diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES index 9d58cb0c58d9..3ef3fa28cfa8 100644 --- a/CHANGES +++ b/CHANGES @@ -1,13690 +1,13727 @@ OpenSSL CHANGES _______________ This is a high-level summary of the most important changes. For a full list of changes, see the git commit log; for example, https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate release branch. + Changes between 1.1.1m and 1.1.1n [15 Mar 2022] + + *) Fixed a bug in the BN_mod_sqrt() function that can cause it to loop forever + for non-prime moduli. + + Internally this function is used when parsing certificates that contain + elliptic curve public keys in compressed form or explicit elliptic curve + parameters with a base point encoded in compressed form. + + It is possible to trigger the infinite loop by crafting a certificate that + has invalid explicit curve parameters. + + Since certificate parsing happens prior to verification of the certificate + signature, any process that parses an externally supplied certificate may + thus be subject to a denial of service attack. The infinite loop can also + be reached when parsing crafted private keys as they can contain explicit + elliptic curve parameters. + + Thus vulnerable situations include: + + - TLS clients consuming server certificates + - TLS servers consuming client certificates + - Hosting providers taking certificates or private keys from customers + - Certificate authorities parsing certification requests from subscribers + - Anything else which parses ASN.1 elliptic curve parameters + + Also any other applications that use the BN_mod_sqrt() where the attacker + can control the parameter values are vulnerable to this DoS issue. + (CVE-2022-0778) + [Tomáš Mráz] + + *) Add ciphersuites based on DHE_PSK (RFC 4279) and ECDHE_PSK (RFC 5489) + to the list of ciphersuites providing Perfect Forward Secrecy as + required by SECLEVEL >= 3. + + [Dmitry Belyavskiy, Nicola Tuveri] + Changes between 1.1.1l and 1.1.1m [14 Dec 2021] *) Avoid loading of a dynamic engine twice. [Bernd Edlinger] *) Fixed building on Debian with kfreebsd kernels [Mattias Ellert] *) Prioritise DANE TLSA issuer certs over peer certs [Viktor Dukhovni] *) Fixed random API for MacOS prior to 10.12 These MacOS versions don't support the CommonCrypto APIs [Lenny Primak] Changes between 1.1.1k and 1.1.1l [24 Aug 2021] *) Fixed an SM2 Decryption Buffer Overflow. In order to decrypt SM2 encrypted data an application is expected to call the API function EVP_PKEY_decrypt(). Typically an application will call this function twice. The first time, on entry, the "out" parameter can be NULL and, on exit, the "outlen" parameter is populated with the buffer size required to hold the decrypted plaintext. The application can then allocate a sufficiently sized buffer and call EVP_PKEY_decrypt() again, but this time passing a non-NULL value for the "out" parameter. A bug in the implementation of the SM2 decryption code means that the calculation of the buffer size required to hold the plaintext returned by the first call to EVP_PKEY_decrypt() can be smaller than the actual size required by the second call. This can lead to a buffer overflow when EVP_PKEY_decrypt() is called by the application a second time with a buffer that is too small. A malicious attacker who is able present SM2 content for decryption to an application could cause attacker chosen data to overflow the buffer by up to a maximum of 62 bytes altering the contents of other data held after the buffer, possibly changing application behaviour or causing the application to crash. The location of the buffer is application dependent but is typically heap allocated. (CVE-2021-3711) [Matt Caswell] *) Fixed various read buffer overruns processing ASN.1 strings ASN.1 strings are represented internally within OpenSSL as an ASN1_STRING structure which contains a buffer holding the string data and a field holding the buffer length. This contrasts with normal C strings which are repesented as a buffer for the string data which is terminated with a NUL (0) byte. Although not a strict requirement, ASN.1 strings that are parsed using OpenSSL's own "d2i" functions (and other similar parsing functions) as well as any string whose value has been set with the ASN1_STRING_set() function will additionally NUL terminate the byte array in the ASN1_STRING structure. However, it is possible for applications to directly construct valid ASN1_STRING structures which do not NUL terminate the byte array by directly setting the "data" and "length" fields in the ASN1_STRING array. This can also happen by using the ASN1_STRING_set0() function. Numerous OpenSSL functions that print ASN.1 data have been found to assume that the ASN1_STRING byte array will be NUL terminated, even though this is not guaranteed for strings that have been directly constructed. Where an application requests an ASN.1 structure to be printed, and where that ASN.1 structure contains ASN1_STRINGs that have been directly constructed by the application without NUL terminating the "data" field, then a read buffer overrun can occur. The same thing can also occur during name constraints processing of certificates (for example if a certificate has been directly constructed by the application instead of loading it via the OpenSSL parsing functions, and the certificate contains non NUL terminated ASN1_STRING structures). It can also occur in the X509_get1_email(), X509_REQ_get1_email() and X509_get1_ocsp() functions. If a malicious actor can cause an application to directly construct an ASN1_STRING and then process it through one of the affected OpenSSL functions then this issue could be hit. This might result in a crash (causing a Denial of Service attack). It could also result in the disclosure of private memory contents (such as private keys, or sensitive plaintext). (CVE-2021-3712) [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.1.1j and 1.1.1k [25 Mar 2021] *) Fixed a problem with verifying a certificate chain when using the X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT flag. This flag enables additional security checks of the certificates present in a certificate chain. It is not set by default. Starting from OpenSSL version 1.1.1h a check to disallow certificates in the chain that have explicitly encoded elliptic curve parameters was added as an additional strict check. An error in the implementation of this check meant that the result of a previous check to confirm that certificates in the chain are valid CA certificates was overwritten. This effectively bypasses the check that non-CA certificates must not be able to issue other certificates. If a "purpose" has been configured then there is a subsequent opportunity for checks that the certificate is a valid CA. All of the named "purpose" values implemented in libcrypto perform this check. Therefore, where a purpose is set the certificate chain will still be rejected even when the strict flag has been used. A purpose is set by default in libssl client and server certificate verification routines, but it can be overridden or removed by an application. In order to be affected, an application must explicitly set the X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT verification flag and either not set a purpose for the certificate verification or, in the case of TLS client or server applications, override the default purpose. (CVE-2021-3450) [Tomáš Mráz] *) Fixed an issue where an OpenSSL TLS server may crash if sent a maliciously crafted renegotiation ClientHello message from a client. If a TLSv1.2 renegotiation ClientHello omits the signature_algorithms extension (where it was present in the initial ClientHello), but includes a signature_algorithms_cert extension then a NULL pointer dereference will result, leading to a crash and a denial of service attack. A server is only vulnerable if it has TLSv1.2 and renegotiation enabled (which is the default configuration). OpenSSL TLS clients are not impacted by this issue. (CVE-2021-3449) [Peter Kästle and Samuel Sapalski] Changes between 1.1.1i and 1.1.1j [16 Feb 2021] *) Fixed the X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() function. It attempts to create a unique hash value based on the issuer and serial number data contained within an X509 certificate. However it was failing to correctly handle any errors that may occur while parsing the issuer field (which might occur if the issuer field is maliciously constructed). This may subsequently result in a NULL pointer deref and a crash leading to a potential denial of service attack. (CVE-2021-23841) [Matt Caswell] *) Fixed the RSA_padding_check_SSLv23() function and the RSA_SSLV23_PADDING padding mode to correctly check for rollback attacks. This is considered a bug in OpenSSL 1.1.1 because it does not support SSLv2. In 1.0.2 this is CVE-2021-23839. [Matt Caswell] *) Fixed the EVP_CipherUpdate, EVP_EncryptUpdate and EVP_DecryptUpdate functions. Previously they could overflow the output length argument in some cases where the input length is close to the maximum permissable length for an integer on the platform. In such cases the return value from the function call would be 1 (indicating success), but the output length value would be negative. This could cause applications to behave incorrectly or crash. (CVE-2021-23840) [Matt Caswell] *) Fixed SRP_Calc_client_key so that it runs in constant time. The previous implementation called BN_mod_exp without setting BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. This could be exploited in a side channel attack to recover the password. Since the attack is local host only this is outside of the current OpenSSL threat model and therefore no CVE is assigned. Thanks to Mohammed Sabt and Daniel De Almeida Braga for reporting this issue. [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.1.1h and 1.1.1i [8 Dec 2020] *) Fixed NULL pointer deref in the GENERAL_NAME_cmp function This function could crash if both GENERAL_NAMEs contain an EDIPARTYNAME. If an attacker can control both items being compared then this could lead to a possible denial of service attack. OpenSSL itself uses the GENERAL_NAME_cmp function for two purposes: 1) Comparing CRL distribution point names between an available CRL and a CRL distribution point embedded in an X509 certificate 2) When verifying that a timestamp response token signer matches the timestamp authority name (exposed via the API functions TS_RESP_verify_response and TS_RESP_verify_token) (CVE-2020-1971) [Matt Caswell] *) Add support for Apple Silicon M1 Macs with the darwin64-arm64-cc target. [Stuart Carnie] *) The security callback, which can be customised by application code, supports the security operation SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH. This is defined to take an EVP_PKEY in the "other" parameter. In most places this is what is passed. All these places occur server side. However there was one client side call of this security operation and it passed a DH object instead. This is incorrect according to the definition of SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, and is inconsistent with all of the other locations. Therefore this client side call has been changed to pass an EVP_PKEY instead. [Matt Caswell] *) In 1.1.1h, an expired trusted (root) certificate was not anymore rejected when validating a certificate path. This check is restored in 1.1.1i. [David von Oheimb] Changes between 1.1.1g and 1.1.1h [22 Sep 2020] *) Certificates with explicit curve parameters are now disallowed in verification chains if the X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT flag is used. [Tomas Mraz] *) The 'MinProtocol' and 'MaxProtocol' configuration commands now silently ignore TLS protocol version bounds when configuring DTLS-based contexts, and conversely, silently ignore DTLS protocol version bounds when configuring TLS-based contexts. The commands can be repeated to set bounds of both types. The same applies with the corresponding "min_protocol" and "max_protocol" command-line switches, in case some application uses both TLS and DTLS. SSL_CTX instances that are created for a fixed protocol version (e.g. TLSv1_server_method()) also silently ignore version bounds. Previously attempts to apply bounds to these protocol versions would result in an error. Now only the "version-flexible" SSL_CTX instances are subject to limits in configuration files in command-line options. [Viktor Dukhovni] *) Handshake now fails if Extended Master Secret extension is dropped on renegotiation. [Tomas Mraz] *) Accidentally, an expired trusted (root) certificate is not anymore rejected when validating a certificate path. [David von Oheimb] *) The Oracle Developer Studio compiler will start reporting deprecated APIs Changes between 1.1.1f and 1.1.1g [21 Apr 2020] *) Fixed segmentation fault in SSL_check_chain() Server or client applications that call the SSL_check_chain() function during or after a TLS 1.3 handshake may crash due to a NULL pointer dereference as a result of incorrect handling of the "signature_algorithms_cert" TLS extension. The crash occurs if an invalid or unrecognised signature algorithm is received from the peer. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in a Denial of Service attack. (CVE-2020-1967) [Benjamin Kaduk] *) Added AES consttime code for no-asm configurations an optional constant time support for AES was added when building openssl for no-asm. Enable with: ./config no-asm -DOPENSSL_AES_CONST_TIME Disable with: ./config no-asm -DOPENSSL_NO_AES_CONST_TIME At this time this feature is by default disabled. It will be enabled by default in 3.0. [Bernd Edlinger] Changes between 1.1.1e and 1.1.1f [31 Mar 2020] *) Revert the change of EOF detection while reading in libssl to avoid regressions in applications depending on the current way of reporting the EOF. As the existing method is not fully accurate the change to reporting the EOF via SSL_ERROR_SSL is kept on the current development branch and will be present in the 3.0 release. [Tomas Mraz] *) Revised BN_generate_prime_ex to not avoid factors 3..17863 in p-1 when primes for RSA keys are computed. Since we previously always generated primes == 2 (mod 3) for RSA keys, the 2-prime and 3-prime RSA modules were easy to distinguish, since N = p*q = 1 (mod 3), but N = p*q*r = 2 (mod 3). Therefore fingerprinting 2-prime vs. 3-prime RSA keys was possible by computing N mod 3. This avoids possible fingerprinting of newly generated RSA modules. [Bernd Edlinger] Changes between 1.1.1d and 1.1.1e [17 Mar 2020] *) Properly detect EOF while reading in libssl. Previously if we hit an EOF while reading in libssl then we would report an error back to the application (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) but errno would be 0. We now add an error to the stack (which means we instead return SSL_ERROR_SSL) and therefore give a hint as to what went wrong. [Matt Caswell] *) Check that ed25519 and ed448 are allowed by the security level. Previously signature algorithms not using an MD were not being checked that they were allowed by the security level. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Fixed SSL_get_servername() behaviour. The behaviour of SSL_get_servername() was not quite right. The behaviour was not consistent between resumption and normal handshakes, and also not quite consistent with historical behaviour. The behaviour in various scenarios has been clarified and it has been updated to make it match historical behaviour as closely as possible. [Matt Caswell] *) [VMS only] The header files that the VMS compilers include automatically, __DECC_INCLUDE_PROLOGUE.H and __DECC_INCLUDE_EPILOGUE.H, use pragmas that the C++ compiler doesn't understand. This is a shortcoming in the compiler, but can be worked around with __cplusplus guards. C++ applications that use OpenSSL libraries must be compiled using the qualifier '/NAMES=(AS_IS,SHORTENED)' to be able to use all the OpenSSL functions. Otherwise, only functions with symbols of less than 31 characters can be used, as the linker will not be able to successfully resolve symbols with longer names. [Richard Levitte] *) Corrected the documentation of the return values from the EVP_DigestSign* set of functions. The documentation mentioned negative values for some errors, but this was never the case, so the mention of negative values was removed. Code that followed the documentation and thereby check with something like 'EVP_DigestSignInit(...) <= 0' will continue to work undisturbed. [Richard Levitte] *) Fixed an an overflow bug in the x64_64 Montgomery squaring procedure used in exponentiation with 512-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against 2-prime RSA1024, 3-prime RSA1536, and DSA1024 as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH512 are considered just feasible. However, for an attack the target would have to re-use the DH512 private key, which is not recommended anyway. Also applications directly using the low level API BN_mod_exp may be affected if they use BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. (CVE-2019-1551) [Andy Polyakov] *) Added a new method to gather entropy on VMS, based on SYS$GET_ENTROPY. The presence of this system service is determined at run-time. [Richard Levitte] *) Added newline escaping functionality to a filename when using openssl dgst. This output format is to replicate the output format found in the '*sum' checksum programs. This aims to preserve backward compatibility. [Matt Eaton, Richard Levitte, and Paul Dale] *) Print all values for a PKCS#12 attribute with 'openssl pkcs12', not just the first value. [Jon Spillett] Changes between 1.1.1c and 1.1.1d [10 Sep 2019] *) Fixed a fork protection issue. OpenSSL 1.1.1 introduced a rewritten random number generator (RNG). This was intended to include protection in the event of a fork() system call in order to ensure that the parent and child processes did not share the same RNG state. However this protection was not being used in the default case. A partial mitigation for this issue is that the output from a high precision timer is mixed into the RNG state so the likelihood of a parent and child process sharing state is significantly reduced. If an application already calls OPENSSL_init_crypto() explicitly using OPENSSL_INIT_ATFORK then this problem does not occur at all. (CVE-2019-1549) [Matthias St. Pierre] *) For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is used even when parsing explicit parameters, when loading a serialized key or calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`/ `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`. This prevents bypass of security hardening and performance gains, especially for curves with specialized EC_METHODs. By default, if a key encoded with explicit parameters is loaded and later serialized, the output is still encoded with explicit parameters, even if internally a "named" EC_GROUP is used for computation. [Nicola Tuveri] *) Compute ECC cofactors if not provided during EC_GROUP construction. Before this change, EC_GROUP_set_generator would accept order and/or cofactor as NULL. After this change, only the cofactor parameter can be NULL. It also does some minimal sanity checks on the passed order. (CVE-2019-1547) [Billy Bob Brumley] *) Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey. An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is used and the recipient will not notice the attack. As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out. The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag. (CVE-2019-1563) [Bernd Edlinger] *) Early start up entropy quality from the DEVRANDOM seed source has been improved for older Linux systems. The RAND subsystem will wait for /dev/random to be producing output before seeding from /dev/urandom. The seeded state is stored for future library initialisations using a system global shared memory segment. The shared memory identifier can be configured by defining OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID to the desired value. The default identifier is 114. [Paul Dale] *) Correct the extended master secret constant on EBCDIC systems. Without this fix TLS connections between an EBCDIC system and a non-EBCDIC system that negotiate EMS will fail. Unfortunately this also means that TLS connections between EBCDIC systems with this fix, and EBCDIC systems without this fix will fail if they negotiate EMS. [Matt Caswell] *) Use Windows installation paths in the mingw builds Mingw isn't a POSIX environment per se, which means that Windows paths should be used for installation. (CVE-2019-1552) [Richard Levitte] *) Changed DH_check to accept parameters with order q and 2q subgroups. With order 2q subgroups the bit 0 of the private key is not secret but DH_generate_key works around that by clearing bit 0 of the private key for those. This avoids leaking bit 0 of the private key. [Bernd Edlinger] *) Significantly reduce secure memory usage by the randomness pools. [Paul Dale] *) Revert the DEVRANDOM_WAIT feature for Linux systems The DEVRANDOM_WAIT feature added a select() call to wait for the /dev/random device to become readable before reading from the /dev/urandom device. It turned out that this change had negative side effects on performance which were not acceptable. After some discussion it was decided to revert this feature and leave it up to the OS resp. the platform maintainer to ensure a proper initialization during early boot time. [Matthias St. Pierre] Changes between 1.1.1b and 1.1.1c [28 May 2019] *) Add build tests for C++. These are generated files that only do one thing, to include one public OpenSSL head file each. This tests that the public header files can be usefully included in a C++ application. This test isn't enabled by default. It can be enabled with the option 'enable-buildtest-c++'. [Richard Levitte] *) Enable SHA3 pre-hashing for ECDSA and DSA. [Patrick Steuer] *) Change the default RSA, DSA and DH size to 2048 bit instead of 1024. This changes the size when using the genpkey app when no size is given. It fixes an omission in earlier changes that changed all RSA, DSA and DH generation apps to use 2048 bits by default. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Reorganize the manual pages to consistently have RETURN VALUES, EXAMPLES, SEE ALSO and HISTORY come in that order, and adjust util/fix-doc-nits accordingly. [Paul Yang, Joshua Lock] *) Add the missing accessor EVP_PKEY_get0_engine() [Matt Caswell] *) Have apps like 's_client' and 's_server' output the signature scheme along with other cipher suite parameters when debugging. [Lorinczy Zsigmond] *) Make OPENSSL_config() error agnostic again. [Richard Levitte] *) Do the error handling in RSA decryption constant time. [Bernd Edlinger] *) Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305. ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV) should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are ignored. It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique. Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a reused nonce. Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further affected. Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th of March 2019 by Joran Dirk Greef of Ronomon. (CVE-2019-1543) [Matt Caswell] *) Add DEVRANDOM_WAIT feature for Linux systems On older Linux systems where the getrandom() system call is not available, OpenSSL normally uses the /dev/urandom device for seeding its CSPRNG. Contrary to getrandom(), the /dev/urandom device will not block during early boot when the kernel CSPRNG has not been seeded yet. To mitigate this known weakness, use select() to wait for /dev/random to become readable before reading from /dev/urandom. *) Ensure that SM2 only uses SM3 as digest algorithm [Paul Yang] Changes between 1.1.1a and 1.1.1b [26 Feb 2019] *) Added SCA hardening for modular field inversion in EC_GROUP through a new dedicated field_inv() pointer in EC_METHOD. This also addresses a leakage affecting conversions from projective to affine coordinates. [Billy Bob Brumley, Nicola Tuveri] *) Change the info callback signals for the start and end of a post-handshake message exchange in TLSv1.3. In 1.1.1/1.1.1a we used SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START and SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE. Experience has shown that many applications get confused by this and assume that a TLSv1.2 renegotiation has started. This can break KeyUpdate handling. Instead we no longer signal the start and end of a post handshake message exchange (although the messages themselves are still signalled). This could break some applications that were expecting the old signals. However without this KeyUpdate is not usable for many applications. [Matt Caswell] *) Fix a bug in the computation of the endpoint-pair shared secret used by DTLS over SCTP. This breaks interoperability with older versions of OpenSSL like OpenSSL 1.1.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.2. There is a runtime switch SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG (off by default) enabling interoperability with such broken implementations. However, enabling this switch breaks interoperability with correct implementations. *) Fix a use after free bug in d2i_X509_PUBKEY when overwriting a re-used X509_PUBKEY object if the second PUBKEY is malformed. [Bernd Edlinger] *) Move strictness check from EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() to EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(). [Richard Levitte] *) Remove the 'dist' target and add a tarball building script. The 'dist' target has fallen out of use, and it shouldn't be necessary to configure just to create a source distribution. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 1.1.1 and 1.1.1a [20 Nov 2018] *) Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation The OpenSSL DSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing algorithm to recover the private key. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th October 2018 by Samuel Weiser. (CVE-2018-0734) [Paul Dale] *) Timing vulnerability in ECDSA signature generation The OpenSSL ECDSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing algorithm to recover the private key. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 25th October 2018 by Samuel Weiser. (CVE-2018-0735) [Paul Dale] *) Added EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_63 and ecdh_KDF_X9_63() as replacements for the EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_62 KDF type and ECDH_KDF_X9_62(). The old names are retained for backwards compatibility. [Antoine Salon] *) Fixed the issue that RAND_add()/RAND_seed() silently discards random input if its length exceeds 4096 bytes. The limit has been raised to a buffer size of two gigabytes and the error handling improved. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Dr. Falko Strenzke. It has been categorized as a normal bug, not a security issue, because the DRBG reseeds automatically and is fully functional even without additional randomness provided by the application. Changes between 1.1.0i and 1.1.1 [11 Sep 2018] *) Add a new ClientHello callback. Provides a callback interface that gives the application the ability to adjust the nascent SSL object at the earliest stage of ClientHello processing, immediately after extensions have been collected but before they have been processed. In particular, this callback can adjust the supported TLS versions in response to the contents of the ClientHello [Benjamin Kaduk] *) Add SM2 base algorithm support. [Jack Lloyd] *) s390x assembly pack: add (improved) hardware-support for the following cryptographic primitives: sha3, shake, aes-gcm, aes-ccm, aes-ctr, aes-ofb, aes-cfb/cfb8, aes-ecb. [Patrick Steuer] *) Make EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() a bit stricter about its input. A NULL pem_str parameter is no longer accepted, as it leads to a corrupt table. NULL pem_str is reserved for alias entries only. [Richard Levitte] *) Use the new ec_scalar_mul_ladder scaffold to implement a specialized ladder step for prime curves. The new implementation is based on formulae from differential addition-and-doubling in homogeneous projective coordinates from Izu-Takagi "A fast parallel elliptic curve multiplication resistant against side channel attacks" and Brier-Joye "Weierstrass Elliptic Curves and Side-Channel Attacks" Eq. (8) for y-coordinate recovery, modified to work in projective coordinates. [Billy Bob Brumley, Nicola Tuveri] *) Change generating and checking of primes so that the error rate of not being prime depends on the intended use based on the size of the input. For larger primes this will result in more rounds of Miller-Rabin. The maximal error rate for primes with more than 1080 bits is lowered to 2^-128. [Kurt Roeckx, Annie Yousar] *) Increase the number of Miller-Rabin rounds for DSA key generating to 64. [Kurt Roeckx] *) The 'tsget' script is renamed to 'tsget.pl', to avoid confusion when moving between systems, and to avoid confusion when a Windows build is done with mingw vs with MSVC. For POSIX installs, there's still a symlink or copy named 'tsget' to avoid that confusion as well. [Richard Levitte] *) Revert blinding in ECDSA sign and instead make problematic addition length-invariant. Switch even to fixed-length Montgomery multiplication. [Andy Polyakov] *) Use the new ec_scalar_mul_ladder scaffold to implement a specialized ladder step for binary curves. The new implementation is based on formulae from differential addition-and-doubling in mixed Lopez-Dahab projective coordinates, modified to independently blind the operands. [Billy Bob Brumley, Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri] *) Add a scaffold to optionally enhance the Montgomery ladder implementation for `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` (formerly `ec_mul_consttime`) allowing EC_METHODs to implement their own specialized "ladder step", to take advantage of more favorable coordinate systems or more efficient differential addition-and-doubling algorithms. [Billy Bob Brumley, Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri] *) Modified the random device based seed sources to keep the relevant file descriptors open rather than reopening them on each access. This allows such sources to operate in a chroot() jail without the associated device nodes being available. This behaviour can be controlled using RAND_keep_random_devices_open(). [Paul Dale] *) Numerous side-channel attack mitigations have been applied. This may have performance impacts for some algorithms for the benefit of improved security. Specific changes are noted in this change log by their respective authors. [Matt Caswell] *) AIX shared library support overhaul. Switch to AIX "natural" way of handling shared libraries, which means collecting shared objects of different versions and bitnesses in one common archive. This allows to mitigate conflict between 1.0 and 1.1 side-by-side installations. It doesn't affect the way 3rd party applications are linked, only how multi-version installation is managed. [Andy Polyakov] *) Make ec_group_do_inverse_ord() more robust and available to other EC cryptosystems, so that irrespective of BN_FLG_CONSTTIME, SCA mitigations are applied to the fallback BN_mod_inverse(). When using this function rather than BN_mod_inverse() directly, new EC cryptosystem implementations are then safer-by-default. [Billy Bob Brumley] *) Add coordinate blinding for EC_POINT and implement projective coordinate blinding for generic prime curves as a countermeasure to chosen point SCA attacks. [Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri, Billy Bob Brumley] *) Add blinding to ECDSA and DSA signatures to protect against side channel attacks discovered by Keegan Ryan (NCC Group). [Matt Caswell] *) Enforce checking in the pkeyutl command line app to ensure that the input length does not exceed the maximum supported digest length when performing a sign, verify or verifyrecover operation. [Matt Caswell] *) SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY is enabled by default. Applications that use blocking I/O in combination with something like select() or poll() will hang. This can be turned off again using SSL_CTX_clear_mode(). Many applications do not properly handle non-application data records, and TLS 1.3 sends more of such records. Setting SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY works around the problems in those applications, but can also break some. It's recommended to read the manpages about SSL_read(), SSL_write(), SSL_get_error(), SSL_shutdown(), SSL_CTX_set_mode() and SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead() again. [Kurt Roeckx] *) When unlocking a pass phrase protected PEM file or PKCS#8 container, we now allow empty (zero character) pass phrases. [Richard Levitte] *) Apply blinding to binary field modular inversion and remove patent pending (OPENSSL_SUN_GF2M_DIV) BN_GF2m_mod_div implementation. [Billy Bob Brumley] *) Deprecate ec2_mult.c and unify scalar multiplication code paths for binary and prime elliptic curves. [Billy Bob Brumley] *) Remove ECDSA nonce padding: EC_POINT_mul is now responsible for constant time fixed point multiplication. [Billy Bob Brumley] *) Revise elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses: ec_wNAF_mul redirects to a constant time implementation when computing fixed point and variable point multiplication (which in OpenSSL are mostly used with secret scalars in keygen, sign, ECDH derive operations). [Billy Bob Brumley, Nicola Tuveri, Cesar Pereida García, Sohaib ul Hassan] *) Updated CONTRIBUTING [Rich Salz] *) Updated DRBG / RAND to request nonce and additional low entropy randomness from the system. [Matthias St. Pierre] *) Updated 'openssl rehash' to use OpenSSL consistent default. [Richard Levitte] *) Moved the load of the ssl_conf module to libcrypto, which helps loading engines that libssl uses before libssl is initialised. [Matt Caswell] *) Added EVP_PKEY_sign() and EVP_PKEY_verify() for EdDSA [Matt Caswell] *) Fixed X509_NAME_ENTRY_set to get multi-valued RDNs right in all cases. [Ingo Schwarze, Rich Salz] *) Added output of accepting IP address and port for 'openssl s_server' [Richard Levitte] *) Added a new API for TLSv1.3 ciphersuites: SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites() SSL_set_ciphersuites() [Matt Caswell] *) Memory allocation failures consistently add an error to the error stack. [Rich Salz] *) Don't use OPENSSL_ENGINES and OPENSSL_CONF environment values in libcrypto when run as setuid/setgid. [Bernd Edlinger] *) Load any config file by default when libssl is used. [Matt Caswell] *) Added new public header file and documentation for the RAND_DRBG API. See manual page RAND_DRBG(7) for an overview. [Matthias St. Pierre] *) QNX support removed (cannot find contributors to get their approval for the license change). [Rich Salz] *) TLSv1.3 replay protection for early data has been implemented. See the SSL_read_early_data() man page for further details. [Matt Caswell] *) Separated TLSv1.3 ciphersuite configuration out from TLSv1.2 ciphersuite configuration. TLSv1.3 ciphersuites are not compatible with TLSv1.2 and below. Similarly TLSv1.2 ciphersuites are not compatible with TLSv1.3. In order to avoid issues where legacy TLSv1.2 ciphersuite configuration would otherwise inadvertently disable all TLSv1.3 ciphersuites the configuration has been separated out. See the ciphers man page or the SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites() man page for more information. [Matt Caswell] *) On POSIX (BSD, Linux, ...) systems the ocsp(1) command running in responder mode now supports the new "-multi" option, which spawns the specified number of child processes to handle OCSP requests. The "-timeout" option now also limits the OCSP responder's patience to wait to receive the full client request on a newly accepted connection. Child processes are respawned as needed, and the CA index file is automatically reloaded when changed. This makes it possible to run the "ocsp" responder as a long-running service, making the OpenSSL CA somewhat more feature-complete. In this mode, most diagnostic messages logged after entering the event loop are logged via syslog(3) rather than written to stderr. [Viktor Dukhovni] *) Added support for X448 and Ed448. Heavily based on original work by Mike Hamburg. [Matt Caswell] *) Extend OSSL_STORE with capabilities to search and to narrow the set of objects loaded. This adds the functions OSSL_STORE_expect() and OSSL_STORE_find() as well as needed tools to construct searches and get the search data out of them. [Richard Levitte] *) Support for TLSv1.3 added. Note that users upgrading from an earlier version of OpenSSL should review their configuration settings to ensure that they are still appropriate for TLSv1.3. For further information see: https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/TLS1.3 [Matt Caswell] *) Grand redesign of the OpenSSL random generator The default RAND method now utilizes an AES-CTR DRBG according to NIST standard SP 800-90Ar1. The new random generator is essentially a port of the default random generator from the OpenSSL FIPS 2.0 object module. It is a hybrid deterministic random bit generator using an AES-CTR bit stream and which seeds and reseeds itself automatically using trusted system entropy sources. Some of its new features are: o Support for multiple DRBG instances with seed chaining. o The default RAND method makes use of a DRBG. o There is a public and private DRBG instance. o The DRBG instances are fork-safe. o Keep all global DRBG instances on the secure heap if it is enabled. o The public and private DRBG instance are per thread for lock free operation [Paul Dale, Benjamin Kaduk, Kurt Roeckx, Rich Salz, Matthias St. Pierre] *) Changed Configure so it only says what it does and doesn't dump so much data. Instead, ./configdata.pm should be used as a script to display all sorts of configuration data. [Richard Levitte] *) Added processing of "make variables" to Configure. [Richard Levitte] *) Added SHA512/224 and SHA512/256 algorithm support. [Paul Dale] *) The last traces of Netware support, first removed in 1.1.0, have now been removed. [Rich Salz] *) Get rid of Makefile.shared, and in the process, make the processing of certain files (rc.obj, or the .def/.map/.opt files produced from the ordinal files) more visible and hopefully easier to trace and debug (or make silent). [Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to have environment variable assignments as arguments to config / Configure. [Richard Levitte] *) Add multi-prime RSA (RFC 8017) support. [Paul Yang] *) Add SM3 implemented according to GB/T 32905-2016 [ Jack Lloyd , Ronald Tse , Erick Borsboom ] *) Add 'Maximum Fragment Length' TLS extension negotiation and support as documented in RFC6066. Based on a patch from Tomasz Moń [Filipe Raimundo da Silva] *) Add SM4 implemented according to GB/T 32907-2016. [ Jack Lloyd , Ronald Tse , Erick Borsboom ] *) Reimplement -newreq-nodes and ERR_error_string_n; the original author does not agree with the license change. [Rich Salz] *) Add ARIA AEAD TLS support. [Jon Spillett] *) Some macro definitions to support VS6 have been removed. Visual Studio 6 has not worked since 1.1.0 [Rich Salz] *) Add ERR_clear_last_mark(), to allow callers to clear the last mark without clearing the errors. [Richard Levitte] *) Add "atfork" functions. If building on a system that without pthreads, see doc/man3/OPENSSL_fork_prepare.pod for application requirements. The RAND facility now uses/requires this. [Rich Salz] *) Add SHA3. [Andy Polyakov] *) The UI API becomes a permanent and integral part of libcrypto, i.e. not possible to disable entirely. However, it's still possible to disable the console reading UI method, UI_OpenSSL() (use UI_null() as a fallback). To disable, configure with 'no-ui-console'. 'no-ui' is still possible to use as an alias. Check at compile time with the macro OPENSSL_NO_UI_CONSOLE. The macro OPENSSL_NO_UI is still possible to check and is an alias for OPENSSL_NO_UI_CONSOLE. [Richard Levitte] *) Add a STORE module, which implements a uniform and URI based reader of stores that can contain keys, certificates, CRLs and numerous other objects. The main API is loosely based on a few stdio functions, and includes OSSL_STORE_open, OSSL_STORE_load, OSSL_STORE_eof, OSSL_STORE_error and OSSL_STORE_close. The implementation uses backends called "loaders" to implement arbitrary URI schemes. There is one built in "loader" for the 'file' scheme. [Richard Levitte] *) Add devcrypto engine. This has been implemented against cryptodev-linux, then adjusted to work on FreeBSD 8.4 as well. Enable by configuring with 'enable-devcryptoeng'. This is done by default on BSD implementations, as cryptodev.h is assumed to exist on all of them. [Richard Levitte] *) Module names can prefixed with OSSL_ or OPENSSL_. This affects util/mkerr.pl, which is adapted to allow those prefixes, leading to error code calls like this: OSSL_FOOerr(OSSL_FOO_F_SOMETHING, OSSL_FOO_R_WHATEVER); With this change, we claim the namespaces OSSL and OPENSSL in a manner that can be encoded in C. For the foreseeable future, this will only affect new modules. [Richard Levitte and Tim Hudson] *) Removed BSD cryptodev engine. [Rich Salz] *) Add a build target 'build_all_generated', to build all generated files and only that. This can be used to prepare everything that requires things like perl for a system that lacks perl and then move everything to that system and do the rest of the build there. [Richard Levitte] *) In the UI interface, make it possible to duplicate the user data. This can be used by engines that need to retain the data for a longer time than just the call where this user data is passed. [Richard Levitte] *) Ignore the '-named_curve auto' value for compatibility of applications with OpenSSL 1.0.2. [Tomas Mraz ] *) Fragmented SSL/TLS alerts are no longer accepted. An alert message is 2 bytes long. In theory it is permissible in SSLv3 - TLSv1.2 to fragment such alerts across multiple records (some of which could be empty). In practice it make no sense to send an empty alert record, or to fragment one. TLSv1.3 prohibits this altogether and other libraries (BoringSSL, NSS) do not support this at all. Supporting it adds significant complexity to the record layer, and its removal is unlikely to cause interoperability issues. [Matt Caswell] *) Add the ASN.1 types INT32, UINT32, INT64, UINT64 and variants prefixed with Z. These are meant to replace LONG and ZLONG and to be size safe. The use of LONG and ZLONG is discouraged and scheduled for deprecation in OpenSSL 1.2.0. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the 'z' and 'j' modifiers to BIO_printf() et al formatting string, 'z' is to be used for [s]size_t, and 'j' - with [u]int64_t. [Richard Levitte, Andy Polyakov] *) Add EC_KEY_get0_engine(), which does for EC_KEY what RSA_get0_engine() does for RSA, etc. [Richard Levitte] *) Have 'config' recognise 64-bit mingw and choose 'mingw64' as the target platform rather than 'mingw'. [Richard Levitte] *) The functions X509_STORE_add_cert and X509_STORE_add_crl return success if they are asked to add an object which already exists in the store. This change cascades to other functions which load certificates and CRLs. [Paul Dale] *) x86_64 assembly pack: annotate code with DWARF CFI directives to facilitate stack unwinding even from assembly subroutines. [Andy Polyakov] *) Remove VAX C specific definitions of OPENSSL_EXPORT, OPENSSL_EXTERN. Also remove OPENSSL_GLOBAL entirely, as it became a no-op. [Richard Levitte] *) Remove the VMS-specific reimplementation of gmtime from crypto/o_times.c. VMS C's RTL has a fully up to date gmtime() and gmtime_r() since V7.1, which is the minimum version we support. [Richard Levitte] *) Certificate time validation (X509_cmp_time) enforces stricter compliance with RFC 5280. Fractional seconds and timezone offsets are no longer allowed. [Emilia Käsper] *) Add support for ARIA [Paul Dale] *) s_client will now send the Server Name Indication (SNI) extension by default unless the new "-noservername" option is used. The server name is based on the host provided to the "-connect" option unless overridden by using "-servername". [Matt Caswell] *) Add support for SipHash [Todd Short] *) OpenSSL now fails if it receives an unrecognised record type in TLS1.0 or TLS1.1. Previously this only happened in SSLv3 and TLS1.2. This is to prevent issues where no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised record types, using up resources processing them. [Matt Caswell] *) 'openssl passwd' can now produce SHA256 and SHA512 based output, using the algorithm defined in https://www.akkadia.org/drepper/SHA-crypt.txt [Richard Levitte] *) Heartbeat support has been removed; the ABI is changed for now. [Richard Levitte, Rich Salz] *) Support for SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC in SSL_CONF_cmd. [Emilia Käsper] *) The RSA "null" method, which was partially supported to avoid patent issues, has been replaced to always returns NULL. [Rich Salz] Changes between 1.1.0h and 1.1.0i [xx XXX xxxx] *) Client DoS due to large DH parameter During key agreement in a TLS handshake using a DH(E) based ciphersuite a malicious server can send a very large prime value to the client. This will cause the client to spend an unreasonably long period of time generating a key for this prime resulting in a hang until the client has finished. This could be exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 5th June 2018 by Guido Vranken (CVE-2018-0732) [Guido Vranken] *) Cache timing vulnerability in RSA Key Generation The OpenSSL RSA Key generation algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a cache timing side channel attack. An attacker with sufficient access to mount cache timing attacks during the RSA key generation process could recover the private key. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th April 2018 by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya, Billy Brumley, Cesar Pereida Garcia and Luis Manuel Alvarez Tapia. (CVE-2018-0737) [Billy Brumley] *) Make EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() a bit stricter about its input. A NULL pem_str parameter is no longer accepted, as it leads to a corrupt table. NULL pem_str is reserved for alias entries only. [Richard Levitte] *) Revert blinding in ECDSA sign and instead make problematic addition length-invariant. Switch even to fixed-length Montgomery multiplication. [Andy Polyakov] *) Change generating and checking of primes so that the error rate of not being prime depends on the intended use based on the size of the input. For larger primes this will result in more rounds of Miller-Rabin. The maximal error rate for primes with more than 1080 bits is lowered to 2^-128. [Kurt Roeckx, Annie Yousar] *) Increase the number of Miller-Rabin rounds for DSA key generating to 64. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Add blinding to ECDSA and DSA signatures to protect against side channel attacks discovered by Keegan Ryan (NCC Group). [Matt Caswell] *) When unlocking a pass phrase protected PEM file or PKCS#8 container, we now allow empty (zero character) pass phrases. [Richard Levitte] *) Certificate time validation (X509_cmp_time) enforces stricter compliance with RFC 5280. Fractional seconds and timezone offsets are no longer allowed. [Emilia Käsper] *) Fixed a text canonicalisation bug in CMS Where a CMS detached signature is used with text content the text goes through a canonicalisation process first prior to signing or verifying a signature. This process strips trailing space at the end of lines, converts line terminators to CRLF and removes additional trailing line terminators at the end of a file. A bug in the canonicalisation process meant that some characters, such as form-feed, were incorrectly treated as whitespace and removed. This is contrary to the specification (RFC5485). This fix could mean that detached text data signed with an earlier version of OpenSSL 1.1.0 may fail to verify using the fixed version, or text data signed with a fixed OpenSSL may fail to verify with an earlier version of OpenSSL 1.1.0. A workaround is to only verify the canonicalised text data and use the "-binary" flag (for the "cms" command line application) or set the SMIME_BINARY/PKCS7_BINARY/CMS_BINARY flags (if using CMS_verify()). [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.1.0g and 1.1.0h [27 Mar 2018] *) Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition could exceed the stack Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition (such as can be found in PKCS7) could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with excessive recursion. This could result in a Denial Of Service attack. There are no such structures used within SSL/TLS that come from untrusted sources so this is considered safe. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th January 2018 by the OSS-fuzz project. (CVE-2018-0739) [Matt Caswell] *) Incorrect CRYPTO_memcmp on HP-UX PA-RISC Because of an implementation bug the PA-RISC CRYPTO_memcmp function is effectively reduced to only comparing the least significant bit of each byte. This allows an attacker to forge messages that would be considered as authenticated in an amount of tries lower than that guaranteed by the security claims of the scheme. The module can only be compiled by the HP-UX assembler, so that only HP-UX PA-RISC targets are affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 2nd March 2018 by Peter Waltenberg (IBM). (CVE-2018-0733) [Andy Polyakov] *) Add a build target 'build_all_generated', to build all generated files and only that. This can be used to prepare everything that requires things like perl for a system that lacks perl and then move everything to that system and do the rest of the build there. [Richard Levitte] *) Backport SSL_OP_NO_RENGOTIATION OpenSSL 1.0.2 and below had the ability to disable renegotiation using the (undocumented) SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS flag. Due to the opacity changes this is no longer possible in 1.1.0. Therefore the new SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION option from 1.1.1-dev has been backported to 1.1.0 to provide equivalent functionality. Note that if an application built against 1.1.0h headers (or above) is run using an older version of 1.1.0 (prior to 1.1.0h) then the option will be accepted but nothing will happen, i.e. renegotiation will not be prevented. [Matt Caswell] *) Removed the OS390-Unix config target. It relied on a script that doesn't exist. [Rich Salz] *) rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 overflow bug on x86_64 There is an overflow bug in the AVX2 Montgomery multiplication procedure used in exponentiation with 1024-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH1024 are considered just feasible, because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be significant. However, for an attack on TLS to be meaningful, the server would have to share the DH1024 private key among multiple clients, which is no longer an option since CVE-2016-0701. This only affects processors that support the AVX2 but not ADX extensions like Intel Haswell (4th generation). This issue was reported to OpenSSL by David Benjamin (Google). The issue was originally found via the OSS-Fuzz project. (CVE-2017-3738) [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 1.1.0f and 1.1.0g [2 Nov 2017] *) bn_sqrx8x_internal carry bug on x86_64 There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private key that is shared between multiple clients. This only affects processors that support the BMI1, BMI2 and ADX extensions like Intel Broadwell (5th generation) and later or AMD Ryzen. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project. (CVE-2017-3736) [Andy Polyakov] *) Malformed X.509 IPAddressFamily could cause OOB read If an X.509 certificate has a malformed IPAddressFamily extension, OpenSSL could do a one-byte buffer overread. The most likely result would be an erroneous display of the certificate in text format. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project. (CVE-2017-3735) [Rich Salz] Changes between 1.1.0e and 1.1.0f [25 May 2017] *) Have 'config' recognise 64-bit mingw and choose 'mingw64' as the target platform rather than 'mingw'. [Richard Levitte] *) Remove the VMS-specific reimplementation of gmtime from crypto/o_times.c. VMS C's RTL has a fully up to date gmtime() and gmtime_r() since V7.1, which is the minimum version we support. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 1.1.0d and 1.1.0e [16 Feb 2017] *) Encrypt-Then-Mac renegotiation crash During a renegotiation handshake if the Encrypt-Then-Mac extension is negotiated where it was not in the original handshake (or vice-versa) then this can cause OpenSSL to crash (dependant on ciphersuite). Both clients and servers are affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joe Orton (Red Hat). (CVE-2017-3733) [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.1.0c and 1.1.0d [26 Jan 2017] *) Truncated packet could crash via OOB read If one side of an SSL/TLS path is running on a 32-bit host and a specific cipher is being used, then a truncated packet can cause that host to perform an out-of-bounds read, usually resulting in a crash. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki of Google. (CVE-2017-3731) [Andy Polyakov] *) Bad (EC)DHE parameters cause a client crash If a malicious server supplies bad parameters for a DHE or ECDHE key exchange then this can result in the client attempting to dereference a NULL pointer leading to a client crash. This could be exploited in a Denial of Service attack. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken. (CVE-2017-3730) [Matt Caswell] *) BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites. Note: This issue is very similar to CVE-2015-3193 but must be treated as a separate problem. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project. (CVE-2017-3732) [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 1.1.0b and 1.1.0c [10 Nov 2016] *) ChaCha20/Poly1305 heap-buffer-overflow TLS connections using *-CHACHA20-POLY1305 ciphersuites are susceptible to a DoS attack by corrupting larger payloads. This can result in an OpenSSL crash. This issue is not considered to be exploitable beyond a DoS. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki (Google Security Team) (CVE-2016-7054) [Richard Levitte] *) CMS Null dereference Applications parsing invalid CMS structures can crash with a NULL pointer dereference. This is caused by a bug in the handling of the ASN.1 CHOICE type in OpenSSL 1.1.0 which can result in a NULL value being passed to the structure callback if an attempt is made to free certain invalid encodings. Only CHOICE structures using a callback which do not handle NULL value are affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Tyler Nighswander of ForAllSecure. (CVE-2016-7053) [Stephen Henson] *) Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results There is a carry propagating bug in the Broadwell-specific Montgomery multiplication procedure that handles input lengths divisible by, but longer than 256 bits. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA, DSA and DH private keys are impossible. This is because the subroutine in question is not used in operations with the private key itself and an input of the attacker's direct choice. Otherwise the bug can manifest itself as transient authentication and key negotiation failures or reproducible erroneous outcome of public-key operations with specially crafted input. Among EC algorithms only Brainpool P-512 curves are affected and one presumably can attack ECDH key negotiation. Impact was not analyzed in detail, because pre-requisites for attack are considered unlikely. Namely multiple clients have to choose the curve in question and the server has to share the private key among them, neither of which is default behaviour. Even then only clients that chose the curve will be affected. This issue was publicly reported as transient failures and was not initially recognized as a security issue. Thanks to Richard Morgan for providing reproducible case. (CVE-2016-7055) [Andy Polyakov] *) Removed automatic addition of RPATH in shared libraries and executables, as this was a remainder from OpenSSL 1.0.x and isn't needed any more. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 1.1.0a and 1.1.0b [26 Sep 2016] *) Fix Use After Free for large message sizes The patch applied to address CVE-2016-6307 resulted in an issue where if a message larger than approx 16k is received then the underlying buffer to store the incoming message is reallocated and moved. Unfortunately a dangling pointer to the old location is left which results in an attempt to write to the previously freed location. This is likely to result in a crash, however it could potentially lead to execution of arbitrary code. This issue only affects OpenSSL 1.1.0a. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki. (CVE-2016-6309) [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.1.0 and 1.1.0a [22 Sep 2016] *) OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation, sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP. Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) (CVE-2016-6304) [Matt Caswell] *) SSL_peek() hang on empty record OpenSSL 1.1.0 SSL/TLS will hang during a call to SSL_peek() if the peer sends an empty record. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Alex Gaynor. (CVE-2016-6305) [Matt Caswell] *) Excessive allocation of memory in tls_get_message_header() and dtls1_preprocess_fragment() A (D)TLS message includes 3 bytes for its length in the header for the message. This would allow for messages up to 16Mb in length. Messages of this length are excessive and OpenSSL includes a check to ensure that a peer is sending reasonably sized messages in order to avoid too much memory being consumed to service a connection. A flaw in the logic of version 1.1.0 means that memory for the message is allocated too early, prior to the excessive message length check. Due to way memory is allocated in OpenSSL this could mean an attacker could force up to 21Mb to be allocated to service a connection. This could lead to a Denial of Service through memory exhaustion. However, the excessive message length check still takes place, and this would cause the connection to immediately fail. Assuming that the application calls SSL_free() on the failed connection in a timely manner then the 21Mb of allocated memory will then be immediately freed again. Therefore the excessive memory allocation will be transitory in nature. This then means that there is only a security impact if: 1) The application does not call SSL_free() in a timely manner in the event that the connection fails or 2) The application is working in a constrained environment where there is very little free memory or 3) The attacker initiates multiple connection attempts such that there are multiple connections in a state where memory has been allocated for the connection; SSL_free() has not yet been called; and there is insufficient memory to service the multiple requests. Except in the instance of (1) above any Denial Of Service is likely to be transitory because as soon as the connection fails the memory is subsequently freed again in the SSL_free() call. However there is an increased risk during this period of application crashes due to the lack of memory - which would then mean a more serious Denial of Service. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) (CVE-2016-6307 and CVE-2016-6308) [Matt Caswell] *) solaris-x86-cc, i.e. 32-bit configuration with vendor compiler, had to be removed. Primary reason is that vendor assembler can't assemble our modules with -KPIC flag. As result it, assembly support, was not even available as option. But its lack means lack of side-channel resistant code, which is incompatible with security by todays standards. Fortunately gcc is readily available prepackaged option, which we firmly point at... [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 1.0.2h and 1.1.0 [25 Aug 2016] *) Windows command-line tool supports UTF-8 opt-in option for arguments and console input. Setting OPENSSL_WIN32_UTF8 environment variable (to any value) allows Windows user to access PKCS#12 file generated with Windows CryptoAPI and protected with non-ASCII password, as well as files generated under UTF-8 locale on Linux also protected with non-ASCII password. [Andy Polyakov] *) To mitigate the SWEET32 attack (CVE-2016-2183), 3DES cipher suites have been disabled by default and removed from DEFAULT, just like RC4. See the RC4 item below to re-enable both. [Rich Salz] *) The method for finding the storage location for the Windows RAND seed file has changed. First we check %RANDFILE%. If that is not set then we check the directories %HOME%, %USERPROFILE% and %SYSTEMROOT% in that order. If all else fails we fall back to C:\. [Matt Caswell] *) The EVP_EncryptUpdate() function has had its return type changed from void to int. A return of 0 indicates and error while a return of 1 indicates success. [Matt Caswell] *) The flags RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME, DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME and DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME which previously provided the ability to switch off the constant time implementation for RSA, DSA and DH have been made no-ops and deprecated. [Matt Caswell] *) Windows RAND implementation was simplified to only get entropy by calling CryptGenRandom(). Various other RAND-related tickets were also closed. [Joseph Wylie Yandle, Rich Salz] *) The stack and lhash API's were renamed to start with OPENSSL_SK_ and OPENSSL_LH_, respectively. The old names are available with API compatibility. They new names are now completely documented. [Rich Salz] *) Unify TYPE_up_ref(obj) methods signature. SSL_CTX_up_ref(), SSL_up_ref(), X509_up_ref(), EVP_PKEY_up_ref(), X509_CRL_up_ref(), X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count() methods are now returning an int (instead of void) like all others TYPE_up_ref() methods. So now these methods also check the return value of CRYPTO_atomic_add(), and the validity of object reference counter. [fdasilvayy@gmail.com] *) With Windows Visual Studio builds, the .pdb files are installed alongside the installed libraries and executables. For a static library installation, ossl_static.pdb is the associate compiler generated .pdb file to be used when linking programs. [Richard Levitte] *) Remove openssl.spec. Packaging files belong with the packagers. [Richard Levitte] *) Automatic Darwin/OSX configuration has had a refresh, it will now recognise x86_64 architectures automatically. You can still decide to build for a different bitness with the environment variable KERNEL_BITS (can be 32 or 64), for example: KERNEL_BITS=32 ./config [Richard Levitte] *) Change default algorithms in pkcs8 utility to use PKCS#5 v2.0, 256 bit AES and HMAC with SHA256. [Steve Henson] *) Remove support for MIPS o32 ABI on IRIX (and IRIX only). [Andy Polyakov] *) Triple-DES ciphers have been moved from HIGH to MEDIUM. [Rich Salz] *) To enable users to have their own config files and build file templates, Configure looks in the directory indicated by the environment variable OPENSSL_LOCAL_CONFIG_DIR as well as the in-source Configurations/ directory. On VMS, OPENSSL_LOCAL_CONFIG_DIR is expected to be a logical name and is used as is. [Richard Levitte] *) The following datatypes were made opaque: X509_OBJECT, X509_STORE_CTX, X509_STORE, X509_LOOKUP, and X509_LOOKUP_METHOD. The unused type X509_CERT_FILE_CTX was removed. [Rich Salz] *) "shared" builds are now the default. To create only static libraries use the "no-shared" Configure option. [Matt Caswell] *) Remove the no-aes, no-hmac, no-rsa, no-sha and no-md5 Configure options. All of these option have not worked for some while and are fundamental algorithms. [Matt Caswell] *) Make various cleanup routines no-ops and mark them as deprecated. Most global cleanup functions are no longer required because they are handled via auto-deinit (see OPENSSL_init_crypto and OPENSSL_init_ssl man pages). Explicitly de-initing can cause problems (e.g. where a library that uses OpenSSL de-inits, but an application is still using it). The affected functions are CONF_modules_free(), ENGINE_cleanup(), OBJ_cleanup(), EVP_cleanup(), BIO_sock_cleanup(), CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(), RAND_cleanup(), SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods(), ERR_free_strings() and COMP_zlib_cleanup(). [Matt Caswell] *) --strict-warnings no longer enables runtime debugging options such as REF_DEBUG. Instead, debug options are automatically enabled with '--debug' builds. [Andy Polyakov, Emilia Käsper] *) Made DH and DH_METHOD opaque. The structures for managing DH objects have been moved out of the public header files. New functions for managing these have been added. [Matt Caswell] *) Made RSA and RSA_METHOD opaque. The structures for managing RSA objects have been moved out of the public header files. New functions for managing these have been added. [Richard Levitte] *) Made DSA and DSA_METHOD opaque. The structures for managing DSA objects have been moved out of the public header files. New functions for managing these have been added. [Matt Caswell] *) Made BIO and BIO_METHOD opaque. The structures for managing BIOs have been moved out of the public header files. New functions for managing these have been added. [Matt Caswell] *) Removed no-rijndael as a config option. Rijndael is an old name for AES. [Matt Caswell] *) Removed the mk1mf build scripts. [Richard Levitte] *) Headers are now wrapped, if necessary, with OPENSSL_NO_xxx, so it is always safe to #include a header now. [Rich Salz] *) Removed the aged BC-32 config and all its supporting scripts [Richard Levitte] *) Removed support for Ultrix, Netware, and OS/2. [Rich Salz] *) Add support for HKDF. [Alessandro Ghedini] *) Add support for blake2b and blake2s [Bill Cox] *) Added support for "pipelining". Ciphers that have the EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE flag set have a capability to process multiple encryptions/decryptions simultaneously. There are currently no built-in ciphers with this property but the expectation is that engines will be able to offer it to significantly improve throughput. Support has been extended into libssl so that multiple records for a single connection can be processed in one go (for >=TLS 1.1). [Matt Caswell] *) Added the AFALG engine. This is an async capable engine which is able to offload work to the Linux kernel. In this initial version it only supports AES128-CBC. The kernel must be version 4.1.0 or greater. [Catriona Lucey] *) OpenSSL now uses a new threading API. It is no longer necessary to set locking callbacks to use OpenSSL in a multi-threaded environment. There are two supported threading models: pthreads and windows threads. It is also possible to configure OpenSSL at compile time for "no-threads". The old threading API should no longer be used. The functions have been replaced with "no-op" compatibility macros. [Alessandro Ghedini, Matt Caswell] *) Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN. [Todd Short] *) Add SSL_CIPHER queries for authentication and key-exchange. [Todd Short] *) Changes to the DEFAULT cipherlist: - Prefer (EC)DHE handshakes over plain RSA. - Prefer AEAD ciphers over legacy ciphers. - Prefer ECDSA over RSA when both certificates are available. - Prefer TLSv1.2 ciphers/PRF. - Remove DSS, SEED, IDEA, CAMELLIA, and AES-CCM from the default cipherlist. [Emilia Käsper] *) Change the ECC default curve list to be this, in order: x25519, secp256r1, secp521r1, secp384r1. [Rich Salz] *) RC4 based libssl ciphersuites are now classed as "weak" ciphers and are disabled by default. They can be re-enabled using the enable-weak-ssl-ciphers option to Configure. [Matt Caswell] *) If the server has ALPN configured, but supports no protocols that the client advertises, send a fatal "no_application_protocol" alert. This behaviour is SHALL in RFC 7301, though it isn't universally implemented by other servers. [Emilia Käsper] *) Add X25519 support. Add ASN.1 and EVP_PKEY methods for X25519. This includes support for public and private key encoding using the format documented in draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-02. The corresponding EVP_PKEY method supports key generation and key derivation. TLS support complies with draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-08 and uses X25519(29). [Steve Henson] *) Deprecate SRP_VBASE_get_by_user. SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had inconsistent memory management behaviour. In order to fix an unavoidable memory leak (CVE-2016-0798), SRP_VBASE_get_by_user was changed to ignore the "fake user" SRP seed, even if the seed is configured. Users should use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead. Note that in SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user, caller must free the returned value. Note also that even though configuring the SRP seed attempts to hide invalid usernames by continuing the handshake with fake credentials, this behaviour is not constant time and no strong guarantees are made that the handshake is indistinguishable from that of a valid user. [Emilia Käsper] *) Configuration change; it's now possible to build dynamic engines without having to build shared libraries and vice versa. This only applies to the engines in engines/, those in crypto/engine/ will always be built into libcrypto (i.e. "static"). Building dynamic engines is enabled by default; to disable, use the configuration option "disable-dynamic-engine". The only requirements for building dynamic engines are the presence of the DSO module and building with position independent code, so they will also automatically be disabled if configuring with "disable-dso" or "disable-pic". The macros OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE and OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE are also taken away from openssl/opensslconf.h, as they are irrelevant. [Richard Levitte] *) Configuration change; if there is a known flag to compile position independent code, it will always be applied on the libcrypto and libssl object files, and never on the application object files. This means other libraries that use routines from libcrypto / libssl can be made into shared libraries regardless of how OpenSSL was configured. If this isn't desirable, the configuration options "disable-pic" or "no-pic" can be used to disable the use of PIC. This will also disable building shared libraries and dynamic engines. [Richard Levitte] *) Removed JPAKE code. It was experimental and has no wide use. [Rich Salz] *) The INSTALL_PREFIX Makefile variable has been renamed to DESTDIR. That makes for less confusion on what this variable is for. Also, the configuration option --install_prefix is removed. [Richard Levitte] *) Heartbeat for TLS has been removed and is disabled by default for DTLS; configure with enable-heartbeats. Code that uses the old #define's might need to be updated. [Emilia Käsper, Rich Salz] *) Rename REF_CHECK to REF_DEBUG. [Rich Salz] *) New "unified" build system The "unified" build system is aimed to be a common system for all platforms we support. With it comes new support for VMS. This system builds supports building in a different directory tree than the source tree. It produces one Makefile (for unix family or lookalikes), or one descrip.mms (for VMS). The source of information to make the Makefile / descrip.mms is small files called 'build.info', holding the necessary information for each directory with source to compile, and a template in Configurations, like unix-Makefile.tmpl or descrip.mms.tmpl. With this change, the library names were also renamed on Windows and on VMS. They now have names that are closer to the standard on Unix, and include the major version number, and in certain cases, the architecture they are built for. See "Notes on shared libraries" in INSTALL. We rely heavily on the perl module Text::Template. [Richard Levitte] *) Added support for auto-initialisation and de-initialisation of the library. OpenSSL no longer requires explicit init or deinit routines to be called, except in certain circumstances. See the OPENSSL_init_crypto() and OPENSSL_init_ssl() man pages for further information. [Matt Caswell] *) The arguments to the DTLSv1_listen function have changed. Specifically the "peer" argument is now expected to be a BIO_ADDR object. *) Rewrite of BIO networking library. The BIO library lacked consistent support of IPv6, and adding it required some more extensive modifications. This introduces the BIO_ADDR and BIO_ADDRINFO types, which hold all types of addresses and chains of address information. It also introduces a new API, with functions like BIO_socket, BIO_connect, BIO_listen, BIO_lookup and a rewrite of BIO_accept. The source/sink BIOs BIO_s_connect, BIO_s_accept and BIO_s_datagram have been adapted accordingly. [Richard Levitte] *) RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1 now accepts inputs with and without the leading 0-byte. [Emilia Käsper] *) CRIME protection: disable compression by default, even if OpenSSL is compiled with zlib enabled. Applications can still enable compression by calling SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION), or by using the SSL_CONF library to configure compression. [Emilia Käsper] *) The signature of the session callback configured with SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb was changed. The read-only input buffer was explicitly marked as 'const unsigned char*' instead of 'unsigned char*'. [Emilia Käsper] *) Always DPURIFY. Remove the use of uninitialized memory in the RNG, and other conditional uses of DPURIFY. This makes -DPURIFY a no-op. [Emilia Käsper] *) Removed many obsolete configuration items, including DES_PTR, DES_RISC1, DES_RISC2, DES_INT MD2_CHAR, MD2_INT, MD2_LONG BF_PTR, BF_PTR2 IDEA_SHORT, IDEA_LONG RC2_SHORT, RC2_LONG, RC4_LONG, RC4_CHUNK, RC4_INDEX [Rich Salz, with advice from Andy Polyakov] *) Many BN internals have been moved to an internal header file. [Rich Salz with help from Andy Polyakov] *) Configuration and writing out the results from it has changed. Files such as Makefile include/openssl/opensslconf.h and are now produced through general templates, such as Makefile.in and crypto/opensslconf.h.in and some help from the perl module Text::Template. Also, the center of configuration information is no longer Makefile. Instead, Configure produces a perl module in configdata.pm which holds most of the config data (in the hash table %config), the target data that comes from the target configuration in one of the Configurations/*.conf files (in %target). [Richard Levitte] *) To clarify their intended purposes, the Configure options --prefix and --openssldir change their semantics, and become more straightforward and less interdependent. --prefix shall be used exclusively to give the location INSTALLTOP where programs, scripts, libraries, include files and manuals are going to be installed. The default is now /usr/local. --openssldir shall be used exclusively to give the default location OPENSSLDIR where certificates, private keys, CRLs are managed. This is also where the default openssl.cnf gets installed. If the directory given with this option is a relative path, the values of both the --prefix value and the --openssldir value will be combined to become OPENSSLDIR. The default for --openssldir is INSTALLTOP/ssl. Anyone who uses --openssldir to specify where OpenSSL is to be installed MUST change to use --prefix instead. [Richard Levitte] *) The GOST engine was out of date and therefore it has been removed. An up to date GOST engine is now being maintained in an external repository. See: https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Binaries. Libssl still retains support for GOST ciphersuites (these are only activated if a GOST engine is present). [Matt Caswell] *) EGD is no longer supported by default; use enable-egd when configuring. [Ben Kaduk and Rich Salz] *) The distribution now has Makefile.in files, which are used to create Makefile's when Configure is run. *Configure must be run before trying to build now.* [Rich Salz] *) The return value for SSL_CIPHER_description() for error conditions has changed. [Rich Salz] *) Support for RFC6698/RFC7671 DANE TLSA peer authentication. Obtaining and performing DNSSEC validation of TLSA records is the application's responsibility. The application provides the TLSA records of its choice to OpenSSL, and these are then used to authenticate the peer. The TLSA records need not even come from DNS. They can, for example, be used to implement local end-entity certificate or trust-anchor "pinning", where the "pin" data takes the form of TLSA records, which can augment or replace verification based on the usual WebPKI public certification authorities. [Viktor Dukhovni] *) Revert default OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED setting. Instead OpenSSL continues to support deprecated interfaces in default builds. However, applications are strongly advised to compile their source files with -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L, which hides the declarations of all interfaces deprecated in 0.9.8, 1.0.0 or the 1.1.0 releases. In environments in which all applications have been ported to not use any deprecated interfaces OpenSSL's Configure script should be used with the --api=1.1.0 option to entirely remove support for the deprecated features from the library and unconditionally disable them in the installed headers. Essentially the same effect can be achieved with the "no-deprecated" argument to Configure, except that this will always restrict the build to just the latest API, rather than a fixed API version. As applications are ported to future revisions of the API, they should update their compile-time OPENSSL_API_COMPAT define accordingly, but in most cases should be able to continue to compile with later releases. The OPENSSL_API_COMPAT versions for 1.0.0, and 0.9.8 are 0x10000000L and 0x00908000L, respectively. However those versions did not support the OPENSSL_API_COMPAT feature, and so applications are not typically tested for explicit support of just the undeprecated features of either release. [Viktor Dukhovni] *) Add support for setting the minimum and maximum supported protocol. It can bet set via the SSL_set_min_proto_version() and SSL_set_max_proto_version(), or via the SSL_CONF's MinProtocol and MaxProtocol. It's recommended to use the new APIs to disable protocols instead of disabling individual protocols using SSL_set_options() or SSL_CONF's Protocol. This change also removes support for disabling TLS 1.2 in the OpenSSL TLS client at compile time by defining OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Support for ChaCha20 and Poly1305 added to libcrypto and libssl. [Andy Polyakov] *) New EC_KEY_METHOD, this replaces the older ECDSA_METHOD and ECDH_METHOD and integrates ECDSA and ECDH functionality into EC. Implementations can now redirect key generation and no longer need to convert to or from ECDSA_SIG format. Note: the ecdsa.h and ecdh.h headers are now no longer needed and just include the ec.h header file instead. [Steve Henson] *) Remove support for all 40 and 56 bit ciphers. This includes all the export ciphers who are no longer supported and drops support the ephemeral RSA key exchange. The LOW ciphers currently doesn't have any ciphers in it. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Made EVP_MD_CTX, EVP_MD, EVP_CIPHER_CTX, EVP_CIPHER and HMAC_CTX opaque. For HMAC_CTX, the following constructors and destructors were added: HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void); void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *ctx); For EVP_MD and EVP_CIPHER, complete APIs to create, fill and destroy such methods has been added. See EVP_MD_meth_new(3) and EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(3) for documentation. Additional changes: 1) EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() and HMAC_CTX_cleanup() were removed. HMAC_CTX_reset() and EVP_MD_CTX_reset() should be called instead to reinitialise an already created structure. 2) For consistency with the majority of our object creators and destructors, EVP_MD_CTX_(create|destroy) were renamed to EVP_MD_CTX_(new|free). The old names are retained as macros for deprecated builds. [Richard Levitte] *) Added ASYNC support. Libcrypto now includes the async sub-library to enable cryptographic operations to be performed asynchronously as long as an asynchronous capable engine is used. See the ASYNC_start_job() man page for further details. Libssl has also had this capability integrated with the introduction of the new mode SSL_MODE_ASYNC and associated error SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC. See the SSL_CTX_set_mode() and SSL_get_error() man pages. This work was developed in partnership with Intel Corp. [Matt Caswell] *) SSL_{CTX_}set_ecdh_auto() has been removed and ECDH is support is always enabled now. If you want to disable the support you should exclude it using the list of supported ciphers. This also means that the "-no_ecdhe" option has been removed from s_server. [Kurt Roeckx] *) SSL_{CTX}_set_tmp_ecdh() which can set 1 EC curve now internally calls SSL_{CTX_}set1_curves() which can set a list. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Remove support for SSL_{CTX_}set_tmp_ecdh_callback(). You should set the curve you want to support using SSL_{CTX_}set1_curves(). [Kurt Roeckx] *) State machine rewrite. The state machine code has been significantly refactored in order to remove much duplication of code and solve issues with the old code (see ssl/statem/README for further details). This change does have some associated API changes. Notably the SSL_state() function has been removed and replaced by SSL_get_state which now returns an "OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE" instead of an int. SSL_set_state() has been removed altogether. The previous handshake states defined in ssl.h and ssl3.h have also been removed. [Matt Caswell] *) All instances of the string "ssleay" in the public API were replaced with OpenSSL (case-matching; e.g., OPENSSL_VERSION for #define's) Some error codes related to internal RSA_eay API's were renamed. [Rich Salz] *) The demo files in crypto/threads were moved to demo/threads. [Rich Salz] *) Removed obsolete engines: 4758cca, aep, atalla, cswift, nuron, gmp, sureware and ubsec. [Matt Caswell, Rich Salz] *) New ASN.1 embed macro. New ASN.1 macro ASN1_EMBED. This is the same as ASN1_SIMPLE except the structure is not allocated: it is part of the parent. That is instead of FOO *x; it must be: FOO x; This reduces memory fragmentation and make it impossible to accidentally set a mandatory field to NULL. This currently only works for some fields specifically a SEQUENCE, CHOICE, or ASN1_STRING type which is part of a parent SEQUENCE. Since it is equivalent to ASN1_SIMPLE it cannot be tagged, OPTIONAL, SET OF or SEQUENCE OF. [Steve Henson] *) Remove EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY, a compile-time option that never compiled. [Emilia Käsper] *) Removed DES and RC4 ciphersuites from DEFAULT. Also removed RC2 although in 1.0.2 EXPORT was already removed and the only RC2 ciphersuite is also an EXPORT one. COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT has been updated accordingly to add DES and RC4 ciphersuites. [Matt Caswell] *) Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs. This changes the decoding behaviour for some invalid messages, though the change is mostly in the more lenient direction, and legacy behaviour is preserved as much as possible. [Emilia Käsper] *) Fix no-stdio build. [ David Woodhouse and also Ivan Nestlerode ] *) New testing framework The testing framework has been largely rewritten and is now using perl and the perl modules Test::Harness and an extended variant of Test::More called OpenSSL::Test to do its work. All test scripts in test/ have been rewritten into test recipes, and all direct calls to executables in test/Makefile have become individual recipes using the simplified testing OpenSSL::Test::Simple. For documentation on our testing modules, do: perldoc test/testlib/OpenSSL/Test/Simple.pm perldoc test/testlib/OpenSSL/Test.pm [Richard Levitte] *) Revamped memory debug; only -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG and -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT are used; the latter aborts on memory leaks (usually checked on exit). Some undocumented "set malloc, etc., hooks" functions were removed and others were changed. All are now documented. [Rich Salz] *) In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short, return an error [Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen ] *) Rewrite PSK to support ECDHE_PSK, DHE_PSK and RSA_PSK. Add ciphersuites from RFC4279, RFC4785, RFC5487, RFC5489. Thanks to Christian J. Dietrich and Giuseppe D'Angelo for the original RSA_PSK patch. [Steve Henson] *) Dropped support for the SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED flag. This SSLeay era flag was never set throughout the codebase (only read). Also removed SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER which was only used if SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED was also set. [Matt Caswell] *) Changed the default name options in the "ca", "crl", "req" and "x509" to be "oneline" instead of "compat". [Richard Levitte] *) Remove SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG. This is SSLeay legacy, we're not aware of clients that still exhibit this bug, and the workaround hasn't been working properly for a while. [Emilia Käsper] *) The return type of BIO_number_read() and BIO_number_written() as well as the corresponding num_read and num_write members in the BIO structure has changed from unsigned long to uint64_t. On platforms where an unsigned long is 32 bits (e.g. Windows) these counters could overflow if >4Gb is transferred. [Matt Caswell] *) Given the pervasive nature of TLS extensions it is inadvisable to run OpenSSL without support for them. It also means that maintaining the OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT option within the code is very invasive (and probably not well tested). Therefore the OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT option has been removed. [Matt Caswell] *) Removed support for the two export grade static DH ciphersuites EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA and EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA. These two ciphersuites were newly added (along with a number of other static DH ciphersuites) to 1.0.2. However the two export ones have *never* worked since they were introduced. It seems strange in any case to be adding new export ciphersuites, and given "logjam" it also does not seem correct to fix them. [Matt Caswell] *) Version negotiation has been rewritten. In particular SSLv23_method(), SSLv23_client_method() and SSLv23_server_method() have been deprecated, and turned into macros which simply call the new preferred function names TLS_method(), TLS_client_method() and TLS_server_method(). All new code should use the new names instead. Also as part of this change the ssl23.h header file has been removed. [Matt Caswell] *) Support for Kerberos ciphersuites in TLS (RFC2712) has been removed. This code and the associated standard is no longer considered fit-for-purpose. [Matt Caswell] *) RT2547 was closed. When generating a private key, try to make the output file readable only by the owner. This behavior change might be noticeable when interacting with other software. *) Documented all exdata functions. Added CRYPTO_free_ex_index. Added a test. [Rich Salz] *) Added HTTP GET support to the ocsp command. [Rich Salz] *) Changed default digest for the dgst and enc commands from MD5 to sha256 [Rich Salz] *) RAND_pseudo_bytes has been deprecated. Users should use RAND_bytes instead. [Matt Caswell] *) Added support for TLS extended master secret from draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-03.txt. Thanks for Alfredo Pironti for an initial patch which was a great help during development. [Steve Henson] *) All libssl internal structures have been removed from the public header files, and the OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN option has been removed (since it is now redundant). Users should not attempt to access internal structures directly. Instead they should use the provided API functions. [Matt Caswell] *) config has been changed so that by default OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is used. Access to deprecated functions can be re-enabled by running config with "enable-deprecated". In addition applications wishing to use deprecated functions must define OPENSSL_USE_DEPRECATED. Note that this new behaviour will, by default, disable some transitive includes that previously existed in the header files (e.g. ec.h will no longer, by default, include bn.h) [Matt Caswell] *) Added support for OCB mode. OpenSSL has been granted a patent license compatible with the OpenSSL license for use of OCB. Details are available at https://www.openssl.org/source/OCB-patent-grant-OpenSSL.pdf. Support for OCB can be removed by calling config with no-ocb. [Matt Caswell] *) SSLv2 support has been removed. It still supports receiving a SSLv2 compatible client hello. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Increased the minimal RSA keysize from 256 to 512 bits [Rich Salz], done while fixing the error code for the key-too-small case. [Annie Yousar ] *) CA.sh has been removed; use CA.pl instead. [Rich Salz] *) Removed old DES API. [Rich Salz] *) Remove various unsupported platforms: Sony NEWS4 BEOS and BEOS_R5 NeXT SUNOS MPE/iX Sinix/ReliantUNIX RM400 DGUX NCR Tandem Cray 16-bit platforms such as WIN16 [Rich Salz] *) Clean up OPENSSL_NO_xxx #define's Use setbuf() and remove OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF Rename OPENSSL_SYSNAME_xxx to OPENSSL_SYS_xxx OPENSSL_NO_EC{DH,DSA} merged into OPENSSL_NO_EC OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD160, OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD merged into OPENSSL_NO_RMD160 OPENSSL_NO_FP_API merged into OPENSSL_NO_STDIO Remove OPENSSL_NO_BIO OPENSSL_NO_BUFFER OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY OPENSSL_NO_EVP OPENSSL_NO_FIPS_ERR OPENSSL_NO_HASH_COMP OPENSSL_NO_LHASH OPENSSL_NO_OBJECT OPENSSL_NO_SPEED OPENSSL_NO_STACK OPENSSL_NO_X509 OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY Remove MS_STATIC; it's a relic from platforms <32 bits. [Rich Salz] *) Cleaned up dead code Remove all but one '#ifdef undef' which is to be looked at. [Rich Salz] *) Clean up calling of xxx_free routines. Just like free(), fix most of the xxx_free routines to accept NULL. Remove the non-null checks from callers. Save much code. [Rich Salz] *) Add secure heap for storage of private keys (when possible). Add BIO_s_secmem(), CBIGNUM, etc. Contributed by Akamai Technologies under our Corporate CLA. [Rich Salz] *) Experimental support for a new, fast, unbiased prime candidate generator, bn_probable_prime_dh_coprime(). Not currently used by any prime generator. [Felix Laurie von Massenbach ] *) New output format NSS in the sess_id command line tool. This allows exporting the session id and the master key in NSS keylog format. [Martin Kaiser ] *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display compilation flags. [mancha ] *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure in i2d_ECPrivateKey. Thanks to Ted Unangst for feedback on this issue. [mancha ] *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable. [mancha ] *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or server. Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to Adam Langley and Bodo Moeller for preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160) [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack" by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from: http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140 Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076) [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger] *) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(): this fixes a limitation in previous versions of OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) Experimental encrypt-then-mac support. Experimental support for encrypt then mac from draft-gutmann-tls-encrypt-then-mac-02.txt To enable it set the appropriate extension number (0x42 for the test server) using e.g. -DTLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac=0x42 For non-compliant peers (i.e. just about everything) this should have no effect. WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, SUBJECT TO CHANGE. [Steve Henson] *) Add EVP support for key wrapping algorithms, to avoid problems with existing code the flag EVP_CIPHER_CTX_WRAP_ALLOW has to be set in the EVP_CIPHER_CTX or an error is returned. Add AES and DES3 wrap algorithms and include tests cases. [Steve Henson] *) Extend CMS code to support RSA-PSS signatures and RSA-OAEP for enveloped data. [Steve Henson] *) Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest, MGF1 digest and OAEP label. [Steve Henson] *) Make openssl verify return errors. [Chris Palmer and Ben Laurie] *) New function ASN1_TIME_diff to calculate the difference between two ASN1_TIME structures or one structure and the current time. [Steve Henson] *) Update fips_test_suite to support multiple command line options. New test to induce all self test errors in sequence and check expected failures. [Steve Henson] *) Add FIPS_{rsa,dsa,ecdsa}_{sign,verify} functions which digest and sign or verify all in one operation. [Steve Henson] *) Add fips_algvs: a multicall fips utility incorporating all the algorithm test programs and fips_test_suite. Includes functionality to parse the minimal script output of fipsalgest.pl directly. [Steve Henson] *) Add authorisation parameter to FIPS_module_mode_set(). [Steve Henson] *) Add FIPS selftest for ECDH algorithm using P-224 and B-233 curves. [Steve Henson] *) Use separate DRBG fields for internal and external flags. New function FIPS_drbg_health_check() to perform on demand health checking. Add generation tests to fips_test_suite with reduced health check interval to demonstrate periodic health checking. Add "nodh" option to fips_test_suite to skip very slow DH test. [Steve Henson] *) New function FIPS_get_cipherbynid() to lookup FIPS supported ciphers based on NID. [Steve Henson] *) More extensive health check for DRBG checking many more failure modes. New function FIPS_selftest_drbg_all() to handle every possible DRBG combination: call this in fips_test_suite. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for canonical generation of DSA parameter 'g'. See FIPS 186-3 A.2.3. *) Add support for HMAC DRBG from SP800-90. Update DRBG algorithm test and POST to handle HMAC cases. [Steve Henson] *) Add functions FIPS_module_version() and FIPS_module_version_text() to return numerical and string versions of the FIPS module number. [Steve Henson] *) Rename FIPS_mode_set and FIPS_mode to FIPS_module_mode_set and FIPS_module_mode. FIPS_mode and FIPS_mode_set will be implemented outside the validated module in the FIPS capable OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) Minor change to DRBG entropy callback semantics. In some cases there is no multiple of the block length between min_len and max_len. Allow the callback to return more than max_len bytes of entropy but discard any extra: it is the callback's responsibility to ensure that the extra data discarded does not impact the requested amount of entropy. [Steve Henson] *) Add PRNG security strength checks to RSA, DSA and ECDSA using information in FIPS186-3, SP800-57 and SP800-131A. [Steve Henson] *) CCM support via EVP. Interface is very similar to GCM case except we must supply all data in one chunk (i.e. no update, final) and the message length must be supplied if AAD is used. Add algorithm test support. [Steve Henson] *) Initial version of POST overhaul. Add POST callback to allow the status of POST to be monitored and/or failures induced. Modify fips_test_suite to use callback. Always run all selftests even if one fails. [Steve Henson] *) XTS support including algorithm test driver in the fips_gcmtest program. Note: this does increase the maximum key length from 32 to 64 bytes but there should be no binary compatibility issues as existing applications will never use XTS mode. [Steve Henson] *) Extensive reorganisation of FIPS PRNG behaviour. Remove all dependencies to OpenSSL RAND code and replace with a tiny FIPS RAND API which also performs algorithm blocking for unapproved PRNG types. Also do not set PRNG type in FIPS_mode_set(): leave this to the application. Add default OpenSSL DRBG handling: sets up FIPS PRNG and seeds with the standard OpenSSL PRNG: set additional data to a date time vector. [Steve Henson] *) Rename old X9.31 PRNG functions of the form FIPS_rand* to FIPS_x931*. This shouldn't present any incompatibility problems because applications shouldn't be using these directly and any that are will need to rethink anyway as the X9.31 PRNG is now deprecated by FIPS 140-2 [Steve Henson] *) Extensive self tests and health checking required by SP800-90 DRBG. Remove strength parameter from FIPS_drbg_instantiate and always instantiate at maximum supported strength. [Steve Henson] *) Add ECDH code to fips module and fips_ecdhvs for primitives only testing. [Steve Henson] *) New algorithm test program fips_dhvs to handle DH primitives only testing. [Steve Henson] *) New function DH_compute_key_padded() to compute a DH key and pad with leading zeroes if needed: this complies with SP800-56A et al. [Steve Henson] *) Initial implementation of SP800-90 DRBGs for Hash and CTR. Not used by anything, incomplete, subject to change and largely untested at present. [Steve Henson] *) Modify fipscanisteronly build option to only build the necessary object files by filtering FIPS_EX_OBJ through a perl script in crypto/Makefile. [Steve Henson] *) Add experimental option FIPSSYMS to give all symbols in fipscanister.o and FIPS or fips prefix. This will avoid conflicts with future versions of OpenSSL. Add perl script util/fipsas.pl to preprocess assembly language source files and rename any affected symbols. [Steve Henson] *) Add selftest checks and algorithm block of non-fips algorithms in FIPS mode. Remove DES2 from selftests. [Steve Henson] *) Add ECDSA code to fips module. Add tiny fips_ecdsa_check to just return internal method without any ENGINE dependencies. Add new tiny fips sign and verify functions. [Steve Henson] *) New build option no-ec2m to disable characteristic 2 code. [Steve Henson] *) New build option "fipscanisteronly". This only builds fipscanister.o and (currently) associated fips utilities. Uses the file Makefile.fips instead of Makefile.org as the prototype. [Steve Henson] *) Add some FIPS mode restrictions to GCM. Add internal IV generator. Update fips_gcmtest to use IV generator. [Steve Henson] *) Initial, experimental EVP support for AES-GCM. AAD can be input by setting output buffer to NULL. The *Final function must be called although it will not retrieve any additional data. The tag can be set or retrieved with a ctrl. The IV length is by default 12 bytes (96 bits) but can be set to an alternative value. If the IV length exceeds the maximum IV length (currently 16 bytes) it cannot be set before the key. [Steve Henson] *) New flag in ciphers: EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER. This means the underlying do_cipher function handles all cipher semantics itself including padding and finalisation. This is useful if (for example) an ENGINE cipher handles block padding itself. The behaviour of do_cipher is subtly changed if this flag is set: the return value is the number of characters written to the output buffer (zero is no longer an error code) or a negative error code. Also if the input buffer is NULL and length 0 finalisation should be performed. [Steve Henson] *) If a candidate issuer certificate is already part of the constructed path ignore it: new debug notification X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP for this case. [Steve Henson] *) Improve forward-security support: add functions void SSL_CTX_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure)) void SSL_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL *ssl, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure)) for use by SSL/TLS servers; the callback function will be called whenever a new session is created, and gets to decide whether the session may be cached to make it resumable (return 0) or not (return 1). (As by the SSL/TLS protocol specifications, the session_id sent by the server will be empty to indicate that the session is not resumable; also, the server will not generate RFC 4507 (RFC 5077) session tickets.) A simple reasonable callback implementation is to return is_forward_secure. This parameter will be set to 1 or 0 depending on the ciphersuite selected by the SSL/TLS server library, indicating whether it can provide forward security. [Emilia Käsper (Google)] *) New -verify_name option in command line utilities to set verification parameters by name. [Steve Henson] *) Initial CMAC implementation. WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, API MAY CHANGE. Add CMAC pkey methods. [Steve Henson] *) Experimental renegotiation in s_server -www mode. If the client browses /reneg connection is renegotiated. If /renegcert it is renegotiated requesting a certificate. [Steve Henson] *) Add an "external" session cache for debugging purposes to s_server. This should help trace issues which normally are only apparent in deployed multi-process servers. [Steve Henson] *) Extensive audit of libcrypto with DEBUG_UNUSED. Fix many cases where return value is ignored. NB. The functions RAND_add(), RAND_seed(), BIO_set_cipher() and some obscure PEM functions were changed so they can now return an error. The RAND changes required a change to the RAND_METHOD structure. [Steve Henson] *) New macro __owur for "OpenSSL Warn Unused Result". This makes use of a gcc attribute to warn if the result of a function is ignored. This is enable if DEBUG_UNUSED is set. Add to several functions in evp.h whose return value is often ignored. [Steve Henson] *) New -noct, -requestct, -requirect and -ctlogfile options for s_client. These allow SCTs (signed certificate timestamps) to be requested and validated when establishing a connection. [Rob Percival ] Changes between 1.0.2g and 1.0.2h [3 May 2016] *) Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check A MITM attacker can use a padding oracle attack to decrypt traffic when the connection uses an AES CBC cipher and the server support AES-NI. This issue was introduced as part of the fix for Lucky 13 padding attack (CVE-2013-0169). The padding check was rewritten to be in constant time by making sure that always the same bytes are read and compared against either the MAC or padding bytes. But it no longer checked that there was enough data to have both the MAC and padding bytes. This issue was reported by Juraj Somorovsky using TLS-Attacker. (CVE-2016-2107) [Kurt Roeckx] *) Fix EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function which is used for Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function is primarily used by the PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes data from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be considered vulnerable to this issue. User applications that call these APIs directly with large amounts of untrusted data may also be vulnerable. This issue was reported by Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-2105) [Matt Caswell] *) Fix EVP_EncryptUpdate overflow An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. Following an analysis of all OpenSSL internal usage of the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function all usage is one of two forms. The first form is where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be the first called function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that specific call must be safe. The second form is where the length passed to EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be seen from the code to be some small value and therefore there is no possibility of an overflow. Since all instances are one of these two forms, it is believed that there can be no overflows in internal code due to this problem. It should be noted that EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate() in certain code paths. Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for EVP_EncryptUpdate(). All instances of these calls have also been analysed too and it is believed there are no instances in internal usage where an overflow could occur. This issue was reported by Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-2106) [Matt Caswell] *) Prevent ASN.1 BIO excessive memory allocation When ASN.1 data is read from a BIO using functions such as d2i_CMS_bio() a short invalid encoding can cause allocation of large amounts of memory potentially consuming excessive resources or exhausting memory. Any application parsing untrusted data through d2i BIO functions is affected. The memory based functions such as d2i_X509() are *not* affected. Since the memory based functions are used by the TLS library, TLS applications are not affected. This issue was reported by Brian Carpenter. (CVE-2016-2109) [Stephen Henson] *) EBCDIC overread ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in applications using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems. This could result in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer. This issue was reported by Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-2176) [Matt Caswell] *) Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN. [Todd Short] *) Remove LOW from the DEFAULT cipher list. This removes singles DES from the default. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Only remove the SSLv2 methods with the no-ssl2-method option. When the methods are enabled and ssl2 is disabled the methods return NULL. [Kurt Roeckx] Changes between 1.0.2f and 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016] * Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL. Builds that are not configured with "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" will not provide any "EXPORT" or "LOW" strength ciphers. [Viktor Dukhovni] * Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers. SSLv2 is by default disabled at build-time. Builds that are not configured with "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2. Even if "enable-ssl2" is used, users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the version-flexible SSLv23_method() will need to explicitly call either of: SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); or SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); as appropriate. Even if either of those is used, or the application explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client and server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search key recovery have been removed. Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit EXPORT ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no longer available. (CVE-2016-0800) [Viktor Dukhovni] *) Fix a double-free in DSA code A double free bug was discovered when OpenSSL parses malformed DSA private keys and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications that receive DSA private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is considered rare. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley(Google/BoringSSL) using libFuzzer. (CVE-2016-0705) [Stephen Henson] *) Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak. Add a new method SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user that handles the seed properly. SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had inconsistent memory management behaviour. In order to fix an unavoidable memory leak, SRP_VBASE_get_by_user was changed to ignore the "fake user" SRP seed, even if the seed is configured. Users should use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead. Note that in SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user, caller must free the returned value. Note also that even though configuring the SRP seed attempts to hide invalid usernames by continuing the handshake with fake credentials, this behaviour is not constant time and no strong guarantees are made that the handshake is indistinguishable from that of a valid user. (CVE-2016-0798) [Emilia Käsper] *) Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using an int value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|. For large values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any memory because |i * 4| is negative. This can leave the internal BIGNUM data field as NULL leading to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values of |i|, the calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|. In this case memory is allocated to the internal BIGNUM data field, but it is insufficiently sized leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists in BN_dec2bn. This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn is ever called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data. This is anticipated to be a rare occurrence. All OpenSSL internal usage of these functions use data that is not expected to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command line arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security consequences. This is also anticipated to be rare. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-0797) [Matt Caswell] *) Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string in the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length of a string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings. Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to an OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of a memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can also occur. The first issue may mask the second issue dependent on compiler behaviour. These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed as command line arguments. Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl. This issue was reported to OpenSSL Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-0799) [Matt Caswell] *) Side channel attack on modular exponentiation A side-channel attack was found which makes use of cache-bank conflicts on the Intel Sandy-Bridge microarchitecture which could lead to the recovery of RSA keys. The ability to exploit this issue is limited as it relies on an attacker who has control of code in a thread running on the same hyper-threaded core as the victim thread which is performing decryptions. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Yuval Yarom, The University of Adelaide and NICTA, Daniel Genkin, Technion and Tel Aviv University, and Nadia Heninger, University of Pennsylvania with more information at http://cachebleed.info. (CVE-2016-0702) [Andy Polyakov] *) Change the req app to generate a 2048-bit RSA/DSA key by default, if no keysize is specified with default_bits. This fixes an omission in an earlier change that changed all RSA/DSA key generation apps to use 2048 bits by default. [Emilia Käsper] Changes between 1.0.2e and 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016] *) DH small subgroups Historically OpenSSL only ever generated DH parameters based on "safe" primes. More recently (in version 1.0.2) support was provided for generating X9.42 style parameter files such as those required for RFC 5114 support. The primes used in such files may not be "safe". Where an application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that are not "safe" then an attacker could use this fact to find a peer's private DH exponent. This attack requires that the attacker complete multiple handshakes in which the peer uses the same private DH exponent. For example this could be used to discover a TLS server's private DH exponent if it's reusing the private DH exponent or it's using a static DH ciphersuite. OpenSSL provides the option SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE for ephemeral DH (DHE) in TLS. It is not on by default. If the option is not set then the server reuses the same private DH exponent for the life of the server process and would be vulnerable to this attack. It is believed that many popular applications do set this option and would therefore not be at risk. The fix for this issue adds an additional check where a "q" parameter is available (as is the case in X9.42 based parameters). This detects the only known attack, and is the only possible defense for static DH ciphersuites. This could have some performance impact. Additionally the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option has been switched on by default and cannot be disabled. This could have some performance impact. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Antonio Sanso (Adobe). (CVE-2016-0701) [Matt Caswell] *) SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers A malicious client can negotiate SSLv2 ciphers that have been disabled on the server and complete SSLv2 handshakes even if all SSLv2 ciphers have been disabled, provided that the SSLv2 protocol was not also disabled via SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th December 2015 by Nimrod Aviram and Sebastian Schinzel. (CVE-2015-3197) [Viktor Dukhovni] Changes between 1.0.2d and 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015] *) BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Hanno Böck. (CVE-2015-3193) [Andy Polyakov] *) Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS algorithm and absent mask generation function parameter. Since these routines are used to verify certificate signature algorithms this can be used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG). (CVE-2015-3194) [Stephen Henson] *) X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak When presented with a malformed X509_ATTRIBUTE structure OpenSSL will leak memory. This structure is used by the PKCS#7 and CMS routines so any application which reads PKCS#7 or CMS data from untrusted sources is affected. SSL/TLS is not affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) using libFuzzer. (CVE-2015-3195) [Stephen Henson] *) Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs. This changes the decoding behaviour for some invalid messages, though the change is mostly in the more lenient direction, and legacy behaviour is preserved as much as possible. [Emilia Käsper] *) In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short, return an error [Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen ] Changes between 1.0.2c and 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015] *) Alternate chains certificate forgery During certificate verification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley/David Benjamin (Google/BoringSSL). [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.0.2b and 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015] *) Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility. The previous version introduced an ABI incompatibility in the handling of HMAC. The previous ABI has now been restored. [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.0.2a and 1.0.2b [11 Jun 2015] *) Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop When processing an ECParameters structure OpenSSL enters an infinite loop if the curve specified is over a specially malformed binary polynomial field. This can be used to perform denial of service against any system which processes public keys, certificate requests or certificates. This includes TLS clients and TLS servers with client authentication enabled. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joseph Barr-Pixton. (CVE-2015-1788) [Andy Polyakov] *) Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time X509_cmp_time does not properly check the length of the ASN1_TIME string and can read a few bytes out of bounds. In addition, X509_cmp_time accepts an arbitrary number of fractional seconds in the time string. An attacker can use this to craft malformed certificates and CRLs of various sizes and potentially cause a segmentation fault, resulting in a DoS on applications that verify certificates or CRLs. TLS clients that verify CRLs are affected. TLS clients and servers with client authentication enabled may be affected if they use custom verification callbacks. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and independently by Hanno Böck. (CVE-2015-1789) [Emilia Käsper] *) PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing inner EncryptedContent correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing. Applications that decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google). (CVE-2015-1790) [Emilia Käsper] *) CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function When verifying a signedData message the CMS code can enter an infinite loop if presented with an unknown hash function OID. This can be used to perform denial of service against any system which verifies signedData messages using the CMS code. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Johannes Bauer. (CVE-2015-1792) [Stephen Henson] *) Race condition handling NewSessionTicket If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data. (CVE-2015-1791) [Matt Caswell] *) Only support 256-bit or stronger elliptic curves with the 'ecdh_auto' setting (server) or by default (client). Of supported curves, prefer P-256 (both). [Emilia Kasper] Changes between 1.0.2 and 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015] *) ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix If a client connects to an OpenSSL 1.0.2 server and renegotiates with an invalid signature algorithms extension a NULL pointer dereference will occur. This can be exploited in a DoS attack against the server. This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by David Ramos of Stanford University. (CVE-2015-0291) [Stephen Henson and Matt Caswell] *) Multiblock corrupted pointer fix OpenSSL 1.0.2 introduced the "multiblock" performance improvement. This feature only applies on 64 bit x86 architecture platforms that support AES NI instructions. A defect in the implementation of "multiblock" can cause OpenSSL's internal write buffer to become incorrectly set to NULL when using non-blocking IO. Typically, when the user application is using a socket BIO for writing, this will only result in a failed connection. However if some other BIO is used then it is likely that a segmentation fault will be triggered, thus enabling a potential DoS attack. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Daniel Danner and Rainer Mueller. (CVE-2015-0290) [Matt Caswell] *) Segmentation fault in DTLSv1_listen fix The DTLSv1_listen function is intended to be stateless and processes the initial ClientHello from many peers. It is common for user code to loop over the call to DTLSv1_listen until a valid ClientHello is received with an associated cookie. A defect in the implementation of DTLSv1_listen means that state is preserved in the SSL object from one invocation to the next that can lead to a segmentation fault. Errors processing the initial ClientHello can trigger this scenario. An example of such an error could be that a DTLS1.0 only client is attempting to connect to a DTLS1.2 only server. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Per Allansson. (CVE-2015-0207) [Matt Caswell] *) Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix The function ASN1_TYPE_cmp will crash with an invalid read if an attempt is made to compare ASN.1 boolean types. Since ASN1_TYPE_cmp is used to check certificate signature algorithm consistency this can be used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication. (CVE-2015-0286) [Stephen Henson] *) Segmentation fault for invalid PSS parameters fix The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS algorithm and invalid parameters. Since these routines are used to verify certificate signature algorithms this can be used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication. This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by Brian Carpenter. (CVE-2015-0208) [Stephen Henson] *) ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix Reusing a structure in ASN.1 parsing may allow an attacker to cause memory corruption via an invalid write. Such reuse is and has been strongly discouraged and is believed to be rare. Applications that parse structures containing CHOICE or ANY DEFINED BY components may be affected. Certificate parsing (d2i_X509 and related functions) are however not affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected. (CVE-2015-0287) [Stephen Henson] *) PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing outer ContentInfo correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing. Applications that verify PKCS#7 signatures, decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google). (CVE-2015-0289) [Emilia Käsper] *) DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix A malicious client can trigger an OPENSSL_assert (i.e., an abort) in servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message. This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper (OpenSSL development team). (CVE-2015-0293) [Emilia Käsper] *) Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix If client auth is used then a server can seg fault in the event of a DHE ciphersuite being selected and a zero length ClientKeyExchange message being sent by the client. This could be exploited in a DoS attack. (CVE-2015-1787) [Matt Caswell] *) Handshake with unseeded PRNG fix Under certain conditions an OpenSSL 1.0.2 client can complete a handshake with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are: - The client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded automatically, and the user has not seeded manually - A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not SSL_client_methodv23) - A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data from the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random (e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA). If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore the output may be predictable. For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will succeed on an unpatched platform: openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA (CVE-2015-0285) [Matt Caswell] *) Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix A malformed EC private key file consumed via the d2i_ECPrivateKey function could cause a use after free condition. This, in turn, could cause a double free in several private key parsing functions (such as d2i_PrivateKey or EVP_PKCS82PKEY) and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications that receive EC private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is considered rare. This issue was discovered by the BoringSSL project and fixed in their commit 517073cd4b. (CVE-2015-0209) [Matt Caswell] *) X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix The function X509_to_X509_REQ will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if the certificate key is invalid. This function is rarely used in practice. This issue was discovered by Brian Carpenter. (CVE-2015-0288) [Stephen Henson] *) Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers [Kurt Roeckx] Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015] *) Facilitate "universal" ARM builds targeting range of ARM ISAs, e.g. ARMv5 through ARMv8, as opposite to "locking" it to single one. So far those who have to target multiple platforms would compromise and argue that binary targeting say ARMv5 would still execute on ARMv8. "Universal" build resolves this compromise by providing near-optimal performance even on newer platforms. [Andy Polyakov] *) Accelerated NIST P-256 elliptic curve implementation for x86_64 (other platforms pending). [Shay Gueron & Vlad Krasnov (Intel Corp), Andy Polyakov] *) Add support for the SignedCertificateTimestampList certificate and OCSP response extensions from RFC6962. [Rob Stradling] *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.) for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Initial support for PowerISA 2.0.7, first implemented in POWER8. This covers AES, SHA256/512 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most common cases are optimized and there still is room for further improvements. Vector Permutation AES for Altivec is also added. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add support for little-endian ppc64 Linux target. [Marcelo Cerri (IBM)] *) Initial support for AMRv8 ISA crypto extensions. This covers AES, SHA1, SHA256 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most common cases are optimized and there still is room for further improvements. Both 32- and 64-bit modes are supported. [Andy Polyakov, Ard Biesheuvel (Linaro)] *) Improved ARMv7 NEON support. [Andy Polyakov] *) Support for SPARC Architecture 2011 crypto extensions, first implemented in SPARC T4. This covers AES, DES, Camellia, SHA1, SHA256/512, MD5, GHASH and modular exponentiation. [Andy Polyakov, David Miller] *) Accelerated modular exponentiation for Intel processors, a.k.a. RSAZ. [Shay Gueron & Vlad Krasnov (Intel Corp)] *) Support for new and upcoming Intel processors, including AVX2, BMI and SHA ISA extensions. This includes additional "stitched" implementations, AESNI-SHA256 and GCM, and multi-buffer support for TLS encrypt. This work was sponsored by Intel Corp. [Andy Polyakov] *) Support for DTLS 1.2. This adds two sets of DTLS methods: DTLS_*_method() supports both DTLS 1.2 and 1.0 and should use whatever version the peer supports and DTLSv1_2_*_method() which supports DTLS 1.2 only. [Steve Henson] *) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(): this fixes a limitation in previous versions of OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest, MGF1 digest and OAEP label. [Steve Henson] *) Add EVP support for key wrapping algorithms, to avoid problems with existing code the flag EVP_CIPHER_CTX_WRAP_ALLOW has to be set in the EVP_CIPHER_CTX or an error is returned. Add AES and DES3 wrap algorithms and include tests cases. [Steve Henson] *) Add functions to allocate and set the fields of an ECDSA_METHOD structure. [Douglas E. Engert, Steve Henson] *) New functions OPENSSL_gmtime_diff and ASN1_TIME_diff to find the difference in days and seconds between two tm or ASN1_TIME structures. [Steve Henson] *) Add -rev test option to s_server to just reverse order of characters received by client and send back to server. Also prints an abbreviated summary of the connection parameters. [Steve Henson] *) New option -brief for s_client and s_server to print out a brief summary of connection parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Add callbacks for arbitrary TLS extensions. [Trevor Perrin and Ben Laurie] *) New option -crl_download in several openssl utilities to download CRLs from CRLDP extension in certificates. [Steve Henson] *) New options -CRL and -CRLform for s_client and s_server for CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509_CRL_diff to generate a delta CRL from the difference of two full CRLs. Add support to "crl" utility. [Steve Henson] *) New functions to set lookup_crls function and to retrieve X509_STORE from X509_STORE_CTX. [Steve Henson] *) Print out deprecated issuer and subject unique ID fields in certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Extend OCSP I/O functions so they can be used for simple general purpose HTTP as well as OCSP. New wrapper function which can be used to download CRLs using the OCSP API. [Steve Henson] *) Delegate command line handling in s_client/s_server to SSL_CONF APIs. [Steve Henson] *) SSL_CONF* functions. These provide a common framework for application configuration using configuration files or command lines. [Steve Henson] *) SSL/TLS tracing code. This parses out SSL/TLS records using the message callback and prints the results. Needs compile time option "enable-ssl-trace". New options to s_client and s_server to enable tracing. [Steve Henson] *) New ctrl and macro to retrieve supported points extensions. Print out extension in s_server and s_client. [Steve Henson] *) New functions to retrieve certificate signature and signature OID NID. [Steve Henson] *) Add functions to retrieve and manipulate the raw cipherlist sent by a client to OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) New Suite B modes for TLS code. These use and enforce the requirements of RFC6460: restrict ciphersuites, only permit Suite B algorithms and only use Suite B curves. The Suite B modes can be set by using the strings "SUITEB128", "SUITEB192" or "SUITEB128ONLY" for the cipherstring. [Steve Henson] *) New chain verification flags for Suite B levels of security. Check algorithms are acceptable when flags are set in X509_verify_cert. [Steve Henson] *) Make tls1_check_chain return a set of flags indicating checks passed by a certificate chain. Add additional tests to handle client certificates: checks for matching certificate type and issuer name comparison. [Steve Henson] *) If an attempt is made to use a signature algorithm not in the peer preference list abort the handshake. If client has no suitable signature algorithms in response to a certificate request do not use the certificate. [Steve Henson] *) If server EC tmp key is not in client preference list abort handshake. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for certificate stores in CERT structure. This makes it possible to have different stores per SSL structure or one store in the parent SSL_CTX. Include distinct stores for certificate chain verification and chain building. New ctrl SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN to build and store a certificate chain in CERT structure: returning an error if the chain cannot be built: this will allow applications to test if a chain is correctly configured. Note: if the CERT based stores are not set then the parent SSL_CTX store is used to retain compatibility with existing behaviour. [Steve Henson] *) New function ssl_set_client_disabled to set a ciphersuite disabled mask based on the current session, check mask when sending client hello and checking the requested ciphersuite. [Steve Henson] *) New ctrls to retrieve and set certificate types in a certificate request message. Print out received values in s_client. If certificate types is not set with custom values set sensible values based on supported signature algorithms. [Steve Henson] *) Support for distinct client and server supported signature algorithms. [Steve Henson] *) Add certificate callback. If set this is called whenever a certificate is required by client or server. An application can decide which certificate chain to present based on arbitrary criteria: for example supported signature algorithms. Add very simple example to s_server. This fixes many of the problems and restrictions of the existing client certificate callback: for example you can now clear an existing certificate and specify the whole chain. [Steve Henson] *) Add new "valid_flags" field to CERT_PKEY structure which determines what the certificate can be used for (if anything). Set valid_flags field in new tls1_check_chain function. Simplify ssl_set_cert_masks which used to have similar checks in it. Add new "cert_flags" field to CERT structure and include a "strict mode". This enforces some TLS certificate requirements (such as only permitting certificate signature algorithms contained in the supported algorithms extension) which some implementations ignore: this option should be used with caution as it could cause interoperability issues. [Steve Henson] *) Update and tidy signature algorithm extension processing. Work out shared signature algorithms based on preferences and peer algorithms and print them out in s_client and s_server. Abort handshake if no shared signature algorithms. [Steve Henson] *) Add new functions to allow customised supported signature algorithms for SSL and SSL_CTX structures. Add options to s_client and s_server to support them. [Steve Henson] *) New function SSL_certs_clear() to delete all references to certificates from an SSL structure. Before this once a certificate had been added it couldn't be removed. [Steve Henson] *) Integrate hostname, email address and IP address checking with certificate verification. New verify options supporting checking in openssl utility. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes and wildcard matching support to hostname and email checking functions. Add manual page. [Florian Weimer (Red Hat Product Security Team)] *) New functions to check a hostname email or IP address against a certificate. Add options x509 utility to print results of checks against a certificate. [Steve Henson] *) Fix OCSP checking. [Rob Stradling and Ben Laurie] *) Initial experimental support for explicitly trusted non-root CAs. OpenSSL still tries to build a complete chain to a root but if an intermediate CA has a trust setting included that is used. The first setting is used: whether to trust (e.g., -addtrust option to the x509 utility) or reject. [Steve Henson] *) Add -trusted_first option which attempts to find certificates in the trusted store even if an untrusted chain is also supplied. [Steve Henson] *) MIPS assembly pack updates: support for MIPS32r2 and SmartMIPS ASE, platform support for Linux and Android. [Andy Polyakov] *) Support for linux-x32, ILP32 environment in x86_64 framework. [Andy Polyakov] *) Experimental multi-implementation support for FIPS capable OpenSSL. When in FIPS mode the approved implementations are used as normal, when not in FIPS mode the internal unapproved versions are used instead. This means that the FIPS capable OpenSSL isn't forced to use the (often lower performance) FIPS implementations outside FIPS mode. [Steve Henson] *) Transparently support X9.42 DH parameters when calling PEM_read_bio_DHparameters. This means existing applications can handle the new parameter format automatically. [Steve Henson] *) Initial experimental support for X9.42 DH parameter format: mainly to support use of 'q' parameter for RFC5114 parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Add DH parameters from RFC5114 including test data to dhtest. [Steve Henson] *) Support for automatic EC temporary key parameter selection. If enabled the most preferred EC parameters are automatically used instead of hardcoded fixed parameters. Now a server just has to call: SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1) and the server will automatically support ECDH and use the most appropriate parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance and tidy EC curve and point format TLS extension code. Use static structures instead of allocation if default values are used. New ctrls to set curves we wish to support and to retrieve shared curves. Print out shared curves in s_server. New options to s_server and s_client to set list of supported curves. [Steve Henson] *) New ctrls to retrieve supported signature algorithms and supported curve values as an array of NIDs. Extend openssl utility to print out received values. [Steve Henson] *) Add new APIs EC_curve_nist2nid and EC_curve_nid2nist which convert between NIDs and the more common NIST names such as "P-256". Enhance ecparam utility and ECC method to recognise the NIST names for curves. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance SSL/TLS certificate chain handling to support different chains for each certificate instead of one chain in the parent SSL_CTX. [Steve Henson] *) Support for fixed DH ciphersuite client authentication: where both server and client use DH certificates with common parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Support for fixed DH ciphersuites: those requiring DH server certificates. [Steve Henson] *) New function i2d_re_X509_tbs for re-encoding the TBS portion of the certificate. Note: Related 1.0.2-beta specific macros X509_get_cert_info, X509_CINF_set_modified, X509_CINF_get_issuer, X509_CINF_get_extensions and X509_CINF_get_signature were reverted post internal team review. Changes between 1.0.1k and 1.0.1l [15 Jan 2015] *) Build fixes for the Windows and OpenVMS platforms [Matt Caswell and Richard Levitte] Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015] *) Fix DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record. A carefully crafted DTLS message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due to a NULL pointer dereference. This could lead to a Denial Of Service attack. Thanks to Markus Stenberg of Cisco Systems, Inc. for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-3571) [Steve Henson] *) Fix DTLS memory leak in dtls1_buffer_record. A memory leak can occur in the dtls1_buffer_record function under certain conditions. In particular this could occur if an attacker sent repeated DTLS records with the same sequence number but for the next epoch. The memory leak could be exploited by an attacker in a Denial of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue. (CVE-2015-0206) [Matt Caswell] *) Fix issue where no-ssl3 configuration sets method to NULL. When openssl is built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL v3 ClientHello is received the ssl method would be set to NULL which could later result in a NULL pointer dereference. Thanks to Frank Schmirler for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-3569) [Kurt Roeckx] *) Abort handshake if server key exchange message is omitted for ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites. Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-3572) [Steve Henson] *) Remove non-export ephemeral RSA code on client and server. This code violated the TLS standard by allowing the use of temporary RSA keys in non-export ciphersuites and could be used by a server to effectively downgrade the RSA key length used to a value smaller than the server certificate. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA or reporting this issue. (CVE-2015-0204) [Steve Henson] *) Fixed issue where DH client certificates are accepted without verification. An OpenSSL server will accept a DH certificate for client authentication without the certificate verify message. This effectively allows a client to authenticate without the use of a private key. This only affects servers which trust a client certificate authority which issues certificates containing DH keys: these are extremely rare and hardly ever encountered. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA or reporting this issue. (CVE-2015-0205) [Steve Henson] *) Ensure that the session ID context of an SSL is updated when its SSL_CTX is updated via SSL_set_SSL_CTX. The session ID context is typically set from the parent SSL_CTX, and can vary with the CTX. [Adam Langley] *) Fix various certificate fingerprint issues. By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature. Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the certificate fingerprint for blacklists. 1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits. If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits. 2. Check certificate algorithm consistency. Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure errors for some broken certificates. Thanks to Konrad Kraszewski from Google for reporting this issue. 3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER. Re-encode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch. This will reject various cases including garbage after signature (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs (negative or with leading zeroes). Further analysis was conducted and fixes were developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team. (CVE-2014-8275) [Steve Henson] *) Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL core team. (CVE-2014-3570) [Andy Polyakov] *) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable sanity and breaks all known clients. [David Benjamin, Emilia Käsper] *) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.) [Emilia Käsper] *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation: ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was announced in the initial ServerHello. Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message. [Emilia Käsper] Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014] *) SRTP Memory Leak. A flaw in the DTLS SRTP extension parsing code allows an attacker, who sends a carefully crafted handshake message, to cause OpenSSL to fail to free up to 64k of memory causing a memory leak. This could be exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue affects OpenSSL 1.0.1 server implementations for both SSL/TLS and DTLS regardless of whether SRTP is used or configured. Implementations of OpenSSL that have been compiled with OPENSSL_NO_SRTP defined are not affected. The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team. (CVE-2014-3513) [OpenSSL team] *) Session Ticket Memory Leak. When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service attack. (CVE-2014-3567) [Steve Henson] *) Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete. When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be configured to send them. (CVE-2014-3568) [Akamai and the OpenSSL team] *) Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV. Client applications doing fallback retries should call SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV). (CVE-2014-3566) [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller] *) Add additional DigestInfo checks. Re-encode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded DigestInfo structures. Note: this is a precautionary measure and no attacks are currently known. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014] *) Fix SRP buffer overrun vulnerability. Invalid parameters passed to the SRP code can be overrun an internal buffer. Add sanity check that g, A, B < N to SRP code. Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC Group for discovering this issue. (CVE-2014-3512) [Steve Henson] *) A flaw in the OpenSSL SSL/TLS server code causes the server to negotiate TLS 1.0 instead of higher protocol versions when the ClientHello message is badly fragmented. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to force a downgrade to TLS 1.0 even if both the server and the client support a higher protocol version, by modifying the client's TLS records. Thanks to David Benjamin and Adam Langley (Google) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3511) [David Benjamin] *) OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages. Thanks to Felix Gröbert (Google) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3510) [Emilia Käsper] *) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3507) [Adam Langley] *) An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3506) [Adam Langley] *) An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3505) [Adam Langley] *) If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write up to 255 bytes to freed memory. Thanks to Gabor Tyukasz (LogMeIn Inc) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3509) [Gabor Tyukasz] *) A malicious server can crash an OpenSSL client with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an SRP ciphersuite even though it was not properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki (Codenomicon) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-5139) [Steve Henson] *) A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing output to the attacker. Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue. (CVE-2014-3508) [Emilia Käsper, and Steve Henson] *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.) for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.) [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014] *) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL SSL/TLS clients and servers. Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-0224) [KIKUCHI Masashi, Steve Henson] *) Fix DTLS recursion flaw. By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing in a DoS attack. Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue. (CVE-2014-0221) [Imre Rad, Steve Henson] *) Fix DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability. A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server. Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195) [Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson] *) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites are subject to a denial of service attack. Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering this issue. (CVE-2014-3470) [Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson] *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display compilation flags. [mancha ] *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure in i2d_ECPrivateKey. [mancha ] *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable. [mancha ] Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014] *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or server. Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to Adam Langley and Bodo Moeller for preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160) [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack" by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from: http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140 Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076) [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger] *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03 Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it is at least 512 bytes long. [Adam Langley, Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014] *) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception. Thanks to Anton Johansson for reporting this issues. (CVE-2013-4353) *) Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need to be resent. (CVE-2013-6450) [Steve Henson] *) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing 10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer. [Rob Stradling, Adam Langley] Changes between 1.0.1d and 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013] *) Correct fix for CVE-2013-0169. The original didn't work on AES-NI supporting platforms or when small records were transferred. [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [5 Feb 2013] *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time. This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and Emilia Käsper for the initial patch. (CVE-2013-0169) [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] *) Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack. Thanks go to and to Adam Langley for discovering and detecting this bug and to Wolfgang Ettlinger for independently discovering this issue. (CVE-2012-2686) [Adam Langley] *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL. This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166) [Steve Henson] *) Make openssl verify return errors. [Chris Palmer and Ben Laurie] *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate() so it returns the certificate actually sent. See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836. [Rob Stradling ] *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys. [Steve Henson] *) Don't use TLS 1.0 record version number in initial client hello if renegotiating. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [10 May 2012] *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS 1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to fix DoS attack. Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic fuzzing as a service testing platform. (CVE-2012-2333) [Steve Henson] *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages. Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue. [Steve Henson] *) In FIPS mode don't try to use composite ciphers as they are not approved. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1a and 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012] *) OpenSSL 1.0.0 sets SSL_OP_ALL to 0x80000FFFL and OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x00000400L which would unfortunately mean any application compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.0 headers setting SSL_OP_ALL would also set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, unintentionally disabling TLS 1.1 also. Fix this by changing the value of SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x10000000L Any application which was previously compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.1 or 1.0.1a headers and which cares about SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 will need to be recompiled as a result. Letting be results in inability to disable specifically TLS 1.1 and in client context, in unlike event, limit maximum offered version to TLS 1.0 [see below]. [Steve Henson] *) In order to ensure interoperability SSL_OP_NO_protocolX does not disable just protocol X, but all protocols above X *if* there are protocols *below* X still enabled. In more practical terms it means that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favor of TLS1.1 and above, it's not sufficient to pass SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, one has to pass SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This applies to client side. [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012] *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer in CRYPTO_realloc_clean. Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this issue and to Adam Langley for fixing it. (CVE-2012-2110) [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team] *) Don't allow TLS 1.2 SHA-256 ciphersuites in TLS 1.0, 1.1 connections. [Adam Langley] *) Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello record length exceeds 255 bytes. 1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work. 2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing: -DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure. Most broken servers should now work. 3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable TLS 1.2 client support entirely. [Steve Henson] *) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH. [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012] *) Add compatibility with old MDC2 signatures which use an ASN1 OCTET STRING form instead of a DigestInfo. [Steve Henson] *) The format used for MDC2 RSA signatures is inconsistent between EVP and the RSA_sign/RSA_verify functions. This was made more apparent when OpenSSL used RSA_sign/RSA_verify for some RSA signatures in particular those which went through EVP_PKEY_METHOD in 1.0.0 and later. Detect the correct format in RSA_verify so both forms transparently work. [Steve Henson] *) Some servers which support TLS 1.0 can choke if we initially indicate support for TLS 1.2 and later renegotiate using TLS 1.0 in the RSA encrypted premaster secret. As a workaround use the maximum permitted client version in client hello, this should keep such servers happy and still work with previous versions of OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for TLS/DTLS heartbeats. [Robin Seggelmann ] *) Add support for SCTP. [Robin Seggelmann ] *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS. [Paul Green ] *) Extensive assembler packs updates, most notably: - x86[_64]: AES-NI, PCLMULQDQ, RDRAND support; - x86[_64]: SSSE3 support (SHA1, vector-permutation AES); - x86_64: bit-sliced AES implementation; - ARM: NEON support, contemporary platforms optimizations; - s390x: z196 support; - *: GHASH and GF(2^m) multiplication implementations; [Andy Polyakov] *) Make TLS-SRP code conformant with RFC 5054 API cleanup (removal of unnecessary code) [Peter Sylvester ] *) Add TLS key material exporter from RFC 5705. [Eric Rescorla] *) Add DTLS-SRTP negotiation from RFC 5764. [Eric Rescorla] *) Add Next Protocol Negotiation, http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-00. Can be disabled with a no-npn flag to config or Configure. Code donated by Google. [Adam Langley and Ben Laurie] *) Add optional 64-bit optimized implementations of elliptic curves NIST-P224, NIST-P256, NIST-P521, with constant-time single point multiplication on typical inputs. Compiler support for the nonstandard type __uint128_t is required to use this (present in gcc 4.4 and later, for 64-bit builds). Code made available under Apache License version 2.0. Specify "enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" on the Configure (or config) command line to include this in your build of OpenSSL, and run "make depend" (or "make update"). This enables the following EC_METHODs: EC_GFp_nistp224_method() EC_GFp_nistp256_method() EC_GFp_nistp521_method() EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name() will automatically use these (while EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() currently prefers the more flexible implementations). [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)] *) Use type ossl_ssize_t instead of ssize_t which isn't available on all platforms. Move ssize_t definition from e_os.h to the public header file e_os2.h as it now appears in public header file cms.h [Steve Henson] *) New -sigopt option to the ca, req and x509 utilities. Additional signature parameters can be passed using this option and in particular PSS. [Steve Henson] *) Add RSA PSS signing function. This will generate and set the appropriate AlgorithmIdentifiers for PSS based on those in the corresponding EVP_MD_CTX structure. No application support yet. [Steve Henson] *) Support for companion algorithm specific ASN1 signing routines. New function ASN1_item_sign_ctx() signs a pre-initialised EVP_MD_CTX structure and sets AlgorithmIdentifiers based on the appropriate parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Add new algorithm specific ASN1 verification initialisation function to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD: this is not in EVP_PKEY_METHOD since the ASN1 handling will be the same no matter what EVP_PKEY_METHOD is used. Add a PSS handler to support verification of PSS signatures: checked against a number of sample certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Add signature printing for PSS. Add PSS OIDs. [Steve Henson, Martin Kaiser ] *) Add algorithm specific signature printing. An individual ASN1 method can now print out signatures instead of the standard hex dump. More complex signatures (e.g. PSS) can print out more meaningful information. Include DSA version that prints out the signature parameters r, s. [Steve Henson] *) Password based recipient info support for CMS library: implementing RFC3211. [Steve Henson] *) Split password based encryption into PBES2 and PBKDF2 functions. This neatly separates the code into cipher and PBE sections and is required for some algorithms that split PBES2 into separate pieces (such as password based CMS). [Steve Henson] *) Session-handling fixes: - Fix handling of connections that are resuming with a session ID, but also support Session Tickets. - Fix a bug that suppressed issuing of a new ticket if the client presented a ticket with an expired session. - Try to set the ticket lifetime hint to something reasonable. - Make tickets shorter by excluding irrelevant information. - On the client side, don't ignore renewed tickets. [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)] *) Fix PSK session representation. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add RC4-MD5 and AESNI-SHA1 "stitched" implementations. This work was sponsored by Intel. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add GCM support to TLS library. Some custom code is needed to split the IV between the fixed (from PRF) and explicit (from TLS record) portions. This adds all GCM ciphersuites supported by RFC5288 and RFC5289. Generalise some AES* cipherstrings to include GCM and add a special AESGCM string for GCM only. [Steve Henson] *) Expand range of ctrls for AES GCM. Permit setting invocation field on decrypt and retrieval of invocation field only on encrypt. [Steve Henson] *) Add HMAC ECC ciphersuites from RFC5289. Include SHA384 PRF support. As required by RFC5289 these ciphersuites cannot be used if for versions of TLS earlier than 1.2. [Steve Henson] *) For FIPS capable OpenSSL interpret a NULL default public key method as unset and return the appropriate default but do *not* set the default. This means we can return the appropriate method in applications that switch between FIPS and non-FIPS modes. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect HMAC and CMAC operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. If an ENGINE is used then we cannot handle that in the FIPS module so we keep original code iff non-FIPS operations are allowed. [Steve Henson] *) Add -attime option to openssl utilities. [Peter Eckersley , Ben Laurie and Steve Henson] *) Redirect DSA and DH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect ECDSA and ECDH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. Also use FIPS EC methods unconditionally for now. [Steve Henson] *) New build option no-ec2m to disable characteristic 2 code. [Steve Henson] *) Backport libcrypto audit of return value checking from 1.1.0-dev; not all cases can be covered as some introduce binary incompatibilities. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect RSA operations to FIPS module including keygen, encrypt, decrypt, sign and verify. Block use of non FIPS RSA methods. [Steve Henson] *) Add similar low level API blocking to ciphers. [Steve Henson] *) Low level digest APIs are not approved in FIPS mode: any attempt to use these will cause a fatal error. Applications that *really* want to use them can use the private_* version instead. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect cipher operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect digest operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds. [Steve Henson] *) Update build system to add "fips" flag which will link in fipscanister.o for static and shared library builds embedding a signature if needed. [Steve Henson] *) Output TLS supported curves in preference order instead of numerical order. This is currently hardcoded for the highest order curves first. This should be configurable so applications can judge speed vs strength. [Steve Henson] *) Add TLS v1.2 server support for client authentication. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for FIPS mode in ssl library: disable SSLv3, non-FIPS ciphers and enable MD5. [Steve Henson] *) Functions FIPS_mode_set() and FIPS_mode() which call the underlying FIPS modules versions. [Steve Henson] *) Add TLS v1.2 client side support for client authentication. Keep cache of handshake records longer as we don't know the hash algorithm to use until after the certificate request message is received. [Steve Henson] *) Initial TLS v1.2 client support. Add a default signature algorithms extension including all the algorithms we support. Parse new signature format in client key exchange. Relax some ECC signing restrictions for TLS v1.2 as indicated in RFC5246. [Steve Henson] *) Add server support for TLS v1.2 signature algorithms extension. Switch to new signature format when needed using client digest preference. All server ciphersuites should now work correctly in TLS v1.2. No client support yet and no support for client certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Initial TLS v1.2 support. Add new SHA256 digest to ssl code, switch to SHA256 for PRF when using TLS v1.2 and later. Add new SHA256 based ciphersuites. At present only RSA key exchange ciphersuites work with TLS v1.2. Add new option for TLS v1.2 replacing the old and obsolete SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK flags with SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2. New TLSv1.2 methods and version checking. [Steve Henson] *) New option OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN. If an application can be compiled with this defined it will not be affected by any changes to ssl internal structures. Add several utility functions to allow openssl application to work with OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN defined. [Steve Henson] *) A long standing patch to add support for SRP from EdelWeb (Peter Sylvester and Christophe Renou) was integrated. [Christophe Renou , Peter Sylvester , Tom Wu , and Ben Laurie] *) Add functions to copy EVP_PKEY_METHOD and retrieve flags and id. [Steve Henson] *) Permit abbreviated handshakes when renegotiating using the function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(). [Robin Seggelmann ] *) Add call to ENGINE_register_all_complete() to ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(), so some implementations get used automatically instead of needing explicit application support. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for TLS key exporter as described in RFC5705. [Robin Seggelmann , Steve Henson] *) Initial TLSv1.1 support. Since TLSv1.1 is very similar to TLS v1.0 only a few changes are required: Add SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 flag. Add TLSv1_1 methods. Update version checking logic to handle version 1.1. Add explicit IV handling (ported from DTLS code). Add command line options to s_client/s_server. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012] *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where an MMA defence is not necessary. Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode for discovering this issue. (CVE-2012-0884) [Steve Henson] *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode for discovering this bug. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012] *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109. Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050) [Antonio Martin] Changes between 1.0.0e and 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012] *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing differences arising during decryption processing. A research paper describing this attack can be found at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann and Michael Tuexen for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108) [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen] *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records. (CVE-2011-4576) [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George Kadianakis for discovering this issue and Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619) [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE. (CVE-2012-0027) [Andrey Kulikov ] *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure. Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw and Rob Austein for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577) [Rob Austein ] *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS. [Paul Green ] *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race. [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c. [Emilia Käsper (Google)] *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different interpretations of the '..._len' fields). [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients. This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously, the last update always remained unused). [Emilia Käsper (Google)] *) In ssl3_clear, preserve s3->init_extra along with s3->rbuf. [Bob Buckholz (Google)] Changes between 1.0.0d and 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011] *) Fix bug where CRLs with nextUpdate in the past are sometimes accepted by initialising X509_STORE_CTX properly. (CVE-2011-3207) [Kaspar Brand ] *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular for multi-threaded use of ECDH. (CVE-2011-3210) [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs. [Bodo Moeller] *) Remove hard coded ecdsaWithSHA1 signature tests in ssl code and check signature public key algorithm by using OID xref utilities instead. Before this you could only use some ECC ciphersuites with SHA1 only. [Steve Henson] *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see: http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf [Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri] Changes between 1.0.0c and 1.0.0d [8 Feb 2011] *) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014 [Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)] *) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is ambiguous. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.0b and 1.0.0c [2 Dec 2010] *) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack. Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180 [Steve Henson] *) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252 [Ben Laurie] Changes between 1.0.0a and 1.0.0b [16 Nov 2010] *) Fix extension code to avoid race conditions which can result in a buffer overrun vulnerability: resumed sessions must not be modified as they can be shared by multiple threads. CVE-2010-3864 [Steve Henson] *) Fix WIN32 build system to correctly link an ENGINE directory into a DLL. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.0 and 1.0.0a [01 Jun 2010] *) Check return value of int_rsa_verify in pkey_rsa_verifyrecover (CVE-2010-1633) [Steve Henson, Peter-Michael Hager ] Changes between 0.9.8n and 1.0.0 [29 Mar 2010] *) Add "missing" function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(). This copies a cipher context. The operation can be customised via the ctrl mechanism in case ENGINEs want to include additional functionality. [Steve Henson] *) Tolerate yet another broken PKCS#8 key format: private key value negative. [Steve Henson] *) Add new -subject_hash_old and -issuer_hash_old options to x509 utility to output hashes compatible with older versions of OpenSSL. [Willy Weisz ] *) Fix compression algorithm handling: if resuming a session use the compression algorithm of the resumed session instead of determining it from client hello again. Don't allow server to change algorithm. [Steve Henson] *) Add load_crls() function to apps tidying load_certs() too. Add option to verify utility to allow additional CRLs to be included. [Steve Henson] *) Update OCSP request code to permit adding custom headers to the request: some responders need this. [Steve Henson] *) The function EVP_PKEY_sign() returns <=0 on error: check return code correctly. [Julia Lawall ] *) Update verify callback code in apps/s_cb.c and apps/verify.c, it needlessly dereferenced structures, used obsolete functions and didn't handle all updated verify codes correctly. [Steve Henson] *) Disable MD2 in the default configuration. [Steve Henson] *) In BIO_pop() and BIO_push() use the ctrl argument (which was NULL) to indicate the initial BIO being pushed or popped. This makes it possible to determine whether the BIO is the one explicitly called or as a result of the ctrl being passed down the chain. Fix BIO_pop() and SSL BIOs so it handles reference counts correctly and doesn't zero out the I/O bio when it is not being explicitly popped. WARNING: applications which included workarounds for the old buggy behaviour will need to be modified or they could free up already freed BIOs. [Steve Henson] *) Extend the uni2asc/asc2uni => OPENSSL_uni2asc/OPENSSL_asc2uni renaming to all platforms (within the 0.9.8 branch, this was done conditionally on Netware platforms to avoid a name clash). [Guenter ] *) Add ECDHE and PSK support to DTLS. [Michael Tuexen ] *) Add CHECKED_STACK_OF macro to safestack.h, otherwise safestack can't be used on C++. [Steve Henson] *) Add "missing" function EVP_MD_flags() (without this the only way to retrieve a digest flags is by accessing the structure directly. Update EVP_MD_do_all*() and EVP_CIPHER_do_all*() to include the name a digest or cipher is registered as in the "from" argument. Print out all registered digests in the dgst usage message instead of manually attempting to work them out. [Steve Henson] *) If no SSLv2 ciphers are used don't use an SSLv2 compatible client hello: this allows the use of compression and extensions. Change default cipher string to remove SSLv2 ciphersuites. This effectively avoids ancient SSLv2 by default unless an application cipher string requests it. [Steve Henson] *) Alter match criteria in PKCS12_parse(). It used to try to use local key ids to find matching certificates and keys but some PKCS#12 files don't follow the (somewhat unwritten) rules and this strategy fails. Now just gather all certificates together and the first private key then look for the first certificate that matches the key. [Steve Henson] *) Support use of registered digest and cipher names for dgst and cipher commands instead of having to add each one as a special case. So now you can do: openssl sha256 foo as well as: openssl dgst -sha256 foo and this works for ENGINE based algorithms too. [Steve Henson] *) Update Gost ENGINE to support parameter files. [Victor B. Wagner ] *) Support GeneralizedTime in ca utility. [Oliver Martin , Steve Henson] *) Enhance the hash format used for certificate directory links. The new form uses the canonical encoding (meaning equivalent names will work even if they aren't identical) and uses SHA1 instead of MD5. This form is incompatible with the older format and as a result c_rehash should be used to rebuild symbolic links. [Steve Henson] *) Make PKCS#8 the default write format for private keys, replacing the traditional format. This form is standardised, more secure and doesn't include an implicit MD5 dependency. [Steve Henson] *) Add a $gcc_devteam_warn option to Configure. The idea is that any code committed to OpenSSL should pass this lot as a minimum. [Steve Henson] *) Add session ticket override functionality for use by EAP-FAST. [Jouni Malinen ] *) Modify HMAC functions to return a value. Since these can be implemented in an ENGINE errors can occur. [Steve Henson] *) Type-checked OBJ_bsearch_ex. [Ben Laurie] *) Type-checked OBJ_bsearch. Also some constification necessitated by type-checking. Still to come: TXT_DB, bsearch(?), OBJ_bsearch_ex, qsort, CRYPTO_EX_DATA, ASN1_VALUE, ASN1_STRING, CONF_VALUE. [Ben Laurie] *) New function OPENSSL_gmtime_adj() to add a specific number of days and seconds to a tm structure directly, instead of going through OS specific date routines. This avoids any issues with OS routines such as the year 2038 bug. New *_adj() functions for ASN1 time structures and X509_time_adj_ex() to cover the extended range. The existing X509_time_adj() is still usable and will no longer have any date issues. [Steve Henson] *) Delta CRL support. New use deltas option which will attempt to locate and search any appropriate delta CRLs available. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Support for CRLs partitioned by reason code. Reorganise CRL processing code and add additional score elements. Validate alternate CRL paths as part of the CRL checking and indicate a new error "CRL path validation error" in this case. Applications wanting additional details can use the verify callback and check the new "parent" field. If this is not NULL CRL path validation is taking place. Existing applications won't see this because it requires extended CRL support which is off by default. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Support for freshest CRL extension. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Initial indirect CRL support. Currently only supported in the CRLs passed directly and not via lookup. Process certificate issuer CRL entry extension and lookup CRL entries by bother issuer name and serial number. Check and process CRL issuer entry in IDP extension. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for distinct certificate and CRL paths. The CRL issuer certificate is validated separately in this case. Only enabled if an extended CRL support flag is set: this flag will enable additional CRL functionality in future. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for policy mappings extension. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes to pathlength constraint, self issued certificate handling, policy processing to align with RFC3280 and PKITS tests. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Support for name constraints certificate extension. DN, email, DNS and URI types are currently supported. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) To cater for systems that provide a pointer-based thread ID rather than numeric, deprecate the current numeric thread ID mechanism and replace it with a structure and associated callback type. This mechanism allows a numeric "hash" to be extracted from a thread ID in either case, and on platforms where pointers are larger than 'long', mixing is done to help ensure the numeric 'hash' is usable even if it can't be guaranteed unique. The default mechanism is to use "&errno" as a pointer-based thread ID to distinguish between threads. Applications that want to provide their own thread IDs should now use CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback() to register a callback that will call either CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric() or CRYPTO_THREADID_set_pointer(). Note that ERR_remove_state() is now deprecated, because it is tied to the assumption that thread IDs are numeric. ERR_remove_state(0) to free the current thread's error state should be replaced by ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL). (This new approach replaces the functions CRYPTO_set_idptr_callback(), CRYPTO_get_idptr_callback(), and CRYPTO_thread_idptr() that existed in OpenSSL 0.9.9-dev between June 2006 and August 2008. Also, if an application was previously providing a numeric thread callback that was inappropriate for distinguishing threads, then uniqueness might have been obtained with &errno that happened immediately in the intermediate development versions of OpenSSL; this is no longer the case, the numeric thread callback will now override the automatic use of &errno.) [Geoff Thorpe, with help from Bodo Moeller] *) Initial support for different CRL issuing certificates. This covers a simple case where the self issued certificates in the chain exist and the real CRL issuer is higher in the existing chain. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Removed effectively defunct crypto/store from the build. [Ben Laurie] *) Revamp of STACK to provide stronger type-checking. Still to come: TXT_DB, bsearch(?), OBJ_bsearch, qsort, CRYPTO_EX_DATA, ASN1_VALUE, ASN1_STRING, CONF_VALUE. [Ben Laurie] *) Add a new SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS mode flag to release unused buffer RAM on SSL connections. This option can save about 34k per idle SSL. [Nick Mathewson] *) Revamp of LHASH to provide stronger type-checking. Still to come: STACK, TXT_DB, bsearch, qsort. [Ben Laurie] *) Initial support for Cryptographic Message Syntax (aka CMS) based on RFC3850, RFC3851 and RFC3852. New cms directory and cms utility, support for data, signedData, compressedData, digestedData and encryptedData, envelopedData types included. Scripts to check against RFC4134 examples draft and interop and consistency checks of many content types and variants. [Steve Henson] *) Add options to enc utility to support use of zlib compression BIO. [Steve Henson] *) Extend mk1mf to support importing of options and assembly language files from Configure script, currently only included in VC-WIN32. The assembly language rules can now optionally generate the source files from the associated perl scripts. [Steve Henson] *) Implement remaining functionality needed to support GOST ciphersuites. Interop testing has been performed using CryptoPro implementations. [Victor B. Wagner ] *) s390x assembler pack. [Andy Polyakov] *) ARMv4 assembler pack. ARMv4 refers to v4 and later ISA, not CPU "family." [Andy Polyakov] *) Implement Opaque PRF Input TLS extension as specified in draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt. Since this is not an official specification yet and no extension type assignment by IANA exists, this extension (for now) will have to be explicitly enabled when building OpenSSL by providing the extension number to use. For example, specify an option -DTLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input=0x9527 to the "config" or "Configure" script to enable the extension, assuming extension number 0x9527 (which is a completely arbitrary and unofficial assignment based on the MD5 hash of the Internet Draft). Note that by doing so, you potentially lose interoperability with other TLS implementations since these might be using the same extension number for other purposes. SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input(ssl, src, len) is used to set the opaque PRF input value to use in the handshake. This will create an internal copy of the length-'len' string at 'src', and will return non-zero for success. To get more control and flexibility, provide a callback function by using SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(ctx, cb) SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg(ctx, arg) where int (*cb)(SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg); void *arg; Callback function 'cb' will be called in handshakes, and is expected to use SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input() as appropriate. Argument 'arg' is for application purposes (the value as given to SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg() will directly be provided to the callback function). The callback function has to return non-zero to report success: usually 1 to use opaque PRF input just if possible, or 2 to enforce use of the opaque PRF input. In the latter case, the library will abort the handshake if opaque PRF input is not successfully negotiated. Arguments 'peerinput' and 'len' given to the callback function will always be NULL and 0 in the case of a client. A server will see the client's opaque PRF input through these variables if available (NULL and 0 otherwise). Note that if the server provides an opaque PRF input, the length must be the same as the length of the client's opaque PRF input. Note that the callback function will only be called when creating a new session (session resumption can resume whatever was previously negotiated), and will not be called in SSL 2.0 handshakes; thus, SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) or SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) is especially recommended for applications that need to enforce opaque PRF input. [Bodo Moeller] *) Update ssl code to support digests other than SHA1+MD5 for handshake MAC. [Victor B. Wagner ] *) Add RFC4507 support to OpenSSL. This includes the corrections in RFC4507bis. The encrypted ticket format is an encrypted encoded SSL_SESSION structure, that way new session features are automatically supported. If a client application caches session in an SSL_SESSION structure support is transparent because tickets are now stored in the encoded SSL_SESSION. The SSL_CTX structure automatically generates keys for ticket protection in servers so again support should be possible with no application modification. If a client or server wishes to disable RFC4507 support then the option SSL_OP_NO_TICKET can be set. Add a TLS extension debugging callback to allow the contents of any client or server extensions to be examined. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Final changes to avoid use of pointer pointer casts in OpenSSL. OpenSSL should now compile cleanly on gcc 4.2 [Peter Hartley , Steve Henson] *) Update SSL library to use new EVP_PKEY MAC API. Include generic MAC support including streaming MAC support: this is required for GOST ciphersuite support. [Victor B. Wagner , Steve Henson] *) Add option -stream to use PKCS#7 streaming in smime utility. New function i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream() and PEM_write_PKCS7_bio_stream() to output in BER and PEM format. [Steve Henson] *) Experimental support for use of HMAC via EVP_PKEY interface. This allows HMAC to be handled via the EVP_DigestSign*() interface. The EVP_PKEY "key" in this case is the HMAC key, potentially allowing ENGINE support for HMAC keys which are unextractable. New -mac and -macopt options to dgst utility. [Steve Henson] *) New option -sigopt to dgst utility. Update dgst to use EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify}*. These two changes make it possible to use alternative signing parameters such as X9.31 or PSS in the dgst utility. [Steve Henson] *) Change ssl_cipher_apply_rule(), the internal function that does the work each time a ciphersuite string requests enabling ("foo+bar"), moving ("+foo+bar"), disabling ("-foo+bar", or removing ("!foo+bar") a class of ciphersuites: Now it maintains the order of disabled ciphersuites such that those ciphersuites that most recently went from enabled to disabled not only stay in order with respect to each other, but also have higher priority than other disabled ciphersuites the next time ciphersuites are enabled again. This means that you can now say, e.g., "PSK:-PSK:HIGH" to enable the same ciphersuites as with "HIGH" alone, but in a specific order where the PSK ciphersuites come first (since they are the most recently disabled ciphersuites when "HIGH" is parsed). Also, change ssl_create_cipher_list() (using this new functionality) such that between otherwise identical ciphersuites, ephemeral ECDH is preferred over ephemeral DH in the default order. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change ssl_create_cipher_list() so that it automatically arranges the ciphersuites in reasonable order before starting to process the rule string. Thus, the definition for "DEFAULT" (SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST) now is just "ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL", but remains equivalent to "AES:ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL:+aECDH:+kRSA:+RC4:@STRENGTH". This makes it much easier to arrive at a reasonable default order in applications for which anonymous ciphers are OK (meaning that you can't actually use DEFAULT). [Bodo Moeller; suggested by Victor Duchovni] *) Split the SSL/TLS algorithm mask (as used for ciphersuite string processing) into multiple integers instead of setting "SSL_MKEY_MASK" bits, "SSL_AUTH_MASK" bits, "SSL_ENC_MASK", "SSL_MAC_MASK", and "SSL_SSL_MASK" bits all in a single integer. (These masks as well as the individual bit definitions are hidden away into the non-exported interface ssl/ssl_locl.h, so this change to the definition of the SSL_CIPHER structure shouldn't affect applications.) This give us more bits for each of these categories, so there is no longer a need to coagulate AES128 and AES256 into a single algorithm bit, and to coagulate Camellia128 and Camellia256 into a single algorithm bit, which has led to all kinds of kludges. Thus, among other things, the kludge introduced in 0.9.7m and 0.9.8e for masking out AES256 independently of AES128 or masking out Camellia256 independently of AES256 is not needed here in 0.9.9. With the change, we also introduce new ciphersuite aliases that so far were missing: "AES128", "AES256", "CAMELLIA128", and "CAMELLIA256". [Bodo Moeller] *) Add support for dsa-with-SHA224 and dsa-with-SHA256. Use the leftmost N bytes of the signature input if the input is larger than the prime q (with N being the size in bytes of q). [Nils Larsch] *) Very *very* experimental PKCS#7 streaming encoder support. Nothing uses it yet and it is largely untested. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for the ecdsa-with-SHA224/256/384/512 signature types. [Nils Larsch] *) Initial incomplete changes to avoid need for function casts in OpenSSL some compilers (gcc 4.2 and later) reject their use. Safestack is reimplemented. Update ASN1 to avoid use of legacy functions. [Steve Henson] *) Win32/64 targets are linked with Winsock2. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add an X509_CRL_METHOD structure to allow CRL processing to be redirected to external functions. This can be used to increase CRL handling efficiency especially when CRLs are very large by (for example) storing the CRL revoked certificates in a database. [Steve Henson] *) Overhaul of by_dir code. Add support for dynamic loading of CRLs so new CRLs added to a directory can be used. New command line option -verify_return_error to s_client and s_server. This causes real errors to be returned by the verify callback instead of carrying on no matter what. This reflects the way a "real world" verify callback would behave. [Steve Henson] *) GOST engine, supporting several GOST algorithms and public key formats. Kindly donated by Cryptocom. [Cryptocom] *) Partial support for Issuing Distribution Point CRL extension. CRLs partitioned by DP are handled but no indirect CRL or reason partitioning (yet). Complete overhaul of CRL handling: now the most suitable CRL is selected via a scoring technique which handles IDP and AKID in CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) New X509_STORE_CTX callbacks lookup_crls() and lookup_certs() which will ultimately be used for all verify operations: this will remove the X509_STORE dependency on certificate verification and allow alternative lookup methods. X509_STORE based implementations of these two callbacks. [Steve Henson] *) Allow multiple CRLs to exist in an X509_STORE with matching issuer names. Modify get_crl() to find a valid (unexpired) CRL if possible. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509_CRL_match() to check if two CRLs are identical. Normally this would be called X509_CRL_cmp() but that name is already used by a function that just compares CRL issuer names. Cache several CRL extensions in X509_CRL structure and cache CRLDP in X509. [Steve Henson] *) Store a "canonical" representation of X509_NAME structure (ASN1 Name) this maps equivalent X509_NAME structures into a consistent structure. Name comparison can then be performed rapidly using memcmp(). [Steve Henson] *) Non-blocking OCSP request processing. Add -timeout option to ocsp utility. [Steve Henson] *) Allow digests to supply their own micalg string for S/MIME type using the ctrl EVP_MD_CTRL_MICALG. [Steve Henson] *) During PKCS7 signing pass the PKCS7 SignerInfo structure to the EVP_PKEY_METHOD before and after signing via the EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN ctrl. It can then customise the structure before and/or after signing if necessary. [Steve Henson] *) New function OBJ_add_sigid() to allow application defined signature OIDs to be added to OpenSSLs internal tables. New function OBJ_sigid_free() to free up any added signature OIDs. [Steve Henson] *) New functions EVP_CIPHER_do_all(), EVP_CIPHER_do_all_sorted(), EVP_MD_do_all() and EVP_MD_do_all_sorted() to enumerate internal digest and cipher tables. New options added to openssl utility: list-message-digest-algorithms and list-cipher-algorithms. [Steve Henson] *) Change the array representation of binary polynomials: the list of degrees of non-zero coefficients is now terminated with -1. Previously it was terminated with 0, which was also part of the value; thus, the array representation was not applicable to polynomials where t^0 has coefficient zero. This change makes the array representation useful in a more general context. [Douglas Stebila] *) Various modifications and fixes to SSL/TLS cipher string handling. For ECC, the code now distinguishes between fixed ECDH with RSA certificates on the one hand and with ECDSA certificates on the other hand, since these are separate ciphersuites. The unused code for Fortezza ciphersuites has been removed. For consistency with EDH, ephemeral ECDH is now called "EECDH" (not "ECDHE"). For consistency with the code for DH certificates, use of ECDH certificates is now considered ECDH authentication, not RSA or ECDSA authentication (the latter is merely the CA's signing algorithm and not actively used in the protocol). The temporary ciphersuite alias "ECCdraft" is no longer available, and ECC ciphersuites are no longer excluded from "ALL" and "DEFAULT". The following aliases now exist for RFC 4492 ciphersuites, most of these by analogy with the DH case: kECDHr - ECDH cert, signed with RSA kECDHe - ECDH cert, signed with ECDSA kECDH - ECDH cert (signed with either RSA or ECDSA) kEECDH - ephemeral ECDH ECDH - ECDH cert or ephemeral ECDH aECDH - ECDH cert aECDSA - ECDSA cert ECDSA - ECDSA cert AECDH - anonymous ECDH EECDH - non-anonymous ephemeral ECDH (equivalent to "kEECDH:-AECDH") [Bodo Moeller] *) Add additional S/MIME capabilities for AES and GOST ciphers if supported. Use correct micalg parameters depending on digest(s) in signed message. [Steve Henson] *) Add engine support for EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD. Add functions to process an ENGINE asn1 method. Support ENGINE lookups in the ASN1 code. [Steve Henson] *) Initial engine support for EVP_PKEY_METHOD. New functions to permit an engine to register a method. Add ENGINE lookups for methods and functional reference processing. [Steve Henson] *) New functions EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify)*. These are enhanced versions of EVP_{Sign,Verify}* which allow an application to customise the signature process. [Steve Henson] *) New -resign option to smime utility. This adds one or more signers to an existing PKCS#7 signedData structure. Also -md option to use an alternative message digest algorithm for signing. [Steve Henson] *) Tidy up PKCS#7 routines and add new functions to make it easier to create PKCS7 structures containing multiple signers. Update smime application to support multiple signers. [Steve Henson] *) New -macalg option to pkcs12 utility to allow setting of an alternative digest MAC. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PRFs other than default SHA1 HMAC. Reorganize PBE internals to lookup from a static table using NIDs, add support for HMAC PBE OID translation. Add a EVP_CIPHER ctrl: EVP_CTRL_PBE_PRF_NID this allows a cipher to specify an alternative PRF which will be automatically used with PBES2. [Steve Henson] *) Replace the algorithm specific calls to generate keys in "req" with the new API. [Steve Henson] *) Update PKCS#7 enveloped data routines to use new API. This is now supported by any public key method supporting the encrypt operation. A ctrl is added to allow the public key algorithm to examine or modify the PKCS#7 RecipientInfo structure if it needs to: for RSA this is a no op. [Steve Henson] *) Add a ctrl to asn1 method to allow a public key algorithm to express a default digest type to use. In most cases this will be SHA1 but some algorithms (such as GOST) need to specify an alternative digest. The return value indicates how strong the preference is 1 means optional and 2 is mandatory (that is it is the only supported type). Modify ASN1_item_sign() to accept a NULL digest argument to indicate it should use the default md. Update openssl utilities to use the default digest type for signing if it is not explicitly indicated. [Steve Henson] *) Use OID cross reference table in ASN1_sign() and ASN1_verify(). New EVP_MD flag EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE. This uses the relevant signing method from the key type. This effectively removes the link between digests and public key types. [Steve Henson] *) Add an OID cross reference table and utility functions. Its purpose is to translate between signature OIDs such as SHA1WithrsaEncryption and SHA1, rsaEncryption. This will allow some of the algorithm specific hackery needed to use the correct OID to be removed. [Steve Henson] *) Remove algorithm specific dependencies when setting PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO structures for PKCS7_sign(). They are now set up by the relevant public key ASN1 method. [Steve Henson] *) Add provisional EC pkey method with support for ECDSA and ECDH. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for key derivation (agreement) in the API, DH method and pkeyutl. [Steve Henson] *) Add DSA pkey method and DH pkey methods, extend DH ASN1 method to support public and private key formats. As a side effect these add additional command line functionality not previously available: DSA signatures can be generated and verified using pkeyutl and DH key support and generation in pkey, genpkey. [Steve Henson] *) BeOS support. [Oliver Tappe ] *) New make target "install_html_docs" installs HTML renditions of the manual pages. [Oliver Tappe ] *) New utility "genpkey" this is analogous to "genrsa" etc except it can generate keys for any algorithm. Extend and update EVP_PKEY_METHOD to support key and parameter generation and add initial key generation functionality for RSA. [Steve Henson] *) Add functions for main EVP_PKEY_method operations. The undocumented functions EVP_PKEY_{encrypt,decrypt} have been renamed to EVP_PKEY_{encrypt,decrypt}_old. [Steve Henson] *) Initial definitions for EVP_PKEY_METHOD. This will be a high level public key API, doesn't do much yet. [Steve Henson] *) New function EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info() to retrieve information about public key algorithms. New option to openssl utility: "list-public-key-algorithms" to print out info. [Steve Henson] *) Implement the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension for ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt. [Douglas Stebila] *) Don't free up OIDs in OBJ_cleanup() if they are in use by EVP_MD or EVP_CIPHER structures to avoid later problems in EVP_cleanup(). [Steve Henson] *) New utilities pkey and pkeyparam. These are similar to algorithm specific utilities such as rsa, dsa, dsaparam etc except they process any key type. [Steve Henson] *) Transfer public key printing routines to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD. New functions EVP_PKEY_print_public(), EVP_PKEY_print_private(), EVP_PKEY_print_param() to print public key data from an EVP_PKEY structure. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for pluggable public key ASN1. De-spaghettify the public key ASN1 handling. Move public and private key ASN1 handling to a new EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD structure. Relocate algorithm specific handling to a single module within the relevant algorithm directory. Add functions to allow (near) opaque processing of public and private key structures. [Steve Henson] *) Implement the Supported Point Formats Extension for ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt. [Douglas Stebila] *) Add initial support for RFC 4279 PSK TLS ciphersuites. Add members for the psk identity [hint] and the psk callback functions to the SSL_SESSION, SSL and SSL_CTX structure. New ciphersuites: PSK-RC4-SHA, PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA, PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA, PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA New functions: SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint SSL_get_psk_identity_hint SSL_get_psk_identity SSL_use_psk_identity_hint [Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of Nokia Corporation] *) Add RFC 3161 compliant time stamp request creation, response generation and response verification functionality. [Zoltán Glózik , The OpenTSA Project] *) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name extension so far. The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now have new members for a host name. The SSL data structure has an additional member SSL_CTX *initial_ctx so that new sessions can be stored in that context to allow for session resumption, even after the SSL has been switched to a new SSL_CTX in reaction to a client's server_name extension. New functions (subject to change): SSL_get_servername() SSL_get_servername_type() SSL_set_SSL_CTX() New CTRL codes and macros (subject to change): SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback() SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg() SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME - SSL_set_tlsext_host_name() openssl s_client has a new '-servername ...' option. openssl s_server has new options '-servername_host ...', '-cert2 ...', '-key2 ...', '-servername_fatal' (subject to change). This allows testing the HostName extension for a specific single host name ('-cert' and '-key' remain fallbacks for handshakes without HostName negotiation). If the unrecognized_name alert has to be sent, this by default is a warning; it becomes fatal with the '-servername_fatal' option. [Peter Sylvester, Remy Allais, Christophe Renou] *) Whirlpool hash implementation is added. [Andy Polyakov] *) BIGNUM code on 64-bit SPARCv9 targets is switched from bn(64,64) to bn(64,32). Because of instruction set limitations it doesn't have any negative impact on performance. This was done mostly in order to make it possible to share assembler modules, such as bn_mul_mont implementations, between 32- and 64-bit builds without hassle. [Andy Polyakov] *) Move code previously exiled into file crypto/ec/ec2_smpt.c to ec2_smpl.c, and no longer require the OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP macro. [Bodo Moeller] *) New candidate for BIGNUM assembler implementation, bn_mul_mont, dedicated Montgomery multiplication procedure, is introduced. BN_MONT_CTX is modified to allow bn_mul_mont to reach for higher "64-bit" performance on certain 32-bit targets. [Andy Polyakov] *) New option SSL_OP_NO_COMP to disable use of compression selectively in SSL structures. New SSL ctrl to set maximum send fragment size. Save memory by setting the I/O buffer sizes dynamically instead of using the maximum available value. [Steve Henson] *) New option -V for 'openssl ciphers'. This prints the ciphersuite code in addition to the text details. [Bodo Moeller] *) Very, very preliminary EXPERIMENTAL support for printing of general ASN1 structures. This currently produces rather ugly output and doesn't handle several customised structures at all. [Steve Henson] *) Integrated support for PVK file format and some related formats such as MS PUBLICKEYBLOB and PRIVATEKEYBLOB. Command line switches to support these in the 'rsa' and 'dsa' utilities. [Steve Henson] *) Support for PKCS#1 RSAPublicKey format on rsa utility command line. [Steve Henson] *) Remove the ancient ASN1_METHOD code. This was only ever used in one place for the (very old) "NETSCAPE" format certificates which are now handled using new ASN1 code equivalents. [Steve Henson] *) Let the TLSv1_method() etc. functions return a 'const' SSL_METHOD pointer and make the SSL_METHOD parameter in SSL_CTX_new, SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version and SSL_set_ssl_method 'const'. [Nils Larsch] *) Modify CRL distribution points extension code to print out previously unsupported fields. Enhance extension setting code to allow setting of all fields. [Steve Henson] *) Add print and set support for Issuing Distribution Point CRL extension. [Steve Henson] *) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default. [NTT] Changes between 0.9.8m and 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010] *) When rejecting SSL/TLS records due to an incorrect version number, never update s->server with a new major version number. As of - OpenSSL 0.9.8m if 'short' is a 16-bit type, - OpenSSL 0.9.8f if 'short' is longer than 16 bits, the previous behavior could result in a read attempt at NULL when receiving specific incorrect SSL/TLS records once record payload protection is active. (CVE-2010-0740) [Bodo Moeller, Adam Langley ] *) Fix for CVE-2010-0433 where some kerberos enabled versions of OpenSSL could be crashed if the relevant tables were not present (e.g. chrooted). [Tomas Hoger ] Changes between 0.9.8l and 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010] *) Always check bn_wexpand() return values for failure. (CVE-2009-3245) [Martin Olsson, Neel Mehta] *) Fix X509_STORE locking: Every 'objs' access requires a lock (to accommodate for stack sorting, always a write lock!). [Bodo Moeller] *) On some versions of WIN32 Heap32Next is very slow. This can cause excessive delays in the RAND_poll(): over a minute. As a workaround include a time check in the inner Heap32Next loop too. [Steve Henson] *) The code that handled flushing of data in SSL/TLS originally used the BIO_CTRL_INFO ctrl to see if any data was pending first. This caused the problem outlined in PR#1949. The fix suggested there however can trigger problems with buggy BIO_CTRL_WPENDING (e.g. some versions of Apache). So instead simplify the code to flush unconditionally. This should be fine since flushing with no data to flush is a no op. [Steve Henson] *) Handle TLS versions 2.0 and later properly and correctly use the highest version of TLS/SSL supported. Although TLS >= 2.0 is some way off ancient servers have a habit of sticking around for a while... [Steve Henson] *) Modify compression code so it frees up structures without using the ex_data callbacks. This works around a problem where some applications call CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data() before application exit (e.g. when restarting) then use compression (e.g. SSL with compression) later. This results in significant per-connection memory leaks and has caused some security issues including CVE-2008-1678 and CVE-2009-4355. [Steve Henson] *) Constify crypto/cast (i.e., ): a CAST_KEY doesn't change when encrypting or decrypting. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add option SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT which will allow clients to connect and renegotiate with servers which do not support RI. Until RI is more widely deployed this option is enabled by default. [Steve Henson] *) Add "missing" ssl ctrls to clear options and mode. [Steve Henson] *) If client attempts to renegotiate and doesn't support RI respond with a no_renegotiation alert as required by RFC5746. Some renegotiating TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully when they receive the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled this alert and would hang waiting for a server hello which it will never receive. Now we treat a received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal error. This is because applications requesting a renegotiation might well expect it to succeed and would have no code in place to handle the server denying it so the only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection. [Steve Henson] *) Add ctrl macro SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() which returns 1 if peer supports secure renegotiation and 0 otherwise. Print out peer renegotiation support in s_client/s_server. [Steve Henson] *) Replace the highly broken and deprecated SPKAC certification method with the updated NID creation version. This should correctly handle UTF8. [Steve Henson] *) Implement RFC5746. Re-enable renegotiation but require the extension as needed. Unfortunately, SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION turns out to be a bad idea. It has been replaced by SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION which can be set with SSL_CTX_set_options(). This is really not recommended unless you know what you are doing. [Eric Rescorla , Ben Laurie, Steve Henson] *) Fixes to stateless session resumption handling. Use initial_ctx when issuing and attempting to decrypt tickets in case it has changed during servername handling. Use a non-zero length session ID when attempting stateless session resumption: this makes it possible to determine if a resumption has occurred immediately after receiving server hello (several places in OpenSSL subtly assume this) instead of later in the handshake. [Steve Henson] *) The functions ENGINE_ctrl(), OPENSSL_isservice(), CMS_get1_RecipientRequest() and RAND_bytes() can return <=0 on error fixes for a few places where the return code is not checked correctly. [Julia Lawall ] *) Add --strict-warnings option to Configure script to include devteam warnings in other configurations. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for --libdir option and LIBDIR variable in makefiles. This makes it possible to install openssl libraries in locations which have names other than "lib", for example "/usr/lib64" which some systems need. [Steve Henson, based on patch from Jeremy Utley] *) Don't allow the use of leading 0x80 in OIDs. This is a violation of X690 8.9.12 and can produce some misleading textual output of OIDs. [Steve Henson, reported by Dan Kaminsky] *) Delete MD2 from algorithm tables. This follows the recommendation in several standards that it is not used in new applications due to several cryptographic weaknesses. For binary compatibility reasons the MD2 API is still compiled in by default. [Steve Henson] *) Add compression id to {d2i,i2d}_SSL_SESSION so it is correctly saved and restored. [Steve Henson] *) Rename uni2asc and asc2uni functions to OPENSSL_uni2asc and OPENSSL_asc2uni conditionally on Netware platforms to avoid a name clash. [Guenter ] *) Fix the server certificate chain building code to use X509_verify_cert(), it used to have an ad-hoc builder which was unable to cope with anything other than a simple chain. [David Woodhouse , Steve Henson] *) Don't check self signed certificate signatures in X509_verify_cert() by default (a flag can override this): it just wastes time without adding any security. As a useful side effect self signed root CAs with non-FIPS digests are now usable in FIPS mode. [Steve Henson] *) In dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message() the check if the current message is already buffered was missing. For every new message was memory allocated, allowing an attacker to perform an denial of service attack with sending out of seq handshake messages until there is no memory left. Additionally every future message was buffered, even if the sequence number made no sense and would be part of another handshake. So only messages with sequence numbers less than 10 in advance will be buffered. (CVE-2009-1378) [Robin Seggelmann, discovered by Daniel Mentz] *) Records are buffered if they arrive with a future epoch to be processed after finishing the corresponding handshake. There is currently no limitation to this buffer allowing an attacker to perform a DOS attack with sending records with future epochs until there is no memory left. This patch adds the pqueue_size() function to determine the size of a buffer and limits the record buffer to 100 entries. (CVE-2009-1377) [Robin Seggelmann, discovered by Daniel Mentz] *) Keep a copy of frag->msg_header.frag_len so it can be used after the parent structure is freed. (CVE-2009-1379) [Daniel Mentz] *) Handle non-blocking I/O properly in SSL_shutdown() call. [Darryl Miles ] *) Add 2.5.4.* OIDs [Ilya O. ] Changes between 0.9.8k and 0.9.8l [5 Nov 2009] *) Disable renegotiation completely - this fixes a severe security problem (CVE-2009-3555) at the cost of breaking all renegotiation. Renegotiation can be re-enabled by setting SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION in s3->flags at run-time. This is really not recommended unless you know what you're doing. [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.8j and 0.9.8k [25 Mar 2009] *) Don't set val to NULL when freeing up structures, it is freed up by underlying code. If sizeof(void *) > sizeof(long) this can result in zeroing past the valid field. (CVE-2009-0789) [Paolo Ganci ] *) Fix bug where return value of CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content() was not checked correctly. This would allow some invalid signed attributes to appear to verify correctly. (CVE-2009-0591) [Ivan Nestlerode ] *) Reject UniversalString and BMPString types with invalid lengths. This prevents a crash in ASN1_STRING_print_ex() which assumes the strings have a legal length. (CVE-2009-0590) [Steve Henson] *) Set S/MIME signing as the default purpose rather than setting it unconditionally. This allows applications to override it at the store level. [Steve Henson] *) Permit restricted recursion of ASN1 strings. This is needed in practice to handle some structures. [Steve Henson] *) Improve efficiency of mem_gets: don't search whole buffer each time for a '\n' [Jeremy Shapiro ] *) New -hex option for openssl rand. [Matthieu Herrb] *) Print out UTF8String and NumericString when parsing ASN1. [Steve Henson] *) Support NumericString type for name components. [Steve Henson] *) Allow CC in the environment to override the automatically chosen compiler. Note that nothing is done to ensure flags work with the chosen compiler. [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.8i and 0.9.8j [07 Jan 2009] *) Properly check EVP_VerifyFinal() and similar return values (CVE-2008-5077). [Ben Laurie, Bodo Moeller, Google Security Team] *) Enable TLS extensions by default. [Ben Laurie] *) Allow the CHIL engine to be loaded, whether the application is multithreaded or not. (This does not release the developer from the obligation to set up the dynamic locking callbacks.) [Sander Temme ] *) Use correct exit code if there is an error in dgst command. [Steve Henson; problem pointed out by Roland Dirlewanger] *) Tweak Configure so that you need to say "experimental-jpake" to enable JPAKE, and need to use -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_JPAKE in applications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add experimental JPAKE support, including demo authentication in s_client and s_server. [Ben Laurie] *) Set the comparison function in v3_addr_canonize(). [Rob Austein ] *) Add support for XMPP STARTTLS in s_client. [Philip Paeps ] *) Change the server-side SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG behavior to ensure that even with this option, only ciphersuites in the server's preference list will be accepted. (Note that the option applies only when resuming a session, so the earlier behavior was just about the algorithm choice for symmetric cryptography.) [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.8h and 0.9.8i [15 Sep 2008] *) Fix NULL pointer dereference if a DTLS server received ChangeCipherSpec as first record (CVE-2009-1386). [PR #1679] *) Fix a state transition in s3_srvr.c and d1_srvr.c (was using SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B, should be ..._ST_SW_SRVR_...). [Nagendra Modadugu] *) The fix in 0.9.8c that supposedly got rid of unsafe double-checked locking was incomplete for RSA blinding, addressing just one layer of what turns out to have been doubly unsafe triple-checked locking. So now fix this for real by retiring the MONT_HELPER macro in crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Marius Schilder] *) Various precautionary measures: - Avoid size_t integer overflow in HASH_UPDATE (md32_common.h). - Avoid a buffer overflow in d2i_SSL_SESSION() (ssl_asn1.c). (NB: This would require knowledge of the secret session ticket key to exploit, in which case you'd be SOL either way.) - Change bn_nist.c so that it will properly handle input BIGNUMs outside the expected range. - Enforce the 'num' check in BN_div() (bn_div.c) for non-BN_DEBUG builds. [Neel Mehta, Bodo Moeller] *) Allow engines to be "soft loaded" - i.e. optionally don't die if the load fails. Useful for distros. [Ben Laurie and the FreeBSD team] *) Add support for Local Machine Keyset attribute in PKCS#12 files. [Steve Henson] *) Fix BN_GF2m_mod_arr() top-bit cleanup code. [Huang Ying] *) Expand ENGINE to support engine supplied SSL client certificate functions. This work was sponsored by Logica. [Steve Henson] *) Add CryptoAPI ENGINE to support use of RSA and DSA keys held in Windows keystores. Support for SSL/TLS client authentication too. Not compiled unless enable-capieng specified to Configure. This work was sponsored by Logica. [Steve Henson] *) Fix bug in X509_ATTRIBUTE creation: don't set attribute using ASN1_TYPE_set1 if MBSTRING flag set. This bug would crash certain attribute creation routines such as certificate requests and PKCS#12 files. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8g and 0.9.8h [28 May 2008] *) Fix flaw if 'Server Key exchange message' is omitted from a TLS handshake which could lead to a client crash as found using the Codenomicon TLS test suite (CVE-2008-1672) [Steve Henson, Mark Cox] *) Fix double free in TLS server name extensions which could lead to a remote crash found by Codenomicon TLS test suite (CVE-2008-0891) [Joe Orton] *) Clear error queue in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() Clear the error queue to ensure that error entries left from older function calls do not interfere with the correct operation. [Lutz Jaenicke, Erik de Castro Lopo] *) Remove root CA certificates of commercial CAs: The OpenSSL project does not recommend any specific CA and does not have any policy with respect to including or excluding any CA. Therefore it does not make any sense to ship an arbitrary selection of root CA certificates with the OpenSSL software. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) RSA OAEP patches to fix two separate invalid memory reads. The first one involves inputs when 'lzero' is greater than 'SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH' (it would read about SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes before the beginning of from). The second one involves inputs where the 'db' section contains nothing but zeroes (there is a one-byte invalid read after the end of 'db'). [Ivan Nestlerode ] *) Partial backport from 0.9.9-dev: Introduce bn_mul_mont (dedicated Montgomery multiplication procedure) as a candidate for BIGNUM assembler implementation. While 0.9.9-dev uses assembler for various architectures, only x86_64 is available by default here in the 0.9.8 branch, and 32-bit x86 is available through a compile-time setting. To try the 32-bit x86 assembler implementation, use Configure option "enable-montasm" (which exists only for this backport). As "enable-montasm" for 32-bit x86 disclaims code stability anyway, in this constellation we activate additional code backported from 0.9.9-dev for further performance improvements, namely BN_from_montgomery_word. (To enable this otherwise, e.g. x86_64, try "-DMONT_FROM_WORD___NON_DEFAULT_0_9_8_BUILD".) [Andy Polyakov (backport partially by Bodo Moeller)] *) Add TLS session ticket callback. This allows an application to set TLS ticket cipher and HMAC keys rather than relying on hardcoded fixed values. This is useful for key rollover for example where several key sets may exist with different names. [Steve Henson] *) Reverse ENGINE-internal logic for caching default ENGINE handles. This was broken until now in 0.9.8 releases, such that the only way a registered ENGINE could be used (assuming it initialises successfully on the host) was to explicitly set it as the default for the relevant algorithms. This is in contradiction with 0.9.7 behaviour and the documentation. With this fix, when an ENGINE is registered into a given algorithm's table of implementations, the 'uptodate' flag is reset so that auto-discovery will be used next time a new context for that algorithm attempts to select an implementation. [Ian Lister (tweaked by Geoff Thorpe)] *) Backport of CMS code to OpenSSL 0.9.8. This differs from the 0.9.9 implementation in the following ways: Lack of EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD means algorithm parameters have to be hard coded. Lack of BER streaming support means one pass streaming processing is only supported if data is detached: setting the streaming flag is ignored for embedded content. CMS support is disabled by default and must be explicitly enabled with the enable-cms configuration option. [Steve Henson] *) Update the GMP engine glue to do direct copies between BIGNUM and mpz_t when openssl and GMP use the same limb size. Otherwise the existing "conversion via a text string export" trick is still used. [Paul Sheer ] *) Zlib compression BIO. This is a filter BIO which compressed and uncompresses any data passed through it. [Steve Henson] *) Add AES_wrap_key() and AES_unwrap_key() functions to implement RFC3394 compatible AES key wrapping. [Steve Henson] *) Add utility functions to handle ASN1 structures. ASN1_STRING_set0(): sets string data without copying. X509_ALGOR_set0() and X509_ALGOR_get0(): set and retrieve X509_ALGOR (AlgorithmIdentifier) data. Attribute function X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(): retrieves data from an X509_ATTRIBUTE structure optionally checking it occurs only once. ASN1_TYPE_set1(): set and ASN1_TYPE structure copying supplied data. [Steve Henson] *) Fix BN flag handling in RSA_eay_mod_exp() and BN_MONT_CTX_set() to get the expected BN_FLG_CONSTTIME behavior. [Bodo Moeller (Google)] *) Netware support: - fixed wrong usage of ioctlsocket() when build for LIBC BSD sockets - fixed do_tests.pl to run the test suite with CLIB builds too (CLIB_OPT) - added some more tests to do_tests.pl - fixed RunningProcess usage so that it works with newer LIBC NDKs too - removed usage of BN_LLONG for CLIB builds to avoid runtime dependency - added new Configure targets netware-clib-bsdsock, netware-clib-gcc, netware-clib-bsdsock-gcc, netware-libc-bsdsock-gcc - various changes to netware.pl to enable gcc-cross builds on Win32 platform - changed crypto/bio/b_sock.c to work with macro functions (CLIB BSD) - various changes to fix missing prototype warnings - fixed x86nasm.pl to create correct asm files for NASM COFF output - added AES, WHIRLPOOL and CPUID assembler code to build files - added missing AES assembler make rules to mk1mf.pl - fixed order of includes in apps/ocsp.c so that e_os.h settings apply [Guenter Knauf ] *) Implement certificate status request TLS extension defined in RFC3546. A client can set the appropriate parameters and receive the encoded OCSP response via a callback. A server can query the supplied parameters and set the encoded OCSP response in the callback. Add simplified examples to s_client and s_server. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8f and 0.9.8g [19 Oct 2007] *) Fix various bugs: + Binary incompatibility of ssl_ctx_st structure + DTLS interoperation with non-compliant servers + Don't call get_session_cb() without proposed session + Fix ia64 assembler code [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8e and 0.9.8f [11 Oct 2007] *) DTLS Handshake overhaul. There were longstanding issues with OpenSSL DTLS implementation, which were making it impossible for RFC 4347 compliant client to communicate with OpenSSL server. Unfortunately just fixing these incompatibilities would "cut off" pre-0.9.8f clients. To allow for hassle free upgrade post-0.9.8e server keeps tolerating non RFC compliant syntax. The opposite is not true, 0.9.8f client can not communicate with earlier server. This update even addresses CVE-2007-4995. [Andy Polyakov] *) Changes to avoid need for function casts in OpenSSL: some compilers (gcc 4.2 and later) reject their use. [Kurt Roeckx , Peter Hartley , Steve Henson] *) Add RFC4507 support to OpenSSL. This includes the corrections in RFC4507bis. The encrypted ticket format is an encrypted encoded SSL_SESSION structure, that way new session features are automatically supported. If a client application caches session in an SSL_SESSION structure support is transparent because tickets are now stored in the encoded SSL_SESSION. The SSL_CTX structure automatically generates keys for ticket protection in servers so again support should be possible with no application modification. If a client or server wishes to disable RFC4507 support then the option SSL_OP_NO_TICKET can be set. Add a TLS extension debugging callback to allow the contents of any client or server extensions to be examined. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name extension so far. The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now have new members for a host name. The SSL data structure has an additional member SSL_CTX *initial_ctx so that new sessions can be stored in that context to allow for session resumption, even after the SSL has been switched to a new SSL_CTX in reaction to a client's server_name extension. New functions (subject to change): SSL_get_servername() SSL_get_servername_type() SSL_set_SSL_CTX() New CTRL codes and macros (subject to change): SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback() SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg() SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME - SSL_set_tlsext_host_name() openssl s_client has a new '-servername ...' option. openssl s_server has new options '-servername_host ...', '-cert2 ...', '-key2 ...', '-servername_fatal' (subject to change). This allows testing the HostName extension for a specific single host name ('-cert' and '-key' remain fallbacks for handshakes without HostName negotiation). If the unrecognized_name alert has to be sent, this by default is a warning; it becomes fatal with the '-servername_fatal' option. [Peter Sylvester, Remy Allais, Christophe Renou, Steve Henson] *) Add AES and SSE2 assembly language support to VC++ build. [Steve Henson] *) Mitigate attack on final subtraction in Montgomery reduction. [Andy Polyakov] *) Fix crypto/ec/ec_mult.c to work properly with scalars of value 0 (which previously caused an internal error). [Bodo Moeller] *) Squeeze another 10% out of IGE mode when in != out. [Ben Laurie] *) AES IGE mode speedup. [Dean Gaudet (Google)] *) Add the Korean symmetric 128-bit cipher SEED (see http://www.kisa.or.kr/kisa/seed/jsp/seed_eng.jsp) and add SEED ciphersuites from RFC 4162: TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "SEED-SHA" TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA" TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA" TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "ADH-SEED-SHA" To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8 series, SEED remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL is configured with 'enable-seed'. [KISA, Bodo Moeller] *) Mitigate branch prediction attacks, which can be practical if a single processor is shared, allowing a spy process to extract information. For detailed background information, see http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/039 (O. Aciicmez, S. Gueron, J.-P. Seifert, "New Branch Prediction Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL and Necessary Software Countermeasures"). The core of the change are new versions BN_div_no_branch() and BN_mod_inverse_no_branch() of BN_div() and BN_mod_inverse(), respectively, which are slower, but avoid the security-relevant conditional branches. These are automatically called by BN_div() and BN_mod_inverse() if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set for one of the input BIGNUMs. Also, BN_is_bit_set() has been changed to remove a conditional branch. BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is the new name for the previous BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME flag, since it now affects more than just modular exponentiation. (Since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, setting this flag in the exponent causes BN_mod_exp_mont() to use the alternative implementation in BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime().) The old name remains as a deprecated alias. Similarly, RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is replaced by a more general RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME flag since the RSA implementation now uses constant-time implementations for more than just exponentiation. Here too the old name is kept as a deprecated alias. BN_BLINDING_new() will now use BN_dup() for the modulus so that the BN_BLINDING structure gets an independent copy of the modulus. This means that the previous "BIGNUM *m" argument to BN_BLINDING_new() and to BN_BLINDING_create_param() now essentially becomes "const BIGNUM *m", although we can't actually change this in the header file before 0.9.9. It allows RSA_setup_blinding() to use BN_with_flags() on the modulus to enable BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp)] *) In the SSL/TLS server implementation, be strict about session ID context matching (which matters if an application uses a single external cache for different purposes). Previously, out-of-context reuse was forbidden only if SSL_VERIFY_PEER was set. This did ensure strict client verification, but meant that, with applications using a single external cache for quite different requirements, clients could circumvent ciphersuite restrictions for a given session ID context by starting a session in a different context. [Bodo Moeller] *) Include "!eNULL" in SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST to make sure that a ciphersuite string such as "DEFAULT:RSA" cannot enable authentication-only ciphersuites. [Bodo Moeller] *) Update the SSL_get_shared_ciphers() fix CVE-2006-3738 which was not complete and could lead to a possible single byte overflow (CVE-2007-5135) [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.8d and 0.9.8e [23 Feb 2007] *) Since AES128 and AES256 (and similarly Camellia128 and Camellia256) share a single mask bit in the logic of ssl/ssl_ciph.c, the code for masking out disabled ciphers needs a kludge to work properly if AES128 is available and AES256 isn't (or if Camellia128 is available and Camellia256 isn't). [Victor Duchovni] *) Fix the BIT STRING encoding generated by crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c (within i2d_ECPrivateKey, i2d_ECPKParameters, i2d_ECParameters): When a point or a seed is encoded in a BIT STRING, we need to prevent the removal of trailing zero bits to get the proper DER encoding. (By default, crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c assumes the case of a NamedBitList, for which trailing 0 bits need to be removed.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Have SSL/TLS server implementation tolerate "mismatched" record protocol version while receiving ClientHello even if the ClientHello is fragmented. (The server can't insist on the particular protocol version it has chosen before the ServerHello message has informed the client about his choice.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add RFC 3779 support. [Rob Austein for ARIN, Ben Laurie] *) Load error codes if they are not already present instead of using a static variable. This allows them to be cleanly unloaded and reloaded. Improve header file function name parsing. [Steve Henson] *) extend SMTP and IMAP protocol emulation in s_client to use EHLO or CAPABILITY handshake as required by RFCs. [Goetz Babin-Ebell] Changes between 0.9.8c and 0.9.8d [28 Sep 2006] *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940) [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson] *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function. (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] *) Since 0.9.8b, ciphersuite strings naming explicit ciphersuites match only those. Before that, "AES256-SHA" would be interpreted as a pattern and match "AES128-SHA" too (since AES128-SHA got the same strength classification in 0.9.7h) as we currently only have a single AES bit in the ciphersuite description bitmap. That change, however, also applied to ciphersuite strings such as "RC4-MD5" that intentionally matched multiple ciphersuites -- namely, SSL 2.0 ciphersuites in addition to the more common ones from SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0. So we change the selection algorithm again: Naming an explicit ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite, and any other similar ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions. Thus, "RC4-MD5" again will properly select both the SSL 2.0 ciphersuite and the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite. Since SSL 2.0 does not have any ciphersuites for which the 128/256 bit distinction would be relevant, this works for now. The proper fix will be to use different bits for AES128 and AES256, which would have avoided the problems from the beginning; however, bits are scarce, so we can only do this in a new release (not just a patchlevel) when we can change the SSL_CIPHER definition to split the single 'unsigned long mask' bitmap into multiple values to extend the available space. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.8b and 0.9.8c [05 Sep 2006] *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team] *) Add AES IGE and biIGE modes. [Ben Laurie] *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when possible instead of select(), since the latter has some undesirable limitations. [Darryl Miles via Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller] *) Disable "ECCdraft" ciphersuites more thoroughly. Now special treatment in ssl/ssl_ciph.s makes sure that these ciphersuites cannot be implicitly activated as part of, e.g., the "AES" alias. However, please upgrade to OpenSSL 0.9.9[-dev] for non-experimental use of the ECC ciphersuites to get TLS extension support, which is required for curve and point format negotiation to avoid potential handshake problems. [Bodo Moeller] *) Disable rogue ciphersuites: - SSLv2 0x08 0x00 0x80 ("RC4-64-MD5") - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x61 ("EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5") - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x60 ("EXP1024-RC4-MD5") The latter two were purportedly from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-0[01].txt, but do not really appear there. Also deactivate the remaining ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt. These are just as unofficial, and the ID has long expired. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occurred on dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add the symmetric cipher Camellia (128-bit, 192-bit, 256-bit key versions), which is now available for royalty-free use (see http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/info/chiteki.html). Also, add Camellia TLS ciphersuites from RFC 4132. To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8 series, Camellia remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL is configured with 'enable-camellia'. [NTT] *) Disable the padding bug check when compression is in use. The padding bug check assumes the first packet is of even length, this is not necessarily true if compression is enabled and can result in false positives causing handshake failure. The actual bug test is ancient code so it is hoped that implementations will either have fixed it by now or any which still have the bug do not support compression. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8a and 0.9.8b [04 May 2006] *) When applying a cipher rule check to see if string match is an explicit cipher suite and only match that one cipher suite if it is. [Steve Henson] *) Link in manifests for VC++ if needed. [Austin Ziegler ] *) Update support for ECC-based TLS ciphersuites according to draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt with proposed changes (but without TLS extensions, which are supported starting with the 0.9.9 branch, not in the OpenSSL 0.9.8 branch). [Douglas Stebila] *) New functions EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free() to support opaque EVP_CIPHER_CTX handling. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes and enhancements to zlib compression code. We now only use "zlib1.dll" and use the default __cdecl calling convention on Win32 to conform with the standards mentioned here: http://www.zlib.net/DLL_FAQ.txt Static zlib linking now works on Windows and the new --with-zlib-include --with-zlib-lib options to Configure can be used to supply the location of the headers and library. Gracefully handle case where zlib library can't be loaded. [Steve Henson] *) Several fixes and enhancements to the OID generation code. The old code sometimes allowed invalid OIDs (1.X for X >= 40 for example), couldn't handle numbers larger than ULONG_MAX, truncated printing and had a non standard OBJ_obj2txt() behaviour. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for building of engines under engine/ as shared libraries under VC++ build system. [Steve Henson] *) Corrected the numerous bugs in the Win32 path splitter in DSO. Hopefully, we will not see any false combination of paths any more. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.8 and 0.9.8a [11 Oct 2005] *) Remove the functionality of SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING (part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad idea. (CVE-2005-2969) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology [AIST], Japan)] *) Add two function to clear and return the verify parameter flags. [Steve Henson] *) Keep cipherlists sorted in the source instead of sorting them at runtime, thus removing the need for a lock. [Nils Larsch] *) Avoid some small subgroup attacks in Diffie-Hellman. [Nick Mathewson and Ben Laurie] *) Add functions for well-known primes. [Nick Mathewson] *) Extended Windows CE support. [Satoshi Nakamura and Andy Polyakov] *) Initialize SSL_METHOD structures at compile time instead of during runtime, thus removing the need for a lock. [Steve Henson] *) Make PKCS7_decrypt() work even if no certificate is supplied by attempting to decrypt each encrypted key in turn. Add support to smime utility. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.8 [05 Jul 2005] [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.7i and later 0.9.7 patch levels were released after OpenSSL 0.9.8.] *) Add libcrypto.pc and libssl.pc for those who feel they need them. [Richard Levitte] *) Change CA.sh and CA.pl so they don't bundle the CSR and the private key into the same file any more. [Richard Levitte] *) Add initial support for Win64, both IA64 and AMD64/x64 flavors. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add -utf8 command line and config file option to 'ca'. [Stefan and Geoff Thorpe] *) Add attribute functions to EVP_PKEY structure. Modify PKCS12_create() to recognize a CSP name attribute and use it. Make -CSP option work again in pkcs12 utility. [Steve Henson] *) Add new functionality to the bn blinding code: - automatic re-creation of the BN_BLINDING parameters after a fixed number of uses (currently 32) - add new function for parameter creation - introduce flags to control the update behaviour of the BN_BLINDING parameters - hide BN_BLINDING structure Add a second BN_BLINDING slot to the RSA structure to improve performance when a single RSA object is shared among several threads. [Nils Larsch] *) Add support for DTLS. [Nagendra Modadugu and Ben Laurie] *) Add support for DER encoded private keys (SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) to SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file() and SSL_use_PrivateKey_file() [Walter Goulet] *) Remove buggy and incomplete DH cert support from ssl/ssl_rsa.c and ssl/s3_both.c [Nils Larsch] *) Use SHA-1 instead of MD5 as the default digest algorithm for the apps/openssl applications. [Nils Larsch] *) Compile clean with "-Wall -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Werror". Currently DEBUG_SAFESTACK must also be set. [Ben Laurie] *) Change ./Configure so that certain algorithms can be disabled by default. The new counterpiece to "no-xxx" is "enable-xxx". The patented RC5 and MDC2 algorithms will now be disabled unless "enable-rc5" and "enable-mdc2", respectively, are specified. (IDEA remains enabled despite being patented. This is because IDEA is frequently required for interoperability, and there is no license fee for non-commercial use. As before, "no-idea" can be used to avoid this algorithm.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add processing of proxy certificates (see RFC 3820). This work was sponsored by KTH (The Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm) and EGEE (Enabling Grids for E-science in Europe). [Richard Levitte] *) RC4 performance overhaul on modern architectures/implementations, such as Intel P4, IA-64 and AMD64. [Andy Polyakov] *) New utility extract-section.pl. This can be used specify an alternative section number in a pod file instead of having to treat each file as a separate case in Makefile. This can be done by adding two lines to the pod file: =for comment openssl_section:XXX The blank line is mandatory. [Steve Henson] *) New arguments -certform, -keyform and -pass for s_client and s_server to allow alternative format key and certificate files and passphrase sources. [Steve Henson] *) New structure X509_VERIFY_PARAM which combines current verify parameters, update associated structures and add various utility functions. Add new policy related verify parameters, include policy checking in standard verify code. Enhance 'smime' application with extra parameters to support policy checking and print out. [Steve Henson] *) Add a new engine to support VIA PadLock ACE extensions in the VIA C3 Nehemiah processors. These extensions support AES encryption in hardware as well as RNG (though RNG support is currently disabled). [Michal Ludvig , with help from Andy Polyakov] *) Deprecate BN_[get|set]_params() functions (they were ignored internally). [Geoff Thorpe] *) New FIPS 180-2 algorithms, SHA-224/-256/-384/-512 are implemented. [Andy Polyakov and a number of other people] *) Improved PowerPC platform support. Most notably BIGNUM assembler implementation contributed by IBM. [Suresh Chari, Peter Waltenberg, Andy Polyakov] *) The new 'RSA_generate_key_ex' function now takes a BIGNUM for the public exponent rather than 'unsigned long'. There is a corresponding change to the new 'rsa_keygen' element of the RSA_METHOD structure. [Jelte Jansen, Geoff Thorpe] *) Functionality for creating the initial serial number file is now moved from CA.pl to the 'ca' utility with a new option -create_serial. (Before OpenSSL 0.9.7e, CA.pl used to initialize the serial number file to 1, which is bound to cause problems. To avoid the problems while respecting compatibility between different 0.9.7 patchlevels, 0.9.7e employed 'openssl x509 -next_serial' in CA.pl for serial number initialization. With the new release 0.9.8, we can fix the problem directly in the 'ca' utility.) [Steve Henson] *) Reduced header interdependencies by declaring more opaque objects in ossl_typ.h. As a consequence, including some headers (eg. engine.h) will give fewer recursive includes, which could break lazy source code - so this change is covered by the OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED symbol. As always, developers should define this symbol when building and using openssl to ensure they track the recommended behaviour, interfaces, [etc], but backwards-compatible behaviour prevails when this isn't defined. [Geoff Thorpe] *) New function X509_POLICY_NODE_print() which prints out policy nodes. [Steve Henson] *) Add new EVP function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key and associated functionality. This will generate a random key of the appropriate length based on the cipher context. The EVP_CIPHER can provide its own random key generation routine to support keys of a specific form. This is used in the des and 3des routines to generate a key of the correct parity. Update S/MIME code to use new functions and hence generate correct parity DES keys. Add EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY #define to return an error if the key is not valid (weak or incorrect parity). [Steve Henson] *) Add a local set of CRLs that can be used by X509_verify_cert() as well as looking them up. This is useful when the verified structure may contain CRLs, for example PKCS#7 signedData. Modify PKCS7_verify() to use any CRLs present unless the new PKCS7_NO_CRL flag is asserted. [Steve Henson] *) Extend ASN1 oid configuration module. It now additionally accepts the syntax: shortName = some long name, 1.2.3.4 [Steve Henson] *) Reimplemented the BN_CTX implementation. There is now no more static limitation on the number of variables it can handle nor the depth of the "stack" handling for BN_CTX_start()/BN_CTX_end() pairs. The stack information can now expand as required, and rather than having a single static array of bignums, BN_CTX now uses a linked-list of such arrays allowing it to expand on demand whilst maintaining the usefulness of BN_CTX's "bundling". [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add a missing BN_CTX parameter to the 'rsa_mod_exp' callback in RSA_METHOD to allow all RSA operations to function using a single BN_CTX. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Preliminary support for certificate policy evaluation and checking. This is initially intended to pass the tests outlined in "Conformance Testing of Relying Party Client Certificate Path Processing Logic" v1.07. [Steve Henson] *) bn_dup_expand() has been deprecated, it was introduced in 0.9.7 and remained unused and not that useful. A variety of other little bignum tweaks and fixes have also been made continuing on from the audit (see below). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Constify all or almost all d2i, c2i, s2i and r2i functions, along with associated ASN1, EVP and SSL functions and old ASN1 macros. [Richard Levitte] *) BN_zero() only needs to set 'top' and 'neg' to zero for correct results, and this should never fail. So the return value from the use of BN_set_word() (which can fail due to needless expansion) is now deprecated; if OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is defined, BN_zero() is a void macro. [Geoff Thorpe] *) BN_CTX_get() should return zero-valued bignums, providing the same initialised value as BN_new(). [Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf Möller] *) Support for inhibitAnyPolicy certificate extension. [Steve Henson] *) An audit of the BIGNUM code is underway, for which debugging code is enabled when BN_DEBUG is defined. This makes stricter enforcements on what is considered valid when processing BIGNUMs, and causes execution to assert() when a problem is discovered. If BN_DEBUG_RAND is defined, further steps are taken to deliberately pollute unused data in BIGNUM structures to try and expose faulty code further on. For now, openssl will (in its default mode of operation) continue to tolerate the inconsistent forms that it has tolerated in the past, but authors and packagers should consider trying openssl and their own applications when compiled with these debugging symbols defined. It will help highlight potential bugs in their own code, and will improve the test coverage for OpenSSL itself. At some point, these tighter rules will become openssl's default to improve maintainability, though the assert()s and other overheads will remain only in debugging configurations. See bn.h for more details. [Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf Möller] *) BN_CTX_init() has been deprecated, as BN_CTX is an opaque structure that can only be obtained through BN_CTX_new() (which implicitly initialises it). The presence of this function only made it possible to overwrite an existing structure (and cause memory leaks). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Because of the callback-based approach for implementing LHASH as a template type, lh_insert() adds opaque objects to hash-tables and lh_doall() or lh_doall_arg() are typically used with a destructor callback to clean up those corresponding objects before destroying the hash table (and losing the object pointers). So some over-zealous constifications in LHASH have been relaxed so that lh_insert() does not take (nor store) the objects as "const" and the lh_doall[_arg] callback wrappers are not prototyped to have "const" restrictions on the object pointers they are given (and so aren't required to cast them away any more). [Geoff Thorpe] *) The tmdiff.h API was so ugly and minimal that our own timing utility (speed) prefers to use its own implementation. The two implementations haven't been consolidated as yet (volunteers?) but the tmdiff API has had its object type properly exposed (MS_TM) instead of casting to/from "char *". This may still change yet if someone realises MS_TM and "ms_time_***" aren't necessarily the greatest nomenclatures - but this is what was used internally to the implementation so I've used that for now. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Ensure that deprecated functions do not get compiled when OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is defined. Some "openssl" subcommands and a few of the self-tests were still using deprecated key-generation functions so these have been updated also. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Reorganise PKCS#7 code to separate the digest location functionality into PKCS7_find_digest(), digest addition into PKCS7_bio_add_digest(). New function PKCS7_set_digest() to set the digest type for PKCS#7 digestedData type. Add additional code to correctly generate the digestedData type and add support for this type in PKCS7 initialization functions. [Steve Henson] *) New function PKCS7_set0_type_other() this initializes a PKCS7 structure of type "other". [Steve Henson] *) Fix prime generation loop in crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl by making sure the loop does correctly stop and breaking ("division by zero") modulus operations are not performed. The (pre-generated) prime table crypto/bn/bn_prime.h was already correct, but it could not be re-generated on some platforms because of the "division by zero" situation in the script. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Update support for ECC-based TLS ciphersuites according to draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt: the KDF1 key derivation function with SHA-1 now is only used for "small" curves (where the representation of a field element takes up to 24 bytes); for larger curves, the field element resulting from ECDH is directly used as premaster secret. [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add code for kP+lQ timings to crypto/ec/ectest.c, and add SEC2 curve secp160r1 to the tests. [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add the possibility to load symbols globally with DSO. [Götz Babin-Ebell via Richard Levitte] *) Add the functions ERR_set_mark() and ERR_pop_to_mark() for better control of the error stack. [Richard Levitte] *) Add support for STORE in ENGINE. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the STORE type. The intention is to provide a common interface to certificate and key stores, be they simple file-based stores, or HSM-type store, or LDAP stores, or... NOTE: The code is currently UNTESTED and isn't really used anywhere. [Richard Levitte] *) Add a generic structure called OPENSSL_ITEM. This can be used to pass a list of arguments to any function as well as provide a way for a function to pass data back to the caller. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the functions BUF_strndup() and BUF_memdup(). BUF_strndup() works like BUF_strdup() but can be used to duplicate a portion of a string. The copy gets NUL-terminated. BUF_memdup() duplicates a memory area. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the function sk_find_ex() which works like sk_find(), but will return an index to an element even if an exact match couldn't be found. The index is guaranteed to point at the element where the searched-for key would be inserted to preserve sorting order. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the function OBJ_bsearch_ex() which works like OBJ_bsearch() but takes an extra flags argument for optional functionality. Currently, the following flags are defined: OBJ_BSEARCH_VALUE_ON_NOMATCH This one gets OBJ_bsearch_ex() to return a pointer to the first element where the comparing function returns a negative or zero number. OBJ_BSEARCH_FIRST_VALUE_ON_MATCH This one gets OBJ_bsearch_ex() to return a pointer to the first element where the comparing function returns zero. This is useful if there are more than one element where the comparing function returns zero. [Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to create self-signed certificates with 'openssl ca' in such a way that the self-signed certificate becomes part of the CA database and uses the same mechanisms for serial number generation as all other certificate signing. The new flag '-selfsign' enables this functionality. Adapt CA.sh and CA.pl.in. [Richard Levitte] *) Add functionality to check the public key of a certificate request against a given private. This is useful to check that a certificate request can be signed by that key (self-signing). [Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same subject in the CA index file. This is done only if the keyword 'unique_subject' is set to 'no' in the main CA section (default if 'CA_default') of the configuration file. The value is saved with the database itself in a separate index attribute file, named like the index file with '.attr' appended to the name. [Richard Levitte] *) Generate multi-valued AVAs using '+' notation in config files for req and dirName. [Steve Henson] *) Support for nameConstraints certificate extension. [Steve Henson] *) Support for policyConstraints certificate extension. [Steve Henson] *) Support for policyMappings certificate extension. [Steve Henson] *) Make sure the default DSA_METHOD implementation only uses its dsa_mod_exp() and/or bn_mod_exp() handlers if they are non-NULL, and change its own handlers to be NULL so as to remove unnecessary indirection. This lets alternative implementations fallback to the default implementation more easily. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Support for directoryName in GeneralName related extensions in config files. [Steve Henson] *) Make it possible to link applications using Makefile.shared. Make that possible even when linking against static libraries! [Richard Levitte] *) Support for single pass processing for S/MIME signing. This now means that S/MIME signing can be done from a pipe, in addition cleartext signing (multipart/signed type) is effectively streaming and the signed data does not need to be all held in memory. This is done with a new flag PKCS7_STREAM. When this flag is set PKCS7_sign() only initializes the PKCS7 structure and the actual signing is done after the data is output (and digests calculated) in SMIME_write_PKCS7(). [Steve Henson] *) Add full support for -rpath/-R, both in shared libraries and applications, at least on the platforms where it's known how to do it. [Richard Levitte] *) In crypto/ec/ec_mult.c, implement fast point multiplication with precomputation, based on wNAF splitting: EC_GROUP_precompute_mult() will now compute a table of multiples of the generator that makes subsequent invocations of EC_POINTs_mul() or EC_POINT_mul() faster (notably in the case of a single point multiplication, scalar * generator). [Nils Larsch, Bodo Moeller] *) IPv6 support for certificate extensions. The various extensions which use the IP:a.b.c.d can now take IPv6 addresses using the formats of RFC1884 2.2 . IPv6 addresses are now also displayed correctly. [Steve Henson] *) Added an ENGINE that implements RSA by performing private key exponentiations with the GMP library. The conversions to and from GMP's mpz_t format aren't optimised nor are any montgomery forms cached, and on x86 it appears OpenSSL's own performance has caught up. However there are likely to be other architectures where GMP could provide a boost. This ENGINE is not built in by default, but it can be specified at Configure time and should be accompanied by the necessary linker additions, eg; ./config -DOPENSSL_USE_GMP -lgmp [Geoff Thorpe] *) "openssl engine" will not display ENGINE/DSO load failure errors when testing availability of engines with "-t" - the old behaviour is produced by increasing the feature's verbosity with "-tt". [Geoff Thorpe] *) ECDSA routines: under certain error conditions uninitialized BN objects could be freed. Solution: make sure initialization is performed early enough. (Reported and fix supplied by Nils Larsch via PR#459) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Key-generation can now be implemented in RSA_METHOD, DSA_METHOD and DH_METHOD (eg. by ENGINE implementations) to override the normal software implementations. For DSA and DH, parameter generation can also be overridden by providing the appropriate method callbacks. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Change the "progress" mechanism used in key-generation and primality testing to functions that take a new BN_GENCB pointer in place of callback/argument pairs. The new API functions have "_ex" postfixes and the older functions are reimplemented as wrappers for the new ones. The OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED symbol can be used to hide declarations of the old functions to help (graceful) attempts to migrate to the new functions. Also, the new key-generation API functions operate on a caller-supplied key-structure and return success/failure rather than returning a key or NULL - this is to help make "keygen" another member function of RSA_METHOD etc. Example for using the new callback interface: int (*my_callback)(int a, int b, BN_GENCB *cb) = ...; void *my_arg = ...; BN_GENCB my_cb; BN_GENCB_set(&my_cb, my_callback, my_arg); return BN_is_prime_ex(some_bignum, BN_prime_checks, NULL, &cb); /* For the meaning of a, b in calls to my_callback(), see the * documentation of the function that calls the callback. * cb will point to my_cb; my_arg can be retrieved as cb->arg. * my_callback should return 1 if it wants BN_is_prime_ex() * to continue, or 0 to stop. */ [Geoff Thorpe] *) Change the ZLIB compression method to be stateful, and make it available to TLS with the number defined in draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the ASN.1 structures and functions for CertificatePair, which is defined as follows (according to X.509_4thEditionDraftV6.pdf): CertificatePair ::= SEQUENCE { forward [0] Certificate OPTIONAL, reverse [1] Certificate OPTIONAL, -- at least one of the pair shall be present -- } Also implement the PEM functions to read and write certificate pairs, and defined the PEM tag as "CERTIFICATE PAIR". This needed to be defined, mostly for the sake of the LDAP attribute crossCertificatePair, but may prove useful elsewhere as well. [Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to inhibit symlinking of shared libraries in Makefile.shared, for Cygwin's sake. [Richard Levitte] *) Extend the BIGNUM API by creating a function void BN_set_negative(BIGNUM *a, int neg); and a macro that behave like int BN_is_negative(const BIGNUM *a); to avoid the need to access 'a->neg' directly in applications. [Nils Larsch] *) Implement fast modular reduction for pseudo-Mersenne primes used in NIST curves (crypto/bn/bn_nist.c, crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c). EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() will now automatically use this if applicable. [Nils Larsch ] *) Add new lock type (CRYPTO_LOCK_BN). [Bodo Moeller] *) Change the ENGINE framework to automatically load engines dynamically from specific directories unless they could be found to already be built in or loaded. Move all the current engines except for the cryptodev one to a new directory engines/. The engines in engines/ are built as shared libraries if the "shared" options was given to ./Configure or ./config. Otherwise, they are inserted in libcrypto.a. /usr/local/ssl/engines is the default directory for dynamic engines, but that can be overridden at configure time through the usual use of --prefix and/or --openssldir, and at run time with the environment variable OPENSSL_ENGINES. [Geoff Thorpe and Richard Levitte] *) Add Makefile.shared, a helper makefile to build shared libraries. Adapt Makefile.org. [Richard Levitte] *) Add version info to Win32 DLLs. [Peter 'Luna' Runestig" ] *) Add new 'medium level' PKCS#12 API. Certificates and keys can be added using this API to created arbitrary PKCS#12 files while avoiding the low level API. New options to PKCS12_create(), key or cert can be NULL and will then be omitted from the output file. The encryption algorithm NIDs can be set to -1 for no encryption, the mac iteration count can be set to 0 to omit the mac. Enhance pkcs12 utility by making the -nokeys and -nocerts options work when creating a PKCS#12 file. New option -nomac to omit the mac, NONE can be set for an encryption algorithm. New code is modified to use the enhanced PKCS12_create() instead of the low level API. [Steve Henson] *) Extend ASN1 encoder to support indefinite length constructed encoding. This can output sequences tags and octet strings in this form. Modify pk7_asn1.c to support indefinite length encoding. This is experimental and needs additional code to be useful, such as an ASN1 bio and some enhanced streaming PKCS#7 code. Extend template encode functionality so that tagging is passed down to the template encoder. [Steve Henson] *) Let 'openssl req' fail if an argument to '-newkey' is not recognized instead of using RSA as a default. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add support for ECC-based ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt. As these are not official, they are not included in "ALL"; the "ECCdraft" ciphersuite group alias can be used to select them. [Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add ECDH engine support. [Nils Gura and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add ECDH in new directory crypto/ecdh/. [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Let BN_rand_range() abort with an error after 100 iterations without success (which indicates a broken PRNG). [Bodo Moeller] *) Change BN_mod_sqrt() so that it verifies that the input value is really the square of the return value. (Previously, BN_mod_sqrt would show GIGO behaviour.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add named elliptic curves over binary fields from X9.62, SECG, and WAP/WTLS; add OIDs that were still missing. [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Extend the EC library for elliptic curves over binary fields (new files ec2_smpl.c, ec2_smpt.c, ec2_mult.c in crypto/ec/). New EC_METHOD: EC_GF2m_simple_method New API functions: EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m Point compression for binary fields is disabled by default for patent reasons (compile with OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP defined to enable it). As binary polynomials are represented as BIGNUMs, various members of the EC_GROUP and EC_POINT data structures can be shared between the implementations for prime fields and binary fields; the above ..._GF2m functions (except for EX_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m) are essentially identical to their ..._GFp counterparts. (For simplicity, the '..._GFp' prefix has been dropped from various internal method names.) An internal 'field_div' method (similar to 'field_mul' and 'field_sqr') has been added; this is used only for binary fields. [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Optionally dispatch EC_POINT_mul(), EC_POINT_precompute_mult() through methods ('mul', 'precompute_mult'). The generic implementations (now internally called 'ec_wNAF_mul' and 'ec_wNAF_precomputed_mult') remain the default if these methods are undefined. [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) New function EC_GROUP_get_degree, which is defined through EC_METHOD. For curves over prime fields, this returns the bit length of the modulus. [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) New functions EC_GROUP_dup, EC_POINT_dup. (These simply call ..._new and ..._copy). [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add binary polynomial arithmetic software in crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c. Polynomials are represented as BIGNUMs (where the sign bit is not used) in the following functions [macros]: BN_GF2m_add BN_GF2m_sub [= BN_GF2m_add] BN_GF2m_mod [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_mul [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_sqr [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_inv BN_GF2m_mod_exp [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr] BN_GF2m_cmp [= BN_ucmp] (Note that only the 'mod' functions are actually for fields GF(2^m). BN_GF2m_add() is misnomer, but this is for the sake of consistency.) For some functions, an the irreducible polynomial defining a field can be given as an 'unsigned int[]' with strictly decreasing elements giving the indices of those bits that are set; i.e., p[] represents the polynomial f(t) = t^p[0] + t^p[1] + ... + t^p[k] where p[0] > p[1] > ... > p[k] = 0. This applies to the following functions: BN_GF2m_mod_arr BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr BN_GF2m_mod_inv_arr [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_inv] BN_GF2m_mod_div_arr [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_div] BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr BN_GF2m_poly2arr BN_GF2m_arr2poly Conversion can be performed by the following functions: BN_GF2m_poly2arr BN_GF2m_arr2poly bntest.c has additional tests for binary polynomial arithmetic. Two implementations for BN_GF2m_mod_div() are available. The default algorithm simply uses BN_GF2m_mod_inv() and BN_GF2m_mod_mul(). The alternative algorithm is compiled in only if OPENSSL_SUN_GF2M_DIV is defined (patent pending; read the copyright notice in crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c before enabling it). [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add new error code 'ERR_R_DISABLED' that can be used when some functionality is disabled at compile-time. [Douglas Stebila ] *) Change default behaviour of 'openssl asn1parse' so that more information is visible when viewing, e.g., a certificate: Modify asn1_parse2 (crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c) so that in non-'dump' mode the content of non-printable OCTET STRINGs is output in a style similar to INTEGERs, but with '[HEX DUMP]' prepended to avoid the appearance of a printable string. [Nils Larsch ] *) Add 'asn1_flag' and 'asn1_form' member to EC_GROUP with access functions EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag() EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag() EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form() EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form() These control ASN1 encoding details: - Curves (i.e., groups) are encoded explicitly unless asn1_flag has been set to OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE. - Points are encoded in uncompressed form by default; options for asn1_for are as for point2oct, namely POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID Also add 'seed' and 'seed_len' members to EC_GROUP with access functions EC_GROUP_set_seed() EC_GROUP_get0_seed() EC_GROUP_get_seed_len() This is used only for ASN1 purposes (so far). [Nils Larsch ] *) Add 'field_type' member to EC_METHOD, which holds the NID of the appropriate field type OID. The new function EC_METHOD_get_field_type() returns this value. [Nils Larsch ] *) Add functions EC_POINT_point2bn() EC_POINT_bn2point() EC_POINT_point2hex() EC_POINT_hex2point() providing useful interfaces to EC_POINT_point2oct() and EC_POINT_oct2point(). [Nils Larsch ] *) Change internals of the EC library so that the functions EC_GROUP_set_generator() EC_GROUP_get_generator() EC_GROUP_get_order() EC_GROUP_get_cofactor() are implemented directly in crypto/ec/ec_lib.c and not dispatched to methods, which would lead to unnecessary code duplication when adding different types of curves. [Nils Larsch with input by Bodo Moeller] *) Implement compute_wNAF (crypto/ec/ec_mult.c) without BIGNUM arithmetic, and such that modified wNAFs are generated (which avoid length expansion in many cases). [Bodo Moeller] *) Add a function EC_GROUP_check_discriminant() (defined via EC_METHOD) that verifies that the curve discriminant is non-zero. Add a function EC_GROUP_check() that makes some sanity tests on a EC_GROUP, its generator and order. This includes EC_GROUP_check_discriminant(). [Nils Larsch ] *) Add ECDSA in new directory crypto/ecdsa/. Add applications 'openssl ecparam' and 'openssl ecdsa' (these are based on 'openssl dsaparam' and 'openssl dsa'). ECDSA support is also included in various other files across the library. Most notably, - 'openssl req' now has a '-newkey ecdsa:file' option; - EVP_PKCS82PKEY (crypto/evp/evp_pkey.c) now can handle ECDSA; - X509_PUBKEY_get (crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c) and d2i_PublicKey (crypto/asn1/d2i_pu.c) have been modified to make them suitable for ECDSA where domain parameters must be extracted before the specific public key; - ECDSA engine support has been added. [Nils Larsch ] *) Include some named elliptic curves, and add OIDs from X9.62, SECG, and WAP/WTLS. Each curve can be obtained from the new function EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(), and the list of available named curves can be obtained with EC_get_builtin_curves(). Also add a 'curve_name' member to EC_GROUP objects, which can be accessed via EC_GROUP_set_curve_name() EC_GROUP_get_curve_name() [Nils Larsch ] *) Include "!eNULL" in SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST to make sure that a ciphersuite string such as "DEFAULT:RSA" cannot enable authentication-only ciphersuites. [Bodo Moeller] *) Since AES128 and AES256 share a single mask bit in the logic of ssl/ssl_ciph.c, the code for masking out disabled ciphers needs a kludge to work properly if AES128 is available and AES256 isn't. [Victor Duchovni] *) Expand security boundary to match 1.1.1 module. [Steve Henson] *) Remove redundant features: hash file source, editing of test vectors modify fipsld to use external fips_premain.c signature. [Steve Henson] *) New perl script mkfipsscr.pl to create shell scripts or batch files to run algorithm test programs. [Steve Henson] *) Make algorithm test programs more tolerant of whitespace. [Steve Henson] *) Have SSL/TLS server implementation tolerate "mismatched" record protocol version while receiving ClientHello even if the ClientHello is fragmented. (The server can't insist on the particular protocol version it has chosen before the ServerHello message has informed the client about his choice.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Load error codes if they are not already present instead of using a static variable. This allows them to be cleanly unloaded and reloaded. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7k and 0.9.7l [28 Sep 2006] *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940) [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson] *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function. (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] *) Change ciphersuite string processing so that an explicit ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite (so that "AES256-SHA" will no longer include "AES128-SHA"), and any other similar ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions (so that "RC4-MD5" will still include both the SSL 2.0 ciphersuite and the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite). This is a backport combining changes from 0.9.8b and 0.9.8d. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.7j and 0.9.7k [05 Sep 2006] *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team] *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when possible instead of select(), since the latter has some undesirable limitations. [Darryl Miles via Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller] *) Disable rogue ciphersuites: - SSLv2 0x08 0x00 0x80 ("RC4-64-MD5") - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x61 ("EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5") - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x60 ("EXP1024-RC4-MD5") The latter two were purportedly from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-0[01].txt, but do not really appear there. Also deactivate the remaining ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt. These are just as unofficial, and the ID has long expired. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occurred on dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.7i and 0.9.7j [04 May 2006] *) Adapt fipsld and the build system to link against the validated FIPS module in FIPS mode. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes for VC++ 2005 build under Windows. [Steve Henson] *) Add new Windows build target VC-32-GMAKE for VC++. This uses GNU make from a Windows bash shell such as MSYS. It is autodetected from the "config" script when run from a VC++ environment. Modify standard VC++ build to use fipscanister.o from the GNU make build. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.7i [14 Oct 2005] *) Wrapped the definition of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE in a #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS. The value now differs depending on if you build for FIPS or not. BEWARE! A program linked with a shared FIPSed libcrypto can't be safely run with a non-FIPSed libcrypto, as it may crash because of the difference induced by this change. [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 0.9.7g and 0.9.7h [11 Oct 2005] *) Remove the functionality of SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING (part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad idea. (CVE-2005-2969) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology [AIST], Japan)] *) Minimal support for X9.31 signatures and PSS padding modes. This is mainly for FIPS compliance and not fully integrated at this stage. [Steve Henson] *) For DSA signing, unless DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is set, perform the exponentiation using a fixed-length exponent. (Otherwise, the information leaked through timing could expose the secret key after many signatures; cf. Bleichenbacher's attack on DSA with biased k.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Make a new fixed-window mod_exp implementation the default for RSA, DSA, and DH private-key operations so that the sequence of squares and multiplies and the memory access pattern are independent of the particular secret key. This will mitigate cache-timing and potential related attacks. BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime() is the new exponentiation implementation, and this is automatically used by BN_mod_exp_mont() if the new flag BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME is set for the exponent. RSA, DSA, and DH will use this BN flag for private exponents unless the flag RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, or DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, respectively, is set. [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp), with some changes by Bodo Moeller] *) Change the client implementation for SSLv23_method() and SSLv23_client_method() so that is uses the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 Client Hello message format if the SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 option is set. (Previously, the SSL 2.0 backwards compatible Client Hello message format would be used even with SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add support for smime-type MIME parameter in S/MIME messages which some clients need. [Steve Henson] *) New function BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked() to set montgomery parameters in a threadsafe manner. Modify rsa code to use new function and add calls to dsa and dh code (which had race conditions before). [Steve Henson] *) Include the fixed error library code in the C error file definitions instead of fixing them up at runtime. This keeps the error code structures constant. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7f and 0.9.7g [11 Apr 2005] [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.7h and later 0.9.7 patch levels were released after OpenSSL 0.9.8.] *) Fixes for newer kerberos headers. NB: the casts are needed because the 'length' field is signed on one version and unsigned on another with no (?) obvious way to tell the difference, without these VC++ complains. Also the "definition" of FAR (blank) is no longer included nor is the error ENOMEM. KRB5_PRIVATE has to be set to 1 to pick up some needed definitions. [Steve Henson] *) Undo Cygwin change. [Ulf Möller] *) Added support for proxy certificates according to RFC 3820. Because they may be a security thread to unaware applications, they must be explicitly allowed in run-time. See docs/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt for further information. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.7e and 0.9.7f [22 Mar 2005] *) Use (SSL_RANDOM_VALUE - 4) bytes of pseudo random data when generating server and client random values. Previously (SSL_RANDOM_VALUE - sizeof(time_t)) would be used which would result in less random data when sizeof(time_t) > 4 (some 64 bit platforms). This change has negligible security impact because: 1. Server and client random values still have 24 bytes of pseudo random data. 2. Server and client random values are sent in the clear in the initial handshake. 3. The master secret is derived using the premaster secret (48 bytes in size for static RSA ciphersuites) as well as client server and random values. The OpenSSL team would like to thank the UK NISCC for bringing this issue to our attention. [Stephen Henson, reported by UK NISCC] *) Use Windows randomness collection on Cygwin. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix hang in EGD/PRNGD query when communication socket is closed prematurely by EGD/PRNGD. [Darren Tucker via Lutz Jänicke, resolves #1014] *) Prompt for pass phrases when appropriate for PKCS12 input format. [Steve Henson] *) Back-port of selected performance improvements from development branch, as well as improved support for PowerPC platforms. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add lots of checks for memory allocation failure, error codes to indicate failure and freeing up memory if a failure occurs. [Nauticus Networks SSL Team , Steve Henson] *) Add new -passin argument to dgst. [Steve Henson] *) Perform some character comparisons of different types in X509_NAME_cmp: this is needed for some certificates that re-encode DNs into UTF8Strings (in violation of RFC3280) and can't or won't issue name rollover certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Make an explicit check during certificate validation to see that the CA setting in each certificate on the chain is correct. As a side effect always do the following basic checks on extensions, not just when there's an associated purpose to the check: - if there is an unhandled critical extension (unless the user has chosen to ignore this fault) - if the path length has been exceeded (if one is set at all) - that certain extensions fit the associated purpose (if one has been given) [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.7d and 0.9.7e [25 Oct 2004] *) Avoid a race condition when CRLs are checked in a multi threaded environment. This would happen due to the reordering of the revoked entries during signature checking and serial number lookup. Now the encoding is cached and the serial number sort performed under a lock. Add new STACK function sk_is_sorted(). [Steve Henson] *) Add Delta CRL to the extension code. [Steve Henson] *) Various fixes to s3_pkt.c so alerts are sent properly. [David Holmes ] *) Reduce the chances of duplicate issuer name and serial numbers (in violation of RFC3280) using the OpenSSL certificate creation utilities. This is done by creating a random 64 bit value for the initial serial number when a serial number file is created or when a self signed certificate is created using 'openssl req -x509'. The initial serial number file is created using 'openssl x509 -next_serial' in CA.pl rather than being initialized to 1. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7c and 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004] *) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079) [Joe Orton, Steve Henson] *) Fix flaw in SSL/TLS handshaking when using Kerberos ciphersuites (CVE-2004-0112) [Joe Orton, Steve Henson] *) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same subject in the CA index file. This is done only if the keyword 'unique_subject' is set to 'no' in the main CA section (default if 'CA_default') of the configuration file. The value is saved with the database itself in a separate index attribute file, named like the index file with '.attr' appended to the name. [Richard Levitte] *) X509 verify fixes. Disable broken certificate workarounds when X509_V_FLAGS_X509_STRICT is set. Check CRL issuer has cRLSign set if keyUsage extension present. Don't accept CRLs with unhandled critical extensions: since verify currently doesn't process CRL extensions this rejects a CRL with *any* critical extensions. Add new verify error codes for these cases. [Steve Henson] *) When creating an OCSP nonce use an OCTET STRING inside the extnValue. A clarification of RFC2560 will require the use of OCTET STRINGs and some implementations cannot handle the current raw format. Since OpenSSL copies and compares OCSP nonces as opaque blobs without any attempt at parsing them this should not create any compatibility issues. [Steve Henson] *) New md flag EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE this allows md_data to be reused when calling EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() to avoid calling OPENSSL_malloc(). Without this HMAC (and other) operations are several times slower than OpenSSL < 0.9.7. [Steve Henson] *) Print out GeneralizedTime and UTCTime in ASN1_STRING_print_ex(). [Peter Sylvester ] *) Use the correct content when signing type "other". [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7b and 0.9.7c [30 Sep 2003] *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite: Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544). Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CVE-2003-0545). If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check certificate signature with the NULL public key. [Steve Henson] *) New -ignore_err option in ocsp application to stop the server exiting on the first error in a request. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_accept() (ssl/s3_srvr.c) only accept a client certificate if the server requested one: as stated in TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0 specifications. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_get_client_hello() (ssl/s3_srvr.c), tolerate additional extra data after the compression methods not only for TLS 1.0 but also for SSL 3.0 (as required by the specification). [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Matthias Loepfe] *) Change X509_certificate_type() to mark the key as exported/exportable when it's 512 *bits* long, not 512 bytes. [Richard Levitte] *) Change AES_cbc_encrypt() so it outputs exact multiple of blocks during encryption. [Richard Levitte] *) Various fixes to base64 BIO and non blocking I/O. On write flushes were not handled properly if the BIO retried. On read data was not being buffered properly and had various logic bugs. This also affects blocking I/O when the data being decoded is a certain size. [Steve Henson] *) Various S/MIME bugfixes and compatibility changes: output correct application/pkcs7 MIME type if PKCS7_NOOLDMIMETYPE is set. Tolerate some broken signatures. Output CR+LF for EOL if PKCS7_CRLFEOL is set (this makes opening of files as .eml work). Correctly handle very long lines in MIME parser. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7a and 0.9.7b [10 Apr 2003] *) Countermeasure against the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 padding: treat a protocol version number mismatch like a decryption error in ssl3_get_client_key_exchange (ssl/s3_srvr.c). [Bodo Moeller] *) Turn on RSA blinding by default in the default implementation to avoid a timing attack. Applications that don't want it can call RSA_blinding_off() or use the new flag RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING. They would be ill-advised to do so in most cases. [Ben Laurie, Steve Henson, Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller] *) Change RSA blinding code so that it works when the PRNG is not seeded (in this case, the secret RSA exponent is abused as an unpredictable seed -- if it is not unpredictable, there is no point in blinding anyway). Make RSA blinding thread-safe by remembering the creator's thread ID in rsa->blinding and having all other threads use local one-time blinding factors (this requires more computation than sharing rsa->blinding, but avoids excessive locking; and if an RSA object is not shared between threads, blinding will still be very fast). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fixed a typo bug that would cause ENGINE_set_default() to set an ENGINE as defaults for all supported algorithms irrespective of the 'flags' parameter. 'flags' is now honoured, so applications should make sure they are passing it correctly. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Target "mingw" now allows native Windows code to be generated in the Cygwin environment as well as with the MinGW compiler. [Ulf Moeller] Changes between 0.9.7 and 0.9.7a [19 Feb 2003] *) In ssl3_get_record (ssl/s3_pkt.c), minimize information leaked via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrect block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL), Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and Martin Vuagnoux (EPFL, Ilion)] *) Make the no-err option work as intended. The intention with no-err is not to have the whole error stack handling routines removed from libcrypto, it's only intended to remove all the function name and reason texts, thereby removing some of the footprint that may not be interesting if those errors aren't displayed anyway. NOTE: it's still possible for any application or module to have its own set of error texts inserted. The routines are there, just not used by default when no-err is given. [Richard Levitte] *) Add support for FreeBSD on IA64. [dirk.meyer@dinoex.sub.org via Richard Levitte, resolves #454] *) Adjust DES_cbc_cksum() so it returns the same value as the MIT Kerberos function mit_des_cbc_cksum(). Before this change, the value returned by DES_cbc_cksum() was like the one from mit_des_cbc_cksum(), except the bytes were swapped. [Kevin Greaney and Richard Levitte] *) Allow an application to disable the automatic SSL chain building. Before this a rather primitive chain build was always performed in ssl3_output_cert_chain(): an application had no way to send the correct chain if the automatic operation produced an incorrect result. Now the chain builder is disabled if either: 1. Extra certificates are added via SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(). 2. The mode flag SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN is set. The reasoning behind this is that an application would not want the auto chain building to take place if extra chain certificates are present and it might also want a means of sending no additional certificates (for example the chain has two certificates and the root is omitted). [Steve Henson] *) Add the possibility to build without the ENGINE framework. [Steven Reddie via Richard Levitte] *) Under Win32 gmtime() can return NULL: check return value in OPENSSL_gmtime(). Add error code for case where gmtime() fails. [Steve Henson] *) DSA routines: under certain error conditions uninitialized BN objects could be freed. Solution: make sure initialization is performed early enough. (Reported and fix supplied by Ivan D Nestlerode , Nils Larsch via PR#459) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Another fix for SSLv2 session ID handling: the session ID was incorrectly checked on reconnect on the client side, therefore session resumption could still fail with a "ssl session id is different" error. This behaviour is masked when SSL_OP_ALL is used due to SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG being set. Behaviour observed by Crispin Flowerday as followup to PR #377. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) IA-32 assembler support enhancements: unified ELF targets, support for SCO/Caldera platforms, fix for Cygwin shared build. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add support for FreeBSD on sparc64. As a consequence, support for FreeBSD on non-x86 processors is separate from x86 processors on the config script, much like the NetBSD support. [Richard Levitte & Kris Kennaway ] Changes between 0.9.6h and 0.9.7 [31 Dec 2002] [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.6i and later 0.9.6 patch levels were released after OpenSSL 0.9.7.] *) Fix session ID handling in SSLv2 client code: the SERVER FINISHED code (06) was taken as the first octet of the session ID and the last octet was ignored consequently. As a result SSLv2 client side session caching could not have worked due to the session ID mismatch between client and server. Behaviour observed by Crispin Flowerday as PR #377. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Change the declaration of needed Kerberos libraries to use EX_LIBS instead of the special (and badly supported) LIBKRB5. LIBKRB5 is removed entirely. [Richard Levitte] *) The hw_ncipher.c engine requires dynamic locks. Unfortunately, it seems that in spite of existing for more than a year, many application author have done nothing to provide the necessary callbacks, which means that this particular engine will not work properly anywhere. This is a very unfortunate situation which forces us, in the name of usability, to give the hw_ncipher.c a static lock, which is part of libcrypto. NOTE: This is for the 0.9.7 series ONLY. This hack will never appear in 0.9.8 or later. We EXPECT application authors to have dealt properly with this when 0.9.8 is released (unless we actually make such changes in the libcrypto locking code that changes will have to be made anyway). [Richard Levitte] *) In asn1_d2i_read_bio() repeatedly call BIO_read() until all content octets have been read, EOF or an error occurs. Without this change some truncated ASN1 structures will not produce an error. [Steve Henson] *) Disable Heimdal support, since it hasn't been fully implemented. Still give the possibility to force the use of Heimdal, but with warnings and a request that patches get sent to openssl-dev. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the VC-CE target, introduce the WINCE sysname, and add INSTALL.WCE and appropriate conditionals to make it build. [Steven Reddie via Richard Levitte] *) Change the DLL names for Cygwin to cygcrypto-x.y.z.dll and cygssl-x.y.z.dll, where x, y and z are the major, minor and edit numbers of the version. [Corinna Vinschen and Richard Levitte] *) Introduce safe string copy and catenation functions (BUF_strlcpy() and BUF_strlcat()). [Ben Laurie (CHATS) and Richard Levitte] *) Avoid using fixed-size buffers for one-line DNs. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add BUF_MEM_grow_clean() to avoid information leakage when resizing buffers containing secrets, and use where appropriate. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Avoid using fixed size buffers for configuration file location. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Avoid filename truncation for various CA files. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Use sizeof in preference to magic numbers. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Avoid filename truncation in cert requests. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add assertions to check for (supposedly impossible) buffer overflows. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Don't cache truncated DNS entries in the local cache (this could potentially lead to a spoofing attack). [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Fix various buffers to be large enough for hex/decimal representations in a platform independent manner. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add CRYPTO_realloc_clean() to avoid information leakage when resizing buffers containing secrets, and use where appropriate. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add BIO_indent() to avoid much slightly worrying code to do indents. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Convert sprintf()/BIO_puts() to BIO_printf(). [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) buffer_gets() could terminate with the buffer only half full. Fixed. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add assertions to prevent user-supplied crypto functions from overflowing internal buffers by having large block sizes, etc. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) New OPENSSL_assert() macro (similar to assert(), but enabled unconditionally). [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused copy of key in RC4. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused and incorrectly sized buffers for IV in pem.h. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Fix off-by-one error in EGD path. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) If RANDFILE path is too long, ignore instead of truncating. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused and incorrectly sized X.509 structure CBCParameter. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused and dangerous function knumber(). [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused and dangerous structure, KSSL_ERR. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Protect against overlong session ID context length in an encoded session object. Since these are local, this does not appear to be exploitable. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Change from security patch (see 0.9.6e below) that did not affect the 0.9.6 release series: Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized master key in Kerberos-enabled versions. (CVE-2002-0657) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Change the SSL kerb5 codes to match RFC 2712. [Richard Levitte] *) Make -nameopt work fully for req and add -reqopt switch. [Michael Bell , Steve Henson] *) The "block size" for block ciphers in CFB and OFB mode should be 1. [Steve Henson, reported by Yngve Nysaeter Pettersen ] *) Make sure tests can be performed even if the corresponding algorithms have been removed entirely. This was also the last step to make OpenSSL compilable with DJGPP under all reasonable conditions. [Richard Levitte, Doug Kaufman ] *) Add cipher selection rules COMPLEMENTOFALL and COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT to allow version independent disabling of normally unselected ciphers, which may be activated as a side-effect of selecting a single cipher. (E.g., cipher list string "RSA" enables ciphersuites that are left out of "ALL" because they do not provide symmetric encryption. "RSA:!COMPLEMEMENTOFALL" avoids these unsafe ciphersuites.) [Lutz Jaenicke, Bodo Moeller] *) Add appropriate support for separate platform-dependent build directories. The recommended way to make a platform-dependent build directory is the following (tested on Linux), maybe with some local tweaks: # Place yourself outside of the OpenSSL source tree. In # this example, the environment variable OPENSSL_SOURCE # is assumed to contain the absolute OpenSSL source directory. mkdir -p objtree/"`uname -s`-`uname -r`-`uname -m`" cd objtree/"`uname -s`-`uname -r`-`uname -m`" (cd $OPENSSL_SOURCE; find . -type f) | while read F; do mkdir -p `dirname $F` ln -s $OPENSSL_SOURCE/$F $F done To be absolutely sure not to disturb the source tree, a "make clean" is a good thing. If it isn't successful, don't worry about it, it probably means the source directory is very clean. [Richard Levitte] *) Make sure any ENGINE control commands make local copies of string pointers passed to them whenever necessary. Otherwise it is possible the caller may have overwritten (or deallocated) the original string data when a later ENGINE operation tries to use the stored values. [Götz Babin-Ebell ] *) Improve diagnostics in file reading and command-line digests. [Ben Laurie aided and abetted by Solar Designer ] *) Add AES modes CFB and OFB to the object database. Correct an error in AES-CFB decryption. [Richard Levitte] *) Remove most calls to EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() in evp_enc.c, this allows existing EVP_CIPHER_CTX structures to be reused after calling EVP_*Final(). This behaviour is used by encryption BIOs and some applications. This has the side effect that applications must explicitly clean up cipher contexts with EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() or they will leak memory. [Steve Henson] *) Check the values of dna and dnb in bn_mul_recursive before calling bn_mul_comba (a non zero value means the a or b arrays do not contain n2 elements) and fallback to bn_mul_normal if either is not zero. [Steve Henson] *) Fix escaping of non-ASCII characters when using the -subj option of the "openssl req" command line tool. (Robert Joop ) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Make object definitions compliant to LDAP (RFC2256): SN is the short form for "surname", serialNumber has no short form. Use "mail" as the short name for "rfc822Mailbox" according to RFC2798; therefore remove "mail" short name for "internet 7". The OID for unique identifiers in X509 certificates is x500UniqueIdentifier, not uniqueIdentifier. Some more OID additions. (Michael Bell ) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add an "init" command to the ENGINE config module and auto initialize ENGINEs. Without any "init" command the ENGINE will be initialized after all ctrl commands have been executed on it. If init=1 the ENGINE is initialized at that point (ctrls before that point are run on the uninitialized ENGINE and after on the initialized one). If init=0 then the ENGINE will not be initialized at all. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the 'app_verify_callback' interface so that the user-defined argument is actually passed to the callback: In the SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback() prototype, the callback declaration has been changed from int (*cb)() into int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *); in ssl_verify_cert_chain (ssl/ssl_cert.c), the call i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx) has been changed into i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg). To update applications using SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(), a dummy argument can be added to their callback functions. [D. K. Smetters ] *) Added the '4758cca' ENGINE to support IBM 4758 cards. [Maurice Gittens , touchups by Geoff Thorpe] *) Add and OPENSSL_LOAD_CONF define which will cause OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() to load the openssl.cnf config file. This allows older applications to transparently support certain OpenSSL features: such as crypto acceleration and dynamic ENGINE loading. Two new functions OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_noconf() which will never load the config file and OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_conf() which will always load it have also been added. [Steve Henson] *) Add the OFB, CFB and CTR (all with 128 bit feedback) to AES. Adjust NIDs and EVP layer. [Stephen Sprunk and Richard Levitte] *) Config modules support in openssl utility. Most commands now load modules from the config file, though in a few (such as version) this isn't done because it couldn't be used for anything. In the case of ca and req the config file used is the same as the utility itself: that is the -config command line option can be used to specify an alternative file. [Steve Henson] *) Move default behaviour from OPENSSL_config(). If appname is NULL use "openssl_conf" if filename is NULL use default openssl config file. [Steve Henson] *) Add an argument to OPENSSL_config() to allow the use of an alternative config section name. Add a new flag to tolerate a missing config file and move code to CONF_modules_load_file(). [Steve Henson] *) Support for crypto accelerator cards from Accelerated Encryption Processing, www.aep.ie. (Use engine 'aep') The support was copied from 0.9.6c [engine] and adapted/corrected to work with the new engine framework. [AEP Inc. and Richard Levitte] *) Support for SureWare crypto accelerator cards from Baltimore Technologies. (Use engine 'sureware') The support was copied from 0.9.6c [engine] and adapted to work with the new engine framework. [Richard Levitte] *) Have the CHIL engine fork-safe (as defined by nCipher) and actually make the newer ENGINE framework commands for the CHIL engine work. [Toomas Kiisk and Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to produce shared libraries on ReliantUNIX. [Robert Dahlem via Richard Levitte] *) Add the configuration target debug-linux-ppro. Make 'openssl rsa' use the general key loading routines implemented in apps.c, and make those routines able to handle the key format FORMAT_NETSCAPE and the variant FORMAT_IISSGC. [Toomas Kiisk via Richard Levitte] *) Fix a crashbug and a logic bug in hwcrhk_load_pubkey(). [Toomas Kiisk via Richard Levitte] *) Add -keyform to rsautl, and document -engine. [Richard Levitte, inspired by Toomas Kiisk ] *) Change BIO_new_file (crypto/bio/bss_file.c) to use new BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE error code rather than the generic ERR_R_SYS_LIB error code if fopen() fails with ENOENT. [Ben Laurie] *) Add new functions ERR_peek_last_error ERR_peek_last_error_line ERR_peek_last_error_line_data. These are similar to ERR_peek_error ERR_peek_error_line ERR_peek_error_line_data, but report on the latest error recorded rather than the first one still in the error queue. [Ben Laurie, Bodo Moeller] *) default_algorithms option in ENGINE config module. This allows things like: default_algorithms = ALL default_algorithms = RSA, DSA, RAND, CIPHERS, DIGESTS [Steve Henson] *) Preliminary ENGINE config module. [Steve Henson] *) New experimental application configuration code. [Steve Henson] *) Change the AES code to follow the same name structure as all other symmetric ciphers, and behave the same way. Move everything to the directory crypto/aes, thereby obsoleting crypto/rijndael. [Stephen Sprunk and Richard Levitte] *) SECURITY: remove unsafe setjmp/signal interaction from ui_openssl.c. [Ben Laurie and Theo de Raadt] *) Add option to output public keys in req command. [Massimiliano Pala madwolf@openca.org] *) Use wNAFs in EC_POINTs_mul() for improved efficiency (up to about 10% better than before for P-192 and P-224). [Bodo Moeller] *) New functions/macros SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(ctx, cb) SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(ctx, arg) SSL_set_msg_callback(ssl, cb) SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, arg) to request calling a callback function void cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg) whenever a protocol message has been completely received (write_p == 0) or sent (write_p == 1). Here 'version' is the protocol version according to which the SSL library interprets the current protocol message (SSL2_VERSION, SSL3_VERSION, or TLS1_VERSION). 'content_type' is 0 in the case of SSL 2.0, or the content type as defined in the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 protocol specification (change_cipher_spec(20), alert(21), handshake(22)). 'buf' and 'len' point to the actual message, 'ssl' to the SSL object, and 'arg' is the application-defined value set by SSL[_CTX]_set_msg_callback_arg(). 'openssl s_client' and 'openssl s_server' have new '-msg' options to enable a callback that displays all protocol messages. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change the shared library support so shared libraries are built as soon as the corresponding static library is finished, and thereby get openssl and the test programs linked against the shared library. This still only happens when the keyword "shard" has been given to the configuration scripts. NOTE: shared library support is still an experimental thing, and backward binary compatibility is still not guaranteed. ["Maciej W. Rozycki" and Richard Levitte] *) Add support for Subject Information Access extension. [Peter Sylvester ] *) Make BUF_MEM_grow() behaviour more consistent: Initialise to zero additional bytes when new memory had to be allocated, not just when reusing an existing buffer. [Bodo Moeller] *) New command line and configuration option 'utf8' for the req command. This allows field values to be specified as UTF8 strings. [Steve Henson] *) Add -multi and -mr options to "openssl speed" - giving multiple parallel runs for the former and machine-readable output for the latter. [Ben Laurie] *) Add '-noemailDN' option to 'openssl ca'. This prevents inclusion of the e-mail address in the DN (i.e., it will go into a certificate extension only). The new configuration file option 'email_in_dn = no' has the same effect. [Massimiliano Pala madwolf@openca.org] *) Change all functions with names starting with des_ to be starting with DES_ instead. Add wrappers that are compatible with libdes, but are named _ossl_old_des_*. Finally, add macros that map the des_* symbols to the corresponding _ossl_old_des_* if libdes compatibility is desired. If OpenSSL 0.9.6c compatibility is desired, the des_* symbols will be mapped to DES_*, with one exception. Since we provide two compatibility mappings, the user needs to define the macro OPENSSL_DES_LIBDES_COMPATIBILITY if libdes compatibility is desired. The default (i.e., when that macro isn't defined) is OpenSSL 0.9.6c compatibility. There are also macros that enable and disable the support of old des functions altogether. Those are OPENSSL_ENABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT and OPENSSL_DISABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT. If none or both of those are defined, the default will apply: to support the old des routines. In either case, one must include openssl/des.h to get the correct definitions. Do not try to just include openssl/des_old.h, that won't work. NOTE: This is a major break of an old API into a new one. Software authors are encouraged to switch to the DES_ style functions. Some time in the future, des_old.h and the libdes compatibility functions will be disable (i.e. OPENSSL_DISABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT will be the default), and then completely removed. [Richard Levitte] *) Test for certificates which contain unsupported critical extensions. If such a certificate is found during a verify operation it is rejected by default: this behaviour can be overridden by either handling the new error X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION or by setting the verify flag X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL. A new function X509_supported_extension() has also been added which returns 1 if a particular extension is supported. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the behaviour of EVP cipher functions in similar way to digests to retain compatibility with existing code. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the behaviour of EVP_DigestInit() and EVP_DigestFinal() to retain compatibility with existing code. In particular the 'ctx' parameter does not have to be to be initialized before the call to EVP_DigestInit() and it is tidied up after a call to EVP_DigestFinal(). New function EVP_DigestFinal_ex() which does not tidy up the ctx. Similarly function EVP_MD_CTX_copy() changed to not require the destination to be initialized valid and new function EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() added which requires the destination to be valid. Modify all the OpenSSL digest calls to use EVP_DigestInit_ex(), EVP_DigestFinal_ex() and EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(). [Steve Henson] *) Change ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) and the functions using it so that complete 'Handshake' protocol structures are kept in memory instead of overwriting 'msg_type' and 'length' with 'body' data. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add an implementation of SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack for Win32. [Massimo Santin via Richard Levitte] *) Major restructuring to the underlying ENGINE code. This includes reduction of linker bloat, separation of pure "ENGINE" manipulation (initialisation, etc) from functionality dealing with implementations of specific crypto interfaces. This change also introduces integrated support for symmetric ciphers and digest implementations - so ENGINEs can now accelerate these by providing EVP_CIPHER and EVP_MD implementations of their own. This is detailed in crypto/engine/README as it couldn't be adequately described here. However, there are a few API changes worth noting - some RSA, DSA, DH, and RAND functions that were changed in the original introduction of ENGINE code have now reverted back - the hooking from this code to ENGINE is now a good deal more passive and at run-time, operations deal directly with RSA_METHODs, DSA_METHODs (etc) as they did before, rather than dereferencing through an ENGINE pointer any more. Also, the ENGINE functions dealing with BN_MOD_EXP[_CRT] handlers have been removed - they were not being used by the framework as there is no concept of a BIGNUM_METHOD and they could not be generalised to the new 'ENGINE_TABLE' mechanism that underlies the new code. Similarly, ENGINE_cpy() has been removed as it cannot be consistently defined in the new code. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Change ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check() to allow fractional seconds. [Steve Henson] *) Change mkdef.pl to sort symbols that get the same entry number, and make sure the automatically generated functions ERR_load_* become part of libeay.num as well. [Richard Levitte] *) New function SSL_renegotiate_pending(). This returns true once renegotiation has been requested (either SSL_renegotiate() call or HelloRequest/ClientHello received from the peer) and becomes false once a handshake has been completed. (For servers, SSL_renegotiate() followed by SSL_do_handshake() sends a HelloRequest, but does not ensure that a handshake takes place. SSL_renegotiate_pending() is useful for checking if the client has followed the request.) [Bodo Moeller] *) New SSL option SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION. By default, clients may request session resumption even during renegotiation (if session ID contexts permit); with this option, session resumption is possible only in the first handshake. SSL_OP_ALL is now 0x00000FFFL instead of 0x000FFFFFL. This makes more bits available for options that should not be part of SSL_OP_ALL (such as SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION). [Bodo Moeller] *) Add some demos for certificate and certificate request creation. [Steve Henson] *) Make maximum certificate chain size accepted from the peer application settable (SSL*_get/set_max_cert_list()), as proposed by "Douglas E. Engert" . [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add support for shared libraries for Unixware-7 (Boyd Lynn Gerber ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add a "destroy" handler to ENGINEs that allows structural cleanup to be done prior to destruction. Use this to unload error strings from ENGINEs that load their own error strings. NB: This adds two new API functions to "get" and "set" this destroy handler in an ENGINE. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Alter all existing ENGINE implementations (except "openssl" and "openbsd") to dynamically instantiate their own error strings. This makes them more flexible to be built both as statically-linked ENGINEs and self-contained shared-libraries loadable via the "dynamic" ENGINE. Also, add stub code to each that makes building them as self-contained shared-libraries easier (see README.ENGINE). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add a "dynamic" ENGINE that provides a mechanism for binding ENGINE implementations into applications that are completely implemented in self-contained shared-libraries. The "dynamic" ENGINE exposes control commands that can be used to configure what shared-library to load and to control aspects of the way it is handled. Also, made an update to the README.ENGINE file that brings its information up-to-date and provides some information and instructions on the "dynamic" ENGINE (ie. how to use it, how to build "dynamic"-loadable ENGINEs, etc). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Make it possible to unload ranges of ERR strings with a new "ERR_unload_strings" function. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add a copy() function to EVP_MD. [Ben Laurie] *) Make EVP_MD routines take a context pointer instead of just the md_data void pointer. [Ben Laurie] *) Add flags to EVP_MD and EVP_MD_CTX. EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT indicates that the digest can only process a single chunk of data (typically because it is provided by a piece of hardware). EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT indicates that the application is only going to provide a single chunk of data, and hence the framework needn't accumulate the data for oneshot drivers. [Ben Laurie] *) As with "ERR", make it possible to replace the underlying "ex_data" functions. This change also alters the storage and management of global ex_data state - it's now all inside ex_data.c and all "class" code (eg. RSA, BIO, SSL_CTX, etc) no longer stores its own STACKS and per-class index counters. The API functions that use this state have been changed to take a "class_index" rather than pointers to the class's local STACK and counter, and there is now an API function to dynamically create new classes. This centralisation allows us to (a) plug a lot of the thread-safety problems that existed, and (b) makes it possible to clean up all allocated state using "CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data()". W.r.t. (b) such data would previously have always leaked in application code and workarounds were in place to make the memory debugging turn a blind eye to it. Application code that doesn't use this new function will still leak as before, but their memory debugging output will announce it now rather than letting it slide. Besides the addition of CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(), another API change induced by the "ex_data" overhaul is that X509_STORE_CTX_init() now has a return value to indicate success or failure. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Make it possible to replace the underlying "ERR" functions such that the global state (2 LHASH tables and 2 locks) is only used by the "default" implementation. This change also adds two functions to "get" and "set" the implementation prior to it being automatically set the first time any other ERR function takes place. Ie. an application can call "get", pass the return value to a module it has just loaded, and that module can call its own "set" function using that value. This means the module's "ERR" operations will use (and modify) the error state in the application and not in its own statically linked copy of OpenSSL code. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Give DH, DSA, and RSA types their own "**_up_ref()" function to increment reference counts. This performs normal REF_PRINT/REF_CHECK macros on the operation, and provides a more encapsulated way for external code (crypto/evp/ and ssl/) to do this. Also changed the evp and ssl code to use these functions rather than manually incrementing the counts. Also rename "DSO_up()" function to more descriptive "DSO_up_ref()". [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add EVP test program. [Ben Laurie] *) Add symmetric cipher support to ENGINE. Expect the API to change! [Ben Laurie] *) New CRL functions: X509_CRL_set_version(), X509_CRL_set_issuer_name() X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(), X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(), X509_CRL_sort(), X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber(), and X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate(). These allow a CRL to be built without having to access X509_CRL fields directly. Modify 'ca' application to use new functions. [Steve Henson] *) Move SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG out of the SSL_OP_ALL list of recommended bug workarounds. Rollback attack detection is a security feature. The problem will only arise on OpenSSL servers when TLSv1 is not available (sslv3_server_method() or SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1). Software authors not wanting to support TLSv1 will have special reasons for their choice and can explicitly enable this option. [Bodo Moeller, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Rationalise EVP so it can be extended: don't include a union of cipher/digest structures, add init/cleanup functions for EVP_MD_CTX (similar to those existing for EVP_CIPHER_CTX). Usage example: EVP_MD_CTX md; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md); /* new function call */ EVP_DigestInit(&md, EVP_sha1()); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, in, len); EVP_DigestFinal(&md, out, NULL); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md); /* new function call */ [Ben Laurie] *) Make DES key schedule conform to the usual scheme, as well as correcting its structure. This means that calls to DES functions now have to pass a pointer to a des_key_schedule instead of a plain des_key_schedule (which was actually always a pointer anyway): E.g., des_key_schedule ks; des_set_key_checked(..., &ks); des_ncbc_encrypt(..., &ks, ...); (Note that a later change renames 'des_...' into 'DES_...'.) [Ben Laurie] *) Initial reduction of linker bloat: the use of some functions, such as PEM causes large amounts of unused functions to be linked in due to poor organisation. For example pem_all.c contains every PEM function which has a knock on effect of linking in large amounts of (unused) ASN1 code. Grouping together similar functions and splitting unrelated functions prevents this. [Steve Henson] *) Cleanup of EVP macros. [Ben Laurie] *) Change historical references to {NID,SN,LN}_des_ede and ede3 to add the correct _ecb suffix. [Ben Laurie] *) Add initial OCSP responder support to ocsp application. The revocation information is handled using the text based index use by the ca application. The responder can either handle requests generated internally, supplied in files (for example via a CGI script) or using an internal minimal server. [Steve Henson] *) Add configuration choices to get zlib compression for TLS. [Richard Levitte] *) Changes to Kerberos SSL for RFC 2712 compliance: 1. Implemented real KerberosWrapper, instead of just using KRB5 AP_REQ message. [Thanks to Simon Wilkinson ] 2. Implemented optional authenticator field of KerberosWrapper. Added openssl-style ASN.1 macros for Kerberos ticket, ap_req, and authenticator structs; see crypto/krb5/. Generalized Kerberos calls to support multiple Kerberos libraries. [Vern Staats , Jeffrey Altman via Richard Levitte] *) Cause 'openssl speed' to use fully hard-coded DSA keys as it already does with RSA. testdsa.h now has 'priv_key/pub_key' values for each of the key sizes rather than having just parameters (and 'speed' generating keys each time). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Speed up EVP routines. Before: encrypt type 8 bytes 64 bytes 256 bytes 1024 bytes 8192 bytes des-cbc 4408.85k 5560.51k 5778.46k 5862.20k 5825.16k des-cbc 4389.55k 5571.17k 5792.23k 5846.91k 5832.11k des-cbc 4394.32k 5575.92k 5807.44k 5848.37k 5841.30k decrypt des-cbc 3482.66k 5069.49k 5496.39k 5614.16k 5639.28k des-cbc 3480.74k 5068.76k 5510.34k 5609.87k 5635.52k des-cbc 3483.72k 5067.62k 5504.60k 5708.01k 5724.80k After: encrypt des-cbc 4660.16k 5650.19k 5807.19k 5827.13k 5783.32k decrypt des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k [Ben Laurie] *) Added the OS2-EMX target. ["Brian Havard" and Richard Levitte] *) Rewrite apps to use NCONF routines instead of the old CONF. New functions to support NCONF routines in extension code. New function CONF_set_nconf() to allow functions which take an NCONF to also handle the old LHASH structure: this means that the old CONF compatible routines can be retained (in particular wrt extensions) without having to duplicate the code. New function X509V3_add_ext_nconf_sk to add extensions to a stack. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance the general user interface with mechanisms for inner control and with possibilities to have yes/no kind of prompts. [Richard Levitte] *) Change all calls to low level digest routines in the library and applications to use EVP. Add missing calls to HMAC_cleanup() and don't assume HMAC_CTX can be copied using memcpy(). [Verdon Walker , Steve Henson] *) Add the possibility to control engines through control names but with arbitrary arguments instead of just a string. Change the key loaders to take a UI_METHOD instead of a callback function pointer. NOTE: this breaks binary compatibility with earlier versions of OpenSSL [engine]. Adapt the nCipher code for these new conditions and add a card insertion callback. [Richard Levitte] *) Enhance the general user interface with mechanisms to better support dialog box interfaces, application-defined prompts, the possibility to use defaults (for example default passwords from somewhere else) and interrupts/cancellations. [Richard Levitte] *) Tidy up PKCS#12 attribute handling. Add support for the CSP name attribute in PKCS#12 files, add new -CSP option to pkcs12 utility. [Steve Henson] *) Fix a memory leak in 'sk_dup()' in the case reallocation fails. (Also tidy up some unnecessarily weird code in 'sk_new()'). [Geoff, reported by Diego Tartara ] *) Change the key loading routines for ENGINEs to use the same kind callback (pem_password_cb) as all other routines that need this kind of callback. [Richard Levitte] *) Increase ENTROPY_NEEDED to 32 bytes, as Rijndael can operate with 256 bit (=32 byte) keys. Of course seeding with more entropy bytes than this minimum value is recommended. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) New random seeder for OpenVMS, using the system process statistics that are easily reachable. [Richard Levitte] *) Windows apparently can't transparently handle global variables defined in DLLs. Initialisations such as: const ASN1_ITEM *it = &ASN1_INTEGER_it; won't compile. This is used by the any applications that need to declare their own ASN1 modules. This was fixed by adding the option EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN to all Win32 platforms, although this isn't strictly needed for static libraries under Win32. [Steve Henson] *) New functions X509_PURPOSE_set() and X509_TRUST_set() to handle setting of purpose and trust fields. New X509_STORE trust and purpose functions and tidy up setting in other SSL functions. [Steve Henson] *) Add copies of X509_STORE_CTX fields and callbacks to X509_STORE structure. These are inherited by X509_STORE_CTX when it is initialised. This allows various defaults to be set in the X509_STORE structure (such as flags for CRL checking and custom purpose or trust settings) for functions which only use X509_STORE_CTX internally such as S/MIME. Modify X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit() so it only sets purposes and trust settings if they are not set in X509_STORE. This allows X509_STORE purposes and trust (in S/MIME for example) to override any set by default. Add command line options for CRL checking to smime, s_client and s_server applications. [Steve Henson] *) Initial CRL based revocation checking. If the CRL checking flag(s) are set then the CRL is looked up in the X509_STORE structure and its validity and signature checked, then if the certificate is found in the CRL the verify fails with a revoked error. Various new CRL related callbacks added to X509_STORE_CTX structure. Command line options added to 'verify' application to support this. This needs some additional work, such as being able to handle multiple CRLs with different times, extension based lookup (rather than just by subject name) and ultimately more complete V2 CRL extension handling. [Steve Henson] *) Add a general user interface API (crypto/ui/). This is designed to replace things like des_read_password and friends (backward compatibility functions using this new API are provided). The purpose is to remove prompting functions from the DES code section as well as provide for prompting through dialog boxes in a window system and the like. [Richard Levitte] *) Add "ex_data" support to ENGINE so implementations can add state at a per-structure level rather than having to store it globally. [Geoff] *) Make it possible for ENGINE structures to be copied when retrieved by ENGINE_by_id() if the ENGINE specifies a new flag: ENGINE_FLAGS_BY_ID_COPY. This causes the "original" ENGINE structure to act like a template, analogous to the RSA vs. RSA_METHOD type of separation. Because of this operational state can be localised to each ENGINE structure, despite the fact they all share the same "methods". New ENGINE structures returned in this case have no functional references and the return value is the single structural reference. This matches the single structural reference returned by ENGINE_by_id() normally, when it is incremented on the pre-existing ENGINE structure. [Geoff] *) Fix ASN1 decoder when decoding type ANY and V_ASN1_OTHER: since this needs to match any other type at all we need to manually clear the tag cache. [Steve Henson] *) Changes to the "openssl engine" utility to include; - verbosity levels ('-v', '-vv', and '-vvv') that provide information about an ENGINE's available control commands. - executing control commands from command line arguments using the '-pre' and '-post' switches. '-post' is only used if '-t' is specified and the ENGINE is successfully initialised. The syntax for the individual commands are colon-separated, for example; openssl engine chil -pre FORK_CHECK:0 -pre SO_PATH:/lib/test.so [Geoff] *) New dynamic control command support for ENGINEs. ENGINEs can now declare their own commands (numbers), names (strings), descriptions, and input types for run-time discovery by calling applications. A subset of these commands are implicitly classed as "executable" depending on their input type, and only these can be invoked through the new string-based API function ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(). (Eg. this can be based on user input, config files, etc). The distinction is that "executable" commands cannot return anything other than a boolean result and can only support numeric or string input, whereas some discoverable commands may only be for direct use through ENGINE_ctrl(), eg. supporting the exchange of binary data, function pointers, or other custom uses. The "executable" commands are to support parameterisations of ENGINE behaviour that can be unambiguously defined by ENGINEs and used consistently across any OpenSSL-based application. Commands have been added to all the existing hardware-supporting ENGINEs, noticeably "SO_PATH" to allow control over shared-library paths without source code alterations. [Geoff] *) Changed all ENGINE implementations to dynamically allocate their ENGINEs rather than declaring them statically. Apart from this being necessary with the removal of the ENGINE_FLAGS_MALLOCED distinction, this also allows the implementations to compile without using the internal engine_int.h header. [Geoff] *) Minor adjustment to "rand" code. RAND_get_rand_method() now returns a 'const' value. Any code that should be able to modify a RAND_METHOD should already have non-const pointers to it (ie. they should only modify their own ones). [Geoff] *) Made a variety of little tweaks to the ENGINE code. - "atalla" and "ubsec" string definitions were moved from header files to C code. "nuron" string definitions were placed in variables rather than hard-coded - allowing parameterisation of these values later on via ctrl() commands. - Removed unused "#if 0"'d code. - Fixed engine list iteration code so it uses ENGINE_free() to release structural references. - Constified the RAND_METHOD element of ENGINE structures. - Constified various get/set functions as appropriate and added missing functions (including a catch-all ENGINE_cpy that duplicates all ENGINE values onto a new ENGINE except reference counts/state). - Removed NULL parameter checks in get/set functions. Setting a method or function to NULL is a way of cancelling out a previously set value. Passing a NULL ENGINE parameter is just plain stupid anyway and doesn't justify the extra error symbols and code. - Deprecate the ENGINE_FLAGS_MALLOCED define and move the area for flags from engine_int.h to engine.h. - Changed prototypes for ENGINE handler functions (init(), finish(), ctrl(), key-load functions, etc) to take an (ENGINE*) parameter. [Geoff] *) Implement binary inversion algorithm for BN_mod_inverse in addition to the algorithm using long division. The binary algorithm can be used only if the modulus is odd. On 32-bit systems, it is faster only for relatively small moduli (roughly 20-30% for 128-bit moduli, roughly 5-15% for 256-bit moduli), so we use it only for moduli up to 450 bits. In 64-bit environments, the binary algorithm appears to be advantageous for much longer moduli; here we use it for moduli up to 2048 bits. [Bodo Moeller] *) Rewrite CHOICE field setting in ASN1_item_ex_d2i(). The old code could not support the combine flag in choice fields. [Steve Henson] *) Add a 'copy_extensions' option to the 'ca' utility. This copies extensions from a certificate request to the certificate. [Steve Henson] *) Allow multiple 'certopt' and 'nameopt' options to be separated by commas. Add 'namopt' and 'certopt' options to the 'ca' config file: this allows the display of the certificate about to be signed to be customised, to allow certain fields to be included or excluded and extension details. The old system didn't display multicharacter strings properly, omitted fields not in the policy and couldn't display additional details such as extensions. [Steve Henson] *) Function EC_POINTs_mul for multiple scalar multiplication of an arbitrary number of elliptic curve points \sum scalars[i]*points[i], optionally including the generator defined for the EC_GROUP: scalar*generator + \sum scalars[i]*points[i]. EC_POINT_mul is a simple wrapper function for the typical case that the point list has just one item (besides the optional generator). [Bodo Moeller] *) First EC_METHODs for curves over GF(p): EC_GFp_simple_method() uses the basic BN_mod_mul and BN_mod_sqr operations and provides various method functions that can also operate with faster implementations of modular arithmetic. EC_GFp_mont_method() reuses most functions that are part of EC_GFp_simple_method, but uses Montgomery arithmetic. [Bodo Moeller; point addition and point doubling implementation directly derived from source code provided by Lenka Fibikova ] *) Framework for elliptic curves (crypto/ec/ec.h, crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h, crypto/ec/ec_lib.c): Curves are EC_GROUP objects (with an optional group generator) based on EC_METHODs that are built into the library. Points are EC_POINT objects based on EC_GROUP objects. Most of the framework would be able to handle curves over arbitrary finite fields, but as there are no obvious types for fields other than GF(p), some functions are limited to that for now. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add the -HTTP option to s_server. It is similar to -WWW, but requires that the file contains a complete HTTP response. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the ec directory to mkdef.pl and mkfiles.pl. In mkdef.pl change the def and num file printf format specifier from "%-40sXXX" to "%-39s XXX". The latter will always guarantee a space after the field while the former will cause them to run together if the field is 40 of more characters long. [Steve Henson] *) Constify the cipher and digest 'method' functions and structures and modify related functions to take constant EVP_MD and EVP_CIPHER pointers. [Steve Henson] *) Hide BN_CTX structure details in bn_lcl.h instead of publishing them in . Also further increase BN_CTX_NUM to 32. [Bodo Moeller] *) Modify EVP_Digest*() routines so they now return values. Although the internal software routines can never fail additional hardware versions might. [Steve Henson] *) Clean up crypto/err/err.h and change some error codes to avoid conflicts: Previously ERR_R_FATAL was too small and coincided with ERR_LIB_PKCS7 (= ERR_R_PKCS7_LIB); it is now 64 instead of 32. ASN1 error codes ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR ... ERR_R_MISSING_ASN1_EOS were 4 .. 9, conflicting with ERR_LIB_RSA (= ERR_R_RSA_LIB) ... ERR_LIB_PEM (= ERR_R_PEM_LIB). They are now 58 .. 63 (i.e., just below ERR_R_FATAL). Add new error code 'ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR'. [Bodo Moeller] *) Don't overuse locks in crypto/err/err.c: For data retrieval, CRYPTO_r_lock suffices. [Bodo Moeller] *) New option '-subj arg' for 'openssl req' and 'openssl ca'. This sets the subject name for a new request or supersedes the subject name in a given request. Formats that can be parsed are 'CN=Some Name, OU=myOU, C=IT' and 'CN=Some Name/OU=myOU/C=IT'. Add options '-batch' and '-verbose' to 'openssl req'. [Massimiliano Pala ] *) Introduce the possibility to access global variables through functions on platform were that's the best way to handle exporting global variables in shared libraries. To enable this functionality, one must configure with "EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN" or defined the C macro "OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION" in crypto/opensslconf.h (the latter is normally done by Configure or something similar). To implement a global variable, use the macro OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL in the source file (foo.c) like this: OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(int,foo)=1; OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(double,bar); To declare a global variable, use the macros OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL and OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF in the header file (foo.h) like this: OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(int,foo); #define foo OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(foo) OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(double,bar); #define bar OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(bar) The #defines are very important, and therefore so is including the header file everywhere where the defined globals are used. The macro OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION also affects the definition of ASN.1 items, but that structure is a bit different. The largest change is in util/mkdef.pl which has been enhanced with better and easier to understand logic to choose which symbols should go into the Windows .def files as well as a number of fixes and code cleanup (among others, algorithm keywords are now sorted lexicographically to avoid constant rewrites). [Richard Levitte] *) In BN_div() keep a copy of the sign of 'num' before writing the result to 'rm' because if rm==num the value will be overwritten and produce the wrong result if 'num' is negative: this caused problems with BN_mod() and BN_nnmod(). [Steve Henson] *) Function OCSP_request_verify(). This checks the signature on an OCSP request and verifies the signer certificate. The signer certificate is just checked for a generic purpose and OCSP request trust settings. [Steve Henson] *) Add OCSP_check_validity() function to check the validity of OCSP responses. OCSP responses are prepared in real time and may only be a few seconds old. Simply checking that the current time lies between thisUpdate and nextUpdate max reject otherwise valid responses caused by either OCSP responder or client clock inaccuracy. Instead we allow thisUpdate and nextUpdate to fall within a certain period of the current time. The age of the response can also optionally be checked. Two new options -validity_period and -status_age added to ocsp utility. [Steve Henson] *) If signature or public key algorithm is unrecognized print out its OID rather that just UNKNOWN. [Steve Henson] *) Change OCSP_cert_to_id() to tolerate a NULL subject certificate and OCSP_cert_id_new() a NULL serialNumber. This allows a partial certificate ID to be generated from the issuer certificate alone which can then be passed to OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(). [Steve Henson] *) New compilation option ASN1_ITEM_FUNCTIONS. This causes the new ASN1 modules to export functions returning ASN1_ITEM pointers instead of the ASN1_ITEM structures themselves. This adds several new macros which allow the underlying ASN1 function/structure to be accessed transparently. As a result code should not use ASN1_ITEM references directly (such as &X509_it) but instead use the relevant macros (such as ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509)). This option is to allow use of the new ASN1 code on platforms where exporting structures is problematical (for example in shared libraries) but exporting functions returning pointers to structures is not. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for overriding the generation of SSL/TLS session IDs. These callbacks can be registered either in an SSL_CTX or per SSL. The purpose of this is to allow applications to control, if they wish, the arbitrary values chosen for use as session IDs, particularly as it can be useful for session caching in multiple-server environments. A command-line switch for testing this (and any client code that wishes to use such a feature) has been added to "s_server". [Geoff Thorpe, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Modify mkdef.pl to recognise and parse preprocessor conditionals of the form '#if defined(...) || defined(...) || ...' and '#if !defined(...) && !defined(...) && ...'. This also avoids the growing number of special cases it was previously handling. [Richard Levitte] *) Make all configuration macros available for application by making sure they are available in opensslconf.h, by giving them names starting with "OPENSSL_" to avoid conflicts with other packages and by making sure e_os2.h will cover all platform-specific cases together with opensslconf.h. Additionally, it is now possible to define configuration/platform- specific names (called "system identities"). In the C code, these are prefixed with "OPENSSL_SYSNAME_". e_os2.h will create another macro with the name beginning with "OPENSSL_SYS_", which is determined from "OPENSSL_SYSNAME_*" or compiler-specific macros depending on what is available. [Richard Levitte] *) New option -set_serial to 'req' and 'x509' this allows the serial number to use to be specified on the command line. Previously self signed certificates were hard coded with serial number 0 and the CA options of 'x509' had to use a serial number in a file which was auto incremented. [Steve Henson] *) New options to 'ca' utility to support V2 CRL entry extensions. Currently CRL reason, invalidity date and hold instruction are supported. Add new CRL extensions to V3 code and some new objects. [Steve Henson] *) New function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding() this is used to disable standard block padding (aka PKCS#5 padding) in the EVP API, which was previously mandatory. This means that the data is not padded in any way and so the total length much be a multiple of the block size, otherwise an error occurs. [Steve Henson] *) Initial (incomplete) OCSP SSL support. [Steve Henson] *) New function OCSP_parse_url(). This splits up a URL into its host, port and path components: primarily to parse OCSP URLs. New -url option to ocsp utility. [Steve Henson] *) New nonce behavior. The return value of OCSP_check_nonce() now reflects the various checks performed. Applications can decide whether to tolerate certain situations such as an absent nonce in a response when one was present in a request: the ocsp application just prints out a warning. New function OCSP_add1_basic_nonce() this is to allow responders to include a nonce in a response even if the request is nonce-less. [Steve Henson] *) Disable stdin buffering in load_cert (apps/apps.c) so that no certs are skipped when using openssl x509 multiple times on a single input file, e.g. "(openssl x509 -out cert1; openssl x509 -out cert2) ] *) New OCSP verify flag OCSP_TRUSTOTHER. When set the "other" certificates passed by the function are trusted implicitly. If any of them signed the response then it is assumed to be valid and is not verified. [Steve Henson] *) In PKCS7_set_type() initialise content_type in PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT to data. This was previously part of the PKCS7 ASN1 code. This was causing problems with OpenSSL created PKCS#12 and PKCS#7 structures. [Steve Henson, reported by Kenneth R. Robinette ] *) Add CRYPTO_push_info() and CRYPTO_pop_info() calls to new ASN1 routines: without these tracing memory leaks is very painful. Fix leaks in PKCS12 and PKCS7 routines. [Steve Henson] *) Make X509_time_adj() cope with the new behaviour of ASN1_TIME_new(). Previously it initialised the 'type' argument to V_ASN1_UTCTIME which effectively meant GeneralizedTime would never be used. Now it is initialised to -1 but X509_time_adj() now has to check the value and use ASN1_TIME_set() if the value is not V_ASN1_UTCTIME or V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, without this it always uses GeneralizedTime. [Steve Henson, reported by Kenneth R. Robinette ] *) Fixes to BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER when bn is zero. This would previously result in a zero length in the ASN1_INTEGER structure which was not consistent with the structure when d2i_ASN1_INTEGER() was used and would cause ASN1_INTEGER_cmp() to fail. Enhance s2i_ASN1_INTEGER() to cope with hex and negative integers. Fix bug in i2a_ASN1_INTEGER() where it did not print out a minus for negative ASN1_INTEGER. [Steve Henson] *) Add summary printout to ocsp utility. The various functions which convert status values to strings have been renamed to: OCSP_response_status_str(), OCSP_cert_status_str() and OCSP_crl_reason_str() and are no longer static. New options to verify nonce values and to disable verification. OCSP response printout format cleaned up. [Steve Henson] *) Add additional OCSP certificate checks. These are those specified in RFC2560. This consists of two separate checks: the CA of the certificate being checked must either be the OCSP signer certificate or the issuer of the OCSP signer certificate. In the latter case the OCSP signer certificate must contain the OCSP signing extended key usage. This check is performed by attempting to match the OCSP signer or the OCSP signer CA to the issuerNameHash and issuerKeyHash in the OCSP_CERTID structures of the response. [Steve Henson] *) Initial OCSP certificate verification added to OCSP_basic_verify() and related routines. This uses the standard OpenSSL certificate verify routines to perform initial checks (just CA validity) and to obtain the certificate chain. Then additional checks will be performed on the chain. Currently the root CA is checked to see if it is explicitly trusted for OCSP signing. This is used to set a root CA as a global signing root: that is any certificate that chains to that CA is an acceptable OCSP signing certificate. [Steve Henson] *) New '-extfile ...' option to 'openssl ca' for reading X.509v3 extensions from a separate configuration file. As when reading extensions from the main configuration file, the '-extensions ...' option may be used for specifying the section to use. [Massimiliano Pala ] *) New OCSP utility. Allows OCSP requests to be generated or read. The request can be sent to a responder and the output parsed, outputted or printed in text form. Not complete yet: still needs to check the OCSP response validity. [Steve Henson] *) New subcommands for 'openssl ca': 'openssl ca -status ' prints the status of the cert with the given serial number (according to the index file). 'openssl ca -updatedb' updates the expiry status of certificates in the index file. [Massimiliano Pala ] *) New '-newreq-nodes' command option to CA.pl. This is like '-newreq', but calls 'openssl req' with the '-nodes' option so that the resulting key is not encrypted. [Damien Miller ] *) New configuration for the GNU Hurd. [Jonathan Bartlett via Richard Levitte] *) Initial code to implement OCSP basic response verify. This is currently incomplete. Currently just finds the signer's certificate and verifies the signature on the response. [Steve Henson] *) New SSLeay_version code SSLEAY_DIR to determine the compiled-in value of OPENSSLDIR. This is available via the new '-d' option to 'openssl version', and is also included in 'openssl version -a'. [Bodo Moeller] *) Allowing defining memory allocation callbacks that will be given file name and line number information in additional arguments (a const char* and an int). The basic functionality remains, as well as the original possibility to just replace malloc(), realloc() and free() by functions that do not know about these additional arguments. To register and find out the current settings for extended allocation functions, the following functions are provided: CRYPTO_set_mem_ex_functions CRYPTO_set_locked_mem_ex_functions CRYPTO_get_mem_ex_functions CRYPTO_get_locked_mem_ex_functions These work the same way as CRYPTO_set_mem_functions and friends. CRYPTO_get_[locked_]mem_functions now writes 0 where such an extended allocation function is enabled. Similarly, CRYPTO_get_[locked_]mem_ex_functions writes 0 where a conventional allocation function is enabled. [Richard Levitte, Bodo Moeller] *) Finish off removing the remaining LHASH function pointer casts. There should no longer be any prototype-casting required when using the LHASH abstraction, and any casts that remain are "bugs". See the callback types and macros at the head of lhash.h for details (and "OBJ_cleanup" in crypto/objects/obj_dat.c as an example). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add automatic query of EGD sockets in RAND_poll() for the unix variant. If /dev/[u]random devices are not available or do not return enough entropy, EGD style sockets (served by EGD or PRNGD) will automatically be queried. The locations /var/run/egd-pool, /dev/egd-pool, /etc/egd-pool, and /etc/entropy will be queried once each in this sequence, querying stops when enough entropy was collected without querying more sockets. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Change the Unix RAND_poll() variant to be able to poll several random devices, as specified by DEVRANDOM, until a sufficient amount of data has been collected. We spend at most 10 ms on each file (select timeout) and read in non-blocking mode. DEVRANDOM now defaults to the list "/dev/urandom", "/dev/random", "/dev/srandom" (previously it was just the string "/dev/urandom"), so on typical platforms the 10 ms delay will never occur. Also separate out the Unix variant to its own file, rand_unix.c. For VMS, there's a currently-empty rand_vms.c. [Richard Levitte] *) Move OCSP client related routines to ocsp_cl.c. These provide utility functions which an application needing to issue a request to an OCSP responder and analyse the response will typically need: as opposed to those which an OCSP responder itself would need which will be added later. OCSP_request_sign() signs an OCSP request with an API similar to PKCS7_sign(). OCSP_response_status() returns status of OCSP response. OCSP_response_get1_basic() extracts basic response from response. OCSP_resp_find_status(): finds and extracts status information from an OCSP_CERTID structure (which will be created when the request structure is built). These are built from lower level functions which work on OCSP_SINGLERESP structures but won't normally be used unless the application wishes to examine extensions in the OCSP response for example. Replace nonce routines with a pair of functions. OCSP_request_add1_nonce() adds a nonce value and optionally generates a random value. OCSP_check_nonce() checks the validity of the nonce in an OCSP response. [Steve Henson] *) Change function OCSP_request_add() to OCSP_request_add0_id(). This doesn't copy the supplied OCSP_CERTID and avoids the need to free up the newly created id. Change return type to OCSP_ONEREQ to return the internal OCSP_ONEREQ structure. This can then be used to add extensions to the request. Deleted OCSP_request_new(), since most of its functionality is now in OCSP_REQUEST_new() (and the case insensitive name clash) apart from the ability to set the request name which will be added elsewhere. [Steve Henson] *) Update OCSP API. Remove obsolete extensions argument from various functions. Extensions are now handled using the new OCSP extension code. New simple OCSP HTTP function which can be used to send requests and parse the response. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the PKCS#7 (S/MIME) code to work with new ASN1. Two new ASN1_ITEM structures help with sign and verify. PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN uses the special reorder version of SET OF to sort the attributes and reorder them to match the encoded order. This resolves a long standing problem: a verify on a PKCS7 structure just after signing it used to fail because the attribute order did not match the encoded order. PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY does not reorder the attributes: it uses the received order. This is necessary to tolerate some broken software that does not order SET OF. This is handled by encoding as a SEQUENCE OF but using implicit tagging (with UNIVERSAL class) to produce the required SET OF. [Steve Henson] *) Have mk1mf.pl generate the macros OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO and OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL and use them appropriately in the header files to get correct declarations of the ASN.1 item variables. [Richard Levitte] *) Rewrite of PKCS#12 code to use new ASN1 functionality. Replace many PKCS#12 macros with real functions. Fix two unrelated ASN1 bugs: asn1_check_tlen() would sometimes attempt to use 'ctx' when it was NULL and ASN1_TYPE was not dereferenced properly in asn1_ex_c2i(). New ASN1 macro: DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM() which just declares the relevant ASN1_ITEM and no wrapper functions. [Steve Henson] *) New functions or ASN1_item_d2i_fp() and ASN1_item_d2i_bio(). These replace the old function pointer based I/O routines. Change most of the *_d2i_bio() and *_d2i_fp() functions to use these. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance mkdef.pl to be more accepting about spacing in C preprocessor lines, recognize more "algorithms" that can be deselected, and make it complain about algorithm deselection that isn't recognised. [Richard Levitte] *) New ASN1 functions to handle dup, sign, verify, digest, pack and unpack operations in terms of ASN1_ITEM. Modify existing wrappers to use new functions. Add NO_ASN1_OLD which can be set to remove some old style ASN1 functions: this can be used to determine if old code will still work when these eventually go away. [Steve Henson] *) New extension functions for OCSP structures, these follow the same conventions as certificates and CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509V3_add1_i2d(). This automatically encodes and adds an extension. Its behaviour can be customised with various flags to append, replace or delete. Various wrappers added for certificates and CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) Fix to avoid calling the underlying ASN1 print routine when an extension cannot be parsed. Correct a typo in the OCSP_SERVICELOC extension. Tidy up print OCSP format. [Steve Henson] *) Make mkdef.pl parse some of the ASN1 macros and add appropriate entries for variables. [Steve Henson] *) Add functionality to apps/openssl.c for detecting locking problems: As the program is single-threaded, all we have to do is register a locking callback using an array for storing which locks are currently held by the program. [Bodo Moeller] *) Use a lock around the call to CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index() in SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_idx(), which is used in ssl_verify_cert_chain() and thus can be called at any time during TLS/SSL handshakes so that thread-safety is essential. Unfortunately, the ex_data design is not at all suited for multi-threaded use, so it probably should be abolished. [Bodo Moeller] *) Added Broadcom "ubsec" ENGINE to OpenSSL. [Broadcom, tweaked and integrated by Geoff Thorpe] *) Move common extension printing code to new function X509V3_print_extensions(). Reorganise OCSP print routines and implement some needed OCSP ASN1 functions. Add OCSP extensions. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509_signature_print() to remove duplication in some print routines. [Steve Henson] *) Add a special meaning when SET OF and SEQUENCE OF flags are both set (this was treated exactly the same as SET OF previously). This is used to reorder the STACK representing the structure to match the encoding. This will be used to get round a problem where a PKCS7 structure which was signed could not be verified because the STACK order did not reflect the encoded order. [Steve Henson] *) Reimplement the OCSP ASN1 module using the new code. [Steve Henson] *) Update the X509V3 code to permit the use of an ASN1_ITEM structure for its ASN1 operations. The old style function pointers still exist for now but they will eventually go away. [Steve Henson] *) Merge in replacement ASN1 code from the ASN1 branch. This almost completely replaces the old ASN1 functionality with a table driven encoder and decoder which interprets an ASN1_ITEM structure describing the ASN1 module. Compatibility with the existing ASN1 API (i2d,d2i) is largely maintained. Almost all of the old asn1_mac.h macro based ASN1 has also been converted to the new form. [Steve Henson] *) Change BN_mod_exp_recp so that negative moduli are tolerated (the sign is ignored). Similarly, ignore the sign in BN_MONT_CTX_set so that BN_mod_exp_mont and BN_mod_exp_mont_word work for negative moduli. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix BN_uadd and BN_usub: Always return non-negative results instead of not touching the result's sign bit. [Bodo Moeller] *) BN_div bugfix: If the result is 0, the sign (res->neg) must not be set. [Bodo Moeller] *) Changed the LHASH code to use prototypes for callbacks, and created macros to declare and implement thin (optionally static) functions that provide type-safety and avoid function pointer casting for the type-specific callbacks. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Added Kerberos Cipher Suites to be used with TLS, as written in RFC 2712. [Veers Staats , Jeffrey Altman , via Richard Levitte] *) Reformat the FAQ so the different questions and answers can be divided in sections depending on the subject. [Richard Levitte] *) Have the zlib compression code load ZLIB.DLL dynamically under Windows. [Richard Levitte] *) New function BN_mod_sqrt for computing square roots modulo a prime (using the probabilistic Tonelli-Shanks algorithm unless p == 3 (mod 4) or p == 5 (mod 8), which are cases that can be handled deterministically). [Lenka Fibikova , Bodo Moeller] *) Make BN_mod_inverse faster by explicitly handling small quotients in the Euclid loop. (Speed gain about 20% for small moduli [256 or 512 bits], about 30% for larger ones [1024 or 2048 bits].) [Bodo Moeller] *) New function BN_kronecker. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix BN_gcd so that it works on negative inputs; the result is positive unless both parameters are zero. Previously something reasonably close to an infinite loop was possible because numbers could be growing instead of shrinking in the implementation of Euclid's algorithm. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix BN_is_word() and BN_is_one() macros to take into account the sign of the number in question. Fix BN_is_word(a,w) to work correctly for w == 0. The old BN_is_word(a,w) macro is now called BN_abs_is_word(a,w) because its test if the absolute value of 'a' equals 'w'. Note that BN_abs_is_word does *not* handle w == 0 reliably; it exists mostly for use in the implementations of BN_is_zero(), BN_is_one(), and BN_is_word(). [Bodo Moeller] *) New function BN_swap. [Bodo Moeller] *) Use BN_nnmod instead of BN_mod in crypto/bn/bn_exp.c so that the exponentiation functions are more likely to produce reasonable results on negative inputs. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change BN_mod_mul so that the result is always non-negative. Previously, it could be negative if one of the factors was negative; I don't think anyone really wanted that behaviour. [Bodo Moeller] *) Move BN_mod_... functions into new file crypto/bn/bn_mod.c (except for exponentiation, which stays in crypto/bn/bn_exp.c, and BN_mod_mul_reciprocal, which stays in crypto/bn/bn_recp.c) and add new functions: BN_nnmod BN_mod_sqr BN_mod_add BN_mod_add_quick BN_mod_sub BN_mod_sub_quick BN_mod_lshift1 BN_mod_lshift1_quick BN_mod_lshift BN_mod_lshift_quick These functions always generate non-negative results. BN_nnmod otherwise is like BN_mod (if BN_mod computes a remainder r such that |m| < r < 0, BN_nnmod will output rem + |m| instead). BN_mod_XXX_quick(r, a, [b,] m) generates the same result as BN_mod_XXX(r, a, [b,] m, ctx), but requires that a [and b] be reduced modulo m. [Lenka Fibikova , Bodo Moeller] #if 0 The following entry accidentally appeared in the CHANGES file distributed with OpenSSL 0.9.7. The modifications described in it do *not* apply to OpenSSL 0.9.7. *) Remove a few calls to bn_wexpand() in BN_sqr() (the one in there was actually never needed) and in BN_mul(). The removal in BN_mul() required a small change in bn_mul_part_recursive() and the addition of the functions bn_cmp_part_words(), bn_sub_part_words() and bn_add_part_words(), which do the same thing as bn_cmp_words(), bn_sub_words() and bn_add_words() except they take arrays with differing sizes. [Richard Levitte] #endif *) In 'openssl passwd', verify passwords read from the terminal unless the '-salt' option is used (which usually means that verification would just waste user's time since the resulting hash is going to be compared with some given password hash) or the new '-noverify' option is used. This is an incompatible change, but it does not affect non-interactive use of 'openssl passwd' (passwords on the command line, '-stdin' option, '-in ...' option) and thus should not cause any problems. [Bodo Moeller] *) Remove all references to RSAref, since there's no more need for it. [Richard Levitte] *) Make DSO load along a path given through an environment variable (SHLIB_PATH) with shl_load(). [Richard Levitte] *) Constify the ENGINE code as a result of BIGNUM constification. Also constify the RSA code and most things related to it. In a few places, most notable in the depth of the ASN.1 code, ugly casts back to non-const were required (to be solved at a later time) [Richard Levitte] *) Make it so the openssl application has all engines loaded by default. [Richard Levitte] *) Constify the BIGNUM routines a little more. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the following functions: ENGINE_load_cswift() ENGINE_load_chil() ENGINE_load_atalla() ENGINE_load_nuron() ENGINE_load_builtin_engines() That way, an application can itself choose if external engines that are built-in in OpenSSL shall ever be used or not. The benefit is that applications won't have to be linked with libdl or other dso libraries unless it's really needed. Changed 'openssl engine' to load all engines on demand. Changed the engine header files to avoid the duplication of some declarations (they differed!). [Richard Levitte] *) 'openssl engine' can now list capabilities. [Richard Levitte] *) Better error reporting in 'openssl engine'. [Richard Levitte] *) Never call load_dh_param(NULL) in s_server. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add engine application. It can currently list engines by name and identity, and test if they are actually available. [Richard Levitte] *) Improve RPM specification file by forcing symbolic linking and making sure the installed documentation is also owned by root.root. [Damien Miller ] *) Give the OpenSSL applications more possibilities to make use of keys (public as well as private) handled by engines. [Richard Levitte] *) Add OCSP code that comes from CertCo. [Richard Levitte] *) Add VMS support for the Rijndael code. [Richard Levitte] *) Added untested support for Nuron crypto accelerator. [Ben Laurie] *) Add support for external cryptographic devices. This code was previously distributed separately as the "engine" branch. [Geoff Thorpe, Richard Levitte] *) Rework the filename-translation in the DSO code. It is now possible to have far greater control over how a "name" is turned into a filename depending on the operating environment and any oddities about the different shared library filenames on each system. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Support threads on FreeBSD-elf in Configure. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix for SHA1 assembly problem with MASM: it produces warnings about corrupt line number information when assembling with debugging information. This is caused by the overlapping of two sections. [Bernd Matthes , Steve Henson] *) NCONF changes. NCONF_get_number() has no error checking at all. As a replacement, NCONF_get_number_e() is defined (_e for "error checking") and is promoted strongly. The old NCONF_get_number is kept around for binary backward compatibility. Make it possible for methods to load from something other than a BIO, by providing a function pointer that is given a name instead of a BIO. For example, this could be used to load configuration data from an LDAP server. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix for non blocking accept BIOs. Added new I/O special reason BIO_RR_ACCEPT to cover this case. Previously use of accept BIOs with non blocking I/O was not possible because no retry code was implemented. Also added new SSL code SSL_WANT_ACCEPT to cover this case. [Steve Henson] *) Added the beginnings of Rijndael support. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix for bug in DirectoryString mask setting. Add support for X509_NAME_print_ex() in 'req' and X509_print_ex() function to allow certificate printing to more controllable, additional 'certopt' option to 'x509' to allow new printing options to be set. [Steve Henson] *) Clean old EAY MD5 hack from e_os.h. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.6l and 0.9.6m [17 Mar 2004] *) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079) [Joe Orton, Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6k and 0.9.6l [04 Nov 2003] *) Fix additional bug revealed by the NISCC test suite: Stop bug triggering large recursion when presented with certain ASN.1 tags (CVE-2003-0851) [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6j and 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003] *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite: Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544). If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check certificate signature with the NULL public key. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_accept() (ssl/s3_srvr.c) only accept a client certificate if the server requested one: as stated in TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0 specifications. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_get_client_hello() (ssl/s3_srvr.c), tolerate additional extra data after the compression methods not only for TLS 1.0 but also for SSL 3.0 (as required by the specification). [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Matthias Loepfe] *) Change X509_certificate_type() to mark the key as exported/exportable when it's 512 *bits* long, not 512 bytes. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.6i and 0.9.6j [10 Apr 2003] *) Countermeasure against the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 padding: treat a protocol version number mismatch like a decryption error in ssl3_get_client_key_exchange (ssl/s3_srvr.c). [Bodo Moeller] *) Turn on RSA blinding by default in the default implementation to avoid a timing attack. Applications that don't want it can call RSA_blinding_off() or use the new flag RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING. They would be ill-advised to do so in most cases. [Ben Laurie, Steve Henson, Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller] *) Change RSA blinding code so that it works when the PRNG is not seeded (in this case, the secret RSA exponent is abused as an unpredictable seed -- if it is not unpredictable, there is no point in blinding anyway). Make RSA blinding thread-safe by remembering the creator's thread ID in rsa->blinding and having all other threads use local one-time blinding factors (this requires more computation than sharing rsa->blinding, but avoids excessive locking; and if an RSA object is not shared between threads, blinding will still be very fast). [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6h and 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003] *) In ssl3_get_record (ssl/s3_pkt.c), minimize information leaked via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrect block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL), Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and Martin Vuagnoux (EPFL, Ilion)] Changes between 0.9.6g and 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002] *) New function OPENSSL_cleanse(), which is used to cleanse a section of memory from its contents. This is done with a counter that will place alternating values in each byte. This can be used to solve two issues: 1) the removal of calls to memset() by highly optimizing compilers, and 2) cleansing with other values than 0, since those can be read through on certain media, for example a swap space on disk. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Bugfix: client side session caching did not work with external caching, because the session->cipher setting was not restored when reloading from the external cache. This problem was masked, when SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) was set. (Found by Steve Haslam .) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix client_certificate (ssl/s2_clnt.c): The permissible total length of the REQUEST-CERTIFICATE message is 18 .. 34, not 17 .. 33. [Zeev Lieber ] *) Undo an undocumented change introduced in 0.9.6e which caused repeated calls to OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers() and OpenSSL_add_all_digests() to be ignored, even after calling EVP_cleanup(). [Richard Levitte] *) Change the default configuration reader to deal with last line not being properly terminated. [Richard Levitte] *) Change X509_NAME_cmp() so it applies the special rules on handling DN values that are of type PrintableString, as well as RDNs of type emailAddress where the value has the type ia5String. [stefank@valicert.com via Richard Levitte] *) Add a SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE flag to take over half the job SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP was inconsistently doing, define a new flag (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL) to be the bitwise-OR of the two for use by the majority of applications wanting this behaviour, and update the docs. The documented behaviour and actual behaviour were inconsistent and had been changing anyway, so this is more a bug-fix than a behavioural change. [Geoff Thorpe, diagnosed by Nadav Har'El] *) Don't impose a 16-byte length minimum on session IDs in ssl/s3_clnt.c (the SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 specifications allow any length up to 32 bytes). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix initialization code race conditions in SSLv23_method(), SSLv23_client_method(), SSLv23_server_method(), SSLv2_method(), SSLv2_client_method(), SSLv2_server_method(), SSLv3_method(), SSLv3_client_method(), SSLv3_server_method(), TLSv1_method(), TLSv1_client_method(), TLSv1_server_method(), ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(), ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(). [Patrick McCormick , Bodo Moeller] *) Reorder cleanup sequence in SSL_CTX_free(): only remove the ex_data after the cached sessions are flushed, as the remove_cb() might use ex_data contents. Bug found by Sam Varshavchik (see [openssl.org #212]). [Geoff Thorpe, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix typo in OBJ_txt2obj which incorrectly passed the content length, instead of the encoding length to d2i_ASN1_OBJECT. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6f and 0.9.6g [9 Aug 2002] *) [In 0.9.6g-engine release:] Fix crypto/engine/vendor_defns/cswift.h for WIN32 (use '_stdcall'). [Lynn Gazis ] Changes between 0.9.6e and 0.9.6f [8 Aug 2002] *) Fix ASN1 checks. Check for overflow by comparing with LONG_MAX and get fix the header length calculation. [Florian Weimer , Alon Kantor (and others), Steve Henson] *) Use proper error handling instead of 'assertions' in buffer overflow checks added in 0.9.6e. This prevents DoS (the assertions could call abort()). [Arne Ansper , Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002] *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear negative or the content length exceeds the length of the supplied buffer. [Steve Henson, Adi Stav , James Yonan ] *) Fix cipher selection routines: ciphers without encryption had no flags for the cipher strength set and where therefore not handled correctly by the selection routines (PR #130). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix EVP_dsa_sha macro. [Nils Larsch] *) New option SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS for disabling the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability countermeasure that was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6d. As the countermeasure turned out to be incompatible with some broken SSL implementations, the new option is part of SSL_OP_ALL. SSL_OP_ALL is usually employed when compatibility with weird SSL implementations is desired (e.g. '-bugs' option to 's_client' and 's_server'), so the new option is automatically set in many applications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Changes in security patch: Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F30602-01-2-0537. *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear negative or the content length exceeds the length of the supplied buffer. (CVE-2002-0659) [Steve Henson, Adi Stav , James Yonan ] *) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to happen in practice. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were too small for 64 bit platforms. (CVE-2002-0655) [Matthew Byng-Maddick and Ben Laurie (CHATS)> *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CVE-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized client master key. (CVE-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002] *) Fix crypto/asn1/a_sign.c so that 'parameters' is omitted (not encoded as NULL) with id-dsa-with-sha1. [Nils Larsch ; problem pointed out by Bodo Moeller] *) Check various X509_...() return values in apps/req.c. [Nils Larsch ] *) Fix BASE64 decode (EVP_DecodeUpdate) for data with CR/LF ended lines: an end-of-file condition would erroneously be flagged, when the CRLF was just at the end of a processed block. The bug was discovered when processing data through a buffering memory BIO handing the data to a BASE64-decoding BIO. Bug fund and patch submitted by Pavel Tsekov and Nedelcho Stanev. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Implement a countermeasure against a vulnerability recently found in CBC ciphersuites in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0: Send an empty fragment before application data chunks to avoid the use of known IVs with data potentially chosen by the attacker. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix length checks in ssl3_get_client_hello(). [Bodo Moeller] *) TLS/SSL library bugfix: use s->s3->in_read_app_data differently to prevent ssl3_read_internal() from incorrectly assuming that ssl3_read_bytes() found application data while handshake processing was enabled when in fact s->s3->in_read_app_data was merely automatically cleared during the initial handshake. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Arne Ansper ] *) Fix object definitions for Private and Enterprise: they were not recognized in their shortname (=lowercase) representation. Extend obj_dat.pl to issue an error when using undefined keywords instead of silently ignoring the problem (Svenning Sorensen ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix DH_generate_parameters() so that it works for 'non-standard' generators, i.e. generators other than 2 and 5. (Previously, the code did not properly initialise the 'add' and 'rem' values to BN_generate_prime().) In the new general case, we do not insist that 'generator' is actually a primitive root: This requirement is rather pointless; a generator of the order-q subgroup is just as good, if not better. [Bodo Moeller] *) Map new X509 verification errors to alerts. Discovered and submitted by Tom Wu . [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix ssl3_pending() (ssl/s3_lib.c) to prevent SSL_pending() from returning non-zero before the data has been completely received when using non-blocking I/O. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by John Hughes] *) Some of the ciphers missed the strength entry (SSL_LOW etc). [Ben Laurie, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix bug in SSL_clear(): bad sessions were not removed (found by Yoram Zahavi ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add information about CygWin 1.3 and on, and preserve proper configuration for the versions before that. [Corinna Vinschen and Richard Levitte] *) Make removal from session cache (SSL_CTX_remove_session()) more robust: check whether we deal with a copy of a session and do not delete from the cache in this case. Problem reported by "Izhar Shoshani Levi" . [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Do not store session data into the internal session cache, if it is never intended to be looked up (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP flag is set). Proposed by Aslam . [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Have ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit() really clear a bit when the requested value is 0. [Richard Levitte] *) [In 0.9.6d-engine release:] Fix a crashbug and a logic bug in hwcrhk_load_pubkey(). [Toomas Kiisk via Richard Levitte] *) Add the configuration target linux-s390x. [Neale Ferguson via Richard Levitte] *) The earlier bugfix for the SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C case of ssl3_accept (ssl/s3_srvr.c) incorrectly used a local flag variable as an indication that a ClientHello message has been received. As the flag value will be lost between multiple invocations of ssl3_accept when using non-blocking I/O, the function may not be aware that a handshake has actually taken place, thus preventing a new session from being added to the session cache. To avoid this problem, we now set s->new_session to 2 instead of using a local variable. [Lutz Jaenicke, Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix: Return -1 from ssl3_get_server_done (ssl3/s3_clnt.c) if the SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH error is detected. [Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller] *) New 'shared_ldflag' column in Configure platform table. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix EVP_CIPHER_mode macro. ["Dan S. Camper" ] *) Fix ssl3_read_bytes (ssl/s3_pkt.c): To ignore messages of unknown type, we must throw them away by setting rr->length to 0. [D P Chang ] Changes between 0.9.6b and 0.9.6c [21 dec 2001] *) Fix BN_rand_range bug pointed out by Dominikus Scherkl . (The previous implementation worked incorrectly for those cases where range = 10..._2 and 3*range is two bits longer than range.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Only add signing time to PKCS7 structures if it is not already present. [Steve Henson] *) Fix crypto/objects/objects.h: "ld-ce" should be "id-ce", OBJ_ld_ce should be OBJ_id_ce. Also some ip-pda OIDs in crypto/objects/objects.txt were incorrect (cf. RFC 3039). [Matt Cooper, Frederic Giudicelli, Bodo Moeller] *) Release CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK when CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid() returns early because it has nothing to do. [Andy Schneider ] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Fix mutex callback return values in crypto/engine/hw_ncipher.c. [Andy Schneider ] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Add support for Cryptographic Appliance's keyserver technology. (Use engine 'keyclient') [Cryptographic Appliances and Geoff Thorpe] *) Add a configuration entry for OS/390 Unix. The C compiler 'c89' is called via tools/c89.sh because arguments have to be rearranged (all '-L' options must appear before the first object modules). [Richard Shapiro ] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Add support for Broadcom crypto accelerator cards, backported from 0.9.7. [Broadcom, Nalin Dahyabhai , Mark Cox] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Add support for SureWare crypto accelerator cards from Baltimore Technologies. (Use engine 'sureware') [Baltimore Technologies and Mark Cox] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Add support for crypto accelerator cards from Accelerated Encryption Processing, www.aep.ie. (Use engine 'aep') [AEP Inc. and Mark Cox] *) Add a configuration entry for gcc on UnixWare. [Gary Benson ] *) Change ssl/s2_clnt.c and ssl/s2_srvr.c so that received handshake messages are stored in a single piece (fixed-length part and variable-length part combined) and fix various bugs found on the way. [Bodo Moeller] *) Disable caching in BIO_gethostbyname(), directly use gethostbyname() instead. BIO_gethostbyname() does not know what timeouts are appropriate, so entries would stay in cache even when they have become invalid. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Rich Salz *) Change ssl23_get_client_hello (ssl/s23_srvr.c) behaviour when faced with a pathologically small ClientHello fragment that does not contain client_version: Instead of aborting with an error, simply choose the highest available protocol version (i.e., TLS 1.0 unless it is disabled). In practice, ClientHello messages are never sent like this, but this change gives us strictly correct behaviour at least for TLS. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix SSL handshake functions and SSL_clear() such that SSL_clear() never resets s->method to s->ctx->method when called from within one of the SSL handshake functions. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Niko Baric] *) In ssl3_get_client_hello (ssl/s3_srvr.c), generate a fatal alert (sent using the client's version number) if client_version is smaller than the protocol version in use. Also change ssl23_get_client_hello (ssl/s23_srvr.c) to select TLS 1.0 if the client demanded SSL 3.0 but only TLS 1.0 is enabled; then the client will at least see that alert. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) to handle message fragmentation correctly. [Bodo Moeller] *) Avoid infinite loop in ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) if a client receives HelloRequest while in a handshake. [Bodo Moeller; bug noticed by Andy Schneider ] *) Bugfix in ssl3_accept (ssl/s3_srvr.c): Case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C should end in 'break', not 'goto end' which circumvents various cleanups done in state SSL_ST_OK. But session related stuff must be disabled for SSL_ST_OK in the case that we just sent a HelloRequest. Also avoid some overhead by not calling ssl_init_wbio_buffer() before just sending a HelloRequest. [Bodo Moeller, Eric Rescorla ] *) Fix ssl/s3_enc.c, ssl/t1_enc.c and ssl/s3_pkt.c so that we don't reveal whether illegal block cipher padding was found or a MAC verification error occurred. (Neither SSLerr() codes nor alerts are directly visible to potential attackers, but the information may leak via logfiles.) Similar changes are not required for the SSL 2.0 implementation because the number of padding bytes is sent in clear for SSL 2.0, and the extra bytes are just ignored. However ssl/s2_pkt.c failed to verify that the purported number of padding bytes is in the legal range. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add OpenUNIX-8 support including shared libraries (Boyd Lynn Gerber ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Improve RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP() check again to avoid 'wristwatch attack' using huge encoding parameters (cf. James H. Manger's CRYPTO 2001 paper). Note that the RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING case of RSA_private_decrypt() does not use encoding parameters and hence was not vulnerable. [Bodo Moeller] *) BN_sqr() bug fix. [Ulf Möller, reported by Jim Ellis ] *) Rabin-Miller test analyses assume uniformly distributed witnesses, so use BN_pseudo_rand_range() instead of using BN_pseudo_rand() followed by modular reduction. [Bodo Moeller; pointed out by Adam Young ] *) Add BN_pseudo_rand_range() with obvious functionality: BN_rand_range() equivalent based on BN_pseudo_rand() instead of BN_rand(). [Bodo Moeller] *) s3_srvr.c: allow sending of large client certificate lists (> 16 kB). This function was broken, as the check for a new client hello message to handle SGC did not allow these large messages. (Tracked down by "Douglas E. Engert" .) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add alert descriptions for TLSv1 to SSL_alert_desc_string[_long](). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix buggy behaviour of BIO_get_num_renegotiates() and BIO_ctrl() for BIO_C_GET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE ("Stephen Hinton" ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Rework the configuration and shared library support for Tru64 Unix. The configuration part makes use of modern compiler features and still retains old compiler behavior for those that run older versions of the OS. The shared library support part includes a variant that uses the RPATH feature, and is available through the special configuration target "alpha-cc-rpath", which will never be selected automatically. [Tim Mooney via Richard Levitte] *) In ssl3_get_key_exchange (ssl/s3_clnt.c), call ssl3_get_message() with the same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request(). Otherwise, if no ServerKeyExchange message occurs, CertificateRequest messages might inadvertently be reject as too long. [Petr Lampa ] *) Enhanced support for IA-64 Unix platforms (well, Linux and HP-UX). [Andy Polyakov] *) Modified SSL library such that the verify_callback that has been set specifically for an SSL object with SSL_set_verify() is actually being used. Before the change, a verify_callback set with this function was ignored and the verify_callback() set in the SSL_CTX at the time of the call was used. New function X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb() introduced to allow the necessary settings. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Initialize static variable in crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c and crypto/dh/dh_lib.c explicitly to NULL, as at least on Solaris 8 this seems not always to be done automatically (in contradiction to the requirements of the C standard). This made problems when used from OpenSSH. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) In OpenSSL 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b, crypto/dh/dh_key.c ignored dh->length and always used BN_rand_range(priv_key, dh->p). BN_rand_range() is not necessary for Diffie-Hellman, and this specific range makes Diffie-Hellman unnecessarily inefficient if dh->length (recommended exponent length) is much smaller than the length of dh->p. We could use BN_rand_range() if the order of the subgroup was stored in the DH structure, but we only have dh->length. So switch back to BN_rand(priv_key, l, ...) where 'l' is dh->length if this is defined, or BN_num_bits(dh->p)-1 otherwise. [Bodo Moeller] *) In RSA_eay_public_encrypt RSA_eay_private_decrypt RSA_eay_private_encrypt (signing) RSA_eay_public_decrypt (signature verification) (default implementations for RSA_public_encrypt, RSA_private_decrypt, RSA_private_encrypt, RSA_public_decrypt), always reject numbers >= n. [Bodo Moeller] *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, use a new short-time lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 to synchronize access to 'locking_thread'. This is necessary on systems where access to 'locking_thread' (an 'unsigned long' variable) is not atomic. [Bodo Moeller] *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, set 'locking_thread' to current thread's ID *before* setting the 'crypto_lock_rand' flag. The previous code had a race condition if 0 is a valid thread ID. [Travis Vitek ] *) Add support for shared libraries under Irix. [Albert Chin-A-Young ] *) Add configuration option to build on Linux on both big-endian and little-endian MIPS. [Ralf Baechle ] *) Add the possibility to create shared libraries on HP-UX. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001] *) Change ssleay_rand_bytes (crypto/rand/md_rand.c) to avoid a SSLeay/OpenSSL PRNG weakness pointed out by Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen : PRNG state recovery was possible based on the output of one PRNG request appropriately sized to gain knowledge on 'md' followed by enough consecutive 1-byte PRNG requests to traverse all of 'state'. 1. When updating 'md_local' (the current thread's copy of 'md') during PRNG output generation, hash all of the previous 'md_local' value, not just the half used for PRNG output. 2. Make the number of bytes from 'state' included into the hash independent from the number of PRNG bytes requested. The first measure alone would be sufficient to avoid Markku-Juhani's attack. (Actually it had never occurred to me that the half of 'md_local' used for chaining was the half from which PRNG output bytes were taken -- I had always assumed that the secret half would be used.) The second measure makes sure that additional data from 'state' is never mixed into 'md_local' in small portions; this heuristically further strengthens the PRNG. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix crypto/bn/asm/mips3.s. [Andy Polyakov] *) When only the key is given to "enc", the IV is undefined. Print out an error message in this case. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Handle special case when X509_NAME is empty in X509 printing routines. [Steve Henson] *) In dsa_do_verify (crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c), verify that r and s are positive and less than q. [Bodo Moeller] *) Don't change *pointer in CRYPTO_add_lock() is add_lock_callback is used: it isn't thread safe and the add_lock_callback should handle that itself. [Paul Rose ] *) Verify that incoming data obeys the block size in ssl3_enc (ssl/s3_enc.c) and tls1_enc (ssl/t1_enc.c). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix OAEP check. [Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller] *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5 when fixing the server behaviour for backwards-compatible 'client hello' messages. (Note that the attack is impractical against SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 anyway because length and version checking means that the probability of guessing a valid ciphertext is around 2^-40; see section 5 in Bleichenbacher's CRYPTO '98 paper.) Before 0.9.5, the countermeasure (hide the error by generating a random 'decryption result') did not work properly because ERR_clear_error() was missing, meaning that SSL_get_error() would detect the supposedly ignored error. Both problems are now fixed. [Bodo Moeller] *) In crypto/bio/bf_buff.c, increase DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE to 4096 (previously it was 1024). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for compatibility mode trust settings: ignore trust settings unless some valid trust or reject settings are present. [Steve Henson] *) Fix for blowfish EVP: its a variable length cipher. [Steve Henson] *) Fix various bugs related to DSA S/MIME verification. Handle missing parameters in DSA public key structures and return an error in the DSA routines if parameters are absent. [Steve Henson] *) In versions up to 0.9.6, RAND_file_name() resorted to file ".rnd" in the current directory if neither $RANDFILE nor $HOME was set. RAND_file_name() in 0.9.6a returned NULL in this case. This has caused some confusion to Windows users who haven't defined $HOME. Thus RAND_file_name() is changed again: e_os.h can define a DEFAULT_HOME, which will be used if $HOME is not set. For Windows, we use "C:"; on other platforms, we still require environment variables. *) Move 'if (!initialized) RAND_poll()' into regions protected by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND. This is not strictly necessary, but avoids having multiple threads call RAND_poll() concurrently. [Bodo Moeller] *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, replace 'add_do_not_lock' flag by a combination of a flag and a thread ID variable. Otherwise while one thread is in ssleay_rand_bytes (which sets the flag), *other* threads can enter ssleay_add_bytes without obeying the CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND lock (and may even illegally release the lock that they do not hold after the first thread unsets add_do_not_lock). [Bodo Moeller] *) Change bctest again: '-x' expressions are not available in all versions of 'test'. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001] *) Fix a couple of memory leaks in PKCS7_dataDecode() [Steve Henson, reported by Heyun Zheng ] *) Change Configure and Makefiles to provide EXE_EXT, which will contain the default extension for executables, if any. Also, make the perl scripts that use symlink() to test if it really exists and use "cp" if it doesn't. All this made OpenSSL compilable and installable in CygWin. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix for asn1_GetSequence() for indefinite length constructed data. If SEQUENCE is length is indefinite just set c->slen to the total amount of data available. [Steve Henson, reported by shige@FreeBSD.org] [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.] *) Change bctest to avoid here-documents inside command substitution (workaround for FreeBSD /bin/sh bug). For compatibility with Ultrix, avoid shell functions (introduced in the bctest version that searches along $PATH). [Bodo Moeller] *) Rename 'des_encrypt' to 'des_encrypt1'. This avoids the clashes with des_encrypt() defined on some operating systems, like Solaris and UnixWare. [Richard Levitte] *) Check the result of RSA-CRT (see D. Boneh, R. DeMillo, R. Lipton: On the Importance of Eliminating Errors in Cryptographic Computations, J. Cryptology 14 (2001) 2, 101-119, http://theory.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/faults.ps.gz). [Ulf Moeller] *) MIPS assembler BIGNUM division bug fix. [Andy Polyakov] *) Disabled incorrect Alpha assembler code. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix PKCS#7 decode routines so they correctly update the length after reading an EOC for the EXPLICIT tag. [Steve Henson] [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.] *) Fix bug in PKCS#12 key generation routines. This was triggered if a 3DES key was generated with a 0 initial byte. Include PKCS12_BROKEN_KEYGEN compilation option to retain the old (but broken) behaviour. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance bctest to search for a working bc along $PATH and print it when found. [Tim Rice via Richard Levitte] *) Fix memory leaks in err.c: free err_data string if necessary; don't write to the wrong index in ERR_set_error_data. [Bodo Moeller] *) Implement ssl23_peek (analogous to ssl23_read), which previously did not exist. [Bodo Moeller] *) Replace rdtsc with _emit statements for VC++ version 5. [Jeremy Cooper ] *) Make it possible to reuse SSLv2 sessions. [Richard Levitte] *) In copy_email() check for >= 0 as a return value for X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() since 0 is a valid index. [Steve Henson reported by Massimiliano Pala ] *) Avoid coredump with unsupported or invalid public keys by checking if X509_get_pubkey() fails in PKCS7_verify(). Fix memory leak when PKCS7_verify() fails with non detached data. [Steve Henson] *) Don't use getenv in library functions when run as setuid/setgid. New function OPENSSL_issetugid(). [Ulf Moeller] *) Avoid false positives in memory leak detection code (crypto/mem_dbg.c) due to incorrect handling of multi-threading: 1. Fix timing glitch in the MemCheck_off() portion of CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(). 2. Fix logical glitch in is_MemCheck_on() aka CRYPTO_is_mem_check_on(). 3. Count how many times MemCheck_off() has been called so that nested use can be treated correctly. This also avoids inband-signalling in the previous code (which relied on the assumption that thread ID 0 is impossible). [Bodo Moeller] *) Add "-rand" option also to s_client and s_server. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix CPU detection on Irix 6.x. [Kurt Hockenbury and "Bruce W. Forsberg" ] *) Fix X509_NAME bug which produced incorrect encoding if X509_NAME was empty. [Steve Henson] [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.] *) Use the cached encoding of an X509_NAME structure rather than copying it. This is apparently the reason for the libsafe "errors" but the code is actually correct. [Steve Henson] *) Add new function BN_rand_range(), and fix DSA_sign_setup() to prevent Bleichenbacher's DSA attack. Extend BN_[pseudo_]rand: As before, top=1 forces the highest two bits to be set and top=0 forces the highest bit to be set; top=-1 is new and leaves the highest bit random. [Ulf Moeller, Bodo Moeller] *) In the NCONF_...-based implementations for CONF_... queries (crypto/conf/conf_lib.c), if the input LHASH is NULL, avoid using a temporary CONF structure with the data component set to NULL (which gives segmentation faults in lh_retrieve). Instead, use NULL for the CONF pointer in CONF_get_string and CONF_get_number (which may use environment variables) and directly return NULL from CONF_get_section. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix potential buffer overrun for EBCDIC. [Ulf Moeller] *) Tolerate nonRepudiation as being valid for S/MIME signing and certSign keyUsage if basicConstraints absent for a CA. [Steve Henson] *) Make SMIME_write_PKCS7() write mail header values with a format that is more generally accepted (no spaces before the semicolon), since some programs can't parse those values properly otherwise. Also make sure BIO's that break lines after each write do not create invalid headers. [Richard Levitte] *) Make the CRL encoding routines work with empty SEQUENCE OF. The macros previously used would not encode an empty SEQUENCE OF and break the signature. [Steve Henson] [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.] *) Zero the premaster secret after deriving the master secret in DH ciphersuites. [Steve Henson] *) Add some EVP_add_digest_alias registrations (as found in OpenSSL_add_all_digests()) to SSL_library_init() aka OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms(). This provides improved compatibility with peers using X.509 certificates with unconventional AlgorithmIdentifier OIDs. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for Irix with NO_ASM. ["Bruce W. Forsberg" ] *) ./config script fixes. [Ulf Moeller, Richard Levitte] *) Fix 'openssl passwd -1'. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change PKCS12_key_gen_asc() so it can cope with non null terminated strings whose length is passed in the passlen parameter, for example from PEM callbacks. This was done by adding an extra length parameter to asc2uni(). [Steve Henson, reported by ] *) Fix C code generated by 'openssl dsaparam -C': If a BN_bin2bn call failed, free the DSA structure. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix to uni2asc() to cope with zero length Unicode strings. These are present in some PKCS#12 files. [Steve Henson] *) Increase s2->wbuf allocation by one byte in ssl2_new (ssl/s2_lib.c). Otherwise do_ssl_write (ssl/s2_pkt.c) will write beyond buffer limits when writing a 32767 byte record. [Bodo Moeller; problem reported by Eric Day ] *) In RSA_eay_public_{en,ed}crypt and RSA_eay_mod_exp (rsa_eay.c), obtain lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA before setting rsa->_method_mod_{n,p,q}. (RSA objects have a reference count access to which is protected by CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA [see rsa_lib.c, s3_srvr.c, ssl_cert.c, ssl_rsa.c], so they are meant to be shared between threads.) [Bodo Moeller, Geoff Thorpe; original patch submitted by "Reddie, Steven" ] *) Fix a deadlock in CRYPTO_mem_leaks(). [Bodo Moeller] *) Use better test patterns in bntest. [Ulf Möller] *) rand_win.c fix for Borland C. [Ulf Möller] *) BN_rshift bugfix for n == 0. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add a 'bctest' script that checks for some known 'bc' bugs so that 'make test' does not abort just because 'bc' is broken. [Bodo Moeller] *) Store verify_result within SSL_SESSION also for client side to avoid potential security hole. (Re-used sessions on the client side always resulted in verify_result==X509_V_OK, not using the original result of the server certificate verification.) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix ssl3_pending: If the record in s->s3->rrec is not of type SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, return 0. Similarly, change ssl2_pending to return 0 if SSL_in_init(s) is true. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix SSL_peek: Both ssl2_peek and ssl3_peek, which were totally broken in earlier releases, have been re-implemented by renaming the previous implementations of ssl2_read and ssl3_read to ssl2_read_internal and ssl3_read_internal, respectively, and adding 'peek' parameters to them. The new ssl[23]_{read,peek} functions are calls to ssl[23]_read_internal with the 'peek' flag set appropriately. A 'peek' parameter has also been added to ssl3_read_bytes, which does the actual work for ssl3_read_internal. [Bodo Moeller] *) Initialise "ex_data" member of RSA/DSA/DH structures prior to calling the method-specific "init()" handler. Also clean up ex_data after calling the method-specific "finish()" handler. Previously, this was happening the other way round. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Increase BN_CTX_NUM (the number of BIGNUMs in a BN_CTX) to 16. The previous value, 12, was not always sufficient for BN_mod_exp(). [Bodo Moeller] *) Make sure that shared libraries get the internal name engine with the full version number and not just 0. This should mark the shared libraries as not backward compatible. Of course, this should be changed again when we can guarantee backward binary compatibility. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix typo in get_cert_by_subject() in by_dir.c [Jean-Marc Desperrier ] *) Rework the system to generate shared libraries: - Make note of the expected extension for the shared libraries and if there is a need for symbolic links from for example libcrypto.so.0 to libcrypto.so.0.9.7. There is extended info in Configure for that. - Make as few rebuilds of the shared libraries as possible. - Still avoid linking the OpenSSL programs with the shared libraries. - When installing, install the shared libraries separately from the static ones. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead macro to actually use its argument. Copy SSL_CTX's read_ahead flag to SSL object directly in SSL_new and not in SSL_clear because the latter is also used by the accept/connect functions; previously, the settings made by SSL_set_read_ahead would be lost during the handshake. [Bodo Moeller; problems reported by Anders Gertz ] *) Correct util/mkdef.pl to be selective about disabled algorithms. Previously, it would create entries for disabled algorithms no matter what. [Richard Levitte] *) Added several new manual pages for SSL_* function. [Lutz Jaenicke] Changes between 0.9.5a and 0.9.6 [24 Sep 2000] *) In ssl23_get_client_hello, generate an error message when faced with an initial SSL 3.0/TLS record that is too small to contain the first two bytes of the ClientHello message, i.e. client_version. (Note that this is a pathologic case that probably has never happened in real life.) The previous approach was to use the version number from the record header as a substitute; but our protocol choice should not depend on that one because it is not authenticated by the Finished messages. [Bodo Moeller] *) More robust randomness gathering functions for Windows. [Jeffrey Altman ] *) For compatibility reasons if the flag X509_V_FLAG_ISSUER_CHECK is not set then we don't setup the error code for issuer check errors to avoid possibly overwriting other errors which the callback does handle. If an application does set the flag then we assume it knows what it is doing and can handle the new informational codes appropriately. [Steve Henson] *) Fix for a nasty bug in ASN1_TYPE handling. ASN1_TYPE is used for a general "ANY" type, as such it should be able to decode anything including tagged types. However it didn't check the class so it would wrongly interpret tagged types in the same way as their universal counterpart and unknown types were just rejected. Changed so that the tagged and unknown types are handled in the same way as a SEQUENCE: that is the encoding is stored intact. There is also a new type "V_ASN1_OTHER" which is used when the class is not universal, in this case we have no idea what the actual type is so we just lump them all together. [Steve Henson] *) On VMS, stdout may very well lead to a file that is written to in a record-oriented fashion. That means that every write() will write a separate record, which will be read separately by the programs trying to read from it. This can be very confusing. The solution is to put a BIO filter in the way that will buffer text until a linefeed is reached, and then write everything a line at a time, so every record written will be an actual line, not chunks of lines and not (usually doesn't happen, but I've seen it once) several lines in one record. BIO_f_linebuffer() is the answer. Currently, it's a VMS-only method, because that's where it has been tested well enough. [Richard Levitte] *) Remove 'optimized' squaring variant in BN_mod_mul_montgomery, it can return incorrect results. (Note: The buggy variant was not enabled in OpenSSL 0.9.5a, but it was in 0.9.6-beta[12].) [Bodo Moeller] *) Disable the check for content being present when verifying detached signatures in pk7_smime.c. Some versions of Netscape (wrongly) include zero length content when signing messages. [Steve Henson] *) New BIO_shutdown_wr macro, which invokes the BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR BIO_ctrl (for BIO pairs). [Bodo Möller] *) Add DSO method for VMS. [Richard Levitte] *) Bug fix: Montgomery multiplication could produce results with the wrong sign. [Ulf Möller] *) Add RPM specification openssl.spec and modify it to build three packages. The default package contains applications, application documentation and run-time libraries. The devel package contains include files, static libraries and function documentation. The doc package contains the contents of the doc directory. The original openssl.spec was provided by Damien Miller . [Richard Levitte] *) Add a large number of documentation files for many SSL routines. [Lutz Jaenicke ] *) Add a configuration entry for Sony News 4. [NAKAJI Hiroyuki ] *) Don't set the two most significant bits to one when generating a random number < q in the DSA library. [Ulf Möller] *) New SSL API mode 'SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY'. This disables the default behaviour that SSL_read may result in SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ (even if the underlying transport is blocking) if a handshake took place. (The default behaviour is needed by applications such as s_client and s_server that use select() to determine when to use SSL_read; but for applications that know in advance when to expect data, it just makes things more complicated.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add RAND_egd_bytes(), which gives control over the number of bytes read from EGD. [Ben Laurie] *) Add a few more EBCDIC conditionals that make `req' and `x509' work better on such systems. [Martin Kraemer ] *) Add two demo programs for PKCS12_parse() and PKCS12_create(). Update PKCS12_parse() so it copies the friendlyName and the keyid to the certificates aux info. [Steve Henson] *) Fix bug in PKCS7_verify() which caused an infinite loop if there was more than one signature. [Sven Uszpelkat ] *) Major change in util/mkdef.pl to include extra information about each symbol, as well as presenting variables as well as functions. This change means that there's n more need to rebuild the .num files when some algorithms are excluded. [Richard Levitte] *) Allow the verify time to be set by an application, rather than always using the current time. [Steve Henson] *) Phase 2 verify code reorganisation. The certificate verify code now looks up an issuer certificate by a number of criteria: subject name, authority key id and key usage. It also verifies self signed certificates by the same criteria. The main comparison function is X509_check_issued() which performs these checks. Lot of changes were necessary in order to support this without completely rewriting the lookup code. Authority and subject key identifier are now cached. The LHASH 'certs' is X509_STORE has now been replaced by a STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT). This is mainly because an LHASH can't store or retrieve multiple objects with the same hash value. As a result various functions (which were all internal use only) have changed to handle the new X509_STORE structure. This will break anything that messed round with X509_STORE internally. The functions X509_STORE_add_cert() now checks for an exact match, rather than just subject name. The X509_STORE API doesn't directly support the retrieval of multiple certificates matching a given criteria, however this can be worked round by performing a lookup first (which will fill the cache with candidate certificates) and then examining the cache for matches. This is probably the best we can do without throwing out X509_LOOKUP entirely (maybe later...). The X509_VERIFY_CTX structure has been enhanced considerably. All certificate lookup operations now go via a get_issuer() callback. Although this currently uses an X509_STORE it can be replaced by custom lookups. This is a simple way to bypass the X509_STORE hackery necessary to make this work and makes it possible to use more efficient techniques in future. A very simple version which uses a simple STACK for its trusted certificate store is also provided using X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(). The verify_cb() and verify() callbacks now have equivalents in the X509_STORE_CTX structure. X509_STORE_CTX also has a 'flags' field which can be used to customise the verify behaviour. [Steve Henson] *) Add new PKCS#7 signing option PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP which excludes S/MIME capabilities. [Steve Henson] *) When a certificate request is read in keep a copy of the original encoding of the signed data and use it when outputting again. Signatures then use the original encoding rather than a decoded, encoded version which may cause problems if the request is improperly encoded. [Steve Henson] *) For consistency with other BIO_puts implementations, call buffer_write(b, ...) directly in buffer_puts instead of calling BIO_write(b, ...). In BIO_puts, increment b->num_write as in BIO_write. [Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr] *) Fix BN_mul_word for the case where the word is 0. (We have to use BN_zero, we may not return a BIGNUM with an array consisting of words set to zero.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Avoid calling abort() from within the library when problems are detected, except if preprocessor symbols have been defined (such as REF_CHECK, BN_DEBUG etc.). [Bodo Moeller] *) New openssl application 'rsautl'. This utility can be used for low level RSA operations. DER public key BIO/fp routines also added. [Steve Henson] *) New Configure entry and patches for compiling on QNX 4. [Andreas Schneider ] *) A demo state-machine implementation was sponsored by Nuron (http://www.nuron.com/) and is now available in demos/state_machine. [Ben Laurie] *) New options added to the 'dgst' utility for signature generation and verification. [Steve Henson] *) Unrecognized PKCS#7 content types are now handled via a catch all ASN1_TYPE structure. This allows unsupported types to be stored as a "blob" and an application can encode and decode it manually. [Steve Henson] *) Fix various signed/unsigned issues to make a_strex.c compile under VC++. [Oscar Jacobsson ] *) ASN1 fixes. i2d_ASN1_OBJECT was not returning the correct length if passed a buffer. ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN failed if passed a NULL BN and its argument was negative. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Sven Heiberg ] *) Modification to PKCS#7 encoding routines to output definite length encoding. Since currently the whole structures are in memory there's not real point in using indefinite length constructed encoding. However if OpenSSL is compiled with the flag PKCS7_INDEFINITE_ENCODING the old form is used. [Steve Henson] *) Added BIO_vprintf() and BIO_vsnprintf(). [Richard Levitte] *) Added more prefixes to parse for in the strings written through a logging bio, to cover all the levels that are available through syslog. The prefixes are now: PANIC, EMERG, EMR => LOG_EMERG ALERT, ALR => LOG_ALERT CRIT, CRI => LOG_CRIT ERROR, ERR => LOG_ERR WARNING, WARN, WAR => LOG_WARNING NOTICE, NOTE, NOT => LOG_NOTICE INFO, INF => LOG_INFO DEBUG, DBG => LOG_DEBUG and as before, if none of those prefixes are present at the beginning of the string, LOG_ERR is chosen. On Win32, the LOG_* levels are mapped according to this: LOG_EMERG, LOG_ALERT, LOG_CRIT, LOG_ERR => EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE LOG_WARNING => EVENTLOG_WARNING_TYPE LOG_NOTICE, LOG_INFO, LOG_DEBUG => EVENTLOG_INFORMATION_TYPE [Richard Levitte] *) Made it possible to reconfigure with just the configuration argument "reconf" or "reconfigure". The command line arguments are stored in Makefile.ssl in the variable CONFIGURE_ARGS, and are retrieved from there when reconfiguring. [Richard Levitte] *) MD4 implemented. [Assar Westerlund , Richard Levitte] *) Add the arguments -CAfile and -CApath to the pkcs12 utility. [Richard Levitte] *) The obj_dat.pl script was messing up the sorting of object names. The reason was that it compared the quoted version of strings as a result "OCSP" > "OCSP Signing" because " > SPACE. Changed script to store unquoted versions of names and add quotes on output. It was also omitting some names from the lookup table if they were given a default value (that is if SN is missing it is given the same value as LN and vice versa), these are now added on the grounds that if an object has a name we should be able to look it up. Finally added warning output when duplicate short or long names are found. [Steve Henson] *) Changes needed for Tandem NSK. [Scott Uroff ] *) Fix SSL 2.0 rollback checking: Due to an off-by-one error in RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(), special padding was never detected and thus the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 countermeasure against protocol version rollback attacks was not effective. In s23_clnt.c, don't use special rollback-attack detection padding (RSA_SSLV23_PADDING) if SSL 2.0 is the only protocol enabled in the client; similarly, in s23_srvr.c, don't do the rollback check if SSL 2.0 is the only protocol enabled in the server. [Bodo Moeller] *) Make it possible to get hexdumps of unprintable data with 'openssl asn1parse'. By implication, the functions ASN1_parse_dump() and BIO_dump_indent() are added. [Richard Levitte] *) New functions ASN1_STRING_print_ex() and X509_NAME_print_ex() these print out strings and name structures based on various flags including RFC2253 support and proper handling of multibyte characters. Added options to the 'x509' utility to allow the various flags to be set. [Steve Henson] *) Various fixes to use ASN1_TIME instead of ASN1_UTCTIME. Also change the functions X509_cmp_current_time() and X509_gmtime_adj() work with an ASN1_TIME structure, this will enable certificates using GeneralizedTime in validity dates to be checked. [Steve Henson] *) Make the NEG_PUBKEY_BUG code (which tolerates invalid negative public key encodings) on by default, NO_NEG_PUBKEY_BUG can be set to disable it. [Steve Henson] *) New function c2i_ASN1_OBJECT() which acts on ASN1_OBJECT content octets. An i2c_ASN1_OBJECT is unnecessary because the encoding can be trivially obtained from the structure. [Steve Henson] *) crypto/err.c locking bugfix: Use write locks (CRYPTO_w_[un]lock), not read locks (CRYPTO_r_[un]lock). [Bodo Moeller] *) A first attempt at creating official support for shared libraries through configuration. I've kept it so the default is static libraries only, and the OpenSSL programs are always statically linked for now, but there are preparations for dynamic linking in place. This has been tested on Linux and Tru64. [Richard Levitte] *) Randomness polling function for Win9x, as described in: Peter Gutmann, Software Generation of Practically Strong Random Numbers. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix so PRNG is seeded in req if using an already existing DSA key. [Steve Henson] *) New options to smime application. -inform and -outform allow alternative formats for the S/MIME message including PEM and DER. The -content option allows the content to be specified separately. This should allow things like Netscape form signing output easier to verify. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the ASN1 encoding of tags using the 'long form'. [Steve Henson] *) New ASN1 functions, i2c_* and c2i_* for INTEGER and BIT STRING types. These convert content octets to and from the underlying type. The actual tag and length octets are already assumed to have been read in and checked. These are needed because all other string types have virtually identical handling apart from the tag. By having versions of the ASN1 functions that just operate on content octets IMPLICIT tagging can be handled properly. It also allows the ASN1_ENUMERATED code to be cut down because ASN1_ENUMERATED and ASN1_INTEGER are identical apart from the tag. [Steve Henson] *) Change the handling of OID objects as follows: - New object identifiers are inserted in objects.txt, following the syntax given in objects.README. - objects.pl is used to process obj_mac.num and create a new obj_mac.h. - obj_dat.pl is used to create a new obj_dat.h, using the data in obj_mac.h. This is currently kind of a hack, and the perl code in objects.pl isn't very elegant, but it works as I intended. The simplest way to check that it worked correctly is to look in obj_dat.h and check the array nid_objs and make sure the objects haven't moved around (this is important!). Additions are OK, as well as consistent name changes. [Richard Levitte] *) Add BSD-style MD5-based passwords to 'openssl passwd' (option '-1'). [Bodo Moeller] *) Addition of the command line parameter '-rand file' to 'openssl req'. The given file adds to whatever has already been seeded into the random pool through the RANDFILE configuration file option or environment variable, or the default random state file. [Richard Levitte] *) mkstack.pl now sorts each macro group into lexical order. Previously the output order depended on the order the files appeared in the directory, resulting in needless rewriting of safestack.h . [Steve Henson] *) Patches to make OpenSSL compile under Win32 again. Mostly work arounds for the VC++ problem that it treats func() as func(void). Also stripped out the parts of mkdef.pl that added extra typesafe functions: these no longer exist. [Steve Henson] *) Reorganisation of the stack code. The macros are now all collected in safestack.h . Each macro is defined in terms of a "stack macro" of the form SKM_(type, a, b). The DEBUG_SAFESTACK is now handled in terms of function casts, this has the advantage of retaining type safety without the use of additional functions. If DEBUG_SAFESTACK is not defined then the non typesafe macros are used instead. Also modified the mkstack.pl script to handle the new form. Needs testing to see if which (if any) compilers it chokes and maybe make DEBUG_SAFESTACK the default if no major problems. Similar behaviour for ASN1_SET_OF and PKCS12_STACK_OF. [Steve Henson] *) When some versions of IIS use the 'NET' form of private key the key derivation algorithm is different. Normally MD5(password) is used as a 128 bit RC4 key. In the modified case MD5(MD5(password) + "SGCKEYSALT") is used instead. Added some new functions i2d_RSA_NET(), d2i_RSA_NET() etc which are the same as the old Netscape_RSA functions except they have an additional 'sgckey' parameter which uses the modified algorithm. Also added an -sgckey command line option to the rsa utility. Thanks to Adrian Peck for posting details of the modified algorithm to openssl-dev. [Steve Henson] *) The evp_local.h macros were using 'c.##kname' which resulted in invalid expansion on some systems (SCO 5.0.5 for example). Corrected to 'c.kname'. [Phillip Porch ] *) New X509_get1_email() and X509_REQ_get1_email() functions that return a STACK of email addresses from a certificate or request, these look in the subject name and the subject alternative name extensions and omit any duplicate addresses. [Steve Henson] *) Re-implement BN_mod_exp2_mont using independent (and larger) windows. This makes DSA verification about 2 % faster. [Bodo Moeller] *) Increase maximum window size in BN_mod_exp_... to 6 bits instead of 5 (meaning that now 2^5 values will be precomputed, which is only 4 KB plus overhead for 1024 bit moduli). This makes exponentiations about 0.5 % faster for 1024 bit exponents (as measured by "openssl speed rsa2048"). [Bodo Moeller] *) Rename memory handling macros to avoid conflicts with other software: Malloc => OPENSSL_malloc Malloc_locked => OPENSSL_malloc_locked Realloc => OPENSSL_realloc Free => OPENSSL_free [Richard Levitte] *) New function BN_mod_exp_mont_word for small bases (roughly 15% faster than BN_mod_exp_mont, i.e. 7% for a full DH exchange). [Bodo Moeller] *) CygWin32 support. [John Jarvie ] *) The type-safe stack code has been rejigged. It is now only compiled in when OpenSSL is configured with the DEBUG_SAFESTACK option and by default all type-specific stack functions are "#define"d back to standard stack functions. This results in more streamlined output but retains the type-safety checking possibilities of the original approach. [Geoff Thorpe] *) The STACK code has been cleaned up, and certain type declarations that didn't make a lot of sense have been brought in line. This has also involved a cleanup of sorts in safestack.h to more correctly map type-safe stack functions onto their plain stack counterparts. This work has also resulted in a variety of "const"ifications of lots of the code, especially "_cmp" operations which should normally be prototyped with "const" parameters anyway. [Geoff Thorpe] *) When generating bytes for the first time in md_rand.c, 'stir the pool' by seeding with STATE_SIZE dummy bytes (with zero entropy count). (The PRNG state consists of two parts, the large pool 'state' and 'md', where all of 'md' is used each time the PRNG is used, but 'state' is used only indexed by a cyclic counter. As entropy may not be well distributed from the beginning, 'md' is important as a chaining variable. However, the output function chains only half of 'md', i.e. 80 bits. ssleay_rand_add, on the other hand, chains all of 'md', and seeding with STATE_SIZE dummy bytes will result in all of 'state' being rewritten, with the new values depending on virtually all of 'md'. This overcomes the 80 bit limitation.) [Bodo Moeller] *) In ssl/s2_clnt.c and ssl/s3_clnt.c, call ERR_clear_error() when the handshake is continued after ssl_verify_cert_chain(); otherwise, if SSL_VERIFY_NONE is set, remaining error codes can lead to 'unexplainable' connection aborts later. [Bodo Moeller; problem tracked down by Lutz Jaenicke] *) Major EVP API cipher revision. Add hooks for extra EVP features. This allows various cipher parameters to be set in the EVP interface. Support added for variable key length ciphers via the EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length() function and setting of RC2 and RC5 parameters. Modify EVP_OpenInit() and EVP_SealInit() to cope with variable key length ciphers. Remove lots of duplicated code from the EVP library. For example *every* cipher init() function handles the 'iv' in the same way according to the cipher mode. They also all do nothing if the 'key' parameter is NULL and for CFB and OFB modes they zero ctx->num. New functionality allows removal of S/MIME code RC2 hack. Most of the routines have the same form and so can be declared in terms of macros. By shifting this to the top level EVP_CipherInit() it can be removed from all individual ciphers. If the cipher wants to handle IVs or keys differently it can set the EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV or EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT flags. Change lots of functions like EVP_EncryptUpdate() to now return a value: although software versions of the algorithms cannot fail any installed hardware versions can. [Steve Henson] *) Implement SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG: In ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, if this option is set, tolerate broken clients that send the negotiated protocol version number instead of the requested protocol version number. [Bodo Moeller] *) Call dh_tmp_cb (set by ..._TMP_DH_CB) with correct 'is_export' flag; i.e. non-zero for export ciphersuites, zero otherwise. Previous versions had this flag inverted, inconsistent with rsa_tmp_cb (..._TMP_RSA_CB). [Bodo Moeller; problem reported by Amit Chopra] *) Add missing DSA library text string. Work around for some IIS key files with invalid SEQUENCE encoding. [Steve Henson] *) Add a document (doc/standards.txt) that list all kinds of standards and so on that are implemented in OpenSSL. [Richard Levitte] *) Enhance c_rehash script. Old version would mishandle certificates with the same subject name hash and wouldn't handle CRLs at all. Added -fingerprint option to crl utility, to support new c_rehash features. [Steve Henson] *) Eliminate non-ANSI declarations in crypto.h and stack.h. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix for SSL server purpose checking. Server checking was rejecting certificates which had extended key usage present but no ssl client purpose. [Steve Henson, reported by Rene Grosser ] *) Make PKCS#12 code work with no password. The PKCS#12 spec is a little unclear about how a blank password is handled. Since the password in encoded as a BMPString with terminating double NULL a zero length password would end up as just the double NULL. However no password at all is different and is handled differently in the PKCS#12 key generation code. NS treats a blank password as zero length. MSIE treats it as no password on export: but it will try both on import. We now do the same: PKCS12_parse() tries zero length and no password if the password is set to "" or NULL (NULL is now a valid password: it wasn't before) as does the pkcs12 application. [Steve Henson] *) Bugfixes in apps/x509.c: Avoid a memory leak; and don't use perror when PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ fails, the error message must be obtained from the error queue. [Bodo Moeller] *) Avoid 'thread_hash' memory leak in crypto/err/err.c by freeing it in ERR_remove_state if appropriate, and change ERR_get_state accordingly to avoid race conditions (this is necessary because thread_hash is no longer constant once set). [Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix for linux-elf makefile.one. [Ulf Möller] *) RSA_get_default_method() will now cause a default RSA_METHOD to be chosen if one doesn't exist already. Previously this was only set during a call to RSA_new() or RSA_new_method(NULL) meaning it was possible for RSA_get_default_method() to return NULL. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Added native name translation to the existing DSO code that will convert (if the flag to do so is set) filenames that are sufficiently small and have no path information into a canonical native form. Eg. "blah" converted to "libblah.so" or "blah.dll" etc. [Geoff Thorpe] *) New function ERR_error_string_n(e, buf, len) which is like ERR_error_string(e, buf), but writes at most 'len' bytes including the 0 terminator. For ERR_error_string_n, 'buf' may not be NULL. [Damien Miller , Bodo Moeller] *) CONF library reworked to become more general. A new CONF configuration file reader "class" is implemented as well as a new functions (NCONF_*, for "New CONF") to handle it. The now old CONF_* functions are still there, but are reimplemented to work in terms of the new functions. Also, a set of functions to handle the internal storage of the configuration data is provided to make it easier to write new configuration file reader "classes" (I can definitely see something reading a configuration file in XML format, for example), called _CONF_*, or "the configuration storage API"... The new configuration file reading functions are: NCONF_new, NCONF_free, NCONF_load, NCONF_load_fp, NCONF_load_bio, NCONF_get_section, NCONF_get_string, NCONF_get_numbre NCONF_default, NCONF_WIN32 NCONF_dump_fp, NCONF_dump_bio NCONF_default and NCONF_WIN32 are method (or "class") choosers, NCONF_new creates a new CONF object. This works in the same way as other interfaces in OpenSSL, like the BIO interface. NCONF_dump_* dump the internal storage of the configuration file, which is useful for debugging. All other functions take the same arguments as the old CONF_* functions with the exception of the first that must be a `CONF *' instead of a `LHASH *'. To make it easier to use the new classes with the old CONF_* functions, the function CONF_set_default_method is provided. [Richard Levitte] *) Add '-tls1' option to 'openssl ciphers', which was already mentioned in the documentation but had not been implemented. (This option is not yet really useful because even the additional experimental TLS 1.0 ciphers are currently treated as SSL 3.0 ciphers.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Initial DSO code added into libcrypto for letting OpenSSL (and OpenSSL-based applications) load shared libraries and bind to them in a portable way. [Geoff Thorpe, with contributions from Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.5 and 0.9.5a [1 Apr 2000] *) Make sure _lrotl and _lrotr are only used with MSVC. *) Use lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND correctly in ssleay_rand_status (the default implementation of RAND_status). *) Rename openssl x509 option '-crlext', which was added in 0.9.5, to '-clrext' (= clear extensions), as intended and documented. [Bodo Moeller; inconsistency pointed out by Michael Attili ] *) Fix for HMAC. It wasn't zeroing the rest of the block if the key length was larger than the MD block size. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Yost William ] *) Modernise PKCS12_parse() so it uses STACK_OF(X509) for its ca argument fix a leak when the ca argument was passed as NULL. Stop X509_PUBKEY_set() using the passed key: if the passed key was a private key the result of X509_print(), for example, would be to print out all the private key components. [Steve Henson] *) des_quad_cksum() byte order bug fix. [Ulf Möller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where the solution is attributed to Derrick J Brashear ] *) Fix so V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE works again: however its use is strongly discouraged. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Brian Korver ] *) For easily testing in shell scripts whether some command 'openssl XXX' exists, the new pseudo-command 'openssl no-XXX' returns with exit code 0 iff no command of the given name is available. 'no-XXX' is printed in this case, 'XXX' otherwise. In both cases, the output goes to stdout and nothing is printed to stderr. Additional arguments are always ignored. Since for each cipher there is a command of the same name, the 'no-cipher' compilation switches can be tested this way. ('openssl no-XXX' is not able to detect pseudo-commands such as 'quit', 'list-XXX-commands', or 'no-XXX' itself.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Update test suite so that 'make test' succeeds in 'no-rsa' configuration. [Bodo Moeller] *) For SSL_[CTX_]set_tmp_dh, don't create a DH key if SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is set; it will be thrown away anyway because each handshake creates its own key. ssl_cert_dup, which is used by SSL_new, now copies DH keys in addition to parameters -- in previous versions (since OpenSSL 0.9.3) the 'default key' from SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh would always be lost, meaning you effectively got SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE when using this macro. [Bodo Moeller] *) New s_client option -ign_eof: EOF at stdin is ignored, and 'Q' and 'R' lose their special meanings (quit/renegotiate). This is part of what -quiet does; unlike -quiet, -ign_eof does not suppress any output. [Richard Levitte] *) Add compatibility options to the purpose and trust code. The purpose X509_PURPOSE_ANY is "any purpose" which automatically accepts a certificate or CA, this was the previous behaviour, with all the associated security issues. X509_TRUST_COMPAT is the old trust behaviour: only and automatically trust self signed roots in certificate store. A new trust setting X509_TRUST_DEFAULT is used to specify that a purpose has no associated trust setting and it should instead use the value in the default purpose. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the PKCS#8 DSA private key code so it decodes keys again and fix a memory leak. [Steve Henson] *) In util/mkerr.pl (which implements 'make errors'), preserve reason strings from the previous version of the .c file, as the default to have only downcase letters (and digits) in automatically generated reasons codes is not always appropriate. [Bodo Moeller] *) In ERR_load_ERR_strings(), build an ERR_LIB_SYS error reason table using strerror. Previously, ERR_reason_error_string() returned library names as reason strings for SYSerr; but SYSerr is a special case where small numbers are errno values, not library numbers. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add '-dsaparam' option to 'openssl dhparam' application. This converts DSA parameters into DH parameters. (When creating parameters, DSA_generate_parameters is used.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Include 'length' (recommended exponent length) in C code generated by 'openssl dhparam -C'. [Bodo Moeller] *) The second argument to set_label in perlasm was already being used so couldn't be used as a "file scope" flag. Moved to third argument which was free. [Steve Henson] *) In PEM_ASN1_write_bio and some other functions, use RAND_pseudo_bytes instead of RAND_bytes for encryption IVs and salts. [Bodo Moeller] *) Include RAND_status() into RAND_METHOD instead of implementing it only for md_rand.c Otherwise replacing the PRNG by calling RAND_set_rand_method would be impossible. [Bodo Moeller] *) Don't let DSA_generate_key() enter an infinite loop if the random number generation fails. [Bodo Moeller] *) New 'rand' application for creating pseudo-random output. [Bodo Moeller] *) Added configuration support for Linux/IA64 [Rolf Haberrecker ] *) Assembler module support for Mingw32. [Ulf Möller] *) Shared library support for HPUX (in shlib/). [Lutz Jaenicke and Anonymous] *) Shared library support for Solaris gcc. [Lutz Behnke ] Changes between 0.9.4 and 0.9.5 [28 Feb 2000] *) PKCS7_encrypt() was adding text MIME headers twice because they were added manually and by SMIME_crlf_copy(). [Steve Henson] *) In bntest.c don't call BN_rand with zero bits argument. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Andrew W. Gray ] *) BN_mul bugfix: In bn_mul_part_recursion() only the a>a[n] && b>b[n] case was implemented. This caused BN_div_recp() to fail occasionally. [Ulf Möller] *) Add an optional second argument to the set_label() in the perl assembly language builder. If this argument exists and is set to 1 it signals that the assembler should use a symbol whose scope is the entire file, not just the current function. This is needed with MASM which uses the format label:: for this scope. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Peter Runestig ] *) Change the ASN1 types so they are typedefs by default. Before almost all types were #define'd to ASN1_STRING which was causing STACK_OF() problems: you couldn't declare STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) for example. [Steve Henson] *) Change names of new functions to the new get1/get0 naming convention: After 'get1', the caller owns a reference count and has to call ..._free; 'get0' returns a pointer to some data structure without incrementing reference counters. (Some of the existing 'get' functions increment a reference counter, some don't.) Similarly, 'set1' and 'add1' functions increase reference counters or duplicate objects. [Steve Henson] *) Allow for the possibility of temp RSA key generation failure: the code used to assume it always worked and crashed on failure. [Steve Henson] *) Fix potential buffer overrun problem in BIO_printf(). [Ulf Möller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem pointed out by David Sacerdote ] *) Support EGD . New functions RAND_egd() and RAND_status(). In the command line application, the EGD socket can be specified like a seed file using RANDFILE or -rand. [Ulf Möller] *) Allow the string CERTIFICATE to be tolerated in PKCS#7 structures. Some CAs (e.g. Verisign) distribute certificates in this form. [Steve Henson] *) Remove the SSL_ALLOW_ADH compile option and set the default cipher list to exclude them. This means that no special compilation option is needed to use anonymous DH: it just needs to be included in the cipher list. [Steve Henson] *) Change the EVP_MD_CTX_type macro so its meaning consistent with EVP_MD_type. The old functionality is available in a new macro called EVP_MD_md(). Change code that uses it and update docs. [Steve Henson] *) ..._ctrl functions now have corresponding ..._callback_ctrl functions where the 'void *' argument is replaced by a function pointer argument. Previously 'void *' was abused to point to functions, which works on many platforms, but is not correct. As these functions are usually called by macros defined in OpenSSL header files, most source code should work without changes. [Richard Levitte] *) (which is created by Configure) now contains sections with information on -D... compiler switches used for compiling the library so that applications can see them. To enable one of these sections, a pre-processor symbol OPENSSL_..._DEFINES must be defined. E.g., #define OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES #include defines all pertinent NO_ symbols, such as NO_IDEA, NO_RSA, etc. [Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo Möller] *) Bugfix: Tolerate fragmentation and interleaving in the SSL 3/TLS record layer. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change the 'other' type in certificate aux info to a STACK_OF X509_ALGOR. Although not an AlgorithmIdentifier as such it has the required ASN1 format: arbitrary types determined by an OID. [Steve Henson] *) Add some PEM_write_X509_REQ_NEW() functions and a command line argument to 'req'. This is not because the function is newer or better than others it just uses the work 'NEW' in the certificate request header lines. Some software needs this. [Steve Henson] *) Reorganise password command line arguments: now passwords can be obtained from various sources. Delete the PEM_cb function and make it the default behaviour: i.e. if the callback is NULL and the usrdata argument is not NULL interpret it as a null terminated pass phrase. If usrdata and the callback are NULL then the pass phrase is prompted for as usual. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for the Compaq Atalla crypto accelerator. If it is installed, the support is automatically enabled. The resulting binaries will autodetect the card and use it if present. [Ben Laurie and Compaq Inc.] *) Work around for Netscape hang bug. This sends certificate request and server done in one record. Since this is perfectly legal in the SSL/TLS protocol it isn't a "bug" option and is on by default. See the bugs/SSLv3 entry for more info. [Steve Henson] *) HP-UX tune-up: new unified configs, HP C compiler bug workaround. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add -rand argument to smime and pkcs12 applications and read/write of seed file. [Steve Henson] *) New 'passwd' tool for crypt(3) and apr1 password hashes. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add command line password options to the remaining applications. [Steve Henson] *) Bug fix for BN_div_recp() for numerators with an even number of bits. [Ulf Möller] *) More tests in bntest.c, and changed test_bn output. [Ulf Möller] *) ./config recognizes MacOS X now. [Andy Polyakov] *) Bug fix for BN_div() when the first words of num and divisor are equal (it gave wrong results if (rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2) < d0). [Ulf Möller] *) Add support for various broken PKCS#8 formats, and command line options to produce them. [Steve Henson] *) New functions BN_CTX_start(), BN_CTX_get() and BT_CTX_end() to get temporary BIGNUMs from a BN_CTX. [Ulf Möller] *) Correct return values in BN_mod_exp_mont() and BN_mod_exp2_mont() for p == 0. [Ulf Möller] *) Change the SSLeay_add_all_*() functions to OpenSSL_add_all_*() and include a #define from the old name to the new. The original intent was that statically linked binaries could for example just call SSLeay_add_all_ciphers() to just add ciphers to the table and not link with digests. This never worked because SSLeay_add_all_digests() and SSLeay_add_all_ciphers() were in the same source file so calling one would link with the other. They are now in separate source files. [Steve Henson] *) Add a new -notext option to 'ca' and a -pubkey option to 'spkac'. [Steve Henson] *) Use a less unusual form of the Miller-Rabin primality test (it used a binary algorithm for exponentiation integrated into the Miller-Rabin loop, our standard modexp algorithms are faster). [Bodo Moeller] *) Support for the EBCDIC character set completed. [Martin Kraemer ] *) Source code cleanups: use const where appropriate, eliminate casts, use void * instead of char * in lhash. [Ulf Möller] *) Bugfix: ssl3_send_server_key_exchange was not restartable (the state was not changed to SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B, and because of this the server could overwrite ephemeral keys that the client has already seen). [Bodo Moeller] *) Turn DSA_is_prime into a macro that calls BN_is_prime, using 50 iterations of the Rabin-Miller test. DSA_generate_parameters now uses BN_is_prime_fasttest (with 50 iterations of the Rabin-Miller test as required by the appendix to FIPS PUB 186[-1]) instead of DSA_is_prime. As BN_is_prime_fasttest includes trial division, DSA parameter generation becomes much faster. This implies a change for the callback functions in DSA_is_prime and DSA_generate_parameters: The callback function is called once for each positive witness in the Rabin-Miller test, not just occasionally in the inner loop; and the parameters to the callback function now provide an iteration count for the outer loop rather than for the current invocation of the inner loop. DSA_generate_parameters additionally can call the callback function with an 'iteration count' of -1, meaning that a candidate has passed the trial division test (when q is generated from an application-provided seed, trial division is skipped). [Bodo Moeller] *) New function BN_is_prime_fasttest that optionally does trial division before starting the Rabin-Miller test and has an additional BN_CTX * argument (whereas BN_is_prime always has to allocate at least one BN_CTX). 'callback(1, -1, cb_arg)' is called when a number has passed the trial division stage. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for bug in CRL encoding. The validity dates weren't being handled as ASN1_TIME. [Steve Henson] *) New -pkcs12 option to CA.pl script to write out a PKCS#12 file. [Steve Henson] *) New function BN_pseudo_rand(). [Ulf Möller] *) Clean up BN_mod_mul_montgomery(): replace the broken (and unreadable) bignum version of BN_from_montgomery() with the working code from SSLeay 0.9.0 (the word based version is faster anyway), and clean up the comments. [Ulf Möller] *) Avoid a race condition in s2_clnt.c (function get_server_hello) that made it impossible to use the same SSL_SESSION data structure in SSL2 clients in multiple threads. [Bodo Moeller] *) The return value of RAND_load_file() no longer counts bytes obtained by stat(). RAND_load_file(..., -1) is new and uses the complete file to seed the PRNG (previously an explicit byte count was required). [Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller] *) Clean up CRYPTO_EX_DATA functions, some of these didn't have prototypes used (char *) instead of (void *) and had casts all over the place. [Steve Henson] *) Make BN_generate_prime() return NULL on error if ret!=NULL. [Ulf Möller] *) Retain source code compatibility for BN_prime_checks macro: BN_is_prime(..., BN_prime_checks, ...) now uses BN_prime_checks_for_size to determine the appropriate number of Rabin-Miller iterations. [Ulf Möller] *) Diffie-Hellman uses "safe" primes: DH_check() return code renamed to DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME. (Check if this is true? OpenPGP calls them "strong".) [Ulf Möller] *) Merge the functionality of "dh" and "gendh" programs into a new program "dhparam". The old programs are retained for now but will handle DH keys (instead of parameters) in future. [Steve Henson] *) Make the ciphers, s_server and s_client programs check the return values when a new cipher list is set. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance the SSL/TLS cipher mechanism to correctly handle the TLS 56bit ciphers. Before when the 56bit ciphers were enabled the sorting was wrong. The syntax for the cipher sorting has been extended to support sorting by cipher-strength (using the strength_bits hard coded in the tables). The new command is "@STRENGTH" (see also doc/apps/ciphers.pod). Fix a bug in the cipher-command parser: when supplying a cipher command string with an "undefined" symbol (neither command nor alphanumeric [A-Za-z0-9], ssl_set_cipher_list used to hang in an endless loop. Now an error is flagged. Due to the strength-sorting extension, the code of the ssl_create_cipher_list() function was completely rearranged. I hope that the readability was also increased :-) [Lutz Jaenicke ] *) Minor change to 'x509' utility. The -CAcreateserial option now uses 1 for the first serial number and places 2 in the serial number file. This avoids problems when the root CA is created with serial number zero and the first user certificate has the same issuer name and serial number as the root CA. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes to X509_ATTRIBUTE utilities, change the 'req' program so it uses the new code. Add documentation for this stuff. [Steve Henson] *) Changes to X509_ATTRIBUTE utilities. These have been renamed from X509_*() to X509at_*() on the grounds that they don't handle X509 structures and behave in an analogous way to the X509v3 functions: they shouldn't be called directly but wrapper functions should be used instead. So we also now have some wrapper functions that call the X509at functions when passed certificate requests. (TO DO: similar things can be done with PKCS#7 signed and unsigned attributes, PKCS#12 attributes and a few other things. Some of these need some d2i or i2d and print functionality because they handle more complex structures.) [Steve Henson] *) Add missing #ifndefs that caused missing symbols when building libssl as a shared library without RSA. Use #ifndef NO_SSL2 instead of NO_RSA in ssl/s2*.c. [Kris Kennaway , modified by Ulf Möller] *) Precautions against using the PRNG uninitialized: RAND_bytes() now has a return value which indicates the quality of the random data (1 = ok, 0 = not seeded). Also an error is recorded on the thread's error queue. New function RAND_pseudo_bytes() generates output that is guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable. RAND_add is like RAND_seed, but takes an extra argument for an entropy estimate (RAND_seed always assumes full entropy). [Ulf Möller] *) Do more iterations of Rabin-Miller probable prime test (specifically, 3 for 1024-bit primes, 6 for 512-bit primes, 12 for 256-bit primes instead of only 2 for all lengths; see BN_prime_checks_for_size definition in crypto/bn/bn_prime.c for the complete table). This guarantees a false-positive rate of at most 2^-80 for random input. [Bodo Moeller] *) Rewrite ssl3_read_n (ssl/s3_pkt.c) avoiding a couple of bugs. [Bodo Moeller] *) New function X509_CTX_rget_chain() (renamed to X509_CTX_get1_chain in the 0.9.5 release), this returns the chain from an X509_CTX structure with a dup of the stack and all the X509 reference counts upped: so the stack will exist after X509_CTX_cleanup() has been called. Modify pkcs12.c to use this. Also make SSL_SESSION_print() print out the verify return code. [Steve Henson] *) Add manpage for the pkcs12 command. Also change the default behaviour so MAC iteration counts are used unless the new -nomaciter option is used. This improves file security and only older versions of MSIE (4.0 for example) need it. [Steve Henson] *) Honor the no-xxx Configure options when creating .DEF files. [Ulf Möller] *) Add PKCS#10 attributes to field table: challengePassword, unstructuredName and unstructuredAddress. These are taken from draft PKCS#9 v2.0 but are compatible with v1.2 provided no international characters are used. More changes to X509_ATTRIBUTE code: allow the setting of types based on strings. Remove the 'loc' parameter when adding attributes because these will be a SET OF encoding which is sorted in ASN1 order. [Steve Henson] *) Initial changes to the 'req' utility to allow request generation automation. This will allow an application to just generate a template file containing all the field values and have req construct the request. Initial support for X509_ATTRIBUTE handling. Stacks of these are used all over the place including certificate requests and PKCS#7 structures. They are currently handled manually where necessary with some primitive wrappers for PKCS#7. The new functions behave in a manner analogous to the X509 extension functions: they allow attributes to be looked up by NID and added. Later something similar to the X509V3 code would be desirable to automatically handle the encoding, decoding and printing of the more complex types. The string types like challengePassword can be handled by the string table functions. Also modified the multi byte string table handling. Now there is a 'global mask' which masks out certain types. The table itself can use the flag STABLE_NO_MASK to ignore the mask setting: this is useful when for example there is only one permissible type (as in countryName) and using the mask might result in no valid types at all. [Steve Henson] *) Clean up 'Finished' handling, and add functions SSL_get_finished and SSL_get_peer_finished to allow applications to obtain the latest Finished messages sent to the peer or expected from the peer, respectively. (SSL_get_peer_finished is usually the Finished message actually received from the peer, otherwise the protocol will be aborted.) As the Finished message are message digests of the complete handshake (with a total of 192 bits for TLS 1.0 and more for SSL 3.0), they can be used for external authentication procedures when the authentication provided by SSL/TLS is not desired or is not enough. [Bodo Moeller] *) Enhanced support for Alpha Linux is added. Now ./config checks if the host supports BWX extension and if Compaq C is present on the $PATH. Just exploiting of the BWX extension results in 20-30% performance kick for some algorithms, e.g. DES and RC4 to mention a couple. Compaq C in turn generates ~20% faster code for MD5 and SHA1. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add support for MS "fast SGC". This is arguably a violation of the SSL3/TLS protocol. Netscape SGC does two handshakes: the first with weak crypto and after checking the certificate is SGC a second one with strong crypto. MS SGC stops the first handshake after receiving the server certificate message and sends a second client hello. Since a server will typically do all the time consuming operations before expecting any further messages from the client (server key exchange is the most expensive) there is little difference between the two. To get OpenSSL to support MS SGC we have to permit a second client hello message after we have sent server done. In addition we have to reset the MAC if we do get this second client hello. [Steve Henson] *) Add a function 'd2i_AutoPrivateKey()' this will automatically decide if a DER encoded private key is RSA or DSA traditional format. Changed d2i_PrivateKey_bio() to use it. This is only needed for the "traditional" format DER encoded private key. Newer code should use PKCS#8 format which has the key type encoded in the ASN1 structure. Added DER private key support to pkcs8 application. [Steve Henson] *) SSL 3/TLS 1 servers now don't request certificates when an anonymous ciphersuites has been selected (as required by the SSL 3/TLS 1 specifications). Exception: When SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT is set, we interpret this as a request to violate the specification (the worst that can happen is a handshake failure, and 'correct' behaviour would result in a handshake failure anyway). [Bodo Moeller] *) In SSL_CTX_add_session, take into account that there might be multiple SSL_SESSION structures with the same session ID (e.g. when two threads concurrently obtain them from an external cache). The internal cache can handle only one SSL_SESSION with a given ID, so if there's a conflict, we now throw out the old one to achieve consistency. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add OIDs for idea and blowfish in CBC mode. This will allow both to be used in PKCS#5 v2.0 and S/MIME. Also add checking to some routines that use cipher OIDs: some ciphers do not have OIDs defined and so they cannot be used for S/MIME and PKCS#5 v2.0 for example. [Steve Henson] *) Simplify the trust setting structure and code. Now we just have two sequences of OIDs for trusted and rejected settings. These will typically have values the same as the extended key usage extension and any application specific purposes. The trust checking code now has a default behaviour: it will just check for an object with the same NID as the passed id. Functions can be provided to override either the default behaviour or the behaviour for a given id. SSL client, server and email already have functions in place for compatibility: they check the NID and also return "trusted" if the certificate is self signed. [Steve Henson] *) Add d2i,i2d bio/fp functions for PrivateKey: these convert the traditional format into an EVP_PKEY structure. [Steve Henson] *) Add a password callback function PEM_cb() which either prompts for a password if usr_data is NULL or otherwise assumes it is a null terminated password. Allow passwords to be passed on command line environment or config files in a few more utilities. [Steve Henson] *) Add a bunch of DER and PEM functions to handle PKCS#8 format private keys. Add some short names for PKCS#8 PBE algorithms and allow them to be specified on the command line for the pkcs8 and pkcs12 utilities. Update documentation. [Steve Henson] *) Support for ASN1 "NULL" type. This could be handled before by using ASN1_TYPE but there wasn't any function that would try to read a NULL and produce an error if it couldn't. For compatibility we also have ASN1_NULL_new() and ASN1_NULL_free() functions but these are faked and don't allocate anything because they don't need to. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for MacOS is now provided. Examine INSTALL.MacOS for details. [Andy Polyakov, Roy Woods ] *) Rebuild of the memory allocation routines used by OpenSSL code and possibly others as well. The purpose is to make an interface that provide hooks so anyone can build a separate set of allocation and deallocation routines to be used by OpenSSL, for example memory pool implementations, or something else, which was previously hard since Malloc(), Realloc() and Free() were defined as macros having the values malloc, realloc and free, respectively (except for Win32 compilations). The same is provided for memory debugging code. OpenSSL already comes with functionality to find memory leaks, but this gives people a chance to debug other memory problems. With these changes, a new set of functions and macros have appeared: CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions() [F] CRYPTO_get_mem_debug_functions() [F] CRYPTO_dbg_set_options() [F] CRYPTO_dbg_get_options() [F] CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init() [M] The memory debug functions are NULL by default, unless the library is compiled with CRYPTO_MDEBUG or friends is defined. If someone wants to debug memory anyway, CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init() (which gives the standard debugging functions that come with OpenSSL) or CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions() (tells OpenSSL to use functions provided by the library user) must be used. When the standard debugging functions are used, CRYPTO_dbg_set_options can be used to request additional information: CRYPTO_dbg_set_options(V_CYRPTO_MDEBUG_xxx) corresponds to setting the CRYPTO_MDEBUG_xxx macro when compiling the library. Also, things like CRYPTO_set_mem_functions will always give the expected result (the new set of functions is used for allocation and deallocation) at all times, regardless of platform and compiler options. To finish it up, some functions that were never use in any other way than through macros have a new API and new semantic: CRYPTO_dbg_malloc() CRYPTO_dbg_realloc() CRYPTO_dbg_free() All macros of value have retained their old syntax. [Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller] *) Some S/MIME fixes. The OID for SMIMECapabilities was wrong, the ordering of SMIMECapabilities wasn't in "strength order" and there was a missing NULL in the AlgorithmIdentifier for the SHA1 signature algorithm. [Steve Henson] *) Some ASN1 types with illegal zero length encoding (INTEGER, ENUMERATED and OBJECT IDENTIFIER) choked the ASN1 routines. [Frans Heymans , modified by Steve Henson] *) Merge in my S/MIME library for OpenSSL. This provides a simple S/MIME API on top of the PKCS#7 code, a MIME parser (with enough functionality to handle multipart/signed properly) and a utility called 'smime' to call all this stuff. This is based on code I originally wrote for Celo who have kindly allowed it to be included in OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) Add variants des_set_key_checked and des_set_key_unchecked of des_set_key (aka des_key_sched). Global variable des_check_key decides which of these is called by des_set_key; this way des_check_key behaves as it always did, but applications and the library itself, which was buggy for des_check_key == 1, have a cleaner way to pick the version they need. [Bodo Moeller] *) New function PKCS12_newpass() which changes the password of a PKCS12 structure. [Steve Henson] *) Modify X509_TRUST and X509_PURPOSE so it also uses a static and dynamic mix. In both cases the ids can be used as an index into the table. Also modified the X509_TRUST_add() and X509_PURPOSE_add() functions so they accept a list of the field values and the application doesn't need to directly manipulate the X509_TRUST structure. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the ASN1_STRING_TABLE stuff so it also uses bsearch and doesn't need initialising. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the way the V3 extension code looks up extensions. This now works in a similar way to the object code: we have some "standard" extensions in a static table which is searched with OBJ_bsearch() and the application can add dynamic ones if needed. The file crypto/x509v3/ext_dat.h now has the info: this file needs to be updated whenever a new extension is added to the core code and kept in ext_nid order. There is a simple program 'tabtest.c' which checks this. New extensions are not added too often so this file can readily be maintained manually. There are two big advantages in doing things this way. The extensions can be looked up immediately and no longer need to be "added" using X509V3_add_standard_extensions(): this function now does nothing. [Side note: I get *lots* of email saying the extension code doesn't work because people forget to call this function] Also no dynamic allocation is done unless new extensions are added: so if we don't add custom extensions there is no need to call X509V3_EXT_cleanup(). [Steve Henson] *) Modify enc utility's salting as follows: make salting the default. Add a magic header, so unsalted files fail gracefully instead of just decrypting to garbage. This is because not salting is a big security hole, so people should be discouraged from doing it. [Ben Laurie] *) Fixes and enhancements to the 'x509' utility. It allowed a message digest to be passed on the command line but it only used this parameter when signing a certificate. Modified so all relevant operations are affected by the digest parameter including the -fingerprint and -x509toreq options. Also -x509toreq choked if a DSA key was used because it didn't fix the digest. [Steve Henson] *) Initial certificate chain verify code. Currently tests the untrusted certificates for consistency with the verify purpose (which is set when the X509_STORE_CTX structure is set up) and checks the pathlength. There is a NO_CHAIN_VERIFY compilation option to keep the old behaviour: this is because it will reject chains with invalid extensions whereas every previous version of OpenSSL and SSLeay made no checks at all. Trust code: checks the root CA for the relevant trust settings. Trust settings have an initial value consistent with the verify purpose: e.g. if the verify purpose is for SSL client use it expects the CA to be trusted for SSL client use. However the default value can be changed to permit custom trust settings: one example of this would be to only trust certificates from a specific "secure" set of CAs. Also added X509_STORE_CTX_new() and X509_STORE_CTX_free() functions which should be used for version portability: especially since the verify structure is likely to change more often now. SSL integration. Add purpose and trust to SSL_CTX and SSL and functions to set them. If not set then assume SSL clients will verify SSL servers and vice versa. Two new options to the verify program: -untrusted allows a set of untrusted certificates to be passed in and -purpose which sets the intended purpose of the certificate. If a purpose is set then the new chain verify code is used to check extension consistency. [Steve Henson] *) Support for the authority information access extension. [Steve Henson] *) Modify RSA and DSA PEM read routines to transparently handle PKCS#8 format private keys. New *_PUBKEY_* functions that handle public keys in a format compatible with certificate SubjectPublicKeyInfo structures. Unfortunately there were already functions called *_PublicKey_* which used various odd formats so these are retained for compatibility: however the DSA variants were never in a public release so they have been deleted. Changed dsa/rsa utilities to handle the new format: note no releases ever handled public keys so we should be OK. The primary motivation for this change is to avoid the same fiasco that dogs private keys: there are several incompatible private key formats some of which are standard and some OpenSSL specific and require various evil hacks to allow partial transparent handling and even then it doesn't work with DER formats. Given the option anything other than PKCS#8 should be dumped: but the other formats have to stay in the name of compatibility. With public keys and the benefit of hindsight one standard format is used which works with EVP_PKEY, RSA or DSA structures: though it clearly returns an error if you try to read the wrong kind of key. Added a -pubkey option to the 'x509' utility to output the public key. Also rename the EVP_PKEY_get_*() to EVP_PKEY_rget_*() (renamed to EVP_PKEY_get1_*() in the OpenSSL 0.9.5 release) and add EVP_PKEY_rset_*() functions (renamed to EVP_PKEY_set1_*()) that do the same as the EVP_PKEY_assign_*() except they up the reference count of the added key (they don't "swallow" the supplied key). [Steve Henson] *) Fixes to crypto/x509/by_file.c the code to read in certificates and CRLs would fail if the file contained no certificates or no CRLs: added a new function to read in both types and return the number read: this means that if none are read it will be an error. The DER versions of the certificate and CRL reader would always fail because it isn't possible to mix certificates and CRLs in DER format without choking one or the other routine. Changed this to just read a certificate: this is the best we can do. Also modified the code in apps/verify.c to take notice of return codes: it was previously attempting to read in certificates from NULL pointers and ignoring any errors: this is one reason why the cert and CRL reader seemed to work. It doesn't check return codes from the default certificate routines: these may well fail if the certificates aren't installed. [Steve Henson] *) Code to support otherName option in GeneralName. [Steve Henson] *) First update to verify code. Change the verify utility so it warns if it is passed a self signed certificate: for consistency with the normal behaviour. X509_verify has been modified to it will now verify a self signed certificate if *exactly* the same certificate appears in the store: it was previously impossible to trust a single self signed certificate. This means that: openssl verify ss.pem now gives a warning about a self signed certificate but openssl verify -CAfile ss.pem ss.pem is OK. [Steve Henson] *) For servers, store verify_result in SSL_SESSION data structure (and add it to external session representation). This is needed when client certificate verifications fails, but an application-provided verification callback (set by SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback) allows accepting the session anyway (i.e. leaves x509_store_ctx->error != X509_V_OK but returns 1): When the session is reused, we have to set ssl->verify_result to the appropriate error code to avoid security holes. [Bodo Moeller, problem pointed out by Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix a bug in the new PKCS#7 code: it didn't consider the case in PKCS7_dataInit() where the signed PKCS7 structure didn't contain any existing data because it was being created. [Po-Cheng Chen , slightly modified by Steve Henson] *) Add a salt to the key derivation routines in enc.c. This forms the first 8 bytes of the encrypted file. Also add a -S option to allow a salt to be input on the command line. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509_cmp(). Oddly enough there wasn't a function to compare two certificates. We do this by working out the SHA1 hash and comparing that. X509_cmp() will be needed by the trust code. [Steve Henson] *) SSL_get1_session() is like SSL_get_session(), but increments the reference count in the SSL_SESSION returned. [Geoff Thorpe ] *) Fix for 'req': it was adding a null to request attributes. Also change the X509_LOOKUP and X509_INFO code to handle certificate auxiliary information. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for 40 and 64 bit RC2 and RC4 algorithms: document the 'enc' command. [Steve Henson] *) Add the possibility to add extra information to the memory leak detecting output, to form tracebacks, showing from where each allocation was originated: CRYPTO_push_info("constant string") adds the string plus current file name and line number to a per-thread stack, CRYPTO_pop_info() does the obvious, CRYPTO_remove_all_info() is like calling CYRPTO_pop_info() until the stack is empty. Also updated memory leak detection code to be multi-thread-safe. [Richard Levitte] *) Add options -text and -noout to pkcs7 utility and delete the encryption options which never did anything. Update docs. [Steve Henson] *) Add options to some of the utilities to allow the pass phrase to be included on either the command line (not recommended on OSes like Unix) or read from the environment. Update the manpages and fix a few bugs. [Steve Henson] *) Add a few manpages for some of the openssl commands. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the -revoke option in ca. It was freeing up memory twice, leaking and not finding already revoked certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Extensive changes to support certificate auxiliary information. This involves the use of X509_CERT_AUX structure and X509_AUX functions. An X509_AUX function such as PEM_read_X509_AUX() can still read in a certificate file in the usual way but it will also read in any additional "auxiliary information". By doing things this way a fair degree of compatibility can be retained: existing certificates can have this information added using the new 'x509' options. Current auxiliary information includes an "alias" and some trust settings. The trust settings will ultimately be used in enhanced certificate chain verification routines: currently a certificate can only be trusted if it is self signed and then it is trusted for all purposes. [Steve Henson] *) Fix assembler for Alpha (tested only on DEC OSF not Linux or *BSD). The problem was that one of the replacement routines had not been working since SSLeay releases. For now the offending routine has been replaced with non-optimised assembler. Even so, this now gives around 95% performance improvement for 1024 bit RSA signs. [Mark Cox] *) Hack to fix PKCS#7 decryption when used with some unorthodox RC2 handling. Most clients have the effective key size in bits equal to the key length in bits: so a 40 bit RC2 key uses a 40 bit (5 byte) key. A few however don't do this and instead use the size of the decrypted key to determine the RC2 key length and the AlgorithmIdentifier to determine the effective key length. In this case the effective key length can still be 40 bits but the key length can be 168 bits for example. This is fixed by manually forcing an RC2 key into the EVP_PKEY structure because the EVP code can't currently handle unusual RC2 key sizes: it always assumes the key length and effective key length are equal. [Steve Henson] *) Add a bunch of functions that should simplify the creation of X509_NAME structures. Now you should be able to do: X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, "CN", MBSTRING_ASC, "Steve", -1, -1, 0); and have it automatically work out the correct field type and fill in the structures. The more adventurous can try: X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, field, MBSTRING_UTF8, str, -1, -1, 0); and it will (hopefully) work out the correct multibyte encoding. [Steve Henson] *) Change the 'req' utility to use the new field handling and multibyte copy routines. Before the DN field creation was handled in an ad hoc way in req, ca, and x509 which was rather broken and didn't support BMPStrings or UTF8Strings. Since some software doesn't implement BMPStrings or UTF8Strings yet, they can be enabled using the config file using the dirstring_type option. See the new comment in the default openssl.cnf for more info. [Steve Henson] *) Make crypto/rand/md_rand.c more robust: - Assure unique random numbers after fork(). - Make sure that concurrent threads access the global counter and md serializably so that we never lose entropy in them or use exactly the same state in multiple threads. Access to the large state is not always serializable because the additional locking could be a performance killer, and md should be large enough anyway. [Bodo Moeller] *) New file apps/app_rand.c with commonly needed functionality for handling the random seed file. Use the random seed file in some applications that previously did not: ca, dsaparam -genkey (which also ignored its '-rand' option), s_client, s_server, x509 (when signing). Except on systems with /dev/urandom, it is crucial to have a random seed file at least for key creation, DSA signing, and for DH exchanges; for RSA signatures we could do without one. gendh and gendsa (unlike genrsa) used to read only the first byte of each file listed in the '-rand' option. The function as previously found in genrsa is now in app_rand.c and is used by all programs that support '-rand'. [Bodo Moeller] *) In RAND_write_file, use mode 0600 for creating files; don't just chmod when it may be too late. [Bodo Moeller] *) Report an error from X509_STORE_load_locations when X509_LOOKUP_load_file or X509_LOOKUP_add_dir failed. [Bill Perry] *) New function ASN1_mbstring_copy() this copies a string in either ASCII, Unicode, Universal (4 bytes per character) or UTF8 format into an ASN1_STRING type. A mask of permissible types is passed and it chooses the "minimal" type to use or an error if not type is suitable. [Steve Henson] *) Add function equivalents to the various macros in asn1.h. The old macros are retained with an M_ prefix. Code inside the library can use the M_ macros. External code (including the openssl utility) should *NOT* in order to be "shared library friendly". [Steve Henson] *) Add various functions that can check a certificate's extensions to see if it usable for various purposes such as SSL client, server or S/MIME and CAs of these types. This is currently VERY EXPERIMENTAL but will ultimately be used for certificate chain verification. Also added a -purpose flag to x509 utility to print out all the purposes. [Steve Henson] *) Add a CRYPTO_EX_DATA to X509 certificate structure and associated functions. [Steve Henson] *) New X509V3_{X509,CRL,REVOKED}_get_d2i() functions. These will search for, obtain and decode and extension and obtain its critical flag. This allows all the necessary extension code to be handled in a single function call. [Steve Henson] *) RC4 tune-up featuring 30-40% performance improvement on most RISC platforms. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details. [Andy Polyakov] *) New -noout option to asn1parse. This causes no output to be produced its main use is when combined with -strparse and -out to extract data from a file (which may not be in ASN.1 format). [Steve Henson] *) Fix for pkcs12 program. It was hashing an invalid certificate pointer when producing the local key id. [Richard Levitte ] *) New option -dhparam in s_server. This allows a DH parameter file to be stated explicitly. If it is not stated then it tries the first server certificate file. The previous behaviour hard coded the filename "server.pem". [Steve Henson] *) Add -pubin and -pubout options to the rsa and dsa commands. These allow a public key to be input or output. For example: openssl rsa -in key.pem -pubout -out pubkey.pem Also added necessary DSA public key functions to handle this. [Steve Henson] *) Fix so PKCS7_dataVerify() doesn't crash if no certificates are contained in the message. This was handled by allowing X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial() to tolerate a NULL passed to it. [Steve Henson, reported by Sampo Kellomaki ] *) Fix for bug in d2i_ASN1_bytes(): other ASN1 functions add an extra null to the end of the strings whereas this didn't. This would cause problems if strings read with d2i_ASN1_bytes() were later modified. [Steve Henson, reported by Arne Ansper ] *) Fix for base64 decode bug. When a base64 bio reads only one line of data and it contains EOF it will end up returning an error. This is caused by input 46 bytes long. The cause is due to the way base64 BIOs find the start of base64 encoded data. They do this by trying a trial decode on each line until they find one that works. When they do a flag is set and it starts again knowing it can pass all the data directly through the decoder. Unfortunately it doesn't reset the context it uses. This means that if EOF is reached an attempt is made to pass two EOFs through the context and this causes the resulting error. This can also cause other problems as well. As is usual with these problems it takes *ages* to find and the fix is trivial: move one line. [Steve Henson, reported by ian@uns.ns.ac.yu (Ivan Nejgebauer) ] *) Ugly workaround to get s_client and s_server working under Windows. The old code wouldn't work because it needed to select() on sockets and the tty (for keypresses and to see if data could be written). Win32 only supports select() on sockets so we select() with a 1s timeout on the sockets and then see if any characters are waiting to be read, if none are present then we retry, we also assume we can always write data to the tty. This isn't nice because the code then blocks until we've received a complete line of data and it is effectively polling the keyboard at 1s intervals: however it's quite a bit better than not working at all :-) A dedicated Windows application might handle this with an event loop for example. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance RSA_METHOD structure. Now there are two extra methods, rsa_sign and rsa_verify. When the RSA_FLAGS_SIGN_VER option is set these functions will be called when RSA_sign() and RSA_verify() are used. This is useful if rsa_pub_dec() and rsa_priv_enc() equivalents are not available. For this to work properly RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt() should *not* be used: RSA_sign() and RSA_verify() must be used instead. This necessitated the support of an extra signature type NID_md5_sha1 for SSL signatures and modifications to the SSL library to use it instead of calling RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt(). [Steve Henson] *) Add new -verify -CAfile and -CApath options to the crl program, these will lookup a CRL issuers certificate and verify the signature in a similar way to the verify program. Tidy up the crl program so it no longer accesses structures directly. Make the ASN1 CRL parsing a bit less strict. It will now permit CRL extensions even if it is not a V2 CRL: this will allow it to tolerate some broken CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) Initialize all non-automatic variables each time one of the openssl sub-programs is started (this is necessary as they may be started multiple times from the "OpenSSL>" prompt). [Lennart Bang, Bodo Moeller] *) Preliminary compilation option RSA_NULL which disables RSA crypto without removing all other RSA functionality (this is what NO_RSA does). This is so (for example) those in the US can disable those operations covered by the RSA patent while allowing storage and parsing of RSA keys and RSA key generation. [Steve Henson] *) Non-copying interface to BIO pairs. (still largely untested) [Bodo Moeller] *) New function ANS1_tag2str() to convert an ASN1 tag to a descriptive ASCII string. This was handled independently in various places before. [Steve Henson] *) New functions UTF8_getc() and UTF8_putc() that parse and generate UTF8 strings a character at a time. [Steve Henson] *) Use client_version from client hello to select the protocol (s23_srvr.c) and for RSA client key exchange verification (s3_srvr.c), as required by the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 specifications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add various utility functions to handle SPKACs, these were previously handled by poking round in the structure internals. Added new function NETSCAPE_SPKI_print() to print out SPKAC and a new utility 'spkac' to print, verify and generate SPKACs. Based on an original idea from Massimiliano Pala but extensively modified. [Steve Henson] *) RIPEMD160 is operational on all platforms and is back in 'make test'. [Andy Polyakov] *) Allow the config file extension section to be overwritten on the command line. Based on an original idea from Massimiliano Pala . The new option is called -extensions and can be applied to ca, req and x509. Also -reqexts to override the request extensions in req and -crlexts to override the crl extensions in ca. [Steve Henson] *) Add new feature to the SPKAC handling in ca. Now you can include the same field multiple times by preceding it by "XXXX." for example: 1.OU="Unit name 1" 2.OU="Unit name 2" this is the same syntax as used in the req config file. [Steve Henson] *) Allow certificate extensions to be added to certificate requests. These are specified in a 'req_extensions' option of the req section of the config file. They can be printed out with the -text option to req but are otherwise ignored at present. [Steve Henson] *) Fix a horrible bug in enc_read() in crypto/evp/bio_enc.c: if the first data read consists of only the final block it would not decrypted because EVP_CipherUpdate() would correctly report zero bytes had been decrypted. A misplaced 'break' also meant the decrypted final block might not be copied until the next read. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for DH_METHOD. Again based on RSA_METHOD. Also added a few extra parameters to the DH structure: these will be useful if for example we want the value of 'q' or implement X9.42 DH. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for DSA_METHOD. This is based on the RSA_METHOD and provides hooks that allow the default DSA functions or functions on a "per key" basis to be replaced. This allows hardware acceleration and hardware key storage to be handled without major modification to the library. Also added low level modexp hooks and CRYPTO_EX structure and associated functions. [Steve Henson] *) Add a new flag to memory BIOs, BIO_FLAG_MEM_RDONLY. This marks the BIO as "read only": it can't be written to and the buffer it points to will not be freed. Reading from a read only BIO is much more efficient than a normal memory BIO. This was added because there are several times when an area of memory needs to be read from a BIO. The previous method was to create a memory BIO and write the data to it, this results in two copies of the data and an O(n^2) reading algorithm. There is a new function BIO_new_mem_buf() which creates a read only memory BIO from an area of memory. Also modified the PKCS#7 routines to use read only memory BIOs. [Steve Henson] *) Bugfix: ssl23_get_client_hello did not work properly when called in state SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, i.e. when the first 7 bytes of a SSLv2-compatible client hello for SSLv3 or TLSv1 could be read, but a retry condition occurred while trying to read the rest. [Bodo Moeller] *) The PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT_new() function was setting the content type as NID_pkcs7_encrypted by default: this was wrong since this should almost always be NID_pkcs7_data. Also modified the PKCS7_set_type() to handle the encrypted data type: this is a more sensible place to put it and it allows the PKCS#12 code to be tidied up that duplicated this functionality. [Steve Henson] *) Changed obj_dat.pl script so it takes its input and output files on the command line. This should avoid shell escape redirection problems under Win32. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for certificate extension requests, these are included in things like Xenroll certificate requests. Included functions to allow extensions to be obtained and added. [Steve Henson] *) -crlf option to s_client and s_server for sending newlines as CRLF (as required by many protocols). [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.3a and 0.9.4 [09 Aug 1999] *) Install libRSAglue.a when OpenSSL is built with RSAref. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) A few more ``#ifndef NO_FP_API / #endif'' pairs for consistency. [Andrija Antonijevic ] *) Fix -startdate and -enddate (which was missing) arguments to 'ca' program. [Steve Henson] *) New function DSA_dup_DH, which duplicates DSA parameters/keys as DH parameters/keys (q is lost during that conversion, but the resulting DH parameters contain its length). For 1024-bit p, DSA_generate_parameters followed by DSA_dup_DH is much faster than DH_generate_parameters (which creates parameters where p = 2*q + 1), and also the smaller q makes DH computations much more efficient (160-bit exponentiation instead of 1024-bit exponentiation); so this provides a convenient way to support DHE ciphersuites in SSL/TLS servers (see ssl/ssltest.c). It is of utter importance to use SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE); or SSL_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE); when such DH parameters are used, because otherwise small subgroup attacks may become possible! [Bodo Moeller] *) Avoid memory leak in i2d_DHparams. [Bodo Moeller] *) Allow the -k option to be used more than once in the enc program: this allows the same encrypted message to be read by multiple recipients. [Steve Henson] *) New function OBJ_obj2txt(buf, buf_len, a, no_name), this converts an ASN1_OBJECT to a text string. If the "no_name" parameter is set then it will always use the numerical form of the OID, even if it has a short or long name. [Steve Henson] *) Added an extra RSA flag: RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY. Previously the rsa_mod_exp method only got called if p,q,dmp1,dmq1,iqmp components were present, otherwise bn_mod_exp was called. In the case of hardware keys for example no private key components need be present and it might store extra data in the RSA structure, which cannot be accessed from bn_mod_exp. By setting RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY rsa_mod_exp will always be called for private key operations. [Steve Henson] *) Added support for SPARC Linux. [Andy Polyakov] *) pem_password_cb function type incompatibly changed from typedef int pem_password_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag); to ....(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *userdata); so that applications can pass data to their callbacks: The PEM[_ASN1]_{read,write}... functions and macros now take an additional void * argument, which is just handed through whenever the password callback is called. [Damien Miller ; tiny changes by Bodo Moeller] New function SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata. Compatibility note: As many C implementations push function arguments onto the stack in reverse order, the new library version is likely to interoperate with programs that have been compiled with the old pem_password_cb definition (PEM_whatever takes some data that happens to be on the stack as its last argument, and the callback just ignores this garbage); but there is no guarantee whatsoever that this will work. *) The -DPLATFORM="\"$(PLATFORM)\"" definition and the similar -DCFLAGS=... (both in crypto/Makefile.ssl for use by crypto/cversion.c) caused problems not only on Windows, but also on some Unix platforms. To avoid problematic command lines, these definitions are now in an auto-generated file crypto/buildinf.h (created by crypto/Makefile.ssl for standard "make" builds, by util/mk1mf.pl for "mk1mf" builds). [Bodo Moeller] *) MIPS III/IV assembler module is reimplemented. [Andy Polyakov] *) More DES library cleanups: remove references to srand/rand and delete an unused file. [Ulf Möller] *) Add support for the free Netwide assembler (NASM) under Win32, since not many people have MASM (ml) and it can be hard to obtain. This is currently experimental but it seems to work OK and pass all the tests. Check out INSTALL.W32 for info. [Steve Henson] *) Fix memory leaks in s3_clnt.c: All non-anonymous SSL3/TLS1 connections without temporary keys kept an extra copy of the server key, and connections with temporary keys did not free everything in case of an error. [Bodo Moeller] *) New function RSA_check_key and new openssl rsa option -check for verifying the consistency of RSA keys. [Ulf Moeller, Bodo Moeller] *) Various changes to make Win32 compile work: 1. Casts to avoid "loss of data" warnings in p5_crpt2.c 2. Change unsigned int to int in b_dump.c to avoid "signed/unsigned comparison" warnings. 3. Add sk__sort to DEF file generator and do make update. [Steve Henson] *) Add a debugging option to PKCS#5 v2 key generation function: when you #define DEBUG_PKCS5V2 passwords, salts, iteration counts and derived keys are printed to stderr. [Steve Henson] *) Copy the flags in ASN1_STRING_dup(). [Roman E. Pavlov ] *) The x509 application mishandled signing requests containing DSA keys when the signing key was also DSA and the parameters didn't match. It was supposed to omit the parameters when they matched the signing key: the verifying software was then supposed to automatically use the CA's parameters if they were absent from the end user certificate. Omitting parameters is no longer recommended. The test was also the wrong way round! This was probably due to unusual behaviour in EVP_cmp_parameters() which returns 1 if the parameters match. This meant that parameters were omitted when they *didn't* match and the certificate was useless. Certificates signed with 'ca' didn't have this bug. [Steve Henson, reported by Doug Erickson ] *) Memory leak checking (-DCRYPTO_MDEBUG) had some problems. The interface is as follows: Applications can use CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON) aka MemCheck_start(), CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_OFF) aka MemCheck_stop(); "off" is now the default. The library internally uses CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE) aka MemCheck_off(), CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE) aka MemCheck_on() to disable memory-checking temporarily. Some inconsistent states that previously were possible (and were even the default) are now avoided. -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_TIME is new and additionally stores the current time with each memory chunk allocated; this is occasionally more helpful than just having a counter. -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_THREAD is also new and adds the thread ID. -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL enables all of the above, plus any future extensions. [Bodo Moeller] *) Introduce "mode" for SSL structures (with defaults in SSL_CTX), which largely parallels "options", but is for changing API behaviour, whereas "options" are about protocol behaviour. Initial "mode" flags are: SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE Allow SSL_write to report success when a single record has been written. SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER Don't insist that SSL_write retries use the same buffer location. (But all of the contents must be copied!) [Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix: SSL_set_options ignored its parameter, only SSL_CTX_set_options worked. *) Fix problems with no-hmac etc. [Ulf Möller, pointed out by Brian Wellington ] *) New functions RSA_get_default_method(), RSA_set_method() and RSA_get_method(). These allows replacement of RSA_METHODs without having to mess around with the internals of an RSA structure. [Steve Henson] *) Fix memory leaks in DSA_do_sign and DSA_is_prime. Also really enable memory leak checks in openssl.c and in some test programs. [Chad C. Mulligan, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix a bug in d2i_ASN1_INTEGER() and i2d_ASN1_INTEGER() which can mess up the length of negative integers. This has now been simplified to just store the length when it is first determined and use it later, rather than trying to keep track of where data is copied and updating it to point to the end. [Steve Henson, reported by Brien Wheeler ] *) Add a new function PKCS7_signatureVerify. This allows the verification of a PKCS#7 signature but with the signing certificate passed to the function itself. This contrasts with PKCS7_dataVerify which assumes the certificate is present in the PKCS#7 structure. This isn't always the case: certificates can be omitted from a PKCS#7 structure and be distributed by "out of band" means (such as a certificate database). [Steve Henson] *) Complete the PEM_* macros with DECLARE_PEM versions to replace the function prototypes in pem.h, also change util/mkdef.pl to add the necessary function names. [Steve Henson] *) mk1mf.pl (used by Windows builds) did not properly read the options set by Configure in the top level Makefile, and Configure was not even able to write more than one option correctly. Fixed, now "no-idea no-rc5 -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG" etc. works as intended. [Bodo Moeller] *) New functions CONF_load_bio() and CONF_load_fp() to allow a config file to be loaded from a BIO or FILE pointer. The BIO version will for example allow memory BIOs to contain config info. [Steve Henson] *) New function "CRYPTO_num_locks" that returns CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS. Whoever hopes to achieve shared-library compatibility across versions must use this, not the compile-time macro. (Exercise 0.9.4: Which is the minimum library version required by such programs?) Note: All this applies only to multi-threaded programs, others don't need locks. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add missing case to s3_clnt.c state machine -- one of the new SSL tests through a BIO pair triggered the default case, i.e. SSLerr(...,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE). [Bodo Moeller] *) New "BIO pair" concept (crypto/bio/bss_bio.c) so that applications can use the SSL library even if none of the specific BIOs is appropriate. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix a bug in i2d_DSAPublicKey() which meant it returned the wrong value for the encoded length. [Jeon KyoungHo ] *) Add initial documentation of the X509V3 functions. [Steve Henson] *) Add a new pair of functions PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey() and PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey() that are equivalent to PEM_write_PrivateKey() and PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey() but use the more secure PKCS#8 private key format with a high iteration count. [Steve Henson] *) Fix determination of Perl interpreter: A perl or perl5 _directory_ in $PATH was also accepted as the interpreter. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix demos/sign/sign.c: well there wasn't anything strictly speaking wrong with it but it was very old and did things like calling PEM_ASN1_read() directly and used MD5 for the hash not to mention some unusual formatting. [Steve Henson] *) Fix demos/selfsign.c: it used obsolete and deleted functions, changed to use the new extension code. [Steve Henson] *) Implement the PEM_read/PEM_write functions in crypto/pem/pem_all.c with macros. This should make it easier to change their form, add extra arguments etc. Fix a few PEM prototypes which didn't have cipher as a constant. [Steve Henson] *) Add to configuration table a new entry that can specify an alternative name for unistd.h (for pre-POSIX systems); we need this for NeXTstep, according to Mark Crispin . [Bodo Moeller] #if 0 *) DES CBC did not update the IV. Weird. [Ben Laurie] #else des_cbc_encrypt does not update the IV, but des_ncbc_encrypt does. Changing the behaviour of the former might break existing programs -- where IV updating is needed, des_ncbc_encrypt can be used. #endif *) When bntest is run from "make test" it drives bc to check its calculations, as well as internally checking them. If an internal check fails, it needs to cause bc to give a non-zero result or make test carries on without noticing the failure. Fixed. [Ben Laurie] *) DES library cleanups. [Ulf Möller] *) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PBE algorithms. This will permit PKCS#8 to be used with any cipher unlike PKCS#5 v1.5 which can at most handle 64 bit ciphers. NOTE: although the key derivation function has been verified against some published test vectors it has not been extensively tested yet. Added a -v2 "cipher" option to pkcs8 application to allow the use of v2.0. [Steve Henson] *) Instead of "mkdir -p", which is not fully portable, use new Perl script "util/mkdir-p.pl". [Bodo Moeller] *) Rewrite the way password based encryption (PBE) is handled. It used to assume that the ASN1 AlgorithmIdentifier parameter was a PBEParameter structure. This was true for the PKCS#5 v1.5 and PKCS#12 PBE algorithms but doesn't apply to PKCS#5 v2.0 where it can be something else. Now the 'parameter' field of the AlgorithmIdentifier is passed to the underlying key generation function so it must do its own ASN1 parsing. This has also changed the EVP_PBE_CipherInit() function which now has a 'parameter' argument instead of literal salt and iteration count values and the function EVP_PBE_ALGOR_CipherInit() has been deleted. [Steve Henson] *) Support for PKCS#5 v1.5 compatible password based encryption algorithms and PKCS#8 functionality. New 'pkcs8' application linked to openssl. Needed to change the PEM_STRING_EVP_PKEY value which was just "PRIVATE KEY" because this clashed with PKCS#8 unencrypted string. Since this value was just used as a "magic string" and not used directly its value doesn't matter. [Steve Henson] *) Introduce some semblance of const correctness to BN. Shame C doesn't support mutable. [Ben Laurie] *) "linux-sparc64" configuration (ultrapenguin). [Ray Miller ] "linux-sparc" configuration. [Christian Forster ] *) config now generates no-xxx options for missing ciphers. [Ulf Möller] *) Support the EBCDIC character set (work in progress). File ebcdic.c not yet included because it has a different license. [Martin Kraemer ] *) Support BS2000/OSD-POSIX. [Martin Kraemer ] *) Make callbacks for key generation use void * instead of char *. [Ben Laurie] *) Make S/MIME samples compile (not yet tested). [Ben Laurie] *) Additional typesafe stacks. [Ben Laurie] *) New configuration variants "bsdi-elf-gcc" (BSD/OS 4.x). [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.3 and 0.9.3a [29 May 1999] *) New configuration variant "sco5-gcc". *) Updated some demos. [Sean O Riordain, Wade Scholine] *) Add missing BIO_free at exit of pkcs12 application. [Wu Zhigang] *) Fix memory leak in conf.c. [Steve Henson] *) Updates for Win32 to assembler version of MD5. [Steve Henson] *) Set #! path to perl in apps/der_chop to where we found it instead of using a fixed path. [Bodo Moeller] *) SHA library changes for irix64-mips4-cc. [Andy Polyakov] *) Improvements for VMS support. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.2b and 0.9.3 [24 May 1999] *) Bignum library bug fix. IRIX 6 passes "make test" now! This also avoids the problems with SC4.2 and unpatched SC5. [Andy Polyakov ] *) New functions sk_num, sk_value and sk_set to replace the previous macros. These are required because of the typesafe stack would otherwise break existing code. If old code used a structure member which used to be STACK and is now STACK_OF (for example cert in a PKCS7_SIGNED structure) with sk_num or sk_value it would produce an error because the num, data members are not present in STACK_OF. Now it just produces a warning. sk_set replaces the old method of assigning a value to sk_value (e.g. sk_value(x, i) = y) which the library used in a few cases. Any code that does this will no longer work (and should use sk_set instead) but this could be regarded as a "questionable" behaviour anyway. [Steve Henson] *) Fix most of the other PKCS#7 bugs. The "experimental" code can now correctly handle encrypted S/MIME data. [Steve Henson] *) Change type of various DES function arguments from des_cblock (which means, in function argument declarations, pointer to char) to des_cblock * (meaning pointer to array with 8 char elements), which allows the compiler to do more typechecking; it was like that back in SSLeay, but with lots of ugly casts. Introduce new type const_des_cblock. [Bodo Moeller] *) Reorganise the PKCS#7 library and get rid of some of the more obvious problems: find RecipientInfo structure that matches recipient certificate and initialise the ASN1 structures properly based on passed cipher. [Steve Henson] *) Belatedly make the BN tests actually check the results. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix the encoding and decoding of negative ASN1 INTEGERS and conversion to and from BNs: it was completely broken. New compilation option NEG_PUBKEY_BUG to allow for some broken certificates that encode public key elements as negative integers. [Steve Henson] *) Reorganize and speed up MD5. [Andy Polyakov ] *) VMS support. [Richard Levitte ] *) New option -out to asn1parse to allow the parsed structure to be output to a file. This is most useful when combined with the -strparse option to examine the output of things like OCTET STRINGS. [Steve Henson] *) Make SSL library a little more fool-proof by not requiring any longer that SSL_set_{accept,connect}_state be called before SSL_{accept,connect} may be used (SSL_set_..._state is omitted in many applications because usually everything *appeared* to work as intended anyway -- now it really works as intended). [Bodo Moeller] *) Move openssl.cnf out of lib/. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix various things to let OpenSSL even pass ``egcc -pipe -O2 -Wall -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-align -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wnested-externs -Winline'' with EGCS 1.1.2+ [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Various fixes to the EVP and PKCS#7 code. It may now be able to handle PKCS#7 enveloped data properly. [Sebastian Akerman , modified by Steve] *) Create a duplicate of the SSL_CTX's CERT in SSL_new instead of copying pointers. The cert_st handling is changed by this in various ways (and thus what used to be known as ctx->default_cert is now called ctx->cert, since we don't resort to s->ctx->[default_]cert any longer when s->cert does not give us what we need). ssl_cert_instantiate becomes obsolete by this change. As soon as we've got the new code right (possibly it already is?), we have solved a couple of bugs of the earlier code where s->cert was used as if it could not have been shared with other SSL structures. Note that using the SSL API in certain dirty ways now will result in different behaviour than observed with earlier library versions: Changing settings for an SSL_CTX *ctx after having done s = SSL_new(ctx) does not influence s as it used to. In order to clean up things more thoroughly, inside SSL_SESSION we don't use CERT any longer, but a new structure SESS_CERT that holds per-session data (if available); currently, this is the peer's certificate chain and, for clients, the server's certificate and temporary key. CERT holds only those values that can have meaningful defaults in an SSL_CTX. [Bodo Moeller] *) New function X509V3_EXT_i2d() to create an X509_EXTENSION structure from the internal representation. Various PKCS#7 fixes: remove some evil casts and set the enc_dig_alg field properly based on the signing key type. [Steve Henson] *) Allow PKCS#12 password to be set from the command line or the environment. Let 'ca' get its config file name from the environment variables "OPENSSL_CONF" or "SSLEAY_CONF" (for consistency with 'req' and 'x509'). [Steve Henson] *) Allow certificate policies extension to use an IA5STRING for the organization field. This is contrary to the PKIX definition but VeriSign uses it and IE5 only recognises this form. Document 'x509' extension option. [Steve Henson] *) Add PEDANTIC compiler flag to allow compilation with gcc -pedantic, without disallowing inline assembler and the like for non-pedantic builds. [Ben Laurie] *) Support Borland C++ builder. [Janez Jere , modified by Ulf Möller] *) Support Mingw32. [Ulf Möller] *) SHA-1 cleanups and performance enhancements. [Andy Polyakov ] *) Sparc v8plus assembler for the bignum library. [Andy Polyakov ] *) Accept any -xxx and +xxx compiler options in Configure. [Ulf Möller] *) Update HPUX configuration. [Anonymous] *) Add missing sk__unshift() function to safestack.h [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) New function SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file that sets the "extra_cert"s in addition to the certificate. (This makes sense only for "PEM" format files, as chains as a whole are not DER-encoded.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Support verify_depth from the SSL API. x509_vfy.c had what can be considered an off-by-one-error: Its depth (which was not part of the external interface) was actually counting the number of certificates in a chain; now it really counts the depth. [Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix in crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c: The SSLerr macro was used instead of X509err, which often resulted in confusing error messages since the error codes are not globally unique (e.g. an alleged error in ssl3_accept when a certificate didn't match the private key). *) New function SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context that allows to set a default value (so that you don't need SSL_set_session_id_context for each connection using the SSL_CTX). [Bodo Moeller] *) OAEP decoding bug fix. [Ulf Möller] *) Support INSTALL_PREFIX for package builders, as proposed by David Harris. [Bodo Moeller] *) New Configure options "threads" and "no-threads". For systems where the proper compiler options are known (currently Solaris and Linux), "threads" is the default. [Bodo Moeller] *) New script util/mklink.pl as a faster substitute for util/mklink.sh. [Bodo Moeller] *) Install various scripts to $(OPENSSLDIR)/misc, not to $(INSTALLTOP)/bin -- they shouldn't clutter directories such as /usr/local/bin. [Bodo Moeller] *) "make linux-shared" to build shared libraries. [Niels Poppe ] *) New Configure option no- (rsa, idea, rc5, ...). [Ulf Möller] *) Add the PKCS#12 API documentation to openssl.txt. Preliminary support for extension adding in x509 utility. [Steve Henson] *) Remove NOPROTO sections and error code comments. [Ulf Möller] *) Partial rewrite of the DEF file generator to now parse the ANSI prototypes. [Steve Henson] *) New Configure options --prefix=DIR and --openssldir=DIR. [Ulf Möller] *) Complete rewrite of the error code script(s). It is all now handled by one script at the top level which handles error code gathering, header rewriting and C source file generation. It should be much better than the old method: it now uses a modified version of Ulf's parser to read the ANSI prototypes in all header files (thus the old K&R definitions aren't needed for error creation any more) and do a better job of translating function codes into names. The old 'ASN1 error code embedded in a comment' is no longer necessary and it doesn't use .err files which have now been deleted. Also the error code call doesn't have to appear all on one line (which resulted in some large lines...). [Steve Henson] *) Change #include filenames from to . [Bodo Moeller] *) Change behaviour of ssl2_read when facing length-0 packets: Don't return 0 (which usually indicates a closed connection), but continue reading. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix some race conditions. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add support for CRL distribution points extension. Add Certificate Policies and CRL distribution points documentation. [Steve Henson] *) Move the autogenerated header file parts to crypto/opensslconf.h. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix new 56-bit DES export ciphersuites: they were using 7 bytes instead of 8 of keying material. Merlin has also confirmed interop with this fix between OpenSSL and Baltimore C/SSL 2.0 and J/SSL 2.0. [Merlin Hughes ] *) Fix lots of warnings. [Richard Levitte ] *) In add_cert_dir() in crypto/x509/by_dir.c, break out of the loop if the directory spec didn't end with a LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR. [Richard Levitte ] *) Fix problems with sizeof(long) == 8. [Andy Polyakov ] *) Change functions to ANSI C. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix typos in error codes. [Martin Kraemer , Ulf Möller] *) Remove defunct assembler files from Configure. [Ulf Möller] *) SPARC v8 assembler BIGNUM implementation. [Andy Polyakov ] *) Support for Certificate Policies extension: both print and set. Various additions to support the r2i method this uses. [Steve Henson] *) A lot of constification, and fix a bug in X509_NAME_oneline() that could return a const string when you are expecting an allocated buffer. [Ben Laurie] *) Add support for ASN1 types UTF8String and VISIBLESTRING, also the CHOICE types DirectoryString and DisplayText. [Steve Henson] *) Add code to allow r2i extensions to access the configuration database, add an LHASH database driver and add several ctx helper functions. [Steve Henson] *) Fix an evil bug in bn_expand2() which caused various BN functions to fail when they extended the size of a BIGNUM. [Steve Henson] *) Various utility functions to handle SXNet extension. Modify mkdef.pl to support typesafe stack. [Steve Henson] *) Fix typo in SSL_[gs]et_options(). [Nils Frostberg ] *) Delete various functions and files that belonged to the (now obsolete) old X509V3 handling code. [Steve Henson] *) New Configure option "rsaref". [Ulf Möller] *) Don't auto-generate pem.h. [Bodo Moeller] *) Introduce type-safe ASN.1 SETs. [Ben Laurie] *) Convert various additional casted stacks to type-safe STACK_OF() variants. [Ben Laurie, Ralf S. Engelschall, Steve Henson] *) Introduce type-safe STACKs. This will almost certainly break lots of code that links with OpenSSL (well at least cause lots of warnings), but fear not: the conversion is trivial, and it eliminates loads of evil casts. A few STACKed things have been converted already. Feel free to convert more. In the fullness of time, I'll do away with the STACK type altogether. [Ben Laurie] *) Add `openssl ca -revoke ' facility which revokes a certificate specified in by updating the entry in the index.txt file. This way one no longer has to edit the index.txt file manually for revoking a certificate. The -revoke option does the gory details now. [Massimiliano Pala , Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix `openssl crl -noout -text' combination where `-noout' killed the `-text' option at all and this way the `-noout -text' combination was inconsistent in `openssl crl' with the friends in `openssl x509|rsa|dsa'. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Make sure a corresponding plain text error message exists for the X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED/23 error number which can occur when a verify callback function determined that a certificate was revoked. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Bugfix: In test/testenc, don't test "openssl " for ciphers that were excluded, e.g. by -DNO_IDEA. Also, test all available ciphers including rc5, which was forgotten until now. In order to let the testing shell script know which algorithms are available, a new (up to now undocumented) command "openssl list-cipher-commands" is used. [Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix: s_client occasionally would sleep in select() when it should have checked SSL_pending() first. [Bodo Moeller] *) New functions DSA_do_sign and DSA_do_verify to provide access to the raw DSA values prior to ASN.1 encoding. [Ulf Möller] *) Tweaks to Configure [Niels Poppe ] *) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 ASN1 PBES2 structures. No other support, yet... [Steve Henson] *) New variables $(RANLIB) and $(PERL) in the Makefiles. [Ulf Möller] *) New config option to avoid instructions that are illegal on the 80386. The default code is faster, but requires at least a 486. [Ulf Möller] *) Got rid of old SSL2_CLIENT_VERSION (inconsistently used) and SSL2_SERVER_VERSION (not used at all) macros, which are now the same as SSL2_VERSION anyway. [Bodo Moeller] *) New "-showcerts" option for s_client. [Bodo Moeller] *) Still more PKCS#12 integration. Add pkcs12 application to openssl application. Various cleanups and fixes. [Steve Henson] *) More PKCS#12 integration. Add new pkcs12 directory with Makefile.ssl and modify error routines to work internally. Add error codes and PBE init to library startup routines. [Steve Henson] *) Further PKCS#12 integration. Added password based encryption, PKCS#8 and packing functions to asn1 and evp. Changed function names and error codes along the way. [Steve Henson] *) PKCS12 integration: and so it begins... First of several patches to slowly integrate PKCS#12 functionality into OpenSSL. Add PKCS#12 objects to objects.h [Steve Henson] *) Add a new 'indent' option to some X509V3 extension code. Initial ASN1 and display support for Thawte strong extranet extension. [Steve Henson] *) Add LinuxPPC support. [Jeff Dubrule ] *) Get rid of redundant BN file bn_mulw.c, and rename bn_div64 to bn_div_words in alpha.s. [Hannes Reinecke and Ben Laurie] *) Make sure the RSA OAEP test is skipped under -DRSAref because OAEP isn't supported when OpenSSL is built with RSAref. [Ulf Moeller ] *) Move definitions of IS_SET/IS_SEQUENCE inside crypto/asn1/asn1.h so they no longer are missing under -DNOPROTO. [Soren S. Jorvang ] Changes between 0.9.1c and 0.9.2b [22 Mar 1999] *) Make SSL_get_peer_cert_chain() work in servers. Unfortunately, it still doesn't work when the session is reused. Coming soon! [Ben Laurie] *) Fix a security hole, that allows sessions to be reused in the wrong context thus bypassing client cert protection! All software that uses client certs and session caches in multiple contexts NEEDS PATCHING to allow session reuse! A fuller solution is in the works. [Ben Laurie, problem pointed out by Holger Reif, Bodo Moeller (and ???)] *) Some more source tree cleanups (removed obsolete files crypto/bf/asm/bf586.pl, test/test.txt and crypto/sha/asm/f.s; changed permission on "config" script to be executable) and a fix for the INSTALL document. [Ulf Moeller ] *) Remove some legacy and erroneous uses of malloc, free instead of Malloc, Free. [Lennart Bang , with minor changes by Steve] *) Make rsa_oaep_test return non-zero on error. [Ulf Moeller ] *) Add support for native Solaris shared libraries. Configure solaris-sparc-sc4-pic, make, then run shlib/solaris-sc4.sh. It'd be nice if someone would make that last step automatic. [Matthias Loepfe ] *) ctx_size was not built with the right compiler during "make links". Fixed. [Ben Laurie] *) Change the meaning of 'ALL' in the cipher list. It now means "everything except NULL ciphers". This means the default cipher list will no longer enable NULL ciphers. They need to be specifically enabled e.g. with the string "DEFAULT:eNULL". [Steve Henson] *) Fix to RSA private encryption routines: if p < q then it would occasionally produce an invalid result. This will only happen with externally generated keys because OpenSSL (and SSLeay) ensure p > q. [Steve Henson] *) Be less restrictive and allow also `perl util/perlpath.pl /path/to/bin/perl' in addition to `perl util/perlpath.pl /path/to/bin', because this way one can also use an interpreter named `perl5' (which is usually the name of Perl 5.xxx on platforms where an Perl 4.x is still installed as `perl'). [Matthias Loepfe ] *) Let util/clean-depend.pl work also with older Perl 5.00x versions. [Matthias Loepfe ] *) Fix Makefile.org so CC,CFLAG etc are passed to 'make links' add advapi32.lib to Win32 build and change the pem test comparison to fc.exe (thanks to Ulrich Kroener for the suggestion). Fix misplaced ASNI prototypes and declarations in evp.h and crypto/des/ede_cbcm_enc.c. [Steve Henson] *) DES quad checksum was broken on big-endian architectures. Fixed. [Ben Laurie] *) Comment out two functions in bio.h that aren't implemented. Fix up the Win32 test batch file so it (might) work again. The Win32 test batch file is horrible: I feel ill.... [Steve Henson] *) Move various #ifdefs around so NO_SYSLOG, NO_DIRENT etc are now selected in e_os.h. Audit of header files to check ANSI and non ANSI sections: 10 functions were absent from non ANSI section and not exported from Windows DLLs. Fixed up libeay.num for new functions. [Steve Henson] *) Make `openssl version' output lines consistent. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix Win32 symbol export lists for BIO functions: Added BIO_get_ex_new_index, BIO_get_ex_num, BIO_get_ex_data and BIO_set_ex_data to ms/libeay{16,32}.def. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Second round of fixing the OpenSSL perl/ stuff. It now at least compiled fine under Unix and passes some trivial tests I've now added. But the whole stuff is horribly incomplete, so a README.1ST with a disclaimer was added to make sure no one expects that this stuff really works in the OpenSSL 0.9.2 release. Additionally I've started to clean the XS sources up and fixed a few little bugs and inconsistencies in OpenSSL.{pm,xs} and openssl_bio.xs. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix the generation of two part addresses in perl. [Kenji Miyake , integrated by Ben Laurie] *) Add config entry for Linux on MIPS. [John Tobey ] *) Make links whenever Configure is run, unless we are on Windoze. [Ben Laurie] *) Permit extensions to be added to CRLs using crl_section in openssl.cnf. Currently only issuerAltName and AuthorityKeyIdentifier make any sense in CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) Add a useful kludge to allow package maintainers to specify compiler and other platforms details on the command line without having to patch the Configure script every time: One now can use ``perl Configure :
