NO_IPPORT_RESERVED_CONCEPT - || (listen_port != 0 && listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED && - pw->pw_uid != 0) + || (fwd.listen_port != 0 && fwd.listen_port < IPPORT_RESERVED && + pw->pw_uid != 0) #endif ) { success = 0; packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding."); } else { /* Start listening on the port */ - success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener( - listen_address, listen_port, - &allocated_listen_port, options.gateway_ports); + success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(&fwd, + &allocated_listen_port, &options.fwd_opts); } - free(listen_address); + free(fwd.listen_host); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-tcpip-forward") == 0) { - char *cancel_address; - u_short cancel_port; + struct Forward fwd; - cancel_address = packet_get_string(NULL); - cancel_port = (u_short)packet_get_int(); + memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); + fwd.listen_host = packet_get_string(NULL); + fwd.listen_port = (u_short)packet_get_int(); debug("%s: cancel-tcpip-forward addr %s port %d", __func__, - cancel_address, cancel_port); + fwd.listen_host, fwd.listen_port); - success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(cancel_address, - cancel_port); - free(cancel_address); + success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(&fwd); + free(fwd.listen_host); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com") == 0) { + struct Forward fwd; + + memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); + fwd.listen_path = packet_get_string(NULL); + debug("server_input_global_request: streamlocal-forward listen path %s", + fwd.listen_path); + + /* check permissions */ + if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0 + || no_port_forwarding_flag) { + success = 0; + packet_send_debug("Server has disabled port forwarding."); + } else { + /* Start listening on the socket */ + success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener( + &fwd, NULL, &options.fwd_opts); + } + free(fwd.listen_path); + } else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com") == 0) { + struct Forward fwd; + + memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd)); + fwd.listen_path = packet_get_string(NULL); + debug("%s: cancel-streamlocal-forward path %s", __func__, + fwd.listen_path); + + success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(&fwd); + free(fwd.listen_path); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "no-more-sessions@openssh.com") == 0) { no_more_sessions = 1; success = 1; } if (want_reply) { packet_start(success ? SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE); if (success && allocated_listen_port > 0) packet_put_int(allocated_listen_port); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } free(rtype); } static void server_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Channel *c; int id, reply, success = 0; char *rtype; id = packet_get_int(); rtype = packet_get_string(NULL); reply = packet_get_char(); debug("server_input_channel_req: channel %d request %s reply %d", id, rtype, reply); if ((c = channel_lookup(id)) == NULL) packet_disconnect("server_input_channel_req: " "unknown channel %d", id); if (!strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com")) { packet_check_eom(); chan_rcvd_eow(c); } else if ((c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL || c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) && strcmp(c->ctype, "session") == 0) success = session_input_channel_req(c, rtype); - if (reply) { + if (reply && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) { packet_start(success ? SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE); packet_put_int(c->remote_id); packet_send(); } free(rtype); } static void server_init_dispatch_20(void) { debug("server_init_dispatch_20"); dispatch_init(&dispatch_protocol_error); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &server_input_channel_open); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &server_input_channel_req); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &server_input_global_request); /* client_alive */ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive); /* rekeying */ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit); } static void server_init_dispatch_13(void) { debug("server_init_dispatch_13"); dispatch_init(NULL); dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_EOF, &server_input_eof); dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_STDIN_DATA, &server_input_stdin_data); dispatch_set(SSH_CMSG_WINDOW_SIZE, &server_input_window_size); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_close); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_close_confirmation); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_PORT_OPEN, &channel_input_port_open); } static void server_init_dispatch_15(void) { server_init_dispatch_13(); debug("server_init_dispatch_15"); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_ieof); dispatch_set(SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_oclose); } static void server_init_dispatch(void) { if (compat20) server_init_dispatch_20(); else if (compat13) server_init_dispatch_13(); else server_init_dispatch_15(); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/session.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/session.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/session.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,2774 +1,2771 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.270 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.274 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 support by Markus Friedl. * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include +#include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "packet.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "match.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "compat.h" #include "channels.h" #include "key.h" #include "cipher.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "auth-options.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "sshlogin.h" #include "serverloop.h" #include "canohost.h" -#include "misc.h" #include "session.h" #include "kex.h" #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "sftp.h" #if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS) #include #endif #ifdef WITH_SELINUX #include #endif #define IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(c) \ (!strncmp(c, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1) && \ (c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\0' || \ c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == ' ' || \ c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\t')) /* func */ Session *session_new(void); void session_set_fds(Session *, int, int, int, int, int); void session_pty_cleanup(Session *); void session_proctitle(Session *); int session_setup_x11fwd(Session *); int do_exec_pty(Session *, const char *); int do_exec_no_pty(Session *, const char *); int do_exec(Session *, const char *); void do_login(Session *, const char *); #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX static void do_pre_login(Session *s); #endif void do_child(Session *, const char *); void do_motd(void); int check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *); static void do_authenticated1(Authctxt *); static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *); static int session_pty_req(Session *); /* import */ extern ServerOptions options; extern char *__progname; extern int log_stderr; extern int debug_flag; extern u_int utmp_len; extern int startup_pipe; extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void); extern Buffer loginmsg; /* original command from peer. */ const char *original_command = NULL; /* data */ static int sessions_first_unused = -1; static int sessions_nalloc = 0; static Session *sessions = NULL; #define SUBSYSTEM_NONE 0 #define SUBSYSTEM_EXT 1 #define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP 2 #define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR 3 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP login_cap_t *lc; #endif static int is_child = 0; /* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */ static char *auth_sock_name = NULL; static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL; /* removes the agent forwarding socket */ static void auth_sock_cleanup_proc(struct passwd *pw) { if (auth_sock_name != NULL) { temporarily_use_uid(pw); unlink(auth_sock_name); rmdir(auth_sock_dir); auth_sock_name = NULL; restore_uid(); } } static int auth_input_request_forwarding(struct passwd * pw) { Channel *nc; int sock = -1; - struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; if (auth_sock_name != NULL) { error("authentication forwarding requested twice."); return 0; } /* Temporarily drop privileged uid for mkdir/bind. */ temporarily_use_uid(pw); /* Allocate a buffer for the socket name, and format the name. */ auth_sock_dir = xstrdup("/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX"); /* Create private directory for socket */ if (mkdtemp(auth_sock_dir) == NULL) { packet_send_debug("Agent forwarding disabled: " "mkdtemp() failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); restore_uid(); free(auth_sock_dir); auth_sock_dir = NULL; goto authsock_err; } xasprintf(&auth_sock_name, "%s/agent.%ld", auth_sock_dir, (long) getpid()); - /* Create the socket. */ - sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); - if (sock < 0) { - error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); - restore_uid(); - goto authsock_err; - } + /* Start a Unix listener on auth_sock_name. */ + sock = unix_listener(auth_sock_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0); - /* Bind it to the name. */ - memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr)); - sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; - strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, auth_sock_name, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)); - - if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) { - error("bind: %.100s", strerror(errno)); - restore_uid(); - goto authsock_err; - } - /* Restore the privileged uid. */ restore_uid(); - /* Start listening on the socket. */ - if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) { - error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno)); + /* Check for socket/bind/listen failure. */ + if (sock < 0) goto authsock_err; - } /* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */ nc = channel_new("auth socket", SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1, CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "auth socket", 1); nc->path = xstrdup(auth_sock_name); return 1; authsock_err: free(auth_sock_name); if (auth_sock_dir != NULL) { rmdir(auth_sock_dir); free(auth_sock_dir); } if (sock != -1) close(sock); auth_sock_name = NULL; auth_sock_dir = NULL; return 0; } static void display_loginmsg(void) { if (buffer_len(&loginmsg) > 0) { buffer_append(&loginmsg, "\0", 1); printf("%s", (char *)buffer_ptr(&loginmsg)); buffer_clear(&loginmsg); } } void do_authenticated(Authctxt *authctxt) { setproctitle("%s", authctxt->pw->pw_name); /* setup the channel layer */ + /* XXX - streamlocal? */ if (no_port_forwarding_flag || (options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) == 0) channel_disable_adm_local_opens(); else channel_permit_all_opens(); auth_debug_send(); if (compat20) do_authenticated2(authctxt); else do_authenticated1(authctxt); do_cleanup(authctxt); } /* * Prepares for an interactive session. This is called after the user has * been successfully authenticated. During this message exchange, pseudo * terminals are allocated, X11, TCP/IP, and authentication agent forwardings * are requested, etc. */ static void do_authenticated1(Authctxt *authctxt) { Session *s; char *command; int success, type, screen_flag; int enable_compression_after_reply = 0; u_int proto_len, data_len, dlen, compression_level = 0; s = session_new(); if (s == NULL) { error("no more sessions"); return; } s->authctxt = authctxt; s->pw = authctxt->pw; /* * We stay in this loop until the client requests to execute a shell * or a command. */ for (;;) { success = 0; /* Get a packet from the client. */ type = packet_read(); /* Process the packet. */ switch (type) { case SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION: compression_level = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); if (compression_level < 1 || compression_level > 9) { packet_send_debug("Received invalid compression level %d.", compression_level); break; } if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) { debug2("compression disabled"); break; } /* Enable compression after we have responded with SUCCESS. */ enable_compression_after_reply = 1; success = 1; break; case SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY: success = session_pty_req(s); break; case SSH_CMSG_X11_REQUEST_FORWARDING: s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(&proto_len); s->auth_data = packet_get_string(&data_len); screen_flag = packet_get_protocol_flags() & SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER; debug2("SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER: %d", screen_flag); if (packet_remaining() == 4) { if (!screen_flag) debug2("Buggy client: " "X11 screen flag missing"); s->screen = packet_get_int(); } else { s->screen = 0; } packet_check_eom(); success = session_setup_x11fwd(s); if (!success) { free(s->auth_proto); free(s->auth_data); s->auth_proto = NULL; s->auth_data = NULL; } break; case SSH_CMSG_AGENT_REQUEST_FORWARDING: if (!options.allow_agent_forwarding || no_agent_forwarding_flag || compat13) { debug("Authentication agent forwarding not permitted for this authentication."); break; } debug("Received authentication agent forwarding request."); success = auth_input_request_forwarding(s->pw); break; case SSH_CMSG_PORT_FORWARD_REQUEST: if (no_port_forwarding_flag) { debug("Port forwarding not permitted for this authentication."); break; } if (!(options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE)) { debug("Port forwarding not permitted."); break; } debug("Received TCP/IP port forwarding request."); if (channel_input_port_forward_request(s->pw->pw_uid == 0, - options.gateway_ports) < 0) { + &options.fwd_opts) < 0) { debug("Port forwarding failed."); break; } success = 1; break; case SSH_CMSG_MAX_PACKET_SIZE: if (packet_set_maxsize(packet_get_int()) > 0) success = 1; break; case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL: case SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD: if (type == SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD) { command = packet_get_string(&dlen); debug("Exec command '%.500s'", command); if (do_exec(s, command) != 0) packet_disconnect( "command execution failed"); free(command); } else { if (do_exec(s, NULL) != 0) packet_disconnect( "shell execution failed"); } packet_check_eom(); session_close(s); return; default: /* * Any unknown messages in this phase are ignored, * and a failure message is returned. */ logit("Unknown packet type received after authentication: %d", type); } packet_start(success ? SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS : SSH_SMSG_FAILURE); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Enable compression now that we have replied if appropriate. */ if (enable_compression_after_reply) { enable_compression_after_reply = 0; packet_start_compression(compression_level); } } } #define USE_PIPES 1 /* * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty. This * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after * setting up file descriptors and such. */ int do_exec_no_pty(Session *s, const char *command) { pid_t pid; #ifdef USE_PIPES int pin[2], pout[2], perr[2]; if (s == NULL) fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session"); /* Allocate pipes for communicating with the program. */ if (pipe(pin) < 0) { error("%s: pipe in: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (pipe(pout) < 0) { error("%s: pipe out: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(pin[0]); close(pin[1]); return -1; } if (pipe(perr) < 0) { error("%s: pipe err: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(pin[0]); close(pin[1]); close(pout[0]); close(pout[1]); return -1; } #else int inout[2], err[2]; if (s == NULL) fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session"); /* Uses socket pairs to communicate with the program. */ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) < 0) { error("%s: socketpair #1: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, err) < 0) { error("%s: socketpair #2: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(inout[0]); close(inout[1]); return -1; } #endif session_proctitle(s); /* Fork the child. */ switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: error("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); #ifdef USE_PIPES close(pin[0]); close(pin[1]); close(pout[0]); close(pout[1]); close(perr[0]); close(perr[1]); #else close(inout[0]); close(inout[1]); close(err[0]); close(err[1]); #endif return -1; case 0: is_child = 1; /* Child. Reinitialize the log since the pid has changed. */ log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); /* * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD * setlogin() affects the entire process group. */ if (setsid() < 0) error("setsid failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); #ifdef USE_PIPES /* * Redirect stdin. We close the parent side of the socket * pair, and make the child side the standard input. */ close(pin[1]); if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0) perror("dup2 stdin"); close(pin[0]); /* Redirect stdout. */ close(pout[0]); if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0) perror("dup2 stdout"); close(pout[1]); /* Redirect stderr. */ close(perr[0]); if (dup2(perr[1], 2) < 0) perror("dup2 stderr"); close(perr[1]); #else /* * Redirect stdin, stdout, and stderr. Stdin and stdout will * use the same socket, as some programs (particularly rdist) * seem to depend on it. */ close(inout[1]); close(err[1]); if (dup2(inout[0], 0) < 0) /* stdin */ perror("dup2 stdin"); if (dup2(inout[0], 1) < 0) /* stdout (same as stdin) */ perror("dup2 stdout"); close(inout[0]); if (dup2(err[0], 2) < 0) /* stderr */ perror("dup2 stderr"); close(err[0]); #endif #ifdef _UNICOS cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */ #endif /* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */ do_child(s, command); /* NOTREACHED */ default: break; } #ifdef _UNICOS signal(WJSIGNAL, cray_job_termination_handler); #endif /* _UNICOS */ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); #endif s->pid = pid; /* Set interactive/non-interactive mode. */ packet_set_interactive(s->display != NULL, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); /* * Clear loginmsg, since it's the child's responsibility to display * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate * multiple copies of the login messages. */ buffer_clear(&loginmsg); #ifdef USE_PIPES /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the pipes. */ close(pin[0]); close(pout[1]); close(perr[1]); if (compat20) { session_set_fds(s, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0], s->is_subsystem, 0); } else { /* Enter the interactive session. */ server_loop(pid, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0]); /* server_loop has closed pin[1], pout[0], and perr[0]. */ } #else /* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the socket pairs. */ close(inout[0]); close(err[0]); /* * Enter the interactive session. Note: server_loop must be able to * handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same. */ if (compat20) { session_set_fds(s, inout[1], inout[1], err[1], s->is_subsystem, 0); } else { server_loop(pid, inout[1], inout[1], err[1]); /* server_loop has closed inout[1] and err[1]. */ } #endif return 0; } /* * This is called to fork and execute a command when we have a tty. This * will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after * setting up file descriptors, controlling tty, updating wtmp, utmp, * lastlog, and other such operations. */ int do_exec_pty(Session *s, const char *command) { int fdout, ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster; pid_t pid; if (s == NULL) fatal("do_exec_pty: no session"); ptyfd = s->ptyfd; ttyfd = s->ttyfd; /* * Create another descriptor of the pty master side for use as the * standard input. We could use the original descriptor, but this * simplifies code in server_loop. The descriptor is bidirectional. * Do this before forking (and cleanup in the child) so as to * detect and gracefully fail out-of-fd conditions. */ if ((fdout = dup(ptyfd)) < 0) { error("%s: dup #1: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(ttyfd); close(ptyfd); return -1; } /* we keep a reference to the pty master */ if ((ptymaster = dup(ptyfd)) < 0) { error("%s: dup #2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(ttyfd); close(ptyfd); close(fdout); return -1; } /* Fork the child. */ switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: error("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno)); close(fdout); close(ptymaster); close(ttyfd); close(ptyfd); return -1; case 0: is_child = 1; close(fdout); close(ptymaster); /* Child. Reinitialize the log because the pid has changed. */ log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); /* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */ close(ptyfd); /* Make the pseudo tty our controlling tty. */ pty_make_controlling_tty(&ttyfd, s->tty); /* Redirect stdin/stdout/stderr from the pseudo tty. */ if (dup2(ttyfd, 0) < 0) error("dup2 stdin: %s", strerror(errno)); if (dup2(ttyfd, 1) < 0) error("dup2 stdout: %s", strerror(errno)); if (dup2(ttyfd, 2) < 0) error("dup2 stderr: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */ close(ttyfd); /* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */ #ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA if (!(options.use_login && command == NULL)) { #ifdef _UNICOS cray_init_job(s->pw); /* set up cray jid and tmpdir */ #endif /* _UNICOS */ do_login(s, command); } # ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX else do_pre_login(s); # endif #endif /* * Do common processing for the child, such as execing * the command. */ do_child(s, command); /* NOTREACHED */ default: break; } #ifdef _UNICOS signal(WJSIGNAL, cray_job_termination_handler); #endif /* _UNICOS */ #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE); #endif s->pid = pid; /* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */ close(ttyfd); /* Enter interactive session. */ s->ptymaster = ptymaster; packet_set_interactive(1, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); if (compat20) { session_set_fds(s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1); } else { server_loop(pid, ptyfd, fdout, -1); /* server_loop _has_ closed ptyfd and fdout. */ } return 0; } #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX static void do_pre_login(Session *s) { socklen_t fromlen; struct sockaddr_storage from; pid_t pid = getpid(); /* * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let * the address be 0.0.0.0. */ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); fromlen = sizeof(from); if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(255); } } record_utmp_only(pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen); } #endif /* * This is called to fork and execute a command. If another command is * to be forced, execute that instead. */ int do_exec(Session *s, const char *command) { int ret; const char *forced = NULL; char session_type[1024], *tty = NULL; if (options.adm_forced_command) { original_command = command; command = options.adm_forced_command; forced = "(config)"; } else if (forced_command) { original_command = command; command = forced_command; forced = "(key-option)"; } if (forced != NULL) { if (IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(command)) { s->is_subsystem = s->is_subsystem ? SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP : SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR; } else if (s->is_subsystem) s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT; snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "forced-command %s '%.900s'", forced, command); } else if (s->is_subsystem) { snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "subsystem '%.900s'", s->subsys); } else if (command == NULL) { snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "shell"); } else { /* NB. we don't log unforced commands to preserve privacy */ snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "command"); } if (s->ttyfd != -1) { tty = s->tty; if (strncmp(tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0) tty += 5; } verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d", session_type, tty == NULL ? "" : " on ", tty == NULL ? "" : tty, s->pw->pw_name, get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port()); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS if (command != NULL) PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command)); else if (s->ttyfd == -1) { char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell; if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */ shell =_PATH_BSHELL; PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell)); } #endif if (s->ttyfd != -1) ret = do_exec_pty(s, command); else ret = do_exec_no_pty(s, command); original_command = NULL; /* * Clear loginmsg: it's the child's responsibility to display * it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate * multiple copies of the login messages. */ buffer_clear(&loginmsg); return ret; } /* administrative, login(1)-like work */ void do_login(Session *s, const char *command) { socklen_t fromlen; struct sockaddr_storage from; struct passwd * pw = s->pw; pid_t pid = getpid(); /* * Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let * the address be 0.0.0.0. */ memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from)); fromlen = sizeof(from); if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { if (getpeername(packet_get_connection_in(), (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) < 0) { debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(255); } } /* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */ if (!use_privsep) record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid, get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns), (struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen); #ifdef USE_PAM /* * If password change is needed, do it now. * This needs to occur before the ~/.hushlogin check. */ if (options.use_pam && !use_privsep && s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { display_loginmsg(); do_pam_chauthtok(); s->authctxt->force_pwchange = 0; /* XXX - signal [net] parent to enable forwardings */ } #endif if (check_quietlogin(s, command)) return; display_loginmsg(); do_motd(); } /* * Display the message of the day. */ void do_motd(void) { FILE *f; char buf[256]; if (options.print_motd) { #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "welcome", "/etc/motd", "/etc/motd"), "r"); #else f = fopen("/etc/motd", "r"); #endif if (f) { while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) fputs(buf, stdout); fclose(f); } } } /* * Check for quiet login, either .hushlogin or command given. */ int check_quietlogin(Session *s, const char *command) { char buf[256]; struct passwd *pw = s->pw; struct stat st; /* Return 1 if .hushlogin exists or a command given. */ if (command != NULL) return 1; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.200s/.hushlogin", pw->pw_dir); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (login_getcapbool(lc, "hushlogin", 0) || stat(buf, &st) >= 0) return 1; #else if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0) return 1; #endif return 0; } /* * Sets the value of the given variable in the environment. If the variable * already exists, its value is overridden. */ void child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name, const char *value) { char **env; u_int envsize; u_int i, namelen; if (strchr(name, '=') != NULL) { error("Invalid environment variable \"%.100s\"", name); return; } /* * If we're passed an uninitialized list, allocate a single null * entry before continuing. */ if (*envp == NULL && *envsizep == 0) { *envp = xmalloc(sizeof(char *)); *envp[0] = NULL; *envsizep = 1; } /* * Find the slot where the value should be stored. If the variable * already exists, we reuse the slot; otherwise we append a new slot * at the end of the array, expanding if necessary. */ env = *envp; namelen = strlen(name); for (i = 0; env[i]; i++) if (strncmp(env[i], name, namelen) == 0 && env[i][namelen] == '=') break; if (env[i]) { /* Reuse the slot. */ free(env[i]); } else { /* New variable. Expand if necessary. */ envsize = *envsizep; if (i >= envsize - 1) { if (envsize >= 1000) fatal("child_set_env: too many env vars"); envsize += 50; env = (*envp) = xrealloc(env, envsize, sizeof(char *)); *envsizep = envsize; } /* Need to set the NULL pointer at end of array beyond the new slot. */ env[i + 1] = NULL; } /* Allocate space and format the variable in the appropriate slot. */ env[i] = xmalloc(strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1); snprintf(env[i], strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1, "%s=%s", name, value); } /* * Reads environment variables from the given file and adds/overrides them * into the environment. If the file does not exist, this does nothing. * Otherwise, it must consist of empty lines, comments (line starts with '#') * and assignments of the form name=value. No other forms are allowed. */ static void read_environment_file(char ***env, u_int *envsize, const char *filename) { FILE *f; char buf[4096]; char *cp, *value; u_int lineno = 0; f = fopen(filename, "r"); if (!f) return; while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) { if (++lineno > 1000) fatal("Too many lines in environment file %s", filename); for (cp = buf; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n') continue; cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0'; value = strchr(cp, '='); if (value == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad line %u in %.100s\n", lineno, filename); continue; } /* * Replace the equals sign by nul, and advance value to * the value string. */ *value = '\0'; value++; child_set_env(env, envsize, cp, value); } fclose(f); } #ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN /* * Return named variable from specified environment, or NULL if not present. */ static char * child_get_env(char **env, const char *name) { int i; size_t len; len = strlen(name); for (i=0; env[i] != NULL; i++) if (strncmp(name, env[i], len) == 0 && env[i][len] == '=') return(env[i] + len + 1); return NULL; } /* * Read /etc/default/login. * We pick up the PATH (or SUPATH for root) and UMASK. */ static void read_etc_default_login(char ***env, u_int *envsize, uid_t uid) { char **tmpenv = NULL, *var; u_int i, tmpenvsize = 0; u_long mask; /* * We don't want to copy the whole file to the child's environment, * so we use a temporary environment and copy the variables we're * interested in. */ read_environment_file(&tmpenv, &tmpenvsize, "/etc/default/login"); if (tmpenv == NULL) return; if (uid == 0) var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "SUPATH"); else var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "PATH"); if (var != NULL) child_set_env(env, envsize, "PATH", var); if ((var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "UMASK")) != NULL) if (sscanf(var, "%5lo", &mask) == 1) umask((mode_t)mask); for (i = 0; tmpenv[i] != NULL; i++) free(tmpenv[i]); free(tmpenv); } #endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */ void copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize) { char *var_name, *var_val; int i; if (source == NULL) return; for(i = 0; source[i] != NULL; i++) { var_name = xstrdup(source[i]); if ((var_val = strstr(var_name, "=")) == NULL) { free(var_name); continue; } *var_val++ = '\0'; debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val); child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val); free(var_name); } } static char ** do_setup_env(Session *s, const char *shell) { char buf[256]; u_int i, envsize; char **env, *laddr; struct passwd *pw = s->pw; #if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN) char *path = NULL; #endif /* Initialize the environment. */ envsize = 100; env = xcalloc(envsize, sizeof(char *)); env[0] = NULL; #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN /* * The Windows environment contains some setting which are * important for a running system. They must not be dropped. */ { char **p; p = fetch_windows_environment(); copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize); free_windows_environment(p); } #endif #ifdef GSSAPI /* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter * the childs environment as they see fit */ ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize); #endif if (!options.use_login) { /* Set basic environment. */ for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, s->env[i].name, s->env[i].val); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name); #ifdef _AIX child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGIN", pw->pw_name); #endif child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH) < 0) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH); else child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", getenv("PATH")); #else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ # ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN /* * There's no standard path on Windows. The path contains * important components pointing to the system directories, * needed for loading shared libraries. So the path better * remains intact here. */ # ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN read_etc_default_login(&env, &envsize, pw->pw_uid); path = child_get_env(env, "PATH"); # endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */ if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') { child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", s->pw->pw_uid == 0 ? SUPERUSER_PATH : _PATH_STDPATH); } # endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */ #endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s", _PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf); /* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */ child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell); } if (getenv("TZ")) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ")); /* Set custom environment options from RSA authentication. */ if (!options.use_login) { while (custom_environment) { struct envstring *ce = custom_environment; char *str = ce->s; for (i = 0; str[i] != '=' && str[i]; i++) ; if (str[i] == '=') { str[i] = 0; child_set_env(&env, &envsize, str, str + i + 1); } custom_environment = ce->next; free(ce->s); free(ce); } } /* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */ snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %d", get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), get_local_port()); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf); laddr = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in()); snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %.50s %d", get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port(), laddr, get_local_port()); free(laddr); child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf); if (s->ttyfd != -1) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TTY", s->tty); if (s->term) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", s->term); if (s->display) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "DISPLAY", s->display); if (original_command) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND", original_command); #ifdef _UNICOS if (cray_tmpdir[0] != '\0') child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TMPDIR", cray_tmpdir); #endif /* _UNICOS */ /* * Since we clear KRB5CCNAME at startup, if it's set now then it * must have been set by a native authentication method (eg AIX or * SIA), so copy it to the child. */ { char *cp; if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp); } #ifdef _AIX { char *cp; if ((cp = getenv("AUTHSTATE")) != NULL) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "AUTHSTATE", cp); read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment"); } #endif #ifdef KRB5 if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", s->authctxt->krb5_ccname); #endif #ifdef USE_PAM /* * Pull in any environment variables that may have * been set by PAM. */ if (options.use_pam) { char **p; p = fetch_pam_child_environment(); copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize); free_pam_environment(p); p = fetch_pam_environment(); copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize); free_pam_environment(p); } #endif /* USE_PAM */ if (auth_sock_name != NULL) child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, auth_sock_name); /* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */ if (options.permit_user_env && !options.use_login) { snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/.ssh/environment", strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? pw->pw_dir : ""); read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf); } if (debug_flag) { /* dump the environment */ fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n"); for (i = 0; env[i]; i++) fprintf(stderr, " %.200s\n", env[i]); } return env; } /* * Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/ssh/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found * first in this order). */ static void do_rc_files(Session *s, const char *shell) { FILE *f = NULL; char cmd[1024]; int do_xauth; struct stat st; do_xauth = s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL; /* ignore _PATH_SSH_USER_RC for subsystems and admin forced commands */ if (!s->is_subsystem && options.adm_forced_command == NULL && - !no_user_rc && stat(_PATH_SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0) { + !no_user_rc && options.permit_user_rc && + stat(_PATH_SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0) { snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'", shell, _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC); if (debug_flag) fprintf(stderr, "Running %s\n", cmd); f = popen(cmd, "w"); if (f) { if (do_xauth) fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); pclose(f); } else fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", _PATH_SSH_USER_RC); } else if (stat(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, &st) >= 0) { if (debug_flag) fprintf(stderr, "Running %s %s\n", _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC); f = popen(_PATH_BSHELL " " _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, "w"); if (f) { if (do_xauth) fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); pclose(f); } else fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC); } else if (do_xauth && options.xauth_location != NULL) { /* Add authority data to .Xauthority if appropriate. */ if (debug_flag) { fprintf(stderr, "Running %.500s remove %.100s\n", options.xauth_location, s->auth_display); fprintf(stderr, "%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n", options.xauth_location, s->auth_display, s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); } snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -q -", options.xauth_location); f = popen(cmd, "w"); if (f) { fprintf(f, "remove %s\n", s->auth_display); fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n", s->auth_display, s->auth_proto, s->auth_data); pclose(f); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n", cmd); } } } static void do_nologin(struct passwd *pw) { FILE *f = NULL; char buf[1024], *nl, *def_nl = _PATH_NOLOGIN; struct stat sb; #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (login_getcapbool(lc, "ignorenologin", 0) || pw->pw_uid == 0) return; nl = login_getcapstr(lc, "nologin", def_nl, def_nl); #else if (pw->pw_uid == 0) return; nl = def_nl; #endif if (stat(nl, &sb) == -1) { if (nl != def_nl) free(nl); return; } /* /etc/nologin exists. Print its contents if we can and exit. */ logit("User %.100s not allowed because %s exists", pw->pw_name, nl); if ((f = fopen(nl, "r")) != NULL) { while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) fputs(buf, stderr); fclose(f); } exit(254); } /* * Chroot into a directory after checking it for safety: all path components * must be root-owned directories with strict permissions. */ static void safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid) { const char *cp; char component[MAXPATHLEN]; struct stat st; if (*path != '/') fatal("chroot path does not begin at root"); if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component)) fatal("chroot path too long"); /* * Descend the path, checking that each component is a * root-owned directory with strict permissions. */ for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) { if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL) strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component)); else { cp++; memcpy(component, path, cp - path); component[cp - path] = '\0'; } debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component); if (stat(component, &st) != 0) fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__, component, strerror(errno)); if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot " "directory %s\"%s\"", cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component); if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode)) fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory", cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component); } if (chdir(path) == -1) fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": " "%s", path, strerror(errno)); if (chroot(path) == -1) fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", path, strerror(errno)); if (chdir("/") == -1) fatal("%s: chdir(/) after chroot: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); verbose("Changed root directory to \"%s\"", path); } /* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */ void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw) { char *chroot_path, *tmp; +#ifdef USE_LIBIAF + int doing_chroot = 0; +#endif platform_setusercontext(pw); if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) { #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) { perror("unable to set user context"); exit(1); } #else if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0) error("setlogin failed: %s", strerror(errno)); if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) { perror("setgid"); exit(1); } /* Initialize the group list. */ if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) { perror("initgroups"); exit(1); } endgrent(); #endif platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw); if (options.chroot_directory != NULL && strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) { tmp = tilde_expand_filename(options.chroot_directory, pw->pw_uid); chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir, "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid); free(tmp); free(chroot_path); /* Make sure we don't attempt to chroot again */ free(options.chroot_directory); options.chroot_directory = NULL; +#ifdef USE_LIBIAF + doing_chroot = 1; +#endif } #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUSER) < 0) { perror("unable to set user context (setuser)"); exit(1); } /* * FreeBSD's setusercontext() will not apply the user's * own umask setting unless running with the user's UID. */ (void) setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUMASK); #else # ifdef USE_LIBIAF - if (set_id(pw->pw_name) != 0) { +/* In a chroot environment, the set_id() will always fail; typically + * because of the lack of necessary authentication services and runtime + * such as ./usr/lib/libiaf.so, ./usr/lib/libpam.so.1, and ./etc/passwd + * We skip it in the internal sftp chroot case. + * We'll lose auditing and ACLs but permanently_set_uid will + * take care of the rest. + */ + if ((doing_chroot == 0) && set_id(pw->pw_name) != 0) { fatal("set_id(%s) Failed", pw->pw_name); } # endif /* USE_LIBIAF */ /* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */ permanently_set_uid(pw); #endif } else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL && strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) { fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory"); } if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid) fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid); } static void do_pwchange(Session *s) { fflush(NULL); fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Your password has expired.\n"); if (s->ttyfd != -1) { fprintf(stderr, "You must change your password now and login again!\n"); #ifdef WITH_SELINUX setexeccon(NULL); #endif #ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); #else execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", (char *)NULL); #endif perror("passwd"); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Password change required but no TTY available.\n"); } exit(1); } static void launch_login(struct passwd *pw, const char *hostname) { /* Launch login(1). */ execl(LOGIN_PROGRAM, "login", "-h", hostname, #ifdef xxxLOGIN_NEEDS_TERM (s->term ? s->term : "unknown"), #endif /* LOGIN_NEEDS_TERM */ #ifdef LOGIN_NO_ENDOPT "-p", "-f", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); #else "-p", "-f", "--", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); #endif /* Login couldn't be executed, die. */ perror("login"); exit(1); } static void child_close_fds(void) { extern AuthenticationConnection *auth_conn; if (auth_conn) { ssh_close_authentication_connection(auth_conn); auth_conn = NULL; } if (packet_get_connection_in() == packet_get_connection_out()) close(packet_get_connection_in()); else { close(packet_get_connection_in()); close(packet_get_connection_out()); } /* * Close all descriptors related to channels. They will still remain * open in the parent. */ /* XXX better use close-on-exec? -markus */ channel_close_all(); /* * Close any extra file descriptors. Note that there may still be * descriptors left by system functions. They will be closed later. */ endpwent(); /* * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them * hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after * initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file * descriptors open. */ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); } /* * Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the * environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group * ids, and executing the command or shell. */ #define ARGV_MAX 10 void do_child(Session *s, const char *command) { extern char **environ; char **env; char *argv[ARGV_MAX]; const char *shell, *shell0, *hostname = NULL; struct passwd *pw = s->pw; int r = 0; /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */ destroy_sensitive_data(); /* Force a password change */ if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) { do_setusercontext(pw); child_close_fds(); do_pwchange(s); exit(1); } /* login(1) is only called if we execute the login shell */ if (options.use_login && command != NULL) options.use_login = 0; #ifdef _UNICOS cray_setup(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_name, command); #endif /* _UNICOS */ /* * Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h" * switch, so we let login(1) to this for us. */ if (!options.use_login) { #ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA session_setup_sia(pw, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty); if (!check_quietlogin(s, command)) do_motd(); #else /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ /* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */ if (!options.use_pam) do_nologin(pw); do_setusercontext(pw); /* * PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have * generated messages, so if this in an interactive * login then display them too. */ if (!check_quietlogin(s, command)) display_loginmsg(); #endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */ } #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam && !options.use_login && !is_pam_session_open()) { debug3("PAM session not opened, exiting"); display_loginmsg(); exit(254); } #endif /* * Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is * legal, and means /bin/sh. */ shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell; /* * Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file, * even if shell is overridden from login.conf */ env = do_setup_env(s, shell); #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell); #endif /* we have to stash the hostname before we close our socket. */ if (options.use_login) hostname = get_remote_name_or_ip(utmp_len, options.use_dns); /* * Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and * the server will still have the socket open, and it is important * that we do not shutdown it. Note that the descriptors cannot be * closed before building the environment, as we call * get_remote_ipaddr there. */ child_close_fds(); /* * Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc, * /etc/ssh/sshrc and xauth are run in the proper environment. */ environ = env; #if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS) /* * At this point, we check to see if AFS is active and if we have * a valid Kerberos 5 TGT. If so, it seems like a good idea to see * if we can (and need to) extend the ticket into an AFS token. If * we don't do this, we run into potential problems if the user's * home directory is in AFS and it's not world-readable. */ if (options.kerberos_get_afs_token && k_hasafs() && (s->authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL)) { char cell[64]; debug("Getting AFS token"); k_setpag(); if (k_afs_cell_of_file(pw->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0) krb5_afslog(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx, s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, cell, NULL); krb5_afslog_home(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx, s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, NULL, NULL, pw->pw_dir); } #endif /* Change current directory to the user's home directory. */ if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) < 0) { /* Suppress missing homedir warning for chroot case */ #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP r = login_getcapbool(lc, "requirehome", 0); #endif if (r || options.chroot_directory == NULL || strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) fprintf(stderr, "Could not chdir to home " "directory %s: %s\n", pw->pw_dir, strerror(errno)); if (r) exit(1); } closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); if (!options.use_login) do_rc_files(s, shell); /* restore SIGPIPE for child */ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR) { printf("This service allows sftp connections only.\n"); fflush(NULL); exit(1); } else if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) { extern int optind, optreset; int i; char *p, *args; setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME); args = xstrdup(command ? command : "sftp-server"); for (i = 0, (p = strtok(args, " ")); p; (p = strtok(NULL, " "))) if (i < ARGV_MAX - 1) argv[i++] = p; argv[i] = NULL; optind = optreset = 1; __progname = argv[0]; #ifdef WITH_SELINUX ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t"); #endif exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw)); } fflush(NULL); if (options.use_login) { launch_login(pw, hostname); /* NEVERREACHED */ } /* Get the last component of the shell name. */ if ((shell0 = strrchr(shell, '/')) != NULL) shell0++; else shell0 = shell; /* * If we have no command, execute the shell. In this case, the shell * name to be passed in argv[0] is preceded by '-' to indicate that * this is a login shell. */ if (!command) { char argv0[256]; /* Start the shell. Set initial character to '-'. */ argv0[0] = '-'; if (strlcpy(argv0 + 1, shell0, sizeof(argv0) - 1) >= sizeof(argv0) - 1) { errno = EINVAL; perror(shell); exit(1); } /* Execute the shell. */ argv[0] = argv0; argv[1] = NULL; execve(shell, argv, env); /* Executing the shell failed. */ perror(shell); exit(1); } /* * Execute the command using the user's shell. This uses the -c * option to execute the command. */ argv[0] = (char *) shell0; argv[1] = "-c"; argv[2] = (char *) command; argv[3] = NULL; execve(shell, argv, env); perror(shell); exit(1); } void session_unused(int id) { debug3("%s: session id %d unused", __func__, id); if (id >= options.max_sessions || id >= sessions_nalloc) { fatal("%s: insane session id %d (max %d nalloc %d)", __func__, id, options.max_sessions, sessions_nalloc); } memset(&sessions[id], 0, sizeof(*sessions)); sessions[id].self = id; sessions[id].used = 0; sessions[id].chanid = -1; sessions[id].ptyfd = -1; sessions[id].ttyfd = -1; sessions[id].ptymaster = -1; sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL; sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused; sessions_first_unused = id; } Session * session_new(void) { Session *s, *tmp; if (sessions_first_unused == -1) { if (sessions_nalloc >= options.max_sessions) return NULL; debug2("%s: allocate (allocated %d max %d)", __func__, sessions_nalloc, options.max_sessions); tmp = xrealloc(sessions, sessions_nalloc + 1, sizeof(*sessions)); if (tmp == NULL) { error("%s: cannot allocate %d sessions", __func__, sessions_nalloc + 1); return NULL; } sessions = tmp; session_unused(sessions_nalloc++); } if (sessions_first_unused >= sessions_nalloc || sessions_first_unused < 0) { fatal("%s: insane first_unused %d max %d nalloc %d", __func__, sessions_first_unused, options.max_sessions, sessions_nalloc); } s = &sessions[sessions_first_unused]; if (s->used) { fatal("%s: session %d already used", __func__, sessions_first_unused); } sessions_first_unused = s->next_unused; s->used = 1; s->next_unused = -1; debug("session_new: session %d", s->self); return s; } static void session_dump(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; debug("dump: used %d next_unused %d session %d %p " "channel %d pid %ld", s->used, s->next_unused, s->self, s, s->chanid, (long)s->pid); } } int session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid) { Session *s = session_new(); debug("session_open: channel %d", chanid); if (s == NULL) { error("no more sessions"); return 0; } s->authctxt = authctxt; s->pw = authctxt->pw; if (s->pw == NULL || !authctxt->valid) fatal("no user for session %d", s->self); debug("session_open: session %d: link with channel %d", s->self, chanid); s->chanid = chanid; return 1; } Session * session_by_tty(char *tty) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1 && strcmp(s->tty, tty) == 0) { debug("session_by_tty: session %d tty %s", i, tty); return s; } } debug("session_by_tty: unknown tty %.100s", tty); session_dump(); return NULL; } static Session * session_by_channel(int id) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used && s->chanid == id) { debug("session_by_channel: session %d channel %d", i, id); return s; } } debug("session_by_channel: unknown channel %d", id); session_dump(); return NULL; } static Session * session_by_x11_channel(int id) { int i, j; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->x11_chanids == NULL || !s->used) continue; for (j = 0; s->x11_chanids[j] != -1; j++) { if (s->x11_chanids[j] == id) { debug("session_by_x11_channel: session %d " "channel %d", s->self, id); return s; } } } debug("session_by_x11_channel: unknown channel %d", id); session_dump(); return NULL; } static Session * session_by_pid(pid_t pid) { int i; debug("session_by_pid: pid %ld", (long)pid); for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used && s->pid == pid) return s; } error("session_by_pid: unknown pid %ld", (long)pid); session_dump(); return NULL; } static int session_window_change_req(Session *s) { s->col = packet_get_int(); s->row = packet_get_int(); s->xpixel = packet_get_int(); s->ypixel = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel); return 1; } static int session_pty_req(Session *s) { u_int len; int n_bytes; if (no_pty_flag || !options.permit_tty) { debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this authentication."); return 0; } if (s->ttyfd != -1) { packet_disconnect("Protocol error: you already have a pty."); return 0; } s->term = packet_get_string(&len); if (compat20) { s->col = packet_get_int(); s->row = packet_get_int(); } else { s->row = packet_get_int(); s->col = packet_get_int(); } s->xpixel = packet_get_int(); s->ypixel = packet_get_int(); if (strcmp(s->term, "") == 0) { free(s->term); s->term = NULL; } /* Allocate a pty and open it. */ debug("Allocating pty."); if (!PRIVSEP(pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty)))) { free(s->term); s->term = NULL; s->ptyfd = -1; s->ttyfd = -1; error("session_pty_req: session %d alloc failed", s->self); return 0; } debug("session_pty_req: session %d alloc %s", s->self, s->tty); /* for SSH1 the tty modes length is not given */ if (!compat20) n_bytes = packet_remaining(); tty_parse_modes(s->ttyfd, &n_bytes); if (!use_privsep) pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty); /* Set window size from the packet. */ pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel); packet_check_eom(); session_proctitle(s); return 1; } static int session_subsystem_req(Session *s) { struct stat st; u_int len; int success = 0; char *prog, *cmd; u_int i; s->subsys = packet_get_string(&len); packet_check_eom(); debug2("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s", s->subsys, s->pw->pw_name); for (i = 0; i < options.num_subsystems; i++) { if (strcmp(s->subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) { prog = options.subsystem_command[i]; cmd = options.subsystem_args[i]; if (strcmp(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, prog) == 0) { s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP; debug("subsystem: %s", prog); } else { if (stat(prog, &st) < 0) debug("subsystem: cannot stat %s: %s", prog, strerror(errno)); s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT; debug("subsystem: exec() %s", cmd); } success = do_exec(s, cmd) == 0; break; } } if (!success) logit("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s failed, " "subsystem not found", s->subsys, s->pw->pw_name); return success; } static int session_x11_req(Session *s) { int success; if (s->auth_proto != NULL || s->auth_data != NULL) { error("session_x11_req: session %d: " "x11 forwarding already active", s->self); return 0; } s->single_connection = packet_get_char(); s->auth_proto = packet_get_string(NULL); s->auth_data = packet_get_string(NULL); s->screen = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); success = session_setup_x11fwd(s); if (!success) { free(s->auth_proto); free(s->auth_data); s->auth_proto = NULL; s->auth_data = NULL; } return success; } static int session_shell_req(Session *s) { packet_check_eom(); return do_exec(s, NULL) == 0; } static int session_exec_req(Session *s) { u_int len, success; char *command = packet_get_string(&len); packet_check_eom(); success = do_exec(s, command) == 0; free(command); return success; } static int session_break_req(Session *s) { packet_get_int(); /* ignored */ packet_check_eom(); if (s->ptymaster == -1 || tcsendbreak(s->ptymaster, 0) < 0) return 0; return 1; } static int session_env_req(Session *s) { char *name, *val; u_int name_len, val_len, i; name = packet_get_cstring(&name_len); val = packet_get_cstring(&val_len); packet_check_eom(); /* Don't set too many environment variables */ if (s->num_env > 128) { debug2("Ignoring env request %s: too many env vars", name); goto fail; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_accept_env; i++) { if (match_pattern(name, options.accept_env[i])) { debug2("Setting env %d: %s=%s", s->num_env, name, val); s->env = xrealloc(s->env, s->num_env + 1, sizeof(*s->env)); s->env[s->num_env].name = name; s->env[s->num_env].val = val; s->num_env++; return (1); } } debug2("Ignoring env request %s: disallowed name", name); fail: free(name); free(val); return (0); } static int session_auth_agent_req(Session *s) { static int called = 0; packet_check_eom(); if (no_agent_forwarding_flag || !options.allow_agent_forwarding) { debug("session_auth_agent_req: no_agent_forwarding_flag"); return 0; } if (called) { return 0; } else { called = 1; return auth_input_request_forwarding(s->pw); } } int session_input_channel_req(Channel *c, const char *rtype) { int success = 0; Session *s; if ((s = session_by_channel(c->self)) == NULL) { logit("session_input_channel_req: no session %d req %.100s", c->self, rtype); return 0; } debug("session_input_channel_req: session %d req %s", s->self, rtype); /* * a session is in LARVAL state until a shell, a command * or a subsystem is executed */ if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) { if (strcmp(rtype, "shell") == 0) { success = session_shell_req(s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "exec") == 0) { success = session_exec_req(s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "pty-req") == 0) { success = session_pty_req(s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "x11-req") == 0) { success = session_x11_req(s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com") == 0) { success = session_auth_agent_req(s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "subsystem") == 0) { success = session_subsystem_req(s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "env") == 0) { success = session_env_req(s); } } if (strcmp(rtype, "window-change") == 0) { success = session_window_change_req(s); } else if (strcmp(rtype, "break") == 0) { success = session_break_req(s); } return success; } void session_set_fds(Session *s, int fdin, int fdout, int fderr, int ignore_fderr, int is_tty) { if (!compat20) fatal("session_set_fds: called for proto != 2.0"); /* * now that have a child and a pipe to the child, * we can activate our channel and register the fd's */ if (s->chanid == -1) fatal("no channel for session %d", s->self); channel_set_fds(s->chanid, fdout, fdin, fderr, ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ, 1, is_tty, CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT); } /* * Function to perform pty cleanup. Also called if we get aborted abnormally * (e.g., due to a dropped connection). */ void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s) { if (s == NULL) { error("session_pty_cleanup: no session"); return; } if (s->ttyfd == -1) return; debug("session_pty_cleanup: session %d release %s", s->self, s->tty); /* Record that the user has logged out. */ if (s->pid != 0) record_logout(s->pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name); /* Release the pseudo-tty. */ if (getuid() == 0) pty_release(s->tty); /* * Close the server side of the socket pairs. We must do this after * the pty cleanup, so that another process doesn't get this pty * while we're still cleaning up. */ if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) < 0) error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s", s->ptymaster, strerror(errno)); /* unlink pty from session */ s->ttyfd = -1; } void session_pty_cleanup(Session *s) { PRIVSEP(session_pty_cleanup2(s)); } static char * sig2name(int sig) { #define SSH_SIG(x) if (sig == SIG ## x) return #x SSH_SIG(ABRT); SSH_SIG(ALRM); SSH_SIG(FPE); SSH_SIG(HUP); SSH_SIG(ILL); SSH_SIG(INT); SSH_SIG(KILL); SSH_SIG(PIPE); SSH_SIG(QUIT); SSH_SIG(SEGV); SSH_SIG(TERM); SSH_SIG(USR1); SSH_SIG(USR2); #undef SSH_SIG return "SIG@openssh.com"; } static void session_close_x11(int id) { Channel *c; if ((c = channel_by_id(id)) == NULL) { debug("session_close_x11: x11 channel %d missing", id); } else { /* Detach X11 listener */ debug("session_close_x11: detach x11 channel %d", id); channel_cancel_cleanup(id); if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) chan_mark_dead(c); } } static void session_close_single_x11(int id, void *arg) { Session *s; u_int i; debug3("session_close_single_x11: channel %d", id); channel_cancel_cleanup(id); if ((s = session_by_x11_channel(id)) == NULL) fatal("session_close_single_x11: no x11 channel %d", id); for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) { debug("session_close_single_x11: session %d: " "closing channel %d", s->self, s->x11_chanids[i]); /* * The channel "id" is already closing, but make sure we * close all of its siblings. */ if (s->x11_chanids[i] != id) session_close_x11(s->x11_chanids[i]); } free(s->x11_chanids); s->x11_chanids = NULL; free(s->display); s->display = NULL; free(s->auth_proto); s->auth_proto = NULL; free(s->auth_data); s->auth_data = NULL; free(s->auth_display); s->auth_display = NULL; } static void session_exit_message(Session *s, int status) { Channel *c; if ((c = channel_lookup(s->chanid)) == NULL) fatal("session_exit_message: session %d: no channel %d", s->self, s->chanid); debug("session_exit_message: session %d channel %d pid %ld", s->self, s->chanid, (long)s->pid); if (WIFEXITED(status)) { channel_request_start(s->chanid, "exit-status", 0); packet_put_int(WEXITSTATUS(status)); packet_send(); } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) { channel_request_start(s->chanid, "exit-signal", 0); packet_put_cstring(sig2name(WTERMSIG(status))); #ifdef WCOREDUMP packet_put_char(WCOREDUMP(status)? 1 : 0); #else /* WCOREDUMP */ packet_put_char(0); #endif /* WCOREDUMP */ packet_put_cstring(""); packet_put_cstring(""); packet_send(); } else { /* Some weird exit cause. Just exit. */ packet_disconnect("wait returned status %04x.", status); } /* disconnect channel */ debug("session_exit_message: release channel %d", s->chanid); /* * Adjust cleanup callback attachment to send close messages when * the channel gets EOF. The session will be then be closed * by session_close_by_channel when the childs close their fds. */ channel_register_cleanup(c->self, session_close_by_channel, 1); /* * emulate a write failure with 'chan_write_failed', nobody will be * interested in data we write. * Note that we must not call 'chan_read_failed', since there could * be some more data waiting in the pipe. */ if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED) chan_write_failed(c); } void session_close(Session *s) { u_int i; debug("session_close: session %d pid %ld", s->self, (long)s->pid); if (s->ttyfd != -1) session_pty_cleanup(s); free(s->term); free(s->display); free(s->x11_chanids); free(s->auth_display); free(s->auth_data); free(s->auth_proto); free(s->subsys); if (s->env != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) { free(s->env[i].name); free(s->env[i].val); } free(s->env); } session_proctitle(s); session_unused(s->self); } void session_close_by_pid(pid_t pid, int status) { Session *s = session_by_pid(pid); if (s == NULL) { debug("session_close_by_pid: no session for pid %ld", (long)pid); return; } if (s->chanid != -1) session_exit_message(s, status); if (s->ttyfd != -1) session_pty_cleanup(s); s->pid = 0; } /* * this is called when a channel dies before * the session 'child' itself dies */ void session_close_by_channel(int id, void *arg) { Session *s = session_by_channel(id); u_int i; if (s == NULL) { debug("session_close_by_channel: no session for id %d", id); return; } debug("session_close_by_channel: channel %d child %ld", id, (long)s->pid); if (s->pid != 0) { debug("session_close_by_channel: channel %d: has child", id); /* * delay detach of session, but release pty, since * the fd's to the child are already closed */ if (s->ttyfd != -1) session_pty_cleanup(s); return; } /* detach by removing callback */ channel_cancel_cleanup(s->chanid); /* Close any X11 listeners associated with this session */ if (s->x11_chanids != NULL) { for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) { session_close_x11(s->x11_chanids[i]); s->x11_chanids[i] = -1; } } s->chanid = -1; session_close(s); } void session_destroy_all(void (*closefunc)(Session *)) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used) { if (closefunc != NULL) closefunc(s); else session_close(s); } } } static char * session_tty_list(void) { static char buf[1024]; int i; char *cp; buf[0] = '\0'; for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) { Session *s = &sessions[i]; if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1) { if (strncmp(s->tty, "/dev/", 5) != 0) { cp = strrchr(s->tty, '/'); cp = (cp == NULL) ? s->tty : cp + 1; } else cp = s->tty + 5; if (buf[0] != '\0') strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof buf); strlcat(buf, cp, sizeof buf); } } if (buf[0] == '\0') strlcpy(buf, "notty", sizeof buf); return buf; } void session_proctitle(Session *s) { if (s->pw == NULL) error("no user for session %d", s->self); else setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, session_tty_list()); } int session_setup_x11fwd(Session *s) { struct stat st; char display[512], auth_display[512]; - char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; + char hostname[NI_MAXHOST]; u_int i; if (no_x11_forwarding_flag) { packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled in user configuration file."); return 0; } if (!options.x11_forwarding) { debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file."); return 0; } if (!options.xauth_location || (stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) { packet_send_debug("No xauth program; cannot forward with spoofing."); return 0; } if (options.use_login) { packet_send_debug("X11 forwarding disabled; " "not compatible with UseLogin=yes."); return 0; } if (s->display != NULL) { debug("X11 display already set."); return 0; } if (x11_create_display_inet(options.x11_display_offset, options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection, &s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) { debug("x11_create_display_inet failed."); return 0; } for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) { channel_register_cleanup(s->x11_chanids[i], session_close_single_x11, 0); } /* Set up a suitable value for the DISPLAY variable. */ if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0) fatal("gethostname: %.100s", strerror(errno)); /* * auth_display must be used as the displayname when the * authorization entry is added with xauth(1). This will be * different than the DISPLAY string for localhost displays. */ if (options.x11_use_localhost) { snprintf(display, sizeof display, "localhost:%u.%u", s->display_number, s->screen); snprintf(auth_display, sizeof auth_display, "unix:%u.%u", s->display_number, s->screen); s->display = xstrdup(display); s->auth_display = xstrdup(auth_display); } else { #ifdef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY struct hostent *he; struct in_addr my_addr; he = gethostbyname(hostname); if (he == NULL) { error("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY."); packet_send_debug("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY."); return 0; } memcpy(&my_addr, he->h_addr_list[0], sizeof(struct in_addr)); snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.50s:%u.%u", inet_ntoa(my_addr), s->display_number, s->screen); #else snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.400s:%u.%u", hostname, s->display_number, s->screen); #endif s->display = xstrdup(display); s->auth_display = xstrdup(display); } return 1; } static void do_authenticated2(Authctxt *authctxt) { server_loop2(authctxt); } void do_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt) { static int called = 0; debug("do_cleanup"); /* no cleanup if we're in the child for login shell */ if (is_child) return; /* avoid double cleanup */ if (called) return; called = 1; if (authctxt == NULL) return; #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) { sshpam_cleanup(); sshpam_thread_cleanup(); } #endif if (!authctxt->authenticated) return; #ifdef KRB5 if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup && authctxt->krb5_ctx) krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt); #endif #ifdef GSSAPI if (compat20 && options.gss_cleanup_creds) ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(); #endif /* remove agent socket */ auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw); /* * Cleanup ptys/utmp only if privsep is disabled, * or if running in monitor. */ if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) session_destroy_all(session_pty_cleanup2); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-client.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-client.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-client.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,1735 +1,1756 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.114 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.c,v 1.115 2014/04/21 14:36:16 logan Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* XXX: memleaks */ /* XXX: signed vs unsigned */ /* XXX: remove all logging, only return status codes */ /* XXX: copy between two remote sites */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "log.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "progressmeter.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sftp.h" #include "sftp-common.h" #include "sftp-client.h" extern volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted; extern int showprogress; /* Minimum amount of data to read at a time */ #define MIN_READ_SIZE 512 /* Maximum depth to descend in directory trees */ #define MAX_DIR_DEPTH 64 struct sftp_conn { int fd_in; int fd_out; u_int transfer_buflen; u_int num_requests; u_int version; u_int msg_id; #define SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME 0x00000001 #define SFTP_EXT_STATVFS 0x00000002 #define SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS 0x00000004 #define SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK 0x00000008 #define SFTP_EXT_FSYNC 0x00000010 u_int exts; u_int64_t limit_kbps; struct bwlimit bwlimit_in, bwlimit_out; }; static char * get_handle(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, u_int *len, const char *errfmt, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 4, 5))); /* ARGSUSED */ static int sftpio(void *_bwlimit, size_t amount) { struct bwlimit *bwlimit = (struct bwlimit *)_bwlimit; bandwidth_limit(bwlimit, amount); return 0; } static void send_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, Buffer *m) { u_char mlen[4]; struct iovec iov[2]; if (buffer_len(m) > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) fatal("Outbound message too long %u", buffer_len(m)); /* Send length first */ put_u32(mlen, buffer_len(m)); iov[0].iov_base = mlen; iov[0].iov_len = sizeof(mlen); iov[1].iov_base = buffer_ptr(m); iov[1].iov_len = buffer_len(m); if (atomiciov6(writev, conn->fd_out, iov, 2, conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_out) != buffer_len(m) + sizeof(mlen)) fatal("Couldn't send packet: %s", strerror(errno)); buffer_clear(m); } static void get_msg(struct sftp_conn *conn, Buffer *m) { u_int msg_len; buffer_append_space(m, 4); if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, buffer_ptr(m), 4, conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_in) != 4) { if (errno == EPIPE) fatal("Connection closed"); else fatal("Couldn't read packet: %s", strerror(errno)); } msg_len = buffer_get_int(m); if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) fatal("Received message too long %u", msg_len); buffer_append_space(m, msg_len); if (atomicio6(read, conn->fd_in, buffer_ptr(m), msg_len, conn->limit_kbps > 0 ? sftpio : NULL, &conn->bwlimit_in) != msg_len) { if (errno == EPIPE) fatal("Connection closed"); else fatal("Read packet: %s", strerror(errno)); } } static void send_string_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, char *s, u_int len) { Buffer msg; buffer_init(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, code); buffer_put_int(&msg, id); buffer_put_string(&msg, s, len); send_msg(conn, &msg); debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", conn->fd_out, code, id); buffer_free(&msg); } static void send_string_attrs_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int code, char *s, u_int len, Attrib *a) { Buffer msg; buffer_init(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, code); buffer_put_int(&msg, id); buffer_put_string(&msg, s, len); encode_attrib(&msg, a); send_msg(conn, &msg); debug3("Sent message fd %d T:%u I:%u", conn->fd_out, code, id); buffer_free(&msg); } static u_int get_status(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id) { Buffer msg; u_int type, id, status; buffer_init(&msg); get_msg(conn, &msg); type = buffer_get_char(&msg); id = buffer_get_int(&msg); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type); status = buffer_get_int(&msg); buffer_free(&msg); debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %u", status); return status; } static char * get_handle(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, u_int *len, const char *errfmt, ...) { Buffer msg; u_int type, id; char *handle, errmsg[256]; va_list args; int status; va_start(args, errfmt); if (errfmt != NULL) vsnprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg), errfmt, args); va_end(args); buffer_init(&msg); get_msg(conn, &msg); type = buffer_get_char(&msg); id = buffer_get_int(&msg); if (id != expected_id) fatal("%s: ID mismatch (%u != %u)", errfmt == NULL ? __func__ : errmsg, id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { status = buffer_get_int(&msg); if (errfmt != NULL) error("%s: %s", errmsg, fx2txt(status)); buffer_free(&msg); return(NULL); } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_HANDLE) fatal("%s: Expected SSH2_FXP_HANDLE(%u) packet, got %u", errfmt == NULL ? __func__ : errmsg, SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, type); handle = buffer_get_string(&msg, len); buffer_free(&msg); return(handle); } static Attrib * get_decode_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int expected_id, int quiet) { Buffer msg; u_int type, id; Attrib *a; buffer_init(&msg); get_msg(conn, &msg); type = buffer_get_char(&msg); id = buffer_get_int(&msg); debug3("Received stat reply T:%u I:%u", type, id); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { int status = buffer_get_int(&msg); if (quiet) debug("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status)); else error("Couldn't stat remote file: %s", fx2txt(status)); buffer_free(&msg); return(NULL); } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_ATTRS) { fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_ATTRS(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_ATTRS, type); } a = decode_attrib(&msg); buffer_free(&msg); return(a); } static int get_decode_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, struct sftp_statvfs *st, u_int expected_id, int quiet) { Buffer msg; u_int type, id, flag; buffer_init(&msg); get_msg(conn, &msg); type = buffer_get_char(&msg); id = buffer_get_int(&msg); debug3("Received statvfs reply T:%u I:%u", type, id); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { int status = buffer_get_int(&msg); if (quiet) debug("Couldn't statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status)); else error("Couldn't statvfs: %s", fx2txt(status)); buffer_free(&msg); return -1; } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY) { fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY, type); } memset(st, 0, sizeof(*st)); st->f_bsize = buffer_get_int64(&msg); st->f_frsize = buffer_get_int64(&msg); st->f_blocks = buffer_get_int64(&msg); st->f_bfree = buffer_get_int64(&msg); st->f_bavail = buffer_get_int64(&msg); st->f_files = buffer_get_int64(&msg); st->f_ffree = buffer_get_int64(&msg); st->f_favail = buffer_get_int64(&msg); st->f_fsid = buffer_get_int64(&msg); flag = buffer_get_int64(&msg); st->f_namemax = buffer_get_int64(&msg); st->f_flag = (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY) ? ST_RDONLY : 0; st->f_flag |= (flag & SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID) ? ST_NOSUID : 0; buffer_free(&msg); return 0; } struct sftp_conn * do_init(int fd_in, int fd_out, u_int transfer_buflen, u_int num_requests, u_int64_t limit_kbps) { u_int type; Buffer msg; struct sftp_conn *ret; ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret)); ret->msg_id = 1; ret->fd_in = fd_in; ret->fd_out = fd_out; ret->transfer_buflen = transfer_buflen; ret->num_requests = num_requests; ret->exts = 0; ret->limit_kbps = 0; buffer_init(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_INIT); buffer_put_int(&msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION); send_msg(ret, &msg); buffer_clear(&msg); get_msg(ret, &msg); /* Expecting a VERSION reply */ if ((type = buffer_get_char(&msg)) != SSH2_FXP_VERSION) { error("Invalid packet back from SSH2_FXP_INIT (type %u)", type); buffer_free(&msg); return(NULL); } ret->version = buffer_get_int(&msg); debug2("Remote version: %u", ret->version); /* Check for extensions */ while (buffer_len(&msg) > 0) { char *name = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL); char *value = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL); int known = 0; if (strcmp(name, "posix-rename@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp(value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "statvfs@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp(value, "2") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_STATVFS; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "fstatvfs@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp(value, "2") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "hardlink@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp(value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK; known = 1; } else if (strcmp(name, "fsync@openssh.com") == 0 && strcmp(value, "1") == 0) { ret->exts |= SFTP_EXT_FSYNC; known = 1; } if (known) { debug2("Server supports extension \"%s\" revision %s", name, value); } else { debug2("Unrecognised server extension \"%s\"", name); } free(name); free(value); } buffer_free(&msg); /* Some filexfer v.0 servers don't support large packets */ if (ret->version == 0) ret->transfer_buflen = MIN(ret->transfer_buflen, 20480); ret->limit_kbps = limit_kbps; if (ret->limit_kbps > 0) { bandwidth_limit_init(&ret->bwlimit_in, ret->limit_kbps, ret->transfer_buflen); bandwidth_limit_init(&ret->bwlimit_out, ret->limit_kbps, ret->transfer_buflen); } return ret; } u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *conn) { return conn->version; } int do_close(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len) { u_int id, status; Buffer msg; buffer_init(&msg); id = conn->msg_id++; buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE); buffer_put_int(&msg, id); buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len); send_msg(conn, &msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_CLOSE I:%u", id); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't close file: %s", fx2txt(status)); buffer_free(&msg); return status; } static int do_lsreaddir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int print_flag, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) { Buffer msg; u_int count, type, id, handle_len, i, expected_id, ents = 0; char *handle; int status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if (dir) *dir = NULL; id = conn->msg_id++; buffer_init(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR); buffer_put_int(&msg, id); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, path); send_msg(conn, &msg); handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len, "remote readdir(\"%s\")", path); if (handle == NULL) { buffer_free(&msg); return -1; } if (dir) { ents = 0; *dir = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**dir)); (*dir)[0] = NULL; } for (; !interrupted;) { id = expected_id = conn->msg_id++; debug3("Sending SSH2_FXP_READDIR I:%u", id); buffer_clear(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_READDIR); buffer_put_int(&msg, id); buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len); send_msg(conn, &msg); buffer_clear(&msg); get_msg(conn, &msg); type = buffer_get_char(&msg); id = buffer_get_int(&msg); debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u", type, id); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { status = buffer_get_int(&msg); debug3("Received SSH2_FXP_STATUS %d", status); if (status == SSH2_FX_EOF) break; error("Couldn't read directory: %s", fx2txt(status)); goto out; } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); count = buffer_get_int(&msg); if (count == 0) break; debug3("Received %d SSH2_FXP_NAME responses", count); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { char *filename, *longname; Attrib *a; filename = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL); longname = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL); a = decode_attrib(&msg); if (print_flag) printf("%s\n", longname); /* * Directory entries should never contain '/' * These can be used to attack recursive ops * (e.g. send '../../../../etc/passwd') */ if (strchr(filename, '/') != NULL) { error("Server sent suspect path \"%s\" " "during readdir of \"%s\"", filename, path); } else if (dir) { *dir = xrealloc(*dir, ents + 2, sizeof(**dir)); (*dir)[ents] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(***dir)); (*dir)[ents]->filename = xstrdup(filename); (*dir)[ents]->longname = xstrdup(longname); memcpy(&(*dir)[ents]->a, a, sizeof(*a)); (*dir)[++ents] = NULL; } free(filename); free(longname); } } status = 0; out: buffer_free(&msg); do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); free(handle); if (status != 0 && dir != NULL) { /* Don't return results on error */ free_sftp_dirents(*dir); *dir = NULL; } else if (interrupted && dir != NULL && *dir != NULL) { /* Don't return partial matches on interrupt */ free_sftp_dirents(*dir); *dir = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**dir)); **dir = NULL; } return status; } int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, SFTP_DIRENT ***dir) { return(do_lsreaddir(conn, path, 0, dir)); } void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **s) { int i; if (s == NULL) return; for (i = 0; s[i]; i++) { free(s[i]->filename); free(s[i]->longname); free(s[i]); } free(s); } int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path) { u_int status, id; debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REMOVE \"%s\"", path); id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, path, strlen(path)); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't delete file: %s", fx2txt(status)); return(status); } int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a, int print_flag) { u_int status, id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, path, strlen(path), a); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK && print_flag) error("Couldn't create directory: %s", fx2txt(status)); return(status); } int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path) { u_int status, id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, path, strlen(path)); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't remove directory: %s", fx2txt(status)); return(status); } Attrib * do_stat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet) { u_int id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, conn->version == 0 ? SSH2_FXP_STAT_VERSION_0 : SSH2_FXP_STAT, path, strlen(path)); return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet)); } Attrib * do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int quiet) { u_int id; if (conn->version == 0) { if (quiet) debug("Server version does not support lstat operation"); else logit("Server version does not support lstat operation"); return(do_stat(conn, path, quiet)); } id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, path, strlen(path)); return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet)); } #ifdef notyet Attrib * do_fstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len, int quiet) { u_int id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, handle, handle_len); return(get_decode_stat(conn, id, quiet)); } #endif int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, Attrib *a) { u_int status, id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, path, strlen(path), a); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't setstat on \"%s\": %s", path, fx2txt(status)); return(status); } int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len, Attrib *a) { u_int status, id; id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_attrs_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, handle, handle_len, a); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't fsetstat: %s", fx2txt(status)); return(status); } char * do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path) { Buffer msg; u_int type, expected_id, count, id; char *filename, *longname; Attrib *a; expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, path, strlen(path)); buffer_init(&msg); get_msg(conn, &msg); type = buffer_get_char(&msg); id = buffer_get_int(&msg); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int status = buffer_get_int(&msg); error("Couldn't canonicalize: %s", fx2txt(status)); buffer_free(&msg); return NULL; } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); count = buffer_get_int(&msg); if (count != 1) fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_REALPATH", count); filename = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL); longname = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL); a = decode_attrib(&msg); debug3("SSH_FXP_REALPATH %s -> %s size %lu", path, filename, (unsigned long)a->size); free(longname); buffer_free(&msg); return(filename); } int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath, int force_legacy) { Buffer msg; u_int status, id; int use_ext = (conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_POSIX_RENAME) && !force_legacy; buffer_init(&msg); /* Send rename request */ id = conn->msg_id++; if (use_ext) { buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED); buffer_put_int(&msg, id); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "posix-rename@openssh.com"); } else { buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_RENAME); buffer_put_int(&msg, id); } buffer_put_cstring(&msg, oldpath); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, newpath); send_msg(conn, &msg); debug3("Sent message %s \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", use_ext ? "posix-rename@openssh.com" : "SSH2_FXP_RENAME", oldpath, newpath); buffer_free(&msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't rename file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, newpath, fx2txt(status)); return(status); } int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath) { Buffer msg; u_int status, id; if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_HARDLINK) == 0) { error("Server does not support hardlink@openssh.com extension"); return -1; } buffer_init(&msg); /* Send link request */ id = conn->msg_id++; buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED); buffer_put_int(&msg, id); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "hardlink@openssh.com"); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, oldpath); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, newpath); send_msg(conn, &msg); debug3("Sent message hardlink@openssh.com \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); buffer_free(&msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't link file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, newpath, fx2txt(status)); return(status); } int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *oldpath, char *newpath) { Buffer msg; u_int status, id; if (conn->version < 3) { error("This server does not support the symlink operation"); return(SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED); } buffer_init(&msg); /* Send symlink request */ id = conn->msg_id++; buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK); buffer_put_int(&msg, id); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, oldpath); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, newpath); send_msg(conn, &msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK \"%s\" -> \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); buffer_free(&msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't symlink file \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", oldpath, newpath, fx2txt(status)); return(status); } int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *handle, u_int handle_len) { Buffer msg; u_int status, id; /* Silently return if the extension is not supported */ if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSYNC) == 0) return -1; buffer_init(&msg); /* Send fsync request */ id = conn->msg_id++; buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED); buffer_put_int(&msg, id); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "fsync@openssh.com"); buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len); send_msg(conn, &msg); debug3("Sent message fsync@openssh.com I:%u", id); buffer_free(&msg); status = get_status(conn, id); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) error("Couldn't sync file: %s", fx2txt(status)); return status; } #ifdef notyet char * do_readlink(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path) { Buffer msg; u_int type, expected_id, count, id; char *filename, *longname; Attrib *a; expected_id = id = conn->msg_id++; send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, path, strlen(path)); buffer_init(&msg); get_msg(conn, &msg); type = buffer_get_char(&msg); id = buffer_get_int(&msg); if (id != expected_id) fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id); if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) { u_int status = buffer_get_int(&msg); error("Couldn't readlink: %s", fx2txt(status)); buffer_free(&msg); return(NULL); } else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_NAME, type); count = buffer_get_int(&msg); if (count != 1) fatal("Got multiple names (%d) from SSH_FXP_READLINK", count); filename = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL); longname = buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL); a = decode_attrib(&msg); debug3("SSH_FXP_READLINK %s -> %s", path, filename); free(longname); buffer_free(&msg); return(filename); } #endif int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, struct sftp_statvfs *st, int quiet) { Buffer msg; u_int id; if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_STATVFS) == 0) { error("Server does not support statvfs@openssh.com extension"); return -1; } id = conn->msg_id++; buffer_init(&msg); buffer_clear(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED); buffer_put_int(&msg, id); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "statvfs@openssh.com"); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, path); send_msg(conn, &msg); buffer_free(&msg); return get_decode_statvfs(conn, st, id, quiet); } #ifdef notyet int do_fstatvfs(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *handle, u_int handle_len, struct sftp_statvfs *st, int quiet) { Buffer msg; u_int id; if ((conn->exts & SFTP_EXT_FSTATVFS) == 0) { error("Server does not support fstatvfs@openssh.com extension"); return -1; } id = conn->msg_id++; buffer_init(&msg); buffer_clear(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED); buffer_put_int(&msg, id); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "fstatvfs@openssh.com"); buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len); send_msg(conn, &msg); buffer_free(&msg); return get_decode_statvfs(conn, st, id, quiet); } #endif static void send_read_request(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_int id, u_int64_t offset, u_int len, char *handle, u_int handle_len) { Buffer msg; buffer_init(&msg); buffer_clear(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_READ); buffer_put_int(&msg, id); buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len); buffer_put_int64(&msg, offset); buffer_put_int(&msg, len); send_msg(conn, &msg); buffer_free(&msg); } int do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *local_path, Attrib *a, int preserve_flag, int resume_flag, int fsync_flag) { Attrib junk; Buffer msg; char *handle; int local_fd = -1, status = 0, write_error; int read_error, write_errno, reordered = 0; u_int64_t offset = 0, size, highwater; u_int handle_len, mode, type, id, buflen, num_req, max_req; off_t progress_counter; struct stat st; struct request { u_int id; u_int len; u_int64_t offset; TAILQ_ENTRY(request) tq; }; TAILQ_HEAD(reqhead, request) requests; struct request *req; TAILQ_INIT(&requests); if (a == NULL && (a = do_stat(conn, remote_path, 0)) == NULL) return -1; /* Do not preserve set[ug]id here, as we do not preserve ownership */ if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) mode = a->perm & 0777; else mode = 0666; if ((a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) && (!S_ISREG(a->perm))) { error("Cannot download non-regular file: %s", remote_path); return(-1); } if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) size = a->size; else size = 0; buflen = conn->transfer_buflen; buffer_init(&msg); /* Send open request */ id = conn->msg_id++; buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN); buffer_put_int(&msg, id); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, remote_path); buffer_put_int(&msg, SSH2_FXF_READ); attrib_clear(&junk); /* Send empty attributes */ encode_attrib(&msg, &junk); send_msg(conn, &msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, remote_path); handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len, "remote open(\"%s\")", remote_path); if (handle == NULL) { buffer_free(&msg); return(-1); } local_fd = open(local_path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | (resume_flag ? 0 : O_TRUNC), mode | S_IWUSR); if (local_fd == -1) { error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for writing: %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } offset = highwater = 0; if (resume_flag) { if (fstat(local_fd, &st) == -1) { error("Unable to stat local file \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } if (st.st_size < 0) { error("\"%s\" has negative size", local_path); goto fail; } if ((u_int64_t)st.st_size > size) { error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": " "local file is larger than remote", local_path); fail: do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); buffer_free(&msg); free(handle); if (local_fd != -1) close(local_fd); return -1; } offset = highwater = st.st_size; } /* Read from remote and write to local */ write_error = read_error = write_errno = num_req = 0; max_req = 1; progress_counter = offset; if (showprogress && size != 0) start_progress_meter(remote_path, size, &progress_counter); while (num_req > 0 || max_req > 0) { char *data; u_int len; /* * Simulate EOF on interrupt: stop sending new requests and * allow outstanding requests to drain gracefully */ if (interrupted) { if (num_req == 0) /* If we haven't started yet... */ break; max_req = 0; } /* Send some more requests */ while (num_req < max_req) { debug3("Request range %llu -> %llu (%d/%d)", (unsigned long long)offset, (unsigned long long)offset + buflen - 1, num_req, max_req); req = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*req)); req->id = conn->msg_id++; req->len = buflen; req->offset = offset; offset += buflen; num_req++; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&requests, req, tq); send_read_request(conn, req->id, req->offset, req->len, handle, handle_len); } buffer_clear(&msg); get_msg(conn, &msg); type = buffer_get_char(&msg); id = buffer_get_int(&msg); debug3("Received reply T:%u I:%u R:%d", type, id, max_req); /* Find the request in our queue */ for (req = TAILQ_FIRST(&requests); req != NULL && req->id != id; req = TAILQ_NEXT(req, tq)) ; if (req == NULL) fatal("Unexpected reply %u", id); switch (type) { case SSH2_FXP_STATUS: status = buffer_get_int(&msg); if (status != SSH2_FX_EOF) read_error = 1; max_req = 0; TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq); free(req); num_req--; break; case SSH2_FXP_DATA: data = buffer_get_string(&msg, &len); debug3("Received data %llu -> %llu", (unsigned long long)req->offset, (unsigned long long)req->offset + len - 1); if (len > req->len) fatal("Received more data than asked for " "%u > %u", len, req->len); if ((lseek(local_fd, req->offset, SEEK_SET) == -1 || atomicio(vwrite, local_fd, data, len) != len) && !write_error) { write_errno = errno; write_error = 1; max_req = 0; } else if (!reordered && req->offset <= highwater) highwater = req->offset + len; else if (!reordered && req->offset > highwater) reordered = 1; progress_counter += len; free(data); if (len == req->len) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&requests, req, tq); free(req); num_req--; } else { /* Resend the request for the missing data */ debug3("Short data block, re-requesting " "%llu -> %llu (%2d)", (unsigned long long)req->offset + len, (unsigned long long)req->offset + req->len - 1, num_req); req->id = conn->msg_id++; req->len -= len; req->offset += len; send_read_request(conn, req->id, req->offset, req->len, handle, handle_len); /* Reduce the request size */ if (len < buflen) buflen = MAX(MIN_READ_SIZE, len); } if (max_req > 0) { /* max_req = 0 iff EOF received */ if (size > 0 && offset > size) { /* Only one request at a time * after the expected EOF */ debug3("Finish at %llu (%2d)", (unsigned long long)offset, num_req); max_req = 1; } else if (max_req <= conn->num_requests) { ++max_req; } } break; default: fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_DATA(%u) packet, got %u", SSH2_FXP_DATA, type); } } if (showprogress && size) stop_progress_meter(); /* Sanity check */ if (TAILQ_FIRST(&requests) != NULL) fatal("Transfer complete, but requests still in queue"); /* Truncate at highest contiguous point to avoid holes on interrupt */ if (read_error || write_error || interrupted) { if (reordered && resume_flag) { error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": " "server reordered requests", local_path); } debug("truncating at %llu", (unsigned long long)highwater); ftruncate(local_fd, highwater); } if (read_error) { error("Couldn't read from remote file \"%s\" : %s", remote_path, fx2txt(status)); status = -1; do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); } else if (write_error) { error("Couldn't write to \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(write_errno)); status = -1; do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); } else { status = do_close(conn, handle, handle_len); if (interrupted || status != SSH2_FX_OK) status = -1; /* Override umask and utimes if asked */ #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD if (preserve_flag && fchmod(local_fd, mode) == -1) #else if (preserve_flag && chmod(local_path, mode) == -1) #endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */ error("Couldn't set mode on \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); if (preserve_flag && (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME)) { struct timeval tv[2]; tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime; tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime; tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0; if (utimes(local_path, tv) == -1) error("Can't set times on \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); } if (fsync_flag) { debug("syncing \"%s\"", local_path); if (fsync(local_fd) == -1) error("Couldn't sync file \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); } } close(local_fd); buffer_free(&msg); free(handle); return(status); } static int download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int depth, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag, int fsync_flag) { int i, ret = 0; SFTP_DIRENT **dir_entries; char *filename, *new_src, *new_dst; mode_t mode = 0777; if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) { error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth); return -1; } if (dirattrib == NULL && (dirattrib = do_stat(conn, src, 1)) == NULL) { error("Unable to stat remote directory \"%s\"", src); return -1; } if (!S_ISDIR(dirattrib->perm)) { error("\"%s\" is not a directory", src); return -1; } if (print_flag) printf("Retrieving %s\n", src); if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) mode = dirattrib->perm & 01777; else { debug("Server did not send permissions for " "directory \"%s\"", dst); } if (mkdir(dst, mode) == -1 && errno != EEXIST) { error("mkdir %s: %s", dst, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (do_readdir(conn, src, &dir_entries) == -1) { error("%s: Failed to get directory contents", src); return -1; } for (i = 0; dir_entries[i] != NULL && !interrupted; i++) { filename = dir_entries[i]->filename; new_dst = path_append(dst, filename); new_src = path_append(src, filename); if (S_ISDIR(dir_entries[i]->a.perm)) { if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 || strcmp(filename, "..") == 0) continue; if (download_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst, depth + 1, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag, print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1) ret = -1; } else if (S_ISREG(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ) { if (do_download(conn, new_src, new_dst, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1) { error("Download of file %s to %s failed", new_src, new_dst); ret = -1; } } else logit("%s: not a regular file\n", new_src); free(new_dst); free(new_src); } if (preserve_flag) { if (dirattrib->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { struct timeval tv[2]; tv[0].tv_sec = dirattrib->atime; tv[1].tv_sec = dirattrib->mtime; tv[0].tv_usec = tv[1].tv_usec = 0; if (utimes(dst, tv) == -1) error("Can't set times on \"%s\": %s", dst, strerror(errno)); } else debug("Server did not send times for directory " "\"%s\"", dst); } free_sftp_dirents(dir_entries); return ret; } int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag, int fsync_flag) { char *src_canon; int ret; if ((src_canon = do_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) { error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", src); return -1; } ret = download_dir_internal(conn, src_canon, dst, 0, dirattrib, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag); free(src_canon); return ret; } int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *local_path, char *remote_path, - int preserve_flag, int fsync_flag) + int preserve_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag) { int local_fd; int status = SSH2_FX_OK; u_int handle_len, id, type; off_t offset, progress_counter; char *handle, *data; Buffer msg; struct stat sb; - Attrib a; + Attrib a, *c = NULL; u_int32_t startid; u_int32_t ackid; struct outstanding_ack { u_int id; u_int len; off_t offset; TAILQ_ENTRY(outstanding_ack) tq; }; TAILQ_HEAD(ackhead, outstanding_ack) acks; struct outstanding_ack *ack = NULL; TAILQ_INIT(&acks); if ((local_fd = open(local_path, O_RDONLY, 0)) == -1) { error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for reading: %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); return(-1); } if (fstat(local_fd, &sb) == -1) { error("Couldn't fstat local file \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); close(local_fd); return(-1); } if (!S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { error("%s is not a regular file", local_path); close(local_fd); return(-1); } stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a); a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE; a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; a.perm &= 0777; if (!preserve_flag) a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME; + if (resume) { + /* Get remote file size if it exists */ + if ((c = do_stat(conn, remote_path, 0)) == NULL) { + close(local_fd); + return -1; + } + + if ((off_t)c->size >= sb.st_size) { + error("destination file bigger or same size as " + "source file"); + close(local_fd); + return -1; + } + + if (lseek(local_fd, (off_t)c->size, SEEK_SET) == -1) { + close(local_fd); + return -1; + } + } + buffer_init(&msg); /* Send open request */ id = conn->msg_id++; buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_OPEN); buffer_put_int(&msg, id); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, remote_path); - buffer_put_int(&msg, SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT|SSH2_FXF_TRUNC); + buffer_put_int(&msg, SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT| + (resume ? SSH2_FXF_APPEND : SSH2_FXF_TRUNC)); encode_attrib(&msg, &a); send_msg(conn, &msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_OPEN I:%u P:%s", id, remote_path); buffer_clear(&msg); handle = get_handle(conn, id, &handle_len, "remote open(\"%s\")", remote_path); if (handle == NULL) { close(local_fd); buffer_free(&msg); return -1; } startid = ackid = id + 1; data = xmalloc(conn->transfer_buflen); /* Read from local and write to remote */ - offset = progress_counter = 0; + offset = progress_counter = (resume ? c->size : 0); if (showprogress) start_progress_meter(local_path, sb.st_size, &progress_counter); for (;;) { int len; /* * Can't use atomicio here because it returns 0 on EOF, * thus losing the last block of the file. * Simulate an EOF on interrupt, allowing ACKs from the * server to drain. */ if (interrupted || status != SSH2_FX_OK) len = 0; else do len = read(local_fd, data, conn->transfer_buflen); while ((len == -1) && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)); if (len == -1) fatal("Couldn't read from \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); if (len != 0) { ack = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ack)); ack->id = ++id; ack->offset = offset; ack->len = len; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&acks, ack, tq); buffer_clear(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_WRITE); buffer_put_int(&msg, ack->id); buffer_put_string(&msg, handle, handle_len); buffer_put_int64(&msg, offset); buffer_put_string(&msg, data, len); send_msg(conn, &msg); debug3("Sent message SSH2_FXP_WRITE I:%u O:%llu S:%u", id, (unsigned long long)offset, len); } else if (TAILQ_FIRST(&acks) == NULL) break; if (ack == NULL) fatal("Unexpected ACK %u", id); if (id == startid || len == 0 || id - ackid >= conn->num_requests) { u_int r_id; buffer_clear(&msg); get_msg(conn, &msg); type = buffer_get_char(&msg); r_id = buffer_get_int(&msg); if (type != SSH2_FXP_STATUS) fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_STATUS(%d) packet, " "got %d", SSH2_FXP_STATUS, type); status = buffer_get_int(&msg); debug3("SSH2_FXP_STATUS %d", status); /* Find the request in our queue */ for (ack = TAILQ_FIRST(&acks); ack != NULL && ack->id != r_id; ack = TAILQ_NEXT(ack, tq)) ; if (ack == NULL) fatal("Can't find request for ID %u", r_id); TAILQ_REMOVE(&acks, ack, tq); debug3("In write loop, ack for %u %u bytes at %lld", ack->id, ack->len, (long long)ack->offset); ++ackid; progress_counter += ack->len; free(ack); } offset += len; if (offset < 0) fatal("%s: offset < 0", __func__); } buffer_free(&msg); if (showprogress) stop_progress_meter(); free(data); if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) { error("Couldn't write to remote file \"%s\": %s", remote_path, fx2txt(status)); status = -1; } if (close(local_fd) == -1) { error("Couldn't close local file \"%s\": %s", local_path, strerror(errno)); status = -1; } /* Override umask and utimes if asked */ if (preserve_flag) do_fsetstat(conn, handle, handle_len, &a); if (fsync_flag) (void)do_fsync(conn, handle, handle_len); if (do_close(conn, handle, handle_len) != SSH2_FX_OK) status = -1; free(handle); return status; } static int upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int depth, - int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int fsync_flag) + int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag) { int ret = 0, status; DIR *dirp; struct dirent *dp; char *filename, *new_src, *new_dst; struct stat sb; Attrib a; if (depth >= MAX_DIR_DEPTH) { error("Maximum directory depth exceeded: %d levels", depth); return -1; } if (stat(src, &sb) == -1) { error("Couldn't stat directory \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (!S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) { error("\"%s\" is not a directory", src); return -1; } if (print_flag) printf("Entering %s\n", src); attrib_clear(&a); stat_to_attrib(&sb, &a); a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE; a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; a.perm &= 01777; if (!preserve_flag) a.flags &= ~SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME; status = do_mkdir(conn, dst, &a, 0); /* * we lack a portable status for errno EEXIST, * so if we get a SSH2_FX_FAILURE back we must check * if it was created successfully. */ if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) { if (status != SSH2_FX_FAILURE) return -1; if (do_stat(conn, dst, 0) == NULL) return -1; } if ((dirp = opendir(src)) == NULL) { error("Failed to open dir \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno)); return -1; } while (((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) && !interrupted) { if (dp->d_ino == 0) continue; filename = dp->d_name; new_dst = path_append(dst, filename); new_src = path_append(src, filename); if (lstat(new_src, &sb) == -1) { logit("%s: lstat failed: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); ret = -1; } else if (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)) { if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 || strcmp(filename, "..") == 0) continue; if (upload_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst, - depth + 1, preserve_flag, print_flag, + depth + 1, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume, fsync_flag) == -1) ret = -1; } else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { if (do_upload(conn, new_src, new_dst, - preserve_flag, fsync_flag) == -1) { + preserve_flag, resume, fsync_flag) == -1) { error("Uploading of file %s to %s failed!", new_src, new_dst); ret = -1; } } else logit("%s: not a regular file\n", filename); free(new_dst); free(new_src); } do_setstat(conn, dst, &a); (void) closedir(dirp); return ret; } int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, int preserve_flag, - int print_flag, int fsync_flag) + int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag) { char *dst_canon; int ret; if ((dst_canon = do_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) { error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", dst); return -1; } ret = upload_dir_internal(conn, src, dst_canon, 0, preserve_flag, - print_flag, fsync_flag); + print_flag, resume, fsync_flag); free(dst_canon); return ret; } char * path_append(char *p1, char *p2) { char *ret; size_t len = strlen(p1) + strlen(p2) + 2; ret = xmalloc(len); strlcpy(ret, p1, len); if (p1[0] != '\0' && p1[strlen(p1) - 1] != '/') strlcat(ret, "/", len); strlcat(ret, p2, len); return(ret); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-client.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-client.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-client.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,134 +1,134 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.24 2013/10/17 00:30:13 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp-client.h,v 1.25 2014/04/21 14:36:16 logan Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ /* Client side of SSH2 filexfer protocol */ #ifndef _SFTP_CLIENT_H #define _SFTP_CLIENT_H typedef struct SFTP_DIRENT SFTP_DIRENT; struct SFTP_DIRENT { char *filename; char *longname; Attrib a; }; /* * Used for statvfs responses on the wire from the server, because the * server's native format may be larger than the client's. */ struct sftp_statvfs { u_int64_t f_bsize; u_int64_t f_frsize; u_int64_t f_blocks; u_int64_t f_bfree; u_int64_t f_bavail; u_int64_t f_files; u_int64_t f_ffree; u_int64_t f_favail; u_int64_t f_fsid; u_int64_t f_flag; u_int64_t f_namemax; }; /* * Initialise a SSH filexfer connection. Returns NULL on error or * a pointer to a initialized sftp_conn struct on success. */ struct sftp_conn *do_init(int, int, u_int, u_int, u_int64_t); u_int sftp_proto_version(struct sftp_conn *); /* Close file referred to by 'handle' */ int do_close(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int); /* Read contents of 'path' to NULL-terminated array 'dir' */ int do_readdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, SFTP_DIRENT ***); /* Frees a NULL-terminated array of SFTP_DIRENTs (eg. from do_readdir) */ void free_sftp_dirents(SFTP_DIRENT **); /* Delete file 'path' */ int do_rm(struct sftp_conn *, char *); /* Create directory 'path' */ int do_mkdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, Attrib *, int); /* Remove directory 'path' */ int do_rmdir(struct sftp_conn *, char *); /* Get file attributes of 'path' (follows symlinks) */ Attrib *do_stat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, int); /* Get file attributes of 'path' (does not follow symlinks) */ Attrib *do_lstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, int); /* Set file attributes of 'path' */ int do_setstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, Attrib *); /* Set file attributes of open file 'handle' */ int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, char *, u_int, Attrib *); /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */ char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, char *); /* Get statistics for filesystem hosting file at "path" */ int do_statvfs(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, struct sftp_statvfs *, int); /* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ int do_rename(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *m, int force_legacy); /* Link 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ int do_hardlink(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *); /* Rename 'oldpath' to 'newpath' */ int do_symlink(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *); /* Call fsync() on open file 'handle' */ int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *, u_int); /* * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times * if 'pflag' is set */ int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, Attrib *, int, int, int); /* * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve * times if 'pflag' is set */ int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, Attrib *, int, int, int, int); /* * Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times * if 'pflag' is set */ -int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int, int); +int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int, int, int); /* * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve * times if 'pflag' is set */ -int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int, int, int); +int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, char *, char *, int, int, int, int); /* Concatenate paths, taking care of slashes. Caller must free result. */ char *path_append(char *, char *); #endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-server.0 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-server.0 (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-server.0 (revision 276707) @@ -1,95 +1,96 @@ -SFTP-SERVER(8) OpenBSD System Manager's Manual SFTP-SERVER(8) +SFTP-SERVER(8) System Manager's Manual SFTP-SERVER(8) NAME sftp-server - SFTP server subsystem SYNOPSIS sftp-server [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] [-l log_level] [-P blacklisted_requests] [-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask] sftp-server -Q protocol_feature DESCRIPTION sftp-server is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol to stdout and expects client requests from stdin. sftp-server is not intended to be called directly, but from sshd(8) using the Subsystem option. Command-line flags to sftp-server should be specified in the Subsystem declaration. See sshd_config(5) for more information. Valid options are: -d start_directory specifies an alternate starting directory for users. The pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at runtime: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is replaced by the username of that user. The default is to use the user's home directory. This option is useful in conjunction with the sshd_config(5) ChrootDirectory option. -e Causes sftp-server to print logging information to stderr instead of syslog for debugging. -f log_facility Specifies the facility code that is used when logging messages from sftp-server. The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The default is AUTH. -h Displays sftp-server usage information. -l log_level Specifies which messages will be logged by sftp-server. The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. INFO and VERBOSE log transactions that sftp-server performs on behalf of the client. DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output. The default is ERROR. -P blacklisted_requests Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are banned by the server. sftp-server will reply to any blacklisted request with a failure. The -Q flag can be used to determine the supported request types. If both a blacklist and a whitelist are specified, then the blacklist is applied before the whitelist. -p whitelisted_requests Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are permitted by the server. All request types that are not on the whitelist will be logged and replied to with a failure message. Care must be taken when using this feature to ensure that requests made implicitly by SFTP clients are permitted. -Q protocol_feature Query protocol features supported by sftp-server. At present the only feature that may be queried is ``requests'', which may be used for black or whitelisting (flags -P and -p respectively). -R Places this instance of sftp-server into a read-only mode. Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations that change the state of the filesystem, will be denied. -u umask Sets an explicit umask(2) to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the user's default mask. - For logging to work, sftp-server must be able to access /dev/log. Use of - sftp-server in a chroot configuration therefore requires that syslogd(8) - establish a logging socket inside the chroot directory. + On some systems, sftp-server must be able to access /dev/log for logging + to work, and use of sftp-server in a chroot configuration therefore + requires that syslogd(8) establish a logging socket inside the chroot + directory. SEE ALSO sftp(1), ssh(1), sshd_config(5), sshd(8) T. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh- filexfer-02.txt, October 2001, work in progress material. HISTORY sftp-server first appeared in OpenBSD 2.8. AUTHORS Markus Friedl -OpenBSD 5.5 October 14, 2013 OpenBSD 5.5 +OpenBSD 5.6 July 28, 2014 OpenBSD 5.6 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-server.8 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-server.8 (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-server.8 (revision 276707) @@ -1,170 +1,170 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.25 2013/10/14 14:18:56 jmc Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.26 2014/07/28 15:40:08 schwarze Exp $ .\" .\" Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: October 14 2013 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: July 28 2014 $ .Dt SFTP-SERVER 8 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm sftp-server .Nd SFTP server subsystem .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm sftp-server .Bk -words .Op Fl ehR .Op Fl d Ar start_directory .Op Fl f Ar log_facility .Op Fl l Ar log_level .Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests .Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests .Op Fl u Ar umask .Ek .Nm .Fl Q Ar protocol_feature .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol to stdout and expects client requests from stdin. .Nm is not intended to be called directly, but from .Xr sshd 8 using the .Cm Subsystem option. .Pp Command-line flags to .Nm should be specified in the .Cm Subsystem declaration. See .Xr sshd_config 5 for more information. .Pp Valid options are: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl d Ar start_directory specifies an alternate starting directory for users. The pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at runtime: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is replaced by the username of that user. The default is to use the user's home directory. This option is useful in conjunction with the .Xr sshd_config 5 .Cm ChrootDirectory option. .It Fl e Causes .Nm to print logging information to stderr instead of syslog for debugging. .It Fl f Ar log_facility Specifies the facility code that is used when logging messages from .Nm . The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The default is AUTH. .It Fl h Displays .Nm usage information. .It Fl l Ar log_level Specifies which messages will be logged by .Nm . The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. INFO and VERBOSE log transactions that .Nm performs on behalf of the client. DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output. The default is ERROR. .It Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are banned by the server. .Nm will reply to any blacklisted request with a failure. The .Fl Q flag can be used to determine the supported request types. If both a blacklist and a whitelist are specified, then the blacklist is applied before the whitelist. .It Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are permitted by the server. All request types that are not on the whitelist will be logged and replied to with a failure message. .Pp Care must be taken when using this feature to ensure that requests made implicitly by SFTP clients are permitted. .It Fl Q Ar protocol_feature Query protocol features supported by .Nm . At present the only feature that may be queried is .Dq requests , which may be used for black or whitelisting (flags .Fl P and .Fl p respectively). .It Fl R Places this instance of .Nm into a read-only mode. Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations that change the state of the filesystem, will be denied. .It Fl u Ar umask Sets an explicit .Xr umask 2 to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the user's default mask. .El .Pp -For logging to work, +On some systems, .Nm must be able to access -.Pa /dev/log . -Use of +.Pa /dev/log +for logging to work, and use of .Nm in a chroot configuration therefore requires that .Xr syslogd 8 establish a logging socket inside the chroot directory. .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr sftp 1 , .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr sshd_config 5 , .Xr sshd 8 .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A S. Lehtinen .%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol" .%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt .%D October 2001 .%O work in progress material .Re .Sh HISTORY .Nm first appeared in .Ox 2.8 . .Sh AUTHORS .An Markus Friedl Aq Mt markus@openbsd.org Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-server.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-server.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp-server.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,1624 +1,1638 @@ /* $OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.103 2014/01/17 06:23:24 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000-2004 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif +#ifdef HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H +#include +#endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "match.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "sftp.h" #include "sftp-common.h" /* helper */ #define get_int64() buffer_get_int64(&iqueue); #define get_int() buffer_get_int(&iqueue); #define get_string(lenp) buffer_get_string(&iqueue, lenp); /* Our verbosity */ static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; /* Our client */ static struct passwd *pw = NULL; static char *client_addr = NULL; /* input and output queue */ static Buffer iqueue; static Buffer oqueue; /* Version of client */ static u_int version; /* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */ static int init_done; /* Disable writes */ static int readonly; /* Requests that are allowed/denied */ static char *request_whitelist, *request_blacklist; /* portable attributes, etc. */ typedef struct Stat Stat; struct Stat { char *name; char *long_name; Attrib attrib; }; /* Packet handlers */ static void process_open(u_int32_t id); static void process_close(u_int32_t id); static void process_read(u_int32_t id); static void process_write(u_int32_t id); static void process_stat(u_int32_t id); static void process_lstat(u_int32_t id); static void process_fstat(u_int32_t id); static void process_setstat(u_int32_t id); static void process_fsetstat(u_int32_t id); static void process_opendir(u_int32_t id); static void process_readdir(u_int32_t id); static void process_remove(u_int32_t id); static void process_mkdir(u_int32_t id); static void process_rmdir(u_int32_t id); static void process_realpath(u_int32_t id); static void process_rename(u_int32_t id); static void process_readlink(u_int32_t id); static void process_symlink(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_posix_rename(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_statvfs(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_fstatvfs(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_hardlink(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended_fsync(u_int32_t id); static void process_extended(u_int32_t id); struct sftp_handler { const char *name; /* user-visible name for fine-grained perms */ const char *ext_name; /* extended request name */ u_int type; /* packet type, for non extended packets */ void (*handler)(u_int32_t); int does_write; /* if nonzero, banned for readonly mode */ }; struct sftp_handler handlers[] = { /* NB. SSH2_FXP_OPEN does the readonly check in the handler itself */ { "open", NULL, SSH2_FXP_OPEN, process_open, 0 }, { "close", NULL, SSH2_FXP_CLOSE, process_close, 0 }, { "read", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READ, process_read, 0 }, { "write", NULL, SSH2_FXP_WRITE, process_write, 1 }, { "lstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_LSTAT, process_lstat, 0 }, { "fstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_FSTAT, process_fstat, 0 }, { "setstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT, process_setstat, 1 }, { "fsetstat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_FSETSTAT, process_fsetstat, 1 }, { "opendir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_OPENDIR, process_opendir, 0 }, { "readdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READDIR, process_readdir, 0 }, { "remove", NULL, SSH2_FXP_REMOVE, process_remove, 1 }, { "mkdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_MKDIR, process_mkdir, 1 }, { "rmdir", NULL, SSH2_FXP_RMDIR, process_rmdir, 1 }, { "realpath", NULL, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH, process_realpath, 0 }, { "stat", NULL, SSH2_FXP_STAT, process_stat, 0 }, { "rename", NULL, SSH2_FXP_RENAME, process_rename, 1 }, { "readlink", NULL, SSH2_FXP_READLINK, process_readlink, 0 }, { "symlink", NULL, SSH2_FXP_SYMLINK, process_symlink, 1 }, { NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 } }; /* SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED submessages */ struct sftp_handler extended_handlers[] = { { "posix-rename", "posix-rename@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_posix_rename, 1 }, { "statvfs", "statvfs@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_statvfs, 0 }, { "fstatvfs", "fstatvfs@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_fstatvfs, 0 }, { "hardlink", "hardlink@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_hardlink, 1 }, { "fsync", "fsync@openssh.com", 0, process_extended_fsync, 1 }, { NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, 0 } }; static int request_permitted(struct sftp_handler *h) { char *result; if (readonly && h->does_write) { verbose("Refusing %s request in read-only mode", h->name); return 0; } if (request_blacklist != NULL && ((result = match_list(h->name, request_blacklist, NULL))) != NULL) { free(result); verbose("Refusing blacklisted %s request", h->name); return 0; } if (request_whitelist != NULL && ((result = match_list(h->name, request_whitelist, NULL))) != NULL) { free(result); debug2("Permitting whitelisted %s request", h->name); return 1; } if (request_whitelist != NULL) { verbose("Refusing non-whitelisted %s request", h->name); return 0; } return 1; } static int errno_to_portable(int unixerrno) { int ret = 0; switch (unixerrno) { case 0: ret = SSH2_FX_OK; break; case ENOENT: case ENOTDIR: case EBADF: case ELOOP: ret = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE; break; case EPERM: case EACCES: case EFAULT: ret = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED; break; case ENAMETOOLONG: case EINVAL: ret = SSH2_FX_BAD_MESSAGE; break; case ENOSYS: ret = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED; break; default: ret = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; break; } return ret; } static int flags_from_portable(int pflags) { int flags = 0; if ((pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) && (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE)) { flags = O_RDWR; } else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) { flags = O_RDONLY; } else if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE) { flags = O_WRONLY; } if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_APPEND) flags |= O_APPEND; if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT) flags |= O_CREAT; if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC) flags |= O_TRUNC; if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL) flags |= O_EXCL; return flags; } static const char * string_from_portable(int pflags) { static char ret[128]; *ret = '\0'; #define PAPPEND(str) { \ if (*ret != '\0') \ strlcat(ret, ",", sizeof(ret)); \ strlcat(ret, str, sizeof(ret)); \ } if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_READ) PAPPEND("READ") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_WRITE) PAPPEND("WRITE") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_APPEND) PAPPEND("APPEND") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_CREAT) PAPPEND("CREATE") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_TRUNC) PAPPEND("TRUNCATE") if (pflags & SSH2_FXF_EXCL) PAPPEND("EXCL") return ret; } static Attrib * get_attrib(void) { return decode_attrib(&iqueue); } /* handle handles */ typedef struct Handle Handle; struct Handle { int use; DIR *dirp; int fd; int flags; char *name; u_int64_t bytes_read, bytes_write; int next_unused; }; enum { HANDLE_UNUSED, HANDLE_DIR, HANDLE_FILE }; Handle *handles = NULL; u_int num_handles = 0; int first_unused_handle = -1; static void handle_unused(int i) { handles[i].use = HANDLE_UNUSED; handles[i].next_unused = first_unused_handle; first_unused_handle = i; } static int handle_new(int use, const char *name, int fd, int flags, DIR *dirp) { int i; if (first_unused_handle == -1) { if (num_handles + 1 <= num_handles) return -1; num_handles++; handles = xrealloc(handles, num_handles, sizeof(Handle)); handle_unused(num_handles - 1); } i = first_unused_handle; first_unused_handle = handles[i].next_unused; handles[i].use = use; handles[i].dirp = dirp; handles[i].fd = fd; handles[i].flags = flags; handles[i].name = xstrdup(name); handles[i].bytes_read = handles[i].bytes_write = 0; return i; } static int handle_is_ok(int i, int type) { return i >= 0 && (u_int)i < num_handles && handles[i].use == type; } static int handle_to_string(int handle, char **stringp, int *hlenp) { if (stringp == NULL || hlenp == NULL) return -1; *stringp = xmalloc(sizeof(int32_t)); put_u32(*stringp, handle); *hlenp = sizeof(int32_t); return 0; } static int handle_from_string(const char *handle, u_int hlen) { int val; if (hlen != sizeof(int32_t)) return -1; val = get_u32(handle); if (handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_FILE) || handle_is_ok(val, HANDLE_DIR)) return val; return -1; } static char * handle_to_name(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)|| handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return handles[handle].name; return NULL; } static DIR * handle_to_dir(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)) return handles[handle].dirp; return NULL; } static int handle_to_fd(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return handles[handle].fd; return -1; } static int handle_to_flags(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return handles[handle].flags; return 0; } static void handle_update_read(int handle, ssize_t bytes) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0) handles[handle].bytes_read += bytes; } static void handle_update_write(int handle, ssize_t bytes) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE) && bytes > 0) handles[handle].bytes_write += bytes; } static u_int64_t handle_bytes_read(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return (handles[handle].bytes_read); return 0; } static u_int64_t handle_bytes_write(int handle) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) return (handles[handle].bytes_write); return 0; } static int handle_close(int handle) { int ret = -1; if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) { ret = close(handles[handle].fd); free(handles[handle].name); handle_unused(handle); } else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_DIR)) { ret = closedir(handles[handle].dirp); free(handles[handle].name); handle_unused(handle); } else { errno = ENOENT; } return ret; } static void handle_log_close(int handle, char *emsg) { if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) { logit("%s%sclose \"%s\" bytes read %llu written %llu", emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ", handle_to_name(handle), (unsigned long long)handle_bytes_read(handle), (unsigned long long)handle_bytes_write(handle)); } else { logit("%s%sclosedir \"%s\"", emsg == NULL ? "" : emsg, emsg == NULL ? "" : " ", handle_to_name(handle)); } } static void handle_log_exit(void) { u_int i; for (i = 0; i < num_handles; i++) if (handles[i].use != HANDLE_UNUSED) handle_log_close(i, "forced"); } static int get_handle(void) { char *handle; int val = -1; u_int hlen; handle = get_string(&hlen); if (hlen < 256) val = handle_from_string(handle, hlen); free(handle); return val; } /* send replies */ static void send_msg(Buffer *m) { int mlen = buffer_len(m); buffer_put_int(&oqueue, mlen); buffer_append(&oqueue, buffer_ptr(m), mlen); buffer_consume(m, mlen); } static const char * status_to_message(u_int32_t status) { const char *status_messages[] = { "Success", /* SSH_FX_OK */ "End of file", /* SSH_FX_EOF */ "No such file", /* SSH_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE */ "Permission denied", /* SSH_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED */ "Failure", /* SSH_FX_FAILURE */ "Bad message", /* SSH_FX_BAD_MESSAGE */ "No connection", /* SSH_FX_NO_CONNECTION */ "Connection lost", /* SSH_FX_CONNECTION_LOST */ "Operation unsupported", /* SSH_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED */ "Unknown error" /* Others */ }; return (status_messages[MIN(status,SSH2_FX_MAX)]); } static void send_status(u_int32_t id, u_int32_t status) { Buffer msg; debug3("request %u: sent status %u", id, status); if (log_level > SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE || (status != SSH2_FX_OK && status != SSH2_FX_EOF)) logit("sent status %s", status_to_message(status)); buffer_init(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_STATUS); buffer_put_int(&msg, id); buffer_put_int(&msg, status); if (version >= 3) { buffer_put_cstring(&msg, status_to_message(status)); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, ""); } send_msg(&msg); buffer_free(&msg); } static void send_data_or_handle(char type, u_int32_t id, const char *data, int dlen) { Buffer msg; buffer_init(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, type); buffer_put_int(&msg, id); buffer_put_string(&msg, data, dlen); send_msg(&msg); buffer_free(&msg); } static void send_data(u_int32_t id, const char *data, int dlen) { debug("request %u: sent data len %d", id, dlen); send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_DATA, id, data, dlen); } static void send_handle(u_int32_t id, int handle) { char *string; int hlen; handle_to_string(handle, &string, &hlen); debug("request %u: sent handle handle %d", id, handle); send_data_or_handle(SSH2_FXP_HANDLE, id, string, hlen); free(string); } static void send_names(u_int32_t id, int count, const Stat *stats) { Buffer msg; int i; buffer_init(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_NAME); buffer_put_int(&msg, id); buffer_put_int(&msg, count); debug("request %u: sent names count %d", id, count); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { buffer_put_cstring(&msg, stats[i].name); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, stats[i].long_name); encode_attrib(&msg, &stats[i].attrib); } send_msg(&msg); buffer_free(&msg); } static void send_attrib(u_int32_t id, const Attrib *a) { Buffer msg; debug("request %u: sent attrib have 0x%x", id, a->flags); buffer_init(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_ATTRS); buffer_put_int(&msg, id); encode_attrib(&msg, a); send_msg(&msg); buffer_free(&msg); } static void send_statvfs(u_int32_t id, struct statvfs *st) { Buffer msg; u_int64_t flag; flag = (st->f_flag & ST_RDONLY) ? SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_RDONLY : 0; flag |= (st->f_flag & ST_NOSUID) ? SSH2_FXE_STATVFS_ST_NOSUID : 0; buffer_init(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED_REPLY); buffer_put_int(&msg, id); buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_bsize); buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_frsize); buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_blocks); buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_bfree); buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_bavail); buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_files); buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_ffree); buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_favail); buffer_put_int64(&msg, FSID_TO_ULONG(st->f_fsid)); buffer_put_int64(&msg, flag); buffer_put_int64(&msg, st->f_namemax); send_msg(&msg); buffer_free(&msg); } /* parse incoming */ static void process_init(void) { Buffer msg; version = get_int(); verbose("received client version %u", version); buffer_init(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_FXP_VERSION); buffer_put_int(&msg, SSH2_FILEXFER_VERSION); /* POSIX rename extension */ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "posix-rename@openssh.com"); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "1"); /* version */ /* statvfs extension */ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "statvfs@openssh.com"); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "2"); /* version */ /* fstatvfs extension */ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "fstatvfs@openssh.com"); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "2"); /* version */ /* hardlink extension */ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "hardlink@openssh.com"); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "1"); /* version */ /* fsync extension */ buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "fsync@openssh.com"); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, "1"); /* version */ send_msg(&msg); buffer_free(&msg); } static void process_open(u_int32_t id) { u_int32_t pflags; Attrib *a; char *name; int handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; name = get_string(NULL); pflags = get_int(); /* portable flags */ debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags); a = get_attrib(); flags = flags_from_portable(pflags); mode = (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a->perm : 0666; logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o", name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode); if (readonly && ((flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_WRONLY || (flags & O_ACCMODE) == O_RDWR)) { verbose("Refusing open request in read-only mode"); status = SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED; } else { fd = open(name, flags, mode); if (fd < 0) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else { handle = handle_new(HANDLE_FILE, name, fd, flags, NULL); if (handle < 0) { close(fd); } else { send_handle(id, handle); status = SSH2_FX_OK; } } } if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_close(u_int32_t id) { int handle, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; handle = get_handle(); debug3("request %u: close handle %u", id, handle); handle_log_close(handle, NULL); ret = handle_close(handle); status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); } static void process_read(u_int32_t id) { char buf[64*1024]; u_int32_t len; int handle, fd, ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; u_int64_t off; handle = get_handle(); off = get_int64(); len = get_int(); debug("request %u: read \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %d", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len); if (len > sizeof buf) { len = sizeof buf; debug2("read change len %d", len); } fd = handle_to_fd(handle); if (fd >= 0) { if (lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) < 0) { error("process_read: seek failed"); status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else { ret = read(fd, buf, len); if (ret < 0) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else if (ret == 0) { status = SSH2_FX_EOF; } else { send_data(id, buf, ret); status = SSH2_FX_OK; handle_update_read(handle, ret); } } } if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); } static void process_write(u_int32_t id) { u_int64_t off; u_int len; int handle, fd, ret, status; char *data; handle = get_handle(); off = get_int64(); data = get_string(&len); debug("request %u: write \"%s\" (handle %d) off %llu len %d", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle, (unsigned long long)off, len); fd = handle_to_fd(handle); if (fd < 0) status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; else { if (!(handle_to_flags(handle) & O_APPEND) && lseek(fd, off, SEEK_SET) < 0) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); error("process_write: seek failed"); } else { /* XXX ATOMICIO ? */ ret = write(fd, data, len); if (ret < 0) { error("process_write: write failed"); status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else if ((size_t)ret == len) { status = SSH2_FX_OK; handle_update_write(handle, ret); } else { debug2("nothing at all written"); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; } } } send_status(id, status); free(data); } static void process_do_stat(u_int32_t id, int do_lstat) { Attrib a; struct stat st; char *name; int ret, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; name = get_string(NULL); debug3("request %u: %sstat", id, do_lstat ? "l" : ""); verbose("%sstat name \"%s\"", do_lstat ? "l" : "", name); ret = do_lstat ? lstat(name, &st) : stat(name, &st); if (ret < 0) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else { stat_to_attrib(&st, &a); send_attrib(id, &a); status = SSH2_FX_OK; } if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_stat(u_int32_t id) { process_do_stat(id, 0); } static void process_lstat(u_int32_t id) { process_do_stat(id, 1); } static void process_fstat(u_int32_t id) { Attrib a; struct stat st; int fd, ret, handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; handle = get_handle(); debug("request %u: fstat \"%s\" (handle %u)", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle); fd = handle_to_fd(handle); if (fd >= 0) { ret = fstat(fd, &st); if (ret < 0) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else { stat_to_attrib(&st, &a); send_attrib(id, &a); status = SSH2_FX_OK; } } if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); } static struct timeval * attrib_to_tv(const Attrib *a) { static struct timeval tv[2]; tv[0].tv_sec = a->atime; tv[0].tv_usec = 0; tv[1].tv_sec = a->mtime; tv[1].tv_usec = 0; return tv; } static void process_setstat(u_int32_t id) { Attrib *a; char *name; int status = SSH2_FX_OK, ret; name = get_string(NULL); a = get_attrib(); debug("request %u: setstat name \"%s\"", id, name); if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) { logit("set \"%s\" size %llu", name, (unsigned long long)a->size); ret = truncate(name, a->size); if (ret == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) { logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a->perm); ret = chmod(name, a->perm & 07777); if (ret == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { char buf[64]; time_t t = a->mtime; strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S", localtime(&t)); logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf); ret = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(a)); if (ret == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name, (u_long)a->uid, (u_long)a->gid); ret = chown(name, a->uid, a->gid); if (ret == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_fsetstat(u_int32_t id) { Attrib *a; int handle, fd, ret; int status = SSH2_FX_OK; handle = get_handle(); a = get_attrib(); debug("request %u: fsetstat handle %d", id, handle); fd = handle_to_fd(handle); if (fd < 0) status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; else { char *name = handle_to_name(handle); if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE) { logit("set \"%s\" size %llu", name, (unsigned long long)a->size); ret = ftruncate(fd, a->size); if (ret == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) { logit("set \"%s\" mode %04o", name, a->perm); #ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD ret = fchmod(fd, a->perm & 07777); #else ret = chmod(name, a->perm & 07777); #endif if (ret == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_ACMODTIME) { char buf[64]; time_t t = a->mtime; strftime(buf, sizeof(buf), "%Y%m%d-%H:%M:%S", localtime(&t)); logit("set \"%s\" modtime %s", name, buf); #ifdef HAVE_FUTIMES ret = futimes(fd, attrib_to_tv(a)); #else ret = utimes(name, attrib_to_tv(a)); #endif if (ret == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } if (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID) { logit("set \"%s\" owner %lu group %lu", name, (u_long)a->uid, (u_long)a->gid); #ifdef HAVE_FCHOWN ret = fchown(fd, a->uid, a->gid); #else ret = chown(name, a->uid, a->gid); #endif if (ret == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); } } send_status(id, status); } static void process_opendir(u_int32_t id) { DIR *dirp = NULL; char *path; int handle, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; path = get_string(NULL); debug3("request %u: opendir", id); logit("opendir \"%s\"", path); dirp = opendir(path); if (dirp == NULL) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } else { handle = handle_new(HANDLE_DIR, path, 0, 0, dirp); if (handle < 0) { closedir(dirp); } else { send_handle(id, handle); status = SSH2_FX_OK; } } if (status != SSH2_FX_OK) send_status(id, status); free(path); } static void process_readdir(u_int32_t id) { DIR *dirp; struct dirent *dp; char *path; int handle; handle = get_handle(); debug("request %u: readdir \"%s\" (handle %d)", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle); dirp = handle_to_dir(handle); path = handle_to_name(handle); if (dirp == NULL || path == NULL) { send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE); } else { struct stat st; char pathname[MAXPATHLEN]; Stat *stats; int nstats = 10, count = 0, i; stats = xcalloc(nstats, sizeof(Stat)); while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) { if (count >= nstats) { nstats *= 2; stats = xrealloc(stats, nstats, sizeof(Stat)); } /* XXX OVERFLOW ? */ snprintf(pathname, sizeof pathname, "%s%s%s", path, strcmp(path, "/") ? "/" : "", dp->d_name); if (lstat(pathname, &st) < 0) continue; stat_to_attrib(&st, &(stats[count].attrib)); stats[count].name = xstrdup(dp->d_name); stats[count].long_name = ls_file(dp->d_name, &st, 0, 0); count++; /* send up to 100 entries in one message */ /* XXX check packet size instead */ if (count == 100) break; } if (count > 0) { send_names(id, count, stats); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { free(stats[i].name); free(stats[i].long_name); } } else { send_status(id, SSH2_FX_EOF); } free(stats); } } static void process_remove(u_int32_t id) { char *name; int status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; int ret; name = get_string(NULL); debug3("request %u: remove", id); logit("remove name \"%s\"", name); ret = unlink(name); status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_mkdir(u_int32_t id) { Attrib *a; char *name; int ret, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; name = get_string(NULL); a = get_attrib(); mode = (a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a->perm & 07777 : 0777; debug3("request %u: mkdir", id); logit("mkdir name \"%s\" mode 0%o", name, mode); ret = mkdir(name, mode); status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_rmdir(u_int32_t id) { char *name; int ret, status; name = get_string(NULL); debug3("request %u: rmdir", id); logit("rmdir name \"%s\"", name); ret = rmdir(name); status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(name); } static void process_realpath(u_int32_t id) { char resolvedname[MAXPATHLEN]; char *path; path = get_string(NULL); if (path[0] == '\0') { free(path); path = xstrdup("."); } debug3("request %u: realpath", id); verbose("realpath \"%s\"", path); if (realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) { send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); } else { Stat s; attrib_clear(&s.attrib); s.name = s.long_name = resolvedname; send_names(id, 1, &s); } free(path); } static void process_rename(u_int32_t id) { char *oldpath, *newpath; int status; struct stat sb; oldpath = get_string(NULL); newpath = get_string(NULL); debug3("request %u: rename", id); logit("rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE; if (lstat(oldpath, &sb) == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { /* Race-free rename of regular files */ if (link(oldpath, newpath) == -1) { if (errno == EOPNOTSUPP || errno == ENOSYS #ifdef EXDEV || errno == EXDEV #endif #ifdef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO || errno == LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO #endif ) { struct stat st; /* * fs doesn't support links, so fall back to * stat+rename. This is racy. */ if (stat(newpath, &st) == -1) { if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); else status = SSH2_FX_OK; } } else { status = errno_to_portable(errno); } } else if (unlink(oldpath) == -1) { status = errno_to_portable(errno); /* clean spare link */ unlink(newpath); } else status = SSH2_FX_OK; } else if (stat(newpath, &sb) == -1) { if (rename(oldpath, newpath) == -1) status = errno_to_portable(errno); else status = SSH2_FX_OK; } send_status(id, status); free(oldpath); free(newpath); } static void process_readlink(u_int32_t id) { int len; char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; char *path; path = get_string(NULL); debug3("request %u: readlink", id); verbose("readlink \"%s\"", path); if ((len = readlink(path, buf, sizeof(buf) - 1)) == -1) send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); else { Stat s; buf[len] = '\0'; attrib_clear(&s.attrib); s.name = s.long_name = buf; send_names(id, 1, &s); } free(path); } static void process_symlink(u_int32_t id) { char *oldpath, *newpath; int ret, status; oldpath = get_string(NULL); newpath = get_string(NULL); debug3("request %u: symlink", id); logit("symlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); /* this will fail if 'newpath' exists */ ret = symlink(oldpath, newpath); status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(oldpath); free(newpath); } static void process_extended_posix_rename(u_int32_t id) { char *oldpath, *newpath; int ret, status; oldpath = get_string(NULL); newpath = get_string(NULL); debug3("request %u: posix-rename", id); logit("posix-rename old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); ret = rename(oldpath, newpath); status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(oldpath); free(newpath); } static void process_extended_statvfs(u_int32_t id) { char *path; struct statvfs st; path = get_string(NULL); debug3("request %u: statvfs", id); logit("statvfs \"%s\"", path); if (statvfs(path, &st) != 0) send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); else send_statvfs(id, &st); free(path); } static void process_extended_fstatvfs(u_int32_t id) { int handle, fd; struct statvfs st; handle = get_handle(); debug("request %u: fstatvfs \"%s\" (handle %u)", id, handle_to_name(handle), handle); if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) < 0) { send_status(id, SSH2_FX_FAILURE); return; } if (fstatvfs(fd, &st) != 0) send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno)); else send_statvfs(id, &st); } static void process_extended_hardlink(u_int32_t id) { char *oldpath, *newpath; int ret, status; oldpath = get_string(NULL); newpath = get_string(NULL); debug3("request %u: hardlink", id); logit("hardlink old \"%s\" new \"%s\"", oldpath, newpath); ret = link(oldpath, newpath); status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; send_status(id, status); free(oldpath); free(newpath); } static void process_extended_fsync(u_int32_t id) { int handle, fd, ret, status = SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED; handle = get_handle(); debug3("request %u: fsync (handle %u)", id, handle); verbose("fsync \"%s\"", handle_to_name(handle)); if ((fd = handle_to_fd(handle)) < 0) status = SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE; else if (handle_is_ok(handle, HANDLE_FILE)) { ret = fsync(fd); status = (ret == -1) ? errno_to_portable(errno) : SSH2_FX_OK; } send_status(id, status); } static void process_extended(u_int32_t id) { char *request; u_int i; request = get_string(NULL); for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) { if (strcmp(request, extended_handlers[i].ext_name) == 0) { if (!request_permitted(&extended_handlers[i])) send_status(id, SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED); else extended_handlers[i].handler(id); break; } } if (extended_handlers[i].handler == NULL) { error("Unknown extended request \"%.100s\"", request); send_status(id, SSH2_FX_OP_UNSUPPORTED); /* MUST */ } free(request); } /* stolen from ssh-agent */ static void process(void) { u_int msg_len, buf_len, consumed, type, i; u_char *cp; u_int32_t id; buf_len = buffer_len(&iqueue); if (buf_len < 5) return; /* Incomplete message. */ cp = buffer_ptr(&iqueue); msg_len = get_u32(cp); if (msg_len > SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH) { error("bad message from %s local user %s", client_addr, pw->pw_name); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(11); } if (buf_len < msg_len + 4) return; buffer_consume(&iqueue, 4); buf_len -= 4; type = buffer_get_char(&iqueue); switch (type) { case SSH2_FXP_INIT: process_init(); init_done = 1; break; case SSH2_FXP_EXTENDED: if (!init_done) fatal("Received extended request before init"); id = get_int(); process_extended(id); break; default: if (!init_done) fatal("Received %u request before init", type); id = get_int(); for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) { if (type == handlers[i].type) { if (!request_permitted(&handlers[i])) { send_status(id, SSH2_FX_PERMISSION_DENIED); } else { handlers[i].handler(id); } break; } } if (handlers[i].handler == NULL) error("Unknown message %u", type); } /* discard the remaining bytes from the current packet */ if (buf_len < buffer_len(&iqueue)) { error("iqueue grew unexpectedly"); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255); } consumed = buf_len - buffer_len(&iqueue); if (msg_len < consumed) { error("msg_len %u < consumed %u", msg_len, consumed); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255); } if (msg_len > consumed) buffer_consume(&iqueue, msg_len - consumed); } /* Cleanup handler that logs active handles upon normal exit */ void sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int i) { if (pw != NULL && client_addr != NULL) { handle_log_exit(); logit("session closed for local user %s from [%s]", pw->pw_name, client_addr); } _exit(i); } static void sftp_server_usage(void) { extern char *__progname; fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] " "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] " "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n" " %s -Q protocol_feature\n", __progname, __progname); exit(1); } int sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw) { fd_set *rset, *wset; int i, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0; ssize_t len, olen, set_size; SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH; char *cp, *homedir = NULL, buf[4*4096]; long mask; extern char *optarg; extern char *__progname; __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); pw = pwcopy(user_pw); while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv, "d:f:l:P:p:Q:u:cehR")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'Q': if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid query type\n"); exit(1); } for (i = 0; handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) printf("%s\n", handlers[i].name); for (i = 0; extended_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) printf("%s\n", extended_handlers[i].name); exit(0); break; case 'R': readonly = 1; break; case 'c': /* * Ignore all arguments if we are invoked as a * shell using "sftp-server -c command" */ skipargs = 1; break; case 'e': log_stderr = 1; break; case 'l': log_level = log_level_number(optarg); if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET) error("Invalid log level \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'f': log_facility = log_facility_number(optarg); if (log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET) error("Invalid log facility \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'd': cp = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, user_pw->pw_uid); homedir = percent_expand(cp, "d", user_pw->pw_dir, "u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); free(cp); break; case 'p': if (request_whitelist != NULL) fatal("Permitted requests already set"); request_whitelist = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'P': if (request_blacklist != NULL) fatal("Refused requests already set"); request_blacklist = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'u': errno = 0; mask = strtol(optarg, &cp, 8); if (mask < 0 || mask > 0777 || *cp != '\0' || cp == optarg || (mask == 0 && errno != 0)) fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg); (void)umask((mode_t)mask); break; case 'h': default: sftp_server_usage(); } } log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); + +#if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE) + /* + * On Linux, we should try to avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps} + * available to the user so that sftp access doesn't automatically + * imply arbitrary code execution access that will break + * restricted configurations. + */ + if (prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0) != 0) + fatal("unable to make the process undumpable"); +#endif /* defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE) */ if ((cp = getenv("SSH_CONNECTION")) != NULL) { client_addr = xstrdup(cp); if ((cp = strchr(client_addr, ' ')) == NULL) { error("Malformed SSH_CONNECTION variable: \"%s\"", getenv("SSH_CONNECTION")); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(255); } *cp = '\0'; } else client_addr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); logit("session opened for local user %s from [%s]", pw->pw_name, client_addr); in = STDIN_FILENO; out = STDOUT_FILENO; #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN setmode(in, O_BINARY); setmode(out, O_BINARY); #endif max = 0; if (in > max) max = in; if (out > max) max = out; buffer_init(&iqueue); buffer_init(&oqueue); set_size = howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); rset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(set_size); wset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(set_size); if (homedir != NULL) { if (chdir(homedir) != 0) { error("chdir to \"%s\" failed: %s", homedir, strerror(errno)); } } for (;;) { memset(rset, 0, set_size); memset(wset, 0, set_size); /* * Ensure that we can read a full buffer and handle * the worst-case length packet it can generate, * otherwise apply backpressure by stopping reads. */ if (buffer_check_alloc(&iqueue, sizeof(buf)) && buffer_check_alloc(&oqueue, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) FD_SET(in, rset); olen = buffer_len(&oqueue); if (olen > 0) FD_SET(out, wset); if (select(max+1, rset, wset, NULL, NULL) < 0) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; error("select: %s", strerror(errno)); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(2); } /* copy stdin to iqueue */ if (FD_ISSET(in, rset)) { len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf); if (len == 0) { debug("read eof"); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(0); } else if (len < 0) { error("read: %s", strerror(errno)); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1); } else { buffer_append(&iqueue, buf, len); } } /* send oqueue to stdout */ if (FD_ISSET(out, wset)) { len = write(out, buffer_ptr(&oqueue), olen); if (len < 0) { error("write: %s", strerror(errno)); sftp_server_cleanup_exit(1); } else { buffer_consume(&oqueue, len); } } /* * Process requests from client if we can fit the results * into the output buffer, otherwise stop processing input * and let the output queue drain. */ if (buffer_check_alloc(&oqueue, SFTP_MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) process(); } } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp.0 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp.0 (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp.0 (revision 276707) @@ -1,370 +1,381 @@ -SFTP(1) OpenBSD Reference Manual SFTP(1) +SFTP(1) General Commands Manual SFTP(1) NAME sftp - secure file transfer program SYNOPSIS sftp [-1246aCfpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-R num_requests] [-S program] [-s subsystem | sftp_server] host sftp [user@]host[:file ...] sftp [user@]host[:dir[/]] sftp -b batchfile [user@]host DESCRIPTION sftp is an interactive file transfer program, similar to ftp(1), which performs all operations over an encrypted ssh(1) transport. It may also use many features of ssh, such as public key authentication and compression. sftp connects and logs into the specified host, then enters an interactive command mode. The second usage format will retrieve files automatically if a non- interactive authentication method is used; otherwise it will do so after successful interactive authentication. The third usage format allows sftp to start in a remote directory. The final usage format allows for automated sessions using the -b option. In such cases, it is necessary to configure non-interactive authentication to obviate the need to enter a password at connection time (see sshd(8) and ssh-keygen(1) for details). Since some usage formats use colon characters to delimit host names from path names, IPv6 addresses must be enclosed in square brackets to avoid ambiguity. The options are as follows: -1 Specify the use of protocol version 1. -2 Specify the use of protocol version 2. -4 Forces sftp to use IPv4 addresses only. -6 Forces sftp to use IPv6 addresses only. - -a Attempt to continue interrupted downloads rather than overwriting - existing partial or complete copies of files. If the remote file - contents differ from the partial local copy then the resultant + -a Attempt to continue interrupted transfers rather than overwriting + existing partial or complete copies of files. If the partial + contents differ from those being transferred, then the resultant file is likely to be corrupt. -B buffer_size Specify the size of the buffer that sftp uses when transferring files. Larger buffers require fewer round trips at the cost of higher memory consumption. The default is 32768 bytes. -b batchfile Batch mode reads a series of commands from an input batchfile instead of stdin. Since it lacks user interaction it should be used in conjunction with non-interactive authentication. A batchfile of `-' may be used to indicate standard input. sftp will abort if any of the following commands fail: get, put, - reget, rename, ln, rm, mkdir, chdir, ls, lchdir, chmod, chown, - chgrp, lpwd, df, symlink, and lmkdir. Termination on error can - be suppressed on a command by command basis by prefixing the - command with a `-' character (for example, -rm /tmp/blah*). + reget, reput, rename, ln, rm, mkdir, chdir, ls, lchdir, chmod, + chown, chgrp, lpwd, df, symlink, and lmkdir. Termination on + error can be suppressed on a command by command basis by + prefixing the command with a `-' character (for example, -rm + /tmp/blah*). -C Enables compression (via ssh's -C flag). -c cipher Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfers. This option is directly passed to ssh(1). -D sftp_server_path Connect directly to a local sftp server (rather than via ssh(1)). This option may be useful in debugging the client and server. -F ssh_config Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for ssh(1). This option is directly passed to ssh(1). -f Requests that files be flushed to disk immediately after transfer. When uploading files, this feature is only enabled if the server implements the "fsync@openssh.com" extension. -i identity_file Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key authentication is read. This option is directly passed to ssh(1). -l limit Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s. -o ssh_option Can be used to pass options to ssh in the format used in ssh_config(5). This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate sftp command-line flag. For example, to specify an alternate port use: sftp -oPort=24. For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see ssh_config(5). AddressFamily BatchMode BindAddress CanonicalDomains CanonicalizeFallbackLocal CanonicalizeHostname CanonicalizeMaxDots CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs ChallengeResponseAuthentication CheckHostIP Cipher Ciphers Compression CompressionLevel ConnectionAttempts ConnectTimeout ControlMaster ControlPath ControlPersist GlobalKnownHostsFile GSSAPIAuthentication GSSAPIDelegateCredentials HashKnownHosts Host HostbasedAuthentication HostKeyAlgorithms HostKeyAlias HostName IdentityFile IdentitiesOnly IPQoS KbdInteractiveAuthentication KbdInteractiveDevices KexAlgorithms LogLevel MACs NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost NumberOfPasswordPrompts PasswordAuthentication PKCS11Provider Port PreferredAuthentications Protocol ProxyCommand PubkeyAuthentication RekeyLimit RhostsRSAAuthentication RSAAuthentication SendEnv ServerAliveInterval ServerAliveCountMax StrictHostKeyChecking TCPKeepAlive UsePrivilegedPort User UserKnownHostsFile VerifyHostKeyDNS -P port Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host. -p Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the original files transferred. -q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and diagnostic messages from ssh(1). -R num_requests Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time. Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed but will increase memory usage. The default is 64 outstanding requests. -r Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and downloading. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal. -S program Name of the program to use for the encrypted connection. The program must understand ssh(1) options. -s subsystem | sftp_server Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server on the remote host. A path is useful for using sftp over protocol version 1, or when the remote sshd(8) does not have an sftp subsystem configured. -v Raise logging level. This option is also passed to ssh. INTERACTIVE COMMANDS Once in interactive mode, sftp understands a set of commands similar to those of ftp(1). Commands are case insensitive. Pathnames that contain spaces must be enclosed in quotes. Any special characters contained within pathnames that are recognized by glob(3) must be escaped with backslashes (`\'). bye Quit sftp. cd path Change remote directory to path. chgrp grp path Change group of file path to grp. path may contain glob(3) characters and may match multiple files. grp must be a numeric GID. chmod mode path Change permissions of file path to mode. path may contain glob(3) characters and may match multiple files. chown own path Change owner of file path to own. path may contain glob(3) characters and may match multiple files. own must be a numeric UID. df [-hi] [path] Display usage information for the filesystem holding the current directory (or path if specified). If the -h flag is specified, the capacity information will be displayed using "human-readable" suffixes. The -i flag requests display of inode information in addition to capacity information. This command is only supported on servers that implement the ``statvfs@openssh.com'' extension. exit Quit sftp. get [-afPpr] remote-path [local-path] Retrieve the remote-path and store it on the local machine. If the local path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has on the remote machine. remote-path may contain glob(3) characters and may match multiple files. If it does and local-path is specified, then local-path must specify a directory. If the -a flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial transfers of existing files. Note that resumption assumes that any partial copy of the local file matches the remote copy. If the remote file contents differ from the partial local copy then the resultant file is likely to be corrupt. If the -f flag is specified, then fsync(2) will be called after the file transfer has completed to flush the file to disk. If either the -P or -p flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are copied too. If the -r flag is specified then directories will be copied recursively. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links when performing recursive transfers. help Display help text. lcd path Change local directory to path. lls [ls-options [path]] Display local directory listing of either path or current directory if path is not specified. ls-options may contain any flags supported by the local system's ls(1) command. path may contain glob(3) characters and may match multiple files. lmkdir path Create local directory specified by path. ln [-s] oldpath newpath Create a link from oldpath to newpath. If the -s flag is specified the created link is a symbolic link, otherwise it is a hard link. lpwd Print local working directory. ls [-1afhlnrSt] [path] Display a remote directory listing of either path or the current directory if path is not specified. path may contain glob(3) characters and may match multiple files. The following flags are recognized and alter the behaviour of ls accordingly: -1 Produce single columnar output. -a List files beginning with a dot (`.'). -f Do not sort the listing. The default sort order is lexicographical. -h When used with a long format option, use unit suffixes: Byte, Kilobyte, Megabyte, Gigabyte, Terabyte, Petabyte, and Exabyte in order to reduce the number of digits to four or fewer using powers of 2 for sizes (K=1024, M=1048576, etc.). -l Display additional details including permissions and ownership information. -n Produce a long listing with user and group information presented numerically. -r Reverse the sort order of the listing. -S Sort the listing by file size. -t Sort the listing by last modification time. lumask umask Set local umask to umask. mkdir path Create remote directory specified by path. progress Toggle display of progress meter. - put [-fPpr] local-path [remote-path] + put [-afPpr] local-path [remote-path] Upload local-path and store it on the remote machine. If the remote path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has on the local machine. local-path may contain glob(3) characters and may match multiple files. If it does and remote-path is specified, then remote-path must specify a directory. + If the -a flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial + transfers of existing files. Note that resumption assumes that + any partial copy of the remote file matches the local copy. If + the local file contents differ from the remote local copy then + the resultant file is likely to be corrupt. + If the -f flag is specified, then a request will be sent to the server to call fsync(2) after the file has been transferred. Note that this is only supported by servers that implement the "fsync@openssh.com" extension. If either the -P or -p flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are copied too. If the -r flag is specified then directories will be copied recursively. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links when performing recursive transfers. pwd Display remote working directory. quit Quit sftp. reget [-Ppr] remote-path [local-path] Resume download of remote-path. Equivalent to get with the -a flag set. + reput [-Ppr] [local-path] remote-path + Resume upload of [local-path]. Equivalent to put with the -a + flag set. + rename oldpath newpath Rename remote file from oldpath to newpath. rm path Delete remote file specified by path. rmdir path Remove remote directory specified by path. symlink oldpath newpath Create a symbolic link from oldpath to newpath. version Display the sftp protocol version. !command Execute command in local shell. ! Escape to local shell. ? Synonym for help. SEE ALSO ftp(1), ls(1), scp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), glob(3), ssh_config(5), sftp-server(8), sshd(8) T. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh- filexfer-00.txt, January 2001, work in progress material. -OpenBSD 5.5 October 20, 2013 OpenBSD 5.5 +OpenBSD 5.6 April 22, 2014 OpenBSD 5.6 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp.1 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp.1 (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp.1 (revision 276707) @@ -1,602 +1,623 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.97 2013/10/20 09:51:26 djm Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.99 2014/04/22 14:16:30 jmc Exp $ .\" .\" Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: October 20 2013 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: April 22 2014 $ .Dt SFTP 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm sftp .Nd secure file transfer program .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm sftp .Bk -words .Op Fl 1246aCfpqrv .Op Fl B Ar buffer_size .Op Fl b Ar batchfile .Op Fl c Ar cipher .Op Fl D Ar sftp_server_path .Op Fl F Ar ssh_config .Op Fl i Ar identity_file .Op Fl l Ar limit .Op Fl o Ar ssh_option .Op Fl P Ar port .Op Fl R Ar num_requests .Op Fl S Ar program .Op Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server .Ar host .Ek .Nm sftp .Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns .Ar host Ns Op : Ns Ar .Nm sftp .Oo .Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns .Ar host Ns Oo : Ns Ar dir Ns .Op Ar / .Oc .Nm sftp .Fl b Ar batchfile .Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns Ar host .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm is an interactive file transfer program, similar to .Xr ftp 1 , which performs all operations over an encrypted .Xr ssh 1 transport. It may also use many features of ssh, such as public key authentication and compression. .Nm connects and logs into the specified .Ar host , then enters an interactive command mode. .Pp The second usage format will retrieve files automatically if a non-interactive authentication method is used; otherwise it will do so after successful interactive authentication. .Pp The third usage format allows .Nm to start in a remote directory. .Pp The final usage format allows for automated sessions using the .Fl b option. In such cases, it is necessary to configure non-interactive authentication to obviate the need to enter a password at connection time (see .Xr sshd 8 and .Xr ssh-keygen 1 for details). .Pp Since some usage formats use colon characters to delimit host names from path names, IPv6 addresses must be enclosed in square brackets to avoid ambiguity. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl 1 Specify the use of protocol version 1. .It Fl 2 Specify the use of protocol version 2. .It Fl 4 Forces .Nm to use IPv4 addresses only. .It Fl 6 Forces .Nm to use IPv6 addresses only. .It Fl a -Attempt to continue interrupted downloads rather than overwriting existing -partial or complete copies of files. -If the remote file contents differ from the partial local copy then the -resultant file is likely to be corrupt. +Attempt to continue interrupted transfers rather than overwriting +existing partial or complete copies of files. +If the partial contents differ from those being transferred, +then the resultant file is likely to be corrupt. .It Fl B Ar buffer_size Specify the size of the buffer that .Nm uses when transferring files. Larger buffers require fewer round trips at the cost of higher memory consumption. The default is 32768 bytes. .It Fl b Ar batchfile Batch mode reads a series of commands from an input .Ar batchfile instead of .Em stdin . Since it lacks user interaction it should be used in conjunction with non-interactive authentication. A .Ar batchfile of .Sq \- may be used to indicate standard input. .Nm will abort if any of the following commands fail: -.Ic get , put , reget , rename , ln , +.Ic get , put , reget , reput, rename , ln , .Ic rm , mkdir , chdir , ls , .Ic lchdir , chmod , chown , .Ic chgrp , lpwd , df , symlink , and .Ic lmkdir . Termination on error can be suppressed on a command by command basis by prefixing the command with a .Sq \- character (for example, .Ic -rm /tmp/blah* ) . .It Fl C Enables compression (via ssh's .Fl C flag). .It Fl c Ar cipher Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfers. This option is directly passed to .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl D Ar sftp_server_path Connect directly to a local sftp server (rather than via .Xr ssh 1 ) . This option may be useful in debugging the client and server. .It Fl F Ar ssh_config Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for .Xr ssh 1 . This option is directly passed to .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl f Requests that files be flushed to disk immediately after transfer. When uploading files, this feature is only enabled if the server implements the "fsync@openssh.com" extension. .It Fl i Ar identity_file Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key authentication is read. This option is directly passed to .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl l Ar limit Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s. .It Fl o Ar ssh_option Can be used to pass options to .Nm ssh in the format used in .Xr ssh_config 5 . This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate .Nm sftp command-line flag. For example, to specify an alternate port use: .Ic sftp -oPort=24 . For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact .It AddressFamily .It BatchMode .It BindAddress .It CanonicalDomains .It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal .It CanonicalizeHostname .It CanonicalizeMaxDots .It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs .It ChallengeResponseAuthentication .It CheckHostIP .It Cipher .It Ciphers .It Compression .It CompressionLevel .It ConnectionAttempts .It ConnectTimeout .It ControlMaster .It ControlPath .It ControlPersist .It GlobalKnownHostsFile .It GSSAPIAuthentication .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials .It HashKnownHosts .It Host .It HostbasedAuthentication .It HostKeyAlgorithms .It HostKeyAlias .It HostName .It IdentityFile .It IdentitiesOnly .It IPQoS .It KbdInteractiveAuthentication .It KbdInteractiveDevices .It KexAlgorithms .It LogLevel .It MACs .It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost .It NumberOfPasswordPrompts .It PasswordAuthentication .It PKCS11Provider .It Port .It PreferredAuthentications .It Protocol .It ProxyCommand .It PubkeyAuthentication .It RekeyLimit .It RhostsRSAAuthentication .It RSAAuthentication .It SendEnv .It ServerAliveInterval .It ServerAliveCountMax .It StrictHostKeyChecking .It TCPKeepAlive .It UsePrivilegedPort .It User .It UserKnownHostsFile .It VerifyHostKeyDNS .El .It Fl P Ar port Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host. .It Fl p Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the original files transferred. .It Fl q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and diagnostic messages from .Xr ssh 1 . .It Fl R Ar num_requests Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time. Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed but will increase memory usage. The default is 64 outstanding requests. .It Fl r Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and downloading. Note that .Nm does not follow symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal. .It Fl S Ar program Name of the .Ar program to use for the encrypted connection. The program must understand .Xr ssh 1 options. .It Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server on the remote host. A path is useful for using .Nm over protocol version 1, or when the remote .Xr sshd 8 does not have an sftp subsystem configured. .It Fl v Raise logging level. This option is also passed to ssh. .El .Sh INTERACTIVE COMMANDS Once in interactive mode, .Nm understands a set of commands similar to those of .Xr ftp 1 . Commands are case insensitive. Pathnames that contain spaces must be enclosed in quotes. Any special characters contained within pathnames that are recognized by .Xr glob 3 must be escaped with backslashes .Pq Sq \e . .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Ic bye Quit .Nm sftp . .It Ic cd Ar path Change remote directory to .Ar path . .It Ic chgrp Ar grp Ar path Change group of file .Ar path to .Ar grp . .Ar path may contain .Xr glob 3 characters and may match multiple files. .Ar grp must be a numeric GID. .It Ic chmod Ar mode Ar path Change permissions of file .Ar path to .Ar mode . .Ar path may contain .Xr glob 3 characters and may match multiple files. .It Ic chown Ar own Ar path Change owner of file .Ar path to .Ar own . .Ar path may contain .Xr glob 3 characters and may match multiple files. .Ar own must be a numeric UID. .It Xo Ic df .Op Fl hi .Op Ar path .Xc Display usage information for the filesystem holding the current directory (or .Ar path if specified). If the .Fl h flag is specified, the capacity information will be displayed using "human-readable" suffixes. The .Fl i flag requests display of inode information in addition to capacity information. This command is only supported on servers that implement the .Dq statvfs@openssh.com extension. .It Ic exit Quit .Nm sftp . .It Xo Ic get .Op Fl afPpr .Ar remote-path .Op Ar local-path .Xc Retrieve the .Ar remote-path and store it on the local machine. If the local path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has on the remote machine. .Ar remote-path may contain .Xr glob 3 characters and may match multiple files. If it does and .Ar local-path is specified, then .Ar local-path must specify a directory. .Pp If the .Fl a flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial transfers of existing files. Note that resumption assumes that any partial copy of the local file matches the remote copy. If the remote file contents differ from the partial local copy then the resultant file is likely to be corrupt. .Pp If the .Fl f flag is specified, then .Xr fsync 2 will be called after the file transfer has completed to flush the file to disk. .Pp If either the .Fl P or .Fl p flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are copied too. .Pp If the .Fl r flag is specified then directories will be copied recursively. Note that .Nm does not follow symbolic links when performing recursive transfers. .It Ic help Display help text. .It Ic lcd Ar path Change local directory to .Ar path . .It Ic lls Op Ar ls-options Op Ar path Display local directory listing of either .Ar path or current directory if .Ar path is not specified. .Ar ls-options may contain any flags supported by the local system's .Xr ls 1 command. .Ar path may contain .Xr glob 3 characters and may match multiple files. .It Ic lmkdir Ar path Create local directory specified by .Ar path . .It Xo Ic ln .Op Fl s .Ar oldpath .Ar newpath .Xc Create a link from .Ar oldpath to .Ar newpath . If the .Fl s flag is specified the created link is a symbolic link, otherwise it is a hard link. .It Ic lpwd Print local working directory. .It Xo Ic ls .Op Fl 1afhlnrSt .Op Ar path .Xc Display a remote directory listing of either .Ar path or the current directory if .Ar path is not specified. .Ar path may contain .Xr glob 3 characters and may match multiple files. .Pp The following flags are recognized and alter the behaviour of .Ic ls accordingly: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl 1 Produce single columnar output. .It Fl a List files beginning with a dot .Pq Sq \&. . .It Fl f Do not sort the listing. The default sort order is lexicographical. .It Fl h When used with a long format option, use unit suffixes: Byte, Kilobyte, Megabyte, Gigabyte, Terabyte, Petabyte, and Exabyte in order to reduce the number of digits to four or fewer using powers of 2 for sizes (K=1024, M=1048576, etc.). .It Fl l Display additional details including permissions and ownership information. .It Fl n Produce a long listing with user and group information presented numerically. .It Fl r Reverse the sort order of the listing. .It Fl S Sort the listing by file size. .It Fl t Sort the listing by last modification time. .El .It Ic lumask Ar umask Set local umask to .Ar umask . .It Ic mkdir Ar path Create remote directory specified by .Ar path . .It Ic progress Toggle display of progress meter. .It Xo Ic put -.Op Fl fPpr +.Op Fl afPpr .Ar local-path .Op Ar remote-path .Xc Upload .Ar local-path and store it on the remote machine. If the remote path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has on the local machine. .Ar local-path may contain .Xr glob 3 characters and may match multiple files. If it does and .Ar remote-path is specified, then .Ar remote-path must specify a directory. .Pp If the +.Fl a +flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial +transfers of existing files. +Note that resumption assumes that any partial copy of the remote file +matches the local copy. +If the local file contents differ from the remote local copy then +the resultant file is likely to be corrupt. +.Pp +If the .Fl f flag is specified, then a request will be sent to the server to call .Xr fsync 2 after the file has been transferred. Note that this is only supported by servers that implement the "fsync@openssh.com" extension. .Pp If either the .Fl P or .Fl p flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are copied too. .Pp If the .Fl r flag is specified then directories will be copied recursively. Note that .Nm does not follow symbolic links when performing recursive transfers. .It Ic pwd Display remote working directory. .It Ic quit Quit .Nm sftp . .It Xo Ic reget .Op Fl Ppr .Ar remote-path .Op Ar local-path .Xc Resume download of .Ar remote-path . Equivalent to .Ic get +with the +.Fl a +flag set. +.It Xo Ic reput +.Op Fl Ppr +.Op Ar local-path +.Ar remote-path +.Xc +Resume upload of +.Op Ar local-path . +Equivalent to +.Ic put with the .Fl a flag set. .It Ic rename Ar oldpath Ar newpath Rename remote file from .Ar oldpath to .Ar newpath . .It Ic rm Ar path Delete remote file specified by .Ar path . .It Ic rmdir Ar path Remove remote directory specified by .Ar path . .It Ic symlink Ar oldpath Ar newpath Create a symbolic link from .Ar oldpath to .Ar newpath . .It Ic version Display the .Nm protocol version. .It Ic \&! Ns Ar command Execute .Ar command in local shell. .It Ic \&! Escape to local shell. .It Ic \&? Synonym for help. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ftp 1 , .Xr ls 1 , .Xr scp 1 , .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr glob 3 , .Xr ssh_config 5 , .Xr sftp-server 8 , .Xr sshd 8 .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A S. Lehtinen .%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol" .%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-00.txt .%D January 2001 .%O work in progress material .Re Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sftp.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,2428 +1,2444 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.158 2013/11/20 20:54:10 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.164 2014/07/09 01:45:10 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H #include #endif #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H #include #endif #ifdef HAVE_LOCALE_H # include #endif #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT #include #else typedef void EditLine; #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H # include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "misc.h" #include "sftp.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "sftp-common.h" #include "sftp-client.h" #define DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN 32768 /* Size of buffer for up/download */ #define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS 64 /* # concurrent outstanding requests */ /* File to read commands from */ FILE* infile; /* Are we in batchfile mode? */ int batchmode = 0; /* PID of ssh transport process */ static pid_t sshpid = -1; /* Suppress diagnositic messages */ int quiet = 0; /* This is set to 0 if the progressmeter is not desired. */ int showprogress = 1; /* When this option is set, we always recursively download/upload directories */ int global_rflag = 0; -/* When this option is set, we resume download if possible */ +/* When this option is set, we resume download or upload if possible */ int global_aflag = 0; /* When this option is set, the file transfers will always preserve times */ int global_pflag = 0; /* When this option is set, transfers will have fsync() called on each file */ int global_fflag = 0; /* SIGINT received during command processing */ volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted = 0; /* I wish qsort() took a separate ctx for the comparison function...*/ int sort_flag; /* Context used for commandline completion */ struct complete_ctx { struct sftp_conn *conn; char **remote_pathp; }; int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */ extern char *__progname; /* Separators for interactive commands */ #define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n" /* ls flags */ #define LS_LONG_VIEW 0x0001 /* Full view ala ls -l */ #define LS_SHORT_VIEW 0x0002 /* Single row view ala ls -1 */ #define LS_NUMERIC_VIEW 0x0004 /* Long view with numeric uid/gid */ #define LS_NAME_SORT 0x0008 /* Sort by name (default) */ #define LS_TIME_SORT 0x0010 /* Sort by mtime */ #define LS_SIZE_SORT 0x0020 /* Sort by file size */ #define LS_REVERSE_SORT 0x0040 /* Reverse sort order */ #define LS_SHOW_ALL 0x0080 /* Don't skip filenames starting with '.' */ #define LS_SI_UNITS 0x0100 /* Display sizes as K, M, G, etc. */ #define VIEW_FLAGS (LS_LONG_VIEW|LS_SHORT_VIEW|LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_SI_UNITS) #define SORT_FLAGS (LS_NAME_SORT|LS_TIME_SORT|LS_SIZE_SORT) /* Commands for interactive mode */ enum sftp_command { I_CHDIR = 1, I_CHGRP, I_CHMOD, I_CHOWN, I_DF, I_GET, I_HELP, I_LCHDIR, I_LINK, I_LLS, I_LMKDIR, I_LPWD, I_LS, I_LUMASK, I_MKDIR, I_PUT, I_PWD, I_QUIT, + I_REGET, I_RENAME, + I_REPUT, I_RM, I_RMDIR, I_SHELL, I_SYMLINK, I_VERSION, I_PROGRESS, - I_REGET, }; struct CMD { const char *c; const int n; const int t; }; /* Type of completion */ #define NOARGS 0 #define REMOTE 1 #define LOCAL 2 static const struct CMD cmds[] = { { "bye", I_QUIT, NOARGS }, { "cd", I_CHDIR, REMOTE }, { "chdir", I_CHDIR, REMOTE }, { "chgrp", I_CHGRP, REMOTE }, { "chmod", I_CHMOD, REMOTE }, { "chown", I_CHOWN, REMOTE }, { "df", I_DF, REMOTE }, { "dir", I_LS, REMOTE }, { "exit", I_QUIT, NOARGS }, { "get", I_GET, REMOTE }, { "help", I_HELP, NOARGS }, { "lcd", I_LCHDIR, LOCAL }, { "lchdir", I_LCHDIR, LOCAL }, { "lls", I_LLS, LOCAL }, { "lmkdir", I_LMKDIR, LOCAL }, { "ln", I_LINK, REMOTE }, { "lpwd", I_LPWD, LOCAL }, { "ls", I_LS, REMOTE }, { "lumask", I_LUMASK, NOARGS }, { "mkdir", I_MKDIR, REMOTE }, { "mget", I_GET, REMOTE }, { "mput", I_PUT, LOCAL }, { "progress", I_PROGRESS, NOARGS }, { "put", I_PUT, LOCAL }, { "pwd", I_PWD, REMOTE }, { "quit", I_QUIT, NOARGS }, { "reget", I_REGET, REMOTE }, { "rename", I_RENAME, REMOTE }, + { "reput", I_REPUT, LOCAL }, { "rm", I_RM, REMOTE }, { "rmdir", I_RMDIR, REMOTE }, { "symlink", I_SYMLINK, REMOTE }, { "version", I_VERSION, NOARGS }, { "!", I_SHELL, NOARGS }, { "?", I_HELP, NOARGS }, { NULL, -1, -1 } }; int interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *, char *file1, char *file2); /* ARGSUSED */ static void killchild(int signo) { if (sshpid > 1) { kill(sshpid, SIGTERM); waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0); } _exit(1); } /* ARGSUSED */ static void cmd_interrupt(int signo) { const char msg[] = "\rInterrupt \n"; int olderrno = errno; (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1); interrupted = 1; errno = olderrno; } static void help(void) { printf("Available commands:\n" "bye Quit sftp\n" "cd path Change remote directory to 'path'\n" "chgrp grp path Change group of file 'path' to 'grp'\n" "chmod mode path Change permissions of file 'path' to 'mode'\n" "chown own path Change owner of file 'path' to 'own'\n" "df [-hi] [path] Display statistics for current directory or\n" " filesystem containing 'path'\n" "exit Quit sftp\n" "get [-Ppr] remote [local] Download file\n" "reget remote [local] Resume download file\n" + "reput [local] remote Resume upload file\n" "help Display this help text\n" "lcd path Change local directory to 'path'\n" "lls [ls-options [path]] Display local directory listing\n" "lmkdir path Create local directory\n" "ln [-s] oldpath newpath Link remote file (-s for symlink)\n" "lpwd Print local working directory\n" "ls [-1afhlnrSt] [path] Display remote directory listing\n" "lumask umask Set local umask to 'umask'\n" "mkdir path Create remote directory\n" "progress Toggle display of progress meter\n" "put [-Ppr] local [remote] Upload file\n" "pwd Display remote working directory\n" "quit Quit sftp\n" "rename oldpath newpath Rename remote file\n" "rm path Delete remote file\n" "rmdir path Remove remote directory\n" "symlink oldpath newpath Symlink remote file\n" "version Show SFTP version\n" "!command Execute 'command' in local shell\n" "! Escape to local shell\n" "? Synonym for help\n"); } static void local_do_shell(const char *args) { int status; char *shell; pid_t pid; if (!*args) args = NULL; if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0') shell = _PATH_BSHELL; if ((pid = fork()) == -1) fatal("Couldn't fork: %s", strerror(errno)); if (pid == 0) { /* XXX: child has pipe fds to ssh subproc open - issue? */ if (args) { debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args); execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL); } else { debug3("Executing %s", shell); execl(shell, shell, (char *)NULL); } fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't execute \"%s\": %s\n", shell, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno)); if (!WIFEXITED(status)) error("Shell exited abnormally"); else if (WEXITSTATUS(status)) error("Shell exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status)); } static void local_do_ls(const char *args) { if (!args || !*args) local_do_shell(_PATH_LS); else { int len = strlen(_PATH_LS " ") + strlen(args) + 1; char *buf = xmalloc(len); /* XXX: quoting - rip quoting code from ftp? */ snprintf(buf, len, _PATH_LS " %s", args); local_do_shell(buf); free(buf); } } /* Strip one path (usually the pwd) from the start of another */ static char * path_strip(char *path, char *strip) { size_t len; if (strip == NULL) return (xstrdup(path)); len = strlen(strip); if (strncmp(path, strip, len) == 0) { if (strip[len - 1] != '/' && path[len] == '/') len++; return (xstrdup(path + len)); } return (xstrdup(path)); } static char * make_absolute(char *p, char *pwd) { char *abs_str; /* Derelativise */ if (p && p[0] != '/') { abs_str = path_append(pwd, p); free(p); return(abs_str); } else return(p); } static int parse_getput_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *aflag, int *fflag, int *pflag, int *rflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *aflag = *fflag = *rflag = *pflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "afPpRr")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'a': *aflag = 1; break; case 'f': *fflag = 1; break; case 'p': case 'P': *pflag = 1; break; case 'r': case 'R': *rflag = 1; break; default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_link_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *sflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *sflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "s")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 's': *sflag = 1; break; default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_rename_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *lflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *lflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "l")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'l': *lflag = 1; break; default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_ls_flags(char **argv, int argc, int *lflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *lflag = LS_NAME_SORT; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "1Safhlnrt")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case '1': *lflag &= ~VIEW_FLAGS; *lflag |= LS_SHORT_VIEW; break; case 'S': *lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS; *lflag |= LS_SIZE_SORT; break; case 'a': *lflag |= LS_SHOW_ALL; break; case 'f': *lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS; break; case 'h': *lflag |= LS_SI_UNITS; break; case 'l': *lflag &= ~LS_SHORT_VIEW; *lflag |= LS_LONG_VIEW; break; case 'n': *lflag &= ~LS_SHORT_VIEW; *lflag |= LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_LONG_VIEW; break; case 'r': *lflag |= LS_REVERSE_SORT; break; case 't': *lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS; *lflag |= LS_TIME_SORT; break; default: error("ls: Invalid flag -%c", optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_df_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *hflag, int *iflag) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; *hflag = *iflag = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hi")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'h': *hflag = 1; break; case 'i': *iflag = 1; break; default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int parse_no_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc) { extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset; int ch; optind = optreset = 1; opterr = 0; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "")) != -1) { switch (ch) { default: error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt); return -1; } } return optind; } static int is_dir(char *path) { struct stat sb; /* XXX: report errors? */ if (stat(path, &sb) == -1) return(0); return(S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)); } static int remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path) { Attrib *a; /* XXX: report errors? */ if ((a = do_stat(conn, path, 1)) == NULL) return(0); if (!(a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)) return(0); return(S_ISDIR(a->perm)); } /* Check whether path returned from glob(..., GLOB_MARK, ...) is a directory */ static int pathname_is_dir(char *pathname) { size_t l = strlen(pathname); return l > 0 && pathname[l - 1] == '/'; } static int process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd, int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag) { char *abs_src = NULL; char *abs_dst = NULL; glob_t g; char *filename, *tmp=NULL; - int i, err = 0; + int i, r, err = 0; abs_src = xstrdup(src); abs_src = make_absolute(abs_src, pwd); memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); debug3("Looking up %s", abs_src); - if (remote_glob(conn, abs_src, GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) { - error("File \"%s\" not found.", abs_src); + if ((r = remote_glob(conn, abs_src, GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) != 0) { + if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) { + error("Too many matches for \"%s\".", abs_src); + } else { + error("File \"%s\" not found.", abs_src); + } err = -1; goto out; } /* * If multiple matches then dst must be a directory or * unspecified. */ if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && dst != NULL && !is_dir(dst)) { error("Multiple source paths, but destination " "\"%s\" is not a directory", dst); err = -1; goto out; } for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]); if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) { error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno)); free(tmp); err = -1; goto out; } if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && dst) { if (is_dir(dst)) { abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename); } else { abs_dst = xstrdup(dst); } } else if (dst) { abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename); } else { abs_dst = xstrdup(filename); } free(tmp); resume |= global_aflag; if (!quiet && resume) printf("Resuming %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); else if (!quiet && !resume) printf("Fetching %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); if (pathname_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) { if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL, pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume, fflag || global_fflag) == -1) err = -1; } else { if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL, pflag || global_pflag, resume, fflag || global_fflag) == -1) err = -1; } free(abs_dst); abs_dst = NULL; } out: free(abs_src); globfree(&g); return(err); } static int process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *src, char *dst, char *pwd, - int pflag, int rflag, int fflag) + int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag) { char *tmp_dst = NULL; char *abs_dst = NULL; char *tmp = NULL, *filename = NULL; glob_t g; int err = 0; int i, dst_is_dir = 1; struct stat sb; if (dst) { tmp_dst = xstrdup(dst); tmp_dst = make_absolute(tmp_dst, pwd); } memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); debug3("Looking up %s", src); if (glob(src, GLOB_NOCHECK | GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) { error("File \"%s\" not found.", src); err = -1; goto out; } /* If we aren't fetching to pwd then stash this status for later */ if (tmp_dst != NULL) dst_is_dir = remote_is_dir(conn, tmp_dst); /* If multiple matches, dst may be directory or unspecified */ if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && tmp_dst && !dst_is_dir) { error("Multiple paths match, but destination " "\"%s\" is not a directory", tmp_dst); err = -1; goto out; } for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { if (stat(g.gl_pathv[i], &sb) == -1) { err = -1; error("stat %s: %s", g.gl_pathv[i], strerror(errno)); continue; } tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]); if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) { error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno)); free(tmp); err = -1; goto out; } if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && tmp_dst) { /* If directory specified, append filename */ if (dst_is_dir) abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, filename); else abs_dst = xstrdup(tmp_dst); } else if (tmp_dst) { abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, filename); } else { abs_dst = make_absolute(xstrdup(filename), pwd); } free(tmp); - if (!quiet) + resume |= global_aflag; + if (!quiet && resume) + printf("Resuming upload of %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], + abs_dst); + else if (!quiet && !resume) printf("Uploading %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst); if (pathname_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) { if (upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, - pflag || global_pflag, 1, + pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume, fflag || global_fflag) == -1) err = -1; } else { if (do_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, - pflag || global_pflag, + pflag || global_pflag, resume, fflag || global_fflag) == -1) err = -1; } } out: free(abs_dst); free(tmp_dst); globfree(&g); return(err); } static int sdirent_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb) { SFTP_DIRENT *a = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)aa; SFTP_DIRENT *b = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)bb; int rmul = sort_flag & LS_REVERSE_SORT ? -1 : 1; #define NCMP(a,b) (a == b ? 0 : (a < b ? 1 : -1)) if (sort_flag & LS_NAME_SORT) return (rmul * strcmp(a->filename, b->filename)); else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT) return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.mtime, b->a.mtime)); else if (sort_flag & LS_SIZE_SORT) return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.size, b->a.size)); fatal("Unknown ls sort type"); } /* sftp ls.1 replacement for directories */ static int do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, int lflag) { int n; u_int c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1; SFTP_DIRENT **d; if ((n = do_readdir(conn, path, &d)) != 0) return (n); if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) { u_int m = 0, width = 80; struct winsize ws; char *tmp; /* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */ for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++) { if (d[n]->filename[0] != '.' || (lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL)) m = MAX(m, strlen(d[n]->filename)); } /* Add any subpath that also needs to be counted */ tmp = path_strip(path, strip_path); m += strlen(tmp); free(tmp); if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1) width = ws.ws_col; columns = width / (m + 2); columns = MAX(columns, 1); colspace = width / columns; colspace = MIN(colspace, width); } if (lflag & SORT_FLAGS) { for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++) ; /* count entries */ sort_flag = lflag & (SORT_FLAGS|LS_REVERSE_SORT); qsort(d, n, sizeof(*d), sdirent_comp); } for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL && !interrupted; n++) { char *tmp, *fname; if (d[n]->filename[0] == '.' && !(lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL)) continue; tmp = path_append(path, d[n]->filename); fname = path_strip(tmp, strip_path); free(tmp); if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) { if (lflag & (LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_SI_UNITS)) { char *lname; struct stat sb; memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb)); attrib_to_stat(&d[n]->a, &sb); lname = ls_file(fname, &sb, 1, (lflag & LS_SI_UNITS)); printf("%s\n", lname); free(lname); } else printf("%s\n", d[n]->longname); } else { printf("%-*s", colspace, fname); if (c >= columns) { printf("\n"); c = 1; } else c++; } free(fname); } if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1)) printf("\n"); free_sftp_dirents(d); return (0); } /* sftp ls.1 replacement which handles path globs */ static int do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, char *strip_path, int lflag) { char *fname, *lname; glob_t g; - int err; + int err, r; struct winsize ws; u_int i, c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1, m = 0, width = 80; memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); - if (remote_glob(conn, path, + if ((r = remote_glob(conn, path, GLOB_MARK|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_KEEPSTAT|GLOB_NOSORT, - NULL, &g) || + NULL, &g)) != 0 || (g.gl_pathc && !g.gl_matchc)) { if (g.gl_pathc) globfree(&g); - error("Can't ls: \"%s\" not found", path); + if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) { + error("Can't ls: Too many matches for \"%s\"", path); + } else { + error("Can't ls: \"%s\" not found", path); + } return -1; } if (interrupted) goto out; /* * If the glob returns a single match and it is a directory, * then just list its contents. */ if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && g.gl_statv[0] != NULL && S_ISDIR(g.gl_statv[0]->st_mode)) { err = do_ls_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[0], strip_path, lflag); globfree(&g); return err; } if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1) width = ws.ws_col; if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) { /* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */ for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++) m = MAX(m, strlen(g.gl_pathv[i])); columns = width / (m + 2); columns = MAX(columns, 1); colspace = width / columns; } for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { fname = path_strip(g.gl_pathv[i], strip_path); if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) { if (g.gl_statv[i] == NULL) { error("no stat information for %s", fname); continue; } lname = ls_file(fname, g.gl_statv[i], 1, (lflag & LS_SI_UNITS)); printf("%s\n", lname); free(lname); } else { printf("%-*s", colspace, fname); if (c >= columns) { printf("\n"); c = 1; } else c++; } free(fname); } if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1)) printf("\n"); out: if (g.gl_pathc) globfree(&g); return 0; } static int do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *path, int hflag, int iflag) { struct sftp_statvfs st; char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; char s_avail[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; char s_root[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; char s_total[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE]; unsigned long long ffree; if (do_statvfs(conn, path, &st, 1) == -1) return -1; if (iflag) { ffree = st.f_files ? (100 * (st.f_files - st.f_ffree) / st.f_files) : 0; printf(" Inodes Used Avail " "(root) %%Capacity\n"); printf("%11llu %11llu %11llu %11llu %3llu%%\n", (unsigned long long)st.f_files, (unsigned long long)(st.f_files - st.f_ffree), (unsigned long long)st.f_favail, (unsigned long long)st.f_ffree, ffree); } else if (hflag) { strlcpy(s_used, "error", sizeof(s_used)); strlcpy(s_avail, "error", sizeof(s_avail)); strlcpy(s_root, "error", sizeof(s_root)); strlcpy(s_total, "error", sizeof(s_total)); fmt_scaled((st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) * st.f_frsize, s_used); fmt_scaled(st.f_bavail * st.f_frsize, s_avail); fmt_scaled(st.f_bfree * st.f_frsize, s_root); fmt_scaled(st.f_blocks * st.f_frsize, s_total); printf(" Size Used Avail (root) %%Capacity\n"); printf("%7sB %7sB %7sB %7sB %3llu%%\n", s_total, s_used, s_avail, s_root, (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) / st.f_blocks)); } else { printf(" Size Used Avail " "(root) %%Capacity\n"); printf("%12llu %12llu %12llu %12llu %3llu%%\n", (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_blocks / 1024), (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) / 1024), (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bavail / 1024), (unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bfree / 1024), (unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) / st.f_blocks)); } return 0; } /* * Undo escaping of glob sequences in place. Used to undo extra escaping * applied in makeargv() when the string is destined for a function that * does not glob it. */ static void undo_glob_escape(char *s) { size_t i, j; for (i = j = 0;;) { if (s[i] == '\0') { s[j] = '\0'; return; } if (s[i] != '\\') { s[j++] = s[i++]; continue; } /* s[i] == '\\' */ ++i; switch (s[i]) { case '?': case '[': case '*': case '\\': s[j++] = s[i++]; break; case '\0': s[j++] = '\\'; s[j] = '\0'; return; default: s[j++] = '\\'; s[j++] = s[i++]; break; } } } /* * Split a string into an argument vector using sh(1)-style quoting, * comment and escaping rules, but with some tweaks to handle glob(3) * wildcards. * The "sloppy" flag allows for recovery from missing terminating quote, for * use in parsing incomplete commandlines during tab autocompletion. * * Returns NULL on error or a NULL-terminated array of arguments. * * If "lastquote" is not NULL, the quoting character used for the last * argument is placed in *lastquote ("\0", "'" or "\""). * * If "terminated" is not NULL, *terminated will be set to 1 when the * last argument's quote has been properly terminated or 0 otherwise. * This parameter is only of use if "sloppy" is set. */ #define MAXARGS 128 #define MAXARGLEN 8192 static char ** makeargv(const char *arg, int *argcp, int sloppy, char *lastquote, u_int *terminated) { int argc, quot; size_t i, j; static char argvs[MAXARGLEN]; static char *argv[MAXARGS + 1]; enum { MA_START, MA_SQUOTE, MA_DQUOTE, MA_UNQUOTED } state, q; *argcp = argc = 0; if (strlen(arg) > sizeof(argvs) - 1) { args_too_longs: error("string too long"); return NULL; } if (terminated != NULL) *terminated = 1; if (lastquote != NULL) *lastquote = '\0'; state = MA_START; i = j = 0; for (;;) { if ((size_t)argc >= sizeof(argv) / sizeof(*argv)){ error("Too many arguments."); return NULL; } if (isspace((unsigned char)arg[i])) { if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) { /* Terminate current argument */ argvs[j++] = '\0'; argc++; state = MA_START; } else if (state != MA_START) argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else if (arg[i] == '"' || arg[i] == '\'') { q = arg[i] == '"' ? MA_DQUOTE : MA_SQUOTE; if (state == MA_START) { argv[argc] = argvs + j; state = q; if (lastquote != NULL) *lastquote = arg[i]; } else if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) state = q; else if (state == q) state = MA_UNQUOTED; else argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else if (arg[i] == '\\') { if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) { quot = state == MA_SQUOTE ? '\'' : '"'; /* Unescape quote we are in */ /* XXX support \n and friends? */ if (arg[i + 1] == quot) { i++; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else if (arg[i + 1] == '?' || arg[i + 1] == '[' || arg[i + 1] == '*') { /* * Special case for sftp: append * double-escaped glob sequence - * glob will undo one level of * escaping. NB. string can grow here. */ if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 5) goto args_too_longs; argvs[j++] = '\\'; argvs[j++] = arg[i++]; argvs[j++] = '\\'; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else { argvs[j++] = arg[i++]; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } } else { if (state == MA_START) { argv[argc] = argvs + j; state = MA_UNQUOTED; if (lastquote != NULL) *lastquote = '\0'; } if (arg[i + 1] == '?' || arg[i + 1] == '[' || arg[i + 1] == '*' || arg[i + 1] == '\\') { /* * Special case for sftp: append * escaped glob sequence - * glob will undo one level of * escaping. */ argvs[j++] = arg[i++]; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else { /* Unescape everything */ /* XXX support \n and friends? */ i++; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } } } else if (arg[i] == '#') { if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) argvs[j++] = arg[i]; else goto string_done; } else if (arg[i] == '\0') { if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) { if (sloppy) { state = MA_UNQUOTED; if (terminated != NULL) *terminated = 0; goto string_done; } error("Unterminated quoted argument"); return NULL; } string_done: if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) { argvs[j++] = '\0'; argc++; } break; } else { if (state == MA_START) { argv[argc] = argvs + j; state = MA_UNQUOTED; if (lastquote != NULL) *lastquote = '\0'; } if ((state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) && (arg[i] == '?' || arg[i] == '[' || arg[i] == '*')) { /* * Special case for sftp: escape quoted * glob(3) wildcards. NB. string can grow * here. */ if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 3) goto args_too_longs; argvs[j++] = '\\'; argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } else argvs[j++] = arg[i]; } i++; } *argcp = argc; return argv; } static int -parse_args(const char **cpp, int *ignore_errors, int *aflag, int *fflag, - int *hflag, int *iflag, int *lflag, int *pflag, int *rflag, int *sflag, +parse_args(const char **cpp, int *ignore_errors, int *aflag, + int *fflag, int *hflag, int *iflag, int *lflag, int *pflag, + int *rflag, int *sflag, unsigned long *n_arg, char **path1, char **path2) { const char *cmd, *cp = *cpp; char *cp2, **argv; int base = 0; long l; int i, cmdnum, optidx, argc; /* Skip leading whitespace */ cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); /* Check for leading '-' (disable error processing) */ *ignore_errors = 0; if (*cp == '-') { *ignore_errors = 1; cp++; cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); } /* Ignore blank lines and lines which begin with comment '#' char */ if (*cp == '\0' || *cp == '#') return (0); if ((argv = makeargv(cp, &argc, 0, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) return -1; /* Figure out which command we have */ for (i = 0; cmds[i].c != NULL; i++) { if (argv[0] != NULL && strcasecmp(cmds[i].c, argv[0]) == 0) break; } cmdnum = cmds[i].n; cmd = cmds[i].c; /* Special case */ if (*cp == '!') { cp++; cmdnum = I_SHELL; } else if (cmdnum == -1) { error("Invalid command."); return -1; } /* Get arguments and parse flags */ *aflag = *fflag = *hflag = *iflag = *lflag = *pflag = 0; *rflag = *sflag = 0; *path1 = *path2 = NULL; optidx = 1; switch (cmdnum) { case I_GET: case I_REGET: + case I_REPUT: case I_PUT: if ((optidx = parse_getput_flags(cmd, argv, argc, aflag, fflag, pflag, rflag)) == -1) return -1; /* Get first pathname (mandatory) */ if (argc - optidx < 1) { error("You must specify at least one path after a " "%s command.", cmd); return -1; } *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); /* Get second pathname (optional) */ if (argc - optidx > 1) { *path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]); /* Destination is not globbed */ undo_glob_escape(*path2); } - if (*aflag && cmdnum == I_PUT) { - /* XXX implement resume for uploads */ - error("Resume is not supported for uploads"); - return -1; - } break; case I_LINK: if ((optidx = parse_link_flags(cmd, argv, argc, sflag)) == -1) return -1; goto parse_two_paths; case I_RENAME: if ((optidx = parse_rename_flags(cmd, argv, argc, lflag)) == -1) return -1; goto parse_two_paths; case I_SYMLINK: if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1) return -1; parse_two_paths: if (argc - optidx < 2) { error("You must specify two paths after a %s " "command.", cmd); return -1; } *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); *path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]); /* Paths are not globbed */ undo_glob_escape(*path1); undo_glob_escape(*path2); break; case I_RM: case I_MKDIR: case I_RMDIR: case I_CHDIR: case I_LCHDIR: case I_LMKDIR: if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1) return -1; /* Get pathname (mandatory) */ if (argc - optidx < 1) { error("You must specify a path after a %s command.", cmd); return -1; } *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); /* Only "rm" globs */ if (cmdnum != I_RM) undo_glob_escape(*path1); break; case I_DF: if ((optidx = parse_df_flags(cmd, argv, argc, hflag, iflag)) == -1) return -1; /* Default to current directory if no path specified */ if (argc - optidx < 1) *path1 = NULL; else { *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); undo_glob_escape(*path1); } break; case I_LS: if ((optidx = parse_ls_flags(argv, argc, lflag)) == -1) return(-1); /* Path is optional */ if (argc - optidx > 0) *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]); break; case I_LLS: /* Skip ls command and following whitespace */ cp = cp + strlen(cmd) + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE); case I_SHELL: /* Uses the rest of the line */ break; case I_LUMASK: case I_CHMOD: base = 8; case I_CHOWN: case I_CHGRP: if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1) return -1; /* Get numeric arg (mandatory) */ if (argc - optidx < 1) goto need_num_arg; errno = 0; l = strtol(argv[optidx], &cp2, base); if (cp2 == argv[optidx] || *cp2 != '\0' || ((l == LONG_MIN || l == LONG_MAX) && errno == ERANGE) || l < 0) { need_num_arg: error("You must supply a numeric argument " "to the %s command.", cmd); return -1; } *n_arg = l; if (cmdnum == I_LUMASK) break; /* Get pathname (mandatory) */ if (argc - optidx < 2) { error("You must specify a path after a %s command.", cmd); return -1; } *path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]); break; case I_QUIT: case I_PWD: case I_LPWD: case I_HELP: case I_VERSION: case I_PROGRESS: if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1) return -1; break; default: fatal("Command not implemented"); } *cpp = cp; return(cmdnum); } static int parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd, int err_abort) { char *path1, *path2, *tmp; - int ignore_errors = 0, aflag = 0, fflag = 0, hflag = 0, iflag = 0; + int ignore_errors = 0, aflag = 0, fflag = 0, hflag = 0, + iflag = 0; int lflag = 0, pflag = 0, rflag = 0, sflag = 0; int cmdnum, i; unsigned long n_arg = 0; Attrib a, *aa; char path_buf[MAXPATHLEN]; int err = 0; glob_t g; path1 = path2 = NULL; cmdnum = parse_args(&cmd, &ignore_errors, &aflag, &fflag, &hflag, &iflag, &lflag, &pflag, &rflag, &sflag, &n_arg, &path1, &path2); if (ignore_errors != 0) err_abort = 0; memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); /* Perform command */ switch (cmdnum) { case 0: /* Blank line */ break; case -1: /* Unrecognized command */ err = -1; break; case I_REGET: aflag = 1; /* FALLTHROUGH */ case I_GET: err = process_get(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag, rflag, aflag, fflag); break; + case I_REPUT: + aflag = 1; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ case I_PUT: err = process_put(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag, - rflag, fflag); + rflag, aflag, fflag); break; case I_RENAME: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd); err = do_rename(conn, path1, path2, lflag); break; case I_SYMLINK: sflag = 1; case I_LINK: if (!sflag) path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd); err = (sflag ? do_symlink : do_hardlink)(conn, path1, path2); break; case I_RM: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g); for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { if (!quiet) printf("Removing %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); err = do_rm(conn, g.gl_pathv[i]); if (err != 0 && err_abort) break; } break; case I_MKDIR: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); attrib_clear(&a); a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS; a.perm = 0777; err = do_mkdir(conn, path1, &a, 1); break; case I_RMDIR: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); err = do_rmdir(conn, path1); break; case I_CHDIR: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); if ((tmp = do_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) { err = 1; break; } if ((aa = do_stat(conn, tmp, 0)) == NULL) { free(tmp); err = 1; break; } if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)) { error("Can't change directory: Can't check target"); free(tmp); err = 1; break; } if (!S_ISDIR(aa->perm)) { error("Can't change directory: \"%s\" is not " "a directory", tmp); free(tmp); err = 1; break; } free(*pwd); *pwd = tmp; break; case I_LS: if (!path1) { do_ls_dir(conn, *pwd, *pwd, lflag); break; } /* Strip pwd off beginning of non-absolute paths */ tmp = NULL; if (*path1 != '/') tmp = *pwd; path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); err = do_globbed_ls(conn, path1, tmp, lflag); break; case I_DF: /* Default to current directory if no path specified */ if (path1 == NULL) path1 = xstrdup(*pwd); path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); err = do_df(conn, path1, hflag, iflag); break; case I_LCHDIR: if (chdir(path1) == -1) { error("Couldn't change local directory to " "\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno)); err = 1; } break; case I_LMKDIR: if (mkdir(path1, 0777) == -1) { error("Couldn't create local directory " "\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno)); err = 1; } break; case I_LLS: local_do_ls(cmd); break; case I_SHELL: local_do_shell(cmd); break; case I_LUMASK: umask(n_arg); printf("Local umask: %03lo\n", n_arg); break; case I_CHMOD: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); attrib_clear(&a); a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS; a.perm = n_arg; remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g); for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { if (!quiet) printf("Changing mode on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); err = do_setstat(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], &a); if (err != 0 && err_abort) break; } break; case I_CHOWN: case I_CHGRP: path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd); remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g); for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) { if (!(aa = do_stat(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], 0))) { if (err_abort) { err = -1; break; } else continue; } if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID)) { error("Can't get current ownership of " "remote file \"%s\"", g.gl_pathv[i]); if (err_abort) { err = -1; break; } else continue; } aa->flags &= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID; if (cmdnum == I_CHOWN) { if (!quiet) printf("Changing owner on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); aa->uid = n_arg; } else { if (!quiet) printf("Changing group on %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]); aa->gid = n_arg; } err = do_setstat(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], aa); if (err != 0 && err_abort) break; } break; case I_PWD: printf("Remote working directory: %s\n", *pwd); break; case I_LPWD: if (!getcwd(path_buf, sizeof(path_buf))) { error("Couldn't get local cwd: %s", strerror(errno)); err = -1; break; } printf("Local working directory: %s\n", path_buf); break; case I_QUIT: /* Processed below */ break; case I_HELP: help(); break; case I_VERSION: printf("SFTP protocol version %u\n", sftp_proto_version(conn)); break; case I_PROGRESS: showprogress = !showprogress; if (showprogress) printf("Progress meter enabled\n"); else printf("Progress meter disabled\n"); break; default: fatal("%d is not implemented", cmdnum); } if (g.gl_pathc) globfree(&g); free(path1); free(path2); /* If an unignored error occurs in batch mode we should abort. */ if (err_abort && err != 0) return (-1); else if (cmdnum == I_QUIT) return (1); return (0); } #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT static char * prompt(EditLine *el) { return ("sftp> "); } /* Display entries in 'list' after skipping the first 'len' chars */ static void complete_display(char **list, u_int len) { u_int y, m = 0, width = 80, columns = 1, colspace = 0, llen; struct winsize ws; char *tmp; /* Count entries for sort and find longest */ for (y = 0; list[y]; y++) m = MAX(m, strlen(list[y])); if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1) width = ws.ws_col; m = m > len ? m - len : 0; columns = width / (m + 2); columns = MAX(columns, 1); colspace = width / columns; colspace = MIN(colspace, width); printf("\n"); m = 1; for (y = 0; list[y]; y++) { llen = strlen(list[y]); tmp = llen > len ? list[y] + len : ""; printf("%-*s", colspace, tmp); if (m >= columns) { printf("\n"); m = 1; } else m++; } printf("\n"); } /* * Given a "list" of words that begin with a common prefix of "word", * attempt to find an autocompletion to extends "word" by the next * characters common to all entries in "list". */ static char * complete_ambiguous(const char *word, char **list, size_t count) { if (word == NULL) return NULL; if (count > 0) { u_int y, matchlen = strlen(list[0]); /* Find length of common stem */ for (y = 1; list[y]; y++) { u_int x; for (x = 0; x < matchlen; x++) if (list[0][x] != list[y][x]) break; matchlen = x; } if (matchlen > strlen(word)) { char *tmp = xstrdup(list[0]); tmp[matchlen] = '\0'; return tmp; } } return xstrdup(word); } /* Autocomplete a sftp command */ static int complete_cmd_parse(EditLine *el, char *cmd, int lastarg, char quote, int terminated) { u_int y, count = 0, cmdlen, tmplen; char *tmp, **list, argterm[3]; const LineInfo *lf; list = xcalloc((sizeof(cmds) / sizeof(*cmds)) + 1, sizeof(char *)); /* No command specified: display all available commands */ if (cmd == NULL) { for (y = 0; cmds[y].c; y++) list[count++] = xstrdup(cmds[y].c); list[count] = NULL; complete_display(list, 0); for (y = 0; list[y] != NULL; y++) free(list[y]); free(list); return count; } /* Prepare subset of commands that start with "cmd" */ cmdlen = strlen(cmd); for (y = 0; cmds[y].c; y++) { if (!strncasecmp(cmd, cmds[y].c, cmdlen)) list[count++] = xstrdup(cmds[y].c); } list[count] = NULL; if (count == 0) { free(list); return 0; } /* Complete ambigious command */ tmp = complete_ambiguous(cmd, list, count); if (count > 1) complete_display(list, 0); for (y = 0; list[y]; y++) free(list[y]); free(list); if (tmp != NULL) { tmplen = strlen(tmp); cmdlen = strlen(cmd); /* If cmd may be extended then do so */ if (tmplen > cmdlen) if (el_insertstr(el, tmp + cmdlen) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr failed."); lf = el_line(el); /* Terminate argument cleanly */ if (count == 1) { y = 0; if (!terminated) argterm[y++] = quote; if (lastarg || *(lf->cursor) != ' ') argterm[y++] = ' '; argterm[y] = '\0'; if (y > 0 && el_insertstr(el, argterm) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr failed."); } free(tmp); } return count; } /* * Determine whether a particular sftp command's arguments (if any) * represent local or remote files. */ static int complete_is_remote(char *cmd) { int i; if (cmd == NULL) return -1; for (i = 0; cmds[i].c; i++) { if (!strncasecmp(cmd, cmds[i].c, strlen(cmds[i].c))) return cmds[i].t; } return -1; } /* Autocomplete a filename "file" */ static int complete_match(EditLine *el, struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path, char *file, int remote, int lastarg, char quote, int terminated) { glob_t g; char *tmp, *tmp2, ins[8]; u_int i, hadglob, pwdlen, len, tmplen, filelen, cesc, isesc, isabs; int clen; const LineInfo *lf; /* Glob from "file" location */ if (file == NULL) tmp = xstrdup("*"); else xasprintf(&tmp, "%s*", file); /* Check if the path is absolute. */ isabs = tmp[0] == '/'; memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g)); if (remote != LOCAL) { tmp = make_absolute(tmp, remote_path); remote_glob(conn, tmp, GLOB_DOOFFS|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g); } else glob(tmp, GLOB_DOOFFS|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g); /* Determine length of pwd so we can trim completion display */ for (hadglob = tmplen = pwdlen = 0; tmp[tmplen] != 0; tmplen++) { /* Terminate counting on first unescaped glob metacharacter */ if (tmp[tmplen] == '*' || tmp[tmplen] == '?') { if (tmp[tmplen] != '*' || tmp[tmplen + 1] != '\0') hadglob = 1; break; } if (tmp[tmplen] == '\\' && tmp[tmplen + 1] != '\0') tmplen++; if (tmp[tmplen] == '/') pwdlen = tmplen + 1; /* track last seen '/' */ } free(tmp); + tmp = NULL; if (g.gl_matchc == 0) goto out; if (g.gl_matchc > 1) complete_display(g.gl_pathv, pwdlen); - tmp = NULL; /* Don't try to extend globs */ if (file == NULL || hadglob) goto out; tmp2 = complete_ambiguous(file, g.gl_pathv, g.gl_matchc); tmp = path_strip(tmp2, isabs ? NULL : remote_path); free(tmp2); if (tmp == NULL) goto out; tmplen = strlen(tmp); filelen = strlen(file); /* Count the number of escaped characters in the input string. */ cesc = isesc = 0; for (i = 0; i < filelen; i++) { if (!isesc && file[i] == '\\' && i + 1 < filelen){ isesc = 1; cesc++; } else isesc = 0; } if (tmplen > (filelen - cesc)) { tmp2 = tmp + filelen - cesc; len = strlen(tmp2); /* quote argument on way out */ for (i = 0; i < len; i += clen) { if ((clen = mblen(tmp2 + i, len - i)) < 0 || (size_t)clen > sizeof(ins) - 2) fatal("invalid multibyte character"); ins[0] = '\\'; memcpy(ins + 1, tmp2 + i, clen); ins[clen + 1] = '\0'; switch (tmp2[i]) { case '\'': case '"': case '\\': case '\t': case '[': case ' ': case '#': case '*': if (quote == '\0' || tmp2[i] == quote) { if (el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr " "failed."); break; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: if (el_insertstr(el, ins + 1) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr failed."); break; } } } lf = el_line(el); if (g.gl_matchc == 1) { i = 0; - if (!terminated) + if (!terminated && quote != '\0') ins[i++] = quote; if (*(lf->cursor - 1) != '/' && (lastarg || *(lf->cursor) != ' ')) ins[i++] = ' '; ins[i] = '\0'; if (i > 0 && el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1) fatal("el_insertstr failed."); } free(tmp); out: globfree(&g); return g.gl_matchc; } /* tab-completion hook function, called via libedit */ static unsigned char complete(EditLine *el, int ch) { char **argv, *line, quote; int argc, carg; u_int cursor, len, terminated, ret = CC_ERROR; const LineInfo *lf; struct complete_ctx *complete_ctx; lf = el_line(el); if (el_get(el, EL_CLIENTDATA, (void**)&complete_ctx) != 0) fatal("%s: el_get failed", __func__); /* Figure out which argument the cursor points to */ cursor = lf->cursor - lf->buffer; line = (char *)xmalloc(cursor + 1); memcpy(line, lf->buffer, cursor); line[cursor] = '\0'; argv = makeargv(line, &carg, 1, "e, &terminated); free(line); /* Get all the arguments on the line */ len = lf->lastchar - lf->buffer; line = (char *)xmalloc(len + 1); memcpy(line, lf->buffer, len); line[len] = '\0'; argv = makeargv(line, &argc, 1, NULL, NULL); /* Ensure cursor is at EOL or a argument boundary */ if (line[cursor] != ' ' && line[cursor] != '\0' && line[cursor] != '\n') { free(line); return ret; } if (carg == 0) { /* Show all available commands */ complete_cmd_parse(el, NULL, argc == carg, '\0', 1); ret = CC_REDISPLAY; } else if (carg == 1 && cursor > 0 && line[cursor - 1] != ' ') { /* Handle the command parsing */ if (complete_cmd_parse(el, argv[0], argc == carg, quote, terminated) != 0) ret = CC_REDISPLAY; } else if (carg >= 1) { /* Handle file parsing */ int remote = complete_is_remote(argv[0]); char *filematch = NULL; if (carg > 1 && line[cursor-1] != ' ') filematch = argv[carg - 1]; if (remote != 0 && complete_match(el, complete_ctx->conn, *complete_ctx->remote_pathp, filematch, remote, carg == argc, quote, terminated) != 0) ret = CC_REDISPLAY; } free(line); return ret; } #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ int interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *file1, char *file2) { char *remote_path; char *dir = NULL; char cmd[2048]; int err, interactive; EditLine *el = NULL; #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT History *hl = NULL; HistEvent hev; extern char *__progname; struct complete_ctx complete_ctx; if (!batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) { if ((el = el_init(__progname, stdin, stdout, stderr)) == NULL) fatal("Couldn't initialise editline"); if ((hl = history_init()) == NULL) fatal("Couldn't initialise editline history"); history(hl, &hev, H_SETSIZE, 100); el_set(el, EL_HIST, history, hl); el_set(el, EL_PROMPT, prompt); el_set(el, EL_EDITOR, "emacs"); el_set(el, EL_TERMINAL, NULL); el_set(el, EL_SIGNAL, 1); el_source(el, NULL); /* Tab Completion */ el_set(el, EL_ADDFN, "ftp-complete", "Context sensitive argument completion", complete); complete_ctx.conn = conn; complete_ctx.remote_pathp = &remote_path; el_set(el, EL_CLIENTDATA, (void*)&complete_ctx); el_set(el, EL_BIND, "^I", "ftp-complete", NULL); /* enable ctrl-left-arrow and ctrl-right-arrow */ el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[1;5C", "em-next-word", NULL); el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[5C", "em-next-word", NULL); el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[1;5D", "ed-prev-word", NULL); el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e\\e[D", "ed-prev-word", NULL); /* make ^w match ksh behaviour */ el_set(el, EL_BIND, "^w", "ed-delete-prev-word", NULL); } #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ remote_path = do_realpath(conn, "."); if (remote_path == NULL) fatal("Need cwd"); if (file1 != NULL) { dir = xstrdup(file1); dir = make_absolute(dir, remote_path); if (remote_is_dir(conn, dir) && file2 == NULL) { if (!quiet) printf("Changing to: %s\n", dir); snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "cd \"%s\"", dir); if (parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &remote_path, 1) != 0) { free(dir); free(remote_path); free(conn); return (-1); } } else { /* XXX this is wrong wrt quoting */ snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "get%s %s%s%s", global_aflag ? " -a" : "", dir, file2 == NULL ? "" : " ", file2 == NULL ? "" : file2); err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &remote_path, 1); free(dir); free(remote_path); free(conn); return (err); } free(dir); } setlinebuf(stdout); setlinebuf(infile); interactive = !batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO); err = 0; for (;;) { char *cp; signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); if (el == NULL) { if (interactive) printf("sftp> "); if (fgets(cmd, sizeof(cmd), infile) == NULL) { if (interactive) printf("\n"); break; } if (!interactive) { /* Echo command */ printf("sftp> %s", cmd); if (strlen(cmd) > 0 && cmd[strlen(cmd) - 1] != '\n') printf("\n"); } } else { #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT const char *line; int count = 0; if ((line = el_gets(el, &count)) == NULL || count <= 0) { printf("\n"); break; } history(hl, &hev, H_ENTER, line); if (strlcpy(cmd, line, sizeof(cmd)) >= sizeof(cmd)) { fprintf(stderr, "Error: input line too long\n"); continue; } #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ } cp = strrchr(cmd, '\n'); if (cp) *cp = '\0'; /* Handle user interrupts gracefully during commands */ interrupted = 0; signal(SIGINT, cmd_interrupt); err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &remote_path, batchmode); if (err != 0) break; } free(remote_path); free(conn); #ifdef USE_LIBEDIT if (el != NULL) el_end(el); #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */ /* err == 1 signifies normal "quit" exit */ return (err >= 0 ? 0 : -1); } static void connect_to_server(char *path, char **args, int *in, int *out) { int c_in, c_out; #ifdef USE_PIPES int pin[2], pout[2]; if ((pipe(pin) == -1) || (pipe(pout) == -1)) fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); *in = pin[0]; *out = pout[1]; c_in = pout[0]; c_out = pin[1]; #else /* USE_PIPES */ int inout[2]; if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) == -1) fatal("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno)); *in = *out = inout[0]; c_in = c_out = inout[1]; #endif /* USE_PIPES */ if ((sshpid = fork()) == -1) fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); else if (sshpid == 0) { if ((dup2(c_in, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) || (dup2(c_out, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) { fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } close(*in); close(*out); close(c_in); close(c_out); /* * The underlying ssh is in the same process group, so we must * ignore SIGINT if we want to gracefully abort commands, * otherwise the signal will make it to the ssh process and * kill it too. Contrawise, since sftp sends SIGTERMs to the * underlying ssh, it must *not* ignore that signal. */ signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); execvp(path, args); fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } signal(SIGTERM, killchild); signal(SIGINT, killchild); signal(SIGHUP, killchild); close(c_in); close(c_out); } static void usage(void) { extern char *__progname; fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-1246aCfpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher]\n" " [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config] " "[-i identity_file] [-l limit]\n" " [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-R num_requests] " "[-S program]\n" " [-s subsystem | sftp_server] host\n" " %s [user@]host[:file ...]\n" " %s [user@]host[:dir[/]]\n" " %s -b batchfile [user@]host\n", __progname, __progname, __progname, __progname); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int in, out, ch, err; char *host = NULL, *userhost, *cp, *file2 = NULL; int debug_level = 0, sshver = 2; char *file1 = NULL, *sftp_server = NULL; char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM, *sftp_direct = NULL; const char *errstr; LogLevel ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; arglist args; extern int optind; extern char *optarg; struct sftp_conn *conn; size_t copy_buffer_len = DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN; size_t num_requests = DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS; long long limit_kbps = 0; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); setlocale(LC_CTYPE, ""); __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args)); args.list = NULL; addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program); addargs(&args, "-oForwardX11 no"); addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no"); addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand no"); addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings yes"); ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; infile = stdin; while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "1246afhpqrvCc:D:i:l:o:s:S:b:B:F:P:R:")) != -1) { switch (ch) { /* Passed through to ssh(1) */ case '4': case '6': case 'C': addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); break; /* Passed through to ssh(1) with argument */ case 'F': case 'c': case 'i': case 'o': addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); addargs(&args, "%s", optarg); break; case 'q': ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; quiet = 1; showprogress = 0; addargs(&args, "-%c", ch); break; case 'P': addargs(&args, "-oPort %s", optarg); break; case 'v': if (debug_level < 3) { addargs(&args, "-v"); ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 + debug_level; } debug_level++; break; case '1': sshver = 1; if (sftp_server == NULL) sftp_server = _PATH_SFTP_SERVER; break; case '2': sshver = 2; break; case 'a': global_aflag = 1; break; case 'B': copy_buffer_len = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10); if (copy_buffer_len == 0 || *cp != '\0') fatal("Invalid buffer size \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 'b': if (batchmode) fatal("Batch file already specified."); /* Allow "-" as stdin */ if (strcmp(optarg, "-") != 0 && (infile = fopen(optarg, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s (%s).", strerror(errno), optarg); showprogress = 0; quiet = batchmode = 1; addargs(&args, "-obatchmode yes"); break; case 'f': global_fflag = 1; break; case 'p': global_pflag = 1; break; case 'D': sftp_direct = optarg; break; case 'l': limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024, &errstr); if (errstr != NULL) usage(); limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */ break; case 'r': global_rflag = 1; break; case 'R': num_requests = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10); if (num_requests == 0 || *cp != '\0') fatal("Invalid number of requests \"%s\"", optarg); break; case 's': sftp_server = optarg; break; case 'S': ssh_program = optarg; replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program); break; case 'h': default: usage(); } } if (!isatty(STDERR_FILENO)) showprogress = 0; log_init(argv[0], ll, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); if (sftp_direct == NULL) { if (optind == argc || argc > (optind + 2)) usage(); userhost = xstrdup(argv[optind]); file2 = argv[optind+1]; if ((host = strrchr(userhost, '@')) == NULL) host = userhost; else { *host++ = '\0'; if (!userhost[0]) { fprintf(stderr, "Missing username\n"); usage(); } addargs(&args, "-l"); addargs(&args, "%s", userhost); } if ((cp = colon(host)) != NULL) { *cp++ = '\0'; file1 = cp; } host = cleanhostname(host); if (!*host) { fprintf(stderr, "Missing hostname\n"); usage(); } addargs(&args, "-oProtocol %d", sshver); /* no subsystem if the server-spec contains a '/' */ if (sftp_server == NULL || strchr(sftp_server, '/') == NULL) addargs(&args, "-s"); addargs(&args, "--"); addargs(&args, "%s", host); addargs(&args, "%s", (sftp_server != NULL ? sftp_server : "sftp")); connect_to_server(ssh_program, args.list, &in, &out); } else { args.list = NULL; addargs(&args, "sftp-server"); connect_to_server(sftp_direct, args.list, &in, &out); } freeargs(&args); conn = do_init(in, out, copy_buffer_len, num_requests, limit_kbps); if (conn == NULL) fatal("Couldn't initialise connection to server"); if (!quiet) { if (sftp_direct == NULL) fprintf(stderr, "Connected to %s.\n", host); else fprintf(stderr, "Attached to %s.\n", sftp_direct); } err = interactive_loop(conn, file1, file2); #if !defined(USE_PIPES) shutdown(in, SHUT_RDWR); shutdown(out, SHUT_RDWR); #endif close(in); close(out); if (batchmode) fclose(infile); while (waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("Couldn't wait for ssh process: %s", strerror(errno)); exit(err == 0 ? 0 : 1); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-add.0 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-add.0 (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-add.0 (revision 276707) @@ -1,123 +1,123 @@ -SSH-ADD(1) OpenBSD Reference Manual SSH-ADD(1) +SSH-ADD(1) General Commands Manual SSH-ADD(1) NAME ssh-add - adds private key identities to the authentication agent SYNOPSIS ssh-add [-cDdkLlXx] [-t life] [file ...] ssh-add -s pkcs11 ssh-add -e pkcs11 DESCRIPTION ssh-add adds private key identities to the authentication agent, ssh-agent(1). When run without arguments, it adds the files ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and ~/.ssh/identity. After loading a private key, ssh-add will try to load corresponding certificate information from the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to the name of the private key file. Alternative file names can be given on the command line. If any file requires a passphrase, ssh-add asks for the passphrase from the user. The passphrase is read from the user's tty. ssh-add retries the last passphrase if multiple identity files are given. The authentication agent must be running and the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable must contain the name of its socket for ssh-add to work. The options are as follows: -c Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation before being used for authentication. Confirmation is performed by the SSH_ASKPASS program mentioned below. Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero exit status from the SSH_ASKPASS program, rather than text entered into the requester. -D Deletes all identities from the agent. -d Instead of adding identities, removes identities from the agent. If ssh-add has been run without arguments, the keys for the default identities and their corresponding certificates will be removed. Otherwise, the argument list will be interpreted as a list of paths to public key files to specify keys and certificates to be removed from the agent. If no public key is found at a given path, ssh-add will append .pub and retry. -e pkcs11 Remove keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11. -k When loading keys into or deleting keys from the agent, process plain private keys only and skip certificates. -L Lists public key parameters of all identities currently represented by the agent. -l Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the agent. -s pkcs11 Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11. -t life Set a maximum lifetime when adding identities to an agent. The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format specified in sshd_config(5). -X Unlock the agent. -x Lock the agent with a password. ENVIRONMENT DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS If ssh-add needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current terminal if it was run from a terminal. If ssh-add does not have a terminal associated with it but DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute the program specified by SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the passphrase. This is particularly useful when calling ssh-add from a .xsession or related script. (Note that on some machines it may be necessary to redirect the input from /dev/null to make this work.) SSH_AUTH_SOCK Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with the agent. FILES ~/.ssh/identity Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user. ~/.ssh/id_dsa Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user. ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa Contains the protocol version 2 ECDSA authentication identity of the user. ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 Contains the protocol version 2 ED25519 authentication identity of the user. ~/.ssh/id_rsa Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user. Identity files should not be readable by anyone but the user. Note that ssh-add ignores identity files if they are accessible by others. EXIT STATUS Exit status is 0 on success, 1 if the specified command fails, and 2 if ssh-add is unable to contact the authentication agent. SEE ALSO ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8) AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. -OpenBSD 5.5 December 7, 2013 OpenBSD 5.5 +OpenBSD 5.6 December 7, 2013 OpenBSD 5.6 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-add.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-add.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-add.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,525 +1,537 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.109 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.113 2014/07/09 14:15:56 benno Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Adds an identity to the authentication server, or removes an identity. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 implementation, * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "log.h" #include "key.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "misc.h" +#include "ssherr.h" /* argv0 */ extern char *__progname; /* Default files to add */ static char *default_files[] = { _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA, _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA, #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA, #endif _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519, _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY, NULL }; /* Default lifetime (0 == forever) */ static int lifetime = 0; /* User has to confirm key use */ static int confirm = 0; /* we keep a cache of one passphrases */ static char *pass = NULL; static void clear_pass(void) { if (pass) { explicit_bzero(pass, strlen(pass)); free(pass); pass = NULL; } } static int delete_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename, int key_only) { Key *public = NULL, *cert = NULL; char *certpath = NULL, *comment = NULL; int ret = -1; public = key_load_public(filename, &comment); if (public == NULL) { printf("Bad key file %s\n", filename); return -1; } if (ssh_remove_identity(ac, public)) { fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment); ret = 0; } else fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity: %s\n", filename); if (key_only) goto out; /* Now try to delete the corresponding certificate too */ free(comment); comment = NULL; xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename); if ((cert = key_load_public(certpath, &comment)) == NULL) goto out; if (!key_equal_public(cert, public)) fatal("Certificate %s does not match private key %s", certpath, filename); if (ssh_remove_identity(ac, cert)) { fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n", certpath, comment); ret = 0; } else fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity: %s\n", certpath); out: if (cert != NULL) key_free(cert); if (public != NULL) key_free(public); free(certpath); free(comment); return ret; } /* Send a request to remove all identities. */ static int delete_all(AuthenticationConnection *ac) { int ret = -1; if (ssh_remove_all_identities(ac, 1)) ret = 0; /* ignore error-code for ssh2 */ ssh_remove_all_identities(ac, 2); if (ret == 0) fprintf(stderr, "All identities removed.\n"); else fprintf(stderr, "Failed to remove all identities.\n"); return ret; } static int add_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, const char *filename, int key_only) { Key *private, *cert; char *comment = NULL; char msg[1024], *certpath = NULL; - int fd, perms_ok, ret = -1; + int r, fd, perms_ok, ret = -1; Buffer keyblob; if (strcmp(filename, "-") == 0) { fd = STDIN_FILENO; filename = "(stdin)"; } else if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) < 0) { perror(filename); return -1; } /* * Since we'll try to load a keyfile multiple times, permission errors * will occur multiple times, so check perms first and bail if wrong. */ if (fd != STDIN_FILENO) { perms_ok = key_perm_ok(fd, filename); if (!perms_ok) { close(fd); return -1; } } buffer_init(&keyblob); if (!key_load_file(fd, filename, &keyblob)) { buffer_free(&keyblob); close(fd); return -1; } close(fd); /* At first, try empty passphrase */ - private = key_parse_private(&keyblob, filename, "", &comment); + if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(&keyblob, "", filename, + &private, &comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) + fatal("Cannot parse %s: %s", filename, ssh_err(r)); + /* try last */ + if (private == NULL && pass != NULL) { + if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(&keyblob, pass, filename, + &private, &comment)) != 0 && + r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) + fatal("Cannot parse %s: %s", filename, ssh_err(r)); + } if (comment == NULL) comment = xstrdup(filename); - /* try last */ - if (private == NULL && pass != NULL) - private = key_parse_private(&keyblob, filename, pass, NULL); if (private == NULL) { /* clear passphrase since it did not work */ clear_pass(); snprintf(msg, sizeof msg, "Enter passphrase for %.200s: ", comment); for (;;) { pass = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (strcmp(pass, "") == 0) { clear_pass(); free(comment); buffer_free(&keyblob); return -1; } - private = key_parse_private(&keyblob, filename, pass, - &comment); + if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(&keyblob, + pass, filename, &private, NULL)) != 0 && + r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) + fatal("Cannot parse %s: %s", + filename, ssh_err(r)); if (private != NULL) break; clear_pass(); snprintf(msg, sizeof msg, "Bad passphrase, try again for %.200s: ", comment); } } buffer_free(&keyblob); if (ssh_add_identity_constrained(ac, private, comment, lifetime, confirm)) { fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n", filename, comment); ret = 0; if (lifetime != 0) fprintf(stderr, "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime); if (confirm != 0) fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm each use of the key\n"); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity: %s\n", filename); } /* Skip trying to load the cert if requested */ if (key_only) goto out; /* Now try to add the certificate flavour too */ xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename); if ((cert = key_load_public(certpath, NULL)) == NULL) goto out; if (!key_equal_public(cert, private)) { error("Certificate %s does not match private key %s", certpath, filename); key_free(cert); goto out; } /* Graft with private bits */ if (key_to_certified(private, key_cert_is_legacy(cert)) != 0) { error("%s: key_to_certified failed", __func__); key_free(cert); goto out; } key_cert_copy(cert, private); key_free(cert); if (!ssh_add_identity_constrained(ac, private, comment, lifetime, confirm)) { error("Certificate %s (%s) add failed", certpath, private->cert->key_id); } fprintf(stderr, "Certificate added: %s (%s)\n", certpath, private->cert->key_id); if (lifetime != 0) fprintf(stderr, "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime); if (confirm != 0) fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm each use of the key\n"); out: if (certpath != NULL) free(certpath); free(comment); key_free(private); return ret; } static int update_card(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int add, const char *id) { char *pin = NULL; int ret = -1; if (add) { if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for PKCS#11: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL) return -1; } if (ssh_update_card(ac, add, id, pin == NULL ? "" : pin, lifetime, confirm)) { fprintf(stderr, "Card %s: %s\n", add ? "added" : "removed", id); ret = 0; } else { fprintf(stderr, "Could not %s card: %s\n", add ? "add" : "remove", id); ret = -1; } free(pin); return ret; } static int list_identities(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int do_fp) { Key *key; char *comment, *fp; int had_identities = 0; int version; for (version = 1; version <= 2; version++) { for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, version); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, version)) { had_identities = 1; if (do_fp) { fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); printf("%d %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(key), fp, comment, key_type(key)); free(fp); } else { if (!key_write(key, stdout)) fprintf(stderr, "key_write failed"); fprintf(stdout, " %s\n", comment); } key_free(key); free(comment); } } if (!had_identities) { printf("The agent has no identities.\n"); return -1; } return 0; } static int lock_agent(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int lock) { char prompt[100], *p1, *p2; int passok = 1, ret = -1; strlcpy(prompt, "Enter lock password: ", sizeof(prompt)); p1 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (lock) { strlcpy(prompt, "Again: ", sizeof prompt); p2 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (strcmp(p1, p2) != 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Passwords do not match.\n"); passok = 0; } explicit_bzero(p2, strlen(p2)); free(p2); } if (passok && ssh_lock_agent(ac, lock, p1)) { fprintf(stderr, "Agent %slocked.\n", lock ? "" : "un"); ret = 0; } else fprintf(stderr, "Failed to %slock agent.\n", lock ? "" : "un"); explicit_bzero(p1, strlen(p1)); free(p1); return (ret); } static int do_file(AuthenticationConnection *ac, int deleting, int key_only, char *file) { if (deleting) { if (delete_file(ac, file, key_only) == -1) return -1; } else { if (add_file(ac, file, key_only) == -1) return -1; } return 0; } static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [options] [file ...]\n", __progname); fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -l List fingerprints of all identities.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -L List public key parameters of all identities.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -k Load only keys and not certificates.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -c Require confirmation to sign using identities\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -t life Set lifetime (in seconds) when adding identities.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -d Delete identity.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -D Delete all identities.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -x Lock agent.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -X Unlock agent.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -s pkcs11 Add keys from PKCS#11 provider.\n"); fprintf(stderr, " -e pkcs11 Remove keys provided by PKCS#11 provider.\n"); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { extern char *optarg; extern int optind; AuthenticationConnection *ac = NULL; char *pkcs11provider = NULL; int i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0, key_only = 0; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); seed_rng(); OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); + + setlinebuf(stdout); /* At first, get a connection to the authentication agent. */ ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection(); if (ac == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Could not open a connection to your authentication agent.\n"); exit(2); } while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "klLcdDxXe:s:t:")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'k': key_only = 1; break; case 'l': case 'L': if (list_identities(ac, ch == 'l' ? 1 : 0) == -1) ret = 1; goto done; case 'x': case 'X': if (lock_agent(ac, ch == 'x' ? 1 : 0) == -1) ret = 1; goto done; case 'c': confirm = 1; break; case 'd': deleting = 1; break; case 'D': if (delete_all(ac) == -1) ret = 1; goto done; case 's': pkcs11provider = optarg; break; case 'e': deleting = 1; pkcs11provider = optarg; break; case 't': if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n"); ret = 1; goto done; } break; default: usage(); ret = 1; goto done; } } argc -= optind; argv += optind; if (pkcs11provider != NULL) { if (update_card(ac, !deleting, pkcs11provider) == -1) ret = 1; goto done; } if (argc == 0) { char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; struct passwd *pw; struct stat st; int count = 0; if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "No user found with uid %u\n", (u_int)getuid()); ret = 1; goto done; } for (i = 0; default_files[i]; i++) { snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, default_files[i]); if (stat(buf, &st) < 0) continue; if (do_file(ac, deleting, key_only, buf) == -1) ret = 1; else count++; } if (count == 0) ret = 1; } else { for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { if (do_file(ac, deleting, key_only, argv[i]) == -1) ret = 1; } } clear_pass(); done: ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac); return ret; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-agent.0 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-agent.0 (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-agent.0 (revision 276707) @@ -1,128 +1,103 @@ -SSH-AGENT(1) OpenBSD Reference Manual SSH-AGENT(1) +SSH-AGENT(1) General Commands Manual SSH-AGENT(1) NAME ssh-agent - authentication agent SYNOPSIS ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-d] [-a bind_address] [-t life] [command [arg ...]] ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k DESCRIPTION ssh-agent is a program to hold private keys used for public key - authentication (RSA, DSA, ECDSA, ED25519). The idea is that ssh-agent is - started in the beginning of an X-session or a login session, and all - other windows or programs are started as clients to the ssh-agent - program. Through use of environment variables the agent can be located - and automatically used for authentication when logging in to other - machines using ssh(1). + authentication (RSA, DSA, ECDSA, ED25519). ssh-agent is usually started + in the beginning of an X-session or a login session, and all other + windows or programs are started as clients to the ssh-agent program. + Through use of environment variables the agent can be located and + automatically used for authentication when logging in to other machines + using ssh(1). + The agent initially does not have any private keys. Keys are added using + ssh-add(1). Multiple identities may be stored in ssh-agent concurrently + and ssh(1) will automatically use them if present. ssh-add(1) is also + used to remove keys from ssh-agent and to query the keys that are held in + one. + The options are as follows: -a bind_address Bind the agent to the UNIX-domain socket bind_address. The default is $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.. -c Generate C-shell commands on stdout. This is the default if SHELL looks like it's a csh style of shell. -d Debug mode. When this option is specified ssh-agent will not fork. -k Kill the current agent (given by the SSH_AGENT_PID environment variable). -s Generate Bourne shell commands on stdout. This is the default if SHELL does not look like it's a csh style of shell. -t life Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added to the agent. The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format specified in sshd_config(5). A lifetime specified for an identity with ssh-add(1) overrides this value. Without this option the default maximum lifetime is forever. If a commandline is given, this is executed as a subprocess of the agent. When the command dies, so does the agent. - The agent initially does not have any private keys. Keys are added using - ssh-add(1). When executed without arguments, ssh-add(1) adds the files - ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and - ~/.ssh/identity. If the identity has a passphrase, ssh-add(1) asks for - the passphrase on the terminal if it has one or from a small X11 program - if running under X11. If neither of these is the case then the - authentication will fail. It then sends the identity to the agent. - Several identities can be stored in the agent; the agent can - automatically use any of these identities. ssh-add -l displays the - identities currently held by the agent. - The idea is that the agent is run in the user's local PC, laptop, or terminal. Authentication data need not be stored on any other machine, and authentication passphrases never go over the network. However, the connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH remote logins, and the user can thus use the privileges given by the identities anywhere in the network in a secure way. There are two main ways to get an agent set up: The first is that the agent starts a new subcommand into which some environment variables are exported, eg ssh-agent xterm &. The second is that the agent prints the needed shell commands (either sh(1) or csh(1) syntax can be generated) which can be evaluated in the calling shell, eg eval `ssh-agent -s` for Bourne-type shells such as sh(1) or ksh(1) and eval `ssh-agent -c` for csh(1) and derivatives. Later ssh(1) looks at these variables and uses them to establish a connection to the agent. The agent will never send a private key over its request channel. Instead, operations that require a private key will be performed by the agent, and the result will be returned to the requester. This way, private keys are not exposed to clients using the agent. A UNIX-domain socket is created and the name of this socket is stored in the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. The socket is made accessible only to the current user. This method is easily abused by root or another instance of the same user. The SSH_AGENT_PID environment variable holds the agent's process ID. The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command line terminates. FILES - ~/.ssh/identity - Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of - the user. - - ~/.ssh/id_dsa - Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of - the user. - - ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa - Contains the protocol version 2 ECDSA authentication identity of - the user. - - ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 - Contains the protocol version 2 ED25519 authentication identity - of the user. - - ~/.ssh/id_rsa - Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of - the user. - $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent. UNIX-domain sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent. These sockets should only be readable by the owner. The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits. SEE ALSO ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8) AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. -OpenBSD 5.5 December 7, 2013 OpenBSD 5.5 +OpenBSD 5.6 April 16, 2014 OpenBSD 5.6 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-agent.1 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-agent.1 (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-agent.1 (revision 276707) @@ -1,217 +1,196 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.54 2013/12/07 11:58:46 naddy Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.55 2014/04/16 23:28:12 djm Exp $ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: December 7 2013 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: April 16 2014 $ .Dt SSH-AGENT 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh-agent .Nd authentication agent .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ssh-agent .Op Fl c | s .Op Fl d .Op Fl a Ar bind_address .Op Fl t Ar life .Op Ar command Op Ar arg ... .Nm ssh-agent .Op Fl c | s .Fl k .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication (RSA, DSA, ECDSA, ED25519). -The idea is that .Nm -is started in the beginning of an X-session or a login session, and +is usually started in the beginning of an X-session or a login session, and all other windows or programs are started as clients to the ssh-agent program. Through use of environment variables the agent can be located and automatically used for authentication when logging in to other machines using .Xr ssh 1 . .Pp +The agent initially does not have any private keys. +Keys are added using +.Xr ssh-add 1 . +Multiple identities may be stored in +.Nm +concurrently and +.Xr ssh 1 +will automatically use them if present. +.Xr ssh-add 1 +is also used to remove keys from +.Nm +and to query the keys that are held in one. +.Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl a Ar bind_address Bind the agent to the .Ux Ns -domain socket .Ar bind_address . The default is .Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt . .It Fl c Generate C-shell commands on .Dv stdout . This is the default if .Ev SHELL looks like it's a csh style of shell. .It Fl d Debug mode. When this option is specified .Nm will not fork. .It Fl k Kill the current agent (given by the .Ev SSH_AGENT_PID environment variable). .It Fl s Generate Bourne shell commands on .Dv stdout . This is the default if .Ev SHELL does not look like it's a csh style of shell. .It Fl t Ar life Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added to the agent. The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format specified in .Xr sshd_config 5 . A lifetime specified for an identity with .Xr ssh-add 1 overrides this value. Without this option the default maximum lifetime is forever. .El .Pp If a commandline is given, this is executed as a subprocess of the agent. When the command dies, so does the agent. .Pp -The agent initially does not have any private keys. -Keys are added using -.Xr ssh-add 1 . -When executed without arguments, -.Xr ssh-add 1 -adds the files -.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa , -.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , -.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , -.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 -and -.Pa ~/.ssh/identity . -If the identity has a passphrase, -.Xr ssh-add 1 -asks for the passphrase on the terminal if it has one or from a small X11 -program if running under X11. -If neither of these is the case then the authentication will fail. -It then sends the identity to the agent. -Several identities can be stored in the -agent; the agent can automatically use any of these identities. -.Ic ssh-add -l -displays the identities currently held by the agent. -.Pp The idea is that the agent is run in the user's local PC, laptop, or terminal. Authentication data need not be stored on any other machine, and authentication passphrases never go over the network. However, the connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH remote logins, and the user can thus use the privileges given by the identities anywhere in the network in a secure way. .Pp There are two main ways to get an agent set up: The first is that the agent starts a new subcommand into which some environment variables are exported, eg .Cm ssh-agent xterm & . The second is that the agent prints the needed shell commands (either .Xr sh 1 or .Xr csh 1 syntax can be generated) which can be evaluated in the calling shell, eg .Cm eval `ssh-agent -s` for Bourne-type shells such as .Xr sh 1 or .Xr ksh 1 and .Cm eval `ssh-agent -c` for .Xr csh 1 and derivatives. .Pp Later .Xr ssh 1 looks at these variables and uses them to establish a connection to the agent. .Pp The agent will never send a private key over its request channel. Instead, operations that require a private key will be performed by the agent, and the result will be returned to the requester. This way, private keys are not exposed to clients using the agent. .Pp A .Ux Ns -domain socket is created and the name of this socket is stored in the .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. The socket is made accessible only to the current user. This method is easily abused by root or another instance of the same user. .Pp The .Ev SSH_AGENT_PID environment variable holds the agent's process ID. .Pp The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command line terminates. .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds -.It Pa ~/.ssh/identity -Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user. -.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa -Contains the protocol version 2 DSA authentication identity of the user. -.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa -Contains the protocol version 2 ECDSA authentication identity of the user. -.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 -Contains the protocol version 2 ED25519 authentication identity of the user. -.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa -Contains the protocol version 2 RSA authentication identity of the user. .It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt .Ux Ns -domain sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent. These sockets should only be readable by the owner. The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-agent.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-agent.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-agent.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,1262 +1,1270 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.183 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.190 2014/07/25 21:22:03 dtucker Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * The authentication agent program. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H # include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" +#endif #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "key.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "compat.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "digest.h" #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #endif #if defined(HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H) #include /* For prctl() and PR_SET_DUMPABLE */ #endif typedef enum { AUTH_UNUSED, AUTH_SOCKET, AUTH_CONNECTION } sock_type; typedef struct { int fd; sock_type type; Buffer input; Buffer output; Buffer request; } SocketEntry; u_int sockets_alloc = 0; SocketEntry *sockets = NULL; typedef struct identity { TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next; Key *key; char *comment; char *provider; time_t death; u_int confirm; } Identity; typedef struct { int nentries; TAILQ_HEAD(idqueue, identity) idlist; } Idtab; /* private key table, one per protocol version */ Idtab idtable[3]; int max_fd = 0; /* pid of shell == parent of agent */ pid_t parent_pid = -1; time_t parent_alive_interval = 0; +/* pid of process for which cleanup_socket is applicable */ +pid_t cleanup_pid = 0; + /* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */ char socket_name[MAXPATHLEN]; char socket_dir[MAXPATHLEN]; /* locking */ int locked = 0; char *lock_passwd = NULL; extern char *__progname; /* Default lifetime in seconds (0 == forever) */ static long lifetime = 0; static void close_socket(SocketEntry *e) { close(e->fd); e->fd = -1; e->type = AUTH_UNUSED; buffer_free(&e->input); buffer_free(&e->output); buffer_free(&e->request); } static void idtab_init(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i <=2; i++) { TAILQ_INIT(&idtable[i].idlist); idtable[i].nentries = 0; } } /* return private key table for requested protocol version */ static Idtab * idtab_lookup(int version) { if (version < 1 || version > 2) fatal("internal error, bad protocol version %d", version); return &idtable[version]; } static void free_identity(Identity *id) { key_free(id->key); free(id->provider); free(id->comment); free(id); } /* return matching private key for given public key */ static Identity * lookup_identity(Key *key, int version) { Identity *id; Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &tab->idlist, next) { if (key_equal(key, id->key)) return (id); } return (NULL); } /* Check confirmation of keysign request */ static int confirm_key(Identity *id) { char *p; int ret = -1; p = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); if (ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.", id->comment, p)) ret = 0; free(p); return (ret); } /* send list of supported public keys to 'client' */ static void process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version) { Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); Identity *id; Buffer msg; buffer_init(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, (version == 1) ? SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER : SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER); buffer_put_int(&msg, tab->nentries); TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &tab->idlist, next) { if (id->key->type == KEY_RSA1) { +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 buffer_put_int(&msg, BN_num_bits(id->key->rsa->n)); buffer_put_bignum(&msg, id->key->rsa->e); buffer_put_bignum(&msg, id->key->rsa->n); +#endif } else { u_char *blob; u_int blen; key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &blen); buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen); free(blob); } buffer_put_cstring(&msg, id->comment); } buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg)); buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg), buffer_len(&msg)); buffer_free(&msg); } +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* ssh1 only */ static void process_authentication_challenge1(SocketEntry *e) { u_char buf[32], mdbuf[16], session_id[16]; u_int response_type; BIGNUM *challenge; Identity *id; int i, len; Buffer msg; struct ssh_digest_ctx *md; Key *key; buffer_init(&msg); key = key_new(KEY_RSA1); if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("process_authentication_challenge1: BN_new failed"); (void) buffer_get_int(&e->request); /* ignored */ buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, key->rsa->e); buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, key->rsa->n); buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, challenge); /* Only protocol 1.1 is supported */ if (buffer_len(&e->request) == 0) goto failure; buffer_get(&e->request, session_id, 16); response_type = buffer_get_int(&e->request); if (response_type != 1) goto failure; id = lookup_identity(key, 1); if (id != NULL && (!id->confirm || confirm_key(id) == 0)) { Key *private = id->key; /* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */ - if (rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, private->rsa) <= 0) + if (rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, private->rsa) != 0) goto failure; /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */ len = BN_num_bytes(challenge); if (len <= 0 || len > 32) { logit("process_authentication_challenge: bad challenge length %d", len); goto failure; } memset(buf, 0, 32); BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + 32 - len); if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL || ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 32) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, 16) < 0 || ssh_digest_final(md, mdbuf, sizeof(mdbuf)) < 0) fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__); ssh_digest_free(md); /* Send the response. */ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) buffer_put_char(&msg, mdbuf[i]); goto send; } failure: /* Unknown identity or protocol error. Send failure. */ buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); send: buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg)); buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg), buffer_len(&msg)); key_free(key); BN_clear_free(challenge); buffer_free(&msg); } +#endif /* ssh2 only */ static void process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e) { u_char *blob, *data, *signature = NULL; u_int blen, dlen, slen = 0; extern int datafellows; int odatafellows; int ok = -1, flags; Buffer msg; Key *key; datafellows = 0; blob = buffer_get_string(&e->request, &blen); data = buffer_get_string(&e->request, &dlen); flags = buffer_get_int(&e->request); odatafellows = datafellows; if (flags & SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE) datafellows = SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB; key = key_from_blob(blob, blen); if (key != NULL) { Identity *id = lookup_identity(key, 2); if (id != NULL && (!id->confirm || confirm_key(id) == 0)) ok = key_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen, data, dlen); key_free(key); } buffer_init(&msg); if (ok == 0) { buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE); buffer_put_string(&msg, signature, slen); } else { buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); } buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg)); buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg), buffer_len(&msg)); buffer_free(&msg); free(data); free(blob); free(signature); datafellows = odatafellows; } /* shared */ static void process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version) { - u_int blen, bits; + u_int blen; int success = 0; Key *key = NULL; u_char *blob; +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 + u_int bits; +#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ switch (version) { +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 case 1: key = key_new(KEY_RSA1); bits = buffer_get_int(&e->request); buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, key->rsa->e); buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, key->rsa->n); if (bits != key_size(key)) logit("Warning: identity keysize mismatch: actual %u, announced %u", key_size(key), bits); break; +#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ case 2: blob = buffer_get_string(&e->request, &blen); key = key_from_blob(blob, blen); free(blob); break; } if (key != NULL) { Identity *id = lookup_identity(key, version); if (id != NULL) { /* * We have this key. Free the old key. Since we * don't want to leave empty slots in the middle of * the array, we actually free the key there and move * all the entries between the empty slot and the end * of the array. */ Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); if (tab->nentries < 1) fatal("process_remove_identity: " "internal error: tab->nentries %d", tab->nentries); TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next); free_identity(id); tab->nentries--; success = 1; } key_free(key); } buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); buffer_put_char(&e->output, success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); } static void process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e, int version) { Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); Identity *id; /* Loop over all identities and clear the keys. */ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next); free_identity(id); } /* Mark that there are no identities. */ tab->nentries = 0; /* Send success. */ buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); buffer_put_char(&e->output, SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS); } /* removes expired keys and returns number of seconds until the next expiry */ static time_t reaper(void) { time_t deadline = 0, now = monotime(); Identity *id, *nxt; int version; Idtab *tab; for (version = 1; version < 3; version++) { tab = idtab_lookup(version); for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = nxt) { nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next); if (id->death == 0) continue; if (now >= id->death) { debug("expiring key '%s'", id->comment); TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next); free_identity(id); tab->nentries--; } else deadline = (deadline == 0) ? id->death : MIN(deadline, id->death); } } if (deadline == 0 || deadline <= now) return 0; else return (deadline - now); } static void process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e, int version) { Idtab *tab = idtab_lookup(version); Identity *id; int type, success = 0, confirm = 0; char *comment; time_t death = 0; Key *k = NULL; switch (version) { +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 case 1: k = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1); (void) buffer_get_int(&e->request); /* ignored */ buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->n); buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->e); buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->d); buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->iqmp); /* SSH and SSL have p and q swapped */ buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->q); /* p */ buffer_get_bignum(&e->request, k->rsa->p); /* q */ /* Generate additional parameters */ - rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa); + if (rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa) != 0) + fatal("%s: rsa_generate_additional_parameters " + "error", __func__); /* enable blinding */ if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) { error("process_add_identity: RSA_blinding_on failed"); key_free(k); goto send; } break; +#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ case 2: k = key_private_deserialize(&e->request); if (k == NULL) { buffer_clear(&e->request); goto send; } break; } - comment = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); - if (k == NULL) { - free(comment); + if (k == NULL) goto send; - } + comment = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); + while (buffer_len(&e->request)) { switch ((type = buffer_get_char(&e->request))) { case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME: death = monotime() + buffer_get_int(&e->request); break; case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM: confirm = 1; break; default: error("process_add_identity: " "Unknown constraint type %d", type); free(comment); key_free(k); goto send; } } success = 1; if (lifetime && !death) death = monotime() + lifetime; if ((id = lookup_identity(k, version)) == NULL) { id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity)); id->key = k; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next); /* Increment the number of identities. */ tab->nentries++; } else { key_free(k); free(id->comment); } id->comment = comment; id->death = death; id->confirm = confirm; send: buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); buffer_put_char(&e->output, success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); } /* XXX todo: encrypt sensitive data with passphrase */ static void process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock) { int success = 0; char *passwd; passwd = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); if (locked && !lock && strcmp(passwd, lock_passwd) == 0) { locked = 0; explicit_bzero(lock_passwd, strlen(lock_passwd)); free(lock_passwd); lock_passwd = NULL; success = 1; } else if (!locked && lock) { locked = 1; lock_passwd = xstrdup(passwd); success = 1; } explicit_bzero(passwd, strlen(passwd)); free(passwd); buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); buffer_put_char(&e->output, success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); } static void no_identities(SocketEntry *e, u_int type) { Buffer msg; buffer_init(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, (type == SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES) ? SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER : SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER); buffer_put_int(&msg, 0); buffer_put_int(&e->output, buffer_len(&msg)); buffer_append(&e->output, buffer_ptr(&msg), buffer_len(&msg)); buffer_free(&msg); } #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 static void process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) { char *provider = NULL, *pin; int i, type, version, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0; time_t death = 0; Key **keys = NULL, *k; Identity *id; Idtab *tab; provider = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); pin = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); while (buffer_len(&e->request)) { switch ((type = buffer_get_char(&e->request))) { case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME: death = monotime() + buffer_get_int(&e->request); break; case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM: confirm = 1; break; default: error("process_add_smartcard_key: " "Unknown constraint type %d", type); goto send; } } if (lifetime && !death) death = monotime() + lifetime; count = pkcs11_add_provider(provider, pin, &keys); for (i = 0; i < count; i++) { k = keys[i]; version = k->type == KEY_RSA1 ? 1 : 2; tab = idtab_lookup(version); if (lookup_identity(k, version) == NULL) { id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity)); id->key = k; id->provider = xstrdup(provider); id->comment = xstrdup(provider); /* XXX */ id->death = death; id->confirm = confirm; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tab->idlist, id, next); tab->nentries++; success = 1; } else { key_free(k); } keys[i] = NULL; } send: free(pin); free(provider); free(keys); buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); buffer_put_char(&e->output, success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); } static void process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e) { char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL; int version, success = 0; Identity *id, *nxt; Idtab *tab; provider = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); pin = buffer_get_string(&e->request, NULL); free(pin); for (version = 1; version < 3; version++) { tab = idtab_lookup(version); for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&tab->idlist); id; id = nxt) { nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next); /* Skip file--based keys */ if (id->provider == NULL) continue; if (!strcmp(provider, id->provider)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&tab->idlist, id, next); free_identity(id); tab->nentries--; } } } if (pkcs11_del_provider(provider) == 0) success = 1; else error("process_remove_smartcard_key:" " pkcs11_del_provider failed"); free(provider); buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); buffer_put_char(&e->output, success ? SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); } #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ /* dispatch incoming messages */ static void process_message(SocketEntry *e) { u_int msg_len, type; u_char *cp; if (buffer_len(&e->input) < 5) return; /* Incomplete message. */ cp = buffer_ptr(&e->input); msg_len = get_u32(cp); if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) { close_socket(e); return; } if (buffer_len(&e->input) < msg_len + 4) return; /* move the current input to e->request */ buffer_consume(&e->input, 4); buffer_clear(&e->request); buffer_append(&e->request, buffer_ptr(&e->input), msg_len); buffer_consume(&e->input, msg_len); type = buffer_get_char(&e->request); /* check wheter agent is locked */ if (locked && type != SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK) { buffer_clear(&e->request); switch (type) { case SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES: case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES: /* send empty lists */ no_identities(e, type); break; default: /* send a fail message for all other request types */ buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); buffer_put_char(&e->output, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); } return; } debug("type %d", type); switch (type) { case SSH_AGENTC_LOCK: case SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK: process_lock_agent(e, type == SSH_AGENTC_LOCK); break; +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* ssh1 */ case SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE: process_authentication_challenge1(e); break; case SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES: process_request_identities(e, 1); break; case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY: case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED: process_add_identity(e, 1); break; case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY: process_remove_identity(e, 1); break; case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES: process_remove_all_identities(e, 1); break; +#endif /* ssh2 */ case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST: process_sign_request2(e); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES: process_request_identities(e, 2); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY: case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED: process_add_identity(e, 2); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY: process_remove_identity(e, 2); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES: process_remove_all_identities(e, 2); break; #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY: case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED: process_add_smartcard_key(e); break; case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY: process_remove_smartcard_key(e); break; #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ default: /* Unknown message. Respond with failure. */ error("Unknown message %d", type); buffer_clear(&e->request); buffer_put_int(&e->output, 1); buffer_put_char(&e->output, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); break; } } static void new_socket(sock_type type, int fd) { u_int i, old_alloc, new_alloc; set_nonblock(fd); if (fd > max_fd) max_fd = fd; for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) if (sockets[i].type == AUTH_UNUSED) { sockets[i].fd = fd; buffer_init(&sockets[i].input); buffer_init(&sockets[i].output); buffer_init(&sockets[i].request); sockets[i].type = type; return; } old_alloc = sockets_alloc; new_alloc = sockets_alloc + 10; sockets = xrealloc(sockets, new_alloc, sizeof(sockets[0])); for (i = old_alloc; i < new_alloc; i++) sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED; sockets_alloc = new_alloc; sockets[old_alloc].fd = fd; buffer_init(&sockets[old_alloc].input); buffer_init(&sockets[old_alloc].output); buffer_init(&sockets[old_alloc].request); sockets[old_alloc].type = type; } static int prepare_select(fd_set **fdrp, fd_set **fdwp, int *fdl, u_int *nallocp, struct timeval **tvpp) { u_int i, sz; int n = 0; static struct timeval tv; time_t deadline; for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) { switch (sockets[i].type) { case AUTH_SOCKET: case AUTH_CONNECTION: n = MAX(n, sockets[i].fd); break; case AUTH_UNUSED: break; default: fatal("Unknown socket type %d", sockets[i].type); break; } } sz = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); if (*fdrp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) { free(*fdrp); free(*fdwp); *fdrp = xmalloc(sz); *fdwp = xmalloc(sz); *nallocp = sz; } if (n < *fdl) debug("XXX shrink: %d < %d", n, *fdl); *fdl = n; memset(*fdrp, 0, sz); memset(*fdwp, 0, sz); for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) { switch (sockets[i].type) { case AUTH_SOCKET: case AUTH_CONNECTION: FD_SET(sockets[i].fd, *fdrp); if (buffer_len(&sockets[i].output) > 0) FD_SET(sockets[i].fd, *fdwp); break; default: break; } } deadline = reaper(); if (parent_alive_interval != 0) deadline = (deadline == 0) ? parent_alive_interval : MIN(deadline, parent_alive_interval); if (deadline == 0) { *tvpp = NULL; } else { tv.tv_sec = deadline; tv.tv_usec = 0; *tvpp = &tv; } return (1); } static void after_select(fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset) { struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; socklen_t slen; char buf[1024]; int len, sock; u_int i, orig_alloc; uid_t euid; gid_t egid; for (i = 0, orig_alloc = sockets_alloc; i < orig_alloc; i++) switch (sockets[i].type) { case AUTH_UNUSED: break; case AUTH_SOCKET: if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, readset)) { slen = sizeof(sunaddr); sock = accept(sockets[i].fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, &slen); if (sock < 0) { error("accept from AUTH_SOCKET: %s", strerror(errno)); break; } if (getpeereid(sock, &euid, &egid) < 0) { error("getpeereid %d failed: %s", sock, strerror(errno)); close(sock); break; } if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) { error("uid mismatch: " "peer euid %u != uid %u", (u_int) euid, (u_int) getuid()); close(sock); break; } new_socket(AUTH_CONNECTION, sock); } break; case AUTH_CONNECTION: if (buffer_len(&sockets[i].output) > 0 && FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, writeset)) { len = write(sockets[i].fd, buffer_ptr(&sockets[i].output), buffer_len(&sockets[i].output)); if (len == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR)) continue; if (len <= 0) { close_socket(&sockets[i]); break; } buffer_consume(&sockets[i].output, len); } if (FD_ISSET(sockets[i].fd, readset)) { len = read(sockets[i].fd, buf, sizeof(buf)); if (len == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK || errno == EINTR)) continue; if (len <= 0) { close_socket(&sockets[i]); break; } buffer_append(&sockets[i].input, buf, len); + explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); process_message(&sockets[i]); } break; default: fatal("Unknown type %d", sockets[i].type); } } static void cleanup_socket(void) { + if (cleanup_pid != 0 && getpid() != cleanup_pid) + return; + debug("%s: cleanup", __func__); if (socket_name[0]) unlink(socket_name); if (socket_dir[0]) rmdir(socket_dir); } void cleanup_exit(int i) { cleanup_socket(); _exit(i); } /*ARGSUSED*/ static void cleanup_handler(int sig) { cleanup_socket(); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 pkcs11_terminate(); #endif _exit(2); } static void check_parent_exists(void) { /* * If our parent has exited then getppid() will return (pid_t)1, * so testing for that should be safe. */ if (parent_pid != -1 && getppid() != parent_pid) { /* printf("Parent has died - Authentication agent exiting.\n"); */ cleanup_socket(); _exit(2); } } static void usage(void) { - fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [options] [command [arg ...]]\n", - __progname); - fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -c Generate C-shell commands on stdout.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -s Generate Bourne shell commands on stdout.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -k Kill the current agent.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -d Debug mode.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -a socket Bind agent socket to given name.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -t life Default identity lifetime (seconds).\n"); + fprintf(stderr, + "usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-d] [-a bind_address] [-t life]\n" + " [command [arg ...]]\n" + " ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n"); exit(1); } int main(int ac, char **av) { int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0; int sock, fd, ch, result, saved_errno; u_int nalloc; char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL; fd_set *readsetp = NULL, *writesetp = NULL; - struct sockaddr_un sunaddr; #ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT struct rlimit rlim; #endif - int prev_mask; extern int optind; extern char *optarg; pid_t pid; char pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid]; struct timeval *tvp = NULL; size_t len; + mode_t prev_mask; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); /* drop */ setegid(getgid()); setgid(getgid()); #if defined(HAVE_PRCTL) && defined(PR_SET_DUMPABLE) /* Disable ptrace on Linux without sgid bit */ prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE, 0); #endif +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); +#endif __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); seed_rng(); while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cdksa:t:")) != -1) { switch (ch) { case 'c': if (s_flag) usage(); c_flag++; break; case 'k': k_flag++; break; case 's': if (c_flag) usage(); s_flag++; break; case 'd': if (d_flag) usage(); d_flag++; break; case 'a': agentsocket = optarg; break; case 't': if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n"); usage(); } break; default: usage(); } } ac -= optind; av += optind; if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag)) usage(); if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) { shell = getenv("SHELL"); if (shell != NULL && (len = strlen(shell)) > 2 && strncmp(shell + len - 3, "csh", 3) == 0) c_flag = 1; } if (k_flag) { const char *errstr = NULL; pidstr = getenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); if (pidstr == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "%s not set, cannot kill agent\n", SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); exit(1); } pid = (int)strtonum(pidstr, 2, INT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) { fprintf(stderr, "%s=\"%s\", which is not a good PID: %s\n", SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstr, errstr); exit(1); } if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) == -1) { perror("kill"); exit(1); } format = c_flag ? "unsetenv %s;\n" : "unset %s;\n"; printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); printf("echo Agent pid %ld killed;\n", (long)pid); exit(0); } parent_pid = getpid(); if (agentsocket == NULL) { /* Create private directory for agent socket */ mktemp_proto(socket_dir, sizeof(socket_dir)); if (mkdtemp(socket_dir) == NULL) { perror("mkdtemp: private socket dir"); exit(1); } snprintf(socket_name, sizeof socket_name, "%s/agent.%ld", socket_dir, (long)parent_pid); } else { /* Try to use specified agent socket */ socket_dir[0] = '\0'; strlcpy(socket_name, agentsocket, sizeof socket_name); } /* * Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from * the parent. */ - sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0); + prev_mask = umask(0177); + sock = unix_listener(socket_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0); if (sock < 0) { - perror("socket"); + /* XXX - unix_listener() calls error() not perror() */ *socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */ cleanup_exit(1); } - memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr)); - sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX; - strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, socket_name, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)); - prev_mask = umask(0177); - if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *) &sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) < 0) { - perror("bind"); - *socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */ - umask(prev_mask); - cleanup_exit(1); - } umask(prev_mask); - if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) { - perror("listen"); - cleanup_exit(1); - } /* * Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present * the socket data. The child continues as the authentication agent. */ if (d_flag) { log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1); format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n"; printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)parent_pid); goto skip; } pid = fork(); if (pid == -1) { perror("fork"); cleanup_exit(1); } if (pid != 0) { /* Parent - execute the given command. */ close(sock); snprintf(pidstrbuf, sizeof pidstrbuf, "%ld", (long)pid); if (ac == 0) { format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n"; printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME); printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME); printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)pid); exit(0); } if (setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, 1) == -1 || setenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, 1) == -1) { perror("setenv"); exit(1); } execvp(av[0], av); perror(av[0]); exit(1); } /* child */ log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0); if (setsid() == -1) { error("setsid: %s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(1); } (void)chdir("/"); if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) { /* XXX might close listen socket */ (void)dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO); (void)dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO); (void)dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO); if (fd > 2) close(fd); } #ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT /* deny core dumps, since memory contains unencrypted private keys */ rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0; if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) < 0) { error("setrlimit RLIMIT_CORE: %s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(1); } #endif skip: + + cleanup_pid = getpid(); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 pkcs11_init(0); #endif new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock); if (ac > 0) parent_alive_interval = 10; idtab_init(); signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); signal(SIGINT, d_flag ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN); signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler); signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler); nalloc = 0; while (1) { prepare_select(&readsetp, &writesetp, &max_fd, &nalloc, &tvp); result = select(max_fd + 1, readsetp, writesetp, NULL, tvp); saved_errno = errno; if (parent_alive_interval != 0) check_parent_exists(); (void) reaper(); /* remove expired keys */ if (result < 0) { if (saved_errno == EINTR) continue; fatal("select: %s", strerror(saved_errno)); } else if (result > 0) after_select(readsetp, writesetp); } /* NOTREACHED */ } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-dss.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-dss.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-dss.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,189 +1,219 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.31 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-dss.c,v 1.32 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include +#include #include #include #include -#include "xmalloc.h" -#include "buffer.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" #include "compat.h" -#include "log.h" -#include "key.h" +#include "ssherr.h" #include "digest.h" +#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL +#include "sshkey.h" #define INTBLOB_LEN 20 #define SIGBLOB_LEN (2*INTBLOB_LEN) int -ssh_dss_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, - const u_char *data, u_int datalen) +ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { - DSA_SIG *sig; + DSA_SIG *sig = NULL; u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN]; - u_int rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); - Buffer b; + size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - if (key == NULL || key_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA || - key->dsa == NULL) { - error("%s: no DSA key", __func__); - return -1; - } + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + if (sigp != NULL) + *sigp = NULL; - if (ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen, - digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0) { - error("%s: ssh_digest_memory failed", __func__); - return -1; - } + if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (dlen == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa); - explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); + if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen, + digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) + goto out; - if (sig == NULL) { - error("ssh_dss_sign: sign failed"); - return -1; + if ((sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; } rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig->r); slen = BN_num_bytes(sig->s); if (rlen > INTBLOB_LEN || slen > INTBLOB_LEN) { - error("bad sig size %u %u", rlen, slen); - DSA_SIG_free(sig); - return -1; + ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto out; } explicit_bzero(sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN); - BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen); - BN_bn2bin(sig->s, sigblob+ SIGBLOB_LEN - slen); - DSA_SIG_free(sig); + BN_bn2bin(sig->r, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - INTBLOB_LEN - rlen); + BN_bn2bin(sig->s, sigblob + SIGBLOB_LEN - slen); - if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) { - if (lenp != NULL) - *lenp = SIGBLOB_LEN; + if (compat & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) { if (sigp != NULL) { - *sigp = xmalloc(SIGBLOB_LEN); + if ((*sigp = malloc(SIGBLOB_LEN)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } memcpy(*sigp, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN); } + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = SIGBLOB_LEN; + ret = 0; } else { /* ietf-drafts */ - buffer_init(&b); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, "ssh-dss"); - buffer_put_string(&b, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN); - len = buffer_len(&b); - if (lenp != NULL) - *lenp = len; + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-dss")) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, SIGBLOB_LEN)) != 0) + goto out; + len = sshbuf_len(b); if (sigp != NULL) { - *sigp = xmalloc(len); - memcpy(*sigp, buffer_ptr(&b), len); + if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); } - buffer_free(&b); + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = len; + ret = 0; } - return 0; + out: + explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); + if (sig != NULL) + DSA_SIG_free(sig); + if (b != NULL) + sshbuf_free(b); + return ret; } + int -ssh_dss_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen, - const u_char *data, u_int datalen) +ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { - DSA_SIG *sig; - u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob; - u_int len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); - int rlen, ret; - Buffer b; + DSA_SIG *sig = NULL; + u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL; + size_t len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1); + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + char *ktype = NULL; - if (key == NULL || key_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA || - key->dsa == NULL) { - error("%s: no DSA key", __func__); - return -1; - } + if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (dlen == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* fetch signature */ - if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) { - sigblob = xmalloc(signaturelen); + if (compat & SSH_BUG_SIGBLOB) { + if ((sigblob = malloc(signaturelen)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; memcpy(sigblob, signature, signaturelen); len = signaturelen; } else { /* ietf-drafts */ - char *ktype; - buffer_init(&b); - buffer_append(&b, signature, signaturelen); - ktype = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL); + if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0 || + sshbuf_get_string(b, &sigblob, &len) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } if (strcmp("ssh-dss", ktype) != 0) { - error("%s: cannot handle type %s", __func__, ktype); - buffer_free(&b); - free(ktype); - return -1; + ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; + goto out; } - free(ktype); - sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len); - rlen = buffer_len(&b); - buffer_free(&b); - if (rlen != 0) { - error("%s: remaining bytes in signature %d", - __func__, rlen); - free(sigblob); - return -1; + if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; + goto out; } } if (len != SIGBLOB_LEN) { - fatal("bad sigbloblen %u != SIGBLOB_LEN", len); + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; } /* parse signature */ - if ((sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: DSA_SIG_new failed", __func__); - if ((sig->r = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: BN_new failed", __func__); - if ((sig->s = BN_new()) == NULL) - fatal("ssh_dss_verify: BN_new failed"); + if ((sig = DSA_SIG_new()) == NULL || + (sig->r = BN_new()) == NULL || + (sig->s = BN_new()) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } if ((BN_bin2bn(sigblob, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->r) == NULL) || - (BN_bin2bn(sigblob+ INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->s) == NULL)) - fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn failed", __func__); + (BN_bin2bn(sigblob+ INTBLOB_LEN, INTBLOB_LEN, sig->s) == NULL)) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } - /* clean up */ - explicit_bzero(sigblob, len); - free(sigblob); - /* sha1 the data */ - if (ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen, - digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0) { - error("%s: digest_memory failed", __func__); - return -1; + if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen, + digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) + goto out; + + switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa)) { + case 1: + ret = 0; + break; + case 0: + ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + goto out; + default: + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; } - ret = DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa); + out: explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); - - DSA_SIG_free(sig); - - debug("%s: signature %s", __func__, - ret == 1 ? "correct" : ret == 0 ? "incorrect" : "error"); + if (sig != NULL) + DSA_SIG_free(sig); + if (b != NULL) + sshbuf_free(b); + if (ktype != NULL) + free(ktype); + if (sigblob != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(sigblob, len); + free(sigblob); + } return ret; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-ecdsa.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-ecdsa.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-ecdsa.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,178 +1,192 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa.c,v 1.10 2014/02/03 23:28:00 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa.c,v 1.11 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC #include #include #include #include #include #include -#include "xmalloc.h" -#include "buffer.h" -#include "compat.h" -#include "log.h" -#include "key.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "ssherr.h" #include "digest.h" +#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL +#include "sshkey.h" +/* ARGSUSED */ int -ssh_ecdsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, - const u_char *data, u_int datalen) +ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { - ECDSA_SIG *sig; + ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL; int hash_alg; u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; - u_int len, dlen; - Buffer b, bb; + size_t len, dlen; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if (key == NULL || key_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA || - key->ecdsa == NULL) { - error("%s: no ECDSA key", __func__); - return -1; - } + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + if (sigp != NULL) + *sigp = NULL; - hash_alg = key_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid); - if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) { - error("%s: bad hash algorithm %d", __func__, hash_alg); - return -1; - } - if (ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, - digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0) { - error("%s: digest_memory failed", __func__); - return -1; - } + if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa); - explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); + if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 || + (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, + digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) + goto out; - if (sig == NULL) { - error("%s: sign failed", __func__); - return -1; + if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; } - buffer_init(&bb); - buffer_put_bignum2(&bb, sig->r); - buffer_put_bignum2(&bb, sig->s); - ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); - - buffer_init(&b); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name_plain(key)); - buffer_put_string(&b, buffer_ptr(&bb), buffer_len(&bb)); - buffer_free(&bb); - len = buffer_len(&b); - if (lenp != NULL) - *lenp = len; + if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, sig->r)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(bb, sig->s)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key))) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, bb)) != 0) + goto out; + len = sshbuf_len(b); if (sigp != NULL) { - *sigp = xmalloc(len); - memcpy(*sigp, buffer_ptr(&b), len); + if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); } - buffer_free(&b); - - return 0; + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = len; + ret = 0; + out: + explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); + if (b != NULL) + sshbuf_free(b); + if (bb != NULL) + sshbuf_free(bb); + if (sig != NULL) + ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); + return ret; } + +/* ARGSUSED */ int -ssh_ecdsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen, - const u_char *data, u_int datalen) +ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { - ECDSA_SIG *sig; + ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL; int hash_alg; - u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob; - u_int len, dlen; - int rlen, ret; - Buffer b, bb; - char *ktype; + u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + size_t dlen; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL; + char *ktype = NULL; - if (key == NULL || key_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA || - key->ecdsa == NULL) { - error("%s: no ECDSA key", __func__); - return -1; - } + if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 || + (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + /* fetch signature */ - buffer_init(&b); - buffer_append(&b, signature, signaturelen); - ktype = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); - if (strcmp(key_ssh_name_plain(key), ktype) != 0) { - error("%s: cannot handle type %s", __func__, ktype); - buffer_free(&b); - free(ktype); - return -1; + if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0 || + sshbuf_froms(b, &sigbuf) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; } - free(ktype); - sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len); - rlen = buffer_len(&b); - buffer_free(&b); - if (rlen != 0) { - error("%s: remaining bytes in signature %d", __func__, rlen); - free(sigblob); - return -1; + if (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key), ktype) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; + goto out; } + if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; + goto out; + } /* parse signature */ - if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) - fatal("%s: ECDSA_SIG_new failed", __func__); - - buffer_init(&bb); - buffer_append(&bb, sigblob, len); - buffer_get_bignum2(&bb, sig->r); - buffer_get_bignum2(&bb, sig->s); - if (buffer_len(&bb) != 0) - fatal("%s: remaining bytes in inner sigblob", __func__); - buffer_free(&bb); - - /* clean up */ - explicit_bzero(sigblob, len); - free(sigblob); - - /* hash the data */ - hash_alg = key_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid); - if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) { - error("%s: bad hash algorithm %d", __func__, hash_alg); - return -1; + if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; } - if (ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, - digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0) { - error("%s: digest_memory failed", __func__); - return -1; + if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, sig->r) != 0 || + sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, sig->s) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; } + if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; + goto out; + } + if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, + digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) + goto out; - ret = ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa); - explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); + switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa)) { + case 1: + ret = 0; + break; + case 0: + ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + goto out; + default: + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } - ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); - - debug("%s: signature %s", __func__, - ret == 1 ? "correct" : ret == 0 ? "incorrect" : "error"); + out: + explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); + if (sigbuf != NULL) + sshbuf_free(sigbuf); + if (b != NULL) + sshbuf_free(b); + if (sig != NULL) + ECDSA_SIG_free(sig); + free(ktype); return ret; } #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-ed25519.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-ed25519.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-ed25519.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,149 +1,166 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ed25519.c,v 1.3 2014/02/23 20:03:42 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ed25519.c,v 1.4 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2013 Markus Friedl * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include +#include #include "crypto_api.h" -#include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" #include "buffer.h" -#include "key.h" +#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL +#include "sshkey.h" +#include "ssherr.h" #include "ssh.h" int -ssh_ed25519_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, - const u_char *data, u_int datalen) +ssh_ed25519_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { - u_char *sig; - u_int slen, len; + u_char *sig = NULL; + size_t slen = 0, len; unsigned long long smlen; - int ret; - Buffer b; + int r, ret; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; - if (key == NULL || key_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519 || - key->ed25519_sk == NULL) { - error("%s: no ED25519 key", __func__); - return -1; - } + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + if (sigp != NULL) + *sigp = NULL; - if (datalen >= UINT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES) { - error("%s: datalen %u too long", __func__, datalen); - return -1; - } + if (key == NULL || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519 || + key->ed25519_sk == NULL || + datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; smlen = slen = datalen + crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES; - sig = xmalloc(slen); + if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; if ((ret = crypto_sign_ed25519(sig, &smlen, data, datalen, key->ed25519_sk)) != 0 || smlen <= datalen) { - error("%s: crypto_sign_ed25519 failed: %d", __func__, ret); - free(sig); - return -1; + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* XXX better error? */ + goto out; } /* encode signature */ - buffer_init(&b); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, "ssh-ed25519"); - buffer_put_string(&b, sig, smlen - datalen); - len = buffer_len(&b); + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-ed25519")) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sig, smlen - datalen)) != 0) + goto out; + len = sshbuf_len(b); + if (sigp != NULL) { + if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); + } if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; - if (sigp != NULL) { - *sigp = xmalloc(len); - memcpy(*sigp, buffer_ptr(&b), len); + /* success */ + r = 0; + out: + sshbuf_free(b); + if (sig != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(sig, slen); + free(sig); } - buffer_free(&b); - explicit_bzero(sig, slen); - free(sig); - return 0; + return r; } int -ssh_ed25519_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen, - const u_char *data, u_int datalen) +ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { - Buffer b; - char *ktype; - u_char *sigblob, *sm, *m; - u_int len; - unsigned long long smlen, mlen; - int rlen, ret; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + char *ktype = NULL; + const u_char *sigblob; + u_char *sm = NULL, *m = NULL; + size_t len; + unsigned long long smlen = 0, mlen = 0; + int r, ret; - if (key == NULL || key_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519 || - key->ed25519_pk == NULL) { - error("%s: no ED25519 key", __func__); - return -1; - } - buffer_init(&b); - buffer_append(&b, signature, signaturelen); - ktype = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL); + if (key == NULL || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519 || + key->ed25519_pk == NULL || + datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + + if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &sigblob, &len)) != 0) + goto out; if (strcmp("ssh-ed25519", ktype) != 0) { - error("%s: cannot handle type %s", __func__, ktype); - buffer_free(&b); - free(ktype); - return -1; + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; + goto out; } - free(ktype); - sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len); - rlen = buffer_len(&b); - buffer_free(&b); - if (rlen != 0) { - error("%s: remaining bytes in signature %d", __func__, rlen); - free(sigblob); - return -1; + if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; + goto out; } if (len > crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES) { - error("%s: len %u > crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES %u", __func__, - len, crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES); - free(sigblob); - return -1; + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; } + if (datalen >= SIZE_MAX - len) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; smlen = len + datalen; - sm = xmalloc(smlen); + mlen = smlen; + if ((sm = malloc(smlen)) == NULL || (m = xmalloc(mlen)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } memcpy(sm, sigblob, len); memcpy(sm+len, data, datalen); - mlen = smlen; - m = xmalloc(mlen); if ((ret = crypto_sign_ed25519_open(m, &mlen, sm, smlen, key->ed25519_pk)) != 0) { debug2("%s: crypto_sign_ed25519_open failed: %d", __func__, ret); } - if (ret == 0 && mlen != datalen) { - debug2("%s: crypto_sign_ed25519_open " - "mlen != datalen (%llu != %u)", __func__, mlen, datalen); - ret = -1; + if (ret != 0 || mlen != datalen) { + r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; + goto out; } /* XXX compare 'm' and 'data' ? */ - - explicit_bzero(sigblob, len); - explicit_bzero(sm, smlen); - explicit_bzero(m, smlen); /* NB. mlen may be invalid if ret != 0 */ - free(sigblob); - free(sm); - free(m); - debug("%s: signature %scorrect", __func__, (ret != 0) ? "in" : ""); - - /* translate return code carefully */ - return (ret == 0) ? 1 : -1; + /* success */ + r = 0; + out: + if (sm != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(sm, smlen); + free(sm); + } + if (m != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(m, smlen); /* NB mlen may be invalid if r != 0 */ + free(m); + } + sshbuf_free(b); + free(ktype); + return r; } + Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keygen.0 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keygen.0 (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keygen.0 (revision 276707) @@ -1,562 +1,562 @@ -SSH-KEYGEN(1) OpenBSD Reference Manual SSH-KEYGEN(1) +SSH-KEYGEN(1) General Commands Manual SSH-KEYGEN(1) NAME ssh-keygen - authentication key generation, management and conversion SYNOPSIS - ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t type] [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment] - [-f output_keyfile] + ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1] + [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile] ssh-keygen -p [-P old_passphrase] [-N new_passphrase] [-f keyfile] ssh-keygen -i [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile] ssh-keygen -e [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile] ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile] ssh-keygen -c [-P passphrase] [-C comment] [-f keyfile] ssh-keygen -l [-f input_keyfile] ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile] ssh-keygen -D pkcs11 ssh-keygen -F hostname [-f known_hosts_file] [-l] ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file] ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file] ssh-keygen -r hostname [-f input_keyfile] [-g] ssh-keygen -G output_file [-v] [-b bits] [-M memory] [-S start_point] ssh-keygen -T output_file -f input_file [-v] [-a rounds] [-J num_lines] [-j start_line] [-K checkpt] [-W generator] ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I certificate_identity [-h] [-n principals] [-O option] [-V validity_interval] [-z serial_number] file ... ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile] ssh-keygen -A ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number] file ... ssh-keygen -Q -f krl_file file ... DESCRIPTION ssh-keygen generates, manages and converts authentication keys for ssh(1). ssh-keygen can create RSA keys for use by SSH protocol version 1 and DSA, ECDSA, ED25519 or RSA keys for use by SSH protocol version 2. The type of key to be generated is specified with the -t option. If invoked without any arguments, ssh-keygen will generate an RSA key for use in SSH protocol 2 connections. ssh-keygen is also used to generate groups for use in Diffie-Hellman group exchange (DH-GEX). See the MODULI GENERATION section for details. Finally, ssh-keygen can be used to generate and update Key Revocation Lists, and to test whether given keys have been revoked by one. See the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details. Normally each user wishing to use SSH with public key authentication runs this once to create the authentication key in ~/.ssh/identity, ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 or ~/.ssh/id_rsa. Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys, as seen in /etc/rc. Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which to store the private key. The public key is stored in a file with the same name but ``.pub'' appended. The program also asks for a passphrase. The passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase (host keys must have an empty passphrase), or it may be a string of arbitrary length. A passphrase is similar to a password, except it can be a phrase with a series of words, punctuation, numbers, whitespace, or any string of characters you want. Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long, are not simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English prose has only 1-2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad passphrases), and contain a mix of upper and lowercase letters, numbers, and non- alphanumeric characters. The passphrase can be changed later by using the -p option. There is no way to recover a lost passphrase. If the passphrase is lost or forgotten, a new key must be generated and the corresponding public key copied to other machines. For RSA1 keys, there is also a comment field in the key file that is only for convenience to the user to help identify the key. The comment can tell what the key is for, or whatever is useful. The comment is initialized to ``user@host'' when the key is created, but can be changed using the -c option. After a key is generated, instructions below detail where the keys should be placed to be activated. The options are as follows: -A For each of the key types (rsa1, rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519) for which host keys do not exist, generate the host keys with the default key file path, an empty passphrase, default bits for the key type, and default comment. This is used by /etc/rc to generate new host keys. -a rounds When saving a new-format private key (i.e. an ed25519 key or any SSH protocol 2 key when the -o flag is set), this option specifies the number of KDF (key derivation function) rounds used. Higher numbers result in slower passphrase verification and increased resistance to brute-force password cracking (should the keys be stolen). When screening DH-GEX candidates ( using the -T command). This option specifies the number of primality tests to perform. -B Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key file. -b bits Specifies the number of bits in the key to create. For RSA keys, the minimum size is 768 bits and the default is 2048 bits. Generally, 2048 bits is considered sufficient. DSA keys must be exactly 1024 bits as specified by FIPS 186-2. For ECDSA keys, the -b flag determines the key length by selecting from one of three elliptic curve sizes: 256, 384 or 521 bits. Attempting to use bit lengths other than these three values for ECDSA keys will fail. ED25519 keys have a fixed length and the -b flag will be ignored. -C comment Provides a new comment. -c Requests changing the comment in the private and public key files. This operation is only supported for RSA1 keys. The program will prompt for the file containing the private keys, for the passphrase if the key has one, and for the new comment. -D pkcs11 Download the RSA public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11. When used in combination with -s, this option indicates that a CA key resides in a PKCS#11 token (see the CERTIFICATES section for details). -e This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and print to stdout the key in one of the formats specified by the -m option. The default export format is ``RFC4716''. This option allows exporting OpenSSH keys for use by other programs, including several commercial SSH implementations. -F hostname Search for the specified hostname in a known_hosts file, listing any occurrences found. This option is useful to find hashed host names or addresses and may also be used in conjunction with the -H option to print found keys in a hashed format. -f filename Specifies the filename of the key file. -G output_file Generate candidate primes for DH-GEX. These primes must be screened for safety (using the -T option) before use. -g Use generic DNS format when printing fingerprint resource records using the -r command. -H Hash a known_hosts file. This replaces all hostnames and addresses with hashed representations within the specified file; the original content is moved to a file with a .old suffix. These hashes may be used normally by ssh and sshd, but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed. This option will not modify existing hashed hostnames and is therefore safe to use on files that mix hashed and non- hashed names. -h When signing a key, create a host certificate instead of a user certificate. Please see the CERTIFICATES section for details. -I certificate_identity Specify the key identity when signing a public key. Please see the CERTIFICATES section for details. -i This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file in the format specified by the -m option and print an OpenSSH - compatible private (or public) key to stdout. + compatible private (or public) key to stdout. This option allows + importing keys from other software, including several commercial + SSH implementations. The default import format is ``RFC4716''. -J num_lines Exit after screening the specified number of lines while performing DH candidate screening using the -T option. -j start_line Start screening at the specified line number while performing DH candidate screening using the -T option. -K checkpt Write the last line processed to the file checkpt while performing DH candidate screening using the -T option. This will be used to skip lines in the input file that have already been - processed if the job is restarted. This option allows importing - keys from other software, including several commercial SSH - implementations. The default import format is ``RFC4716''. + processed if the job is restarted. -k Generate a KRL file. In this mode, ssh-keygen will generate a KRL file at the location specified via the -f flag that revokes every key or certificate presented on the command line. Keys/certificates to be revoked may be specified by public key file or using the format described in the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section. -L Prints the contents of a certificate. -l Show fingerprint of specified public key file. Private RSA1 keys are also supported. For RSA and DSA keys ssh-keygen tries to find the matching public key file and prints its fingerprint. If combined with -v, an ASCII art representation of the key is supplied with the fingerprint. -M memory Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX. -m key_format Specify a key format for the -i (import) or -e (export) conversion options. The supported key formats are: ``RFC4716'' (RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key), ``PKCS8'' (PEM PKCS8 public key) or ``PEM'' (PEM public key). The default conversion format is ``RFC4716''. -N new_passphrase Provides the new passphrase. -n principals Specify one or more principals (user or host names) to be included in a certificate when signing a key. Multiple principals may be specified, separated by commas. Please see the CERTIFICATES section for details. -O option Specify a certificate option when signing a key. This option may be specified multiple times. Please see the CERTIFICATES section for details. The options that are valid for user certificates are: clear Clear all enabled permissions. This is useful for clearing the default set of permissions so permissions may be added individually. force-command=command Forces the execution of command instead of any shell or command specified by the user when the certificate is used for authentication. no-agent-forwarding Disable ssh-agent(1) forwarding (permitted by default). no-port-forwarding Disable port forwarding (permitted by default). no-pty Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default). no-user-rc Disable execution of ~/.ssh/rc by sshd(8) (permitted by default). no-x11-forwarding Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default). permit-agent-forwarding Allows ssh-agent(1) forwarding. permit-port-forwarding Allows port forwarding. permit-pty Allows PTY allocation. permit-user-rc Allows execution of ~/.ssh/rc by sshd(8). permit-x11-forwarding Allows X11 forwarding. source-address=address_list Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate is considered valid. The address_list is a comma- separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR format. At present, no options are valid for host keys. -o Causes ssh-keygen to save SSH protocol 2 private keys using the new OpenSSH format rather than the more compatible PEM format. The new format has increased resistance to brute-force password cracking but is not supported by versions of OpenSSH prior to 6.5. Ed25519 keys always use the new private key format. -P passphrase Provides the (old) passphrase. -p Requests changing the passphrase of a private key file instead of creating a new private key. The program will prompt for the file containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for the new passphrase. -Q Test whether keys have been revoked in a KRL. -q Silence ssh-keygen. -R hostname Removes all keys belonging to hostname from a known_hosts file. This option is useful to delete hashed hosts (see the -H option above). -r hostname Print the SSHFP fingerprint resource record named hostname for the specified public key file. -S start Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX. -s ca_key Certify (sign) a public key using the specified CA key. Please see the CERTIFICATES section for details. When generating a KRL, -s specifies a path to a CA public key file used to revoke certificates directly by key ID or serial number. See the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details. -T output_file Test DH group exchange candidate primes (generated using the -G option) for safety. - -t type + -t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1 Specifies the type of key to create. The possible values are ``rsa1'' for protocol version 1 and ``dsa'', ``ecdsa'', ``ed25519'', or ``rsa'' for protocol version 2. -u Update a KRL. When specified with -k, keys listed via the command line are added to the existing KRL rather than a new KRL being created. -V validity_interval Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate. A validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that the certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time, or may consist of two times separated by a colon to indicate an explicit time interval. The start time may be specified as a date in YYYYMMDD format, a time in YYYYMMDDHHMMSS format or a relative time (to the current time) consisting of a minus sign followed by a relative time in the format described in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5). The end time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date, a YYYYMMDDHHMMSS time or a relative time starting with a plus character. For example: ``+52w1d'' (valid from now to 52 weeks and one day from now), ``-4w:+4w'' (valid from four weeks ago to four weeks from now), ``20100101123000:20110101123000'' (valid from 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011), ``-1d:20110101'' (valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011). -v Verbose mode. Causes ssh-keygen to print debugging messages about its progress. This is helpful for debugging moduli generation. Multiple -v options increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3. -W generator Specify desired generator when testing candidate moduli for DH- GEX. -y This option will read a private OpenSSH format file and print an OpenSSH public key to stdout. -z serial_number Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to distinguish this certificate from others from the same CA. The default serial number is zero. When generating a KRL, the -z flag is used to specify a KRL version number. MODULI GENERATION ssh-keygen may be used to generate groups for the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange (DH-GEX) protocol. Generating these groups is a two-step process: first, candidate primes are generated using a fast, but memory intensive process. These candidate primes are then tested for suitability (a CPU-intensive process). Generation of primes is performed using the -G option. The desired length of the primes may be specified by the -b option. For example: # ssh-keygen -G moduli-2048.candidates -b 2048 By default, the search for primes begins at a random point in the desired length range. This may be overridden using the -S option, which specifies a different start point (in hex). Once a set of candidates have been generated, they must be screened for suitability. This may be performed using the -T option. In this mode ssh-keygen will read candidates from standard input (or a file specified using the -f option). For example: # ssh-keygen -T moduli-2048 -f moduli-2048.candidates By default, each candidate will be subjected to 100 primality tests. This may be overridden using the -a option. The DH generator value will be chosen automatically for the prime under consideration. If a specific generator is desired, it may be requested using the -W option. Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5. Screened DH groups may be installed in /etc/moduli. It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and that both ends of a connection share common moduli. CERTIFICATES ssh-keygen supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be used for user or host authentication. Certificates consist of a public key, some identity information, zero or more principal (user or host) names and a set of options that are signed by a Certification Authority (CA) key. Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify its signature on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys. Note that OpenSSH certificates are a different, and much simpler, format to the X.509 certificates used in ssl(8). ssh-keygen supports two types of certificates: user and host. User certificates authenticate users to servers, whereas host certificates authenticate server hosts to users. To generate a user certificate: $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id /path/to/user_key.pub The resultant certificate will be placed in /path/to/user_key-cert.pub. A host certificate requires the -h option: $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id -h /path/to/host_key.pub The host certificate will be output to /path/to/host_key-cert.pub. It is possible to sign using a CA key stored in a PKCS#11 token by providing the token library using -D and identifying the CA key by providing its public half as an argument to -s: $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id host_key.pub In all cases, key_id is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server when the certificate is used for authentication. Certificates may be limited to be valid for a set of principal (user/host) names. By default, generated certificates are valid for all users or hosts. To generate a certificate for a specified set of principals: $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain user_key.pub Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may be specified through certificate options. A certificate option may disable features of the SSH session, may be valid only when presented from particular source addresses or may force the use of a specific command. For a list of valid certificate options, see the documentation for the -O option above. Finally, certificates may be defined with a validity lifetime. The -V option allows specification of certificate start and end times. A certificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be considered valid. By default, certificates are valid from UNIX Epoch to the distant future. For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA public key must be trusted by sshd(8) or ssh(1). Please refer to those manual pages for details. KEY REVOCATION LISTS ssh-keygen is able to manage OpenSSH format Key Revocation Lists (KRLs). These binary files specify keys or certificates to be revoked using a compact format, taking as little as one bit per certificate if they are being revoked by serial number. KRLs may be generated using the -k flag. This option reads one or more files from the command line and generates a new KRL. The files may either contain a KRL specification (see below) or public keys, listed one per line. Plain public keys are revoked by listing their hash or contents in the KRL and certificates revoked by serial number or key ID (if the serial is zero or not available). Revoking keys using a KRL specification offers explicit control over the types of record used to revoke keys and may be used to directly revoke certificates by serial number or key ID without having the complete original certificate on hand. A KRL specification consists of lines containing one of the following directives followed by a colon and some directive-specific information. serial: serial_number[-serial_number] Revokes a certificate with the specified serial number. Serial numbers are 64-bit values, not including zero and may be expressed in decimal, hex or octal. If two serial numbers are specified separated by a hyphen, then the range of serial numbers including and between each is revoked. The CA key must have been specified on the ssh-keygen command line using the -s option. id: key_id Revokes a certificate with the specified key ID string. The CA key must have been specified on the ssh-keygen command line using the -s option. key: public_key Revokes the specified key. If a certificate is listed, then it is revoked as a plain public key. sha1: public_key Revokes the specified key by its SHA1 hash. KRLs may be updated using the -u flag in addition to -k. When this option is specified, keys listed via the command line are merged into the KRL, adding to those already there. It is also possible, given a KRL, to test whether it revokes a particular key (or keys). The -Q flag will query an existing KRL, testing each key specified on the commandline. If any key listed on the command line has been revoked (or an error encountered) then ssh-keygen will exit with a non-zero exit status. A zero exit status will only be returned if no key was revoked. FILES ~/.ssh/identity Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the user. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be used to encrypt the private part of this file using 3DES. This file is not automatically accessed by ssh-keygen but it is offered as the default file for the private key. ssh(1) will read this file when a login attempt is made. ~/.ssh/identity.pub Contains the protocol version 1 RSA public key for authentication. The contents of this file should be added to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user wishes to log in using RSA authentication. There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret. ~/.ssh/id_dsa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 ~/.ssh/id_rsa Contains the protocol version 2 DSA, ECDSA, ED25519 or RSA authentication identity of the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the user. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be used to encrypt the private part of this file using 128-bit AES. This file is not automatically accessed by ssh-keygen but it is offered as the default file for the private key. ssh(1) will read this file when a login attempt is made. ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub Contains the protocol version 2 DSA, ECDSA, ED25519 or RSA public key for authentication. The contents of this file should be added to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication. There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret. /etc/moduli Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX. The file format is described in moduli(5). SEE ALSO ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), moduli(5), sshd(8) The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format, RFC 4716, 2006. AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. -OpenBSD 5.5 February 5, 2014 OpenBSD 5.5 +OpenBSD 5.6 March 31, 2014 OpenBSD 5.6 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keygen.1 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keygen.1 (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keygen.1 (revision 276707) @@ -1,854 +1,854 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.120 2014/02/05 20:13:25 naddy Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.122 2014/03/31 13:39:34 jmc Exp $ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: February 5 2014 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: March 31 2014 $ .Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh-keygen .Nd authentication key generation, management and conversion .Sh SYNOPSIS .Bk -words .Nm ssh-keygen .Op Fl q .Op Fl b Ar bits -.Op Fl t Ar type +.Op Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1 .Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase .Op Fl C Ar comment .Op Fl f Ar output_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl p .Op Fl P Ar old_passphrase .Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase .Op Fl f Ar keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl i .Op Fl m Ar key_format .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl e .Op Fl m Ar key_format .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl y .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl c .Op Fl P Ar passphrase .Op Fl C Ar comment .Op Fl f Ar keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl l .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl B .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl D Ar pkcs11 .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl F Ar hostname .Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file .Op Fl l .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl H .Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl R Ar hostname .Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl r Ar hostname .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Op Fl g .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl G Ar output_file .Op Fl v .Op Fl b Ar bits .Op Fl M Ar memory .Op Fl S Ar start_point .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl T Ar output_file .Fl f Ar input_file .Op Fl v .Op Fl a Ar rounds .Op Fl J Ar num_lines .Op Fl j Ar start_line .Op Fl K Ar checkpt .Op Fl W Ar generator .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl s Ar ca_key .Fl I Ar certificate_identity .Op Fl h .Op Fl n Ar principals .Op Fl O Ar option .Op Fl V Ar validity_interval .Op Fl z Ar serial_number .Ar .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl L .Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl A .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl k .Fl f Ar krl_file .Op Fl u .Op Fl s Ar ca_public .Op Fl z Ar version_number .Ar .Nm ssh-keygen .Fl Q .Fl f Ar krl_file .Ar .Ek .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm generates, manages and converts authentication keys for .Xr ssh 1 . .Nm can create RSA keys for use by SSH protocol version 1 and DSA, ECDSA, ED25519 or RSA keys for use by SSH protocol version 2. The type of key to be generated is specified with the .Fl t option. If invoked without any arguments, .Nm will generate an RSA key for use in SSH protocol 2 connections. .Pp .Nm is also used to generate groups for use in Diffie-Hellman group exchange (DH-GEX). See the .Sx MODULI GENERATION section for details. .Pp Finally, .Nm can be used to generate and update Key Revocation Lists, and to test whether given keys have been revoked by one. See the .Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details. .Pp Normally each user wishing to use SSH with public key authentication runs this once to create the authentication key in .Pa ~/.ssh/identity , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 or .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa . Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys, as seen in .Pa /etc/rc . .Pp Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which to store the private key. The public key is stored in a file with the same name but .Dq .pub appended. The program also asks for a passphrase. The passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase (host keys must have an empty passphrase), or it may be a string of arbitrary length. A passphrase is similar to a password, except it can be a phrase with a series of words, punctuation, numbers, whitespace, or any string of characters you want. Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long, are not simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English prose has only 1-2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad passphrases), and contain a mix of upper and lowercase letters, numbers, and non-alphanumeric characters. The passphrase can be changed later by using the .Fl p option. .Pp There is no way to recover a lost passphrase. If the passphrase is lost or forgotten, a new key must be generated and the corresponding public key copied to other machines. .Pp For RSA1 keys, there is also a comment field in the key file that is only for convenience to the user to help identify the key. The comment can tell what the key is for, or whatever is useful. The comment is initialized to .Dq user@host when the key is created, but can be changed using the .Fl c option. .Pp After a key is generated, instructions below detail where the keys should be placed to be activated. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl A For each of the key types (rsa1, rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519) for which host keys do not exist, generate the host keys with the default key file path, an empty passphrase, default bits for the key type, and default comment. This is used by .Pa /etc/rc to generate new host keys. .It Fl a Ar rounds When saving a new-format private key (i.e. an ed25519 key or any SSH protocol 2 key when the .Fl o flag is set), this option specifies the number of KDF (key derivation function) rounds used. Higher numbers result in slower passphrase verification and increased resistance to brute-force password cracking (should the keys be stolen). .Pp When screening DH-GEX candidates ( using the .Fl T command). This option specifies the number of primality tests to perform. .It Fl B Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key file. .It Fl b Ar bits Specifies the number of bits in the key to create. For RSA keys, the minimum size is 768 bits and the default is 2048 bits. Generally, 2048 bits is considered sufficient. DSA keys must be exactly 1024 bits as specified by FIPS 186-2. For ECDSA keys, the .Fl b flag determines the key length by selecting from one of three elliptic curve sizes: 256, 384 or 521 bits. Attempting to use bit lengths other than these three values for ECDSA keys will fail. ED25519 keys have a fixed length and the .Fl b flag will be ignored. .It Fl C Ar comment Provides a new comment. .It Fl c Requests changing the comment in the private and public key files. This operation is only supported for RSA1 keys. The program will prompt for the file containing the private keys, for the passphrase if the key has one, and for the new comment. .It Fl D Ar pkcs11 Download the RSA public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library .Ar pkcs11 . When used in combination with .Fl s , this option indicates that a CA key resides in a PKCS#11 token (see the .Sx CERTIFICATES section for details). .It Fl e This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and print to stdout the key in one of the formats specified by the .Fl m option. The default export format is .Dq RFC4716 . This option allows exporting OpenSSH keys for use by other programs, including several commercial SSH implementations. .It Fl F Ar hostname Search for the specified .Ar hostname in a .Pa known_hosts file, listing any occurrences found. This option is useful to find hashed host names or addresses and may also be used in conjunction with the .Fl H option to print found keys in a hashed format. .It Fl f Ar filename Specifies the filename of the key file. .It Fl G Ar output_file Generate candidate primes for DH-GEX. These primes must be screened for safety (using the .Fl T option) before use. .It Fl g Use generic DNS format when printing fingerprint resource records using the .Fl r command. .It Fl H Hash a .Pa known_hosts file. This replaces all hostnames and addresses with hashed representations within the specified file; the original content is moved to a file with a .old suffix. These hashes may be used normally by .Nm ssh and .Nm sshd , but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed. This option will not modify existing hashed hostnames and is therefore safe to use on files that mix hashed and non-hashed names. .It Fl h When signing a key, create a host certificate instead of a user certificate. Please see the .Sx CERTIFICATES section for details. .It Fl I Ar certificate_identity Specify the key identity when signing a public key. Please see the .Sx CERTIFICATES section for details. .It Fl i This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file in the format specified by the .Fl m option and print an OpenSSH compatible private (or public) key to stdout. +This option allows importing keys from other software, including several +commercial SSH implementations. +The default import format is +.Dq RFC4716 . .It Fl J Ar num_lines Exit after screening the specified number of lines while performing DH candidate screening using the .Fl T option. .It Fl j Ar start_line Start screening at the specified line number while performing DH candidate screening using the .Fl T option. .It Fl K Ar checkpt Write the last line processed to the file .Ar checkpt while performing DH candidate screening using the .Fl T option. This will be used to skip lines in the input file that have already been processed if the job is restarted. -This option allows importing keys from other software, including several -commercial SSH implementations. -The default import format is -.Dq RFC4716 . .It Fl k Generate a KRL file. In this mode, .Nm will generate a KRL file at the location specified via the .Fl f flag that revokes every key or certificate presented on the command line. Keys/certificates to be revoked may be specified by public key file or using the format described in the .Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS section. .It Fl L Prints the contents of a certificate. .It Fl l Show fingerprint of specified public key file. Private RSA1 keys are also supported. For RSA and DSA keys .Nm tries to find the matching public key file and prints its fingerprint. If combined with .Fl v , an ASCII art representation of the key is supplied with the fingerprint. .It Fl M Ar memory Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX. .It Fl m Ar key_format Specify a key format for the .Fl i (import) or .Fl e (export) conversion options. The supported key formats are: .Dq RFC4716 (RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key), .Dq PKCS8 (PEM PKCS8 public key) or .Dq PEM (PEM public key). The default conversion format is .Dq RFC4716 . .It Fl N Ar new_passphrase Provides the new passphrase. .It Fl n Ar principals Specify one or more principals (user or host names) to be included in a certificate when signing a key. Multiple principals may be specified, separated by commas. Please see the .Sx CERTIFICATES section for details. .It Fl O Ar option Specify a certificate option when signing a key. This option may be specified multiple times. Please see the .Sx CERTIFICATES section for details. The options that are valid for user certificates are: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Ic clear Clear all enabled permissions. This is useful for clearing the default set of permissions so permissions may be added individually. .It Ic force-command Ns = Ns Ar command Forces the execution of .Ar command instead of any shell or command specified by the user when the certificate is used for authentication. .It Ic no-agent-forwarding Disable .Xr ssh-agent 1 forwarding (permitted by default). .It Ic no-port-forwarding Disable port forwarding (permitted by default). .It Ic no-pty Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default). .It Ic no-user-rc Disable execution of .Pa ~/.ssh/rc by .Xr sshd 8 (permitted by default). .It Ic no-x11-forwarding Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default). .It Ic permit-agent-forwarding Allows .Xr ssh-agent 1 forwarding. .It Ic permit-port-forwarding Allows port forwarding. .It Ic permit-pty Allows PTY allocation. .It Ic permit-user-rc Allows execution of .Pa ~/.ssh/rc by .Xr sshd 8 . .It Ic permit-x11-forwarding Allows X11 forwarding. .It Ic source-address Ns = Ns Ar address_list Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate is considered valid. The .Ar address_list is a comma-separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR format. .El .Pp At present, no options are valid for host keys. .It Fl o Causes .Nm to save SSH protocol 2 private keys using the new OpenSSH format rather than the more compatible PEM format. The new format has increased resistance to brute-force password cracking but is not supported by versions of OpenSSH prior to 6.5. Ed25519 keys always use the new private key format. .It Fl P Ar passphrase Provides the (old) passphrase. .It Fl p Requests changing the passphrase of a private key file instead of creating a new private key. The program will prompt for the file containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for the new passphrase. .It Fl Q Test whether keys have been revoked in a KRL. .It Fl q Silence .Nm ssh-keygen . .It Fl R Ar hostname Removes all keys belonging to .Ar hostname from a .Pa known_hosts file. This option is useful to delete hashed hosts (see the .Fl H option above). .It Fl r Ar hostname Print the SSHFP fingerprint resource record named .Ar hostname for the specified public key file. .It Fl S Ar start Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX. .It Fl s Ar ca_key Certify (sign) a public key using the specified CA key. Please see the .Sx CERTIFICATES section for details. .Pp When generating a KRL, .Fl s specifies a path to a CA public key file used to revoke certificates directly by key ID or serial number. See the .Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details. .It Fl T Ar output_file Test DH group exchange candidate primes (generated using the .Fl G option) for safety. -.It Fl t Ar type +.It Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1 Specifies the type of key to create. The possible values are .Dq rsa1 for protocol version 1 and .Dq dsa , .Dq ecdsa , .Dq ed25519 , or .Dq rsa for protocol version 2. .It Fl u Update a KRL. When specified with .Fl k , keys listed via the command line are added to the existing KRL rather than a new KRL being created. .It Fl V Ar validity_interval Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate. A validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that the certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time, or may consist of two times separated by a colon to indicate an explicit time interval. The start time may be specified as a date in YYYYMMDD format, a time in YYYYMMDDHHMMSS format or a relative time (to the current time) consisting of a minus sign followed by a relative time in the format described in the TIME FORMATS section of .Xr sshd_config 5 . The end time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date, a YYYYMMDDHHMMSS time or a relative time starting with a plus character. .Pp For example: .Dq +52w1d (valid from now to 52 weeks and one day from now), .Dq -4w:+4w (valid from four weeks ago to four weeks from now), .Dq 20100101123000:20110101123000 (valid from 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011), .Dq -1d:20110101 (valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011). .It Fl v Verbose mode. Causes .Nm to print debugging messages about its progress. This is helpful for debugging moduli generation. Multiple .Fl v options increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3. .It Fl W Ar generator Specify desired generator when testing candidate moduli for DH-GEX. .It Fl y This option will read a private OpenSSH format file and print an OpenSSH public key to stdout. .It Fl z Ar serial_number Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to distinguish this certificate from others from the same CA. The default serial number is zero. .Pp When generating a KRL, the .Fl z flag is used to specify a KRL version number. .El .Sh MODULI GENERATION .Nm may be used to generate groups for the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange (DH-GEX) protocol. Generating these groups is a two-step process: first, candidate primes are generated using a fast, but memory intensive process. These candidate primes are then tested for suitability (a CPU-intensive process). .Pp Generation of primes is performed using the .Fl G option. The desired length of the primes may be specified by the .Fl b option. For example: .Pp .Dl # ssh-keygen -G moduli-2048.candidates -b 2048 .Pp By default, the search for primes begins at a random point in the desired length range. This may be overridden using the .Fl S option, which specifies a different start point (in hex). .Pp Once a set of candidates have been generated, they must be screened for suitability. This may be performed using the .Fl T option. In this mode .Nm will read candidates from standard input (or a file specified using the .Fl f option). For example: .Pp .Dl # ssh-keygen -T moduli-2048 -f moduli-2048.candidates .Pp By default, each candidate will be subjected to 100 primality tests. This may be overridden using the .Fl a option. The DH generator value will be chosen automatically for the prime under consideration. If a specific generator is desired, it may be requested using the .Fl W option. Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5. .Pp Screened DH groups may be installed in .Pa /etc/moduli . It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and that both ends of a connection share common moduli. .Sh CERTIFICATES .Nm supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be used for user or host authentication. Certificates consist of a public key, some identity information, zero or more principal (user or host) names and a set of options that are signed by a Certification Authority (CA) key. Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify its signature on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys. Note that OpenSSH certificates are a different, and much simpler, format to the X.509 certificates used in .Xr ssl 8 . .Pp .Nm supports two types of certificates: user and host. User certificates authenticate users to servers, whereas host certificates authenticate server hosts to users. To generate a user certificate: .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id /path/to/user_key.pub .Pp The resultant certificate will be placed in .Pa /path/to/user_key-cert.pub . A host certificate requires the .Fl h option: .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id -h /path/to/host_key.pub .Pp The host certificate will be output to .Pa /path/to/host_key-cert.pub . .Pp It is possible to sign using a CA key stored in a PKCS#11 token by providing the token library using .Fl D and identifying the CA key by providing its public half as an argument to .Fl s : .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id host_key.pub .Pp In all cases, .Ar key_id is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server when the certificate is used for authentication. .Pp Certificates may be limited to be valid for a set of principal (user/host) names. By default, generated certificates are valid for all users or hosts. To generate a certificate for a specified set of principals: .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub .Dl "$ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain user_key.pub" .Pp Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may be specified through certificate options. A certificate option may disable features of the SSH session, may be valid only when presented from particular source addresses or may force the use of a specific command. For a list of valid certificate options, see the documentation for the .Fl O option above. .Pp Finally, certificates may be defined with a validity lifetime. The .Fl V option allows specification of certificate start and end times. A certificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be considered valid. By default, certificates are valid from .Ux Epoch to the distant future. .Pp For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA public key must be trusted by .Xr sshd 8 or .Xr ssh 1 . Please refer to those manual pages for details. .Sh KEY REVOCATION LISTS .Nm is able to manage OpenSSH format Key Revocation Lists (KRLs). These binary files specify keys or certificates to be revoked using a compact format, taking as little as one bit per certificate if they are being revoked by serial number. .Pp KRLs may be generated using the .Fl k flag. This option reads one or more files from the command line and generates a new KRL. The files may either contain a KRL specification (see below) or public keys, listed one per line. Plain public keys are revoked by listing their hash or contents in the KRL and certificates revoked by serial number or key ID (if the serial is zero or not available). .Pp Revoking keys using a KRL specification offers explicit control over the types of record used to revoke keys and may be used to directly revoke certificates by serial number or key ID without having the complete original certificate on hand. A KRL specification consists of lines containing one of the following directives followed by a colon and some directive-specific information. .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm serial : Ar serial_number Ns Op - Ns Ar serial_number Revokes a certificate with the specified serial number. Serial numbers are 64-bit values, not including zero and may be expressed in decimal, hex or octal. If two serial numbers are specified separated by a hyphen, then the range of serial numbers including and between each is revoked. The CA key must have been specified on the .Nm command line using the .Fl s option. .It Cm id : Ar key_id Revokes a certificate with the specified key ID string. The CA key must have been specified on the .Nm command line using the .Fl s option. .It Cm key : Ar public_key Revokes the specified key. If a certificate is listed, then it is revoked as a plain public key. .It Cm sha1 : Ar public_key Revokes the specified key by its SHA1 hash. .El .Pp KRLs may be updated using the .Fl u flag in addition to .Fl k . When this option is specified, keys listed via the command line are merged into the KRL, adding to those already there. .Pp It is also possible, given a KRL, to test whether it revokes a particular key (or keys). The .Fl Q flag will query an existing KRL, testing each key specified on the commandline. If any key listed on the command line has been revoked (or an error encountered) then .Nm will exit with a non-zero exit status. A zero exit status will only be returned if no key was revoked. .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Pa ~/.ssh/identity Contains the protocol version 1 RSA authentication identity of the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the user. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be used to encrypt the private part of this file using 3DES. This file is not automatically accessed by .Nm but it is offered as the default file for the private key. .Xr ssh 1 will read this file when a login attempt is made. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub Contains the protocol version 1 RSA public key for authentication. The contents of this file should be added to .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user wishes to log in using RSA authentication. There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa Contains the protocol version 2 DSA, ECDSA, ED25519 or RSA authentication identity of the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the user. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be used to encrypt the private part of this file using 128-bit AES. This file is not automatically accessed by .Nm but it is offered as the default file for the private key. .Xr ssh 1 will read this file when a login attempt is made. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub Contains the protocol version 2 DSA, ECDSA, ED25519 or RSA public key for authentication. The contents of this file should be added to .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication. There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret. .Pp .It Pa /etc/moduli Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX. The file format is described in .Xr moduli 5 . .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 , .Xr moduli 5 , .Xr sshd 8 .Rs .%R RFC 4716 .%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format" .%D 2006 .Re .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keygen.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keygen.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keygen.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,2704 +1,2718 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.241 2014/02/05 20:13:25 naddy Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.249 2014/07/03 03:47:27 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Identity and host key generation and maintenance. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "key.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "uuencode.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "match.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "dns.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "krl.h" /* Number of bits in the RSA/DSA key. This value can be set on the command line. */ #define DEFAULT_BITS 2048 #define DEFAULT_BITS_DSA 1024 #define DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA 256 u_int32_t bits = 0; /* * Flag indicating that we just want to change the passphrase. This can be * set on the command line. */ int change_passphrase = 0; /* * Flag indicating that we just want to change the comment. This can be set * on the command line. */ int change_comment = 0; int quiet = 0; int log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; /* Flag indicating that we want to hash a known_hosts file */ int hash_hosts = 0; /* Flag indicating that we want lookup a host in known_hosts file */ int find_host = 0; /* Flag indicating that we want to delete a host from a known_hosts file */ int delete_host = 0; /* Flag indicating that we want to show the contents of a certificate */ int show_cert = 0; /* Flag indicating that we just want to see the key fingerprint */ int print_fingerprint = 0; int print_bubblebabble = 0; /* The identity file name, given on the command line or entered by the user. */ char identity_file[1024]; int have_identity = 0; /* This is set to the passphrase if given on the command line. */ char *identity_passphrase = NULL; /* This is set to the new passphrase if given on the command line. */ char *identity_new_passphrase = NULL; /* This is set to the new comment if given on the command line. */ char *identity_comment = NULL; /* Path to CA key when certifying keys. */ char *ca_key_path = NULL; /* Certificate serial number */ unsigned long long cert_serial = 0; /* Key type when certifying */ u_int cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER; /* "key ID" of signed key */ char *cert_key_id = NULL; /* Comma-separated list of principal names for certifying keys */ char *cert_principals = NULL; /* Validity period for certificates */ u_int64_t cert_valid_from = 0; u_int64_t cert_valid_to = ~0ULL; /* Certificate options */ #define CERTOPT_X_FWD (1) #define CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD (1<<1) #define CERTOPT_PORT_FWD (1<<2) #define CERTOPT_PTY (1<<3) #define CERTOPT_USER_RC (1<<4) #define CERTOPT_DEFAULT (CERTOPT_X_FWD|CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD| \ CERTOPT_PORT_FWD|CERTOPT_PTY|CERTOPT_USER_RC) u_int32_t certflags_flags = CERTOPT_DEFAULT; char *certflags_command = NULL; char *certflags_src_addr = NULL; /* Conversion to/from various formats */ int convert_to = 0; int convert_from = 0; enum { FMT_RFC4716, FMT_PKCS8, FMT_PEM } convert_format = FMT_RFC4716; int print_public = 0; int print_generic = 0; char *key_type_name = NULL; /* Load key from this PKCS#11 provider */ char *pkcs11provider = NULL; /* Use new OpenSSH private key format when writing SSH2 keys instead of PEM */ int use_new_format = 0; /* Cipher for new-format private keys */ char *new_format_cipher = NULL; /* * Number of KDF rounds to derive new format keys / * number of primality trials when screening moduli. */ int rounds = 0; /* argv0 */ extern char *__progname; -char hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN]; +char hostname[NI_MAXHOST]; /* moduli.c */ int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *); int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long, unsigned long); static void type_bits_valid(int type, u_int32_t *bitsp) { u_int maxbits; if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) { fprintf(stderr, "unknown key type %s\n", key_type_name); exit(1); } if (*bitsp == 0) { if (type == KEY_DSA) *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_DSA; else if (type == KEY_ECDSA) *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA; else *bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS; } maxbits = (type == KEY_DSA) ? OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS : OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS; if (*bitsp > maxbits) { fprintf(stderr, "key bits exceeds maximum %d\n", maxbits); exit(1); } +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL if (type == KEY_DSA && *bitsp != 1024) fatal("DSA keys must be 1024 bits"); else if (type != KEY_ECDSA && type != KEY_ED25519 && *bitsp < 768) fatal("Key must at least be 768 bits"); else if (type == KEY_ECDSA && key_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(*bitsp) == -1) fatal("Invalid ECDSA key length - valid lengths are " "256, 384 or 521 bits"); +#endif } static void ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt) { char buf[1024]; char *name = NULL; if (key_type_name == NULL) name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA; else { switch (key_type_from_name(key_type_name)) { case KEY_RSA1: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_IDENTITY; break; case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA; break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA; break; #endif case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_RSA: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA; break; case KEY_ED25519: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519; break; default: fprintf(stderr, "bad key type\n"); exit(1); break; } } snprintf(identity_file, sizeof(identity_file), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, name); fprintf(stderr, "%s (%s): ", prompt, identity_file); if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL) exit(1); buf[strcspn(buf, "\n")] = '\0'; if (strcmp(buf, "") != 0) strlcpy(identity_file, buf, sizeof(identity_file)); have_identity = 1; } static Key * load_identity(char *filename) { char *pass; Key *prv; prv = key_load_private(filename, "", NULL); if (prv == NULL) { if (identity_passphrase) pass = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); else pass = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); prv = key_load_private(filename, pass, NULL); explicit_bzero(pass, strlen(pass)); free(pass); } return prv; } #define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----" #define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END "---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----" #define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----" #define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC 0x3f6ff9eb +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL static void do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, Key *k) { u_int len; u_char *blob; char comment[61]; if (k->type == KEY_RSA1) { fprintf(stderr, "version 1 keys are not supported\n"); exit(1); } if (key_to_blob(k, &blob, &len) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "key_to_blob failed\n"); exit(1); } /* Comment + surrounds must fit into 72 chars (RFC 4716 sec 3.3) */ snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment), "%u-bit %s, converted by %s@%s from OpenSSH", key_size(k), key_type(k), pw->pw_name, hostname); fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN); fprintf(stdout, "Comment: \"%s\"\n", comment); dump_base64(stdout, blob, len); fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END); key_free(k); free(blob); exit(0); } static void do_convert_to_pkcs8(Key *k) { switch (key_type_plain(k->type)) { case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: if (!PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->rsa)) fatal("PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY failed"); break; case KEY_DSA: if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa)) fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed"); break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa)) fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed"); break; #endif default: fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, key_type(k)); } exit(0); } static void do_convert_to_pem(Key *k) { switch (key_type_plain(k->type)) { case KEY_RSA1: case KEY_RSA: if (!PEM_write_RSAPublicKey(stdout, k->rsa)) fatal("PEM_write_RSAPublicKey failed"); break; #if notyet /* OpenSSH 0.9.8 lacks this function */ case KEY_DSA: if (!PEM_write_DSAPublicKey(stdout, k->dsa)) fatal("PEM_write_DSAPublicKey failed"); break; #endif /* XXX ECDSA? */ default: fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, key_type(k)); } exit(0); } static void do_convert_to(struct passwd *pw) { Key *k; struct stat st; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((k = key_load_public(identity_file, NULL)) == NULL) { if ((k = load_identity(identity_file)) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "load failed\n"); exit(1); } } switch (convert_format) { case FMT_RFC4716: do_convert_to_ssh2(pw, k); break; case FMT_PKCS8: do_convert_to_pkcs8(k); break; case FMT_PEM: do_convert_to_pem(k); break; default: fatal("%s: unknown key format %d", __func__, convert_format); } exit(0); } static void buffer_get_bignum_bits(Buffer *b, BIGNUM *value) { u_int bignum_bits = buffer_get_int(b); u_int bytes = (bignum_bits + 7) / 8; if (buffer_len(b) < bytes) fatal("buffer_get_bignum_bits: input buffer too small: " "need %d have %d", bytes, buffer_len(b)); if (BN_bin2bn(buffer_ptr(b), bytes, value) == NULL) fatal("buffer_get_bignum_bits: BN_bin2bn failed"); buffer_consume(b, bytes); } static Key * do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(u_char *blob, u_int blen) { Buffer b; Key *key = NULL; char *type, *cipher; - u_char *sig, data[] = "abcde12345"; + u_char *sig = NULL, data[] = "abcde12345"; int magic, rlen, ktype, i1, i2, i3, i4; u_int slen; u_long e; buffer_init(&b); buffer_append(&b, blob, blen); magic = buffer_get_int(&b); if (magic != SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC) { error("bad magic 0x%x != 0x%x", magic, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC); buffer_free(&b); return NULL; } i1 = buffer_get_int(&b); type = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); cipher = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); i2 = buffer_get_int(&b); i3 = buffer_get_int(&b); i4 = buffer_get_int(&b); debug("ignore (%d %d %d %d)", i1, i2, i3, i4); if (strcmp(cipher, "none") != 0) { error("unsupported cipher %s", cipher); free(cipher); buffer_free(&b); free(type); return NULL; } free(cipher); if (strstr(type, "dsa")) { ktype = KEY_DSA; } else if (strstr(type, "rsa")) { ktype = KEY_RSA; } else { buffer_free(&b); free(type); return NULL; } key = key_new_private(ktype); free(type); switch (key->type) { case KEY_DSA: buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->p); buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->g); buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->q); buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->pub_key); buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->dsa->priv_key); break; case KEY_RSA: e = buffer_get_char(&b); debug("e %lx", e); if (e < 30) { e <<= 8; e += buffer_get_char(&b); debug("e %lx", e); e <<= 8; e += buffer_get_char(&b); debug("e %lx", e); } if (!BN_set_word(key->rsa->e, e)) { buffer_free(&b); key_free(key); return NULL; } buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->d); buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->n); buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->iqmp); buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->q); buffer_get_bignum_bits(&b, key->rsa->p); - rsa_generate_additional_parameters(key->rsa); + if (rsa_generate_additional_parameters(key->rsa) != 0) + fatal("%s: rsa_generate_additional_parameters " + "error", __func__); break; } rlen = buffer_len(&b); if (rlen != 0) error("do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob: " "remaining bytes in key blob %d", rlen); buffer_free(&b); /* try the key */ key_sign(key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data)); key_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data)); free(sig); return key; } static int get_line(FILE *fp, char *line, size_t len) { int c; size_t pos = 0; line[0] = '\0'; while ((c = fgetc(fp)) != EOF) { if (pos >= len - 1) { fprintf(stderr, "input line too long.\n"); exit(1); } switch (c) { case '\r': c = fgetc(fp); if (c != EOF && c != '\n' && ungetc(c, fp) == EOF) { fprintf(stderr, "unget: %s\n", strerror(errno)); exit(1); } return pos; case '\n': return pos; } line[pos++] = c; line[pos] = '\0'; } /* We reached EOF */ return -1; } static void do_convert_from_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, Key **k, int *private) { int blen; u_int len; char line[1024]; u_char blob[8096]; char encoded[8096]; int escaped = 0; FILE *fp; if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); encoded[0] = '\0'; while ((blen = get_line(fp, line, sizeof(line))) != -1) { if (blen > 0 && line[blen - 1] == '\\') escaped++; if (strncmp(line, "----", 4) == 0 || strstr(line, ": ") != NULL) { if (strstr(line, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN) != NULL) *private = 1; if (strstr(line, " END ") != NULL) { break; } /* fprintf(stderr, "ignore: %s", line); */ continue; } if (escaped) { escaped--; /* fprintf(stderr, "escaped: %s", line); */ continue; } strlcat(encoded, line, sizeof(encoded)); } len = strlen(encoded); if (((len % 4) == 3) && (encoded[len-1] == '=') && (encoded[len-2] == '=') && (encoded[len-3] == '=')) encoded[len-3] = '\0'; blen = uudecode(encoded, blob, sizeof(blob)); if (blen < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "uudecode failed.\n"); exit(1); } *k = *private ? do_convert_private_ssh2_from_blob(blob, blen) : key_from_blob(blob, blen); if (*k == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "decode blob failed.\n"); exit(1); } fclose(fp); } static void do_convert_from_pkcs8(Key **k, int *private) { EVP_PKEY *pubkey; FILE *fp; if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((pubkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) { fatal("%s: %s is not a recognised public key format", __func__, identity_file); } fclose(fp); switch (EVP_PKEY_type(pubkey->type)) { case EVP_PKEY_RSA: *k = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); (*k)->type = KEY_RSA; (*k)->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pubkey); break; case EVP_PKEY_DSA: *k = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); (*k)->type = KEY_DSA; (*k)->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pubkey); break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case EVP_PKEY_EC: *k = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); (*k)->type = KEY_ECDSA; (*k)->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pubkey); (*k)->ecdsa_nid = key_ecdsa_key_to_nid((*k)->ecdsa); break; #endif default: fatal("%s: unsupported pubkey type %d", __func__, EVP_PKEY_type(pubkey->type)); } EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey); return; } static void do_convert_from_pem(Key **k, int *private) { FILE *fp; RSA *rsa; #ifdef notyet DSA *dsa; #endif if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((rsa = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) { *k = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); (*k)->type = KEY_RSA; (*k)->rsa = rsa; fclose(fp); return; } #if notyet /* OpenSSH 0.9.8 lacks this function */ rewind(fp); if ((dsa = PEM_read_DSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) { *k = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); (*k)->type = KEY_DSA; (*k)->dsa = dsa; fclose(fp); return; } /* XXX ECDSA */ #endif fatal("%s: unrecognised raw private key format", __func__); } static void do_convert_from(struct passwd *pw) { Key *k = NULL; int private = 0, ok = 0; struct stat st; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); switch (convert_format) { case FMT_RFC4716: do_convert_from_ssh2(pw, &k, &private); break; case FMT_PKCS8: do_convert_from_pkcs8(&k, &private); break; case FMT_PEM: do_convert_from_pem(&k, &private); break; default: fatal("%s: unknown key format %d", __func__, convert_format); } if (!private) ok = key_write(k, stdout); if (ok) fprintf(stdout, "\n"); else { switch (k->type) { case KEY_DSA: ok = PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->dsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); break; #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC case KEY_ECDSA: ok = PEM_write_ECPrivateKey(stdout, k->ecdsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); break; #endif case KEY_RSA: ok = PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->rsa, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); break; default: fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, key_type(k)); } } if (!ok) { fprintf(stderr, "key write failed\n"); exit(1); } key_free(k); exit(0); } +#endif static void do_print_public(struct passwd *pw) { Key *prv; struct stat st; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) { perror(identity_file); exit(1); } prv = load_identity(identity_file); if (prv == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "load failed\n"); exit(1); } if (!key_write(prv, stdout)) fprintf(stderr, "key_write failed"); key_free(prv); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); exit(0); } static void do_download(struct passwd *pw) { #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 Key **keys = NULL; int i, nkeys; enum fp_rep rep; enum fp_type fptype; char *fp, *ra; fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX; pkcs11_init(0); nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, NULL, &keys); if (nkeys <= 0) fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11"); for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (print_fingerprint) { fp = key_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep); ra = key_fingerprint(keys[i], SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", key_size(keys[i]), fp, key_type(keys[i])); if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) printf("%s\n", ra); free(ra); free(fp); } else { key_write(keys[i], stdout); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); } key_free(keys[i]); } free(keys); pkcs11_terminate(); exit(0); #else fatal("no pkcs11 support"); #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ } static void do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw) { FILE *f; Key *public; char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, line[16*1024], *fp, *ra; int i, skip = 0, num = 0, invalid = 1; enum fp_rep rep; enum fp_type fptype; struct stat st; fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) { perror(identity_file); exit(1); } public = key_load_public(identity_file, &comment); if (public != NULL) { fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, comment, key_type(public)); if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) printf("%s\n", ra); key_free(public); free(comment); free(ra); free(fp); exit(0); } if (comment) { free(comment); comment = NULL; } if ((f = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), f)) { if ((cp = strchr(line, '\n')) == NULL) { error("line %d too long: %.40s...", num + 1, line); skip = 1; continue; } num++; if (skip) { skip = 0; continue; } *cp = '\0'; /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') continue; i = strtol(cp, &ep, 10); if (i == 0 || ep == NULL || (*ep != ' ' && *ep != '\t')) { int quoted = 0; comment = cp; for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) { if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"') cp++; /* Skip both */ else if (*cp == '"') quoted = !quoted; } if (!*cp) continue; *cp++ = '\0'; } ep = cp; public = key_new(KEY_RSA1); if (key_read(public, &cp) != 1) { cp = ep; key_free(public); public = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); if (key_read(public, &cp) != 1) { key_free(public); continue; } } comment = *cp ? cp : comment; fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, comment ? comment : "no comment", key_type(public)); if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) printf("%s\n", ra); free(ra); free(fp); key_free(public); invalid = 0; } fclose(f); if (invalid) { printf("%s is not a public key file.\n", identity_file); exit(1); } exit(0); } static void do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw) { struct { char *key_type; char *key_type_display; char *path; } key_types[] = { { "rsa1", "RSA1", _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE }, { "rsa", "RSA" ,_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE }, { "dsa", "DSA", _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE }, #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC { "ecdsa", "ECDSA",_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE }, #endif { "ed25519", "ED25519",_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE }, { NULL, NULL, NULL } }; int first = 0; struct stat st; Key *private, *public; char comment[1024]; int i, type, fd; FILE *f; for (i = 0; key_types[i].key_type; i++) { if (stat(key_types[i].path, &st) == 0) continue; if (errno != ENOENT) { printf("Could not stat %s: %s", key_types[i].path, strerror(errno)); first = 0; continue; } if (first == 0) { first = 1; printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname); } printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display); fflush(stdout); type = key_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type); strlcpy(identity_file, key_types[i].path, sizeof(identity_file)); bits = 0; type_bits_valid(type, &bits); private = key_generate(type, bits); if (private == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "key_generate failed\n"); first = 0; continue; } public = key_from_private(private); snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname); if (!key_save_private(private, identity_file, "", comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) { printf("Saving the key failed: %s.\n", identity_file); key_free(private); key_free(public); first = 0; continue; } key_free(private); strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644); if (fd == -1) { printf("Could not save your public key in %s\n", identity_file); key_free(public); first = 0; continue; } f = fdopen(fd, "w"); if (f == NULL) { printf("fdopen %s failed\n", identity_file); key_free(public); first = 0; continue; } if (!key_write(public, f)) { fprintf(stderr, "write key failed\n"); key_free(public); first = 0; continue; } fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment); fclose(f); key_free(public); } if (first != 0) printf("\n"); } static void -printhost(FILE *f, const char *name, Key *public, int ca, int hash) +printhost(FILE *f, const char *name, Key *public, int ca, int revoked, int hash) { if (print_fingerprint) { enum fp_rep rep; enum fp_type fptype; char *fp, *ra; fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_SHA1 : SSH_FP_MD5; rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_HEX; fp = key_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep); ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", key_size(public), fp, name, key_type(public)); if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE) printf("%s\n", ra); free(ra); free(fp); } else { if (hash && (name = host_hash(name, NULL, 0)) == NULL) fatal("hash_host failed"); - fprintf(f, "%s%s%s ", ca ? CA_MARKER : "", ca ? " " : "", name); + fprintf(f, "%s%s%s ", ca ? CA_MARKER " " : "", + revoked ? REVOKE_MARKER " " : "" , name); if (!key_write(public, f)) fatal("key_write failed"); fprintf(f, "\n"); } } static void do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name) { FILE *in, *out = stdout; Key *pub; char *cp, *cp2, *kp, *kp2; char line[16*1024], tmp[MAXPATHLEN], old[MAXPATHLEN]; int c, skip = 0, inplace = 0, num = 0, invalid = 0, has_unhashed = 0; - int ca; + int ca, revoked; int found_key = 0; if (!have_identity) { cp = tilde_expand_filename(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, pw->pw_uid); if (strlcpy(identity_file, cp, sizeof(identity_file)) >= sizeof(identity_file)) fatal("Specified known hosts path too long"); free(cp); have_identity = 1; } if ((in = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); + /* XXX this code is a mess; refactor -djm */ /* * Find hosts goes to stdout, hash and deletions happen in-place * A corner case is ssh-keygen -HF foo, which should go to stdout */ if (!find_host && (hash_hosts || delete_host)) { if (strlcpy(tmp, identity_file, sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) || strlcat(tmp, ".XXXXXXXXXX", sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) || strlcpy(old, identity_file, sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old) || strlcat(old, ".old", sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old)) fatal("known_hosts path too long"); umask(077); if ((c = mkstemp(tmp)) == -1) fatal("mkstemp: %s", strerror(errno)); if ((out = fdopen(c, "w")) == NULL) { c = errno; unlink(tmp); fatal("fdopen: %s", strerror(c)); } inplace = 1; } while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), in)) { if ((cp = strchr(line, '\n')) == NULL) { error("line %d too long: %.40s...", num + 1, line); skip = 1; invalid = 1; continue; } num++; if (skip) { skip = 0; continue; } *cp = '\0'; /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */ for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++) ; if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') { if (inplace) fprintf(out, "%s\n", cp); continue; } - /* Check whether this is a CA key */ + /* Check whether this is a CA key or revocation marker */ if (strncasecmp(cp, CA_MARKER, sizeof(CA_MARKER) - 1) == 0 && (cp[sizeof(CA_MARKER) - 1] == ' ' || cp[sizeof(CA_MARKER) - 1] == '\t')) { ca = 1; cp += sizeof(CA_MARKER); } else ca = 0; + if (strncasecmp(cp, REVOKE_MARKER, + sizeof(REVOKE_MARKER) - 1) == 0 && + (cp[sizeof(REVOKE_MARKER) - 1] == ' ' || + cp[sizeof(REVOKE_MARKER) - 1] == '\t')) { + revoked = 1; + cp += sizeof(REVOKE_MARKER); + } else + revoked = 0; /* Find the end of the host name portion. */ for (kp = cp; *kp && *kp != ' ' && *kp != '\t'; kp++) ; if (*kp == '\0' || *(kp + 1) == '\0') { error("line %d missing key: %.40s...", num, line); invalid = 1; continue; } *kp++ = '\0'; kp2 = kp; pub = key_new(KEY_RSA1); if (key_read(pub, &kp) != 1) { kp = kp2; key_free(pub); pub = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); if (key_read(pub, &kp) != 1) { error("line %d invalid key: %.40s...", num, line); key_free(pub); invalid = 1; continue; } } if (*cp == HASH_DELIM) { if (find_host || delete_host) { cp2 = host_hash(name, cp, strlen(cp)); if (cp2 == NULL) { error("line %d: invalid hashed " "name: %.64s...", num, line); invalid = 1; continue; } c = (strcmp(cp2, cp) == 0); if (find_host && c) { if (!quiet) printf("# Host %s found: " "line %d type %s%s\n", name, num, key_type(pub), - ca ? " (CA key)" : ""); - printhost(out, cp, pub, ca, 0); + ca ? " (CA key)" : + revoked? " (revoked)" : ""); + printhost(out, cp, pub, ca, revoked, 0); found_key = 1; } if (delete_host) { - if (!c && !ca) - printhost(out, cp, pub, ca, 0); - else + if (!c || ca || revoked) { + printhost(out, cp, pub, + ca, revoked, 0); + } else { printf("# Host %s found: " "line %d type %s\n", name, num, key_type(pub)); + } } } else if (hash_hosts) - printhost(out, cp, pub, ca, 0); + printhost(out, cp, pub, ca, revoked, 0); } else { if (find_host || delete_host) { c = (match_hostname(name, cp, strlen(cp)) == 1); if (find_host && c) { if (!quiet) printf("# Host %s found: " "line %d type %s%s\n", name, num, key_type(pub), ca ? " (CA key)" : ""); - printhost(out, name, pub, - ca, hash_hosts && !ca); + printhost(out, name, pub, ca, revoked, + hash_hosts && !(ca || revoked)); found_key = 1; } if (delete_host) { - if (!c && !ca) - printhost(out, cp, pub, ca, 0); - else + if (!c || ca || revoked) { + printhost(out, cp, pub, + ca, revoked, 0); + } else { printf("# Host %s found: " "line %d type %s\n", name, num, key_type(pub)); + } } + } else if (hash_hosts && (ca || revoked)) { + /* Don't hash CA and revoked keys' hostnames */ + printhost(out, cp, pub, ca, revoked, 0); + has_unhashed = 1; } else if (hash_hosts) { + /* Hash each hostname separately */ for (cp2 = strsep(&cp, ","); cp2 != NULL && *cp2 != '\0'; cp2 = strsep(&cp, ",")) { - if (ca) { - fprintf(stderr, "Warning: " - "ignoring CA key for host: " - "%.64s\n", cp2); - printhost(out, cp2, pub, ca, 0); - } else if (strcspn(cp2, "*?!") != + if (strcspn(cp2, "*?!") != strlen(cp2)) { fprintf(stderr, "Warning: " "ignoring host name with " "metacharacters: %.64s\n", cp2); - printhost(out, cp2, pub, ca, 0); - } else - printhost(out, cp2, pub, ca, 1); + printhost(out, cp2, pub, ca, + revoked, 0); + has_unhashed = 1; + } else { + printhost(out, cp2, pub, ca, + revoked, 1); + } } - has_unhashed = 1; } } key_free(pub); } fclose(in); if (invalid) { fprintf(stderr, "%s is not a valid known_hosts file.\n", identity_file); if (inplace) { fprintf(stderr, "Not replacing existing known_hosts " "file because of errors\n"); fclose(out); unlink(tmp); } exit(1); } if (inplace) { fclose(out); /* Backup existing file */ if (unlink(old) == -1 && errno != ENOENT) fatal("unlink %.100s: %s", old, strerror(errno)); if (link(identity_file, old) == -1) fatal("link %.100s to %.100s: %s", identity_file, old, strerror(errno)); /* Move new one into place */ if (rename(tmp, identity_file) == -1) { error("rename\"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", tmp, identity_file, strerror(errno)); unlink(tmp); unlink(old); exit(1); } fprintf(stderr, "%s updated.\n", identity_file); fprintf(stderr, "Original contents retained as %s\n", old); if (has_unhashed) { fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: %s contains unhashed " "entries\n", old); fprintf(stderr, "Delete this file to ensure privacy " "of hostnames\n"); } } exit (find_host && !found_key); } /* * Perform changing a passphrase. The argument is the passwd structure * for the current user. */ static void do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw) { char *comment; char *old_passphrase, *passphrase1, *passphrase2; struct stat st; Key *private; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) { perror(identity_file); exit(1); } /* Try to load the file with empty passphrase. */ private = key_load_private(identity_file, "", &comment); if (private == NULL) { if (identity_passphrase) old_passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); else old_passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter old passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); private = key_load_private(identity_file, old_passphrase, &comment); explicit_bzero(old_passphrase, strlen(old_passphrase)); free(old_passphrase); if (private == NULL) { printf("Bad passphrase.\n"); exit(1); } } printf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment); /* Ask the new passphrase (twice). */ if (identity_new_passphrase) { passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); passphrase2 = NULL; } else { passphrase1 = read_passphrase("Enter new passphrase (empty for no " "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); /* Verify that they are the same. */ if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) { explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); free(passphrase1); free(passphrase2); printf("Pass phrases do not match. Try again.\n"); exit(1); } /* Destroy the other copy. */ explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); free(passphrase2); } /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */ if (!key_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1, comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) { printf("Saving the key failed: %s.\n", identity_file); explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); free(passphrase1); key_free(private); free(comment); exit(1); } /* Destroy the passphrase and the copy of the key in memory. */ explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); free(passphrase1); key_free(private); /* Destroys contents */ free(comment); printf("Your identification has been saved with the new passphrase.\n"); exit(0); } /* * Print the SSHFP RR. */ static int do_print_resource_record(struct passwd *pw, char *fname, char *hname) { Key *public; char *comment = NULL; struct stat st; if (fname == NULL) fatal("%s: no filename", __func__); if (stat(fname, &st) < 0) { if (errno == ENOENT) return 0; perror(fname); exit(1); } public = key_load_public(fname, &comment); if (public != NULL) { export_dns_rr(hname, public, stdout, print_generic); key_free(public); free(comment); return 1; } if (comment) free(comment); printf("failed to read v2 public key from %s.\n", fname); exit(1); } /* * Change the comment of a private key file. */ static void do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw) { char new_comment[1024], *comment, *passphrase; Key *private; Key *public; struct stat st; FILE *f; int fd; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) { perror(identity_file); exit(1); } private = key_load_private(identity_file, "", &comment); if (private == NULL) { if (identity_passphrase) passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); else if (identity_new_passphrase) passphrase = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); else passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); /* Try to load using the passphrase. */ private = key_load_private(identity_file, passphrase, &comment); if (private == NULL) { explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); free(passphrase); printf("Bad passphrase.\n"); exit(1); } } else { passphrase = xstrdup(""); } if (private->type != KEY_RSA1) { fprintf(stderr, "Comments are only supported for RSA1 keys.\n"); key_free(private); exit(1); } printf("Key now has comment '%s'\n", comment); if (identity_comment) { strlcpy(new_comment, identity_comment, sizeof(new_comment)); } else { printf("Enter new comment: "); fflush(stdout); if (!fgets(new_comment, sizeof(new_comment), stdin)) { explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); key_free(private); exit(1); } new_comment[strcspn(new_comment, "\n")] = '\0'; } /* Save the file using the new passphrase. */ if (!key_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase, new_comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) { printf("Saving the key failed: %s.\n", identity_file); explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); free(passphrase); key_free(private); free(comment); exit(1); } explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); free(passphrase); public = key_from_private(private); key_free(private); strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644); if (fd == -1) { printf("Could not save your public key in %s\n", identity_file); exit(1); } f = fdopen(fd, "w"); if (f == NULL) { printf("fdopen %s failed\n", identity_file); exit(1); } if (!key_write(public, f)) fprintf(stderr, "write key failed\n"); key_free(public); fprintf(f, " %s\n", new_comment); fclose(f); free(comment); printf("The comment in your key file has been changed.\n"); exit(0); } static const char * fmt_validity(u_int64_t valid_from, u_int64_t valid_to) { char from[32], to[32]; static char ret[64]; time_t tt; struct tm *tm; *from = *to = '\0'; if (valid_from == 0 && valid_to == 0xffffffffffffffffULL) return "forever"; if (valid_from != 0) { /* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */ tt = valid_from > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : valid_from; tm = localtime(&tt); strftime(from, sizeof(from), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm); } if (valid_to != 0xffffffffffffffffULL) { /* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */ tt = valid_to > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : valid_to; tm = localtime(&tt); strftime(to, sizeof(to), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm); } if (valid_from == 0) { snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "before %s", to); return ret; } if (valid_to == 0xffffffffffffffffULL) { snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "after %s", from); return ret; } snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "from %s to %s", from, to); return ret; } static void add_flag_option(Buffer *c, const char *name) { debug3("%s: %s", __func__, name); buffer_put_cstring(c, name); buffer_put_string(c, NULL, 0); } static void add_string_option(Buffer *c, const char *name, const char *value) { Buffer b; debug3("%s: %s=%s", __func__, name, value); buffer_init(&b); buffer_put_cstring(&b, value); buffer_put_cstring(c, name); buffer_put_string(c, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)); buffer_free(&b); } #define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1 #define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2 static void prepare_options_buf(Buffer *c, int which) { buffer_clear(c); if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 && certflags_command != NULL) add_string_option(c, "force-command", certflags_command); if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_X_FWD) != 0) add_flag_option(c, "permit-X11-forwarding"); if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD) != 0) add_flag_option(c, "permit-agent-forwarding"); if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PORT_FWD) != 0) add_flag_option(c, "permit-port-forwarding"); if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PTY) != 0) add_flag_option(c, "permit-pty"); if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 && (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_USER_RC) != 0) add_flag_option(c, "permit-user-rc"); if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 && certflags_src_addr != NULL) add_string_option(c, "source-address", certflags_src_addr); } static Key * load_pkcs11_key(char *path) { #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 Key **keys = NULL, *public, *private = NULL; int i, nkeys; if ((public = key_load_public(path, NULL)) == NULL) fatal("Couldn't load CA public key \"%s\"", path); nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, identity_passphrase, &keys); debug3("%s: %d keys", __func__, nkeys); if (nkeys <= 0) fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11"); for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (key_equal_public(public, keys[i])) { private = keys[i]; continue; } key_free(keys[i]); } free(keys); key_free(public); return private; #else fatal("no pkcs11 support"); #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ } static void do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv) { int i, fd; u_int n; Key *ca, *public; char *otmp, *tmp, *cp, *out, *comment, **plist = NULL; FILE *f; int v00 = 0; /* legacy keys */ if (key_type_name != NULL) { switch (key_type_from_name(key_type_name)) { case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: v00 = 1; break; case KEY_UNSPEC: if (strcasecmp(key_type_name, "v00") == 0) { v00 = 1; break; } else if (strcasecmp(key_type_name, "v01") == 0) break; /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: fprintf(stderr, "unknown key type %s\n", key_type_name); exit(1); } } +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 pkcs11_init(1); +#endif tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid); if (pkcs11provider != NULL) { if ((ca = load_pkcs11_key(tmp)) == NULL) fatal("No PKCS#11 key matching %s found", ca_key_path); } else if ((ca = load_identity(tmp)) == NULL) fatal("Couldn't load CA key \"%s\"", tmp); free(tmp); for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { /* Split list of principals */ n = 0; if (cert_principals != NULL) { otmp = tmp = xstrdup(cert_principals); plist = NULL; for (; (cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL; n++) { plist = xrealloc(plist, n + 1, sizeof(*plist)); if (*(plist[n] = xstrdup(cp)) == '\0') fatal("Empty principal name"); } free(otmp); } tmp = tilde_expand_filename(argv[i], pw->pw_uid); if ((public = key_load_public(tmp, &comment)) == NULL) fatal("%s: unable to open \"%s\"", __func__, tmp); if (public->type != KEY_RSA && public->type != KEY_DSA && public->type != KEY_ECDSA && public->type != KEY_ED25519) fatal("%s: key \"%s\" type %s cannot be certified", __func__, tmp, key_type(public)); /* Prepare certificate to sign */ if (key_to_certified(public, v00) != 0) fatal("Could not upgrade key %s to certificate", tmp); public->cert->type = cert_key_type; public->cert->serial = (u_int64_t)cert_serial; public->cert->key_id = xstrdup(cert_key_id); public->cert->nprincipals = n; public->cert->principals = plist; public->cert->valid_after = cert_valid_from; public->cert->valid_before = cert_valid_to; if (v00) { - prepare_options_buf(&public->cert->critical, + prepare_options_buf(public->cert->critical, OPTIONS_CRITICAL|OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS); } else { - prepare_options_buf(&public->cert->critical, + prepare_options_buf(public->cert->critical, OPTIONS_CRITICAL); - prepare_options_buf(&public->cert->extensions, + prepare_options_buf(public->cert->extensions, OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS); } public->cert->signature_key = key_from_private(ca); if (key_certify(public, ca) != 0) fatal("Couldn't not certify key %s", tmp); if ((cp = strrchr(tmp, '.')) != NULL && strcmp(cp, ".pub") == 0) *cp = '\0'; xasprintf(&out, "%s-cert.pub", tmp); free(tmp); if ((fd = open(out, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1) fatal("Could not open \"%s\" for writing: %s", out, strerror(errno)); if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) fatal("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (!key_write(public, f)) fatal("Could not write certified key to %s", out); fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment); fclose(f); if (!quiet) { logit("Signed %s key %s: id \"%s\" serial %llu%s%s " "valid %s", key_cert_type(public), out, public->cert->key_id, (unsigned long long)public->cert->serial, cert_principals != NULL ? " for " : "", cert_principals != NULL ? cert_principals : "", fmt_validity(cert_valid_from, cert_valid_to)); } key_free(public); free(out); } +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 pkcs11_terminate(); +#endif exit(0); } static u_int64_t parse_relative_time(const char *s, time_t now) { int64_t mul, secs; mul = *s == '-' ? -1 : 1; if ((secs = convtime(s + 1)) == -1) fatal("Invalid relative certificate time %s", s); if (mul == -1 && secs > now) fatal("Certificate time %s cannot be represented", s); return now + (u_int64_t)(secs * mul); } static u_int64_t parse_absolute_time(const char *s) { struct tm tm; time_t tt; char buf[32], *fmt; /* * POSIX strptime says "The application shall ensure that there * is white-space or other non-alphanumeric characters between * any two conversion specifications" so arrange things this way. */ switch (strlen(s)) { case 8: fmt = "%Y-%m-%d"; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6); break; case 14: fmt = "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S"; snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2sT%.2s:%.2s:%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6, s + 8, s + 10, s + 12); break; default: fatal("Invalid certificate time format %s", s); } memset(&tm, 0, sizeof(tm)); if (strptime(buf, fmt, &tm) == NULL) fatal("Invalid certificate time %s", s); if ((tt = mktime(&tm)) < 0) fatal("Certificate time %s cannot be represented", s); return (u_int64_t)tt; } static void parse_cert_times(char *timespec) { char *from, *to; time_t now = time(NULL); int64_t secs; /* +timespec relative to now */ if (*timespec == '+' && strchr(timespec, ':') == NULL) { if ((secs = convtime(timespec + 1)) == -1) fatal("Invalid relative certificate life %s", timespec); cert_valid_to = now + secs; /* * Backdate certificate one minute to avoid problems on hosts * with poorly-synchronised clocks. */ cert_valid_from = ((now - 59)/ 60) * 60; return; } /* * from:to, where * from := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS * to := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS */ from = xstrdup(timespec); to = strchr(from, ':'); if (to == NULL || from == to || *(to + 1) == '\0') fatal("Invalid certificate life specification %s", timespec); *to++ = '\0'; if (*from == '-' || *from == '+') cert_valid_from = parse_relative_time(from, now); else cert_valid_from = parse_absolute_time(from); if (*to == '-' || *to == '+') cert_valid_to = parse_relative_time(to, now); else cert_valid_to = parse_absolute_time(to); if (cert_valid_to <= cert_valid_from) fatal("Empty certificate validity interval"); free(from); } static void add_cert_option(char *opt) { char *val; if (strcasecmp(opt, "clear") == 0) certflags_flags = 0; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-x11-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_X_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-x11-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_X_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-agent-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-port-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PORT_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PORT_FWD; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-pty") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PTY; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-pty") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PTY; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-user-rc") == 0) certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_USER_RC; else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-user-rc") == 0) certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_USER_RC; else if (strncasecmp(opt, "force-command=", 14) == 0) { val = opt + 14; if (*val == '\0') fatal("Empty force-command option"); if (certflags_command != NULL) fatal("force-command already specified"); certflags_command = xstrdup(val); } else if (strncasecmp(opt, "source-address=", 15) == 0) { val = opt + 15; if (*val == '\0') fatal("Empty source-address option"); if (certflags_src_addr != NULL) fatal("source-address already specified"); if (addr_match_cidr_list(NULL, val) != 0) fatal("Invalid source-address list"); certflags_src_addr = xstrdup(val); } else fatal("Unsupported certificate option \"%s\"", opt); } static void show_options(const Buffer *optbuf, int v00, int in_critical) { - char *name; - u_char *data; + char *name, *arg; + const u_char *data; u_int dlen; Buffer options, option; buffer_init(&options); buffer_append(&options, buffer_ptr(optbuf), buffer_len(optbuf)); buffer_init(&option); while (buffer_len(&options) != 0) { name = buffer_get_string(&options, NULL); data = buffer_get_string_ptr(&options, &dlen); buffer_append(&option, data, dlen); printf(" %s", name); if ((v00 || !in_critical) && (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0 || strcmp(name, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0 || strcmp(name, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0 || strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0 || strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0)) printf("\n"); else if ((v00 || in_critical) && (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0 || strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0)) { - data = buffer_get_string(&option, NULL); - printf(" %s\n", data); - free(data); + arg = buffer_get_cstring(&option, NULL); + printf(" %s\n", arg); + free(arg); } else { printf(" UNKNOWN OPTION (len %u)\n", buffer_len(&option)); buffer_clear(&option); } free(name); if (buffer_len(&option) != 0) fatal("Option corrupt: extra data at end"); } buffer_free(&option); buffer_free(&options); } static void do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw) { Key *key; struct stat st; char *key_fp, *ca_fp; u_int i, v00; if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is"); if (stat(identity_file, &st) < 0) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno)); if ((key = key_load_public(identity_file, NULL)) == NULL) fatal("%s is not a public key", identity_file); if (!key_is_cert(key)) fatal("%s is not a certificate", identity_file); v00 = key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT_V00 || key->type == KEY_DSA_CERT_V00; key_fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ca_fp = key_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); printf("%s:\n", identity_file); printf(" Type: %s %s certificate\n", key_ssh_name(key), key_cert_type(key)); printf(" Public key: %s %s\n", key_type(key), key_fp); printf(" Signing CA: %s %s\n", key_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp); printf(" Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id); if (!v00) { printf(" Serial: %llu\n", (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial); } printf(" Valid: %s\n", fmt_validity(key->cert->valid_after, key->cert->valid_before)); printf(" Principals: "); if (key->cert->nprincipals == 0) printf("(none)\n"); else { for (i = 0; i < key->cert->nprincipals; i++) printf("\n %s", key->cert->principals[i]); printf("\n"); } printf(" Critical Options: "); - if (buffer_len(&key->cert->critical) == 0) + if (buffer_len(key->cert->critical) == 0) printf("(none)\n"); else { printf("\n"); - show_options(&key->cert->critical, v00, 1); + show_options(key->cert->critical, v00, 1); } if (!v00) { printf(" Extensions: "); - if (buffer_len(&key->cert->extensions) == 0) + if (buffer_len(key->cert->extensions) == 0) printf("(none)\n"); else { printf("\n"); - show_options(&key->cert->extensions, v00, 0); + show_options(key->cert->extensions, v00, 0); } } exit(0); } +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL static void load_krl(const char *path, struct ssh_krl **krlp) { Buffer krlbuf; int fd; buffer_init(&krlbuf); if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1) fatal("open %s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); if (!key_load_file(fd, path, &krlbuf)) fatal("Unable to load KRL"); close(fd); /* XXX check sigs */ if (ssh_krl_from_blob(&krlbuf, krlp, NULL, 0) != 0 || *krlp == NULL) fatal("Invalid KRL file"); buffer_free(&krlbuf); } static void update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw, const char *file, const Key *ca, struct ssh_krl *krl) { Key *key = NULL; u_long lnum = 0; char *path, *cp, *ep, line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES]; unsigned long long serial, serial2; int i, was_explicit_key, was_sha1, r; FILE *krl_spec; path = tilde_expand_filename(file, pw->pw_uid); if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) { krl_spec = stdin; free(path); path = xstrdup("(standard input)"); } else if ((krl_spec = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) fatal("fopen %s: %s", path, strerror(errno)); if (!quiet) printf("Revoking from %s\n", path); while (read_keyfile_line(krl_spec, path, line, sizeof(line), &lnum) == 0) { was_explicit_key = was_sha1 = 0; cp = line + strspn(line, " \t"); /* Trim trailing space, comments and strip \n */ for (i = 0, r = -1; cp[i] != '\0'; i++) { if (cp[i] == '#' || cp[i] == '\n') { cp[i] = '\0'; break; } if (cp[i] == ' ' || cp[i] == '\t') { /* Remember the start of a span of whitespace */ if (r == -1) r = i; } else r = -1; } if (r != -1) cp[r] = '\0'; if (*cp == '\0') continue; if (strncasecmp(cp, "serial:", 7) == 0) { if (ca == NULL) { fatal("revoking certificates by serial number " "requires specification of a CA key"); } cp += 7; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); errno = 0; serial = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0); if (*cp == '\0' || (*ep != '\0' && *ep != '-')) fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"", path, lnum, cp); if (errno == ERANGE && serial == ULLONG_MAX) fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range", path, lnum); serial2 = serial; if (*ep == '-') { cp = ep + 1; errno = 0; serial2 = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0); if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0') fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"", path, lnum, cp); if (errno == ERANGE && serial2 == ULLONG_MAX) fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range", path, lnum); if (serial2 <= serial) fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial range " "%llu:%llu", path, lnum, (unsigned long long)serial, (unsigned long long)serial2); } if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca, serial, serial2) != 0) { fatal("%s: revoke serial failed", __func__); } } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "id:", 3) == 0) { if (ca == NULL) { fatal("revoking certificates by key ID " "requires specification of a CA key"); } cp += 3; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca, cp) != 0) fatal("%s: revoke key ID failed", __func__); } else { if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) { cp += 4; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); was_explicit_key = 1; } else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha1:", 5) == 0) { cp += 5; cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); was_sha1 = 1; } else { /* * Just try to process the line as a key. * Parsing will fail if it isn't. */ } if ((key = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) fatal("key_new"); if (key_read(key, &cp) != 1) fatal("%s:%lu: invalid key", path, lnum); if (was_explicit_key) r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key); else if (was_sha1) r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, key); else r = ssh_krl_revoke_key(krl, key); if (r != 0) fatal("%s: revoke key failed", __func__); key_free(key); } } if (strcmp(path, "-") != 0) fclose(krl_spec); free(path); } static void do_gen_krl(struct passwd *pw, int updating, int argc, char **argv) { struct ssh_krl *krl; struct stat sb; Key *ca = NULL; int fd, i; char *tmp; Buffer kbuf; if (*identity_file == '\0') fatal("KRL generation requires an output file"); if (stat(identity_file, &sb) == -1) { if (errno != ENOENT) fatal("Cannot access KRL \"%s\": %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if (updating) fatal("KRL \"%s\" does not exist", identity_file); } if (ca_key_path != NULL) { tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid); if ((ca = key_load_public(tmp, NULL)) == NULL) fatal("Cannot load CA public key %s", tmp); free(tmp); } if (updating) load_krl(identity_file, &krl); else if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) fatal("couldn't create KRL"); if (cert_serial != 0) ssh_krl_set_version(krl, cert_serial); if (identity_comment != NULL) ssh_krl_set_comment(krl, identity_comment); for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) update_krl_from_file(pw, argv[i], ca, krl); buffer_init(&kbuf); if (ssh_krl_to_blob(krl, &kbuf, NULL, 0) != 0) fatal("Couldn't generate KRL"); if ((fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1) fatal("open %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buffer_ptr(&kbuf), buffer_len(&kbuf)) != buffer_len(&kbuf)) fatal("write %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); close(fd); buffer_free(&kbuf); ssh_krl_free(krl); if (ca != NULL) key_free(ca); } static void do_check_krl(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv) { int i, r, ret = 0; char *comment; struct ssh_krl *krl; Key *k; if (*identity_file == '\0') fatal("KRL checking requires an input file"); load_krl(identity_file, &krl); for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { if ((k = key_load_public(argv[i], &comment)) == NULL) fatal("Cannot load public key %s", argv[i]); r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, k); printf("%s%s%s%s: %s\n", argv[i], *comment ? " (" : "", comment, *comment ? ")" : "", r == 0 ? "ok" : "REVOKED"); if (r != 0) ret = 1; key_free(k); free(comment); } ssh_krl_free(krl); exit(ret); } +#endif static void usage(void) { - fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [options]\n", __progname); - fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -A Generate non-existent host keys for all key types.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -a number Number of KDF rounds for new key format or moduli primality tests.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -B Show bubblebabble digest of key file.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -b bits Number of bits in the key to create.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -C comment Provide new comment.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -c Change comment in private and public key files.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, + "usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa | rsa1]\n" + " [-N new_passphrase] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile]\n" + " ssh-keygen -p [-P old_passphrase] [-N new_passphrase] [-f keyfile]\n" + " ssh-keygen -i [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]\n" + " ssh-keygen -e [-m key_format] [-f input_keyfile]\n" + " ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]\n" + " ssh-keygen -c [-P passphrase] [-C comment] [-f keyfile]\n" + " ssh-keygen -l [-f input_keyfile]\n" + " ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]\n"); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 - fprintf(stderr, " -D pkcs11 Download public key from pkcs11 token.\n"); + fprintf(stderr, + " ssh-keygen -D pkcs11\n"); #endif - fprintf(stderr, " -e Export OpenSSH to foreign format key file.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -F hostname Find hostname in known hosts file.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -f filename Filename of the key file.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -G file Generate candidates for DH-GEX moduli.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -g Use generic DNS resource record format.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -H Hash names in known_hosts file.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -h Generate host certificate instead of a user certificate.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -I key_id Key identifier to include in certificate.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -i Import foreign format to OpenSSH key file.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -J number Screen this number of moduli lines.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -j number Start screening moduli at specified line.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -K checkpt Write checkpoints to this file.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -k Generate a KRL file.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -L Print the contents of a certificate.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -l Show fingerprint of key file.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -M memory Amount of memory (MB) to use for generating DH-GEX moduli.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -m key_fmt Conversion format for -e/-i (PEM|PKCS8|RFC4716).\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -N phrase Provide new passphrase.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -n name,... User/host principal names to include in certificate\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -O option Specify a certificate option.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -o Enforce new private key format.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -P phrase Provide old passphrase.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -p Change passphrase of private key file.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -Q Test whether key(s) are revoked in KRL.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -q Quiet.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -R hostname Remove host from known_hosts file.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -r hostname Print DNS resource record.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -S start Start point (hex) for generating DH-GEX moduli.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -s ca_key Certify keys with CA key.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -T file Screen candidates for DH-GEX moduli.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -t type Specify type of key to create.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -u Update KRL rather than creating a new one.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -V from:to Specify certificate validity interval.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -v Verbose.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -W gen Generator to use for generating DH-GEX moduli.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -y Read private key file and print public key.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -Z cipher Specify a cipher for new private key format.\n"); - fprintf(stderr, " -z serial Specify a serial number.\n"); - + fprintf(stderr, + " ssh-keygen -F hostname [-f known_hosts_file] [-l]\n" + " ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file]\n" + " ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file]\n" + " ssh-keygen -r hostname [-f input_keyfile] [-g]\n" + " ssh-keygen -G output_file [-v] [-b bits] [-M memory] [-S start_point]\n" + " ssh-keygen -T output_file -f input_file [-v] [-a rounds] [-J num_lines]\n" + " [-j start_line] [-K checkpt] [-W generator]\n" + " ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I certificate_identity [-h] [-n principals]\n" + " [-O option] [-V validity_interval] [-z serial_number] file ...\n" + " ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]\n" + " ssh-keygen -A\n" + " ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number]\n" + " file ...\n" + " ssh-keygen -Q -f krl_file file ...\n"); exit(1); } /* * Main program for key management. */ int main(int argc, char **argv) { char dotsshdir[MAXPATHLEN], comment[1024], *passphrase1, *passphrase2; char *checkpoint = NULL; char out_file[MAXPATHLEN], *ep, *rr_hostname = NULL; Key *private, *public; struct passwd *pw; struct stat st; int opt, type, fd; u_int32_t memory = 0, generator_wanted = 0; int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0; int gen_all_hostkeys = 0, gen_krl = 0, update_krl = 0, check_krl = 0; unsigned long start_lineno = 0, lines_to_process = 0; BIGNUM *start = NULL; FILE *f; const char *errstr; extern int optind; extern char *optarg; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); log_init(argv[0], SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); seed_rng(); /* we need this for the home * directory. */ pw = getpwuid(getuid()); if (!pw) { printf("No user exists for uid %lu\n", (u_long)getuid()); exit(1); } if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) < 0) { perror("gethostname"); exit(1); } /* Remaining characters: EUYdw */ while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ABHLQXceghiklopquvxy" "C:D:F:G:I:J:K:M:N:O:P:R:S:T:V:W:Z:a:b:f:g:j:m:n:r:s:t:z:")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case 'A': gen_all_hostkeys = 1; break; case 'b': bits = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 256, 32768, &errstr); if (errstr) fatal("Bits has bad value %s (%s)", optarg, errstr); break; case 'F': find_host = 1; rr_hostname = optarg; break; case 'H': hash_hosts = 1; break; case 'I': cert_key_id = optarg; break; case 'J': lines_to_process = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10); break; case 'j': start_lineno = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10); break; case 'R': delete_host = 1; rr_hostname = optarg; break; case 'L': show_cert = 1; break; case 'l': print_fingerprint = 1; break; case 'B': print_bubblebabble = 1; break; case 'm': if (strcasecmp(optarg, "RFC4716") == 0 || strcasecmp(optarg, "ssh2") == 0) { convert_format = FMT_RFC4716; break; } if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PKCS8") == 0) { convert_format = FMT_PKCS8; break; } if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PEM") == 0) { convert_format = FMT_PEM; break; } fatal("Unsupported conversion format \"%s\"", optarg); case 'n': cert_principals = optarg; break; case 'o': use_new_format = 1; break; case 'p': change_passphrase = 1; break; case 'c': change_comment = 1; break; case 'f': if (strlcpy(identity_file, optarg, sizeof(identity_file)) >= sizeof(identity_file)) fatal("Identity filename too long"); have_identity = 1; break; case 'g': print_generic = 1; break; case 'P': identity_passphrase = optarg; break; case 'N': identity_new_passphrase = optarg; break; case 'Q': check_krl = 1; break; case 'O': add_cert_option(optarg); break; case 'Z': new_format_cipher = optarg; break; case 'C': identity_comment = optarg; break; case 'q': quiet = 1; break; case 'e': case 'x': /* export key */ convert_to = 1; break; case 'h': cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST; certflags_flags = 0; break; case 'k': gen_krl = 1; break; case 'i': case 'X': /* import key */ convert_from = 1; break; case 'y': print_public = 1; break; case 's': ca_key_path = optarg; break; case 't': key_type_name = optarg; break; case 'D': pkcs11provider = optarg; break; case 'u': update_krl = 1; break; case 'v': if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; else { if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 && log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) log_level++; } break; case 'r': rr_hostname = optarg; break; case 'W': generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) fatal("Desired generator has bad value: %s (%s)", optarg, errstr); break; case 'a': rounds = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)", optarg, errstr); break; case 'M': memory = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr); if (errstr) fatal("Memory limit is %s: %s", errstr, optarg); break; case 'G': do_gen_candidates = 1; if (strlcpy(out_file, optarg, sizeof(out_file)) >= sizeof(out_file)) fatal("Output filename too long"); break; case 'T': do_screen_candidates = 1; if (strlcpy(out_file, optarg, sizeof(out_file)) >= sizeof(out_file)) fatal("Output filename too long"); break; case 'K': if (strlen(optarg) >= MAXPATHLEN) fatal("Checkpoint filename too long"); checkpoint = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'S': /* XXX - also compare length against bits */ if (BN_hex2bn(&start, optarg) == 0) fatal("Invalid start point."); break; case 'V': parse_cert_times(optarg); break; case 'z': errno = 0; cert_serial = strtoull(optarg, &ep, 10); if (*optarg < '0' || *optarg > '9' || *ep != '\0' || (errno == ERANGE && cert_serial == ULLONG_MAX)) fatal("Invalid serial number \"%s\"", optarg); break; case '?': default: usage(); } } /* reinit */ log_init(argv[0], log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); argv += optind; argc -= optind; if (ca_key_path != NULL) { if (argc < 1 && !gen_krl) { printf("Too few arguments.\n"); usage(); } } else if (argc > 0 && !gen_krl && !check_krl) { printf("Too many arguments.\n"); usage(); } if (change_passphrase && change_comment) { printf("Can only have one of -p and -c.\n"); usage(); } if (print_fingerprint && (delete_host || hash_hosts)) { printf("Cannot use -l with -H or -R.\n"); usage(); } +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL if (gen_krl) { do_gen_krl(pw, update_krl, argc, argv); return (0); } if (check_krl) { do_check_krl(pw, argc, argv); return (0); } +#endif if (ca_key_path != NULL) { if (cert_key_id == NULL) fatal("Must specify key id (-I) when certifying"); do_ca_sign(pw, argc, argv); } if (show_cert) do_show_cert(pw); if (delete_host || hash_hosts || find_host) do_known_hosts(pw, rr_hostname); if (pkcs11provider != NULL) do_download(pw); if (print_fingerprint || print_bubblebabble) do_fingerprint(pw); if (change_passphrase) do_change_passphrase(pw); if (change_comment) do_change_comment(pw); +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL if (convert_to) do_convert_to(pw); if (convert_from) do_convert_from(pw); +#endif if (print_public) do_print_public(pw); if (rr_hostname != NULL) { unsigned int n = 0; if (have_identity) { n = do_print_resource_record(pw, identity_file, rr_hostname); if (n == 0) { perror(identity_file); exit(1); } exit(0); } else { n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname); n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname); n += do_print_resource_record(pw, _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname); - + n += do_print_resource_record(pw, + _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname); if (n == 0) fatal("no keys found."); exit(0); } } if (do_gen_candidates) { FILE *out = fopen(out_file, "w"); if (out == NULL) { error("Couldn't open modulus candidate file \"%s\": %s", out_file, strerror(errno)); return (1); } if (bits == 0) bits = DEFAULT_BITS; if (gen_candidates(out, memory, bits, start) != 0) fatal("modulus candidate generation failed"); return (0); } if (do_screen_candidates) { FILE *in; FILE *out = fopen(out_file, "a"); if (have_identity && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0) { if ((in = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) { fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate " "file \"%s\": %s", identity_file, strerror(errno)); } } else in = stdin; if (out == NULL) { fatal("Couldn't open moduli file \"%s\": %s", out_file, strerror(errno)); } if (prime_test(in, out, rounds == 0 ? 100 : rounds, generator_wanted, checkpoint, start_lineno, lines_to_process) != 0) fatal("modulus screening failed"); return (0); } if (gen_all_hostkeys) { do_gen_all_hostkeys(pw); return (0); } if (key_type_name == NULL) key_type_name = "rsa"; type = key_type_from_name(key_type_name); type_bits_valid(type, &bits); if (!quiet) printf("Generating public/private %s key pair.\n", key_type_name); private = key_generate(type, bits); if (private == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "key_generate failed\n"); exit(1); } public = key_from_private(private); if (!have_identity) ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which to save the key"); /* Create ~/.ssh directory if it doesn't already exist. */ snprintf(dotsshdir, sizeof dotsshdir, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR); if (strstr(identity_file, dotsshdir) != NULL) { if (stat(dotsshdir, &st) < 0) { if (errno != ENOENT) { error("Could not stat %s: %s", dotsshdir, strerror(errno)); } else if (mkdir(dotsshdir, 0700) < 0) { error("Could not create directory '%s': %s", dotsshdir, strerror(errno)); } else if (!quiet) printf("Created directory '%s'.\n", dotsshdir); } } /* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */ if (stat(identity_file, &st) >= 0) { char yesno[3]; printf("%s already exists.\n", identity_file); printf("Overwrite (y/n)? "); fflush(stdout); if (fgets(yesno, sizeof(yesno), stdin) == NULL) exit(1); if (yesno[0] != 'y' && yesno[0] != 'Y') exit(1); } /* Ask for a passphrase (twice). */ if (identity_passphrase) passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_passphrase); else if (identity_new_passphrase) passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase); else { passphrase_again: passphrase1 = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase (empty for no " "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN); if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) { /* * The passphrases do not match. Clear them and * retry. */ explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); free(passphrase1); free(passphrase2); printf("Passphrases do not match. Try again.\n"); goto passphrase_again; } /* Clear the other copy of the passphrase. */ explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2)); free(passphrase2); } if (identity_comment) { strlcpy(comment, identity_comment, sizeof(comment)); } else { /* Create default comment field for the passphrase. */ snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname); } /* Save the key with the given passphrase and comment. */ if (!key_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1, comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) { printf("Saving the key failed: %s.\n", identity_file); explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); free(passphrase1); exit(1); } /* Clear the passphrase. */ explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1)); free(passphrase1); /* Clear the private key and the random number generator. */ key_free(private); if (!quiet) printf("Your identification has been saved in %s.\n", identity_file); strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file)); fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644); if (fd == -1) { printf("Could not save your public key in %s\n", identity_file); exit(1); } f = fdopen(fd, "w"); if (f == NULL) { printf("fdopen %s failed\n", identity_file); exit(1); } if (!key_write(public, f)) fprintf(stderr, "write key failed\n"); fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment); fclose(f); if (!quiet) { char *fp = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); char *ra = key_fingerprint(public, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n", identity_file); printf("The key fingerprint is:\n"); printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment); printf("The key's randomart image is:\n"); printf("%s\n", ra); free(ra); free(fp); } key_free(public); exit(0); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keyscan.0 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keyscan.0 (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keyscan.0 (revision 276707) @@ -1,110 +1,111 @@ -SSH-KEYSCAN(1) OpenBSD Reference Manual SSH-KEYSCAN(1) +SSH-KEYSCAN(1) General Commands Manual SSH-KEYSCAN(1) NAME ssh-keyscan - gather ssh public keys SYNOPSIS ssh-keyscan [-46Hv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type] [host | addrlist namelist] ... DESCRIPTION ssh-keyscan is a utility for gathering the public ssh host keys of a number of hosts. It was designed to aid in building and verifying ssh_known_hosts files. ssh-keyscan provides a minimal interface suitable for use by shell and perl scripts. ssh-keyscan uses non-blocking socket I/O to contact as many hosts as possible in parallel, so it is very efficient. The keys from a domain of 1,000 hosts can be collected in tens of seconds, even when some of those hosts are down or do not run ssh. For scanning, one does not need login access to the machines that are being scanned, nor does the scanning process involve any encryption. The options are as follows: -4 Forces ssh-keyscan to use IPv4 addresses only. -6 Forces ssh-keyscan to use IPv6 addresses only. -f file Read hosts or ``addrlist namelist'' pairs from file, one per line. If - is supplied instead of a filename, ssh-keyscan will read hosts or ``addrlist namelist'' pairs from the standard input. -H Hash all hostnames and addresses in the output. Hashed names may be used normally by ssh and sshd, but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed. -p port Port to connect to on the remote host. -T timeout Set the timeout for connection attempts. If timeout seconds have elapsed since a connection was initiated to a host or since the last time anything was read from that host, then the connection is closed and the host in question considered unavailable. Default is 5 seconds. -t type Specifies the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts. The possible values are ``rsa1'' for protocol version 1 and ``dsa'', ``ecdsa'', ``ed25519'', or ``rsa'' for protocol version 2. Multiple values may be specified by separating them with - commas. The default is to fetch ``rsa'' and ``ecdsa'' keys. + commas. The default is to fetch ``rsa'', ``ecdsa'', and + ``ed25519'' keys. -v Verbose mode. Causes ssh-keyscan to print debugging messages about its progress. SECURITY If an ssh_known_hosts file is constructed using ssh-keyscan without verifying the keys, users will be vulnerable to man in the middle attacks. On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk, ssh-keyscan can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the middle attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was created. FILES Input format: 1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 name.my.domain,name,n.my.domain,n,1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 - Output format for rsa1 keys: + Output format for RSA1 keys: host-or-namelist bits exponent modulus - Output format for rsa, dsa and ecdsa keys: + Output format for RSA, DSA, ECDSA, and ED25519 keys: host-or-namelist keytype base64-encoded-key Where keytype is either ``ecdsa-sha2-nistp256'', ``ecdsa-sha2-nistp384'', ``ecdsa-sha2-nistp521'', ``ssh-ed25519'', ``ssh-dss'' or ``ssh-rsa''. /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts EXAMPLES Print the rsa host key for machine hostname: $ ssh-keyscan hostname Find all hosts from the file ssh_hosts which have new or different keys from those in the sorted file ssh_known_hosts: - $ ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa,ecdsa -f ssh_hosts | \ + $ ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa,ecdsa,ed25519 -f ssh_hosts | \ sort -u - ssh_known_hosts | diff ssh_known_hosts - SEE ALSO ssh(1), sshd(8) AUTHORS David Mazieres wrote the initial version, and Wayne Davison added support for protocol version 2. BUGS It generates "Connection closed by remote host" messages on the consoles of all the machines it scans if the server is older than version 2.9. This is because it opens a connection to the ssh port, reads the public key, and drops the connection as soon as it gets the key. -OpenBSD 5.5 January 28, 2014 OpenBSD 5.5 +OpenBSD 5.6 March 12, 2014 OpenBSD 5.6 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keyscan.1 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keyscan.1 (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keyscan.1 (revision 276707) @@ -1,177 +1,178 @@ -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.34 2014/01/28 14:13:39 jmc Exp $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.35 2014/03/12 13:06:59 naddy Exp $ .\" .\" Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres . .\" .\" Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is .\" permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the .\" OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact. .\" -.Dd $Mdocdate: January 28 2014 $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: March 12 2014 $ .Dt SSH-KEYSCAN 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh-keyscan .Nd gather ssh public keys .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ssh-keyscan .Bk -words .Op Fl 46Hv .Op Fl f Ar file .Op Fl p Ar port .Op Fl T Ar timeout .Op Fl t Ar type .Op Ar host | addrlist namelist .Ar ... .Ek .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm is a utility for gathering the public ssh host keys of a number of hosts. It was designed to aid in building and verifying .Pa ssh_known_hosts files. .Nm provides a minimal interface suitable for use by shell and perl scripts. .Pp .Nm uses non-blocking socket I/O to contact as many hosts as possible in parallel, so it is very efficient. The keys from a domain of 1,000 hosts can be collected in tens of seconds, even when some of those hosts are down or do not run ssh. For scanning, one does not need login access to the machines that are being scanned, nor does the scanning process involve any encryption. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl 4 Forces .Nm to use IPv4 addresses only. .It Fl 6 Forces .Nm to use IPv6 addresses only. .It Fl f Ar file Read hosts or .Dq addrlist namelist pairs from .Ar file , one per line. If .Pa - is supplied instead of a filename, .Nm will read hosts or .Dq addrlist namelist pairs from the standard input. .It Fl H Hash all hostnames and addresses in the output. Hashed names may be used normally by .Nm ssh and .Nm sshd , but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed. .It Fl p Ar port Port to connect to on the remote host. .It Fl T Ar timeout Set the timeout for connection attempts. If .Ar timeout seconds have elapsed since a connection was initiated to a host or since the last time anything was read from that host, then the connection is closed and the host in question considered unavailable. Default is 5 seconds. .It Fl t Ar type Specifies the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts. The possible values are .Dq rsa1 for protocol version 1 and .Dq dsa , .Dq ecdsa , .Dq ed25519 , or .Dq rsa for protocol version 2. Multiple values may be specified by separating them with commas. The default is to fetch -.Dq rsa +.Dq rsa , +.Dq ecdsa , and -.Dq ecdsa +.Dq ed25519 keys. .It Fl v Verbose mode. Causes .Nm to print debugging messages about its progress. .El .Sh SECURITY If an ssh_known_hosts file is constructed using .Nm without verifying the keys, users will be vulnerable to .Em man in the middle attacks. On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk, .Nm can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the middle attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was created. .Sh FILES Input format: .Bd -literal 1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 name.my.domain,name,n.my.domain,n,1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 .Ed .Pp -Output format for rsa1 keys: +Output format for RSA1 keys: .Bd -literal host-or-namelist bits exponent modulus .Ed .Pp -Output format for rsa, dsa and ecdsa keys: +Output format for RSA, DSA, ECDSA, and ED25519 keys: .Bd -literal host-or-namelist keytype base64-encoded-key .Ed .Pp Where .Ar keytype is either .Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 , .Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 , .Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 , .Dq ssh-ed25519 , .Dq ssh-dss or .Dq ssh-rsa . .Pp .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts .Sh EXAMPLES Print the rsa host key for machine .Ar hostname : .Bd -literal $ ssh-keyscan hostname .Ed .Pp Find all hosts from the file .Pa ssh_hosts which have new or different keys from those in the sorted file .Pa ssh_known_hosts : .Bd -literal -$ ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa,ecdsa -f ssh_hosts | \e +$ ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa,ecdsa,ed25519 -f ssh_hosts | \e sort -u - ssh_known_hosts | diff ssh_known_hosts - .Ed .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh AUTHORS .An -nosplit .An David Mazieres Aq Mt dm@lcs.mit.edu wrote the initial version, and .An Wayne Davison Aq Mt wayned@users.sourceforge.net added support for protocol version 2. .Sh BUGS It generates "Connection closed by remote host" messages on the consoles of all the machines it scans if the server is older than version 2.9. This is because it opens a connection to the ssh port, reads the public key, and drops the connection as soon as it gets the key. Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keyscan.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keyscan.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keyscan.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,770 +1,777 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.89 2013/12/06 13:39:49 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.92 2014/04/29 18:01:49 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres . * * Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is * permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the * OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact. */ #include "includes.h" #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "key.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "compat.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "packet.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "log.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "misc.h" #include "hostfile.h" /* Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line. Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. */ int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC; int ssh_port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT; #define KT_RSA1 1 #define KT_DSA 2 #define KT_RSA 4 #define KT_ECDSA 8 #define KT_ED25519 16 -int get_keytypes = KT_RSA|KT_ECDSA;/* Get RSA and ECDSA keys by default */ +int get_keytypes = KT_RSA|KT_ECDSA|KT_ED25519; int hash_hosts = 0; /* Hash hostname on output */ #define MAXMAXFD 256 /* The number of seconds after which to give up on a TCP connection */ int timeout = 5; int maxfd; #define MAXCON (maxfd - 10) extern char *__progname; fd_set *read_wait; size_t read_wait_nfdset; int ncon; int nonfatal_fatal = 0; jmp_buf kexjmp; Key *kexjmp_key; /* * Keep a connection structure for each file descriptor. The state * associated with file descriptor n is held in fdcon[n]. */ typedef struct Connection { u_char c_status; /* State of connection on this file desc. */ #define CS_UNUSED 0 /* File descriptor unused */ #define CS_CON 1 /* Waiting to connect/read greeting */ #define CS_SIZE 2 /* Waiting to read initial packet size */ #define CS_KEYS 3 /* Waiting to read public key packet */ int c_fd; /* Quick lookup: c->c_fd == c - fdcon */ int c_plen; /* Packet length field for ssh packet */ int c_len; /* Total bytes which must be read. */ int c_off; /* Length of data read so far. */ int c_keytype; /* Only one of KT_RSA1, KT_DSA, or KT_RSA */ char *c_namebase; /* Address to free for c_name and c_namelist */ char *c_name; /* Hostname of connection for errors */ char *c_namelist; /* Pointer to other possible addresses */ char *c_output_name; /* Hostname of connection for output */ char *c_data; /* Data read from this fd */ Kex *c_kex; /* The key-exchange struct for ssh2 */ struct timeval c_tv; /* Time at which connection gets aborted */ TAILQ_ENTRY(Connection) c_link; /* List of connections in timeout order. */ } con; TAILQ_HEAD(conlist, Connection) tq; /* Timeout Queue */ con *fdcon; static int fdlim_get(int hard) { #if defined(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) struct rlimit rlfd; if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0) return (-1); if ((hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur) == RLIM_INFINITY) return SSH_SYSFDMAX; else return hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur; #else return SSH_SYSFDMAX; #endif } static int fdlim_set(int lim) { #if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) struct rlimit rlfd; #endif if (lim <= 0) return (-1); #if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE) if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0) return (-1); rlfd.rlim_cur = lim; if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) < 0) return (-1); #elif defined (HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE) setdtablesize(lim); #endif return (0); } /* * This is an strsep function that returns a null field for adjacent * separators. This is the same as the 4.4BSD strsep, but different from the * one in the GNU libc. */ static char * xstrsep(char **str, const char *delim) { char *s, *e; if (!**str) return (NULL); s = *str; e = s + strcspn(s, delim); if (*e != '\0') *e++ = '\0'; *str = e; return (s); } /* * Get the next non-null token (like GNU strsep). Strsep() will return a * null token for two adjacent separators, so we may have to loop. */ static char * strnnsep(char **stringp, char *delim) { char *tok; do { tok = xstrsep(stringp, delim); } while (tok && *tok == '\0'); return (tok); } +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 static Key * keygrab_ssh1(con *c) { static Key *rsa; static Buffer msg; if (rsa == NULL) { buffer_init(&msg); rsa = key_new(KEY_RSA1); } buffer_append(&msg, c->c_data, c->c_plen); buffer_consume(&msg, 8 - (c->c_plen & 7)); /* padding */ if (buffer_get_char(&msg) != (int) SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY) { error("%s: invalid packet type", c->c_name); buffer_clear(&msg); return NULL; } buffer_consume(&msg, 8); /* cookie */ /* server key */ (void) buffer_get_int(&msg); buffer_get_bignum(&msg, rsa->rsa->e); buffer_get_bignum(&msg, rsa->rsa->n); /* host key */ (void) buffer_get_int(&msg); buffer_get_bignum(&msg, rsa->rsa->e); buffer_get_bignum(&msg, rsa->rsa->n); buffer_clear(&msg); return (rsa); } +#endif static int hostjump(Key *hostkey) { kexjmp_key = hostkey; longjmp(kexjmp, 1); } static int ssh2_capable(int remote_major, int remote_minor) { switch (remote_major) { case 1: if (remote_minor == 99) return 1; break; case 2: return 1; default: break; } return 0; } static Key * keygrab_ssh2(con *c) { + char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT }; int j; packet_set_connection(c->c_fd, c->c_fd); enable_compat20(); myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = c->c_keytype == KT_DSA ? "ssh-dss" : (c->c_keytype == KT_RSA ? "ssh-rsa" : (c->c_keytype == KT_ED25519 ? "ssh-ed25519" : "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521")); c->c_kex = kex_setup(myproposal); +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL c->c_kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client; c->c_kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client; c->c_kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; c->c_kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; c->c_kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client; +#endif c->c_kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client; c->c_kex->verify_host_key = hostjump; if (!(j = setjmp(kexjmp))) { nonfatal_fatal = 1; dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &c->c_kex->done, c->c_kex); fprintf(stderr, "Impossible! dispatch_run() returned!\n"); exit(1); } nonfatal_fatal = 0; free(c->c_kex); c->c_kex = NULL; packet_close(); return j < 0? NULL : kexjmp_key; } static void keyprint(con *c, Key *key) { char *host = c->c_output_name ? c->c_output_name : c->c_name; if (!key) return; if (hash_hosts && (host = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL) fatal("host_hash failed"); fprintf(stdout, "%s ", host); key_write(key, stdout); fputs("\n", stdout); } static int tcpconnect(char *host) { struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop; char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; int gaierr, s = -1; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", ssh_port); memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = IPv4or6; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) fatal("getaddrinfo %s: %s", host, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { s = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (s < 0) { error("socket: %s", strerror(errno)); continue; } if (set_nonblock(s) == -1) fatal("%s: set_nonblock(%d)", __func__, s); if (connect(s, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0 && errno != EINPROGRESS) error("connect (`%s'): %s", host, strerror(errno)); else break; close(s); s = -1; } freeaddrinfo(aitop); return s; } static int conalloc(char *iname, char *oname, int keytype) { char *namebase, *name, *namelist; int s; namebase = namelist = xstrdup(iname); do { name = xstrsep(&namelist, ","); if (!name) { free(namebase); return (-1); } } while ((s = tcpconnect(name)) < 0); if (s >= maxfd) fatal("conalloc: fdno %d too high", s); if (fdcon[s].c_status) fatal("conalloc: attempt to reuse fdno %d", s); fdcon[s].c_fd = s; fdcon[s].c_status = CS_CON; fdcon[s].c_namebase = namebase; fdcon[s].c_name = name; fdcon[s].c_namelist = namelist; fdcon[s].c_output_name = xstrdup(oname); fdcon[s].c_data = (char *) &fdcon[s].c_plen; fdcon[s].c_len = 4; fdcon[s].c_off = 0; fdcon[s].c_keytype = keytype; gettimeofday(&fdcon[s].c_tv, NULL); fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); FD_SET(s, read_wait); ncon++; return (s); } static void confree(int s) { if (s >= maxfd || fdcon[s].c_status == CS_UNUSED) fatal("confree: attempt to free bad fdno %d", s); close(s); free(fdcon[s].c_namebase); free(fdcon[s].c_output_name); if (fdcon[s].c_status == CS_KEYS) free(fdcon[s].c_data); fdcon[s].c_status = CS_UNUSED; fdcon[s].c_keytype = 0; TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); FD_CLR(s, read_wait); ncon--; } static void contouch(int s) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); gettimeofday(&fdcon[s].c_tv, NULL); fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link); } static int conrecycle(int s) { con *c = &fdcon[s]; int ret; ret = conalloc(c->c_namelist, c->c_output_name, c->c_keytype); confree(s); return (ret); } static void congreet(int s) { int n = 0, remote_major = 0, remote_minor = 0; char buf[256], *cp; char remote_version[sizeof buf]; size_t bufsiz; con *c = &fdcon[s]; for (;;) { memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf)); bufsiz = sizeof(buf); cp = buf; while (bufsiz-- && (n = atomicio(read, s, cp, 1)) == 1 && *cp != '\n') { if (*cp == '\r') *cp = '\n'; cp++; } if (n != 1 || strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0) break; } if (n == 0) { switch (errno) { case EPIPE: error("%s: Connection closed by remote host", c->c_name); break; case ECONNREFUSED: break; default: error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno)); break; } conrecycle(s); return; } if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') { error("%s: bad greeting", c->c_name); confree(s); return; } *cp = '\0'; if (sscanf(buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) == 3) compat_datafellows(remote_version); else datafellows = 0; if (c->c_keytype != KT_RSA1) { if (!ssh2_capable(remote_major, remote_minor)) { debug("%s doesn't support ssh2", c->c_name); confree(s); return; } } else if (remote_major != 1) { debug("%s doesn't support ssh1", c->c_name); confree(s); return; } fprintf(stderr, "# %s %s\n", c->c_name, chop(buf)); n = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-OpenSSH-keyscan\r\n", c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, c->c_keytype == KT_RSA1? PROTOCOL_MINOR_1 : PROTOCOL_MINOR_2); if (n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sizeof(buf)) { error("snprintf: buffer too small"); confree(s); return; } if (atomicio(vwrite, s, buf, n) != (size_t)n) { error("write (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno)); confree(s); return; } if (c->c_keytype != KT_RSA1) { keyprint(c, keygrab_ssh2(c)); confree(s); return; } c->c_status = CS_SIZE; contouch(s); } static void conread(int s) { con *c = &fdcon[s]; size_t n; if (c->c_status == CS_CON) { congreet(s); return; } n = atomicio(read, s, c->c_data + c->c_off, c->c_len - c->c_off); if (n == 0) { error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno)); confree(s); return; } c->c_off += n; if (c->c_off == c->c_len) switch (c->c_status) { case CS_SIZE: c->c_plen = htonl(c->c_plen); c->c_len = c->c_plen + 8 - (c->c_plen & 7); c->c_off = 0; c->c_data = xmalloc(c->c_len); c->c_status = CS_KEYS; break; +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 case CS_KEYS: keyprint(c, keygrab_ssh1(c)); confree(s); return; +#endif default: fatal("conread: invalid status %d", c->c_status); break; } contouch(s); } static void conloop(void) { struct timeval seltime, now; fd_set *r, *e; con *c; int i; gettimeofday(&now, NULL); c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq); if (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec > now.tv_sec || (c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec > now.tv_usec))) { seltime = c->c_tv; seltime.tv_sec -= now.tv_sec; seltime.tv_usec -= now.tv_usec; if (seltime.tv_usec < 0) { seltime.tv_usec += 1000000; seltime.tv_sec--; } } else timerclear(&seltime); r = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); e = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); memcpy(r, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask)); memcpy(e, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask)); while (select(maxfd, r, NULL, e, &seltime) == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK)) ; for (i = 0; i < maxfd; i++) { if (FD_ISSET(i, e)) { error("%s: exception!", fdcon[i].c_name); confree(i); } else if (FD_ISSET(i, r)) conread(i); } free(r); free(e); c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq); while (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec < now.tv_sec || (c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec < now.tv_usec))) { int s = c->c_fd; c = TAILQ_NEXT(c, c_link); conrecycle(s); } } static void do_host(char *host) { char *name = strnnsep(&host, " \t\n"); int j; if (name == NULL) return; for (j = KT_RSA1; j <= KT_ED25519; j *= 2) { if (get_keytypes & j) { while (ncon >= MAXCON) conloop(); conalloc(name, *host ? host : name, j); } } } void fatal(const char *fmt,...) { va_list args; va_start(args, fmt); do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args); va_end(args); if (nonfatal_fatal) longjmp(kexjmp, -1); else exit(255); } static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-46Hv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type]\n" "\t\t [host | addrlist namelist] ...