'', i.e. platform ids are allowed to have details appended to them (separated by colons). This is treated as there would be a static pre-configured entry in Configure's %table under key with value
and ``perl Configure '' is called. So, when you want to perform a quick test-compile under FreeBSD 3.1 with pgcc and without assembler stuff you can use ``perl Configure "FreeBSD-elf:pgcc:-O6:::"'' now, which overrides the FreeBSD-elf entry on-the-fly. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Disable new TLS1 ciphersuites by default: they aren't official yet. [Ben Laurie] *) Allow DSO flags like -fpic, -fPIC, -KPIC etc. to be specified on the `perl Configure ...' command line. This way one can compile OpenSSL libraries with Position Independent Code (PIC) which is needed for linking it into DSOs. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Remarkably, export ciphers were totally broken and no-one had noticed! Fixed. [Ben Laurie] *) Cleaned up the LICENSE document: The official contact for any license questions now is the OpenSSL core team under openssl-core@openssl.org. And add a paragraph about the dual-license situation to make sure people recognize that _BOTH_ the OpenSSL license _AND_ the SSLeay license apply to the OpenSSL toolkit. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) General source tree makefile cleanups: Made `making xxx in yyy...' display consistent in the source tree and replaced `/bin/rm' by `rm'. Additionally cleaned up the `make links' target: Remove unnecessary semicolons, subsequent redundant removes, inline point.sh into mklink.sh to speed processing and no longer clutter the display with confusing stuff. Instead only the actually done links are displayed. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Permit null encryption ciphersuites, used for authentication only. It used to be necessary to set the preprocessor define SSL_ALLOW_ENULL to do this. It is now necessary to set SSL_FORBID_ENULL to prevent the use of null encryption. [Ben Laurie] *) Add a bunch of fixes to the PKCS#7 stuff. It used to sometimes reorder signed attributes when verifying signatures (this would break them), the detached data encoding was wrong and public keys obtained using X509_get_pubkey() weren't freed. [Steve Henson] *) Add text documentation for the BUFFER functions. Also added a work around to a Win95 console bug. This was triggered by the password read stuff: the last character typed gets carried over to the next fread(). If you were generating a new cert request using 'req' for example then the last character of the passphrase would be CR which would then enter the first field as blank. [Steve Henson] *) Added the new `Includes OpenSSL Cryptography Software' button as doc/openssl_button.{gif,html} which is similar in style to the old SSLeay button and can be used by applications based on OpenSSL to show the relationship to the OpenSSL project. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Remove confusing variables in function signatures in files ssl/ssl_lib.c and ssl/ssl.h. [Lennart Bong ] *) Don't install bss_file.c under PREFIX/include/ [Lennart Bong ] *) Get the Win32 compile working again. Modify mkdef.pl so it can handle functions that return function pointers and has support for NT specific stuff. Fix mk1mf.pl and VC-32.pl to support NT differences also. Various #ifdef WIN32 and WINNTs sprinkled about the place and some changes from unsigned to signed types: this was killing the Win32 compile. [Steve Henson] *) Add new certificate file to stack functions, SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() and SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(). These largely supplant SSL_load_client_CA_file(), and can be used to add multiple certs easily to a stack (usually this is then handed to SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list()). This means that Apache-SSL and similar packages don't have to mess around to add as many CAs as they want to the preferred list. [Ben Laurie] *) Experiment with doxygen documentation. Currently only partially applied to ssl/ssl_lib.c. See http://www.stack.nl/~dimitri/doxygen/index.html, and run doxygen with openssl.doxy as the configuration file. [Ben Laurie] *) Get rid of remaining C++-style comments which strict C compilers hate. [Ralf S. Engelschall, pointed out by Carlos Amengual] *) Changed BN_RECURSION in bn_mont.c to BN_RECURSION_MONT so it is not compiled in by default: it has problems with large keys. [Steve Henson] *) Add a bunch of SSL_xxx() functions for configuring the temporary RSA and DH private keys and/or callback functions which directly correspond to their SSL_CTX_xxx() counterparts but work on a per-connection basis. This is needed for applications which have to configure certificates on a per-connection basis (e.g. Apache+mod_ssl) instead of a per-context basis (e.g. s_server). For the RSA certificate situation is makes no difference, but for the DSA certificate situation this fixes the "no shared cipher" problem where the OpenSSL cipher selection procedure failed because the temporary keys were not overtaken from the context and the API provided no way to reconfigure them. The new functions now let applications reconfigure the stuff and they are in detail: SSL_need_tmp_RSA, SSL_set_tmp_rsa, SSL_set_tmp_dh, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback and SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback. Additionally a new non-public-API function ssl_cert_instantiate() is used as a helper function and also to reduce code redundancy inside ssl_rsa.c. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Move s_server -dcert and -dkey options out of the undocumented feature area because they are useful for the DSA situation and should be recognized by the users. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix the cipher decision scheme for export ciphers: the export bits are *not* within SSL_MKEY_MASK or SSL_AUTH_MASK, they are within SSL_EXP_MASK. So, the original variable has to be used instead of the already masked variable. [Richard Levitte ] *) Fix 'port' variable from `int' to `unsigned int' in crypto/bio/b_sock.c [Richard Levitte ] *) Change type of another md_len variable in pk7_doit.c:PKCS7_dataFinal() from `int' to `unsigned int' because it's a length and initialized by EVP_DigestFinal() which expects an `unsigned int *'. [Richard Levitte ] *) Don't hard-code path to Perl interpreter on shebang line of Configure script. Instead use the usual Shell->Perl transition trick. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Make `openssl x509 -noout -modulus' functional also for DSA certificates (in addition to RSA certificates) to match the behaviour of `openssl dsa -noout -modulus' as it's already the case for `openssl rsa -noout -modulus'. For RSA the -modulus is the real "modulus" while for DSA currently the public key is printed (a decision which was already done by `openssl dsa -modulus' in the past) which serves a similar purpose. Additionally the NO_RSA no longer completely removes the whole -modulus option; it now only avoids using the RSA stuff. Same applies to NO_DSA now, too. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Add Arne Ansper's reliable BIO - this is an encrypted, block-digested BIO. See the source (crypto/evp/bio_ok.c) for more info. [Arne Ansper ] *) Dump the old yucky req code that tried (and failed) to allow raw OIDs to be added. Now both 'req' and 'ca' can use new objects defined in the config file. [Steve Henson] *) Add cool BIO that does syslog (or event log on NT). [Arne Ansper , integrated by Ben Laurie] *) Add support for new TLS ciphersuites, TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_RC4_56_MD5, TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5 and TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, as specified in "56-bit Export Cipher Suites For TLS", draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-00.txt. [Ben Laurie] *) Add preliminary config info for new extension code. [Steve Henson] *) Make RSA_NO_PADDING really use no padding. [Ulf Moeller ] *) Generate errors when private/public key check is done. [Ben Laurie] *) Overhaul for 'crl' utility. New function X509_CRL_print. Partial support for some CRL extensions and new objects added. [Steve Henson] *) Really fix the ASN1 IMPLICIT bug this time... Partial support for private key usage extension and fuller support for authority key id. [Steve Henson] *) Add OAEP encryption for the OpenSSL crypto library. OAEP is the improved padding method for RSA, which is recommended for new applications in PKCS #1 v2.0 (RFC 2437, October 1998). OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding) has better theoretical foundations than the ad-hoc padding used in PKCS #1 v1.5. It is secure against Bleichbacher's attack on RSA. [Ulf Moeller , reformatted, corrected and integrated by Ben Laurie] *) Updates to the new SSL compression code [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)] *) Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3 (because the server will not accept higher), that the version number is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00 [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)] *) Run extensive memory leak checks on SSL apps. Fixed *lots* of memory leaks in ssl/ relating to new X509_get_pubkey() behaviour. Also fixes in apps/ and an unrelated leak in crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c [Steve Henson] *) Support for RAW extensions where an arbitrary extension can be created by including its DER encoding. See apps/openssl.cnf for an example. [Steve Henson] *) Make sure latest Perl versions don't interpret some generated C array code as Perl array code in the crypto/err/err_genc.pl script. [Lars Weber <3weber@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>] *) Modify ms/do_ms.bat to not generate assembly language makefiles since not many people have the assembler. Various Win32 compilation fixes and update to the INSTALL.W32 file with (hopefully) more accurate Win32 build instructions. [Steve Henson] *) Modify configure script 'Configure' to automatically create crypto/date.h file under Win32 and also build pem.h from pem.org. New script util/mkfiles.pl to create the MINFO file on environments that can't do a 'make files': perl util/mkfiles.pl >MINFO should work. [Steve Henson] *) Major rework of DES function declarations, in the pursuit of correctness and purity. As a result, many evil casts evaporated, and some weirdness, too. You may find this causes warnings in your code. Zapping your evil casts will probably fix them. Mostly. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix for a typo in asn1.h. Bug fix to object creation script obj_dat.pl. It considered a zero in an object definition to mean "end of object": none of the objects in objects.h have any zeros so it wasn't spotted. [Steve Henson, reported by Erwann ABALEA ] *) Add support for Triple DES Cipher Block Chaining with Output Feedback Masking (CBCM). In the absence of test vectors, the best I have been able to do is check that the decrypt undoes the encrypt, so far. Send me test vectors if you have them. [Ben Laurie] *) Correct calculation of key length for export ciphers (too much space was allocated for null ciphers). This has not been tested! [Ben Laurie] *) Modifications to the mkdef.pl for Win32 DEF file creation. The usage message is now correct (it understands "crypto" and "ssl" on its command line). There is also now an "update" option. This will update the util/ssleay.num and util/libeay.num files with any new functions. If you do a: perl util/mkdef.pl crypto ssl update it will update them. [Steve Henson] *) Overhauled the Perl interface (perl/*): - ported BN stuff to OpenSSL's different BN library - made the perl/ source tree CVS-aware - renamed the package from SSLeay to OpenSSL (the files still contain their history because I've copied them in the repository) - removed obsolete files (the test scripts will be replaced by better Test::Harness variants in the future) [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) First cut for a very conservative source tree cleanup: 1. merge various obsolete readme texts into doc/ssleay.txt where we collect the old documents and readme texts. 2. remove the first part of files where I'm already sure that we no longer need them because of three reasons: either they are just temporary files which were left by Eric or they are preserved original files where I've verified that the diff is also available in the CVS via "cvs diff -rSSLeay_0_8_1b" or they were renamed (as it was definitely the case for the crypto/md/ stuff). [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) More extension code. Incomplete support for subject and issuer alt name, issuer and authority key id. Change the i2v function parameters and add an extra 'crl' parameter in the X509V3_CTX structure: guess what that's for :-) Fix to ASN1 macro which messed up IMPLICIT tag and add f_enum.c which adds a2i, i2a for ENUMERATED. [Steve Henson] *) Preliminary support for ENUMERATED type. This is largely copied from the INTEGER code. [Steve Henson] *) Add new function, EVP_MD_CTX_copy() to replace frequent use of memcpy. [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)] *) Make sure `make rehash' target really finds the `openssl' program. [Ralf S. Engelschall, Matthias Loepfe ] *) Squeeze another 7% of speed out of MD5 assembler, at least on a P2. I'd like to hear about it if this slows down other processors. [Ben Laurie] *) Add CygWin32 platform information to Configure script. [Alan Batie ] *) Fixed ms/32all.bat script: `no_asm' -> `no-asm' [Rainer W. Gerling ] *) New program nseq to manipulate netscape certificate sequences [Steve Henson] *) Modify crl2pkcs7 so it supports multiple -certfile arguments. Fix a few typos. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes to BN code. Previously the default was to define BN_RECURSION but the BN code had some problems that would cause failures when doing certificate verification and some other functions. [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)] *) Add ASN1 and PEM code to support netscape certificate sequences. [Steve Henson] *) Add ASN1 and PEM code to support netscape certificate sequences. [Steve Henson] *) Add several PKIX and private extended key usage OIDs. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the 'ca' program to handle the new extension code. Modify openssl.cnf for new extension format, add comments. [Steve Henson] *) More X509 V3 changes. Fix typo in v3_bitstr.c. Add support to 'req' and add a sample to openssl.cnf so req -x509 now adds appropriate CA extensions. [Steve Henson] *) Continued X509 V3 changes. Add to other makefiles, integrate with the error code, add initial support to X509_print() and x509 application. [Steve Henson] *) Takes a deep breath and start adding X509 V3 extension support code. Add files in crypto/x509v3. Move original stuff to crypto/x509v3/old. All this stuff is currently isolated and isn't even compiled yet. [Steve Henson] *) Continuing patches for GeneralizedTime. Fix up certificate and CRL ASN1 to use ASN1_TIME and modify print routines to use ASN1_TIME_print. Removed the versions check from X509 routines when loading extensions: this allows certain broken certificates that don't set the version properly to be processed. [Steve Henson] *) Deal with irritating shit to do with dependencies, in YAAHW (Yet Another Ad Hoc Way) - Makefile.ssls now all contain local dependencies, which can still be regenerated with "make depend". [Ben Laurie] *) Spelling mistake in C version of CAST-128. [Ben Laurie, reported by Jeremy Hylton ] *) Changes to the error generation code. The perl script err-code.pl now reads in the old error codes and retains the old numbers, only adding new ones if necessary. It also only changes the .err files if new codes are added. The makefiles have been modified to only insert errors when needed (to avoid needlessly modifying header files). This is done by only inserting errors if the .err file is newer than the auto generated C file. To rebuild all the error codes from scratch (the old behaviour) either modify crypto/Makefile.ssl to pass the -regen flag to err_code.pl or delete all the .err files. [Steve Henson] *) CAST-128 was incorrectly implemented for short keys. The C version has been fixed, but is untested. The assembler versions are also fixed, but new assembler HAS NOT BEEN GENERATED FOR WIN32 - the Makefile needs fixing to regenerate it if needed. [Ben Laurie, reported (with fix for C version) by Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino ] *) File was opened incorrectly in randfile.c. [Ulf Möller ] *) Beginning of support for GeneralizedTime. d2i, i2d, check and print functions. Also ASN1_TIME suite which is a CHOICE of UTCTime or GeneralizedTime. ASN1_TIME is the proper type used in certificates et al: it's just almost always a UTCTime. Note this patch adds new error codes so do a "make errors" if there are problems. [Steve Henson] *) Correct Linux 1 recognition in config. [Ulf Möller ] *) Remove pointless MD5 hash when using DSA keys in ca. [Anonymous ] *) Generate an error if given an empty string as a cert directory. Also generate an error if handed NULL (previously returned 0 to indicate an error, but didn't set one). [Ben Laurie, reported by Anonymous ] *) Add prototypes to SSL methods. Make SSL_write's buffer const, at last. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix the dummy function BN_ref_mod_exp() in rsaref.c to have the correct parameters. This was causing a warning which killed off the Win32 compile. [Steve Henson] *) Remove C++ style comments from crypto/bn/bn_local.h. [Neil Costigan ] *) The function OBJ_txt2nid was broken. It was supposed to return a nid based on a text string, looking up short and long names and finally "dot" format. The "dot" format stuff didn't work. Added new function OBJ_txt2obj to do the same but return an ASN1_OBJECT and rewrote OBJ_txt2nid to use it. OBJ_txt2obj can also return objects even if the OID is not part of the table. [Steve Henson] *) Add prototypes to X509 lookup/verify methods, fixing a bug in X509_LOOKUP_by_alias(). [Ben Laurie] *) Sort openssl functions by name. [Ben Laurie] *) Get the gendsa program working (hopefully) and add it to app list. Remove encryption from sample DSA keys (in case anyone is interested the password was "1234"). [Steve Henson] *) Make _all_ *_free functions accept a NULL pointer. [Frans Heymans ] *) If a DH key is generated in s3_srvr.c, don't blow it by trying to use NULL pointers. [Anonymous ] *) s_server should send the CAfile as acceptable CAs, not its own cert. [Bodo Moeller <3moeller@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>] *) Don't blow it for numeric -newkey arguments to apps/req. [Bodo Moeller <3moeller@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>] *) Temp key "for export" tests were wrong in s3_srvr.c. [Anonymous ] *) Add prototype for temp key callback functions SSL_CTX_set_tmp_{rsa,dh}_callback(). [Ben Laurie] *) Make DH_free() tolerate being passed a NULL pointer (like RSA_free() and DSA_free()). Make X509_PUBKEY_set() check for errors in d2i_PublicKey(). [Steve Henson] *) X509_name_add_entry() freed the wrong thing after an error. [Arne Ansper ] *) rsa_eay.c would attempt to free a NULL context. [Arne Ansper ] *) BIO_s_socket() had a broken should_retry() on Windoze. [Arne Ansper ] *) BIO_f_buffer() didn't pass on BIO_CTRL_FLUSH. [Arne Ansper ] *) Make sure the already existing X509_STORE->depth variable is initialized in X509_STORE_new(), but document the fact that this variable is still unused in the certificate verification process. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix the various library and apps files to free up pkeys obtained from X509_PUBKEY_get() et al. Also allow x509.c to handle netscape extensions. [Steve Henson] *) Fix reference counting in X509_PUBKEY_get(). This makes demos/maurice/example2.c work, amongst others, probably. [Steve Henson and Ben Laurie] *) First cut of a cleanup for apps/. First the `ssleay' program is now named `openssl' and second, the shortcut symlinks for the `openssl ' are no longer created. This way we have a single and consistent command line interface `openssl ', similar to `cvs '. [Ralf S. Engelschall, Paul Sutton and Ben Laurie] *) ca.c: move test for DSA keys inside #ifndef NO_DSA. Make pubkey BIT STRING wrapper always have zero unused bits. [Steve Henson] *) Add CA.pl, perl version of CA.sh, add extended key usage OID. [Steve Henson] *) Make the top-level INSTALL documentation easier to understand. [Paul Sutton] *) Makefiles updated to exit if an error occurs in a sub-directory make (including if user presses ^C) [Paul Sutton] *) Make Montgomery context stuff explicit in RSA data structure. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix build order of pem and err to allow for generated pem.h. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix renumbering bug in X509_NAME_delete_entry(). [Ben Laurie] *) Enhanced the err-ins.pl script so it makes the error library number global and can add a library name. This is needed for external ASN1 and other error libraries. [Steve Henson] *) Fixed sk_insert which never worked properly. [Steve Henson] *) Fix ASN1 macros so they can handle indefinite length constructed EXPLICIT tags. Some non standard certificates use these: they can now be read in. [Steve Henson] *) Merged the various old/obsolete SSLeay documentation files (doc/xxx.doc) into a single doc/ssleay.txt bundle. This way the information is still preserved but no longer messes up this directory. Now it's new room for the new set of documentation files. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) SETs were incorrectly DER encoded. This was a major pain, because they shared code with SEQUENCEs, which aren't coded the same. This means that almost everything to do with SETs or SEQUENCEs has either changed name or number of arguments. [Ben Laurie, based on a partial fix by GP Jayan ] *) Fix test data to work with the above. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix the RSA header declarations that hid a bug I fixed in 0.9.0b but was already fixed by Eric for 0.9.1 it seems. [Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf Möller ] *) Autodetect FreeBSD3. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix various bugs in Configure. This affects the following platforms: nextstep ncr-scde unixware-2.0 unixware-2.0-pentium sco5-cc. [Ben Laurie] *) Eliminate generated files from CVS. Reorder tests to regenerate files before they are needed. [Ben Laurie] *) Generate Makefile.ssl from Makefile.org (to keep CVS happy). [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.1b and 0.9.1c [23-Dec-1998] *) Added OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to crypto/crypto.h and changed SSLeay to OpenSSL in version strings. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Some fixups to the top-level documents. [Paul Sutton] *) Fixed the nasty bug where rsaref.h was not found under compile-time because the symlink to include/ was missing. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Incorporated the popular no-RSA/DSA-only patches which allow to compile a RSA-free SSLeay. [Andrew Cooke / Interrader Ldt., Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fixed nasty rehash problem under `make -f Makefile.ssl links' when "ssleay" is still not found. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Added more platforms to Configure: Cray T3E, HPUX 11, [Ralf S. Engelschall, Beckmann ] *) Updated the README file. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Added various .cvsignore files in the CVS repository subdirs to make a "cvs update" really silent. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Recompiled the error-definition header files and added missing symbols to the Win32 linker tables. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Cleaned up the top-level documents; o new files: CHANGES and LICENSE o merged VERSION, HISTORY* and README* files a CHANGES.SSLeay o merged COPYRIGHT into LICENSE o removed obsolete TODO file o renamed MICROSOFT to INSTALL.W32 [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Removed dummy files from the 0.9.1b source tree: crypto/asn1/x crypto/bio/cd crypto/bio/fg crypto/bio/grep crypto/bio/vi crypto/bn/asm/......add.c crypto/bn/asm/a.out crypto/dsa/f crypto/md5/f crypto/pem/gmon.out crypto/perlasm/f crypto/pkcs7/build crypto/rsa/f crypto/sha/asm/f crypto/threads/f ms/zzz ssl/f ssl/f.mak test/f util/f.mak util/pl/f util/pl/f.mak crypto/bf/bf_locl.old apps/f [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Added various platform portability fixes. [Mark J. Cox] *) The Genesis of the OpenSSL rpject: We start with the latest (unreleased) SSLeay version 0.9.1b which Eric A. Young and Tim J. Hudson created while they were working for C2Net until summer 1998. [The OpenSSL Project] Changes between 0.9.0b and 0.9.1b [not released] *) Updated a few CA certificates under certs/ [Eric A. Young] *) Changed some BIGNUM api stuff. [Eric A. Young] *) Various platform ports: OpenBSD, Ultrix, IRIX 64bit, NetBSD, DGUX x86, Linux Alpha, etc. [Eric A. Young] *) New COMP library [crypto/comp/] for SSL Record Layer Compression: RLE (dummy implemented) and ZLIB (really implemented when ZLIB is available). [Eric A. Young] *) Add -strparse option to asn1pars program which parses nested binary structures [Dr Stephen Henson ] *) Added "oid_file" to ssleay.cnf for "ca" and "req" programs. [Eric A. Young] *) DSA fix for "ca" program. [Eric A. Young] *) Added "-genkey" option to "dsaparam" program. [Eric A. Young] *) Added RIPE MD160 (rmd160) message digest. [Eric A. Young] *) Added -a (all) option to "ssleay version" command. [Eric A. Young] *) Added PLATFORM define which is the id given to Configure. [Eric A. Young] *) Added MemCheck_XXXX functions to crypto/mem.c for memory checking. [Eric A. Young] *) Extended the ASN.1 parser routines. [Eric A. Young] *) Extended BIO routines to support REUSEADDR, seek, tell, etc. [Eric A. Young] *) Added a BN_CTX to the BN library. [Eric A. Young] *) Fixed the weak key values in DES library [Eric A. Young] *) Changed API in EVP library for cipher aliases. [Eric A. Young] *) Added support for RC2/64bit cipher. [Eric A. Young] *) Converted the lhash library to the crypto/mem.c functions. [Eric A. Young] *) Added more recognized ASN.1 object ids. [Eric A. Young] *) Added more RSA padding checks for SSL/TLS. [Eric A. Young] *) Added BIO proxy/filter functionality. [Eric A. Young] *) Added extra_certs to SSL_CTX which can be used send extra CA certificates to the client in the CA cert chain sending process. It can be configured with SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(). [Eric A. Young] *) Now Fortezza is denied in the authentication phase because this is key exchange mechanism is not supported by SSLeay at all. [Eric A. Young] *) Additional PKCS1 checks. [Eric A. Young] *) Support the string "TLSv1" for all TLS v1 ciphers. [Eric A. Young] *) Added function SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() which gives the ex_data index of the SSL context in the X509_STORE_CTX ex_data. [Eric A. Young] *) Fixed a few memory leaks. [Eric A. Young] *) Fixed various code and comment typos. [Eric A. Young] *) A minor bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c where there would always be 4 0 bytes sent in the client random. [Edward Bishop ] diff --git a/Configure b/Configure index faf57b155a1c..4bea49d7da76 100755 --- a/Configure +++ b/Configure @@ -1,3615 +1,3615 @@ #! /usr/bin/env perl # -*- mode: perl; -*- # Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ## Configure -- OpenSSL source tree configuration script use 5.10.0; use strict; use Config; use FindBin; use lib "$FindBin::Bin/util/perl"; use File::Basename; use File::Spec::Functions qw/:DEFAULT abs2rel rel2abs/; use File::Path qw/mkpath/; use OpenSSL::Glob; # see INSTALL for instructions. my $orig_death_handler = $SIG{__DIE__}; $SIG{__DIE__} = \&death_handler; my $usage="Usage: Configure [no- ...] [enable- ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-egd] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--config=FILE] os/compiler[:flags]\n"; # Options: # # --config add the given configuration file, which will be read after # any "Configurations*" files that are found in the same # directory as this script. # --prefix prefix for the OpenSSL installation, which includes the # directories bin, lib, include, share/man, share/doc/openssl # This becomes the value of INSTALLTOP in Makefile # (Default: /usr/local) # --openssldir OpenSSL data area, such as openssl.cnf, certificates and keys. # If it's a relative directory, it will be added on the directory # given with --prefix. # This becomes the value of OPENSSLDIR in Makefile and in C. # (Default: PREFIX/ssl) # # --cross-compile-prefix Add specified prefix to binutils components. # # --api One of 0.9.8, 1.0.0 or 1.1.0. Do not compile support for # interfaces deprecated as of the specified OpenSSL version. # # no-hw-xxx do not compile support for specific crypto hardware. # Generic OpenSSL-style methods relating to this support # are always compiled but return NULL if the hardware # support isn't compiled. # no-hw do not compile support for any crypto hardware. # [no-]threads [don't] try to create a library that is suitable for # multithreaded applications (default is "threads" if we # know how to do it) # [no-]shared [don't] try to create shared libraries when supported. # [no-]pic [don't] try to build position independent code when supported. # If disabled, it also disables shared and dynamic-engine. # no-asm do not use assembler # no-egd do not compile support for the entropy-gathering daemon APIs # [no-]zlib [don't] compile support for zlib compression. # zlib-dynamic Like "zlib", but the zlib library is expected to be a shared # library and will be loaded in run-time by the OpenSSL library. # sctp include SCTP support # enable-weak-ssl-ciphers # Enable weak ciphers that are disabled by default. # 386 generate 80386 code in assembly modules # no-sse2 disables IA-32 SSE2 code in assembly modules, the above # mentioned '386' option implies this one # no- build without specified algorithm (rsa, idea, rc5, ...) # - + All options which are unknown to the 'Configure' script are # / passed through to the compiler. Unix-style options beginning # with a '-' or '+' are recognized, as well as Windows-style # options beginning with a '/'. If the option contains arguments # separated by spaces, then the URL-style notation %20 can be # used for the space character in order to avoid having to quote # the option. For example, -opt%20arg gets expanded to -opt arg. # In fact, any ASCII character can be encoded as %xx using its # hexadecimal encoding. # -static while -static is also a pass-through compiler option (and # as such is limited to environments where it's actually # meaningful), it triggers a number configuration options, # namely no-pic, no-shared and no-threads. It is # argued that the only reason to produce statically linked # binaries (and in context it means executables linked with # -static flag, and not just executables linked with static # libcrypto.a) is to eliminate dependency on specific run-time, # a.k.a. libc version. The mentioned config options are meant # to achieve just that. Unfortunately on Linux it's impossible # to eliminate the dependency completely for openssl executable # because of getaddrinfo and gethostbyname calls, which can # invoke dynamically loadable library facility anyway to meet # the lookup requests. For this reason on Linux statically # linked openssl executable has rather debugging value than # production quality. # # BN_LLONG use the type 'long long' in crypto/bn/bn.h # RC4_CHAR use 'char' instead of 'int' for RC4_INT in crypto/rc4/rc4.h # Following are set automatically by this script # # MD5_ASM use some extra md5 assembler, # SHA1_ASM use some extra sha1 assembler, must define L_ENDIAN for x86 # RMD160_ASM use some extra ripemd160 assembler, # SHA256_ASM sha256_block is implemented in assembler # SHA512_ASM sha512_block is implemented in assembler # AES_ASM AES_[en|de]crypt is implemented in assembler # Minimum warning options... any contributions to OpenSSL should at least # get past these. Note that we only use these with C compilers, not with # C++ compilers. # DEBUG_UNUSED enables __owur (warn unused result) checks. # -DPEDANTIC complements -pedantic and is meant to mask code that # is not strictly standard-compliant and/or implementation-specific, # e.g. inline assembly, disregards to alignment requirements, such # that -pedantic would complain about. Incidentally -DPEDANTIC has # to be used even in sanitized builds, because sanitizer too is # supposed to and does take notice of non-standard behaviour. Then # -pedantic with pre-C9x compiler would also complain about 'long # long' not being supported. As 64-bit algorithms are common now, # it grew impossible to resolve this without sizeable additional # code, so we just tell compiler to be pedantic about everything # but 'long long' type. my @gcc_devteam_warn = qw( -DDEBUG_UNUSED -DPEDANTIC -pedantic -Wno-long-long -Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wswitch -Wsign-compare -Wshadow -Wformat -Wtype-limits -Wundef -Werror -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes ); # These are used in addition to $gcc_devteam_warn when the compiler is clang. # TODO(openssl-team): fix problems and investigate if (at least) the # following warnings can also be enabled: # -Wcast-align # -Wunreachable-code -- no, too ugly/compiler-specific # -Wlanguage-extension-token -- no, we use asm() # -Wunused-macros -- no, too tricky for BN and _XOPEN_SOURCE etc # -Wextended-offsetof -- no, needed in CMS ASN1 code my @clang_devteam_warn = qw( -Wno-unknown-warning-option -Wswitch-default -Wno-parentheses-equality -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -Wconditional-uninitialized -Wincompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers -Wmissing-variable-declarations ); my @cl_devteam_warn = qw( /WX ); # This adds backtrace information to the memory leak info. Is only used # when crypto-mdebug-backtrace is enabled. my $memleak_devteam_backtrace = "-rdynamic"; my $strict_warnings = 0; # As for $BSDthreads. Idea is to maintain "collective" set of flags, # which would cover all BSD flavors. -pthread applies to them all, # but is treated differently. OpenBSD expands is as -D_POSIX_THREAD # -lc_r, which is sufficient. FreeBSD 4.x expands it as -lc_r, # which has to be accompanied by explicit -D_THREAD_SAFE and # sometimes -D_REENTRANT. FreeBSD 5.x expands it as -lc_r, which # seems to be sufficient? our $BSDthreads="-pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT"; # # API compatibility name to version number mapping. # my $maxapi = "1.1.0"; # API for "no-deprecated" builds my $apitable = { "1.1.0" => "0x10100000L", "1.0.0" => "0x10000000L", "0.9.8" => "0x00908000L", }; our %table = (); our %config = (); our %withargs = (); our $now_printing; # set to current entry's name in print_table_entry # (todo: right thing would be to encapsulate name # into %target [class] and make print_table_entry # a method) # Forward declarations ############################################### # read_config(filename) # # Reads a configuration file and populates %table with the contents # (which the configuration file places in %targets). sub read_config; # resolve_config(target) # # Resolves all the late evaluations, inheritances and so on for the # chosen target and any target it inherits from. sub resolve_config; # Information collection ############################################# # Unified build supports separate build dir my $srcdir = catdir(absolutedir(dirname($0))); # catdir ensures local syntax my $blddir = catdir(absolutedir(".")); # catdir ensures local syntax # File::Spec::Unix doesn't detect case insensitivity, so we make sure to # check if the source and build directory are really the same, and make # them so. This avoids all kinds of confusion later on. # We must check @File::Spec::ISA rather than using File::Spec->isa() to # know if File::Spec ended up loading File::Spec::Unix. $srcdir = $blddir if (grep(/::Unix$/, @File::Spec::ISA) && samedir($srcdir, $blddir)); my $dofile = abs2rel(catfile($srcdir, "util/dofile.pl")); my $local_config_envname = 'OPENSSL_LOCAL_CONFIG_DIR'; $config{sourcedir} = abs2rel($srcdir, $blddir); $config{builddir} = abs2rel($blddir, $blddir); # Collect reconfiguration information if needed my @argvcopy=@ARGV; if (grep /^reconf(igure)?$/, @argvcopy) { die "reconfiguring with other arguments present isn't supported" if scalar @argvcopy > 1; if (-f "./configdata.pm") { my $file = "./configdata.pm"; unless (my $return = do $file) { die "couldn't parse $file: $@" if $@; die "couldn't do $file: $!" unless defined $return; die "couldn't run $file" unless $return; } @argvcopy = defined($configdata::config{perlargv}) ? @{$configdata::config{perlargv}} : (); die "Incorrect data to reconfigure, please do a normal configuration\n" if (grep(/^reconf/,@argvcopy)); $config{perlenv} = $configdata::config{perlenv} // {}; } else { die "Insufficient data to reconfigure, please do a normal configuration\n"; } } $config{perlargv} = [ @argvcopy ]; # Collect version numbers $config{version} = "unknown"; $config{version_num} = "unknown"; $config{shlib_version_number} = "unknown"; $config{shlib_version_history} = "unknown"; collect_information( collect_from_file(catfile($srcdir,'include/openssl/opensslv.h')), qr/OPENSSL.VERSION.TEXT.*OpenSSL (\S+) / => sub { $config{version} = $1; }, qr/OPENSSL.VERSION.NUMBER.*(0x\S+)/ => sub { $config{version_num}=$1 }, qr/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER *"([^"]+)"/ => sub { $config{shlib_version_number}=$1 }, qr/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY *"([^"]*)"/ => sub { $config{shlib_version_history}=$1 } ); if ($config{shlib_version_history} ne "") { $config{shlib_version_history} .= ":"; } ($config{major}, $config{minor}) = ($config{version} =~ /^([0-9]+)\.([0-9\.]+)/); ($config{shlib_major}, $config{shlib_minor}) = ($config{shlib_version_number} =~ /^([0-9]+)\.([0-9\.]+)/); die "erroneous version information in opensslv.h: ", "$config{major}, $config{minor}, $config{shlib_major}, $config{shlib_minor}\n" if ($config{major} eq "" || $config{minor} eq "" || $config{shlib_major} eq "" || $config{shlib_minor} eq ""); # Collect target configurations my $pattern = catfile(dirname($0), "Configurations", "*.conf"); foreach (sort glob($pattern)) { &read_config($_); } if (defined env($local_config_envname)) { if ($^O eq 'VMS') { # VMS environment variables are logical names, # which can be used as is $pattern = $local_config_envname . ':' . '*.conf'; } else { $pattern = catfile(env($local_config_envname), '*.conf'); } foreach (sort glob($pattern)) { &read_config($_); } } # Save away perl command information $config{perl_cmd} = $^X; $config{perl_version} = $Config{version}; $config{perl_archname} = $Config{archname}; $config{prefix}=""; $config{openssldir}=""; $config{processor}=""; $config{libdir}=""; my $auto_threads=1; # enable threads automatically? true by default my $default_ranlib; # Top level directories to build $config{dirs} = [ "crypto", "ssl", "engines", "apps", "test", "util", "tools", "fuzz" ]; # crypto/ subdirectories to build $config{sdirs} = [ "objects", "md2", "md4", "md5", "sha", "mdc2", "hmac", "ripemd", "whrlpool", "poly1305", "blake2", "siphash", "sm3", "des", "aes", "rc2", "rc4", "rc5", "idea", "aria", "bf", "cast", "camellia", "seed", "sm4", "chacha", "modes", "bn", "ec", "rsa", "dsa", "dh", "sm2", "dso", "engine", "buffer", "bio", "stack", "lhash", "rand", "err", "evp", "asn1", "pem", "x509", "x509v3", "conf", "txt_db", "pkcs7", "pkcs12", "comp", "ocsp", "ui", "cms", "ts", "srp", "cmac", "ct", "async", "kdf", "store" ]; # test/ subdirectories to build $config{tdirs} = [ "ossl_shim" ]; # Known TLS and DTLS protocols my @tls = qw(ssl3 tls1 tls1_1 tls1_2 tls1_3); my @dtls = qw(dtls1 dtls1_2); # Explicitly known options that are possible to disable. They can # be regexps, and will be used like this: /^no-${option}$/ # For developers: keep it sorted alphabetically my @disablables = ( "afalgeng", "aria", "asan", "asm", "async", "autoalginit", "autoerrinit", "autoload-config", "bf", "blake2", "buildtest-c\\+\\+", "camellia", "capieng", "cast", "chacha", "cmac", "cms", "comp", "crypto-mdebug", "crypto-mdebug-backtrace", "ct", "deprecated", "des", "devcryptoeng", "dgram", "dh", "dsa", "dso", "dtls", "dynamic-engine", "ec", "ec2m", "ecdh", "ecdsa", "ec_nistp_64_gcc_128", "egd", "engine", "err", "external-tests", "filenames", "fuzz-libfuzzer", "fuzz-afl", "gost", "heartbeats", "hw(-.+)?", "idea", "makedepend", "md2", "md4", "mdc2", "msan", "multiblock", "nextprotoneg", "pinshared", "ocb", "ocsp", "pic", "poly1305", "posix-io", "psk", "rc2", "rc4", "rc5", "rdrand", "rfc3779", "rmd160", "scrypt", "sctp", "seed", "shared", "siphash", "sm2", "sm3", "sm4", "sock", "srp", "srtp", "sse2", "ssl", "ssl-trace", "static-engine", "stdio", "tests", "threads", "tls", "ts", "ubsan", "ui-console", "unit-test", "whirlpool", "weak-ssl-ciphers", "zlib", "zlib-dynamic", ); foreach my $proto ((@tls, @dtls)) { push(@disablables, $proto); push(@disablables, "$proto-method") unless $proto eq "tls1_3"; } my %deprecated_disablables = ( "ssl2" => undef, "buf-freelists" => undef, "ripemd" => "rmd160", "ui" => "ui-console", ); # All of the following are disabled by default: our %disabled = ( # "what" => "comment" "asan" => "default", "buildtest-c++" => "default", "crypto-mdebug" => "default", "crypto-mdebug-backtrace" => "default", "devcryptoeng" => "default", "ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" => "default", "egd" => "default", "external-tests" => "default", "fuzz-libfuzzer" => "default", "fuzz-afl" => "default", "heartbeats" => "default", "md2" => "default", "msan" => "default", "rc5" => "default", "sctp" => "default", "ssl-trace" => "default", "ssl3" => "default", "ssl3-method" => "default", "ubsan" => "default", "unit-test" => "default", "weak-ssl-ciphers" => "default", "zlib" => "default", "zlib-dynamic" => "default", ); # Note: => pair form used for aesthetics, not to truly make a hash table my @disable_cascades = ( # "what" => [ "cascade", ... ] sub { $config{processor} eq "386" } => [ "sse2" ], "ssl" => [ "ssl3" ], "ssl3-method" => [ "ssl3" ], "zlib" => [ "zlib-dynamic" ], "des" => [ "mdc2" ], "ec" => [ "ecdsa", "ecdh" ], "dgram" => [ "dtls", "sctp" ], "sock" => [ "dgram" ], "dtls" => [ @dtls ], sub { 0 == scalar grep { !$disabled{$_} } @dtls } => [ "dtls" ], "tls" => [ @tls ], sub { 0 == scalar grep { !$disabled{$_} } @tls } => [ "tls" ], "crypto-mdebug" => [ "crypto-mdebug-backtrace" ], # Without position independent code, there can be no shared libraries or DSOs "pic" => [ "shared" ], "shared" => [ "dynamic-engine" ], "dso" => [ "dynamic-engine" ], "engine" => [ "afalgeng", "devcryptoeng" ], # no-autoalginit is only useful when building non-shared "autoalginit" => [ "shared", "apps" ], "stdio" => [ "apps", "capieng", "egd" ], "apps" => [ "tests" ], "tests" => [ "external-tests" ], "comp" => [ "zlib" ], "ec" => [ "tls1_3", "sm2" ], "sm3" => [ "sm2" ], sub { !$disabled{"unit-test"} } => [ "heartbeats" ], sub { !$disabled{"msan"} } => [ "asm" ], ); # Avoid protocol support holes. Also disable all versions below N, if version # N is disabled while N+1 is enabled. # my @list = (reverse @tls); while ((my $first, my $second) = (shift @list, shift @list)) { last unless @list; push @disable_cascades, ( sub { !$disabled{$first} && $disabled{$second} } => [ @list ] ); unshift @list, $second; } my @list = (reverse @dtls); while ((my $first, my $second) = (shift @list, shift @list)) { last unless @list; push @disable_cascades, ( sub { !$disabled{$first} && $disabled{$second} } => [ @list ] ); unshift @list, $second; } # Explicit "no-..." options will be collected in %disabled along with the defaults. # To remove something from %disabled, use "enable-foo". # For symmetry, "disable-foo" is a synonym for "no-foo". &usage if ($#ARGV < 0); # For the "make variables" CPPINCLUDES and CPPDEFINES, we support lists with # platform specific list separators. Users from those platforms should # recognise those separators from how you set up the PATH to find executables. # The default is the Unix like separator, :, but as an exception, we also # support the space as separator. my $list_separator_re = { VMS => qr/(? qr/(? {$^O} // qr/(? env('AR'), ARFLAGS => [], AS => undef, ASFLAGS => [], CC => env('CC'), CFLAGS => [ env('CFLAGS') || () ], CXX => env('CXX'), CXXFLAGS => [ env('CXXFLAGS') || () ], CPP => undef, CPPFLAGS => [ env('CPPFLAGS') || () ], # -D, -I, -Wp, CPPDEFINES => [], # Alternative for -D CPPINCLUDES => [], # Alternative for -I CROSS_COMPILE => env('CROSS_COMPILE'), HASHBANGPERL=> env('HASHBANGPERL') || env('PERL'), LD => undef, LDFLAGS => [ env('LDFLAGS') || () ], # -L, -Wl, LDLIBS => [ env('LDLIBS') || () ], # -l MT => undef, MTFLAGS => [], PERL => env('PERL') || ($^O ne "VMS" ? $^X : "perl"), RANLIB => env('RANLIB'), RC => env('RC') || env('WINDRES'), RCFLAGS => [ env('RCFLAGS') || () ], RM => undef, ); # Info about what "make variables" may be prefixed with the cross compiler # prefix. This should NEVER mention any such variable with a list for value. my @user_crossable = qw ( AR AS CC CXX CPP LD MT RANLIB RC ); # The same but for flags given as Configure options. These are *additional* # input, as opposed to the VAR=string option that override the corresponding # config target attributes my %useradd = ( CPPDEFINES => [], CPPINCLUDES => [], CPPFLAGS => [], CFLAGS => [], CXXFLAGS => [], LDFLAGS => [], LDLIBS => [], RCFLAGS => [], ); my %user_synonyms = ( HASHBANGPERL=> 'PERL', RC => 'WINDRES', ); # Some target attributes have been renamed, this is the translation table my %target_attr_translate =( ar => 'AR', as => 'AS', cc => 'CC', cxx => 'CXX', cpp => 'CPP', hashbangperl => 'HASHBANGPERL', ld => 'LD', mt => 'MT', ranlib => 'RANLIB', rc => 'RC', rm => 'RM', ); # Initialisers coming from 'config' scripts $config{defines} = [ split(/$list_separator_re/, env('__CNF_CPPDEFINES')) ]; $config{includes} = [ split(/$list_separator_re/, env('__CNF_CPPINCLUDES')) ]; $config{cppflags} = [ env('__CNF_CPPFLAGS') || () ]; $config{cflags} = [ env('__CNF_CFLAGS') || () ]; $config{cxxflags} = [ env('__CNF_CXXFLAGS') || () ]; $config{lflags} = [ env('__CNF_LDFLAGS') || () ]; $config{ex_libs} = [ env('__CNF_LDLIBS') || () ]; $config{openssl_api_defines}=[]; $config{openssl_algorithm_defines}=[]; $config{openssl_thread_defines}=[]; $config{openssl_sys_defines}=[]; $config{openssl_other_defines}=[]; $config{options}=""; $config{build_type} = "release"; my $target=""; my %cmdvars = (); # Stores FOO='blah' type arguments my %unsupported_options = (); my %deprecated_options = (); # If you change this, update apps/version.c my @known_seed_sources = qw(getrandom devrandom os egd none rdcpu librandom); my @seed_sources = (); while (@argvcopy) { $_ = shift @argvcopy; # Support env variable assignments among the options if (m|^(\w+)=(.+)?$|) { $cmdvars{$1} = $2; # Every time a variable is given as a configuration argument, # it acts as a reset if the variable. if (exists $user{$1}) { $user{$1} = ref $user{$1} eq "ARRAY" ? [] : undef; } #if (exists $useradd{$1}) # { # $useradd{$1} = []; # } next; } # VMS is a case insensitive environment, and depending on settings # out of our control, we may receive options uppercased. Let's # downcase at least the part before any equal sign. if ($^O eq "VMS") { s/^([^=]*)/lc($1)/e; } # some people just can't read the instructions, clang people have to... s/^-no-(?!integrated-as)/no-/; # rewrite some options in "enable-..." form s /^-?-?shared$/enable-shared/; s /^sctp$/enable-sctp/; s /^threads$/enable-threads/; s /^zlib$/enable-zlib/; s /^zlib-dynamic$/enable-zlib-dynamic/; if (/^(no|disable|enable)-(.+)$/) { my $word = $2; if (!exists $deprecated_disablables{$word} && !grep { $word =~ /^${_}$/ } @disablables) { $unsupported_options{$_} = 1; next; } } if (/^no-(.+)$/ || /^disable-(.+)$/) { foreach my $proto ((@tls, @dtls)) { if ($1 eq "$proto-method") { $disabled{"$proto"} = "option($proto-method)"; last; } } if ($1 eq "dtls") { foreach my $proto (@dtls) { $disabled{$proto} = "option(dtls)"; } $disabled{"dtls"} = "option(dtls)"; } elsif ($1 eq "ssl") { # Last one of its kind $disabled{"ssl3"} = "option(ssl)"; } elsif ($1 eq "tls") { # XXX: Tests will fail if all SSL/TLS # protocols are disabled. foreach my $proto (@tls) { $disabled{$proto} = "option(tls)"; } } elsif ($1 eq "static-engine") { delete $disabled{"dynamic-engine"}; } elsif ($1 eq "dynamic-engine") { $disabled{"dynamic-engine"} = "option"; } elsif (exists $deprecated_disablables{$1}) { if ($deprecated_disablables{$1} ne "") { $deprecated_options{$_} = 1; if (defined $deprecated_disablables{$1}) { $disabled{$deprecated_disablables{$1}} = "option"; } } } else { $disabled{$1} = "option"; } # No longer an automatic choice $auto_threads = 0 if ($1 eq "threads"); } elsif (/^enable-(.+)$/) { if ($1 eq "static-engine") { $disabled{"dynamic-engine"} = "option"; } elsif ($1 eq "dynamic-engine") { delete $disabled{"dynamic-engine"}; } elsif ($1 eq "zlib-dynamic") { delete $disabled{"zlib"}; } my $algo = $1; delete $disabled{$algo}; # No longer an automatic choice $auto_threads = 0 if ($1 eq "threads"); } elsif (/^--strict-warnings$/) { # Pretend that our strict flags is a C flag, and replace it # with the proper flags later on push @{$useradd{CFLAGS}}, '--ossl-strict-warnings'; $strict_warnings=1; } elsif (/^--debug$/) { $config{build_type} = "debug"; } elsif (/^--release$/) { $config{build_type} = "release"; } elsif (/^386$/) { $config{processor}=386; } elsif (/^fips$/) { die "FIPS mode not supported\n"; } elsif (/^rsaref$/) { # No RSAref support any more since it's not needed. # The check for the option is there so scripts aren't # broken } elsif (/^nofipscanistercheck$/) { die "FIPS mode not supported\n"; } elsif (m|^[-+/]|) { if (/^--prefix=(.*)$/) { $config{prefix}=$1; die "Directory given with --prefix MUST be absolute\n" unless file_name_is_absolute($config{prefix}); } elsif (/^--api=(.*)$/) { $config{api}=$1; } elsif (/^--libdir=(.*)$/) { $config{libdir}=$1; } elsif (/^--openssldir=(.*)$/) { $config{openssldir}=$1; } elsif (/^--with-zlib-lib=(.*)$/) { $withargs{zlib_lib}=$1; } elsif (/^--with-zlib-include=(.*)$/) { $withargs{zlib_include}=$1; } elsif (/^--with-fuzzer-lib=(.*)$/) { $withargs{fuzzer_lib}=$1; } elsif (/^--with-fuzzer-include=(.*)$/) { $withargs{fuzzer_include}=$1; } elsif (/^--with-rand-seed=(.*)$/) { foreach my $x (split(m|,|, $1)) { die "Unknown --with-rand-seed choice $x\n" if ! grep { $x eq $_ } @known_seed_sources; push @seed_sources, $x; } } elsif (/^--cross-compile-prefix=(.*)$/) { $user{CROSS_COMPILE}=$1; } elsif (/^--config=(.*)$/) { read_config $1; } elsif (/^-l(.*)$/) { push @{$useradd{LDLIBS}}, $_; } elsif (/^-framework$/) { push @{$useradd{LDLIBS}}, $_, shift(@argvcopy); } elsif (/^-L(.*)$/ or /^-Wl,/) { push @{$useradd{LDFLAGS}}, $_; } elsif (/^-rpath$/ or /^-R$/) # -rpath is the OSF1 rpath flag # -R is the old Solaris rpath flag { my $rpath = shift(@argvcopy) || ""; $rpath .= " " if $rpath ne ""; push @{$useradd{LDFLAGS}}, $_, $rpath; } elsif (/^-static$/) { push @{$useradd{LDFLAGS}}, $_; } elsif (m|^[-/]D(.*)$|) { push @{$useradd{CPPDEFINES}}, $1; } elsif (m|^[-/]I(.*)$|) { push @{$useradd{CPPINCLUDES}}, $1; } elsif (/^-Wp,$/) { push @{$useradd{CPPFLAGS}}, $1; } else # common if (/^[-+]/), just pass down... { # Treat %xx as an ASCII code (e.g. replace %20 by a space character). # This provides a simple way to pass options with arguments separated # by spaces without quoting (e.g. -opt%20arg translates to -opt arg). $_ =~ s/%([0-9a-f]{1,2})/chr(hex($1))/gei; push @{$useradd{CFLAGS}}, $_; push @{$useradd{CXXFLAGS}}, $_; } } elsif (m|^/|) { # Treat %xx as an ASCII code (e.g. replace %20 by a space character). # This provides a simple way to pass options with arguments separated # by spaces without quoting (e.g. /opt%20arg translates to /opt arg). $_ =~ s/%([0-9a-f]{1,2})/chr(hex($1))/gei; push @{$useradd{CFLAGS}}, $_; push @{$useradd{CXXFLAGS}}, $_; } else { die "target already defined - $target (offending arg: $_)\n" if ($target ne ""); $target=$_; } unless ($_ eq $target || /^no-/ || /^disable-/) { # "no-..." follows later after implied deactivations # have been derived. (Don't take this too seriously, # we really only write OPTIONS to the Makefile out of # nostalgia.) if ($config{options} eq "") { $config{options} = $_; } else { $config{options} .= " ".$_; } } } if (defined($config{api}) && !exists $apitable->{$config{api}}) { die "***** Unsupported api compatibility level: $config{api}\n", } if (keys %deprecated_options) { warn "***** Deprecated options: ", join(", ", keys %deprecated_options), "\n"; } if (keys %unsupported_options) { die "***** Unsupported options: ", join(", ", keys %unsupported_options), "\n"; } # If any %useradd entry has been set, we must check that the "make # variables" haven't been set. We start by checking of any %useradd entry # is set. if (grep { scalar @$_ > 0 } values %useradd) { # Hash of env / make variables names. The possible values are: # 1 - "make vars" # 2 - %useradd entry set # 3 - both set my %detected_vars = map { my $v = 0; $v += 1 if $cmdvars{$_}; $v += 2 if @{$useradd{$_}}; $_ => $v } keys %useradd; # If any of the corresponding "make variables" is set, we error if (grep { $_ & 1 } values %detected_vars) { my $names = join(', ', grep { $detected_vars{$_} > 0 } sort keys %detected_vars); die <<"_____"; ***** Mixing make variables and additional compiler/linker flags as ***** configure command line option is not permitted. ***** Affected make variables: $names _____ } } # Check through all supported command line variables to see if any of them # were set, and canonicalise the values we got. If no compiler or linker # flag or anything else that affects %useradd was set, we also check the # environment for values. my $anyuseradd = grep { defined $_ && (ref $_ ne 'ARRAY' || @$_) } values %useradd; foreach (keys %user) { my $value = $cmdvars{$_}; $value //= env($_) unless $anyuseradd; $value //= defined $user_synonyms{$_} ? $cmdvars{$user_synonyms{$_}} : undef; $value //= defined $user_synonyms{$_} ? env($user_synonyms{$_}) : undef unless $anyuseradd; if (defined $value) { if (ref $user{$_} eq 'ARRAY') { if ($_ eq 'CPPDEFINES' || $_ eq 'CPPINCLUDES') { $user{$_} = [ split /$list_separator_re/, $value ]; } else { $user{$_} = [ $value ]; } } elsif (!defined $user{$_}) { $user{$_} = $value; } } } if (grep { /-rpath\b/ } ($user{LDFLAGS} ? @{$user{LDFLAGS}} : ()) && !$disabled{shared} && !($disabled{asan} && $disabled{msan} && $disabled{ubsan})) { die "***** Cannot simultaneously use -rpath, shared libraries, and\n", "***** any of asan, msan or ubsan\n"; } sub disable { my $disable_type = shift; for (@_) { $disabled{$_} = $disable_type; } my @tocheckfor = (@_ ? @_ : keys %disabled); while (@tocheckfor) { my %new_tocheckfor = (); my @cascade_copy = (@disable_cascades); while (@cascade_copy) { my ($test, $descendents) = (shift @cascade_copy, shift @cascade_copy); if (ref($test) eq "CODE" ? $test->() : defined($disabled{$test})) { foreach (grep { !defined($disabled{$_}) } @$descendents) { $new_tocheckfor{$_} = 1; $disabled{$_} = "cascade"; } } } @tocheckfor = (keys %new_tocheckfor); } } disable(); # First cascade run our $die = sub { die @_; }; if ($target eq "TABLE") { local $die = sub { warn @_; }; foreach (sort keys %table) { print_table_entry($_, "TABLE"); } exit 0; } if ($target eq "LIST") { foreach (sort keys %table) { print $_,"\n" unless $table{$_}->{template}; } exit 0; } if ($target eq "HASH") { local $die = sub { warn @_; }; print "%table = (\n"; foreach (sort keys %table) { print_table_entry($_, "HASH"); } exit 0; } print "Configuring OpenSSL version $config{version} ($config{version_num}) "; print "for $target\n"; if (scalar(@seed_sources) == 0) { print "Using os-specific seed configuration\n"; push @seed_sources, 'os'; } if (scalar(grep { $_ eq 'egd' } @seed_sources) > 0) { delete $disabled{'egd'}; } if (scalar(grep { $_ eq 'none' } @seed_sources) > 0) { die "Cannot seed with none and anything else" if scalar(@seed_sources) > 1; warn <<_____ if scalar(@seed_sources) == 1; ============================== WARNING =============================== You have selected the --with-rand-seed=none option, which effectively disables automatic reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator. All operations depending on the random generator such as creating keys will not work unless the random generator is seeded manually by the application. Please read the 'Note on random number generation' section in the INSTALL instructions and the RAND_DRBG(7) manual page for more details. ============================== WARNING =============================== _____ } push @{$config{openssl_other_defines}}, map { (my $x = $_) =~ tr|[\-a-z]|[_A-Z]|; "OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_$x" } @seed_sources; # Backward compatibility? if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) { $target = "Cygwin".$1; } # Support for legacy targets having a name starting with 'debug-' my ($d, $t) = $target =~ m/^(debug-)?(.*)$/; if ($d) { $config{build_type} = "debug"; # If we do not find debug-foo in the table, the target is set to foo. if (!$table{$target}) { $target = $t; } } &usage if !$table{$target} || $table{$target}->{template}; $config{target} = $target; my %target = resolve_config($target); foreach (keys %target_attr_translate) { $target{$target_attr_translate{$_}} = $target{$_} if $target{$_}; delete $target{$_}; } %target = ( %{$table{DEFAULTS}}, %target ); my %conf_files = map { $_ => 1 } (@{$target{_conf_fname_int}}); $config{conf_files} = [ sort keys %conf_files ]; # Using sub disable within these loops may prove fragile, so we run # a cascade afterwards foreach my $feature (@{$target{disable}}) { if (exists $deprecated_disablables{$feature}) { warn "***** config $target disables deprecated feature $feature\n"; } elsif (!grep { $feature eq $_ } @disablables) { die "***** config $target disables unknown feature $feature\n"; } $disabled{$feature} = 'config'; } foreach my $feature (@{$target{enable}}) { if ("default" eq ($disabled{$feature} // "")) { if (exists $deprecated_disablables{$feature}) { warn "***** config $target enables deprecated feature $feature\n"; } elsif (!grep { $feature eq $_ } @disablables) { die "***** config $target enables unknown feature $feature\n"; } delete $disabled{$feature}; } } disable(); # Run a cascade now $target{CXXFLAGS}//=$target{CFLAGS} if $target{CXX}; $target{cxxflags}//=$target{cflags} if $target{CXX}; $target{exe_extension}=""; $target{exe_extension}=".exe" if ($config{target} eq "DJGPP" || $config{target} =~ /^(?:Cygwin|mingw)/); $target{exe_extension}=".pm" if ($config{target} =~ /vos/); ($target{shared_extension_simple}=$target{shared_extension}) =~ s|\.\$\(SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER\)|| unless defined($target{shared_extension_simple}); $target{dso_extension}//=$target{shared_extension_simple}; ($target{shared_import_extension}=$target{shared_extension_simple}.".a") if ($config{target} =~ /^(?:Cygwin|mingw)/); # Fill %config with values from %user, and in case those are undefined or # empty, use values from %target (acting as a default). foreach (keys %user) { my $ref_type = ref $user{$_}; # Temporary function. Takes an intended ref type (empty string or "ARRAY") # and a value that's to be coerced into that type. my $mkvalue = sub { my $type = shift; my $value = shift; my $undef_p = shift; die "Too many arguments for \$mkvalue" if @_; while (ref $value eq 'CODE') { $value = $value->(); } if ($type eq 'ARRAY') { return undef unless defined $value; return undef if ref $value ne 'ARRAY' && !$value; return undef if ref $value eq 'ARRAY' && !@$value; return [ $value ] unless ref $value eq 'ARRAY'; } return undef unless $value; return $value; }; $config{$_} = $mkvalue->($ref_type, $user{$_}) || $mkvalue->($ref_type, $target{$_}); delete $config{$_} unless defined $config{$_}; } # Finish up %config by appending things the user gave us on the command line # apart from "make variables" foreach (keys %useradd) { # The must all be lists, so we assert that here die "internal error: \$useradd{$_} isn't an ARRAY\n" unless ref $useradd{$_} eq 'ARRAY'; if (defined $config{$_}) { push @{$config{$_}}, @{$useradd{$_}}; } else { $config{$_} = [ @{$useradd{$_}} ]; } } # At this point, we can forget everything about %user and %useradd, # because it's now all been merged into the corresponding $config entry if (grep { $_ eq '-static' } @{$config{LDFLAGS}}) { disable('static', 'pic', 'threads'); } # Allow overriding the build file name $config{build_file} = env('BUILDFILE') || $target{build_file} || "Makefile"; # Make sure build_scheme is consistent. $target{build_scheme} = [ $target{build_scheme} ] if ref($target{build_scheme}) ne "ARRAY"; my ($builder, $builder_platform, @builder_opts) = @{$target{build_scheme}}; foreach my $checker (($builder_platform."-".$target{build_file}."-checker.pm", $builder_platform."-checker.pm")) { my $checker_path = catfile($srcdir, "Configurations", $checker); if (-f $checker_path) { my $fn = $ENV{CONFIGURE_CHECKER_WARN} ? sub { warn $@; } : sub { die $@; }; if (! do $checker_path) { if ($@) { $fn->($@); } elsif ($!) { $fn->($!); } else { $fn->("The detected tools didn't match the platform\n"); } } last; } } push @{$config{defines}}, "NDEBUG" if $config{build_type} eq "release"; if ($target =~ /^mingw/ && `$config{CC} --target-help 2>&1` =~ m/-mno-cygwin/m) { push @{$config{cflags}}, "-mno-cygwin"; push @{$config{cxxflags}}, "-mno-cygwin" if $config{CXX}; push @{$config{shared_ldflag}}, "-mno-cygwin"; } if ($target =~ /linux.*-mips/ && !$disabled{asm} && !grep { $_ !~ /-m(ips|arch=)/ } (@{$config{CFLAGS}})) { # minimally required architecture flags for assembly modules my $value; $value = '-mips2' if ($target =~ /mips32/); $value = '-mips3' if ($target =~ /mips64/); unshift @{$config{cflags}}, $value; unshift @{$config{cxxflags}}, $value if $config{CXX}; } # If threads aren't disabled, check how possible they are unless ($disabled{threads}) { if ($auto_threads) { # Enabled by default, disable it forcibly if unavailable if ($target{thread_scheme} eq "(unknown)") { disable("unavailable", 'threads'); } } else { # The user chose to enable threads explicitly, let's see # if there's a chance that's possible if ($target{thread_scheme} eq "(unknown)") { # If the user asked for "threads" and we don't have internal # knowledge how to do it, [s]he is expected to provide any # system-dependent compiler options that are necessary. We # can't truly check that the given options are correct, but # we expect the user to know what [s]He is doing. if (!@{$config{CFLAGS}} && !@{$config{CPPDEFINES}}) { die "You asked for multi-threading support, but didn't\n" ,"provide any system-specific compiler options\n"; } } } } # If threads still aren't disabled, add a C macro to ensure the source # code knows about it. Any other flag is taken care of by the configs. unless($disabled{threads}) { push @{$config{openssl_thread_defines}}, "OPENSSL_THREADS"; } # With "deprecated" disable all deprecated features. if (defined($disabled{"deprecated"})) { $config{api} = $maxapi; } my $no_shared_warn=0; if ($target{shared_target} eq "") { $no_shared_warn = 1 if (!$disabled{shared} || !$disabled{"dynamic-engine"}); disable('no-shared-target', 'pic'); } if ($disabled{"dynamic-engine"}) { $config{dynamic_engines} = 0; } else { $config{dynamic_engines} = 1; } unless ($disabled{asan}) { push @{$config{cflags}}, "-fsanitize=address"; push @{$config{cxxflags}}, "-fsanitize=address" if $config{CXX}; } unless ($disabled{ubsan}) { # -DPEDANTIC or -fnosanitize=alignment may also be required on some # platforms. push @{$config{cflags}}, "-fsanitize=undefined", "-fno-sanitize-recover=all"; push @{$config{cxxflags}}, "-fsanitize=undefined", "-fno-sanitize-recover=all" if $config{CXX}; } unless ($disabled{msan}) { push @{$config{cflags}}, "-fsanitize=memory"; push @{$config{cxxflags}}, "-fsanitize=memory" if $config{CXX}; } unless ($disabled{"fuzz-libfuzzer"} && $disabled{"fuzz-afl"} && $disabled{asan} && $disabled{ubsan} && $disabled{msan}) { push @{$config{cflags}}, "-fno-omit-frame-pointer", "-g"; push @{$config{cxxflags}}, "-fno-omit-frame-pointer", "-g" if $config{CXX}; } # # Platform fix-ups # # This saves the build files from having to check if ($disabled{pic}) { foreach (qw(shared_cflag shared_cxxflag shared_cppflag shared_defines shared_includes shared_ldflag module_cflags module_cxxflags module_cppflags module_defines module_includes module_lflags)) { delete $config{$_}; $target{$_} = ""; } } else { push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "OPENSSL_PIC"; } if ($target{sys_id} ne "") { push @{$config{openssl_sys_defines}}, "OPENSSL_SYS_$target{sys_id}"; } unless ($disabled{asm}) { $target{cpuid_asm_src}=$table{DEFAULTS}->{cpuid_asm_src} if ($config{processor} eq "386"); push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ" if ($target{cpuid_asm_src} ne "mem_clr.c"); $target{bn_asm_src} =~ s/\w+-gf2m.c// if (defined($disabled{ec2m})); # bn-586 is the only one implementing bn_*_part_words push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "OPENSSL_BN_ASM_PART_WORDS" if ($target{bn_asm_src} =~ /bn-586/); push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "OPENSSL_IA32_SSE2" if (!$disabled{sse2} && $target{bn_asm_src} =~ /86/); push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT" if ($target{bn_asm_src} =~ /-mont/); push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5" if ($target{bn_asm_src} =~ /-mont5/); push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "OPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m" if ($target{bn_asm_src} =~ /-gf2m/); push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "BN_DIV3W" if ($target{bn_asm_src} =~ /-div3w/); if ($target{sha1_asm_src}) { push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "SHA1_ASM" if ($target{sha1_asm_src} =~ /sx86/ || $target{sha1_asm_src} =~ /sha1/); push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "SHA256_ASM" if ($target{sha1_asm_src} =~ /sha256/); push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "SHA512_ASM" if ($target{sha1_asm_src} =~ /sha512/); } if ($target{keccak1600_asm_src} ne $table{DEFAULTS}->{keccak1600_asm_src}) { push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "KECCAK1600_ASM"; } if ($target{rc4_asm_src} ne $table{DEFAULTS}->{rc4_asm_src}) { push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "RC4_ASM"; } if ($target{md5_asm_src}) { push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "MD5_ASM"; } $target{cast_asm_src}=$table{DEFAULTS}->{cast_asm_src} unless $disabled{pic}; # CAST assembler is not PIC if ($target{rmd160_asm_src}) { push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "RMD160_ASM"; } if ($target{aes_asm_src}) { push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "AES_ASM" if ($target{aes_asm_src} =~ m/\baes-/);; push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "AESNI_ASM" if ($target{aes_asm_src} =~ m/\baesni-/);; # aes-ctr.fake is not a real file, only indication that assembler # module implements AES_ctr32_encrypt... push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "AES_CTR_ASM" if ($target{aes_asm_src} =~ s/\s*aes-ctr\.fake//); # aes-xts.fake indicates presence of AES_xts_[en|de]crypt... push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "AES_XTS_ASM" if ($target{aes_asm_src} =~ s/\s*aes-xts\.fake//); $target{aes_asm_src} =~ s/\s*(vpaes|aesni)-x86\.s//g if ($disabled{sse2}); push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "VPAES_ASM" if ($target{aes_asm_src} =~ m/vpaes/); push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "BSAES_ASM" if ($target{aes_asm_src} =~ m/bsaes/); } if ($target{wp_asm_src} =~ /mmx/) { if ($config{processor} eq "386") { $target{wp_asm_src}=$table{DEFAULTS}->{wp_asm_src}; } elsif (!$disabled{"whirlpool"}) { push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "WHIRLPOOL_ASM"; } } if ($target{modes_asm_src} =~ /ghash-/) { push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "GHASH_ASM"; } if ($target{ec_asm_src} =~ /ecp_nistz256/) { push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "ECP_NISTZ256_ASM"; } if ($target{ec_asm_src} =~ /x25519/) { push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "X25519_ASM"; } if ($target{padlock_asm_src} ne $table{DEFAULTS}->{padlock_asm_src}) { push @{$config{dso_defines}}, "PADLOCK_ASM"; } if ($target{poly1305_asm_src} ne "") { push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "POLY1305_ASM"; } } my %predefined_C = compiler_predefined($config{CROSS_COMPILE}.$config{CC}); my %predefined_CXX = $config{CXX} ? compiler_predefined($config{CROSS_COMPILE}.$config{CXX}) : (); # Check for makedepend capabilities. if (!$disabled{makedepend}) { if ($config{target} =~ /^(VC|vms)-/) { # For VC- and vms- targets, there's nothing more to do here. The # functionality is hard coded in the corresponding build files for # cl (Windows) and CC/DECC (VMS). } elsif (($predefined_C{__GNUC__} // -1) >= 3 && !($predefined_C{__APPLE_CC__} && !$predefined_C{__clang__})) { # We know that GNU C version 3 and up as well as all clang # versions support dependency generation, but Xcode did not # handle $cc -M before clang support (but claims __GNUC__ = 3) $config{makedepprog} = "\$(CROSS_COMPILE)$config{CC}"; } else { # In all other cases, we look for 'makedepend', and disable the # capability if not found. $config{makedepprog} = which('makedepend'); disable('unavailable', 'makedepend') unless $config{makedepprog}; } } if (!$disabled{asm} && !$predefined_C{__MACH__} && $^O ne 'VMS') { # probe for -Wa,--noexecstack option... if ($predefined_C{__clang__}) { # clang has builtin assembler, which doesn't recognize --help, # but it apparently recognizes the option in question on all # supported platforms even when it's meaningless. In other words # probe would fail, but probed option always accepted... push @{$config{cflags}}, "-Wa,--noexecstack", "-Qunused-arguments"; } else { my $cc = $config{CROSS_COMPILE}.$config{CC}; open(PIPE, "$cc -Wa,--help -c -o null.$$.o -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1 |"); while() { if (m/--noexecstack/) { push @{$config{cflags}}, "-Wa,--noexecstack"; last; } } close(PIPE); unlink("null.$$.o"); } } # Deal with bn_ops ################################################### $config{bn_ll} =0; $config{export_var_as_fn} =0; my $def_int="unsigned int"; $config{rc4_int} =$def_int; ($config{b64l},$config{b64},$config{b32})=(0,0,1); my $count = 0; foreach (sort split(/\s+/,$target{bn_ops})) { $count++ if /SIXTY_FOUR_BIT|SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG|THIRTY_TWO_BIT/; $config{export_var_as_fn}=1 if $_ eq 'EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN'; $config{bn_ll}=1 if $_ eq 'BN_LLONG'; $config{rc4_int}="unsigned char" if $_ eq 'RC4_CHAR'; ($config{b64l},$config{b64},$config{b32}) =(0,1,0) if $_ eq 'SIXTY_FOUR_BIT'; ($config{b64l},$config{b64},$config{b32}) =(1,0,0) if $_ eq 'SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG'; ($config{b64l},$config{b64},$config{b32}) =(0,0,1) if $_ eq 'THIRTY_TWO_BIT'; } die "Exactly one of SIXTY_FOUR_BIT|SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG|THIRTY_TWO_BIT can be set in bn_ops\n" if $count > 1; # Hack cflags for better warnings (dev option) ####################### # "Stringify" the C and C++ flags string. This permits it to be made part of # a string and works as well on command lines. $config{cflags} = [ map { (my $x = $_) =~ s/([\\\"])/\\$1/g; $x } @{$config{cflags}} ]; $config{cxxflags} = [ map { (my $x = $_) =~ s/([\\\"])/\\$1/g; $x } @{$config{cxxflags}} ] if $config{CXX}; if (defined($config{api})) { $config{openssl_api_defines} = [ "OPENSSL_MIN_API=".$apitable->{$config{api}} ]; my $apiflag = sprintf("OPENSSL_API_COMPAT=%s", $apitable->{$config{api}}); push @{$config{defines}}, $apiflag; } my @strict_warnings_collection=(); if ($strict_warnings) { my $wopt; my $gccver = $predefined_C{__GNUC__} // -1; if ($gccver >= 4) { push @strict_warnings_collection, @gcc_devteam_warn; push @strict_warnings_collection, @clang_devteam_warn if (defined($predefined_C{__clang__})); } elsif ($config{target} =~ /^VC-/) { push @strict_warnings_collection, @cl_devteam_warn; } else { warn "WARNING --strict-warnings requires gcc[>=4] or gcc-alike, or MSVC" } } $config{CFLAGS} = [ map { $_ eq '--ossl-strict-warnings' ? @strict_warnings_collection : ( $_ ) } @{$config{CFLAGS}} ]; unless ($disabled{"crypto-mdebug-backtrace"}) { foreach my $wopt (split /\s+/, $memleak_devteam_backtrace) { push @{$config{cflags}}, $wopt unless grep { $_ eq $wopt } @{$config{cflags}}; } if ($target =~ /^BSD-/) { push @{$config{ex_libs}}, "-lexecinfo"; } } unless ($disabled{afalgeng}) { $config{afalgeng}=""; if (grep { $_ eq 'afalgeng' } @{$target{enable}}) { my $minver = 4*10000 + 1*100 + 0; if ($config{CROSS_COMPILE} eq "") { my $verstr = `uname -r`; my ($ma, $mi1, $mi2) = split("\\.", $verstr); ($mi2) = $mi2 =~ /(\d+)/; my $ver = $ma*10000 + $mi1*100 + $mi2; if ($ver < $minver) { disable('too-old-kernel', 'afalgeng'); } else { push @{$config{engdirs}}, "afalg"; } } else { disable('cross-compiling', 'afalgeng'); } } else { disable('not-linux', 'afalgeng'); } } unless ($disabled{devcryptoeng}) { if ($target =~ m/^BSD/) { my $maxver = 5*100 + 7; my $sysstr = `uname -s`; my $verstr = `uname -r`; $sysstr =~ s|\R$||; $verstr =~ s|\R$||; my ($ma, $mi, @rest) = split m|\.|, $verstr; my $ver = $ma*100 + $mi; if ($sysstr eq 'OpenBSD' && $ver >= $maxver) { disable('too-new-kernel', 'devcryptoeng'); } } } # Get the extra flags used when building shared libraries and modules. We # do this late because some of them depend on %disabled. # Make the flags to build DSOs the same as for shared libraries unless they # are already defined $target{module_cflags} = $target{shared_cflag} unless defined $target{module_cflags}; $target{module_cxxflags} = $target{shared_cxxflag} unless defined $target{module_cxxflags}; $target{module_ldflags} = $target{shared_ldflag} unless defined $target{module_ldflags}; { my $shared_info_pl = catfile(dirname($0), "Configurations", "shared-info.pl"); my %shared_info = read_eval_file($shared_info_pl); push @{$target{_conf_fname_int}}, $shared_info_pl; my $si = $target{shared_target}; while (ref $si ne "HASH") { last if ! defined $si; if (ref $si eq "CODE") { $si = $si->(); } else { $si = $shared_info{$si}; } } # Some of the 'shared_target' values don't have any entries in # %shared_info. That's perfectly fine, AS LONG AS the build file # template knows how to handle this. That is currently the case for # Windows and VMS. if (defined $si) { # Just as above, copy certain shared_* attributes to the corresponding # module_ attribute unless the latter is already defined $si->{module_cflags} = $si->{shared_cflag} unless defined $si->{module_cflags}; $si->{module_cxxflags} = $si->{shared_cxxflag} unless defined $si->{module_cxxflags}; $si->{module_ldflags} = $si->{shared_ldflag} unless defined $si->{module_ldflags}; foreach (sort keys %$si) { $target{$_} = defined $target{$_} ? add($si->{$_})->($target{$_}) : $si->{$_}; } } } # ALL MODIFICATIONS TO %disabled, %config and %target MUST BE DONE FROM HERE ON my %disabled_info = (); # For configdata.pm foreach my $what (sort keys %disabled) { $config{options} .= " no-$what"; if (!grep { $what eq $_ } ( 'buildtest-c++', 'threads', 'shared', 'pic', 'dynamic-engine', 'makedepend', 'zlib-dynamic', 'zlib', 'sse2' )) { (my $WHAT = uc $what) =~ s|-|_|g; # Fix up C macro end names $WHAT = "RMD160" if $what eq "ripemd"; # fix-up crypto/directory name(s) $what = "ripemd" if $what eq "rmd160"; $what = "whrlpool" if $what eq "whirlpool"; my $macro = $disabled_info{$what}->{macro} = "OPENSSL_NO_$WHAT"; if ((grep { $what eq $_ } @{$config{sdirs}}) && $what ne 'async' && $what ne 'err' && $what ne 'dso') { @{$config{sdirs}} = grep { $what ne $_} @{$config{sdirs}}; $disabled_info{$what}->{skipped} = [ catdir('crypto', $what) ]; if ($what ne 'engine') { push @{$config{openssl_algorithm_defines}}, $macro; } else { @{$config{dirs}} = grep !/^engines$/, @{$config{dirs}}; push @{$disabled_info{engine}->{skipped}}, catdir('engines'); push @{$config{openssl_other_defines}}, $macro; } } else { push @{$config{openssl_other_defines}}, $macro; } } } if ($disabled{"dynamic-engine"}) { push @{$config{openssl_other_defines}}, "OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE"; } else { push @{$config{openssl_other_defines}}, "OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE"; } # If we use the unified build, collect information from build.info files my %unified_info = (); my $buildinfo_debug = defined($ENV{CONFIGURE_DEBUG_BUILDINFO}); if ($builder eq "unified") { use with_fallback qw(Text::Template); sub cleandir { my $base = shift; my $dir = shift; my $relativeto = shift || "."; $dir = catdir($base,$dir) unless isabsolute($dir); # Make sure the directories we're building in exists mkpath($dir); my $res = abs2rel(absolutedir($dir), rel2abs($relativeto)); #print STDERR "DEBUG[cleandir]: $dir , $base => $res\n"; return $res; } sub cleanfile { my $base = shift; my $file = shift; my $relativeto = shift || "."; $file = catfile($base,$file) unless isabsolute($file); my $d = dirname($file); my $f = basename($file); # Make sure the directories we're building in exists mkpath($d); my $res = abs2rel(catfile(absolutedir($d), $f), rel2abs($relativeto)); #print STDERR "DEBUG[cleanfile]: $d , $f => $res\n"; return $res; } # Store the name of the template file we will build the build file from # in %config. This may be useful for the build file itself. my @build_file_template_names = ( $builder_platform."-".$target{build_file}.".tmpl", $target{build_file}.".tmpl" ); my @build_file_templates = (); # First, look in the user provided directory, if given if (defined env($local_config_envname)) { @build_file_templates = map { if ($^O eq 'VMS') { # VMS environment variables are logical names, # which can be used as is $local_config_envname . ':' . $_; } else { catfile(env($local_config_envname), $_); } } @build_file_template_names; } # Then, look in our standard directory push @build_file_templates, ( map { cleanfile($srcdir, catfile("Configurations", $_), $blddir) } @build_file_template_names ); my $build_file_template; for $_ (@build_file_templates) { $build_file_template = $_; last if -f $build_file_template; $build_file_template = undef; } if (!defined $build_file_template) { die "*** Couldn't find any of:\n", join("\n", @build_file_templates), "\n"; } $config{build_file_templates} = [ cleanfile($srcdir, catfile("Configurations", "common0.tmpl"), $blddir), $build_file_template, cleanfile($srcdir, catfile("Configurations", "common.tmpl"), $blddir) ]; my @build_infos = ( [ ".", "build.info" ] ); foreach (@{$config{dirs}}) { push @build_infos, [ $_, "build.info" ] if (-f catfile($srcdir, $_, "build.info")); } foreach (@{$config{sdirs}}) { push @build_infos, [ catdir("crypto", $_), "build.info" ] if (-f catfile($srcdir, "crypto", $_, "build.info")); } foreach (@{$config{engdirs}}) { push @build_infos, [ catdir("engines", $_), "build.info" ] if (-f catfile($srcdir, "engines", $_, "build.info")); } foreach (@{$config{tdirs}}) { push @build_infos, [ catdir("test", $_), "build.info" ] if (-f catfile($srcdir, "test", $_, "build.info")); } $config{build_infos} = [ ]; my %ordinals = (); foreach (@build_infos) { my $sourced = catdir($srcdir, $_->[0]); my $buildd = catdir($blddir, $_->[0]); mkpath($buildd); my $f = $_->[1]; # The basic things we're trying to build my @programs = (); my @programs_install = (); my @libraries = (); my @libraries_install = (); my @engines = (); my @engines_install = (); my @scripts = (); my @scripts_install = (); my @extra = (); my @overrides = (); my @intermediates = (); my @rawlines = (); my %sources = (); my %shared_sources = (); my %includes = (); my %depends = (); my %renames = (); my %sharednames = (); my %generate = (); # We want to detect configdata.pm in the source tree, so we # don't use it if the build tree is different. my $src_configdata = cleanfile($srcdir, "configdata.pm", $blddir); push @{$config{build_infos}}, catfile(abs2rel($sourced, $blddir), $f); my $template = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'FILE', SOURCE => catfile($sourced, $f), PREPEND => qq{use lib "$FindBin::Bin/util/perl";}); die "Something went wrong with $sourced/$f: $!\n" unless $template; my @text = split /^/m, $template->fill_in(HASH => { config => \%config, target => \%target, disabled => \%disabled, withargs => \%withargs, builddir => abs2rel($buildd, $blddir), sourcedir => abs2rel($sourced, $blddir), buildtop => abs2rel($blddir, $blddir), sourcetop => abs2rel($srcdir, $blddir) }, DELIMITERS => [ "{-", "-}" ]); # The top item of this stack has the following values # -2 positive already run and we found ELSE (following ELSIF should fail) # -1 positive already run (skip until ENDIF) # 0 negatives so far (if we're at a condition, check it) # 1 last was positive (don't skip lines until next ELSE, ELSIF or ENDIF) # 2 positive ELSE (following ELSIF should fail) my @skip = (); collect_information( collect_from_array([ @text ], qr/\\$/ => sub { my $l1 = shift; my $l2 = shift; $l1 =~ s/\\$//; $l1.$l2 }), # Info we're looking for qr/^\s*IF\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])*)\]\s*$/ => sub { if (! @skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0) { push @skip, !! $1; } else { push @skip, -1; } }, qr/^\s*ELSIF\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])*)\]\s*$/ => sub { die "ELSIF out of scope" if ! @skip; die "ELSIF following ELSE" if abs($skip[$#skip]) == 2; $skip[$#skip] = -1 if $skip[$#skip] != 0; $skip[$#skip] = !! $1 if $skip[$#skip] == 0; }, qr/^\s*ELSE\s*$/ => sub { die "ELSE out of scope" if ! @skip; $skip[$#skip] = -2 if $skip[$#skip] != 0; $skip[$#skip] = 2 if $skip[$#skip] == 0; }, qr/^\s*ENDIF\s*$/ => sub { die "ENDIF out of scope" if ! @skip; pop @skip; }, qr/^\s*PROGRAMS(_NO_INST)?\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { if (!@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0) { my $install = $1; my @x = tokenize($2); push @programs, @x; push @programs_install, @x unless $install; } }, qr/^\s*LIBS(_NO_INST)?\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { if (!@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0) { my $install = $1; my @x = tokenize($2); push @libraries, @x; push @libraries_install, @x unless $install; } }, qr/^\s*ENGINES(_NO_INST)?\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { if (!@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0) { my $install = $1; my @x = tokenize($2); push @engines, @x; push @engines_install, @x unless $install; } }, qr/^\s*SCRIPTS(_NO_INST)?\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { if (!@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0) { my $install = $1; my @x = tokenize($2); push @scripts, @x; push @scripts_install, @x unless $install; } }, qr/^\s*EXTRA\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { push @extra, tokenize($1) if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 }, qr/^\s*OVERRIDES\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { push @overrides, tokenize($1) if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 }, qr/^\s*ORDINALS\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/, => sub { push @{$ordinals{$1}}, tokenize($2) if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 }, qr/^\s*SOURCE\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { push @{$sources{$1}}, tokenize($2) if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 }, qr/^\s*SHARED_SOURCE\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { push @{$shared_sources{$1}}, tokenize($2) if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 }, qr/^\s*INCLUDE\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { push @{$includes{$1}}, tokenize($2) if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 }, qr/^\s*DEPEND\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])*)\]\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { push @{$depends{$1}}, tokenize($2) if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 }, qr/^\s*GENERATE\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { push @{$generate{$1}}, $2 if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 }, qr/^\s*RENAME\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { push @{$renames{$1}}, tokenize($2) if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 }, qr/^\s*SHARED_NAME\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { push @{$sharednames{$1}}, tokenize($2) if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 }, qr/^\s*BEGINRAW\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*$/ => sub { my $lineiterator = shift; my $target_kind = $1; while (defined $lineiterator->()) { s|\R$||; if (/^\s*ENDRAW\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*$/) { die "ENDRAW doesn't match BEGINRAW" if $1 ne $target_kind; last; } next if @skip && $skip[$#skip] <= 0; push @rawlines, $_ if ($target_kind eq $target{build_file} || $target_kind eq $target{build_file}."(".$builder_platform.")"); } }, qr/^\s*(?:#.*)?$/ => sub { }, "OTHERWISE" => sub { die "Something wrong with this line:\n$_\nat $sourced/$f" }, "BEFORE" => sub { if ($buildinfo_debug) { print STDERR "DEBUG: Parsing ",join(" ", @_),"\n"; print STDERR "DEBUG: ... before parsing, skip stack is ",join(" ", map { int($_) } @skip),"\n"; } }, "AFTER" => sub { if ($buildinfo_debug) { print STDERR "DEBUG: .... after parsing, skip stack is ",join(" ", map { int($_) } @skip),"\n"; } }, ); die "runaway IF?" if (@skip); foreach (keys %renames) { die "$_ renamed to more than one thing: " ,join(" ", @{$renames{$_}}),"\n" if scalar @{$renames{$_}} > 1; my $dest = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); my $to = cleanfile($buildd, $renames{$_}->[0], $blddir); die "$dest renamed to more than one thing: " ,$unified_info{rename}->{$dest}, $to unless !defined($unified_info{rename}->{$dest}) or $unified_info{rename}->{$dest} eq $to; $unified_info{rename}->{$dest} = $to; } foreach (@programs) { my $program = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$program}) { $program = $unified_info{rename}->{$program}; } $unified_info{programs}->{$program} = 1; } foreach (@programs_install) { my $program = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$program}) { $program = $unified_info{rename}->{$program}; } $unified_info{install}->{programs}->{$program} = 1; } foreach (@libraries) { my $library = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$library}) { $library = $unified_info{rename}->{$library}; } $unified_info{libraries}->{$library} = 1; } foreach (@libraries_install) { my $library = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$library}) { $library = $unified_info{rename}->{$library}; } $unified_info{install}->{libraries}->{$library} = 1; } die <<"EOF" if scalar @engines and !$config{dynamic_engines}; ENGINES can only be used if configured with 'dynamic-engine'. This is usually a fault in a build.info file. EOF foreach (@engines) { my $library = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$library}) { $library = $unified_info{rename}->{$library}; } $unified_info{engines}->{$library} = 1; } foreach (@engines_install) { my $library = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$library}) { $library = $unified_info{rename}->{$library}; } $unified_info{install}->{engines}->{$library} = 1; } foreach (@scripts) { my $script = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$script}) { $script = $unified_info{rename}->{$script}; } $unified_info{scripts}->{$script} = 1; } foreach (@scripts_install) { my $script = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$script}) { $script = $unified_info{rename}->{$script}; } $unified_info{install}->{scripts}->{$script} = 1; } foreach (@extra) { my $extra = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); $unified_info{extra}->{$extra} = 1; } foreach (@overrides) { my $override = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); $unified_info{overrides}->{$override} = 1; } push @{$unified_info{rawlines}}, @rawlines; unless ($disabled{shared}) { # Check sharednames. foreach (keys %sharednames) { my $dest = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$dest}) { $dest = $unified_info{rename}->{$dest}; } die "shared_name for $dest with multiple values: " ,join(" ", @{$sharednames{$_}}),"\n" if scalar @{$sharednames{$_}} > 1; my $to = cleanfile($buildd, $sharednames{$_}->[0], $blddir); die "shared_name found for a library $dest that isn't defined\n" unless $unified_info{libraries}->{$dest}; die "shared_name for $dest with multiple values: " ,$unified_info{sharednames}->{$dest}, ", ", $to unless !defined($unified_info{sharednames}->{$dest}) or $unified_info{sharednames}->{$dest} eq $to; $unified_info{sharednames}->{$dest} = $to; } # Additionally, we set up sharednames for libraries that don't # have any, as themselves. Only for libraries that aren't # explicitly static. foreach (grep !/\.a$/, keys %{$unified_info{libraries}}) { if (!defined $unified_info{sharednames}->{$_}) { $unified_info{sharednames}->{$_} = $_ } } # Check that we haven't defined any library as both shared and # explicitly static. That is forbidden. my @doubles = (); foreach (grep /\.a$/, keys %{$unified_info{libraries}}) { (my $l = $_) =~ s/\.a$//; push @doubles, $l if defined $unified_info{sharednames}->{$l}; } die "these libraries are both explicitly static and shared:\n ", join(" ", @doubles), "\n" if @doubles; } foreach (keys %sources) { my $dest = $_; my $ddest = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}) { $ddest = $unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}; } foreach (@{$sources{$dest}}) { my $s = cleanfile($sourced, $_, $blddir); # If it isn't in the source tree, we assume it's generated # in the build tree if ($s eq $src_configdata || ! -f $s || $generate{$_}) { $s = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); } # We recognise C++, C and asm files if ($s =~ /\.(cc|cpp|c|s|S)$/) { my $o = $_; $o =~ s/\.[csS]$/.o/; # C and assembler $o =~ s/\.(cc|cpp)$/_cc.o/; # C++ $o = cleanfile($buildd, $o, $blddir); $unified_info{sources}->{$ddest}->{$o} = 1; $unified_info{sources}->{$o}->{$s} = 1; } elsif ($s =~ /\.rc$/) { # We also recognise resource files my $o = $_; $o =~ s/\.rc$/.res/; # Resource configuration my $o = cleanfile($buildd, $o, $blddir); $unified_info{sources}->{$ddest}->{$o} = 1; $unified_info{sources}->{$o}->{$s} = 1; } else { $unified_info{sources}->{$ddest}->{$s} = 1; } } } foreach (keys %shared_sources) { my $dest = $_; my $ddest = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}) { $ddest = $unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}; } foreach (@{$shared_sources{$dest}}) { my $s = cleanfile($sourced, $_, $blddir); # If it isn't in the source tree, we assume it's generated # in the build tree if ($s eq $src_configdata || ! -f $s || $generate{$_}) { $s = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); } if ($s =~ /\.(cc|cpp|c|s|S)$/) { # We recognise C++, C and asm files my $o = $_; $o =~ s/\.[csS]$/.o/; # C and assembler $o =~ s/\.(cc|cpp)$/_cc.o/; # C++ $o = cleanfile($buildd, $o, $blddir); $unified_info{shared_sources}->{$ddest}->{$o} = 1; $unified_info{sources}->{$o}->{$s} = 1; } elsif ($s =~ /\.rc$/) { # We also recognise resource files my $o = $_; $o =~ s/\.rc$/.res/; # Resource configuration my $o = cleanfile($buildd, $o, $blddir); $unified_info{shared_sources}->{$ddest}->{$o} = 1; $unified_info{sources}->{$o}->{$s} = 1; } elsif ($s =~ /\.(def|map|opt)$/) { # We also recognise .def / .map / .opt files # We know they are generated files my $def = cleanfile($buildd, $s, $blddir); $unified_info{shared_sources}->{$ddest}->{$def} = 1; } else { die "unrecognised source file type for shared library: $s\n"; } } } foreach (keys %generate) { my $dest = $_; my $ddest = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}) { $ddest = $unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}; } die "more than one generator for $dest: " ,join(" ", @{$generate{$_}}),"\n" if scalar @{$generate{$_}} > 1; my @generator = split /\s+/, $generate{$dest}->[0]; $generator[0] = cleanfile($sourced, $generator[0], $blddir), $unified_info{generate}->{$ddest} = [ @generator ]; } foreach (keys %depends) { my $dest = $_; my $ddest = $dest eq "" ? "" : cleanfile($sourced, $_, $blddir); # If the destination doesn't exist in source, it can only be # a generated file in the build tree. if ($ddest ne "" && ($ddest eq $src_configdata || ! -f $ddest)) { $ddest = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}) { $ddest = $unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}; } } foreach (@{$depends{$dest}}) { my $d = cleanfile($sourced, $_, $blddir); # If we know it's generated, or assume it is because we can't # find it in the source tree, we set file we depend on to be # in the build tree rather than the source tree, and assume # and that there are lines to build it in a BEGINRAW..ENDRAW # section or in the Makefile template. if ($d eq $src_configdata || ! -f $d || (grep { $d eq $_ } map { cleanfile($srcdir, $_, $blddir) } grep { /\.h$/ } keys %{$unified_info{generate}})) { $d = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); } # Take note if the file to depend on is being renamed # Take extra care with files ending with .a, they should # be treated without that extension, and the extension # should be added back after treatment. $d =~ /(\.a)?$/; my $e = $1 // ""; $d = $`; if ($unified_info{rename}->{$d}) { $d = $unified_info{rename}->{$d}; } $d .= $e; $unified_info{depends}->{$ddest}->{$d} = 1; } } foreach (keys %includes) { my $dest = $_; my $ddest = cleanfile($sourced, $_, $blddir); # If the destination doesn't exist in source, it can only be # a generated file in the build tree. if ($ddest eq $src_configdata || ! -f $ddest) { $ddest = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}) { $ddest = $unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}; } } foreach (@{$includes{$dest}}) { my $is = cleandir($sourced, $_, $blddir); my $ib = cleandir($buildd, $_, $blddir); push @{$unified_info{includes}->{$ddest}->{source}}, $is unless grep { $_ eq $is } @{$unified_info{includes}->{$ddest}->{source}}; push @{$unified_info{includes}->{$ddest}->{build}}, $ib unless grep { $_ eq $ib } @{$unified_info{includes}->{$ddest}->{build}}; } } } my $ordinals_text = join(', ', sort keys %ordinals); warn <<"EOF" if $ordinals_text; WARNING: ORDINALS were specified for $ordinals_text They are ignored and should be replaced with a combination of GENERATE, DEPEND and SHARED_SOURCE. EOF # Massage the result # If the user configured no-shared, we allow no shared sources if ($disabled{shared}) { foreach (keys %{$unified_info{shared_sources}}) { foreach (keys %{$unified_info{shared_sources}->{$_}}) { delete $unified_info{sources}->{$_}; } } $unified_info{shared_sources} = {}; } # If we depend on a header file or a perl module, add an inclusion of # its directory to allow smoothe inclusion foreach my $dest (keys %{$unified_info{depends}}) { next if $dest eq ""; foreach my $d (keys %{$unified_info{depends}->{$dest}}) { next unless $d =~ /\.(h|pm)$/; my $i = dirname($d); my $spot = $d eq "configdata.pm" || defined($unified_info{generate}->{$d}) ? 'build' : 'source'; push @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{$spot}}, $i unless grep { $_ eq $i } @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{$spot}}; } } # Trickle down includes placed on libraries, engines and programs to # their sources (i.e. object files) foreach my $dest (keys %{$unified_info{engines}}, keys %{$unified_info{libraries}}, keys %{$unified_info{programs}}) { foreach my $k (("source", "build")) { next unless defined($unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{$k}); my @incs = reverse @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{$k}}; foreach my $obj (grep /\.o$/, (keys %{$unified_info{sources}->{$dest} // {}}, keys %{$unified_info{shared_sources}->{$dest} // {}})) { foreach my $inc (@incs) { unshift @{$unified_info{includes}->{$obj}->{$k}}, $inc unless grep { $_ eq $inc } @{$unified_info{includes}->{$obj}->{$k}}; } } } delete $unified_info{includes}->{$dest}; } ### Make unified_info a bit more efficient # One level structures foreach (("programs", "libraries", "engines", "scripts", "extra", "overrides")) { $unified_info{$_} = [ sort keys %{$unified_info{$_}} ]; } # Two level structures foreach my $l1 (("install", "sources", "shared_sources", "ldadd", "depends")) { foreach my $l2 (sort keys %{$unified_info{$l1}}) { $unified_info{$l1}->{$l2} = [ sort keys %{$unified_info{$l1}->{$l2}} ]; } } # Includes foreach my $dest (sort keys %{$unified_info{includes}}) { if (defined($unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{build})) { my @source_includes = (); @source_includes = ( @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{source}} ) if defined($unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{source}); $unified_info{includes}->{$dest} = [ @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{build}} ]; foreach my $inc (@source_includes) { push @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}}, $inc unless grep { $_ eq $inc } @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}}; } } else { $unified_info{includes}->{$dest} = [ @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{source}} ]; } } # For convenience collect information regarding directories where # files are generated, those generated files and the end product # they end up in where applicable. Then, add build rules for those # directories my %loopinfo = ( "lib" => [ @{$unified_info{libraries}} ], "dso" => [ @{$unified_info{engines}} ], "bin" => [ @{$unified_info{programs}} ], "script" => [ @{$unified_info{scripts}} ] ); foreach my $type (keys %loopinfo) { foreach my $product (@{$loopinfo{$type}}) { my %dirs = (); my $pd = dirname($product); foreach (@{$unified_info{sources}->{$product} // []}, @{$unified_info{shared_sources}->{$product} // []}) { my $d = dirname($_); # We don't want to create targets for source directories # when building out of source next if ($config{sourcedir} ne $config{builddir} && $d =~ m|^\Q$config{sourcedir}\E|); # We already have a "test" target, and the current directory # is just silly to make a target for next if $d eq "test" || $d eq "."; $dirs{$d} = 1; push @{$unified_info{dirinfo}->{$d}->{deps}}, $_ if $d ne $pd; } foreach (keys %dirs) { push @{$unified_info{dirinfo}->{$_}->{products}->{$type}}, $product; } } } } # For the schemes that need it, we provide the old *_obj configs # from the *_asm_obj ones foreach (grep /_(asm|aux)_src$/, keys %target) { my $src = $_; (my $obj = $_) =~ s/_(asm|aux)_src$/_obj/; $target{$obj} = $target{$src}; $target{$obj} =~ s/\.[csS]\b/.o/g; # C and assembler $target{$obj} =~ s/\.(cc|cpp)\b/_cc.o/g; # C++ } # Write down our configuration where it fits ######################### print "Creating configdata.pm\n"; open(OUT,">configdata.pm") || die "unable to create configdata.pm: $!\n"; print OUT <<"EOF"; #! $config{HASHBANGPERL} package configdata; use strict; use warnings; use Exporter; #use vars qw(\@ISA \@EXPORT); our \@ISA = qw(Exporter); our \@EXPORT = qw(\%config \%target \%disabled \%withargs \%unified_info \@disablables); EOF print OUT "our %config = (\n"; foreach (sort keys %config) { if (ref($config{$_}) eq "ARRAY") { print OUT " ", $_, " => [ ", join(", ", map { quotify("perl", $_) } @{$config{$_}}), " ],\n"; } elsif (ref($config{$_}) eq "HASH") { print OUT " ", $_, " => {"; if (scalar keys %{$config{$_}} > 0) { print OUT "\n"; foreach my $key (sort keys %{$config{$_}}) { print OUT " ", join(" => ", quotify("perl", $key), defined $config{$_}->{$key} ? quotify("perl", $config{$_}->{$key}) : "undef"); print OUT ",\n"; } print OUT " "; } print OUT "},\n"; } else { print OUT " ", $_, " => ", quotify("perl", $config{$_}), ",\n" } } print OUT <<"EOF"; ); EOF print OUT "our %target = (\n"; foreach (sort keys %target) { if (ref($target{$_}) eq "ARRAY") { print OUT " ", $_, " => [ ", join(", ", map { quotify("perl", $_) } @{$target{$_}}), " ],\n"; } else { print OUT " ", $_, " => ", quotify("perl", $target{$_}), ",\n" } } print OUT <<"EOF"; ); EOF print OUT "our \%available_protocols = (\n"; print OUT " tls => [ ", join(", ", map { quotify("perl", $_) } @tls), " ],\n"; print OUT " dtls => [ ", join(", ", map { quotify("perl", $_) } @dtls), " ],\n"; print OUT <<"EOF"; ); EOF print OUT "our \@disablables = (\n"; foreach (@disablables) { print OUT " ", quotify("perl", $_), ",\n"; } print OUT <<"EOF"; ); EOF print OUT "our \%disabled = (\n"; foreach (sort keys %disabled) { print OUT " ", quotify("perl", $_), " => ", quotify("perl", $disabled{$_}), ",\n"; } print OUT <<"EOF"; ); EOF print OUT "our %withargs = (\n"; foreach (sort keys %withargs) { if (ref($withargs{$_}) eq "ARRAY") { print OUT " ", $_, " => [ ", join(", ", map { quotify("perl", $_) } @{$withargs{$_}}), " ],\n"; } else { print OUT " ", $_, " => ", quotify("perl", $withargs{$_}), ",\n" } } print OUT <<"EOF"; ); EOF if ($builder eq "unified") { my $recurse; $recurse = sub { my $indent = shift; foreach (@_) { if (ref $_ eq "ARRAY") { print OUT " "x$indent, "[\n"; foreach (@$_) { $recurse->($indent + 4, $_); } print OUT " "x$indent, "],\n"; } elsif (ref $_ eq "HASH") { my %h = %$_; print OUT " "x$indent, "{\n"; foreach (sort keys %h) { if (ref $h{$_} eq "") { print OUT " "x($indent + 4), quotify("perl", $_), " => ", quotify("perl", $h{$_}), ",\n"; } else { print OUT " "x($indent + 4), quotify("perl", $_), " =>\n"; $recurse->($indent + 8, $h{$_}); } } print OUT " "x$indent, "},\n"; } else { print OUT " "x$indent, quotify("perl", $_), ",\n"; } } }; print OUT "our %unified_info = (\n"; foreach (sort keys %unified_info) { if (ref $unified_info{$_} eq "") { print OUT " "x4, quotify("perl", $_), " => ", quotify("perl", $unified_info{$_}), ",\n"; } else { print OUT " "x4, quotify("perl", $_), " =>\n"; $recurse->(8, $unified_info{$_}); } } print OUT <<"EOF"; ); EOF } print OUT "# The following data is only used when this files is use as a script\n"; print OUT "my \@makevars = (\n"; foreach (sort keys %user) { print OUT " '",$_,"',\n"; } print OUT ");\n"; print OUT "my \%disabled_info = (\n"; foreach my $what (sort keys %disabled_info) { print OUT " '$what' => {\n"; foreach my $info (sort keys %{$disabled_info{$what}}) { if (ref $disabled_info{$what}->{$info} eq 'ARRAY') { print OUT " $info => [ ", join(', ', map { "'$_'" } @{$disabled_info{$what}->{$info}}), " ],\n"; } else { print OUT " $info => '", $disabled_info{$what}->{$info}, "',\n"; } } print OUT " },\n"; } print OUT ");\n"; print OUT 'my @user_crossable = qw( ', join (' ', @user_crossable), " );\n"; print OUT << 'EOF'; # If run directly, we can give some answers, and even reconfigure unless (caller) { use Getopt::Long; use File::Spec::Functions; use File::Basename; use Pod::Usage; my $here = dirname($0); my $dump = undef; my $cmdline = undef; my $options = undef; my $target = undef; my $envvars = undef; my $makevars = undef; my $buildparams = undef; my $reconf = undef; my $verbose = undef; my $help = undef; my $man = undef; GetOptions('dump|d' => \$dump, 'command-line|c' => \$cmdline, 'options|o' => \$options, 'target|t' => \$target, 'environment|e' => \$envvars, 'make-variables|m' => \$makevars, 'build-parameters|b' => \$buildparams, 'reconfigure|reconf|r' => \$reconf, 'verbose|v' => \$verbose, 'help' => \$help, 'man' => \$man) or die "Errors in command line arguments\n"; unless ($dump || $cmdline || $options || $target || $envvars || $makevars || $buildparams || $reconf || $verbose || $help || $man) { print STDERR <<"_____"; You must give at least one option. For more information, do '$0 --help' _____ exit(2); } if ($help) { pod2usage(-exitval => 0, -verbose => 1); } if ($man) { pod2usage(-exitval => 0, -verbose => 2); } if ($dump || $cmdline) { print "\nCommand line (with current working directory = $here):\n\n"; print ' ',join(' ', $config{PERL}, catfile($config{sourcedir}, 'Configure'), @{$config{perlargv}}), "\n"; print "\nPerl information:\n\n"; print ' ',$config{perl_cmd},"\n"; print ' ',$config{perl_version},' for ',$config{perl_archname},"\n"; } if ($dump || $options) { my $longest = 0; my $longest2 = 0; foreach my $what (@disablables) { $longest = length($what) if $longest < length($what); $longest2 = length($disabled{$what}) if $disabled{$what} && $longest2 < length($disabled{$what}); } print "\nEnabled features:\n\n"; foreach my $what (@disablables) { print " $what\n" unless grep { $_ =~ /^${what}$/ } keys %disabled; } print "\nDisabled features:\n\n"; foreach my $what (@disablables) { my @what2 = grep { $_ =~ /^${what}$/ } keys %disabled; my $what3 = $what2[0]; if ($what3) { print " $what3", ' ' x ($longest - length($what3) + 1), "[$disabled{$what3}]", ' ' x ($longest2 - length($disabled{$what3}) + 1); print $disabled_info{$what3}->{macro} if $disabled_info{$what3}->{macro}; print ' (skip ', join(', ', @{$disabled_info{$what3}->{skipped}}), ')' if $disabled_info{$what3}->{skipped}; print "\n"; } } } if ($dump || $target) { print "\nConfig target attributes:\n\n"; foreach (sort keys %target) { next if $_ =~ m|^_| || $_ eq 'template'; my $quotify = sub { map { (my $x = $_) =~ s|([\\\$\@"])|\\$1|g; "\"$x\""} @_; }; print ' ', $_, ' => '; if (ref($target{$_}) eq "ARRAY") { print '[ ', join(', ', $quotify->(@{$target{$_}})), " ],\n"; } else { print $quotify->($target{$_}), ",\n" } } } if ($dump || $envvars) { print "\nRecorded environment:\n\n"; foreach (sort keys %{$config{perlenv}}) { print ' ',$_,' = ',($config{perlenv}->{$_} || ''),"\n"; } } if ($dump || $makevars) { print "\nMakevars:\n\n"; foreach my $var (@makevars) { my $prefix = ''; $prefix = $config{CROSS_COMPILE} if grep { $var eq $_ } @user_crossable; $prefix //= ''; print ' ',$var,' ' x (16 - length $var),'= ', (ref $config{$var} eq 'ARRAY' ? join(' ', @{$config{$var}}) : $prefix.$config{$var}), "\n" if defined $config{$var}; } my @buildfile = ($config{builddir}, $config{build_file}); unshift @buildfile, $here unless file_name_is_absolute($config{builddir}); my $buildfile = canonpath(catdir(@buildfile)); print <<"_____"; NOTE: These variables only represent the configuration view. The build file template may have processed these variables further, please have a look at the build file for more exact data: $buildfile _____ } if ($dump || $buildparams) { my @buildfile = ($config{builddir}, $config{build_file}); unshift @buildfile, $here unless file_name_is_absolute($config{builddir}); print "\nbuild file:\n\n"; print " ", canonpath(catfile(@buildfile)),"\n"; print "\nbuild file templates:\n\n"; foreach (@{$config{build_file_templates}}) { my @tmpl = ($_); unshift @tmpl, $here unless file_name_is_absolute($config{sourcedir}); print ' ',canonpath(catfile(@tmpl)),"\n"; } } if ($reconf) { if ($verbose) { print 'Reconfiguring with: ', join(' ',@{$config{perlargv}}), "\n"; foreach (sort keys %{$config{perlenv}}) { print ' ',$_,' = ',($config{perlenv}->{$_} || ""),"\n"; } } chdir $here; exec $^X,catfile($config{sourcedir}, 'Configure'),'reconf'; } } 1; __END__ =head1 NAME configdata.pm - configuration data for OpenSSL builds =head1 SYNOPSIS Interactive: perl configdata.pm [options] As data bank module: use configdata; =head1 DESCRIPTION This module can be used in two modes, interactively and as a module containing all the data recorded by OpenSSL's Configure script. When used interactively, simply run it as any perl script, with at least one option, and you will get the information you ask for. See L below. When loaded as a module, you get a few databanks with useful information to perform build related tasks. The databanks are: %config Configured things. %target The OpenSSL config target with all inheritances resolved. %disabled The features that are disabled. @disablables The list of features that can be disabled. %withargs All data given through --with-THING options. %unified_info All information that was computed from the build.info files. =head1 OPTIONS =over 4 =item B<--help> Print a brief help message and exit. =item B<--man> Print the manual page and exit. =item B<--dump> | B<-d> Print all relevant configuration data. This is equivalent to B<--command-line> B<--options> B<--target> B<--environment> B<--make-variables> B<--build-parameters>. =item B<--command-line> | B<-c> Print the current configuration command line. =item B<--options> | B<-o> Print the features, both enabled and disabled, and display defined macro and skipped directories where applicable. =item B<--target> | B<-t> Print the config attributes for this config target. =item B<--environment> | B<-e> Print the environment variables and their values at the time of configuration. =item B<--make-variables> | B<-m> Print the main make variables generated in the current configuration =item B<--build-parameters> | B<-b> Print the build parameters, i.e. build file and build file templates. =item B<--reconfigure> | B<--reconf> | B<-r> Redo the configuration. =item B<--verbose> | B<-v> Verbose output. =back =cut EOF close(OUT); if ($builder_platform eq 'unix') { my $mode = (0755 & ~umask); chmod $mode, 'configdata.pm' or warn sprintf("WARNING: Couldn't change mode for 'configdata.pm' to 0%03o: %s\n",$mode,$!); } my %builders = ( unified => sub { print 'Creating ',$target{build_file},"\n"; run_dofile(catfile($blddir, $target{build_file}), @{$config{build_file_templates}}); }, ); $builders{$builder}->($builder_platform, @builder_opts); $SIG{__DIE__} = $orig_death_handler; print <<"EOF" if ($disabled{threads} eq "unavailable"); The library could not be configured for supporting multi-threaded applications as the compiler options required on this system are not known. See file INSTALL for details if you need multi-threading. EOF print <<"EOF" if ($no_shared_warn); The options 'shared', 'pic' and 'dynamic-engine' aren't supported on this platform, so we will pretend you gave the option 'no-pic', which also disables 'shared' and 'dynamic-engine'. If you know how to implement shared libraries or position independent code, please let us know (but please first make sure you have tried with a current version of OpenSSL). EOF print <<"EOF"; ********************************************************************** *** *** *** OpenSSL has been successfully configured *** *** *** *** If you encounter a problem while building, please open an *** *** issue on GitHub *** *** and include the output from the following command: *** *** *** *** perl configdata.pm --dump *** *** *** *** (If you are new to OpenSSL, you might want to consult the *** *** 'Troubleshooting' section in the INSTALL file first) *** *** *** ********************************************************************** EOF exit(0); ###################################################################### # # Helpers and utility functions # # Death handler, to print a helpful message in case of failure ####### # sub death_handler { die @_ if $^S; # To prevent the added message in eval blocks my $build_file = $target{build_file} // "build file"; my @message = ( <<"_____", @_ ); Failure! $build_file wasn't produced. Please read INSTALL and associated NOTES files. You may also have to look over your available compiler tool chain or change your configuration. _____ # Dying is terminal, so it's ok to reset the signal handler here. $SIG{__DIE__} = $orig_death_handler; die @message; } # Configuration file reading ######################################### # Note: All of the helper functions are for lazy evaluation. They all # return a CODE ref, which will return the intended value when evaluated. # Thus, whenever there's mention of a returned value, it's about that # intended value. # Helper function to implement conditional inheritance depending on the # value of $disabled{asm}. Used in inherit_from values as follows: # # inherit_from => [ "template", asm("asm_tmpl") ] # sub asm { my @x = @_; sub { $disabled{asm} ? () : @x; } } # Helper function to implement conditional value variants, with a default # plus additional values based on the value of $config{build_type}. # Arguments are given in hash table form: # # picker(default => "Basic string: ", # debug => "debug", # release => "release") # # When configuring with --debug, the resulting string will be # "Basic string: debug", and when not, it will be "Basic string: release" # # This can be used to create variants of sets of flags according to the # build type: # # cflags => picker(default => "-Wall", # debug => "-g -O0", # release => "-O3") # sub picker { my %opts = @_; return sub { add($opts{default} || (), $opts{$config{build_type}} || ())->(); } } # Helper function to combine several values of different types into one. # This is useful if you want to combine a string with the result of a # lazy function, such as: # # cflags => combine("-Wall", sub { $disabled{zlib} ? () : "-DZLIB" }) # sub combine { my @stuff = @_; return sub { add(@stuff)->(); } } # Helper function to implement conditional values depending on the value # of $disabled{threads}. Can be used as follows: # # cflags => combine("-Wall", threads("-pthread")) # sub threads { my @flags = @_; return sub { add($disabled{threads} ? () : @flags)->(); } } sub shared { my @flags = @_; return sub { add($disabled{shared} ? () : @flags)->(); } } our $add_called = 0; # Helper function to implement adding values to already existing configuration # values. It handles elements that are ARRAYs, CODEs and scalars sub _add { my $separator = shift; # If there's any ARRAY in the collection of values OR the separator # is undef, we will return an ARRAY of combined values, otherwise a # string of joined values with $separator as the separator. my $found_array = !defined($separator); my @values = map { my $res = $_; while (ref($res) eq "CODE") { $res = $res->(); } if (defined($res)) { if (ref($res) eq "ARRAY") { $found_array = 1; @$res; } else { $res; } } else { (); } } (@_); $add_called = 1; if ($found_array) { [ @values ]; } else { join($separator, grep { defined($_) && $_ ne "" } @values); } } sub add_before { my $separator = " "; if (ref($_[$#_]) eq "HASH") { my $opts = pop; $separator = $opts->{separator}; } my @x = @_; sub { _add($separator, @x, @_) }; } sub add { my $separator = " "; if (ref($_[$#_]) eq "HASH") { my $opts = pop; $separator = $opts->{separator}; } my @x = @_; sub { _add($separator, @_, @x) }; } sub read_eval_file { my $fname = shift; my $content; my @result; open F, "< $fname" or die "Can't open '$fname': $!\n"; { undef local $/; $content = ; } close F; { local $@; @result = ( eval $content ); warn $@ if $@; } return wantarray ? @result : $result[0]; } # configuration reader, evaluates the input file as a perl script and expects # it to fill %targets with target configurations. Those are then added to # %table. sub read_config { my $fname = shift; my %targets; { # Protect certain tables from tampering local %table = (); %targets = read_eval_file($fname); } my %preexisting = (); foreach (sort keys %targets) { $preexisting{$_} = 1 if $table{$_}; } die <<"EOF", The following config targets from $fname shadow pre-existing config targets with the same name: EOF map { " $_\n" } sort keys %preexisting if %preexisting; # For each target, check that it's configured with a hash table. foreach (keys %targets) { if (ref($targets{$_}) ne "HASH") { if (ref($targets{$_}) eq "") { warn "Deprecated target configuration for $_, ignoring...\n"; } else { warn "Misconfigured target configuration for $_ (should be a hash table), ignoring...\n"; } delete $targets{$_}; } else { $targets{$_}->{_conf_fname_int} = add([ $fname ]); } } %table = (%table, %targets); } # configuration resolver. Will only resolve all the lazy evaluation # codeblocks for the chosen target and all those it inherits from, # recursively sub resolve_config { my $target = shift; my @breadcrumbs = @_; # my $extra_checks = defined($ENV{CONFIGURE_EXTRA_CHECKS}); if (grep { $_ eq $target } @breadcrumbs) { die "inherit_from loop! target backtrace:\n " ,$target,"\n ",join("\n ", @breadcrumbs),"\n"; } if (!defined($table{$target})) { warn "Warning! target $target doesn't exist!\n"; return (); } # Recurse through all inheritances. They will be resolved on the # fly, so when this operation is done, they will all just be a # bunch of attributes with string values. # What we get here, though, are keys with references to lists of # the combined values of them all. We will deal with lists after # this stage is done. my %combined_inheritance = (); if ($table{$target}->{inherit_from}) { my @inherit_from = map { ref($_) eq "CODE" ? $_->() : $_ } @{$table{$target}->{inherit_from}}; foreach (@inherit_from) { my %inherited_config = resolve_config($_, $target, @breadcrumbs); # 'template' is a marker that's considered private to # the config that had it. delete $inherited_config{template}; foreach (keys %inherited_config) { if (!$combined_inheritance{$_}) { $combined_inheritance{$_} = []; } push @{$combined_inheritance{$_}}, $inherited_config{$_}; } } } # We won't need inherit_from in this target any more, since we've # resolved all the inheritances that lead to this delete $table{$target}->{inherit_from}; # Now is the time to deal with those lists. Here's the place to # decide what shall be done with those lists, all based on the # values of the target we're currently dealing with. # - If a value is a coderef, it will be executed with the list of # inherited values as arguments. # - If the corresponding key doesn't have a value at all or is the # empty string, the inherited value list will be run through the # default combiner (below), and the result becomes this target's # value. # - Otherwise, this target's value is assumed to be a string that # will simply override the inherited list of values. my $default_combiner = add(); my %all_keys = map { $_ => 1 } (keys %combined_inheritance, keys %{$table{$target}}); sub process_values { my $object = shift; my $inherited = shift; # Always a [ list ] my $target = shift; my $entry = shift; $add_called = 0; while(ref($object) eq "CODE") { $object = $object->(@$inherited); } if (!defined($object)) { return (); } elsif (ref($object) eq "ARRAY") { local $add_called; # To make sure recursive calls don't affect it return [ map { process_values($_, $inherited, $target, $entry) } @$object ]; } elsif (ref($object) eq "") { return $object; } else { die "cannot handle reference type ",ref($object) ," found in target ",$target," -> ",$entry,"\n"; } } - foreach (sort keys %all_keys) { - my $previous = $combined_inheritance{$_}; + foreach my $key (sort keys %all_keys) { + my $previous = $combined_inheritance{$key}; # Current target doesn't have a value for the current key? # Assign it the default combiner, the rest of this loop body # will handle it just like any other coderef. - if (!exists $table{$target}->{$_}) { - $table{$target}->{$_} = $default_combiner; + if (!exists $table{$target}->{$key}) { + $table{$target}->{$key} = $default_combiner; } - $table{$target}->{$_} = process_values($table{$target}->{$_}, - $combined_inheritance{$_}, - $target, $_); - unless(defined($table{$target}->{$_})) { - delete $table{$target}->{$_}; + $table{$target}->{$key} = process_values($table{$target}->{$key}, + $combined_inheritance{$key}, + $target, $key); + unless(defined($table{$target}->{$key})) { + delete $table{$target}->{$key}; } # if ($extra_checks && -# $previous && !($add_called || $previous ~~ $table{$target}->{$_})) { -# warn "$_ got replaced in $target\n"; +# $previous && !($add_called || $previous ~~ $table{$target}->{$key})) { +# warn "$key got replaced in $target\n"; # } } # Finally done, return the result. return %{$table{$target}}; } sub usage { print STDERR $usage; print STDERR "\npick os/compiler from:\n"; my $j=0; my $i; my $k=0; foreach $i (sort keys %table) { next if $table{$i}->{template}; next if $i =~ /^debug/; $k += length($i) + 1; if ($k > 78) { print STDERR "\n"; $k=length($i); } print STDERR $i . " "; } foreach $i (sort keys %table) { next if $table{$i}->{template}; next if $i !~ /^debug/; $k += length($i) + 1; if ($k > 78) { print STDERR "\n"; $k=length($i); } print STDERR $i . " "; } print STDERR "\n\nNOTE: If in doubt, on Unix-ish systems use './config'.\n"; exit(1); } sub run_dofile { my $out = shift; my @templates = @_; unlink $out || warn "Can't remove $out, $!" if -f $out; foreach (@templates) { die "Can't open $_, $!" unless -f $_; } my $perlcmd = (quotify("maybeshell", $config{PERL}))[0]; my $cmd = "$perlcmd \"-I.\" \"-Mconfigdata\" \"$dofile\" -o\"Configure\" \"".join("\" \"",@templates)."\" > \"$out.new\""; #print STDERR "DEBUG[run_dofile]: \$cmd = $cmd\n"; system($cmd); exit 1 if $? != 0; rename("$out.new", $out) || die "Can't rename $out.new, $!"; } sub compiler_predefined { state %predefined; my $cc = shift; return () if $^O eq 'VMS'; die 'compiler_predefined called without a compiler command' unless $cc; if (! $predefined{$cc}) { $predefined{$cc} = {}; # collect compiler pre-defines from gcc or gcc-alike... open(PIPE, "$cc -dM -E -x c /dev/null 2>&1 |"); while (my $l = ) { $l =~ m/^#define\s+(\w+(?:\(\w+\))?)(?:\s+(.+))?/ or last; $predefined{$cc}->{$1} = $2 // ''; } close(PIPE); } return %{$predefined{$cc}}; } sub which { my ($name)=@_; if (eval { require IPC::Cmd; 1; }) { IPC::Cmd->import(); return scalar IPC::Cmd::can_run($name); } else { # if there is $directories component in splitpath, # then it's not something to test with $PATH... return $name if (File::Spec->splitpath($name))[1]; foreach (File::Spec->path()) { my $fullpath = catfile($_, "$name$target{exe_extension}"); if (-f $fullpath and -x $fullpath) { return $fullpath; } } } } sub env { my $name = shift; my %opts = @_; unless ($opts{cacheonly}) { # Note that if $ENV{$name} doesn't exist or is undefined, # $config{perlenv}->{$name} will be created with the value # undef. This is intentional. $config{perlenv}->{$name} = $ENV{$name} if ! exists $config{perlenv}->{$name}; } return $config{perlenv}->{$name}; } # Configuration printer ############################################## sub print_table_entry { local $now_printing = shift; my %target = resolve_config($now_printing); my $type = shift; # Don't print the templates return if $target{template}; my @sequence = ( "sys_id", "cpp", "cppflags", "defines", "includes", "cc", "cflags", "unistd", "ld", "lflags", "loutflag", "ex_libs", "bn_ops", "apps_aux_src", "cpuid_asm_src", "uplink_aux_src", "bn_asm_src", "ec_asm_src", "des_asm_src", "aes_asm_src", "bf_asm_src", "md5_asm_src", "cast_asm_src", "sha1_asm_src", "rc4_asm_src", "rmd160_asm_src", "rc5_asm_src", "wp_asm_src", "cmll_asm_src", "modes_asm_src", "padlock_asm_src", "chacha_asm_src", "poly1035_asm_src", "thread_scheme", "perlasm_scheme", "dso_scheme", "shared_target", "shared_cflag", "shared_defines", "shared_ldflag", "shared_rcflag", "shared_extension", "dso_extension", "obj_extension", "exe_extension", "ranlib", "ar", "arflags", "aroutflag", "rc", "rcflags", "rcoutflag", "mt", "mtflags", "mtinflag", "mtoutflag", "multilib", "build_scheme", ); if ($type eq "TABLE") { print "\n"; print "*** $now_printing\n"; foreach (@sequence) { if (ref($target{$_}) eq "ARRAY") { printf "\$%-12s = %s\n", $_, join(" ", @{$target{$_}}); } else { printf "\$%-12s = %s\n", $_, $target{$_}; } } } elsif ($type eq "HASH") { my $largest = length((sort { length($a) <=> length($b) } @sequence)[-1]); print " '$now_printing' => {\n"; foreach (@sequence) { if ($target{$_}) { if (ref($target{$_}) eq "ARRAY") { print " '",$_,"'"," " x ($largest - length($_))," => [ ",join(", ", map { "'$_'" } @{$target{$_}})," ],\n"; } else { print " '",$_,"'"," " x ($largest - length($_))," => '",$target{$_},"',\n"; } } } print " },\n"; } } # Utility routines ################################################### # On VMS, if the given file is a logical name, File::Spec::Functions # will consider it an absolute path. There are cases when we want a # purely syntactic check without checking the environment. sub isabsolute { my $file = shift; # On non-platforms, we just use file_name_is_absolute(). return file_name_is_absolute($file) unless $^O eq "VMS"; # If the file spec includes a device or a directory spec, # file_name_is_absolute() is perfectly safe. return file_name_is_absolute($file) if $file =~ m|[:\[]|; # Here, we know the given file spec isn't absolute return 0; } # Makes a directory absolute and cleans out /../ in paths like foo/../bar # On some platforms, this uses rel2abs(), while on others, realpath() is used. # realpath() requires that at least all path components except the last is an # existing directory. On VMS, the last component of the directory spec must # exist. sub absolutedir { my $dir = shift; # realpath() is quite buggy on VMS. It uses LIB$FID_TO_NAME, which # will return the volume name for the device, no matter what. Also, # it will return an incorrect directory spec if the argument is a # directory that doesn't exist. if ($^O eq "VMS") { return rel2abs($dir); } # We use realpath() on Unix, since no other will properly clean out # a directory spec. use Cwd qw/realpath/; return realpath($dir); } # Check if all paths are one and the same, using stat. They must both exist # We need this for the cases when File::Spec doesn't detect case insensitivity # (File::Spec::Unix assumes case sensitivity) sub samedir { die "samedir expects two arguments\n" unless scalar @_ == 2; my @stat0 = stat($_[0]); # First argument my @stat1 = stat($_[1]); # Second argument die "Couldn't stat $_[0]" unless @stat0; die "Couldn't stat $_[1]" unless @stat1; # Compare device number return 0 unless ($stat0[0] == $stat1[0]); # Compare "inode". The perl manual recommends comparing as # string rather than as number. return 0 unless ($stat0[1] eq $stat1[1]); return 1; # All the same } sub quotify { my %processors = ( perl => sub { my $x = shift; $x =~ s/([\\\$\@"])/\\$1/g; return '"'.$x.'"'; }, maybeshell => sub { my $x = shift; (my $y = $x) =~ s/([\\\"])/\\$1/g; if ($x ne $y || $x =~ m|\s|) { return '"'.$y.'"'; } else { return $x; } }, ); my $for = shift; my $processor = defined($processors{$for}) ? $processors{$for} : sub { shift; }; return map { $processor->($_); } @_; } # collect_from_file($filename, $line_concat_cond_re, $line_concat) # $filename is a file name to read from # $line_concat_cond_re is a regexp detecting a line continuation ending # $line_concat is a CODEref that takes care of concatenating two lines sub collect_from_file { my $filename = shift; my $line_concat_cond_re = shift; my $line_concat = shift; open my $fh, $filename || die "unable to read $filename: $!\n"; return sub { my $saved_line = ""; $_ = ""; while (<$fh>) { s|\R$||; if (defined $line_concat) { $_ = $line_concat->($saved_line, $_); $saved_line = ""; } if (defined $line_concat_cond_re && /$line_concat_cond_re/) { $saved_line = $_; next; } return $_; } die "$filename ending with continuation line\n" if $_; close $fh; return undef; } } # collect_from_array($array, $line_concat_cond_re, $line_concat) # $array is an ARRAYref of lines # $line_concat_cond_re is a regexp detecting a line continuation ending # $line_concat is a CODEref that takes care of concatenating two lines sub collect_from_array { my $array = shift; my $line_concat_cond_re = shift; my $line_concat = shift; my @array = (@$array); return sub { my $saved_line = ""; $_ = ""; while (defined($_ = shift @array)) { s|\R$||; if (defined $line_concat) { $_ = $line_concat->($saved_line, $_); $saved_line = ""; } if (defined $line_concat_cond_re && /$line_concat_cond_re/) { $saved_line = $_; next; } return $_; } die "input text ending with continuation line\n" if $_; return undef; } } # collect_information($lineiterator, $line_continue, $regexp => $CODEref, ...) # $lineiterator is a CODEref that delivers one line at a time. # All following arguments are regex/CODEref pairs, where the regexp detects a # line and the CODEref does something with the result of the regexp. sub collect_information { my $lineiterator = shift; my %collectors = @_; while(defined($_ = $lineiterator->())) { s|\R$||; my $found = 0; if ($collectors{"BEFORE"}) { $collectors{"BEFORE"}->($_); } foreach my $re (keys %collectors) { if ($re !~ /^OTHERWISE|BEFORE|AFTER$/ && /$re/) { $collectors{$re}->($lineiterator); $found = 1; }; } if ($collectors{"OTHERWISE"}) { $collectors{"OTHERWISE"}->($lineiterator, $_) unless $found || !defined $collectors{"OTHERWISE"}; } if ($collectors{"AFTER"}) { $collectors{"AFTER"}->($_); } } } # tokenize($line) # $line is a line of text to split up into tokens # returns a list of tokens # # Tokens are divided by spaces. If the tokens include spaces, they # have to be quoted with single or double quotes. Double quotes # inside a double quoted token must be escaped. Escaping is done # with backslash. # Basically, the same quoting rules apply for " and ' as in any # Unix shell. sub tokenize { my $line = my $debug_line = shift; my @result = (); while ($line =~ s|^\s+||, $line ne "") { my $token = ""; while ($line ne "" && $line !~ m|^\s|) { if ($line =~ m/^"((?:[^"\\]+|\\.)*)"/) { $token .= $1; $line = $'; } elsif ($line =~ m/^'([^']*)'/) { $token .= $1; $line = $'; } elsif ($line =~ m/^(\S+)/) { $token .= $1; $line = $'; } } push @result, $token; } if ($ENV{CONFIGURE_DEBUG_TOKENIZE}) { print STDERR "DEBUG[tokenize]: Parsed '$debug_line' into:\n"; print STDERR "DEBUG[tokenize]: ('", join("', '", @result), "')\n"; } return @result; } diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS index 0769464fefa2..f4ac262888ad 100644 --- a/NEWS +++ b/NEWS @@ -1,1007 +1,1012 @@ NEWS ==== This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL release. For more details please read the CHANGES file. + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1m and OpenSSL 1.1.1n [15 Mar 2022] + + o Fixed a bug in the BN_mod_sqrt() function that can cause it to loop + forever for non-prime moduli ([CVE-2022-0778]) + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1l and OpenSSL 1.1.1m [14 Dec 2021] o None Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1k and OpenSSL 1.1.1l [24 Aug 2021] o Fixed an SM2 Decryption Buffer Overflow (CVE-2021-3711) o Fixed various read buffer overruns processing ASN.1 strings (CVE-2021-3712) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1j and OpenSSL 1.1.1k [25 Mar 2021] o Fixed a problem with verifying a certificate chain when using the X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT flag (CVE-2021-3450) o Fixed an issue where an OpenSSL TLS server may crash if sent a maliciously crafted renegotiation ClientHello message from a client (CVE-2021-3449) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1i and OpenSSL 1.1.1j [16 Feb 2021] o Fixed a NULL pointer deref in the X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() function (CVE-2021-23841) o Fixed the RSA_padding_check_SSLv23() function and the RSA_SSLV23_PADDING padding mode to correctly check for rollback attacks o Fixed an overflow in the EVP_CipherUpdate, EVP_EncryptUpdate and EVP_DecryptUpdate functions (CVE-2021-23840) o Fixed SRP_Calc_client_key so that it runs in constant time Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1h and OpenSSL 1.1.1i [8 Dec 2020] o Fixed NULL pointer deref in GENERAL_NAME_cmp (CVE-2020-1971) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1g and OpenSSL 1.1.1h [22 Sep 2020] o Disallow explicit curve parameters in verifications chains when X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is used o Enable 'MinProtocol' and 'MaxProtocol' to configure both TLS and DTLS contexts o Oracle Developer Studio will start reporting deprecation warnings Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1f and OpenSSL 1.1.1g [21 Apr 2020] o Fixed segmentation fault in SSL_check_chain() (CVE-2020-1967) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1e and OpenSSL 1.1.1f [31 Mar 2020] o Revert the unexpected EOF reporting via SSL_ERROR_SSL Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1d and OpenSSL 1.1.1e [17 Mar 2020] o Fixed an overflow bug in the x64_64 Montgomery squaring procedure used in exponentiation with 512-bit moduli (CVE-2019-1551) o Properly detect unexpected EOF while reading in libssl and report it via SSL_ERROR_SSL Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1c and OpenSSL 1.1.1d [10 Sep 2019] o Fixed a fork protection issue (CVE-2019-1549) o Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey (CVE-2019-1563) o For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is used even when parsing explicit parameters o Compute ECC cofactors if not provided during EC_GROUP construction (CVE-2019-1547) o Early start up entropy quality from the DEVRANDOM seed source has been improved for older Linux systems o Correct the extended master secret constant on EBCDIC systems o Use Windows installation paths in the mingw builds (CVE-2019-1552) o Changed DH_check to accept parameters with order q and 2q subgroups o Significantly reduce secure memory usage by the randomness pools o Revert the DEVRANDOM_WAIT feature for Linux systems Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1b and OpenSSL 1.1.1c [28 May 2019] o Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305 (CVE-2019-1543) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1a and OpenSSL 1.1.1b [26 Feb 2019] o Change the info callback signals for the start and end of a post-handshake message exchange in TLSv1.3. o Fix a bug in DTLS over SCTP. This breaks interoperability with older versions of OpenSSL like OpenSSL 1.1.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.2. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1 and OpenSSL 1.1.1a [20 Nov 2018] o Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation (CVE-2018-0734) o Timing vulnerability in ECDSA signature generation (CVE-2018-0735) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0i and OpenSSL 1.1.1 [11 Sep 2018] o Support for TLSv1.3 added (see https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/TLS1.3 for further important information). The TLSv1.3 implementation includes: o Fully compliant implementation of RFC8446 (TLSv1.3) on by default o Early data (0-RTT) o Post-handshake authentication and key update o Middlebox Compatibility Mode o TLSv1.3 PSKs o Support for all five RFC8446 ciphersuites o RSA-PSS signature algorithms (backported to TLSv1.2) o Configurable session ticket support o Stateless server support o Rewrite of the packet construction code for "safer" packet handling o Rewrite of the extension handling code o Complete rewrite of the OpenSSL random number generator to introduce the following capabilities o The default RAND method now utilizes an AES-CTR DRBG according to NIST standard SP 800-90Ar1. o Support for multiple DRBG instances with seed chaining. o There is a public and private DRBG instance. o The DRBG instances are fork-safe. o Keep all global DRBG instances on the secure heap if it is enabled. o The public and private DRBG instance are per thread for lock free operation o Support for various new cryptographic algorithms including: o SHA3 o SHA512/224 and SHA512/256 o EdDSA (both Ed25519 and Ed448) including X509 and TLS support o X448 (adding to the existing X25519 support in 1.1.0) o Multi-prime RSA o SM2 o SM3 o SM4 o SipHash o ARIA (including TLS support) o Significant Side-Channel attack security improvements o Add a new ClientHello callback to provide the ability to adjust the SSL object at an early stage. o Add 'Maximum Fragment Length' TLS extension negotiation and support o A new STORE module, which implements a uniform and URI based reader of stores that can contain keys, certificates, CRLs and numerous other objects. o Move the display of configuration data to configdata.pm. o Allow GNU style "make variables" to be used with Configure. o Claim the namespaces OSSL and OPENSSL, represented as symbol prefixes o Rewrite of devcrypto engine Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0h and OpenSSL 1.1.0i [under development] o Client DoS due to large DH parameter (CVE-2018-0732) o Cache timing vulnerability in RSA Key Generation (CVE-2018-0737) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0g and OpenSSL 1.1.0h [under development] o Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition could exceed the stack (CVE-2018-0739) o Incorrect CRYPTO_memcmp on HP-UX PA-RISC (CVE-2018-0733) o rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 overflow bug on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3738) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0f and OpenSSL 1.1.0g [2 Nov 2017] o bn_sqrx8x_internal carry bug on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3736) o Malformed X.509 IPAddressFamily could cause OOB read (CVE-2017-3735) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0e and OpenSSL 1.1.0f [25 May 2017] o config now recognises 64-bit mingw and chooses mingw64 instead of mingw Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0d and OpenSSL 1.1.0e [16 Feb 2017] o Encrypt-Then-Mac renegotiation crash (CVE-2017-3733) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0c and OpenSSL 1.1.0d [26 Jan 2017] o Truncated packet could crash via OOB read (CVE-2017-3731) o Bad (EC)DHE parameters cause a client crash (CVE-2017-3730) o BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3732) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0b and OpenSSL 1.1.0c [10 Nov 2016] o ChaCha20/Poly1305 heap-buffer-overflow (CVE-2016-7054) o CMS Null dereference (CVE-2016-7053) o Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results (CVE-2016-7055) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0a and OpenSSL 1.1.0b [26 Sep 2016] o Fix Use After Free for large message sizes (CVE-2016-6309) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0 and OpenSSL 1.1.0a [22 Sep 2016] o OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth (CVE-2016-6304) o SSL_peek() hang on empty record (CVE-2016-6305) o Excessive allocation of memory in tls_get_message_header() (CVE-2016-6307) o Excessive allocation of memory in dtls1_preprocess_fragment() (CVE-2016-6308) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2h and OpenSSL 1.1.0 [25 Aug 2016] o Copyright text was shrunk to a boilerplate that points to the license o "shared" builds are now the default when possible o Added support for "pipelining" o Added the AFALG engine o New threading API implemented o Support for ChaCha20 and Poly1305 added to libcrypto and libssl o Support for extended master secret o CCM ciphersuites o Reworked test suite, now based on perl, Test::Harness and Test::More o *Most* libcrypto and libssl public structures were made opaque, including: BIGNUM and associated types, EC_KEY and EC_KEY_METHOD, DH and DH_METHOD, DSA and DSA_METHOD, RSA and RSA_METHOD, BIO and BIO_METHOD, EVP_MD_CTX, EVP_MD, EVP_CIPHER_CTX, EVP_CIPHER, EVP_PKEY and associated types, HMAC_CTX, X509, X509_CRL, X509_OBJECT, X509_STORE_CTX, X509_STORE, X509_LOOKUP, X509_LOOKUP_METHOD o libssl internal structures made opaque o SSLv2 support removed o Kerberos ciphersuite support removed o RC4 removed from DEFAULT ciphersuites in libssl o 40 and 56 bit cipher support removed from libssl o All public header files moved to include/openssl, no more symlinking o SSL/TLS state machine, version negotiation and record layer rewritten o EC revision: now operations use new EC_KEY_METHOD. o Support for OCB mode added to libcrypto o Support for asynchronous crypto operations added to libcrypto and libssl o Deprecated interfaces can now be disabled at build time either relative to the latest release via the "no-deprecated" Configure argument, or via the "--api=1.1.0|1.0.0|0.9.8" option. o Application software can be compiled with -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=version to ensure that features deprecated in that version are not exposed. o Support for RFC6698/RFC7671 DANE TLSA peer authentication o Change of Configure to use --prefix as the main installation directory location rather than --openssldir. The latter becomes the directory for certs, private key and openssl.cnf exclusively. o Reworked BIO networking library, with full support for IPv6. o New "unified" build system o New security levels o Support for scrypt algorithm o Support for X25519 o Extended SSL_CONF support using configuration files o KDF algorithm support. Implement TLS PRF as a KDF. o Support for Certificate Transparency o HKDF support. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2g and OpenSSL 1.0.2h [3 May 2016] o Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check (CVE-2016-2107) o Fix EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow (CVE-2016-2105) o Fix EVP_EncryptUpdate overflow (CVE-2016-2106) o Prevent ASN.1 BIO excessive memory allocation (CVE-2016-2109) o EBCDIC overread (CVE-2016-2176) o Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN. o Remove LOW from the DEFAULT cipher list. This removes singles DES from the default. o Only remove the SSLv2 methods with the no-ssl2-method option. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2f and OpenSSL 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016] o Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL. o Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers (CVE-2016-0800) o Fix a double-free in DSA code (CVE-2016-0705) o Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak (CVE-2016-0798) o Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption (CVE-2016-0797) o Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions (CVE-2016-0799) o Fix side channel attack on modular exponentiation (CVE-2016-0702) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2e and OpenSSL 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016] o DH small subgroups (CVE-2016-0701) o SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers (CVE-2015-3197) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2d and OpenSSL 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015] o BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 (CVE-2015-3193) o Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter (CVE-2015-3194) o X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak (CVE-2015-3195) o Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs o In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short, return an error Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2c and OpenSSL 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015] o Alternate chains certificate forgery (CVE-2015-1793) o Race condition handling PSK identify hint (CVE-2015-3196) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2b and OpenSSL 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015] o Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2a and OpenSSL 1.0.2b [11 Jun 2015] o Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop (CVE-2015-1788) o Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time (CVE-2015-1789) o PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent (CVE-2015-1790) o CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function (CVE-2015-1792) o Race condition handling NewSessionTicket (CVE-2015-1791) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2 and OpenSSL 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015] o OpenSSL 1.0.2 ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix (CVE-2015-0291) o Multiblock corrupted pointer fix (CVE-2015-0290) o Segmentation fault in DTLSv1_listen fix (CVE-2015-0207) o Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix (CVE-2015-0286) o Segmentation fault for invalid PSS parameters fix (CVE-2015-0208) o ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix (CVE-2015-0287) o PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix (CVE-2015-0289) o DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix (CVE-2015-0293) o Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix (CVE-2015-1787) o Handshake with unseeded PRNG fix (CVE-2015-0285) o Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix (CVE-2015-0209) o X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix (CVE-2015-0288) o Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1l and OpenSSL 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015]: o Suite B support for TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 o Support for DTLS 1.2 o TLS automatic EC curve selection. o API to set TLS supported signature algorithms and curves o SSL_CONF configuration API. o TLS Brainpool support. o ALPN support. o CMS support for RSA-PSS, RSA-OAEP, ECDH and X9.42 DH. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1k and OpenSSL 1.0.1l [15 Jan 2015] o Build fixes for the Windows and OpenVMS platforms Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1j and OpenSSL 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015] o Fix for CVE-2014-3571 o Fix for CVE-2015-0206 o Fix for CVE-2014-3569 o Fix for CVE-2014-3572 o Fix for CVE-2015-0204 o Fix for CVE-2015-0205 o Fix for CVE-2014-8275 o Fix for CVE-2014-3570 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1i and OpenSSL 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014] o Fix for CVE-2014-3513 o Fix for CVE-2014-3567 o Mitigation for CVE-2014-3566 (SSL protocol vulnerability) o Fix for CVE-2014-3568 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1h and OpenSSL 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014] o Fix for CVE-2014-3512 o Fix for CVE-2014-3511 o Fix for CVE-2014-3510 o Fix for CVE-2014-3507 o Fix for CVE-2014-3506 o Fix for CVE-2014-3505 o Fix for CVE-2014-3509 o Fix for CVE-2014-5139 o Fix for CVE-2014-3508 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1g and OpenSSL 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014] o Fix for CVE-2014-0224 o Fix for CVE-2014-0221 o Fix for CVE-2014-0198 o Fix for CVE-2014-0195 o Fix for CVE-2014-3470 o Fix for CVE-2010-5298 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1f and OpenSSL 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014] o Fix for CVE-2014-0160 o Add TLS padding extension workaround for broken servers. o Fix for CVE-2014-0076 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1e and OpenSSL 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014] o Don't include gmt_unix_time in TLS server and client random values o Fix for TLS record tampering bug CVE-2013-4353 o Fix for TLS version checking bug CVE-2013-6449 o Fix for DTLS retransmission bug CVE-2013-6450 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1d and OpenSSL 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]: o Corrected fix for CVE-2013-0169 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1c and OpenSSL 1.0.1d [4 Feb 2013]: o Fix renegotiation in TLS 1.1, 1.2 by using the correct TLS version. o Include the fips configuration module. o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166 o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169 o Fix for TLS AESNI record handling flaw CVE-2012-2686 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1b and OpenSSL 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]: o Fix TLS/DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333 o Don't attempt to use non-FIPS composite ciphers in FIPS mode. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1a and OpenSSL 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012]: o Fix compilation error on non-x86 platforms. o Make FIPS capable OpenSSL ciphers work in non-FIPS mode. o Fix SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 clash with SSL_OP_ALL in OpenSSL 1.0.0 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1 and OpenSSL 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012]: o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110 o Workarounds for some servers that hang on long client hellos. o Fix SEGV in AES code. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0h and OpenSSL 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012]: o TLS/DTLS heartbeat support. o SCTP support. o RFC 5705 TLS key material exporter. o RFC 5764 DTLS-SRTP negotiation. o Next Protocol Negotiation. o PSS signatures in certificates, requests and CRLs. o Support for password based recipient info for CMS. o Support TLS v1.2 and TLS v1.1. o Preliminary FIPS capability for unvalidated 2.0 FIPS module. o SRP support. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0g and OpenSSL 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]: o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884 o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619 o Various DTLS fixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0f and OpenSSL 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012]: o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0e and OpenSSL 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012]: o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108 o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576 o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619 o Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE CVE-2012-0027 o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0d and OpenSSL 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011]: o Fix for CRL vulnerability issue CVE-2011-3207 o Fix for ECDH crashes CVE-2011-3210 o Protection against EC timing attacks. o Support ECDH ciphersuites for certificates using SHA2 algorithms. o Various DTLS fixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0c and OpenSSL 1.0.0d [8 Feb 2011]: o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0b and OpenSSL 1.0.0c [2 Dec 2010]: o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180 o Fix for CVE-2010-4252 o Fix mishandling of absent EC point format extension. o Fix various platform compilation issues. o Corrected fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0a and OpenSSL 1.0.0b [16 Nov 2010]: o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864. o Fix for CVE-2010-2939 o Fix WIN32 build system for GOST ENGINE. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.0a [1 Jun 2010]: o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-1633. o GOST MAC and CFB fixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 1.0.0 [29 Mar 2010]: o RFC3280 path validation: sufficient to process PKITS tests. o Integrated support for PVK files and keyblobs. o Change default private key format to PKCS#8. o CMS support: able to process all examples in RFC4134 o Streaming ASN1 encode support for PKCS#7 and CMS. o Multiple signer and signer add support for PKCS#7 and CMS. o ASN1 printing support. o Whirlpool hash algorithm added. o RFC3161 time stamp support. o New generalised public key API supporting ENGINE based algorithms. o New generalised public key API utilities. o New ENGINE supporting GOST algorithms. o SSL/TLS GOST ciphersuite support. o PKCS#7 and CMS GOST support. o RFC4279 PSK ciphersuite support. o Supported points format extension for ECC ciphersuites. o ecdsa-with-SHA224/256/384/512 signature types. o dsa-with-SHA224 and dsa-with-SHA256 signature types. o Opaque PRF Input TLS extension support. o Updated time routines to avoid OS limitations. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]: o CFB cipher definition fixes. o Fix security issues CVE-2010-0740 and CVE-2010-0433. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8l and OpenSSL 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010]: o Cipher definition fixes. o Workaround for slow RAND_poll() on some WIN32 versions. o Remove MD2 from algorithm tables. o SPKAC handling fixes. o Support for RFC5746 TLS renegotiation extension. o Compression memory leak fixed. o Compression session resumption fixed. o Ticket and SNI coexistence fixes. o Many fixes to DTLS handling. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8k and OpenSSL 0.9.8l [5 Nov 2009]: o Temporary work around for CVE-2009-3555: disable renegotiation. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8j and OpenSSL 0.9.8k [25 Mar 2009]: o Fix various build issues. o Fix security issues (CVE-2009-0590, CVE-2009-0591, CVE-2009-0789) Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8i and OpenSSL 0.9.8j [7 Jan 2009]: o Fix security issue (CVE-2008-5077) o Merge FIPS 140-2 branch code. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8g and OpenSSL 0.9.8h [28 May 2008]: o CryptoAPI ENGINE support. o Various precautionary measures. o Fix for bugs affecting certificate request creation. o Support for local machine keyset attribute in PKCS#12 files. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8f and OpenSSL 0.9.8g [19 Oct 2007]: o Backport of CMS functionality to 0.9.8. o Fixes for bugs introduced with 0.9.8f. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8e and OpenSSL 0.9.8f [11 Oct 2007]: o Add gcc 4.2 support. o Add support for AES and SSE2 assembly language optimization for VC++ build. o Support for RFC4507bis and server name extensions if explicitly selected at compile time. o DTLS improvements. o RFC4507bis support. o TLS Extensions support. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8d and OpenSSL 0.9.8e [23 Feb 2007]: o Various ciphersuite selection fixes. o RFC3779 support. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8c and OpenSSL 0.9.8d [28 Sep 2006]: o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS (CVE-2006-2940) o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343) o Changes to ciphersuite selection algorithm Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8b and OpenSSL 0.9.8c [5 Sep 2006]: o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339 o New cipher Camellia Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8a and OpenSSL 0.9.8b [4 May 2006]: o Cipher string fixes. o Fixes for VC++ 2005. o Updated ECC cipher suite support. o New functions EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(). o Zlib compression usage fixes. o Built in dynamic engine compilation support on Win32. o Fixes auto dynamic engine loading in Win32. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8 and OpenSSL 0.9.8a [11 Oct 2005]: o Fix potential SSL 2.0 rollback, CVE-2005-2969 o Extended Windows CE support Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.8 [5 Jul 2005]: o Major work on the BIGNUM library for higher efficiency and to make operations more streamlined and less contradictory. This is the result of a major audit of the BIGNUM library. o Addition of BIGNUM functions for fields GF(2^m) and NIST curves, to support the Elliptic Crypto functions. o Major work on Elliptic Crypto; ECDH and ECDSA added, including the use through EVP, X509 and ENGINE. o New ASN.1 mini-compiler that's usable through the OpenSSL configuration file. o Added support for ASN.1 indefinite length constructed encoding. o New PKCS#12 'medium level' API to manipulate PKCS#12 files. o Complete rework of shared library construction and linking programs with shared or static libraries, through a separate Makefile.shared. o Rework of the passing of parameters from one Makefile to another. o Changed ENGINE framework to load dynamic engine modules automatically from specifically given directories. o New structure and ASN.1 functions for CertificatePair. o Changed the ZLIB compression method to be stateful. o Changed the key-generation and primality testing "progress" mechanism to take a structure that contains the ticker function and an argument. o New engine module: GMP (performs private key exponentiation). o New engine module: VIA PadLOck ACE extension in VIA C3 Nehemiah processors. o Added support for IPv6 addresses in certificate extensions. See RFC 1884, section 2.2. o Added support for certificate policy mappings, policy constraints and name constraints. o Added support for multi-valued AVAs in the OpenSSL configuration file. o Added support for multiple certificates with the same subject in the 'openssl ca' index file. o Make it possible to create self-signed certificates using 'openssl ca -selfsign'. o Make it possible to generate a serial number file with 'openssl ca -create_serial'. o New binary search functions with extended functionality. o New BUF functions. o New STORE structure and library to provide an interface to all sorts of data repositories. Supports storage of public and private keys, certificates, CRLs, numbers and arbitrary blobs. This library is unfortunately unfinished and unused within OpenSSL. o New control functions for the error stack. o Changed the PKCS#7 library to support one-pass S/MIME processing. o Added the possibility to compile without old deprecated functionality with the OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED macro or the 'no-deprecated' argument to the config and Configure scripts. o Constification of all ASN.1 conversion functions, and other affected functions. o Improved platform support for PowerPC. o New FIPS 180-2 algorithms (SHA-224, -256, -384 and -512). o New X509_VERIFY_PARAM structure to support parameterisation of X.509 path validation. o Major overhaul of RC4 performance on Intel P4, IA-64 and AMD64. o Changed the Configure script to have some algorithms disabled by default. Those can be explicitly enabled with the new argument form 'enable-xxx'. o Change the default digest in 'openssl' commands from MD5 to SHA-1. o Added support for DTLS. o New BIGNUM blinding. o Added support for the RSA-PSS encryption scheme o Added support for the RSA X.931 padding. o Added support for BSD sockets on NetWare. o Added support for files larger than 2GB. o Added initial support for Win64. o Added alternate pkg-config files. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7l and OpenSSL 0.9.7m [23 Feb 2007]: o FIPS 1.1.1 module linking. o Various ciphersuite selection fixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l [28 Sep 2006]: o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS (CVE-2006-2940) o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343) Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k [5 Sep 2006]: o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339 Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j [4 May 2006]: o Visual C++ 2005 fixes. o Update Windows build system for FIPS. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7h and OpenSSL 0.9.7i [14 Oct 2005]: o Give EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE its old value, except for a FIPS build. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.7h [11 Oct 2005]: o Fix SSL 2.0 Rollback, CVE-2005-2969 o Allow use of fixed-length exponent on DSA signing o Default fixed-window RSA, DSA, DH private-key operations Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7f and OpenSSL 0.9.7g [11 Apr 2005]: o More compilation issues fixed. o Adaptation to more modern Kerberos API. o Enhanced or corrected configuration for Solaris64, Mingw and Cygwin. o Enhanced x86_64 assembler BIGNUM module. o More constification. o Added processing of proxy certificates (RFC 3820). Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7e and OpenSSL 0.9.7f [22 Mar 2005]: o Several compilation issues fixed. o Many memory allocation failure checks added. o Improved comparison of X509 Name type. o Mandatory basic checks on certificates. o Performance improvements. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7d and OpenSSL 0.9.7e [25 Oct 2004]: o Fix race condition in CRL checking code. o Fixes to PKCS#7 (S/MIME) code. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7c and OpenSSL 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004]: o Security: Fix Kerberos ciphersuite SSL/TLS handshaking bug o Security: Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() o Allow multiple active certificates with same subject in CA index o Multiple X509 verification fixes o Speed up HMAC and other operations Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7b and OpenSSL 0.9.7c [30 Sep 2003]: o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs. o New -ignore_err option to OCSP utility. o Various interop and bug fixes in S/MIME code. o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7a and OpenSSL 0.9.7b [10 Apr 2003]: o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichbacher's attack o Security: make RSA blinding default. o Configuration: Irix fixes, AIX fixes, better mingw support. o Support for new platforms: linux-ia64-ecc. o Build: shared library support fixes. o ASN.1: treat domainComponent correctly. o Documentation: fixes and additions. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7 and OpenSSL 0.9.7a [19 Feb 2003]: o Security: Important security related bugfixes. o Enhanced compatibility with MIT Kerberos. o Can be built without the ENGINE framework. o IA32 assembler enhancements. o Support for new platforms: FreeBSD/IA64 and FreeBSD/Sparc64. o Configuration: the no-err option now works properly. o SSL/TLS: now handles manual certificate chain building. o SSL/TLS: certain session ID malfunctions corrected. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.7 [30 Dec 2002]: o New library section OCSP. o Complete rewrite of ASN1 code. o CRL checking in verify code and openssl utility. o Extension copying in 'ca' utility. o Flexible display options in 'ca' utility. o Provisional support for international characters with UTF8. o Support for external crypto devices ('engine') is no longer a separate distribution. o New elliptic curve library section. o New AES (Rijndael) library section. o Support for new platforms: Windows CE, Tandem OSS, A/UX, AIX 64-bit, Linux x86_64, Linux 64-bit on Sparc v9 o Extended support for some platforms: VxWorks o Enhanced support for shared libraries. o Now only builds PIC code when shared library support is requested. o Support for pkg-config. o Lots of new manuals. o Makes symbolic links to or copies of manuals to cover all described functions. o Change DES API to clean up the namespace (some applications link also against libdes providing similar functions having the same name). Provide macros for backward compatibility (will be removed in the future). o Unify handling of cryptographic algorithms (software and engine) to be available via EVP routines for asymmetric and symmetric ciphers. o NCONF: new configuration handling routines. o Change API to use more 'const' modifiers to improve error checking and help optimizers. o Finally remove references to RSAref. o Reworked parts of the BIGNUM code. o Support for new engines: Broadcom ubsec, Accelerated Encryption Processing, IBM 4758. o A few new engines added in the demos area. o Extended and corrected OID (object identifier) table. o PRNG: query at more locations for a random device, automatic query for EGD style random sources at several locations. o SSL/TLS: allow optional cipher choice according to server's preference. o SSL/TLS: allow server to explicitly set new session ids. o SSL/TLS: support Kerberos cipher suites (RFC2712). Only supports MIT Kerberos for now. o SSL/TLS: allow more precise control of renegotiations and sessions. o SSL/TLS: add callback to retrieve SSL/TLS messages. o SSL/TLS: support AES cipher suites (RFC3268). Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6j and OpenSSL 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003]: o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs. o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6i and OpenSSL 0.9.6j [10 Apr 2003]: o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichbacher's attack o Security: make RSA blinding default. o Build: shared library support fixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6h and OpenSSL 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003]: o Important security related bugfixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6g and OpenSSL 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002]: o New configuration targets for Tandem OSS and A/UX. o New OIDs for Microsoft attributes. o Better handling of SSL session caching. o Better comparison of distinguished names. o Better handling of shared libraries in a mixed GNU/non-GNU environment. o Support assembler code with Borland C. o Fixes for length problems. o Fixes for uninitialised variables. o Fixes for memory leaks, some unusual crashes and some race conditions. o Fixes for smaller building problems. o Updates of manuals, FAQ and other instructive documents. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6f and OpenSSL 0.9.6g [9 Aug 2002]: o Important building fixes on Unix. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6e and OpenSSL 0.9.6f [8 Aug 2002]: o Various important bugfixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6d and OpenSSL 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002]: o Important security related bugfixes. o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6c and OpenSSL 0.9.6d [9 May 2002]: o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes. o Fix DH parameter generation for 'non-standard' generators. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6b and OpenSSL 0.9.6c [21 Dec 2001]: o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes. o BIGNUM library fixes. o RSA OAEP and random number generation fixes. o Object identifiers corrected and added. o Add assembler BN routines for IA64. o Add support for OS/390 Unix, UnixWare with gcc, OpenUNIX 8, MIPS Linux; shared library support for Irix, HP-UX. o Add crypto accelerator support for AEP, Baltimore SureWare, Broadcom and Cryptographic Appliance's keyserver [in 0.9.6c-engine release]. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6a and OpenSSL 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001]: o Security fix: PRNG improvements. o Security fix: RSA OAEP check. o Security fix: Reinsert and fix countermeasure to Bleichbacher's attack. o MIPS bug fix in BIGNUM. o Bug fix in "openssl enc". o Bug fix in X.509 printing routine. o Bug fix in DSA verification routine and DSA S/MIME verification. o Bug fix to make PRNG thread-safe. o Bug fix in RAND_file_name(). o Bug fix in compatibility mode trust settings. o Bug fix in blowfish EVP. o Increase default size for BIO buffering filter. o Compatibility fixes in some scripts. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001]: o Security fix: change behavior of OpenSSL to avoid using environment variables when running as root. o Security fix: check the result of RSA-CRT to reduce the possibility of deducing the private key from an incorrectly calculated signature. o Security fix: prevent Bleichenbacher's DSA attack. o Security fix: Zero the premaster secret after deriving the master secret in DH ciphersuites. o Reimplement SSL_peek(), which had various problems. o Compatibility fix: the function des_encrypt() renamed to des_encrypt1() to avoid clashes with some Unixen libc. o Bug fixes for Win32, HP/UX and Irix. o Bug fixes in BIGNUM, SSL, PKCS#7, PKCS#12, X.509, CONF and memory checking routines. o Bug fixes for RSA operations in threaded environments. o Bug fixes in misc. openssl applications. o Remove a few potential memory leaks. o Add tighter checks of BIGNUM routines. o Shared library support has been reworked for generality. o More documentation. o New function BN_rand_range(). o Add "-rand" option to openssl s_client and s_server. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5a and OpenSSL 0.9.6 [10 Oct 2000]: o Some documentation for BIO and SSL libraries. o Enhanced chain verification using key identifiers. o New sign and verify options to 'dgst' application. o Support for DER and PEM encoded messages in 'smime' application. o New 'rsautl' application, low level RSA utility. o MD4 now included. o Bugfix for SSL rollback padding check. o Support for external crypto devices [1]. o Enhanced EVP interface. [1] The support for external crypto devices is currently a separate distribution. See the file README.ENGINE. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5 and OpenSSL 0.9.5a [1 Apr 2000]: o Bug fixes for Win32, SuSE Linux, NeXTSTEP and FreeBSD 2.2.8 o Shared library support for HPUX and Solaris-gcc o Support of Linux/IA64 o Assembler support for Mingw32 o New 'rand' application o New way to check for existence of algorithms from scripts Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.4 and OpenSSL 0.9.5 [25 May 2000]: o S/MIME support in new 'smime' command o Documentation for the OpenSSL command line application o Automation of 'req' application o Fixes to make s_client, s_server work under Windows o Support for multiple fieldnames in SPKACs o New SPKAC command line utility and associated library functions o Options to allow passwords to be obtained from various sources o New public key PEM format and options to handle it o Many other fixes and enhancements to command line utilities o Usable certificate chain verification o Certificate purpose checking o Certificate trust settings o Support of authority information access extension o Extensions in certificate requests o Simplified X509 name and attribute routines o Initial (incomplete) support for international character sets o New DH_METHOD, DSA_METHOD and enhanced RSA_METHOD o Read only memory BIOs and simplified creation function o TLS/SSL protocol bugfixes: Accept TLS 'client hello' in SSL 3.0 record; allow fragmentation and interleaving of handshake and other data o TLS/SSL code now "tolerates" MS SGC o Work around for Netscape client certificate hang bug o RSA_NULL option that removes RSA patent code but keeps other RSA functionality o Memory leak detection now allows applications to add extra information via a per-thread stack o PRNG robustness improved o EGD support o BIGNUM library bug fixes o Faster DSA parameter generation o Enhanced support for Alpha Linux o Experimental MacOS support Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.3 and OpenSSL 0.9.4 [9 Aug 1999]: o Transparent support for PKCS#8 format private keys: these are used by several software packages and are more secure than the standard form o PKCS#5 v2.0 implementation o Password callbacks have a new void * argument for application data o Avoid various memory leaks o New pipe-like BIO that allows using the SSL library when actual I/O must be handled by the application (BIO pair) Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.2b and OpenSSL 0.9.3 [24 May 1999]: o Lots of enhancements and cleanups to the Configuration mechanism o RSA OEAP related fixes o Added `openssl ca -revoke' option for revoking a certificate o Source cleanups: const correctness, type-safe stacks and ASN.1 SETs o Source tree cleanups: removed lots of obsolete files o Thawte SXNet, certificate policies and CRL distribution points extension support o Preliminary (experimental) S/MIME support o Support for ASN.1 UTF8String and VisibleString o Full integration of PKCS#12 code o Sparc assembler bignum implementation, optimized hash functions o Option to disable selected ciphers Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.1c and OpenSSL 0.9.2b [22 Mar 1999]: o Fixed a security hole related to session resumption o Fixed RSA encryption routines for the p < q case o "ALL" in cipher lists now means "everything except NULL ciphers" o Support for Triple-DES CBCM cipher o Support of Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) for RSA o First support for new TLSv1 ciphers o Added a few new BIOs (syslog BIO, reliable BIO) o Extended support for DSA certificate/keys. o Extended support for Certificate Signing Requests (CSR) o Initial support for X.509v3 extensions o Extended support for compression inside the SSL record layer o Overhauled Win32 builds o Cleanups and fixes to the Big Number (BN) library o Support for ASN.1 GeneralizedTime o Splitted ASN.1 SETs from SEQUENCEs o ASN1 and PEM support for Netscape Certificate Sequences o Overhauled Perl interface o Lots of source tree cleanups. o Lots of memory leak fixes. o Lots of bug fixes. Major changes between SSLeay 0.9.0b and OpenSSL 0.9.1c [23 Dec 1998]: o Integration of the popular NO_RSA/NO_DSA patches o Initial support for compression inside the SSL record layer o Added BIO proxy and filtering functionality o Extended Big Number (BN) library o Added RIPE MD160 message digest o Added support for RC2/64bit cipher o Extended ASN.1 parser routines o Adjustments of the source tree for CVS o Support for various new platforms diff --git a/README b/README index 50345c3c28eb..3e100933f388 100644 --- a/README +++ b/README @@ -1,93 +1,93 @@ - OpenSSL 1.1.1m 14 Dec 2021 + OpenSSL 1.1.1n 15 Mar 2022 Copyright (c) 1998-2021 The OpenSSL Project Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson All rights reserved. DESCRIPTION ----------- The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, fully featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols (including SSLv3) as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptographic library. OpenSSL is descended from the SSLeay library developed by Eric A. Young and Tim J. Hudson. The OpenSSL toolkit is licensed under a dual-license (the OpenSSL license plus the SSLeay license), which means that you are free to get and use it for commercial and non-commercial purposes as long as you fulfill the conditions of both licenses. OVERVIEW -------- The OpenSSL toolkit includes: libssl (with platform specific naming): Provides the client and server-side implementations for SSLv3 and TLS. libcrypto (with platform specific naming): Provides general cryptographic and X.509 support needed by SSL/TLS but not logically part of it. openssl: A command line tool that can be used for: Creation of key parameters Creation of X.509 certificates, CSRs and CRLs Calculation of message digests Encryption and decryption SSL/TLS client and server tests Handling of S/MIME signed or encrypted mail And more... INSTALLATION ------------ See the appropriate file: INSTALL Linux, Unix, Windows, OpenVMS, ... NOTES.* INSTALL addendums for different platforms SUPPORT ------- See the OpenSSL website www.openssl.org for details on how to obtain commercial technical support. Free community support is available through the openssl-users email list (see https://www.openssl.org/community/mailinglists.html for further details). If you have any problems with OpenSSL then please take the following steps first: - Download the latest version from the repository to see if the problem has already been addressed - Configure with no-asm - Remove compiler optimization flags If you wish to report a bug then please include the following information and create an issue on GitHub: - OpenSSL version: output of 'openssl version -a' - Configuration data: output of 'perl configdata.pm --dump' - OS Name, Version, Hardware platform - Compiler Details (name, version) - Application Details (name, version) - Problem Description (steps that will reproduce the problem, if known) - Stack Traceback (if the application dumps core) Just because something doesn't work the way you expect does not mean it is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL. Use the openssl-users email list for this type of query. HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL ---------------------------- See CONTRIBUTING LEGALITIES ---------- A number of nations restrict the use or export of cryptography. If you are potentially subject to such restrictions you should seek competent professional legal advice before attempting to develop or distribute cryptographic code. diff --git a/apps/apps.c b/apps/apps.c index c06241abb975..1a92271595f1 100644 --- a/apps/apps.c +++ b/apps/apps.c @@ -1,2779 +1,2783 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) /* * On VMS, you need to define this to get the declaration of fileno(). The * value 2 is to make sure no function defined in POSIX-2 is left undefined. */ # define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 2 #endif #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO # include # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA # include #endif #include #include #include "apps.h" #ifdef _WIN32 static int WIN32_rename(const char *from, const char *to); # define rename(from,to) WIN32_rename((from),(to)) #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) # include #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(_WIN32) # define _kbhit kbhit #endif typedef struct { const char *name; unsigned long flag; unsigned long mask; } NAME_EX_TBL; static UI_METHOD *ui_method = NULL; static const UI_METHOD *ui_fallback_method = NULL; static int set_table_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg, const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl); static int set_multi_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg, const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl); int app_init(long mesgwin); int chopup_args(ARGS *arg, char *buf) { int quoted; char c = '\0', *p = NULL; arg->argc = 0; if (arg->size == 0) { arg->size = 20; arg->argv = app_malloc(sizeof(*arg->argv) * arg->size, "argv space"); } for (p = buf;;) { /* Skip whitespace. */ while (*p && isspace(_UC(*p))) p++; if (!*p) break; /* The start of something good :-) */ if (arg->argc >= arg->size) { char **tmp; arg->size += 20; tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(arg->argv, sizeof(*arg->argv) * arg->size); if (tmp == NULL) return 0; arg->argv = tmp; } quoted = *p == '\'' || *p == '"'; if (quoted) c = *p++; arg->argv[arg->argc++] = p; /* now look for the end of this */ if (quoted) { while (*p && *p != c) p++; *p++ = '\0'; } else { while (*p && !isspace(_UC(*p))) p++; if (*p) *p++ = '\0'; } } arg->argv[arg->argc] = NULL; return 1; } #ifndef APP_INIT int app_init(long mesgwin) { return 1; } #endif int ctx_set_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, const char *CApath, int noCAfile, int noCApath) { if (CAfile == NULL && CApath == NULL) { if (!noCAfile && SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_file(ctx) <= 0) return 0; if (!noCApath && SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_dir(ctx) <= 0) return 0; return 1; } return SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT int ctx_set_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *path) { if (path == NULL) return SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(ctx); return SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file(ctx, path); } #endif static unsigned long nmflag = 0; static char nmflag_set = 0; int set_nameopt(const char *arg) { int ret = set_name_ex(&nmflag, arg); if (ret) nmflag_set = 1; return ret; } unsigned long get_nameopt(void) { return (nmflag_set) ? nmflag : XN_FLAG_ONELINE; } int dump_cert_text(BIO *out, X509 *x) { print_name(out, "subject=", X509_get_subject_name(x), get_nameopt()); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); print_name(out, "issuer=", X509_get_issuer_name(x), get_nameopt()); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); return 0; } static int ui_open(UI *ui) { int (*opener)(UI *ui) = UI_method_get_opener(ui_fallback_method); if (opener) return opener(ui); return 1; } static int ui_read(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis) { int (*reader)(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis) = NULL; if (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD && UI_get0_user_data(ui)) { switch (UI_get_string_type(uis)) { case UIT_PROMPT: case UIT_VERIFY: { const char *password = ((PW_CB_DATA *)UI_get0_user_data(ui))->password; if (password && password[0] != '\0') { UI_set_result(ui, uis, password); return 1; } } break; case UIT_NONE: case UIT_BOOLEAN: case UIT_INFO: case UIT_ERROR: break; } } reader = UI_method_get_reader(ui_fallback_method); if (reader) return reader(ui, uis); return 1; } static int ui_write(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis) { int (*writer)(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis) = NULL; if (UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD && UI_get0_user_data(ui)) { switch (UI_get_string_type(uis)) { case UIT_PROMPT: case UIT_VERIFY: { const char *password = ((PW_CB_DATA *)UI_get0_user_data(ui))->password; if (password && password[0] != '\0') return 1; } break; case UIT_NONE: case UIT_BOOLEAN: case UIT_INFO: case UIT_ERROR: break; } } writer = UI_method_get_writer(ui_fallback_method); if (writer) return writer(ui, uis); return 1; } static int ui_close(UI *ui) { int (*closer)(UI *ui) = UI_method_get_closer(ui_fallback_method); if (closer) return closer(ui); return 1; } int setup_ui_method(void) { ui_fallback_method = UI_null(); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI_CONSOLE ui_fallback_method = UI_OpenSSL(); #endif ui_method = UI_create_method("OpenSSL application user interface"); UI_method_set_opener(ui_method, ui_open); UI_method_set_reader(ui_method, ui_read); UI_method_set_writer(ui_method, ui_write); UI_method_set_closer(ui_method, ui_close); return 0; } void destroy_ui_method(void) { if (ui_method) { UI_destroy_method(ui_method); ui_method = NULL; } } const UI_METHOD *get_ui_method(void) { return ui_method; } int password_callback(char *buf, int bufsiz, int verify, PW_CB_DATA *cb_tmp) { int res = 0; UI *ui = NULL; PW_CB_DATA *cb_data = (PW_CB_DATA *)cb_tmp; ui = UI_new_method(ui_method); if (ui) { int ok = 0; char *buff = NULL; int ui_flags = 0; const char *prompt_info = NULL; char *prompt; + int pw_min_len = PW_MIN_LENGTH; if (cb_data != NULL && cb_data->prompt_info != NULL) prompt_info = cb_data->prompt_info; + if (cb_data != NULL && cb_data->password != NULL + && *(const char*)cb_data->password != '\0') + pw_min_len = 1; prompt = UI_construct_prompt(ui, "pass phrase", prompt_info); if (!prompt) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); UI_free(ui); return 0; } ui_flags |= UI_INPUT_FLAG_DEFAULT_PWD; UI_ctrl(ui, UI_CTRL_PRINT_ERRORS, 1, 0, 0); /* We know that there is no previous user data to return to us */ (void)UI_add_user_data(ui, cb_data); ok = UI_add_input_string(ui, prompt, ui_flags, buf, - PW_MIN_LENGTH, bufsiz - 1); + pw_min_len, bufsiz - 1); if (ok >= 0 && verify) { buff = app_malloc(bufsiz, "password buffer"); ok = UI_add_verify_string(ui, prompt, ui_flags, buff, - PW_MIN_LENGTH, bufsiz - 1, buf); + pw_min_len, bufsiz - 1, buf); } if (ok >= 0) do { ok = UI_process(ui); } while (ok < 0 && UI_ctrl(ui, UI_CTRL_IS_REDOABLE, 0, 0, 0)); OPENSSL_clear_free(buff, (unsigned int)bufsiz); if (ok >= 0) res = strlen(buf); if (ok == -1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "User interface error\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, (unsigned int)bufsiz); res = 0; } if (ok == -2) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "aborted!\n"); OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, (unsigned int)bufsiz); res = 0; } UI_free(ui); OPENSSL_free(prompt); } return res; } static char *app_get_pass(const char *arg, int keepbio); int app_passwd(const char *arg1, const char *arg2, char **pass1, char **pass2) { int same; if (arg2 == NULL || arg1 == NULL || strcmp(arg1, arg2)) same = 0; else same = 1; if (arg1 != NULL) { *pass1 = app_get_pass(arg1, same); if (*pass1 == NULL) return 0; } else if (pass1 != NULL) { *pass1 = NULL; } if (arg2 != NULL) { *pass2 = app_get_pass(arg2, same ? 2 : 0); if (*pass2 == NULL) return 0; } else if (pass2 != NULL) { *pass2 = NULL; } return 1; } static char *app_get_pass(const char *arg, int keepbio) { char *tmp, tpass[APP_PASS_LEN]; static BIO *pwdbio = NULL; int i; if (strncmp(arg, "pass:", 5) == 0) return OPENSSL_strdup(arg + 5); if (strncmp(arg, "env:", 4) == 0) { tmp = getenv(arg + 4); if (tmp == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read environment variable %s\n", arg + 4); return NULL; } return OPENSSL_strdup(tmp); } if (!keepbio || pwdbio == NULL) { if (strncmp(arg, "file:", 5) == 0) { pwdbio = BIO_new_file(arg + 5, "r"); if (pwdbio == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open file %s\n", arg + 5); return NULL; } #if !defined(_WIN32) /* * Under _WIN32, which covers even Win64 and CE, file * descriptors referenced by BIO_s_fd are not inherited * by child process and therefore below is not an option. * It could have been an option if bss_fd.c was operating * on real Windows descriptors, such as those obtained * with CreateFile. */ } else if (strncmp(arg, "fd:", 3) == 0) { BIO *btmp; i = atoi(arg + 3); if (i >= 0) pwdbio = BIO_new_fd(i, BIO_NOCLOSE); if ((i < 0) || !pwdbio) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't access file descriptor %s\n", arg + 3); return NULL; } /* * Can't do BIO_gets on an fd BIO so add a buffering BIO */ btmp = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); pwdbio = BIO_push(btmp, pwdbio); #endif } else if (strcmp(arg, "stdin") == 0) { pwdbio = dup_bio_in(FORMAT_TEXT); if (!pwdbio) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open BIO for stdin\n"); return NULL; } } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid password argument \"%s\"\n", arg); return NULL; } } i = BIO_gets(pwdbio, tpass, APP_PASS_LEN); if (keepbio != 1) { BIO_free_all(pwdbio); pwdbio = NULL; } if (i <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading password from BIO\n"); return NULL; } tmp = strchr(tpass, '\n'); if (tmp != NULL) *tmp = 0; return OPENSSL_strdup(tpass); } CONF *app_load_config_bio(BIO *in, const char *filename) { long errorline = -1; CONF *conf; int i; conf = NCONF_new(NULL); i = NCONF_load_bio(conf, in, &errorline); if (i > 0) return conf; if (errorline <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't load ", opt_getprog()); } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error on line %ld of ", opt_getprog(), errorline); } if (filename != NULL) BIO_printf(bio_err, "config file \"%s\"\n", filename); else BIO_printf(bio_err, "config input"); NCONF_free(conf); return NULL; } CONF *app_load_config(const char *filename) { BIO *in; CONF *conf; in = bio_open_default(filename, 'r', FORMAT_TEXT); if (in == NULL) return NULL; conf = app_load_config_bio(in, filename); BIO_free(in); return conf; } CONF *app_load_config_quiet(const char *filename) { BIO *in; CONF *conf; in = bio_open_default_quiet(filename, 'r', FORMAT_TEXT); if (in == NULL) return NULL; conf = app_load_config_bio(in, filename); BIO_free(in); return conf; } int app_load_modules(const CONF *config) { CONF *to_free = NULL; if (config == NULL) config = to_free = app_load_config_quiet(default_config_file); if (config == NULL) return 1; if (CONF_modules_load(config, NULL, 0) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error configuring OpenSSL modules\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); NCONF_free(to_free); return 0; } NCONF_free(to_free); return 1; } int add_oid_section(CONF *conf) { char *p; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sktmp; CONF_VALUE *cnf; int i; if ((p = NCONF_get_string(conf, NULL, "oid_section")) == NULL) { ERR_clear_error(); return 1; } if ((sktmp = NCONF_get_section(conf, p)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "problem loading oid section %s\n", p); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sktmp); i++) { cnf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sktmp, i); if (OBJ_create(cnf->value, cnf->name, cnf->name) == NID_undef) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "problem creating object %s=%s\n", cnf->name, cnf->value); return 0; } } return 1; } static int load_pkcs12(BIO *in, const char *desc, pem_password_cb *pem_cb, void *cb_data, EVP_PKEY **pkey, X509 **cert, STACK_OF(X509) **ca) { const char *pass; char tpass[PEM_BUFSIZE]; int len, ret = 0; PKCS12 *p12; p12 = d2i_PKCS12_bio(in, NULL); if (p12 == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading PKCS12 file for %s\n", desc); goto die; } /* See if an empty password will do */ if (PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, "", 0) || PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, NULL, 0)) { pass = ""; } else { if (!pem_cb) pem_cb = (pem_password_cb *)password_callback; len = pem_cb(tpass, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, cb_data); if (len < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Passphrase callback error for %s\n", desc); goto die; } if (len < PEM_BUFSIZE) tpass[len] = 0; if (!PKCS12_verify_mac(p12, tpass, len)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Mac verify error (wrong password?) in PKCS12 file for %s\n", desc); goto die; } pass = tpass; } ret = PKCS12_parse(p12, pass, pkey, cert, ca); die: PKCS12_free(p12); return ret; } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) static int load_cert_crl_http(const char *url, X509 **pcert, X509_CRL **pcrl) { char *host = NULL, *port = NULL, *path = NULL; BIO *bio = NULL; OCSP_REQ_CTX *rctx = NULL; int use_ssl, rv = 0; if (!OCSP_parse_url(url, &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl)) goto err; if (use_ssl) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "https not supported\n"); goto err; } bio = BIO_new_connect(host); if (!bio || !BIO_set_conn_port(bio, port)) goto err; rctx = OCSP_REQ_CTX_new(bio, 1024); if (rctx == NULL) goto err; if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_http(rctx, "GET", path)) goto err; if (!OCSP_REQ_CTX_add1_header(rctx, "Host", host)) goto err; if (pcert) { do { rv = X509_http_nbio(rctx, pcert); } while (rv == -1); } else { do { rv = X509_CRL_http_nbio(rctx, pcrl); } while (rv == -1); } err: OPENSSL_free(host); OPENSSL_free(path); OPENSSL_free(port); BIO_free_all(bio); OCSP_REQ_CTX_free(rctx); if (rv != 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading %s from %s\n", pcert ? "certificate" : "CRL", url); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } return rv; } #endif X509 *load_cert(const char *file, int format, const char *cert_descrip) { X509 *x = NULL; BIO *cert; if (format == FORMAT_HTTP) { #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) load_cert_crl_http(file, &x, NULL); #endif return x; } if (file == NULL) { unbuffer(stdin); cert = dup_bio_in(format); } else { cert = bio_open_default(file, 'r', format); } if (cert == NULL) goto end; if (format == FORMAT_ASN1) { x = d2i_X509_bio(cert, NULL); } else if (format == FORMAT_PEM) { x = PEM_read_bio_X509_AUX(cert, NULL, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, NULL); } else if (format == FORMAT_PKCS12) { if (!load_pkcs12(cert, cert_descrip, NULL, NULL, NULL, &x, NULL)) goto end; } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad input format specified for %s\n", cert_descrip); goto end; } end: if (x == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load certificate\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } BIO_free(cert); return x; } X509_CRL *load_crl(const char *infile, int format) { X509_CRL *x = NULL; BIO *in = NULL; if (format == FORMAT_HTTP) { #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_OCSP) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SOCK) load_cert_crl_http(infile, NULL, &x); #endif return x; } in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', format); if (in == NULL) goto end; if (format == FORMAT_ASN1) { x = d2i_X509_CRL_bio(in, NULL); } else if (format == FORMAT_PEM) { x = PEM_read_bio_X509_CRL(in, NULL, NULL, NULL); } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad input format specified for input crl\n"); goto end; } if (x == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load CRL\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } end: BIO_free(in); return x; } EVP_PKEY *load_key(const char *file, int format, int maybe_stdin, const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *key_descrip) { BIO *key = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; PW_CB_DATA cb_data; cb_data.password = pass; cb_data.prompt_info = file; if (file == NULL && (!maybe_stdin || format == FORMAT_ENGINE)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "no keyfile specified\n"); goto end; } if (format == FORMAT_ENGINE) { if (e == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "no engine specified\n"); } else { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (ENGINE_init(e)) { pkey = ENGINE_load_private_key(e, file, ui_method, &cb_data); ENGINE_finish(e); } if (pkey == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "cannot load %s from engine\n", key_descrip); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } #else BIO_printf(bio_err, "engines not supported\n"); #endif } goto end; } if (file == NULL && maybe_stdin) { unbuffer(stdin); key = dup_bio_in(format); } else { key = bio_open_default(file, 'r', format); } if (key == NULL) goto end; if (format == FORMAT_ASN1) { pkey = d2i_PrivateKey_bio(key, NULL); } else if (format == FORMAT_PEM) { pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(key, NULL, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, &cb_data); } else if (format == FORMAT_PKCS12) { if (!load_pkcs12(key, key_descrip, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, &cb_data, &pkey, NULL, NULL)) goto end; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) && !defined (OPENSSL_NO_RC4) } else if (format == FORMAT_MSBLOB) { pkey = b2i_PrivateKey_bio(key); } else if (format == FORMAT_PVK) { pkey = b2i_PVK_bio(key, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, &cb_data); #endif } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad input format specified for key file\n"); goto end; } end: BIO_free(key); if (pkey == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load %s\n", key_descrip); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } return pkey; } EVP_PKEY *load_pubkey(const char *file, int format, int maybe_stdin, const char *pass, ENGINE *e, const char *key_descrip) { BIO *key = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; PW_CB_DATA cb_data; cb_data.password = pass; cb_data.prompt_info = file; if (file == NULL && (!maybe_stdin || format == FORMAT_ENGINE)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "no keyfile specified\n"); goto end; } if (format == FORMAT_ENGINE) { if (e == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "no engine specified\n"); } else { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE pkey = ENGINE_load_public_key(e, file, ui_method, &cb_data); if (pkey == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "cannot load %s from engine\n", key_descrip); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } #else BIO_printf(bio_err, "engines not supported\n"); #endif } goto end; } if (file == NULL && maybe_stdin) { unbuffer(stdin); key = dup_bio_in(format); } else { key = bio_open_default(file, 'r', format); } if (key == NULL) goto end; if (format == FORMAT_ASN1) { pkey = d2i_PUBKEY_bio(key, NULL); } else if (format == FORMAT_ASN1RSA) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *rsa; rsa = d2i_RSAPublicKey_bio(key, NULL); if (rsa) { pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa); RSA_free(rsa); } else #else BIO_printf(bio_err, "RSA keys not supported\n"); #endif pkey = NULL; } else if (format == FORMAT_PEMRSA) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *rsa; rsa = PEM_read_bio_RSAPublicKey(key, NULL, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, &cb_data); if (rsa != NULL) { pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, rsa); RSA_free(rsa); } else #else BIO_printf(bio_err, "RSA keys not supported\n"); #endif pkey = NULL; } else if (format == FORMAT_PEM) { pkey = PEM_read_bio_PUBKEY(key, NULL, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, &cb_data); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) } else if (format == FORMAT_MSBLOB) { pkey = b2i_PublicKey_bio(key); #endif } end: BIO_free(key); if (pkey == NULL) BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load %s\n", key_descrip); return pkey; } static int load_certs_crls(const char *file, int format, const char *pass, const char *desc, STACK_OF(X509) **pcerts, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **pcrls) { int i; BIO *bio; STACK_OF(X509_INFO) *xis = NULL; X509_INFO *xi; PW_CB_DATA cb_data; int rv = 0; cb_data.password = pass; cb_data.prompt_info = file; if (format != FORMAT_PEM) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad input format specified for %s\n", desc); return 0; } bio = bio_open_default(file, 'r', FORMAT_PEM); if (bio == NULL) return 0; xis = PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio(bio, NULL, (pem_password_cb *)password_callback, &cb_data); BIO_free(bio); if (pcerts != NULL && *pcerts == NULL) { *pcerts = sk_X509_new_null(); if (*pcerts == NULL) goto end; } if (pcrls != NULL && *pcrls == NULL) { *pcrls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null(); if (*pcrls == NULL) goto end; } for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_INFO_num(xis); i++) { xi = sk_X509_INFO_value(xis, i); if (xi->x509 != NULL && pcerts != NULL) { if (!sk_X509_push(*pcerts, xi->x509)) goto end; xi->x509 = NULL; } if (xi->crl != NULL && pcrls != NULL) { if (!sk_X509_CRL_push(*pcrls, xi->crl)) goto end; xi->crl = NULL; } } if (pcerts != NULL && sk_X509_num(*pcerts) > 0) rv = 1; if (pcrls != NULL && sk_X509_CRL_num(*pcrls) > 0) rv = 1; end: sk_X509_INFO_pop_free(xis, X509_INFO_free); if (rv == 0) { if (pcerts != NULL) { sk_X509_pop_free(*pcerts, X509_free); *pcerts = NULL; } if (pcrls != NULL) { sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(*pcrls, X509_CRL_free); *pcrls = NULL; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load %s\n", pcerts ? "certificates" : "CRLs"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } return rv; } void* app_malloc(int sz, const char *what) { void *vp = OPENSSL_malloc(sz); if (vp == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Could not allocate %d bytes for %s\n", opt_getprog(), sz, what); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); exit(1); } return vp; } /* * Initialize or extend, if *certs != NULL, a certificate stack. */ int load_certs(const char *file, STACK_OF(X509) **certs, int format, const char *pass, const char *desc) { return load_certs_crls(file, format, pass, desc, certs, NULL); } /* * Initialize or extend, if *crls != NULL, a certificate stack. */ int load_crls(const char *file, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) **crls, int format, const char *pass, const char *desc) { return load_certs_crls(file, format, pass, desc, NULL, crls); } #define X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK (0xfL << 16) /* Return error for unknown extensions */ #define X509V3_EXT_DEFAULT 0 /* Print error for unknown extensions */ #define X509V3_EXT_ERROR_UNKNOWN (1L << 16) /* ASN1 parse unknown extensions */ #define X509V3_EXT_PARSE_UNKNOWN (2L << 16) /* BIO_dump unknown extensions */ #define X509V3_EXT_DUMP_UNKNOWN (3L << 16) #define X509_FLAG_CA (X509_FLAG_NO_ISSUER | X509_FLAG_NO_PUBKEY | \ X509_FLAG_NO_HEADER | X509_FLAG_NO_VERSION) int set_cert_ex(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg) { static const NAME_EX_TBL cert_tbl[] = { {"compatible", X509_FLAG_COMPAT, 0xffffffffl}, {"ca_default", X509_FLAG_CA, 0xffffffffl}, {"no_header", X509_FLAG_NO_HEADER, 0}, {"no_version", X509_FLAG_NO_VERSION, 0}, {"no_serial", X509_FLAG_NO_SERIAL, 0}, {"no_signame", X509_FLAG_NO_SIGNAME, 0}, {"no_validity", X509_FLAG_NO_VALIDITY, 0}, {"no_subject", X509_FLAG_NO_SUBJECT, 0}, {"no_issuer", X509_FLAG_NO_ISSUER, 0}, {"no_pubkey", X509_FLAG_NO_PUBKEY, 0}, {"no_extensions", X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS, 0}, {"no_sigdump", X509_FLAG_NO_SIGDUMP, 0}, {"no_aux", X509_FLAG_NO_AUX, 0}, {"no_attributes", X509_FLAG_NO_ATTRIBUTES, 0}, {"ext_default", X509V3_EXT_DEFAULT, X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK}, {"ext_error", X509V3_EXT_ERROR_UNKNOWN, X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK}, {"ext_parse", X509V3_EXT_PARSE_UNKNOWN, X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK}, {"ext_dump", X509V3_EXT_DUMP_UNKNOWN, X509V3_EXT_UNKNOWN_MASK}, {NULL, 0, 0} }; return set_multi_opts(flags, arg, cert_tbl); } int set_name_ex(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg) { static const NAME_EX_TBL ex_tbl[] = { {"esc_2253", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2253, 0}, {"esc_2254", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_2254, 0}, {"esc_ctrl", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_CTRL, 0}, {"esc_msb", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_MSB, 0}, {"use_quote", ASN1_STRFLGS_ESC_QUOTE, 0}, {"utf8", ASN1_STRFLGS_UTF8_CONVERT, 0}, {"ignore_type", ASN1_STRFLGS_IGNORE_TYPE, 0}, {"show_type", ASN1_STRFLGS_SHOW_TYPE, 0}, {"dump_all", ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_ALL, 0}, {"dump_nostr", ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_UNKNOWN, 0}, {"dump_der", ASN1_STRFLGS_DUMP_DER, 0}, {"compat", XN_FLAG_COMPAT, 0xffffffffL}, {"sep_comma_plus", XN_FLAG_SEP_COMMA_PLUS, XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK}, {"sep_comma_plus_space", XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC, XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK}, {"sep_semi_plus_space", XN_FLAG_SEP_SPLUS_SPC, XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK}, {"sep_multiline", XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE, XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK}, {"dn_rev", XN_FLAG_DN_REV, 0}, {"nofname", XN_FLAG_FN_NONE, XN_FLAG_FN_MASK}, {"sname", XN_FLAG_FN_SN, XN_FLAG_FN_MASK}, {"lname", XN_FLAG_FN_LN, XN_FLAG_FN_MASK}, {"align", XN_FLAG_FN_ALIGN, 0}, {"oid", XN_FLAG_FN_OID, XN_FLAG_FN_MASK}, {"space_eq", XN_FLAG_SPC_EQ, 0}, {"dump_unknown", XN_FLAG_DUMP_UNKNOWN_FIELDS, 0}, {"RFC2253", XN_FLAG_RFC2253, 0xffffffffL}, {"oneline", XN_FLAG_ONELINE, 0xffffffffL}, {"multiline", XN_FLAG_MULTILINE, 0xffffffffL}, {"ca_default", XN_FLAG_MULTILINE, 0xffffffffL}, {NULL, 0, 0} }; if (set_multi_opts(flags, arg, ex_tbl) == 0) return 0; if (*flags != XN_FLAG_COMPAT && (*flags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == 0) *flags |= XN_FLAG_SEP_CPLUS_SPC; return 1; } int set_ext_copy(int *copy_type, const char *arg) { if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0) *copy_type = EXT_COPY_NONE; else if (strcasecmp(arg, "copy") == 0) *copy_type = EXT_COPY_ADD; else if (strcasecmp(arg, "copyall") == 0) *copy_type = EXT_COPY_ALL; else return 0; return 1; } int copy_extensions(X509 *x, X509_REQ *req, int copy_type) { STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts = NULL; X509_EXTENSION *ext, *tmpext; ASN1_OBJECT *obj; int i, idx, ret = 0; if (!x || !req || (copy_type == EXT_COPY_NONE)) return 1; exts = X509_REQ_get_extensions(req); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) { ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i); obj = X509_EXTENSION_get_object(ext); idx = X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(x, obj, -1); /* Does extension exist? */ if (idx != -1) { /* If normal copy don't override existing extension */ if (copy_type == EXT_COPY_ADD) continue; /* Delete all extensions of same type */ do { tmpext = X509_get_ext(x, idx); X509_delete_ext(x, idx); X509_EXTENSION_free(tmpext); idx = X509_get_ext_by_OBJ(x, obj, -1); } while (idx != -1); } if (!X509_add_ext(x, ext, -1)) goto end; } ret = 1; end: sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); return ret; } static int set_multi_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg, const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl) { STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *vals; CONF_VALUE *val; int i, ret = 1; if (!arg) return 0; vals = X509V3_parse_list(arg); for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(vals); i++) { val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(vals, i); if (!set_table_opts(flags, val->name, in_tbl)) ret = 0; } sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(vals, X509V3_conf_free); return ret; } static int set_table_opts(unsigned long *flags, const char *arg, const NAME_EX_TBL * in_tbl) { char c; const NAME_EX_TBL *ptbl; c = arg[0]; if (c == '-') { c = 0; arg++; } else if (c == '+') { c = 1; arg++; } else { c = 1; } for (ptbl = in_tbl; ptbl->name; ptbl++) { if (strcasecmp(arg, ptbl->name) == 0) { *flags &= ~ptbl->mask; if (c) *flags |= ptbl->flag; else *flags &= ~ptbl->flag; return 1; } } return 0; } void print_name(BIO *out, const char *title, X509_NAME *nm, unsigned long lflags) { char *buf; char mline = 0; int indent = 0; if (title) BIO_puts(out, title); if ((lflags & XN_FLAG_SEP_MASK) == XN_FLAG_SEP_MULTILINE) { mline = 1; indent = 4; } if (lflags == XN_FLAG_COMPAT) { buf = X509_NAME_oneline(nm, 0, 0); BIO_puts(out, buf); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); OPENSSL_free(buf); } else { if (mline) BIO_puts(out, "\n"); X509_NAME_print_ex(out, nm, indent, lflags); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); } } void print_bignum_var(BIO *out, const BIGNUM *in, const char *var, int len, unsigned char *buffer) { BIO_printf(out, " static unsigned char %s_%d[] = {", var, len); if (BN_is_zero(in)) { BIO_printf(out, "\n 0x00"); } else { int i, l; l = BN_bn2bin(in, buffer); for (i = 0; i < l; i++) { BIO_printf(out, (i % 10) == 0 ? "\n " : " "); if (i < l - 1) BIO_printf(out, "0x%02X,", buffer[i]); else BIO_printf(out, "0x%02X", buffer[i]); } } BIO_printf(out, "\n };\n"); } void print_array(BIO *out, const char* title, int len, const unsigned char* d) { int i; BIO_printf(out, "unsigned char %s[%d] = {", title, len); for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { if ((i % 10) == 0) BIO_printf(out, "\n "); if (i < len - 1) BIO_printf(out, "0x%02X, ", d[i]); else BIO_printf(out, "0x%02X", d[i]); } BIO_printf(out, "\n};\n"); } X509_STORE *setup_verify(const char *CAfile, const char *CApath, int noCAfile, int noCApath) { X509_STORE *store = X509_STORE_new(); X509_LOOKUP *lookup; if (store == NULL) goto end; if (CAfile != NULL || !noCAfile) { lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_file()); if (lookup == NULL) goto end; if (CAfile) { if (!X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, CAfile, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading file %s\n", CAfile); goto end; } } else { X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT); } } if (CApath != NULL || !noCApath) { lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(store, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir()); if (lookup == NULL) goto end; if (CApath) { if (!X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, CApath, X509_FILETYPE_PEM)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading directory %s\n", CApath); goto end; } } else { X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT); } } ERR_clear_error(); return store; end: X509_STORE_free(store); return NULL; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE /* Try to load an engine in a shareable library */ static ENGINE *try_load_engine(const char *engine) { ENGINE *e = ENGINE_by_id("dynamic"); if (e) { if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "SO_PATH", engine, 0) || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, "LOAD", NULL, 0)) { ENGINE_free(e); e = NULL; } } return e; } #endif ENGINE *setup_engine(const char *engine, int debug) { ENGINE *e = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (engine != NULL) { if (strcmp(engine, "auto") == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "enabling auto ENGINE support\n"); ENGINE_register_all_complete(); return NULL; } if ((e = ENGINE_by_id(engine)) == NULL && (e = try_load_engine(engine)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid engine \"%s\"\n", engine); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return NULL; } if (debug) { ENGINE_ctrl(e, ENGINE_CTRL_SET_LOGSTREAM, 0, bio_err, 0); } ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(e, "SET_USER_INTERFACE", 0, ui_method, 0, 1); if (!ENGINE_set_default(e, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "can't use that engine\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); ENGINE_free(e); return NULL; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "engine \"%s\" set.