\n", __progname); exit(1); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { int debug_flag = 0, log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO; int opt, fopt_count = 0, j; char *tname, *cp, line[NI_MAXHOST]; FILE *fp; u_long linenum; extern int optind; extern char *optarg; __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); seed_rng(); TAILQ_INIT(&tq); /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); if (argc <= 1) usage(); while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "Hv46p:T:t:f:")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case 'H': hash_hosts = 1; break; case 'p': ssh_port = a2port(optarg); if (ssh_port <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg); exit(1); } break; case 'T': timeout = convtime(optarg); if (timeout == -1 || timeout == 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad timeout '%s'\n", optarg); usage(); } break; case 'v': if (!debug_flag) { debug_flag = 1; log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; } else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) log_level++; else fatal("Too high debugging level."); break; case 'f': if (strcmp(optarg, "-") == 0) optarg = NULL; argv[fopt_count++] = optarg; break; case 't': get_keytypes = 0; tname = strtok(optarg, ","); while (tname) { int type = key_type_from_name(tname); switch (type) { case KEY_RSA1: get_keytypes |= KT_RSA1; break; case KEY_DSA: get_keytypes |= KT_DSA; break; case KEY_ECDSA: get_keytypes |= KT_ECDSA; break; case KEY_RSA: get_keytypes |= KT_RSA; break; case KEY_ED25519: get_keytypes |= KT_ED25519; break; case KEY_UNSPEC: fatal("unknown key type %s", tname); } tname = strtok(NULL, ","); } break; case '4': IPv4or6 = AF_INET; break; case '6': IPv4or6 = AF_INET6; break; case '?': default: usage(); } } if (optind == argc && !fopt_count) usage(); log_init("ssh-keyscan", log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1); maxfd = fdlim_get(1); if (maxfd < 0) fatal("%s: fdlim_get: bad value", __progname); if (maxfd > MAXMAXFD) maxfd = MAXMAXFD; if (MAXCON <= 0) fatal("%s: not enough file descriptors", __progname); if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0)) fdlim_set(maxfd); fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con)); read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS); read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask)); for (j = 0; j < fopt_count; j++) { if (argv[j] == NULL) fp = stdin; else if ((fp = fopen(argv[j], "r")) == NULL) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j], strerror(errno)); linenum = 0; while (read_keyfile_line(fp, argv[j] == NULL ? "(stdin)" : argv[j], line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) { /* Chomp off trailing whitespace and comments */ if ((cp = strchr(line, '#')) == NULL) cp = line + strlen(line) - 1; while (cp >= line) { if (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t' || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#') *cp-- = '\0'; else break; } /* Skip empty lines */ if (*line == '\0') continue; do_host(line); } if (ferror(fp)) fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j], strerror(errno)); fclose(fp); } while (optind < argc) do_host(argv[optind++]); while (ncon > 0) conloop(); return (0); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keysign.0 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keysign.0 (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keysign.0 (revision 276707) @@ -1,53 +1,53 @@ -SSH-KEYSIGN(8) OpenBSD System Manager's Manual SSH-KEYSIGN(8) +SSH-KEYSIGN(8) System Manager's Manual SSH-KEYSIGN(8) NAME ssh-keysign - ssh helper program for host-based authentication SYNOPSIS ssh-keysign DESCRIPTION ssh-keysign is used by ssh(1) to access the local host keys and generate the digital signature required during host-based authentication with SSH protocol version 2. ssh-keysign is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the global client configuration file /etc/ssh/ssh_config by setting EnableSSHKeysign to ``yes''. ssh-keysign is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from ssh(1). See ssh(1) and sshd(8) for more information about host-based authentication. FILES /etc/ssh/ssh_config Controls whether ssh-keysign is enabled. /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key These files contain the private parts of the host keys used to generate the digital signature. They should be owned by root, readable only by root, and not accessible to others. Since they are readable only by root, ssh-keysign must be set-uid root if host-based authentication is used. /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key-cert.pub /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate information corresponding with the private keys above. SEE ALSO ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5), sshd(8) HISTORY ssh-keysign first appeared in OpenBSD 3.2. AUTHORS Markus Friedl -OpenBSD 5.5 December 7, 2013 OpenBSD 5.5 +OpenBSD 5.6 December 7, 2013 OpenBSD 5.6 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keysign.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keysign.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-keysign.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,260 +1,265 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.39 2013/12/06 13:39:49 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.42 2014/04/29 18:01:49 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "log.h" #include "key.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "misc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "msg.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "uidswap.h" /* XXX readconf.c needs these */ uid_t original_real_uid; extern char *__progname; static int valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, Key **ret, u_char *data, u_int datalen) { Buffer b; Key *key = NULL; u_char *pkblob; u_int blen, len; char *pkalg, *p; int pktype, fail; fail = 0; buffer_init(&b); buffer_append(&b, data, datalen); /* session id, currently limited to SHA1 (20 bytes) or SHA256 (32) */ p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len); if (len != 20 && len != 32) fail++; free(p); if (buffer_get_char(&b) != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST) fail++; /* server user */ buffer_skip_string(&b); /* service */ p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); if (strcmp("ssh-connection", p) != 0) fail++; free(p); /* method */ p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); if (strcmp("hostbased", p) != 0) fail++; free(p); /* pubkey */ pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); pkblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &blen); pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg); if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) fail++; else if ((key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen)) == NULL) fail++; else if (key->type != pktype) fail++; free(pkalg); free(pkblob); /* client host name, handle trailing dot */ p = buffer_get_string(&b, &len); debug2("valid_request: check expect chost %s got %s", host, p); if (strlen(host) != len - 1) fail++; else if (p[len - 1] != '.') fail++; else if (strncasecmp(host, p, len - 1) != 0) fail++; free(p); /* local user */ p = buffer_get_string(&b, NULL); if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, p) != 0) fail++; free(p); /* end of message */ if (buffer_len(&b) != 0) fail++; buffer_free(&b); debug3("valid_request: fail %d", fail); if (fail && key != NULL) key_free(key); else *ret = key; return (fail ? -1 : 0); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { Buffer b; Options options; #define NUM_KEYTYPES 4 Key *keys[NUM_KEYTYPES], *key = NULL; struct passwd *pw; int key_fd[NUM_KEYTYPES], i, found, version = 2, fd; u_char *signature, *data; - char *host; + char *host, *fp; u_int slen, dlen; u_int32_t rnd[256]; /* Ensure that stdin and stdout are connected */ if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) < 2) exit(1); /* Leave /dev/null fd iff it is attached to stderr */ if (fd > 2) close(fd); i = 0; key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY); original_real_uid = getuid(); /* XXX readconf.c needs this */ if ((pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid)) == NULL) fatal("getpwuid failed"); pw = pwcopy(pw); permanently_set_uid(pw); seed_rng(); #ifdef DEBUG_SSH_KEYSIGN log_init("ssh-keysign", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0); #endif /* verify that ssh-keysign is enabled by the admin */ initialize_options(&options); (void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw, "", &options, 0); fill_default_options(&options); if (options.enable_ssh_keysign != 1) fatal("ssh-keysign not enabled in %s", _PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE); for (i = found = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) { if (key_fd[i] != -1) found = 1; } if (found == 0) fatal("could not open any host key"); OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); - for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) - rnd[i] = arc4random(); + arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); found = 0; for (i = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) { keys[i] = NULL; if (key_fd[i] == -1) continue; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +/* XXX wrong api */ keys[i] = key_load_private_pem(key_fd[i], KEY_UNSPEC, NULL, NULL); +#endif close(key_fd[i]); if (keys[i] != NULL) found = 1; } if (!found) fatal("no hostkey found"); buffer_init(&b); if (ssh_msg_recv(STDIN_FILENO, &b) < 0) fatal("ssh_msg_recv failed"); if (buffer_get_char(&b) != version) fatal("bad version"); fd = buffer_get_int(&b); if ((fd == STDIN_FILENO) || (fd == STDOUT_FILENO)) fatal("bad fd"); if ((host = get_local_name(fd)) == NULL) fatal("cannot get local name for fd"); data = buffer_get_string(&b, &dlen); if (valid_request(pw, host, &key, data, dlen) < 0) fatal("not a valid request"); free(host); found = 0; for (i = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) { if (keys[i] != NULL && key_equal_public(key, keys[i])) { found = 1; break; } } - if (!found) - fatal("no matching hostkey found"); + if (!found) { + fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); + fatal("no matching hostkey found for key %s %s", + key_type(key), fp); + } if (key_sign(keys[i], &signature, &slen, data, dlen) != 0) fatal("key_sign failed"); free(data); /* send reply */ buffer_clear(&b); buffer_put_string(&b, signature, slen); if (ssh_msg_send(STDOUT_FILENO, version, &b) == -1) fatal("ssh_msg_send failed"); return (0); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11-client.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11-client.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11-client.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,240 +1,242 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-client.c,v 1.4 2013/05/17 00:13:14 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-client.c,v 1.5 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include + +#include #include "pathnames.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "key.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" /* borrows code from sftp-server and ssh-agent */ int fd = -1; pid_t pid = -1; static void send_msg(Buffer *m) { u_char buf[4]; int mlen = buffer_len(m); put_u32(buf, mlen); if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, 4) != 4 || atomicio(vwrite, fd, buffer_ptr(m), buffer_len(m)) != buffer_len(m)) error("write to helper failed"); buffer_consume(m, mlen); } static int recv_msg(Buffer *m) { u_int l, len; u_char buf[1024]; if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, 4)) != 4) { error("read from helper failed: %u", len); return (0); /* XXX */ } len = get_u32(buf); if (len > 256 * 1024) fatal("response too long: %u", len); /* read len bytes into m */ buffer_clear(m); while (len > 0) { l = len; if (l > sizeof(buf)) l = sizeof(buf); if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, l) != l) { error("response from helper failed."); return (0); /* XXX */ } buffer_append(m, buf, l); len -= l; } return (buffer_get_char(m)); } int pkcs11_init(int interactive) { return (0); } void pkcs11_terminate(void) { close(fd); } static int pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { Key key; u_char *blob, *signature = NULL; u_int blen, slen = 0; int ret = -1; Buffer msg; if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) return (-1); key.type = KEY_RSA; key.rsa = rsa; if (key_to_blob(&key, &blob, &blen) == 0) return -1; buffer_init(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST); buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen); buffer_put_string(&msg, from, flen); buffer_put_int(&msg, 0); free(blob); send_msg(&msg); buffer_clear(&msg); if (recv_msg(&msg) == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) { signature = buffer_get_string(&msg, &slen); if (slen <= (u_int)RSA_size(rsa)) { memcpy(to, signature, slen); ret = slen; } free(signature); } buffer_free(&msg); return (ret); } /* redirect the private key encrypt operation to the ssh-pkcs11-helper */ static int wrap_key(RSA *rsa) { static RSA_METHOD helper_rsa; memcpy(&helper_rsa, RSA_get_default_method(), sizeof(helper_rsa)); helper_rsa.name = "ssh-pkcs11-helper"; helper_rsa.rsa_priv_enc = pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt; RSA_set_method(rsa, &helper_rsa); return (0); } static int pkcs11_start_helper(void) { int pair[2]; if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) { error("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno)); return (-1); } if ((pid = fork()) == -1) { error("fork: %s", strerror(errno)); return (-1); } else if (pid == 0) { if ((dup2(pair[1], STDIN_FILENO) == -1) || (dup2(pair[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) { fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } close(pair[0]); close(pair[1]); execlp(_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER, _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER, (char *) 0); fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } close(pair[1]); fd = pair[0]; return (0); } int pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, Key ***keysp) { Key *k; int i, nkeys; u_char *blob; u_int blen; Buffer msg; if (fd < 0 && pkcs11_start_helper() < 0) return (-1); buffer_init(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, name); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, pin); send_msg(&msg); buffer_clear(&msg); if (recv_msg(&msg) == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) { nkeys = buffer_get_int(&msg); *keysp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(Key *)); for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { blob = buffer_get_string(&msg, &blen); free(buffer_get_string(&msg, NULL)); k = key_from_blob(blob, blen); wrap_key(k->rsa); (*keysp)[i] = k; free(blob); } } else { nkeys = -1; } buffer_free(&msg); return (nkeys); } int pkcs11_del_provider(char *name) { int ret = -1; Buffer msg; buffer_init(&msg); buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, name); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, ""); send_msg(&msg); buffer_clear(&msg); if (recv_msg(&msg) == SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS) ret = 0; buffer_free(&msg); return (ret); } #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0 (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0 (revision 276707) @@ -1,25 +1,25 @@ -SSH-PKCS11-HELPER(8) OpenBSD System Manager's Manual SSH-PKCS11-HELPER(8) +SSH-PKCS11-HELPER(8) System Manager's Manual SSH-PKCS11-HELPER(8) NAME ssh-pkcs11-helper - ssh-agent helper program for PKCS#11 support SYNOPSIS ssh-pkcs11-helper DESCRIPTION ssh-pkcs11-helper is used by ssh-agent(1) to access keys provided by a PKCS#11 token. ssh-pkcs11-helper is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from ssh-agent(1). SEE ALSO ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1) HISTORY ssh-pkcs11-helper first appeared in OpenBSD 4.7. AUTHORS Markus Friedl -OpenBSD 5.5 July 16, 2013 OpenBSD 5.5 +OpenBSD 5.6 July 16, 2013 OpenBSD 5.6 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,370 +1,374 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-helper.c,v 1.7 2013/12/02 02:56:17 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-helper.c,v 1.8 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "key.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 /* borrows code from sftp-server and ssh-agent */ struct pkcs11_keyinfo { Key *key; char *providername; TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_keyinfo) next; }; TAILQ_HEAD(, pkcs11_keyinfo) pkcs11_keylist; #define MAX_MSG_LENGTH 10240 /*XXX*/ /* helper */ #define get_int() buffer_get_int(&iqueue); #define get_string(lenp) buffer_get_string(&iqueue, lenp); /* input and output queue */ Buffer iqueue; Buffer oqueue; static void add_key(Key *k, char *name) { struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki; ki = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ki)); ki->providername = xstrdup(name); ki->key = k; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_keylist, ki, next); } static void del_keys_by_name(char *name) { struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki, *nxt; for (ki = TAILQ_FIRST(&pkcs11_keylist); ki; ki = nxt) { nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(ki, next); if (!strcmp(ki->providername, name)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_keylist, ki, next); free(ki->providername); key_free(ki->key); free(ki); } } } /* lookup matching 'private' key */ static Key * lookup_key(Key *k) { struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki; TAILQ_FOREACH(ki, &pkcs11_keylist, next) { debug("check %p %s", ki, ki->providername); if (key_equal(k, ki->key)) return (ki->key); } return (NULL); } static void send_msg(Buffer *m) { int mlen = buffer_len(m); buffer_put_int(&oqueue, mlen); buffer_append(&oqueue, buffer_ptr(m), mlen); buffer_consume(m, mlen); } static void process_add(void) { char *name, *pin; Key **keys; int i, nkeys; u_char *blob; u_int blen; Buffer msg; buffer_init(&msg); name = get_string(NULL); pin = get_string(NULL); if ((nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(name, pin, &keys)) > 0) { buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER); buffer_put_int(&msg, nkeys); for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (key_to_blob(keys[i], &blob, &blen) == 0) continue; buffer_put_string(&msg, blob, blen); buffer_put_cstring(&msg, name); free(blob); add_key(keys[i], name); } free(keys); } else { buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); } free(pin); free(name); send_msg(&msg); buffer_free(&msg); } static void process_del(void) { char *name, *pin; Buffer msg; buffer_init(&msg); name = get_string(NULL); pin = get_string(NULL); del_keys_by_name(name); if (pkcs11_del_provider(name) == 0) buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS); else buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); free(pin); free(name); send_msg(&msg); buffer_free(&msg); } static void process_sign(void) { u_char *blob, *data, *signature = NULL; u_int blen, dlen, slen = 0; - int ok = -1, ret; + int ok = -1; Key *key, *found; Buffer msg; blob = get_string(&blen); data = get_string(&dlen); (void)get_int(); /* XXX ignore flags */ if ((key = key_from_blob(blob, blen)) != NULL) { if ((found = lookup_key(key)) != NULL) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + int ret; + slen = RSA_size(key->rsa); signature = xmalloc(slen); if ((ret = RSA_private_encrypt(dlen, data, signature, found->rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) != -1) { slen = ret; ok = 0; } +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ } key_free(key); } buffer_init(&msg); if (ok == 0) { buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE); buffer_put_string(&msg, signature, slen); } else { buffer_put_char(&msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE); } free(data); free(blob); free(signature); send_msg(&msg); buffer_free(&msg); } static void process(void) { u_int msg_len; u_int buf_len; u_int consumed; u_int type; u_char *cp; buf_len = buffer_len(&iqueue); if (buf_len < 5) return; /* Incomplete message. */ cp = buffer_ptr(&iqueue); msg_len = get_u32(cp); if (msg_len > MAX_MSG_LENGTH) { error("bad message len %d", msg_len); cleanup_exit(11); } if (buf_len < msg_len + 4) return; buffer_consume(&iqueue, 4); buf_len -= 4; type = buffer_get_char(&iqueue); switch (type) { case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY: debug("process_add"); process_add(); break; case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY: debug("process_del"); process_del(); break; case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST: debug("process_sign"); process_sign(); break; default: error("Unknown message %d", type); break; } /* discard the remaining bytes from the current packet */ if (buf_len < buffer_len(&iqueue)) { error("iqueue grew unexpectedly"); cleanup_exit(255); } consumed = buf_len - buffer_len(&iqueue); if (msg_len < consumed) { error("msg_len %d < consumed %d", msg_len, consumed); cleanup_exit(255); } if (msg_len > consumed) buffer_consume(&iqueue, msg_len - consumed); } void cleanup_exit(int i) { /* XXX */ _exit(i); } int main(int argc, char **argv) { fd_set *rset, *wset; int in, out, max, log_stderr = 0; ssize_t len, olen, set_size; SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH; LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; char buf[4*4096]; extern char *__progname; TAILQ_INIT(&pkcs11_keylist); pkcs11_init(0); seed_rng(); __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr); in = STDIN_FILENO; out = STDOUT_FILENO; max = 0; if (in > max) max = in; if (out > max) max = out; buffer_init(&iqueue); buffer_init(&oqueue); set_size = howmany(max + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); rset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(set_size); wset = (fd_set *)xmalloc(set_size); for (;;) { memset(rset, 0, set_size); memset(wset, 0, set_size); /* * Ensure that we can read a full buffer and handle * the worst-case length packet it can generate, * otherwise apply backpressure by stopping reads. */ if (buffer_check_alloc(&iqueue, sizeof(buf)) && buffer_check_alloc(&oqueue, MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) FD_SET(in, rset); olen = buffer_len(&oqueue); if (olen > 0) FD_SET(out, wset); if (select(max+1, rset, wset, NULL, NULL) < 0) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; error("select: %s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(2); } /* copy stdin to iqueue */ if (FD_ISSET(in, rset)) { len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf); if (len == 0) { debug("read eof"); cleanup_exit(0); } else if (len < 0) { error("read: %s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(1); } else { buffer_append(&iqueue, buf, len); } } /* send oqueue to stdout */ if (FD_ISSET(out, wset)) { len = write(out, buffer_ptr(&oqueue), olen); if (len < 0) { error("write: %s", strerror(errno)); cleanup_exit(1); } else { buffer_consume(&oqueue, len); } } /* * Process requests from client if we can fit the results * into the output buffer, otherwise stop processing input * and let the output queue drain. */ if (buffer_check_alloc(&oqueue, MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) process(); } } #else /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ int main(int argc, char **argv) { extern char *__progname; __progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]); log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0); fatal("PKCS#11 support disabled at compile time"); } #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,670 +1,670 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.11 2013/11/13 13:48:20 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.14 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include #define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT #include "pkcs11.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #include "key.h" #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #include "xmalloc.h" struct pkcs11_slotinfo { CK_TOKEN_INFO token; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; int logged_in; }; struct pkcs11_provider { char *name; void *handle; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *function_list; CK_INFO info; CK_ULONG nslots; CK_SLOT_ID *slotlist; struct pkcs11_slotinfo *slotinfo; int valid; int refcount; TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_provider) next; }; TAILQ_HEAD(, pkcs11_provider) pkcs11_providers; struct pkcs11_key { struct pkcs11_provider *provider; CK_ULONG slotidx; int (*orig_finish)(RSA *rsa); RSA_METHOD rsa_method; char *keyid; int keyid_len; }; int pkcs11_interactive = 0; int pkcs11_init(int interactive) { pkcs11_interactive = interactive; TAILQ_INIT(&pkcs11_providers); return (0); } /* * finalize a provider shared libarary, it's no longer usable. * however, there might still be keys referencing this provider, * so the actuall freeing of memory is handled by pkcs11_provider_unref(). * this is called when a provider gets unregistered. */ static void pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p) { CK_RV rv; CK_ULONG i; debug("pkcs11_provider_finalize: %p refcount %d valid %d", p, p->refcount, p->valid); if (!p->valid) return; for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) { if (p->slotinfo[i].session && (rv = p->function_list->C_CloseSession( p->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK) error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv); } if ((rv = p->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv); p->valid = 0; p->function_list = NULL; dlclose(p->handle); } /* * remove a reference to the provider. * called when a key gets destroyed or when the provider is unregistered. */ static void pkcs11_provider_unref(struct pkcs11_provider *p) { debug("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p refcount %d", p, p->refcount); if (--p->refcount <= 0) { if (p->valid) error("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p still valid", p); free(p->slotlist); free(p->slotinfo); free(p); } } /* unregister all providers, keys might still point to the providers */ void pkcs11_terminate(void) { struct pkcs11_provider *p; while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&pkcs11_providers)) != NULL) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); pkcs11_provider_finalize(p); pkcs11_provider_unref(p); } } /* lookup provider by name */ static struct pkcs11_provider * pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id) { struct pkcs11_provider *p; TAILQ_FOREACH(p, &pkcs11_providers, next) { debug("check %p %s", p, p->name); if (!strcmp(provider_id, p->name)) return (p); } return (NULL); } /* unregister provider by name */ int pkcs11_del_provider(char *provider_id) { struct pkcs11_provider *p; if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); pkcs11_provider_finalize(p); pkcs11_provider_unref(p); return (0); } return (-1); } /* openssl callback for freeing an RSA key */ static int pkcs11_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa) { struct pkcs11_key *k11; int rv = -1; if ((k11 = RSA_get_app_data(rsa)) != NULL) { if (k11->orig_finish) rv = k11->orig_finish(rsa); if (k11->provider) pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider); free(k11->keyid); free(k11); } return (rv); } /* find a single 'obj' for given attributes */ static int pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr, CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj) { CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_ULONG nfound = 0; CK_RV rv; int ret = -1; f = p->function_list; session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, nattr)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_FindObjectsInit failed (nattr %lu): %lu", nattr, rv); return (-1); } if ((rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, obj, 1, &nfound)) != CKR_OK || nfound != 1) { debug("C_FindObjects failed (nfound %lu nattr %lu): %lu", nfound, nattr, rv); } else ret = 0; if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session)) != CKR_OK) error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv); return (ret); } /* openssl callback doing the actual signing operation */ static int pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { struct pkcs11_key *k11; struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj; CK_ULONG tlen = 0; CK_RV rv; CK_OBJECT_CLASS private_key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY; CK_BBOOL true_val = CK_TRUE; CK_MECHANISM mech = { CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL_PTR, 0 }; CK_ATTRIBUTE key_filter[] = { {CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(private_key_class) }, {CKA_ID, NULL, 0}, {CKA_SIGN, NULL, sizeof(true_val) } }; char *pin, prompt[1024]; int rval = -1; key_filter[0].pValue = &private_key_class; key_filter[2].pValue = &true_val; if ((k11 = RSA_get_app_data(rsa)) == NULL) { error("RSA_get_app_data failed for rsa %p", rsa); return (-1); } if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) { error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider for rsa %p", rsa); return (-1); } f = k11->provider->function_list; si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx]; if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) { if (!pkcs11_interactive) { error("need pin"); return (-1); } snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%s': ", si->token.label); pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF); if (pin == NULL) return (-1); /* bail out */ if ((rv = f->C_Login(si->session, CKU_USER, (u_char *)pin, strlen(pin))) != CKR_OK) { free(pin); error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv); return (-1); } free(pin); si->logged_in = 1; } key_filter[1].pValue = k11->keyid; key_filter[1].ulValueLen = k11->keyid_len; /* try to find object w/CKA_SIGN first, retry w/o */ if (pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 3, &obj) < 0 && pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 2, &obj) < 0) { error("cannot find private key"); } else if ((rv = f->C_SignInit(si->session, &mech, obj)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_SignInit failed: %lu", rv); } else { /* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */ tlen = RSA_size(rsa); rv = f->C_Sign(si->session, (CK_BYTE *)from, flen, to, &tlen); if (rv == CKR_OK) rval = tlen; else error("C_Sign failed: %lu", rv); } return (rval); } static int pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { return (-1); } /* redirect private key operations for rsa key to pkcs11 token */ static int pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, RSA *rsa) { struct pkcs11_key *k11; const RSA_METHOD *def = RSA_get_default_method(); k11 = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k11)); k11->provider = provider; provider->refcount++; /* provider referenced by RSA key */ k11->slotidx = slotidx; /* identify key object on smartcard */ k11->keyid_len = keyid_attrib->ulValueLen; k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len); memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len); k11->orig_finish = def->finish; memcpy(&k11->rsa_method, def, sizeof(k11->rsa_method)); k11->rsa_method.name = "pkcs11"; k11->rsa_method.rsa_priv_enc = pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt; k11->rsa_method.rsa_priv_dec = pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt; k11->rsa_method.finish = pkcs11_rsa_finish; RSA_set_method(rsa, &k11->rsa_method); RSA_set_app_data(rsa, k11); return (0); } /* remove trailing spaces */ static void rmspace(u_char *buf, size_t len) { size_t i; if (!len) return; for (i = len - 1; i > 0; i--) if (i == len - 1 || buf[i] == ' ') buf[i] = '\0'; else break; } /* * open a pkcs11 session and login if required. * if pin == NULL we delay login until key use */ static int pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *pin) { CK_RV rv; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; int login_required; f = p->function_list; login_required = p->slotinfo[slotidx].token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED; if (pin && login_required && !strlen(pin)) { error("pin required"); return (-1); } if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION| CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &session)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_OpenSession failed: %lu", rv); return (-1); } if (login_required && pin) { if ((rv = f->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, (u_char *)pin, strlen(pin))) != CKR_OK) { error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv); if ((rv = f->C_CloseSession(session)) != CKR_OK) error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv); return (-1); } p->slotinfo[slotidx].logged_in = 1; } p->slotinfo[slotidx].session = session; return (0); } /* * lookup public keys for token in slot identified by slotidx, * add 'wrapped' public keys to the 'keysp' array and increment nkeys. * keysp points to an (possibly empty) array with *nkeys keys. */ static int pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *, CK_ULONG, CK_ATTRIBUTE [], CK_ATTRIBUTE [3], Key ***, int *) __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,4, 3 * sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE)))); static int pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, Key ***keysp, int *nkeys) { CK_OBJECT_CLASS pubkey_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY; CK_OBJECT_CLASS cert_class = CKO_CERTIFICATE; CK_ATTRIBUTE pubkey_filter[] = { { CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(pubkey_class) } }; CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_filter[] = { { CKA_CLASS, NULL, sizeof(cert_class) } }; CK_ATTRIBUTE pubkey_attribs[] = { { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 }, { CKA_MODULUS, NULL, 0 }, { CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL, 0 } }; CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_attribs[] = { { CKA_ID, NULL, 0 }, { CKA_SUBJECT, NULL, 0 }, { CKA_VALUE, NULL, 0 } }; pubkey_filter[0].pValue = &pubkey_class; cert_filter[0].pValue = &cert_class; if (pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(p, slotidx, pubkey_filter, pubkey_attribs, keysp, nkeys) < 0 || pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(p, slotidx, cert_filter, cert_attribs, keysp, nkeys) < 0) return (-1); return (0); } static int pkcs11_key_included(Key ***keysp, int *nkeys, Key *key) { int i; for (i = 0; i < *nkeys; i++) if (key_equal(key, (*keysp)[i])) return (1); return (0); } static int pkcs11_fetch_keys_filter(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE filter[], CK_ATTRIBUTE attribs[3], Key ***keysp, int *nkeys) { Key *key; RSA *rsa; X509 *x509; EVP_PKEY *evp; int i; const u_char *cp; CK_RV rv; CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj; CK_ULONG nfound; CK_SESSION_HANDLE session; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f; f = p->function_list; session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session; /* setup a filter the looks for public keys */ if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, filter, 1)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv); return (-1); } while (1) { /* XXX 3 attributes in attribs[] */ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) { attribs[i].pValue = NULL; attribs[i].ulValueLen = 0; } if ((rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &nfound)) != CKR_OK || nfound == 0) break; /* found a key, so figure out size of the attributes */ if ((rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attribs, 3)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); continue; } /* check that none of the attributes are zero length */ if (attribs[0].ulValueLen == 0 || attribs[1].ulValueLen == 0 || attribs[2].ulValueLen == 0) { continue; } /* allocate buffers for attributes */ for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) attribs[i].pValue = xmalloc(attribs[i].ulValueLen); /* * retrieve ID, modulus and public exponent of RSA key, * or ID, subject and value for certificates. */ rsa = NULL; if ((rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attribs, 3)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv); } else if (attribs[1].type == CKA_MODULUS ) { if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) { error("RSA_new failed"); } else { rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(attribs[1].pValue, attribs[1].ulValueLen, NULL); rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(attribs[2].pValue, attribs[2].ulValueLen, NULL); } } else { cp = attribs[2].pValue; if ((x509 = X509_new()) == NULL) { error("X509_new failed"); } else if (d2i_X509(&x509, &cp, attribs[2].ulValueLen) == NULL) { error("d2i_X509 failed"); } else if ((evp = X509_get_pubkey(x509)) == NULL || evp->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA || evp->pkey.rsa == NULL) { debug("X509_get_pubkey failed or no rsa"); } else if ((rsa = RSAPublicKey_dup(evp->pkey.rsa)) == NULL) { error("RSAPublicKey_dup"); } if (x509) X509_free(x509); } if (rsa && rsa->n && rsa->e && pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &attribs[0], rsa) == 0) { key = key_new(KEY_UNSPEC); key->rsa = rsa; key->type = KEY_RSA; - key->flags |= KEY_FLAG_EXT; + key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT; if (pkcs11_key_included(keysp, nkeys, key)) { key_free(key); } else { /* expand key array and add key */ *keysp = xrealloc(*keysp, *nkeys + 1, sizeof(Key *)); (*keysp)[*nkeys] = key; *nkeys = *nkeys + 1; debug("have %d keys", *nkeys); } } else if (rsa) { RSA_free(rsa); } for (i = 0; i < 3; i++) free(attribs[i].pValue); } if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session)) != CKR_OK) error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv); return (0); } /* register a new provider, fails if provider already exists */ int pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, Key ***keyp) { int nkeys, need_finalize = 0; struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL; void *handle = NULL; CK_RV (*getfunctionlist)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST **); CK_RV rv; CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL; CK_TOKEN_INFO *token; CK_ULONG i; *keyp = NULL; if (pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id) != NULL) { error("provider already registered: %s", provider_id); goto fail; } /* open shared pkcs11-libarary */ if ((handle = dlopen(provider_id, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) { error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_id, dlerror()); goto fail; } if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) { error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror()); goto fail; } p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p)); p->name = xstrdup(provider_id); p->handle = handle; /* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */ if ((rv = (*getfunctionlist)(&f)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetFunctionList failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } p->function_list = f; if ((rv = f->C_Initialize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_Initialize failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } need_finalize = 1; if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&p->info)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetInfo failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } rmspace(p->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(p->info.manufacturerID)); rmspace(p->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(p->info.libraryDescription)); debug("manufacturerID <%s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d" " libraryDescription <%s> libraryVersion %d.%d", p->info.manufacturerID, p->info.cryptokiVersion.major, p->info.cryptokiVersion.minor, p->info.libraryDescription, p->info.libraryVersion.major, p->info.libraryVersion.minor); if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } if (p->nslots == 0) { error("no slots"); goto fail; } p->slotlist = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID)); if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, p->slotlist, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv); goto fail; } p->slotinfo = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo)); p->valid = 1; nkeys = 0; for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) { token = &p->slotinfo[i].token; if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(p->slotlist[i], token)) != CKR_OK) { error("C_GetTokenInfo failed: %lu", rv); continue; } rmspace(token->label, sizeof(token->label)); rmspace(token->manufacturerID, sizeof(token->manufacturerID)); rmspace(token->model, sizeof(token->model)); rmspace(token->serialNumber, sizeof(token->serialNumber)); debug("label <%s> manufacturerID <%s> model <%s> serial <%s>" " flags 0x%lx", token->label, token->manufacturerID, token->model, token->serialNumber, token->flags); /* open session, login with pin and retrieve public keys */ if (pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin) == 0) pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, &nkeys); } if (nkeys > 0) { TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next); p->refcount++; /* add to provider list */ return (nkeys); } error("no keys"); /* don't add the provider, since it does not have any keys */ fail: if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv); if (p) { free(p->slotlist); free(p->slotinfo); free(p); } if (handle) dlclose(handle); return (-1); } #else int pkcs11_init(int interactive) { return (0); } void pkcs11_terminate(void) { return; } #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-pkcs11.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,20 +1,24 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.h,v 1.2 2010/02/24 06:12:53 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.h,v 1.3 2014/04/29 18:01:49 markus Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ int pkcs11_init(int); void pkcs11_terminate(void); int pkcs11_add_provider(char *, char *, Key ***); int pkcs11_del_provider(char *); + +#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(ENABLE_PKCS11) +#undef ENABLE_PKCS11 +#endif Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-rsa.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-rsa.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh-rsa.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,259 +1,265 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.51 2014/02/02 03:44:31 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh-rsa.c,v 1.52 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000, 2003 Markus Friedl * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include -#include "xmalloc.h" -#include "log.h" -#include "buffer.h" -#include "key.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" #include "compat.h" -#include "misc.h" -#include "ssh.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL +#include "sshkey.h" #include "digest.h" -static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, u_int, u_char *, u_int, RSA *); +static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *); /* RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 (PKCS #1 v2.0 signature) with SHA1 */ int -ssh_rsa_sign(const Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, - const u_char *data, u_int datalen) +ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { int hash_alg; - u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig; - u_int slen, dlen, len; - int ok, nid; - Buffer b; + u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL; + size_t slen; + u_int dlen, len; + int nid, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; - if (key == NULL || key_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA || - key->rsa == NULL) { - error("%s: no RSA key", __func__); - return -1; - } + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + if (sigp != NULL) + *sigp = NULL; + if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + slen = RSA_size(key->rsa); + if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + /* hash the data */ hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; nid = NID_sha1; - if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) { - error("%s: bad hash algorithm %d", __func__, hash_alg); - return -1; + if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, + digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) + goto out; + + if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; } - if (ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, - digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0) { - error("%s: ssh_digest_memory failed", __func__); - return -1; - } - slen = RSA_size(key->rsa); - sig = xmalloc(slen); - - ok = RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa); - explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); - - if (ok != 1) { - int ecode = ERR_get_error(); - - error("%s: RSA_sign failed: %s", __func__, - ERR_error_string(ecode, NULL)); - free(sig); - return -1; + if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; } if (len < slen) { - u_int diff = slen - len; - debug("slen %u > len %u", slen, len); + size_t diff = slen - len; memmove(sig + diff, sig, len); explicit_bzero(sig, diff); } else if (len > slen) { - error("%s: slen %u slen2 %u", __func__, slen, len); - free(sig); - return -1; + ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto out; } /* encode signature */ - buffer_init(&b); - buffer_put_cstring(&b, "ssh-rsa"); - buffer_put_string(&b, sig, slen); - len = buffer_len(&b); + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "ssh-rsa")) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, sig, slen)) != 0) + goto out; + len = sshbuf_len(b); + if (sigp != NULL) { + if ((*sigp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); + } if (lenp != NULL) *lenp = len; - if (sigp != NULL) { - *sigp = xmalloc(len); - memcpy(*sigp, buffer_ptr(&b), len); + ret = 0; + out: + explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); + if (sig != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(sig, slen); + free(sig); } - buffer_free(&b); - explicit_bzero(sig, slen); - free(sig); - + if (b != NULL) + sshbuf_free(b); return 0; } int -ssh_rsa_verify(const Key *key, const u_char *signature, u_int signaturelen, - const u_char *data, u_int datalen) +ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) { - Buffer b; - int hash_alg; - char *ktype; - u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob; - u_int len, dlen, modlen; - int rlen, ret; + char *ktype = NULL; + int hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + size_t len, diff, modlen, dlen; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL; - if (key == NULL || key_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA || - key->rsa == NULL) { - error("%s: no RSA key", __func__); - return -1; - } + if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || + sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA || + BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; - if (BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE) { - error("%s: RSA modulus too small: %d < minimum %d bits", - __func__, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n), - SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE); - return -1; + if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; } - buffer_init(&b); - buffer_append(&b, signature, signaturelen); - ktype = buffer_get_cstring(&b, NULL); if (strcmp("ssh-rsa", ktype) != 0) { - error("%s: cannot handle type %s", __func__, ktype); - buffer_free(&b); - free(ktype); - return -1; + ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; + goto out; } - free(ktype); - sigblob = buffer_get_string(&b, &len); - rlen = buffer_len(&b); - buffer_free(&b); - if (rlen != 0) { - error("%s: remaining bytes in signature %d", __func__, rlen); - free(sigblob); - return -1; + if (sshbuf_get_string(b, &sigblob, &len) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; } + if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA; + goto out; + } /* RSA_verify expects a signature of RSA_size */ modlen = RSA_size(key->rsa); if (len > modlen) { - error("%s: len %u > modlen %u", __func__, len, modlen); - free(sigblob); - return -1; + ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH; + goto out; } else if (len < modlen) { - u_int diff = modlen - len; - debug("%s: add padding: modlen %u > len %u", __func__, - modlen, len); - sigblob = xrealloc(sigblob, 1, modlen); + diff = modlen - len; + osigblob = sigblob; + if ((sigblob = realloc(sigblob, modlen)) == NULL) { + sigblob = osigblob; /* put it back for clear/free */ + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } memmove(sigblob + diff, sigblob, len); explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff); len = modlen; } - /* hash the data */ hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) { - error("%s: bad hash algorithm %d", __func__, hash_alg); - return -1; + ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto out; } - if (ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, - digest, sizeof(digest)) != 0) { - error("%s: ssh_digest_memory failed", __func__); - return -1; - } + if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen, + digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0) + goto out; ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, dlen, sigblob, len, key->rsa); + out: + if (sigblob != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(sigblob, len); + free(sigblob); + } + if (ktype != NULL) + free(ktype); + if (b != NULL) + sshbuf_free(b); explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest)); - explicit_bzero(sigblob, len); - free(sigblob); - debug("%s: signature %scorrect", __func__, (ret == 0) ? "in" : ""); return ret; } /* * See: * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/ * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn */ /* * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) * oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 } */ static const u_char id_sha1[] = { 0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */ 0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */ 0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */ 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */ 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */ 0x04, 0x14 /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */ }; static int -openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen, - u_char *sigbuf, u_int siglen, RSA *rsa) +openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, size_t hashlen, + u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa) { - u_int ret, rsasize, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0; + size_t ret, rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0; int len, oidmatch, hashmatch; const u_char *oid = NULL; u_char *decrypted = NULL; - ret = 0; + ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; switch (hash_alg) { case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1: oid = id_sha1; oidlen = sizeof(id_sha1); hlen = 20; break; default: goto done; } if (hashlen != hlen) { - error("bad hashlen"); + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto done; } rsasize = RSA_size(rsa); - if (siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) { - error("bad siglen"); + if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM || + siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; goto done; } - decrypted = xmalloc(rsasize); + if ((decrypted = malloc(rsasize)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto done; + } if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) { - error("RSA_public_decrypt failed: %s", - ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL)); + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; goto done; } - if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != hlen + oidlen) { - error("bad decrypted len: %d != %d + %d", len, hlen, oidlen); + if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != hlen + oidlen) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; goto done; } oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0; hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0; - if (!oidmatch) { - error("oid mismatch"); + if (!oidmatch || !hashmatch) { + ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID; goto done; } - if (!hashmatch) { - error("hash mismatch"); - goto done; - } - ret = 1; + ret = 0; done: - free(decrypted); + if (decrypted) { + explicit_bzero(decrypted, rsasize); + free(decrypted); + } return ret; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh.0 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh.0 (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh.0 (revision 276707) @@ -1,946 +1,944 @@ -SSH(1) OpenBSD Reference Manual SSH(1) +SSH(1) General Commands Manual SSH(1) NAME ssh - OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program) SYNOPSIS ssh [-1246AaCfgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec] [-D [bind_address:]port] [-E log_file] [-e escape_char] [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11] [-i identity_file] [-L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport] [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port] [-Q cipher | cipher-auth | mac | kex | key] [-R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport] [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port] [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] [user@]hostname [command] DESCRIPTION ssh (SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for executing commands on a remote machine. It is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two - untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and arbitrary - TCP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel. + untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections, arbitrary TCP + ports and UNIX-domain sockets can also be forwarded over the secure + channel. ssh connects and logs into the specified hostname (with optional user name). The user must prove his/her identity to the remote machine using one of several methods depending on the protocol version used (see below). If command is specified, it is executed on the remote host instead of a login shell. The options are as follows: -1 Forces ssh to try protocol version 1 only. -2 Forces ssh to try protocol version 2 only. -4 Forces ssh to use IPv4 addresses only. -6 Forces ssh to use IPv6 addresses only. -A Enables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file. Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's UNIX-domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent. -a Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. -b bind_address Use bind_address on the local machine as the source address of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one address. -C Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, - stderr, and data for forwarded X11 and TCP connections). The - compression algorithm is the same used by gzip(1), and the - ``level'' can be controlled by the CompressionLevel option for - protocol version 1. Compression is desirable on modem lines and - other slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast - networks. The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis - in the configuration files; see the Compression option. + stderr, and data for forwarded X11, TCP and UNIX-domain + connections). The compression algorithm is the same used by + gzip(1), and the ``level'' can be controlled by the + CompressionLevel option for protocol version 1. Compression is + desirable on modem lines and other slow connections, but will + only slow down things on fast networks. The default value can be + set on a host-by-host basis in the configuration files; see the + Compression option. -c cipher_spec Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session. Protocol version 1 allows specification of a single cipher. The - supported values are ``3des'', ``blowfish'', and ``des''. 3des - (triple-des) is an encrypt-decrypt-encrypt triple with three - different keys. It is believed to be secure. blowfish is a fast - block cipher; it appears very secure and is much faster than - 3des. des is only supported in the ssh client for - interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations that do - not support the 3des cipher. Its use is strongly discouraged due - to cryptographic weaknesses. The default is ``3des''. - - For protocol version 2, cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of + supported values are ``3des'', ``blowfish'', and ``des''. For + protocol version 2, cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of ciphers listed in order of preference. See the Ciphers keyword in ssh_config(5) for more information. -D [bind_address:]port Specifies a local ``dynamic'' application-level port forwarding. This works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the local side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address. Whenever a connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the remote machine. Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and ssh will act as a SOCKS server. Only root can forward privileged ports. Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The bind_address of ``localhost'' indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or `*' indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. -E log_file Append debug logs to log_file instead of standard error. -e escape_char Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default: `~'). The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a line. The escape character followed by a dot (`.') closes the connection; followed by control-Z suspends the connection; and followed by itself sends the escape character once. Setting the character to ``none'' disables any escapes and makes the session fully transparent. -F configfile Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file. If a configuration file is given on the command line, the system-wide configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config) will be ignored. The default for the per-user configuration file is ~/.ssh/config. -f Requests ssh to go to background just before command execution. This is useful if ssh is going to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user wants it in the background. This implies -n. The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is with something like ssh -f host xterm. If the ExitOnForwardFailure configuration option is set to ``yes'', then a client started with -f will wait for all remote port forwards to be successfully established before placing itself in the background. - -g Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports. + -g Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports. If used + on a multiplexed connection, then this option must be specified + on the master process. -I pkcs11 Specify the PKCS#11 shared library ssh should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's private RSA key. -i identity_file Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for public key authentication is read. The default is ~/.ssh/identity for protocol version 1, and ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and ~/.ssh/id_rsa for protocol version 2. Identity files may also be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. It is possible to have multiple -i options (and multiple identities specified in configuration files). ssh will also try to load certificate information from the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to identity filenames. -K Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server. -k Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server. -L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport Specifies that the given port on the local (client) host is to be forwarded to the given host and port on the remote side. This works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the local side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address. Whenever a connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is made to host port hostport from the remote machine. Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The bind_address of ``localhost'' indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or `*' indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. -l login_name Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine. This also may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. -M Places the ssh client into ``master'' mode for connection sharing. Multiple -M options places ssh into ``master'' mode with confirmation required before slave connections are accepted. Refer to the description of ControlMaster in ssh_config(5) for details. -m mac_spec Additionally, for protocol version 2 a comma-separated list of MAC (message authentication code) algorithms can be specified in order of preference. See the MACs keyword for more information. -N Do not execute a remote command. This is useful for just forwarding ports (protocol version 2 only). -n Redirects stdin from /dev/null (actually, prevents reading from stdin). This must be used when ssh is run in the background. A common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote machine. For example, ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & will start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel. The ssh program will be put in the background. (This does not work if ssh needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the -f option.) -O ctl_cmd Control an active connection multiplexing master process. When the -O option is specified, the ctl_cmd argument is interpreted and passed to the master process. Valid commands are: ``check'' (check that the master process is running), ``forward'' (request forwardings without command execution), ``cancel'' (cancel forwardings), ``exit'' (request the master to exit), and ``stop'' (request the master to stop accepting further multiplexing requests). -o option Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see ssh_config(5). AddressFamily BatchMode BindAddress CanonicalDomains CanonicalizeFallbackLocal CanonicalizeHostname CanonicalizeMaxDots CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs ChallengeResponseAuthentication CheckHostIP Cipher Ciphers ClearAllForwardings Compression CompressionLevel ConnectionAttempts ConnectTimeout ControlMaster ControlPath ControlPersist DynamicForward EscapeChar ExitOnForwardFailure ForwardAgent ForwardX11 ForwardX11Timeout ForwardX11Trusted GatewayPorts GlobalKnownHostsFile GSSAPIAuthentication GSSAPIDelegateCredentials HashKnownHosts Host HostbasedAuthentication HostKeyAlgorithms HostKeyAlias HostName IdentityFile IdentitiesOnly IPQoS KbdInteractiveAuthentication KbdInteractiveDevices KexAlgorithms LocalCommand LocalForward LogLevel MACs Match NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost NumberOfPasswordPrompts PasswordAuthentication PermitLocalCommand PKCS11Provider Port PreferredAuthentications Protocol ProxyCommand ProxyUseFdpass PubkeyAuthentication RekeyLimit RemoteForward RequestTTY RhostsRSAAuthentication RSAAuthentication SendEnv ServerAliveInterval ServerAliveCountMax + StreamLocalBindMask + StreamLocalBindUnlink StrictHostKeyChecking TCPKeepAlive Tunnel TunnelDevice UsePrivilegedPort User UserKnownHostsFile VerifyHostKeyDNS VisualHostKey XAuthLocation -p port Port to connect to on the remote host. This can be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. -Q cipher | cipher-auth | mac | kex | key Queries ssh for the algorithms supported for the specified version 2. The available features are: cipher (supported symmetric ciphers), cipher-auth (supported symmetric ciphers that support authenticated encryption), mac (supported message integrity codes), kex (key exchange algorithms), key (key types). -q Quiet mode. Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be suppressed. -R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport Specifies that the given port on the remote (server) host is to be forwarded to the given host and port on the local side. This works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the remote side, and whenever a connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is made to host port hostport from the local machine. Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on the remote machine. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. By default, the listening socket on the server will be bound to the loopback interface only. This may be overridden by specifying a bind_address. An empty bind_address, or the address `*', indicates that the remote socket should listen on all interfaces. Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see sshd_config(5)). If the port argument is `0', the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time. When used together with -O forward the allocated port will be printed to the standard output. -S ctl_path Specifies the location of a control socket for connection sharing, or the string ``none'' to disable connection sharing. Refer to the description of ControlPath and ControlMaster in ssh_config(5) for details. -s May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote system. Subsystems are a feature of the SSH2 protocol which facilitate the use of SSH as a secure transport for other applications (eg. sftp(1)). The subsystem is specified as the remote command. -T Disable pseudo-tty allocation. -t Force pseudo-tty allocation. This can be used to execute arbitrary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be very useful, e.g. when implementing menu services. Multiple -t options force tty allocation, even if ssh has no local tty. -V Display the version number and exit. -v Verbose mode. Causes ssh to print debugging messages about its progress. This is helpful in debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems. Multiple -v options increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3. -W host:port Requests that standard input and output on the client be forwarded to host on port over the secure channel. Implies -N, -T, ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings. Works with Protocol version 2 only. -w local_tun[:remote_tun] Requests tunnel device forwarding with the specified tun(4) devices between the client (local_tun) and the server (remote_tun). The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword ``any'', which uses the next available tunnel device. If remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to ``any''. See also the Tunnel and TunnelDevice directives in ssh_config(5). If the Tunnel directive is unset, it is set to the default tunnel mode, which is ``point-to-point''. -X Enables X11 forwarding. This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file. X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the user's X authorization database) can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring. For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY extension restrictions by default. Please refer to the ssh -Y option and the ForwardX11Trusted directive in ssh_config(5) for more information. -x Disables X11 forwarding. -Y Enables trusted X11 forwarding. Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls. -y Send log information using the syslog(3) system module. By default this information is sent to stderr. ssh may additionally obtain configuration data from a per-user configuration file and a system-wide configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in ssh_config(5). AUTHENTICATION The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocols 1 and 2. The default is to use protocol 2 only, though this can be changed via the Protocol option in ssh_config(5) or the -1 and -2 options (see above). Both protocols support similar authentication methods, but protocol 2 is the default since it provides additional mechanisms for confidentiality (the traffic is encrypted using AES, 3DES, Blowfish, CAST128, or Arcfour) and integrity (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512, umac-64, umac-128, hmac-ripemd160). Protocol 1 lacks a strong mechanism for ensuring the integrity of the connection. The methods available for authentication are: GSSAPI-based authentication, host-based authentication, public key authentication, challenge-response authentication, and password authentication. Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above, though protocol 2 has a configuration option to change the default order: PreferredAuthentications. Host-based authentication works as follows: If the machine the user logs in from is listed in /etc/hosts.equiv or /etc/shosts.equiv on the remote machine, and the user names are the same on both sides, or if the files ~/.rhosts or ~/.shosts exist in the user's home directory on the remote machine and contain a line containing the name of the client machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is considered for login. Additionally, the server must be able to verify the client's host key (see the description of /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and ~/.ssh/known_hosts, below) for login to be permitted. This authentication method closes security holes due to IP spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing. [Note to the administrator: /etc/hosts.equiv, ~/.rhosts, and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be disabled if security is desired.] Public key authentication works as follows: The scheme is based on public-key cryptography, using cryptosystems where encryption and decryption are done using separate keys, and it is unfeasible to derive the decryption key from the encryption key. The idea is that each user creates a public/private key pair for authentication purposes. The server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key. ssh implements public key authentication protocol automatically, using one of the DSA, ECDSA, ED25519 or RSA algorithms. Protocol 1 is restricted to using only RSA keys, but protocol 2 may use any. The HISTORY section of ssl(8) contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms. The file ~/.ssh/authorized_keys lists the public keys that are permitted for logging in. When the user logs in, the ssh program tells the server which key pair it would like to use for authentication. The client proves that it has access to the private key and the server checks that the corresponding public key is authorized to accept the account. The user creates his/her key pair by running ssh-keygen(1). This stores the private key in ~/.ssh/identity (protocol 1), ~/.ssh/id_dsa (protocol 2 DSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa (protocol 2 ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 (protocol 2 ED25519), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa (protocol 2 RSA) and stores the public key in ~/.ssh/identity.pub (protocol 1), ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub (protocol 2 DSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub (protocol 2 ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub (protocol 2 ED25519), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub (protocol 2 RSA) in the user's home directory. The user should then copy the public key to ~/.ssh/authorized_keys in his/her home directory on the remote machine. The authorized_keys file corresponds to the conventional ~/.rhosts file, and has one key per line, though the lines can be very long. After this, the user can log in without giving the password. A variation on public key authentication is available in the form of certificate authentication: instead of a set of public/private keys, signed certificates are used. This has the advantage that a single trusted certification authority can be used in place of many public/private keys. See the CERTIFICATES section of ssh-keygen(1) for more information. The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication may be with an authentication agent. See ssh-agent(1) for more information. Challenge-response authentication works as follows: The server sends an arbitrary "challenge" text, and prompts for a response. Protocol 2 allows multiple challenges and responses; protocol 1 is restricted to just one challenge/response. Examples of challenge-response authentication include BSD Authentication (see login.conf(5)) and PAM (some non-OpenBSD systems). Finally, if other authentication methods fail, ssh prompts the user for a password. The password is sent to the remote host for checking; however, since all communications are encrypted, the password cannot be seen by someone listening on the network. ssh automatically maintains and checks a database containing identification for all hosts it has ever been used with. Host keys are stored in ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the user's home directory. Additionally, the file /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts is automatically checked for known hosts. Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file. If a host's identification ever changes, ssh warns about this and disables password authentication to prevent server spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks, which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption. The StrictHostKeyChecking option can be used to control logins to machines whose host key is not known or has changed. When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server either executes the given command, or logs into the machine and gives the user a normal shell on the remote machine. All communication with the remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted. If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated (normal login session), the user may use the escape characters noted below. If no pseudo-tty has been allocated, the session is transparent and can be used to reliably transfer binary data. On most systems, setting the escape character to ``none'' will also make the session transparent even if a tty is used. The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote machine exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed. ESCAPE CHARACTERS When a pseudo-terminal has been requested, ssh supports a number of functions through the use of an escape character. A single tilde character can be sent as ~~ or by following the tilde by a character other than those described below. The escape character must always follow a newline to be interpreted as special. The escape character can be changed in configuration files using the EscapeChar configuration directive or on the command line by the -e option. The supported escapes (assuming the default `~') are: ~. Disconnect. ~^Z Background ssh. ~# List forwarded connections. ~& Background ssh at logout when waiting for forwarded connection / X11 sessions to terminate. ~? Display a list of escape characters. ~B Send a BREAK to the remote system (only useful for SSH protocol version 2 and if the peer supports it). ~C Open command line. Currently this allows the addition of port forwardings using the -L, -R and -D options (see above). It also allows the cancellation of existing port-forwardings with -KL[bind_address:]port for local, -KR[bind_address:]port for remote and -KD[bind_address:]port for dynamic port-forwardings. !command allows the user to execute a local command if the PermitLocalCommand option is enabled in ssh_config(5). Basic help is available, using the -h option. ~R Request rekeying of the connection (only useful for SSH protocol version 2 and if the peer supports it). ~V Decrease the verbosity (LogLevel) when errors are being written to stderr. ~v Increase the verbosity (LogLevel) when errors are being written to stderr. TCP FORWARDING Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over the secure channel can be specified either on the command line or in a configuration file. One possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a mail server; another is going through firewalls. In the example below, we look at encrypting communication between an IRC client and server, even though the IRC server does not directly support encrypted communications. This works as follows: the user connects to the remote host using ssh, specifying a port to be used to forward connections to the remote server. After that it is possible to start the service which is to be encrypted on the client machine, connecting to the same local port, and ssh will encrypt and forward the connection. The following example tunnels an IRC session from client machine ``127.0.0.1'' (localhost) to remote server ``server.example.com'': $ ssh -f -L 1234:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10 $ irc -c '#users' -p 1234 pinky 127.0.0.1 This tunnels a connection to IRC server ``server.example.com'', joining channel ``#users'', nickname ``pinky'', using port 1234. It doesn't matter which port is used, as long as it's greater than 1023 (remember, only root can open sockets on privileged ports) and doesn't conflict with any ports already in use. The connection is forwarded to port 6667 on the remote server, since that's the standard port for IRC services. The -f option backgrounds ssh and the remote command ``sleep 10'' is specified to allow an amount of time (10 seconds, in the example) to start the service which is to be tunnelled. If no connections are made within the time specified, ssh will exit. X11 FORWARDING If the ForwardX11 variable is set to ``yes'' (or see the description of the -X, -x, and -Y options above) and the user is using X11 (the DISPLAY environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11 programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made from the local machine. The user should not manually set DISPLAY. Forwarding of X11 connections can be configured on the command line or in configuration files. The DISPLAY value set by ssh will point to the server machine, but with a display number greater than zero. This is normal, and happens because ssh creates a ``proxy'' X server on the server machine for forwarding the connections over the encrypted channel. ssh will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine. For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie, store it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded connections carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when the connection is opened. The real authentication cookie is never sent to the server machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain). If the ForwardAgent variable is set to ``yes'' (or see the description of the -A and -a options above) and the user is using an authentication agent, the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the remote side. VERIFYING HOST KEYS When connecting to a server for the first time, a fingerprint of the server's public key is presented to the user (unless the option StrictHostKeyChecking has been disabled). Fingerprints can be determined using ssh-keygen(1): $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched and the key can be accepted or rejected. Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys just by looking at hex strings, there is also support to compare host keys visually, using random art. By setting the VisualHostKey option to ``yes'', a small ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter if the session itself is interactive or not. By learning the pattern a known server produces, a user can easily find out that the host key has changed when a completely different pattern is displayed. Because these patterns are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks similar to the pattern remembered only gives a good probability that the host key is the same, not guaranteed proof. To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for all known hosts, the following command line can be used: $ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts If the fingerprint is unknown, an alternative method of verification is available: SSH fingerprints verified by DNS. An additional resource record (RR), SSHFP, is added to a zonefile and the connecting client is able to match the fingerprint with that of the key presented. In this example, we are connecting a client to a server, ``host.example.com''. The SSHFP resource records should first be added to the zonefile for host.example.com: $ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com. The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile. To check that the zone is answering fingerprint queries: $ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com Finally the client connects: $ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com [...] Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? See the VerifyHostKeyDNS option in ssh_config(5) for more information. SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS ssh contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling using the tun(4) network pseudo-device, allowing two networks to be joined securely. The sshd_config(5) configuration option PermitTunnel controls whether the server supports this, and at what level (layer 2 or 3 traffic). The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24 with remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection from 10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2, provided that the SSH server running on the gateway to the remote network, at 192.168.1.15, allows it. On the client: # ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true # ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252 # route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2 On the server: # ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252 # route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1 Client access may be more finely tuned via the /root/.ssh/authorized_keys file (see below) and the PermitRootLogin server option. The following entry would permit connections on tun(4) device 1 from user ``jane'' and on tun device 2 from user ``john'', if PermitRootLogin is set to ``forced-commands-only'': tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead, it may be more suited to temporary setups, such as for wireless VPNs. More permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as ipsecctl(8) and isakmpd(8). ENVIRONMENT ssh will normally set the following environment variables: DISPLAY The DISPLAY variable indicates the location of the X11 server. It is automatically set by ssh to point to a value of the form ``hostname:n'', where ``hostname'' indicates the host where the shell runs, and `n' is an integer >= 1. ssh uses this special value to forward X11 connections over the secure channel. The user should normally not set DISPLAY explicitly, as that will render the X11 connection insecure (and will require the user to manually copy any required authorization cookies). HOME Set to the path of the user's home directory. LOGNAME Synonym for USER; set for compatibility with systems that use this variable. MAIL Set to the path of the user's mailbox. PATH Set to the default PATH, as specified when compiling ssh. SSH_ASKPASS If ssh needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current terminal if it was run from a terminal. If ssh does not have a terminal associated with it but DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute the program specified by SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the passphrase. This is particularly useful when calling ssh from a .xsession or related script. (Note that on some machines it may be necessary to redirect the input from /dev/null to make this work.) SSH_AUTH_SOCK Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with the agent. SSH_CONNECTION Identifies the client and server ends of the connection. The variable contains four space- separated values: client IP address, client port number, server IP address, and server port number. SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND This variable contains the original command line if a forced command is executed. It can be used to extract the original arguments. SSH_TTY This is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associated with the current shell or command. If the current session has no tty, this variable is not set. TZ This variable is set to indicate the present time zone if it was set when the daemon was started (i.e. the daemon passes the value on to new connections). USER Set to the name of the user logging in. Additionally, ssh reads ~/.ssh/environment, and adds lines of the format ``VARNAME=value'' to the environment if the file exists and users are allowed to change their environment. For more information, see the PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5). FILES ~/.rhosts This file is used for host-based authentication (see above). On some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because sshd(8) reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. ~/.shosts This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. ~/.ssh/ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration and authentication information. There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user, and not accessible by others. ~/.ssh/authorized_keys Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, ED25519, RSA) that can be used for logging in as this user. The format of this file is described in the sshd(8) manual page. This file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. ~/.ssh/config This is the per-user configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in ssh_config(5). Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions: read/write for the user, and not writable by others. ~/.ssh/environment Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see ENVIRONMENT, above. ~/.ssh/identity ~/.ssh/id_dsa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 ~/.ssh/id_rsa Contains the private key for authentication. These files contain sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not accessible by others (read/write/execute). ssh will simply ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key which will be used to encrypt the sensitive part of this file using 3DES. ~/.ssh/identity.pub ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub Contains the public key for authentication. These files are not sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone. ~/.ssh/known_hosts Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys. See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this file. ~/.ssh/rc Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the sshd(8) manual page for more information. /etc/hosts.equiv This file is for host-based authentication (see above). It should only be writable by root. /etc/shosts.equiv This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. /etc/ssh/ssh_config Systemwide configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in ssh_config(5). /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key These files contain the private parts of the host keys and are used for host-based authentication. If protocol version 1 is used, ssh must be setuid root, since the host key is readable only by root. For protocol version 2, ssh uses ssh-keysign(8) to access the host keys, eliminating the requirement that ssh be setuid root when host-based authentication is used. By default ssh is not setuid root. /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the organization. It should be world-readable. See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this file. /etc/ssh/sshrc Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the sshd(8) manual page for more information. EXIT STATUS ssh exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 if an error occurred. SEE ALSO scp(1), sftp(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh-keyscan(1), - tun(4), hosts.equiv(5), ssh_config(5), ssh-keysign(8), sshd(8) + tun(4), ssh_config(5), ssh-keysign(8), sshd(8) STANDARDS S. Lehtinen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned Numbers, RFC 4250, January 2006. T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture, RFC 4251, January 2006. T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol, RFC 4252, January 2006. T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4253, January 2006. T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol, RFC 4254, January 2006. J. Schlyter and W. Griffin, Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints, RFC 4255, January 2006. F. Cusack and M. Forssen, Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH), RFC 4256, January 2006. J. Galbraith and P. Remaker, The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break Extension, RFC 4335, January 2006. M. Bellare, T. Kohno, and C. Namprempre, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes, RFC 4344, January 2006. B. Harris, Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4345, January 2006. M. Friedl, N. Provos, and W. Simpson, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, March 2006. J. Galbraith and R. Thayer, The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format, RFC 4716, November 2006. D. Stebila and J. Green, Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer, RFC 5656, December 2009. A. Perrig and D. Song, Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security, 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99). AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. -OpenBSD 5.5 December 7, 2013 OpenBSD 5.5 +OpenBSD 5.6 July 24, 2014 OpenBSD 5.6 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh.1 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh.1 (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh.1 (revision 276707) @@ -1,1593 +1,1582 @@ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.343 2013/12/07 11:58:46 naddy Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: December 7 2013 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.348 2014/07/24 22:57:10 millert Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: July 24 2014 $ .Dt SSH 1 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh .Nd OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program) .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ssh .Bk -words .Op Fl 1246AaCfgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy .Op Fl b Ar bind_address .Op Fl c Ar cipher_spec .Op Fl D Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ns Ar port .Op Fl E Ar log_file .Op Fl e Ar escape_char .Op Fl F Ar configfile .Op Fl I Ar pkcs11 .Op Fl i Ar identity_file .Op Fl L Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ns Ar port : Ns Ar host : Ns Ar hostport .Op Fl l Ar login_name .Op Fl m Ar mac_spec .Op Fl O Ar ctl_cmd .Op Fl o Ar option .Op Fl p Ar port .Op Fl Q Cm cipher | cipher-auth | mac | kex | key .Op Fl R Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ns Ar port : Ns Ar host : Ns Ar hostport .Op Fl S Ar ctl_path .Op Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port .Op Fl w Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun .Oo Ar user Ns @ Oc Ns Ar hostname .Op Ar command .Ek .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm (SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for executing commands on a remote machine. It is intended to replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. -X11 connections and arbitrary TCP ports -can also be forwarded over the secure channel. +X11 connections, arbitrary TCP ports and +.Ux Ns -domain +sockets can also be forwarded over the secure channel. .Pp .Nm connects and logs into the specified .Ar hostname (with optional .Ar user name). The user must prove his/her identity to the remote machine using one of several methods depending on the protocol version used (see below). .Pp If .Ar command is specified, it is executed on the remote host instead of a login shell. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl 1 Forces .Nm to try protocol version 1 only. .It Fl 2 Forces .Nm to try protocol version 2 only. .It Fl 4 Forces .Nm to use IPv4 addresses only. .It Fl 6 Forces .Nm to use IPv6 addresses only. .It Fl A Enables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file. .Pp Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's .Ux Ns -domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent. .It Fl a Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. .It Fl b Ar bind_address Use .Ar bind_address on the local machine as the source address of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one address. .It Fl C Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, stderr, and -data for forwarded X11 and TCP connections). +data for forwarded X11, TCP and +.Ux Ns -domain +connections). The compression algorithm is the same used by .Xr gzip 1 , and the .Dq level can be controlled by the .Cm CompressionLevel option for protocol version 1. Compression is desirable on modem lines and other slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks. The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the configuration files; see the .Cm Compression option. .It Fl c Ar cipher_spec Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session. .Pp Protocol version 1 allows specification of a single cipher. The supported values are .Dq 3des , .Dq blowfish , and .Dq des . -.Ar 3des -(triple-des) is an encrypt-decrypt-encrypt triple with three different keys. -It is believed to be secure. -.Ar blowfish -is a fast block cipher; it appears very secure and is much faster than -.Ar 3des . -.Ar des -is only supported in the -.Nm -client for interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations -that do not support the -.Ar 3des -cipher. -Its use is strongly discouraged due to cryptographic weaknesses. -The default is -.Dq 3des . -.Pp For protocol version 2, .Ar cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of ciphers listed in order of preference. See the .Cm Ciphers keyword in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information. .It Fl D Xo .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc .Ar port .Sm on .Xc Specifies a local .Dq dynamic application-level port forwarding. This works by allocating a socket to listen to .Ar port on the local side, optionally bound to the specified .Ar bind_address . Whenever a connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the remote machine. Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and .Nm will act as a SOCKS server. Only root can forward privileged ports. Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. .Pp IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the .Cm GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit .Ar bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The .Ar bind_address of .Dq localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or .Sq * indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. .It Fl E Ar log_file Append debug logs to .Ar log_file instead of standard error. .It Fl e Ar escape_char Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default: .Ql ~ ) . The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a line. The escape character followed by a dot .Pq Ql \&. closes the connection; followed by control-Z suspends the connection; and followed by itself sends the escape character once. Setting the character to .Dq none disables any escapes and makes the session fully transparent. .It Fl F Ar configfile Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file. If a configuration file is given on the command line, the system-wide configuration file .Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config will be ignored. The default for the per-user configuration file is .Pa ~/.ssh/config . .It Fl f Requests .Nm to go to background just before command execution. This is useful if .Nm is going to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user wants it in the background. This implies .Fl n . The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is with something like .Ic ssh -f host xterm . .Pp If the .Cm ExitOnForwardFailure configuration option is set to .Dq yes , then a client started with .Fl f will wait for all remote port forwards to be successfully established before placing itself in the background. .It Fl g Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports. +If used on a multiplexed connection, then this option must be specified +on the master process. .It Fl I Ar pkcs11 Specify the PKCS#11 shared library .Nm should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's private RSA key. .It Fl i Ar identity_file Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for public key authentication is read. The default is .Pa ~/.ssh/identity for protocol version 1, and .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa for protocol version 2. Identity files may also be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. It is possible to have multiple .Fl i options (and multiple identities specified in configuration files). .Nm will also try to load certificate information from the filename obtained by appending .Pa -cert.pub to identity filenames. .It Fl K Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server. .It Fl k Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server. .It Fl L Xo .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc .Ar port : host : hostport .Sm on .Xc Specifies that the given port on the local (client) host is to be forwarded to the given host and port on the remote side. This works by allocating a socket to listen to .Ar port on the local side, optionally bound to the specified .Ar bind_address . Whenever a connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is made to .Ar host port .Ar hostport from the remote machine. Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the .Cm GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit .Ar bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The .Ar bind_address of .Dq localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or .Sq * indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. .It Fl l Ar login_name Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine. This also may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. .It Fl M Places the .Nm client into .Dq master mode for connection sharing. Multiple .Fl M options places .Nm into .Dq master mode with confirmation required before slave connections are accepted. Refer to the description of .Cm ControlMaster in .Xr ssh_config 5 for details. .It Fl m Ar mac_spec Additionally, for protocol version 2 a comma-separated list of MAC (message authentication code) algorithms can be specified in order of preference. See the .Cm MACs keyword for more information. .It Fl N Do not execute a remote command. This is useful for just forwarding ports (protocol version 2 only). .It Fl n Redirects stdin from .Pa /dev/null (actually, prevents reading from stdin). This must be used when .Nm is run in the background. A common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote machine. For example, .Ic ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & will start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel. The .Nm program will be put in the background. (This does not work if .Nm needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the .Fl f option.) .It Fl O Ar ctl_cmd Control an active connection multiplexing master process. When the .Fl O option is specified, the .Ar ctl_cmd argument is interpreted and passed to the master process. Valid commands are: .Dq check (check that the master process is running), .Dq forward (request forwardings without command execution), .Dq cancel (cancel forwardings), .Dq exit (request the master to exit), and .Dq stop (request the master to stop accepting further multiplexing requests). .It Fl o Ar option Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact .It AddressFamily .It BatchMode .It BindAddress .It CanonicalDomains .It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal .It CanonicalizeHostname .It CanonicalizeMaxDots .It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs .It ChallengeResponseAuthentication .It CheckHostIP .It Cipher .It Ciphers .It ClearAllForwardings .It Compression .It CompressionLevel .It ConnectionAttempts .It ConnectTimeout .It ControlMaster .It ControlPath .It ControlPersist .It DynamicForward .It EscapeChar .It ExitOnForwardFailure .It ForwardAgent .It ForwardX11 .It ForwardX11Timeout .It ForwardX11Trusted .It GatewayPorts .It GlobalKnownHostsFile .It GSSAPIAuthentication .It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials .It HashKnownHosts .It Host .It HostbasedAuthentication .It HostKeyAlgorithms .It HostKeyAlias .It HostName .It IdentityFile .It IdentitiesOnly .It IPQoS .It KbdInteractiveAuthentication .It KbdInteractiveDevices .It KexAlgorithms .It LocalCommand .It LocalForward .It LogLevel .It MACs .It Match .It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost .It NumberOfPasswordPrompts .It PasswordAuthentication .It PermitLocalCommand .It PKCS11Provider .It Port .It PreferredAuthentications .It Protocol .It ProxyCommand .It ProxyUseFdpass .It PubkeyAuthentication .It RekeyLimit .It RemoteForward .It RequestTTY .It RhostsRSAAuthentication .It RSAAuthentication .It SendEnv .It ServerAliveInterval .It ServerAliveCountMax +.It StreamLocalBindMask +.It StreamLocalBindUnlink .It StrictHostKeyChecking .It TCPKeepAlive .It Tunnel .It TunnelDevice .It UsePrivilegedPort .It User .It UserKnownHostsFile .It VerifyHostKeyDNS .It VisualHostKey .It XAuthLocation .El .It Fl p Ar port Port to connect to on the remote host. This can be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. .It Fl Q Cm cipher | cipher-auth | mac | kex | key Queries .Nm for the algorithms supported for the specified version 2. The available features are: .Ar cipher (supported symmetric ciphers), .Ar cipher-auth (supported symmetric ciphers that support authenticated encryption), .Ar mac (supported message integrity codes), .Ar kex (key exchange algorithms), .Ar key (key types). .It Fl q Quiet mode. Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be suppressed. .It Fl R Xo .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc .Ar port : host : hostport .Sm on .Xc Specifies that the given port on the remote (server) host is to be forwarded to the given host and port on the local side. This works by allocating a socket to listen to .Ar port on the remote side, and whenever a connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is made to .Ar host port .Ar hostport from the local machine. .Pp Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file. Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on the remote machine. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. .Pp By default, the listening socket on the server will be bound to the loopback interface only. This may be overridden by specifying a .Ar bind_address . An empty .Ar bind_address , or the address .Ql * , indicates that the remote socket should listen on all interfaces. Specifying a remote .Ar bind_address will only succeed if the server's .Cm GatewayPorts option is enabled (see .Xr sshd_config 5 ) . .Pp If the .Ar port argument is .Ql 0 , the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time. When used together with .Ic -O forward the allocated port will be printed to the standard output. .It Fl S Ar ctl_path Specifies the location of a control socket for connection sharing, or the string .Dq none to disable connection sharing. Refer to the description of .Cm ControlPath and .Cm ControlMaster in .Xr ssh_config 5 for details. .It Fl s May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote system. Subsystems are a feature of the SSH2 protocol which facilitate the use of SSH as a secure transport for other applications (eg.\& .Xr sftp 1 ) . The subsystem is specified as the remote command. .It Fl T Disable pseudo-tty allocation. .It Fl t Force pseudo-tty allocation. This can be used to execute arbitrary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be very useful, e.g. when implementing menu services. Multiple .Fl t options force tty allocation, even if .Nm has no local tty. .It Fl V Display the version number and exit. .It Fl v Verbose mode. Causes .Nm to print debugging messages about its progress. This is helpful in debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems. Multiple .Fl v options increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3. .It Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port Requests that standard input and output on the client be forwarded to .Ar host on .Ar port over the secure channel. Implies .Fl N , .Fl T , .Cm ExitOnForwardFailure and .Cm ClearAllForwardings . Works with Protocol version 2 only. .It Fl w Xo .Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun .Xc Requests tunnel device forwarding with the specified .Xr tun 4 devices between the client .Pq Ar local_tun and the server .Pq Ar remote_tun . .Pp The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword .Dq any , which uses the next available tunnel device. If .Ar remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to .Dq any . See also the .Cm Tunnel and .Cm TunnelDevice directives in .Xr ssh_config 5 . If the .Cm Tunnel directive is unset, it is set to the default tunnel mode, which is .Dq point-to-point . .It Fl X Enables X11 forwarding. This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file. .Pp X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the user's X authorization database) can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring. .Pp For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY extension restrictions by default. Please refer to the .Nm .Fl Y option and the .Cm ForwardX11Trusted directive in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information. .It Fl x Disables X11 forwarding. .It Fl Y Enables trusted X11 forwarding. Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls. .It Fl y Send log information using the .Xr syslog 3 system module. By default this information is sent to stderr. .El .Pp .Nm may additionally obtain configuration data from a per-user configuration file and a system-wide configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Sh AUTHENTICATION The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocols 1 and 2. The default is to use protocol 2 only, though this can be changed via the .Cm Protocol option in .Xr ssh_config 5 or the .Fl 1 and .Fl 2 options (see above). Both protocols support similar authentication methods, but protocol 2 is the default since it provides additional mechanisms for confidentiality (the traffic is encrypted using AES, 3DES, Blowfish, CAST128, or Arcfour) and integrity (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, hmac-sha2-256, hmac-sha2-512, umac-64, umac-128, hmac-ripemd160). Protocol 1 lacks a strong mechanism for ensuring the integrity of the connection. .Pp The methods available for authentication are: GSSAPI-based authentication, host-based authentication, public key authentication, challenge-response authentication, and password authentication. Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above, though protocol 2 has a configuration option to change the default order: .Cm PreferredAuthentications . .Pp Host-based authentication works as follows: If the machine the user logs in from is listed in .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv or .Pa /etc/shosts.equiv on the remote machine, and the user names are the same on both sides, or if the files .Pa ~/.rhosts or .Pa ~/.shosts exist in the user's home directory on the remote machine and contain a line containing the name of the client machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is considered for login. Additionally, the server .Em must be able to verify the client's host key (see the description of .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts , below) for login to be permitted. This authentication method closes security holes due to IP spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing. [Note to the administrator: .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv , .Pa ~/.rhosts , and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be disabled if security is desired.] .Pp Public key authentication works as follows: The scheme is based on public-key cryptography, using cryptosystems where encryption and decryption are done using separate keys, and it is unfeasible to derive the decryption key from the encryption key. The idea is that each user creates a public/private key pair for authentication purposes. The server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key. .Nm implements public key authentication protocol automatically, using one of the DSA, ECDSA, ED25519 or RSA algorithms. Protocol 1 is restricted to using only RSA keys, but protocol 2 may use any. The HISTORY section of .Xr ssl 8 contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms. .Pp The file .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys lists the public keys that are permitted for logging in. When the user logs in, the .Nm program tells the server which key pair it would like to use for authentication. The client proves that it has access to the private key and the server checks that the corresponding public key is authorized to accept the account. .Pp The user creates his/her key pair by running .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . This stores the private key in .Pa ~/.ssh/identity (protocol 1), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa (protocol 2 DSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa (protocol 2 ECDSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 (protocol 2 ED25519), or .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa (protocol 2 RSA) and stores the public key in .Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub (protocol 1), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub (protocol 2 DSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub (protocol 2 ECDSA), .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub (protocol 2 ED25519), or .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub (protocol 2 RSA) in the user's home directory. The user should then copy the public key to .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys in his/her home directory on the remote machine. The .Pa authorized_keys file corresponds to the conventional .Pa ~/.rhosts file, and has one key per line, though the lines can be very long. After this, the user can log in without giving the password. .Pp A variation on public key authentication is available in the form of certificate authentication: instead of a set of public/private keys, signed certificates are used. This has the advantage that a single trusted certification authority can be used in place of many public/private keys. See the CERTIFICATES section of .Xr ssh-keygen 1 for more information. .Pp The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication may be with an authentication agent. See .Xr ssh-agent 1 for more information. .Pp Challenge-response authentication works as follows: The server sends an arbitrary .Qq challenge text, and prompts for a response. Protocol 2 allows multiple challenges and responses; protocol 1 is restricted to just one challenge/response. Examples of challenge-response authentication include .Bx Authentication (see .Xr login.conf 5 ) and PAM (some .Pf non- Ox systems). .Pp Finally, if other authentication methods fail, .Nm prompts the user for a password. The password is sent to the remote host for checking; however, since all communications are encrypted, the password cannot be seen by someone listening on the network. .Pp .Nm automatically maintains and checks a database containing identification for all hosts it has ever been used with. Host keys are stored in .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the user's home directory. Additionally, the file .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts is automatically checked for known hosts. Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file. If a host's identification ever changes, .Nm warns about this and disables password authentication to prevent server spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks, which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption. The .Cm StrictHostKeyChecking option can be used to control logins to machines whose host key is not known or has changed. .Pp When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server either executes the given command, or logs into the machine and gives the user a normal shell on the remote machine. All communication with the remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted. .Pp If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated (normal login session), the user may use the escape characters noted below. .Pp If no pseudo-tty has been allocated, the session is transparent and can be used to reliably transfer binary data. On most systems, setting the escape character to .Dq none will also make the session transparent even if a tty is used. .Pp The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote machine exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed. .Sh ESCAPE CHARACTERS When a pseudo-terminal has been requested, .Nm supports a number of functions through the use of an escape character. .Pp A single tilde character can be sent as .Ic ~~ or by following the tilde by a character other than those described below. The escape character must always follow a newline to be interpreted as special. The escape character can be changed in configuration files using the .Cm EscapeChar configuration directive or on the command line by the .Fl e option. .Pp The supported escapes (assuming the default .Ql ~ ) are: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm ~. Disconnect. .It Cm ~^Z Background .Nm . .It Cm ~# List forwarded connections. .It Cm ~& Background .Nm at logout when waiting for forwarded connection / X11 sessions to terminate. .It Cm ~? Display a list of escape characters. .It Cm ~B Send a BREAK to the remote system (only useful for SSH protocol version 2 and if the peer supports it). .It Cm ~C Open command line. Currently this allows the addition of port forwardings using the .Fl L , .Fl R and .Fl D options (see above). It also allows the cancellation of existing port-forwardings with .Sm off .Fl KL Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on for local, .Sm off .Fl KR Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on for remote and .Sm off .Fl KD Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on for dynamic port-forwardings. .Ic !\& Ns Ar command allows the user to execute a local command if the .Ic PermitLocalCommand option is enabled in .Xr ssh_config 5 . Basic help is available, using the .Fl h option. .It Cm ~R Request rekeying of the connection (only useful for SSH protocol version 2 and if the peer supports it). .It Cm ~V Decrease the verbosity .Pq Ic LogLevel when errors are being written to stderr. .It Cm ~v Increase the verbosity .Pq Ic LogLevel when errors are being written to stderr. .El .Sh TCP FORWARDING Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over the secure channel can be specified either on the command line or in a configuration file. One possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a mail server; another is going through firewalls. .Pp In the example below, we look at encrypting communication between an IRC client and server, even though the IRC server does not directly support encrypted communications. This works as follows: the user connects to the remote host using .Nm , specifying a port to be used to forward connections to the remote server. After that it is possible to start the service which is to be encrypted on the client machine, connecting to the same local port, and .Nm will encrypt and forward the connection. .Pp The following example tunnels an IRC session from client machine .Dq 127.0.0.1 (localhost) to remote server .Dq server.example.com : .Bd -literal -offset 4n $ ssh -f -L 1234:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10 $ irc -c '#users' -p 1234 pinky 127.0.0.1 .Ed .Pp This tunnels a connection to IRC server .Dq server.example.com , joining channel .Dq #users , nickname .Dq pinky , using port 1234. It doesn't matter which port is used, as long as it's greater than 1023 (remember, only root can open sockets on privileged ports) and doesn't conflict with any ports already in use. The connection is forwarded to port 6667 on the remote server, since that's the standard port for IRC services. .Pp The .Fl f option backgrounds .Nm and the remote command .Dq sleep 10 is specified to allow an amount of time (10 seconds, in the example) to start the service which is to be tunnelled. If no connections are made within the time specified, .Nm will exit. .Sh X11 FORWARDING If the .Cm ForwardX11 variable is set to .Dq yes (or see the description of the .Fl X , .Fl x , and .Fl Y options above) and the user is using X11 (the .Ev DISPLAY environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11 programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made from the local machine. The user should not manually set .Ev DISPLAY . Forwarding of X11 connections can be configured on the command line or in configuration files. .Pp The .Ev DISPLAY value set by .Nm will point to the server machine, but with a display number greater than zero. This is normal, and happens because .Nm creates a .Dq proxy X server on the server machine for forwarding the connections over the encrypted channel. .Pp .Nm will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine. For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie, store it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded connections carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when the connection is opened. The real authentication cookie is never sent to the server machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain). .Pp If the .Cm ForwardAgent variable is set to .Dq yes (or see the description of the .Fl A and .Fl a options above) and the user is using an authentication agent, the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the remote side. .Sh VERIFYING HOST KEYS When connecting to a server for the first time, a fingerprint of the server's public key is presented to the user (unless the option .Cm StrictHostKeyChecking has been disabled). Fingerprints can be determined using .Xr ssh-keygen 1 : .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key .Pp If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched and the key can be accepted or rejected. Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys just by looking at hex strings, there is also support to compare host keys visually, using .Em random art . By setting the .Cm VisualHostKey option to .Dq yes , a small ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter if the session itself is interactive or not. By learning the pattern a known server produces, a user can easily find out that the host key has changed when a completely different pattern is displayed. Because these patterns are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks similar to the pattern remembered only gives a good probability that the host key is the same, not guaranteed proof. .Pp To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for all known hosts, the following command line can be used: .Pp .Dl $ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts .Pp If the fingerprint is unknown, an alternative method of verification is available: SSH fingerprints verified by DNS. An additional resource record (RR), SSHFP, is added to a zonefile and the connecting client is able to match the fingerprint with that of the key presented. .Pp In this example, we are connecting a client to a server, .Dq host.example.com . The SSHFP resource records should first be added to the zonefile for host.example.com: .Bd -literal -offset indent $ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com. .Ed .Pp The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile. To check that the zone is answering fingerprint queries: .Pp .Dl $ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com .Pp Finally the client connects: .Bd -literal -offset indent $ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com [...] Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS. Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)? .Ed .Pp See the .Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS option in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information. .Sh SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS .Nm contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling using the .Xr tun 4 network pseudo-device, allowing two networks to be joined securely. The .Xr sshd_config 5 configuration option .Cm PermitTunnel controls whether the server supports this, and at what level (layer 2 or 3 traffic). .Pp The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24 with remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection from 10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2, provided that the SSH server running on the gateway to the remote network, at 192.168.1.15, allows it. .Pp On the client: .Bd -literal -offset indent # ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true # ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252 # route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2 .Ed .Pp On the server: .Bd -literal -offset indent # ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252 # route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1 .Ed .Pp Client access may be more finely tuned via the .Pa /root/.ssh/authorized_keys file (see below) and the .Cm PermitRootLogin server option. The following entry would permit connections on .Xr tun 4 device 1 from user .Dq jane and on tun device 2 from user .Dq john , if .Cm PermitRootLogin is set to .Dq forced-commands-only : .Bd -literal -offset 2n tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john .Ed .Pp Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead, it may be more suited to temporary setups, such as for wireless VPNs. More permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as .Xr ipsecctl 8 and .Xr isakmpd 8 . .Sh ENVIRONMENT .Nm will normally set the following environment variables: .Bl -tag -width "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND" .It Ev DISPLAY The .Ev DISPLAY variable indicates the location of the X11 server. It is automatically set by .Nm to point to a value of the form .Dq hostname:n , where .Dq hostname indicates the host where the shell runs, and .Sq n is an integer \*(Ge 1. .Nm uses this special value to forward X11 connections over the secure channel. The user should normally not set .Ev DISPLAY explicitly, as that will render the X11 connection insecure (and will require the user to manually copy any required authorization cookies). .It Ev HOME Set to the path of the user's home directory. .It Ev LOGNAME Synonym for .Ev USER ; set for compatibility with systems that use this variable. .It Ev MAIL Set to the path of the user's mailbox. .It Ev PATH Set to the default .Ev PATH , as specified when compiling .Nm . .It Ev SSH_ASKPASS If .Nm needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current terminal if it was run from a terminal. If .Nm does not have a terminal associated with it but .Ev DISPLAY and .Ev SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute the program specified by .Ev SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the passphrase. This is particularly useful when calling .Nm from a .Pa .xsession or related script. (Note that on some machines it may be necessary to redirect the input from .Pa /dev/null to make this work.) .It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK Identifies the path of a .Ux Ns -domain socket used to communicate with the agent. .It Ev SSH_CONNECTION Identifies the client and server ends of the connection. The variable contains four space-separated values: client IP address, client port number, server IP address, and server port number. .It Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND This variable contains the original command line if a forced command is executed. It can be used to extract the original arguments. .It Ev SSH_TTY This is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associated with the current shell or command. If the current session has no tty, this variable is not set. .It Ev TZ This variable is set to indicate the present time zone if it was set when the daemon was started (i.e. the daemon passes the value on to new connections). .It Ev USER Set to the name of the user logging in. .El .Pp Additionally, .Nm reads .Pa ~/.ssh/environment , and adds lines of the format .Dq VARNAME=value to the environment if the file exists and users are allowed to change their environment. For more information, see the .Cm PermitUserEnvironment option in .Xr sshd_config 5 . .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Pa ~/.rhosts This file is used for host-based authentication (see above). On some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because .Xr sshd 8 reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.shosts This file is used in exactly the same way as .Pa .rhosts , but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration and authentication information. There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, ED25519, RSA) that can be used for logging in as this user. The format of this file is described in the .Xr sshd 8 manual page. This file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/config This is the per-user configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in .Xr ssh_config 5 . Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions: read/write for the user, and not writable by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/environment Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see .Sx ENVIRONMENT , above. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/identity .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa Contains the private key for authentication. These files contain sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not accessible by others (read/write/execute). .Nm will simply ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key which will be used to encrypt the sensitive part of this file using 3DES. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/identity.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub .It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub Contains the public key for authentication. These files are not sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys. See .Xr sshd 8 for further details of the format of this file. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/rc Commands in this file are executed by .Nm when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the .Xr sshd 8 manual page for more information. .Pp .It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv This file is for host-based authentication (see above). It should only be writable by root. .Pp .It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv This file is used in exactly the same way as .Pa hosts.equiv , but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config Systemwide configuration file. The file format and configuration options are described in .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key These files contain the private parts of the host keys and are used for host-based authentication. If protocol version 1 is used, .Nm must be setuid root, since the host key is readable only by root. For protocol version 2, .Nm uses .Xr ssh-keysign 8 to access the host keys, eliminating the requirement that .Nm be setuid root when host-based authentication is used. By default .Nm is not setuid root. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the organization. It should be world-readable. See .Xr sshd 8 for further details of the format of this file. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc Commands in this file are executed by .Nm when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the .Xr sshd 8 manual page for more information. .El .Sh EXIT STATUS .Nm exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 if an error occurred. .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr scp 1 , .Xr sftp 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 , .Xr tun 4 , -.Xr hosts.equiv 5 , .Xr ssh_config 5 , .Xr ssh-keysign 8 , .Xr sshd 8 .Sh STANDARDS .Rs .%A S. Lehtinen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4250 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned Numbers .Re .Pp .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4251 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture .Re .Pp .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4252 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4253 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A T. Ylonen .%A C. Lonvick .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4254 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A J. Schlyter .%A W. Griffin .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4255 .%T Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints .Re .Pp .Rs .%A F. Cusack .%A M. Forssen .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4256 .%T Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH) .Re .Pp .Rs .%A J. Galbraith .%A P. Remaker .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4335 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break Extension .Re .Pp .Rs .%A M. Bellare .%A T. Kohno .%A C. Namprempre .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4344 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes .Re .Pp .Rs .%A B. Harris .%D January 2006 .%R RFC 4345 .%T Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A M. Friedl .%A N. Provos .%A W. Simpson .%D March 2006 .%R RFC 4419 .%T Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol .Re .Pp .Rs .%A J. Galbraith .%A R. Thayer .%D November 2006 .%R RFC 4716 .%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format .Re .Pp .Rs .%A D. Stebila .%A J. Green .%D December 2009 .%R RFC 5656 .%T Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer .Re .Pp .Rs .%A A. Perrig .%A D. Song .%D 1999 .%O International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99) .%T Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security .Re .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,1851 +1,1922 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.401 2014/02/26 20:18:37 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.407 2014/07/17 07:22:19 djm Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Ssh client program. This program can be used to log into a remote machine. * The software supports strong authentication, encryption, and forwarding * of X11, TCP/IP, and authentication connections. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Modified to work with SSL by Niels Provos * in Canada (German citizen). * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include +#endif #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" +#include "digest.h" #include "packet.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "channels.h" #include "key.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "clientloop.h" #include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "sshconnect.h" -#include "misc.h" #include "kex.h" #include "mac.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "match.h" #include "msg.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "roaming.h" #include "version.h" #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 #include "ssh-pkcs11.h" #endif extern char *__progname; /* Saves a copy of argv for setproctitle emulation */ #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE static char **saved_av; #endif /* Flag indicating whether debug mode is on. May be set on the command line. */ int debug_flag = 0; /* Flag indicating whether a tty should be requested */ int tty_flag = 0; /* don't exec a shell */ int no_shell_flag = 0; /* * Flag indicating that nothing should be read from stdin. This can be set * on the command line. */ int stdin_null_flag = 0; /* * Flag indicating that the current process should be backgrounded and * a new slave launched in the foreground for ControlPersist. */ int need_controlpersist_detach = 0; /* Copies of flags for ControlPersist foreground slave */ int ostdin_null_flag, ono_shell_flag, otty_flag, orequest_tty; /* * Flag indicating that ssh should fork after authentication. This is useful * so that the passphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the * background. */ int fork_after_authentication_flag = 0; /* forward stdio to remote host and port */ char *stdio_forward_host = NULL; int stdio_forward_port = 0; /* * General data structure for command line options and options configurable * in configuration files. See readconf.h. */ Options options; /* optional user configfile */ char *config = NULL; /* * Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the * command line, or the HostName specified for the user-supplied name in a * configuration file. */ char *host; /* socket address the host resolves to */ struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; /* Private host keys. */ Sensitive sensitive_data; /* Original real UID. */ uid_t original_real_uid; uid_t original_effective_uid; /* command to be executed */ Buffer command; /* Should we execute a command or invoke a subsystem? */ int subsystem_flag = 0; /* # of replies received for global requests */ static int remote_forward_confirms_received = 0; /* mux.c */ extern int muxserver_sock; extern u_int muxclient_command; /* Prints a help message to the user. This function never returns. */ static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: ssh [-1246AaCfgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec]\n" " [-D [bind_address:]port] [-E log_file] [-e escape_char]\n" " [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11] [-i identity_file]\n" " [-L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport] [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec]\n" " [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]\n" " [-Q cipher | cipher-auth | mac | kex | key]\n" " [-R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport] [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port]\n" " [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] [user@]hostname [command]\n" ); exit(255); } static int ssh_session(void); static int ssh_session2(void); static void load_public_identity_files(void); static void main_sigchld_handler(int); /* from muxclient.c */ void muxclient(const char *); void muxserver_listen(void); /* ~/ expand a list of paths. NB. assumes path[n] is heap-allocated. */ static void tilde_expand_paths(char **paths, u_int num_paths) { u_int i; char *cp; for (i = 0; i < num_paths; i++) { cp = tilde_expand_filename(paths[i], original_real_uid); free(paths[i]); paths[i] = cp; } } /* * Attempt to resolve a host name / port to a set of addresses and * optionally return any CNAMEs encountered along the way. * Returns NULL on failure. * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. */ static struct addrinfo * resolve_host(const char *name, int port, int logerr, char *cname, size_t clen) { char strport[NI_MAXSERV]; struct addrinfo hints, *res; int gaierr, loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; if (port <= 0) port = default_ssh_port(); snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port); memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ? AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family; hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM; if (cname != NULL) hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME; if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) { if (logerr || (gaierr != EAI_NONAME && gaierr != EAI_NODATA)) loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR; do_log2(loglevel, "%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s", __progname, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); return NULL; } if (cname != NULL && res->ai_canonname != NULL) { if (strlcpy(cname, res->ai_canonname, clen) >= clen) { error("%s: host \"%s\" cname \"%s\" too long (max %lu)", __func__, name, res->ai_canonname, (u_long)clen); if (clen > 0) *cname = '\0'; } } return res; } /* * Check whether the cname is a permitted replacement for the hostname * and perform the replacement if it is. * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. */ static int check_follow_cname(char **namep, const char *cname) { int i; struct allowed_cname *rule; if (*cname == '\0' || options.num_permitted_cnames == 0 || strcmp(*namep, cname) == 0) return 0; if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO) return 0; /* * Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by * a proxy unless the user specifically requests so. */ if (!option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) && options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS) return 0; debug3("%s: check \"%s\" CNAME \"%s\"", __func__, *namep, cname); for (i = 0; i < options.num_permitted_cnames; i++) { rule = options.permitted_cnames + i; if (match_pattern_list(*namep, rule->source_list, strlen(rule->source_list), 1) != 1 || match_pattern_list(cname, rule->target_list, strlen(rule->target_list), 1) != 1) continue; verbose("Canonicalized DNS aliased hostname " "\"%s\" => \"%s\"", *namep, cname); free(*namep); *namep = xstrdup(cname); return 1; } return 0; } /* * Attempt to resolve the supplied hostname after applying the user's * canonicalization rules. Returns the address list for the host or NULL * if no name was found after canonicalization. * NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members. */ static struct addrinfo * resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, int port) { int i, ndots; char *cp, *fullhost, cname_target[NI_MAXHOST]; struct addrinfo *addrs; if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO) return NULL; /* * Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by * a proxy unless the user specifically requests so. */ if (!option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) && options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS) return NULL; /* Don't apply canonicalization to sufficiently-qualified hostnames */ ndots = 0; for (cp = *hostp; *cp != '\0'; cp++) { if (*cp == '.') ndots++; } if (ndots > options.canonicalize_max_dots) { debug3("%s: not canonicalizing hostname \"%s\" (max dots %d)", __func__, *hostp, options.canonicalize_max_dots); return NULL; } /* Attempt each supplied suffix */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_canonical_domains; i++) { *cname_target = '\0'; xasprintf(&fullhost, "%s.%s.", *hostp, options.canonical_domains[i]); debug3("%s: attempting \"%s\" => \"%s\"", __func__, *hostp, fullhost); if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0, cname_target, sizeof(cname_target))) == NULL) { free(fullhost); continue; } /* Remove trailing '.' */ fullhost[strlen(fullhost) - 1] = '\0'; /* Follow CNAME if requested */ if (!check_follow_cname(&fullhost, cname_target)) { debug("Canonicalized hostname \"%s\" => \"%s\"", *hostp, fullhost); } free(*hostp); *hostp = fullhost; return addrs; } if (!options.canonicalize_fallback_local) fatal("%s: Could not resolve host \"%s\"", __progname, *hostp); debug2("%s: host %s not found in any suffix", __func__, *hostp); return NULL; } /* * Read per-user configuration file. Ignore the system wide config * file if the user specifies a config file on the command line. */ static void process_config_files(struct passwd *pw) { char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; int r; if (config != NULL) { if (strcasecmp(config, "none") != 0 && !read_config_file(config, pw, host, &options, SSHCONF_USERCONF)) fatal("Can't open user config file %.100s: " "%.100s", config, strerror(errno)); } else { r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE); if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf)) (void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, &options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM|SSHCONF_USERCONF); /* Read systemwide configuration file after user config. */ (void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw, host, &options, 0); } } /* * Main program for the ssh client. */ int main(int ac, char **av) { int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog; char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, buf[MAXPATHLEN], *host_arg, *logfile; char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV]; char cname[NI_MAXHOST]; struct stat st; struct passwd *pw; int timeout_ms; extern int optind, optreset; extern char *optarg; - Forward fwd; + struct Forward fwd; struct addrinfo *addrs = NULL; + struct ssh_digest_ctx *md; + u_char conn_hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; + char *conn_hash_hex; /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */ /* Save argv so it isn't clobbered by setproctitle() emulation */ saved_av = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_av)); for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) saved_av[i] = xstrdup(av[i]); saved_av[i] = NULL; compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av); av = saved_av; #endif /* * Discard other fds that are hanging around. These can cause problem * with backgrounded ssh processes started by ControlPersist. */ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1); /* * Save the original real uid. It will be needed later (uid-swapping * may clobber the real uid). */ original_real_uid = getuid(); original_effective_uid = geteuid(); /* * Use uid-swapping to give up root privileges for the duration of * option processing. We will re-instantiate the rights when we are * ready to create the privileged port, and will permanently drop * them when the port has been created (actually, when the connection * has been made, as we may need to create the port several times). */ PRIV_END; #ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT /* If we are installed setuid root be careful to not drop core. */ if (original_real_uid != original_effective_uid) { struct rlimit rlim; rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0; if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) < 0) fatal("setrlimit failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); } #endif /* Get user data. */ pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid); if (!pw) { logit("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)original_real_uid); exit(255); } /* Take a copy of the returned structure. */ pw = pwcopy(pw); /* * Set our umask to something reasonable, as some files are created * with the default umask. This will make them world-readable but * writable only by the owner, which is ok for all files for which we * don't set the modes explicitly. */ umask(022); /* * Initialize option structure to indicate that no values have been * set. */ initialize_options(&options); /* Parse command-line arguments. */ host = NULL; use_syslog = 0; logfile = NULL; argv0 = av[0]; again: while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvx" "ACD:E:F:I:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case '1': options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_1; break; case '2': options.protocol = SSH_PROTO_2; break; case '4': options.address_family = AF_INET; break; case '6': options.address_family = AF_INET6; break; case 'n': stdin_null_flag = 1; break; case 'f': fork_after_authentication_flag = 1; stdin_null_flag = 1; break; case 'x': options.forward_x11 = 0; break; case 'X': options.forward_x11 = 1; break; case 'y': use_syslog = 1; break; case 'E': logfile = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'Y': options.forward_x11 = 1; options.forward_x11_trusted = 1; break; case 'g': - options.gateway_ports = 1; + options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 1; break; case 'O': if (stdio_forward_host != NULL) fatal("Cannot specify multiplexing " "command with -W"); else if (muxclient_command != 0) fatal("Multiplexing command already specified"); if (strcmp(optarg, "check") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK; else if (strcmp(optarg, "forward") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD; else if (strcmp(optarg, "exit") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE; else if (strcmp(optarg, "stop") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP; else if (strcmp(optarg, "cancel") == 0) muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD; else fatal("Invalid multiplex command."); break; case 'P': /* deprecated */ options.use_privileged_port = 0; break; case 'Q': cp = NULL; if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher") == 0) cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 0); else if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher-auth") == 0) cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 1); else if (strcmp(optarg, "mac") == 0) cp = mac_alg_list('\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0) cp = kex_alg_list('\n'); else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0) cp = key_alg_list(0, 0); else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0) cp = key_alg_list(1, 0); else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-plain") == 0) cp = key_alg_list(0, 1); if (cp == NULL) fatal("Unsupported query \"%s\"", optarg); printf("%s\n", cp); free(cp); exit(0); break; case 'a': options.forward_agent = 0; break; case 'A': options.forward_agent = 1; break; case 'k': options.gss_deleg_creds = 0; break; case 'K': options.gss_authentication = 1; options.gss_deleg_creds = 1; break; case 'i': if (stat(optarg, &st) < 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s " "not accessible: %s.\n", optarg, strerror(errno)); break; } add_identity_file(&options, NULL, optarg, 1); break; case 'I': #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 options.pkcs11_provider = xstrdup(optarg); #else fprintf(stderr, "no support for PKCS#11.\n"); #endif break; case 't': if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES) options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_FORCE; else options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_YES; break; case 'v': if (debug_flag == 0) { debug_flag = 1; options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; } else { if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) options.log_level++; } break; case 'V': fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", - SSH_RELEASE, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)); + SSH_RELEASE, +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION) +#else + "without OpenSSL" +#endif + ); if (opt == 'V') exit(0); break; case 'w': if (options.tun_open == -1) options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT; options.tun_local = a2tun(optarg, &options.tun_remote); if (options.tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ERR) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad tun device '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'W': if (stdio_forward_host != NULL) fatal("stdio forward already specified"); if (muxclient_command != 0) fatal("Cannot specify stdio forward with -O"); if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) { stdio_forward_host = fwd.listen_host; stdio_forward_port = fwd.listen_port; free(fwd.connect_host); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad stdio forwarding specification '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO; no_shell_flag = 1; options.clear_forwardings = 1; options.exit_on_forward_failure = 1; break; case 'q': options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; break; case 'e': if (optarg[0] == '^' && optarg[2] == 0 && (u_char) optarg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) optarg[1] < 128) options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[1] & 31; else if (strlen(optarg) == 1) options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[0]; else if (strcmp(optarg, "none") == 0) options.escape_char = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE; else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad escape character '%s'.\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'c': if (ciphers_valid(optarg)) { /* SSH2 only */ options.ciphers = xstrdup(optarg); options.cipher = SSH_CIPHER_INVALID; } else { /* SSH1 only */ options.cipher = cipher_number(optarg); if (options.cipher == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher type '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_3DES) options.ciphers = "3des-cbc"; else if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_BLOWFISH) options.ciphers = "blowfish-cbc"; else options.ciphers = (char *)-1; } break; case 'm': if (mac_valid(optarg)) options.macs = xstrdup(optarg); else { fprintf(stderr, "Unknown mac type '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'M': if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_YES) options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK; else options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_YES; break; case 'p': options.port = a2port(optarg); if (options.port <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'l': options.user = optarg; break; case 'L': if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 0)) add_local_forward(&options, &fwd); else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad local forwarding specification '%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'R': if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 1)) { add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad remote forwarding specification " "'%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'D': if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) { add_local_forward(&options, &fwd); } else { fprintf(stderr, "Bad dynamic forwarding specification " "'%s'\n", optarg); exit(255); } break; case 'C': options.compression = 1; break; case 'N': no_shell_flag = 1; options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO; break; case 'T': options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO; break; case 'o': line = xstrdup(optarg); if (process_config_line(&options, pw, host ? host : "", line, "command-line", 0, NULL, SSHCONF_USERCONF) != 0) exit(255); free(line); break; case 's': subsystem_flag = 1; break; case 'S': if (options.control_path != NULL) free(options.control_path); options.control_path = xstrdup(optarg); break; case 'b': options.bind_address = optarg; break; case 'F': config = optarg; break; default: usage(); } } ac -= optind; av += optind; if (ac > 0 && !host) { if (strrchr(*av, '@')) { p = xstrdup(*av); cp = strrchr(p, '@'); if (cp == NULL || cp == p) usage(); options.user = p; *cp = '\0'; host = xstrdup(++cp); } else host = xstrdup(*av); if (ac > 1) { optind = optreset = 1; goto again; } ac--, av++; } /* Check that we got a host name. */ if (!host) usage(); host_arg = xstrdup(host); +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); ERR_load_crypto_strings(); +#endif /* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */ buffer_init(&command); /* * Save the command to execute on the remote host in a buffer. There * is no limit on the length of the command, except by the maximum * packet size. Also sets the tty flag if there is no command. */ if (!ac) { /* No command specified - execute shell on a tty. */ if (subsystem_flag) { fprintf(stderr, "You must specify a subsystem to invoke.\n"); usage(); } } else { /* A command has been specified. Store it into the buffer. */ for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) { if (i) buffer_append(&command, " ", 1); buffer_append(&command, av[i], strlen(av[i])); } } /* Cannot fork to background if no command. */ if (fork_after_authentication_flag && buffer_len(&command) == 0 && !no_shell_flag) fatal("Cannot fork into background without a command " "to execute."); /* * Initialize "log" output. Since we are the client all output * goes to stderr unless otherwise specified by -y or -E. */ if (use_syslog && logfile != NULL) fatal("Can't specify both -y and -E"); if (logfile != NULL) { log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile); free(logfile); } log_init(argv0, options.log_level == -1 ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, !use_syslog); if (debug_flag) - logit("%s, %s", SSH_VERSION, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)); + logit("%s, %s", SSH_RELEASE, +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION) +#else + "without OpenSSL" +#endif + ); /* Parse the configuration files */ process_config_files(pw); /* Hostname canonicalisation needs a few options filled. */ fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(&options); /* If the user has replaced the hostname then take it into use now */ if (options.hostname != NULL) { /* NB. Please keep in sync with readconf.c:match_cfg_line() */ cp = percent_expand(options.hostname, "h", host, (char *)NULL); free(host); host = cp; } /* If canonicalization requested then try to apply it */ lowercase(host); if (options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_NO) addrs = resolve_canonicalize(&host, options.port); /* * If CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs have been specified but * other canonicalization did not happen (by not being requested * or by failing with fallback) then the hostname may still be changed * as a result of CNAME following. * * Try to resolve the bare hostname name using the system resolver's * usual search rules and then apply the CNAME follow rules. * * Skip the lookup if a ProxyCommand is being used unless the user * has specifically requested canonicalisation for this case via * CanonicalizeHostname=always */ if (addrs == NULL && options.num_permitted_cnames != 0 && (option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) || options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)) { - if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, 1, - cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL) - cleanup_exit(255); /* resolve_host logs the error */ - check_follow_cname(&host, cname); + if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, + option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command), + cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL) { + /* Don't fatal proxied host names not in the DNS */ + if (option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command)) + cleanup_exit(255); /* logged in resolve_host */ + } else + check_follow_cname(&host, cname); } /* * If the target hostname has changed as a result of canonicalisation * then re-parse the configuration files as new stanzas may match. */ if (strcasecmp(host_arg, host) != 0) { debug("Hostname has changed; re-reading configuration"); process_config_files(pw); } /* Fill configuration defaults. */ fill_default_options(&options); if (options.port == 0) options.port = default_ssh_port(); channel_set_af(options.address_family); /* Tidy and check options */ if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) lowercase(options.host_key_alias); if (options.proxy_command != NULL && strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0 && options.proxy_use_fdpass) fatal("ProxyCommand=- and ProxyUseFDPass are incompatible"); #ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN if (original_effective_uid != 0) options.use_privileged_port = 0; #endif /* reinit */ log_init(argv0, options.log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, !use_syslog); if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES || options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) tty_flag = 1; /* Allocate a tty by default if no command specified. */ if (buffer_len(&command) == 0) tty_flag = options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_NO; /* Force no tty */ if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_NO || muxclient_command != 0) tty_flag = 0; /* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */ if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || stdin_null_flag) && options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) { if (tty_flag) logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because " "stdin is not a terminal."); tty_flag = 0; } seed_rng(); if (options.user == NULL) options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1) fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); strlcpy(shorthost, thishost, sizeof(shorthost)); shorthost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0'; snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", options.port); + if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL || + ssh_digest_update(md, thishost, strlen(thishost)) < 0 || + ssh_digest_update(md, host, strlen(host)) < 0 || + ssh_digest_update(md, portstr, strlen(portstr)) < 0 || + ssh_digest_update(md, options.user, strlen(options.user)) < 0 || + ssh_digest_final(md, conn_hash, sizeof(conn_hash)) < 0) + fatal("%s: mux digest failed", __func__); + ssh_digest_free(md); + conn_hash_hex = tohex(conn_hash, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)); + if (options.local_command != NULL) { debug3("expanding LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command); cp = options.local_command; - options.local_command = percent_expand(cp, "d", pw->pw_dir, - "h", host, "l", thishost, "n", host_arg, "r", options.user, - "p", portstr, "u", pw->pw_name, "L", shorthost, + options.local_command = percent_expand(cp, + "C", conn_hash_hex, + "L", shorthost, + "d", pw->pw_dir, + "h", host, + "l", thishost, + "n", host_arg, + "p", portstr, + "r", options.user, + "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); debug3("expanded LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command); free(cp); } if (options.control_path != NULL) { cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.control_path, original_real_uid); free(options.control_path); - options.control_path = percent_expand(cp, "h", host, - "l", thishost, "n", host_arg, "r", options.user, - "p", portstr, "u", pw->pw_name, "L", shorthost, + options.control_path = percent_expand(cp, + "C", conn_hash_hex, + "L", shorthost, + "h", host, + "l", thishost, + "n", host_arg, + "p", portstr, + "r", options.user, + "u", pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL); free(cp); } + free(conn_hash_hex); + if (muxclient_command != 0 && options.control_path == NULL) fatal("No ControlPath specified for \"-O\" command"); if (options.control_path != NULL) muxclient(options.control_path); /* * If hostname canonicalisation was not enabled, then we may not * have yet resolved the hostname. Do so now. */ if (addrs == NULL && options.proxy_command == NULL) { if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, 1, cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL) cleanup_exit(255); /* resolve_host logs the error */ } timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000; /* Open a connection to the remote host. */ if (ssh_connect(host, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port, options.address_family, options.connection_attempts, &timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive, options.use_privileged_port) != 0) exit(255); if (addrs != NULL) freeaddrinfo(addrs); packet_set_timeout(options.server_alive_interval, options.server_alive_count_max); if (timeout_ms > 0) debug3("timeout: %d ms remain after connect", timeout_ms); /* * If we successfully made the connection, load the host private key * in case we will need it later for combined rsa-rhosts * authentication. This must be done before releasing extra * privileges, because the file is only readable by root. * If we cannot access the private keys, load the public keys * instead and try to execute the ssh-keysign helper instead. */ sensitive_data.nkeys = 0; sensitive_data.keys = NULL; sensitive_data.external_keysign = 0; if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication || options.hostbased_authentication) { sensitive_data.nkeys = 9; sensitive_data.keys = xcalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys, sizeof(Key)); for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++) sensitive_data.keys[i] = NULL; PRIV_START; sensitive_data.keys[0] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1, _PATH_HOST_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL); sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_DSA, _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_ECDSA, _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL); #endif sensitive_data.keys[3] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_RSA, _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL); sensitive_data.keys[4] = key_load_private_cert(KEY_ED25519, _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, "", NULL); sensitive_data.keys[5] = key_load_private_type(KEY_DSA, _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC sensitive_data.keys[6] = key_load_private_type(KEY_ECDSA, _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL); #endif sensitive_data.keys[7] = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA, _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL); sensitive_data.keys[8] = key_load_private_type(KEY_ED25519, _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, "", NULL, NULL); PRIV_END; if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1 && sensitive_data.keys[0] == NULL && sensitive_data.keys[5] == NULL && sensitive_data.keys[6] == NULL && sensitive_data.keys[7] == NULL && sensitive_data.keys[8] == NULL) { sensitive_data.keys[1] = key_load_cert( _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC sensitive_data.keys[2] = key_load_cert( _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE); #endif sensitive_data.keys[3] = key_load_cert( _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE); sensitive_data.keys[4] = key_load_cert( _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE); sensitive_data.keys[5] = key_load_public( _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, NULL); #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC sensitive_data.keys[6] = key_load_public( _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, NULL); #endif sensitive_data.keys[7] = key_load_public( _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, NULL); sensitive_data.keys[8] = key_load_public( _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, NULL); sensitive_data.external_keysign = 1; } } /* * Get rid of any extra privileges that we may have. We will no * longer need them. Also, extra privileges could make it very hard * to read identity files and other non-world-readable files from the * user's home directory if it happens to be on a NFS volume where * root is mapped to nobody. */ if (original_effective_uid == 0) { PRIV_START; permanently_set_uid(pw); } /* * Now that we are back to our own permissions, create ~/.ssh * directory if it doesn't already exist. */ if (config == NULL) { r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir, strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? "/" : "", _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR); if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf) && stat(buf, &st) < 0) { #ifdef WITH_SELINUX ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(buf); #endif if (mkdir(buf, 0700) < 0) error("Could not create directory '%.200s'.", buf); #ifdef WITH_SELINUX ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(NULL); #endif } } /* load options.identity_files */ load_public_identity_files(); /* Expand ~ in known host file names. */ tilde_expand_paths(options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles); tilde_expand_paths(options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles); signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */ signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); /* Log into the remote system. Never returns if the login fails. */ ssh_login(&sensitive_data, host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr, options.port, pw, timeout_ms); if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { verbose("Authenticated to %s ([%s]:%d).", host, get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port()); } else { verbose("Authenticated to %s (via proxy).", host); } /* We no longer need the private host keys. Clear them now. */ if (sensitive_data.nkeys != 0) { for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++) { if (sensitive_data.keys[i] != NULL) { /* Destroys contents safely */ debug3("clear hostkey %d", i); key_free(sensitive_data.keys[i]); sensitive_data.keys[i] = NULL; } } free(sensitive_data.keys); } for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { free(options.identity_files[i]); options.identity_files[i] = NULL; if (options.identity_keys[i]) { key_free(options.identity_keys[i]); options.identity_keys[i] = NULL; } } exit_status = compat20 ? ssh_session2() : ssh_session(); packet_close(); if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1) unlink(options.control_path); /* Kill ProxyCommand if it is running. */ ssh_kill_proxy_command(); return exit_status; } static void control_persist_detach(void) { pid_t pid; int devnull; debug("%s: backgrounding master process", __func__); /* * master (current process) into the background, and make the * foreground process a client of the backgrounded master. */ switch ((pid = fork())) { case -1: fatal("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); case 0: /* Child: master process continues mainloop */ break; default: /* Parent: set up mux slave to connect to backgrounded master */ debug2("%s: background process is %ld", __func__, (long)pid); stdin_null_flag = ostdin_null_flag; options.request_tty = orequest_tty; tty_flag = otty_flag; close(muxserver_sock); muxserver_sock = -1; options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO; muxclient(options.control_path); /* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */ fatal("Failed to connect to new control master"); } if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) { error("%s: open(\"/dev/null\"): %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } else { if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO) close(devnull); } daemon(1, 1); setproctitle("%s [mux]", options.control_path); } /* Do fork() after authentication. Used by "ssh -f" */ static void fork_postauth(void) { if (need_controlpersist_detach) control_persist_detach(); debug("forking to background"); fork_after_authentication_flag = 0; if (daemon(1, 1) < 0) fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); } /* Callback for remote forward global requests */ static void ssh_confirm_remote_forward(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { - Forward *rfwd = (Forward *)ctxt; + struct Forward *rfwd = (struct Forward *)ctxt; /* XXX verbose() on failure? */ - debug("remote forward %s for: listen %d, connect %s:%d", + debug("remote forward %s for: listen %s%s%d, connect %s:%d", type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure", - rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); - if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) { + rfwd->listen_path ? rfwd->listen_path : + rfwd->listen_host ? rfwd->listen_host : "", + (rfwd->listen_path || rfwd->listen_host) ? ":" : "", + rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path : + rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); + if (rfwd->listen_path == NULL && rfwd->listen_port == 0) { if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) { rfwd->allocated_port = packet_get_int(); logit("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d", rfwd->allocated_port, rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port); channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle, rfwd->allocated_port); } else { channel_update_permitted_opens(rfwd->handle, -1); } } if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE) { - if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) - fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed for " - "listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); - else - logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed for " - "listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); + if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) { + if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL) + fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed " + "for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path); + else + fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed " + "for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); + } else { + if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL) + logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed " + "for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path); + else + logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed " + "for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port); + } } if (++remote_forward_confirms_received == options.num_remote_forwards) { debug("All remote forwarding requests processed"); if (fork_after_authentication_flag) fork_postauth(); } } static void client_cleanup_stdio_fwd(int id, void *arg) { debug("stdio forwarding: done"); cleanup_exit(0); } static void +ssh_stdio_confirm(int id, int success, void *arg) +{ + if (!success) + fatal("stdio forwarding failed"); +} + +static void ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(void) { Channel *c; int in, out; if (stdio_forward_host == NULL) return; if (!compat20) fatal("stdio forwarding require Protocol 2"); debug3("%s: %s:%d", __func__, stdio_forward_host, stdio_forward_port); if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) < 0 || (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) < 0) fatal("channel_connect_stdio_fwd: dup() in/out failed"); if ((c = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(stdio_forward_host, stdio_forward_port, in, out)) == NULL) fatal("%s: channel_connect_stdio_fwd failed", __func__); channel_register_cleanup(c->self, client_cleanup_stdio_fwd, 0); + channel_register_open_confirm(c->self, ssh_stdio_confirm, NULL); } static void ssh_init_forwarding(void) { int success = 0; int i; /* Initiate local TCP/IP port forwardings. */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) { debug("Local connections to %.200s:%d forwarded to remote " "address %.200s:%d", + (options.local_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ? + options.local_forwards[i].listen_path : (options.local_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ? - (options.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") : + (options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") : options.local_forwards[i].listen_host, options.local_forwards[i].listen_port, + (options.local_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ? + options.local_forwards[i].connect_path : options.local_forwards[i].connect_host, options.local_forwards[i].connect_port); success += channel_setup_local_fwd_listener( - options.local_forwards[i].listen_host, - options.local_forwards[i].listen_port, - options.local_forwards[i].connect_host, - options.local_forwards[i].connect_port, - options.gateway_ports); + &options.local_forwards[i], &options.fwd_opts); } if (i > 0 && success != i && options.exit_on_forward_failure) fatal("Could not request local forwarding."); if (i > 0 && success == 0) error("Could not request local forwarding."); /* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) { debug("Remote connections from %.200s:%d forwarded to " "local address %.200s:%d", + (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ? + options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path : (options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ? "LOCALHOST" : options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host, options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port, + (options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ? + options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path : options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host, options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port); options.remote_forwards[i].handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding( - options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host, - options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port, - options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host, - options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port); + &options.remote_forwards[i]); if (options.remote_forwards[i].handle < 0) { if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) fatal("Could not request remote forwarding."); else logit("Warning: Could not request remote " "forwarding."); } else { client_register_global_confirm(ssh_confirm_remote_forward, &options.remote_forwards[i]); } } /* Initiate tunnel forwarding. */ if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) { if (client_request_tun_fwd(options.tun_open, options.tun_local, options.tun_remote) == -1) { if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) fatal("Could not request tunnel forwarding."); else error("Could not request tunnel forwarding."); } } } static void check_agent_present(void) { if (options.forward_agent) { /* Clear agent forwarding if we don't have an agent. */ if (!ssh_agent_present()) options.forward_agent = 0; } } static int ssh_session(void) { int type; int interactive = 0; int have_tty = 0; struct winsize ws; char *cp; const char *display; /* Enable compression if requested. */ if (options.compression) { debug("Requesting compression at level %d.", options.compression_level); if (options.compression_level < 1 || options.compression_level > 9) fatal("Compression level must be from 1 (fast) to " "9 (slow, best)."); /* Send the request. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_COMPRESSION); packet_put_int(options.compression_level); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); type = packet_read(); if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) packet_start_compression(options.compression_level); else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) logit("Warning: Remote host refused compression."); else packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for " "compression response."); } /* Allocate a pseudo tty if appropriate. */ if (tty_flag) { debug("Requesting pty."); /* Start the packet. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_REQUEST_PTY); /* Store TERM in the packet. There is no limit on the length of the string. */ cp = getenv("TERM"); if (!cp) cp = ""; packet_put_cstring(cp); /* Store window size in the packet. */ if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) < 0) memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws)); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_row); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_col); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_xpixel); packet_put_int((u_int)ws.ws_ypixel); /* Store tty modes in the packet. */ tty_make_modes(fileno(stdin), NULL); /* Send the packet, and wait for it to leave. */ packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Read response from the server. */ type = packet_read(); if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { interactive = 1; have_tty = 1; } else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) logit("Warning: Remote host failed or refused to " "allocate a pseudo tty."); else packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for pty " "request response."); } /* Request X11 forwarding if enabled and DISPLAY is set. */ display = getenv("DISPLAY"); if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) { char *proto, *data; /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */ client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data); /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " "spoofing."); x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(0, display, proto, data, 0); /* Read response from the server. */ type = packet_read(); if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { interactive = 1; } else if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) { logit("Warning: Remote host denied X11 forwarding."); } else { packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting for X11 " "forwarding"); } } /* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */ packet_set_interactive(interactive, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); /* Request authentication agent forwarding if appropriate. */ check_agent_present(); if (options.forward_agent) { debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding."); auth_request_forwarding(); /* Read response from the server. */ type = packet_read(); packet_check_eom(); if (type != SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) logit("Warning: Remote host denied authentication agent forwarding."); } /* Initiate port forwardings. */ ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(); ssh_init_forwarding(); /* Execute a local command */ if (options.local_command != NULL && options.permit_local_command) ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command); /* * If requested and we are not interested in replies to remote * forwarding requests, then let ssh continue in the background. */ if (fork_after_authentication_flag) { if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && options.num_remote_forwards > 0) { debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward " "confirmation received"); } else fork_postauth(); } /* * If a command was specified on the command line, execute the * command now. Otherwise request the server to start a shell. */ if (buffer_len(&command) > 0) { int len = buffer_len(&command); if (len > 900) len = 900; debug("Sending command: %.*s", len, (u_char *)buffer_ptr(&command)); packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXEC_CMD); packet_put_string(buffer_ptr(&command), buffer_len(&command)); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } else { debug("Requesting shell."); packet_start(SSH_CMSG_EXEC_SHELL); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } /* Enter the interactive session. */ return client_loop(have_tty, tty_flag ? options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, 0); } /* request pty/x11/agent/tcpfwd/shell for channel */ static void ssh_session2_setup(int id, int success, void *arg) { extern char **environ; const char *display; int interactive = tty_flag; if (!success) return; /* No need for error message, channels code sens one */ display = getenv("DISPLAY"); if (options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) { char *proto, *data; /* Get reasonable local authentication information. */ client_x11_get_proto(display, options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data); /* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */ debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication " "spoofing."); x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(id, display, proto, data, 1); client_expect_confirm(id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN); /* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */ interactive = 1; } check_agent_present(); if (options.forward_agent) { debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding."); channel_request_start(id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0); packet_send(); } /* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */ packet_set_interactive(interactive, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); client_session2_setup(id, tty_flag, subsystem_flag, getenv("TERM"), NULL, fileno(stdin), &command, environ); } /* open new channel for a session */ static int ssh_session2_open(void) { Channel *c; int window, packetmax, in, out, err; if (stdin_null_flag) { in = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY); } else { in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); } out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO); err = dup(STDERR_FILENO); if (in < 0 || out < 0 || err < 0) fatal("dup() in/out/err failed"); /* enable nonblocking unless tty */ if (!isatty(in)) set_nonblock(in); if (!isatty(out)) set_nonblock(out); if (!isatty(err)) set_nonblock(err); window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT; packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT; if (tty_flag) { window >>= 1; packetmax >>= 1; } c = channel_new( "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err, window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", /*nonblock*/0); debug3("ssh_session2_open: channel_new: %d", c->self); channel_send_open(c->self); if (!no_shell_flag) channel_register_open_confirm(c->self, ssh_session2_setup, NULL); return c->self; } static int ssh_session2(void) { int id = -1; /* XXX should be pre-session */ if (!options.control_persist) ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(); ssh_init_forwarding(); /* Start listening for multiplex clients */ muxserver_listen(); /* * If we are in control persist mode and have a working mux listen * socket, then prepare to background ourselves and have a foreground * client attach as a control slave. * NB. we must save copies of the flags that we override for * the backgrounding, since we defer attachment of the slave until * after the connection is fully established (in particular, * async rfwd replies have been received for ExitOnForwardFailure). */ if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock != -1) { ostdin_null_flag = stdin_null_flag; ono_shell_flag = no_shell_flag; orequest_tty = options.request_tty; otty_flag = tty_flag; stdin_null_flag = 1; no_shell_flag = 1; tty_flag = 0; if (!fork_after_authentication_flag) need_controlpersist_detach = 1; fork_after_authentication_flag = 1; } /* * ControlPersist mux listen socket setup failed, attempt the * stdio forward setup that we skipped earlier. */ if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock == -1) ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(); if (!no_shell_flag || (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DUMMYCHAN)) id = ssh_session2_open(); else { packet_set_interactive( options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO, options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk); } /* If we don't expect to open a new session, then disallow it */ if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO && (datafellows & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH)) { debug("Requesting no-more-sessions@openssh.com"); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring("no-more-sessions@openssh.com"); packet_put_char(0); packet_send(); } /* Execute a local command */ if (options.local_command != NULL && options.permit_local_command) ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command); /* * If requested and we are not interested in replies to remote * forwarding requests, then let ssh continue in the background. */ if (fork_after_authentication_flag) { if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && options.num_remote_forwards > 0) { debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward " "confirmation received"); } else fork_postauth(); } if (options.use_roaming) request_roaming(); return client_loop(tty_flag, tty_flag ? options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id); } static void load_public_identity_files(void) { char *filename, *cp, thishost[NI_MAXHOST]; char *pwdir = NULL, *pwname = NULL; int i = 0; Key *public; struct passwd *pw; u_int n_ids; char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; Key *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES]; #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 Key **keys; int nkeys; #endif /* PKCS11 */ n_ids = 0; memset(identity_files, 0, sizeof(identity_files)); memset(identity_keys, 0, sizeof(identity_keys)); #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11 if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL && options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES && (pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode) == 0) && (nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(options.pkcs11_provider, NULL, &keys)) > 0) { for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) { if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) { key_free(keys[i]); continue; } identity_keys[n_ids] = keys[i]; identity_files[n_ids] = xstrdup(options.pkcs11_provider); /* XXX */ n_ids++; } free(keys); } #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */ if ((pw = getpwuid(original_real_uid)) == NULL) fatal("load_public_identity_files: getpwuid failed"); pwname = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); pwdir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir); if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1) fatal("load_public_identity_files: gethostname: %s", strerror(errno)); for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES || strcasecmp(options.identity_files[i], "none") == 0) { free(options.identity_files[i]); continue; } cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i], original_real_uid); filename = percent_expand(cp, "d", pwdir, "u", pwname, "l", thishost, "h", host, "r", options.user, (char *)NULL); free(cp); public = key_load_public(filename, NULL); debug("identity file %s type %d", filename, public ? public->type : -1); free(options.identity_files[i]); identity_files[n_ids] = filename; identity_keys[n_ids] = public; if (++n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) continue; /* Try to add the certificate variant too */ xasprintf(&cp, "%s-cert", filename); public = key_load_public(cp, NULL); debug("identity file %s type %d", cp, public ? public->type : -1); if (public == NULL) { free(cp); continue; } if (!key_is_cert(public)) { debug("%s: key %s type %s is not a certificate", __func__, cp, key_type(public)); key_free(public); free(cp); continue; } identity_keys[n_ids] = public; /* point to the original path, most likely the private key */ identity_files[n_ids] = xstrdup(filename); n_ids++; } options.num_identity_files = n_ids; memcpy(options.identity_files, identity_files, sizeof(identity_files)); memcpy(options.identity_keys, identity_keys, sizeof(identity_keys)); explicit_bzero(pwname, strlen(pwname)); free(pwname); explicit_bzero(pwdir, strlen(pwdir)); free(pwdir); } static void main_sigchld_handler(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; pid_t pid; int status; while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 || (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR)) ; signal(sig, main_sigchld_handler); errno = save_errno; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh_config.0 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh_config.0 (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh_config.0 (revision 276707) @@ -1,889 +1,930 @@ -SSH_CONFIG(5) OpenBSD Programmer's Manual SSH_CONFIG(5) +SSH_CONFIG(5) File Formats Manual SSH_CONFIG(5) NAME ssh_config - OpenSSH SSH client configuration files SYNOPSIS ~/.ssh/config /etc/ssh/ssh_config DESCRIPTION ssh(1) obtains configuration data from the following sources in the following order: 1. command-line options 2. user's configuration file (~/.ssh/config) 3. system-wide configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config) For each parameter, the first obtained value will be used. The configuration files contain sections separated by ``Host'' specifications, and that section is only applied for hosts that match one of the patterns given in the specification. The matched host name is the one given on the command line. Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more host- specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the file, and general defaults at the end. The configuration file has the following format: Empty lines and lines starting with `#' are comments. Otherwise a line is of the format ``keyword arguments''. Configuration options may be separated by whitespace or optional whitespace and exactly one `='; the latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace when specifying configuration options using the ssh, scp, and sftp -o option. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes (") in order to represent arguments containing spaces. The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): Host Restricts the following declarations (up to the next Host or Match keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns given after the keyword. If more than one pattern is provided, they should be separated by whitespace. A single `*' as a pattern can be used to provide global defaults for all hosts. The host is the hostname argument given on the command line (i.e. the name is not converted to a canonicalized host name before matching). A pattern entry may be negated by prefixing it with an exclamation mark (`!'). If a negated entry is matched, then the Host entry is ignored, regardless of whether any other patterns on the line match. Negated matches are therefore useful to provide exceptions for wildcard matches. See PATTERNS for more information on patterns. Match Restricts the following declarations (up to the next Host or Match keyword) to be used only when the conditions following the Match keyword are satisfied. Match conditions are specified using one or more keyword/criteria pairs or the single token all which matches all criteria. The available keywords are: exec, host, originalhost, user, and localuser. The exec keyword executes the specified command under the user's shell. If the command returns a zero exit status then the condition is considered true. Commands containing whitespace characters must be quoted. The following character sequences in the command will be expanded prior to execution: `%L' will be substituted by the first component of the local host name, `%l' will be substituted by the local host name (including any domain name), `%h' will be substituted by the target host name, `%n' will be substituted by the original target host name specified on the command-line, `%p' the destination port, `%r' by the remote login username, and `%u' by the username of the user running ssh(1). The other keywords' criteria must be single entries or comma- separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the PATTERNS section. The criteria for the host keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any substitution by the Hostname option. The originalhost keyword matches against the hostname as it was specified on the command- line. The user keyword matches against the target username on the remote host. The localuser keyword matches against the name of the local user running ssh(1) (this keyword may be useful in system-wide ssh_config files). AddressFamily Specifies which address family to use when connecting. Valid arguments are ``any'', ``inet'' (use IPv4 only), or ``inet6'' (use IPv6 only). BatchMode If set to ``yes'', passphrase/password querying will be disabled. This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user is present to supply the password. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''. BindAddress Use the specified address on the local machine as the source address of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one address. Note that this option does not work if UsePrivilegedPort is set to ``yes''. CanonicalDomains When CanonicalizeHostname is enabled, this option specifies the list of domain suffixes in which to search for the specified destination host. CanonicalizeFallbackLocal Specifies whether to fail with an error when hostname canonicalization fails. The default, ``yes'', will attempt to look up the unqualified hostname using the system resolver's search rules. A value of ``no'' will cause ssh(1) to fail instantly if CanonicalizeHostname is enabled and the target hostname cannot be found in any of the domains specified by CanonicalDomains. CanonicalizeHostname Controls whether explicit hostname canonicalization is performed. The default, ``no'', is not to perform any name rewriting and let the system resolver handle all hostname lookups. If set to ``yes'' then, for connections that do not use a ProxyCommand, ssh(1) will attempt to canonicalize the hostname specified on the command line using the CanonicalDomains suffixes and CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs rules. If CanonicalizeHostname is set to ``always'', then canonicalization is applied to proxied connections too. If this option is enabled and canonicalisation results in the target hostname changing, then the configuration files are processed again using the new target name to pick up any new configuration in matching Host stanzas. CanonicalizeMaxDots Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname before canonicalization is disabled. The default, ``1'', allows a single dot (i.e. hostname.subdomain). CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs Specifies rules to determine whether CNAMEs should be followed when canonicalizing hostnames. The rules consist of one or more arguments of source_domain_list:target_domain_list, where source_domain_list is a pattern-list of domains that may follow CNAMEs in canonicalization, and target_domain_list is a pattern- list of domains that they may resolve to. For example, ``*.a.example.com:*.b.example.com,*.c.example.com'' will allow hostnames matching ``*.a.example.com'' to be canonicalized to names in the ``*.b.example.com'' or ``*.c.example.com'' domains. ChallengeResponseAuthentication Specifies whether to use challenge-response authentication. The argument to this keyword must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``yes''. CheckHostIP If this flag is set to ``yes'', ssh(1) will additionally check the host IP address in the known_hosts file. This allows ssh to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing. If the option is set to ``no'', the check will not be executed. The default is ``yes''. Cipher Specifies the cipher to use for encrypting the session in protocol version 1. Currently, ``blowfish'', ``3des'', and ``des'' are supported. des is only supported in the ssh(1) client for interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations that do not support the 3des cipher. Its use is strongly discouraged due to cryptographic weaknesses. The default is ``3des''. Ciphers Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2 in order of preference. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. The supported ciphers are: - ``3des-cbc'', ``aes128-cbc'', ``aes192-cbc'', ``aes256-cbc'', - ``aes128-ctr'', ``aes192-ctr'', ``aes256-ctr'', - ``aes128-gcm@openssh.com'', ``aes256-gcm@openssh.com'', - ``arcfour128'', ``arcfour256'', ``arcfour'', ``blowfish-cbc'', - ``cast128-cbc'', and ``chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com''. + 3des-cbc + aes128-cbc + aes192-cbc + aes256-cbc + aes128-ctr + aes192-ctr + aes256-ctr + aes128-gcm@openssh.com + aes256-gcm@openssh.com + arcfour + arcfour128 + arcfour256 + blowfish-cbc + cast128-cbc + chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com The default is: - aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128, - aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com, - chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, - aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,aes192-cbc, - aes256-cbc,arcfour + aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr, + aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com, + chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, + arcfour256,arcfour128, + aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc, + aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,arcfour The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using the -Q option of ssh(1). ClearAllForwardings Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings specified in the configuration files or on the command line be cleared. This option is primarily useful when used from the ssh(1) command line to clear port forwardings set in configuration files, and is automatically set by scp(1) and sftp(1). The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''. Compression Specifies whether to use compression. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''. CompressionLevel Specifies the compression level to use if compression is enabled. The argument must be an integer from 1 (fast) to 9 (slow, best). The default level is 6, which is good for most applications. The meaning of the values is the same as in gzip(1). Note that this option applies to protocol version 1 only. ConnectionAttempts Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before exiting. The argument must be an integer. This may be useful in scripts if the connection sometimes fails. The default is 1. ConnectTimeout Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout. This value is used only when the target is down or really unreachable, not when it refuses the connection. ControlMaster Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network connection. When set to ``yes'', ssh(1) will listen for connections on a control socket specified using the ControlPath argument. Additional sessions can connect to this socket using the same ControlPath with ControlMaster set to ``no'' (the default). These sessions will try to reuse the master instance's network connection rather than initiating new ones, but will fall back to connecting normally if the control socket does not exist, or is not listening. Setting this to ``ask'' will cause ssh to listen for control connections, but require confirmation using the SSH_ASKPASS program before they are accepted (see ssh-add(1) for details). If the ControlPath cannot be opened, ssh will continue without connecting to a master instance. X11 and ssh-agent(1) forwarding is supported over these multiplexed connections, however the display and agent forwarded will be the one belonging to the master connection i.e. it is not possible to forward multiple displays or agents. Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try to use a master connection but fall back to creating a new one if one does not already exist. These options are: ``auto'' and ``autoask''. The latter requires confirmation like the ``ask'' option. ControlPath Specify the path to the control socket used for connection sharing as described in the ControlMaster section above or the string ``none'' to disable connection sharing. In the path, `%L' will be substituted by the first component of the local host name, `%l' will be substituted by the local host name (including any domain name), `%h' will be substituted by the target host name, `%n' will be substituted by the original target host name specified on the command line, `%p' the destination port, `%r' by - the remote login username, and `%u' by the username of the user - running ssh(1). It is recommended that any ControlPath used for - opportunistic connection sharing include at least %h, %p, and %r. - This ensures that shared connections are uniquely identified. + the remote login username, `%u' by the username of the user + running ssh(1), and `%C' by a hash of the concatenation: + %l%h%p%r. It is recommended that any ControlPath used for + opportunistic connection sharing include at least %h, %p, and %r + (or alternatively %C). This ensures that shared connections are + uniquely identified. ControlPersist When used in conjunction with ControlMaster, specifies that the master connection should remain open in the background (waiting for future client connections) after the initial client connection has been closed. If set to ``no'', then the master connection will not be placed into the background, and will close as soon as the initial client connection is closed. If set to ``yes'', then the master connection will remain in the background indefinitely (until killed or closed via a mechanism such as the ssh(1) ``-O exit'' option). If set to a time in seconds, or a time in any of the formats documented in sshd_config(5), then the backgrounded master connection will automatically terminate after it has remained idle (with no client connections) for the specified time. DynamicForward Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the remote machine. The argument must be [bind_address:]port. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The bind_address of ``localhost'' indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or `*' indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and ssh(1) will act as a SOCKS server. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. EnableSSHKeysign Setting this option to ``yes'' in the global client configuration file /etc/ssh/ssh_config enables the use of the helper program ssh-keysign(8) during HostbasedAuthentication. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''. This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section. See ssh-keysign(8) for more information. EscapeChar Sets the escape character (default: `~'). The escape character can also be set on the command line. The argument should be a single character, `^' followed by a letter, or ``none'' to disable the escape character entirely (making the connection transparent for binary data). ExitOnForwardFailure Specifies whether ssh(1) should terminate the connection if it cannot set up all requested dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote port forwardings. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''. ForwardAgent Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any) will be forwarded to the remote machine. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''. Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent. ForwardX11 Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically redirected over the secure channel and DISPLAY set. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''. X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the user's X11 authorization database) can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring if the ForwardX11Trusted option is also enabled. ForwardX11Timeout Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding using the format described in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5). X11 connections received by ssh(1) after this time will be refused. The default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty minutes has elapsed. ForwardX11Trusted If this option is set to ``yes'', remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display. If this option is set to ``no'', remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11 clients. Furthermore, the xauth(1) token used for the session will be set to expire after 20 minutes. Remote clients will be refused access after this time. The default is ``no''. See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients. GatewayPorts Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local forwarded ports. By default, ssh(1) binds local port forwardings to the loopback address. This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. GatewayPorts can be used to specify that ssh should bind local port forwardings to the wildcard address, thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''. GlobalKnownHostsFile Specifies one or more files to use for the global host key database, separated by whitespace. The default is /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts, /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2. GSSAPIAuthentication Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. The default is ``no''. Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. GSSAPIDelegateCredentials Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. The default is ``no''. Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. HashKnownHosts Indicates that ssh(1) should hash host names and addresses when they are added to ~/.ssh/known_hosts. These hashed names may be used normally by ssh(1) and sshd(8), but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed. The default is ``no''. Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files will not be converted automatically, but may be manually hashed using ssh-keygen(1). HostbasedAuthentication Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key authentication. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''. This option applies to protocol version 2 only and is similar to RhostsRSAAuthentication. HostKeyAlgorithms Specifies the protocol version 2 host key algorithms that the client wants to use in order of preference. The default for this option is: ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default is modified to prefer their algorithms. HostKeyAlias Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the real host name when looking up or saving the host key in the host key database files. This option is useful for tunneling SSH connections or for multiple servers running on a single host. HostName Specifies the real host name to log into. This can be used to specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts. If the hostname contains the character sequence `%h', then this will be replaced with the host name specified on the command line (this is useful - for manipulating unqualified names). The default is the name - given on the command line. Numeric IP addresses are also - permitted (both on the command line and in HostName - specifications). + for manipulating unqualified names). The character sequence `%%' + will be replaced by a single `%' character, which may be used + when specifying IPv6 link-local addresses. + The default is the name given on the command line. Numeric IP + addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in + HostName specifications). + IdentitiesOnly Specifies that ssh(1) should only use the authentication identity files configured in the ssh_config files, even if ssh-agent(1) or a PKCS11Provider offers more identities. The argument to this keyword must be ``yes'' or ``no''. This option is intended for situations where ssh-agent offers many different identities. The default is ``no''. IdentityFile Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, ED25519 or RSA authentication identity is read. The default is ~/.ssh/identity for protocol version 1, and ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and ~/.ssh/id_rsa for protocol version 2. Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent will be used for authentication unless IdentitiesOnly is set. ssh(1) will try to load certificate information from the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to the path of a specified IdentityFile. The file name may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory or one of the following escape characters: `%d' (local user's home directory), `%u' (local user name), `%l' (local host name), `%h' (remote host name) or `%r' (remote user name). It is possible to have multiple identity files specified in configuration files; all these identities will be tried in sequence. Multiple IdentityFile directives will add to the list of identities tried (this behaviour differs from that of other configuration directives). IdentityFile may be used in conjunction with IdentitiesOnly to select which identities in an agent are offered during authentication. IgnoreUnknown Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are encountered in configuration parsing. This may be used to suppress errors if ssh_config contains options that are unrecognised by ssh(1). It is recommended that IgnoreUnknown be listed early in the configuration file as it will not be applied to unknown options that appear before it. IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for connections. Accepted values are ``af11'', ``af12'', ``af13'', ``af21'', ``af22'', ``af23'', ``af31'', ``af32'', ``af33'', ``af41'', ``af42'', ``af43'', ``cs0'', ``cs1'', ``cs2'', ``cs3'', ``cs4'', ``cs5'', ``cs6'', ``cs7'', ``ef'', ``lowdelay'', ``throughput'', ``reliability'', or a numeric value. This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. The default is ``lowdelay'' for interactive sessions and ``throughput'' for non-interactive sessions. KbdInteractiveAuthentication Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication. The argument to this keyword must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``yes''. KbdInteractiveDevices Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive authentication. Multiple method names must be comma-separated. The default is to use the server specified list. The methods available vary depending on what the server supports. For an OpenSSH server, it may be zero or more of: ``bsdauth'', ``pam'', and ``skey''. KexAlgorithms Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. The default is: curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, - diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1, diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, + diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1, diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 LocalCommand Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully connecting to the server. The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's shell. The following escape character substitutions will be performed: `%d' (local user's home directory), `%h' (remote host name), `%l' (local host name), `%n' (host name as provided on the command line), `%p' (remote port), `%r' (remote user name) or - `%u' (local user name). + `%u' (local user name) or `%C' by a hash of the concatenation: + %l%h%p%r. The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the session of the ssh(1) that spawned it. It should not be used for interactive commands. This directive is ignored unless PermitLocalCommand has been enabled. LocalForward Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote machine. The first argument must be [bind_address:]port and the second argument must be host:hostport. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The bind_address of ``localhost'' indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or `*' indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. LogLevel Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from ssh(1). The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO. DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output. MACs Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms in order of preference. The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2 for data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. The algorithms that contain ``-etm'' calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and their use recommended. The default is: - hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, - hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com, - hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com, - hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, - hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-ripemd160, + umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, + hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512, + hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, + hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com, + hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com,hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com, + hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,hmac-ripemd160, hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96 NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost This option can be used if the home directory is shared across machines. In this case localhost will refer to a different machine on each of the machines and the user will get many warnings about changed host keys. However, this option disables host authentication for localhost. The argument to this keyword must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is to check the host key for localhost. NumberOfPasswordPrompts Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up. The argument to this keyword must be an integer. The default is 3. PasswordAuthentication Specifies whether to use password authentication. The argument to this keyword must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``yes''. PermitLocalCommand Allow local command execution via the LocalCommand option or using the !command escape sequence in ssh(1). The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''. PKCS11Provider Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use. The argument to this keyword is the PKCS#11 shared library ssh(1) should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's private RSA key. Port Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host. The default is 22. PreferredAuthentications Specifies the order in which the client should try protocol 2 authentication methods. This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g. keyboard-interactive) over another method (e.g. password). The default is: gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey, keyboard-interactive,password Protocol Specifies the protocol versions ssh(1) should support in order of preference. The possible values are `1' and `2'. Multiple versions must be comma-separated. When this option is set to ``2,1'' ssh will try version 2 and fall back to version 1 if version 2 is not available. The default is `2'. ProxyCommand Specifies the command to use to connect to the server. The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed - with the user's shell. In the command string, any occurrence of - `%h' will be substituted by the host name to connect, `%p' by the - port, and `%r' by the remote user name. The command can be - basically anything, and should read from its standard input and - write to its standard output. It should eventually connect an - sshd(8) server running on some machine, or execute sshd -i - somewhere. Host key management will be done using the HostName - of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by the - user). Setting the command to ``none'' disables this option - entirely. Note that CheckHostIP is not available for connects - with a proxy command. + using the user's shell `exec' directive to avoid a lingering + shell process. + In the command string, any occurrence of `%h' will be substituted + by the host name to connect, `%p' by the port, and `%r' by the + remote user name. The command can be basically anything, and + should read from its standard input and write to its standard + output. It should eventually connect an sshd(8) server running + on some machine, or execute sshd -i somewhere. Host key + management will be done using the HostName of the host being + connected (defaulting to the name typed by the user). Setting + the command to ``none'' disables this option entirely. Note that + CheckHostIP is not available for connects with a proxy command. + This directive is useful in conjunction with nc(1) and its proxy support. For example, the following directive would connect via an HTTP proxy at 192.0.2.0: ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p ProxyUseFdpass Specifies that ProxyCommand will pass a connected file descriptor back to ssh(1) instead of continuing to execute and pass data. The default is ``no''. PubkeyAuthentication Specifies whether to try public key authentication. The argument to this keyword must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``yes''. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. RekeyLimit Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of `K', `M', or `G' to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between `1G' and `4G', depending on the cipher. The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units documented in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5). The default value for RekeyLimit is ``default none'', which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. RemoteForward Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over the secure channel to the specified host and port from the local machine. The first argument must be [bind_address:]port and the second argument must be host:hostport. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on the remote machine. If the port argument is `0', the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time. If the bind_address is not specified, the default is to only bind to loopback addresses. If the bind_address is `*' or an empty string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all interfaces. Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see sshd_config(5)). RequestTTY Specifies whether to request a pseudo-tty for the session. The argument may be one of: ``no'' (never request a TTY), ``yes'' (always request a TTY when standard input is a TTY), ``force'' (always request a TTY) or ``auto'' (request a TTY when opening a login session). This option mirrors the -t and -T flags for ssh(1). RhostsRSAAuthentication Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with RSA host authentication. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''. This option applies to protocol version 1 only and requires ssh(1) to be setuid root. RSAAuthentication Specifies whether to try RSA authentication. The argument to this keyword must be ``yes'' or ``no''. RSA authentication will only be attempted if the identity file exists, or an authentication agent is running. The default is ``yes''. Note that this option applies to protocol version 1 only. SendEnv Specifies what variables from the local environ(7) should be sent to the server. Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2. The server must also support it, and the server must be configured to accept these environment variables. Refer to AcceptEnv in sshd_config(5) for how to configure the server. Variables are specified by name, which may contain wildcard characters. Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread across multiple SendEnv directives. The default is not to send any environment variables. See PATTERNS for more information on patterns. ServerAliveCountMax Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be sent without ssh(1) receiving any messages back from the server. If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are being sent, ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the session. It is important to note that the use of server alive messages is very different from TCPKeepAlive (below). The server alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option enabled by TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The server alive mechanism is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive. The default value is 3. If, for example, ServerAliveInterval (see below) is set to 15 and ServerAliveCountMax is left at the default, if the server becomes unresponsive, ssh will disconnect after approximately 45 seconds. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. ServerAliveInterval Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received from the server, ssh(1) will send a message through the encrypted channel to request a response from the server. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. + StreamLocalBindMask + Sets the octal file creation mode mask (umask) used when creating + a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding. + This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain + socket file. + + The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket + file that is readable and writable only by the owner. Note that + not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain + socket files. + + StreamLocalBindUnlink + Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file + for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one. + If the socket file already exists and StreamLocalBindUnlink is + not enabled, ssh will be unable to forward the port to the Unix- + domain socket file. This option is only used for port forwarding + to a Unix-domain socket file. + + The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''. + StrictHostKeyChecking If this flag is set to ``yes'', ssh(1) will never automatically add host keys to the ~/.ssh/known_hosts file, and refuses to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. This provides maximum protection against trojan horse attacks, though it can be annoying when the /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts file is poorly maintained or when connections to new hosts are frequently made. This option forces the user to manually add all new hosts. If this flag is set to ``no'', ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user known hosts files. If this flag is set to ``ask'', new host keys will be added to the user known host files only after the user has confirmed that is what they really want to do, and ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. The host keys of known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases. The argument must be ``yes'', ``no'', or ``ask''. The default is ``ask''. TCPKeepAlive Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However, this means that connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people find it annoying. The default is ``yes'' (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the client will notice if the network goes down or the remote host dies. This is important in scripts, and many users want it too. To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to ``no''. Tunnel Request tun(4) device forwarding between the client and the server. The argument must be ``yes'', ``point-to-point'' (layer 3), ``ethernet'' (layer 2), or ``no''. Specifying ``yes'' requests the default tunnel mode, which is ``point-to-point''. The default is ``no''. TunnelDevice Specifies the tun(4) devices to open on the client (local_tun) and the server (remote_tun). The argument must be local_tun[:remote_tun]. The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword ``any'', which uses the next available tunnel device. If remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to ``any''. The default is ``any:any''. UsePrivilegedPort Specifies whether to use a privileged port for outgoing connections. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''. If set to ``yes'', ssh(1) must be setuid root. Note that this option must be set to ``yes'' for RhostsRSAAuthentication with older servers. User Specifies the user to log in as. This can be useful when a different user name is used on different machines. This saves the trouble of having to remember to give the user name on the command line. UserKnownHostsFile Specifies one or more files to use for the user host key database, separated by whitespace. The default is ~/.ssh/known_hosts, ~/.ssh/known_hosts2. VerifyHostKeyDNS Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP resource records. If this option is set to ``yes'', the client will implicitly trust keys that match a secure fingerprint from DNS. Insecure fingerprints will be handled as if this option was set to ``ask''. If this option is set to ``ask'', information on fingerprint match will be displayed, but the user will still need to confirm new host keys according to the StrictHostKeyChecking option. The argument must be ``yes'', ``no'', or ``ask''. The default is ``no''. Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. See also VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1). VisualHostKey If this flag is set to ``yes'', an ASCII art representation of the remote host key fingerprint is printed in addition to the hex fingerprint string at login and for unknown host keys. If this flag is set to ``no'', no fingerprint strings are printed at login and only the hex fingerprint string will be printed for unknown host keys. The default is ``no''. XAuthLocation Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program. The default is /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth. PATTERNS A pattern consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters, `*' (a wildcard that matches zero or more characters), or `?' (a wildcard that matches exactly one character). For example, to specify a set of declarations for any host in the ``.co.uk'' set of domains, the following pattern could be used: Host *.co.uk The following pattern would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network range: Host 192.168.0.? A pattern-list is a comma-separated list of patterns. Patterns within pattern-lists may be negated by preceding them with an exclamation mark (`!'). For example, to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an organization except from the ``dialup'' pool, the following entry (in authorized_keys) could be used: from="!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com" FILES ~/.ssh/config This is the per-user configuration file. The format of this file is described above. This file is used by the SSH client. Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions: read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. /etc/ssh/ssh_config Systemwide configuration file. This file provides defaults for those values that are not specified in the user's configuration file, and for those users who do not have a configuration file. This file must be world-readable. SEE ALSO ssh(1) AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. -OpenBSD 5.5 February 23, 2014 OpenBSD 5.5 +OpenBSD 5.6 July 15, 2014 OpenBSD 5.6 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh_config.5 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh_config.5 (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssh_config.5 (revision 276707) @@ -1,1497 +1,1555 @@ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.185 2014/02/23 20:11:36 djm Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: February 23 2014 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.191 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: July 15 2014 $ .Dt SSH_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm ssh_config .Nd OpenSSH SSH client configuration files .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm ~/.ssh/config .Nm /etc/ssh/ssh_config .Sh DESCRIPTION .Xr ssh 1 obtains configuration data from the following sources in the following order: .Pp .Bl -enum -offset indent -compact .It command-line options .It user's configuration file .Pq Pa ~/.ssh/config .It system-wide configuration file .Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config .El .Pp For each parameter, the first obtained value will be used. The configuration files contain sections separated by .Dq Host specifications, and that section is only applied for hosts that match one of the patterns given in the specification. The matched host name is the one given on the command line. .Pp Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the file, and general defaults at the end. .Pp The configuration file has the following format: .Pp Empty lines and lines starting with .Ql # are comments. Otherwise a line is of the format .Dq keyword arguments . Configuration options may be separated by whitespace or optional whitespace and exactly one .Ql = ; the latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace when specifying configuration options using the .Nm ssh , .Nm scp , and .Nm sftp .Fl o option. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes .Pq \&" in order to represent arguments containing spaces. .Pp The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm Host Restricts the following declarations (up to the next .Cm Host or .Cm Match keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns given after the keyword. If more than one pattern is provided, they should be separated by whitespace. A single .Ql * as a pattern can be used to provide global defaults for all hosts. The host is the .Ar hostname argument given on the command line (i.e. the name is not converted to a canonicalized host name before matching). .Pp A pattern entry may be negated by prefixing it with an exclamation mark .Pq Sq !\& . If a negated entry is matched, then the .Cm Host entry is ignored, regardless of whether any other patterns on the line match. Negated matches are therefore useful to provide exceptions for wildcard matches. .Pp See .Sx PATTERNS for more information on patterns. .It Cm Match Restricts the following declarations (up to the next .Cm Host or .Cm Match keyword) to be used only when the conditions following the .Cm Match keyword are satisfied. Match conditions are specified using one or more keyword/criteria pairs or the single token .Cm all which matches all criteria. The available keywords are: .Cm exec , .Cm host , .Cm originalhost , .Cm user , and .Cm localuser . .Pp The .Cm exec keyword executes the specified command under the user's shell. If the command returns a zero exit status then the condition is considered true. Commands containing whitespace characters must be quoted. The following character sequences in the command will be expanded prior to execution: .Ql %L will be substituted by the first component of the local host name, .Ql %l will be substituted by the local host name (including any domain name), .Ql %h will be substituted by the target host name, .Ql %n will be substituted by the original target host name specified on the command-line, .Ql %p the destination port, .Ql %r by the remote login username, and .Ql %u by the username of the user running .Xr ssh 1 . .Pp The other keywords' criteria must be single entries or comma-separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the .Sx PATTERNS section. The criteria for the .Cm host keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any substitution by the .Cm Hostname option. The .Cm originalhost keyword matches against the hostname as it was specified on the command-line. The .Cm user keyword matches against the target username on the remote host. The .Cm localuser keyword matches against the name of the local user running .Xr ssh 1 (this keyword may be useful in system-wide .Nm files). .It Cm AddressFamily Specifies which address family to use when connecting. Valid arguments are .Dq any , .Dq inet (use IPv4 only), or .Dq inet6 (use IPv6 only). .It Cm BatchMode If set to .Dq yes , passphrase/password querying will be disabled. This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user is present to supply the password. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm BindAddress Use the specified address on the local machine as the source address of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one address. Note that this option does not work if .Cm UsePrivilegedPort is set to .Dq yes . .It Cm CanonicalDomains When .Cm CanonicalizeHostname is enabled, this option specifies the list of domain suffixes in which to search for the specified destination host. .It Cm CanonicalizeFallbackLocal Specifies whether to fail with an error when hostname canonicalization fails. The default, .Dq yes , will attempt to look up the unqualified hostname using the system resolver's search rules. A value of .Dq no will cause .Xr ssh 1 to fail instantly if .Cm CanonicalizeHostname is enabled and the target hostname cannot be found in any of the domains specified by .Cm CanonicalDomains . .It Cm CanonicalizeHostname Controls whether explicit hostname canonicalization is performed. The default, .Dq no , is not to perform any name rewriting and let the system resolver handle all hostname lookups. If set to .Dq yes then, for connections that do not use a .Cm ProxyCommand , .Xr ssh 1 will attempt to canonicalize the hostname specified on the command line using the .Cm CanonicalDomains suffixes and .Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs rules. If .Cm CanonicalizeHostname is set to .Dq always , then canonicalization is applied to proxied connections too. .Pp If this option is enabled and canonicalisation results in the target hostname changing, then the configuration files are processed again using the new target name to pick up any new configuration in matching .Cm Host stanzas. .It Cm CanonicalizeMaxDots Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname before canonicalization is disabled. The default, .Dq 1 , allows a single dot (i.e. hostname.subdomain). .It Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs Specifies rules to determine whether CNAMEs should be followed when canonicalizing hostnames. The rules consist of one or more arguments of .Ar source_domain_list : Ns Ar target_domain_list , where .Ar source_domain_list is a pattern-list of domains that may follow CNAMEs in canonicalization, and .Ar target_domain_list is a pattern-list of domains that they may resolve to. .Pp For example, .Dq *.a.example.com:*.b.example.com,*.c.example.com will allow hostnames matching .Dq *.a.example.com to be canonicalized to names in the .Dq *.b.example.com or .Dq *.c.example.com domains. .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication Specifies whether to use challenge-response authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm CheckHostIP If this flag is set to .Dq yes , .Xr ssh 1 will additionally check the host IP address in the .Pa known_hosts file. This allows ssh to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing. If the option is set to .Dq no , the check will not be executed. The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm Cipher Specifies the cipher to use for encrypting the session in protocol version 1. Currently, .Dq blowfish , .Dq 3des , and .Dq des are supported. .Ar des is only supported in the .Xr ssh 1 client for interoperability with legacy protocol 1 implementations that do not support the .Ar 3des cipher. Its use is strongly discouraged due to cryptographic weaknesses. The default is .Dq 3des . .It Cm Ciphers Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2 in order of preference. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. The supported ciphers are: .Pp -.Dq 3des-cbc , -.Dq aes128-cbc , -.Dq aes192-cbc , -.Dq aes256-cbc , -.Dq aes128-ctr , -.Dq aes192-ctr , -.Dq aes256-ctr , -.Dq aes128-gcm@openssh.com , -.Dq aes256-gcm@openssh.com , -.Dq arcfour128 , -.Dq arcfour256 , -.Dq arcfour , -.Dq blowfish-cbc , -.Dq cast128-cbc , -and -.Dq chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com . +.Bl -item -compact -offset indent +.It +3des-cbc +.It +aes128-cbc +.It +aes192-cbc +.It +aes256-cbc +.It +aes128-ctr +.It +aes192-ctr +.It +aes256-ctr +.It +aes128-gcm@openssh.com +.It +aes256-gcm@openssh.com +.It +arcfour +.It +arcfour128 +.It +arcfour256 +.It +blowfish-cbc +.It +cast128-cbc +.It +chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com +.El .Pp The default is: -.Bd -literal -offset 3n -aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128, +.Bd -literal -offset indent +aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com, chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, -aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,aes192-cbc, -aes256-cbc,arcfour +arcfour256,arcfour128, +aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc, +aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,arcfour .Ed .Pp The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using the .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 . .It Cm ClearAllForwardings Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings specified in the configuration files or on the command line be cleared. This option is primarily useful when used from the .Xr ssh 1 command line to clear port forwardings set in configuration files, and is automatically set by .Xr scp 1 and .Xr sftp 1 . The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm Compression Specifies whether to use compression. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm CompressionLevel Specifies the compression level to use if compression is enabled. The argument must be an integer from 1 (fast) to 9 (slow, best). The default level is 6, which is good for most applications. The meaning of the values is the same as in .Xr gzip 1 . Note that this option applies to protocol version 1 only. .It Cm ConnectionAttempts Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before exiting. The argument must be an integer. This may be useful in scripts if the connection sometimes fails. The default is 1. .It Cm ConnectTimeout Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout. This value is used only when the target is down or really unreachable, not when it refuses the connection. .It Cm ControlMaster Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network connection. When set to .Dq yes , .Xr ssh 1 will listen for connections on a control socket specified using the .Cm ControlPath argument. Additional sessions can connect to this socket using the same .Cm ControlPath with .Cm ControlMaster set to .Dq no (the default). These sessions will try to reuse the master instance's network connection rather than initiating new ones, but will fall back to connecting normally if the control socket does not exist, or is not listening. .Pp Setting this to .Dq ask will cause ssh to listen for control connections, but require confirmation using the .Ev SSH_ASKPASS program before they are accepted (see .Xr ssh-add 1 for details). If the .Cm ControlPath cannot be opened, ssh will continue without connecting to a master instance. .Pp X11 and .Xr ssh-agent 1 forwarding is supported over these multiplexed connections, however the display and agent forwarded will be the one belonging to the master connection i.e. it is not possible to forward multiple displays or agents. .Pp Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try to use a master connection but fall back to creating a new one if one does not already exist. These options are: .Dq auto and .Dq autoask . The latter requires confirmation like the .Dq ask option. .It Cm ControlPath Specify the path to the control socket used for connection sharing as described in the .Cm ControlMaster section above or the string .Dq none to disable connection sharing. In the path, .Ql %L will be substituted by the first component of the local host name, .Ql %l will be substituted by the local host name (including any domain name), .Ql %h will be substituted by the target host name, .Ql %n will be substituted by the original target host name specified on the command line, .Ql %p the destination port, .Ql %r -by the remote login username, and +by the remote login username, .Ql %u by the username of the user running -.Xr ssh 1 . +.Xr ssh 1 , and +.Ql \&%C +by a hash of the concatenation: %l%h%p%r. It is recommended that any .Cm ControlPath used for opportunistic connection sharing include -at least %h, %p, and %r. +at least %h, %p, and %r (or alternatively %C). This ensures that shared connections are uniquely identified. .It Cm ControlPersist When used in conjunction with .Cm ControlMaster , specifies that the master connection should remain open in the background (waiting for future client connections) after the initial client connection has been closed. If set to .Dq no , then the master connection will not be placed into the background, and will close as soon as the initial client connection is closed. If set to .Dq yes , then the master connection will remain in the background indefinitely (until killed or closed via a mechanism such as the .Xr ssh 1 .Dq Fl O No exit option). If set to a time in seconds, or a time in any of the formats documented in .Xr sshd_config 5 , then the backgrounded master connection will automatically terminate after it has remained idle (with no client connections) for the specified time. .It Cm DynamicForward Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the remote machine. .Pp The argument must be .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port . .Sm on IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the .Cm GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit .Ar bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The .Ar bind_address of .Dq localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or .Sq * indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. .Pp Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and .Xr ssh 1 will act as a SOCKS server. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. .It Cm EnableSSHKeysign Setting this option to .Dq yes in the global client configuration file .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config enables the use of the helper program .Xr ssh-keysign 8 during .Cm HostbasedAuthentication . The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section. See .Xr ssh-keysign 8 for more information. .It Cm EscapeChar Sets the escape character (default: .Ql ~ ) . The escape character can also be set on the command line. The argument should be a single character, .Ql ^ followed by a letter, or .Dq none to disable the escape character entirely (making the connection transparent for binary data). .It Cm ExitOnForwardFailure Specifies whether .Xr ssh 1 should terminate the connection if it cannot set up all requested dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote port forwardings. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm ForwardAgent Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any) will be forwarded to the remote machine. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .Pp Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the agent's Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent. .It Cm ForwardX11 Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically redirected over the secure channel and .Ev DISPLAY set. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .Pp X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the user's X11 authorization database) can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring if the .Cm ForwardX11Trusted option is also enabled. .It Cm ForwardX11Timeout Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding using the format described in the TIME FORMATS section of .Xr sshd_config 5 . X11 connections received by .Xr ssh 1 after this time will be refused. The default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty minutes has elapsed. .It Cm ForwardX11Trusted If this option is set to .Dq yes , remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display. .Pp If this option is set to .Dq no , remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11 clients. Furthermore, the .Xr xauth 1 token used for the session will be set to expire after 20 minutes. Remote clients will be refused access after this time. .Pp The default is .Dq no . .Pp See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients. .It Cm GatewayPorts Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local forwarded ports. By default, .Xr ssh 1 binds local port forwardings to the loopback address. This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. .Cm GatewayPorts can be used to specify that ssh should bind local port forwardings to the wildcard address, thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm GlobalKnownHostsFile Specifies one or more files to use for the global host key database, separated by whitespace. The default is .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts , .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2 . .It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. The default is .Dq no . Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. The default is .Dq no . Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm HashKnownHosts Indicates that .Xr ssh 1 should hash host names and addresses when they are added to .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts . These hashed names may be used normally by .Xr ssh 1 and .Xr sshd 8 , but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed. The default is .Dq no . Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files will not be converted automatically, but may be manually hashed using .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key authentication. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . This option applies to protocol version 2 only and is similar to .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication . .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms Specifies the protocol version 2 host key algorithms that the client wants to use in order of preference. The default for this option is: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com, ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com,ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com, ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521, ssh-ed25519,ssh-rsa,ssh-dss .Ed .Pp If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default is modified to prefer their algorithms. .It Cm HostKeyAlias Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the real host name when looking up or saving the host key in the host key database files. This option is useful for tunneling SSH connections or for multiple servers running on a single host. .It Cm HostName Specifies the real host name to log into. This can be used to specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts. If the hostname contains the character sequence .Ql %h , then this will be replaced with the host name specified on the command line (this is useful for manipulating unqualified names). +The character sequence +.Ql %% +will be replaced by a single +.Ql % +character, which may be used when specifying IPv6 link-local addresses. +.Pp The default is the name given on the command line. Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in .Cm HostName specifications). .It Cm IdentitiesOnly Specifies that .Xr ssh 1 should only use the authentication identity files configured in the .Nm files, even if .Xr ssh-agent 1 or a .Cm PKCS11Provider offers more identities. The argument to this keyword must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . This option is intended for situations where ssh-agent offers many different identities. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm IdentityFile Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, ED25519 or RSA authentication identity is read. The default is .Pa ~/.ssh/identity for protocol version 1, and .Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa , .Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and .Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa for protocol version 2. Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent will be used for authentication unless .Cm IdentitiesOnly is set. .Xr ssh 1 will try to load certificate information from the filename obtained by appending .Pa -cert.pub to the path of a specified .Cm IdentityFile . .Pp The file name may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory or one of the following escape characters: .Ql %d (local user's home directory), .Ql %u (local user name), .Ql %l (local host name), .Ql %h (remote host name) or .Ql %r (remote user name). .Pp It is possible to have multiple identity files specified in configuration files; all these identities will be tried in sequence. Multiple .Cm IdentityFile directives will add to the list of identities tried (this behaviour differs from that of other configuration directives). .Pp .Cm IdentityFile may be used in conjunction with .Cm IdentitiesOnly to select which identities in an agent are offered during authentication. .It Cm IgnoreUnknown Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are encountered in configuration parsing. This may be used to suppress errors if .Nm contains options that are unrecognised by .Xr ssh 1 . It is recommended that .Cm IgnoreUnknown be listed early in the configuration file as it will not be applied to unknown options that appear before it. .It Cm IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for connections. Accepted values are .Dq af11 , .Dq af12 , .Dq af13 , .Dq af21 , .Dq af22 , .Dq af23 , .Dq af31 , .Dq af32 , .Dq af33 , .Dq af41 , .Dq af42 , .Dq af43 , .Dq cs0 , .Dq cs1 , .Dq cs2 , .Dq cs3 , .Dq cs4 , .Dq cs5 , .Dq cs6 , .Dq cs7 , .Dq ef , .Dq lowdelay , .Dq throughput , .Dq reliability , or a numeric value. This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. The default is .Dq lowdelay for interactive sessions and .Dq throughput for non-interactive sessions. .It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm KbdInteractiveDevices Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive authentication. Multiple method names must be comma-separated. The default is to use the server specified list. The methods available vary depending on what the server supports. For an OpenSSH server, it may be zero or more of: .Dq bsdauth , .Dq pam , and .Dq skey . .It Cm KexAlgorithms Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, -diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1, diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, +diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1, diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 .Ed .It Cm LocalCommand Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully connecting to the server. The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's shell. The following escape character substitutions will be performed: .Ql %d (local user's home directory), .Ql %h (remote host name), .Ql %l (local host name), .Ql %n (host name as provided on the command line), .Ql %p (remote port), .Ql %r (remote user name) or .Ql %u -(local user name). +(local user name) or +.Ql \&%C +by a hash of the concatenation: %l%h%p%r. .Pp The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the session of the .Xr ssh 1 that spawned it. It should not be used for interactive commands. .Pp This directive is ignored unless .Cm PermitLocalCommand has been enabled. .It Cm LocalForward Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote machine. The first argument must be .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on and the second argument must be .Ar host : Ns Ar hostport . IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the .Cm GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit .Ar bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The .Ar bind_address of .Dq localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty address or .Sq * indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces. .It Cm LogLevel Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from .Xr ssh 1 . The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO. DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output. .It Cm MACs Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms in order of preference. The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2 for data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. The algorithms that contain .Dq -etm calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and their use recommended. The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent -hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, -hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com, -hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com, -hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, -hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-ripemd160, +umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, +hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512, +hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, +hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com, +hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com,hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com, +hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,hmac-ripemd160, hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96 .Ed .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost This option can be used if the home directory is shared across machines. In this case localhost will refer to a different machine on each of the machines and the user will get many warnings about changed host keys. However, this option disables host authentication for localhost. The argument to this keyword must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is to check the host key for localhost. .It Cm NumberOfPasswordPrompts Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up. The argument to this keyword must be an integer. The default is 3. .It Cm PasswordAuthentication Specifies whether to use password authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm PermitLocalCommand Allow local command execution via the .Ic LocalCommand option or using the .Ic !\& Ns Ar command escape sequence in .Xr ssh 1 . The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm PKCS11Provider Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use. The argument to this keyword is the PKCS#11 shared library .Xr ssh 1 should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing the user's private RSA key. .It Cm Port Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host. The default is 22. .It Cm PreferredAuthentications Specifies the order in which the client should try protocol 2 authentication methods. This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.\& .Cm keyboard-interactive ) over another method (e.g.\& .Cm password ) . The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey, keyboard-interactive,password .Ed .It Cm Protocol Specifies the protocol versions .Xr ssh 1 should support in order of preference. The possible values are .Sq 1 and .Sq 2 . Multiple versions must be comma-separated. When this option is set to .Dq 2,1 .Nm ssh will try version 2 and fall back to version 1 if version 2 is not available. The default is .Sq 2 . .It Cm ProxyCommand Specifies the command to use to connect to the server. The command -string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with -the user's shell. +string extends to the end of the line, and is executed +using the user's shell +.Ql exec +directive to avoid a lingering shell process. +.Pp In the command string, any occurrence of .Ql %h will be substituted by the host name to connect, .Ql %p by the port, and .Ql %r by the remote user name. The command can be basically anything, and should read from its standard input and write to its standard output. It should eventually connect an .Xr sshd 8 server running on some machine, or execute .Ic sshd -i somewhere. Host key management will be done using the HostName of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by the user). Setting the command to .Dq none disables this option entirely. Note that .Cm CheckHostIP is not available for connects with a proxy command. .Pp This directive is useful in conjunction with .Xr nc 1 and its proxy support. For example, the following directive would connect via an HTTP proxy at 192.0.2.0: .Bd -literal -offset 3n ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p .Ed .It Cm ProxyUseFdpass Specifies that .Cm ProxyCommand will pass a connected file descriptor back to .Xr ssh 1 instead of continuing to execute and pass data. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication Specifies whether to try public key authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq yes . This option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm RekeyLimit Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of .Sq K , .Sq M , or .Sq G to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between .Sq 1G and .Sq 4G , depending on the cipher. The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units documented in the TIME FORMATS section of .Xr sshd_config 5 . The default value for .Cm RekeyLimit is .Dq default none , which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm RemoteForward Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over the secure channel to the specified host and port from the local machine. The first argument must be .Sm off .Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .Sm on and the second argument must be .Ar host : Ns Ar hostport . IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command line. Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on the remote machine. .Pp If the .Ar port argument is .Ql 0 , the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time. .Pp If the .Ar bind_address is not specified, the default is to only bind to loopback addresses. If the .Ar bind_address is .Ql * or an empty string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all interfaces. Specifying a remote .Ar bind_address will only succeed if the server's .Cm GatewayPorts option is enabled (see .Xr sshd_config 5 ) . .It Cm RequestTTY Specifies whether to request a pseudo-tty for the session. The argument may be one of: .Dq no (never request a TTY), .Dq yes (always request a TTY when standard input is a TTY), .Dq force (always request a TTY) or .Dq auto (request a TTY when opening a login session). This option mirrors the .Fl t and .Fl T flags for .Xr ssh 1 . .It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with RSA host authentication. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . This option applies to protocol version 1 only and requires .Xr ssh 1 to be setuid root. .It Cm RSAAuthentication Specifies whether to try RSA authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . RSA authentication will only be attempted if the identity file exists, or an authentication agent is running. The default is .Dq yes . Note that this option applies to protocol version 1 only. .It Cm SendEnv Specifies what variables from the local .Xr environ 7 should be sent to the server. Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2. The server must also support it, and the server must be configured to accept these environment variables. Refer to .Cm AcceptEnv in .Xr sshd_config 5 for how to configure the server. Variables are specified by name, which may contain wildcard characters. Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread across multiple .Cm SendEnv directives. The default is not to send any environment variables. .Pp See .Sx PATTERNS for more information on patterns. .It Cm ServerAliveCountMax Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be sent without .Xr ssh 1 receiving any messages back from the server. If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are being sent, ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the session. It is important to note that the use of server alive messages is very different from .Cm TCPKeepAlive (below). The server alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option enabled by .Cm TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The server alive mechanism is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive. .Pp The default value is 3. If, for example, .Cm ServerAliveInterval (see below) is set to 15 and .Cm ServerAliveCountMax is left at the default, if the server becomes unresponsive, ssh will disconnect after approximately 45 seconds. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm ServerAliveInterval Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received from the server, .Xr ssh 1 will send a message through the encrypted channel to request a response from the server. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. +.It Cm StreamLocalBindMask +Sets the octal file creation mode mask +.Pq umask +used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote +port forwarding. +This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. +.Pp +The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is +readable and writable only by the owner. +Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain +socket files. +.It Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink +Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local +or remote port forwarding before creating a new one. +If the socket file already exists and +.Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink +is not enabled, +.Nm ssh +will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-domain socket file. +This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. +.Pp +The argument must be +.Dq yes +or +.Dq no . +The default is +.Dq no . .It Cm StrictHostKeyChecking If this flag is set to .Dq yes , .Xr ssh 1 will never automatically add host keys to the .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts file, and refuses to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. This provides maximum protection against trojan horse attacks, though it can be annoying when the .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts file is poorly maintained or when connections to new hosts are frequently made. This option forces the user to manually add all new hosts. If this flag is set to .Dq no , ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user known hosts files. If this flag is set to .Dq ask , new host keys will be added to the user known host files only after the user has confirmed that is what they really want to do, and ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. The host keys of known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases. The argument must be .Dq yes , .Dq no , or .Dq ask . The default is .Dq ask . .It Cm TCPKeepAlive Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However, this means that connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people find it annoying. .Pp The default is .Dq yes (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the client will notice if the network goes down or the remote host dies. This is important in scripts, and many users want it too. .Pp To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to .Dq no . .It Cm Tunnel Request .Xr tun 4 device forwarding between the client and the server. The argument must be .Dq yes , .Dq point-to-point (layer 3), .Dq ethernet (layer 2), or .Dq no . Specifying .Dq yes requests the default tunnel mode, which is .Dq point-to-point . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm TunnelDevice Specifies the .Xr tun 4 devices to open on the client .Pq Ar local_tun and the server .Pq Ar remote_tun . .Pp The argument must be .Sm off .Ar local_tun Op : Ar remote_tun . .Sm on The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword .Dq any , which uses the next available tunnel device. If .Ar remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to .Dq any . The default is .Dq any:any . .It Cm UsePrivilegedPort Specifies whether to use a privileged port for outgoing connections. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . If set to .Dq yes , .Xr ssh 1 must be setuid root. Note that this option must be set to .Dq yes for .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication with older servers. .It Cm User Specifies the user to log in as. This can be useful when a different user name is used on different machines. This saves the trouble of having to remember to give the user name on the command line. .It Cm UserKnownHostsFile Specifies one or more files to use for the user host key database, separated by whitespace. The default is .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts , .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts2 . .It Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP resource records. If this option is set to .Dq yes , the client will implicitly trust keys that match a secure fingerprint from DNS. Insecure fingerprints will be handled as if this option was set to .Dq ask . If this option is set to .Dq ask , information on fingerprint match will be displayed, but the user will still need to confirm new host keys according to the .Cm StrictHostKeyChecking option. The argument must be .Dq yes , .Dq no , or .Dq ask . The default is .Dq no . Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. .Pp See also VERIFYING HOST KEYS in .Xr ssh 1 . .It Cm VisualHostKey If this flag is set to .Dq yes , an ASCII art representation of the remote host key fingerprint is printed in addition to the hex fingerprint string at login and for unknown host keys. If this flag is set to .Dq no , no fingerprint strings are printed at login and only the hex fingerprint string will be printed for unknown host keys. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm XAuthLocation Specifies the full pathname of the .Xr xauth 1 program. The default is .Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth . .El .Sh PATTERNS A .Em pattern consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters, .Sq * (a wildcard that matches zero or more characters), or .Sq ?\& (a wildcard that matches exactly one character). For example, to specify a set of declarations for any host in the .Dq .co.uk set of domains, the following pattern could be used: .Pp .Dl Host *.co.uk .Pp The following pattern would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network range: .Pp .Dl Host 192.168.0.? .Pp A .Em pattern-list is a comma-separated list of patterns. Patterns within pattern-lists may be negated by preceding them with an exclamation mark .Pq Sq !\& . For example, to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an organization except from the .Dq dialup pool, the following entry (in authorized_keys) could be used: .Pp .Dl from=\&"!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com\&" .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Pa ~/.ssh/config This is the per-user configuration file. The format of this file is described above. This file is used by the SSH client. Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions: read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config Systemwide configuration file. This file provides defaults for those values that are not specified in the user's configuration file, and for those users who do not have a configuration file. This file must be world-readable. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr ssh 1 .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshbuf-getput-basic.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshbuf-getput-basic.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshbuf-getput-basic.c (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,421 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-basic.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:29:56 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +int +sshbuf_get(struct sshbuf *buf, void *v, size_t len) +{ + const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, len)) < 0) + return r; + if (v != NULL) + memcpy(v, p, len); + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_get_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t *valp) +{ + const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 8)) < 0) + return r; + if (valp != NULL) + *valp = PEEK_U64(p); + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_get_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t *valp) +{ + const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 4)) < 0) + return r; + if (valp != NULL) + *valp = PEEK_U32(p); + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_get_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t *valp) +{ + const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 2)) < 0) + return r; + if (valp != NULL) + *valp = PEEK_U16(p); + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_get_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char *valp) +{ + const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 1)) < 0) + return r; + if (valp != NULL) + *valp = (u_int8_t)*p; + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_get_string(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) +{ + const u_char *val; + size_t len; + int r; + + if (valp != NULL) + *valp = NULL; + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &val, &len)) < 0) + return r; + if (valp != NULL) { + if ((*valp = malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL")); + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + memcpy(*valp, val, len); + (*valp)[len] = '\0'; + } + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = len; + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_get_string_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp) +{ + size_t len; + const u_char *p; + int r; + + if (valp != NULL) + *valp = NULL; + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) < 0) + return r; + if (valp != 0) + *valp = p; + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = len; + if (sshbuf_consume(buf, len + 4) != 0) { + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR")); + SSHBUF_ABORT(); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_peek_string_direct(const struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, + size_t *lenp) +{ + u_int32_t len; + const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); + + if (valp != NULL) + *valp = NULL; + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + if (sshbuf_len(buf) < 4) { + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE")); + return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + } + len = PEEK_U32(p); + if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 4) { + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE")); + return SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE; + } + if (sshbuf_len(buf) - 4 < len) { + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE")); + return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + } + if (valp != 0) + *valp = p + 4; + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = len; + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_get_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, char **valp, size_t *lenp) +{ + size_t len; + const u_char *p, *z; + int r; + + if (valp != NULL) + *valp = NULL; + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) != 0) + return r; + /* Allow a \0 only at the end of the string */ + if (len > 0 && + (z = memchr(p , '\0', len)) != NULL && z < p + len - 1) { + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT")); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(buf)) != 0) + return -1; + if (valp != NULL) { + if ((*valp = malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL")); + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + memcpy(*valp, p, len); + (*valp)[len] = '\0'; + } + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = (size_t)len; + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_get_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf *v) +{ + u_int32_t len; + u_char *p; + int r; + + /* + * Use sshbuf_peek_string_direct() to figure out if there is + * a complete string in 'buf' and copy the string directly + * into 'v'. + */ + if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &len)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_reserve(v, len, &p)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get(buf, p, len)) != 0) + return r; + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_put(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len) +{ + u_char *p; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len, &p)) < 0) + return r; + memcpy(p, v, len); + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_putb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v) +{ + return sshbuf_put(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v)); +} + +int +sshbuf_putf(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, ...) +{ + va_list ap; + int r; + + va_start(ap, fmt); + r = sshbuf_putfv(buf, fmt, ap); + va_end(ap); + return r; +} + +int +sshbuf_putfv(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, va_list ap) +{ + va_list ap2; + int r, len; + u_char *p; + + va_copy(ap2, ap); + if ((len = vsnprintf(NULL, 0, fmt, ap2)) < 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if (len == 0) { + r = 0; + goto out; /* Nothing to do */ + } + va_end(ap2); + va_copy(ap2, ap); + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, (size_t)len + 1, &p)) < 0) + goto out; + if ((r = vsnprintf((char *)p, len + 1, fmt, ap2)) != len) { + r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto out; /* Shouldn't happen */ + } + /* Consume terminating \0 */ + if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(buf, 1)) != 0) + goto out; + r = 0; + out: + va_end(ap2); + return r; +} + +int +sshbuf_put_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t val) +{ + u_char *p; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 8, &p)) < 0) + return r; + POKE_U64(p, val); + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_put_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t val) +{ + u_char *p; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 4, &p)) < 0) + return r; + POKE_U32(p, val); + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_put_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t val) +{ + u_char *p; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 2, &p)) < 0) + return r; + POKE_U16(p, val); + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_put_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char val) +{ + u_char *p; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 1, &p)) < 0) + return r; + p[0] = val; + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_put_string(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len) +{ + u_char *d; + int r; + + if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 4) { + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE")); + return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len + 4, &d)) < 0) + return r; + POKE_U32(d, len); + memcpy(d + 4, v, len); + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *v) +{ + return sshbuf_put_string(buf, (u_char *)v, strlen(v)); +} + +int +sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v) +{ + return sshbuf_put_string(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v)); +} + +int +sshbuf_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf **bufp) +{ + const u_char *p; + size_t len; + struct sshbuf *ret; + int r; + + if (buf == NULL || bufp == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + *bufp = NULL; + if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) != 0) + return r; + if ((ret = sshbuf_from(p, len)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, len + 4)) != 0 || /* Shouldn't happen */ + (r = sshbuf_set_parent(ret, buf)) != 0) { + sshbuf_free(ret); + return r; + } + *bufp = ret; + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len) +{ + u_char *d; + const u_char *s = (const u_char *)v; + int r, prepend; + + if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 5) { + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE")); + return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE; + } + /* Skip leading zero bytes */ + for (; len > 0 && *s == 0; len--, s++) + ; + /* + * If most significant bit is set then prepend a zero byte to + * avoid interpretation as a negative number. + */ + prepend = len > 0 && (s[0] & 0x80) != 0; + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len + 4 + prepend, &d)) < 0) + return r; + POKE_U32(d, len + prepend); + if (prepend) + d[4] = 0; + memcpy(d + 4 + prepend, s, len); + return 0; +} Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,237 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-crypto.c,v 1.2 2014/06/18 15:42:09 naddy Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC +# include +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +int +sshbuf_get_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM *v) +{ + const u_char *d; + size_t len; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &len)) < 0) + return r; + /* Refuse negative (MSB set) bignums */ + if ((len != 0 && (*d & 0x80) != 0)) + return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE; + /* Refuse overlong bignums, allow prepended \0 to avoid MSB set */ + if (len > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1 || + (len == SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1 && *d != 0)) + return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE; + if (v != NULL && BN_bin2bn(d, len, v) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + /* Consume the string */ + if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL) != 0) { + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR")); + SSHBUF_ABORT(); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_get_bignum1(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM *v) +{ + const u_char *d = sshbuf_ptr(buf); + u_int16_t len_bits; + size_t len_bytes; + + /* Length in bits */ + if (sshbuf_len(buf) < 2) + return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + len_bits = PEEK_U16(d); + len_bytes = (len_bits + 7) >> 3; + if (len_bytes > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM) + return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE; + if (sshbuf_len(buf) < 2 + len_bytes) + return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + if (v != NULL && BN_bin2bn(d + 2, len_bytes, v) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if (sshbuf_consume(buf, 2 + len_bytes) != 0) { + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR")); + SSHBUF_ABORT(); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + return 0; +} + +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC +static int +get_ec(const u_char *d, size_t len, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g) +{ + /* Refuse overlong bignums */ + if (len == 0 || len > SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT) + return SSH_ERR_ECPOINT_TOO_LARGE; + /* Only handle uncompressed points */ + if (*d != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + if (v != NULL && EC_POINT_oct2point(g, v, d, len, NULL) != 1) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* XXX assumption */ + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_get_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g) +{ + const u_char *d; + size_t len; + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &len)) < 0) + return r; + if ((r = get_ec(d, len, v, g)) != 0) + return r; + /* Skip string */ + if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL) != 0) { + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR")); + SSHBUF_ABORT(); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_get_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_KEY *v) +{ + EC_POINT *pt = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(v)); + int r; + const u_char *d; + size_t len; + + if (pt == NULL) { + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL")); + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &len)) < 0) { + EC_POINT_free(pt); + return r; + } + if ((r = get_ec(d, len, pt, EC_KEY_get0_group(v))) != 0) { + EC_POINT_free(pt); + return r; + } + if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(v, pt) != 1) { + EC_POINT_free(pt); + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* XXX assumption */ + } + EC_POINT_free(pt); + /* Skip string */ + if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL) != 0) { + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR")); + SSHBUF_ABORT(); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + return 0; +} +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + +int +sshbuf_put_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v) +{ + u_char d[SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1]; + int len = BN_num_bytes(v), prepend = 0, r; + + if (len < 0 || len > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + *d = '\0'; + if (BN_bn2bin(v, d + 1) != len) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* Shouldn't happen */ + /* If MSB is set, prepend a \0 */ + if (len > 0 && (d[1] & 0x80) != 0) + prepend = 1; + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, d + 1 - prepend, len + prepend)) < 0) { + bzero(d, sizeof(d)); + return r; + } + bzero(d, sizeof(d)); + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_put_bignum1(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v) +{ + int r, len_bits = BN_num_bits(v); + size_t len_bytes = (len_bits + 7) / 8; + u_char d[SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM], *dp; + + if (len_bits < 0 || len_bytes > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (BN_bn2bin(v, d) != (int)len_bytes) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* Shouldn't happen */ + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len_bytes + 2, &dp)) < 0) { + bzero(d, sizeof(d)); + return r; + } + POKE_U16(dp, len_bits); + memcpy(dp + 2, d, len_bytes); + bzero(d, sizeof(d)); + return 0; +} + +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC +int +sshbuf_put_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g) +{ + u_char d[SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT]; + BN_CTX *bn_ctx; + size_t len; + int ret; + + if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((len = EC_POINT_point2oct(g, v, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, + NULL, 0, bn_ctx)) > SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT) { + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + if (EC_POINT_point2oct(g, v, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, + d, len, bn_ctx) != len) { + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* Shouldn't happen */ + } + BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); + ret = sshbuf_put_string(buf, d, len); + bzero(d, len); + return ret; +} + +int +sshbuf_put_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_KEY *v) +{ + return sshbuf_put_ec(buf, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(v), + EC_KEY_get0_group(v)); +} +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshbuf-misc.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshbuf-misc.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshbuf-misc.c (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-misc.c,v 1.2 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "ssherr.h" +#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL +#include "sshbuf.h" + +void +sshbuf_dump_data(const void *s, size_t len, FILE *f) +{ + size_t i, j; + const u_char *p = (const u_char *)s; + + for (i = 0; i < len; i += 16) { + fprintf(f, "%.4zd: ", i); + for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) { + if (j < len) + fprintf(f, "%02x ", p[j]); + else + fprintf(f, " "); + } + fprintf(f, " "); + for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) { + if (j < len) { + if (isascii(p[j]) && isprint(p[j])) + fprintf(f, "%c", p[j]); + else + fprintf(f, "."); + } + } + fprintf(f, "\n"); + } +} + +void +sshbuf_dump(struct sshbuf *buf, FILE *f) +{ + fprintf(f, "buffer %p len = %zu\n", buf, sshbuf_len(buf)); + sshbuf_dump_data(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), f); +} + +char * +sshbuf_dtob16(struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + size_t i, j, len = sshbuf_len(buf); + const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); + char *ret; + const char hex[] = "0123456789abcdef"; + + if (len == 0) + return strdup(""); + if (SIZE_MAX / 2 <= len || (ret = malloc(len * 2 + 1)) == NULL) + return NULL; + for (i = j = 0; i < len; i++) { + ret[j++] = hex[(p[i] >> 4) & 0xf]; + ret[j++] = hex[p[i] & 0xf]; + } + ret[j] = '\0'; + return ret; +} + +char * +sshbuf_dtob64(struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + size_t len = sshbuf_len(buf), plen; + const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf); + char *ret; + int r; + + if (len == 0) + return strdup(""); + plen = ((len + 2) / 3) * 4 + 1; + if (SIZE_MAX / 2 <= len || (ret = malloc(plen)) == NULL) + return NULL; + if ((r = b64_ntop(p, len, ret, plen)) == -1) { + bzero(ret, plen); + free(ret); + return NULL; + } + return ret; +} + +int +sshbuf_b64tod(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *b64) +{ + size_t plen = strlen(b64); + int nlen, r; + u_char *p; + + if (plen == 0) + return 0; + if ((p = malloc(plen)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((nlen = b64_pton(b64, p, plen)) < 0) { + bzero(p, plen); + free(p); + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, p, nlen)) < 0) { + bzero(p, plen); + free(p); + return r; + } + bzero(p, plen); + free(p); + return 0; +} + Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshbuf.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshbuf.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshbuf.c (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,406 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.c,v 1.2 2014/06/25 14:16:09 deraadt Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" + +static inline int +sshbuf_check_sanity(const struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + SSHBUF_TELL("sanity"); + if (__predict_false(buf == NULL || + (!buf->readonly && buf->d != buf->cd) || + buf->refcount < 1 || buf->refcount > SSHBUF_REFS_MAX || + buf->cd == NULL || + (buf->dont_free && (buf->readonly || buf->parent != NULL)) || + buf->max_size > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || + buf->alloc > buf->max_size || + buf->size > buf->alloc || + buf->off > buf->size)) { + /* Do not try to recover from corrupted buffer internals */ + SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR")); + signal(SIGSEGV, SIG_DFL); + raise(SIGSEGV); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + return 0; +} + +static void +sshbuf_maybe_pack(struct sshbuf *buf, int force) +{ + SSHBUF_DBG(("force %d", force)); + SSHBUF_TELL("pre-pack"); + if (buf->off == 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) + return; + if (force || + (buf->off >= SSHBUF_PACK_MIN && buf->off >= buf->size / 2)) { + memmove(buf->d, buf->d + buf->off, buf->size - buf->off); + buf->size -= buf->off; + buf->off = 0; + SSHBUF_TELL("packed"); + } +} + +struct sshbuf * +sshbuf_new(void) +{ + struct sshbuf *ret; + + if ((ret = calloc(sizeof(*ret), 1)) == NULL) + return NULL; + ret->alloc = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT; + ret->max_size = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX; + ret->readonly = 0; + ret->refcount = 1; + ret->parent = NULL; + if ((ret->cd = ret->d = calloc(1, ret->alloc)) == NULL) { + free(ret); + return NULL; + } + return ret; +} + +struct sshbuf * +sshbuf_from(const void *blob, size_t len) +{ + struct sshbuf *ret; + + if (blob == NULL || len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || + (ret = calloc(sizeof(*ret), 1)) == NULL) + return NULL; + ret->alloc = ret->size = ret->max_size = len; + ret->readonly = 1; + ret->refcount = 1; + ret->parent = NULL; + ret->cd = blob; + ret->d = NULL; + return ret; +} + +int +sshbuf_set_parent(struct sshbuf *child, struct sshbuf *parent) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(child)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_check_sanity(parent)) != 0) + return r; + child->parent = parent; + child->parent->refcount++; + return 0; +} + +struct sshbuf * +sshbuf_fromb(struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + struct sshbuf *ret; + + if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0) + return NULL; + if ((ret = sshbuf_from(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf))) == NULL) + return NULL; + if (sshbuf_set_parent(ret, buf) != 0) { + sshbuf_free(ret); + return NULL; + } + return ret; +} + +void +sshbuf_init(struct sshbuf *ret) +{ + bzero(ret, sizeof(*ret)); + ret->alloc = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT; + ret->max_size = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX; + ret->readonly = 0; + ret->dont_free = 1; + ret->refcount = 1; + if ((ret->cd = ret->d = calloc(1, ret->alloc)) == NULL) + ret->alloc = 0; +} + +void +sshbuf_free(struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + int dont_free = 0; + + if (buf == NULL) + return; + /* + * The following will leak on insane buffers, but this is the safest + * course of action - an invalid pointer or already-freed pointer may + * have been passed to us and continuing to scribble over memory would + * be bad. + */ + if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0) + return; + /* + * If we are a child, the free our parent to decrement its reference + * count and possibly free it. + */ + if (buf->parent != NULL) { + sshbuf_free(buf->parent); + buf->parent = NULL; + } + /* + * If we are a parent with still-extant children, then don't free just + * yet. The last child's call to sshbuf_free should decrement our + * refcount to 0 and trigger the actual free. + */ + buf->refcount--; + if (buf->refcount > 0) + return; + dont_free = buf->dont_free; + if (!buf->readonly) { + bzero(buf->d, buf->alloc); + free(buf->d); + } + bzero(buf, sizeof(*buf)); + if (!dont_free) + free(buf); +} + +void +sshbuf_reset(struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + u_char *d; + + if (buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) { + /* Nonsensical. Just make buffer appear empty */ + buf->off = buf->size; + return; + } + if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) == 0) + bzero(buf->d, buf->alloc); + buf->off = buf->size = 0; + if (buf->alloc != SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT) { + if ((d = realloc(buf->d, SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT)) != NULL) { + buf->cd = buf->d = d; + buf->alloc = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT; + } + } +} + +size_t +sshbuf_max_size(const struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + return buf->max_size; +} + +size_t +sshbuf_alloc(const struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + return buf->alloc; +} + +const struct sshbuf * +sshbuf_parent(const struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + return buf->parent; +} + +u_int +sshbuf_refcount(const struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + return buf->refcount; +} + +int +sshbuf_set_max_size(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t max_size) +{ + size_t rlen; + u_char *dp; + int r; + + SSHBUF_DBG(("set max buf = %p len = %zu", buf, max_size)); + if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0) + return r; + if (max_size == buf->max_size) + return 0; + if (buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) + return SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY; + if (max_size > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX) + return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE; + /* pack and realloc if necessary */ + sshbuf_maybe_pack(buf, max_size < buf->size); + if (max_size < buf->alloc && max_size > buf->size) { + if (buf->size < SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT) + rlen = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT; + else + rlen = roundup(buf->size, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC); + if (rlen > max_size) + rlen = max_size; + bzero(buf->d + buf->size, buf->alloc - buf->size); + SSHBUF_DBG(("new alloc = %zu", rlen)); + if ((dp = realloc(buf->d, rlen)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + buf->cd = buf->d = dp; + buf->alloc = rlen; + } + SSHBUF_TELL("new-max"); + if (max_size < buf->alloc) + return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE; + buf->max_size = max_size; + return 0; +} + +size_t +sshbuf_len(const struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0) + return 0; + return buf->size - buf->off; +} + +size_t +sshbuf_avail(const struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) + return 0; + return buf->max_size - (buf->size - buf->off); +} + +const u_char * +sshbuf_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0) + return NULL; + return buf->cd + buf->off; +} + +u_char * +sshbuf_mutable_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf) +{ + if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) + return NULL; + return buf->d + buf->off; +} + +int +sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len) +{ + int r; + + if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0) + return r; + if (buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) + return SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY; + SSHBUF_TELL("check"); + /* Check that len is reasonable and that max_size + available < len */ + if (len > buf->max_size || buf->max_size - len < buf->size - buf->off) + return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE; + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp) +{ + size_t rlen, need; + u_char *dp; + int r; + + if (dpp != NULL) + *dpp = NULL; + + SSHBUF_DBG(("reserve buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len)); + if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) != 0) + return r; + /* + * If the requested allocation appended would push us past max_size + * then pack the buffer, zeroing buf->off. + */ + sshbuf_maybe_pack(buf, buf->size + len > buf->max_size); + SSHBUF_TELL("reserve"); + if (len + buf->size > buf->alloc) { + /* + * Prefer to alloc in SSHBUF_SIZE_INC units, but + * allocate less if doing so would overflow max_size. + */ + need = len + buf->size - buf->alloc; + rlen = roundup(buf->alloc + need, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC); + SSHBUF_DBG(("need %zu initial rlen %zu", need, rlen)); + if (rlen > buf->max_size) + rlen = buf->alloc + need; + SSHBUF_DBG(("adjusted rlen %zu", rlen)); + if ((dp = realloc(buf->d, rlen)) == NULL) { + SSHBUF_DBG(("realloc fail")); + if (dpp != NULL) + *dpp = NULL; + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + buf->alloc = rlen; + buf->cd = buf->d = dp; + if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) < 0) { + /* shouldn't fail */ + if (dpp != NULL) + *dpp = NULL; + return r; + } + } + dp = buf->d + buf->size; + buf->size += len; + SSHBUF_TELL("done"); + if (dpp != NULL) + *dpp = dp; + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_consume(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len) +{ + int r; + + SSHBUF_DBG(("len = %zu", len)); + if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0) + return r; + if (len == 0) + return 0; + if (len > sshbuf_len(buf)) + return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + buf->off += len; + SSHBUF_TELL("done"); + return 0; +} + +int +sshbuf_consume_end(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len) +{ + int r; + + SSHBUF_DBG(("len = %zu", len)); + if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0) + return r; + if (len == 0) + return 0; + if (len > sshbuf_len(buf)) + return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE; + buf->size -= len; + SSHBUF_TELL("done"); + return 0; +} + Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshbuf.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshbuf.h (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshbuf.h (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,336 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.h,v 1.3 2014/06/24 01:13:21 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#ifndef _SSHBUF_H +#define _SSHBUF_H + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +# include +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC +# include +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +#define SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX 0x8000000 /* Hard maximum size */ +#define SSHBUF_REFS_MAX 0x100000 /* Max child buffers */ +#define SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM (16384 / 8) /* Max bignum *bytes* */ +#define SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT ((528 * 2 / 8) + 1) /* Max EC point *bytes* */ + +/* + * NB. do not depend on the internals of this. It will be made opaque + * one day. + */ +struct sshbuf { + u_char *d; /* Data */ + const u_char *cd; /* Const data */ + size_t off; /* First available byte is buf->d + buf->off */ + size_t size; /* Last byte is buf->d + buf->size - 1 */ + size_t max_size; /* Maximum size of buffer */ + size_t alloc; /* Total bytes allocated to buf->d */ + int readonly; /* Refers to external, const data */ + int dont_free; /* Kludge to support sshbuf_init */ + u_int refcount; /* Tracks self and number of child buffers */ + struct sshbuf *parent; /* If child, pointer to parent */ +}; + +#ifndef SSHBUF_NO_DEPREACTED +/* + * NB. Please do not use sshbuf_init() in new code. Please use sshbuf_new() + * instead. sshbuf_init() is deprectated and will go away soon (it is + * only included to allow compat with buffer_* in OpenSSH) + */ +void sshbuf_init(struct sshbuf *buf); +#endif + +/* + * Create a new sshbuf buffer. + * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure. + */ +struct sshbuf *sshbuf_new(void); + +/* + * Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from existing data. + * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure. + */ +struct sshbuf *sshbuf_from(const void *blob, size_t len); + +/* + * Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from the contents of an existing + * buffer. The contents of "buf" must not change in the lifetime of the + * resultant buffer. + * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure. + */ +struct sshbuf *sshbuf_fromb(struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* + * Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from the contents of a string in + * an existing buffer (the string is consumed in the process). + * The contents of "buf" must not change in the lifetime of the resultant + * buffer. + * Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure. + */ +int sshbuf_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf **bufp); + +/* + * Clear and free buf + */ +void sshbuf_free(struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* + * Reset buf, clearing its contents. NB. max_size is preserved. + */ +void sshbuf_reset(struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* + * Return the maximum size of buf + */ +size_t sshbuf_max_size(const struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* + * Set the maximum size of buf + * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. + */ +int sshbuf_set_max_size(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t max_size); + +/* + * Returns the length of data in buf + */ +size_t sshbuf_len(const struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* + * Returns number of bytes left in buffer before hitting max_size. + */ +size_t sshbuf_avail(const struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* + * Returns a read-only pointer to the start of the the data in buf + */ +const u_char *sshbuf_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* + * Returns a mutable pointer to the start of the the data in buf, or + * NULL if the buffer is read-only. + */ +u_char *sshbuf_mutable_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* + * Check whether a reservation of size len will succeed in buf + * Safer to use than direct comparisons again sshbuf_avail as it copes + * with unsigned overflows correctly. + * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. + */ +int sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len); + +/* + * Reserve len bytes in buf. + * Returns 0 on success and a pointer to the first reserved byte via the + * optional dpp parameter or a negative * SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. + */ +int sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp); + +/* + * Consume len bytes from the start of buf + * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. + */ +int sshbuf_consume(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len); + +/* + * Consume len bytes from the end of buf + * Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure. + */ +int sshbuf_consume_end(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len); + +/* Extract or deposit some bytes */ +int sshbuf_get(struct sshbuf *buf, void *v, size_t len); +int sshbuf_put(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len); +int sshbuf_putb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v); + +/* Append using a printf(3) format */ +int sshbuf_putf(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, ...) + __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3))); +int sshbuf_putfv(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, va_list ap); + +/* Functions to extract or store big-endian words of various sizes */ +int sshbuf_get_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t *valp); +int sshbuf_get_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t *valp); +int sshbuf_get_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t *valp); +int sshbuf_get_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char *valp); +int sshbuf_put_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t val); +int sshbuf_put_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t val); +int sshbuf_put_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t val); +int sshbuf_put_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char val); + +/* + * Functions to extract or store SSH wire encoded strings (u32 len || data) + * The "cstring" variants admit no \0 characters in the string contents. + * Caller must free *valp. + */ +int sshbuf_get_string(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp); +int sshbuf_get_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, char **valp, size_t *lenp); +int sshbuf_get_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf *v); +int sshbuf_put_string(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len); +int sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *v); +int sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v); + +/* + * "Direct" variant of sshbuf_get_string, returns pointer into the sshbuf to + * avoid an malloc+memcpy. The pointer is guaranteed to be valid until the + * next sshbuf-modifying function call. Caller does not free. + */ +int sshbuf_get_string_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, + size_t *lenp); + +/* Skip past a string */ +#define sshbuf_skip_string(buf) sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL) + +/* Another variant: "peeks" into the buffer without modifying it */ +int sshbuf_peek_string_direct(const struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, + size_t *lenp); + +/* + * Functions to extract or store SSH wire encoded bignums and elliptic + * curve points. + */ +int sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len); +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +int sshbuf_get_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM *v); +int sshbuf_get_bignum1(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM *v); +int sshbuf_put_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v); +int sshbuf_put_bignum1(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v); +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC +int sshbuf_get_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g); +int sshbuf_get_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_KEY *v); +int sshbuf_put_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g); +int sshbuf_put_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_KEY *v); +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +/* Dump the contents of the buffer in a human-readable format */ +void sshbuf_dump(struct sshbuf *buf, FILE *f); + +/* Dump specified memory in a human-readable format */ +void sshbuf_dump_data(const void *s, size_t len, FILE *f); + +/* Return the hexadecimal representation of the contents of the buffer */ +char *sshbuf_dtob16(struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* Encode the contents of the buffer as base64 */ +char *sshbuf_dtob64(struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* Decode base64 data and append it to the buffer */ +int sshbuf_b64tod(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *b64); + +/* Macros for decoding/encoding integers */ +#define PEEK_U64(p) \ + (((u_int64_t)(((u_char *)(p))[0]) << 56) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(((u_char *)(p))[1]) << 48) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(((u_char *)(p))[2]) << 40) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(((u_char *)(p))[3]) << 32) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(((u_char *)(p))[4]) << 24) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(((u_char *)(p))[5]) << 16) | \ + ((u_int64_t)(((u_char *)(p))[6]) << 8) | \ + (u_int64_t)(((u_char *)(p))[7])) +#define PEEK_U32(p) \ + (((u_int32_t)(((u_char *)(p))[0]) << 24) | \ + ((u_int32_t)(((u_char *)(p))[1]) << 16) | \ + ((u_int32_t)(((u_char *)(p))[2]) << 8) | \ + (u_int32_t)(((u_char *)(p))[3])) +#define PEEK_U16(p) \ + (((u_int16_t)(((u_char *)(p))[0]) << 8) | \ + (u_int16_t)(((u_char *)(p))[1])) + +#define POKE_U64(p, v) \ + do { \ + ((u_char *)(p))[0] = (((u_int64_t)(v)) >> 56) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[1] = (((u_int64_t)(v)) >> 48) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[2] = (((u_int64_t)(v)) >> 40) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[3] = (((u_int64_t)(v)) >> 32) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[4] = (((u_int64_t)(v)) >> 24) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[5] = (((u_int64_t)(v)) >> 16) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[6] = (((u_int64_t)(v)) >> 8) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[7] = ((u_int64_t)(v)) & 0xff; \ + } while (0) +#define POKE_U32(p, v) \ + do { \ + ((u_char *)(p))[0] = (((u_int64_t)(v)) >> 24) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[1] = (((u_int64_t)(v)) >> 16) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[2] = (((u_int64_t)(v)) >> 8) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[3] = ((u_int64_t)(v)) & 0xff; \ + } while (0) +#define POKE_U16(p, v) \ + do { \ + ((u_char *)(p))[0] = (((u_int64_t)(v)) >> 8) & 0xff; \ + ((u_char *)(p))[1] = ((u_int64_t)(v)) & 0xff; \ + } while (0) + +/* Internal definitions follow. Exposed for regress tests */ +#ifdef SSHBUF_INTERNAL + +/* + * Return the allocation size of buf + */ +size_t sshbuf_alloc(const struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* + * Increment the reference count of buf. + */ +int sshbuf_set_parent(struct sshbuf *child, struct sshbuf *parent); + +/* + * Return the parent buffer of buf, or NULL if it has no parent. + */ +const struct sshbuf *sshbuf_parent(const struct sshbuf *buf); + +/* + * Return the reference count of buf + */ +u_int sshbuf_refcount(const struct sshbuf *buf); + +# define SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT 256 /* Initial allocation */ +# define SSHBUF_SIZE_INC 256 /* Preferred increment length */ +# define SSHBUF_PACK_MIN 8192 /* Minimim packable offset */ + +/* # define SSHBUF_ABORT abort */ +/* # define SSHBUF_DEBUG */ + +# ifndef SSHBUF_ABORT +# define SSHBUF_ABORT() +# endif + +# ifdef SSHBUF_DEBUG +# define SSHBUF_TELL(what) do { \ + printf("%s:%d %s: %s size %zu alloc %zu off %zu max %zu\n", \ + __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__, what, \ + buf->size, buf->alloc, buf->off, buf->max_size); \ + fflush(stdout); \ + } while (0) +# define SSHBUF_DBG(x) do { \ + printf("%s:%d %s: ", __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__); \ + printf x; \ + printf("\n"); \ + fflush(stdout); \ + } while (0) +# else +# define SSHBUF_TELL(what) +# define SSHBUF_DBG(x) +# endif +#endif /* SSHBUF_INTERNAL */ + +#endif /* _SSHBUF_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshconnect.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshconnect.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshconnect.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,1405 +1,1434 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.246 2014/02/06 22:21:01 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.251 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the * login (authentication) dialog. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "key.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "packet.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "compat.h" #include "key.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "atomicio.h" -#include "misc.h" #include "dns.h" #include "roaming.h" #include "monitor_fdpass.