\n", ENGINE_get_id(e)); } #endif return e; } void release_engine(ENGINE *e) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (e != NULL) /* Free our "structural" reference. */ ENGINE_free(e); #endif } static unsigned long index_serial_hash(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a) { const char *n; n = a[DB_serial]; while (*n == '0') n++; return OPENSSL_LH_strhash(n); } static int index_serial_cmp(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a, const OPENSSL_CSTRING *b) { const char *aa, *bb; for (aa = a[DB_serial]; *aa == '0'; aa++) ; for (bb = b[DB_serial]; *bb == '0'; bb++) ; return strcmp(aa, bb); } static int index_name_qual(char **a) { return (a[0][0] == 'V'); } static unsigned long index_name_hash(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a) { return OPENSSL_LH_strhash(a[DB_name]); } int index_name_cmp(const OPENSSL_CSTRING *a, const OPENSSL_CSTRING *b) { return strcmp(a[DB_name], b[DB_name]); } static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(index_serial, OPENSSL_CSTRING) static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(index_serial, OPENSSL_CSTRING) static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_HASH_FN(index_name, OPENSSL_CSTRING) static IMPLEMENT_LHASH_COMP_FN(index_name, OPENSSL_CSTRING) #undef BSIZE #define BSIZE 256 BIGNUM *load_serial(const char *serialfile, int create, ASN1_INTEGER **retai) { BIO *in = NULL; BIGNUM *ret = NULL; char buf[1024]; ASN1_INTEGER *ai = NULL; ai = ASN1_INTEGER_new(); if (ai == NULL) goto err; in = BIO_new_file(serialfile, "r"); if (in == NULL) { if (!create) { perror(serialfile); goto err; } ERR_clear_error(); ret = BN_new(); if (ret == NULL || !rand_serial(ret, ai)) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory\n"); } else { if (!a2i_ASN1_INTEGER(in, ai, buf, 1024)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to load number from %s\n", serialfile); goto err; } ret = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(ai, NULL); if (ret == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error converting number from bin to BIGNUM\n"); goto err; } } if (ret && retai) { *retai = ai; ai = NULL; } err: BIO_free(in); ASN1_INTEGER_free(ai); return ret; } int save_serial(const char *serialfile, const char *suffix, const BIGNUM *serial, ASN1_INTEGER **retai) { char buf[1][BSIZE]; BIO *out = NULL; int ret = 0; ASN1_INTEGER *ai = NULL; int j; if (suffix == NULL) j = strlen(serialfile); else j = strlen(serialfile) + strlen(suffix) + 1; if (j >= BSIZE) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "file name too long\n"); goto err; } if (suffix == NULL) OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf[0], serialfile, BSIZE); else { #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s.%s", serialfile, suffix); #else j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s-%s", serialfile, suffix); #endif } out = BIO_new_file(buf[0], "w"); if (out == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } if ((ai = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(serial, NULL)) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error converting serial to ASN.1 format\n"); goto err; } i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(out, ai); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); ret = 1; if (retai) { *retai = ai; ai = NULL; } err: BIO_free_all(out); ASN1_INTEGER_free(ai); return ret; } int rotate_serial(const char *serialfile, const char *new_suffix, const char *old_suffix) { char buf[2][BSIZE]; int i, j; i = strlen(serialfile) + strlen(old_suffix); j = strlen(serialfile) + strlen(new_suffix); if (i > j) j = i; if (j + 1 >= BSIZE) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "file name too long\n"); goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s.%s", serialfile, new_suffix); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof(buf[1]), "%s.%s", serialfile, old_suffix); #else j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s-%s", serialfile, new_suffix); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof(buf[1]), "%s-%s", serialfile, old_suffix); #endif if (rename(serialfile, buf[1]) < 0 && errno != ENOENT #ifdef ENOTDIR && errno != ENOTDIR #endif ) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", serialfile, buf[1]); perror("reason"); goto err; } if (rename(buf[0], serialfile) < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", buf[0], serialfile); perror("reason"); rename(buf[1], serialfile); goto err; } return 1; err: return 0; } int rand_serial(BIGNUM *b, ASN1_INTEGER *ai) { BIGNUM *btmp; int ret = 0; btmp = b == NULL ? BN_new() : b; if (btmp == NULL) return 0; if (!BN_rand(btmp, SERIAL_RAND_BITS, BN_RAND_TOP_ANY, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY)) goto error; if (ai && !BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(btmp, ai)) goto error; ret = 1; error: if (btmp != b) BN_free(btmp); return ret; } CA_DB *load_index(const char *dbfile, DB_ATTR *db_attr) { CA_DB *retdb = NULL; TXT_DB *tmpdb = NULL; BIO *in; CONF *dbattr_conf = NULL; char buf[BSIZE]; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO FILE *dbfp; struct stat dbst; #endif in = BIO_new_file(dbfile, "r"); if (in == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO BIO_get_fp(in, &dbfp); if (fstat(fileno(dbfp), &dbst) == -1) { SYSerr(SYS_F_FSTAT, errno); ERR_add_error_data(3, "fstat('", dbfile, "')"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } #endif if ((tmpdb = TXT_DB_read(in, DB_NUMBER)) == NULL) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.attr", dbfile); #else BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s-attr", dbfile); #endif dbattr_conf = app_load_config_quiet(buf); retdb = app_malloc(sizeof(*retdb), "new DB"); retdb->db = tmpdb; tmpdb = NULL; if (db_attr) retdb->attributes = *db_attr; else { retdb->attributes.unique_subject = 1; } if (dbattr_conf) { char *p = NCONF_get_string(dbattr_conf, NULL, "unique_subject"); if (p) { retdb->attributes.unique_subject = parse_yesno(p, 1); } } retdb->dbfname = OPENSSL_strdup(dbfile); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO retdb->dbst = dbst; #endif err: NCONF_free(dbattr_conf); TXT_DB_free(tmpdb); BIO_free_all(in); return retdb; } /* * Returns > 0 on success, <= 0 on error */ int index_index(CA_DB *db) { if (!TXT_DB_create_index(db->db, DB_serial, NULL, LHASH_HASH_FN(index_serial), LHASH_COMP_FN(index_serial))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error creating serial number index:(%ld,%ld,%ld)\n", db->db->error, db->db->arg1, db->db->arg2); return 0; } if (db->attributes.unique_subject && !TXT_DB_create_index(db->db, DB_name, index_name_qual, LHASH_HASH_FN(index_name), LHASH_COMP_FN(index_name))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error creating name index:(%ld,%ld,%ld)\n", db->db->error, db->db->arg1, db->db->arg2); return 0; } return 1; } int save_index(const char *dbfile, const char *suffix, CA_DB *db) { char buf[3][BSIZE]; BIO *out; int j; j = strlen(dbfile) + strlen(suffix); if (j + 6 >= BSIZE) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "file name too long\n"); goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof(buf[2]), "%s.attr", dbfile); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof(buf[1]), "%s.attr.%s", dbfile, suffix); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s.%s", dbfile, suffix); #else j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof(buf[2]), "%s-attr", dbfile); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof(buf[1]), "%s-attr-%s", dbfile, suffix); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s-%s", dbfile, suffix); #endif out = BIO_new_file(buf[0], "w"); if (out == NULL) { perror(dbfile); BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to open '%s'\n", dbfile); goto err; } j = TXT_DB_write(out, db->db); BIO_free(out); if (j <= 0) goto err; out = BIO_new_file(buf[1], "w"); if (out == NULL) { perror(buf[2]); BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to open '%s'\n", buf[2]); goto err; } BIO_printf(out, "unique_subject = %s\n", db->attributes.unique_subject ? "yes" : "no"); BIO_free(out); return 1; err: return 0; } int rotate_index(const char *dbfile, const char *new_suffix, const char *old_suffix) { char buf[5][BSIZE]; int i, j; i = strlen(dbfile) + strlen(old_suffix); j = strlen(dbfile) + strlen(new_suffix); if (i > j) j = i; if (j + 6 >= BSIZE) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "file name too long\n"); goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS j = BIO_snprintf(buf[4], sizeof(buf[4]), "%s.attr", dbfile); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[3], sizeof(buf[3]), "%s.attr.%s", dbfile, old_suffix); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof(buf[2]), "%s.attr.%s", dbfile, new_suffix); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof(buf[1]), "%s.%s", dbfile, old_suffix); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s.%s", dbfile, new_suffix); #else j = BIO_snprintf(buf[4], sizeof(buf[4]), "%s-attr", dbfile); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[3], sizeof(buf[3]), "%s-attr-%s", dbfile, old_suffix); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[2], sizeof(buf[2]), "%s-attr-%s", dbfile, new_suffix); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[1], sizeof(buf[1]), "%s-%s", dbfile, old_suffix); j = BIO_snprintf(buf[0], sizeof(buf[0]), "%s-%s", dbfile, new_suffix); #endif if (rename(dbfile, buf[1]) < 0 && errno != ENOENT #ifdef ENOTDIR && errno != ENOTDIR #endif ) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", dbfile, buf[1]); perror("reason"); goto err; } if (rename(buf[0], dbfile) < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", buf[0], dbfile); perror("reason"); rename(buf[1], dbfile); goto err; } if (rename(buf[4], buf[3]) < 0 && errno != ENOENT #ifdef ENOTDIR && errno != ENOTDIR #endif ) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", buf[4], buf[3]); perror("reason"); rename(dbfile, buf[0]); rename(buf[1], dbfile); goto err; } if (rename(buf[2], buf[4]) < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to rename %s to %s\n", buf[2], buf[4]); perror("reason"); rename(buf[3], buf[4]); rename(dbfile, buf[0]); rename(buf[1], dbfile); goto err; } return 1; err: return 0; } void free_index(CA_DB *db) { if (db) { TXT_DB_free(db->db); OPENSSL_free(db->dbfname); OPENSSL_free(db); } } int parse_yesno(const char *str, int def) { if (str) { switch (*str) { case 'f': /* false */ case 'F': /* FALSE */ case 'n': /* no */ case 'N': /* NO */ case '0': /* 0 */ return 0; case 't': /* true */ case 'T': /* TRUE */ case 'y': /* yes */ case 'Y': /* YES */ case '1': /* 1 */ return 1; } } return def; } /* * name is expected to be in the format /type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=... * where characters may be escaped by \ */ X509_NAME *parse_name(const char *cp, long chtype, int canmulti) { int nextismulti = 0; char *work; X509_NAME *n; if (*cp++ != '/') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "name is expected to be in the format " "/type0=value0/type1=value1/type2=... where characters may " "be escaped by \\. This name is not in that format: '%s'\n", --cp); return NULL; } n = X509_NAME_new(); if (n == NULL) return NULL; work = OPENSSL_strdup(cp); if (work == NULL) goto err; while (*cp) { char *bp = work; char *typestr = bp; unsigned char *valstr; int nid; int ismulti = nextismulti; nextismulti = 0; /* Collect the type */ while (*cp && *cp != '=') *bp++ = *cp++; if (*cp == '\0') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Hit end of string before finding the equals.\n", opt_getprog()); goto err; } *bp++ = '\0'; ++cp; /* Collect the value. */ valstr = (unsigned char *)bp; for (; *cp && *cp != '/'; *bp++ = *cp++) { if (canmulti && *cp == '+') { nextismulti = 1; break; } if (*cp == '\\' && *++cp == '\0') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: escape character at end of string\n", opt_getprog()); goto err; } } *bp++ = '\0'; /* If not at EOS (must be + or /), move forward. */ if (*cp) ++cp; /* Parse */ nid = OBJ_txt2nid(typestr); if (nid == NID_undef) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Skipping unknown attribute \"%s\"\n", opt_getprog(), typestr); continue; } if (*valstr == '\0') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: No value provided for Subject Attribute %s, skipped\n", opt_getprog(), typestr); continue; } if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(n, nid, chtype, valstr, strlen((char *)valstr), -1, ismulti ? -1 : 0)) goto err; } OPENSSL_free(work); return n; err: X509_NAME_free(n); OPENSSL_free(work); return NULL; } /* * Read whole contents of a BIO into an allocated memory buffer and return * it. */ int bio_to_mem(unsigned char **out, int maxlen, BIO *in) { BIO *mem; int len, ret; unsigned char tbuf[1024]; mem = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); if (mem == NULL) return -1; for (;;) { if ((maxlen != -1) && maxlen < 1024) len = maxlen; else len = 1024; len = BIO_read(in, tbuf, len); if (len < 0) { BIO_free(mem); return -1; } if (len == 0) break; if (BIO_write(mem, tbuf, len) != len) { BIO_free(mem); return -1; } maxlen -= len; if (maxlen == 0) break; } ret = BIO_get_mem_data(mem, (char **)out); BIO_set_flags(mem, BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY); BIO_free(mem); return ret; } int pkey_ctrl_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *value) { int rv; char *stmp, *vtmp = NULL; stmp = OPENSSL_strdup(value); if (!stmp) return -1; vtmp = strchr(stmp, ':'); if (vtmp) { *vtmp = 0; vtmp++; } rv = EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl_str(ctx, stmp, vtmp); OPENSSL_free(stmp); return rv; } static void nodes_print(const char *name, STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes) { X509_POLICY_NODE *node; int i; BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s Policies:", name); if (nodes) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n"); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes); i++) { node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(nodes, i); X509_POLICY_NODE_print(bio_err, node, 2); } } else { BIO_puts(bio_err, " \n"); } } void policies_print(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { X509_POLICY_TREE *tree; int explicit_policy; tree = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(ctx); explicit_policy = X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(ctx); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Require explicit Policy: %s\n", explicit_policy ? "True" : "False"); nodes_print("Authority", X509_policy_tree_get0_policies(tree)); nodes_print("User", X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree)); } /*- * next_protos_parse parses a comma separated list of strings into a string * in a format suitable for passing to SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised. * outlen: (output) set to the length of the resulting buffer on success. * err: (maybe NULL) on failure, an error message line is written to this BIO. * in: a NUL terminated string like "abc,def,ghi" * * returns: a malloc'd buffer or NULL on failure. */ unsigned char *next_protos_parse(size_t *outlen, const char *in) { size_t len; unsigned char *out; size_t i, start = 0; size_t skipped = 0; len = strlen(in); if (len == 0 || len >= 65535) return NULL; out = app_malloc(len + 1, "NPN buffer"); for (i = 0; i <= len; ++i) { if (i == len || in[i] == ',') { /* * Zero-length ALPN elements are invalid on the wire, we could be * strict and reject the entire string, but just ignoring extra * commas seems harmless and more friendly. * * Every comma we skip in this way puts the input buffer another * byte ahead of the output buffer, so all stores into the output * buffer need to be decremented by the number commas skipped. */ if (i == start) { ++start; ++skipped; continue; } if (i - start > 255) { OPENSSL_free(out); return NULL; } out[start-skipped] = (unsigned char)(i - start); start = i + 1; } else { out[i + 1 - skipped] = in[i]; } } if (len <= skipped) { OPENSSL_free(out); return NULL; } *outlen = len + 1 - skipped; return out; } void print_cert_checks(BIO *bio, X509 *x, const char *checkhost, const char *checkemail, const char *checkip) { if (x == NULL) return; if (checkhost) { BIO_printf(bio, "Hostname %s does%s match certificate\n", checkhost, X509_check_host(x, checkhost, 0, 0, NULL) == 1 ? "" : " NOT"); } if (checkemail) { BIO_printf(bio, "Email %s does%s match certificate\n", checkemail, X509_check_email(x, checkemail, 0, 0) ? "" : " NOT"); } if (checkip) { BIO_printf(bio, "IP %s does%s match certificate\n", checkip, X509_check_ip_asc(x, checkip, 0) ? "" : " NOT"); } } /* Get first http URL from a DIST_POINT structure */ static const char *get_dp_url(DIST_POINT *dp) { GENERAL_NAMES *gens; GENERAL_NAME *gen; int i, gtype; ASN1_STRING *uri; if (!dp->distpoint || dp->distpoint->type != 0) return NULL; gens = dp->distpoint->name.fullname; for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); uri = GENERAL_NAME_get0_value(gen, >ype); if (gtype == GEN_URI && ASN1_STRING_length(uri) > 6) { const char *uptr = (const char *)ASN1_STRING_get0_data(uri); if (strncmp(uptr, "http://", 7) == 0) return uptr; } } return NULL; } /* * Look through a CRLDP structure and attempt to find an http URL to * downloads a CRL from. */ static X509_CRL *load_crl_crldp(STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) *crldp) { int i; const char *urlptr = NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(crldp); i++) { DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(crldp, i); urlptr = get_dp_url(dp); if (urlptr) return load_crl(urlptr, FORMAT_HTTP); } return NULL; } /* * Example of downloading CRLs from CRLDP: not usable for real world as it * always downloads, doesn't support non-blocking I/O and doesn't cache * anything. */ static STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls_http_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm) { X509 *x; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL; X509_CRL *crl; STACK_OF(DIST_POINT) *crldp; crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null(); if (!crls) return NULL; x = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_crl_distribution_points, NULL, NULL); crl = load_crl_crldp(crldp); sk_DIST_POINT_pop_free(crldp, DIST_POINT_free); if (!crl) { sk_X509_CRL_free(crls); return NULL; } sk_X509_CRL_push(crls, crl); /* Try to download delta CRL */ crldp = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_freshest_crl, NULL, NULL); crl = load_crl_crldp(crldp); sk_DIST_POINT_pop_free(crldp, DIST_POINT_free); if (crl) sk_X509_CRL_push(crls, crl); return crls; } void store_setup_crl_download(X509_STORE *st) { X509_STORE_set_lookup_crls_cb(st, crls_http_cb); } /* * Platform-specific sections */ #if defined(_WIN32) # ifdef fileno # undef fileno # define fileno(a) (int)_fileno(a) # endif # include # include static int WIN32_rename(const char *from, const char *to) { TCHAR *tfrom = NULL, *tto; DWORD err; int ret = 0; if (sizeof(TCHAR) == 1) { tfrom = (TCHAR *)from; tto = (TCHAR *)to; } else { /* UNICODE path */ size_t i, flen = strlen(from) + 1, tlen = strlen(to) + 1; tfrom = malloc(sizeof(*tfrom) * (flen + tlen)); if (tfrom == NULL) goto err; tto = tfrom + flen; # if !defined(_WIN32_WCE) || _WIN32_WCE>=101 if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, from, flen, (WCHAR *)tfrom, flen)) # endif for (i = 0; i < flen; i++) tfrom[i] = (TCHAR)from[i]; # if !defined(_WIN32_WCE) || _WIN32_WCE>=101 if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, to, tlen, (WCHAR *)tto, tlen)) # endif for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) tto[i] = (TCHAR)to[i]; } if (MoveFile(tfrom, tto)) goto ok; err = GetLastError(); if (err == ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS || err == ERROR_FILE_EXISTS) { if (DeleteFile(tto) && MoveFile(tfrom, tto)) goto ok; err = GetLastError(); } if (err == ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND || err == ERROR_PATH_NOT_FOUND) errno = ENOENT; else if (err == ERROR_ACCESS_DENIED) errno = EACCES; else errno = EINVAL; /* we could map more codes... */ err: ret = -1; ok: if (tfrom != NULL && tfrom != (TCHAR *)from) free(tfrom); return ret; } #endif /* app_tminterval section */ #if defined(_WIN32) double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime) { FILETIME now; double ret = 0; static ULARGE_INTEGER tmstart; static int warning = 1; # ifdef _WIN32_WINNT static HANDLE proc = NULL; if (proc == NULL) { if (check_winnt()) proc = OpenProcess(PROCESS_QUERY_INFORMATION, FALSE, GetCurrentProcessId()); if (proc == NULL) proc = (HANDLE) - 1; } if (usertime && proc != (HANDLE) - 1) { FILETIME junk; GetProcessTimes(proc, &junk, &junk, &junk, &now); } else # endif { SYSTEMTIME systime; if (usertime && warning) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "To get meaningful results, run " "this program on idle system.\n"); warning = 0; } GetSystemTime(&systime); SystemTimeToFileTime(&systime, &now); } if (stop == TM_START) { tmstart.u.LowPart = now.dwLowDateTime; tmstart.u.HighPart = now.dwHighDateTime; } else { ULARGE_INTEGER tmstop; tmstop.u.LowPart = now.dwLowDateTime; tmstop.u.HighPart = now.dwHighDateTime; ret = (__int64)(tmstop.QuadPart - tmstart.QuadPart) * 1e-7; } return ret; } #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) # include double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime) { double ret = 0; # ifdef CLOCK_REALTIME static struct timespec tmstart; struct timespec now; # else static unsigned long tmstart; unsigned long now; # endif static int warning = 1; if (usertime && warning) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "To get meaningful results, run " "this program on idle system.\n"); warning = 0; } # ifdef CLOCK_REALTIME clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &now); if (stop == TM_START) tmstart = now; else ret = ((now.tv_sec + now.tv_nsec * 1e-9) - (tmstart.tv_sec + tmstart.tv_nsec * 1e-9)); # else now = tickGet(); if (stop == TM_START) tmstart = now; else ret = (now - tmstart) / (double)sysClkRateGet(); # endif return ret; } #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYSTEM_VMS) # include # include double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime) { static clock_t tmstart; double ret = 0; clock_t now; # ifdef __TMS struct tms rus; now = times(&rus); if (usertime) now = rus.tms_utime; # else if (usertime) now = clock(); /* sum of user and kernel times */ else { struct timeval tv; gettimeofday(&tv, NULL); now = (clock_t)((unsigned long long)tv.tv_sec * CLK_TCK + (unsigned long long)tv.tv_usec * (1000000 / CLK_TCK) ); } # endif if (stop == TM_START) tmstart = now; else ret = (now - tmstart) / (double)(CLK_TCK); return ret; } #elif defined(_SC_CLK_TCK) /* by means of unistd.h */ # include double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime) { double ret = 0; struct tms rus; clock_t now = times(&rus); static clock_t tmstart; if (usertime) now = rus.tms_utime; if (stop == TM_START) { tmstart = now; } else { long int tck = sysconf(_SC_CLK_TCK); ret = (now - tmstart) / (double)tck; } return ret; } #else # include # include double app_tminterval(int stop, int usertime) { double ret = 0; struct rusage rus; struct timeval now; static struct timeval tmstart; if (usertime) getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF, &rus), now = rus.ru_utime; else gettimeofday(&now, NULL); if (stop == TM_START) tmstart = now; else ret = ((now.tv_sec + now.tv_usec * 1e-6) - (tmstart.tv_sec + tmstart.tv_usec * 1e-6)); return ret; } #endif int app_access(const char* name, int flag) { #ifdef _WIN32 return _access(name, flag); #else return access(name, flag); #endif } /* app_isdir section */ #ifdef _WIN32 int app_isdir(const char *name) { DWORD attr; # if defined(UNICODE) || defined(_UNICODE) size_t i, len_0 = strlen(name) + 1; WCHAR tempname[MAX_PATH]; if (len_0 > MAX_PATH) return -1; # if !defined(_WIN32_WCE) || _WIN32_WCE>=101 if (!MultiByteToWideChar(CP_ACP, 0, name, len_0, tempname, MAX_PATH)) # endif for (i = 0; i < len_0; i++) tempname[i] = (WCHAR)name[i]; attr = GetFileAttributes(tempname); # else attr = GetFileAttributes(name); # endif if (attr == INVALID_FILE_ATTRIBUTES) return -1; return ((attr & FILE_ATTRIBUTE_DIRECTORY) != 0); } #else # include # ifndef S_ISDIR # if defined(_S_IFMT) && defined(_S_IFDIR) # define S_ISDIR(a) (((a) & _S_IFMT) == _S_IFDIR) # else # define S_ISDIR(a) (((a) & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR) # endif # endif int app_isdir(const char *name) { # if defined(S_ISDIR) struct stat st; if (stat(name, &st) == 0) return S_ISDIR(st.st_mode); else return -1; # else return -1; # endif } #endif /* raw_read|write section */ #if defined(__VMS) # include "vms_term_sock.h" static int stdin_sock = -1; static void close_stdin_sock(void) { TerminalSocket (TERM_SOCK_DELETE, &stdin_sock); } int fileno_stdin(void) { if (stdin_sock == -1) { TerminalSocket(TERM_SOCK_CREATE, &stdin_sock); atexit(close_stdin_sock); } return stdin_sock; } #else int fileno_stdin(void) { return fileno(stdin); } #endif int fileno_stdout(void) { return fileno(stdout); } #if defined(_WIN32) && defined(STD_INPUT_HANDLE) int raw_read_stdin(void *buf, int siz) { DWORD n; if (ReadFile(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), buf, siz, &n, NULL)) return n; else return -1; } #elif defined(__VMS) # include int raw_read_stdin(void *buf, int siz) { return recv(fileno_stdin(), buf, siz, 0); } #else int raw_read_stdin(void *buf, int siz) { return read(fileno_stdin(), buf, siz); } #endif #if defined(_WIN32) && defined(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE) int raw_write_stdout(const void *buf, int siz) { DWORD n; if (WriteFile(GetStdHandle(STD_OUTPUT_HANDLE), buf, siz, &n, NULL)) return n; else return -1; } #else int raw_write_stdout(const void *buf, int siz) { return write(fileno_stdout(), buf, siz); } #endif /* * Centralized handling if input and output files with format specification * The format is meant to show what the input and output is supposed to be, * and is therefore a show of intent more than anything else. However, it * does impact behavior on some platform, such as differentiating between * text and binary input/output on non-Unix platforms */ static int istext(int format) { return (format & B_FORMAT_TEXT) == B_FORMAT_TEXT; } BIO *dup_bio_in(int format) { return BIO_new_fp(stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE | (istext(format) ? BIO_FP_TEXT : 0)); } static BIO_METHOD *prefix_method = NULL; BIO *dup_bio_out(int format) { BIO *b = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE | (istext(format) ? BIO_FP_TEXT : 0)); void *prefix = NULL; #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS if (istext(format)) b = BIO_push(BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer()), b); #endif if (istext(format) && (prefix = getenv("HARNESS_OSSL_PREFIX")) != NULL) { if (prefix_method == NULL) prefix_method = apps_bf_prefix(); b = BIO_push(BIO_new(prefix_method), b); BIO_ctrl(b, PREFIX_CTRL_SET_PREFIX, 0, prefix); } return b; } BIO *dup_bio_err(int format) { BIO *b = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE | (istext(format) ? BIO_FP_TEXT : 0)); #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS if (istext(format)) b = BIO_push(BIO_new(BIO_f_linebuffer()), b); #endif return b; } void destroy_prefix_method(void) { BIO_meth_free(prefix_method); prefix_method = NULL; } void unbuffer(FILE *fp) { /* * On VMS, setbuf() will only take 32-bit pointers, and a compilation * with /POINTER_SIZE=64 will give off a MAYLOSEDATA2 warning here. * However, we trust that the C RTL will never give us a FILE pointer * above the first 4 GB of memory, so we simply turn off the warning * temporarily. */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC) # pragma environment save # pragma message disable maylosedata2 #endif setbuf(fp, NULL); #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC) # pragma environment restore #endif } static const char *modestr(char mode, int format) { OPENSSL_assert(mode == 'a' || mode == 'r' || mode == 'w'); switch (mode) { case 'a': return istext(format) ? "a" : "ab"; case 'r': return istext(format) ? "r" : "rb"; case 'w': return istext(format) ? "w" : "wb"; } /* The assert above should make sure we never reach this point */ return NULL; } static const char *modeverb(char mode) { switch (mode) { case 'a': return "appending"; case 'r': return "reading"; case 'w': return "writing"; } return "(doing something)"; } /* * Open a file for writing, owner-read-only. */ BIO *bio_open_owner(const char *filename, int format, int private) { FILE *fp = NULL; BIO *b = NULL; int fd = -1, bflags, mode, textmode; if (!private || filename == NULL || strcmp(filename, "-") == 0) return bio_open_default(filename, 'w', format); mode = O_WRONLY; #ifdef O_CREAT mode |= O_CREAT; #endif #ifdef O_TRUNC mode |= O_TRUNC; #endif textmode = istext(format); if (!textmode) { #ifdef O_BINARY mode |= O_BINARY; #elif defined(_O_BINARY) mode |= _O_BINARY; #endif } #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS /* VMS doesn't have O_BINARY, it just doesn't make sense. But, * it still needs to know that we're going binary, or fdopen() * will fail with "invalid argument"... so we tell VMS what the * context is. */ if (!textmode) fd = open(filename, mode, 0600, "ctx=bin"); else #endif fd = open(filename, mode, 0600); if (fd < 0) goto err; fp = fdopen(fd, modestr('w', format)); if (fp == NULL) goto err; bflags = BIO_CLOSE; if (textmode) bflags |= BIO_FP_TEXT; b = BIO_new_fp(fp, bflags); if (b) return b; err: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't open \"%s\" for writing, %s\n", opt_getprog(), filename, strerror(errno)); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); /* If we have fp, then fdopen took over fd, so don't close both. */ if (fp) fclose(fp); else if (fd >= 0) close(fd); return NULL; } static BIO *bio_open_default_(const char *filename, char mode, int format, int quiet) { BIO *ret; if (filename == NULL || strcmp(filename, "-") == 0) { ret = mode == 'r' ? dup_bio_in(format) : dup_bio_out(format); if (quiet) { ERR_clear_error(); return ret; } if (ret != NULL) return ret; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open %s, %s\n", mode == 'r' ? "stdin" : "stdout", strerror(errno)); } else { ret = BIO_new_file(filename, modestr(mode, format)); if (quiet) { ERR_clear_error(); return ret; } if (ret != NULL) return ret; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open %s for %s, %s\n", filename, modeverb(mode), strerror(errno)); } ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return NULL; } BIO *bio_open_default(const char *filename, char mode, int format) { return bio_open_default_(filename, mode, format, 0); } BIO *bio_open_default_quiet(const char *filename, char mode, int format) { return bio_open_default_(filename, mode, format, 1); } void wait_for_async(SSL *s) { /* On Windows select only works for sockets, so we simply don't wait */ #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS int width = 0; fd_set asyncfds; OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fds; size_t numfds; size_t i; if (!SSL_get_all_async_fds(s, NULL, &numfds)) return; if (numfds == 0) return; fds = app_malloc(sizeof(OSSL_ASYNC_FD) * numfds, "allocate async fds"); if (!SSL_get_all_async_fds(s, fds, &numfds)) { OPENSSL_free(fds); return; } FD_ZERO(&asyncfds); for (i = 0; i < numfds; i++) { if (width <= (int)fds[i]) width = (int)fds[i] + 1; openssl_fdset((int)fds[i], &asyncfds); } select(width, (void *)&asyncfds, NULL, NULL, NULL); OPENSSL_free(fds); #endif } /* if OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS is defined then so is OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) int has_stdin_waiting(void) { # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) HANDLE inhand = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE); DWORD events = 0; INPUT_RECORD inputrec; DWORD insize = 1; BOOL peeked; if (inhand == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { return 0; } peeked = PeekConsoleInput(inhand, &inputrec, insize, &events); if (!peeked) { /* Probably redirected input? _kbhit() does not work in this case */ if (!feof(stdin)) { return 1; } return 0; } # endif return _kbhit(); } #endif /* Corrupt a signature by modifying final byte */ void corrupt_signature(const ASN1_STRING *signature) { unsigned char *s = signature->data; s[signature->length - 1] ^= 0x1; } int set_cert_times(X509 *x, const char *startdate, const char *enddate, int days) { if (startdate == NULL || strcmp(startdate, "today") == 0) { if (X509_gmtime_adj(X509_getm_notBefore(x), 0) == NULL) return 0; } else { if (!ASN1_TIME_set_string_X509(X509_getm_notBefore(x), startdate)) return 0; } if (enddate == NULL) { if (X509_time_adj_ex(X509_getm_notAfter(x), days, 0, NULL) == NULL) return 0; } else if (!ASN1_TIME_set_string_X509(X509_getm_notAfter(x), enddate)) { return 0; } return 1; } void make_uppercase(char *string) { int i; for (i = 0; string[i] != '\0'; i++) string[i] = toupper((unsigned char)string[i]); } diff --git a/apps/openssl.c b/apps/openssl.c index ff7b759a40b1..f35d57f2648c 100644 --- a/apps/openssl.c +++ b/apps/openssl.c @@ -1,832 +1,830 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE # include #endif #include /* Needed to get the other O_xxx flags. */ #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS # include #endif #include "apps.h" #define INCLUDE_FUNCTION_TABLE #include "progs.h" /* Structure to hold the number of columns to be displayed and the * field width used to display them. */ typedef struct { int columns; int width; } DISPLAY_COLUMNS; /* Special sentinel to exit the program. */ #define EXIT_THE_PROGRAM (-1) /* * The LHASH callbacks ("hash" & "cmp") have been replaced by functions with * the base prototypes (we cast each variable inside the function to the * required type of "FUNCTION*"). This removes the necessity for * macro-generated wrapper functions. */ static LHASH_OF(FUNCTION) *prog_init(void); static int do_cmd(LHASH_OF(FUNCTION) *prog, int argc, char *argv[]); static void list_pkey(void); static void list_pkey_meth(void); static void list_type(FUNC_TYPE ft, int one); static void list_disabled(void); char *default_config_file = NULL; BIO *bio_in = NULL; BIO *bio_out = NULL; BIO *bio_err = NULL; static void calculate_columns(DISPLAY_COLUMNS *dc) { FUNCTION *f; int len, maxlen = 0; for (f = functions; f->name != NULL; ++f) if (f->type == FT_general || f->type == FT_md || f->type == FT_cipher) if ((len = strlen(f->name)) > maxlen) maxlen = len; dc->width = maxlen + 2; dc->columns = (80 - 1) / dc->width; } static int apps_startup(void) { #ifdef SIGPIPE signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); #endif /* Set non-default library initialisation settings */ if (!OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_ALL_BUILTIN | OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CONFIG, NULL)) return 0; setup_ui_method(); return 1; } static void apps_shutdown(void) { destroy_ui_method(); destroy_prefix_method(); } static char *make_config_name(void) { const char *t; size_t len; char *p; if ((t = getenv("OPENSSL_CONF")) != NULL) return OPENSSL_strdup(t); t = X509_get_default_cert_area(); len = strlen(t) + 1 + strlen(OPENSSL_CONF) + 1; p = app_malloc(len, "config filename buffer"); strcpy(p, t); #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS strcat(p, "/"); #endif strcat(p, OPENSSL_CONF); return p; } int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { FUNCTION f, *fp; LHASH_OF(FUNCTION) *prog = NULL; - char **copied_argv = NULL; char *p, *pname; char buf[1024]; const char *prompt; ARGS arg; int first, n, i, ret = 0; arg.argv = NULL; arg.size = 0; /* Set up some of the environment. */ default_config_file = make_config_name(); bio_in = dup_bio_in(FORMAT_TEXT); bio_out = dup_bio_out(FORMAT_TEXT); bio_err = dup_bio_err(FORMAT_TEXT); #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC) - copied_argv = argv = copy_argv(&argc, argv); + argv = copy_argv(&argc, argv); #elif defined(_WIN32) /* * Replace argv[] with UTF-8 encoded strings. */ win32_utf8argv(&argc, &argv); #endif p = getenv("OPENSSL_DEBUG_MEMORY"); if (p != NULL && strcmp(p, "on") == 0) CRYPTO_set_mem_debug(1); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON); if (getenv("OPENSSL_FIPS")) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "FIPS mode not supported.\n"); return 1; } if (!apps_startup()) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "FATAL: Startup failure (dev note: apps_startup() failed)\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); ret = 1; goto end; } prog = prog_init(); if (prog == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "FATAL: Startup failure (dev note: prog_init() failed)\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); ret = 1; goto end; } pname = opt_progname(argv[0]); /* first check the program name */ f.name = pname; fp = lh_FUNCTION_retrieve(prog, &f); if (fp != NULL) { argv[0] = pname; ret = fp->func(argc, argv); goto end; } /* If there is stuff on the command line, run with that. */ if (argc != 1) { argc--; argv++; ret = do_cmd(prog, argc, argv); if (ret < 0) ret = 0; goto end; } /* ok, lets enter interactive mode */ for (;;) { ret = 0; /* Read a line, continue reading if line ends with \ */ for (p = buf, n = sizeof(buf), i = 0, first = 1; n > 0; first = 0) { prompt = first ? "OpenSSL> " : "> "; p[0] = '\0'; #ifndef READLINE fputs(prompt, stdout); fflush(stdout); if (!fgets(p, n, stdin)) goto end; if (p[0] == '\0') goto end; i = strlen(p); if (i <= 1) break; if (p[i - 2] != '\\') break; i -= 2; p += i; n -= i; #else { extern char *readline(const char *); extern void add_history(const char *cp); char *text; text = readline(prompt); if (text == NULL) goto end; i = strlen(text); if (i == 0 || i > n) break; if (text[i - 1] != '\\') { p += strlen(strcpy(p, text)); free(text); add_history(buf); break; } text[i - 1] = '\0'; p += strlen(strcpy(p, text)); free(text); n -= i; } #endif } if (!chopup_args(&arg, buf)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't parse (no memory?)\n"); break; } ret = do_cmd(prog, arg.argc, arg.argv); if (ret == EXIT_THE_PROGRAM) { ret = 0; goto end; } if (ret != 0) BIO_printf(bio_err, "error in %s\n", arg.argv[0]); (void)BIO_flush(bio_out); (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); } ret = 1; end: - OPENSSL_free(copied_argv); OPENSSL_free(default_config_file); lh_FUNCTION_free(prog); OPENSSL_free(arg.argv); app_RAND_write(); BIO_free(bio_in); BIO_free_all(bio_out); apps_shutdown(); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG if (CRYPTO_mem_leaks(bio_err) <= 0) ret = 1; #endif BIO_free(bio_err); EXIT(ret); } static void list_cipher_fn(const EVP_CIPHER *c, const char *from, const char *to, void *arg) { if (c != NULL) { BIO_printf(arg, "%s\n", EVP_CIPHER_name(c)); } else { if (from == NULL) from = ""; if (to == NULL) to = ""; BIO_printf(arg, "%s => %s\n", from, to); } } static void list_md_fn(const EVP_MD *m, const char *from, const char *to, void *arg) { if (m != NULL) { BIO_printf(arg, "%s\n", EVP_MD_name(m)); } else { if (from == NULL) from = ""; if (to == NULL) to = ""; BIO_printf((BIO *)arg, "%s => %s\n", from, to); } } static void list_missing_help(void) { const FUNCTION *fp; const OPTIONS *o; for (fp = functions; fp->name != NULL; fp++) { if ((o = fp->help) != NULL) { /* If there is help, list what flags are not documented. */ for ( ; o->name != NULL; o++) { if (o->helpstr == NULL) BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s %s\n", fp->name, o->name); } } else if (fp->func != dgst_main) { /* If not aliased to the dgst command, */ BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s *\n", fp->name); } } } static void list_options_for_command(const char *command) { const FUNCTION *fp; const OPTIONS *o; for (fp = functions; fp->name != NULL; fp++) if (strcmp(fp->name, command) == 0) break; if (fp->name == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid command '%s'; type \"help\" for a list.\n", command); return; } if ((o = fp->help) == NULL) return; for ( ; o->name != NULL; o++) { if (o->name == OPT_HELP_STR || o->name == OPT_MORE_STR || o->name[0] == '\0') continue; BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s %c\n", o->name, o->valtype); } } /* Unified enum for help and list commands. */ typedef enum HELPLIST_CHOICE { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_ONE, OPT_COMMANDS, OPT_DIGEST_COMMANDS, OPT_OPTIONS, OPT_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS, OPT_CIPHER_COMMANDS, OPT_CIPHER_ALGORITHMS, OPT_PK_ALGORITHMS, OPT_PK_METHOD, OPT_DISABLED, OPT_MISSING_HELP } HELPLIST_CHOICE; const OPTIONS list_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"1", OPT_ONE, '-', "List in one column"}, {"commands", OPT_COMMANDS, '-', "List of standard commands"}, {"digest-commands", OPT_DIGEST_COMMANDS, '-', "List of message digest commands"}, {"digest-algorithms", OPT_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS, '-', "List of message digest algorithms"}, {"cipher-commands", OPT_CIPHER_COMMANDS, '-', "List of cipher commands"}, {"cipher-algorithms", OPT_CIPHER_ALGORITHMS, '-', "List of cipher algorithms"}, {"public-key-algorithms", OPT_PK_ALGORITHMS, '-', "List of public key algorithms"}, {"public-key-methods", OPT_PK_METHOD, '-', "List of public key methods"}, {"disabled", OPT_DISABLED, '-', "List of disabled features"}, {"missing-help", OPT_MISSING_HELP, '-', "List missing detailed help strings"}, {"options", OPT_OPTIONS, 's', "List options for specified command"}, {NULL} }; int list_main(int argc, char **argv) { char *prog; HELPLIST_CHOICE o; int one = 0, done = 0; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, list_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: /* Never hit, but suppresses warning */ case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); return 1; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(list_options); break; case OPT_ONE: one = 1; break; case OPT_COMMANDS: list_type(FT_general, one); break; case OPT_DIGEST_COMMANDS: list_type(FT_md, one); break; case OPT_DIGEST_ALGORITHMS: EVP_MD_do_all_sorted(list_md_fn, bio_out); break; case OPT_CIPHER_COMMANDS: list_type(FT_cipher, one); break; case OPT_CIPHER_ALGORITHMS: EVP_CIPHER_do_all_sorted(list_cipher_fn, bio_out); break; case OPT_PK_ALGORITHMS: list_pkey(); break; case OPT_PK_METHOD: list_pkey_meth(); break; case OPT_DISABLED: list_disabled(); break; case OPT_MISSING_HELP: list_missing_help(); break; case OPT_OPTIONS: list_options_for_command(opt_arg()); break; } done = 1; } if (opt_num_rest() != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Extra arguments given.\n"); goto opthelp; } if (!done) goto opthelp; return 0; } typedef enum HELP_CHOICE { OPT_hERR = -1, OPT_hEOF = 0, OPT_hHELP } HELP_CHOICE; const OPTIONS help_options[] = { {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: help [options]\n"}, {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', " help [command]\n"}, {"help", OPT_hHELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {NULL} }; int help_main(int argc, char **argv) { FUNCTION *fp; int i, nl; FUNC_TYPE tp; char *prog; HELP_CHOICE o; DISPLAY_COLUMNS dc; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, help_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_hEOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_hERR: case OPT_hEOF: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); return 1; case OPT_hHELP: opt_help(help_options); return 0; } } if (opt_num_rest() == 1) { char *new_argv[3]; new_argv[0] = opt_rest()[0]; new_argv[1] = "--help"; new_argv[2] = NULL; return do_cmd(prog_init(), 2, new_argv); } if (opt_num_rest() != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Usage: %s\n", prog); return 1; } calculate_columns(&dc); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Standard commands"); i = 0; tp = FT_none; for (fp = functions; fp->name != NULL; fp++) { nl = 0; if (i++ % dc.columns == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); nl = 1; } if (fp->type != tp) { tp = fp->type; if (!nl) BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); if (tp == FT_md) { i = 1; BIO_printf(bio_err, "\nMessage Digest commands (see the `dgst' command for more details)\n"); } else if (tp == FT_cipher) { i = 1; BIO_printf(bio_err, "\nCipher commands (see the `enc' command for more details)\n"); } } BIO_printf(bio_err, "%-*s", dc.width, fp->name); } BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n\n"); return 0; } static void list_type(FUNC_TYPE ft, int one) { FUNCTION *fp; int i = 0; DISPLAY_COLUMNS dc = {0}; if (!one) calculate_columns(&dc); for (fp = functions; fp->name != NULL; fp++) { if (fp->type != ft) continue; if (one) { BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s\n", fp->name); } else { if (i % dc.columns == 0 && i > 0) BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n"); BIO_printf(bio_out, "%-*s", dc.width, fp->name); i++; } } if (!one) BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n\n"); } static int do_cmd(LHASH_OF(FUNCTION) *prog, int argc, char *argv[]) { FUNCTION f, *fp; if (argc <= 0 || argv[0] == NULL) return 0; f.name = argv[0]; fp = lh_FUNCTION_retrieve(prog, &f); if (fp == NULL) { if (EVP_get_digestbyname(argv[0])) { f.type = FT_md; f.func = dgst_main; fp = &f; } else if (EVP_get_cipherbyname(argv[0])) { f.type = FT_cipher; f.func = enc_main; fp = &f; } } if (fp != NULL) { return fp->func(argc, argv); } if ((strncmp(argv[0], "no-", 3)) == 0) { /* * User is asking if foo is unsupported, by trying to "run" the * no-foo command. Strange. */ f.name = argv[0] + 3; if (lh_FUNCTION_retrieve(prog, &f) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s\n", argv[0]); return 0; } BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s\n", argv[0] + 3); return 1; } if (strcmp(argv[0], "quit") == 0 || strcmp(argv[0], "q") == 0 || strcmp(argv[0], "exit") == 0 || strcmp(argv[0], "bye") == 0) /* Special value to mean "exit the program. */ return EXIT_THE_PROGRAM; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid command '%s'; type \"help\" for a list.\n", argv[0]); return 1; } static void list_pkey(void) { int i; for (i = 0; i < EVP_PKEY_asn1_get_count(); i++) { const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; int pkey_id, pkey_base_id, pkey_flags; const char *pinfo, *pem_str; ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0(i); EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, &pkey_base_id, &pkey_flags, &pinfo, &pem_str, ameth); if (pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS) { BIO_printf(bio_out, "Name: %s\n", OBJ_nid2ln(pkey_id)); BIO_printf(bio_out, "\tAlias for: %s\n", OBJ_nid2ln(pkey_base_id)); } else { BIO_printf(bio_out, "Name: %s\n", pinfo); BIO_printf(bio_out, "\tType: %s Algorithm\n", pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_DYNAMIC ? "External" : "Builtin"); BIO_printf(bio_out, "\tOID: %s\n", OBJ_nid2ln(pkey_id)); if (pem_str == NULL) pem_str = "(none)"; BIO_printf(bio_out, "\tPEM string: %s\n", pem_str); } } } static void list_pkey_meth(void) { size_t i; size_t meth_count = EVP_PKEY_meth_get_count(); for (i = 0; i < meth_count; i++) { const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmeth = EVP_PKEY_meth_get0(i); int pkey_id, pkey_flags; EVP_PKEY_meth_get0_info(&pkey_id, &pkey_flags, pmeth); BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s\n", OBJ_nid2ln(pkey_id)); BIO_printf(bio_out, "\tType: %s Algorithm\n", pkey_flags & ASN1_PKEY_DYNAMIC ? "External" : "Builtin"); } } static int function_cmp(const FUNCTION * a, const FUNCTION * b) { return strncmp(a->name, b->name, 8); } static unsigned long function_hash(const FUNCTION * a) { return OPENSSL_LH_strhash(a->name); } static int SortFnByName(const void *_f1, const void *_f2) { const FUNCTION *f1 = _f1; const FUNCTION *f2 = _f2; if (f1->type != f2->type) return f1->type - f2->type; return strcmp(f1->name, f2->name); } static void list_disabled(void) { BIO_puts(bio_out, "Disabled algorithms:\n"); #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ARIA BIO_puts(bio_out, "ARIA\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_BF BIO_puts(bio_out, "BF\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_BLAKE2 BIO_puts(bio_out, "BLAKE2\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA BIO_puts(bio_out, "CAMELLIA\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CAST BIO_puts(bio_out, "CAST\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CMAC BIO_puts(bio_out, "CMAC\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_CMS BIO_puts(bio_out, "CMS\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP BIO_puts(bio_out, "COMP\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DES BIO_puts(bio_out, "DES\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM BIO_puts(bio_out, "DGRAM\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH BIO_puts(bio_out, "DH\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA BIO_puts(bio_out, "DSA\n"); #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_DTLS) BIO_puts(bio_out, "DTLS\n"); #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1) BIO_puts(bio_out, "DTLS1\n"); #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2) BIO_puts(bio_out, "DTLS1_2\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC BIO_puts(bio_out, "EC\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M BIO_puts(bio_out, "EC2M\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE BIO_puts(bio_out, "ENGINE\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_GOST BIO_puts(bio_out, "GOST\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS BIO_puts(bio_out, "HEARTBEATS\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA BIO_puts(bio_out, "IDEA\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD2 BIO_puts(bio_out, "MD2\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD4 BIO_puts(bio_out, "MD4\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 BIO_puts(bio_out, "MD5\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2 BIO_puts(bio_out, "MDC2\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_OCB BIO_puts(bio_out, "OCB\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP BIO_puts(bio_out, "OCSP\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_PSK BIO_puts(bio_out, "PSK\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 BIO_puts(bio_out, "RC2\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 BIO_puts(bio_out, "RC4\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RC5 BIO_puts(bio_out, "RC5\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160 BIO_puts(bio_out, "RMD160\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA BIO_puts(bio_out, "RSA\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT BIO_puts(bio_out, "SCRYPT\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP BIO_puts(bio_out, "SCTP\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SEED BIO_puts(bio_out, "SEED\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SM2 BIO_puts(bio_out, "SM2\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SM3 BIO_puts(bio_out, "SM3\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SM4 BIO_puts(bio_out, "SM4\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK BIO_puts(bio_out, "SOCK\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP BIO_puts(bio_out, "SRP\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP BIO_puts(bio_out, "SRTP\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 BIO_puts(bio_out, "SSL3\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 BIO_puts(bio_out, "TLS1\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 BIO_puts(bio_out, "TLS1_1\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 BIO_puts(bio_out, "TLS1_2\n"); #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL BIO_puts(bio_out, "WHIRLPOOL\n"); #endif #ifndef ZLIB BIO_puts(bio_out, "ZLIB\n"); #endif } static LHASH_OF(FUNCTION) *prog_init(void) { static LHASH_OF(FUNCTION) *ret = NULL; static int prog_inited = 0; FUNCTION *f; size_t i; if (prog_inited) return ret; prog_inited = 1; /* Sort alphabetically within category. For nicer help displays. */ for (i = 0, f = functions; f->name != NULL; ++f, ++i) ; qsort(functions, i, sizeof(*functions), SortFnByName); if ((ret = lh_FUNCTION_new(function_hash, function_cmp)) == NULL) return NULL; for (f = functions; f->name != NULL; f++) (void)lh_FUNCTION_insert(ret, f); return ret; } diff --git a/apps/passwd.c b/apps/passwd.c index d741d05335f8..af08ccd4ac0f 100644 --- a/apps/passwd.c +++ b/apps/passwd.c @@ -1,853 +1,853 @@ /* - * Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2000-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "apps.h" #include "progs.h" #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES # include #endif #include #include static unsigned const char cov_2char[64] = { /* from crypto/des/fcrypt.c */ 0x2E, 0x2F, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48, 0x49, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x4C, 0x4D, 0x4E, 0x4F, 0x50, 0x51, 0x52, 0x53, 0x54, 0x55, 0x56, 0x57, 0x58, 0x59, 0x5A, 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6A, 0x6B, 0x6C, 0x6D, 0x6E, 0x6F, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78, 0x79, 0x7A }; static const char ascii_dollar[] = { 0x24, 0x00 }; typedef enum { passwd_unset = 0, passwd_crypt, passwd_md5, passwd_apr1, passwd_sha256, passwd_sha512, passwd_aixmd5 } passwd_modes; static int do_passwd(int passed_salt, char **salt_p, char **salt_malloc_p, char *passwd, BIO *out, int quiet, int table, int reverse, size_t pw_maxlen, passwd_modes mode); typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_IN, OPT_NOVERIFY, OPT_QUIET, OPT_TABLE, OPT_REVERSE, OPT_APR1, OPT_1, OPT_5, OPT_6, OPT_CRYPT, OPT_AIXMD5, OPT_SALT, OPT_STDIN, OPT_R_ENUM } OPTION_CHOICE; const OPTIONS passwd_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"in", OPT_IN, '<', "Read passwords from file"}, {"noverify", OPT_NOVERIFY, '-', "Never verify when reading password from terminal"}, {"quiet", OPT_QUIET, '-', "No warnings"}, {"table", OPT_TABLE, '-', "Format output as table"}, {"reverse", OPT_REVERSE, '-', "Switch table columns"}, {"salt", OPT_SALT, 's', "Use provided salt"}, {"stdin", OPT_STDIN, '-', "Read passwords from stdin"}, {"6", OPT_6, '-', "SHA512-based password algorithm"}, {"5", OPT_5, '-', "SHA256-based password algorithm"}, {"apr1", OPT_APR1, '-', "MD5-based password algorithm, Apache variant"}, {"1", OPT_1, '-', "MD5-based password algorithm"}, {"aixmd5", OPT_AIXMD5, '-', "AIX MD5-based password algorithm"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES {"crypt", OPT_CRYPT, '-', "Standard Unix password algorithm (default)"}, #endif OPT_R_OPTIONS, {NULL} }; int passwd_main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL; char *infile = NULL, *salt = NULL, *passwd = NULL, **passwds = NULL; char *salt_malloc = NULL, *passwd_malloc = NULL, *prog; OPTION_CHOICE o; int in_stdin = 0, pw_source_defined = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI_CONSOLE int in_noverify = 0; #endif int passed_salt = 0, quiet = 0, table = 0, reverse = 0; int ret = 1; passwd_modes mode = passwd_unset; size_t passwd_malloc_size = 0; size_t pw_maxlen = 256; /* arbitrary limit, should be enough for most * passwords */ prog = opt_init(argc, argv, passwd_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(passwd_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_IN: if (pw_source_defined) goto opthelp; infile = opt_arg(); pw_source_defined = 1; break; case OPT_NOVERIFY: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI_CONSOLE in_noverify = 1; #endif break; case OPT_QUIET: quiet = 1; break; case OPT_TABLE: table = 1; break; case OPT_REVERSE: reverse = 1; break; case OPT_1: if (mode != passwd_unset) goto opthelp; mode = passwd_md5; break; case OPT_5: if (mode != passwd_unset) goto opthelp; mode = passwd_sha256; break; case OPT_6: if (mode != passwd_unset) goto opthelp; mode = passwd_sha512; break; case OPT_APR1: if (mode != passwd_unset) goto opthelp; mode = passwd_apr1; break; case OPT_AIXMD5: if (mode != passwd_unset) goto opthelp; mode = passwd_aixmd5; break; case OPT_CRYPT: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES if (mode != passwd_unset) goto opthelp; mode = passwd_crypt; #endif break; case OPT_SALT: passed_salt = 1; salt = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_STDIN: if (pw_source_defined) goto opthelp; in_stdin = 1; pw_source_defined = 1; break; case OPT_R_CASES: if (!opt_rand(o)) goto end; break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); argv = opt_rest(); if (*argv != NULL) { if (pw_source_defined) goto opthelp; pw_source_defined = 1; passwds = argv; } if (mode == passwd_unset) { /* use default */ mode = passwd_crypt; } #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DES if (mode == passwd_crypt) goto opthelp; #endif if (infile != NULL && in_stdin) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't combine -in and -stdin\n", prog); goto end; } if (infile != NULL || in_stdin) { /* * If in_stdin is true, we know that infile is NULL, and that * bio_open_default() will give us back an alias for stdin. */ in = bio_open_default(infile, 'r', FORMAT_TEXT); if (in == NULL) goto end; } if (mode == passwd_crypt) pw_maxlen = 8; if (passwds == NULL) { /* no passwords on the command line */ passwd_malloc_size = pw_maxlen + 2; /* longer than necessary so that we can warn about truncation */ passwd = passwd_malloc = app_malloc(passwd_malloc_size, "password buffer"); } if ((in == NULL) && (passwds == NULL)) { /* * we use the following method to make sure what * in the 'else' section is always compiled, to * avoid rot of not-frequently-used code. */ if (1) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI_CONSOLE /* build a null-terminated list */ static char *passwds_static[2] = { NULL, NULL }; passwds = passwds_static; if (in == NULL) { if (EVP_read_pw_string (passwd_malloc, passwd_malloc_size, "Password: ", !(passed_salt || in_noverify)) != 0) goto end; } passwds[0] = passwd_malloc; } else { #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, "password required\n"); goto end; } } if (in == NULL) { assert(passwds != NULL); assert(*passwds != NULL); do { /* loop over list of passwords */ passwd = *passwds++; if (!do_passwd(passed_salt, &salt, &salt_malloc, passwd, bio_out, quiet, table, reverse, pw_maxlen, mode)) goto end; } while (*passwds != NULL); } else { /* in != NULL */ int done; assert(passwd != NULL); do { int r = BIO_gets(in, passwd, pw_maxlen + 1); if (r > 0) { char *c = (strchr(passwd, '\n')); if (c != NULL) { *c = 0; /* truncate at newline */ } else { /* ignore rest of line */ char trash[BUFSIZ]; do r = BIO_gets(in, trash, sizeof(trash)); while ((r > 0) && (!strchr(trash, '\n'))); } if (!do_passwd (passed_salt, &salt, &salt_malloc, passwd, bio_out, quiet, table, reverse, pw_maxlen, mode)) goto end; } done = (r <= 0); } while (!done); } ret = 0; end: #if 0 ERR_print_errors(bio_err); #endif OPENSSL_free(salt_malloc); OPENSSL_free(passwd_malloc); BIO_free(in); return ret; } /* * MD5-based password algorithm (should probably be available as a library * function; then the static buffer would not be acceptable). For magic * string "1", this should be compatible to the MD5-based BSD password * algorithm. For 'magic' string "apr1", this is compatible to the MD5-based * Apache password algorithm. (Apparently, the Apache password algorithm is * identical except that the 'magic' string was changed -- the laziest * application of the NIH principle I've ever encountered.) */ static char *md5crypt(const char *passwd, const char *magic, const char *salt) { /* "$apr1$..salt..$.......md5hash..........\0" */ static char out_buf[6 + 9 + 24 + 2]; unsigned char buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; char ascii_magic[5]; /* "apr1" plus '\0' */ char ascii_salt[9]; /* Max 8 chars plus '\0' */ char *ascii_passwd = NULL; char *salt_out; int n; unsigned int i; EVP_MD_CTX *md = NULL, *md2 = NULL; size_t passwd_len, salt_len, magic_len; passwd_len = strlen(passwd); out_buf[0] = 0; magic_len = strlen(magic); OPENSSL_strlcpy(ascii_magic, magic, sizeof(ascii_magic)); #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC if ((magic[0] & 0x80) != 0) /* High bit is 1 in EBCDIC alnums */ ebcdic2ascii(ascii_magic, ascii_magic, magic_len); #endif /* The salt gets truncated to 8 chars */ OPENSSL_strlcpy(ascii_salt, salt, sizeof(ascii_salt)); salt_len = strlen(ascii_salt); #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ebcdic2ascii(ascii_salt, ascii_salt, salt_len); #endif #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ascii_passwd = OPENSSL_strdup(passwd); if (ascii_passwd == NULL) return NULL; ebcdic2ascii(ascii_passwd, ascii_passwd, passwd_len); passwd = ascii_passwd; #endif if (magic_len > 0) { OPENSSL_strlcat(out_buf, ascii_dollar, sizeof(out_buf)); if (magic_len > 4) /* assert it's "1" or "apr1" */ goto err; OPENSSL_strlcat(out_buf, ascii_magic, sizeof(out_buf)); OPENSSL_strlcat(out_buf, ascii_dollar, sizeof(out_buf)); } OPENSSL_strlcat(out_buf, ascii_salt, sizeof(out_buf)); if (strlen(out_buf) > 6 + 8) /* assert "$apr1$..salt.." */ goto err; salt_out = out_buf; if (magic_len > 0) salt_out += 2 + magic_len; if (salt_len > 8) goto err; md = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (md == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, EVP_md5(), NULL) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md, passwd, passwd_len)) goto err; if (magic_len > 0) if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, ascii_dollar, 1) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md, ascii_magic, magic_len) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md, ascii_dollar, 1)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, ascii_salt, salt_len)) goto err; md2 = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (md2 == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(md2, EVP_md5(), NULL) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, passwd, passwd_len) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, ascii_salt, salt_len) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, passwd, passwd_len) || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md2, buf, NULL)) goto err; for (i = passwd_len; i > sizeof(buf); i -= sizeof(buf)) { if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, buf, sizeof(buf))) goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, buf, i)) goto err; n = passwd_len; while (n) { if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, (n & 1) ? "\0" : passwd, 1)) goto err; n >>= 1; } if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, buf, NULL)) - return NULL; + goto err; for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) { if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md2, EVP_md5(), NULL)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, (i & 1) ? (unsigned const char *)passwd : buf, (i & 1) ? passwd_len : sizeof(buf))) goto err; if (i % 3) { if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, ascii_salt, salt_len)) goto err; } if (i % 7) { if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, passwd, passwd_len)) goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, (i & 1) ? buf : (unsigned const char *)passwd, (i & 1) ? sizeof(buf) : passwd_len)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md2, buf, NULL)) goto err; } EVP_MD_CTX_free(md2); EVP_MD_CTX_free(md); md2 = NULL; md = NULL; { /* transform buf into output string */ unsigned char buf_perm[sizeof(buf)]; int dest, source; char *output; /* silly output permutation */ for (dest = 0, source = 0; dest < 14; dest++, source = (source + 6) % 17) buf_perm[dest] = buf[source]; buf_perm[14] = buf[5]; buf_perm[15] = buf[11]; # ifndef PEDANTIC /* Unfortunately, this generates a "no * effect" warning */ assert(16 == sizeof(buf_perm)); # endif output = salt_out + salt_len; assert(output == out_buf + strlen(out_buf)); *output++ = ascii_dollar[0]; for (i = 0; i < 15; i += 3) { *output++ = cov_2char[buf_perm[i + 2] & 0x3f]; *output++ = cov_2char[((buf_perm[i + 1] & 0xf) << 2) | (buf_perm[i + 2] >> 6)]; *output++ = cov_2char[((buf_perm[i] & 3) << 4) | (buf_perm[i + 1] >> 4)]; *output++ = cov_2char[buf_perm[i] >> 2]; } assert(i == 15); *output++ = cov_2char[buf_perm[i] & 0x3f]; *output++ = cov_2char[buf_perm[i] >> 6]; *output = 0; assert(strlen(out_buf) < sizeof(out_buf)); #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ascii2ebcdic(out_buf, out_buf, strlen(out_buf)); #endif } return out_buf; err: OPENSSL_free(ascii_passwd); EVP_MD_CTX_free(md2); EVP_MD_CTX_free(md); return NULL; } /* * SHA based password algorithm, describe by Ulrich Drepper here: * https://www.akkadia.org/drepper/SHA-crypt.txt * (note that it's in the public domain) */ static char *shacrypt(const char *passwd, const char *magic, const char *salt) { /* Prefix for optional rounds specification. */ static const char rounds_prefix[] = "rounds="; /* Maximum salt string length. */ # define SALT_LEN_MAX 16 /* Default number of rounds if not explicitly specified. */ # define ROUNDS_DEFAULT 5000 /* Minimum number of rounds. */ # define ROUNDS_MIN 1000 /* Maximum number of rounds. */ # define ROUNDS_MAX 999999999 /* "$6$rounds=$......salt......$...shahash(up to 86 chars)...\0" */ static char out_buf[3 + 17 + 17 + 86 + 1]; unsigned char buf[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; unsigned char temp_buf[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; size_t buf_size = 0; char ascii_magic[2]; char ascii_salt[17]; /* Max 16 chars plus '\0' */ char *ascii_passwd = NULL; size_t n; EVP_MD_CTX *md = NULL, *md2 = NULL; const EVP_MD *sha = NULL; size_t passwd_len, salt_len, magic_len; unsigned int rounds = 5000; /* Default */ char rounds_custom = 0; char *p_bytes = NULL; char *s_bytes = NULL; char *cp = NULL; passwd_len = strlen(passwd); magic_len = strlen(magic); /* assert it's "5" or "6" */ if (magic_len != 1) return NULL; switch (magic[0]) { case '5': sha = EVP_sha256(); buf_size = 32; break; case '6': sha = EVP_sha512(); buf_size = 64; break; default: return NULL; } if (strncmp(salt, rounds_prefix, sizeof(rounds_prefix) - 1) == 0) { const char *num = salt + sizeof(rounds_prefix) - 1; char *endp; unsigned long int srounds = strtoul (num, &endp, 10); if (*endp == '$') { salt = endp + 1; if (srounds > ROUNDS_MAX) rounds = ROUNDS_MAX; else if (srounds < ROUNDS_MIN) rounds = ROUNDS_MIN; else rounds = (unsigned int)srounds; rounds_custom = 1; } else { return NULL; } } OPENSSL_strlcpy(ascii_magic, magic, sizeof(ascii_magic)); #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC if ((magic[0] & 0x80) != 0) /* High bit is 1 in EBCDIC alnums */ ebcdic2ascii(ascii_magic, ascii_magic, magic_len); #endif /* The salt gets truncated to 16 chars */ OPENSSL_strlcpy(ascii_salt, salt, sizeof(ascii_salt)); salt_len = strlen(ascii_salt); #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ebcdic2ascii(ascii_salt, ascii_salt, salt_len); #endif #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ascii_passwd = OPENSSL_strdup(passwd); if (ascii_passwd == NULL) return NULL; ebcdic2ascii(ascii_passwd, ascii_passwd, passwd_len); passwd = ascii_passwd; #endif out_buf[0] = 0; OPENSSL_strlcat(out_buf, ascii_dollar, sizeof(out_buf)); OPENSSL_strlcat(out_buf, ascii_magic, sizeof(out_buf)); OPENSSL_strlcat(out_buf, ascii_dollar, sizeof(out_buf)); if (rounds_custom) { char tmp_buf[80]; /* "rounds=999999999" */ sprintf(tmp_buf, "rounds=%u", rounds); #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC /* In case we're really on a ASCII based platform and just pretend */ if (tmp_buf[0] != 0x72) /* ASCII 'r' */ ebcdic2ascii(tmp_buf, tmp_buf, strlen(tmp_buf)); #endif OPENSSL_strlcat(out_buf, tmp_buf, sizeof(out_buf)); OPENSSL_strlcat(out_buf, ascii_dollar, sizeof(out_buf)); } OPENSSL_strlcat(out_buf, ascii_salt, sizeof(out_buf)); /* assert "$5$rounds=999999999$......salt......" */ if (strlen(out_buf) > 3 + 17 * rounds_custom + salt_len ) goto err; md = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (md == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, sha, NULL) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md, passwd, passwd_len) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md, ascii_salt, salt_len)) goto err; md2 = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (md2 == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(md2, sha, NULL) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, passwd, passwd_len) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, ascii_salt, salt_len) || !EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, passwd, passwd_len) || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md2, buf, NULL)) goto err; for (n = passwd_len; n > buf_size; n -= buf_size) { if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, buf, buf_size)) goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, buf, n)) goto err; n = passwd_len; while (n) { if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, (n & 1) ? buf : (unsigned const char *)passwd, (n & 1) ? buf_size : passwd_len)) goto err; n >>= 1; } if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, buf, NULL)) - return NULL; + goto err; /* P sequence */ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md2, sha, NULL)) goto err; for (n = passwd_len; n > 0; n--) if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, passwd, passwd_len)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md2, temp_buf, NULL)) - return NULL; + goto err; if ((p_bytes = OPENSSL_zalloc(passwd_len)) == NULL) goto err; for (cp = p_bytes, n = passwd_len; n > buf_size; n -= buf_size, cp += buf_size) memcpy(cp, temp_buf, buf_size); memcpy(cp, temp_buf, n); /* S sequence */ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md2, sha, NULL)) goto err; for (n = 16 + buf[0]; n > 0; n--) if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, ascii_salt, salt_len)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md2, temp_buf, NULL)) - return NULL; + goto err; if ((s_bytes = OPENSSL_zalloc(salt_len)) == NULL) goto err; for (cp = s_bytes, n = salt_len; n > buf_size; n -= buf_size, cp += buf_size) memcpy(cp, temp_buf, buf_size); memcpy(cp, temp_buf, n); for (n = 0; n < rounds; n++) { if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md2, sha, NULL)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, (n & 1) ? (unsigned const char *)p_bytes : buf, (n & 1) ? passwd_len : buf_size)) goto err; if (n % 3) { if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, s_bytes, salt_len)) goto err; } if (n % 7) { if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, p_bytes, passwd_len)) goto err; } if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md2, (n & 1) ? buf : (unsigned const char *)p_bytes, (n & 1) ? buf_size : passwd_len)) goto err; if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md2, buf, NULL)) goto err; } EVP_MD_CTX_free(md2); EVP_MD_CTX_free(md); md2 = NULL; md = NULL; OPENSSL_free(p_bytes); OPENSSL_free(s_bytes); p_bytes = NULL; s_bytes = NULL; cp = out_buf + strlen(out_buf); *cp++ = ascii_dollar[0]; # define b64_from_24bit(B2, B1, B0, N) \ do { \ unsigned int w = ((B2) << 16) | ((B1) << 8) | (B0); \ int i = (N); \ while (i-- > 0) \ { \ *cp++ = cov_2char[w & 0x3f]; \ w >>= 6; \ } \ } while (0) switch (magic[0]) { case '5': b64_from_24bit (buf[0], buf[10], buf[20], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[21], buf[1], buf[11], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[12], buf[22], buf[2], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[3], buf[13], buf[23], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[24], buf[4], buf[14], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[15], buf[25], buf[5], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[6], buf[16], buf[26], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[27], buf[7], buf[17], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[18], buf[28], buf[8], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[9], buf[19], buf[29], 4); b64_from_24bit (0, buf[31], buf[30], 3); break; case '6': b64_from_24bit (buf[0], buf[21], buf[42], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[22], buf[43], buf[1], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[44], buf[2], buf[23], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[3], buf[24], buf[45], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[25], buf[46], buf[4], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[47], buf[5], buf[26], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[6], buf[27], buf[48], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[28], buf[49], buf[7], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[50], buf[8], buf[29], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[9], buf[30], buf[51], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[31], buf[52], buf[10], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[53], buf[11], buf[32], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[12], buf[33], buf[54], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[34], buf[55], buf[13], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[56], buf[14], buf[35], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[15], buf[36], buf[57], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[37], buf[58], buf[16], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[59], buf[17], buf[38], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[18], buf[39], buf[60], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[40], buf[61], buf[19], 4); b64_from_24bit (buf[62], buf[20], buf[41], 4); b64_from_24bit (0, 0, buf[63], 2); break; default: goto err; } *cp = '\0'; #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ascii2ebcdic(out_buf, out_buf, strlen(out_buf)); #endif return out_buf; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(md2); EVP_MD_CTX_free(md); OPENSSL_free(p_bytes); OPENSSL_free(s_bytes); OPENSSL_free(ascii_passwd); return NULL; } static int do_passwd(int passed_salt, char **salt_p, char **salt_malloc_p, char *passwd, BIO *out, int quiet, int table, int reverse, size_t pw_maxlen, passwd_modes mode) { char *hash = NULL; assert(salt_p != NULL); assert(salt_malloc_p != NULL); /* first make sure we have a salt */ if (!passed_salt) { size_t saltlen = 0; size_t i; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES if (mode == passwd_crypt) saltlen = 2; #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DES */ if (mode == passwd_md5 || mode == passwd_apr1 || mode == passwd_aixmd5) saltlen = 8; if (mode == passwd_sha256 || mode == passwd_sha512) saltlen = 16; assert(saltlen != 0); if (*salt_malloc_p == NULL) *salt_p = *salt_malloc_p = app_malloc(saltlen + 1, "salt buffer"); if (RAND_bytes((unsigned char *)*salt_p, saltlen) <= 0) goto end; for (i = 0; i < saltlen; i++) (*salt_p)[i] = cov_2char[(*salt_p)[i] & 0x3f]; /* 6 bits */ (*salt_p)[i] = 0; # ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC /* The password encryption function will convert back to ASCII */ ascii2ebcdic(*salt_p, *salt_p, saltlen); # endif } assert(*salt_p != NULL); /* truncate password if necessary */ if ((strlen(passwd) > pw_maxlen)) { if (!quiet) /* * XXX: really we should know how to print a size_t, not cast it */ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Warning: truncating password to %u characters\n", (unsigned)pw_maxlen); passwd[pw_maxlen] = 0; } assert(strlen(passwd) <= pw_maxlen); /* now compute password hash */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES if (mode == passwd_crypt) hash = DES_crypt(passwd, *salt_p); #endif if (mode == passwd_md5 || mode == passwd_apr1) hash = md5crypt(passwd, (mode == passwd_md5 ? "1" : "apr1"), *salt_p); if (mode == passwd_aixmd5) hash = md5crypt(passwd, "", *salt_p); if (mode == passwd_sha256 || mode == passwd_sha512) hash = shacrypt(passwd, (mode == passwd_sha256 ? "5" : "6"), *salt_p); assert(hash != NULL); if (table && !reverse) BIO_printf(out, "%s\t%s\n", passwd, hash); else if (table && reverse) BIO_printf(out, "%s\t%s\n", hash, passwd); else BIO_printf(out, "%s\n", hash); return 1; end: return 0; } diff --git a/apps/s_client.c b/apps/s_client.c index 121cd1444fe6..00effc80375a 100644 --- a/apps/s_client.c +++ b/apps/s_client.c @@ -1,3566 +1,3577 @@ /* * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "e_os.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK /* * With IPv6, it looks like Digital has mixed up the proper order of * recursive header file inclusion, resulting in the compiler complaining * that u_int isn't defined, but only if _POSIX_C_SOURCE is defined, which is * needed to have fileno() declared correctly... So let's define u_int */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC) && !defined(__U_INT) # define __U_INT typedef unsigned int u_int; #endif #include "apps.h" #include "progs.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT # include #endif #include "s_apps.h" #include "timeouts.h" #include "internal/sockets.h" #if defined(__has_feature) # if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) # include # endif #endif #undef BUFSIZZ #define BUFSIZZ 1024*8 #define S_CLIENT_IRC_READ_TIMEOUT 8 static char *prog; static int c_debug = 0; static int c_showcerts = 0; static char *keymatexportlabel = NULL; static int keymatexportlen = 20; static BIO *bio_c_out = NULL; static int c_quiet = 0; static char *sess_out = NULL; static SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL; static void print_stuff(BIO *berr, SSL *con, int full); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP static int ocsp_resp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg); #endif static int ldap_ExtendedResponse_parse(const char *buf, long rem); static int is_dNS_name(const char *host); static int saved_errno; static void save_errno(void) { saved_errno = errno; errno = 0; } static int restore_errno(void) { int ret = errno; errno = saved_errno; return ret; } static void do_ssl_shutdown(SSL *ssl) { int ret; do { /* We only do unidirectional shutdown */ ret = SSL_shutdown(ssl); if (ret < 0) { switch (SSL_get_error(ssl, ret)) { case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB: /* We just do busy waiting. Nothing clever */ continue; } ret = 0; } } while (ret < 0); } /* Default PSK identity and key */ static char *psk_identity = "Client_identity"; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK static unsigned int psk_client_cb(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len) { int ret; long key_len; unsigned char *key; if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "psk_client_cb\n"); if (!hint) { /* no ServerKeyExchange message */ if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "NULL received PSK identity hint, continuing anyway\n"); } else if (c_debug) { BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Received PSK identity hint '%s'\n", hint); } /* * lookup PSK identity and PSK key based on the given identity hint here */ ret = BIO_snprintf(identity, max_identity_len, "%s", psk_identity); if (ret < 0 || (unsigned int)ret > max_identity_len) goto out_err; if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "created identity '%s' len=%d\n", identity, ret); /* convert the PSK key to binary */ key = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(psk_key, &key_len); if (key == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Could not convert PSK key '%s' to buffer\n", psk_key); return 0; } if (max_psk_len > INT_MAX || key_len > (long)max_psk_len) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "psk buffer of callback is too small (%d) for key (%ld)\n", max_psk_len, key_len); OPENSSL_free(key); return 0; } memcpy(psk, key, key_len); OPENSSL_free(key); if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "created PSK len=%ld\n", key_len); return key_len; out_err: if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error in PSK client callback\n"); return 0; } #endif const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 }; const unsigned char tls13_aes256gcmsha384_id[] = { 0x13, 0x02 }; static int psk_use_session_cb(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char **id, size_t *idlen, SSL_SESSION **sess) { SSL_SESSION *usesess = NULL; const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; if (psksess != NULL) { SSL_SESSION_up_ref(psksess); usesess = psksess; } else { long key_len; unsigned char *key = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(psk_key, &key_len); if (key == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Could not convert PSK key '%s' to buffer\n", psk_key); return 0; } /* We default to SHA-256 */ cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id); if (cipher == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error finding suitable ciphersuite\n"); OPENSSL_free(key); return 0; } usesess = SSL_SESSION_new(); if (usesess == NULL || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(usesess, key, key_len) || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(usesess, cipher) || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(usesess, TLS1_3_VERSION)) { OPENSSL_free(key); goto err; } OPENSSL_free(key); } cipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(usesess); if (cipher == NULL) goto err; if (md != NULL && SSL_CIPHER_get_handshake_digest(cipher) != md) { /* PSK not usable, ignore it */ *id = NULL; *idlen = 0; *sess = NULL; SSL_SESSION_free(usesess); } else { *sess = usesess; *id = (unsigned char *)psk_identity; *idlen = strlen(psk_identity); } return 1; err: SSL_SESSION_free(usesess); return 0; } /* This is a context that we pass to callbacks */ typedef struct tlsextctx_st { BIO *biodebug; int ack; } tlsextctx; static int ssl_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg) { tlsextctx *p = (tlsextctx *) arg; const char *hn = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); if (SSL_get_servername_type(s) != -1) p->ack = !SSL_session_reused(s) && hn != NULL; else BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use SSL_get_servername\n"); return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* This is a context that we pass to all callbacks */ typedef struct srp_arg_st { char *srppassin; char *srplogin; int msg; /* copy from c_msg */ int debug; /* copy from c_debug */ int amp; /* allow more groups */ int strength; /* minimal size for N */ } SRP_ARG; # define SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME 64 static int srp_Verify_N_and_g(const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g) { BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); BIGNUM *p = BN_new(); BIGNUM *r = BN_new(); int ret = g != NULL && N != NULL && bn_ctx != NULL && BN_is_odd(N) && BN_is_prime_ex(N, SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME, bn_ctx, NULL) == 1 && p != NULL && BN_rshift1(p, N) && /* p = (N-1)/2 */ BN_is_prime_ex(p, SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME, bn_ctx, NULL) == 1 && r != NULL && /* verify g^((N-1)/2) == -1 (mod N) */ BN_mod_exp(r, g, p, N, bn_ctx) && BN_add_word(r, 1) && BN_cmp(r, N) == 0; BN_free(r); BN_free(p); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); return ret; } /*- * This callback is used here for two purposes: * - extended debugging * - making some primality tests for unknown groups * The callback is only called for a non default group. * * An application does not need the call back at all if * only the standard groups are used. In real life situations, * client and server already share well known groups, * thus there is no need to verify them. * Furthermore, in case that a server actually proposes a group that * is not one of those defined in RFC 5054, it is more appropriate * to add the group to a static list and then compare since * primality tests are rather cpu consuming. */ static int ssl_srp_verify_param_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) { SRP_ARG *srp_arg = (SRP_ARG *)arg; BIGNUM *N = NULL, *g = NULL; if (((N = SSL_get_srp_N(s)) == NULL) || ((g = SSL_get_srp_g(s)) == NULL)) return 0; if (srp_arg->debug || srp_arg->msg || srp_arg->amp == 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP parameters:\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\tN="); BN_print(bio_err, N); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n\tg="); BN_print(bio_err, g); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); } if (SRP_check_known_gN_param(g, N)) return 1; if (srp_arg->amp == 1) { if (srp_arg->debug) BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP param N and g are not known params, going to check deeper.\n"); /* * The srp_moregroups is a real debugging feature. Implementors * should rather add the value to the known ones. The minimal size * has already been tested. */ if (BN_num_bits(g) <= BN_BITS && srp_Verify_N_and_g(N, g)) return 1; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP param N and g rejected.\n"); return 0; } # define PWD_STRLEN 1024 static char *ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) { SRP_ARG *srp_arg = (SRP_ARG *)arg; char *pass = app_malloc(PWD_STRLEN + 1, "SRP password buffer"); PW_CB_DATA cb_tmp; int l; cb_tmp.password = (char *)srp_arg->srppassin; cb_tmp.prompt_info = "SRP user"; if ((l = password_callback(pass, PWD_STRLEN, 0, &cb_tmp)) < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read Password\n"); OPENSSL_free(pass); return NULL; } *(pass + l) = '\0'; return pass; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* This the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */ typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st { unsigned char *data; size_t len; int status; } tlsextnextprotoctx; static tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto; static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg) { tlsextnextprotoctx *ctx = arg; if (!c_quiet) { /* We can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. */ unsigned i; BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Protocols advertised by server: "); for (i = 0; i < inlen;) { if (i) BIO_write(bio_c_out, ", ", 2); BIO_write(bio_c_out, &in[i + 1], in[i]); i += in[i] + 1; } BIO_write(bio_c_out, "\n", 1); } ctx->status = SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen, ctx->data, ctx->len); return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } #endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */ static int serverinfo_cli_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, int *al, void *arg) { char pem_name[100]; unsigned char ext_buf[4 + 65536]; /* Reconstruct the type/len fields prior to extension data */ inlen &= 0xffff; /* for formal memcmpy correctness */ ext_buf[0] = (unsigned char)(ext_type >> 8); ext_buf[1] = (unsigned char)(ext_type); ext_buf[2] = (unsigned char)(inlen >> 8); ext_buf[3] = (unsigned char)(inlen); memcpy(ext_buf + 4, in, inlen); BIO_snprintf(pem_name, sizeof(pem_name), "SERVERINFO FOR EXTENSION %d", ext_type); PEM_write_bio(bio_c_out, pem_name, "", ext_buf, 4 + inlen); return 1; } /* * Hex decoder that tolerates optional whitespace. Returns number of bytes * produced, advances inptr to end of input string. */ static ossl_ssize_t hexdecode(const char **inptr, void *result) { unsigned char **out = (unsigned char **)result; const char *in = *inptr; unsigned char *ret = app_malloc(strlen(in) / 2, "hexdecode"); unsigned char *cp = ret; uint8_t byte; int nibble = 0; if (ret == NULL) return -1; for (byte = 0; *in; ++in) { int x; if (isspace(_UC(*in))) continue; x = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(*in); if (x < 0) { OPENSSL_free(ret); return 0; } byte |= (char)x; if ((nibble ^= 1) == 0) { *cp++ = byte; byte = 0; } else { byte <<= 4; } } if (nibble != 0) { OPENSSL_free(ret); return 0; } *inptr = in; return cp - (*out = ret); } /* * Decode unsigned 0..255, returns 1 on success, <= 0 on failure. Advances * inptr to next field skipping leading whitespace. */ static ossl_ssize_t checked_uint8(const char **inptr, void *out) { uint8_t *result = (uint8_t *)out; const char *in = *inptr; char *endp; long v; int e; save_errno(); v = strtol(in, &endp, 10); e = restore_errno(); if (((v == LONG_MIN || v == LONG_MAX) && e == ERANGE) || endp == in || !isspace(_UC(*endp)) || v != (*result = (uint8_t) v)) { return -1; } for (in = endp; isspace(_UC(*in)); ++in) continue; *inptr = in; return 1; } struct tlsa_field { void *var; const char *name; ossl_ssize_t (*parser)(const char **, void *); }; static int tlsa_import_rr(SSL *con, const char *rrdata) { /* Not necessary to re-init these values; the "parsers" do that. */ static uint8_t usage; static uint8_t selector; static uint8_t mtype; static unsigned char *data; static struct tlsa_field tlsa_fields[] = { { &usage, "usage", checked_uint8 }, { &selector, "selector", checked_uint8 }, { &mtype, "mtype", checked_uint8 }, { &data, "data", hexdecode }, { NULL, } }; struct tlsa_field *f; int ret; const char *cp = rrdata; ossl_ssize_t len = 0; for (f = tlsa_fields; f->var; ++f) { /* Returns number of bytes produced, advances cp to next field */ if ((len = f->parser(&cp, f->var)) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: warning: bad TLSA %s field in: %s\n", prog, f->name, rrdata); return 0; } } /* The data field is last, so len is its length */ ret = SSL_dane_tlsa_add(con, usage, selector, mtype, data, len); OPENSSL_free(data); if (ret == 0) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: warning: unusable TLSA rrdata: %s\n", prog, rrdata); return 0; } if (ret < 0) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: warning: error loading TLSA rrdata: %s\n", prog, rrdata); return 0; } return ret; } static int tlsa_import_rrset(SSL *con, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *rrset) { int num = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(rrset); int count = 0; int i; for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { char *rrdata = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(rrset, i); if (tlsa_import_rr(con, rrdata) > 0) ++count; } return count > 0; } typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_4, OPT_6, OPT_HOST, OPT_PORT, OPT_CONNECT, OPT_BIND, OPT_UNIX, OPT_XMPPHOST, OPT_VERIFY, OPT_NAMEOPT, OPT_CERT, OPT_CRL, OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD, OPT_SESS_OUT, OPT_SESS_IN, OPT_CERTFORM, OPT_CRLFORM, OPT_VERIFY_RET_ERROR, OPT_VERIFY_QUIET, OPT_BRIEF, OPT_PREXIT, OPT_CRLF, OPT_QUIET, OPT_NBIO, OPT_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE, OPT_IGN_EOF, OPT_NO_IGN_EOF, OPT_DEBUG, OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG, OPT_STATUS, OPT_WDEBUG, OPT_MSG, OPT_MSGFILE, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_TRACE, OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG, OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG_VERBOSE, OPT_SHOWCERTS, OPT_NBIO_TEST, OPT_STATE, OPT_PSK_IDENTITY, OPT_PSK, OPT_PSK_SESS, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP OPT_SRPUSER, OPT_SRPPASS, OPT_SRP_STRENGTH, OPT_SRP_LATEUSER, OPT_SRP_MOREGROUPS, #endif OPT_SSL3, OPT_SSL_CONFIG, OPT_TLS1_3, OPT_TLS1_2, OPT_TLS1_1, OPT_TLS1, OPT_DTLS, OPT_DTLS1, OPT_DTLS1_2, OPT_SCTP, OPT_TIMEOUT, OPT_MTU, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_PASS, OPT_CERT_CHAIN, OPT_CAPATH, OPT_NOCAPATH, OPT_CHAINCAPATH, OPT_VERIFYCAPATH, OPT_KEY, OPT_RECONNECT, OPT_BUILD_CHAIN, OPT_CAFILE, OPT_NOCAFILE, OPT_CHAINCAFILE, OPT_VERIFYCAFILE, OPT_NEXTPROTONEG, OPT_ALPN, OPT_SERVERINFO, OPT_STARTTLS, OPT_SERVERNAME, OPT_NOSERVERNAME, OPT_ASYNC, OPT_USE_SRTP, OPT_KEYMATEXPORT, OPT_KEYMATEXPORTLEN, OPT_PROTOHOST, OPT_MAXFRAGLEN, OPT_MAX_SEND_FRAG, OPT_SPLIT_SEND_FRAG, OPT_MAX_PIPELINES, OPT_READ_BUF, OPT_KEYLOG_FILE, OPT_EARLY_DATA, OPT_REQCAFILE, OPT_V_ENUM, OPT_X_ENUM, OPT_S_ENUM, OPT_FALLBACKSCSV, OPT_NOCMDS, OPT_PROXY, OPT_DANE_TLSA_DOMAIN, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT OPT_CT, OPT_NOCT, OPT_CTLOG_FILE, #endif OPT_DANE_TLSA_RRDATA, OPT_DANE_EE_NO_NAME, OPT_ENABLE_PHA, OPT_SCTP_LABEL_BUG, OPT_R_ENUM } OPTION_CHOICE; const OPTIONS s_client_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"host", OPT_HOST, 's', "Use -connect instead"}, {"port", OPT_PORT, 'p', "Use -connect instead"}, {"connect", OPT_CONNECT, 's', "TCP/IP where to connect (default is :" PORT ")"}, {"bind", OPT_BIND, 's', "bind local address for connection"}, {"proxy", OPT_PROXY, 's', "Connect to via specified proxy to the real server"}, #ifdef AF_UNIX {"unix", OPT_UNIX, 's', "Connect over the specified Unix-domain socket"}, #endif {"4", OPT_4, '-', "Use IPv4 only"}, #ifdef AF_INET6 {"6", OPT_6, '-', "Use IPv6 only"}, #endif {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, 'p', "Turn on peer certificate verification"}, {"cert", OPT_CERT, '<', "Certificate file to use, PEM format assumed"}, {"certform", OPT_CERTFORM, 'F', "Certificate format (PEM or DER) PEM default"}, {"nameopt", OPT_NAMEOPT, 's', "Various certificate name options"}, {"key", OPT_KEY, 's', "Private key file to use, if not in -cert file"}, {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'E', "Key format (PEM, DER or engine) PEM default"}, {"pass", OPT_PASS, 's', "Private key file pass phrase source"}, {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "PEM format directory of CA's"}, {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "PEM format file of CA's"}, {"no-CAfile", OPT_NOCAFILE, '-', "Do not load the default certificates file"}, {"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-', "Do not load certificates from the default certificates directory"}, {"requestCAfile", OPT_REQCAFILE, '<', "PEM format file of CA names to send to the server"}, {"dane_tlsa_domain", OPT_DANE_TLSA_DOMAIN, 's', "DANE TLSA base domain"}, {"dane_tlsa_rrdata", OPT_DANE_TLSA_RRDATA, 's', "DANE TLSA rrdata presentation form"}, {"dane_ee_no_namechecks", OPT_DANE_EE_NO_NAME, '-', "Disable name checks when matching DANE-EE(3) TLSA records"}, {"reconnect", OPT_RECONNECT, '-', "Drop and re-make the connection with the same Session-ID"}, {"showcerts", OPT_SHOWCERTS, '-', "Show all certificates sent by the server"}, {"debug", OPT_DEBUG, '-', "Extra output"}, {"msg", OPT_MSG, '-', "Show protocol messages"}, {"msgfile", OPT_MSGFILE, '>', "File to send output of -msg or -trace, instead of stdout"}, {"nbio_test", OPT_NBIO_TEST, '-', "More ssl protocol testing"}, {"state", OPT_STATE, '-', "Print the ssl states"}, {"crlf", OPT_CRLF, '-', "Convert LF from terminal into CRLF"}, {"quiet", OPT_QUIET, '-', "No s_client output"}, {"ign_eof", OPT_IGN_EOF, '-', "Ignore input eof (default when -quiet)"}, {"no_ign_eof", OPT_NO_IGN_EOF, '-', "Don't ignore input eof"}, {"starttls", OPT_STARTTLS, 's', "Use the appropriate STARTTLS command before starting TLS"}, {"xmpphost", OPT_XMPPHOST, 's', "Alias of -name option for \"-starttls xmpp[-server]\""}, OPT_R_OPTIONS, {"sess_out", OPT_SESS_OUT, '>', "File to write SSL session to"}, {"sess_in", OPT_SESS_IN, '<', "File to read SSL session from"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP {"use_srtp", OPT_USE_SRTP, 's', "Offer SRTP key management with a colon-separated profile list"}, #endif {"keymatexport", OPT_KEYMATEXPORT, 's', "Export keying material using label"}, {"keymatexportlen", OPT_KEYMATEXPORTLEN, 'p', "Export len bytes of keying material (default 20)"}, {"maxfraglen", OPT_MAXFRAGLEN, 'p', "Enable Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation (len values: 512, 1024, 2048 and 4096)"}, {"fallback_scsv", OPT_FALLBACKSCSV, '-', "Send the fallback SCSV"}, {"name", OPT_PROTOHOST, 's', "Hostname to use for \"-starttls lmtp\", \"-starttls smtp\" or \"-starttls xmpp[-server]\""}, {"CRL", OPT_CRL, '<', "CRL file to use"}, {"crl_download", OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD, '-', "Download CRL from distribution points"}, {"CRLform", OPT_CRLFORM, 'F', "CRL format (PEM or DER) PEM is default"}, {"verify_return_error", OPT_VERIFY_RET_ERROR, '-', "Close connection on verification error"}, {"verify_quiet", OPT_VERIFY_QUIET, '-', "Restrict verify output to errors"}, {"brief", OPT_BRIEF, '-', "Restrict output to brief summary of connection parameters"}, {"prexit", OPT_PREXIT, '-', "Print session information when the program exits"}, {"security_debug", OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG, '-', "Enable security debug messages"}, {"security_debug_verbose", OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG_VERBOSE, '-', "Output more security debug output"}, {"cert_chain", OPT_CERT_CHAIN, '<', "Certificate chain file (in PEM format)"}, {"chainCApath", OPT_CHAINCAPATH, '/', "Use dir as certificate store path to build CA certificate chain"}, {"verifyCApath", OPT_VERIFYCAPATH, '/', "Use dir as certificate store path to verify CA certificate"}, {"build_chain", OPT_BUILD_CHAIN, '-', "Build certificate chain"}, {"chainCAfile", OPT_CHAINCAFILE, '<', "CA file for certificate chain (PEM format)"}, {"verifyCAfile", OPT_VERIFYCAFILE, '<', "CA file for certificate verification (PEM format)"}, {"nocommands", OPT_NOCMDS, '-', "Do not use interactive command letters"}, {"servername", OPT_SERVERNAME, 's', "Set TLS extension servername (SNI) in ClientHello (default)"}, {"noservername", OPT_NOSERVERNAME, '-', "Do not send the server name (SNI) extension in the ClientHello"}, {"tlsextdebug", OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG, '-', "Hex dump of all TLS extensions received"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP {"status", OPT_STATUS, '-', "Request certificate status from server"}, #endif {"serverinfo", OPT_SERVERINFO, 's', "types Send empty ClientHello extensions (comma-separated numbers)"}, {"alpn", OPT_ALPN, 's', "Enable ALPN extension, considering named protocols supported (comma-separated list)"}, {"async", OPT_ASYNC, '-', "Support asynchronous operation"}, {"ssl_config", OPT_SSL_CONFIG, 's', "Use specified configuration file"}, {"max_send_frag", OPT_MAX_SEND_FRAG, 'p', "Maximum Size of send frames "}, {"split_send_frag", OPT_SPLIT_SEND_FRAG, 'p', "Size used to split data for encrypt pipelines"}, {"max_pipelines", OPT_MAX_PIPELINES, 'p', "Maximum number of encrypt/decrypt pipelines to be used"}, {"read_buf", OPT_READ_BUF, 'p', "Default read buffer size to be used for connections"}, OPT_S_OPTIONS, OPT_V_OPTIONS, OPT_X_OPTIONS, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 {"ssl3", OPT_SSL3, '-', "Just use SSLv3"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 {"tls1", OPT_TLS1, '-', "Just use TLSv1"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 {"tls1_1", OPT_TLS1_1, '-', "Just use TLSv1.1"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 {"tls1_2", OPT_TLS1_2, '-', "Just use TLSv1.2"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 {"tls1_3", OPT_TLS1_3, '-', "Just use TLSv1.3"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS {"dtls", OPT_DTLS, '-', "Use any version of DTLS"}, {"timeout", OPT_TIMEOUT, '-', "Enable send/receive timeout on DTLS connections"}, {"mtu", OPT_MTU, 'p', "Set the link layer MTU"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 {"dtls1", OPT_DTLS1, '-', "Just use DTLSv1"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 {"dtls1_2", OPT_DTLS1_2, '-', "Just use DTLSv1.2"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP {"sctp", OPT_SCTP, '-', "Use SCTP"}, {"sctp_label_bug", OPT_SCTP_LABEL_BUG, '-', "Enable SCTP label length bug"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE {"trace", OPT_TRACE, '-', "Show trace output of protocol messages"}, #endif #ifdef WATT32 {"wdebug", OPT_WDEBUG, '-', "WATT-32 tcp debugging"}, #endif {"nbio", OPT_NBIO, '-', "Use non-blocking IO"}, {"psk_identity", OPT_PSK_IDENTITY, 's', "PSK identity"}, {"psk", OPT_PSK, 's', "PSK in hex (without 0x)"}, {"psk_session", OPT_PSK_SESS, '<', "File to read PSK SSL session from"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP {"srpuser", OPT_SRPUSER, 's', "SRP authentication for 'user'"}, {"srppass", OPT_SRPPASS, 's', "Password for 'user'"}, {"srp_lateuser", OPT_SRP_LATEUSER, '-', "SRP username into second ClientHello message"}, {"srp_moregroups", OPT_SRP_MOREGROUPS, '-', "Tolerate other than the known g N values."}, {"srp_strength", OPT_SRP_STRENGTH, 'p', "Minimal length in bits for N"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG {"nextprotoneg", OPT_NEXTPROTONEG, 's', "Enable NPN extension, considering named protocols supported (comma-separated list)"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, {"ssl_client_engine", OPT_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE, 's', "Specify engine to be used for client certificate operations"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT {"ct", OPT_CT, '-', "Request and parse SCTs (also enables OCSP stapling)"}, {"noct", OPT_NOCT, '-', "Do not request or parse SCTs (default)"}, {"ctlogfile", OPT_CTLOG_FILE, '<', "CT log list CONF file"}, #endif {"keylogfile", OPT_KEYLOG_FILE, '>', "Write TLS secrets to file"}, {"early_data", OPT_EARLY_DATA, '<', "File to send as early data"}, {"enable_pha", OPT_ENABLE_PHA, '-', "Enable post-handshake-authentication"}, {NULL, OPT_EOF, 0x00, NULL} }; typedef enum PROTOCOL_choice { PROTO_OFF, PROTO_SMTP, PROTO_POP3, PROTO_IMAP, PROTO_FTP, PROTO_TELNET, PROTO_XMPP, PROTO_XMPP_SERVER, PROTO_CONNECT, PROTO_IRC, PROTO_MYSQL, PROTO_POSTGRES, PROTO_LMTP, PROTO_NNTP, PROTO_SIEVE, PROTO_LDAP } PROTOCOL_CHOICE; static const OPT_PAIR services[] = { {"smtp", PROTO_SMTP}, {"pop3", PROTO_POP3}, {"imap", PROTO_IMAP}, {"ftp", PROTO_FTP}, {"xmpp", PROTO_XMPP}, {"xmpp-server", PROTO_XMPP_SERVER}, {"telnet", PROTO_TELNET}, {"irc", PROTO_IRC}, {"mysql", PROTO_MYSQL}, {"postgres", PROTO_POSTGRES}, {"lmtp", PROTO_LMTP}, {"nntp", PROTO_NNTP}, {"sieve", PROTO_SIEVE}, {"ldap", PROTO_LDAP}, {NULL, 0} }; #define IS_INET_FLAG(o) \ (o == OPT_4 || o == OPT_6 || o == OPT_HOST || o == OPT_PORT || o == OPT_CONNECT) #define IS_UNIX_FLAG(o) (o == OPT_UNIX) #define IS_PROT_FLAG(o) \ (o == OPT_SSL3 || o == OPT_TLS1 || o == OPT_TLS1_1 || o == OPT_TLS1_2 \ || o == OPT_TLS1_3 || o == OPT_DTLS || o == OPT_DTLS1 || o == OPT_DTLS1_2) /* Free |*dest| and optionally set it to a copy of |source|. */ static void freeandcopy(char **dest, const char *source) { OPENSSL_free(*dest); *dest = NULL; if (source != NULL) *dest = OPENSSL_strdup(source); } static int new_session_cb(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *sess) { if (sess_out != NULL) { BIO *stmp = BIO_new_file(sess_out, "w"); if (stmp == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error writing session file %s\n", sess_out); } else { PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION(stmp, sess); BIO_free(stmp); } } /* * Session data gets dumped on connection for TLSv1.2 and below, and on * arrival of the NewSessionTicket for TLSv1.3. */ if (SSL_version(s) == TLS1_3_VERSION) { BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "---\nPost-Handshake New Session Ticket arrived:\n"); SSL_SESSION_print(bio_c_out, sess); BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "---\n"); } /* * We always return a "fail" response so that the session gets freed again * because we haven't used the reference. */ return 0; } int s_client_main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *sbio; EVP_PKEY *key = NULL; SSL *con = NULL; SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; X509 *cert = NULL; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL; SSL_EXCERT *exc = NULL; SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *ssl_args = NULL; char *dane_tlsa_domain = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *dane_tlsa_rrset = NULL; int dane_ee_no_name = 0; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL; const SSL_METHOD *meth = TLS_client_method(); const char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL; char *cbuf = NULL, *sbuf = NULL; char *mbuf = NULL, *proxystr = NULL, *connectstr = NULL, *bindstr = NULL; char *cert_file = NULL, *key_file = NULL, *chain_file = NULL; char *chCApath = NULL, *chCAfile = NULL, *host = NULL; char *port = OPENSSL_strdup(PORT); char *bindhost = NULL, *bindport = NULL; char *passarg = NULL, *pass = NULL, *vfyCApath = NULL, *vfyCAfile = NULL; char *ReqCAfile = NULL; char *sess_in = NULL, *crl_file = NULL, *p; const char *protohost = NULL; struct timeval timeout, *timeoutp; fd_set readfds, writefds; int noCApath = 0, noCAfile = 0; int build_chain = 0, cbuf_len, cbuf_off, cert_format = FORMAT_PEM; int key_format = FORMAT_PEM, crlf = 0, full_log = 1, mbuf_len = 0; int prexit = 0; int sdebug = 0; int reconnect = 0, verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE, vpmtouched = 0; int ret = 1, in_init = 1, i, nbio_test = 0, s = -1, k, width, state = 0; int sbuf_len, sbuf_off, cmdletters = 1; int socket_family = AF_UNSPEC, socket_type = SOCK_STREAM, protocol = 0; int starttls_proto = PROTO_OFF, crl_format = FORMAT_PEM, crl_download = 0; int write_tty, read_tty, write_ssl, read_ssl, tty_on, ssl_pending; #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) int at_eof = 0; #endif int read_buf_len = 0; int fallback_scsv = 0; OPTION_CHOICE o; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS int enable_timeouts = 0; long socket_mtu = 0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE *ssl_client_engine = NULL; #endif ENGINE *e = NULL; #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) struct timeval tv; #endif const char *servername = NULL; + char *sname_alloc = NULL; int noservername = 0; const char *alpn_in = NULL; tlsextctx tlsextcbp = { NULL, 0 }; const char *ssl_config = NULL; #define MAX_SI_TYPES 100 unsigned short serverinfo_types[MAX_SI_TYPES]; int serverinfo_count = 0, start = 0, len; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP char *srppass = NULL; int srp_lateuser = 0; SRP_ARG srp_arg = { NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1024 }; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP char *srtp_profiles = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT char *ctlog_file = NULL; int ct_validation = 0; #endif int min_version = 0, max_version = 0, prot_opt = 0, no_prot_opt = 0; int async = 0; unsigned int max_send_fragment = 0; unsigned int split_send_fragment = 0, max_pipelines = 0; enum { use_inet, use_unix, use_unknown } connect_type = use_unknown; int count4or6 = 0; uint8_t maxfraglen = 0; int c_nbio = 0, c_msg = 0, c_ign_eof = 0, c_brief = 0; int c_tlsextdebug = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP int c_status_req = 0; #endif BIO *bio_c_msg = NULL; const char *keylog_file = NULL, *early_data_file = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS int isdtls = 0; #endif char *psksessf = NULL; int enable_pha = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP int sctp_label_bug = 0; #endif FD_ZERO(&readfds); FD_ZERO(&writefds); /* Known false-positive of MemorySanitizer. */ #if defined(__has_feature) # if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) __msan_unpoison(&readfds, sizeof(readfds)); __msan_unpoison(&writefds, sizeof(writefds)); # endif #endif prog = opt_progname(argv[0]); c_quiet = 0; c_debug = 0; c_showcerts = 0; c_nbio = 0; vpm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new(); if (vpm == NULL || cctx == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: out of memory\n", prog); goto end; } cbuf = app_malloc(BUFSIZZ, "cbuf"); sbuf = app_malloc(BUFSIZZ, "sbuf"); mbuf = app_malloc(BUFSIZZ, "mbuf"); SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE); prog = opt_init(argc, argv, s_client_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { /* Check for intermixing flags. */ if (connect_type == use_unix && IS_INET_FLAG(o)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Intermixed protocol flags (unix and internet domains)\n", prog); goto end; } if (connect_type == use_inet && IS_UNIX_FLAG(o)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Intermixed protocol flags (internet and unix domains)\n", prog); goto end; } if (IS_PROT_FLAG(o) && ++prot_opt > 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot supply multiple protocol flags\n"); goto end; } if (IS_NO_PROT_FLAG(o)) no_prot_opt++; if (prot_opt == 1 && no_prot_opt) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot supply both a protocol flag and '-no_'\n"); goto end; } switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(s_client_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_4: connect_type = use_inet; socket_family = AF_INET; count4or6++; break; #ifdef AF_INET6 case OPT_6: connect_type = use_inet; socket_family = AF_INET6; count4or6++; break; #endif case OPT_HOST: connect_type = use_inet; freeandcopy(&host, opt_arg()); break; case OPT_PORT: connect_type = use_inet; freeandcopy(&port, opt_arg()); break; case OPT_CONNECT: connect_type = use_inet; freeandcopy(&connectstr, opt_arg()); break; case OPT_BIND: freeandcopy(&bindstr, opt_arg()); break; case OPT_PROXY: proxystr = opt_arg(); starttls_proto = PROTO_CONNECT; break; #ifdef AF_UNIX case OPT_UNIX: connect_type = use_unix; socket_family = AF_UNIX; freeandcopy(&host, opt_arg()); break; #endif case OPT_XMPPHOST: /* fall through, since this is an alias */ case OPT_PROTOHOST: protohost = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_VERIFY: verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER; verify_args.depth = atoi(opt_arg()); if (!c_quiet) BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify depth is %d\n", verify_args.depth); break; case OPT_CERT: cert_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NAMEOPT: if (!set_nameopt(opt_arg())) goto end; break; case OPT_CRL: crl_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD: crl_download = 1; break; case OPT_SESS_OUT: sess_out = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SESS_IN: sess_in = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CERTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &cert_format)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_CRLFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &crl_format)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_VERIFY_RET_ERROR: verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER; verify_args.return_error = 1; break; case OPT_VERIFY_QUIET: verify_args.quiet = 1; break; case OPT_BRIEF: c_brief = verify_args.quiet = c_quiet = 1; break; case OPT_S_CASES: if (ssl_args == NULL) ssl_args = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (ssl_args == NULL || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(ssl_args, opt_flag()) || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(ssl_args, opt_arg())) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Memory allocation failure\n", prog); goto end; } break; case OPT_V_CASES: if (!opt_verify(o, vpm)) goto end; vpmtouched++; break; case OPT_X_CASES: if (!args_excert(o, &exc)) goto end; break; case OPT_PREXIT: prexit = 1; break; case OPT_CRLF: crlf = 1; break; case OPT_QUIET: c_quiet = c_ign_eof = 1; break; case OPT_NBIO: c_nbio = 1; break; case OPT_NOCMDS: cmdletters = 0; break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 1); break; case OPT_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ssl_client_engine = ENGINE_by_id(opt_arg()); if (ssl_client_engine == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting client auth engine\n"); goto opthelp; } #endif break; case OPT_R_CASES: if (!opt_rand(o)) goto end; break; case OPT_IGN_EOF: c_ign_eof = 1; break; case OPT_NO_IGN_EOF: c_ign_eof = 0; break; case OPT_DEBUG: c_debug = 1; break; case OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG: c_tlsextdebug = 1; break; case OPT_STATUS: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP c_status_req = 1; #endif break; case OPT_WDEBUG: #ifdef WATT32 dbug_init(); #endif break; case OPT_MSG: c_msg = 1; break; case OPT_MSGFILE: bio_c_msg = BIO_new_file(opt_arg(), "w"); break; case OPT_TRACE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE c_msg = 2; #endif break; case OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG: sdebug = 1; break; case OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG_VERBOSE: sdebug = 2; break; case OPT_SHOWCERTS: c_showcerts = 1; break; case OPT_NBIO_TEST: nbio_test = 1; break; case OPT_STATE: state = 1; break; case OPT_PSK_IDENTITY: psk_identity = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PSK: for (p = psk_key = opt_arg(); *p; p++) { if (isxdigit(_UC(*p))) continue; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not a hex number '%s'\n", psk_key); goto end; } break; case OPT_PSK_SESS: psksessf = opt_arg(); break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP case OPT_SRPUSER: srp_arg.srplogin = opt_arg(); if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_VERSION; break; case OPT_SRPPASS: srppass = opt_arg(); if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_VERSION; break; case OPT_SRP_STRENGTH: srp_arg.strength = atoi(opt_arg()); BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP minimal length for N is %d\n", srp_arg.strength); if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_VERSION; break; case OPT_SRP_LATEUSER: srp_lateuser = 1; if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_VERSION; break; case OPT_SRP_MOREGROUPS: srp_arg.amp = 1; if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_VERSION; break; #endif case OPT_SSL_CONFIG: ssl_config = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SSL3: min_version = SSL3_VERSION; max_version = SSL3_VERSION; socket_type = SOCK_STREAM; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS isdtls = 0; #endif break; case OPT_TLS1_3: min_version = TLS1_3_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_3_VERSION; socket_type = SOCK_STREAM; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS isdtls = 0; #endif break; case OPT_TLS1_2: min_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; socket_type = SOCK_STREAM; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS isdtls = 0; #endif break; case OPT_TLS1_1: min_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; socket_type = SOCK_STREAM; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS isdtls = 0; #endif break; case OPT_TLS1: min_version = TLS1_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_VERSION; socket_type = SOCK_STREAM; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS isdtls = 0; #endif break; case OPT_DTLS: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS meth = DTLS_client_method(); socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM; isdtls = 1; #endif break; case OPT_DTLS1: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 meth = DTLS_client_method(); min_version = DTLS1_VERSION; max_version = DTLS1_VERSION; socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM; isdtls = 1; #endif break; case OPT_DTLS1_2: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 meth = DTLS_client_method(); min_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; max_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM; isdtls = 1; #endif break; case OPT_SCTP: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP protocol = IPPROTO_SCTP; #endif break; case OPT_SCTP_LABEL_BUG: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP sctp_label_bug = 1; #endif break; case OPT_TIMEOUT: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS enable_timeouts = 1; #endif break; case OPT_MTU: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS socket_mtu = atol(opt_arg()); #endif break; case OPT_FALLBACKSCSV: fallback_scsv = 1; break; case OPT_KEYFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PDE, &key_format)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_PASS: passarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CERT_CHAIN: chain_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEY: key_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_RECONNECT: reconnect = 5; break; case OPT_CAPATH: CApath = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NOCAPATH: noCApath = 1; break; case OPT_CHAINCAPATH: chCApath = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_VERIFYCAPATH: vfyCApath = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_BUILD_CHAIN: build_chain = 1; break; case OPT_REQCAFILE: ReqCAfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CAFILE: CAfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NOCAFILE: noCAfile = 1; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT case OPT_NOCT: ct_validation = 0; break; case OPT_CT: ct_validation = 1; break; case OPT_CTLOG_FILE: ctlog_file = opt_arg(); break; #endif case OPT_CHAINCAFILE: chCAfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_VERIFYCAFILE: vfyCAfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_DANE_TLSA_DOMAIN: dane_tlsa_domain = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_DANE_TLSA_RRDATA: if (dane_tlsa_rrset == NULL) dane_tlsa_rrset = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (dane_tlsa_rrset == NULL || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(dane_tlsa_rrset, opt_arg())) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Memory allocation failure\n", prog); goto end; } break; case OPT_DANE_EE_NO_NAME: dane_ee_no_name = 1; break; case OPT_NEXTPROTONEG: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG next_proto_neg_in = opt_arg(); #endif break; case OPT_ALPN: alpn_in = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SERVERINFO: p = opt_arg(); len = strlen(p); for (start = 0, i = 0; i <= len; ++i) { if (i == len || p[i] == ',') { serverinfo_types[serverinfo_count] = atoi(p + start); if (++serverinfo_count == MAX_SI_TYPES) break; start = i + 1; } } break; case OPT_STARTTLS: if (!opt_pair(opt_arg(), services, &starttls_proto)) goto end; break; case OPT_SERVERNAME: servername = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NOSERVERNAME: noservername = 1; break; case OPT_USE_SRTP: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP srtp_profiles = opt_arg(); #endif break; case OPT_KEYMATEXPORT: keymatexportlabel = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEYMATEXPORTLEN: keymatexportlen = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_ASYNC: async = 1; break; case OPT_MAXFRAGLEN: len = atoi(opt_arg()); switch (len) { case 512: maxfraglen = TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_512; break; case 1024: maxfraglen = TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_1024; break; case 2048: maxfraglen = TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_2048; break; case 4096: maxfraglen = TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_4096; break; default: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Max Fragment Len %u is out of permitted values", prog, len); goto opthelp; } break; case OPT_MAX_SEND_FRAG: max_send_fragment = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_SPLIT_SEND_FRAG: split_send_fragment = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_MAX_PIPELINES: max_pipelines = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_READ_BUF: read_buf_len = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_KEYLOG_FILE: keylog_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_EARLY_DATA: early_data_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENABLE_PHA: enable_pha = 1; break; } } if (count4or6 >= 2) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't use both -4 and -6\n", prog); goto opthelp; } if (noservername) { if (servername != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't use -servername and -noservername together\n", prog); goto opthelp; } if (dane_tlsa_domain != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't use -dane_tlsa_domain and -noservername together\n", prog); goto opthelp; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc == 1) { /* If there's a positional argument, it's the equivalent of * OPT_CONNECT. * Don't allow -connect and a separate argument. */ if (connectstr != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: must not provide both -connect option and target parameter\n", prog); goto opthelp; } connect_type = use_inet; freeandcopy(&connectstr, *opt_rest()); } else if (argc != 0) { goto opthelp; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG if (min_version == TLS1_3_VERSION && next_proto_neg_in != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot supply -nextprotoneg with TLSv1.3\n"); goto opthelp; } #endif if (proxystr != NULL) { int res; char *tmp_host = host, *tmp_port = port; if (connectstr == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: -proxy requires use of -connect or target parameter\n", prog); goto opthelp; } res = BIO_parse_hostserv(proxystr, &host, &port, BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST); if (tmp_host != host) OPENSSL_free(tmp_host); if (tmp_port != port) OPENSSL_free(tmp_port); if (!res) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: -proxy argument malformed or ambiguous\n", prog); goto end; } + if (servername == NULL && !noservername) { + res = BIO_parse_hostserv(connectstr, &sname_alloc, NULL, BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST); + if (!res) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, + "%s: -connect argument malformed or ambiguous\n", prog); + goto end; + } + servername = sname_alloc; + } } else { int res = 1; char *tmp_host = host, *tmp_port = port; if (connectstr != NULL) res = BIO_parse_hostserv(connectstr, &host, &port, BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST); if (tmp_host != host) OPENSSL_free(tmp_host); if (tmp_port != port) OPENSSL_free(tmp_port); if (!res) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: -connect argument or target parameter malformed or ambiguous\n", prog); goto end; } } if (bindstr != NULL) { int res; res = BIO_parse_hostserv(bindstr, &bindhost, &bindport, BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST); if (!res) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: -bind argument parameter malformed or ambiguous\n", prog); goto end; } } #ifdef AF_UNIX if (socket_family == AF_UNIX && socket_type != SOCK_STREAM) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use unix sockets and datagrams together\n"); goto end; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP) { if (socket_type != SOCK_DGRAM) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use -sctp without DTLS\n"); goto end; } /* SCTP is unusual. It uses DTLS over a SOCK_STREAM protocol */ socket_type = SOCK_STREAM; } #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) next_proto.status = -1; if (next_proto_neg_in) { next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&next_proto.len, next_proto_neg_in); if (next_proto.data == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing -nextprotoneg argument\n"); goto end; } } else next_proto.data = NULL; #endif if (!app_passwd(passarg, NULL, &pass, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto end; } if (key_file == NULL) key_file = cert_file; if (key_file != NULL) { key = load_key(key_file, key_format, 0, pass, e, "client certificate private key file"); if (key == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (cert_file != NULL) { cert = load_cert(cert_file, cert_format, "client certificate file"); if (cert == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (chain_file != NULL) { if (!load_certs(chain_file, &chain, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, "client certificate chain")) goto end; } if (crl_file != NULL) { X509_CRL *crl; crl = load_crl(crl_file, crl_format); if (crl == NULL) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error loading CRL\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null(); if (crls == NULL || !sk_X509_CRL_push(crls, crl)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error adding CRL\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); X509_CRL_free(crl); goto end; } } if (!load_excert(&exc)) goto end; if (bio_c_out == NULL) { if (c_quiet && !c_debug) { bio_c_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_null()); if (c_msg && bio_c_msg == NULL) bio_c_msg = dup_bio_out(FORMAT_TEXT); } else if (bio_c_out == NULL) bio_c_out = dup_bio_out(FORMAT_TEXT); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (!app_passwd(srppass, NULL, &srp_arg.srppassin, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto end; } #endif ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth); if (ctx == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } SSL_CTX_clear_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY); if (sdebug) ssl_ctx_security_debug(ctx, sdebug); if (!config_ctx(cctx, ssl_args, ctx)) goto end; if (ssl_config != NULL) { if (SSL_CTX_config(ctx, ssl_config) == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error using configuration \"%s\"\n", ssl_config); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP && sctp_label_bug == 1) SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG); #endif if (min_version != 0 && SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, min_version) == 0) goto end; if (max_version != 0 && SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, max_version) == 0) goto end; if (vpmtouched && !SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx, vpm)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting verify params\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (async) { SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_ASYNC); } if (max_send_fragment > 0 && !SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(ctx, max_send_fragment)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Max send fragment size %u is out of permitted range\n", prog, max_send_fragment); goto end; } if (split_send_fragment > 0 && !SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment(ctx, split_send_fragment)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Split send fragment size %u is out of permitted range\n", prog, split_send_fragment); goto end; } if (max_pipelines > 0 && !SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines(ctx, max_pipelines)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Max pipelines %u is out of permitted range\n", prog, max_pipelines); goto end; } if (read_buf_len > 0) { SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(ctx, read_buf_len); } if (maxfraglen > 0 && !SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(ctx, maxfraglen)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Max Fragment Length code %u is out of permitted values" "\n", prog, maxfraglen); goto end; } if (!ssl_load_stores(ctx, vfyCApath, vfyCAfile, chCApath, chCAfile, crls, crl_download)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading store locations\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (ReqCAfile != NULL) { STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *nm = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); if (nm == NULL || !SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(nm, ReqCAfile)) { sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(nm, X509_NAME_free); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading CA names\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } SSL_CTX_set0_CA_list(ctx, nm); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (ssl_client_engine) { if (!SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ctx, ssl_client_engine)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error setting client auth engine\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); ENGINE_free(ssl_client_engine); goto end; } ENGINE_free(ssl_client_engine); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (psk_key != NULL) { if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "PSK key given, setting client callback\n"); SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(ctx, psk_client_cb); } #endif if (psksessf != NULL) { BIO *stmp = BIO_new_file(psksessf, "r"); if (stmp == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open PSK session file %s\n", psksessf); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } psksess = PEM_read_bio_SSL_SESSION(stmp, NULL, 0, NULL); BIO_free(stmp); if (psksess == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read PSK session file %s\n", psksessf); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (psk_key != NULL || psksess != NULL) SSL_CTX_set_psk_use_session_callback(ctx, psk_use_session_cb); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (srtp_profiles != NULL) { /* Returns 0 on success! */ if (SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(ctx, srtp_profiles) != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting SRTP profile\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } #endif if (exc != NULL) ssl_ctx_set_excert(ctx, exc); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) if (next_proto.data != NULL) SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto); #endif if (alpn_in) { size_t alpn_len; unsigned char *alpn = next_protos_parse(&alpn_len, alpn_in); if (alpn == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing -alpn argument\n"); goto end; } /* Returns 0 on success! */ if (SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(ctx, alpn, alpn_len) != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting ALPN\n"); goto end; } OPENSSL_free(alpn); } for (i = 0; i < serverinfo_count; i++) { if (!SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(ctx, serverinfo_types[i], NULL, NULL, NULL, serverinfo_cli_parse_cb, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Warning: Unable to add custom extension %u, skipping\n", serverinfo_types[i]); } } if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, apps_ssl_info_callback); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT /* Enable SCT processing, without early connection termination */ if (ct_validation && !SSL_CTX_enable_ct(ctx, SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (!ctx_set_ctlog_list_file(ctx, ctlog_file)) { if (ct_validation) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } /* * If CT validation is not enabled, the log list isn't needed so don't * show errors or abort. We try to load it regardless because then we * can show the names of the logs any SCTs came from (SCTs may be seen * even with validation disabled). */ ERR_clear_error(); } #endif SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify, verify_callback); if (!ctx_set_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath, noCAfile, noCApath)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } ssl_ctx_add_crls(ctx, crls, crl_download); if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, cert, key, chain, build_chain)) goto end; if (!noservername) { tlsextcbp.biodebug = bio_err; SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_servername_cb); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, &tlsextcbp); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (srp_arg.srplogin) { if (!srp_lateuser && !SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(ctx, srp_arg.srplogin)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to set SRP username\n"); goto end; } srp_arg.msg = c_msg; srp_arg.debug = c_debug; SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(ctx, &srp_arg); SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(ctx, ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb); SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(ctx, srp_arg.strength); if (c_msg || c_debug || srp_arg.amp == 0) SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(ctx, ssl_srp_verify_param_cb); } # endif if (dane_tlsa_domain != NULL) { if (SSL_CTX_dane_enable(ctx) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error enabling DANE TLSA authentication.\n", prog); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } /* * In TLSv1.3 NewSessionTicket messages arrive after the handshake and can * come at any time. Therefore we use a callback to write out the session * when we know about it. This approach works for < TLSv1.3 as well. */ SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE); SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(ctx, new_session_cb); if (set_keylog_file(ctx, keylog_file)) goto end; con = SSL_new(ctx); if (con == NULL) goto end; if (enable_pha) SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(con, 1); if (sess_in != NULL) { SSL_SESSION *sess; BIO *stmp = BIO_new_file(sess_in, "r"); if (stmp == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open session file %s\n", sess_in); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } sess = PEM_read_bio_SSL_SESSION(stmp, NULL, 0, NULL); BIO_free(stmp); if (sess == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open session file %s\n", sess_in); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (!SSL_set_session(con, sess)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't set session\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } SSL_SESSION_free(sess); } if (fallback_scsv) SSL_set_mode(con, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV); if (!noservername && (servername != NULL || dane_tlsa_domain == NULL)) { if (servername == NULL) { if(host == NULL || is_dNS_name(host)) servername = (host == NULL) ? "localhost" : host; } if (servername != NULL && !SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(con, servername)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to set TLS servername extension.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (dane_tlsa_domain != NULL) { if (SSL_dane_enable(con, dane_tlsa_domain) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error enabling DANE TLSA " "authentication.\n", prog); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (dane_tlsa_rrset == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: DANE TLSA authentication requires at " "least one -dane_tlsa_rrdata option.\n", prog); goto end; } if (tlsa_import_rrset(con, dane_tlsa_rrset) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Failed to import any TLSA " "records.\n", prog); goto end; } if (dane_ee_no_name) SSL_dane_set_flags(con, DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS); } else if (dane_tlsa_rrset != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: DANE TLSA authentication requires the " "-dane_tlsa_domain option.\n", prog); goto end; } re_start: if (init_client(&s, host, port, bindhost, bindport, socket_family, socket_type, protocol) == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "connect:errno=%d\n", get_last_socket_error()); BIO_closesocket(s); goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "CONNECTED(%08X)\n", s); if (c_nbio) { if (!BIO_socket_nbio(s, 1)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Turned on non blocking io\n"); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS if (isdtls) { union BIO_sock_info_u peer_info; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP) sbio = BIO_new_dgram_sctp(s, BIO_NOCLOSE); else #endif sbio = BIO_new_dgram(s, BIO_NOCLOSE); if ((peer_info.addr = BIO_ADDR_new()) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n"); BIO_closesocket(s); goto end; } if (!BIO_sock_info(s, BIO_SOCK_INFO_ADDRESS, &peer_info)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "getsockname:errno=%d\n", get_last_socket_error()); BIO_ADDR_free(peer_info.addr); BIO_closesocket(s); goto end; } (void)BIO_ctrl_set_connected(sbio, peer_info.addr); BIO_ADDR_free(peer_info.addr); peer_info.addr = NULL; if (enable_timeouts) { timeout.tv_sec = 0; timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_RCV_TIMEOUT; BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_RECV_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout); timeout.tv_sec = 0; timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_SND_TIMEOUT; BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout); } if (socket_mtu) { if (socket_mtu < DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "MTU too small. Must be at least %ld\n", DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con)); BIO_free(sbio); goto shut; } SSL_set_options(con, SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU); if (!DTLS_set_link_mtu(con, socket_mtu)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed to set MTU\n"); BIO_free(sbio); goto shut; } } else { /* want to do MTU discovery */ BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER, 0, NULL); } } else #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DTLS */ sbio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (nbio_test) { BIO *test; test = BIO_new(BIO_f_nbio_test()); sbio = BIO_push(test, sbio); } if (c_debug) { BIO_set_callback(sbio, bio_dump_callback); BIO_set_callback_arg(sbio, (char *)bio_c_out); } if (c_msg) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE if (c_msg == 2) SSL_set_msg_callback(con, SSL_trace); else #endif SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb); SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_c_msg ? bio_c_msg : bio_c_out); } if (c_tlsextdebug) { SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb); SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_c_out); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP if (c_status_req) { SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(con, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, ocsp_resp_cb); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, bio_c_out); } #endif SSL_set_bio(con, sbio, sbio); SSL_set_connect_state(con); /* ok, lets connect */ if (fileno_stdin() > SSL_get_fd(con)) width = fileno_stdin() + 1; else width = SSL_get_fd(con) + 1; read_tty = 1; write_tty = 0; tty_on = 0; read_ssl = 1; write_ssl = 1; cbuf_len = 0; cbuf_off = 0; sbuf_len = 0; sbuf_off = 0; switch ((PROTOCOL_CHOICE) starttls_proto) { case PROTO_OFF: break; case PROTO_LMTP: case PROTO_SMTP: { /* * This is an ugly hack that does a lot of assumptions. We do * have to handle multi-line responses which may come in a single * packet or not. We therefore have to use BIO_gets() which does * need a buffering BIO. So during the initial chitchat we do * push a buffering BIO into the chain that is removed again * later on to not disturb the rest of the s_client operation. */ int foundit = 0; BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); BIO_push(fbio, sbio); /* Wait for multi-line response to end from LMTP or SMTP */ do { mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); } while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[3] == '-'); if (protohost == NULL) protohost = "mail.example.com"; if (starttls_proto == (int)PROTO_LMTP) BIO_printf(fbio, "LHLO %s\r\n", protohost); else BIO_printf(fbio, "EHLO %s\r\n", protohost); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); /* * Wait for multi-line response to end LHLO LMTP or EHLO SMTP * response. */ do { mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (strstr(mbuf, "STARTTLS")) foundit = 1; } while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[3] == '-'); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); BIO_pop(fbio); BIO_free(fbio); if (!foundit) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Didn't find STARTTLS in server response," " trying anyway...\n"); BIO_printf(sbio, "STARTTLS\r\n"); BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ); } break; case PROTO_POP3: { BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); BIO_printf(sbio, "STLS\r\n"); mbuf_len = BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (mbuf_len < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "BIO_read failed\n"); goto end; } } break; case PROTO_IMAP: { int foundit = 0; BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); BIO_push(fbio, sbio); BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); /* STARTTLS command requires CAPABILITY... */ BIO_printf(fbio, ". CAPABILITY\r\n"); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); /* wait for multi-line CAPABILITY response */ do { mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (strstr(mbuf, "STARTTLS")) foundit = 1; } while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[0] != '.'); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); BIO_pop(fbio); BIO_free(fbio); if (!foundit) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Didn't find STARTTLS in server response," " trying anyway...\n"); BIO_printf(sbio, ". STARTTLS\r\n"); BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ); } break; case PROTO_FTP: { BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); BIO_push(fbio, sbio); /* wait for multi-line response to end from FTP */ do { mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); } while (mbuf_len > 3 && (!isdigit(mbuf[0]) || !isdigit(mbuf[1]) || !isdigit(mbuf[2]) || mbuf[3] != ' ')); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); BIO_pop(fbio); BIO_free(fbio); BIO_printf(sbio, "AUTH TLS\r\n"); BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ); } break; case PROTO_XMPP: case PROTO_XMPP_SERVER: { int seen = 0; BIO_printf(sbio, "", starttls_proto == PROTO_XMPP ? "client" : "server", protohost ? protohost : host); seen = BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (seen < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "BIO_read failed\n"); goto end; } mbuf[seen] = '\0'; while (!strstr (mbuf, ""); seen = BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (seen < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "BIO_read failed\n"); goto shut; } sbuf[seen] = '\0'; if (!strstr(sbuf, " 2); } (void)BIO_flush(fbio); BIO_pop(fbio); BIO_free(fbio); if (foundit != success) { goto shut; } } break; case PROTO_IRC: { int numeric; BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); BIO_push(fbio, sbio); BIO_printf(fbio, "STARTTLS\r\n"); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); width = SSL_get_fd(con) + 1; do { numeric = 0; FD_ZERO(&readfds); openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds); timeout.tv_sec = S_CLIENT_IRC_READ_TIMEOUT; timeout.tv_usec = 0; /* * If the IRCd doesn't respond within * S_CLIENT_IRC_READ_TIMEOUT seconds, assume * it doesn't support STARTTLS. Many IRCds * will not give _any_ sort of response to a * STARTTLS command when it's not supported. */ if (!BIO_get_buffer_num_lines(fbio) && !BIO_pending(fbio) && !BIO_pending(sbio) && select(width, (void *)&readfds, NULL, NULL, &timeout) < 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Timeout waiting for response (%d seconds).\n", S_CLIENT_IRC_READ_TIMEOUT); break; } mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (mbuf_len < 1 || sscanf(mbuf, "%*s %d", &numeric) != 1) break; /* :example.net 451 STARTTLS :You have not registered */ /* :example.net 421 STARTTLS :Unknown command */ if ((numeric == 451 || numeric == 421) && strstr(mbuf, "STARTTLS") != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "STARTTLS not supported: %s", mbuf); break; } if (numeric == 691) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "STARTTLS negotiation failed: "); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); break; } } while (numeric != 670); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); BIO_pop(fbio); BIO_free(fbio); if (numeric != 670) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Server does not support STARTTLS.\n"); ret = 1; goto shut; } } break; case PROTO_MYSQL: { /* SSL request packet */ static const unsigned char ssl_req[] = { /* payload_length, sequence_id */ 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* payload */ /* capability flags, CLIENT_SSL always set */ 0x85, 0xae, 0x7f, 0x00, /* max-packet size */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* character set */ 0x21, /* string[23] reserved (all [0]) */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; int bytes = 0; int ssl_flg = 0x800; int pos; const unsigned char *packet = (const unsigned char *)sbuf; /* Receiving Initial Handshake packet. */ bytes = BIO_read(sbio, (void *)packet, BUFSIZZ); if (bytes < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "BIO_read failed\n"); goto shut; /* Packet length[3], Packet number[1] + minimum payload[17] */ } else if (bytes < 21) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "MySQL packet too short.\n"); goto shut; } else if (bytes != (4 + packet[0] + (packet[1] << 8) + (packet[2] << 16))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "MySQL packet length does not match.\n"); goto shut; /* protocol version[1] */ } else if (packet[4] != 0xA) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Only MySQL protocol version 10 is supported.\n"); goto shut; } pos = 5; /* server version[string+NULL] */ for (;;) { if (pos >= bytes) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot confirm server version. "); goto shut; } else if (packet[pos++] == '\0') { break; } } /* make sure we have at least 15 bytes left in the packet */ if (pos + 15 > bytes) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "MySQL server handshake packet is broken.\n"); goto shut; } pos += 12; /* skip over conn id[4] + SALT[8] */ if (packet[pos++] != '\0') { /* verify filler */ BIO_printf(bio_err, "MySQL packet is broken.\n"); goto shut; } /* capability flags[2] */ if (!((packet[pos] + (packet[pos + 1] << 8)) & ssl_flg)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "MySQL server does not support SSL.\n"); goto shut; } /* Sending SSL Handshake packet. */ BIO_write(sbio, ssl_req, sizeof(ssl_req)); (void)BIO_flush(sbio); } break; case PROTO_POSTGRES: { static const unsigned char ssl_request[] = { /* Length SSLRequest */ 0, 0, 0, 8, 4, 210, 22, 47 }; int bytes; /* Send SSLRequest packet */ BIO_write(sbio, ssl_request, 8); (void)BIO_flush(sbio); /* Reply will be a single S if SSL is enabled */ bytes = BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (bytes != 1 || sbuf[0] != 'S') goto shut; } break; case PROTO_NNTP: { int foundit = 0; BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); BIO_push(fbio, sbio); BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); /* STARTTLS command requires CAPABILITIES... */ BIO_printf(fbio, "CAPABILITIES\r\n"); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); /* wait for multi-line CAPABILITIES response */ do { mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (strstr(mbuf, "STARTTLS")) foundit = 1; } while (mbuf_len > 1 && mbuf[0] != '.'); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); BIO_pop(fbio); BIO_free(fbio); if (!foundit) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Didn't find STARTTLS in server response," " trying anyway...\n"); BIO_printf(sbio, "STARTTLS\r\n"); mbuf_len = BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (mbuf_len < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "BIO_read failed\n"); goto end; } mbuf[mbuf_len] = '\0'; if (strstr(mbuf, "382") == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "STARTTLS failed: %s", mbuf); goto shut; } } break; case PROTO_SIEVE: { int foundit = 0; BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); BIO_push(fbio, sbio); /* wait for multi-line response to end from Sieve */ do { mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); /* * According to RFC 5804 § 1.7, capability * is case-insensitive, make it uppercase */ if (mbuf_len > 1 && mbuf[0] == '"') { make_uppercase(mbuf); if (strncmp(mbuf, "\"STARTTLS\"", 10) == 0) foundit = 1; } } while (mbuf_len > 1 && mbuf[0] == '"'); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); BIO_pop(fbio); BIO_free(fbio); if (!foundit) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Didn't find STARTTLS in server response," " trying anyway...\n"); BIO_printf(sbio, "STARTTLS\r\n"); mbuf_len = BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (mbuf_len < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "BIO_read failed\n"); goto end; } mbuf[mbuf_len] = '\0'; if (mbuf_len < 2) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "STARTTLS failed: %s", mbuf); goto shut; } /* * According to RFC 5804 § 2.2, response codes are case- * insensitive, make it uppercase but preserve the response. */ strncpy(sbuf, mbuf, 2); make_uppercase(sbuf); if (strncmp(sbuf, "OK", 2) != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "STARTTLS not supported: %s", mbuf); goto shut; } } break; case PROTO_LDAP: { /* StartTLS Operation according to RFC 4511 */ static char ldap_tls_genconf[] = "asn1=SEQUENCE:LDAPMessage\n" "[LDAPMessage]\n" "messageID=INTEGER:1\n" "extendedReq=EXPLICIT:23A,IMPLICIT:0C," "FORMAT:ASCII,OCT:1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.20037\n"; long errline = -1; char *genstr = NULL; int result = -1; ASN1_TYPE *atyp = NULL; BIO *ldapbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); CONF *cnf = NCONF_new(NULL); if (cnf == NULL) { BIO_free(ldapbio); goto end; } BIO_puts(ldapbio, ldap_tls_genconf); if (NCONF_load_bio(cnf, ldapbio, &errline) <= 0) { BIO_free(ldapbio); NCONF_free(cnf); if (errline <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "NCONF_load_bio failed\n"); goto end; } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error on line %ld\n", errline); goto end; } } BIO_free(ldapbio); genstr = NCONF_get_string(cnf, "default", "asn1"); if (genstr == NULL) { NCONF_free(cnf); BIO_printf(bio_err, "NCONF_get_string failed\n"); goto end; } atyp = ASN1_generate_nconf(genstr, cnf); if (atyp == NULL) { NCONF_free(cnf); BIO_printf(bio_err, "ASN1_generate_nconf failed\n"); goto end; } NCONF_free(cnf); /* Send SSLRequest packet */ BIO_write(sbio, atyp->value.sequence->data, atyp->value.sequence->length); (void)BIO_flush(sbio); ASN1_TYPE_free(atyp); mbuf_len = BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (mbuf_len < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "BIO_read failed\n"); goto end; } result = ldap_ExtendedResponse_parse(mbuf, mbuf_len); if (result < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ldap_ExtendedResponse_parse failed\n"); goto shut; } else if (result > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "STARTTLS failed, LDAP Result Code: %i\n", result); goto shut; } mbuf_len = 0; } break; } if (early_data_file != NULL && ((SSL_get0_session(con) != NULL && SSL_SESSION_get_max_early_data(SSL_get0_session(con)) > 0) || (psksess != NULL && SSL_SESSION_get_max_early_data(psksess) > 0))) { BIO *edfile = BIO_new_file(early_data_file, "r"); size_t readbytes, writtenbytes; int finish = 0; if (edfile == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot open early data file\n"); goto shut; } while (!finish) { if (!BIO_read_ex(edfile, cbuf, BUFSIZZ, &readbytes)) finish = 1; while (!SSL_write_early_data(con, cbuf, readbytes, &writtenbytes)) { switch (SSL_get_error(con, 0)) { case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: /* Just keep trying - busy waiting */ continue; default: BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error writing early data\n"); BIO_free(edfile); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto shut; } } } BIO_free(edfile); } for (;;) { FD_ZERO(&readfds); FD_ZERO(&writefds); if (SSL_is_dtls(con) && DTLSv1_get_timeout(con, &timeout)) timeoutp = &timeout; else timeoutp = NULL; if (!SSL_is_init_finished(con) && SSL_total_renegotiations(con) == 0 && SSL_get_key_update_type(con) == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { in_init = 1; tty_on = 0; } else { tty_on = 1; if (in_init) { in_init = 0; if (c_brief) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "CONNECTION ESTABLISHED\n"); print_ssl_summary(con); } print_stuff(bio_c_out, con, full_log); if (full_log > 0) full_log--; if (starttls_proto) { BIO_write(bio_err, mbuf, mbuf_len); /* We don't need to know any more */ if (!reconnect) starttls_proto = PROTO_OFF; } if (reconnect) { reconnect--; BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "drop connection and then reconnect\n"); do_ssl_shutdown(con); SSL_set_connect_state(con); BIO_closesocket(SSL_get_fd(con)); goto re_start; } } } ssl_pending = read_ssl && SSL_has_pending(con); if (!ssl_pending) { #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) if (tty_on) { /* * Note that select() returns when read _would not block_, * and EOF satisfies that. To avoid a CPU-hogging loop, * set the flag so we exit. */ if (read_tty && !at_eof) openssl_fdset(fileno_stdin(), &readfds); #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) if (write_tty) openssl_fdset(fileno_stdout(), &writefds); #endif } if (read_ssl) openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds); if (write_ssl) openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds); #else if (!tty_on || !write_tty) { if (read_ssl) openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds); if (write_ssl) openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds); } #endif /* * Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR the second parameter is * currently of type (int *) whereas under other systems it is * (void *) if you don't have a cast it will choke the compiler: * if you do have a cast then you can either go for (int *) or * (void *). */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) /* * Under Windows/DOS we make the assumption that we can always * write to the tty: therefore if we need to write to the tty we * just fall through. Otherwise we timeout the select every * second and see if there are any keypresses. Note: this is a * hack, in a proper Windows application we wouldn't do this. */ i = 0; if (!write_tty) { if (read_tty) { tv.tv_sec = 1; tv.tv_usec = 0; i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds, NULL, &tv); if (!i && (!has_stdin_waiting() || !read_tty)) continue; } else i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds, NULL, timeoutp); } #else i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds, NULL, timeoutp); #endif if (i < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad select %d\n", get_last_socket_error()); goto shut; } } if (SSL_is_dtls(con) && DTLSv1_handle_timeout(con) > 0) BIO_printf(bio_err, "TIMEOUT occurred\n"); if (!ssl_pending && FD_ISSET(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds)) { k = SSL_write(con, &(cbuf[cbuf_off]), (unsigned int)cbuf_len); switch (SSL_get_error(con, k)) { case SSL_ERROR_NONE: cbuf_off += k; cbuf_len -= k; if (k <= 0) goto end; /* we have done a write(con,NULL,0); */ if (cbuf_len <= 0) { read_tty = 1; write_ssl = 0; } else { /* if (cbuf_len > 0) */ read_tty = 0; write_ssl = 1; } break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write W BLOCK\n"); write_ssl = 1; read_tty = 0; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write A BLOCK\n"); wait_for_async(con); write_ssl = 1; read_tty = 0; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write R BLOCK\n"); write_tty = 0; read_ssl = 1; write_ssl = 0; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write X BLOCK\n"); break; case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: if (cbuf_len != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "shutdown\n"); ret = 0; goto shut; } else { read_tty = 1; write_ssl = 0; break; } case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: if ((k != 0) || (cbuf_len != 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "write:errno=%d\n", get_last_socket_error()); goto shut; } else { read_tty = 1; write_ssl = 0; } break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB: /* This shouldn't ever happen in s_client - treat as an error */ case SSL_ERROR_SSL: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto shut; } } #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) /* Assume Windows/DOS/BeOS can always write */ else if (!ssl_pending && write_tty) #else else if (!ssl_pending && FD_ISSET(fileno_stdout(), &writefds)) #endif { #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ascii2ebcdic(&(sbuf[sbuf_off]), &(sbuf[sbuf_off]), sbuf_len); #endif i = raw_write_stdout(&(sbuf[sbuf_off]), sbuf_len); if (i <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "DONE\n"); ret = 0; goto shut; } sbuf_len -= i; sbuf_off += i; if (sbuf_len <= 0) { read_ssl = 1; write_tty = 0; } } else if (ssl_pending || FD_ISSET(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds)) { #ifdef RENEG { static int iiii; if (++iiii == 52) { SSL_renegotiate(con); iiii = 0; } } #endif k = SSL_read(con, sbuf, 1024 /* BUFSIZZ */ ); switch (SSL_get_error(con, k)) { case SSL_ERROR_NONE: if (k <= 0) goto end; sbuf_off = 0; sbuf_len = k; read_ssl = 0; write_tty = 1; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read A BLOCK\n"); wait_for_async(con); write_tty = 0; read_ssl = 1; if ((read_tty == 0) && (write_ssl == 0)) write_ssl = 1; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read W BLOCK\n"); write_ssl = 1; read_tty = 0; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read R BLOCK\n"); write_tty = 0; read_ssl = 1; if ((read_tty == 0) && (write_ssl == 0)) write_ssl = 1; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read X BLOCK\n"); break; case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: ret = get_last_socket_error(); if (c_brief) BIO_puts(bio_err, "CONNECTION CLOSED BY SERVER\n"); else BIO_printf(bio_err, "read:errno=%d\n", ret); goto shut; case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "closed\n"); ret = 0; goto shut; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB: /* This shouldn't ever happen in s_client. Treat as an error */ case SSL_ERROR_SSL: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto shut; } } /* OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS includes OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) else if (has_stdin_waiting()) #else else if (FD_ISSET(fileno_stdin(), &readfds)) #endif { if (crlf) { int j, lf_num; i = raw_read_stdin(cbuf, BUFSIZZ / 2); lf_num = 0; /* both loops are skipped when i <= 0 */ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) if (cbuf[j] == '\n') lf_num++; for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { cbuf[j + lf_num] = cbuf[j]; if (cbuf[j] == '\n') { lf_num--; i++; cbuf[j + lf_num] = '\r'; } } assert(lf_num == 0); } else i = raw_read_stdin(cbuf, BUFSIZZ); #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) if (i == 0) at_eof = 1; #endif if ((!c_ign_eof) && ((i <= 0) || (cbuf[0] == 'Q' && cmdletters))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "DONE\n"); ret = 0; goto shut; } if ((!c_ign_eof) && (cbuf[0] == 'R' && cmdletters)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "RENEGOTIATING\n"); SSL_renegotiate(con); cbuf_len = 0; } else if (!c_ign_eof && (cbuf[0] == 'K' || cbuf[0] == 'k' ) && cmdletters) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "KEYUPDATE\n"); SSL_key_update(con, cbuf[0] == 'K' ? SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED : SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED); cbuf_len = 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS else if ((!c_ign_eof) && (cbuf[0] == 'B' && cmdletters)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "HEARTBEATING\n"); SSL_heartbeat(con); cbuf_len = 0; } #endif else { cbuf_len = i; cbuf_off = 0; #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ebcdic2ascii(cbuf, cbuf, i); #endif } write_ssl = 1; read_tty = 0; } } ret = 0; shut: if (in_init) print_stuff(bio_c_out, con, full_log); do_ssl_shutdown(con); /* * If we ended with an alert being sent, but still with data in the * network buffer to be read, then calling BIO_closesocket() will * result in a TCP-RST being sent. On some platforms (notably * Windows) then this will result in the peer immediately abandoning * the connection including any buffered alert data before it has * had a chance to be read. Shutting down the sending side first, * and then closing the socket sends TCP-FIN first followed by * TCP-RST. This seems to allow the peer to read the alert data. */ shutdown(SSL_get_fd(con), 1); /* SHUT_WR */ /* * We just said we have nothing else to say, but it doesn't mean that * the other side has nothing. It's even recommended to consume incoming * data. [In testing context this ensures that alerts are passed on...] */ timeout.tv_sec = 0; timeout.tv_usec = 500000; /* some extreme round-trip */ do { FD_ZERO(&readfds); openssl_fdset(s, &readfds); } while (select(s + 1, &readfds, NULL, NULL, &timeout) > 0 && BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ) > 0); BIO_closesocket(SSL_get_fd(con)); end: if (con != NULL) { if (prexit != 0) print_stuff(bio_c_out, con, 1); SSL_free(con); } SSL_SESSION_free(psksess); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) OPENSSL_free(next_proto.data); #endif SSL_CTX_free(ctx); set_keylog_file(NULL, NULL); X509_free(cert); sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free); EVP_PKEY_free(key); sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); OPENSSL_free(pass); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP OPENSSL_free(srp_arg.srppassin); #endif + OPENSSL_free(sname_alloc); OPENSSL_free(connectstr); OPENSSL_free(bindstr); OPENSSL_free(bindhost); OPENSSL_free(bindport); OPENSSL_free(host); OPENSSL_free(port); X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm); ssl_excert_free(exc); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(ssl_args); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(dane_tlsa_rrset); SSL_CONF_CTX_free(cctx); OPENSSL_clear_free(cbuf, BUFSIZZ); OPENSSL_clear_free(sbuf, BUFSIZZ); OPENSSL_clear_free(mbuf, BUFSIZZ); release_engine(e); BIO_free(bio_c_out); bio_c_out = NULL; BIO_free(bio_c_msg); bio_c_msg = NULL; return ret; } static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full) { X509 *peer = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *sk; const SSL_CIPHER *c; int i, istls13 = (SSL_version(s) == TLS1_3_VERSION); long verify_result; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP const COMP_METHOD *comp, *expansion; #endif unsigned char *exportedkeymat; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT const SSL_CTX *ctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s); #endif if (full) { int got_a_chain = 0; sk = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(s); if (sk != NULL) { got_a_chain = 1; BIO_printf(bio, "---\nCertificate chain\n"); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { BIO_printf(bio, "%2d s:", i); X509_NAME_print_ex(bio, X509_get_subject_name(sk_X509_value(sk, i)), 0, get_nameopt()); BIO_puts(bio, "\n"); BIO_printf(bio, " i:"); X509_NAME_print_ex(bio, X509_get_issuer_name(sk_X509_value(sk, i)), 0, get_nameopt()); BIO_puts(bio, "\n"); if (c_showcerts) PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, sk_X509_value(sk, i)); } } BIO_printf(bio, "---\n"); peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(s); if (peer != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio, "Server certificate\n"); /* Redundant if we showed the whole chain */ if (!(c_showcerts && got_a_chain)) PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, peer); dump_cert_text(bio, peer); } else { BIO_printf(bio, "no peer certificate available\n"); } print_ca_names(bio, s); ssl_print_sigalgs(bio, s); ssl_print_tmp_key(bio, s); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT /* * When the SSL session is anonymous, or resumed via an abbreviated * handshake, no SCTs are provided as part of the handshake. While in * a resumed session SCTs may be present in the session's certificate, * no callbacks are invoked to revalidate these, and in any case that * set of SCTs may be incomplete. Thus it makes little sense to * attempt to display SCTs from a resumed session's certificate, and of * course none are associated with an anonymous peer. */ if (peer != NULL && !SSL_session_reused(s) && SSL_ct_is_enabled(s)) { const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = SSL_get0_peer_scts(s); int sct_count = scts != NULL ? sk_SCT_num(scts) : 0; BIO_printf(bio, "---\nSCTs present (%i)\n", sct_count); if (sct_count > 0) { const CTLOG_STORE *log_store = SSL_CTX_get0_ctlog_store(ctx); BIO_printf(bio, "---\n"); for (i = 0; i < sct_count; ++i) { SCT *sct = sk_SCT_value(scts, i); BIO_printf(bio, "SCT validation status: %s\n", SCT_validation_status_string(sct)); SCT_print(sct, bio, 0, log_store); if (i < sct_count - 1) BIO_printf(bio, "\n---\n"); } BIO_printf(bio, "\n"); } } #endif BIO_printf(bio, "---\nSSL handshake has read %ju bytes " "and written %ju bytes\n", BIO_number_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)), BIO_number_written(SSL_get_wbio(s))); } print_verify_detail(s, bio); BIO_printf(bio, (SSL_session_reused(s) ? "---\nReused, " : "---\nNew, ")); c = SSL_get_current_cipher(s); BIO_printf(bio, "%s, Cipher is %s\n", SSL_CIPHER_get_version(c), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); if (peer != NULL) { EVP_PKEY *pktmp; pktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); BIO_printf(bio, "Server public key is %d bit\n", EVP_PKEY_bits(pktmp)); } BIO_printf(bio, "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n", SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(s) ? "" : " NOT"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP comp = SSL_get_current_compression(s); expansion = SSL_get_current_expansion(s); BIO_printf(bio, "Compression: %s\n", comp ? SSL_COMP_get_name(comp) : "NONE"); BIO_printf(bio, "Expansion: %s\n", expansion ? SSL_COMP_get_name(expansion) : "NONE"); #endif #ifdef SSL_DEBUG { /* Print out local port of connection: useful for debugging */ int sock; union BIO_sock_info_u info; sock = SSL_get_fd(s); if ((info.addr = BIO_ADDR_new()) != NULL && BIO_sock_info(sock, BIO_SOCK_INFO_ADDRESS, &info)) { BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "LOCAL PORT is %u\n", ntohs(BIO_ADDR_rawport(info.addr))); } BIO_ADDR_free(info.addr); } #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) if (next_proto.status != -1) { const unsigned char *proto; unsigned int proto_len; SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(s, &proto, &proto_len); BIO_printf(bio, "Next protocol: (%d) ", next_proto.status); BIO_write(bio, proto, proto_len); BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1); } #endif { const unsigned char *proto; unsigned int proto_len; SSL_get0_alpn_selected(s, &proto, &proto_len); if (proto_len > 0) { BIO_printf(bio, "ALPN protocol: "); BIO_write(bio, proto, proto_len); BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1); } else BIO_printf(bio, "No ALPN negotiated\n"); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP { SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile = SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(s); if (srtp_profile) BIO_printf(bio, "SRTP Extension negotiated, profile=%s\n", srtp_profile->name); } #endif if (istls13) { switch (SSL_get_early_data_status(s)) { case SSL_EARLY_DATA_NOT_SENT: BIO_printf(bio, "Early data was not sent\n"); break; case SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED: BIO_printf(bio, "Early data was rejected\n"); break; case SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: BIO_printf(bio, "Early data was accepted\n"); break; } /* * We also print the verify results when we dump session information, * but in TLSv1.3 we may not get that right away (or at all) depending * on when we get a NewSessionTicket. Therefore we print it now as well. */ verify_result = SSL_get_verify_result(s); BIO_printf(bio, "Verify return code: %ld (%s)\n", verify_result, X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_result)); } else { /* In TLSv1.3 we do this on arrival of a NewSessionTicket */ SSL_SESSION_print(bio, SSL_get_session(s)); } if (SSL_get_session(s) != NULL && keymatexportlabel != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio, "Keying material exporter:\n"); BIO_printf(bio, " Label: '%s'\n", keymatexportlabel); BIO_printf(bio, " Length: %i bytes\n", keymatexportlen); exportedkeymat = app_malloc(keymatexportlen, "export key"); if (!SSL_export_keying_material(s, exportedkeymat, keymatexportlen, keymatexportlabel, strlen(keymatexportlabel), NULL, 0, 0)) { BIO_printf(bio, " Error\n"); } else { BIO_printf(bio, " Keying material: "); for (i = 0; i < keymatexportlen; i++) BIO_printf(bio, "%02X", exportedkeymat[i]); BIO_printf(bio, "\n"); } OPENSSL_free(exportedkeymat); } BIO_printf(bio, "---\n"); X509_free(peer); /* flush, or debugging output gets mixed with http response */ (void)BIO_flush(bio); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP static int ocsp_resp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) { const unsigned char *p; int len; OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp; len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &p); BIO_puts(arg, "OCSP response: "); if (p == NULL) { BIO_puts(arg, "no response sent\n"); return 1; } rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len); if (rsp == NULL) { BIO_puts(arg, "response parse error\n"); BIO_dump_indent(arg, (char *)p, len, 4); return 0; } BIO_puts(arg, "\n======================================\n"); OCSP_RESPONSE_print(arg, rsp, 0); BIO_puts(arg, "======================================\n"); OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp); return 1; } # endif static int ldap_ExtendedResponse_parse(const char *buf, long rem) { const unsigned char *cur, *end; long len; int tag, xclass, inf, ret = -1; cur = (const unsigned char *)buf; end = cur + rem; /* * From RFC 4511: * * LDAPMessage ::= SEQUENCE { * messageID MessageID, * protocolOp CHOICE { * ... * extendedResp ExtendedResponse, * ... }, * controls [0] Controls OPTIONAL } * * ExtendedResponse ::= [APPLICATION 24] SEQUENCE { * COMPONENTS OF LDAPResult, * responseName [10] LDAPOID OPTIONAL, * responseValue [11] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL } * * LDAPResult ::= SEQUENCE { * resultCode ENUMERATED { * success (0), * ... * other (80), * ... }, * matchedDN LDAPDN, * diagnosticMessage LDAPString, * referral [3] Referral OPTIONAL } */ /* pull SEQUENCE */ inf = ASN1_get_object(&cur, &len, &tag, &xclass, rem); if (inf != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || tag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || (rem = end - cur, len > rem)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unexpected LDAP response\n"); goto end; } rem = len; /* ensure that we don't overstep the SEQUENCE */ /* pull MessageID */ inf = ASN1_get_object(&cur, &len, &tag, &xclass, rem); if (inf != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL || tag != V_ASN1_INTEGER || (rem = end - cur, len > rem)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "No MessageID\n"); goto end; } cur += len; /* shall we check for MessageId match or just skip? */ /* pull [APPLICATION 24] */ rem = end - cur; inf = ASN1_get_object(&cur, &len, &tag, &xclass, rem); if (inf != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || xclass != V_ASN1_APPLICATION || tag != 24) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not ExtendedResponse\n"); goto end; } /* pull resultCode */ rem = end - cur; inf = ASN1_get_object(&cur, &len, &tag, &xclass, rem); if (inf != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL || tag != V_ASN1_ENUMERATED || len == 0 || (rem = end - cur, len > rem)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not LDAPResult\n"); goto end; } /* len should always be one, but just in case... */ for (ret = 0, inf = 0; inf < len; inf++) { ret <<= 8; ret |= cur[inf]; } /* There is more data, but we don't care... */ end: return ret; } /* * Host dNS Name verifier: used for checking that the hostname is in dNS format * before setting it as SNI */ static int is_dNS_name(const char *host) { const size_t MAX_LABEL_LENGTH = 63; size_t i; int isdnsname = 0; size_t length = strlen(host); size_t label_length = 0; int all_numeric = 1; /* * Deviation from strict DNS name syntax, also check names with '_' * Check DNS name syntax, any '-' or '.' must be internal, * and on either side of each '.' we can't have a '-' or '.'. * * If the name has just one label, we don't consider it a DNS name. */ for (i = 0; i < length && label_length < MAX_LABEL_LENGTH; ++i) { char c = host[i]; if ((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || c == '_') { label_length += 1; all_numeric = 0; continue; } if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') { label_length += 1; continue; } /* Dot and hyphen cannot be first or last. */ if (i > 0 && i < length - 1) { if (c == '-') { label_length += 1; continue; } /* * Next to a dot the preceding and following characters must not be * another dot or a hyphen. Otherwise, record that the name is * plausible, since it has two or more labels. */ if (c == '.' && host[i + 1] != '.' && host[i - 1] != '-' && host[i + 1] != '-') { label_length = 0; isdnsname = 1; continue; } } isdnsname = 0; break; } /* dNS name must not be all numeric and labels must be shorter than 64 characters. */ isdnsname &= !all_numeric && !(label_length == MAX_LABEL_LENGTH); return isdnsname; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SOCK */ diff --git a/apps/s_socket.c b/apps/s_socket.c index aee366d5f457..96f16d2931cd 100644 --- a/apps/s_socket.c +++ b/apps/s_socket.c @@ -1,405 +1,405 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* socket-related functions used by s_client and s_server */ #include #include #include #include #include #include /* * With IPv6, it looks like Digital has mixed up the proper order of * recursive header file inclusion, resulting in the compiler complaining * that u_int isn't defined, but only if _POSIX_C_SOURCE is defined, which is * needed to have fileno() declared correctly... So let's define u_int */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC) && !defined(__U_INT) # define __U_INT typedef unsigned int u_int; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK # include "apps.h" # include "s_apps.h" # include "internal/sockets.h" # include # include /* Keep track of our peer's address for the cookie callback */ BIO_ADDR *ourpeer = NULL; /* * init_client - helper routine to set up socket communication * @sock: pointer to storage of resulting socket. * @host: the host name or path (for AF_UNIX) to connect to. * @port: the port to connect to (ignored for AF_UNIX). * @bindhost: source host or path (for AF_UNIX). * @bindport: source port (ignored for AF_UNIX). * @family: desired socket family, may be AF_INET, AF_INET6, AF_UNIX or * AF_UNSPEC * @type: socket type, must be SOCK_STREAM or SOCK_DGRAM * @protocol: socket protocol, e.g. IPPROTO_TCP or IPPROTO_UDP (or 0 for any) * * This will create a socket and use it to connect to a host:port, or if * family == AF_UNIX, to the path found in host. * * If the host has more than one address, it will try them one by one until * a successful connection is established. The resulting socket will be * found in *sock on success, it will be given INVALID_SOCKET otherwise. * * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. */ int init_client(int *sock, const char *host, const char *port, const char *bindhost, const char *bindport, int family, int type, int protocol) { BIO_ADDRINFO *res = NULL; BIO_ADDRINFO *bindaddr = NULL; const BIO_ADDRINFO *ai = NULL; const BIO_ADDRINFO *bi = NULL; int found = 0; int ret; if (BIO_sock_init() != 1) return 0; ret = BIO_lookup_ex(host, port, BIO_LOOKUP_CLIENT, family, type, protocol, &res); if (ret == 0) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } if (bindhost != NULL || bindport != NULL) { ret = BIO_lookup_ex(bindhost, bindport, BIO_LOOKUP_CLIENT, family, type, protocol, &bindaddr); if (ret == 0) { ERR_print_errors (bio_err); goto out; } } ret = 0; for (ai = res; ai != NULL; ai = BIO_ADDRINFO_next(ai)) { /* Admittedly, these checks are quite paranoid, we should not get * anything in the BIO_ADDRINFO chain that we haven't * asked for. */ OPENSSL_assert((family == AF_UNSPEC || family == BIO_ADDRINFO_family(ai)) && (type == 0 || type == BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(ai)) && (protocol == 0 || protocol == BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(ai))); if (bindaddr != NULL) { for (bi = bindaddr; bi != NULL; bi = BIO_ADDRINFO_next(bi)) { if (BIO_ADDRINFO_family(bi) == BIO_ADDRINFO_family(ai)) break; } if (bi == NULL) continue; ++found; } *sock = BIO_socket(BIO_ADDRINFO_family(ai), BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(ai), BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(ai), 0); if (*sock == INVALID_SOCKET) { /* Maybe the kernel doesn't support the socket family, even if * BIO_lookup() added it in the returned result... */ continue; } if (bi != NULL) { if (!BIO_bind(*sock, BIO_ADDRINFO_address(bi), BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR)) { BIO_closesocket(*sock); *sock = INVALID_SOCKET; break; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP) { /* * For SCTP we have to set various options on the socket prior to * connecting. This is done automatically by BIO_new_dgram_sctp(). * We don't actually need the created BIO though so we free it again * immediately. */ BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new_dgram_sctp(*sock, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (tmpbio == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } BIO_free(tmpbio); } #endif if (!BIO_connect(*sock, BIO_ADDRINFO_address(ai), - protocol == IPPROTO_TCP ? BIO_SOCK_NODELAY : 0)) { + BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(ai) == IPPROTO_TCP ? BIO_SOCK_NODELAY : 0)) { BIO_closesocket(*sock); *sock = INVALID_SOCKET; continue; } /* Success, don't try any more addresses */ break; } if (*sock == INVALID_SOCKET) { if (bindaddr != NULL && !found) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't bind %saddress for %s%s%s\n", BIO_ADDRINFO_family(res) == AF_INET6 ? "IPv6 " : BIO_ADDRINFO_family(res) == AF_INET ? "IPv4 " : BIO_ADDRINFO_family(res) == AF_UNIX ? "unix " : "", bindhost != NULL ? bindhost : "", bindport != NULL ? ":" : "", bindport != NULL ? bindport : ""); ERR_clear_error(); ret = 0; } ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } else { /* Remove any stale errors from previous connection attempts */ ERR_clear_error(); ret = 1; } out: if (bindaddr != NULL) { BIO_ADDRINFO_free (bindaddr); } BIO_ADDRINFO_free(res); return ret; } /* * do_server - helper routine to perform a server operation * @accept_sock: pointer to storage of resulting socket. * @host: the host name or path (for AF_UNIX) to connect to. * @port: the port to connect to (ignored for AF_UNIX). * @family: desired socket family, may be AF_INET, AF_INET6, AF_UNIX or * AF_UNSPEC * @type: socket type, must be SOCK_STREAM or SOCK_DGRAM * @cb: pointer to a function that receives the accepted socket and * should perform the communication with the connecting client. * @context: pointer to memory that's passed verbatim to the cb function. * @naccept: number of times an incoming connect should be accepted. If -1, * unlimited number. * * This will create a socket and use it to listen to a host:port, or if * family == AF_UNIX, to the path found in host, then start accepting * incoming connections and run cb on the resulting socket. * * 0 on failure, something other on success. */ int do_server(int *accept_sock, const char *host, const char *port, int family, int type, int protocol, do_server_cb cb, unsigned char *context, int naccept, BIO *bio_s_out) { int asock = 0; int sock; int i; BIO_ADDRINFO *res = NULL; const BIO_ADDRINFO *next; int sock_family, sock_type, sock_protocol, sock_port; const BIO_ADDR *sock_address; int sock_family_fallback = AF_UNSPEC; const BIO_ADDR *sock_address_fallback = NULL; int sock_options = BIO_SOCK_REUSEADDR; int ret = 0; if (BIO_sock_init() != 1) return 0; if (!BIO_lookup_ex(host, port, BIO_LOOKUP_SERVER, family, type, protocol, &res)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } /* Admittedly, these checks are quite paranoid, we should not get * anything in the BIO_ADDRINFO chain that we haven't asked for */ OPENSSL_assert((family == AF_UNSPEC || family == BIO_ADDRINFO_family(res)) && (type == 0 || type == BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(res)) && (protocol == 0 || protocol == BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(res))); sock_family = BIO_ADDRINFO_family(res); sock_type = BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(res); sock_protocol = BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(res); sock_address = BIO_ADDRINFO_address(res); next = BIO_ADDRINFO_next(res); if (sock_family == AF_INET6) sock_options |= BIO_SOCK_V6_ONLY; if (next != NULL && BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(next) == sock_type && BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(next) == sock_protocol) { if (sock_family == AF_INET && BIO_ADDRINFO_family(next) == AF_INET6) { /* In case AF_INET6 is returned but not supported by the * kernel, retry with the first detected address family */ sock_family_fallback = sock_family; sock_address_fallback = sock_address; sock_family = AF_INET6; sock_address = BIO_ADDRINFO_address(next); } else if (sock_family == AF_INET6 && BIO_ADDRINFO_family(next) == AF_INET) { sock_options &= ~BIO_SOCK_V6_ONLY; } } asock = BIO_socket(sock_family, sock_type, sock_protocol, 0); if (asock == INVALID_SOCKET && sock_family_fallback != AF_UNSPEC) { asock = BIO_socket(sock_family_fallback, sock_type, sock_protocol, 0); sock_address = sock_address_fallback; } if (asock == INVALID_SOCKET || !BIO_listen(asock, sock_address, sock_options)) { BIO_ADDRINFO_free(res); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); if (asock != INVALID_SOCKET) BIO_closesocket(asock); goto end; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP) { /* * For SCTP we have to set various options on the socket prior to * accepting. This is done automatically by BIO_new_dgram_sctp(). * We don't actually need the created BIO though so we free it again * immediately. */ BIO *tmpbio = BIO_new_dgram_sctp(asock, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (tmpbio == NULL) { BIO_closesocket(asock); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } BIO_free(tmpbio); } #endif sock_port = BIO_ADDR_rawport(sock_address); BIO_ADDRINFO_free(res); res = NULL; if (sock_port == 0) { /* dynamically allocated port, report which one */ union BIO_sock_info_u info; char *hostname = NULL; char *service = NULL; int success = 0; if ((info.addr = BIO_ADDR_new()) != NULL && BIO_sock_info(asock, BIO_SOCK_INFO_ADDRESS, &info) && (hostname = BIO_ADDR_hostname_string(info.addr, 1)) != NULL && (service = BIO_ADDR_service_string(info.addr, 1)) != NULL && BIO_printf(bio_s_out, strchr(hostname, ':') == NULL ? /* IPv4 */ "ACCEPT %s:%s\n" : /* IPv6 */ "ACCEPT [%s]:%s\n", hostname, service) > 0) success = 1; (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); OPENSSL_free(hostname); OPENSSL_free(service); BIO_ADDR_free(info.addr); if (!success) { BIO_closesocket(asock); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } else { (void)BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ACCEPT\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); } if (accept_sock != NULL) *accept_sock = asock; for (;;) { char sink[64]; struct timeval timeout; fd_set readfds; if (type == SOCK_STREAM) { BIO_ADDR_free(ourpeer); ourpeer = BIO_ADDR_new(); if (ourpeer == NULL) { BIO_closesocket(asock); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } do { sock = BIO_accept_ex(asock, ourpeer, 0); } while (sock < 0 && BIO_sock_should_retry(sock)); if (sock < 0) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); BIO_closesocket(asock); break; } BIO_set_tcp_ndelay(sock, 1); i = (*cb)(sock, type, protocol, context); /* * If we ended with an alert being sent, but still with data in the * network buffer to be read, then calling BIO_closesocket() will * result in a TCP-RST being sent. On some platforms (notably * Windows) then this will result in the peer immediately abandoning * the connection including any buffered alert data before it has * had a chance to be read. Shutting down the sending side first, * and then closing the socket sends TCP-FIN first followed by * TCP-RST. This seems to allow the peer to read the alert data. */ shutdown(sock, 1); /* SHUT_WR */ /* * We just said we have nothing else to say, but it doesn't mean * that the other side has nothing. It's even recommended to * consume incoming data. [In testing context this ensures that * alerts are passed on...] */ timeout.tv_sec = 0; timeout.tv_usec = 500000; /* some extreme round-trip */ do { FD_ZERO(&readfds); openssl_fdset(sock, &readfds); } while (select(sock + 1, &readfds, NULL, NULL, &timeout) > 0 && readsocket(sock, sink, sizeof(sink)) > 0); BIO_closesocket(sock); } else { i = (*cb)(asock, type, protocol, context); } if (naccept != -1) naccept--; if (i < 0 || naccept == 0) { BIO_closesocket(asock); ret = i; break; } } end: # ifdef AF_UNIX if (family == AF_UNIX) unlink(host); # endif BIO_ADDR_free(ourpeer); ourpeer = NULL; return ret; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SOCK */ diff --git a/config b/config index 26225ca2a9e5..49422981ae84 100755 --- a/config +++ b/config @@ -1,944 +1,945 @@ #!/bin/sh # Copyright 1998-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # OpenSSL config: determine the operating system and run ./Configure # Derived from minarch and GuessOS from Apache. # # Do "config -h" for usage information. SUFFIX="" DRYRUN="false" VERBOSE="false" EXE="" THERE=`dirname $0` # pick up any command line args to config for i do case "$i" in -d*) options=$options" --debug";; -t*) DRYRUN="true" VERBOSE="true";; -v*) VERBOSE="true";; -h*) DRYRUN="true"; cat </dev/null` || MACHINE="unknown" [ "$RELEASE" ] || RELEASE=`(uname -r) 2>/dev/null` || RELEASE="unknown" [ "$SYSTEM" ] || SYSTEM=`(uname -s) 2>/dev/null` || SYSTEM="unknown" [ "$BUILD" ] || VERSION=`(uname -v) 2>/dev/null` || VERSION="unknown" # Now test for ISC and SCO, since it is has a braindamaged uname. # # We need to work around FreeBSD 1.1.5.1 ( XREL=`uname -X 2>/dev/null | grep "^Release" | awk '{print $3}'` if [ "x$XREL" != "x" ]; then if [ -f /etc/kconfig ]; then case "$XREL" in 4.0|4.1) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-isc4"; exit 0 ;; esac else case "$XREL" in 3.2v4.2) echo "whatever-whatever-sco3"; exit 0 ;; 3.2v5.0*) echo "whatever-whatever-sco5"; exit 0 ;; 4.2MP) case "x${VERSION}" in x2.0*) echo "whatever-whatever-unixware20"; exit 0 ;; x2.1*) echo "whatever-whatever-unixware21"; exit 0 ;; x2*) echo "whatever-whatever-unixware2"; exit 0 ;; esac ;; 4.2) echo "whatever-whatever-unixware1"; exit 0 ;; 5*) case "x${VERSION}" in # We hardcode i586 in place of ${MACHINE} for the # following reason. The catch is that even though Pentium # is minimum requirement for platforms in question, # ${MACHINE} gets always assigned to i386. Now, problem # with i386 is that it makes ./config pass 386 to # ./Configure, which in turn makes make generate # inefficient SHA-1 (for this moment) code. x[678]*) echo "i586-sco-unixware7"; exit 0 ;; esac ;; esac fi fi # Now we simply scan though... In most cases, the SYSTEM info is enough # case "${SYSTEM}:${RELEASE}:${VERSION}:${MACHINE}" in A/UX:*) echo "m68k-apple-aux3"; exit 0 ;; AIX:[3-9]:4:*) echo "${MACHINE}-ibm-aix"; exit 0 ;; AIX:*:[5-9]:*) echo "${MACHINE}-ibm-aix"; exit 0 ;; AIX:*) echo "${MACHINE}-ibm-aix3"; exit 0 ;; HI-UX:*) echo "${MACHINE}-hi-hiux"; exit 0 ;; HP-UX:*) HPUXVER=`echo ${RELEASE}|sed -e 's/[^.]*.[0B]*//'` case "$HPUXVER" in 1[0-9].*) # HPUX 10 and 11 targets are unified echo "${MACHINE}-hp-hpux1x"; exit 0 ;; *) echo "${MACHINE}-hp-hpux"; exit 0 ;; esac ;; IRIX:6.*) echo "mips3-sgi-irix"; exit 0 ;; IRIX64:*) echo "mips4-sgi-irix64"; exit 0 ;; Linux:[2-9].*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-linux2"; exit 0 ;; Linux:1.*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-linux1"; exit 0 ;; GNU*) echo "hurd-x86"; exit 0; ;; LynxOS:*) echo "${MACHINE}-lynx-lynxos"; exit 0 ;; BSD/OS:4.*) # BSD/OS always says 386 echo "i486-whatever-bsdi4"; exit 0 ;; BSD/386:*:*:*486*|BSD/OS:*:*:*:*486*) case `/sbin/sysctl -n hw.model` in Pentium*) echo "i586-whatever-bsdi"; exit 0 ;; *) echo "i386-whatever-bsdi"; exit 0 ;; esac; ;; BSD/386:*|BSD/OS:*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-bsdi"; exit 0 ;; FreeBSD:*:*:*386*) VERS=`echo ${RELEASE} | sed -e 's/[-(].*//'` MACH=`sysctl -n hw.model` ARCH='whatever' case ${MACH} in *386* ) MACH="i386" ;; *486* ) MACH="i486" ;; Pentium\ II*) MACH="i686" ;; Pentium* ) MACH="i586" ;; * ) MACH="$MACHINE" ;; esac case ${MACH} in i[0-9]86 ) ARCH="pc" ;; esac echo "${MACH}-${ARCH}-freebsd${VERS}"; exit 0 ;; DragonFly:*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-dragonfly"; exit 0 ;; FreeBSD:*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-freebsd"; exit 0 ;; Haiku:*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-haiku"; exit 0 ;; NetBSD:*:*:*386*) echo "`(/usr/sbin/sysctl -n hw.model || /sbin/sysctl -n hw.model) | sed 's,.*\(.\)86-class.*,i\186,'`-whatever-netbsd"; exit 0 ;; NetBSD:*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-netbsd"; exit 0 ;; OpenBSD:*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-openbsd"; exit 0 ;; OpenUNIX:*) echo "${MACHINE}-unknown-OpenUNIX${VERSION}"; exit 0 ;; OSF1:*:*:*alpha*) OSFMAJOR=`echo ${RELEASE}| sed -e 's/^V\([0-9]*\)\..*$/\1/'` case "$OSFMAJOR" in 4|5) echo "${MACHINE}-dec-tru64"; exit 0 ;; 1|2|3) echo "${MACHINE}-dec-osf"; exit 0 ;; *) echo "${MACHINE}-dec-osf"; exit 0 ;; esac ;; Paragon*:*:*:*) echo "i860-intel-osf1"; exit 0 ;; Rhapsody:*) echo "ppc-apple-rhapsody"; exit 0 ;; Darwin:*) case "$MACHINE" in Power*) echo "ppc-apple-darwin${VERSION}" ;; *) echo "${MACHINE}-apple-darwin${VERSION}" ;; esac exit 0 ;; SunOS:5.*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-solaris2"; exit 0 ;; SunOS:*) echo "${MACHINE}-sun-sunos4"; exit 0 ;; UNIX_System_V:4.*:*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-sysv4"; exit 0 ;; VOS:*:*:i786) echo "i386-stratus-vos"; exit 0 ;; VOS:*:*:*) echo "hppa1.1-stratus-vos"; exit 0 ;; *:4*:R4*:m88k) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-sysv4"; exit 0 ;; DYNIX/ptx:4*:*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-sysv4"; exit 0 ;; *:4.0:3.0:3[34]?? | *:4.0:3.0:3[34]??,*) echo "i486-ncr-sysv4"; exit 0 ;; ULTRIX:*) echo "${MACHINE}-unknown-ultrix"; exit 0 ;; POSIX-BC*) echo "${MACHINE}-siemens-sysv4"; exit 0 # Here, $MACHINE == "BS2000" ;; machten:*) echo "${MACHINE}-tenon-${SYSTEM}"; exit 0; ;; library:*) echo "${MACHINE}-ncr-sysv4"; exit 0 ;; ConvexOS:*:11.0:*) echo "${MACHINE}-v11-${SYSTEM}"; exit 0; ;; # The following combinations are supported # MINGW64* on x86_64 => mingw64 # MINGW32* on x86_64 => mingw # MINGW32* on i?86 => mingw # # MINGW64* on i?86 isn't expected to work... MINGW64*:*:*:x86_64) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-mingw64"; exit 0; ;; MINGW*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-mingw"; exit 0; ;; CYGWIN*) echo "${MACHINE}-pc-cygwin"; exit 0 ;; vxworks*) echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-vxworks"; exit 0; ;; esac # # Ugg. These are all we can determine by what we know about # the output of uname. Be more creative: # # Do the Apollo stuff first. Here, we just simply assume # that the existence of the /usr/apollo directory is proof # enough if [ -d /usr/apollo ]; then echo "whatever-apollo-whatever" exit 0 fi # Now NeXT ISNEXT=`hostinfo 2>/dev/null` case "$ISNEXT" in *'NeXT Mach 3.3'*) echo "whatever-next-nextstep3.3"; exit 0 ;; *NeXT*) echo "whatever-next-nextstep"; exit 0 ;; esac # At this point we gone through all the one's # we know of: Punt echo "${MACHINE}-whatever-${SYSTEM}" exit 0 ) 2>/dev/null | ( # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # this is where the translation occurs into SSLeay terms # --------------------------------------------------------------------------- # Only set CC if not supplied already if [ -z "$CROSS_COMPILE$CC" ]; then GCCVER=`sh -c "gcc -dumpversion" 2>/dev/null` if [ "$GCCVER" != "" ]; then # then strip off whatever prefix egcs prepends the number with... # Hopefully, this will work for any future prefixes as well. GCCVER=`echo $GCCVER | LC_ALL=C sed 's/^[a-zA-Z]*\-//'` # Since gcc 3.1 gcc --version behaviour has changed. gcc -dumpversion # does give us what we want though, so we use that. We just just the # major and minor version numbers. # peak single digit before and after first dot, e.g. 2.95.1 gives 29 GCCVER=`echo $GCCVER | sed 's/\([0-9]\)\.\([0-9]\).*/\1\2/'` CC=gcc else CC=cc fi fi GCCVER=${GCCVER:-0} if [ "$SYSTEM" = "HP-UX" ];then # By default gcc is a ILP32 compiler (with long long == 64). GCC_BITS="32" if [ $GCCVER -ge 30 ]; then # PA64 support only came in with gcc 3.0.x. # We check if the preprocessor symbol __LP64__ is defined... if echo "__LP64__" | gcc -v -E -x c - 2>/dev/null | grep "^__LP64__" 2>&1 > /dev/null; then : # __LP64__ has slipped through, it therefore is not defined else GCC_BITS="64" fi fi fi if [ "$SYSTEM" = "SunOS" ]; then if [ $GCCVER -ge 30 ]; then # 64-bit ABI isn't officially supported in gcc 3.0, but it appears # to be working, at the very least 'make test' passes... if gcc -v -E -x c /dev/null 2>&1 | grep __arch64__ > /dev/null; then GCC_ARCH="-m64" else GCC_ARCH="-m32" fi fi # check for WorkShop C, expected output is "cc: blah-blah C x.x" CCVER=`(cc -V 2>&1) 2>/dev/null | \ egrep -e '^cc: .* C [0-9]\.[0-9]' | \ sed 's/.* C \([0-9]\)\.\([0-9]\).*/\1\2/'` CCVER=${CCVER:-0} if [ $MACHINE != i86pc -a $CCVER -gt 40 ]; then CC=cc # overrides gcc!!! if [ $CCVER -eq 50 ]; then echo "WARNING! Detected WorkShop C 5.0. Do make sure you have" echo " patch #107357-01 or later applied." sleep 5 fi fi fi if [ "${SYSTEM}" = "AIX" ]; then # favor vendor cc over gcc (cc) 2>&1 | grep -iv "not found" > /dev/null && CC=cc fi CCVER=${CCVER:-0} # read the output of the embedded GuessOS read GUESSOS echo Operating system: $GUESSOS # now map the output into SSLeay terms ... really should hack into the # script above so we end up with values in vars but that would take # more time that I want to waste at the moment case "$GUESSOS" in uClinux*64*) OUT=uClinux-dist64 ;; uClinux*) OUT=uClinux-dist ;; mips3-sgi-irix) OUT="irix-mips3-$CC" ;; mips4-sgi-irix64) echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke '$THERE/Configure irix64-mips4-$CC' *manually*." if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi OUT="irix-mips3-$CC" ;; ppc-apple-rhapsody) OUT="rhapsody-ppc-cc" ;; ppc-apple-darwin*) ISA64=`(sysctl -n hw.optional.64bitops) 2>/dev/null` if [ "$ISA64" = "1" -a -z "$KERNEL_BITS" ]; then echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke '$THERE/Configure darwin64-ppc-cc' *manually*." if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi fi if [ "$ISA64" = "1" -a "$KERNEL_BITS" = "64" ]; then OUT="darwin64-ppc-cc" else OUT="darwin-ppc-cc" fi ;; i?86-apple-darwin*) ISA64=`(sysctl -n hw.optional.x86_64) 2>/dev/null` if [ "$ISA64" = "1" -a -z "$KERNEL_BITS" ]; then echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke 'KERNEL_BITS=64 $THERE/config $options'." if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 1" 2; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste; exit 0) <&1 || exit fi fi if [ "$ISA64" = "1" -a "$KERNEL_BITS" = "64" ]; then OUT="darwin64-x86_64-cc" else OUT="darwin-i386-cc" fi ;; x86_64-apple-darwin*) if [ "$KERNEL_BITS" = "32" ]; then OUT="darwin-i386-cc" else OUT="darwin64-x86_64-cc" fi ;; $MACHINE-apple-darwin*) OUT="darwin64-$MACHINE-cc" ;; armv6+7-*-iphoneos) __CNF_CFLAGS="$__CNF_CFLAGS -arch armv6 -arch armv7" __CNF_CXXFLAGS="$__CNF_CXXFLAGS -arch armv6 -arch armv7" OUT="iphoneos-cross" ;; *-*-iphoneos) __CNF_CFLAGS="$__CNF_CFLAGS -arch ${MACHINE}" __CNF_CXXFLAGS="$__CNF_CXXFLAGS -arch ${MACHINE}" OUT="iphoneos-cross" ;; arm64-*-iphoneos|*-*-ios64) OUT="ios64-cross" ;; alpha-*-linux2) ISA=`awk '/cpu model/{print$4;exit(0);}' /proc/cpuinfo` OUT="linux-alpha-$CC" if [ "$CC" = "gcc" ]; then case ${ISA:-generic} in EV5|EV45) __CNF_CFLAGS="$__CNF_CFLAGS -mcpu=ev5" __CNF_CXXFLAGS="$__CNF_CFLAGS -mcpu=ev5";; EV56|PCA56) __CNF_CFLAGS="$__CNF_CFLAGS -mcpu=ev56" __CNF_CXXFLAGS="$__CNF_CXXFLAGS -mcpu=ev56";; *) __CNF_CFLAGS="$__CNF_CFLAGS -mcpu=ev6" __CNF_CXXFLAGS="$__CNF_CXXFLAGS -mcpu=ev6";; esac fi ;; ppc64-*-linux2) if [ -z "$KERNEL_BITS" ]; then echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke '$THERE/Configure linux-ppc64' *manually*." if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi fi if [ "$KERNEL_BITS" = "64" ]; then OUT="linux-ppc64" else OUT="linux-ppc" if (echo "__LP64__" | gcc -E -x c - 2>/dev/null | grep "^__LP64__" 2>&1 > /dev/null); then :; else __CNF_CFLAGS="$__CNF_CFLAGS -m32" __CNF_CXXFLAGS="$__CNF_CXXFLAGS -m32" fi fi ;; ppc64le-*-linux2) OUT="linux-ppc64le" ;; ppc-*-linux2) OUT="linux-ppc" ;; mips64*-*-linux2) echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke '$THERE/Configure linux64-mips64' *manually*." if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi OUT="linux-mips64" ;; mips*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-mips32" ;; ppc60x-*-vxworks*) OUT="vxworks-ppc60x" ;; ppcgen-*-vxworks*) OUT="vxworks-ppcgen" ;; pentium-*-vxworks*) OUT="vxworks-pentium" ;; simlinux-*-vxworks*) OUT="vxworks-simlinux" ;; mips-*-vxworks*) OUT="vxworks-mips";; ia64-*-linux?) OUT="linux-ia64" ;; sparc64-*-linux2) echo "WARNING! If you *know* that your GNU C supports 64-bit/V9 ABI" echo " and wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke '$THERE/Configure linux64-sparcv9' *manually*." if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi OUT="linux-sparcv9" ;; sparc-*-linux2) KARCH=`awk '/^type/{print$3;exit(0);}' /proc/cpuinfo` case ${KARCH:-sun4} in sun4u*) OUT="linux-sparcv9" ;; sun4m) OUT="linux-sparcv8" ;; sun4d) OUT="linux-sparcv8" ;; *) OUT="linux-generic32"; __CNF_CPPFLAGS="$__CNF_CPPFLAGS -DB_ENDIAN" ;; esac ;; parisc*-*-linux2) # 64-bit builds under parisc64 linux are not supported and # compiler is expected to generate 32-bit objects... CPUARCH=`awk '/cpu family/{print substr($5,1,3); exit(0);}' /proc/cpuinfo` CPUSCHEDULE=`awk '/^cpu.[ ]*: PA/{print substr($3,3); exit(0);}' /proc/cpuinfo` # ??TODO ?? Model transformations # 0. CPU Architecture for the 1.1 processor has letter suffixes. We strip that off # assuming no further arch. identification will ever be used by GCC. # 1. I'm most concerned about whether is a 7300LC is closer to a 7100 versus a 7100LC. # 2. The variant 64-bit processors cause concern should GCC support explicit schedulers # for these chips in the future. # PA7300LC -> 7100LC (1.1) # PA8200 -> 8000 (2.0) # PA8500 -> 8000 (2.0) # PA8600 -> 8000 (2.0) CPUSCHEDULE=`echo $CPUSCHEDULE|sed -e 's/7300LC/7100LC/' -e 's/8.00/8000/'` # Finish Model transformations __CNF_CPPFLAGS="$__CNF_CPPFLAGS -DB_ENDIAN" __CNF_CFLAGS="$__CNF_CFLAGS -mschedule=$CPUSCHEDULE -march=$CPUARCH" __CNF_CXXFLAGS="$__CNF_CXXFLAGS -mschedule=$CPUSCHEDULE -march=$CPUARCH" OUT="linux-generic32" ;; armv[1-3]*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic32" ;; armv[7-9]*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-armv4" __CNF_CFLAGS="$__CNF_CFLAGS -march=armv7-a" __CNF_CXXFLAGS="$__CNF_CXXFLAGS -march=armv7-a" ;; arm*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-armv4" ;; aarch64-*-linux2) OUT="linux-aarch64" ;; sh*b-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic32"; __CNF_CPPFLAGS="$__CNF_CPPFLAGS -DB_ENDIAN" ;; sh*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic32"; __CNF_CPPFLAGS="$__CNF_CPPFLAGS -DL_ENDIAN" ;; m68k*-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic32"; __CNF_CPPFLAGS="$__CNF_CPPFLAGS -DB_ENDIAN" ;; s390-*-linux2) OUT="linux-generic32"; __CNF_CPPFLAGS="$__CNF_CPPFLAGS -DB_ENDIAN" ;; s390x-*-linux2) # To be uncommented when glibc bug is fixed, see Configure... #if egrep -e '^features.* highgprs' /proc/cpuinfo >/dev/null ; then # echo "WARNING! If you wish to build \"highgprs\" 32-bit library, then you" # echo " have to invoke './Configure linux32-s390x' *manually*." # if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t -1 ]; then # echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." # (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 # fi #fi OUT="linux64-s390x" ;; x86_64-*-linux?) if $CC -dM -E -x c /dev/null 2>&1 | grep -q ILP32 > /dev/null; then OUT="linux-x32" else OUT="linux-x86_64" fi ;; *86-*-linux2) # On machines where the compiler understands -m32, prefer a # config target that uses it if $CC -m32 -E -x c /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1; then OUT="linux-x86" else OUT="linux-elf" fi ;; *86-*-linux1) OUT="linux-aout" ;; *-*-linux?) OUT="linux-generic32" ;; sun4[uv]*-*-solaris2) OUT="solaris-sparcv9-$CC" ISA64=`(isainfo) 2>/dev/null | grep sparcv9` if [ "$ISA64" != "" -a "$KERNEL_BITS" = "" ]; then if [ "$CC" = "cc" -a $CCVER -ge 50 ]; then echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke '$THERE/Configure solaris64-sparcv9-cc' *manually*." if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi elif [ "$CC" = "gcc" -a "$GCC_ARCH" = "-m64" ]; then # $GCC_ARCH denotes default ABI chosen by compiler driver # (first one found on the $PATH). I assume that user # expects certain consistency with the rest of his builds # and therefore switch over to 64-bit. OUT="solaris64-sparcv9-gcc" echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 32-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke '$THERE/Configure solaris-sparcv9-gcc' *manually*." if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi elif [ "$GCC_ARCH" = "-m32" ]; then echo "NOTICE! If you *know* that your GNU C supports 64-bit/V9 ABI" echo " and wish to build 64-bit library, then you have to" echo " invoke '$THERE/Configure solaris64-sparcv9-gcc' *manually*." if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi fi fi if [ "$ISA64" != "" -a "$KERNEL_BITS" = "64" ]; then OUT="solaris64-sparcv9-$CC" fi ;; sun4m-*-solaris2) OUT="solaris-sparcv8-$CC" ;; sun4d-*-solaris2) OUT="solaris-sparcv8-$CC" ;; sun4*-*-solaris2) OUT="solaris-sparcv7-$CC" ;; *86*-*-solaris2) ISA64=`(isainfo) 2>/dev/null | grep amd64` if [ "$ISA64" != "" -a ${KERNEL_BITS:-64} -eq 64 ]; then OUT="solaris64-x86_64-$CC" else OUT="solaris-x86-$CC" if [ `uname -r | sed -e 's/5\.//'` -lt 10 ]; then options="$options no-sse2" fi fi ;; *-*-sunos4) OUT="sunos-$CC" ;; *86*-*-bsdi4) OUT="BSD-x86-elf"; options="$options no-sse2"; __CNF_LDFLAGS="$__CNF_LDFLAGS -ldl" ;; alpha*-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-generic64"; __CNF_CPPFLAGS="$__CNF_CPPFLAGS -DL_ENDIAN" ;; powerpc64-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-generic64"; __CNF_CPPFLAGS="$__CNF_CPPFLAGS -DB_ENDIAN" ;; + riscv64-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-riscv64" ;; sparc64-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-sparc64" ;; ia64-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-ia64" ;; x86_64-*-dragonfly*) OUT="BSD-x86_64" ;; amd64-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-x86_64" ;; *86*-*-*bsd*) # mimic ld behaviour when it's looking for libc... if [ -L /usr/lib/libc.so ]; then # [Free|Net]BSD libc=/usr/lib/libc.so else # OpenBSD # ld searches for highest libc.so.* and so do we libc=`(ls /usr/lib/libc.so.* /lib/libc.so.* | tail -1) 2>/dev/null` fi case "`(file -L $libc) 2>/dev/null`" in *ELF*) OUT="BSD-x86-elf" ;; *) OUT="BSD-x86"; options="$options no-sse2" ;; esac ;; *-*-*bsd*) OUT="BSD-generic32" ;; x86_64-*-haiku) OUT="haiku-x86_64" ;; *-*-haiku) OUT="haiku-x86" ;; *-*-osf) OUT="osf1-alpha-cc" ;; *-*-tru64) OUT="tru64-alpha-cc" ;; *-*-[Uu]nix[Ww]are7) if [ "$CC" = "gcc" ]; then OUT="unixware-7-gcc" ; options="$options no-sse2" else OUT="unixware-7" ; options="$options no-sse2" __CNF_CPPFLAGS="$__CNF_CPPFLAGS -D__i386__" fi ;; *-*-[Uu]nix[Ww]are20*) OUT="unixware-2.0"; options="$options no-sse2 no-sha512" ;; *-*-[Uu]nix[Ww]are21*) OUT="unixware-2.1"; options="$options no-sse2 no-sha512" ;; *-*-vos) options="$options no-threads no-shared no-asm no-dso" EXE=".pm" OUT="vos-$CC" ;; BS2000-siemens-sysv4) OUT="BS2000-OSD" ;; *-hpux1*) if [ $CC = "gcc" -a $GCC_BITS = "64" ]; then OUT="hpux64-parisc2-gcc" fi [ "$KERNEL_BITS" ] || KERNEL_BITS=`(getconf KERNEL_BITS) 2>/dev/null` KERNEL_BITS=${KERNEL_BITS:-32} CPU_VERSION=`(getconf CPU_VERSION) 2>/dev/null` CPU_VERSION=${CPU_VERSION:-0} # See for further info on CPU_VERSION. if [ $CPU_VERSION -ge 768 ]; then # IA-64 CPU if [ $KERNEL_BITS -eq 64 -a "$CC" = "cc" ]; then OUT="hpux64-ia64-cc" else OUT="hpux-ia64-cc" fi elif [ $CPU_VERSION -ge 532 ]; then # PA-RISC 2.x CPU # PA-RISC 2.0 is no longer supported as separate 32-bit # target. This is compensated for by run-time detection # in most critical assembly modules and taking advantage # of 2.0 architecture in PA-RISC 1.1 build. OUT=${OUT:-"hpux-parisc1_1-${CC}"} if [ $KERNEL_BITS -eq 64 -a "$CC" = "cc" ]; then echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit library then you have to" echo " invoke '$THERE/Configure hpux64-parisc2-cc' *manually*." if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have about 5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi fi elif [ $CPU_VERSION -ge 528 ]; then # PA-RISC 1.1+ CPU OUT="hpux-parisc1_1-${CC}" elif [ $CPU_VERSION -ge 523 ]; then # PA-RISC 1.0 CPU OUT="hpux-parisc-${CC}" else # Motorola(?) CPU OUT="hpux-$CC" fi __CNF_CPPFLAGS="$__CNF_CPPFLAGS -D_REENTRANT" ;; *-hpux) OUT="hpux-parisc-$CC" ;; *-aix) [ "$KERNEL_BITS" ] || KERNEL_BITS=`(getconf KERNEL_BITMODE) 2>/dev/null` KERNEL_BITS=${KERNEL_BITS:-32} OBJECT_MODE=${OBJECT_MODE:-32} if [ "$CC" = "gcc" ]; then OUT="aix-gcc" if [ $OBJECT_MODE -eq 64 ]; then echo 'Your $OBJECT_MODE was found to be set to 64' OUT="aix64-gcc" fi elif [ $OBJECT_MODE -eq 64 ]; then echo 'Your $OBJECT_MODE was found to be set to 64' OUT="aix64-cc" else OUT="aix-cc" if [ $KERNEL_BITS -eq 64 ]; then echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 64-bit kit, then you have to" echo " invoke '$THERE/Configure aix64-cc' *manually*." if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" -a -t 1 ]; then echo " You have ~5 seconds to press Ctrl-C to abort." (trap "stty `stty -g`; exit 0" 2 0; stty -icanon min 0 time 50; read waste) <&1 fi fi fi if (lsattr -E -O -l `lsdev -c processor|awk '{print$1;exit}'` | grep -i powerpc) >/dev/null 2>&1; then : # this applies even to Power3 and later, as they return PowerPC_POWER[345] else options="$options no-asm" fi ;; # these are all covered by the catchall below i[3456]86-*-cygwin) OUT="Cygwin-x86" ;; *-*-cygwin) OUT="Cygwin-${MACHINE}" ;; x86-*-android|i?86-*-android) OUT="android-x86" ;; armv[7-9]*-*-android) OUT="android-armeabi" __CNF_CFLAGS="$__CNF_CFLAGS -march=armv7-a" __CNF_CXXFLAGS="$__CNF_CXXFLAGS -march=armv7-a";; arm*-*-android) OUT="android-armeabi" ;; *) OUT=`echo $GUESSOS | awk -F- '{print $3}'`;; esac # NB: This atalla support has been superseded by the ENGINE support # That contains its own header and definitions anyway. Support can # be enabled or disabled on any supported platform without external # headers, eg. by adding the "hw-atalla" switch to ./config or # perl Configure # # See whether we can compile Atalla support #if [ -f /usr/include/atasi.h ] #then # __CNF_CPPFLAGS="$__CNF_CPPFLAGS -DATALLA" #fi if [ -n "$CONFIG_OPTIONS" ]; then options="$options $CONFIG_OPTIONS" fi # gcc < 2.8 does not support -march=ultrasparc if [ "$OUT" = solaris-sparcv9-gcc -a $GCCVER -lt 28 ] then echo "WARNING! Falling down to 'solaris-sparcv8-gcc'." echo " Upgrade to gcc-2.8 or later." sleep 5 OUT=solaris-sparcv8-gcc fi if [ "$OUT" = "linux-sparcv9" -a $GCCVER -lt 28 ] then echo "WARNING! Falling down to 'linux-sparcv8'." echo " Upgrade to gcc-2.8 or later." sleep 5 OUT=linux-sparcv8 fi case "$GUESSOS" in i386-*) options="$options 386" ;; esac for i in aes aria bf camellia cast des dh dsa ec hmac idea md2 md5 mdc2 rc2 rc4 rc5 ripemd rsa seed sha sm2 sm3 sm4 do if [ ! -d $THERE/crypto/$i ] then options="$options no-$i" fi done if [ -z "$OUT" ]; then OUT="$CC" fi if [ ".$PERL" = . ] ; then for i in . `echo $PATH | sed 's/:/ /g'`; do if [ -f "$i/perl5$EXE" ] ; then PERL="$i/perl5$EXE" break; fi; done fi if [ ".$PERL" = . ] ; then for i in . `echo $PATH | sed 's/:/ /g'`; do if [ -f "$i/perl$EXE" ] ; then if "$i/perl$EXE" -e 'exit($]<5.0)'; then PERL="$i/perl$EXE" break; fi; fi; done fi if [ ".$PERL" = . ] ; then echo "You need Perl 5." exit 1 fi # run Configure to check to see if we need to specify the # compiler for the platform ... in which case we add it on # the end ... otherwise we leave it off $PERL $THERE/Configure LIST | grep "$OUT-$CC" > /dev/null if [ $? = "0" ]; then OUT="$OUT-$CC" fi OUT="$OUT" if [ "$OUT" = "darwin64-x86_64-cc" ]; then echo "WARNING! If you wish to build 32-bit libraries, then you have to" echo " invoke 'KERNEL_BITS=32 $THERE/config $options'." fi if $PERL $THERE/Configure LIST | grep "$OUT" > /dev/null; then if [ "$VERBOSE" = "true" ]; then echo /usr/bin/env \ __CNF_CPPDEFINES="'$__CNF_CPPDEFINES'" \ __CNF_CPPINCLUDES="'$__CNF_CPPINCLUDES'" \ __CNF_CPPFLAGS="'$__CNF_CPPFLAGS'" \ __CNF_CFLAGS="'$__CNF_CFLAGS'" \ __CNF_CXXFLAGS="'$__CNF_CXXFLAGS'" \ __CNF_LDFLAGS="'$__CNF_LDFLAGS'" \ __CNF_LDLIBS="'$__CNF_LDLIBS'" \ $PERL $THERE/Configure $OUT $options fi if [ "$DRYRUN" = "false" ]; then # eval to make sure quoted options, possibly with spaces inside, # are treated right eval /usr/bin/env \ __CNF_CPPDEFINES="'$__CNF_CPPDEFINES'" \ __CNF_CPPINCLUDES="'$__CNF_CPPINCLUDES'" \ __CNF_CPPFLAGS="'$__CNF_CPPFLAGS'" \ __CNF_CFLAGS="'$__CNF_CFLAGS'" \ __CNF_CXXFLAGS="'$__CNF_CXXFLAGS'" \ __CNF_LDFLAGS="'$__CNF_LDFLAGS'" \ __CNF_LDLIBS="'$__CNF_LDLIBS'" \ $PERL $THERE/Configure $OUT $options fi else echo "This system ($OUT) is not supported. See file INSTALL for details." exit 1 fi # Do not add anothing from here on, so we don't lose the Configure exit code ) diff --git a/crypto/asn1/charmap.h b/crypto/asn1/charmap.h index e234c9e615d0..5630291bd58c 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/charmap.h +++ b/crypto/asn1/charmap.h @@ -1,34 +1,34 @@ /* * WARNING: do not edit! * Generated by crypto/asn1/charmap.pl * - * Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2000-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #define CHARTYPE_HOST_ANY 4096 #define CHARTYPE_HOST_DOT 8192 #define CHARTYPE_HOST_HYPHEN 16384 #define CHARTYPE_HOST_WILD 32768 /* * Mask of various character properties */ static const unsigned short char_type[] = { 1026, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 120, 0, 1, 40, 0, 0, 0, 16, 1040, 1040, 33792, 25, 25, 16400, 8208, 16, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 16, 9, 9, 16, 9, 16, 0, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 0, 1025, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 4112, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2 }; diff --git a/crypto/bio/b_addr.c b/crypto/bio/b_addr.c index 8ea32bce401b..0af7a330bc68 100644 --- a/crypto/bio/b_addr.c +++ b/crypto/bio/b_addr.c @@ -1,928 +1,928 @@ /* - * Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2016-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef _GNU_SOURCE # define _GNU_SOURCE #endif #include #include #include "bio_local.h" #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK #include #include #include "internal/thread_once.h" CRYPTO_RWLOCK *bio_lookup_lock; static CRYPTO_ONCE bio_lookup_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; /* * Throughout this file and bio_local.h, the existence of the macro * AI_PASSIVE is used to detect the availability of struct addrinfo, * getnameinfo() and getaddrinfo(). If that macro doesn't exist, * we use our own implementation instead, using gethostbyname, * getservbyname and a few other. */ /********************************************************************** * * Address structure * */ BIO_ADDR *BIO_ADDR_new(void) { BIO_ADDR *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_ADDR_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->sa.sa_family = AF_UNSPEC; return ret; } void BIO_ADDR_free(BIO_ADDR *ap) { OPENSSL_free(ap); } void BIO_ADDR_clear(BIO_ADDR *ap) { memset(ap, 0, sizeof(*ap)); ap->sa.sa_family = AF_UNSPEC; } /* * BIO_ADDR_make - non-public routine to fill a BIO_ADDR with the contents * of a struct sockaddr. */ int BIO_ADDR_make(BIO_ADDR *ap, const struct sockaddr *sa) { if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET) { memcpy(&(ap->s_in), sa, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)); return 1; } #ifdef AF_INET6 if (sa->sa_family == AF_INET6) { memcpy(&(ap->s_in6), sa, sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)); return 1; } #endif #ifdef AF_UNIX if (sa->sa_family == AF_UNIX) { memcpy(&(ap->s_un), sa, sizeof(struct sockaddr_un)); return 1; } #endif return 0; } int BIO_ADDR_rawmake(BIO_ADDR *ap, int family, const void *where, size_t wherelen, unsigned short port) { #ifdef AF_UNIX if (family == AF_UNIX) { if (wherelen + 1 > sizeof(ap->s_un.sun_path)) return 0; memset(&ap->s_un, 0, sizeof(ap->s_un)); ap->s_un.sun_family = family; strncpy(ap->s_un.sun_path, where, sizeof(ap->s_un.sun_path) - 1); return 1; } #endif if (family == AF_INET) { if (wherelen != sizeof(struct in_addr)) return 0; memset(&ap->s_in, 0, sizeof(ap->s_in)); ap->s_in.sin_family = family; ap->s_in.sin_port = port; ap->s_in.sin_addr = *(struct in_addr *)where; return 1; } #ifdef AF_INET6 if (family == AF_INET6) { if (wherelen != sizeof(struct in6_addr)) return 0; memset(&ap->s_in6, 0, sizeof(ap->s_in6)); ap->s_in6.sin6_family = family; ap->s_in6.sin6_port = port; ap->s_in6.sin6_addr = *(struct in6_addr *)where; return 1; } #endif return 0; } int BIO_ADDR_family(const BIO_ADDR *ap) { return ap->sa.sa_family; } int BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(const BIO_ADDR *ap, void *p, size_t *l) { size_t len = 0; const void *addrptr = NULL; if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_INET) { len = sizeof(ap->s_in.sin_addr); addrptr = &ap->s_in.sin_addr; } #ifdef AF_INET6 else if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) { len = sizeof(ap->s_in6.sin6_addr); addrptr = &ap->s_in6.sin6_addr; } #endif #ifdef AF_UNIX else if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_UNIX) { len = strlen(ap->s_un.sun_path); addrptr = &ap->s_un.sun_path; } #endif if (addrptr == NULL) return 0; if (p != NULL) { memcpy(p, addrptr, len); } if (l != NULL) *l = len; return 1; } unsigned short BIO_ADDR_rawport(const BIO_ADDR *ap) { if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_INET) return ap->s_in.sin_port; #ifdef AF_INET6 if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) return ap->s_in6.sin6_port; #endif return 0; } /*- * addr_strings - helper function to get host and service names * @ap: the BIO_ADDR that has the input info * @numeric: 0 if actual names should be returned, 1 if the numeric * representation should be returned. * @hostname: a pointer to a pointer to a memory area to store the * host name or numeric representation. Unused if NULL. * @service: a pointer to a pointer to a memory area to store the * service name or numeric representation. Unused if NULL. * * The return value is 0 on failure, with the error code in the error * stack, and 1 on success. */ static int addr_strings(const BIO_ADDR *ap, int numeric, char **hostname, char **service) { if (BIO_sock_init() != 1) return 0; if (1) { #ifdef AI_PASSIVE int ret = 0; char host[NI_MAXHOST] = "", serv[NI_MAXSERV] = ""; int flags = 0; if (numeric) flags |= NI_NUMERICHOST | NI_NUMERICSERV; if ((ret = getnameinfo(BIO_ADDR_sockaddr(ap), BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_size(ap), host, sizeof(host), serv, sizeof(serv), flags)) != 0) { # ifdef EAI_SYSTEM if (ret == EAI_SYSTEM) { SYSerr(SYS_F_GETNAMEINFO, get_last_socket_error()); BIOerr(BIO_F_ADDR_STRINGS, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); } else # endif { BIOerr(BIO_F_ADDR_STRINGS, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); ERR_add_error_data(1, gai_strerror(ret)); } return 0; } /* VMS getnameinfo() has a bug, it doesn't fill in serv, which * leaves it with whatever garbage that happens to be there. * However, we initialise serv with the empty string (serv[0] * is therefore NUL), so it gets real easy to detect when things * didn't go the way one might expect. */ if (serv[0] == '\0') { BIO_snprintf(serv, sizeof(serv), "%d", ntohs(BIO_ADDR_rawport(ap))); } if (hostname != NULL) *hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(host); if (service != NULL) *service = OPENSSL_strdup(serv); } else { #endif if (hostname != NULL) *hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(inet_ntoa(ap->s_in.sin_addr)); if (service != NULL) { char serv[6]; /* port is 16 bits => max 5 decimal digits */ BIO_snprintf(serv, sizeof(serv), "%d", ntohs(ap->s_in.sin_port)); *service = OPENSSL_strdup(serv); } } if ((hostname != NULL && *hostname == NULL) || (service != NULL && *service == NULL)) { if (hostname != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(*hostname); *hostname = NULL; } if (service != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(*service); *service = NULL; } BIOerr(BIO_F_ADDR_STRINGS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } return 1; } char *BIO_ADDR_hostname_string(const BIO_ADDR *ap, int numeric) { char *hostname = NULL; if (addr_strings(ap, numeric, &hostname, NULL)) return hostname; return NULL; } char *BIO_ADDR_service_string(const BIO_ADDR *ap, int numeric) { char *service = NULL; if (addr_strings(ap, numeric, NULL, &service)) return service; return NULL; } char *BIO_ADDR_path_string(const BIO_ADDR *ap) { #ifdef AF_UNIX if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_UNIX) return OPENSSL_strdup(ap->s_un.sun_path); #endif return NULL; } /* * BIO_ADDR_sockaddr - non-public routine to return the struct sockaddr * for a given BIO_ADDR. In reality, this is simply a type safe cast. * The returned struct sockaddr is const, so it can't be tampered with. */ const struct sockaddr *BIO_ADDR_sockaddr(const BIO_ADDR *ap) { return &(ap->sa); } /* * BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_noconst - non-public function that does the same * as BIO_ADDR_sockaddr, but returns a non-const. USE WITH CARE, as * it allows you to tamper with the data (and thereby the contents * of the input BIO_ADDR). */ struct sockaddr *BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_noconst(BIO_ADDR *ap) { return &(ap->sa); } /* * BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_size - non-public function that returns the size * of the struct sockaddr the BIO_ADDR is using. If the protocol family * isn't set or is something other than AF_INET, AF_INET6 or AF_UNIX, * the size of the BIO_ADDR type is returned. */ socklen_t BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_size(const BIO_ADDR *ap) { if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_INET) return sizeof(ap->s_in); #ifdef AF_INET6 if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_INET6) return sizeof(ap->s_in6); #endif #ifdef AF_UNIX if (ap->sa.sa_family == AF_UNIX) return sizeof(ap->s_un); #endif return sizeof(*ap); } /********************************************************************** * * Address info database * */ const BIO_ADDRINFO *BIO_ADDRINFO_next(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai) { if (bai != NULL) return bai->bai_next; return NULL; } int BIO_ADDRINFO_family(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai) { if (bai != NULL) return bai->bai_family; return 0; } int BIO_ADDRINFO_socktype(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai) { if (bai != NULL) return bai->bai_socktype; return 0; } int BIO_ADDRINFO_protocol(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai) { if (bai != NULL) { if (bai->bai_protocol != 0) return bai->bai_protocol; #ifdef AF_UNIX if (bai->bai_family == AF_UNIX) return 0; #endif switch (bai->bai_socktype) { case SOCK_STREAM: return IPPROTO_TCP; case SOCK_DGRAM: return IPPROTO_UDP; default: break; } } return 0; } /* * BIO_ADDRINFO_sockaddr_size - non-public function that returns the size * of the struct sockaddr inside the BIO_ADDRINFO. */ socklen_t BIO_ADDRINFO_sockaddr_size(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai) { if (bai != NULL) return bai->bai_addrlen; return 0; } /* * BIO_ADDRINFO_sockaddr - non-public function that returns bai_addr * as the struct sockaddr it is. */ const struct sockaddr *BIO_ADDRINFO_sockaddr(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai) { if (bai != NULL) return bai->bai_addr; return NULL; } const BIO_ADDR *BIO_ADDRINFO_address(const BIO_ADDRINFO *bai) { if (bai != NULL) return (BIO_ADDR *)bai->bai_addr; return NULL; } void BIO_ADDRINFO_free(BIO_ADDRINFO *bai) { if (bai == NULL) return; #ifdef AI_PASSIVE # ifdef AF_UNIX # define _cond bai->bai_family != AF_UNIX # else # define _cond 1 # endif if (_cond) { freeaddrinfo(bai); return; } #endif /* Free manually when we know that addrinfo_wrap() was used. * See further comment above addrinfo_wrap() */ while (bai != NULL) { BIO_ADDRINFO *next = bai->bai_next; OPENSSL_free(bai->bai_addr); OPENSSL_free(bai); bai = next; } } /********************************************************************** * * Service functions * */ /*- * The specs in hostserv can take these forms: * * host:service => *host = "host", *service = "service" * host:* => *host = "host", *service = NULL * host: => *host = "host", *service = NULL * :service => *host = NULL, *service = "service" * *:service => *host = NULL, *service = "service" * * in case no : is present in the string, the result depends on * hostserv_prio, as follows: * * when hostserv_prio == BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST * host => *host = "host", *service untouched * * when hostserv_prio == BIO_PARSE_PRIO_SERV * service => *host untouched, *service = "service" * */ int BIO_parse_hostserv(const char *hostserv, char **host, char **service, enum BIO_hostserv_priorities hostserv_prio) { const char *h = NULL; size_t hl = 0; const char *p = NULL; size_t pl = 0; if (*hostserv == '[') { if ((p = strchr(hostserv, ']')) == NULL) goto spec_err; h = hostserv + 1; hl = p - h; p++; if (*p == '\0') p = NULL; else if (*p != ':') goto spec_err; else { p++; pl = strlen(p); } } else { const char *p2 = strrchr(hostserv, ':'); p = strchr(hostserv, ':'); /*- * Check for more than one colon. There are three possible * interpretations: * 1. IPv6 address with port number, last colon being separator. * 2. IPv6 address only. * 3. IPv6 address only if hostserv_prio == BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST, * IPv6 address and port number if hostserv_prio == BIO_PARSE_PRIO_SERV * Because of this ambiguity, we currently choose to make it an * error. */ if (p != p2) goto amb_err; if (p != NULL) { h = hostserv; hl = p - h; p++; pl = strlen(p); } else if (hostserv_prio == BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST) { h = hostserv; hl = strlen(h); } else { p = hostserv; pl = strlen(p); } } if (p != NULL && strchr(p, ':')) goto spec_err; if (h != NULL && host != NULL) { if (hl == 0 || (hl == 1 && h[0] == '*')) { *host = NULL; } else { *host = OPENSSL_strndup(h, hl); if (*host == NULL) goto memerr; } } if (p != NULL && service != NULL) { if (pl == 0 || (pl == 1 && p[0] == '*')) { *service = NULL; } else { *service = OPENSSL_strndup(p, pl); if (*service == NULL) goto memerr; } } return 1; amb_err: BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_PARSE_HOSTSERV, BIO_R_AMBIGUOUS_HOST_OR_SERVICE); return 0; spec_err: BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_PARSE_HOSTSERV, BIO_R_MALFORMED_HOST_OR_SERVICE); return 0; memerr: BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_PARSE_HOSTSERV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } /* addrinfo_wrap is used to build our own addrinfo "chain". * (it has only one entry, so calling it a chain may be a stretch) * It should ONLY be called when getaddrinfo() and friends * aren't available, OR when dealing with a non IP protocol * family, such as AF_UNIX * * the return value is 1 on success, or 0 on failure, which * only happens if a memory allocation error occurred. */ static int addrinfo_wrap(int family, int socktype, const void *where, size_t wherelen, unsigned short port, BIO_ADDRINFO **bai) { if ((*bai = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(**bai))) == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_ADDRINFO_WRAP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } (*bai)->bai_family = family; (*bai)->bai_socktype = socktype; if (socktype == SOCK_STREAM) (*bai)->bai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP; if (socktype == SOCK_DGRAM) (*bai)->bai_protocol = IPPROTO_UDP; #ifdef AF_UNIX if (family == AF_UNIX) (*bai)->bai_protocol = 0; #endif { /* Magic: We know that BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_noconst is really just an advanced cast of BIO_ADDR* to struct sockaddr * by the power of union, so while it may seem that we're creating a memory leak here, we are not. It will be all right. */ BIO_ADDR *addr = BIO_ADDR_new(); if (addr != NULL) { BIO_ADDR_rawmake(addr, family, where, wherelen, port); (*bai)->bai_addr = BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_noconst(addr); } } (*bai)->bai_next = NULL; if ((*bai)->bai_addr == NULL) { BIO_ADDRINFO_free(*bai); *bai = NULL; return 0; } return 1; } DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_bio_lookup_init) { if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL)) return 0; bio_lookup_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); return bio_lookup_lock != NULL; } int BIO_lookup(const char *host, const char *service, enum BIO_lookup_type lookup_type, int family, int socktype, BIO_ADDRINFO **res) { return BIO_lookup_ex(host, service, lookup_type, family, socktype, 0, res); } /*- * BIO_lookup_ex - look up the node and service you want to connect to. * @node: the node you want to connect to. * @service: the service you want to connect to. * @lookup_type: declare intent with the result, client or server. * @family: the address family you want to use. Use AF_UNSPEC for any, or * AF_INET, AF_INET6 or AF_UNIX. * @socktype: The socket type you want to use. Can be SOCK_STREAM, SOCK_DGRAM * or 0 for all. * @protocol: The protocol to use, e.g. IPPROTO_TCP or IPPROTO_UDP or 0 for all. * Note that some platforms may not return IPPROTO_SCTP without * explicitly requesting it (i.e. IPPROTO_SCTP may not be returned * with 0 for the protocol) * @res: Storage place for the resulting list of returned addresses * * This will do a lookup of the node and service that you want to connect to. * It returns a linked list of different addresses you can try to connect to. * * When no longer needed you should call BIO_ADDRINFO_free() to free the result. * * The return value is 1 on success or 0 in case of error. */ int BIO_lookup_ex(const char *host, const char *service, int lookup_type, int family, int socktype, int protocol, BIO_ADDRINFO **res) { int ret = 0; /* Assume failure */ switch(family) { case AF_INET: #ifdef AF_INET6 case AF_INET6: #endif #ifdef AF_UNIX case AF_UNIX: #endif #ifdef AF_UNSPEC case AF_UNSPEC: #endif break; default: BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP_EX, BIO_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_FAMILY); return 0; } #ifdef AF_UNIX if (family == AF_UNIX) { if (addrinfo_wrap(family, socktype, host, strlen(host), 0, res)) return 1; else BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP_EX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } #endif if (BIO_sock_init() != 1) return 0; if (1) { #ifdef AI_PASSIVE int gai_ret = 0, old_ret = 0; struct addrinfo hints; memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints)); hints.ai_family = family; hints.ai_socktype = socktype; hints.ai_protocol = protocol; # ifdef AI_ADDRCONFIG # ifdef AF_UNSPEC if (host != NULL && family == AF_UNSPEC) # endif hints.ai_flags |= AI_ADDRCONFIG; # endif if (lookup_type == BIO_LOOKUP_SERVER) hints.ai_flags |= AI_PASSIVE; /* Note that |res| SHOULD be a 'struct addrinfo **' thanks to * macro magic in bio_local.h */ # if defined(AI_ADDRCONFIG) && defined(AI_NUMERICHOST) retry: # endif switch ((gai_ret = getaddrinfo(host, service, &hints, res))) { # ifdef EAI_SYSTEM case EAI_SYSTEM: SYSerr(SYS_F_GETADDRINFO, get_last_socket_error()); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP_EX, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); break; # endif # ifdef EAI_MEMORY case EAI_MEMORY: BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP_EX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); break; # endif case 0: ret = 1; /* Success */ break; default: # if defined(AI_ADDRCONFIG) && defined(AI_NUMERICHOST) if (hints.ai_flags & AI_ADDRCONFIG) { hints.ai_flags &= ~AI_ADDRCONFIG; hints.ai_flags |= AI_NUMERICHOST; old_ret = gai_ret; goto retry; } # endif BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP_EX, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); ERR_add_error_data(1, gai_strerror(old_ret ? old_ret : gai_ret)); break; } } else { #endif const struct hostent *he; /* * Because struct hostent is defined for 32-bit pointers only with * VMS C, we need to make sure that '&he_fallback_address' and * '&he_fallback_addresses' are 32-bit pointers */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC) # pragma pointer_size save # pragma pointer_size 32 #endif /* Windows doesn't seem to have in_addr_t */ -#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS +#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) static uint32_t he_fallback_address; static const char *he_fallback_addresses[] = { (char *)&he_fallback_address, NULL }; #else static in_addr_t he_fallback_address; static const char *he_fallback_addresses[] = { (char *)&he_fallback_address, NULL }; #endif static const struct hostent he_fallback = { NULL, NULL, AF_INET, sizeof(he_fallback_address), (char **)&he_fallback_addresses }; #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC) # pragma pointer_size restore #endif struct servent *se; /* Apparently, on WIN64, s_proto and s_port have traded places... */ #ifdef _WIN64 struct servent se_fallback = { NULL, NULL, NULL, 0 }; #else struct servent se_fallback = { NULL, NULL, 0, NULL }; #endif if (!RUN_ONCE(&bio_lookup_init, do_bio_lookup_init)) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP_EX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ret = 0; goto err; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(bio_lookup_lock); he_fallback_address = INADDR_ANY; if (host == NULL) { he = &he_fallback; switch(lookup_type) { case BIO_LOOKUP_CLIENT: he_fallback_address = INADDR_LOOPBACK; break; case BIO_LOOKUP_SERVER: he_fallback_address = INADDR_ANY; break; default: /* We forgot to handle a lookup type! */ assert("We forgot to handle a lookup type!" == NULL); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP_EX, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ret = 0; goto err; } } else { he = gethostbyname(host); if (he == NULL) { #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS /* * This might be misleading, because h_errno is used as if * it was errno. To minimize mixup add 1000. Underlying * reason for this is that hstrerror is declared obsolete, * not to mention that a) h_errno is not always guaranteed * to be meaningless; b) hstrerror can reside in yet another * library, linking for sake of hstrerror is an overkill; * c) this path is not executed on contemporary systems * anyway [above getaddrinfo/gai_strerror is]. We just let * system administrator figure this out... */ # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) /* h_errno doesn't exist on VxWorks */ SYSerr(SYS_F_GETHOSTBYNAME, 1000 ); # else SYSerr(SYS_F_GETHOSTBYNAME, 1000 + h_errno); # endif #else SYSerr(SYS_F_GETHOSTBYNAME, WSAGetLastError()); #endif ret = 0; goto err; } } if (service == NULL) { se_fallback.s_port = 0; se_fallback.s_proto = NULL; se = &se_fallback; } else { char *endp = NULL; long portnum = strtol(service, &endp, 10); /* * Because struct servent is defined for 32-bit pointers only with * VMS C, we need to make sure that 'proto' is a 32-bit pointer. */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC) # pragma pointer_size save # pragma pointer_size 32 #endif char *proto = NULL; #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC) # pragma pointer_size restore #endif switch (socktype) { case SOCK_STREAM: proto = "tcp"; break; case SOCK_DGRAM: proto = "udp"; break; } if (endp != service && *endp == '\0' && portnum > 0 && portnum < 65536) { se_fallback.s_port = htons((unsigned short)portnum); se_fallback.s_proto = proto; se = &se_fallback; } else if (endp == service) { se = getservbyname(service, proto); if (se == NULL) { #ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS SYSerr(SYS_F_GETSERVBYNAME, errno); #else SYSerr(SYS_F_GETSERVBYNAME, WSAGetLastError()); #endif goto err; } } else { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP_EX, BIO_R_MALFORMED_HOST_OR_SERVICE); goto err; } } *res = NULL; { /* * Because hostent::h_addr_list is an array of 32-bit pointers with VMS C, * we must make sure our iterator designates the same element type, hence * the pointer size dance. */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC) # pragma pointer_size save # pragma pointer_size 32 #endif char **addrlistp; #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && defined(__DECC) # pragma pointer_size restore #endif size_t addresses; BIO_ADDRINFO *tmp_bai = NULL; /* The easiest way to create a linked list from an array is to start from the back */ for(addrlistp = he->h_addr_list; *addrlistp != NULL; addrlistp++) ; for(addresses = addrlistp - he->h_addr_list; addrlistp--, addresses-- > 0; ) { if (!addrinfo_wrap(he->h_addrtype, socktype, *addrlistp, he->h_length, se->s_port, &tmp_bai)) goto addrinfo_malloc_err; tmp_bai->bai_next = *res; *res = tmp_bai; continue; addrinfo_malloc_err: BIO_ADDRINFO_free(*res); *res = NULL; BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_LOOKUP_EX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ret = 0; goto err; } ret = 1; } err: CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(bio_lookup_lock); } return ret; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SOCK */ diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_exp2.c b/crypto/bn/bn_exp2.c index e542abe46fa1..eac0896e6869 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_exp2.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_exp2.c @@ -1,201 +1,201 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_local.h" #define TABLE_SIZE 32 int BN_mod_exp2_mont(BIGNUM *rr, const BIGNUM *a1, const BIGNUM *p1, const BIGNUM *a2, const BIGNUM *p2, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *in_mont) { int i, j, bits, b, bits1, bits2, ret = 0, wpos1, wpos2, window1, window2, wvalue1, wvalue2; int r_is_one = 1; BIGNUM *d, *r; const BIGNUM *a_mod_m; /* Tables of variables obtained from 'ctx' */ BIGNUM *val1[TABLE_SIZE], *val2[TABLE_SIZE]; BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL; bn_check_top(a1); bn_check_top(p1); bn_check_top(a2); bn_check_top(p2); bn_check_top(m); - if (!(m->d[0] & 1)) { + if (!BN_is_odd(m)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_EXP2_MONT, BN_R_CALLED_WITH_EVEN_MODULUS); return 0; } bits1 = BN_num_bits(p1); bits2 = BN_num_bits(p2); if ((bits1 == 0) && (bits2 == 0)) { ret = BN_one(rr); return ret; } bits = (bits1 > bits2) ? bits1 : bits2; BN_CTX_start(ctx); d = BN_CTX_get(ctx); r = BN_CTX_get(ctx); val1[0] = BN_CTX_get(ctx); val2[0] = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (val2[0] == NULL) goto err; if (in_mont != NULL) mont = in_mont; else { if ((mont = BN_MONT_CTX_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set(mont, m, ctx)) goto err; } window1 = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits1); window2 = BN_window_bits_for_exponent_size(bits2); /* * Build table for a1: val1[i] := a1^(2*i + 1) mod m for i = 0 .. 2^(window1-1) */ if (a1->neg || BN_ucmp(a1, m) >= 0) { if (!BN_mod(val1[0], a1, m, ctx)) goto err; a_mod_m = val1[0]; } else a_mod_m = a1; if (BN_is_zero(a_mod_m)) { BN_zero(rr); ret = 1; goto err; } if (!BN_to_montgomery(val1[0], a_mod_m, mont, ctx)) goto err; if (window1 > 1) { if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(d, val1[0], val1[0], mont, ctx)) goto err; j = 1 << (window1 - 1); for (i = 1; i < j; i++) { if (((val1[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(val1[i], val1[i - 1], d, mont, ctx)) goto err; } } /* * Build table for a2: val2[i] := a2^(2*i + 1) mod m for i = 0 .. 2^(window2-1) */ if (a2->neg || BN_ucmp(a2, m) >= 0) { if (!BN_mod(val2[0], a2, m, ctx)) goto err; a_mod_m = val2[0]; } else a_mod_m = a2; if (BN_is_zero(a_mod_m)) { BN_zero(rr); ret = 1; goto err; } if (!BN_to_montgomery(val2[0], a_mod_m, mont, ctx)) goto err; if (window2 > 1) { if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(d, val2[0], val2[0], mont, ctx)) goto err; j = 1 << (window2 - 1); for (i = 1; i < j; i++) { if (((val2[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) || !BN_mod_mul_montgomery(val2[i], val2[i - 1], d, mont, ctx)) goto err; } } /* Now compute the power product, using independent windows. */ r_is_one = 1; wvalue1 = 0; /* The 'value' of the first window */ wvalue2 = 0; /* The 'value' of the second window */ wpos1 = 0; /* If wvalue1 > 0, the bottom bit of the * first window */ wpos2 = 0; /* If wvalue2 > 0, the bottom bit of the * second window */ if (!BN_to_montgomery(r, BN_value_one(), mont, ctx)) goto err; for (b = bits - 1; b >= 0; b--) { if (!r_is_one) { if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, r, mont, ctx)) goto err; } if (!wvalue1) if (BN_is_bit_set(p1, b)) { /* * consider bits b-window1+1 .. b for this window */ i = b - window1 + 1; while (!BN_is_bit_set(p1, i)) /* works for i<0 */ i++; wpos1 = i; wvalue1 = 1; for (i = b - 1; i >= wpos1; i--) { wvalue1 <<= 1; if (BN_is_bit_set(p1, i)) wvalue1++; } } if (!wvalue2) if (BN_is_bit_set(p2, b)) { /* * consider bits b-window2+1 .. b for this window */ i = b - window2 + 1; while (!BN_is_bit_set(p2, i)) i++; wpos2 = i; wvalue2 = 1; for (i = b - 1; i >= wpos2; i--) { wvalue2 <<= 1; if (BN_is_bit_set(p2, i)) wvalue2++; } } if (wvalue1 && b == wpos1) { /* wvalue1 is odd and < 2^window1 */ if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, val1[wvalue1 >> 1], mont, ctx)) goto err; wvalue1 = 0; r_is_one = 0; } if (wvalue2 && b == wpos2) { /* wvalue2 is odd and < 2^window2 */ if (!BN_mod_mul_montgomery(r, r, val2[wvalue2 >> 1], mont, ctx)) goto err; wvalue2 = 0; r_is_one = 0; } } if (!BN_from_montgomery(rr, r, mont, ctx)) goto err; ret = 1; err: if (in_mont == NULL) BN_MONT_CTX_free(mont); BN_CTX_end(ctx); bn_check_top(rr); return ret; } diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_prime.h b/crypto/bn/bn_prime.h index 1a25c285773a..8f2d7e995a01 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_prime.h +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_prime.h @@ -1,273 +1,273 @@ /* * WARNING: do not edit! * Generated by crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl * - * Copyright 1998-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1998-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ typedef unsigned short prime_t; # define NUMPRIMES 2048 static const prime_t primes[2048] = { 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47, 53, 59, 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83, 89, 97, 101, 103, 107, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, 139, 149, 151, 157, 163, 167, 173, 179, 181, 191, 193, 197, 199, 211, 223, 227, 229, 233, 239, 241, 251, 257, 263, 269, 271, 277, 281, 283, 293, 307, 311, 313, 317, 331, 337, 347, 349, 353, 359, 367, 373, 379, 383, 389, 397, 401, 409, 419, 421, 431, 433, 439, 443, 449, 457, 461, 463, 467, 479, 487, 491, 499, 503, 509, 521, 523, 541, 547, 557, 563, 569, 571, 577, 587, 593, 599, 601, 607, 613, 617, 619, 631, 641, 643, 647, 653, 659, 661, 673, 677, 683, 691, 701, 709, 719, 727, 733, 739, 743, 751, 757, 761, 769, 773, 787, 797, 809, 811, 821, 823, 827, 829, 839, 853, 857, 859, 863, 877, 881, 883, 887, 907, 911, 919, 929, 937, 941, 947, 953, 967, 971, 977, 983, 991, 997, 1009, 1013, 1019, 1021, 1031, 1033, 1039, 1049, 1051, 1061, 1063, 1069, 1087, 1091, 1093, 1097, 1103, 1109, 1117, 1123, 1129, 1151, 1153, 1163, 1171, 1181, 1187, 1193, 1201, 1213, 1217, 1223, 1229, 1231, 1237, 1249, 1259, 1277, 1279, 1283, 1289, 1291, 1297, 1301, 1303, 1307, 1319, 1321, 1327, 1361, 1367, 1373, 1381, 1399, 1409, 1423, 1427, 1429, 1433, 1439, 1447, 1451, 1453, 1459, 1471, 1481, 1483, 1487, 1489, 1493, 1499, 1511, 1523, 1531, 1543, 1549, 1553, 1559, 1567, 1571, 1579, 1583, 1597, 1601, 1607, 1609, 1613, 1619, 1621, 1627, 1637, 1657, 1663, 1667, 1669, 1693, 1697, 1699, 1709, 1721, 1723, 1733, 1741, 1747, 1753, 1759, 1777, 1783, 1787, 1789, 1801, 1811, 1823, 1831, 1847, 1861, 1867, 1871, 1873, 1877, 1879, 1889, 1901, 1907, 1913, 1931, 1933, 1949, 1951, 1973, 1979, 1987, 1993, 1997, 1999, 2003, 2011, 2017, 2027, 2029, 2039, 2053, 2063, 2069, 2081, 2083, 2087, 2089, 2099, 2111, 2113, 2129, 2131, 2137, 2141, 2143, 2153, 2161, 2179, 2203, 2207, 2213, 2221, 2237, 2239, 2243, 2251, 2267, 2269, 2273, 2281, 2287, 2293, 2297, 2309, 2311, 2333, 2339, 2341, 2347, 2351, 2357, 2371, 2377, 2381, 2383, 2389, 2393, 2399, 2411, 2417, 2423, 2437, 2441, 2447, 2459, 2467, 2473, 2477, 2503, 2521, 2531, 2539, 2543, 2549, 2551, 2557, 2579, 2591, 2593, 2609, 2617, 2621, 2633, 2647, 2657, 2659, 2663, 2671, 2677, 2683, 2687, 2689, 2693, 2699, 2707, 2711, 2713, 2719, 2729, 2731, 2741, 2749, 2753, 2767, 2777, 2789, 2791, 2797, 2801, 2803, 2819, 2833, 2837, 2843, 2851, 2857, 2861, 2879, 2887, 2897, 2903, 2909, 2917, 2927, 2939, 2953, 2957, 2963, 2969, 2971, 2999, 3001, 3011, 3019, 3023, 3037, 3041, 3049, 3061, 3067, 3079, 3083, 3089, 3109, 3119, 3121, 3137, 3163, 3167, 3169, 3181, 3187, 3191, 3203, 3209, 3217, 3221, 3229, 3251, 3253, 3257, 3259, 3271, 3299, 3301, 3307, 3313, 3319, 3323, 3329, 3331, 3343, 3347, 3359, 3361, 3371, 3373, 3389, 3391, 3407, 3413, 3433, 3449, 3457, 3461, 3463, 3467, 3469, 3491, 3499, 3511, 3517, 3527, 3529, 3533, 3539, 3541, 3547, 3557, 3559, 3571, 3581, 3583, 3593, 3607, 3613, 3617, 3623, 3631, 3637, 3643, 3659, 3671, 3673, 3677, 3691, 3697, 3701, 3709, 3719, 3727, 3733, 3739, 3761, 3767, 3769, 3779, 3793, 3797, 3803, 3821, 3823, 3833, 3847, 3851, 3853, 3863, 3877, 3881, 3889, 3907, 3911, 3917, 3919, 3923, 3929, 3931, 3943, 3947, 3967, 3989, 4001, 4003, 4007, 4013, 4019, 4021, 4027, 4049, 4051, 4057, 4073, 4079, 4091, 4093, 4099, 4111, 4127, 4129, 4133, 4139, 4153, 4157, 4159, 4177, 4201, 4211, 4217, 4219, 4229, 4231, 4241, 4243, 4253, 4259, 4261, 4271, 4273, 4283, 4289, 4297, 4327, 4337, 4339, 4349, 4357, 4363, 4373, 4391, 4397, 4409, 4421, 4423, 4441, 4447, 4451, 4457, 4463, 4481, 4483, 4493, 4507, 4513, 4517, 4519, 4523, 4547, 4549, 4561, 4567, 4583, 4591, 4597, 4603, 4621, 4637, 4639, 4643, 4649, 4651, 4657, 4663, 4673, 4679, 4691, 4703, 4721, 4723, 4729, 4733, 4751, 4759, 4783, 4787, 4789, 4793, 4799, 4801, 4813, 4817, 4831, 4861, 4871, 4877, 4889, 4903, 4909, 4919, 4931, 4933, 4937, 4943, 4951, 4957, 4967, 4969, 4973, 4987, 4993, 4999, 5003, 5009, 5011, 5021, 5023, 5039, 5051, 5059, 5077, 5081, 5087, 5099, 5101, 5107, 5113, 5119, 5147, 5153, 5167, 5171, 5179, 5189, 5197, 5209, 5227, 5231, 5233, 5237, 5261, 5273, 5279, 5281, 5297, 5303, 5309, 5323, 5333, 5347, 5351, 5381, 5387, 5393, 5399, 5407, 5413, 5417, 5419, 5431, 5437, 5441, 5443, 5449, 5471, 5477, 5479, 5483, 5501, 5503, 5507, 5519, 5521, 5527, 5531, 5557, 5563, 5569, 5573, 5581, 5591, 5623, 5639, 5641, 5647, 5651, 5653, 5657, 5659, 5669, 5683, 5689, 5693, 5701, 5711, 5717, 5737, 5741, 5743, 5749, 5779, 5783, 5791, 5801, 5807, 5813, 5821, 5827, 5839, 5843, 5849, 5851, 5857, 5861, 5867, 5869, 5879, 5881, 5897, 5903, 5923, 5927, 5939, 5953, 5981, 5987, 6007, 6011, 6029, 6037, 6043, 6047, 6053, 6067, 6073, 6079, 6089, 6091, 6101, 6113, 6121, 6131, 6133, 6143, 6151, 6163, 6173, 6197, 6199, 6203, 6211, 6217, 6221, 6229, 6247, 6257, 6263, 6269, 6271, 6277, 6287, 6299, 6301, 6311, 6317, 6323, 6329, 6337, 6343, 6353, 6359, 6361, 6367, 6373, 6379, 6389, 6397, 6421, 6427, 6449, 6451, 6469, 6473, 6481, 6491, 6521, 6529, 6547, 6551, 6553, 6563, 6569, 6571, 6577, 6581, 6599, 6607, 6619, 6637, 6653, 6659, 6661, 6673, 6679, 6689, 6691, 6701, 6703, 6709, 6719, 6733, 6737, 6761, 6763, 6779, 6781, 6791, 6793, 6803, 6823, 6827, 6829, 6833, 6841, 6857, 6863, 6869, 6871, 6883, 6899, 6907, 6911, 6917, 6947, 6949, 6959, 6961, 6967, 6971, 6977, 6983, 6991, 6997, 7001, 7013, 7019, 7027, 7039, 7043, 7057, 7069, 7079, 7103, 7109, 7121, 7127, 7129, 7151, 7159, 7177, 7187, 7193, 7207, 7211, 7213, 7219, 7229, 7237, 7243, 7247, 7253, 7283, 7297, 7307, 7309, 7321, 7331, 7333, 7349, 7351, 7369, 7393, 7411, 7417, 7433, 7451, 7457, 7459, 7477, 7481, 7487, 7489, 7499, 7507, 7517, 7523, 7529, 7537, 7541, 7547, 7549, 7559, 7561, 7573, 7577, 7583, 7589, 7591, 7603, 7607, 7621, 7639, 7643, 7649, 7669, 7673, 7681, 7687, 7691, 7699, 7703, 7717, 7723, 7727, 7741, 7753, 7757, 7759, 7789, 7793, 7817, 7823, 7829, 7841, 7853, 7867, 7873, 7877, 7879, 7883, 7901, 7907, 7919, 7927, 7933, 7937, 7949, 7951, 7963, 7993, 8009, 8011, 8017, 8039, 8053, 8059, 8069, 8081, 8087, 8089, 8093, 8101, 8111, 8117, 8123, 8147, 8161, 8167, 8171, 8179, 8191, 8209, 8219, 8221, 8231, 8233, 8237, 8243, 8263, 8269, 8273, 8287, 8291, 8293, 8297, 8311, 8317, 8329, 8353, 8363, 8369, 8377, 8387, 8389, 8419, 8423, 8429, 8431, 8443, 8447, 8461, 8467, 8501, 8513, 8521, 8527, 8537, 8539, 8543, 8563, 8573, 8581, 8597, 8599, 8609, 8623, 8627, 8629, 8641, 8647, 8663, 8669, 8677, 8681, 8689, 8693, 8699, 8707, 8713, 8719, 8731, 8737, 8741, 8747, 8753, 8761, 8779, 8783, 8803, 8807, 8819, 8821, 8831, 8837, 8839, 8849, 8861, 8863, 8867, 8887, 8893, 8923, 8929, 8933, 8941, 8951, 8963, 8969, 8971, 8999, 9001, 9007, 9011, 9013, 9029, 9041, 9043, 9049, 9059, 9067, 9091, 9103, 9109, 9127, 9133, 9137, 9151, 9157, 9161, 9173, 9181, 9187, 9199, 9203, 9209, 9221, 9227, 9239, 9241, 9257, 9277, 9281, 9283, 9293, 9311, 9319, 9323, 9337, 9341, 9343, 9349, 9371, 9377, 9391, 9397, 9403, 9413, 9419, 9421, 9431, 9433, 9437, 9439, 9461, 9463, 9467, 9473, 9479, 9491, 9497, 9511, 9521, 9533, 9539, 9547, 9551, 9587, 9601, 9613, 9619, 9623, 9629, 9631, 9643, 9649, 9661, 9677, 9679, 9689, 9697, 9719, 9721, 9733, 9739, 9743, 9749, 9767, 9769, 9781, 9787, 9791, 9803, 9811, 9817, 9829, 9833, 9839, 9851, 9857, 9859, 9871, 9883, 9887, 9901, 9907, 9923, 9929, 9931, 9941, 9949, 9967, 9973, 10007, 10009, 10037, 10039, 10061, 10067, 10069, 10079, 10091, 10093, 10099, 10103, 10111, 10133, 10139, 10141, 10151, 10159, 10163, 10169, 10177, 10181, 10193, 10211, 10223, 10243, 10247, 10253, 10259, 10267, 10271, 10273, 10289, 10301, 10303, 10313, 10321, 10331, 10333, 10337, 10343, 10357, 10369, 10391, 10399, 10427, 10429, 10433, 10453, 10457, 10459, 10463, 10477, 10487, 10499, 10501, 10513, 10529, 10531, 10559, 10567, 10589, 10597, 10601, 10607, 10613, 10627, 10631, 10639, 10651, 10657, 10663, 10667, 10687, 10691, 10709, 10711, 10723, 10729, 10733, 10739, 10753, 10771, 10781, 10789, 10799, 10831, 10837, 10847, 10853, 10859, 10861, 10867, 10883, 10889, 10891, 10903, 10909, 10937, 10939, 10949, 10957, 10973, 10979, 10987, 10993, 11003, 11027, 11047, 11057, 11059, 11069, 11071, 11083, 11087, 11093, 11113, 11117, 11119, 11131, 11149, 11159, 11161, 11171, 11173, 11177, 11197, 11213, 11239, 11243, 11251, 11257, 11261, 11273, 11279, 11287, 11299, 11311, 11317, 11321, 11329, 11351, 11353, 11369, 11383, 11393, 11399, 11411, 11423, 11437, 11443, 11447, 11467, 11471, 11483, 11489, 11491, 11497, 11503, 11519, 11527, 11549, 11551, 11579, 11587, 11593, 11597, 11617, 11621, 11633, 11657, 11677, 11681, 11689, 11699, 11701, 11717, 11719, 11731, 11743, 11777, 11779, 11783, 11789, 11801, 11807, 11813, 11821, 11827, 11831, 11833, 11839, 11863, 11867, 11887, 11897, 11903, 11909, 11923, 11927, 11933, 11939, 11941, 11953, 11959, 11969, 11971, 11981, 11987, 12007, 12011, 12037, 12041, 12043, 12049, 12071, 12073, 12097, 12101, 12107, 12109, 12113, 12119, 12143, 12149, 12157, 12161, 12163, 12197, 12203, 12211, 12227, 12239, 12241, 12251, 12253, 12263, 12269, 12277, 12281, 12289, 12301, 12323, 12329, 12343, 12347, 12373, 12377, 12379, 12391, 12401, 12409, 12413, 12421, 12433, 12437, 12451, 12457, 12473, 12479, 12487, 12491, 12497, 12503, 12511, 12517, 12527, 12539, 12541, 12547, 12553, 12569, 12577, 12583, 12589, 12601, 12611, 12613, 12619, 12637, 12641, 12647, 12653, 12659, 12671, 12689, 12697, 12703, 12713, 12721, 12739, 12743, 12757, 12763, 12781, 12791, 12799, 12809, 12821, 12823, 12829, 12841, 12853, 12889, 12893, 12899, 12907, 12911, 12917, 12919, 12923, 12941, 12953, 12959, 12967, 12973, 12979, 12983, 13001, 13003, 13007, 13009, 13033, 13037, 13043, 13049, 13063, 13093, 13099, 13103, 13109, 13121, 13127, 13147, 13151, 13159, 13163, 13171, 13177, 13183, 13187, 13217, 13219, 13229, 13241, 13249, 13259, 13267, 13291, 13297, 13309, 13313, 13327, 13331, 13337, 13339, 13367, 13381, 13397, 13399, 13411, 13417, 13421, 13441, 13451, 13457, 13463, 13469, 13477, 13487, 13499, 13513, 13523, 13537, 13553, 13567, 13577, 13591, 13597, 13613, 13619, 13627, 13633, 13649, 13669, 13679, 13681, 13687, 13691, 13693, 13697, 13709, 13711, 13721, 13723, 13729, 13751, 13757, 13759, 13763, 13781, 13789, 13799, 13807, 13829, 13831, 13841, 13859, 13873, 13877, 13879, 13883, 13901, 13903, 13907, 13913, 13921, 13931, 13933, 13963, 13967, 13997, 13999, 14009, 14011, 14029, 14033, 14051, 14057, 14071, 14081, 14083, 14087, 14107, 14143, 14149, 14153, 14159, 14173, 14177, 14197, 14207, 14221, 14243, 14249, 14251, 14281, 14293, 14303, 14321, 14323, 14327, 14341, 14347, 14369, 14387, 14389, 14401, 14407, 14411, 14419, 14423, 14431, 14437, 14447, 14449, 14461, 14479, 14489, 14503, 14519, 14533, 14537, 14543, 14549, 14551, 14557, 14561, 14563, 14591, 14593, 14621, 14627, 14629, 14633, 14639, 14653, 14657, 14669, 14683, 14699, 14713, 14717, 14723, 14731, 14737, 14741, 14747, 14753, 14759, 14767, 14771, 14779, 14783, 14797, 14813, 14821, 14827, 14831, 14843, 14851, 14867, 14869, 14879, 14887, 14891, 14897, 14923, 14929, 14939, 14947, 14951, 14957, 14969, 14983, 15013, 15017, 15031, 15053, 15061, 15073, 15077, 15083, 15091, 15101, 15107, 15121, 15131, 15137, 15139, 15149, 15161, 15173, 15187, 15193, 15199, 15217, 15227, 15233, 15241, 15259, 15263, 15269, 15271, 15277, 15287, 15289, 15299, 15307, 15313, 15319, 15329, 15331, 15349, 15359, 15361, 15373, 15377, 15383, 15391, 15401, 15413, 15427, 15439, 15443, 15451, 15461, 15467, 15473, 15493, 15497, 15511, 15527, 15541, 15551, 15559, 15569, 15581, 15583, 15601, 15607, 15619, 15629, 15641, 15643, 15647, 15649, 15661, 15667, 15671, 15679, 15683, 15727, 15731, 15733, 15737, 15739, 15749, 15761, 15767, 15773, 15787, 15791, 15797, 15803, 15809, 15817, 15823, 15859, 15877, 15881, 15887, 15889, 15901, 15907, 15913, 15919, 15923, 15937, 15959, 15971, 15973, 15991, 16001, 16007, 16033, 16057, 16061, 16063, 16067, 16069, 16073, 16087, 16091, 16097, 16103, 16111, 16127, 16139, 16141, 16183, 16187, 16189, 16193, 16217, 16223, 16229, 16231, 16249, 16253, 16267, 16273, 16301, 16319, 16333, 16339, 16349, 16361, 16363, 16369, 16381, 16411, 16417, 16421, 16427, 16433, 16447, 16451, 16453, 16477, 16481, 16487, 16493, 16519, 16529, 16547, 16553, 16561, 16567, 16573, 16603, 16607, 16619, 16631, 16633, 16649, 16651, 16657, 16661, 16673, 16691, 16693, 16699, 16703, 16729, 16741, 16747, 16759, 16763, 16787, 16811, 16823, 16829, 16831, 16843, 16871, 16879, 16883, 16889, 16901, 16903, 16921, 16927, 16931, 16937, 16943, 16963, 16979, 16981, 16987, 16993, 17011, 17021, 17027, 17029, 17033, 17041, 17047, 17053, 17077, 17093, 17099, 17107, 17117, 17123, 17137, 17159, 17167, 17183, 17189, 17191, 17203, 17207, 17209, 17231, 17239, 17257, 17291, 17293, 17299, 17317, 17321, 17327, 17333, 17341, 17351, 17359, 17377, 17383, 17387, 17389, 17393, 17401, 17417, 17419, 17431, 17443, 17449, 17467, 17471, 17477, 17483, 17489, 17491, 17497, 17509, 17519, 17539, 17551, 17569, 17573, 17579, 17581, 17597, 17599, 17609, 17623, 17627, 17657, 17659, 17669, 17681, 17683, 17707, 17713, 17729, 17737, 17747, 17749, 17761, 17783, 17789, 17791, 17807, 17827, 17837, 17839, 17851, 17863, }; diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_print.c b/crypto/bn/bn_print.c index 69749a9fa7dc..17ac6e7cac1c 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_print.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_print.c @@ -1,345 +1,345 @@ /* * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "crypto/ctype.h" #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "bn_local.h" static const char Hex[] = "0123456789ABCDEF"; /* Must 'OPENSSL_free' the returned data */ char *BN_bn2hex(const BIGNUM *a) { int i, j, v, z = 0; char *buf; char *p; if (BN_is_zero(a)) return OPENSSL_strdup("0"); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(a->top * BN_BYTES * 2 + 2); if (buf == NULL) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_BN2HEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } p = buf; if (a->neg) *p++ = '-'; for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) { for (j = BN_BITS2 - 8; j >= 0; j -= 8) { /* strip leading zeros */ v = (int)((a->d[i] >> j) & 0xff); if (z || v != 0) { *p++ = Hex[v >> 4]; *p++ = Hex[v & 0x0f]; z = 1; } } } *p = '\0'; err: return buf; } /* Must 'OPENSSL_free' the returned data */ char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a) { int i = 0, num, ok = 0, n, tbytes; char *buf = NULL; char *p; BIGNUM *t = NULL; BN_ULONG *bn_data = NULL, *lp; int bn_data_num; /*- * get an upper bound for the length of the decimal integer * num <= (BN_num_bits(a) + 1) * log(2) * <= 3 * BN_num_bits(a) * 0.101 + log(2) + 1 (rounding error) * <= 3 * BN_num_bits(a) / 10 + 3 * BN_num_bits / 1000 + 1 + 1 */ i = BN_num_bits(a) * 3; num = (i / 10 + i / 1000 + 1) + 1; tbytes = num + 3; /* negative and terminator and one spare? */ bn_data_num = num / BN_DEC_NUM + 1; bn_data = OPENSSL_malloc(bn_data_num * sizeof(BN_ULONG)); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(tbytes); if (buf == NULL || bn_data == NULL) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_BN2DEC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if ((t = BN_dup(a)) == NULL) goto err; p = buf; lp = bn_data; if (BN_is_zero(t)) { *p++ = '0'; *p++ = '\0'; } else { if (BN_is_negative(t)) *p++ = '-'; while (!BN_is_zero(t)) { if (lp - bn_data >= bn_data_num) goto err; *lp = BN_div_word(t, BN_DEC_CONV); if (*lp == (BN_ULONG)-1) goto err; lp++; } lp--; /* * We now have a series of blocks, BN_DEC_NUM chars in length, where * the last one needs truncation. The blocks need to be reversed in * order. */ n = BIO_snprintf(p, tbytes - (size_t)(p - buf), BN_DEC_FMT1, *lp); if (n < 0) goto err; p += n; while (lp != bn_data) { lp--; n = BIO_snprintf(p, tbytes - (size_t)(p - buf), BN_DEC_FMT2, *lp); if (n < 0) goto err; p += n; } } ok = 1; err: OPENSSL_free(bn_data); BN_free(t); if (ok) return buf; OPENSSL_free(buf); return NULL; } int BN_hex2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a) { BIGNUM *ret = NULL; BN_ULONG l = 0; int neg = 0, h, m, i, j, k, c; int num; if (a == NULL || *a == '\0') return 0; if (*a == '-') { neg = 1; a++; } for (i = 0; i <= INT_MAX / 4 && ossl_isxdigit(a[i]); i++) continue; if (i == 0 || i > INT_MAX / 4) - goto err; + return 0; num = i + neg; if (bn == NULL) return num; /* a is the start of the hex digits, and it is 'i' long */ if (*bn == NULL) { if ((ret = BN_new()) == NULL) return 0; } else { ret = *bn; BN_zero(ret); } /* i is the number of hex digits */ if (bn_expand(ret, i * 4) == NULL) goto err; j = i; /* least significant 'hex' */ m = 0; h = 0; while (j > 0) { m = (BN_BYTES * 2 <= j) ? BN_BYTES * 2 : j; l = 0; for (;;) { c = a[j - m]; k = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(c); if (k < 0) k = 0; /* paranoia */ l = (l << 4) | k; if (--m <= 0) { ret->d[h++] = l; break; } } j -= BN_BYTES * 2; } ret->top = h; bn_correct_top(ret); *bn = ret; bn_check_top(ret); /* Don't set the negative flag if it's zero. */ if (ret->top != 0) ret->neg = neg; return num; err: if (*bn == NULL) BN_free(ret); return 0; } int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a) { BIGNUM *ret = NULL; BN_ULONG l = 0; int neg = 0, i, j; int num; if (a == NULL || *a == '\0') return 0; if (*a == '-') { neg = 1; a++; } for (i = 0; i <= INT_MAX / 4 && ossl_isdigit(a[i]); i++) continue; if (i == 0 || i > INT_MAX / 4) goto err; num = i + neg; if (bn == NULL) return num; /* * a is the start of the digits, and it is 'i' long. We chop it into * BN_DEC_NUM digits at a time */ if (*bn == NULL) { if ((ret = BN_new()) == NULL) return 0; } else { ret = *bn; BN_zero(ret); } /* i is the number of digits, a bit of an over expand */ if (bn_expand(ret, i * 4) == NULL) goto err; j = BN_DEC_NUM - i % BN_DEC_NUM; if (j == BN_DEC_NUM) j = 0; l = 0; while (--i >= 0) { l *= 10; l += *a - '0'; a++; if (++j == BN_DEC_NUM) { if (!BN_mul_word(ret, BN_DEC_CONV) || !BN_add_word(ret, l)) goto err; l = 0; j = 0; } } bn_correct_top(ret); *bn = ret; bn_check_top(ret); /* Don't set the negative flag if it's zero. */ if (ret->top != 0) ret->neg = neg; return num; err: if (*bn == NULL) BN_free(ret); return 0; } int BN_asc2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a) { const char *p = a; if (*p == '-') p++; if (p[0] == '0' && (p[1] == 'X' || p[1] == 'x')) { if (!BN_hex2bn(bn, p + 2)) return 0; } else { if (!BN_dec2bn(bn, p)) return 0; } /* Don't set the negative flag if it's zero. */ if (*a == '-' && (*bn)->top != 0) (*bn)->neg = 1; return 1; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int BN_print_fp(FILE *fp, const BIGNUM *a) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) return 0; BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = BN_print(b, a); BIO_free(b); return ret; } # endif int BN_print(BIO *bp, const BIGNUM *a) { int i, j, v, z = 0; int ret = 0; if ((a->neg) && BIO_write(bp, "-", 1) != 1) goto end; if (BN_is_zero(a) && BIO_write(bp, "0", 1) != 1) goto end; for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) { for (j = BN_BITS2 - 4; j >= 0; j -= 4) { /* strip leading zeros */ v = (int)((a->d[i] >> j) & 0x0f); if (z || v != 0) { if (BIO_write(bp, &Hex[v], 1) != 1) goto end; z = 1; } } } ret = 1; end: return ret; } char *BN_options(void) { static int init = 0; static char data[16]; if (!init) { init++; #ifdef BN_LLONG BIO_snprintf(data, sizeof(data), "bn(%zu,%zu)", sizeof(BN_ULLONG) * 8, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8); #else BIO_snprintf(data, sizeof(data), "bn(%zu,%zu)", sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8, sizeof(BN_ULONG) * 8); #endif } return data; } diff --git a/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c b/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c index 1723d5ded5a8..6a42ce8a9413 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c +++ b/crypto/bn/bn_sqrt.c @@ -1,359 +1,365 @@ /* - * Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2000-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "bn_local.h" BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx) /* * Returns 'ret' such that ret^2 == a (mod p), using the Tonelli/Shanks * algorithm (cf. Henri Cohen, "A Course in Algebraic Computational Number - * Theory", algorithm 1.5.1). 'p' must be prime! + * Theory", algorithm 1.5.1). 'p' must be prime, otherwise an error or + * an incorrect "result" will be returned. */ { BIGNUM *ret = in; int err = 1; int r; BIGNUM *A, *b, *q, *t, *x, *y; int e, i, j; if (!BN_is_odd(p) || BN_abs_is_word(p, 1)) { if (BN_abs_is_word(p, 2)) { if (ret == NULL) ret = BN_new(); if (ret == NULL) goto end; if (!BN_set_word(ret, BN_is_bit_set(a, 0))) { if (ret != in) BN_free(ret); return NULL; } bn_check_top(ret); return ret; } BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_P_IS_NOT_PRIME); return NULL; } if (BN_is_zero(a) || BN_is_one(a)) { if (ret == NULL) ret = BN_new(); if (ret == NULL) goto end; if (!BN_set_word(ret, BN_is_one(a))) { if (ret != in) BN_free(ret); return NULL; } bn_check_top(ret); return ret; } BN_CTX_start(ctx); A = BN_CTX_get(ctx); b = BN_CTX_get(ctx); q = BN_CTX_get(ctx); t = BN_CTX_get(ctx); x = BN_CTX_get(ctx); y = BN_CTX_get(ctx); if (y == NULL) goto end; if (ret == NULL) ret = BN_new(); if (ret == NULL) goto end; /* A = a mod p */ if (!BN_nnmod(A, a, p, ctx)) goto end; /* now write |p| - 1 as 2^e*q where q is odd */ e = 1; while (!BN_is_bit_set(p, e)) e++; /* we'll set q later (if needed) */ if (e == 1) { /*- * The easy case: (|p|-1)/2 is odd, so 2 has an inverse * modulo (|p|-1)/2, and square roots can be computed * directly by modular exponentiation. * We have * 2 * (|p|+1)/4 == 1 (mod (|p|-1)/2), * so we can use exponent (|p|+1)/4, i.e. (|p|-3)/4 + 1. */ if (!BN_rshift(q, p, 2)) goto end; q->neg = 0; if (!BN_add_word(q, 1)) goto end; if (!BN_mod_exp(ret, A, q, p, ctx)) goto end; err = 0; goto vrfy; } if (e == 2) { /*- * |p| == 5 (mod 8) * * In this case 2 is always a non-square since * Legendre(2,p) = (-1)^((p^2-1)/8) for any odd prime. * So if a really is a square, then 2*a is a non-square. * Thus for * b := (2*a)^((|p|-5)/8), * i := (2*a)*b^2 * we have * i^2 = (2*a)^((1 + (|p|-5)/4)*2) * = (2*a)^((p-1)/2) * = -1; * so if we set * x := a*b*(i-1), * then * x^2 = a^2 * b^2 * (i^2 - 2*i + 1) * = a^2 * b^2 * (-2*i) * = a*(-i)*(2*a*b^2) * = a*(-i)*i * = a. * * (This is due to A.O.L. Atkin, * Subject: Square Roots and Cognate Matters modulo p=8n+5. * URL: https://listserv.nodak.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind9211&L=NMBRTHRY&P=4026 * November 1992.) */ /* t := 2*a */ if (!BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t, A, p)) goto end; /* b := (2*a)^((|p|-5)/8) */ if (!BN_rshift(q, p, 3)) goto end; q->neg = 0; if (!BN_mod_exp(b, t, q, p, ctx)) goto end; /* y := b^2 */ if (!BN_mod_sqr(y, b, p, ctx)) goto end; /* t := (2*a)*b^2 - 1 */ if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, y, p, ctx)) goto end; if (!BN_sub_word(t, 1)) goto end; /* x = a*b*t */ if (!BN_mod_mul(x, A, b, p, ctx)) goto end; if (!BN_mod_mul(x, x, t, p, ctx)) goto end; if (!BN_copy(ret, x)) goto end; err = 0; goto vrfy; } /* * e > 2, so we really have to use the Tonelli/Shanks algorithm. First, * find some y that is not a square. */ if (!BN_copy(q, p)) goto end; /* use 'q' as temp */ q->neg = 0; i = 2; do { /* * For efficiency, try small numbers first; if this fails, try random * numbers. */ if (i < 22) { if (!BN_set_word(y, i)) goto end; } else { if (!BN_priv_rand(y, BN_num_bits(p), 0, 0)) goto end; if (BN_ucmp(y, p) >= 0) { if (!(p->neg ? BN_add : BN_sub) (y, y, p)) goto end; } /* now 0 <= y < |p| */ if (BN_is_zero(y)) if (!BN_set_word(y, i)) goto end; } r = BN_kronecker(y, q, ctx); /* here 'q' is |p| */ if (r < -1) goto end; if (r == 0) { /* m divides p */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_P_IS_NOT_PRIME); goto end; } } while (r == 1 && ++i < 82); if (r != -1) { /* * Many rounds and still no non-square -- this is more likely a bug * than just bad luck. Even if p is not prime, we should have found * some y such that r == -1. */ BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS); goto end; } /* Here's our actual 'q': */ if (!BN_rshift(q, q, e)) goto end; /* * Now that we have some non-square, we can find an element of order 2^e * by computing its q'th power. */ if (!BN_mod_exp(y, y, q, p, ctx)) goto end; if (BN_is_one(y)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_P_IS_NOT_PRIME); goto end; } /*- * Now we know that (if p is indeed prime) there is an integer * k, 0 <= k < 2^e, such that * * a^q * y^k == 1 (mod p). * * As a^q is a square and y is not, k must be even. * q+1 is even, too, so there is an element * * X := a^((q+1)/2) * y^(k/2), * * and it satisfies * * X^2 = a^q * a * y^k * = a, * * so it is the square root that we are looking for. */ /* t := (q-1)/2 (note that q is odd) */ if (!BN_rshift1(t, q)) goto end; /* x := a^((q-1)/2) */ if (BN_is_zero(t)) { /* special case: p = 2^e + 1 */ if (!BN_nnmod(t, A, p, ctx)) goto end; if (BN_is_zero(t)) { /* special case: a == 0 (mod p) */ BN_zero(ret); err = 0; goto end; } else if (!BN_one(x)) goto end; } else { if (!BN_mod_exp(x, A, t, p, ctx)) goto end; if (BN_is_zero(x)) { /* special case: a == 0 (mod p) */ BN_zero(ret); err = 0; goto end; } } /* b := a*x^2 (= a^q) */ if (!BN_mod_sqr(b, x, p, ctx)) goto end; if (!BN_mod_mul(b, b, A, p, ctx)) goto end; /* x := a*x (= a^((q+1)/2)) */ if (!BN_mod_mul(x, x, A, p, ctx)) goto end; while (1) { /*- * Now b is a^q * y^k for some even k (0 <= k < 2^E * where E refers to the original value of e, which we * don't keep in a variable), and x is a^((q+1)/2) * y^(k/2). * * We have a*b = x^2, * y^2^(e-1) = -1, * b^2^(e-1) = 1. */ if (BN_is_one(b)) { if (!BN_copy(ret, x)) goto end; err = 0; goto vrfy; } - /* find smallest i such that b^(2^i) = 1 */ - i = 1; - if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, b, p, ctx)) - goto end; - while (!BN_is_one(t)) { - i++; - if (i == e) { - BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE); - goto end; + /* Find the smallest i, 0 < i < e, such that b^(2^i) = 1. */ + for (i = 1; i < e; i++) { + if (i == 1) { + if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, b, p, ctx)) + goto end; + + } else { + if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, t, p, ctx)) + goto end; } - if (!BN_mod_mul(t, t, t, p, ctx)) - goto end; + if (BN_is_one(t)) + break; + } + /* If not found, a is not a square or p is not prime. */ + if (i >= e) { + BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE); + goto end; } /* t := y^2^(e - i - 1) */ if (!BN_copy(t, y)) goto end; for (j = e - i - 1; j > 0; j--) { if (!BN_mod_sqr(t, t, p, ctx)) goto end; } if (!BN_mod_mul(y, t, t, p, ctx)) goto end; if (!BN_mod_mul(x, x, t, p, ctx)) goto end; if (!BN_mod_mul(b, b, y, p, ctx)) goto end; e = i; } vrfy: if (!err) { /* * verify the result -- the input might have been not a square (test * added in 0.9.8) */ if (!BN_mod_sqr(x, ret, p, ctx)) err = 1; if (!err && 0 != BN_cmp(x, A)) { BNerr(BN_F_BN_MOD_SQRT, BN_R_NOT_A_SQUARE); err = 1; } } end: if (err) { if (ret != in) BN_clear_free(ret); ret = NULL; } BN_CTX_end(ctx); bn_check_top(ret); return ret; } diff --git a/crypto/conf/conf_def.h b/crypto/conf/conf_def.h index 1e4a03e10bbd..0490236287ac 100644 --- a/crypto/conf/conf_def.h +++ b/crypto/conf/conf_def.h @@ -1,76 +1,76 @@ /* * WARNING: do not edit! * Generated by crypto/conf/keysets.pl * - * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #define CONF_NUMBER 1 #define CONF_UPPER 2 #define CONF_LOWER 4 #define CONF_UNDER 256 #define CONF_PUNCT 512 #define CONF_WS 16 #define CONF_ESC 32 #define CONF_QUOTE 64 #define CONF_DQUOTE 1024 #define CONF_COMMENT 128 #define CONF_FCOMMENT 2048 #define CONF_EOF 8 #define CONF_ALPHA (CONF_UPPER|CONF_LOWER) #define CONF_ALNUM (CONF_ALPHA|CONF_NUMBER|CONF_UNDER) #define CONF_ALNUM_PUNCT (CONF_ALPHA|CONF_NUMBER|CONF_UNDER|CONF_PUNCT) #define IS_COMMENT(conf,c) is_keytype(conf, c, CONF_COMMENT) #define IS_FCOMMENT(conf,c) is_keytype(conf, c, CONF_FCOMMENT) #define IS_EOF(conf,c) is_keytype(conf, c, CONF_EOF) #define IS_ESC(conf,c) is_keytype(conf, c, CONF_ESC) #define IS_NUMBER(conf,c) is_keytype(conf, c, CONF_NUMBER) #define IS_WS(conf,c) is_keytype(conf, c, CONF_WS) #define IS_ALNUM(conf,c) is_keytype(conf, c, CONF_ALNUM) #define IS_ALNUM_PUNCT(conf,c) is_keytype(conf, c, CONF_ALNUM_PUNCT) #define IS_QUOTE(conf,c) is_keytype(conf, c, CONF_QUOTE) #define IS_DQUOTE(conf,c) is_keytype(conf, c, CONF_DQUOTE) static const unsigned short CONF_type_default[128] = { 0x0008, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0010, 0x0010, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0010, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0010, 0x0200, 0x0040, 0x0080, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0040, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0000, 0x0020, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0100, 0x0040, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0000, }; static const unsigned short CONF_type_win32[128] = { 0x0008, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0010, 0x0010, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0010, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0010, 0x0200, 0x0400, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0000, 0x0A00, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0002, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0100, 0x0000, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0000, }; diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_all.c b/crypto/engine/eng_all.c index b675ed7892e2..474a60c9bf13 100644 --- a/crypto/engine/eng_all.c +++ b/crypto/engine/eng_all.c @@ -1,25 +1,22 @@ /* - * Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2001-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "eng_local.h" void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void) { - /* Some ENGINEs need this */ - OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(); - OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_ALL_BUILTIN, NULL); } #if (defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__)) && OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L void ENGINE_setup_bsd_cryptodev(void) { } #endif diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c b/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c index 87c762edb8a0..6a0ddc162d00 100644 --- a/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c +++ b/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c @@ -1,512 +1,521 @@ /* - * Copyright 2001-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2001-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "eng_local.h" #include "internal/dso.h" #include /* * Shared libraries implementing ENGINEs for use by the "dynamic" ENGINE * loader should implement the hook-up functions with the following * prototypes. */ /* Our ENGINE handlers */ static int dynamic_init(ENGINE *e); static int dynamic_finish(ENGINE *e); static int dynamic_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void)); /* Predeclare our context type */ typedef struct st_dynamic_data_ctx dynamic_data_ctx; /* The implementation for the important control command */ static int dynamic_load(ENGINE *e, dynamic_data_ctx *ctx); #define DYNAMIC_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE #define DYNAMIC_CMD_NO_VCHECK (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 1) #define DYNAMIC_CMD_ID (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 2) #define DYNAMIC_CMD_LIST_ADD (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 3) #define DYNAMIC_CMD_DIR_LOAD (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 4) #define DYNAMIC_CMD_DIR_ADD (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 5) #define DYNAMIC_CMD_LOAD (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 6) /* The constants used when creating the ENGINE */ static const char *engine_dynamic_id = "dynamic"; static const char *engine_dynamic_name = "Dynamic engine loading support"; static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN dynamic_cmd_defns[] = { {DYNAMIC_CMD_SO_PATH, "SO_PATH", "Specifies the path to the new ENGINE shared library", ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING}, {DYNAMIC_CMD_NO_VCHECK, "NO_VCHECK", "Specifies to continue even if version checking fails (boolean)", ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC}, {DYNAMIC_CMD_ID, "ID", "Specifies an ENGINE id name for loading", ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING}, {DYNAMIC_CMD_LIST_ADD, "LIST_ADD", "Whether to add a loaded ENGINE to the internal list (0=no,1=yes,2=mandatory)", ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC}, {DYNAMIC_CMD_DIR_LOAD, "DIR_LOAD", "Specifies whether to load from 'DIR_ADD' directories (0=no,1=yes,2=mandatory)", ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC}, {DYNAMIC_CMD_DIR_ADD, "DIR_ADD", "Adds a directory from which ENGINEs can be loaded", ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING}, {DYNAMIC_CMD_LOAD, "LOAD", "Load up the ENGINE specified by other settings", ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT}, {0, NULL, NULL, 0} }; /* * Loading code stores state inside the ENGINE structure via the "ex_data" * element. We load all our state into a single structure and use that as a * single context in the "ex_data" stack. */ struct st_dynamic_data_ctx { /* The DSO object we load that supplies the ENGINE code */ DSO *dynamic_dso; /* * The function pointer to the version checking shared library function */ dynamic_v_check_fn v_check; /* * The function pointer to the engine-binding shared library function */ dynamic_bind_engine bind_engine; /* The default name/path for loading the shared library */ char *DYNAMIC_LIBNAME; /* Whether to continue loading on a version check failure */ int no_vcheck; /* If non-NULL, stipulates the 'id' of the ENGINE to be loaded */ char *engine_id; /* * If non-zero, a successfully loaded ENGINE should be added to the * internal ENGINE list. If 2, the add must succeed or the entire load * should fail. */ int list_add_value; /* The symbol name for the version checking function */ const char *DYNAMIC_F1; /* The symbol name for the "initialise ENGINE structure" function */ const char *DYNAMIC_F2; /* * Whether to never use 'dirs', use 'dirs' as a fallback, or only use * 'dirs' for loading. Default is to use 'dirs' as a fallback. */ int dir_load; /* A stack of directories from which ENGINEs could be loaded */ STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *dirs; }; /* * This is the "ex_data" index we obtain and reserve for use with our context * structure. */ static int dynamic_ex_data_idx = -1; static void int_free_str(char *s) { OPENSSL_free(s); } /* * Because our ex_data element may or may not get allocated depending on * whether a "first-use" occurs before the ENGINE is freed, we have a memory * leak problem to solve. We can't declare a "new" handler for the ex_data as * we don't want a dynamic_data_ctx in *all* ENGINE structures of all types * (this is a bug in the design of CRYPTO_EX_DATA). As such, we just declare * a "free" handler and that will get called if an ENGINE is being destroyed * and there was an ex_data element corresponding to our context type. */ static void dynamic_data_ctx_free_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl, void *argp) { if (ptr) { dynamic_data_ctx *ctx = (dynamic_data_ctx *)ptr; DSO_free(ctx->dynamic_dso); OPENSSL_free(ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME); OPENSSL_free(ctx->engine_id); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(ctx->dirs, int_free_str); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } } /* * Construct the per-ENGINE context. We create it blindly and then use a lock * to check for a race - if so, all but one of the threads "racing" will have * wasted their time. The alternative involves creating everything inside the * lock which is far worse. */ static int dynamic_set_data_ctx(ENGINE *e, dynamic_data_ctx **ctx) { dynamic_data_ctx *c = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*c)); int ret = 1; if (c == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_SET_DATA_CTX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } c->dirs = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (c->dirs == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_SET_DATA_CTX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(c); return 0; } c->DYNAMIC_F1 = "v_check"; c->DYNAMIC_F2 = "bind_engine"; c->dir_load = 1; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); if ((*ctx = (dynamic_data_ctx *)ENGINE_get_ex_data(e, dynamic_ex_data_idx)) == NULL) { /* Good, we're the first */ ret = ENGINE_set_ex_data(e, dynamic_ex_data_idx, c); if (ret) { *ctx = c; c = NULL; } } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); /* * If we lost the race to set the context, c is non-NULL and *ctx is the * context of the thread that won. */ if (c) sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(c->dirs); OPENSSL_free(c); return ret; } /* * This function retrieves the context structure from an ENGINE's "ex_data", * or if it doesn't exist yet, sets it up. */ static dynamic_data_ctx *dynamic_get_data_ctx(ENGINE *e) { dynamic_data_ctx *ctx; if (dynamic_ex_data_idx < 0) { /* * Create and register the ENGINE ex_data, and associate our "free" * function with it to ensure any allocated contexts get freed when * an ENGINE goes underground. */ int new_idx = ENGINE_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, dynamic_data_ctx_free_func); if (new_idx == -1) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_GET_DATA_CTX, ENGINE_R_NO_INDEX); return NULL; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); /* Avoid a race by checking again inside this lock */ if (dynamic_ex_data_idx < 0) { /* Good, someone didn't beat us to it */ dynamic_ex_data_idx = new_idx; new_idx = -1; } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); /* * In theory we could "give back" the index here if (new_idx>-1), but * it's not possible and wouldn't gain us much if it were. */ } ctx = (dynamic_data_ctx *)ENGINE_get_ex_data(e, dynamic_ex_data_idx); /* Check if the context needs to be created */ if ((ctx == NULL) && !dynamic_set_data_ctx(e, &ctx)) /* "set_data" will set errors if necessary */ return NULL; return ctx; } static ENGINE *engine_dynamic(void) { ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; if (!ENGINE_set_id(ret, engine_dynamic_id) || !ENGINE_set_name(ret, engine_dynamic_name) || !ENGINE_set_init_function(ret, dynamic_init) || !ENGINE_set_finish_function(ret, dynamic_finish) || !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(ret, dynamic_ctrl) || !ENGINE_set_flags(ret, ENGINE_FLAGS_BY_ID_COPY) || !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(ret, dynamic_cmd_defns)) { ENGINE_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } void engine_load_dynamic_int(void) { ENGINE *toadd = engine_dynamic(); if (!toadd) return; ENGINE_add(toadd); /* * If the "add" worked, it gets a structural reference. So either way, we * release our just-created reference. */ ENGINE_free(toadd); /* * If the "add" didn't work, it was probably a conflict because it was * already added (eg. someone calling ENGINE_load_blah then calling * ENGINE_load_builtin_engines() perhaps). */ ERR_clear_error(); } static int dynamic_init(ENGINE *e) { /* * We always return failure - the "dynamic" engine itself can't be used * for anything. */ return 0; } static int dynamic_finish(ENGINE *e) { /* * This should never be called on account of "dynamic_init" always * failing. */ return 0; } static int dynamic_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void)) { dynamic_data_ctx *ctx = dynamic_get_data_ctx(e); int initialised; if (!ctx) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ENGINE_R_NOT_LOADED); return 0; } initialised = ((ctx->dynamic_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1); /* All our control commands require the ENGINE to be uninitialised */ if (initialised) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ENGINE_R_ALREADY_LOADED); return 0; } switch (cmd) { case DYNAMIC_CMD_SO_PATH: /* a NULL 'p' or a string of zero-length is the same thing */ if (p && (strlen((const char *)p) < 1)) p = NULL; OPENSSL_free(ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME); if (p) ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME = OPENSSL_strdup(p); else ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME = NULL; return (ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME ? 1 : 0); case DYNAMIC_CMD_NO_VCHECK: ctx->no_vcheck = ((i == 0) ? 0 : 1); return 1; case DYNAMIC_CMD_ID: /* a NULL 'p' or a string of zero-length is the same thing */ if (p && (strlen((const char *)p) < 1)) p = NULL; OPENSSL_free(ctx->engine_id); if (p) ctx->engine_id = OPENSSL_strdup(p); else ctx->engine_id = NULL; return (ctx->engine_id ? 1 : 0); case DYNAMIC_CMD_LIST_ADD: if ((i < 0) || (i > 2)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ENGINE_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT); return 0; } ctx->list_add_value = (int)i; return 1; case DYNAMIC_CMD_LOAD: return dynamic_load(e, ctx); case DYNAMIC_CMD_DIR_LOAD: if ((i < 0) || (i > 2)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ENGINE_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT); return 0; } ctx->dir_load = (int)i; return 1; case DYNAMIC_CMD_DIR_ADD: /* a NULL 'p' or a string of zero-length is the same thing */ if (!p || (strlen((const char *)p) < 1)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ENGINE_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT); return 0; } { char *tmp_str = OPENSSL_strdup(p); if (tmp_str == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(ctx->dirs, tmp_str)) { OPENSSL_free(tmp_str); ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } return 1; default: break; } ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ENGINE_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); return 0; } static int int_load(dynamic_data_ctx *ctx) { int num, loop; /* Unless told not to, try a direct load */ if ((ctx->dir_load != 2) && (DSO_load(ctx->dynamic_dso, ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME, NULL, 0)) != NULL) return 1; /* If we're not allowed to use 'dirs' or we have none, fail */ if (!ctx->dir_load || (num = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(ctx->dirs)) < 1) return 0; for (loop = 0; loop < num; loop++) { const char *s = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(ctx->dirs, loop); char *merge = DSO_merge(ctx->dynamic_dso, ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME, s); if (!merge) return 0; if (DSO_load(ctx->dynamic_dso, merge, NULL, 0)) { /* Found what we're looking for */ OPENSSL_free(merge); return 1; } OPENSSL_free(merge); } return 0; } static int dynamic_load(ENGINE *e, dynamic_data_ctx *ctx) { ENGINE cpy; dynamic_fns fns; if (ctx->dynamic_dso == NULL) ctx->dynamic_dso = DSO_new(); if (ctx->dynamic_dso == NULL) return 0; if (!ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME) { if (!ctx->engine_id) return 0; DSO_ctrl(ctx->dynamic_dso, DSO_CTRL_SET_FLAGS, DSO_FLAG_NAME_TRANSLATION_EXT_ONLY, NULL); ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME = DSO_convert_filename(ctx->dynamic_dso, ctx->engine_id); } if (!int_load(ctx)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_LOAD, ENGINE_R_DSO_NOT_FOUND); DSO_free(ctx->dynamic_dso); ctx->dynamic_dso = NULL; return 0; } /* We have to find a bind function otherwise it'll always end badly */ if (! (ctx->bind_engine = (dynamic_bind_engine) DSO_bind_func(ctx->dynamic_dso, ctx->DYNAMIC_F2))) { ctx->bind_engine = NULL; DSO_free(ctx->dynamic_dso); ctx->dynamic_dso = NULL; ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_LOAD, ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE); return 0; } /* Do we perform version checking? */ if (!ctx->no_vcheck) { unsigned long vcheck_res = 0; /* * Now we try to find a version checking function and decide how to * cope with failure if/when it fails. */ ctx->v_check = (dynamic_v_check_fn) DSO_bind_func(ctx->dynamic_dso, ctx->DYNAMIC_F1); if (ctx->v_check) vcheck_res = ctx->v_check(OSSL_DYNAMIC_VERSION); /* * We fail if the version checker veto'd the load *or* if it is * deferring to us (by returning its version) and we think it is too * old. + * Unfortunately the version checker does not distinguish between + * engines built for openssl 1.1.x and openssl 3.x, but loading + * an engine that is built for openssl 3.x will cause a fatal + * error. Detect such engines, since EVP_PKEY_get_base_id is exported + * as a function in openssl 3.x, while it is named EVP_PKEY_base_id + * in openssl 1.1.x. Therefore we take the presence of that symbol + * as an indication that the engine will be incompatible. */ - if (vcheck_res < OSSL_DYNAMIC_OLDEST) { + if (vcheck_res < OSSL_DYNAMIC_OLDEST + || DSO_bind_func(ctx->dynamic_dso, + "EVP_PKEY_get_base_id") != NULL) { /* Fail */ ctx->bind_engine = NULL; ctx->v_check = NULL; DSO_free(ctx->dynamic_dso); ctx->dynamic_dso = NULL; ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_LOAD, ENGINE_R_VERSION_INCOMPATIBILITY); return 0; } } /* * First binary copy the ENGINE structure so that we can roll back if the * hand-over fails */ memcpy(&cpy, e, sizeof(ENGINE)); /* * Provide the ERR, "ex_data", memory, and locking callbacks so the * loaded library uses our state rather than its own. FIXME: As noted in * engine.h, much of this would be simplified if each area of code * provided its own "summary" structure of all related callbacks. It * would also increase opaqueness. */ fns.static_state = ENGINE_get_static_state(); CRYPTO_get_mem_functions(&fns.mem_fns.malloc_fn, &fns.mem_fns.realloc_fn, &fns.mem_fns.free_fn); /* * Now that we've loaded the dynamic engine, make sure no "dynamic" * ENGINE elements will show through. */ engine_set_all_null(e); /* Try to bind the ENGINE onto our own ENGINE structure */ if (!engine_add_dynamic_id(e, (ENGINE_DYNAMIC_ID)ctx->bind_engine, 1) || !ctx->bind_engine(e, ctx->engine_id, &fns)) { engine_remove_dynamic_id(e, 1); ctx->bind_engine = NULL; ctx->v_check = NULL; DSO_free(ctx->dynamic_dso); ctx->dynamic_dso = NULL; ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_LOAD, ENGINE_R_INIT_FAILED); /* Copy the original ENGINE structure back */ memcpy(e, &cpy, sizeof(ENGINE)); return 0; } /* Do we try to add this ENGINE to the internal list too? */ if (ctx->list_add_value > 0) { if (!ENGINE_add(e)) { /* Do we tolerate this or fail? */ if (ctx->list_add_value > 1) { /* * Fail - NB: By this time, it's too late to rollback, and * trying to do so allows the bind_engine() code to have * created leaks. We just have to fail where we are, after * the ENGINE has changed. */ ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_LOAD, ENGINE_R_CONFLICTING_ENGINE_ID); return 0; } /* Tolerate */ ERR_clear_error(); } } return 1; } diff --git a/crypto/evp/digest.c b/crypto/evp/digest.c index d1bfa274ca81..01a6f251f56e 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/digest.c +++ b/crypto/evp/digest.c @@ -1,301 +1,311 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include "crypto/evp.h" #include "evp_local.h" + +static void cleanup_old_md_data(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int force) +{ + if (ctx->digest != NULL) { + if (ctx->digest->cleanup != NULL + && !EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_CLEANED)) + ctx->digest->cleanup(ctx); + if (ctx->md_data != NULL && ctx->digest->ctx_size > 0 + && (!EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE) + || force)) { + OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->md_data, ctx->digest->ctx_size); + ctx->md_data = NULL; + } + } +} + /* This call frees resources associated with the context */ int EVP_MD_CTX_reset(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx == NULL) return 1; /* * Don't assume ctx->md_data was cleaned in EVP_Digest_Final, because * sometimes only copies of the context are ever finalised. */ - if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->cleanup - && !EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_CLEANED)) - ctx->digest->cleanup(ctx); - if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->ctx_size && ctx->md_data - && !EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE)) { - OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->md_data, ctx->digest->ctx_size); - } + cleanup_old_md_data(ctx, 0); + /* * pctx should be freed by the user of EVP_MD_CTX * if EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_KEEP_PKEY_CTX is set */ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_KEEP_PKEY_CTX)) EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx->pctx); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(ctx->engine); #endif OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx, sizeof(*ctx)); return 1; } EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void) { return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX)); } void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } int EVP_DigestInit(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type) { EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx); return EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, type, NULL); } int EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl) { EVP_MD_CTX_clear_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_CLEANED); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE /* * Whether it's nice or not, "Inits" can be used on "Final"'d contexts so * this context may already have an ENGINE! Try to avoid releasing the * previous handle, re-querying for an ENGINE, and having a * reinitialisation, when it may all be unnecessary. */ if (ctx->engine && ctx->digest && (type == NULL || (type->type == ctx->digest->type))) goto skip_to_init; + if (type) { /* * Ensure an ENGINE left lying around from last time is cleared (the * previous check attempted to avoid this if the same ENGINE and * EVP_MD could be used). */ ENGINE_finish(ctx->engine); if (impl != NULL) { if (!ENGINE_init(impl)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); return 0; } } else { /* Ask if an ENGINE is reserved for this job */ impl = ENGINE_get_digest_engine(type->type); } if (impl != NULL) { /* There's an ENGINE for this job ... (apparently) */ const EVP_MD *d = ENGINE_get_digest(impl, type->type); if (d == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); ENGINE_finish(impl); return 0; } /* We'll use the ENGINE's private digest definition */ type = d; /* * Store the ENGINE functional reference so we know 'type' came * from an ENGINE and we need to release it when done. */ ctx->engine = impl; } else ctx->engine = NULL; } else { if (!ctx->digest) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX, EVP_R_NO_DIGEST_SET); return 0; } type = ctx->digest; } #endif if (ctx->digest != type) { - if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->ctx_size) { - OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->md_data, ctx->digest->ctx_size); - ctx->md_data = NULL; - } + cleanup_old_md_data(ctx, 1); + ctx->digest = type; if (!(ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT) && type->ctx_size) { ctx->update = type->update; ctx->md_data = OPENSSL_zalloc(type->ctx_size); if (ctx->md_data == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE skip_to_init: #endif if (ctx->pctx) { int r; r = EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx->pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT, 0, ctx); if (r <= 0 && (r != -2)) return 0; } if (ctx->flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT) return 1; return ctx->digest->init(ctx); } int EVP_DigestUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) { if (count == 0) return 1; return ctx->update(ctx, data, count); } /* The caller can assume that this removes any secret data from the context */ int EVP_DigestFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *size) { int ret; ret = EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, md, size); EVP_MD_CTX_reset(ctx); return ret; } /* The caller can assume that this removes any secret data from the context */ int EVP_DigestFinal_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *size) { int ret; OPENSSL_assert(ctx->digest->md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); ret = ctx->digest->final(ctx, md); if (size != NULL) *size = ctx->digest->md_size; if (ctx->digest->cleanup) { ctx->digest->cleanup(ctx); EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_CLEANED); } OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->md_data, ctx->digest->ctx_size); return ret; } int EVP_DigestFinalXOF(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md, size_t size) { int ret = 0; if (ctx->digest->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_XOF && size <= INT_MAX && ctx->digest->md_ctrl(ctx, EVP_MD_CTRL_XOF_LEN, (int)size, NULL)) { ret = ctx->digest->final(ctx, md); if (ctx->digest->cleanup != NULL) { ctx->digest->cleanup(ctx); EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_CLEANED); } OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->md_data, ctx->digest->ctx_size); } else { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DIGESTFINALXOF, EVP_R_NOT_XOF_OR_INVALID_LENGTH); } return ret; } int EVP_MD_CTX_copy(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in) { EVP_MD_CTX_reset(out); return EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(out, in); } int EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *out, const EVP_MD_CTX *in) { unsigned char *tmp_buf; if ((in == NULL) || (in->digest == NULL)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX, EVP_R_INPUT_NOT_INITIALIZED); return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE /* Make sure it's safe to copy a digest context using an ENGINE */ if (in->engine && !ENGINE_init(in->engine)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); return 0; } #endif if (out->digest == in->digest) { tmp_buf = out->md_data; EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(out, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE); } else tmp_buf = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX_reset(out); memcpy(out, in, sizeof(*out)); /* copied EVP_MD_CTX should free the copied EVP_PKEY_CTX */ EVP_MD_CTX_clear_flags(out, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_KEEP_PKEY_CTX); /* Null these variables, since they are getting fixed up * properly below. Anything else may cause a memleak and/or * double free if any of the memory allocations below fail */ out->md_data = NULL; out->pctx = NULL; if (in->md_data && out->digest->ctx_size) { if (tmp_buf) out->md_data = tmp_buf; else { out->md_data = OPENSSL_malloc(out->digest->ctx_size); if (out->md_data == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } memcpy(out->md_data, in->md_data, out->digest->ctx_size); } out->update = in->update; if (in->pctx) { out->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_dup(in->pctx); if (!out->pctx) { EVP_MD_CTX_reset(out); return 0; } } if (out->digest->copy) return out->digest->copy(out, in); return 1; } int EVP_Digest(const void *data, size_t count, unsigned char *md, unsigned int *size, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl) { EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); int ret; if (ctx == NULL) return 0; EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT); ret = EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, type, impl) && EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, data, count) && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, md, size); EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); return ret; } int EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd, int p1, void *p2) { if (ctx->digest && ctx->digest->md_ctrl) { int ret = ctx->digest->md_ctrl(ctx, cmd, p1, p2); if (ret <= 0) return 0; return 1; } return 0; } diff --git a/crypto/lhash/lhash.c b/crypto/lhash/lhash.c index 9dc887d91e4b..603224975ca1 100644 --- a/crypto/lhash/lhash.c +++ b/crypto/lhash/lhash.c @@ -1,393 +1,395 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "crypto/ctype.h" #include "crypto/lhash.h" #include "lhash_local.h" /* * A hashing implementation that appears to be based on the linear hashing * algorithm: * https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linear_hashing * * Litwin, Witold (1980), "Linear hashing: A new tool for file and table * addressing", Proc. 6th Conference on Very Large Databases: 212-223 * https://hackthology.com/pdfs/Litwin-1980-Linear_Hashing.pdf * * From the Wikipedia article "Linear hashing is used in the BDB Berkeley * database system, which in turn is used by many software systems such as * OpenLDAP, using a C implementation derived from the CACM article and first * published on the Usenet in 1988 by Esmond Pitt." * * The CACM paper is available here: * https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/ff4d/1c5deca6269cc316bfd952172284dbf610ee.pdf */ #undef MIN_NODES #define MIN_NODES 16 #define UP_LOAD (2*LH_LOAD_MULT) /* load times 256 (default 2) */ #define DOWN_LOAD (LH_LOAD_MULT) /* load times 256 (default 1) */ static int expand(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh); static void contract(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh); static OPENSSL_LH_NODE **getrn(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, const void *data, unsigned long *rhash); OPENSSL_LHASH *OPENSSL_LH_new(OPENSSL_LH_HASHFUNC h, OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC c) { OPENSSL_LHASH *ret; if ((ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) { /* * Do not set the error code, because the ERR code uses LHASH * and we want to avoid possible endless error loop. * CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_LH_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); */ return NULL; } if ((ret->b = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret->b) * MIN_NODES)) == NULL) goto err; ret->comp = ((c == NULL) ? (OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC)strcmp : c); ret->hash = ((h == NULL) ? (OPENSSL_LH_HASHFUNC)OPENSSL_LH_strhash : h); ret->num_nodes = MIN_NODES / 2; ret->num_alloc_nodes = MIN_NODES; ret->pmax = MIN_NODES / 2; ret->up_load = UP_LOAD; ret->down_load = DOWN_LOAD; return ret; err: OPENSSL_free(ret->b); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } void OPENSSL_LH_free(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh) { unsigned int i; OPENSSL_LH_NODE *n, *nn; if (lh == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < lh->num_nodes; i++) { n = lh->b[i]; while (n != NULL) { nn = n->next; OPENSSL_free(n); n = nn; } } OPENSSL_free(lh->b); OPENSSL_free(lh); } void *OPENSSL_LH_insert(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, void *data) { unsigned long hash; OPENSSL_LH_NODE *nn, **rn; void *ret; lh->error = 0; if ((lh->up_load <= (lh->num_items * LH_LOAD_MULT / lh->num_nodes)) && !expand(lh)) return NULL; /* 'lh->error++' already done in 'expand' */ rn = getrn(lh, data, &hash); if (*rn == NULL) { if ((nn = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*nn))) == NULL) { lh->error++; return NULL; } nn->data = data; nn->next = NULL; nn->hash = hash; *rn = nn; ret = NULL; lh->num_insert++; lh->num_items++; } else { /* replace same key */ ret = (*rn)->data; (*rn)->data = data; lh->num_replace++; } return ret; } void *OPENSSL_LH_delete(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, const void *data) { unsigned long hash; OPENSSL_LH_NODE *nn, **rn; void *ret; lh->error = 0; rn = getrn(lh, data, &hash); if (*rn == NULL) { lh->num_no_delete++; return NULL; } else { nn = *rn; *rn = nn->next; ret = nn->data; OPENSSL_free(nn); lh->num_delete++; } lh->num_items--; if ((lh->num_nodes > MIN_NODES) && (lh->down_load >= (lh->num_items * LH_LOAD_MULT / lh->num_nodes))) contract(lh); return ret; } void *OPENSSL_LH_retrieve(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, const void *data) { unsigned long hash; OPENSSL_LH_NODE **rn; void *ret; tsan_store((TSAN_QUALIFIER int *)&lh->error, 0); rn = getrn(lh, data, &hash); if (*rn == NULL) { tsan_counter(&lh->num_retrieve_miss); return NULL; } else { ret = (*rn)->data; tsan_counter(&lh->num_retrieve); } return ret; } static void doall_util_fn(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, int use_arg, OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNC func, OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNCARG func_arg, void *arg) { int i; OPENSSL_LH_NODE *a, *n; if (lh == NULL) return; /* * reverse the order so we search from 'top to bottom' We were having * memory leaks otherwise */ for (i = lh->num_nodes - 1; i >= 0; i--) { a = lh->b[i]; while (a != NULL) { n = a->next; if (use_arg) func_arg(a->data, arg); else func(a->data); a = n; } } } void OPENSSL_LH_doall(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNC func) { doall_util_fn(lh, 0, func, (OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNCARG)0, NULL); } void OPENSSL_LH_doall_arg(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNCARG func, void *arg) { doall_util_fn(lh, 1, (OPENSSL_LH_DOALL_FUNC)0, func, arg); } static int expand(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh) { OPENSSL_LH_NODE **n, **n1, **n2, *np; unsigned int p, pmax, nni, j; unsigned long hash; nni = lh->num_alloc_nodes; p = lh->p; pmax = lh->pmax; if (p + 1 >= pmax) { j = nni * 2; n = OPENSSL_realloc(lh->b, sizeof(OPENSSL_LH_NODE *) * j); if (n == NULL) { lh->error++; return 0; } lh->b = n; memset(n + nni, 0, sizeof(*n) * (j - nni)); lh->pmax = nni; lh->num_alloc_nodes = j; lh->num_expand_reallocs++; lh->p = 0; } else { lh->p++; } lh->num_nodes++; lh->num_expands++; n1 = &(lh->b[p]); n2 = &(lh->b[p + pmax]); *n2 = NULL; for (np = *n1; np != NULL;) { hash = np->hash; if ((hash % nni) != p) { /* move it */ *n1 = (*n1)->next; np->next = *n2; *n2 = np; } else n1 = &((*n1)->next); np = *n1; } return 1; } static void contract(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh) { OPENSSL_LH_NODE **n, *n1, *np; np = lh->b[lh->p + lh->pmax - 1]; lh->b[lh->p + lh->pmax - 1] = NULL; /* 24/07-92 - eay - weird but :-( */ if (lh->p == 0) { n = OPENSSL_realloc(lh->b, (unsigned int)(sizeof(OPENSSL_LH_NODE *) * lh->pmax)); if (n == NULL) { /* fputs("realloc error in lhash",stderr); */ lh->error++; return; } lh->num_contract_reallocs++; lh->num_alloc_nodes /= 2; lh->pmax /= 2; lh->p = lh->pmax - 1; lh->b = n; } else lh->p--; lh->num_nodes--; lh->num_contracts++; n1 = lh->b[(int)lh->p]; if (n1 == NULL) lh->b[(int)lh->p] = np; else { while (n1->next != NULL) n1 = n1->next; n1->next = np; } } static OPENSSL_LH_NODE **getrn(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, const void *data, unsigned long *rhash) { OPENSSL_LH_NODE **ret, *n1; unsigned long hash, nn; OPENSSL_LH_COMPFUNC cf; hash = (*(lh->hash)) (data); tsan_counter(&lh->num_hash_calls); *rhash = hash; nn = hash % lh->pmax; if (nn < lh->p) nn = hash % lh->num_alloc_nodes; cf = lh->comp; ret = &(lh->b[(int)nn]); for (n1 = *ret; n1 != NULL; n1 = n1->next) { tsan_counter(&lh->num_hash_comps); if (n1->hash != hash) { ret = &(n1->next); continue; } tsan_counter(&lh->num_comp_calls); if (cf(n1->data, data) == 0) break; ret = &(n1->next); } return ret; } /* * The following hash seems to work very well on normal text strings no * collisions on /usr/dict/words and it distributes on %2^n quite well, not * as good as MD5, but still good. */ unsigned long OPENSSL_LH_strhash(const char *c) { unsigned long ret = 0; long n; unsigned long v; int r; if ((c == NULL) || (*c == '\0')) return ret; n = 0x100; while (*c) { v = n | (*c); n += 0x100; r = (int)((v >> 2) ^ v) & 0x0f; - ret = (ret << r) | (ret >> (32 - r)); + /* cast to uint64_t to avoid 32 bit shift of 32 bit value */ + ret = (ret << r) | (unsigned long)((uint64_t)ret >> (32 - r)); ret &= 0xFFFFFFFFL; ret ^= v * v; c++; } return (ret >> 16) ^ ret; } unsigned long openssl_lh_strcasehash(const char *c) { unsigned long ret = 0; long n; unsigned long v; int r; if (c == NULL || *c == '\0') return ret; for (n = 0x100; *c != '\0'; n += 0x100) { v = n | ossl_tolower(*c); r = (int)((v >> 2) ^ v) & 0x0f; - ret = (ret << r) | (ret >> (32 - r)); + /* cast to uint64_t to avoid 32 bit shift of 32 bit value */ + ret = (ret << r) | (unsigned long)((uint64_t)ret >> (32 - r)); ret &= 0xFFFFFFFFL; ret ^= v * v; c++; } return (ret >> 16) ^ ret; } unsigned long OPENSSL_LH_num_items(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh) { return lh ? lh->num_items : 0; } unsigned long OPENSSL_LH_get_down_load(const OPENSSL_LHASH *lh) { return lh->down_load; } void OPENSSL_LH_set_down_load(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh, unsigned long down_load) { lh->down_load = down_load; } int OPENSSL_LH_error(OPENSSL_LHASH *lh) { return lh->error; } diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c index 46006fe6cf9c..7e8de727f310 100644 --- a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c +++ b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.c @@ -1,739 +1,740 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "crypto/ctype.h" #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "crypto/objects.h" #include #include "crypto/asn1.h" #include "obj_local.h" /* obj_dat.h is generated from objects.h by obj_dat.pl */ #include "obj_dat.h" DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const ASN1_OBJECT *, unsigned int, sn); DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const ASN1_OBJECT *, unsigned int, ln); DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const ASN1_OBJECT *, unsigned int, obj); #define ADDED_DATA 0 #define ADDED_SNAME 1 #define ADDED_LNAME 2 #define ADDED_NID 3 struct added_obj_st { int type; ASN1_OBJECT *obj; }; static int new_nid = NUM_NID; static LHASH_OF(ADDED_OBJ) *added = NULL; static int sn_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *const *a, const unsigned int *b) { return strcmp((*a)->sn, nid_objs[*b].sn); } IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const ASN1_OBJECT *, unsigned int, sn); static int ln_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *const *a, const unsigned int *b) { return strcmp((*a)->ln, nid_objs[*b].ln); } IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const ASN1_OBJECT *, unsigned int, ln); static unsigned long added_obj_hash(const ADDED_OBJ *ca) { const ASN1_OBJECT *a; int i; unsigned long ret = 0; unsigned char *p; a = ca->obj; switch (ca->type) { case ADDED_DATA: ret = a->length << 20L; p = (unsigned char *)a->data; for (i = 0; i < a->length; i++) ret ^= p[i] << ((i * 3) % 24); break; case ADDED_SNAME: ret = OPENSSL_LH_strhash(a->sn); break; case ADDED_LNAME: ret = OPENSSL_LH_strhash(a->ln); break; case ADDED_NID: ret = a->nid; break; default: /* abort(); */ return 0; } ret &= 0x3fffffffL; ret |= ((unsigned long)ca->type) << 30L; return ret; } static int added_obj_cmp(const ADDED_OBJ *ca, const ADDED_OBJ *cb) { ASN1_OBJECT *a, *b; int i; i = ca->type - cb->type; if (i) return i; a = ca->obj; b = cb->obj; switch (ca->type) { case ADDED_DATA: i = (a->length - b->length); if (i) return i; return memcmp(a->data, b->data, (size_t)a->length); case ADDED_SNAME: if (a->sn == NULL) return -1; else if (b->sn == NULL) return 1; else return strcmp(a->sn, b->sn); case ADDED_LNAME: if (a->ln == NULL) return -1; else if (b->ln == NULL) return 1; else return strcmp(a->ln, b->ln); case ADDED_NID: return a->nid - b->nid; default: /* abort(); */ return 0; } } static int init_added(void) { if (added != NULL) return 1; added = lh_ADDED_OBJ_new(added_obj_hash, added_obj_cmp); return added != NULL; } static void cleanup1_doall(ADDED_OBJ *a) { a->obj->nid = 0; a->obj->flags |= ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC | ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS | ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA; } static void cleanup2_doall(ADDED_OBJ *a) { a->obj->nid++; } static void cleanup3_doall(ADDED_OBJ *a) { if (--a->obj->nid == 0) ASN1_OBJECT_free(a->obj); OPENSSL_free(a); } void obj_cleanup_int(void) { if (added == NULL) return; lh_ADDED_OBJ_set_down_load(added, 0); lh_ADDED_OBJ_doall(added, cleanup1_doall); /* zero counters */ lh_ADDED_OBJ_doall(added, cleanup2_doall); /* set counters */ lh_ADDED_OBJ_doall(added, cleanup3_doall); /* free objects */ lh_ADDED_OBJ_free(added); added = NULL; } int OBJ_new_nid(int num) { int i; i = new_nid; new_nid += num; return i; } int OBJ_add_object(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) { ASN1_OBJECT *o; ADDED_OBJ *ao[4] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }, *aop; int i; if (added == NULL) if (!init_added()) return 0; if ((o = OBJ_dup(obj)) == NULL) goto err; if ((ao[ADDED_NID] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ao[0]))) == NULL) goto err2; if ((o->length != 0) && (obj->data != NULL)) if ((ao[ADDED_DATA] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ao[0]))) == NULL) goto err2; if (o->sn != NULL) if ((ao[ADDED_SNAME] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ao[0]))) == NULL) goto err2; if (o->ln != NULL) if ((ao[ADDED_LNAME] = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ao[0]))) == NULL) goto err2; for (i = ADDED_DATA; i <= ADDED_NID; i++) { if (ao[i] != NULL) { ao[i]->type = i; ao[i]->obj = o; aop = lh_ADDED_OBJ_insert(added, ao[i]); /* memory leak, but should not normally matter */ OPENSSL_free(aop); } } o->flags &= ~(ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC | ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_STRINGS | ASN1_OBJECT_FLAG_DYNAMIC_DATA); return o->nid; err2: OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_ADD_OBJECT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: for (i = ADDED_DATA; i <= ADDED_NID; i++) OPENSSL_free(ao[i]); ASN1_OBJECT_free(o); return NID_undef; } ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_nid2obj(int n) { ADDED_OBJ ad, *adp; ASN1_OBJECT ob; if ((n >= 0) && (n < NUM_NID)) { if ((n != NID_undef) && (nid_objs[n].nid == NID_undef)) { OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2OBJ, OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID); return NULL; } return (ASN1_OBJECT *)&(nid_objs[n]); - } else if (added == NULL) + } else if (added == NULL) { + OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2OBJ, OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID); return NULL; - else { + } else { ad.type = ADDED_NID; ad.obj = &ob; ob.nid = n; adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad); if (adp != NULL) return adp->obj; else { OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2OBJ, OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID); return NULL; } } } const char *OBJ_nid2sn(int n) { ADDED_OBJ ad, *adp; ASN1_OBJECT ob; if ((n >= 0) && (n < NUM_NID)) { if ((n != NID_undef) && (nid_objs[n].nid == NID_undef)) { OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2SN, OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID); return NULL; } return nid_objs[n].sn; } else if (added == NULL) return NULL; else { ad.type = ADDED_NID; ad.obj = &ob; ob.nid = n; adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad); if (adp != NULL) return adp->obj->sn; else { OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2SN, OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID); return NULL; } } } const char *OBJ_nid2ln(int n) { ADDED_OBJ ad, *adp; ASN1_OBJECT ob; if ((n >= 0) && (n < NUM_NID)) { if ((n != NID_undef) && (nid_objs[n].nid == NID_undef)) { OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2LN, OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID); return NULL; } return nid_objs[n].ln; } else if (added == NULL) return NULL; else { ad.type = ADDED_NID; ad.obj = &ob; ob.nid = n; adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad); if (adp != NULL) return adp->obj->ln; else { OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NID2LN, OBJ_R_UNKNOWN_NID); return NULL; } } } static int obj_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *const *ap, const unsigned int *bp) { int j; const ASN1_OBJECT *a = *ap; const ASN1_OBJECT *b = &nid_objs[*bp]; j = (a->length - b->length); if (j) return j; if (a->length == 0) return 0; return memcmp(a->data, b->data, a->length); } IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_CMP_FN(const ASN1_OBJECT *, unsigned int, obj); int OBJ_obj2nid(const ASN1_OBJECT *a) { const unsigned int *op; ADDED_OBJ ad, *adp; if (a == NULL) return NID_undef; if (a->nid != 0) return a->nid; if (a->length == 0) return NID_undef; if (added != NULL) { ad.type = ADDED_DATA; ad.obj = (ASN1_OBJECT *)a; /* XXX: ugly but harmless */ adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad); if (adp != NULL) return adp->obj->nid; } op = OBJ_bsearch_obj(&a, obj_objs, NUM_OBJ); if (op == NULL) return NID_undef; return nid_objs[*op].nid; } /* * Convert an object name into an ASN1_OBJECT if "noname" is not set then * search for short and long names first. This will convert the "dotted" form * into an object: unlike OBJ_txt2nid it can be used with any objects, not * just registered ones. */ ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_txt2obj(const char *s, int no_name) { int nid = NID_undef; ASN1_OBJECT *op; unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p; const unsigned char *cp; int i, j; if (!no_name) { if (((nid = OBJ_sn2nid(s)) != NID_undef) || ((nid = OBJ_ln2nid(s)) != NID_undef)) return OBJ_nid2obj(nid); } /* Work out size of content octets */ i = a2d_ASN1_OBJECT(NULL, 0, s, -1); if (i <= 0) { /* Don't clear the error */ /* * ERR_clear_error(); */ return NULL; } /* Work out total size */ j = ASN1_object_size(0, i, V_ASN1_OBJECT); if (j < 0) return NULL; if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(j)) == NULL) { OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_TXT2OBJ, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } p = buf; /* Write out tag+length */ ASN1_put_object(&p, 0, i, V_ASN1_OBJECT, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL); /* Write out contents */ a2d_ASN1_OBJECT(p, i, s, -1); cp = buf; op = d2i_ASN1_OBJECT(NULL, &cp, j); OPENSSL_free(buf); return op; } int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name) { int i, n = 0, len, nid, first, use_bn; BIGNUM *bl; unsigned long l; const unsigned char *p; char tbuf[DECIMAL_SIZE(i) + DECIMAL_SIZE(l) + 2]; /* Ensure that, at every state, |buf| is NUL-terminated. */ if (buf && buf_len > 0) buf[0] = '\0'; if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL)) return 0; if (!no_name && (nid = OBJ_obj2nid(a)) != NID_undef) { const char *s; s = OBJ_nid2ln(nid); if (s == NULL) s = OBJ_nid2sn(nid); if (s) { if (buf) OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, s, buf_len); n = strlen(s); return n; } } len = a->length; p = a->data; first = 1; bl = NULL; while (len > 0) { l = 0; use_bn = 0; for (;;) { unsigned char c = *p++; len--; if ((len == 0) && (c & 0x80)) goto err; if (use_bn) { if (!BN_add_word(bl, c & 0x7f)) goto err; } else l |= c & 0x7f; if (!(c & 0x80)) break; if (!use_bn && (l > (ULONG_MAX >> 7L))) { if (bl == NULL && (bl = BN_new()) == NULL) goto err; if (!BN_set_word(bl, l)) goto err; use_bn = 1; } if (use_bn) { if (!BN_lshift(bl, bl, 7)) goto err; } else l <<= 7L; } if (first) { first = 0; if (l >= 80) { i = 2; if (use_bn) { if (!BN_sub_word(bl, 80)) goto err; } else l -= 80; } else { i = (int)(l / 40); l -= (long)(i * 40); } if (buf && (buf_len > 1)) { *buf++ = i + '0'; *buf = '\0'; buf_len--; } n++; } if (use_bn) { char *bndec; bndec = BN_bn2dec(bl); if (!bndec) goto err; i = strlen(bndec); if (buf) { if (buf_len > 1) { *buf++ = '.'; *buf = '\0'; buf_len--; } OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, bndec, buf_len); if (i > buf_len) { buf += buf_len; buf_len = 0; } else { buf += i; buf_len -= i; } } n++; n += i; OPENSSL_free(bndec); } else { BIO_snprintf(tbuf, sizeof(tbuf), ".%lu", l); i = strlen(tbuf); if (buf && (buf_len > 0)) { OPENSSL_strlcpy(buf, tbuf, buf_len); if (i > buf_len) { buf += buf_len; buf_len = 0; } else { buf += i; buf_len -= i; } } n += i; l = 0; } } BN_free(bl); return n; err: BN_free(bl); return -1; } int OBJ_txt2nid(const char *s) { ASN1_OBJECT *obj; int nid; obj = OBJ_txt2obj(s, 0); nid = OBJ_obj2nid(obj); ASN1_OBJECT_free(obj); return nid; } int OBJ_ln2nid(const char *s) { ASN1_OBJECT o; const ASN1_OBJECT *oo = &o; ADDED_OBJ ad, *adp; const unsigned int *op; o.ln = s; if (added != NULL) { ad.type = ADDED_LNAME; ad.obj = &o; adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad); if (adp != NULL) return adp->obj->nid; } op = OBJ_bsearch_ln(&oo, ln_objs, NUM_LN); if (op == NULL) return NID_undef; return nid_objs[*op].nid; } int OBJ_sn2nid(const char *s) { ASN1_OBJECT o; const ASN1_OBJECT *oo = &o; ADDED_OBJ ad, *adp; const unsigned int *op; o.sn = s; if (added != NULL) { ad.type = ADDED_SNAME; ad.obj = &o; adp = lh_ADDED_OBJ_retrieve(added, &ad); if (adp != NULL) return adp->obj->nid; } op = OBJ_bsearch_sn(&oo, sn_objs, NUM_SN); if (op == NULL) return NID_undef; return nid_objs[*op].nid; } const void *OBJ_bsearch_(const void *key, const void *base, int num, int size, int (*cmp) (const void *, const void *)) { return OBJ_bsearch_ex_(key, base, num, size, cmp, 0); } const void *OBJ_bsearch_ex_(const void *key, const void *base_, int num, int size, int (*cmp) (const void *, const void *), int flags) { const char *base = base_; int l, h, i = 0, c = 0; const char *p = NULL; if (num == 0) return NULL; l = 0; h = num; while (l < h) { i = (l + h) / 2; p = &(base[i * size]); c = (*cmp) (key, p); if (c < 0) h = i; else if (c > 0) l = i + 1; else break; } #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC /* * THIS IS A KLUDGE - Because the *_obj is sorted in ASCII order, and I * don't have perl (yet), we revert to a *LINEAR* search when the object * wasn't found in the binary search. */ if (c != 0) { for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { p = &(base[i * size]); c = (*cmp) (key, p); if (c == 0 || (c < 0 && (flags & OBJ_BSEARCH_VALUE_ON_NOMATCH))) return p; } } #endif if (c != 0 && !(flags & OBJ_BSEARCH_VALUE_ON_NOMATCH)) p = NULL; else if (c == 0 && (flags & OBJ_BSEARCH_FIRST_VALUE_ON_MATCH)) { while (i > 0 && (*cmp) (key, &(base[(i - 1) * size])) == 0) i--; p = &(base[i * size]); } return p; } /* * Parse a BIO sink to create some extra oid's objects. * Line format: */ int OBJ_create_objects(BIO *in) { char buf[512]; int i, num = 0; char *o, *s, *l = NULL; for (;;) { s = o = NULL; i = BIO_gets(in, buf, 512); if (i <= 0) return num; buf[i - 1] = '\0'; if (!ossl_isalnum(buf[0])) return num; o = s = buf; while (ossl_isdigit(*s) || *s == '.') s++; if (*s != '\0') { *(s++) = '\0'; while (ossl_isspace(*s)) s++; if (*s == '\0') { s = NULL; } else { l = s; while (*l != '\0' && !ossl_isspace(*l)) l++; if (*l != '\0') { *(l++) = '\0'; while (ossl_isspace(*l)) l++; if (*l == '\0') { l = NULL; } } else { l = NULL; } } } else { s = NULL; } if (*o == '\0') return num; if (!OBJ_create(o, s, l)) return num; num++; } } int OBJ_create(const char *oid, const char *sn, const char *ln) { ASN1_OBJECT *tmpoid = NULL; int ok = 0; /* Check to see if short or long name already present */ if ((sn != NULL && OBJ_sn2nid(sn) != NID_undef) || (ln != NULL && OBJ_ln2nid(ln) != NID_undef)) { OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_CREATE, OBJ_R_OID_EXISTS); return 0; } /* Convert numerical OID string to an ASN1_OBJECT structure */ tmpoid = OBJ_txt2obj(oid, 1); if (tmpoid == NULL) return 0; /* If NID is not NID_undef then object already exists */ if (OBJ_obj2nid(tmpoid) != NID_undef) { OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_CREATE, OBJ_R_OID_EXISTS); goto err; } tmpoid->nid = OBJ_new_nid(1); tmpoid->sn = (char *)sn; tmpoid->ln = (char *)ln; ok = OBJ_add_object(tmpoid); tmpoid->sn = NULL; tmpoid->ln = NULL; err: ASN1_OBJECT_free(tmpoid); return ok; } size_t OBJ_length(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) { if (obj == NULL) return 0; return obj->length; } const unsigned char *OBJ_get0_data(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj) { if (obj == NULL) return NULL; return obj->data; } diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h index 24b49a2df258..63bf69e4437d 100644 --- a/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h +++ b/crypto/objects/obj_dat.h @@ -1,5733 +1,5733 @@ /* * WARNING: do not edit! * Generated by crypto/objects/obj_dat.pl * - * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Serialized OID's */ static const unsigned char so[7762] = { 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D, /* [ 0] OBJ_rsadsi */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01, /* [ 6] OBJ_pkcs */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x02, /* [ 13] OBJ_md2 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x05, /* [ 21] OBJ_md5 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x03,0x04, /* [ 29] OBJ_rc4 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x01, /* [ 37] OBJ_rsaEncryption */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x02, /* [ 46] OBJ_md2WithRSAEncryption */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x04, /* [ 55] OBJ_md5WithRSAEncryption */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x01, /* [ 64] OBJ_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x03, /* [ 73] OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC */ 0x55, /* [ 82] OBJ_X500 */ 0x55,0x04, /* [ 83] OBJ_X509 */ 0x55,0x04,0x03, /* [ 85] OBJ_commonName */ 0x55,0x04,0x06, /* [ 88] OBJ_countryName */ 0x55,0x04,0x07, /* [ 91] OBJ_localityName */ 0x55,0x04,0x08, /* [ 94] OBJ_stateOrProvinceName */ 0x55,0x04,0x0A, /* [ 97] OBJ_organizationName */ 0x55,0x04,0x0B, /* [ 100] OBJ_organizationalUnitName */ 0x55,0x08,0x01,0x01, /* [ 103] OBJ_rsa */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x07, /* [ 107] OBJ_pkcs7 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x07,0x01, /* [ 115] OBJ_pkcs7_data */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x07,0x02, /* [ 124] OBJ_pkcs7_signed */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x07,0x03, /* [ 133] OBJ_pkcs7_enveloped */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x07,0x04, /* [ 142] OBJ_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x07,0x05, /* [ 151] OBJ_pkcs7_digest */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x07,0x06, /* [ 160] OBJ_pkcs7_encrypted */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x03, /* [ 169] OBJ_pkcs3 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x03,0x01, /* [ 177] OBJ_dhKeyAgreement */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x06, /* [ 186] OBJ_des_ecb */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x09, /* [ 191] OBJ_des_cfb64 */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x07, /* [ 196] OBJ_des_cbc */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x11, /* [ 201] OBJ_des_ede_ecb */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x81,0x3C,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x02, /* [ 206] OBJ_idea_cbc */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x03,0x02, /* [ 217] OBJ_rc2_cbc */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x12, /* [ 225] OBJ_sha */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x0F, /* [ 230] OBJ_shaWithRSAEncryption */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x03,0x07, /* [ 235] OBJ_des_ede3_cbc */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x08, /* [ 243] OBJ_des_ofb64 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09, /* [ 248] OBJ_pkcs9 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x01, /* [ 256] OBJ_pkcs9_emailAddress */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x02, /* [ 265] OBJ_pkcs9_unstructuredName */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x03, /* [ 274] OBJ_pkcs9_contentType */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x04, /* [ 283] OBJ_pkcs9_messageDigest */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x05, /* [ 292] OBJ_pkcs9_signingTime */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x06, /* [ 301] OBJ_pkcs9_countersignature */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x07, /* [ 310] OBJ_pkcs9_challengePassword */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x08, /* [ 319] OBJ_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x09, /* [ 328] OBJ_pkcs9_extCertAttributes */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42, /* [ 337] OBJ_netscape */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01, /* [ 344] OBJ_netscape_cert_extension */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x02, /* [ 352] OBJ_netscape_data_type */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x1A, /* [ 360] OBJ_sha1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x05, /* [ 365] OBJ_sha1WithRSAEncryption */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x0D, /* [ 374] OBJ_dsaWithSHA */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x0C, /* [ 379] OBJ_dsa_2 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x0B, /* [ 384] OBJ_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x0C, /* [ 393] OBJ_id_pbkdf2 */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x1B, /* [ 402] OBJ_dsaWithSHA1_2 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,0x01, /* [ 407] OBJ_netscape_cert_type */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,0x02, /* [ 416] OBJ_netscape_base_url */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,0x03, /* [ 425] OBJ_netscape_revocation_url */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,0x04, /* [ 434] OBJ_netscape_ca_revocation_url */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,0x07, /* [ 443] OBJ_netscape_renewal_url */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,0x08, /* [ 452] OBJ_netscape_ca_policy_url */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,0x0C, /* [ 461] OBJ_netscape_ssl_server_name */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x01,0x0D, /* [ 470] OBJ_netscape_comment */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x02,0x05, /* [ 479] OBJ_netscape_cert_sequence */ 0x55,0x1D, /* [ 488] OBJ_id_ce */ 0x55,0x1D,0x0E, /* [ 490] OBJ_subject_key_identifier */ 0x55,0x1D,0x0F, /* [ 493] OBJ_key_usage */ 0x55,0x1D,0x10, /* [ 496] OBJ_private_key_usage_period */ 0x55,0x1D,0x11, /* [ 499] OBJ_subject_alt_name */ 0x55,0x1D,0x12, /* [ 502] OBJ_issuer_alt_name */ 0x55,0x1D,0x13, /* [ 505] OBJ_basic_constraints */ 0x55,0x1D,0x14, /* [ 508] OBJ_crl_number */ 0x55,0x1D,0x20, /* [ 511] OBJ_certificate_policies */ 0x55,0x1D,0x23, /* [ 514] OBJ_authority_key_identifier */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x97,0x55,0x01,0x02, /* [ 517] OBJ_bf_cbc */ 0x55,0x08,0x03,0x65, /* [ 526] OBJ_mdc2 */ 0x55,0x08,0x03,0x64, /* [ 530] OBJ_mdc2WithRSA */ 0x55,0x04,0x2A, /* [ 534] OBJ_givenName */ 0x55,0x04,0x04, /* [ 537] OBJ_surname */ 0x55,0x04,0x2B, /* [ 540] OBJ_initials */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x2C, /* [ 543] OBJ_uniqueIdentifier */ 0x55,0x1D,0x1F, /* [ 553] OBJ_crl_distribution_points */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x03, /* [ 556] OBJ_md5WithRSA */ 0x55,0x04,0x05, /* [ 561] OBJ_serialNumber */ 0x55,0x04,0x0C, /* [ 564] OBJ_title */ 0x55,0x04,0x0D, /* [ 567] OBJ_description */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF6,0x7D,0x07,0x42,0x0A, /* [ 570] OBJ_cast5_cbc */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF6,0x7D,0x07,0x42,0x0C, /* [ 579] OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x38,0x04,0x03, /* [ 588] OBJ_dsaWithSHA1 */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x1D, /* [ 595] OBJ_sha1WithRSA */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x38,0x04,0x01, /* [ 600] OBJ_dsa */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x02,0x01, /* [ 607] OBJ_ripemd160 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x01,0x02, /* [ 612] OBJ_ripemd160WithRSA */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x03,0x08, /* [ 618] OBJ_rc5_cbc */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x08, /* [ 626] OBJ_zlib_compression */ 0x55,0x1D,0x25, /* [ 637] OBJ_ext_key_usage */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07, /* [ 640] OBJ_id_pkix */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03, /* [ 646] OBJ_id_kp */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x01, /* [ 653] OBJ_server_auth */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x02, /* [ 661] OBJ_client_auth */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x03, /* [ 669] OBJ_code_sign */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x04, /* [ 677] OBJ_email_protect */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x08, /* [ 685] OBJ_time_stamp */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x02,0x01,0x15, /* [ 693] OBJ_ms_code_ind */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x02,0x01,0x16, /* [ 703] OBJ_ms_code_com */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x0A,0x03,0x01, /* [ 713] OBJ_ms_ctl_sign */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x0A,0x03,0x03, /* [ 723] OBJ_ms_sgc */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x0A,0x03,0x04, /* [ 733] OBJ_ms_efs */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x86,0xF8,0x42,0x04,0x01, /* [ 743] OBJ_ns_sgc */ 0x55,0x1D,0x1B, /* [ 752] OBJ_delta_crl */ 0x55,0x1D,0x15, /* [ 755] OBJ_crl_reason */ 0x55,0x1D,0x18, /* [ 758] OBJ_invalidity_date */ 0x2B,0x65,0x01,0x04,0x01, /* [ 761] OBJ_sxnet */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x01,0x01, /* [ 766] OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x01,0x02, /* [ 776] OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x01,0x03, /* [ 786] OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x01,0x04, /* [ 796] OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x01,0x05, /* [ 806] OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x01,0x06, /* [ 816] OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x0A,0x01,0x01, /* [ 826] OBJ_keyBag */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x0A,0x01,0x02, /* [ 837] OBJ_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x0A,0x01,0x03, /* [ 848] OBJ_certBag */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x0A,0x01,0x04, /* [ 859] OBJ_crlBag */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x0A,0x01,0x05, /* [ 870] OBJ_secretBag */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x0C,0x0A,0x01,0x06, /* [ 881] OBJ_safeContentsBag */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x14, /* [ 892] OBJ_friendlyName */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x15, /* [ 901] OBJ_localKeyID */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x16,0x01, /* [ 910] OBJ_x509Certificate */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x16,0x02, /* [ 920] OBJ_sdsiCertificate */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x17,0x01, /* [ 930] OBJ_x509Crl */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x0D, /* [ 940] OBJ_pbes2 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x0E, /* [ 949] OBJ_pbmac1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x07, /* [ 958] OBJ_hmacWithSHA1 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x02,0x01, /* [ 966] OBJ_id_qt_cps */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x02,0x02, /* [ 974] OBJ_id_qt_unotice */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x0F, /* [ 982] OBJ_SMIMECapabilities */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x04, /* [ 991] OBJ_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x06, /* [ 1000] OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05,0x0A, /* [ 1009] OBJ_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x02,0x01,0x0E, /* [ 1018] OBJ_ms_ext_req */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x0E, /* [ 1028] OBJ_ext_req */ 0x55,0x04,0x29, /* [ 1037] OBJ_name */ 0x55,0x04,0x2E, /* [ 1040] OBJ_dnQualifier */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01, /* [ 1043] OBJ_id_pe */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30, /* [ 1050] OBJ_id_ad */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x01, /* [ 1057] OBJ_info_access */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01, /* [ 1065] OBJ_ad_OCSP */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x02, /* [ 1073] OBJ_ad_ca_issuers */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x09, /* [ 1081] OBJ_OCSP_sign */ 0x2A, /* [ 1089] OBJ_member_body */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48, /* [ 1090] OBJ_ISO_US */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x38, /* [ 1093] OBJ_X9_57 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x38,0x04, /* [ 1098] OBJ_X9cm */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01, /* [ 1104] OBJ_pkcs1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x05, /* [ 1112] OBJ_pkcs5 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10, /* [ 1120] OBJ_SMIME */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00, /* [ 1129] OBJ_id_smime_mod */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01, /* [ 1139] OBJ_id_smime_ct */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02, /* [ 1149] OBJ_id_smime_aa */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03, /* [ 1159] OBJ_id_smime_alg */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x04, /* [ 1169] OBJ_id_smime_cd */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x05, /* [ 1179] OBJ_id_smime_spq */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x06, /* [ 1189] OBJ_id_smime_cti */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,0x01, /* [ 1199] OBJ_id_smime_mod_cms */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,0x02, /* [ 1210] OBJ_id_smime_mod_ess */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,0x03, /* [ 1221] OBJ_id_smime_mod_oid */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,0x04, /* [ 1232] OBJ_id_smime_mod_msg_v3 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,0x05, /* [ 1243] OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_88 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,0x06, /* [ 1254] OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_97 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,0x07, /* [ 1265] OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_88 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x00,0x08, /* [ 1276] OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_97 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x01, /* [ 1287] OBJ_id_smime_ct_receipt */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x02, /* [ 1298] OBJ_id_smime_ct_authData */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x03, /* [ 1309] OBJ_id_smime_ct_publishCert */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x04, /* [ 1320] OBJ_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x05, /* [ 1331] OBJ_id_smime_ct_TDTInfo */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x06, /* [ 1342] OBJ_id_smime_ct_contentInfo */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x07, /* [ 1353] OBJ_id_smime_ct_DVCSRequestData */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x08, /* [ 1364] OBJ_id_smime_ct_DVCSResponseData */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x01, /* [ 1375] OBJ_id_smime_aa_receiptRequest */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x02, /* [ 1386] OBJ_id_smime_aa_securityLabel */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x03, /* [ 1397] OBJ_id_smime_aa_mlExpandHistory */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x04, /* [ 1408] OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentHint */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x05, /* [ 1419] OBJ_id_smime_aa_msgSigDigest */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x06, /* [ 1430] OBJ_id_smime_aa_encapContentType */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x07, /* [ 1441] OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentIdentifier */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x08, /* [ 1452] OBJ_id_smime_aa_macValue */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x09, /* [ 1463] OBJ_id_smime_aa_equivalentLabels */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x0A, /* [ 1474] OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentReference */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x0B, /* [ 1485] OBJ_id_smime_aa_encrypKeyPref */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x0C, /* [ 1496] OBJ_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x0D, /* [ 1507] OBJ_id_smime_aa_smimeEncryptCerts */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x0E, /* [ 1518] OBJ_id_smime_aa_timeStampToken */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x0F, /* [ 1529] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_sigPolicyId */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x10, /* [ 1540] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_commitmentType */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x11, /* [ 1551] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_signerLocation */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x12, /* [ 1562] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_signerAttr */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x13, /* [ 1573] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_otherSigCert */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x14, /* [ 1584] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_contentTimestamp */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x15, /* [ 1595] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_CertificateRefs */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x16, /* [ 1606] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_RevocationRefs */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x17, /* [ 1617] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_certValues */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x18, /* [ 1628] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_revocationValues */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x19, /* [ 1639] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_escTimeStamp */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x1A, /* [ 1650] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_certCRLTimestamp */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x1B, /* [ 1661] OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_archiveTimeStamp */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x1C, /* [ 1672] OBJ_id_smime_aa_signatureType */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x1D, /* [ 1683] OBJ_id_smime_aa_dvcs_dvc */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x01, /* [ 1694] OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDHwith3DES */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x02, /* [ 1705] OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDHwithRC2 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x03, /* [ 1716] OBJ_id_smime_alg_3DESwrap */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x04, /* [ 1727] OBJ_id_smime_alg_RC2wrap */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x05, /* [ 1738] OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDH */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x06, /* [ 1749] OBJ_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x07, /* [ 1760] OBJ_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x04,0x01, /* [ 1771] OBJ_id_smime_cd_ldap */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x05,0x01, /* [ 1782] OBJ_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_uri */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x05,0x02, /* [ 1793] OBJ_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_unotice */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x06,0x01, /* [ 1804] OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfOrigin */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x06,0x02, /* [ 1815] OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfReceipt */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x06,0x03, /* [ 1826] OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfDelivery */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x06,0x04, /* [ 1837] OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfSender */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x06,0x05, /* [ 1848] OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfApproval */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x06,0x06, /* [ 1859] OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfCreation */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x04, /* [ 1870] OBJ_md4 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00, /* [ 1878] OBJ_id_pkix_mod */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x02, /* [ 1885] OBJ_id_qt */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04, /* [ 1892] OBJ_id_it */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05, /* [ 1899] OBJ_id_pkip */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x06, /* [ 1906] OBJ_id_alg */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07, /* [ 1913] OBJ_id_cmc */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x08, /* [ 1920] OBJ_id_on */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09, /* [ 1927] OBJ_id_pda */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A, /* [ 1934] OBJ_id_aca */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0B, /* [ 1941] OBJ_id_qcs */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0C, /* [ 1948] OBJ_id_cct */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x01, /* [ 1955] OBJ_id_pkix1_explicit_88 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x02, /* [ 1963] OBJ_id_pkix1_implicit_88 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x03, /* [ 1971] OBJ_id_pkix1_explicit_93 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x04, /* [ 1979] OBJ_id_pkix1_implicit_93 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x05, /* [ 1987] OBJ_id_mod_crmf */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x06, /* [ 1995] OBJ_id_mod_cmc */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x07, /* [ 2003] OBJ_id_mod_kea_profile_88 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x08, /* [ 2011] OBJ_id_mod_kea_profile_93 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x09, /* [ 2019] OBJ_id_mod_cmp */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x0A, /* [ 2027] OBJ_id_mod_qualified_cert_88 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x0B, /* [ 2035] OBJ_id_mod_qualified_cert_93 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x0C, /* [ 2043] OBJ_id_mod_attribute_cert */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x0D, /* [ 2051] OBJ_id_mod_timestamp_protocol */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x0E, /* [ 2059] OBJ_id_mod_ocsp */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x0F, /* [ 2067] OBJ_id_mod_dvcs */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x00,0x10, /* [ 2075] OBJ_id_mod_cmp2000 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x02, /* [ 2083] OBJ_biometricInfo */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x03, /* [ 2091] OBJ_qcStatements */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x04, /* [ 2099] OBJ_ac_auditEntity */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x05, /* [ 2107] OBJ_ac_targeting */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x06, /* [ 2115] OBJ_aaControls */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x07, /* [ 2123] OBJ_sbgp_ipAddrBlock */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x08, /* [ 2131] OBJ_sbgp_autonomousSysNum */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x09, /* [ 2139] OBJ_sbgp_routerIdentifier */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x02,0x03, /* [ 2147] OBJ_textNotice */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x05, /* [ 2155] OBJ_ipsecEndSystem */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x06, /* [ 2163] OBJ_ipsecTunnel */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x07, /* [ 2171] OBJ_ipsecUser */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x0A, /* [ 2179] OBJ_dvcs */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x01, /* [ 2187] OBJ_id_it_caProtEncCert */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x02, /* [ 2195] OBJ_id_it_signKeyPairTypes */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x03, /* [ 2203] OBJ_id_it_encKeyPairTypes */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x04, /* [ 2211] OBJ_id_it_preferredSymmAlg */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x05, /* [ 2219] OBJ_id_it_caKeyUpdateInfo */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x06, /* [ 2227] OBJ_id_it_currentCRL */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x07, /* [ 2235] OBJ_id_it_unsupportedOIDs */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x08, /* [ 2243] OBJ_id_it_subscriptionRequest */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x09, /* [ 2251] OBJ_id_it_subscriptionResponse */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x0A, /* [ 2259] OBJ_id_it_keyPairParamReq */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x0B, /* [ 2267] OBJ_id_it_keyPairParamRep */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x0C, /* [ 2275] OBJ_id_it_revPassphrase */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x0D, /* [ 2283] OBJ_id_it_implicitConfirm */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x0E, /* [ 2291] OBJ_id_it_confirmWaitTime */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x0F, /* [ 2299] OBJ_id_it_origPKIMessage */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x01, /* [ 2307] OBJ_id_regCtrl */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x02, /* [ 2315] OBJ_id_regInfo */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x01,0x01, /* [ 2323] OBJ_id_regCtrl_regToken */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x01,0x02, /* [ 2332] OBJ_id_regCtrl_authenticator */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x01,0x03, /* [ 2341] OBJ_id_regCtrl_pkiPublicationInfo */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x01,0x04, /* [ 2350] OBJ_id_regCtrl_pkiArchiveOptions */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x01,0x05, /* [ 2359] OBJ_id_regCtrl_oldCertID */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x01,0x06, /* [ 2368] OBJ_id_regCtrl_protocolEncrKey */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x02,0x01, /* [ 2377] OBJ_id_regInfo_utf8Pairs */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x05,0x02,0x02, /* [ 2386] OBJ_id_regInfo_certReq */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x06,0x01, /* [ 2395] OBJ_id_alg_des40 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x06,0x02, /* [ 2403] OBJ_id_alg_noSignature */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x06,0x03, /* [ 2411] OBJ_id_alg_dh_sig_hmac_sha1 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x06,0x04, /* [ 2419] OBJ_id_alg_dh_pop */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x01, /* [ 2427] OBJ_id_cmc_statusInfo */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x02, /* [ 2435] OBJ_id_cmc_identification */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x03, /* [ 2443] OBJ_id_cmc_identityProof */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x04, /* [ 2451] OBJ_id_cmc_dataReturn */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x05, /* [ 2459] OBJ_id_cmc_transactionId */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x06, /* [ 2467] OBJ_id_cmc_senderNonce */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x07, /* [ 2475] OBJ_id_cmc_recipientNonce */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x08, /* [ 2483] OBJ_id_cmc_addExtensions */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x09, /* [ 2491] OBJ_id_cmc_encryptedPOP */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x0A, /* [ 2499] OBJ_id_cmc_decryptedPOP */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x0B, /* [ 2507] OBJ_id_cmc_lraPOPWitness */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x0F, /* [ 2515] OBJ_id_cmc_getCert */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x10, /* [ 2523] OBJ_id_cmc_getCRL */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x11, /* [ 2531] OBJ_id_cmc_revokeRequest */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x12, /* [ 2539] OBJ_id_cmc_regInfo */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x13, /* [ 2547] OBJ_id_cmc_responseInfo */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x15, /* [ 2555] OBJ_id_cmc_queryPending */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x16, /* [ 2563] OBJ_id_cmc_popLinkRandom */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x17, /* [ 2571] OBJ_id_cmc_popLinkWitness */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x07,0x18, /* [ 2579] OBJ_id_cmc_confirmCertAcceptance */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x08,0x01, /* [ 2587] OBJ_id_on_personalData */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,0x01, /* [ 2595] OBJ_id_pda_dateOfBirth */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,0x02, /* [ 2603] OBJ_id_pda_placeOfBirth */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,0x03, /* [ 2611] OBJ_id_pda_gender */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,0x04, /* [ 2619] OBJ_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x09,0x05, /* [ 2627] OBJ_id_pda_countryOfResidence */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x01, /* [ 2635] OBJ_id_aca_authenticationInfo */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x02, /* [ 2643] OBJ_id_aca_accessIdentity */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x03, /* [ 2651] OBJ_id_aca_chargingIdentity */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x04, /* [ 2659] OBJ_id_aca_group */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x05, /* [ 2667] OBJ_id_aca_role */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0B,0x01, /* [ 2675] OBJ_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0C,0x01, /* [ 2683] OBJ_id_cct_crs */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0C,0x02, /* [ 2691] OBJ_id_cct_PKIData */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0C,0x03, /* [ 2699] OBJ_id_cct_PKIResponse */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x03, /* [ 2707] OBJ_ad_timeStamping */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x04, /* [ 2715] OBJ_ad_dvcs */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x01, /* [ 2723] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_basic */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x02, /* [ 2732] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x03, /* [ 2741] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x04, /* [ 2750] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x05, /* [ 2759] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x06, /* [ 2768] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x07, /* [ 2777] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x08, /* [ 2786] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x09, /* [ 2795] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_valid */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x0A, /* [ 2804] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_path */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x01,0x0B, /* [ 2813] OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02, /* [ 2822] OBJ_algorithm */ 0x2B,0x0E,0x03,0x02,0x0B, /* [ 2826] OBJ_rsaSignature */ 0x55,0x08, /* [ 2831] OBJ_X500algorithms */ 0x2B, /* [ 2833] OBJ_org */ 0x2B,0x06, /* [ 2834] OBJ_dod */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01, /* [ 2836] OBJ_iana */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x01, /* [ 2839] OBJ_Directory */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x02, /* [ 2843] OBJ_Management */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x03, /* [ 2847] OBJ_Experimental */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04, /* [ 2851] OBJ_Private */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05, /* [ 2855] OBJ_Security */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x06, /* [ 2859] OBJ_SNMPv2 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x07, /* [ 2863] OBJ_Mail */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01, /* [ 2867] OBJ_Enterprises */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x8B,0x3A,0x82,0x58, /* [ 2872] OBJ_dcObject */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x19, /* [ 2881] OBJ_domainComponent */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x0D, /* [ 2891] OBJ_Domain */ 0x55,0x01,0x05, /* [ 2901] OBJ_selected_attribute_types */ 0x55,0x01,0x05,0x37, /* [ 2904] OBJ_clearance */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x03, /* [ 2908] OBJ_md4WithRSAEncryption */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x0A, /* [ 2917] OBJ_ac_proxying */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x0B, /* [ 2925] OBJ_sinfo_access */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x0A,0x06, /* [ 2933] OBJ_id_aca_encAttrs */ 0x55,0x04,0x48, /* [ 2941] OBJ_role */ 0x55,0x1D,0x24, /* [ 2944] OBJ_policy_constraints */ 0x55,0x1D,0x37, /* [ 2947] OBJ_target_information */ 0x55,0x1D,0x38, /* [ 2950] OBJ_no_rev_avail */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D, /* [ 2953] OBJ_ansi_X9_62 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x01,0x01, /* [ 2958] OBJ_X9_62_prime_field */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x01,0x02, /* [ 2965] OBJ_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x02,0x01, /* [ 2972] OBJ_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x01,0x01, /* [ 2979] OBJ_X9_62_prime192v1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x01,0x02, /* [ 2987] OBJ_X9_62_prime192v2 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x01,0x03, /* [ 2995] OBJ_X9_62_prime192v3 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x01,0x04, /* [ 3003] OBJ_X9_62_prime239v1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x01,0x05, /* [ 3011] OBJ_X9_62_prime239v2 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x01,0x06, /* [ 3019] OBJ_X9_62_prime239v3 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x01,0x07, /* [ 3027] OBJ_X9_62_prime256v1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x04,0x01, /* [ 3035] OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA1 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x11,0x01, /* [ 3042] OBJ_ms_csp_name */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x01, /* [ 3051] OBJ_aes_128_ecb */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x02, /* [ 3060] OBJ_aes_128_cbc */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x03, /* [ 3069] OBJ_aes_128_ofb128 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x04, /* [ 3078] OBJ_aes_128_cfb128 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x15, /* [ 3087] OBJ_aes_192_ecb */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x16, /* [ 3096] OBJ_aes_192_cbc */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x17, /* [ 3105] OBJ_aes_192_ofb128 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x18, /* [ 3114] OBJ_aes_192_cfb128 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x29, /* [ 3123] OBJ_aes_256_ecb */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x2A, /* [ 3132] OBJ_aes_256_cbc */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x2B, /* [ 3141] OBJ_aes_256_ofb128 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x2C, /* [ 3150] OBJ_aes_256_cfb128 */ 0x55,0x1D,0x17, /* [ 3159] OBJ_hold_instruction_code */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x38,0x02,0x01, /* [ 3162] OBJ_hold_instruction_none */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x38,0x02,0x02, /* [ 3169] OBJ_hold_instruction_call_issuer */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x38,0x02,0x03, /* [ 3176] OBJ_hold_instruction_reject */ 0x09, /* [ 3183] OBJ_data */ 0x09,0x92,0x26, /* [ 3184] OBJ_pss */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C, /* [ 3187] OBJ_ucl */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64, /* [ 3194] OBJ_pilot */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01, /* [ 3202] OBJ_pilotAttributeType */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x03, /* [ 3211] OBJ_pilotAttributeSyntax */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04, /* [ 3220] OBJ_pilotObjectClass */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x0A, /* [ 3229] OBJ_pilotGroups */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x03,0x04, /* [ 3238] OBJ_iA5StringSyntax */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x03,0x05, /* [ 3248] OBJ_caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x03, /* [ 3258] OBJ_pilotObject */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x04, /* [ 3268] OBJ_pilotPerson */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x05, /* [ 3278] OBJ_account */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x06, /* [ 3288] OBJ_document */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x07, /* [ 3298] OBJ_room */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x09, /* [ 3308] OBJ_documentSeries */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x0E, /* [ 3318] OBJ_rFC822localPart */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x0F, /* [ 3328] OBJ_dNSDomain */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x11, /* [ 3338] OBJ_domainRelatedObject */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x12, /* [ 3348] OBJ_friendlyCountry */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x13, /* [ 3358] OBJ_simpleSecurityObject */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x14, /* [ 3368] OBJ_pilotOrganization */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x15, /* [ 3378] OBJ_pilotDSA */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x04,0x16, /* [ 3388] OBJ_qualityLabelledData */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x01, /* [ 3398] OBJ_userId */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x02, /* [ 3408] OBJ_textEncodedORAddress */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x03, /* [ 3418] OBJ_rfc822Mailbox */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x04, /* [ 3428] OBJ_info */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x05, /* [ 3438] OBJ_favouriteDrink */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x06, /* [ 3448] OBJ_roomNumber */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x07, /* [ 3458] OBJ_photo */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x08, /* [ 3468] OBJ_userClass */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x09, /* [ 3478] OBJ_host */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x0A, /* [ 3488] OBJ_manager */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x0B, /* [ 3498] OBJ_documentIdentifier */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x0C, /* [ 3508] OBJ_documentTitle */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x0D, /* [ 3518] OBJ_documentVersion */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x0E, /* [ 3528] OBJ_documentAuthor */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x0F, /* [ 3538] OBJ_documentLocation */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x14, /* [ 3548] OBJ_homeTelephoneNumber */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x15, /* [ 3558] OBJ_secretary */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x16, /* [ 3568] OBJ_otherMailbox */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x17, /* [ 3578] OBJ_lastModifiedTime */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x18, /* [ 3588] OBJ_lastModifiedBy */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x1A, /* [ 3598] OBJ_aRecord */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x1B, /* [ 3608] OBJ_pilotAttributeType27 */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x1C, /* [ 3618] OBJ_mXRecord */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x1D, /* [ 3628] OBJ_nSRecord */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x1E, /* [ 3638] OBJ_sOARecord */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x1F, /* [ 3648] OBJ_cNAMERecord */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x25, /* [ 3658] OBJ_associatedDomain */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x26, /* [ 3668] OBJ_associatedName */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x27, /* [ 3678] OBJ_homePostalAddress */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x28, /* [ 3688] OBJ_personalTitle */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x29, /* [ 3698] OBJ_mobileTelephoneNumber */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x2A, /* [ 3708] OBJ_pagerTelephoneNumber */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x2B, /* [ 3718] OBJ_friendlyCountryName */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x2D, /* [ 3728] OBJ_organizationalStatus */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x2E, /* [ 3738] OBJ_janetMailbox */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x2F, /* [ 3748] OBJ_mailPreferenceOption */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x30, /* [ 3758] OBJ_buildingName */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x31, /* [ 3768] OBJ_dSAQuality */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x32, /* [ 3778] OBJ_singleLevelQuality */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x33, /* [ 3788] OBJ_subtreeMinimumQuality */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x34, /* [ 3798] OBJ_subtreeMaximumQuality */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x35, /* [ 3808] OBJ_personalSignature */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x36, /* [ 3818] OBJ_dITRedirect */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x37, /* [ 3828] OBJ_audio */ 0x09,0x92,0x26,0x89,0x93,0xF2,0x2C,0x64,0x01,0x38, /* [ 3838] OBJ_documentPublisher */ 0x55,0x04,0x2D, /* [ 3848] OBJ_x500UniqueIdentifier */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x07,0x01, /* [ 3851] OBJ_mime_mhs */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x07,0x01,0x01, /* [ 3856] OBJ_mime_mhs_headings */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x07,0x01,0x02, /* [ 3862] OBJ_mime_mhs_bodies */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x01, /* [ 3868] OBJ_id_hex_partial_message */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x02, /* [ 3875] OBJ_id_hex_multipart_message */ 0x55,0x04,0x2C, /* [ 3882] OBJ_generationQualifier */ 0x55,0x04,0x41, /* [ 3885] OBJ_pseudonym */ 0x67,0x2A, /* [ 3888] OBJ_id_set */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00, /* [ 3890] OBJ_set_ctype */ 0x67,0x2A,0x01, /* [ 3893] OBJ_set_msgExt */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03, /* [ 3896] OBJ_set_attr */ 0x67,0x2A,0x05, /* [ 3899] OBJ_set_policy */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07, /* [ 3902] OBJ_set_certExt */ 0x67,0x2A,0x08, /* [ 3905] OBJ_set_brand */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x00, /* [ 3908] OBJ_setct_PANData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x01, /* [ 3912] OBJ_setct_PANToken */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x02, /* [ 3916] OBJ_setct_PANOnly */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x03, /* [ 3920] OBJ_setct_OIData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x04, /* [ 3924] OBJ_setct_PI */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x05, /* [ 3928] OBJ_setct_PIData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x06, /* [ 3932] OBJ_setct_PIDataUnsigned */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x07, /* [ 3936] OBJ_setct_HODInput */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x08, /* [ 3940] OBJ_setct_AuthResBaggage */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x09, /* [ 3944] OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqBaggage */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x0A, /* [ 3948] OBJ_setct_AuthRevResBaggage */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x0B, /* [ 3952] OBJ_setct_CapTokenSeq */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x0C, /* [ 3956] OBJ_setct_PInitResData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x0D, /* [ 3960] OBJ_setct_PI_TBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x0E, /* [ 3964] OBJ_setct_PResData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x10, /* [ 3968] OBJ_setct_AuthReqTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x11, /* [ 3972] OBJ_setct_AuthResTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x12, /* [ 3976] OBJ_setct_AuthResTBSX */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x13, /* [ 3980] OBJ_setct_AuthTokenTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x14, /* [ 3984] OBJ_setct_CapTokenData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x15, /* [ 3988] OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x16, /* [ 3992] OBJ_setct_AcqCardCodeMsg */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x17, /* [ 3996] OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x18, /* [ 4000] OBJ_setct_AuthRevResData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x19, /* [ 4004] OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x1A, /* [ 4008] OBJ_setct_CapReqTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x1B, /* [ 4012] OBJ_setct_CapReqTBSX */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x1C, /* [ 4016] OBJ_setct_CapResData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x1D, /* [ 4020] OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x1E, /* [ 4024] OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBSX */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x1F, /* [ 4028] OBJ_setct_CapRevResData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x20, /* [ 4032] OBJ_setct_CredReqTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x21, /* [ 4036] OBJ_setct_CredReqTBSX */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x22, /* [ 4040] OBJ_setct_CredResData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x23, /* [ 4044] OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x24, /* [ 4048] OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBSX */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x25, /* [ 4052] OBJ_setct_CredRevResData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x26, /* [ 4056] OBJ_setct_PCertReqData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x27, /* [ 4060] OBJ_setct_PCertResTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x28, /* [ 4064] OBJ_setct_BatchAdminReqData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x29, /* [ 4068] OBJ_setct_BatchAdminResData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x2A, /* [ 4072] OBJ_setct_CardCInitResTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x2B, /* [ 4076] OBJ_setct_MeAqCInitResTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x2C, /* [ 4080] OBJ_setct_RegFormResTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x2D, /* [ 4084] OBJ_setct_CertReqData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x2E, /* [ 4088] OBJ_setct_CertReqTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x2F, /* [ 4092] OBJ_setct_CertResData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x30, /* [ 4096] OBJ_setct_CertInqReqTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x31, /* [ 4100] OBJ_setct_ErrorTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x32, /* [ 4104] OBJ_setct_PIDualSignedTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x33, /* [ 4108] OBJ_setct_PIUnsignedTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x34, /* [ 4112] OBJ_setct_AuthReqTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x35, /* [ 4116] OBJ_setct_AuthResTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x36, /* [ 4120] OBJ_setct_AuthResTBEX */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x37, /* [ 4124] OBJ_setct_AuthTokenTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x38, /* [ 4128] OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x39, /* [ 4132] OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBEX */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x3A, /* [ 4136] OBJ_setct_AcqCardCodeMsgTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x3B, /* [ 4140] OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x3C, /* [ 4144] OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x3D, /* [ 4148] OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBEB */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x3E, /* [ 4152] OBJ_setct_CapReqTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x3F, /* [ 4156] OBJ_setct_CapReqTBEX */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x40, /* [ 4160] OBJ_setct_CapResTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x41, /* [ 4164] OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x42, /* [ 4168] OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBEX */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x43, /* [ 4172] OBJ_setct_CapRevResTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x44, /* [ 4176] OBJ_setct_CredReqTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x45, /* [ 4180] OBJ_setct_CredReqTBEX */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x46, /* [ 4184] OBJ_setct_CredResTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x47, /* [ 4188] OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x48, /* [ 4192] OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBEX */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x49, /* [ 4196] OBJ_setct_CredRevResTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x4A, /* [ 4200] OBJ_setct_BatchAdminReqTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x4B, /* [ 4204] OBJ_setct_BatchAdminResTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x4C, /* [ 4208] OBJ_setct_RegFormReqTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x4D, /* [ 4212] OBJ_setct_CertReqTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x4E, /* [ 4216] OBJ_setct_CertReqTBEX */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x4F, /* [ 4220] OBJ_setct_CertResTBE */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x50, /* [ 4224] OBJ_setct_CRLNotificationTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x51, /* [ 4228] OBJ_setct_CRLNotificationResTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x00,0x52, /* [ 4232] OBJ_setct_BCIDistributionTBS */ 0x67,0x2A,0x01,0x01, /* [ 4236] OBJ_setext_genCrypt */ 0x67,0x2A,0x01,0x03, /* [ 4240] OBJ_setext_miAuth */ 0x67,0x2A,0x01,0x04, /* [ 4244] OBJ_setext_pinSecure */ 0x67,0x2A,0x01,0x05, /* [ 4248] OBJ_setext_pinAny */ 0x67,0x2A,0x01,0x07, /* [ 4252] OBJ_setext_track2 */ 0x67,0x2A,0x01,0x08, /* [ 4256] OBJ_setext_cv */ 0x67,0x2A,0x05,0x00, /* [ 4260] OBJ_set_policy_root */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x00, /* [ 4264] OBJ_setCext_hashedRoot */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x01, /* [ 4268] OBJ_setCext_certType */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x02, /* [ 4272] OBJ_setCext_merchData */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x03, /* [ 4276] OBJ_setCext_cCertRequired */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x04, /* [ 4280] OBJ_setCext_tunneling */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x05, /* [ 4284] OBJ_setCext_setExt */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x06, /* [ 4288] OBJ_setCext_setQualf */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x07, /* [ 4292] OBJ_setCext_PGWYcapabilities */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x08, /* [ 4296] OBJ_setCext_TokenIdentifier */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x09, /* [ 4300] OBJ_setCext_Track2Data */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x0A, /* [ 4304] OBJ_setCext_TokenType */ 0x67,0x2A,0x07,0x0B, /* [ 4308] OBJ_setCext_IssuerCapabilities */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x00, /* [ 4312] OBJ_setAttr_Cert */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x01, /* [ 4316] OBJ_setAttr_PGWYcap */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x02, /* [ 4320] OBJ_setAttr_TokenType */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03, /* [ 4324] OBJ_setAttr_IssCap */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x00,0x00, /* [ 4328] OBJ_set_rootKeyThumb */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x00,0x01, /* [ 4333] OBJ_set_addPolicy */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x02,0x01, /* [ 4338] OBJ_setAttr_Token_EMV */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x02,0x02, /* [ 4343] OBJ_setAttr_Token_B0Prime */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,0x03, /* [ 4348] OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_CVM */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,0x04, /* [ 4353] OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_T2 */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,0x05, /* [ 4358] OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_Sig */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,0x03,0x01, /* [ 4363] OBJ_setAttr_GenCryptgrm */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,0x04,0x01, /* [ 4369] OBJ_setAttr_T2Enc */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,0x04,0x02, /* [ 4375] OBJ_setAttr_T2cleartxt */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,0x05,0x01, /* [ 4381] OBJ_setAttr_TokICCsig */ 0x67,0x2A,0x03,0x03,0x05,0x02, /* [ 4387] OBJ_setAttr_SecDevSig */ 0x67,0x2A,0x08,0x01, /* [ 4393] OBJ_set_brand_IATA_ATA */ 0x67,0x2A,0x08,0x1E, /* [ 4397] OBJ_set_brand_Diners */ 0x67,0x2A,0x08,0x22, /* [ 4401] OBJ_set_brand_AmericanExpress */ 0x67,0x2A,0x08,0x23, /* [ 4405] OBJ_set_brand_JCB */ 0x67,0x2A,0x08,0x04, /* [ 4409] OBJ_set_brand_Visa */ 0x67,0x2A,0x08,0x05, /* [ 4413] OBJ_set_brand_MasterCard */ 0x67,0x2A,0x08,0xAE,0x7B, /* [ 4417] OBJ_set_brand_Novus */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x03,0x0A, /* [ 4422] OBJ_des_cdmf */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x06, /* [ 4430] OBJ_rsaOAEPEncryptionSET */ 0x67, /* [ 4439] OBJ_international_organizations */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x14,0x02,0x02, /* [ 4440] OBJ_ms_smartcard_login */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x14,0x02,0x03, /* [ 4450] OBJ_ms_upn */ 0x55,0x04,0x09, /* [ 4460] OBJ_streetAddress */ 0x55,0x04,0x11, /* [ 4463] OBJ_postalCode */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x15, /* [ 4466] OBJ_id_ppl */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x0E, /* [ 4473] OBJ_proxyCertInfo */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x15,0x00, /* [ 4481] OBJ_id_ppl_anyLanguage */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x15,0x01, /* [ 4489] OBJ_id_ppl_inheritAll */ 0x55,0x1D,0x1E, /* [ 4497] OBJ_name_constraints */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x15,0x02, /* [ 4500] OBJ_Independent */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x0B, /* [ 4508] OBJ_sha256WithRSAEncryption */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x0C, /* [ 4517] OBJ_sha384WithRSAEncryption */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x0D, /* [ 4526] OBJ_sha512WithRSAEncryption */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x0E, /* [ 4535] OBJ_sha224WithRSAEncryption */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x01, /* [ 4544] OBJ_sha256 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x02, /* [ 4553] OBJ_sha384 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x03, /* [ 4562] OBJ_sha512 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x04, /* [ 4571] OBJ_sha224 */ 0x2B, /* [ 4580] OBJ_identified_organization */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04, /* [ 4581] OBJ_certicom_arc */ 0x67,0x2B, /* [ 4584] OBJ_wap */ 0x67,0x2B,0x01, /* [ 4586] OBJ_wap_wsg */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x01,0x02,0x03, /* [ 4589] OBJ_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x01,0x02,0x03,0x01, /* [ 4597] OBJ_X9_62_onBasis */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x01,0x02,0x03,0x02, /* [ 4606] OBJ_X9_62_tpBasis */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x01,0x02,0x03,0x03, /* [ 4615] OBJ_X9_62_ppBasis */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x01, /* [ 4624] OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x02, /* [ 4632] OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v2 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x03, /* [ 4640] OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v3 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x04, /* [ 4648] OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb176v1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x05, /* [ 4656] OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x06, /* [ 4664] OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v2 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x07, /* [ 4672] OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v3 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x08, /* [ 4680] OBJ_X9_62_c2onb191v4 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x09, /* [ 4688] OBJ_X9_62_c2onb191v5 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x0A, /* [ 4696] OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb208w1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x0B, /* [ 4704] OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x0C, /* [ 4712] OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v2 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x0D, /* [ 4720] OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v3 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x0E, /* [ 4728] OBJ_X9_62_c2onb239v4 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x0F, /* [ 4736] OBJ_X9_62_c2onb239v5 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x10, /* [ 4744] OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb272w1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x11, /* [ 4752] OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb304w1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x12, /* [ 4760] OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb359v1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x13, /* [ 4768] OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb368w1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x03,0x00,0x14, /* [ 4776] OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb431r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x06, /* [ 4784] OBJ_secp112r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x07, /* [ 4789] OBJ_secp112r2 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x1C, /* [ 4794] OBJ_secp128r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x1D, /* [ 4799] OBJ_secp128r2 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x09, /* [ 4804] OBJ_secp160k1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x08, /* [ 4809] OBJ_secp160r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x1E, /* [ 4814] OBJ_secp160r2 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x1F, /* [ 4819] OBJ_secp192k1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x20, /* [ 4824] OBJ_secp224k1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x21, /* [ 4829] OBJ_secp224r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x0A, /* [ 4834] OBJ_secp256k1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x22, /* [ 4839] OBJ_secp384r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x23, /* [ 4844] OBJ_secp521r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x04, /* [ 4849] OBJ_sect113r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x05, /* [ 4854] OBJ_sect113r2 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x16, /* [ 4859] OBJ_sect131r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x17, /* [ 4864] OBJ_sect131r2 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x01, /* [ 4869] OBJ_sect163k1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x02, /* [ 4874] OBJ_sect163r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x0F, /* [ 4879] OBJ_sect163r2 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x18, /* [ 4884] OBJ_sect193r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x19, /* [ 4889] OBJ_sect193r2 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x1A, /* [ 4894] OBJ_sect233k1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x1B, /* [ 4899] OBJ_sect233r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x03, /* [ 4904] OBJ_sect239k1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x10, /* [ 4909] OBJ_sect283k1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x11, /* [ 4914] OBJ_sect283r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x24, /* [ 4919] OBJ_sect409k1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x25, /* [ 4924] OBJ_sect409r1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x26, /* [ 4929] OBJ_sect571k1 */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x00,0x27, /* [ 4934] OBJ_sect571r1 */ 0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x01, /* [ 4939] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1 */ 0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x03, /* [ 4944] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3 */ 0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x04, /* [ 4949] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4 */ 0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x05, /* [ 4954] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5 */ 0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x06, /* [ 4959] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6 */ 0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x07, /* [ 4964] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7 */ 0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x08, /* [ 4969] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8 */ 0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x09, /* [ 4974] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9 */ 0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x0A, /* [ 4979] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10 */ 0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x0B, /* [ 4984] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11 */ 0x67,0x2B,0x01,0x04,0x0C, /* [ 4989] OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12 */ 0x55,0x1D,0x20,0x00, /* [ 4994] OBJ_any_policy */ 0x55,0x1D,0x21, /* [ 4998] OBJ_policy_mappings */ 0x55,0x1D,0x36, /* [ 5001] OBJ_inhibit_any_policy */ 0x2A,0x83,0x08,0x8C,0x9A,0x4B,0x3D,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x02, /* [ 5004] OBJ_camellia_128_cbc */ 0x2A,0x83,0x08,0x8C,0x9A,0x4B,0x3D,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x03, /* [ 5015] OBJ_camellia_192_cbc */ 0x2A,0x83,0x08,0x8C,0x9A,0x4B,0x3D,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x04, /* [ 5026] OBJ_camellia_256_cbc */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x01, /* [ 5037] OBJ_camellia_128_ecb */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x15, /* [ 5045] OBJ_camellia_192_ecb */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x29, /* [ 5053] OBJ_camellia_256_ecb */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x04, /* [ 5061] OBJ_camellia_128_cfb128 */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x18, /* [ 5069] OBJ_camellia_192_cfb128 */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x2C, /* [ 5077] OBJ_camellia_256_cfb128 */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x03, /* [ 5085] OBJ_camellia_128_ofb128 */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x17, /* [ 5093] OBJ_camellia_192_ofb128 */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x2B, /* [ 5101] OBJ_camellia_256_ofb128 */ 0x55,0x1D,0x09, /* [ 5109] OBJ_subject_directory_attributes */ 0x55,0x1D,0x1C, /* [ 5112] OBJ_issuing_distribution_point */ 0x55,0x1D,0x1D, /* [ 5115] OBJ_certificate_issuer */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x44, /* [ 5118] OBJ_kisa */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x44,0x01,0x03, /* [ 5124] OBJ_seed_ecb */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x44,0x01,0x04, /* [ 5132] OBJ_seed_cbc */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x44,0x01,0x06, /* [ 5140] OBJ_seed_ofb128 */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x44,0x01,0x05, /* [ 5148] OBJ_seed_cfb128 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x08,0x01,0x01, /* [ 5156] OBJ_hmac_md5 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x08,0x01,0x02, /* [ 5164] OBJ_hmac_sha1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF6,0x7D,0x07,0x42,0x0D, /* [ 5172] OBJ_id_PasswordBasedMAC */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF6,0x7D,0x07,0x42,0x1E, /* [ 5181] OBJ_id_DHBasedMac */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x04,0x10, /* [ 5190] OBJ_id_it_suppLangTags */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x30,0x05, /* [ 5198] OBJ_caRepository */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x09, /* [ 5206] OBJ_id_smime_ct_compressedData */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x1B, /* [ 5217] OBJ_id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x05, /* [ 5228] OBJ_id_aes128_wrap */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x19, /* [ 5237] OBJ_id_aes192_wrap */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x2D, /* [ 5246] OBJ_id_aes256_wrap */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x04,0x02, /* [ 5255] OBJ_ecdsa_with_Recommended */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x04,0x03, /* [ 5262] OBJ_ecdsa_with_Specified */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x04,0x03,0x01, /* [ 5269] OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA224 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x04,0x03,0x02, /* [ 5277] OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA256 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x04,0x03,0x03, /* [ 5285] OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA384 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3D,0x04,0x03,0x04, /* [ 5293] OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA512 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x06, /* [ 5301] OBJ_hmacWithMD5 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x08, /* [ 5309] OBJ_hmacWithSHA224 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x09, /* [ 5317] OBJ_hmacWithSHA256 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x0A, /* [ 5325] OBJ_hmacWithSHA384 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x0B, /* [ 5333] OBJ_hmacWithSHA512 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x03,0x01, /* [ 5341] OBJ_dsa_with_SHA224 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x03,0x02, /* [ 5350] OBJ_dsa_with_SHA256 */ 0x28,0xCF,0x06,0x03,0x00,0x37, /* [ 5359] OBJ_whirlpool */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02, /* [ 5365] OBJ_cryptopro */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x09, /* [ 5370] OBJ_cryptocom */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x03, /* [ 5375] OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x04, /* [ 5381] OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x09, /* [ 5387] OBJ_id_GostR3411_94 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x0A, /* [ 5393] OBJ_id_HMACGostR3411_94 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x13, /* [ 5399] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x14, /* [ 5405] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x15, /* [ 5411] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x16, /* [ 5417] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_MAC */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x17, /* [ 5423] OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_prf */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x62, /* [ 5429] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001DH */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x63, /* [ 5435] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94DH */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x0E,0x01, /* [ 5441] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_KeyMeshing */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x0E,0x00, /* [ 5448] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_None_KeyMeshing */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1E,0x00, /* [ 5455] OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_TestParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1E,0x01, /* [ 5462] OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1F,0x00, /* [ 5469] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_TestParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1F,0x01, /* [ 5476] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1F,0x02, /* [ 5483] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1F,0x03, /* [ 5490] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1F,0x04, /* [ 5497] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1F,0x05, /* [ 5504] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_1_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1F,0x06, /* [ 5511] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_0_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x1F,0x07, /* [ 5518] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_RIC_1_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x20,0x00, /* [ 5525] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_TestParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x20,0x02, /* [ 5532] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x20,0x03, /* [ 5539] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x20,0x04, /* [ 5546] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x20,0x05, /* [ 5553] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x21,0x01, /* [ 5560] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x21,0x02, /* [ 5567] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x21,0x03, /* [ 5574] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchC_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x23,0x00, /* [ 5581] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_TestParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x23,0x01, /* [ 5588] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x23,0x02, /* [ 5595] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x23,0x03, /* [ 5602] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x24,0x00, /* [ 5609] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x24,0x01, /* [ 5616] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x14,0x01, /* [ 5623] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_a */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x14,0x02, /* [ 5630] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_aBis */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x14,0x03, /* [ 5637] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_b */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x02,0x14,0x04, /* [ 5644] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_bBis */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x09,0x01,0x06,0x01, /* [ 5651] OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_cc */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x09,0x01,0x05,0x03, /* [ 5659] OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_cc */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x09,0x01,0x05,0x04, /* [ 5667] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_cc */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x09,0x01,0x03,0x03, /* [ 5675] OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x09,0x01,0x03,0x04, /* [ 5683] OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x02,0x09,0x01,0x08,0x01, /* [ 5691] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_ParamSet_cc */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x11,0x02, /* [ 5699] OBJ_LocalKeySet */ 0x55,0x1D,0x2E, /* [ 5708] OBJ_freshest_crl */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x08,0x03, /* [ 5711] OBJ_id_on_permanentIdentifier */ 0x55,0x04,0x0E, /* [ 5719] OBJ_searchGuide */ 0x55,0x04,0x0F, /* [ 5722] OBJ_businessCategory */ 0x55,0x04,0x10, /* [ 5725] OBJ_postalAddress */ 0x55,0x04,0x12, /* [ 5728] OBJ_postOfficeBox */ 0x55,0x04,0x13, /* [ 5731] OBJ_physicalDeliveryOfficeName */ 0x55,0x04,0x14, /* [ 5734] OBJ_telephoneNumber */ 0x55,0x04,0x15, /* [ 5737] OBJ_telexNumber */ 0x55,0x04,0x16, /* [ 5740] OBJ_teletexTerminalIdentifier */ 0x55,0x04,0x17, /* [ 5743] OBJ_facsimileTelephoneNumber */ 0x55,0x04,0x18, /* [ 5746] OBJ_x121Address */ 0x55,0x04,0x19, /* [ 5749] OBJ_internationaliSDNNumber */ 0x55,0x04,0x1A, /* [ 5752] OBJ_registeredAddress */ 0x55,0x04,0x1B, /* [ 5755] OBJ_destinationIndicator */ 0x55,0x04,0x1C, /* [ 5758] OBJ_preferredDeliveryMethod */ 0x55,0x04,0x1D, /* [ 5761] OBJ_presentationAddress */ 0x55,0x04,0x1E, /* [ 5764] OBJ_supportedApplicationContext */ 0x55,0x04,0x1F, /* [ 5767] OBJ_member */ 0x55,0x04,0x20, /* [ 5770] OBJ_owner */ 0x55,0x04,0x21, /* [ 5773] OBJ_roleOccupant */ 0x55,0x04,0x22, /* [ 5776] OBJ_seeAlso */ 0x55,0x04,0x23, /* [ 5779] OBJ_userPassword */ 0x55,0x04,0x24, /* [ 5782] OBJ_userCertificate */ 0x55,0x04,0x25, /* [ 5785] OBJ_cACertificate */ 0x55,0x04,0x26, /* [ 5788] OBJ_authorityRevocationList */ 0x55,0x04,0x27, /* [ 5791] OBJ_certificateRevocationList */ 0x55,0x04,0x28, /* [ 5794] OBJ_crossCertificatePair */ 0x55,0x04,0x2F, /* [ 5797] OBJ_enhancedSearchGuide */ 0x55,0x04,0x30, /* [ 5800] OBJ_protocolInformation */ 0x55,0x04,0x31, /* [ 5803] OBJ_distinguishedName */ 0x55,0x04,0x32, /* [ 5806] OBJ_uniqueMember */ 0x55,0x04,0x33, /* [ 5809] OBJ_houseIdentifier */ 0x55,0x04,0x34, /* [ 5812] OBJ_supportedAlgorithms */ 0x55,0x04,0x35, /* [ 5815] OBJ_deltaRevocationList */ 0x55,0x04,0x36, /* [ 5818] OBJ_dmdName */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x03,0x09, /* [ 5821] OBJ_id_alg_PWRI_KEK */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x06, /* [ 5832] OBJ_aes_128_gcm */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x07, /* [ 5841] OBJ_aes_128_ccm */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x08, /* [ 5850] OBJ_id_aes128_wrap_pad */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x1A, /* [ 5859] OBJ_aes_192_gcm */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x1B, /* [ 5868] OBJ_aes_192_ccm */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x1C, /* [ 5877] OBJ_id_aes192_wrap_pad */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x2E, /* [ 5886] OBJ_aes_256_gcm */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x2F, /* [ 5895] OBJ_aes_256_ccm */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x01,0x30, /* [ 5904] OBJ_id_aes256_wrap_pad */ 0x2A,0x83,0x08,0x8C,0x9A,0x4B,0x3D,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x02, /* [ 5913] OBJ_id_camellia128_wrap */ 0x2A,0x83,0x08,0x8C,0x9A,0x4B,0x3D,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x03, /* [ 5924] OBJ_id_camellia192_wrap */ 0x2A,0x83,0x08,0x8C,0x9A,0x4B,0x3D,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x04, /* [ 5935] OBJ_id_camellia256_wrap */ 0x55,0x1D,0x25,0x00, /* [ 5946] OBJ_anyExtendedKeyUsage */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x08, /* [ 5950] OBJ_mgf1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x0A, /* [ 5959] OBJ_rsassaPss */ 0x2B,0x6F,0x02,0x8C,0x53,0x00,0x01,0x01, /* [ 5968] OBJ_aes_128_xts */ 0x2B,0x6F,0x02,0x8C,0x53,0x00,0x01,0x02, /* [ 5976] OBJ_aes_256_xts */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x07, /* [ 5984] OBJ_rsaesOaep */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0xCE,0x3E,0x02,0x01, /* [ 5993] OBJ_dhpublicnumber */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x01, /* [ 6000] OBJ_brainpoolP160r1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x02, /* [ 6009] OBJ_brainpoolP160t1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x03, /* [ 6018] OBJ_brainpoolP192r1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x04, /* [ 6027] OBJ_brainpoolP192t1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x05, /* [ 6036] OBJ_brainpoolP224r1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x06, /* [ 6045] OBJ_brainpoolP224t1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x07, /* [ 6054] OBJ_brainpoolP256r1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x08, /* [ 6063] OBJ_brainpoolP256t1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x09, /* [ 6072] OBJ_brainpoolP320r1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x0A, /* [ 6081] OBJ_brainpoolP320t1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x0B, /* [ 6090] OBJ_brainpoolP384r1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x0C, /* [ 6099] OBJ_brainpoolP384t1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x0D, /* [ 6108] OBJ_brainpoolP512r1 */ 0x2B,0x24,0x03,0x03,0x02,0x08,0x01,0x01,0x0E, /* [ 6117] OBJ_brainpoolP512t1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x09, /* [ 6126] OBJ_pSpecified */ 0x2B,0x81,0x05,0x10,0x86,0x48,0x3F,0x00,0x02, /* [ 6135] OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x01,0x0B,0x00, /* [ 6144] OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x01,0x0B,0x01, /* [ 6150] OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x01,0x0B,0x02, /* [ 6156] OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x01,0x0B,0x03, /* [ 6162] OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme */ 0x2B,0x81,0x05,0x10,0x86,0x48,0x3F,0x00,0x03, /* [ 6168] OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x01,0x0E,0x00, /* [ 6177] OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x01,0x0E,0x01, /* [ 6183] OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x01,0x0E,0x02, /* [ 6189] OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme */ 0x2B,0x81,0x04,0x01,0x0E,0x03, /* [ 6195] OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0xD6,0x79,0x02,0x04,0x02, /* [ 6201] OBJ_ct_precert_scts */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0xD6,0x79,0x02,0x04,0x03, /* [ 6211] OBJ_ct_precert_poison */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0xD6,0x79,0x02,0x04,0x04, /* [ 6221] OBJ_ct_precert_signer */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0xD6,0x79,0x02,0x04,0x05, /* [ 6231] OBJ_ct_cert_scts */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x3C,0x02,0x01,0x01, /* [ 6241] OBJ_jurisdictionLocalityName */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x3C,0x02,0x01,0x02, /* [ 6252] OBJ_jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x82,0x37,0x3C,0x02,0x01,0x03, /* [ 6263] OBJ_jurisdictionCountryName */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x06, /* [ 6274] OBJ_camellia_128_gcm */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x07, /* [ 6282] OBJ_camellia_128_ccm */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x09, /* [ 6290] OBJ_camellia_128_ctr */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x0A, /* [ 6298] OBJ_camellia_128_cmac */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x1A, /* [ 6306] OBJ_camellia_192_gcm */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x1B, /* [ 6314] OBJ_camellia_192_ccm */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x1D, /* [ 6322] OBJ_camellia_192_ctr */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x1E, /* [ 6330] OBJ_camellia_192_cmac */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x2E, /* [ 6338] OBJ_camellia_256_gcm */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x2F, /* [ 6346] OBJ_camellia_256_ccm */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x31, /* [ 6354] OBJ_camellia_256_ctr */ 0x03,0xA2,0x31,0x05,0x03,0x01,0x09,0x32, /* [ 6362] OBJ_camellia_256_cmac */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0xDA,0x47,0x04,0x0B, /* [ 6370] OBJ_id_scrypt */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01, /* [ 6379] OBJ_id_tc26 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01, /* [ 6384] OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x01, /* [ 6390] OBJ_id_tc26_sign */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01, /* [ 6397] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2012_256 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x02, /* [ 6405] OBJ_id_GostR3410_2012_512 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x02, /* [ 6413] OBJ_id_tc26_digest */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x02,0x02, /* [ 6420] OBJ_id_GostR3411_2012_256 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x02,0x03, /* [ 6428] OBJ_id_GostR3411_2012_512 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x03, /* [ 6436] OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x02, /* [ 6443] OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x03, /* [ 6451] OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x04, /* [ 6459] OBJ_id_tc26_mac */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x04,0x01, /* [ 6466] OBJ_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x04,0x02, /* [ 6474] OBJ_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x05, /* [ 6482] OBJ_id_tc26_cipher */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x06, /* [ 6489] OBJ_id_tc26_agreement */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x06,0x01, /* [ 6496] OBJ_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_256 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x06,0x02, /* [ 6504] OBJ_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_512 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02, /* [ 6512] OBJ_id_tc26_constants */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x01, /* [ 6518] OBJ_id_tc26_sign_constants */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x01,0x02, /* [ 6525] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x01,0x02,0x00, /* [ 6533] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetTest */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x01,0x02,0x01, /* [ 6542] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x01,0x02,0x02, /* [ 6551] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x02, /* [ 6560] OBJ_id_tc26_digest_constants */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x05, /* [ 6567] OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_constants */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x05,0x01, /* [ 6574] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_28147_constants */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x05,0x01,0x01, /* [ 6582] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x03,0x81,0x03,0x01,0x01, /* [ 6591] OBJ_INN */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x64,0x01, /* [ 6599] OBJ_OGRN */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x64,0x03, /* [ 6604] OBJ_SNILS */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x64,0x6F, /* [ 6609] OBJ_subjectSignTool */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x64,0x70, /* [ 6614] OBJ_issuerSignTool */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x01,0x18, /* [ 6619] OBJ_tlsfeature */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x11, /* [ 6627] OBJ_ipsec_IKE */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x12, /* [ 6635] OBJ_capwapAC */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x13, /* [ 6643] OBJ_capwapWTP */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x15, /* [ 6651] OBJ_sshClient */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x16, /* [ 6659] OBJ_sshServer */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x17, /* [ 6667] OBJ_sendRouter */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x18, /* [ 6675] OBJ_sendProxiedRouter */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x19, /* [ 6683] OBJ_sendOwner */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x1A, /* [ 6691] OBJ_sendProxiedOwner */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x02,0x03, /* [ 6699] OBJ_id_pkinit */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x02,0x03,0x04, /* [ 6705] OBJ_pkInitClientAuth */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x02,0x03,0x05, /* [ 6712] OBJ_pkInitKDC */ 0x2B,0x65,0x6E, /* [ 6719] OBJ_X25519 */ 0x2B,0x65,0x6F, /* [ 6722] OBJ_X448 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x8D,0x3A,0x0C,0x02,0x01,0x10, /* [ 6725] OBJ_blake2b512 */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x04,0x01,0x8D,0x3A,0x0C,0x02,0x02,0x08, /* [ 6736] OBJ_blake2s256 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x13, /* [ 6747] OBJ_id_smime_ct_contentCollection */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x17, /* [ 6758] OBJ_id_smime_ct_authEnvelopedData */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x01,0x1C, /* [ 6769] OBJ_id_ct_xml */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x6E,0x01,0x01,0x01, /* [ 6780] OBJ_aria_128_ecb */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x6E,0x01,0x01,0x02, /* [ 6789] OBJ_aria_128_cbc */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x6E,0x01,0x01,0x03, /* [ 6798] OBJ_aria_128_cfb128 */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x6E,0x01,0x01,0x04, /* [ 6807] OBJ_aria_128_ofb128 */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x6E,0x01,0x01,0x05, /* [ 6816] OBJ_aria_128_ctr */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x6E,0x01,0x01,0x06, /* [ 6825] OBJ_aria_192_ecb */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x6E,0x01,0x01,0x07, /* [ 6834] OBJ_aria_192_cbc */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x6E,0x01,0x01,0x08, /* [ 6843] OBJ_aria_192_cfb128 */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x6E,0x01,0x01,0x09, /* [ 6852] OBJ_aria_192_ofb128 */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x6E,0x01,0x01,0x0A, /* [ 6861] OBJ_aria_192_ctr */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x6E,0x01,0x01,0x0B, /* [ 6870] OBJ_aria_256_ecb */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x6E,0x01,0x01,0x0C, /* [ 6879] OBJ_aria_256_cbc */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x6E,0x01,0x01,0x0D, /* [ 6888] OBJ_aria_256_cfb128 */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x6E,0x01,0x01,0x0E, /* [ 6897] OBJ_aria_256_ofb128 */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x6E,0x01,0x01,0x0F, /* [ 6906] OBJ_aria_256_ctr */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x09,0x10,0x02,0x2F, /* [ 6915] OBJ_id_smime_aa_signingCertificateV2 */ 0x2B,0x65,0x70, /* [ 6926] OBJ_ED25519 */ 0x2B,0x65,0x71, /* [ 6929] OBJ_ED448 */ 0x55,0x04,0x61, /* [ 6932] OBJ_organizationIdentifier */ 0x55,0x04,0x62, /* [ 6935] OBJ_countryCode3c */ 0x55,0x04,0x63, /* [ 6938] OBJ_countryCode3n */ 0x55,0x04,0x64, /* [ 6941] OBJ_dnsName */ 0x2B,0x24,0x08,0x03,0x03, /* [ 6944] OBJ_x509ExtAdmission */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x05, /* [ 6949] OBJ_sha512_224 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x06, /* [ 6958] OBJ_sha512_256 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x07, /* [ 6967] OBJ_sha3_224 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x08, /* [ 6976] OBJ_sha3_256 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x09, /* [ 6985] OBJ_sha3_384 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x0A, /* [ 6994] OBJ_sha3_512 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x0B, /* [ 7003] OBJ_shake128 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x0C, /* [ 7012] OBJ_shake256 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x0D, /* [ 7021] OBJ_hmac_sha3_224 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x0E, /* [ 7030] OBJ_hmac_sha3_256 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x0F, /* [ 7039] OBJ_hmac_sha3_384 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x02,0x10, /* [ 7048] OBJ_hmac_sha3_512 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x03,0x03, /* [ 7057] OBJ_dsa_with_SHA384 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x03,0x04, /* [ 7066] OBJ_dsa_with_SHA512 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x03,0x05, /* [ 7075] OBJ_dsa_with_SHA3_224 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x03,0x06, /* [ 7084] OBJ_dsa_with_SHA3_256 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x03,0x07, /* [ 7093] OBJ_dsa_with_SHA3_384 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x03,0x08, /* [ 7102] OBJ_dsa_with_SHA3_512 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x03,0x09, /* [ 7111] OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA3_224 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x03,0x0A, /* [ 7120] OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA3_256 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x03,0x0B, /* [ 7129] OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA3_384 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x03,0x0C, /* [ 7138] OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA3_512 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x03,0x0D, /* [ 7147] OBJ_RSA_SHA3_224 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x03,0x0E, /* [ 7156] OBJ_RSA_SHA3_256 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x03,0x0F, /* [ 7165] OBJ_RSA_SHA3_384 */ 0x60,0x86,0x48,0x01,0x65,0x03,0x04,0x03,0x10, /* [ 7174] OBJ_RSA_SHA3_512 */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x6E,0x01,0x01,0x25, /* [ 7183] OBJ_aria_128_ccm */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x6E,0x01,0x01,0x26, /* [ 7192] OBJ_aria_192_ccm */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x6E,0x01,0x01,0x27, /* [ 7201] OBJ_aria_256_ccm */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x6E,0x01,0x01,0x22, /* [ 7210] OBJ_aria_128_gcm */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x6E,0x01,0x01,0x23, /* [ 7219] OBJ_aria_192_gcm */ 0x2A,0x83,0x1A,0x8C,0x9A,0x6E,0x01,0x01,0x24, /* [ 7228] OBJ_aria_256_gcm */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x1B, /* [ 7237] OBJ_cmcCA */ 0x2B,0x06,0x01,0x05,0x05,0x07,0x03,0x1C, /* [ 7245] OBJ_cmcRA */ 0x2A,0x81,0x1C,0xCF,0x55,0x01,0x68,0x01, /* [ 7253] OBJ_sm4_ecb */ 0x2A,0x81,0x1C,0xCF,0x55,0x01,0x68,0x02, /* [ 7261] OBJ_sm4_cbc */ 0x2A,0x81,0x1C,0xCF,0x55,0x01,0x68,0x03, /* [ 7269] OBJ_sm4_ofb128 */ 0x2A,0x81,0x1C,0xCF,0x55,0x01,0x68,0x05, /* [ 7277] OBJ_sm4_cfb1 */ 0x2A,0x81,0x1C,0xCF,0x55,0x01,0x68,0x04, /* [ 7285] OBJ_sm4_cfb128 */ 0x2A,0x81,0x1C,0xCF,0x55,0x01,0x68,0x06, /* [ 7293] OBJ_sm4_cfb8 */ 0x2A,0x81,0x1C,0xCF,0x55,0x01,0x68,0x07, /* [ 7301] OBJ_sm4_ctr */ 0x2A,0x81,0x1C, /* [ 7309] OBJ_ISO_CN */ 0x2A,0x81,0x1C,0xCF,0x55, /* [ 7312] OBJ_oscca */ 0x2A,0x81,0x1C,0xCF,0x55,0x01, /* [ 7317] OBJ_sm_scheme */ 0x2A,0x81,0x1C,0xCF,0x55,0x01,0x83,0x11, /* [ 7323] OBJ_sm3 */ 0x2A,0x81,0x1C,0xCF,0x55,0x01,0x83,0x78, /* [ 7331] OBJ_sm3WithRSAEncryption */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x0F, /* [ 7339] OBJ_sha512_224WithRSAEncryption */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x01,0x01,0x10, /* [ 7348] OBJ_sha512_256WithRSAEncryption */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x01,0x01, /* [ 7357] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_constants */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x01, /* [ 7365] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x01,0x02,0x03, /* [ 7374] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC */ 0x2A,0x86,0x24, /* [ 7383] OBJ_ISO_UA */ 0x2A,0x86,0x24,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x01, /* [ 7386] OBJ_ua_pki */ 0x2A,0x86,0x24,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01, /* [ 7393] OBJ_dstu28147 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x24,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x02, /* [ 7403] OBJ_dstu28147_ofb */ 0x2A,0x86,0x24,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x03, /* [ 7414] OBJ_dstu28147_cfb */ 0x2A,0x86,0x24,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x05, /* [ 7425] OBJ_dstu28147_wrap */ 0x2A,0x86,0x24,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x02, /* [ 7436] OBJ_hmacWithDstu34311 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x24,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x02,0x01, /* [ 7446] OBJ_dstu34311 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x24,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x01,0x01, /* [ 7456] OBJ_dstu4145le */ 0x2A,0x86,0x24,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01, /* [ 7467] OBJ_dstu4145be */ 0x2A,0x86,0x24,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x01,0x01,0x02,0x00, /* [ 7480] OBJ_uacurve0 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x24,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x01,0x01,0x02,0x01, /* [ 7493] OBJ_uacurve1 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x24,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x01,0x01,0x02,0x02, /* [ 7506] OBJ_uacurve2 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x24,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x01,0x01,0x02,0x03, /* [ 7519] OBJ_uacurve3 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x24,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x01,0x01,0x02,0x04, /* [ 7532] OBJ_uacurve4 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x24,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x01,0x01,0x02,0x05, /* [ 7545] OBJ_uacurve5 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x24,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x01,0x01,0x02,0x06, /* [ 7558] OBJ_uacurve6 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x24,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x01,0x01,0x02,0x07, /* [ 7571] OBJ_uacurve7 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x24,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x01,0x01,0x02,0x08, /* [ 7584] OBJ_uacurve8 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x24,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x01,0x03,0x01,0x01,0x02,0x09, /* [ 7597] OBJ_uacurve9 */ 0x2B,0x6F, /* [ 7610] OBJ_ieee */ 0x2B,0x6F,0x02,0x8C,0x53, /* [ 7612] OBJ_ieee_siswg */ 0x2A,0x81,0x1C,0xCF,0x55,0x01,0x82,0x2D, /* [ 7617] OBJ_sm2 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x05,0x01, /* [ 7625] OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_magma */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x05,0x01,0x01, /* [ 7633] OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_magma_ctracpkm */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x05,0x01,0x02, /* [ 7642] OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_magma_ctracpkm_omac */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x05,0x02, /* [ 7651] OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x05,0x02,0x01, /* [ 7659] OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik_ctracpkm */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x05,0x02,0x02, /* [ 7668] OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik_ctracpkm_omac */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x07, /* [ 7677] OBJ_id_tc26_wrap */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x07,0x01, /* [ 7684] OBJ_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_magma */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x07,0x01,0x01, /* [ 7692] OBJ_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_magma_kexp15 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x07,0x02, /* [ 7701] OBJ_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x01,0x07,0x02,0x01, /* [ 7709] OBJ_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik_kexp15 */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x02, /* [ 7718] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x03, /* [ 7727] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC */ 0x2A,0x85,0x03,0x07,0x01,0x02,0x01,0x01,0x04, /* [ 7736] OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x0C, /* [ 7745] OBJ_hmacWithSHA512_224 */ 0x2A,0x86,0x48,0x86,0xF7,0x0D,0x02,0x0D, /* [ 7753] OBJ_hmacWithSHA512_256 */ }; #define NUM_NID 1195 static const ASN1_OBJECT nid_objs[NUM_NID] = { {"UNDEF", "undefined", NID_undef}, {"rsadsi", "RSA Data Security, Inc.", NID_rsadsi, 6, &so[0]}, {"pkcs", "RSA Data Security, Inc. PKCS", NID_pkcs, 7, &so[6]}, {"MD2", "md2", NID_md2, 8, &so[13]}, {"MD5", "md5", NID_md5, 8, &so[21]}, {"RC4", "rc4", NID_rc4, 8, &so[29]}, {"rsaEncryption", "rsaEncryption", NID_rsaEncryption, 9, &so[37]}, {"RSA-MD2", "md2WithRSAEncryption", NID_md2WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[46]}, {"RSA-MD5", "md5WithRSAEncryption", NID_md5WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[55]}, {"PBE-MD2-DES", "pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC", NID_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC, 9, &so[64]}, {"PBE-MD5-DES", "pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC", NID_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC, 9, &so[73]}, {"X500", "directory services (X.500)", NID_X500, 1, &so[82]}, {"X509", "X509", NID_X509, 2, &so[83]}, {"CN", "commonName", NID_commonName, 3, &so[85]}, {"C", "countryName", NID_countryName, 3, &so[88]}, {"L", "localityName", NID_localityName, 3, &so[91]}, {"ST", "stateOrProvinceName", NID_stateOrProvinceName, 3, &so[94]}, {"O", "organizationName", NID_organizationName, 3, &so[97]}, {"OU", "organizationalUnitName", NID_organizationalUnitName, 3, &so[100]}, {"RSA", "rsa", NID_rsa, 4, &so[103]}, {"pkcs7", "pkcs7", NID_pkcs7, 8, &so[107]}, {"pkcs7-data", "pkcs7-data", NID_pkcs7_data, 9, &so[115]}, {"pkcs7-signedData", "pkcs7-signedData", NID_pkcs7_signed, 9, &so[124]}, {"pkcs7-envelopedData", "pkcs7-envelopedData", NID_pkcs7_enveloped, 9, &so[133]}, {"pkcs7-signedAndEnvelopedData", "pkcs7-signedAndEnvelopedData", NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped, 9, &so[142]}, {"pkcs7-digestData", "pkcs7-digestData", NID_pkcs7_digest, 9, &so[151]}, {"pkcs7-encryptedData", "pkcs7-encryptedData", NID_pkcs7_encrypted, 9, &so[160]}, {"pkcs3", "pkcs3", NID_pkcs3, 8, &so[169]}, {"dhKeyAgreement", "dhKeyAgreement", NID_dhKeyAgreement, 9, &so[177]}, {"DES-ECB", "des-ecb", NID_des_ecb, 5, &so[186]}, {"DES-CFB", "des-cfb", NID_des_cfb64, 5, &so[191]}, {"DES-CBC", "des-cbc", NID_des_cbc, 5, &so[196]}, {"DES-EDE", "des-ede", NID_des_ede_ecb, 5, &so[201]}, {"DES-EDE3", "des-ede3", NID_des_ede3_ecb}, {"IDEA-CBC", "idea-cbc", NID_idea_cbc, 11, &so[206]}, {"IDEA-CFB", "idea-cfb", NID_idea_cfb64}, {"IDEA-ECB", "idea-ecb", NID_idea_ecb}, {"RC2-CBC", "rc2-cbc", NID_rc2_cbc, 8, &so[217]}, {"RC2-ECB", "rc2-ecb", NID_rc2_ecb}, {"RC2-CFB", "rc2-cfb", NID_rc2_cfb64}, {"RC2-OFB", "rc2-ofb", NID_rc2_ofb64}, {"SHA", "sha", NID_sha, 5, &so[225]}, {"RSA-SHA", "shaWithRSAEncryption", NID_shaWithRSAEncryption, 5, &so[230]}, {"DES-EDE-CBC", "des-ede-cbc", NID_des_ede_cbc}, {"DES-EDE3-CBC", "des-ede3-cbc", NID_des_ede3_cbc, 8, &so[235]}, {"DES-OFB", "des-ofb", NID_des_ofb64, 5, &so[243]}, {"IDEA-OFB", "idea-ofb", NID_idea_ofb64}, {"pkcs9", "pkcs9", NID_pkcs9, 8, &so[248]}, {"emailAddress", "emailAddress", NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, 9, &so[256]}, {"unstructuredName", "unstructuredName", NID_pkcs9_unstructuredName, 9, &so[265]}, {"contentType", "contentType", NID_pkcs9_contentType, 9, &so[274]}, {"messageDigest", "messageDigest", NID_pkcs9_messageDigest, 9, &so[283]}, {"signingTime", "signingTime", NID_pkcs9_signingTime, 9, &so[292]}, {"countersignature", "countersignature", NID_pkcs9_countersignature, 9, &so[301]}, {"challengePassword", "challengePassword", NID_pkcs9_challengePassword, 9, &so[310]}, {"unstructuredAddress", "unstructuredAddress", NID_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress, 9, &so[319]}, {"extendedCertificateAttributes", "extendedCertificateAttributes", NID_pkcs9_extCertAttributes, 9, &so[328]}, {"Netscape", "Netscape Communications Corp.", NID_netscape, 7, &so[337]}, {"nsCertExt", "Netscape Certificate Extension", NID_netscape_cert_extension, 8, &so[344]}, {"nsDataType", "Netscape Data Type", NID_netscape_data_type, 8, &so[352]}, {"DES-EDE-CFB", "des-ede-cfb", NID_des_ede_cfb64}, {"DES-EDE3-CFB", "des-ede3-cfb", NID_des_ede3_cfb64}, {"DES-EDE-OFB", "des-ede-ofb", NID_des_ede_ofb64}, {"DES-EDE3-OFB", "des-ede3-ofb", NID_des_ede3_ofb64}, {"SHA1", "sha1", NID_sha1, 5, &so[360]}, {"RSA-SHA1", "sha1WithRSAEncryption", NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[365]}, {"DSA-SHA", "dsaWithSHA", NID_dsaWithSHA, 5, &so[374]}, {"DSA-old", "dsaEncryption-old", NID_dsa_2, 5, &so[379]}, {"PBE-SHA1-RC2-64", "pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC", NID_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC, 9, &so[384]}, {"PBKDF2", "PBKDF2", NID_id_pbkdf2, 9, &so[393]}, {"DSA-SHA1-old", "dsaWithSHA1-old", NID_dsaWithSHA1_2, 5, &so[402]}, {"nsCertType", "Netscape Cert Type", NID_netscape_cert_type, 9, &so[407]}, {"nsBaseUrl", "Netscape Base Url", NID_netscape_base_url, 9, &so[416]}, {"nsRevocationUrl", "Netscape Revocation Url", NID_netscape_revocation_url, 9, &so[425]}, {"nsCaRevocationUrl", "Netscape CA Revocation Url", NID_netscape_ca_revocation_url, 9, &so[434]}, {"nsRenewalUrl", "Netscape Renewal Url", NID_netscape_renewal_url, 9, &so[443]}, {"nsCaPolicyUrl", "Netscape CA Policy Url", NID_netscape_ca_policy_url, 9, &so[452]}, {"nsSslServerName", "Netscape SSL Server Name", NID_netscape_ssl_server_name, 9, &so[461]}, {"nsComment", "Netscape Comment", NID_netscape_comment, 9, &so[470]}, {"nsCertSequence", "Netscape Certificate Sequence", NID_netscape_cert_sequence, 9, &so[479]}, {"DESX-CBC", "desx-cbc", NID_desx_cbc}, {"id-ce", "id-ce", NID_id_ce, 2, &so[488]}, {"subjectKeyIdentifier", "X509v3 Subject Key Identifier", NID_subject_key_identifier, 3, &so[490]}, {"keyUsage", "X509v3 Key Usage", NID_key_usage, 3, &so[493]}, {"privateKeyUsagePeriod", "X509v3 Private Key Usage Period", NID_private_key_usage_period, 3, &so[496]}, {"subjectAltName", "X509v3 Subject Alternative Name", NID_subject_alt_name, 3, &so[499]}, {"issuerAltName", "X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name", NID_issuer_alt_name, 3, &so[502]}, {"basicConstraints", "X509v3 Basic Constraints", NID_basic_constraints, 3, &so[505]}, {"crlNumber", "X509v3 CRL Number", NID_crl_number, 3, &so[508]}, {"certificatePolicies", "X509v3 Certificate Policies", NID_certificate_policies, 3, &so[511]}, {"authorityKeyIdentifier", "X509v3 Authority Key Identifier", NID_authority_key_identifier, 3, &so[514]}, {"BF-CBC", "bf-cbc", NID_bf_cbc, 9, &so[517]}, {"BF-ECB", "bf-ecb", NID_bf_ecb}, {"BF-CFB", "bf-cfb", NID_bf_cfb64}, {"BF-OFB", "bf-ofb", NID_bf_ofb64}, {"MDC2", "mdc2", NID_mdc2, 4, &so[526]}, {"RSA-MDC2", "mdc2WithRSA", NID_mdc2WithRSA, 4, &so[530]}, {"RC4-40", "rc4-40", NID_rc4_40}, {"RC2-40-CBC", "rc2-40-cbc", NID_rc2_40_cbc}, {"GN", "givenName", NID_givenName, 3, &so[534]}, {"SN", "surname", NID_surname, 3, &so[537]}, {"initials", "initials", NID_initials, 3, &so[540]}, {"uid", "uniqueIdentifier", NID_uniqueIdentifier, 10, &so[543]}, {"crlDistributionPoints", "X509v3 CRL Distribution Points", NID_crl_distribution_points, 3, &so[553]}, {"RSA-NP-MD5", "md5WithRSA", NID_md5WithRSA, 5, &so[556]}, {"serialNumber", "serialNumber", NID_serialNumber, 3, &so[561]}, {"title", "title", NID_title, 3, &so[564]}, {"description", "description", NID_description, 3, &so[567]}, {"CAST5-CBC", "cast5-cbc", NID_cast5_cbc, 9, &so[570]}, {"CAST5-ECB", "cast5-ecb", NID_cast5_ecb}, {"CAST5-CFB", "cast5-cfb", NID_cast5_cfb64}, {"CAST5-OFB", "cast5-ofb", NID_cast5_ofb64}, {"pbeWithMD5AndCast5CBC", "pbeWithMD5AndCast5CBC", NID_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC, 9, &so[579]}, {"DSA-SHA1", "dsaWithSHA1", NID_dsaWithSHA1, 7, &so[588]}, {"MD5-SHA1", "md5-sha1", NID_md5_sha1}, {"RSA-SHA1-2", "sha1WithRSA", NID_sha1WithRSA, 5, &so[595]}, {"DSA", "dsaEncryption", NID_dsa, 7, &so[600]}, {"RIPEMD160", "ripemd160", NID_ripemd160, 5, &so[607]}, { NULL, NULL, NID_undef }, {"RSA-RIPEMD160", "ripemd160WithRSA", NID_ripemd160WithRSA, 6, &so[612]}, {"RC5-CBC", "rc5-cbc", NID_rc5_cbc, 8, &so[618]}, {"RC5-ECB", "rc5-ecb", NID_rc5_ecb}, {"RC5-CFB", "rc5-cfb", NID_rc5_cfb64}, {"RC5-OFB", "rc5-ofb", NID_rc5_ofb64}, { NULL, NULL, NID_undef }, {"ZLIB", "zlib compression", NID_zlib_compression, 11, &so[626]}, {"extendedKeyUsage", "X509v3 Extended Key Usage", NID_ext_key_usage, 3, &so[637]}, {"PKIX", "PKIX", NID_id_pkix, 6, &so[640]}, {"id-kp", "id-kp", NID_id_kp, 7, &so[646]}, {"serverAuth", "TLS Web Server Authentication", NID_server_auth, 8, &so[653]}, {"clientAuth", "TLS Web Client Authentication", NID_client_auth, 8, &so[661]}, {"codeSigning", "Code Signing", NID_code_sign, 8, &so[669]}, {"emailProtection", "E-mail Protection", NID_email_protect, 8, &so[677]}, {"timeStamping", "Time Stamping", NID_time_stamp, 8, &so[685]}, {"msCodeInd", "Microsoft Individual Code Signing", NID_ms_code_ind, 10, &so[693]}, {"msCodeCom", "Microsoft Commercial Code Signing", NID_ms_code_com, 10, &so[703]}, {"msCTLSign", "Microsoft Trust List Signing", NID_ms_ctl_sign, 10, &so[713]}, {"msSGC", "Microsoft Server Gated Crypto", NID_ms_sgc, 10, &so[723]}, {"msEFS", "Microsoft Encrypted File System", NID_ms_efs, 10, &so[733]}, {"nsSGC", "Netscape Server Gated Crypto", NID_ns_sgc, 9, &so[743]}, {"deltaCRL", "X509v3 Delta CRL Indicator", NID_delta_crl, 3, &so[752]}, {"CRLReason", "X509v3 CRL Reason Code", NID_crl_reason, 3, &so[755]}, {"invalidityDate", "Invalidity Date", NID_invalidity_date, 3, &so[758]}, {"SXNetID", "Strong Extranet ID", NID_sxnet, 5, &so[761]}, {"PBE-SHA1-RC4-128", "pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC4", NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4, 10, &so[766]}, {"PBE-SHA1-RC4-40", "pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC4", NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4, 10, &so[776]}, {"PBE-SHA1-3DES", "pbeWithSHA1And3-KeyTripleDES-CBC", NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC, 10, &so[786]}, {"PBE-SHA1-2DES", "pbeWithSHA1And2-KeyTripleDES-CBC", NID_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC, 10, &so[796]}, {"PBE-SHA1-RC2-128", "pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC2-CBC", NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC, 10, &so[806]}, {"PBE-SHA1-RC2-40", "pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC2-CBC", NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC, 10, &so[816]}, {"keyBag", "keyBag", NID_keyBag, 11, &so[826]}, {"pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag", "pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag", NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag, 11, &so[837]}, {"certBag", "certBag", NID_certBag, 11, &so[848]}, {"crlBag", "crlBag", NID_crlBag, 11, &so[859]}, {"secretBag", "secretBag", NID_secretBag, 11, &so[870]}, {"safeContentsBag", "safeContentsBag", NID_safeContentsBag, 11, &so[881]}, {"friendlyName", "friendlyName", NID_friendlyName, 9, &so[892]}, {"localKeyID", "localKeyID", NID_localKeyID, 9, &so[901]}, {"x509Certificate", "x509Certificate", NID_x509Certificate, 10, &so[910]}, {"sdsiCertificate", "sdsiCertificate", NID_sdsiCertificate, 10, &so[920]}, {"x509Crl", "x509Crl", NID_x509Crl, 10, &so[930]}, {"PBES2", "PBES2", NID_pbes2, 9, &so[940]}, {"PBMAC1", "PBMAC1", NID_pbmac1, 9, &so[949]}, {"hmacWithSHA1", "hmacWithSHA1", NID_hmacWithSHA1, 8, &so[958]}, {"id-qt-cps", "Policy Qualifier CPS", NID_id_qt_cps, 8, &so[966]}, {"id-qt-unotice", "Policy Qualifier User Notice", NID_id_qt_unotice, 8, &so[974]}, {"RC2-64-CBC", "rc2-64-cbc", NID_rc2_64_cbc}, {"SMIME-CAPS", "S/MIME Capabilities", NID_SMIMECapabilities, 9, &so[982]}, {"PBE-MD2-RC2-64", "pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC", NID_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC, 9, &so[991]}, {"PBE-MD5-RC2-64", "pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC", NID_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC, 9, &so[1000]}, {"PBE-SHA1-DES", "pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC", NID_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC, 9, &so[1009]}, {"msExtReq", "Microsoft Extension Request", NID_ms_ext_req, 10, &so[1018]}, {"extReq", "Extension Request", NID_ext_req, 9, &so[1028]}, {"name", "name", NID_name, 3, &so[1037]}, {"dnQualifier", "dnQualifier", NID_dnQualifier, 3, &so[1040]}, {"id-pe", "id-pe", NID_id_pe, 7, &so[1043]}, {"id-ad", "id-ad", NID_id_ad, 7, &so[1050]}, {"authorityInfoAccess", "Authority Information Access", NID_info_access, 8, &so[1057]}, {"OCSP", "OCSP", NID_ad_OCSP, 8, &so[1065]}, {"caIssuers", "CA Issuers", NID_ad_ca_issuers, 8, &so[1073]}, {"OCSPSigning", "OCSP Signing", NID_OCSP_sign, 8, &so[1081]}, {"ISO", "iso", NID_iso}, {"member-body", "ISO Member Body", NID_member_body, 1, &so[1089]}, {"ISO-US", "ISO US Member Body", NID_ISO_US, 3, &so[1090]}, {"X9-57", "X9.57", NID_X9_57, 5, &so[1093]}, {"X9cm", "X9.57 CM ?", NID_X9cm, 6, &so[1098]}, {"pkcs1", "pkcs1", NID_pkcs1, 8, &so[1104]}, {"pkcs5", "pkcs5", NID_pkcs5, 8, &so[1112]}, {"SMIME", "S/MIME", NID_SMIME, 9, &so[1120]}, {"id-smime-mod", "id-smime-mod", NID_id_smime_mod, 10, &so[1129]}, {"id-smime-ct", "id-smime-ct", NID_id_smime_ct, 10, &so[1139]}, {"id-smime-aa", "id-smime-aa", NID_id_smime_aa, 10, &so[1149]}, {"id-smime-alg", "id-smime-alg", NID_id_smime_alg, 10, &so[1159]}, {"id-smime-cd", "id-smime-cd", NID_id_smime_cd, 10, &so[1169]}, {"id-smime-spq", "id-smime-spq", NID_id_smime_spq, 10, &so[1179]}, {"id-smime-cti", "id-smime-cti", NID_id_smime_cti, 10, &so[1189]}, {"id-smime-mod-cms", "id-smime-mod-cms", NID_id_smime_mod_cms, 11, &so[1199]}, {"id-smime-mod-ess", "id-smime-mod-ess", NID_id_smime_mod_ess, 11, &so[1210]}, {"id-smime-mod-oid", "id-smime-mod-oid", NID_id_smime_mod_oid, 11, &so[1221]}, {"id-smime-mod-msg-v3", "id-smime-mod-msg-v3", NID_id_smime_mod_msg_v3, 11, &so[1232]}, {"id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-88", "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-88", NID_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_88, 11, &so[1243]}, {"id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-97", "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-97", NID_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_97, 11, &so[1254]}, {"id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-88", "id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-88", NID_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_88, 11, &so[1265]}, {"id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-97", "id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-97", NID_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_97, 11, &so[1276]}, {"id-smime-ct-receipt", "id-smime-ct-receipt", NID_id_smime_ct_receipt, 11, &so[1287]}, {"id-smime-ct-authData", "id-smime-ct-authData", NID_id_smime_ct_authData, 11, &so[1298]}, {"id-smime-ct-publishCert", "id-smime-ct-publishCert", NID_id_smime_ct_publishCert, 11, &so[1309]}, {"id-smime-ct-TSTInfo", "id-smime-ct-TSTInfo", NID_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo, 11, &so[1320]}, {"id-smime-ct-TDTInfo", "id-smime-ct-TDTInfo", NID_id_smime_ct_TDTInfo, 11, &so[1331]}, {"id-smime-ct-contentInfo", "id-smime-ct-contentInfo", NID_id_smime_ct_contentInfo, 11, &so[1342]}, {"id-smime-ct-DVCSRequestData", "id-smime-ct-DVCSRequestData", NID_id_smime_ct_DVCSRequestData, 11, &so[1353]}, {"id-smime-ct-DVCSResponseData", "id-smime-ct-DVCSResponseData", NID_id_smime_ct_DVCSResponseData, 11, &so[1364]}, {"id-smime-aa-receiptRequest", "id-smime-aa-receiptRequest", NID_id_smime_aa_receiptRequest, 11, &so[1375]}, {"id-smime-aa-securityLabel", "id-smime-aa-securityLabel", NID_id_smime_aa_securityLabel, 11, &so[1386]}, {"id-smime-aa-mlExpandHistory", "id-smime-aa-mlExpandHistory", NID_id_smime_aa_mlExpandHistory, 11, &so[1397]}, {"id-smime-aa-contentHint", "id-smime-aa-contentHint", NID_id_smime_aa_contentHint, 11, &so[1408]}, {"id-smime-aa-msgSigDigest", "id-smime-aa-msgSigDigest", NID_id_smime_aa_msgSigDigest, 11, &so[1419]}, {"id-smime-aa-encapContentType", "id-smime-aa-encapContentType", NID_id_smime_aa_encapContentType, 11, &so[1430]}, {"id-smime-aa-contentIdentifier", "id-smime-aa-contentIdentifier", NID_id_smime_aa_contentIdentifier, 11, &so[1441]}, {"id-smime-aa-macValue", "id-smime-aa-macValue", NID_id_smime_aa_macValue, 11, &so[1452]}, {"id-smime-aa-equivalentLabels", "id-smime-aa-equivalentLabels", NID_id_smime_aa_equivalentLabels, 11, &so[1463]}, {"id-smime-aa-contentReference", "id-smime-aa-contentReference", NID_id_smime_aa_contentReference, 11, &so[1474]}, {"id-smime-aa-encrypKeyPref", "id-smime-aa-encrypKeyPref", NID_id_smime_aa_encrypKeyPref, 11, &so[1485]}, {"id-smime-aa-signingCertificate", "id-smime-aa-signingCertificate", NID_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate, 11, &so[1496]}, {"id-smime-aa-smimeEncryptCerts", "id-smime-aa-smimeEncryptCerts", NID_id_smime_aa_smimeEncryptCerts, 11, &so[1507]}, {"id-smime-aa-timeStampToken", "id-smime-aa-timeStampToken", NID_id_smime_aa_timeStampToken, 11, &so[1518]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-sigPolicyId", "id-smime-aa-ets-sigPolicyId", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_sigPolicyId, 11, &so[1529]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-commitmentType", "id-smime-aa-ets-commitmentType", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_commitmentType, 11, &so[1540]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-signerLocation", "id-smime-aa-ets-signerLocation", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_signerLocation, 11, &so[1551]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-signerAttr", "id-smime-aa-ets-signerAttr", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_signerAttr, 11, &so[1562]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-otherSigCert", "id-smime-aa-ets-otherSigCert", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_otherSigCert, 11, &so[1573]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-contentTimestamp", "id-smime-aa-ets-contentTimestamp", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_contentTimestamp, 11, &so[1584]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-CertificateRefs", "id-smime-aa-ets-CertificateRefs", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_CertificateRefs, 11, &so[1595]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-RevocationRefs", "id-smime-aa-ets-RevocationRefs", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_RevocationRefs, 11, &so[1606]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-certValues", "id-smime-aa-ets-certValues", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_certValues, 11, &so[1617]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-revocationValues", "id-smime-aa-ets-revocationValues", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_revocationValues, 11, &so[1628]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-escTimeStamp", "id-smime-aa-ets-escTimeStamp", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_escTimeStamp, 11, &so[1639]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp", "id-smime-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_certCRLTimestamp, 11, &so[1650]}, {"id-smime-aa-ets-archiveTimeStamp", "id-smime-aa-ets-archiveTimeStamp", NID_id_smime_aa_ets_archiveTimeStamp, 11, &so[1661]}, {"id-smime-aa-signatureType", "id-smime-aa-signatureType", NID_id_smime_aa_signatureType, 11, &so[1672]}, {"id-smime-aa-dvcs-dvc", "id-smime-aa-dvcs-dvc", NID_id_smime_aa_dvcs_dvc, 11, &so[1683]}, {"id-smime-alg-ESDHwith3DES", "id-smime-alg-ESDHwith3DES", NID_id_smime_alg_ESDHwith3DES, 11, &so[1694]}, {"id-smime-alg-ESDHwithRC2", "id-smime-alg-ESDHwithRC2", NID_id_smime_alg_ESDHwithRC2, 11, &so[1705]}, {"id-smime-alg-3DESwrap", "id-smime-alg-3DESwrap", NID_id_smime_alg_3DESwrap, 11, &so[1716]}, {"id-smime-alg-RC2wrap", "id-smime-alg-RC2wrap", NID_id_smime_alg_RC2wrap, 11, &so[1727]}, {"id-smime-alg-ESDH", "id-smime-alg-ESDH", NID_id_smime_alg_ESDH, 11, &so[1738]}, {"id-smime-alg-CMS3DESwrap", "id-smime-alg-CMS3DESwrap", NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap, 11, &so[1749]}, {"id-smime-alg-CMSRC2wrap", "id-smime-alg-CMSRC2wrap", NID_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap, 11, &so[1760]}, {"id-smime-cd-ldap", "id-smime-cd-ldap", NID_id_smime_cd_ldap, 11, &so[1771]}, {"id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-uri", "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-uri", NID_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_uri, 11, &so[1782]}, {"id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-unotice", "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-unotice", NID_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_unotice, 11, &so[1793]}, {"id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin", "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin", NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfOrigin, 11, &so[1804]}, {"id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt", "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt", NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfReceipt, 11, &so[1815]}, {"id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery", "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery", NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfDelivery, 11, &so[1826]}, {"id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfSender", "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfSender", NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfSender, 11, &so[1837]}, {"id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfApproval", "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfApproval", NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfApproval, 11, &so[1848]}, {"id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfCreation", "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfCreation", NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfCreation, 11, &so[1859]}, {"MD4", "md4", NID_md4, 8, &so[1870]}, {"id-pkix-mod", "id-pkix-mod", NID_id_pkix_mod, 7, &so[1878]}, {"id-qt", "id-qt", NID_id_qt, 7, &so[1885]}, {"id-it", "id-it", NID_id_it, 7, &so[1892]}, {"id-pkip", "id-pkip", NID_id_pkip, 7, &so[1899]}, {"id-alg", "id-alg", NID_id_alg, 7, &so[1906]}, {"id-cmc", "id-cmc", NID_id_cmc, 7, &so[1913]}, {"id-on", "id-on", NID_id_on, 7, &so[1920]}, {"id-pda", "id-pda", NID_id_pda, 7, &so[1927]}, {"id-aca", "id-aca", NID_id_aca, 7, &so[1934]}, {"id-qcs", "id-qcs", NID_id_qcs, 7, &so[1941]}, {"id-cct", "id-cct", NID_id_cct, 7, &so[1948]}, {"id-pkix1-explicit-88", "id-pkix1-explicit-88", NID_id_pkix1_explicit_88, 8, &so[1955]}, {"id-pkix1-implicit-88", "id-pkix1-implicit-88", NID_id_pkix1_implicit_88, 8, &so[1963]}, {"id-pkix1-explicit-93", "id-pkix1-explicit-93", NID_id_pkix1_explicit_93, 8, &so[1971]}, {"id-pkix1-implicit-93", "id-pkix1-implicit-93", NID_id_pkix1_implicit_93, 8, &so[1979]}, {"id-mod-crmf", "id-mod-crmf", NID_id_mod_crmf, 8, &so[1987]}, {"id-mod-cmc", "id-mod-cmc", NID_id_mod_cmc, 8, &so[1995]}, {"id-mod-kea-profile-88", "id-mod-kea-profile-88", NID_id_mod_kea_profile_88, 8, &so[2003]}, {"id-mod-kea-profile-93", "id-mod-kea-profile-93", NID_id_mod_kea_profile_93, 8, &so[2011]}, {"id-mod-cmp", "id-mod-cmp", NID_id_mod_cmp, 8, &so[2019]}, {"id-mod-qualified-cert-88", "id-mod-qualified-cert-88", NID_id_mod_qualified_cert_88, 8, &so[2027]}, {"id-mod-qualified-cert-93", "id-mod-qualified-cert-93", NID_id_mod_qualified_cert_93, 8, &so[2035]}, {"id-mod-attribute-cert", "id-mod-attribute-cert", NID_id_mod_attribute_cert, 8, &so[2043]}, {"id-mod-timestamp-protocol", "id-mod-timestamp-protocol", NID_id_mod_timestamp_protocol, 8, &so[2051]}, {"id-mod-ocsp", "id-mod-ocsp", NID_id_mod_ocsp, 8, &so[2059]}, {"id-mod-dvcs", "id-mod-dvcs", NID_id_mod_dvcs, 8, &so[2067]}, {"id-mod-cmp2000", "id-mod-cmp2000", NID_id_mod_cmp2000, 8, &so[2075]}, {"biometricInfo", "Biometric Info", NID_biometricInfo, 8, &so[2083]}, {"qcStatements", "qcStatements", NID_qcStatements, 8, &so[2091]}, {"ac-auditEntity", "ac-auditEntity", NID_ac_auditEntity, 8, &so[2099]}, {"ac-targeting", "ac-targeting", NID_ac_targeting, 8, &so[2107]}, {"aaControls", "aaControls", NID_aaControls, 8, &so[2115]}, {"sbgp-ipAddrBlock", "sbgp-ipAddrBlock", NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock, 8, &so[2123]}, {"sbgp-autonomousSysNum", "sbgp-autonomousSysNum", NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum, 8, &so[2131]}, {"sbgp-routerIdentifier", "sbgp-routerIdentifier", NID_sbgp_routerIdentifier, 8, &so[2139]}, {"textNotice", "textNotice", NID_textNotice, 8, &so[2147]}, {"ipsecEndSystem", "IPSec End System", NID_ipsecEndSystem, 8, &so[2155]}, {"ipsecTunnel", "IPSec Tunnel", NID_ipsecTunnel, 8, &so[2163]}, {"ipsecUser", "IPSec User", NID_ipsecUser, 8, &so[2171]}, {"DVCS", "dvcs", NID_dvcs, 8, &so[2179]}, {"id-it-caProtEncCert", "id-it-caProtEncCert", NID_id_it_caProtEncCert, 8, &so[2187]}, {"id-it-signKeyPairTypes", "id-it-signKeyPairTypes", NID_id_it_signKeyPairTypes, 8, &so[2195]}, {"id-it-encKeyPairTypes", "id-it-encKeyPairTypes", NID_id_it_encKeyPairTypes, 8, &so[2203]}, {"id-it-preferredSymmAlg", "id-it-preferredSymmAlg", NID_id_it_preferredSymmAlg, 8, &so[2211]}, {"id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo", "id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo", NID_id_it_caKeyUpdateInfo, 8, &so[2219]}, {"id-it-currentCRL", "id-it-currentCRL", NID_id_it_currentCRL, 8, &so[2227]}, {"id-it-unsupportedOIDs", "id-it-unsupportedOIDs", NID_id_it_unsupportedOIDs, 8, &so[2235]}, {"id-it-subscriptionRequest", "id-it-subscriptionRequest", NID_id_it_subscriptionRequest, 8, &so[2243]}, {"id-it-subscriptionResponse", "id-it-subscriptionResponse", NID_id_it_subscriptionResponse, 8, &so[2251]}, {"id-it-keyPairParamReq", "id-it-keyPairParamReq", NID_id_it_keyPairParamReq, 8, &so[2259]}, {"id-it-keyPairParamRep", "id-it-keyPairParamRep", NID_id_it_keyPairParamRep, 8, &so[2267]}, {"id-it-revPassphrase", "id-it-revPassphrase", NID_id_it_revPassphrase, 8, &so[2275]}, {"id-it-implicitConfirm", "id-it-implicitConfirm", NID_id_it_implicitConfirm, 8, &so[2283]}, {"id-it-confirmWaitTime", "id-it-confirmWaitTime", NID_id_it_confirmWaitTime, 8, &so[2291]}, {"id-it-origPKIMessage", "id-it-origPKIMessage", NID_id_it_origPKIMessage, 8, &so[2299]}, {"id-regCtrl", "id-regCtrl", NID_id_regCtrl, 8, &so[2307]}, {"id-regInfo", "id-regInfo", NID_id_regInfo, 8, &so[2315]}, {"id-regCtrl-regToken", "id-regCtrl-regToken", NID_id_regCtrl_regToken, 9, &so[2323]}, {"id-regCtrl-authenticator", "id-regCtrl-authenticator", NID_id_regCtrl_authenticator, 9, &so[2332]}, {"id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo", "id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo", NID_id_regCtrl_pkiPublicationInfo, 9, &so[2341]}, {"id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions", "id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions", NID_id_regCtrl_pkiArchiveOptions, 9, &so[2350]}, {"id-regCtrl-oldCertID", "id-regCtrl-oldCertID", NID_id_regCtrl_oldCertID, 9, &so[2359]}, {"id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey", "id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey", NID_id_regCtrl_protocolEncrKey, 9, &so[2368]}, {"id-regInfo-utf8Pairs", "id-regInfo-utf8Pairs", NID_id_regInfo_utf8Pairs, 9, &so[2377]}, {"id-regInfo-certReq", "id-regInfo-certReq", NID_id_regInfo_certReq, 9, &so[2386]}, {"id-alg-des40", "id-alg-des40", NID_id_alg_des40, 8, &so[2395]}, {"id-alg-noSignature", "id-alg-noSignature", NID_id_alg_noSignature, 8, &so[2403]}, {"id-alg-dh-sig-hmac-sha1", "id-alg-dh-sig-hmac-sha1", NID_id_alg_dh_sig_hmac_sha1, 8, &so[2411]}, {"id-alg-dh-pop", "id-alg-dh-pop", NID_id_alg_dh_pop, 8, &so[2419]}, {"id-cmc-statusInfo", "id-cmc-statusInfo", NID_id_cmc_statusInfo, 8, &so[2427]}, {"id-cmc-identification", "id-cmc-identification", NID_id_cmc_identification, 8, &so[2435]}, {"id-cmc-identityProof", "id-cmc-identityProof", NID_id_cmc_identityProof, 8, &so[2443]}, {"id-cmc-dataReturn", "id-cmc-dataReturn", NID_id_cmc_dataReturn, 8, &so[2451]}, {"id-cmc-transactionId", "id-cmc-transactionId", NID_id_cmc_transactionId, 8, &so[2459]}, {"id-cmc-senderNonce", "id-cmc-senderNonce", NID_id_cmc_senderNonce, 8, &so[2467]}, {"id-cmc-recipientNonce", "id-cmc-recipientNonce", NID_id_cmc_recipientNonce, 8, &so[2475]}, {"id-cmc-addExtensions", "id-cmc-addExtensions", NID_id_cmc_addExtensions, 8, &so[2483]}, {"id-cmc-encryptedPOP", "id-cmc-encryptedPOP", NID_id_cmc_encryptedPOP, 8, &so[2491]}, {"id-cmc-decryptedPOP", "id-cmc-decryptedPOP", NID_id_cmc_decryptedPOP, 8, &so[2499]}, {"id-cmc-lraPOPWitness", "id-cmc-lraPOPWitness", NID_id_cmc_lraPOPWitness, 8, &so[2507]}, {"id-cmc-getCert", "id-cmc-getCert", NID_id_cmc_getCert, 8, &so[2515]}, {"id-cmc-getCRL", "id-cmc-getCRL", NID_id_cmc_getCRL, 8, &so[2523]}, {"id-cmc-revokeRequest", "id-cmc-revokeRequest", NID_id_cmc_revokeRequest, 8, &so[2531]}, {"id-cmc-regInfo", "id-cmc-regInfo", NID_id_cmc_regInfo, 8, &so[2539]}, {"id-cmc-responseInfo", "id-cmc-responseInfo", NID_id_cmc_responseInfo, 8, &so[2547]}, {"id-cmc-queryPending", "id-cmc-queryPending", NID_id_cmc_queryPending, 8, &so[2555]}, {"id-cmc-popLinkRandom", "id-cmc-popLinkRandom", NID_id_cmc_popLinkRandom, 8, &so[2563]}, {"id-cmc-popLinkWitness", "id-cmc-popLinkWitness", NID_id_cmc_popLinkWitness, 8, &so[2571]}, {"id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance", "id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance", NID_id_cmc_confirmCertAcceptance, 8, &so[2579]}, {"id-on-personalData", "id-on-personalData", NID_id_on_personalData, 8, &so[2587]}, {"id-pda-dateOfBirth", "id-pda-dateOfBirth", NID_id_pda_dateOfBirth, 8, &so[2595]}, {"id-pda-placeOfBirth", "id-pda-placeOfBirth", NID_id_pda_placeOfBirth, 8, &so[2603]}, { NULL, NULL, NID_undef }, {"id-pda-gender", "id-pda-gender", NID_id_pda_gender, 8, &so[2611]}, {"id-pda-countryOfCitizenship", "id-pda-countryOfCitizenship", NID_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship, 8, &so[2619]}, {"id-pda-countryOfResidence", "id-pda-countryOfResidence", NID_id_pda_countryOfResidence, 8, &so[2627]}, {"id-aca-authenticationInfo", "id-aca-authenticationInfo", NID_id_aca_authenticationInfo, 8, &so[2635]}, {"id-aca-accessIdentity", "id-aca-accessIdentity", NID_id_aca_accessIdentity, 8, &so[2643]}, {"id-aca-chargingIdentity", "id-aca-chargingIdentity", NID_id_aca_chargingIdentity, 8, &so[2651]}, {"id-aca-group", "id-aca-group", NID_id_aca_group, 8, &so[2659]}, {"id-aca-role", "id-aca-role", NID_id_aca_role, 8, &so[2667]}, {"id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1", "id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1", NID_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1, 8, &so[2675]}, {"id-cct-crs", "id-cct-crs", NID_id_cct_crs, 8, &so[2683]}, {"id-cct-PKIData", "id-cct-PKIData", NID_id_cct_PKIData, 8, &so[2691]}, {"id-cct-PKIResponse", "id-cct-PKIResponse", NID_id_cct_PKIResponse, 8, &so[2699]}, {"ad_timestamping", "AD Time Stamping", NID_ad_timeStamping, 8, &so[2707]}, {"AD_DVCS", "ad dvcs", NID_ad_dvcs, 8, &so[2715]}, {"basicOCSPResponse", "Basic OCSP Response", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_basic, 9, &so[2723]}, {"Nonce", "OCSP Nonce", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce, 9, &so[2732]}, {"CrlID", "OCSP CRL ID", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID, 9, &so[2741]}, {"acceptableResponses", "Acceptable OCSP Responses", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses, 9, &so[2750]}, {"noCheck", "OCSP No Check", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck, 9, &so[2759]}, {"archiveCutoff", "OCSP Archive Cutoff", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff, 9, &so[2768]}, {"serviceLocator", "OCSP Service Locator", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator, 9, &so[2777]}, {"extendedStatus", "Extended OCSP Status", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus, 9, &so[2786]}, {"valid", "valid", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_valid, 9, &so[2795]}, {"path", "path", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_path, 9, &so[2804]}, {"trustRoot", "Trust Root", NID_id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot, 9, &so[2813]}, {"algorithm", "algorithm", NID_algorithm, 4, &so[2822]}, {"rsaSignature", "rsaSignature", NID_rsaSignature, 5, &so[2826]}, {"X500algorithms", "directory services - algorithms", NID_X500algorithms, 2, &so[2831]}, {"ORG", "org", NID_org, 1, &so[2833]}, {"DOD", "dod", NID_dod, 2, &so[2834]}, {"IANA", "iana", NID_iana, 3, &so[2836]}, {"directory", "Directory", NID_Directory, 4, &so[2839]}, {"mgmt", "Management", NID_Management, 4, &so[2843]}, {"experimental", "Experimental", NID_Experimental, 4, &so[2847]}, {"private", "Private", NID_Private, 4, &so[2851]}, {"security", "Security", NID_Security, 4, &so[2855]}, {"snmpv2", "SNMPv2", NID_SNMPv2, 4, &so[2859]}, {"Mail", "Mail", NID_Mail, 4, &so[2863]}, {"enterprises", "Enterprises", NID_Enterprises, 5, &so[2867]}, {"dcobject", "dcObject", NID_dcObject, 9, &so[2872]}, {"DC", "domainComponent", NID_domainComponent, 10, &so[2881]}, {"domain", "Domain", NID_Domain, 10, &so[2891]}, {"NULL", "NULL", NID_joint_iso_ccitt}, {"selected-attribute-types", "Selected Attribute Types", NID_selected_attribute_types, 3, &so[2901]}, {"clearance", "clearance", NID_clearance, 4, &so[2904]}, {"RSA-MD4", "md4WithRSAEncryption", NID_md4WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[2908]}, {"ac-proxying", "ac-proxying", NID_ac_proxying, 8, &so[2917]}, {"subjectInfoAccess", "Subject Information Access", NID_sinfo_access, 8, &so[2925]}, {"id-aca-encAttrs", "id-aca-encAttrs", NID_id_aca_encAttrs, 8, &so[2933]}, {"role", "role", NID_role, 3, &so[2941]}, {"policyConstraints", "X509v3 Policy Constraints", NID_policy_constraints, 3, &so[2944]}, {"targetInformation", "X509v3 AC Targeting", NID_target_information, 3, &so[2947]}, {"noRevAvail", "X509v3 No Revocation Available", NID_no_rev_avail, 3, &so[2950]}, {"NULL", "NULL", NID_ccitt}, {"ansi-X9-62", "ANSI X9.62", NID_ansi_X9_62, 5, &so[2953]}, {"prime-field", "prime-field", NID_X9_62_prime_field, 7, &so[2958]}, {"characteristic-two-field", "characteristic-two-field", NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 7, &so[2965]}, {"id-ecPublicKey", "id-ecPublicKey", NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey, 7, &so[2972]}, {"prime192v1", "prime192v1", NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 8, &so[2979]}, {"prime192v2", "prime192v2", NID_X9_62_prime192v2, 8, &so[2987]}, {"prime192v3", "prime192v3", NID_X9_62_prime192v3, 8, &so[2995]}, {"prime239v1", "prime239v1", NID_X9_62_prime239v1, 8, &so[3003]}, {"prime239v2", "prime239v2", NID_X9_62_prime239v2, 8, &so[3011]}, {"prime239v3", "prime239v3", NID_X9_62_prime239v3, 8, &so[3019]}, {"prime256v1", "prime256v1", NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 8, &so[3027]}, {"ecdsa-with-SHA1", "ecdsa-with-SHA1", NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, 7, &so[3035]}, {"CSPName", "Microsoft CSP Name", NID_ms_csp_name, 9, &so[3042]}, {"AES-128-ECB", "aes-128-ecb", NID_aes_128_ecb, 9, &so[3051]}, {"AES-128-CBC", "aes-128-cbc", NID_aes_128_cbc, 9, &so[3060]}, {"AES-128-OFB", "aes-128-ofb", NID_aes_128_ofb128, 9, &so[3069]}, {"AES-128-CFB", "aes-128-cfb", NID_aes_128_cfb128, 9, &so[3078]}, {"AES-192-ECB", "aes-192-ecb", NID_aes_192_ecb, 9, &so[3087]}, {"AES-192-CBC", "aes-192-cbc", NID_aes_192_cbc, 9, &so[3096]}, {"AES-192-OFB", "aes-192-ofb", NID_aes_192_ofb128, 9, &so[3105]}, {"AES-192-CFB", "aes-192-cfb", NID_aes_192_cfb128, 9, &so[3114]}, {"AES-256-ECB", "aes-256-ecb", NID_aes_256_ecb, 9, &so[3123]}, {"AES-256-CBC", "aes-256-cbc", NID_aes_256_cbc, 9, &so[3132]}, {"AES-256-OFB", "aes-256-ofb", NID_aes_256_ofb128, 9, &so[3141]}, {"AES-256-CFB", "aes-256-cfb", NID_aes_256_cfb128, 9, &so[3150]}, {"holdInstructionCode", "Hold Instruction Code", NID_hold_instruction_code, 3, &so[3159]}, {"holdInstructionNone", "Hold Instruction None", NID_hold_instruction_none, 7, &so[3162]}, {"holdInstructionCallIssuer", "Hold Instruction Call Issuer", NID_hold_instruction_call_issuer, 7, &so[3169]}, {"holdInstructionReject", "Hold Instruction Reject", NID_hold_instruction_reject, 7, &so[3176]}, {"data", "data", NID_data, 1, &so[3183]}, {"pss", "pss", NID_pss, 3, &so[3184]}, {"ucl", "ucl", NID_ucl, 7, &so[3187]}, {"pilot", "pilot", NID_pilot, 8, &so[3194]}, {"pilotAttributeType", "pilotAttributeType", NID_pilotAttributeType, 9, &so[3202]}, {"pilotAttributeSyntax", "pilotAttributeSyntax", NID_pilotAttributeSyntax, 9, &so[3211]}, {"pilotObjectClass", "pilotObjectClass", NID_pilotObjectClass, 9, &so[3220]}, {"pilotGroups", "pilotGroups", NID_pilotGroups, 9, &so[3229]}, {"iA5StringSyntax", "iA5StringSyntax", NID_iA5StringSyntax, 10, &so[3238]}, {"caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax", "caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax", NID_caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax, 10, &so[3248]}, {"pilotObject", "pilotObject", NID_pilotObject, 10, &so[3258]}, {"pilotPerson", "pilotPerson", NID_pilotPerson, 10, &so[3268]}, {"account", "account", NID_account, 10, &so[3278]}, {"document", "document", NID_document, 10, &so[3288]}, {"room", "room", NID_room, 10, &so[3298]}, {"documentSeries", "documentSeries", NID_documentSeries, 10, &so[3308]}, {"rFC822localPart", "rFC822localPart", NID_rFC822localPart, 10, &so[3318]}, {"dNSDomain", "dNSDomain", NID_dNSDomain, 10, &so[3328]}, {"domainRelatedObject", "domainRelatedObject", NID_domainRelatedObject, 10, &so[3338]}, {"friendlyCountry", "friendlyCountry", NID_friendlyCountry, 10, &so[3348]}, {"simpleSecurityObject", "simpleSecurityObject", NID_simpleSecurityObject, 10, &so[3358]}, {"pilotOrganization", "pilotOrganization", NID_pilotOrganization, 10, &so[3368]}, {"pilotDSA", "pilotDSA", NID_pilotDSA, 10, &so[3378]}, {"qualityLabelledData", "qualityLabelledData", NID_qualityLabelledData, 10, &so[3388]}, {"UID", "userId", NID_userId, 10, &so[3398]}, {"textEncodedORAddress", "textEncodedORAddress", NID_textEncodedORAddress, 10, &so[3408]}, {"mail", "rfc822Mailbox", NID_rfc822Mailbox, 10, &so[3418]}, {"info", "info", NID_info, 10, &so[3428]}, {"favouriteDrink", "favouriteDrink", NID_favouriteDrink, 10, &so[3438]}, {"roomNumber", "roomNumber", NID_roomNumber, 10, &so[3448]}, {"photo", "photo", NID_photo, 10, &so[3458]}, {"userClass", "userClass", NID_userClass, 10, &so[3468]}, {"host", "host", NID_host, 10, &so[3478]}, {"manager", "manager", NID_manager, 10, &so[3488]}, {"documentIdentifier", "documentIdentifier", NID_documentIdentifier, 10, &so[3498]}, {"documentTitle", "documentTitle", NID_documentTitle, 10, &so[3508]}, {"documentVersion", "documentVersion", NID_documentVersion, 10, &so[3518]}, {"documentAuthor", "documentAuthor", NID_documentAuthor, 10, &so[3528]}, {"documentLocation", "documentLocation", NID_documentLocation, 10, &so[3538]}, {"homeTelephoneNumber", "homeTelephoneNumber", NID_homeTelephoneNumber, 10, &so[3548]}, {"secretary", "secretary", NID_secretary, 10, &so[3558]}, {"otherMailbox", "otherMailbox", NID_otherMailbox, 10, &so[3568]}, {"lastModifiedTime", "lastModifiedTime", NID_lastModifiedTime, 10, &so[3578]}, {"lastModifiedBy", "lastModifiedBy", NID_lastModifiedBy, 10, &so[3588]}, {"aRecord", "aRecord", NID_aRecord, 10, &so[3598]}, {"pilotAttributeType27", "pilotAttributeType27", NID_pilotAttributeType27, 10, &so[3608]}, {"mXRecord", "mXRecord", NID_mXRecord, 10, &so[3618]}, {"nSRecord", "nSRecord", NID_nSRecord, 10, &so[3628]}, {"sOARecord", "sOARecord", NID_sOARecord, 10, &so[3638]}, {"cNAMERecord", "cNAMERecord", NID_cNAMERecord, 10, &so[3648]}, {"associatedDomain", "associatedDomain", NID_associatedDomain, 10, &so[3658]}, {"associatedName", "associatedName", NID_associatedName, 10, &so[3668]}, {"homePostalAddress", "homePostalAddress", NID_homePostalAddress, 10, &so[3678]}, {"personalTitle", "personalTitle", NID_personalTitle, 10, &so[3688]}, {"mobileTelephoneNumber", "mobileTelephoneNumber", NID_mobileTelephoneNumber, 10, &so[3698]}, {"pagerTelephoneNumber", "pagerTelephoneNumber", NID_pagerTelephoneNumber, 10, &so[3708]}, {"friendlyCountryName", "friendlyCountryName", NID_friendlyCountryName, 10, &so[3718]}, {"organizationalStatus", "organizationalStatus", NID_organizationalStatus, 10, &so[3728]}, {"janetMailbox", "janetMailbox", NID_janetMailbox, 10, &so[3738]}, {"mailPreferenceOption", "mailPreferenceOption", NID_mailPreferenceOption, 10, &so[3748]}, {"buildingName", "buildingName", NID_buildingName, 10, &so[3758]}, {"dSAQuality", "dSAQuality", NID_dSAQuality, 10, &so[3768]}, {"singleLevelQuality", "singleLevelQuality", NID_singleLevelQuality, 10, &so[3778]}, {"subtreeMinimumQuality", "subtreeMinimumQuality", NID_subtreeMinimumQuality, 10, &so[3788]}, {"subtreeMaximumQuality", "subtreeMaximumQuality", NID_subtreeMaximumQuality, 10, &so[3798]}, {"personalSignature", "personalSignature", NID_personalSignature, 10, &so[3808]}, {"dITRedirect", "dITRedirect", NID_dITRedirect, 10, &so[3818]}, {"audio", "audio", NID_audio, 10, &so[3828]}, {"documentPublisher", "documentPublisher", NID_documentPublisher, 10, &so[3838]}, {"x500UniqueIdentifier", "x500UniqueIdentifier", NID_x500UniqueIdentifier, 3, &so[3848]}, {"mime-mhs", "MIME MHS", NID_mime_mhs, 5, &so[3851]}, {"mime-mhs-headings", "mime-mhs-headings", NID_mime_mhs_headings, 6, &so[3856]}, {"mime-mhs-bodies", "mime-mhs-bodies", NID_mime_mhs_bodies, 6, &so[3862]}, {"id-hex-partial-message", "id-hex-partial-message", NID_id_hex_partial_message, 7, &so[3868]}, {"id-hex-multipart-message", "id-hex-multipart-message", NID_id_hex_multipart_message, 7, &so[3875]}, {"generationQualifier", "generationQualifier", NID_generationQualifier, 3, &so[3882]}, {"pseudonym", "pseudonym", NID_pseudonym, 3, &so[3885]}, { NULL, NULL, NID_undef }, {"id-set", "Secure Electronic Transactions", NID_id_set, 2, &so[3888]}, {"set-ctype", "content types", NID_set_ctype, 3, &so[3890]}, {"set-msgExt", "message extensions", NID_set_msgExt, 3, &so[3893]}, {"set-attr", "set-attr", NID_set_attr, 3, &so[3896]}, {"set-policy", "set-policy", NID_set_policy, 3, &so[3899]}, {"set-certExt", "certificate extensions", NID_set_certExt, 3, &so[3902]}, {"set-brand", "set-brand", NID_set_brand, 3, &so[3905]}, {"setct-PANData", "setct-PANData", NID_setct_PANData, 4, &so[3908]}, {"setct-PANToken", "setct-PANToken", NID_setct_PANToken, 4, &so[3912]}, {"setct-PANOnly", "setct-PANOnly", NID_setct_PANOnly, 4, &so[3916]}, {"setct-OIData", "setct-OIData", NID_setct_OIData, 4, &so[3920]}, {"setct-PI", "setct-PI", NID_setct_PI, 4, &so[3924]}, {"setct-PIData", "setct-PIData", NID_setct_PIData, 4, &so[3928]}, {"setct-PIDataUnsigned", "setct-PIDataUnsigned", NID_setct_PIDataUnsigned, 4, &so[3932]}, {"setct-HODInput", "setct-HODInput", NID_setct_HODInput, 4, &so[3936]}, {"setct-AuthResBaggage", "setct-AuthResBaggage", NID_setct_AuthResBaggage, 4, &so[3940]}, {"setct-AuthRevReqBaggage", "setct-AuthRevReqBaggage", NID_setct_AuthRevReqBaggage, 4, &so[3944]}, {"setct-AuthRevResBaggage", "setct-AuthRevResBaggage", NID_setct_AuthRevResBaggage, 4, &so[3948]}, {"setct-CapTokenSeq", "setct-CapTokenSeq", NID_setct_CapTokenSeq, 4, &so[3952]}, {"setct-PInitResData", "setct-PInitResData", NID_setct_PInitResData, 4, &so[3956]}, {"setct-PI-TBS", "setct-PI-TBS", NID_setct_PI_TBS, 4, &so[3960]}, {"setct-PResData", "setct-PResData", NID_setct_PResData, 4, &so[3964]}, {"setct-AuthReqTBS", "setct-AuthReqTBS", NID_setct_AuthReqTBS, 4, &so[3968]}, {"setct-AuthResTBS", "setct-AuthResTBS", NID_setct_AuthResTBS, 4, &so[3972]}, {"setct-AuthResTBSX", "setct-AuthResTBSX", NID_setct_AuthResTBSX, 4, &so[3976]}, {"setct-AuthTokenTBS", "setct-AuthTokenTBS", NID_setct_AuthTokenTBS, 4, &so[3980]}, {"setct-CapTokenData", "setct-CapTokenData", NID_setct_CapTokenData, 4, &so[3984]}, {"setct-CapTokenTBS", "setct-CapTokenTBS", NID_setct_CapTokenTBS, 4, &so[3988]}, {"setct-AcqCardCodeMsg", "setct-AcqCardCodeMsg", NID_setct_AcqCardCodeMsg, 4, &so[3992]}, {"setct-AuthRevReqTBS", "setct-AuthRevReqTBS", NID_setct_AuthRevReqTBS, 4, &so[3996]}, {"setct-AuthRevResData", "setct-AuthRevResData", NID_setct_AuthRevResData, 4, &so[4000]}, {"setct-AuthRevResTBS", "setct-AuthRevResTBS", NID_setct_AuthRevResTBS, 4, &so[4004]}, {"setct-CapReqTBS", "setct-CapReqTBS", NID_setct_CapReqTBS, 4, &so[4008]}, {"setct-CapReqTBSX", "setct-CapReqTBSX", NID_setct_CapReqTBSX, 4, &so[4012]}, {"setct-CapResData", "setct-CapResData", NID_setct_CapResData, 4, &so[4016]}, {"setct-CapRevReqTBS", "setct-CapRevReqTBS", NID_setct_CapRevReqTBS, 4, &so[4020]}, {"setct-CapRevReqTBSX", "setct-CapRevReqTBSX", NID_setct_CapRevReqTBSX, 4, &so[4024]}, {"setct-CapRevResData", "setct-CapRevResData", NID_setct_CapRevResData, 4, &so[4028]}, {"setct-CredReqTBS", "setct-CredReqTBS", NID_setct_CredReqTBS, 4, &so[4032]}, {"setct-CredReqTBSX", "setct-CredReqTBSX", NID_setct_CredReqTBSX, 4, &so[4036]}, {"setct-CredResData", "setct-CredResData", NID_setct_CredResData, 4, &so[4040]}, {"setct-CredRevReqTBS", "setct-CredRevReqTBS", NID_setct_CredRevReqTBS, 4, &so[4044]}, {"setct-CredRevReqTBSX", "setct-CredRevReqTBSX", NID_setct_CredRevReqTBSX, 4, &so[4048]}, {"setct-CredRevResData", "setct-CredRevResData", NID_setct_CredRevResData, 4, &so[4052]}, {"setct-PCertReqData", "setct-PCertReqData", NID_setct_PCertReqData, 4, &so[4056]}, {"setct-PCertResTBS", "setct-PCertResTBS", NID_setct_PCertResTBS, 4, &so[4060]}, {"setct-BatchAdminReqData", "setct-BatchAdminReqData", NID_setct_BatchAdminReqData, 4, &so[4064]}, {"setct-BatchAdminResData", "setct-BatchAdminResData", NID_setct_BatchAdminResData, 4, &so[4068]}, {"setct-CardCInitResTBS", "setct-CardCInitResTBS", NID_setct_CardCInitResTBS, 4, &so[4072]}, {"setct-MeAqCInitResTBS", "setct-MeAqCInitResTBS", NID_setct_MeAqCInitResTBS, 4, &so[4076]}, {"setct-RegFormResTBS", "setct-RegFormResTBS", NID_setct_RegFormResTBS, 4, &so[4080]}, {"setct-CertReqData", "setct-CertReqData", NID_setct_CertReqData, 4, &so[4084]}, {"setct-CertReqTBS", "setct-CertReqTBS", NID_setct_CertReqTBS, 4, &so[4088]}, {"setct-CertResData", "setct-CertResData", NID_setct_CertResData, 4, &so[4092]}, {"setct-CertInqReqTBS", "setct-CertInqReqTBS", NID_setct_CertInqReqTBS, 4, &so[4096]}, {"setct-ErrorTBS", "setct-ErrorTBS", NID_setct_ErrorTBS, 4, &so[4100]}, {"setct-PIDualSignedTBE", "setct-PIDualSignedTBE", NID_setct_PIDualSignedTBE, 4, &so[4104]}, {"setct-PIUnsignedTBE", "setct-PIUnsignedTBE", NID_setct_PIUnsignedTBE, 4, &so[4108]}, {"setct-AuthReqTBE", "setct-AuthReqTBE", NID_setct_AuthReqTBE, 4, &so[4112]}, {"setct-AuthResTBE", "setct-AuthResTBE", NID_setct_AuthResTBE, 4, &so[4116]}, {"setct-AuthResTBEX", "setct-AuthResTBEX", NID_setct_AuthResTBEX, 4, &so[4120]}, {"setct-AuthTokenTBE", "setct-AuthTokenTBE", NID_setct_AuthTokenTBE, 4, &so[4124]}, {"setct-CapTokenTBE", "setct-CapTokenTBE", NID_setct_CapTokenTBE, 4, &so[4128]}, {"setct-CapTokenTBEX", "setct-CapTokenTBEX", NID_setct_CapTokenTBEX, 4, &so[4132]}, {"setct-AcqCardCodeMsgTBE", "setct-AcqCardCodeMsgTBE", NID_setct_AcqCardCodeMsgTBE, 4, &so[4136]}, {"setct-AuthRevReqTBE", "setct-AuthRevReqTBE", NID_setct_AuthRevReqTBE, 4, &so[4140]}, {"setct-AuthRevResTBE", "setct-AuthRevResTBE", NID_setct_AuthRevResTBE, 4, &so[4144]}, {"setct-AuthRevResTBEB", "setct-AuthRevResTBEB", NID_setct_AuthRevResTBEB, 4, &so[4148]}, {"setct-CapReqTBE", "setct-CapReqTBE", NID_setct_CapReqTBE, 4, &so[4152]}, {"setct-CapReqTBEX", "setct-CapReqTBEX", NID_setct_CapReqTBEX, 4, &so[4156]}, {"setct-CapResTBE", "setct-CapResTBE", NID_setct_CapResTBE, 4, &so[4160]}, {"setct-CapRevReqTBE", "setct-CapRevReqTBE", NID_setct_CapRevReqTBE, 4, &so[4164]}, {"setct-CapRevReqTBEX", "setct-CapRevReqTBEX", NID_setct_CapRevReqTBEX, 4, &so[4168]}, {"setct-CapRevResTBE", "setct-CapRevResTBE", NID_setct_CapRevResTBE, 4, &so[4172]}, {"setct-CredReqTBE", "setct-CredReqTBE", NID_setct_CredReqTBE, 4, &so[4176]}, {"setct-CredReqTBEX", "setct-CredReqTBEX", NID_setct_CredReqTBEX, 4, &so[4180]}, {"setct-CredResTBE", "setct-CredResTBE", NID_setct_CredResTBE, 4, &so[4184]}, {"setct-CredRevReqTBE", "setct-CredRevReqTBE", NID_setct_CredRevReqTBE, 4, &so[4188]}, {"setct-CredRevReqTBEX", "setct-CredRevReqTBEX", NID_setct_CredRevReqTBEX, 4, &so[4192]}, {"setct-CredRevResTBE", "setct-CredRevResTBE", NID_setct_CredRevResTBE, 4, &so[4196]}, {"setct-BatchAdminReqTBE", "setct-BatchAdminReqTBE", NID_setct_BatchAdminReqTBE, 4, &so[4200]}, {"setct-BatchAdminResTBE", "setct-BatchAdminResTBE", NID_setct_BatchAdminResTBE, 4, &so[4204]}, {"setct-RegFormReqTBE", "setct-RegFormReqTBE", NID_setct_RegFormReqTBE, 4, &so[4208]}, {"setct-CertReqTBE", "setct-CertReqTBE", NID_setct_CertReqTBE, 4, &so[4212]}, {"setct-CertReqTBEX", "setct-CertReqTBEX", NID_setct_CertReqTBEX, 4, &so[4216]}, {"setct-CertResTBE", "setct-CertResTBE", NID_setct_CertResTBE, 4, &so[4220]}, {"setct-CRLNotificationTBS", "setct-CRLNotificationTBS", NID_setct_CRLNotificationTBS, 4, &so[4224]}, {"setct-CRLNotificationResTBS", "setct-CRLNotificationResTBS", NID_setct_CRLNotificationResTBS, 4, &so[4228]}, {"setct-BCIDistributionTBS", "setct-BCIDistributionTBS", NID_setct_BCIDistributionTBS, 4, &so[4232]}, {"setext-genCrypt", "generic cryptogram", NID_setext_genCrypt, 4, &so[4236]}, {"setext-miAuth", "merchant initiated auth", NID_setext_miAuth, 4, &so[4240]}, {"setext-pinSecure", "setext-pinSecure", NID_setext_pinSecure, 4, &so[4244]}, {"setext-pinAny", "setext-pinAny", NID_setext_pinAny, 4, &so[4248]}, {"setext-track2", "setext-track2", NID_setext_track2, 4, &so[4252]}, {"setext-cv", "additional verification", NID_setext_cv, 4, &so[4256]}, {"set-policy-root", "set-policy-root", NID_set_policy_root, 4, &so[4260]}, {"setCext-hashedRoot", "setCext-hashedRoot", NID_setCext_hashedRoot, 4, &so[4264]}, {"setCext-certType", "setCext-certType", NID_setCext_certType, 4, &so[4268]}, {"setCext-merchData", "setCext-merchData", NID_setCext_merchData, 4, &so[4272]}, {"setCext-cCertRequired", "setCext-cCertRequired", NID_setCext_cCertRequired, 4, &so[4276]}, {"setCext-tunneling", "setCext-tunneling", NID_setCext_tunneling, 4, &so[4280]}, {"setCext-setExt", "setCext-setExt", NID_setCext_setExt, 4, &so[4284]}, {"setCext-setQualf", "setCext-setQualf", NID_setCext_setQualf, 4, &so[4288]}, {"setCext-PGWYcapabilities", "setCext-PGWYcapabilities", NID_setCext_PGWYcapabilities, 4, &so[4292]}, {"setCext-TokenIdentifier", "setCext-TokenIdentifier", NID_setCext_TokenIdentifier, 4, &so[4296]}, {"setCext-Track2Data", "setCext-Track2Data", NID_setCext_Track2Data, 4, &so[4300]}, {"setCext-TokenType", "setCext-TokenType", NID_setCext_TokenType, 4, &so[4304]}, {"setCext-IssuerCapabilities", "setCext-IssuerCapabilities", NID_setCext_IssuerCapabilities, 4, &so[4308]}, {"setAttr-Cert", "setAttr-Cert", NID_setAttr_Cert, 4, &so[4312]}, {"setAttr-PGWYcap", "payment gateway capabilities", NID_setAttr_PGWYcap, 4, &so[4316]}, {"setAttr-TokenType", "setAttr-TokenType", NID_setAttr_TokenType, 4, &so[4320]}, {"setAttr-IssCap", "issuer capabilities", NID_setAttr_IssCap, 4, &so[4324]}, {"set-rootKeyThumb", "set-rootKeyThumb", NID_set_rootKeyThumb, 5, &so[4328]}, {"set-addPolicy", "set-addPolicy", NID_set_addPolicy, 5, &so[4333]}, {"setAttr-Token-EMV", "setAttr-Token-EMV", NID_setAttr_Token_EMV, 5, &so[4338]}, {"setAttr-Token-B0Prime", "setAttr-Token-B0Prime", NID_setAttr_Token_B0Prime, 5, &so[4343]}, {"setAttr-IssCap-CVM", "setAttr-IssCap-CVM", NID_setAttr_IssCap_CVM, 5, &so[4348]}, {"setAttr-IssCap-T2", "setAttr-IssCap-T2", NID_setAttr_IssCap_T2, 5, &so[4353]}, {"setAttr-IssCap-Sig", "setAttr-IssCap-Sig", NID_setAttr_IssCap_Sig, 5, &so[4358]}, {"setAttr-GenCryptgrm", "generate cryptogram", NID_setAttr_GenCryptgrm, 6, &so[4363]}, {"setAttr-T2Enc", "encrypted track 2", NID_setAttr_T2Enc, 6, &so[4369]}, {"setAttr-T2cleartxt", "cleartext track 2", NID_setAttr_T2cleartxt, 6, &so[4375]}, {"setAttr-TokICCsig", "ICC or token signature", NID_setAttr_TokICCsig, 6, &so[4381]}, {"setAttr-SecDevSig", "secure device signature", NID_setAttr_SecDevSig, 6, &so[4387]}, {"set-brand-IATA-ATA", "set-brand-IATA-ATA", NID_set_brand_IATA_ATA, 4, &so[4393]}, {"set-brand-Diners", "set-brand-Diners", NID_set_brand_Diners, 4, &so[4397]}, {"set-brand-AmericanExpress", "set-brand-AmericanExpress", NID_set_brand_AmericanExpress, 4, &so[4401]}, {"set-brand-JCB", "set-brand-JCB", NID_set_brand_JCB, 4, &so[4405]}, {"set-brand-Visa", "set-brand-Visa", NID_set_brand_Visa, 4, &so[4409]}, {"set-brand-MasterCard", "set-brand-MasterCard", NID_set_brand_MasterCard, 4, &so[4413]}, {"set-brand-Novus", "set-brand-Novus", NID_set_brand_Novus, 5, &so[4417]}, {"DES-CDMF", "des-cdmf", NID_des_cdmf, 8, &so[4422]}, {"rsaOAEPEncryptionSET", "rsaOAEPEncryptionSET", NID_rsaOAEPEncryptionSET, 9, &so[4430]}, {"ITU-T", "itu-t", NID_itu_t}, {"JOINT-ISO-ITU-T", "joint-iso-itu-t", NID_joint_iso_itu_t}, {"international-organizations", "International Organizations", NID_international_organizations, 1, &so[4439]}, {"msSmartcardLogin", "Microsoft Smartcard Login", NID_ms_smartcard_login, 10, &so[4440]}, {"msUPN", "Microsoft User Principal Name", NID_ms_upn, 10, &so[4450]}, {"AES-128-CFB1", "aes-128-cfb1", NID_aes_128_cfb1}, {"AES-192-CFB1", "aes-192-cfb1", NID_aes_192_cfb1}, {"AES-256-CFB1", "aes-256-cfb1", NID_aes_256_cfb1}, {"AES-128-CFB8", "aes-128-cfb8", NID_aes_128_cfb8}, {"AES-192-CFB8", "aes-192-cfb8", NID_aes_192_cfb8}, {"AES-256-CFB8", "aes-256-cfb8", NID_aes_256_cfb8}, {"DES-CFB1", "des-cfb1", NID_des_cfb1}, {"DES-CFB8", "des-cfb8", NID_des_cfb8}, {"DES-EDE3-CFB1", "des-ede3-cfb1", NID_des_ede3_cfb1}, {"DES-EDE3-CFB8", "des-ede3-cfb8", NID_des_ede3_cfb8}, {"street", "streetAddress", NID_streetAddress, 3, &so[4460]}, {"postalCode", "postalCode", NID_postalCode, 3, &so[4463]}, {"id-ppl", "id-ppl", NID_id_ppl, 7, &so[4466]}, {"proxyCertInfo", "Proxy Certificate Information", NID_proxyCertInfo, 8, &so[4473]}, {"id-ppl-anyLanguage", "Any language", NID_id_ppl_anyLanguage, 8, &so[4481]}, {"id-ppl-inheritAll", "Inherit all", NID_id_ppl_inheritAll, 8, &so[4489]}, {"nameConstraints", "X509v3 Name Constraints", NID_name_constraints, 3, &so[4497]}, {"id-ppl-independent", "Independent", NID_Independent, 8, &so[4500]}, {"RSA-SHA256", "sha256WithRSAEncryption", NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[4508]}, {"RSA-SHA384", "sha384WithRSAEncryption", NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[4517]}, {"RSA-SHA512", "sha512WithRSAEncryption", NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[4526]}, {"RSA-SHA224", "sha224WithRSAEncryption", NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[4535]}, {"SHA256", "sha256", NID_sha256, 9, &so[4544]}, {"SHA384", "sha384", NID_sha384, 9, &so[4553]}, {"SHA512", "sha512", NID_sha512, 9, &so[4562]}, {"SHA224", "sha224", NID_sha224, 9, &so[4571]}, {"identified-organization", "identified-organization", NID_identified_organization, 1, &so[4580]}, {"certicom-arc", "certicom-arc", NID_certicom_arc, 3, &so[4581]}, {"wap", "wap", NID_wap, 2, &so[4584]}, {"wap-wsg", "wap-wsg", NID_wap_wsg, 3, &so[4586]}, {"id-characteristic-two-basis", "id-characteristic-two-basis", NID_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis, 8, &so[4589]}, {"onBasis", "onBasis", NID_X9_62_onBasis, 9, &so[4597]}, {"tpBasis", "tpBasis", NID_X9_62_tpBasis, 9, &so[4606]}, {"ppBasis", "ppBasis", NID_X9_62_ppBasis, 9, &so[4615]}, {"c2pnb163v1", "c2pnb163v1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v1, 8, &so[4624]}, {"c2pnb163v2", "c2pnb163v2", NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v2, 8, &so[4632]}, {"c2pnb163v3", "c2pnb163v3", NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v3, 8, &so[4640]}, {"c2pnb176v1", "c2pnb176v1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb176v1, 8, &so[4648]}, {"c2tnb191v1", "c2tnb191v1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v1, 8, &so[4656]}, {"c2tnb191v2", "c2tnb191v2", NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v2, 8, &so[4664]}, {"c2tnb191v3", "c2tnb191v3", NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v3, 8, &so[4672]}, {"c2onb191v4", "c2onb191v4", NID_X9_62_c2onb191v4, 8, &so[4680]}, {"c2onb191v5", "c2onb191v5", NID_X9_62_c2onb191v5, 8, &so[4688]}, {"c2pnb208w1", "c2pnb208w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb208w1, 8, &so[4696]}, {"c2tnb239v1", "c2tnb239v1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v1, 8, &so[4704]}, {"c2tnb239v2", "c2tnb239v2", NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v2, 8, &so[4712]}, {"c2tnb239v3", "c2tnb239v3", NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v3, 8, &so[4720]}, {"c2onb239v4", "c2onb239v4", NID_X9_62_c2onb239v4, 8, &so[4728]}, {"c2onb239v5", "c2onb239v5", NID_X9_62_c2onb239v5, 8, &so[4736]}, {"c2pnb272w1", "c2pnb272w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb272w1, 8, &so[4744]}, {"c2pnb304w1", "c2pnb304w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb304w1, 8, &so[4752]}, {"c2tnb359v1", "c2tnb359v1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb359v1, 8, &so[4760]}, {"c2pnb368w1", "c2pnb368w1", NID_X9_62_c2pnb368w1, 8, &so[4768]}, {"c2tnb431r1", "c2tnb431r1", NID_X9_62_c2tnb431r1, 8, &so[4776]}, {"secp112r1", "secp112r1", NID_secp112r1, 5, &so[4784]}, {"secp112r2", "secp112r2", NID_secp112r2, 5, &so[4789]}, {"secp128r1", "secp128r1", NID_secp128r1, 5, &so[4794]}, {"secp128r2", "secp128r2", NID_secp128r2, 5, &so[4799]}, {"secp160k1", "secp160k1", NID_secp160k1, 5, &so[4804]}, {"secp160r1", "secp160r1", NID_secp160r1, 5, &so[4809]}, {"secp160r2", "secp160r2", NID_secp160r2, 5, &so[4814]}, {"secp192k1", "secp192k1", NID_secp192k1, 5, &so[4819]}, {"secp224k1", "secp224k1", NID_secp224k1, 5, &so[4824]}, {"secp224r1", "secp224r1", NID_secp224r1, 5, &so[4829]}, {"secp256k1", "secp256k1", NID_secp256k1, 5, &so[4834]}, {"secp384r1", "secp384r1", NID_secp384r1, 5, &so[4839]}, {"secp521r1", "secp521r1", NID_secp521r1, 5, &so[4844]}, {"sect113r1", "sect113r1", NID_sect113r1, 5, &so[4849]}, {"sect113r2", "sect113r2", NID_sect113r2, 5, &so[4854]}, {"sect131r1", "sect131r1", NID_sect131r1, 5, &so[4859]}, {"sect131r2", "sect131r2", NID_sect131r2, 5, &so[4864]}, {"sect163k1", "sect163k1", NID_sect163k1, 5, &so[4869]}, {"sect163r1", "sect163r1", NID_sect163r1, 5, &so[4874]}, {"sect163r2", "sect163r2", NID_sect163r2, 5, &so[4879]}, {"sect193r1", "sect193r1", NID_sect193r1, 5, &so[4884]}, {"sect193r2", "sect193r2", NID_sect193r2, 5, &so[4889]}, {"sect233k1", "sect233k1", NID_sect233k1, 5, &so[4894]}, {"sect233r1", "sect233r1", NID_sect233r1, 5, &so[4899]}, {"sect239k1", "sect239k1", NID_sect239k1, 5, &so[4904]}, {"sect283k1", "sect283k1", NID_sect283k1, 5, &so[4909]}, {"sect283r1", "sect283r1", NID_sect283r1, 5, &so[4914]}, {"sect409k1", "sect409k1", NID_sect409k1, 5, &so[4919]}, {"sect409r1", "sect409r1", NID_sect409r1, 5, &so[4924]}, {"sect571k1", "sect571k1", NID_sect571k1, 5, &so[4929]}, {"sect571r1", "sect571r1", NID_sect571r1, 5, &so[4934]}, {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1, 5, &so[4939]}, {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3, 5, &so[4944]}, {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4, 5, &so[4949]}, {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5, 5, &so[4954]}, {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6, 5, &so[4959]}, {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7, 5, &so[4964]}, {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8, 5, &so[4969]}, {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9, 5, &so[4974]}, {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10, 5, &so[4979]}, {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11, 5, &so[4984]}, {"wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12", "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12", NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12, 5, &so[4989]}, {"anyPolicy", "X509v3 Any Policy", NID_any_policy, 4, &so[4994]}, {"policyMappings", "X509v3 Policy Mappings", NID_policy_mappings, 3, &so[4998]}, {"inhibitAnyPolicy", "X509v3 Inhibit Any Policy", NID_inhibit_any_policy, 3, &so[5001]}, {"Oakley-EC2N-3", "ipsec3", NID_ipsec3}, {"Oakley-EC2N-4", "ipsec4", NID_ipsec4}, {"CAMELLIA-128-CBC", "camellia-128-cbc", NID_camellia_128_cbc, 11, &so[5004]}, {"CAMELLIA-192-CBC", "camellia-192-cbc", NID_camellia_192_cbc, 11, &so[5015]}, {"CAMELLIA-256-CBC", "camellia-256-cbc", NID_camellia_256_cbc, 11, &so[5026]}, {"CAMELLIA-128-ECB", "camellia-128-ecb", NID_camellia_128_ecb, 8, &so[5037]}, {"CAMELLIA-192-ECB", "camellia-192-ecb", NID_camellia_192_ecb, 8, &so[5045]}, {"CAMELLIA-256-ECB", "camellia-256-ecb", NID_camellia_256_ecb, 8, &so[5053]}, {"CAMELLIA-128-CFB", "camellia-128-cfb", NID_camellia_128_cfb128, 8, &so[5061]}, {"CAMELLIA-192-CFB", "camellia-192-cfb", NID_camellia_192_cfb128, 8, &so[5069]}, {"CAMELLIA-256-CFB", "camellia-256-cfb", NID_camellia_256_cfb128, 8, &so[5077]}, {"CAMELLIA-128-CFB1", "camellia-128-cfb1", NID_camellia_128_cfb1}, {"CAMELLIA-192-CFB1", "camellia-192-cfb1", NID_camellia_192_cfb1}, {"CAMELLIA-256-CFB1", "camellia-256-cfb1", NID_camellia_256_cfb1}, {"CAMELLIA-128-CFB8", "camellia-128-cfb8", NID_camellia_128_cfb8}, {"CAMELLIA-192-CFB8", "camellia-192-cfb8", NID_camellia_192_cfb8}, {"CAMELLIA-256-CFB8", "camellia-256-cfb8", NID_camellia_256_cfb8}, {"CAMELLIA-128-OFB", "camellia-128-ofb", NID_camellia_128_ofb128, 8, &so[5085]}, {"CAMELLIA-192-OFB", "camellia-192-ofb", NID_camellia_192_ofb128, 8, &so[5093]}, {"CAMELLIA-256-OFB", "camellia-256-ofb", NID_camellia_256_ofb128, 8, &so[5101]}, {"subjectDirectoryAttributes", "X509v3 Subject Directory Attributes", NID_subject_directory_attributes, 3, &so[5109]}, {"issuingDistributionPoint", "X509v3 Issuing Distribution Point", NID_issuing_distribution_point, 3, &so[5112]}, {"certificateIssuer", "X509v3 Certificate Issuer", NID_certificate_issuer, 3, &so[5115]}, { NULL, NULL, NID_undef }, {"KISA", "kisa", NID_kisa, 6, &so[5118]}, { NULL, NULL, NID_undef }, { NULL, NULL, NID_undef }, {"SEED-ECB", "seed-ecb", NID_seed_ecb, 8, &so[5124]}, {"SEED-CBC", "seed-cbc", NID_seed_cbc, 8, &so[5132]}, {"SEED-OFB", "seed-ofb", NID_seed_ofb128, 8, &so[5140]}, {"SEED-CFB", "seed-cfb", NID_seed_cfb128, 8, &so[5148]}, {"HMAC-MD5", "hmac-md5", NID_hmac_md5, 8, &so[5156]}, {"HMAC-SHA1", "hmac-sha1", NID_hmac_sha1, 8, &so[5164]}, {"id-PasswordBasedMAC", "password based MAC", NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC, 9, &so[5172]}, {"id-DHBasedMac", "Diffie-Hellman based MAC", NID_id_DHBasedMac, 9, &so[5181]}, {"id-it-suppLangTags", "id-it-suppLangTags", NID_id_it_suppLangTags, 8, &so[5190]}, {"caRepository", "CA Repository", NID_caRepository, 8, &so[5198]}, {"id-smime-ct-compressedData", "id-smime-ct-compressedData", NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData, 11, &so[5206]}, {"id-ct-asciiTextWithCRLF", "id-ct-asciiTextWithCRLF", NID_id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF, 11, &so[5217]}, {"id-aes128-wrap", "id-aes128-wrap", NID_id_aes128_wrap, 9, &so[5228]}, {"id-aes192-wrap", "id-aes192-wrap", NID_id_aes192_wrap, 9, &so[5237]}, {"id-aes256-wrap", "id-aes256-wrap", NID_id_aes256_wrap, 9, &so[5246]}, {"ecdsa-with-Recommended", "ecdsa-with-Recommended", NID_ecdsa_with_Recommended, 7, &so[5255]}, {"ecdsa-with-Specified", "ecdsa-with-Specified", NID_ecdsa_with_Specified, 7, &so[5262]}, {"ecdsa-with-SHA224", "ecdsa-with-SHA224", NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, 8, &so[5269]}, {"ecdsa-with-SHA256", "ecdsa-with-SHA256", NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, 8, &so[5277]}, {"ecdsa-with-SHA384", "ecdsa-with-SHA384", NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, 8, &so[5285]}, {"ecdsa-with-SHA512", "ecdsa-with-SHA512", NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, 8, &so[5293]}, {"hmacWithMD5", "hmacWithMD5", NID_hmacWithMD5, 8, &so[5301]}, {"hmacWithSHA224", "hmacWithSHA224", NID_hmacWithSHA224, 8, &so[5309]}, {"hmacWithSHA256", "hmacWithSHA256", NID_hmacWithSHA256, 8, &so[5317]}, {"hmacWithSHA384", "hmacWithSHA384", NID_hmacWithSHA384, 8, &so[5325]}, {"hmacWithSHA512", "hmacWithSHA512", NID_hmacWithSHA512, 8, &so[5333]}, {"dsa_with_SHA224", "dsa_with_SHA224", NID_dsa_with_SHA224, 9, &so[5341]}, {"dsa_with_SHA256", "dsa_with_SHA256", NID_dsa_with_SHA256, 9, &so[5350]}, {"whirlpool", "whirlpool", NID_whirlpool, 6, &so[5359]}, {"cryptopro", "cryptopro", NID_cryptopro, 5, &so[5365]}, {"cryptocom", "cryptocom", NID_cryptocom, 5, &so[5370]}, {"id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001", "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-2001", NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001, 6, &so[5375]}, {"id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94", "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-94", NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94, 6, &so[5381]}, {"md_gost94", "GOST R 34.11-94", NID_id_GostR3411_94, 6, &so[5387]}, {"id-HMACGostR3411-94", "HMAC GOST 34.11-94", NID_id_HMACGostR3411_94, 6, &so[5393]}, {"gost2001", "GOST R 34.10-2001", NID_id_GostR3410_2001, 6, &so[5399]}, {"gost94", "GOST R 34.10-94", NID_id_GostR3410_94, 6, &so[5405]}, {"gost89", "GOST 28147-89", NID_id_Gost28147_89, 6, &so[5411]}, {"gost89-cnt", "gost89-cnt", NID_gost89_cnt}, {"gost-mac", "GOST 28147-89 MAC", NID_id_Gost28147_89_MAC, 6, &so[5417]}, {"prf-gostr3411-94", "GOST R 34.11-94 PRF", NID_id_GostR3411_94_prf, 6, &so[5423]}, {"id-GostR3410-2001DH", "GOST R 34.10-2001 DH", NID_id_GostR3410_2001DH, 6, &so[5429]}, {"id-GostR3410-94DH", "GOST R 34.10-94 DH", NID_id_GostR3410_94DH, 6, &so[5435]}, {"id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-KeyMeshing", "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-KeyMeshing", NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_KeyMeshing, 7, &so[5441]}, {"id-Gost28147-89-None-KeyMeshing", "id-Gost28147-89-None-KeyMeshing", NID_id_Gost28147_89_None_KeyMeshing, 7, &so[5448]}, {"id-GostR3411-94-TestParamSet", "id-GostR3411-94-TestParamSet", NID_id_GostR3411_94_TestParamSet, 7, &so[5455]}, {"id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet", "id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet", NID_id_GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet, 7, &so[5462]}, {"id-Gost28147-89-TestParamSet", "id-Gost28147-89-TestParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_TestParamSet, 7, &so[5469]}, {"id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet", "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet, 7, &so[5476]}, {"id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet", "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet, 7, &so[5483]}, {"id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet", "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet, 7, &so[5490]}, {"id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet", "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet, 7, &so[5497]}, {"id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-1-ParamSet", "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-1-ParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_1_ParamSet, 7, &so[5504]}, {"id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-0-ParamSet", "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-0-ParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_0_ParamSet, 7, &so[5511]}, {"id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-RIC-1-ParamSet", "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-RIC-1-ParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_RIC_1_ParamSet, 7, &so[5518]}, {"id-GostR3410-94-TestParamSet", "id-GostR3410-94-TestParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_94_TestParamSet, 7, &so[5525]}, {"id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet, 7, &so[5532]}, {"id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet, 7, &so[5539]}, {"id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet, 7, &so[5546]}, {"id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet, 7, &so[5553]}, {"id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet, 7, &so[5560]}, {"id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet, 7, &so[5567]}, {"id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchC-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchC-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchC_ParamSet, 7, &so[5574]}, {"id-GostR3410-2001-TestParamSet", "id-GostR3410-2001-TestParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_2001_TestParamSet, 7, &so[5581]}, {"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet, 7, &so[5588]}, {"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet, 7, &so[5595]}, {"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet, 7, &so[5602]}, {"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet, 7, &so[5609]}, {"id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet", "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet", NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet, 7, &so[5616]}, {"id-GostR3410-94-a", "id-GostR3410-94-a", NID_id_GostR3410_94_a, 7, &so[5623]}, {"id-GostR3410-94-aBis", "id-GostR3410-94-aBis", NID_id_GostR3410_94_aBis, 7, &so[5630]}, {"id-GostR3410-94-b", "id-GostR3410-94-b", NID_id_GostR3410_94_b, 7, &so[5637]}, {"id-GostR3410-94-bBis", "id-GostR3410-94-bBis", NID_id_GostR3410_94_bBis, 7, &so[5644]}, {"id-Gost28147-89-cc", "GOST 28147-89 Cryptocom ParamSet", NID_id_Gost28147_89_cc, 8, &so[5651]}, {"gost94cc", "GOST 34.10-94 Cryptocom", NID_id_GostR3410_94_cc, 8, &so[5659]}, {"gost2001cc", "GOST 34.10-2001 Cryptocom", NID_id_GostR3410_2001_cc, 8, &so[5667]}, {"id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94-cc", "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-94 Cryptocom", NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc, 8, &so[5675]}, {"id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001-cc", "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-2001 Cryptocom", NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc, 8, &so[5683]}, {"id-GostR3410-2001-ParamSet-cc", "GOST R 3410-2001 Parameter Set Cryptocom", NID_id_GostR3410_2001_ParamSet_cc, 8, &so[5691]}, {"HMAC", "hmac", NID_hmac}, {"LocalKeySet", "Microsoft Local Key set", NID_LocalKeySet, 9, &so[5699]}, {"freshestCRL", "X509v3 Freshest CRL", NID_freshest_crl, 3, &so[5708]}, {"id-on-permanentIdentifier", "Permanent Identifier", NID_id_on_permanentIdentifier, 8, &so[5711]}, {"searchGuide", "searchGuide", NID_searchGuide, 3, &so[5719]}, {"businessCategory", "businessCategory", NID_businessCategory, 3, &so[5722]}, {"postalAddress", "postalAddress", NID_postalAddress, 3, &so[5725]}, {"postOfficeBox", "postOfficeBox", NID_postOfficeBox, 3, &so[5728]}, {"physicalDeliveryOfficeName", "physicalDeliveryOfficeName", NID_physicalDeliveryOfficeName, 3, &so[5731]}, {"telephoneNumber", "telephoneNumber", NID_telephoneNumber, 3, &so[5734]}, {"telexNumber", "telexNumber", NID_telexNumber, 3, &so[5737]}, {"teletexTerminalIdentifier", "teletexTerminalIdentifier", NID_teletexTerminalIdentifier, 3, &so[5740]}, {"facsimileTelephoneNumber", "facsimileTelephoneNumber", NID_facsimileTelephoneNumber, 3, &so[5743]}, {"x121Address", "x121Address", NID_x121Address, 3, &so[5746]}, {"internationaliSDNNumber", "internationaliSDNNumber", NID_internationaliSDNNumber, 3, &so[5749]}, {"registeredAddress", "registeredAddress", NID_registeredAddress, 3, &so[5752]}, {"destinationIndicator", "destinationIndicator", NID_destinationIndicator, 3, &so[5755]}, {"preferredDeliveryMethod", "preferredDeliveryMethod", NID_preferredDeliveryMethod, 3, &so[5758]}, {"presentationAddress", "presentationAddress", NID_presentationAddress, 3, &so[5761]}, {"supportedApplicationContext", "supportedApplicationContext", NID_supportedApplicationContext, 3, &so[5764]}, {"member", "member", NID_member, 3, &so[5767]}, {"owner", "owner", NID_owner, 3, &so[5770]}, {"roleOccupant", "roleOccupant", NID_roleOccupant, 3, &so[5773]}, {"seeAlso", "seeAlso", NID_seeAlso, 3, &so[5776]}, {"userPassword", "userPassword", NID_userPassword, 3, &so[5779]}, {"userCertificate", "userCertificate", NID_userCertificate, 3, &so[5782]}, {"cACertificate", "cACertificate", NID_cACertificate, 3, &so[5785]}, {"authorityRevocationList", "authorityRevocationList", NID_authorityRevocationList, 3, &so[5788]}, {"certificateRevocationList", "certificateRevocationList", NID_certificateRevocationList, 3, &so[5791]}, {"crossCertificatePair", "crossCertificatePair", NID_crossCertificatePair, 3, &so[5794]}, {"enhancedSearchGuide", "enhancedSearchGuide", NID_enhancedSearchGuide, 3, &so[5797]}, {"protocolInformation", "protocolInformation", NID_protocolInformation, 3, &so[5800]}, {"distinguishedName", "distinguishedName", NID_distinguishedName, 3, &so[5803]}, {"uniqueMember", "uniqueMember", NID_uniqueMember, 3, &so[5806]}, {"houseIdentifier", "houseIdentifier", NID_houseIdentifier, 3, &so[5809]}, {"supportedAlgorithms", "supportedAlgorithms", NID_supportedAlgorithms, 3, &so[5812]}, {"deltaRevocationList", "deltaRevocationList", NID_deltaRevocationList, 3, &so[5815]}, {"dmdName", "dmdName", NID_dmdName, 3, &so[5818]}, {"id-alg-PWRI-KEK", "id-alg-PWRI-KEK", NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK, 11, &so[5821]}, {"CMAC", "cmac", NID_cmac}, {"id-aes128-GCM", "aes-128-gcm", NID_aes_128_gcm, 9, &so[5832]}, {"id-aes128-CCM", "aes-128-ccm", NID_aes_128_ccm, 9, &so[5841]}, {"id-aes128-wrap-pad", "id-aes128-wrap-pad", NID_id_aes128_wrap_pad, 9, &so[5850]}, {"id-aes192-GCM", "aes-192-gcm", NID_aes_192_gcm, 9, &so[5859]}, {"id-aes192-CCM", "aes-192-ccm", NID_aes_192_ccm, 9, &so[5868]}, {"id-aes192-wrap-pad", "id-aes192-wrap-pad", NID_id_aes192_wrap_pad, 9, &so[5877]}, {"id-aes256-GCM", "aes-256-gcm", NID_aes_256_gcm, 9, &so[5886]}, {"id-aes256-CCM", "aes-256-ccm", NID_aes_256_ccm, 9, &so[5895]}, {"id-aes256-wrap-pad", "id-aes256-wrap-pad", NID_id_aes256_wrap_pad, 9, &so[5904]}, {"AES-128-CTR", "aes-128-ctr", NID_aes_128_ctr}, {"AES-192-CTR", "aes-192-ctr", NID_aes_192_ctr}, {"AES-256-CTR", "aes-256-ctr", NID_aes_256_ctr}, {"id-camellia128-wrap", "id-camellia128-wrap", NID_id_camellia128_wrap, 11, &so[5913]}, {"id-camellia192-wrap", "id-camellia192-wrap", NID_id_camellia192_wrap, 11, &so[5924]}, {"id-camellia256-wrap", "id-camellia256-wrap", NID_id_camellia256_wrap, 11, &so[5935]}, {"anyExtendedKeyUsage", "Any Extended Key Usage", NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage, 4, &so[5946]}, {"MGF1", "mgf1", NID_mgf1, 9, &so[5950]}, {"RSASSA-PSS", "rsassaPss", NID_rsassaPss, 9, &so[5959]}, {"AES-128-XTS", "aes-128-xts", NID_aes_128_xts, 8, &so[5968]}, {"AES-256-XTS", "aes-256-xts", NID_aes_256_xts, 8, &so[5976]}, {"RC4-HMAC-MD5", "rc4-hmac-md5", NID_rc4_hmac_md5}, {"AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1", "aes-128-cbc-hmac-sha1", NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1}, {"AES-192-CBC-HMAC-SHA1", "aes-192-cbc-hmac-sha1", NID_aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha1}, {"AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1", "aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha1", NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1}, {"RSAES-OAEP", "rsaesOaep", NID_rsaesOaep, 9, &so[5984]}, {"dhpublicnumber", "X9.42 DH", NID_dhpublicnumber, 7, &so[5993]}, {"brainpoolP160r1", "brainpoolP160r1", NID_brainpoolP160r1, 9, &so[6000]}, {"brainpoolP160t1", "brainpoolP160t1", NID_brainpoolP160t1, 9, &so[6009]}, {"brainpoolP192r1", "brainpoolP192r1", NID_brainpoolP192r1, 9, &so[6018]}, {"brainpoolP192t1", "brainpoolP192t1", NID_brainpoolP192t1, 9, &so[6027]}, {"brainpoolP224r1", "brainpoolP224r1", NID_brainpoolP224r1, 9, &so[6036]}, {"brainpoolP224t1", "brainpoolP224t1", NID_brainpoolP224t1, 9, &so[6045]}, {"brainpoolP256r1", "brainpoolP256r1", NID_brainpoolP256r1, 9, &so[6054]}, {"brainpoolP256t1", "brainpoolP256t1", NID_brainpoolP256t1, 9, &so[6063]}, {"brainpoolP320r1", "brainpoolP320r1", NID_brainpoolP320r1, 9, &so[6072]}, {"brainpoolP320t1", "brainpoolP320t1", NID_brainpoolP320t1, 9, &so[6081]}, {"brainpoolP384r1", "brainpoolP384r1", NID_brainpoolP384r1, 9, &so[6090]}, {"brainpoolP384t1", "brainpoolP384t1", NID_brainpoolP384t1, 9, &so[6099]}, {"brainpoolP512r1", "brainpoolP512r1", NID_brainpoolP512r1, 9, &so[6108]}, {"brainpoolP512t1", "brainpoolP512t1", NID_brainpoolP512t1, 9, &so[6117]}, {"PSPECIFIED", "pSpecified", NID_pSpecified, 9, &so[6126]}, {"dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme, 9, &so[6135]}, {"dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme, 6, &so[6144]}, {"dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme, 6, &so[6150]}, {"dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme, 6, &so[6156]}, {"dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme, 6, &so[6162]}, {"dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme, 9, &so[6168]}, {"dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme, 6, &so[6177]}, {"dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme, 6, &so[6183]}, {"dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme, 6, &so[6189]}, {"dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme", "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme", NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme, 6, &so[6195]}, {"dh-std-kdf", "dh-std-kdf", NID_dh_std_kdf}, {"dh-cofactor-kdf", "dh-cofactor-kdf", NID_dh_cofactor_kdf}, {"AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA256", "aes-128-cbc-hmac-sha256", NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256}, {"AES-192-CBC-HMAC-SHA256", "aes-192-cbc-hmac-sha256", NID_aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha256}, {"AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA256", "aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha256", NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256}, {"ct_precert_scts", "CT Precertificate SCTs", NID_ct_precert_scts, 10, &so[6201]}, {"ct_precert_poison", "CT Precertificate Poison", NID_ct_precert_poison, 10, &so[6211]}, {"ct_precert_signer", "CT Precertificate Signer", NID_ct_precert_signer, 10, &so[6221]}, {"ct_cert_scts", "CT Certificate SCTs", NID_ct_cert_scts, 10, &so[6231]}, {"jurisdictionL", "jurisdictionLocalityName", NID_jurisdictionLocalityName, 11, &so[6241]}, {"jurisdictionST", "jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName", NID_jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName, 11, &so[6252]}, {"jurisdictionC", "jurisdictionCountryName", NID_jurisdictionCountryName, 11, &so[6263]}, {"AES-128-OCB", "aes-128-ocb", NID_aes_128_ocb}, {"AES-192-OCB", "aes-192-ocb", NID_aes_192_ocb}, {"AES-256-OCB", "aes-256-ocb", NID_aes_256_ocb}, {"CAMELLIA-128-GCM", "camellia-128-gcm", NID_camellia_128_gcm, 8, &so[6274]}, {"CAMELLIA-128-CCM", "camellia-128-ccm", NID_camellia_128_ccm, 8, &so[6282]}, {"CAMELLIA-128-CTR", "camellia-128-ctr", NID_camellia_128_ctr, 8, &so[6290]}, {"CAMELLIA-128-CMAC", "camellia-128-cmac", NID_camellia_128_cmac, 8, &so[6298]}, {"CAMELLIA-192-GCM", "camellia-192-gcm", NID_camellia_192_gcm, 8, &so[6306]}, {"CAMELLIA-192-CCM", "camellia-192-ccm", NID_camellia_192_ccm, 8, &so[6314]}, {"CAMELLIA-192-CTR", "camellia-192-ctr", NID_camellia_192_ctr, 8, &so[6322]}, {"CAMELLIA-192-CMAC", "camellia-192-cmac", NID_camellia_192_cmac, 8, &so[6330]}, {"CAMELLIA-256-GCM", "camellia-256-gcm", NID_camellia_256_gcm, 8, &so[6338]}, {"CAMELLIA-256-CCM", "camellia-256-ccm", NID_camellia_256_ccm, 8, &so[6346]}, {"CAMELLIA-256-CTR", "camellia-256-ctr", NID_camellia_256_ctr, 8, &so[6354]}, {"CAMELLIA-256-CMAC", "camellia-256-cmac", NID_camellia_256_cmac, 8, &so[6362]}, {"id-scrypt", "scrypt", NID_id_scrypt, 9, &so[6370]}, {"id-tc26", "id-tc26", NID_id_tc26, 5, &so[6379]}, {"gost89-cnt-12", "gost89-cnt-12", NID_gost89_cnt_12}, {"gost-mac-12", "gost-mac-12", NID_gost_mac_12}, {"id-tc26-algorithms", "id-tc26-algorithms", NID_id_tc26_algorithms, 6, &so[6384]}, {"id-tc26-sign", "id-tc26-sign", NID_id_tc26_sign, 7, &so[6390]}, {"gost2012_256", "GOST R 34.10-2012 with 256 bit modulus", NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256, 8, &so[6397]}, {"gost2012_512", "GOST R 34.10-2012 with 512 bit modulus", NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512, 8, &so[6405]}, {"id-tc26-digest", "id-tc26-digest", NID_id_tc26_digest, 7, &so[6413]}, {"md_gost12_256", "GOST R 34.11-2012 with 256 bit hash", NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, 8, &so[6420]}, {"md_gost12_512", "GOST R 34.11-2012 with 512 bit hash", NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, 8, &so[6428]}, {"id-tc26-signwithdigest", "id-tc26-signwithdigest", NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest, 7, &so[6436]}, {"id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-2012-256", "GOST R 34.10-2012 with GOST R 34.11-2012 (256 bit)", NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256, 8, &so[6443]}, {"id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-2012-512", "GOST R 34.10-2012 with GOST R 34.11-2012 (512 bit)", NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512, 8, &so[6451]}, {"id-tc26-mac", "id-tc26-mac", NID_id_tc26_mac, 7, &so[6459]}, {"id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-2012-256", "HMAC GOST 34.11-2012 256 bit", NID_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256, 8, &so[6466]}, {"id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-2012-512", "HMAC GOST 34.11-2012 512 bit", NID_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512, 8, &so[6474]}, {"id-tc26-cipher", "id-tc26-cipher", NID_id_tc26_cipher, 7, &so[6482]}, {"id-tc26-agreement", "id-tc26-agreement", NID_id_tc26_agreement, 7, &so[6489]}, {"id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-256", "id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-256", NID_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_256, 8, &so[6496]}, {"id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-512", "id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-512", NID_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_512, 8, &so[6504]}, {"id-tc26-constants", "id-tc26-constants", NID_id_tc26_constants, 6, &so[6512]}, {"id-tc26-sign-constants", "id-tc26-sign-constants", NID_id_tc26_sign_constants, 7, &so[6518]}, {"id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants", "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants", NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants, 8, &so[6525]}, {"id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetTest", "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) testing parameter set", NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetTest, 9, &so[6533]}, {"id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetA", "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet A", NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA, 9, &so[6542]}, {"id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetB", "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet B", NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB, 9, &so[6551]}, {"id-tc26-digest-constants", "id-tc26-digest-constants", NID_id_tc26_digest_constants, 7, &so[6560]}, {"id-tc26-cipher-constants", "id-tc26-cipher-constants", NID_id_tc26_cipher_constants, 7, &so[6567]}, {"id-tc26-gost-28147-constants", "id-tc26-gost-28147-constants", NID_id_tc26_gost_28147_constants, 8, &so[6574]}, {"id-tc26-gost-28147-param-Z", "GOST 28147-89 TC26 parameter set", NID_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z, 9, &so[6582]}, {"INN", "INN", NID_INN, 8, &so[6591]}, {"OGRN", "OGRN", NID_OGRN, 5, &so[6599]}, {"SNILS", "SNILS", NID_SNILS, 5, &so[6604]}, {"subjectSignTool", "Signing Tool of Subject", NID_subjectSignTool, 5, &so[6609]}, {"issuerSignTool", "Signing Tool of Issuer", NID_issuerSignTool, 5, &so[6614]}, {"gost89-cbc", "gost89-cbc", NID_gost89_cbc}, {"gost89-ecb", "gost89-ecb", NID_gost89_ecb}, {"gost89-ctr", "gost89-ctr", NID_gost89_ctr}, {"grasshopper-ecb", "grasshopper-ecb", NID_grasshopper_ecb}, {"grasshopper-ctr", "grasshopper-ctr", NID_grasshopper_ctr}, {"grasshopper-ofb", "grasshopper-ofb", NID_grasshopper_ofb}, {"grasshopper-cbc", "grasshopper-cbc", NID_grasshopper_cbc}, {"grasshopper-cfb", "grasshopper-cfb", NID_grasshopper_cfb}, {"grasshopper-mac", "grasshopper-mac", NID_grasshopper_mac}, {"ChaCha20-Poly1305", "chacha20-poly1305", NID_chacha20_poly1305}, {"ChaCha20", "chacha20", NID_chacha20}, {"tlsfeature", "TLS Feature", NID_tlsfeature, 8, &so[6619]}, {"TLS1-PRF", "tls1-prf", NID_tls1_prf}, {"ipsecIKE", "ipsec Internet Key Exchange", NID_ipsec_IKE, 8, &so[6627]}, {"capwapAC", "Ctrl/provision WAP Access", NID_capwapAC, 8, &so[6635]}, {"capwapWTP", "Ctrl/Provision WAP Termination", NID_capwapWTP, 8, &so[6643]}, {"secureShellClient", "SSH Client", NID_sshClient, 8, &so[6651]}, {"secureShellServer", "SSH Server", NID_sshServer, 8, &so[6659]}, {"sendRouter", "Send Router", NID_sendRouter, 8, &so[6667]}, {"sendProxiedRouter", "Send Proxied Router", NID_sendProxiedRouter, 8, &so[6675]}, {"sendOwner", "Send Owner", NID_sendOwner, 8, &so[6683]}, {"sendProxiedOwner", "Send Proxied Owner", NID_sendProxiedOwner, 8, &so[6691]}, {"id-pkinit", "id-pkinit", NID_id_pkinit, 6, &so[6699]}, {"pkInitClientAuth", "PKINIT Client Auth", NID_pkInitClientAuth, 7, &so[6705]}, {"pkInitKDC", "Signing KDC Response", NID_pkInitKDC, 7, &so[6712]}, {"X25519", "X25519", NID_X25519, 3, &so[6719]}, {"X448", "X448", NID_X448, 3, &so[6722]}, {"HKDF", "hkdf", NID_hkdf}, {"KxRSA", "kx-rsa", NID_kx_rsa}, {"KxECDHE", "kx-ecdhe", NID_kx_ecdhe}, {"KxDHE", "kx-dhe", NID_kx_dhe}, {"KxECDHE-PSK", "kx-ecdhe-psk", NID_kx_ecdhe_psk}, {"KxDHE-PSK", "kx-dhe-psk", NID_kx_dhe_psk}, {"KxRSA_PSK", "kx-rsa-psk", NID_kx_rsa_psk}, {"KxPSK", "kx-psk", NID_kx_psk}, {"KxSRP", "kx-srp", NID_kx_srp}, {"KxGOST", "kx-gost", NID_kx_gost}, {"AuthRSA", "auth-rsa", NID_auth_rsa}, {"AuthECDSA", "auth-ecdsa", NID_auth_ecdsa}, {"AuthPSK", "auth-psk", NID_auth_psk}, {"AuthDSS", "auth-dss", NID_auth_dss}, {"AuthGOST01", "auth-gost01", NID_auth_gost01}, {"AuthGOST12", "auth-gost12", NID_auth_gost12}, {"AuthSRP", "auth-srp", NID_auth_srp}, {"AuthNULL", "auth-null", NID_auth_null}, { NULL, NULL, NID_undef }, { NULL, NULL, NID_undef }, {"BLAKE2b512", "blake2b512", NID_blake2b512, 11, &so[6725]}, {"BLAKE2s256", "blake2s256", NID_blake2s256, 11, &so[6736]}, {"id-smime-ct-contentCollection", "id-smime-ct-contentCollection", NID_id_smime_ct_contentCollection, 11, &so[6747]}, {"id-smime-ct-authEnvelopedData", "id-smime-ct-authEnvelopedData", NID_id_smime_ct_authEnvelopedData, 11, &so[6758]}, {"id-ct-xml", "id-ct-xml", NID_id_ct_xml, 11, &so[6769]}, {"Poly1305", "poly1305", NID_poly1305}, {"SipHash", "siphash", NID_siphash}, {"KxANY", "kx-any", NID_kx_any}, {"AuthANY", "auth-any", NID_auth_any}, {"ARIA-128-ECB", "aria-128-ecb", NID_aria_128_ecb, 9, &so[6780]}, {"ARIA-128-CBC", "aria-128-cbc", NID_aria_128_cbc, 9, &so[6789]}, {"ARIA-128-CFB", "aria-128-cfb", NID_aria_128_cfb128, 9, &so[6798]}, {"ARIA-128-OFB", "aria-128-ofb", NID_aria_128_ofb128, 9, &so[6807]}, {"ARIA-128-CTR", "aria-128-ctr", NID_aria_128_ctr, 9, &so[6816]}, {"ARIA-192-ECB", "aria-192-ecb", NID_aria_192_ecb, 9, &so[6825]}, {"ARIA-192-CBC", "aria-192-cbc", NID_aria_192_cbc, 9, &so[6834]}, {"ARIA-192-CFB", "aria-192-cfb", NID_aria_192_cfb128, 9, &so[6843]}, {"ARIA-192-OFB", "aria-192-ofb", NID_aria_192_ofb128, 9, &so[6852]}, {"ARIA-192-CTR", "aria-192-ctr", NID_aria_192_ctr, 9, &so[6861]}, {"ARIA-256-ECB", "aria-256-ecb", NID_aria_256_ecb, 9, &so[6870]}, {"ARIA-256-CBC", "aria-256-cbc", NID_aria_256_cbc, 9, &so[6879]}, {"ARIA-256-CFB", "aria-256-cfb", NID_aria_256_cfb128, 9, &so[6888]}, {"ARIA-256-OFB", "aria-256-ofb", NID_aria_256_ofb128, 9, &so[6897]}, {"ARIA-256-CTR", "aria-256-ctr", NID_aria_256_ctr, 9, &so[6906]}, {"ARIA-128-CFB1", "aria-128-cfb1", NID_aria_128_cfb1}, {"ARIA-192-CFB1", "aria-192-cfb1", NID_aria_192_cfb1}, {"ARIA-256-CFB1", "aria-256-cfb1", NID_aria_256_cfb1}, {"ARIA-128-CFB8", "aria-128-cfb8", NID_aria_128_cfb8}, {"ARIA-192-CFB8", "aria-192-cfb8", NID_aria_192_cfb8}, {"ARIA-256-CFB8", "aria-256-cfb8", NID_aria_256_cfb8}, {"id-smime-aa-signingCertificateV2", "id-smime-aa-signingCertificateV2", NID_id_smime_aa_signingCertificateV2, 11, &so[6915]}, {"ED25519", "ED25519", NID_ED25519, 3, &so[6926]}, {"ED448", "ED448", NID_ED448, 3, &so[6929]}, {"organizationIdentifier", "organizationIdentifier", NID_organizationIdentifier, 3, &so[6932]}, {"c3", "countryCode3c", NID_countryCode3c, 3, &so[6935]}, {"n3", "countryCode3n", NID_countryCode3n, 3, &so[6938]}, {"dnsName", "dnsName", NID_dnsName, 3, &so[6941]}, {"x509ExtAdmission", "Professional Information or basis for Admission", NID_x509ExtAdmission, 5, &so[6944]}, {"SHA512-224", "sha512-224", NID_sha512_224, 9, &so[6949]}, {"SHA512-256", "sha512-256", NID_sha512_256, 9, &so[6958]}, {"SHA3-224", "sha3-224", NID_sha3_224, 9, &so[6967]}, {"SHA3-256", "sha3-256", NID_sha3_256, 9, &so[6976]}, {"SHA3-384", "sha3-384", NID_sha3_384, 9, &so[6985]}, {"SHA3-512", "sha3-512", NID_sha3_512, 9, &so[6994]}, {"SHAKE128", "shake128", NID_shake128, 9, &so[7003]}, {"SHAKE256", "shake256", NID_shake256, 9, &so[7012]}, {"id-hmacWithSHA3-224", "hmac-sha3-224", NID_hmac_sha3_224, 9, &so[7021]}, {"id-hmacWithSHA3-256", "hmac-sha3-256", NID_hmac_sha3_256, 9, &so[7030]}, {"id-hmacWithSHA3-384", "hmac-sha3-384", NID_hmac_sha3_384, 9, &so[7039]}, {"id-hmacWithSHA3-512", "hmac-sha3-512", NID_hmac_sha3_512, 9, &so[7048]}, {"id-dsa-with-sha384", "dsa_with_SHA384", NID_dsa_with_SHA384, 9, &so[7057]}, {"id-dsa-with-sha512", "dsa_with_SHA512", NID_dsa_with_SHA512, 9, &so[7066]}, {"id-dsa-with-sha3-224", "dsa_with_SHA3-224", NID_dsa_with_SHA3_224, 9, &so[7075]}, {"id-dsa-with-sha3-256", "dsa_with_SHA3-256", NID_dsa_with_SHA3_256, 9, &so[7084]}, {"id-dsa-with-sha3-384", "dsa_with_SHA3-384", NID_dsa_with_SHA3_384, 9, &so[7093]}, {"id-dsa-with-sha3-512", "dsa_with_SHA3-512", NID_dsa_with_SHA3_512, 9, &so[7102]}, {"id-ecdsa-with-sha3-224", "ecdsa_with_SHA3-224", NID_ecdsa_with_SHA3_224, 9, &so[7111]}, {"id-ecdsa-with-sha3-256", "ecdsa_with_SHA3-256", NID_ecdsa_with_SHA3_256, 9, &so[7120]}, {"id-ecdsa-with-sha3-384", "ecdsa_with_SHA3-384", NID_ecdsa_with_SHA3_384, 9, &so[7129]}, {"id-ecdsa-with-sha3-512", "ecdsa_with_SHA3-512", NID_ecdsa_with_SHA3_512, 9, &so[7138]}, {"id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-224", "RSA-SHA3-224", NID_RSA_SHA3_224, 9, &so[7147]}, {"id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-256", "RSA-SHA3-256", NID_RSA_SHA3_256, 9, &so[7156]}, {"id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-384", "RSA-SHA3-384", NID_RSA_SHA3_384, 9, &so[7165]}, {"id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-512", "RSA-SHA3-512", NID_RSA_SHA3_512, 9, &so[7174]}, {"ARIA-128-CCM", "aria-128-ccm", NID_aria_128_ccm, 9, &so[7183]}, {"ARIA-192-CCM", "aria-192-ccm", NID_aria_192_ccm, 9, &so[7192]}, {"ARIA-256-CCM", "aria-256-ccm", NID_aria_256_ccm, 9, &so[7201]}, {"ARIA-128-GCM", "aria-128-gcm", NID_aria_128_gcm, 9, &so[7210]}, {"ARIA-192-GCM", "aria-192-gcm", NID_aria_192_gcm, 9, &so[7219]}, {"ARIA-256-GCM", "aria-256-gcm", NID_aria_256_gcm, 9, &so[7228]}, {"ffdhe2048", "ffdhe2048", NID_ffdhe2048}, {"ffdhe3072", "ffdhe3072", NID_ffdhe3072}, {"ffdhe4096", "ffdhe4096", NID_ffdhe4096}, {"ffdhe6144", "ffdhe6144", NID_ffdhe6144}, {"ffdhe8192", "ffdhe8192", NID_ffdhe8192}, {"cmcCA", "CMC Certificate Authority", NID_cmcCA, 8, &so[7237]}, {"cmcRA", "CMC Registration Authority", NID_cmcRA, 8, &so[7245]}, {"SM4-ECB", "sm4-ecb", NID_sm4_ecb, 8, &so[7253]}, {"SM4-CBC", "sm4-cbc", NID_sm4_cbc, 8, &so[7261]}, {"SM4-OFB", "sm4-ofb", NID_sm4_ofb128, 8, &so[7269]}, {"SM4-CFB1", "sm4-cfb1", NID_sm4_cfb1, 8, &so[7277]}, {"SM4-CFB", "sm4-cfb", NID_sm4_cfb128, 8, &so[7285]}, {"SM4-CFB8", "sm4-cfb8", NID_sm4_cfb8, 8, &so[7293]}, {"SM4-CTR", "sm4-ctr", NID_sm4_ctr, 8, &so[7301]}, {"ISO-CN", "ISO CN Member Body", NID_ISO_CN, 3, &so[7309]}, {"oscca", "oscca", NID_oscca, 5, &so[7312]}, {"sm-scheme", "sm-scheme", NID_sm_scheme, 6, &so[7317]}, {"SM3", "sm3", NID_sm3, 8, &so[7323]}, {"RSA-SM3", "sm3WithRSAEncryption", NID_sm3WithRSAEncryption, 8, &so[7331]}, {"RSA-SHA512/224", "sha512-224WithRSAEncryption", NID_sha512_224WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[7339]}, {"RSA-SHA512/256", "sha512-256WithRSAEncryption", NID_sha512_256WithRSAEncryption, 9, &so[7348]}, {"id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-constants", "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-constants", NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_constants, 8, &so[7357]}, {"id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetA", "GOST R 34.10-2012 (256 bit) ParamSet A", NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA, 9, &so[7365]}, {"id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC", "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet C", NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC, 9, &so[7374]}, {"ISO-UA", "ISO-UA", NID_ISO_UA, 3, &so[7383]}, {"ua-pki", "ua-pki", NID_ua_pki, 7, &so[7386]}, {"dstu28147", "DSTU Gost 28147-2009", NID_dstu28147, 10, &so[7393]}, {"dstu28147-ofb", "DSTU Gost 28147-2009 OFB mode", NID_dstu28147_ofb, 11, &so[7403]}, {"dstu28147-cfb", "DSTU Gost 28147-2009 CFB mode", NID_dstu28147_cfb, 11, &so[7414]}, {"dstu28147-wrap", "DSTU Gost 28147-2009 key wrap", NID_dstu28147_wrap, 11, &so[7425]}, {"hmacWithDstu34311", "HMAC DSTU Gost 34311-95", NID_hmacWithDstu34311, 10, &so[7436]}, {"dstu34311", "DSTU Gost 34311-95", NID_dstu34311, 10, &so[7446]}, {"dstu4145le", "DSTU 4145-2002 little endian", NID_dstu4145le, 11, &so[7456]}, {"dstu4145be", "DSTU 4145-2002 big endian", NID_dstu4145be, 13, &so[7467]}, {"uacurve0", "DSTU curve 0", NID_uacurve0, 13, &so[7480]}, {"uacurve1", "DSTU curve 1", NID_uacurve1, 13, &so[7493]}, {"uacurve2", "DSTU curve 2", NID_uacurve2, 13, &so[7506]}, {"uacurve3", "DSTU curve 3", NID_uacurve3, 13, &so[7519]}, {"uacurve4", "DSTU curve 4", NID_uacurve4, 13, &so[7532]}, {"uacurve5", "DSTU curve 5", NID_uacurve5, 13, &so[7545]}, {"uacurve6", "DSTU curve 6", NID_uacurve6, 13, &so[7558]}, {"uacurve7", "DSTU curve 7", NID_uacurve7, 13, &so[7571]}, {"uacurve8", "DSTU curve 8", NID_uacurve8, 13, &so[7584]}, {"uacurve9", "DSTU curve 9", NID_uacurve9, 13, &so[7597]}, {"ieee", "ieee", NID_ieee, 2, &so[7610]}, {"ieee-siswg", "IEEE Security in Storage Working Group", NID_ieee_siswg, 5, &so[7612]}, {"SM2", "sm2", NID_sm2, 8, &so[7617]}, {"id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-magma", "id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-magma", NID_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_magma, 8, &so[7625]}, {"id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm", "id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm", NID_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_magma_ctracpkm, 9, &so[7633]}, {"id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm-omac", "id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm-omac", NID_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_magma_ctracpkm_omac, 9, &so[7642]}, {"id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik", "id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik", NID_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik, 8, &so[7651]}, {"id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm", "id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm", NID_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik_ctracpkm, 9, &so[7659]}, {"id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm-omac", "id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm-omac", NID_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik_ctracpkm_omac, 9, &so[7668]}, {"id-tc26-wrap", "id-tc26-wrap", NID_id_tc26_wrap, 7, &so[7677]}, {"id-tc26-wrap-gostr3412-2015-magma", "id-tc26-wrap-gostr3412-2015-magma", NID_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_magma, 8, &so[7684]}, {"id-tc26-wrap-gostr3412-2015-magma-kexp15", "id-tc26-wrap-gostr3412-2015-magma-kexp15", NID_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_magma_kexp15, 9, &so[7692]}, {"id-tc26-wrap-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik", "id-tc26-wrap-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik", NID_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik, 8, &so[7701]}, {"id-tc26-wrap-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-kexp15", "id-tc26-wrap-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-kexp15", NID_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik_kexp15, 9, &so[7709]}, {"id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetB", "GOST R 34.10-2012 (256 bit) ParamSet B", NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB, 9, &so[7718]}, {"id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetC", "GOST R 34.10-2012 (256 bit) ParamSet C", NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC, 9, &so[7727]}, {"id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetD", "GOST R 34.10-2012 (256 bit) ParamSet D", NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD, 9, &so[7736]}, {"magma-ecb", "magma-ecb", NID_magma_ecb}, {"magma-ctr", "magma-ctr", NID_magma_ctr}, {"magma-ofb", "magma-ofb", NID_magma_ofb}, {"magma-cbc", "magma-cbc", NID_magma_cbc}, {"magma-cfb", "magma-cfb", NID_magma_cfb}, {"magma-mac", "magma-mac", NID_magma_mac}, {"hmacWithSHA512-224", "hmacWithSHA512-224", NID_hmacWithSHA512_224, 8, &so[7745]}, {"hmacWithSHA512-256", "hmacWithSHA512-256", NID_hmacWithSHA512_256, 8, &so[7753]}, }; #define NUM_SN 1186 static const unsigned int sn_objs[NUM_SN] = { 364, /* "AD_DVCS" */ 419, /* "AES-128-CBC" */ 916, /* "AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1" */ 948, /* "AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA256" */ 421, /* "AES-128-CFB" */ 650, /* "AES-128-CFB1" */ 653, /* "AES-128-CFB8" */ 904, /* "AES-128-CTR" */ 418, /* "AES-128-ECB" */ 958, /* "AES-128-OCB" */ 420, /* "AES-128-OFB" */ 913, /* "AES-128-XTS" */ 423, /* "AES-192-CBC" */ 917, /* "AES-192-CBC-HMAC-SHA1" */ 949, /* "AES-192-CBC-HMAC-SHA256" */ 425, /* "AES-192-CFB" */ 651, /* "AES-192-CFB1" */ 654, /* "AES-192-CFB8" */ 905, /* "AES-192-CTR" */ 422, /* "AES-192-ECB" */ 959, /* "AES-192-OCB" */ 424, /* "AES-192-OFB" */ 427, /* "AES-256-CBC" */ 918, /* "AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1" */ 950, /* "AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA256" */ 429, /* "AES-256-CFB" */ 652, /* "AES-256-CFB1" */ 655, /* "AES-256-CFB8" */ 906, /* "AES-256-CTR" */ 426, /* "AES-256-ECB" */ 960, /* "AES-256-OCB" */ 428, /* "AES-256-OFB" */ 914, /* "AES-256-XTS" */ 1066, /* "ARIA-128-CBC" */ 1120, /* "ARIA-128-CCM" */ 1067, /* "ARIA-128-CFB" */ 1080, /* "ARIA-128-CFB1" */ 1083, /* "ARIA-128-CFB8" */ 1069, /* "ARIA-128-CTR" */ 1065, /* "ARIA-128-ECB" */ 1123, /* "ARIA-128-GCM" */ 1068, /* "ARIA-128-OFB" */ 1071, /* "ARIA-192-CBC" */ 1121, /* "ARIA-192-CCM" */ 1072, /* "ARIA-192-CFB" */ 1081, /* "ARIA-192-CFB1" */ 1084, /* "ARIA-192-CFB8" */ 1074, /* "ARIA-192-CTR" */ 1070, /* "ARIA-192-ECB" */ 1124, /* "ARIA-192-GCM" */ 1073, /* "ARIA-192-OFB" */ 1076, /* "ARIA-256-CBC" */ 1122, /* "ARIA-256-CCM" */ 1077, /* "ARIA-256-CFB" */ 1082, /* "ARIA-256-CFB1" */ 1085, /* "ARIA-256-CFB8" */ 1079, /* "ARIA-256-CTR" */ 1075, /* "ARIA-256-ECB" */ 1125, /* "ARIA-256-GCM" */ 1078, /* "ARIA-256-OFB" */ 1064, /* "AuthANY" */ 1049, /* "AuthDSS" */ 1047, /* "AuthECDSA" */ 1050, /* "AuthGOST01" */ 1051, /* "AuthGOST12" */ 1053, /* "AuthNULL" */ 1048, /* "AuthPSK" */ 1046, /* "AuthRSA" */ 1052, /* "AuthSRP" */ 91, /* "BF-CBC" */ 93, /* "BF-CFB" */ 92, /* "BF-ECB" */ 94, /* "BF-OFB" */ 1056, /* "BLAKE2b512" */ 1057, /* "BLAKE2s256" */ 14, /* "C" */ 751, /* "CAMELLIA-128-CBC" */ 962, /* "CAMELLIA-128-CCM" */ 757, /* "CAMELLIA-128-CFB" */ 760, /* "CAMELLIA-128-CFB1" */ 763, /* "CAMELLIA-128-CFB8" */ 964, /* "CAMELLIA-128-CMAC" */ 963, /* "CAMELLIA-128-CTR" */ 754, /* "CAMELLIA-128-ECB" */ 961, /* "CAMELLIA-128-GCM" */ 766, /* "CAMELLIA-128-OFB" */ 752, /* "CAMELLIA-192-CBC" */ 966, /* "CAMELLIA-192-CCM" */ 758, /* "CAMELLIA-192-CFB" */ 761, /* "CAMELLIA-192-CFB1" */ 764, /* "CAMELLIA-192-CFB8" */ 968, /* "CAMELLIA-192-CMAC" */ 967, /* "CAMELLIA-192-CTR" */ 755, /* "CAMELLIA-192-ECB" */ 965, /* "CAMELLIA-192-GCM" */ 767, /* "CAMELLIA-192-OFB" */ 753, /* "CAMELLIA-256-CBC" */ 970, /* "CAMELLIA-256-CCM" */ 759, /* "CAMELLIA-256-CFB" */ 762, /* "CAMELLIA-256-CFB1" */ 765, /* "CAMELLIA-256-CFB8" */ 972, /* "CAMELLIA-256-CMAC" */ 971, /* "CAMELLIA-256-CTR" */ 756, /* "CAMELLIA-256-ECB" */ 969, /* "CAMELLIA-256-GCM" */ 768, /* "CAMELLIA-256-OFB" */ 108, /* "CAST5-CBC" */ 110, /* "CAST5-CFB" */ 109, /* "CAST5-ECB" */ 111, /* "CAST5-OFB" */ 894, /* "CMAC" */ 13, /* "CN" */ 141, /* "CRLReason" */ 417, /* "CSPName" */ 1019, /* "ChaCha20" */ 1018, /* "ChaCha20-Poly1305" */ 367, /* "CrlID" */ 391, /* "DC" */ 31, /* "DES-CBC" */ 643, /* "DES-CDMF" */ 30, /* "DES-CFB" */ 656, /* "DES-CFB1" */ 657, /* "DES-CFB8" */ 29, /* "DES-ECB" */ 32, /* "DES-EDE" */ 43, /* "DES-EDE-CBC" */ 60, /* "DES-EDE-CFB" */ 62, /* "DES-EDE-OFB" */ 33, /* "DES-EDE3" */ 44, /* "DES-EDE3-CBC" */ 61, /* "DES-EDE3-CFB" */ 658, /* "DES-EDE3-CFB1" */ 659, /* "DES-EDE3-CFB8" */ 63, /* "DES-EDE3-OFB" */ 45, /* "DES-OFB" */ 80, /* "DESX-CBC" */ 380, /* "DOD" */ 116, /* "DSA" */ 66, /* "DSA-SHA" */ 113, /* "DSA-SHA1" */ 70, /* "DSA-SHA1-old" */ 67, /* "DSA-old" */ 297, /* "DVCS" */ 1087, /* "ED25519" */ 1088, /* "ED448" */ 99, /* "GN" */ 1036, /* "HKDF" */ 855, /* "HMAC" */ 780, /* "HMAC-MD5" */ 781, /* "HMAC-SHA1" */ 381, /* "IANA" */ 34, /* "IDEA-CBC" */ 35, /* "IDEA-CFB" */ 36, /* "IDEA-ECB" */ 46, /* "IDEA-OFB" */ 1004, /* "INN" */ 181, /* "ISO" */ 1140, /* "ISO-CN" */ 1150, /* "ISO-UA" */ 183, /* "ISO-US" */ 645, /* "ITU-T" */ 646, /* "JOINT-ISO-ITU-T" */ 773, /* "KISA" */ 1063, /* "KxANY" */ 1039, /* "KxDHE" */ 1041, /* "KxDHE-PSK" */ 1038, /* "KxECDHE" */ 1040, /* "KxECDHE-PSK" */ 1045, /* "KxGOST" */ 1043, /* "KxPSK" */ 1037, /* "KxRSA" */ 1042, /* "KxRSA_PSK" */ 1044, /* "KxSRP" */ 15, /* "L" */ 856, /* "LocalKeySet" */ 3, /* "MD2" */ 257, /* "MD4" */ 4, /* "MD5" */ 114, /* "MD5-SHA1" */ 95, /* "MDC2" */ 911, /* "MGF1" */ 388, /* "Mail" */ 393, /* "NULL" */ 404, /* "NULL" */ 57, /* "Netscape" */ 366, /* "Nonce" */ 17, /* "O" */ 178, /* "OCSP" */ 180, /* "OCSPSigning" */ 1005, /* "OGRN" */ 379, /* "ORG" */ 18, /* "OU" */ 749, /* "Oakley-EC2N-3" */ 750, /* "Oakley-EC2N-4" */ 9, /* "PBE-MD2-DES" */ 168, /* "PBE-MD2-RC2-64" */ 10, /* "PBE-MD5-DES" */ 169, /* "PBE-MD5-RC2-64" */ 147, /* "PBE-SHA1-2DES" */ 146, /* "PBE-SHA1-3DES" */ 170, /* "PBE-SHA1-DES" */ 148, /* "PBE-SHA1-RC2-128" */ 149, /* "PBE-SHA1-RC2-40" */ 68, /* "PBE-SHA1-RC2-64" */ 144, /* "PBE-SHA1-RC4-128" */ 145, /* "PBE-SHA1-RC4-40" */ 161, /* "PBES2" */ 69, /* "PBKDF2" */ 162, /* "PBMAC1" */ 127, /* "PKIX" */ 935, /* "PSPECIFIED" */ 1061, /* "Poly1305" */ 98, /* "RC2-40-CBC" */ 166, /* "RC2-64-CBC" */ 37, /* "RC2-CBC" */ 39, /* "RC2-CFB" */ 38, /* "RC2-ECB" */ 40, /* "RC2-OFB" */ 5, /* "RC4" */ 97, /* "RC4-40" */ 915, /* "RC4-HMAC-MD5" */ 120, /* "RC5-CBC" */ 122, /* "RC5-CFB" */ 121, /* "RC5-ECB" */ 123, /* "RC5-OFB" */ 117, /* "RIPEMD160" */ 19, /* "RSA" */ 7, /* "RSA-MD2" */ 396, /* "RSA-MD4" */ 8, /* "RSA-MD5" */ 96, /* "RSA-MDC2" */ 104, /* "RSA-NP-MD5" */ 119, /* "RSA-RIPEMD160" */ 42, /* "RSA-SHA" */ 65, /* "RSA-SHA1" */ 115, /* "RSA-SHA1-2" */ 671, /* "RSA-SHA224" */ 668, /* "RSA-SHA256" */ 669, /* "RSA-SHA384" */ 670, /* "RSA-SHA512" */ 1145, /* "RSA-SHA512/224" */ 1146, /* "RSA-SHA512/256" */ 1144, /* "RSA-SM3" */ 919, /* "RSAES-OAEP" */ 912, /* "RSASSA-PSS" */ 777, /* "SEED-CBC" */ 779, /* "SEED-CFB" */ 776, /* "SEED-ECB" */ 778, /* "SEED-OFB" */ 41, /* "SHA" */ 64, /* "SHA1" */ 675, /* "SHA224" */ 672, /* "SHA256" */ 1096, /* "SHA3-224" */ 1097, /* "SHA3-256" */ 1098, /* "SHA3-384" */ 1099, /* "SHA3-512" */ 673, /* "SHA384" */ 674, /* "SHA512" */ 1094, /* "SHA512-224" */ 1095, /* "SHA512-256" */ 1100, /* "SHAKE128" */ 1101, /* "SHAKE256" */ 1172, /* "SM2" */ 1143, /* "SM3" */ 1134, /* "SM4-CBC" */ 1137, /* "SM4-CFB" */ 1136, /* "SM4-CFB1" */ 1138, /* "SM4-CFB8" */ 1139, /* "SM4-CTR" */ 1133, /* "SM4-ECB" */ 1135, /* "SM4-OFB" */ 188, /* "SMIME" */ 167, /* "SMIME-CAPS" */ 100, /* "SN" */ 1006, /* "SNILS" */ 16, /* "ST" */ 143, /* "SXNetID" */ 1062, /* "SipHash" */ 1021, /* "TLS1-PRF" */ 458, /* "UID" */ 0, /* "UNDEF" */ 1034, /* "X25519" */ 1035, /* "X448" */ 11, /* "X500" */ 378, /* "X500algorithms" */ 12, /* "X509" */ 184, /* "X9-57" */ 185, /* "X9cm" */ 125, /* "ZLIB" */ 478, /* "aRecord" */ 289, /* "aaControls" */ 287, /* "ac-auditEntity" */ 397, /* "ac-proxying" */ 288, /* "ac-targeting" */ 368, /* "acceptableResponses" */ 446, /* "account" */ 363, /* "ad_timestamping" */ 376, /* "algorithm" */ 405, /* "ansi-X9-62" */ 910, /* "anyExtendedKeyUsage" */ 746, /* "anyPolicy" */ 370, /* "archiveCutoff" */ 484, /* "associatedDomain" */ 485, /* "associatedName" */ 501, /* "audio" */ 177, /* "authorityInfoAccess" */ 90, /* "authorityKeyIdentifier" */ 882, /* "authorityRevocationList" */ 87, /* "basicConstraints" */ 365, /* "basicOCSPResponse" */ 285, /* "biometricInfo" */ 921, /* "brainpoolP160r1" */ 922, /* "brainpoolP160t1" */ 923, /* "brainpoolP192r1" */ 924, /* "brainpoolP192t1" */ 925, /* "brainpoolP224r1" */ 926, /* "brainpoolP224t1" */ 927, /* "brainpoolP256r1" */ 928, /* "brainpoolP256t1" */ 929, /* "brainpoolP320r1" */ 930, /* "brainpoolP320t1" */ 931, /* "brainpoolP384r1" */ 932, /* "brainpoolP384t1" */ 933, /* "brainpoolP512r1" */ 934, /* "brainpoolP512t1" */ 494, /* "buildingName" */ 860, /* "businessCategory" */ 691, /* "c2onb191v4" */ 692, /* "c2onb191v5" */ 697, /* "c2onb239v4" */ 698, /* "c2onb239v5" */ 684, /* "c2pnb163v1" */ 685, /* "c2pnb163v2" */ 686, /* "c2pnb163v3" */ 687, /* "c2pnb176v1" */ 693, /* "c2pnb208w1" */ 699, /* "c2pnb272w1" */ 700, /* "c2pnb304w1" */ 702, /* "c2pnb368w1" */ 688, /* "c2tnb191v1" */ 689, /* "c2tnb191v2" */ 690, /* "c2tnb191v3" */ 694, /* "c2tnb239v1" */ 695, /* "c2tnb239v2" */ 696, /* "c2tnb239v3" */ 701, /* "c2tnb359v1" */ 703, /* "c2tnb431r1" */ 1090, /* "c3" */ 881, /* "cACertificate" */ 483, /* "cNAMERecord" */ 179, /* "caIssuers" */ 785, /* "caRepository" */ 1023, /* "capwapAC" */ 1024, /* "capwapWTP" */ 443, /* "caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax" */ 152, /* "certBag" */ 677, /* "certicom-arc" */ 771, /* "certificateIssuer" */ 89, /* "certificatePolicies" */ 883, /* "certificateRevocationList" */ 54, /* "challengePassword" */ 407, /* "characteristic-two-field" */ 395, /* "clearance" */ 130, /* "clientAuth" */ 1131, /* "cmcCA" */ 1132, /* "cmcRA" */ 131, /* "codeSigning" */ 50, /* "contentType" */ 53, /* "countersignature" */ 153, /* "crlBag" */ 103, /* "crlDistributionPoints" */ 88, /* "crlNumber" */ 884, /* "crossCertificatePair" */ 806, /* "cryptocom" */ 805, /* "cryptopro" */ 954, /* "ct_cert_scts" */ 952, /* "ct_precert_poison" */ 951, /* "ct_precert_scts" */ 953, /* "ct_precert_signer" */ 500, /* "dITRedirect" */ 451, /* "dNSDomain" */ 495, /* "dSAQuality" */ 434, /* "data" */ 390, /* "dcobject" */ 140, /* "deltaCRL" */ 891, /* "deltaRevocationList" */ 107, /* "description" */ 871, /* "destinationIndicator" */ 947, /* "dh-cofactor-kdf" */ 946, /* "dh-std-kdf" */ 28, /* "dhKeyAgreement" */ 941, /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme" */ 942, /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme" */ 943, /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme" */ 944, /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme" */ 945, /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme" */ 936, /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme" */ 937, /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme" */ 938, /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme" */ 939, /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme" */ 940, /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme" */ 920, /* "dhpublicnumber" */ 382, /* "directory" */ 887, /* "distinguishedName" */ 892, /* "dmdName" */ 174, /* "dnQualifier" */ 1092, /* "dnsName" */ 447, /* "document" */ 471, /* "documentAuthor" */ 468, /* "documentIdentifier" */ 472, /* "documentLocation" */ 502, /* "documentPublisher" */ 449, /* "documentSeries" */ 469, /* "documentTitle" */ 470, /* "documentVersion" */ 392, /* "domain" */ 452, /* "domainRelatedObject" */ 802, /* "dsa_with_SHA224" */ 803, /* "dsa_with_SHA256" */ 1152, /* "dstu28147" */ 1154, /* "dstu28147-cfb" */ 1153, /* "dstu28147-ofb" */ 1155, /* "dstu28147-wrap" */ 1157, /* "dstu34311" */ 1159, /* "dstu4145be" */ 1158, /* "dstu4145le" */ 791, /* "ecdsa-with-Recommended" */ 416, /* "ecdsa-with-SHA1" */ 793, /* "ecdsa-with-SHA224" */ 794, /* "ecdsa-with-SHA256" */ 795, /* "ecdsa-with-SHA384" */ 796, /* "ecdsa-with-SHA512" */ 792, /* "ecdsa-with-Specified" */ 48, /* "emailAddress" */ 132, /* "emailProtection" */ 885, /* "enhancedSearchGuide" */ 389, /* "enterprises" */ 384, /* "experimental" */ 172, /* "extReq" */ 56, /* "extendedCertificateAttributes" */ 126, /* "extendedKeyUsage" */ 372, /* "extendedStatus" */ 867, /* "facsimileTelephoneNumber" */ 462, /* "favouriteDrink" */ 1126, /* "ffdhe2048" */ 1127, /* "ffdhe3072" */ 1128, /* "ffdhe4096" */ 1129, /* "ffdhe6144" */ 1130, /* "ffdhe8192" */ 857, /* "freshestCRL" */ 453, /* "friendlyCountry" */ 490, /* "friendlyCountryName" */ 156, /* "friendlyName" */ 509, /* "generationQualifier" */ 815, /* "gost-mac" */ 976, /* "gost-mac-12" */ 811, /* "gost2001" */ 851, /* "gost2001cc" */ 979, /* "gost2012_256" */ 980, /* "gost2012_512" */ 813, /* "gost89" */ 1009, /* "gost89-cbc" */ 814, /* "gost89-cnt" */ 975, /* "gost89-cnt-12" */ 1011, /* "gost89-ctr" */ 1010, /* "gost89-ecb" */ 812, /* "gost94" */ 850, /* "gost94cc" */ 1015, /* "grasshopper-cbc" */ 1016, /* "grasshopper-cfb" */ 1013, /* "grasshopper-ctr" */ 1012, /* "grasshopper-ecb" */ 1017, /* "grasshopper-mac" */ 1014, /* "grasshopper-ofb" */ 1156, /* "hmacWithDstu34311" */ 797, /* "hmacWithMD5" */ 163, /* "hmacWithSHA1" */ 798, /* "hmacWithSHA224" */ 799, /* "hmacWithSHA256" */ 800, /* "hmacWithSHA384" */ 801, /* "hmacWithSHA512" */ 1193, /* "hmacWithSHA512-224" */ 1194, /* "hmacWithSHA512-256" */ 432, /* "holdInstructionCallIssuer" */ 430, /* "holdInstructionCode" */ 431, /* "holdInstructionNone" */ 433, /* "holdInstructionReject" */ 486, /* "homePostalAddress" */ 473, /* "homeTelephoneNumber" */ 466, /* "host" */ 889, /* "houseIdentifier" */ 442, /* "iA5StringSyntax" */ 783, /* "id-DHBasedMac" */ 824, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet" */ 825, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet" */ 826, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet" */ 827, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet" */ 819, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-KeyMeshing" */ 829, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-0-ParamSet" */ 828, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-1-ParamSet" */ 830, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-RIC-1-ParamSet" */ 820, /* "id-Gost28147-89-None-KeyMeshing" */ 823, /* "id-Gost28147-89-TestParamSet" */ 849, /* "id-Gost28147-89-cc" */ 840, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet" */ 841, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet" */ 842, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet" */ 843, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet" */ 844, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet" */ 854, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-ParamSet-cc" */ 839, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-TestParamSet" */ 817, /* "id-GostR3410-2001DH" */ 832, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet" */ 833, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet" */ 834, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet" */ 835, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet" */ 836, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet" */ 837, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet" */ 838, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchC-ParamSet" */ 831, /* "id-GostR3410-94-TestParamSet" */ 845, /* "id-GostR3410-94-a" */ 846, /* "id-GostR3410-94-aBis" */ 847, /* "id-GostR3410-94-b" */ 848, /* "id-GostR3410-94-bBis" */ 818, /* "id-GostR3410-94DH" */ 822, /* "id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet" */ 821, /* "id-GostR3411-94-TestParamSet" */ 807, /* "id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001" */ 853, /* "id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001-cc" */ 808, /* "id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94" */ 852, /* "id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94-cc" */ 810, /* "id-HMACGostR3411-94" */ 782, /* "id-PasswordBasedMAC" */ 266, /* "id-aca" */ 355, /* "id-aca-accessIdentity" */ 354, /* "id-aca-authenticationInfo" */ 356, /* "id-aca-chargingIdentity" */ 399, /* "id-aca-encAttrs" */ 357, /* "id-aca-group" */ 358, /* "id-aca-role" */ 176, /* "id-ad" */ 896, /* "id-aes128-CCM" */ 895, /* "id-aes128-GCM" */ 788, /* "id-aes128-wrap" */ 897, /* "id-aes128-wrap-pad" */ 899, /* "id-aes192-CCM" */ 898, /* "id-aes192-GCM" */ 789, /* "id-aes192-wrap" */ 900, /* "id-aes192-wrap-pad" */ 902, /* "id-aes256-CCM" */ 901, /* "id-aes256-GCM" */ 790, /* "id-aes256-wrap" */ 903, /* "id-aes256-wrap-pad" */ 262, /* "id-alg" */ 893, /* "id-alg-PWRI-KEK" */ 323, /* "id-alg-des40" */ 326, /* "id-alg-dh-pop" */ 325, /* "id-alg-dh-sig-hmac-sha1" */ 324, /* "id-alg-noSignature" */ 907, /* "id-camellia128-wrap" */ 908, /* "id-camellia192-wrap" */ 909, /* "id-camellia256-wrap" */ 268, /* "id-cct" */ 361, /* "id-cct-PKIData" */ 362, /* "id-cct-PKIResponse" */ 360, /* "id-cct-crs" */ 81, /* "id-ce" */ 680, /* "id-characteristic-two-basis" */ 263, /* "id-cmc" */ 334, /* "id-cmc-addExtensions" */ 346, /* "id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance" */ 330, /* "id-cmc-dataReturn" */ 336, /* "id-cmc-decryptedPOP" */ 335, /* "id-cmc-encryptedPOP" */ 339, /* "id-cmc-getCRL" */ 338, /* "id-cmc-getCert" */ 328, /* "id-cmc-identification" */ 329, /* "id-cmc-identityProof" */ 337, /* "id-cmc-lraPOPWitness" */ 344, /* "id-cmc-popLinkRandom" */ 345, /* "id-cmc-popLinkWitness" */ 343, /* "id-cmc-queryPending" */ 333, /* "id-cmc-recipientNonce" */ 341, /* "id-cmc-regInfo" */ 342, /* "id-cmc-responseInfo" */ 340, /* "id-cmc-revokeRequest" */ 332, /* "id-cmc-senderNonce" */ 327, /* "id-cmc-statusInfo" */ 331, /* "id-cmc-transactionId" */ 787, /* "id-ct-asciiTextWithCRLF" */ 1060, /* "id-ct-xml" */ 1108, /* "id-dsa-with-sha3-224" */ 1109, /* "id-dsa-with-sha3-256" */ 1110, /* "id-dsa-with-sha3-384" */ 1111, /* "id-dsa-with-sha3-512" */ 1106, /* "id-dsa-with-sha384" */ 1107, /* "id-dsa-with-sha512" */ 408, /* "id-ecPublicKey" */ 1112, /* "id-ecdsa-with-sha3-224" */ 1113, /* "id-ecdsa-with-sha3-256" */ 1114, /* "id-ecdsa-with-sha3-384" */ 1115, /* "id-ecdsa-with-sha3-512" */ 508, /* "id-hex-multipart-message" */ 507, /* "id-hex-partial-message" */ 1102, /* "id-hmacWithSHA3-224" */ 1103, /* "id-hmacWithSHA3-256" */ 1104, /* "id-hmacWithSHA3-384" */ 1105, /* "id-hmacWithSHA3-512" */ 260, /* "id-it" */ 302, /* "id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo" */ 298, /* "id-it-caProtEncCert" */ 311, /* "id-it-confirmWaitTime" */ 303, /* "id-it-currentCRL" */ 300, /* "id-it-encKeyPairTypes" */ 310, /* "id-it-implicitConfirm" */ 308, /* "id-it-keyPairParamRep" */ 307, /* "id-it-keyPairParamReq" */ 312, /* "id-it-origPKIMessage" */ 301, /* "id-it-preferredSymmAlg" */ 309, /* "id-it-revPassphrase" */ 299, /* "id-it-signKeyPairTypes" */ 305, /* "id-it-subscriptionRequest" */ 306, /* "id-it-subscriptionResponse" */ 784, /* "id-it-suppLangTags" */ 304, /* "id-it-unsupportedOIDs" */ 128, /* "id-kp" */ 280, /* "id-mod-attribute-cert" */ 274, /* "id-mod-cmc" */ 277, /* "id-mod-cmp" */ 284, /* "id-mod-cmp2000" */ 273, /* "id-mod-crmf" */ 283, /* "id-mod-dvcs" */ 275, /* "id-mod-kea-profile-88" */ 276, /* "id-mod-kea-profile-93" */ 282, /* "id-mod-ocsp" */ 278, /* "id-mod-qualified-cert-88" */ 279, /* "id-mod-qualified-cert-93" */ 281, /* "id-mod-timestamp-protocol" */ 264, /* "id-on" */ 858, /* "id-on-permanentIdentifier" */ 347, /* "id-on-personalData" */ 265, /* "id-pda" */ 352, /* "id-pda-countryOfCitizenship" */ 353, /* "id-pda-countryOfResidence" */ 348, /* "id-pda-dateOfBirth" */ 351, /* "id-pda-gender" */ 349, /* "id-pda-placeOfBirth" */ 175, /* "id-pe" */ 1031, /* "id-pkinit" */ 261, /* "id-pkip" */ 258, /* "id-pkix-mod" */ 269, /* "id-pkix1-explicit-88" */ 271, /* "id-pkix1-explicit-93" */ 270, /* "id-pkix1-implicit-88" */ 272, /* "id-pkix1-implicit-93" */ 662, /* "id-ppl" */ 664, /* "id-ppl-anyLanguage" */ 667, /* "id-ppl-independent" */ 665, /* "id-ppl-inheritAll" */ 267, /* "id-qcs" */ 359, /* "id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1" */ 259, /* "id-qt" */ 164, /* "id-qt-cps" */ 165, /* "id-qt-unotice" */ 313, /* "id-regCtrl" */ 316, /* "id-regCtrl-authenticator" */ 319, /* "id-regCtrl-oldCertID" */ 318, /* "id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions" */ 317, /* "id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo" */ 320, /* "id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey" */ 315, /* "id-regCtrl-regToken" */ 314, /* "id-regInfo" */ 322, /* "id-regInfo-certReq" */ 321, /* "id-regInfo-utf8Pairs" */ 1116, /* "id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-224" */ 1117, /* "id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-256" */ 1118, /* "id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-384" */ 1119, /* "id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-512" */ 973, /* "id-scrypt" */ 512, /* "id-set" */ 191, /* "id-smime-aa" */ 215, /* "id-smime-aa-contentHint" */ 218, /* "id-smime-aa-contentIdentifier" */ 221, /* "id-smime-aa-contentReference" */ 240, /* "id-smime-aa-dvcs-dvc" */ 217, /* "id-smime-aa-encapContentType" */ 222, /* "id-smime-aa-encrypKeyPref" */ 220, /* "id-smime-aa-equivalentLabels" */ 232, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-CertificateRefs" */ 233, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-RevocationRefs" */ 238, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-archiveTimeStamp" */ 237, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp" */ 234, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-certValues" */ 227, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-commitmentType" */ 231, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-contentTimestamp" */ 236, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-escTimeStamp" */ 230, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-otherSigCert" */ 235, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-revocationValues" */ 226, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-sigPolicyId" */ 229, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-signerAttr" */ 228, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-signerLocation" */ 219, /* "id-smime-aa-macValue" */ 214, /* "id-smime-aa-mlExpandHistory" */ 216, /* "id-smime-aa-msgSigDigest" */ 212, /* "id-smime-aa-receiptRequest" */ 213, /* "id-smime-aa-securityLabel" */ 239, /* "id-smime-aa-signatureType" */ 223, /* "id-smime-aa-signingCertificate" */ 1086, /* "id-smime-aa-signingCertificateV2" */ 224, /* "id-smime-aa-smimeEncryptCerts" */ 225, /* "id-smime-aa-timeStampToken" */ 192, /* "id-smime-alg" */ 243, /* "id-smime-alg-3DESwrap" */ 246, /* "id-smime-alg-CMS3DESwrap" */ 247, /* "id-smime-alg-CMSRC2wrap" */ 245, /* "id-smime-alg-ESDH" */ 241, /* "id-smime-alg-ESDHwith3DES" */ 242, /* "id-smime-alg-ESDHwithRC2" */ 244, /* "id-smime-alg-RC2wrap" */ 193, /* "id-smime-cd" */ 248, /* "id-smime-cd-ldap" */ 190, /* "id-smime-ct" */ 210, /* "id-smime-ct-DVCSRequestData" */ 211, /* "id-smime-ct-DVCSResponseData" */ 208, /* "id-smime-ct-TDTInfo" */ 207, /* "id-smime-ct-TSTInfo" */ 205, /* "id-smime-ct-authData" */ 1059, /* "id-smime-ct-authEnvelopedData" */ 786, /* "id-smime-ct-compressedData" */ 1058, /* "id-smime-ct-contentCollection" */ 209, /* "id-smime-ct-contentInfo" */ 206, /* "id-smime-ct-publishCert" */ 204, /* "id-smime-ct-receipt" */ 195, /* "id-smime-cti" */ 255, /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfApproval" */ 256, /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfCreation" */ 253, /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery" */ 251, /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin" */ 252, /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt" */ 254, /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfSender" */ 189, /* "id-smime-mod" */ 196, /* "id-smime-mod-cms" */ 197, /* "id-smime-mod-ess" */ 202, /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-88" */ 203, /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-97" */ 200, /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-88" */ 201, /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-97" */ 199, /* "id-smime-mod-msg-v3" */ 198, /* "id-smime-mod-oid" */ 194, /* "id-smime-spq" */ 250, /* "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-unotice" */ 249, /* "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-uri" */ 974, /* "id-tc26" */ 991, /* "id-tc26-agreement" */ 992, /* "id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-256" */ 993, /* "id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-512" */ 977, /* "id-tc26-algorithms" */ 990, /* "id-tc26-cipher" */ 1001, /* "id-tc26-cipher-constants" */ 1176, /* "id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik" */ 1177, /* "id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm" */ 1178, /* "id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm-omac" */ 1173, /* "id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-magma" */ 1174, /* "id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm" */ 1175, /* "id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm-omac" */ 994, /* "id-tc26-constants" */ 981, /* "id-tc26-digest" */ 1000, /* "id-tc26-digest-constants" */ 1002, /* "id-tc26-gost-28147-constants" */ 1003, /* "id-tc26-gost-28147-param-Z" */ 1147, /* "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-constants" */ 1148, /* "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetA" */ 1184, /* "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetB" */ 1185, /* "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetC" */ 1186, /* "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetD" */ 996, /* "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants" */ 998, /* "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetA" */ 999, /* "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetB" */ 1149, /* "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC" */ 997, /* "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetTest" */ 988, /* "id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-2012-256" */ 989, /* "id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-2012-512" */ 987, /* "id-tc26-mac" */ 978, /* "id-tc26-sign" */ 995, /* "id-tc26-sign-constants" */ 984, /* "id-tc26-signwithdigest" */ 985, /* "id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-2012-256" */ 986, /* "id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-2012-512" */ 1179, /* "id-tc26-wrap" */ 1182, /* "id-tc26-wrap-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik" */ 1183, /* "id-tc26-wrap-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-kexp15" */ 1180, /* "id-tc26-wrap-gostr3412-2015-magma" */ 1181, /* "id-tc26-wrap-gostr3412-2015-magma-kexp15" */ 676, /* "identified-organization" */ 1170, /* "ieee" */ 1171, /* "ieee-siswg" */ 461, /* "info" */ 748, /* "inhibitAnyPolicy" */ 101, /* "initials" */ 647, /* "international-organizations" */ 869, /* "internationaliSDNNumber" */ 142, /* "invalidityDate" */ 294, /* "ipsecEndSystem" */ 1022, /* "ipsecIKE" */ 295, /* "ipsecTunnel" */ 296, /* "ipsecUser" */ 86, /* "issuerAltName" */ 1008, /* "issuerSignTool" */ 770, /* "issuingDistributionPoint" */ 492, /* "janetMailbox" */ 957, /* "jurisdictionC" */ 955, /* "jurisdictionL" */ 956, /* "jurisdictionST" */ 150, /* "keyBag" */ 83, /* "keyUsage" */ 477, /* "lastModifiedBy" */ 476, /* "lastModifiedTime" */ 157, /* "localKeyID" */ 480, /* "mXRecord" */ 1190, /* "magma-cbc" */ 1191, /* "magma-cfb" */ 1188, /* "magma-ctr" */ 1187, /* "magma-ecb" */ 1192, /* "magma-mac" */ 1189, /* "magma-ofb" */ 460, /* "mail" */ 493, /* "mailPreferenceOption" */ 467, /* "manager" */ 982, /* "md_gost12_256" */ 983, /* "md_gost12_512" */ 809, /* "md_gost94" */ 875, /* "member" */ 182, /* "member-body" */ 51, /* "messageDigest" */ 383, /* "mgmt" */ 504, /* "mime-mhs" */ 506, /* "mime-mhs-bodies" */ 505, /* "mime-mhs-headings" */ 488, /* "mobileTelephoneNumber" */ 136, /* "msCTLSign" */ 135, /* "msCodeCom" */ 134, /* "msCodeInd" */ 138, /* "msEFS" */ 171, /* "msExtReq" */ 137, /* "msSGC" */ 648, /* "msSmartcardLogin" */ 649, /* "msUPN" */ 1091, /* "n3" */ 481, /* "nSRecord" */ 173, /* "name" */ 666, /* "nameConstraints" */ 369, /* "noCheck" */ 403, /* "noRevAvail" */ 72, /* "nsBaseUrl" */ 76, /* "nsCaPolicyUrl" */ 74, /* "nsCaRevocationUrl" */ 58, /* "nsCertExt" */ 79, /* "nsCertSequence" */ 71, /* "nsCertType" */ 78, /* "nsComment" */ 59, /* "nsDataType" */ 75, /* "nsRenewalUrl" */ 73, /* "nsRevocationUrl" */ 139, /* "nsSGC" */ 77, /* "nsSslServerName" */ 681, /* "onBasis" */ 1089, /* "organizationIdentifier" */ 491, /* "organizationalStatus" */ 1141, /* "oscca" */ 475, /* "otherMailbox" */ 876, /* "owner" */ 489, /* "pagerTelephoneNumber" */ 374, /* "path" */ 112, /* "pbeWithMD5AndCast5CBC" */ 499, /* "personalSignature" */ 487, /* "personalTitle" */ 464, /* "photo" */ 863, /* "physicalDeliveryOfficeName" */ 437, /* "pilot" */ 439, /* "pilotAttributeSyntax" */ 438, /* "pilotAttributeType" */ 479, /* "pilotAttributeType27" */ 456, /* "pilotDSA" */ 441, /* "pilotGroups" */ 444, /* "pilotObject" */ 440, /* "pilotObjectClass" */ 455, /* "pilotOrganization" */ 445, /* "pilotPerson" */ 1032, /* "pkInitClientAuth" */ 1033, /* "pkInitKDC" */ 2, /* "pkcs" */ 186, /* "pkcs1" */ 27, /* "pkcs3" */ 187, /* "pkcs5" */ 20, /* "pkcs7" */ 21, /* "pkcs7-data" */ 25, /* "pkcs7-digestData" */ 26, /* "pkcs7-encryptedData" */ 23, /* "pkcs7-envelopedData" */ 24, /* "pkcs7-signedAndEnvelopedData" */ 22, /* "pkcs7-signedData" */ 151, /* "pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag" */ 47, /* "pkcs9" */ 401, /* "policyConstraints" */ 747, /* "policyMappings" */ 862, /* "postOfficeBox" */ 861, /* "postalAddress" */ 661, /* "postalCode" */ 683, /* "ppBasis" */ 872, /* "preferredDeliveryMethod" */ 873, /* "presentationAddress" */ 816, /* "prf-gostr3411-94" */ 406, /* "prime-field" */ 409, /* "prime192v1" */ 410, /* "prime192v2" */ 411, /* "prime192v3" */ 412, /* "prime239v1" */ 413, /* "prime239v2" */ 414, /* "prime239v3" */ 415, /* "prime256v1" */ 385, /* "private" */ 84, /* "privateKeyUsagePeriod" */ 886, /* "protocolInformation" */ 663, /* "proxyCertInfo" */ 510, /* "pseudonym" */ 435, /* "pss" */ 286, /* "qcStatements" */ 457, /* "qualityLabelledData" */ 450, /* "rFC822localPart" */ 870, /* "registeredAddress" */ 400, /* "role" */ 877, /* "roleOccupant" */ 448, /* "room" */ 463, /* "roomNumber" */ 6, /* "rsaEncryption" */ 644, /* "rsaOAEPEncryptionSET" */ 377, /* "rsaSignature" */ 1, /* "rsadsi" */ 482, /* "sOARecord" */ 155, /* "safeContentsBag" */ 291, /* "sbgp-autonomousSysNum" */ 290, /* "sbgp-ipAddrBlock" */ 292, /* "sbgp-routerIdentifier" */ 159, /* "sdsiCertificate" */ 859, /* "searchGuide" */ 704, /* "secp112r1" */ 705, /* "secp112r2" */ 706, /* "secp128r1" */ 707, /* "secp128r2" */ 708, /* "secp160k1" */ 709, /* "secp160r1" */ 710, /* "secp160r2" */ 711, /* "secp192k1" */ 712, /* "secp224k1" */ 713, /* "secp224r1" */ 714, /* "secp256k1" */ 715, /* "secp384r1" */ 716, /* "secp521r1" */ 154, /* "secretBag" */ 474, /* "secretary" */ 717, /* "sect113r1" */ 718, /* "sect113r2" */ 719, /* "sect131r1" */ 720, /* "sect131r2" */ 721, /* "sect163k1" */ 722, /* "sect163r1" */ 723, /* "sect163r2" */ 724, /* "sect193r1" */ 725, /* "sect193r2" */ 726, /* "sect233k1" */ 727, /* "sect233r1" */ 728, /* "sect239k1" */ 729, /* "sect283k1" */ 730, /* "sect283r1" */ 731, /* "sect409k1" */ 732, /* "sect409r1" */ 733, /* "sect571k1" */ 734, /* "sect571r1" */ 1025, /* "secureShellClient" */ 1026, /* "secureShellServer" */ 386, /* "security" */ 878, /* "seeAlso" */ 394, /* "selected-attribute-types" */ 1029, /* "sendOwner" */ 1030, /* "sendProxiedOwner" */ 1028, /* "sendProxiedRouter" */ 1027, /* "sendRouter" */ 105, /* "serialNumber" */ 129, /* "serverAuth" */ 371, /* "serviceLocator" */ 625, /* "set-addPolicy" */ 515, /* "set-attr" */ 518, /* "set-brand" */ 638, /* "set-brand-AmericanExpress" */ 637, /* "set-brand-Diners" */ 636, /* "set-brand-IATA-ATA" */ 639, /* "set-brand-JCB" */ 641, /* "set-brand-MasterCard" */ 642, /* "set-brand-Novus" */ 640, /* "set-brand-Visa" */ 517, /* "set-certExt" */ 513, /* "set-ctype" */ 514, /* "set-msgExt" */ 516, /* "set-policy" */ 607, /* "set-policy-root" */ 624, /* "set-rootKeyThumb" */ 620, /* "setAttr-Cert" */ 631, /* "setAttr-GenCryptgrm" */ 623, /* "setAttr-IssCap" */ 628, /* "setAttr-IssCap-CVM" */ 630, /* "setAttr-IssCap-Sig" */ 629, /* "setAttr-IssCap-T2" */ 621, /* "setAttr-PGWYcap" */ 635, /* "setAttr-SecDevSig" */ 632, /* "setAttr-T2Enc" */ 633, /* "setAttr-T2cleartxt" */ 634, /* "setAttr-TokICCsig" */ 627, /* "setAttr-Token-B0Prime" */ 626, /* "setAttr-Token-EMV" */ 622, /* "setAttr-TokenType" */ 619, /* "setCext-IssuerCapabilities" */ 615, /* "setCext-PGWYcapabilities" */ 616, /* "setCext-TokenIdentifier" */ 618, /* "setCext-TokenType" */ 617, /* "setCext-Track2Data" */ 611, /* "setCext-cCertRequired" */ 609, /* "setCext-certType" */ 608, /* "setCext-hashedRoot" */ 610, /* "setCext-merchData" */ 613, /* "setCext-setExt" */ 614, /* "setCext-setQualf" */ 612, /* "setCext-tunneling" */ 540, /* "setct-AcqCardCodeMsg" */ 576, /* "setct-AcqCardCodeMsgTBE" */ 570, /* "setct-AuthReqTBE" */ 534, /* "setct-AuthReqTBS" */ 527, /* "setct-AuthResBaggage" */ 571, /* "setct-AuthResTBE" */ 572, /* "setct-AuthResTBEX" */ 535, /* "setct-AuthResTBS" */ 536, /* "setct-AuthResTBSX" */ 528, /* "setct-AuthRevReqBaggage" */ 577, /* "setct-AuthRevReqTBE" */ 541, /* "setct-AuthRevReqTBS" */ 529, /* "setct-AuthRevResBaggage" */ 542, /* "setct-AuthRevResData" */ 578, /* "setct-AuthRevResTBE" */ 579, /* "setct-AuthRevResTBEB" */ 543, /* "setct-AuthRevResTBS" */ 573, /* "setct-AuthTokenTBE" */ 537, /* "setct-AuthTokenTBS" */ 600, /* "setct-BCIDistributionTBS" */ 558, /* "setct-BatchAdminReqData" */ 592, /* "setct-BatchAdminReqTBE" */ 559, /* "setct-BatchAdminResData" */ 593, /* "setct-BatchAdminResTBE" */ 599, /* "setct-CRLNotificationResTBS" */ 598, /* "setct-CRLNotificationTBS" */ 580, /* "setct-CapReqTBE" */ 581, /* "setct-CapReqTBEX" */ 544, /* "setct-CapReqTBS" */ 545, /* "setct-CapReqTBSX" */ 546, /* "setct-CapResData" */ 582, /* "setct-CapResTBE" */ 583, /* "setct-CapRevReqTBE" */ 584, /* "setct-CapRevReqTBEX" */ 547, /* "setct-CapRevReqTBS" */ 548, /* "setct-CapRevReqTBSX" */ 549, /* "setct-CapRevResData" */ 585, /* "setct-CapRevResTBE" */ 538, /* "setct-CapTokenData" */ 530, /* "setct-CapTokenSeq" */ 574, /* "setct-CapTokenTBE" */ 575, /* "setct-CapTokenTBEX" */ 539, /* "setct-CapTokenTBS" */ 560, /* "setct-CardCInitResTBS" */ 566, /* "setct-CertInqReqTBS" */ 563, /* "setct-CertReqData" */ 595, /* "setct-CertReqTBE" */ 596, /* "setct-CertReqTBEX" */ 564, /* "setct-CertReqTBS" */ 565, /* "setct-CertResData" */ 597, /* "setct-CertResTBE" */ 586, /* "setct-CredReqTBE" */ 587, /* "setct-CredReqTBEX" */ 550, /* "setct-CredReqTBS" */ 551, /* "setct-CredReqTBSX" */ 552, /* "setct-CredResData" */ 588, /* "setct-CredResTBE" */ 589, /* "setct-CredRevReqTBE" */ 590, /* "setct-CredRevReqTBEX" */ 553, /* "setct-CredRevReqTBS" */ 554, /* "setct-CredRevReqTBSX" */ 555, /* "setct-CredRevResData" */ 591, /* "setct-CredRevResTBE" */ 567, /* "setct-ErrorTBS" */ 526, /* "setct-HODInput" */ 561, /* "setct-MeAqCInitResTBS" */ 522, /* "setct-OIData" */ 519, /* "setct-PANData" */ 521, /* "setct-PANOnly" */ 520, /* "setct-PANToken" */ 556, /* "setct-PCertReqData" */ 557, /* "setct-PCertResTBS" */ 523, /* "setct-PI" */ 532, /* "setct-PI-TBS" */ 524, /* "setct-PIData" */ 525, /* "setct-PIDataUnsigned" */ 568, /* "setct-PIDualSignedTBE" */ 569, /* "setct-PIUnsignedTBE" */ 531, /* "setct-PInitResData" */ 533, /* "setct-PResData" */ 594, /* "setct-RegFormReqTBE" */ 562, /* "setct-RegFormResTBS" */ 606, /* "setext-cv" */ 601, /* "setext-genCrypt" */ 602, /* "setext-miAuth" */ 604, /* "setext-pinAny" */ 603, /* "setext-pinSecure" */ 605, /* "setext-track2" */ 52, /* "signingTime" */ 454, /* "simpleSecurityObject" */ 496, /* "singleLevelQuality" */ 1142, /* "sm-scheme" */ 387, /* "snmpv2" */ 660, /* "street" */ 85, /* "subjectAltName" */ 769, /* "subjectDirectoryAttributes" */ 398, /* "subjectInfoAccess" */ 82, /* "subjectKeyIdentifier" */ 1007, /* "subjectSignTool" */ 498, /* "subtreeMaximumQuality" */ 497, /* "subtreeMinimumQuality" */ 890, /* "supportedAlgorithms" */ 874, /* "supportedApplicationContext" */ 402, /* "targetInformation" */ 864, /* "telephoneNumber" */ 866, /* "teletexTerminalIdentifier" */ 865, /* "telexNumber" */ 459, /* "textEncodedORAddress" */ 293, /* "textNotice" */ 133, /* "timeStamping" */ 106, /* "title" */ 1020, /* "tlsfeature" */ 682, /* "tpBasis" */ 375, /* "trustRoot" */ 1151, /* "ua-pki" */ 1160, /* "uacurve0" */ 1161, /* "uacurve1" */ 1162, /* "uacurve2" */ 1163, /* "uacurve3" */ 1164, /* "uacurve4" */ 1165, /* "uacurve5" */ 1166, /* "uacurve6" */ 1167, /* "uacurve7" */ 1168, /* "uacurve8" */ 1169, /* "uacurve9" */ 436, /* "ucl" */ 102, /* "uid" */ 888, /* "uniqueMember" */ 55, /* "unstructuredAddress" */ 49, /* "unstructuredName" */ 880, /* "userCertificate" */ 465, /* "userClass" */ 879, /* "userPassword" */ 373, /* "valid" */ 678, /* "wap" */ 679, /* "wap-wsg" */ 735, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1" */ 743, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10" */ 744, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11" */ 745, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12" */ 736, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3" */ 737, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4" */ 738, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5" */ 739, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6" */ 740, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7" */ 741, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8" */ 742, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9" */ 804, /* "whirlpool" */ 868, /* "x121Address" */ 503, /* "x500UniqueIdentifier" */ 158, /* "x509Certificate" */ 160, /* "x509Crl" */ 1093, /* "x509ExtAdmission" */ }; #define NUM_LN 1186 static const unsigned int ln_objs[NUM_LN] = { 363, /* "AD Time Stamping" */ 405, /* "ANSI X9.62" */ 368, /* "Acceptable OCSP Responses" */ 910, /* "Any Extended Key Usage" */ 664, /* "Any language" */ 177, /* "Authority Information Access" */ 365, /* "Basic OCSP Response" */ 285, /* "Biometric Info" */ 179, /* "CA Issuers" */ 785, /* "CA Repository" */ 1131, /* "CMC Certificate Authority" */ 1132, /* "CMC Registration Authority" */ 954, /* "CT Certificate SCTs" */ 952, /* "CT Precertificate Poison" */ 951, /* "CT Precertificate SCTs" */ 953, /* "CT Precertificate Signer" */ 131, /* "Code Signing" */ 1024, /* "Ctrl/Provision WAP Termination" */ 1023, /* "Ctrl/provision WAP Access" */ 1159, /* "DSTU 4145-2002 big endian" */ 1158, /* "DSTU 4145-2002 little endian" */ 1152, /* "DSTU Gost 28147-2009" */ 1154, /* "DSTU Gost 28147-2009 CFB mode" */ 1153, /* "DSTU Gost 28147-2009 OFB mode" */ 1155, /* "DSTU Gost 28147-2009 key wrap" */ 1157, /* "DSTU Gost 34311-95" */ 1160, /* "DSTU curve 0" */ 1161, /* "DSTU curve 1" */ 1162, /* "DSTU curve 2" */ 1163, /* "DSTU curve 3" */ 1164, /* "DSTU curve 4" */ 1165, /* "DSTU curve 5" */ 1166, /* "DSTU curve 6" */ 1167, /* "DSTU curve 7" */ 1168, /* "DSTU curve 8" */ 1169, /* "DSTU curve 9" */ 783, /* "Diffie-Hellman based MAC" */ 382, /* "Directory" */ 392, /* "Domain" */ 132, /* "E-mail Protection" */ 1087, /* "ED25519" */ 1088, /* "ED448" */ 389, /* "Enterprises" */ 384, /* "Experimental" */ 372, /* "Extended OCSP Status" */ 172, /* "Extension Request" */ 813, /* "GOST 28147-89" */ 849, /* "GOST 28147-89 Cryptocom ParamSet" */ 815, /* "GOST 28147-89 MAC" */ 1003, /* "GOST 28147-89 TC26 parameter set" */ 851, /* "GOST 34.10-2001 Cryptocom" */ 850, /* "GOST 34.10-94 Cryptocom" */ 811, /* "GOST R 34.10-2001" */ 817, /* "GOST R 34.10-2001 DH" */ 1148, /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 (256 bit) ParamSet A" */ 1184, /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 (256 bit) ParamSet B" */ 1185, /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 (256 bit) ParamSet C" */ 1186, /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 (256 bit) ParamSet D" */ 998, /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet A" */ 999, /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet B" */ 1149, /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet C" */ 997, /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) testing parameter set" */ 979, /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 with 256 bit modulus" */ 980, /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 with 512 bit modulus" */ 985, /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 with GOST R 34.11-2012 (256 bit)" */ 986, /* "GOST R 34.10-2012 with GOST R 34.11-2012 (512 bit)" */ 812, /* "GOST R 34.10-94" */ 818, /* "GOST R 34.10-94 DH" */ 982, /* "GOST R 34.11-2012 with 256 bit hash" */ 983, /* "GOST R 34.11-2012 with 512 bit hash" */ 809, /* "GOST R 34.11-94" */ 816, /* "GOST R 34.11-94 PRF" */ 807, /* "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-2001" */ 853, /* "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-2001 Cryptocom" */ 808, /* "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-94" */ 852, /* "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-94 Cryptocom" */ 854, /* "GOST R 3410-2001 Parameter Set Cryptocom" */ 1156, /* "HMAC DSTU Gost 34311-95" */ 988, /* "HMAC GOST 34.11-2012 256 bit" */ 989, /* "HMAC GOST 34.11-2012 512 bit" */ 810, /* "HMAC GOST 34.11-94" */ 432, /* "Hold Instruction Call Issuer" */ 430, /* "Hold Instruction Code" */ 431, /* "Hold Instruction None" */ 433, /* "Hold Instruction Reject" */ 634, /* "ICC or token signature" */ 1171, /* "IEEE Security in Storage Working Group" */ 1004, /* "INN" */ 294, /* "IPSec End System" */ 295, /* "IPSec Tunnel" */ 296, /* "IPSec User" */ 1140, /* "ISO CN Member Body" */ 182, /* "ISO Member Body" */ 183, /* "ISO US Member Body" */ 1150, /* "ISO-UA" */ 667, /* "Independent" */ 665, /* "Inherit all" */ 647, /* "International Organizations" */ 142, /* "Invalidity Date" */ 504, /* "MIME MHS" */ 388, /* "Mail" */ 383, /* "Management" */ 417, /* "Microsoft CSP Name" */ 135, /* "Microsoft Commercial Code Signing" */ 138, /* "Microsoft Encrypted File System" */ 171, /* "Microsoft Extension Request" */ 134, /* "Microsoft Individual Code Signing" */ 856, /* "Microsoft Local Key set" */ 137, /* "Microsoft Server Gated Crypto" */ 648, /* "Microsoft Smartcard Login" */ 136, /* "Microsoft Trust List Signing" */ 649, /* "Microsoft User Principal Name" */ 393, /* "NULL" */ 404, /* "NULL" */ 72, /* "Netscape Base Url" */ 76, /* "Netscape CA Policy Url" */ 74, /* "Netscape CA Revocation Url" */ 71, /* "Netscape Cert Type" */ 58, /* "Netscape Certificate Extension" */ 79, /* "Netscape Certificate Sequence" */ 78, /* "Netscape Comment" */ 57, /* "Netscape Communications Corp." */ 59, /* "Netscape Data Type" */ 75, /* "Netscape Renewal Url" */ 73, /* "Netscape Revocation Url" */ 77, /* "Netscape SSL Server Name" */ 139, /* "Netscape Server Gated Crypto" */ 178, /* "OCSP" */ 370, /* "OCSP Archive Cutoff" */ 367, /* "OCSP CRL ID" */ 369, /* "OCSP No Check" */ 366, /* "OCSP Nonce" */ 371, /* "OCSP Service Locator" */ 180, /* "OCSP Signing" */ 1005, /* "OGRN" */ 161, /* "PBES2" */ 69, /* "PBKDF2" */ 162, /* "PBMAC1" */ 1032, /* "PKINIT Client Auth" */ 127, /* "PKIX" */ 858, /* "Permanent Identifier" */ 164, /* "Policy Qualifier CPS" */ 165, /* "Policy Qualifier User Notice" */ 385, /* "Private" */ 1093, /* "Professional Information or basis for Admission" */ 663, /* "Proxy Certificate Information" */ 1, /* "RSA Data Security, Inc." */ 2, /* "RSA Data Security, Inc. PKCS" */ 1116, /* "RSA-SHA3-224" */ 1117, /* "RSA-SHA3-256" */ 1118, /* "RSA-SHA3-384" */ 1119, /* "RSA-SHA3-512" */ 188, /* "S/MIME" */ 167, /* "S/MIME Capabilities" */ 1006, /* "SNILS" */ 387, /* "SNMPv2" */ 1025, /* "SSH Client" */ 1026, /* "SSH Server" */ 512, /* "Secure Electronic Transactions" */ 386, /* "Security" */ 394, /* "Selected Attribute Types" */ 1029, /* "Send Owner" */ 1030, /* "Send Proxied Owner" */ 1028, /* "Send Proxied Router" */ 1027, /* "Send Router" */ 1033, /* "Signing KDC Response" */ 1008, /* "Signing Tool of Issuer" */ 1007, /* "Signing Tool of Subject" */ 143, /* "Strong Extranet ID" */ 398, /* "Subject Information Access" */ 1020, /* "TLS Feature" */ 130, /* "TLS Web Client Authentication" */ 129, /* "TLS Web Server Authentication" */ 133, /* "Time Stamping" */ 375, /* "Trust Root" */ 1034, /* "X25519" */ 1035, /* "X448" */ 12, /* "X509" */ 402, /* "X509v3 AC Targeting" */ 746, /* "X509v3 Any Policy" */ 90, /* "X509v3 Authority Key Identifier" */ 87, /* "X509v3 Basic Constraints" */ 103, /* "X509v3 CRL Distribution Points" */ 88, /* "X509v3 CRL Number" */ 141, /* "X509v3 CRL Reason Code" */ 771, /* "X509v3 Certificate Issuer" */ 89, /* "X509v3 Certificate Policies" */ 140, /* "X509v3 Delta CRL Indicator" */ 126, /* "X509v3 Extended Key Usage" */ 857, /* "X509v3 Freshest CRL" */ 748, /* "X509v3 Inhibit Any Policy" */ 86, /* "X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name" */ 770, /* "X509v3 Issuing Distribution Point" */ 83, /* "X509v3 Key Usage" */ 666, /* "X509v3 Name Constraints" */ 403, /* "X509v3 No Revocation Available" */ 401, /* "X509v3 Policy Constraints" */ 747, /* "X509v3 Policy Mappings" */ 84, /* "X509v3 Private Key Usage Period" */ 85, /* "X509v3 Subject Alternative Name" */ 769, /* "X509v3 Subject Directory Attributes" */ 82, /* "X509v3 Subject Key Identifier" */ 920, /* "X9.42 DH" */ 184, /* "X9.57" */ 185, /* "X9.57 CM ?" */ 478, /* "aRecord" */ 289, /* "aaControls" */ 287, /* "ac-auditEntity" */ 397, /* "ac-proxying" */ 288, /* "ac-targeting" */ 446, /* "account" */ 364, /* "ad dvcs" */ 606, /* "additional verification" */ 419, /* "aes-128-cbc" */ 916, /* "aes-128-cbc-hmac-sha1" */ 948, /* "aes-128-cbc-hmac-sha256" */ 896, /* "aes-128-ccm" */ 421, /* "aes-128-cfb" */ 650, /* "aes-128-cfb1" */ 653, /* "aes-128-cfb8" */ 904, /* "aes-128-ctr" */ 418, /* "aes-128-ecb" */ 895, /* "aes-128-gcm" */ 958, /* "aes-128-ocb" */ 420, /* "aes-128-ofb" */ 913, /* "aes-128-xts" */ 423, /* "aes-192-cbc" */ 917, /* "aes-192-cbc-hmac-sha1" */ 949, /* "aes-192-cbc-hmac-sha256" */ 899, /* "aes-192-ccm" */ 425, /* "aes-192-cfb" */ 651, /* "aes-192-cfb1" */ 654, /* "aes-192-cfb8" */ 905, /* "aes-192-ctr" */ 422, /* "aes-192-ecb" */ 898, /* "aes-192-gcm" */ 959, /* "aes-192-ocb" */ 424, /* "aes-192-ofb" */ 427, /* "aes-256-cbc" */ 918, /* "aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha1" */ 950, /* "aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha256" */ 902, /* "aes-256-ccm" */ 429, /* "aes-256-cfb" */ 652, /* "aes-256-cfb1" */ 655, /* "aes-256-cfb8" */ 906, /* "aes-256-ctr" */ 426, /* "aes-256-ecb" */ 901, /* "aes-256-gcm" */ 960, /* "aes-256-ocb" */ 428, /* "aes-256-ofb" */ 914, /* "aes-256-xts" */ 376, /* "algorithm" */ 1066, /* "aria-128-cbc" */ 1120, /* "aria-128-ccm" */ 1067, /* "aria-128-cfb" */ 1080, /* "aria-128-cfb1" */ 1083, /* "aria-128-cfb8" */ 1069, /* "aria-128-ctr" */ 1065, /* "aria-128-ecb" */ 1123, /* "aria-128-gcm" */ 1068, /* "aria-128-ofb" */ 1071, /* "aria-192-cbc" */ 1121, /* "aria-192-ccm" */ 1072, /* "aria-192-cfb" */ 1081, /* "aria-192-cfb1" */ 1084, /* "aria-192-cfb8" */ 1074, /* "aria-192-ctr" */ 1070, /* "aria-192-ecb" */ 1124, /* "aria-192-gcm" */ 1073, /* "aria-192-ofb" */ 1076, /* "aria-256-cbc" */ 1122, /* "aria-256-ccm" */ 1077, /* "aria-256-cfb" */ 1082, /* "aria-256-cfb1" */ 1085, /* "aria-256-cfb8" */ 1079, /* "aria-256-ctr" */ 1075, /* "aria-256-ecb" */ 1125, /* "aria-256-gcm" */ 1078, /* "aria-256-ofb" */ 484, /* "associatedDomain" */ 485, /* "associatedName" */ 501, /* "audio" */ 1064, /* "auth-any" */ 1049, /* "auth-dss" */ 1047, /* "auth-ecdsa" */ 1050, /* "auth-gost01" */ 1051, /* "auth-gost12" */ 1053, /* "auth-null" */ 1048, /* "auth-psk" */ 1046, /* "auth-rsa" */ 1052, /* "auth-srp" */ 882, /* "authorityRevocationList" */ 91, /* "bf-cbc" */ 93, /* "bf-cfb" */ 92, /* "bf-ecb" */ 94, /* "bf-ofb" */ 1056, /* "blake2b512" */ 1057, /* "blake2s256" */ 921, /* "brainpoolP160r1" */ 922, /* "brainpoolP160t1" */ 923, /* "brainpoolP192r1" */ 924, /* "brainpoolP192t1" */ 925, /* "brainpoolP224r1" */ 926, /* "brainpoolP224t1" */ 927, /* "brainpoolP256r1" */ 928, /* "brainpoolP256t1" */ 929, /* "brainpoolP320r1" */ 930, /* "brainpoolP320t1" */ 931, /* "brainpoolP384r1" */ 932, /* "brainpoolP384t1" */ 933, /* "brainpoolP512r1" */ 934, /* "brainpoolP512t1" */ 494, /* "buildingName" */ 860, /* "businessCategory" */ 691, /* "c2onb191v4" */ 692, /* "c2onb191v5" */ 697, /* "c2onb239v4" */ 698, /* "c2onb239v5" */ 684, /* "c2pnb163v1" */ 685, /* "c2pnb163v2" */ 686, /* "c2pnb163v3" */ 687, /* "c2pnb176v1" */ 693, /* "c2pnb208w1" */ 699, /* "c2pnb272w1" */ 700, /* "c2pnb304w1" */ 702, /* "c2pnb368w1" */ 688, /* "c2tnb191v1" */ 689, /* "c2tnb191v2" */ 690, /* "c2tnb191v3" */ 694, /* "c2tnb239v1" */ 695, /* "c2tnb239v2" */ 696, /* "c2tnb239v3" */ 701, /* "c2tnb359v1" */ 703, /* "c2tnb431r1" */ 881, /* "cACertificate" */ 483, /* "cNAMERecord" */ 751, /* "camellia-128-cbc" */ 962, /* "camellia-128-ccm" */ 757, /* "camellia-128-cfb" */ 760, /* "camellia-128-cfb1" */ 763, /* "camellia-128-cfb8" */ 964, /* "camellia-128-cmac" */ 963, /* "camellia-128-ctr" */ 754, /* "camellia-128-ecb" */ 961, /* "camellia-128-gcm" */ 766, /* "camellia-128-ofb" */ 752, /* "camellia-192-cbc" */ 966, /* "camellia-192-ccm" */ 758, /* "camellia-192-cfb" */ 761, /* "camellia-192-cfb1" */ 764, /* "camellia-192-cfb8" */ 968, /* "camellia-192-cmac" */ 967, /* "camellia-192-ctr" */ 755, /* "camellia-192-ecb" */ 965, /* "camellia-192-gcm" */ 767, /* "camellia-192-ofb" */ 753, /* "camellia-256-cbc" */ 970, /* "camellia-256-ccm" */ 759, /* "camellia-256-cfb" */ 762, /* "camellia-256-cfb1" */ 765, /* "camellia-256-cfb8" */ 972, /* "camellia-256-cmac" */ 971, /* "camellia-256-ctr" */ 756, /* "camellia-256-ecb" */ 969, /* "camellia-256-gcm" */ 768, /* "camellia-256-ofb" */ 443, /* "caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax" */ 108, /* "cast5-cbc" */ 110, /* "cast5-cfb" */ 109, /* "cast5-ecb" */ 111, /* "cast5-ofb" */ 152, /* "certBag" */ 677, /* "certicom-arc" */ 517, /* "certificate extensions" */ 883, /* "certificateRevocationList" */ 1019, /* "chacha20" */ 1018, /* "chacha20-poly1305" */ 54, /* "challengePassword" */ 407, /* "characteristic-two-field" */ 395, /* "clearance" */ 633, /* "cleartext track 2" */ 894, /* "cmac" */ 13, /* "commonName" */ 513, /* "content types" */ 50, /* "contentType" */ 53, /* "countersignature" */ 1090, /* "countryCode3c" */ 1091, /* "countryCode3n" */ 14, /* "countryName" */ 153, /* "crlBag" */ 884, /* "crossCertificatePair" */ 806, /* "cryptocom" */ 805, /* "cryptopro" */ 500, /* "dITRedirect" */ 451, /* "dNSDomain" */ 495, /* "dSAQuality" */ 434, /* "data" */ 390, /* "dcObject" */ 891, /* "deltaRevocationList" */ 31, /* "des-cbc" */ 643, /* "des-cdmf" */ 30, /* "des-cfb" */ 656, /* "des-cfb1" */ 657, /* "des-cfb8" */ 29, /* "des-ecb" */ 32, /* "des-ede" */ 43, /* "des-ede-cbc" */ 60, /* "des-ede-cfb" */ 62, /* "des-ede-ofb" */ 33, /* "des-ede3" */ 44, /* "des-ede3-cbc" */ 61, /* "des-ede3-cfb" */ 658, /* "des-ede3-cfb1" */ 659, /* "des-ede3-cfb8" */ 63, /* "des-ede3-ofb" */ 45, /* "des-ofb" */ 107, /* "description" */ 871, /* "destinationIndicator" */ 80, /* "desx-cbc" */ 947, /* "dh-cofactor-kdf" */ 946, /* "dh-std-kdf" */ 28, /* "dhKeyAgreement" */ 941, /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme" */ 942, /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme" */ 943, /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme" */ 944, /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme" */ 945, /* "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme" */ 936, /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme" */ 937, /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme" */ 938, /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme" */ 939, /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme" */ 940, /* "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme" */ 11, /* "directory services (X.500)" */ 378, /* "directory services - algorithms" */ 887, /* "distinguishedName" */ 892, /* "dmdName" */ 174, /* "dnQualifier" */ 1092, /* "dnsName" */ 447, /* "document" */ 471, /* "documentAuthor" */ 468, /* "documentIdentifier" */ 472, /* "documentLocation" */ 502, /* "documentPublisher" */ 449, /* "documentSeries" */ 469, /* "documentTitle" */ 470, /* "documentVersion" */ 380, /* "dod" */ 391, /* "domainComponent" */ 452, /* "domainRelatedObject" */ 116, /* "dsaEncryption" */ 67, /* "dsaEncryption-old" */ 66, /* "dsaWithSHA" */ 113, /* "dsaWithSHA1" */ 70, /* "dsaWithSHA1-old" */ 802, /* "dsa_with_SHA224" */ 803, /* "dsa_with_SHA256" */ 1108, /* "dsa_with_SHA3-224" */ 1109, /* "dsa_with_SHA3-256" */ 1110, /* "dsa_with_SHA3-384" */ 1111, /* "dsa_with_SHA3-512" */ 1106, /* "dsa_with_SHA384" */ 1107, /* "dsa_with_SHA512" */ 297, /* "dvcs" */ 791, /* "ecdsa-with-Recommended" */ 416, /* "ecdsa-with-SHA1" */ 793, /* "ecdsa-with-SHA224" */ 794, /* "ecdsa-with-SHA256" */ 795, /* "ecdsa-with-SHA384" */ 796, /* "ecdsa-with-SHA512" */ 792, /* "ecdsa-with-Specified" */ 1112, /* "ecdsa_with_SHA3-224" */ 1113, /* "ecdsa_with_SHA3-256" */ 1114, /* "ecdsa_with_SHA3-384" */ 1115, /* "ecdsa_with_SHA3-512" */ 48, /* "emailAddress" */ 632, /* "encrypted track 2" */ 885, /* "enhancedSearchGuide" */ 56, /* "extendedCertificateAttributes" */ 867, /* "facsimileTelephoneNumber" */ 462, /* "favouriteDrink" */ 1126, /* "ffdhe2048" */ 1127, /* "ffdhe3072" */ 1128, /* "ffdhe4096" */ 1129, /* "ffdhe6144" */ 1130, /* "ffdhe8192" */ 453, /* "friendlyCountry" */ 490, /* "friendlyCountryName" */ 156, /* "friendlyName" */ 631, /* "generate cryptogram" */ 509, /* "generationQualifier" */ 601, /* "generic cryptogram" */ 99, /* "givenName" */ 976, /* "gost-mac-12" */ 1009, /* "gost89-cbc" */ 814, /* "gost89-cnt" */ 975, /* "gost89-cnt-12" */ 1011, /* "gost89-ctr" */ 1010, /* "gost89-ecb" */ 1015, /* "grasshopper-cbc" */ 1016, /* "grasshopper-cfb" */ 1013, /* "grasshopper-ctr" */ 1012, /* "grasshopper-ecb" */ 1017, /* "grasshopper-mac" */ 1014, /* "grasshopper-ofb" */ 1036, /* "hkdf" */ 855, /* "hmac" */ 780, /* "hmac-md5" */ 781, /* "hmac-sha1" */ 1102, /* "hmac-sha3-224" */ 1103, /* "hmac-sha3-256" */ 1104, /* "hmac-sha3-384" */ 1105, /* "hmac-sha3-512" */ 797, /* "hmacWithMD5" */ 163, /* "hmacWithSHA1" */ 798, /* "hmacWithSHA224" */ 799, /* "hmacWithSHA256" */ 800, /* "hmacWithSHA384" */ 801, /* "hmacWithSHA512" */ 1193, /* "hmacWithSHA512-224" */ 1194, /* "hmacWithSHA512-256" */ 486, /* "homePostalAddress" */ 473, /* "homeTelephoneNumber" */ 466, /* "host" */ 889, /* "houseIdentifier" */ 442, /* "iA5StringSyntax" */ 381, /* "iana" */ 824, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet" */ 825, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet" */ 826, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet" */ 827, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet" */ 819, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-KeyMeshing" */ 829, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-0-ParamSet" */ 828, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-1-ParamSet" */ 830, /* "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-RIC-1-ParamSet" */ 820, /* "id-Gost28147-89-None-KeyMeshing" */ 823, /* "id-Gost28147-89-TestParamSet" */ 840, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet" */ 841, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet" */ 842, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet" */ 843, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet" */ 844, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet" */ 839, /* "id-GostR3410-2001-TestParamSet" */ 832, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet" */ 833, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet" */ 834, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet" */ 835, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet" */ 836, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet" */ 837, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet" */ 838, /* "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchC-ParamSet" */ 831, /* "id-GostR3410-94-TestParamSet" */ 845, /* "id-GostR3410-94-a" */ 846, /* "id-GostR3410-94-aBis" */ 847, /* "id-GostR3410-94-b" */ 848, /* "id-GostR3410-94-bBis" */ 822, /* "id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet" */ 821, /* "id-GostR3411-94-TestParamSet" */ 266, /* "id-aca" */ 355, /* "id-aca-accessIdentity" */ 354, /* "id-aca-authenticationInfo" */ 356, /* "id-aca-chargingIdentity" */ 399, /* "id-aca-encAttrs" */ 357, /* "id-aca-group" */ 358, /* "id-aca-role" */ 176, /* "id-ad" */ 788, /* "id-aes128-wrap" */ 897, /* "id-aes128-wrap-pad" */ 789, /* "id-aes192-wrap" */ 900, /* "id-aes192-wrap-pad" */ 790, /* "id-aes256-wrap" */ 903, /* "id-aes256-wrap-pad" */ 262, /* "id-alg" */ 893, /* "id-alg-PWRI-KEK" */ 323, /* "id-alg-des40" */ 326, /* "id-alg-dh-pop" */ 325, /* "id-alg-dh-sig-hmac-sha1" */ 324, /* "id-alg-noSignature" */ 907, /* "id-camellia128-wrap" */ 908, /* "id-camellia192-wrap" */ 909, /* "id-camellia256-wrap" */ 268, /* "id-cct" */ 361, /* "id-cct-PKIData" */ 362, /* "id-cct-PKIResponse" */ 360, /* "id-cct-crs" */ 81, /* "id-ce" */ 680, /* "id-characteristic-two-basis" */ 263, /* "id-cmc" */ 334, /* "id-cmc-addExtensions" */ 346, /* "id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance" */ 330, /* "id-cmc-dataReturn" */ 336, /* "id-cmc-decryptedPOP" */ 335, /* "id-cmc-encryptedPOP" */ 339, /* "id-cmc-getCRL" */ 338, /* "id-cmc-getCert" */ 328, /* "id-cmc-identification" */ 329, /* "id-cmc-identityProof" */ 337, /* "id-cmc-lraPOPWitness" */ 344, /* "id-cmc-popLinkRandom" */ 345, /* "id-cmc-popLinkWitness" */ 343, /* "id-cmc-queryPending" */ 333, /* "id-cmc-recipientNonce" */ 341, /* "id-cmc-regInfo" */ 342, /* "id-cmc-responseInfo" */ 340, /* "id-cmc-revokeRequest" */ 332, /* "id-cmc-senderNonce" */ 327, /* "id-cmc-statusInfo" */ 331, /* "id-cmc-transactionId" */ 787, /* "id-ct-asciiTextWithCRLF" */ 1060, /* "id-ct-xml" */ 408, /* "id-ecPublicKey" */ 508, /* "id-hex-multipart-message" */ 507, /* "id-hex-partial-message" */ 260, /* "id-it" */ 302, /* "id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo" */ 298, /* "id-it-caProtEncCert" */ 311, /* "id-it-confirmWaitTime" */ 303, /* "id-it-currentCRL" */ 300, /* "id-it-encKeyPairTypes" */ 310, /* "id-it-implicitConfirm" */ 308, /* "id-it-keyPairParamRep" */ 307, /* "id-it-keyPairParamReq" */ 312, /* "id-it-origPKIMessage" */ 301, /* "id-it-preferredSymmAlg" */ 309, /* "id-it-revPassphrase" */ 299, /* "id-it-signKeyPairTypes" */ 305, /* "id-it-subscriptionRequest" */ 306, /* "id-it-subscriptionResponse" */ 784, /* "id-it-suppLangTags" */ 304, /* "id-it-unsupportedOIDs" */ 128, /* "id-kp" */ 280, /* "id-mod-attribute-cert" */ 274, /* "id-mod-cmc" */ 277, /* "id-mod-cmp" */ 284, /* "id-mod-cmp2000" */ 273, /* "id-mod-crmf" */ 283, /* "id-mod-dvcs" */ 275, /* "id-mod-kea-profile-88" */ 276, /* "id-mod-kea-profile-93" */ 282, /* "id-mod-ocsp" */ 278, /* "id-mod-qualified-cert-88" */ 279, /* "id-mod-qualified-cert-93" */ 281, /* "id-mod-timestamp-protocol" */ 264, /* "id-on" */ 347, /* "id-on-personalData" */ 265, /* "id-pda" */ 352, /* "id-pda-countryOfCitizenship" */ 353, /* "id-pda-countryOfResidence" */ 348, /* "id-pda-dateOfBirth" */ 351, /* "id-pda-gender" */ 349, /* "id-pda-placeOfBirth" */ 175, /* "id-pe" */ 1031, /* "id-pkinit" */ 261, /* "id-pkip" */ 258, /* "id-pkix-mod" */ 269, /* "id-pkix1-explicit-88" */ 271, /* "id-pkix1-explicit-93" */ 270, /* "id-pkix1-implicit-88" */ 272, /* "id-pkix1-implicit-93" */ 662, /* "id-ppl" */ 267, /* "id-qcs" */ 359, /* "id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1" */ 259, /* "id-qt" */ 313, /* "id-regCtrl" */ 316, /* "id-regCtrl-authenticator" */ 319, /* "id-regCtrl-oldCertID" */ 318, /* "id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions" */ 317, /* "id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo" */ 320, /* "id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey" */ 315, /* "id-regCtrl-regToken" */ 314, /* "id-regInfo" */ 322, /* "id-regInfo-certReq" */ 321, /* "id-regInfo-utf8Pairs" */ 191, /* "id-smime-aa" */ 215, /* "id-smime-aa-contentHint" */ 218, /* "id-smime-aa-contentIdentifier" */ 221, /* "id-smime-aa-contentReference" */ 240, /* "id-smime-aa-dvcs-dvc" */ 217, /* "id-smime-aa-encapContentType" */ 222, /* "id-smime-aa-encrypKeyPref" */ 220, /* "id-smime-aa-equivalentLabels" */ 232, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-CertificateRefs" */ 233, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-RevocationRefs" */ 238, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-archiveTimeStamp" */ 237, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp" */ 234, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-certValues" */ 227, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-commitmentType" */ 231, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-contentTimestamp" */ 236, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-escTimeStamp" */ 230, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-otherSigCert" */ 235, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-revocationValues" */ 226, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-sigPolicyId" */ 229, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-signerAttr" */ 228, /* "id-smime-aa-ets-signerLocation" */ 219, /* "id-smime-aa-macValue" */ 214, /* "id-smime-aa-mlExpandHistory" */ 216, /* "id-smime-aa-msgSigDigest" */ 212, /* "id-smime-aa-receiptRequest" */ 213, /* "id-smime-aa-securityLabel" */ 239, /* "id-smime-aa-signatureType" */ 223, /* "id-smime-aa-signingCertificate" */ 1086, /* "id-smime-aa-signingCertificateV2" */ 224, /* "id-smime-aa-smimeEncryptCerts" */ 225, /* "id-smime-aa-timeStampToken" */ 192, /* "id-smime-alg" */ 243, /* "id-smime-alg-3DESwrap" */ 246, /* "id-smime-alg-CMS3DESwrap" */ 247, /* "id-smime-alg-CMSRC2wrap" */ 245, /* "id-smime-alg-ESDH" */ 241, /* "id-smime-alg-ESDHwith3DES" */ 242, /* "id-smime-alg-ESDHwithRC2" */ 244, /* "id-smime-alg-RC2wrap" */ 193, /* "id-smime-cd" */ 248, /* "id-smime-cd-ldap" */ 190, /* "id-smime-ct" */ 210, /* "id-smime-ct-DVCSRequestData" */ 211, /* "id-smime-ct-DVCSResponseData" */ 208, /* "id-smime-ct-TDTInfo" */ 207, /* "id-smime-ct-TSTInfo" */ 205, /* "id-smime-ct-authData" */ 1059, /* "id-smime-ct-authEnvelopedData" */ 786, /* "id-smime-ct-compressedData" */ 1058, /* "id-smime-ct-contentCollection" */ 209, /* "id-smime-ct-contentInfo" */ 206, /* "id-smime-ct-publishCert" */ 204, /* "id-smime-ct-receipt" */ 195, /* "id-smime-cti" */ 255, /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfApproval" */ 256, /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfCreation" */ 253, /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery" */ 251, /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin" */ 252, /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt" */ 254, /* "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfSender" */ 189, /* "id-smime-mod" */ 196, /* "id-smime-mod-cms" */ 197, /* "id-smime-mod-ess" */ 202, /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-88" */ 203, /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-97" */ 200, /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-88" */ 201, /* "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-97" */ 199, /* "id-smime-mod-msg-v3" */ 198, /* "id-smime-mod-oid" */ 194, /* "id-smime-spq" */ 250, /* "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-unotice" */ 249, /* "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-uri" */ 974, /* "id-tc26" */ 991, /* "id-tc26-agreement" */ 992, /* "id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-256" */ 993, /* "id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-512" */ 977, /* "id-tc26-algorithms" */ 990, /* "id-tc26-cipher" */ 1001, /* "id-tc26-cipher-constants" */ 1176, /* "id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik" */ 1177, /* "id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm" */ 1178, /* "id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm-omac" */ 1173, /* "id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-magma" */ 1174, /* "id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm" */ 1175, /* "id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm-omac" */ 994, /* "id-tc26-constants" */ 981, /* "id-tc26-digest" */ 1000, /* "id-tc26-digest-constants" */ 1002, /* "id-tc26-gost-28147-constants" */ 1147, /* "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-constants" */ 996, /* "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants" */ 987, /* "id-tc26-mac" */ 978, /* "id-tc26-sign" */ 995, /* "id-tc26-sign-constants" */ 984, /* "id-tc26-signwithdigest" */ 1179, /* "id-tc26-wrap" */ 1182, /* "id-tc26-wrap-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik" */ 1183, /* "id-tc26-wrap-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-kexp15" */ 1180, /* "id-tc26-wrap-gostr3412-2015-magma" */ 1181, /* "id-tc26-wrap-gostr3412-2015-magma-kexp15" */ 34, /* "idea-cbc" */ 35, /* "idea-cfb" */ 36, /* "idea-ecb" */ 46, /* "idea-ofb" */ 676, /* "identified-organization" */ 1170, /* "ieee" */ 461, /* "info" */ 101, /* "initials" */ 869, /* "internationaliSDNNumber" */ 1022, /* "ipsec Internet Key Exchange" */ 749, /* "ipsec3" */ 750, /* "ipsec4" */ 181, /* "iso" */ 623, /* "issuer capabilities" */ 645, /* "itu-t" */ 492, /* "janetMailbox" */ 646, /* "joint-iso-itu-t" */ 957, /* "jurisdictionCountryName" */ 955, /* "jurisdictionLocalityName" */ 956, /* "jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName" */ 150, /* "keyBag" */ 773, /* "kisa" */ 1063, /* "kx-any" */ 1039, /* "kx-dhe" */ 1041, /* "kx-dhe-psk" */ 1038, /* "kx-ecdhe" */ 1040, /* "kx-ecdhe-psk" */ 1045, /* "kx-gost" */ 1043, /* "kx-psk" */ 1037, /* "kx-rsa" */ 1042, /* "kx-rsa-psk" */ 1044, /* "kx-srp" */ 477, /* "lastModifiedBy" */ 476, /* "lastModifiedTime" */ 157, /* "localKeyID" */ 15, /* "localityName" */ 480, /* "mXRecord" */ 1190, /* "magma-cbc" */ 1191, /* "magma-cfb" */ 1188, /* "magma-ctr" */ 1187, /* "magma-ecb" */ 1192, /* "magma-mac" */ 1189, /* "magma-ofb" */ 493, /* "mailPreferenceOption" */ 467, /* "manager" */ 3, /* "md2" */ 7, /* "md2WithRSAEncryption" */ 257, /* "md4" */ 396, /* "md4WithRSAEncryption" */ 4, /* "md5" */ 114, /* "md5-sha1" */ 104, /* "md5WithRSA" */ 8, /* "md5WithRSAEncryption" */ 95, /* "mdc2" */ 96, /* "mdc2WithRSA" */ 875, /* "member" */ 602, /* "merchant initiated auth" */ 514, /* "message extensions" */ 51, /* "messageDigest" */ 911, /* "mgf1" */ 506, /* "mime-mhs-bodies" */ 505, /* "mime-mhs-headings" */ 488, /* "mobileTelephoneNumber" */ 481, /* "nSRecord" */ 173, /* "name" */ 681, /* "onBasis" */ 379, /* "org" */ 1089, /* "organizationIdentifier" */ 17, /* "organizationName" */ 491, /* "organizationalStatus" */ 18, /* "organizationalUnitName" */ 1141, /* "oscca" */ 475, /* "otherMailbox" */ 876, /* "owner" */ 935, /* "pSpecified" */ 489, /* "pagerTelephoneNumber" */ 782, /* "password based MAC" */ 374, /* "path" */ 621, /* "payment gateway capabilities" */ 9, /* "pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC" */ 168, /* "pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC" */ 112, /* "pbeWithMD5AndCast5CBC" */ 10, /* "pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC" */ 169, /* "pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC" */ 148, /* "pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC2-CBC" */ 144, /* "pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC4" */ 147, /* "pbeWithSHA1And2-KeyTripleDES-CBC" */ 146, /* "pbeWithSHA1And3-KeyTripleDES-CBC" */ 149, /* "pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC2-CBC" */ 145, /* "pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC4" */ 170, /* "pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC" */ 68, /* "pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC" */ 499, /* "personalSignature" */ 487, /* "personalTitle" */ 464, /* "photo" */ 863, /* "physicalDeliveryOfficeName" */ 437, /* "pilot" */ 439, /* "pilotAttributeSyntax" */ 438, /* "pilotAttributeType" */ 479, /* "pilotAttributeType27" */ 456, /* "pilotDSA" */ 441, /* "pilotGroups" */ 444, /* "pilotObject" */ 440, /* "pilotObjectClass" */ 455, /* "pilotOrganization" */ 445, /* "pilotPerson" */ 186, /* "pkcs1" */ 27, /* "pkcs3" */ 187, /* "pkcs5" */ 20, /* "pkcs7" */ 21, /* "pkcs7-data" */ 25, /* "pkcs7-digestData" */ 26, /* "pkcs7-encryptedData" */ 23, /* "pkcs7-envelopedData" */ 24, /* "pkcs7-signedAndEnvelopedData" */ 22, /* "pkcs7-signedData" */ 151, /* "pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag" */ 47, /* "pkcs9" */ 1061, /* "poly1305" */ 862, /* "postOfficeBox" */ 861, /* "postalAddress" */ 661, /* "postalCode" */ 683, /* "ppBasis" */ 872, /* "preferredDeliveryMethod" */ 873, /* "presentationAddress" */ 406, /* "prime-field" */ 409, /* "prime192v1" */ 410, /* "prime192v2" */ 411, /* "prime192v3" */ 412, /* "prime239v1" */ 413, /* "prime239v2" */ 414, /* "prime239v3" */ 415, /* "prime256v1" */ 886, /* "protocolInformation" */ 510, /* "pseudonym" */ 435, /* "pss" */ 286, /* "qcStatements" */ 457, /* "qualityLabelledData" */ 450, /* "rFC822localPart" */ 98, /* "rc2-40-cbc" */ 166, /* "rc2-64-cbc" */ 37, /* "rc2-cbc" */ 39, /* "rc2-cfb" */ 38, /* "rc2-ecb" */ 40, /* "rc2-ofb" */ 5, /* "rc4" */ 97, /* "rc4-40" */ 915, /* "rc4-hmac-md5" */ 120, /* "rc5-cbc" */ 122, /* "rc5-cfb" */ 121, /* "rc5-ecb" */ 123, /* "rc5-ofb" */ 870, /* "registeredAddress" */ 460, /* "rfc822Mailbox" */ 117, /* "ripemd160" */ 119, /* "ripemd160WithRSA" */ 400, /* "role" */ 877, /* "roleOccupant" */ 448, /* "room" */ 463, /* "roomNumber" */ 19, /* "rsa" */ 6, /* "rsaEncryption" */ 644, /* "rsaOAEPEncryptionSET" */ 377, /* "rsaSignature" */ 919, /* "rsaesOaep" */ 912, /* "rsassaPss" */ 482, /* "sOARecord" */ 155, /* "safeContentsBag" */ 291, /* "sbgp-autonomousSysNum" */ 290, /* "sbgp-ipAddrBlock" */ 292, /* "sbgp-routerIdentifier" */ 973, /* "scrypt" */ 159, /* "sdsiCertificate" */ 859, /* "searchGuide" */ 704, /* "secp112r1" */ 705, /* "secp112r2" */ 706, /* "secp128r1" */ 707, /* "secp128r2" */ 708, /* "secp160k1" */ 709, /* "secp160r1" */ 710, /* "secp160r2" */ 711, /* "secp192k1" */ 712, /* "secp224k1" */ 713, /* "secp224r1" */ 714, /* "secp256k1" */ 715, /* "secp384r1" */ 716, /* "secp521r1" */ 154, /* "secretBag" */ 474, /* "secretary" */ 717, /* "sect113r1" */ 718, /* "sect113r2" */ 719, /* "sect131r1" */ 720, /* "sect131r2" */ 721, /* "sect163k1" */ 722, /* "sect163r1" */ 723, /* "sect163r2" */ 724, /* "sect193r1" */ 725, /* "sect193r2" */ 726, /* "sect233k1" */ 727, /* "sect233r1" */ 728, /* "sect239k1" */ 729, /* "sect283k1" */ 730, /* "sect283r1" */ 731, /* "sect409k1" */ 732, /* "sect409r1" */ 733, /* "sect571k1" */ 734, /* "sect571r1" */ 635, /* "secure device signature" */ 878, /* "seeAlso" */ 777, /* "seed-cbc" */ 779, /* "seed-cfb" */ 776, /* "seed-ecb" */ 778, /* "seed-ofb" */ 105, /* "serialNumber" */ 625, /* "set-addPolicy" */ 515, /* "set-attr" */ 518, /* "set-brand" */ 638, /* "set-brand-AmericanExpress" */ 637, /* "set-brand-Diners" */ 636, /* "set-brand-IATA-ATA" */ 639, /* "set-brand-JCB" */ 641, /* "set-brand-MasterCard" */ 642, /* "set-brand-Novus" */ 640, /* "set-brand-Visa" */ 516, /* "set-policy" */ 607, /* "set-policy-root" */ 624, /* "set-rootKeyThumb" */ 620, /* "setAttr-Cert" */ 628, /* "setAttr-IssCap-CVM" */ 630, /* "setAttr-IssCap-Sig" */ 629, /* "setAttr-IssCap-T2" */ 627, /* "setAttr-Token-B0Prime" */ 626, /* "setAttr-Token-EMV" */ 622, /* "setAttr-TokenType" */ 619, /* "setCext-IssuerCapabilities" */ 615, /* "setCext-PGWYcapabilities" */ 616, /* "setCext-TokenIdentifier" */ 618, /* "setCext-TokenType" */ 617, /* "setCext-Track2Data" */ 611, /* "setCext-cCertRequired" */ 609, /* "setCext-certType" */ 608, /* "setCext-hashedRoot" */ 610, /* "setCext-merchData" */ 613, /* "setCext-setExt" */ 614, /* "setCext-setQualf" */ 612, /* "setCext-tunneling" */ 540, /* "setct-AcqCardCodeMsg" */ 576, /* "setct-AcqCardCodeMsgTBE" */ 570, /* "setct-AuthReqTBE" */ 534, /* "setct-AuthReqTBS" */ 527, /* "setct-AuthResBaggage" */ 571, /* "setct-AuthResTBE" */ 572, /* "setct-AuthResTBEX" */ 535, /* "setct-AuthResTBS" */ 536, /* "setct-AuthResTBSX" */ 528, /* "setct-AuthRevReqBaggage" */ 577, /* "setct-AuthRevReqTBE" */ 541, /* "setct-AuthRevReqTBS" */ 529, /* "setct-AuthRevResBaggage" */ 542, /* "setct-AuthRevResData" */ 578, /* "setct-AuthRevResTBE" */ 579, /* "setct-AuthRevResTBEB" */ 543, /* "setct-AuthRevResTBS" */ 573, /* "setct-AuthTokenTBE" */ 537, /* "setct-AuthTokenTBS" */ 600, /* "setct-BCIDistributionTBS" */ 558, /* "setct-BatchAdminReqData" */ 592, /* "setct-BatchAdminReqTBE" */ 559, /* "setct-BatchAdminResData" */ 593, /* "setct-BatchAdminResTBE" */ 599, /* "setct-CRLNotificationResTBS" */ 598, /* "setct-CRLNotificationTBS" */ 580, /* "setct-CapReqTBE" */ 581, /* "setct-CapReqTBEX" */ 544, /* "setct-CapReqTBS" */ 545, /* "setct-CapReqTBSX" */ 546, /* "setct-CapResData" */ 582, /* "setct-CapResTBE" */ 583, /* "setct-CapRevReqTBE" */ 584, /* "setct-CapRevReqTBEX" */ 547, /* "setct-CapRevReqTBS" */ 548, /* "setct-CapRevReqTBSX" */ 549, /* "setct-CapRevResData" */ 585, /* "setct-CapRevResTBE" */ 538, /* "setct-CapTokenData" */ 530, /* "setct-CapTokenSeq" */ 574, /* "setct-CapTokenTBE" */ 575, /* "setct-CapTokenTBEX" */ 539, /* "setct-CapTokenTBS" */ 560, /* "setct-CardCInitResTBS" */ 566, /* "setct-CertInqReqTBS" */ 563, /* "setct-CertReqData" */ 595, /* "setct-CertReqTBE" */ 596, /* "setct-CertReqTBEX" */ 564, /* "setct-CertReqTBS" */ 565, /* "setct-CertResData" */ 597, /* "setct-CertResTBE" */ 586, /* "setct-CredReqTBE" */ 587, /* "setct-CredReqTBEX" */ 550, /* "setct-CredReqTBS" */ 551, /* "setct-CredReqTBSX" */ 552, /* "setct-CredResData" */ 588, /* "setct-CredResTBE" */ 589, /* "setct-CredRevReqTBE" */ 590, /* "setct-CredRevReqTBEX" */ 553, /* "setct-CredRevReqTBS" */ 554, /* "setct-CredRevReqTBSX" */ 555, /* "setct-CredRevResData" */ 591, /* "setct-CredRevResTBE" */ 567, /* "setct-ErrorTBS" */ 526, /* "setct-HODInput" */ 561, /* "setct-MeAqCInitResTBS" */ 522, /* "setct-OIData" */ 519, /* "setct-PANData" */ 521, /* "setct-PANOnly" */ 520, /* "setct-PANToken" */ 556, /* "setct-PCertReqData" */ 557, /* "setct-PCertResTBS" */ 523, /* "setct-PI" */ 532, /* "setct-PI-TBS" */ 524, /* "setct-PIData" */ 525, /* "setct-PIDataUnsigned" */ 568, /* "setct-PIDualSignedTBE" */ 569, /* "setct-PIUnsignedTBE" */ 531, /* "setct-PInitResData" */ 533, /* "setct-PResData" */ 594, /* "setct-RegFormReqTBE" */ 562, /* "setct-RegFormResTBS" */ 604, /* "setext-pinAny" */ 603, /* "setext-pinSecure" */ 605, /* "setext-track2" */ 41, /* "sha" */ 64, /* "sha1" */ 115, /* "sha1WithRSA" */ 65, /* "sha1WithRSAEncryption" */ 675, /* "sha224" */ 671, /* "sha224WithRSAEncryption" */ 672, /* "sha256" */ 668, /* "sha256WithRSAEncryption" */ 1096, /* "sha3-224" */ 1097, /* "sha3-256" */ 1098, /* "sha3-384" */ 1099, /* "sha3-512" */ 673, /* "sha384" */ 669, /* "sha384WithRSAEncryption" */ 674, /* "sha512" */ 1094, /* "sha512-224" */ 1145, /* "sha512-224WithRSAEncryption" */ 1095, /* "sha512-256" */ 1146, /* "sha512-256WithRSAEncryption" */ 670, /* "sha512WithRSAEncryption" */ 42, /* "shaWithRSAEncryption" */ 1100, /* "shake128" */ 1101, /* "shake256" */ 52, /* "signingTime" */ 454, /* "simpleSecurityObject" */ 496, /* "singleLevelQuality" */ 1062, /* "siphash" */ 1142, /* "sm-scheme" */ 1172, /* "sm2" */ 1143, /* "sm3" */ 1144, /* "sm3WithRSAEncryption" */ 1134, /* "sm4-cbc" */ 1137, /* "sm4-cfb" */ 1136, /* "sm4-cfb1" */ 1138, /* "sm4-cfb8" */ 1139, /* "sm4-ctr" */ 1133, /* "sm4-ecb" */ 1135, /* "sm4-ofb" */ 16, /* "stateOrProvinceName" */ 660, /* "streetAddress" */ 498, /* "subtreeMaximumQuality" */ 497, /* "subtreeMinimumQuality" */ 890, /* "supportedAlgorithms" */ 874, /* "supportedApplicationContext" */ 100, /* "surname" */ 864, /* "telephoneNumber" */ 866, /* "teletexTerminalIdentifier" */ 865, /* "telexNumber" */ 459, /* "textEncodedORAddress" */ 293, /* "textNotice" */ 106, /* "title" */ 1021, /* "tls1-prf" */ 682, /* "tpBasis" */ 1151, /* "ua-pki" */ 436, /* "ucl" */ 0, /* "undefined" */ 102, /* "uniqueIdentifier" */ 888, /* "uniqueMember" */ 55, /* "unstructuredAddress" */ 49, /* "unstructuredName" */ 880, /* "userCertificate" */ 465, /* "userClass" */ 458, /* "userId" */ 879, /* "userPassword" */ 373, /* "valid" */ 678, /* "wap" */ 679, /* "wap-wsg" */ 735, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1" */ 743, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10" */ 744, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11" */ 745, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12" */ 736, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3" */ 737, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4" */ 738, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5" */ 739, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6" */ 740, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7" */ 741, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8" */ 742, /* "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9" */ 804, /* "whirlpool" */ 868, /* "x121Address" */ 503, /* "x500UniqueIdentifier" */ 158, /* "x509Certificate" */ 160, /* "x509Crl" */ 125, /* "zlib compression" */ }; #define NUM_OBJ 1071 static const unsigned int obj_objs[NUM_OBJ] = { 0, /* OBJ_undef 0 */ 181, /* OBJ_iso 1 */ 393, /* OBJ_joint_iso_ccitt OBJ_joint_iso_itu_t */ 404, /* OBJ_ccitt OBJ_itu_t */ 645, /* OBJ_itu_t 0 */ 646, /* OBJ_joint_iso_itu_t 2 */ 434, /* OBJ_data 0 9 */ 182, /* OBJ_member_body 1 2 */ 379, /* OBJ_org 1 3 */ 676, /* OBJ_identified_organization 1 3 */ 11, /* OBJ_X500 2 5 */ 647, /* OBJ_international_organizations 2 23 */ 380, /* OBJ_dod 1 3 6 */ 1170, /* OBJ_ieee 1 3 111 */ 12, /* OBJ_X509 2 5 4 */ 378, /* OBJ_X500algorithms 2 5 8 */ 81, /* OBJ_id_ce 2 5 29 */ 512, /* OBJ_id_set 2 23 42 */ 678, /* OBJ_wap 2 23 43 */ 435, /* OBJ_pss 0 9 2342 */ 1140, /* OBJ_ISO_CN 1 2 156 */ 1150, /* OBJ_ISO_UA 1 2 804 */ 183, /* OBJ_ISO_US 1 2 840 */ 381, /* OBJ_iana 1 3 6 1 */ 1034, /* OBJ_X25519 1 3 101 110 */ 1035, /* OBJ_X448 1 3 101 111 */ 1087, /* OBJ_ED25519 1 3 101 112 */ 1088, /* OBJ_ED448 1 3 101 113 */ 677, /* OBJ_certicom_arc 1 3 132 */ 394, /* OBJ_selected_attribute_types 2 5 1 5 */ 13, /* OBJ_commonName 2 5 4 3 */ 100, /* OBJ_surname 2 5 4 4 */ 105, /* OBJ_serialNumber 2 5 4 5 */ 14, /* OBJ_countryName 2 5 4 6 */ 15, /* OBJ_localityName 2 5 4 7 */ 16, /* OBJ_stateOrProvinceName 2 5 4 8 */ 660, /* OBJ_streetAddress 2 5 4 9 */ 17, /* OBJ_organizationName 2 5 4 10 */ 18, /* OBJ_organizationalUnitName 2 5 4 11 */ 106, /* OBJ_title 2 5 4 12 */ 107, /* OBJ_description 2 5 4 13 */ 859, /* OBJ_searchGuide 2 5 4 14 */ 860, /* OBJ_businessCategory 2 5 4 15 */ 861, /* OBJ_postalAddress 2 5 4 16 */ 661, /* OBJ_postalCode 2 5 4 17 */ 862, /* OBJ_postOfficeBox 2 5 4 18 */ 863, /* OBJ_physicalDeliveryOfficeName 2 5 4 19 */ 864, /* OBJ_telephoneNumber 2 5 4 20 */ 865, /* OBJ_telexNumber 2 5 4 21 */ 866, /* OBJ_teletexTerminalIdentifier 2 5 4 22 */ 867, /* OBJ_facsimileTelephoneNumber 2 5 4 23 */ 868, /* OBJ_x121Address 2 5 4 24 */ 869, /* OBJ_internationaliSDNNumber 2 5 4 25 */ 870, /* OBJ_registeredAddress 2 5 4 26 */ 871, /* OBJ_destinationIndicator 2 5 4 27 */ 872, /* OBJ_preferredDeliveryMethod 2 5 4 28 */ 873, /* OBJ_presentationAddress 2 5 4 29 */ 874, /* OBJ_supportedApplicationContext 2 5 4 30 */ 875, /* OBJ_member 2 5 4 31 */ 876, /* OBJ_owner 2 5 4 32 */ 877, /* OBJ_roleOccupant 2 5 4 33 */ 878, /* OBJ_seeAlso 2 5 4 34 */ 879, /* OBJ_userPassword 2 5 4 35 */ 880, /* OBJ_userCertificate 2 5 4 36 */ 881, /* OBJ_cACertificate 2 5 4 37 */ 882, /* OBJ_authorityRevocationList 2 5 4 38 */ 883, /* OBJ_certificateRevocationList 2 5 4 39 */ 884, /* OBJ_crossCertificatePair 2 5 4 40 */ 173, /* OBJ_name 2 5 4 41 */ 99, /* OBJ_givenName 2 5 4 42 */ 101, /* OBJ_initials 2 5 4 43 */ 509, /* OBJ_generationQualifier 2 5 4 44 */ 503, /* OBJ_x500UniqueIdentifier 2 5 4 45 */ 174, /* OBJ_dnQualifier 2 5 4 46 */ 885, /* OBJ_enhancedSearchGuide 2 5 4 47 */ 886, /* OBJ_protocolInformation 2 5 4 48 */ 887, /* OBJ_distinguishedName 2 5 4 49 */ 888, /* OBJ_uniqueMember 2 5 4 50 */ 889, /* OBJ_houseIdentifier 2 5 4 51 */ 890, /* OBJ_supportedAlgorithms 2 5 4 52 */ 891, /* OBJ_deltaRevocationList 2 5 4 53 */ 892, /* OBJ_dmdName 2 5 4 54 */ 510, /* OBJ_pseudonym 2 5 4 65 */ 400, /* OBJ_role 2 5 4 72 */ 1089, /* OBJ_organizationIdentifier 2 5 4 97 */ 1090, /* OBJ_countryCode3c 2 5 4 98 */ 1091, /* OBJ_countryCode3n 2 5 4 99 */ 1092, /* OBJ_dnsName 2 5 4 100 */ 769, /* OBJ_subject_directory_attributes 2 5 29 9 */ 82, /* OBJ_subject_key_identifier 2 5 29 14 */ 83, /* OBJ_key_usage 2 5 29 15 */ 84, /* OBJ_private_key_usage_period 2 5 29 16 */ 85, /* OBJ_subject_alt_name 2 5 29 17 */ 86, /* OBJ_issuer_alt_name 2 5 29 18 */ 87, /* OBJ_basic_constraints 2 5 29 19 */ 88, /* OBJ_crl_number 2 5 29 20 */ 141, /* OBJ_crl_reason 2 5 29 21 */ 430, /* OBJ_hold_instruction_code 2 5 29 23 */ 142, /* OBJ_invalidity_date 2 5 29 24 */ 140, /* OBJ_delta_crl 2 5 29 27 */ 770, /* OBJ_issuing_distribution_point 2 5 29 28 */ 771, /* OBJ_certificate_issuer 2 5 29 29 */ 666, /* OBJ_name_constraints 2 5 29 30 */ 103, /* OBJ_crl_distribution_points 2 5 29 31 */ 89, /* OBJ_certificate_policies 2 5 29 32 */ 747, /* OBJ_policy_mappings 2 5 29 33 */ 90, /* OBJ_authority_key_identifier 2 5 29 35 */ 401, /* OBJ_policy_constraints 2 5 29 36 */ 126, /* OBJ_ext_key_usage 2 5 29 37 */ 857, /* OBJ_freshest_crl 2 5 29 46 */ 748, /* OBJ_inhibit_any_policy 2 5 29 54 */ 402, /* OBJ_target_information 2 5 29 55 */ 403, /* OBJ_no_rev_avail 2 5 29 56 */ 513, /* OBJ_set_ctype 2 23 42 0 */ 514, /* OBJ_set_msgExt 2 23 42 1 */ 515, /* OBJ_set_attr 2 23 42 3 */ 516, /* OBJ_set_policy 2 23 42 5 */ 517, /* OBJ_set_certExt 2 23 42 7 */ 518, /* OBJ_set_brand 2 23 42 8 */ 679, /* OBJ_wap_wsg 2 23 43 1 */ 382, /* OBJ_Directory 1 3 6 1 1 */ 383, /* OBJ_Management 1 3 6 1 2 */ 384, /* OBJ_Experimental 1 3 6 1 3 */ 385, /* OBJ_Private 1 3 6 1 4 */ 386, /* OBJ_Security 1 3 6 1 5 */ 387, /* OBJ_SNMPv2 1 3 6 1 6 */ 388, /* OBJ_Mail 1 3 6 1 7 */ 376, /* OBJ_algorithm 1 3 14 3 2 */ 395, /* OBJ_clearance 2 5 1 5 55 */ 19, /* OBJ_rsa 2 5 8 1 1 */ 96, /* OBJ_mdc2WithRSA 2 5 8 3 100 */ 95, /* OBJ_mdc2 2 5 8 3 101 */ 746, /* OBJ_any_policy 2 5 29 32 0 */ 910, /* OBJ_anyExtendedKeyUsage 2 5 29 37 0 */ 519, /* OBJ_setct_PANData 2 23 42 0 0 */ 520, /* OBJ_setct_PANToken 2 23 42 0 1 */ 521, /* OBJ_setct_PANOnly 2 23 42 0 2 */ 522, /* OBJ_setct_OIData 2 23 42 0 3 */ 523, /* OBJ_setct_PI 2 23 42 0 4 */ 524, /* OBJ_setct_PIData 2 23 42 0 5 */ 525, /* OBJ_setct_PIDataUnsigned 2 23 42 0 6 */ 526, /* OBJ_setct_HODInput 2 23 42 0 7 */ 527, /* OBJ_setct_AuthResBaggage 2 23 42 0 8 */ 528, /* OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqBaggage 2 23 42 0 9 */ 529, /* OBJ_setct_AuthRevResBaggage 2 23 42 0 10 */ 530, /* OBJ_setct_CapTokenSeq 2 23 42 0 11 */ 531, /* OBJ_setct_PInitResData 2 23 42 0 12 */ 532, /* OBJ_setct_PI_TBS 2 23 42 0 13 */ 533, /* OBJ_setct_PResData 2 23 42 0 14 */ 534, /* OBJ_setct_AuthReqTBS 2 23 42 0 16 */ 535, /* OBJ_setct_AuthResTBS 2 23 42 0 17 */ 536, /* OBJ_setct_AuthResTBSX 2 23 42 0 18 */ 537, /* OBJ_setct_AuthTokenTBS 2 23 42 0 19 */ 538, /* OBJ_setct_CapTokenData 2 23 42 0 20 */ 539, /* OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBS 2 23 42 0 21 */ 540, /* OBJ_setct_AcqCardCodeMsg 2 23 42 0 22 */ 541, /* OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqTBS 2 23 42 0 23 */ 542, /* OBJ_setct_AuthRevResData 2 23 42 0 24 */ 543, /* OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBS 2 23 42 0 25 */ 544, /* OBJ_setct_CapReqTBS 2 23 42 0 26 */ 545, /* OBJ_setct_CapReqTBSX 2 23 42 0 27 */ 546, /* OBJ_setct_CapResData 2 23 42 0 28 */ 547, /* OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBS 2 23 42 0 29 */ 548, /* OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBSX 2 23 42 0 30 */ 549, /* OBJ_setct_CapRevResData 2 23 42 0 31 */ 550, /* OBJ_setct_CredReqTBS 2 23 42 0 32 */ 551, /* OBJ_setct_CredReqTBSX 2 23 42 0 33 */ 552, /* OBJ_setct_CredResData 2 23 42 0 34 */ 553, /* OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBS 2 23 42 0 35 */ 554, /* OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBSX 2 23 42 0 36 */ 555, /* OBJ_setct_CredRevResData 2 23 42 0 37 */ 556, /* OBJ_setct_PCertReqData 2 23 42 0 38 */ 557, /* OBJ_setct_PCertResTBS 2 23 42 0 39 */ 558, /* OBJ_setct_BatchAdminReqData 2 23 42 0 40 */ 559, /* OBJ_setct_BatchAdminResData 2 23 42 0 41 */ 560, /* OBJ_setct_CardCInitResTBS 2 23 42 0 42 */ 561, /* OBJ_setct_MeAqCInitResTBS 2 23 42 0 43 */ 562, /* OBJ_setct_RegFormResTBS 2 23 42 0 44 */ 563, /* OBJ_setct_CertReqData 2 23 42 0 45 */ 564, /* OBJ_setct_CertReqTBS 2 23 42 0 46 */ 565, /* OBJ_setct_CertResData 2 23 42 0 47 */ 566, /* OBJ_setct_CertInqReqTBS 2 23 42 0 48 */ 567, /* OBJ_setct_ErrorTBS 2 23 42 0 49 */ 568, /* OBJ_setct_PIDualSignedTBE 2 23 42 0 50 */ 569, /* OBJ_setct_PIUnsignedTBE 2 23 42 0 51 */ 570, /* OBJ_setct_AuthReqTBE 2 23 42 0 52 */ 571, /* OBJ_setct_AuthResTBE 2 23 42 0 53 */ 572, /* OBJ_setct_AuthResTBEX 2 23 42 0 54 */ 573, /* OBJ_setct_AuthTokenTBE 2 23 42 0 55 */ 574, /* OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBE 2 23 42 0 56 */ 575, /* OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBEX 2 23 42 0 57 */ 576, /* OBJ_setct_AcqCardCodeMsgTBE 2 23 42 0 58 */ 577, /* OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqTBE 2 23 42 0 59 */ 578, /* OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBE 2 23 42 0 60 */ 579, /* OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBEB 2 23 42 0 61 */ 580, /* OBJ_setct_CapReqTBE 2 23 42 0 62 */ 581, /* OBJ_setct_CapReqTBEX 2 23 42 0 63 */ 582, /* OBJ_setct_CapResTBE 2 23 42 0 64 */ 583, /* OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBE 2 23 42 0 65 */ 584, /* OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBEX 2 23 42 0 66 */ 585, /* OBJ_setct_CapRevResTBE 2 23 42 0 67 */ 586, /* OBJ_setct_CredReqTBE 2 23 42 0 68 */ 587, /* OBJ_setct_CredReqTBEX 2 23 42 0 69 */ 588, /* OBJ_setct_CredResTBE 2 23 42 0 70 */ 589, /* OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBE 2 23 42 0 71 */ 590, /* OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBEX 2 23 42 0 72 */ 591, /* OBJ_setct_CredRevResTBE 2 23 42 0 73 */ 592, /* OBJ_setct_BatchAdminReqTBE 2 23 42 0 74 */ 593, /* OBJ_setct_BatchAdminResTBE 2 23 42 0 75 */ 594, /* OBJ_setct_RegFormReqTBE 2 23 42 0 76 */ 595, /* OBJ_setct_CertReqTBE 2 23 42 0 77 */ 596, /* OBJ_setct_CertReqTBEX 2 23 42 0 78 */ 597, /* OBJ_setct_CertResTBE 2 23 42 0 79 */ 598, /* OBJ_setct_CRLNotificationTBS 2 23 42 0 80 */ 599, /* OBJ_setct_CRLNotificationResTBS 2 23 42 0 81 */ 600, /* OBJ_setct_BCIDistributionTBS 2 23 42 0 82 */ 601, /* OBJ_setext_genCrypt 2 23 42 1 1 */ 602, /* OBJ_setext_miAuth 2 23 42 1 3 */ 603, /* OBJ_setext_pinSecure 2 23 42 1 4 */ 604, /* OBJ_setext_pinAny 2 23 42 1 5 */ 605, /* OBJ_setext_track2 2 23 42 1 7 */ 606, /* OBJ_setext_cv 2 23 42 1 8 */ 620, /* OBJ_setAttr_Cert 2 23 42 3 0 */ 621, /* OBJ_setAttr_PGWYcap 2 23 42 3 1 */ 622, /* OBJ_setAttr_TokenType 2 23 42 3 2 */ 623, /* OBJ_setAttr_IssCap 2 23 42 3 3 */ 607, /* OBJ_set_policy_root 2 23 42 5 0 */ 608, /* OBJ_setCext_hashedRoot 2 23 42 7 0 */ 609, /* OBJ_setCext_certType 2 23 42 7 1 */ 610, /* OBJ_setCext_merchData 2 23 42 7 2 */ 611, /* OBJ_setCext_cCertRequired 2 23 42 7 3 */ 612, /* OBJ_setCext_tunneling 2 23 42 7 4 */ 613, /* OBJ_setCext_setExt 2 23 42 7 5 */ 614, /* OBJ_setCext_setQualf 2 23 42 7 6 */ 615, /* OBJ_setCext_PGWYcapabilities 2 23 42 7 7 */ 616, /* OBJ_setCext_TokenIdentifier 2 23 42 7 8 */ 617, /* OBJ_setCext_Track2Data 2 23 42 7 9 */ 618, /* OBJ_setCext_TokenType 2 23 42 7 10 */ 619, /* OBJ_setCext_IssuerCapabilities 2 23 42 7 11 */ 636, /* OBJ_set_brand_IATA_ATA 2 23 42 8 1 */ 640, /* OBJ_set_brand_Visa 2 23 42 8 4 */ 641, /* OBJ_set_brand_MasterCard 2 23 42 8 5 */ 637, /* OBJ_set_brand_Diners 2 23 42 8 30 */ 638, /* OBJ_set_brand_AmericanExpress 2 23 42 8 34 */ 639, /* OBJ_set_brand_JCB 2 23 42 8 35 */ 1141, /* OBJ_oscca 1 2 156 10197 */ 805, /* OBJ_cryptopro 1 2 643 2 2 */ 806, /* OBJ_cryptocom 1 2 643 2 9 */ 974, /* OBJ_id_tc26 1 2 643 7 1 */ 1005, /* OBJ_OGRN 1 2 643 100 1 */ 1006, /* OBJ_SNILS 1 2 643 100 3 */ 1007, /* OBJ_subjectSignTool 1 2 643 100 111 */ 1008, /* OBJ_issuerSignTool 1 2 643 100 112 */ 184, /* OBJ_X9_57 1 2 840 10040 */ 405, /* OBJ_ansi_X9_62 1 2 840 10045 */ 389, /* OBJ_Enterprises 1 3 6 1 4 1 */ 504, /* OBJ_mime_mhs 1 3 6 1 7 1 */ 104, /* OBJ_md5WithRSA 1 3 14 3 2 3 */ 29, /* OBJ_des_ecb 1 3 14 3 2 6 */ 31, /* OBJ_des_cbc 1 3 14 3 2 7 */ 45, /* OBJ_des_ofb64 1 3 14 3 2 8 */ 30, /* OBJ_des_cfb64 1 3 14 3 2 9 */ 377, /* OBJ_rsaSignature 1 3 14 3 2 11 */ 67, /* OBJ_dsa_2 1 3 14 3 2 12 */ 66, /* OBJ_dsaWithSHA 1 3 14 3 2 13 */ 42, /* OBJ_shaWithRSAEncryption 1 3 14 3 2 15 */ 32, /* OBJ_des_ede_ecb 1 3 14 3 2 17 */ 41, /* OBJ_sha 1 3 14 3 2 18 */ 64, /* OBJ_sha1 1 3 14 3 2 26 */ 70, /* OBJ_dsaWithSHA1_2 1 3 14 3 2 27 */ 115, /* OBJ_sha1WithRSA 1 3 14 3 2 29 */ 117, /* OBJ_ripemd160 1 3 36 3 2 1 */ 1093, /* OBJ_x509ExtAdmission 1 3 36 8 3 3 */ 143, /* OBJ_sxnet 1 3 101 1 4 1 */ 1171, /* OBJ_ieee_siswg 1 3 111 2 1619 */ 721, /* OBJ_sect163k1 1 3 132 0 1 */ 722, /* OBJ_sect163r1 1 3 132 0 2 */ 728, /* OBJ_sect239k1 1 3 132 0 3 */ 717, /* OBJ_sect113r1 1 3 132 0 4 */ 718, /* OBJ_sect113r2 1 3 132 0 5 */ 704, /* OBJ_secp112r1 1 3 132 0 6 */ 705, /* OBJ_secp112r2 1 3 132 0 7 */ 709, /* OBJ_secp160r1 1 3 132 0 8 */ 708, /* OBJ_secp160k1 1 3 132 0 9 */ 714, /* OBJ_secp256k1 1 3 132 0 10 */ 723, /* OBJ_sect163r2 1 3 132 0 15 */ 729, /* OBJ_sect283k1 1 3 132 0 16 */ 730, /* OBJ_sect283r1 1 3 132 0 17 */ 719, /* OBJ_sect131r1 1 3 132 0 22 */ 720, /* OBJ_sect131r2 1 3 132 0 23 */ 724, /* OBJ_sect193r1 1 3 132 0 24 */ 725, /* OBJ_sect193r2 1 3 132 0 25 */ 726, /* OBJ_sect233k1 1 3 132 0 26 */ 727, /* OBJ_sect233r1 1 3 132 0 27 */ 706, /* OBJ_secp128r1 1 3 132 0 28 */ 707, /* OBJ_secp128r2 1 3 132 0 29 */ 710, /* OBJ_secp160r2 1 3 132 0 30 */ 711, /* OBJ_secp192k1 1 3 132 0 31 */ 712, /* OBJ_secp224k1 1 3 132 0 32 */ 713, /* OBJ_secp224r1 1 3 132 0 33 */ 715, /* OBJ_secp384r1 1 3 132 0 34 */ 716, /* OBJ_secp521r1 1 3 132 0 35 */ 731, /* OBJ_sect409k1 1 3 132 0 36 */ 732, /* OBJ_sect409r1 1 3 132 0 37 */ 733, /* OBJ_sect571k1 1 3 132 0 38 */ 734, /* OBJ_sect571r1 1 3 132 0 39 */ 624, /* OBJ_set_rootKeyThumb 2 23 42 3 0 0 */ 625, /* OBJ_set_addPolicy 2 23 42 3 0 1 */ 626, /* OBJ_setAttr_Token_EMV 2 23 42 3 2 1 */ 627, /* OBJ_setAttr_Token_B0Prime 2 23 42 3 2 2 */ 628, /* OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_CVM 2 23 42 3 3 3 */ 629, /* OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_T2 2 23 42 3 3 4 */ 630, /* OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_Sig 2 23 42 3 3 5 */ 642, /* OBJ_set_brand_Novus 2 23 42 8 6011 */ 735, /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1 2 23 43 1 4 1 */ 736, /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3 2 23 43 1 4 3 */ 737, /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4 2 23 43 1 4 4 */ 738, /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5 2 23 43 1 4 5 */ 739, /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6 2 23 43 1 4 6 */ 740, /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7 2 23 43 1 4 7 */ 741, /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8 2 23 43 1 4 8 */ 742, /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9 2 23 43 1 4 9 */ 743, /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10 2 23 43 1 4 10 */ 744, /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11 2 23 43 1 4 11 */ 745, /* OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12 2 23 43 1 4 12 */ 804, /* OBJ_whirlpool 1 0 10118 3 0 55 */ 1142, /* OBJ_sm_scheme 1 2 156 10197 1 */ 773, /* OBJ_kisa 1 2 410 200004 */ 807, /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001 1 2 643 2 2 3 */ 808, /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94 1 2 643 2 2 4 */ 809, /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_94 1 2 643 2 2 9 */ 810, /* OBJ_id_HMACGostR3411_94 1 2 643 2 2 10 */ 811, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001 1 2 643 2 2 19 */ 812, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94 1 2 643 2 2 20 */ 813, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89 1 2 643 2 2 21 */ 815, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_MAC 1 2 643 2 2 22 */ 816, /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_prf 1 2 643 2 2 23 */ 817, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001DH 1 2 643 2 2 98 */ 818, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94DH 1 2 643 2 2 99 */ 977, /* OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms 1 2 643 7 1 1 */ 994, /* OBJ_id_tc26_constants 1 2 643 7 1 2 */ 1, /* OBJ_rsadsi 1 2 840 113549 */ 185, /* OBJ_X9cm 1 2 840 10040 4 */ 1031, /* OBJ_id_pkinit 1 3 6 1 5 2 3 */ 127, /* OBJ_id_pkix 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 */ 505, /* OBJ_mime_mhs_headings 1 3 6 1 7 1 1 */ 506, /* OBJ_mime_mhs_bodies 1 3 6 1 7 1 2 */ 119, /* OBJ_ripemd160WithRSA 1 3 36 3 3 1 2 */ 937, /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme 1 3 132 1 11 0 */ 938, /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme 1 3 132 1 11 1 */ 939, /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme 1 3 132 1 11 2 */ 940, /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme 1 3 132 1 11 3 */ 942, /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme 1 3 132 1 14 0 */ 943, /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme 1 3 132 1 14 1 */ 944, /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme 1 3 132 1 14 2 */ 945, /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme 1 3 132 1 14 3 */ 631, /* OBJ_setAttr_GenCryptgrm 2 23 42 3 3 3 1 */ 632, /* OBJ_setAttr_T2Enc 2 23 42 3 3 4 1 */ 633, /* OBJ_setAttr_T2cleartxt 2 23 42 3 3 4 2 */ 634, /* OBJ_setAttr_TokICCsig 2 23 42 3 3 5 1 */ 635, /* OBJ_setAttr_SecDevSig 2 23 42 3 3 5 2 */ 436, /* OBJ_ucl 0 9 2342 19200300 */ 820, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_None_KeyMeshing 1 2 643 2 2 14 0 */ 819, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_KeyMeshing 1 2 643 2 2 14 1 */ 845, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_a 1 2 643 2 2 20 1 */ 846, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_aBis 1 2 643 2 2 20 2 */ 847, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_b 1 2 643 2 2 20 3 */ 848, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_bBis 1 2 643 2 2 20 4 */ 821, /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_TestParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 30 0 */ 822, /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 30 1 */ 823, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_TestParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 31 0 */ 824, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 31 1 */ 825, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 31 2 */ 826, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 31 3 */ 827, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 31 4 */ 828, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_1_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 31 5 */ 829, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_0_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 31 6 */ 830, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_RIC_1_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 31 7 */ 831, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_TestParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 32 0 */ 832, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 32 2 */ 833, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 32 3 */ 834, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 32 4 */ 835, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 32 5 */ 836, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 33 1 */ 837, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 33 2 */ 838, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchC_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 33 3 */ 839, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_TestParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 35 0 */ 840, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 35 1 */ 841, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 35 2 */ 842, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 35 3 */ 843, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 36 0 */ 844, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet 1 2 643 2 2 36 1 */ 978, /* OBJ_id_tc26_sign 1 2 643 7 1 1 1 */ 981, /* OBJ_id_tc26_digest 1 2 643 7 1 1 2 */ 984, /* OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest 1 2 643 7 1 1 3 */ 987, /* OBJ_id_tc26_mac 1 2 643 7 1 1 4 */ 990, /* OBJ_id_tc26_cipher 1 2 643 7 1 1 5 */ 991, /* OBJ_id_tc26_agreement 1 2 643 7 1 1 6 */ 1179, /* OBJ_id_tc26_wrap 1 2 643 7 1 1 7 */ 995, /* OBJ_id_tc26_sign_constants 1 2 643 7 1 2 1 */ 1000, /* OBJ_id_tc26_digest_constants 1 2 643 7 1 2 2 */ 1001, /* OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_constants 1 2 643 7 1 2 5 */ 1151, /* OBJ_ua_pki 1 2 804 2 1 1 1 */ 2, /* OBJ_pkcs 1 2 840 113549 1 */ 431, /* OBJ_hold_instruction_none 1 2 840 10040 2 1 */ 432, /* OBJ_hold_instruction_call_issuer 1 2 840 10040 2 2 */ 433, /* OBJ_hold_instruction_reject 1 2 840 10040 2 3 */ 116, /* OBJ_dsa 1 2 840 10040 4 1 */ 113, /* OBJ_dsaWithSHA1 1 2 840 10040 4 3 */ 406, /* OBJ_X9_62_prime_field 1 2 840 10045 1 1 */ 407, /* OBJ_X9_62_characteristic_two_field 1 2 840 10045 1 2 */ 408, /* OBJ_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey 1 2 840 10045 2 1 */ 416, /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA1 1 2 840 10045 4 1 */ 791, /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_Recommended 1 2 840 10045 4 2 */ 792, /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_Specified 1 2 840 10045 4 3 */ 920, /* OBJ_dhpublicnumber 1 2 840 10046 2 1 */ 1032, /* OBJ_pkInitClientAuth 1 3 6 1 5 2 3 4 */ 1033, /* OBJ_pkInitKDC 1 3 6 1 5 2 3 5 */ 258, /* OBJ_id_pkix_mod 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 */ 175, /* OBJ_id_pe 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 */ 259, /* OBJ_id_qt 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 2 */ 128, /* OBJ_id_kp 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 */ 260, /* OBJ_id_it 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 */ 261, /* OBJ_id_pkip 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 */ 262, /* OBJ_id_alg 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 6 */ 263, /* OBJ_id_cmc 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 */ 264, /* OBJ_id_on 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 8 */ 265, /* OBJ_id_pda 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 */ 266, /* OBJ_id_aca 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 */ 267, /* OBJ_id_qcs 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 11 */ 268, /* OBJ_id_cct 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 12 */ 662, /* OBJ_id_ppl 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 21 */ 176, /* OBJ_id_ad 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 */ 507, /* OBJ_id_hex_partial_message 1 3 6 1 7 1 1 1 */ 508, /* OBJ_id_hex_multipart_message 1 3 6 1 7 1 1 2 */ 57, /* OBJ_netscape 2 16 840 1 113730 */ 754, /* OBJ_camellia_128_ecb 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 1 */ 766, /* OBJ_camellia_128_ofb128 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 3 */ 757, /* OBJ_camellia_128_cfb128 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 4 */ 961, /* OBJ_camellia_128_gcm 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 6 */ 962, /* OBJ_camellia_128_ccm 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 7 */ 963, /* OBJ_camellia_128_ctr 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 9 */ 964, /* OBJ_camellia_128_cmac 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 10 */ 755, /* OBJ_camellia_192_ecb 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 21 */ 767, /* OBJ_camellia_192_ofb128 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 23 */ 758, /* OBJ_camellia_192_cfb128 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 24 */ 965, /* OBJ_camellia_192_gcm 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 26 */ 966, /* OBJ_camellia_192_ccm 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 27 */ 967, /* OBJ_camellia_192_ctr 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 29 */ 968, /* OBJ_camellia_192_cmac 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 30 */ 756, /* OBJ_camellia_256_ecb 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 41 */ 768, /* OBJ_camellia_256_ofb128 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 43 */ 759, /* OBJ_camellia_256_cfb128 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 44 */ 969, /* OBJ_camellia_256_gcm 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 46 */ 970, /* OBJ_camellia_256_ccm 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 47 */ 971, /* OBJ_camellia_256_ctr 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 49 */ 972, /* OBJ_camellia_256_cmac 0 3 4401 5 3 1 9 50 */ 437, /* OBJ_pilot 0 9 2342 19200300 100 */ 1133, /* OBJ_sm4_ecb 1 2 156 10197 1 104 1 */ 1134, /* OBJ_sm4_cbc 1 2 156 10197 1 104 2 */ 1135, /* OBJ_sm4_ofb128 1 2 156 10197 1 104 3 */ 1137, /* OBJ_sm4_cfb128 1 2 156 10197 1 104 4 */ 1136, /* OBJ_sm4_cfb1 1 2 156 10197 1 104 5 */ 1138, /* OBJ_sm4_cfb8 1 2 156 10197 1 104 6 */ 1139, /* OBJ_sm4_ctr 1 2 156 10197 1 104 7 */ 1172, /* OBJ_sm2 1 2 156 10197 1 301 */ 1143, /* OBJ_sm3 1 2 156 10197 1 401 */ 1144, /* OBJ_sm3WithRSAEncryption 1 2 156 10197 1 504 */ 776, /* OBJ_seed_ecb 1 2 410 200004 1 3 */ 777, /* OBJ_seed_cbc 1 2 410 200004 1 4 */ 779, /* OBJ_seed_cfb128 1 2 410 200004 1 5 */ 778, /* OBJ_seed_ofb128 1 2 410 200004 1 6 */ 852, /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc 1 2 643 2 9 1 3 3 */ 853, /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc 1 2 643 2 9 1 3 4 */ 850, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_cc 1 2 643 2 9 1 5 3 */ 851, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_cc 1 2 643 2 9 1 5 4 */ 849, /* OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_cc 1 2 643 2 9 1 6 1 */ 854, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_ParamSet_cc 1 2 643 2 9 1 8 1 */ 1004, /* OBJ_INN 1 2 643 3 131 1 1 */ 979, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2012_256 1 2 643 7 1 1 1 1 */ 980, /* OBJ_id_GostR3410_2012_512 1 2 643 7 1 1 1 2 */ 982, /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_2012_256 1 2 643 7 1 1 2 2 */ 983, /* OBJ_id_GostR3411_2012_512 1 2 643 7 1 1 2 3 */ 985, /* OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256 1 2 643 7 1 1 3 2 */ 986, /* OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512 1 2 643 7 1 1 3 3 */ 988, /* OBJ_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256 1 2 643 7 1 1 4 1 */ 989, /* OBJ_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512 1 2 643 7 1 1 4 2 */ 1173, /* OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_magma 1 2 643 7 1 1 5 1 */ 1176, /* OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik 1 2 643 7 1 1 5 2 */ 992, /* OBJ_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_256 1 2 643 7 1 1 6 1 */ 993, /* OBJ_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_512 1 2 643 7 1 1 6 2 */ 1180, /* OBJ_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_magma 1 2 643 7 1 1 7 1 */ 1182, /* OBJ_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik 1 2 643 7 1 1 7 2 */ 1147, /* OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_constants 1 2 643 7 1 2 1 1 */ 996, /* OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants 1 2 643 7 1 2 1 2 */ 1002, /* OBJ_id_tc26_gost_28147_constants 1 2 643 7 1 2 5 1 */ 186, /* OBJ_pkcs1 1 2 840 113549 1 1 */ 27, /* OBJ_pkcs3 1 2 840 113549 1 3 */ 187, /* OBJ_pkcs5 1 2 840 113549 1 5 */ 20, /* OBJ_pkcs7 1 2 840 113549 1 7 */ 47, /* OBJ_pkcs9 1 2 840 113549 1 9 */ 3, /* OBJ_md2 1 2 840 113549 2 2 */ 257, /* OBJ_md4 1 2 840 113549 2 4 */ 4, /* OBJ_md5 1 2 840 113549 2 5 */ 797, /* OBJ_hmacWithMD5 1 2 840 113549 2 6 */ 163, /* OBJ_hmacWithSHA1 1 2 840 113549 2 7 */ 798, /* OBJ_hmacWithSHA224 1 2 840 113549 2 8 */ 799, /* OBJ_hmacWithSHA256 1 2 840 113549 2 9 */ 800, /* OBJ_hmacWithSHA384 1 2 840 113549 2 10 */ 801, /* OBJ_hmacWithSHA512 1 2 840 113549 2 11 */ 1193, /* OBJ_hmacWithSHA512_224 1 2 840 113549 2 12 */ 1194, /* OBJ_hmacWithSHA512_256 1 2 840 113549 2 13 */ 37, /* OBJ_rc2_cbc 1 2 840 113549 3 2 */ 5, /* OBJ_rc4 1 2 840 113549 3 4 */ 44, /* OBJ_des_ede3_cbc 1 2 840 113549 3 7 */ 120, /* OBJ_rc5_cbc 1 2 840 113549 3 8 */ 643, /* OBJ_des_cdmf 1 2 840 113549 3 10 */ 680, /* OBJ_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis 1 2 840 10045 1 2 3 */ 684, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v1 1 2 840 10045 3 0 1 */ 685, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v2 1 2 840 10045 3 0 2 */ 686, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v3 1 2 840 10045 3 0 3 */ 687, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb176v1 1 2 840 10045 3 0 4 */ 688, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v1 1 2 840 10045 3 0 5 */ 689, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v2 1 2 840 10045 3 0 6 */ 690, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v3 1 2 840 10045 3 0 7 */ 691, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2onb191v4 1 2 840 10045 3 0 8 */ 692, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2onb191v5 1 2 840 10045 3 0 9 */ 693, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb208w1 1 2 840 10045 3 0 10 */ 694, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v1 1 2 840 10045 3 0 11 */ 695, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v2 1 2 840 10045 3 0 12 */ 696, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v3 1 2 840 10045 3 0 13 */ 697, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2onb239v4 1 2 840 10045 3 0 14 */ 698, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2onb239v5 1 2 840 10045 3 0 15 */ 699, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb272w1 1 2 840 10045 3 0 16 */ 700, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb304w1 1 2 840 10045 3 0 17 */ 701, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb359v1 1 2 840 10045 3 0 18 */ 702, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb368w1 1 2 840 10045 3 0 19 */ 703, /* OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb431r1 1 2 840 10045 3 0 20 */ 409, /* OBJ_X9_62_prime192v1 1 2 840 10045 3 1 1 */ 410, /* OBJ_X9_62_prime192v2 1 2 840 10045 3 1 2 */ 411, /* OBJ_X9_62_prime192v3 1 2 840 10045 3 1 3 */ 412, /* OBJ_X9_62_prime239v1 1 2 840 10045 3 1 4 */ 413, /* OBJ_X9_62_prime239v2 1 2 840 10045 3 1 5 */ 414, /* OBJ_X9_62_prime239v3 1 2 840 10045 3 1 6 */ 415, /* OBJ_X9_62_prime256v1 1 2 840 10045 3 1 7 */ 793, /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA224 1 2 840 10045 4 3 1 */ 794, /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA256 1 2 840 10045 4 3 2 */ 795, /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA384 1 2 840 10045 4 3 3 */ 796, /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA512 1 2 840 10045 4 3 4 */ 269, /* OBJ_id_pkix1_explicit_88 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 1 */ 270, /* OBJ_id_pkix1_implicit_88 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 2 */ 271, /* OBJ_id_pkix1_explicit_93 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 3 */ 272, /* OBJ_id_pkix1_implicit_93 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 4 */ 273, /* OBJ_id_mod_crmf 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 5 */ 274, /* OBJ_id_mod_cmc 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 6 */ 275, /* OBJ_id_mod_kea_profile_88 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 7 */ 276, /* OBJ_id_mod_kea_profile_93 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 8 */ 277, /* OBJ_id_mod_cmp 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 9 */ 278, /* OBJ_id_mod_qualified_cert_88 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 10 */ 279, /* OBJ_id_mod_qualified_cert_93 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 11 */ 280, /* OBJ_id_mod_attribute_cert 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 12 */ 281, /* OBJ_id_mod_timestamp_protocol 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 13 */ 282, /* OBJ_id_mod_ocsp 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 14 */ 283, /* OBJ_id_mod_dvcs 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 15 */ 284, /* OBJ_id_mod_cmp2000 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 0 16 */ 177, /* OBJ_info_access 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1 */ 285, /* OBJ_biometricInfo 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 2 */ 286, /* OBJ_qcStatements 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 3 */ 287, /* OBJ_ac_auditEntity 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 4 */ 288, /* OBJ_ac_targeting 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 5 */ 289, /* OBJ_aaControls 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 6 */ 290, /* OBJ_sbgp_ipAddrBlock 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 7 */ 291, /* OBJ_sbgp_autonomousSysNum 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 8 */ 292, /* OBJ_sbgp_routerIdentifier 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 9 */ 397, /* OBJ_ac_proxying 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 10 */ 398, /* OBJ_sinfo_access 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 11 */ 663, /* OBJ_proxyCertInfo 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 14 */ 1020, /* OBJ_tlsfeature 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 24 */ 164, /* OBJ_id_qt_cps 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 2 1 */ 165, /* OBJ_id_qt_unotice 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 2 2 */ 293, /* OBJ_textNotice 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 2 3 */ 129, /* OBJ_server_auth 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 1 */ 130, /* OBJ_client_auth 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 2 */ 131, /* OBJ_code_sign 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 3 */ 132, /* OBJ_email_protect 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 4 */ 294, /* OBJ_ipsecEndSystem 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 5 */ 295, /* OBJ_ipsecTunnel 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 6 */ 296, /* OBJ_ipsecUser 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 7 */ 133, /* OBJ_time_stamp 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 8 */ 180, /* OBJ_OCSP_sign 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 9 */ 297, /* OBJ_dvcs 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 10 */ 1022, /* OBJ_ipsec_IKE 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 17 */ 1023, /* OBJ_capwapAC 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 18 */ 1024, /* OBJ_capwapWTP 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 19 */ 1025, /* OBJ_sshClient 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 21 */ 1026, /* OBJ_sshServer 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 22 */ 1027, /* OBJ_sendRouter 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 23 */ 1028, /* OBJ_sendProxiedRouter 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 24 */ 1029, /* OBJ_sendOwner 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 25 */ 1030, /* OBJ_sendProxiedOwner 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 26 */ 1131, /* OBJ_cmcCA 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 27 */ 1132, /* OBJ_cmcRA 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 3 28 */ 298, /* OBJ_id_it_caProtEncCert 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 1 */ 299, /* OBJ_id_it_signKeyPairTypes 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 2 */ 300, /* OBJ_id_it_encKeyPairTypes 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 3 */ 301, /* OBJ_id_it_preferredSymmAlg 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 4 */ 302, /* OBJ_id_it_caKeyUpdateInfo 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 5 */ 303, /* OBJ_id_it_currentCRL 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 6 */ 304, /* OBJ_id_it_unsupportedOIDs 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 7 */ 305, /* OBJ_id_it_subscriptionRequest 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 8 */ 306, /* OBJ_id_it_subscriptionResponse 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 9 */ 307, /* OBJ_id_it_keyPairParamReq 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 10 */ 308, /* OBJ_id_it_keyPairParamRep 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 11 */ 309, /* OBJ_id_it_revPassphrase 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 12 */ 310, /* OBJ_id_it_implicitConfirm 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 13 */ 311, /* OBJ_id_it_confirmWaitTime 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 14 */ 312, /* OBJ_id_it_origPKIMessage 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 15 */ 784, /* OBJ_id_it_suppLangTags 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 4 16 */ 313, /* OBJ_id_regCtrl 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 1 */ 314, /* OBJ_id_regInfo 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 2 */ 323, /* OBJ_id_alg_des40 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 6 1 */ 324, /* OBJ_id_alg_noSignature 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 6 2 */ 325, /* OBJ_id_alg_dh_sig_hmac_sha1 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 6 3 */ 326, /* OBJ_id_alg_dh_pop 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 6 4 */ 327, /* OBJ_id_cmc_statusInfo 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 1 */ 328, /* OBJ_id_cmc_identification 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 2 */ 329, /* OBJ_id_cmc_identityProof 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 3 */ 330, /* OBJ_id_cmc_dataReturn 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 4 */ 331, /* OBJ_id_cmc_transactionId 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 5 */ 332, /* OBJ_id_cmc_senderNonce 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 6 */ 333, /* OBJ_id_cmc_recipientNonce 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 7 */ 334, /* OBJ_id_cmc_addExtensions 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 8 */ 335, /* OBJ_id_cmc_encryptedPOP 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 9 */ 336, /* OBJ_id_cmc_decryptedPOP 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 10 */ 337, /* OBJ_id_cmc_lraPOPWitness 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 11 */ 338, /* OBJ_id_cmc_getCert 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 15 */ 339, /* OBJ_id_cmc_getCRL 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 16 */ 340, /* OBJ_id_cmc_revokeRequest 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 17 */ 341, /* OBJ_id_cmc_regInfo 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 18 */ 342, /* OBJ_id_cmc_responseInfo 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 19 */ 343, /* OBJ_id_cmc_queryPending 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 21 */ 344, /* OBJ_id_cmc_popLinkRandom 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 22 */ 345, /* OBJ_id_cmc_popLinkWitness 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 23 */ 346, /* OBJ_id_cmc_confirmCertAcceptance 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 7 24 */ 347, /* OBJ_id_on_personalData 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 8 1 */ 858, /* OBJ_id_on_permanentIdentifier 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 8 3 */ 348, /* OBJ_id_pda_dateOfBirth 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 1 */ 349, /* OBJ_id_pda_placeOfBirth 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 2 */ 351, /* OBJ_id_pda_gender 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 3 */ 352, /* OBJ_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 4 */ 353, /* OBJ_id_pda_countryOfResidence 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 9 5 */ 354, /* OBJ_id_aca_authenticationInfo 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 1 */ 355, /* OBJ_id_aca_accessIdentity 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 2 */ 356, /* OBJ_id_aca_chargingIdentity 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 3 */ 357, /* OBJ_id_aca_group 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 4 */ 358, /* OBJ_id_aca_role 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 5 */ 399, /* OBJ_id_aca_encAttrs 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 10 6 */ 359, /* OBJ_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 11 1 */ 360, /* OBJ_id_cct_crs 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 12 1 */ 361, /* OBJ_id_cct_PKIData 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 12 2 */ 362, /* OBJ_id_cct_PKIResponse 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 12 3 */ 664, /* OBJ_id_ppl_anyLanguage 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 21 0 */ 665, /* OBJ_id_ppl_inheritAll 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 21 1 */ 667, /* OBJ_Independent 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 21 2 */ 178, /* OBJ_ad_OCSP 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 */ 179, /* OBJ_ad_ca_issuers 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2 */ 363, /* OBJ_ad_timeStamping 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 3 */ 364, /* OBJ_ad_dvcs 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 4 */ 785, /* OBJ_caRepository 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 5 */ 780, /* OBJ_hmac_md5 1 3 6 1 5 5 8 1 1 */ 781, /* OBJ_hmac_sha1 1 3 6 1 5 5 8 1 2 */ 913, /* OBJ_aes_128_xts 1 3 111 2 1619 0 1 1 */ 914, /* OBJ_aes_256_xts 1 3 111 2 1619 0 1 2 */ 58, /* OBJ_netscape_cert_extension 2 16 840 1 113730 1 */ 59, /* OBJ_netscape_data_type 2 16 840 1 113730 2 */ 438, /* OBJ_pilotAttributeType 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 */ 439, /* OBJ_pilotAttributeSyntax 0 9 2342 19200300 100 3 */ 440, /* OBJ_pilotObjectClass 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 */ 441, /* OBJ_pilotGroups 0 9 2342 19200300 100 10 */ 1065, /* OBJ_aria_128_ecb 1 2 410 200046 1 1 1 */ 1066, /* OBJ_aria_128_cbc 1 2 410 200046 1 1 2 */ 1067, /* OBJ_aria_128_cfb128 1 2 410 200046 1 1 3 */ 1068, /* OBJ_aria_128_ofb128 1 2 410 200046 1 1 4 */ 1069, /* OBJ_aria_128_ctr 1 2 410 200046 1 1 5 */ 1070, /* OBJ_aria_192_ecb 1 2 410 200046 1 1 6 */ 1071, /* OBJ_aria_192_cbc 1 2 410 200046 1 1 7 */ 1072, /* OBJ_aria_192_cfb128 1 2 410 200046 1 1 8 */ 1073, /* OBJ_aria_192_ofb128 1 2 410 200046 1 1 9 */ 1074, /* OBJ_aria_192_ctr 1 2 410 200046 1 1 10 */ 1075, /* OBJ_aria_256_ecb 1 2 410 200046 1 1 11 */ 1076, /* OBJ_aria_256_cbc 1 2 410 200046 1 1 12 */ 1077, /* OBJ_aria_256_cfb128 1 2 410 200046 1 1 13 */ 1078, /* OBJ_aria_256_ofb128 1 2 410 200046 1 1 14 */ 1079, /* OBJ_aria_256_ctr 1 2 410 200046 1 1 15 */ 1123, /* OBJ_aria_128_gcm 1 2 410 200046 1 1 34 */ 1124, /* OBJ_aria_192_gcm 1 2 410 200046 1 1 35 */ 1125, /* OBJ_aria_256_gcm 1 2 410 200046 1 1 36 */ 1120, /* OBJ_aria_128_ccm 1 2 410 200046 1 1 37 */ 1121, /* OBJ_aria_192_ccm 1 2 410 200046 1 1 38 */ 1122, /* OBJ_aria_256_ccm 1 2 410 200046 1 1 39 */ 1174, /* OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_magma_ctracpkm 1 2 643 7 1 1 5 1 1 */ 1175, /* OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_magma_ctracpkm_omac 1 2 643 7 1 1 5 1 2 */ 1177, /* OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik_ctracpkm 1 2 643 7 1 1 5 2 1 */ 1178, /* OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik_ctracpkm_omac 1 2 643 7 1 1 5 2 2 */ 1181, /* OBJ_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_magma_kexp15 1 2 643 7 1 1 7 1 1 */ 1183, /* OBJ_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik_kexp15 1 2 643 7 1 1 7 2 1 */ 1148, /* OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA 1 2 643 7 1 2 1 1 1 */ 1184, /* OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB 1 2 643 7 1 2 1 1 2 */ 1185, /* OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC 1 2 643 7 1 2 1 1 3 */ 1186, /* OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD 1 2 643 7 1 2 1 1 4 */ 997, /* OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetTest 1 2 643 7 1 2 1 2 0 */ 998, /* OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA 1 2 643 7 1 2 1 2 1 */ 999, /* OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB 1 2 643 7 1 2 1 2 2 */ 1149, /* OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC 1 2 643 7 1 2 1 2 3 */ 1003, /* OBJ_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z 1 2 643 7 1 2 5 1 1 */ 108, /* OBJ_cast5_cbc 1 2 840 113533 7 66 10 */ 112, /* OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC 1 2 840 113533 7 66 12 */ 782, /* OBJ_id_PasswordBasedMAC 1 2 840 113533 7 66 13 */ 783, /* OBJ_id_DHBasedMac 1 2 840 113533 7 66 30 */ 6, /* OBJ_rsaEncryption 1 2 840 113549 1 1 1 */ 7, /* OBJ_md2WithRSAEncryption 1 2 840 113549 1 1 2 */ 396, /* OBJ_md4WithRSAEncryption 1 2 840 113549 1 1 3 */ 8, /* OBJ_md5WithRSAEncryption 1 2 840 113549 1 1 4 */ 65, /* OBJ_sha1WithRSAEncryption 1 2 840 113549 1 1 5 */ 644, /* OBJ_rsaOAEPEncryptionSET 1 2 840 113549 1 1 6 */ 919, /* OBJ_rsaesOaep 1 2 840 113549 1 1 7 */ 911, /* OBJ_mgf1 1 2 840 113549 1 1 8 */ 935, /* OBJ_pSpecified 1 2 840 113549 1 1 9 */ 912, /* OBJ_rsassaPss 1 2 840 113549 1 1 10 */ 668, /* OBJ_sha256WithRSAEncryption 1 2 840 113549 1 1 11 */ 669, /* OBJ_sha384WithRSAEncryption 1 2 840 113549 1 1 12 */ 670, /* OBJ_sha512WithRSAEncryption 1 2 840 113549 1 1 13 */ 671, /* OBJ_sha224WithRSAEncryption 1 2 840 113549 1 1 14 */ 1145, /* OBJ_sha512_224WithRSAEncryption 1 2 840 113549 1 1 15 */ 1146, /* OBJ_sha512_256WithRSAEncryption 1 2 840 113549 1 1 16 */ 28, /* OBJ_dhKeyAgreement 1 2 840 113549 1 3 1 */ 9, /* OBJ_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC 1 2 840 113549 1 5 1 */ 10, /* OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC 1 2 840 113549 1 5 3 */ 168, /* OBJ_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC 1 2 840 113549 1 5 4 */ 169, /* OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC 1 2 840 113549 1 5 6 */ 170, /* OBJ_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC 1 2 840 113549 1 5 10 */ 68, /* OBJ_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC 1 2 840 113549 1 5 11 */ 69, /* OBJ_id_pbkdf2 1 2 840 113549 1 5 12 */ 161, /* OBJ_pbes2 1 2 840 113549 1 5 13 */ 162, /* OBJ_pbmac1 1 2 840 113549 1 5 14 */ 21, /* OBJ_pkcs7_data 1 2 840 113549 1 7 1 */ 22, /* OBJ_pkcs7_signed 1 2 840 113549 1 7 2 */ 23, /* OBJ_pkcs7_enveloped 1 2 840 113549 1 7 3 */ 24, /* OBJ_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped 1 2 840 113549 1 7 4 */ 25, /* OBJ_pkcs7_digest 1 2 840 113549 1 7 5 */ 26, /* OBJ_pkcs7_encrypted 1 2 840 113549 1 7 6 */ 48, /* OBJ_pkcs9_emailAddress 1 2 840 113549 1 9 1 */ 49, /* OBJ_pkcs9_unstructuredName 1 2 840 113549 1 9 2 */ 50, /* OBJ_pkcs9_contentType 1 2 840 113549 1 9 3 */ 51, /* OBJ_pkcs9_messageDigest 1 2 840 113549 1 9 4 */ 52, /* OBJ_pkcs9_signingTime 1 2 840 113549 1 9 5 */ 53, /* OBJ_pkcs9_countersignature 1 2 840 113549 1 9 6 */ 54, /* OBJ_pkcs9_challengePassword 1 2 840 113549 1 9 7 */ 55, /* OBJ_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress 1 2 840 113549 1 9 8 */ 56, /* OBJ_pkcs9_extCertAttributes 1 2 840 113549 1 9 9 */ 172, /* OBJ_ext_req 1 2 840 113549 1 9 14 */ 167, /* OBJ_SMIMECapabilities 1 2 840 113549 1 9 15 */ 188, /* OBJ_SMIME 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 */ 156, /* OBJ_friendlyName 1 2 840 113549 1 9 20 */ 157, /* OBJ_localKeyID 1 2 840 113549 1 9 21 */ 681, /* OBJ_X9_62_onBasis 1 2 840 10045 1 2 3 1 */ 682, /* OBJ_X9_62_tpBasis 1 2 840 10045 1 2 3 2 */ 683, /* OBJ_X9_62_ppBasis 1 2 840 10045 1 2 3 3 */ 417, /* OBJ_ms_csp_name 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 17 1 */ 856, /* OBJ_LocalKeySet 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 17 2 */ 390, /* OBJ_dcObject 1 3 6 1 4 1 1466 344 */ 91, /* OBJ_bf_cbc 1 3 6 1 4 1 3029 1 2 */ 973, /* OBJ_id_scrypt 1 3 6 1 4 1 11591 4 11 */ 315, /* OBJ_id_regCtrl_regToken 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 1 1 */ 316, /* OBJ_id_regCtrl_authenticator 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 1 2 */ 317, /* OBJ_id_regCtrl_pkiPublicationInfo 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 1 3 */ 318, /* OBJ_id_regCtrl_pkiArchiveOptions 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 1 4 */ 319, /* OBJ_id_regCtrl_oldCertID 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 1 5 */ 320, /* OBJ_id_regCtrl_protocolEncrKey 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 1 6 */ 321, /* OBJ_id_regInfo_utf8Pairs 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 2 1 */ 322, /* OBJ_id_regInfo_certReq 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 5 2 2 */ 365, /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_basic 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 1 */ 366, /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 2 */ 367, /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 3 */ 368, /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 4 */ 369, /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 5 */ 370, /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 6 */ 371, /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 7 */ 372, /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 8 */ 373, /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_valid 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 9 */ 374, /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_path 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 10 */ 375, /* OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot 1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 11 */ 921, /* OBJ_brainpoolP160r1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 1 */ 922, /* OBJ_brainpoolP160t1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 2 */ 923, /* OBJ_brainpoolP192r1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 3 */ 924, /* OBJ_brainpoolP192t1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 4 */ 925, /* OBJ_brainpoolP224r1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 5 */ 926, /* OBJ_brainpoolP224t1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 6 */ 927, /* OBJ_brainpoolP256r1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 7 */ 928, /* OBJ_brainpoolP256t1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 8 */ 929, /* OBJ_brainpoolP320r1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 9 */ 930, /* OBJ_brainpoolP320t1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 10 */ 931, /* OBJ_brainpoolP384r1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 11 */ 932, /* OBJ_brainpoolP384t1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 12 */ 933, /* OBJ_brainpoolP512r1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 13 */ 934, /* OBJ_brainpoolP512t1 1 3 36 3 3 2 8 1 1 14 */ 936, /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme 1 3 133 16 840 63 0 2 */ 941, /* OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme 1 3 133 16 840 63 0 3 */ 418, /* OBJ_aes_128_ecb 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 1 */ 419, /* OBJ_aes_128_cbc 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 2 */ 420, /* OBJ_aes_128_ofb128 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 3 */ 421, /* OBJ_aes_128_cfb128 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 4 */ 788, /* OBJ_id_aes128_wrap 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 5 */ 895, /* OBJ_aes_128_gcm 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 6 */ 896, /* OBJ_aes_128_ccm 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 7 */ 897, /* OBJ_id_aes128_wrap_pad 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 8 */ 422, /* OBJ_aes_192_ecb 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 21 */ 423, /* OBJ_aes_192_cbc 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 22 */ 424, /* OBJ_aes_192_ofb128 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 23 */ 425, /* OBJ_aes_192_cfb128 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 24 */ 789, /* OBJ_id_aes192_wrap 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 25 */ 898, /* OBJ_aes_192_gcm 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 26 */ 899, /* OBJ_aes_192_ccm 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 27 */ 900, /* OBJ_id_aes192_wrap_pad 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 28 */ 426, /* OBJ_aes_256_ecb 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 41 */ 427, /* OBJ_aes_256_cbc 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 42 */ 428, /* OBJ_aes_256_ofb128 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 43 */ 429, /* OBJ_aes_256_cfb128 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 44 */ 790, /* OBJ_id_aes256_wrap 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 45 */ 901, /* OBJ_aes_256_gcm 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 46 */ 902, /* OBJ_aes_256_ccm 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 47 */ 903, /* OBJ_id_aes256_wrap_pad 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 1 48 */ 672, /* OBJ_sha256 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 1 */ 673, /* OBJ_sha384 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 2 */ 674, /* OBJ_sha512 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 3 */ 675, /* OBJ_sha224 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 4 */ 1094, /* OBJ_sha512_224 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 5 */ 1095, /* OBJ_sha512_256 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 6 */ 1096, /* OBJ_sha3_224 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 7 */ 1097, /* OBJ_sha3_256 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 8 */ 1098, /* OBJ_sha3_384 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 9 */ 1099, /* OBJ_sha3_512 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 10 */ 1100, /* OBJ_shake128 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 11 */ 1101, /* OBJ_shake256 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 12 */ 1102, /* OBJ_hmac_sha3_224 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 13 */ 1103, /* OBJ_hmac_sha3_256 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 14 */ 1104, /* OBJ_hmac_sha3_384 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 15 */ 1105, /* OBJ_hmac_sha3_512 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 2 16 */ 802, /* OBJ_dsa_with_SHA224 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 1 */ 803, /* OBJ_dsa_with_SHA256 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 2 */ 1106, /* OBJ_dsa_with_SHA384 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 3 */ 1107, /* OBJ_dsa_with_SHA512 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 4 */ 1108, /* OBJ_dsa_with_SHA3_224 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 5 */ 1109, /* OBJ_dsa_with_SHA3_256 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 6 */ 1110, /* OBJ_dsa_with_SHA3_384 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 7 */ 1111, /* OBJ_dsa_with_SHA3_512 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 8 */ 1112, /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA3_224 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 9 */ 1113, /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA3_256 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 10 */ 1114, /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA3_384 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 11 */ 1115, /* OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA3_512 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 12 */ 1116, /* OBJ_RSA_SHA3_224 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 13 */ 1117, /* OBJ_RSA_SHA3_256 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 14 */ 1118, /* OBJ_RSA_SHA3_384 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 15 */ 1119, /* OBJ_RSA_SHA3_512 2 16 840 1 101 3 4 3 16 */ 71, /* OBJ_netscape_cert_type 2 16 840 1 113730 1 1 */ 72, /* OBJ_netscape_base_url 2 16 840 1 113730 1 2 */ 73, /* OBJ_netscape_revocation_url 2 16 840 1 113730 1 3 */ 74, /* OBJ_netscape_ca_revocation_url 2 16 840 1 113730 1 4 */ 75, /* OBJ_netscape_renewal_url 2 16 840 1 113730 1 7 */ 76, /* OBJ_netscape_ca_policy_url 2 16 840 1 113730 1 8 */ 77, /* OBJ_netscape_ssl_server_name 2 16 840 1 113730 1 12 */ 78, /* OBJ_netscape_comment 2 16 840 1 113730 1 13 */ 79, /* OBJ_netscape_cert_sequence 2 16 840 1 113730 2 5 */ 139, /* OBJ_ns_sgc 2 16 840 1 113730 4 1 */ 458, /* OBJ_userId 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 1 */ 459, /* OBJ_textEncodedORAddress 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 2 */ 460, /* OBJ_rfc822Mailbox 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 3 */ 461, /* OBJ_info 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 4 */ 462, /* OBJ_favouriteDrink 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 5 */ 463, /* OBJ_roomNumber 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 6 */ 464, /* OBJ_photo 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 7 */ 465, /* OBJ_userClass 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 8 */ 466, /* OBJ_host 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 9 */ 467, /* OBJ_manager 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 10 */ 468, /* OBJ_documentIdentifier 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 11 */ 469, /* OBJ_documentTitle 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 12 */ 470, /* OBJ_documentVersion 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 13 */ 471, /* OBJ_documentAuthor 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 14 */ 472, /* OBJ_documentLocation 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 15 */ 473, /* OBJ_homeTelephoneNumber 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 20 */ 474, /* OBJ_secretary 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 21 */ 475, /* OBJ_otherMailbox 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 22 */ 476, /* OBJ_lastModifiedTime 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 23 */ 477, /* OBJ_lastModifiedBy 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 24 */ 391, /* OBJ_domainComponent 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 25 */ 478, /* OBJ_aRecord 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 26 */ 479, /* OBJ_pilotAttributeType27 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 27 */ 480, /* OBJ_mXRecord 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 28 */ 481, /* OBJ_nSRecord 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 29 */ 482, /* OBJ_sOARecord 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 30 */ 483, /* OBJ_cNAMERecord 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 31 */ 484, /* OBJ_associatedDomain 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 37 */ 485, /* OBJ_associatedName 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 38 */ 486, /* OBJ_homePostalAddress 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 39 */ 487, /* OBJ_personalTitle 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 40 */ 488, /* OBJ_mobileTelephoneNumber 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 41 */ 489, /* OBJ_pagerTelephoneNumber 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 42 */ 490, /* OBJ_friendlyCountryName 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 43 */ 102, /* OBJ_uniqueIdentifier 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 44 */ 491, /* OBJ_organizationalStatus 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 45 */ 492, /* OBJ_janetMailbox 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 46 */ 493, /* OBJ_mailPreferenceOption 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 47 */ 494, /* OBJ_buildingName 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 48 */ 495, /* OBJ_dSAQuality 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 49 */ 496, /* OBJ_singleLevelQuality 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 50 */ 497, /* OBJ_subtreeMinimumQuality 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 51 */ 498, /* OBJ_subtreeMaximumQuality 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 52 */ 499, /* OBJ_personalSignature 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 53 */ 500, /* OBJ_dITRedirect 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 54 */ 501, /* OBJ_audio 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 55 */ 502, /* OBJ_documentPublisher 0 9 2342 19200300 100 1 56 */ 442, /* OBJ_iA5StringSyntax 0 9 2342 19200300 100 3 4 */ 443, /* OBJ_caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax 0 9 2342 19200300 100 3 5 */ 444, /* OBJ_pilotObject 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 3 */ 445, /* OBJ_pilotPerson 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 4 */ 446, /* OBJ_account 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 5 */ 447, /* OBJ_document 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 6 */ 448, /* OBJ_room 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 7 */ 449, /* OBJ_documentSeries 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 9 */ 392, /* OBJ_Domain 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 13 */ 450, /* OBJ_rFC822localPart 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 14 */ 451, /* OBJ_dNSDomain 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 15 */ 452, /* OBJ_domainRelatedObject 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 17 */ 453, /* OBJ_friendlyCountry 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 18 */ 454, /* OBJ_simpleSecurityObject 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 19 */ 455, /* OBJ_pilotOrganization 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 20 */ 456, /* OBJ_pilotDSA 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 21 */ 457, /* OBJ_qualityLabelledData 0 9 2342 19200300 100 4 22 */ 1152, /* OBJ_dstu28147 1 2 804 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 */ 1156, /* OBJ_hmacWithDstu34311 1 2 804 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 */ 1157, /* OBJ_dstu34311 1 2 804 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 */ 189, /* OBJ_id_smime_mod 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 */ 190, /* OBJ_id_smime_ct 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 */ 191, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 */ 192, /* OBJ_id_smime_alg 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 */ 193, /* OBJ_id_smime_cd 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 4 */ 194, /* OBJ_id_smime_spq 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 5 */ 195, /* OBJ_id_smime_cti 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 */ 158, /* OBJ_x509Certificate 1 2 840 113549 1 9 22 1 */ 159, /* OBJ_sdsiCertificate 1 2 840 113549 1 9 22 2 */ 160, /* OBJ_x509Crl 1 2 840 113549 1 9 23 1 */ 144, /* OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4 1 2 840 113549 1 12 1 1 */ 145, /* OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4 1 2 840 113549 1 12 1 2 */ 146, /* OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC 1 2 840 113549 1 12 1 3 */ 147, /* OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC 1 2 840 113549 1 12 1 4 */ 148, /* OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC 1 2 840 113549 1 12 1 5 */ 149, /* OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC 1 2 840 113549 1 12 1 6 */ 171, /* OBJ_ms_ext_req 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 2 1 14 */ 134, /* OBJ_ms_code_ind 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 2 1 21 */ 135, /* OBJ_ms_code_com 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 2 1 22 */ 136, /* OBJ_ms_ctl_sign 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 10 3 1 */ 137, /* OBJ_ms_sgc 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 10 3 3 */ 138, /* OBJ_ms_efs 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 10 3 4 */ 648, /* OBJ_ms_smartcard_login 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 20 2 2 */ 649, /* OBJ_ms_upn 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 20 2 3 */ 951, /* OBJ_ct_precert_scts 1 3 6 1 4 1 11129 2 4 2 */ 952, /* OBJ_ct_precert_poison 1 3 6 1 4 1 11129 2 4 3 */ 953, /* OBJ_ct_precert_signer 1 3 6 1 4 1 11129 2 4 4 */ 954, /* OBJ_ct_cert_scts 1 3 6 1 4 1 11129 2 4 5 */ 751, /* OBJ_camellia_128_cbc 1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 1 2 */ 752, /* OBJ_camellia_192_cbc 1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 1 3 */ 753, /* OBJ_camellia_256_cbc 1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 1 4 */ 907, /* OBJ_id_camellia128_wrap 1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 3 2 */ 908, /* OBJ_id_camellia192_wrap 1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 3 3 */ 909, /* OBJ_id_camellia256_wrap 1 2 392 200011 61 1 1 3 4 */ 1153, /* OBJ_dstu28147_ofb 1 2 804 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 */ 1154, /* OBJ_dstu28147_cfb 1 2 804 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 */ 1155, /* OBJ_dstu28147_wrap 1 2 804 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 5 */ 1158, /* OBJ_dstu4145le 1 2 804 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 */ 196, /* OBJ_id_smime_mod_cms 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 1 */ 197, /* OBJ_id_smime_mod_ess 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 2 */ 198, /* OBJ_id_smime_mod_oid 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 3 */ 199, /* OBJ_id_smime_mod_msg_v3 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 4 */ 200, /* OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_88 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 5 */ 201, /* OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_97 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 6 */ 202, /* OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_88 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 7 */ 203, /* OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_97 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 0 8 */ 204, /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_receipt 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 1 */ 205, /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_authData 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 2 */ 206, /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_publishCert 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 3 */ 207, /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 4 */ 208, /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_TDTInfo 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 5 */ 209, /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_contentInfo 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 6 */ 210, /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_DVCSRequestData 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 7 */ 211, /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_DVCSResponseData 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 8 */ 786, /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_compressedData 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 9 */ 1058, /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_contentCollection 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 19 */ 1059, /* OBJ_id_smime_ct_authEnvelopedData 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 23 */ 787, /* OBJ_id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 27 */ 1060, /* OBJ_id_ct_xml 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 1 28 */ 212, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_receiptRequest 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 1 */ 213, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_securityLabel 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 2 */ 214, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_mlExpandHistory 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 3 */ 215, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentHint 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 4 */ 216, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_msgSigDigest 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 5 */ 217, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_encapContentType 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 6 */ 218, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentIdentifier 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 7 */ 219, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_macValue 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 8 */ 220, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_equivalentLabels 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 9 */ 221, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentReference 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 10 */ 222, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_encrypKeyPref 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 11 */ 223, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 12 */ 224, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_smimeEncryptCerts 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 13 */ 225, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_timeStampToken 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 14 */ 226, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_sigPolicyId 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 15 */ 227, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_commitmentType 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 16 */ 228, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_signerLocation 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 17 */ 229, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_signerAttr 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 18 */ 230, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_otherSigCert 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 19 */ 231, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_contentTimestamp 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 20 */ 232, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_CertificateRefs 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 21 */ 233, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_RevocationRefs 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 22 */ 234, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_certValues 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 23 */ 235, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_revocationValues 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 24 */ 236, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_escTimeStamp 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 25 */ 237, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_certCRLTimestamp 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 26 */ 238, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_archiveTimeStamp 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 27 */ 239, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_signatureType 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 28 */ 240, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_dvcs_dvc 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 29 */ 1086, /* OBJ_id_smime_aa_signingCertificateV2 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 2 47 */ 241, /* OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDHwith3DES 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 1 */ 242, /* OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDHwithRC2 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 2 */ 243, /* OBJ_id_smime_alg_3DESwrap 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 3 */ 244, /* OBJ_id_smime_alg_RC2wrap 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 4 */ 245, /* OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDH 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 5 */ 246, /* OBJ_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 6 */ 247, /* OBJ_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 7 */ 125, /* OBJ_zlib_compression 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 8 */ 893, /* OBJ_id_alg_PWRI_KEK 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 3 9 */ 248, /* OBJ_id_smime_cd_ldap 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 4 1 */ 249, /* OBJ_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_uri 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 5 1 */ 250, /* OBJ_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_unotice 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 5 2 */ 251, /* OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfOrigin 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 1 */ 252, /* OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfReceipt 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 2 */ 253, /* OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfDelivery 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 3 */ 254, /* OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfSender 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 4 */ 255, /* OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfApproval 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 5 */ 256, /* OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfCreation 1 2 840 113549 1 9 16 6 6 */ 150, /* OBJ_keyBag 1 2 840 113549 1 12 10 1 1 */ 151, /* OBJ_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag 1 2 840 113549 1 12 10 1 2 */ 152, /* OBJ_certBag 1 2 840 113549 1 12 10 1 3 */ 153, /* OBJ_crlBag 1 2 840 113549 1 12 10 1 4 */ 154, /* OBJ_secretBag 1 2 840 113549 1 12 10 1 5 */ 155, /* OBJ_safeContentsBag 1 2 840 113549 1 12 10 1 6 */ 34, /* OBJ_idea_cbc 1 3 6 1 4 1 188 7 1 1 2 */ 955, /* OBJ_jurisdictionLocalityName 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 60 2 1 1 */ 956, /* OBJ_jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 60 2 1 2 */ 957, /* OBJ_jurisdictionCountryName 1 3 6 1 4 1 311 60 2 1 3 */ 1056, /* OBJ_blake2b512 1 3 6 1 4 1 1722 12 2 1 16 */ 1057, /* OBJ_blake2s256 1 3 6 1 4 1 1722 12 2 2 8 */ 1159, /* OBJ_dstu4145be 1 2 804 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 */ 1160, /* OBJ_uacurve0 1 2 804 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 0 */ 1161, /* OBJ_uacurve1 1 2 804 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 1 */ 1162, /* OBJ_uacurve2 1 2 804 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 2 */ 1163, /* OBJ_uacurve3 1 2 804 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 3 */ 1164, /* OBJ_uacurve4 1 2 804 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 4 */ 1165, /* OBJ_uacurve5 1 2 804 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 5 */ 1166, /* OBJ_uacurve6 1 2 804 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 6 */ 1167, /* OBJ_uacurve7 1 2 804 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 7 */ 1168, /* OBJ_uacurve8 1 2 804 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 8 */ 1169, /* OBJ_uacurve9 1 2 804 2 1 1 1 1 3 1 1 2 9 */ }; diff --git a/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h b/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h index 5c3561ab7d7e..5ef094bbfd84 100644 --- a/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h +++ b/crypto/objects/obj_xref.h @@ -1,128 +1,128 @@ /* * WARNING: do not edit! * Generated by objxref.pl * - * Copyright 1998-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1998-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ typedef struct { int sign_id; int hash_id; int pkey_id; } nid_triple; DEFINE_STACK_OF(nid_triple) static const nid_triple sigoid_srt[] = { {NID_md2WithRSAEncryption, NID_md2, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_md5WithRSAEncryption, NID_md5, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_shaWithRSAEncryption, NID_sha, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption, NID_sha1, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_dsaWithSHA, NID_sha, NID_dsa}, {NID_dsaWithSHA1_2, NID_sha1, NID_dsa_2}, {NID_mdc2WithRSA, NID_mdc2, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_md5WithRSA, NID_md5, NID_rsa}, {NID_dsaWithSHA1, NID_sha1, NID_dsa}, {NID_sha1WithRSA, NID_sha1, NID_rsa}, {NID_ripemd160WithRSA, NID_ripemd160, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_md4WithRSAEncryption, NID_md4, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1, NID_sha1, NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey}, {NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption, NID_sha256, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption, NID_sha384, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption, NID_sha512, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption, NID_sha224, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_ecdsa_with_Recommended, NID_undef, NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey}, {NID_ecdsa_with_Specified, NID_undef, NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey}, {NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_sha224, NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey}, {NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256, NID_sha256, NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey}, {NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384, NID_sha384, NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey}, {NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512, NID_sha512, NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey}, {NID_dsa_with_SHA224, NID_sha224, NID_dsa}, {NID_dsa_with_SHA256, NID_sha256, NID_dsa}, {NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001, NID_id_GostR3411_94, NID_id_GostR3410_2001}, {NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94, NID_id_GostR3411_94, NID_id_GostR3410_94}, {NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc, NID_id_GostR3411_94, NID_id_GostR3410_94_cc}, {NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc, NID_id_GostR3411_94, NID_id_GostR3410_2001_cc}, {NID_rsassaPss, NID_undef, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme, NID_sha1, NID_dh_std_kdf}, {NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme, NID_sha224, NID_dh_std_kdf}, {NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme, NID_sha256, NID_dh_std_kdf}, {NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme, NID_sha384, NID_dh_std_kdf}, {NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme, NID_sha512, NID_dh_std_kdf}, {NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme, NID_sha1, NID_dh_cofactor_kdf}, {NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme, NID_sha224, NID_dh_cofactor_kdf}, {NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme, NID_sha256, NID_dh_cofactor_kdf}, {NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme, NID_sha384, NID_dh_cofactor_kdf}, {NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme, NID_sha512, NID_dh_cofactor_kdf}, {NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256, NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256}, {NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512, NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512}, {NID_ED25519, NID_undef, NID_ED25519}, {NID_ED448, NID_undef, NID_ED448}, {NID_RSA_SHA3_224, NID_sha3_224, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_RSA_SHA3_256, NID_sha3_256, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_RSA_SHA3_384, NID_sha3_384, NID_rsaEncryption}, {NID_RSA_SHA3_512, NID_sha3_512, NID_rsaEncryption}, }; static const nid_triple *const sigoid_srt_xref[] = { &sigoid_srt[0], &sigoid_srt[1], &sigoid_srt[7], &sigoid_srt[2], &sigoid_srt[4], &sigoid_srt[3], &sigoid_srt[9], &sigoid_srt[5], &sigoid_srt[8], &sigoid_srt[12], &sigoid_srt[30], &sigoid_srt[35], &sigoid_srt[6], &sigoid_srt[10], &sigoid_srt[11], &sigoid_srt[13], &sigoid_srt[24], &sigoid_srt[20], &sigoid_srt[32], &sigoid_srt[37], &sigoid_srt[14], &sigoid_srt[21], &sigoid_srt[33], &sigoid_srt[38], &sigoid_srt[15], &sigoid_srt[22], &sigoid_srt[34], &sigoid_srt[39], &sigoid_srt[16], &sigoid_srt[23], &sigoid_srt[19], &sigoid_srt[31], &sigoid_srt[36], &sigoid_srt[25], &sigoid_srt[26], &sigoid_srt[27], &sigoid_srt[28], &sigoid_srt[40], &sigoid_srt[41], &sigoid_srt[44], &sigoid_srt[45], &sigoid_srt[46], &sigoid_srt[47], }; diff --git a/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c b/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c index 9526c16536cb..0f630a5bd963 100644 --- a/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c +++ b/crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c @@ -1,754 +1,756 @@ /* - * Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2001-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "e_os.h" #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_UI_CONSOLE /* * need for #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE arises whenever you pass -ansi to gcc * [maybe others?], because it masks interfaces not discussed in standard, * sigaction and fileno included. -pedantic would be more appropriate for the * intended purposes, but we can't prevent users from adding -ansi. */ # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) # include # endif # if !defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # ifndef _POSIX_C_SOURCE # define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 2 # endif # endif # include # include # include # include # if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # ifdef OPENSSL_UNISTD # include OPENSSL_UNISTD # else # include # endif /* * If unistd.h defines _POSIX_VERSION, we conclude that we are on a POSIX * system and have sigaction and termios. */ # if defined(_POSIX_VERSION) && _POSIX_VERSION>=199309L # define SIGACTION # if !defined(TERMIOS) && !defined(TERMIO) && !defined(SGTTY) # define TERMIOS # endif # endif # endif # include "ui_local.h" # include "internal/cryptlib.h" # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS /* prototypes for sys$whatever */ # include # ifdef __DECC # pragma message disable DOLLARID # endif # endif # ifdef WIN_CONSOLE_BUG # include # ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE # include # endif # endif /* * There are 6 types of terminal interface supported, TERMIO, TERMIOS, VMS, * MSDOS, WIN32 Console and SGTTY. * * If someone defines one of the macros TERMIO, TERMIOS or SGTTY, it will * remain respected. Otherwise, we default to TERMIOS except for a few * systems that require something different. * * Note: we do not use SGTTY unless it's defined by the configuration. We * may eventually opt to remove its use entirely. */ # if !defined(TERMIOS) && !defined(TERMIO) && !defined(SGTTY) # if defined(_LIBC) # undef TERMIOS # define TERMIO # undef SGTTY /* * We know that VMS, MSDOS, VXWORKS, use entirely other mechanisms. */ # elif !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) \ && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) \ && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) # define TERMIOS # undef TERMIO # undef SGTTY # endif # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) # undef TERMIOS # undef TERMIO # undef SGTTY # endif # ifdef TERMIOS # include # define TTY_STRUCT struct termios # define TTY_FLAGS c_lflag # define TTY_get(tty,data) tcgetattr(tty,data) # define TTY_set(tty,data) tcsetattr(tty,TCSANOW,data) # endif # ifdef TERMIO # include # define TTY_STRUCT struct termio # define TTY_FLAGS c_lflag # define TTY_get(tty,data) ioctl(tty,TCGETA,data) # define TTY_set(tty,data) ioctl(tty,TCSETA,data) # endif # ifdef SGTTY # include # define TTY_STRUCT struct sgttyb # define TTY_FLAGS sg_flags # define TTY_get(tty,data) ioctl(tty,TIOCGETP,data) # define TTY_set(tty,data) ioctl(tty,TIOCSETP,data) # endif # if !defined(_LIBC) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # include # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS # include # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS # include # include # include # include struct IOSB { short iosb$w_value; short iosb$w_count; long iosb$l_info; }; # endif # ifndef NX509_SIG # define NX509_SIG 32 # endif /* Define globals. They are protected by a lock */ # ifdef SIGACTION static struct sigaction savsig[NX509_SIG]; # else static void (*savsig[NX509_SIG]) (int); # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS static struct IOSB iosb; static $DESCRIPTOR(terminal, "TT"); static long tty_orig[3], tty_new[3]; /* XXX Is there any guarantee that this * will always suffice for the actual * structures? */ static long status; static unsigned short channel = 0; # elif defined(_WIN32) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE) static DWORD tty_orig, tty_new; # else # if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(__DJGPP__) static TTY_STRUCT tty_orig, tty_new; # endif # endif static FILE *tty_in, *tty_out; static int is_a_tty; /* Declare static functions */ # if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) static int read_till_nl(FILE *); static void recsig(int); static void pushsig(void); static void popsig(void); # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(_WIN32) static int noecho_fgets(char *buf, int size, FILE *tty); # endif static int read_string_inner(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis, int echo, int strip_nl); static int read_string(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis); static int write_string(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis); static int open_console(UI *ui); static int echo_console(UI *ui); static int noecho_console(UI *ui); static int close_console(UI *ui); /* * The following function makes sure that info and error strings are printed * before any prompt. */ static int write_string(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis) { switch (UI_get_string_type(uis)) { case UIT_ERROR: case UIT_INFO: fputs(UI_get0_output_string(uis), tty_out); fflush(tty_out); break; case UIT_NONE: case UIT_PROMPT: case UIT_VERIFY: case UIT_BOOLEAN: break; } return 1; } static int read_string(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis) { int ok = 0; switch (UI_get_string_type(uis)) { case UIT_BOOLEAN: fputs(UI_get0_output_string(uis), tty_out); fputs(UI_get0_action_string(uis), tty_out); fflush(tty_out); return read_string_inner(ui, uis, UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO, 0); case UIT_PROMPT: fputs(UI_get0_output_string(uis), tty_out); fflush(tty_out); return read_string_inner(ui, uis, UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO, 1); case UIT_VERIFY: fprintf(tty_out, "Verifying - %s", UI_get0_output_string(uis)); fflush(tty_out); if ((ok = read_string_inner(ui, uis, UI_get_input_flags(uis) & UI_INPUT_FLAG_ECHO, 1)) <= 0) return ok; if (strcmp(UI_get0_result_string(uis), UI_get0_test_string(uis)) != 0) { fprintf(tty_out, "Verify failure\n"); fflush(tty_out); return 0; } break; case UIT_NONE: case UIT_INFO: case UIT_ERROR: break; } return 1; } # if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) /* Internal functions to read a string without echoing */ static int read_till_nl(FILE *in) { # define SIZE 4 char buf[SIZE + 1]; do { if (!fgets(buf, SIZE, in)) return 0; } while (strchr(buf, '\n') == NULL); return 1; } static volatile sig_atomic_t intr_signal; # endif static int read_string_inner(UI *ui, UI_STRING *uis, int echo, int strip_nl) { static int ps; int ok; char result[BUFSIZ]; int maxsize = BUFSIZ - 1; # if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) char *p = NULL; int echo_eol = !echo; intr_signal = 0; ok = 0; ps = 0; pushsig(); ps = 1; if (!echo && !noecho_console(ui)) goto error; ps = 2; result[0] = '\0'; # if defined(_WIN32) if (is_a_tty) { DWORD numread; # if defined(CP_UTF8) if (GetEnvironmentVariableW(L"OPENSSL_WIN32_UTF8", NULL, 0) != 0) { WCHAR wresult[BUFSIZ]; if (ReadConsoleW(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), wresult, maxsize, &numread, NULL)) { if (numread >= 2 && wresult[numread-2] == L'\r' && wresult[numread-1] == L'\n') { wresult[numread-2] = L'\n'; numread--; } wresult[numread] = '\0'; if (WideCharToMultiByte(CP_UTF8, 0, wresult, -1, result, sizeof(result), NULL, 0) > 0) p = result; OPENSSL_cleanse(wresult, sizeof(wresult)); } } else # endif if (ReadConsoleA(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), result, maxsize, &numread, NULL)) { if (numread >= 2 && result[numread-2] == '\r' && result[numread-1] == '\n') { result[numread-2] = '\n'; numread--; } result[numread] = '\0'; p = result; } } else # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) if (!echo) { noecho_fgets(result, maxsize, tty_in); p = result; /* FIXME: noecho_fgets doesn't return errors */ } else # endif p = fgets(result, maxsize, tty_in); if (p == NULL) goto error; if (feof(tty_in)) goto error; if (ferror(tty_in)) goto error; if ((p = (char *)strchr(result, '\n')) != NULL) { if (strip_nl) *p = '\0'; } else if (!read_till_nl(tty_in)) goto error; if (UI_set_result(ui, uis, result) >= 0) ok = 1; error: if (intr_signal == SIGINT) ok = -1; if (echo_eol) fprintf(tty_out, "\n"); if (ps >= 2 && !echo && !echo_console(ui)) ok = 0; if (ps >= 1) popsig(); # else ok = 1; # endif OPENSSL_cleanse(result, BUFSIZ); return ok; } /* Internal functions to open, handle and close a channel to the console. */ static int open_console(UI *ui) { CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ui->lock); is_a_tty = 1; # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) tty_in = stdin; tty_out = stderr; # elif defined(_WIN32) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE) if ((tty_out = fopen("conout$", "w")) == NULL) tty_out = stderr; if (GetConsoleMode(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), &tty_orig)) { tty_in = stdin; } else { is_a_tty = 0; if ((tty_in = fopen("conin$", "r")) == NULL) tty_in = stdin; } # else # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS # define DEV_TTY "con" # else # define DEV_TTY "/dev/tty" # endif if ((tty_in = fopen(DEV_TTY, "r")) == NULL) tty_in = stdin; if ((tty_out = fopen(DEV_TTY, "w")) == NULL) tty_out = stderr; # endif # if defined(TTY_get) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) if (TTY_get(fileno(tty_in), &tty_orig) == -1) { # ifdef ENOTTY if (errno == ENOTTY) is_a_tty = 0; else # endif # ifdef EINVAL /* * Ariel Glenn reports that solaris can return EINVAL instead. * This should be ok */ if (errno == EINVAL) is_a_tty = 0; else # endif # ifdef ENXIO /* * Solaris can return ENXIO. * This should be ok */ if (errno == ENXIO) is_a_tty = 0; else # endif # ifdef EIO /* * Linux can return EIO. * This should be ok */ if (errno == EIO) is_a_tty = 0; else # endif # ifdef EPERM /* * Linux can return EPERM (Operation not permitted), * e.g. if a daemon executes openssl via fork()+execve() * This should be ok */ if (errno == EPERM) is_a_tty = 0; else # endif # ifdef ENODEV /* * MacOS X returns ENODEV (Operation not supported by device), * which seems appropriate. */ if (errno == ENODEV) is_a_tty = 0; else # endif { char tmp_num[10]; BIO_snprintf(tmp_num, sizeof(tmp_num) - 1, "%d", errno); UIerr(UI_F_OPEN_CONSOLE, UI_R_UNKNOWN_TTYGET_ERRNO_VALUE); ERR_add_error_data(2, "errno=", tmp_num); return 0; } } # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS status = sys$assign(&terminal, &channel, 0, 0); /* if there isn't a TT device, something is very wrong */ if (status != SS$_NORMAL) { char tmp_num[12]; BIO_snprintf(tmp_num, sizeof(tmp_num) - 1, "%%X%08X", status); UIerr(UI_F_OPEN_CONSOLE, UI_R_SYSASSIGN_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(2, "status=", tmp_num); return 0; } status = sys$qiow(0, channel, IO$_SENSEMODE, &iosb, 0, 0, tty_orig, 12, 0, 0, 0, 0); /* If IO$_SENSEMODE doesn't work, this is not a terminal device */ if ((status != SS$_NORMAL) || (iosb.iosb$w_value != SS$_NORMAL)) is_a_tty = 0; # endif return 1; } static int noecho_console(UI *ui) { # ifdef TTY_FLAGS memcpy(&(tty_new), &(tty_orig), sizeof(tty_orig)); tty_new.TTY_FLAGS &= ~ECHO; # endif # if defined(TTY_set) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) if (is_a_tty && (TTY_set(fileno(tty_in), &tty_new) == -1)) return 0; # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS if (is_a_tty) { tty_new[0] = tty_orig[0]; tty_new[1] = tty_orig[1] | TT$M_NOECHO; tty_new[2] = tty_orig[2]; status = sys$qiow(0, channel, IO$_SETMODE, &iosb, 0, 0, tty_new, 12, 0, 0, 0, 0); if ((status != SS$_NORMAL) || (iosb.iosb$w_value != SS$_NORMAL)) { char tmp_num[2][12]; BIO_snprintf(tmp_num[0], sizeof(tmp_num[0]) - 1, "%%X%08X", status); BIO_snprintf(tmp_num[1], sizeof(tmp_num[1]) - 1, "%%X%08X", iosb.iosb$w_value); UIerr(UI_F_NOECHO_CONSOLE, UI_R_SYSQIOW_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(5, "status=", tmp_num[0], ",", "iosb.iosb$w_value=", tmp_num[1]); return 0; } } # endif # if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE) if (is_a_tty) { tty_new = tty_orig; tty_new &= ~ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT; SetConsoleMode(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), tty_new); } # endif return 1; } static int echo_console(UI *ui) { # if defined(TTY_set) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) memcpy(&(tty_new), &(tty_orig), sizeof(tty_orig)); if (is_a_tty && (TTY_set(fileno(tty_in), &tty_new) == -1)) return 0; # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS if (is_a_tty) { tty_new[0] = tty_orig[0]; tty_new[1] = tty_orig[1]; tty_new[2] = tty_orig[2]; status = sys$qiow(0, channel, IO$_SETMODE, &iosb, 0, 0, tty_new, 12, 0, 0, 0, 0); if ((status != SS$_NORMAL) || (iosb.iosb$w_value != SS$_NORMAL)) { char tmp_num[2][12]; BIO_snprintf(tmp_num[0], sizeof(tmp_num[0]) - 1, "%%X%08X", status); BIO_snprintf(tmp_num[1], sizeof(tmp_num[1]) - 1, "%%X%08X", iosb.iosb$w_value); UIerr(UI_F_ECHO_CONSOLE, UI_R_SYSQIOW_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(5, "status=", tmp_num[0], ",", "iosb.iosb$w_value=", tmp_num[1]); return 0; } } # endif # if defined(_WIN32) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE) if (is_a_tty) { tty_new = tty_orig; SetConsoleMode(GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE), tty_new); } # endif return 1; } static int close_console(UI *ui) { + int ret = 1; + if (tty_in != stdin) fclose(tty_in); if (tty_out != stderr) fclose(tty_out); # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS status = sys$dassgn(channel); if (status != SS$_NORMAL) { char tmp_num[12]; BIO_snprintf(tmp_num, sizeof(tmp_num) - 1, "%%X%08X", status); UIerr(UI_F_CLOSE_CONSOLE, UI_R_SYSDASSGN_ERROR); ERR_add_error_data(2, "status=", tmp_num); - return 0; + ret = 0; } # endif CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ui->lock); - return 1; + return ret; } # if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) /* Internal functions to handle signals and act on them */ static void pushsig(void) { # ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 int i; # endif # ifdef SIGACTION struct sigaction sa; memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); sa.sa_handler = recsig; # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 savsig[SIGABRT] = signal(SIGABRT, recsig); savsig[SIGFPE] = signal(SIGFPE, recsig); savsig[SIGILL] = signal(SIGILL, recsig); savsig[SIGINT] = signal(SIGINT, recsig); savsig[SIGSEGV] = signal(SIGSEGV, recsig); savsig[SIGTERM] = signal(SIGTERM, recsig); # else for (i = 1; i < NX509_SIG; i++) { # ifdef SIGUSR1 if (i == SIGUSR1) continue; # endif # ifdef SIGUSR2 if (i == SIGUSR2) continue; # endif # ifdef SIGKILL if (i == SIGKILL) /* We can't make any action on that. */ continue; # endif # ifdef SIGACTION sigaction(i, &sa, &savsig[i]); # else savsig[i] = signal(i, recsig); # endif } # endif # ifdef SIGWINCH signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL); # endif } static void popsig(void) { # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 signal(SIGABRT, savsig[SIGABRT]); signal(SIGFPE, savsig[SIGFPE]); signal(SIGILL, savsig[SIGILL]); signal(SIGINT, savsig[SIGINT]); signal(SIGSEGV, savsig[SIGSEGV]); signal(SIGTERM, savsig[SIGTERM]); # else int i; for (i = 1; i < NX509_SIG; i++) { # ifdef SIGUSR1 if (i == SIGUSR1) continue; # endif # ifdef SIGUSR2 if (i == SIGUSR2) continue; # endif # ifdef SIGACTION sigaction(i, &savsig[i], NULL); # else signal(i, savsig[i]); # endif } # endif } static void recsig(int i) { intr_signal = i; } # endif /* Internal functions specific for Windows */ # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) && !defined(_WIN32) static int noecho_fgets(char *buf, int size, FILE *tty) { int i; char *p; p = buf; for (;;) { if (size == 0) { *p = '\0'; break; } size--; # if defined(_WIN32) i = _getch(); # else i = getch(); # endif if (i == '\r') i = '\n'; *(p++) = i; if (i == '\n') { *p = '\0'; break; } } # ifdef WIN_CONSOLE_BUG /* * Win95 has several evil console bugs: one of these is that the last * character read using getch() is passed to the next read: this is * usually a CR so this can be trouble. No STDIO fix seems to work but * flushing the console appears to do the trick. */ { HANDLE inh; inh = GetStdHandle(STD_INPUT_HANDLE); FlushConsoleInputBuffer(inh); } # endif return strlen(buf); } # endif static UI_METHOD ui_openssl = { "OpenSSL default user interface", open_console, write_string, NULL, /* No flusher is needed for command lines */ read_string, close_console, NULL }; /* The method with all the built-in console thingies */ UI_METHOD *UI_OpenSSL(void) { return &ui_openssl; } static const UI_METHOD *default_UI_meth = &ui_openssl; #else static const UI_METHOD *default_UI_meth = NULL; #endif void UI_set_default_method(const UI_METHOD *meth) { default_UI_meth = meth; } const UI_METHOD *UI_get_default_method(void) { return default_UI_meth; } diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c index e404fcc602df..b18489f67f6e 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c @@ -1,3389 +1,3390 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include "crypto/ctype.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/dane.h" #include "crypto/x509.h" #include "x509_local.h" /* CRL score values */ /* No unhandled critical extensions */ #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 /* certificate is within CRL scope */ #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 /* CRL times valid */ #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 /* Issuer name matches certificate */ #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e); static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted); static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth); static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert); static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert); static int check_curve(X509 *cert); static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score); static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, unsigned int *preasons); static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) { return ok; } /* * Return 1 if given cert is considered self-signed, 0 if not or on error. * This does not verify self-signedness but relies on x509v3_cache_extensions() * matching issuer and subject names (i.e., the cert being self-issued) and any * present authority key identifier matching the subject key identifier, etc. */ static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x) { if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1) return 0; if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) return 1; else return 0; } /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */ static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { STACK_OF(X509) *certs; X509 *xtmp = NULL; int i; /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */ certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x)); if (certs == NULL) return NULL; /* Look for exact match */ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i); if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) break; xtmp = NULL; } if (xtmp != NULL && !X509_up_ref(xtmp)) xtmp = NULL; sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); return xtmp; } /*- * Inform the verify callback of an error. * If B is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at * B. * If B is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave * unchanged (presumably set by the caller). * * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue. */ static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err) { ctx->error_depth = depth; ctx->current_cert = (x != NULL) ? x : sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth); if (err != X509_V_OK) ctx->error = err; return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); } /*- * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error * number. * * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue. */ static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) { ctx->error = err; return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); } static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int i; int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); if (ctx->param->auth_level <= 0) return 1; for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); /* * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only * check the security of issuer keys. */ if (i > 0 && !check_key_level(ctx, cert) && verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL) == 0) return 0; /* * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1. */ if (i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert) && verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK) == 0) return 0; } return 1; } static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int err; int ok; /* * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks, * instantiate chain public key parameters. */ if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) == 0 || (ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx)) == 0 || (ok = check_auth_level(ctx)) == 0 || (ok = check_id(ctx)) == 0 || 1) X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); if (ok == 0 || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) == 0) return ok; err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain, ctx->param->flags); if (err != X509_V_OK) { if ((ok = verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err)) == 0) return ok; } /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */ ok = (ctx->verify != NULL) ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx); if (!ok) return ok; if ((ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) == 0) return ok; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ if ((ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) == 0) return ok; if ((ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) == 0) return ok; #endif /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK) ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); return ok; } int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; int ret; if (ctx->cert == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; return -1; } if (ctx->chain != NULL) { /* * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We * cannot do another one. */ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; return -1; } if (!X509_up_ref(ctx->cert)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; return -1; } /* * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that * the first entry is in place */ if ((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) { X509_free(ctx->cert); X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return -1; } ctx->num_untrusted = 1; /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */ if (!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert) && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL)) return 0; if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane)) ret = dane_verify(ctx); else ret = verify_chain(ctx); /* * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error, * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE). */ if (ret <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK) ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; return ret; } static int sk_X509_contains(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *cert) { int i, n = sk_X509_num(sk); for (i = 0; i < n; i++) if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk, i), cert) == 0) return 1; return 0; } /* * Find in given STACK_OF(X509) sk an issuer cert of given cert x. * The issuer must not yet be in ctx->chain, where the exceptional case * that x is self-issued and ctx->chain has just one element is allowed. * Prefer the first one that is not expired, else take the last expired one. */ static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) { int i; X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer) && (((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0 && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) || !sk_X509_contains(ctx->chain, issuer))) { rv = issuer; if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, -1)) break; } } return rv; } /* Check that the given certificate 'x' is issued by the certificate 'issuer' */ static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) { return x509_likely_issued(issuer, x) == X509_V_OK; } /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); if (*issuer == NULL || !X509_up_ref(*issuer)) goto err; return 1; err: *issuer = NULL; return 0; } static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm) { STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; X509 *x; int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i); if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) { if (!X509_up_ref(x)) { sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); X509err(X509_F_LOOKUP_CERTS_SK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; return NULL; } if (sk == NULL) sk = sk_X509_new_null(); if (sk == NULL || !sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { X509_free(x); sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); X509err(X509_F_LOOKUP_CERTS_SK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return NULL; } } } return sk; } /* * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions. */ static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth, int must_be_ca) { int tr_ok = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; /* * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust * settings trump the purpose constraints. * * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in * ctx->param->purpose! * * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value * via the X509_PURPOSE API. * * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is * also set. */ if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted && purpose == ctx->param->purpose) tr_ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT); switch (tr_ok) { case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: return 1; case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: break; default: switch (X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0)) { case 1: return 1; case 0: break; default: if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) == 0) return 1; } break; } return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE); } /* * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied * purpose */ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0; X509 *x; int proxy_path_length = 0; int purpose; int allow_proxy_certs; int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); /*- * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. */ must_be_ca = -1; /* CRL path validation */ if (ctx->parent) { allow_proxy_certs = 0; purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; } else { allow_proxy_certs = ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); purpose = ctx->param->purpose; } for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { int ret; x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION)) return 0; } if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) { if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED)) return 0; } ret = X509_check_ca(x); switch (must_be_ca) { case -1: if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) { ret = 0; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; } else ret = 1; break; case 0: if (ret != 0) { ret = 0; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; } else ret = 1; break; default: /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */ if ((ret == 0) || ((i + 1 < num || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && (ret != 1))) { ret = 0; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; } else ret = 1; break; } if (ret > 0 && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && num > 1) { /* Check for presence of explicit elliptic curve parameters */ ret = check_curve(x); if (ret < 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; ret = 0; } else if (ret == 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS; } } if (ret > 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0 && x->ex_pathlen != -1 && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; ret = 0; } if (ret == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_OK)) return 0; /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */ if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca)) return 0; /* Check pathlen */ if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length))) { if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED)) return 0; } /* Increment path length if not a self issued intermediate CA */ if (i > 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) == 0) plen++; /* * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not, * the next certificate must be a CA certificate. */ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { /* * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it. * * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC, * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally, * increment proxy_path_length. */ if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) { if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) { if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED)) return 0; } proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen; } proxy_path_length++; must_be_ca = 0; } else must_be_ca = 1; } return 1; } static int has_san_id(X509 *x, int gtype) { int i; int ret = 0; GENERAL_NAMES *gs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); if (gs == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gs); i++) { GENERAL_NAME *g = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gs, i); if (g->type == gtype) { ret = 1; break; } } GENERAL_NAMES_free(gs); return ret; } static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int i; /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); int j; /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) continue; /* * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry * added. * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4)) */ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x); X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x); X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL; int last_object_nid = 0; int err = X509_V_OK; int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1; /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */ if (last_object_loc < 1) { err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; goto proxy_name_done; } /* * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as * there is in issuer. */ if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) { err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; goto proxy_name_done; } /* * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a * multivalued RDN */ if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc)) == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc - 1))) { err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; goto proxy_name_done; } /* * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly */ tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject); if (tmpsubject == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return 0; } tmpentry = X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc); last_object_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry)); if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) { err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; } X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry); X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject); proxy_name_done: if (err != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, err)) return 0; } /* * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them * to be obeyed. */ for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) { NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; if (nc) { int rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); /* If EE certificate check commonName too */ if (rv == X509_V_OK && i == 0 && (ctx->param->hostflags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT) == 0 && ((ctx->param->hostflags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT) != 0 || !has_san_id(x, GEN_DNS))) rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x, nc); switch (rv) { case X509_V_OK: break; case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: return 0; default: if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, rv)) return 0; break; } } } } return 1; } static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode) { return verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, errcode); } static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) { int i; int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts); char *name; if (vpm->peername != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(vpm->peername); vpm->peername = NULL; } for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm->hosts, i); if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, vpm->hostflags, &vpm->peername) > 0) return 1; } return n == 0; } static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param; X509 *x = ctx->cert; if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) { if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)) return 0; } if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) { if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) return 0; } if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) { if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)) return 0; } return 1; } static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted) { int i; X509 *x = NULL; X509 *mx; SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); int trust; /* * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2) * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth. */ if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0 && num_untrusted < num) { switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted)) { case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: return trust; } } /* * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up. * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those, * and wants to incrementally check just any added since. */ for (i = num_untrusted; i < num; i++) { x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */ if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) goto trusted; if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) goto rejected; } /* * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains, * the chain is PKIX trusted. */ if (num_untrusted < num) { if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) goto trusted; return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; } if (num_untrusted == num && ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { /* * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf * for a direct trust store match. */ i = 0; x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x); if (!mx) return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; /* * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set, * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed. */ trust = X509_check_trust(mx, ctx->param->trust, 0); if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { X509_free(mx); goto rejected; } /* Replace leaf with trusted match */ (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx); X509_free(x); ctx->num_untrusted = 0; goto trusted; } /* * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated. */ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; rejected: if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED)) return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; trusted: if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane)) return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; if (dane->pdpth < 0) dane->pdpth = num_untrusted; /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */ if (dane->mdpth >= 0) return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; } static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0; if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) return 1; if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; else { /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ if (ctx->parent) return 1; last = 0; } for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) { ctx->error_depth = i; ok = check_cert(ctx); if (!ok) return ok; } return 1; } static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; int ok = 0; int cnum = ctx->error_depth; X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); ctx->current_cert = x; ctx->current_issuer = NULL; ctx->current_crl_score = 0; ctx->current_reasons = 0; if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) return 1; while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) { unsigned int last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ if (ctx->get_crl) ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); else ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); /* * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback */ if (!ok) { ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL); goto done; } ctx->current_crl = crl; ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); if (!ok) goto done; if (dcrl) { ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); if (!ok) goto done; ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); if (!ok) goto done; } else ok = 1; /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ if (ok != 2) { ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); if (!ok) goto done; } X509_CRL_free(crl); X509_CRL_free(dcrl); crl = NULL; dcrl = NULL; /* * If reasons not updated we won't get anywhere by another iteration, * so exit loop. */ if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) { ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL); goto done; } } done: X509_CRL_free(crl); X509_CRL_free(dcrl); ctx->current_crl = NULL; return ok; } /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) { time_t *ptime; int i; if (notify) ctx->current_crl = crl; if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) return 1; else ptime = NULL; i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); if (i == 0) { if (!notify) return 0; if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD)) return 0; } if (i > 0) { if (!notify) return 0; if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID)) return 0; } if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) { i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); if (i == 0) { if (!notify) return 0; if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD)) return 0; } /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) { if (!notify) return 0; if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED)) return 0; } } if (notify) ctx->current_crl = NULL; return 1; } static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) { int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); reasons = *preasons; crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0) continue; /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */ if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) { int day, sec; if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl), X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0) continue; /* * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day| * and |sec|. */ if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0) continue; } best_crl = crl; best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; best_score = crl_score; best_reasons = reasons; } if (best_crl) { X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); *pcrl = best_crl; *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; *pscore = best_score; *preasons = best_reasons; X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl); X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); *pdcrl = NULL; get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); } if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) return 1; return 0; } /* * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. */ static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; int i; i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); if (i >= 0) { /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) return 0; exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); } else exta = NULL; i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); if (i >= 0) { if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) return 0; extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); } else extb = NULL; if (!exta && !extb) return 1; if (!exta || !extb) return 0; if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) return 0; return 1; } /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) { /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ if (!delta->base_crl_number) return 0; /* Base must have a CRL number */ if (!base->crl_number) return 0; /* Issuer names must match */ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) return 0; /* AKID and IDP must match */ if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) return 0; if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) return 0; /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) return 0; /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) return 1; return 0; } /* * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or * retrieve a chain of deltas... */ static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) { X509_CRL *delta; int i; if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) return; if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) return; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) { if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; X509_CRL_up_ref(delta); *dcrl = delta; return; } } *dcrl = NULL; } /* * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. */ static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) { int crl_score = 0; unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) return 0; /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) { if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) return 0; } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) { /* If no new reasons reject */ if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) return 0; } /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ else if (crl->base_crl_number) return 0; /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) { if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) return 0; } else crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; /* Check expiry */ if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) return 0; /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) { /* If no new reasons reject */ if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) return 0; tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; } *preasons = tmp_reasons; return crl_score; } static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) { X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); int cidx = ctx->error_depth; int i; if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) cidx++; crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) { *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; *pissuer = crl_issuer; return; } } for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) { crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) continue; if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; *pissuer = crl_issuer; return; } } /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) return; /* * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of * untrusted certificates. */ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) { crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) continue; if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { *pissuer = crl_issuer; *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; return; } } } /* * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice. */ static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; int ret; /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ if (ctx->parent) return 0; if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) return -1; crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; /* Copy verify params across */ X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); crl_ctx.parent = ctx; crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; /* Verify CRL issuer */ ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); if (ret <= 0) goto err; /* Check chain is acceptable */ ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); err: X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); return ret; } /* * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor, * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the * RFC5280 version */ static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) { X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) return 1; return 0; } /*- * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. */ static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) { X509_NAME *nm = NULL; GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; int i, j; if (!a || !b) return 1; if (a->type == 1) { if (!a->dpname) return 0; /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ if (b->type == 1) { if (!b->dpname) return 0; if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) return 1; else return 0; } /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ nm = a->dpname; gens = b->name.fullname; } else if (b->type == 1) { if (!b->dpname) return 0; /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ gens = a->name.fullname; nm = b->dpname; } /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ if (nm) { for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) continue; if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) return 1; } return 0; } /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) { gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) { genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) return 1; } } return 0; } static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) { int i; X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ if (!dp->CRLissuer) return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) continue; if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) return 1; } return 0; } /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, unsigned int *preasons) { int i; if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) return 0; if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) { if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) return 0; } else { if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) return 0; } *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; return 1; } } } if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) return 1; return 0; } /* * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try * to find a delta CRL too */ static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) { int ok; X509 *issuer = NULL; int crl_score = 0; unsigned int reasons; X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); reasons = ctx->current_reasons; ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); if (ok) goto done; /* Lookup CRLs from store */ skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ if (!skcrl && crl) goto done; get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); done: /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ if (crl) { ctx->current_issuer = issuer; ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; ctx->current_reasons = reasons; *pcrl = crl; *pdcrl = dcrl; return 1; } return 0; } /* Check CRL validity */ static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) { X509 *issuer = NULL; EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; int cnum = ctx->error_depth; int chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ if (ctx->current_issuer) issuer = ctx->current_issuer; /* * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next * certificate in chain. */ else if (cnum < chnum) issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); else { issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER)) return 0; } if (issuer == NULL) return 1; /* * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done */ if (!crl->base_crl_number) { /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN)) return 0; if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE)) return 0; if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) && check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR)) return 0; if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION)) return 0; } if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) && !check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1)) return 0; /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer); if (!ikey && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY)) return 0; if (ikey) { int rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags); if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, rv)) return 0; /* Verify CRL signature */ if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0 && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE)) return 0; } return 1; } /* Check certificate against CRL */ static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) { X509_REVOKED *rev; /* * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can * change the meaning of CRL entries. */ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION)) return 0; /* * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure * reason is not removeFromCRL. */ if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) { if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) return 2; if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED)) return 0; } return 1; } static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int ret; if (ctx->parent) return 1; /* * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280 * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the * X509_policy_check() call. */ if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) { X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return 0; } ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) { X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return 0; } /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) { int i; /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */ for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) continue; if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION)) return 0; } return 1; } if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) { ctx->current_cert = NULL; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); } if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) { X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) { ctx->current_cert = NULL; /* * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK. */ if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) return 0; } return 1; } /*- * Check certificate validity times. * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return * the validation status. * * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth) { time_t *ptime; int i; if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) return 1; else ptime = NULL; i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x), ptime); if (i >= 0 && depth < 0) return 0; if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD)) return 0; if (i > 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID)) return 0; i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x), ptime); if (i <= 0 && depth < 0) return 0; if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD)) return 0; if (i < 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED)) return 0; return 1; } /* verify the issuer signatures and cert times of ctx->chain */ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); X509 *xs; /* * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as * NULL, since all we have is a bare key. */ if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) { xs = xi; xi = NULL; goto check_cert_time; } if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) xs = xi; /* the typical case: last cert in the chain is self-issued */ else { if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { xs = xi; goto check_cert_time; } if (n <= 0) { if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, 0, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE)) return 0; xs = xi; goto check_cert_time; } n--; ctx->error_depth = n; xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); } /* * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril). */ while (n >= 0) { /* * For each iteration of this loop: * n is the subject depth * xs is the subject cert, for which the signature is to be checked * xi is the supposed issuer cert containing the public key to use * Initially xs == xi if the last cert in the chain is self-issued. * * Skip signature check for self-signed certificates unless explicitly * asked for because it does not add any security and just wastes time. */ if (xs != xi || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE) && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)) { EVP_PKEY *pkey; /* * If the issuer's public key is not available or its key usage * does not support issuing the subject cert, report the issuer * cert and its depth (rather than n, the depth of the subject). */ int issuer_depth = n + (xs == xi ? 0 : 1); /* * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.4 * step (n) we must check any given key usage extension in a CA cert * when preparing the verification of a certificate issued by it. * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3 * we must not verify a certifiate signature if the key usage of the * CA certificate that issued the certificate prohibits signing. * In case the 'issuing' certificate is the last in the chain and is * not a CA certificate but a 'self-issued' end-entity cert (i.e., * xs == xi && !(xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)) RFC 5280 does not apply * (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6818#section-2) and thus * we are free to ignore any key usage restrictions on such certs. */ int ret = xs == xi && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0 ? X509_V_OK : x509_signing_allowed(xi, xs); if (ret != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret)) return 0; if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { ret = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret)) return 0; } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) { ret = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xs, n, ret)) return 0; } } check_cert_time: /* in addition to RFC 5280, do also for trusted (root) cert */ /* Calls verify callback as needed */ if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n)) return 0; /* * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any) * is retained. */ ctx->current_issuer = xi; ctx->current_cert = xs; ctx->error_depth = n; if (!ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx)) return 0; if (--n >= 0) { xi = xs; xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); } } return 1; } int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) { return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); } int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) { static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1; static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1; ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL; int i, day, sec, ret = 0; #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC const char upper_z = 0x5A; #else const char upper_z = 'Z'; #endif /* * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280. * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed: * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ * * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement: * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime." */ switch (ctm->type) { case V_ASN1_UTCTIME: if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length)) return 0; break; case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME: if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length)) return 0; break; default: return 0; } /** * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280. * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods. */ for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) { if (!ascii_isdigit(ctm->data[i])) return 0; } if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != upper_z) return 0; /* * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t, * so we go through ASN.1 */ asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time); if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time)) goto err; /* * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=. * The return value 0 is reserved for errors. */ ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1; err: ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time); return ret; } ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) { return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); } ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) { return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); } ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) { time_t t; if (in_tm) t = *in_tm; else time(&t); if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) { if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); } return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); } int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2; int i, j; if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i)); if (ktmp == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); return 0; } if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) break; } if (ktmp == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); return 0; } /* first, populate the other certs */ for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j)); EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp); } if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp); return 1; } /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */ X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) { X509_CRL *crl = NULL; int i; STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL; /* CRLs can't be delta already */ if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA); return NULL; } /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */ if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER); return NULL; } /* Issuer names must match */ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH); return NULL; } /* AKID and IDP must match */ if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH); return NULL; } if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH); return NULL; } /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER); return NULL; } /* CRLs must verify */ if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 || X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE); return NULL; } /* Create new CRL */ crl = X509_CRL_new(); if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1)) goto memerr; /* Set issuer name */ if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) goto memerr; if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer))) goto memerr; if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer))) goto memerr; /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */ if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0)) goto memerr; /* * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL * number to correct value too. */ for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) { X509_EXTENSION *ext; ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i); if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1)) goto memerr; } /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */ revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) { X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp; rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i); /* * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs. */ if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) { rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn); if (!rvtmp) goto memerr; if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) { X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp); goto memerr; } } } /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */ if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md)) goto memerr; return crl; memerr: X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); X509_CRL_free(crl); return NULL; } int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) { return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); } void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); } int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->error; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) { ctx->error = err; } int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->error_depth; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) { ctx->error_depth = depth; } X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->current_cert; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { ctx->current_cert = x; } STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->chain; } STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { if (!ctx->chain) return NULL; return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain); } X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->current_issuer; } X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->current_crl; } X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->parent; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { ctx->cert = x; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) { ctx->crls = sk; } int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) { /* * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust? * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init(). */ return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); } int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) { /* * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case. */ return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); } /* * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values. * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL * client/server. */ int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, int purpose, int trust) { int idx; /* If purpose not set use default */ if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose; + /* + * If purpose is set but we don't have a default then set the default to + * the current purpose + */ + else if (def_purpose == 0) + def_purpose = purpose; /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ if (purpose) { X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); if (idx == -1) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); return 0; } ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); - /* - * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is - * not a known value, so idx will always be -1. How is the - * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled? - */ if (idx == -1) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); return 0; } ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); } /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust; } if (trust) { idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); if (idx == -1) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); return 0; } } if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose; if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust; return 1; } X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) { X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); if (ctx == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } return ctx; } void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx == NULL) return; X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { int ret = 1; ctx->ctx = store; ctx->cert = x509; ctx->untrusted = chain; ctx->crls = NULL; ctx->num_untrusted = 0; ctx->other_ctx = NULL; ctx->valid = 0; ctx->chain = NULL; ctx->error = 0; ctx->explicit_policy = 0; ctx->error_depth = 0; ctx->current_cert = NULL; ctx->current_issuer = NULL; ctx->current_crl = NULL; ctx->current_crl_score = 0; ctx->current_reasons = 0; ctx->tree = NULL; ctx->parent = NULL; ctx->dane = NULL; ctx->bare_ta_signed = 0; /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */ memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */ if (store) ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; else ctx->cleanup = 0; if (store && store->check_issued) ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; else ctx->check_issued = check_issued; if (store && store->get_issuer) ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; else ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; if (store && store->verify_cb) ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; else ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; if (store && store->verify) ctx->verify = store->verify; else ctx->verify = internal_verify; if (store && store->check_revocation) ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; else ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; if (store && store->get_crl) ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; else ctx->get_crl = NULL; if (store && store->check_crl) ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; else ctx->check_crl = check_crl; if (store && store->cert_crl) ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; else ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; if (store && store->check_policy) ctx->check_policy = store->check_policy; else ctx->check_policy = check_policy; if (store && store->lookup_certs) ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; else ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs; if (store && store->lookup_crls) ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; else ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls; ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); if (ctx->param == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. */ if (store) ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); else ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; if (ret) ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); if (ret == 0) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the * purpose if this still yields the default value. */ if (ctx->param->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { int idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx->param->purpose); X509_PURPOSE *xp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); if (xp != NULL) ctx->param->trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp); } if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &ctx->ex_data)) return 1; X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: /* * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so. */ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); return 0; } /* * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. */ void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) { ctx->other_ctx = sk; ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs_sk; } void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { /* * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free() * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the * pointers below after they're freed! */ /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */ if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) { ctx->cleanup(ctx); ctx->cleanup = NULL; } if (ctx->param != NULL) { if (ctx->parent == NULL) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); ctx->param = NULL; } X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); ctx->tree = NULL; sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); ctx->chain = NULL; CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); } X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cert; } STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->untrusted; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) { ctx->untrusted = sk; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) { sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); ctx->chain = sk; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb) { ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; } X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->verify_cb; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify) { ctx->verify = verify; } X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->verify; } X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->get_issuer; } X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->check_issued; } X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->check_revocation; } X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->get_crl; } X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->check_crl; } X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cert_crl; } X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->check_policy; } X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->lookup_certs; } X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->lookup_crls; } X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cleanup; } X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->tree; } int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->explicit_policy; } int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->num_untrusted; } int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) { const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); if (!param) return 0; return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); } X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->param; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); ctx->param = param; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane) { ctx->dane = dane; } static unsigned char *dane_i2d( X509 *cert, uint8_t selector, unsigned int *i2dlen) { unsigned char *buf = NULL; int len; /* * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key. */ switch (selector) { case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT: len = i2d_X509(cert, &buf); break; case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI: len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf); break; default: X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR); return NULL; } if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } *i2dlen = (unsigned int)len; return buf; } #define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */ static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth) { SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; unsigned usage = DANETLS_NONE; unsigned selector = DANETLS_NONE; unsigned ordinal = DANETLS_NONE; unsigned mtype = DANETLS_NONE; unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL; unsigned int i2dlen = 0; unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char *cmpbuf = NULL; unsigned int cmplen = 0; int i; int recnum; int matched = 0; danetls_record *t = NULL; uint32_t mask; mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK; /* * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2) */ if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted) mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK; /* * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain. * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already. */ if (dane->mdpth >= 0) mask &= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK; /*- * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4 * * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1). * * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c. * * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1", * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1" * or multiple "3 0 1" records. * * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation. */ recnum = (dane->umask & mask) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0; for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) { t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i); if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0) continue; if (t->usage != usage) { usage = t->usage; /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */ mtype = DANETLS_NONE; ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype]; } if (t->selector != selector) { selector = t->selector; /* Update per-selector state */ OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf); i2dbuf = dane_i2d(cert, selector, &i2dlen); if (i2dbuf == NULL) return -1; /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */ mtype = DANETLS_NONE; ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype]; } else if (t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) { /*- * Digest agility: * * * * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals * other than "Full". */ if (dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype] < ordinal) continue; } /* * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space. */ if (t->mtype != mtype) { const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype]; cmpbuf = i2dbuf; cmplen = i2dlen; if (md != NULL) { cmpbuf = mdbuf; if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) { matched = -1; break; } } } /* * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a * full chain. */ if (cmplen == t->dlen && memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) { if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK) matched = 1; if (matched || dane->mdpth < 0) { dane->mdpth = depth; dane->mtlsa = t; OPENSSL_free(dane->mcert); dane->mcert = cert; X509_up_ref(cert); } break; } } /* Clear the one-element DER cache */ OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf); return matched; } static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) { SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; int matched = 0; X509 *cert; if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0) return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; /* * Record any DANE trust-anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking * for an exact match for the leaf certificate). */ cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth); if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0) return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; if (matched > 0) { ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1; return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; } return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; } static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; danetls_record *t; int num = ctx->num_untrusted; X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs); int i; for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) { t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i); if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA || t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI || t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL || X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0) continue; /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */ X509_free(dane->mcert); dane->mcert = NULL; /* Record match via a bare TA public key */ ctx->bare_ta_signed = 1; dane->mdpth = num - 1; dane->mtlsa = t; /* Prune any excess chain certificates */ num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); for (; num > ctx->num_untrusted; --num) X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain)); return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; } return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; } static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE *dane) { /* * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure. */ X509_free(dane->mcert); dane->mcert = NULL; dane->mtlsa = NULL; dane->mdpth = -1; dane->pdpth = -1; } static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) { int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags); if (err == X509_V_OK) return 1; return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, err); } static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { X509 *cert = ctx->cert; SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; int matched; int done; dane_reset(dane); /*- * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record, * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done. If however we match a PKIX-EE(1) * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust-anchor. * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done * if: * + matched < 0, internal error. * + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record * + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no * DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test. */ matched = dane_match(ctx, ctx->cert, 0); done = matched != 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0); if (done) X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); if (matched > 0) { /* Callback invoked as needed */ if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert)) return 0; /* Callback invoked as needed */ if ((dane->flags & DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS) == 0 && !check_id(ctx)) return 0; /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */ ctx->error_depth = 0; ctx->current_cert = cert; return ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx); } if (matched < 0) { ctx->error_depth = 0; ctx->current_cert = cert; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return -1; } if (done) { /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */ if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert)) return 0; return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH); } /* * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0 * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain. */ return verify_chain(ctx); } /* Get issuer, without duplicate suppression */ static int get_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) { STACK_OF(X509) *saved_chain = ctx->chain; int ok; ctx->chain = NULL; ok = ctx->get_issuer(issuer, ctx, cert); ctx->chain = saved_chain; return ok; } static int augment_stack(STACK_OF(X509) *src, STACK_OF(X509) **dstPtr) { if (src) { STACK_OF(X509) *dst; int i; if (*dstPtr == NULL) return ((*dstPtr = sk_X509_dup(src)) != NULL); for (dst = *dstPtr, i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(src); ++i) { if (!sk_X509_push(dst, sk_X509_value(src, i))) { sk_X509_free(dst); *dstPtr = NULL; return 0; } } } return 1; } static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); int ss = cert_self_signed(cert); STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL; unsigned int search; int may_trusted = 0; int may_alternate = 0; int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; int alt_untrusted = 0; int depth; int ok = 0; int i; /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */ if (!ossl_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num)) { X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; return 0; } #define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */ #define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */ #define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */ /* * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled. * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first, * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain * if no luck with untrusted first. */ search = (ctx->untrusted != NULL) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0; if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) { if (search == 0 || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) search |= S_DOTRUSTED; else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) may_alternate = 1; may_trusted = 1; } /* * If we got any "Cert(0) Full(0)" issuer certificates from DNS, *prepend* * them to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack. Since the * caller of X509_STORE_CTX_init() may have provided only a leaf cert with * no corresponding stack of untrusted certificates, we may need to create * an empty stack first. [ At present only the ssl library provides DANE * support, and ssl_verify_cert_chain() always provides a non-null stack * containing at least the leaf certificate, but we must be prepared for * this to change. ] */ if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && !augment_stack(dane->certs, &sktmp)) { X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return 0; } /* * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go. */ if (!augment_stack(ctx->untrusted, &sktmp)) { X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return 0; } /* * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound * might be reasonable. */ if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX/2) ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX/2; /* * Try to Extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer. * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit, * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code. */ depth = ctx->param->depth + 1; while (search != 0) { X509 *x; X509 *xtmp = NULL; /* * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point * we've not found a trust-anchor, any trusted chain would be too long. * * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0, * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain * would be a-priori too long. */ if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) { i = num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) { /* * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or * ctx->num_untrusted. * * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of * untrusted certificates, not a "depth". */ i = alt_untrusted; } x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i-1); ok = (depth < num) ? 0 : get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); if (ok < 0) { trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; search = 0; continue; } if (ok > 0) { /* * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert? * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note * that despite the current trust-store match we might still * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust-anchor, in which * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on * again with an even shorter untrusted chain! * * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted * certificate among the ones from the trust store. */ if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) { if (!ossl_assert(num > i && i > 0 && ss == 0)) { X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); X509_free(xtmp); trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; search = 0; continue; } search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE; for (; num > i; --num) X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain)); ctx->num_untrusted = num; if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) { dane->mdpth = -1; X509_free(dane->mcert); dane->mcert = NULL; } if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) dane->pdpth = -1; } /* * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain. */ if (ss == 0) { if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) { X509_free(xtmp); X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; search = 0; continue; } ss = cert_self_signed(x); } else if (num == ctx->num_untrusted) { /* * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as * a trust-anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid * possible impersonation via key substitution etc. */ if (X509_cmp(x, xtmp) != 0) { /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */ X509_free(xtmp); ok = 0; } else { X509_free(x); ctx->num_untrusted = --num; (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, x = xtmp); } } /* * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper. * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain. * * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num. */ if (ok) { if (!ossl_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num)) { X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; search = 0; continue; } search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED; switch (trust = check_trust(ctx, num)) { case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: search = 0; continue; } if (ss == 0) continue; } } /* * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled, * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time, * and trying to extend the shorted chain. */ if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) == 0) { /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */ if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 && --alt_untrusted > 0) continue; /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */ if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 || ctx->num_untrusted < 2) break; /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */ search |= S_DOALTERNATE; alt_untrusted = ctx->num_untrusted - 1; ss = 0; } } /* * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates */ if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) { num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); if (!ossl_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted)) { X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; search = 0; continue; } x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num-1); /* * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled. */ xtmp = (ss || depth < num) ? NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x); if (xtmp == NULL) { search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED; if (may_trusted) search |= S_DOTRUSTED; continue; } /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */ (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp); if (!X509_up_ref(xtmp)) { X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; search = 0; continue; } if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) { X509_free(xtmp); X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; search = 0; continue; } x = xtmp; ++ctx->num_untrusted; ss = cert_self_signed(xtmp); /* * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate. */ switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1)) { case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: search = 0; continue; } } } sk_X509_free(sktmp); /* * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust. */ num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); if (num <= depth) { if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane)) trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx); if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && num == ctx->num_untrusted) trust = check_trust(ctx, num); } switch (trust) { case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: return 1; case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: /* Callback already issued */ return 0; case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED: default: num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); if (num > depth) return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG); if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0)) return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH); if (ss && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT); if (ss) return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN); if (ctx->num_untrusted < num) return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT); return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY); } } static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 }; static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table); /* * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` meets the security level of * ``ctx``. * * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) { EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert); int level = ctx->param->auth_level; /* * At security level zero, return without checking for a supported public * key type. Some engines support key types not understood outside the * engine, and we only need to understand the key when enforcing a security * floor. */ if (level <= 0) return 1; /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */ if (pkey == NULL) return 0; if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS) level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS; return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1]; } /* * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` does not use explicit params * for an elliptic curve. * * Returns 1 on success, 0 if check fails, -1 for other errors. */ static int check_curve(X509 *cert) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert); /* Unsupported or malformed key */ if (pkey == NULL) return -1; if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) { int ret; ret = EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)); return ret < 0 ? ret : !ret; } #endif return 1; } /* * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether * self-signed or otherwise). * * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) { int secbits = -1; int level = ctx->param->auth_level; if (level <= 0) return 1; if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS) level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS; if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, NULL, NULL, &secbits, NULL)) return 0; return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1]; } diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c index f41c699b5af0..a7ff4b4fb4d3 100644 --- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c +++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_utl.c @@ -1,1273 +1,1284 @@ /* - * Copyright 1999-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1999-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* X509 v3 extension utilities */ #include "e_os.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "crypto/ctype.h" #include #include #include #include "crypto/x509.h" #include #include "ext_dat.h" static char *strip_spaces(char *name); static int sk_strcmp(const char *const *a, const char *const *b); static STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *get_email(X509_NAME *name, GENERAL_NAMES *gens); static void str_free(OPENSSL_STRING str); static int append_ia5(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) **sk, const ASN1_IA5STRING *email); static int ipv4_from_asc(unsigned char *v4, const char *in); static int ipv6_from_asc(unsigned char *v6, const char *in); static int ipv6_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *usr); static int ipv6_hex(unsigned char *out, const char *in, int inlen); /* Add a CONF_VALUE name value pair to stack */ static int x509v3_add_len_value(const char *name, const char *value, size_t vallen, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist) { CONF_VALUE *vtmp = NULL; char *tname = NULL, *tvalue = NULL; int sk_allocated = (*extlist == NULL); if (name != NULL && (tname = OPENSSL_strdup(name)) == NULL) goto err; if (value != NULL && vallen > 0) { /* * We tolerate a single trailing NUL character, but otherwise no * embedded NULs */ if (memchr(value, 0, vallen - 1) != NULL) goto err; tvalue = OPENSSL_strndup(value, vallen); if (tvalue == NULL) goto err; } if ((vtmp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*vtmp))) == NULL) goto err; if (sk_allocated && (*extlist = sk_CONF_VALUE_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; vtmp->section = NULL; vtmp->name = tname; vtmp->value = tvalue; if (!sk_CONF_VALUE_push(*extlist, vtmp)) goto err; return 1; err: X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_ADD_LEN_VALUE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); if (sk_allocated) { sk_CONF_VALUE_free(*extlist); *extlist = NULL; } OPENSSL_free(vtmp); OPENSSL_free(tname); OPENSSL_free(tvalue); return 0; } int X509V3_add_value(const char *name, const char *value, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist) { return x509v3_add_len_value(name, value, value != NULL ? strlen((const char *)value) : 0, extlist); } int X509V3_add_value_uchar(const char *name, const unsigned char *value, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist) { return x509v3_add_len_value(name, (const char *)value, value != NULL ? strlen((const char *)value) : 0, extlist); } int x509v3_add_len_value_uchar(const char *name, const unsigned char *value, size_t vallen, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist) { return x509v3_add_len_value(name, (const char *)value, vallen, extlist); } /* Free function for STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) */ void X509V3_conf_free(CONF_VALUE *conf) { if (!conf) return; OPENSSL_free(conf->name); OPENSSL_free(conf->value); OPENSSL_free(conf->section); OPENSSL_free(conf); } int X509V3_add_value_bool(const char *name, int asn1_bool, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist) { if (asn1_bool) return X509V3_add_value(name, "TRUE", extlist); return X509V3_add_value(name, "FALSE", extlist); } int X509V3_add_value_bool_nf(const char *name, int asn1_bool, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist) { if (asn1_bool) return X509V3_add_value(name, "TRUE", extlist); return 1; } static char *bignum_to_string(const BIGNUM *bn) { char *tmp, *ret; size_t len; /* * Display large numbers in hex and small numbers in decimal. Converting to * decimal takes quadratic time and is no more useful than hex for large * numbers. */ if (BN_num_bits(bn) < 128) return BN_bn2dec(bn); tmp = BN_bn2hex(bn); if (tmp == NULL) return NULL; len = strlen(tmp) + 3; ret = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (ret == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_BIGNUM_TO_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(tmp); return NULL; } /* Prepend "0x", but place it after the "-" if negative. */ if (tmp[0] == '-') { OPENSSL_strlcpy(ret, "-0x", len); OPENSSL_strlcat(ret, tmp + 1, len); } else { OPENSSL_strlcpy(ret, "0x", len); OPENSSL_strlcat(ret, tmp, len); } OPENSSL_free(tmp); return ret; } char *i2s_ASN1_ENUMERATED(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, const ASN1_ENUMERATED *a) { BIGNUM *bntmp = NULL; char *strtmp = NULL; if (!a) return NULL; if ((bntmp = ASN1_ENUMERATED_to_BN(a, NULL)) == NULL || (strtmp = bignum_to_string(bntmp)) == NULL) X509V3err(X509V3_F_I2S_ASN1_ENUMERATED, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); BN_free(bntmp); return strtmp; } char *i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, const ASN1_INTEGER *a) { BIGNUM *bntmp = NULL; char *strtmp = NULL; if (!a) return NULL; if ((bntmp = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(a, NULL)) == NULL || (strtmp = bignum_to_string(bntmp)) == NULL) X509V3err(X509V3_F_I2S_ASN1_INTEGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); BN_free(bntmp); return strtmp; } ASN1_INTEGER *s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, const char *value) { BIGNUM *bn = NULL; ASN1_INTEGER *aint; int isneg, ishex; int ret; if (value == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_INTEGER, X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_VALUE); return NULL; } bn = BN_new(); if (bn == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_INTEGER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } if (value[0] == '-') { value++; isneg = 1; } else isneg = 0; if (value[0] == '0' && ((value[1] == 'x') || (value[1] == 'X'))) { value += 2; ishex = 1; } else ishex = 0; if (ishex) ret = BN_hex2bn(&bn, value); else ret = BN_dec2bn(&bn, value); if (!ret || value[ret]) { BN_free(bn); X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_INTEGER, X509V3_R_BN_DEC2BN_ERROR); return NULL; } if (isneg && BN_is_zero(bn)) isneg = 0; aint = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(bn, NULL); BN_free(bn); if (!aint) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_S2I_ASN1_INTEGER, X509V3_R_BN_TO_ASN1_INTEGER_ERROR); return NULL; } if (isneg) aint->type |= V_ASN1_NEG; return aint; } int X509V3_add_value_int(const char *name, const ASN1_INTEGER *aint, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) **extlist) { char *strtmp; int ret; if (!aint) return 1; if ((strtmp = i2s_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, aint)) == NULL) return 0; ret = X509V3_add_value(name, strtmp, extlist); OPENSSL_free(strtmp); return ret; } int X509V3_get_value_bool(const CONF_VALUE *value, int *asn1_bool) { const char *btmp; if ((btmp = value->value) == NULL) goto err; if (strcmp(btmp, "TRUE") == 0 || strcmp(btmp, "true") == 0 || strcmp(btmp, "Y") == 0 || strcmp(btmp, "y") == 0 || strcmp(btmp, "YES") == 0 || strcmp(btmp, "yes") == 0) { *asn1_bool = 0xff; return 1; } if (strcmp(btmp, "FALSE") == 0 || strcmp(btmp, "false") == 0 || strcmp(btmp, "N") == 0 || strcmp(btmp, "n") == 0 || strcmp(btmp, "NO") == 0 || strcmp(btmp, "no") == 0) { *asn1_bool = 0; return 1; } err: X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_GET_VALUE_BOOL, X509V3_R_INVALID_BOOLEAN_STRING); X509V3_conf_err(value); return 0; } int X509V3_get_value_int(const CONF_VALUE *value, ASN1_INTEGER **aint) { ASN1_INTEGER *itmp; if ((itmp = s2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, value->value)) == NULL) { X509V3_conf_err(value); return 0; } *aint = itmp; return 1; } #define HDR_NAME 1 #define HDR_VALUE 2 /* * #define DEBUG */ STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *X509V3_parse_list(const char *line) { char *p, *q, c; char *ntmp, *vtmp; STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *values = NULL; char *linebuf; int state; /* We are going to modify the line so copy it first */ linebuf = OPENSSL_strdup(line); if (linebuf == NULL) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_PARSE_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } state = HDR_NAME; ntmp = NULL; /* Go through all characters */ for (p = linebuf, q = linebuf; (c = *p) && (c != '\r') && (c != '\n'); p++) { switch (state) { case HDR_NAME: if (c == ':') { state = HDR_VALUE; *p = 0; ntmp = strip_spaces(q); if (!ntmp) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_PARSE_LIST, X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_NAME); goto err; } q = p + 1; } else if (c == ',') { *p = 0; ntmp = strip_spaces(q); q = p + 1; if (!ntmp) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_PARSE_LIST, X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_NAME); goto err; } X509V3_add_value(ntmp, NULL, &values); } break; case HDR_VALUE: if (c == ',') { state = HDR_NAME; *p = 0; vtmp = strip_spaces(q); if (!vtmp) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_PARSE_LIST, X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_VALUE); goto err; } X509V3_add_value(ntmp, vtmp, &values); ntmp = NULL; q = p + 1; } } } if (state == HDR_VALUE) { vtmp = strip_spaces(q); if (!vtmp) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_PARSE_LIST, X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_VALUE); goto err; } X509V3_add_value(ntmp, vtmp, &values); } else { ntmp = strip_spaces(q); if (!ntmp) { X509V3err(X509V3_F_X509V3_PARSE_LIST, X509V3_R_INVALID_NULL_NAME); goto err; } X509V3_add_value(ntmp, NULL, &values); } OPENSSL_free(linebuf); return values; err: OPENSSL_free(linebuf); sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(values, X509V3_conf_free); return NULL; } /* Delete leading and trailing spaces from a string */ static char *strip_spaces(char *name) { char *p, *q; /* Skip over leading spaces */ p = name; while (*p && ossl_isspace(*p)) p++; if (!*p) return NULL; q = p + strlen(p) - 1; while ((q != p) && ossl_isspace(*q)) q--; if (p != q) q[1] = 0; if (!*p) return NULL; return p; } /* * V2I name comparison function: returns zero if 'name' matches cmp or cmp.* */ int name_cmp(const char *name, const char *cmp) { int len, ret; char c; len = strlen(cmp); if ((ret = strncmp(name, cmp, len))) return ret; c = name[len]; if (!c || (c == '.')) return 0; return 1; } static int sk_strcmp(const char *const *a, const char *const *b) { return strcmp(*a, *b); } STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *X509_get1_email(X509 *x) { GENERAL_NAMES *gens; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *ret; gens = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); ret = get_email(X509_get_subject_name(x), gens); sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(gens, GENERAL_NAME_free); return ret; } STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *X509_get1_ocsp(X509 *x) { AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS *info; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *ret = NULL; int i; info = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_info_access, NULL, NULL); if (!info) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_num(info); i++) { ACCESS_DESCRIPTION *ad = sk_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION_value(info, i); if (OBJ_obj2nid(ad->method) == NID_ad_OCSP) { if (ad->location->type == GEN_URI) { if (!append_ia5 (&ret, ad->location->d.uniformResourceIdentifier)) break; } } } AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS_free(info); return ret; } STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *X509_REQ_get1_email(X509_REQ *x) { GENERAL_NAMES *gens; STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *ret; exts = X509_REQ_get_extensions(x); gens = X509V3_get_d2i(exts, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); ret = get_email(X509_REQ_get_subject_name(x), gens); sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(gens, GENERAL_NAME_free); sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); return ret; } static STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *get_email(X509_NAME *name, GENERAL_NAMES *gens) { STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *ret = NULL; X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne; const ASN1_IA5STRING *email; GENERAL_NAME *gen; int i = -1; /* Now add any email address(es) to STACK */ /* First supplied X509_NAME */ while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, i)) >= 0) { ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i); email = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne); if (!append_ia5(&ret, email)) return NULL; } for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); if (gen->type != GEN_EMAIL) continue; if (!append_ia5(&ret, gen->d.ia5)) return NULL; } return ret; } static void str_free(OPENSSL_STRING str) { OPENSSL_free(str); } static int append_ia5(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) **sk, const ASN1_IA5STRING *email) { char *emtmp; /* First some sanity checks */ if (email->type != V_ASN1_IA5STRING) return 1; if (email->data == NULL || email->length == 0) return 1; if (memchr(email->data, 0, email->length) != NULL) return 1; if (*sk == NULL) *sk = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new(sk_strcmp); if (*sk == NULL) return 0; emtmp = OPENSSL_strndup((char *)email->data, email->length); - if (emtmp == NULL) + if (emtmp == NULL) { + X509_email_free(*sk); + *sk = NULL; return 0; + } /* Don't add duplicates */ if (sk_OPENSSL_STRING_find(*sk, emtmp) != -1) { OPENSSL_free(emtmp); return 1; } if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(*sk, emtmp)) { OPENSSL_free(emtmp); /* free on push failure */ X509_email_free(*sk); *sk = NULL; return 0; } return 1; } void X509_email_free(STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sk) { sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(sk, str_free); } typedef int (*equal_fn) (const unsigned char *pattern, size_t pattern_len, const unsigned char *subject, size_t subject_len, unsigned int flags); /* Skip pattern prefix to match "wildcard" subject */ static void skip_prefix(const unsigned char **p, size_t *plen, size_t subject_len, unsigned int flags) { const unsigned char *pattern = *p; size_t pattern_len = *plen; /* * If subject starts with a leading '.' followed by more octets, and * pattern is longer, compare just an equal-length suffix with the * full subject (starting at the '.'), provided the prefix contains * no NULs. */ if ((flags & _X509_CHECK_FLAG_DOT_SUBDOMAINS) == 0) return; while (pattern_len > subject_len && *pattern) { if ((flags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_SINGLE_LABEL_SUBDOMAINS) && *pattern == '.') break; ++pattern; --pattern_len; } /* Skip if entire prefix acceptable */ if (pattern_len == subject_len) { *p = pattern; *plen = pattern_len; } } /* Compare while ASCII ignoring case. */ static int equal_nocase(const unsigned char *pattern, size_t pattern_len, const unsigned char *subject, size_t subject_len, unsigned int flags) { skip_prefix(&pattern, &pattern_len, subject_len, flags); if (pattern_len != subject_len) return 0; while (pattern_len) { unsigned char l = *pattern; unsigned char r = *subject; /* The pattern must not contain NUL characters. */ if (l == 0) return 0; if (l != r) { if ('A' <= l && l <= 'Z') l = (l - 'A') + 'a'; if ('A' <= r && r <= 'Z') r = (r - 'A') + 'a'; if (l != r) return 0; } ++pattern; ++subject; --pattern_len; } return 1; } /* Compare using memcmp. */ static int equal_case(const unsigned char *pattern, size_t pattern_len, const unsigned char *subject, size_t subject_len, unsigned int flags) { skip_prefix(&pattern, &pattern_len, subject_len, flags); if (pattern_len != subject_len) return 0; return !memcmp(pattern, subject, pattern_len); } /* * RFC 5280, section 7.5, requires that only the domain is compared in a * case-insensitive manner. */ static int equal_email(const unsigned char *a, size_t a_len, const unsigned char *b, size_t b_len, unsigned int unused_flags) { size_t i = a_len; if (a_len != b_len) return 0; /* * We search backwards for the '@' character, so that we do not have to * deal with quoted local-parts. The domain part is compared in a * case-insensitive manner. */ while (i > 0) { --i; if (a[i] == '@' || b[i] == '@') { if (!equal_nocase(a + i, a_len - i, b + i, a_len - i, 0)) return 0; break; } } if (i == 0) i = a_len; return equal_case(a, i, b, i, 0); } /* * Compare the prefix and suffix with the subject, and check that the * characters in-between are valid. */ static int wildcard_match(const unsigned char *prefix, size_t prefix_len, const unsigned char *suffix, size_t suffix_len, const unsigned char *subject, size_t subject_len, unsigned int flags) { const unsigned char *wildcard_start; const unsigned char *wildcard_end; const unsigned char *p; int allow_multi = 0; int allow_idna = 0; if (subject_len < prefix_len + suffix_len) return 0; if (!equal_nocase(prefix, prefix_len, subject, prefix_len, flags)) return 0; wildcard_start = subject + prefix_len; wildcard_end = subject + (subject_len - suffix_len); if (!equal_nocase(wildcard_end, suffix_len, suffix, suffix_len, flags)) return 0; /* * If the wildcard makes up the entire first label, it must match at * least one character. */ if (prefix_len == 0 && *suffix == '.') { if (wildcard_start == wildcard_end) return 0; allow_idna = 1; if (flags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_MULTI_LABEL_WILDCARDS) allow_multi = 1; } /* IDNA labels cannot match partial wildcards */ if (!allow_idna && subject_len >= 4 && strncasecmp((char *)subject, "xn--", 4) == 0) return 0; /* The wildcard may match a literal '*' */ if (wildcard_end == wildcard_start + 1 && *wildcard_start == '*') return 1; /* * Check that the part matched by the wildcard contains only * permitted characters and only matches a single label unless * allow_multi is set. */ for (p = wildcard_start; p != wildcard_end; ++p) if (!(('0' <= *p && *p <= '9') || ('A' <= *p && *p <= 'Z') || ('a' <= *p && *p <= 'z') || *p == '-' || (allow_multi && *p == '.'))) return 0; return 1; } #define LABEL_START (1 << 0) #define LABEL_END (1 << 1) #define LABEL_HYPHEN (1 << 2) #define LABEL_IDNA (1 << 3) static const unsigned char *valid_star(const unsigned char *p, size_t len, unsigned int flags) { const unsigned char *star = 0; size_t i; int state = LABEL_START; int dots = 0; for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) { /* * Locate first and only legal wildcard, either at the start * or end of a non-IDNA first and not final label. */ if (p[i] == '*') { int atstart = (state & LABEL_START); int atend = (i == len - 1 || p[i + 1] == '.'); /*- * At most one wildcard per pattern. * No wildcards in IDNA labels. * No wildcards after the first label. */ if (star != NULL || (state & LABEL_IDNA) != 0 || dots) return NULL; /* Only full-label '*.example.com' wildcards? */ if ((flags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_PARTIAL_WILDCARDS) && (!atstart || !atend)) return NULL; /* No 'foo*bar' wildcards */ if (!atstart && !atend) return NULL; star = &p[i]; state &= ~LABEL_START; } else if (('a' <= p[i] && p[i] <= 'z') || ('A' <= p[i] && p[i] <= 'Z') || ('0' <= p[i] && p[i] <= '9')) { if ((state & LABEL_START) != 0 && len - i >= 4 && strncasecmp((char *)&p[i], "xn--", 4) == 0) state |= LABEL_IDNA; state &= ~(LABEL_HYPHEN | LABEL_START); } else if (p[i] == '.') { if ((state & (LABEL_HYPHEN | LABEL_START)) != 0) return NULL; state = LABEL_START; ++dots; } else if (p[i] == '-') { /* no domain/subdomain starts with '-' */ if ((state & LABEL_START) != 0) return NULL; state |= LABEL_HYPHEN; } else return NULL; } /* * The final label must not end in a hyphen or ".", and * there must be at least two dots after the star. */ if ((state & (LABEL_START | LABEL_HYPHEN)) != 0 || dots < 2) return NULL; return star; } /* Compare using wildcards. */ static int equal_wildcard(const unsigned char *pattern, size_t pattern_len, const unsigned char *subject, size_t subject_len, unsigned int flags) { const unsigned char *star = NULL; /* * Subject names starting with '.' can only match a wildcard pattern * via a subject sub-domain pattern suffix match. */ if (!(subject_len > 1 && subject[0] == '.')) star = valid_star(pattern, pattern_len, flags); if (star == NULL) return equal_nocase(pattern, pattern_len, subject, subject_len, flags); return wildcard_match(pattern, star - pattern, star + 1, (pattern + pattern_len) - star - 1, subject, subject_len, flags); } /* * Compare an ASN1_STRING to a supplied string. If they match return 1. If * cmp_type > 0 only compare if string matches the type, otherwise convert it * to UTF8. */ static int do_check_string(const ASN1_STRING *a, int cmp_type, equal_fn equal, unsigned int flags, const char *b, size_t blen, char **peername) { int rv = 0; if (!a->data || !a->length) return 0; if (cmp_type > 0) { if (cmp_type != a->type) return 0; if (cmp_type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING) rv = equal(a->data, a->length, (unsigned char *)b, blen, flags); else if (a->length == (int)blen && !memcmp(a->data, b, blen)) rv = 1; - if (rv > 0 && peername) + if (rv > 0 && peername != NULL) { *peername = OPENSSL_strndup((char *)a->data, a->length); + if (*peername == NULL) + return -1; + } } else { int astrlen; unsigned char *astr; astrlen = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&astr, a); if (astrlen < 0) { /* * -1 could be an internal malloc failure or a decoding error from * malformed input; we can't distinguish. */ return -1; } rv = equal(astr, astrlen, (unsigned char *)b, blen, flags); - if (rv > 0 && peername) + if (rv > 0 && peername != NULL) { *peername = OPENSSL_strndup((char *)astr, astrlen); + if (*peername == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(astr); + return -1; + } + } OPENSSL_free(astr); } return rv; } static int do_x509_check(X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen, unsigned int flags, int check_type, char **peername) { GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; X509_NAME *name = NULL; int i; int cnid = NID_undef; int alt_type; int san_present = 0; int rv = 0; equal_fn equal; /* See below, this flag is internal-only */ flags &= ~_X509_CHECK_FLAG_DOT_SUBDOMAINS; if (check_type == GEN_EMAIL) { cnid = NID_pkcs9_emailAddress; alt_type = V_ASN1_IA5STRING; equal = equal_email; } else if (check_type == GEN_DNS) { cnid = NID_commonName; /* Implicit client-side DNS sub-domain pattern */ if (chklen > 1 && chk[0] == '.') flags |= _X509_CHECK_FLAG_DOT_SUBDOMAINS; alt_type = V_ASN1_IA5STRING; if (flags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NO_WILDCARDS) equal = equal_nocase; else equal = equal_wildcard; } else { alt_type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; equal = equal_case; } if (chklen == 0) chklen = strlen(chk); gens = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); if (gens) { for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { GENERAL_NAME *gen; ASN1_STRING *cstr; gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); if (gen->type != check_type) continue; san_present = 1; if (check_type == GEN_EMAIL) cstr = gen->d.rfc822Name; else if (check_type == GEN_DNS) cstr = gen->d.dNSName; else cstr = gen->d.iPAddress; /* Positive on success, negative on error! */ if ((rv = do_check_string(cstr, alt_type, equal, flags, chk, chklen, peername)) != 0) break; } GENERAL_NAMES_free(gens); if (rv != 0) return rv; if (san_present && !(flags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT)) return 0; } /* We're done if CN-ID is not pertinent */ if (cnid == NID_undef || (flags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT)) return 0; i = -1; name = X509_get_subject_name(x); while ((i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(name, cnid, i)) >= 0) { const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(name, i); const ASN1_STRING *str = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne); /* Positive on success, negative on error! */ if ((rv = do_check_string(str, -1, equal, flags, chk, chklen, peername)) != 0) return rv; } return 0; } int X509_check_host(X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen, unsigned int flags, char **peername) { if (chk == NULL) return -2; /* * Embedded NULs are disallowed, except as the last character of a * string of length 2 or more (tolerate caller including terminating * NUL in string length). */ if (chklen == 0) chklen = strlen(chk); else if (memchr(chk, '\0', chklen > 1 ? chklen - 1 : chklen)) return -2; if (chklen > 1 && chk[chklen - 1] == '\0') --chklen; return do_x509_check(x, chk, chklen, flags, GEN_DNS, peername); } int X509_check_email(X509 *x, const char *chk, size_t chklen, unsigned int flags) { if (chk == NULL) return -2; /* * Embedded NULs are disallowed, except as the last character of a * string of length 2 or more (tolerate caller including terminating * NUL in string length). */ if (chklen == 0) chklen = strlen((char *)chk); else if (memchr(chk, '\0', chklen > 1 ? chklen - 1 : chklen)) return -2; if (chklen > 1 && chk[chklen - 1] == '\0') --chklen; return do_x509_check(x, chk, chklen, flags, GEN_EMAIL, NULL); } int X509_check_ip(X509 *x, const unsigned char *chk, size_t chklen, unsigned int flags) { if (chk == NULL) return -2; return do_x509_check(x, (char *)chk, chklen, flags, GEN_IPADD, NULL); } int X509_check_ip_asc(X509 *x, const char *ipasc, unsigned int flags) { unsigned char ipout[16]; size_t iplen; if (ipasc == NULL) return -2; iplen = (size_t)a2i_ipadd(ipout, ipasc); if (iplen == 0) return -2; return do_x509_check(x, (char *)ipout, iplen, flags, GEN_IPADD, NULL); } /* * Convert IP addresses both IPv4 and IPv6 into an OCTET STRING compatible * with RFC3280. */ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a2i_IPADDRESS(const char *ipasc) { unsigned char ipout[16]; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ret; int iplen; /* If string contains a ':' assume IPv6 */ iplen = a2i_ipadd(ipout, ipasc); if (!iplen) return NULL; ret = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ret, ipout, iplen)) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a2i_IPADDRESS_NC(const char *ipasc) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ret = NULL; unsigned char ipout[32]; char *iptmp = NULL, *p; int iplen1, iplen2; p = strchr(ipasc, '/'); if (!p) return NULL; iptmp = OPENSSL_strdup(ipasc); if (!iptmp) return NULL; p = iptmp + (p - ipasc); *p++ = 0; iplen1 = a2i_ipadd(ipout, iptmp); if (!iplen1) goto err; iplen2 = a2i_ipadd(ipout + iplen1, p); OPENSSL_free(iptmp); iptmp = NULL; if (!iplen2 || (iplen1 != iplen2)) goto err; ret = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new(); if (ret == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ret, ipout, iplen1 + iplen2)) goto err; return ret; err: OPENSSL_free(iptmp); ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret); return NULL; } int a2i_ipadd(unsigned char *ipout, const char *ipasc) { /* If string contains a ':' assume IPv6 */ if (strchr(ipasc, ':')) { if (!ipv6_from_asc(ipout, ipasc)) return 0; return 16; } else { if (!ipv4_from_asc(ipout, ipasc)) return 0; return 4; } } static int ipv4_from_asc(unsigned char *v4, const char *in) { int a0, a1, a2, a3; if (sscanf(in, "%d.%d.%d.%d", &a0, &a1, &a2, &a3) != 4) return 0; if ((a0 < 0) || (a0 > 255) || (a1 < 0) || (a1 > 255) || (a2 < 0) || (a2 > 255) || (a3 < 0) || (a3 > 255)) return 0; v4[0] = a0; v4[1] = a1; v4[2] = a2; v4[3] = a3; return 1; } typedef struct { /* Temporary store for IPV6 output */ unsigned char tmp[16]; /* Total number of bytes in tmp */ int total; /* The position of a zero (corresponding to '::') */ int zero_pos; /* Number of zeroes */ int zero_cnt; } IPV6_STAT; static int ipv6_from_asc(unsigned char *v6, const char *in) { IPV6_STAT v6stat; v6stat.total = 0; v6stat.zero_pos = -1; v6stat.zero_cnt = 0; /* * Treat the IPv6 representation as a list of values separated by ':'. * The presence of a '::' will parse as one, two or three zero length * elements. */ if (!CONF_parse_list(in, ':', 0, ipv6_cb, &v6stat)) return 0; /* Now for some sanity checks */ if (v6stat.zero_pos == -1) { /* If no '::' must have exactly 16 bytes */ if (v6stat.total != 16) return 0; } else { /* If '::' must have less than 16 bytes */ if (v6stat.total == 16) return 0; /* More than three zeroes is an error */ if (v6stat.zero_cnt > 3) return 0; /* Can only have three zeroes if nothing else present */ else if (v6stat.zero_cnt == 3) { if (v6stat.total > 0) return 0; } /* Can only have two zeroes if at start or end */ else if (v6stat.zero_cnt == 2) { if ((v6stat.zero_pos != 0) && (v6stat.zero_pos != v6stat.total)) return 0; } else /* Can only have one zero if *not* start or end */ { if ((v6stat.zero_pos == 0) || (v6stat.zero_pos == v6stat.total)) return 0; } } /* Format result */ if (v6stat.zero_pos >= 0) { /* Copy initial part */ memcpy(v6, v6stat.tmp, v6stat.zero_pos); /* Zero middle */ memset(v6 + v6stat.zero_pos, 0, 16 - v6stat.total); /* Copy final part */ if (v6stat.total != v6stat.zero_pos) memcpy(v6 + v6stat.zero_pos + 16 - v6stat.total, v6stat.tmp + v6stat.zero_pos, v6stat.total - v6stat.zero_pos); } else memcpy(v6, v6stat.tmp, 16); return 1; } static int ipv6_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *usr) { IPV6_STAT *s = usr; /* Error if 16 bytes written */ if (s->total == 16) return 0; if (len == 0) { /* Zero length element, corresponds to '::' */ if (s->zero_pos == -1) s->zero_pos = s->total; /* If we've already got a :: its an error */ else if (s->zero_pos != s->total) return 0; s->zero_cnt++; } else { /* If more than 4 characters could be final a.b.c.d form */ if (len > 4) { /* Need at least 4 bytes left */ if (s->total > 12) return 0; /* Must be end of string */ if (elem[len]) return 0; if (!ipv4_from_asc(s->tmp + s->total, elem)) return 0; s->total += 4; } else { if (!ipv6_hex(s->tmp + s->total, elem, len)) return 0; s->total += 2; } } return 1; } /* * Convert a string of up to 4 hex digits into the corresponding IPv6 form. */ static int ipv6_hex(unsigned char *out, const char *in, int inlen) { unsigned char c; unsigned int num = 0; int x; if (inlen > 4) return 0; while (inlen--) { c = *in++; num <<= 4; x = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(c); if (x < 0) return 0; num |= (char)x; } out[0] = num >> 8; out[1] = num & 0xff; return 1; } int X509V3_NAME_from_section(X509_NAME *nm, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *dn_sk, unsigned long chtype) { CONF_VALUE *v; int i, mval, spec_char, plus_char; char *p, *type; if (!nm) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(dn_sk); i++) { v = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(dn_sk, i); type = v->name; /* * Skip past any leading X. X: X, etc to allow for multiple instances */ for (p = type; *p; p++) { #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC spec_char = ((*p == ':') || (*p == ',') || (*p == '.')); #else spec_char = ((*p == os_toascii[':']) || (*p == os_toascii[',']) || (*p == os_toascii['.'])); #endif if (spec_char) { p++; if (*p) type = p; break; } } #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC plus_char = (*type == '+'); #else plus_char = (*type == os_toascii['+']); #endif if (plus_char) { mval = -1; type++; } else mval = 0; if (!X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, type, chtype, (unsigned char *)v->value, -1, -1, mval)) return 0; } return 1; } diff --git a/doc/man1/cms.pod b/doc/man1/cms.pod index 2caf3ef4d156..c30e834cfae7 100644 --- a/doc/man1/cms.pod +++ b/doc/man1/cms.pod @@ -1,745 +1,748 @@ =pod =head1 NAME openssl-cms, cms - CMS utility =head1 SYNOPSIS B B [B<-help>] [B<-encrypt>] [B<-decrypt>] [B<-sign>] [B<-verify>] [B<-cmsout>] [B<-resign>] [B<-data_create>] [B<-data_out>] [B<-digest_create>] [B<-digest_verify>] [B<-compress>] [B<-uncompress>] [B<-EncryptedData_encrypt>] [B<-sign_receipt>] [B<-verify_receipt receipt>] [B<-in filename>] [B<-inform SMIME|PEM|DER>] [B<-rctform SMIME|PEM|DER>] [B<-out filename>] [B<-outform SMIME|PEM|DER>] [B<-stream -indef -noindef>] [B<-noindef>] [B<-content filename>] [B<-text>] [B<-noout>] [B<-print>] [B<-CAfile file>] [B<-CApath dir>] [B<-no-CAfile>] [B<-no-CApath>] [B<-attime timestamp>] [B<-check_ss_sig>] [B<-crl_check>] [B<-crl_check_all>] [B<-explicit_policy>] [B<-extended_crl>] [B<-ignore_critical>] [B<-inhibit_any>] [B<-inhibit_map>] [B<-no_check_time>] [B<-partial_chain>] [B<-policy arg>] [B<-policy_check>] [B<-policy_print>] [B<-purpose purpose>] [B<-suiteB_128>] [B<-suiteB_128_only>] [B<-suiteB_192>] [B<-trusted_first>] [B<-no_alt_chains>] [B<-use_deltas>] [B<-auth_level num>] [B<-verify_depth num>] [B<-verify_email email>] [B<-verify_hostname hostname>] [B<-verify_ip ip>] [B<-verify_name name>] [B<-x509_strict>] [B<-md digest>] [B<-I>] [B<-nointern>] [B<-noverify>] [B<-nocerts>] [B<-noattr>] [B<-nosmimecap>] [B<-binary>] [B<-crlfeol>] [B<-asciicrlf>] [B<-nodetach>] [B<-certfile file>] [B<-certsout file>] [B<-signer file>] [B<-recip file>] [B<-keyid>] [B<-receipt_request_all>] [B<-receipt_request_first>] [B<-receipt_request_from emailaddress>] [B<-receipt_request_to emailaddress>] [B<-receipt_request_print>] [B<-secretkey key>] [B<-secretkeyid id>] [B<-econtent_type type>] [B<-inkey file>] [B<-keyopt name:parameter>] [B<-passin arg>] [B<-rand file...>] [B<-writerand file>] [B] [B<-to addr>] [B<-from addr>] [B<-subject subj>] [cert.pem]... =head1 DESCRIPTION The B command handles S/MIME v3.1 mail. It can encrypt, decrypt, sign and verify, compress and uncompress S/MIME messages. =head1 OPTIONS There are fourteen operation options that set the type of operation to be performed. The meaning of the other options varies according to the operation type. =over 4 =item B<-help> Print out a usage message. =item B<-encrypt> Encrypt mail for the given recipient certificates. Input file is the message to be encrypted. The output file is the encrypted mail in MIME format. The actual CMS type is EnvelopedData. Note that no revocation check is done for the recipient cert, so if that key has been compromised, others may be able to decrypt the text. =item B<-decrypt> Decrypt mail using the supplied certificate and private key. Expects an encrypted mail message in MIME format for the input file. The decrypted mail is written to the output file. =item B<-debug_decrypt> This option sets the B flag. This option should be used with caution: see the notes section below. =item B<-sign> Sign mail using the supplied certificate and private key. Input file is the message to be signed. The signed message in MIME format is written to the output file. =item B<-verify> Verify signed mail. Expects a signed mail message on input and outputs the signed data. Both clear text and opaque signing is supported. =item B<-cmsout> Takes an input message and writes out a PEM encoded CMS structure. =item B<-resign> Resign a message: take an existing message and one or more new signers. =item B<-data_create> Create a CMS B type. =item B<-data_out> B type and output the content. =item B<-digest_create> Create a CMS B type. =item B<-digest_verify> Verify a CMS B type and output the content. =item B<-compress> Create a CMS B type. OpenSSL must be compiled with B support for this option to work, otherwise it will output an error. =item B<-uncompress> Uncompress a CMS B type and output the content. OpenSSL must be compiled with B support for this option to work, otherwise it will output an error. =item B<-EncryptedData_encrypt> Encrypt content using supplied symmetric key and algorithm using a CMS B type and output the content. =item B<-sign_receipt> Generate and output a signed receipt for the supplied message. The input message B contain a signed receipt request. Functionality is otherwise similar to the B<-sign> operation. =item B<-verify_receipt receipt> Verify a signed receipt in filename B. The input message B contain the original receipt request. Functionality is otherwise similar to the B<-verify> operation. =item B<-in filename> The input message to be encrypted or signed or the message to be decrypted or verified. =item B<-inform SMIME|PEM|DER> This specifies the input format for the CMS structure. The default is B which reads an S/MIME format message. B and B format change this to expect PEM and DER format CMS structures instead. This currently only affects the input format of the CMS structure, if no CMS structure is being input (for example with B<-encrypt> or B<-sign>) this option has no effect. =item B<-rctform SMIME|PEM|DER> Specify the format for a signed receipt for use with the B<-receipt_verify> operation. =item B<-out filename> The message text that has been decrypted or verified or the output MIME format message that has been signed or verified. =item B<-outform SMIME|PEM|DER> This specifies the output format for the CMS structure. The default is B which writes an S/MIME format message. B and B format change this to write PEM and DER format CMS structures instead. This currently only affects the output format of the CMS structure, if no CMS structure is being output (for example with B<-verify> or B<-decrypt>) this option has no effect. =item B<-stream -indef -noindef> The B<-stream> and B<-indef> options are equivalent and enable streaming I/O for encoding operations. This permits single pass processing of data without the need to hold the entire contents in memory, potentially supporting very large files. Streaming is automatically set for S/MIME signing with detached data if the output format is B it is currently off by default for all other operations. =item B<-noindef> Disable streaming I/O where it would produce and indefinite length constructed encoding. This option currently has no effect. In future streaming will be enabled by default on all relevant operations and this option will disable it. =item B<-content filename> This specifies a file containing the detached content, this is only useful with the B<-verify> command. This is only usable if the CMS structure is using the detached signature form where the content is not included. This option will override any content if the input format is S/MIME and it uses the multipart/signed MIME content type. =item B<-text> This option adds plain text (text/plain) MIME headers to the supplied message if encrypting or signing. If decrypting or verifying it strips off text headers: if the decrypted or verified message is not of MIME type text/plain then an error occurs. =item B<-noout> For the B<-cmsout> operation do not output the parsed CMS structure. This is useful when combined with the B<-print> option or if the syntax of the CMS structure is being checked. =item B<-print> For the B<-cmsout> operation print out all fields of the CMS structure. This is mainly useful for testing purposes. =item B<-CAfile file> A file containing trusted CA certificates, only used with B<-verify>. =item B<-CApath dir> A directory containing trusted CA certificates, only used with B<-verify>. This directory must be a standard certificate directory: that is a hash of each subject name (using B) should be linked to each certificate. =item B<-no-CAfile> Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default file location =item B<-no-CApath> Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default directory location =item B<-md digest> Digest algorithm to use when signing or resigning. If not present then the default digest algorithm for the signing key will be used (usually SHA1). =item B<-I> The encryption algorithm to use. For example triple DES (168 bits) - B<-des3> or 256 bit AES - B<-aes256>. Any standard algorithm name (as used by the EVP_get_cipherbyname() function) can also be used preceded by a dash, for example B<-aes-128-cbc>. See L for a list of ciphers supported by your version of OpenSSL. If not specified triple DES is used. Only used with B<-encrypt> and B<-EncryptedData_create> commands. =item B<-nointern> When verifying a message normally certificates (if any) included in the message are searched for the signing certificate. With this option only the certificates specified in the B<-certfile> option are used. The supplied certificates can still be used as untrusted CAs however. =item B<-noverify> Do not verify the signers certificate of a signed message. =item B<-nocerts> When signing a message the signer's certificate is normally included with this option it is excluded. This will reduce the size of the signed message but the verifier must have a copy of the signers certificate available locally (passed using the B<-certfile> option for example). =item B<-noattr> Normally when a message is signed a set of attributes are included which include the signing time and supported symmetric algorithms. With this option they are not included. =item B<-nosmimecap> Exclude the list of supported algorithms from signed attributes, other options such as signing time and content type are still included. =item B<-binary> Normally the input message is converted to "canonical" format which is effectively using CR and LF as end of line: as required by the S/MIME specification. When this option is present no translation occurs. This is useful when handling binary data which may not be in MIME format. =item B<-crlfeol> Normally the output file uses a single B as end of line. When this option is present B is used instead. =item B<-asciicrlf> When signing use ASCII CRLF format canonicalisation. This strips trailing whitespace from all lines, deletes trailing blank lines at EOF and sets the encapsulated content type. This option is normally used with detached content and an output signature format of DER. This option is not normally needed when verifying as it is enabled automatically if the encapsulated content format is detected. =item B<-nodetach> When signing a message use opaque signing: this form is more resistant to translation by mail relays but it cannot be read by mail agents that do not support S/MIME. Without this option cleartext signing with the MIME type multipart/signed is used. =item B<-certfile file> Allows additional certificates to be specified. When signing these will be included with the message. When verifying these will be searched for the signers certificates. The certificates should be in PEM format. =item B<-certsout file> Any certificates contained in the message are written to B. =item B<-signer file> A signing certificate when signing or resigning a message, this option can be used multiple times if more than one signer is required. If a message is being verified then the signers certificates will be written to this file if the verification was successful. =item B<-recip file> When decrypting a message this specifies the recipients certificate. The certificate must match one of the recipients of the message or an error occurs. When encrypting a message this option may be used multiple times to specify each recipient. This form B be used if customised parameters are required (for example to specify RSA-OAEP). Only certificates carrying RSA, Diffie-Hellman or EC keys are supported by this option. =item B<-keyid> Use subject key identifier to identify certificates instead of issuer name and serial number. The supplied certificate B include a subject key identifier extension. Supported by B<-sign> and B<-encrypt> options. =item B<-receipt_request_all>, B<-receipt_request_first> For B<-sign> option include a signed receipt request. Indicate requests should be provided by all recipient or first tier recipients (those mailed directly and not from a mailing list). Ignored it B<-receipt_request_from> is included. =item B<-receipt_request_from emailaddress> For B<-sign> option include a signed receipt request. Add an explicit email address where receipts should be supplied. =item B<-receipt_request_to emailaddress> Add an explicit email address where signed receipts should be sent to. This option B but supplied if a signed receipt it requested. =item B<-receipt_request_print> For the B<-verify> operation print out the contents of any signed receipt requests. =item B<-secretkey key> Specify symmetric key to use. The key must be supplied in hex format and be consistent with the algorithm used. Supported by the B<-EncryptedData_encrypt> B<-EncryptedData_decrypt>, B<-encrypt> and B<-decrypt> options. When used with B<-encrypt> or B<-decrypt> the supplied key is used to wrap or unwrap the content encryption key using an AES key in the B type. =item B<-secretkeyid id> The key identifier for the supplied symmetric key for B type. This option B be present if the B<-secretkey> option is used with B<-encrypt>. With B<-decrypt> operations the B is used to locate the relevant key if it is not supplied then an attempt is used to decrypt any B structures. =item B<-econtent_type type> Set the encapsulated content type to B if not supplied the B type is used. The B argument can be any valid OID name in either text or numerical format. =item B<-inkey file> The private key to use when signing or decrypting. This must match the corresponding certificate. If this option is not specified then the private key must be included in the certificate file specified with the B<-recip> or B<-signer> file. When signing this option can be used multiple times to specify successive keys. =item B<-keyopt name:opt> For signing and encryption this option can be used multiple times to set customised parameters for the preceding key or certificate. It can currently be used to set RSA-PSS for signing, RSA-OAEP for encryption or to modify default parameters for ECDH. =item B<-passin arg> The private key password source. For more information about the format of B see L. =item B<-rand file...> A file or files containing random data used to seed the random number generator. Multiple files can be specified separated by an OS-dependent character. The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for all others. =item [B<-writerand file>] Writes random data to the specified I upon exit. This can be used with a subsequent B<-rand> flag. =item B One or more certificates of message recipients: used when encrypting a message. =item B<-to, -from, -subject> The relevant mail headers. These are included outside the signed portion of a message so they may be included manually. If signing then many S/MIME mail clients check the signers certificate's email address matches that specified in the From: address. =item B<-attime>, B<-check_ss_sig>, B<-crl_check>, B<-crl_check_all>, B<-explicit_policy>, B<-extended_crl>, B<-ignore_critical>, B<-inhibit_any>, B<-inhibit_map>, B<-no_alt_chains>, B<-no_check_time>, B<-partial_chain>, B<-policy>, B<-policy_check>, B<-policy_print>, B<-purpose>, B<-suiteB_128>, B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_192>, B<-trusted_first>, B<-use_deltas>, B<-auth_level>, B<-verify_depth>, B<-verify_email>, B<-verify_hostname>, B<-verify_ip>, B<-verify_name>, B<-x509_strict> Set various certificate chain validation options. See the L manual page for details. =back =head1 NOTES The MIME message must be sent without any blank lines between the headers and the output. Some mail programs will automatically add a blank line. Piping the mail directly to sendmail is one way to achieve the correct format. The supplied message to be signed or encrypted must include the necessary MIME headers or many S/MIME clients won't display it properly (if at all). You can use the B<-text> option to automatically add plain text headers. A "signed and encrypted" message is one where a signed message is then encrypted. This can be produced by encrypting an already signed message: see the examples section. This version of the program only allows one signer per message but it will verify multiple signers on received messages. Some S/MIME clients choke if a message contains multiple signers. It is possible to sign messages "in parallel" by signing an already signed message. The options B<-encrypt> and B<-decrypt> reflect common usage in S/MIME clients. Strictly speaking these process CMS enveloped data: CMS encrypted data is used for other purposes. The B<-resign> option uses an existing message digest when adding a new signer. This means that attributes must be present in at least one existing signer using the same message digest or this operation will fail. The B<-stream> and B<-indef> options enable streaming I/O support. As a result the encoding is BER using indefinite length constructed encoding and no longer DER. Streaming is supported for the B<-encrypt> operation and the B<-sign> operation if the content is not detached. Streaming is always used for the B<-sign> operation with detached data but since the content is no longer part of the CMS structure the encoding remains DER. If the B<-decrypt> option is used without a recipient certificate then an attempt is made to locate the recipient by trying each potential recipient in turn using the supplied private key. To thwart the MMA attack (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) all recipients are tried whether they succeed or not and if no recipients match the message is "decrypted" using a random key which will typically output garbage. The B<-debug_decrypt> option can be used to disable the MMA attack protection and return an error if no recipient can be found: this option should be used with caution. For a fuller description see L). =head1 EXIT CODES =over 4 =item Z<>0 The operation was completely successfully. =item Z<>1 An error occurred parsing the command options. =item Z<>2 One of the input files could not be read. =item Z<>3 An error occurred creating the CMS file or when reading the MIME message. =item Z<>4 An error occurred decrypting or verifying the message. =item Z<>5 The message was verified correctly but an error occurred writing out the signers certificates. =back =head1 COMPATIBILITY WITH PKCS#7 format. The B utility can only process the older B format. The B utility supports Cryptographic Message Syntax format. Use of some features will result in messages which cannot be processed by applications which only support the older format. These are detailed below. The use of the B<-keyid> option with B<-sign> or B<-encrypt>. The B<-outform PEM> option uses different headers. The B<-compress> option. The B<-secretkey> option when used with B<-encrypt>. The use of PSS with B<-sign>. The use of OAEP or non-RSA keys with B<-encrypt>. Additionally the B<-EncryptedData_create> and B<-data_create> type cannot be processed by the older B command. =head1 EXAMPLES Create a cleartext signed message: openssl cms -sign -in message.txt -text -out mail.msg \ -signer mycert.pem Create an opaque signed message openssl cms -sign -in message.txt -text -out mail.msg -nodetach \ -signer mycert.pem Create a signed message, include some additional certificates and read the private key from another file: openssl cms -sign -in in.txt -text -out mail.msg \ -signer mycert.pem -inkey mykey.pem -certfile mycerts.pem Create a signed message with two signers, use key identifier: openssl cms -sign -in message.txt -text -out mail.msg \ -signer mycert.pem -signer othercert.pem -keyid Send a signed message under Unix directly to sendmail, including headers: openssl cms -sign -in in.txt -text -signer mycert.pem \ -from steve@openssl.org -to someone@somewhere \ -subject "Signed message" | sendmail someone@somewhere Verify a message and extract the signer's certificate if successful: openssl cms -verify -in mail.msg -signer user.pem -out signedtext.txt Send encrypted mail using triple DES: openssl cms -encrypt -in in.txt -from steve@openssl.org \ -to someone@somewhere -subject "Encrypted message" \ -des3 user.pem -out mail.msg Sign and encrypt mail: openssl cms -sign -in ml.txt -signer my.pem -text \ | openssl cms -encrypt -out mail.msg \ -from steve@openssl.org -to someone@somewhere \ -subject "Signed and Encrypted message" -des3 user.pem Note: the encryption command does not include the B<-text> option because the message being encrypted already has MIME headers. Decrypt mail: openssl cms -decrypt -in mail.msg -recip mycert.pem -inkey key.pem The output from Netscape form signing is a PKCS#7 structure with the detached signature format. You can use this program to verify the signature by line wrapping the base64 encoded structure and surrounding it with: -----BEGIN PKCS7----- -----END PKCS7----- and using the command, openssl cms -verify -inform PEM -in signature.pem -content content.txt alternatively you can base64 decode the signature and use openssl cms -verify -inform DER -in signature.der -content content.txt Create an encrypted message using 128 bit Camellia: openssl cms -encrypt -in plain.txt -camellia128 -out mail.msg cert.pem Add a signer to an existing message: openssl cms -resign -in mail.msg -signer newsign.pem -out mail2.msg Sign mail using RSA-PSS: openssl cms -sign -in message.txt -text -out mail.msg \ -signer mycert.pem -keyopt rsa_padding_mode:pss Create encrypted mail using RSA-OAEP: openssl cms -encrypt -in plain.txt -out mail.msg \ -recip cert.pem -keyopt rsa_padding_mode:oaep Use SHA256 KDF with an ECDH certificate: openssl cms -encrypt -in plain.txt -out mail.msg \ -recip ecdhcert.pem -keyopt ecdh_kdf_md:sha256 =head1 BUGS The MIME parser isn't very clever: it seems to handle most messages that I've thrown at it but it may choke on others. The code currently will only write out the signer's certificate to a file: if the signer has a separate encryption certificate this must be manually extracted. There should be some heuristic that determines the correct encryption certificate. Ideally a database should be maintained of a certificates for each email address. The code doesn't currently take note of the permitted symmetric encryption algorithms as supplied in the SMIMECapabilities signed attribute. this means the user has to manually include the correct encryption algorithm. It should store the list of permitted ciphers in a database and only use those. No revocation checking is done on the signer's certificate. +The B<-binary> option does not work correctly when processing text input which +(contrary to the S/MIME specification) uses LF rather than CRLF line endings. + =head1 HISTORY The use of multiple B<-signer> options and the B<-resign> command were first added in OpenSSL 1.0.0. The B option was added in OpenSSL 1.0.2. Support for RSA-OAEP and RSA-PSS was added in OpenSSL 1.0.2. The use of non-RSA keys with B<-encrypt> and B<-decrypt> was added in OpenSSL 1.0.2. The -no_alt_chains option was added in OpenSSL 1.0.2b. =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2008-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2008-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut diff --git a/doc/man3/BIO_ctrl.pod b/doc/man3/BIO_ctrl.pod index 2e438c3ce952..cf6ba135dfe9 100644 --- a/doc/man3/BIO_ctrl.pod +++ b/doc/man3/BIO_ctrl.pod @@ -1,136 +1,136 @@ =pod =head1 NAME BIO_ctrl, BIO_callback_ctrl, BIO_ptr_ctrl, BIO_int_ctrl, BIO_reset, BIO_seek, BIO_tell, BIO_flush, BIO_eof, BIO_set_close, BIO_get_close, BIO_pending, BIO_wpending, BIO_ctrl_pending, BIO_ctrl_wpending, BIO_get_info_callback, BIO_set_info_callback, BIO_info_cb - BIO control operations =head1 SYNOPSIS #include typedef int BIO_info_cb(BIO *b, int state, int res); long BIO_ctrl(BIO *bp, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long BIO_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *cb); - char *BIO_ptr_ctrl(BIO *bp, int cmd, long larg); + void *BIO_ptr_ctrl(BIO *bp, int cmd, long larg); long BIO_int_ctrl(BIO *bp, int cmd, long larg, int iarg); int BIO_reset(BIO *b); int BIO_seek(BIO *b, int ofs); int BIO_tell(BIO *b); int BIO_flush(BIO *b); int BIO_eof(BIO *b); int BIO_set_close(BIO *b, long flag); int BIO_get_close(BIO *b); int BIO_pending(BIO *b); int BIO_wpending(BIO *b); size_t BIO_ctrl_pending(BIO *b); size_t BIO_ctrl_wpending(BIO *b); int BIO_get_info_callback(BIO *b, BIO_info_cb **cbp); int BIO_set_info_callback(BIO *b, BIO_info_cb *cb); =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_ctrl(), BIO_callback_ctrl(), BIO_ptr_ctrl() and BIO_int_ctrl() are BIO "control" operations taking arguments of various types. These functions are not normally called directly, various macros are used instead. The standard macros are described below, macros specific to a particular type of BIO are described in the specific BIOs manual page as well as any special features of the standard calls. BIO_reset() typically resets a BIO to some initial state, in the case of file related BIOs for example it rewinds the file pointer to the start of the file. BIO_seek() resets a file related BIO's (that is file descriptor and FILE BIOs) file position pointer to B bytes from start of file. BIO_tell() returns the current file position of a file related BIO. BIO_flush() normally writes out any internally buffered data, in some cases it is used to signal EOF and that no more data will be written. BIO_eof() returns 1 if the BIO has read EOF, the precise meaning of "EOF" varies according to the BIO type. BIO_set_close() sets the BIO B close flag to B. B can take the value BIO_CLOSE or BIO_NOCLOSE. Typically BIO_CLOSE is used in a source/sink BIO to indicate that the underlying I/O stream should be closed when the BIO is freed. BIO_get_close() returns the BIOs close flag. BIO_pending(), BIO_ctrl_pending(), BIO_wpending() and BIO_ctrl_wpending() return the number of pending characters in the BIOs read and write buffers. Not all BIOs support these calls. BIO_ctrl_pending() and BIO_ctrl_wpending() return a size_t type and are functions, BIO_pending() and BIO_wpending() are macros which call BIO_ctrl(). =head1 RETURN VALUES BIO_reset() normally returns 1 for success and 0 or -1 for failure. File BIOs are an exception, they return 0 for success and -1 for failure. BIO_seek() and BIO_tell() both return the current file position on success and -1 for failure, except file BIOs which for BIO_seek() always return 0 for success and -1 for failure. BIO_flush() returns 1 for success and 0 or -1 for failure. BIO_eof() returns 1 if EOF has been reached 0 otherwise. BIO_set_close() always returns 1. BIO_get_close() returns the close flag value: BIO_CLOSE or BIO_NOCLOSE. BIO_pending(), BIO_ctrl_pending(), BIO_wpending() and BIO_ctrl_wpending() return the amount of pending data. =head1 NOTES BIO_flush(), because it can write data may return 0 or -1 indicating that the call should be retried later in a similar manner to BIO_write_ex(). The BIO_should_retry() call should be used and appropriate action taken is the call fails. The return values of BIO_pending() and BIO_wpending() may not reliably determine the amount of pending data in all cases. For example in the case of a file BIO some data may be available in the FILE structures internal buffers but it is not possible to determine this in a portably way. For other types of BIO they may not be supported. Filter BIOs if they do not internally handle a particular BIO_ctrl() operation usually pass the operation to the next BIO in the chain. This often means there is no need to locate the required BIO for a particular operation, it can be called on a chain and it will be automatically passed to the relevant BIO. However, this can cause unexpected results: for example no current filter BIOs implement BIO_seek(), but this may still succeed if the chain ends in a FILE or file descriptor BIO. Source/sink BIOs return an 0 if they do not recognize the BIO_ctrl() operation. =head1 BUGS Some of the return values are ambiguous and care should be taken. In particular a return value of 0 can be returned if an operation is not supported, if an error occurred, if EOF has not been reached and in the case of BIO_seek() on a file BIO for a successful operation. =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut diff --git a/doc/man3/BIO_f_base64.pod b/doc/man3/BIO_f_base64.pod index 5097c2849ba1..c2c5309a6017 100644 --- a/doc/man3/BIO_f_base64.pod +++ b/doc/man3/BIO_f_base64.pod @@ -1,91 +1,104 @@ =pod =head1 NAME BIO_f_base64 - base64 BIO filter =head1 SYNOPSIS =for comment multiple includes #include #include const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_base64(void); =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_f_base64() returns the base64 BIO method. This is a filter BIO that base64 encodes any data written through it and decodes any data read through it. Base64 BIOs do not support BIO_gets() or BIO_puts(). +For writing, output is by default divided to lines of length 64 +characters and there is always a newline at the end of output. + +For reading, first line should be at most 1024 +characters long. If it is longer then it is ignored completely. +Other input lines can be of any length. There must be a newline +at the end of input. + +This behavior can be changed with BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL flag. + BIO_flush() on a base64 BIO that is being written through is used to signal that no more data is to be encoded: this is used to flush the final block through the BIO. -The flag BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL can be set with BIO_set_flags() -to encode the data all on one line or expect the data to be all -on one line. +The flag BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL can be set with BIO_set_flags(). +For writing, it causes all data to be written on one line without +newline at the end. +For reading, it forces the decoder to process the data regardless +of newlines. All newlines are ignored and the input does not need +to contain any newline at all. =head1 NOTES Because of the format of base64 encoding the end of the encoded block cannot always be reliably determined. =head1 RETURN VALUES BIO_f_base64() returns the base64 BIO method. =head1 EXAMPLES Base64 encode the string "Hello World\n" and write the result to standard output: BIO *bio, *b64; char message[] = "Hello World \n"; b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64()); bio = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); BIO_push(b64, bio); BIO_write(b64, message, strlen(message)); BIO_flush(b64); BIO_free_all(b64); Read Base64 encoded data from standard input and write the decoded data to standard output: BIO *bio, *b64, *bio_out; char inbuf[512]; int inlen; b64 = BIO_new(BIO_f_base64()); bio = BIO_new_fp(stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE); bio_out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); BIO_push(b64, bio); while ((inlen = BIO_read(b64, inbuf, 512)) > 0) BIO_write(bio_out, inbuf, inlen); BIO_flush(bio_out); BIO_free_all(b64); =head1 BUGS The ambiguity of EOF in base64 encoded data can cause additional data following the base64 encoded block to be misinterpreted. There should be some way of specifying a test that the BIO can perform to reliably determine EOF (for example a MIME boundary). =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut diff --git a/doc/man3/BN_add.pod b/doc/man3/BN_add.pod index dccd4790ede7..a4912fbab1d5 100644 --- a/doc/man3/BN_add.pod +++ b/doc/man3/BN_add.pod @@ -1,129 +1,140 @@ =pod =head1 NAME BN_add, BN_sub, BN_mul, BN_sqr, BN_div, BN_mod, BN_nnmod, BN_mod_add, -BN_mod_sub, BN_mod_mul, BN_mod_sqr, BN_exp, BN_mod_exp, BN_gcd - +BN_mod_sub, BN_mod_mul, BN_mod_sqr, BN_mod_sqrt, BN_exp, BN_mod_exp, BN_gcd - arithmetic operations on BIGNUMs =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int BN_add(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); int BN_sub(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b); int BN_mul(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_sqr(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *d, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod(BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_nnmod(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_add(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_sub(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_mul(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); + BIGNUM *BN_mod_sqrt(BIGNUM *in, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); + int BN_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); int BN_gcd(BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION BN_add() adds I and I and places the result in I (C). I may be the same B as I or I. BN_sub() subtracts I from I and places the result in I (C). I may be the same B as I or I. BN_mul() multiplies I and I and places the result in I (C). I may be the same B as I or I. For multiplication by powers of 2, use L. BN_sqr() takes the square of I and places the result in I (C). I and I may be the same B. This function is faster than BN_mul(r,a,a). BN_div() divides I by I and places the result in I and the remainder in I (C). Either of I and I may be B, in which case the respective value is not returned. The result is rounded towards zero; thus if I is negative, the remainder will be zero or negative. For division by powers of 2, use BN_rshift(3). BN_mod() corresponds to BN_div() with I set to B. BN_nnmod() reduces I modulo I and places the nonnegative remainder in I. BN_mod_add() adds I to I modulo I and places the nonnegative result in I. BN_mod_sub() subtracts I from I modulo I and places the nonnegative result in I. BN_mod_mul() multiplies I by I and finds the nonnegative remainder respective to modulus I (C). I may be the same B as I or I. For more efficient algorithms for repeated computations using the same modulus, see L and L. BN_mod_sqr() takes the square of I modulo B and places the result in I. +BN_mod_sqrt() returns the modular square root of I such that +C. The modulus I

must be a +prime, otherwise an error or an incorrect "result" will be returned. +The result is stored into I which can be NULL. The result will be +newly allocated in that case. + BN_exp() raises I to the I

-th power and places the result in I (C). This function is faster than repeated applications of BN_mul(). BN_mod_exp() computes I to the I

-th power modulo I (C). This function uses less time and space than BN_exp(). Do not call this function when B is even and any of the parameters have the B flag set. BN_gcd() computes the greatest common divisor of I and I and places the result in I. I may be the same B as I or I. For all functions, I is a previously allocated B used for temporary variables; see L. Unless noted otherwise, the result B must be different from the arguments. =head1 RETURN VALUES -For all functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error. The return +The BN_mod_sqrt() returns the result (possibly incorrect if I

is +not a prime), or NULL. + +For all remaining functions, 1 is returned for success, 0 on error. The return value should always be checked (e.g., C). The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut diff --git a/doc/man3/DEFINE_STACK_OF.pod b/doc/man3/DEFINE_STACK_OF.pod index 43a3214d584a..6f4ac7ec0ef0 100644 --- a/doc/man3/DEFINE_STACK_OF.pod +++ b/doc/man3/DEFINE_STACK_OF.pod @@ -1,271 +1,272 @@ =pod =head1 NAME DEFINE_STACK_OF, DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST, DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF, DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST, sk_TYPE_num, sk_TYPE_value, sk_TYPE_new, sk_TYPE_new_null, sk_TYPE_reserve, sk_TYPE_free, sk_TYPE_zero, sk_TYPE_delete, sk_TYPE_delete_ptr, sk_TYPE_push, sk_TYPE_unshift, sk_TYPE_pop, sk_TYPE_shift, sk_TYPE_pop_free, sk_TYPE_insert, sk_TYPE_set, sk_TYPE_find, sk_TYPE_find_ex, sk_TYPE_sort, sk_TYPE_is_sorted, sk_TYPE_dup, sk_TYPE_deep_copy, sk_TYPE_set_cmp_func, sk_TYPE_new_reserve - stack container =head1 SYNOPSIS =for comment generic #include STACK_OF(TYPE) DEFINE_STACK_OF(TYPE) DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(TYPE) DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF(FUNCTYPE, TYPE) DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST(FUNCTYPE, TYPE) typedef int (*sk_TYPE_compfunc)(const TYPE *const *a, const TYPE *const *b); typedef TYPE * (*sk_TYPE_copyfunc)(const TYPE *a); typedef void (*sk_TYPE_freefunc)(TYPE *a); int sk_TYPE_num(const STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk); TYPE *sk_TYPE_value(const STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, int idx); STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk_TYPE_new(sk_TYPE_compfunc compare); STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk_TYPE_new_null(void); int sk_TYPE_reserve(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, int n); void sk_TYPE_free(const STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk); void sk_TYPE_zero(const STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk); TYPE *sk_TYPE_delete(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, int i); TYPE *sk_TYPE_delete_ptr(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, TYPE *ptr); int sk_TYPE_push(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, const TYPE *ptr); int sk_TYPE_unshift(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, const TYPE *ptr); TYPE *sk_TYPE_pop(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk); TYPE *sk_TYPE_shift(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk); void sk_TYPE_pop_free(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, sk_TYPE_freefunc freefunc); int sk_TYPE_insert(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, TYPE *ptr, int idx); TYPE *sk_TYPE_set(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, int idx, const TYPE *ptr); int sk_TYPE_find(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, TYPE *ptr); int sk_TYPE_find_ex(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, TYPE *ptr); void sk_TYPE_sort(const STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk); int sk_TYPE_is_sorted(const STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk); STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk_TYPE_dup(const STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk); STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk_TYPE_deep_copy(const STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, sk_TYPE_copyfunc copyfunc, sk_TYPE_freefunc freefunc); sk_TYPE_compfunc (*sk_TYPE_set_cmp_func(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, sk_TYPE_compfunc compare)); STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk_TYPE_new_reserve(sk_TYPE_compfunc compare, int n); =head1 DESCRIPTION Applications can create and use their own stacks by placing any of the macros described below in a header file. These macros define typesafe inline functions that wrap around the utility B API. In the description here, I is used as a placeholder for any of the OpenSSL datatypes, such as I. STACK_OF() returns the name for a stack of the specified B. DEFINE_STACK_OF() creates set of functions for a stack of B. This will mean that type B is stored in each stack, the type is referenced by STACK_OF(TYPE) and each function name begins with I. For example: TYPE *sk_TYPE_value(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, int idx); DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST() is identical to DEFINE_STACK_OF() except each element is constant. For example: const TYPE *sk_TYPE_value(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, int idx); DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF() defines a stack of B but each function uses B in the function name. For example: TYPE *sk_FUNCNAME_value(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, int idx); DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF_CONST() is similar except that each element is constant: const TYPE *sk_FUNCNAME_value(STACK_OF(TYPE) *sk, int idx); sk_TYPE_num() returns the number of elements in B or -1 if B is B. sk_TYPE_value() returns element B in B, where B starts at zero. If B is out of range then B is returned. sk_TYPE_new() allocates a new empty stack using comparison function B. If B is B then no comparison function is used. This function is equivalent to sk_TYPE_new_reserve(compare, 0). sk_TYPE_new_null() allocates a new empty stack with no comparison function. This function is equivalent to sk_TYPE_new_reserve(NULL, 0). sk_TYPE_reserve() allocates additional memory in the B structure such that the next B calls to sk_TYPE_insert(), sk_TYPE_push() or sk_TYPE_unshift() will not fail or cause memory to be allocated or reallocated. If B is zero, any excess space allocated in the B structure is freed. On error B is unchanged. sk_TYPE_new_reserve() allocates a new stack. The new stack will have additional memory allocated to hold B elements if B is positive. The next B calls to sk_TYPE_insert(), sk_TYPE_push() or sk_TYPE_unshift() will not fail or cause memory to be allocated or reallocated. If B is zero or less than zero, no memory is allocated. sk_TYPE_new_reserve() also sets the comparison function B to the newly created stack. If B is B then no comparison function is used. sk_TYPE_set_cmp_func() sets the comparison function of B to B. The previous comparison function is returned or B if there was no previous comparison function. sk_TYPE_free() frees up the B structure. It does B free up any elements of B. After this call B is no longer valid. sk_TYPE_zero() sets the number of elements in B to zero. It does not free B so after this call B is still valid. sk_TYPE_pop_free() frees up all elements of B and B itself. The free function freefunc() is called on each element to free it. sk_TYPE_delete() deletes element B from B. It returns the deleted element or B if B is out of range. sk_TYPE_delete_ptr() deletes element matching B from B. It returns the deleted element or B if no element matching B was found. sk_TYPE_insert() inserts B into B at position B. Any existing elements at or after B are moved downwards. If B is out of range the new element is appended to B. sk_TYPE_insert() either returns the number of elements in B after the new element is inserted or zero if an error (such as memory allocation failure) occurred. sk_TYPE_push() appends B to B it is equivalent to: sk_TYPE_insert(sk, ptr, -1); sk_TYPE_unshift() inserts B at the start of B it is equivalent to: sk_TYPE_insert(sk, ptr, 0); sk_TYPE_pop() returns and removes the last element from B. sk_TYPE_shift() returns and removes the first element from B. sk_TYPE_set() sets element B of B to B replacing the current element. The new element value is returned or B if an error occurred: this will only happen if B is B or B is out of range. sk_TYPE_find() searches B for the element B. In the case where no comparison function has been specified, the function performs a linear search for a pointer equal to B. The index of the first matching element is returned or B<-1> if there is no match. In the case where a comparison function has been specified, B is sorted then sk_TYPE_find() returns the index of a matching element or B<-1> if there is no match. Note that, in this case, the matching element returned is not guaranteed to be the first; the comparison function will usually compare the values pointed to rather than the pointers themselves and the order of elements in B could change. sk_TYPE_find_ex() operates like sk_TYPE_find() except when a comparison function has been specified and no matching element is found. Instead of returning B<-1>, sk_TYPE_find_ex() returns the index of the element either before or after the location where B would be if it were present in B. sk_TYPE_sort() sorts B using the supplied comparison function. sk_TYPE_is_sorted() returns B<1> if B is sorted and B<0> otherwise. sk_TYPE_dup() returns a copy of B. Note the pointers in the copy are identical to the original. sk_TYPE_deep_copy() returns a new stack where each element has been copied. Copying is performed by the supplied copyfunc() and freeing by freefunc(). The function freefunc() is only called if an error occurs. =head1 NOTES Care should be taken when accessing stacks in multi-threaded environments. Any operation which increases the size of a stack such as sk_TYPE_insert() or sk_push() can "grow" the size of an internal array and cause race conditions if the same stack is accessed in a different thread. Operations such as sk_find() and sk_sort() can also reorder the stack. Any comparison function supplied should use a metric suitable for use in a binary search operation. That is it should return zero, a positive or negative value if B is equal to, greater than or less than B respectively. Care should be taken when checking the return values of the functions sk_TYPE_find() and sk_TYPE_find_ex(). They return an index to the matching element. In particular B<0> indicates a matching first element. A failed search is indicated by a B<-1> return value. STACK_OF(), DEFINE_STACK_OF(), DEFINE_STACK_OF_CONST(), and DEFINE_SPECIAL_STACK_OF() are implemented as macros. The underlying utility B API should not be used directly. It defines these functions: OPENSSL_sk_deep_copy(), OPENSSL_sk_delete(), OPENSSL_sk_delete_ptr(), OPENSSL_sk_dup(), OPENSSL_sk_find(), OPENSSL_sk_find_ex(), OPENSSL_sk_free(), OPENSSL_sk_insert(), OPENSSL_sk_is_sorted(), OPENSSL_sk_new(), OPENSSL_sk_new_null(), OPENSSL_sk_num(), OPENSSL_sk_pop(), OPENSSL_sk_pop_free(), OPENSSL_sk_push(), OPENSSL_sk_reserve(), OPENSSL_sk_set(), OPENSSL_sk_set_cmp_func(), OPENSSL_sk_shift(), OPENSSL_sk_sort(), OPENSSL_sk_unshift(), OPENSSL_sk_value(), OPENSSL_sk_zero(). =head1 RETURN VALUES sk_TYPE_num() returns the number of elements in the stack or B<-1> if the passed stack is B. sk_TYPE_value() returns a pointer to a stack element or B if the index is out of range. sk_TYPE_new(), sk_TYPE_new_null() and sk_TYPE_new_reserve() return an empty stack or B if an error occurs. sk_TYPE_reserve() returns B<1> on successful allocation of the required memory or B<0> on error. sk_TYPE_set_cmp_func() returns the old comparison function or B if there was no old comparison function. sk_TYPE_free(), sk_TYPE_zero(), sk_TYPE_pop_free() and sk_TYPE_sort() do not return values. sk_TYPE_pop(), sk_TYPE_shift(), sk_TYPE_delete() and sk_TYPE_delete_ptr() return a pointer to the deleted element or B on error. sk_TYPE_insert(), sk_TYPE_push() and sk_TYPE_unshift() return the total -number of elements in the stack and 0 if an error occurred. +number of elements in the stack and 0 if an error occurred. sk_TYPE_push() +further returns -1 if B is B. sk_TYPE_set() returns a pointer to the replacement element or B on error. sk_TYPE_find() and sk_TYPE_find_ex() return an index to the found element or B<-1> on error. sk_TYPE_is_sorted() returns B<1> if the stack is sorted and B<0> if it is not. sk_TYPE_dup() and sk_TYPE_deep_copy() return a pointer to the copy of the stack. =head1 HISTORY Before OpenSSL 1.1.0, this was implemented via macros and not inline functions and was not a public API. sk_TYPE_reserve() and sk_TYPE_new_reserve() were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut diff --git a/doc/man3/OBJ_nid2obj.pod b/doc/man3/OBJ_nid2obj.pod index 74379ad817da..b37d992307c2 100644 --- a/doc/man3/OBJ_nid2obj.pod +++ b/doc/man3/OBJ_nid2obj.pod @@ -1,191 +1,191 @@ =pod =head1 NAME i2t_ASN1_OBJECT, OBJ_length, OBJ_get0_data, OBJ_nid2obj, OBJ_nid2ln, OBJ_nid2sn, OBJ_obj2nid, OBJ_txt2nid, OBJ_ln2nid, OBJ_sn2nid, OBJ_cmp, OBJ_dup, OBJ_txt2obj, OBJ_obj2txt, OBJ_create, OBJ_cleanup - ASN1 object utility functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_nid2obj(int n); const char *OBJ_nid2ln(int n); const char *OBJ_nid2sn(int n); int OBJ_obj2nid(const ASN1_OBJECT *o); int OBJ_ln2nid(const char *ln); int OBJ_sn2nid(const char *sn); int OBJ_txt2nid(const char *s); ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_txt2obj(const char *s, int no_name); int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name); int i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a); int OBJ_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *b); ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_dup(const ASN1_OBJECT *o); int OBJ_create(const char *oid, const char *sn, const char *ln); size_t OBJ_length(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj); const unsigned char *OBJ_get0_data(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj); Deprecated: #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L void OBJ_cleanup(void) #endif =head1 DESCRIPTION The ASN1 object utility functions process ASN1_OBJECT structures which are a representation of the ASN1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER (OID) type. For convenience, OIDs are usually represented in source code as numeric identifiers, or Is. OpenSSL has an internal table of OIDs that are generated when the library is built, and their corresponding NIDs are available as defined constants. For the functions below, application code should treat all returned values -- OIDs, NIDs, or names -- as constants. OBJ_nid2obj(), OBJ_nid2ln() and OBJ_nid2sn() convert the NID I to an ASN1_OBJECT structure, its long name and its short name respectively, or B if an error occurred. OBJ_obj2nid(), OBJ_ln2nid(), OBJ_sn2nid() return the corresponding NID for the object I, the long name or the short name respectively or NID_undef if an error occurred. OBJ_txt2nid() returns NID corresponding to text string I. I can be a long name, a short name or the numerical representation of an object. OBJ_txt2obj() converts the text string I into an ASN1_OBJECT structure. If I is 0 then long names and short names will be interpreted as well as numerical forms. If I is 1 only the numerical form is acceptable. -OBJ_obj2txt() converts the B B into a textual representation. -The representation is written as a null terminated string to B -at most B bytes are written, truncating the result if necessary. -The total amount of space required is returned. If B is 0 then -if the object has a long or short name then that will be used, otherwise -the numerical form will be used. If B is 1 then the numerical -form will always be used. +OBJ_obj2txt() converts the B I into a textual representation. +Unless I is NULL, +the representation is written as a NUL-terminated string to I, where +at most I bytes are written, truncating the result if necessary. +In any case it returns the total string length, excluding the NUL character, +required for non-truncated representation, or -1 on error. +If I is 0 then if the object has a long or short name +then that will be used, otherwise the numerical form will be used. +If I is 1 then the numerical form will always be used. i2t_ASN1_OBJECT() is the same as OBJ_obj2txt() with the I set to zero. OBJ_cmp() compares I to I. If the two are identical 0 is returned. OBJ_dup() returns a copy of I. OBJ_create() adds a new object to the internal table. I is the numerical form of the object, I the short name and I the long name. A new NID is returned for the created object in case of success and NID_undef in case of failure. OBJ_length() returns the size of the content octets of I. OBJ_get0_data() returns a pointer to the content octets of I. The returned pointer is an internal pointer which B be freed. OBJ_cleanup() releases any resources allocated by creating new objects. =head1 NOTES Objects in OpenSSL can have a short name, a long name and a numerical identifier (NID) associated with them. A standard set of objects is represented in an internal table. The appropriate values are defined in the header file B. For example the OID for commonName has the following definitions: #define SN_commonName "CN" #define LN_commonName "commonName" #define NID_commonName 13 New objects can be added by calling OBJ_create(). Table objects have certain advantages over other objects: for example their NIDs can be used in a C language switch statement. They are also static constant structures which are shared: that is there is only a single constant structure for each table object. Objects which are not in the table have the NID value NID_undef. Objects do not need to be in the internal tables to be processed, the functions OBJ_txt2obj() and OBJ_obj2txt() can process the numerical form of an OID. Some objects are used to represent algorithms which do not have a corresponding ASN.1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER encoding (for example no OID currently exists for a particular algorithm). As a result they B be encoded or decoded as part of ASN.1 structures. Applications can determine if there is a corresponding OBJECT IDENTIFIER by checking OBJ_length() is not zero. These functions cannot return B because an B can represent both an internal, constant, OID and a dynamically-created one. The latter cannot be constant because it needs to be freed after use. =head1 RETURN VALUES OBJ_nid2obj() returns an B structure or B is an error occurred. OBJ_nid2ln() and OBJ_nid2sn() returns a valid string or B on error. OBJ_obj2nid(), OBJ_ln2nid(), OBJ_sn2nid() and OBJ_txt2nid() return a NID or B on error. +OBJ_add_sigid() returns 1 on success or 0 on error. + +i2t_ASN1_OBJECT() an OBJ_obj2txt() return -1 on error. +On success, they return the length of the string written to I if I is +not NULL and I is big enough, otherwise the total string length. +Note that this does not count the trailing NUL character. + =head1 EXAMPLES Create an object for B: ASN1_OBJECT *o = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_commonName); Check if an object is B if (OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == NID_commonName) /* Do something */ Create a new NID and initialize an object from it: int new_nid = OBJ_create("1.2.3.4", "NewOID", "New Object Identifier"); ASN1_OBJECT *obj = OBJ_nid2obj(new_nid); Create a new object directly: obj = OBJ_txt2obj("1.2.3.4", 1); -=head1 BUGS - -OBJ_obj2txt() is awkward and messy to use: it doesn't follow the -convention of other OpenSSL functions where the buffer can be set -to B to determine the amount of data that should be written. -Instead B must point to a valid buffer and B should -be set to a positive value. A buffer length of 80 should be more -than enough to handle any OID encountered in practice. - =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY OBJ_cleanup() was deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0 by L and should not be used. =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2002-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2002-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod index 900c4f3a5648..7f0e08868725 100644 --- a/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod +++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CONF_cmd.pod @@ -1,704 +1,704 @@ =pod =head1 NAME SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type, SSL_CONF_cmd - send configuration command =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_CONF_cmd(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *cmd, const char *value); int SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, const char *cmd); =head1 DESCRIPTION The function SSL_CONF_cmd() performs configuration operation B with optional parameter B on B. Its purpose is to simplify application configuration of B or B structures by providing a common framework for command line options or configuration files. SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type() returns the type of value that B refers to. =head1 SUPPORTED COMMAND LINE COMMANDS Currently supported B names for command lines (i.e. when the flag B is set) are listed below. Note: all B names are case sensitive. Unless otherwise stated commands can be used by both clients and servers and the B parameter is not used. The default prefix for command line commands is B<-> and that is reflected below. =over 4 =item B<-sigalgs> This sets the supported signature algorithms for TLSv1.2 and TLSv1.3. For clients this value is used directly for the supported signature algorithms extension. For servers it is used to determine which signature algorithms to support. The B argument should be a colon separated list of signature algorithms in order of decreasing preference of the form B or B. B is one of B, B or B and B is a supported algorithm OID short name such as B, B, B, B of B. Note: algorithm and hash names are case sensitive. B is one of the signature schemes defined in TLSv1.3, specified using the IETF name, e.g., B, B, or B. If this option is not set then all signature algorithms supported by the OpenSSL library are permissible. Note: algorithms which specify a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature scheme (either by using B as the B or by using one of the B identifiers) are ignored in TLSv1.3 and will not be negotiated. =item B<-client_sigalgs> This sets the supported signature algorithms associated with client authentication for TLSv1.2 and TLSv1.3. For servers the value is used in the B field of a B message. For clients it is used to determine which signature algorithm to use with the client certificate. If a server does not request a certificate this option has no effect. The syntax of B is identical to B<-sigalgs>. If not set then the value set for B<-sigalgs> will be used instead. =item B<-groups> This sets the supported groups. For clients, the groups are sent using the supported groups extension. For servers, it is used to determine which group to use. This setting affects groups used for signatures (in TLSv1.2 and earlier) and key exchange. The first group listed will also be used for the B sent by a client in a TLSv1.3 B. The B argument is a colon separated list of groups. The group can be either the B name (e.g. B), some other commonly used name where applicable (e.g. B) or an OpenSSL OID name (e.g. B). Group names are case sensitive. The list should be in order of preference with the most preferred group first. =item B<-curves> This is a synonym for the "-groups" command. =item B<-named_curve> This sets the temporary curve used for ephemeral ECDH modes. Only used by servers The B argument is a curve name or the special value B which picks an appropriate curve based on client and server preferences. The curve can be either the B name (e.g. B) or an OpenSSL OID name (e.g. B). Curve names are case sensitive. =item B<-cipher> Sets the TLSv1.2 and below ciphersuite list to B. This list will be combined with any configured TLSv1.3 ciphersuites. Note: syntax checking of B is currently not performed unless a B or B structure is associated with B. =item B<-ciphersuites> Sets the available ciphersuites for TLSv1.3 to value. This is a simple colon (":") separated list of TLSv1.3 ciphersuite names in order of preference. This list will be combined any configured TLSv1.2 and below ciphersuites. See L for more information. =item B<-cert> Attempts to use the file B as the certificate for the appropriate context. It currently uses SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() if an B structure is set or SSL_use_certificate_file() with filetype PEM if an B structure is set. This option is only supported if certificate operations are permitted. =item B<-key> Attempts to use the file B as the private key for the appropriate context. This option is only supported if certificate operations are permitted. Note: if no B<-key> option is set then a private key is not loaded unless the flag B is set. =item B<-dhparam> Attempts to use the file B as the set of temporary DH parameters for the appropriate context. This option is only supported if certificate operations are permitted. =item B<-record_padding> Attempts to pad TLSv1.3 records so that they are a multiple of B in length on send. A B of 0 or 1 turns off padding. Otherwise, the B must be >1 or <=16384. =item B<-no_renegotiation> Disables all attempts at renegotiation in TLSv1.2 and earlier, same as setting B. =item B<-min_protocol>, B<-max_protocol> Sets the minimum and maximum supported protocol. Currently supported protocol values are B, B, B, B, B for TLS; B, B for DTLS, and B for no limit. If either the lower or upper bound is not specified then only the other bound applies, if specified. If your application supports both TLS and DTLS you can specify any of these options twice, once with a bound for TLS and again with an appropriate bound for DTLS. To restrict the supported protocol versions use these commands rather than the deprecated alternative commands below. =item B<-no_ssl3>, B<-no_tls1>, B<-no_tls1_1>, B<-no_tls1_2>, B<-no_tls1_3> Disables protocol support for SSLv3, TLSv1.0, TLSv1.1, TLSv1.2 or TLSv1.3 by setting the corresponding options B, B, B, B and B respectively. These options are deprecated, instead use B<-min_protocol> and B<-max_protocol>. =item B<-bugs> Various bug workarounds are set, same as setting B. =item B<-comp> Enables support for SSL/TLS compression, same as clearing B. This command was introduced in OpenSSL 1.1.0. As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, compression is off by default. =item B<-no_comp> Disables support for SSL/TLS compression, same as setting B. As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, compression is off by default. =item B<-no_ticket> Disables support for session tickets, same as setting B. =item B<-serverpref> Use server and not client preference order when determining which cipher suite, signature algorithm or elliptic curve to use for an incoming connection. Equivalent to B. Only used by servers. =item B<-prioritize_chacha> Prioritize ChaCha ciphers when the client has a ChaCha20 cipher at the top of its preference list. This usually indicates a client without AES hardware acceleration (e.g. mobile) is in use. Equivalent to B. Only used by servers. Requires B<-serverpref>. =item B<-no_resumption_on_reneg> set SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION flag. Only used by servers. =item B<-legacyrenegotiation> permits the use of unsafe legacy renegotiation. Equivalent to setting B. =item B<-legacy_server_connect>, B<-no_legacy_server_connect> permits or prohibits the use of unsafe legacy renegotiation for OpenSSL clients only. Equivalent to setting or clearing B. Set by default. =item B<-allow_no_dhe_kex> In TLSv1.3 allow a non-(ec)dhe based key exchange mode on resumption. This means that there will be no forward secrecy for the resumed session. =item B<-strict> enables strict mode protocol handling. Equivalent to setting B. =item B<-anti_replay>, B<-no_anti_replay> Switches replay protection, on or off respectively. With replay protection on, OpenSSL will automatically detect if a session ticket has been used more than once, TLSv1.3 has been negotiated, and early data is enabled on the server. A full handshake is forced if a session ticket is used a second or subsequent time. Anti-Replay is on by default unless overridden by a configuration file and is only used by servers. Anti-replay measures are required for compliance with the TLSv1.3 specification. Some applications may be able to mitigate the replay risks in other ways and in such cases the built-in OpenSSL functionality is not required. Switching off anti-replay is equivalent to B. =back =head1 SUPPORTED CONFIGURATION FILE COMMANDS Currently supported B names for configuration files (i.e. when the flag B is set) are listed below. All configuration file B names are case insensitive so B is recognised as well as B. Unless otherwise stated the B names are also case insensitive. Note: the command prefix (if set) alters the recognised B values. =over 4 =item B Sets the ciphersuite list for TLSv1.2 and below to B. This list will be combined with any configured TLSv1.3 ciphersuites. Note: syntax checking of B is currently not performed unless an B or B structure is associated with B. =item B Sets the available ciphersuites for TLSv1.3 to B. This is a simple colon (":") separated list of TLSv1.3 ciphersuite names in order of preference. This list will be combined any configured TLSv1.2 and below ciphersuites. See L for more information. =item B Attempts to use the file B as the certificate for the appropriate context. It currently uses SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() if an B structure is set or SSL_use_certificate_file() with filetype PEM if an B structure is set. This option is only supported if certificate operations are permitted. =item B Attempts to use the file B as the private key for the appropriate context. This option is only supported if certificate operations are permitted. Note: if no B option is set then a private key is not loaded unless the B is set. =item B, B, B, B These options indicate a file or directory used for building certificate chains or verifying certificate chains. These options are only supported if certificate operations are permitted. =item B This option indicates a file containing a set of certificates in PEM form. The subject names of the certificates are sent to the peer in the B extension for TLS 1.3 (in ClientHello or CertificateRequest) or in a certificate request for previous versions or TLS. =item B Attempts to use the file B in the "serverinfo" extension using the function SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file. =item B Attempts to use the file B as the set of temporary DH parameters for the appropriate context. This option is only supported if certificate operations are permitted. =item B Attempts to pad TLSv1.3 records so that they are a multiple of B in length on send. A B of 0 or 1 turns off padding. Otherwise, the B must be >1 or <=16384. =item B This sets the supported signature algorithms for TLSv1.2 and TLSv1.3. For clients this value is used directly for the supported signature algorithms extension. For servers it is used to determine which signature algorithms to support. The B argument should be a colon separated list of signature algorithms in order of decreasing preference of the form B or B. B is one of B, B or B and B is a supported algorithm OID short name such as B, B, B, B of B. Note: algorithm and hash names are case sensitive. B is one of the signature schemes defined in TLSv1.3, specified using the IETF name, e.g., B, B, or B. If this option is not set then all signature algorithms supported by the OpenSSL library are permissible. Note: algorithms which specify a PKCS#1 v1.5 signature scheme (either by using B as the B or by using one of the B identifiers) are ignored in TLSv1.3 and will not be negotiated. =item B This sets the supported signature algorithms associated with client authentication for TLSv1.2 and TLSv1.3. For servers the value is used in the B field of a B message. For clients it is used to determine which signature algorithm to use with the client certificate. If a server does not request a certificate this option has no effect. The syntax of B is identical to B. If not set then the value set for B will be used instead. =item B This sets the supported groups. For clients, the groups are sent using the supported groups extension. For servers, it is used to determine which group to use. This setting affects groups used for signatures (in TLSv1.2 and earlier) and key exchange. The first group listed will also be used for the B sent by a client in a TLSv1.3 B. The B argument is a colon separated list of groups. The group can be either the B name (e.g. B), some other commonly used name where applicable (e.g. B) or an OpenSSL OID name (e.g. B). Group names are case sensitive. The list should be in order of preference with the most preferred group first. =item B This is a synonym for the "Groups" command. =item B This sets the minimum supported SSL, TLS or DTLS version. Currently supported protocol values are B, B, B, B, B, B and B. The SSL and TLS bounds apply only to TLS-based contexts, while the DTLS bounds apply only to DTLS-based contexts. The command can be repeated with one instance setting a TLS bound, and the other setting a DTLS bound. The value B applies to both types of contexts and disables the limits. =item B This sets the maximum supported SSL, TLS or DTLS version. Currently supported protocol values are B, B, B, B, B, B and B. The SSL and TLS bounds apply only to TLS-based contexts, while the DTLS bounds apply only to DTLS-based contexts. The command can be repeated with one instance setting a TLS bound, and the other setting a DTLS bound. The value B applies to both types of contexts and disables the limits. =item B This can be used to enable or disable certain versions of the SSL, TLS or DTLS protocol. The B argument is a comma separated list of supported protocols to enable or disable. If a protocol is preceded by B<-> that version is disabled. All protocol versions are enabled by default. You need to disable at least one protocol version for this setting have any effect. Only enabling some protocol versions does not disable the other protocol versions. Currently supported protocol values are B, B, B, B, B, B and B. The special value B refers to all supported versions. This can't enable protocols that are disabled using B or B, but can disable protocols that are still allowed by them. The B command is fragile and deprecated; do not use it. Use B and B instead. If you do use B, make sure that the resulting range of enabled protocols has no "holes", e.g. if TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.2 are both enabled, make sure to also leave TLS 1.1 enabled. =item B The B argument is a comma separated list of various flags to set. If a flag string is preceded B<-> it is disabled. See the L function for more details of individual options. Each option is listed below. Where an operation is enabled by default the B<-flag> syntax is needed to disable it. B: session ticket support, enabled by default. Inverse of B: that is B<-SessionTicket> is the same as setting B. -B: SSL/TLS compression support, enabled by default. Inverse +B: SSL/TLS compression support, disabled by default. Inverse of B. B: use empty fragments as a countermeasure against a SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 protocol vulnerability affecting CBC ciphers. It is set by default. Inverse of B. B: enable various bug workarounds. Same as B. B: enable single use DH keys, set by default. Inverse of B. Only used by servers. B: enable single use ECDH keys, set by default. Inverse of B. Only used by servers. B: use server and not client preference order when determining which cipher suite, signature algorithm or elliptic curve to use for an incoming connection. Equivalent to B. Only used by servers. B: prioritizes ChaCha ciphers when the client has a ChaCha20 cipher at the top of its preference list. This usually indicates a mobile client is in use. Equivalent to B. Only used by servers. B: set B flag. Only used by servers. B: disables all attempts at renegotiation in TLSv1.2 and earlier, same as setting B. B: permits the use of unsafe legacy renegotiation. Equivalent to B. B: permits the use of unsafe legacy renegotiation for OpenSSL clients only. Equivalent to B. Set by default. B: use encrypt-then-mac extension, enabled by default. Inverse of B: that is, B<-EncryptThenMac> is the same as setting B. B: In TLSv1.3 allow a non-(ec)dhe based key exchange mode on resumption. This means that there will be no forward secrecy for the resumed session. Equivalent to B. B: If set then dummy Change Cipher Spec (CCS) messages are sent in TLSv1.3. This has the effect of making TLSv1.3 look more like TLSv1.2 so that middleboxes that do not understand TLSv1.3 will not drop the connection. This option is set by default. A future version of OpenSSL may not set this by default. Equivalent to B. B: If set then OpenSSL will automatically detect if a session ticket has been used more than once, TLSv1.3 has been negotiated, and early data is enabled on the server. A full handshake is forced if a session ticket is used a second or subsequent time. This option is set by default and is only used by servers. Anti-replay measures are required to comply with the TLSv1.3 specification. Some applications may be able to mitigate the replay risks in other ways and in such cases the built-in OpenSSL functionality is not required. Disabling anti-replay is equivalent to setting B. =item B The B argument is a comma separated list of flags to set. B enables peer verification: for clients only. B requests but does not require a certificate from the client. Servers only. B requests and requires a certificate from the client: an error occurs if the client does not present a certificate. Servers only. B requests a certificate from a client only on the initial connection: not when renegotiating. Servers only. B configures the connection to support requests but does not require a certificate from the client post-handshake. A certificate will not be requested during the initial handshake. The server application must provide a mechanism to request a certificate post-handshake. Servers only. TLSv1.3 only. B configures the connection to support requests and requires a certificate from the client post-handshake: an error occurs if the client does not present a certificate. A certificate will not be requested during the initial handshake. The server application must provide a mechanism to request a certificate post-handshake. Servers only. TLSv1.3 only. =item B, B A file or directory of certificates in PEM format whose names are used as the set of acceptable names for client CAs. Servers only. This option is only supported if certificate operations are permitted. =back =head1 SUPPORTED COMMAND TYPES The function SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type() currently returns one of the following types: =over 4 =item B The B string is unrecognised, this return value can be use to flag syntax errors. =item B The value is a string without any specific structure. =item B The value is a filename. =item B The value is a directory name. =item B The value string is not used e.g. a command line option which doesn't take an argument. =back =head1 NOTES The order of operations is significant. This can be used to set either defaults or values which cannot be overridden. For example if an application calls: SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Protocol", "-SSLv3"); SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, userparam, uservalue); it will disable SSLv3 support by default but the user can override it. If however the call sequence is: SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, userparam, uservalue); SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Protocol", "-SSLv3"); SSLv3 is B disabled and attempt to override this by the user are ignored. By checking the return code of SSL_CONF_cmd() it is possible to query if a given B is recognised, this is useful if SSL_CONF_cmd() values are mixed with additional application specific operations. For example an application might call SSL_CONF_cmd() and if it returns -2 (unrecognised command) continue with processing of application specific commands. Applications can also use SSL_CONF_cmd() to process command lines though the utility function SSL_CONF_cmd_argv() is normally used instead. One way to do this is to set the prefix to an appropriate value using SSL_CONF_CTX_set1_prefix(), pass the current argument to B and the following argument to B (which may be NULL). In this case if the return value is positive then it is used to skip that number of arguments as they have been processed by SSL_CONF_cmd(). If -2 is returned then B is not recognised and application specific arguments can be checked instead. If -3 is returned a required argument is missing and an error is indicated. If 0 is returned some other error occurred and this can be reported back to the user. The function SSL_CONF_cmd_value_type() can be used by applications to check for the existence of a command or to perform additional syntax checking or translation of the command value. For example if the return value is B an application could translate a relative pathname to an absolute pathname. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CONF_cmd() returns 1 if the value of B is recognised and B is B used and 2 if both B and B are used. In other words it returns the number of arguments processed. This is useful when processing command lines. A return value of -2 means B is not recognised. A return value of -3 means B is recognised and the command requires a value but B is NULL. A return code of 0 indicates that both B and B are valid but an error occurred attempting to perform the operation: for example due to an error in the syntax of B in this case the error queue may provide additional information. =head1 EXAMPLES Set supported signature algorithms: SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "SignatureAlgorithms", "ECDSA+SHA256:RSA+SHA256:DSA+SHA256"); There are various ways to select the supported protocols. This set the minimum protocol version to TLSv1, and so disables SSLv3. This is the recommended way to disable protocols. SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "MinProtocol", "TLSv1"); The following also disables SSLv3: SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Protocol", "-SSLv3"); The following will first enable all protocols, and then disable SSLv3. If no protocol versions were disabled before this has the same effect as "-SSLv3", but if some versions were disables this will re-enable them before disabling SSLv3. SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Protocol", "ALL,-SSLv3"); Only enable TLSv1.2: SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "MinProtocol", "TLSv1.2"); SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "MaxProtocol", "TLSv1.2"); This also only enables TLSv1.2: SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Protocol", "-ALL,TLSv1.2"); Disable TLS session tickets: SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Options", "-SessionTicket"); Enable compression: SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Options", "Compression"); Set supported curves to P-256, P-384: SSL_CONF_cmd(ctx, "Curves", "P-256:P-384"); =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY The SSL_CONF_cmd() function was added in OpenSSL 1.0.2. The B option doesn't have effect since 1.1.0, but the macro is retained for backwards compatibility. The B was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. In earlier versions of OpenSSL passing a command which didn't take an argument would return B. B and B where added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. B and B were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1. =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2012-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2012-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod b/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod index aba7fff781e5..b8024dc4af66 100644 --- a/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod +++ b/doc/man3/X509_STORE_CTX_new.pod @@ -1,174 +1,241 @@ =pod =head1 NAME X509_STORE_CTX_new, X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup, X509_STORE_CTX_free, X509_STORE_CTX_init, X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack, X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert, X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls, X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain, X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain, X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param, X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param, X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted, X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted, X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted, X509_STORE_CTX_set_default, X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify, -X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn +X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn, +X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose, +X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust, +X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit - X509_STORE_CTX initialisation =head1 SYNOPSIS #include X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void); void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, STACK_OF(X509) *chain); void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk); void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain); void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk); X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param); int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name); STACK_OF(X509)* X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk); int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); typedef int (*X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn)(X509_STORE_CTX *); void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify); + int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose); + int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust); + int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, + int purpose, int trust); + =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions initialise an B structure for subsequent use by X509_verify_cert(). X509_STORE_CTX_new() returns a newly initialised B structure. X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() internally cleans up an B structure. The context can then be reused with a new call to X509_STORE_CTX_init(). X509_STORE_CTX_free() completely frees up B. After this call B is no longer valid. If B is NULL nothing is done. X509_STORE_CTX_init() sets up B for a subsequent verification operation. It must be called before each call to X509_verify_cert(), i.e. a B is only good for one call to X509_verify_cert(); if you want to verify a second certificate with the same B then you must call X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup() and then X509_STORE_CTX_init() again before the second call to X509_verify_cert(). The trusted certificate store is set to B, the end entity certificate to be verified is set to B and a set of additional certificates (which will be untrusted but may be used to build the chain) in B. Any or all of the B, B and B parameters can be B. X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack() sets the set of trusted certificates of B to B. This is an alternative way of specifying trusted certificates instead of using an B. X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert() sets the certificate to be verified in B to B. X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain() sets the validated chain used by B to be B. Ownership of the chain is transferred to B and should not be free'd by the caller. X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain() returns the internal pointer used by the B that contains the validated chain. X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls() sets a set of CRLs to use to aid certificate verification to B. These CRLs will only be used if CRL verification is enabled in the associated B structure. This might be used where additional "useful" CRLs are supplied as part of a protocol, for example in a PKCS#7 structure. X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param() retrieves an internal pointer to the verification parameters associated with B. X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted() retrieves an internal pointer to the stack of untrusted certificates associated with B. X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted() sets the internal point to the stack of untrusted certificates associated with B to B. X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param() sets the internal verification parameter pointer to B. After this call B should not be used. X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() looks up and sets the default verification method to B. This uses the function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() to find an appropriate set of parameters from B. X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted() returns the number of untrusted certificates that were used in building the chain following a call to X509_verify_cert(). X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify() provides the capability for overriding the default verify function. This function is responsible for verifying chain signatures and expiration times. A verify function is defined as an X509_STORE_CTX_verify type which has the following signature: int (*verify)(X509_STORE_CTX *); This function should receive the current X509_STORE_CTX as a parameter and return 1 on success or 0 on failure. +X509 certificates may contain information about what purposes keys contained +within them can be used for. For example "TLS WWW Server Authentication" or +"Email Protection". This "key usage" information is held internally to the +certificate itself. In addition the trust store containing trusted certificates +can declare what purposes we trust different certificates for. This "trust" +information is not held within the certificate itself but is "meta" information +held alongside it. This "meta" information is associated with the certificate +after it is issued and could be determined by a system administrator. For +example a certificate might declare that it is suitable for use for both +"TLS WWW Server Authentication" and "TLS Client Authentication", but a system +administrator might only trust it for the former. An X.509 certificate extension +exists that can record extended key usage information to supplement the purpose +information described above. This extended mechanism is arbitrarily extensible +and not well suited for a generic library API; applications that need to +validate extended key usage information in certifiates will need to define a +custom "purpose" (see below) or supply a nondefault verification callback +(L). + +X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose() sets the purpose for the target certificate being +verified in the I. Built-in available values for the I argument +are B, B, +B, B, +B, B, B, +B and B. It is also +possible to create a custom purpose value. Setting a purpose will ensure that +the key usage declared within certificates in the chain being verified is +consistent with that purpose as well as, potentially, other checks. Every +purpose also has an associated default trust value which will also be set at the +same time. During verification this trust setting will be verified to check it +is consistent with the trust set by the system administrator for certificates in +the chain. + +X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust() sets the trust value for the target certificate +being verified in the I. Built-in available values for the I +argument are B, B, +B, B, B, +B, B and B. It is +also possible to create a custom trust value. Since X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose() +also sets the trust value it is normally sufficient to only call that function. +If both are called then X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust() should be called after +X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose() since the trust setting of the last call will be +used. + +It should not normally be necessary for end user applications to call +X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit() directly. Typically applications should call +X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose() or X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust() instead. Using this +function it is possible to set the purpose and trust values for the I at +the same time. The I and I arguments can have the same +purpose values as described for X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose() above. The I +argument can have the same trust values as described in +X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust() above. Any of the I, I or +I values may also have the value 0 to indicate that the supplied +parameter should be ignored. After calling this function the purpose to be used +for verification is set from the I argument, and the trust is set from +the I argument. If I is 0 then the trust value will be set from +the default trust value for I. If the default trust value for the +purpose is I and I is 0 then the default trust value +associated with the I value is used for the trust setting instead. + =head1 NOTES The certificates and CRLs in a store are used internally and should B be freed up until after the associated B is freed. =head1 BUGS The certificates and CRLs in a context are used internally and should B be freed up until after the associated B is freed. Copies should be made or reference counts increased instead. =head1 RETURN VALUES X509_STORE_CTX_new() returns a newly allocated context or B if an error occurred. X509_STORE_CTX_init() returns 1 for success or 0 if an error occurred. X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param() returns a pointer to an B structure or B if an error occurred. X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(), X509_STORE_CTX_free(), X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(), X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(), X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls() and X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param() do not return values. X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() returns 1 for success or 0 if an error occurred. X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted() returns the number of untrusted certificates used. =head1 SEE ALSO L L =head1 HISTORY The X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls() function was added in OpenSSL 1.0.0. The X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2009-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2009-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut diff --git a/include/internal/sockets.h b/include/internal/sockets.h index 39186efef207..4fc1aecdbb20 100644 --- a/include/internal/sockets.h +++ b/include/internal/sockets.h @@ -1,155 +1,157 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef OSSL_INTERNAL_SOCKETS_H # define OSSL_INTERNAL_SOCKETS_H # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) # define NO_SYS_PARAM_H # endif # ifdef WIN32 # define NO_SYS_UN_H # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS # define NO_SYS_PARAM_H # define NO_SYS_UN_H # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) # if defined(__DJGPP__) # include # include # include # include +# include +# include # elif defined(_WIN32_WCE) && _WIN32_WCE<410 # define getservbyname _masked_declaration_getservbyname # endif # if !defined(IPPROTO_IP) /* winsock[2].h was included already? */ # include # endif # ifdef getservbyname /* this is used to be wcecompat/include/winsock_extras.h */ # undef getservbyname struct servent *PASCAL getservbyname(const char *, const char *); # endif # ifdef _WIN64 /* * Even though sizeof(SOCKET) is 8, it's safe to cast it to int, because * the value constitutes an index in per-process table of limited size * and not a real pointer. And we also depend on fact that all processors * Windows run on happen to be two's-complement, which allows to * interchange INVALID_SOCKET and -1. */ # define socket(d,t,p) ((int)socket(d,t,p)) # define accept(s,f,l) ((int)accept(s,f,l)) # endif # else # ifndef NO_SYS_PARAM_H # include # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS # include # endif # include # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_NODECC) # include # include # include # else # include # ifndef NO_SYS_UN_H # include # ifndef UNIX_PATH_MAX # define UNIX_PATH_MAX sizeof(((struct sockaddr_un *)NULL)->sun_path) # endif # endif # ifdef FILIO_H # include /* FIONBIO in some SVR4, e.g. unixware, solaris */ # endif # include # include # include # endif # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_AIX # include # endif # ifndef VMS # include # else # if !defined(TCPIP_TYPE_SOCKETSHR) && defined(__VMS_VER) && (__VMS_VER > 70000000) /* ioctl is only in VMS > 7.0 and when socketshr is not used */ # include # endif # include # if defined(TCPIP_TYPE_SOCKETSHR) # include # endif # endif # ifndef INVALID_SOCKET # define INVALID_SOCKET (-1) # endif # endif /* * Some IPv6 implementations are broken, you can disable them in known * bad versions. */ # if !defined(OPENSSL_USE_IPV6) # if defined(AF_INET6) # define OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 1 # else # define OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 0 # endif # endif # define get_last_socket_error() errno # define clear_socket_error() errno=0 # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) # undef get_last_socket_error # undef clear_socket_error # define get_last_socket_error() WSAGetLastError() # define clear_socket_error() WSASetLastError(0) # define readsocket(s,b,n) recv((s),(b),(n),0) # define writesocket(s,b,n) send((s),(b),(n),0) # elif defined(__DJGPP__) # define WATT32 # define WATT32_NO_OLDIES # define closesocket(s) close_s(s) # define readsocket(s,b,n) read_s(s,b,n) # define writesocket(s,b,n) send(s,b,n,0) # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) # define ioctlsocket(a,b,c) ioctl(a,b,c) # define closesocket(s) close(s) # define readsocket(s,b,n) recv((s),(b),(n),0) # define writesocket(s,b,n) send((s),(b),(n),0) # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) # define ioctlsocket(a,b,c) ioctl((a),(b),(int)(c)) # define closesocket(s) close(s) # define readsocket(s,b,n) read((s),(b),(n)) # define writesocket(s,b,n) write((s),(char *)(b),(n)) # else # define ioctlsocket(a,b,c) ioctl(a,b,c) # define closesocket(s) close(s) # define readsocket(s,b,n) read((s),(b),(n)) # define writesocket(s,b,n) write((s),(b),(n)) # endif #endif diff --git a/include/openssl/engine.h b/include/openssl/engine.h index 0780f0fb5f32..d707eaeb6ee3 100644 --- a/include/openssl/engine.h +++ b/include/openssl/engine.h @@ -1,751 +1,752 @@ /* - * Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2000-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_ENGINE_H # define HEADER_ENGINE_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # endif # include # include # include # include # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif /* * These flags are used to control combinations of algorithm (methods) by * bitwise "OR"ing. */ # define ENGINE_METHOD_RSA (unsigned int)0x0001 # define ENGINE_METHOD_DSA (unsigned int)0x0002 # define ENGINE_METHOD_DH (unsigned int)0x0004 # define ENGINE_METHOD_RAND (unsigned int)0x0008 # define ENGINE_METHOD_CIPHERS (unsigned int)0x0040 # define ENGINE_METHOD_DIGESTS (unsigned int)0x0080 # define ENGINE_METHOD_PKEY_METHS (unsigned int)0x0200 # define ENGINE_METHOD_PKEY_ASN1_METHS (unsigned int)0x0400 # define ENGINE_METHOD_EC (unsigned int)0x0800 /* Obvious all-or-nothing cases. */ # define ENGINE_METHOD_ALL (unsigned int)0xFFFF # define ENGINE_METHOD_NONE (unsigned int)0x0000 /* * This(ese) flag(s) controls behaviour of the ENGINE_TABLE mechanism used * internally to control registration of ENGINE implementations, and can be * set by ENGINE_set_table_flags(). The "NOINIT" flag prevents attempts to * initialise registered ENGINEs if they are not already initialised. */ # define ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_NOINIT (unsigned int)0x0001 /* ENGINE flags that can be set by ENGINE_set_flags(). */ /* Not used */ /* #define ENGINE_FLAGS_MALLOCED 0x0001 */ /* * This flag is for ENGINEs that wish to handle the various 'CMD'-related * control commands on their own. Without this flag, ENGINE_ctrl() handles * these control commands on behalf of the ENGINE using their "cmd_defns" * data. */ # define ENGINE_FLAGS_MANUAL_CMD_CTRL (int)0x0002 /* * This flag is for ENGINEs who return new duplicate structures when found * via "ENGINE_by_id()". When an ENGINE must store state (eg. if * ENGINE_ctrl() commands are called in sequence as part of some stateful * process like key-generation setup and execution), it can set this flag - * then each attempt to obtain the ENGINE will result in it being copied into * a new structure. Normally, ENGINEs don't declare this flag so * ENGINE_by_id() just increments the existing ENGINE's structural reference * count. */ # define ENGINE_FLAGS_BY_ID_COPY (int)0x0004 /* * This flag if for an ENGINE that does not want its methods registered as * part of ENGINE_register_all_complete() for example if the methods are not * usable as default methods. */ # define ENGINE_FLAGS_NO_REGISTER_ALL (int)0x0008 /* * ENGINEs can support their own command types, and these flags are used in * ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FLAGS to indicate to the caller what kind of input * each command expects. Currently only numeric and string input is * supported. If a control command supports none of the _NUMERIC, _STRING, or * _NO_INPUT options, then it is regarded as an "internal" control command - * and not for use in config setting situations. As such, they're not * available to the ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string() function, only raw ENGINE_ctrl() * access. Changes to this list of 'command types' should be reflected * carefully in ENGINE_cmd_is_executable() and ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(). */ /* accepts a 'long' input value (3rd parameter to ENGINE_ctrl) */ # define ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC (unsigned int)0x0001 /* * accepts string input (cast from 'void*' to 'const char *', 4th parameter * to ENGINE_ctrl) */ # define ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING (unsigned int)0x0002 /* * Indicates that the control command takes *no* input. Ie. the control * command is unparameterised. */ # define ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT (unsigned int)0x0004 /* * Indicates that the control command is internal. This control command won't * be shown in any output, and is only usable through the ENGINE_ctrl_cmd() * function. */ # define ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL (unsigned int)0x0008 /* * NB: These 3 control commands are deprecated and should not be used. * ENGINEs relying on these commands should compile conditional support for * compatibility (eg. if these symbols are defined) but should also migrate * the same functionality to their own ENGINE-specific control functions that * can be "discovered" by calling applications. The fact these control * commands wouldn't be "executable" (ie. usable by text-based config) * doesn't change the fact that application code can find and use them * without requiring per-ENGINE hacking. */ /* * These flags are used to tell the ctrl function what should be done. All * command numbers are shared between all engines, even if some don't make * sense to some engines. In such a case, they do nothing but return the * error ENGINE_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED. */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_SET_LOGSTREAM 1 # define ENGINE_CTRL_SET_PASSWORD_CALLBACK 2 # define ENGINE_CTRL_HUP 3/* Close and reinitialise * any handles/connections * etc. */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_SET_USER_INTERFACE 4/* Alternative to callback */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK_DATA 5/* User-specific data, used * when calling the password * callback and the user * interface */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_LOAD_CONFIGURATION 6/* Load a configuration, * given a string that * represents a file name * or so */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_LOAD_SECTION 7/* Load data from a given * section in the already * loaded configuration */ /* * These control commands allow an application to deal with an arbitrary * engine in a dynamic way. Warn: Negative return values indicate errors FOR * THESE COMMANDS because zero is used to indicate 'end-of-list'. Other * commands, including ENGINE-specific command types, return zero for an * error. An ENGINE can choose to implement these ctrl functions, and can * internally manage things however it chooses - it does so by setting the * ENGINE_FLAGS_MANUAL_CMD_CTRL flag (using ENGINE_set_flags()). Otherwise * the ENGINE_ctrl() code handles this on the ENGINE's behalf using the * cmd_defns data (set using ENGINE_set_cmd_defns()). This means an ENGINE's * ctrl() handler need only implement its own commands - the above "meta" * commands will be taken care of. */ /* * Returns non-zero if the supplied ENGINE has a ctrl() handler. If "not", * then all the remaining control commands will return failure, so it is * worth checking this first if the caller is trying to "discover" the * engine's capabilities and doesn't want errors generated unnecessarily. */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION 10 /* * Returns a positive command number for the first command supported by the * engine. Returns zero if no ctrl commands are supported. */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FIRST_CMD_TYPE 11 /* * The 'long' argument specifies a command implemented by the engine, and the * return value is the next command supported, or zero if there are no more. */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NEXT_CMD_TYPE 12 /* * The 'void*' argument is a command name (cast from 'const char *'), and the * return value is the command that corresponds to it. */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME 13 /* * The next two allow a command to be converted into its corresponding string * form. In each case, the 'long' argument supplies the command. In the * NAME_LEN case, the return value is the length of the command name (not * counting a trailing EOL). In the NAME case, the 'void*' argument must be a * string buffer large enough, and it will be populated with the name of the * command (WITH a trailing EOL). */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_LEN_FROM_CMD 14 # define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_FROM_CMD 15 /* The next two are similar but give a "short description" of a command. */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_LEN_FROM_CMD 16 # define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_FROM_CMD 17 /* * With this command, the return value is the OR'd combination of * ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_*** values that indicate what kind of input a given * engine-specific ctrl command expects. */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FLAGS 18 /* * ENGINE implementations should start the numbering of their own control * commands from this value. (ie. ENGINE_CMD_BASE, ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 1, etc). */ # define ENGINE_CMD_BASE 200 /* * NB: These 2 nCipher "chil" control commands are deprecated, and their * functionality is now available through ENGINE-specific control commands * (exposed through the above-mentioned 'CMD'-handling). Code using these 2 * commands should be migrated to the more general command handling before * these are removed. */ /* Flags specific to the nCipher "chil" engine */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_SET_FORKCHECK 100 /* * Depending on the value of the (long)i argument, this sets or * unsets the SimpleForkCheck flag in the CHIL API to enable or * disable checking and workarounds for applications that fork(). */ # define ENGINE_CTRL_CHIL_NO_LOCKING 101 /* * This prevents the initialisation function from providing mutex * callbacks to the nCipher library. */ /* * If an ENGINE supports its own specific control commands and wishes the * framework to handle the above 'ENGINE_CMD_***'-manipulation commands on * its behalf, it should supply a null-terminated array of ENGINE_CMD_DEFN * entries to ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(). It should also implement a ctrl() * handler that supports the stated commands (ie. the "cmd_num" entries as * described by the array). NB: The array must be ordered in increasing order * of cmd_num. "null-terminated" means that the last ENGINE_CMD_DEFN element * has cmd_num set to zero and/or cmd_name set to NULL. */ typedef struct ENGINE_CMD_DEFN_st { unsigned int cmd_num; /* The command number */ const char *cmd_name; /* The command name itself */ const char *cmd_desc; /* A short description of the command */ unsigned int cmd_flags; /* The input the command expects */ } ENGINE_CMD_DEFN; /* Generic function pointer */ typedef int (*ENGINE_GEN_FUNC_PTR) (void); /* Generic function pointer taking no arguments */ typedef int (*ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR) (ENGINE *); /* Specific control function pointer */ typedef int (*ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR) (ENGINE *, int, long, void *, void (*f) (void)); /* Generic load_key function pointer */ typedef EVP_PKEY *(*ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR)(ENGINE *, const char *, UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); typedef int (*ENGINE_SSL_CLIENT_CERT_PTR) (ENGINE *, SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn, X509 **pcert, EVP_PKEY **pkey, STACK_OF(X509) **pother, UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); /*- * These callback types are for an ENGINE's handler for cipher and digest logic. * These handlers have these prototypes; * int foo(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, const int **nids, int nid); * int foo(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, const int **nids, int nid); * Looking at how to implement these handlers in the case of cipher support, if * the framework wants the EVP_CIPHER for 'nid', it will call; * foo(e, &p_evp_cipher, NULL, nid); (return zero for failure) * If the framework wants a list of supported 'nid's, it will call; * foo(e, NULL, &p_nids, 0); (returns number of 'nids' or -1 for error) */ /* * Returns to a pointer to the array of supported cipher 'nid's. If the * second parameter is non-NULL it is set to the size of the returned array. */ typedef int (*ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR) (ENGINE *, const EVP_CIPHER **, const int **, int); typedef int (*ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR) (ENGINE *, const EVP_MD **, const int **, int); typedef int (*ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR) (ENGINE *, EVP_PKEY_METHOD **, const int **, int); typedef int (*ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR) (ENGINE *, EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD **, const int **, int); /* * STRUCTURE functions ... all of these functions deal with pointers to * ENGINE structures where the pointers have a "structural reference". This * means that their reference is to allowed access to the structure but it * does not imply that the structure is functional. To simply increment or * decrement the structural reference count, use ENGINE_by_id and * ENGINE_free. NB: This is not required when iterating using ENGINE_get_next * as it will automatically decrement the structural reference count of the * "current" ENGINE and increment the structural reference count of the * ENGINE it returns (unless it is NULL). */ /* Get the first/last "ENGINE" type available. */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_first(void); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_last(void); /* Iterate to the next/previous "ENGINE" type (NULL = end of the list). */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_next(ENGINE *e); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_prev(ENGINE *e); /* Add another "ENGINE" type into the array. */ int ENGINE_add(ENGINE *e); /* Remove an existing "ENGINE" type from the array. */ int ENGINE_remove(ENGINE *e); /* Retrieve an engine from the list by its unique "id" value. */ ENGINE *ENGINE_by_id(const char *id); #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # define ENGINE_load_openssl() \ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_OPENSSL, NULL) # define ENGINE_load_dynamic() \ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_DYNAMIC, NULL) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE # define ENGINE_load_padlock() \ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_PADLOCK, NULL) # define ENGINE_load_capi() \ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CAPI, NULL) # define ENGINE_load_afalg() \ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_AFALG, NULL) # endif # define ENGINE_load_cryptodev() \ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_CRYPTODEV, NULL) # define ENGINE_load_rdrand() \ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ENGINE_RDRAND, NULL) #endif void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void); /* * Get and set global flags (ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_***) for the implementation * "registry" handling. */ unsigned int ENGINE_get_table_flags(void); void ENGINE_set_table_flags(unsigned int flags); /*- Manage registration of ENGINEs per "table". For each type, there are 3 * functions; * ENGINE_register_***(e) - registers the implementation from 'e' (if it has one) * ENGINE_unregister_***(e) - unregister the implementation from 'e' * ENGINE_register_all_***() - call ENGINE_register_***() for each 'e' in the list * Cleanup is automatically registered from each table when required. */ int ENGINE_register_RSA(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_RSA(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_RSA(void); int ENGINE_register_DSA(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_DSA(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_DSA(void); int ENGINE_register_EC(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_EC(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_EC(void); int ENGINE_register_DH(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_DH(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_DH(void); int ENGINE_register_RAND(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_RAND(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_RAND(void); int ENGINE_register_ciphers(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_ciphers(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_ciphers(void); int ENGINE_register_digests(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_digests(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_digests(void); int ENGINE_register_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_pkey_meths(void); int ENGINE_register_pkey_asn1_meths(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_pkey_asn1_meths(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_pkey_asn1_meths(void); /* * These functions register all support from the above categories. Note, use * of these functions can result in static linkage of code your application * may not need. If you only need a subset of functionality, consider using * more selective initialisation. */ int ENGINE_register_complete(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_register_all_complete(void); /* * Send parameterised control commands to the engine. The possibilities to * send down an integer, a pointer to data or a function pointer are * provided. Any of the parameters may or may not be NULL, depending on the * command number. In actuality, this function only requires a structural * (rather than functional) reference to an engine, but many control commands * may require the engine be functional. The caller should be aware of trying * commands that require an operational ENGINE, and only use functional * references in such situations. */ int ENGINE_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void)); /* * This function tests if an ENGINE-specific command is usable as a * "setting". Eg. in an application's config file that gets processed through * ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(). If this returns zero, it is not available to * ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(), only ENGINE_ctrl(). */ int ENGINE_cmd_is_executable(ENGINE *e, int cmd); /* * This function works like ENGINE_ctrl() with the exception of taking a * command name instead of a command number, and can handle optional * commands. See the comment on ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string() for an explanation * on how to use the cmd_name and cmd_optional. */ int ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(ENGINE *e, const char *cmd_name, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void), int cmd_optional); /* * This function passes a command-name and argument to an ENGINE. The * cmd_name is converted to a command number and the control command is * called using 'arg' as an argument (unless the ENGINE doesn't support such * a command, in which case no control command is called). The command is * checked for input flags, and if necessary the argument will be converted * to a numeric value. If cmd_optional is non-zero, then if the ENGINE * doesn't support the given cmd_name the return value will be success * anyway. This function is intended for applications to use so that users * (or config files) can supply engine-specific config data to the ENGINE at * run-time to control behaviour of specific engines. As such, it shouldn't * be used for calling ENGINE_ctrl() functions that return data, deal with * binary data, or that are otherwise supposed to be used directly through * ENGINE_ctrl() in application code. Any "return" data from an ENGINE_ctrl() * operation in this function will be lost - the return value is interpreted * as failure if the return value is zero, success otherwise, and this * function returns a boolean value as a result. In other words, vendors of * 'ENGINE'-enabled devices should write ENGINE implementations with * parameterisations that work in this scheme, so that compliant ENGINE-based * applications can work consistently with the same configuration for the * same ENGINE-enabled devices, across applications. */ int ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(ENGINE *e, const char *cmd_name, const char *arg, int cmd_optional); /* * These functions are useful for manufacturing new ENGINE structures. They * don't address reference counting at all - one uses them to populate an * ENGINE structure with personalised implementations of things prior to * using it directly or adding it to the builtin ENGINE list in OpenSSL. * These are also here so that the ENGINE structure doesn't have to be * exposed and break binary compatibility! */ ENGINE *ENGINE_new(void); int ENGINE_free(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_up_ref(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_id(ENGINE *e, const char *id); int ENGINE_set_name(ENGINE *e, const char *name); int ENGINE_set_RSA(ENGINE *e, const RSA_METHOD *rsa_meth); int ENGINE_set_DSA(ENGINE *e, const DSA_METHOD *dsa_meth); int ENGINE_set_EC(ENGINE *e, const EC_KEY_METHOD *ecdsa_meth); int ENGINE_set_DH(ENGINE *e, const DH_METHOD *dh_meth); int ENGINE_set_RAND(ENGINE *e, const RAND_METHOD *rand_meth); int ENGINE_set_destroy_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR destroy_f); int ENGINE_set_init_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR init_f); int ENGINE_set_finish_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR finish_f); int ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ctrl_f); int ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR loadpriv_f); int ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR loadpub_f); int ENGINE_set_load_ssl_client_cert_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_SSL_CLIENT_CERT_PTR loadssl_f); int ENGINE_set_ciphers(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR f); int ENGINE_set_digests(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR f); int ENGINE_set_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR f); int ENGINE_set_pkey_asn1_meths(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR f); int ENGINE_set_flags(ENGINE *e, int flags); int ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(ENGINE *e, const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *defns); /* These functions allow control over any per-structure ENGINE data. */ #define ENGINE_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \ CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_ENGINE, l, p, newf, dupf, freef) int ENGINE_set_ex_data(ENGINE *e, int idx, void *arg); void *ENGINE_get_ex_data(const ENGINE *e, int idx); #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L /* * This function previously cleaned up anything that needs it. Auto-deinit will * now take care of it so it is no longer required to call this function. */ # define ENGINE_cleanup() while(0) continue #endif /* * These return values from within the ENGINE structure. These can be useful * with functional references as well as structural references - it depends * which you obtained. Using the result for functional purposes if you only * obtained a structural reference may be problematic! */ const char *ENGINE_get_id(const ENGINE *e); const char *ENGINE_get_name(const ENGINE *e); const RSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_RSA(const ENGINE *e); const DSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_DSA(const ENGINE *e); const EC_KEY_METHOD *ENGINE_get_EC(const ENGINE *e); const DH_METHOD *ENGINE_get_DH(const ENGINE *e); const RAND_METHOD *ENGINE_get_RAND(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_destroy_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_init_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_finish_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_ctrl_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR ENGINE_get_load_privkey_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR ENGINE_get_load_pubkey_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_SSL_CLIENT_CERT_PTR ENGINE_get_ssl_client_cert_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR ENGINE_get_ciphers(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR ENGINE_get_digests(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR ENGINE_get_pkey_meths(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meths(const ENGINE *e); const EVP_CIPHER *ENGINE_get_cipher(ENGINE *e, int nid); const EVP_MD *ENGINE_get_digest(ENGINE *e, int nid); const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ENGINE_get_pkey_meth(ENGINE *e, int nid); const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth(ENGINE *e, int nid); const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth_str(ENGINE *e, const char *str, int len); const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ENGINE_pkey_asn1_find_str(ENGINE **pe, const char *str, int len); const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *ENGINE_get_cmd_defns(const ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_get_flags(const ENGINE *e); /* * FUNCTIONAL functions. These functions deal with ENGINE structures that * have (or will) be initialised for use. Broadly speaking, the structural * functions are useful for iterating the list of available engine types, * creating new engine types, and other "list" operations. These functions * actually deal with ENGINEs that are to be used. As such these functions * can fail (if applicable) when particular engines are unavailable - eg. if * a hardware accelerator is not attached or not functioning correctly. Each * ENGINE has 2 reference counts; structural and functional. Every time a * functional reference is obtained or released, a corresponding structural * reference is automatically obtained or released too. */ /* * Initialise a engine type for use (or up its reference count if it's * already in use). This will fail if the engine is not currently operational * and cannot initialise. */ int ENGINE_init(ENGINE *e); /* * Free a functional reference to a engine type. This does not require a * corresponding call to ENGINE_free as it also releases a structural * reference. */ int ENGINE_finish(ENGINE *e); /* * The following functions handle keys that are stored in some secondary * location, handled by the engine. The storage may be on a card or * whatever. */ EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_private_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_public_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); int ENGINE_load_ssl_client_cert(ENGINE *e, SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn, X509 **pcert, EVP_PKEY **ppkey, STACK_OF(X509) **pother, UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); /* * This returns a pointer for the current ENGINE structure that is (by * default) performing any RSA operations. The value returned is an * incremented reference, so it should be free'd (ENGINE_finish) before it is * discarded. */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_RSA(void); /* Same for the other "methods" */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_DSA(void); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_EC(void); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_DH(void); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_RAND(void); /* * These functions can be used to get a functional reference to perform * ciphering or digesting corresponding to "nid". */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_cipher_engine(int nid); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_digest_engine(int nid); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_pkey_meth_engine(int nid); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_pkey_asn1_meth_engine(int nid); /* * This sets a new default ENGINE structure for performing RSA operations. If * the result is non-zero (success) then the ENGINE structure will have had * its reference count up'd so the caller should still free their own * reference 'e'. */ int ENGINE_set_default_RSA(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_string(ENGINE *e, const char *def_list); /* Same for the other "methods" */ int ENGINE_set_default_DSA(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_EC(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_DH(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_RAND(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_ciphers(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_digests(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_pkey_meths(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_pkey_asn1_meths(ENGINE *e); /* * The combination "set" - the flags are bitwise "OR"d from the * ENGINE_METHOD_*** defines above. As with the "ENGINE_register_complete()" * function, this function can result in unnecessary static linkage. If your * application requires only specific functionality, consider using more * selective functions. */ int ENGINE_set_default(ENGINE *e, unsigned int flags); void ENGINE_add_conf_module(void); /* Deprecated functions ... */ /* int ENGINE_clear_defaults(void); */ /**************************/ /* DYNAMIC ENGINE SUPPORT */ /**************************/ /* Binary/behaviour compatibility levels */ # define OSSL_DYNAMIC_VERSION (unsigned long)0x00030000 /* * Binary versions older than this are too old for us (whether we're a loader * or a loadee) */ # define OSSL_DYNAMIC_OLDEST (unsigned long)0x00030000 /* * When compiling an ENGINE entirely as an external shared library, loadable * by the "dynamic" ENGINE, these types are needed. The 'dynamic_fns' * structure type provides the calling application's (or library's) error * functionality and memory management function pointers to the loaded * library. These should be used/set in the loaded library code so that the * loading application's 'state' will be used/changed in all operations. The * 'static_state' pointer allows the loaded library to know if it shares the * same static data as the calling application (or library), and thus whether * these callbacks need to be set or not. */ typedef void *(*dyn_MEM_malloc_fn) (size_t, const char *, int); typedef void *(*dyn_MEM_realloc_fn) (void *, size_t, const char *, int); typedef void (*dyn_MEM_free_fn) (void *, const char *, int); typedef struct st_dynamic_MEM_fns { dyn_MEM_malloc_fn malloc_fn; dyn_MEM_realloc_fn realloc_fn; dyn_MEM_free_fn free_fn; } dynamic_MEM_fns; /* * FIXME: Perhaps the memory and locking code (crypto.h) should declare and * use these types so we (and any other dependent code) can simplify a bit?? */ /* The top-level structure */ typedef struct st_dynamic_fns { void *static_state; dynamic_MEM_fns mem_fns; } dynamic_fns; /* * The version checking function should be of this prototype. NB: The * ossl_version value passed in is the OSSL_DYNAMIC_VERSION of the loading * code. If this function returns zero, it indicates a (potential) version * incompatibility and the loaded library doesn't believe it can proceed. * Otherwise, the returned value is the (latest) version supported by the * loading library. The loader may still decide that the loaded code's * version is unsatisfactory and could veto the load. The function is * expected to be implemented with the symbol name "v_check", and a default * implementation can be fully instantiated with * IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN(). */ typedef unsigned long (*dynamic_v_check_fn) (unsigned long ossl_version); # define IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() \ OPENSSL_EXPORT unsigned long v_check(unsigned long v); \ OPENSSL_EXPORT unsigned long v_check(unsigned long v) { \ if (v >= OSSL_DYNAMIC_OLDEST) return OSSL_DYNAMIC_VERSION; \ return 0; } /* * This function is passed the ENGINE structure to initialise with its own * function and command settings. It should not adjust the structural or * functional reference counts. If this function returns zero, (a) the load * will be aborted, (b) the previous ENGINE state will be memcpy'd back onto * the structure, and (c) the shared library will be unloaded. So * implementations should do their own internal cleanup in failure * circumstances otherwise they could leak. The 'id' parameter, if non-NULL, * represents the ENGINE id that the loader is looking for. If this is NULL, * the shared library can choose to return failure or to initialise a * 'default' ENGINE. If non-NULL, the shared library must initialise only an * ENGINE matching the passed 'id'. The function is expected to be * implemented with the symbol name "bind_engine". A standard implementation * can be instantiated with IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(fn) where the parameter * 'fn' is a callback function that populates the ENGINE structure and * returns an int value (zero for failure). 'fn' should have prototype; * [static] int fn(ENGINE *e, const char *id); */ typedef int (*dynamic_bind_engine) (ENGINE *e, const char *id, const dynamic_fns *fns); # define IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(fn) \ OPENSSL_EXPORT \ int bind_engine(ENGINE *e, const char *id, const dynamic_fns *fns); \ OPENSSL_EXPORT \ int bind_engine(ENGINE *e, const char *id, const dynamic_fns *fns) { \ if (ENGINE_get_static_state() == fns->static_state) goto skip_cbs; \ CRYPTO_set_mem_functions(fns->mem_fns.malloc_fn, \ fns->mem_fns.realloc_fn, \ fns->mem_fns.free_fn); \ + OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_NO_ATEXIT, NULL); \ skip_cbs: \ if (!fn(e, id)) return 0; \ return 1; } /* * If the loading application (or library) and the loaded ENGINE library * share the same static data (eg. they're both dynamically linked to the * same libcrypto.so) we need a way to avoid trying to set system callbacks - * this would fail, and for the same reason that it's unnecessary to try. If * the loaded ENGINE has (or gets from through the loader) its own copy of * the libcrypto static data, we will need to set the callbacks. The easiest * way to detect this is to have a function that returns a pointer to some * static data and let the loading application and loaded ENGINE compare * their respective values. */ void *ENGINE_get_static_state(void); # if defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__DragonFly__) DEPRECATEDIN_1_1_0(void ENGINE_setup_bsd_cryptodev(void)) # endif # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif diff --git a/include/openssl/obj_mac.h b/include/openssl/obj_mac.h index eb812ed18dcc..53516a06c69b 100644 --- a/include/openssl/obj_mac.h +++ b/include/openssl/obj_mac.h @@ -1,5198 +1,5198 @@ /* * WARNING: do not edit! * Generated by crypto/objects/objects.pl * - * Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2000-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #define SN_undef "UNDEF" #define LN_undef "undefined" #define NID_undef 0 #define OBJ_undef 0L #define SN_itu_t "ITU-T" #define LN_itu_t "itu-t" #define NID_itu_t 645 #define OBJ_itu_t 0L #define NID_ccitt 404 #define OBJ_ccitt OBJ_itu_t #define SN_iso "ISO" #define LN_iso "iso" #define NID_iso 181 #define OBJ_iso 1L #define SN_joint_iso_itu_t "JOINT-ISO-ITU-T" #define LN_joint_iso_itu_t "joint-iso-itu-t" #define NID_joint_iso_itu_t 646 #define OBJ_joint_iso_itu_t 2L #define NID_joint_iso_ccitt 393 #define OBJ_joint_iso_ccitt OBJ_joint_iso_itu_t #define SN_member_body "member-body" #define LN_member_body "ISO Member Body" #define NID_member_body 182 #define OBJ_member_body OBJ_iso,2L #define SN_identified_organization "identified-organization" #define NID_identified_organization 676 #define OBJ_identified_organization OBJ_iso,3L #define SN_hmac_md5 "HMAC-MD5" #define LN_hmac_md5 "hmac-md5" #define NID_hmac_md5 780 #define OBJ_hmac_md5 OBJ_identified_organization,6L,1L,5L,5L,8L,1L,1L #define SN_hmac_sha1 "HMAC-SHA1" #define LN_hmac_sha1 "hmac-sha1" #define NID_hmac_sha1 781 #define OBJ_hmac_sha1 OBJ_identified_organization,6L,1L,5L,5L,8L,1L,2L #define SN_x509ExtAdmission "x509ExtAdmission" #define LN_x509ExtAdmission "Professional Information or basis for Admission" #define NID_x509ExtAdmission 1093 #define OBJ_x509ExtAdmission OBJ_identified_organization,36L,8L,3L,3L #define SN_certicom_arc "certicom-arc" #define NID_certicom_arc 677 #define OBJ_certicom_arc OBJ_identified_organization,132L #define SN_ieee "ieee" #define NID_ieee 1170 #define OBJ_ieee OBJ_identified_organization,111L #define SN_ieee_siswg "ieee-siswg" #define LN_ieee_siswg "IEEE Security in Storage Working Group" #define NID_ieee_siswg 1171 #define OBJ_ieee_siswg OBJ_ieee,2L,1619L #define SN_international_organizations "international-organizations" #define LN_international_organizations "International Organizations" #define NID_international_organizations 647 #define OBJ_international_organizations OBJ_joint_iso_itu_t,23L #define SN_wap "wap" #define NID_wap 678 #define OBJ_wap OBJ_international_organizations,43L #define SN_wap_wsg "wap-wsg" #define NID_wap_wsg 679 #define OBJ_wap_wsg OBJ_wap,1L #define SN_selected_attribute_types "selected-attribute-types" #define LN_selected_attribute_types "Selected Attribute Types" #define NID_selected_attribute_types 394 #define OBJ_selected_attribute_types OBJ_joint_iso_itu_t,5L,1L,5L #define SN_clearance "clearance" #define NID_clearance 395 #define OBJ_clearance OBJ_selected_attribute_types,55L #define SN_ISO_US "ISO-US" #define LN_ISO_US "ISO US Member Body" #define NID_ISO_US 183 #define OBJ_ISO_US OBJ_member_body,840L #define SN_X9_57 "X9-57" #define LN_X9_57 "X9.57" #define NID_X9_57 184 #define OBJ_X9_57 OBJ_ISO_US,10040L #define SN_X9cm "X9cm" #define LN_X9cm "X9.57 CM ?" #define NID_X9cm 185 #define OBJ_X9cm OBJ_X9_57,4L #define SN_ISO_CN "ISO-CN" #define LN_ISO_CN "ISO CN Member Body" #define NID_ISO_CN 1140 #define OBJ_ISO_CN OBJ_member_body,156L #define SN_oscca "oscca" #define NID_oscca 1141 #define OBJ_oscca OBJ_ISO_CN,10197L #define SN_sm_scheme "sm-scheme" #define NID_sm_scheme 1142 #define OBJ_sm_scheme OBJ_oscca,1L #define SN_dsa "DSA" #define LN_dsa "dsaEncryption" #define NID_dsa 116 #define OBJ_dsa OBJ_X9cm,1L #define SN_dsaWithSHA1 "DSA-SHA1" #define LN_dsaWithSHA1 "dsaWithSHA1" #define NID_dsaWithSHA1 113 #define OBJ_dsaWithSHA1 OBJ_X9cm,3L #define SN_ansi_X9_62 "ansi-X9-62" #define LN_ansi_X9_62 "ANSI X9.62" #define NID_ansi_X9_62 405 #define OBJ_ansi_X9_62 OBJ_ISO_US,10045L #define OBJ_X9_62_id_fieldType OBJ_ansi_X9_62,1L #define SN_X9_62_prime_field "prime-field" #define NID_X9_62_prime_field 406 #define OBJ_X9_62_prime_field OBJ_X9_62_id_fieldType,1L #define SN_X9_62_characteristic_two_field "characteristic-two-field" #define NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field 407 #define OBJ_X9_62_characteristic_two_field OBJ_X9_62_id_fieldType,2L #define SN_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis "id-characteristic-two-basis" #define NID_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis 680 #define OBJ_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis OBJ_X9_62_characteristic_two_field,3L #define SN_X9_62_onBasis "onBasis" #define NID_X9_62_onBasis 681 #define OBJ_X9_62_onBasis OBJ_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis,1L #define SN_X9_62_tpBasis "tpBasis" #define NID_X9_62_tpBasis 682 #define OBJ_X9_62_tpBasis OBJ_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis,2L #define SN_X9_62_ppBasis "ppBasis" #define NID_X9_62_ppBasis 683 #define OBJ_X9_62_ppBasis OBJ_X9_62_id_characteristic_two_basis,3L #define OBJ_X9_62_id_publicKeyType OBJ_ansi_X9_62,2L #define SN_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey "id-ecPublicKey" #define NID_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey 408 #define OBJ_X9_62_id_ecPublicKey OBJ_X9_62_id_publicKeyType,1L #define OBJ_X9_62_ellipticCurve OBJ_ansi_X9_62,3L #define OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve OBJ_X9_62_ellipticCurve,0L #define SN_X9_62_c2pnb163v1 "c2pnb163v1" #define NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v1 684 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v1 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,1L #define SN_X9_62_c2pnb163v2 "c2pnb163v2" #define NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v2 685 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v2 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,2L #define SN_X9_62_c2pnb163v3 "c2pnb163v3" #define NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v3 686 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb163v3 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,3L #define SN_X9_62_c2pnb176v1 "c2pnb176v1" #define NID_X9_62_c2pnb176v1 687 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb176v1 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,4L #define SN_X9_62_c2tnb191v1 "c2tnb191v1" #define NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v1 688 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v1 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,5L #define SN_X9_62_c2tnb191v2 "c2tnb191v2" #define NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v2 689 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v2 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,6L #define SN_X9_62_c2tnb191v3 "c2tnb191v3" #define NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v3 690 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb191v3 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,7L #define SN_X9_62_c2onb191v4 "c2onb191v4" #define NID_X9_62_c2onb191v4 691 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2onb191v4 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,8L #define SN_X9_62_c2onb191v5 "c2onb191v5" #define NID_X9_62_c2onb191v5 692 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2onb191v5 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,9L #define SN_X9_62_c2pnb208w1 "c2pnb208w1" #define NID_X9_62_c2pnb208w1 693 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb208w1 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,10L #define SN_X9_62_c2tnb239v1 "c2tnb239v1" #define NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v1 694 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v1 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,11L #define SN_X9_62_c2tnb239v2 "c2tnb239v2" #define NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v2 695 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v2 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,12L #define SN_X9_62_c2tnb239v3 "c2tnb239v3" #define NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v3 696 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb239v3 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,13L #define SN_X9_62_c2onb239v4 "c2onb239v4" #define NID_X9_62_c2onb239v4 697 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2onb239v4 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,14L #define SN_X9_62_c2onb239v5 "c2onb239v5" #define NID_X9_62_c2onb239v5 698 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2onb239v5 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,15L #define SN_X9_62_c2pnb272w1 "c2pnb272w1" #define NID_X9_62_c2pnb272w1 699 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb272w1 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,16L #define SN_X9_62_c2pnb304w1 "c2pnb304w1" #define NID_X9_62_c2pnb304w1 700 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb304w1 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,17L #define SN_X9_62_c2tnb359v1 "c2tnb359v1" #define NID_X9_62_c2tnb359v1 701 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb359v1 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,18L #define SN_X9_62_c2pnb368w1 "c2pnb368w1" #define NID_X9_62_c2pnb368w1 702 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2pnb368w1 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,19L #define SN_X9_62_c2tnb431r1 "c2tnb431r1" #define NID_X9_62_c2tnb431r1 703 #define OBJ_X9_62_c2tnb431r1 OBJ_X9_62_c_TwoCurve,20L #define OBJ_X9_62_primeCurve OBJ_X9_62_ellipticCurve,1L #define SN_X9_62_prime192v1 "prime192v1" #define NID_X9_62_prime192v1 409 #define OBJ_X9_62_prime192v1 OBJ_X9_62_primeCurve,1L #define SN_X9_62_prime192v2 "prime192v2" #define NID_X9_62_prime192v2 410 #define OBJ_X9_62_prime192v2 OBJ_X9_62_primeCurve,2L #define SN_X9_62_prime192v3 "prime192v3" #define NID_X9_62_prime192v3 411 #define OBJ_X9_62_prime192v3 OBJ_X9_62_primeCurve,3L #define SN_X9_62_prime239v1 "prime239v1" #define NID_X9_62_prime239v1 412 #define OBJ_X9_62_prime239v1 OBJ_X9_62_primeCurve,4L #define SN_X9_62_prime239v2 "prime239v2" #define NID_X9_62_prime239v2 413 #define OBJ_X9_62_prime239v2 OBJ_X9_62_primeCurve,5L #define SN_X9_62_prime239v3 "prime239v3" #define NID_X9_62_prime239v3 414 #define OBJ_X9_62_prime239v3 OBJ_X9_62_primeCurve,6L #define SN_X9_62_prime256v1 "prime256v1" #define NID_X9_62_prime256v1 415 #define OBJ_X9_62_prime256v1 OBJ_X9_62_primeCurve,7L #define OBJ_X9_62_id_ecSigType OBJ_ansi_X9_62,4L #define SN_ecdsa_with_SHA1 "ecdsa-with-SHA1" #define NID_ecdsa_with_SHA1 416 #define OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA1 OBJ_X9_62_id_ecSigType,1L #define SN_ecdsa_with_Recommended "ecdsa-with-Recommended" #define NID_ecdsa_with_Recommended 791 #define OBJ_ecdsa_with_Recommended OBJ_X9_62_id_ecSigType,2L #define SN_ecdsa_with_Specified "ecdsa-with-Specified" #define NID_ecdsa_with_Specified 792 #define OBJ_ecdsa_with_Specified OBJ_X9_62_id_ecSigType,3L #define SN_ecdsa_with_SHA224 "ecdsa-with-SHA224" #define NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224 793 #define OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA224 OBJ_ecdsa_with_Specified,1L #define SN_ecdsa_with_SHA256 "ecdsa-with-SHA256" #define NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256 794 #define OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA256 OBJ_ecdsa_with_Specified,2L #define SN_ecdsa_with_SHA384 "ecdsa-with-SHA384" #define NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384 795 #define OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA384 OBJ_ecdsa_with_Specified,3L #define SN_ecdsa_with_SHA512 "ecdsa-with-SHA512" #define NID_ecdsa_with_SHA512 796 #define OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA512 OBJ_ecdsa_with_Specified,4L #define OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve OBJ_certicom_arc,0L #define SN_secp112r1 "secp112r1" #define NID_secp112r1 704 #define OBJ_secp112r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,6L #define SN_secp112r2 "secp112r2" #define NID_secp112r2 705 #define OBJ_secp112r2 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,7L #define SN_secp128r1 "secp128r1" #define NID_secp128r1 706 #define OBJ_secp128r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,28L #define SN_secp128r2 "secp128r2" #define NID_secp128r2 707 #define OBJ_secp128r2 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,29L #define SN_secp160k1 "secp160k1" #define NID_secp160k1 708 #define OBJ_secp160k1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,9L #define SN_secp160r1 "secp160r1" #define NID_secp160r1 709 #define OBJ_secp160r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,8L #define SN_secp160r2 "secp160r2" #define NID_secp160r2 710 #define OBJ_secp160r2 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,30L #define SN_secp192k1 "secp192k1" #define NID_secp192k1 711 #define OBJ_secp192k1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,31L #define SN_secp224k1 "secp224k1" #define NID_secp224k1 712 #define OBJ_secp224k1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,32L #define SN_secp224r1 "secp224r1" #define NID_secp224r1 713 #define OBJ_secp224r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,33L #define SN_secp256k1 "secp256k1" #define NID_secp256k1 714 #define OBJ_secp256k1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,10L #define SN_secp384r1 "secp384r1" #define NID_secp384r1 715 #define OBJ_secp384r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,34L #define SN_secp521r1 "secp521r1" #define NID_secp521r1 716 #define OBJ_secp521r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,35L #define SN_sect113r1 "sect113r1" #define NID_sect113r1 717 #define OBJ_sect113r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,4L #define SN_sect113r2 "sect113r2" #define NID_sect113r2 718 #define OBJ_sect113r2 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,5L #define SN_sect131r1 "sect131r1" #define NID_sect131r1 719 #define OBJ_sect131r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,22L #define SN_sect131r2 "sect131r2" #define NID_sect131r2 720 #define OBJ_sect131r2 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,23L #define SN_sect163k1 "sect163k1" #define NID_sect163k1 721 #define OBJ_sect163k1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,1L #define SN_sect163r1 "sect163r1" #define NID_sect163r1 722 #define OBJ_sect163r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,2L #define SN_sect163r2 "sect163r2" #define NID_sect163r2 723 #define OBJ_sect163r2 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,15L #define SN_sect193r1 "sect193r1" #define NID_sect193r1 724 #define OBJ_sect193r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,24L #define SN_sect193r2 "sect193r2" #define NID_sect193r2 725 #define OBJ_sect193r2 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,25L #define SN_sect233k1 "sect233k1" #define NID_sect233k1 726 #define OBJ_sect233k1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,26L #define SN_sect233r1 "sect233r1" #define NID_sect233r1 727 #define OBJ_sect233r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,27L #define SN_sect239k1 "sect239k1" #define NID_sect239k1 728 #define OBJ_sect239k1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,3L #define SN_sect283k1 "sect283k1" #define NID_sect283k1 729 #define OBJ_sect283k1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,16L #define SN_sect283r1 "sect283r1" #define NID_sect283r1 730 #define OBJ_sect283r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,17L #define SN_sect409k1 "sect409k1" #define NID_sect409k1 731 #define OBJ_sect409k1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,36L #define SN_sect409r1 "sect409r1" #define NID_sect409r1 732 #define OBJ_sect409r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,37L #define SN_sect571k1 "sect571k1" #define NID_sect571k1 733 #define OBJ_sect571k1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,38L #define SN_sect571r1 "sect571r1" #define NID_sect571r1 734 #define OBJ_sect571r1 OBJ_secg_ellipticCurve,39L #define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid OBJ_wap_wsg,4L #define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1 "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls1" #define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1 735 #define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1 OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,1L #define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3 "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls3" #define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3 736 #define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3 OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,3L #define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4 "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls4" #define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4 737 #define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4 OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,4L #define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5 "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls5" #define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5 738 #define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5 OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,5L #define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6 "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls6" #define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6 739 #define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6 OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,6L #define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7 "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7" #define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7 740 #define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7 OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,7L #define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8 "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls8" #define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8 741 #define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8 OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,8L #define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9 "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9" #define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9 742 #define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9 OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,9L #define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10 "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls10" #define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10 743 #define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10 OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,10L #define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11 "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls11" #define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11 744 #define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11 OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,11L #define SN_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12 "wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls12" #define NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12 745 #define OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12 OBJ_wap_wsg_idm_ecid,12L #define SN_cast5_cbc "CAST5-CBC" #define LN_cast5_cbc "cast5-cbc" #define NID_cast5_cbc 108 #define OBJ_cast5_cbc OBJ_ISO_US,113533L,7L,66L,10L #define SN_cast5_ecb "CAST5-ECB" #define LN_cast5_ecb "cast5-ecb" #define NID_cast5_ecb 109 #define SN_cast5_cfb64 "CAST5-CFB" #define LN_cast5_cfb64 "cast5-cfb" #define NID_cast5_cfb64 110 #define SN_cast5_ofb64 "CAST5-OFB" #define LN_cast5_ofb64 "cast5-ofb" #define NID_cast5_ofb64 111 #define LN_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC "pbeWithMD5AndCast5CBC" #define NID_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC 112 #define OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndCast5_CBC OBJ_ISO_US,113533L,7L,66L,12L #define SN_id_PasswordBasedMAC "id-PasswordBasedMAC" #define LN_id_PasswordBasedMAC "password based MAC" #define NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC 782 #define OBJ_id_PasswordBasedMAC OBJ_ISO_US,113533L,7L,66L,13L #define SN_id_DHBasedMac "id-DHBasedMac" #define LN_id_DHBasedMac "Diffie-Hellman based MAC" #define NID_id_DHBasedMac 783 #define OBJ_id_DHBasedMac OBJ_ISO_US,113533L,7L,66L,30L #define SN_rsadsi "rsadsi" #define LN_rsadsi "RSA Data Security, Inc." #define NID_rsadsi 1 #define OBJ_rsadsi OBJ_ISO_US,113549L #define SN_pkcs "pkcs" #define LN_pkcs "RSA Data Security, Inc. PKCS" #define NID_pkcs 2 #define OBJ_pkcs OBJ_rsadsi,1L #define SN_pkcs1 "pkcs1" #define NID_pkcs1 186 #define OBJ_pkcs1 OBJ_pkcs,1L #define LN_rsaEncryption "rsaEncryption" #define NID_rsaEncryption 6 #define OBJ_rsaEncryption OBJ_pkcs1,1L #define SN_md2WithRSAEncryption "RSA-MD2" #define LN_md2WithRSAEncryption "md2WithRSAEncryption" #define NID_md2WithRSAEncryption 7 #define OBJ_md2WithRSAEncryption OBJ_pkcs1,2L #define SN_md4WithRSAEncryption "RSA-MD4" #define LN_md4WithRSAEncryption "md4WithRSAEncryption" #define NID_md4WithRSAEncryption 396 #define OBJ_md4WithRSAEncryption OBJ_pkcs1,3L #define SN_md5WithRSAEncryption "RSA-MD5" #define LN_md5WithRSAEncryption "md5WithRSAEncryption" #define NID_md5WithRSAEncryption 8 #define OBJ_md5WithRSAEncryption OBJ_pkcs1,4L #define SN_sha1WithRSAEncryption "RSA-SHA1" #define LN_sha1WithRSAEncryption "sha1WithRSAEncryption" #define NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption 65 #define OBJ_sha1WithRSAEncryption OBJ_pkcs1,5L #define SN_rsaesOaep "RSAES-OAEP" #define LN_rsaesOaep "rsaesOaep" #define NID_rsaesOaep 919 #define OBJ_rsaesOaep OBJ_pkcs1,7L #define SN_mgf1 "MGF1" #define LN_mgf1 "mgf1" #define NID_mgf1 911 #define OBJ_mgf1 OBJ_pkcs1,8L #define SN_pSpecified "PSPECIFIED" #define LN_pSpecified "pSpecified" #define NID_pSpecified 935 #define OBJ_pSpecified OBJ_pkcs1,9L #define SN_rsassaPss "RSASSA-PSS" #define LN_rsassaPss "rsassaPss" #define NID_rsassaPss 912 #define OBJ_rsassaPss OBJ_pkcs1,10L #define SN_sha256WithRSAEncryption "RSA-SHA256" #define LN_sha256WithRSAEncryption "sha256WithRSAEncryption" #define NID_sha256WithRSAEncryption 668 #define OBJ_sha256WithRSAEncryption OBJ_pkcs1,11L #define SN_sha384WithRSAEncryption "RSA-SHA384" #define LN_sha384WithRSAEncryption "sha384WithRSAEncryption" #define NID_sha384WithRSAEncryption 669 #define OBJ_sha384WithRSAEncryption OBJ_pkcs1,12L #define SN_sha512WithRSAEncryption "RSA-SHA512" #define LN_sha512WithRSAEncryption "sha512WithRSAEncryption" #define NID_sha512WithRSAEncryption 670 #define OBJ_sha512WithRSAEncryption OBJ_pkcs1,13L #define SN_sha224WithRSAEncryption "RSA-SHA224" #define LN_sha224WithRSAEncryption "sha224WithRSAEncryption" #define NID_sha224WithRSAEncryption 671 #define OBJ_sha224WithRSAEncryption OBJ_pkcs1,14L #define SN_sha512_224WithRSAEncryption "RSA-SHA512/224" #define LN_sha512_224WithRSAEncryption "sha512-224WithRSAEncryption" #define NID_sha512_224WithRSAEncryption 1145 #define OBJ_sha512_224WithRSAEncryption OBJ_pkcs1,15L #define SN_sha512_256WithRSAEncryption "RSA-SHA512/256" #define LN_sha512_256WithRSAEncryption "sha512-256WithRSAEncryption" #define NID_sha512_256WithRSAEncryption 1146 #define OBJ_sha512_256WithRSAEncryption OBJ_pkcs1,16L #define SN_pkcs3 "pkcs3" #define NID_pkcs3 27 #define OBJ_pkcs3 OBJ_pkcs,3L #define LN_dhKeyAgreement "dhKeyAgreement" #define NID_dhKeyAgreement 28 #define OBJ_dhKeyAgreement OBJ_pkcs3,1L #define SN_pkcs5 "pkcs5" #define NID_pkcs5 187 #define OBJ_pkcs5 OBJ_pkcs,5L #define SN_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC "PBE-MD2-DES" #define LN_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC "pbeWithMD2AndDES-CBC" #define NID_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC 9 #define OBJ_pbeWithMD2AndDES_CBC OBJ_pkcs5,1L #define SN_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC "PBE-MD5-DES" #define LN_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC "pbeWithMD5AndDES-CBC" #define NID_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC 10 #define OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndDES_CBC OBJ_pkcs5,3L #define SN_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC "PBE-MD2-RC2-64" #define LN_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC "pbeWithMD2AndRC2-CBC" #define NID_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC 168 #define OBJ_pbeWithMD2AndRC2_CBC OBJ_pkcs5,4L #define SN_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC "PBE-MD5-RC2-64" #define LN_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC "pbeWithMD5AndRC2-CBC" #define NID_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC 169 #define OBJ_pbeWithMD5AndRC2_CBC OBJ_pkcs5,6L #define SN_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC "PBE-SHA1-DES" #define LN_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC "pbeWithSHA1AndDES-CBC" #define NID_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC 170 #define OBJ_pbeWithSHA1AndDES_CBC OBJ_pkcs5,10L #define SN_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC "PBE-SHA1-RC2-64" #define LN_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC "pbeWithSHA1AndRC2-CBC" #define NID_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC 68 #define OBJ_pbeWithSHA1AndRC2_CBC OBJ_pkcs5,11L #define LN_id_pbkdf2 "PBKDF2" #define NID_id_pbkdf2 69 #define OBJ_id_pbkdf2 OBJ_pkcs5,12L #define LN_pbes2 "PBES2" #define NID_pbes2 161 #define OBJ_pbes2 OBJ_pkcs5,13L #define LN_pbmac1 "PBMAC1" #define NID_pbmac1 162 #define OBJ_pbmac1 OBJ_pkcs5,14L #define SN_pkcs7 "pkcs7" #define NID_pkcs7 20 #define OBJ_pkcs7 OBJ_pkcs,7L #define LN_pkcs7_data "pkcs7-data" #define NID_pkcs7_data 21 #define OBJ_pkcs7_data OBJ_pkcs7,1L #define LN_pkcs7_signed "pkcs7-signedData" #define NID_pkcs7_signed 22 #define OBJ_pkcs7_signed OBJ_pkcs7,2L #define LN_pkcs7_enveloped "pkcs7-envelopedData" #define NID_pkcs7_enveloped 23 #define OBJ_pkcs7_enveloped OBJ_pkcs7,3L #define LN_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped "pkcs7-signedAndEnvelopedData" #define NID_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped 24 #define OBJ_pkcs7_signedAndEnveloped OBJ_pkcs7,4L #define LN_pkcs7_digest "pkcs7-digestData" #define NID_pkcs7_digest 25 #define OBJ_pkcs7_digest OBJ_pkcs7,5L #define LN_pkcs7_encrypted "pkcs7-encryptedData" #define NID_pkcs7_encrypted 26 #define OBJ_pkcs7_encrypted OBJ_pkcs7,6L #define SN_pkcs9 "pkcs9" #define NID_pkcs9 47 #define OBJ_pkcs9 OBJ_pkcs,9L #define LN_pkcs9_emailAddress "emailAddress" #define NID_pkcs9_emailAddress 48 #define OBJ_pkcs9_emailAddress OBJ_pkcs9,1L #define LN_pkcs9_unstructuredName "unstructuredName" #define NID_pkcs9_unstructuredName 49 #define OBJ_pkcs9_unstructuredName OBJ_pkcs9,2L #define LN_pkcs9_contentType "contentType" #define NID_pkcs9_contentType 50 #define OBJ_pkcs9_contentType OBJ_pkcs9,3L #define LN_pkcs9_messageDigest "messageDigest" #define NID_pkcs9_messageDigest 51 #define OBJ_pkcs9_messageDigest OBJ_pkcs9,4L #define LN_pkcs9_signingTime "signingTime" #define NID_pkcs9_signingTime 52 #define OBJ_pkcs9_signingTime OBJ_pkcs9,5L #define LN_pkcs9_countersignature "countersignature" #define NID_pkcs9_countersignature 53 #define OBJ_pkcs9_countersignature OBJ_pkcs9,6L #define LN_pkcs9_challengePassword "challengePassword" #define NID_pkcs9_challengePassword 54 #define OBJ_pkcs9_challengePassword OBJ_pkcs9,7L #define LN_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress "unstructuredAddress" #define NID_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress 55 #define OBJ_pkcs9_unstructuredAddress OBJ_pkcs9,8L #define LN_pkcs9_extCertAttributes "extendedCertificateAttributes" #define NID_pkcs9_extCertAttributes 56 #define OBJ_pkcs9_extCertAttributes OBJ_pkcs9,9L #define SN_ext_req "extReq" #define LN_ext_req "Extension Request" #define NID_ext_req 172 #define OBJ_ext_req OBJ_pkcs9,14L #define SN_SMIMECapabilities "SMIME-CAPS" #define LN_SMIMECapabilities "S/MIME Capabilities" #define NID_SMIMECapabilities 167 #define OBJ_SMIMECapabilities OBJ_pkcs9,15L #define SN_SMIME "SMIME" #define LN_SMIME "S/MIME" #define NID_SMIME 188 #define OBJ_SMIME OBJ_pkcs9,16L #define SN_id_smime_mod "id-smime-mod" #define NID_id_smime_mod 189 #define OBJ_id_smime_mod OBJ_SMIME,0L #define SN_id_smime_ct "id-smime-ct" #define NID_id_smime_ct 190 #define OBJ_id_smime_ct OBJ_SMIME,1L #define SN_id_smime_aa "id-smime-aa" #define NID_id_smime_aa 191 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa OBJ_SMIME,2L #define SN_id_smime_alg "id-smime-alg" #define NID_id_smime_alg 192 #define OBJ_id_smime_alg OBJ_SMIME,3L #define SN_id_smime_cd "id-smime-cd" #define NID_id_smime_cd 193 #define OBJ_id_smime_cd OBJ_SMIME,4L #define SN_id_smime_spq "id-smime-spq" #define NID_id_smime_spq 194 #define OBJ_id_smime_spq OBJ_SMIME,5L #define SN_id_smime_cti "id-smime-cti" #define NID_id_smime_cti 195 #define OBJ_id_smime_cti OBJ_SMIME,6L #define SN_id_smime_mod_cms "id-smime-mod-cms" #define NID_id_smime_mod_cms 196 #define OBJ_id_smime_mod_cms OBJ_id_smime_mod,1L #define SN_id_smime_mod_ess "id-smime-mod-ess" #define NID_id_smime_mod_ess 197 #define OBJ_id_smime_mod_ess OBJ_id_smime_mod,2L #define SN_id_smime_mod_oid "id-smime-mod-oid" #define NID_id_smime_mod_oid 198 #define OBJ_id_smime_mod_oid OBJ_id_smime_mod,3L #define SN_id_smime_mod_msg_v3 "id-smime-mod-msg-v3" #define NID_id_smime_mod_msg_v3 199 #define OBJ_id_smime_mod_msg_v3 OBJ_id_smime_mod,4L #define SN_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_88 "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-88" #define NID_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_88 200 #define OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_88 OBJ_id_smime_mod,5L #define SN_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_97 "id-smime-mod-ets-eSignature-97" #define NID_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_97 201 #define OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSignature_97 OBJ_id_smime_mod,6L #define SN_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_88 "id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-88" #define NID_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_88 202 #define OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_88 OBJ_id_smime_mod,7L #define SN_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_97 "id-smime-mod-ets-eSigPolicy-97" #define NID_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_97 203 #define OBJ_id_smime_mod_ets_eSigPolicy_97 OBJ_id_smime_mod,8L #define SN_id_smime_ct_receipt "id-smime-ct-receipt" #define NID_id_smime_ct_receipt 204 #define OBJ_id_smime_ct_receipt OBJ_id_smime_ct,1L #define SN_id_smime_ct_authData "id-smime-ct-authData" #define NID_id_smime_ct_authData 205 #define OBJ_id_smime_ct_authData OBJ_id_smime_ct,2L #define SN_id_smime_ct_publishCert "id-smime-ct-publishCert" #define NID_id_smime_ct_publishCert 206 #define OBJ_id_smime_ct_publishCert OBJ_id_smime_ct,3L #define SN_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo "id-smime-ct-TSTInfo" #define NID_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo 207 #define OBJ_id_smime_ct_TSTInfo OBJ_id_smime_ct,4L #define SN_id_smime_ct_TDTInfo "id-smime-ct-TDTInfo" #define NID_id_smime_ct_TDTInfo 208 #define OBJ_id_smime_ct_TDTInfo OBJ_id_smime_ct,5L #define SN_id_smime_ct_contentInfo "id-smime-ct-contentInfo" #define NID_id_smime_ct_contentInfo 209 #define OBJ_id_smime_ct_contentInfo OBJ_id_smime_ct,6L #define SN_id_smime_ct_DVCSRequestData "id-smime-ct-DVCSRequestData" #define NID_id_smime_ct_DVCSRequestData 210 #define OBJ_id_smime_ct_DVCSRequestData OBJ_id_smime_ct,7L #define SN_id_smime_ct_DVCSResponseData "id-smime-ct-DVCSResponseData" #define NID_id_smime_ct_DVCSResponseData 211 #define OBJ_id_smime_ct_DVCSResponseData OBJ_id_smime_ct,8L #define SN_id_smime_ct_compressedData "id-smime-ct-compressedData" #define NID_id_smime_ct_compressedData 786 #define OBJ_id_smime_ct_compressedData OBJ_id_smime_ct,9L #define SN_id_smime_ct_contentCollection "id-smime-ct-contentCollection" #define NID_id_smime_ct_contentCollection 1058 #define OBJ_id_smime_ct_contentCollection OBJ_id_smime_ct,19L #define SN_id_smime_ct_authEnvelopedData "id-smime-ct-authEnvelopedData" #define NID_id_smime_ct_authEnvelopedData 1059 #define OBJ_id_smime_ct_authEnvelopedData OBJ_id_smime_ct,23L #define SN_id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF "id-ct-asciiTextWithCRLF" #define NID_id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF 787 #define OBJ_id_ct_asciiTextWithCRLF OBJ_id_smime_ct,27L #define SN_id_ct_xml "id-ct-xml" #define NID_id_ct_xml 1060 #define OBJ_id_ct_xml OBJ_id_smime_ct,28L #define SN_id_smime_aa_receiptRequest "id-smime-aa-receiptRequest" #define NID_id_smime_aa_receiptRequest 212 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_receiptRequest OBJ_id_smime_aa,1L #define SN_id_smime_aa_securityLabel "id-smime-aa-securityLabel" #define NID_id_smime_aa_securityLabel 213 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_securityLabel OBJ_id_smime_aa,2L #define SN_id_smime_aa_mlExpandHistory "id-smime-aa-mlExpandHistory" #define NID_id_smime_aa_mlExpandHistory 214 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_mlExpandHistory OBJ_id_smime_aa,3L #define SN_id_smime_aa_contentHint "id-smime-aa-contentHint" #define NID_id_smime_aa_contentHint 215 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentHint OBJ_id_smime_aa,4L #define SN_id_smime_aa_msgSigDigest "id-smime-aa-msgSigDigest" #define NID_id_smime_aa_msgSigDigest 216 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_msgSigDigest OBJ_id_smime_aa,5L #define SN_id_smime_aa_encapContentType "id-smime-aa-encapContentType" #define NID_id_smime_aa_encapContentType 217 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_encapContentType OBJ_id_smime_aa,6L #define SN_id_smime_aa_contentIdentifier "id-smime-aa-contentIdentifier" #define NID_id_smime_aa_contentIdentifier 218 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentIdentifier OBJ_id_smime_aa,7L #define SN_id_smime_aa_macValue "id-smime-aa-macValue" #define NID_id_smime_aa_macValue 219 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_macValue OBJ_id_smime_aa,8L #define SN_id_smime_aa_equivalentLabels "id-smime-aa-equivalentLabels" #define NID_id_smime_aa_equivalentLabels 220 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_equivalentLabels OBJ_id_smime_aa,9L #define SN_id_smime_aa_contentReference "id-smime-aa-contentReference" #define NID_id_smime_aa_contentReference 221 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_contentReference OBJ_id_smime_aa,10L #define SN_id_smime_aa_encrypKeyPref "id-smime-aa-encrypKeyPref" #define NID_id_smime_aa_encrypKeyPref 222 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_encrypKeyPref OBJ_id_smime_aa,11L #define SN_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate "id-smime-aa-signingCertificate" #define NID_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate 223 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_signingCertificate OBJ_id_smime_aa,12L #define SN_id_smime_aa_smimeEncryptCerts "id-smime-aa-smimeEncryptCerts" #define NID_id_smime_aa_smimeEncryptCerts 224 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_smimeEncryptCerts OBJ_id_smime_aa,13L #define SN_id_smime_aa_timeStampToken "id-smime-aa-timeStampToken" #define NID_id_smime_aa_timeStampToken 225 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_timeStampToken OBJ_id_smime_aa,14L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_sigPolicyId "id-smime-aa-ets-sigPolicyId" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_sigPolicyId 226 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_sigPolicyId OBJ_id_smime_aa,15L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_commitmentType "id-smime-aa-ets-commitmentType" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_commitmentType 227 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_commitmentType OBJ_id_smime_aa,16L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_signerLocation "id-smime-aa-ets-signerLocation" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_signerLocation 228 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_signerLocation OBJ_id_smime_aa,17L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_signerAttr "id-smime-aa-ets-signerAttr" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_signerAttr 229 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_signerAttr OBJ_id_smime_aa,18L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_otherSigCert "id-smime-aa-ets-otherSigCert" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_otherSigCert 230 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_otherSigCert OBJ_id_smime_aa,19L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_contentTimestamp "id-smime-aa-ets-contentTimestamp" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_contentTimestamp 231 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_contentTimestamp OBJ_id_smime_aa,20L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_CertificateRefs "id-smime-aa-ets-CertificateRefs" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_CertificateRefs 232 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_CertificateRefs OBJ_id_smime_aa,21L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_RevocationRefs "id-smime-aa-ets-RevocationRefs" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_RevocationRefs 233 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_RevocationRefs OBJ_id_smime_aa,22L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_certValues "id-smime-aa-ets-certValues" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_certValues 234 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_certValues OBJ_id_smime_aa,23L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_revocationValues "id-smime-aa-ets-revocationValues" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_revocationValues 235 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_revocationValues OBJ_id_smime_aa,24L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_escTimeStamp "id-smime-aa-ets-escTimeStamp" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_escTimeStamp 236 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_escTimeStamp OBJ_id_smime_aa,25L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_certCRLTimestamp "id-smime-aa-ets-certCRLTimestamp" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_certCRLTimestamp 237 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_certCRLTimestamp OBJ_id_smime_aa,26L #define SN_id_smime_aa_ets_archiveTimeStamp "id-smime-aa-ets-archiveTimeStamp" #define NID_id_smime_aa_ets_archiveTimeStamp 238 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_ets_archiveTimeStamp OBJ_id_smime_aa,27L #define SN_id_smime_aa_signatureType "id-smime-aa-signatureType" #define NID_id_smime_aa_signatureType 239 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_signatureType OBJ_id_smime_aa,28L #define SN_id_smime_aa_dvcs_dvc "id-smime-aa-dvcs-dvc" #define NID_id_smime_aa_dvcs_dvc 240 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_dvcs_dvc OBJ_id_smime_aa,29L #define SN_id_smime_aa_signingCertificateV2 "id-smime-aa-signingCertificateV2" #define NID_id_smime_aa_signingCertificateV2 1086 #define OBJ_id_smime_aa_signingCertificateV2 OBJ_id_smime_aa,47L #define SN_id_smime_alg_ESDHwith3DES "id-smime-alg-ESDHwith3DES" #define NID_id_smime_alg_ESDHwith3DES 241 #define OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDHwith3DES OBJ_id_smime_alg,1L #define SN_id_smime_alg_ESDHwithRC2 "id-smime-alg-ESDHwithRC2" #define NID_id_smime_alg_ESDHwithRC2 242 #define OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDHwithRC2 OBJ_id_smime_alg,2L #define SN_id_smime_alg_3DESwrap "id-smime-alg-3DESwrap" #define NID_id_smime_alg_3DESwrap 243 #define OBJ_id_smime_alg_3DESwrap OBJ_id_smime_alg,3L #define SN_id_smime_alg_RC2wrap "id-smime-alg-RC2wrap" #define NID_id_smime_alg_RC2wrap 244 #define OBJ_id_smime_alg_RC2wrap OBJ_id_smime_alg,4L #define SN_id_smime_alg_ESDH "id-smime-alg-ESDH" #define NID_id_smime_alg_ESDH 245 #define OBJ_id_smime_alg_ESDH OBJ_id_smime_alg,5L #define SN_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap "id-smime-alg-CMS3DESwrap" #define NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap 246 #define OBJ_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap OBJ_id_smime_alg,6L #define SN_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap "id-smime-alg-CMSRC2wrap" #define NID_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap 247 #define OBJ_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap OBJ_id_smime_alg,7L #define SN_id_alg_PWRI_KEK "id-alg-PWRI-KEK" #define NID_id_alg_PWRI_KEK 893 #define OBJ_id_alg_PWRI_KEK OBJ_id_smime_alg,9L #define SN_id_smime_cd_ldap "id-smime-cd-ldap" #define NID_id_smime_cd_ldap 248 #define OBJ_id_smime_cd_ldap OBJ_id_smime_cd,1L #define SN_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_uri "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-uri" #define NID_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_uri 249 #define OBJ_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_uri OBJ_id_smime_spq,1L #define SN_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_unotice "id-smime-spq-ets-sqt-unotice" #define NID_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_unotice 250 #define OBJ_id_smime_spq_ets_sqt_unotice OBJ_id_smime_spq,2L #define SN_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfOrigin "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfOrigin" #define NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfOrigin 251 #define OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfOrigin OBJ_id_smime_cti,1L #define SN_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfReceipt "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfReceipt" #define NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfReceipt 252 #define OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfReceipt OBJ_id_smime_cti,2L #define SN_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfDelivery "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfDelivery" #define NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfDelivery 253 #define OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfDelivery OBJ_id_smime_cti,3L #define SN_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfSender "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfSender" #define NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfSender 254 #define OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfSender OBJ_id_smime_cti,4L #define SN_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfApproval "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfApproval" #define NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfApproval 255 #define OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfApproval OBJ_id_smime_cti,5L #define SN_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfCreation "id-smime-cti-ets-proofOfCreation" #define NID_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfCreation 256 #define OBJ_id_smime_cti_ets_proofOfCreation OBJ_id_smime_cti,6L #define LN_friendlyName "friendlyName" #define NID_friendlyName 156 #define OBJ_friendlyName OBJ_pkcs9,20L #define LN_localKeyID "localKeyID" #define NID_localKeyID 157 #define OBJ_localKeyID OBJ_pkcs9,21L #define SN_ms_csp_name "CSPName" #define LN_ms_csp_name "Microsoft CSP Name" #define NID_ms_csp_name 417 #define OBJ_ms_csp_name 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,17L,1L #define SN_LocalKeySet "LocalKeySet" #define LN_LocalKeySet "Microsoft Local Key set" #define NID_LocalKeySet 856 #define OBJ_LocalKeySet 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,17L,2L #define OBJ_certTypes OBJ_pkcs9,22L #define LN_x509Certificate "x509Certificate" #define NID_x509Certificate 158 #define OBJ_x509Certificate OBJ_certTypes,1L #define LN_sdsiCertificate "sdsiCertificate" #define NID_sdsiCertificate 159 #define OBJ_sdsiCertificate OBJ_certTypes,2L #define OBJ_crlTypes OBJ_pkcs9,23L #define LN_x509Crl "x509Crl" #define NID_x509Crl 160 #define OBJ_x509Crl OBJ_crlTypes,1L #define OBJ_pkcs12 OBJ_pkcs,12L #define OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids OBJ_pkcs12,1L #define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4 "PBE-SHA1-RC4-128" #define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4 "pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC4" #define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4 144 #define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC4 OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids,1L #define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4 "PBE-SHA1-RC4-40" #define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4 "pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC4" #define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4 145 #define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC4 OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids,2L #define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC "PBE-SHA1-3DES" #define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC "pbeWithSHA1And3-KeyTripleDES-CBC" #define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC 146 #define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And3_Key_TripleDES_CBC OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids,3L #define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC "PBE-SHA1-2DES" #define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC "pbeWithSHA1And2-KeyTripleDES-CBC" #define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC 147 #define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And2_Key_TripleDES_CBC OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids,4L #define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC "PBE-SHA1-RC2-128" #define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC "pbeWithSHA1And128BitRC2-CBC" #define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC 148 #define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And128BitRC2_CBC OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids,5L #define SN_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC "PBE-SHA1-RC2-40" #define LN_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC "pbeWithSHA1And40BitRC2-CBC" #define NID_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC 149 #define OBJ_pbe_WithSHA1And40BitRC2_CBC OBJ_pkcs12_pbeids,6L #define OBJ_pkcs12_Version1 OBJ_pkcs12,10L #define OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds OBJ_pkcs12_Version1,1L #define LN_keyBag "keyBag" #define NID_keyBag 150 #define OBJ_keyBag OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds,1L #define LN_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag "pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag" #define NID_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag 151 #define OBJ_pkcs8ShroudedKeyBag OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds,2L #define LN_certBag "certBag" #define NID_certBag 152 #define OBJ_certBag OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds,3L #define LN_crlBag "crlBag" #define NID_crlBag 153 #define OBJ_crlBag OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds,4L #define LN_secretBag "secretBag" #define NID_secretBag 154 #define OBJ_secretBag OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds,5L #define LN_safeContentsBag "safeContentsBag" #define NID_safeContentsBag 155 #define OBJ_safeContentsBag OBJ_pkcs12_BagIds,6L #define SN_md2 "MD2" #define LN_md2 "md2" #define NID_md2 3 #define OBJ_md2 OBJ_rsadsi,2L,2L #define SN_md4 "MD4" #define LN_md4 "md4" #define NID_md4 257 #define OBJ_md4 OBJ_rsadsi,2L,4L #define SN_md5 "MD5" #define LN_md5 "md5" #define NID_md5 4 #define OBJ_md5 OBJ_rsadsi,2L,5L #define SN_md5_sha1 "MD5-SHA1" #define LN_md5_sha1 "md5-sha1" #define NID_md5_sha1 114 #define LN_hmacWithMD5 "hmacWithMD5" #define NID_hmacWithMD5 797 #define OBJ_hmacWithMD5 OBJ_rsadsi,2L,6L #define LN_hmacWithSHA1 "hmacWithSHA1" #define NID_hmacWithSHA1 163 #define OBJ_hmacWithSHA1 OBJ_rsadsi,2L,7L #define SN_sm2 "SM2" #define LN_sm2 "sm2" #define NID_sm2 1172 #define OBJ_sm2 OBJ_sm_scheme,301L #define SN_sm3 "SM3" #define LN_sm3 "sm3" #define NID_sm3 1143 #define OBJ_sm3 OBJ_sm_scheme,401L #define SN_sm3WithRSAEncryption "RSA-SM3" #define LN_sm3WithRSAEncryption "sm3WithRSAEncryption" #define NID_sm3WithRSAEncryption 1144 #define OBJ_sm3WithRSAEncryption OBJ_sm_scheme,504L #define LN_hmacWithSHA224 "hmacWithSHA224" #define NID_hmacWithSHA224 798 #define OBJ_hmacWithSHA224 OBJ_rsadsi,2L,8L #define LN_hmacWithSHA256 "hmacWithSHA256" #define NID_hmacWithSHA256 799 #define OBJ_hmacWithSHA256 OBJ_rsadsi,2L,9L #define LN_hmacWithSHA384 "hmacWithSHA384" #define NID_hmacWithSHA384 800 #define OBJ_hmacWithSHA384 OBJ_rsadsi,2L,10L #define LN_hmacWithSHA512 "hmacWithSHA512" #define NID_hmacWithSHA512 801 #define OBJ_hmacWithSHA512 OBJ_rsadsi,2L,11L #define LN_hmacWithSHA512_224 "hmacWithSHA512-224" #define NID_hmacWithSHA512_224 1193 #define OBJ_hmacWithSHA512_224 OBJ_rsadsi,2L,12L #define LN_hmacWithSHA512_256 "hmacWithSHA512-256" #define NID_hmacWithSHA512_256 1194 #define OBJ_hmacWithSHA512_256 OBJ_rsadsi,2L,13L #define SN_rc2_cbc "RC2-CBC" #define LN_rc2_cbc "rc2-cbc" #define NID_rc2_cbc 37 #define OBJ_rc2_cbc OBJ_rsadsi,3L,2L #define SN_rc2_ecb "RC2-ECB" #define LN_rc2_ecb "rc2-ecb" #define NID_rc2_ecb 38 #define SN_rc2_cfb64 "RC2-CFB" #define LN_rc2_cfb64 "rc2-cfb" #define NID_rc2_cfb64 39 #define SN_rc2_ofb64 "RC2-OFB" #define LN_rc2_ofb64 "rc2-ofb" #define NID_rc2_ofb64 40 #define SN_rc2_40_cbc "RC2-40-CBC" #define LN_rc2_40_cbc "rc2-40-cbc" #define NID_rc2_40_cbc 98 #define SN_rc2_64_cbc "RC2-64-CBC" #define LN_rc2_64_cbc "rc2-64-cbc" #define NID_rc2_64_cbc 166 #define SN_rc4 "RC4" #define LN_rc4 "rc4" #define NID_rc4 5 #define OBJ_rc4 OBJ_rsadsi,3L,4L #define SN_rc4_40 "RC4-40" #define LN_rc4_40 "rc4-40" #define NID_rc4_40 97 #define SN_des_ede3_cbc "DES-EDE3-CBC" #define LN_des_ede3_cbc "des-ede3-cbc" #define NID_des_ede3_cbc 44 #define OBJ_des_ede3_cbc OBJ_rsadsi,3L,7L #define SN_rc5_cbc "RC5-CBC" #define LN_rc5_cbc "rc5-cbc" #define NID_rc5_cbc 120 #define OBJ_rc5_cbc OBJ_rsadsi,3L,8L #define SN_rc5_ecb "RC5-ECB" #define LN_rc5_ecb "rc5-ecb" #define NID_rc5_ecb 121 #define SN_rc5_cfb64 "RC5-CFB" #define LN_rc5_cfb64 "rc5-cfb" #define NID_rc5_cfb64 122 #define SN_rc5_ofb64 "RC5-OFB" #define LN_rc5_ofb64 "rc5-ofb" #define NID_rc5_ofb64 123 #define SN_ms_ext_req "msExtReq" #define LN_ms_ext_req "Microsoft Extension Request" #define NID_ms_ext_req 171 #define OBJ_ms_ext_req 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,2L,1L,14L #define SN_ms_code_ind "msCodeInd" #define LN_ms_code_ind "Microsoft Individual Code Signing" #define NID_ms_code_ind 134 #define OBJ_ms_code_ind 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,2L,1L,21L #define SN_ms_code_com "msCodeCom" #define LN_ms_code_com "Microsoft Commercial Code Signing" #define NID_ms_code_com 135 #define OBJ_ms_code_com 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,2L,1L,22L #define SN_ms_ctl_sign "msCTLSign" #define LN_ms_ctl_sign "Microsoft Trust List Signing" #define NID_ms_ctl_sign 136 #define OBJ_ms_ctl_sign 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,10L,3L,1L #define SN_ms_sgc "msSGC" #define LN_ms_sgc "Microsoft Server Gated Crypto" #define NID_ms_sgc 137 #define OBJ_ms_sgc 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,10L,3L,3L #define SN_ms_efs "msEFS" #define LN_ms_efs "Microsoft Encrypted File System" #define NID_ms_efs 138 #define OBJ_ms_efs 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,10L,3L,4L #define SN_ms_smartcard_login "msSmartcardLogin" #define LN_ms_smartcard_login "Microsoft Smartcard Login" #define NID_ms_smartcard_login 648 #define OBJ_ms_smartcard_login 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,20L,2L,2L #define SN_ms_upn "msUPN" #define LN_ms_upn "Microsoft User Principal Name" #define NID_ms_upn 649 #define OBJ_ms_upn 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,20L,2L,3L #define SN_idea_cbc "IDEA-CBC" #define LN_idea_cbc "idea-cbc" #define NID_idea_cbc 34 #define OBJ_idea_cbc 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,188L,7L,1L,1L,2L #define SN_idea_ecb "IDEA-ECB" #define LN_idea_ecb "idea-ecb" #define NID_idea_ecb 36 #define SN_idea_cfb64 "IDEA-CFB" #define LN_idea_cfb64 "idea-cfb" #define NID_idea_cfb64 35 #define SN_idea_ofb64 "IDEA-OFB" #define LN_idea_ofb64 "idea-ofb" #define NID_idea_ofb64 46 #define SN_bf_cbc "BF-CBC" #define LN_bf_cbc "bf-cbc" #define NID_bf_cbc 91 #define OBJ_bf_cbc 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,3029L,1L,2L #define SN_bf_ecb "BF-ECB" #define LN_bf_ecb "bf-ecb" #define NID_bf_ecb 92 #define SN_bf_cfb64 "BF-CFB" #define LN_bf_cfb64 "bf-cfb" #define NID_bf_cfb64 93 #define SN_bf_ofb64 "BF-OFB" #define LN_bf_ofb64 "bf-ofb" #define NID_bf_ofb64 94 #define SN_id_pkix "PKIX" #define NID_id_pkix 127 #define OBJ_id_pkix 1L,3L,6L,1L,5L,5L,7L #define SN_id_pkix_mod "id-pkix-mod" #define NID_id_pkix_mod 258 #define OBJ_id_pkix_mod OBJ_id_pkix,0L #define SN_id_pe "id-pe" #define NID_id_pe 175 #define OBJ_id_pe OBJ_id_pkix,1L #define SN_id_qt "id-qt" #define NID_id_qt 259 #define OBJ_id_qt OBJ_id_pkix,2L #define SN_id_kp "id-kp" #define NID_id_kp 128 #define OBJ_id_kp OBJ_id_pkix,3L #define SN_id_it "id-it" #define NID_id_it 260 #define OBJ_id_it OBJ_id_pkix,4L #define SN_id_pkip "id-pkip" #define NID_id_pkip 261 #define OBJ_id_pkip OBJ_id_pkix,5L #define SN_id_alg "id-alg" #define NID_id_alg 262 #define OBJ_id_alg OBJ_id_pkix,6L #define SN_id_cmc "id-cmc" #define NID_id_cmc 263 #define OBJ_id_cmc OBJ_id_pkix,7L #define SN_id_on "id-on" #define NID_id_on 264 #define OBJ_id_on OBJ_id_pkix,8L #define SN_id_pda "id-pda" #define NID_id_pda 265 #define OBJ_id_pda OBJ_id_pkix,9L #define SN_id_aca "id-aca" #define NID_id_aca 266 #define OBJ_id_aca OBJ_id_pkix,10L #define SN_id_qcs "id-qcs" #define NID_id_qcs 267 #define OBJ_id_qcs OBJ_id_pkix,11L #define SN_id_cct "id-cct" #define NID_id_cct 268 #define OBJ_id_cct OBJ_id_pkix,12L #define SN_id_ppl "id-ppl" #define NID_id_ppl 662 #define OBJ_id_ppl OBJ_id_pkix,21L #define SN_id_ad "id-ad" #define NID_id_ad 176 #define OBJ_id_ad OBJ_id_pkix,48L #define SN_id_pkix1_explicit_88 "id-pkix1-explicit-88" #define NID_id_pkix1_explicit_88 269 #define OBJ_id_pkix1_explicit_88 OBJ_id_pkix_mod,1L #define SN_id_pkix1_implicit_88 "id-pkix1-implicit-88" #define NID_id_pkix1_implicit_88 270 #define OBJ_id_pkix1_implicit_88 OBJ_id_pkix_mod,2L #define SN_id_pkix1_explicit_93 "id-pkix1-explicit-93" #define NID_id_pkix1_explicit_93 271 #define OBJ_id_pkix1_explicit_93 OBJ_id_pkix_mod,3L #define SN_id_pkix1_implicit_93 "id-pkix1-implicit-93" #define NID_id_pkix1_implicit_93 272 #define OBJ_id_pkix1_implicit_93 OBJ_id_pkix_mod,4L #define SN_id_mod_crmf "id-mod-crmf" #define NID_id_mod_crmf 273 #define OBJ_id_mod_crmf OBJ_id_pkix_mod,5L #define SN_id_mod_cmc "id-mod-cmc" #define NID_id_mod_cmc 274 #define OBJ_id_mod_cmc OBJ_id_pkix_mod,6L #define SN_id_mod_kea_profile_88 "id-mod-kea-profile-88" #define NID_id_mod_kea_profile_88 275 #define OBJ_id_mod_kea_profile_88 OBJ_id_pkix_mod,7L #define SN_id_mod_kea_profile_93 "id-mod-kea-profile-93" #define NID_id_mod_kea_profile_93 276 #define OBJ_id_mod_kea_profile_93 OBJ_id_pkix_mod,8L #define SN_id_mod_cmp "id-mod-cmp" #define NID_id_mod_cmp 277 #define OBJ_id_mod_cmp OBJ_id_pkix_mod,9L #define SN_id_mod_qualified_cert_88 "id-mod-qualified-cert-88" #define NID_id_mod_qualified_cert_88 278 #define OBJ_id_mod_qualified_cert_88 OBJ_id_pkix_mod,10L #define SN_id_mod_qualified_cert_93 "id-mod-qualified-cert-93" #define NID_id_mod_qualified_cert_93 279 #define OBJ_id_mod_qualified_cert_93 OBJ_id_pkix_mod,11L #define SN_id_mod_attribute_cert "id-mod-attribute-cert" #define NID_id_mod_attribute_cert 280 #define OBJ_id_mod_attribute_cert OBJ_id_pkix_mod,12L #define SN_id_mod_timestamp_protocol "id-mod-timestamp-protocol" #define NID_id_mod_timestamp_protocol 281 #define OBJ_id_mod_timestamp_protocol OBJ_id_pkix_mod,13L #define SN_id_mod_ocsp "id-mod-ocsp" #define NID_id_mod_ocsp 282 #define OBJ_id_mod_ocsp OBJ_id_pkix_mod,14L #define SN_id_mod_dvcs "id-mod-dvcs" #define NID_id_mod_dvcs 283 #define OBJ_id_mod_dvcs OBJ_id_pkix_mod,15L #define SN_id_mod_cmp2000 "id-mod-cmp2000" #define NID_id_mod_cmp2000 284 #define OBJ_id_mod_cmp2000 OBJ_id_pkix_mod,16L #define SN_info_access "authorityInfoAccess" #define LN_info_access "Authority Information Access" #define NID_info_access 177 #define OBJ_info_access OBJ_id_pe,1L #define SN_biometricInfo "biometricInfo" #define LN_biometricInfo "Biometric Info" #define NID_biometricInfo 285 #define OBJ_biometricInfo OBJ_id_pe,2L #define SN_qcStatements "qcStatements" #define NID_qcStatements 286 #define OBJ_qcStatements OBJ_id_pe,3L #define SN_ac_auditEntity "ac-auditEntity" #define NID_ac_auditEntity 287 #define OBJ_ac_auditEntity OBJ_id_pe,4L #define SN_ac_targeting "ac-targeting" #define NID_ac_targeting 288 #define OBJ_ac_targeting OBJ_id_pe,5L #define SN_aaControls "aaControls" #define NID_aaControls 289 #define OBJ_aaControls OBJ_id_pe,6L #define SN_sbgp_ipAddrBlock "sbgp-ipAddrBlock" #define NID_sbgp_ipAddrBlock 290 #define OBJ_sbgp_ipAddrBlock OBJ_id_pe,7L #define SN_sbgp_autonomousSysNum "sbgp-autonomousSysNum" #define NID_sbgp_autonomousSysNum 291 #define OBJ_sbgp_autonomousSysNum OBJ_id_pe,8L #define SN_sbgp_routerIdentifier "sbgp-routerIdentifier" #define NID_sbgp_routerIdentifier 292 #define OBJ_sbgp_routerIdentifier OBJ_id_pe,9L #define SN_ac_proxying "ac-proxying" #define NID_ac_proxying 397 #define OBJ_ac_proxying OBJ_id_pe,10L #define SN_sinfo_access "subjectInfoAccess" #define LN_sinfo_access "Subject Information Access" #define NID_sinfo_access 398 #define OBJ_sinfo_access OBJ_id_pe,11L #define SN_proxyCertInfo "proxyCertInfo" #define LN_proxyCertInfo "Proxy Certificate Information" #define NID_proxyCertInfo 663 #define OBJ_proxyCertInfo OBJ_id_pe,14L #define SN_tlsfeature "tlsfeature" #define LN_tlsfeature "TLS Feature" #define NID_tlsfeature 1020 #define OBJ_tlsfeature OBJ_id_pe,24L #define SN_id_qt_cps "id-qt-cps" #define LN_id_qt_cps "Policy Qualifier CPS" #define NID_id_qt_cps 164 #define OBJ_id_qt_cps OBJ_id_qt,1L #define SN_id_qt_unotice "id-qt-unotice" #define LN_id_qt_unotice "Policy Qualifier User Notice" #define NID_id_qt_unotice 165 #define OBJ_id_qt_unotice OBJ_id_qt,2L #define SN_textNotice "textNotice" #define NID_textNotice 293 #define OBJ_textNotice OBJ_id_qt,3L #define SN_server_auth "serverAuth" #define LN_server_auth "TLS Web Server Authentication" #define NID_server_auth 129 #define OBJ_server_auth OBJ_id_kp,1L #define SN_client_auth "clientAuth" #define LN_client_auth "TLS Web Client Authentication" #define NID_client_auth 130 #define OBJ_client_auth OBJ_id_kp,2L #define SN_code_sign "codeSigning" #define LN_code_sign "Code Signing" #define NID_code_sign 131 #define OBJ_code_sign OBJ_id_kp,3L #define SN_email_protect "emailProtection" #define LN_email_protect "E-mail Protection" #define NID_email_protect 132 #define OBJ_email_protect OBJ_id_kp,4L #define SN_ipsecEndSystem "ipsecEndSystem" #define LN_ipsecEndSystem "IPSec End System" #define NID_ipsecEndSystem 294 #define OBJ_ipsecEndSystem OBJ_id_kp,5L #define SN_ipsecTunnel "ipsecTunnel" #define LN_ipsecTunnel "IPSec Tunnel" #define NID_ipsecTunnel 295 #define OBJ_ipsecTunnel OBJ_id_kp,6L #define SN_ipsecUser "ipsecUser" #define LN_ipsecUser "IPSec User" #define NID_ipsecUser 296 #define OBJ_ipsecUser OBJ_id_kp,7L #define SN_time_stamp "timeStamping" #define LN_time_stamp "Time Stamping" #define NID_time_stamp 133 #define OBJ_time_stamp OBJ_id_kp,8L #define SN_OCSP_sign "OCSPSigning" #define LN_OCSP_sign "OCSP Signing" #define NID_OCSP_sign 180 #define OBJ_OCSP_sign OBJ_id_kp,9L #define SN_dvcs "DVCS" #define LN_dvcs "dvcs" #define NID_dvcs 297 #define OBJ_dvcs OBJ_id_kp,10L #define SN_ipsec_IKE "ipsecIKE" #define LN_ipsec_IKE "ipsec Internet Key Exchange" #define NID_ipsec_IKE 1022 #define OBJ_ipsec_IKE OBJ_id_kp,17L #define SN_capwapAC "capwapAC" #define LN_capwapAC "Ctrl/provision WAP Access" #define NID_capwapAC 1023 #define OBJ_capwapAC OBJ_id_kp,18L #define SN_capwapWTP "capwapWTP" #define LN_capwapWTP "Ctrl/Provision WAP Termination" #define NID_capwapWTP 1024 #define OBJ_capwapWTP OBJ_id_kp,19L #define SN_sshClient "secureShellClient" #define LN_sshClient "SSH Client" #define NID_sshClient 1025 #define OBJ_sshClient OBJ_id_kp,21L #define SN_sshServer "secureShellServer" #define LN_sshServer "SSH Server" #define NID_sshServer 1026 #define OBJ_sshServer OBJ_id_kp,22L #define SN_sendRouter "sendRouter" #define LN_sendRouter "Send Router" #define NID_sendRouter 1027 #define OBJ_sendRouter OBJ_id_kp,23L #define SN_sendProxiedRouter "sendProxiedRouter" #define LN_sendProxiedRouter "Send Proxied Router" #define NID_sendProxiedRouter 1028 #define OBJ_sendProxiedRouter OBJ_id_kp,24L #define SN_sendOwner "sendOwner" #define LN_sendOwner "Send Owner" #define NID_sendOwner 1029 #define OBJ_sendOwner OBJ_id_kp,25L #define SN_sendProxiedOwner "sendProxiedOwner" #define LN_sendProxiedOwner "Send Proxied Owner" #define NID_sendProxiedOwner 1030 #define OBJ_sendProxiedOwner OBJ_id_kp,26L #define SN_cmcCA "cmcCA" #define LN_cmcCA "CMC Certificate Authority" #define NID_cmcCA 1131 #define OBJ_cmcCA OBJ_id_kp,27L #define SN_cmcRA "cmcRA" #define LN_cmcRA "CMC Registration Authority" #define NID_cmcRA 1132 #define OBJ_cmcRA OBJ_id_kp,28L #define SN_id_it_caProtEncCert "id-it-caProtEncCert" #define NID_id_it_caProtEncCert 298 #define OBJ_id_it_caProtEncCert OBJ_id_it,1L #define SN_id_it_signKeyPairTypes "id-it-signKeyPairTypes" #define NID_id_it_signKeyPairTypes 299 #define OBJ_id_it_signKeyPairTypes OBJ_id_it,2L #define SN_id_it_encKeyPairTypes "id-it-encKeyPairTypes" #define NID_id_it_encKeyPairTypes 300 #define OBJ_id_it_encKeyPairTypes OBJ_id_it,3L #define SN_id_it_preferredSymmAlg "id-it-preferredSymmAlg" #define NID_id_it_preferredSymmAlg 301 #define OBJ_id_it_preferredSymmAlg OBJ_id_it,4L #define SN_id_it_caKeyUpdateInfo "id-it-caKeyUpdateInfo" #define NID_id_it_caKeyUpdateInfo 302 #define OBJ_id_it_caKeyUpdateInfo OBJ_id_it,5L #define SN_id_it_currentCRL "id-it-currentCRL" #define NID_id_it_currentCRL 303 #define OBJ_id_it_currentCRL OBJ_id_it,6L #define SN_id_it_unsupportedOIDs "id-it-unsupportedOIDs" #define NID_id_it_unsupportedOIDs 304 #define OBJ_id_it_unsupportedOIDs OBJ_id_it,7L #define SN_id_it_subscriptionRequest "id-it-subscriptionRequest" #define NID_id_it_subscriptionRequest 305 #define OBJ_id_it_subscriptionRequest OBJ_id_it,8L #define SN_id_it_subscriptionResponse "id-it-subscriptionResponse" #define NID_id_it_subscriptionResponse 306 #define OBJ_id_it_subscriptionResponse OBJ_id_it,9L #define SN_id_it_keyPairParamReq "id-it-keyPairParamReq" #define NID_id_it_keyPairParamReq 307 #define OBJ_id_it_keyPairParamReq OBJ_id_it,10L #define SN_id_it_keyPairParamRep "id-it-keyPairParamRep" #define NID_id_it_keyPairParamRep 308 #define OBJ_id_it_keyPairParamRep OBJ_id_it,11L #define SN_id_it_revPassphrase "id-it-revPassphrase" #define NID_id_it_revPassphrase 309 #define OBJ_id_it_revPassphrase OBJ_id_it,12L #define SN_id_it_implicitConfirm "id-it-implicitConfirm" #define NID_id_it_implicitConfirm 310 #define OBJ_id_it_implicitConfirm OBJ_id_it,13L #define SN_id_it_confirmWaitTime "id-it-confirmWaitTime" #define NID_id_it_confirmWaitTime 311 #define OBJ_id_it_confirmWaitTime OBJ_id_it,14L #define SN_id_it_origPKIMessage "id-it-origPKIMessage" #define NID_id_it_origPKIMessage 312 #define OBJ_id_it_origPKIMessage OBJ_id_it,15L #define SN_id_it_suppLangTags "id-it-suppLangTags" #define NID_id_it_suppLangTags 784 #define OBJ_id_it_suppLangTags OBJ_id_it,16L #define SN_id_regCtrl "id-regCtrl" #define NID_id_regCtrl 313 #define OBJ_id_regCtrl OBJ_id_pkip,1L #define SN_id_regInfo "id-regInfo" #define NID_id_regInfo 314 #define OBJ_id_regInfo OBJ_id_pkip,2L #define SN_id_regCtrl_regToken "id-regCtrl-regToken" #define NID_id_regCtrl_regToken 315 #define OBJ_id_regCtrl_regToken OBJ_id_regCtrl,1L #define SN_id_regCtrl_authenticator "id-regCtrl-authenticator" #define NID_id_regCtrl_authenticator 316 #define OBJ_id_regCtrl_authenticator OBJ_id_regCtrl,2L #define SN_id_regCtrl_pkiPublicationInfo "id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo" #define NID_id_regCtrl_pkiPublicationInfo 317 #define OBJ_id_regCtrl_pkiPublicationInfo OBJ_id_regCtrl,3L #define SN_id_regCtrl_pkiArchiveOptions "id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions" #define NID_id_regCtrl_pkiArchiveOptions 318 #define OBJ_id_regCtrl_pkiArchiveOptions OBJ_id_regCtrl,4L #define SN_id_regCtrl_oldCertID "id-regCtrl-oldCertID" #define NID_id_regCtrl_oldCertID 319 #define OBJ_id_regCtrl_oldCertID OBJ_id_regCtrl,5L #define SN_id_regCtrl_protocolEncrKey "id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey" #define NID_id_regCtrl_protocolEncrKey 320 #define OBJ_id_regCtrl_protocolEncrKey OBJ_id_regCtrl,6L #define SN_id_regInfo_utf8Pairs "id-regInfo-utf8Pairs" #define NID_id_regInfo_utf8Pairs 321 #define OBJ_id_regInfo_utf8Pairs OBJ_id_regInfo,1L #define SN_id_regInfo_certReq "id-regInfo-certReq" #define NID_id_regInfo_certReq 322 #define OBJ_id_regInfo_certReq OBJ_id_regInfo,2L #define SN_id_alg_des40 "id-alg-des40" #define NID_id_alg_des40 323 #define OBJ_id_alg_des40 OBJ_id_alg,1L #define SN_id_alg_noSignature "id-alg-noSignature" #define NID_id_alg_noSignature 324 #define OBJ_id_alg_noSignature OBJ_id_alg,2L #define SN_id_alg_dh_sig_hmac_sha1 "id-alg-dh-sig-hmac-sha1" #define NID_id_alg_dh_sig_hmac_sha1 325 #define OBJ_id_alg_dh_sig_hmac_sha1 OBJ_id_alg,3L #define SN_id_alg_dh_pop "id-alg-dh-pop" #define NID_id_alg_dh_pop 326 #define OBJ_id_alg_dh_pop OBJ_id_alg,4L #define SN_id_cmc_statusInfo "id-cmc-statusInfo" #define NID_id_cmc_statusInfo 327 #define OBJ_id_cmc_statusInfo OBJ_id_cmc,1L #define SN_id_cmc_identification "id-cmc-identification" #define NID_id_cmc_identification 328 #define OBJ_id_cmc_identification OBJ_id_cmc,2L #define SN_id_cmc_identityProof "id-cmc-identityProof" #define NID_id_cmc_identityProof 329 #define OBJ_id_cmc_identityProof OBJ_id_cmc,3L #define SN_id_cmc_dataReturn "id-cmc-dataReturn" #define NID_id_cmc_dataReturn 330 #define OBJ_id_cmc_dataReturn OBJ_id_cmc,4L #define SN_id_cmc_transactionId "id-cmc-transactionId" #define NID_id_cmc_transactionId 331 #define OBJ_id_cmc_transactionId OBJ_id_cmc,5L #define SN_id_cmc_senderNonce "id-cmc-senderNonce" #define NID_id_cmc_senderNonce 332 #define OBJ_id_cmc_senderNonce OBJ_id_cmc,6L #define SN_id_cmc_recipientNonce "id-cmc-recipientNonce" #define NID_id_cmc_recipientNonce 333 #define OBJ_id_cmc_recipientNonce OBJ_id_cmc,7L #define SN_id_cmc_addExtensions "id-cmc-addExtensions" #define NID_id_cmc_addExtensions 334 #define OBJ_id_cmc_addExtensions OBJ_id_cmc,8L #define SN_id_cmc_encryptedPOP "id-cmc-encryptedPOP" #define NID_id_cmc_encryptedPOP 335 #define OBJ_id_cmc_encryptedPOP OBJ_id_cmc,9L #define SN_id_cmc_decryptedPOP "id-cmc-decryptedPOP" #define NID_id_cmc_decryptedPOP 336 #define OBJ_id_cmc_decryptedPOP OBJ_id_cmc,10L #define SN_id_cmc_lraPOPWitness "id-cmc-lraPOPWitness" #define NID_id_cmc_lraPOPWitness 337 #define OBJ_id_cmc_lraPOPWitness OBJ_id_cmc,11L #define SN_id_cmc_getCert "id-cmc-getCert" #define NID_id_cmc_getCert 338 #define OBJ_id_cmc_getCert OBJ_id_cmc,15L #define SN_id_cmc_getCRL "id-cmc-getCRL" #define NID_id_cmc_getCRL 339 #define OBJ_id_cmc_getCRL OBJ_id_cmc,16L #define SN_id_cmc_revokeRequest "id-cmc-revokeRequest" #define NID_id_cmc_revokeRequest 340 #define OBJ_id_cmc_revokeRequest OBJ_id_cmc,17L #define SN_id_cmc_regInfo "id-cmc-regInfo" #define NID_id_cmc_regInfo 341 #define OBJ_id_cmc_regInfo OBJ_id_cmc,18L #define SN_id_cmc_responseInfo "id-cmc-responseInfo" #define NID_id_cmc_responseInfo 342 #define OBJ_id_cmc_responseInfo OBJ_id_cmc,19L #define SN_id_cmc_queryPending "id-cmc-queryPending" #define NID_id_cmc_queryPending 343 #define OBJ_id_cmc_queryPending OBJ_id_cmc,21L #define SN_id_cmc_popLinkRandom "id-cmc-popLinkRandom" #define NID_id_cmc_popLinkRandom 344 #define OBJ_id_cmc_popLinkRandom OBJ_id_cmc,22L #define SN_id_cmc_popLinkWitness "id-cmc-popLinkWitness" #define NID_id_cmc_popLinkWitness 345 #define OBJ_id_cmc_popLinkWitness OBJ_id_cmc,23L #define SN_id_cmc_confirmCertAcceptance "id-cmc-confirmCertAcceptance" #define NID_id_cmc_confirmCertAcceptance 346 #define OBJ_id_cmc_confirmCertAcceptance OBJ_id_cmc,24L #define SN_id_on_personalData "id-on-personalData" #define NID_id_on_personalData 347 #define OBJ_id_on_personalData OBJ_id_on,1L #define SN_id_on_permanentIdentifier "id-on-permanentIdentifier" #define LN_id_on_permanentIdentifier "Permanent Identifier" #define NID_id_on_permanentIdentifier 858 #define OBJ_id_on_permanentIdentifier OBJ_id_on,3L #define SN_id_pda_dateOfBirth "id-pda-dateOfBirth" #define NID_id_pda_dateOfBirth 348 #define OBJ_id_pda_dateOfBirth OBJ_id_pda,1L #define SN_id_pda_placeOfBirth "id-pda-placeOfBirth" #define NID_id_pda_placeOfBirth 349 #define OBJ_id_pda_placeOfBirth OBJ_id_pda,2L #define SN_id_pda_gender "id-pda-gender" #define NID_id_pda_gender 351 #define OBJ_id_pda_gender OBJ_id_pda,3L #define SN_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship "id-pda-countryOfCitizenship" #define NID_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship 352 #define OBJ_id_pda_countryOfCitizenship OBJ_id_pda,4L #define SN_id_pda_countryOfResidence "id-pda-countryOfResidence" #define NID_id_pda_countryOfResidence 353 #define OBJ_id_pda_countryOfResidence OBJ_id_pda,5L #define SN_id_aca_authenticationInfo "id-aca-authenticationInfo" #define NID_id_aca_authenticationInfo 354 #define OBJ_id_aca_authenticationInfo OBJ_id_aca,1L #define SN_id_aca_accessIdentity "id-aca-accessIdentity" #define NID_id_aca_accessIdentity 355 #define OBJ_id_aca_accessIdentity OBJ_id_aca,2L #define SN_id_aca_chargingIdentity "id-aca-chargingIdentity" #define NID_id_aca_chargingIdentity 356 #define OBJ_id_aca_chargingIdentity OBJ_id_aca,3L #define SN_id_aca_group "id-aca-group" #define NID_id_aca_group 357 #define OBJ_id_aca_group OBJ_id_aca,4L #define SN_id_aca_role "id-aca-role" #define NID_id_aca_role 358 #define OBJ_id_aca_role OBJ_id_aca,5L #define SN_id_aca_encAttrs "id-aca-encAttrs" #define NID_id_aca_encAttrs 399 #define OBJ_id_aca_encAttrs OBJ_id_aca,6L #define SN_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1 "id-qcs-pkixQCSyntax-v1" #define NID_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1 359 #define OBJ_id_qcs_pkixQCSyntax_v1 OBJ_id_qcs,1L #define SN_id_cct_crs "id-cct-crs" #define NID_id_cct_crs 360 #define OBJ_id_cct_crs OBJ_id_cct,1L #define SN_id_cct_PKIData "id-cct-PKIData" #define NID_id_cct_PKIData 361 #define OBJ_id_cct_PKIData OBJ_id_cct,2L #define SN_id_cct_PKIResponse "id-cct-PKIResponse" #define NID_id_cct_PKIResponse 362 #define OBJ_id_cct_PKIResponse OBJ_id_cct,3L #define SN_id_ppl_anyLanguage "id-ppl-anyLanguage" #define LN_id_ppl_anyLanguage "Any language" #define NID_id_ppl_anyLanguage 664 #define OBJ_id_ppl_anyLanguage OBJ_id_ppl,0L #define SN_id_ppl_inheritAll "id-ppl-inheritAll" #define LN_id_ppl_inheritAll "Inherit all" #define NID_id_ppl_inheritAll 665 #define OBJ_id_ppl_inheritAll OBJ_id_ppl,1L #define SN_Independent "id-ppl-independent" #define LN_Independent "Independent" #define NID_Independent 667 #define OBJ_Independent OBJ_id_ppl,2L #define SN_ad_OCSP "OCSP" #define LN_ad_OCSP "OCSP" #define NID_ad_OCSP 178 #define OBJ_ad_OCSP OBJ_id_ad,1L #define SN_ad_ca_issuers "caIssuers" #define LN_ad_ca_issuers "CA Issuers" #define NID_ad_ca_issuers 179 #define OBJ_ad_ca_issuers OBJ_id_ad,2L #define SN_ad_timeStamping "ad_timestamping" #define LN_ad_timeStamping "AD Time Stamping" #define NID_ad_timeStamping 363 #define OBJ_ad_timeStamping OBJ_id_ad,3L #define SN_ad_dvcs "AD_DVCS" #define LN_ad_dvcs "ad dvcs" #define NID_ad_dvcs 364 #define OBJ_ad_dvcs OBJ_id_ad,4L #define SN_caRepository "caRepository" #define LN_caRepository "CA Repository" #define NID_caRepository 785 #define OBJ_caRepository OBJ_id_ad,5L #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP OBJ_ad_OCSP #define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_basic "basicOCSPResponse" #define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_basic "Basic OCSP Response" #define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_basic 365 #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_basic OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,1L #define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce "Nonce" #define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce "OCSP Nonce" #define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce 366 #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_Nonce OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,2L #define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID "CrlID" #define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID "OCSP CRL ID" #define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID 367 #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_CrlID OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,3L #define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses "acceptableResponses" #define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses "Acceptable OCSP Responses" #define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses 368 #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_acceptableResponses OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,4L #define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck "noCheck" #define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck "OCSP No Check" #define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck 369 #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_noCheck OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,5L #define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff "archiveCutoff" #define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff "OCSP Archive Cutoff" #define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff 370 #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_archiveCutoff OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,6L #define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator "serviceLocator" #define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator "OCSP Service Locator" #define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator 371 #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_serviceLocator OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,7L #define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus "extendedStatus" #define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus "Extended OCSP Status" #define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus 372 #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_extendedStatus OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,8L #define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_valid "valid" #define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_valid 373 #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_valid OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,9L #define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_path "path" #define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_path 374 #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_path OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,10L #define SN_id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot "trustRoot" #define LN_id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot "Trust Root" #define NID_id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot 375 #define OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP_trustRoot OBJ_id_pkix_OCSP,11L #define SN_algorithm "algorithm" #define LN_algorithm "algorithm" #define NID_algorithm 376 #define OBJ_algorithm 1L,3L,14L,3L,2L #define SN_md5WithRSA "RSA-NP-MD5" #define LN_md5WithRSA "md5WithRSA" #define NID_md5WithRSA 104 #define OBJ_md5WithRSA OBJ_algorithm,3L #define SN_des_ecb "DES-ECB" #define LN_des_ecb "des-ecb" #define NID_des_ecb 29 #define OBJ_des_ecb OBJ_algorithm,6L #define SN_des_cbc "DES-CBC" #define LN_des_cbc "des-cbc" #define NID_des_cbc 31 #define OBJ_des_cbc OBJ_algorithm,7L #define SN_des_ofb64 "DES-OFB" #define LN_des_ofb64 "des-ofb" #define NID_des_ofb64 45 #define OBJ_des_ofb64 OBJ_algorithm,8L #define SN_des_cfb64 "DES-CFB" #define LN_des_cfb64 "des-cfb" #define NID_des_cfb64 30 #define OBJ_des_cfb64 OBJ_algorithm,9L #define SN_rsaSignature "rsaSignature" #define NID_rsaSignature 377 #define OBJ_rsaSignature OBJ_algorithm,11L #define SN_dsa_2 "DSA-old" #define LN_dsa_2 "dsaEncryption-old" #define NID_dsa_2 67 #define OBJ_dsa_2 OBJ_algorithm,12L #define SN_dsaWithSHA "DSA-SHA" #define LN_dsaWithSHA "dsaWithSHA" #define NID_dsaWithSHA 66 #define OBJ_dsaWithSHA OBJ_algorithm,13L #define SN_shaWithRSAEncryption "RSA-SHA" #define LN_shaWithRSAEncryption "shaWithRSAEncryption" #define NID_shaWithRSAEncryption 42 #define OBJ_shaWithRSAEncryption OBJ_algorithm,15L #define SN_des_ede_ecb "DES-EDE" #define LN_des_ede_ecb "des-ede" #define NID_des_ede_ecb 32 #define OBJ_des_ede_ecb OBJ_algorithm,17L #define SN_des_ede3_ecb "DES-EDE3" #define LN_des_ede3_ecb "des-ede3" #define NID_des_ede3_ecb 33 #define SN_des_ede_cbc "DES-EDE-CBC" #define LN_des_ede_cbc "des-ede-cbc" #define NID_des_ede_cbc 43 #define SN_des_ede_cfb64 "DES-EDE-CFB" #define LN_des_ede_cfb64 "des-ede-cfb" #define NID_des_ede_cfb64 60 #define SN_des_ede3_cfb64 "DES-EDE3-CFB" #define LN_des_ede3_cfb64 "des-ede3-cfb" #define NID_des_ede3_cfb64 61 #define SN_des_ede_ofb64 "DES-EDE-OFB" #define LN_des_ede_ofb64 "des-ede-ofb" #define NID_des_ede_ofb64 62 #define SN_des_ede3_ofb64 "DES-EDE3-OFB" #define LN_des_ede3_ofb64 "des-ede3-ofb" #define NID_des_ede3_ofb64 63 #define SN_desx_cbc "DESX-CBC" #define LN_desx_cbc "desx-cbc" #define NID_desx_cbc 80 #define SN_sha "SHA" #define LN_sha "sha" #define NID_sha 41 #define OBJ_sha OBJ_algorithm,18L #define SN_sha1 "SHA1" #define LN_sha1 "sha1" #define NID_sha1 64 #define OBJ_sha1 OBJ_algorithm,26L #define SN_dsaWithSHA1_2 "DSA-SHA1-old" #define LN_dsaWithSHA1_2 "dsaWithSHA1-old" #define NID_dsaWithSHA1_2 70 #define OBJ_dsaWithSHA1_2 OBJ_algorithm,27L #define SN_sha1WithRSA "RSA-SHA1-2" #define LN_sha1WithRSA "sha1WithRSA" #define NID_sha1WithRSA 115 #define OBJ_sha1WithRSA OBJ_algorithm,29L #define SN_ripemd160 "RIPEMD160" #define LN_ripemd160 "ripemd160" #define NID_ripemd160 117 #define OBJ_ripemd160 1L,3L,36L,3L,2L,1L #define SN_ripemd160WithRSA "RSA-RIPEMD160" #define LN_ripemd160WithRSA "ripemd160WithRSA" #define NID_ripemd160WithRSA 119 #define OBJ_ripemd160WithRSA 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,1L,2L #define SN_blake2b512 "BLAKE2b512" #define LN_blake2b512 "blake2b512" #define NID_blake2b512 1056 #define OBJ_blake2b512 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,1722L,12L,2L,1L,16L #define SN_blake2s256 "BLAKE2s256" #define LN_blake2s256 "blake2s256" #define NID_blake2s256 1057 #define OBJ_blake2s256 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,1722L,12L,2L,2L,8L #define SN_sxnet "SXNetID" #define LN_sxnet "Strong Extranet ID" #define NID_sxnet 143 #define OBJ_sxnet 1L,3L,101L,1L,4L,1L #define SN_X500 "X500" #define LN_X500 "directory services (X.500)" #define NID_X500 11 #define OBJ_X500 2L,5L #define SN_X509 "X509" #define NID_X509 12 #define OBJ_X509 OBJ_X500,4L #define SN_commonName "CN" #define LN_commonName "commonName" #define NID_commonName 13 #define OBJ_commonName OBJ_X509,3L #define SN_surname "SN" #define LN_surname "surname" #define NID_surname 100 #define OBJ_surname OBJ_X509,4L #define LN_serialNumber "serialNumber" #define NID_serialNumber 105 #define OBJ_serialNumber OBJ_X509,5L #define SN_countryName "C" #define LN_countryName "countryName" #define NID_countryName 14 #define OBJ_countryName OBJ_X509,6L #define SN_localityName "L" #define LN_localityName "localityName" #define NID_localityName 15 #define OBJ_localityName OBJ_X509,7L #define SN_stateOrProvinceName "ST" #define LN_stateOrProvinceName "stateOrProvinceName" #define NID_stateOrProvinceName 16 #define OBJ_stateOrProvinceName OBJ_X509,8L #define SN_streetAddress "street" #define LN_streetAddress "streetAddress" #define NID_streetAddress 660 #define OBJ_streetAddress OBJ_X509,9L #define SN_organizationName "O" #define LN_organizationName "organizationName" #define NID_organizationName 17 #define OBJ_organizationName OBJ_X509,10L #define SN_organizationalUnitName "OU" #define LN_organizationalUnitName "organizationalUnitName" #define NID_organizationalUnitName 18 #define OBJ_organizationalUnitName OBJ_X509,11L #define SN_title "title" #define LN_title "title" #define NID_title 106 #define OBJ_title OBJ_X509,12L #define LN_description "description" #define NID_description 107 #define OBJ_description OBJ_X509,13L #define LN_searchGuide "searchGuide" #define NID_searchGuide 859 #define OBJ_searchGuide OBJ_X509,14L #define LN_businessCategory "businessCategory" #define NID_businessCategory 860 #define OBJ_businessCategory OBJ_X509,15L #define LN_postalAddress "postalAddress" #define NID_postalAddress 861 #define OBJ_postalAddress OBJ_X509,16L #define LN_postalCode "postalCode" #define NID_postalCode 661 #define OBJ_postalCode OBJ_X509,17L #define LN_postOfficeBox "postOfficeBox" #define NID_postOfficeBox 862 #define OBJ_postOfficeBox OBJ_X509,18L #define LN_physicalDeliveryOfficeName "physicalDeliveryOfficeName" #define NID_physicalDeliveryOfficeName 863 #define OBJ_physicalDeliveryOfficeName OBJ_X509,19L #define LN_telephoneNumber "telephoneNumber" #define NID_telephoneNumber 864 #define OBJ_telephoneNumber OBJ_X509,20L #define LN_telexNumber "telexNumber" #define NID_telexNumber 865 #define OBJ_telexNumber OBJ_X509,21L #define LN_teletexTerminalIdentifier "teletexTerminalIdentifier" #define NID_teletexTerminalIdentifier 866 #define OBJ_teletexTerminalIdentifier OBJ_X509,22L #define LN_facsimileTelephoneNumber "facsimileTelephoneNumber" #define NID_facsimileTelephoneNumber 867 #define OBJ_facsimileTelephoneNumber OBJ_X509,23L #define LN_x121Address "x121Address" #define NID_x121Address 868 #define OBJ_x121Address OBJ_X509,24L #define LN_internationaliSDNNumber "internationaliSDNNumber" #define NID_internationaliSDNNumber 869 #define OBJ_internationaliSDNNumber OBJ_X509,25L #define LN_registeredAddress "registeredAddress" #define NID_registeredAddress 870 #define OBJ_registeredAddress OBJ_X509,26L #define LN_destinationIndicator "destinationIndicator" #define NID_destinationIndicator 871 #define OBJ_destinationIndicator OBJ_X509,27L #define LN_preferredDeliveryMethod "preferredDeliveryMethod" #define NID_preferredDeliveryMethod 872 #define OBJ_preferredDeliveryMethod OBJ_X509,28L #define LN_presentationAddress "presentationAddress" #define NID_presentationAddress 873 #define OBJ_presentationAddress OBJ_X509,29L #define LN_supportedApplicationContext "supportedApplicationContext" #define NID_supportedApplicationContext 874 #define OBJ_supportedApplicationContext OBJ_X509,30L #define SN_member "member" #define NID_member 875 #define OBJ_member OBJ_X509,31L #define SN_owner "owner" #define NID_owner 876 #define OBJ_owner OBJ_X509,32L #define LN_roleOccupant "roleOccupant" #define NID_roleOccupant 877 #define OBJ_roleOccupant OBJ_X509,33L #define SN_seeAlso "seeAlso" #define NID_seeAlso 878 #define OBJ_seeAlso OBJ_X509,34L #define LN_userPassword "userPassword" #define NID_userPassword 879 #define OBJ_userPassword OBJ_X509,35L #define LN_userCertificate "userCertificate" #define NID_userCertificate 880 #define OBJ_userCertificate OBJ_X509,36L #define LN_cACertificate "cACertificate" #define NID_cACertificate 881 #define OBJ_cACertificate OBJ_X509,37L #define LN_authorityRevocationList "authorityRevocationList" #define NID_authorityRevocationList 882 #define OBJ_authorityRevocationList OBJ_X509,38L #define LN_certificateRevocationList "certificateRevocationList" #define NID_certificateRevocationList 883 #define OBJ_certificateRevocationList OBJ_X509,39L #define LN_crossCertificatePair "crossCertificatePair" #define NID_crossCertificatePair 884 #define OBJ_crossCertificatePair OBJ_X509,40L #define SN_name "name" #define LN_name "name" #define NID_name 173 #define OBJ_name OBJ_X509,41L #define SN_givenName "GN" #define LN_givenName "givenName" #define NID_givenName 99 #define OBJ_givenName OBJ_X509,42L #define SN_initials "initials" #define LN_initials "initials" #define NID_initials 101 #define OBJ_initials OBJ_X509,43L #define LN_generationQualifier "generationQualifier" #define NID_generationQualifier 509 #define OBJ_generationQualifier OBJ_X509,44L #define LN_x500UniqueIdentifier "x500UniqueIdentifier" #define NID_x500UniqueIdentifier 503 #define OBJ_x500UniqueIdentifier OBJ_X509,45L #define SN_dnQualifier "dnQualifier" #define LN_dnQualifier "dnQualifier" #define NID_dnQualifier 174 #define OBJ_dnQualifier OBJ_X509,46L #define LN_enhancedSearchGuide "enhancedSearchGuide" #define NID_enhancedSearchGuide 885 #define OBJ_enhancedSearchGuide OBJ_X509,47L #define LN_protocolInformation "protocolInformation" #define NID_protocolInformation 886 #define OBJ_protocolInformation OBJ_X509,48L #define LN_distinguishedName "distinguishedName" #define NID_distinguishedName 887 #define OBJ_distinguishedName OBJ_X509,49L #define LN_uniqueMember "uniqueMember" #define NID_uniqueMember 888 #define OBJ_uniqueMember OBJ_X509,50L #define LN_houseIdentifier "houseIdentifier" #define NID_houseIdentifier 889 #define OBJ_houseIdentifier OBJ_X509,51L #define LN_supportedAlgorithms "supportedAlgorithms" #define NID_supportedAlgorithms 890 #define OBJ_supportedAlgorithms OBJ_X509,52L #define LN_deltaRevocationList "deltaRevocationList" #define NID_deltaRevocationList 891 #define OBJ_deltaRevocationList OBJ_X509,53L #define SN_dmdName "dmdName" #define NID_dmdName 892 #define OBJ_dmdName OBJ_X509,54L #define LN_pseudonym "pseudonym" #define NID_pseudonym 510 #define OBJ_pseudonym OBJ_X509,65L #define SN_role "role" #define LN_role "role" #define NID_role 400 #define OBJ_role OBJ_X509,72L #define LN_organizationIdentifier "organizationIdentifier" #define NID_organizationIdentifier 1089 #define OBJ_organizationIdentifier OBJ_X509,97L #define SN_countryCode3c "c3" #define LN_countryCode3c "countryCode3c" #define NID_countryCode3c 1090 #define OBJ_countryCode3c OBJ_X509,98L #define SN_countryCode3n "n3" #define LN_countryCode3n "countryCode3n" #define NID_countryCode3n 1091 #define OBJ_countryCode3n OBJ_X509,99L #define LN_dnsName "dnsName" #define NID_dnsName 1092 #define OBJ_dnsName OBJ_X509,100L #define SN_X500algorithms "X500algorithms" #define LN_X500algorithms "directory services - algorithms" #define NID_X500algorithms 378 #define OBJ_X500algorithms OBJ_X500,8L #define SN_rsa "RSA" #define LN_rsa "rsa" #define NID_rsa 19 #define OBJ_rsa OBJ_X500algorithms,1L,1L #define SN_mdc2WithRSA "RSA-MDC2" #define LN_mdc2WithRSA "mdc2WithRSA" #define NID_mdc2WithRSA 96 #define OBJ_mdc2WithRSA OBJ_X500algorithms,3L,100L #define SN_mdc2 "MDC2" #define LN_mdc2 "mdc2" #define NID_mdc2 95 #define OBJ_mdc2 OBJ_X500algorithms,3L,101L #define SN_id_ce "id-ce" #define NID_id_ce 81 #define OBJ_id_ce OBJ_X500,29L #define SN_subject_directory_attributes "subjectDirectoryAttributes" #define LN_subject_directory_attributes "X509v3 Subject Directory Attributes" #define NID_subject_directory_attributes 769 #define OBJ_subject_directory_attributes OBJ_id_ce,9L #define SN_subject_key_identifier "subjectKeyIdentifier" #define LN_subject_key_identifier "X509v3 Subject Key Identifier" #define NID_subject_key_identifier 82 #define OBJ_subject_key_identifier OBJ_id_ce,14L #define SN_key_usage "keyUsage" #define LN_key_usage "X509v3 Key Usage" #define NID_key_usage 83 #define OBJ_key_usage OBJ_id_ce,15L #define SN_private_key_usage_period "privateKeyUsagePeriod" #define LN_private_key_usage_period "X509v3 Private Key Usage Period" #define NID_private_key_usage_period 84 #define OBJ_private_key_usage_period OBJ_id_ce,16L #define SN_subject_alt_name "subjectAltName" #define LN_subject_alt_name "X509v3 Subject Alternative Name" #define NID_subject_alt_name 85 #define OBJ_subject_alt_name OBJ_id_ce,17L #define SN_issuer_alt_name "issuerAltName" #define LN_issuer_alt_name "X509v3 Issuer Alternative Name" #define NID_issuer_alt_name 86 #define OBJ_issuer_alt_name OBJ_id_ce,18L #define SN_basic_constraints "basicConstraints" #define LN_basic_constraints "X509v3 Basic Constraints" #define NID_basic_constraints 87 #define OBJ_basic_constraints OBJ_id_ce,19L #define SN_crl_number "crlNumber" #define LN_crl_number "X509v3 CRL Number" #define NID_crl_number 88 #define OBJ_crl_number OBJ_id_ce,20L #define SN_crl_reason "CRLReason" #define LN_crl_reason "X509v3 CRL Reason Code" #define NID_crl_reason 141 #define OBJ_crl_reason OBJ_id_ce,21L #define SN_invalidity_date "invalidityDate" #define LN_invalidity_date "Invalidity Date" #define NID_invalidity_date 142 #define OBJ_invalidity_date OBJ_id_ce,24L #define SN_delta_crl "deltaCRL" #define LN_delta_crl "X509v3 Delta CRL Indicator" #define NID_delta_crl 140 #define OBJ_delta_crl OBJ_id_ce,27L #define SN_issuing_distribution_point "issuingDistributionPoint" #define LN_issuing_distribution_point "X509v3 Issuing Distribution Point" #define NID_issuing_distribution_point 770 #define OBJ_issuing_distribution_point OBJ_id_ce,28L #define SN_certificate_issuer "certificateIssuer" #define LN_certificate_issuer "X509v3 Certificate Issuer" #define NID_certificate_issuer 771 #define OBJ_certificate_issuer OBJ_id_ce,29L #define SN_name_constraints "nameConstraints" #define LN_name_constraints "X509v3 Name Constraints" #define NID_name_constraints 666 #define OBJ_name_constraints OBJ_id_ce,30L #define SN_crl_distribution_points "crlDistributionPoints" #define LN_crl_distribution_points "X509v3 CRL Distribution Points" #define NID_crl_distribution_points 103 #define OBJ_crl_distribution_points OBJ_id_ce,31L #define SN_certificate_policies "certificatePolicies" #define LN_certificate_policies "X509v3 Certificate Policies" #define NID_certificate_policies 89 #define OBJ_certificate_policies OBJ_id_ce,32L #define SN_any_policy "anyPolicy" #define LN_any_policy "X509v3 Any Policy" #define NID_any_policy 746 #define OBJ_any_policy OBJ_certificate_policies,0L #define SN_policy_mappings "policyMappings" #define LN_policy_mappings "X509v3 Policy Mappings" #define NID_policy_mappings 747 #define OBJ_policy_mappings OBJ_id_ce,33L #define SN_authority_key_identifier "authorityKeyIdentifier" #define LN_authority_key_identifier "X509v3 Authority Key Identifier" #define NID_authority_key_identifier 90 #define OBJ_authority_key_identifier OBJ_id_ce,35L #define SN_policy_constraints "policyConstraints" #define LN_policy_constraints "X509v3 Policy Constraints" #define NID_policy_constraints 401 #define OBJ_policy_constraints OBJ_id_ce,36L #define SN_ext_key_usage "extendedKeyUsage" #define LN_ext_key_usage "X509v3 Extended Key Usage" #define NID_ext_key_usage 126 #define OBJ_ext_key_usage OBJ_id_ce,37L #define SN_freshest_crl "freshestCRL" #define LN_freshest_crl "X509v3 Freshest CRL" #define NID_freshest_crl 857 #define OBJ_freshest_crl OBJ_id_ce,46L #define SN_inhibit_any_policy "inhibitAnyPolicy" #define LN_inhibit_any_policy "X509v3 Inhibit Any Policy" #define NID_inhibit_any_policy 748 #define OBJ_inhibit_any_policy OBJ_id_ce,54L #define SN_target_information "targetInformation" #define LN_target_information "X509v3 AC Targeting" #define NID_target_information 402 #define OBJ_target_information OBJ_id_ce,55L #define SN_no_rev_avail "noRevAvail" #define LN_no_rev_avail "X509v3 No Revocation Available" #define NID_no_rev_avail 403 #define OBJ_no_rev_avail OBJ_id_ce,56L #define SN_anyExtendedKeyUsage "anyExtendedKeyUsage" #define LN_anyExtendedKeyUsage "Any Extended Key Usage" #define NID_anyExtendedKeyUsage 910 #define OBJ_anyExtendedKeyUsage OBJ_ext_key_usage,0L #define SN_netscape "Netscape" #define LN_netscape "Netscape Communications Corp." #define NID_netscape 57 #define OBJ_netscape 2L,16L,840L,1L,113730L #define SN_netscape_cert_extension "nsCertExt" #define LN_netscape_cert_extension "Netscape Certificate Extension" #define NID_netscape_cert_extension 58 #define OBJ_netscape_cert_extension OBJ_netscape,1L #define SN_netscape_data_type "nsDataType" #define LN_netscape_data_type "Netscape Data Type" #define NID_netscape_data_type 59 #define OBJ_netscape_data_type OBJ_netscape,2L #define SN_netscape_cert_type "nsCertType" #define LN_netscape_cert_type "Netscape Cert Type" #define NID_netscape_cert_type 71 #define OBJ_netscape_cert_type OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,1L #define SN_netscape_base_url "nsBaseUrl" #define LN_netscape_base_url "Netscape Base Url" #define NID_netscape_base_url 72 #define OBJ_netscape_base_url OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,2L #define SN_netscape_revocation_url "nsRevocationUrl" #define LN_netscape_revocation_url "Netscape Revocation Url" #define NID_netscape_revocation_url 73 #define OBJ_netscape_revocation_url OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,3L #define SN_netscape_ca_revocation_url "nsCaRevocationUrl" #define LN_netscape_ca_revocation_url "Netscape CA Revocation Url" #define NID_netscape_ca_revocation_url 74 #define OBJ_netscape_ca_revocation_url OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,4L #define SN_netscape_renewal_url "nsRenewalUrl" #define LN_netscape_renewal_url "Netscape Renewal Url" #define NID_netscape_renewal_url 75 #define OBJ_netscape_renewal_url OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,7L #define SN_netscape_ca_policy_url "nsCaPolicyUrl" #define LN_netscape_ca_policy_url "Netscape CA Policy Url" #define NID_netscape_ca_policy_url 76 #define OBJ_netscape_ca_policy_url OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,8L #define SN_netscape_ssl_server_name "nsSslServerName" #define LN_netscape_ssl_server_name "Netscape SSL Server Name" #define NID_netscape_ssl_server_name 77 #define OBJ_netscape_ssl_server_name OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,12L #define SN_netscape_comment "nsComment" #define LN_netscape_comment "Netscape Comment" #define NID_netscape_comment 78 #define OBJ_netscape_comment OBJ_netscape_cert_extension,13L #define SN_netscape_cert_sequence "nsCertSequence" #define LN_netscape_cert_sequence "Netscape Certificate Sequence" #define NID_netscape_cert_sequence 79 #define OBJ_netscape_cert_sequence OBJ_netscape_data_type,5L #define SN_ns_sgc "nsSGC" #define LN_ns_sgc "Netscape Server Gated Crypto" #define NID_ns_sgc 139 #define OBJ_ns_sgc OBJ_netscape,4L,1L #define SN_org "ORG" #define LN_org "org" #define NID_org 379 #define OBJ_org OBJ_iso,3L #define SN_dod "DOD" #define LN_dod "dod" #define NID_dod 380 #define OBJ_dod OBJ_org,6L #define SN_iana "IANA" #define LN_iana "iana" #define NID_iana 381 #define OBJ_iana OBJ_dod,1L #define OBJ_internet OBJ_iana #define SN_Directory "directory" #define LN_Directory "Directory" #define NID_Directory 382 #define OBJ_Directory OBJ_internet,1L #define SN_Management "mgmt" #define LN_Management "Management" #define NID_Management 383 #define OBJ_Management OBJ_internet,2L #define SN_Experimental "experimental" #define LN_Experimental "Experimental" #define NID_Experimental 384 #define OBJ_Experimental OBJ_internet,3L #define SN_Private "private" #define LN_Private "Private" #define NID_Private 385 #define OBJ_Private OBJ_internet,4L #define SN_Security "security" #define LN_Security "Security" #define NID_Security 386 #define OBJ_Security OBJ_internet,5L #define SN_SNMPv2 "snmpv2" #define LN_SNMPv2 "SNMPv2" #define NID_SNMPv2 387 #define OBJ_SNMPv2 OBJ_internet,6L #define LN_Mail "Mail" #define NID_Mail 388 #define OBJ_Mail OBJ_internet,7L #define SN_Enterprises "enterprises" #define LN_Enterprises "Enterprises" #define NID_Enterprises 389 #define OBJ_Enterprises OBJ_Private,1L #define SN_dcObject "dcobject" #define LN_dcObject "dcObject" #define NID_dcObject 390 #define OBJ_dcObject OBJ_Enterprises,1466L,344L #define SN_mime_mhs "mime-mhs" #define LN_mime_mhs "MIME MHS" #define NID_mime_mhs 504 #define OBJ_mime_mhs OBJ_Mail,1L #define SN_mime_mhs_headings "mime-mhs-headings" #define LN_mime_mhs_headings "mime-mhs-headings" #define NID_mime_mhs_headings 505 #define OBJ_mime_mhs_headings OBJ_mime_mhs,1L #define SN_mime_mhs_bodies "mime-mhs-bodies" #define LN_mime_mhs_bodies "mime-mhs-bodies" #define NID_mime_mhs_bodies 506 #define OBJ_mime_mhs_bodies OBJ_mime_mhs,2L #define SN_id_hex_partial_message "id-hex-partial-message" #define LN_id_hex_partial_message "id-hex-partial-message" #define NID_id_hex_partial_message 507 #define OBJ_id_hex_partial_message OBJ_mime_mhs_headings,1L #define SN_id_hex_multipart_message "id-hex-multipart-message" #define LN_id_hex_multipart_message "id-hex-multipart-message" #define NID_id_hex_multipart_message 508 #define OBJ_id_hex_multipart_message OBJ_mime_mhs_headings,2L #define SN_zlib_compression "ZLIB" #define LN_zlib_compression "zlib compression" #define NID_zlib_compression 125 #define OBJ_zlib_compression OBJ_id_smime_alg,8L #define OBJ_csor 2L,16L,840L,1L,101L,3L #define OBJ_nistAlgorithms OBJ_csor,4L #define OBJ_aes OBJ_nistAlgorithms,1L #define SN_aes_128_ecb "AES-128-ECB" #define LN_aes_128_ecb "aes-128-ecb" #define NID_aes_128_ecb 418 #define OBJ_aes_128_ecb OBJ_aes,1L #define SN_aes_128_cbc "AES-128-CBC" #define LN_aes_128_cbc "aes-128-cbc" #define NID_aes_128_cbc 419 #define OBJ_aes_128_cbc OBJ_aes,2L #define SN_aes_128_ofb128 "AES-128-OFB" #define LN_aes_128_ofb128 "aes-128-ofb" #define NID_aes_128_ofb128 420 #define OBJ_aes_128_ofb128 OBJ_aes,3L #define SN_aes_128_cfb128 "AES-128-CFB" #define LN_aes_128_cfb128 "aes-128-cfb" #define NID_aes_128_cfb128 421 #define OBJ_aes_128_cfb128 OBJ_aes,4L #define SN_id_aes128_wrap "id-aes128-wrap" #define NID_id_aes128_wrap 788 #define OBJ_id_aes128_wrap OBJ_aes,5L #define SN_aes_128_gcm "id-aes128-GCM" #define LN_aes_128_gcm "aes-128-gcm" #define NID_aes_128_gcm 895 #define OBJ_aes_128_gcm OBJ_aes,6L #define SN_aes_128_ccm "id-aes128-CCM" #define LN_aes_128_ccm "aes-128-ccm" #define NID_aes_128_ccm 896 #define OBJ_aes_128_ccm OBJ_aes,7L #define SN_id_aes128_wrap_pad "id-aes128-wrap-pad" #define NID_id_aes128_wrap_pad 897 #define OBJ_id_aes128_wrap_pad OBJ_aes,8L #define SN_aes_192_ecb "AES-192-ECB" #define LN_aes_192_ecb "aes-192-ecb" #define NID_aes_192_ecb 422 #define OBJ_aes_192_ecb OBJ_aes,21L #define SN_aes_192_cbc "AES-192-CBC" #define LN_aes_192_cbc "aes-192-cbc" #define NID_aes_192_cbc 423 #define OBJ_aes_192_cbc OBJ_aes,22L #define SN_aes_192_ofb128 "AES-192-OFB" #define LN_aes_192_ofb128 "aes-192-ofb" #define NID_aes_192_ofb128 424 #define OBJ_aes_192_ofb128 OBJ_aes,23L #define SN_aes_192_cfb128 "AES-192-CFB" #define LN_aes_192_cfb128 "aes-192-cfb" #define NID_aes_192_cfb128 425 #define OBJ_aes_192_cfb128 OBJ_aes,24L #define SN_id_aes192_wrap "id-aes192-wrap" #define NID_id_aes192_wrap 789 #define OBJ_id_aes192_wrap OBJ_aes,25L #define SN_aes_192_gcm "id-aes192-GCM" #define LN_aes_192_gcm "aes-192-gcm" #define NID_aes_192_gcm 898 #define OBJ_aes_192_gcm OBJ_aes,26L #define SN_aes_192_ccm "id-aes192-CCM" #define LN_aes_192_ccm "aes-192-ccm" #define NID_aes_192_ccm 899 #define OBJ_aes_192_ccm OBJ_aes,27L #define SN_id_aes192_wrap_pad "id-aes192-wrap-pad" #define NID_id_aes192_wrap_pad 900 #define OBJ_id_aes192_wrap_pad OBJ_aes,28L #define SN_aes_256_ecb "AES-256-ECB" #define LN_aes_256_ecb "aes-256-ecb" #define NID_aes_256_ecb 426 #define OBJ_aes_256_ecb OBJ_aes,41L #define SN_aes_256_cbc "AES-256-CBC" #define LN_aes_256_cbc "aes-256-cbc" #define NID_aes_256_cbc 427 #define OBJ_aes_256_cbc OBJ_aes,42L #define SN_aes_256_ofb128 "AES-256-OFB" #define LN_aes_256_ofb128 "aes-256-ofb" #define NID_aes_256_ofb128 428 #define OBJ_aes_256_ofb128 OBJ_aes,43L #define SN_aes_256_cfb128 "AES-256-CFB" #define LN_aes_256_cfb128 "aes-256-cfb" #define NID_aes_256_cfb128 429 #define OBJ_aes_256_cfb128 OBJ_aes,44L #define SN_id_aes256_wrap "id-aes256-wrap" #define NID_id_aes256_wrap 790 #define OBJ_id_aes256_wrap OBJ_aes,45L #define SN_aes_256_gcm "id-aes256-GCM" #define LN_aes_256_gcm "aes-256-gcm" #define NID_aes_256_gcm 901 #define OBJ_aes_256_gcm OBJ_aes,46L #define SN_aes_256_ccm "id-aes256-CCM" #define LN_aes_256_ccm "aes-256-ccm" #define NID_aes_256_ccm 902 #define OBJ_aes_256_ccm OBJ_aes,47L #define SN_id_aes256_wrap_pad "id-aes256-wrap-pad" #define NID_id_aes256_wrap_pad 903 #define OBJ_id_aes256_wrap_pad OBJ_aes,48L #define SN_aes_128_xts "AES-128-XTS" #define LN_aes_128_xts "aes-128-xts" #define NID_aes_128_xts 913 #define OBJ_aes_128_xts OBJ_ieee_siswg,0L,1L,1L #define SN_aes_256_xts "AES-256-XTS" #define LN_aes_256_xts "aes-256-xts" #define NID_aes_256_xts 914 #define OBJ_aes_256_xts OBJ_ieee_siswg,0L,1L,2L #define SN_aes_128_cfb1 "AES-128-CFB1" #define LN_aes_128_cfb1 "aes-128-cfb1" #define NID_aes_128_cfb1 650 #define SN_aes_192_cfb1 "AES-192-CFB1" #define LN_aes_192_cfb1 "aes-192-cfb1" #define NID_aes_192_cfb1 651 #define SN_aes_256_cfb1 "AES-256-CFB1" #define LN_aes_256_cfb1 "aes-256-cfb1" #define NID_aes_256_cfb1 652 #define SN_aes_128_cfb8 "AES-128-CFB8" #define LN_aes_128_cfb8 "aes-128-cfb8" #define NID_aes_128_cfb8 653 #define SN_aes_192_cfb8 "AES-192-CFB8" #define LN_aes_192_cfb8 "aes-192-cfb8" #define NID_aes_192_cfb8 654 #define SN_aes_256_cfb8 "AES-256-CFB8" #define LN_aes_256_cfb8 "aes-256-cfb8" #define NID_aes_256_cfb8 655 #define SN_aes_128_ctr "AES-128-CTR" #define LN_aes_128_ctr "aes-128-ctr" #define NID_aes_128_ctr 904 #define SN_aes_192_ctr "AES-192-CTR" #define LN_aes_192_ctr "aes-192-ctr" #define NID_aes_192_ctr 905 #define SN_aes_256_ctr "AES-256-CTR" #define LN_aes_256_ctr "aes-256-ctr" #define NID_aes_256_ctr 906 #define SN_aes_128_ocb "AES-128-OCB" #define LN_aes_128_ocb "aes-128-ocb" #define NID_aes_128_ocb 958 #define SN_aes_192_ocb "AES-192-OCB" #define LN_aes_192_ocb "aes-192-ocb" #define NID_aes_192_ocb 959 #define SN_aes_256_ocb "AES-256-OCB" #define LN_aes_256_ocb "aes-256-ocb" #define NID_aes_256_ocb 960 #define SN_des_cfb1 "DES-CFB1" #define LN_des_cfb1 "des-cfb1" #define NID_des_cfb1 656 #define SN_des_cfb8 "DES-CFB8" #define LN_des_cfb8 "des-cfb8" #define NID_des_cfb8 657 #define SN_des_ede3_cfb1 "DES-EDE3-CFB1" #define LN_des_ede3_cfb1 "des-ede3-cfb1" #define NID_des_ede3_cfb1 658 #define SN_des_ede3_cfb8 "DES-EDE3-CFB8" #define LN_des_ede3_cfb8 "des-ede3-cfb8" #define NID_des_ede3_cfb8 659 #define OBJ_nist_hashalgs OBJ_nistAlgorithms,2L #define SN_sha256 "SHA256" #define LN_sha256 "sha256" #define NID_sha256 672 #define OBJ_sha256 OBJ_nist_hashalgs,1L #define SN_sha384 "SHA384" #define LN_sha384 "sha384" #define NID_sha384 673 #define OBJ_sha384 OBJ_nist_hashalgs,2L #define SN_sha512 "SHA512" #define LN_sha512 "sha512" #define NID_sha512 674 #define OBJ_sha512 OBJ_nist_hashalgs,3L #define SN_sha224 "SHA224" #define LN_sha224 "sha224" #define NID_sha224 675 #define OBJ_sha224 OBJ_nist_hashalgs,4L #define SN_sha512_224 "SHA512-224" #define LN_sha512_224 "sha512-224" #define NID_sha512_224 1094 #define OBJ_sha512_224 OBJ_nist_hashalgs,5L #define SN_sha512_256 "SHA512-256" #define LN_sha512_256 "sha512-256" #define NID_sha512_256 1095 #define OBJ_sha512_256 OBJ_nist_hashalgs,6L #define SN_sha3_224 "SHA3-224" #define LN_sha3_224 "sha3-224" #define NID_sha3_224 1096 #define OBJ_sha3_224 OBJ_nist_hashalgs,7L #define SN_sha3_256 "SHA3-256" #define LN_sha3_256 "sha3-256" #define NID_sha3_256 1097 #define OBJ_sha3_256 OBJ_nist_hashalgs,8L #define SN_sha3_384 "SHA3-384" #define LN_sha3_384 "sha3-384" #define NID_sha3_384 1098 #define OBJ_sha3_384 OBJ_nist_hashalgs,9L #define SN_sha3_512 "SHA3-512" #define LN_sha3_512 "sha3-512" #define NID_sha3_512 1099 #define OBJ_sha3_512 OBJ_nist_hashalgs,10L #define SN_shake128 "SHAKE128" #define LN_shake128 "shake128" #define NID_shake128 1100 #define OBJ_shake128 OBJ_nist_hashalgs,11L #define SN_shake256 "SHAKE256" #define LN_shake256 "shake256" #define NID_shake256 1101 #define OBJ_shake256 OBJ_nist_hashalgs,12L #define SN_hmac_sha3_224 "id-hmacWithSHA3-224" #define LN_hmac_sha3_224 "hmac-sha3-224" #define NID_hmac_sha3_224 1102 #define OBJ_hmac_sha3_224 OBJ_nist_hashalgs,13L #define SN_hmac_sha3_256 "id-hmacWithSHA3-256" #define LN_hmac_sha3_256 "hmac-sha3-256" #define NID_hmac_sha3_256 1103 #define OBJ_hmac_sha3_256 OBJ_nist_hashalgs,14L #define SN_hmac_sha3_384 "id-hmacWithSHA3-384" #define LN_hmac_sha3_384 "hmac-sha3-384" #define NID_hmac_sha3_384 1104 #define OBJ_hmac_sha3_384 OBJ_nist_hashalgs,15L #define SN_hmac_sha3_512 "id-hmacWithSHA3-512" #define LN_hmac_sha3_512 "hmac-sha3-512" #define NID_hmac_sha3_512 1105 #define OBJ_hmac_sha3_512 OBJ_nist_hashalgs,16L #define OBJ_dsa_with_sha2 OBJ_nistAlgorithms,3L #define SN_dsa_with_SHA224 "dsa_with_SHA224" #define NID_dsa_with_SHA224 802 #define OBJ_dsa_with_SHA224 OBJ_dsa_with_sha2,1L #define SN_dsa_with_SHA256 "dsa_with_SHA256" #define NID_dsa_with_SHA256 803 #define OBJ_dsa_with_SHA256 OBJ_dsa_with_sha2,2L #define OBJ_sigAlgs OBJ_nistAlgorithms,3L #define SN_dsa_with_SHA384 "id-dsa-with-sha384" #define LN_dsa_with_SHA384 "dsa_with_SHA384" #define NID_dsa_with_SHA384 1106 #define OBJ_dsa_with_SHA384 OBJ_sigAlgs,3L #define SN_dsa_with_SHA512 "id-dsa-with-sha512" #define LN_dsa_with_SHA512 "dsa_with_SHA512" #define NID_dsa_with_SHA512 1107 #define OBJ_dsa_with_SHA512 OBJ_sigAlgs,4L #define SN_dsa_with_SHA3_224 "id-dsa-with-sha3-224" #define LN_dsa_with_SHA3_224 "dsa_with_SHA3-224" #define NID_dsa_with_SHA3_224 1108 #define OBJ_dsa_with_SHA3_224 OBJ_sigAlgs,5L #define SN_dsa_with_SHA3_256 "id-dsa-with-sha3-256" #define LN_dsa_with_SHA3_256 "dsa_with_SHA3-256" #define NID_dsa_with_SHA3_256 1109 #define OBJ_dsa_with_SHA3_256 OBJ_sigAlgs,6L #define SN_dsa_with_SHA3_384 "id-dsa-with-sha3-384" #define LN_dsa_with_SHA3_384 "dsa_with_SHA3-384" #define NID_dsa_with_SHA3_384 1110 #define OBJ_dsa_with_SHA3_384 OBJ_sigAlgs,7L #define SN_dsa_with_SHA3_512 "id-dsa-with-sha3-512" #define LN_dsa_with_SHA3_512 "dsa_with_SHA3-512" #define NID_dsa_with_SHA3_512 1111 #define OBJ_dsa_with_SHA3_512 OBJ_sigAlgs,8L #define SN_ecdsa_with_SHA3_224 "id-ecdsa-with-sha3-224" #define LN_ecdsa_with_SHA3_224 "ecdsa_with_SHA3-224" #define NID_ecdsa_with_SHA3_224 1112 #define OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA3_224 OBJ_sigAlgs,9L #define SN_ecdsa_with_SHA3_256 "id-ecdsa-with-sha3-256" #define LN_ecdsa_with_SHA3_256 "ecdsa_with_SHA3-256" #define NID_ecdsa_with_SHA3_256 1113 #define OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA3_256 OBJ_sigAlgs,10L #define SN_ecdsa_with_SHA3_384 "id-ecdsa-with-sha3-384" #define LN_ecdsa_with_SHA3_384 "ecdsa_with_SHA3-384" #define NID_ecdsa_with_SHA3_384 1114 #define OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA3_384 OBJ_sigAlgs,11L #define SN_ecdsa_with_SHA3_512 "id-ecdsa-with-sha3-512" #define LN_ecdsa_with_SHA3_512 "ecdsa_with_SHA3-512" #define NID_ecdsa_with_SHA3_512 1115 #define OBJ_ecdsa_with_SHA3_512 OBJ_sigAlgs,12L #define SN_RSA_SHA3_224 "id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-224" #define LN_RSA_SHA3_224 "RSA-SHA3-224" #define NID_RSA_SHA3_224 1116 #define OBJ_RSA_SHA3_224 OBJ_sigAlgs,13L #define SN_RSA_SHA3_256 "id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-256" #define LN_RSA_SHA3_256 "RSA-SHA3-256" #define NID_RSA_SHA3_256 1117 #define OBJ_RSA_SHA3_256 OBJ_sigAlgs,14L #define SN_RSA_SHA3_384 "id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-384" #define LN_RSA_SHA3_384 "RSA-SHA3-384" #define NID_RSA_SHA3_384 1118 #define OBJ_RSA_SHA3_384 OBJ_sigAlgs,15L #define SN_RSA_SHA3_512 "id-rsassa-pkcs1-v1_5-with-sha3-512" #define LN_RSA_SHA3_512 "RSA-SHA3-512" #define NID_RSA_SHA3_512 1119 #define OBJ_RSA_SHA3_512 OBJ_sigAlgs,16L #define SN_hold_instruction_code "holdInstructionCode" #define LN_hold_instruction_code "Hold Instruction Code" #define NID_hold_instruction_code 430 #define OBJ_hold_instruction_code OBJ_id_ce,23L #define OBJ_holdInstruction OBJ_X9_57,2L #define SN_hold_instruction_none "holdInstructionNone" #define LN_hold_instruction_none "Hold Instruction None" #define NID_hold_instruction_none 431 #define OBJ_hold_instruction_none OBJ_holdInstruction,1L #define SN_hold_instruction_call_issuer "holdInstructionCallIssuer" #define LN_hold_instruction_call_issuer "Hold Instruction Call Issuer" #define NID_hold_instruction_call_issuer 432 #define OBJ_hold_instruction_call_issuer OBJ_holdInstruction,2L #define SN_hold_instruction_reject "holdInstructionReject" #define LN_hold_instruction_reject "Hold Instruction Reject" #define NID_hold_instruction_reject 433 #define OBJ_hold_instruction_reject OBJ_holdInstruction,3L #define SN_data "data" #define NID_data 434 #define OBJ_data OBJ_itu_t,9L #define SN_pss "pss" #define NID_pss 435 #define OBJ_pss OBJ_data,2342L #define SN_ucl "ucl" #define NID_ucl 436 #define OBJ_ucl OBJ_pss,19200300L #define SN_pilot "pilot" #define NID_pilot 437 #define OBJ_pilot OBJ_ucl,100L #define LN_pilotAttributeType "pilotAttributeType" #define NID_pilotAttributeType 438 #define OBJ_pilotAttributeType OBJ_pilot,1L #define LN_pilotAttributeSyntax "pilotAttributeSyntax" #define NID_pilotAttributeSyntax 439 #define OBJ_pilotAttributeSyntax OBJ_pilot,3L #define LN_pilotObjectClass "pilotObjectClass" #define NID_pilotObjectClass 440 #define OBJ_pilotObjectClass OBJ_pilot,4L #define LN_pilotGroups "pilotGroups" #define NID_pilotGroups 441 #define OBJ_pilotGroups OBJ_pilot,10L #define LN_iA5StringSyntax "iA5StringSyntax" #define NID_iA5StringSyntax 442 #define OBJ_iA5StringSyntax OBJ_pilotAttributeSyntax,4L #define LN_caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax "caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax" #define NID_caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax 443 #define OBJ_caseIgnoreIA5StringSyntax OBJ_pilotAttributeSyntax,5L #define LN_pilotObject "pilotObject" #define NID_pilotObject 444 #define OBJ_pilotObject OBJ_pilotObjectClass,3L #define LN_pilotPerson "pilotPerson" #define NID_pilotPerson 445 #define OBJ_pilotPerson OBJ_pilotObjectClass,4L #define SN_account "account" #define NID_account 446 #define OBJ_account OBJ_pilotObjectClass,5L #define SN_document "document" #define NID_document 447 #define OBJ_document OBJ_pilotObjectClass,6L #define SN_room "room" #define NID_room 448 #define OBJ_room OBJ_pilotObjectClass,7L #define LN_documentSeries "documentSeries" #define NID_documentSeries 449 #define OBJ_documentSeries OBJ_pilotObjectClass,9L #define SN_Domain "domain" #define LN_Domain "Domain" #define NID_Domain 392 #define OBJ_Domain OBJ_pilotObjectClass,13L #define LN_rFC822localPart "rFC822localPart" #define NID_rFC822localPart 450 #define OBJ_rFC822localPart OBJ_pilotObjectClass,14L #define LN_dNSDomain "dNSDomain" #define NID_dNSDomain 451 #define OBJ_dNSDomain OBJ_pilotObjectClass,15L #define LN_domainRelatedObject "domainRelatedObject" #define NID_domainRelatedObject 452 #define OBJ_domainRelatedObject OBJ_pilotObjectClass,17L #define LN_friendlyCountry "friendlyCountry" #define NID_friendlyCountry 453 #define OBJ_friendlyCountry OBJ_pilotObjectClass,18L #define LN_simpleSecurityObject "simpleSecurityObject" #define NID_simpleSecurityObject 454 #define OBJ_simpleSecurityObject OBJ_pilotObjectClass,19L #define LN_pilotOrganization "pilotOrganization" #define NID_pilotOrganization 455 #define OBJ_pilotOrganization OBJ_pilotObjectClass,20L #define LN_pilotDSA "pilotDSA" #define NID_pilotDSA 456 #define OBJ_pilotDSA OBJ_pilotObjectClass,21L #define LN_qualityLabelledData "qualityLabelledData" #define NID_qualityLabelledData 457 #define OBJ_qualityLabelledData OBJ_pilotObjectClass,22L #define SN_userId "UID" #define LN_userId "userId" #define NID_userId 458 #define OBJ_userId OBJ_pilotAttributeType,1L #define LN_textEncodedORAddress "textEncodedORAddress" #define NID_textEncodedORAddress 459 #define OBJ_textEncodedORAddress OBJ_pilotAttributeType,2L #define SN_rfc822Mailbox "mail" #define LN_rfc822Mailbox "rfc822Mailbox" #define NID_rfc822Mailbox 460 #define OBJ_rfc822Mailbox OBJ_pilotAttributeType,3L #define SN_info "info" #define NID_info 461 #define OBJ_info OBJ_pilotAttributeType,4L #define LN_favouriteDrink "favouriteDrink" #define NID_favouriteDrink 462 #define OBJ_favouriteDrink OBJ_pilotAttributeType,5L #define LN_roomNumber "roomNumber" #define NID_roomNumber 463 #define OBJ_roomNumber OBJ_pilotAttributeType,6L #define SN_photo "photo" #define NID_photo 464 #define OBJ_photo OBJ_pilotAttributeType,7L #define LN_userClass "userClass" #define NID_userClass 465 #define OBJ_userClass OBJ_pilotAttributeType,8L #define SN_host "host" #define NID_host 466 #define OBJ_host OBJ_pilotAttributeType,9L #define SN_manager "manager" #define NID_manager 467 #define OBJ_manager OBJ_pilotAttributeType,10L #define LN_documentIdentifier "documentIdentifier" #define NID_documentIdentifier 468 #define OBJ_documentIdentifier OBJ_pilotAttributeType,11L #define LN_documentTitle "documentTitle" #define NID_documentTitle 469 #define OBJ_documentTitle OBJ_pilotAttributeType,12L #define LN_documentVersion "documentVersion" #define NID_documentVersion 470 #define OBJ_documentVersion OBJ_pilotAttributeType,13L #define LN_documentAuthor "documentAuthor" #define NID_documentAuthor 471 #define OBJ_documentAuthor OBJ_pilotAttributeType,14L #define LN_documentLocation "documentLocation" #define NID_documentLocation 472 #define OBJ_documentLocation OBJ_pilotAttributeType,15L #define LN_homeTelephoneNumber "homeTelephoneNumber" #define NID_homeTelephoneNumber 473 #define OBJ_homeTelephoneNumber OBJ_pilotAttributeType,20L #define SN_secretary "secretary" #define NID_secretary 474 #define OBJ_secretary OBJ_pilotAttributeType,21L #define LN_otherMailbox "otherMailbox" #define NID_otherMailbox 475 #define OBJ_otherMailbox OBJ_pilotAttributeType,22L #define LN_lastModifiedTime "lastModifiedTime" #define NID_lastModifiedTime 476 #define OBJ_lastModifiedTime OBJ_pilotAttributeType,23L #define LN_lastModifiedBy "lastModifiedBy" #define NID_lastModifiedBy 477 #define OBJ_lastModifiedBy OBJ_pilotAttributeType,24L #define SN_domainComponent "DC" #define LN_domainComponent "domainComponent" #define NID_domainComponent 391 #define OBJ_domainComponent OBJ_pilotAttributeType,25L #define LN_aRecord "aRecord" #define NID_aRecord 478 #define OBJ_aRecord OBJ_pilotAttributeType,26L #define LN_pilotAttributeType27 "pilotAttributeType27" #define NID_pilotAttributeType27 479 #define OBJ_pilotAttributeType27 OBJ_pilotAttributeType,27L #define LN_mXRecord "mXRecord" #define NID_mXRecord 480 #define OBJ_mXRecord OBJ_pilotAttributeType,28L #define LN_nSRecord "nSRecord" #define NID_nSRecord 481 #define OBJ_nSRecord OBJ_pilotAttributeType,29L #define LN_sOARecord "sOARecord" #define NID_sOARecord 482 #define OBJ_sOARecord OBJ_pilotAttributeType,30L #define LN_cNAMERecord "cNAMERecord" #define NID_cNAMERecord 483 #define OBJ_cNAMERecord OBJ_pilotAttributeType,31L #define LN_associatedDomain "associatedDomain" #define NID_associatedDomain 484 #define OBJ_associatedDomain OBJ_pilotAttributeType,37L #define LN_associatedName "associatedName" #define NID_associatedName 485 #define OBJ_associatedName OBJ_pilotAttributeType,38L #define LN_homePostalAddress "homePostalAddress" #define NID_homePostalAddress 486 #define OBJ_homePostalAddress OBJ_pilotAttributeType,39L #define LN_personalTitle "personalTitle" #define NID_personalTitle 487 #define OBJ_personalTitle OBJ_pilotAttributeType,40L #define LN_mobileTelephoneNumber "mobileTelephoneNumber" #define NID_mobileTelephoneNumber 488 #define OBJ_mobileTelephoneNumber OBJ_pilotAttributeType,41L #define LN_pagerTelephoneNumber "pagerTelephoneNumber" #define NID_pagerTelephoneNumber 489 #define OBJ_pagerTelephoneNumber OBJ_pilotAttributeType,42L #define LN_friendlyCountryName "friendlyCountryName" #define NID_friendlyCountryName 490 #define OBJ_friendlyCountryName OBJ_pilotAttributeType,43L #define SN_uniqueIdentifier "uid" #define LN_uniqueIdentifier "uniqueIdentifier" #define NID_uniqueIdentifier 102 #define OBJ_uniqueIdentifier OBJ_pilotAttributeType,44L #define LN_organizationalStatus "organizationalStatus" #define NID_organizationalStatus 491 #define OBJ_organizationalStatus OBJ_pilotAttributeType,45L #define LN_janetMailbox "janetMailbox" #define NID_janetMailbox 492 #define OBJ_janetMailbox OBJ_pilotAttributeType,46L #define LN_mailPreferenceOption "mailPreferenceOption" #define NID_mailPreferenceOption 493 #define OBJ_mailPreferenceOption OBJ_pilotAttributeType,47L #define LN_buildingName "buildingName" #define NID_buildingName 494 #define OBJ_buildingName OBJ_pilotAttributeType,48L #define LN_dSAQuality "dSAQuality" #define NID_dSAQuality 495 #define OBJ_dSAQuality OBJ_pilotAttributeType,49L #define LN_singleLevelQuality "singleLevelQuality" #define NID_singleLevelQuality 496 #define OBJ_singleLevelQuality OBJ_pilotAttributeType,50L #define LN_subtreeMinimumQuality "subtreeMinimumQuality" #define NID_subtreeMinimumQuality 497 #define OBJ_subtreeMinimumQuality OBJ_pilotAttributeType,51L #define LN_subtreeMaximumQuality "subtreeMaximumQuality" #define NID_subtreeMaximumQuality 498 #define OBJ_subtreeMaximumQuality OBJ_pilotAttributeType,52L #define LN_personalSignature "personalSignature" #define NID_personalSignature 499 #define OBJ_personalSignature OBJ_pilotAttributeType,53L #define LN_dITRedirect "dITRedirect" #define NID_dITRedirect 500 #define OBJ_dITRedirect OBJ_pilotAttributeType,54L #define SN_audio "audio" #define NID_audio 501 #define OBJ_audio OBJ_pilotAttributeType,55L #define LN_documentPublisher "documentPublisher" #define NID_documentPublisher 502 #define OBJ_documentPublisher OBJ_pilotAttributeType,56L #define SN_id_set "id-set" #define LN_id_set "Secure Electronic Transactions" #define NID_id_set 512 #define OBJ_id_set OBJ_international_organizations,42L #define SN_set_ctype "set-ctype" #define LN_set_ctype "content types" #define NID_set_ctype 513 #define OBJ_set_ctype OBJ_id_set,0L #define SN_set_msgExt "set-msgExt" #define LN_set_msgExt "message extensions" #define NID_set_msgExt 514 #define OBJ_set_msgExt OBJ_id_set,1L #define SN_set_attr "set-attr" #define NID_set_attr 515 #define OBJ_set_attr OBJ_id_set,3L #define SN_set_policy "set-policy" #define NID_set_policy 516 #define OBJ_set_policy OBJ_id_set,5L #define SN_set_certExt "set-certExt" #define LN_set_certExt "certificate extensions" #define NID_set_certExt 517 #define OBJ_set_certExt OBJ_id_set,7L #define SN_set_brand "set-brand" #define NID_set_brand 518 #define OBJ_set_brand OBJ_id_set,8L #define SN_setct_PANData "setct-PANData" #define NID_setct_PANData 519 #define OBJ_setct_PANData OBJ_set_ctype,0L #define SN_setct_PANToken "setct-PANToken" #define NID_setct_PANToken 520 #define OBJ_setct_PANToken OBJ_set_ctype,1L #define SN_setct_PANOnly "setct-PANOnly" #define NID_setct_PANOnly 521 #define OBJ_setct_PANOnly OBJ_set_ctype,2L #define SN_setct_OIData "setct-OIData" #define NID_setct_OIData 522 #define OBJ_setct_OIData OBJ_set_ctype,3L #define SN_setct_PI "setct-PI" #define NID_setct_PI 523 #define OBJ_setct_PI OBJ_set_ctype,4L #define SN_setct_PIData "setct-PIData" #define NID_setct_PIData 524 #define OBJ_setct_PIData OBJ_set_ctype,5L #define SN_setct_PIDataUnsigned "setct-PIDataUnsigned" #define NID_setct_PIDataUnsigned 525 #define OBJ_setct_PIDataUnsigned OBJ_set_ctype,6L #define SN_setct_HODInput "setct-HODInput" #define NID_setct_HODInput 526 #define OBJ_setct_HODInput OBJ_set_ctype,7L #define SN_setct_AuthResBaggage "setct-AuthResBaggage" #define NID_setct_AuthResBaggage 527 #define OBJ_setct_AuthResBaggage OBJ_set_ctype,8L #define SN_setct_AuthRevReqBaggage "setct-AuthRevReqBaggage" #define NID_setct_AuthRevReqBaggage 528 #define OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqBaggage OBJ_set_ctype,9L #define SN_setct_AuthRevResBaggage "setct-AuthRevResBaggage" #define NID_setct_AuthRevResBaggage 529 #define OBJ_setct_AuthRevResBaggage OBJ_set_ctype,10L #define SN_setct_CapTokenSeq "setct-CapTokenSeq" #define NID_setct_CapTokenSeq 530 #define OBJ_setct_CapTokenSeq OBJ_set_ctype,11L #define SN_setct_PInitResData "setct-PInitResData" #define NID_setct_PInitResData 531 #define OBJ_setct_PInitResData OBJ_set_ctype,12L #define SN_setct_PI_TBS "setct-PI-TBS" #define NID_setct_PI_TBS 532 #define OBJ_setct_PI_TBS OBJ_set_ctype,13L #define SN_setct_PResData "setct-PResData" #define NID_setct_PResData 533 #define OBJ_setct_PResData OBJ_set_ctype,14L #define SN_setct_AuthReqTBS "setct-AuthReqTBS" #define NID_setct_AuthReqTBS 534 #define OBJ_setct_AuthReqTBS OBJ_set_ctype,16L #define SN_setct_AuthResTBS "setct-AuthResTBS" #define NID_setct_AuthResTBS 535 #define OBJ_setct_AuthResTBS OBJ_set_ctype,17L #define SN_setct_AuthResTBSX "setct-AuthResTBSX" #define NID_setct_AuthResTBSX 536 #define OBJ_setct_AuthResTBSX OBJ_set_ctype,18L #define SN_setct_AuthTokenTBS "setct-AuthTokenTBS" #define NID_setct_AuthTokenTBS 537 #define OBJ_setct_AuthTokenTBS OBJ_set_ctype,19L #define SN_setct_CapTokenData "setct-CapTokenData" #define NID_setct_CapTokenData 538 #define OBJ_setct_CapTokenData OBJ_set_ctype,20L #define SN_setct_CapTokenTBS "setct-CapTokenTBS" #define NID_setct_CapTokenTBS 539 #define OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBS OBJ_set_ctype,21L #define SN_setct_AcqCardCodeMsg "setct-AcqCardCodeMsg" #define NID_setct_AcqCardCodeMsg 540 #define OBJ_setct_AcqCardCodeMsg OBJ_set_ctype,22L #define SN_setct_AuthRevReqTBS "setct-AuthRevReqTBS" #define NID_setct_AuthRevReqTBS 541 #define OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqTBS OBJ_set_ctype,23L #define SN_setct_AuthRevResData "setct-AuthRevResData" #define NID_setct_AuthRevResData 542 #define OBJ_setct_AuthRevResData OBJ_set_ctype,24L #define SN_setct_AuthRevResTBS "setct-AuthRevResTBS" #define NID_setct_AuthRevResTBS 543 #define OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBS OBJ_set_ctype,25L #define SN_setct_CapReqTBS "setct-CapReqTBS" #define NID_setct_CapReqTBS 544 #define OBJ_setct_CapReqTBS OBJ_set_ctype,26L #define SN_setct_CapReqTBSX "setct-CapReqTBSX" #define NID_setct_CapReqTBSX 545 #define OBJ_setct_CapReqTBSX OBJ_set_ctype,27L #define SN_setct_CapResData "setct-CapResData" #define NID_setct_CapResData 546 #define OBJ_setct_CapResData OBJ_set_ctype,28L #define SN_setct_CapRevReqTBS "setct-CapRevReqTBS" #define NID_setct_CapRevReqTBS 547 #define OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBS OBJ_set_ctype,29L #define SN_setct_CapRevReqTBSX "setct-CapRevReqTBSX" #define NID_setct_CapRevReqTBSX 548 #define OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBSX OBJ_set_ctype,30L #define SN_setct_CapRevResData "setct-CapRevResData" #define NID_setct_CapRevResData 549 #define OBJ_setct_CapRevResData OBJ_set_ctype,31L #define SN_setct_CredReqTBS "setct-CredReqTBS" #define NID_setct_CredReqTBS 550 #define OBJ_setct_CredReqTBS OBJ_set_ctype,32L #define SN_setct_CredReqTBSX "setct-CredReqTBSX" #define NID_setct_CredReqTBSX 551 #define OBJ_setct_CredReqTBSX OBJ_set_ctype,33L #define SN_setct_CredResData "setct-CredResData" #define NID_setct_CredResData 552 #define OBJ_setct_CredResData OBJ_set_ctype,34L #define SN_setct_CredRevReqTBS "setct-CredRevReqTBS" #define NID_setct_CredRevReqTBS 553 #define OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBS OBJ_set_ctype,35L #define SN_setct_CredRevReqTBSX "setct-CredRevReqTBSX" #define NID_setct_CredRevReqTBSX 554 #define OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBSX OBJ_set_ctype,36L #define SN_setct_CredRevResData "setct-CredRevResData" #define NID_setct_CredRevResData 555 #define OBJ_setct_CredRevResData OBJ_set_ctype,37L #define SN_setct_PCertReqData "setct-PCertReqData" #define NID_setct_PCertReqData 556 #define OBJ_setct_PCertReqData OBJ_set_ctype,38L #define SN_setct_PCertResTBS "setct-PCertResTBS" #define NID_setct_PCertResTBS 557 #define OBJ_setct_PCertResTBS OBJ_set_ctype,39L #define SN_setct_BatchAdminReqData "setct-BatchAdminReqData" #define NID_setct_BatchAdminReqData 558 #define OBJ_setct_BatchAdminReqData OBJ_set_ctype,40L #define SN_setct_BatchAdminResData "setct-BatchAdminResData" #define NID_setct_BatchAdminResData 559 #define OBJ_setct_BatchAdminResData OBJ_set_ctype,41L #define SN_setct_CardCInitResTBS "setct-CardCInitResTBS" #define NID_setct_CardCInitResTBS 560 #define OBJ_setct_CardCInitResTBS OBJ_set_ctype,42L #define SN_setct_MeAqCInitResTBS "setct-MeAqCInitResTBS" #define NID_setct_MeAqCInitResTBS 561 #define OBJ_setct_MeAqCInitResTBS OBJ_set_ctype,43L #define SN_setct_RegFormResTBS "setct-RegFormResTBS" #define NID_setct_RegFormResTBS 562 #define OBJ_setct_RegFormResTBS OBJ_set_ctype,44L #define SN_setct_CertReqData "setct-CertReqData" #define NID_setct_CertReqData 563 #define OBJ_setct_CertReqData OBJ_set_ctype,45L #define SN_setct_CertReqTBS "setct-CertReqTBS" #define NID_setct_CertReqTBS 564 #define OBJ_setct_CertReqTBS OBJ_set_ctype,46L #define SN_setct_CertResData "setct-CertResData" #define NID_setct_CertResData 565 #define OBJ_setct_CertResData OBJ_set_ctype,47L #define SN_setct_CertInqReqTBS "setct-CertInqReqTBS" #define NID_setct_CertInqReqTBS 566 #define OBJ_setct_CertInqReqTBS OBJ_set_ctype,48L #define SN_setct_ErrorTBS "setct-ErrorTBS" #define NID_setct_ErrorTBS 567 #define OBJ_setct_ErrorTBS OBJ_set_ctype,49L #define SN_setct_PIDualSignedTBE "setct-PIDualSignedTBE" #define NID_setct_PIDualSignedTBE 568 #define OBJ_setct_PIDualSignedTBE OBJ_set_ctype,50L #define SN_setct_PIUnsignedTBE "setct-PIUnsignedTBE" #define NID_setct_PIUnsignedTBE 569 #define OBJ_setct_PIUnsignedTBE OBJ_set_ctype,51L #define SN_setct_AuthReqTBE "setct-AuthReqTBE" #define NID_setct_AuthReqTBE 570 #define OBJ_setct_AuthReqTBE OBJ_set_ctype,52L #define SN_setct_AuthResTBE "setct-AuthResTBE" #define NID_setct_AuthResTBE 571 #define OBJ_setct_AuthResTBE OBJ_set_ctype,53L #define SN_setct_AuthResTBEX "setct-AuthResTBEX" #define NID_setct_AuthResTBEX 572 #define OBJ_setct_AuthResTBEX OBJ_set_ctype,54L #define SN_setct_AuthTokenTBE "setct-AuthTokenTBE" #define NID_setct_AuthTokenTBE 573 #define OBJ_setct_AuthTokenTBE OBJ_set_ctype,55L #define SN_setct_CapTokenTBE "setct-CapTokenTBE" #define NID_setct_CapTokenTBE 574 #define OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBE OBJ_set_ctype,56L #define SN_setct_CapTokenTBEX "setct-CapTokenTBEX" #define NID_setct_CapTokenTBEX 575 #define OBJ_setct_CapTokenTBEX OBJ_set_ctype,57L #define SN_setct_AcqCardCodeMsgTBE "setct-AcqCardCodeMsgTBE" #define NID_setct_AcqCardCodeMsgTBE 576 #define OBJ_setct_AcqCardCodeMsgTBE OBJ_set_ctype,58L #define SN_setct_AuthRevReqTBE "setct-AuthRevReqTBE" #define NID_setct_AuthRevReqTBE 577 #define OBJ_setct_AuthRevReqTBE OBJ_set_ctype,59L #define SN_setct_AuthRevResTBE "setct-AuthRevResTBE" #define NID_setct_AuthRevResTBE 578 #define OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBE OBJ_set_ctype,60L #define SN_setct_AuthRevResTBEB "setct-AuthRevResTBEB" #define NID_setct_AuthRevResTBEB 579 #define OBJ_setct_AuthRevResTBEB OBJ_set_ctype,61L #define SN_setct_CapReqTBE "setct-CapReqTBE" #define NID_setct_CapReqTBE 580 #define OBJ_setct_CapReqTBE OBJ_set_ctype,62L #define SN_setct_CapReqTBEX "setct-CapReqTBEX" #define NID_setct_CapReqTBEX 581 #define OBJ_setct_CapReqTBEX OBJ_set_ctype,63L #define SN_setct_CapResTBE "setct-CapResTBE" #define NID_setct_CapResTBE 582 #define OBJ_setct_CapResTBE OBJ_set_ctype,64L #define SN_setct_CapRevReqTBE "setct-CapRevReqTBE" #define NID_setct_CapRevReqTBE 583 #define OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBE OBJ_set_ctype,65L #define SN_setct_CapRevReqTBEX "setct-CapRevReqTBEX" #define NID_setct_CapRevReqTBEX 584 #define OBJ_setct_CapRevReqTBEX OBJ_set_ctype,66L #define SN_setct_CapRevResTBE "setct-CapRevResTBE" #define NID_setct_CapRevResTBE 585 #define OBJ_setct_CapRevResTBE OBJ_set_ctype,67L #define SN_setct_CredReqTBE "setct-CredReqTBE" #define NID_setct_CredReqTBE 586 #define OBJ_setct_CredReqTBE OBJ_set_ctype,68L #define SN_setct_CredReqTBEX "setct-CredReqTBEX" #define NID_setct_CredReqTBEX 587 #define OBJ_setct_CredReqTBEX OBJ_set_ctype,69L #define SN_setct_CredResTBE "setct-CredResTBE" #define NID_setct_CredResTBE 588 #define OBJ_setct_CredResTBE OBJ_set_ctype,70L #define SN_setct_CredRevReqTBE "setct-CredRevReqTBE" #define NID_setct_CredRevReqTBE 589 #define OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBE OBJ_set_ctype,71L #define SN_setct_CredRevReqTBEX "setct-CredRevReqTBEX" #define NID_setct_CredRevReqTBEX 590 #define OBJ_setct_CredRevReqTBEX OBJ_set_ctype,72L #define SN_setct_CredRevResTBE "setct-CredRevResTBE" #define NID_setct_CredRevResTBE 591 #define OBJ_setct_CredRevResTBE OBJ_set_ctype,73L #define SN_setct_BatchAdminReqTBE "setct-BatchAdminReqTBE" #define NID_setct_BatchAdminReqTBE 592 #define OBJ_setct_BatchAdminReqTBE OBJ_set_ctype,74L #define SN_setct_BatchAdminResTBE "setct-BatchAdminResTBE" #define NID_setct_BatchAdminResTBE 593 #define OBJ_setct_BatchAdminResTBE OBJ_set_ctype,75L #define SN_setct_RegFormReqTBE "setct-RegFormReqTBE" #define NID_setct_RegFormReqTBE 594 #define OBJ_setct_RegFormReqTBE OBJ_set_ctype,76L #define SN_setct_CertReqTBE "setct-CertReqTBE" #define NID_setct_CertReqTBE 595 #define OBJ_setct_CertReqTBE OBJ_set_ctype,77L #define SN_setct_CertReqTBEX "setct-CertReqTBEX" #define NID_setct_CertReqTBEX 596 #define OBJ_setct_CertReqTBEX OBJ_set_ctype,78L #define SN_setct_CertResTBE "setct-CertResTBE" #define NID_setct_CertResTBE 597 #define OBJ_setct_CertResTBE OBJ_set_ctype,79L #define SN_setct_CRLNotificationTBS "setct-CRLNotificationTBS" #define NID_setct_CRLNotificationTBS 598 #define OBJ_setct_CRLNotificationTBS OBJ_set_ctype,80L #define SN_setct_CRLNotificationResTBS "setct-CRLNotificationResTBS" #define NID_setct_CRLNotificationResTBS 599 #define OBJ_setct_CRLNotificationResTBS OBJ_set_ctype,81L #define SN_setct_BCIDistributionTBS "setct-BCIDistributionTBS" #define NID_setct_BCIDistributionTBS 600 #define OBJ_setct_BCIDistributionTBS OBJ_set_ctype,82L #define SN_setext_genCrypt "setext-genCrypt" #define LN_setext_genCrypt "generic cryptogram" #define NID_setext_genCrypt 601 #define OBJ_setext_genCrypt OBJ_set_msgExt,1L #define SN_setext_miAuth "setext-miAuth" #define LN_setext_miAuth "merchant initiated auth" #define NID_setext_miAuth 602 #define OBJ_setext_miAuth OBJ_set_msgExt,3L #define SN_setext_pinSecure "setext-pinSecure" #define NID_setext_pinSecure 603 #define OBJ_setext_pinSecure OBJ_set_msgExt,4L #define SN_setext_pinAny "setext-pinAny" #define NID_setext_pinAny 604 #define OBJ_setext_pinAny OBJ_set_msgExt,5L #define SN_setext_track2 "setext-track2" #define NID_setext_track2 605 #define OBJ_setext_track2 OBJ_set_msgExt,7L #define SN_setext_cv "setext-cv" #define LN_setext_cv "additional verification" #define NID_setext_cv 606 #define OBJ_setext_cv OBJ_set_msgExt,8L #define SN_set_policy_root "set-policy-root" #define NID_set_policy_root 607 #define OBJ_set_policy_root OBJ_set_policy,0L #define SN_setCext_hashedRoot "setCext-hashedRoot" #define NID_setCext_hashedRoot 608 #define OBJ_setCext_hashedRoot OBJ_set_certExt,0L #define SN_setCext_certType "setCext-certType" #define NID_setCext_certType 609 #define OBJ_setCext_certType OBJ_set_certExt,1L #define SN_setCext_merchData "setCext-merchData" #define NID_setCext_merchData 610 #define OBJ_setCext_merchData OBJ_set_certExt,2L #define SN_setCext_cCertRequired "setCext-cCertRequired" #define NID_setCext_cCertRequired 611 #define OBJ_setCext_cCertRequired OBJ_set_certExt,3L #define SN_setCext_tunneling "setCext-tunneling" #define NID_setCext_tunneling 612 #define OBJ_setCext_tunneling OBJ_set_certExt,4L #define SN_setCext_setExt "setCext-setExt" #define NID_setCext_setExt 613 #define OBJ_setCext_setExt OBJ_set_certExt,5L #define SN_setCext_setQualf "setCext-setQualf" #define NID_setCext_setQualf 614 #define OBJ_setCext_setQualf OBJ_set_certExt,6L #define SN_setCext_PGWYcapabilities "setCext-PGWYcapabilities" #define NID_setCext_PGWYcapabilities 615 #define OBJ_setCext_PGWYcapabilities OBJ_set_certExt,7L #define SN_setCext_TokenIdentifier "setCext-TokenIdentifier" #define NID_setCext_TokenIdentifier 616 #define OBJ_setCext_TokenIdentifier OBJ_set_certExt,8L #define SN_setCext_Track2Data "setCext-Track2Data" #define NID_setCext_Track2Data 617 #define OBJ_setCext_Track2Data OBJ_set_certExt,9L #define SN_setCext_TokenType "setCext-TokenType" #define NID_setCext_TokenType 618 #define OBJ_setCext_TokenType OBJ_set_certExt,10L #define SN_setCext_IssuerCapabilities "setCext-IssuerCapabilities" #define NID_setCext_IssuerCapabilities 619 #define OBJ_setCext_IssuerCapabilities OBJ_set_certExt,11L #define SN_setAttr_Cert "setAttr-Cert" #define NID_setAttr_Cert 620 #define OBJ_setAttr_Cert OBJ_set_attr,0L #define SN_setAttr_PGWYcap "setAttr-PGWYcap" #define LN_setAttr_PGWYcap "payment gateway capabilities" #define NID_setAttr_PGWYcap 621 #define OBJ_setAttr_PGWYcap OBJ_set_attr,1L #define SN_setAttr_TokenType "setAttr-TokenType" #define NID_setAttr_TokenType 622 #define OBJ_setAttr_TokenType OBJ_set_attr,2L #define SN_setAttr_IssCap "setAttr-IssCap" #define LN_setAttr_IssCap "issuer capabilities" #define NID_setAttr_IssCap 623 #define OBJ_setAttr_IssCap OBJ_set_attr,3L #define SN_set_rootKeyThumb "set-rootKeyThumb" #define NID_set_rootKeyThumb 624 #define OBJ_set_rootKeyThumb OBJ_setAttr_Cert,0L #define SN_set_addPolicy "set-addPolicy" #define NID_set_addPolicy 625 #define OBJ_set_addPolicy OBJ_setAttr_Cert,1L #define SN_setAttr_Token_EMV "setAttr-Token-EMV" #define NID_setAttr_Token_EMV 626 #define OBJ_setAttr_Token_EMV OBJ_setAttr_TokenType,1L #define SN_setAttr_Token_B0Prime "setAttr-Token-B0Prime" #define NID_setAttr_Token_B0Prime 627 #define OBJ_setAttr_Token_B0Prime OBJ_setAttr_TokenType,2L #define SN_setAttr_IssCap_CVM "setAttr-IssCap-CVM" #define NID_setAttr_IssCap_CVM 628 #define OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_CVM OBJ_setAttr_IssCap,3L #define SN_setAttr_IssCap_T2 "setAttr-IssCap-T2" #define NID_setAttr_IssCap_T2 629 #define OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_T2 OBJ_setAttr_IssCap,4L #define SN_setAttr_IssCap_Sig "setAttr-IssCap-Sig" #define NID_setAttr_IssCap_Sig 630 #define OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_Sig OBJ_setAttr_IssCap,5L #define SN_setAttr_GenCryptgrm "setAttr-GenCryptgrm" #define LN_setAttr_GenCryptgrm "generate cryptogram" #define NID_setAttr_GenCryptgrm 631 #define OBJ_setAttr_GenCryptgrm OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_CVM,1L #define SN_setAttr_T2Enc "setAttr-T2Enc" #define LN_setAttr_T2Enc "encrypted track 2" #define NID_setAttr_T2Enc 632 #define OBJ_setAttr_T2Enc OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_T2,1L #define SN_setAttr_T2cleartxt "setAttr-T2cleartxt" #define LN_setAttr_T2cleartxt "cleartext track 2" #define NID_setAttr_T2cleartxt 633 #define OBJ_setAttr_T2cleartxt OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_T2,2L #define SN_setAttr_TokICCsig "setAttr-TokICCsig" #define LN_setAttr_TokICCsig "ICC or token signature" #define NID_setAttr_TokICCsig 634 #define OBJ_setAttr_TokICCsig OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_Sig,1L #define SN_setAttr_SecDevSig "setAttr-SecDevSig" #define LN_setAttr_SecDevSig "secure device signature" #define NID_setAttr_SecDevSig 635 #define OBJ_setAttr_SecDevSig OBJ_setAttr_IssCap_Sig,2L #define SN_set_brand_IATA_ATA "set-brand-IATA-ATA" #define NID_set_brand_IATA_ATA 636 #define OBJ_set_brand_IATA_ATA OBJ_set_brand,1L #define SN_set_brand_Diners "set-brand-Diners" #define NID_set_brand_Diners 637 #define OBJ_set_brand_Diners OBJ_set_brand,30L #define SN_set_brand_AmericanExpress "set-brand-AmericanExpress" #define NID_set_brand_AmericanExpress 638 #define OBJ_set_brand_AmericanExpress OBJ_set_brand,34L #define SN_set_brand_JCB "set-brand-JCB" #define NID_set_brand_JCB 639 #define OBJ_set_brand_JCB OBJ_set_brand,35L #define SN_set_brand_Visa "set-brand-Visa" #define NID_set_brand_Visa 640 #define OBJ_set_brand_Visa OBJ_set_brand,4L #define SN_set_brand_MasterCard "set-brand-MasterCard" #define NID_set_brand_MasterCard 641 #define OBJ_set_brand_MasterCard OBJ_set_brand,5L #define SN_set_brand_Novus "set-brand-Novus" #define NID_set_brand_Novus 642 #define OBJ_set_brand_Novus OBJ_set_brand,6011L #define SN_des_cdmf "DES-CDMF" #define LN_des_cdmf "des-cdmf" #define NID_des_cdmf 643 #define OBJ_des_cdmf OBJ_rsadsi,3L,10L #define SN_rsaOAEPEncryptionSET "rsaOAEPEncryptionSET" #define NID_rsaOAEPEncryptionSET 644 #define OBJ_rsaOAEPEncryptionSET OBJ_rsadsi,1L,1L,6L #define SN_ipsec3 "Oakley-EC2N-3" #define LN_ipsec3 "ipsec3" #define NID_ipsec3 749 #define SN_ipsec4 "Oakley-EC2N-4" #define LN_ipsec4 "ipsec4" #define NID_ipsec4 750 #define SN_whirlpool "whirlpool" #define NID_whirlpool 804 #define OBJ_whirlpool OBJ_iso,0L,10118L,3L,0L,55L #define SN_cryptopro "cryptopro" #define NID_cryptopro 805 #define OBJ_cryptopro OBJ_member_body,643L,2L,2L #define SN_cryptocom "cryptocom" #define NID_cryptocom 806 #define OBJ_cryptocom OBJ_member_body,643L,2L,9L #define SN_id_tc26 "id-tc26" #define NID_id_tc26 974 #define OBJ_id_tc26 OBJ_member_body,643L,7L,1L #define SN_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001 "id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001" #define LN_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001 "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-2001" #define NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001 807 #define OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001 OBJ_cryptopro,3L #define SN_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94 "id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94" #define LN_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94 "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-94" #define NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94 808 #define OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94 OBJ_cryptopro,4L #define SN_id_GostR3411_94 "md_gost94" #define LN_id_GostR3411_94 "GOST R 34.11-94" #define NID_id_GostR3411_94 809 #define OBJ_id_GostR3411_94 OBJ_cryptopro,9L #define SN_id_HMACGostR3411_94 "id-HMACGostR3411-94" #define LN_id_HMACGostR3411_94 "HMAC GOST 34.11-94" #define NID_id_HMACGostR3411_94 810 #define OBJ_id_HMACGostR3411_94 OBJ_cryptopro,10L #define SN_id_GostR3410_2001 "gost2001" #define LN_id_GostR3410_2001 "GOST R 34.10-2001" #define NID_id_GostR3410_2001 811 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001 OBJ_cryptopro,19L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94 "gost94" #define LN_id_GostR3410_94 "GOST R 34.10-94" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94 812 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94 OBJ_cryptopro,20L #define SN_id_Gost28147_89 "gost89" #define LN_id_Gost28147_89 "GOST 28147-89" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89 813 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89 OBJ_cryptopro,21L #define SN_gost89_cnt "gost89-cnt" #define NID_gost89_cnt 814 #define SN_gost89_cnt_12 "gost89-cnt-12" #define NID_gost89_cnt_12 975 #define SN_gost89_cbc "gost89-cbc" #define NID_gost89_cbc 1009 #define SN_gost89_ecb "gost89-ecb" #define NID_gost89_ecb 1010 #define SN_gost89_ctr "gost89-ctr" #define NID_gost89_ctr 1011 #define SN_id_Gost28147_89_MAC "gost-mac" #define LN_id_Gost28147_89_MAC "GOST 28147-89 MAC" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89_MAC 815 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_MAC OBJ_cryptopro,22L #define SN_gost_mac_12 "gost-mac-12" #define NID_gost_mac_12 976 #define SN_id_GostR3411_94_prf "prf-gostr3411-94" #define LN_id_GostR3411_94_prf "GOST R 34.11-94 PRF" #define NID_id_GostR3411_94_prf 816 #define OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_prf OBJ_cryptopro,23L #define SN_id_GostR3410_2001DH "id-GostR3410-2001DH" #define LN_id_GostR3410_2001DH "GOST R 34.10-2001 DH" #define NID_id_GostR3410_2001DH 817 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001DH OBJ_cryptopro,98L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94DH "id-GostR3410-94DH" #define LN_id_GostR3410_94DH "GOST R 34.10-94 DH" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94DH 818 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94DH OBJ_cryptopro,99L #define SN_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_KeyMeshing "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-KeyMeshing" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_KeyMeshing 819 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_KeyMeshing OBJ_cryptopro,14L,1L #define SN_id_Gost28147_89_None_KeyMeshing "id-Gost28147-89-None-KeyMeshing" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89_None_KeyMeshing 820 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_None_KeyMeshing OBJ_cryptopro,14L,0L #define SN_id_GostR3411_94_TestParamSet "id-GostR3411-94-TestParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3411_94_TestParamSet 821 #define OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_TestParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,30L,0L #define SN_id_GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet "id-GostR3411-94-CryptoProParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet 822 #define OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_CryptoProParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,30L,1L #define SN_id_Gost28147_89_TestParamSet "id-Gost28147-89-TestParamSet" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89_TestParamSet 823 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_TestParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,31L,0L #define SN_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet 824 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,31L,1L #define SN_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet 825 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,31L,2L #define SN_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet 826 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,31L,3L #define SN_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet 827 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,31L,4L #define SN_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_1_ParamSet "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-1-ParamSet" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_1_ParamSet 828 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_1_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,31L,5L #define SN_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_0_ParamSet "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-Oscar-1-0-ParamSet" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_0_ParamSet 829 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_Oscar_1_0_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,31L,6L #define SN_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_RIC_1_ParamSet "id-Gost28147-89-CryptoPro-RIC-1-ParamSet" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_RIC_1_ParamSet 830 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_CryptoPro_RIC_1_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,31L,7L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_TestParamSet "id-GostR3410-94-TestParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_TestParamSet 831 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_TestParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,32L,0L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet 832 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,32L,2L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet 833 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,32L,3L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet 834 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,32L,4L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-D-ParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet 835 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_D_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,32L,5L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet 836 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,33L,1L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet 837 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,33L,2L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchC_ParamSet "id-GostR3410-94-CryptoPro-XchC-ParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchC_ParamSet 838 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_CryptoPro_XchC_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,33L,3L #define SN_id_GostR3410_2001_TestParamSet "id-GostR3410-2001-TestParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_2001_TestParamSet 839 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_TestParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,35L,0L #define SN_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-A-ParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet 840 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_A_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,35L,1L #define SN_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-B-ParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet 841 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_B_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,35L,2L #define SN_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-C-ParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet 842 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_C_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,35L,3L #define SN_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchA-ParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet 843 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchA_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,36L,0L #define SN_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet "id-GostR3410-2001-CryptoPro-XchB-ParamSet" #define NID_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet 844 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_CryptoPro_XchB_ParamSet OBJ_cryptopro,36L,1L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_a "id-GostR3410-94-a" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_a 845 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_a OBJ_id_GostR3410_94,1L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_aBis "id-GostR3410-94-aBis" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_aBis 846 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_aBis OBJ_id_GostR3410_94,2L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_b "id-GostR3410-94-b" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_b 847 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_b OBJ_id_GostR3410_94,3L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_bBis "id-GostR3410-94-bBis" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_bBis 848 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_bBis OBJ_id_GostR3410_94,4L #define SN_id_Gost28147_89_cc "id-Gost28147-89-cc" #define LN_id_Gost28147_89_cc "GOST 28147-89 Cryptocom ParamSet" #define NID_id_Gost28147_89_cc 849 #define OBJ_id_Gost28147_89_cc OBJ_cryptocom,1L,6L,1L #define SN_id_GostR3410_94_cc "gost94cc" #define LN_id_GostR3410_94_cc "GOST 34.10-94 Cryptocom" #define NID_id_GostR3410_94_cc 850 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_94_cc OBJ_cryptocom,1L,5L,3L #define SN_id_GostR3410_2001_cc "gost2001cc" #define LN_id_GostR3410_2001_cc "GOST 34.10-2001 Cryptocom" #define NID_id_GostR3410_2001_cc 851 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_cc OBJ_cryptocom,1L,5L,4L #define SN_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc "id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-94-cc" #define LN_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-94 Cryptocom" #define NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc 852 #define OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_94_cc OBJ_cryptocom,1L,3L,3L #define SN_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc "id-GostR3411-94-with-GostR3410-2001-cc" #define LN_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc "GOST R 34.11-94 with GOST R 34.10-2001 Cryptocom" #define NID_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc 853 #define OBJ_id_GostR3411_94_with_GostR3410_2001_cc OBJ_cryptocom,1L,3L,4L #define SN_id_GostR3410_2001_ParamSet_cc "id-GostR3410-2001-ParamSet-cc" #define LN_id_GostR3410_2001_ParamSet_cc "GOST R 3410-2001 Parameter Set Cryptocom" #define NID_id_GostR3410_2001_ParamSet_cc 854 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2001_ParamSet_cc OBJ_cryptocom,1L,8L,1L #define SN_id_tc26_algorithms "id-tc26-algorithms" #define NID_id_tc26_algorithms 977 #define OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms OBJ_id_tc26,1L #define SN_id_tc26_sign "id-tc26-sign" #define NID_id_tc26_sign 978 #define OBJ_id_tc26_sign OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms,1L #define SN_id_GostR3410_2012_256 "gost2012_256" #define LN_id_GostR3410_2012_256 "GOST R 34.10-2012 with 256 bit modulus" #define NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 979 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2012_256 OBJ_id_tc26_sign,1L #define SN_id_GostR3410_2012_512 "gost2012_512" #define LN_id_GostR3410_2012_512 "GOST R 34.10-2012 with 512 bit modulus" #define NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512 980 #define OBJ_id_GostR3410_2012_512 OBJ_id_tc26_sign,2L #define SN_id_tc26_digest "id-tc26-digest" #define NID_id_tc26_digest 981 #define OBJ_id_tc26_digest OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms,2L #define SN_id_GostR3411_2012_256 "md_gost12_256" #define LN_id_GostR3411_2012_256 "GOST R 34.11-2012 with 256 bit hash" #define NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256 982 #define OBJ_id_GostR3411_2012_256 OBJ_id_tc26_digest,2L #define SN_id_GostR3411_2012_512 "md_gost12_512" #define LN_id_GostR3411_2012_512 "GOST R 34.11-2012 with 512 bit hash" #define NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512 983 #define OBJ_id_GostR3411_2012_512 OBJ_id_tc26_digest,3L #define SN_id_tc26_signwithdigest "id-tc26-signwithdigest" #define NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest 984 #define OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms,3L #define SN_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256 "id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-2012-256" #define LN_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256 "GOST R 34.10-2012 with GOST R 34.11-2012 (256 bit)" #define NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256 985 #define OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_256 OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest,2L #define SN_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512 "id-tc26-signwithdigest-gost3410-2012-512" #define LN_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512 "GOST R 34.10-2012 with GOST R 34.11-2012 (512 bit)" #define NID_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512 986 #define OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest_gost3410_2012_512 OBJ_id_tc26_signwithdigest,3L #define SN_id_tc26_mac "id-tc26-mac" #define NID_id_tc26_mac 987 #define OBJ_id_tc26_mac OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms,4L #define SN_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256 "id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-2012-256" #define LN_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256 "HMAC GOST 34.11-2012 256 bit" #define NID_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256 988 #define OBJ_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_256 OBJ_id_tc26_mac,1L #define SN_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512 "id-tc26-hmac-gost-3411-2012-512" #define LN_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512 "HMAC GOST 34.11-2012 512 bit" #define NID_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512 989 #define OBJ_id_tc26_hmac_gost_3411_2012_512 OBJ_id_tc26_mac,2L #define SN_id_tc26_cipher "id-tc26-cipher" #define NID_id_tc26_cipher 990 #define OBJ_id_tc26_cipher OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms,5L #define SN_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_magma "id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-magma" #define NID_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_magma 1173 #define OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_magma OBJ_id_tc26_cipher,1L #define SN_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_magma_ctracpkm "id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm" #define NID_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_magma_ctracpkm 1174 #define OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_magma_ctracpkm OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_magma,1L #define SN_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_magma_ctracpkm_omac "id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-magma-ctracpkm-omac" #define NID_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_magma_ctracpkm_omac 1175 #define OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_magma_ctracpkm_omac OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_magma,2L #define SN_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik "id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik" #define NID_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik 1176 #define OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik OBJ_id_tc26_cipher,2L #define SN_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik_ctracpkm "id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm" #define NID_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik_ctracpkm 1177 #define OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik_ctracpkm OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik,1L #define SN_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik_ctracpkm_omac "id-tc26-cipher-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-ctracpkm-omac" #define NID_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik_ctracpkm_omac 1178 #define OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik_ctracpkm_omac OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik,2L #define SN_id_tc26_agreement "id-tc26-agreement" #define NID_id_tc26_agreement 991 #define OBJ_id_tc26_agreement OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms,6L #define SN_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_256 "id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-256" #define NID_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_256 992 #define OBJ_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_256 OBJ_id_tc26_agreement,1L #define SN_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_512 "id-tc26-agreement-gost-3410-2012-512" #define NID_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_512 993 #define OBJ_id_tc26_agreement_gost_3410_2012_512 OBJ_id_tc26_agreement,2L #define SN_id_tc26_wrap "id-tc26-wrap" #define NID_id_tc26_wrap 1179 #define OBJ_id_tc26_wrap OBJ_id_tc26_algorithms,7L #define SN_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_magma "id-tc26-wrap-gostr3412-2015-magma" #define NID_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_magma 1180 #define OBJ_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_magma OBJ_id_tc26_wrap,1L #define SN_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_magma_kexp15 "id-tc26-wrap-gostr3412-2015-magma-kexp15" #define NID_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_magma_kexp15 1181 #define OBJ_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_magma_kexp15 OBJ_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_magma,1L #define SN_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik "id-tc26-wrap-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik" #define NID_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik 1182 #define OBJ_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik OBJ_id_tc26_wrap,2L #define SN_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik_kexp15 "id-tc26-wrap-gostr3412-2015-kuznyechik-kexp15" #define NID_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik_kexp15 1183 #define OBJ_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik_kexp15 OBJ_id_tc26_wrap_gostr3412_2015_kuznyechik,1L #define SN_id_tc26_constants "id-tc26-constants" #define NID_id_tc26_constants 994 #define OBJ_id_tc26_constants OBJ_id_tc26,2L #define SN_id_tc26_sign_constants "id-tc26-sign-constants" #define NID_id_tc26_sign_constants 995 #define OBJ_id_tc26_sign_constants OBJ_id_tc26_constants,1L #define SN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_constants "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-constants" #define NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_constants 1147 #define OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_constants OBJ_id_tc26_sign_constants,1L #define SN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetA" #define LN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA "GOST R 34.10-2012 (256 bit) ParamSet A" #define NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA 1148 #define OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetA OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_constants,1L #define SN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetB" #define LN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB "GOST R 34.10-2012 (256 bit) ParamSet B" #define NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB 1184 #define OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetB OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_constants,2L #define SN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetC" #define LN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC "GOST R 34.10-2012 (256 bit) ParamSet C" #define NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC 1185 #define OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetC OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_constants,3L #define SN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-256-paramSetD" #define LN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD "GOST R 34.10-2012 (256 bit) ParamSet D" #define NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD 1186 #define OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_paramSetD OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_256_constants,4L #define SN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-constants" #define NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants 996 #define OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants OBJ_id_tc26_sign_constants,2L #define SN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetTest "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetTest" #define LN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetTest "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) testing parameter set" #define NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetTest 997 #define OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetTest OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants,0L #define SN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetA" #define LN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet A" #define NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA 998 #define OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetA OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants,1L #define SN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetB" #define LN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet B" #define NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB 999 #define OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetB OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants,2L #define SN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC "id-tc26-gost-3410-2012-512-paramSetC" #define LN_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC "GOST R 34.10-2012 (512 bit) ParamSet C" #define NID_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC 1149 #define OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_paramSetC OBJ_id_tc26_gost_3410_2012_512_constants,3L #define SN_id_tc26_digest_constants "id-tc26-digest-constants" #define NID_id_tc26_digest_constants 1000 #define OBJ_id_tc26_digest_constants OBJ_id_tc26_constants,2L #define SN_id_tc26_cipher_constants "id-tc26-cipher-constants" #define NID_id_tc26_cipher_constants 1001 #define OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_constants OBJ_id_tc26_constants,5L #define SN_id_tc26_gost_28147_constants "id-tc26-gost-28147-constants" #define NID_id_tc26_gost_28147_constants 1002 #define OBJ_id_tc26_gost_28147_constants OBJ_id_tc26_cipher_constants,1L #define SN_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z "id-tc26-gost-28147-param-Z" #define LN_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z "GOST 28147-89 TC26 parameter set" #define NID_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z 1003 #define OBJ_id_tc26_gost_28147_param_Z OBJ_id_tc26_gost_28147_constants,1L #define SN_INN "INN" #define LN_INN "INN" #define NID_INN 1004 #define OBJ_INN OBJ_member_body,643L,3L,131L,1L,1L #define SN_OGRN "OGRN" #define LN_OGRN "OGRN" #define NID_OGRN 1005 #define OBJ_OGRN OBJ_member_body,643L,100L,1L #define SN_SNILS "SNILS" #define LN_SNILS "SNILS" #define NID_SNILS 1006 #define OBJ_SNILS OBJ_member_body,643L,100L,3L #define SN_subjectSignTool "subjectSignTool" #define LN_subjectSignTool "Signing Tool of Subject" #define NID_subjectSignTool 1007 #define OBJ_subjectSignTool OBJ_member_body,643L,100L,111L #define SN_issuerSignTool "issuerSignTool" #define LN_issuerSignTool "Signing Tool of Issuer" #define NID_issuerSignTool 1008 #define OBJ_issuerSignTool OBJ_member_body,643L,100L,112L #define SN_grasshopper_ecb "grasshopper-ecb" #define NID_grasshopper_ecb 1012 #define SN_grasshopper_ctr "grasshopper-ctr" #define NID_grasshopper_ctr 1013 #define SN_grasshopper_ofb "grasshopper-ofb" #define NID_grasshopper_ofb 1014 #define SN_grasshopper_cbc "grasshopper-cbc" #define NID_grasshopper_cbc 1015 #define SN_grasshopper_cfb "grasshopper-cfb" #define NID_grasshopper_cfb 1016 #define SN_grasshopper_mac "grasshopper-mac" #define NID_grasshopper_mac 1017 #define SN_magma_ecb "magma-ecb" #define NID_magma_ecb 1187 #define SN_magma_ctr "magma-ctr" #define NID_magma_ctr 1188 #define SN_magma_ofb "magma-ofb" #define NID_magma_ofb 1189 #define SN_magma_cbc "magma-cbc" #define NID_magma_cbc 1190 #define SN_magma_cfb "magma-cfb" #define NID_magma_cfb 1191 #define SN_magma_mac "magma-mac" #define NID_magma_mac 1192 #define SN_camellia_128_cbc "CAMELLIA-128-CBC" #define LN_camellia_128_cbc "camellia-128-cbc" #define NID_camellia_128_cbc 751 #define OBJ_camellia_128_cbc 1L,2L,392L,200011L,61L,1L,1L,1L,2L #define SN_camellia_192_cbc "CAMELLIA-192-CBC" #define LN_camellia_192_cbc "camellia-192-cbc" #define NID_camellia_192_cbc 752 #define OBJ_camellia_192_cbc 1L,2L,392L,200011L,61L,1L,1L,1L,3L #define SN_camellia_256_cbc "CAMELLIA-256-CBC" #define LN_camellia_256_cbc "camellia-256-cbc" #define NID_camellia_256_cbc 753 #define OBJ_camellia_256_cbc 1L,2L,392L,200011L,61L,1L,1L,1L,4L #define SN_id_camellia128_wrap "id-camellia128-wrap" #define NID_id_camellia128_wrap 907 #define OBJ_id_camellia128_wrap 1L,2L,392L,200011L,61L,1L,1L,3L,2L #define SN_id_camellia192_wrap "id-camellia192-wrap" #define NID_id_camellia192_wrap 908 #define OBJ_id_camellia192_wrap 1L,2L,392L,200011L,61L,1L,1L,3L,3L #define SN_id_camellia256_wrap "id-camellia256-wrap" #define NID_id_camellia256_wrap 909 #define OBJ_id_camellia256_wrap 1L,2L,392L,200011L,61L,1L,1L,3L,4L #define OBJ_ntt_ds 0L,3L,4401L,5L #define OBJ_camellia OBJ_ntt_ds,3L,1L,9L #define SN_camellia_128_ecb "CAMELLIA-128-ECB" #define LN_camellia_128_ecb "camellia-128-ecb" #define NID_camellia_128_ecb 754 #define OBJ_camellia_128_ecb OBJ_camellia,1L #define SN_camellia_128_ofb128 "CAMELLIA-128-OFB" #define LN_camellia_128_ofb128 "camellia-128-ofb" #define NID_camellia_128_ofb128 766 #define OBJ_camellia_128_ofb128 OBJ_camellia,3L #define SN_camellia_128_cfb128 "CAMELLIA-128-CFB" #define LN_camellia_128_cfb128 "camellia-128-cfb" #define NID_camellia_128_cfb128 757 #define OBJ_camellia_128_cfb128 OBJ_camellia,4L #define SN_camellia_128_gcm "CAMELLIA-128-GCM" #define LN_camellia_128_gcm "camellia-128-gcm" #define NID_camellia_128_gcm 961 #define OBJ_camellia_128_gcm OBJ_camellia,6L #define SN_camellia_128_ccm "CAMELLIA-128-CCM" #define LN_camellia_128_ccm "camellia-128-ccm" #define NID_camellia_128_ccm 962 #define OBJ_camellia_128_ccm OBJ_camellia,7L #define SN_camellia_128_ctr "CAMELLIA-128-CTR" #define LN_camellia_128_ctr "camellia-128-ctr" #define NID_camellia_128_ctr 963 #define OBJ_camellia_128_ctr OBJ_camellia,9L #define SN_camellia_128_cmac "CAMELLIA-128-CMAC" #define LN_camellia_128_cmac "camellia-128-cmac" #define NID_camellia_128_cmac 964 #define OBJ_camellia_128_cmac OBJ_camellia,10L #define SN_camellia_192_ecb "CAMELLIA-192-ECB" #define LN_camellia_192_ecb "camellia-192-ecb" #define NID_camellia_192_ecb 755 #define OBJ_camellia_192_ecb OBJ_camellia,21L #define SN_camellia_192_ofb128 "CAMELLIA-192-OFB" #define LN_camellia_192_ofb128 "camellia-192-ofb" #define NID_camellia_192_ofb128 767 #define OBJ_camellia_192_ofb128 OBJ_camellia,23L #define SN_camellia_192_cfb128 "CAMELLIA-192-CFB" #define LN_camellia_192_cfb128 "camellia-192-cfb" #define NID_camellia_192_cfb128 758 #define OBJ_camellia_192_cfb128 OBJ_camellia,24L #define SN_camellia_192_gcm "CAMELLIA-192-GCM" #define LN_camellia_192_gcm "camellia-192-gcm" #define NID_camellia_192_gcm 965 #define OBJ_camellia_192_gcm OBJ_camellia,26L #define SN_camellia_192_ccm "CAMELLIA-192-CCM" #define LN_camellia_192_ccm "camellia-192-ccm" #define NID_camellia_192_ccm 966 #define OBJ_camellia_192_ccm OBJ_camellia,27L #define SN_camellia_192_ctr "CAMELLIA-192-CTR" #define LN_camellia_192_ctr "camellia-192-ctr" #define NID_camellia_192_ctr 967 #define OBJ_camellia_192_ctr OBJ_camellia,29L #define SN_camellia_192_cmac "CAMELLIA-192-CMAC" #define LN_camellia_192_cmac "camellia-192-cmac" #define NID_camellia_192_cmac 968 #define OBJ_camellia_192_cmac OBJ_camellia,30L #define SN_camellia_256_ecb "CAMELLIA-256-ECB" #define LN_camellia_256_ecb "camellia-256-ecb" #define NID_camellia_256_ecb 756 #define OBJ_camellia_256_ecb OBJ_camellia,41L #define SN_camellia_256_ofb128 "CAMELLIA-256-OFB" #define LN_camellia_256_ofb128 "camellia-256-ofb" #define NID_camellia_256_ofb128 768 #define OBJ_camellia_256_ofb128 OBJ_camellia,43L #define SN_camellia_256_cfb128 "CAMELLIA-256-CFB" #define LN_camellia_256_cfb128 "camellia-256-cfb" #define NID_camellia_256_cfb128 759 #define OBJ_camellia_256_cfb128 OBJ_camellia,44L #define SN_camellia_256_gcm "CAMELLIA-256-GCM" #define LN_camellia_256_gcm "camellia-256-gcm" #define NID_camellia_256_gcm 969 #define OBJ_camellia_256_gcm OBJ_camellia,46L #define SN_camellia_256_ccm "CAMELLIA-256-CCM" #define LN_camellia_256_ccm "camellia-256-ccm" #define NID_camellia_256_ccm 970 #define OBJ_camellia_256_ccm OBJ_camellia,47L #define SN_camellia_256_ctr "CAMELLIA-256-CTR" #define LN_camellia_256_ctr "camellia-256-ctr" #define NID_camellia_256_ctr 971 #define OBJ_camellia_256_ctr OBJ_camellia,49L #define SN_camellia_256_cmac "CAMELLIA-256-CMAC" #define LN_camellia_256_cmac "camellia-256-cmac" #define NID_camellia_256_cmac 972 #define OBJ_camellia_256_cmac OBJ_camellia,50L #define SN_camellia_128_cfb1 "CAMELLIA-128-CFB1" #define LN_camellia_128_cfb1 "camellia-128-cfb1" #define NID_camellia_128_cfb1 760 #define SN_camellia_192_cfb1 "CAMELLIA-192-CFB1" #define LN_camellia_192_cfb1 "camellia-192-cfb1" #define NID_camellia_192_cfb1 761 #define SN_camellia_256_cfb1 "CAMELLIA-256-CFB1" #define LN_camellia_256_cfb1 "camellia-256-cfb1" #define NID_camellia_256_cfb1 762 #define SN_camellia_128_cfb8 "CAMELLIA-128-CFB8" #define LN_camellia_128_cfb8 "camellia-128-cfb8" #define NID_camellia_128_cfb8 763 #define SN_camellia_192_cfb8 "CAMELLIA-192-CFB8" #define LN_camellia_192_cfb8 "camellia-192-cfb8" #define NID_camellia_192_cfb8 764 #define SN_camellia_256_cfb8 "CAMELLIA-256-CFB8" #define LN_camellia_256_cfb8 "camellia-256-cfb8" #define NID_camellia_256_cfb8 765 #define OBJ_aria 1L,2L,410L,200046L,1L,1L #define SN_aria_128_ecb "ARIA-128-ECB" #define LN_aria_128_ecb "aria-128-ecb" #define NID_aria_128_ecb 1065 #define OBJ_aria_128_ecb OBJ_aria,1L #define SN_aria_128_cbc "ARIA-128-CBC" #define LN_aria_128_cbc "aria-128-cbc" #define NID_aria_128_cbc 1066 #define OBJ_aria_128_cbc OBJ_aria,2L #define SN_aria_128_cfb128 "ARIA-128-CFB" #define LN_aria_128_cfb128 "aria-128-cfb" #define NID_aria_128_cfb128 1067 #define OBJ_aria_128_cfb128 OBJ_aria,3L #define SN_aria_128_ofb128 "ARIA-128-OFB" #define LN_aria_128_ofb128 "aria-128-ofb" #define NID_aria_128_ofb128 1068 #define OBJ_aria_128_ofb128 OBJ_aria,4L #define SN_aria_128_ctr "ARIA-128-CTR" #define LN_aria_128_ctr "aria-128-ctr" #define NID_aria_128_ctr 1069 #define OBJ_aria_128_ctr OBJ_aria,5L #define SN_aria_192_ecb "ARIA-192-ECB" #define LN_aria_192_ecb "aria-192-ecb" #define NID_aria_192_ecb 1070 #define OBJ_aria_192_ecb OBJ_aria,6L #define SN_aria_192_cbc "ARIA-192-CBC" #define LN_aria_192_cbc "aria-192-cbc" #define NID_aria_192_cbc 1071 #define OBJ_aria_192_cbc OBJ_aria,7L #define SN_aria_192_cfb128 "ARIA-192-CFB" #define LN_aria_192_cfb128 "aria-192-cfb" #define NID_aria_192_cfb128 1072 #define OBJ_aria_192_cfb128 OBJ_aria,8L #define SN_aria_192_ofb128 "ARIA-192-OFB" #define LN_aria_192_ofb128 "aria-192-ofb" #define NID_aria_192_ofb128 1073 #define OBJ_aria_192_ofb128 OBJ_aria,9L #define SN_aria_192_ctr "ARIA-192-CTR" #define LN_aria_192_ctr "aria-192-ctr" #define NID_aria_192_ctr 1074 #define OBJ_aria_192_ctr OBJ_aria,10L #define SN_aria_256_ecb "ARIA-256-ECB" #define LN_aria_256_ecb "aria-256-ecb" #define NID_aria_256_ecb 1075 #define OBJ_aria_256_ecb OBJ_aria,11L #define SN_aria_256_cbc "ARIA-256-CBC" #define LN_aria_256_cbc "aria-256-cbc" #define NID_aria_256_cbc 1076 #define OBJ_aria_256_cbc OBJ_aria,12L #define SN_aria_256_cfb128 "ARIA-256-CFB" #define LN_aria_256_cfb128 "aria-256-cfb" #define NID_aria_256_cfb128 1077 #define OBJ_aria_256_cfb128 OBJ_aria,13L #define SN_aria_256_ofb128 "ARIA-256-OFB" #define LN_aria_256_ofb128 "aria-256-ofb" #define NID_aria_256_ofb128 1078 #define OBJ_aria_256_ofb128 OBJ_aria,14L #define SN_aria_256_ctr "ARIA-256-CTR" #define LN_aria_256_ctr "aria-256-ctr" #define NID_aria_256_ctr 1079 #define OBJ_aria_256_ctr OBJ_aria,15L #define SN_aria_128_cfb1 "ARIA-128-CFB1" #define LN_aria_128_cfb1 "aria-128-cfb1" #define NID_aria_128_cfb1 1080 #define SN_aria_192_cfb1 "ARIA-192-CFB1" #define LN_aria_192_cfb1 "aria-192-cfb1" #define NID_aria_192_cfb1 1081 #define SN_aria_256_cfb1 "ARIA-256-CFB1" #define LN_aria_256_cfb1 "aria-256-cfb1" #define NID_aria_256_cfb1 1082 #define SN_aria_128_cfb8 "ARIA-128-CFB8" #define LN_aria_128_cfb8 "aria-128-cfb8" #define NID_aria_128_cfb8 1083 #define SN_aria_192_cfb8 "ARIA-192-CFB8" #define LN_aria_192_cfb8 "aria-192-cfb8" #define NID_aria_192_cfb8 1084 #define SN_aria_256_cfb8 "ARIA-256-CFB8" #define LN_aria_256_cfb8 "aria-256-cfb8" #define NID_aria_256_cfb8 1085 #define SN_aria_128_ccm "ARIA-128-CCM" #define LN_aria_128_ccm "aria-128-ccm" #define NID_aria_128_ccm 1120 #define OBJ_aria_128_ccm OBJ_aria,37L #define SN_aria_192_ccm "ARIA-192-CCM" #define LN_aria_192_ccm "aria-192-ccm" #define NID_aria_192_ccm 1121 #define OBJ_aria_192_ccm OBJ_aria,38L #define SN_aria_256_ccm "ARIA-256-CCM" #define LN_aria_256_ccm "aria-256-ccm" #define NID_aria_256_ccm 1122 #define OBJ_aria_256_ccm OBJ_aria,39L #define SN_aria_128_gcm "ARIA-128-GCM" #define LN_aria_128_gcm "aria-128-gcm" #define NID_aria_128_gcm 1123 #define OBJ_aria_128_gcm OBJ_aria,34L #define SN_aria_192_gcm "ARIA-192-GCM" #define LN_aria_192_gcm "aria-192-gcm" #define NID_aria_192_gcm 1124 #define OBJ_aria_192_gcm OBJ_aria,35L #define SN_aria_256_gcm "ARIA-256-GCM" #define LN_aria_256_gcm "aria-256-gcm" #define NID_aria_256_gcm 1125 #define OBJ_aria_256_gcm OBJ_aria,36L #define SN_kisa "KISA" #define LN_kisa "kisa" #define NID_kisa 773 #define OBJ_kisa OBJ_member_body,410L,200004L #define SN_seed_ecb "SEED-ECB" #define LN_seed_ecb "seed-ecb" #define NID_seed_ecb 776 #define OBJ_seed_ecb OBJ_kisa,1L,3L #define SN_seed_cbc "SEED-CBC" #define LN_seed_cbc "seed-cbc" #define NID_seed_cbc 777 #define OBJ_seed_cbc OBJ_kisa,1L,4L #define SN_seed_cfb128 "SEED-CFB" #define LN_seed_cfb128 "seed-cfb" #define NID_seed_cfb128 779 #define OBJ_seed_cfb128 OBJ_kisa,1L,5L #define SN_seed_ofb128 "SEED-OFB" #define LN_seed_ofb128 "seed-ofb" #define NID_seed_ofb128 778 #define OBJ_seed_ofb128 OBJ_kisa,1L,6L #define SN_sm4_ecb "SM4-ECB" #define LN_sm4_ecb "sm4-ecb" #define NID_sm4_ecb 1133 #define OBJ_sm4_ecb OBJ_sm_scheme,104L,1L #define SN_sm4_cbc "SM4-CBC" #define LN_sm4_cbc "sm4-cbc" #define NID_sm4_cbc 1134 #define OBJ_sm4_cbc OBJ_sm_scheme,104L,2L #define SN_sm4_ofb128 "SM4-OFB" #define LN_sm4_ofb128 "sm4-ofb" #define NID_sm4_ofb128 1135 #define OBJ_sm4_ofb128 OBJ_sm_scheme,104L,3L #define SN_sm4_cfb128 "SM4-CFB" #define LN_sm4_cfb128 "sm4-cfb" #define NID_sm4_cfb128 1137 #define OBJ_sm4_cfb128 OBJ_sm_scheme,104L,4L #define SN_sm4_cfb1 "SM4-CFB1" #define LN_sm4_cfb1 "sm4-cfb1" #define NID_sm4_cfb1 1136 #define OBJ_sm4_cfb1 OBJ_sm_scheme,104L,5L #define SN_sm4_cfb8 "SM4-CFB8" #define LN_sm4_cfb8 "sm4-cfb8" #define NID_sm4_cfb8 1138 #define OBJ_sm4_cfb8 OBJ_sm_scheme,104L,6L #define SN_sm4_ctr "SM4-CTR" #define LN_sm4_ctr "sm4-ctr" #define NID_sm4_ctr 1139 #define OBJ_sm4_ctr OBJ_sm_scheme,104L,7L #define SN_hmac "HMAC" #define LN_hmac "hmac" #define NID_hmac 855 #define SN_cmac "CMAC" #define LN_cmac "cmac" #define NID_cmac 894 #define SN_rc4_hmac_md5 "RC4-HMAC-MD5" #define LN_rc4_hmac_md5 "rc4-hmac-md5" #define NID_rc4_hmac_md5 915 #define SN_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 "AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1" #define LN_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 "aes-128-cbc-hmac-sha1" #define NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 916 #define SN_aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha1 "AES-192-CBC-HMAC-SHA1" #define LN_aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha1 "aes-192-cbc-hmac-sha1" #define NID_aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha1 917 #define SN_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1 "AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1" #define LN_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1 "aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha1" #define NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1 918 #define SN_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256 "AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA256" #define LN_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256 "aes-128-cbc-hmac-sha256" #define NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256 948 #define SN_aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha256 "AES-192-CBC-HMAC-SHA256" #define LN_aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha256 "aes-192-cbc-hmac-sha256" #define NID_aes_192_cbc_hmac_sha256 949 #define SN_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256 "AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA256" #define LN_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256 "aes-256-cbc-hmac-sha256" #define NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256 950 #define SN_chacha20_poly1305 "ChaCha20-Poly1305" #define LN_chacha20_poly1305 "chacha20-poly1305" #define NID_chacha20_poly1305 1018 #define SN_chacha20 "ChaCha20" #define LN_chacha20 "chacha20" #define NID_chacha20 1019 #define SN_dhpublicnumber "dhpublicnumber" #define LN_dhpublicnumber "X9.42 DH" #define NID_dhpublicnumber 920 #define OBJ_dhpublicnumber OBJ_ISO_US,10046L,2L,1L #define SN_brainpoolP160r1 "brainpoolP160r1" #define NID_brainpoolP160r1 921 #define OBJ_brainpoolP160r1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,1L #define SN_brainpoolP160t1 "brainpoolP160t1" #define NID_brainpoolP160t1 922 #define OBJ_brainpoolP160t1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,2L #define SN_brainpoolP192r1 "brainpoolP192r1" #define NID_brainpoolP192r1 923 #define OBJ_brainpoolP192r1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,3L #define SN_brainpoolP192t1 "brainpoolP192t1" #define NID_brainpoolP192t1 924 #define OBJ_brainpoolP192t1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,4L #define SN_brainpoolP224r1 "brainpoolP224r1" #define NID_brainpoolP224r1 925 #define OBJ_brainpoolP224r1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,5L #define SN_brainpoolP224t1 "brainpoolP224t1" #define NID_brainpoolP224t1 926 #define OBJ_brainpoolP224t1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,6L #define SN_brainpoolP256r1 "brainpoolP256r1" #define NID_brainpoolP256r1 927 #define OBJ_brainpoolP256r1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,7L #define SN_brainpoolP256t1 "brainpoolP256t1" #define NID_brainpoolP256t1 928 #define OBJ_brainpoolP256t1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,8L #define SN_brainpoolP320r1 "brainpoolP320r1" #define NID_brainpoolP320r1 929 #define OBJ_brainpoolP320r1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,9L #define SN_brainpoolP320t1 "brainpoolP320t1" #define NID_brainpoolP320t1 930 #define OBJ_brainpoolP320t1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,10L #define SN_brainpoolP384r1 "brainpoolP384r1" #define NID_brainpoolP384r1 931 #define OBJ_brainpoolP384r1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,11L #define SN_brainpoolP384t1 "brainpoolP384t1" #define NID_brainpoolP384t1 932 #define OBJ_brainpoolP384t1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,12L #define SN_brainpoolP512r1 "brainpoolP512r1" #define NID_brainpoolP512r1 933 #define OBJ_brainpoolP512r1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,13L #define SN_brainpoolP512t1 "brainpoolP512t1" #define NID_brainpoolP512t1 934 #define OBJ_brainpoolP512t1 1L,3L,36L,3L,3L,2L,8L,1L,1L,14L #define OBJ_x9_63_scheme 1L,3L,133L,16L,840L,63L,0L #define OBJ_secg_scheme OBJ_certicom_arc,1L #define SN_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha1kdf-scheme" #define NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme 936 #define OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha1kdf_scheme OBJ_x9_63_scheme,2L #define SN_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha224kdf-scheme" #define NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme 937 #define OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha224kdf_scheme OBJ_secg_scheme,11L,0L #define SN_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha256kdf-scheme" #define NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme 938 #define OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha256kdf_scheme OBJ_secg_scheme,11L,1L #define SN_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha384kdf-scheme" #define NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme 939 #define OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha384kdf_scheme OBJ_secg_scheme,11L,2L #define SN_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme "dhSinglePass-stdDH-sha512kdf-scheme" #define NID_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme 940 #define OBJ_dhSinglePass_stdDH_sha512kdf_scheme OBJ_secg_scheme,11L,3L #define SN_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha1kdf-scheme" #define NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme 941 #define OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha1kdf_scheme OBJ_x9_63_scheme,3L #define SN_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha224kdf-scheme" #define NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme 942 #define OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha224kdf_scheme OBJ_secg_scheme,14L,0L #define SN_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha256kdf-scheme" #define NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme 943 #define OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha256kdf_scheme OBJ_secg_scheme,14L,1L #define SN_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha384kdf-scheme" #define NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme 944 #define OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha384kdf_scheme OBJ_secg_scheme,14L,2L #define SN_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme "dhSinglePass-cofactorDH-sha512kdf-scheme" #define NID_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme 945 #define OBJ_dhSinglePass_cofactorDH_sha512kdf_scheme OBJ_secg_scheme,14L,3L #define SN_dh_std_kdf "dh-std-kdf" #define NID_dh_std_kdf 946 #define SN_dh_cofactor_kdf "dh-cofactor-kdf" #define NID_dh_cofactor_kdf 947 #define SN_ct_precert_scts "ct_precert_scts" #define LN_ct_precert_scts "CT Precertificate SCTs" #define NID_ct_precert_scts 951 #define OBJ_ct_precert_scts 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,11129L,2L,4L,2L #define SN_ct_precert_poison "ct_precert_poison" #define LN_ct_precert_poison "CT Precertificate Poison" #define NID_ct_precert_poison 952 #define OBJ_ct_precert_poison 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,11129L,2L,4L,3L #define SN_ct_precert_signer "ct_precert_signer" #define LN_ct_precert_signer "CT Precertificate Signer" #define NID_ct_precert_signer 953 #define OBJ_ct_precert_signer 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,11129L,2L,4L,4L #define SN_ct_cert_scts "ct_cert_scts" #define LN_ct_cert_scts "CT Certificate SCTs" #define NID_ct_cert_scts 954 #define OBJ_ct_cert_scts 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,11129L,2L,4L,5L #define SN_jurisdictionLocalityName "jurisdictionL" #define LN_jurisdictionLocalityName "jurisdictionLocalityName" #define NID_jurisdictionLocalityName 955 #define OBJ_jurisdictionLocalityName 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,60L,2L,1L,1L #define SN_jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName "jurisdictionST" #define LN_jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName "jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName" #define NID_jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName 956 #define OBJ_jurisdictionStateOrProvinceName 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,60L,2L,1L,2L #define SN_jurisdictionCountryName "jurisdictionC" #define LN_jurisdictionCountryName "jurisdictionCountryName" #define NID_jurisdictionCountryName 957 #define OBJ_jurisdictionCountryName 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,311L,60L,2L,1L,3L #define SN_id_scrypt "id-scrypt" #define LN_id_scrypt "scrypt" #define NID_id_scrypt 973 #define OBJ_id_scrypt 1L,3L,6L,1L,4L,1L,11591L,4L,11L #define SN_tls1_prf "TLS1-PRF" #define LN_tls1_prf "tls1-prf" #define NID_tls1_prf 1021 #define SN_hkdf "HKDF" #define LN_hkdf "hkdf" #define NID_hkdf 1036 #define SN_id_pkinit "id-pkinit" #define NID_id_pkinit 1031 #define OBJ_id_pkinit 1L,3L,6L,1L,5L,2L,3L #define SN_pkInitClientAuth "pkInitClientAuth" #define LN_pkInitClientAuth "PKINIT Client Auth" #define NID_pkInitClientAuth 1032 #define OBJ_pkInitClientAuth OBJ_id_pkinit,4L #define SN_pkInitKDC "pkInitKDC" #define LN_pkInitKDC "Signing KDC Response" #define NID_pkInitKDC 1033 #define OBJ_pkInitKDC OBJ_id_pkinit,5L #define SN_X25519 "X25519" #define NID_X25519 1034 #define OBJ_X25519 1L,3L,101L,110L #define SN_X448 "X448" #define NID_X448 1035 #define OBJ_X448 1L,3L,101L,111L #define SN_ED25519 "ED25519" #define NID_ED25519 1087 #define OBJ_ED25519 1L,3L,101L,112L #define SN_ED448 "ED448" #define NID_ED448 1088 #define OBJ_ED448 1L,3L,101L,113L #define SN_kx_rsa "KxRSA" #define LN_kx_rsa "kx-rsa" #define NID_kx_rsa 1037 #define SN_kx_ecdhe "KxECDHE" #define LN_kx_ecdhe "kx-ecdhe" #define NID_kx_ecdhe 1038 #define SN_kx_dhe "KxDHE" #define LN_kx_dhe "kx-dhe" #define NID_kx_dhe 1039 #define SN_kx_ecdhe_psk "KxECDHE-PSK" #define LN_kx_ecdhe_psk "kx-ecdhe-psk" #define NID_kx_ecdhe_psk 1040 #define SN_kx_dhe_psk "KxDHE-PSK" #define LN_kx_dhe_psk "kx-dhe-psk" #define NID_kx_dhe_psk 1041 #define SN_kx_rsa_psk "KxRSA_PSK" #define LN_kx_rsa_psk "kx-rsa-psk" #define NID_kx_rsa_psk 1042 #define SN_kx_psk "KxPSK" #define LN_kx_psk "kx-psk" #define NID_kx_psk 1043 #define SN_kx_srp "KxSRP" #define LN_kx_srp "kx-srp" #define NID_kx_srp 1044 #define SN_kx_gost "KxGOST" #define LN_kx_gost "kx-gost" #define NID_kx_gost 1045 #define SN_kx_any "KxANY" #define LN_kx_any "kx-any" #define NID_kx_any 1063 #define SN_auth_rsa "AuthRSA" #define LN_auth_rsa "auth-rsa" #define NID_auth_rsa 1046 #define SN_auth_ecdsa "AuthECDSA" #define LN_auth_ecdsa "auth-ecdsa" #define NID_auth_ecdsa 1047 #define SN_auth_psk "AuthPSK" #define LN_auth_psk "auth-psk" #define NID_auth_psk 1048 #define SN_auth_dss "AuthDSS" #define LN_auth_dss "auth-dss" #define NID_auth_dss 1049 #define SN_auth_gost01 "AuthGOST01" #define LN_auth_gost01 "auth-gost01" #define NID_auth_gost01 1050 #define SN_auth_gost12 "AuthGOST12" #define LN_auth_gost12 "auth-gost12" #define NID_auth_gost12 1051 #define SN_auth_srp "AuthSRP" #define LN_auth_srp "auth-srp" #define NID_auth_srp 1052 #define SN_auth_null "AuthNULL" #define LN_auth_null "auth-null" #define NID_auth_null 1053 #define SN_auth_any "AuthANY" #define LN_auth_any "auth-any" #define NID_auth_any 1064 #define SN_poly1305 "Poly1305" #define LN_poly1305 "poly1305" #define NID_poly1305 1061 #define SN_siphash "SipHash" #define LN_siphash "siphash" #define NID_siphash 1062 #define SN_ffdhe2048 "ffdhe2048" #define NID_ffdhe2048 1126 #define SN_ffdhe3072 "ffdhe3072" #define NID_ffdhe3072 1127 #define SN_ffdhe4096 "ffdhe4096" #define NID_ffdhe4096 1128 #define SN_ffdhe6144 "ffdhe6144" #define NID_ffdhe6144 1129 #define SN_ffdhe8192 "ffdhe8192" #define NID_ffdhe8192 1130 #define SN_ISO_UA "ISO-UA" #define NID_ISO_UA 1150 #define OBJ_ISO_UA OBJ_member_body,804L #define SN_ua_pki "ua-pki" #define NID_ua_pki 1151 #define OBJ_ua_pki OBJ_ISO_UA,2L,1L,1L,1L #define SN_dstu28147 "dstu28147" #define LN_dstu28147 "DSTU Gost 28147-2009" #define NID_dstu28147 1152 #define OBJ_dstu28147 OBJ_ua_pki,1L,1L,1L #define SN_dstu28147_ofb "dstu28147-ofb" #define LN_dstu28147_ofb "DSTU Gost 28147-2009 OFB mode" #define NID_dstu28147_ofb 1153 #define OBJ_dstu28147_ofb OBJ_dstu28147,2L #define SN_dstu28147_cfb "dstu28147-cfb" #define LN_dstu28147_cfb "DSTU Gost 28147-2009 CFB mode" #define NID_dstu28147_cfb 1154 #define OBJ_dstu28147_cfb OBJ_dstu28147,3L #define SN_dstu28147_wrap "dstu28147-wrap" #define LN_dstu28147_wrap "DSTU Gost 28147-2009 key wrap" #define NID_dstu28147_wrap 1155 #define OBJ_dstu28147_wrap OBJ_dstu28147,5L #define SN_hmacWithDstu34311 "hmacWithDstu34311" #define LN_hmacWithDstu34311 "HMAC DSTU Gost 34311-95" #define NID_hmacWithDstu34311 1156 #define OBJ_hmacWithDstu34311 OBJ_ua_pki,1L,1L,2L #define SN_dstu34311 "dstu34311" #define LN_dstu34311 "DSTU Gost 34311-95" #define NID_dstu34311 1157 #define OBJ_dstu34311 OBJ_ua_pki,1L,2L,1L #define SN_dstu4145le "dstu4145le" #define LN_dstu4145le "DSTU 4145-2002 little endian" #define NID_dstu4145le 1158 #define OBJ_dstu4145le OBJ_ua_pki,1L,3L,1L,1L #define SN_dstu4145be "dstu4145be" #define LN_dstu4145be "DSTU 4145-2002 big endian" #define NID_dstu4145be 1159 #define OBJ_dstu4145be OBJ_dstu4145le,1L,1L #define SN_uacurve0 "uacurve0" #define LN_uacurve0 "DSTU curve 0" #define NID_uacurve0 1160 #define OBJ_uacurve0 OBJ_dstu4145le,2L,0L #define SN_uacurve1 "uacurve1" #define LN_uacurve1 "DSTU curve 1" #define NID_uacurve1 1161 #define OBJ_uacurve1 OBJ_dstu4145le,2L,1L #define SN_uacurve2 "uacurve2" #define LN_uacurve2 "DSTU curve 2" #define NID_uacurve2 1162 #define OBJ_uacurve2 OBJ_dstu4145le,2L,2L #define SN_uacurve3 "uacurve3" #define LN_uacurve3 "DSTU curve 3" #define NID_uacurve3 1163 #define OBJ_uacurve3 OBJ_dstu4145le,2L,3L #define SN_uacurve4 "uacurve4" #define LN_uacurve4 "DSTU curve 4" #define NID_uacurve4 1164 #define OBJ_uacurve4 OBJ_dstu4145le,2L,4L #define SN_uacurve5 "uacurve5" #define LN_uacurve5 "DSTU curve 5" #define NID_uacurve5 1165 #define OBJ_uacurve5 OBJ_dstu4145le,2L,5L #define SN_uacurve6 "uacurve6" #define LN_uacurve6 "DSTU curve 6" #define NID_uacurve6 1166 #define OBJ_uacurve6 OBJ_dstu4145le,2L,6L #define SN_uacurve7 "uacurve7" #define LN_uacurve7 "DSTU curve 7" #define NID_uacurve7 1167 #define OBJ_uacurve7 OBJ_dstu4145le,2L,7L #define SN_uacurve8 "uacurve8" #define LN_uacurve8 "DSTU curve 8" #define NID_uacurve8 1168 #define OBJ_uacurve8 OBJ_dstu4145le,2L,8L #define SN_uacurve9 "uacurve9" #define LN_uacurve9 "DSTU curve 9" #define NID_uacurve9 1169 #define OBJ_uacurve9 OBJ_dstu4145le,2L,9L diff --git a/include/openssl/opensslv.h b/include/openssl/opensslv.h index 261d7cb326cb..c48626447036 100644 --- a/include/openssl/opensslv.h +++ b/include/openssl/opensslv.h @@ -1,101 +1,101 @@ /* * Copyright 1999-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_OPENSSLV_H # define HEADER_OPENSSLV_H #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /*- * Numeric release version identifier: * MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status * The status nibble has one of the values 0 for development, 1 to e for betas * 1 to 14, and f for release. The patch level is exactly that. * For example: * 0.9.3-dev 0x00903000 * 0.9.3-beta1 0x00903001 * 0.9.3-beta2-dev 0x00903002 * 0.9.3-beta2 0x00903002 (same as ...beta2-dev) * 0.9.3 0x0090300f * 0.9.3a 0x0090301f * 0.9.4 0x0090400f * 1.2.3z 0x102031af * * For continuity reasons (because 0.9.5 is already out, and is coded * 0x00905100), between 0.9.5 and 0.9.6 the coding of the patch level * part is slightly different, by setting the highest bit. This means * that 0.9.5a looks like this: 0x0090581f. At 0.9.6, we can start * with 0x0090600S... * * (Prior to 0.9.3-dev a different scheme was used: 0.9.2b is 0x0922.) * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for * major minor fix final patch/beta) */ -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x101010dfL -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.1.1m 14 Dec 2021" +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x101010efL +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.1.1n 15 Mar 2022" /*- * The macros below are to be used for shared library (.so, .dll, ...) * versioning. That kind of versioning works a bit differently between * operating systems. The most usual scheme is to set a major and a minor * number, and have the runtime loader check that the major number is equal * to what it was at application link time, while the minor number has to * be greater or equal to what it was at application link time. With this * scheme, the version number is usually part of the file name, like this: * * libcrypto.so.0.9 * * Some unixen also make a softlink with the major version number only: * * libcrypto.so.0 * * On Tru64 and IRIX 6.x it works a little bit differently. There, the * shared library version is stored in the file, and is actually a series * of versions, separated by colons. The rightmost version present in the * library when linking an application is stored in the application to be * matched at run time. When the application is run, a check is done to * see if the library version stored in the application matches any of the * versions in the version string of the library itself. * This version string can be constructed in any way, depending on what * kind of matching is desired. However, to implement the same scheme as * the one used in the other unixen, all compatible versions, from lowest * to highest, should be part of the string. Consecutive builds would * give the following versions strings: * * 3.0 * 3.0:3.1 * 3.0:3.1:3.2 * 4.0 * 4.0:4.1 * * Notice how version 4 is completely incompatible with version, and * therefore give the breach you can see. * * There may be other schemes as well that I haven't yet discovered. * * So, here's the way it works here: first of all, the library version * number doesn't need at all to match the overall OpenSSL version. * However, it's nice and more understandable if it actually does. * The current library version is stored in the macro SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER, * which is just a piece of text in the format "M.m.e" (Major, minor, edit). * For the sake of Tru64, IRIX, and any other OS that behaves in similar ways, * we need to keep a history of version numbers, which is done in the * macro SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY. The numbers are separated by colons and * should only keep the versions that are binary compatible with the current. */ # define SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY "" # define SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "1.1" #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* HEADER_OPENSSLV_H */ diff --git a/ssl/s3_lib.c b/ssl/s3_lib.c index b256a4b93503..e4cf007f82a5 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_lib.c +++ b/ssl/s3_lib.c @@ -1,4858 +1,4858 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/nelem.h" #include "ssl_local.h" #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #define TLS13_NUM_CIPHERS OSSL_NELEM(tls13_ciphers) #define SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS OSSL_NELEM(ssl3_ciphers) #define SSL3_NUM_SCSVS OSSL_NELEM(ssl3_scsvs) /* TLSv1.3 downgrade protection sentinel values */ const unsigned char tls11downgrade[] = { 0x44, 0x4f, 0x57, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x00 }; const unsigned char tls12downgrade[] = { 0x44, 0x4f, 0x57, 0x4e, 0x47, 0x52, 0x44, 0x01 }; /* The list of available TLSv1.3 ciphers */ static SSL_CIPHER tls13_ciphers[] = { { 1, TLS1_3_RFC_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_3_RFC_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_3_CK_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kANY, SSL_aANY, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_3_VERSION, TLS1_3_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_3_RFC_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_3_RFC_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_3_CK_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kANY, SSL_aANY, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_3_VERSION, TLS1_3_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384, 256, 256, }, #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305) { 1, TLS1_3_RFC_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, TLS1_3_RFC_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, TLS1_3_CK_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, SSL_kANY, SSL_aANY, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_3_VERSION, TLS1_3_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256, 256, 256, }, #endif { 1, TLS1_3_RFC_AES_128_CCM_SHA256, TLS1_3_RFC_AES_128_CCM_SHA256, TLS1_3_CK_AES_128_CCM_SHA256, SSL_kANY, SSL_aANY, SSL_AES128CCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_3_VERSION, TLS1_3_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_3_RFC_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256, TLS1_3_RFC_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256, TLS1_3_CK_AES_128_CCM_8_SHA256, SSL_kANY, SSL_aANY, SSL_AES128CCM8, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_3_VERSION, TLS1_3_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256, 128, 128, } }; /* * The list of available ciphers, mostly organized into the following * groups: * Always there * EC * PSK * SRP (within that: RSA EC PSK) * Cipher families: Chacha/poly, Camellia, Gost, IDEA, SEED * Weak ciphers */ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_ciphers[] = { { 1, SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_MD5, SSL3_RFC_RSA_NULL_MD5, SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_MD5, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_eNULL, SSL_MD5, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, { 1, SSL3_TXT_RSA_NULL_SHA, SSL3_RFC_RSA_NULL_SHA, SSL3_CK_RSA_NULL_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL3_RFC_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL3_CK_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, { 1, SSL3_TXT_DHE_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL3_RFC_DHE_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL3_CK_DHE_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, { 1, SSL3_TXT_DHE_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL3_RFC_DHE_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL3_CK_DHE_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, { 1, SSL3_TXT_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA, SSL3_RFC_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA, SSL3_CK_ADH_DES_192_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, #endif { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA, TLS1_RFC_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA, TLS1_RFC_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA, TLS1_RFC_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA, TLS1_RFC_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA, TLS1_RFC_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA, TLS1_RFC_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA256, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_SHA256, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, TLS1_RFC_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128CCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, TLS1_RFC_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256CCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, TLS1_RFC_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128CCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, TLS1_RFC_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256CCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, TLS1_RFC_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128CCM8, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, TLS1_RFC_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256CCM8, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, TLS1_RFC_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128CCM8, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, TLS1_RFC_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256CCM8, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, TLS1_RFC_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128CCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, TLS1_RFC_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256CCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, TLS1_RFC_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128CCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, TLS1_RFC_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256CCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, TLS1_RFC_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128CCM8, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, TLS1_RFC_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256CCM8, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, TLS1_RFC_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128CCM8, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, TLS1_RFC_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256CCM8, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES128CCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES256CCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM_8, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES128CCM8, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM_8, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES256CCM8, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, # endif { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, # endif { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, # endif { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_SHA256, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_SHA384, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_RFC_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_RFC_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_RFC_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, # endif { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, # endif { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, # endif { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 0, 0, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 0, 0, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 0, 0, }, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_kECDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, # endif { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kECDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kECDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kECDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_kECDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA, SSL_kECDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA256, SSL_kECDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 0, 0, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_NULL_SHA384, SSL_kECDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_eNULL, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_STRONG_NONE | SSL_FIPS, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 0, 0, }, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aSRP, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aRSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aDSS, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 112, 168, }, # endif { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aSRP, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aDSS, SSL_AES128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aSRP, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aRSA, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kSRP, SSL_aDSS, SSL_AES256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305) { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS1_RFC_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS1_RFC_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, SSL_kECDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS1_RFC_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS1_RFC_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, #endif /* !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA) && * !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305) */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, - SSL_kEDH, + SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, - SSL_kEDH, + SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, - SSL_kEDH, + SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, - SSL_kEDH, + SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, - SSL_kEDH, + SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA256, - SSL_kEDH, + SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_128_CBC_SHA256, SSL_kECDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_CAMELLIA128, SSL_SHA256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_CAMELLIA_256_CBC_SHA384, SSL_kECDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_CAMELLIA256, SSL_SHA384, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST { 1, "GOST2001-GOST89-GOST89", "TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_28147_CNT_IMIT", 0x3000081, SSL_kGOST, SSL_aGOST01, SSL_eGOST2814789CNT, SSL_GOST89MAC, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 | TLS1_PRF_GOST94 | TLS1_STREAM_MAC, 256, 256, }, { 1, "GOST2001-NULL-GOST94", "TLS_GOSTR341001_WITH_NULL_GOSTR3411", 0x3000083, SSL_kGOST, SSL_aGOST01, SSL_eNULL, SSL_GOST94, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_STRONG_NONE, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 | TLS1_PRF_GOST94, 0, 0, }, { 1, "GOST2012-GOST8912-GOST8912", NULL, 0x0300ff85, SSL_kGOST, SSL_aGOST12 | SSL_aGOST01, SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12, SSL_GOST89MAC12, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST12_256 | TLS1_PRF_GOST12_256 | TLS1_STREAM_MAC, 256, 256, }, { 1, "GOST2012-NULL-GOST12", NULL, 0x0300ff87, SSL_kGOST, SSL_aGOST12 | SSL_aGOST01, SSL_eNULL, SSL_GOST12_256, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_STRONG_NONE, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST12_256 | TLS1_PRF_GOST12_256 | TLS1_STREAM_MAC, 0, 0, }, #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_GOST */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA { 1, SSL3_TXT_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA, SSL3_RFC_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA, SSL3_CK_RSA_IDEA_128_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_IDEA, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_1_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA, TLS1_RFC_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_SEED, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA, TLS1_RFC_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_SEED, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA, TLS1_RFC_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_SEED, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA, TLS1_CK_ADH_WITH_SEED_SHA, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_SEED, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_BAD_VER, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SEED */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS { 1, SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_MD5, SSL3_RFC_RSA_RC4_128_MD5, SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_MD5, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_RC4, SSL_MD5, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, SSL3_TXT_RSA_RC4_128_SHA, SSL3_RFC_RSA_RC4_128_SHA, SSL3_CK_RSA_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, SSL3_TXT_ADH_RC4_128_MD5, SSL3_RFC_ADH_RC4_128_MD5, SSL3_CK_ADH_RC4_128_MD5, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_RC4, SSL_MD5, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kECDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aNULL, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, TLS1_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_RFC_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_RFC_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_RFC_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_RC4, SSL_SHA1, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_MEDIUM, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF, 128, 128, }, #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_WEAK_SSL_CIPHERS */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ARIA { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_ARIA128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA, SSL_ARIA256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_ARIA128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_ARIA256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_ARIA128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_DHE_DSS_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_ARIA256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_ARIA128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, SSL_ARIA256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_ARIA128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_ARIA256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_ARIA128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_ARIA256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_ARIA128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_DHE_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kDHEPSK, SSL_aPSK, SSL_ARIA256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_RFC_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_ARIA128GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256, 128, 128, }, { 1, TLS1_TXT_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_RFC_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, TLS1_CK_RSA_PSK_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384, SSL_kRSAPSK, SSL_aRSA, SSL_ARIA256GCM, SSL_AEAD, TLS1_2_VERSION, TLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, DTLS1_2_VERSION, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT | SSL_HIGH, SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384, 256, 256, }, #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_ARIA */ }; /* * The list of known Signalling Cipher-Suite Value "ciphers", non-valid * values stuffed into the ciphers field of the wire protocol for signalling * purposes. */ static SSL_CIPHER ssl3_scsvs[] = { { 0, "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV", "TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV", SSL3_CK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, }, { 0, "TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV", "TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV", SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, }, }; static int cipher_compare(const void *a, const void *b) { const SSL_CIPHER *ap = (const SSL_CIPHER *)a; const SSL_CIPHER *bp = (const SSL_CIPHER *)b; if (ap->id == bp->id) return 0; return ap->id < bp->id ? -1 : 1; } void ssl_sort_cipher_list(void) { qsort(tls13_ciphers, TLS13_NUM_CIPHERS, sizeof(tls13_ciphers[0]), cipher_compare); qsort(ssl3_ciphers, SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS, sizeof(ssl3_ciphers[0]), cipher_compare); qsort(ssl3_scsvs, SSL3_NUM_SCSVS, sizeof(ssl3_scsvs[0]), cipher_compare); } static int ssl_undefined_function_1(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *r, size_t s, const char * t, size_t u, const unsigned char * v, size_t w, int x) { (void)r; (void)s; (void)t; (void)u; (void)v; (void)w; (void)x; return ssl_undefined_function(ssl); } const SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data = { ssl3_enc, n_ssl3_mac, ssl3_setup_key_block, ssl3_generate_master_secret, ssl3_change_cipher_state, ssl3_final_finish_mac, SSL3_MD_CLIENT_FINISHED_CONST, 4, SSL3_MD_SERVER_FINISHED_CONST, 4, ssl3_alert_code, ssl_undefined_function_1, 0, ssl3_set_handshake_header, tls_close_construct_packet, ssl3_handshake_write }; long ssl3_default_timeout(void) { /* * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the SSLv3 spec is way too long for * http, the cache would over fill */ return (60 * 60 * 2); } int ssl3_num_ciphers(void) { return SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS; } const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher(unsigned int u) { if (u < SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS) return &(ssl3_ciphers[SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS - 1 - u]); else return NULL; } int ssl3_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) { /* No header in the event of a CCS */ if (htype == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) return 1; /* Set the content type and 3 bytes for the message len */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, htype) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) return 0; return 1; } int ssl3_handshake_write(SSL *s) { return ssl3_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE); } int ssl3_new(SSL *s) { SSL3_STATE *s3; if ((s3 = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*s3))) == NULL) goto err; s->s3 = s3; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (!SSL_SRP_CTX_init(s)) goto err; #endif if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s)) return 0; return 1; err: return 0; } void ssl3_free(SSL *s) { if (s == NULL || s->s3 == NULL) return; ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp); s->s3->peer_tmp = NULL; EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; #endif OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw); OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen); OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs); OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs); ssl3_free_digest_list(s); OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP SSL_SRP_CTX_free(s); #endif OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3, sizeof(*s->s3)); s->s3 = NULL; } int ssl3_clear(SSL *s) { ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ctype); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw); OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.pms, s->s3->tmp.pmslen); OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalgs); OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->peer_tmp); #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ ssl3_free_digest_list(s); OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_proposed); /* NULL/zero-out everything in the s3 struct */ memset(s->s3, 0, sizeof(*s->s3)); if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) return 0; s->version = SSL3_VERSION; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn); s->ext.npn = NULL; s->ext.npn_len = 0; #endif return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP static char *srp_password_from_info_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) { return OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.info); } #endif static int ssl3_set_req_cert_type(CERT *c, const unsigned char *p, size_t len); long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) { int ret = 0; switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_REQUEST: break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS: ret = s->s3->num_renegotiations; break; case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_NUM_RENEGOTIATIONS: ret = s->s3->num_renegotiations; s->s3->num_renegotiations = 0; break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_TOTAL_RENEGOTIATIONS: ret = s->s3->total_renegotiations; break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_FLAGS: ret = (int)(s->s3->flags); break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH: { DH *dh = (DH *)parg; EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL; if (dh == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return ret; } pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dh); if (pkdh == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdh), 0, pkdh)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); return ret; } EVP_PKEY_free(s->cert->dh_tmp); s->cert->dh_tmp = pkdh; ret = 1; } break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB: { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return ret; } case SSL_CTRL_SET_DH_AUTO: s->cert->dh_tmp_auto = larg; return 1; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH: { const EC_GROUP *group = NULL; int nid; if (parg == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } group = EC_KEY_get0_group((const EC_KEY *)parg); if (group == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); return 0; } nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group); if (nid == NID_undef) return 0; return tls1_set_groups(&s->ext.supportedgroups, &s->ext.supportedgroups_len, &nid, 1); } break; #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME: /* * TODO(OpenSSL1.2) * This API is only used for a client to set what SNI it will request * from the server, but we currently allow it to be used on servers * as well, which is a programming error. Currently we just clear * the field in SSL_do_handshake() for server SSLs, but when we can * make ABI-breaking changes, we may want to make use of this API * an error on server SSLs. */ if (larg == TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) { size_t len; OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname); s->ext.hostname = NULL; ret = 1; if (parg == NULL) break; len = strlen((char *)parg); if (len == 0 || len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME); return 0; } if ((s->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup((char *)parg)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTRL, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_SERVERNAME_TYPE); return 0; } break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_ARG: s->ext.debug_arg = parg; ret = 1; break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE: ret = s->ext.status_type; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE: s->ext.status_type = larg; ret = 1; break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS: *(STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) **)parg = s->ext.ocsp.exts; ret = 1; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_EXTS: s->ext.ocsp.exts = parg; ret = 1; break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS: *(STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) **)parg = s->ext.ocsp.ids; ret = 1; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_IDS: s->ext.ocsp.ids = parg; ret = 1; break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP: *(unsigned char **)parg = s->ext.ocsp.resp; if (s->ext.ocsp.resp_len == 0 || s->ext.ocsp.resp_len > LONG_MAX) return -1; return (long)s->ext.ocsp.resp_len; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_OCSP_RESP: OPENSSL_free(s->ext.ocsp.resp); s->ext.ocsp.resp = parg; s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = larg; ret = 1; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS case SSL_CTRL_DTLS_EXT_SEND_HEARTBEAT: case SSL_CTRL_GET_DTLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_PENDING: case SSL_CTRL_SET_DTLS_EXT_HEARTBEAT_NO_REQUESTS: break; #endif case SSL_CTRL_CHAIN: if (larg) return ssl_cert_set1_chain(s, NULL, (STACK_OF(X509) *)parg); else return ssl_cert_set0_chain(s, NULL, (STACK_OF(X509) *)parg); case SSL_CTRL_CHAIN_CERT: if (larg) return ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(s, NULL, (X509 *)parg); else return ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(s, NULL, (X509 *)parg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_CHAIN_CERTS: *(STACK_OF(X509) **)parg = s->cert->key->chain; ret = 1; break; case SSL_CTRL_SELECT_CURRENT_CERT: return ssl_cert_select_current(s->cert, (X509 *)parg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURRENT_CERT: if (larg == SSL_CERT_SET_SERVER) { const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; if (!s->server) return 0; cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; if (cipher == NULL) return 0; /* * No certificate for unauthenticated ciphersuites or using SRP * authentication */ if (cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP)) return 2; if (s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) return 0; s->cert->key = s->s3->tmp.cert; return 1; } return ssl_cert_set_current(s->cert, larg); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case SSL_CTRL_GET_GROUPS: { uint16_t *clist; size_t clistlen; if (!s->session) return 0; clist = s->ext.peer_supportedgroups; clistlen = s->ext.peer_supportedgroups_len; if (parg) { size_t i; int *cptr = parg; for (i = 0; i < clistlen; i++) { const TLS_GROUP_INFO *cinf = tls1_group_id_lookup(clist[i]); if (cinf != NULL) cptr[i] = cinf->nid; else cptr[i] = TLSEXT_nid_unknown | clist[i]; } } return (int)clistlen; } case SSL_CTRL_SET_GROUPS: return tls1_set_groups(&s->ext.supportedgroups, &s->ext.supportedgroups_len, parg, larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_GROUPS_LIST: return tls1_set_groups_list(&s->ext.supportedgroups, &s->ext.supportedgroups_len, parg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_SHARED_GROUP: { uint16_t id = tls1_shared_group(s, larg); if (larg != -1) { const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = tls1_group_id_lookup(id); return ginf == NULL ? 0 : ginf->nid; } return id; } #endif case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS: return tls1_set_sigalgs(s->cert, parg, larg, 0); case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST: return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(s->cert, parg, 0); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS: return tls1_set_sigalgs(s->cert, parg, larg, 1); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST: return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(s->cert, parg, 1); case SSL_CTRL_GET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES: { const unsigned char **pctype = parg; if (s->server || !s->s3->tmp.cert_req) return 0; if (pctype) *pctype = s->s3->tmp.ctype; return s->s3->tmp.ctype_len; } case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES: if (!s->server) return 0; return ssl3_set_req_cert_type(s->cert, parg, larg); case SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN: return ssl_build_cert_chain(s, NULL, larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_VERIFY_CERT_STORE: return ssl_cert_set_cert_store(s->cert, parg, 0, larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CHAIN_CERT_STORE: return ssl_cert_set_cert_store(s->cert, parg, 1, larg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_PEER_SIGNATURE_NID: if (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg == NULL) return 0; *(int *)parg = s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->hash; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_GET_SIGNATURE_NID: if (s->s3->tmp.sigalg == NULL) return 0; *(int *)parg = s->s3->tmp.sigalg->hash; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_GET_PEER_TMP_KEY: #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) if (s->session == NULL || s->s3->peer_tmp == NULL) { return 0; } else { EVP_PKEY_up_ref(s->s3->peer_tmp); *(EVP_PKEY **)parg = s->s3->peer_tmp; return 1; } #else return 0; #endif case SSL_CTRL_GET_TMP_KEY: #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) if (s->session == NULL || s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { return 0; } else { EVP_PKEY_up_ref(s->s3->tmp.pkey); *(EVP_PKEY **)parg = s->s3->tmp.pkey; return 1; } #else return 0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case SSL_CTRL_GET_EC_POINT_FORMATS: { const unsigned char **pformat = parg; if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL) return 0; *pformat = s->ext.peer_ecpointformats; return (int)s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len; } #endif default: break; } return ret; } long ssl3_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)) { int ret = 0; switch (cmd) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB: { s->cert->dh_tmp_cb = (DH *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp; } break; #endif case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_DEBUG_CB: s->ext.debug_cb = (void (*)(SSL *, int, int, const unsigned char *, int, void *))fp; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_NOT_RESUMABLE_SESS_CB: { s->not_resumable_session_cb = (int (*)(SSL *, int))fp; } break; default: break; } return ret; } long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) { switch (cmd) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH: { DH *dh = (DH *)parg; EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL; if (dh == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dh); if (pkdh == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!ssl_ctx_security(ctx, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdh), 0, pkdh)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); return 0; } EVP_PKEY_free(ctx->cert->dh_tmp); ctx->cert->dh_tmp = pkdh; return 1; } case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB: { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } case SSL_CTRL_SET_DH_AUTO: ctx->cert->dh_tmp_auto = larg; return 1; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_ECDH: { const EC_GROUP *group = NULL; int nid; if (parg == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } group = EC_KEY_get0_group((const EC_KEY *)parg); if (group == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); return 0; } nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group); if (nid == NID_undef) return 0; return tls1_set_groups(&ctx->ext.supportedgroups, &ctx->ext.supportedgroups_len, &nid, 1); } #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG: ctx->ext.servername_arg = parg; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS: case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS: { unsigned char *keys = parg; long tick_keylen = (sizeof(ctx->ext.tick_key_name) + sizeof(ctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key) + sizeof(ctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key)); if (keys == NULL) return tick_keylen; if (larg != tick_keylen) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_INVALID_TICKET_KEYS_LENGTH); return 0; } if (cmd == SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEYS) { memcpy(ctx->ext.tick_key_name, keys, sizeof(ctx->ext.tick_key_name)); memcpy(ctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key, keys + sizeof(ctx->ext.tick_key_name), sizeof(ctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key)); memcpy(ctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, keys + sizeof(ctx->ext.tick_key_name) + sizeof(ctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key), sizeof(ctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key)); } else { memcpy(keys, ctx->ext.tick_key_name, sizeof(ctx->ext.tick_key_name)); memcpy(keys + sizeof(ctx->ext.tick_key_name), ctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key, sizeof(ctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key)); memcpy(keys + sizeof(ctx->ext.tick_key_name) + sizeof(ctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key), ctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, sizeof(ctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key)); } return 1; } case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE: return ctx->ext.status_type; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_TYPE: ctx->ext.status_type = larg; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG: ctx->ext.status_arg = parg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB_ARG: *(void**)parg = ctx->ext.status_arg; break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB: *(int (**)(SSL*, void*))parg = ctx->ext.status_cb; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME: ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP; OPENSSL_free(ctx->srp_ctx.login); ctx->srp_ctx.login = NULL; if (parg == NULL) break; if (strlen((const char *)parg) > 255 || strlen((const char *)parg) < 1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, SSL_R_INVALID_SRP_USERNAME); return 0; } if ((ctx->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_strdup((char *)parg)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_PASSWORD: ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = srp_password_from_info_cb; if (ctx->srp_ctx.info != NULL) OPENSSL_free(ctx->srp_ctx.info); if ((ctx->srp_ctx.info = BUF_strdup((char *)parg)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_ARG: ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP; ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_cb_arg = parg; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_STRENGTH: ctx->srp_ctx.strength = larg; break; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case SSL_CTRL_SET_GROUPS: return tls1_set_groups(&ctx->ext.supportedgroups, &ctx->ext.supportedgroups_len, parg, larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_GROUPS_LIST: return tls1_set_groups_list(&ctx->ext.supportedgroups, &ctx->ext.supportedgroups_len, parg); #endif case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS: return tls1_set_sigalgs(ctx->cert, parg, larg, 0); case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST: return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(ctx->cert, parg, 0); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS: return tls1_set_sigalgs(ctx->cert, parg, larg, 1); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST: return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(ctx->cert, parg, 1); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_CERT_TYPES: return ssl3_set_req_cert_type(ctx->cert, parg, larg); case SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN: return ssl_build_cert_chain(NULL, ctx, larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_VERIFY_CERT_STORE: return ssl_cert_set_cert_store(ctx->cert, parg, 0, larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CHAIN_CERT_STORE: return ssl_cert_set_cert_store(ctx->cert, parg, 1, larg); /* A Thawte special :-) */ case SSL_CTRL_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERT: if (ctx->extra_certs == NULL) { if ((ctx->extra_certs = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->extra_certs, (X509 *)parg)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_CTX_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } break; case SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS: if (ctx->extra_certs == NULL && larg == 0) *(STACK_OF(X509) **)parg = ctx->cert->key->chain; else *(STACK_OF(X509) **)parg = ctx->extra_certs; break; case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_EXTRA_CHAIN_CERTS: sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->extra_certs, X509_free); ctx->extra_certs = NULL; break; case SSL_CTRL_CHAIN: if (larg) return ssl_cert_set1_chain(NULL, ctx, (STACK_OF(X509) *)parg); else return ssl_cert_set0_chain(NULL, ctx, (STACK_OF(X509) *)parg); case SSL_CTRL_CHAIN_CERT: if (larg) return ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(NULL, ctx, (X509 *)parg); else return ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(NULL, ctx, (X509 *)parg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_CHAIN_CERTS: *(STACK_OF(X509) **)parg = ctx->cert->key->chain; break; case SSL_CTRL_SELECT_CURRENT_CERT: return ssl_cert_select_current(ctx->cert, (X509 *)parg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_CURRENT_CERT: return ssl_cert_set_current(ctx->cert, larg); default: return 0; } return 1; } long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)) { switch (cmd) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH case SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB: { ctx->cert->dh_tmp_cb = (DH *(*)(SSL *, int, int))fp; } break; #endif case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB: ctx->ext.servername_cb = (int (*)(SSL *, int *, void *))fp; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_STATUS_REQ_CB: ctx->ext.status_cb = (int (*)(SSL *, void *))fp; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_TICKET_KEY_CB: ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb = (int (*)(SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, HMAC_CTX *, int))fp; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_VERIFY_PARAM_CB: ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP; ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_verify_param_callback = (int (*)(SSL *, void *))fp; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_TLS_EXT_SRP_USERNAME_CB: ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP; ctx->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback = (int (*)(SSL *, int *, void *))fp; break; case SSL_CTRL_SET_SRP_GIVE_CLIENT_PWD_CB: ctx->srp_ctx.srp_Mask |= SSL_kSRP; ctx->srp_ctx.SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback = (char *(*)(SSL *, void *))fp; break; #endif case SSL_CTRL_SET_NOT_RESUMABLE_SESS_CB: { ctx->not_resumable_session_cb = (int (*)(SSL *, int))fp; } break; default: return 0; } return 1; } const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_id(uint32_t id) { SSL_CIPHER c; const SSL_CIPHER *cp; c.id = id; cp = OBJ_bsearch_ssl_cipher_id(&c, tls13_ciphers, TLS13_NUM_CIPHERS); if (cp != NULL) return cp; cp = OBJ_bsearch_ssl_cipher_id(&c, ssl3_ciphers, SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS); if (cp != NULL) return cp; return OBJ_bsearch_ssl_cipher_id(&c, ssl3_scsvs, SSL3_NUM_SCSVS); } const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_std_name(const char *stdname) { SSL_CIPHER *tbl; SSL_CIPHER *alltabs[] = {tls13_ciphers, ssl3_ciphers, ssl3_scsvs}; size_t i, j, tblsize[] = {TLS13_NUM_CIPHERS, SSL3_NUM_CIPHERS, SSL3_NUM_SCSVS}; /* this is not efficient, necessary to optimize this? */ for (j = 0; j < OSSL_NELEM(alltabs); j++) { for (i = 0, tbl = alltabs[j]; i < tblsize[j]; i++, tbl++) { if (tbl->stdname == NULL) continue; if (strcmp(stdname, tbl->stdname) == 0) { return tbl; } } } return NULL; } /* * This function needs to check if the ciphers required are actually * available */ const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p) { return ssl3_get_cipher_by_id(SSL3_CK_CIPHERSUITE_FLAG | ((uint32_t)p[0] << 8L) | (uint32_t)p[1]); } int ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, WPACKET *pkt, size_t *len) { if ((c->id & 0xff000000) != SSL3_CK_CIPHERSUITE_FLAG) { *len = 0; return 1; } if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, c->id & 0xffff)) return 0; *len = 2; return 1; } /* * ssl3_choose_cipher - choose a cipher from those offered by the client * @s: SSL connection * @clnt: ciphers offered by the client * @srvr: ciphers enabled on the server? * * Returns the selected cipher or NULL when no common ciphers. */ const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *s, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *srvr) { const SSL_CIPHER *c, *ret = NULL; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio, *allow; int i, ii, ok, prefer_sha256 = 0; unsigned long alg_k = 0, alg_a = 0, mask_k = 0, mask_a = 0; const EVP_MD *mdsha256 = EVP_sha256(); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *prio_chacha = NULL; #endif /* Let's see which ciphers we can support */ /* * Do not set the compare functions, because this may lead to a * reordering by "id". We want to keep the original ordering. We may pay * a price in performance during sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(), but would have to * pay with the price of sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(). */ #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Server has %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr), (void *)srvr); for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr); ++i) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(srvr, i); fprintf(stderr, "%p:%s\n", (void *)c, c->name); } fprintf(stderr, "Client sent %d from %p:\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt), (void *)clnt); for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt); ++i) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(clnt, i); fprintf(stderr, "%p:%s\n", (void *)c, c->name); } #endif /* SUITE-B takes precedence over server preference and ChaCha priortiy */ if (tls1_suiteb(s)) { prio = srvr; allow = clnt; } else if (s->options & SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE) { prio = srvr; allow = clnt; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA /* If ChaCha20 is at the top of the client preference list, and there are ChaCha20 ciphers in the server list, then temporarily prioritize all ChaCha20 ciphers in the servers list. */ if (s->options & SSL_OP_PRIORITIZE_CHACHA && sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clnt) > 0) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(clnt, 0); if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) { /* ChaCha20 is client preferred, check server... */ int num = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvr); int found = 0; for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(srvr, i); if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) { found = 1; break; } } if (found) { prio_chacha = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_reserve(NULL, num); /* if reserve fails, then there's likely a memory issue */ if (prio_chacha != NULL) { /* Put all ChaCha20 at the top, starting with the one we just found */ sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(prio_chacha, c); for (i++; i < num; i++) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(srvr, i); if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(prio_chacha, c); } /* Pull in the rest */ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(srvr, i); if (c->algorithm_enc != SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(prio_chacha, c); } prio = prio_chacha; } } } } # endif } else { prio = clnt; allow = srvr; } if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK int j; /* * If we allow "old" style PSK callbacks, and we have no certificate (so * we're not going to succeed without a PSK anyway), and we're in * TLSv1.3 then the default hash for a PSK is SHA-256 (as per the * TLSv1.3 spec). Therefore we should prioritise ciphersuites using * that. */ if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL) { for (j = 0; j < SSL_PKEY_NUM && !ssl_has_cert(s, j); j++); if (j == SSL_PKEY_NUM) { /* There are no certificates */ prefer_sha256 = 1; } } #endif } else { tls1_set_cert_validity(s); ssl_set_masks(s); } for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(prio); i++) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(prio, i); /* Skip ciphers not supported by the protocol version */ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ((s->version < c->min_tls) || (s->version > c->max_tls))) continue; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && (DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, c->min_dtls) || DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, c->max_dtls))) continue; /* * Since TLS 1.3 ciphersuites can be used with any auth or * key exchange scheme skip tests. */ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { mask_k = s->s3->tmp.mask_k; mask_a = s->s3->tmp.mask_a; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (s->srp_ctx.srp_Mask & SSL_kSRP) { mask_k |= SSL_kSRP; mask_a |= SSL_aSRP; } #endif alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* with PSK there must be server callback set */ if ((alg_k & SSL_PSK) && s->psk_server_callback == NULL) continue; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ ok = (alg_k & mask_k) && (alg_a & mask_a); #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "%d:[%08lX:%08lX:%08lX:%08lX]%p:%s\n", ok, alg_k, alg_a, mask_k, mask_a, (void *)c, c->name); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * if we are considering an ECC cipher suite that uses an ephemeral * EC key check it */ if (alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) ok = ok && tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(s, c->id); #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ if (!ok) continue; } ii = sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(allow, c); if (ii >= 0) { /* Check security callback permits this cipher */ if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SHARED, c->strength_bits, 0, (void *)c)) continue; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) if ((alg_k & SSL_kECDHE) && (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) && s->s3->is_probably_safari) { if (!ret) ret = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow, ii); continue; } #endif if (prefer_sha256) { const SSL_CIPHER *tmp = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow, ii); if (ssl_md(tmp->algorithm2) == mdsha256) { ret = tmp; break; } if (ret == NULL) ret = tmp; continue; } ret = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(allow, ii); break; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CHACHA sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(prio_chacha); #endif return ret; } int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { uint32_t alg_k, alg_a = 0; /* If we have custom certificate types set, use them */ if (s->cert->ctype) return WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->cert->ctype, s->cert->ctype_len); /* Get mask of algorithms disabled by signature list */ ssl_set_sig_mask(&alg_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK); alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && (alg_k & SSL_kGOST)) return WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLS_CT_GOST01_SIGN) && WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLS_CT_GOST12_SIGN) && WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLS_CT_GOST12_512_SIGN); #endif if ((s->version == SSL3_VERSION) && (alg_k & SSL_kDHE)) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_CT_RSA_EPHEMERAL_DH)) return 0; # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_CT_DSS_EPHEMERAL_DH)) return 0; # endif #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_DH */ } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (!(alg_a & SSL_aRSA) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_CT_RSA_SIGN)) return 0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (!(alg_a & SSL_aDSS) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_CT_DSS_SIGN)) return 0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * ECDSA certs can be used with RSA cipher suites too so we don't * need to check for SSL_kECDH or SSL_kECDHE */ if (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && !(alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN)) return 0; #endif return 1; } static int ssl3_set_req_cert_type(CERT *c, const unsigned char *p, size_t len) { OPENSSL_free(c->ctype); c->ctype = NULL; c->ctype_len = 0; if (p == NULL || len == 0) return 1; if (len > 0xff) return 0; c->ctype = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len); if (c->ctype == NULL) return 0; c->ctype_len = len; return 1; } int ssl3_shutdown(SSL *s) { int ret; /* * Don't do anything much if we have not done the handshake or we don't * want to send messages :-) */ if (s->quiet_shutdown || SSL_in_before(s)) { s->shutdown = (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN); return 1; } if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN)) { s->shutdown |= SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN; ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); /* * our shutdown alert has been sent now, and if it still needs to be * written, s->s3->alert_dispatch will be true */ if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) return -1; /* return WANT_WRITE */ } else if (s->s3->alert_dispatch) { /* resend it if not sent */ ret = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); if (ret == -1) { /* * we only get to return -1 here the 2nd/Nth invocation, we must * have already signalled return 0 upon a previous invocation, * return WANT_WRITE */ return ret; } } else if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) { size_t readbytes; /* * If we are waiting for a close from our peer, we are closed */ s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, 0, NULL, NULL, 0, 0, &readbytes); if (!(s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) { return -1; /* return WANT_READ */ } } if ((s->shutdown == (SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN)) && !s->s3->alert_dispatch) return 1; else return 0; } int ssl3_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, size_t len, size_t *written) { clear_sys_error(); if (s->s3->renegotiate) ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 0); return s->method->ssl_write_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, buf, len, written); } static int ssl3_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes) { int ret; clear_sys_error(); if (s->s3->renegotiate) ssl3_renegotiate_check(s, 0); s->s3->in_read_app_data = 1; ret = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, NULL, buf, len, peek, readbytes); if ((ret == -1) && (s->s3->in_read_app_data == 2)) { /* * ssl3_read_bytes decided to call s->handshake_func, which called * ssl3_read_bytes to read handshake data. However, ssl3_read_bytes * actually found application data and thinks that application data * makes sense here; so disable handshake processing and try to read * application data again. */ ossl_statem_set_in_handshake(s, 1); ret = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, NULL, buf, len, peek, readbytes); ossl_statem_set_in_handshake(s, 0); } else s->s3->in_read_app_data = 0; return ret; } int ssl3_read(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t len, size_t *readbytes) { return ssl3_read_internal(s, buf, len, 0, readbytes); } int ssl3_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t len, size_t *readbytes) { return ssl3_read_internal(s, buf, len, 1, readbytes); } int ssl3_renegotiate(SSL *s) { if (s->handshake_func == NULL) return 1; s->s3->renegotiate = 1; return 1; } /* * Check if we are waiting to do a renegotiation and if so whether now is a * good time to do it. If |initok| is true then we are being called from inside * the state machine so ignore the result of SSL_in_init(s). Otherwise we * should not do a renegotiation if SSL_in_init(s) is true. Returns 1 if we * should do a renegotiation now and sets up the state machine for it. Otherwise * returns 0. */ int ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL *s, int initok) { int ret = 0; if (s->s3->renegotiate) { if (!RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(&s->rlayer) && !RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer) && (initok || !SSL_in_init(s))) { /* * if we are the server, and we have sent a 'RENEGOTIATE' * message, we need to set the state machine into the renegotiate * state. */ ossl_statem_set_renegotiate(s); s->s3->renegotiate = 0; s->s3->num_renegotiations++; s->s3->total_renegotiations++; ret = 1; } } return ret; } /* * If we are using default SHA1+MD5 algorithms switch to new SHA256 PRF and * handshake macs if required. * * If PSK and using SHA384 for TLS < 1.2 switch to default. */ long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s) { long alg2; if (s->s3 == NULL || s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) return -1; alg2 = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2; if (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF) { if (alg2 == (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF)) return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 | TLS1_PRF_SHA256; } else if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK) { if (alg2 == (SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 | TLS1_PRF_SHA384)) return SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT | TLS1_PRF; } return alg2; } /* * Fill a ClientRandom or ServerRandom field of length len. Returns <= 0 on * failure, 1 on success. */ int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *result, size_t len, DOWNGRADE dgrd) { int send_time = 0, ret; if (len < 4) return 0; if (server) send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_SERVERHELLO_TIME) != 0; else send_time = (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_CLIENTHELLO_TIME) != 0; if (send_time) { unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); unsigned char *p = result; l2n(Time, p); ret = RAND_bytes(p, len - 4); } else { ret = RAND_bytes(result, len); } if (ret > 0) { if (!ossl_assert(sizeof(tls11downgrade) < len) || !ossl_assert(sizeof(tls12downgrade) < len)) return 0; if (dgrd == DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2) memcpy(result + len - sizeof(tls12downgrade), tls12downgrade, sizeof(tls12downgrade)); else if (dgrd == DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1) memcpy(result + len - sizeof(tls11downgrade), tls11downgrade, sizeof(tls11downgrade)); } return ret; } int ssl_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *pms, size_t pmslen, int free_pms) { unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; int ret = 0; if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK unsigned char *pskpms, *t; size_t psklen = s->s3->tmp.psklen; size_t pskpmslen; /* create PSK premaster_secret */ /* For plain PSK "other_secret" is psklen zeroes */ if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) pmslen = psklen; pskpmslen = 4 + pmslen + psklen; pskpms = OPENSSL_malloc(pskpmslen); if (pskpms == NULL) goto err; t = pskpms; s2n(pmslen, t); if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) memset(t, 0, pmslen); else memcpy(t, pms, pmslen); t += pmslen; s2n(psklen, t); memcpy(t, s->s3->tmp.psk, psklen); OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, psklen); s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; s->s3->tmp.psklen = 0; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, pskpms, pskpmslen, &s->session->master_key_length)) { OPENSSL_clear_free(pskpms, pskpmslen); /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } OPENSSL_clear_free(pskpms, pskpmslen); #else /* Should never happen */ goto err; #endif } else { if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->session->master_key, pms, pmslen, &s->session->master_key_length)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } } ret = 1; err: if (pms) { if (free_pms) OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); else OPENSSL_cleanse(pms, pmslen); } if (s->server == 0) { s->s3->tmp.pms = NULL; s->s3->tmp.pmslen = 0; } return ret; } /* Generate a private key from parameters */ EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_pkey(EVP_PKEY *pm) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; if (pm == NULL) return NULL; pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pm, NULL); if (pctx == NULL) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &pkey) <= 0) { EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); pkey = NULL; } err: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); return pkey; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* Generate a private key from a group ID */ EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_pkey_group(SSL *s, uint16_t id) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = tls1_group_id_lookup(id); uint16_t gtype; if (ginf == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_GENERATE_PKEY_GROUP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } gtype = ginf->flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE; if (gtype == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(ginf->nid, NULL); else pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL); if (pctx == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_GENERATE_PKEY_GROUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(pctx) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_GENERATE_PKEY_GROUP, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (gtype != TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM && EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, ginf->nid) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_GENERATE_PKEY_GROUP, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(pctx, &pkey) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_GENERATE_PKEY_GROUP, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); pkey = NULL; } err: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); return pkey; } /* * Generate parameters from a group ID */ EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_param_group(uint16_t id) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = tls1_group_id_lookup(id); if (ginf == NULL) goto err; if ((ginf->flags & TLS_CURVE_TYPE) == TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM) { pkey = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (pkey != NULL && EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, ginf->nid)) return pkey; EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); return NULL; } pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL); if (pctx == NULL) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, ginf->nid) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, &pkey) <= 0) { EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); pkey = NULL; } err: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); return pkey; } #endif /* Derive secrets for ECDH/DH */ int ssl_derive(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *privkey, EVP_PKEY *pubkey, int gensecret) { int rv = 0; unsigned char *pms = NULL; size_t pmslen = 0; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; if (privkey == NULL || pubkey == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_DERIVE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(privkey, NULL); if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(pctx) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx, pubkey) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, NULL, &pmslen) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_DERIVE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } pms = OPENSSL_malloc(pmslen); if (pms == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_DERIVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_derive(pctx, pms, &pmslen) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_DERIVE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (gensecret) { /* SSLfatal() called as appropriate in the below functions */ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { /* * If we are resuming then we already generated the early secret * when we created the ClientHello, so don't recreate it. */ if (!s->hit) rv = tls13_generate_secret(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), NULL, NULL, 0, (unsigned char *)&s->early_secret); else rv = 1; rv = rv && tls13_generate_handshake_secret(s, pms, pmslen); } else { rv = ssl_generate_master_secret(s, pms, pmslen, 0); } } else { /* Save premaster secret */ s->s3->tmp.pms = pms; s->s3->tmp.pmslen = pmslen; pms = NULL; rv = 1; } err: OPENSSL_clear_free(pms, pmslen); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); return rv; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH EVP_PKEY *ssl_dh_to_pkey(DH *dh) { EVP_PKEY *ret; if (dh == NULL) return NULL; ret = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(ret, dh) <= 0) { EVP_PKEY_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } #endif diff --git a/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/ssl/ssl_cert.c index e7feda81d046..eba96b207eee 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_cert.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_cert.c @@ -1,1024 +1,1025 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2022 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/nelem.h" #include "internal/o_dir.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/refcount.h" #include "ssl_local.h" #include "ssl_cert_table.h" #include "internal/thread_once.h" static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex); static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_x509_store_ctx_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ssl_x509_store_ctx_init) { ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0, "SSL for verify callback", NULL, NULL, NULL); return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx >= 0; } int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void) { if (!RUN_ONCE(&ssl_x509_store_ctx_once, ssl_x509_store_ctx_init)) return -1; return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx; } CERT *ssl_cert_new(void) { CERT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->key = &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA]); ret->references = 1; ret->sec_cb = ssl_security_default_callback; ret->sec_level = OPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL; ret->sec_ex = NULL; ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (ret->lock == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert) { CERT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); int i; if (ret == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->references = 1; ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - cert->pkeys]; ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (ret->lock == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) { ret->dh_tmp = cert->dh_tmp; EVP_PKEY_up_ref(ret->dh_tmp); } ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb; ret->dh_tmp_auto = cert->dh_tmp_auto; #endif for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { CERT_PKEY *cpk = cert->pkeys + i; CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i; if (cpk->x509 != NULL) { rpk->x509 = cpk->x509; X509_up_ref(rpk->x509); } if (cpk->privatekey != NULL) { rpk->privatekey = cpk->privatekey; EVP_PKEY_up_ref(cpk->privatekey); } if (cpk->chain) { rpk->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cpk->chain); if (!rpk->chain) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if (cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo != NULL) { /* Just copy everything. */ ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length); if (ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length = cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length; memcpy(ret->pkeys[i].serverinfo, cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo, cert->pkeys[i].serverinfo_length); } } /* Configured sigalgs copied across */ if (cert->conf_sigalgs) { ret->conf_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->conf_sigalgslen * sizeof(*cert->conf_sigalgs)); if (ret->conf_sigalgs == NULL) goto err; memcpy(ret->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgslen * sizeof(*cert->conf_sigalgs)); ret->conf_sigalgslen = cert->conf_sigalgslen; } else ret->conf_sigalgs = NULL; if (cert->client_sigalgs) { ret->client_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->client_sigalgslen * sizeof(*cert->client_sigalgs)); if (ret->client_sigalgs == NULL) goto err; memcpy(ret->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgslen * sizeof(*cert->client_sigalgs)); ret->client_sigalgslen = cert->client_sigalgslen; } else ret->client_sigalgs = NULL; /* Copy any custom client certificate types */ if (cert->ctype) { ret->ctype = OPENSSL_memdup(cert->ctype, cert->ctype_len); if (ret->ctype == NULL) goto err; ret->ctype_len = cert->ctype_len; } ret->cert_flags = cert->cert_flags; ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb; ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg; if (cert->verify_store) { X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->verify_store); ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store; } if (cert->chain_store) { X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->chain_store); ret->chain_store = cert->chain_store; } ret->sec_cb = cert->sec_cb; ret->sec_level = cert->sec_level; ret->sec_ex = cert->sec_ex; if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->custext, &cert->custext)) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (cert->psk_identity_hint) { ret->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(cert->psk_identity_hint); if (ret->psk_identity_hint == NULL) goto err; } #endif return ret; err: ssl_cert_free(ret); return NULL; } /* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */ void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c) { int i; if (c == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i; X509_free(cpk->x509); cpk->x509 = NULL; EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey); cpk->privatekey = NULL; sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); cpk->chain = NULL; OPENSSL_free(cpk->serverinfo); cpk->serverinfo = NULL; cpk->serverinfo_length = 0; } } void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c) { int i; if (c == NULL) return; CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&c->references, &i, c->lock); REF_PRINT_COUNT("CERT", c); if (i > 0) return; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH EVP_PKEY_free(c->dh_tmp); #endif ssl_cert_clear_certs(c); OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs); OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs); OPENSSL_free(c->ctype); X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store); X509_STORE_free(c->chain_store); custom_exts_free(&c->custext); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK OPENSSL_free(c->psk_identity_hint); #endif CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(c->lock); OPENSSL_free(c); } int ssl_cert_set0_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { int i, r; CERT_PKEY *cpk = s ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key; if (!cpk) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, sk_X509_value(chain, i), 0, 0); if (r != 1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_SET0_CHAIN, r); return 0; } } sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); cpk->chain = chain; return 1; } int ssl_cert_set1_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { STACK_OF(X509) *dchain; if (!chain) return ssl_cert_set0_chain(s, ctx, NULL); dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain); if (!dchain) return 0; if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(s, ctx, dchain)) { sk_X509_pop_free(dchain, X509_free); return 0; } return 1; } int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { int r; CERT_PKEY *cpk = s ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key; if (!cpk) return 0; r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, x, 0, 0); if (r != 1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CERT_ADD0_CHAIN_CERT, r); return 0; } if (!cpk->chain) cpk->chain = sk_X509_new_null(); if (!cpk->chain || !sk_X509_push(cpk->chain, x)) return 0; return 1; } int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(s, ctx, x)) return 0; X509_up_ref(x); return 1; } int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x) { int i; if (x == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i; if (cpk->x509 == x && cpk->privatekey) { c->key = cpk; return 1; } } for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i; if (cpk->privatekey && cpk->x509 && !X509_cmp(cpk->x509, x)) { c->key = cpk; return 1; } } return 0; } int ssl_cert_set_current(CERT *c, long op) { int i, idx; if (!c) return 0; if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_FIRST) idx = 0; else if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_NEXT) { idx = (int)(c->key - c->pkeys + 1); if (idx >= SSL_PKEY_NUM) return 0; } else return 0; for (i = idx; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i; if (cpk->x509 && cpk->privatekey) { c->key = cpk; return 1; } } return 0; } void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { c->cert_cb = cb; c->cert_cb_arg = arg; } int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) { X509 *x; int i = 0; X509_STORE *verify_store; X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_X509_num(sk) == 0)) return 0; if (s->cert->verify_store) verify_store = s->cert->verify_store; else verify_store = s->ctx->cert_store; ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0); if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, verify_store, x, sk)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); goto end; } param = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx); /* * XXX: Separate @AUTHSECLEVEL and @TLSSECLEVEL would be useful at some * point, for now a single @SECLEVEL sets the same policy for TLS crypto * and PKI authentication. */ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(param, SSL_get_security_level(s)); /* Set suite B flags if needed */ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, tls1_suiteb(s)); if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data (ctx, SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(), s)) { goto end; } /* Verify via DANE if enabled */ if (DANETLS_ENABLED(&s->dane)) X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(ctx, &s->dane); /* * We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates or * vice versa. */ X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(ctx, s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server"); /* * Anything non-default in "s->param" should overwrite anything in the ctx. */ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(param, s->param); if (s->verify_callback) X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, s->verify_callback); if (s->ctx->app_verify_callback != NULL) i = s->ctx->app_verify_callback(ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg); else i = X509_verify_cert(ctx); s->verify_result = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); sk_X509_pop_free(s->verified_chain, X509_free); s->verified_chain = NULL; if (X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(ctx) != NULL) { s->verified_chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx); if (s->verified_chain == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); i = 0; } } /* Move peername from the store context params to the SSL handle's */ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(s->param, param); end: X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx); return i; } static void set0_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free); *ca_list = name_list; } STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk) { int i; const int num = sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret; X509_NAME *name; ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_reserve(NULL, num); if (ret == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DUP_CA_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i)); if (name == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DUP_CA_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free); return NULL; } sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name); /* Cannot fail after reserve call */ } return ret; } void SSL_set0_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { set0_CA_list(&s->ca_names, name_list); } void SSL_CTX_set0_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { set0_CA_list(&ctx->ca_names, name_list); } const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get0_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->ca_names; } const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get0_CA_list(const SSL *s) { return s->ca_names != NULL ? s->ca_names : s->ctx->ca_names; } void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { set0_CA_list(&ctx->client_ca_names, name_list); } STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->client_ca_names; } void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list) { set0_CA_list(&s->client_ca_names, name_list); } const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get0_peer_CA_list(const SSL *s) { return s->s3 != NULL ? s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names : NULL; } STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s) { if (!s->server) return s->s3 != NULL ? s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names : NULL; return s->client_ca_names != NULL ? s->client_ca_names : s->ctx->client_ca_names; } static int add_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk, const X509 *x) { X509_NAME *name; if (x == NULL) return 0; if (*sk == NULL && ((*sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL)) return 0; if ((name = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL) return 0; if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk, name)) { X509_NAME_free(name); return 0; } return 1; } int SSL_add1_to_CA_list(SSL *ssl, const X509 *x) { return add_ca_name(&ssl->ca_names, x); } int SSL_CTX_add1_to_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const X509 *x) { return add_ca_name(&ctx->ca_names, x); } /* * The following two are older names are to be replaced with * SSL(_CTX)_add1_to_CA_list */ int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x) { return add_ca_name(&ssl->client_ca_names, x); } int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { return add_ca_name(&ctx->client_ca_names, x); } static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b) { unsigned char *abuf = NULL, *bbuf = NULL; int alen, blen, ret; /* X509_NAME_cmp() itself casts away constness in this way, so * assume it's safe: */ alen = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, &abuf); blen = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, &bbuf); if (alen < 0 || blen < 0) ret = -2; else if (alen != blen) ret = alen - blen; else /* alen == blen */ ret = memcmp(abuf, bbuf, alen); OPENSSL_free(abuf); OPENSSL_free(bbuf); return ret; } static int xname_sk_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) { return xname_cmp(*a, *b); } static unsigned long xname_hash(const X509_NAME *a) { return X509_NAME_hash((X509_NAME *)a); } STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file) { BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); X509 *x = NULL; X509_NAME *xn = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL; LHASH_OF(X509_NAME) *name_hash = lh_X509_NAME_new(xname_hash, xname_cmp); if ((name_hash == NULL) || (in == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file)) goto err; for (;;) { if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL) break; if (ret == NULL) { ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); if (ret == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_LOAD_CLIENT_CA_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } if ((xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err; /* check for duplicates */ xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn); if (xn == NULL) goto err; if (lh_X509_NAME_retrieve(name_hash, xn) != NULL) { /* Duplicate. */ X509_NAME_free(xn); xn = NULL; } else { lh_X509_NAME_insert(name_hash, xn); if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn)) goto err; } } goto done; err: X509_NAME_free(xn); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free); ret = NULL; done: BIO_free(in); X509_free(x); lh_X509_NAME_free(name_hash); if (ret != NULL) ERR_clear_error(); return ret; } int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, const char *file) { BIO *in; X509 *x = NULL; X509_NAME *xn = NULL; int ret = 1; int (*oldcmp) (const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b); oldcmp = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_sk_cmp); in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); if (in == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_FILE_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!BIO_read_filename(in, file)) goto err; for (;;) { if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL) break; if ((xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL) goto err; xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn); if (xn == NULL) goto err; if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0) { /* Duplicate. */ X509_NAME_free(xn); } else if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn)) { X509_NAME_free(xn); goto err; } } ERR_clear_error(); goto done; err: ret = 0; done: BIO_free(in); X509_free(x); (void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, oldcmp); return ret; } int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack, const char *dir) { OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL; const char *filename; int ret = 0; /* Note that a side effect is that the CAs will be sorted by name */ while ((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir))) { char buf[1024]; int r; if (strlen(dir) + strlen(filename) + 2 > sizeof(buf)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG); goto err; } #ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s%s", dir, filename); #else r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", dir, filename); #endif if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf)) goto err; if (!SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack, buf)) goto err; } if (errno) { SYSerr(SYS_F_OPENDIR, get_last_sys_error()); ERR_add_error_data(3, "OPENSSL_DIR_read(&ctx, '", dir, "')"); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_DIR_CERT_SUBJECTS_TO_STACK, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); goto err; } ret = 1; err: if (d) OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d); return ret; } /* Build a certificate chain for current certificate */ int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags) { CERT *c = s ? s->cert : ctx->cert; CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key; X509_STORE *chain_store = NULL; X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL, *untrusted = NULL; X509 *x; int i, rv = 0; if (!cpk->x509) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); goto err; } /* Rearranging and check the chain: add everything to a store */ if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK) { chain_store = X509_STORE_new(); if (chain_store == NULL) goto err; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(cpk->chain); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(cpk->chain, i); if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, x)) goto err; } /* Add EE cert too: it might be self signed */ if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, cpk->x509)) goto err; } else { if (c->chain_store) chain_store = c->chain_store; else if (s) chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; else chain_store = ctx->cert_store; if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED) untrusted = cpk->chain; } xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); if (xs_ctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); goto err; } /* Set suite B flags if needed */ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(xs_ctx, c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS); i = X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); if (i <= 0 && flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR) { if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR) ERR_clear_error(); i = 1; rv = 2; } if (i > 0) chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(xs_ctx); if (i <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(xs_ctx); ERR_add_error_data(2, "Verify error:", X509_verify_cert_error_string(i)); goto err; } /* Remove EE certificate from chain */ x = sk_X509_shift(chain); X509_free(x); if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_NO_ROOT) { if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 0) { /* See if last cert is self signed */ x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1); if (X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) { x = sk_X509_pop(chain); X509_free(x); } } } /* * Check security level of all CA certificates: EE will have been checked * already. */ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); rv = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, x, 0, 0); if (rv != 1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN, rv); sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); rv = 0; goto err; } } sk_X509_pop_free(cpk->chain, X509_free); cpk->chain = chain; if (rv == 0) rv = 1; err: if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK) X509_STORE_free(chain_store); X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); return rv; } int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref) { X509_STORE **pstore; if (chain) pstore = &c->chain_store; else pstore = &c->verify_store; X509_STORE_free(*pstore); *pstore = store; if (ref && store) X509_STORE_up_ref(store); return 1; } int ssl_get_security_level_bits(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int *levelp) { int level; static const int minbits_table[5 + 1] = { 0, 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 }; if (ctx != NULL) level = SSL_CTX_get_security_level(ctx); else level = SSL_get_security_level(s); if (level > 5) level = 5; else if (level < 0) level = 0; if (levelp != NULL) *levelp = level; return minbits_table[level]; } static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex) { - int level, minbits; + int level, minbits, pfs_mask; minbits = ssl_get_security_level_bits(s, ctx, &level); if (level == 0) { /* * No EDH keys weaker than 1024-bits even at level 0, otherwise, * anything goes. */ if (op == SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH && bits < 80) return 0; return 1; } switch (op) { case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED: case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SHARED: case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK: { const SSL_CIPHER *c = other; /* No ciphers below security level */ if (bits < minbits) return 0; /* No unauthenticated ciphersuites */ if (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) return 0; /* No MD5 mac ciphersuites */ if (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_MD5) return 0; /* SHA1 HMAC is 160 bits of security */ if (minbits > 160 && c->algorithm_mac & SSL_SHA1) return 0; /* Level 2: no RC4 */ if (level >= 2 && c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) return 0; /* Level 3: forward secure ciphersuites only */ + pfs_mask = SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK; if (level >= 3 && c->min_tls != TLS1_3_VERSION && - !(c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH))) + !(c->algorithm_mkey & pfs_mask)) return 0; break; } case SSL_SECOP_VERSION: if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* SSLv3 not allowed at level 2 */ if (nid <= SSL3_VERSION && level >= 2) return 0; /* TLS v1.1 and above only for level 3 */ if (nid <= TLS1_VERSION && level >= 3) return 0; /* TLS v1.2 only for level 4 and above */ if (nid <= TLS1_1_VERSION && level >= 4) return 0; } else { /* DTLS v1.2 only for level 4 and above */ if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(nid, DTLS1_2_VERSION) && level >= 4) return 0; } break; case SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION: if (level >= 2) return 0; break; case SSL_SECOP_TICKET: if (level >= 3) return 0; break; default: if (bits < minbits) return 0; } return 1; } int ssl_security(const SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other) { return s->cert->sec_cb(s, NULL, op, bits, nid, other, s->cert->sec_ex); } int ssl_ctx_security(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other) { return ctx->cert->sec_cb(NULL, ctx, op, bits, nid, other, ctx->cert->sec_ex); } int ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(int nid, size_t *pidx) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(ssl_cert_info); i++) { if (ssl_cert_info[i].nid == nid) { *pidx = i; return 1; } } return 0; } const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(const EVP_PKEY *pk, size_t *pidx) { int nid = EVP_PKEY_id(pk); size_t tmpidx; if (nid == NID_undef) return NULL; if (!ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(nid, &tmpidx)) return NULL; if (pidx != NULL) *pidx = tmpidx; return &ssl_cert_info[tmpidx]; } const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(size_t idx) { if (idx >= OSSL_NELEM(ssl_cert_info)) return NULL; return &ssl_cert_info[idx]; }