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "version.h" char *client_version_string = NULL; char *server_version_string = NULL; +Key *previous_host_key = NULL; static int matching_host_key_dns = 0; static pid_t proxy_command_pid = 0; /* import */ extern Options options; extern char *__progname; extern uid_t original_real_uid; extern uid_t original_effective_uid; static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *, Key *); static void warn_changed_key(Key *); /* Expand a proxy command */ static char * expand_proxy_command(const char *proxy_command, const char *user, const char *host, int port) { char *tmp, *ret, strport[NI_MAXSERV]; snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port); xasprintf(&tmp, "exec %s", proxy_command); ret = percent_expand(tmp, "h", host, "p", strport, "r", options.user, (char *)NULL); free(tmp); return ret; } /* * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command that passes a * a connected fd back to us. */ static int ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command) { char *command_string; int sp[2], sock; pid_t pid; char *shell; if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL) shell = _PATH_BSHELL; if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sp) < 0) fatal("Could not create socketpair to communicate with " "proxy dialer: %.100s", strerror(errno)); command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user, host, port); debug("Executing proxy dialer command: %.500s", command_string); /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { char *argv[10]; /* Child. Permanently give up superuser privileges. */ permanently_drop_suid(original_real_uid); close(sp[1]); /* Redirect stdin and stdout. */ if (sp[0] != 0) { if (dup2(sp[0], 0) < 0) perror("dup2 stdin"); } if (sp[0] != 1) { if (dup2(sp[0], 1) < 0) perror("dup2 stdout"); } if (sp[0] >= 2) close(sp[0]); /* * Stderr is left as it is so that error messages get * printed on the user's terminal. */ argv[0] = shell; argv[1] = "-c"; argv[2] = command_string; argv[3] = NULL; /* * Execute the proxy command. * Note that we gave up any extra privileges above. */ execv(argv[0], argv); perror(argv[0]); exit(1); } /* Parent. */ if (pid < 0) fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); close(sp[0]); free(command_string); if ((sock = mm_receive_fd(sp[1])) == -1) fatal("proxy dialer did not pass back a connection"); while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Set the connection file descriptors. */ packet_set_connection(sock, sock); return 0; } /* * Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command. */ static int ssh_proxy_connect(const char *host, u_short port, const char *proxy_command) { char *command_string; int pin[2], pout[2]; pid_t pid; char *shell; if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0') shell = _PATH_BSHELL; /* Create pipes for communicating with the proxy. */ if (pipe(pin) < 0 || pipe(pout) < 0) fatal("Could not create pipes to communicate with the proxy: %.100s", strerror(errno)); command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user, host, port); debug("Executing proxy command: %.500s", command_string); /* Fork and execute the proxy command. */ if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { char *argv[10]; /* Child. Permanently give up superuser privileges. */ permanently_drop_suid(original_real_uid); /* Redirect stdin and stdout. */ close(pin[1]); if (pin[0] != 0) { if (dup2(pin[0], 0) < 0) perror("dup2 stdin"); close(pin[0]); } close(pout[0]); if (dup2(pout[1], 1) < 0) perror("dup2 stdout"); /* Cannot be 1 because pin allocated two descriptors. */ close(pout[1]); /* Stderr is left as it is so that error messages get printed on the user's terminal. */ argv[0] = shell; argv[1] = "-c"; argv[2] = command_string; argv[3] = NULL; /* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any extra privileges above. */ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); execv(argv[0], argv); perror(argv[0]); exit(1); } /* Parent. */ if (pid < 0) fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); else proxy_command_pid = pid; /* save pid to clean up later */ /* Close child side of the descriptors. */ close(pin[0]); close(pout[1]); /* Free the command name. */ free(command_string); /* Set the connection file descriptors. */ packet_set_connection(pout[0], pin[1]); /* Indicate OK return */ return 0; } void ssh_kill_proxy_command(void) { /* * Send SIGHUP to proxy command if used. We don't wait() in * case it hangs and instead rely on init to reap the child */ if (proxy_command_pid > 1) kill(proxy_command_pid, SIGHUP); } /* * Creates a (possibly privileged) socket for use as the ssh connection. */ static int ssh_create_socket(int privileged, struct addrinfo *ai) { int sock, r, gaierr; struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL; sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (sock < 0) { error("socket: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); /* Bind the socket to an alternative local IP address */ if (options.bind_address == NULL && !privileged) return sock; if (options.bind_address) { memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = ai->ai_family; hints.ai_socktype = ai->ai_socktype; hints.ai_protocol = ai->ai_protocol; hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; gaierr = getaddrinfo(options.bind_address, NULL, &hints, &res); if (gaierr) { error("getaddrinfo: %s: %s", options.bind_address, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr)); close(sock); return -1; } } /* * If we are running as root and want to connect to a privileged * port, bind our own socket to a privileged port. */ if (privileged) { PRIV_START; r = bindresvport_sa(sock, res ? res->ai_addr : NULL); PRIV_END; if (r < 0) { error("bindresvport_sa: af=%d %s", ai->ai_family, strerror(errno)); goto fail; } } else { if (bind(sock, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen) < 0) { error("bind: %s: %s", options.bind_address, strerror(errno)); fail: close(sock); freeaddrinfo(res); return -1; } } if (res != NULL) freeaddrinfo(res); return sock; } static int timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr, socklen_t addrlen, int *timeoutp) { fd_set *fdset; struct timeval tv, t_start; socklen_t optlen; int optval, rc, result = -1; gettimeofday(&t_start, NULL); if (*timeoutp <= 0) { result = connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen); goto done; } set_nonblock(sockfd); rc = connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen); if (rc == 0) { unset_nonblock(sockfd); result = 0; goto done; } if (errno != EINPROGRESS) { result = -1; goto done; } fdset = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(sockfd + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask)); FD_SET(sockfd, fdset); ms_to_timeval(&tv, *timeoutp); for (;;) { rc = select(sockfd + 1, NULL, fdset, NULL, &tv); if (rc != -1 || errno != EINTR) break; } switch (rc) { case 0: /* Timed out */ errno = ETIMEDOUT; break; case -1: /* Select error */ debug("select: %s", strerror(errno)); break; case 1: /* Completed or failed */ optval = 0; optlen = sizeof(optval); if (getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, &optlen) == -1) { debug("getsockopt: %s", strerror(errno)); break; } if (optval != 0) { errno = optval; break; } result = 0; unset_nonblock(sockfd); break; default: /* Should not occur */ fatal("Bogus return (%d) from select()", rc); } free(fdset); done: if (result == 0 && *timeoutp > 0) { ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, timeoutp); if (*timeoutp <= 0) { errno = ETIMEDOUT; result = -1; } } return (result); } /* * Opens a TCP/IP connection to the remote server on the given host. * The address of the remote host will be returned in hostaddr. * If port is 0, the default port will be used. If needpriv is true, * a privileged port will be allocated to make the connection. * This requires super-user privileges if needpriv is true. * Connection_attempts specifies the maximum number of tries (one per * second). If proxy_command is non-NULL, it specifies the command (with %h * and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact * the daemon. */ static int ssh_connect_direct(const char *host, struct addrinfo *aitop, struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family, int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive, int needpriv) { int on = 1; int sock = -1, attempt; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; struct addrinfo *ai; debug2("ssh_connect: needpriv %d", needpriv); for (attempt = 0; attempt < connection_attempts; attempt++) { if (attempt > 0) { /* Sleep a moment before retrying. */ sleep(1); debug("Trying again..."); } /* * Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in * sequence until the connection succeeds. */ for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) { error("ssh_connect: getnameinfo failed"); continue; } debug("Connecting to %.200s [%.100s] port %s.", host, ntop, strport); /* Create a socket for connecting. */ sock = ssh_create_socket(needpriv, ai); if (sock < 0) /* Any error is already output */ continue; if (timeout_connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, timeout_ms) >= 0) { /* Successful connection. */ memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen); break; } else { debug("connect to address %s port %s: %s", ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); close(sock); sock = -1; } } if (sock != -1) break; /* Successful connection. */ } /* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */ if (sock == -1) { error("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s", host, strport, strerror(errno)); return (-1); } debug("Connection established."); /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */ if (want_keepalive && setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on, sizeof(on)) < 0) error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); /* Set the connection. */ packet_set_connection(sock, sock); return 0; } int ssh_connect(const char *host, struct addrinfo *addrs, struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family, int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive, int needpriv) { if (options.proxy_command == NULL) { return ssh_connect_direct(host, addrs, hostaddr, port, family, connection_attempts, timeout_ms, want_keepalive, needpriv); } else if (strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0) { packet_set_connection(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO); return 0; /* Always succeeds */ } else if (options.proxy_use_fdpass) { return ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(host, port, options.proxy_command); } return ssh_proxy_connect(host, port, options.proxy_command); } static void send_client_banner(int connection_out, int minor1) { /* Send our own protocol version identification. */ if (compat20) { xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\r\n", PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION); } else { xasprintf(&client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s\n", PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, minor1, SSH_VERSION); } if (roaming_atomicio(vwrite, connection_out, client_version_string, strlen(client_version_string)) != strlen(client_version_string)) fatal("write: %.100s", strerror(errno)); chop(client_version_string); debug("Local version string %.100s", client_version_string); } /* * Waits for the server identification string, and sends our own * identification string. */ void ssh_exchange_identification(int timeout_ms) { char buf[256], remote_version[256]; /* must be same size! */ int remote_major, remote_minor, mismatch; int connection_in = packet_get_connection_in(); int connection_out = packet_get_connection_out(); int minor1 = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1, client_banner_sent = 0; u_int i, n; size_t len; int fdsetsz, remaining, rc; struct timeval t_start, t_remaining; fd_set *fdset; fdsetsz = howmany(connection_in + 1, NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask); fdset = xcalloc(1, fdsetsz); /* * If we are SSH2-only then we can send the banner immediately and * save a round-trip. */ if (options.protocol == SSH_PROTO_2) { enable_compat20(); send_client_banner(connection_out, 0); client_banner_sent = 1; } /* Read other side's version identification. */ remaining = timeout_ms; for (n = 0;;) { for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) { if (timeout_ms > 0) { gettimeofday(&t_start, NULL); ms_to_timeval(&t_remaining, remaining); FD_SET(connection_in, fdset); rc = select(connection_in + 1, fdset, NULL, fdset, &t_remaining); ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, &remaining); if (rc == 0 || remaining <= 0) fatal("Connection timed out during " "banner exchange"); if (rc == -1) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: " "select: %s", strerror(errno)); } } len = roaming_atomicio(read, connection_in, &buf[i], 1); if (len != 1 && errno == EPIPE) fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: " "Connection closed by remote host"); else if (len != 1) fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: " "read: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (buf[i] == '\r') { buf[i] = '\n'; buf[i + 1] = 0; continue; /**XXX wait for \n */ } if (buf[i] == '\n') { buf[i + 1] = 0; break; } if (++n > 65536) fatal("ssh_exchange_identification: " "No banner received"); } buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; if (strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0) break; debug("ssh_exchange_identification: %s", buf); } server_version_string = xstrdup(buf); free(fdset); /* * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. */ if (sscanf(server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) fatal("Bad remote protocol version identification: '%.100s'", buf); debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s", remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); compat_datafellows(remote_version); mismatch = 0; switch (remote_major) { case 1: if (remote_minor == 99 && (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1_PREFERRED)) { enable_compat20(); break; } if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) { mismatch = 1; break; } if (remote_minor < 3) { fatal("Remote machine has too old SSH software version."); } else if (remote_minor == 3 || remote_minor == 4) { /* We speak 1.3, too. */ enable_compat13(); minor1 = 3; if (options.forward_agent) { logit("Agent forwarding disabled for protocol 1.3"); options.forward_agent = 0; } } break; case 2: if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { enable_compat20(); break; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: mismatch = 1; break; } if (mismatch) fatal("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d", (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) ? PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2 : PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1, remote_major); if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY) != 0) fatal("Server version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe key agreement; " "refusing connection", remote_version); if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) logit("Server version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature " "scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version); if (!client_banner_sent) send_client_banner(connection_out, minor1); chop(server_version_string); } /* defaults to 'no' */ static int confirm(const char *prompt) { const char *msg, *again = "Please type 'yes' or 'no': "; char *p; int ret = -1; if (options.batch_mode) return 0; for (msg = prompt;;msg = again) { p = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ECHO); if (p == NULL || (p[0] == '\0') || (p[0] == '\n') || strncasecmp(p, "no", 2) == 0) ret = 0; if (p && strncasecmp(p, "yes", 3) == 0) ret = 1; free(p); if (ret != -1) return ret; } } static int check_host_cert(const char *host, const Key *host_key) { const char *reason; if (key_cert_check_authority(host_key, 1, 0, host, &reason) != 0) { error("%s", reason); return 0; } - if (buffer_len(&host_key->cert->critical) != 0) { + if (buffer_len(host_key->cert->critical) != 0) { error("Certificate for %s contains unsupported " "critical options(s)", host); return 0; } return 1; } static int sockaddr_is_local(struct sockaddr *hostaddr) { switch (hostaddr->sa_family) { case AF_INET: return (ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)hostaddr)-> sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET; case AF_INET6: return IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK( &(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)hostaddr)->sin6_addr)); default: return 0; } } /* * Prepare the hostname and ip address strings that are used to lookup * host keys in known_hosts files. These may have a port number appended. */ void get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, char **hostfile_hostname, char **hostfile_ipaddr) { char ntop[NI_MAXHOST]; socklen_t addrlen; switch (hostaddr == NULL ? -1 : hostaddr->sa_family) { case -1: addrlen = 0; break; case AF_INET: addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in); break; case AF_INET6: addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6); break; default: addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr); break; } /* * We don't have the remote ip-address for connections * using a proxy command */ if (hostfile_ipaddr != NULL) { if (options.proxy_command == NULL) { if (getnameinfo(hostaddr, addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0) fatal("check_host_key: getnameinfo failed"); *hostfile_ipaddr = put_host_port(ntop, port); } else { *hostfile_ipaddr = xstrdup(""); } } /* * Allow the user to record the key under a different name or * differentiate a non-standard port. This is useful for ssh * tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run multiple * sshd's on different ports on the same machine. */ if (hostfile_hostname != NULL) { if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) { *hostfile_hostname = xstrdup(options.host_key_alias); debug("using hostkeyalias: %s", *hostfile_hostname); } else { *hostfile_hostname = put_host_port(hostname, port); } } } /* * check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key * is not valid. user_hostfile[0] will not be updated if 'readonly' is true. */ #define RDRW 0 #define RDONLY 1 #define ROQUIET 2 static int check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, Key *host_key, int readonly, char **user_hostfiles, u_int num_user_hostfiles, char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles) { HostStatus host_status; HostStatus ip_status; Key *raw_key = NULL; char *ip = NULL, *host = NULL; char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp, *ra; char msg[1024]; const char *type; const struct hostkey_entry *host_found, *ip_found; int len, cancelled_forwarding = 0; int local = sockaddr_is_local(hostaddr); int r, want_cert = key_is_cert(host_key), host_ip_differ = 0; struct hostkeys *host_hostkeys, *ip_hostkeys; u_int i; /* * Force accepting of the host key for loopback/localhost. The * problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to multiple * machines, localhost will refer to a different machine in each of * them, and the user will get bogus HOST_CHANGED warnings. This * essentially disables host authentication for localhost; however, * this is probably not a real problem. */ if (options.no_host_authentication_for_localhost == 1 && local && options.host_key_alias == NULL) { debug("Forcing accepting of host key for " "loopback/localhost."); return 0; } /* * Prepare the hostname and address strings used for hostkey lookup. * In some cases, these will have a port number appended. */ get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(hostname, hostaddr, port, &host, &ip); /* * Turn off check_host_ip if the connection is to localhost, via proxy * command or if we don't have a hostname to compare with */ if (options.check_host_ip && (local || strcmp(hostname, ip) == 0 || options.proxy_command != NULL)) options.check_host_ip = 0; host_hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, user_hostfiles[i]); for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, system_hostfiles[i]); ip_hostkeys = NULL; if (!want_cert && options.check_host_ip) { ip_hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, user_hostfiles[i]); for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, system_hostfiles[i]); } retry: /* Reload these as they may have changed on cert->key downgrade */ want_cert = key_is_cert(host_key); type = key_type(host_key); /* * Check if the host key is present in the user's list of known * hosts or in the systemwide list. */ host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host_key, &host_found); /* * Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are * localhost, looking for a certificate, or the hostname was an ip * address to begin with. */ if (!want_cert && ip_hostkeys != NULL) { ip_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, host_key, &ip_found); if (host_status == HOST_CHANGED && (ip_status != HOST_CHANGED || (ip_found != NULL && !key_equal(ip_found->key, host_found->key)))) host_ip_differ = 1; } else ip_status = host_status; switch (host_status) { case HOST_OK: /* The host is known and the key matches. */ debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the %s host %s.", host, type, want_cert ? "certificate" : "key"); debug("Found %s in %s:%lu", want_cert ? "CA key" : "key", host_found->file, host_found->line); if (want_cert && !check_host_cert(hostname, host_key)) goto fail; if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) { if (readonly || want_cert) logit("%s host key for IP address " "'%.128s' not in list of known hosts.", type, ip); else if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts)) logit("Failed to add the %s host key for IP " "address '%.128s' to the list of known " "hosts (%.30s).", type, ip, user_hostfiles[0]); else logit("Warning: Permanently added the %s host " "key for IP address '%.128s' to the list " "of known hosts.", type, ip); } else if (options.visual_host_key) { fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s\n", fp, ra); free(ra); free(fp); } break; case HOST_NEW: if (options.host_key_alias == NULL && port != 0 && port != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) { debug("checking without port identifier"); if (check_host_key(hostname, hostaddr, 0, host_key, ROQUIET, user_hostfiles, num_user_hostfiles, system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles) == 0) { debug("found matching key w/out port"); break; } } if (readonly || want_cert) goto fail; /* The host is new. */ if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) { /* * User has requested strict host key checking. We * will not add the host key automatically. The only * alternative left is to abort. */ error("No %s host key is known for %.200s and you " "have requested strict checking.", type, host); goto fail; } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) { char msg1[1024], msg2[1024]; if (show_other_keys(host_hostkeys, host_key)) snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), "\nbut keys of different type are already" " known for this host."); else snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), "."); /* The default */ fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ra = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); msg2[0] = '\0'; if (options.verify_host_key_dns) { if (matching_host_key_dns) snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2), "Matching host key fingerprint" " found in DNS.\n"); else snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2), "No matching host key fingerprint" " found in DNS.\n"); } snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be " "established%s\n" "%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s" "Are you sure you want to continue connecting " "(yes/no)? ", host, ip, msg1, type, fp, options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "", options.visual_host_key ? ra : "", msg2); free(ra); free(fp); if (!confirm(msg)) goto fail; } /* * If not in strict mode, add the key automatically to the * local known_hosts file. */ if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) { snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s", host, ip); hostp = hostline; if (options.hash_known_hosts) { /* Add hash of host and IP separately */ r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], host, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts) && add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts); } else { /* Add unhashed "host,ip" */ r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], hostline, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts); } } else { r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], host, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts); hostp = host; } if (!r) logit("Failed to add the host to the list of known " "hosts (%.500s).", user_hostfiles[0]); else logit("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' (%s) to the " "list of known hosts.", hostp, type); break; case HOST_REVOKED: error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("@ WARNING: REVOKED HOST KEY DETECTED! @"); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("The %s host key for %s is marked as revoked.", type, host); error("This could mean that a stolen key is being used to"); error("impersonate this host."); /* * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have * to edit the key manually and we can only abort. */ if (options.strict_host_key_checking) { error("%s host key for %.200s was revoked and you have " "requested strict checking.", type, host); goto fail; } goto continue_unsafe; case HOST_CHANGED: if (want_cert) { /* * This is only a debug() since it is valid to have * CAs with wildcard DNS matches that don't match * all hosts that one might visit. */ debug("Host certificate authority does not " "match %s in %s:%lu", CA_MARKER, host_found->file, host_found->line); goto fail; } if (readonly == ROQUIET) goto fail; if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) { char *key_msg; if (ip_status == HOST_NEW) key_msg = "is unknown"; else if (ip_status == HOST_OK) key_msg = "is unchanged"; else key_msg = "has a different value"; error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("@ WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED! @"); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("The %s host key for %s has changed,", type, host); error("and the key for the corresponding IP address %s", ip); error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg); error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host"); error("and its host key have changed at the same time."); if (ip_status != HOST_NEW) error("Offending key for IP in %s:%lu", ip_found->file, ip_found->line); } /* The host key has changed. */ warn_changed_key(host_key); error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.", user_hostfiles[0]); error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu", key_type(host_found->key), host_found->file, host_found->line); /* * If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have * to edit the key manually and we can only abort. */ if (options.strict_host_key_checking) { error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have " "requested strict checking.", type, host); goto fail; } continue_unsafe: /* * If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow * the connection but without MITM-able authentication or * forwarding. */ if (options.password_authentication) { error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.password_authentication = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication) { error("Keyboard-interactive authentication is disabled" " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0; options.challenge_response_authentication = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.challenge_response_authentication) { error("Challenge/response authentication is disabled" " to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.challenge_response_authentication = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.forward_agent) { error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.forward_agent = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.forward_x11) { error("X11 forwarding is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.forward_x11 = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.num_local_forwards > 0 || options.num_remote_forwards > 0) { error("Port forwarding is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.num_local_forwards = options.num_remote_forwards = 0; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) { error("Tunnel forwarding is disabled to avoid " "man-in-the-middle attacks."); options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO; cancelled_forwarding = 1; } if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && cancelled_forwarding) fatal("Error: forwarding disabled due to host key " "check failure"); /* * XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id. * This could be done by converting the host key to an * identifying sentence, tell that the host identifies itself * by that sentence, and ask the user if he/she wishes to * accept the authentication. */ break; case HOST_FOUND: fatal("internal error"); break; } if (options.check_host_ip && host_status != HOST_CHANGED && ip_status == HOST_CHANGED) { snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "Warning: the %s host key for '%.200s' " "differs from the key for the IP address '%.128s'" "\nOffending key for IP in %s:%lu", type, host, ip, ip_found->file, ip_found->line); if (host_status == HOST_OK) { len = strlen(msg); snprintf(msg + len, sizeof(msg) - len, "\nMatching host key in %s:%lu", host_found->file, host_found->line); } if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 1) { logit("%s", msg); error("Exiting, you have requested strict checking."); goto fail; } else if (options.strict_host_key_checking == 2) { strlcat(msg, "\nAre you sure you want " "to continue connecting (yes/no)? ", sizeof(msg)); if (!confirm(msg)) goto fail; } else { logit("%s", msg); } } free(ip); free(host); if (host_hostkeys != NULL) free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys); if (ip_hostkeys != NULL) free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys); return 0; fail: if (want_cert && host_status != HOST_REVOKED) { /* * No matching certificate. Downgrade cert to raw key and * search normally. */ debug("No matching CA found. Retry with plain key"); raw_key = key_from_private(host_key); if (key_drop_cert(raw_key) != 0) fatal("Couldn't drop certificate"); host_key = raw_key; goto retry; } if (raw_key != NULL) key_free(raw_key); free(ip); free(host); if (host_hostkeys != NULL) free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys); if (ip_hostkeys != NULL) free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys); return -1; } /* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */ int verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, Key *host_key) { - int flags = 0; + int r = -1, flags = 0; char *fp; + Key *plain = NULL; fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); debug("Server host key: %s %s", key_type(host_key), fp); free(fp); - /* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS */ - if (!key_is_cert(host_key) && options.verify_host_key_dns && - verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, host_key, &flags) == 0) { - if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) { + if (key_equal(previous_host_key, host_key)) { + debug("%s: server host key matches cached key", __func__); + return 0; + } - if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 && - flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH && - flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) - return 0; - - if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) { - matching_host_key_dns = 1; - } else { - warn_changed_key(host_key); - error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS with the new " - "host key to get rid of this message."); + if (options.verify_host_key_dns) { + /* + * XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS, so downgrade + * them and try the plain key. + */ + plain = key_from_private(host_key); + if (key_is_cert(plain)) + key_drop_cert(plain); + if (verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, plain, &flags) == 0) { + if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) { + if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 && + flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH && + flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) { + key_free(plain); + r = 0; + goto done; + } + if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) { + matching_host_key_dns = 1; + } else { + warn_changed_key(plain); + error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS " + "with the new host key to get rid " + "of this message."); + } } } + key_free(plain); } - return check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key, RDRW, + r = check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key, RDRW, options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles, options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles); + +done: + if (r == 0 && host_key != NULL) { + key_free(previous_host_key); + previous_host_key = key_from_private(host_key); + } + + return r; } /* * Starts a dialog with the server, and authenticates the current user on the * server. This does not need any extra privileges. The basic connection * to the server must already have been established before this is called. * If login fails, this function prints an error and never returns. * This function does not require super-user privileges. */ void ssh_login(Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, struct passwd *pw, int timeout_ms) { char *host; char *server_user, *local_user; local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name); server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user; /* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */ host = xstrdup(orighost); lowercase(host); /* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */ ssh_exchange_identification(timeout_ms); /* Put the connection into non-blocking mode. */ packet_set_nonblocking(); /* key exchange */ /* authenticate user */ if (compat20) { ssh_kex2(host, hostaddr, port); ssh_userauth2(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive); } else { +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 ssh_kex(host, hostaddr); ssh_userauth1(local_user, server_user, host, sensitive); +#else + fatal("ssh1 is not unsupported"); +#endif } free(local_user); } void ssh_put_password(char *password) { int size; char *padded; if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PASSWORDPAD) { packet_put_cstring(password); return; } size = roundup(strlen(password) + 1, 32); padded = xcalloc(1, size); strlcpy(padded, password, size); packet_put_string(padded, size); explicit_bzero(padded, size); free(padded); } /* print all known host keys for a given host, but skip keys of given type */ static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, Key *key) { int type[] = { KEY_RSA1, KEY_RSA, KEY_DSA, KEY_ECDSA, KEY_ED25519, -1 }; int i, ret = 0; char *fp, *ra; const struct hostkey_entry *found; for (i = 0; type[i] != -1; i++) { if (type[i] == key->type) continue; if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found)) continue; fp = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); ra = key_fingerprint(found->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_RANDOMART); logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n" "in %s:%lu\n" "%s key fingerprint %s.", key_type(found->key), found->host, found->file, found->line, key_type(found->key), fp); if (options.visual_host_key) logit("%s", ra); free(ra); free(fp); ret = 1; } return ret; } static void warn_changed_key(Key *host_key) { char *fp; fp = key_fingerprint(host_key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @"); error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@"); error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!"); error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!"); error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed."); error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.", key_type(host_key), fp); error("Please contact your system administrator."); free(fp); } /* * Execute a local command */ int ssh_local_cmd(const char *args) { char *shell; pid_t pid; int status; void (*osighand)(int); if (!options.permit_local_command || args == NULL || !*args) return (1); if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0') shell = _PATH_BSHELL; osighand = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); pid = fork(); if (pid == 0) { signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL); debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args); execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL); error("Couldn't execute %s -c \"%s\": %s", shell, args, strerror(errno)); _exit(1); } else if (pid == -1) fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno)); while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) if (errno != EINTR) fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno)); signal(SIGCHLD, osighand); if (!WIFEXITED(status)) return (1); return (WEXITSTATUS(status)); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshconnect1.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshconnect1.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshconnect1.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,755 +1,757 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.74 2014/02/02 03:44:32 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect1.c,v 1.76 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the * login (authentication) dialog. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "packet.h" #include "key.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "kex.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "log.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "readconf.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "authfile.h" -#include "misc.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "digest.h" /* Session id for the current session. */ u_char session_id[16]; u_int supported_authentications = 0; extern Options options; extern char *__progname; /* * Checks if the user has an authentication agent, and if so, tries to * authenticate using the agent. */ static int try_agent_authentication(void) { int type; char *comment; AuthenticationConnection *auth; u_char response[16]; u_int i; Key *key; BIGNUM *challenge; /* Get connection to the agent. */ auth = ssh_get_authentication_connection(); if (!auth) return 0; if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("try_agent_authentication: BN_new failed"); /* Loop through identities served by the agent. */ for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(auth, &comment, 1); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(auth, &comment, 1)) { /* Try this identity. */ debug("Trying RSA authentication via agent with '%.100s'", comment); free(comment); /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA); packet_put_bignum(key->rsa->n); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Wait for server's response. */ type = packet_read(); /* The server sends failure if it doesn't like our key or does not support RSA authentication. */ if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) { debug("Server refused our key."); key_free(key); continue; } /* Otherwise it should have sent a challenge. */ if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type); packet_get_bignum(challenge); packet_check_eom(); debug("Received RSA challenge from server."); /* Ask the agent to decrypt the challenge. */ if (!ssh_decrypt_challenge(auth, key, challenge, session_id, 1, response)) { /* * The agent failed to authenticate this identifier * although it advertised it supports this. Just * return a wrong value. */ logit("Authentication agent failed to decrypt challenge."); explicit_bzero(response, sizeof(response)); } key_free(key); debug("Sending response to RSA challenge."); /* Send the decrypted challenge back to the server. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) packet_put_char(response[i]); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Wait for response from the server. */ type = packet_read(); /* The server returns success if it accepted the authentication. */ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { ssh_close_authentication_connection(auth); BN_clear_free(challenge); debug("RSA authentication accepted by server."); return 1; } /* Otherwise it should return failure. */ if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type); } ssh_close_authentication_connection(auth); BN_clear_free(challenge); debug("RSA authentication using agent refused."); return 0; } /* * Computes the proper response to a RSA challenge, and sends the response to * the server. */ static void respond_to_rsa_challenge(BIGNUM * challenge, RSA * prv) { u_char buf[32], response[16]; struct ssh_digest_ctx *md; int i, len; /* Decrypt the challenge using the private key. */ /* XXX think about Bleichenbacher, too */ - if (rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, prv) <= 0) + if (rsa_private_decrypt(challenge, challenge, prv) != 0) packet_disconnect( "respond_to_rsa_challenge: rsa_private_decrypt failed"); /* Compute the response. */ /* The response is MD5 of decrypted challenge plus session id. */ len = BN_num_bytes(challenge); if (len <= 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(buf)) packet_disconnect( "respond_to_rsa_challenge: bad challenge length %d", len); memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); BN_bn2bin(challenge, buf + sizeof(buf) - len); if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL || ssh_digest_update(md, buf, 32) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(md, session_id, 16) < 0 || ssh_digest_final(md, response, sizeof(response)) < 0) fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__); ssh_digest_free(md); debug("Sending response to host key RSA challenge."); /* Send the response back to the server. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) packet_put_char(response[i]); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); explicit_bzero(response, sizeof(response)); explicit_bzero(&md, sizeof(md)); } /* * Checks if the user has authentication file, and if so, tries to authenticate * the user using it. */ static int try_rsa_authentication(int idx) { BIGNUM *challenge; Key *public, *private; char buf[300], *passphrase, *comment, *authfile; int i, perm_ok = 1, type, quit; public = options.identity_keys[idx]; authfile = options.identity_files[idx]; comment = xstrdup(authfile); debug("Trying RSA authentication with key '%.100s'", comment); /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA); packet_put_bignum(public->rsa->n); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Wait for server's response. */ type = packet_read(); /* * The server responds with failure if it doesn't like our key or * doesn't support RSA authentication. */ if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) { debug("Server refused our key."); free(comment); return 0; } /* Otherwise, the server should respond with a challenge. */ if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type); /* Get the challenge from the packet. */ if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("try_rsa_authentication: BN_new failed"); packet_get_bignum(challenge); packet_check_eom(); debug("Received RSA challenge from server."); /* * If the key is not stored in external hardware, we have to * load the private key. Try first with empty passphrase; if it * fails, ask for a passphrase. */ - if (public->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT) + if (public->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) private = public; else private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1, authfile, "", NULL, &perm_ok); if (private == NULL && !options.batch_mode && perm_ok) { snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Enter passphrase for RSA key '%.100s': ", comment); for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) { passphrase = read_passphrase(buf, 0); if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) { private = key_load_private_type(KEY_RSA1, authfile, passphrase, NULL, NULL); quit = 0; } else { debug2("no passphrase given, try next key"); quit = 1; } explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); free(passphrase); if (private != NULL || quit) break; debug2("bad passphrase given, try again..."); } } /* We no longer need the comment. */ free(comment); if (private == NULL) { if (!options.batch_mode && perm_ok) error("Bad passphrase."); /* Send a dummy response packet to avoid protocol error. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RSA_RESPONSE); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) packet_put_char(0); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Expect the server to reject it... */ packet_read_expect(SSH_SMSG_FAILURE); BN_clear_free(challenge); return 0; } /* Compute and send a response to the challenge. */ respond_to_rsa_challenge(challenge, private->rsa); /* Destroy the private key unless it in external hardware. */ - if (!(private->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT)) + if (!(private->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT)) key_free(private); /* We no longer need the challenge. */ BN_clear_free(challenge); /* Wait for response from the server. */ type = packet_read(); if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { debug("RSA authentication accepted by server."); return 1; } if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type); debug("RSA authentication refused."); return 0; } /* * Tries to authenticate the user using combined rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv * authentication and RSA host authentication. */ static int try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(const char *local_user, Key * host_key) { int type; BIGNUM *challenge; debug("Trying rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication."); /* Tell the server that we are willing to authenticate using this key. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA); packet_put_cstring(local_user); packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n)); packet_put_bignum(host_key->rsa->e); packet_put_bignum(host_key->rsa->n); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* Wait for server's response. */ type = packet_read(); /* The server responds with failure if it doesn't admit our .rhosts authentication or doesn't know our host key. */ if (type == SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) { debug("Server refused our rhosts authentication or host key."); return 0; } /* Otherwise, the server should respond with a challenge. */ if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_RSA_CHALLENGE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error during RSA authentication: %d", type); /* Get the challenge from the packet. */ if ((challenge = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("try_rhosts_rsa_authentication: BN_new failed"); packet_get_bignum(challenge); packet_check_eom(); debug("Received RSA challenge for host key from server."); /* Compute a response to the challenge. */ respond_to_rsa_challenge(challenge, host_key->rsa); /* We no longer need the challenge. */ BN_clear_free(challenge); /* Wait for response from the server. */ type = packet_read(); if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) { debug("Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication accepted by server."); return 1; } if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error waiting RSA auth response: %d", type); debug("Rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv with RSA host authentication refused."); return 0; } /* * Tries to authenticate with any string-based challenge/response system. * Note that the client code is not tied to s/key or TIS. */ static int try_challenge_response_authentication(void) { int type, i; u_int clen; char prompt[1024]; char *challenge, *response; debug("Doing challenge response authentication."); for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) { /* request a challenge */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); type = packet_read(); if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE && type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) { packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response " "to SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS", type); } if (type != SSH_SMSG_AUTH_TIS_CHALLENGE) { debug("No challenge."); return 0; } challenge = packet_get_string(&clen); packet_check_eom(); snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt, "%s%s", challenge, strchr(challenge, '\n') ? "" : "\nResponse: "); free(challenge); if (i != 0) error("Permission denied, please try again."); if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE) logit("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! " "Response will be transmitted in clear text."); response = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); if (strcmp(response, "") == 0) { free(response); break; } packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE); ssh_put_password(response); explicit_bzero(response, strlen(response)); free(response); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); type = packet_read(); if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) return 1; if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response " "to SSH_CMSG_AUTH_TIS_RESPONSE", type); } /* failure */ return 0; } /* * Tries to authenticate with plain passwd authentication. */ static int try_password_authentication(char *prompt) { int type, i; char *password; debug("Doing password authentication."); if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NONE) logit("WARNING: Encryption is disabled! Password will be transmitted in clear text."); for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) { if (i != 0) error("Permission denied, please try again."); password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); packet_start(SSH_CMSG_AUTH_PASSWORD); ssh_put_password(password); explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password)); free(password); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); type = packet_read(); if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) return 1; if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to passwd auth", type); } /* failure */ return 0; } /* * SSH1 key exchange */ void ssh_kex(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr) { int i; BIGNUM *key; Key *host_key, *server_key; int bits, rbits; int ssh_cipher_default = SSH_CIPHER_3DES; u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; u_char cookie[8]; u_int supported_ciphers; u_int server_flags, client_flags; u_int32_t rnd = 0; debug("Waiting for server public key."); /* Wait for a public key packet from the server. */ packet_read_expect(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY); /* Get cookie from the packet. */ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) cookie[i] = packet_get_char(); /* Get the public key. */ server_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1); bits = packet_get_int(); packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->e); packet_get_bignum(server_key->rsa->n); rbits = BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n); if (bits != rbits) { logit("Warning: Server lies about size of server public key: " "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits); logit("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh."); } /* Get the host key. */ host_key = key_new(KEY_RSA1); bits = packet_get_int(); packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->e); packet_get_bignum(host_key->rsa->n); rbits = BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n); if (bits != rbits) { logit("Warning: Server lies about size of server host key: " "actual size is %d bits vs. announced %d.", rbits, bits); logit("Warning: This may be due to an old implementation of ssh."); } /* Get protocol flags. */ server_flags = packet_get_int(); packet_set_protocol_flags(server_flags); supported_ciphers = packet_get_int(); supported_authentications = packet_get_int(); packet_check_eom(); debug("Received server public key (%d bits) and host key (%d bits).", BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n)); if (verify_host_key(host, hostaddr, host_key) == -1) fatal("Host key verification failed."); client_flags = SSH_PROTOFLAG_SCREEN_NUMBER | SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN; derive_ssh1_session_id(host_key->rsa->n, server_key->rsa->n, cookie, session_id); /* * Generate an encryption key for the session. The key is a 256 bit * random number, interpreted as a 32-byte key, with the least * significant 8 bits being the first byte of the key. */ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++) { if (i % 4 == 0) rnd = arc4random(); session_key[i] = rnd & 0xff; rnd >>= 8; } /* * According to the protocol spec, the first byte of the session key * is the highest byte of the integer. The session key is xored with * the first 16 bytes of the session id. */ if ((key = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("ssh_kex: BN_new failed"); if (BN_set_word(key, 0) == 0) fatal("ssh_kex: BN_set_word failed"); for (i = 0; i < SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH; i++) { if (BN_lshift(key, key, 8) == 0) fatal("ssh_kex: BN_lshift failed"); if (i < 16) { if (BN_add_word(key, session_key[i] ^ session_id[i]) == 0) fatal("ssh_kex: BN_add_word failed"); } else { if (BN_add_word(key, session_key[i]) == 0) fatal("ssh_kex: BN_add_word failed"); } } /* * Encrypt the integer using the public key and host key of the * server (key with smaller modulus first). */ if (BN_cmp(server_key->rsa->n, host_key->rsa->n) < 0) { /* Public key has smaller modulus. */ if (BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n) < BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: host_key %d < server_key %d + " "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n), SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); } - rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, server_key->rsa); - rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key->rsa); + if (rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, server_key->rsa) != 0 || + rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key->rsa) != 0) + fatal("%s: rsa_public_encrypt failed", __func__); } else { /* Host key has smaller modulus (or they are equal). */ if (BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n) < BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { fatal("respond_to_rsa_challenge: server_key %d < host_key %d + " "SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", BN_num_bits(server_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(host_key->rsa->n), SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); } - rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key->rsa); - rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, server_key->rsa); + if (rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, host_key->rsa) != 0 || + rsa_public_encrypt(key, key, server_key->rsa) != 0) + fatal("%s: rsa_public_encrypt failed", __func__); } /* Destroy the public keys since we no longer need them. */ key_free(server_key); key_free(host_key); if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_NOT_SET) { if (cipher_mask_ssh1(1) & supported_ciphers & (1 << ssh_cipher_default)) options.cipher = ssh_cipher_default; } else if (options.cipher == SSH_CIPHER_INVALID || !(cipher_mask_ssh1(1) & (1 << options.cipher))) { logit("No valid SSH1 cipher, using %.100s instead.", cipher_name(ssh_cipher_default)); options.cipher = ssh_cipher_default; } /* Check that the selected cipher is supported. */ if (!(supported_ciphers & (1 << options.cipher))) fatal("Selected cipher type %.100s not supported by server.", cipher_name(options.cipher)); debug("Encryption type: %.100s", cipher_name(options.cipher)); /* Send the encrypted session key to the server. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY); packet_put_char(options.cipher); /* Send the cookie back to the server. */ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) packet_put_char(cookie[i]); /* Send and destroy the encrypted encryption key integer. */ packet_put_bignum(key); BN_clear_free(key); /* Send protocol flags. */ packet_put_int(client_flags); /* Send the packet now. */ packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); debug("Sent encrypted session key."); /* Set the encryption key. */ packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, options.cipher); /* * We will no longer need the session key here. * Destroy any extra copies. */ explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key)); /* * Expect a success message from the server. Note that this message * will be received in encrypted form. */ packet_read_expect(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS); debug("Received encrypted confirmation."); } /* * Authenticate user */ void ssh_userauth1(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host, Sensitive *sensitive) { int i, type; if (supported_authentications == 0) fatal("ssh_userauth1: server supports no auth methods"); /* Send the name of the user to log in as on the server. */ packet_start(SSH_CMSG_USER); packet_put_cstring(server_user); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); /* * The server should respond with success if no authentication is * needed (the user has no password). Otherwise the server responds * with failure. */ type = packet_read(); /* check whether the connection was accepted without authentication. */ if (type == SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS) goto success; if (type != SSH_SMSG_FAILURE) packet_disconnect("Protocol error: got %d in response to SSH_CMSG_USER", type); /* * Try .rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication with RSA host * authentication. */ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA)) && options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) { for (i = 0; i < sensitive->nkeys; i++) { if (sensitive->keys[i] != NULL && sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 && try_rhosts_rsa_authentication(local_user, sensitive->keys[i])) goto success; } } /* Try RSA authentication if the server supports it. */ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA)) && options.rsa_authentication) { /* * Try RSA authentication using the authentication agent. The * agent is tried first because no passphrase is needed for * it, whereas identity files may require passphrases. */ if (try_agent_authentication()) goto success; /* Try RSA authentication for each identity. */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) if (options.identity_keys[i] != NULL && options.identity_keys[i]->type == KEY_RSA1 && try_rsa_authentication(i)) goto success; } /* Try challenge response authentication if the server supports it. */ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS)) && options.challenge_response_authentication && !options.batch_mode) { if (try_challenge_response_authentication()) goto success; } /* Try password authentication if the server supports it. */ if ((supported_authentications & (1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD)) && options.password_authentication && !options.batch_mode) { char prompt[80]; snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.128s's password: ", server_user, host); if (try_password_authentication(prompt)) goto success; } /* All authentication methods have failed. Exit with an error message. */ fatal("Permission denied."); /* NOTREACHED */ success: return; /* need statement after label */ } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshconnect2.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshconnect2.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshconnect2.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,1672 +1,1675 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.204 2014/02/02 03:44:32 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.210 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS) #include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "buffer.h" #include "packet.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "key.h" #include "kex.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "sshconnect.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "dh.h" #include "authfd.h" #include "log.h" -#include "readconf.h" #include "misc.h" +#include "readconf.h" #include "match.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "msg.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "hostfile.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif /* import */ extern char *client_version_string; extern char *server_version_string; extern Options options; /* * SSH2 key exchange */ u_char *session_id2 = NULL; u_int session_id2_len = 0; char *xxx_host; struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr; Kex *xxx_kex = NULL; static int verify_host_key_callback(Key *hostkey) { if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey) == -1) fatal("Host key verification failed."); return 0; } static char * order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) { char *oavail, *avail, *first, *last, *alg, *hostname, *ret; size_t maxlen; struct hostkeys *hostkeys; int ktype; u_int i; /* Find all hostkeys for this hostname */ get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host, hostaddr, port, &hostname, NULL); hostkeys = init_hostkeys(); for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.user_hostfiles[i]); for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++) load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i]); oavail = avail = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG); maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1; first = xmalloc(maxlen); last = xmalloc(maxlen); *first = *last = '\0'; #define ALG_APPEND(to, from) \ do { \ if (*to != '\0') \ strlcat(to, ",", maxlen); \ strlcat(to, from, maxlen); \ } while (0) while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') { if ((ktype = key_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) fatal("%s: unknown alg %s", __func__, alg); if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, key_type_plain(ktype), NULL)) ALG_APPEND(first, alg); else ALG_APPEND(last, alg); } #undef ALG_APPEND xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", first, *first == '\0' ? "" : ",", last); if (*first != '\0') debug3("%s: prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", __func__, first); free(first); free(last); free(hostname); free(oavail); free_hostkeys(hostkeys); return ret; } void ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port) { + char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT }; Kex *kex; xxx_host = host; xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr; if (options.ciphers == (char *)-1) { logit("No valid ciphers for protocol version 2 given, using defaults."); options.ciphers = NULL; } if (options.ciphers != NULL) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; } myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]); if (options.compression) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "zlib@openssh.com,zlib,none"; } else { myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib"; } if (options.macs != NULL) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; } if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL) myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms); else { /* Prefer algorithms that we already have keys for */ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal( order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port)); } if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL) myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms; myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal( myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]); if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit, (time_t)options.rekey_interval); /* start key exchange */ kex = kex_setup(myproposal); +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_client; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_client; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client; kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_client; +#endif kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_client; kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback; xxx_kex = kex; dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex); if (options.use_roaming && !kex->roaming) { debug("Roaming not allowed by server"); options.use_roaming = 0; } session_id2 = kex->session_id; session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE); packet_put_cstring("markus"); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); #endif } /* * Authenticate user */ typedef struct Authctxt Authctxt; typedef struct Authmethod Authmethod; typedef struct identity Identity; typedef struct idlist Idlist; struct identity { TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next; AuthenticationConnection *ac; /* set if agent supports key */ Key *key; /* public/private key */ char *filename; /* comment for agent-only keys */ int tried; int isprivate; /* key points to the private key */ int userprovided; }; TAILQ_HEAD(idlist, identity); struct Authctxt { const char *server_user; const char *local_user; const char *host; const char *service; Authmethod *method; sig_atomic_t success; char *authlist; /* pubkey */ Idlist keys; AuthenticationConnection *agent; /* hostbased */ Sensitive *sensitive; /* kbd-interactive */ int info_req_seen; /* generic */ void *methoddata; }; struct Authmethod { char *name; /* string to compare against server's list */ int (*userauth)(Authctxt *authctxt); void (*cleanup)(Authctxt *authctxt); int *enabled; /* flag in option struct that enables method */ int *batch_flag; /* flag in option struct that disables method */ }; void input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, void *); void input_userauth_success_unexpected(int, u_int32_t, void *); void input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, void *); void input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, void *); void input_userauth_error(int, u_int32_t, void *); void input_userauth_info_req(int, u_int32_t, void *); void input_userauth_pk_ok(int, u_int32_t, void *); void input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int, u_int32_t, void *); int userauth_none(Authctxt *); int userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *); int userauth_passwd(Authctxt *); int userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *); int userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *); #ifdef GSSAPI int userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt); void input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, void *); void input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, void *); void input_gssapi_hash(int type, u_int32_t, void *); void input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, void *); void input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, void *); #endif void userauth(Authctxt *, char *); static int sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *, Identity *); static void pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *); static void pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *); static Key *load_identity_file(char *, int); static Authmethod *authmethod_get(char *authlist); static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *name); static char *authmethods_get(void); Authmethod authmethods[] = { #ifdef GSSAPI {"gssapi-with-mic", userauth_gssapi, NULL, &options.gss_authentication, NULL}, #endif {"hostbased", userauth_hostbased, NULL, &options.hostbased_authentication, NULL}, {"publickey", userauth_pubkey, NULL, &options.pubkey_authentication, NULL}, {"keyboard-interactive", userauth_kbdint, NULL, &options.kbd_interactive_authentication, &options.batch_mode}, {"password", userauth_passwd, NULL, &options.password_authentication, &options.batch_mode}, {"none", userauth_none, NULL, NULL, NULL}, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL} }; void ssh_userauth2(const char *local_user, const char *server_user, char *host, Sensitive *sensitive) { Authctxt authctxt; int type; if (options.challenge_response_authentication) options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; packet_start(SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring("ssh-userauth"); packet_send(); debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST sent"); packet_write_wait(); type = packet_read(); if (type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT) fatal("Server denied authentication request: %d", type); if (packet_remaining() > 0) { char *reply = packet_get_string(NULL); debug2("service_accept: %s", reply); free(reply); } else { debug2("buggy server: service_accept w/o service"); } packet_check_eom(); debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT received"); if (options.preferred_authentications == NULL) options.preferred_authentications = authmethods_get(); /* setup authentication context */ memset(&authctxt, 0, sizeof(authctxt)); pubkey_prepare(&authctxt); authctxt.server_user = server_user; authctxt.local_user = local_user; authctxt.host = host; authctxt.service = "ssh-connection"; /* service name */ authctxt.success = 0; authctxt.method = authmethod_lookup("none"); authctxt.authlist = NULL; authctxt.methoddata = NULL; authctxt.sensitive = sensitive; authctxt.info_req_seen = 0; if (authctxt.method == NULL) fatal("ssh_userauth2: internal error: cannot send userauth none request"); /* initial userauth request */ userauth_none(&authctxt); dispatch_init(&input_userauth_error); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, &input_userauth_success); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE, &input_userauth_failure); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER, &input_userauth_banner); dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success, &authctxt); /* loop until success */ pubkey_cleanup(&authctxt); dispatch_range(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX, NULL); debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name); } void userauth(Authctxt *authctxt, char *authlist) { if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL) authctxt->method->cleanup(authctxt); free(authctxt->methoddata); authctxt->methoddata = NULL; if (authlist == NULL) { authlist = authctxt->authlist; } else { free(authctxt->authlist); authctxt->authlist = authlist; } for (;;) { Authmethod *method = authmethod_get(authlist); if (method == NULL) fatal("Permission denied (%s).", authlist); authctxt->method = method; /* reset the per method handler */ dispatch_range(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MAX, NULL); /* and try new method */ if (method->userauth(authctxt) != 0) { debug2("we sent a %s packet, wait for reply", method->name); break; } else { debug2("we did not send a packet, disable method"); method->enabled = NULL; } } } /* ARGSUSED */ void input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { fatal("input_userauth_error: bad message during authentication: " "type %d", type); } /* ARGSUSED */ void input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { char *msg, *raw, *lang; u_int len; debug3("input_userauth_banner"); raw = packet_get_string(&len); lang = packet_get_string(NULL); if (len > 0 && options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) { if (len > 65536) len = 65536; msg = xmalloc(len * 4 + 1); /* max expansion from strnvis() */ strnvis(msg, raw, len * 4 + 1, VIS_SAFE|VIS_OCTAL|VIS_NOSLASH); fprintf(stderr, "%s", msg); free(msg); } free(raw); free(lang); } /* ARGSUSED */ void input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_success: no authentication context"); free(authctxt->authlist); authctxt->authlist = NULL; if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL) authctxt->method->cleanup(authctxt); free(authctxt->methoddata); authctxt->methoddata = NULL; authctxt->success = 1; /* break out */ } void input_userauth_success_unexpected(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("%s: no authentication context", __func__); fatal("Unexpected authentication success during %s.", authctxt->method->name); } /* ARGSUSED */ void input_userauth_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; char *authlist = NULL; int partial; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_failure: no authentication context"); authlist = packet_get_string(NULL); partial = packet_get_char(); packet_check_eom(); if (partial != 0) { logit("Authenticated with partial success."); /* reset state */ pubkey_cleanup(authctxt); pubkey_prepare(authctxt); } debug("Authentications that can continue: %s", authlist); userauth(authctxt, authlist); } /* ARGSUSED */ void input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; Key *key = NULL; Identity *id = NULL; Buffer b; int pktype, sent = 0; u_int alen, blen; char *pkalg, *fp; u_char *pkblob; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_pk_ok: no authentication context"); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKOK) { /* this is similar to SSH_BUG_PKAUTH */ debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: SSH_BUG_PKOK"); pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); buffer_init(&b); buffer_append(&b, pkblob, blen); pkalg = buffer_get_string(&b, &alen); buffer_free(&b); } else { pkalg = packet_get_string(&alen); pkblob = packet_get_string(&blen); } packet_check_eom(); debug("Server accepts key: pkalg %s blen %u", pkalg, blen); if ((pktype = key_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) { debug("unknown pkalg %s", pkalg); goto done; } if ((key = key_from_blob(pkblob, blen)) == NULL) { debug("no key from blob. pkalg %s", pkalg); goto done; } if (key->type != pktype) { error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch " "for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)", key->type, pktype); goto done; } fp = key_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); debug2("input_userauth_pk_ok: fp %s", fp); free(fp); /* * search keys in the reverse order, because last candidate has been * moved to the end of the queue. this also avoids confusion by * duplicate keys */ TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(id, &authctxt->keys, idlist, next) { if (key_equal(key, id->key)) { sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(authctxt, id); break; } } done: if (key != NULL) key_free(key); free(pkalg); free(pkblob); /* try another method if we did not send a packet */ if (sent == 0) userauth(authctxt, NULL); } #ifdef GSSAPI int userauth_gssapi(Authctxt *authctxt) { Gssctxt *gssctxt = NULL; static gss_OID_set gss_supported = NULL; static u_int mech = 0; OM_uint32 min; int ok = 0; /* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at * once. */ if (gss_supported == NULL) gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &gss_supported); /* Check to see if the mechanism is usable before we offer it */ while (mech < gss_supported->count && !ok) { /* My DER encoding requires length<128 */ if (gss_supported->elements[mech].length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt, &gss_supported->elements[mech], authctxt->host)) { ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */ } else { mech++; } } if (!ok) return 0; authctxt->methoddata=(void *)gssctxt; packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); packet_put_int(1); packet_put_int((gss_supported->elements[mech].length) + 2); packet_put_char(SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE); packet_put_char(gss_supported->elements[mech].length); packet_put_raw(gss_supported->elements[mech].elements, gss_supported->elements[mech].length); packet_send(); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE, &input_gssapi_response); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR, &input_gssapi_error); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok); mech++; /* Move along to next candidate */ return 1; } static OM_uint32 process_gssapi_token(void *ctxt, gss_buffer_t recv_tok) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc gssbuf; OM_uint32 status, ms, flags; Buffer b; status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds, recv_tok, &send_tok, &flags); if (send_tok.length > 0) { if (GSS_ERROR(status)) packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK); else packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN); packet_put_string(send_tok.value, send_tok.length); packet_send(); gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok); } if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) { /* send either complete or MIC, depending on mechanism */ if (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE); packet_send(); } else { ssh_gssapi_buildmic(&b, authctxt->server_user, authctxt->service, "gssapi-with-mic"); gssbuf.value = buffer_ptr(&b); gssbuf.length = buffer_len(&b); status = ssh_gssapi_sign(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic); if (!GSS_ERROR(status)) { packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC); packet_put_string(mic.value, mic.length); packet_send(); } buffer_free(&b); gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic); } } return status; } /* ARGSUSED */ void input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; int oidlen; char *oidv; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; /* Setup our OID */ oidv = packet_get_string(&oidlen); if (oidlen <= 2 || oidv[0] != SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE || oidv[1] != oidlen - 2) { free(oidv); debug("Badly encoded mechanism OID received"); userauth(authctxt, NULL); return; } if (!ssh_gssapi_check_oid(gssctxt, oidv + 2, oidlen - 2)) fatal("Server returned different OID than expected"); packet_check_eom(); free(oidv); if (GSS_ERROR(process_gssapi_token(ctxt, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER))) { /* Start again with next method on list */ debug("Trying to start again"); userauth(authctxt, NULL); return; } } /* ARGSUSED */ void input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; OM_uint32 status; u_int slen; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&slen); recv_tok.length = slen; /* safe typecast */ packet_check_eom(); status = process_gssapi_token(ctxt, &recv_tok); free(recv_tok.value); if (GSS_ERROR(status)) { /* Start again with the next method in the list */ userauth(authctxt, NULL); return; } } /* ARGSUSED */ void input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; Gssctxt *gssctxt; gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER; gss_buffer_desc recv_tok; OM_uint32 ms; u_int len; if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context"); gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata; recv_tok.value = packet_get_string(&len); recv_tok.length = len; packet_check_eom(); /* Stick it into GSSAPI and see what it says */ (void)ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds, &recv_tok, &send_tok, NULL); free(recv_tok.value); gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok); /* Server will be returning a failed packet after this one */ } /* ARGSUSED */ void input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, void *ctxt) { char *msg; char *lang; /* maj */(void)packet_get_int(); /* min */(void)packet_get_int(); msg=packet_get_string(NULL); lang=packet_get_string(NULL); packet_check_eom(); debug("Server GSSAPI Error:\n%s", msg); free(msg); free(lang); } #endif /* GSSAPI */ int userauth_none(Authctxt *authctxt) { /* initial userauth request */ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); packet_send(); return 1; } int userauth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt) { static int attempt = 0; char prompt[150]; char *password; const char *host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host; if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts) return 0; if (attempt != 1) error("Permission denied, please try again."); snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "%.30s@%.128s's password: ", authctxt->server_user, host); password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); packet_put_char(0); packet_put_cstring(password); explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password)); free(password); packet_add_padding(64); packet_send(); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, &input_userauth_passwd_changereq); return 1; } /* * parse PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, prompt user and send SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST */ /* ARGSUSED */ void input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; char *info, *lang, *password = NULL, *retype = NULL; char prompt[150]; const char *host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host; debug2("input_userauth_passwd_changereq"); if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_passwd_changereq: " "no authentication context"); info = packet_get_string(NULL); lang = packet_get_string(NULL); if (strlen(info) > 0) logit("%s", info); free(info); free(lang); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); packet_put_char(1); /* additional info */ snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter %.30s@%.128s's old password: ", authctxt->server_user, host); password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); packet_put_cstring(password); explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password)); free(password); password = NULL; while (password == NULL) { snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter %.30s@%.128s's new password: ", authctxt->server_user, host); password = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF); if (password == NULL) { /* bail out */ return; } snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Retype %.30s@%.128s's new password: ", authctxt->server_user, host); retype = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); if (strcmp(password, retype) != 0) { explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password)); free(password); logit("Mismatch; try again, EOF to quit."); password = NULL; } explicit_bzero(retype, strlen(retype)); free(retype); } packet_put_cstring(password); explicit_bzero(password, strlen(password)); free(password); packet_add_padding(64); packet_send(); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, &input_userauth_passwd_changereq); } static int identity_sign(Identity *id, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, u_char *data, u_int datalen) { Key *prv; int ret; /* the agent supports this key */ if (id->ac) return (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen)); /* * we have already loaded the private key or * the private key is stored in external hardware */ - if (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT)) + if (id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT)) return (key_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen)); /* load the private key from the file */ if ((prv = load_identity_file(id->filename, id->userprovided)) == NULL) return (-1); ret = key_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen); key_free(prv); return (ret); } static int sign_and_send_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id) { Buffer b; u_char *blob, *signature; u_int bloblen, slen; u_int skip = 0; int ret = -1; int have_sig = 1; char *fp; fp = key_fingerprint(id->key, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX); debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: %s %s", key_type(id->key), fp); free(fp); if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) { /* we cannot handle this key */ debug3("sign_and_send_pubkey: cannot handle key"); return 0; } /* data to be signed */ buffer_init(&b); if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) { buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); skip = session_id2_len; } else { buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); skip = buffer_len(&b); } buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->server_user); buffer_put_cstring(&b, datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" : authctxt->service); if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH) { buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); } else { buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name); buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(id->key)); } buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen); /* generate signature */ ret = identity_sign(id, &signature, &slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)); if (ret == -1) { free(blob); buffer_free(&b); return 0; } #ifdef DEBUG_PK buffer_dump(&b); #endif if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKSERVICE) { buffer_clear(&b); buffer_append(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); skip = session_id2_len; buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->server_user); buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->service); buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name); buffer_put_char(&b, have_sig); if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH)) buffer_put_cstring(&b, key_ssh_name(id->key)); buffer_put_string(&b, blob, bloblen); } free(blob); /* append signature */ buffer_put_string(&b, signature, slen); free(signature); /* skip session id and packet type */ if (buffer_len(&b) < skip + 1) fatal("userauth_pubkey: internal error"); buffer_consume(&b, skip + 1); /* put remaining data from buffer into packet */ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); packet_put_raw(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)); buffer_free(&b); packet_send(); return 1; } static int send_pubkey_test(Authctxt *authctxt, Identity *id) { u_char *blob; u_int bloblen, have_sig = 0; debug3("send_pubkey_test"); if (key_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen) == 0) { /* we cannot handle this key */ debug3("send_pubkey_test: cannot handle key"); return 0; } /* register callback for USERAUTH_PK_OK message */ dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, &input_userauth_pk_ok); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); packet_put_char(have_sig); if (!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_PKAUTH)) packet_put_cstring(key_ssh_name(id->key)); packet_put_string(blob, bloblen); free(blob); packet_send(); return 1; } static Key * load_identity_file(char *filename, int userprovided) { Key *private; char prompt[300], *passphrase; int perm_ok = 0, quit, i; struct stat st; if (stat(filename, &st) < 0) { (userprovided ? logit : debug3)("no such identity: %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno)); return NULL; } private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename, "", NULL, &perm_ok); if (!perm_ok) { if (private != NULL) key_free(private); return NULL; } if (private == NULL) { if (options.batch_mode) return NULL; snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt, "Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ", filename); for (i = 0; i < options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) { passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0); if (strcmp(passphrase, "") != 0) { private = key_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, filename, passphrase, NULL, NULL); quit = 0; } else { debug2("no passphrase given, try next key"); quit = 1; } explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase)); free(passphrase); if (private != NULL || quit) break; debug2("bad passphrase given, try again..."); } } return private; } /* * try keys in the following order: * 1. agent keys that are found in the config file * 2. other agent keys * 3. keys that are only listed in the config file */ static void pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt) { Identity *id, *id2, *tmp; Idlist agent, files, *preferred; Key *key; AuthenticationConnection *ac; char *comment; int i, found; TAILQ_INIT(&agent); /* keys from the agent */ TAILQ_INIT(&files); /* keys from the config file */ preferred = &authctxt->keys; TAILQ_INIT(preferred); /* preferred order of keys */ /* list of keys stored in the filesystem and PKCS#11 */ for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) { key = options.identity_keys[i]; if (key && key->type == KEY_RSA1) continue; if (key && key->cert && key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) continue; options.identity_keys[i] = NULL; id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id)); id->key = key; id->filename = xstrdup(options.identity_files[i]); id->userprovided = options.identity_file_userprovided[i]; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&files, id, next); } /* Prefer PKCS11 keys that are explicitly listed */ TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, &files, next, tmp) { - if (id->key == NULL || (id->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) + if (id->key == NULL || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) continue; found = 0; TAILQ_FOREACH(id2, &files, next) { if (id2->key == NULL || - (id2->key->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0) + (id2->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) continue; if (key_equal(id->key, id2->key)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); found = 1; break; } } /* If IdentitiesOnly set and key not found then don't use it */ if (!found && options.identities_only) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); explicit_bzero(id, sizeof(*id)); free(id); } } /* list of keys supported by the agent */ if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection())) { for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) { found = 0; TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &files, next) { /* agent keys from the config file are preferred */ if (key_equal(key, id->key)) { key_free(key); free(comment); TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); id->ac = ac; found = 1; break; } } if (!found && !options.identities_only) { id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id)); id->key = key; id->filename = comment; id->ac = ac; TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&agent, id, next); } } /* append remaining agent keys */ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&agent, id, next); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); } authctxt->agent = ac; } /* append remaining keys from the config file */ for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next); } TAILQ_FOREACH(id, preferred, next) { debug2("key: %s (%p),%s", id->filename, id->key, id->userprovided ? " explicit" : ""); } } static void pubkey_cleanup(Authctxt *authctxt) { Identity *id; if (authctxt->agent != NULL) ssh_close_authentication_connection(authctxt->agent); for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys)) { TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next); if (id->key) key_free(id->key); free(id->filename); free(id); } } int userauth_pubkey(Authctxt *authctxt) { Identity *id; int sent = 0; while ((id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys))) { if (id->tried++) return (0); /* move key to the end of the queue */ TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next); TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&authctxt->keys, id, next); /* * send a test message if we have the public key. for * encrypted keys we cannot do this and have to load the * private key instead */ if (id->key != NULL) { if (key_type_plain(id->key->type) == KEY_RSA && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { debug("Skipped %s key %s for RSA/MD5 server", key_type(id->key), id->filename); } else if (id->key->type != KEY_RSA1) { debug("Offering %s public key: %s", key_type(id->key), id->filename); sent = send_pubkey_test(authctxt, id); } } else { debug("Trying private key: %s", id->filename); id->key = load_identity_file(id->filename, id->userprovided); if (id->key != NULL) { id->isprivate = 1; if (key_type_plain(id->key->type) == KEY_RSA && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { debug("Skipped %s key %s for RSA/MD5 " "server", key_type(id->key), id->filename); } else { sent = sign_and_send_pubkey( authctxt, id); } key_free(id->key); id->key = NULL; } } if (sent) return (sent); } return (0); } /* * Send userauth request message specifying keyboard-interactive method. */ int userauth_kbdint(Authctxt *authctxt) { static int attempt = 0; if (attempt++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts) return 0; /* disable if no SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST has been seen */ if (attempt > 1 && !authctxt->info_req_seen) { debug3("userauth_kbdint: disable: no info_req_seen"); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, NULL); return 0; } debug2("userauth_kbdint"); packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); packet_put_cstring(""); /* lang */ packet_put_cstring(options.kbd_interactive_devices ? options.kbd_interactive_devices : ""); packet_send(); dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, &input_userauth_info_req); return 1; } /* * parse INFO_REQUEST, prompt user and send INFO_RESPONSE */ void input_userauth_info_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt) { Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt; char *name, *inst, *lang, *prompt, *response; u_int num_prompts, i; int echo = 0; debug2("input_userauth_info_req"); if (authctxt == NULL) fatal("input_userauth_info_req: no authentication context"); authctxt->info_req_seen = 1; name = packet_get_string(NULL); inst = packet_get_string(NULL); lang = packet_get_string(NULL); if (strlen(name) > 0) logit("%s", name); if (strlen(inst) > 0) logit("%s", inst); free(name); free(inst); free(lang); num_prompts = packet_get_int(); /* * Begin to build info response packet based on prompts requested. * We commit to providing the correct number of responses, so if * further on we run into a problem that prevents this, we have to * be sure and clean this up and send a correct error response. */ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE); packet_put_int(num_prompts); debug2("input_userauth_info_req: num_prompts %d", num_prompts); for (i = 0; i < num_prompts; i++) { prompt = packet_get_string(NULL); echo = packet_get_char(); response = read_passphrase(prompt, echo ? RP_ECHO : 0); packet_put_cstring(response); explicit_bzero(response, strlen(response)); free(response); free(prompt); } packet_check_eom(); /* done with parsing incoming message. */ packet_add_padding(64); packet_send(); } static int ssh_keysign(Key *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp, u_char *data, u_int datalen) { Buffer b; struct stat st; pid_t pid; int to[2], from[2], status, version = 2; debug2("ssh_keysign called"); if (stat(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, &st) < 0) { error("ssh_keysign: not installed: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (fflush(stdout) != 0) error("ssh_keysign: fflush: %s", strerror(errno)); if (pipe(to) < 0) { error("ssh_keysign: pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (pipe(from) < 0) { error("ssh_keysign: pipe: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } if ((pid = fork()) < 0) { error("ssh_keysign: fork: %s", strerror(errno)); return -1; } if (pid == 0) { /* keep the socket on exec */ fcntl(packet_get_connection_in(), F_SETFD, 0); permanently_drop_suid(getuid()); close(from[0]); if (dup2(from[1], STDOUT_FILENO) < 0) fatal("ssh_keysign: dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); close(to[1]); if (dup2(to[0], STDIN_FILENO) < 0) fatal("ssh_keysign: dup2: %s", strerror(errno)); close(from[1]); close(to[0]); execl(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, (char *) 0); fatal("ssh_keysign: exec(%s): %s", _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, strerror(errno)); } close(from[1]); close(to[0]); buffer_init(&b); buffer_put_int(&b, packet_get_connection_in()); /* send # of socket */ buffer_put_string(&b, data, datalen); if (ssh_msg_send(to[1], version, &b) == -1) fatal("ssh_keysign: couldn't send request"); if (ssh_msg_recv(from[0], &b) < 0) { error("ssh_keysign: no reply"); buffer_free(&b); return -1; } close(from[0]); close(to[1]); while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) if (errno != EINTR) break; if (buffer_get_char(&b) != version) { error("ssh_keysign: bad version"); buffer_free(&b); return -1; } *sigp = buffer_get_string(&b, lenp); buffer_free(&b); return 0; } int userauth_hostbased(Authctxt *authctxt) { Key *private = NULL; Sensitive *sensitive = authctxt->sensitive; Buffer b; u_char *signature, *blob; char *chost, *pkalg, *p; const char *service; u_int blen, slen; int ok, i, found = 0; /* check for a useful key */ for (i = 0; i < sensitive->nkeys; i++) { private = sensitive->keys[i]; if (private && private->type != KEY_RSA1) { found = 1; /* we take and free the key */ sensitive->keys[i] = NULL; break; } } if (!found) { debug("No more client hostkeys for hostbased authentication."); return 0; } if (key_to_blob(private, &blob, &blen) == 0) { key_free(private); return 0; } /* figure out a name for the client host */ p = get_local_name(packet_get_connection_in()); if (p == NULL) { error("userauth_hostbased: cannot get local ipaddr/name"); key_free(private); free(blob); return 0; } xasprintf(&chost, "%s.", p); debug2("userauth_hostbased: chost %s", chost); free(p); service = datafellows & SSH_BUG_HBSERVICE ? "ssh-userauth" : authctxt->service; pkalg = xstrdup(key_ssh_name(private)); buffer_init(&b); /* construct data */ buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2, session_id2_len); buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->server_user); buffer_put_cstring(&b, service); buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->method->name); buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg); buffer_put_string(&b, blob, blen); buffer_put_cstring(&b, chost); buffer_put_cstring(&b, authctxt->local_user); #ifdef DEBUG_PK buffer_dump(&b); #endif if (sensitive->external_keysign) ok = ssh_keysign(private, &signature, &slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)); else ok = key_sign(private, &signature, &slen, buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b)); key_free(private); buffer_free(&b); if (ok != 0) { error("key_sign failed"); free(chost); free(pkalg); free(blob); return 0; } packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->server_user); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->service); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->method->name); packet_put_cstring(pkalg); packet_put_string(blob, blen); packet_put_cstring(chost); packet_put_cstring(authctxt->local_user); packet_put_string(signature, slen); explicit_bzero(signature, slen); free(signature); free(chost); free(pkalg); free(blob); packet_send(); return 1; } /* find auth method */ /* * given auth method name, if configurable options permit this method fill * in auth_ident field and return true, otherwise return false. */ static int authmethod_is_enabled(Authmethod *method) { if (method == NULL) return 0; /* return false if options indicate this method is disabled */ if (method->enabled == NULL || *method->enabled == 0) return 0; /* return false if batch mode is enabled but method needs interactive mode */ if (method->batch_flag != NULL && *method->batch_flag != 0) return 0; return 1; } static Authmethod * authmethod_lookup(const char *name) { Authmethod *method = NULL; if (name != NULL) for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) if (strcmp(name, method->name) == 0) return method; debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name ? name : "NULL"); return NULL; } /* XXX internal state */ static Authmethod *current = NULL; static char *supported = NULL; static char *preferred = NULL; /* * Given the authentication method list sent by the server, return the * next method we should try. If the server initially sends a nil list, * use a built-in default list. */ static Authmethod * authmethod_get(char *authlist) { char *name = NULL; u_int next; /* Use a suitable default if we're passed a nil list. */ if (authlist == NULL || strlen(authlist) == 0) authlist = options.preferred_authentications; if (supported == NULL || strcmp(authlist, supported) != 0) { debug3("start over, passed a different list %s", authlist); free(supported); supported = xstrdup(authlist); preferred = options.preferred_authentications; debug3("preferred %s", preferred); current = NULL; } else if (current != NULL && authmethod_is_enabled(current)) return current; for (;;) { if ((name = match_list(preferred, supported, &next)) == NULL) { debug("No more authentication methods to try."); current = NULL; return NULL; } preferred += next; debug3("authmethod_lookup %s", name); debug3("remaining preferred: %s", preferred); if ((current = authmethod_lookup(name)) != NULL && authmethod_is_enabled(current)) { debug3("authmethod_is_enabled %s", name); debug("Next authentication method: %s", name); free(name); return current; } free(name); } } static char * authmethods_get(void) { Authmethod *method = NULL; Buffer b; char *list; buffer_init(&b); for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) { if (authmethod_is_enabled(method)) { if (buffer_len(&b) > 0) buffer_append(&b, ",", 1); buffer_append(&b, method->name, strlen(method->name)); } } buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1); list = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b)); buffer_free(&b); return list; } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd.0 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd.0 (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd.0 (revision 276707) @@ -1,643 +1,635 @@ -SSHD(8) OpenBSD System Manager's Manual SSHD(8) +SSHD(8) System Manager's Manual SSHD(8) NAME sshd - OpenSSH SSH daemon SYNOPSIS sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-b bits] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_certificate_file] [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time] [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len] DESCRIPTION sshd (OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for ssh(1). Together these - programs replace rlogin(1) and rsh(1), and provide secure encrypted + programs replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. sshd listens for connections from clients. It is normally started at boot from /etc/rc. It forks a new daemon for each incoming connection. The forked daemons handle key exchange, encryption, authentication, command execution, and data exchange. sshd can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file (by default sshd_config(5)); command-line options override values specified in the configuration file. sshd rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal, SIGHUP, by executing itself with the name and options it was started with, e.g. /usr/sbin/sshd. The options are as follows: -4 Forces sshd to use IPv4 addresses only. -6 Forces sshd to use IPv6 addresses only. -b bits Specifies the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key (default 1024). -C connection_spec Specify the connection parameters to use for the -T extended test mode. If provided, any Match directives in the configuration file that would apply to the specified user, host, and address will be set before the configuration is written to standard output. The connection parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs. The keywords are ``user'', ``host'', ``laddr'', ``lport'', and ``addr''. All are required and may be supplied in any order, either with multiple -C options or as a comma- separated list. -c host_certificate_file Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify sshd during key exchange. The certificate file must match a host key file specified using the -h option or the HostKey configuration directive. -D When this option is specified, sshd will not detach and does not become a daemon. This allows easy monitoring of sshd. -d Debug mode. The server sends verbose debug output to standard error, and does not put itself in the background. The server also will not fork and will only process one connection. This option is only intended for debugging for the server. Multiple -d options increase the debugging level. Maximum is 3. -E log_file Append debug logs to log_file instead of the system log. -e Write debug logs to standard error instead of the system log. -f config_file Specifies the name of the configuration file. The default is /etc/ssh/sshd_config. sshd refuses to start if there is no configuration file. -g login_grace_time Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (default 120 seconds). If the client fails to authenticate the user within this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits. A value of zero indicates no limit. -h host_key_file Specifies a file from which a host key is read. This option must be given if sshd is not run as root (as the normal host key files are normally not readable by anyone but root). The default is /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key for protocol version 1, and /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key. /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key for protocol version 2. It is possible to have multiple host key files for the different protocol versions and host key algorithms. -i Specifies that sshd is being run from inetd(8). sshd is normally not run from inetd because it needs to generate the server key before it can respond to the client, and this may take tens of seconds. Clients would have to wait too long if the key was regenerated every time. However, with small key sizes (e.g. 512) using sshd from inetd may be feasible. -k key_gen_time Specifies how often the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key is regenerated (default 3600 seconds, or one hour). The motivation for regenerating the key fairly often is that the key is not stored anywhere, and after about an hour it becomes impossible to recover the key for decrypting intercepted communications even if the machine is cracked into or physically seized. A value of zero indicates that the key will never be regenerated. -o option Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details of the options, and their values, see sshd_config(5). -p port Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections (default 22). Multiple port options are permitted. Ports specified in the configuration file with the Port option are ignored when a command-line port is specified. Ports specified using the ListenAddress option override command-line ports. -q Quiet mode. Nothing is sent to the system log. Normally the beginning, authentication, and termination of each connection is logged. -T Extended test mode. Check the validity of the configuration file, output the effective configuration to stdout and then exit. Optionally, Match rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more -C options. -t Test mode. Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys. This is useful for updating sshd reliably as configuration options may change. -u len This option is used to specify the size of the field in the utmp structure that holds the remote host name. If the resolved host name is longer than len, the dotted decimal value will be used instead. This allows hosts with very long host names that overflow this field to still be uniquely identified. Specifying -u0 indicates that only dotted decimal addresses should be put into the utmp file. -u0 may also be used to prevent sshd from making DNS requests unless the authentication mechanism or configuration requires it. Authentication mechanisms that may require DNS include RhostsRSAAuthentication, HostbasedAuthentication, and using a from="pattern-list" option in a key file. Configuration options that require DNS include using a USER@HOST pattern in AllowUsers or DenyUsers. AUTHENTICATION The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocols 1 and 2. The default is to use protocol 2 only, though this can be changed via the Protocol option in sshd_config(5). Protocol 2 supports DSA, ECDSA, ED25519 and RSA keys; protocol 1 only supports RSA keys. For both protocols, each host has a host-specific key, normally 2048 bits, used to identify the host. Forward security for protocol 1 is provided through an additional server key, normally 768 bits, generated when the server starts. This key is normally regenerated every hour if it has been used, and is never stored on disk. Whenever a client connects, the daemon responds with its public host and server keys. The client compares the RSA host key against its own database to verify that it has not changed. The client then generates a 256-bit random number. It encrypts this random number using both the host key and the server key, and sends the encrypted number to the server. Both sides then use this random number as a session key which is used to encrypt all further communications in the session. The rest of the session is encrypted using a conventional cipher, currently Blowfish or 3DES, with 3DES being used by default. The client selects the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the server. For protocol 2, forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement. This key agreement results in a shared session key. The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher, currently 128-bit AES, Blowfish, 3DES, CAST128, Arcfour, 192-bit AES, or 256-bit AES. The client selects the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the server. Additionally, session integrity is provided through a cryptographic message authentication code (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64, umac-128, hmac-ripemd160, hmac-sha2-256 or hmac-sha2-512). Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog. The client tries to authenticate itself using host-based authentication, public key authentication, challenge-response authentication, or password authentication. Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to ensure that it is accessible. An account is not accessible if it is locked, listed in DenyUsers or its group is listed in DenyGroups . The definition of a locked account is system dependant. Some platforms have their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field ( `*LK*' on Solaris and UnixWare, `*' on HP-UX, containing `Nologin' on Tru64, a leading `*LOCKED*' on FreeBSD and a leading `!' on most Linuxes). If there is a requirement to disable password authentication for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field should be set to something other than these values (eg `NP' or `*NP*' ). If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for preparing the session is entered. At this time the client may request things like allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections, forwarding TCP connections, or forwarding the authentication agent connection over the secure channel. After this, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command. The sides then enter session mode. In this mode, either side may send data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or command on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side. When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to the client, and both sides exit. LOGIN PROCESS When a user successfully logs in, sshd does the following: 1. If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified, prints last login time and /etc/motd (unless prevented in the configuration file or by ~/.hushlogin; see the FILES section). 2. If the login is on a tty, records login time. 3. Checks /etc/nologin; if it exists, prints contents and quits (unless root). 4. Changes to run with normal user privileges. 5. Sets up basic environment. 6. Reads the file ~/.ssh/environment, if it exists, and users are allowed to change their environment. See the PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5). 7. Changes to user's home directory. - 8. If ~/.ssh/rc exists, runs it; else if /etc/ssh/sshrc exists, - runs it; otherwise runs xauth. The ``rc'' files are given the - X11 authentication protocol and cookie in standard input. See + 8. If ~/.ssh/rc exists and the sshd_config(5) PermitUserRC option + is set, runs it; else if /etc/ssh/sshrc exists, runs it; + otherwise runs xauth. The ``rc'' files are given the X11 + authentication protocol and cookie in standard input. See SSHRC, below. 9. Runs user's shell or command. SSHRC If the file ~/.ssh/rc exists, sh(1) runs it after reading the environment files but before starting the user's shell or command. It must not produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used instead. If X11 forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in its standard input (and DISPLAY in its environment). The script must call xauth(1) because sshd will not run xauth automatically to add X11 cookies. The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environment. This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by something similar to: if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then # X11UseLocalhost=yes echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY | cut -c11-` $proto $cookie else # X11UseLocalhost=no echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie fi | xauth -q - fi If this file does not exist, /etc/ssh/sshrc is run, and if that does not exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie. AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT AuthorizedKeysFile specifies the files containing public keys for public key authentication; if none is specified, the default is ~/.ssh/authorized_keys and ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2. Each line of the file contains one key (empty lines and lines starting with a `#' are ignored as comments). Protocol 1 public keys consist of the following space-separated fields: options, bits, exponent, modulus, comment. Protocol 2 public key consist of: options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment. The options field is optional; its presence is determined by whether the line starts with a number or not (the options field never starts with a number). The bits, exponent, modulus, and comment fields give the RSA key for protocol version 1; the comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the user to identify the key). For protocol version 2 the keytype is ``ecdsa-sha2-nistp256'', ``ecdsa-sha2-nistp384'', ``ecdsa-sha2-nistp521'', ``ssh-ed25519'', ``ssh-dss'' or ``ssh-rsa''. Note that lines in this file are usually several hundred bytes long (because of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of 8 kilobytes, which permits DSA keys up to 8 kilobits and RSA keys up to 16 kilobits. You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the identity.pub, id_dsa.pub, id_ecdsa.pub, id_ed25519.pub, or the id_rsa.pub file and edit it. sshd enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size for protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys of 768 bits. The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option specifications. No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes. The following option specifications are supported (note that option keywords are case-insensitive): cert-authority Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA) that is trusted to validate signed certificates for user authentication. Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key options. If both certificate restrictions and key options are present, the most restrictive union of the two is applied. command="command" Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for authentication. The command supplied by the user (if any) is ignored. The command is run on a pty if the client requests a pty; otherwise it is run without a tty. If an 8-bit clean channel is required, one must not request a pty or should specify no-pty. A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash. This option might be useful to restrict certain public keys to perform just a specific operation. An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else. Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11 forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited. The command originally supplied by the client is available in the SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution. Also note that this command may be superseded by either a sshd_config(5) ForceCommand directive or a command embedded in a certificate. environment="NAME=value" Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when logging in using this key. Environment variables set this way override other default environment values. Multiple options of this type are permitted. Environment processing is disabled by default and is controlled via the PermitUserEnvironment option. This option is automatically disabled if UseLogin is enabled. from="pattern-list" Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either the canonical name of the remote host or its IP address must be present in the comma-separated list of patterns. See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns. In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to hostnames or addresses, a from stanza may match IP addresses using CIDR address/masklen notation. The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security: public key authentication by itself does not trust the network or name servers or anything (but the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world. This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to just the key). no-agent-forwarding Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for authentication. no-port-forwarding Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication. Any port forward requests by the client will return an error. This might be used, e.g. in connection with the command option. no-pty Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail). no-user-rc Disables execution of ~/.ssh/rc. no-X11-forwarding Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication. Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error. permitopen="host:port" Limit local ``ssh -L'' port forwarding such that it may only connect to the specified host and port. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Multiple permitopen options may be applied separated by commas. No pattern matching is performed on the specified hostnames, they must be literal domains or addresses. A port specification of * matches any port. principals="principals" On a cert-authority line, specifies allowed principals for certificate authentication as a comma-separated list. At least one name from the list must appear in the certificate's list of principals for the certificate to be accepted. This option is ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate signers using the cert-authority option. tunnel="n" Force a tun(4) device on the server. Without this option, the next available device will be used if the client requests a tunnel. An example authorized_keys file: # Comments allowed at start of line ssh-rsa AAAAB3Nza...LiPk== user@example.net from="*.sales.example.net,!pc.sales.example.net" ssh-rsa AAAAB2...19Q== john@example.net command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding ssh-dss AAAAC3...51R== example.net permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-dss AAAAB5...21S== tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa AAAA...== jane@example.net SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT The /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and ~/.ssh/known_hosts files contain host public keys for all known hosts. The global file should be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is maintained automatically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host, its key is added to the per-user file. Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers (optional), hostnames, bits, exponent, modulus, comment. The fields are separated by spaces. The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of ``@cert-authority'', to indicate that the line contains a certification authority (CA) key, or ``@revoked'', to indicate that the key contained on the line is revoked and must not ever be accepted. Only one marker should be used on a key line. Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns (`*' and `?' act as wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the canonical host name (when authenticating a client) or against the user-supplied name (when authenticating a server). A pattern may also be preceded by `!' to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it matched another pattern on the line. A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within `[' and `]' brackets then followed by `:' and a non-standard port number. Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host names and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed. Hashed hostnames start with a `|' character. Only one hashed hostname may appear on a single line and none of the above negation or wildcard operators may be applied. Bits, exponent, and modulus are taken directly from the RSA host key; they can be obtained, for example, from /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub. The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used. Lines starting with `#' and empty lines are ignored as comments. When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or, if the server has presented a certificate for authentication, the key of the certification authority that signed the certificate. For a key to be trusted as a certification authority, it must use the ``@cert-authority'' marker described above. The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked, for example when it is known that the associated private key has been stolen. Revoked keys are specified by including the ``@revoked'' marker at the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for authentication or as certification authorities, but instead will produce a warning from ssh(1) when they are encountered. It is permissible (but not recommended) to have several lines or different host keys for the same names. This will inevitably happen when short forms of host names from different domains are put in the file. It is possible that the files contain conflicting information; authentication is accepted if valid information can be found from either file. Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand. Rather, generate them by a script, ssh-keyscan(1) or by taking /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub and adding the host names at the front. ssh-keygen(1) also offers some basic automated editing for ~/.ssh/known_hosts including removing hosts matching a host name and converting all host names to their hashed representations. An example ssh_known_hosts file: # Comments allowed at start of line closenet,...,192.0.2.53 1024 37 159...93 closenet.example.net cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....= # A hashed hostname |1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....= # A revoked key @revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... # A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org @cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... FILES ~/.hushlogin This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and /etc/motd, if PrintLastLog and PrintMotd, respectively, are enabled. It does not suppress printing of the banner specified by Banner. ~/.rhosts This file is used for host-based authentication (see ssh(1) for more information). On some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because sshd reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. ~/.shosts This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. ~/.ssh/ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration and authentication information. There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user, and not accessible by others. ~/.ssh/authorized_keys Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, ED25519, RSA) that can be used for logging in as this user. The format of this file is described above. The content of the file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. If this file, the ~/.ssh directory, or the user's home directory are writable by other users, then the file could be modified or replaced by unauthorized users. In this case, sshd will not allow it to be used unless the StrictModes option has been set to ``no''. ~/.ssh/environment This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists). It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with `#'), and assignment lines of the form name=value. The file should be writable only by the user; it need not be readable by anyone else. Environment processing is disabled by default and is controlled via the PermitUserEnvironment option. ~/.ssh/known_hosts Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys. The format of this file is described above. This file should be writable only by root/the owner and can, but need not be, world-readable. ~/.ssh/rc Contains initialization routines to be run before the user's home directory becomes accessible. This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be readable by anyone else. - /etc/hosts.allow - /etc/hosts.deny - Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are - defined here. Further details are described in hosts_access(5). - /etc/hosts.equiv This file is for host-based authentication (see ssh(1)). It should only be writable by root. /etc/moduli Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange". The file format is described in moduli(5). /etc/motd See motd(5). /etc/nologin If this file exists, sshd refuses to let anyone except root log in. The contents of the file are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are refused. The file should be world-readable. /etc/shosts.equiv This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key These files contain the private parts of the host keys. These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not accessible to others. Note that sshd does not start if these files are group/world-accessible. /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub These files contain the public parts of the host keys. These files should be world-readable but writable only by root. Their contents should match the respective private parts. These files are not really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files. These files are created using ssh-keygen(1). /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the organization. The format of this file is described above. This file should be writable only by root/the owner and should be world-readable. /etc/ssh/sshd_config Contains configuration data for sshd. The file format and configuration options are described in sshd_config(5). /etc/ssh/sshrc Similar to ~/.ssh/rc, it can be used to specify machine-specific login-time initializations globally. This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable. /var/empty chroot(2) directory used by sshd during privilege separation in the pre-authentication phase. The directory should not contain any files and must be owned by root and not group or world- writable. /var/run/sshd.pid Contains the process ID of the sshd listening for connections (if there are several daemons running concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one started last). The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world- readable. SEE ALSO scp(1), sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), - ssh-keyscan(1), chroot(2), hosts_access(5), login.conf(5), moduli(5), - sshd_config(5), inetd(8), sftp-server(8) + ssh-keyscan(1), chroot(2), login.conf(5), moduli(5), sshd_config(5), + inetd(8), sftp-server(8) AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support for privilege separation. -CAVEATS - System security is not improved unless rshd, rlogind, and rexecd are - disabled (thus completely disabling rlogin and rsh into the machine). - -OpenBSD 5.5 December 7, 2013 OpenBSD 5.5 +OpenBSD 5.6 July 3, 2014 OpenBSD 5.6 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd.8 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd.8 (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd.8 (revision 276707) @@ -1,990 +1,972 @@ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.273 2013/12/07 11:58:46 naddy Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: December 7 2013 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.276 2014/07/03 22:40:43 djm Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: July 3 2014 $ .Dt SSHD 8 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm sshd .Nd OpenSSH SSH daemon .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm sshd .Bk -words .Op Fl 46DdeiqTt .Op Fl b Ar bits .Op Fl C Ar connection_spec .Op Fl c Ar host_certificate_file .Op Fl E Ar log_file .Op Fl f Ar config_file .Op Fl g Ar login_grace_time .Op Fl h Ar host_key_file .Op Fl k Ar key_gen_time .Op Fl o Ar option .Op Fl p Ar port .Op Fl u Ar len .Ek .Sh DESCRIPTION .Nm (OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for .Xr ssh 1 . -Together these programs replace -.Xr rlogin 1 -and -.Xr rsh 1 , +Together these programs replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. .Pp .Nm listens for connections from clients. It is normally started at boot from .Pa /etc/rc . It forks a new daemon for each incoming connection. The forked daemons handle key exchange, encryption, authentication, command execution, and data exchange. .Pp .Nm can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file (by default .Xr sshd_config 5 ) ; command-line options override values specified in the configuration file. .Nm rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal, .Dv SIGHUP , by executing itself with the name and options it was started with, e.g.\& .Pa /usr/sbin/sshd . .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Fl 4 Forces .Nm to use IPv4 addresses only. .It Fl 6 Forces .Nm to use IPv6 addresses only. .It Fl b Ar bits Specifies the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key (default 1024). .It Fl C Ar connection_spec Specify the connection parameters to use for the .Fl T extended test mode. If provided, any .Cm Match directives in the configuration file that would apply to the specified user, host, and address will be set before the configuration is written to standard output. The connection parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs. The keywords are .Dq user , .Dq host , .Dq laddr , .Dq lport , and .Dq addr . All are required and may be supplied in any order, either with multiple .Fl C options or as a comma-separated list. .It Fl c Ar host_certificate_file Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify .Nm during key exchange. The certificate file must match a host key file specified using the .Fl h option or the .Cm HostKey configuration directive. .It Fl D When this option is specified, .Nm will not detach and does not become a daemon. This allows easy monitoring of .Nm sshd . .It Fl d Debug mode. The server sends verbose debug output to standard error, and does not put itself in the background. The server also will not fork and will only process one connection. This option is only intended for debugging for the server. Multiple .Fl d options increase the debugging level. Maximum is 3. .It Fl E Ar log_file Append debug logs to .Ar log_file instead of the system log. .It Fl e Write debug logs to standard error instead of the system log. .It Fl f Ar config_file Specifies the name of the configuration file. The default is .Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config . .Nm refuses to start if there is no configuration file. .It Fl g Ar login_grace_time Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (default 120 seconds). If the client fails to authenticate the user within this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits. A value of zero indicates no limit. .It Fl h Ar host_key_file Specifies a file from which a host key is read. This option must be given if .Nm is not run as root (as the normal host key files are normally not readable by anyone but root). The default is .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key for protocol version 1, and .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key , .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key . .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key for protocol version 2. It is possible to have multiple host key files for the different protocol versions and host key algorithms. .It Fl i Specifies that .Nm is being run from .Xr inetd 8 . .Nm is normally not run from inetd because it needs to generate the server key before it can respond to the client, and this may take tens of seconds. Clients would have to wait too long if the key was regenerated every time. However, with small key sizes (e.g. 512) using .Nm from inetd may be feasible. .It Fl k Ar key_gen_time Specifies how often the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key is regenerated (default 3600 seconds, or one hour). The motivation for regenerating the key fairly often is that the key is not stored anywhere, and after about an hour it becomes impossible to recover the key for decrypting intercepted communications even if the machine is cracked into or physically seized. A value of zero indicates that the key will never be regenerated. .It Fl o Ar option Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details of the options, and their values, see .Xr sshd_config 5 . .It Fl p Ar port Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections (default 22). Multiple port options are permitted. Ports specified in the configuration file with the .Cm Port option are ignored when a command-line port is specified. Ports specified using the .Cm ListenAddress option override command-line ports. .It Fl q Quiet mode. Nothing is sent to the system log. Normally the beginning, authentication, and termination of each connection is logged. .It Fl T Extended test mode. Check the validity of the configuration file, output the effective configuration to stdout and then exit. Optionally, .Cm Match rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more .Fl C options. .It Fl t Test mode. Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys. This is useful for updating .Nm reliably as configuration options may change. .It Fl u Ar len This option is used to specify the size of the field in the .Li utmp structure that holds the remote host name. If the resolved host name is longer than .Ar len , the dotted decimal value will be used instead. This allows hosts with very long host names that overflow this field to still be uniquely identified. Specifying .Fl u0 indicates that only dotted decimal addresses should be put into the .Pa utmp file. .Fl u0 may also be used to prevent .Nm from making DNS requests unless the authentication mechanism or configuration requires it. Authentication mechanisms that may require DNS include .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication , .Cm HostbasedAuthentication , and using a .Cm from="pattern-list" option in a key file. Configuration options that require DNS include using a USER@HOST pattern in .Cm AllowUsers or .Cm DenyUsers . .El .Sh AUTHENTICATION The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocols 1 and 2. The default is to use protocol 2 only, though this can be changed via the .Cm Protocol option in .Xr sshd_config 5 . Protocol 2 supports DSA, ECDSA, ED25519 and RSA keys; protocol 1 only supports RSA keys. For both protocols, each host has a host-specific key, normally 2048 bits, used to identify the host. .Pp Forward security for protocol 1 is provided through an additional server key, normally 768 bits, generated when the server starts. This key is normally regenerated every hour if it has been used, and is never stored on disk. Whenever a client connects, the daemon responds with its public host and server keys. The client compares the RSA host key against its own database to verify that it has not changed. The client then generates a 256-bit random number. It encrypts this random number using both the host key and the server key, and sends the encrypted number to the server. Both sides then use this random number as a session key which is used to encrypt all further communications in the session. The rest of the session is encrypted using a conventional cipher, currently Blowfish or 3DES, with 3DES being used by default. The client selects the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the server. .Pp For protocol 2, forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement. This key agreement results in a shared session key. The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher, currently 128-bit AES, Blowfish, 3DES, CAST128, Arcfour, 192-bit AES, or 256-bit AES. The client selects the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the server. Additionally, session integrity is provided through a cryptographic message authentication code (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64, umac-128, hmac-ripemd160, hmac-sha2-256 or hmac-sha2-512). .Pp Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog. The client tries to authenticate itself using host-based authentication, public key authentication, challenge-response authentication, or password authentication. .Pp Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to ensure that it is accessible. An account is not accessible if it is locked, listed in .Cm DenyUsers or its group is listed in .Cm DenyGroups \&. The definition of a locked account is system dependant. Some platforms have their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field ( .Ql \&*LK\&* on Solaris and UnixWare, .Ql \&* on HP-UX, containing .Ql Nologin on Tru64, a leading .Ql \&*LOCKED\&* on FreeBSD and a leading .Ql \&! on most Linuxes). If there is a requirement to disable password authentication for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field should be set to something other than these values (eg .Ql NP or .Ql \&*NP\&* ). .Pp If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for preparing the session is entered. At this time the client may request things like allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections, forwarding TCP connections, or forwarding the authentication agent connection over the secure channel. .Pp After this, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command. The sides then enter session mode. In this mode, either side may send data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or command on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side. .Pp When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to the client, and both sides exit. .Sh LOGIN PROCESS When a user successfully logs in, .Nm does the following: .Bl -enum -offset indent .It If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified, prints last login time and .Pa /etc/motd (unless prevented in the configuration file or by .Pa ~/.hushlogin ; see the .Sx FILES section). .It If the login is on a tty, records login time. .It Checks .Pa /etc/nologin ; if it exists, prints contents and quits (unless root). .It Changes to run with normal user privileges. .It Sets up basic environment. .It Reads the file .Pa ~/.ssh/environment , if it exists, and users are allowed to change their environment. See the .Cm PermitUserEnvironment option in .Xr sshd_config 5 . .It Changes to user's home directory. .It If .Pa ~/.ssh/rc -exists, runs it; else if +exists and the +.Xr sshd_config 5 +.Cm PermitUserRC +option is set, runs it; else if .Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc exists, runs it; otherwise runs xauth. The .Dq rc files are given the X11 authentication protocol and cookie in standard input. See .Sx SSHRC , below. .It Runs user's shell or command. .El .Sh SSHRC If the file .Pa ~/.ssh/rc exists, .Xr sh 1 runs it after reading the environment files but before starting the user's shell or command. It must not produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used instead. If X11 forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in its standard input (and .Ev DISPLAY in its environment). The script must call .Xr xauth 1 because .Nm will not run xauth automatically to add X11 cookies. .Pp The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environment. .Pp This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by something similar to: .Bd -literal -offset 3n if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then # X11UseLocalhost=yes echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY | cut -c11-` $proto $cookie else # X11UseLocalhost=no echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie fi | xauth -q - fi .Ed .Pp If this file does not exist, .Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc is run, and if that does not exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie. .Sh AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile specifies the files containing public keys for public key authentication; if none is specified, the default is .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys and .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2 . Each line of the file contains one key (empty lines and lines starting with a .Ql # are ignored as comments). Protocol 1 public keys consist of the following space-separated fields: options, bits, exponent, modulus, comment. Protocol 2 public key consist of: options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment. The options field is optional; its presence is determined by whether the line starts with a number or not (the options field never starts with a number). The bits, exponent, modulus, and comment fields give the RSA key for protocol version 1; the comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the user to identify the key). For protocol version 2 the keytype is .Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 , .Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 , .Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 , .Dq ssh-ed25519 , .Dq ssh-dss or .Dq ssh-rsa . .Pp Note that lines in this file are usually several hundred bytes long (because of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of 8 kilobytes, which permits DSA keys up to 8 kilobits and RSA keys up to 16 kilobits. You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the .Pa identity.pub , .Pa id_dsa.pub , .Pa id_ecdsa.pub , .Pa id_ed25519.pub , or the .Pa id_rsa.pub file and edit it. .Pp .Nm enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size for protocol 1 and protocol 2 keys of 768 bits. .Pp The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option specifications. No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes. The following option specifications are supported (note that option keywords are case-insensitive): .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm cert-authority Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA) that is trusted to validate signed certificates for user authentication. .Pp Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key options. If both certificate restrictions and key options are present, the most restrictive union of the two is applied. .It Cm command="command" Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for authentication. The command supplied by the user (if any) is ignored. The command is run on a pty if the client requests a pty; otherwise it is run without a tty. If an 8-bit clean channel is required, one must not request a pty or should specify .Cm no-pty . A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash. This option might be useful to restrict certain public keys to perform just a specific operation. An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else. Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11 forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited. The command originally supplied by the client is available in the .Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution. Also note that this command may be superseded by either a .Xr sshd_config 5 .Cm ForceCommand directive or a command embedded in a certificate. .It Cm environment="NAME=value" Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when logging in using this key. Environment variables set this way override other default environment values. Multiple options of this type are permitted. Environment processing is disabled by default and is controlled via the .Cm PermitUserEnvironment option. This option is automatically disabled if .Cm UseLogin is enabled. .It Cm from="pattern-list" Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either the canonical name of the remote host or its IP address must be present in the comma-separated list of patterns. See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .Pp In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to hostnames or addresses, a .Cm from stanza may match IP addresses using CIDR address/masklen notation. .Pp The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security: public key authentication by itself does not trust the network or name servers or anything (but the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world. This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to just the key). .It Cm no-agent-forwarding Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for authentication. .It Cm no-port-forwarding Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication. Any port forward requests by the client will return an error. This might be used, e.g. in connection with the .Cm command option. .It Cm no-pty Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail). .It Cm no-user-rc Disables execution of .Pa ~/.ssh/rc . .It Cm no-X11-forwarding Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication. Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error. .It Cm permitopen="host:port" Limit local .Li ``ssh -L'' port forwarding such that it may only connect to the specified host and port. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets. Multiple .Cm permitopen options may be applied separated by commas. No pattern matching is performed on the specified hostnames, they must be literal domains or addresses. A port specification of .Cm * matches any port. .It Cm principals="principals" On a .Cm cert-authority line, specifies allowed principals for certificate authentication as a comma-separated list. At least one name from the list must appear in the certificate's list of principals for the certificate to be accepted. This option is ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate signers using the .Cm cert-authority option. .It Cm tunnel="n" Force a .Xr tun 4 device on the server. Without this option, the next available device will be used if the client requests a tunnel. .El .Pp An example authorized_keys file: .Bd -literal -offset 3n # Comments allowed at start of line ssh-rsa AAAAB3Nza...LiPk== user@example.net from="*.sales.example.net,!pc.sales.example.net" ssh-rsa AAAAB2...19Q== john@example.net command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding ssh-dss AAAAC3...51R== example.net permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-dss AAAAB5...21S== tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa AAAA...== jane@example.net .Ed .Sh SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT The .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts files contain host public keys for all known hosts. The global file should be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is maintained automatically: whenever the user connects from an unknown host, its key is added to the per-user file. .Pp Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers (optional), hostnames, bits, exponent, modulus, comment. The fields are separated by spaces. .Pp The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of .Dq @cert-authority , to indicate that the line contains a certification authority (CA) key, or .Dq @revoked , to indicate that the key contained on the line is revoked and must not ever be accepted. Only one marker should be used on a key line. .Pp Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns .Pf ( Ql * and .Ql \&? act as wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the canonical host name (when authenticating a client) or against the user-supplied name (when authenticating a server). A pattern may also be preceded by .Ql \&! to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it matched another pattern on the line. A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within .Ql \&[ and .Ql \&] brackets then followed by .Ql \&: and a non-standard port number. .Pp Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host names and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed. Hashed hostnames start with a .Ql | character. Only one hashed hostname may appear on a single line and none of the above negation or wildcard operators may be applied. .Pp Bits, exponent, and modulus are taken directly from the RSA host key; they can be obtained, for example, from .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub . The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used. .Pp Lines starting with .Ql # and empty lines are ignored as comments. .Pp When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or, if the server has presented a certificate for authentication, the key of the certification authority that signed the certificate. For a key to be trusted as a certification authority, it must use the .Dq @cert-authority marker described above. .Pp The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked, for example when it is known that the associated private key has been stolen. Revoked keys are specified by including the .Dq @revoked marker at the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for authentication or as certification authorities, but instead will produce a warning from .Xr ssh 1 when they are encountered. .Pp It is permissible (but not recommended) to have several lines or different host keys for the same names. This will inevitably happen when short forms of host names from different domains are put in the file. It is possible that the files contain conflicting information; authentication is accepted if valid information can be found from either file. .Pp Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand. Rather, generate them by a script, .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 or by taking .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub and adding the host names at the front. .Xr ssh-keygen 1 also offers some basic automated editing for .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts including removing hosts matching a host name and converting all host names to their hashed representations. .Pp An example ssh_known_hosts file: .Bd -literal -offset 3n # Comments allowed at start of line closenet,...,192.0.2.53 1024 37 159...93 closenet.example.net cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....= # A hashed hostname |1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....= # A revoked key @revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... # A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org @cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W... .Ed .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact .It Pa ~/.hushlogin This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and .Pa /etc/motd , if .Cm PrintLastLog and .Cm PrintMotd , respectively, are enabled. It does not suppress printing of the banner specified by .Cm Banner . .Pp .It Pa ~/.rhosts This file is used for host-based authentication (see .Xr ssh 1 for more information). On some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because .Nm reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.shosts This file is used in exactly the same way as .Pa .rhosts , but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/ This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration and authentication information. There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, ED25519, RSA) that can be used for logging in as this user. The format of this file is described above. The content of the file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others. .Pp If this file, the .Pa ~/.ssh directory, or the user's home directory are writable by other users, then the file could be modified or replaced by unauthorized users. In this case, .Nm will not allow it to be used unless the .Cm StrictModes option has been set to .Dq no . .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/environment This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists). It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with .Ql # ) , and assignment lines of the form name=value. The file should be writable only by the user; it need not be readable by anyone else. Environment processing is disabled by default and is controlled via the .Cm PermitUserEnvironment option. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys. The format of this file is described above. This file should be writable only by root/the owner and can, but need not be, world-readable. .Pp .It Pa ~/.ssh/rc Contains initialization routines to be run before the user's home directory becomes accessible. This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be readable by anyone else. .Pp -.It Pa /etc/hosts.allow -.It Pa /etc/hosts.deny -Access controls that should be enforced by tcp-wrappers are defined here. -Further details are described in -.Xr hosts_access 5 . -.Pp .It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv This file is for host-based authentication (see .Xr ssh 1 ) . It should only be writable by root. .Pp .It Pa /etc/moduli Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange". The file format is described in .Xr moduli 5 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/motd See .Xr motd 5 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/nologin If this file exists, .Nm refuses to let anyone except root log in. The contents of the file are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are refused. The file should be world-readable. .Pp .It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv This file is used in exactly the same way as .Pa hosts.equiv , but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with rlogin/rsh. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key These files contain the private parts of the host keys. These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not accessible to others. Note that .Nm does not start if these files are group/world-accessible. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub These files contain the public parts of the host keys. These files should be world-readable but writable only by root. Their contents should match the respective private parts. These files are not really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files. These files are created using .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the organization. The format of this file is described above. This file should be writable only by root/the owner and should be world-readable. .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config Contains configuration data for .Nm sshd . The file format and configuration options are described in .Xr sshd_config 5 . .Pp .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc Similar to .Pa ~/.ssh/rc , it can be used to specify machine-specific login-time initializations globally. This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable. .Pp .It Pa /var/empty .Xr chroot 2 directory used by .Nm during privilege separation in the pre-authentication phase. The directory should not contain any files and must be owned by root and not group or world-writable. .Pp .It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid Contains the process ID of the .Nm listening for connections (if there are several daemons running concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one started last). The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr scp 1 , .Xr sftp 1 , .Xr ssh 1 , .Xr ssh-add 1 , .Xr ssh-agent 1 , .Xr ssh-keygen 1 , .Xr ssh-keyscan 1 , .Xr chroot 2 , -.Xr hosts_access 5 , .Xr login.conf 5 , .Xr moduli 5 , .Xr sshd_config 5 , .Xr inetd 8 , .Xr sftp-server 8 .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support for privilege separation. -.Sh CAVEATS -System security is not improved unless -.Nm rshd , -.Nm rlogind , -and -.Nm rexecd -are disabled (thus completely disabling -.Xr rlogin -and -.Xr rsh -into the machine). Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,2528 +1,2541 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.420 2014/02/26 21:53:37 markus Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.428 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients, * and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards * information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted * connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and * authentication agent connections. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * SSH2 implementation: * Privilege Separation: * * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H # include #endif #ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H # include #endif #include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h" #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h" #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H #include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include #include #include #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" +#endif #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE #include #include #endif #include "xmalloc.h" #include "ssh.h" #include "ssh1.h" #include "ssh2.h" #include "rsa.h" #include "sshpty.h" #include "packet.h" #include "log.h" #include "buffer.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" #include "uidswap.h" #include "compat.h" #include "cipher.h" #include "digest.h" #include "key.h" #include "kex.h" -#include "dh.h" #include "myproposal.h" #include "authfile.h" #include "pathnames.h" #include "atomicio.h" #include "canohost.h" #include "hostfile.h" #include "auth.h" #include "authfd.h" -#include "misc.h" #include "msg.h" #include "dispatch.h" #include "channels.h" #include "session.h" #include "monitor_mm.h" #include "monitor.h" #ifdef GSSAPI #include "ssh-gss.h" #endif #include "monitor_wrap.h" #include "roaming.h" #include "ssh-sandbox.h" #include "version.h" -#ifdef LIBWRAP -#include -#include -int allow_severity; -int deny_severity; -#endif /* LIBWRAP */ - #ifndef O_NOCTTY #define O_NOCTTY 0 #endif /* Re-exec fds */ #define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1) #define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2) #define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3) #define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4) extern char *__progname; /* Server configuration options. */ ServerOptions options; /* Name of the server configuration file. */ char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE; /* * Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug * mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system * log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing * the first connection. */ int debug_flag = 0; /* Flag indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys. */ int test_flag = 0; /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */ int inetd_flag = 0; /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */ int no_daemon_flag = 0; /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */ int log_stderr = 0; /* Saved arguments to main(). */ char **saved_argv; int saved_argc; /* re-exec */ int rexeced_flag = 0; int rexec_flag = 1; int rexec_argc = 0; char **rexec_argv; /* * The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP * signal handler. */ #define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16 int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS]; int num_listen_socks = 0; /* * the client's version string, passed by sshd2 in compat mode. if != NULL, * sshd will skip the version-number exchange */ char *client_version_string = NULL; char *server_version_string = NULL; /* for rekeying XXX fixme */ Kex *xxx_kex; /* Daemon's agent connection */ AuthenticationConnection *auth_conn = NULL; int have_agent = 0; /* * Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this * structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so * that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some * problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle) * have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is * not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented. */ struct { Key *server_key; /* ephemeral server key */ Key *ssh1_host_key; /* ssh1 host key */ Key **host_keys; /* all private host keys */ Key **host_pubkeys; /* all public host keys */ Key **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */ int have_ssh1_key; int have_ssh2_key; u_char ssh1_cookie[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; } sensitive_data; /* * Flag indicating whether the RSA server key needs to be regenerated. * Is set in the SIGALRM handler and cleared when the key is regenerated. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t key_do_regen = 0; /* This is set to true when a signal is received. */ static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0; static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0; /* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */ u_char session_id[16]; /* same for ssh2 */ u_char *session_id2 = NULL; u_int session_id2_len = 0; /* record remote hostname or ip */ u_int utmp_len = MAXHOSTNAMELEN; /* options.max_startup sized array of fd ints */ int *startup_pipes = NULL; int startup_pipe; /* in child */ /* variables used for privilege separation */ int use_privsep = -1; struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL; int privsep_is_preauth = 1; /* global authentication context */ Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL; /* sshd_config buffer */ Buffer cfg; /* message to be displayed after login */ Buffer loginmsg; /* Unprivileged user */ struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL; /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */ void destroy_sensitive_data(void); void demote_sensitive_data(void); +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 static void do_ssh1_kex(void); +#endif static void do_ssh2_kex(void); /* * Close all listening sockets */ static void close_listen_socks(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) close(listen_socks[i]); num_listen_socks = -1; } static void close_startup_pipes(void) { int i; if (startup_pipes) for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) close(startup_pipes[i]); } /* * Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP; * the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate * the server key). */ /*ARGSUSED*/ static void sighup_handler(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; received_sighup = 1; signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler); errno = save_errno; } /* * Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP. * Restarts the server. */ static void sighup_restart(void) { logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting."); platform_pre_restart(); close_listen_socks(); close_startup_pipes(); alarm(0); /* alarm timer persists across exec */ signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* will be restored after exec */ execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv); logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0], strerror(errno)); exit(1); } /* * Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon. */ /*ARGSUSED*/ static void sigterm_handler(int sig) { received_sigterm = sig; } /* * SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then * reap any zombies left by exited children. */ /*ARGSUSED*/ static void main_sigchld_handler(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; pid_t pid; int status; while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 || (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR)) ; signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); errno = save_errno; } /* * Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired. */ /*ARGSUSED*/ static void grace_alarm_handler(int sig) { if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0) kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM); /* * Try to kill any processes that we have spawned, E.g. authorized * keys command helpers. */ if (getpgid(0) == getpid()) { signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN); kill(0, SIGTERM); } /* Log error and exit. */ sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s", get_remote_ipaddr()); } /* * Signal handler for the key regeneration alarm. Note that this * alarm only occurs in the daemon waiting for connections, and it does not * do anything with the private key or random state before forking. * Thus there should be no concurrency control/asynchronous execution * problems. */ static void generate_ephemeral_server_key(void) { verbose("Generating %s%d bit RSA key.", sensitive_data.server_key ? "new " : "", options.server_key_bits); if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL) key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); sensitive_data.server_key = key_generate(KEY_RSA1, options.server_key_bits); verbose("RSA key generation complete."); arc4random_buf(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); } /*ARGSUSED*/ static void key_regeneration_alarm(int sig) { int save_errno = errno; signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); errno = save_errno; key_do_regen = 1; } static void sshd_exchange_identification(int sock_in, int sock_out) { u_int i; int mismatch; int remote_major, remote_minor; int major, minor; char *s, *newline = "\n"; char buf[256]; /* Must not be larger than remote_version. */ char remote_version[256]; /* Must be at least as big as buf. */ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2)) { major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1; minor = 99; } else if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2; minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_2; newline = "\r\n"; } else { major = PROTOCOL_MAJOR_1; minor = PROTOCOL_MINOR_1; } xasprintf(&server_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s%s", major, minor, SSH_VERSION, *options.version_addendum == '\0' ? "" : " ", options.version_addendum, newline); /* Send our protocol version identification. */ if (roaming_atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, server_version_string, strlen(server_version_string)) != strlen(server_version_string)) { logit("Could not write ident string to %s", get_remote_ipaddr()); cleanup_exit(255); } /* Read other sides version identification. */ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf)); for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf) - 1; i++) { if (roaming_atomicio(read, sock_in, &buf[i], 1) != 1) { logit("Did not receive identification string from %s", get_remote_ipaddr()); cleanup_exit(255); } if (buf[i] == '\r') { buf[i] = 0; /* Kludge for F-Secure Macintosh < 1.0.2 */ if (i == 12 && strncmp(buf, "SSH-1.5-W1.0", 12) == 0) break; continue; } if (buf[i] == '\n') { buf[i] = 0; break; } } buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = 0; client_version_string = xstrdup(buf); /* * Check that the versions match. In future this might accept * several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them. */ if (sscanf(client_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n", &remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) { s = "Protocol mismatch.\n"; (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); logit("Bad protocol version identification '%.100s' " "from %s port %d", client_version_string, get_remote_ipaddr(), get_remote_port()); close(sock_in); close(sock_out); cleanup_exit(255); } debug("Client protocol version %d.%d; client software version %.100s", remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version); compat_datafellows(remote_version); if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_PROBE) != 0) { logit("probed from %s with %s. Don't panic.", get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string); cleanup_exit(255); } if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) != 0) { logit("scanned from %s with %s. Don't panic.", get_remote_ipaddr(), client_version_string); cleanup_exit(255); } if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) { logit("Client version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature " "scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version); } if ((datafellows & SSH_BUG_DERIVEKEY) != 0) { fatal("Client version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe key agreement; " "refusing connection", remote_version); } mismatch = 0; switch (remote_major) { case 1: if (remote_minor == 99) { if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) enable_compat20(); else mismatch = 1; break; } if (!(options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) { mismatch = 1; break; } if (remote_minor < 3) { packet_disconnect("Your ssh version is too old and " "is no longer supported. Please install a newer version."); } else if (remote_minor == 3) { /* note that this disables agent-forwarding */ enable_compat13(); } break; case 2: if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) { enable_compat20(); break; } /* FALLTHROUGH */ default: mismatch = 1; break; } chop(server_version_string); debug("Local version string %.200s", server_version_string); if (mismatch) { s = "Protocol major versions differ.\n"; (void) atomicio(vwrite, sock_out, s, strlen(s)); close(sock_in); close(sock_out); logit("Protocol major versions differ for %s: %.200s vs. %.200s", get_remote_ipaddr(), server_version_string, client_version_string); cleanup_exit(255); } } /* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */ void destroy_sensitive_data(void) { int i; if (sensitive_data.server_key) { key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; } if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) { key_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]); sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; } } sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL; explicit_bzero(sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH); } /* Demote private to public keys for network child */ void demote_sensitive_data(void) { Key *tmp; int i; if (sensitive_data.server_key) { tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.server_key); key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); sensitive_data.server_key = tmp; } for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) { tmp = key_demote(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); key_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp; if (tmp->type == KEY_RSA1) sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = tmp; } /* Certs do not need demotion */ } /* We do not clear ssh1_host key and cookie. XXX - Okay Niels? */ } static void privsep_preauth_child(void) { u_int32_t rnd[256]; gid_t gidset[1]; /* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */ privsep_challenge_enable(); #ifdef GSSAPI /* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */ if (options.gss_authentication) ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids(); #endif arc4random_stir(); arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ demote_sensitive_data(); /* Change our root directory */ if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1) fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, strerror(errno)); if (chdir("/") == -1) fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno)); /* Drop our privileges */ debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_uid, (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_gid); #if 0 /* XXX not ready, too heavy after chroot */ do_setusercontext(privsep_pw); #else gidset[0] = privsep_pw->pw_gid; if (setgroups(1, gidset) < 0) fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno)); permanently_set_uid(privsep_pw); #endif } static int privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt) { int status; pid_t pid; struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL; /* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */ pmonitor = monitor_init(); /* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */ pmonitor->m_pkex = &xxx_kex; if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON) box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor); pid = fork(); if (pid == -1) { fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); } else if (pid != 0) { debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid); pmonitor->m_pid = pid; if (have_agent) auth_conn = ssh_get_authentication_connection(); if (box != NULL) ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(box, pid); monitor_child_preauth(authctxt, pmonitor); /* Sync memory */ monitor_sync(pmonitor); /* Wait for the child's exit status */ while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) < 0) { if (errno == EINTR) continue; pmonitor->m_pid = -1; fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno)); } privsep_is_preauth = 0; pmonitor->m_pid = -1; if (WIFEXITED(status)) { if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) fatal("%s: preauth child exited with status %d", __func__, WEXITSTATUS(status)); } else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) fatal("%s: preauth child terminated by signal %d", __func__, WTERMSIG(status)); if (box != NULL) ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(box); return 1; } else { /* child */ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd); /* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */ set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor); /* Demote the child */ if (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0) privsep_preauth_child(); setproctitle("%s", "[net]"); if (box != NULL) ssh_sandbox_child(box); return 0; } } static void privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt) { u_int32_t rnd[256]; #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING if (1) { #else if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 || options.use_login) { #endif /* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */ use_privsep = 0; goto skip; } /* New socket pair */ monitor_reinit(pmonitor); pmonitor->m_pid = fork(); if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1) fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed"); else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) { verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid); buffer_clear(&loginmsg); monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor); /* NEVERREACHED */ exit(0); } /* child */ close(pmonitor->m_sendfd); pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1; /* Demote the private keys to public keys. */ demote_sensitive_data(); arc4random_stir(); arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); /* Drop privileges */ do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw); skip: /* It is safe now to apply the key state */ monitor_apply_keystate(pmonitor); /* * Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since * this information is not part of the key state. */ packet_set_authenticated(); } static char * list_hostkey_types(void) { Buffer b; const char *p; char *ret; int i; Key *key; buffer_init(&b); for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; if (key == NULL) key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i]; if (key == NULL) continue; switch (key->type) { case KEY_RSA: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ED25519: if (buffer_len(&b) > 0) buffer_append(&b, ",", 1); p = key_ssh_name(key); buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p)); break; } /* If the private key has a cert peer, then list that too */ key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]; if (key == NULL) continue; switch (key->type) { case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: if (buffer_len(&b) > 0) buffer_append(&b, ",", 1); p = key_ssh_name(key); buffer_append(&b, p, strlen(p)); break; } } buffer_append(&b, "\0", 1); ret = xstrdup(buffer_ptr(&b)); buffer_free(&b); debug("list_hostkey_types: %s", ret); return ret; } static Key * get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int need_private) { int i; Key *key; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { switch (type) { case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: case KEY_RSA_CERT: case KEY_DSA_CERT: case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: case KEY_ED25519_CERT: key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]; break; default: key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i]; if (key == NULL && !need_private) key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i]; break; } if (key != NULL && key->type == type) return need_private ? sensitive_data.host_keys[i] : key; } return NULL; } Key * get_hostkey_public_by_type(int type) { return get_hostkey_by_type(type, 0); } Key * get_hostkey_private_by_type(int type) { return get_hostkey_by_type(type, 1); } Key * get_hostkey_by_index(int ind) { if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files) return (NULL); return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]); } Key * get_hostkey_public_by_index(int ind) { if (ind < 0 || ind >= options.num_host_key_files) return (NULL); return (sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[ind]); } int get_hostkey_index(Key *key) { int i; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { if (key_is_cert(key)) { if (key == sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) return (i); } else { if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) return (i); if (key == sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i]) return (i); } } return (-1); } /* * returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise. * dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability * of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until * all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups */ static int drop_connection(int startups) { int p, r; if (startups < options.max_startups_begin) return 0; if (startups >= options.max_startups) return 1; if (options.max_startups_rate == 100) return 1; p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate; p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin; p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin; p += options.max_startups_rate; r = arc4random_uniform(100); debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r); return (r < p) ? 1 : 0; } static void usage(void) { fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n", - SSH_RELEASE, SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)); + SSH_RELEASE, +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION) +#else + "without OpenSSL" +#endif + ); fprintf(stderr, "usage: sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-b bits] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_cert_file]\n" " [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n" " [-h host_key_file] [-k key_gen_time] [-o option] [-p port]\n" " [-u len]\n" ); exit(1); } static void send_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf) { Buffer m; debug3("%s: entering fd = %d config len %d", __func__, fd, buffer_len(conf)); /* * Protocol from reexec master to child: * string configuration * u_int ephemeral_key_follows * bignum e (only if ephemeral_key_follows == 1) * bignum n " * bignum d " * bignum iqmp " * bignum p " * bignum q " * string rngseed (only if OpenSSL is not self-seeded) */ buffer_init(&m); buffer_put_cstring(&m, buffer_ptr(conf)); +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL && sensitive_data.server_key->type == KEY_RSA1) { buffer_put_int(&m, 1); buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e); buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n); buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d); buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp); buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p); buffer_put_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q); } else +#endif buffer_put_int(&m, 0); #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY rexec_send_rng_seed(&m); #endif if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, &m) == -1) fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__); buffer_free(&m); debug3("%s: done", __func__); } static void recv_rexec_state(int fd, Buffer *conf) { Buffer m; char *cp; u_int len; debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__, fd); buffer_init(&m); if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, &m) == -1) fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__); if (buffer_get_char(&m) != 0) fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__); cp = buffer_get_string(&m, &len); if (conf != NULL) buffer_append(conf, cp, len + 1); free(cp); if (buffer_get_int(&m)) { +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 if (sensitive_data.server_key != NULL) key_free(sensitive_data.server_key); sensitive_data.server_key = key_new_private(KEY_RSA1); buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e); buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n); buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->d); buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->iqmp); buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->p); buffer_get_bignum(&m, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->q); - rsa_generate_additional_parameters( - sensitive_data.server_key->rsa); + if (rsa_generate_additional_parameters( + sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0) + fatal("%s: rsa_generate_additional_parameters " + "error", __func__); +#else + fatal("ssh1 not supported"); +#endif } #ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY rexec_recv_rng_seed(&m); #endif buffer_free(&m); debug3("%s: done", __func__); } /* Accept a connection from inetd */ static void server_accept_inetd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out) { int fd; startup_pipe = -1; if (rexeced_flag) { close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD); *sock_in = *sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO); if (!debug_flag) { startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); } } else { *sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); *sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO); } /* * We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2 * as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if * ttyfd happens to be one of those. */ if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) { dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO); dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO); if (!log_stderr) dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO); if (fd > (log_stderr ? STDERR_FILENO : STDOUT_FILENO)) close(fd); } debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", *sock_in, *sock_out); } /* * Listen for TCP connections */ static void server_listen(void) { int ret, listen_sock, on = 1; struct addrinfo *ai; char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV]; for (ai = options.listen_addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) { if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) continue; if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS) fatal("Too many listen sockets. " "Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS"); if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport), NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) { error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(ret)); continue; } /* Create socket for listening. */ listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol); if (listen_sock < 0) { /* kernel may not support ipv6 */ verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno)); continue; } if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) { close(listen_sock); continue; } /* * Set socket options. * Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT. */ if (setsockopt(listen_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR: %s", strerror(errno)); /* Only communicate in IPv6 over AF_INET6 sockets. */ if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) sock_set_v6only(listen_sock); debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop); /* Bind the socket to the desired port. */ if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) { error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.", strport, ntop, strerror(errno)); close(listen_sock); continue; } listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock; num_listen_socks++; /* Start listening on the port. */ if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) < 0) fatal("listen on [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport, strerror(errno)); logit("Server listening on %s port %s.", ntop, strport); } freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs); if (!num_listen_socks) fatal("Cannot bind any address."); } /* * The main TCP accept loop. Note that, for the non-debug case, returns * from this function are in a forked subprocess. */ static void server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s) { fd_set *fdset; int i, j, ret, maxfd; int key_used = 0, startups = 0; int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 }; struct sockaddr_storage from; socklen_t fromlen; pid_t pid; u_char rnd[256]; /* setup fd set for accept */ fdset = NULL; maxfd = 0; for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd) maxfd = listen_socks[i]; /* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */ startup_pipes = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int)); for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) startup_pipes[i] = -1; /* * Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or * the daemon is killed with a signal. */ for (;;) { if (received_sighup) sighup_restart(); if (fdset != NULL) free(fdset); fdset = (fd_set *)xcalloc(howmany(maxfd + 1, NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask)); for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset); for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) if (startup_pipes[i] != -1) FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset); /* Wait in select until there is a connection. */ ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (ret < 0 && errno != EINTR) error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (received_sigterm) { logit("Received signal %d; terminating.", (int) received_sigterm); close_listen_socks(); unlink(options.pid_file); exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255); } if (key_used && key_do_regen) { generate_ephemeral_server_key(); key_used = 0; key_do_regen = 0; } if (ret < 0) continue; for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) if (startup_pipes[i] != -1 && FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset)) { /* * the read end of the pipe is ready * if the child has closed the pipe * after successful authentication * or if the child has died */ close(startup_pipes[i]); startup_pipes[i] = -1; startups--; } for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) { if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset)) continue; fromlen = sizeof(from); *newsock = accept(listen_socks[i], (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen); if (*newsock < 0) { if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK && errno != ECONNABORTED && errno != EAGAIN) error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE) usleep(100 * 1000); continue; } if (unset_nonblock(*newsock) == -1) { close(*newsock); continue; } if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) { debug("drop connection #%d", startups); close(*newsock); continue; } if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) { close(*newsock); continue; } if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1) { error("reexec socketpair: %s", strerror(errno)); close(*newsock); close(startup_p[0]); close(startup_p[1]); continue; } for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++) if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) { startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0]; if (maxfd < startup_p[0]) maxfd = startup_p[0]; startups++; break; } /* * Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless * we are in debugging mode. */ if (debug_flag) { /* * In debugging mode. Close the listening * socket, and start processing the * connection without forking. */ debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode."); close_listen_socks(); *sock_in = *newsock; *sock_out = *newsock; close(startup_p[0]); close(startup_p[1]); startup_pipe = -1; pid = getpid(); if (rexec_flag) { send_rexec_state(config_s[0], &cfg); close(config_s[0]); } break; } /* * Normal production daemon. Fork, and have * the child process the connection. The * parent continues listening. */ platform_pre_fork(); if ((pid = fork()) == 0) { /* * Child. Close the listening and * max_startup sockets. Start using * the accepted socket. Reinitialize * logging (since our pid has changed). * We break out of the loop to handle * the connection. */ platform_post_fork_child(); startup_pipe = startup_p[1]; close_startup_pipes(); close_listen_socks(); *sock_in = *newsock; *sock_out = *newsock; log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); if (rexec_flag) close(config_s[0]); break; } /* Parent. Stay in the loop. */ platform_post_fork_parent(pid); if (pid < 0) error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno)); else debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid); close(startup_p[1]); if (rexec_flag) { send_rexec_state(config_s[0], &cfg); close(config_s[0]); close(config_s[1]); } /* * Mark that the key has been used (it * was "given" to the child). */ if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && key_used == 0) { /* Schedule server key regeneration alarm. */ signal(SIGALRM, key_regeneration_alarm); alarm(options.key_regeneration_time); key_used = 1; } close(*newsock); /* * Ensure that our random state differs * from that of the child */ arc4random_stir(); arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); } /* child process check (or debug mode) */ if (num_listen_socks < 0) break; } } /* * Main program for the daemon. */ int main(int ac, char **av) { extern char *optarg; extern int optind; int opt, i, j, on = 1; int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1; const char *remote_ip; int remote_port; char *line, *logfile = NULL; int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 }; u_int n; u_int64_t ibytes, obytes; mode_t new_umask; Key *key; Key *pubkey; int keytype; Authctxt *authctxt; struct connection_info *connection_info = get_connection_info(0, 0); #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE (void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av); #endif __progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]); /* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */ saved_argc = ac; rexec_argc = ac; saved_argv = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_argv)); for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]); saved_argv[i] = NULL; #ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE /* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */ compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av); av = saved_argv; #endif if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1) debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno)); /* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */ sanitise_stdfd(); /* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */ initialize_server_options(&options); /* Parse command-line arguments. */ while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "f:p:b:k:h:g:u:o:C:dDeE:iqrtQRT46")) != -1) { switch (opt) { case '4': options.address_family = AF_INET; break; case '6': options.address_family = AF_INET6; break; case 'f': config_file_name = optarg; break; case 'c': if (options.num_host_cert_files >= MAX_HOSTCERTS) { fprintf(stderr, "too many host certificates.\n"); exit(1); } options.host_cert_files[options.num_host_cert_files++] = derelativise_path(optarg); break; case 'd': if (debug_flag == 0) { debug_flag = 1; options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1; } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) options.log_level++; break; case 'D': no_daemon_flag = 1; break; case 'E': logfile = xstrdup(optarg); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case 'e': log_stderr = 1; break; case 'i': inetd_flag = 1; break; case 'r': rexec_flag = 0; break; case 'R': rexeced_flag = 1; inetd_flag = 1; break; case 'Q': /* ignored */ break; case 'q': options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET; break; case 'b': options.server_key_bits = (int)strtonum(optarg, 256, 32768, NULL); break; case 'p': options.ports_from_cmdline = 1; if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) { fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n"); exit(1); } options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg); if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n"); exit(1); } break; case 'g': if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n"); exit(1); } break; case 'k': if ((options.key_regeneration_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid key regeneration interval.\n"); exit(1); } break; case 'h': if (options.num_host_key_files >= MAX_HOSTKEYS) { fprintf(stderr, "too many host keys.\n"); exit(1); } options.host_key_files[options.num_host_key_files++] = derelativise_path(optarg); break; case 't': test_flag = 1; break; case 'T': test_flag = 2; break; case 'C': if (parse_server_match_testspec(connection_info, optarg) == -1) exit(1); break; case 'u': utmp_len = (u_int)strtonum(optarg, 0, MAXHOSTNAMELEN+1, NULL); if (utmp_len > MAXHOSTNAMELEN) { fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n"); exit(1); } break; case 'o': line = xstrdup(optarg); if (process_server_config_line(&options, line, "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL) != 0) exit(1); free(line); break; case '?': default: usage(); break; } } if (rexeced_flag || inetd_flag) rexec_flag = 0; if (!test_flag && (rexec_flag && (av[0] == NULL || *av[0] != '/'))) fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path"); if (rexeced_flag) closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD); else closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD); +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); +#endif /* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */ if (logfile != NULL) { log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile); free(logfile); } /* * Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host * key (unless started from inetd) */ log_init(__progname, options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level, options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ? SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility, log_stderr || !inetd_flag); /* * Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from * root's environment */ if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL) (void) unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME"); #ifdef _UNICOS /* Cray can define user privs drop all privs now! * Not needed on PRIV_SU systems! */ drop_cray_privs(); #endif sensitive_data.server_key = NULL; sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = NULL; sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 0; sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0; /* * If we're doing an extended config test, make sure we have all of * the parameters we need. If we're not doing an extended test, * do not silently ignore connection test params. */ if (test_flag >= 2 && server_match_spec_complete(connection_info) == 0) fatal("user, host and addr are all required when testing " "Match configs"); if (test_flag < 2 && server_match_spec_complete(connection_info) >= 0) fatal("Config test connection parameter (-C) provided without " "test mode (-T)"); /* Fetch our configuration */ buffer_init(&cfg); if (rexeced_flag) recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, &cfg); else load_server_config(config_file_name, &cfg); parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name, &cfg, NULL); seed_rng(); /* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */ fill_default_server_options(&options); /* challenge-response is implemented via keyboard interactive */ if (options.challenge_response_authentication) options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1; /* Check that options are sensible */ if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL && (options.authorized_keys_command != NULL && strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_command, "none") != 0)) fatal("AuthorizedKeysCommand set without " "AuthorizedKeysCommandUser"); /* * Check whether there is any path through configured auth methods. * Unfortunately it is not possible to verify this generally before * daemonisation in the presence of Match block, but this catches * and warns for trivial misconfigurations that could break login. */ if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) { if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1)) fatal("AuthenticationMethods is not supported with " "SSH protocol 1"); for (n = 0; n < options.num_auth_methods; n++) { if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[n], 1) == 0) break; } if (n >= options.num_auth_methods) fatal("AuthenticationMethods cannot be satisfied by " "enabled authentication methods"); } /* set default channel AF */ channel_set_af(options.address_family); /* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */ if (optind < ac) { fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]); exit(1); } debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION, - SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION)); +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + SSLeay_version(SSLEAY_VERSION) +#else + "without OpenSSL" +#endif + ); /* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */ if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) { if (use_privsep || options.kerberos_authentication) fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist", SSH_PRIVSEP_USER); } else { explicit_bzero(privsep_pw->pw_passwd, strlen(privsep_pw->pw_passwd)); privsep_pw = pwcopy(privsep_pw); free(privsep_pw->pw_passwd); privsep_pw->pw_passwd = xstrdup("*"); } endpwent(); /* load host keys */ sensitive_data.host_keys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, sizeof(Key *)); sensitive_data.host_pubkeys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, sizeof(Key *)); for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = NULL; } if (options.host_key_agent) { if (strcmp(options.host_key_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME)) setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, options.host_key_agent, 1); have_agent = ssh_agent_present(); } for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) { key = key_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "", NULL); pubkey = key_load_public(options.host_key_files[i], NULL); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key; sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = pubkey; if (key == NULL && pubkey != NULL && pubkey->type != KEY_RSA1 && have_agent) { debug("will rely on agent for hostkey %s", options.host_key_files[i]); keytype = pubkey->type; } else if (key != NULL) { keytype = key->type; } else { error("Could not load host key: %s", options.host_key_files[i]); sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL; sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = NULL; continue; } switch (keytype) { case KEY_RSA1: sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key = key; sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key = 1; break; case KEY_RSA: case KEY_DSA: case KEY_ECDSA: case KEY_ED25519: sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1; break; } debug("private host key: #%d type %d %s", i, keytype, key_type(key ? key : pubkey)); } if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh1_key) { logit("Disabling protocol version 1. Could not load host key"); options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_1; } if ((options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_2) && !sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) { logit("Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key"); options.protocol &= ~SSH_PROTO_2; } if (!(options.protocol & (SSH_PROTO_1|SSH_PROTO_2))) { logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting."); exit(1); } /* * Load certificates. They are stored in an array at identical * indices to the public keys that they relate to. */ sensitive_data.host_certificates = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files, sizeof(Key *)); for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL; for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_cert_files; i++) { key = key_load_public(options.host_cert_files[i], NULL); if (key == NULL) { error("Could not load host certificate: %s", options.host_cert_files[i]); continue; } if (!key_is_cert(key)) { error("Certificate file is not a certificate: %s", options.host_cert_files[i]); key_free(key); continue; } /* Find matching private key */ for (j = 0; j < options.num_host_key_files; j++) { if (key_equal_public(key, sensitive_data.host_keys[j])) { sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key; break; } } if (j >= options.num_host_key_files) { error("No matching private key for certificate: %s", options.host_cert_files[i]); key_free(key); continue; } sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key; debug("host certificate: #%d type %d %s", j, key->type, key_type(key)); } + +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* Check certain values for sanity. */ if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) { if (options.server_key_bits < 512 || options.server_key_bits > 32768) { fprintf(stderr, "Bad server key size.\n"); exit(1); } /* * Check that server and host key lengths differ sufficiently. This * is necessary to make double encryption work with rsaref. Oh, I * hate software patents. I dont know if this can go? Niels */ if (options.server_key_bits > BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) - SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED && options.server_key_bits < BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { options.server_key_bits = BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED; debug("Forcing server key to %d bits to make it differ from host key.", options.server_key_bits); } } +#endif if (use_privsep) { struct stat st; if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) || (S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0)) fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR); #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) && (st.st_uid != getuid () || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)) #else if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0) #endif fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or " "world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR); } if (test_flag > 1) { if (server_match_spec_complete(connection_info) == 1) parse_server_match_config(&options, connection_info); dump_config(&options); } /* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */ if (test_flag) exit(0); /* * Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This * prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the * portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM * to create a file, and we can't control the code in every * module which might be used). */ if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0) debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); if (rexec_flag) { rexec_argv = xcalloc(rexec_argc + 2, sizeof(char *)); for (i = 0; i < rexec_argc; i++) { debug("rexec_argv[%d]='%s'", i, saved_argv[i]); rexec_argv[i] = saved_argv[i]; } rexec_argv[rexec_argc] = "-R"; rexec_argv[rexec_argc + 1] = NULL; } /* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */ new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022; (void) umask(new_umask); /* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */ if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag)) log_stderr = 1; log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); /* * If not in debugging mode, and not started from inetd, disconnect * from the controlling terminal, and fork. The original process * exits. */ if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag)) { #ifdef TIOCNOTTY int fd; #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ if (daemon(0, 0) < 0) fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno)); /* Disconnect from the controlling tty. */ #ifdef TIOCNOTTY fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); if (fd >= 0) { (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL); close(fd); } #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ } /* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */ log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); /* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be unmounted if desired. */ if (chdir("/") == -1) error("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno)); /* ignore SIGPIPE */ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* Get a connection, either from inetd or a listening TCP socket */ if (inetd_flag) { server_accept_inetd(&sock_in, &sock_out); } else { platform_pre_listen(); server_listen(); if (options.protocol & SSH_PROTO_1) generate_ephemeral_server_key(); signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler); signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler); signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler); signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler); /* * Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler * is setup and the listen sockets are bound */ if (!debug_flag) { FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w"); if (f == NULL) { error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s", options.pid_file, strerror(errno)); } else { fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid()); fclose(f); } } /* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */ server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out, &newsock, config_s); } /* This is the child processing a new connection. */ setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]"); /* * Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD * setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't * want the child to be able to affect the parent. */ #if !defined(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY) /* * If setsid is called, on some platforms sshd will later acquire a * controlling terminal which will result in "could not set * controlling tty" errors. */ if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() < 0) error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno)); #endif if (rexec_flag) { int fd; debug("rexec start in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d", sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]); dup2(newsock, STDIN_FILENO); dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO); if (startup_pipe == -1) close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); else if (startup_pipe != REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD) { dup2(startup_pipe, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD); close(startup_pipe); startup_pipe = REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD; } dup2(config_s[1], REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD); close(config_s[1]); execv(rexec_argv[0], rexec_argv); /* Reexec has failed, fall back and continue */ error("rexec of %s failed: %s", rexec_argv[0], strerror(errno)); recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, NULL); log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr); /* Clean up fds */ close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD); newsock = sock_out = sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO); if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) { dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO); dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO); if (fd > STDERR_FILENO) close(fd); } debug("rexec cleanup in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d", sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]); } /* Executed child processes don't need these. */ fcntl(sock_out, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); fcntl(sock_in, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC); /* * Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the * key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We * will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense. */ alarm(0); signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL); signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL); signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL); signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); /* * Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do * not have a key. */ packet_set_connection(sock_in, sock_out); packet_set_server(); /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */ if (options.tcp_keep_alive && packet_connection_is_on_socket() && setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) < 0) error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno)); if ((remote_port = get_remote_port()) < 0) { debug("get_remote_port failed"); cleanup_exit(255); } /* * We use get_canonical_hostname with usedns = 0 instead of * get_remote_ipaddr here so IP options will be checked. */ (void) get_canonical_hostname(0); /* * The rest of the code depends on the fact that * get_remote_ipaddr() caches the remote ip, even if * the socket goes away. */ remote_ip = get_remote_ipaddr(); #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port); #endif -#ifdef LIBWRAP - allow_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_INFO; - deny_severity = options.log_facility|LOG_WARNING; - /* Check whether logins are denied from this host. */ - if (packet_connection_is_on_socket()) { - struct request_info req; - request_init(&req, RQ_DAEMON, __progname, RQ_FILE, sock_in, 0); - fromhost(&req); - - if (!hosts_access(&req)) { - debug("Connection refused by tcp wrapper"); - refuse(&req); - /* NOTREACHED */ - fatal("libwrap refuse returns"); - } - } -#endif /* LIBWRAP */ - /* Log the connection. */ verbose("Connection from %s port %d on %s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port, get_local_ipaddr(sock_in), get_local_port()); /* * We don't want to listen forever unless the other side * successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is * cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero * indicates no limit. Note that we don't set the alarm in debugging * mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you * are about to discover the bug. */ signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler); if (!debug_flag) alarm(options.login_grace_time); sshd_exchange_identification(sock_in, sock_out); /* In inetd mode, generate ephemeral key only for proto 1 connections */ if (!compat20 && inetd_flag && sensitive_data.server_key == NULL) generate_ephemeral_server_key(); packet_set_nonblocking(); /* allocate authentication context */ authctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*authctxt)); authctxt->loginmsg = &loginmsg; /* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */ the_authctxt = authctxt; /* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */ buffer_init(&loginmsg); auth_debug_reset(); if (use_privsep) { if (privsep_preauth(authctxt) == 1) goto authenticated; } else if (compat20 && have_agent) auth_conn = ssh_get_authentication_connection(); /* perform the key exchange */ /* authenticate user and start session */ if (compat20) { do_ssh2_kex(); do_authentication2(authctxt); } else { +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 do_ssh1_kex(); do_authentication(authctxt); +#else + fatal("ssh1 not supported"); +#endif } /* * If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers * the current keystate and exits */ if (use_privsep) { mm_send_keystate(pmonitor); exit(0); } authenticated: /* * Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for * authentication. */ alarm(0); signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL); authctxt->authenticated = 1; if (startup_pipe != -1) { close(startup_pipe); startup_pipe = -1; } #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS audit_event(SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS); #endif #ifdef GSSAPI if (options.gss_authentication) { temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw); ssh_gssapi_storecreds(); restore_uid(); } #endif #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) { do_pam_setcred(1); do_pam_session(); } #endif /* * In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare * file descriptor passing. */ if (use_privsep) { privsep_postauth(authctxt); /* the monitor process [priv] will not return */ if (!compat20) destroy_sensitive_data(); } packet_set_timeout(options.client_alive_interval, options.client_alive_count_max); /* Start session. */ do_authenticated(authctxt); /* The connection has been terminated. */ packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes); packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes); verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes", (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes); verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port); #ifdef USE_PAM if (options.use_pam) finish_pam(); #endif /* USE_PAM */ #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS PRIVSEP(audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE)); #endif packet_close(); if (use_privsep) mm_terminate(); exit(0); } +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 /* * Decrypt session_key_int using our private server key and private host key * (key with larger modulus first). */ int ssh1_session_key(BIGNUM *session_key_int) { int rsafail = 0; if (BN_cmp(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) > 0) { /* Server key has bigger modulus. */ if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) < BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { fatal("do_connection: %s: " "server_key %d < host_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", get_remote_ipaddr(), BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n), SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); } if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, - sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) <= 0) + sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0) rsafail++; if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, - sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) <= 0) + sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) != 0) rsafail++; } else { /* Host key has bigger modulus (or they are equal). */ if (BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n) < BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n) + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED) { fatal("do_connection: %s: " "host_key %d < server_key %d + SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED %d", get_remote_ipaddr(), BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), SSH_KEY_BITS_RESERVED); } if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, - sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) < 0) + sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa) != 0) rsafail++; if (rsa_private_decrypt(session_key_int, session_key_int, - sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) < 0) + sensitive_data.server_key->rsa) != 0) rsafail++; } return (rsafail); } + /* * SSH1 key exchange */ static void do_ssh1_kex(void) { int i, len; int rsafail = 0; BIGNUM *session_key_int; u_char session_key[SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH]; u_char cookie[8]; u_int cipher_type, auth_mask, protocol_flags; /* * Generate check bytes that the client must send back in the user * packet in order for it to be accepted; this is used to defy ip * spoofing attacks. Note that this only works against somebody * doing IP spoofing from a remote machine; any machine on the local * network can still see outgoing packets and catch the random * cookie. This only affects rhosts authentication, and this is one * of the reasons why it is inherently insecure. */ arc4random_buf(cookie, sizeof(cookie)); /* * Send our public key. We include in the packet 64 bits of random * data that must be matched in the reply in order to prevent IP * spoofing. */ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_PUBLIC_KEY); for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) packet_put_char(cookie[i]); /* Store our public server RSA key. */ packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n)); packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->e); packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n); /* Store our public host RSA key. */ packet_put_int(BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n)); packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->e); packet_put_bignum(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n); /* Put protocol flags. */ packet_put_int(SSH_PROTOFLAG_HOST_IN_FWD_OPEN); /* Declare which ciphers we support. */ packet_put_int(cipher_mask_ssh1(0)); /* Declare supported authentication types. */ auth_mask = 0; if (options.rhosts_rsa_authentication) auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RHOSTS_RSA; if (options.rsa_authentication) auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_RSA; if (options.challenge_response_authentication == 1) auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_TIS; if (options.password_authentication) auth_mask |= 1 << SSH_AUTH_PASSWORD; packet_put_int(auth_mask); /* Send the packet and wait for it to be sent. */ packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); debug("Sent %d bit server key and %d bit host key.", BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n), BN_num_bits(sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n)); /* Read clients reply (cipher type and session key). */ packet_read_expect(SSH_CMSG_SESSION_KEY); /* Get cipher type and check whether we accept this. */ cipher_type = packet_get_char(); if (!(cipher_mask_ssh1(0) & (1 << cipher_type))) packet_disconnect("Warning: client selects unsupported cipher."); /* Get check bytes from the packet. These must match those we sent earlier with the public key packet. */ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) if (cookie[i] != packet_get_char()) packet_disconnect("IP Spoofing check bytes do not match."); debug("Encryption type: %.200s", cipher_name(cipher_type)); /* Get the encrypted integer. */ if ((session_key_int = BN_new()) == NULL) fatal("do_ssh1_kex: BN_new failed"); packet_get_bignum(session_key_int); protocol_flags = packet_get_int(); packet_set_protocol_flags(protocol_flags); packet_check_eom(); /* Decrypt session_key_int using host/server keys */ rsafail = PRIVSEP(ssh1_session_key(session_key_int)); /* * Extract session key from the decrypted integer. The key is in the * least significant 256 bits of the integer; the first byte of the * key is in the highest bits. */ if (!rsafail) { (void) BN_mask_bits(session_key_int, sizeof(session_key) * 8); len = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int); if (len < 0 || (u_int)len > sizeof(session_key)) { error("do_ssh1_kex: bad session key len from %s: " "session_key_int %d > sizeof(session_key) %lu", get_remote_ipaddr(), len, (u_long)sizeof(session_key)); rsafail++; } else { explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key)); BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, session_key + sizeof(session_key) - len); derive_ssh1_session_id( sensitive_data.ssh1_host_key->rsa->n, sensitive_data.server_key->rsa->n, cookie, session_id); /* * Xor the first 16 bytes of the session key with the * session id. */ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) session_key[i] ^= session_id[i]; } } if (rsafail) { int bytes = BN_num_bytes(session_key_int); u_char *buf = xmalloc(bytes); struct ssh_digest_ctx *md; logit("do_connection: generating a fake encryption key"); BN_bn2bin(session_key_int, buf); if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL || ssh_digest_update(md, buf, bytes) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH) < 0 || ssh_digest_final(md, session_key, sizeof(session_key)) < 0) fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__); ssh_digest_free(md); if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL || ssh_digest_update(md, session_key, 16) < 0 || ssh_digest_update(md, sensitive_data.ssh1_cookie, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH) < 0 || ssh_digest_final(md, session_key + 16, sizeof(session_key) - 16) < 0) fatal("%s: md5 failed", __func__); ssh_digest_free(md); explicit_bzero(buf, bytes); free(buf); for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) session_id[i] = session_key[i] ^ session_key[i + 16]; } /* Destroy the private and public keys. No longer. */ destroy_sensitive_data(); if (use_privsep) mm_ssh1_session_id(session_id); /* Destroy the decrypted integer. It is no longer needed. */ BN_clear_free(session_key_int); /* Set the session key. From this on all communications will be encrypted. */ packet_set_encryption_key(session_key, SSH_SESSION_KEY_LENGTH, cipher_type); /* Destroy our copy of the session key. It is no longer needed. */ explicit_bzero(session_key, sizeof(session_key)); debug("Received session key; encryption turned on."); /* Send an acknowledgment packet. Note that this packet is sent encrypted. */ packet_start(SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); } +#endif void sshd_hostkey_sign(Key *privkey, Key *pubkey, u_char **signature, u_int *slen, u_char *data, u_int dlen) { if (privkey) { if (PRIVSEP(key_sign(privkey, signature, slen, data, dlen) < 0)) fatal("%s: key_sign failed", __func__); } else if (use_privsep) { if (mm_key_sign(pubkey, signature, slen, data, dlen) < 0) fatal("%s: pubkey_sign failed", __func__); } else { if (ssh_agent_sign(auth_conn, pubkey, signature, slen, data, dlen)) fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed", __func__); } } /* * SSH2 key exchange: diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 */ static void do_ssh2_kex(void) { + char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER }; Kex *kex; if (options.ciphers != NULL) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = options.ciphers; } myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS]); myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC]); if (options.macs != NULL) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs; } if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none"; } else if (options.compression == COMP_DELAYED) { myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] = myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none,zlib@openssh.com"; } if (options.kex_algorithms != NULL) myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = options.kex_algorithms; myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal( myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS]); if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval) packet_set_rekey_limits((u_int32_t)options.rekey_limit, (time_t)options.rekey_interval); myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal( list_hostkey_types()); /* start key exchange */ kex = kex_setup(myproposal); +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kexdh_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kexdh_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server; kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server; kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kexecdh_server; +#endif kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kexc25519_server; kex->server = 1; kex->client_version_string=client_version_string; kex->server_version_string=server_version_string; kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type; kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type; kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index; kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign; xxx_kex = kex; dispatch_run(DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done, kex); session_id2 = kex->session_id; session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len; #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH /* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */ packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE); packet_put_cstring("markus"); packet_send(); packet_write_wait(); #endif debug("KEX done"); } /* server specific fatal cleanup */ void cleanup_exit(int i) { if (the_authctxt) { do_cleanup(the_authctxt); - if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) { + if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && + pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) { debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid); if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 && errno != ESRCH) error("%s: kill(%d): %s", __func__, pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno)); } } #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS /* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */ if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) audit_event(SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON); #endif _exit(i); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd_config.0 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd_config.0 (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd_config.0 (revision 276707) @@ -1,835 +1,906 @@ -SSHD_CONFIG(5) OpenBSD Programmer's Manual SSHD_CONFIG(5) +SSHD_CONFIG(5) File Formats Manual SSHD_CONFIG(5) NAME sshd_config - OpenSSH SSH daemon configuration file SYNOPSIS /etc/ssh/sshd_config DESCRIPTION sshd(8) reads configuration data from /etc/ssh/sshd_config (or the file specified with -f on the command line). The file contains keyword- argument pairs, one per line. Lines starting with `#' and empty lines are interpreted as comments. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes (") in order to represent arguments containing spaces. The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): AcceptEnv Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be copied into the session's environ(7). See SendEnv in ssh_config(5) for how to configure the client. Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2. Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters `*' and `?'. Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread across multiple AcceptEnv directives. Be warned that some environment variables could be used to bypass restricted user environments. For this reason, care should be taken in the use of this directive. The default is not to accept any environment variables. AddressFamily Specifies which address family should be used by sshd(8). Valid arguments are ``any'', ``inet'' (use IPv4 only), or ``inet6'' (use IPv6 only). The default is ``any''. AllowAgentForwarding Specifies whether ssh-agent(1) forwarding is permitted. The default is ``yes''. Note that disabling agent forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. AllowGroups This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns. Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally AllowGroups. See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns. AllowTcpForwarding Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted. The available options are ``yes'' or ``all'' to allow TCP forwarding, ``no'' to prevent all TCP forwarding, ``local'' to allow local (from the perspective of ssh(1)) forwarding only or ``remote'' to allow remote forwarding only. The default is ``yes''. Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. + AllowStreamLocalForwarding + Specifies whether StreamLocal (Unix-domain socket) forwarding is + permitted. The available options are ``yes'' or ``all'' to allow + StreamLocal forwarding, ``no'' to prevent all StreamLocal + forwarding, ``local'' to allow local (from the perspective of + ssh(1)) forwarding only or ``remote'' to allow remote forwarding + only. The default is ``yes''. Note that disabling StreamLocal + forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied + shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. + AllowUsers This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for user names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to particular users from particular hosts. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally AllowGroups. See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns. AuthenticationMethods Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully completed for a user to be granted access. This option must be followed by one or more comma-separated lists of authentication method names. Successful authentication requires completion of every method in at least one of these lists. For example, an argument of ``publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactive'' would require the user to complete public key authentication, followed by either password or keyboard interactive authentication. Only methods that are next in one or more lists are offered at each stage, so for this example, it would not be possible to attempt password or keyboard-interactive authentication before public key. For keyboard interactive authentication it is also possible to restrict authentication to a specific device by appending a colon followed by the device identifier ``bsdauth'', ``pam'', or ``skey'', depending on the server configuration. For example, ``keyboard-interactive:bsdauth'' would restrict keyboard interactive authentication to the ``bsdauth'' device. This option is only available for SSH protocol 2 and will yield a fatal error if enabled if protocol 1 is also enabled. Note that each authentication method listed should also be explicitly enabled in the configuration. The default is not to require multiple authentication; successful completion of a single authentication method is sufficient. AuthorizedKeysCommand Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys. The program must be owned by root and not writable by group or others. It will be invoked with a single argument of the username being authenticated, and should produce on standard output zero or more lines of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in sshd(8)). If a key supplied by AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully authenticate and authorize the user then public key authentication continues using the usual AuthorizedKeysFile files. By default, no AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. AuthorizedKeysCommandUser Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host than running authorized keys commands. AuthorizedKeysFile Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used for user authentication. The format is described in the AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT section of sshd(8). AuthorizedKeysFile may contain tokens of the form %T which are substituted during connection setup. The following tokens are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is replaced by the username of that user. After expansion, AuthorizedKeysFile is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home directory. Multiple files may be listed, separated by whitespace. The default is ``.ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2''. AuthorizedPrincipalsFile Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for certificate authentication. When using certificates signed by a key listed in TrustedUserCAKeys, this file lists names, one of which must appear in the certificate for it to be accepted for authentication. Names are listed one per line preceded by key options (as described in AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT in sshd(8)). Empty lines and comments starting with `#' are ignored. AuthorizedPrincipalsFile may contain tokens of the form %T which are substituted during connection setup. The following tokens are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is replaced by the username of that user. After expansion, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home directory. The default is ``none'', i.e. not to use a principals file - in this case, the username of the user must appear in a certificate's principals list for it to be accepted. Note that AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is only used when authentication proceeds using a CA listed in TrustedUserCAKeys and is not consulted for certification authorities trusted via ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, though the principals= key option offers a similar facility (see sshd(8) for details). Banner The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before authentication is allowed. If the argument is ``none'' then no banner is displayed. This option is only available for protocol version 2. By default, no banner is displayed. ChallengeResponseAuthentication Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed - (e.g. via PAM or though authentication styles supported in + (e.g. via PAM or through authentication styles supported in login.conf(5)) The default is ``yes''. ChrootDirectory Specifies the pathname of a directory to chroot(2) to after authentication. All components of the pathname must be root- owned directories that are not writable by any other user or group. After the chroot, sshd(8) changes the working directory to the user's home directory. The pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at runtime once the connecting user has been authenticated: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is replaced by the username of that user. The ChrootDirectory must contain the necessary files and directories to support the user's session. For an interactive session this requires at least a shell, typically sh(1), and basic /dev nodes such as null(4), zero(4), stdin(4), stdout(4), stderr(4), arandom(4) and tty(4) devices. For file transfer sessions using ``sftp'', no additional configuration of the environment is necessary if the in-process sftp server is used, - though sessions which use logging do require /dev/log inside the - chroot directory (see sftp-server(8) for details). + though sessions which use logging may require /dev/log inside the + chroot directory on some operating systems (see sftp-server(8) + for details). The default is not to chroot(2). Ciphers Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. The supported ciphers are: - ``3des-cbc'', ``aes128-cbc'', ``aes192-cbc'', ``aes256-cbc'', - ``aes128-ctr'', ``aes192-ctr'', ``aes256-ctr'', - ``aes128-gcm@openssh.com'', ``aes256-gcm@openssh.com'', - ``arcfour128'', ``arcfour256'', ``arcfour'', ``blowfish-cbc'', - ``cast128-cbc'', and ``chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com''. + 3des-cbc + aes128-cbc + aes192-cbc + aes256-cbc + aes128-ctr + aes192-ctr + aes256-ctr + aes128-gcm@openssh.com + aes256-gcm@openssh.com + arcfour + arcfour128 + arcfour256 + blowfish-cbc + cast128-cbc + chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com The default is: - aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128, - aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com, - chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, - aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,aes192-cbc, - aes256-cbc,arcfour + aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr, + aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com, + chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using the -Q option of ssh(1). ClientAliveCountMax Sets the number of client alive messages (see below) which may be sent without sshd(8) receiving any messages back from the client. If this threshold is reached while client alive messages are being sent, sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the session. It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is very different from TCPKeepAlive (below). The client alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option enabled by TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The client alive mechanism is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive. The default value is 3. If ClientAliveInterval (see below) is set to 15, and ClientAliveCountMax is left at the default, unresponsive SSH clients will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. ClientAliveInterval Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received from the client, sshd(8) will send a message through the encrypted channel to request a response from the client. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the client. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. Compression Specifies whether compression is allowed, or delayed until the user has authenticated successfully. The argument must be ``yes'', ``delayed'', or ``no''. The default is ``delayed''. DenyGroups This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns. Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally AllowGroups. See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns. DenyUsers This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for user names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to particular users from particular hosts. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally AllowGroups. See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns. ForceCommand Forces the execution of the command specified by ForceCommand, ignoring any command supplied by the client and ~/.ssh/rc if present. The command is invoked by using the user's login shell with the -c option. This applies to shell, command, or subsystem execution. It is most useful inside a Match block. The command originally supplied by the client is available in the SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Specifying a command of ``internal-sftp'' will force the use of an in-process sftp server that requires no support files when used with ChrootDirectory. GatewayPorts Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports forwarded for the client. By default, sshd(8) binds remote port forwardings to the loopback address. This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. GatewayPorts can be used to specify that sshd should allow remote port forwardings to bind to non-loopback addresses, thus allowing other hosts to connect. The argument may be ``no'' to force remote port forwardings to be available to the local host only, ``yes'' to force remote port forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or ``clientspecified'' to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding is bound. The default is ``no''. GSSAPIAuthentication Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. The default is ``no''. Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. GSSAPICleanupCredentials Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache on logout. The default is ``yes''. Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. HostbasedAuthentication Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together with successful public key client host authentication is allowed (host-based authentication). This option is similar to RhostsRSAAuthentication and applies to protocol version 2 only. The default is ``no''. HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a reverse name lookup when matching the name in the ~/.shosts, ~/.rhosts, and /etc/hosts.equiv files during HostbasedAuthentication. A setting of ``yes'' means that sshd(8) uses the name supplied by the client rather than attempting to resolve the name from the TCP connection itself. The default is ``no''. HostCertificate Specifies a file containing a public host certificate. The certificate's public key must match a private host key already specified by HostKey. The default behaviour of sshd(8) is not to load any certificates. HostKey Specifies a file containing a private host key used by SSH. The default is /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key for protocol version 1, and /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key for protocol version 2. Note that sshd(8) will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-accessible. It is possible to have multiple host key files. ``rsa1'' keys are used for version 1 and ``dsa'', ``ecdsa'', ``ed25519'' or ``rsa'' are used for version 2 of the SSH protocol. It is also possible to specify public host key files instead. In this case operations on the private key will be delegated to an ssh-agent(1). HostKeyAgent Identifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with an agent that has access to the private host keys. If ``SSH_AUTH_SOCK'' is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. IgnoreRhosts Specifies that .rhosts and .shosts files will not be used in RhostsRSAAuthentication or HostbasedAuthentication. /etc/hosts.equiv and /etc/shosts.equiv are still used. The default is ``yes''. IgnoreUserKnownHosts Specifies whether sshd(8) should ignore the user's ~/.ssh/known_hosts during RhostsRSAAuthentication or HostbasedAuthentication. The default is ``no''. IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the connection. Accepted values are ``af11'', ``af12'', ``af13'', ``af21'', ``af22'', ``af23'', ``af31'', ``af32'', ``af33'', ``af41'', ``af42'', ``af43'', ``cs0'', ``cs1'', ``cs2'', ``cs3'', ``cs4'', ``cs5'', ``cs6'', ``cs7'', ``ef'', ``lowdelay'', ``throughput'', ``reliability'', or a numeric value. This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. The default is ``lowdelay'' for interactive sessions and ``throughput'' for non-interactive sessions. KbdInteractiveAuthentication Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication. The argument to this keyword must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is to use whatever value ChallengeResponseAuthentication is set to (by default ``yes''). KerberosAuthentication Specifies whether the password provided by the user for PasswordAuthentication will be validated through the Kerberos KDC. To use this option, the server needs a Kerberos servtab which allows the verification of the KDC's identity. The default is ``no''. KerberosGetAFSToken If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to acquire an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory. The default is ``no''. KerberosOrLocalPasswd If password authentication through Kerberos fails then the password will be validated via any additional local mechanism such as /etc/passwd. The default is ``yes''. KerberosTicketCleanup Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache file on logout. The default is ``yes''. KexAlgorithms Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple - algorithms must be comma-separated. The default is + algorithms must be comma-separated. The supported algorithms + are: + curve25519-sha256@libssh.org + diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 + diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 + diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 + diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 + ecdh-sha2-nistp256 + ecdh-sha2-nistp384 + ecdh-sha2-nistp521 + + The default is: + curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, - diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1, - diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, - diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 + diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 KeyRegenerationInterval In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically regenerated after this many seconds (if it has been used). The purpose of regeneration is to prevent decrypting captured sessions by later breaking into the machine and stealing the keys. The key is never stored anywhere. If the value is 0, the key is never regenerated. The default is 3600 (seconds). ListenAddress Specifies the local addresses sshd(8) should listen on. The following forms may be used: ListenAddress host|IPv4_addr|IPv6_addr ListenAddress host|IPv4_addr:port ListenAddress [host|IPv6_addr]:port If port is not specified, sshd will listen on the address and all prior Port options specified. The default is to listen on all local addresses. Multiple ListenAddress options are permitted. Additionally, any Port options must precede this option for non- port qualified addresses. LoginGraceTime The server disconnects after this time if the user has not successfully logged in. If the value is 0, there is no time limit. The default is 120 seconds. LogLevel Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from sshd(8). The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO. DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output. Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended. MACs Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms. The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2 for data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma- separated. The algorithms that contain ``-etm'' calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered - safer and their use recommended. The default is: + safer and their use recommended. The supported MACs are: - hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, + hmac-md5 + hmac-md5-96 + hmac-ripemd160 + hmac-sha1 + hmac-sha1-96 + hmac-sha2-256 + hmac-sha2-512 + umac-64@openssh.com + umac-128@openssh.com + hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com + hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com + hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com + hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com + hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com + hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com + hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com + umac-64-etm@openssh.com + umac-128-etm@openssh.com + + The default is: + umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, - hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com, - hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com, - hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, - hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-ripemd160, - hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96 + umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, + hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512 Match Introduces a conditional block. If all of the criteria on the Match line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines override those set in the global section of the config file, until either another Match line or the end of the file. If a keyword appears in multiple Match blocks that are satisified, only the first instance of the keyword is applied. The arguments to Match are one or more criteria-pattern pairs or the single token All which matches all criteria. The available criteria are User, Group, Host, LocalAddress, LocalPort, and Address. The match patterns may consist of single entries or comma-separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the PATTERNS section of ssh_config(5). The patterns in an Address criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format, e.g. ``192.0.2.0/24'' or ``3ffe:ffff::/32''. Note that the mask length provided must be consistent with the address - it is an error to specify a mask length that is too long for the address or one with bits set in this host portion of the address. For example, ``192.0.2.0/33'' and ``192.0.2.0/8'' respectively. Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a Match keyword. Available keywords are AcceptEnv, AllowAgentForwarding, AllowGroups, AllowTcpForwarding, AllowUsers, AuthenticationMethods, AuthorizedKeysCommand, AuthorizedKeysCommandUser, AuthorizedKeysFile, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile, Banner, ChrootDirectory, DenyGroups, DenyUsers, ForceCommand, GatewayPorts, GSSAPIAuthentication, HostbasedAuthentication, HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, KbdInteractiveAuthentication, KerberosAuthentication, MaxAuthTries, MaxSessions, PasswordAuthentication, PermitEmptyPasswords, PermitOpen, PermitRootLogin, PermitTTY, - PermitTunnel, PubkeyAuthentication, RekeyLimit, + PermitTunnel, PermitUserRC, PubkeyAuthentication, RekeyLimit, RhostsRSAAuthentication, RSAAuthentication, X11DisplayOffset, X11Forwarding and X11UseLocalHost. MaxAuthTries Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted per connection. Once the number of failures reaches half this value, additional failures are logged. The default is 6. MaxSessions Specifies the maximum number of open sessions permitted per network connection. The default is 10. MaxStartups Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated connections to the SSH daemon. Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the LoginGraceTime expires for a connection. The default is 10:30:100. Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying the three colon separated values ``start:rate:full'' (e.g. "10:30:60"). sshd(8) will refuse connection attempts with a probability of ``rate/100'' (30%) if there are currently ``start'' (10) unauthenticated connections. The probability increases linearly and all connection attempts are refused if the number of unauthenticated connections reaches ``full'' (60). PasswordAuthentication Specifies whether password authentication is allowed. The default is ``yes''. PermitEmptyPasswords When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the server allows login to accounts with empty password strings. The default is ``no''. PermitOpen Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is permitted. The forwarding specification must be one of the following forms: PermitOpen host:port PermitOpen IPv4_addr:port PermitOpen [IPv6_addr]:port Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with whitespace. An argument of ``any'' can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any forwarding requests. An argument of ``none'' can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests. By default all port forwarding requests are permitted. PermitRootLogin Specifies whether root can log in using ssh(1). The argument must be ``yes'', ``without-password'', ``forced-commands-only'', or ``no''. The default is ``yes''. If this option is set to ``without-password'', password authentication is disabled for root. If this option is set to ``forced-commands-only'', root login with public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the command option has been specified (which may be useful for taking remote backups even if root login is normally not allowed). All other authentication methods are disabled for root. If this option is set to ``no'', root is not allowed to log in. PermitTunnel Specifies whether tun(4) device forwarding is allowed. The argument must be ``yes'', ``point-to-point'' (layer 3), ``ethernet'' (layer 2), or ``no''. Specifying ``yes'' permits both ``point-to-point'' and ``ethernet''. The default is ``no''. PermitTTY Specifies whether pty(4) allocation is permitted. The default is ``yes''. PermitUserEnvironment Specifies whether ~/.ssh/environment and environment= options in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys are processed by sshd(8). The default is ``no''. Enabling environment processing may enable users to bypass access restrictions in some configurations using mechanisms such as LD_PRELOAD. + PermitUserRC + Specifies whether any ~/.ssh/rc file is executed. The default is + ``yes''. + PidFile Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the SSH daemon. The default is /var/run/sshd.pid. Port Specifies the port number that sshd(8) listens on. The default is 22. Multiple options of this type are permitted. See also ListenAddress. PrintLastLog Specifies whether sshd(8) should print the date and time of the last user login when a user logs in interactively. The default is ``yes''. PrintMotd Specifies whether sshd(8) should print /etc/motd when a user logs in interactively. (On some systems it is also printed by the shell, /etc/profile, or equivalent.) The default is ``yes''. Protocol Specifies the protocol versions sshd(8) supports. The possible values are `1' and `2'. Multiple versions must be comma- separated. The default is `2'. Note that the order of the protocol list does not indicate preference, because the client selects among multiple protocol versions offered by the server. Specifying ``2,1'' is identical to ``1,2''. PubkeyAuthentication Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed. The default is ``yes''. Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. RekeyLimit Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of `K', `M', or `G' to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between `1G' and `4G', depending on the cipher. The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units documented in the TIME FORMATS section. The default value for RekeyLimit is ``default none'', which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. RevokedKeys Specifies revoked public keys. Keys listed in this file will be refused for public key authentication. Note that if this file is not readable, then public key authentication will be refused for all users. Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by ssh-keygen(1). For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in ssh-keygen(1). RhostsRSAAuthentication Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together with successful RSA host authentication is allowed. The default is ``no''. This option applies to protocol version 1 only. RSAAuthentication Specifies whether pure RSA authentication is allowed. The default is ``yes''. This option applies to protocol version 1 only. ServerKeyBits Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key. The minimum value is 512, and the default is 1024. + StreamLocalBindMask + Sets the octal file creation mode mask (umask) used when creating + a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding. + This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain + socket file. + + The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket + file that is readable and writable only by the owner. Note that + not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain + socket files. + + StreamLocalBindUnlink + Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file + for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one. + If the socket file already exists and StreamLocalBindUnlink is + not enabled, sshd will be unable to forward the port to the Unix- + domain socket file. This option is only used for port forwarding + to a Unix-domain socket file. + + The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''. + StrictModes Specifies whether sshd(8) should check file modes and ownership of the user's files and home directory before accepting login. This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally leave their directory or files world-writable. The default is ``yes''. Note that this does not apply to ChrootDirectory, whose permissions and ownership are checked unconditionally. Subsystem Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon). Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional arguments) to execute upon subsystem request. The command sftp-server(8) implements the ``sftp'' file transfer subsystem. Alternately the name ``internal-sftp'' implements an in-process ``sftp'' server. This may simplify configurations using ChrootDirectory to force a different filesystem root on clients. By default no subsystems are defined. Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. SyslogFacility Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The default is AUTH. TCPKeepAlive Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However, this means that connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people find it annoying. On the other hand, if TCP keepalives are not sent, sessions may hang indefinitely on the server, leaving ``ghost'' users and consuming server resources. The default is ``yes'' (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the server will notice if the network goes down or the client host crashes. This avoids infinitely hanging sessions. To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to ``no''. TrustedUserCAKeys Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are trusted to sign user certificates for authentication. Keys are listed one per line; empty lines and comments starting with `#' are allowed. If a certificate is presented for authentication and has its signing CA key listed in this file, then it may be used for authentication for any user listed in the certificate's principals list. Note that certificates that lack a list of principals will not be permitted for authentication using TrustedUserCAKeys. For more details on certificates, see the CERTIFICATES section in ssh-keygen(1). UseDNS Specifies whether sshd(8) should look up the remote host name and check that the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the very same IP address. The default is ``yes''. UseLogin Specifies whether login(1) is used for interactive login sessions. The default is ``no''. Note that login(1) is never used for remote command execution. Note also, that if this is enabled, X11Forwarding will be disabled because login(1) does not know how to handle xauth(1) cookies. If UsePrivilegeSeparation is specified, it will be disabled after authentication. UsePAM Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface. If set to ``yes'' this will enable PAM authentication using ChallengeResponseAuthentication and PasswordAuthentication in addition to PAM account and session module processing for all authentication types. Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable either PasswordAuthentication or ChallengeResponseAuthentication. If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a non-root user. The default is ``no''. UsePrivilegeSeparation Specifies whether sshd(8) separates privileges by creating an unprivileged child process to deal with incoming network traffic. After successful authentication, another process will be created that has the privilege of the authenticated user. The goal of privilege separation is to prevent privilege escalation by containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes. The default is ``yes''. If UsePrivilegeSeparation is set to ``sandbox'' then the pre-authentication unprivileged process is subject to additional restrictions. VersionAddendum Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner sent by the server upon connection. The default is ``none''. X11DisplayOffset Specifies the first display number available for sshd(8)'s X11 forwarding. This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers. The default is 10. X11Forwarding Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``no''. When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure to the server and to client displays if the sshd(8) proxy display is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see X11UseLocalhost below), though this is not the default. Additionally, the authentication spoofing and authentication data verification and substitution occur on the client side. The security risk of using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11 display server may be exposed to attack when the SSH client requests forwarding (see the warnings for ForwardX11 in ssh_config(5)). A system administrator may have a stance in which they want to protect clients that may expose themselves to attack by unwittingly requesting X11 forwarding, which can warrant a ``no'' setting. Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own forwarders. X11 forwarding is automatically disabled if UseLogin is enabled. X11UseLocalhost Specifies whether sshd(8) should bind the X11 forwarding server to the loopback address or to the wildcard address. By default, sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets the hostname part of the DISPLAY environment variable to ``localhost''. This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display. However, some older X11 clients may not function with this configuration. X11UseLocalhost may be set to ``no'' to specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the wildcard address. The argument must be ``yes'' or ``no''. The default is ``yes''. XAuthLocation Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program. The default is /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth. TIME FORMATS sshd(8) command-line arguments and configuration file options that specify time may be expressed using a sequence of the form: time[qualifier], where time is a positive integer value and qualifier is one of the following: seconds s | S seconds m | M minutes h | H hours d | D days w | W weeks Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate the total time value. Time format examples: 600 600 seconds (10 minutes) 10m 10 minutes 1h30m 1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes) FILES /etc/ssh/sshd_config Contains configuration data for sshd(8). This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended (though not necessary) that it be world-readable. SEE ALSO sshd(8) AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support for privilege separation. -OpenBSD 5.5 February 27, 2014 OpenBSD 5.5 +OpenBSD 5.6 July 28, 2014 OpenBSD 5.6 Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd_config.5 =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd_config.5 (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshd_config.5 (revision 276707) @@ -1,1378 +1,1502 @@ .\" .\" Author: Tatu Ylonen .\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland .\" All rights reserved .\" .\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software .\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this .\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is .\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be .\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". .\" .\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved. .\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES .\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. .\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, .\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT .\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, .\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY .\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. .\" -.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.172 2014/02/27 22:47:07 djm Exp $ -.Dd $Mdocdate: February 27 2014 $ +.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.176 2014/07/28 15:40:08 schwarze Exp $ +.Dd $Mdocdate: July 28 2014 $ .Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm sshd_config .Nd OpenSSH SSH daemon configuration file .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm /etc/ssh/sshd_config .Sh DESCRIPTION .Xr sshd 8 reads configuration data from .Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config (or the file specified with .Fl f on the command line). The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line. Lines starting with .Ql # and empty lines are interpreted as comments. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes .Pq \&" in order to represent arguments containing spaces. .Pp The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive): .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Cm AcceptEnv Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be copied into the session's .Xr environ 7 . See .Cm SendEnv in .Xr ssh_config 5 for how to configure the client. Note that environment passing is only supported for protocol 2. Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters .Ql * and .Ql \&? . Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread across multiple .Cm AcceptEnv directives. Be warned that some environment variables could be used to bypass restricted user environments. For this reason, care should be taken in the use of this directive. The default is not to accept any environment variables. .It Cm AddressFamily Specifies which address family should be used by .Xr sshd 8 . Valid arguments are .Dq any , .Dq inet (use IPv4 only), or .Dq inet6 (use IPv6 only). The default is .Dq any . .It Cm AllowAgentForwarding Specifies whether .Xr ssh-agent 1 forwarding is permitted. The default is .Dq yes . Note that disabling agent forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. .It Cm AllowGroups This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns. Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: .Cm DenyUsers , .Cm AllowUsers , .Cm DenyGroups , and finally .Cm AllowGroups . .Pp See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .It Cm AllowTcpForwarding Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted. The available options are .Dq yes or .Dq all to allow TCP forwarding, .Dq no to prevent all TCP forwarding, .Dq local to allow local (from the perspective of .Xr ssh 1 ) forwarding only or .Dq remote to allow remote forwarding only. The default is .Dq yes . Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their own forwarders. +.It Cm AllowStreamLocalForwarding +Specifies whether StreamLocal (Unix-domain socket) forwarding is permitted. +The available options are +.Dq yes +or +.Dq all +to allow StreamLocal forwarding, +.Dq no +to prevent all StreamLocal forwarding, +.Dq local +to allow local (from the perspective of +.Xr ssh 1 ) +forwarding only or +.Dq remote +to allow remote forwarding only. +The default is +.Dq yes . +Note that disabling StreamLocal forwarding does not improve security unless +users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their +own forwarders. .It Cm AllowUsers This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for user names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to particular users from particular hosts. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: .Cm DenyUsers , .Cm AllowUsers , .Cm DenyGroups , and finally .Cm AllowGroups . .Pp See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .It Cm AuthenticationMethods Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully completed for a user to be granted access. This option must be followed by one or more comma-separated lists of authentication method names. Successful authentication requires completion of every method in at least one of these lists. .Pp For example, an argument of .Dq publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactive would require the user to complete public key authentication, followed by either password or keyboard interactive authentication. Only methods that are next in one or more lists are offered at each stage, so for this example, it would not be possible to attempt password or keyboard-interactive authentication before public key. .Pp For keyboard interactive authentication it is also possible to restrict authentication to a specific device by appending a colon followed by the device identifier .Dq bsdauth , .Dq pam , or .Dq skey , depending on the server configuration. For example, .Dq keyboard-interactive:bsdauth would restrict keyboard interactive authentication to the .Dq bsdauth device. .Pp This option is only available for SSH protocol 2 and will yield a fatal error if enabled if protocol 1 is also enabled. Note that each authentication method listed should also be explicitly enabled in the configuration. The default is not to require multiple authentication; successful completion of a single authentication method is sufficient. .It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys. The program must be owned by root and not writable by group or others. It will be invoked with a single argument of the username being authenticated, and should produce on standard output zero or more lines of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in .Xr sshd 8 ) . If a key supplied by AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully authenticate and authorize the user then public key authentication continues using the usual .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile files. By default, no AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. .It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand is run. It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host than running authorized keys commands. .It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile Specifies the file that contains the public keys that can be used for user authentication. The format is described in the AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT section of .Xr sshd 8 . .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile may contain tokens of the form %T which are substituted during connection setup. The following tokens are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is replaced by the username of that user. After expansion, .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home directory. Multiple files may be listed, separated by whitespace. The default is .Dq .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2 . .It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for certificate authentication. When using certificates signed by a key listed in .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys , this file lists names, one of which must appear in the certificate for it to be accepted for authentication. Names are listed one per line preceded by key options (as described in AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT in .Xr sshd 8 ) . Empty lines and comments starting with .Ql # are ignored. .Pp .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile may contain tokens of the form %T which are substituted during connection setup. The following tokens are defined: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is replaced by the username of that user. After expansion, .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home directory. .Pp The default is .Dq none , i.e. not to use a principals file \(en in this case, the username of the user must appear in a certificate's principals list for it to be accepted. Note that .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is only used when authentication proceeds using a CA listed in .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys and is not consulted for certification authorities trusted via .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys , though the .Cm principals= key option offers a similar facility (see .Xr sshd 8 for details). .It Cm Banner The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before authentication is allowed. If the argument is .Dq none then no banner is displayed. This option is only available for protocol version 2. By default, no banner is displayed. .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via -PAM or though authentication styles supported in +PAM or through authentication styles supported in .Xr login.conf 5 ) The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm ChrootDirectory Specifies the pathname of a directory to .Xr chroot 2 to after authentication. All components of the pathname must be root-owned directories that are not writable by any other user or group. After the chroot, .Xr sshd 8 changes the working directory to the user's home directory. .Pp The pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at runtime once the connecting user has been authenticated: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %h is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is replaced by the username of that user. .Pp The .Cm ChrootDirectory must contain the necessary files and directories to support the user's session. For an interactive session this requires at least a shell, typically .Xr sh 1 , and basic .Pa /dev nodes such as .Xr null 4 , .Xr zero 4 , .Xr stdin 4 , .Xr stdout 4 , .Xr stderr 4 , .Xr arandom 4 and .Xr tty 4 devices. For file transfer sessions using .Dq sftp , no additional configuration of the environment is necessary if the in-process sftp server is used, -though sessions which use logging do require +though sessions which use logging may require .Pa /dev/log -inside the chroot directory (see +inside the chroot directory on some operating systems (see .Xr sftp-server 8 for details). .Pp The default is not to .Xr chroot 2 . .It Cm Ciphers Specifies the ciphers allowed for protocol version 2. Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. The supported ciphers are: .Pp -.Dq 3des-cbc , -.Dq aes128-cbc , -.Dq aes192-cbc , -.Dq aes256-cbc , -.Dq aes128-ctr , -.Dq aes192-ctr , -.Dq aes256-ctr , -.Dq aes128-gcm@openssh.com , -.Dq aes256-gcm@openssh.com , -.Dq arcfour128 , -.Dq arcfour256 , -.Dq arcfour , -.Dq blowfish-cbc , -.Dq cast128-cbc , -and -.Dq chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com . +.Bl -item -compact -offset indent +.It +3des-cbc +.It +aes128-cbc +.It +aes192-cbc +.It +aes256-cbc +.It +aes128-ctr +.It +aes192-ctr +.It +aes256-ctr +.It +aes128-gcm@openssh.com +.It +aes256-gcm@openssh.com +.It +arcfour +.It +arcfour128 +.It +arcfour256 +.It +blowfish-cbc +.It +cast128-cbc +.It +chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com +.El .Pp The default is: -.Bd -literal -offset 3n -aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,arcfour256,arcfour128, +.Bd -literal -offset indent +aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com, -chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, -aes128-cbc,3des-cbc,blowfish-cbc,cast128-cbc,aes192-cbc, -aes256-cbc,arcfour +chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com .Ed .Pp The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using the .Fl Q option of .Xr ssh 1 . .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax Sets the number of client alive messages (see below) which may be sent without .Xr sshd 8 receiving any messages back from the client. If this threshold is reached while client alive messages are being sent, sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the session. It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is very different from .Cm TCPKeepAlive (below). The client alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option enabled by .Cm TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The client alive mechanism is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a connection has become inactive. .Pp The default value is 3. If .Cm ClientAliveInterval (see below) is set to 15, and .Cm ClientAliveCountMax is left at the default, unresponsive SSH clients will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm ClientAliveInterval Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received from the client, .Xr sshd 8 will send a message through the encrypted channel to request a response from the client. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the client. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm Compression Specifies whether compression is allowed, or delayed until the user has authenticated successfully. The argument must be .Dq yes , .Dq delayed , or .Dq no . The default is .Dq delayed . .It Cm DenyGroups This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns. Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: .Cm DenyUsers , .Cm AllowUsers , .Cm DenyGroups , and finally .Cm AllowGroups . .Pp See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .It Cm DenyUsers This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for user names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to particular users from particular hosts. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order: .Cm DenyUsers , .Cm AllowUsers , .Cm DenyGroups , and finally .Cm AllowGroups . .Pp See PATTERNS in .Xr ssh_config 5 for more information on patterns. .It Cm ForceCommand Forces the execution of the command specified by .Cm ForceCommand , ignoring any command supplied by the client and .Pa ~/.ssh/rc if present. The command is invoked by using the user's login shell with the -c option. This applies to shell, command, or subsystem execution. It is most useful inside a .Cm Match block. The command originally supplied by the client is available in the .Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Specifying a command of .Dq internal-sftp will force the use of an in-process sftp server that requires no support files when used with .Cm ChrootDirectory . .It Cm GatewayPorts Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports forwarded for the client. By default, .Xr sshd 8 binds remote port forwardings to the loopback address. This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. .Cm GatewayPorts can be used to specify that sshd should allow remote port forwardings to bind to non-loopback addresses, thus allowing other hosts to connect. The argument may be .Dq no to force remote port forwardings to be available to the local host only, .Dq yes to force remote port forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or .Dq clientspecified to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding is bound. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed. The default is .Dq no . Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache on logout. The default is .Dq yes . Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm HostbasedAuthentication Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together with successful public key client host authentication is allowed (host-based authentication). This option is similar to .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication and applies to protocol version 2 only. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a reverse name lookup when matching the name in the .Pa ~/.shosts , .Pa ~/.rhosts , and .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv files during .Cm HostbasedAuthentication . A setting of .Dq yes means that .Xr sshd 8 uses the name supplied by the client rather than attempting to resolve the name from the TCP connection itself. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm HostCertificate Specifies a file containing a public host certificate. The certificate's public key must match a private host key already specified by .Cm HostKey . The default behaviour of .Xr sshd 8 is not to load any certificates. .It Cm HostKey Specifies a file containing a private host key used by SSH. The default is .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key for protocol version 1, and .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key , .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key , .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and .Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key for protocol version 2. Note that .Xr sshd 8 will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-accessible. It is possible to have multiple host key files. .Dq rsa1 keys are used for version 1 and .Dq dsa , .Dq ecdsa , .Dq ed25519 or .Dq rsa are used for version 2 of the SSH protocol. It is also possible to specify public host key files instead. In this case operations on the private key will be delegated to an .Xr ssh-agent 1 . .It Cm HostKeyAgent Identifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with an agent that has access to the private host keys. If .Dq SSH_AUTH_SOCK is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. .It Cm IgnoreRhosts Specifies that .Pa .rhosts and .Pa .shosts files will not be used in .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication or .Cm HostbasedAuthentication . .Pp .Pa /etc/hosts.equiv and .Pa /etc/shosts.equiv are still used. The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm IgnoreUserKnownHosts Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should ignore the user's .Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts during .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication or .Cm HostbasedAuthentication . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the connection. Accepted values are .Dq af11 , .Dq af12 , .Dq af13 , .Dq af21 , .Dq af22 , .Dq af23 , .Dq af31 , .Dq af32 , .Dq af33 , .Dq af41 , .Dq af42 , .Dq af43 , .Dq cs0 , .Dq cs1 , .Dq cs2 , .Dq cs3 , .Dq cs4 , .Dq cs5 , .Dq cs6 , .Dq cs7 , .Dq ef , .Dq lowdelay , .Dq throughput , .Dq reliability , or a numeric value. This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions. The default is .Dq lowdelay for interactive sessions and .Dq throughput for non-interactive sessions. .It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication. The argument to this keyword must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is to use whatever value .Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication is set to (by default .Dq yes ) . .It Cm KerberosAuthentication Specifies whether the password provided by the user for .Cm PasswordAuthentication will be validated through the Kerberos KDC. To use this option, the server needs a Kerberos servtab which allows the verification of the KDC's identity. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm KerberosGetAFSToken If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to acquire an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm KerberosOrLocalPasswd If password authentication through Kerberos fails then the password will be validated via any additional local mechanism such as .Pa /etc/passwd . The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm KerberosTicketCleanup Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache file on logout. The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm KexAlgorithms Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. -The default is +The supported algorithms are: +.Pp +.Bl -item -compact -offset indent +.It +curve25519-sha256@libssh.org +.It +diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 +.It +diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 +.It +diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 +.It +diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 +.It +ecdh-sha2-nistp256 +.It +ecdh-sha2-nistp384 +.It +ecdh-sha2-nistp521 +.El +.Pp +The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent curve25519-sha256@libssh.org, ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521, diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256, -diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1, -diffie-hellman-group14-sha1, -diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 +diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 .Ed .It Cm KeyRegenerationInterval In protocol version 1, the ephemeral server key is automatically regenerated after this many seconds (if it has been used). The purpose of regeneration is to prevent decrypting captured sessions by later breaking into the machine and stealing the keys. The key is never stored anywhere. If the value is 0, the key is never regenerated. The default is 3600 (seconds). .It Cm ListenAddress Specifies the local addresses .Xr sshd 8 should listen on. The following forms may be used: .Pp .Bl -item -offset indent -compact .It .Cm ListenAddress .Sm off .Ar host No | Ar IPv4_addr No | Ar IPv6_addr .Sm on .It .Cm ListenAddress .Sm off .Ar host No | Ar IPv4_addr No : Ar port .Sm on .It .Cm ListenAddress .Sm off .Oo .Ar host No | Ar IPv6_addr Oc : Ar port .Sm on .El .Pp If .Ar port is not specified, sshd will listen on the address and all prior .Cm Port options specified. The default is to listen on all local addresses. Multiple .Cm ListenAddress options are permitted. Additionally, any .Cm Port options must precede this option for non-port qualified addresses. .It Cm LoginGraceTime The server disconnects after this time if the user has not successfully logged in. If the value is 0, there is no time limit. The default is 120 seconds. .It Cm LogLevel Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from .Xr sshd 8 . The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO. DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output. Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended. .It Cm MACs Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms. The MAC algorithm is used in protocol version 2 for data integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. The algorithms that contain .Dq -etm calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and their use recommended. +The supported MACs are: +.Pp +.Bl -item -compact -offset indent +.It +hmac-md5 +.It +hmac-md5-96 +.It +hmac-ripemd160 +.It +hmac-sha1 +.It +hmac-sha1-96 +.It +hmac-sha2-256 +.It +hmac-sha2-512 +.It +umac-64@openssh.com +.It +umac-128@openssh.com +.It +hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com +.It +hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com +.It +hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com +.It +hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com +.It +hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com +.It +hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com +.It +hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com +.It +umac-64-etm@openssh.com +.It +umac-128-etm@openssh.com +.El +.Pp The default is: .Bd -literal -offset indent -hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com, umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com, -hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com, -hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com, -hmac-md5,hmac-sha1,umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, -hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-ripemd160, -hmac-sha1-96,hmac-md5-96 +umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com, +hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512 .Ed .It Cm Match Introduces a conditional block. If all of the criteria on the .Cm Match line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines override those set in the global section of the config file, until either another .Cm Match line or the end of the file. If a keyword appears in multiple .Cm Match blocks that are satisified, only the first instance of the keyword is applied. .Pp The arguments to .Cm Match are one or more criteria-pattern pairs or the single token .Cm All which matches all criteria. The available criteria are .Cm User , .Cm Group , .Cm Host , .Cm LocalAddress , .Cm LocalPort , and .Cm Address . The match patterns may consist of single entries or comma-separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the PATTERNS section of .Xr ssh_config 5 . .Pp The patterns in an .Cm Address criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format, e.g.\& .Dq 192.0.2.0/24 or .Dq 3ffe:ffff::/32 . Note that the mask length provided must be consistent with the address - it is an error to specify a mask length that is too long for the address or one with bits set in this host portion of the address. For example, .Dq 192.0.2.0/33 and .Dq 192.0.2.0/8 respectively. .Pp Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a .Cm Match keyword. Available keywords are .Cm AcceptEnv , .Cm AllowAgentForwarding , .Cm AllowGroups , .Cm AllowTcpForwarding , .Cm AllowUsers , .Cm AuthenticationMethods , .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand , .Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser , .Cm AuthorizedKeysFile , .Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile , .Cm Banner , .Cm ChrootDirectory , .Cm DenyGroups , .Cm DenyUsers , .Cm ForceCommand , .Cm GatewayPorts , .Cm GSSAPIAuthentication , .Cm HostbasedAuthentication , .Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly , .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication , .Cm KerberosAuthentication , .Cm MaxAuthTries , .Cm MaxSessions , .Cm PasswordAuthentication , .Cm PermitEmptyPasswords , .Cm PermitOpen , .Cm PermitRootLogin , .Cm PermitTTY , .Cm PermitTunnel , +.Cm PermitUserRC , .Cm PubkeyAuthentication , .Cm RekeyLimit , .Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication , .Cm RSAAuthentication , .Cm X11DisplayOffset , .Cm X11Forwarding and .Cm X11UseLocalHost . .It Cm MaxAuthTries Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted per connection. Once the number of failures reaches half this value, additional failures are logged. The default is 6. .It Cm MaxSessions Specifies the maximum number of open sessions permitted per network connection. The default is 10. .It Cm MaxStartups Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated connections to the SSH daemon. Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the .Cm LoginGraceTime expires for a connection. The default is 10:30:100. .Pp Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying the three colon separated values .Dq start:rate:full (e.g. "10:30:60"). .Xr sshd 8 will refuse connection attempts with a probability of .Dq rate/100 (30%) if there are currently .Dq start (10) unauthenticated connections. The probability increases linearly and all connection attempts are refused if the number of unauthenticated connections reaches .Dq full (60). .It Cm PasswordAuthentication Specifies whether password authentication is allowed. The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm PermitEmptyPasswords When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the server allows login to accounts with empty password strings. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm PermitOpen Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is permitted. The forwarding specification must be one of the following forms: .Pp .Bl -item -offset indent -compact .It .Cm PermitOpen .Sm off .Ar host : port .Sm on .It .Cm PermitOpen .Sm off .Ar IPv4_addr : port .Sm on .It .Cm PermitOpen .Sm off .Ar \&[ IPv6_addr \&] : port .Sm on .El .Pp Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with whitespace. An argument of .Dq any can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any forwarding requests. An argument of .Dq none can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests. By default all port forwarding requests are permitted. .It Cm PermitRootLogin Specifies whether root can log in using .Xr ssh 1 . The argument must be .Dq yes , .Dq without-password , .Dq forced-commands-only , or .Dq no . The default is .Dq yes . .Pp If this option is set to .Dq without-password , password authentication is disabled for root. .Pp If this option is set to .Dq forced-commands-only , root login with public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the .Ar command option has been specified (which may be useful for taking remote backups even if root login is normally not allowed). All other authentication methods are disabled for root. .Pp If this option is set to .Dq no , root is not allowed to log in. .It Cm PermitTunnel Specifies whether .Xr tun 4 device forwarding is allowed. The argument must be .Dq yes , .Dq point-to-point (layer 3), .Dq ethernet (layer 2), or .Dq no . Specifying .Dq yes permits both .Dq point-to-point and .Dq ethernet . The default is .Dq no . .It Cm PermitTTY Specifies whether .Xr pty 4 allocation is permitted. The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm PermitUserEnvironment Specifies whether .Pa ~/.ssh/environment and .Cm environment= options in .Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys are processed by .Xr sshd 8 . The default is .Dq no . Enabling environment processing may enable users to bypass access restrictions in some configurations using mechanisms such as .Ev LD_PRELOAD . +.It Cm PermitUserRC +Specifies whether any +.Pa ~/.ssh/rc +file is executed. +The default is +.Dq yes . .It Cm PidFile Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the SSH daemon. The default is .Pa /var/run/sshd.pid . .It Cm Port Specifies the port number that .Xr sshd 8 listens on. The default is 22. Multiple options of this type are permitted. See also .Cm ListenAddress . .It Cm PrintLastLog Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should print the date and time of the last user login when a user logs in interactively. The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm PrintMotd Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should print .Pa /etc/motd when a user logs in interactively. (On some systems it is also printed by the shell, .Pa /etc/profile , or equivalent.) The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm Protocol Specifies the protocol versions .Xr sshd 8 supports. The possible values are .Sq 1 and .Sq 2 . Multiple versions must be comma-separated. The default is .Sq 2 . Note that the order of the protocol list does not indicate preference, because the client selects among multiple protocol versions offered by the server. Specifying .Dq 2,1 is identical to .Dq 1,2 . .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed. The default is .Dq yes . Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm RekeyLimit Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of .Sq K , .Sq M , or .Sq G to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between .Sq 1G and .Sq 4G , depending on the cipher. The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units documented in the .Sx TIME FORMATS section. The default value for .Cm RekeyLimit is .Dq default none , which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done. This option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm RevokedKeys Specifies revoked public keys. Keys listed in this file will be refused for public key authentication. Note that if this file is not readable, then public key authentication will be refused for all users. Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Cm RhostsRSAAuthentication Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together with successful RSA host authentication is allowed. The default is .Dq no . This option applies to protocol version 1 only. .It Cm RSAAuthentication Specifies whether pure RSA authentication is allowed. The default is .Dq yes . This option applies to protocol version 1 only. .It Cm ServerKeyBits Defines the number of bits in the ephemeral protocol version 1 server key. The minimum value is 512, and the default is 1024. +.It Cm StreamLocalBindMask +Sets the octal file creation mode mask +.Pq umask +used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote +port forwarding. +This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. +.Pp +The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is +readable and writable only by the owner. +Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain +socket files. +.It Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink +Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local +or remote port forwarding before creating a new one. +If the socket file already exists and +.Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink +is not enabled, +.Nm sshd +will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-domain socket file. +This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file. +.Pp +The argument must be +.Dq yes +or +.Dq no . +The default is +.Dq no . .It Cm StrictModes Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should check file modes and ownership of the user's files and home directory before accepting login. This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally leave their directory or files world-writable. The default is .Dq yes . Note that this does not apply to .Cm ChrootDirectory , whose permissions and ownership are checked unconditionally. .It Cm Subsystem Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon). Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional arguments) to execute upon subsystem request. .Pp The command .Xr sftp-server 8 implements the .Dq sftp file transfer subsystem. .Pp Alternately the name .Dq internal-sftp implements an in-process .Dq sftp server. This may simplify configurations using .Cm ChrootDirectory to force a different filesystem root on clients. .Pp By default no subsystems are defined. Note that this option applies to protocol version 2 only. .It Cm SyslogFacility Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from .Xr sshd 8 . The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The default is AUTH. .It Cm TCPKeepAlive Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However, this means that connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people find it annoying. On the other hand, if TCP keepalives are not sent, sessions may hang indefinitely on the server, leaving .Dq ghost users and consuming server resources. .Pp The default is .Dq yes (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the server will notice if the network goes down or the client host crashes. This avoids infinitely hanging sessions. .Pp To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to .Dq no . .It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are trusted to sign user certificates for authentication. Keys are listed one per line; empty lines and comments starting with .Ql # are allowed. If a certificate is presented for authentication and has its signing CA key listed in this file, then it may be used for authentication for any user listed in the certificate's principals list. Note that certificates that lack a list of principals will not be permitted for authentication using .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys . For more details on certificates, see the CERTIFICATES section in .Xr ssh-keygen 1 . .It Cm UseDNS Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should look up the remote host name and check that the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the very same IP address. The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm UseLogin Specifies whether .Xr login 1 is used for interactive login sessions. The default is .Dq no . Note that .Xr login 1 is never used for remote command execution. Note also, that if this is enabled, .Cm X11Forwarding will be disabled because .Xr login 1 does not know how to handle .Xr xauth 1 cookies. If .Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation is specified, it will be disabled after authentication. .It Cm UsePAM Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface. If set to .Dq yes this will enable PAM authentication using .Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication and .Cm PasswordAuthentication in addition to PAM account and session module processing for all authentication types. .Pp Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable either .Cm PasswordAuthentication or .Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication. .Pp If .Cm UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run .Xr sshd 8 as a non-root user. The default is .Dq no . .It Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 separates privileges by creating an unprivileged child process to deal with incoming network traffic. After successful authentication, another process will be created that has the privilege of the authenticated user. The goal of privilege separation is to prevent privilege escalation by containing any corruption within the unprivileged processes. The default is .Dq yes . If .Cm UsePrivilegeSeparation is set to .Dq sandbox then the pre-authentication unprivileged process is subject to additional restrictions. .It Cm VersionAddendum Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner sent by the server upon connection. The default is .Dq none . .It Cm X11DisplayOffset Specifies the first display number available for .Xr sshd 8 Ns 's X11 forwarding. This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers. The default is 10. .It Cm X11Forwarding Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq no . .Pp When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure to the server and to client displays if the .Xr sshd 8 proxy display is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see .Cm X11UseLocalhost below), though this is not the default. Additionally, the authentication spoofing and authentication data verification and substitution occur on the client side. The security risk of using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11 display server may be exposed to attack when the SSH client requests forwarding (see the warnings for .Cm ForwardX11 in .Xr ssh_config 5 ) . A system administrator may have a stance in which they want to protect clients that may expose themselves to attack by unwittingly requesting X11 forwarding, which can warrant a .Dq no setting. .Pp Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own forwarders. X11 forwarding is automatically disabled if .Cm UseLogin is enabled. .It Cm X11UseLocalhost Specifies whether .Xr sshd 8 should bind the X11 forwarding server to the loopback address or to the wildcard address. By default, sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets the hostname part of the .Ev DISPLAY environment variable to .Dq localhost . This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display. However, some older X11 clients may not function with this configuration. .Cm X11UseLocalhost may be set to .Dq no to specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the wildcard address. The argument must be .Dq yes or .Dq no . The default is .Dq yes . .It Cm XAuthLocation Specifies the full pathname of the .Xr xauth 1 program. The default is .Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth . .El .Sh TIME FORMATS .Xr sshd 8 command-line arguments and configuration file options that specify time may be expressed using a sequence of the form: .Sm off .Ar time Op Ar qualifier , .Sm on where .Ar time is a positive integer value and .Ar qualifier is one of the following: .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent .It Aq Cm none seconds .It Cm s | Cm S seconds .It Cm m | Cm M minutes .It Cm h | Cm H hours .It Cm d | Cm D days .It Cm w | Cm W weeks .El .Pp Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate the total time value. .Pp Time format examples: .Pp .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent .It 600 600 seconds (10 minutes) .It 10m 10 minutes .It 1h30m 1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes) .El .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Ds .It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config Contains configuration data for .Xr sshd 8 . This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended (though not necessary) that it be world-readable. .El .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr sshd 8 .Sh AUTHORS OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support for privilege separation. Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssherr.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssherr.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssherr.c (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssherr.c,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:29:56 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#include +#include +#include "ssherr.h" + +const char * +ssh_err(int n) +{ + switch (n) { + case SSH_ERR_SUCCESS: + return "success"; + case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR: + return "unexpected internal error"; + case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL: + return "memory allocation failed"; + case SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE: + return "incomplete message"; + case SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT: + return "invalid format"; + case SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE: + return "bignum is negative"; + case SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE: + return "string is too large"; + case SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE: + return "bignum is too large"; + case SSH_ERR_ECPOINT_TOO_LARGE: + return "elliptic curve point is too large"; + case SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE: + return "insufficient buffer space"; + case SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT: + return "invalid argument"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH: + return "key bits do not match"; + case SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID: + return "invalid elliptic curve"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH: + return "key type does not match"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN: + return "unknown or unsupported key type"; + case SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH: + return "elliptic curve does not match"; + case SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT: + return "plain key provided where certificate required"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB: + return "key lacks certificate data"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE: + return "unknown/unsupported certificate type"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY: + return "invalid certificate signing key"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE: + return "invalid elliptic curve value"; + case SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID: + return "incorrect signature"; + case SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR: + return "error in libcrypto"; /* XXX fetch and return */ + case SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA: + return "unexpected bytes remain after decoding"; + case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR: + return strerror(errno); + case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID: + return "invalid certificate"; + case SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION: + return "communication with agent failed"; + case SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE: + return "agent refused operation"; + case SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE: + return "DH GEX group out of range"; + case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED: + return "disconnected"; + case SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID: + return "message authentication code incorrect"; + case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH: + return "no matching cipher found"; + case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH: + return "no matching MAC found"; + case SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH: + return "no matching compression method found"; + case SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH: + return "no matching key exchange method found"; + case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH: + return "no matching host key type found"; + case SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH: + return "protocol version mismatch"; + case SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION: + return "could not read protocol version"; + case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED: + return "could not load host key"; + case SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY: + return "rekeying not supported by peer"; + case SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT: + return "passphrase is too short (minimum four characters)"; + case SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED: + return "file changed while reading"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER: + return "key encrypted using unsupported cipher"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE: + return "incorrect passphrase supplied to decrypt private key"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS: + return "bad permissions"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH: + return "certificate does not match key"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND: + return "key not found"; + case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT: + return "agent not present"; + case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES: + return "agent contains no identities"; + case SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC: + return "KRL file has invalid magic number"; + case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED: + return "Key is revoked"; + default: + return "unknown error"; + } +} Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssherr.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssherr.h (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/ssherr.h (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: ssherr.h,v 1.1 2014/04/30 05:29:56 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller + * + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies. + * + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE. + */ + +#ifndef _SSHERR_H +#define _SSHERR_H + +/* XXX are these too granular? not granular enough? I can't decide - djm */ + +/* Error codes */ +#define SSH_ERR_SUCCESS 0 +#define SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR -1 +#define SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL -2 +#define SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE -3 +#define SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT -4 +#define SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE -5 +#define SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE -6 +#define SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE -7 +#define SSH_ERR_ECPOINT_TOO_LARGE -8 +#define SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE -9 +#define SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT -10 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH -11 +#define SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID -12 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH -13 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN -14 /* XXX UNSUPPORTED? */ +#define SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH -15 +#define SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT -16 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB -17 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE -18 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY -19 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE -20 +#define SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID -21 +#define SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR -22 +#define SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA -23 +#define SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR -24 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID -25 +#define SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION -26 +#define SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE -27 +#define SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE -28 +#define SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED -29 +#define SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID -30 +#define SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH -31 +#define SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH -32 +#define SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH -33 +#define SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH -34 +#define SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH -35 +#define SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED -36 +#define SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH -37 +#define SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION -38 +#define SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY -39 +#define SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT -40 +#define SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED -41 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER -42 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE -43 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS -44 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH -45 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND -46 +#define SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT -47 +#define SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES -48 +#define SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY -49 +#define SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC -50 +#define SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED -51 + +/* Translate a numeric error code to a human-readable error string */ +const char *ssh_err(int n); + +#endif /* _SSHERR_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshkey.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshkey.c (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshkey.c (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,3856 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.3 2014/07/03 01:45:38 djm Exp $ */ +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2008 Alexander von Gernler. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2010,2011 Damien Miller. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include "includes.h" + +#include +#include + +#include +#include +#include + +#include "crypto_api.h" + +#include +#include +#include +#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H +#include +#endif /* HAVE_UTIL_H */ + +#include "ssh2.h" +#include "ssherr.h" +#include "misc.h" +#include "sshbuf.h" +#include "rsa.h" +#include "cipher.h" +#include "digest.h" +#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL +#include "sshkey.h" + +/* openssh private key file format */ +#define MARK_BEGIN "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n" +#define MARK_END "-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n" +#define MARK_BEGIN_LEN (sizeof(MARK_BEGIN) - 1) +#define MARK_END_LEN (sizeof(MARK_END) - 1) +#define KDFNAME "bcrypt" +#define AUTH_MAGIC "openssh-key-v1" +#define SALT_LEN 16 +#define DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME "aes256-cbc" +#define DEFAULT_ROUNDS 16 + +/* Version identification string for SSH v1 identity files. */ +#define LEGACY_BEGIN "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE FORMAT 1.1\n" + +static int sshkey_from_blob_internal(const u_char *blob, size_t blen, + struct sshkey **keyp, int allow_cert); + +/* Supported key types */ +struct keytype { + const char *name; + const char *shortname; + int type; + int nid; + int cert; +}; +static const struct keytype keytypes[] = { + { "ssh-ed25519", "ED25519", KEY_ED25519, 0, 0 }, + { "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ED25519-CERT", + KEY_ED25519_CERT, 0, 1 }, +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + { NULL, "RSA1", KEY_RSA1, 0, 0 }, + { "ssh-rsa", "RSA", KEY_RSA, 0, 0 }, + { "ssh-dss", "DSA", KEY_DSA, 0, 0 }, +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256", "ECDSA", KEY_ECDSA, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 0 }, + { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384", "ECDSA", KEY_ECDSA, NID_secp384r1, 0 }, +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 + { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521", "ECDSA", KEY_ECDSA, NID_secp521r1, 0 }, +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + { "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT", KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, 1 }, + { "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com", "DSA-CERT", KEY_DSA_CERT, 0, 1 }, +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", + KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1 }, + { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", + KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp384r1, 1 }, +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 + { "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", + KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp521r1, 1 }, +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + { "ssh-rsa-cert-v00@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT-V00", + KEY_RSA_CERT_V00, 0, 1 }, + { "ssh-dss-cert-v00@openssh.com", "DSA-CERT-V00", + KEY_DSA_CERT_V00, 0, 1 }, +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + { NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0 } +}; + +const char * +sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *k) +{ + const struct keytype *kt; + + for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { + if (kt->type == k->type) + return kt->shortname; + } + return "unknown"; +} + +static const char * +sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(int type, int nid) +{ + const struct keytype *kt; + + for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { + if (kt->type == type && (kt->nid == 0 || kt->nid == nid)) + return kt->name; + } + return "ssh-unknown"; +} + +int +sshkey_type_is_cert(int type) +{ + const struct keytype *kt; + + for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { + if (kt->type == type) + return kt->cert; + } + return 0; +} + +const char * +sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *k) +{ + return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(k->type, k->ecdsa_nid); +} + +const char * +sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *k) +{ + return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(sshkey_type_plain(k->type), + k->ecdsa_nid); +} + +int +sshkey_type_from_name(const char *name) +{ + const struct keytype *kt; + + for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { + /* Only allow shortname matches for plain key types */ + if ((kt->name != NULL && strcmp(name, kt->name) == 0) || + (!kt->cert && strcasecmp(kt->shortname, name) == 0)) + return kt->type; + } + return KEY_UNSPEC; +} + +int +sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *name) +{ + const struct keytype *kt; + + for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { + if (kt->type != KEY_ECDSA && kt->type != KEY_ECDSA_CERT) + continue; + if (kt->name != NULL && strcmp(name, kt->name) == 0) + return kt->nid; + } + return -1; +} + +char * +key_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only) +{ + char *tmp, *ret = NULL; + size_t nlen, rlen = 0; + const struct keytype *kt; + + for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) { + if (kt->name == NULL) + continue; + if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert)) + continue; + if (ret != NULL) + ret[rlen++] = '\n'; + nlen = strlen(kt->name); + if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) { + free(ret); + return NULL; + } + ret = tmp; + memcpy(ret + rlen, kt->name, nlen + 1); + rlen += nlen; + } + return ret; +} + +int +sshkey_names_valid2(const char *names) +{ + char *s, *cp, *p; + + if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0) + return 0; + if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL) + return 0; + for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; + (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { + switch (sshkey_type_from_name(p)) { + case KEY_RSA1: + case KEY_UNSPEC: + free(s); + return 0; + } + } + free(s); + return 1; +} + +u_int +sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *k) +{ + switch (k->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_RSA1: + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + return BN_num_bits(k->rsa->n); + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + return BN_num_bits(k->dsa->p); + case KEY_ECDSA: + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + return sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(k->ecdsa_nid); +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + return 256; /* XXX */ + } + return 0; +} + +int +sshkey_cert_is_legacy(const struct sshkey *k) +{ + switch (k->type) { + case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: + return 1; + default: + return 0; + } +} + +static int +sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type) +{ + switch (type) { + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_ECDSA: + case KEY_ED25519: + return 1; + default: + return 0; + } +} + +int +sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k) +{ + if (k == NULL) + return 0; + return sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type); +} + +/* Return the cert-less equivalent to a certified key type */ +int +sshkey_type_plain(int type) +{ + switch (type) { + case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + return KEY_RSA; + case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + return KEY_DSA; + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + return KEY_ECDSA; + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + return KEY_ED25519; + default: + return type; + } +} + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +/* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */ +int +sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name) +{ + if (strcmp(name, "nistp256") == 0) + return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; + else if (strcmp(name, "nistp384") == 0) + return NID_secp384r1; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 + else if (strcmp(name, "nistp521") == 0) + return NID_secp521r1; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ + else + return -1; +} + +u_int +sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(int nid) +{ + switch (nid) { + case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: + return 256; + case NID_secp384r1: + return 384; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 + case NID_secp521r1: + return 521; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ + default: + return 0; + } +} + +int +sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int bits) +{ + switch (bits) { + case 256: + return NID_X9_62_prime256v1; + case 384: + return NID_secp384r1; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 + case 521: + return NID_secp521r1; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ + default: + return -1; + } +} + +const char * +sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(int nid) +{ + switch (nid) { + case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: + return "nistp256"; + case NID_secp384r1: + return "nistp384"; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 + case NID_secp521r1: + return "nistp521"; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ + default: + return NULL; + } +} + +int +sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid) +{ + int kbits = sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(nid); + + if (kbits <= 0) + return -1; + + /* RFC5656 section 6.2.1 */ + if (kbits <= 256) + return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256; + else if (kbits <= 384) + return SSH_DIGEST_SHA384; + else + return SSH_DIGEST_SHA512; +} +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +static void +cert_free(struct sshkey_cert *cert) +{ + u_int i; + + if (cert == NULL) + return; + if (cert->certblob != NULL) + sshbuf_free(cert->certblob); + if (cert->critical != NULL) + sshbuf_free(cert->critical); + if (cert->extensions != NULL) + sshbuf_free(cert->extensions); + if (cert->key_id != NULL) + free(cert->key_id); + for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) + free(cert->principals[i]); + if (cert->principals != NULL) + free(cert->principals); + if (cert->signature_key != NULL) + sshkey_free(cert->signature_key); + explicit_bzero(cert, sizeof(*cert)); + free(cert); +} + +static struct sshkey_cert * +cert_new(void) +{ + struct sshkey_cert *cert; + + if ((cert = calloc(1, sizeof(*cert))) == NULL) + return NULL; + if ((cert->certblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (cert->critical = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (cert->extensions = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + cert_free(cert); + return NULL; + } + cert->key_id = NULL; + cert->principals = NULL; + cert->signature_key = NULL; + return cert; +} + +struct sshkey * +sshkey_new(int type) +{ + struct sshkey *k; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + RSA *rsa; + DSA *dsa; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + + if ((k = calloc(1, sizeof(*k))) == NULL) + return NULL; + k->type = type; + k->ecdsa = NULL; + k->ecdsa_nid = -1; + k->dsa = NULL; + k->rsa = NULL; + k->cert = NULL; + k->ed25519_sk = NULL; + k->ed25519_pk = NULL; + switch (k->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_RSA1: + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL || + (rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL || + (rsa->e = BN_new()) == NULL) { + if (rsa != NULL) + RSA_free(rsa); + free(k); + return NULL; + } + k->rsa = rsa; + break; + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL || + (dsa->p = BN_new()) == NULL || + (dsa->q = BN_new()) == NULL || + (dsa->g = BN_new()) == NULL || + (dsa->pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL) { + if (dsa != NULL) + DSA_free(dsa); + free(k); + return NULL; + } + k->dsa = dsa; + break; + case KEY_ECDSA: + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + /* Cannot do anything until we know the group */ + break; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + /* no need to prealloc */ + break; + case KEY_UNSPEC: + break; + default: + free(k); + return NULL; + break; + } + + if (sshkey_is_cert(k)) { + if ((k->cert = cert_new()) == NULL) { + sshkey_free(k); + return NULL; + } + } + + return k; +} + +int +sshkey_add_private(struct sshkey *k) +{ + switch (k->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_RSA1: + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: +#define bn_maybe_alloc_failed(p) (p == NULL && (p = BN_new()) == NULL) + if (bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->d) || + bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->iqmp) || + bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->q) || + bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->p) || + bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->dmq1) || + bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->rsa->dmp1)) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + break; + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + if (bn_maybe_alloc_failed(k->dsa->priv_key)) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + break; +#undef bn_maybe_alloc_failed + case KEY_ECDSA: + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + /* Cannot do anything until we know the group */ + break; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + /* no need to prealloc */ + break; + case KEY_UNSPEC: + break; + default: + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + return 0; +} + +struct sshkey * +sshkey_new_private(int type) +{ + struct sshkey *k = sshkey_new(type); + + if (k == NULL) + return NULL; + if (sshkey_add_private(k) != 0) { + sshkey_free(k); + return NULL; + } + return k; +} + +void +sshkey_free(struct sshkey *k) +{ + if (k == NULL) + return; + switch (k->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_RSA1: + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + if (k->rsa != NULL) + RSA_free(k->rsa); + k->rsa = NULL; + break; + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + if (k->dsa != NULL) + DSA_free(k->dsa); + k->dsa = NULL; + break; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA: + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + if (k->ecdsa != NULL) + EC_KEY_free(k->ecdsa); + k->ecdsa = NULL; + break; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + if (k->ed25519_pk) { + explicit_bzero(k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ); + free(k->ed25519_pk); + k->ed25519_pk = NULL; + } + if (k->ed25519_sk) { + explicit_bzero(k->ed25519_sk, ED25519_SK_SZ); + free(k->ed25519_sk); + k->ed25519_sk = NULL; + } + break; + case KEY_UNSPEC: + break; + default: + break; + } + if (sshkey_is_cert(k)) + cert_free(k->cert); + explicit_bzero(k, sizeof(*k)); + free(k); +} + +static int +cert_compare(struct sshkey_cert *a, struct sshkey_cert *b) +{ + if (a == NULL && b == NULL) + return 1; + if (a == NULL || b == NULL) + return 0; + if (sshbuf_len(a->certblob) != sshbuf_len(b->certblob)) + return 0; + if (timingsafe_bcmp(sshbuf_ptr(a->certblob), sshbuf_ptr(b->certblob), + sshbuf_len(a->certblob)) != 0) + return 0; + return 1; +} + +/* + * Compare public portions of key only, allowing comparisons between + * certificates and plain keys too. + */ +int +sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b) +{ +#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) + BN_CTX *bnctx; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + + if (a == NULL || b == NULL || + sshkey_type_plain(a->type) != sshkey_type_plain(b->type)) + return 0; + + switch (a->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_RSA1: + case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + case KEY_RSA: + return a->rsa != NULL && b->rsa != NULL && + BN_cmp(a->rsa->e, b->rsa->e) == 0 && + BN_cmp(a->rsa->n, b->rsa->n) == 0; + case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + case KEY_DSA: + return a->dsa != NULL && b->dsa != NULL && + BN_cmp(a->dsa->p, b->dsa->p) == 0 && + BN_cmp(a->dsa->q, b->dsa->q) == 0 && + BN_cmp(a->dsa->g, b->dsa->g) == 0 && + BN_cmp(a->dsa->pub_key, b->dsa->pub_key) == 0; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA: + if (a->ecdsa == NULL || b->ecdsa == NULL || + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa) == NULL || + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa) == NULL) + return 0; + if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + return 0; + if (EC_GROUP_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa), + EC_KEY_get0_group(b->ecdsa), bnctx) != 0 || + EC_POINT_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa), + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa), + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa), bnctx) != 0) { + BN_CTX_free(bnctx); + return 0; + } + BN_CTX_free(bnctx); + return 1; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + return a->ed25519_pk != NULL && b->ed25519_pk != NULL && + memcmp(a->ed25519_pk, b->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ) == 0; + default: + return 0; + } + /* NOTREACHED */ +} + +int +sshkey_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b) +{ + if (a == NULL || b == NULL || a->type != b->type) + return 0; + if (sshkey_is_cert(a)) { + if (!cert_compare(a->cert, b->cert)) + return 0; + } + return sshkey_equal_public(a, b); +} + +static int +to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, int force_plain) +{ + int type, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + const char *typename; + + if (key == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + + type = force_plain ? sshkey_type_plain(key->type) : key->type; + typename = sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid); + + switch (type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + /* Use the existing blob */ + /* XXX modified flag? */ + if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0) + return ret; + break; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_DSA: + if (key->dsa == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key)) != 0) + return ret; + break; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA: + if (key->ecdsa == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, + sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0) + return ret; + break; +# endif + case KEY_RSA: + if (key->rsa == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n)) != 0) + return ret; + break; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + if (key->ed25519_pk == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_string(b, + key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0) + return ret; + break; + default: + return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + } + return 0; +} + +int +sshkey_to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) +{ + return to_blob_buf(key, b, 0); +} + +int +sshkey_plain_to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) +{ + return to_blob_buf(key, b, 1); +} + +static int +to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp, int force_plain) +{ + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + size_t len; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + if (blobp != NULL) + *blobp = NULL; + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((ret = to_blob_buf(key, b, force_plain)) != 0) + goto out; + len = sshbuf_len(b); + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = len; + if (blobp != NULL) { + if ((*blobp = malloc(len)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + memcpy(*blobp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len); + } + ret = 0; + out: + sshbuf_free(b); + return ret; +} + +int +sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp) +{ + return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 0); +} + +int +sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp) +{ + return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 1); +} + +int +sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k, enum sshkey_fp_type dgst_type, + u_char **retp, size_t *lenp) +{ + u_char *blob = NULL, *ret = NULL; + size_t blob_len = 0; + int hash_alg = -1, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (retp != NULL) + *retp = NULL; + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + + switch (dgst_type) { + case SSH_FP_MD5: + hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_MD5; + break; + case SSH_FP_SHA1: + hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1; + break; + case SSH_FP_SHA256: + hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256; + break; + default: + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + + if (k->type == KEY_RSA1) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + int nlen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->n); + int elen = BN_num_bytes(k->rsa->e); + + blob_len = nlen + elen; + if (nlen >= INT_MAX - elen || + (blob = malloc(blob_len)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->n, blob); + BN_bn2bin(k->rsa->e, blob + nlen); +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + } else if ((r = to_blob(k, &blob, &blob_len, 1)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((ret = calloc(1, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, blob, blob_len, + ret, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0) + goto out; + /* success */ + if (retp != NULL) { + *retp = ret; + ret = NULL; + } + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg); + r = 0; + out: + free(ret); + if (blob != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(blob, blob_len); + free(blob); + } + return r; +} + +static char * +fingerprint_hex(u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len) +{ + char *retval; + size_t i; + + if ((retval = calloc(1, dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1)) == NULL) + return NULL; + for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) { + char hex[4]; + snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%02x:", dgst_raw[i]); + strlcat(retval, hex, dgst_raw_len * 3 + 1); + } + + /* Remove the trailing ':' character */ + retval[(dgst_raw_len * 3) - 1] = '\0'; + return retval; +} + +static char * +fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len) +{ + char vowels[] = { 'a', 'e', 'i', 'o', 'u', 'y' }; + char consonants[] = { 'b', 'c', 'd', 'f', 'g', 'h', 'k', 'l', 'm', + 'n', 'p', 'r', 's', 't', 'v', 'z', 'x' }; + u_int i, j = 0, rounds, seed = 1; + char *retval; + + rounds = (dgst_raw_len / 2) + 1; + if ((retval = calloc(rounds, 6)) == NULL) + return NULL; + retval[j++] = 'x'; + for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) { + u_int idx0, idx1, idx2, idx3, idx4; + if ((i + 1 < rounds) || (dgst_raw_len % 2 != 0)) { + idx0 = (((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 6) & 3) + + seed) % 6; + idx1 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 2) & 15; + idx2 = ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) & 3) + + (seed / 6)) % 6; + retval[j++] = vowels[idx0]; + retval[j++] = consonants[idx1]; + retval[j++] = vowels[idx2]; + if ((i + 1) < rounds) { + idx3 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])) >> 4) & 15; + idx4 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1]))) & 15; + retval[j++] = consonants[idx3]; + retval[j++] = '-'; + retval[j++] = consonants[idx4]; + seed = ((seed * 5) + + ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) * 7) + + ((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])))) % 36; + } + } else { + idx0 = seed % 6; + idx1 = 16; + idx2 = seed / 6; + retval[j++] = vowels[idx0]; + retval[j++] = consonants[idx1]; + retval[j++] = vowels[idx2]; + } + } + retval[j++] = 'x'; + retval[j++] = '\0'; + return retval; +} + +/* + * Draw an ASCII-Art representing the fingerprint so human brain can + * profit from its built-in pattern recognition ability. + * This technique is called "random art" and can be found in some + * scientific publications like this original paper: + * + * "Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security", + * Perrig A. and Song D., 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic + * Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99) + * sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/projects/validation/validation.pdf + * + * The subject came up in a talk by Dan Kaminsky, too. + * + * If you see the picture is different, the key is different. + * If the picture looks the same, you still know nothing. + * + * The algorithm used here is a worm crawling over a discrete plane, + * leaving a trace (augmenting the field) everywhere it goes. + * Movement is taken from dgst_raw 2bit-wise. Bumping into walls + * makes the respective movement vector be ignored for this turn. + * Graphs are not unambiguous, because circles in graphs can be + * walked in either direction. + */ + +/* + * Field sizes for the random art. Have to be odd, so the starting point + * can be in the exact middle of the picture, and FLDBASE should be >=8 . + * Else pictures would be too dense, and drawing the frame would + * fail, too, because the key type would not fit in anymore. + */ +#define FLDBASE 8 +#define FLDSIZE_Y (FLDBASE + 1) +#define FLDSIZE_X (FLDBASE * 2 + 1) +static char * +fingerprint_randomart(u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len, + const struct sshkey *k) +{ + /* + * Chars to be used after each other every time the worm + * intersects with itself. Matter of taste. + */ + char *augmentation_string = " .o+=*BOX@%&#/^SE"; + char *retval, *p, title[FLDSIZE_X]; + u_char field[FLDSIZE_X][FLDSIZE_Y]; + size_t i, tlen; + u_int b; + int x, y, r; + size_t len = strlen(augmentation_string) - 1; + + if ((retval = calloc((FLDSIZE_X + 3), (FLDSIZE_Y + 2))) == NULL) + return NULL; + + /* initialize field */ + memset(field, 0, FLDSIZE_X * FLDSIZE_Y * sizeof(char)); + x = FLDSIZE_X / 2; + y = FLDSIZE_Y / 2; + + /* process raw key */ + for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) { + int input; + /* each byte conveys four 2-bit move commands */ + input = dgst_raw[i]; + for (b = 0; b < 4; b++) { + /* evaluate 2 bit, rest is shifted later */ + x += (input & 0x1) ? 1 : -1; + y += (input & 0x2) ? 1 : -1; + + /* assure we are still in bounds */ + x = MAX(x, 0); + y = MAX(y, 0); + x = MIN(x, FLDSIZE_X - 1); + y = MIN(y, FLDSIZE_Y - 1); + + /* augment the field */ + if (field[x][y] < len - 2) + field[x][y]++; + input = input >> 2; + } + } + + /* mark starting point and end point*/ + field[FLDSIZE_X / 2][FLDSIZE_Y / 2] = len - 1; + field[x][y] = len; + + /* assemble title */ + r = snprintf(title, sizeof(title), "[%s %u]", + sshkey_type(k), sshkey_size(k)); + /* If [type size] won't fit, then try [type]; fits "[ED25519-CERT]" */ + if (r < 0 || r > (int)sizeof(title)) + snprintf(title, sizeof(title), "[%s]", sshkey_type(k)); + tlen = strlen(title); + + /* output upper border */ + p = retval; + *p++ = '+'; + for (i = 0; i < (FLDSIZE_X - tlen) / 2; i++) + *p++ = '-'; + memcpy(p, title, tlen); + p += tlen; + for (i = p - retval - 1; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++) + *p++ = '-'; + *p++ = '+'; + *p++ = '\n'; + + /* output content */ + for (y = 0; y < FLDSIZE_Y; y++) { + *p++ = '|'; + for (x = 0; x < FLDSIZE_X; x++) + *p++ = augmentation_string[MIN(field[x][y], len)]; + *p++ = '|'; + *p++ = '\n'; + } + + /* output lower border */ + *p++ = '+'; + for (i = 0; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++) + *p++ = '-'; + *p++ = '+'; + + return retval; +} + +char * +sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *k, enum sshkey_fp_type dgst_type, + enum sshkey_fp_rep dgst_rep) +{ + char *retval = NULL; + u_char *dgst_raw; + size_t dgst_raw_len; + + if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(k, dgst_type, &dgst_raw, &dgst_raw_len) != 0) + return NULL; + switch (dgst_rep) { + case SSH_FP_HEX: + retval = fingerprint_hex(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); + break; + case SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE: + retval = fingerprint_bubblebabble(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); + break; + case SSH_FP_RANDOMART: + retval = fingerprint_randomart(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, k); + break; + default: + explicit_bzero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); + free(dgst_raw); + return NULL; + } + explicit_bzero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len); + free(dgst_raw); + return retval; +} + +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 +/* + * Reads a multiple-precision integer in decimal from the buffer, and advances + * the pointer. The integer must already be initialized. This function is + * permitted to modify the buffer. This leaves *cpp to point just beyond the + * last processed character. + */ +static int +read_decimal_bignum(char **cpp, BIGNUM *v) +{ + char *cp; + size_t e; + int skip = 1; /* skip white space */ + + cp = *cpp; + while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t') + cp++; + e = strspn(cp, "0123456789"); + if (e == 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + if (e > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 3) + return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE; + if (cp[e] == '\0') + skip = 0; + else if (index(" \t\r\n", cp[e]) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + cp[e] = '\0'; + if (BN_dec2bn(&v, cp) <= 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + *cpp = cp + e + skip; + return 0; +} +#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ + +/* returns 0 ok, and < 0 error */ +int +sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp) +{ + struct sshkey *k; + int retval = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + char *cp, *space; + int r, type, curve_nid = -1; + struct sshbuf *blob; +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 + char *ep; + u_long bits; +#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ + + cp = *cpp; + + switch (ret->type) { + case KEY_RSA1: +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 + /* Get number of bits. */ + bits = strtoul(cp, &ep, 10); + if (*cp == '\0' || index(" \t\r\n", *ep) == NULL || + bits == 0 || bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* Bad bit count... */ + /* Get public exponent, public modulus. */ + if ((r = read_decimal_bignum(&ep, ret->rsa->e)) < 0) + return r; + if ((r = read_decimal_bignum(&ep, ret->rsa->n)) < 0) + return r; + *cpp = ep; + /* validate the claimed number of bits */ + if (BN_num_bits(ret->rsa->n) != (int)bits) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH; + retval = 0; +#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ + break; + case KEY_UNSPEC: + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_ECDSA: + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + space = strchr(cp, ' '); + if (space == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + *space = '\0'; + type = sshkey_type_from_name(cp); + if (sshkey_type_plain(type) == KEY_ECDSA && + (curve_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(cp)) == -1) + return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID; + *space = ' '; + if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + cp = space+1; + if (*cp == '\0') + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + if (ret->type == KEY_UNSPEC) { + ret->type = type; + } else if (ret->type != type) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; + if ((blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + /* trim comment */ + space = strchr(cp, ' '); + if (space) + *space = '\0'; + if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(blob, cp)) != 0) { + sshbuf_free(blob); + return r; + } + if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(blob), + sshbuf_len(blob), &k)) != 0) { + sshbuf_free(blob); + return r; + } + sshbuf_free(blob); + if (k->type != type) { + sshkey_free(k); + return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH; + } + if (sshkey_type_plain(type) == KEY_ECDSA && + curve_nid != k->ecdsa_nid) { + sshkey_free(k); + return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH; + } +/*XXXX*/ + if (sshkey_is_cert(ret)) { + if (!sshkey_is_cert(k)) { + sshkey_free(k); + return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT; + } + if (ret->cert != NULL) + cert_free(ret->cert); + ret->cert = k->cert; + k->cert = NULL; + } +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + if (sshkey_type_plain(ret->type) == KEY_RSA) { + if (ret->rsa != NULL) + RSA_free(ret->rsa); + ret->rsa = k->rsa; + k->rsa = NULL; +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + RSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->rsa, 8); +#endif + } + if (sshkey_type_plain(ret->type) == KEY_DSA) { + if (ret->dsa != NULL) + DSA_free(ret->dsa); + ret->dsa = k->dsa; + k->dsa = NULL; +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + DSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->dsa, 8); +#endif + } +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + if (sshkey_type_plain(ret->type) == KEY_ECDSA) { + if (ret->ecdsa != NULL) + EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdsa); + ret->ecdsa = k->ecdsa; + ret->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid; + k->ecdsa = NULL; + k->ecdsa_nid = -1; +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + sshkey_dump_ec_key(ret->ecdsa); +#endif + } +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + if (sshkey_type_plain(ret->type) == KEY_ED25519) { + free(ret->ed25519_pk); + ret->ed25519_pk = k->ed25519_pk; + k->ed25519_pk = NULL; +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + /* XXX */ +#endif + } + retval = 0; +/*XXXX*/ + sshkey_free(k); + if (retval != 0) + break; + /* advance cp: skip whitespace and data */ + while (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t') + cp++; + while (*cp != '\0' && *cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t') + cp++; + *cpp = cp; + break; + default: + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + return retval; +} + +int +sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f) +{ + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL; + char *uu = NULL; +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 + u_int bits = 0; + char *dec_e = NULL, *dec_n = NULL; +#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ + + if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) { + if (key->cert == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT; + if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB; + } + if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + switch (key->type) { +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 + case KEY_RSA1: + if (key->rsa == NULL || key->rsa->e == NULL || + key->rsa->n == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if ((dec_e = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->e)) == NULL || + (dec_n = BN_bn2dec(key->rsa->n)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + /* size of modulus 'n' */ + if ((bits = BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n)) <= 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if ((ret = sshbuf_putf(b, "%u %s %s", bits, dec_e, dec_n)) != 0) + goto out; +#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ + break; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA: + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((ret = sshkey_to_blob_buf(key, bb)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((uu = sshbuf_dtob64(bb)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((ret = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s ", sshkey_ssh_name(key))) != 0) + goto out; + if ((ret = sshbuf_put(b, uu, strlen(uu))) != 0) + goto out; + break; + default: + ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + goto out; + } + if (fwrite(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), 1, f) != 1) { + if (feof(f)) + errno = EPIPE; + ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR; + goto out; + } + ret = 0; + out: + if (b != NULL) + sshbuf_free(b); + if (bb != NULL) + sshbuf_free(bb); + if (uu != NULL) + free(uu); +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 + if (dec_e != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(dec_e); + if (dec_n != NULL) + OPENSSL_free(dec_n); +#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ + return ret; +} + +const char * +sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *k) +{ + switch (k->cert->type) { + case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER: + return "user"; + case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST: + return "host"; + default: + return "unknown"; + } +} + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +static int +rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA **rsap) +{ + RSA *private = NULL; + BIGNUM *f4 = NULL; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (rsap == NULL || + bits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE || + bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + *rsap = NULL; + if ((private = RSA_new()) == NULL || (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) || + !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + *rsap = private; + private = NULL; + ret = 0; + out: + if (private != NULL) + RSA_free(private); + if (f4 != NULL) + BN_free(f4); + return ret; +} + +static int +dsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, DSA **dsap) +{ + DSA *private; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (dsap == NULL || bits != 1024) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if ((private = DSA_new()) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + *dsap = NULL; + if (!DSA_generate_parameters_ex(private, bits, NULL, 0, NULL, + NULL, NULL) || !DSA_generate_key(private)) { + DSA_free(private); + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + *dsap = private; + private = NULL; + ret = 0; + out: + if (private != NULL) + DSA_free(private); + return ret; +} + +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC +int +sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *k) +{ + EC_GROUP *eg; + int nids[] = { + NID_X9_62_prime256v1, + NID_secp384r1, +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 + NID_secp521r1, +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */ + -1 + }; + int nid; + u_int i; + BN_CTX *bnctx; + const EC_GROUP *g = EC_KEY_get0_group(k); + + /* + * The group may be stored in a ASN.1 encoded private key in one of two + * ways: as a "named group", which is reconstituted by ASN.1 object ID + * or explicit group parameters encoded into the key blob. Only the + * "named group" case sets the group NID for us, but we can figure + * it out for the other case by comparing against all the groups that + * are supported. + */ + if ((nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(g)) > 0) + return nid; + if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + return -1; + for (i = 0; nids[i] != -1; i++) { + if ((eg = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nids[i])) == NULL) { + BN_CTX_free(bnctx); + return -1; + } + if (EC_GROUP_cmp(g, eg, bnctx) == 0) + break; + EC_GROUP_free(eg); + } + BN_CTX_free(bnctx); + if (nids[i] != -1) { + /* Use the group with the NID attached */ + EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(eg, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE); + if (EC_KEY_set_group(k, eg) != 1) { + EC_GROUP_free(eg); + return -1; + } + } + return nids[i]; +} + +static int +ecdsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, int *nid, EC_KEY **ecdsap) +{ + EC_KEY *private; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (nid == NULL || ecdsap == NULL || + (*nid = sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits)) == -1) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + *ecdsap = NULL; + if ((private = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(*nid)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (EC_KEY_generate_key(private) != 1) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(private, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE); + *ecdsap = private; + private = NULL; + ret = 0; + out: + if (private != NULL) + EC_KEY_free(private); + return ret; +} +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +int +sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp) +{ + struct sshkey *k; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (keyp == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + *keyp = NULL; + if ((k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + switch (type) { + case KEY_ED25519: + if ((k->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL || + (k->ed25519_sk = malloc(ED25519_SK_SZ)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + break; + } + crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(k->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_sk); + ret = 0; + break; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_DSA: + ret = dsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->dsa); + break; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA: + ret = ecdsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->ecdsa_nid, + &k->ecdsa); + break; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA1: + ret = rsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->rsa); + break; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + default: + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + if (ret == 0) { + k->type = type; + *keyp = k; + } else + sshkey_free(k); + return ret; +} + +int +sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *from_key, struct sshkey *to_key) +{ + u_int i; + const struct sshkey_cert *from; + struct sshkey_cert *to; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (to_key->cert != NULL) { + cert_free(to_key->cert); + to_key->cert = NULL; + } + + if ((from = from_key->cert) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + + if ((to = to_key->cert = cert_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + + if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(to->certblob, from->certblob)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_putb(to->critical, from->critical)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_putb(to->extensions, from->extensions) != 0)) + return ret; + + to->serial = from->serial; + to->type = from->type; + if (from->key_id == NULL) + to->key_id = NULL; + else if ((to->key_id = strdup(from->key_id)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + to->valid_after = from->valid_after; + to->valid_before = from->valid_before; + if (from->signature_key == NULL) + to->signature_key = NULL; + else if ((ret = sshkey_from_private(from->signature_key, + &to->signature_key)) != 0) + return ret; + + if (from->nprincipals > SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (from->nprincipals > 0) { + if ((to->principals = calloc(from->nprincipals, + sizeof(*to->principals))) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + for (i = 0; i < from->nprincipals; i++) { + to->principals[i] = strdup(from->principals[i]); + if (to->principals[i] == NULL) { + to->nprincipals = i; + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + } + } + to->nprincipals = from->nprincipals; + return 0; +} + +int +sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey **pkp) +{ + struct sshkey *n = NULL; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (pkp != NULL) + *pkp = NULL; + + switch (k->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((BN_copy(n->dsa->p, k->dsa->p) == NULL) || + (BN_copy(n->dsa->q, k->dsa->q) == NULL) || + (BN_copy(n->dsa->g, k->dsa->g) == NULL) || + (BN_copy(n->dsa->pub_key, k->dsa->pub_key) == NULL)) { + sshkey_free(n); + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + break; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA: + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + n->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid; + n->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid); + if (n->ecdsa == NULL) { + sshkey_free(n); + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(n->ecdsa, + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 1) { + sshkey_free(n); + return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + } + break; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA1: + case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((BN_copy(n->rsa->n, k->rsa->n) == NULL) || + (BN_copy(n->rsa->e, k->rsa->e) == NULL)) { + sshkey_free(n); + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + break; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if (k->ed25519_pk != NULL) { + if ((n->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL) { + sshkey_free(n); + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + } + memcpy(n->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ); + } + break; + default: + return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + } + if (sshkey_is_cert(k)) { + if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, n)) != 0) { + sshkey_free(n); + return ret; + } + } + *pkp = n; + return 0; +} + +static int +cert_parse(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key, const u_char *blob, + size_t blen) +{ + u_char *principals = NULL, *critical = NULL, *exts = NULL; + u_char *sig_key = NULL, *sig = NULL; + size_t signed_len, plen, clen, sklen, slen, kidlen, elen; + struct sshbuf *tmp; + char *principal; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + int v00 = sshkey_cert_is_legacy(key); + char **oprincipals; + + if ((tmp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + + /* Copy the entire key blob for verification and later serialisation */ + if ((ret = sshbuf_put(key->cert->certblob, blob, blen)) != 0) + return ret; + + elen = 0; /* Not touched for v00 certs */ + principals = exts = critical = sig_key = sig = NULL; + if ((!v00 && (ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->serial)) != 0) || + (ret = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &key->cert->type)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &key->cert->key_id, &kidlen)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &principals, &plen)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->valid_after)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->valid_before)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &critical, &clen)) != 0 || + (!v00 && (ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &exts, &elen)) != 0) || + (v00 && (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0) || + (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &sig_key, &sklen)) != 0) { + /* XXX debug print error for ret */ + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + + /* Signature is left in the buffer so we can calculate this length */ + signed_len = sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) - sshbuf_len(b); + + if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &sig, &slen)) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + + if (key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER && + key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) { + ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE; + goto out; + } + + if ((ret = sshbuf_put(tmp, principals, plen)) != 0) + goto out; + while (sshbuf_len(tmp) > 0) { + if (key->cert->nprincipals >= SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if ((ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(tmp, &principal, &plen)) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + oprincipals = key->cert->principals; + key->cert->principals = realloc(key->cert->principals, + (key->cert->nprincipals + 1) * + sizeof(*key->cert->principals)); + if (key->cert->principals == NULL) { + free(principal); + key->cert->principals = oprincipals; + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + key->cert->principals[key->cert->nprincipals++] = principal; + } + + sshbuf_reset(tmp); + + if ((ret = sshbuf_put(key->cert->critical, critical, clen)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put(tmp, critical, clen)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* validate structure */ + while (sshbuf_len(tmp) != 0) { + if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(tmp, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(tmp, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + } + sshbuf_reset(tmp); + + if ((ret = sshbuf_put(key->cert->extensions, exts, elen)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put(tmp, exts, elen)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* validate structure */ + while (sshbuf_len(tmp) != 0) { + if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(tmp, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(tmp, NULL, NULL)) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + } + sshbuf_reset(tmp); + + if (sshkey_from_blob_internal(sig_key, sklen, + &key->cert->signature_key, 0) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; + goto out; + } + if (!sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(key->cert->signature_key->type)) { + ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; + goto out; + } + + if ((ret = sshkey_verify(key->cert->signature_key, sig, slen, + sshbuf_ptr(key->cert->certblob), signed_len, 0)) != 0) + goto out; + ret = 0; + + out: + sshbuf_free(tmp); + free(principals); + free(critical); + free(exts); + free(sig_key); + free(sig); + return ret; +} + +static int +sshkey_from_blob_internal(const u_char *blob, size_t blen, + struct sshkey **keyp, int allow_cert) +{ + struct sshbuf *b = NULL; + int type, nid = -1, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + char *ktype = NULL, *curve = NULL; + struct sshkey *key = NULL; + size_t len; + u_char *pk = NULL; +#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) + EC_POINT *q = NULL; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + +#ifdef DEBUG_PK /* XXX */ + dump_base64(stderr, blob, blen); +#endif + *keyp = NULL; + if ((b = sshbuf_from(blob, blen)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + + type = sshkey_type_from_name(ktype); + if (sshkey_type_plain(type) == KEY_ECDSA) + nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(ktype); + if (!allow_cert && sshkey_type_is_cert(type)) { + ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; + goto out; + } + switch (type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: + if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e) == -1 || + sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n) == -1) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8); +#endif + break; + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: + if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p) == -1 || + sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q) == -1 || + sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g) == -1 || + sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key) == -1) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + DSA_print_fp(stderr, key->dsa, 8); +#endif + break; + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA: + if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + key->ecdsa_nid = nid; + if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &curve, NULL) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (key->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) { + ret = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH; + goto out; + } + if (key->ecdsa != NULL) + EC_KEY_free(key->ecdsa); + if ((key->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(key->ecdsa_nid)) + == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID; + goto out; + } + if ((q = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa))) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (sshbuf_get_ec(b, q, EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa)) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), + q) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE; + goto out; + } + if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(key->ecdsa, q) != 1) { + /* XXX assume it is a allocation error */ + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + sshkey_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), q); +#endif + break; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case KEY_ED25519: + if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pk, &len)) != 0) + goto out; + if (len != ED25519_PK_SZ) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + key->ed25519_pk = pk; + pk = NULL; + break; + case KEY_UNSPEC: + if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + break; + default: + ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + goto out; + } + + /* Parse certificate potion */ + if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && + (ret = cert_parse(b, key, blob, blen)) != 0) + goto out; + + if (key != NULL && sshbuf_len(b) != 0) { + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + ret = 0; + *keyp = key; + key = NULL; + out: + sshbuf_free(b); + sshkey_free(key); + free(ktype); + free(curve); + free(pk); +#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) + if (q != NULL) + EC_POINT_free(q); +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + return ret; +} + +int +sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *blob, size_t blen, struct sshkey **keyp) +{ + return sshkey_from_blob_internal(blob, blen, keyp, 1); +} + +int +sshkey_sign(const struct sshkey *key, + u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat) +{ + if (sigp != NULL) + *sigp = NULL; + if (lenp != NULL) + *lenp = 0; + if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + switch (key->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + case KEY_DSA: + return ssh_dss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat); +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA: + return ssh_ecdsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat); +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + case KEY_RSA: + return ssh_rsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat); +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + return ssh_ed25519_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat); + default: + return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + } +} + +/* + * ssh_key_verify returns 0 for a correct signature and < 0 on error. + */ +int +sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, + const u_char *data, size_t dlen, u_int compat) +{ + if (siglen == 0) + return -1; + + if (dlen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + switch (key->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + case KEY_DSA: + return ssh_dss_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat); +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + case KEY_ECDSA: + return ssh_ecdsa_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat); +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + case KEY_RSA: + return ssh_rsa_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat); +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + return ssh_ed25519_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat); + default: + return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + } +} + +/* Converts a private to a public key */ +int +sshkey_demote(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey **dkp) +{ + struct sshkey *pk; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if (dkp != NULL) + *dkp = NULL; + + if ((pk = calloc(1, sizeof(*pk))) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + pk->type = k->type; + pk->flags = k->flags; + pk->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid; + pk->dsa = NULL; + pk->ecdsa = NULL; + pk->rsa = NULL; + pk->ed25519_pk = NULL; + pk->ed25519_sk = NULL; + + switch (k->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, pk)) != 0) + goto fail; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case KEY_RSA1: + case KEY_RSA: + if ((pk->rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL || + (pk->rsa->e = BN_dup(k->rsa->e)) == NULL || + (pk->rsa->n = BN_dup(k->rsa->n)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto fail; + } + break; + case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, pk)) != 0) + goto fail; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case KEY_DSA: + if ((pk->dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL || + (pk->dsa->p = BN_dup(k->dsa->p)) == NULL || + (pk->dsa->q = BN_dup(k->dsa->q)) == NULL || + (pk->dsa->g = BN_dup(k->dsa->g)) == NULL || + (pk->dsa->pub_key = BN_dup(k->dsa->pub_key)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto fail; + } + break; + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, pk)) != 0) + goto fail; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA: + pk->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(pk->ecdsa_nid); + if (pk->ecdsa == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto fail; + } + if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(pk->ecdsa, + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 1) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto fail; + } + break; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + if ((ret = sshkey_cert_copy(k, pk)) != 0) + goto fail; + /* FALLTHROUGH */ + case KEY_ED25519: + if (k->ed25519_pk != NULL) { + if ((pk->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto fail; + } + memcpy(pk->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ); + } + break; + default: + ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + fail: + sshkey_free(pk); + return ret; + } + *dkp = pk; + return 0; +} + +/* Convert a plain key to their _CERT equivalent */ +int +sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *k, int legacy) +{ + int newtype; + + switch (k->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_RSA: + newtype = legacy ? KEY_RSA_CERT_V00 : KEY_RSA_CERT; + break; + case KEY_DSA: + newtype = legacy ? KEY_DSA_CERT_V00 : KEY_DSA_CERT; + break; + case KEY_ECDSA: + if (legacy) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + newtype = KEY_ECDSA_CERT; + break; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + if (legacy) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + newtype = KEY_ED25519_CERT; + break; + default: + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + if ((k->cert = cert_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + k->type = newtype; + return 0; +} + +/* Convert a certificate to its raw key equivalent */ +int +sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *k) +{ + if (!sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type)) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + cert_free(k->cert); + k->cert = NULL; + k->type = sshkey_type_plain(k->type); + return 0; +} + +/* Sign a certified key, (re-)generating the signed certblob. */ +int +sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca) +{ + struct sshbuf *principals = NULL; + u_char *ca_blob = NULL, *sig_blob = NULL, nonce[32]; + size_t i, ca_len, sig_len; + int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + struct sshbuf *cert; + + if (k == NULL || k->cert == NULL || + k->cert->certblob == NULL || ca == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + if (!sshkey_is_cert(k)) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + if (!sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(ca->type)) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; + + if ((ret = sshkey_to_blob(ca, &ca_blob, &ca_len)) != 0) + return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY; + + cert = k->cert->certblob; /* for readability */ + sshbuf_reset(cert); + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, sshkey_ssh_name(k))) != 0) + goto out; + + /* -v01 certs put nonce first */ + arc4random_buf(&nonce, sizeof(nonce)); + if (!sshkey_cert_is_legacy(k)) { + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, nonce, sizeof(nonce))) != 0) + goto out; + } + + /* XXX this substantially duplicates to_blob(); refactor */ + switch (k->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->p)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->q)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->g)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->dsa->pub_key)) != 0) + goto out; + break; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, + sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(k->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_ec(cert, + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa), + EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa))) != 0) + goto out; + break; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->rsa->e)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, k->rsa->n)) != 0) + goto out; + break; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, + k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + default: + ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + } + + /* -v01 certs have a serial number next */ + if (!sshkey_cert_is_legacy(k)) { + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->serial)) != 0) + goto out; + } + + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u32(cert, k->cert->type)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, k->cert->key_id)) != 0) + goto out; + + if ((principals = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) { + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, + k->cert->principals[i])) != 0) + goto out; + } + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, principals)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->valid_after)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->valid_before)) != 0 || + (ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, k->cert->critical)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* -v01 certs have non-critical options here */ + if (!sshkey_cert_is_legacy(k)) { + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, k->cert->extensions)) != 0) + goto out; + } + + /* -v00 certs put the nonce at the end */ + if (sshkey_cert_is_legacy(k)) { + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, nonce, sizeof(nonce))) != 0) + goto out; + } + + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* Reserved */ + (ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, ca_blob, ca_len)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Sign the whole mess */ + if ((ret = sshkey_sign(ca, &sig_blob, &sig_len, sshbuf_ptr(cert), + sshbuf_len(cert), 0)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Append signature and we are done */ + if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, sig_blob, sig_len)) != 0) + goto out; + ret = 0; + out: + if (ret != 0) + sshbuf_reset(cert); + if (sig_blob != NULL) + free(sig_blob); + if (ca_blob != NULL) + free(ca_blob); + if (principals != NULL) + sshbuf_free(principals); + return ret; +} + +int +sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *k, + int want_host, int require_principal, + const char *name, const char **reason) +{ + u_int i, principal_matches; + time_t now = time(NULL); + + if (reason != NULL) + *reason = NULL; + + if (want_host) { + if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) { + *reason = "Certificate invalid: not a host certificate"; + return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; + } + } else { + if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) { + *reason = "Certificate invalid: not a user certificate"; + return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; + } + } + if (now < 0) { + /* yikes - system clock before epoch! */ + *reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid"; + return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; + } + if ((u_int64_t)now < k->cert->valid_after) { + *reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid"; + return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; + } + if ((u_int64_t)now >= k->cert->valid_before) { + *reason = "Certificate invalid: expired"; + return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; + } + if (k->cert->nprincipals == 0) { + if (require_principal) { + *reason = "Certificate lacks principal list"; + return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; + } + } else if (name != NULL) { + principal_matches = 0; + for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) { + if (strcmp(name, k->cert->principals[i]) == 0) { + principal_matches = 1; + break; + } + } + if (!principal_matches) { + *reason = "Certificate invalid: name is not a listed " + "principal"; + return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID; + } + } + return 0; +} + +int +sshkey_private_serialize(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b) +{ + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key))) != 0) + goto out; + switch (key->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_RSA: + if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->n)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->e)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->d)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->p)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->rsa->q)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KEY_DSA: + if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->p)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->q)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->g)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->pub_key)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, key->dsa->priv_key)) != 0) + goto out; + break; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA: + if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, + sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, + EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa))) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, + EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa))) != 0) + goto out; + break; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk, + ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_sk, + ED25519_SK_SZ)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk, + ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_sk, + ED25519_SK_SZ)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + default: + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + /* success */ + r = 0; + out: + return r; +} + +int +sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **kp) +{ + char *tname = NULL, *curve = NULL; + struct sshkey *k = NULL; + const u_char *cert; + size_t len, pklen = 0, sklen = 0; + int type, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + u_char *ed25519_pk = NULL, *ed25519_sk = NULL; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + BIGNUM *exponent = NULL; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + + if (kp != NULL) + *kp = NULL; + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &tname, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname); + switch (type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_DSA: + if ((k = sshkey_new_private(type)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->p)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->q)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->g)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->pub_key)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->priv_key)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KEY_DSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_DSA_CERT: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &cert, &len)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_from_blob(cert, len, &k)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->dsa->priv_key)) != 0) + goto out; + break; +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA: + if ((k = sshkey_new_private(type)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((k->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(tname)) == -1) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &curve, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + if (k->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) { + r = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH; + goto out; + } + k->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid); + if (k->ecdsa == NULL || (exponent = BN_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_eckey(buf, k->ecdsa)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, exponent))) + goto out; + if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, exponent) != 1) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa), + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 0) || + (r = sshkey_ec_validate_private(k->ecdsa)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KEY_ECDSA_CERT: + if ((exponent = BN_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &cert, &len)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_from_blob(cert, len, &k)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, exponent)) != 0) + goto out; + if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, exponent) != 1) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa), + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 0) || + (r = sshkey_ec_validate_private(k->ecdsa)) != 0) + goto out; + break; +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + case KEY_RSA: + if ((k = sshkey_new_private(type)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->n)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->e)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->d)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->p)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->q)) != 0 || + (r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &cert, &len)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_from_blob(cert, len, &k)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->d) != 0) || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->iqmp) != 0) || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->p) != 0) || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, k->rsa->q) != 0) || + (r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(k->rsa)) != 0) + goto out; + break; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + if ((k = sshkey_new_private(type)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_pk, &pklen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_sk, &sklen)) != 0) + goto out; + if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ || sklen != ED25519_SK_SZ) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + k->ed25519_pk = ed25519_pk; + k->ed25519_sk = ed25519_sk; + ed25519_pk = ed25519_sk = NULL; + break; + case KEY_ED25519_CERT: + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &cert, &len)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_from_blob(cert, len, &k)) != 0 || + (r = sshkey_add_private(k)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_pk, &pklen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_sk, &sklen)) != 0) + goto out; + if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ || sklen != ED25519_SK_SZ) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + k->ed25519_pk = ed25519_pk; + k->ed25519_sk = ed25519_sk; + ed25519_pk = ed25519_sk = NULL; + break; + default: + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + goto out; + } +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + /* enable blinding */ + switch (k->type) { + case KEY_RSA: + case KEY_RSA_CERT_V00: + case KEY_RSA_CERT: + case KEY_RSA1: + if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + break; + } +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + /* success */ + r = 0; + if (kp != NULL) { + *kp = k; + k = NULL; + } + out: + free(tname); + free(curve); +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + if (exponent != NULL) + BN_clear_free(exponent); +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + sshkey_free(k); + if (ed25519_pk != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(ed25519_pk, pklen); + free(ed25519_pk); + } + if (ed25519_sk != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(ed25519_sk, sklen); + free(ed25519_sk); + } + return r; +} + +#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) +int +sshkey_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *public) +{ + BN_CTX *bnctx; + EC_POINT *nq = NULL; + BIGNUM *order, *x, *y, *tmp; + int ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE; + + if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + BN_CTX_start(bnctx); + + /* + * We shouldn't ever hit this case because bignum_get_ecpoint() + * refuses to load GF2m points. + */ + if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) != + NID_X9_62_prime_field) + goto out; + + /* Q != infinity */ + if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, public)) + goto out; + + if ((x = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || + (y = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || + (order = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || + (tmp = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + + /* log2(x) > log2(order)/2, log2(y) > log2(order)/2 */ + if (EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, bnctx) != 1 || + EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, public, + x, y, bnctx) != 1) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if (BN_num_bits(x) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2 || + BN_num_bits(y) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2) + goto out; + + /* nQ == infinity (n == order of subgroup) */ + if ((nq = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (EC_POINT_mul(group, nq, NULL, public, order, bnctx) != 1) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, nq) != 1) + goto out; + + /* x < order - 1, y < order - 1 */ + if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one())) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if (BN_cmp(x, tmp) >= 0 || BN_cmp(y, tmp) >= 0) + goto out; + ret = 0; + out: + BN_CTX_free(bnctx); + if (nq != NULL) + EC_POINT_free(nq); + return ret; +} + +int +sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *key) +{ + BN_CTX *bnctx; + BIGNUM *order, *tmp; + int ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE; + + if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + BN_CTX_start(bnctx); + + if ((order = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || + (tmp = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL) { + ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + + /* log2(private) > log2(order)/2 */ + if (EC_GROUP_get_order(EC_KEY_get0_group(key), order, bnctx) != 1) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if (BN_num_bits(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) <= + BN_num_bits(order) / 2) + goto out; + + /* private < order - 1 */ + if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one())) { + ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if (BN_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key), tmp) >= 0) + goto out; + ret = 0; + out: + BN_CTX_free(bnctx); + return ret; +} + +void +sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point) +{ + BIGNUM *x, *y; + BN_CTX *bnctx; + + if (point == NULL) { + fputs("point=(NULL)\n", stderr); + return; + } + if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: BN_CTX_new failed\n", __func__); + return; + } + BN_CTX_start(bnctx); + if ((x = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL || + (y = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: BN_CTX_get failed\n", __func__); + return; + } + if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) != + NID_X9_62_prime_field) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: group is not a prime field\n", __func__); + return; + } + if (EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y, + bnctx) != 1) { + fprintf(stderr, "%s: EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp\n", + __func__); + return; + } + fputs("x=", stderr); + BN_print_fp(stderr, x); + fputs("\ny=", stderr); + BN_print_fp(stderr, y); + fputs("\n", stderr); + BN_CTX_free(bnctx); +} + +void +sshkey_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *key) +{ + const BIGNUM *exponent; + + sshkey_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key), + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key)); + fputs("exponent=", stderr); + if ((exponent = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) == NULL) + fputs("(NULL)", stderr); + else + BN_print_fp(stderr, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)); + fputs("\n", stderr); +} +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + +static int +sshkey_private_to_blob2(const struct sshkey *prv, struct sshbuf *blob, + const char *passphrase, const char *comment, const char *ciphername, + int rounds) +{ + u_char *cp, *b64 = NULL, *key = NULL, *pubkeyblob = NULL; + u_char salt[SALT_LEN]; + size_t i, pubkeylen, keylen, ivlen, blocksize, authlen; + u_int check; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext; + const struct sshcipher *cipher; + const char *kdfname = KDFNAME; + struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *encrypted = NULL, *kdf = NULL; + + memset(&ciphercontext, 0, sizeof(ciphercontext)); + + if (rounds <= 0) + rounds = DEFAULT_ROUNDS; + if (passphrase == NULL || !strlen(passphrase)) { + ciphername = "none"; + kdfname = "none"; + } else if (ciphername == NULL) + ciphername = DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME; + else if (cipher_number(ciphername) != SSH_CIPHER_SSH2) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto out; + } + + if ((kdf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (encrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher); + keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher); + ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher); + authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher); + if ((key = calloc(1, keylen + ivlen)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") == 0) { + arc4random_buf(salt, SALT_LEN); + if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), + salt, SALT_LEN, key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(kdf, salt, SALT_LEN)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(kdf, rounds)) != 0) + goto out; + } else if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0) { + /* Unsupported KDF type */ + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER; + goto out; + } + if ((r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen, + key + keylen, ivlen, 1)) != 0) + goto out; + + if ((r = sshbuf_put(encoded, AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encoded, ciphername)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encoded, kdfname)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(encoded, kdf)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, 1)) != 0 || /* number of keys */ + (r = sshkey_to_blob(prv, &pubkeyblob, &pubkeylen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_string(encoded, pubkeyblob, pubkeylen)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* set up the buffer that will be encrypted */ + + /* Random check bytes */ + check = arc4random(); + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, check)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, check)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* append private key and comment*/ + if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(prv, encrypted)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encrypted, comment)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* padding */ + i = 0; + while (sshbuf_len(encrypted) % blocksize) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encrypted, ++i & 0xff)) != 0) + goto out; + } + + /* length in destination buffer */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, sshbuf_len(encrypted))) != 0) + goto out; + + /* encrypt */ + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encoded, + sshbuf_len(encrypted) + authlen, &cp)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, cp, + sshbuf_ptr(encrypted), sshbuf_len(encrypted), 0, authlen)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* uuencode */ + if ((b64 = sshbuf_dtob64(encoded)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + + sshbuf_reset(blob); + if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, MARK_BEGIN, MARK_BEGIN_LEN)) != 0) + goto out; + for (i = 0; i < strlen(b64); i++) { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(blob, b64[i])) != 0) + goto out; + /* insert line breaks */ + if (i % 70 == 69 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(blob, '\n')) != 0) + goto out; + } + if (i % 70 != 69 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(blob, '\n')) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, MARK_END, MARK_END_LEN)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* success */ + r = 0; + + out: + sshbuf_free(kdf); + sshbuf_free(encoded); + sshbuf_free(encrypted); + cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext); + explicit_bzero(salt, sizeof(salt)); + if (key != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen); + free(key); + } + if (pubkeyblob != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(pubkeyblob, pubkeylen); + free(pubkeyblob); + } + if (b64 != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(b64, strlen(b64)); + free(b64); + } + return r; +} + +static int +sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase, + struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) +{ + char *comment = NULL, *ciphername = NULL, *kdfname = NULL; + const struct sshcipher *cipher = NULL; + const u_char *cp; + int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + size_t encoded_len; + size_t i, keylen = 0, ivlen = 0, slen = 0; + struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *decoded = NULL; + struct sshbuf *kdf = NULL, *decrypted = NULL; + struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext; + struct sshkey *k = NULL; + u_char *key = NULL, *salt = NULL, *dp, pad, last; + u_int blocksize, rounds, nkeys, encrypted_len, check1, check2; + + memset(&ciphercontext, 0, sizeof(ciphercontext)); + if (keyp != NULL) + *keyp = NULL; + if (commentp != NULL) + *commentp = NULL; + + if ((encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (decoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || + (decrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + + /* check preamble */ + cp = sshbuf_ptr(blob); + encoded_len = sshbuf_len(blob); + if (encoded_len < (MARK_BEGIN_LEN + MARK_END_LEN) || + memcmp(cp, MARK_BEGIN, MARK_BEGIN_LEN) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + cp += MARK_BEGIN_LEN; + encoded_len -= MARK_BEGIN_LEN; + + /* Look for end marker, removing whitespace as we go */ + while (encoded_len > 0) { + if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') { + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, *cp)) != 0) + goto out; + } + last = *cp; + encoded_len--; + cp++; + if (last == '\n') { + if (encoded_len >= MARK_END_LEN && + memcmp(cp, MARK_END, MARK_END_LEN) == 0) { + /* \0 terminate */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, 0)) != 0) + goto out; + break; + } + } + } + if (encoded_len == 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + + /* decode base64 */ + if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(decoded, sshbuf_ptr(encoded))) != 0) + goto out; + + /* check magic */ + if (sshbuf_len(decoded) < sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC) || + memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(decoded), AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + /* parse public portion of key */ + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decoded, &ciphername, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decoded, &kdfname, NULL)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_froms(decoded, &kdf)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &nkeys)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_skip_string(decoded)) != 0 || /* pubkey */ + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &encrypted_len)) != 0) + goto out; + + if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER; + goto out; + } + if ((passphrase == NULL || strlen(passphrase) == 0) && + strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0) { + /* passphrase required */ + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; + goto out; + } + if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0 && strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER; + goto out; + } + if (!strcmp(kdfname, "none") && strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (nkeys != 1) { + /* XXX only one key supported */ + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + + /* check size of encrypted key blob */ + blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher); + if (encrypted_len < blocksize || (encrypted_len % blocksize) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + + /* setup key */ + keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher); + ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher); + if ((key = calloc(1, keylen + ivlen)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if (strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") == 0) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(kdf, &salt, &slen)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(kdf, &rounds)) != 0) + goto out; + if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), salt, slen, + key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + } + + /* decrypt private portion of key */ + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, encrypted_len, &dp)) != 0 || + (r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen, + key + keylen, ivlen, 0)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(decoded), + sshbuf_len(decoded), 0, cipher_authlen(cipher))) != 0) { + /* an integrity error here indicates an incorrect passphrase */ + if (r == SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID) + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, encrypted_len)) != 0) + goto out; + /* there should be no trailing data */ + if (sshbuf_len(decoded) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + + /* check check bytes */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(decrypted, &check1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(decrypted, &check2)) != 0) + goto out; + if (check1 != check2) { + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; + goto out; + } + + /* Load the private key and comment */ + if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(decrypted, &k)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decrypted, &comment, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Check deterministic padding */ + i = 0; + while (sshbuf_len(decrypted)) { + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(decrypted, &pad)) != 0) + goto out; + if (pad != (++i & 0xff)) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + } + + /* XXX decode pubkey and check against private */ + + /* success */ + r = 0; + if (keyp != NULL) { + *keyp = k; + k = NULL; + } + if (commentp != NULL) { + *commentp = comment; + comment = NULL; + } + out: + pad = 0; + cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext); + free(ciphername); + free(kdfname); + free(comment); + if (salt != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(salt, slen); + free(salt); + } + if (key != NULL) { + explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen); + free(key); + } + sshbuf_free(encoded); + sshbuf_free(decoded); + sshbuf_free(kdf); + sshbuf_free(decrypted); + sshkey_free(k); + return r; +} + +#if WITH_SSH1 +/* + * Serialises the authentication (private) key to a blob, encrypting it with + * passphrase. The identification of the blob (lowest 64 bits of n) will + * precede the key to provide identification of the key without needing a + * passphrase. + */ +static int +sshkey_private_rsa1_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob, + const char *passphrase, const char *comment) +{ + struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL, *encrypted = NULL; + u_char buf[8]; + int r, cipher_num; + struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext; + const struct sshcipher *cipher; + u_char *cp; + + /* + * If the passphrase is empty, use SSH_CIPHER_NONE to ease converting + * to another cipher; otherwise use SSH_AUTHFILE_CIPHER. + */ + cipher_num = (strcmp(passphrase, "") == 0) ? + SSH_CIPHER_NONE : SSH_CIPHER_3DES; + if ((cipher = cipher_by_number(cipher_num)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + /* This buffer is used to build the secret part of the private key. */ + if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + + /* Put checkbytes for checking passphrase validity. */ + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buffer, 4, &cp)) != 0) + goto out; + arc4random_buf(cp, 2); + memcpy(cp + 2, cp, 2); + + /* + * Store the private key (n and e will not be stored because they + * will be stored in plain text, and storing them also in encrypted + * format would just give known plaintext). + * Note: q and p are stored in reverse order to SSL. + */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->d)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->q)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(buffer, key->rsa->p)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Pad the part to be encrypted to a size that is a multiple of 8. */ + explicit_bzero(buf, 8); + if ((r = sshbuf_put(buffer, buf, 8 - (sshbuf_len(buffer) % 8))) != 0) + goto out; + + /* This buffer will be used to contain the data in the file. */ + if ((encrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + + /* First store keyfile id string. */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put(encrypted, LEGACY_BEGIN, + sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN))) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Store cipher type and "reserved" field. */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encrypted, cipher_num)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, 0)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Store public key. This will be in plain text. */ + if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, BN_num_bits(key->rsa->n))) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(encrypted, key->rsa->n) != 0) || + (r = sshbuf_put_bignum1(encrypted, key->rsa->e) != 0) || + (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encrypted, comment) != 0)) + goto out; + + /* Allocate space for the private part of the key in the buffer. */ + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encrypted, sshbuf_len(buffer), &cp)) != 0) + goto out; + + if ((r = cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, + CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, cp, + sshbuf_ptr(buffer), sshbuf_len(buffer), 0, 0)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext)) != 0) + goto out; + + r = sshbuf_putb(blob, encrypted); + + out: + explicit_bzero(&ciphercontext, sizeof(ciphercontext)); + explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf)); + if (buffer != NULL) + sshbuf_free(buffer); + if (encrypted != NULL) + sshbuf_free(encrypted); + + return r; +} +#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +/* convert SSH v2 key in OpenSSL PEM format */ +static int +sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob, + const char *_passphrase, const char *comment) +{ + int success, r; + int blen, len = strlen(_passphrase); + u_char *passphrase = (len > 0) ? (u_char *)_passphrase : NULL; +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x00907000L) + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_des_ede3_cbc() : NULL; +#else + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_aes_128_cbc() : NULL; +#endif + const u_char *bptr; + BIO *bio = NULL; + + if (len > 0 && len <= 4) + return SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT; + if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + + switch (key->type) { + case KEY_DSA: + success = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bio, key->dsa, + cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL); + break; +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + case KEY_ECDSA: + success = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key->ecdsa, + cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL); + break; +#endif + case KEY_RSA: + success = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio, key->rsa, + cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL); + break; + default: + success = 0; + break; + } + if (success == 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if ((blen = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &bptr)) <= 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, bptr, blen)) != 0) + goto out; + r = 0; + out: + BIO_free(bio); + return r; +} +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +/* Serialise "key" to buffer "blob" */ +int +sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob, + const char *passphrase, const char *comment, + int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds) +{ + switch (key->type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_RSA1: + return sshkey_private_rsa1_to_blob(key, blob, + passphrase, comment); + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_ECDSA: + case KEY_RSA: + if (force_new_format) { + return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase, + comment, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds); + } + return sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(key, blob, + passphrase, comment); +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase, + comment, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds); + default: + return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + } +} + +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 +/* + * Parse the public, unencrypted portion of a RSA1 key. + */ +int +sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, + struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) +{ + int r; + struct sshkey *pub = NULL; + struct sshbuf *copy = NULL; + + if (keyp != NULL) + *keyp = NULL; + if (commentp != NULL) + *commentp = NULL; + + /* Check that it is at least big enough to contain the ID string. */ + if (sshbuf_len(blob) < sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN)) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + + /* + * Make sure it begins with the id string. Consume the id string + * from the buffer. + */ + if (memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(blob), LEGACY_BEGIN, sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN)) != 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + /* Make a working copy of the keyblob and skip past the magic */ + if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(blob)) == NULL) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN))) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Skip cipher type, reserved data and key bits. */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, NULL)) != 0 || /* cipher type */ + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */ + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, NULL)) != 0) /* key bits */ + goto out; + + /* Read the public key from the buffer. */ + if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, pub->rsa->n)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, pub->rsa->e)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Finally, the comment */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(copy, (u_char**)commentp, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* The encrypted private part is not parsed by this function. */ + + r = 0; + if (keyp != NULL) + *keyp = pub; + else + sshkey_free(pub); + pub = NULL; + + out: + if (copy != NULL) + sshbuf_free(copy); + if (pub != NULL) + sshkey_free(pub); + return r; +} + +static int +sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(struct sshbuf *blob, const char *passphrase, + struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) +{ + int r; + u_int16_t check1, check2; + u_int8_t cipher_type; + struct sshbuf *decrypted = NULL, *copy = NULL; + u_char *cp; + char *comment = NULL; + struct sshcipher_ctx ciphercontext; + const struct sshcipher *cipher; + struct sshkey *prv = NULL; + + *keyp = NULL; + if (commentp != NULL) + *commentp = NULL; + + /* Check that it is at least big enough to contain the ID string. */ + if (sshbuf_len(blob) < sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN)) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + + /* + * Make sure it begins with the id string. Consume the id string + * from the buffer. + */ + if (memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(blob), LEGACY_BEGIN, sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN)) != 0) + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + + if ((prv = sshkey_new_private(KEY_RSA1)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(blob)) == NULL || + (decrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sizeof(LEGACY_BEGIN))) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Read cipher type. */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &cipher_type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, NULL)) != 0) /* reserved */ + goto out; + + /* Read the public key and comment from the buffer. */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, NULL)) != 0 || /* key bits */ + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, prv->rsa->n)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(copy, prv->rsa->e)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(copy, &comment, NULL)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Check that it is a supported cipher. */ + cipher = cipher_by_number(cipher_type); + if (cipher == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER; + goto out; + } + /* Initialize space for decrypted data. */ + if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, sshbuf_len(copy), &cp)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* Rest of the buffer is encrypted. Decrypt it using the passphrase. */ + if ((r = cipher_set_key_string(&ciphercontext, cipher, passphrase, + CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0) + goto out; + if ((r = cipher_crypt(&ciphercontext, 0, cp, + sshbuf_ptr(copy), sshbuf_len(copy), 0, 0)) != 0) { + cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext); + goto out; + } + if ((r = cipher_cleanup(&ciphercontext)) != 0) + goto out; + + if ((r = sshbuf_get_u16(decrypted, &check1)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u16(decrypted, &check2)) != 0) + goto out; + if (check1 != check2) { + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; + goto out; + } + + /* Read the rest of the private key. */ + if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->d)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->iqmp)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->q)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_bignum1(decrypted, prv->rsa->p)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* calculate p-1 and q-1 */ + if ((r = rsa_generate_additional_parameters(prv->rsa)) != 0) + goto out; + + /* enable blinding */ + if (RSA_blinding_on(prv->rsa, NULL) != 1) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + r = 0; + *keyp = prv; + prv = NULL; + if (commentp != NULL) { + *commentp = comment; + comment = NULL; + } + out: + explicit_bzero(&ciphercontext, sizeof(ciphercontext)); + if (comment != NULL) + free(comment); + if (prv != NULL) + sshkey_free(prv); + if (copy != NULL) + sshbuf_free(copy); + if (decrypted != NULL) + sshbuf_free(decrypted); + return r; +} +#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +/* XXX make private once ssh-keysign.c fixed */ +int +sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, + const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) +{ + EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; + struct sshkey *prv = NULL; + char *name = ""; + BIO *bio = NULL; + int r; + + *keyp = NULL; + if (commentp != NULL) + *commentp = NULL; + + if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL || sshbuf_len(blob) > INT_MAX) + return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + if (BIO_write(bio, sshbuf_ptr(blob), sshbuf_len(blob)) != + (int)sshbuf_len(blob)) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + + if ((pk = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, NULL, + (char *)passphrase)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE; + goto out; + } + if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA && + (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_RSA)) { + if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + prv->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pk); + prv->type = KEY_RSA; + name = "rsa w/o comment"; +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + RSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->rsa, 8); +#endif + if (RSA_blinding_on(prv->rsa, NULL) != 1) { + r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR; + goto out; + } + } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA && + (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_DSA)) { + if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + prv->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pk); + prv->type = KEY_DSA; + name = "dsa w/o comment"; +#ifdef DEBUG_PK + DSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->dsa, 8); +#endif +#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC + } else if (pk->type == EVP_PKEY_EC && + (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_ECDSA)) { + if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + prv->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pk); + prv->type = KEY_ECDSA; + prv->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(prv->ecdsa); + if (prv->ecdsa_nid == -1 || + sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(prv->ecdsa_nid) == NULL || + sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(prv->ecdsa), + EC_KEY_get0_public_key(prv->ecdsa)) != 0 || + sshkey_ec_validate_private(prv->ecdsa) != 0) { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + name = "ecdsa w/o comment"; +# ifdef DEBUG_PK + if (prv != NULL && prv->ecdsa != NULL) + sshkey_dump_ec_key(prv->ecdsa); +# endif +#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ + } else { + r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; + goto out; + } + if (commentp != NULL && + (*commentp = strdup(name)) == NULL) { + r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; + goto out; + } + r = 0; + *keyp = prv; + prv = NULL; + out: + BIO_free(bio); + if (pk != NULL) + EVP_PKEY_free(pk); + if (prv != NULL) + sshkey_free(prv); + return r; +} +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +int +sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, + const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) +{ + int r; + + *keyp = NULL; + if (commentp != NULL) + *commentp = NULL; + + switch (type) { +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + case KEY_RSA1: + return sshkey_parse_private_rsa1(blob, passphrase, + keyp, commentp); + case KEY_DSA: + case KEY_ECDSA: + case KEY_RSA: + return sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(blob, type, passphrase, + keyp, commentp); +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + case KEY_ED25519: + return sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, + keyp, commentp); + case KEY_UNSPEC: + if ((r = sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, keyp, + commentp)) == 0) + return 0; +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL + return sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(blob, type, passphrase, + keyp, commentp); +#else + return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + default: + return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN; + } +} + +int +sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer, const char *passphrase, + const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp) +{ + int r; + + if (keyp != NULL) + *keyp = NULL; + if (commentp != NULL) + *commentp = NULL; + +#ifdef WITH_SSH1 + /* it's a SSH v1 key if the public key part is readable */ + if ((r = sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(buffer, NULL, NULL)) == 0) { + return sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_RSA1, + passphrase, keyp, commentp); + } +#endif /* WITH_SSH1 */ + if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_UNSPEC, + passphrase, keyp, commentp)) == 0) + return 0; + return r; +} Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshkey.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshkey.h (nonexistent) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshkey.h (revision 276707) @@ -0,0 +1,232 @@ +/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.1 2014/06/24 01:16:58 djm Exp $ */ + +/* + * Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. + * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, + * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT + * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, + * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY + * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF + * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. + */ +#ifndef SSHKEY_H +#define SSHKEY_H + +#include + +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL +#include +#include +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC +# include +# else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +# define EC_KEY void +# define EC_GROUP void +# define EC_POINT void +# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */ +#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */ +# define RSA void +# define DSA void +# define EC_KEY void +# define EC_GROUP void +# define EC_POINT void +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */ + +#define SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE 768 +#define SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE (1 << 20) + +struct sshbuf; + +/* Key types */ +enum sshkey_types { + KEY_RSA1, + KEY_RSA, + KEY_DSA, + KEY_ECDSA, + KEY_ED25519, + KEY_RSA_CERT, + KEY_DSA_CERT, + KEY_ECDSA_CERT, + KEY_ED25519_CERT, + KEY_RSA_CERT_V00, + KEY_DSA_CERT_V00, + KEY_UNSPEC +}; + +/* Fingerprint hash algorithms */ +enum sshkey_fp_type { + SSH_FP_SHA1, + SSH_FP_MD5, + SSH_FP_SHA256 +}; + +/* Fingerprint representation formats */ +enum sshkey_fp_rep { + SSH_FP_HEX, + SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE, + SSH_FP_RANDOMART +}; + +/* key is stored in external hardware */ +#define SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT 0x0001 + +#define SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS 256 +/* XXX opaquify? */ +struct sshkey_cert { + struct sshbuf *certblob; /* Kept around for use on wire */ + u_int type; /* SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER or SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST */ + u_int64_t serial; + char *key_id; + u_int nprincipals; + char **principals; + u_int64_t valid_after, valid_before; + struct sshbuf *critical; + struct sshbuf *extensions; + struct sshkey *signature_key; +}; + +/* XXX opaquify? */ +struct sshkey { + int type; + int flags; + RSA *rsa; + DSA *dsa; + int ecdsa_nid; /* NID of curve */ + EC_KEY *ecdsa; + u_char *ed25519_sk; + u_char *ed25519_pk; + struct sshkey_cert *cert; +}; + +#define ED25519_SK_SZ crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES +#define ED25519_PK_SZ crypto_sign_ed25519_PUBLICKEYBYTES + +struct sshkey *sshkey_new(int); +int sshkey_add_private(struct sshkey *); +struct sshkey *sshkey_new_private(int); +void sshkey_free(struct sshkey *); +int sshkey_demote(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey **); +int sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey *, + const struct sshkey *); +int sshkey_equal(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *); +char *sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *, + enum sshkey_fp_type, enum sshkey_fp_rep); +int sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k, + enum sshkey_fp_type dgst_type, u_char **retp, size_t *lenp); +const char *sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *); +const char *sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *); +int sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *, FILE *); +int sshkey_read(struct sshkey *, char **); +u_int sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *); + +int sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp); +int sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey **); +int sshkey_type_from_name(const char *); +int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *); +int sshkey_type_is_cert(int); +int sshkey_type_plain(int); +int sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *, int); +int sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *); +int sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *); +int sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *); +int sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *, int, int, + const char *, const char **); +int sshkey_cert_is_legacy(const struct sshkey *); + +int sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *); +int sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *); +const char * sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(int); +u_int sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(int); +int sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int); +int sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *); +int sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid); +int sshkey_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); +int sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *); +const char *sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *); +const char *sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *); +int sshkey_names_valid2(const char *); +char *key_alg_list(int, int); + +int sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **); +int sshkey_to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); +int sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *); +int sshkey_plain_to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *); +int sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *); + +int sshkey_sign(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *, + const u_char *, size_t, u_int); +int sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t, + const u_char *, size_t, u_int); + +/* for debug */ +void sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *); +void sshkey_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *); + +/* private key parsing and serialisation */ +int sshkey_private_serialize(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf); +int sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **keyp); + +/* private key file format parsing and serialisation */ +int sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob, + const char *passphrase, const char *comment, + int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds); +int sshkey_parse_public_rsa1_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, + struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp); +int sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, + const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp); +int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer, + const char *passphrase, const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, + char **commentp); +int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, + const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp); + +#ifdef SSHKEY_INTERNAL +int ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); +int ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); +int ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); +int ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); +int ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); +int ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); +int ssh_ed25519_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); +int ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key, + const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen, + const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat); +#endif + +#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) +# undef RSA +# undef DSA +# undef EC_KEY +# undef EC_GROUP +# undef EC_POINT +#elif !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) +# undef EC_KEY +# undef EC_GROUP +# undef EC_POINT +#endif + +#endif /* SSHKEY_H */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshlogin.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshlogin.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshlogin.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,163 +1,164 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.28 2014/01/31 16:39:19 tedu Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: sshlogin.c,v 1.29 2014/07/15 15:54:14 millert Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * This file performs some of the things login(1) normally does. We cannot * easily use something like login -p -h host -f user, because there are * several different logins around, and it is hard to determined what kind of * login the current system has. Also, we want to be able to execute commands * on a tty. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". * * Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 1999 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "loginrec.h" #include "log.h" #include "buffer.h" +#include "misc.h" #include "servconf.h" extern Buffer loginmsg; extern ServerOptions options; /* * Returns the time when the user last logged in. Returns 0 if the * information is not available. This must be called before record_login. * The host the user logged in from will be returned in buf. */ time_t get_last_login_time(uid_t uid, const char *logname, char *buf, size_t bufsize) { struct logininfo li; login_get_lastlog(&li, uid); strlcpy(buf, li.hostname, bufsize); return (time_t)li.tv_sec; } /* * Generate and store last login message. This must be done before * login_login() is called and lastlog is updated. */ static void store_lastlog_message(const char *user, uid_t uid) { #ifndef NO_SSH_LASTLOG char *time_string, hostname[MAXHOSTNAMELEN] = "", buf[512]; time_t last_login_time; if (!options.print_lastlog) return; # ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG time_string = sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(user, uid); if (time_string != NULL) { buffer_append(&loginmsg, time_string, strlen(time_string)); free(time_string); } # else last_login_time = get_last_login_time(uid, user, hostname, sizeof(hostname)); if (last_login_time != 0) { time_string = ctime(&last_login_time); time_string[strcspn(time_string, "\n")] = '\0'; if (strcmp(hostname, "") == 0) snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Last login: %s\r\n", time_string); else snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Last login: %s from %s\r\n", time_string, hostname); buffer_append(&loginmsg, buf, strlen(buf)); } # endif /* CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_GET_LASTLOGIN_MSG */ #endif /* NO_SSH_LASTLOG */ } /* * Records that the user has logged in. I wish these parts of operating * systems were more standardized. */ void record_login(pid_t pid, const char *tty, const char *user, uid_t uid, const char *host, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen) { struct logininfo *li; /* save previous login details before writing new */ store_lastlog_message(user, uid); li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, tty); login_set_addr(li, addr, addrlen); login_login(li); login_free_entry(li); } #ifdef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX void record_utmp_only(pid_t pid, const char *ttyname, const char *user, const char *host, struct sockaddr *addr, socklen_t addrlen) { struct logininfo *li; li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, host, ttyname); login_set_addr(li, addr, addrlen); login_utmp_only(li); login_free_entry(li); } #endif /* Records that the user has logged out. */ void record_logout(pid_t pid, const char *tty, const char *user) { struct logininfo *li; li = login_alloc_entry(pid, user, NULL, tty); login_logout(li); login_free_entry(li); } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshpty.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshpty.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/sshpty.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,258 +1,245 @@ /* $OpenBSD: sshpty.c,v 1.28 2007/09/11 23:49:09 stevesk Exp $ */ /* * Author: Tatu Ylonen * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen , Espoo, Finland * All rights reserved * Allocating a pseudo-terminal, and making it the controlling tty. * * As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software * can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this * software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is * incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be * called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell". */ #include "includes.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H # include #endif #include #include #include #include #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H # include #endif #include #include "sshpty.h" #include "log.h" #include "misc.h" #ifdef HAVE_PTY_H # include #endif #ifndef O_NOCTTY #define O_NOCTTY 0 #endif #ifdef __APPLE__ # include # if (MAC_OS_X_VERSION_MAX_ALLOWED >= MAC_OS_X_VERSION_10_5) # define __APPLE_PRIVPTY__ # endif #endif /* * Allocates and opens a pty. Returns 0 if no pty could be allocated, or * nonzero if a pty was successfully allocated. On success, open file * descriptors for the pty and tty sides and the name of the tty side are * returned (the buffer must be able to hold at least 64 characters). */ int pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen) { /* openpty(3) exists in OSF/1 and some other os'es */ char *name; int i; i = openpty(ptyfd, ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (i < 0) { error("openpty: %.100s", strerror(errno)); return 0; } name = ttyname(*ttyfd); if (!name) fatal("openpty returns device for which ttyname fails."); strlcpy(namebuf, name, namebuflen); /* possible truncation */ return 1; } /* Releases the tty. Its ownership is returned to root, and permissions to 0666. */ void pty_release(const char *tty) { #ifndef __APPLE_PRIVPTY__ if (chown(tty, (uid_t) 0, (gid_t) 0) < 0) error("chown %.100s 0 0 failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno)); if (chmod(tty, (mode_t) 0666) < 0) error("chmod %.100s 0666 failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno)); #endif /* __APPLE_PRIVPTY__ */ } /* Makes the tty the process's controlling tty and sets it to sane modes. */ void pty_make_controlling_tty(int *ttyfd, const char *tty) { int fd; -#ifdef USE_VHANGUP - void *old; -#endif /* USE_VHANGUP */ #ifdef _UNICOS if (setsid() < 0) error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno)); fd = open(tty, O_RDWR|O_NOCTTY); if (fd != -1) { signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); ioctl(fd, TCVHUP, (char *)NULL); signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL); setpgid(0, 0); close(fd); } else { error("Failed to disconnect from controlling tty."); } debug("Setting controlling tty using TCSETCTTY."); ioctl(*ttyfd, TCSETCTTY, NULL); fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR); if (fd < 0) error("%.100s: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno)); close(*ttyfd); *ttyfd = fd; #else /* _UNICOS */ /* First disconnect from the old controlling tty. */ #ifdef TIOCNOTTY fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); if (fd >= 0) { (void) ioctl(fd, TIOCNOTTY, NULL); close(fd); } #endif /* TIOCNOTTY */ if (setsid() < 0) error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno)); /* * Verify that we are successfully disconnected from the controlling * tty. */ fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY); if (fd >= 0) { error("Failed to disconnect from controlling tty."); close(fd); } /* Make it our controlling tty. */ #ifdef TIOCSCTTY debug("Setting controlling tty using TIOCSCTTY."); if (ioctl(*ttyfd, TIOCSCTTY, NULL) < 0) error("ioctl(TIOCSCTTY): %.100s", strerror(errno)); #endif /* TIOCSCTTY */ #ifdef NEED_SETPGRP if (setpgrp(0,0) < 0) error("SETPGRP %s",strerror(errno)); #endif /* NEED_SETPGRP */ -#ifdef USE_VHANGUP - old = signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); - vhangup(); - signal(SIGHUP, old); -#endif /* USE_VHANGUP */ fd = open(tty, O_RDWR); if (fd < 0) { error("%.100s: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno)); } else { -#ifdef USE_VHANGUP - close(*ttyfd); - *ttyfd = fd; -#else /* USE_VHANGUP */ close(fd); -#endif /* USE_VHANGUP */ } /* Verify that we now have a controlling tty. */ fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_WRONLY); if (fd < 0) error("open /dev/tty failed - could not set controlling tty: %.100s", strerror(errno)); else close(fd); #endif /* _UNICOS */ } /* Changes the window size associated with the pty. */ void pty_change_window_size(int ptyfd, u_int row, u_int col, u_int xpixel, u_int ypixel) { struct winsize w; /* may truncate u_int -> u_short */ w.ws_row = row; w.ws_col = col; w.ws_xpixel = xpixel; w.ws_ypixel = ypixel; (void) ioctl(ptyfd, TIOCSWINSZ, &w); } void pty_setowner(struct passwd *pw, const char *tty) { struct group *grp; gid_t gid; mode_t mode; struct stat st; /* Determine the group to make the owner of the tty. */ grp = getgrnam("tty"); if (grp) { gid = grp->gr_gid; mode = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP; } else { gid = pw->pw_gid; mode = S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR | S_IWGRP | S_IWOTH; } /* * Change owner and mode of the tty as required. * Warn but continue if filesystem is read-only and the uids match/ * tty is owned by root. */ if (stat(tty, &st)) fatal("stat(%.100s) failed: %.100s", tty, strerror(errno)); #ifdef WITH_SELINUX ssh_selinux_setup_pty(pw->pw_name, tty); #endif if (st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid || st.st_gid != gid) { if (chown(tty, pw->pw_uid, gid) < 0) { if (errno == EROFS && (st.st_uid == pw->pw_uid || st.st_uid == 0)) debug("chown(%.100s, %u, %u) failed: %.100s", tty, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)gid, strerror(errno)); else fatal("chown(%.100s, %u, %u) failed: %.100s", tty, (u_int)pw->pw_uid, (u_int)gid, strerror(errno)); } } if ((st.st_mode & (S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)) != mode) { if (chmod(tty, mode) < 0) { if (errno == EROFS && (st.st_mode & (S_IRGRP | S_IROTH)) == 0) debug("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s", tty, (u_int)mode, strerror(errno)); else fatal("chmod(%.100s, 0%o) failed: %.100s", tty, (u_int)mode, strerror(errno)); } } } Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/umac.c =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/umac.c (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/umac.c (revision 276707) @@ -1,1287 +1,1276 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: umac.c,v 1.8 2013/11/08 00:39:15 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: umac.c,v 1.11 2014/07/22 07:13:42 guenther Exp $ */ /* ----------------------------------------------------------------------- * * umac.c -- C Implementation UMAC Message Authentication * * Version 0.93b of rfc4418.txt -- 2006 July 18 * * For a full description of UMAC message authentication see the UMAC * world-wide-web page at http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/umac * Please report bugs and suggestions to the UMAC webpage. * * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 Ted Krovetz * * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and * its documentation for any purpose and with or without fee, is hereby * granted provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies * and in supporting documentation, and that the name of the copyright * holder not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining to * distribution of the software without specific, written prior permission. * * Comments should be directed to Ted Krovetz (tdk@acm.org) * * ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ////////////////////// IMPORTANT NOTES ///////////////////////////////// * * 1) This version does not work properly on messages larger than 16MB * * 2) If you set the switch to use SSE2, then all data must be 16-byte * aligned * * 3) When calling the function umac(), it is assumed that msg is in * a writable buffer of length divisible by 32 bytes. The message itself * does not have to fill the entire buffer, but bytes beyond msg may be * zeroed. * * 4) Three free AES implementations are supported by this implementation of * UMAC. Paulo Barreto's version is in the public domain and can be found * at http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/ (search for * "Barreto"). The only two files needed are rijndael-alg-fst.c and * rijndael-alg-fst.h. Brian Gladman's version is distributed with the GNU * Public lisence at http://fp.gladman.plus.com/AES/index.htm. It * includes a fast IA-32 assembly version. The OpenSSL crypo library is * the third. * * 5) With FORCE_C_ONLY flags set to 0, incorrect results are sometimes * produced under gcc with optimizations set -O3 or higher. Dunno why. * /////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* --- User Switches ---------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #ifndef UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN #define UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN 8 /* Alowable: 4, 8, 12, 16 */ #endif #if UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 4 && UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 8 && \ UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 12 && UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 16 # error UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN must be defined to 4, 8, 12 or 16 #endif /* #define FORCE_C_ONLY 1 ANSI C and 64-bit integers req'd */ /* #define AES_IMPLEMENTAION 1 1 = OpenSSL, 2 = Barreto, 3 = Gladman */ /* #define SSE2 0 Is SSE2 is available? */ /* #define RUN_TESTS 0 Run basic correctness/speed tests */ /* #define UMAC_AE_SUPPORT 0 Enable auhthenticated encrytion */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* -- Global Includes --------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #include "includes.h" #include - -#include "xmalloc.h" -#include "umac.h" #include +#include #include #include +#include "xmalloc.h" +#include "umac.h" +#include "misc.h" + /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* --- Primitive Data Types --- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* The following assumptions may need change on your system */ typedef u_int8_t UINT8; /* 1 byte */ typedef u_int16_t UINT16; /* 2 byte */ typedef u_int32_t UINT32; /* 4 byte */ typedef u_int64_t UINT64; /* 8 bytes */ typedef unsigned int UWORD; /* Register */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* --- Constants -------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #define UMAC_KEY_LEN 16 /* UMAC takes 16 bytes of external key */ /* Message "words" are read from memory in an endian-specific manner. */ /* For this implementation to behave correctly, __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ must */ /* be set true if the host computer is little-endian. */ #if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN #define __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ 1 #else #define __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ 0 #endif /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- Architecture Specific ------------------------------------------ */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- Primitive Routines --------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* --- 32-bit by 32-bit to 64-bit Multiplication ------------------------ */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #define MUL64(a,b) ((UINT64)((UINT64)(UINT32)(a) * (UINT64)(UINT32)(b))) /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* --- Endian Conversion --- Forcing assembly on some platforms */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ -#if HAVE_SWAP32 -#define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p) (swap32(*(const UINT32 *)(p))) -#define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v) (*(UINT32 *)(p) = swap32(v)) -#else /* HAVE_SWAP32 */ - -static UINT32 LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(const void *ptr) -{ - UINT32 temp = *(const UINT32 *)ptr; - temp = (temp >> 24) | ((temp & 0x00FF0000) >> 8 ) - | ((temp & 0x0000FF00) << 8 ) | (temp << 24); - return (UINT32)temp; -} - -# if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) -static void STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(void *ptr, UINT32 x) -{ - UINT32 i = (UINT32)x; - *(UINT32 *)ptr = (i >> 24) | ((i & 0x00FF0000) >> 8 ) - | ((i & 0x0000FF00) << 8 ) | (i << 24); -} -# endif /* __LITTLE_ENDIAN */ -#endif /* HAVE_SWAP32 */ - -/* The following definitions use the above reversal-primitives to do the right - * thing on endian specific load and stores. - */ - #if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) -#define LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(ptr) (*(const UINT32 *)(ptr)) -#define STORE_UINT32_BIG(ptr,x) STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(ptr,x) +#define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p) get_u32(p) +#define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v) put_u32(p,v) #else -#define LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(ptr) LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(ptr) -#define STORE_UINT32_BIG(ptr,x) (*(UINT32 *)(ptr) = (UINT32)(x)) +#define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p) get_u32_le(p) +#define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v) put_u32_le(p,v) #endif +#define LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(p) (get_u32_le(p)) +#define STORE_UINT32_BIG(p,v) put_u32(p, v) + /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- Begin KDF & PDF Section ---------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* UMAC uses AES with 16 byte block and key lengths */ #define AES_BLOCK_LEN 16 /* OpenSSL's AES */ +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h" #ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL # include #endif typedef AES_KEY aes_int_key[1]; #define aes_encryption(in,out,int_key) \ AES_encrypt((u_char *)(in),(u_char *)(out),(AES_KEY *)int_key) #define aes_key_setup(key,int_key) \ AES_set_encrypt_key((const u_char *)(key),UMAC_KEY_LEN*8,int_key) +#else +#include "rijndael.h" +#define AES_ROUNDS ((UMAC_KEY_LEN / 4) + 6) +typedef UINT8 aes_int_key[AES_ROUNDS+1][4][4]; /* AES internal */ +#define aes_encryption(in,out,int_key) \ + rijndaelEncrypt((u32 *)(int_key), AES_ROUNDS, (u8 *)(in), (u8 *)(out)) +#define aes_key_setup(key,int_key) \ + rijndaelKeySetupEnc((u32 *)(int_key), (const unsigned char *)(key), \ + UMAC_KEY_LEN*8) +#endif /* The user-supplied UMAC key is stretched using AES in a counter * mode to supply all random bits needed by UMAC. The kdf function takes * an AES internal key representation 'key' and writes a stream of * 'nbytes' bytes to the memory pointed at by 'bufp'. Each distinct * 'ndx' causes a distinct byte stream. */ static void kdf(void *bufp, aes_int_key key, UINT8 ndx, int nbytes) { UINT8 in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN] = {0}; UINT8 out_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; UINT8 *dst_buf = (UINT8 *)bufp; int i; /* Setup the initial value */ in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-9] = ndx; in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-1] = i = 1; while (nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_LEN) { aes_encryption(in_buf, out_buf, key); memcpy(dst_buf,out_buf,AES_BLOCK_LEN); in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-1] = ++i; nbytes -= AES_BLOCK_LEN; dst_buf += AES_BLOCK_LEN; } if (nbytes) { aes_encryption(in_buf, out_buf, key); memcpy(dst_buf,out_buf,nbytes); } } /* The final UHASH result is XOR'd with the output of a pseudorandom * function. Here, we use AES to generate random output and * xor the appropriate bytes depending on the last bits of nonce. * This scheme is optimized for sequential, increasing big-endian nonces. */ typedef struct { UINT8 cache[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; /* Previous AES output is saved */ UINT8 nonce[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; /* The AES input making above cache */ aes_int_key prf_key; /* Expanded AES key for PDF */ } pdf_ctx; static void pdf_init(pdf_ctx *pc, aes_int_key prf_key) { UINT8 buf[UMAC_KEY_LEN]; kdf(buf, prf_key, 0, UMAC_KEY_LEN); aes_key_setup(buf, pc->prf_key); /* Initialize pdf and cache */ memset(pc->nonce, 0, sizeof(pc->nonce)); aes_encryption(pc->nonce, pc->cache, pc->prf_key); } static void pdf_gen_xor(pdf_ctx *pc, const UINT8 nonce[8], UINT8 buf[8]) { /* 'ndx' indicates that we'll be using the 0th or 1st eight bytes * of the AES output. If last time around we returned the ndx-1st * element, then we may have the result in the cache already. */ #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4) #define LOW_BIT_MASK 3 #elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8) #define LOW_BIT_MASK 1 #elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN > 8) #define LOW_BIT_MASK 0 #endif union { UINT8 tmp_nonce_lo[4]; UINT32 align; } t; #if LOW_BIT_MASK != 0 int ndx = nonce[7] & LOW_BIT_MASK; #endif *(UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo = ((const UINT32 *)nonce)[1]; t.tmp_nonce_lo[3] &= ~LOW_BIT_MASK; /* zero last bit */ if ( (((UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo)[0] != ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[1]) || (((const UINT32 *)nonce)[0] != ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[0]) ) { ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[0] = ((const UINT32 *)nonce)[0]; ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[1] = ((UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo)[0]; aes_encryption(pc->nonce, pc->cache, pc->prf_key); } #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4) *((UINT32 *)buf) ^= ((UINT32 *)pc->cache)[ndx]; #elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8) *((UINT64 *)buf) ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[ndx]; #elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 12) ((UINT64 *)buf)[0] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[0]; ((UINT32 *)buf)[2] ^= ((UINT32 *)pc->cache)[2]; #elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) ((UINT64 *)buf)[0] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[0]; ((UINT64 *)buf)[1] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[1]; #endif } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- Begin NH Hash Section ------------------------------------------ */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* The NH-based hash functions used in UMAC are described in the UMAC paper * and specification, both of which can be found at the UMAC website. * The interface to this implementation has two * versions, one expects the entire message being hashed to be passed * in a single buffer and returns the hash result immediately. The second * allows the message to be passed in a sequence of buffers. In the * muliple-buffer interface, the client calls the routine nh_update() as * many times as necessary. When there is no more data to be fed to the * hash, the client calls nh_final() which calculates the hash output. * Before beginning another hash calculation the nh_reset() routine * must be called. The single-buffer routine, nh(), is equivalent to * the sequence of calls nh_update() and nh_final(); however it is * optimized and should be prefered whenever the multiple-buffer interface * is not necessary. When using either interface, it is the client's * responsability to pass no more than L1_KEY_LEN bytes per hash result. * * The routine nh_init() initializes the nh_ctx data structure and * must be called once, before any other PDF routine. */ /* The "nh_aux" routines do the actual NH hashing work. They * expect buffers to be multiples of L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. These routines * produce output for all STREAMS NH iterations in one call, * allowing the parallel implementation of the streams. */ #define STREAMS (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN / 4) /* Number of times hash is applied */ #define L1_KEY_LEN 1024 /* Internal key bytes */ #define L1_KEY_SHIFT 16 /* Toeplitz key shift between streams */ #define L1_PAD_BOUNDARY 32 /* pad message to boundary multiple */ #define ALLOC_BOUNDARY 16 /* Keep buffers aligned to this */ #define HASH_BUF_BYTES 64 /* nh_aux_hb buffer multiple */ typedef struct { UINT8 nh_key [L1_KEY_LEN + L1_KEY_SHIFT * (STREAMS - 1)]; /* NH Key */ UINT8 data [HASH_BUF_BYTES]; /* Incoming data buffer */ int next_data_empty; /* Bookeeping variable for data buffer. */ int bytes_hashed; /* Bytes (out of L1_KEY_LEN) incorperated. */ UINT64 state[STREAMS]; /* on-line state */ } nh_ctx; #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4) static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen) /* NH hashing primitive. Previous (partial) hash result is loaded and * then stored via hp pointer. The length of the data pointed at by "dp", * "dlen", is guaranteed to be divisible by L1_PAD_BOUNDARY (32). Key * is expected to be endian compensated in memory at key setup. */ { UINT64 h; UWORD c = dlen / 32; UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp; const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp; UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7; UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7; h = *((UINT64 *)hp); do { d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1); d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3); d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5); d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7); k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3); k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7); h += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4)); h += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5)); h += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6)); h += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7)); d += 8; k += 8; } while (--c); *((UINT64 *)hp) = h; } #elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8) static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen) /* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass, * reading and writing 16 bytes of hash-state per call. */ { UINT64 h1,h2; UWORD c = dlen / 32; UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp; const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp; UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7; UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7, k8,k9,k10,k11; h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp); h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1); k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3); do { d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1); d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3); d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5); d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7); k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7); k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11); h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4)); h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4)); h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5)); h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5)); h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6)); h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6)); h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7)); h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7)); k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11; d += 8; k += 8; } while (--c); ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1; ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2; } #elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 12) static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen) /* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass, * reading and writing 24 bytes of hash-state per call. */ { UINT64 h1,h2,h3; UWORD c = dlen / 32; UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp; const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp; UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7; UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7, k8,k9,k10,k11,k12,k13,k14,k15; h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp); h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1); h3 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 2); k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3); k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7); do { d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1); d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3); d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5); d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7); k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11); k12 = *(k+12); k13 = *(k+13); k14 = *(k+14); k15 = *(k+15); h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4)); h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4)); h3 += MUL64((k8 + d0), (k12 + d4)); h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5)); h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5)); h3 += MUL64((k9 + d1), (k13 + d5)); h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6)); h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6)); h3 += MUL64((k10 + d2), (k14 + d6)); h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7)); h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7)); h3 += MUL64((k11 + d3), (k15 + d7)); k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11; k4 = k12; k5 = k13; k6 = k14; k7 = k15; d += 8; k += 8; } while (--c); ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1; ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2; ((UINT64 *)hp)[2] = h3; } #elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen) /* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass, * reading and writing 24 bytes of hash-state per call. */ { UINT64 h1,h2,h3,h4; UWORD c = dlen / 32; UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp; const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp; UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7; UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7, k8,k9,k10,k11,k12,k13,k14,k15, k16,k17,k18,k19; h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp); h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1); h3 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 2); h4 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 3); k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3); k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7); do { d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1); d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3); d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5); d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7); k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11); k12 = *(k+12); k13 = *(k+13); k14 = *(k+14); k15 = *(k+15); k16 = *(k+16); k17 = *(k+17); k18 = *(k+18); k19 = *(k+19); h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4)); h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4)); h3 += MUL64((k8 + d0), (k12 + d4)); h4 += MUL64((k12 + d0), (k16 + d4)); h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5)); h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5)); h3 += MUL64((k9 + d1), (k13 + d5)); h4 += MUL64((k13 + d1), (k17 + d5)); h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6)); h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6)); h3 += MUL64((k10 + d2), (k14 + d6)); h4 += MUL64((k14 + d2), (k18 + d6)); h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7)); h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7)); h3 += MUL64((k11 + d3), (k15 + d7)); h4 += MUL64((k15 + d3), (k19 + d7)); k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11; k4 = k12; k5 = k13; k6 = k14; k7 = k15; k8 = k16; k9 = k17; k10 = k18; k11 = k19; d += 8; k += 8; } while (--c); ((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1; ((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2; ((UINT64 *)hp)[2] = h3; ((UINT64 *)hp)[3] = h4; } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #endif /* UMAC_OUTPUT_LENGTH */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static void nh_transform(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 nbytes) /* This function is a wrapper for the primitive NH hash functions. It takes * as argument "hc" the current hash context and a buffer which must be a * multiple of L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. The key passed to nh_aux is offset * appropriately according to how much message has been hashed already. */ { UINT8 *key; key = hc->nh_key + hc->bytes_hashed; nh_aux(key, buf, hc->state, nbytes); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__) static void endian_convert(void *buf, UWORD bpw, UINT32 num_bytes) /* We endian convert the keys on little-endian computers to */ /* compensate for the lack of big-endian memory reads during hashing. */ { UWORD iters = num_bytes / bpw; if (bpw == 4) { UINT32 *p = (UINT32 *)buf; do { *p = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p); p++; } while (--iters); } else if (bpw == 8) { UINT32 *p = (UINT32 *)buf; UINT32 t; do { t = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p+1); p[1] = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p); p[0] = t; p += 2; } while (--iters); } } #define endian_convert_if_le(x,y,z) endian_convert((x),(y),(z)) #else #define endian_convert_if_le(x,y,z) do{}while(0) /* Do nothing */ #endif /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static void nh_reset(nh_ctx *hc) /* Reset nh_ctx to ready for hashing of new data */ { hc->bytes_hashed = 0; hc->next_data_empty = 0; hc->state[0] = 0; #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8) hc->state[1] = 0; #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12) hc->state[2] = 0; #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) hc->state[3] = 0; #endif } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static void nh_init(nh_ctx *hc, aes_int_key prf_key) /* Generate nh_key, endian convert and reset to be ready for hashing. */ { kdf(hc->nh_key, prf_key, 1, sizeof(hc->nh_key)); endian_convert_if_le(hc->nh_key, 4, sizeof(hc->nh_key)); nh_reset(hc); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static void nh_update(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 nbytes) /* Incorporate nbytes of data into a nh_ctx, buffer whatever is not an */ /* even multiple of HASH_BUF_BYTES. */ { UINT32 i,j; j = hc->next_data_empty; if ((j + nbytes) >= HASH_BUF_BYTES) { if (j) { i = HASH_BUF_BYTES - j; memcpy(hc->data+j, buf, i); nh_transform(hc,hc->data,HASH_BUF_BYTES); nbytes -= i; buf += i; hc->bytes_hashed += HASH_BUF_BYTES; } if (nbytes >= HASH_BUF_BYTES) { i = nbytes & ~(HASH_BUF_BYTES - 1); nh_transform(hc, buf, i); nbytes -= i; buf += i; hc->bytes_hashed += i; } j = 0; } memcpy(hc->data + j, buf, nbytes); hc->next_data_empty = j + nbytes; } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static void zero_pad(UINT8 *p, int nbytes) { /* Write "nbytes" of zeroes, beginning at "p" */ if (nbytes >= (int)sizeof(UWORD)) { while ((ptrdiff_t)p % sizeof(UWORD)) { *p = 0; nbytes--; p++; } while (nbytes >= (int)sizeof(UWORD)) { *(UWORD *)p = 0; nbytes -= sizeof(UWORD); p += sizeof(UWORD); } } while (nbytes) { *p = 0; nbytes--; p++; } } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static void nh_final(nh_ctx *hc, UINT8 *result) /* After passing some number of data buffers to nh_update() for integration * into an NH context, nh_final is called to produce a hash result. If any * bytes are in the buffer hc->data, incorporate them into the * NH context. Finally, add into the NH accumulation "state" the total number * of bits hashed. The resulting numbers are written to the buffer "result". * If nh_update was never called, L1_PAD_BOUNDARY zeroes are incorporated. */ { int nh_len, nbits; if (hc->next_data_empty != 0) { nh_len = ((hc->next_data_empty + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)); zero_pad(hc->data + hc->next_data_empty, nh_len - hc->next_data_empty); nh_transform(hc, hc->data, nh_len); hc->bytes_hashed += hc->next_data_empty; } else if (hc->bytes_hashed == 0) { nh_len = L1_PAD_BOUNDARY; zero_pad(hc->data, L1_PAD_BOUNDARY); nh_transform(hc, hc->data, nh_len); } nbits = (hc->bytes_hashed << 3); ((UINT64 *)result)[0] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[0] + nbits; #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8) ((UINT64 *)result)[1] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[1] + nbits; #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12) ((UINT64 *)result)[2] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[2] + nbits; #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) ((UINT64 *)result)[3] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[3] + nbits; #endif nh_reset(hc); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static void nh(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 padded_len, UINT32 unpadded_len, UINT8 *result) /* All-in-one nh_update() and nh_final() equivalent. * Assumes that padded_len is divisible by L1_PAD_BOUNDARY and result is * well aligned */ { UINT32 nbits; /* Initialize the hash state */ nbits = (unpadded_len << 3); ((UINT64 *)result)[0] = nbits; #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8) ((UINT64 *)result)[1] = nbits; #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12) ((UINT64 *)result)[2] = nbits; #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) ((UINT64 *)result)[3] = nbits; #endif nh_aux(hc->nh_key, buf, result, padded_len); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- Begin UHASH Section -------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* UHASH is a multi-layered algorithm. Data presented to UHASH is first * hashed by NH. The NH output is then hashed by a polynomial-hash layer * unless the initial data to be hashed is short. After the polynomial- * layer, an inner-product hash is used to produce the final UHASH output. * * UHASH provides two interfaces, one all-at-once and another where data * buffers are presented sequentially. In the sequential interface, the * UHASH client calls the routine uhash_update() as many times as necessary. * When there is no more data to be fed to UHASH, the client calls * uhash_final() which * calculates the UHASH output. Before beginning another UHASH calculation * the uhash_reset() routine must be called. The all-at-once UHASH routine, * uhash(), is equivalent to the sequence of calls uhash_update() and * uhash_final(); however it is optimized and should be * used whenever the sequential interface is not necessary. * * The routine uhash_init() initializes the uhash_ctx data structure and * must be called once, before any other UHASH routine. */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- Constants and uhash_ctx ---------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- Poly hash and Inner-Product hash Constants --------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* Primes and masks */ #define p36 ((UINT64)0x0000000FFFFFFFFBull) /* 2^36 - 5 */ #define p64 ((UINT64)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC5ull) /* 2^64 - 59 */ #define m36 ((UINT64)0x0000000FFFFFFFFFull) /* The low 36 of 64 bits */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ typedef struct uhash_ctx { nh_ctx hash; /* Hash context for L1 NH hash */ UINT64 poly_key_8[STREAMS]; /* p64 poly keys */ UINT64 poly_accum[STREAMS]; /* poly hash result */ UINT64 ip_keys[STREAMS*4]; /* Inner-product keys */ UINT32 ip_trans[STREAMS]; /* Inner-product translation */ UINT32 msg_len; /* Total length of data passed */ /* to uhash */ } uhash_ctx; typedef struct uhash_ctx *uhash_ctx_t; /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* The polynomial hashes use Horner's rule to evaluate a polynomial one * word at a time. As described in the specification, poly32 and poly64 * require keys from special domains. The following implementations exploit * the special domains to avoid overflow. The results are not guaranteed to * be within Z_p32 and Z_p64, but the Inner-Product hash implementation * patches any errant values. */ static UINT64 poly64(UINT64 cur, UINT64 key, UINT64 data) { UINT32 key_hi = (UINT32)(key >> 32), key_lo = (UINT32)key, cur_hi = (UINT32)(cur >> 32), cur_lo = (UINT32)cur, x_lo, x_hi; UINT64 X,T,res; X = MUL64(key_hi, cur_lo) + MUL64(cur_hi, key_lo); x_lo = (UINT32)X; x_hi = (UINT32)(X >> 32); res = (MUL64(key_hi, cur_hi) + x_hi) * 59 + MUL64(key_lo, cur_lo); T = ((UINT64)x_lo << 32); res += T; if (res < T) res += 59; res += data; if (res < data) res += 59; return res; } /* Although UMAC is specified to use a ramped polynomial hash scheme, this * implementation does not handle all ramp levels. Because we don't handle * the ramp up to p128 modulus in this implementation, we are limited to * 2^14 poly_hash() invocations per stream (for a total capacity of 2^24 * bytes input to UMAC per tag, ie. 16MB). */ static void poly_hash(uhash_ctx_t hc, UINT32 data_in[]) { int i; UINT64 *data=(UINT64*)data_in; for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) { if ((UINT32)(data[i] >> 32) == 0xfffffffful) { hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i], hc->poly_key_8[i], p64 - 1); hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i], hc->poly_key_8[i], (data[i] - 59)); } else { hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i], hc->poly_key_8[i], data[i]); } } } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* The final step in UHASH is an inner-product hash. The poly hash * produces a result not neccesarily WORD_LEN bytes long. The inner- * product hash breaks the polyhash output into 16-bit chunks and * multiplies each with a 36 bit key. */ static UINT64 ip_aux(UINT64 t, UINT64 *ipkp, UINT64 data) { t = t + ipkp[0] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 48); t = t + ipkp[1] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 32); t = t + ipkp[2] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 16); t = t + ipkp[3] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data); return t; } static UINT32 ip_reduce_p36(UINT64 t) { /* Divisionless modular reduction */ UINT64 ret; ret = (t & m36) + 5 * (t >> 36); if (ret >= p36) ret -= p36; /* return least significant 32 bits */ return (UINT32)(ret); } /* If the data being hashed by UHASH is no longer than L1_KEY_LEN, then * the polyhash stage is skipped and ip_short is applied directly to the * NH output. */ static void ip_short(uhash_ctx_t ahc, UINT8 *nh_res, u_char *res) { UINT64 t; UINT64 *nhp = (UINT64 *)nh_res; t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys, nhp[0]); STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+0, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[0]); #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8) t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+4, nhp[1]); STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+1, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[1]); #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12) t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+8, nhp[2]); STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+2, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[2]); #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+12, nhp[3]); STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+3, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[3]); #endif } /* If the data being hashed by UHASH is longer than L1_KEY_LEN, then * the polyhash stage is not skipped and ip_long is applied to the * polyhash output. */ static void ip_long(uhash_ctx_t ahc, u_char *res) { int i; UINT64 t; for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) { /* fix polyhash output not in Z_p64 */ if (ahc->poly_accum[i] >= p64) ahc->poly_accum[i] -= p64; t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+(i*4), ahc->poly_accum[i]); STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+i, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[i]); } } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* Reset uhash context for next hash session */ static int uhash_reset(uhash_ctx_t pc) { nh_reset(&pc->hash); pc->msg_len = 0; pc->poly_accum[0] = 1; #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8) pc->poly_accum[1] = 1; #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12) pc->poly_accum[2] = 1; #endif #if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16) pc->poly_accum[3] = 1; #endif return 1; } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* Given a pointer to the internal key needed by kdf() and a uhash context, * initialize the NH context and generate keys needed for poly and inner- * product hashing. All keys are endian adjusted in memory so that native * loads cause correct keys to be in registers during calculation. */ static void uhash_init(uhash_ctx_t ahc, aes_int_key prf_key) { int i; UINT8 buf[(8*STREAMS+4)*sizeof(UINT64)]; /* Zero the entire uhash context */ memset(ahc, 0, sizeof(uhash_ctx)); /* Initialize the L1 hash */ nh_init(&ahc->hash, prf_key); /* Setup L2 hash variables */ kdf(buf, prf_key, 2, sizeof(buf)); /* Fill buffer with index 1 key */ for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) { /* Fill keys from the buffer, skipping bytes in the buffer not * used by this implementation. Endian reverse the keys if on a * little-endian computer. */ memcpy(ahc->poly_key_8+i, buf+24*i, 8); endian_convert_if_le(ahc->poly_key_8+i, 8, 8); /* Mask the 64-bit keys to their special domain */ ahc->poly_key_8[i] &= ((UINT64)0x01ffffffu << 32) + 0x01ffffffu; ahc->poly_accum[i] = 1; /* Our polyhash prepends a non-zero word */ } /* Setup L3-1 hash variables */ kdf(buf, prf_key, 3, sizeof(buf)); /* Fill buffer with index 2 key */ for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) memcpy(ahc->ip_keys+4*i, buf+(8*i+4)*sizeof(UINT64), 4*sizeof(UINT64)); endian_convert_if_le(ahc->ip_keys, sizeof(UINT64), sizeof(ahc->ip_keys)); for (i = 0; i < STREAMS*4; i++) ahc->ip_keys[i] %= p36; /* Bring into Z_p36 */ /* Setup L3-2 hash variables */ /* Fill buffer with index 4 key */ kdf(ahc->ip_trans, prf_key, 4, STREAMS * sizeof(UINT32)); endian_convert_if_le(ahc->ip_trans, sizeof(UINT32), STREAMS * sizeof(UINT32)); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #if 0 static uhash_ctx_t uhash_alloc(u_char key[]) { /* Allocate memory and force to a 16-byte boundary. */ uhash_ctx_t ctx; u_char bytes_to_add; aes_int_key prf_key; ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)malloc(sizeof(uhash_ctx)+ALLOC_BOUNDARY); if (ctx) { if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) { bytes_to_add = ALLOC_BOUNDARY - ((ptrdiff_t)ctx & (ALLOC_BOUNDARY -1)); ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)((u_char *)ctx + bytes_to_add); *((u_char *)ctx - 1) = bytes_to_add; } aes_key_setup(key,prf_key); uhash_init(ctx, prf_key); } return (ctx); } #endif /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #if 0 static int uhash_free(uhash_ctx_t ctx) { /* Free memory allocated by uhash_alloc */ u_char bytes_to_sub; if (ctx) { if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) { bytes_to_sub = *((u_char *)ctx - 1); ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)((u_char *)ctx - bytes_to_sub); } free(ctx); } return (1); } #endif /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static int uhash_update(uhash_ctx_t ctx, const u_char *input, long len) /* Given len bytes of data, we parse it into L1_KEY_LEN chunks and * hash each one with NH, calling the polyhash on each NH output. */ { UWORD bytes_hashed, bytes_remaining; UINT64 result_buf[STREAMS]; UINT8 *nh_result = (UINT8 *)&result_buf; if (ctx->msg_len + len <= L1_KEY_LEN) { nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, len); ctx->msg_len += len; } else { bytes_hashed = ctx->msg_len % L1_KEY_LEN; if (ctx->msg_len == L1_KEY_LEN) bytes_hashed = L1_KEY_LEN; if (bytes_hashed + len >= L1_KEY_LEN) { /* If some bytes have been passed to the hash function */ /* then we want to pass at most (L1_KEY_LEN - bytes_hashed) */ /* bytes to complete the current nh_block. */ if (bytes_hashed) { bytes_remaining = (L1_KEY_LEN - bytes_hashed); nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, bytes_remaining); nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result); ctx->msg_len += bytes_remaining; poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result); len -= bytes_remaining; input += bytes_remaining; } /* Hash directly from input stream if enough bytes */ while (len >= L1_KEY_LEN) { nh(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, L1_KEY_LEN, L1_KEY_LEN, nh_result); ctx->msg_len += L1_KEY_LEN; len -= L1_KEY_LEN; input += L1_KEY_LEN; poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result); } } /* pass remaining < L1_KEY_LEN bytes of input data to NH */ if (len) { nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, len); ctx->msg_len += len; } } return (1); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ static int uhash_final(uhash_ctx_t ctx, u_char *res) /* Incorporate any pending data, pad, and generate tag */ { UINT64 result_buf[STREAMS]; UINT8 *nh_result = (UINT8 *)&result_buf; if (ctx->msg_len > L1_KEY_LEN) { if (ctx->msg_len % L1_KEY_LEN) { nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result); poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result); } ip_long(ctx, res); } else { nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result); ip_short(ctx,nh_result, res); } uhash_reset(ctx); return (1); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #if 0 static int uhash(uhash_ctx_t ahc, u_char *msg, long len, u_char *res) /* assumes that msg is in a writable buffer of length divisible by */ /* L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. Bytes beyond msg[len] may be zeroed. */ { UINT8 nh_result[STREAMS*sizeof(UINT64)]; UINT32 nh_len; int extra_zeroes_needed; /* If the message to be hashed is no longer than L1_HASH_LEN, we skip * the polyhash. */ if (len <= L1_KEY_LEN) { if (len == 0) /* If zero length messages will not */ nh_len = L1_PAD_BOUNDARY; /* be seen, comment out this case */ else nh_len = ((len + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)); extra_zeroes_needed = nh_len - len; zero_pad((UINT8 *)msg + len, extra_zeroes_needed); nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, nh_len, len, nh_result); ip_short(ahc,nh_result, res); } else { /* Otherwise, we hash each L1_KEY_LEN chunk with NH, passing the NH * output to poly_hash(). */ do { nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, L1_KEY_LEN, L1_KEY_LEN, nh_result); poly_hash(ahc,(UINT32 *)nh_result); len -= L1_KEY_LEN; msg += L1_KEY_LEN; } while (len >= L1_KEY_LEN); if (len) { nh_len = ((len + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)); extra_zeroes_needed = nh_len - len; zero_pad((UINT8 *)msg + len, extra_zeroes_needed); nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, nh_len, len, nh_result); poly_hash(ahc,(UINT32 *)nh_result); } ip_long(ahc, res); } uhash_reset(ahc); return 1; } #endif /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- Begin UMAC Section --------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* The UMAC interface has two interfaces, an all-at-once interface where * the entire message to be authenticated is passed to UMAC in one buffer, * and a sequential interface where the message is presented a little at a * time. The all-at-once is more optimaized than the sequential version and * should be preferred when the sequential interface is not required. */ struct umac_ctx { uhash_ctx hash; /* Hash function for message compression */ pdf_ctx pdf; /* PDF for hashed output */ void *free_ptr; /* Address to free this struct via */ } umac_ctx; /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #if 0 int umac_reset(struct umac_ctx *ctx) /* Reset the hash function to begin a new authentication. */ { uhash_reset(&ctx->hash); return (1); } #endif /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ int umac_delete(struct umac_ctx *ctx) /* Deallocate the ctx structure */ { if (ctx) { if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) ctx = (struct umac_ctx *)ctx->free_ptr; free(ctx); } return (1); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ struct umac_ctx *umac_new(const u_char key[]) /* Dynamically allocate a umac_ctx struct, initialize variables, * generate subkeys from key. Align to 16-byte boundary. */ { struct umac_ctx *ctx, *octx; size_t bytes_to_add; aes_int_key prf_key; octx = ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ctx) + ALLOC_BOUNDARY); if (ctx) { if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) { bytes_to_add = ALLOC_BOUNDARY - ((ptrdiff_t)ctx & (ALLOC_BOUNDARY - 1)); ctx = (struct umac_ctx *)((u_char *)ctx + bytes_to_add); } ctx->free_ptr = octx; aes_key_setup(key, prf_key); pdf_init(&ctx->pdf, prf_key); uhash_init(&ctx->hash, prf_key); } return (ctx); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ int umac_final(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char tag[], const u_char nonce[8]) /* Incorporate any pending data, pad, and generate tag */ { uhash_final(&ctx->hash, (u_char *)tag); pdf_gen_xor(&ctx->pdf, (const UINT8 *)nonce, (UINT8 *)tag); return (1); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ int umac_update(struct umac_ctx *ctx, const u_char *input, long len) /* Given len bytes of data, we parse it into L1_KEY_LEN chunks and */ /* hash each one, calling the PDF on the hashed output whenever the hash- */ /* output buffer is full. */ { uhash_update(&ctx->hash, input, len); return (1); } /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ #if 0 int umac(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char *input, long len, u_char tag[], u_char nonce[8]) /* All-in-one version simply calls umac_update() and umac_final(). */ { uhash(&ctx->hash, input, len, (u_char *)tag); pdf_gen_xor(&ctx->pdf, (UINT8 *)nonce, (UINT8 *)tag); return (1); } #endif /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ----- End UMAC Section ----------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ /* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */ Index: vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/version.h =================================================================== --- vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/version.h (revision 276706) +++ vendor-crypto/openssh/dist/version.h (revision 276707) @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ -/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.70 2014/02/27 22:57:40 djm Exp $ */ +/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.71 2014/04/18 23:52:25 djm Exp $ */ -#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_6.6.1" +#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_6.7" #define SSH_PORTABLE "p1" #define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE